Central Europe Through the Lens of Language and Politics: On the Sample Maps from the Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe

Tomasz Kamusella, Motoki Nomachi, and Catherine Gibson (eds.)
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# Table of Contents

Tomasz Kamusella, Motoki Nomachi, and Catherine Gibson .......................... v

## Preface

### Part One: Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe: A Conceptual Framework

**Acknowledgments** ............................................................................................. 3

Yukiyasu Arai .................................................................................................... 5

- Reflecting on the Project *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly ................................................................................... 9

- Languages, Nation and States, Border and Borderlands: A Critical Assessment

Catherine Gibson ............................................................................................ 27

- Ethnolinguistic Atlases: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections

Tomasz Kamusella .......................................................................................... 35

- Language in Central Europe’s History and Politics: From the Rule of *cuius regio, eius religio* to the National Principle of *cuius regio, eius lingua*?

Tomasz Kamusella .......................................................................................... 55

- The Concept of the *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*

Michael Moser ................................................................................................ 75

- A Few Words on Tomasz Kamusella’s *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*

### Part Two: Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe: The Sample Maps

Tomasz Kamusella .......................................................................................... 83

- The Completed Maps: Bibliographies
Tomasz Kamusella
The Completed Maps

A. The Dialect Continua Series
   A1. Dialect Continua in Central Europe, 9th Century .................. 91
   A2. Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1050 ...................... 92
   A3. Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1570 ...................... 93
   A4. Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1910 ...................... 94
   A5. Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 2009 ...................... 95

B. Maps to Be Developed into Separate Series
   B1. Linguistic Areas (Sprachbünde) in Central Europe, c 1930 ................................................................. 96
   B2. Central Europe’s Writing Systems in 2009 and the Past ...... 97

C. The Isomorphism Series
   C1. Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, c 1930 ................................................................. 98
   C3. Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 2009 ................................................................. 100

D.
   D1. Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th – 21st Centuries ................................................................. 101
   D2. List of Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th – 21st Centuries ................................................................. 102

List of Contributors ....................................................................................... 103
Preface

by

Tomasz Kamusella, Motoki Nomachi and Catherine Gibson

During the 1980s, Central Europe re-emerged as a concept of socio-political analysis in samizdat publications brought out in the region when the Cold War division of the continent into Eastern and Western Europe still stood fast. This concept of a newly found self-definition among Central Europe’s literati and dissidents was brought to the wider attention of the West in 1984 by the Czech(oslovak) writer Milan Kundera in his seminal essay published in the *New York Review of Books* (Kundera 1984). To some it was a revelation that Central Europe could be a world unto itself, while others criticized this concept as a political delusion. More nationally-minded critics also saw it as a tool for a potential renewed German domination over the region. They reiterated how during the First World War *Mitteleuropa* had been a blueprint for building an economic-cum-political bloc in Central Europe under the joint control of Germany and Austria-Hungary (Naumann 1915).

The breakup in 1989 of the Soviet bloc gave a lease of political reality to Central Europe. However, following the 1993 founding of the European Union (EU) the region’s freshly postcommunist states applied for membership in this union, seen as a synonym of the West or, more exactly, of Western Europe. The Central European wish to join the European Union was a desire to become part of Western Europe. The curiously changing membership of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) vindicates this view. Founded in 1992 by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the original member states promptly left it when they joined the EU in 2004. Nowadays, CEFTA embraces Albania, Moldova, and the post-Yugoslav states that have not joined the EU yet.

Apart from politics and wishful thinking, it appears that the difference between Central Europe and the western and eastern sections of the continent lies in the unusually high politicization of language that prevails in the region. This politicization of language in Central Europe is clearly visible in the widespread normative perception of language as the foundation of national identity and the indispensable cornerstone of any legitimate national statehood. According to this view, for a nation-state to be a proper polity it must possess its own unique national language not shared with any other state or nation. This equation of language, nation, and state has been sometimes evoked across the entire continent of Europe, but never so consistently as in Central Europe. Hence, the national language of the interwar Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (since 1929, Yugoslavia) had to be Serbo-Croatian in order to embrace and meld in the Yugoslav nation all the three ethnic groups that featured in the polity’s original name. Likewise, the protracted 1991–2008 breakup of Yugoslavia necessitated the split of Serbo-Croatian into Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian, so that each of the post-Yugoslav nation-states could be supplied with its own unique and unshared national language.
Tomasz Kamusella has researched the rise and the dynamics of this specifically Central European politics of language during the last two centuries from the vantage of political science. Motoki Nomachi has delved into the importance of extralinguistic elements in the standardization and emergence of languages in the region, especially in the Balkans. Catherine Gibson meanwhile has probed into the uses of cartography for nation and state building. In this volume, they present an interdisciplinary portrait of Central Europe in the form of an in-depth reflection on Tomasz Kamusella’s work-in-progress, *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*. This *Atlas*, by marrying the insights of history, linguistics, and social sciences, aspires to show how, especially during the last two centuries, the use of languages and scripts has evolved in Central Europe, how the political and the social have impinged on these languages and scripts, and how linguistic factors exerted influence on the social reality and politics in this part of Europe. The discussion chapters are followed by a presentation of the 11 maps (roughly a quarter of the planned total) that have already been completed.

Five maps (A1–A5) present historical changes in the use of languages through Central Europe’s history at the level of dialect continua. Map six (B1) reflects on the classification of the region’s languages in the form of linguistic areas prior to World War II. In contrast to the purely linguistic concept of dialect continuum, linguistic areas tend to take into consideration extralinguistic features such as political and social changes and events. Map seven (B2) has a synoptic look at the changes in the use of different writing systems in Central Europe during the last millennium. Three further maps (C1–C3) focus squarely on how ethnolinguistic nationalism utilized language for building and legitimizing nation-states in the region during the 20th century, which brought about This process marginalized all the many languages that were not selected for these successful national projects. The last map (D1–D2, that is, consisting of two plates) is devoted to these forgotten languages and their speech communities, many of which survive to this day.

The aforementioned maps and the presentation of the project of the *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* constitute a platform for critical reflection on the work-in-progress and its methodology. For this task, we invited four specialists from Canada, Austria, Japan, and Italy (Britain) to share their thoughts on the *Atlas*. Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly first offers a general reflection on the subject of language and politics. Michael Moser delves into the assumptions and methodology of the proposed *Atlas* and offer comments and suggestions for improvement. Yukiyasu Arai reflects on the Atlas from the perspective of historical atlases. Last but not least, Catherine Gibson reflects on the topic of ethnolinguistic atlases.

In light of the findings presented in the *Atlas*, it appears that official and everyday multilingualism (or more correctly, polyglossia) and multiscriptualism (the use of many scripts) was the norm across the breadth and length of Central Europe until the age of nationalism. From the mid-19th to the mid-20th centuries, Central Europe was split among ethnolinguistic nation-states with their specific national-cum-official languages. This development did not reduce the multilingualism of Central Europe as a whole, but largely did away with polyglossia and multiscriptualism. In most cases, the aforesaid nation-states were founded as normatively monolingual entities, meaning that in a nation-state only one language is permitted and it must be written in a single script.
Until its progressive breakup between 1991 and 2007, the sole Central European polity that escaped this fate of parallel monolinguaization and monoscripturalization was federal Yugoslavia with its two official scripts (Cyrillic and Latin) and its numerous official languages (the dominant Serbo-Croatian, and alongside it, Albanian, Hungarian, Macedonian, Slovak, Slovenian, Romanian, and Rusyn). In the wake of the destructive wars of Yugoslav succession, however, the polity had been replaced by the turn of the 21st century with monolingual nation-states or national polities aspiring to such monolingualism. This development required the splitting of Serbo-Croatian into (thus far) the state languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, Serbian, and Bunjevac. Bunjevac is a community language with a semi-formal status in Serbia’s Vojvodina.

At present, only one fully recognized polity remains officially bilingual in Central Europe, defined here as the vertical midsection of the continent, namely Finland with Finnish and Swedish as its co-official languages. Furthermore, Cyrillic-based Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian are all official in the de facto polity of Transnistria. Otherwise, multilingualism is relegated in Central Europe to autonomous regions submerged within their home states, for instance, to Italy’s Trentino-Alto Adige (South Tyrol), Moldova’s Gagauzia, Serbia’s Vojvodina, or Ukraine’s Crimea. Bosnia is officially trilingual, while Kosovo enjoys two official languages. Yet, in both the aforementioned cases, it is more a case of “compartmentalized multilingualism.” Namely, in different, geographically separate areas of the state, as apportioned to this or that ethnic or national group, the languages of these groups are used to the exclusion of any other. As a result, in an officially multilingual polity, the normative monolingualism is instituted in its nationally specific regions.

When it comes multiscripturalism, only Montenegro is officially biscriptural, its official and national language of Montenegrin written in the legally equal Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. In this small way, the tradition of the biscriptural Serbo-Croatian continues, though otherwise Montenegro is officially monolingual in Montenegrin only (however, with some concessions for minority languages at the regional level). Apart from the multilingual and biscriptural autonomous Vojvodina, Serbia is officially monolingual and monoscriptural. The 2006 Constitution recognizes Cyrillic as the sole official script for writing the nation-state’s official language of Serbian. But in reality, roughly half of printed matter produced in Serbia is in Latin characters. A degree of multiscripturality in Latin and Cyrillic letters is observed in Moldavia’s autonomous Gagauzia and Ukraine’s autonomous Crimea thanks to the official use of Cyrillic- and Latin script-based languages side by side. However, in 2014 politics intervened Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea led to the gradual limitation of the use of the Crimean Tatar language that is written in the Latin alphabet.

The two aforementioned legally and de facto multilingual polities in today’s Central Europe, the bilingual Finland and the trilingual Transnistria, are fully monoscriptural, the latter employing exclusively Cyrillic and the former the Latin alphabet. This again leaves the multiscriptural Bosnia and Kosovo as a category in its own right. Regionally-based official monolingualism in different languages, as observed in the two polities is complemented by a similar spatial compartmentalization of scripts. Only one
script, in which a given official language is written, is employed in a specific nationally construed autonomous area of Bosnia or Kosovo. These two officially multilingual and biscriptural polities, practice de facto monolingualism and monoscripturalism in their nationally delineated autonomous regions.

For better or worse, nationally construed monolingualism and monoscripturalism are the political norm of today’s Central Europe of ethnolinguistic nation-states. For a polity to be deemed a “true” nation-state in the region, it must be a home to one nation only, this nation composed from—ideally, all—the speakers of a given national language. And in turn, this language must be written in a single script, which is emotionally deemed as “true” to the language’s national and historic character. Until today, the borders and territories of nation-states have been drawn and redrawn in Central Europe in agreement with this principle.

Sapporo, February 2017
Revised: St Andrews, Sapporo, Florence, March 2017

A NOTE ON THE TEXT

Readers should bear in mind that the majority of texts in this volume were written in 2009, hence new relevant developments from the period 2009–2017 are not covered in this book.

REFERENCES


Part One:
Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe: A Conceptual Framework
Acknowledgments

First of all, the volume’s co-editors, Tomasz Kamusella, Motoki Nomachi, and Cathe-
rine Gibson, wish to thank the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center at Hokkaido University
for making this volume possible. We hope that it may facilitate the completion of Atlas of
Language Politics in Modern Central Europe and significantly add to the scholarly and
cartographic quality and accurateness of this work-in-progress. We also extend a word of
our gratitude to the volume’s other contributors, whose commentary essays on the Atlas
help us see the project’s strengths and weaknesses, so that we could build on the former
and ameliorate the latter.

The project, Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe, as conceived
and initially conducted by Tomasz Kamusella, was launched in the academic year
2008/2009, in Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, thanks to a Research Funding Initiative
grant from the Long Room Hub, and a Start-up grant from Trinity College’s Research
and Innovation. A word of thanks also goes to Moray McGowan and Jason McElligott in
Trinity’s Long Room Hub for their sustained encouragement and support.

An idea of this Atlas budded in the wake of the publication of Kamusella’s exten-
sive monograph The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe
(Palgrave 2009). The cartographic presentation of his findings from this work should
make them more readily available to general public, due to the attractive and succinct
form.

The funding, which Kamusella could allocate from the two aforementioned grants
for map-making, was not sufficient to entice any cartographer in Ireland to under-
take such a commission. Fortunately, courtesy of the common market ensured by the
enlarged European Union, Kamusella was allowed to commission the experienced car-
tographer, Robert Chmielewski, based in Warsaw, Poland (as usefully recommended
by the renowned Polish historian, Jerzy Tomaszewski). Stretching every cent available,
Kamusella managed to complete eleven maps. Then, not able to stop himself in tracks,
from his own pocket he paid for the drawing of another, twelfth, map Non-State Minor-
ity, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe,
19th – 21st Centuries, followed by its map-size legend.

Furthermore, Kamusella wishes also to thank A. D., Trinity College, for kindly
agreeing to proof read the completed maps. Her meticulousness and close attention paid
to detail let Kamusella and Robert Chmielewski improve these maps considerably.

Kamusella believes that one cannot speak about languages as a socio-political phe-
nomenon without making them somewhat more tangible by the way of illustrations. In
the case of this Atlas-in-making, his illustrations of choice are title (and sometimes sam-
ple) pages of authoritative or first grammars and dictionaries of the covered languages, and also of unique books and publications in these languages marking the beginning or end of a certain salient tendency.

Numerous illustrations were originally gathered to accompany this volume. Unfortunately, they could not be included due to the cost. Nevertheless Kamusella wishes to thank the following persons and institutions for their help in locating and securing these illustrations: Ahmet Alibašić, Asmir Aljić, Nidzara Beganovic, the staff of the Center for Advanced Studies, and the Gazi Husrev-beg Library staff in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Antonis Maratheftis, Cyprus Library, Nicosia, Cyprus; the Estonian National Library staff, Tallinn; the National Library of Finland staff, Helsinki / Helsingfors; the National Library of Romania staff, Bucharest; and the Steven Spielberg Digital Yiddish Library, Amherst MA, USA.

In the absence of clear-cut grants that could be utilized for scholarly map-making, Kamusella already presented the completed maps to specialists and scholars interested in the subject matter. First, in the scope of the two following lectures: ‘A Steel Hand in a Kid Glove: Language in Modern Central Europe’ (Long Room Hub, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland) in October 2009, and ‘Language and Politics in Postcommunist Europe’ (Eastern Europe after 1989: The 7th Lewis Glucksman Memorial Symposium, Long Room Hub, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland) in December the same year. Later in December 2009, these were followed by two overview presentations of the Atlas held in December 2009 in the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan and at the seminar organized by the Japan Society for the Study of Slavic Languages and Literatures (former Japan Society for the West Slavic Studies). Last but not least, a small exhibition of the maps also took place in the aforementioned Slavic Research Center. The serendipity of Kamusella’s visit to Japan, on the kind invitation of Motoki Nomachi at the Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, was such that it swiftly led to our cooperation and thus made this volume possible.

Our hope is that making the completed maps available to a wider public and discussing what they intend to represent may contribute to attracting more funds for completing the project. In his email letter of 12 March 2009 to Kamusella, the doyen of British historians, Eric J. Hobsbawm, wrote “Thank you for sending me the material on your proposed Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe. [...] It seems clear to me that your proposed Atlas will be of enormous interest and value.” We trust then that with generous advice and help of our colleagues and grant-making institutions we will be able to meet Hobsbawm’s generous prediction.
Reflecting on the Project *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*

Yukiyasu Arai

*The Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* is a very interesting project that will try to portray the linguistic order of Central Europe using new approaches and methods. Its aim is to offer “a synthetic insight into the mechanisms and history of how languages have been made, unmade and deployed for political action in the age of nationalism (19th – 21st centuries).”

This interdisciplinary Atlas is unique in its approach and scope. When I was in high school in a small town in the north-west of the United States, I found a European historical atlas in the town library. It did not touch on linguistic matters at all, being a straightforward historical atlas. But, I still clearly recollect that among the maps included in this atlas there was one that showed the language situation in Europe during the 18th or 19th centuries. Scanning this map carefully, I spotted the color of the German language on the banks of the Volga river. This made me think about how these people had got there in the first place. In due course, I discovered that they came from the Holy Roman Empire at the invitation of Empress Catherine II. A good map has the capacity to surprise readers by highlighting the presence of certain phenomena in places where we would not expect them to be. A clear answer and deeper explanation of such surprises can only be found in an accompanying explanatory text or in another book. Hence, I predict that the project under discussion, when it has finally yielded the promised Atlas, will offer rewarding surprises not only to high school students, but to scholars as well. These surprises stand a good chance of translating into a renewed impetus for sociolinguistic research on history and social changes in Central Europe.

A map, as Benedict Anderson famously proposed, enables people to imagine the world. If a map represents a delimited territory, this depiction provides users from among this territory’s inhabitants with a heightened sense of belonging to the place made visible through cartography. People begin to see this territory as their own, while those living outside it come to be perceived as “Others.” All boundaries inscribed onto a map cannot avoid making this kind of distinction. Maps also work for a particular ideology. If a map draws a territory of a nation larger than the territory it presently occupies, it gives rise to the feeling among some readers, especially for people belonging to the nation in question, that they have lost something and it needs to be restored. It is not easy to make...
any map neutral, since it may, consciously or unconsciously, benefit one group and harm the interests of others.

Also, the maps of modern times do not contain empty spaces. People cannot live without space; however, it does not mean that all land belongs to someone. White space simply makes us feel uncomfortable, even if it exists in reality. We should understand that this type of modern mindset was formed during our schooling, when we are trained to read a map and form expectations of what a map should look like.

The world is changing and so is the way we draw maps of the world. The way the Ancient Greeks looked at the world used to be very influential. Looking at a historical map of the world, European scholars still exaggerate the role of the Greeks in the other parts of the world. I always doubted European maps which, in my view, attributed too much space to Greek colonies (painted in colors), such as in the maps of “Dialect continua in Central Europe, 9th century” and “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c. 1050,” specifically with regards to the Crimean Peninsula and Anatolia. Rulers in these areas might have used Greek as the official language or even lingua franca, but how can we know that all those who lived there spoke Greek? The border between Greeks and others was not totally controlled and did not prevent migration. Especially in the case of Anatolia, I always wondered how people absorbed Turkic languages so quickly after the Seljuk Empire and Ottomans took hold the territory. In the study by the linguist Gou’ichi Kojima, he found many little-known languages during his fieldwork in Anatolia in the 1970s–1990s, in both the eastern and western parts. I do not think these languages came to Anatolia during the time of Ottoman rule, but some of them date back to old times. The Turkish government will never admit the existence of these languages, but you can find these living languages in the region (if the people are willing to speak out). In this context, the atlas needs to take special care with regards to politics. It is very easy to say, “we will make an atlas of the Armenian genocide,” which is another political question which European scholars love to discuss in one dimension or another, but from a sociolinguistic point of view, casting light on ignored languages seems to be more valuable. For this reason, if possible, I would strongly recommend that Gou’ichi Kojima to join the project to contribute a map of Anatolia, both in the past and in modern times, to make the atlas more vivid and more interesting.

Speaking of languages used by those people who ruled and were ruled, the atlas seems to make other confusions, similar to that which I described earlier in relation to Greek in Anatolia and Crimea. For instance, the legendary King Rurik, who is said to be a Viking, came from the north. He and some of his decedents supposedly could not speak Slavic but they ruled the Slavic-speaking area inhabited by Bulgars of Bulgarian Empire, who are said to be originally Turkic people. The original Bulgars are said to have been quickly absorbed into the Slavic people so that Turkic language features disappeared at quite an early stage during its formation. However, they continued to have some impact, comparable to the case of England after the Norman conquest. The development of Romanian, of course, would be a very interesting case too.

The formation of states in Europe was intertwined as the rulers of Europe intermarried one another. As a result, I wonder how the atlas will reflect the entangled relationship of European rulers’ claims to the sovereignty of their remote domains.
The House of Habsburg is a famous case, in which Sicily, Spain, the Netherlands, and Austria were once ruled by one King. In what language did a new king speak with his subjects when he moved from another place, for example Sigismund (1368–1437) who became a king of Luxemburg first, then Hungary and Holy Roman Empire, and finally Bohemia. Or Sigmund III (1566–1632) who first became King of Poland-Lithuania (1587) and then of Sweden (1594) and many other places. Do the kings and their followers have any impact on language politics or is it outside of the scope of this atlas?

The dynamic changes to the vernaculars in the region were brought about by the relations between languages. For this reason, the atlas pays special attention to language contacts and linguistic areas. The attempt made in this atlas is very important and significant, but the influence of the linguistic hierarchy between rulers and the ruled, I would argue, had an even greater impact on language dynamics, especially for the formation of a language. However, the atlas seems to leave this question out of its scope. Partly, this is because it is simply very difficult to show these language hierarchies on the map. An idea that might be worth pursuing is to create a digital version of the atlas, to enable viewers to select different topic-based layers to make them appear and disappear on the map, such as information on minorities, linguistic areas, movements of the king and aristocrats, and so on. For the printed version, different themed sheets of polyester film could be used to overlay the base map.

History is a very important component of this project, but so far it is not so clear why the atlas starts in the 9th century and goes to from 11th to 19th centuries. There are many historical events to consider, such as the year 1848, which some scholars consider the start of modern history (other scholars think that the end of Thirty Years War was the beginning of modern history, as well as “international relations” in politics). It is likely that more maps are planned for the final atlas. Hopefully, the historically-important years of 1648 and 1848 will feature in the completed atlas to make the atlas attractive to historians as well.

There is also a technical problem in the map of “Non-state minority, regional and unrecognized languages, and written dialects in Central Europe, 19th to 21st centuries,” which puzzled me. One of the reasons that I was confused was that I could not see the difference at first glance what the notes on the map were trying to say: “2 Latgalian, Language name” and in next line “7 Osmanlıca, Extinct or Declining Language.” I had to think for several minutes before figuring out that 7 Osmanlıca is in italics. Moreover, in the map, only the numbers are shown and it was very hard for me to distinguish between 7 in italic and 7 in non-italic. Therefore, I would suggest more visible differentiation of the numbers on the map.

On the same map, it will also be interesting to see how the map will deal with minorities who moved from one place to another. Terry Martin described how Poles, amongst others, in Soviet Union moved from borderlands to inner areas in his magnificent book *The Affirmative Action Empire* (2001), which also describes how this experience was later used for massive deportations from one place to another within Soviet territory in the case of Germans, Kalmyks, Chechens, and so on. In an extreme case, Turkey and Greece agreed to exchange their people in 1923 according to belief (Islam or Christianity) and regardless of the language they spoke. After this event, Muslims
who spoke Greek in Turkey and Christians who spoke Turkish in Greek appeared. Will this map reflect these population movements and impact as well?

Since the first birthday present that I requested from my parents at the age of three was a puzzle of the map of Japan, the maps in the Atlas attract me very much. So, putting all the above comments aside, I am very much looking forward to see the result of this project. As I outlined at the beginning, maps have the power to present a new image of the world and tell interesting stories. Hopefully some part of my comments will be reflected on in the completed Atlas.
Languages, Nation and States, Border and Borderlands: A Critical Assessment

Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly

INTRODUCTION

Examining the role of languages in shaping borders and borderlands offers fundamental insights into nation and state formations. In particular, languages themselves may act as agents of bordering processes and borderland formations, along with other concurrent mechanisms that may have been used by states to mark borders. As is evidenced in Tomasz Kamusella’s work-in-progress, and this Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe, the role of language in shaping border and borderland processes is neither historically nor culturally constant. And, as this essay argues, this role appears to be currently undergoing significant transformation.

Indeed, this Atlas is of great use to borders and borderlands scholars because it documents the history of Central European languages and discusses the tug-of-war between a state of dialect continua, that is a linguistic continuum across Central Europe, and that of isomorphism, suggesting a tight overlap between language, state, and nation. In particular, from the perspective of border scholars this Atlas sheds light on whether language is structural or of the domain of agents in the praxis of statehood, state border, and borderland formation.

As suggested in this introduction of this volume, the progressive disappearance of a continuum made up of a multitude of dialects “without borders,” but yet unifying and separating all the people, communities, and regions of Central Europe, is a process that started in the 19th century and is closely related to the concurrent nationalistic ideology of European states and empires. It is best exemplified with the post 1919 creation of Yugoslavian language (Serbo-Croato-Slovenian) in former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia (Czech and Slovak) in former Czechoslovakia when both countries were formed. What is significant, at the time, is the prominence language played in legitimizing statehood, something that is now being undone.

On the contrary to this history, in the contemporary period most educated individuals speak some English not for identity’s sake, but rather for convenience. An example

1 From now on “The Atlas.”
is the rise to linguistic supremacy of English following years of domination of French across all European Union (EU) institutions. Today, French has lost its status as working language of the EU, yet it is not for reasons of identity or culture. It is simply that public officials of all EU institutions conduct most of their business in English; it is remarkable because the European Union does not have a language policy per se, but has only determined to limit the number of European tongues used and translated for the purpose of European Union business to 20 official languages.

Another contemporary and equally striking example is that more Chinese people are learning to speak English than there are students of the English language in the whole of Europe. Are there political or border-related implications for the European Union or for Chinese anglophiles? Probably no obvious ones because the evolution of languages may be too complex to be perfectly correlated to politics, but there is a history of languages that is deeply rooted to identity and nation formation, and state development, that was fundamental to early 19th and early 20th century discourses, and particularly to Western and Central European political discourses. Borders and languages then started to form spaces of national belonging, and were perceived as mechanisms of both inclusion and exclusion; a new idea then. Indeed, in general, people who spoke a specific language belonged to a community but with unclear links to a specific identity or national belonging, and sometimes even to a specific state; this is much less the case today.

While reviewing some of the assumptions and findings of the Atlas, this essay discusses in turn the linguistic dimensions of nationality and statehood, the linguistic dimensions of state borders and borderland formations, and the implication of the Atlas’s findings for our social scientific understanding of borders and borderlands. The material presented in this chapter suggests that, as documented by this Atlas, while language isomorphism has become prominent in central European countries such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo, and is therefore prominent across most European states, and certainly most states members of the European Union, in a parallel process, over the last quarter century, language has been displaced as a fundamental and defining attribute of nationality and citizenship by a complex of embedded attributes that open or close borders to their carriers.

### The Linguistic Dimensions of Nationality and Statehood

Historically, language has been one of the defining attributes of nationality and statehood. It was, in 19th century Europe, almost a visible attribute, and certainly a visibly defining characteristic of a people or a nation; as evidenced by, for instance, the policies regarding language grammar books and maps that were central tools of nation and state building. These were policies of a few important states and empires but, as documented in this Atlas, these were “competing” with nearly 150 spoken minority, regional languages and written dialects alive throughout Central Europe (see in this book the maps on “Non-State
Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th – 21st Centuries” and the “List of Non State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th – 20th Centuries.”

The idea that language matters to nations and to states has its roots in the works of German Romantics of the early part of the 19th century. At the forefront of these Romantics was Herder, for instance, who assumed that language was the authentic expression of an original culture, which allowed individuals to express profound sentiments and where tongue and soul met in cultural representation. Tony Judt and Denis Lacorne suggest that his followers A. W. Schlegel and J. G. Fichte further expanded this linkage from soul to language to culture. In “Discourse to the German Nation” (1808) Fichte probably articulated best this form of Romantic linguistic nationalism in his expressed disappointment that German people did not have a common political history like the French. Instead, he asserted that their “unique asset” was their common and primitive tongue, German. Schlegel’s contention that the German language was purer than all other continental European languages, which had emerged from the various regional languages across Europe and resulted from bastardisations of Latin, made a forceful impact then. His contemporary, Fichte, saw in German a primordial and defining element of the German people as well. He suggested that the German language helped Germans become a modern united people who were able to embrace the values of the Enlightenment of justice, individual rights, and equality.

Germany, however, is an exception in that it is a federal state that is also monolingual. Indeed, it would be very difficult to argue that the borders of other federal states, such as Belgium, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, and the United States, or even unitary states, such as France or the United Kingdom, are fundamental expressions of their unique cultural and linguistic origins. Indeed, these are examples of multilingual and multicultural states, but France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, are also examples of states where a dominant culture is conveyed by one language only, both in schools and in the media. And most laws, regulations, and public debates take place in those dominant languages only.

Subsequent debates have questioned this Romantic link from soul to language and culture to nation and statehood. Meinecke, for instance, suggested that a common language may lead to a dominant culture—a political culture, primarily sustained by a pre-existing language. Renan, on the contrary, argued then that solidarity was the founding factor in the formation of political nations. He also contended that nations resulted from the historically reaffirmed desire to “live together.” For Renan the role of language, or for that matter, the role of race, religion, ethnicity, or a community

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of interests, is irrelevant; Renan’s best example were the UK and the USA, or Spain and South American states, which share a language but were not nations. What was missing, in his view, was the “will to be together” in the sense also used by Arendt that politics is the “will to act together,” where past choices are actualized daily.7

It is as a result of those romantic and national utopias of the 19th century that certain languages in the 1900 were re-asserted by governments to serve identity, nationalist, and state goals. In some countries, by the turn of the 20th century there were fully fledged linguistic policies that informed nationalist politics and lasted until the later part of last century. Many regions or communities of Europe had their own language in the early part of the 19th century, but it is the nationalistic awakening for instance of Hungary, Greece, or the Baltic countries, and others around them, that led to the discovery and assertion of specific national languages, nations, and states during the 20th century. Clearly, it is the works of folklorists and grammarians, then, which was fundamental to the affirmation of certain national languages, while in the process other local or regional tongues were slowly disappearing. A prototypical example is France, where Oc and Oil languages divided the land along a north-south invisible line running from the city of Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast to the city of Basel in the Franco-German-Swiss borderlands region. Within the Oc language (southern) region, local tongues such as Languedocian, Provencal, or Catalan seemed to have nearly vanished by the end of the second part of the 20th century. In other words, history shows us that there is no inevitable relationship between language and nation, or language and state, because language has to be claimed, produced, and disseminated explicitly as a nation and/or state making tool in order for it to function as such. During the 19th century, there was an ideology of one language and one nation, but there are nations and states that are multi-linguistic.

Furthermore, what is arguable, as is demonstrated in the works of Ferdinand Brunot, namely the “History of the French Language and Literature,” is that the 19th and early 20th century emergence of the national French language is built up upon vanquished and demeaned regional tongues, but it is also possible that the domination of French only crept in very progressively as other regional languages were possibly spoken but not written as much, and also possibly progressively taught less as well.8 In the case of France, this process is documented with the generalization and mandatory schooling of children, that actually led to the progressive imposition of French as the dominant primary school language in France by Minister Jules Ferry in 1879. The imposition of French in primary schools opened the door then to a progressive imposition of a unique language to a nation in the making. French, however, did not suddenly impose itself, but only very progressively replaced regional and local patois and other dialects; for a lengthy period of time French communal schools were unofficially bilingual in most regions, with the possible exception of the Île-de-France region. Patois, however, were still spoken in the late 1970s and since then have re-emerged as

many vectors of regional identity formation in Brittany, Alsace, Catalonia, Corsica, Languedoc, and Provence, for instance, where they are re-appearing in high school curriculum since the decentralization laws of the 1980s that downloaded aspects of education policies to newly formed French regions.

More broadly, today across the European Union (EU), people speak national and regional languages; indeed, although there are about 35 national languages, many are overlapping and used in more than two countries, as well as across EU member-states, and a large number are local and regional languages. Overall, Europeans speak German (24%), French (16%), English (16%), Italian (16%), Spanish (11%), Dutch (6%), Greek (3%), Portuguese (3%), Swedish (2%), Danish (1%), and Finnish (1%). However interestingly, according to Euromosaic, a European Commission-sponsored research project on EU minority languages, there are over 48 minority languages in the EU-12 member-states of the 1980s and 1990s. And while the number of minority languages recognized by the European Commission is much smaller than the nearly 150 documented in this Atlas, research-in-progress has suggested about 90 minority communities where language is the defining feature of ethnic identity across the current EU’s 27 member-states.

Indeed, the most common language is English. English is the mother tongue for 16% of the European population, but a further 31% of EU citizens speak it well enough to hold a conversation. The second most-spoken language is German, the mother tongue for 24% of EU citizens and spoken as a second language by another 8% of EU citizens. French comes in third, with 28% of the EU population speaking French. Italian is fourth, spoken by 16% of the EU population, while Spanish is spoken by 15% of the population. Apart from their mother tongue, about 75% of people in the Netherlands, 77% of those in Denmark, and 75% of those in Sweden can speak English well enough to take part in a conversation. In Luxembourg, 86% of people are likely to speak French well enough to take part in a conversation; in Belgium, this is the case for 38% of the population. In Luxembourg, 77% of people who do not consider German their mother tongue can speak it well enough to take part in a conversation. Other countries where many people know German are the Netherlands (59%) and Denmark (49%). Compared to their mother tongues, 9

9 Armenian, Bulgarian, Croatian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, Flemish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Roma, Romanian, Ruthenian, Sami, Serbian, Slovenian, Slovakian, Slovene, Spanish, Swedish, Ukrainian.

10 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom, Greece.

11 See in this book the map “The List on Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe, 19th – 21st Centuries.”

to 1990, the proportion of people who can speak English well enough to take part in a conversation has increased in most member-states. The largest increases took place in the Netherlands (15%), Greece (13%), and Belgium, Denmark, and Italy (9%). Finally, when asked what two languages they find most useful in addition to their mother tongue, 69% of the EU respondents answered English, 37% French, and 26% German.

This linguistic diversity led the European Union to limit the number of official languages to 20; with 20 official languages, the Union assumed that language will never be a barrier for EU-published legal documents. This diversity is an important aspect of the EU’s social and cultural dimension, and it is striking that so many citizens of Europe speak so many languages, although 47% speak only their mother tongue and English. Also, while language is a significant feature of the culture of cross-border regions, it is important to underline that it is not related to the emergence of cross-border regions in the European Union. Indeed, there were very few cross-border regions prior to the 1980s, and those were multi-linguistic cross-border communities. Indeed, what the above points to is a possible period of revival of regional and local languages; Catalonia is such an example, where living and speaking Catalan is necessary in public life—even if you are not originally from Catalonia—as demonstrated by René Pujol, the regionalist leader of Catalonia, born in Andalusia, but a strong defendant of Catalan language. In other words, language is still an attribute of nationality, but it is being challenged by the diversity of languages spoken by Europeans today. Indeed, more than half of Europeans speak more than two languages. All in all, the identity of the European Union is not based on a single language, but on the strength of multiple languages. In the 1990s, for instance, the European commissioner for Social Affairs, Padraig Flynn, claimed that “Europe’s strength lies in its ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity.”

In brief, the above illustrates the strength of the agency of language, the influence of language policy in the complex processes of identity formation, and the linkages to nation building and to statehood development, where language undeniably plays an important role. What the above points toward is the strong and clear link from nation-building to language policy; what is less clear is the linkage from language to nation and to statehood that is the very praxis documented by this Atlas, linking the Dialect Continua to the Isomorphism of Language in Central Europe. Indeed, what remains at stake is to link nationalist language policy to the bordering process and policies of states, a historical development that is fundamentally structural where established states, kingdoms, and empires mutually recognize their peers in the international world system, but where the linguistic attribute or attributes of those constituting units of the international world system are nearly irrelevant, as argued below.

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13 The 20 official languages are: Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish. Irish is an official (treaty) language and became a full working language on January 1, 2007.

THE LINGUISTIC DIMENSION OF STATE BORDERS AND BORDERLAND FORMATIONS

Much more so than language or languages, it is clear that originally, it is borders that are fundamental to the existence of the era of the modern state order, because borders delineate the territorial possessions of princes, kings, and emperors. It is also because an overarching international legal system, grounded in the 1648 peace of Westphalia, established a world order where kingdoms and empires recognised each others’ sovereign use of violence over and within a given territory.

Delineations as dotted lines of inclusion or exclusions are profoundly entrenched into the human psyche; indeed, delineations—in the forms of borders, boundaries, frontiers, and borderlands are discussed in most ethical/religious traditions. Jewish, Christians, Confucian, Islamic, and Liberal traditions, however, differ on how to ascertain borders; settlement may be acceptable, and purchase, inheritance, and secession are also issues of contention. What is clearly unacceptable is conquest. Yet, it is conquest that best explains the establishment of borders, for instance, between Rome and the rest of the world. Limites made of stone or turf delineated the Roman Empire and organized it according to spatial hierarchies where cities, provinces, and regions played an important role within those Roman borders.

It is during the Middle Ages that borderlands emerged as a rather vague system of spatial organization that was primarily connected to the control of cities and their immediate regions, alliances between fiefdoms, and where borderlands were the rather unclear zones of differentiations between those areas. This was a historical period where borderlands were particularly fluid and were really only zones of transitions between settled communities; these were not unlike the many languages and written dialects documented by this Atlas, where thirteen languages families (Albanian, Baltic, Finno-Ugric Finnic, Finno-Ugric Ugrian, Germanic, Greek, Indic, East and West Romance, Semitic, North and South Slavic, and Turkic) link and divide Central Europe, but rarely actually follow the boundary lines of established states in the 19th and 20th centuries. The writing systems found in Central Europe, for instance, include Runes that are present in most of the Nordic states but also the Lovat’ and Dnieper valleys, as far inside continental Central Europe as Kyiv in Ukraine. Similarly, Armenian is present in Kyiv in Ukraine, and also in Lublin, Poland, Belgrade, Serbia, and half of Turkey from Istanbul to Ankara and south to Konya. Hebrew is also found in Estonia, Lithuania, Belarus, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bosnia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece. But, none of those follow state boundaries and fulfill any language isomorphism in any period detailed in this Atlas.

The international recognition of boundaries is a marker of the nascent modern political order that resulted from the peace of Westphalia of 1648, a treaty that established the boundaries of sovereign and territorially demarcated states, and brought together England, France, Dutch-land, German Princedoms, Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, 

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15 See the map in the Atlas “Central Europe’s Writing Systems in 2009 and in the Past.”
Spain, and Sweden. This treaty marked a new era of nation-state building and of nationalism. From Westphalia onward, Kingdoms, Empires, and then States progressively implemented nation-building policies without accommodating for local and regional identities and cultures in borderland regions.

In the same vein, the idea of the frontier captures the challenge that borderlands pose to nation-states. Indeed, the idea of frontier emerged in the earlier 20th century with the works of the great American historian Frederick Jackson Turner, *The Frontier in American History* (1920), a book describing the culture emerging from the progressive invasion and settlement of the North American continent by European and Asian immigrants. The frontier characterizes a cultural borderland where settlers are advancing across lands and, as they are transforming the land, they are progressively also being transformed by it. Turners’ views have been used to qualify the north frontier of China, for instance, and the German Bohemia language frontier with Czechs.

The Westphalia world order remains central to our understanding of territorial authority because it underscores the authority states have to regulate all other types of authority top-down and it is an internationally recognized system, where a set number of territorial units divide people and nations, and where the recognition by other states forms the basis of a stable international relation system. This conception of the world was stable until the 1919 Treaty of Paris, where George Clemenceau, David Lloyd George, and Woodrow Wilson, redistributed authority the world over so as to serve their imperial powers and possibly prevent another great war. However, a new and disturbing, yet unclear, idea was presented by the president of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, when he suggested that people’s self-determination should affect fundamental decisions. Despite being the watchword at the Paris conference, self-determination only became one of the principles organizing the international world system thirty years later during the arduous deconstruction of the great nationalist empires that had emerged during the 19th century (British, French, Prussian, Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and of the United States). It is during those years, in between the two great wars, that self-determination and a certain understanding of what nations are, that crept into politics and fuelled some of the most ignominious discussions and conflicts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Indeed, because language was perceived as one of the keys to nationhood, some states, kingdoms, and empires instituted policies of one language, one nation, and forcefully implemented linguistic claims. But others did not; hence, Belgium and Switzerland established their identity despite their linguistic diversity, and Germany and Austria also developed distinct national identities despite the same language.

This idea of self-determination was a turning point in the stability of the Westphalia world order because it brought back nations and people in international relations and, for instance, the number sovereign countries expanded from 51 present at the first General Assembly of the United Nations in 1945, to 194 in 2007. Obviously, despite

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being rather vague, the idea of self-determination had to do with the rediscovery of people and nations, and about the very nature of those people and nation’s culture, and possibly of other attributes such as religion, and ethnic and regional belonging, and indeed also language. Woodrow Wilson suggested fourteen points that underscored the importance of the freedom nations should have to determine the nature and institutions that would represent them in the international system, a system that would guarantee their political independence and territorial integrity whether these nations formed a large or a small state. Obviously, central to the success of each nascent new country was their international recognition and that of their borders.

During the first part of the 20th century, scholarship on borders and frontiers focused on land settlement: ideal boundaries are not settled because they are geographical sites where humans cannot settle.\(^{18}\) Similarly, Holdich and Lyde categorize boundaries according to their merits in nurturing or restraining tensions between settled communities, and possibly wars between states.\(^ {19}\) Boundaries can have a function: for instance, Brigham suggests they may provide economic balance, while Boggs argues that their role that may vary in time and space to minimize tensions between states.\(^ {20}\) Furthermore, Spykman brings back borderlands as places bound to limit power relations across boundaries, while Peattie and Jones suggest that borders are about state power, but that international organizations have a role in limiting tensions.\(^ {21}\)

All in all, borders delineated sovereign spaces as determined by the peace of Westphalia. During the Middle Ages, they were primarily about mediating spaces. More recently, they were about buffering spaces. What is striking, however, is the limited discussion about the perception and role of borderland communities as organized polities with their own distinct culture and language. Yet, it is notable that students of nationalist movements, i.e. movements that since the Treaty of Paris 1919 have contested the hegemony of kingdoms, empires, and other central governments, which in some instances are nation-states (such as France), and reasserted such attributes as identity—ethnic, religious, cultural or linguistic—to the original nature of local-regional political institutions. Indeed, the very nature of internationally-defined bound-

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aries depends on their local political and cultural influence and their level of activism. For instance, Keating argues that stateless nations are affirmed and affirming. Indeed, these movements are often bounded to a specific territory, but their identity may also result from a specific combination of language and religion or ethnicity.\(^\text{22}\) In highly nationalistic and centralized states, it is not unusual to see the emergence of pluri-national, fluid, yet affirmed communities, such as Basques, Catalans, Provencal, Bretons, Normans, Walloons, or Flemish people, among others, who change the nature of the border policies and the borderland politics. The unifying and symbolic, yet dividing and exclusionary, role of borders may be undermined by stateless nations that perforate and weaken the integrity of state borders because of their reasserted national characteristics, whether they are ethnic, religious, social, economic, or linguistic.

According to Tony Judt’s \textit{Postwar}, an outstanding history of post-World War II Europe, two important events in the history of Europe have resulted in profound transformations of boundaries, borders, and borderlands. The first was when negotiation and international agreements over European borders culminated in the Treaty of Paris of 1919, the second episode takes place in 2004–2007, just prior to the expansion of the European Union to include the former Soviet bloc Central European states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.\(^\text{23}\) It is important to note that the role of language in mediating these border disputes and debates changed quite profoundly during the intervening years. Margaret Macmillan underscores that both languages and maps were used by Poles, Czechs and Slovaks during the 1919 Paris negotiations, when aggrandized regional maps and linguistic claims were made on borderlands.\(^\text{24}\) This is also documented by Caitlin Murdock in \textit{Changing Places} regarding the Saxon-Bohemian borderlands.\(^\text{25}\) But during the 2004–07 negotiation mediated by the European Commission, language becomes irrelevant; instead, what is at stake is integration into the European Union and boundary settlements, a non-negotiable issue. The European Supreme court stepped in to resolve the most complex cases regarding important natural resources.

How does one link language to nation and citizenship in cases where linguistic requirements do not exist, or when they do but are challenged by stateless nations? Indeed, today citizenship is less about identity and nationalistic belonging than it is about rights. Some states, particularly nation-states, implemented rights and obligations of citizenship that include language mastery, but this is not the case for all. For instance, Ireland, Israel, Italy, or Sweden do not have any linguistic requirements as part of their naturalization process. Other countries, such as Germany or the Netherlands, do.

The above therefore illustrate how the agency of languages has had limited historical and fundamental influence on boundaries and borders of states. But, it also

reasserts the long-lasting influence of languages in the historical development of local, regional, and national communities, and their frontiers and borderlands, which may then either strengthen or weaken bordering processes among other factors still debated in the literature. In other words, linking language to nation and to the bordering process of states, kingdom and empires, makes little sense but for the nationalist idealistic period that spans the second part of the 19th century and most of the 20th century; indeed, as documented in this Atlas, in 2009, most European member states have achieved or aspire to achieve isomorphism of language. All in all, it is arguable that language is only one attribute of citizenship among many, but then it is also important to underline that in most cases one-language, one-nation policies are not the exception. Finally, it is striking that this Atlas mapping writing systems overlaps with the international boundary line of the European Union—that is, it follows the eastern boundaries of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Ukraine, and Albania. The remaining exceptions are Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Vojvodina. The following section looks at the implications of those findings for our understanding of borders.

**Implications for Our Social Scientific Understanding of Borders and Borderlands**

Since September 11, 2001, borders and borderlands have come back to the center of numerous discussions in the media and in academia. Most of these focus on issues of border security, hence, also addressing current debates on the spatial and functional transformations of state’s territorial policies. Obviously, the forces at play are espe-

cially visible in borderland regions where economic, social, cultural, and political asymmetries have either served, or come into conflict with, the security agendas of states. The current scholarship on borders and borderlands focuses our attention on the subtle ways in which borders, as territorial markers, and functional—fluid vectors—of demarcation, may be transforming or evolving. It is in these spaces that languages play a fundamental role of bridging (or distantiating) humans across geographical hedges, and enabling (or disenabling) solidarity in borderland regions and across borders. But then what is the place of languages in this new era?

As I have suggested elsewhere, to understand borders and borderlands, social scientists need to focus on lenses of analysis that underscore the tug-of-war between agency and structural processes in the multi-scalar construction / de-construction of states, and their concurrent impact on border regions and policies. Certainly, in most cases governments set borders, but borders and borderland processes (tensions, integration, and dis-integration) are a pointed reminder that international agreements are not always enough to establish boundaries. Indeed, beyond international agreements between governments, to understand borders we need to understand the complex, intermeshed networks of government policy that interact to produce those international boundaries, establish border and borderland policies and functions, and their impact on the people of those regions. National governments are key players, yet governing is complex and policy analysts note the increasing influence of complex policy processes that sway what central governments can do in borders and borderlands. Among those factors, local political clout establishes linkages between communities and across international boundaries, and the local culture—i.e. ethnic, religious, linguistic, or a cultural sense of belonging—grounds those linkages across borders and borderland regions. There are, obviously, many instances of borderland communities that have established linkages when contiguous. Scholars describe borderland cultures, languages than span across borderland regions, or policy network and symbolic regimes in North America and in Europe. This Atlas documents such linguistic borderlands of Central Europe very well: it shows for instance that in 2009 writing systems divide Central Europe into Latin, Cyrillic, and Greek systems clearly. The only countries/regions that use more than one writing system are in Crimea, Vojvodina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo. Furthermore, this Atlas also shows that most Central European countries following a period of “hesitations” between dialectic continuum and isomorphism (1974–1989); all have adopted isomorphic policies today.

Yet the context (of this linguistic achievement) discussed in the literature on the global economy, new technologies, and free trade suggests a transformation of the relations of states and other government tiers with market forces that make the

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governing of regional and local borderland communities much more complex. For instance, Sassen suggests new legal regimes “un-bundle sovereignties” and “denationalise territories,” which in turn have “disturbing repercussions for distributive justice and equity.”30 Similarly, Brenner claims that state spaces are being recalibrated, which leads regional-central government relations to be redefined from vertical, coordinate, and re-distributive, to horizontal, competitive and developmentalist.31 In the same vein, Keating, focusing on multination states in Europe, finds that along with constitutional reforms, an asymmetry of rights develops, which further differentiates local and regional constituencies in a process where federal and centralized states seem to progressively resemble each other.32 Castells, focusing on the information communication revolution, suggests a fundamental transformation of the relationship between politics and market forces: “spaces of places” and “spaces of flows.”33 In other words, a radical transformation of local—central relations, and relations with the rest of the world’s economy with geopolitical implications, mark the current era.

The literatures comparing such transformations across international case studies suggest that processes of multilevel governance have emerged that transform the nature of states. Government and politics retreat from equalization as they build on increasingly salient economic, social, and political differences of places. Decentralization and downloading of policies progressively empower local and regional actors, and economic, social, and political asymmetries develop. Yet, these processes are particularly visible in borderland regions where economic, social, and political asymmetries either serve, or come in conflict with, the recent security agenda of states.

These top-down analyses of institutional changes and functional downloading, however, do not debate as effectively how local power and politics is also being transformed by these structural changes. Some borderland scholars focusing on the agency of borderlands document various trends where borders disappear as a result of economic regions,34 or bend as a result of their far-reaching activities,35 as well as bottom-up processes, such as agents resisting the newly implemented security agenda for economic, cultural, or political reasons.36

Borders are not just hard territorial lines. They are structures/institutions that result from bordering processes and are thus about people. And for most settled ter-

ritories they are predominantly about inclusion and exclusion, as they are woven into varied cultural, economic, and political fabrics. Bounded territories and borderlands are the outcome of the continual interactions and intersections between the actions of people (agency) within the constraints and limits placed by contextual and structural factors (structure).

Thus, our understanding of borders is limited by what Yosef Lapid called the “Territorialist Epistemology.” Borders started as Roman Limites built of stone or turf in North Africa, Germany, and Britain because Romans viewed boundaries as markers between sovereign states, and also enjoyed world hegemony. As a result, our understanding of borders has erroneously remained fixed on boundary lines. But, borders are no longer only about territorially bounded authorities. They are not just sea and air ports of entry, or border crossings. Borders are also increasingly virtual or simply impalpable (i.e. electronic borders, non-visible borders based on biometric identification and control, or electronic devices set to track flows of goods or people, such as tracking financial transactions, spywares of all kinds). Etienne Balibar suggested that borders are “vacillating, multiplied and reduced in their localisation, thinned out and doubled, no longer the shores of politics but the space of the political itself.” In short, there is a growing literature that is now suggesting that we are developing an understanding of borders that goes beyond the “territorialist” and geopolitical intellectual and policy traditions.

Hence, our focus on bordering processes and policies is critical to our understanding of what borders are. This leads to a focus on the agency of borders, which is the activities of social, economic, and political individuals (agents) and the processes of production and re-production of borders—the bordering and de-bordering praxis—which are economically, politically and culturally embedded at a given time in history and within a given space. Then, borders result from competing production and re-production practices that are fundamentally rooted in individual actions, themselves deeply rooted in economic, political, and cultural interests and motivations where language plays a role.

These individual actions result from competing cultural, economic, and political interests and motivations however, and concurrently, these become fundamental to our understanding of bordering processes. These individual actions are deeply rooted in local culture and may reflect a variety of cultural characteristics of the borderland regions: language, religion, ethnic belonging, territorial sense of belonging, all may play a defining role. Similarly, immigration across international boundary lines affects the very nature and culture of the newly settled borderland region. These are the praxis


that underlie and challenge international boundary lines and bordering processes—in aggregate they are human tidal waves against states!\(^{39}\)

In a world of multi-identity, world border policies also adapt to filtering flows of people, goods, and money by focusing on the very attributes embedded in cross-border carrier, whether human, good, or capital; language is only one of them and sometimes it is not. Indeed, because of the importance of the security agenda for states such as Canada and the United States, or the European Union, border security agencies have developed a focus on attributes other than those found in traditional security policy, such as linguistic ability, or ethnic, religious, or territorial sense of belongings, which underline individual embedded security. Whereas languages are receding from the forefront of citizenship recognition, other specific attributes have become more relevant and these are generally collectively used in \textit{preclearance} policies. These policies were introduced originally in the 1950s between Canada and the United States, for instance, and have been generalized since 9/11.\(^{40}\) In 2009, only two Canadian Airport routes were not equipped to provide such a process: Saskatoon and Regina. All in all, over 11 million passengers are pre-cleared yearly just between Canada and the USA. Indeed, as the knowledge of language is receding from the forefront of statehood, the bordering process now includes embedded attributes that both minimize the importance of the frontier, or the boundary line, and the location of the border and borderland, and fundamentally define the carrier as an enabled or disabled border crosser.

Conversely, borders and borderlands have become geopolitical spaces of contentions where asymmetrical economic, social, cultural, and political forces are either serving, or in conflict with, the agenda of central governments; further to this, they show the subtle ways in which borders as territorial markers are being transformed into functional, fluid vectors of demarcation, which are profoundly dependent upon bordering and de-bordering praxis. From the perspective of security, local or regional language is less important than specific inner attributes of residence, birth, or documented crossings. Hence, for instance, the recent rediscovery of passports in the United States, where less than 50% of the population carried one traditionally because speaking English in the local idiom was good enough to go to Canada and back until the late 1970s. Today, borders remain territorial but the new filtering mechanisms are more concerned with the \textit{embeddedness} of bordering processes. These are less territorial because all flows of money, goods, or people have to carry within themselves specific attributes that determine their origins and their community of belonging rather than being located within a given territory; and their embedded character becomes then fundamental to their successful border crossing.\(^{41}\) For instance, in the 1970s, in prac-

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41 A good example of physical embeddedness of security is found in the technology used to read the iris of individual border crosser.
tice one did need a passport to cross the Franco-German border, and today one does not; today, a national identity card or driver’s licence is enough. It carries biometric identification readings that further enhance the power of these requirements. These are individualised and simultaneously virtualized. Indeed, with biometric identification the carriers are pre-identified as welcome border crossers even if they only rarely need to travel across the boundary line. Their own bio-metrics physically embed their rights. Biometric passports and North American Nexus Cards policies implement mechanisms of pre-clearance of individuals that carry those attributes, for example, if they are frequent crossers. Here again, the Atlas demonstrates effectively the great yet possibly waning wealth of Central European dialects and regional languages. Indeed, some of the regions that offer the greatest number of minority and regional languages are located in the recently-formed states of Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, former Yugoslavia (particularly Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia), and Greece. The current praxis may indeed further enhance isomorphisms or be the dawn of a new era where individual agency, region, and community-building will also give birth to renewed linguistic innovation and praxis.

**Conclusions**

In the end this Atlas teaches us that languages are numerous and diverse in Central Europe; it also demonstrates that this diversity, as an indicator of the dialectic continuum running across Central Europe, has given way to state isomorphism. Thanks to its time serial maps, the Atlas shows that in the last century state policies of isomorphism may have reached their goal at a time when the relevance of language to statehood and nation building was vanishing because of the fundamental embeddedness and complexity of statehood rights, where language was only a small defining factor. The embeddedness of specific attributes was successfully implemented for goods and financial flows until 9/11, when such processes started to become primary requirements for travellers. These new security mechanisms fundamentally transformed borders and borderlands because our geographical understanding of space and of precise boundary line then became irrelevant. Belonging is not determined by where you come from or where you go, but by the very legal attributes embedded in an individual, the product, or the financial flow one is part of. Clearly, the characteristics embedded in an individual that can cross borders are related to specific state citizenships and the attributes of their citizenship; for instance, British citizens today are the only ones in the world that can go to over 170 countries with no visa. These border crossing rights are fundamentally linked to broad definitions of citizenship-based rights, but based less so on place of birth and sense of belonging, or language or religion or ethnic belonging. Hence the 19th century idealistic characteristics have been replaced by much more specific individual attributes such as place of residence, cumulative crossing history, or criminal record, or again, skills, training, or work experience that confer border-crossing rights to their carriers. Thus it is, the embeddedness of specific attributes that lead to an individualization of the right to cross borders. Language has lost its “visible” individualizing and nationalising character, and its linkage to citizenship and statehood is much less
obvious. Languages may become less regulated and return to their primary function of communication, once again diversify along territorial and dialectical continuums, with English linking foreign communities and people within the European Union. Language may once again be woven into local and community identities in a multitude of complementary territorial and linguistic patchworks linking individuals to their immediate community, yet differentiating individuals from their regional or national belonging.
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The Genre of the Ethnolinguistic Atlas

Kamusella rightly identifies the centrality of language in understandings of statehood and national forms of identification in Central Europe in the past two centuries. However, there is also something very Central European about ethnolinguistic atlases as a genre of thematic cartography. In the mid-19th century, ethnolinguistic maps emerged as a popular medium for visualising the sub-division of Central Europe’s inhabitants into homogenous and self-contained ethnolinguistic groups. Ideas about ethnographic mapping were exchanged and circulated around the region, usually through the medium of German, inspiring efforts by individual cartographers such as Pavel Jozef Šafárik’s 1842 map of the Slavic languages and Heinrich Berghaus’ ethnographic and language maps (Sprachkarte) in his Physical Atlas (1849), to imperial-sponsored projects in the Romanov and Habsburg Empires to map the linguistic diversity of their inhabitants, such as Petr Keppen’s (Peter von Koeppen) Ethnographic Map of European Russia (1851) and Karl von Czoernig’s Ethnographic Map of the Austrian Monarchy (1855). Central European maps of this type have been the subject of several excellent scholarly monographs over the past decade (Petronis 2007; Seegel 2012; Hansen 2015; Staliūnas 2016). Although these maps usually bore the title of “ethnographic map,” or rather the literal translation of this term into one of the regional languages (Ethnographische Karte, Этнографическая карта etc.), the spoken language of the majority of inhabitants was often used as the basis of defining a region’s ethnic character. In practice, most of these so-called ethnographic maps were thus technically speaking ethnolinguistic maps.

Kamusella’s Atlas can thus be positioned within this specific genre of thematic cartography which has historically had a strong presence in Central Europe, both as a result of and a contributing factor to the salient politicisation of language questions in the region. In the short commentary that follows, I present a handful reflections on the Atlas-in-progress which I hope will serve both as an appraisal of the work thus-far completed and offer some suggestions for how the project might be developed. Moreover, by situating the Atlas in a broader historical and theoretical context, I attempt to draw attention to some of the assumptions we often make when making or reading maps and bring a
heightened awareness of cartographic methods to the fore. In responding to the Atlas, I draw mainly from the experience of my own research on 19th century ethnolinguistic maps of the Romanov Empire, as I believe that many of the debates that preoccupied cartographers then also yield useful insights and food for thought for contemporary ethnolinguistic map-makers.

**Mapping and the Linguistic “Spatial Turn”**

Whereas many scholars have noted the political transformations affecting the classification and taxonomisation of languages in Central and Eastern Europe (Kamusella 2009; Maxwell 2015), less attention has been paid to the role of maps in constructing and disseminating ideas about the subdivision of dialectal continua into discrete languages. As I have argued elsewhere, the use of cartography to visualise the various speech and written forms employed in Central Europe over the course of history has focused our attention on the territorial distribution of the speakers of a language and on the borders between different languages (Gibson forthcoming). In short, ethnolinguistic maps have been a driving force in spatializing our thinking about languages. For this reason, a linguistic overview of Central Europe presented through the medium of cartography differs in crucial ways from the information presented about the region’s languages in other formats, such as census records, encyclopaedias, dictionaries, grammars, and specialist monographs. It is important to flag these points of divergence from the outset, as they influence how we read and interpret the information conveyed through maps.

Firstly, printed maps present a static snapshot and are generally unable to convey information about variables that move. As a result, languages spoken by itinerant, migrant, or nomadic populations often end up underrepresented in ethnolinguistic maps because they cannot be attached to a specific territory. Whereas statistics about these speakers can be tabulated in numerical form based on their presence within the borders of an administrative space (e.g. n speakers in x district), their lack of a definable and fixed territory means that their presence is often not acknowledged on maps.

Secondly, ethnolinguistic maps do not generally indicate population density and thus tend to visually extenuate the presence of languages spoken over a wide geographical area by a small, low density population, and diminish the graphic impact of languages spoken by a large number of people concentrated in a more compact territory. For the same reason, ethnolinguistic maps struggle to handle contexts where different languages are spoken in cities and towns, compared to the areas surrounding them. Usually, the scale of the map is not large enough to detail the linguistic composition within a town or city. Kamusella acknowledges this limitation and attempts to address this in several ways. For example, on Map A4 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1910” he prints the names of towns and cities in more than one language. He also adds another layer of complexity by underlining the names of town inhabited by Turkic-speaking Armenian communities. Still, in most cases ethnolinguistic maps focus on mapping those linguistic groups with an identifiable “geo-body” (Winichakul 1994).

Thirdly, another sociolinguistic situation that is tricky to translate into the cartographical medium concerns regions where the inhabitants are multilingual. Whereas
Kamusella uses hatching in several instances to denote the presence of areas where two or more dialect continua or languages areas overlap, this method of rendering suggests the cohabitation of speakers of different languages, rather than bilingualism or multilingualism. For instance, the region of Latgale in present-day eastern Latvia is presented on the maps as an area of overlap between the Baltic and North Slavic dialect continua and language areas. In practise, many people in this region are multilingual and speak several different languages in their everyday life. Moreover, there has been centuries of contact between Baltic (Latgalian), North Slavic (Russian, Belarusian, Polish), and Germanic (German, Yiddish) languages and dialects in the region, which have mutually influenced one another. Despite this, the maps reinforce the idea of the region as a meeting point of two dialect continua rather than an area of confluence.

Finally, all lines on maps have undergone a degree of simplification and “smoothing” (Monmonier 1991: 29). In the case of ethnolinguistic maps, this process of flattening and enclosing speakers muffles the messiness and ambiguities of linguistic classification. For this reason, the future publishers of the completed Atlas should be urged to print the work no smaller than A4 size so that readers may fully engage with the details of the maps.

**The Cartographic Language**

In tandem with the development of ethnolinguistic cartography as a popular genre of demographic mapping in 19th century Central Europe, practitioners sought to establish common cartographical conventions for the graphical visualisation of demographic statistics. As the geographer Mark Monmonier reminds us, maps depend on a “graphic code for storing and retrieving data in a two-dimensional geographic framework” (Monmonier 1991, 18). The international statistical congresses held between 1853–76 attempted to create guidelines and conventions for measurement, notation, and expression with the aim of achieving a scientific universalism (Palsky 1999; Randeraad & Molnár 2011). Most map-makers today, including amateurs who might not be directly familiar with these international cartographical standards, unconsciously subscribe to a set of graphical conventions to denote certain elements and characteristics when making ethnolinguistic maps. The key to decoding the map is explained on the map’s legend, however most of these tropes have become so widespread that readers are able to retrieve a substantial amount of information from ethnolinguistic maps even if the text on them is written in a language or script they do not understand.

Some features of the ethnolinguistic cartographical language include:
- a geopolitical base map with city names and sometimes also administrative and/or borders marked to orientate the reader;
- each linguistic group is assigned its own colour or shade, which is used to denote its territorial distribution;
- proximate colours are used to suggest linguistic proximity or kinship between groups, while contrasting colours are used to suggest a greater degree of linguistic difference;
cross-hatching or some form of shading indicates the presence of mixed regions;
linguistic areas and their speakers are bordered, either by thin delineating lines surrounding the shaded areas or by the contrasting colours used for neighbouring groups, which clearly mark the transition point from one linguistic area to another.

Just because this cartographical language has become ubiquitous does not mean that we should be uncritical in the ways that we use it. By bearing in mind the 19th century origins of much of our thinking about ethnolinguistic mapping, we become attuned to how many of these linguistic cartographical tropes serve to emphasise differences rather than similarities between peoples and languages. The use of solid lines or contrasting colours to demarcate linguistic groups risks attributing a degree of solidity and impermeability to linguistic borders, which is at odds with the complex sociolinguistic reality that Kamusella is trying to convey. The visual similarities between the lines delineating linguistic groups and those signifying state administrative boundaries convey the impression that these linguistic frontiers are somehow solid and observable, or that crossing a linguistic threshold is like traversing a state border crossing. While visualising difference and drawing borders between the in-group and out-group may have been on the horizons of imperial or state administrators and nationally-minded intellectuals, it is important that the Atlas also provides a platform to challenge, or at least to question, this.

I will illustrate some of the dangers of this approach with a more detailed commentary on Map C1 “Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 1931,” which particularly stood out for me. The three Baltic states are represented on the map as nation-states, with Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian as official languages, respectively. Yet the map masks the linguistic diversity which existed within these states at the time; while these three languages many have been the official languages, they were not spoken (especially not on an everyday basis) by a significant proportion of the population. Moreover, minority legislation in Estonia and Latvia in the 1920s protected the interests of speakers of languages other than the official state language. The idea that Estonia and Latvia were moving towards the nationalist ideal of the “isomorphism of language, nation, and state” can thus be challenged, especially in the 1920s. In addition, from the Lithuanian perspective, interwar Lithuania was not a state that fulfilled the isomorphism of language, nation, and state as Poland “occupied” their national capital of Vilnius (Wilno) and the surrounding area. It strikes me that in mapping the coincidences of language, nation, and state, Kamusella presents a rather simplified overview of the linguistic situation in the region that inadvertently risks supporting the very nationalist claims that he is trying to subvert.

Overall, I strongly recommend that each map in the finished Atlas be accompanied by an extensive commentary, similar to the format used by Paul Robert Magosci in his Historical Atlas of East Central Europe (1993). This is vital to historicize the myriad of changes Kamusella is drawing attention to and also to point out important nuances and subtleties that it was impossible to include in maps for the technical reasons outlined above. Possible questions that could be brought to the attention of the
reader in this commentary are: How have perceptions of what constitutes a language or a dialect at any given time changed? How are the borders between languages defined in a particular time and space? How have the relationships between different languages been conceived and changed over time? What are the key turning points, in Kamusella’s opinion, in the chronological history of languages in Central Europe and how do these correspond to the periodisation of the maps?

THE POLITICS OF ETHNOLINGUISTIC MAPS

Benedict Anderson famously argued that the census, map, and museum are three institutions of power that had a profound impact on the way that states imagined the people they ruled over, the geography of the territory, and legitimated their right to rule (Anderson 1991). In doing so, Anderson reminds us that maps do not merely illustrate or represent, but are constructed objects. These artefacts are used by actors to disseminate and legitimise specific ways of viewing the world (Harley 2002). The ways in which maps functioned as powerful instruments for restructuring territories and drawing borders was especially visible in Central Europe following World War I. At the Paris Peace Conference, national delegations used maps to propose plans for the division of Central Europe into new territorial units, whose frontiers were to correspond (in theory) to ethnolinguistic borders in accordance with the principle of “national self-determination” (Wilkinson 1951; Crampton 2006).

Kamusella’s Atlas, it seems to me, has two political points of engagement. On the one hand, Kamusella sets out to challenge teleological nationalist accounts of the “awakenings” of nations and the development of primordial national languages. The long temporal scope and wide geographical area of coverage of the map plates enables Kamusella to make a convincing argument about how languages are constructed, disintegrated, and reconstructed over time. On the other hand, alongside challenging nationalist narratives about the historical development of languages in Central Europe, Kamusella uses the Atlas to draw attention to non-official regional languages and so-called dialects, such as his native Silesian, Samogitian, Võro-Seto, and Latgalian, to name but a few examples. The Atlas thus functions as an instrument for promoting awareness of minority, regional, local, lesser-used, or “micro-languages” (Dulichenko 1981) that have often been overlooked or deliberately omitted from nationally orientated accounts. Moreover, through his mapping of the distribution of the Romani language in Central Europe, Kamusella draws our attention to an ethnolinguistic group that is usually marginalised from historical accounts of the region and “silenced” from ethnolinguistic maps (Harley 1988). For this reason, the Atlas will surely gain the attention of regional language activists across Central Europe. Whereas there have been other atlases that map Central Europe’s minority and/or “endangered” languages (e.g. Moseley 2010), one of the strengths of Kamusella’s work lies in the way he challenges readers to question the commonplace hierarchy of “a language” and “a dialect” by demonstrating the historical and political contingency surrounding these labels.
All map-makers are faced with many difficult choices. Not only must they decide what to include and exclude, the scale and frame into which this data is projected, and the cartographical language (conventions, techniques, and symbols) used to communicate the desired information, but they also face the practical challenges of finding skilled draftsmen, printers, publishers, and sources of funding for this expensive type of publication. Kamusella sheds light on some of these trials and tribulations of being an ethnolinguistic map-maker in his Acknowledgements and chapter on “The Concept of the Atlas.” At the end of the day, every map is a compromise between the cartographer’s vision and the need to work within the constraints imposed by the media.

Despite some of the theoretical and methodological pitfalls of ethnolinguistic cartography detailed above, I strongly support Kamusella’s decision to employ cartography as the format through which to present an extensive overview of the history of the development of languages in Central Europe. Kamusella’s previous work on the trajectories of Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Magyar in the 19th and 20th centuries ran to more than 1000 pages (Kamusella 2009); a similarly-detailed study on all the languages and dialects in Central Europe over the last millennia is unfeasible. Just as cartographers in the 19th century marvelled at the power of maps as a methodological tool to synthesise and accessibly communicate their many years of statistical, linguistic, and ethnographic labour, Kamusella’s Atlas aggregates an enormous amount of data into an informative, analytical, and very visually appealing series of images, which should be accessible and of interest to a broad audience.

By shining a spotlight on the methods and sources used, the decisions taken and paths not followed, the dialogue on the Atlas—in-progress presented in this volume takes important steps towards demystifying the map as an object of unquestionable authority. It reminds us that maps are crafted objects, and a technology of mechanical reproduction that shapes our spatial discourses about the sociolinguistic landscape.

**Errata on Estonia and Latvia**

Errors in a mapping project of this scope are inevitable. In the collaborative spirit behind Kamusella’s endeavour, I take the liberty of drawing attention to some minor mistakes so that they can be corrected in the completed version of the Atlas.

- Map A1 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, 9th century”: Semigallians is the more common spelling in English rather than Zemgalians.
- Map A2 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1050”: Semigallians are missing from this map.
- Map A3 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1570”: The Bishopric of Piltene was also part of Denmark between 1560–1585.
- Map A4 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 1910”: The Pale of Settlement did not include the eastern tip of Courland province; the territory of Latgale in western Vitebsk province should be included within the Slavic dialect continua (to indicate the presence of Russian, Polish, and Belarusian dialects); all of the...
Baltic and North-West provinces should be hatched as part of the North Slavic dialect continua, similar to the shading of all of the Habsburg Empire as part of the German dialect continua.

- Map A5 “Dialect Continua in Central Europe, c 2009”: There is a substantial presence of North Slavic in many parts of Estonia and Latvia; Rīga (not Riga) is the Latvian name for the capital city (also applies to Maps B1, B2, C1, C2, C3, D1).
- Map B2 “Central Europe’s Writing Systems in 2009 and the Past”: Was Hebrew ever an official script in Courland?
- Map C1 “Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 1931”: The name of the eastern region of Latvia should read Latgale not Latgalia; I would argue that Lithuania was “aspiring to fulfil” isomorphism due to the conflict with Poland over Vilnius/Wilno during this period.
- Map C3 “Isomorphism of Language, Nation, and State in Central Europe, 2009”: Latgalian is not an official language in Latvia in its spoken form, even in the region of Latgale. It is only recognised in the State Language Law as a historical written variety of Latvian. Võro/Seto is likewise not an official language in Estonia.

**References**


Language in Central Europe’s History and Politics: From the Rule of *cuius regio, eius religio* to the National Principle of *cuius regio, eius lingua*?¹

Tomasz Kamusella

**The Multilingualism of Central Europe**

There are many definitions of Central Europe. For the sake of this chapter it is the middle one-third of the continent, or the zone bordered by Italy and the German-speaking polities of Germany and Austria in the west and the multilingual Russian Federation in the East. I exclude Scandinavia from the purview for the sake of brevity (Magocsi 2002: xi).

The general linguistic shape of Central Europe as we know it today emerged between the arrival in the 10th century of the Hungarians (or rather a coalition of Finno-Ugric and Turkic ethnic groups) in the Danube basin and the 14th century founding of the Romance-speaking principalities of Walachia and Moldavia (that is, the predecessors of modern-day Romania and Moldova). In the middle of the region the East Romance languages of Moldovan and Romanian, alongside the Finno-Ugric one of Hungarian, are spoken from the Black Sea to Austria, which is part of the German-speaking zone. This multilingual belt separates the North and South Slavic dialect continua (that is, geographically continuous zones within which language changes gradually from locality to locality; the cleavage of mutual incomprehensibility occurs where two continua meet). At present the former is identified with Polish, Czech, Slovak, Belarusian, Ukrainian, and Russian, while the latter with Slovenian, Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Bulgarian (Schenker and Stankiewicz 1980; Dulichenko 2011).

At Central Europe’s southern end terminating in the Mediterranean and the Bosporus, the Indo-European isolates (mutually incomprehensible languages, with no cognates) of Albanian and Greek rub shoulders with Turkish, which is part of the Turkic dialect continuum extending to Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and eastern China. In the

¹ Motoki Nomachi and Catherine Gibson kindly commented on this chapter, while its prose was kindly streamlined by Michael O Gorman and Catherine Gibson. Obviously all remaining infelicities remain the sole responsibility of the author.
North, the sole surviving Baltic languages of Lithuanian and Latvian are squeezed between the North Slavic dialect continuum and the Finno-Ugric language of Estonian. All the mentioned idioms belong to the Indo-European family of languages, with the exception of the Finno-Ugric ones and Turkish (Plasseraud 2005).

**Religion, Language and Identity**

Until the modern times (18th – 19th centuries) people in Central Europe chose to express their identity through religion rather than language. Non-scripture (“traditional”) religions disappeared in the region in the late 14th century when Christianity was adopted in Lithuania. On the other hand, the northward expansion of the Ottoman Empire from the 14th to 17th centuries spread Islam across the Balkans. During the 14th and 15th centuries, expulsions and persecution caused Ashkenazim (Germanic-speaking Jews) to leave Western Europe for the middle and northern sections of Central Europe, and Sephardim (Romance-speaking Jews from the Iberian Peninsula) for North Africa and the Balkans. Afterward, the majority of the world’s Jews (those who confessed Judaism) lived in Central Europe until the Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany during World War II.

All three monotheistic faiths come complete with their Holy Writs and respective traditions of literacy, most visibly expressed by various scripts (alphabets) employed to write in the “sacred languages.” Accordingly, Jews write in the Hebrew characters of the Hebrew-language original of the Pentateuch and Muslims in the Arabic letters of the Arabic-language original of the Koran. In the case of Christians, those who pay allegiance to the pope in Rome (Catholics) write in Latin (Roman) letters of the Vulgate, or the official Latin translation of the Bible. The Uniate, or Greek Catholic, churches are an exception to this principle, most employing the Cyrillic-based Church Slavonic in liturgy. Those who adopted Christianity from Byzantium, and at present consider the ecumenical patriarch in Constantinople (Istanbul) the highest authority in the Orthodox Church, were allowed a greater degree of multilingualism. Greeks (and earlier also Orthodox Slavs, Albanians and Turks under Constantinople’s direct ecclesiastical control) write in Greek letters of the ancient Greek-language original of the New Testament. In the mid-9th century the Slavs of Greater Moravia (today’s Czech Republic, Hungary, southern Poland, and Slovakia) adopted Christianity from Byzantium, but in the Slavic language of Salonika written in a specific script, Glagolitic. In scholarly literature this language is called Old Church Slavonic, as named by the linguist and Austrian civil servant Barthlomäus (Jernej) Kopitar in the early 19th century. In the 10th century Cyrillic (developed in the Bulgarian Empire) replaced Glagolitic and the language, known as Church Slavonic (and whose corpus includes some local dialect features), remains the language of liturgy among Orthodox Slavs (mainly in the eastern Balkans, Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine) to this day.

Regarding the issue of literacy, faith, and identity in the context of Central Europe, it is necessary to mention Armenia and Georgia, which were the first two states to adopt Christianity as their state religion in the early 4th century. This event was later coupled with the devising of the specific Armenian and Georgian scripts, which were used in the
translation of the Bible into Armenian and Georgian. With time the Georgian Church became part of the Orthodox Church, while the Armenian (Apostolic) Church retained its singular character and organization. Christianity and the respective traditions of literacy, complete with their specific scripts, let the Armenians and the Georgians survive as separate ethnic groups when their lands were overrun by Byzantium, Muslim Arabs, Zoroastrians, Islamic Persia, the Ottoman Empire, and Russia. The subsequent destruction of the two Armenian kingdoms in the 11th and 14th centuries at the hands of Byzantium and the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt, respectively, drove waves of Armenian refugees out of their homeland. They established themselves as a significant diaspora in Central Europe. Most lost their native language and spoke the Turkic idiom of Kipchak, and later, other languages dominant in Central Europe. Until the modern times, however, they wrote all these languages in Armenian characters.

In the Catholic areas of Central Europe, due to the rise of distinctive and durable polities and reaffirmation of the secular power in them, people began to write in the new administrative languages of German (12th – 13th centuries), Czech (14th – 15th centuries), Polish (15th – 16th centuries), and Croatian (16th – 17th centuries) using the Latin script. The only exception was northwestern Croatia’s Adriatic littoral, where the Catholic Glagolitic-based tradition of Church Slavonic liturgy survived until the mid-20th century. In the Orthodox zone of the region, Romanian began to be used for official purposes in the 16th century and was written in Cyrillic until the mid-19th century. The Cyrillic-based Slavic idiom of Ruthenian (seen as the common predecessor of Belarusian and Ukrainian) was an official language of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (coterminous with present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine) until the end of the 17th century. In the Ottoman Empire the Ottoman language (Osmanlıca or Old Turkish) and Persian were employed for administration and literary endeavors, respectively, and predictably both were noted down in Arabic characters. In the 15th century the need arose among Bosnia’s Slavophone Muslims to write in Slavic, which was done in the Arabic script. Slavic publications in Arabic characters written and published there until the early 1940s are perceived today as the beginnings of the Bosnian language. Muslim Tatars who settled in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th century followed the same practice of using Arabic letters to write in Ruthenian and Polish. In a similar fashion, ethnic Greeks and Albanians professing Islam wrote down their idioms in the Arabic script too. Likewise, from the 15th century when Jews developed their written tradition in the Germanic language of Yiddish and the Romance idiom of Spanyol (Ladino), they wrote both in Hebrew characters.

In the Catholic segment of Central Europe the development of new written languages in the 16th and 17th centuries is connected to the Reformation, which called for the translation of the Bible into the ethnic languages of the faithful. Later, the Catholic Church also adopted this approach in an effort to reform itself and reverse the spread of

2 In the 14th and 15th century (until the 1430s), the Glagolitic script was used also in Bohemia.

3 There was also a tradition written in a specific Cyrillic script “Bosančica,” created in the 10th or 11th century, which can be regarded as the beginnings of a Bosnian literary tradition, as well.
Protestantism. Hence, Protestant and Catholic translators made Hungarian into an official language in the Ottoman fief of Transylvania, ushered into being Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Slovenian, revived Czech and Croatian, and inspired Slovak. This last language was actually formed in the first half of the 19th century, mainly under the influence of the novel force of nationalism (Burke 2002; Fine 2006).

The splitting of the north and center of Central Europe between Catholicism and Protestantism (mainly Lutheranism) was also reflected in scriptural practices. Catholics employed the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet, while Protestants the Gothic type (Black Letter, Fraktur). It was not an absolute norm, as Catholic German-speakers and Czech-speakers employed Gothic, while Calvinist Hungarian- and Polish-speakers used Antiqua. In the nationalist 19th century the use of Gothic was gradually limited to the German language, though some Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian books were published in Gothic until the interwar period.

Another effect of the Counter-Reformation was an attempt to bring the Orthodox population of the Catholic polities of Poland-Lithuania and historical Hungary (coterminous with today’s Hungary, Slovakia, southwestern Ukraine, northwestern Romania, northern Serbia, and northwestern Croatia) into a union with the Catholic Church. As a result, Uniate (Greek Catholic) Churches were founded. They accepted the authority of the pope but kept their Cyrillic-based Slavonic liturgy. In the case of Transylvania’s Uniate and Orthodox Romanians, this change facilitated the adoption of Romanian as their language of liturgy, increasingly written in Latin characters. Significantly, today the Ukrainians perceive their Greek Catholic Church as their national Church (Barbour & Carmichael 2000; Myhill 2006: 88–90).

MODERNITY, LANGUAGE AND NATIONALISM

At the beginning of the 19th century the invading Napoleonic armies brought the idea of nationalism to Central Europe as part and parcel of modernization expressed through the centralization of state administration and transportation networks, industrialization, popular free elementary education, and conscript military service and suffrage for all males. German and Italian nationalists worked out the specifically Central European form of nationalism that is aptly qualified with the adjective “ethnolinguistic.” This ideology entailed that all the speakers of various dialects construed as a single language form a nation. In turn, the contiguous area inhabited by the members of such a linguistically defined nation should be organized into their nation-state. The success of the Kingdom of Italy (1861) and the German Empire (1871) built in this way from a variety of polities encouraged the rise of various ethnolinguistic national movements across Central Europe. These movements endangered the existence of the multiethnic empires of Russia, Austria, and the Ottomans, between which the region was then divided (Gellner 1983; Hroch 2000; Fishman 1973; Kamusella 2001 and 2004).

In the Habsburg hereditary lands (that is, the Austrian Empire after 1804), German replaced Latin as the official language at the close of the 18th century. However, an outcry against this imposition in the Hungarian half of the monarchy led to the reinstatement of Latin in the Kingdom of Hungary, where it remained the official language
until the mid-19th century. The 1867 restructuring of this empire into Austria-Hungary made Hungarian the official language of the Kingdom of Hungary. In the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy German remained the most important language, but in the non-German-speaking crownlands (administrative regions) and communes Croatian (Serbo-Croatian), Czech, Polish, Slovenian, and Cyrillic-based Ukrainian (pressure exerted in the 1850s for coaxing Ukrainians to write and print in Latin characters eventually failed) were introduced as official, co-official, and auxiliary languages. In the Hungarian half of the empire only Croatian was recognized as official in the kingdom’s Croatian lands, though Serbian (Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian), Slovak, Romanian, and Cyrillic-based Rusyn were grudgingly accepted as media of education and pastoral service. In Bosnia, occupied by Austria-Hungary in 1877, apart from German, variously named Slavic (Bosnian, Croatian, Serbo-Croatian) was employed in administration and print, in Latin characters for Catholics (identified as Croatians), in Cyrillic for Orthodox (identified as Serbs), and in Arabic characters for Muslims (identified as Bosnians).

In the western provinces of the Russian Empire German and Polish were used as official languages. The former on the territory of present-day Estonia and Latvia, and the latter in what today is Lithuania, Belarus, and central Ukraine. The development of the Russian language began with Peter the Great’s early 18th century decree to use modernized Cyrillic (Grazhdanka or civil script modeled on the Latin script, or its most popular form today, Antiqua) for the production of non-ecclesiastical books in Church Slavonic. In the second half of the 18th century, Russian written in Grazhdanka was standardized on the basis of Church Slavonic and the dialect of Moscow. The use of Russian for literary pursuits and administration spread in the first half of the 19th century. In the second half of the century Russian replaced German and Polish as the sole official language in the western provinces. A ban was placed on Belarusian and Ukrainian because they were construed as “unworthy peasant” dialects of the (Great) Russian language. The fledgling use of Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Cyrillic-based Moldavian (Moldovan) in elementary schools was tentatively allowed in 1905. Then, German and Polish were reintroduced as languages of instruction as well (Haugen 1966; Hroch 1985 & 2000).

In the Ottoman Empire the population was divided into non-territorial confessionally-defined millets. Thus, Orthodox Greek-, Slavic-, Turkic-, and Albanian-speakers belonged to the Orthodox millet and their Muslim counterparts to the Muslim millet. The administrative language of the latter millet was identical to the empire’s official language, Ottoman written in the Arabic script. In the Orthodox millet antiquated Byzantine Greek dominated, though some use of Church Slavonic was reluctantly accepted in low-key liturgy and elementary schools in some Slavophone areas. In the 18th century the Sultan replaced local Romanian rulers in Walachia and Moldavia (southern and eastern Romania) with more loyal Greek administrators from Constantinople, which

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4 One has to keep in mind that the Muslims started to publish their non-Croatia-oriented newspaper in the Latin script. In addition, they also published a non-Serbia-oriented newspaper in Cyrillic.
led to the replacement of Cyrillic-based Romanian with Byzantine Greek as the official language. The Ottomans reversed this arrangement in the 1820s when the Greek War of Independence led to the founding of an independent Greece (1832), where Byzantine Greek replaced Ottoman as the sole official language.

The period from the 1810s to the 1910s was marked by the retreat of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans due to the rise of autonomous and then independent (predominantly) Christian nation-states, encouraged by the West and Russia. Bulgarian, Montenegrin, and Serbian national leaders who used Cyrillic to write in Church Slavonic, but also in vernaculars mixed with Church Slavonic, marked their ethnic difference via-à-vis one another by referring to the tradition of medieval polities and Orthodox patriarchates erected in them. These patriarchates had continued to exist after the incorporation of the polities into the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century. The first Balkan nation-state founded purely on the basis of language was Albania (1913), or the polity for Albanian-speaking Muslims, Orthodox Christians, and Catholics.

In the 1880s the movement for the replacement of Byzantine Greek (Katharévousa, or “purifying language”) with modern-day Greek (Demotic) unfolded in Greece. Between 1917 and 1974, first Demotic and then Katharévousa were announced successively as the official language, before the former won the contest, apparently definitively. The two varieties of Greek did not diverge into two different languages because the linguistic difference was not translated into an ethnic cleavage but a political one. Greek conservatives sided with Katharévousa and liberals with Demotic. On the other hand, the liturgy in Greek Orthodox churches continues to be said in the ancient Greek of the New Testament.

Likewise, to this day Church Slavonic is preserved as the language of liturgy in Slavic Orthodox and Greek Catholic churches. Modern vernacular-based Slavic languages written in Cyrillic were initially reserved for temporal matters. This new trend spread from Russia to the Balkans, where the tsar reaffirmed his international role as the protector of Christians (the Ottomans agreed to this in a treaty of 1774). The codification of Bulgarian followed the Russian model of mixing elements of Church Slavonic and the Slavic dialects of eastern Bulgaria, Serbian, as employed in Serbia and Montenegro, also followed this pattern of mixing Church Slavonic with the local Slavic dialects of Belgrade and Cetinje. However, in the second half of the 19th century the idea of creating a common Serbo-Croatian language for the Slavic-speakers in the western half of the Balkans won the day. Nevertheless, Catholics were to write this language in the Latin script and Orthodox Christians in Cyrillic. The Albanians were undecided whether to write their own language in Greek, Latin, Cyrillic, Arabic characters, or a mixture of those before they settled on the Latin alphabet in 1911.

The significance of ethnic languages written in their specific scripts for separate (usually national) identification rose with the spread of popular literacy. Although full literacy was achieved among Central Europe’s German-speakers and Czechs by the 1870s, elsewhere in the region the process was completed only after the founding of the communist regimes in the wake of World War II. Earlier, literacy was a privilege of the narrow elite (often only its male half), meaning the nobility (later the intelligentsia and middle class), “professional Ottomans” (Muslim administrators) in the Ottoman
Empire, and clergy. In the Catholic zone of Central Europe the elite employed Latin, the knowledge of which spread eastward among Orthodox adherents due to the rise of the Greek Catholic Churches. The 18th century disavowal of Church Slavonic was accompanied with the elevation of Latin and German as the languages of learning and progress in Russia. Besides, beginning in the 18th century French emerged as the language of cultured discourse across all of Europe. It remained the main sociolect of Central Europe’s and Russia’s aristocracy and richer nobility until their destruction as a cohesive group during and after World War I. The modernization of the Ottoman Empire, which commenced in the 1840s, also made French the language of choice among the elite there.

Due to this modernizing process in the Ottoman Empire, beginning in the 1860s Sephardim accepted French as the preferred language of instruction in their schools. Its influence was such that they gradually switched from the Hebrew to Latin script for writing and printing in their ethnic language of Spanyol. On the other hand, despite the bans on the use of Hebrew characters in legal documents and contracts in Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, Ashkenazim stuck to their Hebrew script for writing in Hebrew and Yiddish. Simultaneously, thanks to the emancipation of Jews in Germany and Austria-Hungary and to the establishment of Russian-language elementary schools for Jews in Russia, German and Russian alongside Polish and Hungarian became their main languages of interethnic communication. However, the Dreyfus affair (1894) in France convinced many Jews that full assimilation would never be possible in Europe.

As a result, at the turn of the 20th century the Jewish national movement developed. One section revived Hebrew as a living language and proposed to establish a Hebrew-speaking Jewish nation with its national polity in Palestine. The other group made Yiddish, reviled even by some Jews as a “corrupt jargon,” into the national language of Ashkenazim who wished to stay in Europe as a distinct but accepted minority. The Holocaust annulled the latter option and paved the way for the modern Hebrew (Ivrit)-speaking Jewish nation-state of Israel (1948).

Interestingly, wishing to bridge the linguistic gap between Ashkenazim and Sephardim, and later with an eye to providing a language of neutral communication, L. L. Zamenhof from the town of Białystok (then in Russia, today in Poland) developed Romance-based Esperanto (1887), the most successful artificial language ever. It could have become an official language of the League of Nations but France intervened to stop such a development. In the interwar period Esperanto was hugely popular in Germany and the Soviet Union until the 1930s when Hitler and Stalin banned this language and persecuted Esperantists, who were accused of “rootless cosmopolitanism” (Kamusella 2008: ch 3; Okuka and Kren 2002; Todorova 1992; Tornow 2005).

**Linguistic Nation-States**

In the course of the Great War, the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation administrations banned Russian and discouraged the use of Cyrillic in Russia’s western provinces. Russian was replaced with German and Polish as official languages. Then, practically for the first time in history, Belarusian (in Cyrillic and also in Latin charac-
ters), Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Yiddish (in the Hebrew script) were employed for local administration and as languages of instruction in elementary and secondary schools. This practice encouraged the coalescence of ethnolinguistic national movements with the use of which Berlin and Vienna hoped to create a buffer zone between postwar Russia on the one hand, and the German Empire and Austria-Hungary on the other.

**Interwar Period**

The collapse of the Central Powers, coupled with the breakup of Austria-Hungary and the revolutionary turmoil in Russia, opened up Central Europe for a political reorganization. The Western Allies, pressured by delegations of various national movements, agreed to create ethnolinguistic nation-states in this region, that is, polities for nations speaking their specific languages, not shared by any other nations or polities, namely: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary (or one-third of the former Kingdom of Hungary), and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (since 1929, Yugoslavia). The sole non-national polity of interwar Central Europe was the Free City of Danzig, predominantly inhabited by Germans. Short-lived independent Belarus and Ukraine were divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. However, the administrative division of the latter polity was based on ethnonational union republics with their specific languages as official ones. Thus, Ukrainian was the official language of Soviet Ukraine. Soviet Belarus was exceptional in the fact that in addition to Belarusian and Russian, Yiddish and Polish were also used there as co-official languages until 1938. Hence, three scripts were in use in interwar Belarus: Cyrillic, Hebrew, and Latin.

The Soviet authorities consciously used language as an instrument of politics and social engineering. For instance, in order to prevent the rise of a Turkicphone Muslim nation that extended from the middle Volga to Crimea and the Caucasus, and from what today is Kazakhstan to Central Asia, which would have endangered the demographically dominant position of the Russians, the Bolsheviks banned the long-established Arabic script-based Turkic languages of Tatar and Chaghatai employed for widespread communication among Turkic Muslims. The use of Tatar was limited to Tatarstan and elsewhere it was replaced with the brand-new languages of Azeri, Bashkir, Chuvash, Crimean Tatar, and Kazak, developed on the basis of local dialects. Chaghatai disappeared completely and in its stead Karakalpak, Kyrgyz, Turkmen, and Uzbek were created. Furthermore, in 1923 the Arabic script was replaced with the Latin alphabet for writing these languages, as the latter was perceived to be a “tool of progress.” In the 1930s Cyrillic superseded the Latin script for writing these languages. Thus, in reality the changes in script made the Soviet Union’s Turkic Muslims unable to peruse earlier writings in “reactionary” Arabic script-based Tatar and Chaghatai.

The developments in Central Europe and the Soviet Union convinced Turkish nationalists that their cause could be served only by giving up the Arabic-speaking areas of the Ottoman Empire and converting the Turkish-speaking core into a Turkish nation-state. The Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923. Ottoman (Osmanlıca), replete with numerous Arabic and Persian linguistic loans, was replaced with vernacular-based Turkish and intensively purged (“reformed”) of non-Turkic elements especially in the
1930s and 1940s. Impressed by Soviet linguistic and social engineering, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin script for writing Turkish in 1928. This event triggered the Cyrillicization of the Latin alphabets of the Turkic languages in the Soviet Union due to the Kremlin’s fear of opening a channel of Latin-script based communication that would allow for the flow of unwanted ideological influence from Turkey to the Soviet Union. Interestingly, like in Greece, the ongoing competition between Ottoman and radical reformist Turkish was not translated into a new ethnolinguistic cleavage, but rather the former became associated with pro-Islamic conservatives and the latter with westernizers (the army, liberals and socialists) (Estraikh 1999; Grenoble 2003; Ioffe 2003; Kamusella 2006; Shevelov 1989; Smith 1998).

The normative imperative of one language for one nation-state was of such importance for statehood legitimization in Central Europe that the par excellence multi-ethnic polities of Czechoslovakia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes proclaimed Czechoslovak and Serbo-Croato-Slovenian as their respective official and national languages. The two languages were a constitutional fiction as in reality, both Czech and Slovak were used in Czechoslovakia, while bi-scriptural Serbo-Croatian and Latin script-based Slovenian were used in the Kingdom. After the 1929 proclamation of Yugoslavia, Serbo-Croato-Slovenian became eponymously known as Yugoslavian.

The ethnolinguistic nation-states engaged in various (frequently extralegal) policies that, through voluntary or forced assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities, were to produce ethnolinguistically homogenous populations in these polities. The remaining linguistic difference was frowned on as a possible source of irredentism and delegitimization of statehood. In this atmosphere the two-century-old tradition of grassroots multilingualism in the vicinity of the Slovak capital of Bratislava disappeared, where previously predominantly illiterate Croatian-, German-, Hungarian-, and Slovak-speaking peasants had lived next to one another in the region’s villages. In order to cross the linguistic divide they exchanged their children for a couple of months at a time so that they would become fluent in all the languages spoken by neighbors (Liszka 1996).

World War II
The interwar division of Central Europe into ethnolinguistic nation-states was briefly overturned during World War II when German and Russian replaced in their official capacity other languages in the northern half of the region. The breakup of Czechoslovakia and the founding of an independent Slovakia with Slovak as its official language meant the end of Czechoslovak. Likewise, the breakup of Yugoslavia into Croatia and German-dominated Serbia spelt the end of Yugoslavian. Croatian was declared the former polity’s official language and Cyrillic was banned there. By the same token, the Cyrillic-based language employed in wartime Serbia became known as Serbian.

The Communist Years
After 1945 all Central Europe, with the exception of Greece, found itself either in the enlarged Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), or in the Soviet bloc (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania), or, at least initially, in the Soviet sphere of influence (Albania and Yugoslavia, which remained communist polities
even after they broke with Moscow). During and after the war until 1950, vast border changes and huge multidirectional ethnic cleansing were effected. About 47 million people were expelled or displaced. The most visible result of this exercise was the disappearance of German-speaking communities in Central Europe and of German as the region’s leading language of interethnic communication.

The Holocaust perpetrated by Nazi Germany claimed the lives of 5 million Jews and 0.5 to 1 million Roma (Gypsies). The recurrent waves of anti-Semitism in the Soviet bloc sent most of the Jewish survivors either to Israel or the West. The ethnolinguistic distinctiveness of the Roma tended to be denied in the Soviet bloc. They were defined as “lumpenproletariat” (the lowest, most degraded stratum of the working class) and their traditional way of life was destroyed through forced sedentization (Bakker & Kyuchkov 2000; Magocsi 2002: 186, 189–193).

In this way, an unprecedented level of ethnolinguistic homogeneity was achieved in Central Europe’s nation-states. The non-national polity of the Free City of Danzig was removed from the map. The postwar constitutional construct of the Czechoslovak people consisting of the two fraternal nations of the Czechs and the Slovaks was seen by the latter as an instrument of the perpetuation of Czech dominance over Czechoslovakia. In 1969 the polity was transformed into a bi-national federation with genuine full Czech-Slovak bilingualism. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, annexed by the Soviet Union, were made into union republics with their respective languages accorded official-cum-national status; unusually, the Cyrillic script was not imposed on these languages. However, the ideological drive to mold the Soviet Union’s inhabitants into a potentially global-wide communist people (or nation) with Russian as their “international language” (“interlanguage”) meant the swift (and often forced) linguistic Russification of the three Baltic republics in certain spheres (Barbour & Carmichael 2000; Grenoble 2003; Isayev 1977).

Neither the constitutional fiction of Yugoslavian nor the unitary character of the state was possible to maintain in postwar Yugoslavia. The polity was federalized. Slovenian and the newly formed Cyrillic-based language of Macedonian were excluded from the commonality of Yugoslavian and made into the official and national languages of the Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Macedonia, respectively. The officially-named Serbo-Croatian / Croato-Serbian language was retained as the common language for other republics, but it was customarily written in Latin characters in Croatia, in Cyrillic in Serbia, and in both scripts in Bosnia and Montenegro. However, the dialectal base of this language slightly differed in all the four republics, as provided by law. Furthermore, in Serbia’s Autonomous Province of Kosovo Albanian was made co-official, while in Serbia’s other Autonomous Province of Vojvodina this status was shared by Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, and Rusyn. A similar Soviet-style autonomous region was established for Hungarians in Romania, with Hungarian as a co-official language, but it was short-lived (1952–1968) (Greenberg 2004; Lučić 2002).

5 In the Soviet Union, prior to World War II, all the official languages were written in Cyrillic with the exception of Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish.
Language in Central Europe’s History

After Communism

Post-Soviet States
The fall of the communist system in 1989 also spelt the end of communism as a viable ideology of statehood legitimization. These events precipitated the breakup of the studiously non-national communist polity of the Soviet Union into 15 ethnolinguistic nation-states, including Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, and Ukraine in the case of Central Europe. The transformation into ethnolinguistic national polities was most successful in the case of the three Baltic republics where no official status was accorded to Russian, though Russian-speakers account for as many as one-third of Estonia’s and Latvia’s inhabitants. In Ukraine, an Autonomous Republic of Crimea was founded with Latin alphabet-based Crimean Tatar and Russian as co-official languages. In Belarus, after the period of 1991–1995 when Belarusian was the sole official and national language, Russian was made into a co-official language, though de facto it is the dominant language, which effectively de-Belarusified the polity. Thus, at present Belarus is the only Central European nation-state that does not draw statehood legitimation from language. De-communized Sovietism functions as the legitimator of this state.

In Moldova Cyrillic was replaced with the Latin script for writing Moldovan, which for all practical reasons made it identical with Romanian. This, coupled with a drive to unite the country with Romania, alienated Russian-speakers concentrated east of the Dniester River. With Russian help, in 1992 these Russian-speakers waged a successful secessionist war and founded the unrecognized polity of Transnistria. As in the case of Belarus, Transnistria draws its legitimacy not from language but decommunized Sovietism. The citizenry is defined as a “multinational people” (reminiscent of the Soviet Union’s Soviet people/nation), while Cyrillic-based Moldovan, Russian, and Ukrainian were made into co-official languages. Significantly, all of them are united by the same script, perhaps, reflecting the Kremlin’s 2002 decision to impose Cyrillic for writing the languages of the “peoples” (nations, ethnic groups) native to the territory of the Russian Federation.6

In an effort to reestablish the territorial unity of Moldova, autonomy was granted to Transnistria and Moldovan (constitutionally kept separate from Romanian) remains the state’s official language. In addition, the autonomous region of Gagauzia was established for the Gagauzes, or Turkic-speaking Orthodox Christians, whose language is close to Turkish. In the Soviet times Cyrillic was used for writing Gagauz, but today the Latin script is employed for this purpose. In Gagauzia Russian is recognized as a co-official language.

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6 This federal law was passed to prevent the implementation of the Autonomous Republic of Tatarstan’s decision to supplant Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet for writing Tatar. In doing so, Tatarstan wanted to emulate the script change already implemented in post-Soviet Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
In 1993 Czechoslovakia split into the two ethnolinguistic nation-states of the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Interestingly, only then, for the first time in history, was Czech made into the sole official language in the Czech lands (earlier it shared this role either with German or Slovak). The breakup of Yugoslavia was followed by bloody wars and successive waves of ethnic cleansing. Eventually, between 1991 and 2008 the process spawned seven polities, including six clearly ethnolinguistic nation-states. The latter group is composed of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. In order to conform to the normative paradigm of ethnolinguistic nationalism the previously common language of Serbo-Croatian was split into Latin script-based Bosnian and Croatian, Cyrillic-based Serbian, and bi-scriptural Montenegrin.7 In reality about half of the publications produced in Serbia are in Latin characters. Latin script-based Serbian is used by liberal and pro-European Serbs, while the official Cyrillic version is employed by nationalists and conservatives.

Bosnia does not conform to the usual paradigm of the ethnolinguistic nation-state as this polity is composed of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska (not to be confused with Serbia proper). In the former entity Bosnian and Croatian are employed, both written in Latin characters, while Cyrillic-based Serbian is used in the latter entity. Initially, in Bosnia, religious rather than linguistic difference (or a religious heritage ascribed from above in the case of non-religious persons) was used to differentiate between Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, construed, respectively, as Muslims, Catholics, and Orthodox. It is only nowadays that the ethnoreligious difference is translated into the linguistic one.8 Similarly, Serbia is not a model of an ethnolinguistic nation-state either because of its Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, where after the split of Serbo-Croatian, Croatian was added to the four co-official languages alongside the new statewide language of Serbian.

Kosovo is the sole non-ethnolinguistic nation-state spawned by the breakup of Yugoslavia and the only recognized one of such a character in today’s Central Europe. The polity’s de facto official and dominant language is Albanian and Kosovo’s Albanian-speakers define themselves as Albanians. Hence, Kosovo is a second Albanian nation-state, which is in clear breach with the unspoken principle of Central Europe’s ethnolinguistic nationalism that the speakers of a single language form a nation, which should live in its own single nation-state. The Kosovan constitution of 2008 accords the status of a state co-official language to Serbian, while at the local level Bosnian, Romani, and Turkish also serve as co-official languages.

However, a linguistic difference that could be translated into a Kosovan language does exist. There are two Albanian dialects, Tosk spoken in southern Albania and

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7 Between 1920 and 2008 six languages emerged out of official Serbo-Croato-Slovenian [Yugoslavian], namely: Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian and Slovenian.

8 Sometimes Bosnians and their language are referred to as “Bosniak” and the label “Bosnian” is reserved for Bosnia’s entire citizenry, irrespective of ethnic, religious, or linguistic difference.
Gheg in northern Albania and Kosovo. Although two-thirds of Albanians speak Gheg, standard Albanian, codified after the war in communist Albania, is steeped in Tosk. Nowadays standard Albanian is increasingly interlaced with Gheg or even replaced by it in publications produced in Kosovo. However, most agree that more space should be made for Gheg in the standard, rather than transform Gheg into a separate language of Kosovan (Greenberg 2004; Kamusella 2008; Lučić 2002; Pipa 1989).

**Future**

It is worthwhile remarking that, as in the case of Czech and Slovak, all the four post-Serbo-Croatian languages are mutually comprehensible, although it must be remembered that Czech and Slovak stem from two different dialectal bases, while the post-Serbo-Croatian languages from the very same dialect. However, with time the separation reinforced by different linguistic practices and state borders may be translated into gradual incomprehension among these languages’ speakers born and raised in the new states. This phenomenon is already clearly visible among the younger generation of Czechs and Slovaks who were not exposed to the bilingualism of federal Czechoslovakia. The same happens in the case of Serbs and Macedonians, as the latter in the past studied Serbo-Croatian and had few problems understanding the Serbian variety of this language. On the other hand, at the political level, such processes of differentiation can be denied or opposed, usually from outside. For instance, Romania (alongside many Romance-speaking Moldovan citizens) does not recognize the separateness of Moldovan, considering it to be nothing more than Romanian with a handful of regionalisms and Russian linguistic loans thrown in. Bulgaria takes a similar stance vis-à-vis Macedonian, considering it Bulgarian written in the Serbian-style Cyrillic (cf Velichkova 1992).

In the two successive rounds of European Union (EU) enlargement in 2004 and 2007, ten Central European linguistic nation-states joined the EU. As a consequence, their respective national languages also acquired the status of official Union languages. These languages are: Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish, Romanian, Slovak, and Slovenian. Prior to 2007 only two scripts were in official use in the EU, Latin and Greek. With the accession of Bulgaria, Cyrillic was added to this repertory.

**English**

The intensive development of economic, cultural, and social relations, alongside tourism, in postcommunist Central Europe made it necessary for agreements to be made on effective means of communication, something that was not foregone due to half a century of enforced isolation in the Soviet bloc, which tended to enforce nationally conditioned monolingualism. In the 1990s English emerged in the role of the main language of interethnic communication in the region. Central Europe’s inhabitants decided on this language for pragmatic reasons, as English is currently the sole language of worldwide communication. On the other hand, they shunned the region’s two former lingua francas, German and Russian, as irretrievably tainted by their association with the atrocities ofnazism and communism, respectively. French, the pre-World War II
The privileged position of English as the language of wider communication in Central Europe was recently fortified by the founding of the transitional international English-language administrations in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the stream of refugees from both polities to the United States and the United Kingdom. Today these erstwhile refugees and their offspring, who speak English with a native fluency, regularly shuttle between their countries of residence and origin. This phenomenon is repeated on an even wider scale in the case of about 3 to 4 million inter-EU migrants from Central Europe, who after 2004 have moved mainly to the English-speaking polities of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Other old EU members, geographically much closer to Central Europe than the United Kingdom or Ireland, namely Germany, Austria, France and Italy, elected to keep their job markets closed to Central European migrants (which they could do until 2011). Perhaps this doomed any remaining possibility of reviving French and German as languages of interethnic communication in Central Europe.

Non-State Languages

Romani
In the wake of the fall of communism Roma intellectuals and leaders from many Central European countries began to cooperate in order to address the dire economic and social plight of the Roma, but also to codify their Romani language and to create a Romani national movement. The first efforts to publish in Romani were undertaken in the interwar Soviet Union (in Cyrillic) and in communist Yugoslavia (also in Cyrillic). Two-thirds of the world’s 10 to 12 million Roma live in Central Europe, mainly in the Balkans, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia. They usually adhere to the dominant religion in a given polity, that is, in Central Europe, Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, Islam or, more rarely, Protestantism. Likewise, they tend to write in the script of the national language of the polity where they live, that is, in the Cyrillic, Greek, or Latin alphabet. Despite many centuries of persecution at least half of the Roma continue to speak Romani. Besides the language, they use their specific customs, way of life, and endogamy to maintain their ethnic difference. The traditional orality of their culture stands in the way of making Romani a written language. Various codifications of Romani, based on different dialects, and conducted using the Cyrillic, Latin, or Greek script have been created in Central European polities. Interestingly, the Romani Wikipedia is available in Latin characters and the Indian script of Devanagari, which is a reflection of New Delhi’s 1970s policy to recognize and support the Roma as one of India’s peoples (ethnolinguistic nations).

There are no regular schools with Romani as the medium of education, yet it is generally recognized as a minority language. At present the only place in the world where Romani is employed as an official language is the municipality of Shuto Orizari within the administrative borders of the Macedonian capital of Skopje. But in line with the Kosovan constitution, further municipalities in Kosovo may adopt this language as
co-official. Romani is an Indo-European language of the Indic branch which comprises the Indo-European languages of India and Pakistan.

**National Minority Languages**

The construction of ethnolinguistic nation-states in Central Europe required the ethnic and linguistic homogenization of populations in such polities. The next step to achieving this goal was to spread the officially adopted standard of the national language, which necessitated the liquidation of dialectal variety. Administrative measures and other social factors including universal popular education, the recruitment of mass conscript armies, and ultimately the pervading of society by the truly ubiquitous mass media of radio and television were mobilized to this end. However, frequently changing borders, persisting historical or religious legacies, and persecution triggered by linguistic and ethnic difference (perceived as unjust by the target group) repeatedly nullified state-directed efforts to homogenize the population and to eliminate dialectal differences, especially so in the borderland regions, which changed hands most often.

With Soviet approval, Central Europe’s communist regimes used ethnolinguistic homogenization as an instrument for their own legitimation. After the fall of communism democratization allowed for increasingly freer expressions of surviving ethnolinguistic and dialectal difference, which often began to be deployed for political ends due to the fact that the linguistically defined national polity remained the foundation of the political organization of the region. Bowing to this revival, and under the pressure of the West (expressed in the form of the French-organized Balladur Plan), most Central Europe’s states in the 1990s contracted bilateral treaties with neighboring states in which they agreed to recognize and protect national minorities ethnolinguistically associated with the nation of the neighboring polity. The European Council completed this process with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which entered into force in 1998.

**Stateless National, Ethnic Minority, Regional and Immigrant Languages**

These steps fell short, however, of recognizing and reaffirming the languages of nations, or of ethnic, religious, and regional groups who could not be directly identified with any state. The problem was slowly recognized and addressed by the European Council through the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages that entered into force in 1998. An NGO, the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL), founded in 1982 in Dublin (initially to canvass for making Ireland’s co-official Celtic language of Irish an EU official language, an aim achieved in 2008), strove to support the recognition and use of these languages, and closely cooperated to this end with the European Union and the Council of Europe. However, when everything is said and done, the actual decision to recognize such a language rests exclusively with the state on whose territory it is spoken. Not surprisingly, many Central European nation-states, having invested so much in the building and maintaining of ethnolinguistic homogeneity (or its illusion), are reluctant to grant such recognition.

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9 This Bureau was disbanded in 2010.
In Central Europe small ethnic and regional languages abound in the borderlands of the former Kingdom of Hungary, all of them Slavic, namely: Cyrillic-based Rusyn (today in eastern Slovakia, eastern Hungary, southwestern Ukraine, Serbia’s Vojvodina, and eastern Croatia), and Latin script-based: Banat Bulgarian (mainly in western Romania and eastern Serbia), Bunjevac (Serbia’s Vojvodina and southern Hungary), Čakavian and Kajkavian (western and north-central Croatia), Prekmurjan Slovenian (northeastern Slovenia), and Burgenland Croatian (eastern Austria). Two further languages belonging to this group already became fully recognized national languages complete with their respective nation-states, that is, Bosnian and Slovak. In the meeting zone between the West Romance and South Slavic dialect continua, the Slavic languages of Molisean (cognate with Croatian) and Resian (cognate with Slovenian) emerged in what today is northeastern Italy.

In southern Italy and Sicily, the Latin alphabet-based Arbëresh is spoken, while the Greek script-based Arvantika is spoken in central Greece; both are cognate with Albanian, or its Tosk dialect. The remnants of the Romance-speakers who used to be the link between the West and East Romance dialect continua, are today spread thinly across the Balkans from Greece and Bulgaria to Croatia’s Istria. Their three distinctive groups go by the names of Aromanians, Megleno-Romanians, and Istro-Romanians. (The two former groups are also referred to as “Vlachs”). They write their languages variously in the Latin, Greek, or Cyrillic script. In southern Bulgaria, and across the border in northern Greece, the Muslim Slavophone group of Pomaks live. They usually write their Pomakian language in Greek letters.

In the former meeting zone between the West Germanic and North Slavic dialect continua (after 1945 shifted by ethnic cleansing to the Oder-Neisse line) the following Slavic languages (with strong Germanic influence on lexicon, syntax, and phonology) emerged: Mazurian (in present-day northeastern Poland), Kashubian (northern Poland), Upper and Lower Sorbian (eastern Germany), Silesian (southern Poland, and the northeastern corner of the Czech Republic), and Moravian (the southeast of the Czech Republic). At the confluence of the current Belarusian, Polish, and Ukrainian borders the bi-scriptural (Cyrillic and Latin) West Polesian language coalesced (also construed as Podlachian in Poland). In a similar manner Goralian (Podhalanian) emerged in the Polish-Slovak borderland of the High Tatars.

In Latvia and Lithuania the use of former parallel dialectal bases of Latvian and Lithuanian have revived Latgalian in eastern Latvia and Samogitian in western Lithuania. Significantly, Latgalian- and Samogitian-speakers amount to one-third of all Latvian- and Lithuanian-speakers, respectively. Latvia protects the northwestern littoral of the Gulf of Riga, dubbed as the Livonian historical territory, which is of more cultural and tourist importance than linguistic, because the remaining speakers of the Finno-Ugric language of Livonian are few. In Estonia southern Estonian, which used to be a former dialectal basis of the Estonian language, was also revived. Nowadays it comes in two closely related varieties, one used by the Lutheran inhabitants of the Estonian town of Võro and its vicinity and the other by Orthodox Finno-Ugric-speakers, who refer to themselves as Setus. Thus, it is usual to refer to this language as Võro-Seto.
Across Central Europe some languages other than Romani, Yiddish, or Spanyol remain in diasporic use. The most important ones include Karaim and Armenian. The former is the idiom (akin to Crimean Tatar, and Krymchak, or the Hebrew script-based language of Crimea’s Jews) of the Karaites (Karaims), that is, the Turkic-speaking community who profess a religion (Karaism) close to Judaism. They write their language in Hebrew characters. The traditional Armenian diaspora has only a limited knowledge of Grabar (the classical language of the 4th century Armenian translation of the Bible) used in the liturgy, or modern Armenian, for that matter. After the fall of communism they were joined by numerous Armenian immigrants from post-Soviet Armenia, who speak contemporary Armenian. During communist times, as part and parcel of the Soviet bloc’s ideologized cooperation with Asia’s communist states, Vietnamese and North Korean immigrant communities made an appearance in Central Europe. Nowadays, they have been joined by further immigrant (refugee) communities of Chechens, Chinese, Georgians, Indians (mainly Hindi- and Punjabi-speakers), Kazaks, Nigerians, Russian-speakers, and Ukrainians, among others.

Some of the mentioned languages are tiny, weak, or even moribund, and thus usually of little or no political significance (Istro-Romanian, Livonian, Mazurian, Lower Sorbian, Megleno-Romanian, Molisean, Banat Bulgarian, West Polesian, Prekmur-Slovenian, or Resian). Some are fully or almost fully recognized as national languages of stateless nations (Aromanian, Sorbian, and Rusyn). Others are recognized as specific to regional groups of a nation enjoying its own nation-state (Čakavian, Goralian, Kajkavian, Kashubian, Latgalian, Samogitian, or Võro-Seto). Still others are construed as pertaining to separate ethnic groups which do not express any clear desire to transform themselves into nations (Arbëresh, Arvantika, Burgenland Croatian, Čakavian, Kajkavian, Kashubian, or Pomak). Some of these languages are also deployed for building political movements that may be qualified simultaneously as regional and national (Bunjevac, Kashubian, Moravian, or Silesian). Unfortunately, languages of immigrant and refugee communities are neither recognized nor employed by administration or schools in order to facilitate their integration into Central Europe’s societies.

Interestingly, although the Silesians constitute the largest ethnic or national minority in today’s Poland (according to the 2002 Polish census), neither they nor their language are recognized in the country. Similarly, no recognition was granted to Goralian. In emulation of the French example, Greece does not recognize any minorities or minority languages on its territory, except Turkish. Bulgaria considers Pomak speech a dialect of Bulgarian. Romania claims Aromanian, Istro-Romanian, and Megleno-Romanian as the southern dialects of Romanian, but the speakers of the three languages dispute this. Although Čakavian and Kajkavian are more different from standard Croatian than Bosnian, Montenegrin, or Serbian, they are nevertheless construed as dialects of Croatian (Blanke 2001; Dulichenko 2003–2004; Hannan 1996; Kamusella 2008: ch 3; Magocsi 1996; O’Reilly 2001; Tornow 2005; Wicherkiewicz 2003).
Tomasz Kamusella

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The Concept of the *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* \(^1\)

Tomasz Kamusella

**INTRODUCTION**

Language is such a commonplace phenomenon that it frequently escapes one’s conscious attention and becomes a “transparent,” seemingly obvious, category. Perhaps because of this, and also because of the fact that language is repeatedly actualized in a plethora of different realizations (or languages), language, since the emergence of humanity, has been the most potent marker of group identity. The Enlightenment values of progress and universalism attempted to overcome this divisive nature of language, but with only limited success. Peoples and states have frequently quarreled, gone to war, and even committed genocides over language as a symbol of group identity and group difference.

Using the example of Central Europe, the *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* offers a synthetic insight into the mechanisms and history of how languages have been made, unmade, and deployed for political action in the age of nationalism between the 19th and 21st centuries. This interdisciplinary *Atlas* is unique in its approach and scope as, to my knowledge, no similar work has been attempted so far. Significantly, it makes a wealth of specialist and otherwise inaccessible information readily available to the expert and general reader.

As remarked above, language has always been a significant marker of group identity and of cultural separateness in the case of polities. But this has been so to a highly unusual extent in modern Central Europe, where the politicized equation of language with nation and state became the sole legitimizing basis of state-building in the region after World War I. The idea of normative isomorphism (or, tight spatial and ideological overlapping) of language, state, and nation (also known as ethnolinguistic or ethnic nationalism) emerged in the first half of the 19th century in the German Confederation and in the Apennine Peninsula, where, respectively, a German Empire and a Kingdom of Italy were founded, as nation-states for the ethnolinguistically defined nations of Germans and Italians.

\(^1\) The prose of this article was kindly streamlined by Michael O’Gorman and Catherine Gibson. I also thank Motoki Nomachi and Catherine Gibson for their advice and suggestions for improvement. Obviously all remaining infelicities are the author’s sole responsibility.
Later, ethnolinguistic nation-states closely fulfilling this isomorphism’s requirements emerged in Central Europe in three successive waves, after World War I, after World War II, and in the wake of the collapse of communism (marked by the breakups of Yugoslavia beginning in 1991, of the Soviet Union in 1991, and of Czechoslovakia in 1993). The process triggered vast political, social, and economic instabilities and upheavals. This was because the ideologically motivated endeavors aiming at bringing about the spatial overlapping of state territory and nation (with “nation” understood as all the speakers of a national language) necessarily disregarded historical borders and necessitated the unprecedented mass expulsions of “foreigners” (or those speaking languages other than the national one). Simultaneously, it frequently involved a program of “repatriations” (in effect, the compulsory immigration) of the national language’s speakers to “their” nation-state from “foreign” states; the result was the removal of language communities from areas of their traditional settlement because frontier changes had allocated those areas to ethnolinguistic nation-states with national languages other than their own.

When the achievement of this goal of the tight overlapping of language, nation, and state was frustrated or proved for some reasons impractical, specious “constitutional languages” were sometimes called into existence by legislation to ensure that an aspiring nation-state would not violate this isomorphic principle. The best known examples of this phenomenon include the Serbo-Croato-Slovenian (Yugoslavian) language in Yugoslavia and the Czechoslovak language in Czechoslovakia, both of which were legislated into existence in the interwar period. Likewise, the breakup of Yugoslavia required the parallel breakup of Serbo-Croatian, so that Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia, as newly-emergent ethnolinguistic nation-states, could conform to the isomorphic principle, and thus acquire their separate national languages of Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin, and Serbian, respectively. Similarly, when the non-Romance (that is, Slavophone) population and the local Fourteenth Russian (until 1991, Soviet) army thwarted the unification of the newly independent post-Soviet Moldova with Romania in the 1992 war, the continued existence of Moldova as a nation-state in its own right required the constitutional preservation of Moldovan as its national and official language, though for all practical purposes it is the same language as Romanian.

Thus far, however, the interdisciplinary field of the study of language politics from the perspective of nation- and nation-state-building has been the focus of relatively few comprehensive works. This comes at the detriment of research, especially on Central Europe, where language has been ideologized to such an unprecedented degree that it has become the sole legitimizing basis of statehood in this area of Europe.

Historians, sociologists, and political scientists tend to treat languages as a “black box,” and do not analyze how they are constructed and deployed for political and other socially significant ends. Likewise, although linguists and sociolinguists are well aware of the constructedness of national languages, they often either disregard the influence of politics and ideology on language-making, or unreflectively follow politically correct national narratives that obtain in their home nation-states by restricting their linguistic research to what a given national political correctness requires. On the other hand, anthropologists, who are best suited to bridge this cognitive gap, do not pursue
all-embracing research on Central Europe, preferring to focus on narrower case studies, usually from outside Europe, or more broadly speaking, from outside the territories perceived as constituting the West, or of the developed world. (As the popular observation has it, “sociologists study the West, and anthropologists the Rest.”)

The *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* aspires to ameliorate this situation. On one hand, when completed, in an easily accessible and attractive form of overview maps accompanied by explanatory texts, it will provide social scientists with information on the formation and ideologically motivated construction of languages. This will be analyzed against the backdrop of border and population changes, triggered by the processes of nation- and nation-state-building. On the other hand, this *Atlas* will also allow linguists and sociolinguists to situate their intimate knowledge of the region’s languages in the context of Central European history and politics, disentangled from the straitjacket of national master narratives and the myths which these narratives spawn and perpetuate. Furthermore, the *Atlas* will help European Union (EU) and NATO political analysts, along with the interested reader, to comprehend the dynamics of politics and history in modern Central Europe, a politically significant region that extends alongside (and in places, straddles) the EU’s current eastern and southeastern frontiers. In the near future, those polities which currently lie outside of the post-2013 EU border, may also become part of the European Union.

**THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS**

In order to progress with the Atlas, it was necessary firstly to identify concepts with which it would be possible to problematize the constructed character of languages and their highly politicized use for nation- and nation-state-building in Central Europe. After deciding on such concepts, the second stage was to devise practical cartographical ways in which they could be operationalized and presented in the form of a map series.

Thanks to my previous research on these issues (Kamusella 1998, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2006, 2009), I came to the conclusion that the concepts of dialect continuum and normative isomorphism of language, nation, and state were the most appropriate conceptual tools for problematizing the subject matter. On the one hand, they allowed me to analyze social and political processes, as reflected in language change, while on the other hand, they lent themselves relatively easily to cartographic representation. Both features considerably facilitated the design and execution of relevant map series, chronologically illustrating how the dynamics of the interaction of language with political and social forces unfolded in Central Europe.

**CENTRAL EUROPE?**

Having decided on these issues, the problem which emerged was how to define Central Europe. It is quite a malleable term, and is to a degree as imagined as Europe itself, which is commonly construed as a continent, though in reality it is a subcontinent (or large peninsula) of Eurasia, as is also true of the Indian subcontinent. The usual
definition of a continent prescribes that it should be a large and continuous landmass surrounded by seas and oceans, and not connected to any other similar landmasses by anything more substantial than a narrow land bridge. The only two continents that do not meet these criteria are Europe and Asia, because of the late 18th century consensus to delineate the border between them along the Ural Mountains and the Caucasus Mountains (Wolff 1994: 154–155, 196–197).

The end of the 18th century also coincided with a change in the conceptualization of the regional division of Europe. Earlier, one spoke of Southern and Northern Europe with the Alps and the Carpathians as the rough dividing line. In this model, what today is Germany, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and the three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, then belonged squarely to Northern Europe (Wolff 1994: 141). The “invention of Eastern Europe,” as Wolff terms it, in a real sense occurred when the Habsburgs (“Austria”), Prussia, and the Russian Empire partitioned Poland-Lithuania in the late 18th century. Contemporary commentators in France, Britain, and the Holy Roman Empire who shaped the discourse of politics, presented their western part of Europe as “civilized” and in opposition to the “oriental” and “barbaric” eastern section of the continent, identified as Russia and the Ottoman Empire. To Western eyes, both of these were decidedly non-European.

A complication later arose, commencing in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars with the founding of the German Confederation, which began the extension of the zone of “civilized western Europe” some distance eastward. This initiated a process of further eastward encroachment of this western area of supposed higher civilization, which continued over the course of the 19th century. By the turn of the 20th century, this area was shared by the German Empire in the north and Austria-Hungary in the south. To the eye of the Western observer, both polities appeared to be somewhat “immature” members of Western Europe, tainted by their contacts and common borders with Russia and the Ottomans. In the emerging ideological pecking order, German and Austro-Hungarian politicians and intellectuals, simultaneously aspired to membership of this “better” Western Europe, and also tended to draw a line between their countries and this “menacing” Eastern Europe.

The Great War, which pitted the German and Dual empires both against the “real” Western Europe, on the one hand, and against Eastern Europe, embodied by the Russian Empire, led to the emergence of the concept of Mitteleuropa, first translated into English as “Middle Europe,” before “Central Europe” became a standard English-language term in the mid-20th century. Central Europe developed a clearer identity as an area composed of nation-states rather than only of the marchlands of three multinational empires after 1918. The empires either disappeared or withdrew from the region and were decisively replaced by a group of national polities, each of which was created and legitimized by the application of the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism. This short-lived, interwar Central Europe composed of nation-states disappeared during World War II. After 1945, when Europe was split between two ideological and military blocs separated by an impenetrable “Iron Curtain,” the continent appeared to be neatly divided into Western and Eastern Europe again, despite the formal or legal restoration of the group of nation-states on the eastern side of the frontier (Wolff 1994: 14–15).
This dualistic, Cold War political division of the continent came to a (now we know, tentative) end after the collapse of communism, which led to the termination of the Cold War in 1989. That event was followed by the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union, which yielded on its former western flank the resurgent nation-states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and also the entirely new nation-states of Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. With the disappearance of the Cold War binary West-East conception of Europe, a space was created in the 1990s for the reemergence of the concept of Central Europe in politics and culture. (Obviously, not all the polities concerned or their elites have consistently identified with this space.)

However, the continual eastward enlargement of the European Union and of NATO seems to have involved the extension of the boundaries of Western Europe (construed as “our common Europe”) at the expense of Central Europe. Thus, in the late 2000s, the conceptualization of the continent as consisting of Western and Eastern Europe gained considerable purchase in both public and scholarly discourse. The core of Eastern Europe is identified with “European Russia,” as (at least, so far) no serious Western or Russian politician has proposed that Russia could become a member of the EU or of NATO.

Given the conceptual and political malleability or indeterminacy of the concept of Central Europe, in the Atlas I decided to follow the pragmatic and practical approach employed by the Canadian scholar Paul Robert Magocsi in his unequalled Historical Atlas of Central Europe (2002). But even he, before coming to his current stance on what Central Europe is, engaged with terminological problems, as evidenced by the revealing difference in the title of the first edition of his atlas in 1993, Historical Atlas of East Central Europe. “East” was a throwback to the Cold War years, when Central European scholars working in the United States contested the then-obtaining dual division of Europe, and advanced the proposition that Central Europe, bisected by the Iron Curtain, consisted of West and East Central Europe. Heuristically, it was difficult to maintain this distinction, as scholars from states classified as belonging to West Central Europe (for instance, Belgium, Austria, the Netherlands, or Switzerland) preferred to subsume them in the category of Western Europe. Hence, it did not make sense to qualify Central Europe with the adjective “East,” because nobody wanted this term’s counterpart of West Central Europe.

Bearing this in mind, and also the fact that neither politicians nor scholars contest the definition of Europe as an imagined continent extending from the Urals to Portugal (including the country’s Azores in the middle of the Atlantic), Magocsi proposed to treat the middle one-third of this landmass (extending between 10ºE and 30ºE longitude) as Central Europe (1993: xi; 2002: xi, xiii). In my Atlas I follow his decision. However, Magocsi decided to exclude Scandinavia, the Baltic Sea and the Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia from the quadrant of his base map of Central Europe, perhaps concluding that these regions belonged to a tentative region of Northern Europe. However, his maps do include western Anatolia, though technically it is part of Asia, because both the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantium) and its successor, the Ottoman Empire, straddled the Bosporus, as Turkey does today. Essentially, all such subregions of a continent and continents themselves are imagined, like nations and states (cf Grataloup 2009).
But the involvement and importance of Scandinavia and the territories of Estonia and Latvia for the northern half of Central Europe is comparable to that of Byzantium and the Ottomans for the southern section of Central Europe. Having taken this into consideration, alongside the practicalities of cartography, I decided to commission a quadrant as my Atlas’s base map that includes within its frame the southern reaches of Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and also Estonia, Latvia, and Russia’s Baltic littoral with the former imperial capital of St. Petersburg. Likewise, given their importance for the history of Central Europe, I took the decision to extend the quadrant’s eastern limit slightly to the east, in order to take in the area of Moscow, Crimea with almost all of eastern Ukraine, central Anatolia with the Turkish capital of Ankara, and Cyprus. I believe that these extensions of scope add to the explicatory value of the Atlas (cf Kamusella 2009: Introduction).

OTHER WOES

The goal of the Atlas is to shed light on the interface between politics and language-making in modern Central Europe. In the preparatory phases of the project it emerged that it was also indispensable to probe into a more distant past, in order to trace the lineages of certain developments which shaped or still continue to impact on the region. As a result, the troublesome issue of different linguistic forms of place-names (toponyms) and of other administrative or geographical names had to be confronted. As I proposed in my article devoted to this issue (Kamusella 2004a), I made an effort to use the forms of the names that were either widely adopted or official in a given period to which a map pertains. In parentheses I gave the forms that are current today.

This seemingly simple solution to the widespread problem of the anachronistic use of place-names in most literature on Central Europe published today has its disadvantages too. Firstly, in the maps in the Atlas depicting Central Europe in the 9th century and in 1050, the use of today’s forms of place-names was generally unavoidable. This is because official or prevalent forms from those two periods are either unknown, or display such a high incidence of variance in the few preserved records as to be of marginal practical value as cartographic toponyms. This is especially true of the northern half of Central Europe, where the technology of writing was only haltingly introduced at the turn of the second millennium CE. In the case of Latin or Greek official forms on the territory of the Eastern Roman Empire or of the defunct Western Roman Empire, I did include them with modern-day forms in parentheses. I also included some

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2 Obviously, the question of different linguistic names of toponyms is “troublesome” only in today’s world of standardization and uniformization, underpinned by the ideology of monolingualism and monoscripturalism. There is nothing inherently “unnatural” about the use of numerous different linguistic forms of place-names committed to paper in a variety of writing systems.

3 During the last decade it is becoming quite a common trope—in Anglophone publications on Central Europe at least—to include a note on place-names at the beginning of a monograph or a table/index of place names in various languages.
recorded original Slavic place-names in the area that is Germany today and Norse ones in the Baltic southern littoral and Rus’.

Secondly, a further issue concerned the transliteration of historic and contemporary place-names from the Cyrillic, Arabic, and Greek scripts. In most cases I follow Magocsi’s *Historical Atlas of Central Europe*, though I double-checked the correctness of his transliterations against other atlases and printed sources, the latter mostly in Cyrillic and the Greek alphabet. This allowed for significant corrections, as in the use of Katharevousa Greek forms of place-names prior to 1974, and Demotic Greek ones after this date, when the latter form of the Greek language replaced the former one as the official language. In the transliteration of Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) place-names and in the use of modern-day place-names in Turkish, often a confusion appears as to the employment of the letters [ı, I] and [i, İ], that denote two different Turkish phonemes. For instance, a name given in minuscule letters is spelt correctly, as in Girit for Crete, but in capitals it is given incorrectly as GIRIT, where it should read GİRİT.

Thirdly, some places, especially capital cities (old and new), as well as bigger or renowned cities and regions, have recognized Anglicized forms of their names. In such cases I supply the Anglicized names, though, where it is of practical value, I append the names with their official forms in local languages. In those cases where a state recognizes two official or national languages, I adopted the convention of giving the two official linguistic forms of a place-name separated by a slash, as in the case of Finland’s capital of Helsinki/Helsingfors, where the forms are of Finnish and Swedish origin, respectively.

Fourthly, I tried to stick to the official names of states featured on the maps. Thus, I do not use “Germany” for the Holy Roman Empire. In the case of the East Roman Empire, popularly known as the “Byzantine Empire,” I append the latter with the polity’s official Byzantine Greek name, Romania, in parentheses. In the case of the Ottoman Empire, I employ a similar concession for the sake of easy comprehension and in order not to alienate readers unduly, by either adding the word “caliphate” to “empire” (hence, the “Ottoman Empire-Caliphate”) or by putting it in parentheses. In one instance, I also give the official Ottoman form of the state’s name, that is, the “Sublime Ottoman State.” But in order not to make the picture too familiar for the reader, which might in itself be misleading, I chose to give the name of the Crimean Khanate also in its original Turkic form, as Kırım Hanlığı.

Another problem with the names of polities is that although we know of the existence of some of these polities, we have no way of knowing what their official names might have been. That is the case, for example, with the exonym “Greater Moravia,” a name which is derived from a Latin reference to this polity recorded in a medieval chronicle. Although, it is known that the polity was referred to as Rus’, it is unknown if that was just a customary name or also official name of the realm. As until the mid-11th century, the Rus’ ruler used the title of khagan (or great khan), in one of the maps I decided to use the term “Rus’ Khaganate.” The capital of Rus’ was in Kyiv (or Kiev in Russian), hence why historians popularly refer to this polity as Kievan Rus’. I sometimes follow the practice, but instead using the Russian form of the city’s name, I settled for the Ukrainian one since Kyiv is today the capital of Ukraine (hence, “Kyivan Rus’”).

61
On the map of Central Europe’s dialect continua in the 9th century I followed Magocsi’s (2002: 11) convention of featuring the names of ethnic groups, even those which were recorded in the late medieval chronicles of the 13th and 14th centuries, and as such appear to be anachronistic inventions of chroniclers. It is especially true of the Czechs, Polanians, and Slovaks, from which the respective national master narratives derive the present-day nations of Czechs, Poles, and Slovaks (Jasiński 2007, Urbańczyk 2008). This issue will also be discussed in an explanatory text to accompany the map.

Another contentious issue was that of the origin of the Romancephone population in what today is Romania and Moldova. The proponents of the Romanian national master narrative claim a demographic and linguistic continuity between the Roman province of Dacia that existed within the Roman Empire’s frontiers for a century and a half (106–271 CE) and the Danubian principalities of Walachia and Moldavia that coalesced in the 14th and 15th centuries. Their Hungarian counterparts, and seemingly the majority of international scholars, point to the fact that such continuity has not been documented with adequate written and archeological records. They propose that Romance-speakers, whose descendants became a Romanian nation in the 19th century, had migrated to this area from the Balkans at the turn of the second millennium CE. Hence, the Romancephone Vlachs of today (Aromanians, Istro-Romanians and Megleno-Romanians), still living in the Balkans, appear to be the original population from which the Romanians stem.

Of the two interpretations about the origins of the Romanians and the Moldovans, the latter interpretation seems to be better documented and more persuasive, and I decided to represent it in the dialect continuum maps for the periods of the 9th and the mid-11th centuries. Obviously, I will explain the decision at length in an explanatory text to accompany these maps. Should evidence come to light in clear support of the national Romanian stance on this issue before the completion of the Atlas, I would propose to correct the maps accordingly.

**Conventions**

Certain conventions had to be employed in order to emphasize the changing dynamics of the complex relationships between linguistic reality and culture, construed in this work as political and social forces. The obvious choice was color coding. I chose dialect continua as the foundation for this color coding, to which I ascribed different colors. In the cases of related continua, I employed various shades of a single color to indicate their degree of closeness. This, in turn, allowed me to employ darker (thus, appropriately distinctive) shades of these colors for writing the names of languages and ethnic groups (popularly, though unnecessarily disparagingly, referred to as “tribes,” especially in the context of the Middle Ages, or in imperial Russia’s officialese until 1917) featured on the maps. This device also easily lent itself to the color coding of various writing systems that originated for writing different languages that were (are) invariably related to one dialect continuum or another.

This color coding of information about dialect continua, languages, names of ethnic groups speaking them, and scripts employed for writing these languages allows
The Concept of the Atlas

the maps to be grouped into series and for a coherence to be maintained between these series. In turn, this device helps emphasize the dynamics of unfolding relationships between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the political and the social, on the other. Obviously, because the genetic classification of languages, as proposed by August Schleicher in the mid-19th century, is not the only possible one, I also included a composite map of linguistic areas. To emphasize the fact that this method of language classification, as developed by areal linguists, differs radically from that of genetic linguistics, a completely different set of colors was developed for denoting Central Europe’s linguistic areas. On this basis, in the future I plan to develop a series of maps of linguistic areas, which would complement the dialect continua series.

The political reality is depicted on the maps as various political and administrative borders rendered in black. The same color is used for writing the names of states, regions, and localities. Thus, these elements remain quite distinctive, though they do not dominate the maps as is the norm in conventional atlases. This part of the historic and the present-day reality of Central Europe is quite well known, so relegating it to the background does not diminish the value of the Atlas to the reader. On the contrary, the foregrounding of the linguistic through the use of color draws the reader’s attention to this rarely analyzed aspect of Central Europe, which is the Atlas’s primary goal.

Dialect continua are usually depicted as solid blocs of color. However, occasionally, when speakers are (or were) bilingual in languages from two different dialect continua, or speakers of two different languages live (or lived) side by side, intermingling stripes of two colors reflect such a situation. When a population speaking a language from a different dialect continuum is (or was) thinly spread (for instance, Yiddish-speaking Jews before World War II, or Roma today) in areas where the majority of inhabitants use languages from different dialect continua, the presence of the former is rendered by lines, rather than stripes.

What Is a Dialect Continuum?

Prior to the invention of writing and the codification of languages (as discrete artefacts), spoken language changed gradually from village to village and from region to region. In this manner, chains of gradually changing (but still mutually comprehensible) dialects are created. These dialects (or local language forms), shading from one into another, form dialect continua. People speaking dialects from different dialect continua do not understand one another. However, this barrier of incomprehensibility may be easily bridged by multilingualism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dialect Chain</th>
<th>Dialect A</th>
<th>Adjacent Dialect B</th>
<th>More Distant Dialect F</th>
<th>Far-Flung Dialect Z</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Degree of comprehensibility with Dialect A</td>
<td>Full mutual comprehensibility</td>
<td>Good mutual comprehensibility</td>
<td>With more distance, less mutual comprehensibility</td>
<td>Poor, but still retained, mutual comprehensibility</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Dialect Continua Map Series

This was the first series, consisting of five maps, to be completed for this Atlas. The idea was to show that until the modern period linguistic and political borders did not converge in Central Europe. This began to change when ethnolinguistic nationalism emerged in the 19th century and became a standard component of state building projects and of state legitimization in the region after World War I. Vast voluntary and involuntary population movements (including expulsions and genocide), combined with often dramatic changes in political borders, led to the growing convergence between linguistic and political borders in Central Europe. The degree of this convergence is high (though not full) and quite unusual compared both to other areas of the world and to Central Europe itself in the period before 1918.

I decided to use the concept of dialect continuum in order to depict the phenomenon of the convergence of political and linguistic borders as driven by the normative urge introduced by ethnolinguistic nationalism, because borders between dialect continua are the only linguistic borders that can be incontrovertibly discerned from the linguistic reality alone. Fundamentally, from the linguistic (dialectal) perspective, territories inhabited by speakers of languages from a single dialect continuum are not divided sharply from one another. Dialectal change is gradual throughout the entire area within a dialect continuum and, as such, cannot coincide with sharp political borders. This state of things may come to an end when ethnolinguistic nation-states have succeeded in replacing dialects with their respective standard languages. But now, in an age of open borders and free population movement, together with borderless mass media and the internet further eroding the compartmentalization of states, it may prove impossible to achieve such an ethnolinguistic ideal.

I plan to complement the dialect continua series with maps for the five following periods, not yet depicted, namely, 1250, 1721, 1917, 1930, and 1943.

What Is “a Language”?

The popularly accepted definition of “a language” (meaning one of the plethora of existing languages) goes back to Leonard Bloomfield’s 1926 deceptively simple proposal that languages are language forms that are mutually incomprehensible, while dialects are language forms that, despite differing from one another, are nevertheless mutually comprehensible. In the 1960s Einar Haugen showed that mutual comprehensibility is not a symmetrical phenomenon. Speakers of language/dialect 1 can understand language/dialect 2, while the speakers of the other do not necessarily understand the former (1966a).

Furthermore, there are recognized languages that are either fully mutually intelligible, or at least, are so to a considerable degree; Czech and Slovak, Bulgarian and Macedonian, and Moldovan and Romanian are three such pairs of languages. In light of Bloomfield’s definition, they should be classified as dialects. On the other hand, dialects of such languages as Arabic or Chinese are frequently less mutually intelligible than French and Italian, or even German and Polish. Somehow, however, these dialects
of Arabic or of Chinese are not categorized as separate languages. To consider another category, the German dialect of Low German is mutually comprehensible with Dutch, yet Dutch is not believed to be a dialect of German, nor is Low German supposed to be a dialect of Dutch. Nor, indeed, is the existence of a common Dutch-German language proposed.

Reflecting upon this dilemma, Haugen came to the conclusion that (written, standard) languages are socio-political constructs, carved from a segment or segments of a dialect continuum, and shaped, usually with the use of writing, by decisions taken at a given cultural and/or political center. Although we commonly believe that languages consist of dialects, this is an anachronistic understanding, brought about by the socio-political forces that created and still create entities, which we recognize as languages. To put it briefly, dialects are older than (written, standard) languages, hence, from the linguistic point of view, it is erroneous to subsume the former in the latter. It is rather an act of political will (Haugen 1966 and 1966b, Kamusella 2004b).

Consequently, at least in the Western approach to language, there is no linguistic definition of “a language,” with the partial exception of the highly specialized German term *Einzelsprache*. Such a definition can be only of a political or sociolinguistic character. As a result, it is appropriate to state that linguists do research on dialects or language in general, but not on languages.

The Atlas delves into the interface between the linguistic, on the one hand, and the political and the social, on the other. Languages being political projects, it would be inappropriate to present the subject matter through the lens of one of these projects. For instance, Bulgaria recognizes Macedonia, but declines to recognize the Macedonian language. By excluding this language from my maps, I would side with the Bulgarian stance, which would mean adopting one of the national master narratives that obtain in Central Europe. I decided to approach this dilemma head on, by adopting the “emic” (in-group) understanding of what languages are (or were). Thus, the same or similar varieties of a single language may bear different names in different periods (Belorussian and Belarusian) or in different regions separated from one another by a political border (Moldavian, Moldovan and Romanian). I also feature languages not recognized by the state on whose territory they are spoken by a language community which believes it to be a separate language in its own right (for instance, Silesian) (cf Kamusella 2001).

**A Different Approach to the Analysis of Language Differentiation: Linguistic Areas**

The concept of dialect continua emerged from the so-called genetic classification of languages, as proposed in the mid-19th century by August Schleicher. In this approach to conceptualizing linguistic difference through time, one construes languages as discrete entities that bifurcate and produce new languages, thus also implying a hierarchy. Thus, falling into the error of anthropomorphism, linguists speak of “parent” and “children” languages when explaining this concept to laymen. Lineages, often quite spurious, are created and present the reader with the appealing image of a “genealogical tree” of languages, within which one speaks of “language families” and their “branches.”
In this biologizing approach, languages are treated as autonomous individuals or species, as though independent of humans. However, in the world in which we live, languages are not able to exist independently of their human producers, users, and manipulators. Furthermore, it is typical of a human to speak, or otherwise use, many dialects/languages, which, especially given the increased social and spatial mobility characteristic of the modern world, have created numerous channels of exchange among different languages/dialects. This led in some cases to the emergence of entirely new languages, pidgins (trade languages with no language communities using them in everyday life, that is, outside the commercial context), and creoles (pidgins adopted by language communities as their everyday languages). In other cases, it led to the rise of multilingualism or multidialecticism, especially in the linguistic borderlands between (or, in the overlap of) various dialect continua (cf Kamusella 1998).  

Thus, genetically different languages (or dialects) become related through various shared elements of culture and history, and by certain linguistic commonalities. The effect of this is to blur the previously sharper linguistic border between dialect continua. In this manner, as proposed by Hugo Schuchardt in the 1870s, linguistic areas are formed, also known as linguistic leagues (or unions), from the original German term *Sprachbund*. This, apparently more realistic approach to languages as more diffuse and malleable phenomena, does not lend itself to such an appealing reification as that which genetic linguists found for their theory in the form of a genealogical tree. What is more, if languages were not self-contained entities, they could not serve as an ideological basis for the creation of ethnolinguistically defined nations or polities (cf Kamusella 2004b). Hence, this approach to the analysis and presentation of the linguistic remains the preserve of one group of specialists, so-called areal linguists.

The first linguistic area proposed, and to date the best researched, is the Balkan *Sprachbund*. It groups the Slavic and Romance languages employed in this area, along with Albanian, Greek, and sometimes Turkish. Other linguistic areas are more contested and there is no clear agreement about their membership, which perhaps reflects the complicated routes of linguistic contacts and influences that follow the dynamics of social, political, and economic relationships among human groups.

In the *Atlas*, I included one composite map of Central Europe’s linguistic areas in 1930. It is a composite map, as it represents two different schemes of such linguistic areas. I plan to divide this 1930 map into two, separating the two conceptual schemes, and then to add two more of the same kind to illustrate Central Europe’s linguistic areas as they are now at the beginning of the 21st century.

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4 Also, some languages, which we learned to classify as straightforwardly belonging to a given linguistic family, cease to fit into their categories so definitively when they are scrutinized more closely. For instance, English is generally categorized as one of the Germanic languages. On the basis of its grammar, this is clearly true. However, if one takes into account the vocabulary, the majority of which is of Romance origin, English appears to be more of a Germanic-Romance creole.
THE CONCEPT OF THE ATLAS

THE QUESTION OF WRITING

In the Western world, what makes a language a language is quintessentially writing. Commenting from the historical perspective, we live in a strange period where everybody, from childhood onwards, is expected to be able to read and write. Full literacy is a recent phenomenon though, dating back only to the 19th century in Northern America, Western Europe, and Australia; to the mid-20th century in Central and Eastern Europe, and to the latter half of this century in some other regions, notably in post-Soviet Central Asia, East and South East Asia, and Latin America. This development still eludes Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

As previously indicated, writing has been known in the southern half of Central Europe since antiquity, though it reached the northern half only in the 9th and 10th centuries. From the Middle Ages to the Early Modern period, writing was the preserve of clerks, churchmen, and the narrow stratum of administrators and politicians. It was a component of the ideological package grounded in one religion or another. Hence, all the scripts employed today in Europe stem directly from so-called “holy languages,” the Greek script from the Greek original of the Gospels, the Latin script from the Vulgate (the official Catholic Latin translation of the Bible), and Cyrillic from the (Old Church) Slavonic translation of the Bible.

I have completed a single, composite map of Central Europe’s writing systems with the political and administrative borders drawn as they were in 2009. The present-day distribution of the use of the different scripts in this region is marked in blocs of color. I also marked the furthest extent of each script in the past using lines. (And reviewing this map, I see now that I have omitted to mark the use of the Arabic script in some areas of today’s Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine by Muslim Tatars to write their Slavic speech.)

I intend to develop a map series that would depict the use of scripts in Central Europe in the 9th century, 1050, 1250, 1570, 1721, 1910, 1917, 1930, 1943, 1974, and 2009.

THE ISOMORPHISM MAP SERIES

I use the term “isomorphism” to denote a tight spatial and ideological overlapping of the national language, the nation that speaks it, and that nation’s nation-state. This model of normative isomorphism underpins the dynamics of ethnolinguistic nationalisms as they unfolded in Central Europe, especially in the wake of World War I. This isomorphism has guided and legitimated the process of nation-state-making in this region to this day (Kamusella 2004b and 2006).

The necessary requirements of this normative isomorphism are the following:

1. The speakers of a language constitute a nation (ergo, their language is a national one).
2. The territory inhabited by this language’s speakers should be made into the nation’s nation-state.
3 The nation’s national language cannot be shared in its official (national) capacity with any other nation or polity.
4 No autonomous regions with official languages other than the nation’s national one can exist in the nation’s nation-state.
5 By the same token, no autonomous regions with the nation’s language can exist in other polities.

To this scheme, one can add further, ideal (though, in practice deemed as non-essential) requirements, which ethnolinguistic national movements and states nevertheless aspire to implement. These requirements are:

1 All the nation’s members ought to be monolingual.
2 All the nation’s members should permanently reside within the borders of their respective nation-state.
3 Members of other nations (that is, speaking other languages) must not be permitted to reside permanently in the nation’s nation-state.

In the isomorphism map series, I depict languages (represented in the colors of their respective dialect continua) as coterminous with the boundaries of the states where they are used as national and official languages. Obviously, these maps reflect not a linguistic reality, but the reality of language politics, as desired and implemented by states. The success of this political drive is illustrated by the relative intensity of colors employed to depict states. Those states which are shown in vivid colors fulfill the essential requirements of the normative isomorphism, while those depicted in pale colors do not, though in most cases they aspire to the same ideal.

In addition to the three maps already completed (1930, 1974, and 2009), I plan to produce three further maps for the periods: 1910, 1917–18, and 1943.

**Non-State Minority, Regional and Unrecognized Languages, and Written Dialects in Central Europe**

For the period from the late 19th century to the early 21st century, I developed a map, complemented by the same A3 size detailed legend done in color, of the non-state minority, regional and unrecognized languages, and written dialects in Central Europe. The number of these languages and written dialects is such that the names of only a few could be written in full on the map. The rest were replaced by numbers explained in the legend. All the names and numbers are in the colors used for the respective dialect continua to which these languages belong. I also decided to represent the Romani (Gypsy) language in detail, consisting of the different dialects (and/or languages?) employed for rudimentary literacy and educational purposes in different states and regions of Central Europe. Because neither Roma nor non-Roma claim them to be separate languages, I resorted to marking them, in alphabetical order in capital letters, *not* numbers.

I intend to develop at least one other dual panel map of such languages for the long 19th century.
The Concept of the Atlas

Portraying Languages

In the course of the work on the maps thus far completed, I came to the conclusion that there is something lacking in this cartographic representation of languages as social, cultural, and political artefacts. No amount of talking about languages as such artefacts can convey a clear, complete, and comprehensive understanding on how and what they actually were or are in all their complexity (cf Mühlhäusler 1996).

But what does it mean? What is this elusive quality of language-ness that we endow languages with within the confines of the modern (Western) concept of “a language”? I believe that it is writing; hence the popular belief has it that a language without a written form is not a language at all, but at best, a dialect.

Apart from writing per se, it is all the conventions connected to this technology for recording something reified as a language on paper, on parchment in the past, or nowadays, in cyberspace. Initially such conventions developed in an unplanned manner at the hands of the first scribes, chanceries, and printers. When the Western idea of standard(ized) language emerged in the early modern period, certain procedures for “regularizing” and controlling such languages were also established. These procedures include the development of authoritative translations of sacred texts, authoritative grammars, and dictionaries that were—and continue to be—prescribed for official, school, and other public use (and ideally, for private use, too). Such conventions and authoritative publications are often under the control of a carefully selected group of scholars organized as an Academy (which can be national, linguistic, or scientific in character and designation).

Bearing this in mind, I decided to complete the presentation of Central European languages in the Atlas with scans of title and sample pages of:
- authoritative (most extensive) dictionaries and grammars,
- one of the earliest books (periodicals) published in a language,
- and in some cases of the translations of fundamental religious texts into these languages,
- or of some other publications that are of significance for the featured languages.

I gathered relevant illustrative material of this kind for several languages, but much remains to be done in this field. I presume that the illustrative section of the Atlas will never be exhaustive and will rather present selected examples of the aforementioned types of publications, pertaining to some languages.

Plans

As mentioned above, in addition to the completed 12 maps, I intend to add:
- five maps in the dialect continua series
- three maps in the linguistic areas series
- ten maps in the writing system series
- three maps in the isomorphism series
- and an additional map on non-state minority, regional and unrecognized languages, and written dialects.

Hence, 23 more maps, that together with the completed 12 maps, would yield 35 maps in total.

In addition, I intend to introduce another map series on the forced population movements and genocides in Central Europe during the 20th and 21st centuries. This period, in a quite atypical manner in comparison with earlier (Central) European history, was characterized by large-scale expulsions and genocides, perpetrated mainly in the name of German national socialism, Soviet communism, and a number of ethno-linguistic nationalisms. These policies either decisively changed the make-up of the extant language communities, extinguished such communities, or forcibly moved them from place to place. As a result of this unprecedented social engineering, the linguistic boundaries of the dialect continua in this region were made to coincide quite closely with the frontiers of the Central European ethnolinguistic nation-states.

In order to comment on this tragic aspect of 20th century Central Europe, I intend to develop a 1917 map on the World War I population movements, a 1930 map on the interwar population movements, a 1943 map on the 1938–1943 World War II population movements, a 1974 map on the postwar 1944–1950 forced population movements, another 1974 map on the 1951–1989 Cold War population movements, and a 2009 map on the postcommunist population movements.

This would mean adding six more full-scale maps, yielding a total of 41 such maps.

I plan to complement the 1917 map with four small maps. One would illustrate both the 18th and 19th century expulsions of Muslims from the Black Sea lands (which Russia seized from the Ottoman Empire), and the subsequent process of repopulating these lands with Christian settlers from Western and Central Europe, and from the Balkans. The second map would indicate population movements brought about by the Balkan Wars and by the redrawing of international borders that followed. The third would concentrate on the German genocide of the Herero in South West Africa. The fourth would concern the Ottoman massacres (genocide) of Armenians in 1894/95 and 1915.

It may be necessary to supplement the 1943 map with a small insert map on the genocide of Jews and Roma (Gypsy). Likewise, the first 1974 map may have to be accompanied by a small map (or a short sequence of small maps) on the Jewish settlement in Palestine and Israel, and on the simultaneous expulsion of Arabs/Palestinians from this region. I also plan to add two insert maps to the 2009 map, one on the population movements and genocide during the post-Yugoslav wars, and another on the free population movements, after 2004 and 2007, from the new EU member states to the old Fifteen.

In this way, eight small maps would be added to the main ones in this series.

Central Europe, as seen through the spectacles of a given language and an ethno-linguistic (or other group) ideology attached to it, tends to look like a different place, if compared to how it appears viewed through the prism of other languages. The con-
sequent use of English and English-based transliteration for the aforementioned maps, unfortunately, levels out some of these salient differences. But without grasping these differences, it is difficult to comprehend how Central Europe may appear to a person brought up and educated in the context of one or other ethnolinguistic nationalism and the national master narrative built on it.

In order to tackle this shortcoming, I propose to develop a series of smaller, more schematic maps with about 80 names of states, regions, and localities featured on each. In the interests of simplicity, I propose to show state frontiers as they were in 2009, and not to complicate the visual presentation unduly with the representation of other administrative borders.

The names featured on these maps should be given in the following Central European languages:

1 Pre-national ones:
   a) Latin
   b) Biblical Hebrew vs Ladino
   c) Classical / Byzantine Greek
   d) Church Slavonic / Ruthenian
   e) French
   f) Grabar (or Kipchak in Armenian letters) vs Armenian

2 National / Official ones
   a) Albanian (Gheg vs Tosk?)
   b) Arabic
   c) Belarusian: official vs Tarashkevitsa vs Latin script-based Belarusian
   d) Bosnian vs Montenegrin vs Serbian
   e) Bulgarian vs Macedonian
   f) Croatian vs Čakavian vs Kajkavian
   g) Czech vs Slovak
   h) Danish
   i) Estonian vs Võro-Seto
   j) Finnish vs Swedish
   k) German: Antiqua vs Fraktur
   l) Greek: Demotic vs Katharevousa
   m) Hungarian
   n) Italian vs Neapolitan/Sicilian
   o) Latvian vs Latgalian
   p) Lithuanian vs Samogitian
   q) Moldovan vs Romanian vs Cyrillic-based Moldovan
   r) Norwegian: Bokmål vs Nynorsk
   s) Polish
   t) Russian
   u) Slovenian
   v) Turkish vs Osmanlıca
   w) Yiddish vs Spanyol
3 Selected official/national languages of autonomous regions and non-state minority, regional and unrecognized languages, and written dialects
   a) Sorbian: Lower vs Upper
   b) Gagauz vs Crimean Tatar
   c) Karelian
   d) Kashubian
   e) Livonian
   f) Low German vs Dutch
   g) Megleno Romanian vs Aromanian
   h) Romani
   i) Rusyn

The current tally would add 38 such small maps to the Atlas.

In cases when a language is written in a script other than the Latin one, the English-language transliteration of these names should be given, ideally, on the map to enable the reader to pronounce these names. Furthermore, these maps could be enriched with the maximal territorial claims for respective ethnolinguistic national projects, and also with the frontiers of historical polities which the proponents of these national projects claim as “early states” of their respective nations.

In accordance with the aforementioned plans, the Atlas in total would consist of 41 full scale maps and 46 insert maps.

It is clear that more illustrative material remains to be gathered for the Atlas.

REFERENCES


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A Few Words on Tomasz Kamusella’s *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe*

Michael Moser

Tomasz Kamusella’s *Atlas of Language Politics in Modern Central Europe* is an impressive project that certainly offers more than just a view of language politics in Modern Central Europe. It also presents, to a certain extent, a view of the history of the dialect continua of Modern Central Europe. The maps that will be briefly discussed here illustrate: dialect continua in Central Europe in the 9th century (A1); dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 1050 (A2); dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 1570 (A3); dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 1910 (A4); dialect continua in Central Europe c. 2009 (A5); linguistic areas (*Sprachbünde*) in Central Europe c. 1930 (B1); and, finally, Central Europe’s writing systems in 2009 and the past (B2).

In the following, I will outline a brief assessment of the maps and a short discussion of the program on which they are based. I should perhaps anticipate that my perspective is that of a Slavist who adheres to a quite traditional approach to the field, but is ready to share a couple of views with the author of the maps, their introduction, and a number of other publications, including his impressive monograph (Kamusella 2009). Since I understand that representatives of various fields have been invited to review the project, I will deal almost exclusively with the interpretation of Slavic varieties and only exceptionally refer to issues extending beyond that scope.

The map on dialect continua in Central Europe in the 9th century (A1) offers a scheme of well-known and partly disputed names of medieval tribes (ethnic groups) and links them to certain areas. Tomasz Kamusella makes clear in his introduction that he is perfectly aware of the problems associated with the tribal names, which are more often than not are attested only in later sources and might in fact be “anachronistic inventions of chroniclers.” What we see on the map are a few striped areas that are meant to indicate mixed border areas and contact zones, but beyond that one primarily sees compact areas suggesting that they were settled by more or less mono-ethnic groups. But can we be so certain that this was actually the case in 9th century Central Europe if we take a look at what an ethnicity usually meant in the Early Middle Ages (cf. Pohl 2002)? I am also sure that Tomasz Kamusella is aware that it is virtually impossible to delineate, for example, the confines of Great Moravia in a way that would be in agreement with all
divergent scholarly views. Still, I would like to comment that Kamusella tends toward the assumption of a comparatively large Great Moravia with a quite far reach to the north, the east, and the west, which I personally do not find that convincing.

As signaled in the Introduction, Kamusella knows perfectly well that many Slavists will be surprised by his term Rus’ “Khaganate” in reference to the 9th century. I personally believe that this was an excellent choice given the fact that this seems to be the only term attested in contemporary documents.

What I personally miss on the map are glottonyms. Many people who will turn to the atlas will probably also be interested in what is known about the names of the dialect(s) or dialect continua that were in use in the 9th century because they give a certain hint as to how the contemporaries tended to view the structure of the continua. To my knowledge, the only endonymic glottonym that was used for Slavic during that time was “Slavic” (slovenьskъ јezyкъ).

With regard to the map on dialect continua c. 1050 (A2), one might be surprised to see most eastern parts of modern Austria and Germany depicted as parts of the Slavic dialect continuum solely. In fact, this seems to be a bit anachronistic. At that period of time, Slavic-speaking communities might have persisted in some parts of these areas, but in many places they already coexisted with Germanic dialects if they had not yet switched to their neighbors’ language. With regard to the term “Kyivian [sic on the map, instead of Kyivan] Rus’,” Tomasz Kamusella writes the following: “Because the capital of Rus’ was in Kyiv (or Kiev in Russian), historians popularly refer to this polity as Kievan Rus’. I sometimes follow the practice, but instead using the Russian form of the city’s name, I settled for the Ukrainian one, since today Kyiv is the capital of Ukraine (hence, ‘Kyivan Rus’).” The choice to refer to Kyiv rather than to Kiev has to be welcomed, and not only due to political correctness. It could be added at this point that the reference to the capital in the name of the medieval state of “Rus’” in fact stems from modern times. Contemporaries used the term “Rus’” alone, but it had at least two different meanings: the inner Rus’ of the Kyiv-Pereiaslav area on the one hand, and the outer Rus’ in terms of the realm of the Rus’ (Varangians) on the other (on the meanings of Rus’, see Plokhy 2006).

Map 3 (A3) presents dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 1570. Here, one is on the contrary surprised that only a tiny bit of Austrian Carinthia and a rather small part of Styria (primarily contemporary Slovenian) are marked as at least partly South Slavic-speaking. To my knowledge, Slovenian dialects were better preserved in the area at that time. What we do not see on the map—and this is certainly not easy to depict—is the linguistic situation of a lot of towns in many regions of Central Europe, where German often played a considerable role as a leading language of the burghers, and the same applies to the towns of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the role of Polish beyond the continuum. Tomasz Kamusella might have intended to convey an idea of these facts by placing German names such as Laibach, Agram, Brünn, Preßburg, or Kaschau before the contemporary ones, but this is not entirely clear. Beyond that, although Tomasz Kamusella is perfectly aware of the enormous problems of rendering toponyms (he justly speaks of “the troublesome issue of different linguistic forms of place-names and of other administrative or geographical names”), one might still won-
A Few Words

der—even if only for technical reasons—why the háček is used for place names like “Niš” or “Košice,” whereas “Chernihiv” or “Krements’” [sic] (the latter in brackets after Polish “Krzemieniec”) are transcribed from Ukrainian according to the Library of Congress system. Altogether, apart from some of the most well-known toponyms such as Prague, Warsaw, Cracow, and Vienna, but also considerably less-known ones such as Tver (instead of Tver’), the system of rendering place names is sometimes a bit inconsistent and tends to be “statist” to such a degree that one even reads “MACARISTAN (Hungary),” in reference to the years after 1526. Bearing this in mind, it is not entirely clear, on the other hand, why one reads “Gdańsk/Danzig,” and not the other way round, or “Poznań” (but not “Posen”). What one might still miss on this map is at least an attempt to demonstrate how the contemporaries usually viewed the dialect continua. After all, in the 16th century observers did have ideas of different languages within the continua prior to modern nationalism and they used various glottonyms for them.

The next map to be discussed here is that on dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 1910 (A4), prior to the outbreak of World War I. Here the statist perspective is still so strong that one finds now not only “Danzig (Gdańsk)” or “Posen (Poznań),” but also “Varshava (Warszawa),” “Keltse (Kielce),” “Kamenets-Podol’sk (Kamianets-Podil’skyi)” or “Czernowitz (Chernivtsi),” yet on the other hand, for whatever reasons, “Praha/Prag (Prague),” “Kraków (Cracow),” or “Lwów (L’viv).” If in the case of the Galician cities the autonomous status might perhaps come into play as a good reason for this toponymic device, one wonders why the Hungarian place name was chosen as the primary form in “Zágráb/Zagreb.” Moreover, one is surprised to read, with reference to the year of 1910, the name “Saray-Bosna/Sarajewo (Sarajevo).” Why one now finds “Moskva (Moscow),” but on the other hand “St Petersburg” solely (and not “Sankt-Peterburg (St Petersburg)”), is not entirely clear either. What the maps do not convey is the situation of the many minority groups of Central Europe, such as that of the Burgenland Croats and the Tatars of the Białystok area, to name just two of them. In this regard, one can be ready to accept Tomasz Kamusella’s argument in the introduction and look forward to the promised map: “For the period from the late 19th century to the early 21st century, I developed a map, complemented by the same A3 size detailed legend done in color, of the non-state minority, regional and unrecognized languages, and written dialects in Central Europe. The number of these languages and written dialects is such that the names of only a few could be written in full on the map.” Still, viewers of only the existing maps might get the impression that Jews and Roma are the only significant historical minorities in Europe. Moreover, modern glottonyms are still consistently absent from the maps. I now miss them even more than before because, apparently, it is above all the languages and not so much the dialect continua as such that have been in the focus of language politics. Decisions on toponyms are still disputable in a number of cases. Frankly, I fail to see why Vienna is now at a sudden called “Wien (Vienna).” Perhaps the author wanted to underline the highly explosive nationalized situation in Central Europe on the eve of World War I to emphasize his argument that it was primarily the nationalization of groups and languages that led to the catastrophes of the 20th century?
The last map on dialect continua in the course of history depicts the situation of dialect continua in Central Europe, c. 2009 (A5). Here one-colored blocs prevail, although some stains and spots mark the presence of minorities such as the Roma in most parts of Central Europe, Turks in the German-speaking area, and the like. The substantial presence of speakers of other languages such as Turkish in a number of Central European towns and cities is now marked by colored underlining of the names of the towns. I find this method highly appropriate and would recommend applying it to the maps on earlier stages too (i.e. the above-mentioned historical presence of German- or Polish-speakers in the towns of Central Europe). Now, some of Central Europe’s minorities are made visible too, although one could perhaps have expected to see more of them. With reference to the 21st century, one might still regret that the question of how the continua have been used for the make-up of languages is not raised. This is true even more so because since the 19th century a couple of more or less successful efforts have been made to give new structures to specific continua by adding new idioms with the status of full-fledged standard languages onto the map of the languages of Central Europe. In those processes, various pieces of the areas have been typically claimed for different linguistic movements.

I will not discuss the map on “linguistic areas (Sprachbünde) in Central Europe, c. 1930 [B1]” here because I personally agree that “the term ‘linguistic area’ has become empty as a result of excessive use” (Sture Umland 1990: 477). Tomasz Kamusella himself concedes that quite frequently “linguistic areas are more contested” than the Balkan “Sprachbund,” and that “there is no clear agreement about their membership.” A propos: As an Austrian, I am deeply surprised to see Austria not counted as a member of the Danubian linguistic area. If such an area should exist in whatever sense, Austria seems to be part of it, if not for historical reasons then certainly due to the fact that the Austrian variant of German played a crucial role for language contacts in that area.

The last map to be assessed is that of ‘Central Europe’s Writing Systems in 2009 and the Past [B2].’ This map is particularly useful, but I would like to encourage the author to add at least some small pieces of information on the periods when certain scripts were used in a given area on the map itself. This map also demonstrates that even if various colors are used for the atlas in a very professional way, it is not always that easy to distinguish the lines and follow their course. Such problems are probably inevitable. Perhaps they could be reduced or even be overcome in a parallel online version of the atlas, where one could activate or deactivate various delineations.

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After this brief assessment of the seven maps, I would like to switch to a general discussion of the ideological foundations of the map as outlined in Tomasz Kamusella’s introduction. First and foremost, I agree with his statement that “language, since the emergence of humanity, has been the most potent marker of group identity.” However, I am not entirely sure how I should interpret the remark that “the Enlightenment values of progress and universalism were proposed to overcome this divisive nature of language, but with limited success.” If it is true that “peoples and states have frequently
quarreled, gone to war, and even committed genocides over language as a symbol of group identity and group difference,” and that precisely this was the most horrible outcome of the nationalist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries, then I would also argue that modern nationalism has significantly contributed to the linguistic and ethnic or national diversity of Central Europe. Above all, certain linguistic communities might not have persisted at all if there had been no national movements directed against attempts to suppress linguistic and cultural identities in the name of another nation or also in the name of some alleged internationalism of whatever background. Other languages might not have been developed into full-fledged languages. They might still be regarded as dialects of other idioms that had been acknowledged as languages before, either owing to a slightly earlier national movement or to earlier developments when languages were created out of dialects for other reasons, such as the wish to spread the word of God in the vernaculars. To make the point clearer, whoever likes the fact that Slovak exists as a widely acknowledged language against the background of Czech—with Slovak formerly being regarded as a bulk of Czech dialects—or even against the background of Magyar—with Slovak formerly being regarded as a bulk of Slavic dialects whose shortcomings can be overcome only by using Magyar—, should not condemn nationalism altogether. Without a Slovak national movement, the Slovak language would simply not exist. Moreover, to be sure, the same basically applies to Czech and Magyar, too. Can one imagine the rise of Hebrew as a full-fledged modern language without Jewish nationalism?

It is a matter of fact that the national movements of the 19th and 20th centuries caused a lot of damage and harm, but in my view their assessment apparently requires a dialectic approach. The same also applies to the concrete historical manifestations of the ideas of “progress and universalism,” which also had very harmful consequences for the development of the languages of the world. If we interpret the French Revolution not only as one of the triggers of national movements, but also as one of the most important outcomes of European Enlightenment, then we should not overlook the fact that precisely “the Enlightenment values of progress and universalism” and attempts at overcoming the “divisive nature of language” caused the French revolutionaries to impose the French standard language as the language of the revolution on the population of France. In turn, this significantly contributed to the oppression and partial extinction of the minority languages and dialects of France. Can one thus claim that Central Europeans should regard France—or also Great Britain—as best-practice models in terms of linguistic diversity or language policy altogether? Did “Enlightenment and Progress,” as opposed to Central European nationalism, foster linguistic diversity in the Americas? Where could one really find a convincing best-practice model?

It is certainly true that “the idea of normative isomorphism (or, tight spatial and ideological overlapping) of language, state, and nation (also known as ethnolinguistic or ethnic nationalism)” became a powerful ideology or that “the ideologically motivated endeavors aiming at bringing about the spatial overlapping of state territory and nation (with ‘nation’ understood as all the speakers of a national language) necessarily disregarded historical borders.” However, it might be too one-sided to depict “unprecedented mass expulsions of ‘foreigners’ (or those speaking languages other than the
national one)” as the necessary result of any nationalism. After all, national movements also had a strong emancipatory and democratic accent, at least in their beginnings. Is it not an exaggeration to claim that in Central Europe “language has been ideologized to such an unprecedented degree that it has become the sole legitimizing basis of statehood”? It is clear that Tomasz Kamusella’s presentation of the ideas of isomorphism of state, language, and nation cannot be just downplayed as mere fiction. Radical nationalist movements in fact propagated precisely those assumptions. Yet nationalism has not always been that radical and some nationalists did develop quite reasonable ideas on the coexistence of different nations within the confines of one state.

Moreover, weren’t the European empires (and not only the Central European Habsburg and Hohenzollern Empires) nationalist themselves, in that they at least propagated some kind of “banal nationalism” (Billig 1995), but more often than not just sided with one of the ethnically based nationalisms of their realm? Can Western Europe be regarded as an exclusively positive alternative to the allegedly exclusively negative nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries? Isn’t one of the outcomes of Central European ethnolinguistic nationalisms in fact more linguistic diversity than in Western Europe, with linguistic diversity meaning a variety of modern standard languages more or less meeting all demands of modernity?

Even if one might not agree with each and every detail of this atlas there can be no doubt that Tomasz Kamusella’s project is a great endeavor that deserves full support.

REFERENCES


