

THEBES, THE BOEOTIAN LEAGUE, AND CENTRAL GREECE:
POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT AND INTERACTION IN
THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

Michael Stephen Furman

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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
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Thebes, The Boeotian League, and Central Greece:
Political and Military Development and Interaction in
the fourth century B.C.

Michael Stephen Furman



University of
St Andrews

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews

17 May 2017

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ABSTRACT

The history of central Greece in the fourth century BC has long been viewed through the lens of Athenian and Spartan interests which distorts the historical narrative and often misleads the reader regarding the causes and effects of events in this region. The following examination rejects this view and instead uses a regional approach to achieve new and unique understandings of major events in central Greece during the first half of the fourth century BC. The main focus of the examination is the internal developments of the Boeotian League and its interaction with the other states of central Greece. This refers to the relationship between Thebes and the other cities of Boeotia within the federal state as well as between the Boeotian League and Locris, Phocis, and Thessaly. These relationships, when assessed from a regional perspective using both literary and archaeological evidence, craft a new narrative for the political and military history of central Greece, a narrative which can be defined as 'Boeotian.' In doing so, many long-standing ideas regarding this period will be challenged including ideological shifts within the government of Boeotia, motivations for the beginning of the Corinthian War, the historical importance of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, and the mechanisms of Boeotian supremacy in central Greece.

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

That Boeotia played an instrumental role in shaping Greek history in the first half of the fourth century BC has never been in doubt, but this historical role has most often been viewed in terms of the interaction between the Boeotian League and the powerful states of southern Greece, Athens and Sparta. Put simply, the Boeotian influence on Greek history in the fourth century is seen as a reaction to the policies and interests of Sparta and Athens rather than as uniquely Boeotian. As an example, the claim has repeatedly been made without much criticism that after 379 BC Thebes made a change in government based on Athenian democracy and these principles began to dictate the behavior of the Boeotian League as it was reconstructed. As a result of this bias, no study to date has addressed the four major areas of central Greece (Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, and Thessaly) as a distinct regional unit with its own characteristics, priorities, and motivations in the political and military spheres. Does looking from Boeotia northward change the way we understand the history of central Greece in the fourth century? It does, and these four states will be isolated as much as possible to arrive at an understanding of history which relies on a regional focus. This regional focus on central Greece has, up until now, been neglected by major scholarship. To preface through an example, at the start of the Corinthian War, the leaders of the Boeotian League instigated a conflict between the eastern Locrians and the Phocians in order to (allegedly) draw Sparta into a war it would not start on its own.¹ But what was the regional background for the conflict between Phocis and Locris, and by extension between Phocis and Thebes? Since Spartan entry into the conflict was by no means guaranteed, why was this specific conflict initiated? If the Boeotians were unsure of a

¹ This issue will be more fully explored in the chapter on the political institutions of the Locrians.

Spartan declaration of war, what did they stand to gain from northern intervention? The answer to these questions can only be discovered through an analysis of interaction between central Greek states which prioritizes regional motivations and goals. The following examination seeks to situate Thebes, the Boeotian League, and the rest of central Greece within the history of the first half of the fourth century (from the Corinthian War to 364 BC) in terms of its regional interests and analyze how power was attained and disrupted in central Greece during this time to ensure Boeotian supremacy over its northern neighbors.

An explanation of and justification for the chronological and geographic limitation of this examination is necessary. In terms of the time frame, the beginning of the Corinthian War in 395 BC was deemed a suitable starting point because it was at this point that we can most clearly see the apex of Boeotian power under the federal structure described in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Due to the comparative nature of the current examination, the assessment of this apex is vital to understanding the long-term trends which transcended the dismemberment of the Boeotian League under the terms of the King's Peace and its subsequent revival after the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC. As an end date for this examination, the suppression of Alexander of Pherae in 364 BC and his ensuing alliance with the Boeotian League will be used. This date was chosen because of its importance in analyzing Boeotian-Thessalian relationships in the fourth century and, more importantly, because it represented the Boeotian return to the dominance of central Greece it had enjoyed before the King's Peace. Additionally, if the lower limit were set further into the fourth century, a vast amount of material, and scholarship, would need to be addressed due to the rise of Philip of Macedon in the 350s BC through his involvement in the Third Sacred War. While it would undoubtedly

be interesting to explore Boeotian interaction with northern states throughout the entirety of the fourth century, the limitations imposed on the length of a thesis require a more narrow approach to ensure a thorough analysis. Of course, relevant information from the fifth century and later fourth century BC will be utilized when appropriate in order to provide context for the arguments put forward below. Given the time frame of 395 to 364 BC, the geographic boundaries are largely dictated by the available evidence. Looking northward from Boeotia, what states provide the most evidence for interaction with the Boeotian League within this time frame? The answer is of course Phocis, Locris, and Thessaly which is why this examination will focus on Boeotian interaction with these three states. Phocis and Locris, as the states physically adjacent to Boeotia to the north, are obvious candidates for assessment given that their proximity necessitates a large amount of interaction which is borne out by the evidence. Thessalian interaction with Boeotia is attested in both literary and epigraphic evidence and, as will be demonstrated below, during the time period of 395 to 364 BC Thessaly presented the largest threat to Boeotian influence in the region. To summarize, this examination is focused on Boeotian interaction with Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris (which will be referred to as central Greece) in the period from 395 to 364 BC.

So how does one arrive at a 'Boeotian' history? We must first think about Boeotian interests and what the government of the Boeotian League concerned itself with in the fourth century. It will be argued that the main objectives of the Boeotian League remained largely unchanged throughout the first half of the fourth century, which requires the identification of a theme present throughout this time frame. Unlike Athens and Sparta, the theme cannot be expansion, because the Boeotians were not particularly interested in concrete territorial expansion or overseas military

expeditions.² If we allow the ancient sources to be our guide, the Boeotians were interested in maintaining their superiority in central Greece, which refers to Boeotia, Phocis, Locris, and Thessaly. Specifically, they were interested in consolidation. The theme of consolidation applies in two senses. First, they were interested in the completion and maintenance of consolidation within Boeotia. The key to promoting Boeotian influence in central Greece was the consolidation of the Boeotian League itself. Only by combining the resources of the cities of Boeotia could the Boeotians hope to expand their influence in other central Greek states. Second, they were concerned with the prevention of consolidation and unification in the rest of central Greece to preserve their own power and security. It is through the study of development within and interaction between these cities and states over the course of the first half of the fourth century that we can begin to arrive at an understanding of how stability and consolidation, or lack thereof, shaped central Greek history in the fourth century BC. This examination will address the theme of consolidation in central Greece through the study of its two main expressions: political and military history. The consequences of consolidation and development in these areas can be used as a framework for understanding city and state-level relationships in central Greece in the first half of the fourth century BC.

The choice of political and military history as the topic of this examination requires some explanation. This focus is a response to current trends in the scholarship

² There are a few extraordinary exceptions which serve to prove the rule. There was a group of Thebans in Byzantium at one stage of the Peloponnesian War under Coeratadas. Xen. *Hell.* 1.3.15. Also during the Peloponnesian War the Boeotian League sent only 300 men to Sicily. Thuc. 7.19.3. This of course excludes Thebans undertaking mercenary service. Xen. *Ana.* 7.1.32 described a Theban named Coeratadas (possibly the same man who escaped Byzantium) who was journeying abroad to find service as a mercenary. Pammenes and his mission to Asia can also be categorized as a type of mercenary service. Diod. 16.34.1.

of both Boeotia and federalism in the Greek world. The work of Buckler, outlined below in a more complete discussion of previous scholarship, took this political and military approach as well (though, as will be demonstrated, with significant flaws in both interpretation and methodology). However, since the time of Buckler, his views have gone relatively unchallenged due to a tremendous shift toward cultural and religious approaches to the history of Boeotia and central Greece. These approaches, of which the best examples are McInerney, Larson, Mackil, have certainly added a new dimension to our understanding of the region, but have generally accepted the conclusions of Buckler and his contemporaries like Buck. The reasons for this are based on the fact that these recent studies focus on defining the processes through which identity is formed among an *ethnos*, such as the Boeotians. Whether political-military issues were viewed as ‘done’ and thus avoided no one can say, but to classify the approach in this way is certainly inaccurate. While recognizing the validity and importance of cultural approaches, this examination seeks to return to the political-military approach to the history of central Greece in the fourth century in order to demonstrate its continued relevance when applied to states north of Boeotia. This approach still yields new insights into formal political structures, power relationships, and locations of strategic importance which, for the last few decades (and in some cases the previous century) have been largely ignored.

Politics

How, politically, was consolidation achieved and expressed in Boeotia and the rest of central Greece? The internal political developments within these four states established their ability to project their power throughout the rest of central Greece. While leadership of the Boeotian League in earlier periods can be, and has been,

disputed, during the period covered by this examination it must be recognized that the leadership of the Boeotian League fell to the city of Thebes, though all the *poleis* of Boeotia participated in the political and military spheres of the league at some stage. Even during years when the Boeotian League was not in existence (386-379 BC), Thebes was still the largest and most powerful city in Boeotia.³ For the Thebans then, the primary goal was the organization of Boeotia into a federal state, one which was controlled by Theban interests. Without this goal accomplished, Thebes and the Boeotian cities remained individually powerless to intervene in an effective way to prevent consolidation (which challenged their own power and security) in the other central Greek states. To be clear, this examination does not assert that the formation of a federal state was the only path to consolidation, as central Greek history in the fourth century readily disproves this. However, politically, the federal structure of Boeotia allowed for stable centralized, consolidated power which made it the most consistently influential central Greek state in the first half of the fourth century. This federal structure was shattered by the King's Peace in 386 BC but re-emerged after the liberation of Thebes in 379. The resilience and longevity of this federal structure can be assessed through the institutions of the *boeotarchia* and the Boeotian council, which did not undergo the dramatic changes commonly attributed to the period post-479 BC. In Phocis, political consolidation is more difficult to identify and *stasis* was common. In the fourth century, this *stasis* was resolved in two ways which correspond to significant challenges to Boeotian power. The first resolution was generated externally and utilized Spartan leadership while the second was internally generated by

³ Bintliff 1997, 232 illustrated the large differential between Thebes and other 'Group A' cities like Orchomenus.

Philomelus and his successors. In Thessaly, power was distributed among several large *poleis* which were unable to be unified due to aristocratic rivalry until the 370s BC.

Once centralized control encompassed larger areas of Thessaly, the tyrants of Pherae began utilizing their increased power by expanding their level of interaction with other central Greek states at both the personal and state level. Thessaly, like Boeotia, could not intervene in other major Greek states unless the power of the region was consolidated, but the lack of a stable, centralized organizational structure made Thessalian claims to power in central Greece tenuous. The final major central Greek states, eastern (Opuntian) and western (Ozolian) Locris, generally relied on alliances with the Boeotian League for continued support due to small military populations and did comparatively little to expand their own influence, and of these two the eastern Locrians maintained the closest contact with the Boeotian League.

Military

Consolidation also played a large role in determining the military capabilities of central Greek states in the first half of the fourth century. Generally, political consolidation was necessary for military consolidation, but as suggested above political consolidation came in many forms. Boeotia was an excellent example of this because it was the only central Greek state to exhibit political and military consolidation from the beginning of the fourth century BC. The Boeotian League at the beginning of the fourth century, as described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, was a unified force which fielded a large federal army.⁴ This army could then be used in an interventionist role to assert a large amount of influence over central Greek affairs due to the political instability of

⁴ *Hell. Oxy.* F16.4 listed the eleven districts of the Boeotian League as providing a total of 11,000 hoplites and 1100 cavalry as a standard requirement.

the other states. Boeotian military intervention in central Greece was concentrated in two areas, Phocis and Thessaly. Phocis was particularly important during the Corinthian War because Spartan support allowed Phocian cities to challenge Boeotian power in central Greece. The removal of this support was the primary goal in diminishing Phocian power in the region and resolving the conflict between Phocis and Locris. Like the political consolidation achieved during these years, the power and progress of the Boeotian League in the military sphere were shattered by the King's Peace. In fact, the Boeotian League was the only central Greek state to be greatly affected by the King's Peace, and this external influence had important ramifications for the rest of fourth century history in the region. Thebes, as the leader of the restoration of the Boeotian League, spent much of the 370s BC bringing the cities of Boeotia back into the federal fold. The test case of Orchomenus in particular demonstrates both the military force used by Thebes in restoring the Boeotian League as well as the importance of individual cities of Boeotia to the security and strength of the league. With Boeotia essentially unable to intervene in the rest of central Greece, an opening was provided for these states to consolidate and challenge the military power of Boeotia. The only state to take advantage of this opportunity was Thessaly under Jason of Pherae in the 370s BC. Thessaly represented a far greater threat to Boeotia throughout the first half of the fourth century. The key to maintaining Boeotian power in Thessaly and limiting Thessalian power was keeping the major cities in conflict with each other. Initial intervention in Thessaly was very limited but effective during the Corinthian War but relationships with Thessaly became increasingly more important from the 370s BC onward. Jason's death allowed a reintroduction of Boeotian influence in Thessaly. The subsequent expeditions of Pelopidas and other Boeotian generals to

Thessaly indicate that the Boeotian League, was attempting, as it had in the 390s BC, to create a balance of power between the major cities of Thessaly which prevented threats to Boeotia from materializing. Unlike the Phocians and Thessalians, the eastern Locrians, as allies of the Boeotian League, did not require hostile intervention but did help ensure a friendly presence on the western coast of the Northern Euboean Gulf.

The Source Material

Xenophon's *Hellenica* represents the only complete contemporary source for the majority of the period covered by the current examination.⁵ Xenophon has in the past been accused of harboring a hatred for Thebes due to his close association with and reverence for the Spartan King Agesilaus, who himself was certainly hostile to Thebes.⁶ However, the claim that Xenophon transmitted a hostility to Thebes through his writing is largely exaggerated and will not be accepted by this examination.⁷ What will be accepted is that Xenophon often cast the Spartan cause in a favorable light and explained away Spartan reversals, with one such example being his comment that at Leuctra fortune aligned against the Spartans and it was rumored that Cleombrotus and his men had been drinking that morning.⁸ As a contemporary historian, Xenophon either personally witnessed events (particularly regarding Agesilaus) or interviewed

⁵ Arguably the most prolific scholar of Xenophon's writings in the last fifty years has been Vivienne Gray, whose most recent work has included a study of leadership in Xenophon's historical writing. Gray 2011, 71-118. For an exploration of Xenophon's life and career see Anderson 1974. The general trend in scholarship on Xenophon lately has been to produce large edited volumes of assorted papers as evidenced by Tuplin 2004 and, more recently, Hobden & Tuplin 2012. For influences on Xenophon's historical writings see Dillery 1995. For the composition and stylistic aspects of the *Hellenica* in particular see Gray 1991.

⁶ Gray 1981, 334 demonstrated the majority of dialog in *Hellenica* focused on displaying the character of Agesilaus. Bosworth 2003, 194 laid the blame of distortion on contemporary historians. Derivative historians, on the other hand, used careful selection to make their point rather than outright fabrication. For other discussions of the writing of history in Antiquity see Marincola 1997 and 2001.

⁷ An example of the opposing view is Westlake 1975, 23 which attributed the relative omission of Epaminondas from the *Hellenica* to Xenophon's anti-Theban views. Could it be that Epaminondas was just not as important as commonly believed?

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.8.

those who did, which does give a certain amount of authoritative weight to his narrative. The key in utilizing Xenophon as a historian is to recognize his method of information gathering. When Xenophon's narrative is suspicious, his potential source material and motives will be considered in explaining how his historical writing can be applied to the history of central Greece in the fourth century BC.

Completely unknown until the early twentieth century AD, we owe much of our understanding of the late fifth century BC Boeotian constitution to the anonymous author of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.⁹ Referred to simply as 'P' the actual identity of the author does not have a great impact on the proposals presented here, though various candidates include Cratippus (the most likely), Ephorus, Daimachus, Androtion, and Theopompus.¹⁰ This work provides a useful check against Xenophon because it is contemporary to his own time and includes material not found in Xenophon, especially in its demonstration of knowledge of the internal political situation in Boeotia and early intervention in Phocis at the start of the fourth century. The main issue with this work, authorship aside, is its fragmentary nature. The incomplete narrative handicaps the historian in effectively using the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as an authoritative source because the methodology of the author is so difficult to identify. However, the level of detail regarding central Greece included in this work which is not found in other works means it must be included as a valid but not definitive source on the events of the early fourth century, and in this examination will be checked by the testimony of Xenophon to determine whether the two works can be considered complementary or divergent in a given situation.

⁹ Grenfell & Hunt 1908. Scholarly interest in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* has waxed and waned in the last fifty years, but a recent addition of Occhipinti 2016 to the corpus may represent a revival of the focus. Previous major publications included Bruce 1967 and McKechnie & Kern 1987.

¹⁰ Meister 2005. Cartledge 2000, 398.

Though often maligned by modern scholars, Diodorus Siculus, who compiled his expansive *Historia Bibliotheca* in the first century BC, remains, however unfortunately, our best source for the middle years of the fourth century, particularly in regard to the Sacred War, and thus becomes an invaluable element of the current investigation in regard to Phocian politics.¹¹ One of the glaring issues with Diodorus' work is its chronological framework, which often duplicates events or compresses sequences into one year when they in fact took place over the course of several.¹² Diodorus' source for most of books fourteen and fifteen is generally taken to be the late fourth century BC historian Ephorus who himself utilized the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. While caution should be exercised, this examination does not believe that Diodorus and Ephorus should be 'consigned to the garbage dump of history.'¹³ Diodorus' chronology will always be under suspicion as will his figures, but his narration of events will be considered alongside those of the other historians with the understanding that his history is derivative rather than direct.

As a native Boeotian (from Chaeronea) living under Roman rule, Plutarch provided an insightful perspective of his native history.¹⁴ Of the *Lives*, *Pelopidas* will be the most prominent in this examination given that it provides a substantial amount of information, however biased, on Boeotian political and military interaction with Thessaly, particularly in the 360s BC, which cannot be found in any other source. It should always be remembered that Plutarch was highly moralizing, and the nature of

¹¹ Assessments of Diodorus' narrative include Gray 1980 and 1987; Rood 2004; Markle 1994; Rice 1975; and Hammond 1937. For Diodorus' use of his source material see Rubincam 1998.

¹² One example which has been examined and found to be a fabrication was the third battle at Arginusae. Gray 1987, 85.

¹³ Buck 1989, 93.

¹⁴ A discussion of scholarship on Plutarch must of course include the works of Christopher Pelling which have recently been compiled into Pelling 2002. Plutarchan studies has also been generally defined by the publication of essay collections sponsored and created by the International Plutarch Society.

the *Lives* indicates a desire for the subject to become central in any action, regardless of the historical reality.¹⁵ The characters included in the *Lives*, often serving as foils to each other, are frequently deprived of complexity and winnowed down to their base virtues (or vices).¹⁶ The *Moralia* generally serve as a source of illustrative vignettes, often without any narrative cohesion, but are none the less illuminating examples of major themes and will be employed as such throughout this work.¹⁷

Easily one of the most underestimated and incorrectly utilized authors of antiquity, the second century AD traveler Pausanias wove a complex literary narrative through his *Periegesis* centered on his own conception of the Greek past.¹⁸ The reluctance of archaeologists to acknowledge that Pausanias does not describe a literal, physical landscape before him has resulted in mistaken identifications in terms of structures and even sites. Yet despite this, Pausanias is still useful, because he included historical digressions which demonstrate how Greeks of his time (most prominently himself) viewed their own past.¹⁹ When using Pausanias as a source, we must remember that he is displaying an idealized and nostalgic view of the Greek past and frames historical events in this light.

¹⁵ For a discussion of Plutarch's stylistic development compared to other biographers see Geiger 1988. For a recent and detailed investigation of Plutarch's compositional technique see Duff 2011. For an analysis specific to *Pelopidas* see Georgiadou 1997.

¹⁶ The most blatant example of this in the *Life of Pelopidas* is the opposition between Pelopidas and Alexander of Pherae in terms of their character. For an investigation into Plutarch's motives see Pelling 1980. For Plutarch's choice of subject in the *Lives* see Geiger 1981. The specific theme of virtue and vice in the *Lives* was explored by Duff 1999. For the importance of stability in Plutarch's *Lives* see Fulkerson 2012.

¹⁷ For interactions between the *Lives* and the *Moralia* see Nikolaidis 2008.

¹⁸ For a recent discussion of this issue see Stewart 2013, 231-261 as well as Alcock, Cherry, & Elsner 2001 and Pretzler 2004 and 2007.

¹⁹ For a discussion of the features of these narrative digressions see Akujarvi 2005. The idea that Pausanias included an epitome of Plutarch's lost *Epaminondas* has been convincingly refuted by Tuplin 1984, 346-358. For the relationship between Pausanias and epigraphy see Habicht 1984.

The speeches delivered by Aeschines, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and other Attic orators cannot be taken to represent historical reality. One only needs to look at the purpose of the speeches to dismiss much of their historical value in terms of Boeotia and central Greece. Despite their contemporary value, exaggeration and hyperbole are standard elements of every speech, and we must remember that these speeches were meant to play on the stereotypes and preconceptions held by the Athenian people. Relevant passages will of course be cited, but their value will be dubious in examining history from a Boeotian perspective.²⁰

Archaeological Evidence

In terms of archaeological evidence, Boeotia, and to a wider extent central Greece, continues to be both promising and frustrating.²¹ In Thebes itself, the Thebes Excavation on the Ismenion Hill holds a great deal of potential for expanding our understanding of cult sites and dedications within Thebes as well as the later reuse of these sites in the Late Antique and Byzantine Periods.²² The main issue with continuing archaeological exploration in Thebes is the unfortunately unsolvable dilemma that the modern town lies directly on top of the ancient city. Because of this, excavations will continue to be sporadic ‘rescue’ excavations carried out by the greatly under-supported Greek Ministry of Culture whenever new development and construction work begins.

In contrast to excavation, a branch of archaeological investigation which continues to yield impressive results in Boeotia is field survey. The groundbreaking Cambridge-Bradford Project served as one of the first survey projects in Boeotia and

²⁰ As Todd 1990 noted it might be wise to disregard whatever the orators use to support their case.

²¹ As Buck 1994, xix noted ‘comparatively little archaeological excavation has been done in Boeotia, and even less has been published.’ This sentiment is unfortunately still very much applicable.

²² I am currently a supervisor on this project and the publication of findings from the last five years will begin later in 2016.

generally helped form methods of field survey in the region. It represented, for the first time, the value of moving away from the often inaccessible urban centers of Boeotia and eventually evolved into other survey projects. The work of the most prominent and expansive survey, the Leiden-Llujana Ancient Cities of Boeotia Project has continued with the publication of monographs on the major sites of Boeotia with a particular focus on the hinterland (*chora*) of urban centers, though these monographs are being completed at a fairly slow pace, which is a problem endemic to much of the archaeological research in the region.²³ It is not uncommon for archaeological projects, and even the most prominent objects from those excavations, to take a decade or more to publish in their entirety after their completion or initial discovery. In spite of this, the last fifteen years have yielded a number of promising inscriptions particularly in relation to the early formation of federal institutions as well as a new treaty between Thebes and the Euboean city of Histiaea and new decrees of *proxenia* which will be utilized throughout this examination.

Issues in Previous Scholarship

Before delving into the main body of this examination, it is first necessary to contextualize it within recent scholarship addressing fourth century Boeotia. Unsurprisingly, most of the earliest attention given to Boeotia in modern times related to political structures and military achievements, the former of which was invigorated by the discovery of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and the publication of its Boeotian constitution in 1908.²⁴ The trend of political interest continued and expanded to other regions of central Greece into the 1930s when Westlake first examined Thessaly in the

²³ Farinetti 2011 was based partly on the findings of the Leiden-Llujana Ancient Cities of Boeotia Project.

²⁴ Grenfell & Hunt 1908. Any assessment of Boeotia prior to this was essentially rendered useless by the discovery of this document.

fourth century and Sordi continued the work of Westlake in the 1950s and beyond. In most mid-century scholarship, the Boeotian League is often treated as a single element of a larger theme, as can be seen in the work of Larsen on Greek federal states and, among many others, Hamilton's multiple treatises on the Corinthian War. As Helly has recently noted, the historical study of Thessalian institutions has not advanced particularly far since the 1930s.²⁵

A major advancement in the study of the Boeotian League was the publication of John Buckler's *The Theban Hegemony* in 1980 but this milestone work was not without its faults.²⁶ One of the major issues with the most recent studies of Boeotian history, including Buckler, is the lack of chronological breadth. *The Theban Hegemony* only detailed the years from the Battle of Leuctra in 371 BC to the Battle of Mantinea in 362 BC. This work then opened several decades of increased attention on Boeotia in the fourth century, but many works suffered from this same chronological limitation and thus missed important patterns which will be identified by the current examination. Buckler's other major work, *Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century*, attempted to encompass the entire span of Greek history from 404 BC until the establishment of Philip's control over Greece (notably well before the end of the fourth century), and in doing so became understandably concerned with issues more relevant to Sparta and Athens than to Boeotia and central Greece.²⁷ The sections of this work which did address Boeotia showed little development and often simply restated views and conclusions from *The Theban Hegemony*. Buck's *Boiotia and the Boiotian League* covered the span of 432 to 371 BC, but was cursory in doing so and can be categorized

²⁵ Helly 2015, 231-232.

²⁶ Buckler 1980.

²⁷ Buckler 2003.

as little more than a narrative compilation of the ancient sources with minimal analysis.²⁸ Additionally, the end date of 371 BC for this work was chosen not because it was a suitable stopping place in terms of Boeotian history (Leuctra was hardly the end of Spartan power or the start of Boeotian influence in central Greece), but because ‘my *History of Boeotia* stopped at 432, and John Buckler’s *Theban Hegemony* begins at 371.’²⁹ This unwillingness to challenge previous conceptions of history damages the value of the scholarship through unnecessary limitation, thus making it difficult to observe long-term patterns of behavior in central Greece and promotes the idea that a scholarly work can be the ‘definitive’ source for a topic. The current examination will address this issue by assessing continuous time span from the Corinthian War to the 364 BC. This allows for the identification of trends in the fourth century which were overlooked in earlier scholarship due to a limited chronological span.

The second major issue affecting recent scholarship on Boeotia in the fourth century is the continued view that the interests and policies of the Boeotian League were driven by the two greatest generals of Thebes, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Buckler in particular was increasingly affected by these two figures and as a result *The Theban Hegemony* ends, like Xenophon’s *Hellenica*, with the death of Epaminondas in 362 BC rather than continuing into the prelude to the Third Sacred War. The final line of *The Theban Hegemony* betrayed Buckler’s motive and bias by stating, ‘the history of the Theban hegemony is in no small measure the story of Epaminondas and Pelopidas.’³⁰ These views mostly derive from archaic notions of historical development and are reinforced by the extensive use of Plutarch as a historical source, since

²⁸ Buck 1994.

²⁹ Buck 1994, xv.

³⁰ Buckler 1980, 227.

Plutarch's *Pelopidas* covers several events in fourth-century history specifically relating to central Greece in more detail than other sources. Yet in Plutarch, Pelopidas was made the central figure and driving force of the action in almost all of these events, as mentioned above in the introduction to Plutarch's work, though many scholars who chose fourth-century Boeotia as their subject treated the *Lives* as analogous both to Plutarch's other works and to history. This examination will of course reference Pelopidas and Epaminondas, to not do-so would be a catastrophically irresponsible approach central Greek history, but attention will be paid to possible source bias and it will be shown that, when Boeotian history is examined over the course of the first half of the fourth century rather than only the 'Theban Hegemony' of the 370s and 360s BC, these two men did not have as significant an impact on strategy and policy as claimed by modern scholars particularly in the development of political structures. The story is of course quite different in Phocis and Thessaly, where the lack of defined institutional development necessitated the historical reality of a 'great man' driven narrative in the cases of the tyrants of Pherae and Philomelus and his successors in Phocis. This diversity speaks to the distinct and unique nature of state formation and historical development in central Greece.

In the last twenty years, scholarship on Boeotia has tended to focus on the processes and motivations for the formation of federal institutions, and this has led to the identification of factors far beyond the political and military, with the greatest amount of work focused on the ethnic origins of federalism. Of these studies, it is important to note that only Larson's *Tales of Epic Ancestry* has focused solely on Boeotia, while the others such as Mackil's *Creating Common Polity*, Beck's *Polis and Koinon*, and most recently Beck and Funke's *Federalism in Greek Antiquity* have taken

a more widespread approach to federalism in Greece, using Boeotia and the other central Greek states as only one of many case studies.³¹ Over this same time, there has been a renewed interest in regional studies of the other states of central Greece, though thus far this has tended to be the work of one or two dedicated scholars. In Phocis, McInerney's work *The Folds of Parnassos*, like that of Larson in Boeotia, sought to tie the land of Phocis to a concept of ethnicity and identity while Fossey's *Topography of Ancient Phokis* provided valuable insight into the identification of ancient sites while commenting more generally on the history of the region. In Thessaly, Sprawski has focused mainly on the Pheraean tyranny in his *Jason of Pherae* and multiple articles on the subject while others like Liampi have provided a useful study on Thessalian coinage and the identification of possible mint sites. In Locris, by far the most neglected of the four regions, the most comprehensive study in recent years has been Pascual and Papakonstantinou's *Topography and History of Ancient Epicnemidian Locris* which should serve as a model for future studies on small regions (particularly in central Greece) with its combination of modern archaeological techniques, including the importance of geological formation on the much altered coastline, and expansive literary and historical framework.

The two greatest contributors to the understanding of the epigraphic tradition in Boeotia have been the French epigraphists Roesch and Knoepfler, with Roesch particularly focused on the material from Thespieae. A renewed interest in Boeotian epigraphy has been initiated by the work of Papazarkadas and Marchand, but the

³¹ Larson 2007, while focused solely on Boeotia, was limited to the Archaic and early Classical Periods. The most recent study on federalism in the Greek world is Beck & Funke 2015, which replaces Larsen 1968 as a useful general source on federalism in all regions and all periods. In particular, Mackil has been invaluable in addressing the potential of religious and economic motivations for the adoption of federalism. The proceedings of a conference held at Oxford on Boeotia in the fourth century have been published as Gartland 2016 and will be used in this examination.

majority of Boeotian epigraphy currently available originates in the Hellenistic Period. However, recent work by Papazarkadas, Aravantinos, and Mackil has identified several new pieces originating in the fourth century BC which can lead to a greater degree of understanding of political and military interaction between Boeotia and other Greek (and some non-Greek) states.

Up to this point, no study has attempted to create a historical analysis of central Greece in the fourth century which isolates central Greece from the policies and motives of Athens and Sparta, and none have combined this approach with a chronological frame extending from the 395 to 364 BC. This study seeks to remedy this by focusing on events in central Greece within this time frame. In doing so, a picture begins to emerge of Boeotia's place in central Greek history which is different from previous models. Rather than a disjointed series of rapid changes based on relationships with Athens and Sparta, we can see that the Boeotian League was driven by its own traditions and motivations concerned with the states to its north. The stability of these traditions and strategies allowed the Boeotian League, with Thebes as its leader, to maintain the greatest amount of power in central Greece throughout the first half of the fourth century and to protect this position of power through intervention in the other states. The collapse of this stability brought about by the King's Peace highlights its importance in the maintenance of Boeotian dominance. The methods of intervention and interaction utilized by the Boeotian League to maintain its influence in central Greece were consistently based on regional power dynamics which can only be defined through close analysis and comparison of the interweaving histories of Boeotia, Locris, Phocis, and Thessaly in the first half of the fourth century BC.

PART II: POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

Ila: Introduction

Political systems in central Greece provide us with a framework to examine relationships and consolidation within Boeotia, Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris. Focusing on these internal political systems shifts historical understanding to regional concerns which in turn illustrate new viewpoints for major events and developments as outlined below. This examination asserts that other central Greek states could only challenge Boeotian power when political unification and consolidation occurred. This section explores how internal political structures contributed to or hindered the unification of these four areas.

In order to discuss the political structures of central Greek states, we must define what is meant by terms such as ‘Boeotia’ or ‘Thessaly.’ It is apparent to anyone studying the history of central Greece that geographic borders can shift and, as demonstrated in Phocis and Locris, be heavily contested over the course of centuries. Significantly, these geographic boundaries did not necessarily equate to the limitations of cultural influence and identity as seen, for example, in the cult of Itonian Athena which was prominent in both Thessaly and Boeotia. To this end, a brief discussion identifying what is meant by each area (Boeotia, Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris) in geographic terms as well as issues of cultural identity will be presented to clarify these contexts at the beginning of each of the chapters in this section. Unifying factors can range from cultural concerns such as a shared dialect and cult in Boeotia to more pragmatic responses to external threats as seen in Phocis. As demonstrated in previous scholarship, these cultural concerns played the largest role in the initial formation of

states in central Greece which primarily occurred before the fourth century BC.¹ Despite largely taking place beyond the scope of this examination, these issues of culture and identity do provide additional context in understanding each of these regions in the fourth century BC and deserve mention as we arrive at each region.

In general terms, all four of these regions were governed by varying degrees of oligarchy in the first half of the fourth century BC which will be examined below. This is a contentious claim regarding Boeotia in particular, because the vast majority of scholarship in the last century has operated on the premise that the Boeotian League underwent significant changes in both character and organization, specifically that the oligarchy was abolished in favor of a democracy after the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC.

This examination will demonstrate that changes in government within the Boeotian League were more gradual than commonly proposed, and that these changes can be tracked through the two major governmental institutions of the Boeotian League, the college of *boeotarchoi* and the Boeotian Council. The Theban generals Pelopidas and Epaminondas have generally been credited with expanding the powers of the *boeotarchia*, and subsequently much of Boeotian success in the fourth century has been attributed to them. This examination will assess this perception by comparing aspects of the office including the election, the number, the composition, and the powers of the *boeotarchia* in the time period before the King's Peace (and before the emergence of Pelopidas and Epaminondas in the historical record) and after the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC to demonstrate that, if anything, the powers of the

¹ Works which address issues of early state formation based on cultural factors include Larson 2007, McInerney 1999, Mackil 2013, Beck & Funke 2015, Kowalzig 2007, and Schachter 2016.

boeotarchoi were more limited in the time of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The Boeotian Council did undergo a transition from a representative assembly to a direct assembly, but this examination will demonstrate this body remained oligarchic and a conversion to democracy did not occur. The main issues addressed here are the continuation of a wealth requirement for both citizenship and political participation and the assertion that the shift in ideology was not from oligarchy to democracy, but a return to a moderate oligarchy from the narrow, non-traditional *dynasteia* imposed by Leontiades and his associates with the help of the Spartan garrison in Thebes after 382 BC. The changes which occurred during the reformation of the Boeotian League were a reaction to this *dynasteia* and a product of the practical concerns associated with reestablishing a federal state. Though it was overthrown in Boeotia in 379 BC, *dynasteia* was a common form of oligarchy in both Phocis and Thessaly.

In Phocis, the *dynastai* of the individual cities and their associated rivalries prevented consolidation and contributed to *stasis*. This *stasis* was occasionally broken in the course of the first half of the fourth century which allowed Phocis to threaten Boeotian security and pre-eminence in the region. This examination will explore how this *stasis* was resolved through two methods: externally through Spartan intervention and internally through the office of *strategos autokrator*. Compared to the *boeotarchoi* this office gave significant power to an individual and this contributed to fluctuations in the stability of a Phocian state. Through these two resolution strategies, it will become evident that any political consolidation of Phocis was tenuous and this instability allowed the Boeotian League to intervene in Phocis.

In Thessaly, the *dynastai* formed even smaller and more powerful groups within cities controlling vast amounts of resources. The *dynasteia* in place was based on the

aristocratic tradition of Thessaly which emphasized personal relationships between individual Thessalians (members of the *dynastai*) and powerful individuals within other cities and states. Throughout the first half of the fourth century the *dynastai* of Thessaly fought against each other to gain regional control and this examination will frame Thessalian political history within this struggle. This internal control, attempted by Lycophron, was eventually achieved by Jason of Pherae. Jason was presented the opportunity to unify Thessaly by the situation of Boeotia in the 370s when Thebes struggled to regain power through the revival of the Boeotian League. Jason's death in 370 BC coupled with the concentration of power in his own person rather than in a distributive institution like in the Boeotian League caused the coalition he had built to crumble under his successors. Opposition to the successors of Jason eventually resulted in the creation of a Thessalian League by the Thessalian cities opposed to Pherae.

Locris, which was divided into two geographic units, was more moderate than Phocis and Thessaly, and more aligned politically with the Boeotian League. A federal structure allowed for stability in eastern Locris, and the longstanding Locrian alliance with the Boeotian League was an integral part of the start of the Corinthian War. This examination will demonstrate that the outbreak of the Corinthian War, traditionally thought of as an action of the Boeotian League to draw Sparta into a war, was in fact a regional conflict that unintentionally escalated to the point of a war with Sparta.

Through an analysis of these institutions and events, we will gain the understanding that the oligarchic governments of central Greece were concerned with regional issues and the consolidation of resources within their respective areas. The nature and institutions of governments in Phocis and Thessaly made their claims to power in central Greece unstable in contrast to the Boeotian League and eastern Locris.

Eastern Locris was limited by a lack of military population despite having a unified and stable government, leaving the Boeotian League as the premier power in central Greece as long as *stasis* and aristocratic rivalry could be maintained in Phocis and Thessaly.

The following examination will consider Boeotia, Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris in turn in order to demonstrate how these internal political structures contributed to Boeotian supremacy in central Greece in the first half of the fourth century.

Ib: The Boeotarchia

Though the territory of Boeotia extended from the Corinthian to Euboean Gulfs, a ring of mountains actually restricted broad access to the sea from the main population centers which existed in the central plains of Boeotia and created small coastal plains along the Euboean Gulf.¹ These mountains also served as the primary geographic borders to Boeotia, though there were some areas which remained contested throughout Antiquity. The most fluid border seems to have been between northeast Boeotia and eastern Locris where there were no clear geographic markers as there were in the south.² Divisions within ancient Boeotia can be generally defined by its main geographic feature, the Copaic Basin. Since the Bronze Age Lake Copais had divided Boeotia, in terms of territorial influence, into two main regions. The northwest area around Lake Copais was under the influence of Orchomenus while the eastern plains came under the influence of Thebes. In relation to the rest of Greece, Boeotia is unanimously considered a cross-roads with access to the Peloponnese, Attica, northwest Greece through Phocis, and Thessaly.³ This northern access allowed Boeotia to play a prominent role in history throughout the Classical Period from the battle of Plataea in the Persian Wars to the defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338 BC. While these routes could let an invading army into Boeotia from the north they could also be, and were, used in the time period covered by the scope of this examination to project Boeotian power into Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris. These strategic concerns will be addressed in Part III of this examination.

¹ The barrier in the west, formed mainly by Mt. Helicon, was easily the more formidable of the two. Fossey 1988, 4. On the coastal plains see Buck 1979, 4-5.

² Buck 1979, 2 pointed to Larymna as an example of a city that could fluctuate between Boeotian and Locrian control. The Cithaeron and Parnes ranges in the south helped to define the border between Boeotia and Attica.

³ Buck 1979, 4-5 described eight routes in and out of Boeotia which were in use in the Classical Period.

The Boeotians defined themselves as an *ethnos* through their association with the ‘Boiotoi,’ a group which originated in central Thessaly (providing an ancient link between the two regions) and moved (or were forced by invaders) into Boeotia, lending their name to the region, prior to the Archaic Period.⁴ The Boeotians were unified by their common dialect which has generally been identified with an origin in northwestern Greece.⁵ This northwestern origin was recognized and promoted by the Boeotians in historical times through the annual carrying of a tripod to Dodona, a ritual which likely originated when the Boiotoi were still inhabiting Thessaly.⁶ The perseverance of this ritual throughout the historical period reinforces the idea that the northern origins of the Boiotoi played an important part in the collective memory of the Boeotians and thus helped to shape their cultural identity. This collective, migratory identity was also expressed through the cult of Itonian Athena at Coroneia and at Delphi in the form of the Theban treasury.⁷ By the late Archaic and early Classical Periods then there was already a collective sense of ‘Boeotia’ which was expressed through shared cult sites.⁸ This led to debates throughout the fifth century of which cities were ‘Boeotian,’ the most prominent of which revolved around Plataea.⁹ By the Classical Period, the Thebans had become the ultimate authority on what was

⁴ Schachter 2016, 3 dated these migrations to the Dark Ages and Geometric Period.

⁵ The most recent commentary on this is Schachter 2016, 8 which highlighted the fact that, if nothing else, the Plataeans were ‘Boeotian’ in their dialect while the Oropians, who occupied a contested space between Attica and Boeotia, were not.

⁶ The significance of this ritual in the Boeotian context was explored by Kowalzig 2007, 331-352. Schachter 2016, 15-16 recognized the connection of the tripod ritual but also demonstrated similarities between shrines in Boeotia and those in northwest Greece. Thuc. 1.12.13 specified the Boiotoi fled from Arne in Thessaly sixty years after the Trojan War.

⁷ As Kowalzig 2007, 362 has noted, this warrior goddess can be taken to represent the conquest of Boeotia during the migration out of Thessaly. Larson 2007, 52-64. Mackil 2013, 158-162. For a discussion of the expression of Boeotian and Theban identity see at Delphi see Scott 2016, 100-110.

⁸ Mackil 2013, 157-173 particularly emphasized the significance of Itonian Athena and Apollo Ptoios as well as Apollo Ismenios at Thebes.

⁹ Kowalzig 2007, 355-356.

‘Boeotian’ due to their military strength. They then used this power over the definition of group identity to draw states into the Boeotian League as we know it from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* which, chronologically, is where this examination picks up.¹⁰ If the Boeotians of the fourth century continued to maintain the tradition of a mass migration into the area from the north, and continued to look northward in terms of cult, there is no reason to suspect that they did not continue to do so in the political and military spheres.

The first step in understanding political development and interaction in central Greece is to assess changes in the political structure of the Boeotian League. This assessment will focus on the two most powerful bodies, the college of *boeotarchoi* and the Boeotian council. The *boeotarchoi* served as the chief federal magistrates of the Boeotian League. The importance of the office can be contextualized with Plutarch’s comparison that the attainment of the *boeotarchia* was analogous with the leadership of the Amphictyonic Council, the prytany in Rhodes, and the generalship in Athens.¹¹ Though most of their recorded duties appear to be linked to the direction of the military forces of the federal state, it is apparent that these duties also extended to the diplomatic and possibly to the economic spheres. The study of this office is crucial to understanding what institutional shifts occurred from the Boeotian League of the fifth and early fourth centuries to the Boeotian League which was established after 379 BC because it featured in both incarnations of the Boeotian League. Additionally, the composition of the college serves as an indicator of the extent to which Thebes had established centralized and consolidated power in Boeotia, which in turn helps to

¹⁰ The ritual of the Daphnephoria in particular has been used to represent Theban control of a pan-Boeotian migration myth. Kowalzig 2007, 381. Schachter 2016, 18-19 saw an irony in this as Thebes was the ‘least Boeotian’ city in Boeotia due to its unique foundation myth.

¹¹ Plut. *Mor.* 785C; 813D.

explain why it maintained its position as the greatest power in central Greece for most of the first half of the fourth century BC. This examination claims that the nature of the office did not drastically change from one version of the Boeotian League to the other, which then devalues the claim that the Boeotian League was able to reclaim its ascendancy in central Greece due to a radical shift in the nature of the organization after the recapture of the Cadmeia. The argument for this shift rests upon the assumption that the liberators (particularly Pelopidas) were politically influenced by their time in Athens, an assumption based on no concrete evidence. What is indicated instead is the existence of long-standing patterns of power dynamics and behavior which enabled Thebes to dominate the Boeotian League, and the Boeotian League in turn to dominate central Greece. To evaluate the evolution of the office from the Boeotian League of the early fourth century to the Boeotian League after 379 BC, we must examine the contexts in which the *boeotarchia* was mentioned by both literature and epigraphy in each time span and analyze the functions of the office.

The Boeotarchia in Herodotus

In order to discuss the *boeotarchia* as a federal institution, we must first ascertain when the office came into existence. Herodotus mentioned the *boeotarchia* only once, and neither named the individuals who held the office nor indicated the scope of their powers. Herodotus' testimony only described the abilities of these *boeotarchoi* in a specific instance of sending for men from the Asopus, which formed the natural border between Thebes and Plataea, to guide the army of Mardonius through Boeotia.¹²

¹² Hdt. 9.15.1. The men were meant to lead Mardonius' army to Tanagra. On the Asopus as the border see Paus. 9.4.4. Hdt. 6.108.6.

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Μαρδονίῳ ἦλθε ἀγγελίη ὡς ἀλέες εἶσαν οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐν τῷ Ἴσθμῳ. οὕτω δὲ ὀπίσω ἐπορεύετο διὰ Δεκελῆς: οἱ γὰρ βοιωτάρχαι μετεπέμψαντο τοὺς προσχώρους τῶν Ἀσωπίων, οὗτοι δὲ αὐτῷ τὴν ὁδὸν ἠγέοντο ἐς Σφενδαλέας, ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ ἐς Τάναγραν.

Given that the Plataeans were actively opposed to Mardonius and the Persians, it is reasonable to conclude that these men came from the Theban side of the river, which weakens any argument ascribing greater federal powers to the *boeotarchoi*.¹³ The *boeotarchoi* described here were acting in concert with the Persians, and because of this we can discard the idea that the office was created at this time as a reaction to the military threat posed by the Persians.¹⁴ Additionally, the request for guides hardly demonstrates the military power typically associated with the *boeotarchoi* of the Peloponnesian War and later periods.¹⁵ Regardless of their title, Herodotus did not indicate any powers of these ‘*boeotarchoi*’ which are not localized. If the *boeotarchia* existed in any form approaching its status of the later fifth century BC, Herodotus did not illustrate it despite ample opportunity.¹⁶ The most obvious events to highlight the existence of the *boeotarchoi* in their most conspicuous role, that of commanders of the army, were the two major battles of the Persian Wars at Thermopylae and Plataea, yet the term is conspicuously absent from both narratives. The Thebans were of course present at Thermopylae, but their commander Leontiades son of Eurymachus

¹³ Mackil 2013, 30 and Beck & Ganter 2015, 139 suggested the titles demonstrated the desire of Thebes to organize a fully functional federal state but this assumed the titles were locally generated and not a descriptor generated by Herodotus. Buck 1974, 47-48 assumed (wrongly) the existence of a Boeotian League at this time and thus declared Herodotus to be in error. Demand 1982, 18 was more reasonable in positing that the title was reflective of Herodotus’ own time. Rhodes 1993, 168 also cited the existence of the *boeotarchia* at this time.

¹⁴ Mackil 2013, 32 saw the creation of the office as a reaction to the imminent Persian invasion.

¹⁵ Buck 1979, 124 claimed the *boeotarchoi* held significant federal military power by the Persian Wars, but the evidence gathered here demonstrates that argument to be unfounded.

¹⁶ This is quite the opposite of Buck 1979, 124 which represented Herodotus’ use of the term as ‘casual’ and indicative of a widespread knowledge of the office throughout Greece. This view was convincingly opposed by Larson 2007, 172-173.

(forefather of the traitor of the Cadmeia) was not referred to as *boeotarch*.¹⁷ Instead, Herodotus consistently referred to him as *strategos*.¹⁸

ταῦτα λέγοντες περιεγίνοντο: εἶχον γὰρ καὶ Θεσσαλοὺς τούτων τῶν λόγων μάρτυρας: οὐ μέντοι τά γε πάντα εὐτύχησαν: ὡς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔλαβον οἱ βάρβαροι ἐλθόντας, τοὺς μὲν τινὰς καὶ ἀπέκτειναν προσιόντας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῦνας αὐτῶν κελεύσαντος Ξέρξεω ἔστιζον στίγματα βασιλῆια, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Λεοντιάδεω

Likewise at Plataea, the Theban commanders are not referred to as *boeotarchoi* despite the earlier (both chronological and narrative) reference to the office. The commander of the cavalry at Plataea, Asopodorus son of Timander, was specifically described as a *hipparchos*, an office for which evidence exists as a localized position at least at Thebes.¹⁹ In the face of this we must ask what is more probable, that Herodotus made a single error in including the term *boeotarch*, a product of his own time, or that he knew the names of the Theban generals but not the offices they held? We must select the former. This then leads to the proposition that the *boeotarchia* did not take on its formal political meaning until after the Athenians were cast out of Boeotia in 447 BC.²⁰

¹⁷ Leontiades fathered another Eurymachus who organized the Theban attempt on Plataea in 431 BC. Thuc. 2.2.3

¹⁸ The noun στρατηγός was used once at Hdt. 7.233.2 while the verb στρατηγέω appeared at Hdt. 7.205.2 & 7.233.1. Salmon 1978, 130 posited four *boeotarchoi* at this time based on the command at Thermopylae despite the fact that no Boeotian commander was identified as a *boeotarch*.

¹⁹ Hdt. 9.69.2. This name also hints to the connection between the Thebans and the area around the Asopus where the guides mentioned above originated. Asopodorus is a common name in Boeotia, and equating this name with the *boeotarchia* may have been projected back in time from *IG VII* 2408 where an Asopodorus is named as a *boeotarch*. The *hipparchos* at Thebes was associated with a tradition involving the tomb of Dirce. Plut. *Mor.* 578B. For an examination of the traditions of Dirce in the ancient evidence see Berman 2007, 18-39. There is also a mention of a Boeotian *hipparchos* at Thuc. 4.72.4.

²⁰ Buck 1972, 94 and Hammond 1992, 144 proposed a date of 520 BC for the formation of the Boeotian League. This view is not supported by the current examination which favors a mid-fifth century date. Larsen 1968, 31 suggested that these *boeotarchoi* were self-proclaimed which is not unlikely if the region was ruled by narrow oligarchies. It is correct to cite the Theban defense at Plataea in support of this idea, but the theory of Herodotean error is still to be preferred. Thuc. 3.62.3. The Boeotians had reclaimed their region from Athenian control at the Battle of Coroneia in 447 BC. Diod. 12.6.2 indicated that disaster was so complete that the Athenians gave up Boeotia in order to gain back some of the captives of the battle.

A recently discovered, and even more recently published, inscription currently housed in the Thebes Museum which has been claimed to confirm the existence of the *boeotarchia* could potentially challenge this proposition.²¹ However, this evidence is not without its faults. The dating of the bronze tablet is not secure and the archaeological context for its discovery is uncertain. The plaque itself was one of four found during a rescue excavation in 2001 in the suburb of *Pyri* in modern Thebes.²² The details of the excavation were roughly outlined when an inscribed *kioniskos*, found at the same location was published. The plaques were found at the lowest levels of a monumental cist which the excavator dated to the sixth century BC based on construction techniques.²³ However, even the excavator noted that the context in which the plaque was discovered may not be secure: ‘It is not clear if in this last period the contents of the cist were disturbed, jumbled, or plundered.’²⁴ Yet it was still claimed that these four bronze plaques occupied an undisturbed layer at the bottom of the cist.²⁵ The assertion that the cist was filled at the end of the fifth century does not help matters, because if this were the case the plaques could have come from the mid-fifth century BC when the *boeotarchia* was already in existence.²⁶ Until the dating of this inscription can be secured, it cannot be taken as definitive evidence to support the existence of the *boeotarchia* as an institution during the Persian Wars. In addition to the

²¹ Beck & Ganter 2015, 138 claimed that the term *boeotarchoi* appeared on this plaque and that this reference consequently proved the office was in existence at the time of the Persian Wars.

²² Whitley 2005, 46. Symeonoglou 1985, 136-140 placed a sanctuary of Themis as well as a heroon of Iolaus, a stadium, and a gymnasium in this area. Aravantinos 2006, 371-372 denied the existence of a temple here but did reference the other structures proposed by Symeonoglou.

²³ Aravantinos 2006, 369.

²⁴ Aravantinos 2006, 369 when referring to a later medieval intrusion into the cist.

²⁵ Aravantinos 2006, 370.

²⁶ Aravantinos 2006, 376. Matthaïou 2014, 211 admitted that the depositional context was taken on the word of Aravantinos and not from his own examination of the reports, and the publication cited here is only a preliminary report (made 13 years after the original discovery of the plaques) in expectation of a joint Aravantinos & Matthaïou publication which as of writing is still forthcoming.

unstable archaeological context, the actual text of the tablets is difficult to read, and this is even admitted by the epigraphist.²⁷ This leads to a final judgment that, though these tablets are interesting in their own right in terms of land agreements and estates in the early Classical Period, the tablet cited by Beck and Ganter (one of the two opisthographic tablets) may not even mention the *boeotarchoi*. As described above, the text is difficult to read, and the epigraphist actually read *prorarchoi* rather than *boeotarchoi*.²⁸ The only justifiable conclusion to be drawn from this body of literary and archaeological evidence is that the *boeotarchia* as a federal institution did not come into existence until later in the fifth century BC, and that Herodotus' descriptor was an unintentional slip into his contemporary terminology.

The first attested use of the term *boeotarch* to describe a recognized, elected official of the Boeotian League is then to be found in Thucydides. Thucydides not only mentioned the office but named specific individuals as holders of it. It is obvious from Thucydides that the *boeotarchia* during the Peloponnesian War functioned in both the military and political spheres, encompassing a wide range of powers. Thucydides' use of the term in its appropriate context indicates both the office and its powers were well-understood by the end of the fifth century. It is from this point then that we should begin our examination of the functions of this institution. Various aspects of the office have been identified below, and under each heading will follow a comparison of this function from the pre-King's Peace to the post-379 form. This will demonstrate that the

²⁷ Matthaïou 2014, 212.

²⁸ Matthaïou 2014, 216. Yet another recently published inscription unequivocally mentions the *boeotarchoi*, but again the dating of the plaque is not secure. Aravantinos 2014, 199-202 would prefer a date in the first half of the fifth century so as to both increase its importance and validate Herodotus, but once again the author left open the possibility that the metal plaque could be dated to the latter half of the fifth century. Even a five-year difference, placing the plaque in 445 BC, would align it with a later date for the formation of the Boeotian League and the creation of the *boeotarchia*.

powers of the office were not, despite the claims of modern scholars, greatly expanded under the restored Boeotian League.²⁹

The Number of the Boeotarchoi

The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* provided the total number and division of *boeotarchoi* in the time period just before the King's Peace. Just as there were eleven districts in the Boeotian League, there were eleven *boeotarchoi*, one for each district.

[καθ' ἓν]δεκα μέρη διήρηντο πάντες οἱ τὴν χώραν οἰκοῦντες, καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον ἓνα παρείχετο βοιωτάρχην [οὔτω·] Θηβαῖοι μὲν τέτταρας (σ)υνεβάλλοντο, δύο μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς πόλεως, δύο δὲ ὑπὲρ Πλαταιέων καὶ Σκλου καὶ Ερυθρῶν καὶ Σκαφῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τῶν πρότερον μὲν ἐκείνοις συμπολιευομένων τότε δὲ συντελούντων εἰς τὰς θήβας.

This meant that Thebes, as the most powerful city in the Boeotian League and possessor of four districts, provided four *boeotarchoi* at the time of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.³⁰ It should be briefly noted that this examination asserts that the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* described the Boeotian League after the destruction of Plataea during the Peloponnesian War in 427 BC, otherwise the Theban possession of the Plataean districts would be left without a reasonable explanation.³¹ The other *boeotarchoi* were sent from districts composed of Orchomenus and Hyettus (which sent two), Thespieae with Eutresis and Thisbe (which also sent two), Tanagra, and a rotating

²⁹ Beck 1997a, 102; Beck & Ganter 2015, 148. Buckler 1980, 25 opined their 'importance in shaping and implementing policy was unmatched. Larsen 1968, 178 referred to the *boeotarchoi* as 'nearly omnipotent.

³⁰ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3. Thebes controlled four total districts. Two for itself and two for Plataea and its dependencies of Scolos, Eteonos, and Erythrae. For site descriptions see Fossey 1988, 116-126 for Erythrae and Scolos. Eteonos has not yet been positively identified though a site on the north side of the Asopus basin has been suggested by Fossey 1988, 131.

³¹ Larsen 1955, 31; Larsen 1968, 26 and Bruce 1967, 157 claimed the Boeotian League as described existed from 447-386 BC but this cannot be the case because Plataean territory was not annexed by Thebes until 427 BC. Thuc. 3.68.3. It should be obvious that Plataea was a part of the Boeotian League initially but had left before 431 BC. Buck 1979, 154. Mackil 2013, 336-337 used the inclusion of Plataea to argue rather convincingly that the formation of the Boeotian League was marked by an initial period of compromise between the cities. Bruce 1967, 3-4 was more reasonable in giving the scope of the work the range of 411-386 BC which accords with the situation in Boeotia.

system allowed Haliartus, Lebadeia, and Coroneia to take turns sending one *boeotarch*.³²

δύο δὲ παρείχοντο βοιωτάρχας Ορχομένιοι καὶ Ὑ[σιαῖοι], δύο δὲ Θεσπιεῖς σὺν Εὐτρήσει καὶ Θίσβαις, ἓνα δὲ Ταναγαῖοι, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερον Ἀλιάρτιοι καὶ Λεβαδεῖς καὶ Κορωνεῖς, ὃν ἔπεμπε κατὰ μέρος ἐκάστη τῶν πόλεων, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἐβάδιζεν ἐξ Ακραιφνίου καὶ Κοπῶν καὶ Χαιρωνείας.

The same rotational organization was used to send a single *boeotarch* from Acraiphiae, Copae, and Chaeronea. As is obvious from this arrangement, the majority of representation came from the largest cities of Boeotia, while the smaller cities were still allowed input into the leadership of the federal state. There has been general consensus that these districts were not based on geographic considerations, but instead on population, which is reasonable given that the largest cities possessed multiple districts and some districts were geographically disjointed.³³

After the return of the liberators from Athens in 379 BC, the number of *boeotarchoi* was initially set at four.³⁴ From Plutarch we are given the impression that the *boeotarchia* was reinstated immediately after the recapture of the Cadmeia. Shortly after the liberators declared their return to Thebes by murdering Leontiades and his associates, Pelopidas, Melon, Charon, and Gorgidas were all elected to the office of *boeotarch*.³⁵ There has been some argument that they were not elected to the *boeotarchia* but became the three *polemarchoi* and the sole *hipparchos* of Thebes.³⁶

³² *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3. Though some read Hyettus here see Dull 1985, 35.

³³ Beck & Ganter 2015, 141. Larsen 1955, 33. Mackil 2013, 372 explained the movement of Chaeronea from subservience to Orchomenus to share in its own district as punishment for the failed attempts at a coup in 424 BC. Dull 1985, 35 noticed this shift as well.

³⁴ Salmon 1976, 132. Buckler 2003, 215.

³⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 13.1. DeVoto 1992, 4 added the unnecessary and unfounded explanation that Epaminondas was not chosen for the *boeotarchia* because of his ‘intellectual arrogance.’ Buckler 1980, 40-41 reasonably added Gorgidas as one of the first men elected to the *boeotarchia*. It was also assumed that Gorgidas was killed in battle because he was not mentioned after 378 BC, an event for which no evidence exists. Sordi 1973, 80 following Fuscagni 1972 claimed that only Melon and Charon were elected to the *boeotarchia* at this time.

³⁶ Cawkwell 1972, 275. Cloché 1952, 119.

While these local offices definitely existed under Leontiades, these three men were almost certainly elected to the *boeotarchia*.³⁷ This election should be taken as the starting point from which the college of *boeotarchoi* could expand as the Boeotian League was rebuilt.³⁸ Four *boeotarchoi* was seen as the ‘traditional’ number for Thebes to supply at this point because the time when Thebes had only supplied two (before 427 BC) was barely within living memory. The selection of four is then significant in assessing the nature of the ‘new’ Boeotian League. If the goal of the liberators was to create a new Boeotian League, markedly different from the last, why did they select this traditional number? This signifies not the beginning of a wholly new and unique enterprise, but rather a return to the past that they had been deprived of structurally in 386 BC through the King’s Peace and physically through the Spartan occupation in 382 BC. Though there were initially four *boeotarchoi*, by the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC seven were listed.³⁹

ἕξ γὰρ ὄντων βοιωταρχῶν τρεῖς μὲν ᾤοντο δεῖν ἀπάγειν τὴν δύναμιν, τρεῖς δὲ μένειν καὶ διαγωνίζεσθαι, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ ὁ Ἐπαμεινώνδας συνεξαριθμούμενος. ἀπορίας δ’ οὔσης μεγάλης καὶ δυσκρίτου τῶν βοιωταρχῶν ὁ ἕβδομος ἦκεν, ὃν πείσας Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁμόψηφον ἑαυτῶ γενέσθαι προετέρησε τῆ γνώμη.

The expansion of the *boeotarchia* from four to seven members then requires some explanation. Could seven *boeotarchoi* have been elected in the year following the recapture of the Cadmeia?⁴⁰ This seems unlikely given the available evidence. The most reasonable explanation is that the four elected immediately served as a starting point from which to rebuild the Boeotian League. As more cities were brought into the

³⁷ For a detailed defense of this view see Buckler 1979, 50-64 = Buckler 2008, 87-98. Beck & Ganter 2015, 147.

³⁸ Beck 1997, 103. Cloché 1952, 119. Sordi 1973, 80 claimed this election signaled their intention to reform the Boeotian League. Larsen 1968, 176. Mackil 2013, 68 ‘The Thebans immediately set about rebuilding the Boeotian *koinon*.’ This view was followed by Beck & Ganter 2015, 147.

³⁹ Diod. 15.53.3.

⁴⁰ This was the date of expansion proposed by Roesch 1982, 287.

Boeotian League which in turn increased the number of citizens and thus the size of the assembly and federal army, the duties of the *boeotarchoi* increased and required an expansion of the college. Increasing military duties which coincided with the added citizenship from cities which joined in the course of the 370s BC certainly contributed to this expansion.

In this re-established Boeotian League, the number of *boeotarchoi* was set at seven at least by the battle of Leuctra and this remained the standard into the 360s BC. This is supported by inscriptional evidence as well as accounts of the battle.⁴¹ In epigraphic terms, it is common to see the *boeotarchoi* listed at the end of decrees of *proxenia* in the 360s BC. The proxeny decree for Nobas of Carthage (which has been lost since its publication) listed the seven *boeotarchoi* as Timon, Daitondas, Thion, Melon, Hippias, Eumaridas, and Patron.⁴²

[θ]εός, τύχα. [Θι]οτέ<λ>[ι]-
 ος ἄρχοντος ἔδοξε
 τοῖ δάμοι, πρόξενον
 εἶμεν Βοιωτῶν καὶ εὐε-
 ργέταν Νώβαν Ἀξι-
 ούβω Καρχαδόνιον, καὶ
 εἶμέν <φ>οι γᾶς καὶ <φ>οικία-
 ς ἔ<π>πασιν καὶ ἀτέλιαν
 καὶ ἀσουλίαν καὶ κᾶ<γ γ>ᾶ<γ>
 καὶ κᾶτ θάλατ<τ>αν καὶ πο-
 λέμω καὶ <ι>ρά<να>ς ἰ<ώ>σας.
 [β]οιωταρχιόντων Τίμ<ων>[ο]-
 ς, Αἰτών<δ>αο, Θίωνος, <Μ>έ[ν]-
 <ω>νος, Ἰπί<α>ο, <Ε>ὐμαρί[δ]αο,
 Πά<τ>ρ<ω>νος.

⁴¹ As Mackil 2008, 162 noted, the proxeny decree for Timeas is broken at the bottom where the *boeotarchoi* would have been listed. Buckler 2003, 275 = Buckler 1980, 23 & Salmon 1976, 133 attributed this number to the elimination of federal representation for Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus. Rhodes 1993, 172.

⁴² *IG VII* 2407, 12-15. Knoepfler 1978, 390-392. A discussion of the Boeotian alphabet in use in the Archaic and Classical Periods can be found in Vottero 1996, 157-181. For the adoption of the Ionic alphabet in Boeotia and the shift from epichoric in the fourth century see Papazarkadas 2016, 138-142.

καὶ φοικίας ἔπασιν κῆ
 ἐνώναν κῆ ἀσυλίαν κ-
 ἢ πολέμω κῆ ἱράνας ἰώ-
 σας κῆ κατὰ γᾶν κῆ κὰτ θ-
 ἀλαττ[α]ν κῆ αὐτοῖ κ[ῆ] γέ-
 νι, Βο[ιωταρ]χιόντων [Πελο]-
 πίδα[ο, Τι]μολάω, Δαμ[οφίλ]ω,
 [Π]άτρων[ος], Ἀσωποτέλ[εο]ς,
 Ἡσχύλω, Παντακλειῖος

The inclusion of Pelopidas requires a date before his death in 364 BC, and it cannot be 371 BC because he was not a *boeotarch* at Leuctra. The exclusion of Epaminondas then leads to a date in 365 BC.⁴⁶ In the literary sources, the most *boeotarchoi* mentioned after 379 BC are the seven described as gathering at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC as described above.⁴⁷ Given this relative abundance of evidence, we can be confident in claiming that from the battle of Leuctra into the 360s BC the college of *boeotarchoi* was composed of seven members.

The Composition of the Boeotarchoi

As to the makeup of the *boeotarchia* after 379 BC, the evidence is scant considering that on the proxeny decrees listed above, the city-ethnics of the *boeotarchoi* are not listed.⁴⁸ Some have claimed that the office was limited to four Thebans and three men from other cities, but this cannot be demonstrated with any degree of certainty.⁴⁹ Still others have claimed that the *boeotarchia* was held solely by

⁴⁶ Rhodes & Osborne 2003, 421.

⁴⁷ Buck 1994, 109 argued that there may have been no fixed number for the *boeotarchoi*. This may have been true while *poleis* were still being reincorporated back into the Boeotian League, but after 371 BC it seems unlikely given that the limits of the office were so clearly defined. Salmon 1976, 141 wondered if the number seven was chosen to avoid ties. Sordi 1973, 82 suggested Thebes absorbed former districts to make seven. Larsen 1968, 179 offered the explanation that any cities which opposed Thebes were denied representation which may have been true but this was not necessarily by design.

⁴⁸ Salmon 1978, 136-137 agreed the *boeotarchoi* were chosen locally, but a local emphasis might then be expected in the epigraphic evidence. This should not be particularly surprising given the focus of these decrees on a 'Boeotian' collective identity.

⁴⁹ Beck 1997a, 102-103; 335 and Buck 1985, 294 both claimed that four out of the seven seats in the college of *boeotarchoi* were filled by Thebans. Larsen 1968, 175 stated that three *boeotarchoi* were Theban. Salmon 1976, 133. *SEG* 25:553 should be dated after the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. Beck

Thebans for the entire span of 379-338 BC.⁵⁰ In face of the lack of evidence, the most attractive option is that no rule existed regarding the civic identity of those who were elected to the *boeotarchia* and this would explain the preponderance of Thebans holding the position given the abolition of representative government in favor of direct assembly to be discussed below.⁵¹

Voting Within the College of Boeotarchoi

The most famous *boeotarch* of the period described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* was the general Pagondas, son of Aeoladas.⁵² Pagondas was at the center of the only illustrative example of a pre-battle meeting between the *boeotarchoi* in this period, and this gives an insight into the consultation and voting procedure which took place when the *boeotarchoi* were in disagreement. At Delium, Pagondas and Arianthidas were the two *boeotarchoi* representing Thebes.⁵³ Despite the *boeotarchoi* each being able to vote about whether to bring about a battle, there was a system in place where one *boeotarch* held the overall command.⁵⁴ Outnumbered in the vote, Pagondas nullified the result by personally exhorting the Boeotians to demand battle.⁵⁵

Παγώνδας ὁ Αἰολάδου βοιωταρχῶν ἐκ Θηβῶν μετ' Ἀριανθίδου τοῦ Λυσιμαχίδου καὶ ἡγεμονίας οὔσης αὐτοῦ βουλόμενος τὴν μάχην ποιῆσαι καὶ νομίζων ἄμεινον εἶναι κινδυνεῦσαι, προσκαλῶν ἐκάστους κατὰ λόγους, ὅπως μὴ ἀθρόοι ἐκλίποιεν τὰ ὄπλα, ἔπειθε τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς ἰέναι ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῖσθαι

& Ganter 2015, 149 assuming an earlier date, saw this as a concession in no way part of the normal structure of the Boeotian League.

⁵⁰ Buckler 2003, 275; Mackil 2013, 339. Robinson 2011, 57.

⁵¹ Rhodes & Osborne 2003, 219.

⁵² Pind. *Parth.* 94B, 9-10.

⁵³ Thuc. 4.91.1. This might indicate that the Plataean districts were still regarded as 'Plataean' despite their control by Thebes.

⁵⁴ Thuc. 4.91.1. Pagondas at this time was described as holding the command among the *boeotarchoi*. This goes against the claim proposed by Miller 2007, 110 that by Delium there was no need to rotate command.

⁵⁵ Thuc. 4.91.1. Buck 1990, 61 made the strange comment that 'nothing indicates' that this course of action was unusual, 'except its setting' Doesn't this make a direct appeal to the army unusual?

Though Pagondas was able to convince the Boeotians to fight, this should not be taken as evidence that he as the commander possessed the decisive vote.⁵⁶ The powers of the ‘overall commander’ must have been limited to the day-to-day practicalities of administration over a large military force on campaign because the other *boeotarchoi* (when they were present) were consulted for major decisions like the offering of battle. Though some believed that Thebes held a permanent command among the cities during war, this is unlikely given the representation of the other cities, and Thebes already controlled the greatest influence due to the structure of the Boeotian League.⁵⁷

In the post-379 BC Boeotian League, we again see an instance of a vote being taken among the *boeotarchoi* regarding the decision to offer battle at Leuctra in 371 BC. A crucial point in the events of Leuctra is that a vote was required among the *boeotarchoi* to decide whether or not to offer battle to the Spartan army under Cleombrotus.⁵⁸ It is well known that Epaminondas was a *boeotarch* but Pelopidas was not during this year, but the other six *boeotarchoi* are rarely given attention.⁵⁹ Pausanias told of a split vote with Epaminondas, Malgis, and Xenocrates for war while Damocleidas, Damophilus, and Simangelus voted to withdraw.⁶⁰ This deadlock was

⁵⁶ Larsen 1968, 35-36 viewed Pagondas as having sole authority but if this were the case it would render both the vote and the act of persuasion which Thucydides described in detail useless. Salmon 1976, 140-141 posited that Pagondas wanted battle not because he was about to lose command, but because he saw an opportunity to press an advantage against the Athenians and remarked on the extraordinary nature of this event by calling it a coup. This is comparable to Cloché 1952, 82-84 which placed Pagondas’ speech as the most important part of this episode in that he overcame the ‘reluctance of his colleagues.’ Comparison can be drawn to Epaminondas’ call to duty during the Thessalian campaign discussed below.

⁵⁷ Buck 1979, 157. Salmon 1976, 139. This idea also assumed that *all* the *boeotarchoi* would be present on a given campaign.

⁵⁸ This combats the idea offered by Hammond 2000, 90 that Epaminondas had sole power. Beck 1997a, 102 noted that decisions in the field were made via internal vote of the *boeotarchoi* present.

⁵⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 20.2; 23.4. Ael. *V.H.* 7.14. Cawkwell 1972, 264 boldly claimed that Pelopidas was not a *boeotarch* because he was needed to train the Sacred Band for the Peloponnesian campaigns. This would take an absolutely impossible degree of foresight on the part of the Thebans and should be rejected. The Peloponnesian campaigns had not entered the Theban imagination before the victory at Leuctra.

⁶⁰ Paus. 9.13.6. Cawkwell 1972, 260 took the objection to battle as a sign of ‘Theban cowardliness’ which Epaminondas needed to rise above. This sentiment is so non-academic that it should not even

broken by the arrival of Brachyllides, the seventh *boeotarch*, who sided with Epaminondas and broke the tie.⁶¹

τῶν μὲν δὴ ἕξ ἕς τοσοῦτον ἦν κεχωρισμένα τὰ βουλευόμενα: προσγενομένης δὲ ψήφου τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπαμινώνδαν τοῦ ἑβδόμου τῶν Βοιωταρχῶν, ὃς ἐφρούρει μὲν τὴν κατὰ τὸν Κιθαιρῶνα ἐσβολήν, ὄνομα δὲ ἦν οἱ Βραχυλλίδης, τούτου τοῦ ἀνδρός, ὡς ἐπανῆλθεν ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον, προσθεμένου τοῖς περὶ τὸν Ἐπαμινώνδαν, τότε καὶ πᾶσιν ἐδέδοκτο ἀγῶνι διακρίνεσθαι

A similar story, with the names of the other *boeotarchoi* excluded, appeared in Diodorus in which Epaminondas convinced the seventh *boeotarch* to vote with him for battle.⁶² As for Pelopidas' role, though commanding the Sacred Band was important and prestigious, it was not his decision whether to offer battle. The only evidence for Pelopidas influencing the vote of the *boeotarchoi* is in Plutarch, who as a biographer had an interest in exaggerating Pelopidas' role.⁶³ Any influence ascribed to Pelopidas was then not based on the official powers of his office and he had no legal standing to vote in this conference. We should continue to see this meeting as a function of the office of the *boeotarchia* rather than the personal influence of Pelopidas and to a lesser extent Epaminondas.

This kind of conference and subsequent vote should then not be seen as unique to Epaminondas' time. In fact, the actions of Epaminondas demonstrate him going well beyond the bounds of his office by overruling the other *boeotarchoi* through popular consent of the assembled army. Epaminondas at least persevered through a standard vote of the *boeotarchoi*. There are of course moments when persuasion, though still

require a rebuttal to be discarded. Xenocrates was thought to have died during the battle based on a gravestone found in Thebes. Rhodes & Osborne 2003, 150-151.

⁶¹ Paus. 9.13.7.

⁶² Diod. 15.53.3. Buckler 1980, 55 asserted that Epaminondas was 'pre-eminent' among the *boeotarchoi* and this is an easy claim to make given the eventual course of history, but at the time this cannot have been as easily recognized by the Thebans. After all, Epaminondas still faced significant opposition from the other *boeotarchoi*.

⁶³ Plut. *Pel.* 20.2. Buckler 2003, 290 followed Plutarch by giving Pelopidas a role in this discussion.

within the council, was necessary when a vote did not go a certain way. The prime example of this was the extension of the term of office by Pelopidas and Epaminondas, to be discussed in more detail below, where the other *boeotarchoi* had to be convinced to stay in the Peloponnese during the first invasion.⁶⁴ That persuasion was necessary can hardly be surprising given that the punishment for failing to give up their office was death. In light of the above examples it is already becoming difficult to argue that the *boeotarchoi* of the post-379 BC Boeotian League possessed more power than their predecessors.

A Wealth Requirement for Office?

It has been suggested that in the pre-King's Peace Boeotian League there must have been a higher wealth requirement to obtain the *boeotarchia*, and that this requirement corresponded to the cavalry class.⁶⁵ These claims are speculative and unfounded, and can generally be explained away as an attempt to make the post-379 BC Boeotian League, which allowed the less wealthy Epaminondas to take the office, look more democratic through comparison. In both versions of the Boeotian League there was no specific requirement to attain the office of *boeotarch* beyond holding citizenship, and even this, while obviously heavily implied by the sources, was never explicitly stated.

The Election of the Boeotarchoi

Surprisingly little is known about how the *boeotarchoi* were chosen. Given the rotational systems in two of the eleven districts (Haliartus, Lebadeia, and Coronea comprised one while the other consisted of Acraiphia, Copae, and Chaeronea) they may

⁶⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 24.2. Salmon 1976, 140 believed supreme command was given either by the assembly, or, as was the case here, by a vote of the other *boeotarchoi*. In either case a vote was still required before battle.

⁶⁵ Salmon 1976, 135-136. Buck 1979, 156 imagined that eligibility was determined by the districts, but in districts with more than one major city consensus may have been difficult to reach.

have been chosen locally by the assemblies of the major cities before proceeding to Thebes to serve their terms.⁶⁶ Considering their military role, a local election of *boeotarchoi* would strengthen their authority in commanding the forces of their district on campaign given that the hoplite-class made up the electorate.⁶⁷

Much like in the earlier period, and given the lack of source material, it is difficult to determine how the *boeotarchoi* were chosen in the aftermath of the liberation of Thebes. The election after the murder of Leontiades was an *ad hoc* affair and took place before the Cadmeia had actually fallen. Plutarch's testimony stated that on this same morning an *ecclesia* of the *demos* met to declare freedom from the Spartans and elect the *boeotarchoi*.⁶⁸ This timing corresponded to the arrival of the Theban hoplites and cavalrymen as described by Xenophon.⁶⁹ The *polites* of the *demos* described by Plutarch were in fact the hoplites and cavalry of Xenophon. This provides an indication as to the earliest makeup of the assembly in this period in that hoplite status wealth continued to be a requirement for citizenship.

That the first *boeotarchoi* were Theban can hardly have been surprising.⁷⁰ What other cities were represented in Thebes immediately after the capture of the Cadmeia? If they were chosen at the federal level by a vote of all members of the assembly, this opens the way for a criticism of the system in that it would heavily favor a Theban

⁶⁶ Dull 1985, 36 used the assumption that the *boeotarchoi* were chosen in Thebes to argue, unconvincingly, that Hysiae actually controlled the votes it shared with Orchomenus. Such an imbalance of power would have been unacceptable to such a large city which was later quick to leave the Boeotian League. Roesch 1965, 123.

⁶⁷ Larsen 1955, 38-39 and Hammond 2000, 86 were probably correct in his proposal that men from dependent cities served under the *boeotarch* of the main city (or cities) of the district. Given that councilors to the federal assembly were compensated for their time, and the large amount of representative government at the federal level, hoplite-level wealth is a reasonable assumption for the property qualification. Salmon 1976, 139.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 12.4.

⁶⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.9.

⁷⁰ Mackil 2013, 68 noted this would have severe implications for the nature of the Boeotian League.

influence.⁷¹ The important (and fatal) assumption here is that the system was fair and balanced, when it was clearly not and was never designed to be. Though the Thebans doubtlessly made up the largest voting bloc, this power dynamic was not a development unique to the Boeotian League of the 370s BC.⁷² As stated above, in the system described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* the Thebans made up the largest representative contingent by virtue of their 240 counselors and four *boeotarchoi*. Even if votes were split between citizens from different cities of the same district, Thebes still represented the largest voting bloc, and disjointed opinion was almost certain at any level of politics and in any delegation from the districts. Just as factionalism was a feature of the earlier Boeotian League, it was also a feature of the new. The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* was clear in its presentation of the internal struggle at Thebes that existed shortly before the Corinthian War.⁷³ This theme is confirmed post-379 BC by Plutarch's mention that as the reputations of Pelopidas and Epaminondas grew, so too did the envy (*φθόρος*) of their colleagues.⁷⁴ Because the process of reconsolidation would be anything but uniform, and Thebes would be unwilling to give up its power within this new league, it is reasonable to conclude that the *boeotarchoi* were elected by the federal assembly after 379 BC.⁷⁵ The issue of the new assembly will be more fully explored below, but for our purposes here we can conclude that the *boeotarchoi* were chosen directly by the assembly.

⁷¹ Beck 1997a, 102 and Beck & Ganter 2015, 148 proposed the selection of the *boeotarchoi* by the assembly.

⁷² Buckler 2003, 275 presented this as a new development to explain a preponderance of Thebans in the college of *boeotarchoi*.

⁷³ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.1.

⁷⁴ *Plut. Pel.* 25.1. Even if envy was not the real cause of the dispute, it is clear some sort of fragmentation existed.

⁷⁵ Buck 1985a, 293 & Buckler 1980, 31 believed the *boeotarchoi* were chosen by the federal assembly. Roesch 1965, 124 supported election by the assembly. Roesch 1982, 271 dated the proxeny decree for the Pellene to after Chaeronea based on literary, and not epigraphic or archaeological evidence.

The Limits of Office & Accountability

There is no indication of how long a term the *boeotarchoi* served in the period before the King's Peace, but given the rotational nature of the office in two of the districts as described above, it is reasonable to propose that they were chosen annually.⁷⁶ The limits of the office were tested after 379 BC in a way which suggests that the *boeotarchoi* were actually more limited in power in this period in opposition to some modern scholarship.

The pivotal events in understanding the function and limits of the *boeotarchia* after the recapture of Thebes are the trials of the *boeotarchoi* after their return from the first expedition to the Peloponnese.⁷⁷ The underlying cause of the trial was the extension of their terms as *boeotarchoi* by four months beyond the start of the new year.⁷⁸

θανάτου γὰρ ἀμφοτέροι δίκας ἔφυγον ἐπανελθόντες, ὅτι τοῦ νόμου κελεύοντος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ μηνὶ παραδοῦναι τὴν βοιωταρχίαν ἑτέροις, ὃν Βουκάτιον ὀνομάζουσι, τέτταρας ὅλους προσεπεβάλλοντο μῆνας, ἐν οἷς τὰ περὶ Μεσσήνην καὶ Ἀρκαδίαν καὶ τὴν Λακωνικὴν διώκησαν.

The prosecution was carried out by Menecleidas, who Plutarch claimed was one of the liberators, but who became jealous because he had not won the fame which he believed he deserved.⁷⁹

Μενεκλείδας ὁ ῥήτωρ ἦν μὲν εἷς τῶν μετὰ Πελοπίδου καὶ Μέλωνος εἰς τὴν Χάρωνος οἰκίαν συνελθόντων, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν ἴσων οὐκ ἤξιοῦτο παρὰ τοῖς

⁷⁶ Simon 1979, 25. Salmon 1976, 137. Buck 1979, 157.

⁷⁷ For an extended examination of Plutarch's handling of source material in this instance see Buckler 1978, 36-42 which concluded that the full version of the trial was included in the lost *Life of Epaminondas*.

⁷⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 25.1 stated that the *boeotarchoi* were required to turn over their offices at the start of the new year in the month known as Boukatios. For a discussion of the Boeotian calendar see Roesch 1982, 33-46 which included a chart detailing the existing evidence for the Boeotian months. Four month extension: Ael. *V.H.* 13.42; Plut. *Mor.* 194A; 817F; App. *Syr.* 7.41 claimed the extension of the term was six months, but all other sources agree that the extension was four months leading to the conclusion that Appian (or the copyist) committed a minor error here. Buckler 1980, 76 described the law as 'irrelevant' to the situation of the *boeotarchoi* but given the subsequent trial this was clearly not the case.

⁷⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 25.3. For the composition of the court see Bonner & Smith 1945, 18-19.

Θηβαίοις, δεινότατος μὲν ὦν λέγειν, ἀκόλαστος δὲ καὶ κακοήθης τὸν τρόπον, ἐχρῆτο τῇ φύσει πρὸς τὸ συκοφαντεῖν καὶ διαβάλλειν τοὺς κρείττονας, οὐδὲ μετὰ δίκην ἐκείνην παυσάμενος

Plutarch journeyed into lengthy digressions about the accomplishments of Charon and the issue of a painting commissioned in Thebes to the extent that the account of the trial as found in the *Pelopidas* is skeletal at best. This version of the trial is also highly moralizing in its condemnation of envy and jealousy and their effects on leaders. The trial resulted in all three men escaping capital punishment, but Epaminondas was prevented from becoming a *boeotarch*.⁸⁰

What is apparent from the trials of the *boeotarchoi* is that the men holding these offices, however great their fame, were still held accountable by the federal state. It is telling that Pelopidas, despite his earlier fame due to the victory at Tegrya in 375 BC, was not continually elected as a *boeotarch*, especially because Epaminondas, who was not yet famous for his military prowess, held the office.⁸¹ Plutarch's testimony that Pelopidas was either a *boeotarch* or led the Sacred Band every year from 379 BC until his death may be more accurate because he was the leader of the Sacred Band at Leuctra in a year when we know he was not a *boeotarch*.⁸²

Pelopidas and Epaminondas were of course not the only men forced to face a judgment by the federal assembly. Other than the *boeotarchoi* tried alongside Pelopidas and Epaminondas, during the mission to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias from Alexander

⁸⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 25.3-4. Pelopidas, unlike Epaminondas, was elected to serve another term as *boeotarch*. Cawkwell 1972, 277-278 claimed that there were two trials for Epaminondas in consecutive years and that he was chosen as a *boeotarch* later in the same year as his first trial. Buckler 1978, 36 likewise posited the existence of two trials.

⁸¹ Diod. 15.81.4 was incorrect (proven by the decrees of *proxenia* and the Leuctra narrative) in claiming that Pelopidas was elected as a *boeotarch* every year from recapture of the Cadmeia until his death at Cynoscephalae in 364 BC. Plut. *Pel.* 34.5 may be more accurate in claiming that Pelopidas was *boeotarch* for the thirteenth time when he died. DeVoto 1992, 10 proposed that Pelopidas was not a *boeotarch* at Leuctra because he failed to take Elateia in Phocis the previous year.

⁸² Plut. *Pel.* 15.3; 20.2.

of Pherae, the two *boeotarchoi* in command of the mission were forced to retreat.⁸³

After their return from Thessaly, the Thebans were described as fining the *boeotarchoi* of the time who decided to fall back to Boeotia.⁸⁴

οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι τοὺς τότε βιωταρχήσαντας καταδικάσαντες, πολλοῖς χρήμασιν ἐζημίωσαν.

These *boeotarchoi*, Cleomenes and Hypatus, resigned their command to Epaminondas who was serving in the ranks when the Boeotian army was repeatedly attacked by the forces of Alexander of Pherae.⁸⁵ It is interesting that the texts do not mention what the *boeotarchoi* were fined for, though most assume it was the act of retreating from Thessaly. This notion was almost certainly developed out of reverence for Epaminondas as a leader, which would lead the reader to assume it was perfectly reasonable for the *boeotarchoi* to cede command to Epaminondas in a time of need. The question they fail to raise is whether or not the censure was the result of ceding their office and thus the dereliction of their duty to the state and Boeotian people. This shifts the conversation from one about the incredible abilities of Epaminondas to one about the nature and limitations of the *boeotarchia*. The *boeotarchoi* did not escape punishment, and because of this it can also be proposed that the Thebans may not have had the unfaltering faith in Epaminondas which modern historians have enjoyed. This event, combined with the trials of the *boeotarchoi* on their return from the Peloponnese demonstrates that the *boeotarchoi* were not as independent or omnipotent in their decision-making as some would suggest.⁸⁶

⁸³ Plut. *Pel.* 29.1.

⁸⁴ Diod. 15.71.7. Though the Oldfather translation gives ‘of the day’ this examination prefers ‘at the time.’ The error is likely due to the desire to reflect the rotating structure of *boeotarchoi* that was known to exist before the King’s Peace.

⁸⁵ Paus. 9.15.1-2.

⁸⁶ Buckler 2003, 275 believed the *boeotarchoi* could essentially dictate their own foreign policy.

Two key trends have been indicated in this discussion of the limitation of powers and accountability of the *boeotarchoi*. First, Epaminondas and Pelopidas may not have been nearly as important or as unanimously lauded in their own time (hence the instances where they were not re-elected) as they were to later historians.⁸⁷ Second, and most importantly for the purposes of this examination, the *boeotarchoi* were not absolute in their power and could be brought to trial, fined, and even executed by the federal body. This can hardly be described as a massive expansion of the power of the *boeotarchia*, particularly when there is no instance of a *boeotarch* being brought to trial or even fined in the source material before the 360s BC. Now that some limitations have been defined, we can turn to a discussion of the powers of the office in both periods.

Military Responsibilities & Powers

In terms of military power, the *boeotarchoi* were clearly the leaders of the army whenever it took the field. There does not appear to be any sort of minimum number of men in a force before a *boeotarch* would be able to take command. At the start of the Peloponnesian War, the *boeotarchoi* Pythangelus and Diemporus led a force of slightly more than 300 (ὀλίγω πλείους τριακοσίων) men to take the city of Plataea at night.⁸⁸ At least one *boeotarch* was also known to have led the rescue effort at Mycalessus, and this force cannot have been particularly large given the light casualties of only twenty men.⁸⁹ The *boeotarchoi* did demonstrate some independence in the military sphere in that they were able to deploy military forces within Boeotia without first bringing the

⁸⁷ Shrimpton 1971, 317 grounded their fame in the later fourth century BC writers Callisthenes and Ephorus.

⁸⁸ Thuc. 2.2.1. Dem. 59.99 claimed that these men were led by Eurymachus, the son of the *boeotarch* Leontiades. This stemmed from Hdt. 7.233. Hornblower 2012, 123 made the reasonable claim that Thucydides was trying to correct Herodotus.

⁸⁹ Thuc. 7.30.3. The *boeotarch* Scirphondas was named here as one of the casualties.

subject to the council for a vote. When Agesilaus attempted to sacrifice at Aulis in imitation of Agamemnon, the *boeotarchoi* were able to send cavalry to stop the sacrifice.⁹⁰ The rapidity of movement in this episode suggests that the council was not consulted beforehand. Whether this force was led by a *boeotarch* is unknown. In terms of the number of *boeotarchoi* assigned to a command, a proportional detachment of *boeotarchoi* for various forces seems logistically unlikely. For example, the 300 men who were sent to Sicily under the command of three men were not likely commanded by three *boeotarchoi*.⁹¹

οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ ἀπέστελλον περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ταῖς ὀλκάσι τοὺς ὀπλίτας ἐς τὴν Σικελίαν, Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν τῶν τε Εἰλώτων ἐπιλεξάμενοι τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ τῶν νεοδαμωδῶν, ξυναμφοτέρων ἐς ἑξακοσίους ὀπλίτας, καὶ Ἐκκριτον Σπαρτιάτην ἄρχοντα, Βοιωτοὶ δὲ τριακοσίους ὀπλίτας, ὧν ἦρχον Ξένων τε καὶ Νίκων Θηβαῖοι καὶ Ἠγήσανδρος Θεσπιεύς.

The numbers do not bear out. 300 men represented less than 3% of the standard levy of the federal army (11,000 men). It would be reasonable to send one *boeotarch* to command the mission, but to send 27% of the leadership of the Boeotian League, particularly given the non-military responsibilities of the *boeotarchoi*, would be absurd. The *boeotarchoi* may have chosen their commands based on importance and generally at their own discretion. Command of the forces of their home districts also undoubtedly played a role in their assignment.

Like the *boeotarchia* of the earlier Boeotian League, there does not seem to have been a minimum number of men to necessitate the leadership of a *boeotarch* after 379 BC. At the battle of Tegyra in 375 BC, Pelopidas led only the Sacred Band (300

⁹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4. Plut. *Ages.* 6.6.

⁹¹ Thuc. 7.19.3. Salmon 1976, 142; Sordi 1997, 227-229; Roesch 1965, 98 believed all three were *boeotarchoi*.

men) and some cavalry.⁹² The *boeotarchoi* were also able to compel men of military age to take up arms. Neocles commanded that those attending the assembly do so while armed before leading them to take Plataea for the second time, and Epaminondas was said to have kept the men of Boeotia ready for war at all times.⁹³ The mention of Epaminondas is especially interesting given that Plutarch clearly noted that Epaminondas only did this when he was a *boeotarch*. This indicates that despite his fame and honor, Epaminondas still yielded the powers and influence of the *boeotarchia* when he was not in office. Though Pelopidas volunteered for his final mission to Thessaly, we might have some degree of skepticism for his motives given the personal animosity between Pelopidas and Alexander of Pherae. In general then the *boeotarchoi* do not seem to have exercised a great deal of autonomy in their choice of command after 379 BC. Their absolute power in the field while at war did not necessarily translate to power over *all* their actions.

The Role of the Boeotarchoi in Diplomacy

Thucydides offered a glimpse into the non-military roles of the *boeotarchoi* in his description of the proposed treaties with the Argives, Corinthians, Megarians, and Thracians. The *boeotarchoi* appear as the first contact for both the Boeotian ambassadors returning from the Isthmus and the Argive ambassadors who arrived in Thebes shortly afterward.⁹⁴

ἀφικόμενοι δὲ οἱ Βοιωτοὶ ἀπήγγειλαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τὰ τε ἐκ τῆς
 Λακεδαιμόνου καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τῶν συγγενομένων Ἀργείων: καὶ οἱ βοιωτάρχαι
 ἠρέσκοντό τε καὶ πολλῶ προθυμότεροι ἦσαν, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρωθεν ξυνεβεβήκει
 αὐτοῖς τοὺς τε φίλους τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖσθαι καὶ τοὺς
 Ἀργείους ἐς τὰ ὁμοῖα σπεύδειν. καὶ οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον πρέσβεις παρήσαν
 Ἀργείων τὰ εἰρημένα προκαλοῦμενοι: καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀπέπεμψαν ἐπαινέσαντες

⁹² Diod. 15.81.2 indicated that Pelopidas was a *boeotarch* at this time and was the only one present at the battle.

⁹³ Paus. 9.1.6. Plut. *Mor.* 193E.

⁹⁴ Thuc. 5.37.4-5.

τοὺς λόγους οἱ βοιωτάρχαι καὶ πρέσβεις ὑποσχόμενοι ἀποστελεῖν περὶ τῆς
 ξυμμαχίας ἐς Ἄργος.

Though the *boeotarchoi* promised to make a treaty with the Corinthians, Megarians, and Thracians, it is clear that their power was limited in this regard because they were still required to present their proposals to the four councils of the Boeotian League.⁹⁵

ἐν δὲ τούτῳ ἐδόκει πρῶτον τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις καὶ Κορινθίοις καὶ Μεγαρεῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβεσιν ὁμόσαι ὄρκους ἀλλήλοις ἢ μὴν ἔν τε τῷ παρατυχόντι ἀμυνεῖν τῷ δεομένῳ καὶ μὴ πολεμήσειν τῷ μηδὲ συμβήσεσθαι ἄνευ κοινῆς γνώμης, καὶ οὕτως ἤδη τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ Μεγαρέας (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἐποίουν) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀργεῖους σπένδεσθαι. [2] πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὄρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῦρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ παρήνουν γενέσθαι ὄρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ σφίσι ξυνομύναι.

Due to the rejection of the proposals, the *boeotarchoi* then decided not to present the Argive proposal to the councils which indicates they possessed at least some element of discretion in their dealings with the federal councils.⁹⁶ Despite this discretion, this is still far from the idea that the running of the Boeotian state was largely left to the *boeotarchoi*.⁹⁷

In the diplomatic sphere, little is mentioned of the *boeotarchia* after 379 BC. Unlike in the Peloponnesian War, we do not have direct evidence for the *boeotarchoi* introducing proposals to the federal assembly, but it would be unusual if they did not continue to serve a probouletic function, especially in the absence of the representative system of federal government.⁹⁸ Though some *boeotarchoi* did serve as ambassadors, it

⁹⁵ Thuc. 5.38.1-2.

⁹⁶ Thuc. 5.38.4.

⁹⁷ Larsen 1968, 35 suggested the assembly followed the lead of the *boeotarchoi* when this was clearly not always the case. Larsen 1955, 37-38 claimed that the government was essentially run by these eleven *boeotarchoi* which may be over-reaching, but it is reasonable to say that these *boeotarchoi* essentially had probouletic powers.

⁹⁸ Buckler 1980, 25 = Buckler 2003, 216; 275.

is not clear whether or not *only* the *boeotarchoi* could serve in this role.⁹⁹ When Epaminondas journeyed to the failed peace conference in 371 BC, a year in which we know he was also a *boeotarch* from the accounts of Leuctra, his role was not described as a *boeotarch*.¹⁰⁰ Likewise Pelopidas was not described as *boeotarch* during his trip to the Persian court, but Plutarch consistently referred to the undertaking as a *πρεσβεία* and Pelopidas as a *πρέσβυς*.¹⁰¹

ἡ μὲν οὖν πρεσβεία τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ προσέθηκεν οὐ μικρὰν εὐνοίαν ἐπανελθόντι,
διὰ τὸν Μεσσήνης συνοικισμὸν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων αὐτονομίαν

Pelopidas and Ismenias, who were not described as *boeotarchoi*, were sent to Alexander of Pherae on an embassy.¹⁰² It was not then necessary to make one office a part of the other. The *boeotarchoi* would be obvious candidates for embassies, but this did not mean non-*boeotarchoi* could not serve in this role.

In terms of the making of treaties, if the thirty-day truce (*ἀνοχὰς τοῦ πολέμου*) made by Epaminondas to secure the release of Pelopidas and Ismenias from imprisonment by Alexander of Pherae is any indication, the *boeotarchoi* were able to make short, temporary agreements on campaign.¹⁰³ That the *boeotarchoi* had the power to make such agreements cannot be surprising given their ability to make post-combat truces to take up the dead. The most famous instance of this is Epaminondas at Leuctra, who forced the Spartans and their allies to take turns removing the dead from the battlefield so that all could see how many Spartiates died.¹⁰⁴

⁹⁹ Buckler 2003, 275 viewed the ability to negotiate as the ability to dictate foreign policy while admitting that nothing was binding until approved by the federal assembly.

¹⁰⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 27.4.

¹⁰¹ Plut. *Pel.* 31.1.

¹⁰² Plut. *Pel.* 27.1 used the verb *πρεσβεύω* to describe the role in which Pelopidas and Ismenias were sent.

¹⁰³ Plut. *Pel.* 29.6.

¹⁰⁴ Paus. 9.13.11.

Θηβαίοις μὲν ἡ νίκη κατείργαστο ἐπιφανέστατα πασῶν ὀπόσας κατὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀνείλοντο Ἕλληνες: Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ὑστεραίαν τοὺς τεθνεῶτας διεννοῦντο ὡς θάψοντες καὶ ἀποστέλλουσι κήρυκα ἐς τοὺς Θηβαίους. Ἐπαμινώνδας δέ, ἐπιστάμενος ὡς ἐπικρύπτεσθαι τὰς συμφορὰς ἀεὶ ποτε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πεφύκασιν, ἔφασκεν ἀναίρεσιν τῶν νεκρῶν προτέροις αὐτῶν δίδοναι τοῖς συμμάχοις, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐκείνοις ἀνελομένοις οὕτω καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἡξίου θάπτειν τοὺς αὐτῶν.

Jason of Pherae also played a role in the treaty negotiations at Leuctra as will be discussed below, and because they all took place at Leuctra, the treaty must have been made with the *boeotarchoi*.¹⁰⁵ The Spartan apprehension over this treaty which caused them to take the difficult road through Creusis at night might also indicate that the treaty was not binding until approved by a meeting of the assembly.

Role in Minting Coinage

There have also been suggestions that the *boeotarchoi* were responsible for the minting of federal coinage.¹⁰⁶ The federal coinage of the Boeotian League is easily recognizable from the Boeotian shield which adorned the obverse of each coin type for nearly two centuries. In the fourth century, the abbreviations of magistrates' (not necessarily the *boeotarchoi*) names begin to appear on the coinage.¹⁰⁷ The most famous subset of this coinage is that which has been attributed to Epaminondas and includes three different abbreviations of the name.¹⁰⁸ The attribution of this coinage to Epaminondas would tempt the scholar to make a connection between the *boeotarchoi* and the minting of coinage, and studies have shown that this may in fact be the case. Like the *boeotarchoi*, the evidence points to whatever magistrate was denoted by the

¹⁰⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.25.

¹⁰⁶ Beck 1997b, 334. Mackil 2008, 164. Salmon 1976, 143.

¹⁰⁷ For a relative chronology of this coinage based on die link analysis see Hepworth 1998, 61-89. There are also non-federal (indicated by the lack of the Boeotian shield) electrum issues which have been dated to the 360s BC which were connected to the Boeotian shipbuilding program by Gartland 2013, 29-30.

¹⁰⁸ Hepworth 1986, 35.

abbreviation on the coin had an annual term.¹⁰⁹ There are also several breaks in the coinage series, which could potentially correspond to the dismantling of the Boeotian League caused by the King's Peace.¹¹⁰ Additionally, the coins show several abbreviations that can potentially be linked with prominent Thebans from the literary and epigraphic records including, as mentioned above, Epaminondas. Even though this coinage is contained within the fourth century, the identification of the financial magistrate with the *boeotarchia* is not unique to the post-379 BC Boeotian League. A start date of the extremely early fourth century BC has been proposed based on a transition between epichoric and Ionic spelling, although an exact date cannot be pinpointed.¹¹¹ Since no *boeotarchoi* are known from the Corinthian War, we are left with the unsatisfactory association between the most famous Boeotian figures of the period and their probable term as *boeotarchoi* such as Androcleidas. By all indications, only one of the *boeotarchoi* would be in charge of the mint because we do not have, for example, seven different names all struck on coins in the same year. We can then propose that one of the *boeotarchoi* was assigned to this duty, possibly by vote of the assembly.

Conclusions

Through the analysis outlined above, the idea that the powers of the *boeotarchia* were greatly altered and expanded in the course of the fourth century BC is not readily apparent given the evidence available to us.¹¹² Instead, the *boeotarchia* and the powers

¹⁰⁹ Hepworth 1986, 37.

¹¹⁰ Hepworth 1998, 63.

¹¹¹ Hepworth 1986, 37. The new chronology proposed by Schachter 2016, 55-56 did not drastically change the start date of the coinage series but the end date should now be in the Third Sacred War.

¹¹² The argument for expanded powers was made by Beck 1997a, 102 and Beck & Ganter 2015, 148. Beck 1997a in particular attributed among these expanded powers the probouletic function of the office as well as the reception of ambassadors from other states. Both of these functions were known in the earlier iteration of the Boeotian League as has been demonstrated above.

it encompasses are a point of stability which link the Boeotian League before and after the King's Peace. The retention of these powers indicates that the Boeotian state formed after 379 BC was not meant to represent a radical change from the past form of the Boeotian League, but rather a radical change from the reign of Leontiades and the *polemarchoi* which had been placed over Thebes for three years. The *boeotarchia* could be seen as a rallying cry for the Thebans to return to their past power through the reclamation of one of the primary institutions of the Boeotian League. Yes, the new college of *boeotarchoi* favored Thebes in the balance of power, but Thebes also possessed a preponderance of influence before the King's Peace. The Thebans were consistently at the head of Boeotian policy throughout the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars (Pagondas and Ismenias, both Thebans, were the most famous figures), and the historical reality of the situation in 379 BC dictated that they must once again take the lead. We must remember that in the winter of 379 BC, Thebes was the only major city in the Boeotian League. How could the new League not favor Theban power? With this parallel we can begin to see the post-379 BC Boeotian League as a return of Thebes to its dominance over Boeotia, not because Pelopidas and Epaminondas exerted the energies of their respective genius to do so, but because the Thebans wanted a return to their former position. Just in examining this single institution, we can identify a consistency and stability which has, until now, been denied, and it is this stability which serves as a crucial element in how Thebes and the Boeotian League gained, lost, reclaimed, and exercised their authority over central Greek affairs. To further confirm this trend, the other major institution of the Boeotian state, the federal council, must be examined.

Iic: The Assembly of the Boeotian League: Oligarchy to Democracy?

The Boeotian League, as a federal state, featured a council to decide on political and military matters. Much like the *boeotarchia*, the federal assembly of the Boeotian League has been said to have undergone dramatic change after its reconstitution in 379 BC, but like the *boeotarchia* the evidence upon which this assertion is based is fairly minimal and actually demonstrates a more negligible change in terms of the power dynamics within the Boeotian League. The existence of this council and its membership is indicative of the degree of consolidation achieved within Boeotia and its relative stability. In both incarnations of the Boeotian League the power of Thebes over the other Boeotian cities was exercised through institutions. The following analysis will demonstrate that the change concerning the main deliberative body of the Boeotian League which occurred at the institutional level after 379 BC represented a moderation of the pre-existing oligarchic structure, was a product of the circumstances in Boeotia after the recapture of the Cadmeia, and, like the Boeotian League of the early fourth century BC, prioritized Theban power and interests through these institutional reforms.

Before the King's Peace: A Representative Oligarchy

The greatest insight into the function of the Boeotian assembly as it existed at the beginning of the fourth century was provided by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.¹ Based on this document, the governmental structure of the Boeotian League can be separated into two levels: federal and local. The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* clearly stated that the

¹ This described a system after 427 BC but the general aspects of which had been in place since the expulsion of the Athenians in 447 BC. For potential explanations for limiting the power of Thebes see Mackil 2013, 335. In brief, the general belief is that no single city had the power to force the others into a state at this time (447 BC).

federal government existed separately from the local governments of the individual cities of Boeotia, and that this federal structure was divided into eleven districts.²

[καθ' ἕν]δεκα μέρη διήρηντο πάντες οἱ τὴν χώραν οἰκοῦντες

Each of these eleven districts provided 60 representatives for the federal assembly which met at the Cadmeia in Thebes.³

παρείχεται δὲ καὶ βουλευτὰς ἐξήκοντα κατὰ τὸν βοιωτάρχην, καὶ τούτοις αὐτοὶ τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν ἀνήλσκον... τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔθνος ὅλον οὕτως ἐπολιτεύετο, καὶ τὰ συνέδρια {καὶ} τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἐν τῇ Καδμεΐᾳ συνεκάθιζεν.

Simple math dictates that this assembly would then consist of 660 members. Districts which were split between three cities like that of Haliartus, Lebadeia, and Coroneia were forced by necessity to split their number of counselors, and it is a reasonable suggestion that in these districts each city would send twenty men to maintain the proportional delegation upon which the federal structure was based.⁴ There was a property qualification for citizenship which most likely took the form of a hoplite census at both the local and federal level, though the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* only provided the vague measure of a ‘certain level of wealth.’⁵

ὅν οὐ[χ ἄπασι] τοῖς πολ[ίταις ἐξῆ]ν μετέχειν ἀ[λλὰ] τοῖς κεκ[τημένοις] πλῆθος τ[ι χρημᾶ]των

² *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3.

³ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.4. Salmon 1976, 168 was correct in stating that this oligarchic form of government had existed since 447 B.C. Buck 1979, 125 believed that due to the ‘oddness’ of this number that it must date back to a sixth century BC version of the Boeotian League. For possible reasons for the choosing of 60 see Demand 1982, 38.

⁴ This equal division of federal representatives is tantalizing never explicitly stated in the sources, but remains the most likely solution. Larsen 1955, 34; Beck & Ganter 2015, 143.

⁵ Bruce 1967, 158. Salmon 1976, 135 argued for this qualification at both levels of government. This is a reasonable assertion to make since *Hell. Oxy.* F19.1 declared that there was a property requirement to sit on the city councils though as stated above no details were given as to the exact measure of this wealth. McKechnie & Kern 1988, 155. Larsen 1955, 32 favored the hoplite qualification. Cloché 1952, 73 indicated that the time away would require a certain degree of wealth above that of a subsistence farmer, though this was based on the reading that the representatives were not compensated.

Even at the moderate level of a hoplite census, this would still have left many Boeotians disenfranchised, and we might look to the 10,000 light armed troops present at the battle of Delium in 424 BC as representative of this disenfranchised group.⁶ Beyond the wealth requirement to be a citizen, there is no indication of a higher property qualification for serving as a representative, and there is no evidence for an age requirement. Any attempt to apply an age requirement to being a representative in the federal state derives ultimately from comparisons to the Athenian state, which assumes a great amount of influence between the two regions.⁷ The actual selection of counselors was undertaken by the local councils of the cities.⁸ It has been suggested that $\frac{1}{4}$ of the representatives were chosen by each of the four councils in a city, but this does not work for the two districts which were each split between three cities.⁹ The sources are unclear on whether the governments of the various cities of Boeotia mirrored that of the federal government in its representative nature. The cities of Boeotia may not have had representative government, but were instead made up of the citizen body roughly divided into the four councils.¹⁰

εἶχεν δὲ τὰ πράγματα τότε κατὰ τὴν Βοιωτίαν οὕτως· ἦσαν καθεστηκυῖαι βουλαι τότε τέττα[ρες παρ' ἐ]κάστη τῶν πόλεων

This type of structure would heavily favor the citizenry of the main urban centers and could indicate that old regional power dynamics found a way to survive at least at the local, if not the federal, level within the Boeotian federal state.¹¹

⁶ This idea has been put forward by Bonner 1910, 410 and followed by Larsen 1955, 33. Thuc. 4.93.3.

⁷ Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 30.2. Bruce 1967, 160 proposed that thirty would be the minimum age to serve on the council.

⁸ Salmon 1976, 171 wondered whether this process was done through a raising of hands or by ballot or lottery, but the answer is unattainable given the current evidence, and relatively unimportant.

⁹ Larsen 1955, 38.

¹⁰ Larsen 1955, 32. *Hell. Oxy.* F16.3.

¹¹ For a discussion of the *synteleis* major cities of Boeotia held over their surrounding regions see Beck 1997b, 336.

While the local governments of the cities of Boeotia were made of four rotating councils with the ‘active’ council taking on the role of an executive body, there has been some debate regarding whether the rotational system was in place at the federal level. Though it is not mentioned explicitly by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, Thucydides did refer to four councils.¹²

πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὄρκους γενέσθαι οἱ βιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἶπερ ἅπαν τὸ κῆρος ἔχουσιν, καὶ παρήνουν γενέσθαι ὄρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσαι βούλονται ἐπ’ ὠφελίᾳ σφίσι ξυνομύναι.

Because the representatives were maintained at the expense of the state, this rotating system would prove more cost-effective in that only fifteen of the sixty counselors from each district would need to be maintained at a time in Thebes, reducing the financial burdens on the cities.¹³ Additionally, because the federal assembly met at the Cadmeia in Thebes, this would allow for a minimum number of a city’s leadership to be away at any given time.¹⁴ The textual evidence then, as well as the practical considerations of balancing federal and local governments, points to the conclusion that the rotating system was in place at the federal level.¹⁵ Since the 60 counselors from each district could be divided into four groups evenly (of 15), this maintained the proportional representation of each district.

The Boeotian federal council deliberated mostly on diplomatic and military matters and was the only body able to declare war on another state.¹⁶ There are several

¹² Thuc. 5.38.2. Roesch 1965, 123-124.

¹³ *Hell. Oxy.* 16.4. was clear that the representatives were paid for their daily expenses. Bonner 1910, 407 took this to mean that the property qualification was fairly low.

¹⁴ Cloché 1953, 73. *Hell. Oxy.* F16.4.

¹⁵ McKechnie & Kern 1988, 157. Robinson 2010, 55. Beck & Ganter 2015, 143 unnecessarily suggested that the arithmetic did not align, but as shown above it does. The only problem occurs is if representation is thought of as being by city rather than by district. Larsen 1955, 37 believed even 165 members was too large a body to function effectively and used this to argue that most of the work was left to the *boeotarchoi*.

¹⁶ Bruce 1960, 81.

examples to support this conclusion. First, when the Thebans attempted to bring Plataea into the Boeotian League (again) in 431 BC, though the initial entry into the city was made by only 300 men, they were commanded by two *boeotarchoi*.¹⁷ It is tempting to say these men were acting out of self-interest, but the arrival of the main Boeotian force the following day indicates that this was an officially sanctioned action that only could have been undertaken on the orders of the council.¹⁸ As demonstrated above, the *boeotarchoi* were able to deploy forces quickly in Boeotia, but never on such a large scale as calling out a major part of the army.¹⁹ The confusion surrounding the outbreak of the Corinthian War indicated that this was not a power given to the *boeotarchoi* (despite their importance in military leadership once the war began), but instead required a vote of the assembly, such as when Androcleides and Ismenias required the consent of their fellow citizens in order to come to the aid of the Locrians.²⁰ In diplomatic terms, the attempted alliance with the Corinthians and Argives during the Peloponnesian War points to the four federal councils as the only body to possess the power to formalize alliances.²¹ The federal councils then can be seen as the ultimate authoritative body on all matters of official diplomatic and military concerns.

After the King's Peace

The specific clause of the King's Peace which most affected the Boeotian League referred to the autonomy of Greek cities.²²

¹⁷ Thuc. 2.2.1.

¹⁸ Diod. 12.41.7. Thuc. 2.5.1 indicated the main force was supposed to arrive that same night which demonstrates the initial plan involved the whole army.

¹⁹ The rapid deployments ordered by the *boeotarchoi* usually involved a small number of men like the defense of Mycalessus and the halting of the sacrifices at Aulis, both discussed in the previous chapter.

²⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.4. Cook 1988, 83 has convincingly argued that the majority of these counselors would not be members of the same faction and would thus have to be persuaded into action. Bonner 1910, 416 believed the faction in power in Thebes controlled the Boeotian League.

²¹ Thuc. 5.38.3.

²² Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.31. Hamilton 1979, 322 attributed the inclusion of the autonomy clause to Antalcidas' skill as a diplomat because the clause so directly benefitted Spartan interests.

Ἄρταξέρξης βασιλεὺς νομίζει δίκαιον τὰς μὲν ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ πόλεις ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι καὶ τῶν νήσων Κλαζομενὰς καὶ Κύπρον, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφεῖναι πλὴν Λήμνου καὶ Ἴμβρου καὶ Σκύρου: ταύτας δὲ ὥσπερ τὸ ἀρχαῖον εἶναι Ἀθηναίων.

There may have been a real difference of opinion between the Spartans and Boeotians over what was meant by the term *autonomia*.²³ Some have placed importance on the secession of Orchomenus from the Boeotian league as a critical act in defining the autonomy of the Boeotian *poleis*.²⁴ This is a weak claim because the secession of a city from a voluntary league does not indicate a lack of autonomy when the city was a member of that league. Furthermore, the Boeotian League had made no effort to deprive Orchomenus of its autonomy by using military force to bring it back into the federal state up to this point in history. At this time though the Spartans were in a position to enforce their definition and ordered the dismantling of the federal structure.²⁵ The autonomy clause effectively destroyed the federal structure of the Boeotian League, which in turn limited the power of the individual cities of Boeotia. This was not a condemnation of federalism as a form of government, but rather the selective use of the autonomy clause by the Spartans to undermine the power of a potential rival in mainland Greece.²⁶ As stated above, the Spartans did nothing to dismantle the Locrian federal state, indicating this position was not based on political ideology. In the same way, Agesilaus' personal animosity toward the Thebans should

²³ Rhodes 1999, 35. Beck 2001, 362 correctly called autonomy under the King's Peace an ambiguous term for which 'absence was better defined than its presence.' Buckler 2003, 144 likewise described autonomy as 'more of a vague notion than a political tenet. Ma 2016, 37-40 essentially created a small typology of *autonomia* which can apply at both the regional and local levels. This again supports the idea that *autonomia* was a concept that was argued between actors and defined by constantly changing power dynamics. Mosley 1971, 327 identified the trend that the clauses in most treaties of the fourth century could be disputed.

²⁴ Buckler 2003, 145.

²⁵ Buckler 2003, 177 chose this moment as when Sparta demonstrated that it was the 'real *prostates*' of the peace.

²⁶ As Seager 1974, 36 noted, 'the King's Peace was a weapon to be wielded by a single state.'

not be held as reflective of his view of federalism.²⁷ It is reasonable to believe that only the *poleis* of Boeotia were entitled to *autonomia* and were left in control of their perioecic settlements.²⁸ With the application of the King's Peace to the cities of Boeotia, which became autonomous in 386 BC, the Boeotian League was dissolved and thus there was no federal council.²⁹

Though the overarching structure of the federal government was removed, we should not assume that massive structural changes took place in government at the local level (with the obvious exception of Plataea which was repopulated and gained independence from Theban control for the first time since 427 BC). The rotating system of four councils within each of the cities described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* did not infringe on the autonomy clause of the King's Peace, and barring political upheaval could have remained in place until each city was reintegrated into the Boeotian League in the 370s BC.

Post-379 BC

After the liberation of the Cadmeia, a council of the Boeotians was re-established, though the four representative councils were replaced with a single, direct assembly of citizens often referred to as the ἐκκλησία.³⁰ While the actual voting procedures are absent, it is reasonable to assume that a majority opinion carried the

²⁷ Buckler 2003, 188 saw Agesilaus as the prime influence on the fall of the Boeotian League, describing him as 'an arrogant, malicious, and stupid man' yet still believed that the dissolution of the Boeotian League was a rejection of federalism as a form of government. Hamilton 1979, 322 attributed Agesilaus' application of the treaty to break up the Boeotian League as the product of his personal hatred toward the Thebans.

²⁸ Rhodes 1999, 35-36; 40 which also explained how the Spartans could retain their perioecic cities without violating the peace and why Agesilaus rejected Epaminondas' proposal.

²⁹ Beck & Ganter 2015, 146 added the unfounded assertion that the breaking of the Boeotian League was met with joy by many Boeotians. Undoubtedly certain Boeotians saw the fall of Thebes as a way to advance their own political ambitions, but this makes their motivation personal rather than ideological.

³⁰ Buck 1994, 106 claimed that there was a *boule* chosen by lot from the assembly but there is no evidence for this.

vote in any issue to come before the assembly.³¹ In terms of responsibilities and powers of this assembly, we receive some direct evidence, though it is mostly centered around the exploits of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The assembly clearly had the power to dispatch military forces and chose the commanders from among the *boeotarchoi* as demonstrated by the sending of the rescue force to Thessaly to retrieve Pelopidas and Ismenias.³² The assembly also made the final decision regarding new military (and by extension fiscal) matters including the naval program advocated by Epaminondas, the debate for which took place in front of the assembly.³³

The Establishment of Democracy(?)

The list of scholars who have claimed that this post-379 BC assembly indicated a transition from oligarchy to democracy is almost endless.³⁴ Moreover, some have suspected that the exiles had been inspired by their time in Athens to establish this democracy in Boeotia, despite the fact we are poorly informed as to the interaction between the Theban exiles and the Athenians during their three year stay.³⁵ To the latter claim we have a roughly contemporary counterpoint. Thrasybulus' stay in Thebes did not turn him into an oligarch, so why should the opposite be true for the Thebans living in Athens?³⁶ To the former point a more detailed examination is necessary. What evidence are these assertions based on? Surely such a radical change in governmental

³¹ Larsen 1955, 72 and Beck 1997a, 101 suggested that voting was based on a show of hands which is not unreasonable, but also not verifiable.

³² Plut. *Pel.* 28.1.

³³ Diod. 15.78.4-15.79.1.

³⁴ Beck 1997b, 333. Beck & Ganter 2015, 148. Bakhuizen 1994, 308. Robinson 2011, 56. Mackil 2013, 339 referred to a 'democratic leaning.' Buckler 2003, 216 spoke of a 'federal system based on democratic principles.' Larsen 1968, 175. Buck 1994, 79; 106 claimed the transition was to 'an Athenian-style democracy.' Buck 1985b, 29. Cloché 1953, 134. The odd one out among modern scholars was Bruce 1960, 86 which presumed the new Boeotian League kept its old constitution but this was also inaccurate.

³⁵ Bakhuizen 1994, 319.

³⁶ Buck 2005, 42 wisely noted that the connection between Ismenias and Thrasybulus was based more on practical need than ideological alignment. The same could be true for the Theban exiles in Athens.

character would gain some attention, but in fact we learn very little of major constitutional change beyond the abolition of representative government, which will be discussed later as a product of the historical circumstances surrounding the re-foundation of the Boeotian League. The key to understanding the lack of a shift from oligarchy to democracy is to maintain the Boeotian view of oligarchy, which is quite different from how many Athenian audiences of the time might have understood it. For this examination, as it was for Ostwald, the greatest insight into the way the Boeotians thought about oligarchy can be found in the speech of the Thebans at the trial of the Plataeans, which demonstrated, ‘for purposes of their own, the Thebans distinguished between two kinds of oligarchy: They condemned *dynasteia* but approved...an oligarchy which recognized some kind of political equality.’³⁷ Aristotle defined *dynasteia* as the fourth and most extreme form of oligarchy.³⁸

ὅταν δὲ ἤδη πολὺ ὑπερτείνωσι ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς πολυφιλίαις, ἐγγύς ἢ τοιαύτη δυναστεία μοναρχίας ἐστίν, καὶ κύριοι γίνονται οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁ νόμος: καὶ τὸ τέταρτον εἶδος τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, ἀντίστροφον τῷ τελευταίῳ τῆς δημοκρατίας.

It is this disdain for the extreme form of oligarchy known as *dynasteia* which will explain the political shifts of the Boeotian League after the recapture of the Cadmeia.

Factional Politics and their Representation

Many of the liberators who returned from Athens were adherents of the faction led by Ismenias and Androcleides and it is there we must begin our examination. The interests of this faction have remained somewhat of a historical enigma, at times thought to be pro-democratic and pro-Athenian in opposition to the pro-Spartan

³⁷ Ostwald 2000, 24. Thuc. 3.62.3.

³⁸ Aristot. *Pol.* 1293a.

tendencies of Leontiades.³⁹ The main evidence for a pro-democratic claim is from Plutarch, and the text does not state that the faction was democratic, but only that it was perceived to be and this was immediately contrasted with the rich oligarchs of the faction of Leontiades, Archias, and Philip who wished to have the government in the hands of a small number of men.⁴⁰

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν λόγῳ μὲν ὡς φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις προσφερομένων τοῖς Θηβαίοις, ἔργῳ δὲ τὸ φρόνημα τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ὑφορωμένων, καὶ μάλιστα τὴν Ἰσμηνίου καὶ Ἀνδροκλείδου μισούντων ἑταιρείαν, ἧς μετεῖχεν ὁ Πελοπίδας, φιλελεύθερον ἅμα καὶ δημοτικὴν εἶναι δοκοῦσαν, Ἀρχίας καὶ Λεοντίδας καὶ Φίλιππος, ἄνδρες ὀλιγαρχικοὶ καὶ πλούσιοι καὶ μέτριον οὐδὲν φρονοῦντες, ἀναπειθουσι Φοιβίδαν τὸν Λάκωνα μετὰ στρατιᾶς διαπορευόμενον ἐξαίφνης καταλαβεῖν τὴν Καδμείαν καὶ τοὺς ὑπεναντιούμενους αὐτοῖς ἐκβαλόντα πρὸς τὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ὑπήκοον ἀρμόσασθαι δι' ὀλίγων τὴν πολιτείαν.

What could cause the perception of a pro-democratic party? For many it was probably the accompanying perception that the party was pro-Athenian which seems to have had enough traction to require a renunciation by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.⁴¹

οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν αἰτίαν μὲν εἶχον ἀττικίζειν ἐξ ὧν πρόθυμοι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ἐγένοντο ὡς ἔφυγεν· οὐ μὴν ἐφρόντιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἀλλ' εἶχ[ον...]

Xenophon did not assist in clarifying the stance of Ismenias' party but instead only claimed they were anti-Spartan and that those 'of similar views' to Ismenias fled to Athens after 382 BC.⁴²

οἱ μὲν δὴ εἰδότες τὸ πρᾶγμα παρήσαν τε καὶ ἐπέιθοντο καὶ συνελάμβανον: τῶν δὲ μὴ εἰδόντων, ἐναντίων δὲ ὄντων τοῖς περὶ Λεοντιάδην, οἱ μὲν ἔφευγον εὐθύς ἔξω τῆς πόλεως, δείσαντες μὴ ἀποθάνοιεν: οἱ δὲ καὶ οἴκαδε πρῶτον ἀπεχώρησαν: ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰργμένον τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν ἦσθοντο οἱ ἐν τῇ Καδμεία, τότε δὴ ἀπεχώρησαν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας οἱ ταῦτα γινώσκοντες Ἀνδροκλείδα τε καὶ Ἰσμηνία μάλιστα τριακόσιοι.

³⁹ This has been effectively challenged by Bruce 1960, 78 and Perlman 1964, 65.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 5.1-2. Bruce 1960, 77 and Cook 1988, 58 indicated that both these parties were likely to be fairly aristocratic.

⁴¹ *Hell. Oxy.* F17.1. The text frustratingly breaks off before the real interests of Ismenias are defined.

⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.31.

These two factions (and there were certainly more which were not recorded) may not have been strict holders of separate ideologies, but they could have rather been in different places on the same spectrum in terms of political participation.⁴³ Not all oligarchic governments functioned in the same way, as Aristotle demonstrated, and we could instead think of Ismenias and Androcleides as being in favor of a more moderate oligarchy with a wider (though still limited to the hoplite census) franchise for citizenship and political participation.⁴⁴

The expansion or contraction of the Boeotian oligarchy, particularly in Thebes, after the King's Peace could also have been affected by the important development of the repopulating of Plataea. Previously, the land of the Plataeans had been leased to Thebans, which may have allowed for an increase in wealth and thus an expansion in those eligible for the franchise.⁴⁵ Without Plataea, this path to citizenship was lost. This might have then resulted in a narrowing of the oligarchy, drawing it closer to the dreaded status of *dynasteia* and drawing support away from more moderate factions like that of Androcleides and Ismenias.⁴⁶ There are also the political realities of the time to consider. At the time of the capture of the Cadmeia in 382 BC, Ismenias and his companions apparently enjoyed popular support and thus the largest influence in the

⁴³ Perlman 1964, 80 pointed out that the major parties in Greek cities were not as divided on social or ideological lines as was once thought. Ostwald 2000, 388 made the attractive claim that there were no ideological oligarchs or democrats in ancient Greece. Kowalzig 2007, 355 recognized elites would back whichever form of government would place them in power. Schachter 2016, 67 emphasized the significance of personal ambition in Theban politics. Buck 1985, 26 described a possible creation of an 'oligarchy within the wider oligarchy' during the Persian Wars but the same idea could be applied here.

⁴⁴ Aristot. *Pol.* 1293a. Buck 1981, 50 recognized but did not endorse the idea that oligarchy in Boeotia could be reorganized to create a wider electorate.

⁴⁵ Thuc. 3.68.3. Bruce 1968, 197. It is worth noting that the land of Plataea around the Asopus was regarded as fertile in the Classical Period, particularly in regards to grain, hence Euripides' remark on the Asopus which 'produced abundant grain for the Thebans' and Aeschylus' comment that it 'enriches the soil of the Boeotians.' Eurip. *Bac.* 749-750. Aesch. *Per.* 805-806. Not to be confused with the river of Phlius. Paus. 5.14.3. Hom. *Il.* 4.383.

⁴⁶ Ostwald 2000, 392 named this type of fluctuation in the number or size of estates as a deciding factor in the moderation of oligarchies.

Boeotian councils. It was then only natural for Leontiades to want a narrowing of the oligarchy which would place him in power, and this is in fact exactly the type of government which was established once he led the Spartans to the Cadmeia.⁴⁷

Other than the degree of moderation within the oligarchy, wealth also played a role in delineating Leontiades and his companions from the heroes of Plutarch's narrative. In his description of the political factions in fourth century Boeotia, Plutarch discussed the issue of wealth adding that those who associated with Leontiades tended to be wealthy (πλούσιος) as shown above.⁴⁸ This wealth stands in stark contrast to the financial status of one of Plutarch's heroes, Epaminondas, who was able to remain in Thebes when Pelopidas and others fled because of his poverty (πενία), a fact which was mentioned immediately after the discussion of Leontiades' wealth.⁴⁹

Ἴσμηνίας μὲν συναρπασθεὶς καὶ κομισθεὶς εἰς Λακεδαίμονα μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἀνηρέθη, Πελοπίδας δὲ καὶ Φερένικος καὶ Ἄνδροκλείδας μετὰ συχνοῶν ἄλλων φεύγοντες ἐξεκηρύχθησαν, Ἐπαμεινώνδας δὲ κατὰ χώραν ἔμεινε τῷ καταφρονηθῆναι διὰ μὲν φιλοσοφίαν ὡς ἀπράγμων, διὰ δὲ πενίαν ὡς ἀδύνατος.

This should not be taken to mean that Epaminondas was disenfranchised, because this was certainly not the case. His wealth was instead meagre in comparison to his companions in the government and particularly that of Leontiades. As attested in the biographers, Epaminondas still had the requisite amount of wealth to possess the hoplite qualification. According to Plutarch and Nepos, Pelopidas and Epaminondas served together as hoplites before 379 BC, at the battle of Mantinea where

⁴⁷ Beck & Ganter 2015, 147. Cook 1988, 79 indicated that political groupings in Boeotia were small to begin with, so the government under Leontiades may literally have been in the hands of only a few men.

⁴⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 5.2.

⁴⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 5.3. Epaminondas' attitude toward material wealth (and the lack of it) was well documented in the source material and particularly emphasized in the biographers. Corn. Nep. *Epam.* 3.5 Epaminondas refused to gain from the wealth of his friends; 4.1-2; Plut. *Mor.* 193C when Diomedes attempted to bribe Epaminondas but was unsuccessful. Plut. *Mor.* 193B; 583F Jason of Pherae offered Epaminondas money but was rebuffed. Paus. 9.13.1 stated Epaminondas was less wealthy than an ordinary Theban. Sordi 1973, 87-88 oddly associated Epaminondas with the mythical Spartoi to explain his noble yet poor circumstances.

Epaminondas saved Pelopidas' life after he was wounded, which obviously indicates that Epaminondas possessed at least hoplite-level wealth.⁵⁰ Pelopidas of course was wealthy from a young age, but in contrast to Leontiades was a generous man and, when combined with Epaminondas, embodied all the best virtues of men.⁵¹

Πελοπίδα τῷ Ἰππόκλου γένος μὲν ἦν εὐδόκιμον ἐν Θήβαις ὥσπερ Ἐπαμεινώνδα, τραφεὶς δὲ ἐν οὐσίᾳ μεγάλη καὶ παραλαβὼν ἔτι νέος λαμπρὸν οἶκον ὥρμησε τῶν δεομένων τοῖς ἀξίοις βοηθεῖν, ἵνα κύριος ἀληθῶς φαίνοιτο χρημάτων γεγονώς, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοῦλος.

We might look for a point of comparison in terms of character and wealth in Xenophon, but it is interesting that in his telling of the liberation, Xenophon did not mention Pelopidas at all.⁵² This might be an indicator that Plutarch was employing literary exaggeration and hyperbole to accomplish his goal of demonstrating the virtues and widespread support of Epaminondas and Pelopidas as compared to the personal corruption of Leontiades and the illegitimacy of his government. When viewed against *dynasteia*, even a moderate oligarchic group would seem to be the voice of the many.

The rule of the government of Leontiades and Archias was then consistently contrasted with the previous government by its description as a tyranny.⁵³ Many comrades of the liberators who remained in Thebes were eventually imprisoned and only freed the night of the liberation.⁵⁴ This oppressive government was not the oligarchy the Boeotian League was accustomed to, and the reign of Leontiades was recognized as against the law.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 4.4-5. Corn. Nep. *Epam.* 2.4-5. This would have been sufficient for him to achieve the franchise.

⁵¹ Plut. *Pel.* 3.1.

⁵² Hamilton 1991, 155 thought this was due to Xenophon's anti-Theban bias.

⁵³ Plut. *Pel.* 6.1; 9.2. Plut. *Mor.* 576B. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.1. Plut. *Mor.* 597E named Leontiades as a 'tyrannical' man.

⁵⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 598A-C. Hamilton 1991, 154-156. These were the men who were armed by taking the weapons from the temples and armorers' workshops. Plut. *Pel.* 12.1.

⁵⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 576A.

καὶ γὰρ, ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἀρχίαν καὶ Λεοντίδην Φοιβίδαν πείσαντες ἐν σπονδαῖς καταλαβεῖν τὴν Καδμείαν τοὺς μὲν ἐξέβαλον τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς δὲ φόβῳ κατεῖργον ἄρχοντες αὐτοὶ παρανόμως καὶ βιαίως.

We can use the speech of the Thebans at the trial of the Plataeans mentioned above to create a parallel with this situation. The Thebans claimed that during the Persian Wars, when Thebes famously medized, the government was characterized by *dynasteia* which to the Theban mind was ‘nearest a tyranny’.⁵⁶

ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἡ πόλις τότε ἐτύγχανεν οὔτε κατ’ ὀλιγαρχίαν ἰσόνομον πολιτεύουσα οὔτε κατὰ δημοκρατίαν: ὅπερ δὲ ἐστὶ νόμοις μὲν καὶ τῷ σωφρονεστάτῳ ἐναντιώτατον, ἐγγυτάτῳ δὲ τυράννου, δυναστεία ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν εἶχε τὰ πράγματα.

This theme of tyranny was further illustrated by Pelopidas’ plea to his comrades to emulate Thrasybulus, who had come back to Athens and overthrown the tyranny.⁵⁷ The delineation which is occurring in Plutarch is not between oligarchy and democracy, but between the wealthy nobility/aristocracy (the few currently in power) and the rest of the still oligarchic/propertied citizen body (the more common people who were denied a voice). The same model could be applied to the claim that the liberators had gained the support of *all* the Thebans, meaning that those who had been excluded from the government (e.g. the exiles and those in prison) were able to reclaim their old constitution.⁵⁸ The liberation was not a group of democrats overthrowing an oligarchic government, but rather a group of traditional oligarchs overthrowing a narrower oligarchic regime.

⁵⁶ Thuc. 3.62.3.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 7.2. Diod. 15.25.4 also mentioned the parallel between the two events.

⁵⁸ Diod. 15.25.2. Obviously this cannot be taken to mean literally *all* Thebans. There were rifts even between the liberators.

The Recapture of the Cadmeia: The Birth of Theban Democracy?

One of the most commonly used events to demonstrate that a democracy was established in the new Boeotian League is the election of the *boeotarchoi* after the death of Leontiades but before the actual fall of the Cadmeia. Plutarch emphasized the numbers involved in the uprising by commenting on the many (πλήθος) who were scared to come out and join the liberation before dawn.⁵⁹ It is important to note that these Thebans who gathered at dawn were considered citizens (πολίται).⁶⁰ One could infer from Plutarch that the men who joined up with Pelopidas and the other liberators were indeed disenfranchised from the way they had to be armed from breaking into the ironworks, but Xenophon clarified that the men armed in such a way were in fact released from prison by the liberators, which explains their lack of weapons as discussed above.⁶¹ Given the brutality visited on Ismenias and the assassination of Androcleides in Athens, it should not be surprising that those judged to be a threat to the *dynasteia* were imprisoned.⁶² Plutarch also mentioned the meeting of an assembly of the people, or the many.⁶³

ἅμα δὲ ἡμέρα παρήσαν μὲν ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς οἱ φυγάδες ὀπλισμένοι,
 συνήθροιστο δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὁ δῆμος. εἰσήγον δὲ τοὺς περὶ Πελοπίδαν
 Ἐπαμεινώνδας καὶ Γοργίδας ὑπὸ τῶν ἱερέων περιεχομένους στέμματα
 προτεινόντων καὶ παρακαλούντων τοὺς πολίτας τῇ πατρίδι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς
 βοηθεῖν, ἢ δ' ἐκκλησία ὀρθῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν μετὰ κρότου καὶ βοῆς ἐξάνεστη,
 δεχομένων τοὺς ἄνδρας ὡς εὐεργέτας καὶ σωτῆρας.

Many have taken this to represent the establishment of a democracy in Thebes, and thus within the new Boeotian League, but this ignores Plutarch's purpose as a biographer

⁵⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 12.2.

⁶⁰ Diod. 15.25.2.

⁶¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.8 stated these men were then told to wait at the Ampheon, which is north of the Cadmeia near the modern museum. Symeonoglou 1985, 273-274.

⁶² Plut. *Pel.* 6.2. As was demonstrated during the initial capture of Thebes by the Spartans, the polemarchs had the power to arrest.

⁶³ Plut. *Pel.* 12.4.

and the contrast he was attempting to draw between moderates and the *dynasteia* of Leontiades as detailed above.⁶⁴ The Thebans did not need to use democracy as a tool to rally men to their cause, this had already been accomplished for them by the Spartan occupation and the essentially puppet government of Leontiades.⁶⁵ Another piece of evidence often used to demonstrate the establishment of democracy in Thebes and thus in the Boeotian League was the flight of the *demos* of Thespieae to Thebes during the period of reconsolidation.⁶⁶

ἐκ δὲ τούτου πάλιν αὖ τὰ τῶν Θηβαίων ἀνεξωπυρεῖτο, καὶ ἐστρατεύοντο εἰς Θεσπιάς καὶ εἰς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς περιοικίδας πόλεις. ὁ μέντοι δῆμος ἐξ αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἀπεχώρει: ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ταῖς πόλεσι δυναστεῖαι καθειστήκεσαν

While some have taken this to be a democratic faction, it could instead be a further delineation between the *demos* and the ruling *dynasteia* and may be a more relative comparison than most suspect.⁶⁷ Additionally, the Thebans did not implement a plan of installing democracies in allied cities throughout Greece, and central Greece especially provided clear examples where this was not the case.⁶⁸ The most obvious of these are the alliances with the Pheraean tyranny, first with Jason in the 370s BC and then with Alexander in the late 360s BC.

Some have argued for the extension of the franchise of citizenship down to the lower classes, but this rests on scant evidence.⁶⁹ A common argument is that because decrees of the time mention the *demos* of the Boeotians, this must indicate an

⁶⁴ Buck 1994, 79.

⁶⁵ Buckler 1980, 16 admitted that this unification was caused by the Spartan takeover, but then later claimed (20) that ‘the Thebans championed democracy in Boeotia.’

⁶⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.46. Robinson 2010, 56.

⁶⁷ Rhodes 2016, 61 noted the *demos* does not equate to a democratic movement.

⁶⁸ Robinson 2011, 58 claimed Theban support for democracy in allied cities. As Beck 1997b, 344 has shown, the overall influence of Boeotian federalism on the systems of other states was significantly less than previously thought.

⁶⁹ Buckler 1980, 30. Buck 1994, 106 believed citizenship was extended to all adult male Boeotians but there is no evidence for this.

expansion of the franchise to a democratic level in which a property qualification did not exist.⁷⁰ Very few have ever challenged this argument, but Larsen, despite ultimately deciding on a democratic Boeotia after 379 BC, warned, ‘The language of the decrees suggests a democratic government. Yet the most that the references to the *damos* can prove is that all active citizens had a right to vote in the assembly.’⁷¹

Mechanisms of Theban Domination

The abolition of representative government by districts should not come as a surprise when the practical concerns of re-establishing the Boeotian League are taken into account. At the outset, a primary assembly of the citizens was the only option available, because Thebes and the smaller cities in the surrounding area were the only cities involved in the Boeotian League. It would not be until much later in the 370s BC that the major *poleis* of Boeotia would be brought back into the federal fold. Why should such a small government be representative? The smaller cities surrounding Thebes had never possessed individual representation under the previous system, why should they now? This, especially if as suggested above the city governments were not representative under the pre-King’s Peace Boeotian League, would represent a degree of continuity from the previous government. Votes would still be dominated by the urban Theban population, a trend which continued even after Boeotia became consolidated.⁷² Though some have attempted to map the districts onto the new college of *boeotarchoi*, which as shown above had been reduced from eleven before the King’s

⁷⁰ This refers mainly to the decrees of *proxenia* from the 360s. *IG VII: 2407*; *IG VII: 2408*; *SEG 34:355*; *SEG 55:564* which were highlighted above.

⁷¹ Larsen 1968, 178. Finley 1983, 1-2 likewise commented on the ambiguity of the term.

⁷² As Larsen 1955, 72 = Larsen 1968, 175 noted, holding the meetings of the federal assembly in Thebes allowed for Thebes to be the dominant force in political decisions. Roesch 1965, 124. Buck 1985, 29. Beck 1997a, 101 suggestion of fixed dates for the meetings of the assembly is not unlikely given the story of the Plataeans from Paus. 9.1.5.

Peace to four in 379 BC and raised back to seven by 371 BC and remained at that level into the 360s BC, this kind of analogy is not particularly necessary or effective in explaining the change. Let us take the districts of Thespieae for example, which under the old system numbered two and thus two *boeotarchoi* were supplied. Thespieae was brought into the Boeotian League and the Spartan garrison expelled well before the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. Assuming the old districts were still in place, there would have been nine *boeotarchoi* at Leuctra, because Thespieae had not yet suffered at the hands of the Thebans, which would happen immediately after Leuctra. The other three *boeotarchoi* would then come from Tanagra and the two districts made of three cities each, which were also certainly part of the Boeotian League at this time.⁷³ We should then conclude that there is no evidence, and no reasonable explanation, to have maintained the old districts, especially because the government was no longer representative but was instead direct.⁷⁴ The abolition of districts also made for an easier reconstruction of the Boeotian League because populations could be incorporated piecemeal and immediately as they were brought under more moderate control.

But was Theban domination of the Boeotian League something new to this reconstituted organization? Some have compared the two Boeotian Leagues in this way, ‘In the previous confederacy the Thebans had had to persuade their countrymen. In the new one they could direct them’ and ‘the federal assembly was the tool by which Thebes controlled the confederacy.’⁷⁵ Maybe in 447 BC when the initial districts were allotted and the Thebans had only two districts, the same as Orchomenus and Thespieae,

⁷³ Buckler 1980, 23 claimed that Thespieae and Orchomenus were denied representation in the new Boeotian League. Buckler 2003, 215 repeated the claim of the districts remaining in use.

⁷⁴ Cloché 1953, 134 believed that the districts remained in the new Boeotian League although their number was reduced to seven.

⁷⁵ Buckler 1980, 18 & 30. Buckler 2008, 216.

it could be said that there was some degree of parity. Yet after 427 BC and the assumption of the Plataean districts by Thebes, the federal assembly was in fact used as a way to control the policies of the Boeotian League.⁷⁶ This is especially true once Orchomenus left the Boeotian League at the outset of the Corinthian War, which left Thebes in an even *more* commanding position until the King's Peace destroyed this structure.

In the individual cities, we hear very little of changes in the form of government, though certainly the ruling factions changed from anti-League to pro-League supporters, and the exile of prominent men who aided the Spartans is not unlikely. Under the old federal state, exile was not an unusual practice, and there are numerous accounts which testify to this. In the prelude to the failed Athenian invasion of 424 BC, Thucydides spoke of the Theban exile Ptoedorus as being involved in negotiations with the Athenians as well as friends of Chaeronean exiles who planned to surrender their city.⁷⁷ In the restored Boeotian League, Thebes did not hesitate to exile its own citizens, as there were some serving as cavalrymen with Agesilaus.⁷⁸ The fact that these exiles were serving as cavalrymen also indicates their level of wealth. This, combined with their Theban origin, strongly suggests that these men were exiled members of Leontiades' faction or some of the Spartan supporters who had fled to the Cadmeia during the liberation. Other than factional power shifts, the local governments appear to have been able to conduct their own affairs with the obvious exception of foreign policy.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ Demand 1982, 37-38 saw Thebes as wielding a large amount of power from the inception of the Boeotian League in 447 BC.

⁷⁷ Thuc. 4.76.2-3.

⁷⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.39.

⁷⁹ Buckler 2003, 215.

Conclusions

How can we now characterize the post-379 Boeotian League as compared to its predecessor? As demonstrated above, the largest change was the abolition of representative government in favor of direct assembly, but this was dictated by historical circumstances and we must imagine that for a time the Theban assembly and the federal assembly were nearly synonymous until more major cities could be incorporated into the Boeotian League. Rather than a further restructuring as these new members were initiated (such as the reintroduction of districts), the system put in place after the liberation of the Cadmeia was retained because it legitimized and institutionalized Theban supremacy over the rest of the Boeotian League. As for the idea that the character of the Boeotian League was changed from an oligarchy to democracy, it has been shown above that there are abundant reasons to doubt the establishment of democracy in Boeotia after 379 BC. It should be clear that the Thebans understood two different types of oligarchy, one which was based on equal rights and share in the government for all citizens, and the other a near-tyrannical *dynasteia* in which an extremely narrow group of men controlled the government. Since *dynasteia* was established in the Boeotian cities after 382 BC, most notably in Thebes under the faction of Leontiades, we should be able to frame the narratives of the liberation, which set the many citizens against the few in power, as a struggle between these two types of oligarchy, not between oligarchy and democracy. The government established by the liberators was then a return in many ways to the Boeotian League of the early fourth century. The representative government was abolished due to the practical concerns surrounding the return of the liberators from Athens. The oligarchy, held in a state of *dynasteia* for three years by the wealthy few of Leontiades faction,

was returned to a moderate oligarchy in which all men of a certain property qualification (hoplite-level wealth) were allowed participation in an assembly. Within this theme of a return to a previous form of government, the *boeotarchia* was re-established with essentially the same functions and limited in power by the laws and judgments of this assembly. With so much continuity between these two versions of the Boeotian League, we can now begin to look outward to the rest of central Greece and examine not only whether this political continuity and stability existed in other states, but how the continuity and stability of the Boeotian League affected interaction with and intervention in Phocis, Thessaly, and Locris during the first half of the fourth century.

Iid: The Phocian State

Despite their involvement in central Greek affairs throughout the first half of the fourth century BC the Phocians, as they are usually referred to in this time period rather than by their specific city ethnics, remain something of an enigma in terms of their political structure. This leaves ample room to question both the degree of regional political organization and consolidation achieved and the strength of Phocis in comparison to other central Greek states. In order to understand the methods and motives of the Boeotian League in dealing with the Phocians we must attempt to uncover the nature of the Phocian state, albeit from scant evidence.

Before continuing, we should first briefly sketch the physical territory referred to by 'Phocis' in this examination. Phocis was directly adjacent to northwestern Boeotia.¹ The western edge of Phocian territory butted against Western Locris, while access to the northern Corinthian gulf was granted in the southwest and southern boundaries of Phocis by ports at Cirrha (which as we will see was a point of territorial debate in the Classical Period) and along the Gulf of Anticyra. In the northwest sat Mt. Oetae and the land of Doris, while to the northeast and east a contested border (to be discussed in detail below) with the eastern Locrians existed near the Phocian towns of Hyampolis and Abae.² The defining feature of Phocis was of course Mt. Parnassus which created a terrain with 'violent fluctuations in elevation.'³ Mt. Parnassus essentially separated Phocis into two regions, one which ran west to the Corinthian

¹ Paus. 10.4.1. The Phocian city of Panopeus was only twenty *stades* from the Boeotian city of Chaeronea. Strab. 9.3.14 commented both on the proximity of city to Boeotian territory and its name change to Phanoteus.

² Strab. 9.3.17 clearly illustrated that Phocis, in a time previous to his own, had split the territory of the Locrians into two parts (Ozolian and Opuntian) through its control of Daphnous on the Northern Euboean Gulf.

³ McInerney 1999, 41.

Gulf, and another which was centered on the Cephissus River.⁴ The Cephissus was one of the most significant waterways in central Greece and eventually fed into Lake Copais in Boeotia, providing an important physical connection and access between the two regions. The importance of this river and its tributaries lends weight to the idea that the specific borders of the region outlined above were defined by its watercourses.⁵

With the geographic limits of Phocis defined, we must also briefly discuss the concept of Phocian identity which has received attention in recent studies. As stated above, the people of Phocis are generally termed, ‘the Phocians’ in extant literature, but how was this identity perceived in Antiquity? In Homer, those who occupied the sites of Hyampolis, Panopeus, and Lilaea (all inhabited sites in the Classical Period) were referred to as sharing in some form of Phocian identity.⁶ For the majority of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Phocians were thought of by scholars as an *ethnos* joined in a political union based on this shared ethnicity.⁷ However, as recent scholarship has proposed, the *ethnos* may not have been the driving force of political consolidation, but was instead supplementary to it. Specifically, the Phocian state was defined largely by the establishment of Delphic autonomy and the Thessalian threat to the cities around Parnassus in the sixth century BC.⁸ Recent scholarship has also suggested that there was significant economic motivation for cooperation as reflected in

⁴ Larsen 1960, 40. McInerney 1997, 195.

⁵ A detailed discussion of these borders can be found in McInerney 1999, 76-80.

⁶ Hom. *Il.* 2.517-524. Paus. 10.1.10 the Phocians were named after the mythological figure of Phocus. A more detailed discussion of the association of the name Phocus with the region around Mt. Parnassus can be found in Paus. 2.29.2-3.

⁷ The primary proponent of this view was Larsen 1960, 40-42 which saw the formation of the Phocian state as defined by a tribal cohesion already in place by the Archaic Period.

⁸ McInerney 1999, 154-157. Of course, each of the Phocian cities had their own mythological tradition which can be illustrated by the new inscriptions found in Panopeus as reported in Rousset, Camp, and Minon 2015.

the early coinage minted in Phocis.⁹ What we see then, is a shared mythology used to represent a political structure created out of necessity by conditions on the ground. This pragmatic union was further enforced through the association with cult as recent investigations into the site of the Phokikon has demonstrated its association with Zeus, Hera, and Athena as well as its physical proximity to the heroon of a shared ancestor.¹⁰ The Phocians as an *ethnos* were identifiable as much by their geography and historical circumstances as they were by their mythic past.

Pausanias, in his description of Delphi, stated that the city was threatened most often by the Phocian *dynastai*.¹¹

ἔοικε δὲ ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὸ ἱερὸν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων ἐπιβεβουλευσθαι πλείστων ἤδη. οὐτός τε ὁ Εὐβοεὺς ληστὴς καὶ ἔτεσιν ὕστερον τὸ ἔθνος τὸ Φλεγυῶν, ἔτι δὲ Πύρρος ὁ Ἀχιλλέως ἐπεχείρησεν αὐτῷ, καὶ δυνάμεως μοῖρα τῆς Ξέρξου, καὶ οἱ χρόνον τε ἐπὶ πλείστον καὶ μάλιστα τοῦ θεοῦ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἐπελθόντες οἱ ἐν Φωκεῦσι δυνάσται, καὶ ἡ Γαλατῶν στρατιά.

Though some might equate this to the situation of the Thessalian cities, the two regions are not quite comparable in terms of size or in levels of cooperation.¹² This term *dynastai* was also applied to specific, powerful Phocians during the Sacred War. Just as they did to overthrow the Thessalians in the late Archaic and early Classical periods, the *dynastai* would band together in times of war, and multiple Phocian cities made up the army of the Phocians. Without a centralized federal political structure, the task of organizing military forces fell to the leaders of each individual city which could result

⁹ Mackil 2013, 249. This is against the suggestion of Williams 1972, 9-11 which argued for a parallel political development with the economic factors. Economic motivations for action in the Archaic Period were also presented by Howe 2003, 129-146.

¹⁰ As McNerney 1997, 197-203 has suggested, both of these associations would serve to enforce a collective identity among the Phocian cities.

¹¹ Paus. 10.7.1. The presence of *dynastai* aligns with McNerney 1999, 203 in denoting the rise of 'powerful local families' in the fifth and fourth centuries. Aristot. *Pol.* 1293a identified this type of government as the fourth and narrowest form of oligarchy. Ostwald 2000, 392-393.

¹² McNerney 1999, 203.

in delays or outright refusal to participate based on local political interests. Lysander's orders to ensure the enrolment of various contingents in his invasion force in 395 BC may have been a result of these organizational difficulties.¹³ This lack of cooperation continued into the 370s when, during Jason's march to Leuctra in 371 BC, the Phocians were not able to gather their forces from various cities to oppose him.¹⁴ Though the Boeotian League was able to rally the Phocians for a Peloponnesian campaign after Leuctra, by 362 BC the Phocians were once again difficult to muster.¹⁵ What can explain this lack of cohesion and consensus? In the case of the Boeotian League and its expeditions the answer was likely the animosity of the Phocians not toward each other, but to their habitual regional rivals the Boeotians. For the other instances though, the answer could lie in a long-term *stasis* which affected the cities of Phocis, with rival oligarchic groups both in cities and across the region unable to agree both on specific policy and on the election of centralized federal leadership.¹⁶ This theory also meshes well with the concept of *dynastai* controlling the cities of Phocis who were more concerned with expanding their own power than with establishing a more moderate, unified Phocian state.¹⁷ As noted above, this type of *dynasteia* was reviled by the Boeotians and overthrown in 379 BC, but in this instance its existence aided Boeotian interests. As long as *stasis* persisted in Phocis, the Boeotian League did not need to

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6-7.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.21. Jason also attacked the cities of Phocis on his return journey from Leuctra and was able to succeed despite the relatively small size of his force compared to the full military potential of Thessaly at his disposal.

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23; 7.5.4. The Phocians cited the defensive nature of their alliance with the Boeotians to drop out of the campaign.

¹⁶ McInerney 1999, 203 claimed that these oligarchic groups were both wealthier and more educated than other Phocians. For a discussion of *stasis* in the Greek city states see Gehrke 1985, 131 for a brief section on Phocis during the Sacred War.

¹⁷ As McInerney 1999, 41 has suggested, the very topography of Phocis was not conducive to a single city controlling the entire region in a centralized manner. Cooperation and negotiation were then essential to any Phocian attempts at unification.

worry about Phocian incursions into northern Boeotia. Only when this *stasis* was solved could the Phocians present a threat to the consolidation of the Boeotian League and seriously challenge for power in central Greece. This *stasis* could be resolved in two ways: through intervention by external forces or a substantial internal power shift among the *dynastai* of the Phocian cities, and the first half of the fourth century demonstrates both types of resolutions. Externally, it was the Spartans who used their influence to bring the still limited power of Phocis to bear against the Boeotian League, while the internal resolution stemmed from the fine assessed by the Amphictyons before the Sacred War and the rise of Philomelus and his successors.

From the fifth century onward, the leadership of the Phocian cities does not seem to have been as organized or permanent as that of Boeotia. To begin, there was no regularity in the number of men chosen to lead the Phocians. Plutarch, in his account of the rebellion of the Phocians from Thessalian rule in the late Archaic Period, claimed there were three leaders, though it is important to notice that Plutarch referred to these men not as στρατηγοί but as ἀρχῶντες.¹⁸

ἄσπονδος ἦν Θετταλοῖς πρὸς Φωκέας πόλεμος: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντας αὐτῶν καὶ τυράννους ἐν ταῖς Φωκικαῖς πόλεσιν ἡμέρα μιᾷ πάντας ἀπέκτειναν, οἱ δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ διακοσίους ἐκείνων ὁμήρους κατηλόησαν εἶτα πανστρατιᾷ διὰ Λοκρῶν ἐνέβαλον, δόγμα θέμενοι μηδενὸς φείδεσθαι τῶν ἐν ἡλικία, παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναικας ἀνδραποδίσασθαι. Δαΐφαντος οὖν ὁ Βαθυλλίου, τρίτος αὐτὸς ἄρχων...

The powers of these archons, and the method by which they were selected, is unknown. With no evidence for their continued existence after the revolt, the nature of these offices could have in fact been temporary. Earlier in the same passage, Plutarch used the same word, ἀρχῶντες, to describe the Thessalians ruling Phocis before the uprising

¹⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 244C. This Phocian uprising against the Thessalians has been generally dated to between 510 and 490 BC. Larsen 1968, 44.

which could indicate that this was not the title as known to the Phocians, but the closest equivalent used by Plutarch to denote the replacement of Thessalians with Phocians in positions of power. The context of the claim also deserves scrutiny, because Plutarch admitted that a fuller treatment of this episode was presented in his *Life of Daiphantus*, one of his lost works.¹⁹ As it appeared in the *Moralia* the event occurred after the murder of the Thessalian governors, which indicates a Phocian system of leadership needed to be established. The creation of these offices would then not be evidence of a consolidated state with non-military functions, but rather as a reaction to immediate military need. The Thessalians served as a focal point for the cities of Phocis to unite against and it was the threat posed by the Thessalians which drove the Phocian cities to cooperate.²⁰ Evaluations of the degree of cooperation between the cities are generally based on the surviving coinage, which has led most scholars to agree that a federal state was in existence by the early fifth century though this faces the same issues as early Boeotian coinage.²¹ While minting a unified coinage is certainly an indicator of economic cooperation, the degree of political unification is still largely unproven. This examination does not believe that a formal political structure existed in Phocis in the fifth century.

If the Phocians did have federal commanders during the Corinthian War, then these offices were somehow undermined by or subordinate to Spartan authority. Not only did the Phocians fight under the command of Lysander at Haliartus in 395 BC, but they later fought under the command of the Spartan Alcisthenes at Naryx.²²

¹⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 244B. This Daiphantus should not be confused with the fourth century figure Daiphantus of Thebes, who was a commander slain at Mantinea in 362 BC. Plut. *Mor.* 194C.

²⁰ McInerney 1999, 177.

²¹ McInerney 1999, 180.

²² Diod. 14.82.8. Diodorus will be utilized heavily in this section as he provided the most complete account of the Sacred War. For the purposes of this examination it will be assumed that Diodorus used

καταστρατοπεδεύοντος δ' αὐτοῦ εἰς Νάρυκα τῆς Λοκρίδος, ἐξ ἧς φασι τὸν Αἴαντα γεγενῆσθαι, τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Φωκέων ἀπῆντησε μετὰ τῶν ὄπλων, τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντος Ἀλκισθέου τοῦ Λάκωνος.

The subordination to Lysander was understandable given his reputation, but Alcisthenes was, from a historical perspective, a literal unknown who appeared only in this instance. The reasonable conclusion here is that the Phocians in the Corinthian War were divided into contingents by city and led by local commanders from these various cities while the overall command, which would normally be given to a Phocian, was ceded to their Spartan allies. Evidence for this can be found in the aftermath of the battle of Haliartus. When the Phocians deserted their Spartan allies after the death of Lysander, the men returned to their different cities.²³

ταύτη μὲν οὖν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἠθύμουν, νομίζοντες οὐκ ἐλάττω κακὰ πεπονθέναι ἢ πεποιηκέναι: τῇ δ' ὕστεραία ἐπεὶ ἦσθοντο ἀπεληλυθότας ἐν νυκτὶ τοὺς τε Φωκέας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας οἴκαδε ἐκάστους, ἐκ τούτου μεῖζον δὴ ἐφρόνουν ἐπὶ τῷ γεγενημένῳ.

No explanation was provided for the abandonment of the Spartan cause, but the greatest change in the expedition prior to the retreat was the death of Lysander. Perhaps the Phocians, deprived of the central leadership provided by the Spartans, were unable to resolve their own internal crisis of leadership and felt compelled to avoid incurring further losses. This type of situation was resolved by the college of *boeotarchoi* within the Boeotian League, but no such mechanism of resolution existed in Phocis. For almost the entire first half of the fourth century, we are left with the impression that an effective, centralized state did not exist in Phocis, but instead individual cities would join together in times of necessity or when pressured by a stronger ally such as Sparta.

multiple sources which he rearranged to make his account. Markle 1994, 45. McInerney 1999, 197 suggested that the Phocian forces were light-armed troops or peltasts though there is no indication of this in the text. Pascual 2013, 486 proposed that Alcisthenes was the Spartan harmost of Phocis, but it is more likely that he was one of Lysander's men who remained in Phocis after the battle of Haliartus.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21.

For the Boeotian League, *stasis* in Phocis meant that intervention was only necessary when operating from a position of strength to ensure continued political instability or to expand their influence in the face of threats to their position such as when Thessaly began to consolidate and grow in power in the 370s BC. If this *stasis* were ever solved, the Boeotian League would face a severe threat to its position in central Greece.

The most information we gain about Phocian leadership and political structures comes from the Sacred War when the catalyst needed to resolve this *stasis* came in the form of the judgment of the Amphictyons and the subsequent Phocian reaction.²⁴ It is no coincidence that this is when named Phocian leaders reappear in the historical record. The conflict between the Phocians and the other Amphictyons began, like the Boeotian prelude to the Corinthian War, with a dispute over land, though this dispute had a significantly more religious tone. The Phocians were found guilty by the Amphictyons of cultivating the sacred land of Cirrha and a fine was laid against them, with the further threat that if the fine were not paid, their land would be cursed.²⁵

οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς ἐπεργασάμενοι πολλὴν τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας τῆς ὀνομαζομένης
Κιρραίας δίκας ὑπέσχον ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι καὶ πολλοῖς ταλάντοις κατεκρίθησαν.
οὐκ ἐκτινόντων δ' αὐτῶν τὰ ὀφλήματα οἱ μὲν ἱερομνήμονες ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι
κατηγόρουν τῶν Φωκέων καὶ τὸ συνέδριον ἤξιουν, ἔαν μὴ τὰ χρήματα τῷ θεῷ
ἀποδῶσιν οἱ Φωκεῖς, καθιερῶσαι τὴν χώραν τῶν ἀποστερούντων τὸν θεόν.

The settlement of Cirrha served as the port of Delphi and the surrounding lands, despite the ban, were often agriculturally exploited by the surrounding cities.²⁶ There has been

²⁴ This conflict, sometimes known as the Third Sacred War, will only be referred to as the Sacred War in this examination because it is the only instance of the name being analyzed. As Markle 1994, 49 has suggested, Diodorus' error in attributing different years to the length of the war was likely an error made by Diodorus himself.

²⁵ Diod. 16.23.3.

²⁶ Paus. 10.37.4-5 stated that the road between Delphi and Cirrha was sixty stades long and that even in his day the land remained under a curse and was uncultivated. Not long after the Phocians were fined by the Amphictyons, Aeschines claimed that he witnessed the land being cultivated again, this time by the Amphissans, while he was one of the Athenian *pylagori*. Aeschin. 3.119.

some debate about which of the other Amphictyons brought this charge against the Phocians. While some modern scholars have followed Justin in laying the responsibility on the Thebans, the context of the accusation makes the Delphians the more likely candidate.²⁷ Justin's claim that the Thebans brought the charges against the Spartans *and* the Phocians is undermined by the further suggestion that the charge was not to do with Cirrha, but with the destruction of Boeotia.²⁸ Given the eventual course of the Sacred War, this claim would be more appropriate at the end of the war than at its beginning because the Phocians had not severely damaged Theban land at all in the fourth century up to this point. Additionally, such an active prosecution against a central Greek state which at this point posed no real threat to the power of the Boeotian League would go against the long-standing Boeotian tactic of interfering in these states only when consolidation was threatened. This fine played an important role in the election of Philomelus to the office of *strategos autokrator*, which would eventually force the Boeotians to intervene.²⁹

The leading Phocian generals (those given the title of *strategos autokrator*) of the Sacred War, of which Philomelus was the first, are crucial figures in understanding the governmental structure of the Phocians in the fourth century BC, but unfortunately little is directly said in terms of the scope of their powers, leaving the reader to compile the information. Even in antiquity there may have been some misunderstanding in other

²⁷ Mackil 2013, 83 named the Thebans as the complainants and provided as their motivation the desire to show themselves as defenders of the oracle. Mackil also assumed Spartan and Athenian support for the Phocians implicitly combatted the charges laid against the Spartans. While the Spartans certainly had no desire to pay the fine, we should not assume either side saw the two charges as linked. Hammond 1937, 73 saw Theban involvement as stemming from a desire to rid Phocis of anti-Theban sentiment but this seems to be a historically impossible task. Buckler 2003, 400 claimed it was the Delphians who brought the charge after sensing a Phocian threat to Cirrha and the sanctuary itself which is very reasonable given the undeniable evidence linking the Phocians to the cultivation of the sacred land.

²⁸ Justin 8.1.4.

²⁹ McInerney 1999, 202 saw this as the moment when Phocis became a legitimate state on par with the other central Greeks. Philomelus was the 'Big Man' McInerney saw as crucial to state development.

Greek states as to what this office actually represented and entailed. Aeschines and Athenaeus referred to the Phocian generals as the tyrants of Phocis.³⁰ As will be shown below, though some actions may appear tyrannical in a more modern sense, there was at least some election process involved. While *strategos autokrator* is not an originally Phocian term, this examination will continue with the understanding that in the Phocian context, this term denotes a specific office with a unique set of powers and responsibilities. Each of these generals will be taken in turn and the acts they performed as *strategos autokrator* will be used to evaluate the scope of the powers of the office.

Philomelus

Philomelus the son of Theotimus, whom Pausanias described as being the greatest of the Phocians, hailed from the Phocian city of Ledon.³¹ In spite of this greatness, the act of seizing Delphi tarnished his reputation, hence why Diodorus referred to him as arrogant (θρασύς) and full of lawlessness (παρανομία).³²

ἐπ' ἄρχοντος δ' Ἀθήνησι Καλλιστράτου Ῥωμαῖοι κατέστησαν ὑπάτους Μάρκον Φάβιον καὶ Γάιον Πλώτιον. ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων ὁ κληθεὶς ἱερὸς πόλεμος συνέστη καὶ διέμεινεν ἔτη ἑννέα. Φιλόμηλος γὰρ ὁ Φωκεὺς, ἀνὴρ θράσει καὶ παρανομία διαφέρων, κατελάβετο μὲν τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱερόν, ἐξέκαυσε δὲ τὸν ἱερόν πόλεμον διὰ τοιαύτας τινὰς αἰτίας.

This cruel nature was enhanced by various anecdotes about his behavior in the course of the Sacred War including the forcing of defeated Locrians off the cliffs of Phaedriades and the public execution of captives after an engagement with the Boeotians.³³ Of course, these anecdotes serve the purpose of teaching a moral lesson

³⁰ Aeschin. 2.131. Ath. 605A referred to only Phayllus as a Phocian tyrant.

³¹ Paus. 10.2.2. This assessment is supported by Diod. 16.23.4 which stated that Philomelus had the greatest reputation (ἀξίωμα) of the Phocians. In Pausanias' time the city of Ledon was abandoned and only a small number of people remained in the area, and even these were forty stades from the ancient ruins. Pausanias blamed Philomelus for the disgrace and destruction of the city. Paus. 10.33.1. Hansen & Neilsen 2004, 420-421.

³² Diod. 16.23.1

³³ Diod. 16.28.3; 16.30.3.

and in the specific case of the Locrians conveniently foreshadow the death of Philomelus to emphasize the narrative theme of divine retribution. However, some of these anecdotes do hint at some sort of underlying political structure, or at the very least demonstrate the establishment of a power dynamic within Phocis. The method in which he became the leader of the Phocians seems to have been due to a combination of extreme circumstances and his own initiative. According to most sources he was elected to the generalship with complete power (*strategos autokrator*) which is the first we hear of this position within the Phocian state.³⁴

τῶν δὲ Φωκέων διὰ τὸν ἐκ τῆς καταδίκης φόβον ἐλομένων αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορα στρατηγὸν ὁ Φιλόμηλος ἐνεργῶς ἐπετέλει τὰς ἐπαγγελίας.

The election occurred at a meeting of Phocians to discuss their course of action regarding the fine assessed by the Amphictyonic Council at which Philomelus delivered a speech outlining a plan whereby the Phocians would be able to seize the sanctuary.³⁵ Some recent scholars have claimed that at the same time of his election, Philomelus ‘nominated Onomarchus and one other’ general.³⁶ There is no indication that Onomarchus’ position as general derived from Philomelus or that he even held the position in the same year that Philomelus was elected. These claims were undoubtedly based (though the position was never fully explained) on the later replacement of Phalaecus (who also held the office of *strategos autokrator*) with three generals.³⁷

ἅμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Φάλαικος μὲν ὁ τῶν Φωκέων στρατηγός, διαβλήθεις ὅτι πολλὰ τῶν ἱερῶν χρημάτων κέκλοφεν, ἐξέπεσεν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς,

³⁴ Diod. 16.24.1 noted that Philomelus was elected out of fear of the judgment handed down by the Amphictyonic Council. Beck 1997a, 116 agreed that the election of Philomelus demonstrated a time of crisis for the Phocian state.

³⁵ Hammond 1937, 73-74 separated the events of this period into the ‘personal propaganda’ of Philomelus and official acts of the Phocian state, but once elected to office, which occurred before the seizure of Delphi, Philomelus acted as an agent of the official Phocian state.

³⁶ Buckler 1985, 22 = Buckler 2003, 401.

³⁷ Diod. 16.56.3.

ἀντὶ δὲ τούτου στρατηγῶν αἰρεθέντων τριῶν, Δεινοκράτους καὶ Καλλίου καὶ Σωφάνους...

This assertion cannot stand on this evidence, for the generals were chosen to replace Phalaecus alone, not another board of three generals, as demonstrated by Diodorus' use of the singular.³⁸ A second basis for these claims can be found in the passage from Plutarch which described the three ἀρχῶντες during the revolt of the Phocians against the Thessalians as discussed above, but this occurred over a century before Philomelus' election.³⁹ We can then say with confidence that *only* Philomelus was elected at this meeting according to the available sources. His election served to end the *stasis* which had plagued Phocis for the majority of the fourth century BC and allowed it to once again become influential and challenge Boeotian supremacy in central Greece.⁴⁰

The role of *strategos autokrator* certainly lived up to its name. Once chosen to lead the Phocians, the extent of Philomelus' power was extremely broad compared to the *boeotarchoi*. Unlike the *boeotarchoi*, he was able to personally shape foreign policy, and exercised this power by traveling to Sparta in an official capacity for an audience with King Archidamus which resulted in the collection of fifteen talents though no formal support from the Spartans.⁴¹ Though some have suggested that Archidamus also stopped Philomelus from slaughtering the citizens of Delphi, there is no indication that it was Philomelus who was in a position of leadership at the time of the incident.⁴² This course of action would be more consistent with the behavior of

³⁸ Diod. 16.56.3.

³⁹ Plut. *Mor.* 244C. Beck 1997a, 116 used this same evidence to claim that three was the regular number for *stratego*i within the Phocian state.

⁴⁰ Buckler 1985, 245 used this *stasis* to explain why the Delphians brought charges against the Phocians at this time.

⁴¹ Diod. 16.24.1-2. The fifteen talents offered was a personal gift from the king. Buckler 2003, 402 claimed Archidamus 'obviously acted in the full knowledge and approval of the Spartan authorities.' If this is accurate, why was the meeting held in private, and why was any acknowledgement of formal support withheld? It was Archidamus, not Philomelus, who was acting in a private capacity.

⁴² Buckler 2003, 402.

Philomelus' successor Onomarchus. Also contributing to his influence in foreign policy, Philomelus was able to choose ambassadors from among his friends rather than the other *dynastai* of Phocis.⁴³

ἐπαρθεῖς οὖν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἐπέλεξε τῶν φίλων τοὺς εὐθετωτάτους εἰς τὰς πρεσβείας καὶ τούτων τοὺς μὲν εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας, τοὺς δ' εἰς Λακεδαίμονα, τοὺς δ' εἰς τὰς Θήβας ἐξέπεμψεν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας τὰς ἐπισημοτάτας τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα πόλεων ἀπέστειλεν

In a combination of economic, political, and military power, there is absolutely no doubt that Philomelus was empowered to hire mercenaries to help defend the newly acquired sanctuary, and the money given by Archidamus was put toward this purpose along with a matching sum from his own funds.⁴⁴

Φιλόμηλος παρὰ μὲν τούτου πεντεκαίδεκα τάλαντα λαβὼν, ἰδίᾳ δὲ προσθεὶς οὐκ ἐλάττω τούτων μισθοφόρους τε ξένους ἐμισθώσατο καὶ τῶν Φωκέων ἐπέλεξε χιλίους, οὓς ὠνόμασε πελταστάς.

Mercenaries were essential to the Phocian cause given the inferior population of the region compared to that of Boeotia and Thessaly. At first, Philomelus raised a mixed army of 5000 mercenaries and Phocians, but by the time he made the historically predictable maneuver of attacking Locris his combined army numbered 10,000.⁴⁵ Utilizing mercenary forces in central Greece was nothing new. The Pheraean rulers had employed a mercenary army since the time of Jason.⁴⁶ One important historical unknown in Philomelus' reign is whether or not he used the treasures of Delphi to fund his campaigns. Diodorus claimed in his narrative that he did at one point while claiming that he did not in another.⁴⁷ Athenaeus left Philomelus off the list of the

⁴³ Diod. 16.27.3.

⁴⁴ Diod. 16.24.2.

⁴⁵ Diod. 16.25.1; 16.30.3.

⁴⁶ This counters Buckler 2003, 412 which stated 'Philomelus and Onomarchus ushered into the mainstream of Greek history the era of the hired army.'

⁴⁷ Diod. 16.56.5 claimed that Philomelus did not use the treasures. Polyae. 5.45 stated that Philomelus used the wealth of Delphi, but this account was dubious in stating that the election to the generalship was

Phocians who plundered Delphi.⁴⁸ Given the expenses involved in maintaining a mercenary army, at some point Philomelus would have had to use the wealth of the sanctuary out of necessity unless a new source of money could be found and there is no indication that such a source existed.⁴⁹ Philomelus remained in power in Phocis until 354 BC when he fought an invading army of Boeotians under Pammenes at the battle of Neon. After being defeated and facing punishment at the hands of the Amphictyons, Philomelus enacted his own punishment and threw himself off a cliff to his death.⁵⁰ The element of being forced off of cliffs was a recurring theme throughout the Sacred War as one of the punishments for the robbers of temples. While it makes for fairly colorful narrative, this recurring theme also casts doubt upon the accuracy of the source material given that sources unfriendly to Phocis (and often moralizing) would alter the historical truth to illustrate their thematic point and these views would be mirrored in Diodorus.⁵¹

Onomarchus

The next Phocian leader to emerge after the death of Philomelus was the most well known of the four, Onomarchus. As mentioned above during the election of Philomelus, there is some debate about the relationship between Onomarchus and Philomelus. Diodorus at two points claimed they were brothers but at another made no

precipitated by attacks by Thebes and Thessaly, with no mention of the judgment of the Amphictyons. Mackil 2013, 83 cited Diod. 16.23.4-16.24.5 to support the argument that Philomelus did in fact use the treasures of Delphi.

⁴⁸ Ath. 232E. Buckler 2003, 406 portrayed Philomelus as a temple robber who ‘looked upon Apollo as his paymaster.’

⁴⁹ Perhaps the closest approximation of the events involving the temple can be found in Hammond 1937, 75 which stated that Philomelus respected the treasures until war was officially declared by the Amphictyons at which point he began to exploit the wealth of the sanctuary. Williams 1972, 46 followed Hammond in this line of thought as did Beck 1997a, 117.

⁵⁰ Diod. 16.31.4; 16.61.2. Paus. 10.2.4. In Justin 8.1.13 Philomelus was the first casualty in battle. As Markle 1994, 59 has pointed out, by giving Philomelus this death Diodorus’ source for this section has indicated that all the Phocian generals of the Sacred War robbed the temple. For an investigation into the physical site of Neon see Tillard 1910/1911, 56-59.

⁵¹ Markle 1994, 61 broke Diodorus’ narrative into four sections, claiming two were hostile to the Phocians (and thus portrayed Philomelus as robbing the treasures) and two were less biased (and portrayed the treasures as untouched).

mention of the relationship.⁵² If Aristotle is to be believed, the father of Onomarchus was Euthrycrates which would, if accurate, weigh against the two men being brothers.⁵³ By not being related by blood, the argument that the office of *strategos autokrator* was a hereditary dynasty is severely undercut, if Philomelus was intended as the starting point for this dynasty. Instead what this indicates is that the leadership of the Phocian state during the Sacred War, while factional, was a more complex mechanism than a rapid takeover by a single powerful family. The current examination supports the view that the two men were unrelated. How Onomarchus gained his power provides some insight into the nature of Phocian politics and power in the first half of the fourth century. According to Diodorus, Onomarchus was a general at the same time as Philomelus and assumed command upon the latter's death.⁵⁴

ὁ δὲ συνάρχων αὐτῷ στρατηγὸς Ὀνόμαρχος διαδεξάμενος τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ μετὰ τῆς ἀνασωζομένης δυνάμεως ἀναχωρήσας ἀνελάμβανε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς φυγῆς ἐπανιόντας.

The fact that Onomarchus was also in a position of command, though not holding the highest command, demonstrates that the *strategos autokrator* was not alone in his leadership.⁵⁵ This assumed command appeared to have been temporary and based on the plight of the Phocian army after its defeat, because Onomarchus was later elected as *strategos autokrator* by the council of the Phocians and their allies which met in Delphi.⁵⁶

⁵² Diod. 16.56.5; 16.61.2. Beck 1997a, 116 came down on the side of Onomarchus and Philomelus being brothers.

⁵³ Aristot. *Pol.* 1304A. Philomelus was the son of Theotimus. Justin 8.1.14 likewise remained silent on the relationship between the two.

⁵⁴ Diod. 16.31.5.

⁵⁵ This bears some similarity to Larsen 1968, 44 which claimed that the Phocian state at this time was 'characterized by a strong executive in the shape of a general or group of generals.'

⁵⁶ Diod. 16.32.4. His election is repeated at 16.33.2. Hammond 1937, 75 saw in the death of Philomelus the rebirth of *stasis* in Phocis but the state was clearly functional enough to both call a meeting of allies and confirm Onomarchus' election though he was already in a position of power.

αίρεθεις δὲ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ μισθοφόρων τε πλῆθος ἤθροιζε καὶ τὰς τῶν τετελευτηκότων τάξεις ἀναπληρώσας καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ξενολογηθέντων ἀυξήσας τὴν δύναμιν μεγάλας παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο συμμάχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν εἰς πόλεμον χρησίμων.

This accords with Pausanias' narrative which described Onomarchus being chosen by the Phocians.⁵⁷

μετὰ δὲ Φιλόμελον τελευτήσαντα Ὀνομάρχῳ μὲν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν διδόασιν οἱ Φωκεῖς, ἐς δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων τὴν συμμαχίαν προσεχώρησε Φίλιππος ὁ Ἀμύντου

That Onomarchus needed to be formally elected to the highest post demonstrates the exceptional nature of the office in that despite its broad powers, the holder was still responsible at least in some degree to the Phocian council.⁵⁸ The necessity of election also hints at the loyalty of the mercenaries. If he gained access to the treasury, Onomarchus may have been able to shift the loyalty of the mercenaries from the Phocian state to himself. This lack of access suggests that only the *strategos autokrator* had the capability to mint coinage. Once this access was gained through election, Onomarchus wielded an array of powers which allowed him to be more aggressive regarding his personal agenda. Like Philomelus, Onomarchus continued to hire mercenaries to increase the military strength of the Phocians.⁵⁹ Also like Philomelus, Onomarchus seemed able to dictate some degree of foreign policy in his support of the rulers of Pherae in Thessaly. Assertions that he did this to keep the other Thessalians out of Phocian affairs are probably accurate given that, as we will see, this strategy of preventing consolidation in Thessaly was employed by the Boeotians throughout the

⁵⁷ Paus. 10.2.5.

⁵⁸ As Larsen 1968, 45 suggested, the post of *strategos autokrator* could only be conferred by a meeting of the Phocian assembly. Buckler 2003, 408 included Phayllus as being elected to the position of general but the ancient sources give no indication that this was an elected office. As *strategos autokrator* it is not unreasonable to believe that Onomarchus, like Philomelus before him, had the freedom to choose his own subordinates.

⁵⁹ Diod. 16.32.4.

first half of the fourth century.⁶⁰ Unlike Philomelus, Onomarchus was specifically described as having the power to mint coinage, which he then used to maintain his power.⁶¹

ὁ δ' οὖν Ὀνόμαρχος στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ἡρημένος ἐκ μὲν τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου κατεσκεύασεν ὄπλων πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου νόμισμα κόψας ταῖς τε συμμαχούσαις πόλεσι διεδίδου καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς προεστηκότας ἐδωροδόκει.

In addition to using the treasures of Delphi to mint coinage, Onomarchus used iron and bronze dedications to create weapons and armor, but who were the intended recipients of this armor?⁶² The increase in mercenary numbers may be indicative of a continued lack of manpower in Phocis, particularly after the defeat of Philomelus at Neon. This could have resulted in the recruitment of Phocians who were not able to afford their own weapons, even as peltasts in which case their equipment would need to be supplied by the Phocian state.⁶³ Also unlike Philomelus, Onomarchus was particularly brutal to his fellow Phocians. He executed and seized the property of those who were opposed to him.⁶⁴

καὶ τῶν μὲν Φωκέων τοὺς ἐναντιομένους συλλαμβάνων ἀνήρει καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἐδήμευεν...

This, when combined with the evidence from Aristotle that his father and Mnaseas, the father of Mnason were involved in a faction together indicates the fragmented nature of

⁶⁰ Buckler 2003, 410.

⁶¹ Diod. 16.33.2.

⁶² Diod. 16.33.2.

⁶³ It is highly unlikely that mercenaries did not bring their own equipment with them. Whitehead 1991, 113. McKechnie 1994, 302 was unconvincing in his used of Diod. 16.33.2 in rebutting the argument of Whitehead and fully admitted that no direct evidence existed in linking this equipment to the mercenaries.

⁶⁴ Diod. 16.33.3. Buckler 2003, 409 believed these actions were lawful, though tyrannical in nature, given Onomarchus' position. Even if this were not the case, Onomarchus' command of a large mercenary army may have made resistance seem futile to his fellow Phocians. This contradicts McInerney 1999, 204 which suggested the Sacred War ended conflict between families.

Phocian politics at this time.⁶⁵ The destruction of opposition secured Onomarchus in his power and helped to avoid the return to stasis which up to this point had plagued Phocis for much of the fourth century to the benefit of the Boeotian League. The seizure of property also helped pay for the continued recruitment of mercenaries. There is some controversy over the exact nature of Onomarchus' death though all agree it stemmed from his defeat by the army of Philip II in the Crocus Field. The most popular version was that he died while trying to swim out to Chares' ships which happened to be passing Thessaly.⁶⁶ Yet another version claimed that he was killed by his own men.⁶⁷ The third version, provided by Philo, stated that his horse bolted into the sea and he was dragged under by the tide and drowned.⁶⁸ As can readily be seen, all accounts point to an inglorious death for a deserving and sacrilegious man which plays into the moralizing trend seen in most authors on this subject. Onomarchus' brother, Phayllus, then assumed the command of the Phocians.⁶⁹

Phayllus

The first mention of Phayllus in terms of the Sacred War was his mission to aid Lycophron of Pherae which resulted in failure and the expulsion of the Phocian presence from Thessaly at the hands of Philip II of Macedon.⁷⁰ Like Onomarchus, Phayllus also possessed the power to coin money and did so in prolific quantities of both gold and silver which totaled 4000 and 6000 talents respectively.⁷¹ This extra

⁶⁵ Aristot. *Pol.* 1304A.

⁶⁶ Diod. 16.35.6.

⁶⁷ Paus. 10.2.5.

⁶⁸ Philo *On Providence*, 2.33.

⁶⁹ Diod. 16.36.1. The fact that Phayllus was the brother of Onomarchus was repeated at 16.56.5 and by Paus. 10.2.6.

⁷⁰ Diod. 16.35.1.

⁷¹ Diod. 16.36.1; 16.61.3. This claim was repeated at 16.56.5-6 which specified some of the treasures Phayllus used including 120 gold bricks (240 talents) dedicated by Croesus as well as 360 gold goblets (2 minae each) and golden statues of a woman and a lion which weighed a combined 30 talents.

money became necessary as Phayllus sought to hire mercenaries just as his predecessors had done, but successive Phocian defeats which resulted in a huge loss of life required him to offer double pay to ensure a continued supply of men.⁷²

μετὰ δὲ τὴν Ὀνομάρχου τελευτὴν διεδέξατο τὴν Φωκέων ἡγεμονίαν ὁ ἀδελφὸς Φάυλλος. οὗτος δὲ τὴν γεγενημένην συμφορὰν διορθούμενος μισθοφόρων τε πλῆθος ἤθροιζε, διπλασιάσας τοὺς εἰωθότας μισθοῦς, καὶ παρὰ τῶν συμμάχων βοήθειαν μετεπέμψατο: κατεσκευάζετο δὲ καὶ ὄπλων πλῆθος καὶ νόμισμα κατέκοψε χρυσοῦν τε καὶ ἀργυροῦν.

Like Onomarchus, the construction of military equipment was attributed to Phayllus.⁷³

This should not be surprising given the massive losses incurred by the Phocians at the battle of the Crocus Field. Phayllus would have had to provide weapons for those Phocians who were too poor to provide suitable equipment for themselves. Losses continued to mount under Phayllus as he sought to maintain holdings in northern Boeotia which increasingly destabilized the Phocian state through the loss of manpower and the continued outpouring of money.⁷⁴ Unlike his predecessors, Phayllus did not die in battle but instead contracted a wasting disease, which still fits the moralizing narrative of divine justice meted out to the sacrilegious Phocian leaders.⁷⁵

Phalaecus

The final Phocian general of the Sacred War was the son of Onomarchus, Phalaecus, who after the death of Phayllus was left in the guardianship of Mnaseas, a friend of Phayllus.⁷⁶ Phalaecus was often referred to as a tyrant (τύραννος) of the

⁷² Diod. 16.36.1. At the battle of the Crocus Field it was said Philip's army killed 6000 Phocians and mercenaries and captured another 3000 which were subsequently executed by being driven into the sea. Diod. 16.35.6.

⁷³ Diod. 16.36.1.

⁷⁴ Diod. 16.37.5-6 these successive defeats occurred near Orchomenus, the Cephissus river, and Coroneia and resulted in the loss or capture of well over 1000 men.

⁷⁵ Philo *On Providence* 2.33 claimed knowledge of an alternate version of his death that he burned in the fire at the temple at Abae. This was obviously an attempt to make his death appear to be the result of the desecration of the sanctuary. The event of the burning of the temple was described by Diod. 16.58.6.

⁷⁶ Diod. 16.38.6. Paus. 10.2.7 claimed that Phalaecus was the son of Phayllus and not of Onomarchus. Mnaseas was killed in an engagement with the Boeotians soon after the succession of Phalaecus.

Phocians.⁷⁷ In Pausanias, it was not the generalship, but the *dynasteia* of the Phocians which is passed from Phayllus to Phalaecus.⁷⁸

Φάλλου δὲ ἀποθανόντος ἐς Φάλαικον τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ περιεχώρησεν ἡ ἐν Φωκεῦσι δυναστεία...

Importantly for the current examination, the case of Phalaecus proved that the position of *strategos autokrator* could be limited in some way. After the realization that some of the treasury stores had gone missing and with Phalaecus as the likely culprit, he was removed from command and replaced not by a single general but with three as described above.⁷⁹ Continued military defeats and the loss of resources under Phalaecus could also have contributed to the discontent of the Phocians which resulted in him being removed from office.⁸⁰ The body which removed him could only be the same body with the power to elect the *strategos autokrator*, the Phocian assembly. This provides evidence that, despite never being described as *strategos autokrator* (Diodorus only referred to him as *strategos*) Phalaecus held this office. This suggestion is further confirmed by the fact that Phalaecus, like his predecessors, had men described as *strategoī* who were subordinate to him.⁸¹

ἐπεχείρησαν δ' οἱ περὶ τὸν Φάλαικον στρατηγοὶ καὶ τὸν ναὸν ὀρύττειν, εἰπόντος τινὸς ὡς ἐν αὐτῷ θησαυρὸς εἶη πολὺν ἔχων ἄργυρόν τε καὶ χρυσόν: καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν ἐστίαν καὶ τὸν τρίποδα φιλοτίμως ἀνέσκαπτον.

For an unspecified reason Phalaecus was later returned to the generalship by the Phocians before the conclusion of the war.⁸² Phalaecus did not escape a painful demise

⁷⁷ Aeschin. 2.130; 2.135.

⁷⁸ Paus. 10.2.7.

⁷⁹ Diod. 16.56.3. The three new generals were named as Deinocrates, Callias, and Sophanes. Paus. 10.2.7.

⁸⁰ A number of the Phocian cavalry were lost in an engagement near Chaeronea. Diod. 16.38.7.

⁸¹ These subordinates attempted to dig underneath the temple at Delphi because of a legend of riches hidden there. Diod. 16.56.7.

⁸² Diod. 16.59.2. Buckler 2003, more concerned with the military and political genius of Philip II at this point, made no mention of Phalaecus' removal from power. Omission of this fact conveniently allowed

either, as he wandered the Mediterranean with his mercenaries and perished during the siege of Cydonia, but by this time all his responsibility and power in Phocis had been taken from him.⁸³ The defeat of Phalaecus signaled the end of a powerful Phocian state, though for the Boeotians it came at the expense of the ascension of Philip II and the Macedonians to supremacy in central Greece.

Conclusions

What then, can be said of the office of *strategos autokrator* as an official position in the Phocian state? Starting with one of the most basic elements of any political office, the terms of office do not demonstrate consistency throughout the period. The suggestion that the office was for life cannot be easily disproven because the holders of the office tended to die fairly quickly.⁸⁴ Unlike for the *boeotarchoi*, there is no indication of an annual election. However, the removal of Phalaecus from office and his subsequent return is an indicator that even a lifetime appointment was not set in stone and that the most powerful office of the Phocian state was still subject to the will of the other Phocians. The assumption of the office then was not a seizure of power by an individual, but a promotion granted by an assembly of Phocians. This is why Philomelus found it necessary to deliver a speech to his countrymen imploring them to grant him the power that would allow him to take control of the shrine at Delphi which they believed to be ancestrally theirs.⁸⁵ While the assumption of the office was then not an individual enterprise, the success of the Phocians once the election took place was very much intertwined with the abilities of the chosen individual. The lack of ability

for the continuation of the narrative that the Phocian leaders were sacrilegious tyrants whom the other Phocians were powerless to stop.

⁸³ According to Diod. 16.63.3 Phalaecus died in a fire when lightning struck the siege towers he had constructed, though some claimed he was murdered by one of his mercenaries.

⁸⁴ Larsen 1968, 46 suggested the office may have been for life.

⁸⁵ Diod. 16.23.5-6.

could result in the removal of the individual under extreme circumstances as the case of Phalaecus proved.

The ability to mint coinage provides a problem as well. In the literary record, only Onomarchus and Phayllus were described as having minted coinage. The archaeological record has also provided evidence that Phalaecus minted coinage because his name appears on bronze coinage of the period.⁸⁶ That leaves only Philomelus, who out of necessity must have minted coinage to pay the large mercenary forces he recruited.⁸⁷ Additionally, the payment of mercenaries was not the only factor in increasing the amount of money produced. It was well known that Onomarchus and Phayllus both distributed money to other Greek city-states in order to gain their support, which was common in other central Greek states, noticeably among the rulers of Pherae.⁸⁸ In foreign policy the *strategos autokrator* was given a wide latitude, as all four men who held the office dealt with embassies to foreign states and it was Phalaecus who reached the agreement to finally end the Sacred War. Unlike the *boeotarchoi* the *strategos autokrator* did not have to present resolutions to the council, but instead enjoyed relative autonomy in foreign policy. What we see then is that the Phocian state in this period was largely defined by the actions and ambitions of the *strategos autokrator*, though control over who held this office rested with a larger political body. This larger political body can be referred to as the Phocian assembly, but as has been shown above we have only a skeletal knowledge of its function in this

⁸⁶ As Williams 1972, 49 noted the Sacred War was the only event which would call for such an output of silver coinage in Phocis.

⁸⁷ Williams 1972, 51 laid out a convincing case for this demonstrating that the wealth required for the employment of so many mercenaries was beyond the means attributed to Philomelus.

⁸⁸ Phayllus: Diod. 16.37.2-4.

period.⁸⁹ It is certain that this body had the power to both grant and strip the power of *strategos autokrator* but who made up this body? After the death of Philomelus, the Phocians met in a common council at Delphi along with their allies.⁹⁰

οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς ἀπολυθέντες τοῦ πολέμου κατὰ τὸ παρὸν ἐπανῆλθον εἰς Δελφοὺς καὶ συνελθόντες μετὰ τῶν συμμάχων εἰς κοινὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ τοῦ πολέμου.

If Diodorus' description of this council is accurate, it provides evidence for a more advanced political system than had previously been attributed to the Phocians, particularly because of the inclusion of allies in the council. This was the same council where Onomarchus was elected to be *strategos autokrator*, which could indicate that this position commanded forces beyond those of Phocis if the allies were allowed to vote in the election. The composition of the Phocian assembly is also debatable, but given the evidence presented above, some tentative conclusions can be drawn. The body was undoubtedly oligarchic, and based on the rule of the *dynastai* within the cities of Phocis we can be confident in suggesting that the Phocian assembly was narrowly oligarchic. This, combined with a large amount of power invested in a single individual, made for an unstable and volatile political environment which the Boeotians could use to their advantage. The lack of cooperation and organization at the political level allowed for the Boeotians (and for a brief time Jason of Pherae) to intervene in Phocian affairs. The fragility demonstrated here of *dynasteia* could lend an additional perspective to the Boeotian distaste for this type of government, because power and influence could quickly crumble with the removal of the few (or lone) decision-makers as seen in the case of Leontiades in Thebes and the Phocian *dynastai* here.

⁸⁹ Larsen 1968, 45 reasonably suggested that some kind of hoplite-type property qualification would be needed to sit in the assembly.

⁹⁰ Diod. 16.32.2.

The outcome of the Sacred War had drastic political implications for the Phocian state. They obviously lost the cities they had captured in Boeotia, which returned them to the Boeotian League and helped reconsolidate Boeotian power after a protracted and costly war.⁹¹ The Phocians lost their seat on the Amphictyonic Council (to Philip II) and their cities were razed.⁹² The Boeotian League was free from an actively hostile presence in Phocis and on the Amphictyonic Council, but they also introduced a new threat to their hold on central Greece in the form of Philip II. They had unknowingly started down the path that would lead to Chaeronea and the end of Boeotian power in central Greece.

⁹¹ These three cities, Orchomenus, Coroneia, and Chaeronea also had their walls removed which may have been orchestrated by the Thebans to assert greater dominance over them, especially because the northwest of Boeotia had been a problem to consolidate for the majority of the fourth century BC. Kelly 1980, 66 saw the Sacred War as a slow bleed of Boeotian power.

⁹² Diod. 16.60.1-2.

Ile: The Thessalian State

The most powerful central Greek state the Boeotian League dealt with was Thessaly, which was also the only other state to effectively assume supremacy in central Greece in the first half of the fourth century BC. Geographically, what will be referred to as ‘Thessaly’ in this examination was a vast area which could draw on significant natural resources and at times exerted an influence over an even larger perioecic region. Like Boeotia, the main population centers of Thessaly (Larisa, Pharsalus, and Pherae) were located in plains hemmed in by mountains. Herodotus listed these mountainous borders as Pelion and Ossa in the east, Olympus in the north, the Pindus in the west, and Othrys in the south.¹ Thessaly ‘proper’ (the area within the plains) could be divided into four ‘tetradic’ regions as described by Strabo: Thessaliotis, Hestiaeotis, Pelasgiotis, and Phthiotis.² Thessaliotis contained many of the older cities of Thessaly and extended to Magnesia in the east. Hestiaeotis included the western parts of Thessaly between the Pindus range and Upper Macedonia. Pelasgiotis consisted of the plains below Hestiaeotis and bordered on Lower Macedonia. Phthiotis began in the south near Thermopylae and, according to Strabo, ended somewhere near Cape Pyrrha. Despite these divisions, it is the *poleis* of Thessaly which are of the most interest to the current examination.³ In addition to Thessaly proper, there were many perioecic tribes living on the mountainous borderlands between Thessaly and other major states. In the south the Othrys Mountains bordered on the land of the Malians,

¹ Hdt. 7.129.1. Plin. *Nat.* 4.15 numbered 34 mountains in Thessaly which enclosed 75 cities in the plains below.

² Strab. 9.5.3. Whether these tetrads were in use in the Classical Period is unclear, but not likely given the events of the fourth century.

³ Westlake 1935, 7-8 noted the rise of *poleis* to be the most important units of Thessaly by the fourth century BC and situated the prominent cities of Thessaly in the eastern plain as compared to the western mountains.

while the Oetaean and Aetolian mountains bordered on the land of the Oetaean tribes and the Dorians.⁴ Western Thessaly was said to have been surrounded by numerous tribes including the Aetolians, Acarnanians, Amphilocheians, Athamanians, Molossians, and the Aethices.⁵ The picture that emerges of Thessaly, geographically, is of a core set of plains containing the major cities of the Classical Period (the focus of this examination) bordered by mountains which delineated perioecic regions. The political relationship between the major cities of the plains and the perioecic regions will be addressed in more detail below.

Ethnically, Thessaly seems to have been divided between the native *penestae* who had been subjugated during the Dorian invasion which created the ruling aristocracy.⁶ The relationship between these two groups will be discussed below. This theme of a northern invasion aligns with the myth of the Boiotoi being driven from Thessaly into Boeotia as described above. As members of the Delphic Amphictyony, the Thessalians were linked through religion to the other regions discussed in this examination.⁷ In addition to the cult of Itonian Athena, the Thessalians also promoted the cult of Pythian Apollo locally which some have suggested acted as a unifying cultural force in the fourth century.⁸ This unifying cultural force can be viewed as an

⁴ Strab. 9.5.1; 9.5.8.

⁵ Strabo made a point of mentioning that the Athamanians and Molossians were Epirote tribes. Strab. 9.5.1.

⁶ The Thessalian aristocracy were similar to the Macedonian elites in their reputation for wealth and generosity. For a discussion of the corrupting nature of Thessalian hospitality see Aston 2012, 247-271.

⁷ The three main deities worshipped in Thessaly were Zeus, Poseidon, and Itonian Athena. Westlake 1935, 42-43. Paus. 10.1.10 Itonian Athena was so recognized throughout Thessaly that it was used as a watchword in battle. This cult provided a link between the Thessalians and Boeotians as there was also a temple to Itonian Athena in Boeotia. Paus. 9.34.1. For the development of the regional cult of Ennodia originating in Pherae see Graninger 2009, 114-120.

⁸ The path of the Septeria festival passed through Thessaly between Delphi and Tempe. Plut. *Mor.* 293B-F. The promotion of Pythian Apollo also served the political needs of Jason of Pherae in unifying the Thessalians. Jason's appropriation of this cult has been discussed by Graninger 2009, 111-113 and Sprawski 1999, 118-132.

almost political tool in the fourth century if, as is likely, the aristocratic nature of Thessaly had drained loyalties from a collective identity in favor of service and association with the *poleis* and landed elites.⁹

Thessalian politics in the fourth century BC was defined by a near-constant battle for internal control of the major cities of Thessaly between narrow oligarchic groups often bound by kinship (*dynastai*) just as in Phocis, though with more of an eye toward concrete territorial expansion. These groups then competed for control of larger portions of Thessaly including smaller cities which occasionally fell under the control of the major urban centers of Pherae, Pharsalus, and Larisa. Unlike the cities of Boeotia, this type of narrow government, including the ‘tyranny’ in place in Pherae, was driven not by popular consent of the citizens but instead by the ambitions and talents of the ruling factions. While there may have been some internal stability in Thessaly as a region in the fifth century through the existence of a weak federal structure, by the turn of the fourth century BC the major cities of Thessaly were engaged in active warfare with each other.¹⁰ The ruler of this loose Thessalian federal state in the early phase of the Classical Period was the *basileus* or *archon*. Regardless of the title, the last known ruler of ‘all Thessaly’ was a certain Daochus attested on a fourth century dedication made by his grandson at Delphi.¹¹

Δάοχος Ἄγία εἰμί, πατρίς Φάρσαλος, ἀπάσης
Θεσσαλίας ἄρξας...

⁹ Westlake 1935, 30.

¹⁰ Sprawski 1999, 30 linked this warfare to the death of Daochus. Morgan 2003, 87 highlighted the factional strife of the late fifth century as indicative of a lack of ‘regional coherence.’

¹¹ *SIG*³ 274. Rather than comment on the historical importance of the monument Westlake 1935, 45 concluded it was ‘crude and tasteless.’ For a recent interpretation of the Daochus monument as a link between Thessaly and Macedon see Aston 2012a, 41-60.

The virtual destruction of the Thessalian League by the late fifth century BC was confirmed by the attempt of Lycophrone of Pherae to control all Thessaly and the plea of the Lariseans for military aid against him.¹² The defeat of the Lariseans in 404 BC and the subsequent Spartan occupation of Pharsalus set the tone for the internal situation in Thessaly in the fourth century. The military implications and resolution of this inter-city warfare will be discussed in a following chapter while the political situation within the cities and Thessaly as a whole will be discussed below. For the initial stages of the fourth century, including the Corinthian War, this political discord prevented the unification and consolidation of Thessaly until Jason of Pherae's emergence in the historical record in the 370s BC.¹³ This same discord resumed and prevented consolidation after his death. With these concerns in mind, we can begin to examine internal developments in Thessaly and how these developments affected political relationships with the rest of the central Greek states.

The Dynastai of the Thessalian Cities

For the majority of the Classical Period, the cities of Thessaly were controlled by narrow oligarchies which we can classify as *dynasteia*.¹⁴ This is of course the type of government which was hated by the Boeotians and also employed by the Phocians as discussed above, but this political arrangement was almost traditional in Thessaly, where aristocratic power had been firmly established for centuries.¹⁵ Though some have

¹² Sprawski 1999, 23 claimed permanent officials were still elected at this time but Sprawski 2006, 205 indicated the opposite. Sordi 1958, 154-155 did not envision the Thessalian League as being dissolved until 395 BC.

¹³ Graninger 2009, 111 attempted to view these struggles as a contest for the definition of a 'Thessalian identity' but this examination believes the more practical concerns of power politics were at work especially given the fact that most of this history was driven by individuals due to the nature of the political systems.

¹⁴ Thuc. 4.78.3.

¹⁵ For an examination of early Thessaly see Larsen 1960a, 238 and Sordi 1958.

described the political systems in Thessaly as feudal or baronial, this term does not give due credit to the unique developments of the Thessalian cities and will be avoided in this examination especially because the exact nature of this aristocratic preeminence was not defined in the ancient sources.¹⁶ However, this power was almost certainly based to a significant extent on the control of agricultural estates and their production, and there is certainly evidence for the control of land on a scale not attested elsewhere in central Greece.¹⁷ Keeping up this theme of aristocratic power, by the time period covered by this examination, there was no longer (if there had ever been) an opposition by these aristocrats to the formation of cities, and by this time they had come to identify closely with and based their power within major urban centers.¹⁸ Historically, the Aleuadae exercised control over Larisa, the Scopads dominated Crannon (though by the fourth century the city had fallen from prominence) and the Echekratidae directed the affairs of Pharsalus (at least until the mid-fifth century). These groups, while centralizing power within their own cities and surrounding dependencies, frequently attempted and often failed to extend their power over Thessaly as a whole from the end of the fifth century onward. The exact size of these elite groups is unknown, but their identification by kinship suggests the numbers could be extremely varied between cities and could fluctuate drastically over time. Regardless of the exact numbers, in Thessaly we can generally state that an extremely narrow group wielded the majority of political power. The effect of this system on the political sphere was that it shifted interstate

¹⁶ These terms were frequently employed in twentieth century scholarship. For example, Larsen 1968 was a proponent of the use of 'feudal' as a descriptor. Westlake 1935, 29 referred to the *dynastai* as 'barons.' As an example of recent trends in organizational thought, Morgan 2003, 24 has demonstrated that the use of 'feudal' distorts the image of power relationships in Thessaly.

¹⁷ Graninger 2011, 12. Archibald 2002, 230 recognized land ownership as the basis for aristocratic power in Thessaly.

¹⁸ Stamatopoulou 2007, 317 believed the aristocrats were actually the driving force behind city formation which is extremely plausible but beyond the scope of the current examination.

relationships from an emphasis on the collective government to one centered on personal relationships (*xenia* and *philia*) with powerful individuals.¹⁹ This type of relationship came to define many of the interactions between the Boeotian League and the cities of Thessaly.

The power of the *dynastai* extended into every aspect of government within their respective cities. These *dynastai*, like the *boeotarchoi*, also occupied military roles and commanded units sent abroad.²⁰ In the fifth century Menon committed 200 of his *penestai* (mounted) to the Athenian cause at Eion.²¹

τὰς δὲ τῶν ξένων πῶς; ἐκεῖνοι Μένωνι τῷ Φαρσαλίῳ δώδεκα μὲν τάλαντ' ἀργυρίου δόντι πρὸς τὸν ἐπ' Ἡϊόνι τῇ πρὸς Ἀμφιπόλει πόλεμον, διακοσίους δ' ἰππεῦσι πενέσταις ἰδίῳις βοηθήσαντι, οὐκ ἐψηφίσαντο πολιτείαν, ἀλλ' ἀτέλειαν ἔδωκαν μόνον.

During the Peloponnesian War, leading men of Larisa, Polymedes and Aristonus, commanded the Larisean contingents while Menon led the cavalry from Pharsalus.²²

ἡγοῦντο δὲ αὐτῶν ἐκ μὲν Λαρίσης Πολυμήδης καὶ Ἀριστόνους, ἀπὸ τῆς στάσεως ἐκάτερος, ἐκ δὲ Φαρσάλου Μένων: ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατὰ πόλεις ἄρχοντες.

¹⁹ Only personal bonds relating to the fourth century will be addressed here. For the Archaic and Early Classical Periods see Stamatopoulou 2007, 318 and Tracy 2010.

²⁰ Helly 2015, 237 was right to state that military mobilization was left to the cities, but there is no evidence from the fourth century that these were based on the *tetrads*. Mobilization by cities could still operate without the overarching structure given the degree of power wielded by the *dynastai* within these cities.

²¹ Dem. 23.109; 13.23. Helly 2015, 235 did not seem to care about the significance that these men were *penestai* and the horses must have belonged to Menon himself.

²² Thuc. 2.22.3. Sprawski 1999, 25-26 convincingly argued that these two contingents do not represent factions within the same city. Helly 1995, 233-240 has likewise convincingly argued against reading this passage as evidence of *stasis* within Larisa. Helly 2015, 233 attempted to use this passage as evidence for division within the Thessalian state based on *tetrads*, but this only demonstrates that the cities sent their own units with their own commanders. It could actually argue the opposite: that the cities aiding the Athenians were autonomous and were not bound as a collective to participate. Tracy 2010, 26 rightly connected this Aristonus with the one honored by the Athenians in *IG I*³ 55.

There was also a Menon named in the service of Cyrus the Younger, who brought 1000 hoplites and 500 peltasts to aid the usurper's cause.²³

ἐνταῦθα ἔμεινεν ἡμέρας ἑπτὰ: καὶ ἦκε Μένων ὁ Θεσσαλὸς ὀπλίτας ἔχων χιλίους καὶ πελταστὰς πεντακοσίους, Δόλοπας καὶ Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Ὀλυνθίους.

The men brought on these expeditions were either their subjects (like Menon's *penestae*) or citizens under their influence. The *dynastai* were the ultimate decision makers in terms of summoning military forces.

It is clear that the *dynastai* were able to control the foreign affairs of their individual cities.²⁴ In Larisa, the Aleuadae were the ruling family for the majority of the Classical Period.²⁵ Throughout the fourth century, the Aleuadae consistently opposed the tyrants of Pherae, eventually ending up in an alliance with Philip II against Lycophron and Tisiphonius.²⁶ At the beginning of the fourth century Medius, who was holding the *dynasteia* of Larisa, sent for aid from the allied council at Corinth which resulted in the dispatch of forces north to combat Lycophron of Pherae.²⁷

Μηδίου δὲ τοῦ τῆς Λαρίσσης τῆς ἐν Θεσσαλία δυναστεύοντος διαπολεμοῦντος πρὸς Λυκόφρονα τὸν Φερῶν τύραννον, καὶ δεομένου πέμψαι βοήθειαν, ἀπέστειλεν αὐτῷ τὸ συνέδριον στρατιώτας δισχιλίους

It does not appear as though the power of the Aleuadae ever significantly waned within Larisa in the first half of the fourth century with the exception of their brief expulsion by the successors of Jason. Some have used the quip of Gorgias reported by Aristotle which mentions the creation of citizens in Larisa to demonstrate a decline in aristocratic

²³ Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.6-7. Stamatopoulou 2007, 219 suggested Menon's assistance was personal rather than state sponsored. This is a difficult distinction to make given that the will of the state was very closely related to, if not synonymous with, the will of the aristocracy.

²⁴ Larsen 1968, 21.

²⁵ They were prominent from the early fifth century when Pind. *Pyth.* 10.5-6 named the Aleuadae as the commissioners of the work.

²⁶ Diod. 16.14.2.

²⁷ Diod. 14.82.5. For identification of Medius as an Aleuad see Westlake 1935, 60.

power, but the making of new citizens is not necessarily indicative of a change in the power dynamics of *dynasteia*.²⁸

Γοργίας μὲν οὖν ὁ Λεοντῖνος, τὰ μὲν ἴσως ἀπορῶν τὰ δ' εἰρωνευόμενος, ἔφη, καθάπερ ὄλμους εἶναι τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν ὄλμοποιῶν πεποιημένους, οὕτω καὶ Λαρισαίους τοὺς ὑπὸ τῶν δημιουργῶν πεποιημένους: εἶναι γὰρ τινας λαρισσοποιούς.

Though in his comment Gorgias mentioned that some of the magistrates of Larisa were craftsmen, we might question the historical authenticity of this comment because Gorgias, in the eyes of Plato and Aristotle, was well-known for rhetorical embellishment.²⁹ *Dynasteia* was not concerned with the spread of citizenship but rather with the distribution of actual power. Just as the Thebans were not deprived of their citizenship under Leontiades, the Lariseans could have enjoyed some rights without having a major role in government. The continued dominance of the Aleuadae in Larisa made it one of the more stable oligarchies in Thessaly.

In Pharsalus, the power dynamics were much less stable and politics were much more heavily factionalized. Once the Echekratidae were removed in the fifth century, the city fell into *stasis* caused by rival aristocratic factions. These aristocratic factions were attempting to attain the power the Echekratididae once wielded, probably through the assumption of their substantial land holdings. There was eventually an attempt to reinstall Orestes and return the Echekratididae to power but this failed and the *stasis* remained.³⁰ Evidence for oligarchic conflict within Pharsalus was illustrated by the journey of Brasidas through Thessaly during the Peloponnesian War. Despite having

²⁸ Sprawski 1999, 46. Aristot. *Pol.* 3.1275b.

²⁹ For the use of jest according to Gorgias see Aristot. *Rhet.* 3.1419b. For Gorgias as a rhetorician and his purpose as a persuader see Plat. *Gorg.* 452e.

³⁰ Thuc. 1.111.1. Stamatopoulou 2007, 219-220 saw this as an indication that the city was fortified in the fifth century but rightly indicated that Pharsalus suffers from the same archaeological dilemma as Thebes in that the ancient city is buried directly beneath the modern town.

men from Pharsalus escorting him, Brasidas' march was halted by men from the rival faction.³¹

ὥστε εἰ μὴ δυναστεία μᾶλλον ἢ ἰσονομία ἐχρῶντο τὸ ἐγχώριον οἱ Θεσσαλοί, οὐκ ἂν ποτε προῆλθεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τότε πορευομένῳ αὐτῷ ἀπαντήσαντες ἄλλοι τῶν τάναντία τούτοις βουλομένων ἐπὶ τῷ Ἐνιπεῖ ποταμῷ ἐκόλυον καὶ ἀδικεῖν ἔφασαν ἄνευ τοῦ πάντων κοινοῦ πορευόμενον.

In this same passage Thucydides mentioned Niconidas of Larisa who was a personal friend of Perdiccas of Macedon.³²

ἦγον δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Θεσσαλῶν αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκ Λαρίσης Νικονίδας Περδίκκα ἐπιτήδειος ὢν

This emphasis on personal connections is a theme which continues in Thessalian politics well into the fourth century. Brasidas' escort admitted that they were merely his friends and not acting in an official capacity but their presence must still have been valuable and influential otherwise why would they be mentioned at all?³³ It should be clear that these factions were not pro-Spartan or pro-Athenian in an ideological sense, but the members of these factions were tied to individuals from other states, in this case Brasidas.³⁴ In the later fifth century some degree of control may have been established by various factions for brief periods. Given his financial resources, the Menon mentioned above was almost certainly a leading member of the city during the later fifth century. Menon was a common name in Pharsalus among the aristocracy and we might take this family to be one which assumed the power of the Echekratidae after the

³¹ Thuc. 4.78.3. This evidence weighs heavily against Archibald 2002, 215 which claimed that political fragmentation was less common in Thessaly than other central Greek states.

³² Thuc. 4.78.2.

³³ Thuc. 4.78.4.

³⁴ Larsen 1968, 21 suggested the factions were divided along pro-Spartan and pro-Athenian lines but the text only stated that the Thessalians as a whole were traditionally friendly to the Athenians. Sprawski 1999, 31 promoted non-ideological reasons for individual alliances which is the view accepted by this examination.

mid-fifth century.³⁵ The fall of this family, possibly caused by the war against Lycophron and Medius' capture of the city, contributed to the continuation of *stasis* within the city.

This *stasis* was still in place in the 370s BC, as can be seen by the enormous powers granted to Polydamas.³⁶

οὗτος δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ Θεσσαλίᾳ μάλα ἠὺδοκίμει, καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει οὕτως ἐδόκει καλὸς τε κάγαθος εἶναι ὥστε καὶ στασιάσαντες οἱ Φαρσάλιοι παρακατέθεντο αὐτῷ τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἐπέτρεψαν λαμβάνοντι, ὅσα ἐγγράπτο ἐν τοῖς νόμοις, εἷς τε τὰ ἱερὰ ἀναλίσκειν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην διοίκησιν.

Polydamas, despite his expansive powers, was clearly not acting as autonomously as the previous *dynastai* because he was responsible for keeping a ledger and presenting the revenues and expenditures each year to the Pharsalians.³⁷ This kind of accountability was unheard of in Classical Thessaly (though not in Boeotia, where the *boeotarchoi* were answerable to the federal council), and it is frustrating that more is not known about the circumstances which produced this unique office. Whatever *stasis* had affected Pharsalus, by the time of Aristotle it had been resolved and Pharsalus was held to be the model of a good oligarchy.³⁸

ὁμονοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὐτῆς. σημεῖον δὲ ἢ ἐν Φαρσάλῳ πολιτεία: ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ὀλίγοι ὄντες πολλῶν κύριοι εἰσι διὰ τὸ χρῆσθαι σφίσι αὐτοῖς καλῶς.

³⁵ Another Pharsalian named Menon was mentioned by Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.6. This same Menon was a prominent figure in Athens in the late fifth century. Stamatopoulou 2007, 220 saw possible hereditary bonds between this family and Athens. This would align with this examination's emphasis on the importance of ritualized friendship in Thessalian foreign affairs.

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2.

³⁷ Mitchell 1997, 29 called him a 'virtual tyrant.' Pharsalus had always been a bit of an outlier in financial affairs. Stamatopoulou 2007, 221 noted that Pharsalian coinage was different from the rest of Pelasgiotis.

³⁸ Aristot. *Pol.* 5.1306a.

Similar to Larisa, there has been some argument for a major change of government via the inclusion of new citizens in the fourth century. This argument is supposedly supported by a decree from Pharsalus awarding land to new citizens, but this treaty dates to the third century BC and should not be taken as reflective of the situation in the fourth century BC.³⁹

The Pheraean Tyrants and the Tageia

Unlike in the other Thessalian cities, power within Pherae was limited to an even more narrow kinship group. Sole or dual power was the standard form of rule in Pherae in the first half of the fourth century. The first to hold the position of sole ruler of Pherae was Lycophron, who gained only a passing mention in the source material. Any hypotheses relating to Lycophron's rise to power are purely speculative, but the most reasonable view is that he was already a wealthy aristocrat who took advantage of a strategic opportunity to seize power.⁴⁰ Events in Pherae (and in most of Thessaly) for the 380s BC are almost completely unknown to us, which has made this time period ripe for speculation. Given the almost total lack of evidence, this examination will not attempt to create a fictionalized version of history, but will instead limit itself to the obvious statement that during this time period Lycophron died and Jason assumed power, but these events do not need to be seen as immediately successive or related.⁴¹

While most Thessalian leaders had attempted to build a base of power and increase their holdings across the region through warfare, in Jason of Pherae we see a

³⁹ *IG IX 2, 234*. Decourt 1990, 183 for a third century BC date.

⁴⁰ Sprawski 1999, 47.

⁴¹ Sordi 1958, 156 believed that Jason inherited his power directly from Lycophron and they were related, but there is no evidence to support this conclusion. Mandel 1980, 54 stated Jason did not become active in the 380s because he was not mentioned during the Spartan marches through Thessaly. This is a weak argument because the ancient authors generally do not show interest in the internal workings of Thessaly.

leader who knew the value of political maneuvering. He may have witnessed the ineffectiveness of a policy of domination through warfare employed by Lycophron and decided on a more legitimate and ultimately more effective approach. Unlike Lycophron, Jason knew the value of acquiring power via diplomacy and used this both within and without Thessaly.⁴² As stated above, Jason's political origins are unknown, because by the time he appeared in the historical record he was already established as the tyrant of Pherae.⁴³ As the sole authority in Pherae, Jason was of course able to make treaties without consultation, as he did with Pharsalus to cement his hold over the Thessalian cities.⁴⁴ Like the *dynastai* of the rest of the Thessalian cities, Jason was able to extend his influence to the surrounding areas, at one time claiming the Maracians and Dolopians as his subjects as well as Alcetas the ruler of Epirus.⁴⁵

ἐπεδείκνυε δέ μοι εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ὑπήκοοι ἤδη αὐτῷ εἶεν Μαρακοὶ καὶ Δόλοπες
καὶ Ἀλκέτας ὁ ἐν τῇ Ἠπειρῷ ὑπάρχος

Jason was also an ally of Amyntas of Macedon, who had been restored to the throne by the Thessalians.⁴⁶ Again, the importance of personal connections between Thessalian rulers and foreign leaders is emphasized. The *tagos* as defined by Jason was the supreme military leader of Thessaly and by Jason's own calculations could control 6000 cavalry and 10,000 hoplites.⁴⁷

⁴² Sprawski 2006, 210 saw Jason, along with Dionysius I of Syracuse as a forefather of the Hellenistic monarchies. This examination is not prepared to attribute such a significant later influence to Jason's maneuverings in Thessaly.

⁴³ For a discussion of whether or not Jason held the title of 'tyrant of Pherae' or whether he was a 'tyrant of Thessaly' see Sprawski 1999, 59-62 and Sprawski 2006.

⁴⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4. At the time of the treaty with Pharsalus, Jason must have already brought the Aleuadae and Larisa under his control. This could explain why Polydamas claimed Jason had the strongest cities of Thessaly as his allies by the time of his journey to Sparta. Sprawski 1999, 72 wondered why the Aleuadae were never mentioned.

⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.7.

⁴⁶ Diod. 14.92.3; 15.60.2. Perdiccas also attempted to keep alliances with the ruling *dynastai* of the Thessalians. Thuc. 4.134.2.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8.

οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν εὐδὴλον ἡμῖν, ὅτι Φαρσάλου προσγενομένης καὶ τῶν ἐξ ὑμῶν ἡρτημένων πόλεων εὐπετῶς ἂν ἐγὼ ταγὸς Θετταλῶν ἀπάντων κατασταίην: ὥς γε μὴν, ὅταν ταγεύηται Θετταλία, εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους μὲν οἱ ἱππεύοντες γίνονται, ὀπλιῖται δὲ πλείους ἢ μύριοι καθίστανται.

There is no reason to doubt this claim especially when Jason's 6000 mercenaries are included in the totals.⁴⁸ Jason was certainly able to expand the power of the *tageia* at his pleasure, and this expansion could include setting the military contributions for the cities.⁴⁹ Aside from connections with other tyrants and monarchs, he was also interested in interaction with non-Thessalian cities, as his meddling in Histiaea demonstrated.⁵⁰

When Jason was elected to the *tageia*, it was the first time such an election had taken place in the fourth century, and possibly the first since the mid-fifth century.⁵¹ Until fairly recently, modern scholars have had difficulty accepting that Jason's status as *tagos* was almost completely of his own design. Sprawski has admirably compiled the evidence indicating that in the Archaic and early Classical Periods Thessaly was either led by an *archon* or *basileus*.⁵² It should be fairly clear that seeking the election to the *tageia* was an attempt on Jason's part to legitimize his rule over parts of Thessaly extending beyond Pherae and its dependencies.⁵³ In Jason's time, the confirmation as *tagos* required a vote of the Thessalian cities.⁵⁴ This vote was held once Pharsalus

⁴⁸ Sprawski 1999, 76. Helly 1995 241-251 attempted to demonstrate these numbers were based on changes in the mathematical models of *kleroi* but this is an extreme view with no supporting evidence.

⁴⁹ Larsen 1968, 24 saw this as a centralizing of power.

⁵⁰ Diod. 15.30.3.

⁵¹ For an etymological study of the word *tagos* and its cognates see Sprawski 1999, 15-17. Helly 2015, 237-238 saw the *tageia* as an ancient method of mobilization as well as a civic group.

⁵² Larsen 1968, 17 saw Jason's succession to the *tageia* as a revival rather than the creation of a new office. Sprawski 1999, 23; 2006, 207 viewed the creation of the *tageia* as a new office made by Jason. Stamatopoulou 2007, 317 believed the *tagos* was not the traditional ruler of Thessaly until Jason. This contradicts Mandel 1980, 48 which believed the office was created by the Aleuadae.

⁵³ Aston 2012b, 57-58 suggested that this might be indicative of a Thessalian ideal of acting in accordance with the law.

⁵⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8.

capitulated to his rule, and Jason was chosen as the *tagos* by common consent (ὁμολογουμένως).⁵⁵

ὡς δὲ τὰ πιστὰ ἔδοσαν ἀλλήλοις, εὐθὺς μὲν οἱ Φαρσάλιοι εἰρήνην ἤγον, ταχὺ δὲ ὁ Ἰάσων ὁμολογουμένως ταγὸς τῶν Θετταλῶν καθειστήκει.

There are two issues here. The first is the dating of Jason's election, and second the meaning of 'common consent.' The dating issue comes to a choice between two options: 375/374 which was indicated by Xenophon and a post-Leuctra date suggested by Diodorus.⁵⁶ The dating of Xenophon is preferred here given the amount of power Jason wielded at the time of Leuctra and the generally accepted pre-Leuctra date for Polydamas' mission to Sparta. But what does common consent mean in the case of Thessaly? Some have taken it to indicate an assembly and used the march of Brasidas described above to support the argument, but this can hardly be the case.⁵⁷ The march is much better explained using the factional politics which were known to exist at the time. Due to the direct approach to Polydamas, it is most likely that Jason used a meeting of leading aristocrats to confirm his rule.⁵⁸ This issue of 'common consent' is interesting, because Xenophon stated that Jason's brothers, Polydorus and Polyphron, became *tagoi* after his death.⁵⁹

ἀποθανόντος μέντοι ἐκείνου Πολύδωρος ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ Πολύφρων ταγοὶ κατέστησαν

⁵⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.18. Xenophon also uses this term to indicate commonality of opinion such as in Athens before the rise of the Thirty. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.38. The other use of this term in the *Hellenica* parallels the use here, where the Spartans had been chosen as the leaders of the Greek land forces during the Persian Wars. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35. It is significant that Xenophon indicated through this parallel that separate autonomous states were involved in the process.

⁵⁶ Sprawski 1999, 80 did not propose a new solution, but repeated the claim of Tuplin 1993, 207-209 that Diodorus was not referring to an election but to an authorization to act.

⁵⁷ Larsen 1968, 19.

⁵⁸ Sprawski 2006, 207.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.33.

Did they too become *tagoi* by ‘common consent?’ It would appear so but this is not explicitly confirmed in any of the source material. The real issue of legitimacy may have been raised when Alexander took power through the murder of Polyphron. While his accession in Pherae seems to have been smooth, this acceptance may not have been widespread throughout Thessaly. His assumption of the *tageia* may have been an attempt to legitimize his rule.⁶⁰ The rejection of his status as *tagos* by the Thessalian cities was then a rejection of his legitimacy. Diodorus’ claim that Alexander of Pherae had gained his power illegally may reference the idea that he did not gain the common consent of the Thessalians in an election.⁶¹

οὗτος δὲ παρανόμως καὶ βιαίως κτησάμενος τὴν δυναστείαν, ἀκολούθως ταύτη τῇ προαιρέσει διώκει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχήν.

This seems to have continued after Alexander’s assassination, as Lycophron and Tisiphonius were said to have held the government by force.⁶²

οὗτοι δὲ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὡς τυραννοκτόνοι μεγάλης ἐτύγχανον ἀποδοχῆς, ὕστερον δὲ μετανοήσαντες καὶ τοὺς μισθοφόρους χρήμασι πείσαντες ἀνέδειξαν ἑαυτοὺς τυράννους καὶ πολλοὺς μὲν τῶν ἀντιπραττομένων ἀνεῖλον, κατασκευασάμενοι δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἀξιόλογον βία κατεῖχον τὴν ἀρχήν.

Common consent can then be seen as the key to unified rule over Thessaly, and this stability was lost at least by Alexander’s seizure of power.

The Thessalian Use of Personal Relationships

There are essentially two types of personal relationships at work in Thessaly, the personal bond of *xenia* and the official state bond of *proxenia*.⁶³ The use of these

⁶⁰ Beck 1997a, 129 saw the loss of legality as related to Alexander’s accession to power.

⁶¹ Diod. 15.61.2.

⁶² Diod. 16.14.1.

⁶³ For the differences between the two types of friendship see Adcock & Mosley 1975, 11; Mitchell 1997, 28-29; Herman 1987, 130-141. The factors in choosing a suitable *proxenos* were charted by Mack 2015, 32 and included extended service to the granting city as well as the obvious requirement of citizen-status in his own *polis*.

relationships was essential to maintaining influence within the region. Sprawski has proposed that the aristocrats of Thessaly used the bonds of *philia* to attain a patron-like status over the members of their city which helps explain the maintenance of their power.⁶⁴ It is significant in understanding the mechanisms of foreign policy in Thessaly that the issuing of *proxenia* was left to the individual cities.⁶⁵ This is not something which occurred in the federal structure of Boeotia, where grants of *proxenia* in the fourth century were given on behalf of the Boeotians as a whole as in the examples discussed above. The issuing and acceptance of *proxenia* was by no means a new development in fourth century Thessaly. In the course of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides mentioned the Chalcidian *proxenos* in Pharsalus, Strophacus.⁶⁶ In the 370s, Polydamas was the Spartan *proxenos* in Pharsalus and highlighted the fact that his position was hereditary which was not uncommon in Greece.⁶⁷

ἐγώ, ὃ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, πρόξενος ὑμῶν ὄν καὶ εὐεργέτης ἐκ πάντων ὧν μεμνήμεθα προγόνων...

In addition to awarding *proxenia* to non-Thessalians in central Greece, the issuing of this honor to men in other Thessalian cities could be indicative of an extremely loose, if not non-existent, structure in the first half of the fourth century.⁶⁸

Ἀριστοκλέαι Σκοτ-
οσσαίωι Φεραῖοι ἔδ-
ωκαν προξενίαν
κα[ὶ ἀ]σ[υλία]ν
κ[αὶ ἀτ]έ[λει]αν
[α]ὐτῶι [καὶ χρή]μασι.

⁶⁴ Sprawski 1999, 56. Aristippus of Larisa also appealed to Cyrus his personal friend. Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.10.

⁶⁵ Mack 2015, 174-182 indicated that *proxeny* networks could vary widely in size even between *poleis* in close proximity to one another.

⁶⁶ Thuc. 4.78.1.

⁶⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4. Russell 1999, 80-81 noted that Polydamas' appeal may have been as much for his personal protection as that of his city. This may have some plausibility because his own children were later taken as hostages by Jason. There is an indication that Demosthenes' role as the *proxenos* of Thebes was also hereditary. Perlman 1958, 188-189. Hereditary roles are recognized by Trevett 1999, 186 but denied in the specific case of Demosthenes.

⁶⁸ Graninger 2011, 11. Bequignon 1964, 405 = *SEG* 23:409.

Because the majority of the evidence for these decrees comes from Pherae, we might be inclined to assume that the bonds of *proxenia* were used by the Pheraeans to promote their cause in the other cities of Thessaly.⁶⁹ For our purposes here, one of the most important grants of *proxenia* is that given by the Pheraeans to a citizen of Thebes, Archelaus son of Smicrion. The grant is formulaic and guarantees the *proxenos* safety for him, his family, and his property.⁷⁰

Ἀρχελάωι : Θηβαίωι
 Σμικρίωνος υἱῶι
 Φεραῖοι ἔδοσαν
 προξενίαν καὶ ἀσυλίαν
 αὐτῶι καὶ γενεᾷ
 καὶ χρήμασιν.
 Κρατεράϊος
 Ἀγασικράτεος.

The official state use of *proxenia* could explain why the decree is not listed as having its origins with the Pheraeans, but rather with the Pheraeans. What is the significance of having a Pheraeans *proxenos* in Thebes?⁷¹ It demonstrates that Thessalian rulers and cities had extensive interaction with the Theban leadership at both the personal and state level. It is also apparent Thessalian aristocrats could hold multiple roles. In Jason's case, he was apparently able to both be an ally of the Thebans and to be a *proxenos* of the Spartans.⁷²

⁶⁹ Mitchell 1997, 53-55 demonstrated that even decisions of the state could be influenced by personal factors, and given the nature of government in Thessaly this must be even more accurate than in states to the south. The use of *proxenia* to improve individual ties was not a concept unfamiliar to the Boeotians either. Gerolymatos 1985, 308 and Gerolymatos 1986.

⁷⁰ SEG 23:417 = Bequignon 1964, 402.

⁷¹ Russell 1999, 80-83 noted the expectation placed on *proxenia* that they would provide information to the granting state, though this function has been recognized since Adcock & Mosley 1975, 174. Mack 2015, 65-76 gave a detailed description of the various expectations placed on the *proxenos* by the granting *polis* which included, among other things, hospitality, information, and access to political institutions.

⁷² Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.24. Mitchell 1997, 30 read this to mean that Jason was the *proxenos* of the Thebans but he was clearly speaking to the Spartans here.

In conjunction with personal relationships, wealth also served as an influential tool in Thessalian politics. Alexander of Pherae used money to influence his foreign relations, and Plutarch mentioned a curious case of him sending money to the Athenians, who in turn were building a statue of him.⁷³

...Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ μισθοδότην Ἀλέξανδρον εἶχον καὶ χαλκοῦν ἵστασαν ὡς εὐεργέτην...

It is odd that there is no mention of what the payment was for, but the implication on the part of Plutarch must have been some kind of political bribery. Alexander was also said to have sent meat to Athens at a cheap price, indicating that influential wealth was not only measured in minerals.⁷⁴ The use of wealth as a political tool was not limited to the morally corrupt Alexander, which supports the idea that this form of political interaction was commonplace and not totally invented to smear the character of Alexander. Jason's attempts to give money to Epaminondas, while obviously meant to reflect the virtues of Epaminondas, demonstrate some kind of use of money as a political tool.⁷⁵

Ἰάσονος δὲ τοῦ Θετταλῶν μονάρχου συμμάχου μὲν εἰς Θήβας παραγενομένου, δισχίλιους δὲ χρυσοῦς τῷ Ἐπαμεινώνδῃ πέμψαντος ἰσχυρῶς πενομένῳ, τὸ μὲν χρυσίον οὐκ ἔλαβε, τὸν δὲ Ἰάσονα θεασάμενος, 'ἀδίκων,' ἔφη, 'χειρῶν ἄρχεις' αὐτὸς δὲ πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς δανεισάμενος παρά τινος τῶν πολιτῶν, ἐφόδιον τῆς στρατιᾶς, ἐνέβαλεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον.

This holds true even if it was not an attempt at outright bribery, but instead, as Sprawski supposed, an attempt to create some kind of *philia* like he had with

⁷³ Plut. *Pel.* 31.4. Beck 1997a, 129 dated Alexander's alliance with the Athenians to 368 BC.

⁷⁴ Plut. *Mor.* 193E. Epaminondas quipped that he would provide wood to cook the meat by cutting down every tree in Attica.

⁷⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 193B.

Pelopidas.⁷⁶ Once again, the idea that political power in Thessaly was rooted in the relationship between powerful individuals and other entities is reinforced.

Thessaly and the Perioecic Communities in the Fourth Century

The power dynamic between the Thessalian cities and their perioecic territories was extremely unbalanced and this resulted in these territories generally following the lead of the nearest cities politically while still maintaining some degree of autonomy as represented by their coinage.⁷⁷ These regions were forced to recognize their inferiority through the payment of tribute, which to Thessalian aristocrats was more valuable than political alignment. For example, the Lariseans were able to extend their power significantly to the region around them, and the Perrhaebians were described as paying tribute to Larisa until the mid-fourth century.⁷⁸

οἱ τοὶ δ' οὖν κατεῖχον τέως τὴν Περραιβίαν καὶ φόρους ἐπράττοντο, ἕως
Φίλιππος κατέστη κύριος τῶν τόπων.

It is interesting to note that Jason was said to have subdued the Perrhaebians as well, which could indicate his overlordship of Larisa and the Aleuadae by the assumption of a traditional power base and revenue stream. There is another implication to Jason's influence over the Perrhaebians, and that is that if he had already subdued Larisa, which seems to be apparent, then why did he not automatically gain control over the Perrhaebians? The answer to this must be that the Perrhaebians saw an opportunity to gain a greater degree of autonomy than they enjoyed under the influence of Larisa and

⁷⁶ Sprawski 1999, 69. Aston 2012a, 263 noted that the power of the individual in Thessaly determined policy not the collective of the Thessalian cities. This power was expressed through ritualized friendship. Trundle 2006, 72 saw wealth as essential to these types of political relationships.

⁷⁷ Sprawski 2006, 136.

⁷⁸ Strab. 9.5.19. Thucydides did not do much to clarify the issue, but only insisted that the Perrhaebians were Thessalian subjects. Sprawski 2006, 135 suggested that these neighboring peoples could be better described as *symmachoi*. Helly 2015, 239-240 believed that the tribute from these communities was pooled into the Thessalian federal state, but this is unproven.

acted accordingly.⁷⁹ For Pharsalus, the main perioecic region was Achaea Phthiotis, but during the long-term *stasis* of the city the aristocratic factions were unable to capitalize on its resources.⁸⁰ The perioecic cities of Thessaly not included above were also required to pay tribute once Jason was named *tagos* in the 370s BC.⁸¹

προεῖπε δὲ τοῖς περιοίκοις πᾶσι καὶ τὸν φόρον ὡς περ ἐπὶ Σκόπα τεταγμένος ἦν φέρειν.

This tribute had apparently been fixed in the sixth century BC but had not been paid in a long time, but because this evidence comes from a speech of Jason reported by Polydamas in his own speech, the strict meaning is problematic.⁸² Jason's speech as related by Xenophon was full of exaggeration such as the eventual subservience of Athens to his rule.⁸³ In speaking of a return to tribute collection, Jason may have been appealing to a glorious and impressive past to make his own power potential seem greater.⁸⁴ The role of the perioecic peoples within a military context is also problematic in that it has been misunderstood in modern studies. The idea that the perioecic soldiers served as 'auxiliaries' to the Thessalians betrays a lack of understanding of the way they fought.⁸⁵ Their traditional fighting style was not as a hoplite, but as a peltast or

⁷⁹ Sprawski 2006, 136 took this to mean that Larisean control over the region was not always secure. Westlake 1935, 65 saw the perioecic cities as completely independent up until Jason's time. The independent production of coinage may have been an indication of this autonomy.

⁸⁰ Dem. 11.1. Stamatopoulou 2007, 219 saw the potential for grain export from this region but the lack of a usable port would be problematic.

⁸¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19. Helly 2015, 234 recognized that the perioecic cities were dominated politically by the Thessalians. Morgan 2003, 23 saw the perioecic cities as economically rather than politically dependent, but both may be the case.

⁸² The attribution of Scopas to the sixth century BC can be found in Larsen 1968, 18-19. Helly 2015, 238 stated that the main source of income for the Thessalian state was tribute, but this clearly cannot be the case if this tribute had not been paid in living memory. It also severely underestimates the trade potential of Thessaly.

⁸³ Sprawski 1999, 77-78 compiled the more implausible claims of Jason.

⁸⁴ Graninger 2011, 15 suggested the tribute fixed by Scopas was an invention of Jason. This same appeal to ancient authority to justify reform was proposed by Sprawski 1999, 23; 2012, 146. Aston 2012a, 56 rightly widened this trend to include other families seeking to legitimize their authority.

⁸⁵ Helly 2015, 231-232 made a convoluted statement which at various points claimed the perioecic people were auxiliaries while at others denouncing this same claim.

slinger. Their military service alongside the Thessalians was not due to their status, but rather to their training. They were only inferior in this regard if the hoplite is considered the pinnacle of the Greek military, which may have been true in southern Greece, but central Greece had a long tradition of both light armed troops and cavalry being utilized heavily in combat, and this trend only expanded the farther north one traveled.

The Existence of a Thessalian League

Thus far, this examination has focused on the development within the cities of a narrow oligarchy which prioritized personal, individual relationships with foreign powers. The cities were united by Jason who reserved ultimate authority for himself, but there has been some argument for a Thessalian federal state which remains to be examined. Federalism in Thessaly has often been discussed in terms of the Thessalian League meant to have existed in the sixth and fifth centuries BC, but in the fourth century the existence of a League prior to 361 BC can be questioned.⁸⁶ Initially, there is the issue of whether the Thessalian federal state existed at this time. Unlike in the other central Greek states, Thessaly did not have a unified coinage created on behalf of the Thessalian League, and only started minting coins in the fifth century BC.⁸⁷ In the fourth century, the attempt of Lycophron to gain power and the capture of Pharsalus by Medius indicates that there was no federal state which united Thessaly, even in a loose way. As stated above, Thessalian history is not well documented in the early fourth century, but it does not appear that any degree of Thessalian unity was established until the time of Jason.⁸⁸ Under Jason of Pherae, the state which existed in Thessaly cannot

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the earliest 'federal' state in Thessaly as created by Aleuas the Red see Larsen 1968, 12-20; Graninger 2011, 10-11; Sprawski 2012, 143-146. The question of Aleuas the Red's existence is largely irrelevant to the current examination.

⁸⁷ Martin 1985, 34-35 was probably correct in the assessment that coinage was initially made in Larisa for the purpose of paying the Persian King during the Persian Wars.

⁸⁸ Sordi 1958, 152 saw a temporary reformation of the Thessalian League in 394 BC.

definitively be described as federal, because we have no evidence for a federal structure beyond Jason's own power. Jason, as the *tagos* of the Thessalians, could do as he pleased and form his own policy. The narrative at Leuctra certainly does not indicate that Jason needed any kind of approval to act. The issue stemming from this is of course that Jason's mercenaries were loyal to him and only to him which the mercenaries of Phocis would mimic later in the century. Xenophon made this abundantly clear in his assessment of Jason's character. The *tageia* was not necessarily installed with the power of the combined might of the Thessalian cities as willing participants, but more with the threat of Jason's own personal power over these cities which meant that Thessalian unity lived and died with a single man. In the conversation with Polydamas, Jason made the point clear that he was not averse to using military means to forcibly bring Pharsalus into the fold. This military intimidation was an initial route to power, but as suggested above Jason may have attempted to legitimize and institutionalize his leadership.⁸⁹ Due to the lack of evidence, it is perhaps too much of a stretch, as Sprawski has proposed, to say that Jason had begun to establish mechanisms of a federal state which then influenced reforms in the Thessalian League in the 360s BC.⁹⁰

The problem of identifying a Thessalian League can be seen in the opposition of the other Thessalian cities to the tyrants of Pherae over the course of the fourth century. No evidence points to the inherent desire of the Thessalian cities to form a federal state. Far from the 'nationalists' proposed by Westlake, these Thessalians opposed to Jason and the other Pheraeans were combining their forces to regain a greater degree of

⁸⁹ Aston 2012b, 56.

⁹⁰ Sprawski 2006, 209.

autonomy for their individual cities and holdings. There was no ideological struggle for the freedom of the Thessalians, but the individual cities and the aristocrats who led them were certainly interested in ensuring their renewed autonomy. There has been a large amount of speculation that the re-emergence of a Thessalian League in the 360s BC was due to the actions of Pelopidas. Many scholars have even gone so far as to speculate that Pelopidas was the engineer of this renewed Thessalian League, but as will be shown the evidence is so minimal that this attribution cannot be held.⁹¹ It does not clarify matters that in the course of the 360s, those who opposed Alexander of Pherae on the side of the Boeotians were simply called ‘the Thessalians’ which does not necessarily indicate a federal structure.⁹² A piece of literary evidence often used to give Pelopidas a role in the formation of a Thessalian League is that during his first trip to Thessaly he left the Thessalian cities in accord with one another.⁹³

ὁ δὲ Πελοπίδας ἄδειαν τε πολλὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ τυράννου τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς ἀπολιπὼν καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμόνοιαν, αὐτὸς εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἀπῆρε...

He was also said to have arranged things in a way which benefitted the Boeotians.⁹⁴

Βοιωτοὶ δέ, μεταπεμπομένων αὐτοῦς Θετταλῶν ἐπ’ ἐλευθερώσει μὲν τῶν πόλεων, καταλύσει δὲ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φεραίου τυραννίδος ἐξαπέστειλαν Πελοπίδαν μετὰ δυνάμεως εἰς Θετταλίαν, δόντες ἐντολὰς αὐτῷ εἰς τὸ συμφέρον τῶν Βοιωτῶν διοικῆσαι τὰ κατὰ τὴν Θετταλίαν.

To say that this represented the foundation or reorganization of a Thessalian League is a stretch. At best it indicates that the cities may have made alliances with each other against Alexander of Pherae, but this is far from a formal federation.⁹⁵ It could also

⁹¹ Scholars supporting the reorganization under Pelopidas include Graninger 2011, 71; Aston 2012b, 45; Buckler 1980, 116; Sordi 1958, 207. Westlake 1935, 134-135. Beck 1997a, 130.

⁹² Graninger 2011, 11 assumed the two were synonymous.

⁹³ Plut. *Pel.* 26.3. Westlake 1935, 135 thought this phrase hinted at the creation of a new political system.

⁹⁴ Diod. 15.67.3.

⁹⁵ Buckler 1980, 115 thought that Pelopidas suggested the recreation of the Thessalian League as a counterbalance to Alexander.

refer to the re-establishment of the Aleuadae in Larisa or the ending of *stasis* in Pharsalus. Pelopidas has also been credited with the reform of the Thessalian army, particularly in the case of the hoplites.⁹⁶ If anyone carried out major hoplite reform in Thessaly it was Jason of Pherae. He was believed to have more than 20,000 hoplites at his disposal in 375 BC.⁹⁷ The other date proposed for the restoration of the Thessalian League is in 364 BC, which seems to be the most probable.⁹⁸ The only way this date is made improbable is through the insistence that the Thessalians did not reform their federal state on their own. This not only insults the ability of the Thessalians to collaborate in times of trouble, but gives undue political influence to the Boeotians who, as discussed above, were not ideologically invested in imparting their own political systems on their central Greek allies. In his analysis of the Thessalian League, Westlake stated, ‘This system was created by a friend of the Aleuadae and for the benefit of the Aleuadae.’⁹⁹ Based on the almost total lack of evidence for the political involvement of the Boeotians, could we not reasonably hypothesize that this system could have been made for the Aleuadae *by* the Aleuadae?

Epigraphically, the Thessalian League is attested as a federal state only in 361 BC when a decree from Athens confirmed an alliance between Athens and the League.¹⁰⁰

ἐπὶ Νικοφῆμο ἄρχοντος
 συμμαχία Ἀθηναίων καὶ
 Θετταλῶν εἰς τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον.
 [καὶ τὸ κ]-
 [οινὸν] τῶν Θετ[ταλ]ῶν

⁹⁶ Buckler 1980, 117.

⁹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19.

⁹⁸ Buckler 1980, 247-248 admitted that the Thessalian Confederacy could have been rebuilt at any point between the death of Jason and 361 BC, but attributed a restoration in 364 BC to Epaminondas. Westlake 1935, 134 likewise attributed reorganization at any point to the Boeotians.

⁹⁹ Westlake 1935, 137.

¹⁰⁰ *IG II²* 116. Rhodes & Osborne 2003, 218-223.

An archon is listed as the highest office in this inscription, though we should not equate this to the archon of the Boeotians, who did not serve a governmental function beyond naming the year and possibly religious duties.¹⁰¹ Prior to the mid-fourth century, there is in fact no evidence for a body, oligarchic or otherwise, which was responsible for decisions of a federal state.¹⁰² Helly has attempted to argue that an inscription confirming a treaty with Athens dates to the 390s BC, which if true would indicate a federal state which existed after Lycophron's attempt though it bears more similarities to a treaty from the mid-fourth century.¹⁰³ The organs of the central government seem at this time to have been non-existent, and we must conclude that there was no Thessalian League in existence until the 360s BC.¹⁰⁴

Conclusions

It is clear from the above examination that Thessalian politics in the first half of the fourth century were destabilized by the traditional *dynasteia* and tyranny which existed in major cities. These forms of government led to an emphasis on individual power and personal connections which under Jason achieved an unified Thessaly, but this unity could and did collapse very quickly. Rivalry between families and factions meant *stasis* was frequent in Pharsalus and prevented collaboration between cities except in times of emergency. Personal connections also extended to foreign powers,

¹⁰¹ Despite this Westlake 1935, 135 detected a constitution based on that of the Boeotian League. The archon named in the treaty, Agelaus, was reasonably identified as a Daochid (from Pharsalus) by Stamatopoulou 2007, 222.

¹⁰² Graninger 2011, 11 favored an oligarchic body but admitted there was no evidence for this. Buckler 2003, 322 suggested a probouletic council of *hippeis* with an assembly made up of the hoplite class. Aeschin. 3.161; Diod. 17.4.1 which referred to a vote of the Thessalians dealt with events 30 years later.

¹⁰³ Helly 2015, 234. The treaty was dated by Tracy 2010, 27; 29 to the early fourth or late fifth centuries. The dating is speculative and is based on letter forms, though the author admits it bears many similarities to *IG II² 116* which certainly comes from the mid-fourth century.

¹⁰⁴ Larsen 1968, 15 saw the period of *atageia* as a weakening of the federal government rather than its dissolution.

including Thebes which showed evidence of these connections in addition to the formal office of *proxenia*. The Thessalian League was not established until 364 BC or later as a response to the threat of Alexander of Pherae and not at the direction of the Boeotians. All of these factors allowed the Boeotian League to exert influence over the cities of Thessaly in the form of direct military intervention in the first half of the fourth century.

If: The Locrian League

The Locrians made up the fourth major regional group of central Greece (the others of course being the Boeotians, Phocians, and Thessalians) and of the four practiced the least degree of independent initiative, at least in foreign affairs which in turn necessitated less direct intervention from the Boeotian League to maintain its superiority. By the Classical Period, the *ethnos* of the Locrians was divided into two distinct geographic sections. The Locrians in the west were known as the Ozolians (and as the Hesperians) while those in the east were further divided into the Opuntian, Hypocnemidian, and Epicnemidian Locrians.¹

In the northwest (the eastern border was defined by the Euboean Gulf), eastern Locris bordered on the territory of the Malians and Dorians with the definitive boundary set as the ‘Middle Gate’ of Thermopylae.² The largest swath of the western border was shared with Phocis which, as will be discussed below, caused significant political issues as there were no natural borders to divide Locrian cities from Phocian cities. Western Locris, which was mountainous, stretched from western Phocis and the port of Cirrha to Aetolia in the west and had access to the Corinthian Gulf through the port of Naupactus, the settlement of which will be discussed below.³ Unlike Thessaly and Boeotia, eastern Locris was not particularly extensive in area and did not feature significant tracts of arable land which led the Locrians, unlike their neighbors to the south, to look to the sea rather than the land for prosperity.⁴

¹ For a framework explaining how these regions may have come to be divided see Larsen 1968, 49; Rocchi 2015, 179. Nielsen 2000, 99-102 = Nielsen 2004, 664 convincingly demonstrated that Opuntian and Hypocnemidian refer to the same people, with the former used by ‘outsiders’ and the latter used in epichoric. The same pattern applies to ‘Ozolian’ and ‘Hesperian’ respectively.

² Pascual 2013, 66. Strab. 9.4.10;17. Hdt. 7.216 named Alpenus as the closest Locrian city to Malis. Kramer-Hajos 2008, 12.

³ Paus. 10.38.1. The border between Aetolia and western Locris was Antirrhium. Strab. 8.2.3; 10.2.22.

⁴ An analysis of ports and piracy on the Locrian coast can be found in Arjona 2015, 361-392.

Culturally, Locris had a long epic tradition beginning in literature with the Homeric epics. In the *Iliad*, the Locrians (exclusively the eastern Locrians) were led by Aias and contributed forty ships to the Trojan Expedition.⁵ Aias became a hero for the eastern Locrians, making them culturally distinct from their neighbors, and embodied the rugged lifestyle of the Locrians who dwelled in the mountainous northwest regions of the country.⁶ Like the Boeotians, the Locrians spoke in a dialect which originated in northwest Greece providing them a common language from which to help form their cultural identity.⁷ In western Locris, the foundation myth of Locrus, who lent his name to both countries, provides a mythical connection between the two states.⁸ Like in Phocis and Thessaly, by the fourth century BC the significance of the *ethnos* had been slowly bled away by the rise of the *polis* and the increasing power of aristocratic families within those *poleis*.⁹ It is this focus on political organization as defined by the *poleis* of Locris which will be taken up by the current examination. Though both eastern and western Locris eventually formed alliances with the Boeotian League, it is clear from the historical record that eastern Locris was of a more immediate interest to the Boeotian League, and this examination will largely focus on the development and Boeotian interaction with eastern Locris.

⁵ Hom. *Il.*2.527-535. As Kramer-Hajos 2012, 88 remarked, Locris is one of the smallest states mentioned in the *Catalog*.

⁶ Kramer-Hajos 2012, 97.

⁷ Larsen 1968, 49. This dialect applies to both sets of Locrians which linked the two culturally despite being separated geographically. Katsonopoulou 1990, 16 specifically saw Epirus as the point of origin for the Locrians.

⁸ Plut. *Mor.* 294E-F. Katsonopoulou 1990, 20. Other foundation myths include the wounding of Nessus and the growth of the Locroi from a tree planted by Orestheus. Paus. 10.38.1-2. Monedero 2015, 412-413.

⁹ Monedero 2013, 424.

A Federal State Throughout the Classical Period

The eastern Locrians appear to have developed a federal state fairly early on in the fifth century that could have survived down through the King's Peace (thus outliving the first Boeotian League) and included both the Epicnemidian and Hypocnemidian Locrians.¹⁰ Opus was the largest city of the eastern Locrians and the use of the name 'Opuntian' in the literary record may indicate widespread recognition as the center of power in eastern Locris, and the city was ideally situated to serve as the seat of the federal government.¹¹ The federal organs of government must have convened somewhere, and the accessible location of Opus, as well as its prominence in the Classical Period, indicates that this is where the main power of the Hypocnemidian League was established. Identifying this site as the seat of a centralized government is proven more difficult, as in most of central Greece, by the archaeological record which thus far has not provided a definitive site for Opus.¹² The evidence for this federal state comes from an inscription regarding the colonization of Naupactus, a city in western Locris and an important port on the Corinthian Gulf, which occurred in the early fifth century sometime before the Athenian capture of the city.¹³ This document is important

¹⁰ Rocchi 2015, 190 suggested that the two regions must form a single state due to small population numbers in Epicnemidian Locris. Fossey 1990, 112-113 indicated gradual expansion in settlement throughout the Archaic and Classical Periods which again indicates small overall population compared to land area. Fossey 1990, 162 recognized the potential for a small federal state similar to that of Boeotia. Nielsen 2000, 116-118 concluded that Epicnemidian Locris was combined into a single state. Monedero 2013, 458.

¹¹ Larsen 1968, 51; 54 suggested this was where the federal institutions such as the assembly and the courts were convened. Nielsen 2000, 112-113 compared the position of Opus within a Hypocnemidian League to that of Thebes within the Boeotian League in that the terms became interchangeable which is not an unreasonable analogy given the literary evidence. Beck 1999, 62.

¹² There have been two sites proposed for Opus. One is at modern day Atalanti while the other is at Kyparissi which is seven km away. Most modern scholars believe the site to be Atalanti including Summa & Kounouclas 2011, 203 and Kramer-Hajos 2012, 90. The identification with Kyparissi was supported by Pritchett 1985, 182-185 and Dakaronia 1993, 117. The limited excavations carried out by Blegen failed to produce conclusive evidence. Blegen 1926, 404. For an early study of Locris see Oldfather 1916a, 1916b, & 1922.

¹³ *IG IX I² 3:718*. Fossey 1990, 109 gave the reasonable date of 456 BC as the *terminus ante quem* because this is the generally accepted date for the Athenian capture of Naupactus. Thuc. 1.103.3. Diod.

in that this is evidence of colonization within mainland Greece and because the Locrians did not favor colonization to the extent of other Greek states.¹⁴ The inscription makes it clear that both sets of Locrians took part in the re-foundation of Naupactus, since the colonists, while still having ties to their ancestral homes, were considered to be citizens of Naupactus and paid their taxes in accordance with the laws of the Western Locrians.¹⁵

τέλος μὲ φάρειν μεδὲν : ἡότι μὲ <μ>ετὰ Λογροῶν τῶν Φεσπαρί-
ον : Α : ἔνορρον τοῖς ἐπιφοίροις ἐν Ναύπακτον...

In the inscription, it appears that the Locrians, contrary to what we find in the literary sources, defined the Opuntians as the citizens only of the city of Opus, while the Hypocnemidians represented all of the Locrians contained within the Locrian League which lends support to the multiple divisions of eastern Locris being generated internally.¹⁶ Much like the Boeotian League of the late fifth and early fourth centuries BC, the inscriptions make it clear that there was a select political body of this Locrian League which was called the Thousand of the Opuntians (τε χιλίον πλέθαι).¹⁷ Most scholars have readily agreed that this indicated an oligarchic constitution with a wealth requirement for participation which links it at a basic organizational level to the

11.84.7. The change in ownership could be why the city and harbor were fortified in the Classical Period. Rousset 2004, 396. Meiggs & Lewis 1969, 35 gave a date of 500-475 BC. It is unlikely any narrowing of the date can take place. Naupactus was a city well known for its shipbuilding and provided a valuable port. Strab. 9.4.7.

¹⁴ As Fossey 1990, 109 has suggested, the Locrians, like the Boeotians, were not subject to the pressures which caused other states to develop widespread colonization in the Archaic and Classical Periods.

¹⁵ *IG IX I*² 3:718, 10-11.

¹⁶ Nielsen 2000, 113-114. Rocchi 2015, 188 explained the literary trend of using ‘Opuntian’ to refer to all of eastern Locris.

¹⁷ Nielsen 2000, 114-115 attempted to demonstrate that this could refer to the assembly of only the city of Opus, but did so using a dangerous method pioneered by Hansen which derives a population figure from a military figure. Both interpretations rest upon the accuracy of Diodorus’ number for the Locrians at Thermopylae. Monedero 2013, 458-459 agreed this was a federal assembly. Though this could be in some way related to the ancient ‘hundred houses,’ such considerations are beyond the scope of the current examination.

Boeotian League, but few have questioned whether this government was representative or direct.¹⁸

ἐν πάσαις γὰρ ὑπάρχειν ἐνδέχεται στρατηγίαν αἰδίων, οἷον ἐν δημοκρατία καὶ ἀριστοκρατία, καὶ πολλοὶ ποιοῦσιν ἓνα κύριον τῆς διοικήσεως: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἀρχή τις ἔστι καὶ περὶ Ἐπίδαμνον, καὶ περὶ Ὀποῦντα δὲ κατὰ τι μέρος ἔλαττον

It may not have been representative in the same sense as the Boeotian League, and given some aristocratic tendencies it is reasonable to suggest a higher wealth requirement to sit on this body. The treaty from Naupactus also indicates a division between the federal government based in Opus and the local governments of the other east Locrian cities.¹⁹ As Larsen previously noted, one may notice that this division between local and federal governments bears striking resemblances to that of the later Boeotian League.²⁰ Influence between the two states is certainly feasible and could have contributed to the consistent good-will demonstrated by the more powerful Boeotian League throughout the fourth century. However, any kind of camaraderie did not have as great an influence in Boeotian decisions as the practical benefits discussed below. In the west, the structures of federal government were not so apparent, which may indicate that rather than true federal state, the western Locrians employed a more loose association of various cities until the early fourth century, when epigraphic evidence attests to a Hesperian *koinon*.²¹

[Ἔ]δοξε τῶι κοινῶι τῶν Λοκρῶν τῶν Ἐσ[περί]-
[ων]

¹⁸ Aristot. *Pol.* 3.1287a. Larsen 1968, 53 made the connection between the 1000 man assembly and the 1000 Locrian hoplites at Thermopylae, but this number could not literally represent ‘all’ those with hoplite level wealth in the region. Hdt. 7.203. Diod. 11.4.7. Monedero 2013, 460 argued for limited oligarchy.

¹⁹ Rocchi 2015, 189.

²⁰ Larsen 1968, 58. The revolt which freed Boeotia from Athenian control in the fifth century may have actually started in Locris. Pascual 2013, 476.

²¹ Larsen 1968, 54-56. Rocchi 2015, 192. *IG IX.I²* 3:665.

In terms of political alliance and foreign policy, throughout the first half of the fourth century, and indeed well before it, the Locrians sought to align themselves with the Boeotian League and proved to be followers more than leaders.²² Their relationship with the Boeotian League and their usefulness to the Boeotian cause can best be illustrated through the events surrounding the start of the Corinthian War.

The Outbreak of the Corinthian War: Which Locris?

The greatest role the Locrians played on the wider stage of the Greek political world came in 395 BC with the start of the Corinthian War. Many forget that the Corinthian War had its origins in a local land dispute in central Greece, between the Phocians and Locrians. Assessing this event is almost immediately problematic because the identity of the Locrians involved in the incident with the Phocians has come under dispute from a variety of scholars due to a discrepancy among the sources. According to Xenophon, it was the Opuntian Locrians who levied a fine on land under disputed ownership with the Phocians.²³

γιγνώσκοντες δὲ οἱ ἐν ταῖς Θήβαις προεστῶτες ὅτι εἰ μὴ τις ἄρξει πολέμου, οὐκ ἐθελήσουσιν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι λύειν τὰς σπονδὰς πρὸς τοὺς συμμάχους, πείθουσι Λοκροὺς τοὺς Ὀπουνητίους, ἐκ τῆς ἀμφισβητησίμου χώρας Φωκεῦσί τε καὶ ἑαυτοῖς, χρήματα τελέσαι, νομίζοντες τοὺς Φωκέας τούτου γενομένου ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Λοκρίδα. καὶ οὐκ ἐψεύσθησαν, ἀλλ' εὐθύς οἱ Φωκεῖς ἐμβάλοντες εἰς τὴν Λοκρίδα πολλαπλάσια χρήματα ἔλαβον.

The *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* instead claimed it was the Hesperian Locrians who were harmed by the Phocians.²⁴

²² Thuc. 2.9.2-3; Diod. 12.42.4 named the Locrians among the Spartan allies during the Peloponnesian War, contributing valuable cavalry to the cause. Thuc. 4.96.8 the Locrian cavalry assisted the Boeotians in routing the Athenians at Delium. Thuc. 5.64.4 the Locrians and Boeotians were called to the aid of the Spartans at Mantinea.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3. Bruce 1960, 82 claimed the Locrian taxation of land was not important to the historical discussion, only the response of Thebes was. Buckler 2008, 53-54 was right in pointing out that this fine did not necessarily have to be monetary.

²⁴ *Hell. Oxy.* F18.2. Perlman 1964, 70-71 viewed the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as the ultimate source for Diodorus concerning these events. Lendon 1989, 313 preferred the version of events told by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* as did Szemler 1996, 98 and Cook 1981, 237-239.

...ἀνέπεισαν ἄνδρας τινὰς Φωκέων ἐμβαλεῖν εἰς τὴν Λοκρῶν τῶν Ἑσπερίων καλουμένων.

The identification of the western Locrians is unlikely given a variety of concerns, one of which is the substantial documentary evidence linking the Boeotians with the eastern Locrians which preceded this incident for nearly a century.²⁵ This examination supports the opinion of Xenophon that it was the eastern Locrians who started the conflict and subsequently called for Boeotian aid.²⁶ With the two claimants on the land identified, its location, which is important in assessing Boeotian actions, can be assessed.

As to where on the border of eastern Locris and Phocis the initial dispute took place, a number of sites have been put forward which attempt to follow the ancient evidence. The contested region was somewhere in the vicinity of Mt Parnassus which helps to limit the search.²⁷

ἔστι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν τουτοῖς ἀμφισβητήσιμος χώρα περὶ τὸν Παρνασσόν, περὶ ἧς καὶ πρότερόν ποτε πεπολεμήκασιν...

The most probable is the area between Opus (Locris) and Hyampolis and Abae (Phocis) which, as has been pointed out by modern visitors, lacks clear natural boundaries, making it a prime candidate for a conflicted border.²⁸ It was this lack of a clear natural boundary which influenced the subsequent events surrounding the initial levying of a

²⁵ Pascual 2013, 483 provided a convincing list of reasons why the Hesperian Locrians would actually be more inclined to ask the Spartans for aid, with the emphatic point that the Spartans had given them control of Naupactus only five years previously. Diod. 14.34.2-3. Naupactus had formerly been inhabited by Messenians. Paus. 4.26.2. As Buckler 2008, 50 demonstrated, the geographic concerns eliminate western Locris as a potential site.

²⁶ The most recent defense of this assertion can be found in Pascual 2013, 484-485. Buck 1994, 33. Hamilton 1979, 194 avoided attempting to identify these Locrians. McInerney 1999, 195 saw the plausibility in both scenarios but leaned toward Xenophon. As Buckler 2008, 49-50; 54 has demonstrated, Xenophon would likely have first-hand knowledge of the area and his information would come from the local Phocians, making his account more readily acceptable particularly in terms of the system of alliances. Szemler 1991, 121 advocated for the Ozolian Locrians.

²⁷ *Hell. Oxy.* F18.3.

²⁸ Buckler 2003, 76 = Buckler 2008, 51; McInerney 1999, 195. Kase & Szemler 1991, 120 and Szemler 1996, 99 suggested the Vinianni Valley on the assumption that it was the Ozolian Locrians who initiated the dispute.

tax by the Locrians because the ambiguity could be utilized by both sides. The fluidity of this border made it equally easy for the Phocians to raid across, and this is precisely what happened as the Phocian retaliation came in the form of invading (ἐμβάλλω) Locris itself and not just the disputed territory.²⁹ This Phocian retribution would have certainly caught the attention of the Boeotian League because it infringed on the regional power of their ally and threatened their own control of central Greece.

While the results of the initial action were certainly cause for Boeotian interest, was this action rooted in Boeotian motives from the outset? The Locrians apparently acted in this case on the suggestion of the leaders of one of the Theban factions, namely Ismenias and Androcleides.³⁰ This faction at the time held the most influence at Thebes, which made them influential in the policy formation of the Boeotian League.³¹ While they were influential, it should be made clear that they were not decisive given the large number of factions within the Boeotian League as suggested above. There was supposedly a certain degree of trickery involved which does seem like an attempt to slander Ismenias and his compatriots, but the important element here is what influence the Thebans could have over the Locrians to motivate them to start a conflict.³² This examination has already proposed that it was the eastern Locrians which began the conflict and this means they were already allies of the Boeotian League.³³

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3-4. *Hell. Oxy.* F18.3.

³⁰ Hamilton 1979, 194 was adamant that the cause of the war lay with these two men. Fornis 2008, 86 suggested that this method was similar to how the Thebans started the Peloponnesian War, but if the two are really comparable then the action was about Boeotian interests in central Greece and not about starting a war with Athens or Sparta which supports the arguments of this examination.

³¹ Lendon 1989, 302 stated that this faction had been in power since 404 BC. Kagan 1961, 330.

³² Bruce 1960, 86 claimed that Ismenias did not need to resort to trickery and this might be an effort on the part of a pro-Spartan Theban as a source for this section of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Hamilton 1979, 194 thought that 'P' may have been using a Boeotian source. Perlman 1964, 72 saw Xenophon as influenced by Spartan propaganda in laying the cause of the war on Thebes. Lendon 1989, 312 described the necessity of the ruse to convince Boeotians who were not sure about war with Sparta.

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.4.

οἱ οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἀνδροκλείδαν ταχὺ ἔπεισαν τοὺς Θηβαίους βοηθεῖν τοῖς
 Λοκροῖς, ὡς οὐκ εἰς τὴν ἀμφισβητήσιμον, ἀλλ' εἰς τὴν ὁμολογουμένην φίλην τε
 καὶ σύμμαχον εἶναι Λοκρίδα ἐμβεβληκότων αὐτῶν.

It probably did not require much more than the assurances that Thebes and the Boeotian League would support Locris against any Phocian retaliation.³⁴ What is clear from the source material is that compared to the quadripartite Corinthian alliance which developed later in the war between the Boeotian League, Athens, Corinth, and Argos, there was no kind of consultation or scheming as to how to begin the war between the future allies suggested in the source material.³⁵ This could indicate that the Thebans and other Boeotians did not intend for the initial action to erupt into the panhellenic conflict it eventually did and that the effects of this conflict were never meant to spread beyond the regional level. Oddly, the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* stated it was the Phocians who were stimulated by the Thebans to invade Locrian land, but this is extremely unlikely given the historical circumstances surrounding the two states.³⁶ This could have been the result of some confusion because the Phocians were the first to *invade* their neighbor but it was the eastern Locrians who instigated the dispute which led to this invasion. In the end, the Locrians sent to the Thebans for help which was unsurprisingly granted given the Boeotian interest in supporting their major regional ally while also limiting Phocian power. In defending the idea that the Boeotian League was driven by regional concerns, we must examine the alternate motivations proposed in recent decades.

³⁴ Buckler 2008, 54.

³⁵ Buckler 2003, 76 claimed that informal consultations arrived at the solution of the Phocian-Locrian dispute but as stated above this is pure speculation.

³⁶ *Hell. Oxy.* F18.2. Buckler 2008, 52-53 convincingly refuted the idea that there would be pro-Theban Phocians in power in Phocis at this time and demonstrated the futility of any plan involving Phocians not in power within the Phocian cities. Buck 1994, 33. Cook 1981, 234 was in support of the idea that the first invasion was by the Phocians. Tuplin 1993, 63 did not dismiss a Phocian origin.

Motivations for War: The Mission of Timocrates

Most modern scholarship has been directed at the idea that the Corinthian War was caused by animosity toward Sparta and justifiable fear that Sparta may interfere in the affairs of Greek states.³⁷ Following this line of reasoning, for the Thebans, the ultimate goal of promoting the border dispute would be to bring Sparta into the war, but can alternative explanations be found?³⁸ While popular, this theory ignores the significant regional aspects of central Greek history, which is after all where the war began. It is certainly correct to say that the Thebans and other Boeotians would have felt obligated to help their allies their Locrians in their war against Phocis, but what tangible benefit would the Boeotian League gain from a war with Sparta? Some have pointed to the money given out by Timocrates to suggest that individual Thebans sought a profit from the war, but this explanation again leaves out the regional dynamic as to what the Boeotian League would want with a war between Phocis and Locris.³⁹ Then what role did Timocrates play in this regional dispute? According to the ancient sources, Timocrates gave Persian money to leading men in Thebes (Ismenias, Androcleides, and Galaxidorus) to begin a war against Sparta.⁴⁰

³⁷ Perlman 1964, 80. Buckler 2008, 48.

³⁸ Kagan 1961, 341 stated that Thebes needed this kind of start to the war because it needed allies in the fight against Sparta.

³⁹ Kagan, 1961, 339. Hamilton 1979, 183 proposed two missions of Timocrates in order to resolve the divergent accounts of Xenophon and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*. Hamilton 1979, 196 voiced surprise at why the Thebans waited until the last minute to ask for Athenian help. This could be because they never thought Sparta would actually invade while Agesilaus was away in Asia Minor. The panhellenic appeal of freedom against hegemony introduced by Fornis 2008, 86 was not particularly convincing.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1. Ismenias and Androcleides were named in all sources. *Hell. Oxy.* F17.1 added Antitheus to the faction but did not make mention of him receiving money. Paus. 3.9.8 added Amphithemis. Buckler 2003, 75 accepted the addition of Antitheus but not that of Amphithemis for reasons which are not supplied and acknowledged that gold was received before the outbreak of the war. The charge of bribery from Persia was repeated at Ismenias' trial in 382 BC. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.35. Lewis 1989, 233 noted how unusual it would be for Persian gold to be used in this way.

ὁ μέντοι Τιθραύστης, καταμαθεῖν δοκῶν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον καταφρονοῦντα τῶν βασιλέως πραγμάτων καὶ οὐδαμῆ διανοοῦμενον ἀπιέναι ἐκ τῆς Ἀσίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλπίδας ἔχοντα μεγάλας αἰρήσειν βασιλέα, ἀπορῶν τί χρῆτο τοῖς πράγμασι, πέμπει Τιμοκράτην τὸν Ῥόδιον εἰς Ἑλλάδα, δοῦς χρυσίον εἰς πενήκοντα τάλαντα ἀργυρίου, καὶ κελεύει πειρᾶσθαι πιστὰ τὰ μέγιστα λαμβάνοντα διδόναι τοῖς προεστηκόσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐφ' ὅτε πόλεμον ἐξοίσειν πρὸς Λακεδαιμονίους. ἐκεῖνος δ' ἐλθὼν δίδωσιν ἐν Θήβαις μὲν Ἄνδροκλείδα τε καὶ Ἴσμηνία καὶ Γαλαξιδώρω, ἐν Κορίνθῳ δὲ Τιμολάω τε καὶ Πολυάνθει, ἐν Ἄργει δὲ Κύλωνί τε καὶ τοῖς μετ' αὐτοῦ

The first two should be immediately recognizable as the leaders of the Theban faction opposed to and eventually exiled by Leontiades as discussed above. Though Xenophon believed the transfer of money to have taken place before the war, the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* was not so clear in the matter, instead suggesting that the envoy (not named as Timocrates) had made only the promise of money to fund the war.⁴¹

...οἰόμενοι δὲ ῥαδίως τοῦτο πρ[άξειν ὑπολα]μβάνοντες βασιλέα χρήματα παρέξε[ιν, καθ' ἃ ὁ π]αρά τοῦ βαρβάρου πεμφθεὶς ἐπηγγέλλετο...

The differences in the two accounts are obvious. The version of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* is significantly less personal and ensures future support of the state rather than individual gain. If this version is accepted, the Theban leaders may have thought the promise of money for a war against Sparta was a sort of safeguard against an actual Spartan military response, which given the fact that Agesilaus was in Asia Minor and internal politics at Sparta were divided may have seemed unlikely at the time.⁴² This is a much more reasonable chain of events which reinforces the point that this was a regional conflict not intended to spread to Greece as a whole. With the version of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* accepted, we must probe Xenophon's account to further verify the proposals given above.

⁴¹ *Hell. Oxy.* F18.1. Fornis 2008, 86 saw the promise of future money as a major incentive.

⁴² As Lendon 1989, 304-305 has proposed, there was an internal power struggle occurring in Sparta between the 'imperialists' led by Lysander and the 'anti-imperialists' represented by King Pausanias. Hamilton 1979, 198.

Xenophon's Bias

What might have caused Xenophon to claim that the Theban leaders had accepted money from Timocrates? As stated in the introduction, this examination does not generally believe that Xenophon as a historian was anti-Theban, but this may be a case where he held resentment for *specific* Thebans.⁴³ According to the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, the party of Ismenias and Androcleides had been in power for some amount of time before the events between Phocis and Locris transpired.⁴⁴

ἔδύναντο δὲ τότε μὲν καὶ μικρῶ πρότερον οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἰσμηνίαν καὶ τὸν Ἀνδροκλείδαν καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς τοῖς Θεβαίοις καὶ [παρὰ] τῇ βουλῇ τῶν Βοιωτῶν...

Given their prominent position in Thebes, the men would be obvious candidates for the *boeotarchia* as the two Theban representatives. The faction of Leontiades (or any other faction) could have occupied one or more of the other spots of the total four controlled by Thebes, but this may not have mattered because there is no evidence for the consultation among *boeotarchoi* when not in the field. In other words, the other *boeotarchoi* may have not been able to act quickly enough to stop the orders of Ismenias or Androcleides. Given the time period, this may have been the same group of *boeotarchoi* who stopped the sacrifices at Aulis and angered Agesilaus, whom Xenophon was with in Asia Minor soon after the event.⁴⁵ One of these men could have even accompanied the cavalry to Aulis as its commander, but this is speculative. Xenophon may then have been transmitting his bias against these specific men, not against Thebes as a whole, when he described them as taking money from the Persians

⁴³ Buck 1994, 34 claimed that Xenophon's bias extended to all Thebans, but likewise doubted the claim of bribery. The Athenians did not take money according to Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.2. Tuplin 1993, 61 suggested the desire for empire was all the motivation the Athenians needed.

⁴⁴ *Hell. Oxy.* F17.1.

⁴⁵ Hamilton 1991, 103 claimed the incident at Aulis was meant to provoke a hostile reaction from Sparta.

thus challenging their integrity and motivation. We can then look at the mission of Timocrates not as an act of bribery, but a promise of future funds in the event of a war with Sparta. With direct monetary gain eliminated from consideration, we should look to regional interests for an explanation as to why the Boeotians would start this conflict.

Did the Boeotian League Want a War with Sparta?

The critical point for the current examination is the Spartan response, which varies depending on the source. Xenophon and Pausanias agreed that the Spartans were eager for war, but Pausanias added the important note that the Athenians attempted to prevent Spartan involvement.⁴⁶ The Phocians called for Spartan aid, which might have been predicted, but the Boeotians must have been surprised at the force of the Spartan reaction to what was essentially a small regional dispute.⁴⁷ The image that we gain of Sparta from the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* differs significantly from that of Xenophon, where the Spartans first attempt diplomacy by sending envoys to dissuade the Thebans from invading Phocis.⁴⁸

[οἱ δὲ καίπερ] λέγειν αὐτοὺς νομίσαντες ἄπιστα [ὅμως πέμψαντες] οὐκ ἔϊων
τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς πόλεμον ἐκ[φέρειν πρὸς τοὺς] Φωκέας...

These envoys were then turned back by the Thebans, giving the Spartans no choice but to attack once the Boeotian army moved into Phocis. According to Mackil, the Boeotians then, ‘had what they wanted.’⁴⁹ But was this really the case? The Thebans

⁴⁶ Buckler 2008, 56 rejected the mission of the Athenian ambassadors.

⁴⁷ Hamilton 1979, 194 preferred the account of the Oxyrhynchus Historian where the Phocians asked for Spartan aid before the Boeotian invasion. *Hell. Oxy.* F18.4. Hamilton 1979, 197 noted the important fact that technically the Boeotian League was still a Spartan ally, which may have allowed the Thebans to believe that they could intervene in Phocis as a defender of their Locrian allies without Spartan intervention.

⁴⁸ *Hell. Oxy.* F18.4. Buckler 2003, 77 did not make a judgment on whether this embassy actually occurred. Cook 1988, 85 saw this as the real starting point for the Corinthian War.

⁴⁹ Mackil 2013, 60. Clearly not all Thebans wanted a war either, as Cook 1988, 81 has pointed out.

and Locrians had everything to gain from a regional war over territory with Phocis.⁵⁰

With many of the Thessalian cities involved in their own war against Lycophron of Pherae, the timing was perfect for these two allies to expand their influence in central Greece and continue to check the power of the Phocians. If this was their primary goal, and by all indications it was, Sparta was the last state the Boeotian League would want involved in order to achieve its regional objective.

The fact that the Spartans actually invested significant forces and opened a war against their recent Boeotian allies may have surprised the Thebans which would then explain why they sent envoys to Athens for an alliance only *after* the Spartan army was already on the march from the Peloponnese and Lysander was *already* in Phocis.⁵¹ That Xenophon stated that the Spartans were eager for war must have also come as a surprise to the Thebans but once the Spartans arrived in Phocis the Boeotians were forced to act to defend their interests in central Greece as well as their homeland.⁵² The military details and impact of Lysander's subsequent journey to Phocis which resulted in the battle at Haliartus will be dealt with in a following chapter. It is worth noting that if not united politically, the Hypocnemidian and Epicnemidian Locrians were at least united in working with the Boeotian League against the Phocians and their Spartan allies, because Ismenias and his army billeted in the Epicnemidian town of Naryx during his later campaign.⁵³

⁵⁰ Cook 1981, 248-250 mentioned the possibility of gain if Sparta did not actually open hostilities, though given the non-expansionist tendencies of the Boeotian League outside Boeotia, the 'capture of some Phocian towns' would have not resulted in permanent occupation as Cook suggested.

⁵¹ Buckler 2008, 58 viewed, correctly, the speech of the Theban envoys itself as a fabrication of Xenophon meant to absolve the Athenians of blame for participating in the war.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5 listed a number of offenses the Thebans had committed against the Spartans, the most recent of which were the refusal to join in the campaign to Asia and the insult during the sacrifice at Aulis.

⁵³ Diod. 14.82.8.

This continuing alliance was reinforced by the military support given to the Boeotians during Agesilaus' march back from Asia.⁵⁶

At the close of the Corinthian War and the introduction of the King's Peace, the Locrian federal state seems to have escaped the dismantlement imposed on the Boeotian League. The reasons for this seem fairly obvious. The eastern Locrians did not present a threat to Spartan interests in Greece as a whole, and there was no need to remove Opus from leadership of the Locrian League. This speaks to the idea that the King's Peace was used selectively by the Spartans to promote their own political agenda rather than on any ideological grounds. Much like the rest of central Greece, the historical record is quiet regarding the situation in Locris from the King's Peace to the 370s.

Post-379 BC

During the revival of the Boeotian League, the Locrians continued to side with the Boeotians despite the balance of power being stacked heavily against them with a still fragmentary Boeotian League at their side. The Spartan forces which Pelopidas defeated at Tegyra in 375 BC had been off fighting in Locris prior to their chance encounter with the Boeotians.⁵⁷

ὡς δὲ ἤκουσε τοῖς φρουροῖς εἰς τὴν Λοκρίδα γεγενῆσθαι στρατείαν [p. 378]
ἐλπίσας ἔρημον αἰρήσειν τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν ἐστράτευσεν, ἔχων μεθ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν
ιερόν λόχον καὶ τῶν ἰππέων οὐ πολλούς...

The reason for this fighting is unknown, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Spartans were attempting to prevent aid coming to the Thebans while at the same time

⁵⁶ Plut. *Mor.* 212A named both east and west Locrians suffering a defeat at the hands of Agesilaus. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17; 4.3.15 indicated that both eastern and western Locrians were present at both Nemea and Coroneia.

⁵⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 16.2. Buckler 1971, 358 and Gray 1980, 309 argued for a Boeotian invasion of Phocis in 375 but the retreat to their own territory refers to a withdrawal from the region of Orchomenus. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

expanding the influence of their Phocian allies. The pre-Leuctra alignment may be indicative of the persistence of Boeotian influence in the region, especially at a time when Jason of Pherae was rapidly bringing large swathes of Thessaly under his control. The Phocians may have been encouraged at this time to enact some amount of revenge for the Corinthian War and take valuable land and resources from eastern Locris. The Phocians and Spartans were still in an alliance and the Phocians could have relied on Spartan support in the same way the Locrians had relied on Boeotian support to back their actions in the Corinthian War. The Spartan presence in Phocis may have then been to support Phocian aggression against the Locrians, who at that time were deprived of the ally who had saved them in the Corinthian War. The ties between Sparta and Phocis can be further seen in the fact that Cleombrotus' army was in Phocis prior to the invasion which led to Leuctra.⁵⁸

Λακεδαιμόνιοι μέντοι ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τούς τε ἄρμοστὰς καὶ τοὺς φρουροὺς ἀπήγαγον, Κλεόμβροτον δὲ ἔχοντα τὸ ἐν Φωκεῦσι στράτευμα καὶ ἐπερωτῶντα τὰ οἴκοι τέλη τί χρῆ ποιεῖν...

Depriving Thebes of its Locrian ally in regional affairs would challenge friendly control of the northern Euboean Gulf, which would be especially fruitful for the Phocians, who at that time controlled Daphnous. At Leuctra, the Phocians sent peltasts with Cleombrotus' army and attacked the Boeotian baggage train.⁵⁹ The Locrians were named as official allies of the Boeotians in the source material at least by 370 BC when Orchomenus was finally taken by pro-League forces.⁶⁰ The Locrians were also eager to

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.2.

⁵⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9. The Phocians may have been the allies that the Spartans had been waiting for at Coroneia prior to the battle. Diod. 15.52.1. The Spartans were gathering allies in Phocis as early as 375 BC. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.1.

⁶⁰ Diod. 15.57.1.

help the Boeotians in their Peloponnesian campaigns and sent a contingent at least on the first and last campaigns.⁶¹

Conclusions

Though the Locrians may have had quite a stable and centralized federal government, their limited population, and thus their limited military resources, prevented them from pursuing a more aggressive independent policy. Their longstanding rivalry with the neighboring Phocians still required action though. Faced with this dilemma, the eastern Locrians made the most reasonable choice possible from the fifth century onward, and aligned themselves with the only other stable and powerful state in the region, the Boeotian League.⁶² This relationship was also beneficial to the Boeotians, who were able to use border disputes between Locris and Phocis to secure their own position in central Greece, and this was the desired result of the events of the beginning of the Corinthian War. The start of the Corinthian War was intended as a regional power maneuver, not as the start of a war with Sparta. The relative reliance on the Boeotian League for protection is indicated by the fact that there are only two episodes of large scale, programmatic fortification in eastern Locris, and neither of these programs fall within the Classical Period, when the Boeotian League was the most powerful state in central Greece.⁶³ In central Greek history then, we should view eastern Locris as an example of long-term federalism on a smaller scale which remained consistently allied with the Boeotian League for the majority of the Classical Period due to shared political interests in central Greece.

⁶¹ Diod. 15.62.4; 15.85.2. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23.

⁶² As Pascual 2013, 471-472 demonstrated, this relationship was asymmetrical, but this should be obvious to even the casual observer.

⁶³ Fossey 1990, 140-141 indicated that these construction periods occurred in the sixth and later fourth centuries BC. The latter is particularly enlightening given that this is precisely the period in which Boeotian power was strained and on the decline due to the Third Sacred War and Philip II's influence.

Ilg: Conclusions

As demonstrated by the above examination, the political systems of central Greece employed moderate to narrow oligarchy and through the distribution of power within these systems achieved varying levels of consolidation over their respective areas. The stability of the Boeotian League, which was established before the Corinthian War, broken by the King's Peace, and re-established by Thebes after the recapture of the Cadmeia was assessed through its two primary political institutions, the *boeotarchia* and the Boeotian Council. In Phocis, *stasis* was commonplace and was only resolved externally by the leadership of the Spartans and internally by the office of *strategos autokrator*. Thessaly achieved unification and stability under the *tageia* of Jason of Pherae, while outside of his lifetime it was characterized by aristocratic rivalry within and between major cities. The confederation of the eastern Locrians remained unified throughout the period covered by this examination and was consistently allied with the Boeotian League though limited by a small population. The main effect of alliance with the Locrians was to hinder Phocian power and resources along its border with Locris and action to achieve these goals resulted unexpectedly in the nearly panhellenic conflict of the Corinthian War. With these themes in mind we can begin to discuss how the arguments displayed in this examination shift the traditional narrative regarding the political history of central Greece in the fourth century BC.

The Influence of Pelopidas and Epaminondas

To begin with specifically Boeotian history, the above discussion has provided significant evidence to suggest that, contrary to Buckler and others, the history of the Boeotian League in central Greece is not analogous to the history of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. As displayed above, the evidence put forth in this examination points to

the conclusion that the two iterations of the Boeotian League actually had more commonalities than differences and the differences which did exist were not implemented by the two most famous generals of Thebes. This evidence includes consistent trends in Boeotian political development, which can be seen in both the *boeotarchia* and the Boeotian Council. In the *boeotarchia*, Thebes contributed four *boeotarchoi* to the Boeotian League at the time of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* and this same traditional number was used after the liberation of the Cadmeia when *boeotarchoi* were elected for the first time since 386 BC. Particularly significant to assessing the role of Pelopidas and Epaminondas, the powers and actions of the *boeotarchoi* in the two iterations concerned here also support a model of consistency. In both versions of the Boeotian League, the *boeotarchoi* were not the ultimate authorities on policy but instead served a probouletic function and presented items for approval to the Boeotian Council. If anything, there are indications of a lessening of powers rather than an expansion attributed to Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Contributing to the limitation of the power of the *boeotarchoi*, the trials of the *boeotarchoi* demonstrated that they were ultimately answerable to the Boeotian Council. Though in the field they enjoyed supreme military command, this examination has shown that the *boeotarchoi* were far from the omnipotent directors of policy. In addition to domestic institutions, the role of Pelopidas and Epaminondas in the development of federal structures in other central Greek states has been greatly exaggerated. A prominent example of this was the formation of the Thessalian League in the 360s BC. The creation of this federation has generally been attributed to Boeotian influence through Pelopidas, but as the above examination has demonstrated, there is no convincing evidence for this attribution. What then has caused so much historical development to be credited to these two men

without, and in times in spite of, significant evidence? There are two related trends at work. The first is an unfortunate reliance on Plutarch for much of Boeotian history in this period without an evaluation or acceptance of his motives as a biographer. The second issue is the still pervasive tendency among Greek historians to attribute change to ‘great men’ in history, but the government of the Boeotian League as described above restricts the power of an individual (even a *boeotarch*) in the formation of political structures and policy in contrast to the other states of central Greece. This examination then suggests that while the evidence indicates that in the other central Greek states we can think of individuals shaping policy in their respective states, this approach has been wrongly applied to Boeotian history in the fourth century. Pelopidas and Epaminondas undoubtedly excelled in the capacity of their military skill as their victories prove, but their talents in this area cannot justify crediting political development in Boeotia to these two men. By casting off the Athenocentric model of political development, we reinforce the idea that Athens was in fact the outlier (and certainly not the ideal model) rather than the norm in the formation of Greek political institutions. In Boeotia and throughout central Greece, we should look to regional motivations as drivers of state formation. This forces us to step away from the view of an Athenian observer and instead become more understanding of the process, to in a sense become more Boeotian.

Tradition Moderated by Circumstance

If Pelopidas and Epaminondas were not central influences on the re-establishment of the institutions of the Boeotian League, then what was the primary influence on the development of government after 379 BC? The evidence outlined in the above examination indicates that a mixture of Boeotian political tradition and

practical concerns dominated the re-establishment of a federal government in Boeotia after the liberation of the Cadmeia. These traditions and concerns can once again be seen in the *boeotarchia* and the Boeotian Council. In the *boeotarchia*, practical concerns can be seen in two aspects, the expansion of the college of *boeotarchoi* to seven members by the battle of Leuctra, and the removal of civic designations for the selection of *boeotarchoi*. The expansion in numbers was caused by the inclusion of more and more territory into the Boeotian League over the course of the 370s which required an increase in military command and leadership. Beginning initially with the traditional number of four *boeotarchoi* for Thebes, this gradual expansion of territory also influenced the most altered and most incorrectly evaluated institution of the Boeotian League after 379 BC, the Boeotian Council. As stated above, the Boeotian League replaced the representative councils with a single direct body after 379 BC. Was this change due to an ideological shift brought on by the liberators of the Cadmeia from oligarchy to democracy? The majority of scholarly opinion to this point has claimed that this is the case, but the evidence above points to a much stronger conclusion. The institutional shift after 379 BC was not from oligarchy to democracy, but a return from the *dynasteia* under Leontiades to the traditional moderate oligarchy of the pre-King's Peace Boeotian League. This opposition between *dynasteia* and moderate oligarchy was explained by the factional politics inherent in Boeotian oligarchy. Leontiades, who was in a wealthy but unpopular faction in 382 BC, sought to narrow the government to the point of *dynasteia* which allowed him to stifle his opponents and wield a large amount of power. The liberators who returned to Thebes in 379 BC sought a return to the old oligarchy which limited the power of an individual in office, and the system employed by the restored Boeotian League, the open council,

was a product of Thebes' position within Boeotia at the time. The rebuilding of the Boeotian League was a return to a traditional form of government. The liberators of the Cadmeia were not revolutionaries, they were traditionalists who sought a reinstatement of the government of which they had been forcibly deprived. The practicality of the direct assembly was that it allowed for rapid integration of cities into the Boeotian League and ensured political participation for refugees from other cities (which we know came from at least Thespieae) and those living in the *chora* surrounding anti-League controlled Boeotian cities. This system also formalized Theban influence within the Boeotian League as the major population center of the region. This formalization occurred because Thebes was the only city to make up the fledgling Boeotian League after 379 BC until cities like Thespieae, Tanagra, and Plataea were brought into the federal fold. This understanding of Boeotian political history greatly changes the way we think about Boeotian political development in the first half of the fourth century. The government of the Boeotian League after 379 BC can no longer be considered a product of Athenian influence, but is distinctly Boeotian. It shifts the approach of history in central Greece from the Athenocentric model which pervades the field of ancient history to one which examines political structures as products of a distinct regional tradition. This examination asserts that Boeotian political organization and development in the fourth century was deeply rooted in its own unique tradition which should be examined in its own regional and historical context.

Structural Advantages and Disadvantages in Central Greece

Did the political organization and development of the Boeotian League provide it with a significant advantage in maintaining power in central Greece? This examination has shown that it did, because states like Phocis and Thessaly consistently

failed to maintain political consolidation and were thus incapable of projecting their power throughout central Greece. Exploring the reasons *why* this instability existed from a political perspective has given us new insight into the internal structures of these states as well as the challenges to or support for Boeotian power in central Greece.

When compared to these other states, the limitation of individual power in the Boeotian political structure is significant in the maintenance of its stability and its power. In fact, the *dynasteia* which was rejected in Boeotia was a key factor in the inability of Phocis and Thessaly to maintain extended influence in central Greece. Phocis in particular was wracked by *stasis* rooted in competition between the ruling *dynastai* of the Phocian cities for the majority of the first half of the fourth century. The issue of *stasis* in Phocis was demonstrated by the two events which resulted in its resolution, one external and one internal. During the Corinthian War the leadership of the Spartans temporarily bound the Phocians together, but once Spartan aid was removed, the Phocian state once again dissolved into *stasis* until the rise of the generals of the Sacred War. The views expressed above indicate that Phocis was not a pawn in a grand game between Sparta and the Boeotian League, but an important state with its own motivation and influence in central Greece which challenged Boeotian power.

In both Phocis and Thessaly one of the major obstacles to sustained consolidation and increased influence in central Greece was the concentration of power in a single individual. While some individuals brought their states to new heights, like Jason of Pherae, in central Greece this greatness was extremely short-lived. This volatility was due to the same power being vested in far less exceptional, and in some cases not even competent, individuals. The wide disparity caused by personal ability or inability added an element of instability to these states which was not present in

Boeotia due its limitation of individual power. In Phocis, this came in the form of the *strategos autokrator* which, when compared to the *boeotarchia*, encompassed a much wider range of powers including independence in diplomacy, the ability to access precious metals for coinage, and the ability to hire mercenaries. This shifted power from the collective state to the individual which meant that power could be misused, and this is precisely what happened in Phocis. Over time, particularly from Onomarchus' election as *strategos autokrator*, it was not uncommon for property to be seized and citizens to be killed or exiled which increasingly destabilized the Phocian state and as a result diminished Phocian influence in central Greece. In Boeotia, such actions were the outlier rather than the rule which demonstrates both the exceptional nature of the Boeotian state and the long-term political stability it enjoyed.

This same pattern of power accumulation and disruption can be seen in Thessaly, where the aristocratic tradition persevered into the political environment of the fourth century BC. Like in Phocis, the *dynastai* constantly battled for control of land and resources and struggled to expand their own influence in the region. These *dynastai* had nearly complete control over the affairs of their respective cities, and used their personal connections with leaders in other states as well as their own personal wealth to secure their position. Thessaly finally achieved unification and consolidation under Jason of Pherae when he assumed the office of *tagos* through the common consent of the cities of Thessaly. The *tageia* of Jason of Pherae was particularly successful in that he was able to bind the cities of Thessaly together and effectively assert Thessalian power and influence in central Greece. Jason's reign as *tagos* and the benefits it provided to Thessaly proved vulnerable because power was concentrated solely in Jason's own person and thus Thessalian influence and security was rooted in

his own admittedly extraordinary abilities. However, after Jason's death this consolidation collapsed because his successors failed to gain the common consent which was essential to Thessalian power in central Greece. This lack of common consent resulted in the cities of Thessaly rebelling from the rule of Alexander of Pherae and forming the Thessalian League late in the 360s BC against Alexander of Pherae, with no instruction from Pelopidas.

This examination has advocated for a new approach to central Greek political history by focusing on regional traditions and concerns which serve as a backdrop to political development in the first half of the fourth century BC. This approach has thus far yielded a new understanding of central Greek states and their ability to project their influence across the region. By effectively localizing history we can see that the Boeotian and Locrian federal states were influenced more by tradition than has been credited and that in Boeotia the limitation of individual power stabilized the state and, most importantly for the shift in narrative proposed here, also limited the influence of Pelopidas and Epaminondas who up until this point were considered to be architects of a new Boeotian state. In contrast to Boeotia and Locris, political instability in central Greece stemmed from oligarchic competition between groups of *dynastai* and was only resolved through the concentration of power within a single individual or very small group. This meant that the success of the group hinged on the abilities of these individuals to an extent not seen in Boeotia and Locris. The removal of this leadership, often through the death of a general or *tagos*, renewed instability almost immediately. Despite this, throughout the fourth century both Phocis and Thessaly went through periods where unification was threatened and spurred the Boeotian League to action. The Boeotians then, operating from a strong position (with the obvious exception of

386-379 BC) sought to utilize their own stability to push their influence militarily in Phocis and Thessaly to ensure that no such unification occurred and their own security remained intact.

PART III: MILITARY INFLUENCE AND INTERVENTION

IIIa: Introduction

Now that the political systems of central Greece have been discussed and potential instabilities identified, we can question how the Boeotian League capitalized on this instability through intervention in order to maintain its position as the main power in central Greece. This intervention came in the form of military force, which could only reach its potential while the Boeotian League was unified. While the above examination focused on internal structure and developments which allowed Boeotia to retain a stable supremacy in central Greece for the majority of the first half of the fourth century, the following will focus on the external projection of force between the Boeotian League and other states of central Greece. The absence of Boeotian military intervention led to the build-up of power in Thessaly in the 370s, and this intervention resumed after the reconsolidation of the Boeotian League, renewing instability after the death of Jason. As discussed above, the Locrians were allied with the Boeotian League throughout the first half of the fourth century, and so military intervention in Locris was not required to the same extent as in Phocis and Thessaly. As a result of this, benefits to the Locrians will be indicated when appropriate, but this portion of the examination will focus on military interaction between Thebes, the Boeotian League, Phocis, and Thessaly.

The military strength of the Boeotian League, and thus its ability to project its influence in other central Greek states, hinged on the extent of membership within the Boeotian League. To establish an early benchmark for our understanding of military capability, membership of the Boeotian League at the outset of the Corinthian War was widespread, and the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* provided an insight into both the

membership of the League and its military capabilities. At this point in time the Boeotian League was made up of eleven districts formed by a total of seventeen *poleis* which included the largest cities of Boeotia in Thebes, Orchomenus, Thespieae, and Theban-controlled Plataea.¹ Most important to the discussion of the military capabilities of the Corinthian War-era Boeotian League, each district was required to provide 1000 hoplites and 100 cavalry for the federal army.² This resulted in a standard muster (but not the maximum levy of Boeotians) of 11,000 hoplites and 1100 cavalrymen.

The zenith of Boeotian military power before the King's Peace was reached in the early stages of the Corinthian War. Victory in the Peloponnesian War had solidified the position of Thebes as the military leader of Boeotia and despite the exile of anti-League Plataeans in the course of the war, Boeotia still had a significant population to draw on for military service.³ With both Phocis and Thessaly hindered by factional strife, the Boeotian League occupied a position of strength within central Greece. From this position, the Boeotian League was able to use the opening stages of the Corinthian War to extend its power to the north, in particular to check the power of Phocis while maintaining a balance of power between the cities of Thessaly.

As outlined above, the political *stasis* in Phocis was temporarily resolved through the leadership of the Spartans during the Corinthian War, but we can now assess how this resolution allowed the Phocians to challenge the power of the Boeotian League militarily, and how the Boeotian League responded with military force to

¹ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3.

² *Hell. Oxy.* F19.4. Hansen 2011 laid out an extremely speculative method for acquiring a population number from an army roll but it is too unreliable to be used in the current examination.

³ Bintliff 2005, 8 indicated that this time period also marked the height of population numbers in ancient Boeotia.

ensure the limitation of Phocian power and the resumption of *stasis* within Phocis. The resolution of *stasis* through Spartan leadership allowed the Phocians to invade Boeotia, but this campaign ended in disaster for the Phocian cause at the battle of Haliartus. The Boeotian League then sought to capitalize on its advantage after Haliartus and began a campaign of limiting Phocian access to Spartan support. The Boeotians saw Heracleia Trachinia as a key in this limitation and its history and strategic value will be explored below. Once the fortification at Heracleia Trachinia was in friendly hands, the Boeotian League looked to invade Phocis itself. This limitation of Phocian power was the primary goal of the Boeotian phase of the Corinthian War (which we should always remember was rooted in a border dispute between Phocis and eastern Locris as demonstrated above), and focusing on the regional repercussions of these actions provides an insight into the maintenance and expression of Boeotian power in central Greece.

Thessaly was the greatest threat to Boeotian military power in central Greece, and from the Corinthian War to the eventual defeat of Alexander of Pherae the Boeotian League challenged any attempts at Thessalian unity whenever it had the resources to do so. The first example of this interference came in the Corinthian War, when the Boeotian League used the invitation of Medius of Larisa to take Pharsalus and provide additional allies to be used against Lycophron of Pherae in his attempt to unite Thessaly. This intervention must have served its purpose, because the next time Thessalian and Boeotian interests aligned was not until the 370s BC. The 370s marked a shift in power in central Greece, and for the first time in the fourth century Thessaly was in direct competition with Boeotia for control of central Greece. Jason, not yet in control of a united Thessaly, attempted to gain support in the northern Euboean city of

Histiaea. The city of Histiaea was eventually taken and brought into an alliance with Thebes and the Boeotian League, indicating the importance of this city and the Northern Euboean Gulf to both Thessaly and the Boeotian League. After this event, Jason began consolidating Thessaly into a unified state with his power based on his mercenary army. Eventually only Pharsalus remained to oppose him and, when all hopes of aid were rejected, joined in electing Jason to the *tageia*, the powers of which were discussed above. Jason then immediately set about expanding his influence as the supreme power in central Greece, the effects of which were illustrated by his intervention and arbitration after the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. This marked the only time in the period of this examination that the Boeotian League was definitively usurped as the major power of central Greece. This situation was not at all enduring, and due to the concentration of power in the individual *tagos* as described above, Jason's death renewed the instability between major cities which had defined Thessaly for decades. Alexander of Pherae in particular, who failed to gain the common consent of the Thessalians to take up the office of the *tageia*, represented an opportunity for the Boeotian League to reintroduce its influence to the region, and the medium through which this influence was channeled was direct military intervention. The missions of Pelopidas and other *boeotarchoi* to the region in the course of the 360s BC sought to limit the power of individual Thessalian cities, particularly Pherae, while risking a minimal amount of losses for the army of the Boeotian League. This examination operates on the assertion that the interests of the Boeotian League as a whole superseded those of Pelopidas in Thessaly. As demonstrated above, the *boeotarchoi* of the Boeotian League both before the King's Peace and after 379 BC were at the mercy of the Boeotian Council rather than omnipotent shapers of policy. In terms of Boeotian

goals in Thessaly, a clear policy was in place throughout the first half of the fourth century. The Boeotians sought to maintain rivalry and instability between major Thessalian cities while risking as few resources as possible. Thessaly in the 360s could very well be considered a major success story for the Boeotian League and this will be demonstrated in the following examination.

The consolidation of Thessaly under Jason begs the question of why the Boeotian League, after its successful intervention against Lycophron of Pherae in the 390s, did not act to prevent this unification. The answer is that while Jason was setting about the unification of Thessaly, the Boeotian League, under the direction of Thebes, was setting about its own unification project in order to gather the manpower and resources necessary to regain supremacy in central Greece. This reconsolidation of the Boeotian League, which as evaluated above formalized the power of Thebes within the federal system was made necessary by the King's Peace. The King's Peace was the pivotal event which destroyed Boeotian military power in central Greece, and Sparta as the self-proclaimed enforcer of the peace used the autonomy clause selectively to dismantle the federal structure of Boeotian and deprive Thebes of the wide power base it once enjoyed. After 379 BC Thebes sought to rebuild the Boeotian League through the recapture of cities garrisoned by Sparta or controlled by a narrow *dynasteia* opposed to membership in the Boeotian League. This examination will use the case of Orchomenus as an example of the methods and benefits of this process of reintegration. The strategic value of Orchomenus will be analyzed and the benefits of its membership to the Boeotian League assessed to illuminate the importance of a unified Boeotia to the power the Boeotian League was able to project into other central Greek states and maintain its position as the controlling power.

To briefly summarize, the following examination will argue that throughout the first half of the fourth century, the Boeotian League used military intervention to maintain its power through the removal of sources of support for Phocis and the maintenance of tension and instability between Thessalian cities, with the main goal of limiting the power of Pherae. Additionally, the military power of the Boeotian League, and thus its ability to accomplish these goals, hinged on the unification of Boeotia, which Thebes utilized military force to complete during the 370s BC, and this will be examined through the test case of Orchomenus.

IIIb: Phocis and the Corinthian War

The Battle of Haliartus: Regional Consequences

The strength and resolve of the Boeotian League's military capabilities was tested early in the Corinthian War (in what is often referred to as the Boeotian War) when the Spartans and their Phocian allies attempted to check the regional power of Boeotia by invading on two fronts. The situation bore some similarity to what the Athenians had attempted in the prelude to the battle at Delium nearly 30 years earlier.¹ The Spartans may have actually faced a greater challenge than the Athenians, in that unlike the Athenians they could not depend on widespread defection from the Theban-driven League cause among the other Boeotian cities (with the exception of Orchomenus) since the anti-League Plataeans had been sent into exile during the Peloponnesian War.²

With Agesilaus still absent from mainland Greece, the Spartans, as would become increasingly common throughout the fourth century, needed significant military support from their allies in order for their plan to succeed.³ The obvious candidate for providing additional troops was Phocis. First, the Phocians had already called for Spartan intervention against Locris, which was backed by the Boeotian League.⁴ As demonstrated above, the entry of the Boeotian League on the side of

¹ Though a dual-fronted invasion is what actually occurred, Westlake 1985, 125 usefully reminded that only Xenophon claimed the invasion was planned this way in advance.

² Pascual 2007, 40 described the Spartans as hoping to turn other Boeotian cities, but realistically only strongly anti-Theban Orchomenus could be counted on to act.

³ The scarcity of Spartiates compared to those under them also served as a lynchpin to the Theban argument for alliance against the Spartans in front of the Athenian assembly in the early stages of the Corinthian War. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.15. The army which Agesilaus took to Asia Minor, while only containing 30 Spartiates, also numbered 2000 emancipated helots and 6000 allies. He gathered even more forces after leaving Aulis. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.2; Plut. *Ages.* 6.2. Diod. 14.79.1 apparently did not account for the helots, giving the total as 6000 men.

⁴ Diod. 14.81.1. Hamilton 1979, 194 was probably correct in claiming the call for Spartan aid went out before the Boeotian invasion.

Locris was a foregone conclusion. The Boeotian League saw this regional conflict as a means to both demonstrate support for an ally and limit the power of Phocis in central Greece. The Phocians undoubtedly welcomed additional support in removing Boeotian influence at their borders. A major defeat of the Boeotian League would result in its breakup at the hands of the Spartans in an effort to curb Theban power through the deprivation of resources and manpower. This dismemberment of the federal structure coupled with increased factionalism and internal warfare between the major cities of Thessaly would in turn secure the Phocian position in central Greece through a reduction of Boeotian power which left Locris and its disputed territory vulnerable. On their own, the Phocians were too divided to inflict this sort of blow to the Boeotian League, which is why the call to the Spartans made perfect sense.

There is no reason to doubt Spartan confidence in ultimate victory. At this point they were by far the pre-eminent military power in Greece and Athens had not yet entered the war on the side of the Boeotian League.⁵ The war between the Phocians and Locrians, instigated by the Boeotians to reassert their power in the region, gave the Spartans an opportunity to break up the Boeotian League and thus remove Theban influence over central Greece. There was one major logistical issue for the Spartans however, and it was a lack of manpower to face the Boeotian army. Agesilaus was in Asia Minor with a sizeable force, while the entirety of the Boeotian army remained in Boeotia.⁶

⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5. For once Xenophon's Spartan viewpoint is of use as he conveyed the prevailing feeling at Sparta before the formal opening of hostilities.

⁶ The Boeotian League had established a pattern of keeping military forces within Boeotia since the end of the Peloponnesian War. They refused to participate in expeditions against Athens in 403 BC and against Elis in 401 BC. Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.30; 3.2.25. By comparison, Agesilaus had taken 6000 men with him when he sailed from Aulis to Ephesus, none of which were Boeotian. Diod. 14.79.1.

As much as the Spartans needed the numerical advantage of the Phocian troops, the Phocians needed the experienced leadership of the Spartiates. As demonstrated above, the Phocian cities were caught in a situation of *stasis* with no clear leadership or structure. To this end, Lysander was dispatched to Phocis in order to organize the Phocian army. In Plutarch's version of events, Lysander convinced the ephors to declare war against Boeotia due in part to his own grievances.⁷

ἤδη δὲ παντάπασι χαλεπὸς ὦν ὀργὴν διὰ τὴν μελαγχολίαν ἐπιτείνουσιν εἰς γῆρας, παρώξυνε τοὺς ἐφόρους καὶ συνέπεισε φῆναι φρουρὰν ἐπ' αὐτούς, καὶ λαβῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐξεστράτευσεν.

The centrality of Lysander is no surprise given Plutarch's role as a biographer, but a figure as powerful in Spartan politics as Lysander, even after falling out of favor with Agesilaus, undoubtedly still held a great deal of influence in the planning of the campaign.⁸ The main arguments for war included the lingering animosity resulting from the Theban harboring of Athenian exiles and the support given to Thrasybulus in his return to Attica.⁹ These grievances, combined with the plight of their Phocian allies who faced a formidable allied effort once the Boeotian League threw its military force behind the Locrians, provided the rationale for a war against the Boeotians.

As a commander essentially on par with Pausanias, who would lead the force marching from the Peloponnese, Lysander arrived in Phocis with a small group of Spartans to orchestrate an invasion from the north using primarily Phocian troops.¹⁰

⁷ Plut. *Lys.* 28.1.

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.7-9 described Lysander's fall from grace with Agesilaus in Asia Minor. Hamilton 1979, 195 accepted Plutarch's version that Lysander was the driving force behind Spartan entry into the war. For an analysis of the literary sources associated with the Haliartus campaign see Bommelaer 1981, 193-197.

⁹ Plut. *Lys.* 27.2-4. The Thebans passed laws declaring that the Athenian exiles were to be aided and provided Thrasybulus with weapons before he took the border fort of Phyle. This support of Thrasybulus would pay dividends for the Thebans in recruiting Athenian aid for the defense of Boeotia in the lead-up to the battle of Haliartus.

¹⁰ Diod. 14.81.4.

According to Pausanias, Lysander gathered the Phocian force in its entirety before moving into Boeotia.¹¹

...τότε δὲ Λύσανδρος μὲν ἐς τὴν Φωκίδα ἀφικόμενος καὶ ἀναλαβὼν πανδημῆι τοὺς Φωκέας οὐδένα ἔτι ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἕς τε Βοιωτίαν ἐληλύθει καὶ προσβολὰς ἐποιεῖτο ἐς τὸ Ἀλιαρτίων τεῖχος οὐκ ἐθελόντων ἀπὸ Θηβαίων ἀφίστασθαι.

This must mean that he mustered forces from all the Phocian cities, a feat no Phocian could accomplish due to the intense factionalism of the *dynastai*. Though more central Greek allies could have been absorbed into Lysander's army, only Xenophon specified that Lysander was charged by the ephors to gather the forces of non-Phocian cities.¹²

οὕτω δὲ γιγνωσκούσης τῆς πόλεως τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρὰν μὲν οἱ ἔφοροι ἔφαινον, Λύσανδρον δ' ἐξέπεμψαν εἰς Φωκέας καὶ ἐκέλευσαν αὐτοὺς τε τοὺς Φωκέας ἄγοντα παρεῖναι καὶ Οἰταίους καὶ Ἡρακλεώτας καὶ Μηλιέας καὶ Αἰνιᾶνας εἰς Ἀλίαρτον.

Since Xenophon confirmed that Lysander carried out all of his orders, there is no reason to assume the army was made up of only the Phocians and the small group of Spartans. This demonstrates the importance of Spartan leadership in the invasion, because the Phocians on their own could not have marshaled the support of other central Greek states when they could not even guarantee the participation of their own forces. This is not to say this army was somehow worse off because of its varied composition. The cavalry of the central Greek states was an essential element of Lysander's force, and of the intended larger army, whose Spartan cavalry was of a

¹¹ Paus. 3.5.3.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6. The inclusion of the Oetaeans, Heracleots, Malians, and Aenianians is particularly interesting because some of these groups opposed the foundation of the Spartan colony at Heracleia Trachinia as will be discussed later. Thuc. 5.51.2. Diod. 12.77.4. Herippidas must have reined in these tribes during his reckoning a few years earlier. Success in this endeavor would help explain why he was chosen to go to Histiaea in 378 BC.

comparatively poor quality.¹³ As for the total numbers involved in Lysander's army, none of the ancient sources provided any clear picture, but it has been estimated that he brought 600 Spartans with him (plus light troops which could make an even 1000) to which were added 3000 Phocians and approximately 2000 hoplites from other central Greek states.¹⁴

Haliartus may seem an unusual host to one of the most important military engagements of the Corinthian War, but given the invasion from Phocis in the north, it was one of the last major Boeotian cities (named in the federal structure of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*) before Lysander's army reached Theban territory. Despite the relative obscurity of Haliartus, there is a precedent for major military action in the area. In 447 BC Tolmides, an Athenian general, was killed and his force routed when he attempted to attack Boeotia.¹⁵ Given that Tolmides had besieged Chaeronea before moving on Haliartus, it can be proposed that he advanced on Boeotia from the north, much the same as Lysander in 395 BC.¹⁶ Haliartus was by no means a soft target for the invading army, as it boasted walls and towers despite a fairly small population.¹⁷

Advancing from Phocis, Lysander could be confident that he would receive additional aid from Orchomenus, which would also benefit from the dissolution of a Theban-led Boeotian League because Thebes was its traditional rival for power within Boeotia. If not unwilling, Orchomenus was certainly not an eager member of a federal

¹³ Buckler 2003, 78 referred to Lysander's force as 'a rather motley group of troops of indifferent quality.' This was either meant to lessen the Theban victory or apologize for Lysander's defeat, and did not give the central Greek allies enough credit. Compared to the Spartiates any Greek force would seem to be of lower training, but the Spartiates were the exception rather than the rule. The same words of Buckler could be used to describe the Peloponnesian cavalry of the early fourth century in comparison to that of the central Greeks.

¹⁴ Pascual 2007, 48-49.

¹⁵ Paus. 1.27.5.

¹⁶ Paus. 1.27.5.

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.23.

structure which saw power centered on Thebes and formalized the dominance of Theban interests once the Plataean districts were absorbed. Orchomenus, one of the largest cities of Boeotia, would be able to field a real military challenge to Theban power once the military strength the rest of the Boeotian League provided Thebes was stripped away, especially in the area of the Copaic basin. It should not be surprising then that Lysander invaded from Phocis, and he was guaranteed entry into Boeotia by the Orchomenians, who immediately capitulated, joined Lysander's army and advanced to Haliartus.¹⁸

...Λύσανδρος δὲ διὰ Φωκέων ἀπήντα στρατιώτας ἔχων πολλούς· καὶ τὴν μὲν Ὀρχομενίων πόλιν ἐκουσίως προσχωρήσασαν ἔλαβε...

An estimate of 1000 hoplites contributed by Orchomenus is not unreasonable which brought the size of Lysander's force to 7000.¹⁹ This number is significant because it made the forces fairly equal if the Thebans brought their remaining levy to meet Lysander. Plutarch inserted a stop at Lebadeia to assault the city.²⁰

...τὴν δὲ Λεβάδειαν ἐπελθὼν διεπόρθησεν.

His use of διαπορθέω and ἐπέρχομαι to describe the actions of Lysander's army at Lebadeia suggested the city was assaulted and suffered a high degree of damage.²¹

¹⁸ Plut. *Lys.* 28.2. This is against Hamilton 1979, 196 which argued that Lysander 'lured' Orchomenus away from the Boeotian League. Factionalism within the Boeotian League provided the motivation for the defection of Orchomenus. For an unconvincing argument for Orchomenian supremacy in the Boeotian League in 447 BC see Larsen 1960b, 9-18. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17. The Orchomenians also occupied the left wing of Agesilaus' formation, directly opposite the Thebans at the battle of Coroneia. Plut. *Ages.* 18.1.

¹⁹ Pascual 2007, 49. These numbers are based off the required levy of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, and assumed Orchomenus controlled only one of its districts while Hyettus controlled the other. If this was not the case, at least 2000 hoplites could have been contributed.

²⁰ Plut. *Lys.* 28.2.

²¹ Pascual 2007, 44 believed Lebadeia, along with Chaeroneia and Coroneia, were not taken because the troops of each city were still there defending them. While this is an interesting theory, it is pure speculation as the ancient sources are silent on the matter.

Fortunately for the Thebans, they were able to intercept correspondence between Lysander and Pausanias which revealed their plan to converge at Haliartus.²²

ἔπεμψε δὲ τῷ Πausανίᾳ γράμματα κελεύων εἰς Ἀλίαρτον ἐκ Πλαταιῶν
συνάπτειν, ὡς αὐτὸς ἄμ' ἡμέρᾳ πρὸς τοῖς τείχεσι τῶν Ἀλιαρτίων γενησόμενος.
ταῦτα τὰ γράμματα πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους ἀπηνέχθη, τοῦ κομίζοντος εἰς
κατασκόπους τινὰς ἐμπεσόντος.

This indicates that the Thebans were actively patrolling the surrounding area while their main army remained in Thebes and, like the interception of Agesilaus' sacrifice and the defense of Mycalessus, demonstrated how rapidly forces could be moved within the Boeotian plain. This would have allowed the Boeotian army to react to movements of the two armies while still protecting Thebes, and there is no doubt that the protection of Thebes was the ultimate goal. As the seat of the federal government of the Boeotian League the fall of Thebes would also signal the end of the federal Boeotian state. As the events of 382 BC would prove, the capture of Thebes was a severe blow to any pro-League movement. This might explain the otherwise drastic measure of leaving the Athenians to guard Thebes in their absence while the Boeotian forces successfully completed a night march which brought them to Haliartus shortly before Lysander and avoided his detection.²³

οἱ δὲ προσβεβηθηκότων αὐτοῖς Ἀθηναίων τὴν μὲν πόλιν ἐκεῖνοις
διεπίστευσαν, αὐτοὶ δὲ περὶ πρῶτον ὕπνον ἐξορμήσαντες ἔφθασαν ὀλίγῳ τὸν
Λύσανδρον ἐν Ἀλιάρτῳ γενόμενοι...

Thus far, of the cities of the Boeotian League, Orchomenus immediately defected while the Lebedeians refused, but the ancient accounts conflict regarding the willingness of the Haliartans to join the Orchomenians in capitulating to Lysander, which is important in assessing the cohesion of the Boeotian League at the turn of the fourth century. All

²² Plut. *Lys.* 28.2.

²³ Plut. *Lys.* 28.3.

sources agreed that the Haliartans did not surrender their city to Lysander which is obvious given that the battle actually occurred, but Xenophon claimed that the Haliartans were prevented from going over to the Spartan side by the Thebans who were within the city.²⁴

καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἔπειθεν αὐτοὺς ἀφίστασθαι καὶ αὐτονόμους γίνεσθαι: ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων τινὲς ὄντες ἐν τῷ τείχει διεκώλυον, προσέβαλε πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος.

One could argue for a pro-Spartan bias, but a better explanation lies in the factionalism of oligarchy in the Boeotian cities as described above. Lysander could have been in talks with a faction, much like Phoebidas would be with Leontiades in 382 BC, but the arrival of the Thebans either cut off communications or swayed the decision of the Haliartan council.²⁵ This distinction was further obscured by Xenophon's source material. Most of Xenophon's material would have consisted of oral reports from Spartans with Lysander which could not have been collected until his return from Asia Minor with Agesilaus.²⁶ Perhaps some anti-League Haliartans had wished to join the Spartan cause, but the fact that the Thebans were allowed into the city the previous night indicates that the majority of the Haliartans were willing to defend their city against Lysander's army. It is well known that the arrival of a military force could bolster an oligarchic faction into power. If the Haliartans as a whole wished to defect, they could have denied the Thebans entry and left them at the mercy of the imminently

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18. Mackil 2013, 60 incorrectly claimed that Lysander had convinced the Haliartans to surrender *before* the Thebans arrived. This series of events is untenable given the source material.

²⁵ Despite being critical of Xenophon's source material, Hamilton 1979, 196 readily accepted this version of events regardless of it being the only one to mention the preventative action of the Thebans. Buckler 2003, 81 hinted that the Haliartans may have been swayed if the Thebans were not already within the city. Westlake 1985, 119 noted with surprise the willingness of other authors to blindly side with Xenophon, yet despite this agreed at 127 that the Thebans prevented the Haliartans from defecting. This in turn runs counter to the defense of secondary source material at 133. Only Pascual 2007, 46 questioned Xenophon's account.

²⁶ This point was correctly emphasized by Westlake 1985 123-124. Pascual 2007, 47 speculated that Xenophon's main source was with Pausanias and not Lysander which would obscure the accounts even further because Pausanias only arrived after the battle.

arriving enemy army. If there was an ever an opportunity to shake off Theban influence, this was it for the Haliartans. They could have easily done nothing and denied the Thebans entry, but instead decided to fight against the invading force proving their loyalty and demonstrating cohesion with a powerful Thebes.²⁷

This willingness to stand with the Boeotian League might seem to provide an insight into the Theban relationship with non-medizing Boeotian cities at first, but the main source for this, Pausanias, gives a dubious account of Haliartus' actions in the Persian Wars. According to Pausanias, while the Haliartans sided with the Greeks in the Persian Wars and watched as the Persians burned their city, they harbored no animosity toward the medizing Thebans.²⁸

κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἐπιστρατείαν τοῦ Μήδου φρονήσασιν Ἄλιαρτίοις τὰ Ἑλλήνων
μοῖρα τῆς Ξέρξου στρατιᾶς γῆν τέ σφισιν ὁμοῦ καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐπεξῆλθε
καίουσα.

A major obstacle to this analysis is a believed misunderstanding by Pausanias of his sources. No other sources mentioned the Haliartans as resistant to the Persian invasion. If Pausanias gained this information from local tradition, there is a large room for error. Pausanias visited the city after its destruction by the Romans in the Third Macedonian War, and the locals could have invented a story to explain the ruinous state of the city's religious sites.²⁹ Additionally, archaeological evidence fails to support Pausanias' claim. Excavations at Haliartus have not demonstrated a destruction of the temple dated

²⁷ Paus. 3.5.3 did not mention any kind of influence from the Theban force in the decision of the Haliartans. Austin 1932, 208 described the Haliartans as acting out of loyalty to the Theban-led Boeotian League.

²⁸ Paus. 9.32.5; 10.35.2 stated that some temples within Haliartan territory remained half destroyed as a reminder of the Persian Wars.

²⁹ Strab. 9.2.30.

to 480 BC.³⁰ We should not view actions from the Persian Wars as an element in the Haliartan decision.

Blame for the defeat of Lysander's army rests squarely with Lysander himself, who hubristically elected not to wait for Pausanias, whose army would have created a numerical advantage the Boeotians would have been hard-pressed to overcome even with the eventual arrival of the Athenians.³¹ There is some debate as to whether Lysander arrived early to Haliartus or Pausanias arrived late, but the issue is irrelevant to what actually transpired in the battle because both scenarios result in Lysander choosing to fight the battle alone.³² The end result was still that Lysander chose to attack without waiting for Pausanias. If the assessed quotas of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* were accurate the numbers were fairly even between the opposing forces, with the Thebans sending possibly 4000 hoplites to join with the Haliartans who could provide at least 500.³³ An even larger Theban and Haliartan contribution can be expected because this was an emergency and not enough men remained even to guard Thebes which, as stated above, was left in the care of the Athenians. Even without knowing the Thebans were there, Lysander was still attempting to assault a fortified position when there was really no need to capture the city immediately. There is no doubt that the fighting took place very close to the walls of Haliartus.³⁴ Lysander led

³⁰ Austin 1932, 206.

³¹ Hamilton 1979, 206 tended to absolve Lysander from blame and instead suggested that Pausanias intentionally delayed his arrival in order to make a political point. This view is not surprising given the lengthy discussions of political factionalism at Sparta throughout the work.

³² Buck 1994, 38 decided it was Lysander who arrived ahead of schedule which caused the isolation of his army.

³³ Pascual 2007, 62 absolved Lysander from blame because he was unaware of the Thebans.

³⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.18-19. The victory trophy stood near the gates of Haliartus.

his men in a column up to the city and was killed with his *mantis* by the Thebans and Haliartans who advanced through the gate.³⁵

οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ πόλει Θηβαῖοι μετὰ τῶν Ἀλιαρτίων συντεταγμένοι τέως μὲν ἡσύχαζον, ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸν Λύσανδρον ἅμα τοῖς πρώτοις προσπελάζοντα τῷ τείχει κατεῖδον, ἐξαπίνης ἀνοίξαντες τὰς πύλας καὶ προσπεσόντες αὐτόν τε μετὰ τοῦ μάντεως κατέβαλον καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὀλίγους τινάς· οἱ γὰρ πλεῖστοι ταχέως ἀνέφυγον πρὸς τὴν φάλαγγα.

This action helps confirm the idea that Lysander was unaware of the Theban presence.

A small force such as that supplied by Haliartus would not have been expected to sally forth out from the fortifications as they did. They would have been expected to wait for the main Boeotian army, but unknown to Lysander that army was already there.

Plutarch specified, supposedly derived from a report of a Phocian eyewitness, that the men at the front of the column, including Lysander, were killed as they crossed a small stream known as the Hoplites.³⁶

ἐνταῦθα δὴ τῆς στρατιᾶς καταυλισαμένης λέγεται τινα τῶν Φωκέων ἐτέρῳ μὴ παρατυχόντι τὸν ἀγῶνα διηγούμενον, εἰπεῖν ὡς οἱ πολέμοι προσπέσειεν αὐτοῖς τοῦ Λυσάνδρου τὸν Ὀπλίτην ἤδη διαβεβηκότος. θαυμάσαντα δὲ Σπαρτιάτην ἄνδρα τοῦ Λυσάνδρου φίλον ἐρέσθαι τίνα λέγοι τὸν Ὀπλίτην: οὐ γὰρ εἰδέναι τοῦνομα: ‘καὶ μὴν ἐκεῖ γε,’ φάναι, ‘τοὺς πρώτους ἡμῶν οἱ πολέμοι κατέβαλον. τὸ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν πόλιν ῥεῖθρον Ὀπλίτην καλοῦσιν.’

The uneven ground presented here coupled with the surprise of the Boeotians emerging through the gate explains why the army of Lysander had trouble forming into a battle line in time to resist the Boeotian attack. Lysander was allegedly killed by a Haliartan named Neochorus who had a serpent emblazoned on his shield, which conveniently fulfilled the oracle of the Ismenian Apollo in Thebes.³⁷ This of course demonstrates a desire for a lesson on fate and hubris in Plutarch but the important element for this

³⁵ Plut. *Lys.* 28.5.

³⁶ Plut. *Lys.* 29.3-4.

³⁷ Plut. *Lys.* 29.6-7. A similar response is ascribed to the Delphic oracle. Plut. *Mor.* 408B.

examination is that Lysander was among the first to be killed. While the sources clearly stated that the Thebans possessed both infantry and cavalry outside the walls, there is no mention of cavalry in Lysander's army but these units must have been furnished by the wealthy aristocrats of central Greece who controlled the cities of Phocis.³⁸ While the Phocians, Orchomenians, and other central Greeks would have provided some cavalry as suggested above, it could be expected that the Boeotians would have a superiority both in numbers and in quality. The Phocians and other central Greeks almost immediately retreated, and a Boeotian superiority in cavalry may help explain why 1000 of Lysander's army were killed in the pursuit.³⁹ Despite the Boeotian victory, many Thebans were killed as a result of an overzealous pursuit of the fleeing army, which eventually achieved a defensible position on a height and began hurling stones and boulders down on their pursuers, resulting in the death of 200 Thebans.⁴⁰

ὥς δὲ ἄνω ἤδη ἦσαν διώκοντες καὶ δυσχωρία τε καὶ στενοπορία ὑπελάμβανεν αὐτούς, ὑποστρέψαντες οἱ ὀπλίται ἠκόντιζόν τε καὶ ἔβαλλον. ὥς δὲ ἔπεσον αὐτῶν δύο ἢ τρεῖς οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ ἐπὶ τοὺς λοιποὺς ἐπεκυλίνδουν πέτρους εἰς τὸ κάταντες καὶ πολλῇ προθυμίᾳ ἐνέκειντο, ἐτρέφθησαν οἱ Θηβαῖοι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατάντους καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσιν αὐτῶν πλείους ἢ διακόσιοι.

These Thebans who died were supposedly Spartan sympathizers who wished to prove their loyalty to the Boeotian cause and there is really no evidence to disprove this statement, but the loss of 200 men in military terms is still the loss of 200 men.⁴¹

Though all the fighting was done by the Boeotians (the Thebans and Haliartans) the Athenians were eager to insert themselves into the narrative of victory over the

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.19.

³⁹ Plut. *Lys.* 28.6. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21 downplayed the losses as almost equal to that of the Thebans. He could have been referring only to Spartiate losses, which would make his claim more accurate. Spartan losses would be heavy if Lysander surrounded himself with his countrymen at the head of the column which appears to have been the case.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.20. Plut. *Lys.* 28.6 numbered the Theban dead at 300.

⁴¹ Plut. *Lys.* 28.6. Westlake 1985, 128.

Spartans and Phocians, going so far as to portray themselves as the saviors of Boeotia.⁴² This tradition was popular even within the fourth century BC as Demosthenes twice claimed that the Athenians aided the Thebans at the battle of Haliartus.⁴³ Pausanias, following in the tradition of the Athenian orators, twice stated that an Athenian contingent was present inside Haliartus with the Thebans.⁴⁴ Some doubt is raised regarding Pausanias' accuracy due to his inclusion at this point of a claim to have seen the tomb of Lysander at Haliartus, which given the testimony of all other sources of the aftermath of the battle is nearly impossible as will be shown below.⁴⁵

The Athenians did eventually arrive at Haliartus, but not until Lysander had fallen and the battle with his forces was over. The timing of their arrival coincided with that of the second Spartan force under Pausanias.⁴⁶ The Phocians had abandoned the Spartan cause in the night, but the Spartans remained.⁴⁷ After the losses suffered during the battle, and no longer disillusioned with the invincibility of their Spartan leaders, the remaining Phocians and other central Greeks feared immediate reprisal from the Boeotian League and left to protect their homes from the almost certain invasion. The retreat of the Phocians left Pausanias' army with few skilled cavalrymen to array

⁴² Buck 1994, 38 claimed the troops of Coroneia, Acraiphnia, and Copae were all present at the battle but there is no evidence for this.

⁴³ Dem. *Orat.* 4.17; 18.96. The Athenian orator Lysias was nearly an eyewitness to the events at Haliartus and claimed he was called up for the cavalry but instead asked to serve in the infantry. Lys. 16.13.

⁴⁴ Paus. 3.5.3; 9.32.5.

⁴⁵ Buckler 2003, 82 asserted that this was not Lysander's tomb but instead a cenotaph. The most reasonable speculation of why Pausanias claimed to see Lysander's tomb is Austin 1932, 209 which suggested Pausanias was shown a tomb the locals told him belonged to Lysander.

⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17. Pausanias' army was made up of Spartiates and Peloponnesian allies with the exception of the Corinthians.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21. The only indication of the size of Pausanias' army is the 6000 provided by Diod. 14.81.1. Given Xenophon's testimony most of these soldiers would have been infantry.

against the Boeotians.⁴⁸ There was certainly a chance for a second battle between the Boeotians and Pausanias' army, but the proximity of the Athenians, commanded by the Boeotian-friendly Thrasybulus, swayed Pausanias into accepting a truce.⁴⁹

ἐνταῦθα οἱ τε Θηβαῖοι τὰ ἐναντία ἐτάσσοντο καὶ Θρασύβουλος ἀπέχειν οὐ πολὺ ἀπηγγέλλετο ἄγων τοὺς Ἀθηναίους: ἀνέμενε δὲ ἄρξαι Λακεδαιμονίους μάχης, ἄρξασι δὲ αὐτὸς ἤδη κατὰ νότου σφίσιν ἔμελλεν ἐπικείσεσθαι. ἔδεισεν οὖν ὁ Πausανίας διπλοῦ στρατιωτικοῦ πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν μεταξὺ ἀποληφθῆναι, καὶ οὕτω σπονδὰς τε πρὸς τοὺς Θηβαίους ἐποιήσατο καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ τῷ Ἀλιαρτίων τείχει πεσόντας ἀνείλετο.

The truce allowed for the removal of the Spartan dead, including the body of Lysander. The conditions of the truce stipulated that the Spartans had to leave Boeotia, making the above-mentioned tomb of Lysander at Haliartus impossible.⁵⁰ Instead, Lysander was buried as soon as the Peloponnesian army left Boeotia in the land of the Panopeans.⁵¹

What were the effects in central Greece of the Haliartus campaign? While many focus on the panhellenic repercussions, notably Lysander's death, this examination finds more importance in the regional consequences within central Greece. First, the victory at Haliartus proved the Boeotian League was both cohesive and effective militarily. The Haliartans, refusing to capitulate to Lysander, won a significant victory fighting alongside the Thebans. What the victory at Haliartus in no way proved was the effectiveness of the greater alliance (the Boeotian League, Athens, Argos, and Corinth)

⁴⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.23.

⁴⁹ Paus. 3.5.4-5. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22. Plut. *Lys.* 29.2. Xenophon claimed the Athenians formed a battle line with the Thebans, but this could be an attempt to save Spartan face by making the threat more readily apparent. Paus. 3.5.4 claimed the Athenians were not standing with the Thebans but were 'ἀπέχειν οὐ πολὺ.' Parker 2007, 15-17 argued that the opposite was the case during the retaking of the Cadmeia, where Xenophon omitted Athenian support.

⁵⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.24. Xenophon seemed to indicate here that the Thebans escorted the army out of Boeotia to ensure their exit.

⁵¹ Plut. *Lys.* 29.3. This lies on the ancient road between Chaeronea and Delphi which was at the border of Phocis and Boeotia.

in the field.⁵² The only combatants on the allied side were members of the Boeotian League. The Athenians, despite being ready for battle, never actually engaged the Spartan army. Though Orchomenus did defect and would remain independent for decades, no more departures from the Boeotian League occurred until the King's Peace which left Orchomenus isolated in Boeotia and unable to expand its influence. Phocis was undoubtedly the state most negatively affected by these events. Their venture at dealing the Boeotian League a decisive blow failed spectacularly. They were once again deprived of central leadership which destroyed their own military cohesion as they remained in a state of *stasis* politically. Add to this casualties from the effective pursuit by the Boeotians, and the Phocians were left in a weakened position militarily. The Boeotian League recognized this and would be quick to press its advantage in central Greece by removing further sources of support for the Phocians.

⁵² This is against Buckler 2003, 82 which saw Haliartus as the proving ground for the alliance. While the Athenians did demonstrate devotion to the cause by sending an army to Thebes, their absence at the actual battle left them with something to prove.

Heracleia Trachinia and the Phocian Campaign

After the crisis in Thessaly had been averted through military aid to Medius, with the added bonus of removing a Spartan garrison from a main route to Boeotia from the north which could potentially lend further aid to the Phocians, the Boeotians under Ismenias (with the Argive contingent in tow) sought to settle issues closer to the Boeotian border specifically issues affecting Locris and Phocis. After the liberation of Pharsalus, the allies left Medius and the other Thessalians in an uneasy standoff and prevented a new threat to Boeotia from developing. Now that the allied mission had been completed, the Boeotians, operating from a position of strength with allied forces still supporting their own, wanted to press their advantage in the region through military force.¹ The next target in the continued campaign was the strategic fortification at Heracleia Trachinia in Trachis.

The region of Trachis provided a land route into Boeotia from the north, and thus became critical to the security of Boeotia whenever a northern threat manifested itself.² The area was useful for Boeotian action against both Thessaly and Phocis, but because Thessaly had been neutralized the Phocian element was more influential at this time. The challenge of Thessalian unification was consistently present but in this case the threat of continued support for the Phocians just north of Epicnemidian Locris also made the region crucial to Boeotian security. Not quite in Thessaly proper, the region was primarily concerned politically with tribal rivalries well into the Classical Period. Much like the struggles between the *poleis* of Thessaly, this tribal rivalry made the area

¹ Buck 1994, 41 separated the two events into two different expeditions but they are obviously connected and part of a single Boeotian/Argive expedition.

² Horblower 2012, 120 claimed that the Boeotians had more insight into the value of Heracleia Trachinia than the Spartans. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that the city was a much more immediate strategic threat to Boeotia than to any other cities of Spartan interest.

extremely fertile for foreign intervention, including the promotion of Boeotian strategic interests. The perioecic nature of the region meant if Thessaly were not unified little attention would be paid to it by the major Thessalian powers in favor of expanding influence in Thessaly itself. Influence on the shores of the Maliac Gulf would bring the Boeotians as close to the border of Thessaly as possible and make future intervention in Thessaly, which would undoubtedly be necessary, much more convenient. It also provided a way to check Phocian movements from their northern border.³ A fortress in the region provided the opportunity to control a vital point of access to either southern or northern Greece, depending on which way one was looking including access to the Northern Euboean Gulf.

Heracleia Trachinia was founded as a Spartan colony during the Peloponnesian War. The people of Trachis, under pressure from the neighboring *ethnos* of the Oetaeans, used their ancient Dorian kinship with the Spartans to plead for aid, which resulted in the sending of colonists and the renaming of the city to Heracleia.⁴

ἄμα δὲ τούτοις πραττομένοις Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὴν Τραχῖνα καλουμένην ᾤκισαν καὶ μετωνόμασαν Ἡράκλειαν διὰ τοιαύτας τινὰς αἰτίας. Τραχίνιοι πρὸς Οἰταίους ὁμόρους ὄντας ἔτη πολλὰ διεπολέμουν καὶ τοὺς πλείους τῶν πολιτῶν ἀπέβαλον. ἐρήμου δ' οὔσης τῆς πόλεως ἤξιωσαν Λακεδαιμονίους ὄντας ἀποίκους ἐπιμεληθῆναι τῆς πόλεως. οἱ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν συγγένειαν καὶ διὰ τὸ τὸν Ἡρακλέα, πρόγονον ἑαυτῶν ὄντα, ἐγκαταρκήναι κατὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους χρόνους ἐν τῇ Τραχῖνι, ἔγνωσαν μεγάλην αὐτὴν ποιῆσαι πόλιν.

³ Kase & Szemler 1982, 353 identified this route as the route Xerxes took into Phocis from the north in the fifth century. For an alternative view see Larsen 1960a, 233.

⁴ Diod. 12.59.3-5. Thuc. 3.92.1-5 named the three Spartan founders as Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon. Alcidas was a Spartan navarch who was placed in command of the Spartan fleet prepared to go to Lesbos. There are many acts attributed to a Leon in the mid-Classical period. For a discussion of these see Poralla 1966, 83-84. Thuc. 3.16.3. He was also in command of 42 ships sent to Mytilene. Thuc. 3.26.1; 3.29-33. Diod. 12.55.6 gave the number of ships as 45. The failure of the Lesbian expedition led to a redirection of forces to Corcyra under Alcidas. Thuc. 3.69.2. This is the only attribution in historical literature to a Spartan named Damagon.

The initial number of colonists was determined as 10,000 by the sources, which made Heracleia a sizable settlement with a formidable defense force.⁵

διὸ καὶ Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν καὶ τῶν Πελοποννησίων τετρακισχίλιους οἰκῆτορας ἐκπεμψάντων, καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τοὺς βουλομένους μετέχειν τῆς ἀποικίας προσεδέξαντο: οὗτοι δ' ἦσαν οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν ἑξακισχίλιων. διὸ καὶ τὴν Τραχῖνα μυριάνδρον ποιήσαντες, καὶ τὴν χώραν κατακληρουχήσαντες, ὠνόμασαν τὴν πόλιν Ἡράκλειαν.

Though close to the much older city of Trachis, Heracleia was actually a new foundation by the colonists.⁶ The new settlement was located forty *stadia* from the pass at Thermopylae and twenty *stadia* from the sea which offered it an advantageous position in the area.⁷ In his description of the foundation, Thucydides outlined the advantages to a fortification in the region, in that a naval force could be stationed close to Euboea and soldiers could be rapidly transported to Thrace which would aid in the war against the Athenians.⁸

ἐπὶ τε γὰρ τῇ Εὐβοίᾳ ναυτικὸν παρασκευασθῆναι ἄν, ὥστ' ἐκ βραχέος τὴν διάβασιν γίνεσθαι, τῆς τε ἐπὶ Θράκης παρόδου χρησίμως ἔξειν. τό τε ξύμπαν ὄρμηντο τὸ χωρίον κτίζειν.

The Boeotians recognized the value for transport of troops, but to a much closer target than Thrace. If Boeotian triremes were able to call at Heracleia Trachinia not only would Boeotian control of the Northern Euboean Gulf be solidified, but the Boeotians would be able to rapidly move troops into the Pagasitic Gulf and threaten Pherae if the need arose which was easily foreseeable given the uneasy balance of power Ismenias had just left behind in Thessaly. This access could also be used to threaten the Phocian

⁵ Diod. 12.59.5 specified that 4000 colonists were Peloponnesian while 6000 were from other Greek states. Hansen & Neilsen 2004, 711 viewed this number as ideological rather than historical for reasons which were not given.

⁶ Strab. 9.4.13 described the new city as six *stadia* from Trachis. Paus. 10.22.1 demonstrated that Heracleia was a separate city by describing a nearby path which ran near the ruins of Trachis.

⁷ Thuc. 3.92.6 mentioned the construction of docks close to Thermopylae which were easily defensible.

⁸ Thuc. 3.92.4.

port of Daphnous on the Euboean Gulf and further prevent aid from reaching the Phocians.

Unfortunately for the colonists, the new foundation was plagued by problems from the outset. The arrival of the Peloponnesians and other Greeks did nothing to quell the warfare of the surrounding tribes, which Thucydides grouped together (perhaps too generally) as ‘the Thessalians’.⁹ While initially the city boasted an army large enough to send contingents away on other campaigns, successive military defeats at home halted this practice.¹⁰ Boeotian intervention at Heracleia Trachinia was by no means new to the Corinthian War. A defeat at the hands of the Aenianians, Dolopians, and Malians led the men of Heracleia to ask the Boeotian League for aid, which responded by saving the city through the intervention of 1000 hoplites.¹¹

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐκτὸς τόποις Αἰνιᾶνες καὶ Δόλοπες καὶ Μηλιεῖς συμφρονήσαντες δυνάμεσιν ἀξιολόγοις ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχῖνι. ἀντιταχθέντων δὲ τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν, καὶ μάχης γενομένης ἰσχυρᾶς, ἠττήθησαν οἱ τὴν Ἡράκλειαν κατοικοῦντες. πολλοὺς δ’ ἀποβαλόντες στρατιώτας, καὶ συμφυγόντες ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν, μετεπέμψαντο βοήθειαν παρὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν. ἀποστειλάντων δ’ αὐτοῖς τῶν Θηβαίων χιλίους ὀπλίτας ἐπιλέκτους, μετ’ αὐτῶν ἠμύνοντο τοὺς ἐπεστρατευκότας.

Though the Boeotians were acting at the behest of their Spartan allies rather than any declared strategic motive, this episode demonstrates the speed with which troops could be moved from Boeotia into the region. Even this measure did not keep the colonists safe for long, as a betrayal by the Achaeans led to a defeat at the hands of their old enemies the Oetaeans in which 700 men were killed along with the Spartan commander Labotas.¹²

⁹ Thuc. 3.93.2. At times the area could fall under the control of Thessalians as one of the many perioecic regions of Thessaly so this general grouping, while inaccurate, is not particularly unwarranted.

¹⁰ Thuc. 3.100.2 stated that 500 men from Heracleia took part in the expedition against Naupactus.

¹¹ Diod. 12.77.4. Thuc. 5.51.2 also mentioned this battle and included the name of the Spartan commander who was killed in the battle, Xenares.

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.18.

In addition to the external threats posed by the surrounding tribes, internal strife plagued the colony throughout its period under Spartan influence. From the very beginning, Spartan rule in Heracleia was extremely harsh and the Spartans were continually forced to send new commanders to rectify the situation.¹³ Prior to the betrayal by the Achaeans, there was obviously discord within the city as three Spartan commanders: Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydidas spent time in Heracleia to right what they felt was wrong.¹⁴

καὶ ὑπὸ τοὺς αὐτοὺς χρόνους τοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος Ῥαμφίας καὶ
 Αὐτοχαρίδας καὶ Ἐπικυδίδας Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης χωρία βοήθειαν
 ἤγον ἑνακοσίων ὀπλιτῶν, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχῖνι
 καθίσταντο ὅτι αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν.

The specific issue was not mentioned by Thucydides, but it must have been an issue within the city pertaining to the already harsh rule of the Spartan governors. After this, the Boeotians took control of the city and expelled the Spartan commander Agesippidas for his mistreatment of the city which angered their Spartan allies.¹⁵

τοῦ δ' ἐπιγιννομένου θέρους εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου τὴν Ἡράκλειαν, ὡς μετὰ τὴν
 μάχην κακῶς ἐφθείρετο, Βοιωτοὶ παρέλαβον, καὶ Ἀγησιππίδαν τὸν
 Λακεδαιμόνιον ὡς οὐ καλῶς ἄρχοντα ἐξέπεμψαν. δείσαντες δὲ παρέλαβον τὸ
 χωρίον μὴ Λακεδαιμονίων τὰ κατὰ Πελοπόννησον θορυβουμένων Ἀθηναῖοι
 λάβωσιν...

The Boeotian occupation of the city served their own military position admirably, as they now exercised some control over the main route from Boeotia to Thessaly. This occupation also illustrated the increasing rift between the Boeotian League and the

¹³ Thuc. 3.93.2 indicated this harsh rule depopulated the city by driving men away. This further exacerbated the military issues posed by continual defeats.

¹⁴ Thuc. 5.12.1. Ramphias was the father of the famous Spartan general Clearchus. Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.35. Thuc. 8.8.2. He was also one of the Spartan ambassadors sent to Athens in 431 BC. Thuc. 1.139.1.

¹⁵ Thuc. 5.52.1. The Boeotians attempted to defend this position by claiming they acted in the interests of the alliance by ensuring the city would not fall into the hands of the Athenians. Agesippidas' loss of the city does not seem to have been career-ending because he was chosen to lead 300 men to garrison Epidaurus. Thuc. 5.56.1. Hornblower 2012, 130 emphasized the anxiety the lack of control over Heracleia would cause the Boeotians.

Spartans as the Peloponnesian War continued, a rift which would eventually lead to the Spartan attack on Boeotia during the Corinthian War. The colony must have been transferred back to Spartan control at some point before the Corinthian War, because the next mention of Heracleia in the source material described it in Spartan hands.¹⁶ This, however, does not mean that the city passed directly from Boeotian to Spartan control.¹⁷ Control of the city could have been ceded to one of the local tribes until the Spartans sought to restore direct control before the Corinthian War. The catalyst for a new Spartan interest in direct control was the continuation of internal strife, and Herippidas was eventually sent to settle the discord in the city which resulted in the death of 500 citizens at the hands of the Spartan hoplites.¹⁸

ἐν Ἡρακλείᾳ δὲ τῇ περὶ Τραχίνα στάσεως γενομένης, Ἡριππίδαν ἐξέπεμψαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καταστήσοντα τὰ πράγματα. ὃς παραγενόμενος εἰς Ἡράκλειαν συνήγαγεν εἰς ἐκκλησίαν τὰ πλήθη, καὶ περιστήσας αὐτοῖς ὀπίτας συνέλαβε τοὺς αἰτίους καὶ πάντα ἀνεῖλεν, ὄντας περὶ πεντακοσίου.

The tumultuous history of the city has been well documented in this examination and it is perhaps in this instability that Ismenias saw the opportunity to further isolate Phocis from potential support.

Heracleia Trachinia remained under Spartan control until the arrival of Ismenias' army from Pharsalus. The city did not immediately capitulate, which cannot be surprising given the presence of the Spartan garrison. If word had reached the

¹⁶ Lendon 1989, 312 claimed that the Boeotians may have been willing to start the Corinthian War in order to strengthen their influence in the region of Heracleia Trachinia given the recent Spartan intervention. This would be more plausible if the Boeotians had lost support by returning the colony to the Spartans at the end of the Peloponnesian War, though this does not seem to necessarily be the case. Andrewes 1971, 225 saw Lysander as the driving force behind renewed Spartan interest in central Greece.

¹⁷ Kagan 1961, 331 voiced surprise that the Thebans did not challenge the Spartan occupation of Heracleia. An intervening period where the city was under neither Boeotian or Spartan control would help to explain this and aligns with the Boeotian preference against occupation and concrete territorial expansion.

¹⁸ Diod. 14.38.4. Andrewes 1971, 223 suggested a date of 400 BC for this event.

Spartans of the fate of their comrades at Pharsalus, they would have been particularly unwilling to give up the city. As they were besieging the city, by a stroke of good fortune the Boeotians and Argives were allowed into the city at night which resulted in its capture.¹⁹ Finding anti-Spartan elements within the city was not difficult given the Spartan ineptitude at choosing governors and the brutal tactics of Herippidas only a few years previously. The nocturnal entry into the city could also be connected to the earlier Boeotian intervention at Heracleia. If the Boeotians had a history of returning the city to local control as proposed above, there would have been added incentive for locals to betray the city in expectation of a return to independence. The sending of 1000 hoplites to save the city and the later expulsion of the brutal Spartan commander allowed the Boeotians to win the good graces of certain factions within the city and this preference for the Boeotians could have easily lasted until the Corinthian War.

When the Boeotians and Argives captured Heracleia Trachinia, they put to death all of the Spartans within the city.²⁰

μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' οἱ Βοιωτοὶ μετ' Ἀργείων Ἡράκλειαν τὴν ἐν Τραχῖνι κατελάβοντο, χωρισθέντες ἀπὸ Μηδίου: καὶ νυκτὸς ἐντὸς τῶν τειχῶν ὑπὸ τινῶν εἰσαχθέντες Λακεδαιμονίους μὲν τοὺς καταληφθέντας ἀπέσφαξαν, τοὺς δ' ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου τὰ σφῶν ἔχοντας εἶσαν ἀπελθεῖν.

This may seem like a drastic course of action, but there were several compelling reasons for this seemingly cold brutality. Obviously putting to death every Spartan served the practical purpose of reducing Spartan manpower and depriving Phocis of any further help from Sparta. Importantly for the regional focus of this examination, the removal of Spartan manpower also hindered the Phocian cause by the removal of yet

¹⁹ Diod. 14.82.6. Buck 1994, 41 passed over this episode in narrative without comment on the motives or implications of the capture of the city.

²⁰ Diod. 14.82.6.

another source of potential aid in the conflict which was still ongoing between the central Greek states. Additionally, the act may have further earned the favor of the Trachinians who saw the Spartans as cruel oppressors. Perhaps the decision was even left to the Trachinians themselves. The Trachinian reaction to the brutality of the specifically Spartan commanders may have been why only the Spartans were executed while the rest of the Peloponnesians were allowed to leave unharmed.²¹ To further cement the loyalty of the city, it was then given over to the Trachinians for the second time which included the return of those exiled by the Spartans. The return of the exiles provided demonstrable proof that the Boeotians would not subject the city to the same treatment as the Spartans. The Argives were left in the city as a garrison, possibly at the request of the Trachinians who found their military population depleted by years of warfare and the removal of the Spartans and the Peloponnesians.²² Leaving the Argives behind was also beneficial to Ismenias and the Boeotian League because it ensured a continued friendly presence in the region without sacrificing Boeotian forces which could now be used to pursue more specifically Boeotian interests in central Greece.

Turning his attention finally to a weakened and isolated Phocis, Ismenias felt the conditions were conducive to an incursion into Phocis itself. He raised men to swell his army with nearly 6000 recruits.²³

μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀφηγούμενος Ἴσμηνίας τοὺς μὲν Ἀργεῖους ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέλιπε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα, αὐτὸς δὲ πείσας ἀποστῆναι ἀπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων Αἰνιᾶνας καὶ Ἀθαμᾶνας ἤθροισε παρά τε τούτων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων

²¹ Diod. 14.82.4. Buckler 2003, 83 saw the different treatment of the other Peloponnesians as a part of a conscious program by Ismenias to drive a wedge between Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies. This does not keep in mind the regional consideration of specifically Spartan aid for the Phocians and the idea of disrupting the alliance of the Peloponnesians could hardly be attributed to Ismenias because one of the first acts of the anti-Spartan alliance was to unsuccessfully send to the cities of the Peloponnese in an attempt to incite revolt. Buckler undoubtedly attributed this to Ismenias in an attempt to connect it to Epaminondas' demand that the Spartan dead be removed last at Leuctra more than 20 years later, but the situations were obviously very different.

²² Diod. 14.82.7.

²³ Diod. 14.82.7.

στρατιώτας: τοὺς πάντα δ' ἔχων μικρὸν ἀπολείποντας τῶν ἑξακισχιλίων
ἔστράτευσεν εἰς Φωκεῖς.

Assuming at least 1000 Boeotian hoplites were with him this brought his total force to 7000 men. Some of these men were almost certainly drawn from the eastern (Opuntian) Locrians because Ismenias did not march back to Boeotia before taking the offensive against Phocis, making this part of a continuous campaign which began with the aid to Medius. The contribution of the eastern Locrians was reasonable given that at this stage they were prepared to take the offensive with the Boeotians and reclaim their land and possessions from the Phocians. The other men could have been made up of a Boeotian force sent north to meet Ismenias.

With Heracleia Trachinia now friendly to the Boeotians and Spartan manpower in central Greece greatly diminished, the Phocians could be dealt with. An attack on the Phocians was a prudent action for several reasons. The Phocians, despite their losses at Haliartus presented a clear military threat to Boeotia on their own, especially with anti-League Orchomenus leaving the way from hostile Phocis into Boeotia open. Additionally, Spartan support, crucial to Phocian organization and power, was momentarily at an ebb, but this would not last for long with Agesilaus' recall from Asia Minor almost guaranteed by the Boeotian victory at Haliartus. Reducing Phocian military power further through battle would then have the effect of reducing Phocian influence at the borders of both Boeotia and Locris, which allowed Locris to regain lost territory and influence. A further depletion of Phocian forces would also discourage Sparta from sending any more aid, leaving Boeotia as the undisputed master of central Greece. For the Boeotians, operating out of Locris demonstrated to the Locrians that the Boeotian League was committed to defending Locrian interests after using the

conflict with Phocis to confirm their own power in the region, even with the unexpected consequence of Spartan entry and the launch of the Corinthian War.

The capture of Heracleia Trachinia in the context of Agesilaus' march back from Asia Minor raises an important point regarding the usefulness of the fortress specifically related to guarding the pass at Thermopylae. Agesilaus, who was delayed in Thessaly, appears to have marched through Thermopylae without much difficulty. There is no record of his army being harried as they passed through the region as was the case in Thessaly. From this it can be suggested that control of Heracleia Trachinia in no way meant a force marching through Thermopylae would be stopped. The Boeotians and Argives must have done the same on their way to Thessaly while Heracleia Trachinia was still under Spartan control.²⁴ One possible solution is to blame the often unreliable dating of Diodorus and claim that the capture of Heracleia Trachinia occurred after Agesilaus entered Boeotia, but this is tenuous at best.²⁵ The more reasonable solution is that Agesilaus moved too rapidly through Thessaly and disrupted a planned reinforcement of the Argive garrison which would have allowed an allied force to leave the fortress and meet Agesilaus in the field though because there is no indication of this in the source material we might conclude that stopping Agesilaus was not a priority at this point.²⁶

²⁴ Cary 1922, 98-99 raised the issue that the Boeotians and Argives had done this with only 2000 men.

²⁵ Harrison 1913, 132 was the first to propose this solution. Hamilton 1979, 224 mentioned this theory but did not evaluate it.

²⁶ Cary 1922, 99 believed the Thebans meant to send a large army to Heracleia Trachinia before Agesilaus' arrival. The proposition that a garrison could not stop passage through Thermopylae but a field army could is perfectly reasonable given the events described.

To bolster Locrian forces, Ismenias led his army from Heracleia Trachinia into allied Locris to the city of Naryx.²⁷ Archaeological evidence indicates that Naryx was a substantial settlement in the fourth century and sherds present at the site denote that occupation continued even after the destruction of the city in 351 BC.²⁸ The city was also clearly fortified, at least around the steep acropolis, where some sections of polygonal walls remained into the twentieth century AD.²⁹ While Ismenias' army was at Naryx, the Phocian army decided to press the battle and marched to meet them.

Even after their defeat at Haliartus, the Phocians continued to fight under Spartan leadership. The army under Ismenias faced a Phocian army under the Spartan commander Alcistenes.³⁰

καταστρατοπεδεύοντος δ' αὐτοῦ εἰς Νάρυκα τῆς Λοκρίδος, ἐξ ἧς φασι τὸν Αἴαντα γεγενῆσθαι, τὸ πλῆθος τῶν Φωκέων ἀπὴντησε μετὰ τῶν ὀπλῶν, τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἔχοντος Ἀλκισθένου τοῦ Λάκωνος.

The continued Spartan leadership of Phocian forces indicates the continued inability of Phocian cities to work closely with one another and unite under a single commander.³¹ The size of the Phocian army was not indicated in the source material, but since it took an aggressive approach and came to meet the army of Ismenias and the battle was noted to have been long and taxing the forces must have been reasonably well-matched. The

²⁷ Diod. 14.82.8. The city was razed later in the fourth century BC by Phayllus the Phocian general and brother of Onomarchus. Diod. 16.38.5. He had previously taken the city by nighttime treason but was later ejected from it before returning to raze it. Diod. 15.38.3.

²⁸ Pritchett 1985, 168-171 described large numbers of late Classical and Hellenistic pottery which had been ploughed up in fields beneath the slopes of the acropolis and identified Naryx as Homeric Tarphe.

²⁹ Pritchett 1985, 168-169 noted that the wall appeared to have collapsed into a ravine along the western edge of the site.

³⁰ Diod. 14.82.8. Alcisthenes is admittedly a strange name for a Spartan, and no other evidence remains to support Diodorus' statement that this man was the commander of the Phocian forces. Buckler 2003, 84 emended the Teubner text to 'Λακισθένου.' The actual name is not particularly important to the current examination compared to the significance of a Spartan commanding Phocian forces.

³¹ Phocian commanders could be very talented, as Onomarchus would later prove, but uniting the Phocians as an effective military organization was a problem which, as shown above, would not be resolved internally until the mid-fourth century.

Boeotians and their allies were victorious, killing 1000 of the enemy, but the victory came at a high cost as nearly 500 of Ismenias' soldiers were killed as well.³²

γενομένης δὲ μάχης ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἰσχυρᾶς ἐκράτησαν οἱ Βοιωτοί, καὶ μέχρι νυκτὸς διώξαντες τοὺς φεύγοντας ἀνεῖλον οὐ πολὺ λείποντας τῶν χιλίων, τῶν δ' ἰδίων ἀπέβαλον ἐν τῇ μάχῃ πεντακοσίους.

These high casualty figures can be attributed to the tenacity and longevity of the engagement. With the Phocian forces convincingly defeated for a second time in roughly a year and sufficiently cowed to not represent an immediate threat to Boeotia, Ismenias disbanded his army and returned to Boeotia with his Boeotian contingent. This victory was sufficient for the eastern Locrians to regain any lost holdings along the border with Phocis, and the loss of such a high number of men essentially guaranteed that the Phocians could not challenge the border for some time.

The removal of the Spartan garrisons at Pharsalus and Heracleia Trachinia had a major impact on the war against the Phocians. Isolated from Spartan reinforcements and leadership, the Phocians were in a much weaker state which allowed for a second decisive defeat in the field. The capture of Heracleia Trachinia, combined with the removal of the Spartan garrison at Pharsalus in Thessaly, also made Agesilaus' return to Greece more difficult. The allied mission to Thessaly was actually one which prioritized Boeotian interests and aided their war against the Phocians. The successive victories allowed the Boeotian League to confirm its position as the leading power in central Greece and silenced a significant Phocian challenge to Boeotian military power.

Phocis did not figure prominently in the Boeotian military mind again until the power of the Boeotian League was reconstituted in the late 370s BC. In the year after Leuctra, the Boeotian League was strong enough to once again turn its attention to the

³² Diod. 14.82.9.

north.³³ As Jason's ally, the Boeotian League was free to operate against Phocis as well, but their delay in doing so can be attributed to need to first secure Boeotia before moving on to other ventures and not to the 'threat' of Jason in Thessaly.³⁴ With Jason's power eliminated by his death, the Boeotians had both the opportunity and the capability to once again limit Phocian power. Before invading the Peloponnese, the Boeotians turned the Phocians into their allies.³⁵

διόπερ τοὺς μὲν Ὀρχομενίους εἰς τὴν τῶν συμμάχων χώραν κατέταξαν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Φωκεῖς καὶ Αἰτωλοὺς καὶ Λοκροὺς φίλους ποιησάμενοι τὴν εἰς Βοιωτίαν ἐπάνοδον ἐποίησαντο.

The domination of Phocis was the Boeotian attempt to reassert their power in central Greece. The attack on Phocis reinforced their support of Locris, and the forging of an alliance with Phocis, which did not occur in the Corinthian War, may have been meant to prevent further Thessalian intervention in Phocis. With a defensive alliance in place the Thessalians could not attack Phocis without opening a war with the once again powerful Boeotian League. This Phocian alliance also worked toward a goal of reintegrating Orchomenus into the Boeotian League. The removal of Phocian support combined with the defeat of the Spartans left Orchomenus isolated. The swift action of the Boeotian League assured that Phocis would not challenge their power again until the Third Sacred War.

³³ Sprawski 1999, 97 claimed that by 371 BC Jason was racing the Boeotian League for control of central Greece and 124 emphasized that control of Phocis and Locris was vital to both Jason and the Boeotian League. All of this is true, but Jason had a head start because the Boeotian League was not strong enough to take an active role north of Orchomenus until after the battle of Leuctra.

³⁴ Buckler 1978, 90 believed that the Boeotian League could not take control of central Greece with Jason still in control of Thessaly. Cawkwell 1972, 265 described Jason as a threat to Boeotia which required a focus on reconsolidation. After Leuctra the reconsolidation of Boeotia was nearly complete, and this consolidation had been the focus of the Boeotian League throughout the 370s BC.

³⁵ Diod. 15.57.1. The alliance was confirmed by Diod. 15.62.5 when the Phocians accompanied the Boeotian army on its first invasion of the Peloponnese. Buckler 2008, 134 suspected the Phocian presence during the invasion may have been for the lure of booty and not military coercion. Buckler 1980, 68 = Buckler 1985, 237 stated the alliance between Phocis and Thebes was a defensive agreement.

IIIc: The Rise and Fall of Thessaly

The Corinthian War: Lycophron and Medius

After the victory at Haliartus, the Thebans essentially controlled a Boeotian League (now without Orchomenus) which had proven its cohesion and effectiveness in the face of a significant military threat. Although the Spartan-backed Phocians were far from defeated, the Boeotian League was now confident it possessed the necessary military capabilities to take the offensive and intervene in other regions of central Greece, including Phocis, Eastern Locris, and Thessaly. By expanding their military influence northward, the Boeotians hoped to secure their own northern border and prevent other states from gathering sufficient power and resources to challenge Boeotian supremacy. At this point in history three major cities (Larisa, Pharsalus, and Pherae) vied to achieve control over Thessaly as a whole. Control over all Thessaly would present the victor with a large pool of both manpower and resources including agricultural production, vast numbers of livestock, and a large supply of timber all of which had military implications. A united Thessaly would not be in the interests of the Boeotian League. A united Thessaly would move the Thessalians from the role of useful ally to that of legitimate power with potentially expansionist ambitions, and in the 390s BC the Boeotian League used direct military intervention to prevent this scenario.

As demonstrated above, instead of a unified Thessalian state, a constantly shifting balance of power between the three most powerful cities, combined with the narrow (compared to Boeotia) oligarchic factionalism in Larisa and Pharsalus, and at times tenuous tyranny in Pherae made Thessaly an ideal target for intervention. Increased Boeotian influence in the region would in turn secure part of Boeotia's

northern border and, if the Thessalian cities could be brought into an alliance, provide an additional check on the Phocians. Though an unfortunately small amount of source material exists for developments in Thessaly in this period, some conclusions can be drawn regarding Boeotian tendencies in military intervention, beginning with the rise of Lycophron.

Pherae, a Thessalian city in Pelasgiotis on the northern shore of the Pagasitic Gulf, had not played a significant role in Thessalian history until Lycophron, the first known sole ruler of Pherae, rose to power at the very end of the fifth century BC.¹

While little is known about Lycophron as a historical figure, Xenophon attributed a desire to rule all of Thessaly, an ambition later displayed by both Jason and Alexander, to him.²

κατὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν περὶ ἡλίου ἔκλειψιν Λυκόφρων ὁ Φεραῖος,
βουλόμενος ἄρξαι ὅλης τῆς Θεσσαλίας, τοὺς ἐναντιουμένους αὐτῷ τῶν
Θεσσαλῶν, Λαρισαίους τε καὶ ἄλλους, μάχῃ ἐνίκησε καὶ πολλοὺς ἀπέκτεινε.

Rather than the combination of diplomatic and military endeavors which Jason would use to achieve this goal, Lycophron sought to accomplish his task through sheer military force, and in 404 BC Lycophron defeated a coalition of other Thessalian cities led by the Lariseans in open battle.³ This victory was not enough to win permanent control of Thessaly because within a decade the Lariseans, led by Medius of Larisa, were in a

¹ Buckler 2003, 87 seemed to be thinking ahead to the future power of Pherae in the fourth century claiming that Pherae was 'traditionally one of the strongest Thessalian cities.'

² Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.4. For a possible, but speculative path to power see Mandel 1980, 49. Sprawski 2004, 441-448 gave a more general account of the establishment of tyranny in Pherae. Sprawski 1999, 38 specifically rested Lycophron's power appeal to the lower classes. Westlake 1935, 49 suggested Lycophron gained power by creating an export empire. While this could be an element of his power base, it like does not represent its entirety. Any connection between the later tyrants of Pherae and Lycophron is tenuous at best. Though Jason was almost certainly not the son of Lycophron he may have married his daughter. Most speculation is an attempt on the part of historians to connect Lycophron to the later Lycophron who was an assassin and successor of Alexander of Pherae. Sordi 1958, 157 believed that Jason was Lycophron's son, but again there is absolutely no evidence to indicate this.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.4. Unfortunately even the most basic details such as the location of the battle were not provided beyond the mention that it took place during an eclipse.

position to appeal to the newly victorious Boeotians for help against Lycophron, which was readily granted.⁴

Μηδίου δὲ τοῦ τῆς Λαρίσσης τῆς ἐν Θεσσαλίᾳ δυναστεύοντος διαπολεμοῦντος πρὸς Λυκόφρονα τὸν Φερῶν τύραννον, καὶ δεομένου πέμψαι βοήθειαν, ἀπέστειλεν αὐτῷ τὸ συνέδριον στρατιώτας δισχιλίους.

The obvious implication here is that despite the victory Lycophron failed to take Larisa and remove the Aleuadae from power. The other effect of Lycophron's campaign was that Pharsalus was weakened to the point where a Spartan garrison was able to take control of the city. As we know from the examination so far, Pharsalus had been in a state of flux since the expulsion of the Echekratidae.⁵ The Spartans may have sensed an opportunity to extend their reach north beyond the fortress at Heracleia Trachinia and occupied the city at the behest of an oligarchic faction, much as they would do in Thebes in 382 BC. By contrast, both Medius and Lycophron exercised tight control over their respective cities. Medius' control of Larisa is unsurprising given the precedents of Larisean government which, like other Thessalian cities, was under *dynasteia*.⁶ Lycophron's position in Pherae is a matter of debate, since only Diodorus referred to him as τύραννος.⁷ Whatever his title, it is clear that he held the greatest amount of power among the Thessalian leaders. There may have been a connection between Lycophron and Sparta, since Medius acted against the Spartan garrison in Pharsalus after calling for aid against Lycophron, but as far as the ancient sources are

⁴ Diod. 14.82.5-6.

⁵ The Athenians had attempted to reinstate Orestes, the son of Echekratidas as a ruler in Thessaly during the Peloponnesian War but were unsuccessful.

⁶ Diod. 14.82.5. This makes Buckler 2003, 83 terribly incorrect in his titling of Medius as a tyrant, not even of just Larisa, but of Thessaly. As Sprawski 2004, 437 correctly noted, tyranny in Thessaly is rare compared to narrow oligarchy. Sprawski 1999, 59. There is little doubt that Medius was an Aleuad. Sordi 1958, 152.

⁷ Diod. 14.82.5. Sprawski 2004, 450 concluded that Lycophron was not a tyrant of Pherae but instead held power in Thessaly as an autocrat. Sprawski 1999, 62.

concerned this was never made into a formal alliance. There is no indication that Lycophron took Pharsalus after the battle in 404 BC, but this event would have certainly weakened Pharsalian power to the point where an outside power could intervene. Additionally, there is no evidence at all that connects Lycophron to the installation of the Spartan garrison.⁸ The Boeotians may have thought of the garrison as a way to continue support for the Phocians after the battle of Haliartus, and as such needed to be removed. This garrison, combined with the worry that Lycophron was within reach of achieving his goal of a unified Thessalian state, drove the Boeotians and other allies into action and they quickly assented to the request of Medius.

The capture of Pharsalus was achieved using the soldiers of Medius and 2000 soldiers sent by the allies. The allied force assisting Medius consisted of Boeotians and Argives.⁹

ὁ δὲ Μήδιος τῆς συμμαχίας αὐτῷ παραγενομένης Φάρσαλον εἶλεν ὑπὸ
 Λακεδαιμονίων φρουρουμένην καὶ τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ κατοικοῦντας
 ἐλαφροπώλησεν...μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' ὁ τῶν Βοιωτῶν ἀφηγούμενος Ἴσμηνίας τοὺς
 μὲν Ἀργεῖους ἐν τῇ πόλει κατέλιπε φυλακῆς ἕνεκα...

There is no indication as to the size of each contingent but the command was held by the Theban Ismenias which would indicate some majority on the part of the Boeotians and that Ismenias was a *boeotarch* in this year. The inhabitants of the city were supposedly sold off by Medius but this assertion is historically untenable given later events.¹⁰ The fact that by the 370s Pharsalus was once again a powerful state does not support the idea that the city was depopulated by Medius. It was so powerful, in fact, that it was the last city standing in the way of Jason's unification of Thessaly as proven

⁸ Westlake 1935, 59 claimed Lycophron helped the Spartans establish the garrison in Pharsalus despite the lack of any evidence. Sordi 1958, 151 likewise assumed that Lycophron was a Spartan ally.

⁹ Diod. 14.82.6. These are the only two states mentioned.

¹⁰ Diod. 14.82.6.

by Polydamas' mission to Sparta and the content of his speech.¹¹ There are several alternatives to selling the entire population into slavery.¹² For example, the selling of inhabitants into slavery may not have been as extensive as Diodorus claims or, far less likely, the city was somehow repopulated in the ensuing twenty years. The fact that Pharsalian cavalrymen fought Agesilaus on his return from Asia makes the latter choice impossible given the short time span between the two events. The most probable scenario is one in which the Spartan garrison was sold into slavery along with the leaders of the Pharsalian faction who had supported the occupation. In capturing Pharsalus the Boeotians achieved their objectives in Thessaly. First, liberating Pharsalus opened another Thessalian city to help Medius in opposing Lycophron and, since there is no indication Medius actually took permanent possession of the city, also helped keep the power of Larisa contained.¹³ There is a mention of Medius' forces in Aristotle, unfortunately with no context, which mentions their destruction near Pharsalus.¹⁴

περὶ δὲ τοὺς χρόνους ἐν ᾧ ἀπώλοντο οἱ Μηδίου ξένοι ἐν Φαρσάλῳ, ἐρημία ἐν τοῖς τόποις τοῖς περὶ Ἀθήνας καὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐγένετο κοράκων, ὡς ἐχόντων αἰσθησὶν τινα τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλων δηλώσεως.

This defeat must have occurred after the departure of the Boeotians and Argives. This explains why the depopulation of the city did not occur if the battle took place immediately after the removal of the Spartan garrison. Secondly, the removal of the

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.18.

¹² Buckler 2003, 83 accepted that the Pharsalians were sold into slavery despite the evidence to the contrary. He advanced Diodorus' argument even further by suggesting the Spartans were sold into slavery as well. Given the evidence, it is actually more likely that *only* the Spartans were sold into slavery. Westlake 1935, 61 claimed that Pharsalus was actually captured with the help of its population.

¹³ Sordi 1958, 153 believed Pharsalus was brought under Larisean control and the leading men were exiled.

¹⁴ Aristot. *Hist. An.* 618b. Sordi 1958, 153-254 identified this loss as occurring after the removal of the Spartan garrison.

Spartan garrison decreased Spartan influence in a major Thessalian city and further limited the potential for Spartan support of Phocis and thus diminished its power in the region.

Despite the ancient sources providing no clear resolution to the conflict between Medius and Lycophron, a reasonable hypothesis can be proposed. Though the end of Lycophron's story is unknown, by all indications he retained control over Pherae.¹⁵ He was certainly not removed from power by the Boeotians, and without further assistance from foreign states the Thessalian cities would have found it difficult to completely dislodge him from Pherae. Additionally, defeat of Medius at the hands of the Pharsalians made his ability to completely remove Lycophron nearly impossible. The Boeotians may have seen their efforts as enough to restore some balance of power in Thessaly, and did not want to waste manpower in Thessaly when the advantage could be pressed more effectively against the geographically closer and more openly hostile Phocians.

It is unsurprising that the Boeotians were approached first and eagerly participated in this campaign to their north. The first reason Medius appealed to the Boeotians is obvious. The Boeotians had just successfully defended their territory against the Spartans, killed their most famous general, and caused King Pausanias to be tried and forced to flee into exile.¹⁶ They did this with some help from the Athenians, who were in Boeotia under Thrasybulus but did not participate in the battle itself. Now the alliance of the Boeotian League and Athens had been joined by Corinth and Argos, which until Agesilaus returned from Asia formed one of, if not the most, powerful

¹⁵ Sprawski 2004, 450 suggested a nearly identical scenario where Lycophron retained power in Pherae but was powerless to stop foreign aid to his enemies.

¹⁶ Pausanias avoided his death sentence by fleeing to Tegea. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.25.

armies in Greece. Friendly relations with this alliance would help curb the power of Lycophron while allowing for the maintenance of Larisean power. Additionally, the oligarchies of Larisa and Boeotia had a history together dating back to the Persian Wars, when the Aleuadae were notably the first Greeks to surrender themselves to Xerxes during his invasion.¹⁷

ταῦτα δὲ ἔχοντα ἔλεγε ἐς τοὺς Ἀλεύεω παῖδας, ὅτι πρῶτοι Ἑλλήνων ἐόντες
Θεσσαλοὶ ἔδοσαν ἐωυτοῦς βασιλεί, δοκέων ὁ Ξέρξης ἀπὸ παντός σφεας τοῦ
ἔθνεος ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι φιλίην.

They would of course be followed in this by the Thebans and the majority of the Boeotian cities. They were, in a sense, comrades in infamy.

The Boeotians, for their involvement, had their own motives when it came to Thessaly, one of which was the return of Agesilaus from Asia, made inevitable by their victory at Haliartus. Securing valuable allies in Thessaly would help bolster their confidence in meeting the Spartan threat and further demoralize the Phocians.¹⁸ A loose parallel to the potential for Thessalian harassment of a Spartan army can be found in the march of Brasidas through Thessaly during the Peloponnesian War.¹⁹ Their aid against Lycophron certainly assured them of the goodwill of the Lariseans and the removal of the Spartan garrison from Pharsalus gave the Boeotians another ally with negative experience with the Spartans.²⁰ This goodwill did pay some dividends once Agesilaus reached Thessaly on his homeward march.

¹⁷ Hdt. 7.130.3. The Thebans and most of the other Boeotians were notorious medizers. Westlake 1936, 24 claimed the Aleuadae were the driving force behind the treachery of the Thessalians.

¹⁸ This should seem obvious but only Hamilton 1979, 215 recognized that Thessaly could greatly hinder Agesilaus.

¹⁹ Thuc. 4.78.1-4. Brasidas attempted to march north through Thessaly and used his friends in Pharsalus to secure safe passage but not before encountering resistance from anti-Spartan forces.

²⁰ Buck 1994, 40 was almost certainly wrong in claiming the aid was sent to Medius because of the allied need for cavalry. The Boeotians already possessed one of the largest and highest quality cavalry forces in Greece.

Upon arrival in Thessaly, Agesilaus sent two men, Xenocles and Scythes, who were seized when they came to Larisa.²¹

τῶν δὲ Θετταλῶν τοῖς πολεμίοις συμμαχούντων ἐπόρθει τὴν χώραν. εἰς δὲ Λάρισσαν ἔπεμψε Ξενοκλέα καὶ Σκύθην περὶ φιλίας: συλληφθέντων δὲ τούτων καὶ παραφυλασσομένων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι βαρέως φέροντες ᾤοντο δεῖν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον περιστρατοπεδεύσαντα πολιορκεῖν τὴν Λάρισσαν...

The Thessalians were described as being in alliance (συμμαχέω) with his enemies which makes it strange that he sent two men of fairly high rank to Larisa. Medius of Larisa had just expelled a Spartan garrison from Pharsalus, and there is no real evidence as to why Agesilaus thought he could win them over rather than appeal to the Pheraeans, especially after he had raided their territory.²² Xenocles and Scythes were apparently valued men as Agesilaus negotiated with the Lariseans for their safe return against the advice of his army.²³

...ὁ δὲ φήσας οὐκ ἂν ἐθελῆσαι Θεσσαλίαν ὅλην λαβεῖν ἀπολέσας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὸν ἕτερον, ὑποσπόνδους αὐτοὺς ἀπέλαβε.

Xenophon provided a more specific list of the Thessalians allied with the Boeotians which included the Lariseans, Pharsalians, Scotussans, and Crannonians.²⁴

ὁ μὲν δὴ Δερκυλίδας ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντου πρῶτον ἐπορεύετο: ὁ δ' Ἀγησίλαος διαλλάξας Μακεδονίαν εἰς Θετταλίαν ἀφίκετο. Λαρισαῖοι μὲν οὖν καὶ Κραννῶνιοι καὶ Σκοτουσσαῖοι καὶ Φαρσάλιοι, σύμμαχοι ὄντες Βοιωτοῖς, καὶ πάντες δὲ Θετταλοί, πλὴν ὅσοι αὐτῶν φυγάδες τότε ἐτύγγανον, ἐκακούργουν αὐτὸν ἐπακολουθοῦντες.

²¹ Plut. *Ages.* 16.3.

²² The destruction of territory appears only in Plutarch. Xenophon omitted this detail instead making it seem like Agesilaus did not delay in Thessaly. Buckler 2003, 90 determined that the Pheraeans stayed out of the action because they were isolated by Ismenias' campaign. The Pheraeans may simply have been of no use since they could not convey Agesilaus' army out of Thessaly. Buckler pointed out that the hostile Thessalians controlled the route south, but did not connect this to the inactivity of the Pheraeans. Hamilton 1991, 105 passed over this incident without analysis and simply repeated the ancient sources. Similarly Hamilton 1979, 224 claimed the Thessalians were acting 'in concert' with the allies.

²³ Plut. *Ages.* 16.3. Xenophon left this episode out from this commentary and instead focused on the eventual defeat of the Thessalian horsemen. Xenocles and Scythes both served on Agesilaus' board of thirty Spartans with Herippidas. Xenocles commanded the cavalry while Scythes took the emancipated helots. Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.20. Xenocles also commanded 1400 men during an ambush in Asia Minor against the forces of Tissaphernes. Diod. 14.80.2.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3.

As Agesilaus' army moved south, it was continually harassed by the Pharsalians.²⁵

These Pharsalians were those opposed to the Spartan garrison and who had defeated Medius to ensure the independence of their city. Xenophon made it clear that the Thessalians had only horsemen with them.²⁶ Despite their reputation as excellent horsemen, Agesilaus was able to turn back his attackers and set up a trophy.²⁷

τῶν δὲ Φαρσαλίων προσκειμένων αὐτῷ καὶ κακούντων τὸ στράτευμα,
πεντακοσίοις ἵππεῦσιν ἐμβαλεῖν κελεύσας σὺν αὐτῷ καὶ τρεψάμενος ἔστησε
τρόπαιον ὑπὸ τῷ Ναρθακίῳ

Xenophon provided less of a sense of pitched battle than Plutarch in his longer description of the event. In Xenophon's account, the Thessalian horsemen were caught by an unexpected charge on the part of the Spartan cavalry, and while many escaped those who hesitated in retreating were run down or captured.²⁸

οἱ δὲ Θετταλοὶ ὡς εἶδον παρὰ δόξαν ἐλαύνοντας, οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἔφυγον, οἱ δ' ἀνέστρεψαν, οἱ δὲ πειρώμενοι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πλαγίους ἔχοντες τοὺς ἵππους ἠλίσκοντο.

In either scenario, Agesilaus, despite facing local resistance, was able to lead his army through Thessaly and into Boeotia. While the result of Agesilaus' march through Thessaly could have been more desirable to the Boeotians, their direct military involvement in Thessaly served its purpose.

Ismenias must have felt as though the mission to Thessaly had served its purpose. Invited by Medius for his own personal gain, the Boeotian League also stood to gain heavily from the limitation of Lycophron's power. As a result of the Boeotian-

²⁵ Plut. *Ages.* 16.5. Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.3 included more than the Pharsalians as the harassers of his army, instead naming all the Thessalians in alliance with the Boeotians.

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.5 stated the Thessalians turned away when Agesilaus presented a battle line because they did not want to engage hoplites with only their cavalry.

²⁷ Plut. *Ages.* 16.5. Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.9.

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.6-8. Xenophon also gave the name of the Pharsalian commander who fell fighting, Polycharmus. The entirety of Agesilaus' march through Thessaly was repeated by Xen. *Ages.* 2.2-5.

Argive intervention, Lycophron was unable to take control of Thessaly as a whole, and Pharsalus was freed to challenge both Lycophron and Medius, guaranteeing the cities of Thessaly would be locked in opposition for some time. This in turn helped assure the security of Boeotia through the further isolation of Phocis from the aid necessary to continue their fight against the Boeotians and their Locrian allies. Their mission in Thessaly seemingly done, the Boeotians and Argives continued their attack on support for Phocis. They moved on toward Heracleia Trachinia, a vital entryway into Boeotia which at the time was controlled by the Spartans.²⁹ Thessalian and Boeotian interests would not align again until the 370s BC when the liberation of the Cadmeia allowed for the Thebans to begin rebuilding the Boeotian League destroyed by the King's Peace in 386 BC.

²⁹ Diod. 14.82.6.

Histiaea and the Northern Euboean Gulf

Without a unified Boeotian state, and thus deprived of the wider reserves of military manpower in Boeotia, the Thebans as the obvious leaders of the new Boeotian League needed to find less direct methods of maintaining a military influence in central Greece. Securing the Northern Euboean Gulf was of paramount importance after the liberation of the Cadmeia and the subsequent Spartan invasions under Cleombrotus and Agesilaus. The Spartan invasions cut off the Thebans from their agricultural hinterland, and food now needed to be imported into the usually self-sufficient region. Control of the Northern Euboean Gulf would ensure a trade route for the import of food from Locris and Thessaly, specifically from a Pherae which was friendly to Thebes. A key in the establishment of control was the city of Histiaea on Euboea.

Histiaea was located on the northwest coast of Euboea in close proximity to the mouth of the Pagasitic Gulf. This strategic position raised its importance in terms of the trade between Thessaly and Boeotia particularly the Pheraeon port at Pagasae. Unfortunately for historians the identity of the city was muddled by a change in name during the Classical Period.¹ Even in antiquity confusion existed between the ancient settlement of Histiaea and the newer development of Oreus which sat in close proximity, so close that the two settlements became one in the course of the next century.² According to Strabo, who provided various traditions regarding the foundation of both Histiaea and Oreus, but did not seem to prefer one over the other, this merger took place under the rule of Philip II, who appointed Philistides the tyrant

¹ It is interesting to note that the region surrounding Histiaea, Histiaeaotis, shared its name with a region in northwest Thessaly. Strabo 9.5.3. This region seems to have undergone a name change as well. In an earlier period it was known as Doris. Strabo 9.5.17.

² Herodotus wrote only of Histiaea which was captured by the Persians during Xerxes' invasion. Hdt. 8.23.1. Thuc. 1.114.3 mentioned the expulsion of the Histiaeans by the Athenians and the settlement of their city.

of Oreus and the Histiaeans and their city took the same name at this point.³ The confusion seems to have come from the fact that the name of Histiaea continued to be used throughout antiquity. Pausanias indicated that even in the second century AD some still referred to the city as Histiaea.⁴ This demonstrates that these settlements, or at least their identities, were merged at some point in time.⁵ Since control of Histiaea frequently also meant control of Oreus, and because the events analyzed here occurred before Philip II's reign, only the name Histiaea will be used in this examination. It was at Histiaea where the interests of Jason and the Boeotian League first intersected and a new power dynamic was introduced to central Greece.

To properly contextualize Boeotian involvement in the affairs of Histiaea, we must first turn to Jason of Pherae's roughly contemporary intervention. One of the first recorded actions of Jason was an attempt to establish Neogenes, an otherwise unknown figure in fourth century history, as tyrant over Histiaea. In addition to Histiaea, Neogenes also managed to gain control of Oreus.⁶

κατὰ δὲ τὴν Εὐβοίαν βραχὺ μὲν πρὸ τούτων τῶν χρόνων Νεογένης τις ὄνομα μετ' Ἰάσονος τοῦ Φεραίου συλλέξας στρατιώτας κατελάβετο τὴν τε ἀκρόπολιν τῶν Ἐστιαίων, καὶ τύραννον ἑαυτὸν ἀπέδειξε ταύτης τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς τῶν Ὀρειτῶν πόλεως.

There is no evidence that Jason traveled to Histiaea himself, but instead helped Neogenes find men to use in his uprising. It is almost certain that these men were mercenaries because there would have been no need for Jason's aid if Neogenes had

³ Strabo 10.1.3-4. Various traditions include Athenian settlement, forced migration, and the advance of the Ellopians into Oreitan territory. Strabo cited Dem. 18.71 as his source.

⁴ Paus. 7.26.4. Hansen & Nielsen 2004, 656 did not delineate between the two, using only one entry of Histiaea/Oreus.

⁵ Cargill 1981, 37 tentatively suggested that Oreus and Histiaea were counted as one for the purpose of joining the Second Athenian League.

⁶ Diod. 15.30.3. The acropolis of Histiaea was occupied (καταλαμβάνω) and control was exercised over Oreus, which was here referred to as the city of the Oreitans (τῆς τῶν Ὀρειτῶν πόλεως).

secured widespread support in Histiaea. Mercenaries were in ample supply in Thessaly at this time, as Jason's substantial mercenary force attests.⁷ It is unlikely that the mercenaries used by Neogenes were Jason's own, given that at this point Jason's power in Thessaly was far from well-established.⁸ Jason had not yet won control of Thessaly, and sending even a portion of his expensive, highly trained mercenaries away would impact his ability to expand his control over the cities of Thessaly.⁹ Furthermore, even once he achieved control of Thessaly, there is no evidence that Jason ever sent his own men to fight under the command of anyone other than himself. This would run in opposition to everything we know about Jason's character. It was Jason's direct contact with his mercenaries which won him their loyalty and Xenophon's acclaim.¹⁰ Jason may have provided some funds for these mercenaries given his wealth. An ally in control of Histiaea would have been beneficial to his own ambition and further tax revenue, but not the men themselves.¹¹ Jason's financial situation at this time is unclear due in part to the anecdotal evidence provided by Polyaeus but control of Pagasae would have given him a substantial income. It was already well-known in Antiquity that Jason was an expert at acquiring funds through any means possible.¹²

With Histiaea friendly to him, Jason could exercise power over the straits of Artemisium and thus access to the northern Euboean and Maliac Gulfs. Control of

⁷ At the time of the speech of Polydamas in 374 BC, Jason was reported to have commanded 6000 mercenaries. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5.

⁸ Buckler 2003, 243 following in the tradition of Parke, was of the opinion that the mercenaries were Jason's own. Parke 1933, 101 then used this assumption to state Jason's control over Thessaly was secure at this time.

⁹ Xenophon made clear that Jason was not averse to the use of force. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5; 6.1.13.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5-6.

¹¹ Jason was certainly no stranger to heaping monetary reward on both his own men (Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.6) and other Greek leaders (Plut. *Mor.* 193B; 583F). For a discussion of the corrupting force of Thessalian money on other Greeks see Aston 2012, 262-269.

¹² The anecdotes from Polyaeus showed Jason's various efforts to rob and extort money from his own family. Polyae. 6.1.2-7.

these bodies of water also isolated the region of Thermopylae including the colony at Heracleia Trachinia, which would later play a massive role in securing his southern border to prevent foreign interference during his attempt at consolidation. Herodotus confirmed the two locations were strategically close and could function together when the Greeks made their plans for the defense of Greece during Xerxes' invasion.¹³

τὴν δὲ ἀτραπὸν, δι' ἣλωσαν οἱ ἀλόντες Ἑλλήνων ἐν Θερμοπύλῃσι, οὐδὲ ἤδεσαν ἐοῦσαν πρότερον ἢ περ ἀπικόμενοι ἐς Θερμοπύλας ἐπύθοντο Τρηχινίων. ταύτην ὧν ἐβουλεύσαντο φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἐσβολὴν μὴ παριέναι ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα τὸν βάρβαρον, τὸν δὲ ναυτικὸν στρατὸν πλέειν γῆς τῆς Ἰστιαιωτίδος ἐπὶ Ἀρτεμίσιον. ταῦτα γὰρ ἀγχοῦ τε ἀλλήλων ἐστὶ ὥστε πυνθάνεσθαι τὰ κατὰ ἑκατέρους ἐόντα, οἳ τε χῶροι οὕτω ἔχουσι.

Providing the funds for Neogenes' actions, but not the actual manpower, also aligned with Jason's political strategy of not formally committing himself to the affairs of other states (preferring personal bonds) until his own control of Thessaly was established.¹⁴

The assumption of the tyranny by Neogenes most likely took place at some point in 379 BC, since enough time must have elapsed for the Spartans to take control of Histiaea before capturing the Theban ships in 377 BC.¹⁵ Some modern scholarship has suggested support of the Histiaean tyranny made Jason an enemy of the Spartans, but this is a tenuous assertion.¹⁶ Histiaea was not in Spartan hands during Neogenes' attempt, and Jason did nothing to later aid Neogenes against the Spartan attack. There would then be no reason for hostility between Pherae and Sparta.

Neogenes was apparently successful in his attempt for at least a short time, but the violent nature of his rule eventually brought the attention of the Spartans, who

¹³ Hdt. 7.175.2.

¹⁴ Sprawski 1999, 90.

¹⁵ One probable chronology for Neogenes' attempt was given by Parke, 1927, 160. If this timeline is correct this aid to Neogenes is Jason's first recorded action as is suggested above. Buckler 2003, 243 gave a wider timeframe for Neogenes' takeover from 382-379 BC.

¹⁶ Westlake 1935, 70.

sensed an opportunity to gain a strategic location.¹⁷ Histiaea was especially important to the Spartans in 378 BC given that the liberators had thrown off their occupation of Thebes.¹⁸ If Heracleia Trachinia was never regained by the Spartans after the Corinthian War, which by all signs seems to be the case, control of Histiaea would be vital in cutting off Theban access to the north as well as potential Athenian naval aid. In describing his rule as tyrannical, Diodorus effectively portrayed Neogenes as everything Jason was not. In fact Neogenes' actions parallel most closely with a later ruler of Pherae: Alexander.¹⁹ To challenge Neogenes the Spartans sent a man called Therippidas by Diodorus, but who could very well have been Herippidas, the former harmost at Thebes during its occupation by the Spartans.²⁰

...ἄρχοντος δ' αὐτοῦ βιαίως καὶ ὑπερηφάνως Λακεδαιμόνιοι Θηριπίδην ἀπέστειλαν ἐπ' αὐτόν.

Herippidas also had a history in the area. He was sent twenty years earlier to resolve the situation at Heracleia Trachinia.²¹ Though he first tried to resolve the conflict through diplomacy, he eventually incited the people of the city to an armed assault on the acropolis and toppled the tyranny of Neogenes.²² Given the nature of Neogenes' rule, it must not have required much prodding on the part of Herippidas to induce an open revolt much like the revolts against the Spartans at Heracleia Trachinia. Diodorus noted

¹⁷ Diod. 15.30.3. Sprawski pointed out that the Spartan intervention was not caused by the existence of Neogenes' tyranny, but by its nature. Sprawski 1999, 66.

¹⁸ Buckler 2003, 243.

¹⁹ Alexander of Pherae was known for a host of cruel actions including slaughtering the citizens of Scotussa; Paus. 6.5.2; Diod. 15.75.1; and dressing men in boarskins so he could watch his dogs tear them apart; Plut. *Pel.* 29.4.

²⁰ Parke 1927, 159-160. The basis of Parke's argument was that Therippidas was nowhere else attested as a Spartan name, and Diodorus was known to alter the spelling of names. Even in the spelling of Histiaea, where most authors prefer Ἰστιαίας; Strabo 10.1.5; Paus. 7.4.9; Poly. *Strat.* 2.7.1. Diodorus 15.30.1 instead used Ἐστιαίας. Buckler 2003, 243 accepted this emendation.

²¹ Diod. 14.38.4. See above for a discussion of Heracleia Trachinia.

²² Diod. 15.30.4. Oreus was also freed but whether it came under Spartan control remains unclear. The attacks of Chabrias indicated an attempt to free the previously Athenian settlement of Oreus.

this deliverance from tyranny solidified the bond between Histiaea and Sparta, but the ensuing events demonstrated that this loyalty may not have been as strong as Diodorus indicated.²³

The Spartans retained control of Histiaea, despite the attacks of Chabrias, until an encounter with Theban grain ships in 377 BC altered the situation.²⁴ The Thebans, who were attempting to defend themselves from Spartan attacks launched from occupied Boeotian cities and were undoubtedly short on food stores, sent two ships to Pagasae for grain.²⁵

μάλα δὲ πιεζόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι σπάνει σίτου διὰ τὸ δυοῖν ἔτοῖν μὴ εἰληφέναι καρπὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ δυοῖν τριήροιν ἄνδρας εἰς Παγασὰς ἐπὶ σῖτον δέκα τάλαντα δόντες.

Where these ships departed from was not mentioned by the ancient sources, but some reasonable hypotheses can be put forth which in turn enhance our understanding of Boeotian naval power after the King's Peace and liberation of the Cadmeia. It must be established that the ships left from a port in northeastern Boeotia for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that this would provide the shortest route between Boeotia and Thessaly. Additionally, ports in western Boeotia were controlled by cities unfriendly to Thebes and unlikely to act against the will of their Spartan overseers.²⁶ Effective Spartan control of Thespieae and a recently repopulated Plataea blocked Theban access to the ports at Creusis and Siphae, while military action in the region of

²³ Diod. 15.30.1.

²⁴ Chabrias was said to have ravaged the land of Histiaeotis and garrisoned a place referred to by Diodorus as Metropolis but was not mentioned as having captured the city of Histiaea or Oreus. Diod. 15.30.5. There was, however, a Metropolis in Thessalian Histiaeotis according to Strabo 9.5.17. Diodorus obviously confused the two regions.

²⁵ It was reported that the Thebans had not been able to bring in crops for two years during the Spartan invasions. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56.

²⁶ Thespieae had a Spartan garrison from 378 BC. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15; Diod. 15.32.2; Plut. *Pel.* 14.2. There was also evidence for a Spartan harmost at Tanagra. Plut. *Pel.* 15.4.

Tanagra blocked Theban access to the southeast.²⁷ The northwest was not an option because of the hostile presence of Orchomenus and the Phocians as well as the length of the voyage that would be required. Thebes must have looked to the northeast for a useable port. The best port in this region for the Thebans to use would have been Aulis. The harbor was large with plenty of beach, and communication with Thebes was relatively direct.²⁸ The speed at which communication passed from Aulis to Thebes was highlighted, as discussed above, by the episode of Agesilaus' sacrifice at the start of his campaign in Asia Minor.²⁹ Rapid communication and transportation would be essential to ensure the shipment of grain was not intercepted, and this makes Aulis the most likely port for the grain expedition.

The route from Boeotia to Pagasae took the ships north through the Euboean Gulf. They evaded the Spartans on the journey north, but were captured on the return journey.³⁰

Ἀλκέτας δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος φυλάττων Ὠρεόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐκεῖνοι τὸν σῖτον
 συνεωνοῦντο, ἐπληρώσατο τρεῖς τριήρεις, ἐπιμεληθεὶς ὅπως μὴ ἐξαγγελθείη.
 ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπήγετο ὁ σῖτος, λαμβάνει ὁ Ἀλκέτας τὸν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις, καὶ
 τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐζώγρησεν οὐκ ἐλάττους ἢ τριακοσίους. τούτους δὲ εἶρξεν ἐν τῇ
 ἀκροπόλει, οὐπὲρ αὐτὸς ἐσκήνου.

Perhaps the Spartans noticed the ships on their northward journey and planned to intercept them on the way back. There is no doubt that the mission to Pagasae was successful, as both ships sent by the Thebans were full of food when they were captured by the Spartans. The Spartans had stationed a fleet at Histiaea though its size is unknown. Only three ships were sent by the Spartan commander Alcetas to capture

²⁷ For an examination on the territory of Tanagra see Schachter 2003, 45-74.

²⁸ Buckler 2008, 189 used the same rationale in identifying Aulis as the main Theban naval base when speaking of the naval program mentioned by Diod. 15.79.1.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56.

the two Theban triremes, but whether this was the entire force or not is unclear.³¹ The Spartan force must have been roughly equal to the at least 300 Thebans captured along with the grain, because the ensuing events would not have been possible without at least some degree of equality between forces. While Alcetas was occupied with a young boy he favored in the city below, the Thebans somehow managed to break free and seized the acropolis, which drove the city to revolt and fall under Theban control.³²

ἀκολουθοῦντος δέ τινος τῶν Ὀρειτῶν παιδός, ὡς ἔφασαν, μάλα καλοῦ τε κἀγαθοῦ, καταβαίνων ἐκ τῆς ἀκροπόλεως περὶ τοῦτον ἦν. καταγόντες δὲ οἱ αἰχμάλωτοι τὴν ἀμέλειαν, καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν, καὶ ἡ πόλις ἀφίσταται: ὥστ' εὐπόρως ἤδη οἱ Θηβαῖοι σῆτον παρεκομίζοντο.

If the city were so willing to embrace the Thebans, they must not have been as enamored with the Spartans as Diodorus let on. Additionally, the Spartans must have been disgraced if their soldiers were defeated by a force made up of mostly sailors rather than hoplites (for why would the Thebans send a large group of soldiers to friendly Pherae when they were sorely needed to defend Thebes?). There is no evidence of cooperation between Jason and Thebes in the capture of Histiaea, but this statement is almost completely unnecessary given the nature of the evidence.³³ First, the Spartan presence at Histiaea was no threat to Jason because they were not at war.³⁴ Cooperation would require that the Thebans, desperately in need of food, sent ships to Pagasae with the intention that they would be captured by the Spartans, and that once imprisoned the

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.56. Front. 4.7.19 = Poly. 2.7.1 related that Alcetas readied his ships in secret and had his rowers practice in a single ship to deceive the Thebans into thinking this was his entire force. The only mention of this figure in the fourth century. Poralla 1966, 17 asserted Histiaea was 'lost through his carelessness and lust.'

³² Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.57 was obviously being moralizing here. Hindley 1999, 74-99. For a discussion of the dangers of unrestrained lust in military command which mentions Alcetas in particular, see Hindley 1994, 349-350. Buckler 2003, 244 passed over this episode in narrative without comment.

³³ Sordi 1958, 158 saw the Theban capture of Histiaea as part of a collaboration between Jason, the Thebans, and the Athenians.

³⁴ Buckler 2003, 243 believed otherwise.

Thebans would be able to break free and take the acropolis. There is simply no evidence for such a chain of events.

Just because Jason did not play a direct role in the Theban capture of Histiaea does not mean that he viewed the result as unbeneficial to him. It is unlikely that that Jason attempted to install Neogenes to aid the Thebans in their war against the Spartans.³⁵ In establishing Neogenes as tyrant in Histiaea, Jason was attempting to place an ally in a position which would be advantageous to himself.³⁶ To Jason, the Thebans succeeded where Neogenes had failed. The Thebans were no threat to Jason (yet) as they were fighting for their own survival in Boeotia, and it was in their own interests to keep the sea lanes open for trade with Pagasae. Xenophon made the important note that after this the Thebans were able to bring in food freely, which indicates that the trade for supplies continued with Pagasae as long as the Spartans and their allies isolated them from their crops.³⁷ In other words, the initial mission to Pagasae was not a one-off affair. This continuing trade has significant implications for the relationship between Jason and Thebes. As briefly mentioned above, Jason's wealth likely stemmed from control of the export trade which came out of Pagasae.³⁸ If the supply of food to Thebes was linked to Jason personally, it demonstrates an early willingness to aid Thebes, but it should be remembered that this was not an act of charity. Jason was encouraging revenue for Pagasae and, as stated above, probably for himself as well.

³⁵ Mitchell, 1984, 56 suggested Jason was more actively supporting Thebes at this point than the sources indicate.

³⁶ Sprawski 1999, 66.

³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.57.

³⁸ Sprawski 1999, 53-54.

With Jason friendly to Thebes and Histiaea under Theban influence, the long-held alliance with eastern Locris rendered the Northern Euboean Gulf a controlled waterway. This relative peace within the Northern Euboean Gulf allowed for increased trade revenues since, as Xenophon stated, peace was much more profitable than war.³⁹ In sum, Thebes was able to continue to feed its sizable population (swelled by urban refugees and pro-League sympathizers as a result of the Spartan invasions) while Jason both accumulated wealth to further his goals in Thessaly through the hiring of mercenaries and invested essentially risk-free in a historically powerful central Greek ally.

Trade with Pagasae continued by necessity at least until 375 BC when Pelopidas shook the Spartan presence in Boeotia with the surprise victory at Tegyra.⁴⁰ Even after this, Thebes was still fully engaged in re-establishing its dominance over the rest of Boeotia, and extra food supplies from Thessaly would be necessary to feed their troops since they were engaged in almost constant warfare.⁴¹ Whether the Thebans left a garrison in Histiaea is unclear, but this is unlikely given the need for men to defend Thebes at this point in time. Even if they had left a garrison, it would have been removed under the terms of both the Peace of 375 BC and the charter of the Second Athenian League, of which both the Thebans and the Histiaeans were members.⁴²

³⁹ Xen. *Oik.* 5.11-12.

⁴⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 17.1-6. As Plutarch related, this was a first time a numerically superior Spartan force was defeated in battle.

⁴¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10 reported that the superiority of the Boeotian cavalry at Leuctra was due to their practice in the wars against the cities of Thespieae and Orchomenus.

⁴² The list of members is reproduced here. For the terms of the Second Athenian League see *IG II²* 43.

face B left.col. I,II.1

80	Χῖοι Τενέδιοι Μυτιλη[ν]αῖοι [Μ]ηθυ[μν]αῖοι Ρόδιοι Ποιήσσιοι Βυζάντιοι Περίνθιοι Πεπαρήθιοι Σκιάθιοι Μαρωνῖται Διῆς Πάρ[ι]οι Ο[— — —] Ἀθηνῖται Π[— — —]	Θηβαῖοι Χαλκιδῆς Ἐρετριῆς Ἀρεθόσιοι Καρύστιοι Ἴκιοι Παλλ[— —]	5	[Θη]ραίων [ό δ]ῆμος [Ἀβδη]ρίται [Θάσι]οι { ² vac.} ² [Χαλκι]δῆς ἀπὸ [Θράικης] { ²² vs. vac.} ² Αἴνιοι Σαμοθραῖκ[ες] Δικαιοπολιται { ²² vs. vac.} ² Ἀκαρνᾶνες { ² vac.} ² Κεφαλλήνων Πρωῶννοι Ἀλκέτας { ² vac.} ² Νεοπτόλεμος { ² vac.} ²
			10	[--- --- ---]ν Ἄνδριοι [Τ]ήνιοι [Ἴσ]τιαῖς { ²² vs. vac.} ² Μυ[κ]όνιοι { ² vac.} ²
			15	Ἀντισσαῖοι { ² vac.} ² Ἐρέσιοι { ² vac.} ² Ἀστραιούσιοι { ² vac.} ² Κείων Ἰουλιῆται { ² vac.} ²
			20	Καρθαιεῖς { ² vac.} ² Κορήσιοι { ² vac.} ² . Ἐλαιόσιοι Ἀμόργιοι { ² vac.} ² Σηλυμβριανο[ί] { ² vac.} ²
			25	Σίφνιοι Σικινῆται { ²² vs. vac.} ² Διεῖς ἀπὸ Θράικης { ² vac.} ² Νεοπολιται { ² 16 vs. vac.} ²
			30	Ζακυν[θ]ίων
			35	

The history of the city which included the tyranny of Neogenes given by Diodorus was actually prompted by a discussion of the joining of Euboean cities in the Second Athenian League as an explanation of why Histiaea joined later than the other Euboean cities.⁴³ If, as Diodorus stated, loyalty to Sparta (more likely Spartan control) was the

⁴³ Diod. 15.30.1.

cause of this, Histiaea could not have joined the Second Athenian League before the Theban debacle of 377 BC.⁴⁴ Cargill suggested that only two states, Thera and Zacynthus, joined after the Peace of 375 BC, because the need for protection among smaller cities would have dwindled which would place Histiaean entry into the League in 376 or 375 BC if the other Euboean cities joined in 377.⁴⁵

It is worth briefly exploring whether or not Jason was a likely member of the Second Athenian League, because if he were this would add to the explanation of why he never attempted to restore his influence over Histiaea again. To attempt to take the city or install another tyrant would violate the autonomy clause of the Second Athenian League. The debate surrounding Jason's membership is never-ending, mostly because his name is not on the stele but thanks to an ancient erasure there is room for speculation. The main argument for Jason being a member of the Second Athenian League comes from inserting his name into the erasure in line 111 (line 15 of Face B).⁴⁶ If he was a member of the Second Athenian League, there are several options for the date of his joining.⁴⁷ The theory proposed by Westlake was that Jason joined in 375 BC and worked out a compromise in the summer of 374 BC during the negotiations over the King's Peace whereby he could resign from the Second Athenian League and thereby keep control of the Thessalian cities without infringing on the autonomy clause.⁴⁸ Mitchell then argued that Jason's name was not on the stele, but that the name of the Pheraeans would be more appropriate.⁴⁹ The Pheraeans would have been engraved on line 1 of Face B as [Φε]ραίων, which is contrary to the restoration

⁴⁴ Cargill 1981, 64.

⁴⁵ Cargill 1981, 64.

⁴⁶ *IG* II² 43, 111. Cawkwell 1980a, 44 accepted the restoration of Jason's name.

⁴⁷ Mitchell 1984, 56 chose 376 BC as the most likely date.

⁴⁸ Westlake 1969, 74-75.

⁴⁹ Mitchell, 1984, 45-46.

proposed by Bradeen and Coleman of [Θη]ραίων.⁵⁰ Mitchell then explained that the erasure at line 111 was caused by a repetition of names.⁵¹ Cargill was of the opinion that Jason was never made a member of the Second Athenian League, but instead made a bilateral pact with Athens between 375 and 373 BC.⁵² This examination takes the stance that that because there is no evidence for Jason being a member of the Second Athenian league, it must be considered that he was not a member. This did not seem to affect his relationship with the Boeotian League because he was able to make direct alliances.

Circumstances in Thessaly changed drastically after Jason's death and the Northern Euboean Gulf took on a new significance. Histiaea became a crucial city to both Boeotia and Thessaly once again after the assassination of Jason and Alexander of Pherae's assumption of the tyranny. There is no evidence in the literary record, but the epigraphic record highlights the interest of Thebes in securing Histiaea as an ally. A recently published inscription found in Thebes provided the details of a treaty between the Boeotian League and Histiaea.⁵³

 [------?μὲ ἐξεμεν καταλ]-
 ύεσθαι [τὸ]ν πόλεμον ηιστιαιέ-
 ας χορις Θεβαίον· ηαγεμονία-
 ν δὲ ἐμεν τὸ πολέμο Θεβαίον και
 κατὰ γαν και κατ θάλατταν
 vacat

⁵⁰ Bradeen & Coleman 1967, 103. This was also accepted by Cawkwell 1980a, 42.

⁵¹ Mitchell 1984, 50.

⁵² Cargill 1981, 83-84; Cargill 1996, 41-42. Likewise Baron 2006, 390-391 argued against inclusion of either Jason or the Pheraeans. Woodhead 1957, 373 included Jason in the 'group' which joined in 373 BC.

⁵³ The fact that the treaty only uses the name Histiaea demonstrates that the name was still officially used by its own people well into the fourth century BC.

There are two possible periods for the dating of this treaty. It could apply to either Jason's reign in the 370s or that of Alexander in the 360s.⁵⁴ The key point in the historical context of the treaty is the mention of Theban leadership in an unspecified war.⁵⁵ Thebes was given hegemony over both land and sea forces.⁵⁶ The common enemy in the war was not provided, though most assume that this enemy was Sparta. This is appealing, but Thebes was not at war with only the Spartans in the 370s and 360s BC. The Spartan theory does not consider Boeotian military intervention in central Greece as an important historical element. Once the regional focus of this examination is applied, another possibility emerges. If the treaty dates to some point in the 360s BC, the war in question could refer to the war against Alexander of Pherae. This would establish a *terminus post quem* for the treaty as Alexander's accession in 369 BC. There are also circumstances weighing against a date in the 370s. Before 371 BC there would have been no need for a pact of war against the Spartans because Thebes and Histiaea, along with the rest of Euboea, were both members of the Second Athenian League by 376 BC. Under this alliance, Histiaea would already be at war with Sparta and assisting Thebes because the charter of the Second Athenian League guaranteed aid in the event of an attack upon one of its member states.⁵⁷ After Leuctra Sparta was on its heels, and the risk of a sea invasion from the Northern Euboean Gulf was minimal. However, the cooperation of Histiaea against Alexander of Pherae, who was known to have possessed a fleet, would have been absolutely necessary for the same reasons Jason wanted influence over the city discussed above especially if this

⁵⁴ The authors preferred a pre-Leuctra date for the treaty in 377 BC but admitted a post-Leuctra date could not be omitted from consideration. Aravantinos & Papazardakas 2012, 250.

⁵⁵ Line 3 of the inscription.

⁵⁶ The authors noted that this is the first attested use of the term *hegemonia* in epigraphy. Aravantinos & Papazardakas 2012, 241.

⁵⁷ *IG II²* 43, 46-51.

treaty dates to the start of the 360s before the advent of the Boeotian naval program.⁵⁸ A separate treaty would have been necessary after 371 BC when Thebes was forced to drop out of the Second Athenian League. The Euboeans also left the Second Athenian League after Leuctra as they were counted as allies during the first invasion of the Peloponnese.⁵⁹ Control of Histiaea would secure the eastern seaboard of Boeotia from raids, while at the same time providing an offensive staging ground for attacks on Alexander's ships. If Alexander, following in the tradition of Jason, relied on the export of foodstuffs and customs duties from Pagasae to fund his personal wealth, controlling the sea lanes would limit his income.⁶⁰ Since Alexander relied on highly paid mercenaries, probably even more so than Jason, a loss in wealth would directly equate to a loss in military power and, as discussed below, there are indications that Alexander was having financial issues. These issues could have been caused in part by a decrease in trade. This loss in military power may have allowed the Pharsalians and other Thessalians to have a reasonable chance of defeating Alexander on their own. Using naval power to hinder Alexander could have been an attempt by the Boeotians to avoid committing land forces to a war in Thessaly, though ultimately this was unavoidable. In Histiaea we can see both the Thessalians and Boeotians acting to further their own regional interests, particularly in regard to control of the Northern Euboean Gulf. The advantages conferred by friendly relations with this city could not be fully realized until power was secured in their respective regions. In the early to mid-370s BC, the race was on between Jason and Thebes to unite their respective regions and stake their claim to the supremacy of central Greece.

⁵⁸ References to Alexander's fleet include Dem. 50.4; Dem. 51.8; and Diod. 15.95.1-2. Poly. *Strat.* 6.2.1 mentioned victory over the Athenians at Peparethus as well as his ensuing raid on the Piraeus.

⁵⁹ Rhodes 2006, 252. For Euboeans in Epaminondas' army see Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23.

⁶⁰ Martin 1981, 195 saw Pagasae as crucial to Pheraean power and the security of Pherae itself.

Jason and the Thessalian Ascendancy

Despite the fortuitous expulsion of the Spartan garrison at Histiaea, the continued survival of a pro-League Thebes was by no means certain. Even with the end of Spartan invasions under the kings Agesilaus and Cleombrotus, anti-League factions controlled Plataea, Thespieae, and Orchomenus which deprived the Boeotian League of significant resources. These factions were sometimes supported by Spartan garrisons, and needed to be removed before the Boeotian League could once again effectively operate outside Boeotia. This meant that for the first time in the fourth century, Thessaly was free from the spectre of Boeotian military intervention which had prevented the unification of Thessaly under a single power in the 390s BC. Jason of Pherae, driven by the same desire as Lycophron at the turn of the century, sought to take advantage of this freedom.¹ As a result, while the Thebans were struggling to bring more cities, and military resources, under the control of the restored Boeotian League, Jason was undertaking a parallel consolidation in Thessaly which, if successful, would create the formidable military threat the Boeotians had worked to prevent earlier in the fourth century.

It is clear that by 375 BC Jason had expanded his influence to include most of Thessaly, with only Pharsalus and its allies opposing him.² Once isolated from the rest of the Thessalians, the Pharsalians sent Polydamas, who had essentially been placed in control of Pharsalus, to Sparta to secure aid against Jason.³ As discussed above in terms

¹ Sordi 1958, 160 saw Jason's alliance with Thebes as a way to prevent Theban support for the cities opposed to Jason. This overlooks the fact that Thebes was in no position to interfere to begin with.

² Pharsalus, like most major Thessalian (and Boeotian) cities had smaller cities dependent upon it. Hansen & Nielsen 2004, 703 noted that the number of cities dependent on Pharsalus at this time is unknown.

³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2-4 additionally noted that Polydamas was the *proxenos* of Sparta which is no doubt why he was chosen for the mission. Westlake 1935, 76-7 claimed that Pharsalus was under Spartan control at the time of Polydamas' mission. No evidence exists for this other than the assumption by Westlake that

of political history, it is clear that Polydamas had a significant amount of control over state affairs which included control over the finances of the city as well as command of the acropolis.⁴ As we know, Polydamas' office was created as a response to factionalism among aristocrats.⁵ Polydamas had been approached by Jason to discuss the surrender of Pharsalus which would give him control of all Thessaly. In this case Jason was attempting a diplomatic means for extending his control over Thessaly, but Jason had previously used military force to meet his goals.⁶

...μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐπὶ τὴν Περραιβίαν ἀναζεύξας τῶν πόλεων τὰς μὲν λόγοις φιλανθρώποις προσηγάγετο, τὰς δὲ διὰ τῆς βίας ἐχειρώσατο.

Jason had already emerged victorious over most of the largest cities of Thessaly in a battle where Polydamas also fought, which indicates that a number of large Thessalian cities banded together to oppose Jason much as had happened against Lycophron at the turn of the century, and likewise failed in their attempt to stop him.⁷ Jason's speech to Polydamas as recorded by Xenophon, while certainly exaggerated to increase the magnitude of his power, does provide an insight into his military alliances as they stood at the time of the speech in 374 BC. Jason described the Boeotians as his allies which is

Polydamas' unique position had been created by the Spartans. This hypothesis must be rejected. Pharsalus was independent of Sparta at the time of Polydamas' mission. In fact, Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2 directly contradicted this hypothesis by stating that Polydamas received his power from the Pharsalians (οἱ Φαρσάλιοι).

⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2. The acropolis of Pharsalus was located at the modern day site of the hill of the *Profitas Ilias*. Hansen & Nielsen 2004, 704.

⁵ This infighting was of course triggered by the expulsion of the Echekratidae in the fifth century BC. Thuc. 1.111.1.

⁶ In winning the Perrhaebians to his cause Jason used both generosity and military force. Diod. 15.57.2.

⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5. Lycophron of Pherae had defeated the Lariseans and their allies under an eclipse. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.4. Sprawski 1999, 74 described Jason's war against the Thessalians as 'a series of victorious skirmishes.' This doesn't do credit to the size of forces available in Thessaly. Additionally, if the forces of Pharsalus were involved, the battle mentioned by Jason to Polydamas cannot have been particularly small.

the first indication of a formal military alliance between the Theban-led Boeotian League and Jason.⁸

καὶ μὴν Βοιωτοὶ γε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι Λακεδαιμονίοις πολεμοῦντες
ὑπάρχουσί μοι σύμμαχοι: καὶ ἀκολουθεῖν τοίνυν ἀξιοῦσιν ἐμοί, ἂν μόνον ἀπὸ
Λακεδαιμονίων ἐλευθερῶ αὐτούς.

The mention of the Boeotians as his allies may have served to further intimidate Polydamas before he asked Sparta for aid. If Polydamas brought Sparta into the war, he would also bring the Boeotians, who had much easier access to Thessaly than Sparta. Though not an immediate military threat, the pro-League Boeotians under the leadership of Pelopidas had just won an inspiring victory over the Spartans at Tegyra and were turning the tide against the anti-League Boeotian cities. Spartan power in northern Boeotia and Phocis was now diminished and any force sent over land from Sparta could be harassed by the pro-League forces. In this same passage Jason claimed that the Athenians wanted to be his allies but this was not in his interests, meaning that in 374 BC Jason was neither a member of the Second Athenian League nor had a separate bipartisan alliance with the Athenians as demonstrated above.⁹

Jason's challenge to Polydamas to approach the Spartans demonstrated his confidence in his military forces.¹⁰ The Spartans deliberated on the decision for two days before finally responding that their forces were not available to help Polydamas.¹¹

οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τότε μὲν ἀνεβάλλοντο τὴν ἀπόκρισιν: τῇ δ' ὑστεραία καὶ τῇ
τρίτῃ λογιζάμενοι τὰς τε ἔξω μόρας ὅσαι αὐτοῖς εἶεν καὶ τὰς περὶ Λακεδαίμονα
πρὸς τὰς ἔξω τῶν Ἀθηναίων τριήρεις καὶ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους πόλεμον,
ἀπεκρίναντο ὅτι ἐν τῷ παρόντι οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο ἰκανὴν αὐτῷ ἐκπέμψαι

⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.10.

⁹ Westlake 1935, 81-82 doubted Jason's ability to defend his holdings in the event of a Spartan attack, but given the size and professionalism of his forces this was a tenuous assertion at best. This hinges on the issue of whether or not Jason was a member of the Second Athenian League and thus already at war with Sparta, and his actions at Leuctra weigh heavily against this possibility.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.13 made it obvious that Jason had no concerns about deciding the issue by war.

¹¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.17.

ἐπικουρίαν, ἀλλ' ἀπιόντα συντίθεσθαι αὐτὸν ἐκέλευον ὅπη δύναίτο ἄριστα τὰ τε ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως.

After Polydamas' failure to gain Spartan support against Jason he had no choice but to turn Pharsalus over or else face its destruction at the hands of Jason's army. Unlike in the 390s BC, there would be no help coming from the south to prevent the unification of Thessaly under a Pheraean leader. In an act of consolation Jason allowed Polydamas to retain control of the Pharsalian acropolis. This indicates that Jason was not interested in dominating his subjects as a military leader, but rather that he wanted to demonstrate that his power came from an alliance of Thessalian states rather than a community of subjects. Once pledges had been made and hostages had been given, the resistance of Pharsalus was removed and Jason was declared *tagos* of Thessaly in the process described above.¹² The unification of Thessaly brought both military and financial benefits to Jason. In terms of military power, his assessment of forces after assuming the *tageia* counted more than 8000 horsemen and at least 20,000 hoplites with countless peltasts to add to the tally.¹³ Financially, Jason now took on the tribute of the perioecic cities of Thessaly which left him less reliant on trade to pay his mercenaries.¹⁴

With Thessaly finally secured and his position as *tagos* confirmed by common consent (ὁμολογουμένως) of the Thessalian cities, Jason was able to use his military influence to reverse the normal power dynamic between Thessaly and Boeotia and exert tangible influence over Boeotia for the first time in the fourth century. In terms of this new power dynamic, his most significant act was his arbitration after the battle of

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.18. Some of the hostages were the children of Polydamas.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19. Sprawski 1999, 112 suggested that this tribute gave Jason a regular income as compared to the non-abundant booty to be gained through war in Thessaly. Trundle 2004, 97 demonstrated that payment could range anywhere from one and a half drachma a day to two obols.

Leuctra in 371 BC. By this point in the 370s BC Jason was considered an ally of Thebes which reinforces the declaration made to Polydamas three years previously.¹⁵

πρὸς μέντοι Ἰάσονα, σύμμαχον ὄντα, ἔπεμπον σπουδῆ οἱ Θηβαῖοι, κελεύοντες βοηθεῖν, διαλογιζόμενοι πῆ τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσοιτο.

While the initial battle ended in a Boeotian victory and the death of Cleombrotus, the Spartans were able to retreat and take up a defensive position in their camp.¹⁶ The Thebans then sent a message to Jason and the Athenians asking for aid.¹⁷ Jason, unlike the Athenians, answered the call and despite manning ships as if to go by sea took his mercenaries and a bodyguard of cavalry through Phocis so rapidly that no force could be summoned in time to stop him.¹⁸

ὁ δ' εὐθὺς τριήρεις μὲν ἐπλήρου, ὡς βοηθήσων κατὰ θάλατταν, συλλαβὼν δὲ τό τε ξενικὸν καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν ἰππέας, καίπερ ἀκηρύκτω πολέμῳ τῶν Φωκέων χρωμένων, πεζῇ διεπορεύθη εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων πρότερον ὀφθεῖς ἢ ἀγγελθεῖς ὅτι πορεύοιτο. πρὶν γοῦν συλλέγεσθαι τι πανταχόθεν ἔφθανε πόρρω γιγνόμενος, δῆλον ποιῶν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ τὸ τάχος μᾶλλον τῆς βίας διαπράττεται τὰ δέοντα.

The Phocian aspect of the battle is often underutilized in modern scholarship but it is a crucial element in terms of understanding the concerns of the central Greek states. It is well-known that before Jason's involvement at Leuctra he was already at war with the Phocians.¹⁹ If he was unwilling to come to destroy the Spartans, the Boeotians may

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20.

¹⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.14.

¹⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.20. The messenger sent to Athens was rebuffed by the assembly. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19-20.

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.21. The cavalry could also have been a mercenary force since Jason was known to employ both infantry and cavalry mercenaries. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.28. Mandel 1980, 71 was under the impression that Jason's mercenaries were used for garrison duty and thus were not the force which accompanied him to Leuctra, and also admitted that the numbers given by Diodorus are plausible. This means that the 2000 men Jason took would equal only 1/3 of his mercenary force. It is inconceivable that Jason would use 2/3 or more of his mercenaries for garrison duty given that by this point Jason had won acceptance as the leader of a united Thessaly. Buckler 1980, 65 supported the idea that the men Jason took with him were part of his mercenary force. Mandel 1980, 67 claimed Jason 'gave up' on building a fleet, but that is obviously not the case since Xenophon spoke of Pheraean triremes in 371 BC. It would also be odd for the ruler of a port city to not exercise at least some degree of naval power.

¹⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.21.

have assumed that he would jump at the opportunity to see the Phocians brought low. Conflict with the Phocians represented Jason's assumption of the role traditionally held by the Boeotian League. Jason sought to maintain his own power in central Greece by limiting the power of Phocis just as the Boeotians had done in the 390s. Diodorus cannot be correct in his timeline of Jason's arrival which he placed before the battle.²⁰ Upon his arrival he expertly arbitrated between the two parties by convincing the Thebans to take the victory they had already gained and not risk attacking the Spartans again.²¹

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀφίκετο εἰς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, λεγόντων τῶν Θηβαίων ὡς καιρὸς εἶη ἐπιτίθεσθαι τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, ἄνωθεν μὲν ἐκεῖνον σὺν τῷ ξενικῷ, σφᾶς δὲ ἀντιπρόσωπους, ἀπέτρεπεν αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἰάσων, διδάσκων ὡς καλοῦ ἔργου γεγενημένου οὐκ ἄξιον αὐτοῖς εἶη διακινδυνεῦσαι, ὥστε ἢ ἔτι μείζω καταπραΰσαι ἢ στερηθῆναι καὶ τῆς γεγενημένης νίκης.

This was an incredibly shrewd maneuver on Jason's part for several reasons. First, it allowed him to become an authoritative presence among the powers of mainland Greece by demonstrating that two historically powerful states would take his counsel. Secondly, he kept the other Greek states in a sort of uneasy equilibrium by not allowing the Thebans to destroy the rest of the Spartan army. This is reminiscent of the Boeotian refusal to destroy Lycophron in the 390s which created this same uneasy balance. As it stood, Leuctra had crippled Sparta but by no means reduced it to the subservience of Thebes. While these states were busy fighting one another, they would not be able to interfere in a significant way in whatever he had planned for the regions adjacent to

²⁰ Diod. 15.54.5 was still reasonable in its estimation of numbers in Jason's contingent of 1500 infantry and 500 cavalry. Westlake 1935, 91-92 also preferred Xenophon's testimony with the correct belief that it would be unthinkable for Jason's forces to stand by and watch as the battle was fought.

²¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.22.

Thessaly, namely Phocis and Locris.²² Locris would certainly have drawn Boeotian aid based on their longstanding alliance described above. To exert military influence in Locris, Jason would need to keep Thebes occupied and at least under some threat, which was accomplished by the preservation of the remaining Spartan army. Finally, Jason accomplished all this without risking the lives of his valuable mercenaries. He needed these mercenaries to maintain his power in a recently unified Thessaly. As later events would show, the Thessalian cities were quick to cast off Pheraeon lordship once the military power of Pherae was destabilized.

The more interesting conversation during this arbitration occurred between Jason and the Spartans. According to Xenophon, Jason claimed both that his father was a friend of the Spartans and that he (Jason) was their *proxenos*.²³

εἰ δ' ἐπιλαθέσθαι, ἔφη, βούλεσθε τὸ γεγενημένον πάθος, συμβουλεύω ἀναπνεύσαντας καὶ ἀναπασσαμένους καὶ μείζους γεγενημένους τοῖς ἀηττήτοις οὕτως εἰς μάχην ἰέναι. νῦν δέ, ἔφη, εὖ ἴστε ὅτι καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ὑμῖν εἰσὶν οἱ διαλέγονται περὶ φιλίας τοῖς πολεμίοις: ἀλλὰ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πειρᾶσθε σπονδὰς λαβεῖν. ταῦτα δ', ἔφη, ἐγὼ προθυμοῦμαι, σῶσαι ὑμᾶς βουλόμενος διὰ τε τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς φιλίαν πρὸς ὑμᾶς καὶ διὰ τὸ προξενεῖν ὑμῶν.

This statement greatly contrasts with what Jason said in his speech to Polydamas in 375 BC where Jason made no mention of a relationship with Sparta. It would be extremely odd for Jason to lie to the Spartans in such a blatant way, which leaves the possibility that Xenophon embellished his speech to make Jason, who he regarded very highly, sympathetic to the Spartan cause, thus increasing their own reputation.²⁴ In practical

²² Sprawski 1999, 96 also described this advantage to continued warfare in southern Greece. Mitchell 1984, 54 detailed how this was also advantageous to the Athenians but Jason was the one to actually execute the plan.

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.24. As demonstrated above hereditary *proxenia* was not unusual in Thessaly.

²⁴ Sprawski 1999, 75 claimed Polydamas delayed going to Sparta because there was a close relationship between Sparta and the Pheraeon tyranny. If this were the case, Athens would have been more likely to support anti-Pheraeon sentiment. Contrary to the proposal of Mandel 1980, 54 Jason was not at this or any other time a sworn enemy of Sparta. Hindley 1994, 349 correctly observed that Xenophon saw Jason and Agesilaus as ideal military commanders in the embodiment of self-control.

terms it would not particularly matter whether Jason was a friend of the Spartans, because the remaining Spartan forces could either believe him and allow him to negotiate a truce, or turn him away and be destroyed by the combined force of his mercenaries and the Theban-led Boeotians. In this way the Spartans were saved from total annihilation, the Thebans were denied an absolute victory, and Jason demonstrated himself to be a major military power to Sparta and the other states of southern Greece without suffering a single casualty.²⁵

After the success of his arbitration, Jason could set plans in motion to bring more of central Greece under his influence. Unlike the journey south, Jason's return journey was full of fighting in central Greece. The destruction of Heracleia Trachinia, which as discussed above had a tumultuous history of changing hands between major powers, stamped an exclamation point on his arrival as a major power.²⁶ Given his power since 375 BC, Jason could have taken Heracleia Trachinia at any point, so why did he destroy the city in 371? The key is in renewed Boeotian power. Leuctra affirmed the return of the Boeotian League to military eminence in the region. As shown above, the fort of Heracleia Trachinia could only prevent entry into Locris and Boeotia with a significant military force. Leuctra demonstrated to Jason that the Boeotians now had the necessary forces to use the fort in this way. The destruction of the fort prevented this from happening and increased pressure on the Locrians to shift their primary reliance on security from the Boeotian League to Jason, further indicating that Jason was assuming the role traditionally held by the Boeotian League. He also continued to

²⁵ Westlake 1935, 94 was too enthusiastic in claiming that 'Jason had reaped the fruits of a victory so laboriously won by Thebes.' To Sparta and Athens, Thebes still remained the largest threat while Jason returned north to expand his interests in central Greece. Buckler 2003, 294-295 claimed 'Jason saw in Leuctra an instrument of for his own ambition,' but failed to properly explain how this was the case.

²⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27. Heracleia Trachinia had been held at various points since its founding during the Peloponnesian War by the Spartans, the Boeotians, and the local tribes of Malis.

prosecute his war against the Phocians. Hyampolis, a major Phocian city, was assaulted but not taken.²⁷

ὁ μέντοι Ἰάσων ἀπιὼν διὰ τῆς Φωκίδος Ὑαμπολιτῶν μὲν τό τε προάστιον εἴλε καὶ τὴν χώραν ἐπόρθησε καὶ ἀπέκτεινε πολλούς· τὴν δ' ἄλλην Φωκίδα διήλθεν ἀπραγμόνως.

This attack and resulting failure to take the city mirrored what the Boeotians had attempted during the Corinthian War, and can be seen as yet another indicator that Jason had now assumed the role in central Greece normally occupied by the Boeotian League.²⁸ Could the attack on Hyampolis have been a further play on the initial issue of the Corinthian War? As stated above the geography of the region allowed ambiguity in terms of setting borders, and the settlement of a border dispute favorable to the Locrians would further incentivize the Locrian League to shift its dependence and loyalty away from the Boeotian League to Jason.

If Jason wished to subdue the Phocians, he did not live to see the dream realized. Jason's assassination followed closely on the heels of his intervention at Leuctra. Jason mobilized his full army, which included the contingents of cities across Thessaly and not just his own mercenaries in preparation of advancing to the Pythian festival at Delphi.²⁹ As a part of this process, Jason reviewed the Pheraean cavalry and held an audience during which he was killed by seven young men, five of which eluded Jason's guards and took refuge in other Greek cities.³⁰

ὁ δ' οὖν ἀνὴρ τηλικούτος ὢν καὶ τοσαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα διανοούμενος, ἐξέτασιν πεποηκῶς καὶ δοκιμασίαν τοῦ Φεραίων ἰππικοῦ, καὶ ἤδη καθήμενος καὶ ἀποκρινόμενος, εἴ τις δεόμενός του προσίοι, ὑπὸ νεανίσκων ἑπτὰ προσελθόντων ὡς διαφερομένων τι ἀλλήλοις ἀποσφάττεται καὶ κατακόπτεται.

²⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27. Jason only succeeded in capturing the outer/suburban (προάστιος) part of the city.

²⁸ *Hell. Oxy.* F21.5.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.30.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31-32. For the stylistic aspects of Jason's arc and fall see Gray 1989, 163-165.

This version of events in which seven young men acted as the assassins aligns with what Diodorus claimed as Ephorus' version. The alternative and less convincing version, also in Diodorus, named Jason's brother Polyphron as his murderer.³¹

τρίτος δὲ Ἰάσων ὁ Φεραῖος ἡγεμὼν ἡρημένος τῆς Θεσσαλίας, καὶ δοκῶν ἐπιεικῶς ἄρχειν τῶν ὑποτεταγμένων, ἐδολοφονήθη, ὡς μὲν Ἐφορος γέγραφεν, ὑπὸ τινῶν ἑπτὰ νεανίσκων συνομοσαμένων δόξης ἕνεκα, ὡς δ' ἔνιοι γράφουσιν, ὑπὸ Πολυδώρου τᾶδελφοῦ.

Regardless of the method of Jason's death, the position of Pherae and Thessaly as the undisputed power of central Greece died with him.

With Jason removed from power and his successors left with a confederation that had been held together by Jason's skill as a leader and the threat of military force, the brief time of Thessaly as the major power of central Greece was waning. The Thebans were about to re-establish their power over Boeotia to an extent not seen since the start of the Corinthian War and resume their traditional role of balancing the power of the central Greek cities against each other. Like in 395 BC, the Boeotian League had the power to intervene in Thessaly after Jason's death, and only needed the opportunity to do so which developed in the form of Thessalian revolt from the successors of Jason, particularly Alexander of Pherae.

³¹ Diod. 15.60.5 claimed this version of events was given by some (ἔνιοι) historians who were not named. There may have been some confusion given the later accusations of fratricide against Polyphron.

Alexander of Pherae and Destabilization

The resurgence of Boeotian military intervention in Thessaly was precipitated by the rise of Alexander to power in Pherae. Alexander assumed power after assassinating Polyphron, one of Jason's brothers, in 369 BC. The hereditary ties between Alexander and Polyphron were not unanimously specified among the ancient sources. Diodorus referred to Alexander as the nephew of Polyphron.¹

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Πολύδωρος ὁ Φεραῖος ὁ τῶν Θετταλῶν ἄρξας ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ ἀδελφιδοῦ ἀνηρέθη φαρμάκῳ, προκληθεὶς εἰς μέθην: τὴν δὲ δυναστείαν διαδεξάμενος Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ ἀδελφιδοῦς ἤρξεν ἔτη ἕνδεκα.

Xenophon made no mention of the relationship, which seems out of place given that he described the ties between Jason, Polydorus, and Polyphron in the preceding section.²

ταῦτα δὲ ποιῶν καὶ οὗτος ἀποθνήσκει ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὡς τιμωροῦντος τῷ Πολυδώρῳ καὶ τὴν τυραννίδα καταλύοντος.

Despite the disparity of the source material, given the way he later portrayed himself and the actions surrounding his assumption of power, this examination will continue on the premise that Alexander was the son of Polydorus, which makes him the nephew of Jason and Polyphron.

There are two versions of Alexander's power bid, both of which are fairly macabre. One tradition (reported above) claimed Alexander poisoned his uncle after

¹ Diod. 15.61.2. Buckler 1980,110 named Alexander as the murderer but gave no familial relationship between him and Polyphron.

² Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.33-34. It was thought that Polyphron had murdered his brother Polydorus to attain sole power over Thessaly. Polyphron was not mentioned at all by Diodorus, who showed the succession of power moving directly from Jason to Polydorus: Diod. 15.60.5. Westlake 1935, 127 was probably right here in supposing that Diodorus confused the two names. The presence of only one name could be attributed to the extremely brief rule of Polydorus. A general consensus among scholars was that both Polyphron and Polydorus were brothers of Jason. Buckler 2003, 320; Sprawski 1999, 50; Westlake 1935, 127.

challenging him to a drinking contest.³ The other had Alexander run Polyphron through with a spear which was later made sacred.⁴

...τὴν δὲ λόγχην ἣ Πολύφρονα τὸν θεῖον ἀπέκτεινε καθιερώσας καὶ καταστέψας, ἔθυσεν ὥσπερ θεῶ καὶ Τύχωνα προσηγόρευε.

What is particularly remarkable in this episode is that Alexander was apparently able to take power in such a violent way with no repercussions. The sources did not indicate resistance in Pherae itself, which suggests that Alexander bought the loyalty of Jason's 6000 mercenaries before or shortly after his coup. As a member of Jason's family, Alexander had access to the same family revenue sources outlined above. Plutarch's version of the assassination indicated that Alexander had already purchased the loyalty of at least Polyphron's bodyguards, otherwise he might have been killed immediately like a few of Jason's assassins.⁵ Even if Alexander did not obtain control of the mercenaries until after he took power, they provided him with a significant advantage over anyone who challenged his authority. Additionally, the lack of a challenge may be attributed to the notion that Polyphron murdered Alexander's father Polydorus. The suspicion of this act must have been widely held and further promoted by Alexander once he assumed power. This would then allow Alexander to portray himself both as an avenger and tyrant slayer, which is precisely the self-styled image attributed to him by Xenophon.⁶ Diodorus claimed that Alexander had gained his power illegally but described no objection to his rise within Pherae.⁷ Like Jason, Alexander could initially base his power in Thessaly on the threat of direct military force due to his possession of

³ Diod. 15.61.2.

⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 29.4.

⁵ As mentioned above, two of Jason's assassins were killed by his bodyguard. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.32.

⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.34. Sprawski 2006, 138 suggested Alexander had more support in Thessaly than the ancient sources would have us believe. This could very well be true given that we only hear of other major Thessalian cities opposing Pherae rule, but the evidence for Thessaly is hardly ever detailed.

⁷ Diod. 15.61.2. This could refer to his claim to the *tageia* and not the assumption of power in Pherae.

the only large, professional army in Thessaly, but in nature Alexander was nothing like Jason.⁸ His weakness as a ruler would eventually lead the cities of Thessaly to believe that with the assistance of the Boeotian League they could shake off their Pheraeon overlord. It had been accomplished before.

If Alexander at first appeared to be a liberator and tyrant-slayer, this illusion was quickly shattered. The leading aristocrats of other Thessalian cities quickly recognized that Alexander had neither the temperament nor the talent which had allowed Jason to keep them effectively under his thumb. The almost immediate revolt of the Thessalian cities against Alexander demonstrated the fragility of Jason's empire and broke the supposedly unified Thessaly, short-lived though it was, created by him.⁹ As he saw his influence over Thessaly begin to wane, Alexander responded with increasingly brutal tactics which only deepened the rift between Pherae and other Thessalian cities. The ancient sources provided a number of anecdotes which illustrate Alexander's cruelty.¹⁰ Scotussa, a city in Pelasgiotis to the east of Pherae, felt Alexander's wrath after word spread of their intention to challenge Alexander's power. Alexander commanded all the men of the city to assemble in the theater at which point they were surrounded and slaughtered by peltasts and archers.¹¹

⁸ The Boeotians were likely more afraid of Alexander's erratic behavior and unpredictable behavior than his skill as a leader despite Buckler 1980, 111 claiming the Thebans started to worry when 'Alexander came to power and showed signs of attaining to Jason's old eminence.' Jason was at least a stable ally. With Alexander the threat was actually the use of force.

⁹ As Sprawski 2004, 449 suggested, Alexander's title of *tagos* probably meant very little outside of areas under his direct control. See above for a discussion of the legality of Alexander's rule.

¹⁰ Sprawski 2006, 136-137 suggested that Plutarch in particular tainted the legacy of Alexander in order to make him a more effective counterpoint to his hero Pelopidas. This sentiment was derived from Westlake 1935, 157, though Westlake did not contest the fact that Alexander was a cruel ruler. These arguments are weakened by the testimony of Xenophon, who described Alexander as *χαλεπός* in his dealings with the Thessalians and the Thebans, who Xenophon had no inclination to turn into heroes. *Xen. Hell.* 6.4.35.

¹¹ Paus. 6.5.2 also noted that in his own time the city was unpopulated. It is interesting if archers were used to kill the men of the city, because they were fairly rare in central Greek warfare at this time. The use of peltasts should be in no way surprising due to their abundance in Thessaly. *Plut. Pel.* 29.4 claimed that the citizens of Meliboea were likewise slaughtered by Alexander.

Σκοτούσσα δὲ ἡ τοῦ Πουλυδάμαντας πατρὶς οὐκ ᾤκειτο ἔτι ἐφ' ἡμῶν:
 Ἀλέξανδρος γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὁ Φεραίων τυραννήσας κατέλαβεν ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ
 Σκοτουσσαίων τούς τε ἐς τὸ θέατρον συνειλεγμένους—ἔτυχε γὰρ σφισι καὶ
 ἐκκλησία τηρικαῦτα οὔσα—τούτους τε ἅπαντας κατηκόντισε, πελτασταῖς ἐν
 κύκλῳ περισχῶν καὶ τοξόταις, καὶ τὸ ἄλλο ὅσον ἐν ἡλικίᾳ κατεφόνευσε,
 γυναῖκας δὲ ἀπέδοτο καὶ παῖδας, μισθὸν εἶναι τὰ χρήματα τοῖς ξένοις.

Pausanias' claim that Alexander sold the women and children of Scotussa into slavery to pay for his mercenaries indicates that at some point Alexander lost the tribute of the perioecic cities which had been one of Jason's greatest accomplishments.¹² This cannot be surprising given the situation in the cities in Thessaly proper and the fact that this was the last stage in Jason's ascendancy in Thessaly. If they felt they could break away from Alexander, the perioecic cities, who had been largely left to their own devices for a century before Jason, surely felt at ease in the cessation of payment. While the claims regarding Scotussa and Meliboea have grounding in practical concerns (the funding of mercenaries which equated to the maintenance of power), Alexander's more personal atrocities reflect the desire of Plutarch to create a complete villain for his hero Pelopidas to challenge. In this vein his erratic behavior also extended to those within his own court. Alexander reportedly had one of his favorite boys detained, and when Thebe, his wife, begged for leniency Alexander had the man executed.¹³

ἡ δὲ ἔχθρα λέγεται αὐτῇ πρὸς τὸν ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ὑπὸ μὲν τινων ὡς ἐπεὶ ἔδησε
 τὰ ἑαυτοῦ παιδικὰ ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος, νεανίσκον ὄντα καλόν, δεηθείσης αὐτῆς
 λῦσαι ἐξαγαγὼν αὐτὸν ἀπέσφαξεν...

He also buried men alive, and made men dress in boar skins to be hunted with dogs.¹⁴

To summarize, though likely not as monstrous as Plutarch suggested, Alexander was by no means a fair and just ruler. His actions were motivated by personal gain and the

¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19.

¹³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37.

¹⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 29.4.

maintenance of his power in Thessaly and challenged the power of traditional local elites which in turn alienated the *poleis* of Thessaly from Pheraeon rule and created an opportunity for the resumption of Boeotian military intervention which did not exist in Jason's time.

Much like in the Corinthian War, the Aleuadae of Larisa were the first to call for foreign aid in Thessaly. The Aleuadae were certainly among those who were exiled during the brief reign of Polyphron and saw their opportunity to reassert their control over Larisa when Alexander came to power.¹⁵ These Aleuadae, who are not individually named in the ancient sources, first approached Alexander II of Macedon to help them retake their city.¹⁶

διὸ καὶ τὴν παρανομίαν φοβηθέντες τῶν Λαρισσαίων τινές, οἱ δι' εὐγένειαν Ἀλευάδαι προσαγορευόμενοι, συνέθεντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους καταλῦσαι τὴν δυναστείαν. ἀπελθόντες δ' ἐκ Λαρίσσης εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἔπεισαν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν βασιλέα συγκαταλῦσαι τὸν τύραννον.

These men were probably living in the Macedonian court at the time because the Argead house (of which Alexander II was a member) had a history with the Thessalians.¹⁷ At some point during the Corinthian War, Amyntas, the father of both Alexander II and Philip II, had been driven out of Macedonia by the Illyrians, but was later restored to the throne by an unnamed group of Thessalians which very well could have been the Aleuadae.¹⁸

κατὰ δὲ τὴν Μακεδονίαν Ἀμύντας ὁ Φιλίππου πατὴρ Ἰλλυριῶν ἐμβalόντων εἰς Μακεδονίαν ἐξέπιπτεν ἐκ τῆς χώρας: ἀπογνοῦς δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν Ὀλυνθίοις μὲν τὴν

¹⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.34. Buckler 2003, 321 made it sound as though the Aleuadae were still in Larisa at the time, claiming they sent an embassy to Alexander II.

¹⁶ Diod. 15.61.3.

¹⁷ Diod. 15.61.3 used the aorist participle of ἀπέρχομαι to describe the journey of the Aleuadae to the Macedonian court. Translated as 'having gone from Larisa to Macedonia' the passage could refer to the exile of the Aleuads rather than a journey after Alexander took power since no context of relative time is provided. When Alexander II did arrive at Larisa, he had Larisean refugees with him. Diod. 15.61.4. Who would Polyphron exile if not the ruling family who opposed him?

¹⁸ Diod. 14.92.3. For a more detailed examination of the Macedonian succession in this period see March 1995, 272-275.

σύνεγγυς χώραν ἔδωρήσατο, αὐτὸς δὲ τότε μὲν ἀπέβαλε τὴν βασιλείαν, μετ' ὀλίγον δὲ χρόνον ὑπὸ Θετταλῶν καταχθεὶς ἀνεκτήσατο τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ ἐβασίλευσεν ἔτη εἴκοσι τέτταρα.

Thanks to some treachery (a consistent aspect of how cities were captured in central Greece) the army of Alexander II was allowed into Larisa by some unnamed Lariseans and proceeded to take the citadel, which was garrisoned by men loyal to Alexander of Pherae, through a brief siege.¹⁹ There should be really no contesting that Pheraeans forces controlled Larisa at this time, despite scholarly claims to the contrary.²⁰ When Polydorus died (or was murdered), he and Polyphron were journeying to Larisa, the same city from which Polyphron would later expel the leading citizens. How would Polyphron be able to exile the leading men of the city if the Pheraeans did not have control? Additionally, who would Alexander II be fighting against when he took Larisa's citadel by siege? It cannot have been the majority of the Lariseans since they were the ones who allowed him into the city. The situation may have been similar to Heracleia Trachinia where the citizenry allowed an army in to topple an occupying garrison. If he were actively fighting the Lariseans then the deal suggested by scholars between Macedon, Larisa, and the Boeotian League could not have existed. This is not to say that Alexander of Pherae was physically in Larisa at the time. While not within the citadel, he was nearby while Larisa was being taken, and Diodorus recorded that he was pursued back to Pherae, presumably by the Macedonians.²¹ The most reasonable conclusion which can be drawn from these events is that Alexander maintained a garrison in Larisa which was put in place by his predecessor Polyphron. Alexander, unlike Jason, preferred to maintain power through garrisons which means there is little

¹⁹ Diod. 15.61.4-5. He also captured the city of Crannon which is south of Larisa along a major ancient road.

²⁰ Buckler 1980, 112.

²¹ Diod. 15.61.5.

chance he ceded power to another Larisean faction. He was known to garrison smaller cities, and wanted to continue to repress the power of increasingly dangerous local elites in one of Thessaly's largest cities.²²

While the main goal of removing the influence of Alexander of Pherae from Larisa was accomplished, the Aleuadae could not be satisfied with the final result. Alexander II saw an opportunity to solidify his influence in Thessaly perhaps as a counter to his declining power in Macedon, and given the hasty retreat of Alexander of Pherae may have had ambitions to continue his campaign. With this in mind, Alexander II garrisoned Larisa himself rather than cede control to the Aleuadae.²³

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν τε ἄκραν ἐξεπολιόρησε καὶ Κραννῶνα πόλιν
προσαγαγόμενος ὡμολόγησε μὲν τοῖς Θετταλοῖς ἀποδώσειν τὰς πόλεις,
καταφρονήσας δὲ τῆς δόξης, καὶ φρουρὰς ἀξιολόγους εἰσαγαγόν, αὐτὸς κατεῖχε
τὰς πόλεις. ὁ δὲ Φεραῖος Ἀλέξανδρος καταδιωχθεὶς ἅμα καὶ καταπλαγεὶς
ἐπανῆλθεν εἰς τὰς Φεράς. καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Θετταλίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν.

The Aleuadae were now in need of another foreign savior and there was no better candidate than the Boeotian League. The Boeotian willingness to send forces to Thessaly was already proven, and the situation somewhat echoed the occasion when Medius called for aid against Lycophron in the Corinthian War. Like in the 390s BC, the Boeotians had just won a major battle over the Spartans (Leuctra) with no assistance from other states. One Spartan king was killed in battle (as opposed to Sparta's most famous general in 395 BC) and unique for the 370s BC, the Peloponnese had then been successfully invaded. For the moment, the Boeotian League was the dominant military force in Greece, as long as it could prevent a major challenge to its traditional domain of central Greece through consolidation of manpower in the north

²² Plut. *Pel.* 35.2. Alexander garrisoned cities in nearby Magnesia and Achaean Phthiotis during his reign.

²³ Diod. 15.61.5.

under a Thessalian or Macedonian leader.²⁴ For the first time since the Corinthian War, direct intervention in Thessaly was a viable method of achieving Boeotian goals and neutralizing threats to Boeotian power in central Greece.

If Alexander II and the Macedonians had been worried about reliving the threat of a unified Thessaly, the Boeotians must have been terrified. After the victory at Leuctra in 371 BC the Boeotians heavily invested their manpower in minimizing Sparta's influence in the Peloponnese, which in turn avoided further Spartan intervention in the Theban consolidation of Boeotia. While the Thebans were ultimately interested in using allies to keep the Spartans in check, and thus free up forces for their own needs in central Greece, in 369 BC there was still a need for an invasion army to detach the other states of the Peloponnese from Spartan control. Sending an army to the Peloponnese, even though the Boeotians made up only a fraction of the total manpower, meant their ability to stop an invasion from northern Greece was hindered. Jason had effectively shifted the balance of power in central Greece after he destroyed Heracleia Trachinia in 371 BC and ordered a mobilization ahead of the Pythian Games, but his death made it possible for the Boeotian League to remove this northern threat in a way they could not have done in the 370s BC.²⁵ The sending of an army to Thessaly should be seen as a matter of extreme urgency and potential benefit to the Boeotian League. If Alexander of Pherae's power could be contained by the other Thessalian cities, the Boeotians would have little to fear from their northern border and could resume the regional pre-eminence they had previously enjoyed. An added benefit to

²⁴ Buckler 2003, 319-320 believed that the death of Jason of Pherae ended any hopes at a unified Thessaly. While this proved to be true in the end, there is no way the Boeotians could have predicted this at the time. The risk of not acting to ensure Thessaly could not be united was simply too great.

²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.27-30.

this strategy was the further isolation of Orchomenus, which still served as a harbor of anti-League sentiment at this time.

Before moving on to the Theban reaction to the plea of the Aleuadae, one aspect of the plea itself requires examination.²⁶ Among modern scholarship there has been argument for a pre-existing tripartite accord between the Lariseans, Alexander II, and the Boeotians in which Alexander agreed to hold the city until the Boeotian relief force could arrive.²⁷ This contradicts the ancient testimony that Alexander II was holding Larisa and Crannon against the will of the Thessalians. Diodorus described the garrisoning of these two cities by Alexander II's forces as 'καταφρονήσας δέ τῆς δόξης,' which clearly indicates continuing Macedonian control was not an expected result of the original arrangement.²⁸ Additionally, there is no indication that the Boeotians retained garrisons within these cities. It went against Boeotian interests to establish a permanent garrison in a Thessalian city from both the perspective of resources and past patterns of behavior. The better solution, and the one which was eventually employed, was to liberate cities hostile to Alexander and allow them to challenge his power just as what happened in the 390s to Lycophron. The Boeotian League would then convincingly return to its role as the largest power in central Greece while risking a minimal amount of resources in Thessaly. The Larisean call for help and the subsequent Boeotian missions to Thessaly demonstrate the enactment of this strategy.

²⁶ Sprawski 2006, 140 was of the opinion that Pharsalus must have been the city to call for aid because Larisa was already supported by Alexander II of Macedon, but this does not account for what happened after the removal of Alexander of Pherae's garrison. An additional argument against Pharsalus is that the sources make no mention of the Boeotian army stopping there, instead proceeding straight to Larisa. Plut. *Pel.* 26.2. If Pharsalus had been the complainant, there surely would be some evidence of acknowledgement here.

²⁷ Buckler 1980, 113-114. Roy 1994, 194 followed Buckler's arguments.

²⁸ Diod. 15.61.5.

Pelopidas and the Boeotian League in Thessaly

The widest range of Boeotian strategies regarding military influence and intervention beyond the northern border of Boeotia was demonstrated by the three expeditions of Pelopidas into Thessaly. All three utilized different techniques to achieve the ultimate goal of establishing an uncomfortable and often tenuous balance of power between the major Thessalian cities. This goal was essentially unchanged since the Corinthian War, but the evolving situation in Boeotia regarding the reconsolidation of the Boeotian League under Theban leadership necessitated different approaches. After the unexpected results of Alexander II's intervention at Larisa, the Thebans assented to the Thessalian request for an army. Included in the Thessalian plea was a request for a general and Pelopidas volunteered to lead the force into Thessaly.¹

ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φερῶν τυράννου πολεμοῦντος μὲν ἐκ προδήλου πολλοῖς Θετταλῶν, ἐπιβουλεύοντος δὲ πᾶσιν, ἐπρέσβευσαν εἰς Θήβας αἱ πόλεις στρατηγὸν αἰτούμεναι καὶ δύναμιν, ὧν ὁ Πελοπίδας τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν τὰς ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ πράξεις διοικεῖν,¹ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπέδωκε καὶ προσένευε τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς...

There are essentially two chronologies which have been proposed for the date of this first action. One favors a dating of events one year later than the other. The 'high' chronology will be used here.² This places Epaminondas' second invasion of the Peloponnese, and Pelopidas' initial intervention in Thessaly, in 369 rather than 368 BC.

The association of Pelopidas with the Thessalian campaigns has proven troublesome for historians who often chose (in true Plutarchan fashion) to make the story center on Pelopidas rather than focusing on the interests of the Boeotian League as a whole. The current examination seeks to rectify this error by maintaining focus on

¹ Plut. *Pel.* 26.1.

² For a defense of this chronology see Buckler 1980, 245-249. For an alternative view see Wiseman 1969, 177-199.

the needs of the Boeotian state over those of an individual. To preface with an example, due to their adherence to Plutarch, some scholars have read more personal reasons into Pelopidas' choice to take command of the first expedition. Pelopidas has been portrayed as the caretaker of Jason's widow and the protector of Jason's daughter (and Alexander's wife) Thebe.³ Despite these romantic, heroic approaches to the situation, there were abundant practical reasons for Boeotian intervention. As Jason had proven with his intervention at Leuctra and assembling of the army, a unified Thessaly could be extremely powerful. With Sparta weakened but not yet defeated and Athens increasingly hostile, the Boeotian League could not risk a powerful threat to their own power base in central Greece.

In his first campaign into Thessaly it is clear that Pelopidas was accompanied by a Boeotian army.⁴ There is no indication as to the size of this army but it cannot have been very large given that Epaminondas was campaigning in the Peloponnese at the same time.⁵ In subsequent campaigns Pelopidas first stopped at Pharsalus before taking significant action, but in this case he advanced further north to Larisa which brought his forces directly between Pherae and Macedon.⁶

ὡς οὖν ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Θεσσαλίαν μετὰ δυνάμεως, τὴν τε Λάρισσαν εὐθύς παρέλαβε, καὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον ἐλθόντα καὶ δεόμενον διαλλάττειν ἐπειρᾶτο καὶ ποιεῖν ἐκ τυράννου πρᾶον ἄρχοντα τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς καὶ νόμιμον.

³ Buckler 1980, 110-111; 2003, 320-321. Jason's widow was living in Thebes after his death but nothing more is known about her. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37.

⁴ Diod. 15.61.5.

⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 26.1. Buckler 1980, 114 agreed with the current estimation and described the size of the army as 'moderate.'

⁶ Plut. *Pel.* 26.2. The immediacy of Pelopidas' advance to Larisa is indicated by Plutarch's use of εὐθύς. Diod. 15.67.4.

The quick move past Pharsalus was due to Pharsalus still being independent from Alexander and thus requiring no immediate assistance. No actual battle is recorded at Larisa, though Pelopidas was able to take control of the city.⁷

οὗτος δὲ καταντήσας εἰς Λάρισσαν, καὶ καταλαβὼν τὴν ἀκρόπολιν
φρουρουμένην ὑπὸ Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Μακεδόνοιο, ταύτην μὲν παρέλαβεν...

Both Diodorus and Plutarch used ‘*παραλαμβάνω*’ to describe the shift in possession, which does not have a strong connotation of violent action. While, as stated above, it was unlikely for Alexander II, the Lariseans, and Thebes to have a prearranged partnership in place, Alexander II, hoping to win Theban support against his rival Ptolemy, could have turned over Larisa in exchange for Boeotian support and arbitration. It was an easy choice for Alexander II and his forces. He could either hold the city and open a war against the Boeotian League which would undoubtedly lead to his downfall once they joined with Ptolemy, or he could attempt to make a new ally in his struggle for control of the Macedonian throne.

The Boeotian liberation of Larisa did not go unnoticed in Pherae, and Alexander attempted to negotiate with Pelopidas. According to Plutarch, Pelopidas attempted to make Alexander govern the Thessalians in a just way (*νόμιμος*), but became enraged by Alexander’s savage (*θηριώδης*) nature and Alexander fled from their meeting place.⁸

ὡς δὲ ἦν ἀνήκεστος καὶ θηριώδης καὶ πολλὴ μὲν ὀμότης αὐτοῦ, πολλὴ δὲ
ἀσέλγεια καὶ πλεονεξία κατηγορεῖτο, τραχυνομένου τοῦ Πελοπίδου πρὸς αὐτὸν
καὶ χαλεπαίνοντος ἀποδρᾶς ὄχρετο μετὰ τῶν δορυφόρων.

Though some have taken this to indicate that Pelopidas was content to let Alexander govern Thessaly as a constitutional ruler, but regional concerns preclude this option.⁹

⁷ Diod. 15.67.4. Mackil 2013, 73-74 made the stunning error of confusing the two Alexanders and implying that it was the Pheraeian who held Larisa rather than the Macedonian.

⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 26.2.

⁹ Sprawski 2006, 141 indicated that Pelopidas might be willing to give Thessaly to Alexander.

Allowing Alexander complete control of Thessaly was the very thing the Boeotians had become involved in the war to prevent. Instead, Pelopidas challenged Alexander to take power according to the laws, which as described above required the common consent of the Thessalians. The liberation of Larisa guaranteed that this would not occur.

Alexander, unable to gain support in Thessaly, was attempting to override his opposition by receiving an endorsement from the traditionally influential Boeotian League. The result the Boeotians hoped for from this intervention was very similar to their intervention in Pharsalus in the 390s BC. They sought to create an uneasy balance of power which would prevent a unified Thessaly while not requiring further investment of military forces because the limitation of Spartan power in the Peloponnese was far from complete. Additionally, their Thessalian allies would not have been satisfied if the Boeotian League had recognized Alexander as the rightful ruler of Thessaly contrary to their own laws.¹⁰ Pelopidas had, after all, been instructed to reach a settlement in Thessaly which was in the best interest of the Boeotians and leaving Thessaly unified under an unstable ruler could not be further from an agreeable settlement.¹¹ The entirety of this first expedition can be understood through the idea that Pelopidas was attempting to perform his mission, dictated by the Boeotian League but also placing a great deal of trust in his judgment, with as little material and human investment as possible. Given this goal, it should come as no surprise that Pelopidas did not attempt to challenge Alexander on the battlefield. Even with a force bolstered by the Lariseans, it would have posed a high risk to engage Alexander and his 6000 mercenaries in open battle. Furthermore, the sources suggest that Epaminondas was

¹⁰ Buckler 1980, 115. Westlake 1935, 133 correctly deemed the willingness of Pelopidas to recognize Alexander as *tagos* 'unlikely.'

¹¹ Diod. 15.67.3.

already in the Peloponnese when the Thessalians made their plea. The Boeotians were not expecting action in northern Greece and as a result Epaminondas may have taken the best Boeotian troops, including the continuously trained Sacred Band (the closest the Boeotians could come to a professional unit), to the Peloponnese with him.¹² This left Pelopidas with the least combat-ready troops in Boeotia meaning either the young men not yet in their prime or the older men well past it. There would have been a scramble to mobilize, and unlike Epaminondas Pelopidas did not have the advantage of a wide array of allied reinforcements. If Pelopidas lost a large portion of his army in a pitched battle with Alexander's forces, Alexander would be able to challenge newly reestablished Boeotian influence in Phocis and threaten Boeotian-allied Locris and the northern borders of Boeotia especially because Heracleia Trachinia was no longer a possible stronghold.

Around this time Pelopidas also took control of Crannon which had also been garrisoned by the Macedonians.¹³ A free Crannon benefited all parties involved in the ceding of Larisa. For the Macedonians, Alexander II gained back valuable forces to use against Ptolemy. The Lariseans gained another valuable ally in their continued struggle against Alexander of Pherae. The Boeotian League furthered the instability in Thessaly by liberating another historically powerful city. Though some believe that Boeotian forces were left in Larisa and Crannon in order to guard against further attack from Alexander of Pherae, garrisons are not mentioned anywhere in the source material and it would be unusual for the Boeotian League to utilize garrisons in central Greece.

Boeotian garrisons can be ruled out given the circumstances surrounding the

¹² Plut. *Pel.* 18.1 stated that the men of the Sacred Band were maintained at the expense of the city.

¹³ Diod. 15.61.5.

campaign.¹⁴ Given that issues in the Peloponnese were far from decided, and that Orchomenus remained, as usual, a seat of dissidence within the Boeotian League, forces could not be spared for garrisons in the north, particularly with a newly hostile, post-Leuctra Athens lurking in the south. Pelopidas must have ceded control of Larisa to the Aleuadae, which fulfilled the broken promise made by Alexander II of Macedon and continued the association between the two powers.

What remains unclear regarding this first invasion is if and where any military action took place, or whether posturing was all that was necessary to achieve Pelopidas' limited goals. It has been suggested that during his march back to Thebes Pelopidas created Theban outposts at Nicaea and Echinus, though there is no clear evidence to suggest this date for these events.¹⁵ More serious consideration should be given to the attribution of the events described by Polyaeus and Frontinus to this campaign, which scholars have used to create a Magnesian episode in the history. The issue with the evidence is that it is almost completely anecdotal and in general does not provide enough specific information to identify the locations involved with any certainty.¹⁶ The only source to mention Magnesia was Frontinus, who related an anecdote of how Pelopidas captured two towns by setting the forest between them on fire and leading each town to believe that the other had been captured.¹⁷

Pelopidas Thebanus Magnetum duo oppida simul oppugnaturus non ita longo spatio distantia, quo tempore ad alterum eorum exercitum admovebat, praecepit, ut ex composito ab aliis castris quattuor equites coronati notabili

¹⁴ Westlake 1935, 133. Buckler 1980, 115. Tracy 2010, 23 overstated the case that the Thebans wanted to take control of Thessaly.

¹⁵ Westlake 1935, 134 admitted the lack of evidence pointing to this dating.

¹⁶ Buckler 1980, 247 followed the lead of Westlake 1935, 132 and seemed unwilling to entertain the idea that these stories are unconvincing in their generalization. The same view was then reiterated by Buckler 2003, 322 but this time stated the Magnesian campaign as fact without describing how this was part of the overall invasion or critically evaluating the source material.

¹⁷ Front. *Strat.* 3.8.2.

alacritate velut victoriam nuntiantes venirent. Ad cuius simulationem curavit, ut silva quae in medio erat incenderetur, praebitura speciem urbis ardentis...

Polyaenus, who did not state these cities were in Magnesia, claimed that they were 120 stades apart, which would actually make the technique plausible because at sea level the cities would be just beyond the horizon from each other.¹⁸ Neither source actually named the two cities, which makes both their geographic and chronological placement more difficult. The real difficulty in attributing these events to this first expedition, and to the realm of reality, lies in the geographic considerations. Magnesia makes up the eastern coast of Thessaly and includes the peninsula of Mt. Pelion. Accessing southern Magnesia would require passing Pherae which Pelopidas was hesitant to do. This action would mean a military engagement with Alexander which as indicated above was not in Boeotian interests. Later garrisons of Alexander over the Magnesian cities indicate that if Pelopidas did intervene here, its effects were short-lived.¹⁹

καταλαβόντες δὲ συνεσταλμένον καὶ περικεκομμένον τῆς δυνάμεως
Ἀλέξανδρον ἠνάγκασαν Θεσσαλοῖς μὲν ἀποδοῦναι τὰς πόλεις ἃς εἶχεν αὐτῶν,
Μάγνητας δὲ καὶ Φθιώτας Ἀχαιοὺς ἀφεῖναι καὶ τὰς φρουρὰς ἐξαγαγεῖν...

We should then conclude that no combat took place on this expedition and the Magnesian episode occurred at another time or was a complete fabrication.

Considerably more information survives regarding Pelopidas' second trip to Thessaly in 368 BC. The Thessalians, once again tormented by the persistent Alexander, brought a complaint to the Boeotian League which responded by sending Pelopidas and Ismenias on an embassy with no accompanying military force.²⁰

μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάλιν τῶν Θετταλῶν αἰτιωμένων τὸν Φεραῖον Ἀλέξανδρον ὡς διαταράττοντα τὰς πόλεις, ἀπεστάλη Μετὰ Ἴσμηνίου πρεσβεύων ὁ Πελοπίδας:

¹⁸ Polyaen. 2.4.1.

¹⁹ Plut. *Pel.* 35.2.

²⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 27.1. Diod. 15.71.2. stated that Pelopidas went with Ismenias, but did not specify whether or not they were accompanied by other forces.

καὶ παρῆν οὔτε οἴκοθεν ἄγων δύναμιν οὔτε πόλεμον προσδοκήσας, αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῖς Θετταλοῖς χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ κατεπεῖγον τῶν πραγμάτων ἀναγκαζόμενος.

Though Pelopidas was not a *boeotarch* in this year he obviously still had enough influence to be chosen for the embassy.²¹ There are no details of other members of the embassy beyond these two, which can be taken as an indication of the amount of influence that both Pelopidas and Ismenias held in Thessaly.²² Ismenias the son of Ismenias had connections to Thessaly through his father, who, as detailed above, campaigned there after the battle of Haliartus and was put to death by the Spartans after the capture of the Cadmeia in 382 BC.²³ As the first major city in Thessaly on the road north from Boeotia, Pelopidas and Ismenias first stopped at Pharsalus. While at Pharsalus, Pelopidas and Ismenias met with Alexander but were taken prisoner and Pharsalus was captured.²⁴

ὁ δέ, ὡς εἶδεν ἀνόπλους καὶ μόνους προσιόντας, ἐκείνους μὲν εὐθὺς συνέλαβε, τὴν δὲ Φάρσαλον κατέσχε...

The capture of Pharsalus signaled a major step in Alexander's campaign against the other Thessalian cities. Possession of Pharsalus meant that Boeotian aid to Larisa was hampered and the Aleuadae were isolated. Alexander cannot have believed this egregious act of imprisoning ambassadors would work toward his overall goal of long-term domination of Thessaly but at this point he might not have had much to lose. The Boeotians had already demonstrated in the first expedition that they would never

²¹ Westlake 1935, 141 placed a great deal of emphasis on Pelopidas' disfavor in Thebes at this time.

²² Mosley 1965, 255 concluded that there was no set number of envoys deemed appropriate for any given embassy.

²³ Plut. *Mor.* 576A. Plut. *Pel.* 5.3. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.36.

²⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 27.6. Diod. 15.71.2 did not mention the capture of Pharsalus, only the imprisonment of Pelopidas and Ismenias. Westlake 1935, 141 was adamant in its conviction that Alexander did not do this because of his nature. Mackil 2013, 74 claimed Pelopidas was held at Pharsalus. There is no indication of this in the ancient sources and unless Thebe was living in Pharsalus for some reason the meeting described in Plutarch (whatever its historical truth) would be impossible. As stated in the introduction, it is unlikely that Plutarch himself fabricated events, but this does not eliminate the possibility of a contemporary fabrication from his sources.

recognize his claim to rule Thessaly without the consent of the other Thessalian cities but he might have thought they would change course with the lives of their ambassadors hanging in the balance.²⁵ Of course, Alexander's power play did not work to his desired results. For the Boeotians to respond with anything other than a strong military expedition would show weakness to both their Thessalian allies and the Athenians and Spartans, not to mention the remaining anti-League elements in Boeotia. Alexander had upset the delicate balance of power Pelopidas had managed to establish in his military campaign the year before. The Boeotian League was forced to send an army to punish Alexander and retrieve their ambassadors.

The Thebans reacted swiftly to the capture of their ambassadors and sent an army into Thessaly.²⁶ This army was large even by Boeotian standards, with 8000 hoplites and 600 cavalry.²⁷ The Boeotians were initially accompanied by their Thessalian allies but these allies abandoned the Boeotians which signaled the start of several issues for the invading force.²⁸

Θηβαίων δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς πραχθεῖσι παροξυνθέντων, καὶ ταχέως εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν ἐκπεμψάντων ὀπλίτας μὲν ὀκτακισχιλίους, ἵππεῖς δ' ἑξακοσίους...

The Thessalian allies served to bolster the cavalry of the Boeotians which was severely outnumbered by that of Alexander and his allies. The Boeotians, for their part, provided the quality infantry to face Alexander's mercenaries. Unfortunately for the Boeotians,

²⁵ This goes against Westlake 1935, 141-142 which stated the Theban government would not wish to mount a campaign.

²⁶ Diod. 15.71.3. Plut. *Pel.* 28.1. Paus. 9.15.1 named the two *boeotarchoi* in command as Cleomenes and Hypatus.

²⁷ Diod. 15.71.3.

²⁸ Diod. 15.71.4. The importance of allies in Thessaly was illustrated during the Peloponnesian War by the march of Brasidas as discussed above. Thuc. 4.78.2-5.

Alexander had gained the support of the now hostile Athenians, who sent 30 ships and 1000 men north under the command of Autocles.²⁹

...φοβηθεὶς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐξέπεμψε πρεσβευτὰς εἰς τὰς Ἀθήνας περὶ συμμαχίας. ᾧ παραχρῆμα ὁ δῆμος ἐξέπεμψε ναῦς μὲν τριάκοντα, στρατιώτας δὲ χιλίους, ὧν ἦν στρατηγὸς Αὐτοκλῆς.

This seems to contradict the testimony of Xenophon, who claimed Alexander was hostile to both the Thebans and the Athenians.³⁰

ταῦτα δὲ ποιῶν καὶ οὗτος ἀποθνήσκει ὑπ' Ἀλεξάνδρου, ὡς τιμωροῦντος τῷ Πολυδώρῳ καὶ τὴν τυραννίδα καταλύοντος. ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτὸς παρέλαβε τὴν ἀρχήν, χαλεπὸς μὲν Θετταλοῖς ταγὸς ἐγένετο, χαλεπὸς δὲ Θηβαίοις καὶ Ἀθηναίοις πολέμιος, ἄδικος δὲ ληστής καὶ κατὰ γῆν καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν.

Xenophon was undoubtedly referring to Alexander's later naval actions against the Athenians in favor of omitting their earlier cooperation, which Demosthenes viewed as shameful in his later speech.³¹ As mentioned above, the Athenians were not Alexander's only allies, as he was joined in his standoff with the Boeotian army by other forces.³²

...ὡς δ' οὗτοι μὲν αὐτοὺς ἐγκατέλιπον, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ τινες ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι παρεγένοντο τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ...

These allies were the Thessalians who were still subject to Alexander at this time.³³

Alexander's combined army coupled with the defection of the Thessalians supposedly loyal to the Boeotians and a dwindling number of supplies left the Boeotians no choice but to retreat back to their border.³⁴

²⁹ Diod. 15.71.3. Though he mentioned no specific troop numbers, Dem. 23.120 confirmed that aid was sent to Alexander of Pherae after he had captured Pelopidas.

³⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35.

³¹ Dem. 23.130. Plut. *Pel.* 31.4. claimed that at the time of Pelopidas' third invasion in 364 BC Alexander was giving money to the Athenians, so Alexander must not have initiated his naval war against the Athenians until after this date which in turn allows for Athenian cooperation with him here.

³² Diod. 15.71.4.

³³ Westlake 1935, 144 claimed, not unjustifiably, that by this point Alexander controlled 'less than half of Pelasgiotis, the greater part of Magnesia, and nearly all Achaëa.'

³⁴ Diod. 15.71.4.

τὰ δὲ σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ καὶ τᾶλλα πάντα ἐπέλειπε τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἐπάνοδον ποιῆσθαι.

Even if the Boeotians thought they could win on their own against Alexander, the risks remained the same as in Pelopidas' first campaign. A defeat would still leave open the possibility that Alexander would execute the Boeotian ambassadors and crush the remaining resistance in Thessaly which at this point was mainly left to Larisa.³⁵

Epaminondas was apparently serving in the ranks during this campaign and was implored to save the army which he did by using the Boeotian cavalry and light-armed troops to cover the retreat of the hoplites back through the pass at Thermopylae.³⁶

ἤδη δ' αὐτῶν τὴν σωτηρίαν ἀπογινοσκόντων, Ἐπαμεινώνδας ἰδιωτεύων κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὑπὸ τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατεστάθη στρατηγός. εὐθὺς δὲ διαλέξας τοὺς τε ψιλοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἰππεῖς, τούτους μὲν αὐτὸς ἀνέλαβε, καὶ ταχθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς οὐραγίας διὰ τούτων ἀνέστελλε τοὺς ἐπακολουθοῦντας πολεμίους καὶ πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν παρείχετο τοῖς προηγουμένοις ὀπλίταις, ποιούμενος δὲ μάχας ἐξ ὑποστροφῆς καὶ τάξει φιλοτέχνῳ χρώμενος διέσωσε τὸ στρατόπεδον.

While Pausanias agreed that Epaminondas took command from the *boeotarchoi*, he described the army as only getting just beyond the pass at Thermopylae before they were met by Alexander and his forces.³⁷

It is clear from the sources that a second invasion was launched after the failure of the first, and the two *boeotarchoi* were punished for their failure as discussed above.³⁸ Epaminondas was placed in command of this second army, though no numbers are given by the ancient sources to indicate the size of the force, but given the tactics adopted by Epaminondas it may have been smaller than in the first invasion.³⁹

³⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 211F. Their retreat was remarkably similar to the situation faced by Agesilaus on his return from Asia Minor during the Corinthian War.

³⁶ Diod. 15.71.6.

³⁷ Paus. 9.15.2.

³⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 29.1 claimed they were each fined 10,000 drachmas.

³⁹ Only Plut. *Pel.* 29.1 named Epaminondas as the commander.

ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ στρατηγοὶ τῶν Θηβαίων εἰς τὴν Θετταλίαν ἐμβαλόντες ἔπραξαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀπειρίαν ἢ δυστυχίαν αἰσχυρῶς ἀνεχώρησαν, ἐκείνων μὲν ἕκαστον ἢ πόλις μυρίαὶς δραχμαῖς ἐζημίωσεν, Ἐπαμεινώνδαν δὲ μετὰ δυνάμεως ἀπέστειλεν.

Further support for Epaminondas commanding the second invasion comes from Polyaeus who describe Epaminondas using fire to cross the Spercheus and form a battle line against some Thessalians, which must refer to an army of Alexander or that of his allies.⁴⁰ Epaminondas was clearly in command and taking an offensive action which does not equate with the description of the first campaign in the other sources. However, this evidence from Polyaeus should still be viewed with a certain degree of suspicion due to its anecdotal nature and lack of context.

Epaminondas' strategy deviated from that of the first campaign under Cleomenes and Hypatus, which, until the Thessalian allies deserted them, seemed destined to result in a set battle with Alexander of Pherae. Instead, the Boeotian army avoided a major battle and attempted to draw out the war through rapid movements.⁴¹

οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' Ἐπαμεινώνδας τὴν αὐτοῦ δόξαν ἐν ὑστέρω τῆς Πελοπίδου σωτηρίας τιθέμενος, καὶ δεδοικῶς μὴ τῶν πραγμάτων ταραχθέντων ἀπογνοῦς ἑαυτὸν Ἀλέξανδρος ὥσπερ θηρίον τράπηται πρὸς ἐκεῖνον, ἐπηωρεῖτο τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ κύκλῳ περιῶν, τῇ παρασκευῇ καὶ τῇ μελλήσει κατεσκευάζε καὶ συνέστελλε τὸν τύραννον, ὡς μήτε ἀντεῖναι τὸ αὐθαδὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ θρασυνόμενον μήτε τὸ πικρὸν καὶ θυμοειδὲς ἐξερεθίσαι.

Though Plutarch tended to focus on personal reasons for adopting this strategy (Epaminondas feared for the life of Pelopidas if he engaged Alexander directly) there were certainly practical benefits to keeping Alexander in suspense and avoiding a major battle.⁴² By moving rapidly around Thessaly, Epaminondas was buying time to draw

⁴⁰ Polyae. *Strat.* 2.3.13. Though here we have support from Plutarch, using Polyaeus as a source was warned against above.

⁴¹ Plut. *Pel.* 29.3.

⁴² Westlake 1935, 143 followed Plutarch's line of thought in claiming that Epaminondas only cared about the two prisoners but Epaminondas' actions can clearly be framed within a pattern of Boeotian interests and intervention.

away or ‘liberate’ cities from Alexander’s control. By removing cities from Alexander’s control, Epaminondas was establishing more opponents to Alexander who would ideally not require further Boeotian manpower or resources to keep Thessaly in a disjointed state. The ensuing events are colored by Plutarch’s motives in portraying his subjects as heroes, but can still provide an insight into the military situation in Thessaly during this invasion under Epaminondas. Apparently the reputation of Epaminondas caused enough fear in Alexander to send an embassy to him seeking a peace, but the practicalities of defeating an elusive Boeotian army were more apparent than a personal fear.⁴³

οὗτος μέντοι τὴν δόξαν αὐτὴν καὶ τοῦνομα καὶ τὸ πρόσχημα τῆς Ἐπαμεινώνδου στρατηγίας καταπλαγεῖς...

An earlier passage in Plutarch may indicate that Alexander’s actions may not have come from his own personal fear of Epaminondas. When Epaminondas appeared at the head of a Boeotian army, Alexander’s commanders and companions began to fear the growing tide of resistance which Epaminondas’ presence helped to swell.⁴⁴

εὐθὺς οὖν κίνησιν τις μεγάλη Θετταλῶν ἦν ἐπαιρομένων πρὸς τὴν δόξαν τοῦ στρατηγοῦ, καὶ τὰ πράγματα τοῦ τυράννου ροπῆς ἔδειτο μικρᾶς ἀπολωλέναι: τοσοῦτος ἐνεπεπτώκει φόβος τοῖς περὶ αὐτὸν ἡγεμόσι καὶ φίλοις, τοσαύτη δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους ὄρμη πρὸς ἀπόστασιν εἶχε καὶ χαρὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὡς νῦν ἐποιομένους δίκην διδόντα τὸν τύραννον.

Facing a restless Thessalian population in danger of breaking away thanks to Epaminondas’ actions and shaky leadership at the command level of his forces, Alexander had very little choice but to seek terms with Epaminondas. After all, Alexander could still use Pelopidas and Ismenias as leverage against their personal

⁴³ Plut. *Pel.* 29.6. Paus. 9.15.2 admitted that the presence of Epaminondas affected Alexander’s confidence but omits the embassy, opting instead to make the decision to release Pelopidas a personal decision by Alexander.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 29.2.

friend Epaminondas in negotiations (a strategy which may not have been as effective against the earlier Boeotian commanders), so a reasonable compromise that would leave him in power over his current holdings, but not Thessaly as a whole, was a distinct possibility. Epaminondas refused, though as our discussion on the powers of the *boeotarchoi* indicated he was not empowered to make a formal peace treaty with Alexander but did make a 30-day truce and returned to Thebes with Pelopidas and Ismenias.⁴⁵

καὶ τοὺς ἀπολογησομένους ταχὺ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔπεμπεν. ὁ δὲ συνθέσθαι μὲν εἰρήνην καὶ φιλίαν πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα Θηβαίοις οὐχ ὑπέμεινε, σπεισάμενος δὲ τριακονθήμερους ἀνοχὰς τοῦ πολέμου καὶ λαβὼν τὸν Πελοπίδαν καὶ τὸν Ἴσμηνίαν ἀνεχώρησεν.

This result could hardly have been agreeable to the Thessalian cities which had originally reached out to the Boeotian League in that Alexander was still in power, but for the Boeotians it promised the immediate goal of the return of their ambassadors and did not grant Alexander any more power or recognition than he already possessed. While future hostilities were almost inevitable given Alexander's behavior up until this point, the truce at least bought him some time to operate in Thessaly without further intervention by the Boeotians.⁴⁶

In 364 BC, Pelopidas was called to the aid of the Thessalians for the last time. The Thessalians, who were faring poorly against Alexander, sent to Thebes to ask for an army specifically commanded by Pelopidas.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 29.6.

⁴⁶ Buckler 2003, 326 suggested that Alexander knew further hostilities were unlikely after the expiration of the truce, which is true for that year certainly, but he could not have expected this to remain the case in subsequent years if he continued in his attempt to unite Thessaly.

⁴⁷ Diod. 15.80.1. This can be contrasted with the situation in 369 BC when they did not specify which general they wanted. This could hardly be called a 'broad appeal' as Mackil 2013, 79 suggested. Westlake 1935, 148 made the stretched conclusion that Athenian interest in Thrace drove the Boeotians to send an army to Thessaly. Plut. *Pel.* 31.3 gave an indication of Pelopidas' personal motives.

περὶ δὲ τοὺς αὐτοὺς καιροὺς Θετταλοὶ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν Φερῶν τύραννον διαπολεμοῦντες, καὶ πλείοσι μάχαις ἠττωμένοι, πολλοὺς δὲ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες, πρέσβεις ἀπέστειλαν πρὸς Θηβαίους, ἀξιοῦντες αὐτοῖς βοηθῆσαι καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτοῖς ἐξαποστεῖλαι Πελοπίδαν.

By this time Pelopidas had a reputation of defending the Thessalian cities against Alexander and a personal vendetta stemming from his imprisonment to settle. While a Boeotian army was mustered the omen of an eclipse caused Pelopidas to enter Thessaly with only 300 volunteer cavalrymen while the rest of the army remained in Thebes.⁴⁸

ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν μόνον τοῖς Θεσσαλοῖς ἐπιδούς καὶ τριακοσίους τῶν ἰππέων ἐθελοντὰς ἀναλαβὼν καὶ ξένους ἐξώρμησεν, οὔτε τῶν μάντεων ἐόντων οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων συμπροθυμουμένων πολιτῶν μέγα γὰρ ἐδόκει καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα λαμπρὸν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ γεγονέναι σημεῖον.

The identity of these cavalrymen can provide a great deal of insight into Theban relationships in Thessaly at this time. These cavalrymen were described by Plutarch as ‘ξένος’ which Perrin translated as ‘foreign.’ Other scholars instead translated the passage to mean the force consisted of mercenaries along with any Boeotian volunteers.⁴⁹ If these cavalrymen were mercenaries, a question is then raised of why the Boeotians would need to enlist mercenary cavalry when they already possessed horsemen which eclipsed every Greek state to the south in terms of quality and quantity. As the following events demonstrated, the Boeotians could also count on using the cavalry of the Thessalian cities despite their actions in the first attempt to rescue Pelopidas and Ismenias. Additionally, in 364 BC, the funds of the Boeotians were heavily invested in the maintenance of their new fleet, the construction of which

⁴⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 31.3; Diod. 15.80.2 claimed the eclipse foreshadowed the death of Pelopidas which is not surprising given the benefit of hindsight. The eclipse reported would have been a partial eclipse on the morning of July 13, 364 BC. Buckler 2003, 340 indicated Pelopidas played a central role in convincing the council but this is nowhere mentioned in the sources. Buckler 1980, 175 made the additional claim that operations of the Athenians in the north triggered the expedition.

⁴⁹ Buckler 1980, 176 = Buckler 2003, 340. DeVoto 1992, 15 made the ridiculous claim that some of these volunteers were members of the Sacred Band, but the Sacred Band was never attested as fighting on horseback. Westlake 1935, 148 made no attempt to identify these cavalrymen.

came at a high cost.⁵⁰ The explanation must be that these cavalrymen were foreigners, but what foreigners could have been in Thebes at the time? These foreigners would need to be horsemen with an interest in Thessalian affairs, so much so that they ignored the omen to march north with Pelopidas. All signs point to these cavalrymen being exiled Thessalians. While little precedent exists for mercenary cavalry used by the Boeotians in this period, there was a precedent for Thessalians taking refuge in Thebes along with personal and state ties between individual Thessalians, Thessalian cities, and the Boeotians. After all, Jason's wife had come to Thebes after his assassination.⁵¹

...ὅτι πέμπων εἰς Θήβας ἐμνήστευε τὴν Ἰάσονος γυναῖκα ἀναλαβεῖν...

As outlined above, it is known that Thessalians were exiled under the rule of Polyphron after the death of Jason.⁵² It was against Alexander's interests to allow these exiles to return after the death of Polyphron, because they had already posed a challenge to Pheraean power, and Alexander did not have the diplomatic skill of Jason to keep them in check through non-violent means. These foreigners were almost certainly from cities still under Alexander's control because the liberation of their homes cities by the Boeotians (the only liberations we hear of in this period) would have enabled their return.

Like in the diplomatic endeavor four years earlier, Pelopidas first moved for Pharsalus to gather forces before facing Alexander.⁵³ These forces were provided by the Thessalian cities opposed to Alexander, with Pharsalus and Larisa being the foremost among them.⁵⁴ Pharsalus was obviously once again a free city, and its

⁵⁰ For the Boeotian fleet see Diod. 15.79.1.

⁵¹ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37.

⁵² Xen. *Hell.* 6.4. 34.

⁵³ Plut. *Pel.* 32.1.

⁵⁴ This was not, as Westlake 1935, 148 suggested, an army of the Thessalian League.

liberation could have taken place at any point from 367 to 364 BC. According to Plutarch, Pelopidas and his army marched until they were met by Alexander's forces near the temple of Thetis.⁵⁵ Diodorus counted Alexander of Pherae's army at more than 20,000 men, and Plutarch asserted that Alexander had twice as many hoplites under his command as Pelopidas.⁵⁶ This is not unreasonable given that Thessaly was not particularly well-known for producing hoplites, Pelopidas had not brought any with him, and the large difference could be due in part to Alexander's employment of mercenary forces, which were made up mostly of infantry.⁵⁷ The 7000 Boeotians Pelopidas intended to bring were mostly infantry and would have made up the deficiency of the Thessalian allies if not for the omen.⁵⁸

Cynoscephalae, in the territory of the then depopulated Scotussa, comprised a set of small hills rising out of a plain which became crucial in the course of the battle.⁵⁹ In the initial stages of the battle, both sides sought to gain the high ground using infantry while Pelopidas' cavalry successfully drove off their opponents.⁶⁰

ἀνατεινόντων δὲ πρὸς τὸ μέσον κατὰ τὰς καλουμένας Κυνὸς κεφαλὰς λόφων
περικλινῶν καὶ ὑψηλῶν, ὄρμησαν ἀμφοτέρωθεν τούτους καταλαβεῖν τοῖς πεζοῖς.
τοὺς δ' ἰππεῖς ὁ Πελοπίδας πολλοὺς κάγαθοὺς ὄντας ἐφῆκε τοῖς ἰππεῦσι τῶν

⁵⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 32.2. The location of the temple of Thetis has been argued by several scholars. Westlake 1935, 149 located the temple at the southern edge of the plain. Pritchett 1969, 141 preferred the church of Agios Athanasios which is indeed located at the southern edge of the plain. Buckler 1980, 176 agreed with this placement and also took the opportunity to remark on the valor of Pelopidas, 'never a timid man even when faced with great odds,' which continued to reinforce Buckler's heroic conception of the Theban.

⁵⁶ Diod. 15.80.4. Plut. *Pel.* 32.2. Westlake 1935, 149 believed that the claim regarding the hoplites should not be taken literally but gave no reason as to why. Since Pelopidas was only using Thessalian forces in this encounter, and their numbers had been depleted by their war with Alexander, the claim of Diodorus is not so unreasonable. Diod. 15.80.1 stated the Thessalians had lost most of their military population.

⁵⁷ Westlake 1935, 149 claimed Alexander's army was made up mostly (2/3) of mercenaries but surely many men were drawn from Pherae and the surrounding regions. The cost of hiring 13,000 mercenaries would have been astronomical. Even Jason, who controlled significantly more territory and had more wealth to draw upon, only employed 6000 mercenaries in 374 BC. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.5.

⁵⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 31.2. Diod. 15.80.2.

⁵⁹ Strab. 9.5.20. It is interesting that Strabo mentioned only the battle of 197 BC in connection with Cynoscephalae. Plut. *Pel.* 32.2. For a detailed modern description of the area see Pritchett 1969, 133-134.

⁶⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 32.2.

πολεμίων, ὡς δὲ οὗτοι μὲν ἐκράτουν καὶ συνεξέπεσον εἰς τὸ πεδῖον τοῖς φεύγουσιν...

Though some have claimed Pelopidas personally led the cavalry against that of Alexander, he clearly sent (ἐφίημι) them away while he remained to observe the infantry.⁶¹ Pelopidas' Thessalians struggled to gain ground against Alexander's superior infantry which was reinforced by light-armed missile troops.⁶²

τοῖς ὀπλίταις τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ὕστερον ἐπερχομένοις καὶ πρὸς ἰσχυρὰ καὶ μετέωρα χωρία βιαζομένοις ἐμβαλὼν ἔκτεινε τοὺς πρώτους, οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι πληγὰς λαβόντες οὐδὲν ἔπρασσον. κατιδὼν οὖν ὁ Πελοπίδας τοὺς μὲν ἵππεῖς ἀνεκαλεῖτο καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνεστηκὸς τῶν πολεμίων ἐλαύνειν ἐκέλευεν, αὐτὸς δὲ συνέμιξε δρόμῳ τοῖς περὶ τοὺς λόφους μαχομένοις εὐθὺς τὴν ἀσπίδα λαβών.

It should be no surprise that Alexander was well-supplied with light-armed troops, as Thessalian peltasts were well known in the 370s and 360s BC.⁶³ After holding off the Thessalian infantry, Alexander's forces began a retreat when they saw that Pelopidas has recalled his cavalry to use against them.⁶⁴

καὶ διὰ τῶν ὀπισθεν ὠσάμενος εἰς τοὺς πρώτους τοσαύτην ἐνεποίησε ῥώμην καὶ προθυμίαν ἅπασιν ὥστε καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐτέρους δοκεῖν γεγονότας καὶ σώμασι καὶ ψυχαῖς ἐπέρχεσθαι. καὶ δύο μὲν ἢ τρεῖς ἀπεκρούσαντο προσβολάς, ὁρῶντες δὲ καὶ τούτους ἐπιβαίνοντας εὐρώστως καὶ τὴν ἵππον ἀπὸ τῆς διώξεως ἀναστρέφουσαν εἶξαν, ἐπὶ σκέλος ποιούμενοι τὴν ἀναχώρησιν.

Once again, some have confused or emended the narrative of the battle in order to make Pelopidas appear to be a more of a central figure in the victory by claiming that the cavalry assault won the day when in fact the cavalry did not engage Alexander's infantry until *after* the retreat began.⁶⁵ It is clear the act of seeing (ὁράω) the cavalry

⁶¹ Buckler 2003, 341 = Buckler 1980, 176 continually placed Pelopidas in the center of the action and relied upon this action to demonstrate Pelopidas' tactical prowess.

⁶² Plut. *Pel.* 32.3.

⁶³ Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.9 stated that the men who live in the regions surrounding Thessaly were trained in the use of the javelin. Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.19 claimed that the peltasts of Jason's army were countless and it would be a task in itself to list the cities which provided them.

⁶⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 32.3-4.

⁶⁵ Buckler 2003, 341. Westlake 1935, 150 compared Pelopidas' generalship to that of Alexander the Great which was echoed by Buckler 1980, 180.

making their return (ἀναστρέφω) initiated a deliberate retreat on the part of Alexander's forces. While all this was happening, Pelopidas, who was watching the battle up until this point, grabbed his shield and joined in the battle as the hill was taken by his Thessalian allies.⁶⁶ He then saw Alexander surrounded by his mercenaries below him, and in fit of passion charged alone down the hill, where he was killed by Alexander's bodyguard.⁶⁷ This coincided with the return of the Thessalian cavalry which routed Alexander's army and in the ensuing pursuit killed nearly 3000 of Alexander's men.⁶⁸

οἱ τε ἰππεῖς προσελάσαντες ὄλην ἐτρέψαντο τὴν φάλαγγα καὶ διώξαντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐνέπλησαν νεκρῶν τὴν χώραν, πλεόν ἢ τρισχιλίους καταβαλόντες.

This loss out of 20,000 men made the casualty rate for Alexander's forces 15%, which according to a recent study is very near the average loss for the losing side in a hoplite battle of the Classical Period.⁶⁹ Given this, Plutarch's number for casualties is by no means unreasonable, especially because the majority of these casualties were sustained in the flight and pursuit of Alexander's army which according to Plutarch was carried out over a great distance (διώξαντες ἐπὶ πλεῖστον).⁷⁰ The importance and influence of Pelopidas to the Thessalians can be seen in the Thessalian desire to bury him, which was allowed by the Thebans, although some Plutarchan exaggeration, especially

⁶⁶ Plut. *Pel.* 32.3-5.

⁶⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 32.5-6. Corn. Nep. *Pel.* 5.4. claimed Pelopidas was still mounted when he attacked Alexander, undoubtedly for dramatic effect. Buckler 1980, 180 attempted to make Pelopidas' death a tactical choice but even Plutarch lamented the rashness of Pelopidas' actions. Plut. *Pel.* 2.5 used παράλογος in his description of the deaths of Pelopidas and Marcellus, who were paired for this very reason.

⁶⁸ Plut. *Pel.* 32.7. Westlake 1935, 150 challenged this number by claiming there would be no need for a second expedition if this many men had died.

⁶⁹ Krentz 1985, 19 gave the average as 14% based on a survey of battles in the Classical period.

⁷⁰ Plut. *Pel.* 32.7. This counters Westlake 1935, 150 which stated against Plutarch's testimony that the pursuit was not aggressive. Hammond 1989, 60 recognized that the majority of casualties occurred in the pursuit in Greek battles.

regarding the most heroic tropes like the shearing of the horses, can be seen in this event.⁷¹

What did this victory and Pelopidas' death mean for the Boeotian League and central Greece? Given the fact that Pelopidas perished in the course of the battle, most scholars count Cynoscephalae as close victory for the Boeotians or a draw.⁷² Yet this argument cannot possibly hold once the wider picture of Boeotian military influence in Thessaly is considered. First, the hopes and dreams of Boeotian greatness and influence in Thessaly did not live and die with Pelopidas despite Plutarch's assessment of the plight of the Thessalians. While he was certainly a powerful figure he was far from irreplaceable. Second, the Boeotian death toll at Cynoscephalae was precisely one. Using Thessalian troops meant Boeotian military power remained intact as nearly every other expedition to Thessaly was meant to preserve. Alexander of Pherae was about to discover how powerful the Boeotian army was when united in a common goal. Finally, the battle did inflict significant damage on Alexander's forces as 3000 men was by no means a small number to lose.⁷³

The death of Pelopidas did spark a Theban response which involved sending 7000 hoplites and 700 cavalry (probably the force that Pelopidas had assembled before the eclipse) to deliver vengeance against Alexander under the *boeotarchoi* Malcitas and Diogeiton.⁷⁴

Θηβαῖοι γὰρ, ὡς ἐπύθοντο τὴν τοῦ Πελοπίδου τελευτὴν, οὐδεμίαν ἀναβολὴν ποιησάμενοι τῆς τιμωρίας κατὰ τάχος ἐστράτευσαν ὀπλίταις ἑπτακισχιλίοις, ἰππεῦσι δ' ἑπτακοσίοις, ἡγουμένου Μαλκίτου καὶ Διογεΐτονος.

⁷¹ Plut. *Pel.* 33.4-5.

⁷² Buckler 2003, 341 termed it 'a victory as costly as it was indecisive.'

⁷³ This hardly left Alexander 'undisturbed in his power,' as Buckler 2003, 341 suggested especially when compared to earlier ventures.

⁷⁴ Plut. *Pel.* 35.1.

The Boeotians were successful in subduing Alexander but allowed him to remain in power on the condition that he remove his garrisons and set free any Thessalian cities he had occupied.⁷⁵ Most importantly, he swore an oath to follow Theban direction against their enemies.⁷⁶

...ὁμόσαι δὲ αὐτὸν ἐφ' οὓς ἂν ἡγῶνται Θηβαῖοι καὶ κελεύσωσιν ἀκολουθήσειν...

The success of these *boeotarchoi* proved that Pelopidas and Epaminondas were not the only competent Theban generals, and that success in Thessaly did not require the presence of Pelopidas. Though some have questioned the effectiveness of leaving Alexander in power, he was now isolated in Pherae by the Thessalians he had previously oppressed.⁷⁷ It is impossible to predict how many men he lost in the battle against Malcitas and Diogeiton, but if the casualties were anywhere close to Cynoscephalae, Alexander's forces were heavily depleted, and hiring more mercenaries would come at a high price given his current position. Unlike Jason, Alexander did not have the personal charisma and appeal which drove mercenaries to his employment, and a series of defeats deprived the mercenaries of the spoils that war under Jason had brought. In short, despite remaining in power, Alexander was essentially rendered a non-threat to the security of Boeotia. Even his naval power, which continued after 364 BC, could not seriously harm Boeotian interests if they had constructed even part of their 100 trireme fleet and still counted Histiaea among their allies. This victory over

⁷⁵ Plut. *Pel.* 35.2. Diod. 15.80.6. The victory was so complete that Diodorus described Alexander as being completely shattered (τοῖς ὅλοις συντριβείς). Buckler 2003, 341 perhaps in an effort to minimize the efforts of the *boeotarchoi* contradicted himself and stated that Alexander was weakened before the final battle. Westlake 1935, 151 asserted that Alexander's mercenaries had deserted him which is nowhere indicated in the sources. This must be an explanation for Alexander's weakness because Westlake denied placing the death toll at 3000 for Cynoscephalae. Desertion by the other Thessalian cities was much more likely.

⁷⁶ Plut. *Pel.* 35.2. Diod. 15.80.6.

⁷⁷ Buckler 1980, 182 believed Alexander was not in a weakened position in Thessaly.

Alexander meant that the Boeotian League now had nothing to fear from Thessaly and could refocus their efforts on managing alliances to minimize Spartan power in the Peloponnese.⁷⁸ It also gave the Thebans an even larger supply of allied manpower to use in future campaigns as well as a navy to add to their own in order to challenge Athenian interests in the Aegean and ensure control of the Northern Euboean Gulf. The defeat of Alexander of Pherae cemented the Boeotian League as the supreme power in central Greece. After over two decades, the Boeotian League had finally returned to its position in central Greece.

⁷⁸ Buckler 1980, 181 indicated that Pelopidas had loftier goals for the region but did not support this statement.

III d: Thebes and the Boeotian League

Orchomenus: A Test Case

This examination has thus far concentrated on the military efforts of the Boeotian League beyond its northern border, but in the first half of the fourth century military power was also directed against other cities within the Boeotian League by Thebes. We shall now turn to this topic and demonstrate how and why Thebes used military force against Boeotian cities by employing Orchomenus as a test case. Orchomenus has generally been regarded as the ‘second city’ of Boeotia for the majority of the Classical Period and also the most hostile toward the formation of a Theban-led Boeotian League.¹ This prominence had early roots as reflected by the epic record where Orchomenus was recognized as one of the most powerful cities in the region and was described as ‘Minyan Orchomenus.’²

προσθέντες δὲ τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ τὴν Ὀρχομενίαν (οὐ γὰρ ἦσαν κοινῇ πρότερον, οὐδ’ Ὅμηρος μετὰ Βοιωτῶν αὐτοὺς κατέλεξεν ἄλλ’ ἰδίᾳ, Μινύας προσαγορεύσας)...

This Minyan identity, as opposed to the identity of the ‘Boiotoi’ adopted by the rest of Boeotia in the Classical Period, has been regarded by some as the root cause of conflict between Orchomenus and Thebes in the Archaic and Classical Periods.³ Direct competition between the two cities was significant enough to warrant integration into local Theban myth. This tradition was expressed through the myths of Heracles, the

¹ Buck 1972, 96 saw Thessalian support for Orchomenian opposition to Thebes in the sixth century but a discussion of this relationship is beyond the scope of the current examination.

² Strab. 9.2.3. Hom. *Il.* 2.511. Pausanias explained the reason for the ‘Minyan’ descriptor in order to differentiate the city from the Orchomenus in Arcadia. Paus. 9.36.6. Occupation of the site in the Bronze Age is undisputed. A collection of Bronze Age structures unearthed in Orchomenus including the ‘Treasury of Minyas’ can be found in Fossey 1988, 354-355. The foundation myth of Orchomenus is recounted by Paus. 9.34.6-10. A useful compilation of Orchomenian myth including the hero Erginus can be found in Buck 1979, 58-60. Schachter 2016, 18-19 depicted a relatively peaceful relationship between Thebes and Orchomenus in the Bronze Age.

³ Kowalzig 2007, 355. Gartland 2016, 85 argued that this cultural separation allowed Orchomenus to resist Theban influence.

hero of Thebes.⁴ These myths generally centered on the triumph of Heracles and the Thebans over the Orchomenians in battle.⁵ This conflict as portrayed in both ancestry and localized myth provides an insight into how the Thebans regarded their Orchomenian neighbors which can be used as a background for the events of the fifth and fourth centuries.

Conflict between Thebes and Orchomenus was probably inevitable, but how did this conflict take shape on the ground? In other words, how did the geographic position of Orchomenus within central Greece affect its importance in ensuring the security of Boeotia? In terms of the urban center, by the Classical Period, the size and population of Orchomenus was clearly less than that of Thebes, but of the other Boeotian cities Orchomenus remained the largest and thus posed the greatest military threat to Theban leadership of the Boeotian League.⁶ The territory of Orchomenus was largely defined by Lake Copais and the Orchomenian plain which represented ‘upper Boeotia’ in comparison to the ‘lower’ plain occupied by Thebes and the other major cities.⁷ The territory of Orchomenus was also said to include the Athamanthian plain as well as the city of Hyettus, which, as stated above, shared in representation with Orchomenus under the Boeotian League as described by the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*.⁸ The sphere of Orchomenian influence must then be taken to indicate the area northwest of Lake

⁴ The association between Thebes and Heracles in the Classical Period was so well known that the club of Heracles was used as a shield blazon. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.20.

⁵ Paus. 9.17.1 related the story of the daughters of Antipoenus. Paus. 9.25.4 told how Heracles cut off the noses of the Orchomenians who came to Thebes to demand tribute. Heracles also bound the horses of the Orchomenians together prior to the victory of the Thebans. Paus. 9.26.1.

⁶ Bintliff 1997, 232 made this distinction very clear.

⁷ It is difficult to imagine this type of geographic situation when traveling through modern Boeotia due to the draining of Lake Copais. This drastic change in the landscape makes the route between Thebes and Orchomenus direct and easy.

⁸ Paus. 9.24.3. The namesake of the Athamanthian Plain, Athamas, was a mythical king of Orchomenus and served to connect the city to both the migration of the Boiotoi and, by extension, to Epirus and Thessaly. Kowalzig 2007, 342-343.

Copais.⁹ Given this geographic separation, it can hardly be surprising that Orchomenus was able to create its own sphere of influence separate from that of Thebes.

Orchomenus and its surrounding territory essentially served as the gateway to the rest of central Greece or, tellingly, the gateway to Boeotia depending on the perspective.

The Cephissus River, which flowed through Orchomenian territory, created a physical access point between northern Boeotia and the territory of Phocis which, as stated

above, was largely defined in the east by the Cephissus. This position made

Orchomenus and its surrounding territory vital to the security of Boeotia as well as an essential jumping-off point for military expeditions north of the Boeotian border.¹⁰ The

Boeotian League was then much more powerful (through added hoplites and cavalry)

and more secure (through the expansion of the border and the control of routes to

Phocis and Locris) when Orchomenus was a member. By contrast, possession of or

alliance with Orchomenus could put other states in a strong position to exert pressure

on a Theban-led Boeotian League and limit its ability to influence the rest of central

Greece. Thinking of Orchomenus as an area where the interests of the Boeotian League

and the other states of central Greece intersected can lead to a new understanding of

both the strategic importance of northern Boeotia and provide a test case to evaluate

how the Thebans treated other Boeotian cities in their quest to reestablish the Boeotian

League and regain supremacy in central Greece after 379 BC.

⁹ Fossey 1988, 351.

¹⁰ Demand 1982, 12 referred to Orchomenus as 'virtually a border city.' Ma 2016, 33 named the *komai* of Orchomenus as Aspledon, Kyrtone, and Chorsiae.

Orchomenus before the Corinthian War

By all indications Orchomenus was a member of the Boeotian League from its inception in the mid-fifth century BC.¹¹ The most prominent role played by Orchomenus before the Corinthian War was in the ending Athenian control of Boeotia in 447 BC. It was in fact at Orchomenus that the effort to wrest Boeotia from Athenian control began, though the role of the Orchomenians themselves in this action has been a matter of debate.¹² Boeotians who had been exiled by the Athenians after the battle of Oenophyta in 457 BC, and had probably fled to Locris based on the Locrian presence at Coroneia, returned to Boeotia and occupied Orchomenus and Chaeronea.¹³

καὶ χρόνου ἐγγενομένου μετὰ ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι, Βοιωτῶν τῶν φευγόντων ἔχόντων Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Χαιρώνειαν καὶ ἄλλα χωρία τῆς Βοιωτίας, ἐστράτευσαν ἑαυτῶν μὲν χιλίοις ὀπλίταις, τῶν δὲ ζυμμάχων ὡς ἑκάστοις ἐπὶ τὰ χωρία ταῦτα πολέμια ὄντα, Τολμίδου τοῦ Τολμαίου στρατηγοῦντος.

While the Athenians were able to retake Chaeronea, the exiles and their allies launched an attack and defeated the Athenian forces under Tolmides as they were withdrawing which resulted in the removal of the Athenian presence in Boeotia and the return of the remaining exiles.¹⁴

καὶ Χαιρώνειαν ἐλόντες καὶ ἀνδραποδίσαντες ἀπεχώρουν φυλακὴν καταστήσαντες. πορευομένοις δ' αὐτοῖς ἐν Κορωνείᾳ ἐπιτίθενται οἱ τε ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενοῦ φυγάδες Βοιωτῶν καὶ Λοκροὶ μετ' αὐτῶν καὶ Εὐβοέων φυγάδες καὶ ὅσοι τῆς αὐτῆς γνώμης ἦσαν, καὶ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες τοὺς μὲν διέφθειραν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, τοὺς δὲ ζῶντας ἔλαβον. καὶ τὴν Βοιωτίαν ἐξέλιπον Ἀθηναῖοι πᾶσαν, σπονδὰς ποιησάμενοι ἐφ' ᾧ τοὺς ἄνδρας κομιοῦνται. καὶ οἱ φεύγοντες Βοιωτῶν κατελθόντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες αὐτόνομοι πάλιν ἐγένοντο.

¹¹ As stated above this examination rejects the idea of a late-sixth century foundation for the Boeotian League and thus also rejects the proposal of Buck 172, 99 that Orchomenus joined the Boeotian League between 511 and 507 BC.

¹² Buck 1979, 150 saw the return of the exiles as an effort driven by Thebans in particular. Larsen 1960b, 9 believed, to the contrary, that the Orchomenians led the effort to liberate Boeotia from Athenian control. This view was effectively rebutted by Dull 1977, 305-314. Regardless of leadership, it is certain that Orchomenus and the cities around it were critical components in the war against the Athenians.

¹³ Thuc. 1.113.1.

¹⁴ Thuc. 1.113.2-4.

This episode is significant not only in showing that Orchomenus was a valuable strategic point of fortification, but also in its physical access to Phocis and Locris. The presence of the Locrians indicates an ease of access between the two states. The Athenians in particular remembered the strategic value of Orchomenus and Chaeronea in planning the opening stages of the campaign which led to the battle of Delium. It is, in fact, in the lead up to the Delium campaign in 424 BC that Orchomenus reemerges into the historical narrative. Political factionalism in Orchomenus during this time, and a pro-League response to this factionalism, was attested by the exile of Orchomenians, some of whom were complicit in the plot to hand over the city of Chaeronea to the Athenians.¹⁵

Χαιρώνειαν δέ, ἣ ἐξ Ὀρχομενὸν τὸν Μινύειον πρότερον καλούμενον, νῦν δὲ Βοιωτίον, ξυντελεῖ, ἄλλοι ἐξ Ὀρχομενοῦ ἐνεδίδοσαν, καὶ οἱ Ὀρχομενίων φυγάδες ξυνέπρασσον τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἄνδρας ἐμισθοῦντο ἐκ Πελοποννήσου...

The Athenians, understanding the strategic importance of northern Boeotia from their experience in 447 BC, believed capturing these cities would effectively isolate Thebes and the rest of Boeotia.¹⁶ Due to errors in the timing of the assault as well as the betrayal of the plan by a Phocian, the Boeotians managed to reinforce Chaeronea and turn their full army against the Athenians who were attempting to fortify Delium.¹⁷ At Delium, the Orchomenian contingent held the left wing of the assembled Boeotian army alongside the hoplites from Thespieae and Tanagra.¹⁸

εἶχον δὲ δεξιὸν μὲν κέρας Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ ζύμμοροι αὐτοῖς; μέσοι δὲ Ἀλιάρτιοι καὶ Κορωνάιοι καὶ Κοπαιῆς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ τὴν λίμνην; τὸ δὲ εὐώνυμον εἶχον Θεσπιῆς καὶ Ταναγραῖοι καὶ Ὀρχομενῖοι.

¹⁵ Thuc. 4.76.3.

¹⁶ Thuc. 4.76.5.

¹⁷ Thuc. 4.89.1. Diod. 12.69.1-4.

¹⁸ Thuc. 4.93.4. Diod. 12.70.1. Paus. 9.6.3 did not indicate which Boeotians took part but did comment on the magnitude of the victory.

This wing of the Boeotian formation suffered severe casualties, and we can infer that the Orchomenians suffered heavy losses along with the Thespians who were singled out in that regard.¹⁹ That Orchomenus still fought on the Boeotian side during the battle of Delium indicates a pro-League control of the city during the first half of the Peloponnesian War.²⁰ This can hardly be surprising given that subterfuge would not be necessary if the anti-League factions were in the majority within Orchomenus.

After Delium, Orchomenus certainly saw a decline in influence mostly due to the increased power of Thebes through the adoption of the Plataean districts which doubled Theban representation in both the Boeotian council and in the college of *boeotarchoi*.²¹ It was shortly after this that Thebes used its newfound power to initiate the removal of Chaeronea from Orchomenian influence.²² The timeline for this removal is fairly broad, but certainly occurred before the time of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* when Chaeronea made up a district with Acraiphniae and Copae. In summary, the Peloponnesian War represented a lessening of power for Orchomenus to the benefit of Thebes but the region under Orchomenian control still indicates its vital role in the security of Boeotia. Even with its influence over Chaeronea removed, the representative unit of Orchomenus and Hyettus still made up a significant portion of the

¹⁹ The Thespian casualty list has been partially preserved as *IG VII 1888*. Dull 1985, 36 proposed that Orchomenus could have suffered losses equal to those of Thespieae which is not unreasonable. Schachter 1996, 118 placed Thespian casualties at 20% of the total Boeotian losses.

²⁰ Buck 1994, 36 suggested that Orchomenus sided with the faction of Leontiades because it was anti-Boeotian League, but there was never any indication that Leontiades, himself a Theban, was against Theban control of a Boeotian League which included Orchomenus.

²¹ Demand 1982, 41 suggested an earthquake in 426 BC damaged the fortifications of Orchomenus. If this were the case, Thebes did little to physically capitalize on the Orchomenian vulnerability.

²² Ma 2016, 35 used the relationship between Orchomenus and Chaeronea to demonstrate levels of autonomy within Boeotia. Dull 1985, 36 suggested that Hyettus essentially received a 'battlefield promotion' to share a district with Orchomenus due to its performance at Delium but there is no evidence for this. Miller 2007, 112-113 believed Chaeronea was separated before Delium due to its position on the battlefield. Larsen 1960b, 13 proposed that Orchomenus originally had three districts but lost one with Chaeronea.

border with Phocis. These factors contributed to a building of animosity in Orchomenus which could have resulted in the anti-League faction taking control of the local government, setting up a showdown between Orchomenus and Thebes in the fourth century BC.

Defection and the Corinthian War

The tensions which were rooted in the Peloponnesian War and the build-up of Theban power within the Boeotian League had reached a breaking point by 395 BC. As stated above, Orchomenus defected from the Boeotian League almost immediately after the start of the Corinthian War.²³ This is confirmed by the fact that when Lysander reached the city of Haliartus his combined army included forces from Orchomenus.²⁴

ὁ δὲ Λύσανδρος, ἄγων τὸ ἀπὸ Φωκέων καὶ Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ τῶν κατ' ἐκεῖνα χωρίων στράτευμα, ἔφθη τὸν Πausανίαν ἐν τῷ Ἀλιάρτῳ γενόμενος.

It is also significant that Xenophon grouped the Phocians and Orchomenians as part of the same region, which indicates both their geographic proximity and their wider influence over the smaller cities in the *chora*. This further reinforces the idea that Orchomenus was now no longer part of Boeotia, but had essentially split the region by siding with the Phocians. The conflict between Thebes and Orchomenus seems to have been so significant that the idea it was actually at the heart of the Corinthian War existed even in the fourth century. The information provided by Andocides that the refusal of Thebes to allow an independent Orchomenus was the cause of the Corinthian War is an interesting piece of evidence of this perception.²⁵

²³ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6. Hansen 1996, 130 saw this defection as a regaining of the *autonomia* of the city, implying that cities in the Boeotian League did not possess the *autonomia* later required by the King's Peace.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.17.

²⁵ Andoc. 3.13; 3.20. Buckler 2003, 145 believed the acceptance of an independent Orchomenus represented a condemnation of the Boeotian League as a political entity. Buck 1994, 51 claimed Sparta specifically had Orchomenus in mind when insisting on the enforcement of the autonomy clause.

οἵτινες τὸν μὲν πόλεμον ἐποίησαντο ἕνεκα Ὀρχομενοῦ, ὡς οὐκ ἐπιτρέψοντες αὐτόνομον εἶναι, νῦν δὲ τεθνεώτων μὲν αὐτοῖς ἀνδρῶν τοσοῦτων τὸ πλῆθος, τῆς δὲ γῆς ἐκ μέρους τινὸς τετμημένης, χρήματα δ' εἰσηνηνοχότες πολλὰ καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία, ὧν στέρονται, πολεμήσαντες δὲ ἔτη τέτταρα, ὅμως Ὀρχομενὸν ἀφέντες αὐτόνομον τὴν εἰρήνην ποιοῦνται καὶ ταῦτα μάτην πεπόνθασιν: ἐξῆν γὰρ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐῶσιν Ὀρχομενίους αὐτονόμους εἰρήνην ἄγειν.

We must keep in mind that the speech from which this passage is excerpted was delivered four years into the Corinthian War during the initial peace negotiations (in which Andocides served as an ambassador). The concept of *autonomia* was an essential element of the final version of the King's Peace and this may have found its way into Andocides' speech. The issue obstructing the agreement on a peace was then conflated with the original cause of the conflict which, from an Athenian viewpoint, may not have been well known. This is especially true if, as proposed above, regional concerns in central Greece motivated the Corinthian War.

The defection of Orchomenus and its desire for *autonomia* could have been motivated by both the internal situation of the Boeotian League and the external factors of Orchomenus' position in relation to other central Greek states. Internally, Orchomenus had seen a drain on its influence within the Boeotian Council since the Peloponnesian War and the expansion of Theban power which included the removal of the walls of Thespieae, an act which must have been viewed in Boeotia as the ultimate show of force on the part of the Thebans without engaging in outright war.²⁶ This same Theban leadership had placed Orchomenus under the threat of an external force through the outbreak of the Corinthian War. By supporting the eastern Locrians against Phocis, the Boeotian League essentially positioned Orchomenus on the front lines of the war. The proximity of Phocis which has been emphasized throughout this examination

²⁶ Thuc. 4.103.1.

meant that Orchomenian lands could be raided (much as the Thebans would later do) even if the city itself was too strong to be taken. The connection of Orchomenus to the rest of central Greece once again demonstrated its importance when Agesilaus returned from Asia Minor. His path took him through central Greece and into northern Boeotia which resulted in the battle of Coroneia.

At the battle of Coroneia, the Orchomenians fought on the Spartan side.²⁷ Xenophon confirmed that the position of Orchomenus as the gateway to the Cephissus (and thus to Phocis) played an important role in the security of Boeotia because it was from this region that the army of Agesilaus arrived.²⁸ The Orchomenians occupied the left wing of the army under Agesilaus, directly opposite their long-time rivals the Thebans.²⁹

συνῆσαν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὸ κατὰ Κορώνειαν πεδῖον οἱ μὲν σὺν Ἀγησιλάῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ Κηφισοῦ, οἱ δὲ σὺν Θεβαίοις ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἑλικῶνος, εἶχε δ' Ἀγησίλαος μὲν δεξιὸν τοῦ μετ' αὐτοῦ, Ὀρχομένιοι δ' αὐτῶ ἔσχατοι ἦσαν τοῦ εὐωνύμου, οἱ δ' αὖ Θεβαῖοι αὐτοὶ μὲν δεξιοὶ ἦσαν, Ἀργεῖοι δ' αὐτοῖς τὸ εὐώνυμον εἶχον.

The Thebans defeated their opponents (although Agesilaus also defeated the forces which were opposing his wing) which must have further depleted Orchomenian military strength. Any weakening of the military potential of Orchomenus would have assisted the Boeotian League in securing its remaining territory, even though the initial number of troops which could be levied by Orchomenus and its dependencies must have been significant. Though some citizens may have fled to Thebes or cities still in the Boeotian League, we have no way of even estimating these numbers and how they would impact the military capabilities of Orchomenus.³⁰ The Orchomenian

²⁷ Plut. *Ages.* 18.1.

²⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.16.

²⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.16; *Ages.* 2.6.

³⁰ There has been some discussion about whether exiles from Orchomenus would be continued to be represented in the federal council of the Boeotian League, as Plataea might have been, though there is no

involvement in both the Haliartus campaign and the later battle of Coroneia indicates a substantial shift in manpower (to the effect of at least 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry) away from the Boeotian League and toward the Phocian side. The weakness in troop numbers was illustrated by Xenophon's account of the battle of the Nemea River, where the absence of Orchomenus was used to explain why the Boeotian forces numbered only 5000 men and 800 cavalry.³¹

...Βοιωτῶν δ', ἐπεὶ Ὀρχομένιοι οὐ παρήσαν, περὶ πεντακισχιλίους... ἵππεῖς δὲ Βοιωτῶν μὲν ἐπεὶ Ὀρχομένιοι οὐ παρήσαν εἰς ὀκτακοσίους...

Geographically, the independence of Orchomenus from the Boeotian League had a significant effect on the security of the region, essentially ensuring that a force from the north of Boeotia would be able to enter the region uncontested if they had gained the alliance of Orchomenus as proven by Agesilaus' march.³² This indicates the loss of Orchomenus may have affected Boeotian strategy after the battle of Haliartus, where, as suggested above, the Boeotian League aggressively worked to limit Phocian power. With the Phocians on their heels within their own territory and lacking Spartan support, they could not take advantage of an independent Orchomenus. It is interesting then that there is no evidence of a serious effort to bring Orchomenus back into the Boeotian League like we see in the 370s and 360s BC especially when Ismenias was operating well north of the Boeotian border.³³ The explanation might be found in the losses to Orchomenian manpower over the course of the Corinthian War. The fortifications of

evidence on either side to properly settle, or even debate, this issue. Buck 1994, 39 believed that the exiled or displaced citizens of Orchomenus would constitute the *polis*.

³¹ Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17.

³² The increased security provided by an Orchomenus friendly to the Boeotian League was indicated by Dem. 16.4 which commented on the threat to Thebes posed by a hostile Orchomenus. Buckler 2003, 178 believed an independent Orchomenus would be used by Spartan forces entering Boeotia from Cirrha on the Northern Corinthian Gulf.

³³ Buck 1994, 53 stated, without any supporting evidence, that Ismenias' faction in Thebes would not have tolerated an independent Orchomenus.

Orchomenus may have been too substantial for its capture, but its manpower too small to stop an army marching through its territory. Orchomenus managed to remain independent for the rest of the Corinthian War. With the Boeotian League dismantled by the King's Peace, Orchomenus had nothing to fear from Thebes until the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC.

Orchomenus and the Restored Boeotian League

Throughout the 370s BC, the period of reconsolidation under the Thebans, Orchomenus stood as a major obstacle to their ambitions. At some point after the capture of Thebes in 382 BC, Orchomenus had made its allegiance clear by allowing a Spartan garrison to occupy the city.³⁴ The military strength of Orchomenus (which by this point had time to recover from the battle of Haliartus and Coroneia) combined with the two units of Spartans actually presented a far greater threat to Thebes in its attempt to restore the Boeotian League than Lysander's army did in 395 BC because it had a fortified city to use as its base of operations. As demonstrated above, Spartan support for northern adversaries was the very thing the Boeotians had worked to prevent in the Corinthian War. It is highly likely that the Thebans had the same goal when dealing with other Boeotian cities. With Spartan support eliminated, Thebes could use its superior military strength to bring the Boeotian cities under its control.

In 375 BC, sensing an opportunity to take Orchomenus while the Spartan garrison was away, the Thebans under Pelopidas attempted an assault which was aborted due to the presence of Spartan reinforcements. Though the Thebans failed to

³⁴ The garrisoning of the city by two Spartan *morai* was confirmed by Plut. *Pel.* 16.1-2. Wickersham 2007, 244 believed the garrison at Orchomenus was not introduced until after the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC.

take the city, the short campaign did result in the surprising Theban victory at Tegyra.³⁵

The Theban forces, which consisted of the Sacred Band (300 men) along with some cavalry, unexpectedly encountered the returning Spartan garrison.³⁶

εἰς δ' οὖν Τηγύρας οἱ Θηβαῖοι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἐκ τῆς Ὀρχομενίας ἀπιόντες καὶ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι συνέπιπτον, ἐξ ἑναντίας αὐτοῖς ἐκ τῆς Λοκρίδος ἀναζευγνύντες. ὡς δὲ πρῶτον ὤφθησαν τὰ στενὰ διεκβάλλοντες, καὶ τις εἶπε τῷ Πελοπίδᾳ προσδραμών: 'ἐμπεπτώκαμεν εἰς τοὺς πολεμίους,' 'τί μᾶλλον,' εἶπεν, 'ἢ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐκεῖνοι;'

The Thebans, despite being heavily outnumbered (estimates varied even in Plutarch's time as to the exact number of Spartans) took advantage of the Spartan attempt to let them through and routed their numerically superior adversaries.³⁷

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν δεδομένην ὁ Πελοπίδας ἠγεῖτο πρὸς τοὺς συνεστῶτας καὶ διεξήει φονεύων, οὕτω πάντες προτροπάδην ἔφευγον. ἐγένετο δὲ οὐκ ἐπὶ πολὺν τόπον ἢ δίωξις: ἐφοβοῦντο γὰρ ἐγγὺς ὄντας οἱ Θηβαῖοι τοὺς Ὀρχομενίους καὶ τὴν διαδοχὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

This victory, despite its stunning nature, did not result in the capture of Orchomenus which was still a formidable presence as evidenced by the rationale for the short pursuit above. Xenophon implied that attacks on Orchomenus were not unusual when he included Orchomenus in the list of cities the Theban cavalry had been fighting for the majority of the 370s BC.³⁸

ἦν δὲ τὸ μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων ἰππικὸν μεμελετηκὸς διὰ τε τὸν πρὸς Ὀρχομενίους πόλεμον καὶ διὰ τὸν πρὸς Θεσπιάς, τοῖς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίοις κατ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον πονηρότατον ἦν τὸ ἰππικόν.

The specific emphasis on the cavalry also indicates what type of military actions were taking place in the course of this decade. It is fairly easy to envision quick raids which

³⁵ Diod. 15.37.1. Plut. *Pel.* 16.3. For a study of the topography and an effort to pinpoint the exact location of the battle see Buckler 2008, 101-106 which also compiled information from nineteenth century travelers.

³⁶ Diod. 15.81.2. Plut. *Pel.* 16.2.

³⁷ Plut. *Pel.* 17.4.

³⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10.

were designed to catch the Orchomenians unprepared such as those which were aimed against Plataea and Thespieae in this same period. Attacks on Orchomenian territory therefore continued throughout the 370s BC until another Boeotian victory, this time at Leuctra, changed the power dynamic in the region.

The victory at Leuctra shattered Spartan influence in Boeotia. As the last major Boeotian city to resist reintegration into a Theban-led Boeotian League, Orchomenus was once again assaulted and this time the city was forced into an alliance with the Boeotian League.³⁹

ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Θηβαῖοι μεγάλη δυνάμει στρατεύσαντες ἐπ' Ὀρχομενὸν ἐπεβάλλοντο μὲν ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι τὴν πόλιν, Ἐπαμεινώνδου δὲ συμβουλευσαντος ὅτι τὰ διὰ τῆς ἀνδρείας κατεργασθέντα τῇ φιλάνθρωπίᾳ δεῖ διαφυλάττειν τοὺς τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας ὀρεγομένους, μετέγνωσαν. διόπερ τοὺς μὲν Ὀρχομενίους εἰς τὴν τῶν συμμάχων χώραν κατέταξαν...

The reluctance of the Boeotians to destroy the city can of course be attributed to more practical reasons than concerns over the damage to the reputation of Thebes. Given that Jason of Pherae had destroyed Heracleia Trachinia, the necessity for a large, fortified city in northern Boeotia in alliance with the reestablished Boeotian League was obvious. The Boeotians also likely recognized the economic importance of Orchomenus and its surrounding hinterland to a region with an expanding population.⁴⁰ It is significant that the Orchomenians seems to have been deprived of their political participation in the Boeotian League. This action could only have deepened the rift between Orchomenus and Thebes by placing Orchomenus in a position of subservience to Thebes. The animosity felt by the Orchomenians would inevitably lead to another attempt to break free from Theban influence.

³⁹ Diod. 15.57.1.

⁴⁰ Buckler 2003, 297 believed Epaminondas saw this as an opportunity to place Orchomenus under the control of surrounding cities and thus create a greater reliance on Thebes for protection.

With the Orchomenians still acting as an extremely reluctant ally, the Thebans eventually resorted to a permanent solution to the problem of Orchomenian hostility to their leadership of the Boeotian League: removing the Orchomenians from Boeotia.⁴¹

ἐν ὄσφ δὲ ἀπῆν ὁ Ἐπαμινώνδας, Ὀρχομενίους Θηβαῖοι ποιούσιν ἀναστάτους ἐκ τῆς χώρας: συμφορὰν δὲ τὴν ἀνάστασιν τὴν Ὀρχομενίων ἐνόμιζεν ὁ Ἐπαμινώνδας καὶ οὐ ποτ' ἂν ἐξεργασθῆναι τόλμημα τοιοῦτον αὐτοῦ γε παρόντος ἔφρασκεν ὑπὸ Θηβαίων.

This refers to the events of 364 BC when the *boeotarchoi* used a plot to reinstate a narrow oligarchy which was supported by 300 wealthy Orchomenians as a pretense to completely raze the city and sell its citizens into slavery.⁴²

οἱ μὲν οὖν συστησάμενοι τὴν πράξιν μετανοήσαντες ἐδήλωσαν τοῖς βοιωτάρχαις τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, προδόντες τοὺς συνομόσαντας, καὶ διὰ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ταύτης ἑαυτοῖς ἐπορίσαντο τὴν σωτηρίαν. τῶν δ' ἀρχόντων συλλαβόντων τοὺς τῶν Ὀρχομενίων ἱππεῖς καὶ παραγαγόντων εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, ὁ δῆμος ἐψηφίσατο τούτους μὲν ἀποσφάζει, τοὺς δ' Ὀρχομενίους ἐξανδραποδίσασθαι καὶ τὴν πόλιν κατασκάψαι.

This was an incredible step for Thebes to take, and several factors may have played a role in the decision. First, the Boeotian League may have felt able to conduct this operation because, as mentioned above, Orchomenus had already been reduced to a dependency and did not share in the formal structure of the Boeotian League. Secondly, there may have been no other punishment to inflict on the city after its initial reduction in status and loss of territory than the removal of the population and the destruction of the walls. There are of course economic factors to consider as well. Around this same time the Boeotian League was embarking on a shipbuilding program as mentioned above.⁴³ It is telling that this program was mentioned in the same chapter of Diodorus

⁴¹ Paus. 9.15.3.

⁴² Diod. 15.79.3-9. Plut. *Pel. & Mar.* 1.1 alluded to the fate of the Orchomenians but never actually described what happened. Gartland 2016, 155 referred to this event as 'the single most brutal act ever to have been exacted by one Boeotian community against another.'

⁴³ Diod. 15.79.1.

as the destruction of Orchomenus and the sale of its population. It is well known that maintaining an extensive navy was an expensive undertaking, and the sale of the Orchomenians may have helped supply the funds for this endeavor. Strategically, by the late 360s BC, as demonstrated above, the Boeotian League had returned to its prominence in central Greece by defeating Alexander of Pherae and bringing the Phocians into a defensive alliance which meant that Orchomenus was no longer as integral to the security of Boeotia as it once was. The northern threats which had once made Orchomenus essential to Boeotian security had been neutralized, leaving only Orchomenus itself as a focal point of resistance to Thebes and the reestablished Boeotian League. The destruction of Orchomenus and the sale of its population into slavery can then be viewed as a symbol of Boeotian power and a signal that the Boeotian League was once again supreme in central Greece.

IIIe: Conclusions

This portion of the examination assessed the methods by which the Boeotian League used military force to maintain its position of supremacy in central Greece. Throughout the first half of the fourth century the Boeotian League had two primary antagonistic military goals in central Greece. The first was to continue *stasis* in Phocis by limiting support which had previously proven to provide a resolution, namely the leadership of the Spartans. The second goal applied to Thessaly, and that was to use the aristocratic rivalries between cities to prevent a single power from uniting Thessaly and using its considerable resources to challenge Boeotian supremacy and security. Thessaly's challenge under Jason of Pherae was made possible by the King's Peace. The implementation of the autonomy clause of the King's Peace shattered Boeotian power in central Greece and necessitated the use of military force against other Boeotian cities during the reconsolidation of the Boeotian League in the 370s BC. With the details of individual events and campaigns laid out above, we can now take a wider view of the implications of these findings in understanding the history of central Greece in the first half of the fourth century.

Boeotian Patterns of Behavior in Phocis

To begin, the findings of this examination indicate that we should dissociate war against Phocis from a war against Sparta. This means Phocis, not Sparta, should be viewed as the primary opponent of the Boeotian League at this stage of the Corinthian War. Sparta was integral to the Phocian effort in the Corinthian War and the attacks on Spartan positions in central Greece were part of a program of isolating Phocis. The relationship between Sparta and Phocis was mutually beneficial though the Phocians assumed the majority of the risk. Sparta provided the leadership while Phocis provided

the manpower. In Phocis, the first significant threat to the Boeotian League came in 395 BC when Lysander was able to unite the Phocians in his army and invaded part of Boeotia. The Phocian element is crucial to contextualizing central Greece in the Corinthian War. Sparta was not the primary opponent in central Greece, but Phocis, as demonstrated by the battle of Haliartus. The severity of the threat posed by the Phocian army (supplemented by only a small number of Spartans) was indicated by the movement of the entire Theban army to Haliartus which left the Athenians under Thrasybulus guarding Thebes. By comparison, the Spartan garrisons removed by the Boeotian League in central Greece could not take offensive action on their own, but could provide a unifying leadership to the more numerous Phocians as seen at the battle of Naryx. Most modern scholarship has emphasized the death of Lysander as the most important result of the battle of Haliartus, but this examination has demonstrated that, for central Greek history, the most significant element of this battle was the defeat of the Phocian soldiers who made up the largest portion of Lysander's army and suffered the greatest losses in the pursuit. Though the Spartan threat was momentarily waning, the original source of the conflict, the border dispute between the Phocians and eastern Locrians, was still very much in effect and though beaten, the Phocian forces which still posed a threat to Boeotia. The importance of this regional focus has been obscured in scholarship by several factors. One factor, as mentioned above, was the inflated importance of Lysander's death. Another factor was the Athenian desire to insert themselves into the narrative of the battle of Haliartus. This viewpoint proceeded to become embedded in subsequent histories and in modern scholarship. This shifts the narrative south to a traditional Athenocentric model when the subsequent action outlined by this examination has demonstrated that the narrative should instead center

on the Boeotian intervention in the states to its north. Despite Athenian claims to have shared in the victory, credit for the success rested squarely on the Boeotian League, and it is in this context that we should frame further conflict in central Greece during the Corinthian War.

The idea that Boeotian interests in the Corinthian War should focus on central Greece is further supported by the subsequent actions of the Boeotian League after the battle of Haliartus. The Boeotian League sought to press its momentary advantage in central Greece by first removing further Spartan support for Phocis, which as demonstrated above had proven the key to the viability of Phocian power, and then attacking Phocis itself.

The halting of Agesilaus' march back from Asia Minor was *not* the primary goal of this campaign, but was instead a secondary effect. If stopping Agesilaus were the primary goal, Ismenias might have stayed with the Argives at Heracleia Trachinia. Instead, the Argive garrison left by Ismenias was not sufficient to command the route into Boeotia, and allied reinforcements were never sent in time to stop Agesilaus. To stop Agesilaus, the Boeotian League might have invested significantly more time in Thessaly, and perhaps marched as far north as Tempe, but the Boeotian army never moved past Pharsalus. Instead, as detailed above, the Boeotian army turned back southward in a maneuver better suited to the isolation of Phocis than a halting of the Spartan army coming from Asia Minor. This again shifts the narrative from a Spartan-Boeotian League struggle to the Boeotian League/Locrian-Phocian conflict it began as and the Boeotians had always intended it to be.

The Boeotian strategy worked nearly perfectly in regard to the reduction of Phocian power during the Corinthian War. In a desperate effort to halt the

Boeotian/Locrian advance, the Phocians under a Spartan commander and cut off from further support from his countrymen, attacked the Boeotians and Locrians at Naryx and lost a further 1000 men. This loss of men, coupled with the casualty figures from the battle of Haliartus, ended the Phocian threat to Boeotian power. Even when the Boeotian League was being rebuilt in the 370s BC, the Phocians failed to mount a significant threat and were eventually forced into an alliance. There was then a consistent emphasis on limiting the regional power of Phocis throughout the first half of the fourth century.

This trend demonstrates a new perspective on the Corinthian War: the Boeotian perspective. As proven throughout this examination, a regional approach illuminates different methods of historical understanding which have not been utilized in the majority of modern scholarship. Boeotian action in Phocis should be viewed regionally as an act against the Phocians. Due to their intervention in 395 BC and the *stasis* in Phocis which prevented resistance in the 370s BC, the Boeotian League was able to effectively use military force to maintain its power over Phocis until the outbreak of the Sacred War. Most importantly for the larger understanding of the Corinthian War, the outbreak of the war and the subsequent Boeotian expedition to the north should be thought of as a regional conflict in support of a consistent Boeotian interest which upends the traditional view of this conflict as a roundabout way to draw Sparta into a war. Every action the Boeotian League performed in central Greece at the outset of the Corinthian War was characteristic of an expansion of regional influence in support of an allied state engaged in a conflict over a topographically ambiguous border. The Spartan involvement was unintentional and Spartan garrisons in central Greece were attacked only *after* a Spartan-led force had invaded Boeotia, formalizing Spartan entry

into the war on the side of Phocis. The garrisons then needed to be removed to hinder support for Phocis before an invasion of Phocis itself could occur. The invasion of Phocis and the disbanding of the Boeotian army after the defeat of the Phocians punctuates the idea that the Boeotian League still thought of this as a regional war against the Phocians. Given the new narrative perspective laid out by this examination, we might finally embrace the ancient perspective and refer to every event from the raiding of disputed territory to the disbanding of the Boeotian army after the battle at Naryx as the 'Boeotian War.'

Thessaly: The Greatest Threat to Boeotian Power

Moving to another central Greek state, this examination has shown that Thessaly was by far the greatest military threat to Boeotian power in the first half of the fourth century, and it is no surprise the majority of Boeotian interest in central Greece was concentrated there. Military intervention in Thessaly was aimed at perpetuating aristocratic rivalry between cities to ensure the resources of Thessaly could not be brought under the control of a single person or city. Unlike in Phocis, Boeotian military intervention in Thessaly was often invited from within Thessaly as seen in the invitation of Medius during the Corinthian War and the numerous calls for aid in the 360s. The above examination has demonstrated that in each case of intervention the goal was the same, to create and support resistance to the major power of the time, which in the time period covered by this examination was Pherae. During the Corinthian War, the liberation of Pharsalus was instrumental in halting the attempt of Lycophron of Pherae to unite Thessaly under his rule. By freeing Pharsalus the Boeotian League essentially guaranteed that infighting between the Thessalian cities would continue and the Boeotian League would be free to deal with Phocis without

interference. Successful implementation of this plan is evidenced by the fact that we do not hear of the threat of Thessalian unity for the remainder of the Corinthian War. The removal of the Spartan garrison at Pharsalus also cut off a potential source of support for the Phocians in their border war against Locris and the Boeotian League and this added benefit may have influenced the formation of strategy for the campaign. This intervention had the secondary effect of winning influence and relationships for the Boeotians. These relationships, shown to be vital to the development of Thessalian politics and interaction with other states, may have motivated the Thessalians to attack Agesilaus on his return from Asia Minor.

The importance of limiting Thessalian power in order to protect Boeotian influence was proven in the above examination by the brief period in which Thessaly was united and assumed a major position of influence in central Greece: the reign of Jason of Pherae. By 374 BC Jason had brought all the cities of Thessaly under his control after the failure of Polydamas to secure foreign aid for a Pharsalian resistance. Jason was then able to accomplish what the Boeotian League had previously acted to prevent: usurp Boeotian power in central Greece. He capitalized on his newfound position almost immediately and his ensuing actions in central Greece demonstrated that the Thessalians had assumed the role previously occupied by the Boeotian League. His arbitration at Leuctra recognized his power, and the resolution of these negotiations was extremely favorable to the retention of Jason's position in central Greece. Jason then expanded his own influence in Phocis on the return journey to Thessaly by assaulting the city of Hyampolis which was very similar to what the Boeotians had attempted during the Corinthian War. The choice of Hyampolis as a target may have been strategically selected to sway the eastern Locrians from their long held alliance

with the Boeotian League, further transitioning Thessaly into the role usually occupied by the Boeotian League. This transition has gone almost completely unnoticed among modern historians in terms of the power dynamic in central Greece, but as shown here Jason's reign marked a major development in the history of central Greece. Fortunately for the Boeotians, the Thessalian ascendancy was short-lived. As discussed above, due to the concentration of power in the Thessalian political structure, Jason's death dissolved the unity of Thessaly and allowed for a Boeotian resurgence in central Greece.

Thebes and the Cities of Boeotia

This examination has demonstrated that the King's Peace was a turning point in central Greek history in that it dismantled the Boeotian League and opened a path for Jason to unite Thessaly and gain supremacy in central Greece. But why did Thebes almost immediately set about recreating the Boeotian League after 379 BC? Why was the federal state so vital to Boeotian interests in central Greece? The entire purpose behind the Theban rebuilding of the Boeotian League by Thebes was to gather the manpower and resources of Boeotia and insulate itself through the reestablishment of traditional borders such as that between Boeotia and Phocis. By reintegrating Boeotian cities back through smaller skirmishes and raids, the new members of the Boeotian League were attempting to preserve their fighting strength while removing anti-League elements from Boeotia. Only when the Boeotian cities aligned under the new Boeotian League did Boeotians possess the strength to once again assert their supremacy in central Greece, and Theban military action against other Boeotian cities sought to achieve this goal.

The methods employed by the Thebans in their rebuilding of the Boeotian League were illustrated in this examination by the test case of Orchomenus. This examination traced the history of the relationship between Thebes and Orchomenus, which demonstrated the military value and use of Orchomenus and its *chora*. The allegiance, or at least obedience, of Orchomenus and its territory was a vital element in maintaining the security of Boeotia against attacks from the north, particularly during the Corinthian War and the period of reconsolidation under Theban leadership. Orchomenus also controlled a sizeable population which could provide more soldiers for the federal army as well as an important fortification near the border with Phocis. The ultimate destruction of Orchomenus and the selling of its population into slavery, a unique event among Boeotian cities, represented the pinnacle of Boeotian power in the 360s BC. This element of the examination also provides ample room for expansion as findings from recent archaeological surveys in Boeotia are published. These survey projects will continue to inform our understanding of the relationship between Boeotian cities, the extent and manifestation of the borders of Boeotia in the Classical Period, and continue to shift the narrative toward a regional perspective.

Strategic Points in Central Greece

The above examination of military power in central Greece from a regional perspective has highlighted traditionally understudied strategic locations in the region and the prime example of this was Histiaea on Euboea. This examination has demonstrated that the Northern Euboean Gulf was a vital sphere of influence for both Thessaly and Boeotia as illustrated by the events at Histiaea in the 370s BC. At this time both the Boeotian League and Jason of Pherae saw the use of Histiaea on the northern coast of Euboea as an essential part of securing the Northern Euboean Gulf.

There is no connection between Jason and Thebes in the sense that they may have been acting in concert to take the city from Spartan control, and the fact that no connection exists indicates how both found the site valuable to their own interests in central Greece. This importance was confirmed by the treaty between Thebes and Histiaea which this examination has argued should date to the early 360s BC. For Jason, trade in the Northern Euboean and Pagasitic Gulfs was instrumental in maintaining a source of revenue to fund his mercenary army. On the other side, The Boeotians needed access to the Northern Euboean Gulf in order to maintain a food supply from Pagasae to eastern Boeotian ports during the Spartan invasions. The return of the city to the Histiaeans reinforces the Boeotian reluctance to garrison cities which was consistently displayed throughout the period of this examination. Beyond its usefulness in trade to Boeotia, a good relationship with Histiaea allowed the Boeotian League to limit Alexander of Pherae's military power through a control of trade routes. An alliance with Histiaea hindered Alexander's profits from maritime trade which in turn reduced his ability to hire mercenaries to combat the other Thessalian cities in his attempt to recreate the empire of Jason. The significance of the Northern Euboean Gulf has often been passed over in favor of more traditionally emphasized areas like the Isthmus or the Corinthian Gulf but the regional approach to history proposed by this examination has demonstrated that this body of water was vital to the development of central Greek history in the first half of the fourth century and, most significantly, was viewed as such by the central Greeks themselves.

PART IV: CONCLUSIONS

With the exploration of political and military development and interaction in central Greece concluded, we must now assess how the regional focus of this investigation and its findings change our perceptions of the history of central Greece, and how this research can be continued to further expand our understanding of this understudied region in an incredibly important time period. In the introduction, the idea of assessing the history of central Greece through political and military consolidation was proposed, with the intention that this approach would illuminate regional motivations for developments and events which have often been attributed to the influence or in response to the actions of Athens and Sparta. The other major issue facing modern scholarship on central Greece was demonstrated to be the consistent attribution of policy and institutional development to the two most famous generals of Thebes, Pelopidas and Epaminondas. With these issues in mind, we now reflect upon the major findings of this examination.

Oligarchy and Democracy in Boeotia

To begin with one of the most substantial findings of this examination and one which contradicts the vast majority of modern scholarship, there was no installation of democracy in Thebes or in Boeotia as a whole after 379 BC. This conclusion was reached by focusing on regional history and internal trends within Boeotia as traced through the political institutions of the *boeotarchia* and the Boeotian Council. As demonstrated above, this examination opposes the vast majority of scholarship on the Boeotian League in the fourth century, including some of the most recent publications. When Athenian influence is diminished and the new Boeotian League is contextualized within the history of federalism in Boeotia, the conflict between forms of government

was not between oligarchy and democracy, but between a moderate oligarchy and the *dynasteia* which was forced on Thebes (and other Boeotian cities) by the presence of a Spartan garrison. This garrison supported the faction of Leontiades at the expense of any challengers which included the faction of Ismenias, Androcleides, and Pelopidas. Changes in the details of governmental structure were also assessed and shown to be less significant than has been claimed by modern scholarship. There was no abolition of the wealth requirement, and the reinstatement of the *boeotarchia* was carried out in a way which indicates that tradition played an important role in the re-foundation of the Boeotian League. This drastically changes the way we think about Boeotian political institutions. It demonstrates that we should move away from an Athenocentric model of political development in central Greece, and should instead focus on regional history and traditions. Regarding Boeotian history as distinctly Boeotian results in a characterization of Boeotian political development as consistent in its desire to maintain a moderate oligarchy which was over time adjusted due to contemporary pragmatic concerns and not out of drastic ideological shifts. The elimination of ideological shifts as a motivating factor for change suggests we might stop searching for (and at times creating) interwoven political histories between Boeotia and states to its south. The northern gaze of this examination allowed for a new assessment of major events in the first half of the fourth century BC, including the Corinthian War.

The Corinthian War: Regional Motivations

As demonstrated in the above examination, there is evidence to suggest that Spartan involvement in the regional conflict which started the Corinthian War was not the intended result of the border dispute. The motivation was instead the expansion of Boeotian and Locrian power at the expense of Phocis through the deprivation of

resources. The expansion of power for the Boeotian-Locrian alliance and the diminishing of Phocian influence in central Greece can in fact be used to explain the majority of Boeotian action in the region throughout the early stages of the Corinthian War. This examination has also demonstrated that the practical realities of one of the major events of the Corinthian War, the battle of Haliartus, reinforces the validity of a regional approach. While every modern examination has emphasized the death of Lysander as the most significant aspect of the battle, the real significance for central Greece was the death of a large number of Phocian soldiers. From a regional perspective, the battle of Haliartus proved two major points. First, it proved to the Boeotians that the Phocians could be united under Spartan leadership and actually threaten the security of Boeotia. This is crucial in understanding the ensuing campaign led by Ismenias, because, as shown in the assessment of the political institutions of the Phocians, as long as *stasis* could be maintained Boeotian power would not be threatened. Second, it demonstrated that the removal of the Spartan leadership would shatter the temporary Phocian unity, return Phocis to a state of *stasis*, and allow the eastern Locrians to gain more land.

With these two concerns in mind, it becomes obvious that the Boeotian campaign in central Greece during the Corinthian War was a deliberate campaign with the ultimate goal of limiting Phocian power. The removal of the Spartan garrisons at Pharsalus and Heracleia Trachinia was not aimed at inflicting significant harm to Sparta, and indeed these actions did not as Agesilaus was still able to march back through Thessaly and past Heracleia Trachinia without the significant resistance we might have expected if the halting of his march was the primary objective. What then was the purpose of removing these garrisons? This examination has demonstrated that

we should consider the removal of the garrisons part of an effort to harm Phocis, not Sparta. Deprived of further aid, the Phocians were unable to maintain their challenge to Boeotian power in central Greece after their defeat at Naryx. The Boeotian League used an effective strategy of intervention to maintain their power in central Greece, and this strategy is only illuminated when the focus is placed on regional concerns as this examination has demonstrated. The consequences of this new understanding are significant in challenging traditional interpretations of Boeotian history during the Corinthian War. The progression should be as follows.

The event which started the Corinthian War, the border dispute between the Phocians and Locrians, was intended to limit Phocian power and expand the influence of the Boeotian-Locrian alliance. The Boeotian League, which was at the height of its power, sought to press its advantage in central Greece and further affirm its status as the supreme regional power. When this influence was challenged by the unexpected entry of Sparta into the war which culminated in the battle of Haliartus, the Boeotian League began moving to eliminate the element which had allowed the Phocians to unite, Spartan leadership. Though Lysander had been killed, Spartan aid for Phocis was still represented by the garrisons at Pharsalus and Heracleia Trachinia. These sources of support needed to be removed and the invitation of Medius provided a convenient method of entering Thessaly. Once this influence was eliminated, an attack on Phocis was launched in concert with the Locrian and other central Greek allies. The heavy Phocian losses at Naryx, combined with those at Haliartus, and the elimination of Spartan leadership which resulted in the fragmentation of the Phocian army into its constituent parts, effectively ended the Phocian threat to Boeotia. All of this points to the idea that these opening stages of the Corinthian War have been grossly

misunderstood. Phocis, not Sparta, should be considered the primary antagonist for the Boeotian League. The opening stages of the Corinthian War were in fact a 'Boeotian War' which was concerned with issues of regional power. This new understanding further validates the methodology of this thesis by proving that the preference for Athens and Sparta in the majority of modern scholarship has caused a distortion in our understanding of the historical narrative for central Greece in the first half of the fourth century BC.

Thessaly: The Underestimated Superpower

This examination has clearly demonstrated that the greatest threat to Boeotian power in central Greece in the first half of the fourth century came not from Phocis, but from Thessaly. As demonstrated above, Thessaly had significant agricultural and military resources at its disposal, but these resources were rarely consolidated under a single power for a directed purpose. The reasons for this were rooted in the nature of political power in Thessaly. The *dynastai* within the major Thessalian cities derived their influence from a long tradition of aristocratic dominance in the region and represented extremely narrow, often familial groups which vied with each other for control over a greater amount of resources. These resources including agriculture, timber, and equine breeding factored into the military power of the Thessalian cities and thus in their ability to gain control of more resources as well as defend their own holdings. This competition, while in general limiting Thessalian influence in other areas of central Greece, posed a significant threat when one city was able to gain an advantage and begin the process of unification.

The Boeotian goal in Thessaly was then to use these aristocratic rivalries to destabilize the region to the point where no one entity could accumulate enough power

to challenge the influence of the Boeotian League in central Greece. This goal was accomplished through limited military intervention which occurred both during the Corinthian War and in the 360s BC. In the Corinthian War, Boeotian intervention in Thessaly was invited by Medius of Larisa and resulted in the liberation of Pharsalus from a Spartan garrison. As stated above, this limited Spartan support for Phocis, but it had the dual effect of creating another opponent for Lycophron of Pherae in his quest for Thessalian domination.

Boeotian fears over Thessalian unification were legitimized by the accomplishments of Jason of Pherae in the 370s BC. Jason's subjugation of the other Thessalian cities was made possible in part by the Boeotian inability to intervene after the King's Peace dissolved the federal state from which the Boeotians drew their own significant power. As described in Part III above, Jason was able to effectively usurp the Boeotian position as the leader in central Greece by using a large military force including significant quantities of mercenaries to establish the influence that led to his domination of the arbitration at Leuctra. The significance of Jason's usurpation of Boeotian power in central Greece has until now been almost completely overlooked by modern scholarship. However, this examination has demonstrated through a regional focus that this event shook long-established power dynamics in central Greece and influenced the behavior of the Boeotian League after Jason's death.

When viewed as part of a regional history of central Greece, Boeotian intervention in Thessaly after Jason's death becomes less about a Theban hero punishing an evil Thessalian tyrant and more about the struggle of a re-established Boeotian federal state to regain the position from which it had been toppled by the King's Peace. The goal of the invasions of Thessaly in the 360s BC was to ensure that

Alexander of Pherae was not able to recreate the empire that Jason had achieved. If the Thessalian cities were divided and fighting each other, the Boeotian League was secure in its power. The leaders of the Boeotian League understood the sources of power in Thessaly, and their actions sought to limit Alexander's access to these resources. This is why cities were liberated to oppose Alexander while an open battle with his mercenaries was largely avoided. This is also why the Boeotian League sought to maintain its connection with Histiaea on the northern tip of Euboea. Both Jason's and the Thebans' experiences at Histiaea had demonstrated its value in controlling shipping in the Northern Euboean Gulf. The treaty with Histiaea demonstrated that the Thebans were attempting to strangle Alexander's power by cutting his revenue, and thus diminishing his access to mercenary forces. Yet again, the regional approach utilized by this examination has illuminated previously underappreciated and nuanced aspects to the behavior of the Boeotian League in central Greece in the first half of the fourth century BC.

The Importance of Pelopidas and Epaminondas

Many of the points highlighted by this examination have been obscured in modern scholarship because of a single pervasive trend: the attribution of political and military development to the efforts of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. In contrast to the majority of modern scholarship, all the evidence presented throughout this examination has reinforced the view that Pelopidas and Epaminondas actually contributed far less to the political development and military policies of the Boeotian League than has been claimed by every major scholar on central Greece in the last century. This idea was reinforced by assessing the evidence for Boeotian political institutions and military behavior in the period before the King's Peace. In the political regime of the Boeotian

League, we saw that the Boeotian League which was formed after 379 BC bore many similarities to the previous incarnation of the federal state. Changes in the institutional structures (separate from the ideological issues mentioned above) were also demonstrated to be due to the circumstances surrounding the post-379 BC Boeotian League. In the cases of Boeotian involvement in both Phocis and Thessaly we saw that the actions taken by the Boeotian League (and Jason once he became the primary power in central Greece) were incredibly consistent from the 390s to the 360s BC, thereby precluding the concept that these strategies and developments were the result of the actions of Pelopidas and Epaminondas. While able generals on the battlefield, these two men did not play as significant a role in Boeotian history as is commonly believed.

The Future of Central Greek History

The last question which needs to be addressed is how this examination establishes a path for the future study of central Greece. To begin, the methodology of this examination marks an important step in reevaluating much of what has been claimed in modern scholarship. Though a movement toward regional examinations has been gradually occurring over the last decades, the vast majority of publications betray the fact that Athenocentrism and Laconocentrism still dominates the study of the Classical Period. As stated in the introduction, progress has been made in issues of ethnic identity in central Greek states, but while extremely progressive in their evaluations of cultural history, many of these studies continue to utilize a model of political and military development where the deeds of great men are the driving force of the narrative and every historically recorded act must link to some greater part of history, usually involving Athens or Sparta. In a sense, Athenian and Spartan involvement still continues to determine whether an event is historically significant. As

this examination has demonstrated, this method of evaluation must be cast aside if we are to begin to understand development in central Greece as driven by the interests of the central Greek states themselves. This examination advocates close study of regional context and tradition if we are to gain new perspectives on the Greek past, and this approach will be utilized by the author in expanding on this work to include case studies of other major cities of Boeotia as well as other aspects of interaction including religion.

While new approaches are useful in shifting the historical narrative to a regional basis, we must also look to the potential for the emergence of new evidence. Considerable hope for the future of central Greek history exists in the continued undertaking of archaeological survey and excavation in central Greece. One of the strengths of promoting future research in central Greece is that it is so under-excavated compared to Attica and southern Greece. Continuing fieldwork will hopefully lead to the uncovering of more epigraphic evidence from the fourth century which further illuminates political and military interaction between the states of central Greece. The likelihood of this occurring has already been demonstrated by the treaty with Histiaea utilized in this examination. It is the hope of the author that this examination has encouraged others to seek out a regional history, and, in doing so, has taken a significant step toward making Boeotian history truly Boeotian.

APPENDIX I: A FURTHER TEST CASE

Thespieae

While in the above examination Orchomenus was used as a test case for an analysis of how Thebes used military power against other Boeotian cities, its history and status as a border region may make it unique in that it was at an intersection of several states. To more fully examine the methods of reconsolidation under Theban leadership, we should examine another Boeotian town as well. An example we can look to for illustration of the process of reconsolidation is Thespieae. Thespieae, while one of the leading cities of Boeotia in its own right, proved to be a crucial element in assessing the military power and security of Boeotia through its domination of the surrounding territory. The land under Thespian influence in the Classical period was bounded by Haliartus in the north, Plataea in the south, Thebes to the east, and, most importantly, the Corinthian Gulf to the west.¹ Though some have argued Thespieae was relocated after the Persian Wars, the current investigation is only concerned with its traditional, identifiable location in the Classical Period.² Classical Thespieae is noticeably situated in a fairly flat area which affords little natural defensibility and thus places great importance on the maintenance of its walls and other defensive structures. As will be shown, the destruction and reconstruction of the walls of Thespieae coincide with shifts in in Thespieae's military role within Boeotia as a source of manpower, resources, and a geographically valuable asset.

¹ The town of Hippotae, while not large, may have served to mark the limits of Thespian territory in the north. Schachter 1996, 104-105.

² Due to the lack of Geometric and Archaic sherds at the current site, Schachter 1996, 105-107 suggested the area around the possible sanctuary of Apollo Archegetas at the modern site of *Topitsi* as the location of the older city.

The large amount of arable agricultural land contained in the region traditionally believed to be under Thespian control could have supported a sizable population, which reinforces the claim of the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* in setting the military levy of Thespieae's districts at 2000 hoplites and 200 cavalry.³ Control of two districts of the Boeotian League placed Thespieae and its territory on the same level as Thebes in the earliest incarnation of the Boeotian League, which eventually controlled four districts only through its assimilation of the two districts previously assigned to Plataea.⁴ This section in the text also indicates other cities which fell under Thespian control in the Classical Period and suggests that Thespieae, through control of the surrounding region, possessed a significant portion of Boeotia's manpower. The two districts are described as belonging to 'Θεσπιεῖς σὺν Εὐτρήσει.' This should be taken to mean that Eutresis was subordinate to Thespieae at this point. The archaeological remains at Eutresis indicate a city significantly smaller than Thespieae, and thus the two would not share representation and population on equal terms.⁵ Leuctra, possibly the most famous location in Thespian territory due to the battle of 371 BC was a small village if it was settled at all.⁶ While this means a significant military age population could not be drawn from this area, the region could have been agriculturally significant

³ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3. Fossey 1988, 135. As Dull 1985, 37 suggested, Thespieae may have been superior to Orchomenus in the Classical Period. Gonzalez 2006, 49 grouped Orchomenus, Thespieae, and Tanagra together as the 'large' *poleis* of Boeotia, inferior in size only to Thebes.

⁴ *Hell. Oxy.* F19.3. Thebes probably assimilated Plataea's districts immediately after the destruction of the city in 427 BC.

⁵ Fossey 1988, 151 noted that the most extensive periods of occupation at this site were in the prehistoric and Byzantine periods. However, the naming of it in the *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* would indicate habitation and a *polis* identity in the Classical Period. This effectively counters Buck 1979, 11 which claimed the site was abandoned by the Geometric Period. Likewise, while Hansen & Nielsen 2004, 441 counted Eutresis among the *poleis* of Boeotia, its classification as a 'C' type *polis* indicates a degree of skepticism on the part of the authors about its actual existence as such in the Classical Period. Roesch 1965, 37 saw Eutresis as not subject to Thespieae.

⁶ Fossey 1988, 157 reasonably suggested that if a settlement existed, we might never find it because the modern city could be covering any remains if the ancient village were small.

in supporting the populations of larger cities. Ascra can also be included in the territory of Thespieae.⁷ Ascra, most famous as the birthplace of Hesiod, was a sizable settlement in the Classical period given the large number of Classical sherds found at the site.⁸ Its estimated minimum area of 0.2 km² (20 hectares) would make it approximately the same size as, if not slightly larger than, Haliartus.⁹ Thisbe is often associated with Thespieae and was likely a dependency at points in the Classical period.¹⁰ All of these sites contributed to the levy of soldiers, and it is a mistake to think that most of the 2000 men would be drawn from the urban center. Thespieae's control over a large region, not the size of the city itself, determined its allotment in the federal system.

We can make some claims regarding the agricultural potential of the region around Thespieae thanks to the recent survey work that has been published. This in turn can provide us with an idea of how valuable Thespieae was to a federal state in terms of resources exploitation. Though comparison of the modern climate to the ancient is a slippery slope, rainfall measured in the area over a period of thirty years observed only a single year with unviable rainfall.¹¹ If the ancient climate was in any way similar, this would explain why import from outside Boeotia was an exceptional event. Crop rotation would have been necessary and allowing an area to fallow for a year would ensure continued yields throughout the region.¹² To support a population peak such as occurred in the fourth century, the land would have to be stretched to its maximum

⁷ Strab. *Geog.* 9.2.25 placed Ascra in the territory of Thespieae.

⁸ The site of *Pyrgaki-Episkopi*, *Pyrgaki* being the acropolis-type hill and *Episkopi* the settlement below has been convincingly identified as Ascra. Fossey 1988, 142-145. Snodgrass 1985, 87-90. Buck 1979, 10.

⁹ Snodgrass 1985, 90-95.

¹⁰ Schachter 1996, 104.

¹¹ Bintliff, Howard, & Snodgrass 2007, 97.

¹² Bintliff, Howard, & Snodgrass 2007, 104-105. Fallow land was also recommended by Hesiod *Works and Days* 462-464.

capacity, possibly to an untenable degree in the long term, but they might not have looked so far into the future. This necessitated a combined land use for both agricultural types. As noted in the recent survey results, at least in this region, the majority of land is in some way cultivable, and what remains could be used to support grazing populations of smaller livestock.¹³

Thespieae distinguished itself from other major Boeotian cities in terms of strategic significance through its access to the Corinthian Gulf. The main port of the region was Creusis, which, according to Pausanias, served as the ἐπίγειον of Thespieae.¹⁴ In addition to the natural defenses provided by the steep cliffs, Creusis was fortified in the Classical Period. The main extant fortifications are ashlar and include interval towers which indicate a Classical construction, likely in the late fifth and fourth centuries BC.¹⁵ In terms of Boeotian naval power, a traditionally underestimated element of the Boeotian military, there are indications that it was used strategically as a naval base in both the Corinthian War and the 370s BC. During the Corinthian War, the Boeotians used Creusis to provide aid to the Corinthians.¹⁶ This is despite the fact that the route between Creusis and Corinth was not particularly straightforward and was made more complex by high winds.¹⁷ Despite the difficulty, this does demonstrate that the Boeotians maintained a naval interest in the Corinthian Gulf into the fourth century BC. Evidence also exists for its renewed use by the Boeotian League during the reconsolidation of Boeotia under the Thebans in the 370s BC. In the prelude to Leuctra,

¹³ Bintliff, Howard, & Snodgrass 2007, 106.

¹⁴ Paus. 9.32.1. Strab. 9.2.25. As Schachter 1996, 119 suggested, Creusis never seems to have been independent of Thespieae in the Classical period. This is against Roesch 1965, 37 which argued for autonomy among the port cities but as noted here this is unlikely.

¹⁵ Fossey 1988, 158-159.

¹⁶ Xen. Ages. 2.18.

¹⁷ Paus. 9.32.1.

Cleombrotus captured twelve Boeotian triremes as he entered Boeotia from Phocis by way of Thisbe.¹⁸ These triremes may have been in place to protect trade in and out of the port. Given that the Thebans had been cut off from supplies earlier in the 370s by Spartan invasion, they may have wanted to diversify their options in the event of another Spartan invasion.

An even earlier usage of the port as a naval base in the Classical period could be hypothesized in the context of the force of Boeotians sent to Sicily. To aid the Spartans in Sicily, 300 hoplites were chosen to sail east.¹⁹ Two of these men, Xenon and Nicon, were Theban while the third, Hegesander, was Thespian.²⁰ Given the presence of the Thespians, there is every reason to believe that this expedition left from Creusis to sail westward. Siphae, while also a viable option, was not as well connected to the interior, making Creusis the most viable point of departure. What this episode also demonstrates is that at this point in time Thespieae was still involved in a significant military role in the Boeotian League. While providing assistance to the Spartans on a fairly rare Boeotian overseas expedition, this also presented an opportunity to remove political and military elements with questionable loyalty to the cause of the Boeotian League. Given the recent internal struggles at Thespieae, these 100 men could have been of the anti-League faction. Much like Polycrates a hundred years earlier, the pro-League Boeotians (mainly the Thebans) may have felt sending these dissidents out of Boeotia (without having to formally exile them) was the best solution to maintain their power.²¹

¹⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.3. The route from Creusis to Thespieae, while facilitating trade between the two cities, also provided access to the Boeotian plains. Buck 1979, 5.

¹⁹ Thuc. 7.19.3.

²⁰ Thuc. 7.19.3. There is no objective reason to argue Schachter's point that each leader maintained 100 men under his command meaning 100 of the hoplites were Thespian. Schachter 1996, 119.

²¹ Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, sent dissenters to fight for the Egyptian pharaoh Amasis who was instructed not to send the men back. Hdt. 3.44.2.

Dispatching them to Sicily, outnumbered two to one by the Theban contingent, would give the pro-League Thespians time to build power without major interference.²²

Creusis also supported a main route in and out of Boeotia through Megara to the Isthmus.²³ It should be no surprise that the Spartans utilized this route in the fourth century as they sought to minimize Theban control over the region. Cleombrotus passed through there on his return from the first invasion of Boeotia in 378 BC after the recapture of the Cadmeia.²⁴ Additionally, Thespian territory provided access to the Cithaeron pass which Agesilaus ordered the Spartan commander at Thespieae to take in the prelude to his invasion the following year.²⁵

In addition to Creusis, the more northerly port of Siphae also rested within Thespian territory.²⁶ While not always included in areas under Thespian influence, evidence suggests Siphae was not independent at this time. Siphae lies between Creusis and Thisbe, and if Thisbe were under Thespian control, it would be unusual for a much smaller city, surrounded as Siphae was, to remain independent. Siphae was intended to be betrayed to the Athenians during the Delium campaign in 424 BC, and was described as being in the land of Thespieae (εἰσι τῆς Θεσπικῆς γῆς).²⁷ This connection to Thespieae could explain why the Thebans tore down the walls of Thespieae shortly after the battle of Delium on the pretext of Thespian support for the Athenians.²⁸ While some have seen the removal of walls as part of membership of the Boeotian League, such an

²² This is contrary to Buck's argument that the sending of Thespian hoplites indicated that anti-League power had been crushed. Buck 1994, 22.

²³ For a detailed investigation of roads and tracks in this area see Hammond 1954, 103-108.

²⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.16.

²⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.47. The Cithaeron pass, accessed via formerly Plataean territory, was used frequently in antiquity by armies moving from the Isthmus into Boeotia or *vice versa*.

²⁶ Siphae has been described as 'surely one of the smallest divisions of all Boeotia,' by Fossey 1988, 167.

²⁷ Thuc. 4.76.3.

²⁸ Thuc. 4.103.1. Schachter 1996, 118 saw this as an act of support for the oligarchy against a democratic movement. The citing of Athenian collaboration is undoubtedly what led to the labelling of the anti-league faction as 'democrats' in Buck 1994, 17.

extreme action could not represent the *status quo*, especially because cities like Haliartus clearly had walls into the Corinthian War.²⁹ At Delium the Thespians fought alongside the other Boeotians and did so with distinction, demonstrating the commitment of the majority to the cause of the Boeotian League.³⁰ The Thebans seem to have been correct in their fears of insurrection, as by 414 BC a group of what could only have been anti-League Thespians attempted to overthrow the local government of Thespieae but were stopped by the Thebans before fleeing to Athens.³¹

Though the Thespians fought on the side of the Theban-led Boeotian League in the Corinthian War, the King's Peace allowed anti-league elements within Thespieae to once again rise to the fore.³² Given the terms of the King's Peace described above, Thespieae certainly exercised more independence on the Boeotian stage. The Thespians may have been able to rebuild their walls at this point. The removal of Theban influence probably did not have an impact on Thespieae's control of its region which continued into the 370s BC.³³ Given the losses incurred by military conflict over the previous 50 years, the King's Peace also provided a brief window for the growth of military-aged population of Thespieae and its surrounding cities.³⁴

²⁹ Tuplin 1986, 324 referred to the removal of walls as 'consistent' with League membership, but lists only Thespieae as an example.

³⁰ As Schachter 1996, 118 pointed out, the Thespians accounted for more than 20% of the Boeotian casualties at Delium. Hornblower 2012, 128 is probably correct in the assertion that the use of *ανθος* here, the only appearance of the word in Thucydides, is an allusion to Pindar.

³¹ Thuc. 6.95.2. Buck 1994, 18-19 saw this as the ultimate justification for tearing down the walls after Delium. The remark of Hornblower 2012, 118 that pro-Athenian (in the terminology used here anti-league) elements in Thespieae indicated that the Thebans were never in complete control of Boeotia is of false importance. It is clear from the factional nature of oligarchy that the Thebans would never exercise *total* control even into the fourth century and the period of the 'Theban hegemony.'

³² The Thespians certainly fought on the side of the Boeotians at the Nemea River where they overcame the Pellenes. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.20.

³³ Buckler 2003, 178 claimed a period of renewed prominence for Thespieae at this time, but provided no qualification for this claim.

³⁴ Buckler 2003, 187 described Thespieae at this time as 'strong and hostile' though failed to elaborate on this claim. Thespieae certainly maintained a strong strategic position in Boeotia, but manpower was lacking. While politically hostile, no military action was taken against the Thebans before the Spartan occupation of the Cadmeia made the use of force unnecessary.

After the capture of the Cadmeia by Phoebidas in 382 BC which stamped Spartan influence on Boeotia, it is likely that an anti-League faction took control of Thespieae. Certainly by the time of the recapture of the Cadmeia in 379 BC the Thespians were seen as standing against Thebes. As the assault on the Cadmeia commenced, they were ordered to assemble under arms by the Spartans and await further instructions.³⁵ The Spartans must have been fairly certain the Thespians would follow these instructions, and since there was no Spartan garrison in Thespieae at this time the assembly of men fell to local elites, the *dynastai*. The Thespian anti-League *dynastai* must have seen that the cause in aiding the Spartans on the Cadmeia was hopeless, and instead chose to protect their city rather than come to Thebes when called.³⁶ This decision in the end proved wise, given the fate of the Plataean contingent which did abide by the command of the Spartans. These *dynastai* also put up immediate resistance to the Thebans, as an initial Theban attack on Thespieae was repulsed.³⁷ This indicates that the walls which were torn down after the Delium campaign had been rebuilt at some point after the Peloponnesian War, with the most suitable time being after the enactment of the King's Peace when Thebes lost much of its influence over other Boeotian cities.

The anti-league faction in Thespieae then gained the military support of the Spartans after Cleombrotus' invasion of Boeotia. By the time Agesilaus entered Boeotia on his campaign, Thespieae was already under the influence of a Spartan garrison, and could be used as a base of operations.³⁸ Cleombrotus had left Sphodrias in

³⁵ Plut. *Mor.* 586F.

³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.10. Buck 1994, 79 declared the inaction to be the result of a pro-league, pro-democratic government but if this were the case why did the Thebans then attack Thespieae?

³⁷ Diod. 15.27.4.

³⁸ Diod. 15.32.2. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.38. Wickersham 2007, 243 correctly noted that there were no Spartan garrisons in Boeotian cities (except Thebes obviously) before 378 BC.

Thespieae with both a sizable force of allies and the funds to hire mercenaries.³⁹ The need for mercenaries could be the result of either the lack of quality cavalry which was always a danger to the Spartans, the lack of a large military-age population in Thespieae, or a combination of the two. During Agesilaus' stay in Thespieae, the fortification of the city continued as the existing walls were improved upon.⁴⁰ It was from Thespieae that Sphodrias launched his abortive raid against the Piraeus which lost him his command (though he was eventually acquitted to the outrage of Athens) and brought the Athenians into the war.⁴¹ Throughout the 370s, the Thebans attempted to take Thespieae and thus remove a major threat to the security of Boeotia while gaining its resources. Given the access Thespieae enjoyed to the Corinthian Gulf, the threat of Spartan reinforcements was very real. Before Agesilaus' second invasion of Boeotia, the Thebans attempted another attack on Thespieae and destroyed what Diodorus referred to as a 'προφυλακή' before an unsuccessful attack on Thespieae itself.⁴² Thespian hoplites were used against the Thebans in this attack, which would indicate that the anti-league faction still held sway within the city.⁴³ The assault did move to weaken Spartan military influence in Thespieae though as the Spartan harmost, Phoebidas, the same man who had captured Thebes in 382 BC, was killed in the ensuing battle.⁴⁴ This, coupled with a reduced number of anti-League Thespians thanks to the Theban assault, may have provided a stimulus for a pro-league faction to take power. On Agesilaus' arrival for his second invasion he found the city embroiled in *stasis* between the two factions.⁴⁵

³⁹ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.15.

⁴⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.41.

⁴¹ Plut. *Pel.* 14.2. Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20. Seager 1974, 46-47 believed Agesilaus worked to acquit Sphodrias with the full knowledge that Athens would enter the war.

⁴² Diod. 15.33.5. Buckler 2008, 92 recognized the possibility that Thespieae was attacked twice.

⁴³ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.43.

⁴⁴ Diod. 15.33.6. Plut. *Pel.* 15.4.

⁴⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.55.

After the last invasion by Agesilaus, raids against anti-league or Spartan garrisoned Boeotian cities became the chosen method of the Thebans to ward off threats within Boeotia. This was demonstrated by the raid against Thespieae which followed the destruction of Plataea.⁴⁶ That the warfare between Thebes and Thespieae was fairly constant was demonstrated by Xenophon's explanation that the prowess of the Theban cavalry at Leuctra was due to their constant wars against the Thespians and Orchomenians.⁴⁷ Diodorus believed that Thespieae was depopulated at some point before Leuctra, as this is one of the reasons given for the invasion under Cleombrotus which resulted in the battle.⁴⁸ Given the presence of the Thespians at Leuctra, Diodorus cannot be correct. What Diodorus could have been referring to was the recapture of Thespieae by the Thebans, which occurred in the mid-370s.⁴⁹ All sources indicate that the Thebans never took the city by force, the departure of Agesilaus could have re-energized the pro-league faction he had previously put down. Tearing down the walls of Thespieae once again ensured the Thebans could respond with military force in the event of further factional conflict, just as they did during the Peloponnesian War. The final ring of Thespieae's knell came at the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC. At Leuctra the Thespian hoplites demonstrated their lack of loyalty, and thus their unreliability, to the cause of the new Boeotian League. The already suspicious Epaminondas invited any Boeotians not wishing to fight to leave, and the Thespians are the only contingent

⁴⁶ Diod. 15.46.6.

⁴⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.10.

⁴⁸ Diod. 15.51.3.

⁴⁹ Schachter 1996, 120 posited a date of 376 or 375 BC. This is not unreasonable given that both dates fall after Agesilaus' last invasion of Boeotia. Buckler 2003, 272 suggested a date of 373 BC for the capture of Thespieae and its reincorporation into the Boeotian League. Like Schachter's suggestion, this date is not unreasonable and, like most of Buckler's views on Thespieae, was derived from passing mention in Isocrates' *Plataicus*. Tuplin 1986, 321 believed, probably correctly, that *Plataicus* was delivered around the time of the capture of Plataea in 373 BC.

named which left.⁵⁰ Once the battle was won, the Thebans were in a stronger position to force the Thespians into compliance, and this was their first order of business once Jason and the Spartans departed.

The aftermath of Leuctra spelled doom for the reluctant Thespians, and they relocated to Ceressus, a strong point in the territory of Thespieae.⁵¹ The move to Ceressus was necessitated by the lack of fortification at Thespieae and the Thespian abandonment of the Boeotian cause at Leuctra. The Thebans had easily interfered in Thespian affairs during the Peloponnesian War once the walls had been dismantled. Those Thespians loyal to the Boeotian League probably remained in the unfortified city, as they would have no reason to fear reprisal from the main Boeotian army. Fulfilling the Delphic prophecy transmitted to the Thessalians, Epaminondas captured Ceressus and the Thespians within.⁵² A popular theory for the fate of the Thespians after Leuctra is that the Thespians were expelled from Boeotia.⁵³ While incredibly impractical in terms of the military power of the Boeotian League, this theory could be modified to only include anti-league Thespians, particularly those who had collaborated with the Spartan occupiers in the 370s BC similar to those Thebes had exiled after 379 BC. Given the depletion of forces caused by the second exile of the Plataeans and the recent *stasis* in Thespieae, the Thebans allowed the Thespians to remain in Boeotia.⁵⁴ The land would not be worth much to the Thebans without a population to work it, and no literary sources attest a Theban takeover of Thespian land after the battle of

⁵⁰ Paus. 9.13.8.

⁵¹ Paus. 9.14.2.

⁵² Paus. 9.14.3-4. The prophecy referred to a defeat of the Dorians which would foreshadow the capture of Ceressus.

⁵³ Tuplin 1986, 339.

⁵⁴ This reason is more practical than Buckler 2003, 297 which attributed the sparing of the Thespians at Ceressus to Epaminondas' 'unwillingness to shed the blood of his fellow-citizens.'

Leuctra.⁵⁵ Additionally, the city itself was not razed post-Leuctra as Plataea had been.⁵⁶

The main evidence used to argue for the total destruction of the city are political speeches from Athens in the 360s BC the dangers of which were mentioned in the introduction. Destroying the city would be completely unnecessary in terms of the security of Boeotia. The intervention during the Peloponnesian War described above had already proven this to be true. Additionally, it is widely agreed that Thespieae was not destroyed until *after* Leuctra. If the city was a defensible position, why would the Thespians have fled to Ceressus?

From the Peloponnesian War through the ultimate reduction of the city post-Leuctra several trends emerge which are indicative of the strategies of the Boeotian League elsewhere. First, there is a consistent decline in the fighting population of Thespieae throughout the Classical Period. The Thespians were on the losing side of almost every major conflict in which they chose to involve themselves. Even at Delium, where the Boeotians were victorious, the Thespians suffered a higher casualty rate than the rest of the Boeotian contingents. This development greatly affected their ability to both protect themselves and contribute to the federal army of the Boeotian League. Furthermore, Thespieae's importance as a strategic site, illustrated during the Peloponnesian War, grew during the 370s as Thebes attempted to eradicate anti-League sentiment in Boeotia and regain the demographic and territorial framework which had created the large armies of the previous incarnation of the Boeotian League. With Thespieae, the Thebans must have been disappointed at the cost of their reconsolidation.

⁵⁵ Tuplin 1986, 322-224 used Isocrates *Plataicus* to claim the Thebans only coveted the land of the Plataeans. Bakhuizen 1994, 316 suggested Theban supervision of Thespian lands and the destruction of the city itself.

⁵⁶ Despite popular views, Plataea should be viewed as the exception to how the Boeotian League treated dissenting cities.

After the capture of Ceressus, the Boeotian League had gained territory and agriculture thus increasing the security of Boeotia from foreign intervention and decreasing its reliance on the import of grain, but had failed to secure as large a military fighting force as they had wanted from such a large region. Despite this disappointment, the Boeotian League was now in a position to reassert its authority over central Greek affairs.

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