Seeking the Face of God:

A Study on Augustine’s Reception in the Mystical Thought of
Bernard of Clairvaux and William of Saint Thierry

by Carmen Angela Cvetković

A thesis submitted for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
August 2010
University of St Andrews
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Abstract

The present thesis examines the way in which two twelfth century authors, the Cistercian monks, Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry, used Augustine in the articulation of their mystical thought. The approach to this subject takes into account the fact that in the works of all these medieval authors the “mystical” element is inescapably entangled with their theological discourse and that an accurate understanding of their views on the soul’s direct encounter with God cannot be achieved without a discussion of their theology.

This thesis posits that the cohesion of Bernard’s and William’s mystical thought lies in their appropriation of the guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical theology: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you” (conf. 1.1.1), reflected in the subtle interplay of three main themes, namely (1) the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God, which provides the grounds for the understanding of the soul’s search for direct contact with God; (2) love as a longing innate in every human being, which explores the means to attain immediacy with God; and (3) the soul’s direct encounter with God, which discusses the nature of the soul’s immediate experience of the divine presence that can only be achieved in lasting fullness at the end of time. This examination of Bernard’s and William’s use of Augustine is structured on the basis of these three core themes which form the scaffolding of their mystical thought.

Investigating the specific methods of their reception of Augustine will highlight the originality and uniqueness of each of the two Cistercian authors, who while drawing on the same patristic source use it nevertheless in various ways, by focussing on different aspects of Augustine’s immense oeuvre and by arriving at distinct mystical programmes.
Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast,
Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen.

„What you have as heritage,
Take now as task;
For thus, you will make it your own!”

Goethe, Faust
Acknowledgements

I owe a great deal of gratitude to many people who provided support, encouragement and inspiration in the course of my work on this project.

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I owe many thanks to the Faculty of Theology of Aarhus University (Denmark) who offered me the possibility to spend six months in Aarhus at the Department of Systematic Theology in the spring and summer of 2007 in order to work on my own project. I am especially grateful to Anders-Christian Jacobsen for having been a constant source of encouragement and also a wonderful friend during all these years. I am also indebted to Else Marie Wiberg Pedersen who kindly sacrificed her Danish students for my sake, accepting to teach a whole course in English so that I could attend it.

Many thanks are owed to the Baden Württemberg government for having offered me a ten months scholarship so that I could spend the academic year 2008-2009 at the Faculty of Theology of the Albert-Ludwigs Universität in Freiburg (Germany). I have greatly appreciated the kindness of my academic adviser Markus Enders and his willingness to read and to comment on large sections of my thesis despite his very busy schedule.

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for the inspiring and thought provoking conversations we had over the years: in particular to Katerina Oikonomopoulou, Arnoud Visser, Jon Coulston and Ralph Anderson. I owe many thanks to my PG fellows for making the School such a friendly and vibrant environment in which to work and study, to: Jeremy Armstrong, Symke Haverkaamp, Jamie McIntyre, Gwynaeth McIntyre, Jon Entwisle, Mark Philippo, Joe Howley, Trevor Mahy, Daniel Mintz, Hannah Swithinbank, Michael Sloan, Allison Weir, Matthijs Wibier, Laurie Wilson and Christos Zekas. Special thanks are owed to my dear colleagues and friends Margarita Lianou, Paula Whiscombe, Susanne Gatzemeier and Georgiana Mazilu who offered me much help and affection at some of the most difficult moments of this project.

Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents for their immense kindness, unwavering love and generous support and to my husband Vladimir to whom I dedicate this thesis.
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Abbreviations

A. Augustine of Hippo:
c. Adim. Contra Adimantum Manichaei discipulum
quant. De animae quantitate
bapt. De baptismo
b. conjug. De bono conjugali
civ. Dei De civitate Dei
conf. Confessiones
conf. Max. Conlatio cum Maximino Arianorum episco po
corrept. De correptione et gratia
div. qu. De diversis quaeestionibus octoginta tribus
doc. Chr. De doctrina Christiana
en. Ps. Enarrationes in Psalmos
ench. Enchiridion ad Laurentium de fide spe et caritate
ep. Epistulae
ep. Jo. In epistulam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus
c. ep. Pel. Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum
c. Faust. Contra Faustum Manichaeum
f. et symb. De fide et symbolo
Gn. litt. De Genesi ad litteram
Gn. litt. imp. De Genesi ad litteram imperfectus liber
gr. et lib. arb. De gratia et libero arbitrio
gr. et pecc. or. De gratia Christi et peccato originali
Jo. ev. tr. In Joannis evangelium tractatus
lib. arb. De libero arbitrio
c. Max. Contra Maximum Arianum
mend. De mendacio
mor. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum
mus. De musica
ord. De ordine
pecc. mer. De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum
qu. Quaestiones in Heptateuchum
retr. Retractationes
s. Sermones
sol. Soliloquia
spir. et litt. De spiritu et littera
symb. cat. De symbolo ad catechumenos
Trin. De Trinitate
vera rel. De vera religione
vid. Deo De videndo Deo (ep. 147)

**B. Bernard of Clairvaux:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adv.</td>
<td>In adventu Domini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ant.</td>
<td>Super Antiphonarium Cisterciensis Ordinis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apo.</td>
<td>Apologia ad Guillelmum abbatem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asc.</td>
<td>In ascensione Domini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asspt.</td>
<td>In assumptione S. Mariae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conv.</td>
<td>De conversione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Csi.</td>
<td>De consideratione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ded.</td>
<td>In Dedicatione Ecclesiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dil.</td>
<td>De diligendo Deo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div.</td>
<td>Sermones de Diversis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ep.</td>
<td>Epistulae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gra.</td>
<td>De gratia et libero arbitrio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hum.</td>
<td>De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mart.</td>
<td>In festivitate Sancti Martini episcopi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss.</td>
<td>Homiliae super Missus est. In Laudibus Virginis Matris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov1.</td>
<td>Pro dominica I Novembris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pent.</td>
<td>In die Pentecostes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre.</td>
<td>De praecepto et dispensatione</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Par.</td>
<td>Parabolae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasc.</td>
<td>In die sancto Paschae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quad.</td>
<td>In quadragesima</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QH.</td>
<td>In psalmum “Qui habitat”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SC.</td>
<td>Sermones super Cantica Canticorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sent.</td>
<td>Sententiae</td>
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**C. William of St. Thierry:**

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Contemp.</td>
<td>De contemplando Deo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. am.</td>
<td>De natura et dignitate amoris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacr. alt.</td>
<td>De sacramento altaris</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disp. Ab.</td>
<td>Disputatio adversus Abaelardum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exp. Rom.</td>
<td>Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med.</td>
<td>Meditativae Orationes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat. corp.</td>
<td>De natura corporis et animae</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cant.</td>
<td>Expositio super Cantica Canticorum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spec.</td>
<td>Speculum fidei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aenig.</td>
<td>Aenigma fidei</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ep. frat.</td>
<td>Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei</td>
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**D. Bible:**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vl</td>
<td>Vetus Latina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vg</td>
<td>Vulgata</td>
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**Old Testament:**
<table>
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<td>Genesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ex</td>
<td>Exodus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lv</td>
<td>Leviticus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nm</td>
<td>Numbers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dt</td>
<td>Deuteronomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Kgs</td>
<td>3 Kings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ps</td>
<td>Psalms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prv</td>
<td>Proverbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sg</td>
<td>Song of Songs</td>
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**New Testament:**

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mt</td>
<td>Matthew</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mk</td>
<td>Mark</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lk</td>
<td>Luke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jn</td>
<td>John</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts</td>
<td>Acts of Apostles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rom</td>
<td>Romans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Cor</td>
<td>1 Corinthians</td>
</tr>
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<td>2 Cor</td>
<td>2 Corinthians</td>
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<td>Galatians</td>
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<td>Eph</td>
<td>Ephesians</td>
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<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>Colossians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Tm</td>
<td>1 Timothy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tit</td>
<td>Titus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Jn</td>
<td>1 John</td>
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**E. Abbreviations of Collective Works, Dictionaries, Journals and Series:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>AHDLMA</td>
<td><em>Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age</em> (Paris, 1926-).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASOC</td>
<td><em>Analecta Sacri Ordinis Cisterciensis</em> (Rome, 1945-).</td>
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<tr>
<td>AugStud</td>
<td><em>Augustinian Studies</em> (Villanova, 1970-).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Collectanea Cisterciensia (Westmalle, 1934-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCCM</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis (Turnhout, 1953-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCL</td>
<td>Corpus Christianorum. Series Latina (Turnhout, 1953-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CF</td>
<td>Cistercian Fathers Series (Kalamazoo, 1970-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COCR</td>
<td>Collectanea Ordinis Cisterciensium Reformatorum (Rome, 1934-1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CollAug</td>
<td>Collectanea Augustiniana Series (New York, 1990-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Cistercian Studies Series (Kalamazoo, 1970-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna, 1865-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSQ</td>
<td>Cistercian Studies Quarterly (Spencer, Mass., 1966-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>The Downside Review (Bath, 1880-1939; Oxford, 1980-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSAM</td>
<td>Dictionnaire de Spiritualité Ascétique et Mystique (Paris, 1937-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNO</td>
<td>Gregorii Nysseni Opera, eds. W. Jaeger, H. Langerbeck, H. Hörner (Leiden, 1952-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTS</td>
<td>Journal of Theological Studies (London, 1899-)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTR</td>
<td>Harvard Theological Review (Harvard, 1908-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RechAug</td>
<td>Recherches Augustiniennes (Paris, 1958-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RechSR</td>
<td>Recherches de Sciences Religieuses (Paris, 1910-)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTAM</td>
<td>Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale (Louvain, 1929-)</td>
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<td>REAug</td>
<td>Revue des Études Augustiniennes (Paris, 1955-)</td>
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<td>RMAL</td>
<td>Revue du Moyen Âge Latin (Strasbourg, 1945-)</td>
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<td>SC</td>
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<td>SP</td>
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<td>StudMed</td>
<td><em>Studi Medievali</em> (Spoleto, 1980-).</td>
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INTRODUCTION

It is for others to serve God, it is for you to cling to him; it is for others to believe him, love him and revere him; it is for you to taste him, understand him, be acquainted with him, enjoy him. (...) For that is your profession, to seek the God of Jacob, not as the ordinary run of men do, but to seek the very face of God, which Jacob saw, he who said: “I have seen the Lord face to face and yet my life was not forfeit”.

These lines from the *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei*, written by William of St. Thierry around 1144 and addressed to the Carthusian hermits of Mont-Dieu, capture perfectly one of the distinctive features of monastic life in the twelfth century, namely the search for immediacy with God or what in modern terminology may be referred to as “mysticism”. In the history of Western Christendom the twelfth century represents “the age of the richest development of the monastic mystical tradition”\(^2\). More than the preceding monastic writers, the new monks, chiefly the Cistercians, placed great emphasis on the direct encounter with God as the essence of the cloistered life\(^3\). While this fundamental characteristic is not clearly distinct among the founders of Cîteaux, it becomes undeniably manifest in the subsequent generation of Cistercian monks, dominated by the outstanding figures of Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) and William of St. Thierry (c. 1080-1148)\(^4\). Their ardent desire to find the face of God left an indelible mark on their writings, which frequently discuss the nature of and the means to attain direct contact with God.

Since the beginning of the last century the writings of these two Cistercian monks have been under intense scholarly scrutiny. The pioneering studies of Étienne Gilson on Bernard of Clairvaux and those of Jean-Marie Déchanet on William of St. Thierry have contributed a great deal to reawaken the interest of contemporary scholars in the medieval monastic tradition, which had previously been neglected in favor of the scholastic tradition. Their efforts were especially directed at elevating “mysticism” to the

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\(^1\) *Ep. frat.* 16; 25.
\(^2\) McGinn (1994) xiii.
\(^3\) Pennington (1973) 23; Renna (1994) 382.
\(^4\) Some scholars manifest reluctance when it comes to considering William of St. Thierry a Cistercian monk. He spent most of his life as a Benedictine monk and abbot of the monastery of St. Thierry and only the last years of his life he spent at the Cistercian community of Signy, leaving the black habit of the Benedictine monastic order for the white habit of the Cistercian monks.
level of theological discussion. However, in spite of their invaluable contribution to the study of Bernard and William, their penchant for finding the sources of the mystical thought of these two Latin authors in the exotic soil of the Greek patristic writers, has plagued subsequent scholarship for many decades. More recently this tendency has been extensively questioned in the light of substantial evidence demonstrating that the theological background of these authors is to be found primarily in more proximate sources such as Augustine and other Latin patristic authors. While William’s Augustinian spirituality has been the subject of a seminal work, which convincingly showed the primacy of Augustine among other patristic sources, Bernard’s dependence on Augustine is still largely under-researched. It is the aim of the present study to explore the way in which Bernard and William drew on Augustine’s legacy in the articulation of their mystical thought, by covering neglected material and by systematizing the contributions of previous scholarship.

As this study does not deal with Bernard’s and William’s teaching as a whole, but attempts to focus only on those aspects which are related to their understanding of the soul’s contact with God and which may be said to form their mystical thought, it is necessary to clarify what is understood by the terms “mystical” and “mysticism”. This clarification is so much more needed since mysticism, which is a notoriously fluid concept, may be problematic when applied to twelfth century monastic literature.

While the qualifier mystikos with its Latin equivalent mysticus meaning simply “hidden” or “secret” was often used in the first Christian centuries, the noun “mysticism” is a neologism first attested in English in 1724, corresponding to the French term “mystique” coined in the early seventeenth century. The meaning of the newly created term was decisively shaped by the views on the soul’s contact with God

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5 Bell (1984).

6 Bouyer (1980) 42-56 demonstrated that the term mystikos was used in the early Christian texts in three different contexts. The oldest and the most important context is that of the biblical exegesis, when the term mystikos is applied primarily to the deeper sense of the scriptural text. Later, the term occurs in a liturgical context, being attached to liturgical objects, texts or ceremonies. Sporadically, the term occurs in what Bouyer calls the ‘spiritual’ context, referring to the life of Christian. McGinn (1991) 416, n. 127 has counted 124 occurrences of the terms mysticus and mystice in Augustine, who uses the terms in the same three ways.

7 Oxford English Dictionary, online ed., s.v. “Mysticism”.

8 For the emergence of the noun “mystique” in French, see De Certeau (1964) 2:269-291. The noun “mysticisme” was first attested in French in 1804, see Le Grand Robert de la Langue Française, 2nd ed. s.v. “Mysticisme”.
expressed by Spanish mystics, such as Theresa of Avila and John of the Cross. As such, the term refers to extraordinary religious states of consciousness, emphasizing the passivity of the soul and the need for infused grace\(^9\). Increasingly the Christian literature devoted to the exploration of the subjective states of personal religious experience has become separated from the more objective aspect of theology that is its doctrinal element. As Thomas Merton wittily observed, dogmatic and mystical theology have become “set apart in mutually exclusive categories, as if mysticism were for saintly women and theological study were for practical, but alas, unsaintly men”\(^10\).

The divorce between mysticism and theology in the West had a twofold consequence for the study of Christian authors who wrote before this separation became manifest. On one hand, modern systematic theologians were not interested in considering the teaching of those authors labeled as mystics in their works dealing with doctrinal aspects. Adolph von Harnack, who does not consider Bernard worthy of a chapter in his *Dogmengeschichte*, is a case in point. On the other hand, the so called “common–core” theorists of the mystical phenomenon who focus on the essential qualities of the mystical experience cutting across time, religions and cultures, and who emphasize its psychological aspects, totally disregard the theological discourse in which an overwhelming part of the Christian mystical experiences is wrapped\(^11\). Without doubt the intense scholarly scrutiny of some of Augustine’s accounts of personal mystical experience from the central books of the *Confessions* represents the most illustrious example of how the model of experiential mysticism has been applied to the work of a patristic author, often with no attention paid to the theological context in which these narratives are deeply embedded. Such an approach resulted not only in a deformation of Augustine’s teaching, but also led to a debate which spans over a century and which reached deadlock with scholars arguing *pro* and *contra* Augustine’s mysticism on the

\(^10\) Merton (1962) 254-255.
\(^11\) The pioneering studies of James (1902) and Underhill (1911) which focused especially on mystical experience as a major psychological event have been followed by a multitude of other studies in the same vein of which I name just a few: Otto (1917); Zaehner (1957); Stace (1961); Lewis (1971); Hardy (1980).
basis of an abstract consideration of the essential characteristics of the mystical experience\textsuperscript{12}.

In approaching the works of Bernard and William, who wrote before the early modern period, it is important to be aware of the fact that the mystical and the doctrinal elements are inextricably intertwined and that an attempt to separate them always involves a distortion of their thought. It is the merit of Étienne Gilson to have stressed the fact that the mysticism of the Cistercian authors is formulated theologically. He referred to both Bernard and William as “speculative mystics”\textsuperscript{13}. In demonstrating the coherence and depth of Bernard’s theological thought in his classical study *The Mystical Theology of Bernard of Clairvaux*, he convincingly refuted the views of those who considered Bernard to be no more than a pious devotional author.

In order to explore the mystical element inherent in complex theological texts of patristic and medieval authors, scholars such as Bernard McGinn\textsuperscript{14} and John P. Kenney\textsuperscript{15} suggested a model of mysticism derived from and compatible with their writings. In contrast to the experiential model of mysticism, in this new model the emphasis shifts from the mystical experience and its psychological aspects to the theological context. These scholars are not interested in establishing whether a person is a mystic or not on the basis of his or her experiences, which can be defined as mystical. Their objective is rather to focus on the theology of texts containing mystical elements, on their cognitive content and to establish their significance in the history of Christian mysticism. Thus, Bernard McGinn drew attention to three important aspects in his understanding of mysticism. First, mysticism must be understood as an element of a concrete religion; second, it has to be considered as a process or way of life, rather than simply concentrating on the culmination of the process and artificially isolating it from the path that leads there; third, he prefers to speak of the achieved goal in terms of consciousness of the immediate presence of God rather than in terms of union, since mystics had

\textsuperscript{12} For a history of the debate see Mandouze (1954) 3:103-168. For a more recent assessment of Augustine’s mysticism from the same perspective see Bonner (1994) 113-157 who relies in his article on Hardy’s definition of mysticism.

\textsuperscript{13} Gilson (1955) 164-168.

\textsuperscript{14} McGinn (1991) xi-xx and (1994) x-xii.

recourse to a variety of categories in order to express their attainment of this final stage, of which union is but one.\textsuperscript{16} Finally, he suggests a definition of the mystical element in Christianity as “that part of its beliefs and practices that concerns the preparation for, the consciousness of, and the reaction to the immediate or direct presence of God”\textsuperscript{17}. This is the sense in which the terms “mystical” and “mysticism” shall be used in the present thesis. Taking this wider view of mysticism will enable us to put together a more complete account of the main theological themes that went into Bernard’s and William’s understanding of the significance of the soul’s direct contact with God.

Neither Augustine nor Bernard nor William arranged their insights on mysticism in a systematic form. It usually happens that a particular subject is approached from different perspectives and developed each time differently. However, a coherent picture of their mystical thought emerges when the main theological themes important for their understanding of the soul’s contact with God are assembled. What they all have in common is the conviction that the grounds for the possibility of any form of direct contact with God lie in the nature of the human being created in the image and likeness of God and that the means to attain direct contact with God is by way of love. Therefore, in studying the way in which Bernard and William use Augustine I will focus on three main themes: image and likeness, love and the soul’s direct encounter with God. The role of Christ is also important for the possibility of the soul’s direct contact with God, however it will not be dealt with as a separate chapter, but will be touched upon in the discussion of the other themes.

Previous scholarship has mainly highlighted only one aspect deriving from Augustine and which the Cistercian authors used in the articulation of their mystical thought. É. Gilson mentioned the role of Augustine’s teaching on love for Bernard’s mysticism\textsuperscript{18}; in a recent article T. Renna focused on the way in which the Cistercian authors used Augustine’s teaching on image and likeness adapting it to their contemplative goals\textsuperscript{19}. The only exception to what is usually a one-sided approach to the relation between Augustine and the Cistercian authors is the study by David N. Bell on

\begin{footnotes}
18 Gilson (1940) 220, n. 24.
19 Renna (1994) 380-400.
\end{footnotes}
William of St. Thierry. He convincingly demonstrates that several elements, which can be traced back to Augustine, need to be taken into account in the understanding of William’s spirituality: image, likeness, participation and love\textsuperscript{20}. The main argument of the present thesis goes along the lines indicated by Bell, but presses things a step further in claiming that if image and likeness, love and direct contact with God are connected in the mystical thought of the Cistercians, it is because Augustine encourages them to see a link between them. It is particularly Augustine’s biblical commentaries and his major treatises, such as the \textit{Confessiones} and the \textit{De Trinitate} that contain the bishop’s view on the noble destiny of the human being created with a restless tendency towards God as a consequence of his creation in the image and likeness of God\textsuperscript{21}. This view may be summed up using a famous quotation from the \textit{Confessiones}, which Andrew Louth reckoned to represent the “guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical theology”\textsuperscript{22}: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until it rests in you”\textsuperscript{23}. As this line of thought, salient especially in Augustine’s writings of the early and middle period, is less discernable in the bishop’s late works against Pelagians, where a more sombre picture of the human destiny is presented, numerous modern scholars focused on what they considered to be a fissure at the heart of Augustine’s thought, speaking even of the “two Augustines”\textsuperscript{24}. One recent example of this scholarly trend is the study of Gerald Bonner who considers as irreconcilable the “optimistic” or “dynamic” field of Augustine’s theology where he confidently speaks of the soul’s quest for God and of deification, and the “pessimistic” aspects of his theology on grace, predestination and original sin developed in the anti-Pelagian works\textsuperscript{25}. While this perspective on the contradictory tensions of Augustine’s thought was predominant in the last few decades, there have been significant attempts, coming from scholars such as Goulven Madec\textsuperscript{26} and more recently

\textsuperscript{20} Bell (1984) 252.  
\textsuperscript{21} For an excellent study on Augustine’s idea that the human being was created with a tendency toward God, see Bochet (1982).  
\textsuperscript{22} Louth (2006) 134.  
\textsuperscript{23} conf. 1.1.1.  
\textsuperscript{24} Brown (1967) chapter “Lost Future”, is undoubtedly the most famous advocate of the “two Augustines” theory, which for a few decades represented the scholarly consensus regarding Augustine’s intellectual evolution.  
\textsuperscript{26} Madec (1989).
Carol Harrison\textsuperscript{27}, to approach the vast continent of the bishop’s works as forming a coherent whole.

Based on these insights, the present thesis intends to explore whether Bernard and William follow Augustine in his “optimistic” view of the destiny of the human kind by drawing mainly on the bishop’s works from the early and middle period and whether they manifest any interest for some of Augustine’s late anti-Pelagian works. It also intends to establish whether like numerous modern scholars they are sensitive to any rupture lying at the heart of Augustine’s thought or whether they read his works totally unaware of the seemingly contradictions that have so much puzzled his modern interpreters.

As this thesis intends to approach the relation between the two Cistercian authors and Augustine through the prism of reception, focusing on the same themes in our treatment of each author will help to illustrate more pertinently the way in which the same source can be exploited in different ways. Bernard and William were intimate friends and collaborators who constantly inspired and supported each other in their creative enterprises. Their interests are so similar that for many centuries some of William’s works were confused with those of Bernard, circulating and reaching fame under his friend’s name\textsuperscript{28}. However, in spite of their treatment of the same themes and in spite of developing their mystical thought along the lines established by Augustine, each of them emerges as an original thinker in his own right.

In the present thesis the method of reception cannot be applied by concentrating solely on the examination of the quotations that Bernard and William extract from Augustine and adapt to their own goals. The reason why we are bound to use reception as a rather loose methodological tool arises from the way in which Bernard and William draw on their sources. Whereas the latter quotes at length from Augustine especially in his treatises where he applies the method of compilation, Bernard is notorious for the way in which he changes his sources beyond recognition at the level of linguistic expression. Therefore, rather than searching exclusively for exact terminological congruence, similar

\textsuperscript{27} Harrison (2006).
\textsuperscript{28} William’s treatises \textit{De contemplando Deo} and \textit{De natura et dignitate amoris} circulated together with Bernard’s \textit{De diligendo deo} under the title \textit{De amore Dei}, being all attributed to Bernard. See Hourlier (1953) 223. \textit{Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei} had an identical fate, circulating under Bernard’s name for centuries. For more details see Déchanet (1980) ix-xiii and p. 106, n.1 and n. 2.
ideas or similar terms need to be taken into account in the attempt to understand how Bernard makes use of Augustine in building up his own mystical thought.

Apart from the mere identification of quotations, terms or ideas, which can be traced back to Augustine, by embracing the perspective of creative reception we intend to scrutinize the way in which material taken from Augustine is selected, to reflect on the possible reasons that determine a particular selection of Augustine’s texts or ideas, to investigate the possible amalgamation of this material with material coming from other sources, especially Greek, and finally to evaluate the way in which Bernard and William respectively incorporate and adapt Augustine’s thought to their contemplative agenda. Moreover, the present investigation will concentrate on material derived directly from Augustine, and to a lesser degree, received through compiling mediators. It will not embark on a wider analysis of “Augustinianism” where tradition added its own material, but still called it “Augustinian”.

As Bernard and William do not produce systematic treatises on mysticism it is difficult to isolate a specific corpus of their works on the basis of which to examine their use of Augustine. Moreover, some of their works, which are said to be more doctrinal in character, contain essential material for the understanding of some of the issues that they develop in relation with their mystical thought. This is the case with Bernard’s rather dogmatic treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio, or with William’s Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos, which formed the doctrinal foundation for the works William wrote during the years 1135-114529. However, the research on Bernard in the present thesis concentrates especially on his main works De diligendo Deo, De gratia et libero arbitrio and the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum. Other sources, such as his letters, the treatises De consideratione, De gradibus humilitatis, his Sermones de Diversis, Sermones per annum etc. are also used as evidence but they are not predominant in the present analysis. For William, I relied chiefly on his early treatises De contemplando Deo, De natura et dignitate amoris, Meditativae orationes and on his mature works Speculum fidei, Aenigma fidei and Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei. Occasionally I turned to some of his other works such as the Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos, the De sacramento altaris and the Disputatio adversus Abaelardum.

At the level of structure this thesis consists of two parts devoted to Bernard and William respectively. Each part opens with a preliminary section which reviews the relevant literature on the subject and which attempts to understand the attitude of the two Cistercian authors towards what they name *patres* and *doctores* in order better to comprehend their approach to the patristic sources. In the case of Bernard we also address the problem of discerning his sources and suggest a specific methodology in the attempt to find a solution to this difficulty. Following these preliminary remarks each part unfolds in three chapters which examine the themes that contribute to the main argument of the thesis, namely image and likeness, love and direct encounter with God. Thus, the first chapter of the part devoted to Bernard focuses on his early treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio* in an attempt to highlight the role played by Augustine in the abbot’s location of the soul’s direct encounter with God at the level of the restored likeness. The second chapter follows Bernard in his use of Augustine in the development of his views on love from the emphasis on the primacy of divine love, through the development of the human love as *desiderium*, to the significant theme of *ordinatio caritatis*, which deals with the ordering of human affections, the *sine qua non* condition for the soul’s loving encounter with God. Finally, the last chapter deals specifically with various perspectives on the mystical experience, understood either in Augustine’s terms as *contemplatio*, *visio dei*, *ecstasis* or under an aspect which does not feature explicitly in Augustine, that of *unitas spiritus*. The analysis of *unitas spiritus* attempts to demonstrate Bernard’s use of Augustine’s distinction between *unum* and *unus spiritus*, which the bishop formulated against the Arians, but which Bernard uses for his own contemplative agenda.

The first chapter from the second part of the thesis devoted to William discusses his indebtedness to Augustine, Claudianus Mamertus and Gregory of Nyssa in his development of the theme of image and likeness. We also attempt to demonstrate that his location of the vision of God at the level of perfect likeness of the soul with God depends directly on Augustine’s texts. In the second chapter, we approach the theme of love through the prism of the various definitions that William gives to the term. Thus, we follow William in his understanding of love in Augustine’s terms as *voluntas*, *motus*, *pondus* or *affectus*. We analyse the use of Augustine’s theory of sense perception and thought formation from Book XI of the *De Trinitate* in William’s development of the
notions of *sensus amoris* and *intellectus amoris*. Another section deals with Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit as love which William makes the backbone of his mysticism. Finally the last section of this chapter examines the progress of human affection from *voluntas*, to *amor*, *dilectio* and finally *unitas spiritus*, attempting to detect the role played by Augustine in William’s view on the ascending stages of love. The final chapter devoted to the soul’s direct encounter with God examines the way in which William uses one of Augustine’s main texts on the vision of God from the *Epistula* 147 in advancing his own view on *visio Dei*. Finally the last section on *unitas spiritus* highlights the central role of Augustine’s idea on the Holy Spirit as love for William’s understanding of the union of the soul with God. In this section we also attempt to refute Paul Verdeyen’s claim\(^\text{30}\) that Bernard’s and William’s different views concerning the *unitas spiritus* led to a controversy, which undermined their friendship towards the end of their lives.

The appendix contains the Latin text of the most substantial quotations from primary sources, which due to their considerable seize have not been included in the actual footnotes.

The present study of Augustine’s reception in the mystical thought of Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St Thierry is expected to make a further contribution to scholarship in several ways. It will offer concrete evidence for elements from Augustine’s thought being used by Bernard and William in the scaffolding of their mystical theology. It will highlight different reception techniques of the main literary sources, such as the Bible and the patristic sources, in these two twelfth century monastic medieval writers. It will provide a more accurate estimation of the place of Augustine among other patristic sources used in the monastic twelfth century putting an end to a scholarly trend that claimed erroneously a greater dependence of Bernard and William on Greek patristic sources. Finally, the reception perspective will contribute to a more solid reconstruction of the dynamic appropriation of ideas taken from patristic sources in these two medieval thinkers. Furthermore, the method of reception will enable us to capture more accurately the originality and uniqueness of both Bernard and William, who draw on exactly the same Latin biblical and patristic heritage, but use it differently.

\(^{30}\) Verdeyen (1990) 73.
Part I: The Exegetical Mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux

Preliminary remarks

In his monumental History of Dogma, Adolph von Harnack spoke of Bernard of Clairvaux as Augustinus redivivus, adding that “he moulded himself entirely on the pattern of the great African, and that from him what lay at the foundation of his pious contemplation was derived.” This view came soon to be neglected, when, a few decades later, Étienne Gilson in his influential study, The Mystical Theology of Saint Bernard, drastically reassessed the extent of Bernard’s debt to Augustine. According to Gilson, the main sources of Bernard’s mystical theology are to be found in a combination of three doctrinal blocks consisting of: a) a series of scriptural quotations from the first Epistle of St. John speaking of the union of the soul with God; b) the theme of deification by ecstasy present in a text of Maximus the Confessor accessible in Latin in the translation of Eriugena; c) the recurrent idea of renouncing one’s will of which speaks the Rule of St. Benedict. Augustine’s influence, on the other hand, is described as “diffuse”, hence difficult to grasp, but apparent nevertheless in Bernard’s doctrine on love. In another of his works, Gilson reckons as certain Bernard’s acquaintance with the Latin translations of the works of Greek authors such as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Denys the Areopagite and Maximus the Confessor. In his view, Bernard achieves for the first time since Eriugena a synthesis of the Eastern and Western theological traditions, uniting “the Greek theology based upon the relation of image to model with the Latin theology based upon the relation of nature to grace.” While Bernard’s direct dependence on various aspects of

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1 The title of this chapter is inspired by a remark made by Étienne Gilson regarding Origen’s mysticism, which he labeled as “the mysticism of an exegete”, see Gilson (1940) 28. Later De Lubac observes that one may also legitimately speak of “the exegesis of a mystic”, see De Lubac (2000) 158-159. Mutatis mutandis the same may be said of Bernard as De Lubac concludes that: “If then, it is indubitable that the exegesis of Bernard is the exegesis of a mystic, it is no less true that, more essentially, by its very texture, his mysticism is the mysticism of an exegete”. See De Lubac (2000) 162.

2 Harnack (1899) 6:10.

3 Gilson (1940) 20-32.

4 Gilson (1940) 220-221.

5 Gilson (1955) 164.

Origen’s thought is beyond question, it is difficult to assert the same about his reliance on the other Greek authors mentioned by Gilson. It has been recently lamented that Gilson’s enthusiasm for detecting Bernard’s Greek sources has diverted for years the attention of scholars from the more likely sources of his thought, such as Augustine and the Latin Christian authors. Taking their cue from Gilson, many scholars contented themselves to refer to Augustine’s influence on Bernard as “vast and diffuse” and manifested little or no interest in exploring in depth the relation between the two authors. Consequently, apart from a handful of articles and occasional sparse treatments of Bernard’s use of themes or ideas originating in Augustine’s works, the abundant scholarly literature on Bernard has not much to offer on this particular subject.

1. The problem of sources

Discerning the patristic sources that inspired Bernard’s writings is far from being a straightforward matter. The difficulty of this task for the modern interpreter consists

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8 Following Gilson (1940) 17, Daniélou (1953) 52-55 argued for a direct influence of Gregory of Nyssa’s De opificio hominis in Eriugena’s translation on Bernard’s view on the image and likeness developed in SC. 80-82. However, most scholars regard this claim with suspicion. More recently, while acknowledging that apart from Origen, Bernard knew Gregory of Nyssa, Denys and Maximus, Lackner (1976) 394, speaks rather of an indirect influence of these authors on the abbot of Clairvaux. The similarities between Bernard’s and Gregory of Nyssa’s commentaries on the Song of Songs have been traced back to a common source, namely Origen. See Ohly (1958) 141. Regarding Bernard’s knowledge of Denys the Areopagite, Fracheboud (1957) 329-333 claimed that Bernard was well acquainted with the Corpus Areopagiticum. E. Boissard has questioned these claims in two articles, which have established the scholarly consensus on this matter. Although Bernard may have known sections of the Corpus Areopagiticum, due to his contacts with the learned men of his time, such as Hugh of Saint-Victor, who produced a commentary on Denys’s Celestial Hierarchies, it has been established that there is no substantial evidence to sustain the allegation of Denys’s influence on Bernard’s works. See Boissard (1953) 114-135; Boissard (1959) 214-263 and McGinn (1976) 222-224. Finally, while Gilson (1935) 188-195 and (1940) 25-28 spoke confidently of the existing links between Bernard and Maximus through Eriugena’s translation, more recent scholars regard these links as rather tenuous. See Casey (1988) 31; Ruh (1990) 1:272.

9 Leclercq (1990b) xxii.

10 Casey (1988) 47.

11 Especially Bernard’s early treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio was the object of scholarly research of Augustine’s influence, see Faust (1962) and more recently Rydstrøm-Poulsen (2004) 301-321. Bernard’s dependence on Augustine in his articulation of the theology of grace was studied by Rydstrøm-Poulsen (1992) 307-343. The influence of Augustine on Bernard’s view on memory was briefly treated by Coleman (1992) 169-192 and was the subject of a more detailed study by Griggs (1997) 475-485. Other articles dealing with Bernard’s use of Augustine are Rigolot (1992) 132-144 and McGinn (2006) 7-11, which highlight the role played by Augustine with regard to Bernard’s spirituality and mysticism respectively.
primarily in the fact that, while acknowledging that he follows in the footsteps of his illustrious Christian predecessors without any attempt to introduce novelties in the doctrine received from early Christian writers, with a few rare exceptions, Bernard does not consider it necessary to name his patristic sources. The only explicit source acknowledged and carefully quoted in Bernard’s texts is the Bible\textsuperscript{12}. In neglecting to mention the name of the authors on whose writings he was drawing, Bernard does not differ from other medieval writers who have a similar attitude toward the use of the patristic heritage. However, in Bernard’s case, the modern researcher is confronted with an additional difficulty due to the fact that, apart from not indicating his sources, direct quotations are also extremely rarely present in his writings\textsuperscript{13}. Moreover, Bernard does not simply repeat what he might have read in previous authors; he is not a compiler. As a skilled artisan with words who combined the gift of natural talent with intensive work on his texts at the level of composition, correction and revision of his manuscripts, Bernard retained faithfully the meaning of his readings while transforming significantly the outward expression. Thus, R. W. Southern attributes the originality of Bernard’s style to two main elements: on the one hand, to his exquisite command of the scriptural undertones, and on the other hand, to Bernard’s familiarity with the French vernacular “which gave the old language a fresh fluency and vivacity”\textsuperscript{14}. The result is then, as Étienne Gilson has rightly observed with regard to Bernard’s mystical theology, “an incontestably original creation, albeit altogether made up of traditional elements”\textsuperscript{15}.

And yet, no matter how arduous the task of discerning the patristic sources used by Bernard might be, it needs to be undertaken, since one cannot hope to understand properly his texts without a constant reading of his thought against the biblical and the patristic background. Moreover, in order to appreciate Bernard’s links with the Christian past, it is necessary to understand the immediate context of his reception of the patristic

\textsuperscript{12} Leclercq (1962) 276.
\textsuperscript{13} Searching for direct quotations in Bernard’s \textit{Sermones super Cantica Canticorum}, Leclercq is able to indicate with exactitude merely two sentences from ancient satirical authors, a short fragment from a liturgical hymn, two sentences from Fulgentius and other two short sentences from Augustine, see Leclercq (1962) 275-319.
\textsuperscript{14} Southern (1953) 215-216. Mohrmann also considers Bernard’s phrase as revolutionary, leaving behind the hypotactic structure of the Classical Latin phrase and adopting, like Augustine especially in his sermons, the paratactic construction characteristic of the oral style. See Mohrmann (1961) 347-367 and Evans (1983) 104.
\textsuperscript{15} Gilson (1940) 20.
texts. Thus, looking at the habits of reading and learning in the monastic environment, while also taking into consideration Bernard’s method of writing, might help us to understand better significant aspects of his dealing with the patristic sources. It is worth noting that in the case of Bernard there is a close and fundamental relation between the author and his texts, therefore, as Michael Casey has judiciously remarked: “Bernard’s life and writings cannot be separated…To understand the man, to understand his situation, to understand his writings: these three distinct and irreducible tasks are yet somehow one”16.

2. Monastic learning

In his conversations with his friends Bernard himself used to say playfully that he had never studied and that the only masters he had were the oaks and the beeches17. It is known, however, that before entering Cîteaux, he started his education at the canons of St. Vorles18. Although there is no information about the content of Bernard’s early studies, it is presumed that he had received at the canons of St. Vorles his introduction to classical culture and that literature and not dialectic formed the basis of his education at this time19. This would explain to some extent the frequent quotations from or reminiscences of the classical authors present in his writings20. Another possibility would be that he had received a fractured classical culture by reading preponderantly the ecclesiastical writers who in many of their works refer to the pagan realities of their time21.

The choice Bernard had made fairly early in his life between the study in an urban school and the seclusion of the monastery had as a result his exposure to a new and particular way of learning. Instead of being taught by a master in a town school, he most probably pursued his education in the cloister under the personal supervision of a spiritual father. Instead of secular or classical writers he was occupied with the Bible and

17 Vita Prima 1.4.23: et in hoc nullos aliquando se magistros habuisse, nisi quercus et fagos, joco illo suo gratioso inter amicos dicere solet. See also Ep. 106. 2, where Bernard appreciates more the knowledge he acquires from nature than that which is to be found in books.
20 For Bernard’s use of classical literature see, Déchanet (1953) 56-77; Renna (1980) 122-131.
the patristic authors that were read during *lectio divina* and during the liturgy. As strict observers of the Rule of St. Benedict, the Cistercians could not have neglected the role of reading among other activities present in the life of the monk. The holy reading or *lectio divina* finished in meditation: *meditari aut legere*. Jean Leclercq reminds us that during the Middle Ages the monks had not the same habits of reading as today. They used to read not only with their eyes, but also with their lips, pronouncing the words, and with their ears, hearing and listening to the phrases. This “acoustical reading” is an active reading that leads to *meditatio* and to *oratio*. In *Usus Ordinis Cisterciensis* it is stated that the monk is free to interrupt his reading at any time and go and pray in the church. While in the town schools of the same time the purpose of the reading was to lead to *quaestio* and *disputatio* within the limits of the text, in the cloister, *lectio divina* was practiced as a means to seeking God in contemplative prayer. In order to achieve this goal, there should be as few distractions as possible.

William of St. Thierry presents the monastic method of reading in the *Epistula ad frатres de Monte Dei*. It is highly likely that Bernard practiced this method as well since William describes in fact the method of reading outlined in the Rule of St. Benedict. William advises his novices to read regularly and only one text at a time, until they grow accustomed with the style of the author. The novices should read in this way the Epistles of St. Paul and the Psalms of David until they recuperate the “spirit” in which these texts were written. Dispersing their attention between too many texts or reading casually would destabilize their mind rather than render it more stable. Memorising some part of the daily *lectio divina* would enable the readers to digest them more carefully and to bring them up again for frequent rumination. The metaphor of rumination applied to the holy reading is used frequently and is suggestive of the way in which the sacred texts needed to be approached. Reading is seen not as an end in itself but it should give rise to prayer. The interruption that prayer might cause is not to be considered as an obstacle to

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22 RB 48. For the importance of reading the patristic authors (*patres*) in addition to the biblical books, see RB 73.
23 Leclercq (1982a) 15.
24 The expression belongs to Leclercq (1982a) 15.
25 *Usus Ordinis Cisterciensis* 3.71.
26 *Ep. frat.* 51-52.
27 Southern (1953) 188-189.
reading, on the contrary, its purpose is to apply to it a mind more purified and more prepared for understanding.

G. R. Evans observes that William of St. Thierry was writing this passage from the letter to the brethren at Mont Dieu at the same time as the section from the *Vita Prima* where he discusses the education received by Bernard. In this biography, Bernard is presented as reading in order (*seriatim*) and rather frequently (*saepius*) and with no other intention than that of understanding the sacred texts. In order to support his reading from the Holy Scripture he turned to the patristic authors, whose judgment he accepted humbly. He acquired such a foundation of his knowledge, says William, that, since then, Bernard was able to use these sources in teaching with confidence and for the benefit of his audience.

The habit of quoting from memory could lead sometimes to errors as Bernard himself recognizes in the *Retractatio* to his small treatise *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, where trying to support his point of view with a biblical passage, he quotes it in a wrong way:

> It was rash to do it from memory, because afterwards I could not find it in the Gospel. I was mistaken in thinking the text said ‘Nor did the Son know’. It was not a deliberate error. Yet although I remembered the words wrongly, I got the sense right. I should have said, ‘Not even the Son of Man knows’ (Mk 13:32).

The monastic way of learning and reading, which, as we could see, engages the whole person - body, soul and mind - had direct and significant consequences on the way of teaching and writing in the cloistered communities. Jean Leclercq observed that the method of contemplative prayer, which unites reading, meditation and prayer, explains the phenomenon of reminiscence, in other words the spontaneous remembrance of quotations and allusions, which evoke one another only given the similarity of the words. Similar words are grouped together and the evocation of one of them will attract in a spontaneous and effortless way the presence of the others. The phenomenon of

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28 Evans (1983) 49. Bernard’s first biography is a joint endeavour, being written by three of his contemporaries who knew him well: his friend William of St. Thierry, his secretary, Geoffrey of Auxerre and Arnold of Bonneval, whose connections with Bernard are not always clear. For more details on the *Vita Prima* and its authors see Bredero (1996) 90-141.

29 *Vita Prima* 1.4.24.

30 *Hum.* *Retractatio*.

31 Leclercq (1982a) 73-74.
reminiscences affected also the way of writing in such a way that frequently the occurrence of one word with a biblical flavour anticipated a whole biblical quotation, which evoked in turn the mentioning of other similar scriptural verses.

It is beyond any doubt that the Bible was Bernard’s most extensive source. His familiarity with the biblical text was so great that it is difficult to say “when the Bible ends and when Bernard begins”. However, it would be erroneous to think that his command of the biblical text results entirely from the individual study of the different books of the Bible. Although the way of reading is very important and explains some of the aspects of the reception process, this is not the only occasion in which the monks are exposed to the sacred texts. More important than lectio divina, the liturgy provides the spiritual context in which the Bible and the patristic authors can be heard on a daily basis. Jean Leclercq considers that it is legitimate to ask whether the Bible was for Bernard a book meant merely to be read and argues that in fact the liturgy is the main of Bernard’s sources, where he could have become acquainted with all other sources. Leclercq remarks that often the biblical quotations do not follow the text of the Vulgate, but are made according to the text of the Old Latin Bible which is found in the patristic authors or which is used in the liturgy: “Evidently the chanted portions of the Divine Office, its responses and antiphons, were imprinted in his memory even more than were those of the Mass. He received his Scripture from tradition. For him the Bible was the word of God living in the church.” Along the same lines, G. R. Evans argues that Bernard’s active way of life as a busy abbot and preacher would have constituted an impediment for his studious activities. Apart from the daily communal reading, there is not much evidence supporting the idea of Bernard’s solitary reading. Therefore, orality plays an important role in understanding the reception of the texts in the Middle Ages. According to Brian Stock, Bernard perfected the oral techniques commonly practiced in the monastic environment.

32 Farkasfalvy (1969) 3-13. The author of this article estimates that in Bernard’s Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, a biblical quotation occurs every two lines. For Bernard’s use of the Bible, see also Bodard (1953) 24-45 and Dumontier (1953).
34 Leclercq (1962) 296-297.
36 Evans (1983) 44.
The other sources for biblical quotations are the writings of the patristic authors, which were read both independently during the *lectio divina* and in a liturgical context. Bernard follows them cautiously, because his greatest concern is not to introduce any novelties in his preaching. His declared intention is to say nothing new, but to say something that is right. This might be one of the reasons why he is not preoccupied with indicating his sources, making thus a clear distinction between his own contribution and the biblical or patristic thought. Bernard’s position follows the position of many Christian authors. He is not willing to go beyond the limits of tradition; on the contrary, his preoccupation is to stay within the boundaries set by his patristic predecessors.

Bernard’s reluctance against novel things can be better understood if we remember the reforms that were taking place in the urban schools of his time, the birthplace of scholastics. Leclercq’s distinction between monastic and scholastic theology, although questioned recently by scholars for attributing to the twelfth century a reality which suits better the subsequent century, can still be found useful for defining the essential parameters of a particular type of theology which follows in the footsteps of patristic theology and which is practiced in the twelfth century particularly in the cloister. According to Leclercq the monastic theology of which Bernard was the most prominent representative differed from scholastic theology in object, method and goal. Although the Bible and the works of the patristic authors remained the scholastics’ main texts, the latter were also interested in using extensively sources from outside the Christian tradition, such as the pagan philosophers and in particular Aristotle. They

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38 Ep. 77.
39 See the discussion on the importance that Bernard attached to the idea of not transgressing the borders set by his Christian predecessors below, pp. 25-29.
40 This topic is discussed in Leclercq (1953) 1-23; Leclercq (1982a) Chapter 9; Leclercq (1982b) 68-88;
41 Otten (2004a) 366 and (2004b) 1, where speaking of the twelfth century pre-scholastic climate of thought, Willemien Otten observes that categories such as monastic and scholastic theology do not really do justice to the complexity of this intellectual period when the walls of the monasteries were by no means impenetrable. With particular view to Bernard, many studies have attempted to demonstrate that although not trained in an academic environment, he was not, however, ignorant of some of the methods, which were being popular in the schools. Thus, Bernard makes use of dialectic in his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, which is an ample answer to a question raised by one of his students regarding the relationship between grace and free choice. Also, it has been demonstrated that Bernard expected the clergy to be trained in dialectic in order to communicate the truth of the Church and in order to edify the ignorant, see Sommerfeldt (1977) 169-179. G. R. Evans also notices that Bernard does not oppose dialectic as such, but only the mode and the purpose of the use of the dialectical skill, see Evans (2000) 43.
42 Leclercq (1953) 8: «Le moyen âge monastique est le prolongement de l’âge patristique».
43 Leclercq (1953) 10.
applied to the study of religious texts the method of *quaestio* and *disputatio*. Finally, the scholastics were pursuing knowledge for its own sake. In the monastic environment, while the pagan sources were not opposed as such, they were used only as a means to a higher end. While not being entirely rejected, these sources needed to be handled cautiously since the knowledge they contained did nothing to help the monk in his search for God. The approach to the text was not based on *quaestio* and *disputatio* but on *lectio divina* or on the exposure to the biblical text and the Christian authors during the liturgy. While authors such as Abelard, for instance, attempted to explain the objective reality by means of the dialectical method, for Bernard the fact was already established by the Bible and the patristic authors, and by means of *lectio divina*, *meditatio* and *oratio*, it needed only to be reassimilated. Finally, knowledge pursued in the schools for its own sake is overtly condemned in the monastic circles where the knowledge had a salvific value, having a direct impact on and affecting the entire way of life of the contemplative monk. Following the patristic tradition since Tertullian, *De anima 2* and *De praescriptione haereticorum* 14, knowledge for its own sake is linked by Bernard with *curiositas*. He opposes true wisdom with vain curiosity. Between these two extremes there are several stages. On the lowest level, Bernard places the curiosity or the knowledge for its own sake. He links the knowledge sought for boasting with vain glory, the knowledge looked for in order to edify the others with love. Finally, the knowledge pursued for the sake of God and for the love of God, is conjoined with wisdom. Bernard’s view on *curiositas* has similarities with Augustine’s understanding of the concept. The term was mainly used with a negative connotation even in Augustine’s early works, where the study of the disciplines is said not to have a goal in itself but to be oriented towards divine contemplation. *Curiosus* is a pejorative term contrasted by

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44 SC. 36.1-3 and SC. 37.2. The problem of the use of pagan authors in the monastic environment is not a straightforward one and more recent scholarship has coined the expression “monastic humanism” in order to refer to monks’ tendency to admire and even to assimilate the style and content of ancient works. Bernard himself, recommended the study of the liberal arts to the clergy, but he did not see its utility for the monastic learning. See Renna (1980) 122-127.


47 Sent. 3.57. For a detailed discussion of Bernard’s views on *curiositas* see Leclercq (1990a) 92-100.

48 ord. 2.16.44. For more details on Augustine’s view on *curiositas* see Labhardt (1986) 188-196; Marrou (1938) 278-279; 350-352; 472-473; Torchia (1999) 259-261.
Augustine with *studiosus*\(^{49}\), *religiosus*\(^{50}\) and *capax*\(^{51}\). It designates the person who indulges in knowledge (*cognitio*) for its own sake. This knowledge is capable of deviating the soul from the contemplation of eternal things\(^{52}\). Augustine also links curiosity with vanity\(^{53}\).

The reception of important Christian texts, including the Biblical and patristic sources, in the monastic environment of the twelfth century emerges as a regulated and complex process, containing a strong element of orality. This must be taken into consideration when dealing with the patristic sources of the medieval authors. Although it would be impossible to clarify or to indicate beyond the shadow of a doubt the way in which the ideas circulated from one author to another, knowing something about the reading methods of an author can, at least, position researchers on the right path in their investigation.

### 3. Writing

Apart from understanding the way of reading and learning in the monastic environment and apart from taking into consideration the significant oral element involved in the communication of texts and ideas, it is also necessary to approach Bernard’s texts by being aware of his specific method of writing, which may reveal additional significant aspects of his dealing with the sources. Bernard was not academically trained in the way that some of his contemporary theologians who attended the courses of the cathedral schools used to be\(^{54}\). Therefore, he never made use in his works of the technique of compilation, nor did he dedicate his time to collecting sentences from the patristic authors in the fashion of the school students. As he himself testifies in a letter sent to Ogier, canon of Mont-Saint-Eloi, the whole process of writing was for him highly laborious and he sharply contrasts the effortful activity of composition with the ease of conversation. Instead of peace and quiet, one experiences

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\(^{49}\) *ord.* 1.11.31; 2.5.17.

\(^{50}\) *ord.* 2.15.42.

\(^{51}\) *doc. Chr.* prol. 1.

\(^{52}\) *mus.* 6.13.

\(^{53}\) *mus.* 6.13.

\(^{54}\) Bernard’s friend William of St. Thierry was most probably a former student of the School of Reims, where he might have studied even together with Abelard. See Bell (1979) 221-248.
mental turmoil, when toiling on a text searching for the precise expression to convey the exact content of one’s ideas. Many phrases competing for expression come to one’s mind when writing, and yet the exact formulation of one’s thoughts escapes capture\textsuperscript{55}.

Bernard was primarily a talented speaker, for whom writing came second to speaking\textsuperscript{56}. A great number of Bernard’s works developed from his preaching; other works, especially his treatises, have been written for a particular occasion or at a specific request. Based on a few rare statements pertaining to Bernard\textsuperscript{57} and on the testimony of his friends and disciples\textsuperscript{58}, Jean Leclercq was able to reconstruct the stages traversed by a Bernardine text before reaching the polished form of the final version. At the outset, Bernard addressed orally his audience (loqui, dicere) while his secretaries took notes of what he said (stylo excipere). Next, the text was transcribed either by Bernard or by his secretaries (scribere, transcribere) and later Bernard himself revised the text (corrigere), when this was not transcribed by himself. The final stage was the publication (edere).

Bernard’s treatises, probably, are not the result of this multifold process of composition, since Bernard uses with regard to his opuscula the term scribere rather than transcribere. While the latter retains the meaning of transcribing already a written text, the verb scribere refers in this context to works that are not based on a verbal presentation\textsuperscript{59}. Also, Bernard’s masterpiece, the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, most likely contains material which had never been orally delivered in front of the monastic audience, in spite of the multitude of oral features which appear in the text due to Bernard’s scrupulosity towards the rules of the homiletic genre\textsuperscript{60}.

Not only the distinct process of composition might have affected Bernard’s handling of the sources, but also the different literary genres that he adopts dictate the way in which he incorporates the patristic material to his works. The most careful quotations and even the designation by name of the Christian authorities occur especially in Bernard’s letters. The least frequent citations figure in the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, where, in addition to almost the total absence of direct references to the

\textsuperscript{55} Ep. 89.
\textsuperscript{56} Evans (1983) 51.
\textsuperscript{57} SC. 54.1; Ep. 17; Ep. 18.4-5 and Ep. 153.2.
\textsuperscript{58} William of St. Thierry and Arnold of Bonneval. See Leclercq (1962) 3-25.
\textsuperscript{59} Ep. 18. See also Leclercq (1962) 9.
\textsuperscript{60} Leclercq (1962) 193-212.
previous Christian authors, the possible traces of the sources have been obscured through Bernard’s arduous work on the text, until all external elements integrated naturally in the new narrative.

Apart from searching diligently for the best way to convey the content of his thoughts clearly, Bernard also worked assiduously on his text for achieving a literary effect. His deep concern for the euphonic, esthetical and rhetorical qualities of his texts led him to subtle corrections, which sometimes regarded, the exchange of a word with another, or merely the substitution of a letter for another if this could have as a result an unexpected assonance. Bernard also changed frequently the order of the words if this contributed to influencing the rhythm of the phrase or he operated changes at the morphological level, by modifying the case of a noun or of an adjective, or by choosing the passive voice for a verb that was initially used with an active meaning, etc. All these corrections however were meant only in order to enhance the sense and not to alter the initial meaning of the text:

Presque jamais les changements n’atteignent le sens, bien qu’ils en modifient quelque fois la nuance. Mais ce sont des corrections d’artiste, d’homme de lettres, d’humaniste exigeant pour soi-même, soucieux de maintes détails qui sont de pure esthétique, améliorant avant de mourir l’œuvre qu’il va laisser à la postérité.

Preoccupied rather with remaining faithful to the sense conveyed in the writings of his predecessors, than with maintaining their formulations ad litteram, in his arduous search for the perfect expression, Bernard frequently transforms his sources beyond any easy recognition. In a literary work such as the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, where the quotations are deliberately avoided and the references given by the author are minimal, similar words or similar expressions may constitute then the sole indices of Bernard’s dependence on the texts of the previous Christian authors and they need to be taken in consideration. However, even if one succeeds in indicating the link existing between Bernard’s texts and the Christian past, it still may remain exceedingly difficult to appreciate whether Bernard read his sources directly, whether he read them integrally or partially, whether the traces surviving in his work were borrowed from another author,

61 Leclercq (1962) 321-351.
62 Leclercq (1962) 349.
heard during the liturgy or picked up during a conversation. In such a situation, knowing something of Bernard’s reading and writing habits may be paramount for advancing an accurate hypothesis of his use of the sources.

4. Bernard and the “Fathers”

Tout comme on perçoit constamment dans le style de S. Bernard la résonance de la Vulgate⁶³, même là où il ne puis pas directement de l’écriture sainte, ainsi l’héritage des Pères est toujours là comme une espèce de substrat⁶⁴.

Indeed there is no doubt that Bernard absorbed his patristic sources to such an extent that he could have legitimately claimed like John of Fécamp: *Dicta mea dicta sunt Patrum*⁶⁵. His resistance to the theological methods developed in the schools of his time made him even more dependent on a Christian past concentrated in the Bible, the liturgy and the writings of the previous Christian authors. In fact, these sources were traditionally closely interconnected so as to form a “unified system of authority”⁶⁶. The message of the Bible read during *lectio divina* or heard during the liturgy was frequently obscure and patristic interpretation was required in order to explain and solve textual difficulties.

If the patristic authors play such an important role in shaping Bernard’s thought, offering constant assistance in his efforts to interpret the Scripture, then it is imperative to ask who exactly were those who Bernard called “Fathers”, and what was his attitude towards them. The answer to the first question will enable us to avoid the confusion existing nowadays among the modern scholars who do not share a unanimous view regarding the delimitation of the patristic period. The answer to the second question might enable us to discover additional aspects of Bernard’s handling of his sources and of his patristic sources in particular.

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⁶³ But see above my remarks about the various Latin Bible texts available to Bernard, p. 17.
⁶⁶ Pelikan (1978) 223. Pelikan refers only to the inseparable authorities of the Bible and of the patristic authors. However, the liturgy may be also included since as Leclercq (1982a) 71 has pointed out: “The liturgy (…) is the medium through which the Bible and the patristic authors are received, and it is the liturgy that gives unity to all the manifestations of monastic culture”. For the close link between the biblical books and the works of the patristic authors, see also Smalley (1964) 37.
Certain modern scholars see the patristic period extending until fifth century and including all Christian authors regardless of their doctrine. Other scholars, adopting especially the view of the Catholic Church, reduce the number of the Church Fathers to sixteen and see the patristic period ending in the West with Isidore of Seville (†636) and in the East with John Damascene (†749). Finally, there are those scholars who accept as Church Fathers all Christian authors who expressed in their works the true doctrine of the Church whatever the period of time in which they lived. Among these modern conceptions of the Church Fathers, the third view shares more similarities with the view that prevailed in the Middle Ages, and to which Bernard himself appears to have adhered.

Bernard uses most often the term *patres* in order to refer to Christian authoritative writers, such as Augustine or Ambrose among others. However, the perusal of the occurrences of *patres* in Bernard’s works shows that the meaning of this term was not restricted to designating Christian authors. Bernard calls *patres* the patriarchs of the Old Testament such as Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. The hermits of the Egyptian desert are also named *patres*. Bernard uses the same term in order to refer to Benedict, the author of the monastic rule adopted in the Cistercian monasteries, and he applies it to the founders of the Cistercian order. In his correspondence, Bernard occasionally addresses some of his contemporaries as *pater*, if the recipient of his letter is an abbot, a prior or a bishop. The popes Innocentius II and Eugeniuis III are equally addressed as *pater*. As Bernard usually prefers to speak of *patres* in general, the exact sense of the term has almost always to be deduced from the context.

67 For different modern views regarding the periodisation of the patristic age see Werckmeister (1997) 51 and Elders (1997) 337.
69 Ep. 77.7.
70 From the West he also mentions by name, Jerome, Hilary of Poitiers, Gregory the Great. From the East he mentions Athanasius and Basil the Great.
71 Miss. 1.3; Miss. 4.8.
72 Apo. 9.23.
73 Ded. 5.1.
74 Ant. Prologus.
75 Ep. 11.
76 Ep. 61.
77 Ep. 190; Csi. 5.24.
A second term used by Bernard to denote Christian authoritative writers is *doctores*, whose meaning is narrower than that of *patres*. In the *Epistula 190*, with the purpose of refuting Abelard, Bernard appeals to the authority of the *doctores nostri*, who came after the apostles. While Bernard concedes that the *doctores* follow chronologically the apostles, he does not attempt to draw the superior temporal line, which would mark the end of the patristic period. Among the later Christian authorities he mentions by name Bede without calling him either a *doctor* or a *pater*, and he is totally silent with regard to Anselm, who in Bernard’s time was highly praised. Does this mean that for Bernard the patristic period ends in the seventh century with Gregory the Great (†604)? Probably not, since although Bernard does not refer explicitly to later Christian authors in his works, in designating an author as a *pater* or a *doctor* he was not following his own judgment but most likely respected the usage of these terms established by tradition. The scholarly findings show that by the twelfth century the meaning of the term *patres* was so broad as to include “not only apostolic fathers, early councils and popes and such figures as Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome and Gregory, but later thinkers as well, beginning with Bede.” In addition, there seems to have been a tendency among medieval authors to avoid a sharp delimitation of the patristic period. Thomas Aquinas writing in the thirteenth century is as elusive as Bernard when it comes to indicating the limits of the period of the authoritative Christian authors. In the light of these observations, it is probably more accurate to consider that in Bernard’s view the patristic period extends beyond the first seven centuries.

It is also unclear from Bernard’s statements, whether a controversial author such as Origen needs to be included among *patres* and *doctores*. Needless to say, that he never uses these terms on the few occasions when he mentions Origen by name. However, Bernard’s friend, William of St. Thierry does not hesitate to mention Origen together with Augustine and Ambrose as one of the great doctors of the Church. In considering

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78 *Ep.* 190.11.
79 *Ep.* 77.15.
80 Bernard’s contemporary, John Salisbury wrote a biography of Anselm in view of his canonisation, see Pranger (1997) 188.
83 *Div.* 34.1; *Ep.* 190.3; *NovL.* 4.3.
Origen the equal of the greatest early Church authorities, William does not express his personal opinion; rather he continues a long tradition in the West. Therefore, we must assume that in spite of Bernard’s silence with regard to Origen’s status and in spite of his acquaintance with Origen’s controversial treatment of a few doctrinal issues, like William and the majority of their contemporaries, Bernard, most likely, did consider the Greek author as one of the doctors of the Church.

All the evidence discussed so far leads to the conclusion that in speaking of the *patres* or *doctores*, Bernard made no attempt to demarcate exactly a specific period of the Christian past as the sole producer of Christian authorities. Both the terms *patres* and *doctores* are used in a broader sense than any of the meanings with which they are invested by modern scholars. While *doctores* seems closer to the modern conception of Fathers of the Church since Bernard places them in time after the apostles, however, by the fact that the term includes authors who have expressed not only the true doctrine of the Church in their teaching, such as Origen, it still maintains a larger meaning than the broadest modern conception of the term Fathers. In what follows, we will avoid speaking of “Fathers” in order to refer to the patristic authors, as it has been shown that Bernard uses the term *patres* with a much broader meaning.

In turning now to the exploration of Bernard’s attitude towards the church authorities in his sense (*patres* and *doctores*), it is necessary to draw attention from the outset to the fact that the majority of Bernard’s occasional statements on his dealing with the patristic sources derives from his polemic with Abelard. Against him most often Bernard quoted or alluded to three biblical verses, which represent the basic rules needed to be respected for a sound attitude toward the patristic heritage: *Non sum melior quam patres mei* “I am not better than my Fathers” (3 Kgs 19:4), *Ne transgredi terminos antiquos quos posuerunt patres nostri* “Do not transgress the boundaries set by our Fathers” (Prv 22:28) and the condemnation of the “novelties of opinions” (*vocum novitates*) deriving from 1 Tim 6:20. Thus, in a passage from the important letter on

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85 For an impressively long list of Western authors who consider Origen a *doctor* and a *pater*, beginning with Isidore of Seville and ending in the twelfth century with Bernard’s contemporaries, see De Lubac (1998) 173-174.
86 *Div.* 34.1; *Ep.* 190.3.
87 *Ep.* 77; *Ep.* 189.1; *Ep.* 190.11.
baptism addressed to Hugh of St. Victor, where most likely he hints at Abelard\textsuperscript{88}, Bernard seizes upon the principles, which contain the quintessence of the appropriate approach to ‘theologising’\textsuperscript{89}:

Therefore, we do not search for “battles of words” and according to the apostolic teaching, we also avoid the novelties. We oppose [to him] only the sentences and the words of the Fathers and not ours; for we are not wiser than our Fathers\textsuperscript{90}.

Despite Bernard’s declaration that his intention is not to add anything novel to the patristic teaching, following the patristic authors and not transgressing the boundaries of the Christian doctrine established by them, was not a straightforward matter. During the eleventh century Eucharistic debate, medieval theologians were faced with irreconcilable discrepancies existing between the patristic authorities who dealt with this subject. In their attempt to cope with the conflicting patristic views, the medieval theologians committed themselves to the effort of discovering a patristic consensus behind discrepancies\textsuperscript{91}. In the twelfth century, one of the most famous books providing a method of dealing with the contradictions encountered in the works of the patristic authors is Abelard’s \textit{Sic et Non}. Apart from systematizing the techniques in use for decades on the part of the earlier canonists\textsuperscript{92} (the corruption of the manuscripts, the author’s own rejections, the authorial intention), Abelard breaks with the tradition in two main aspects. First, he differentiates between the authority of the Scripture and that of the patristic authors, claiming that the latter does not deserve “the undoubting faith” appropriate to the writers of the biblical books\textsuperscript{93}. Second, he suggests a procedure of achieving patristic consensus, which presupposes, when all the other techniques were unsuccessfully applied, to compare the authorities and “that which has the stronger

\textsuperscript{88} Ep. 77 is addressed to Hugh of Saint Victor, but it is highly likely that in the introductory part of his letter Bernard refers to Abelard, see Heiss (1991) 349-378.

\textsuperscript{89} I use here the term ‘theologising’ suggested by W. Otten, as an alternative to the term ‘theology’, which in the first half of the twelfth century was not clearly distinguished from other disciplines. See Otten (2004b) 1. Bernard himself uses the term \textit{theologia} in a negative context when speaking of Abelard and mocks it rhyme with \textit{stultologia}. See Ep. 190.9.

\textsuperscript{90} Ep. 77.

\textsuperscript{91} Pelikan (1978) 216-223.

\textsuperscript{92} Colish (2004) 372.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Sic et Non}. Prologus. Boyer & McKeon (1976) 103. For a discussion of this aspect see Pelikan (1978) 224.
witness and the greater support should be given preference"\textsuperscript{94}. This comparison resulting in the preference of one patristic authority over another cannot be carried out by someone who persists in the traditional mindset, according to which one has to humbly subject one’s judgment to that of the patristic authors\textsuperscript{95}. Approaching the patristic sources by means of ratio and ingenium\textsuperscript{96} in order to perform his choice, Abelard abandons the traditional humble attitude towards patristic authorities.

Bernard himself was also aware of the patristic authors not being always in agreement regarding a particular matter\textsuperscript{97}, but his dealing with the contradictions encountered in their works was distinct from the controversial procedure suggested by Abelard, which encouraged the choice among patristic views. In contrast to Abelard, Bernard refuses to show his preference for a Christian author to the detriment of another and chooses a traditional solution for the impasse\textsuperscript{98}, dismissing the treatment of the problem as completely irrelevant for one’s spiritual growth and being reluctant in presenting his own opinion on a theological issue which generated divergent views among the patristic authors:

The patristic authors seem to have held divergent views on the problem and I must confess that I cannot come to a decision about the view I might be justified in teaching. But I am of the opinion that knowledge of these matters would not contribute greatly to your progress\textsuperscript{99}.

In the famous Epistula 190 addressed to Pope Innocent II, Bernard touches upon two other issues which made Abelard’s theological approach highly controversial from a traditional perspective\textsuperscript{100}: the breach that Abelard introduces in the unified conception of

\textsuperscript{95} For William’s description of Bernard’s method of reading the patristic authors see above pp. 15-16.
\textsuperscript{96} Otten (2004b) 133 has observed that for Abelard, the word ingenium apart from referring solely to one’s talent hints also at the emergence of a theological approach based on doubt and jeopardizing the certainty of all human knowledge.
\textsuperscript{97} SC. 5.7.
\textsuperscript{98} D’Onofrio (1991) 124 showed that Eriugena had recourse to exactly the same method in his attempt to cope with the differences existing between the Latin and the Greek patristic authors. Another similar example is Lanfranc of Bec (1009-1089), Archbishop of Canterbury, who, several decades before Bernard, recommended the same cautious approach to the difficulties arising from conflicting testimonies of authority. See Epistula 50. PL 150:544.
\textsuperscript{99} SC. 5.7.
\textsuperscript{100} Here I deal exclusively with the problems related to the patristic authority. For useful discussions of other aspects present in this letter see Otten (2004a) 353-354; Pranger (1997) 182-189.
Christian authority by differentiating between biblical and patristic authority, and his inappropriate exaltation of *ratio* and *ingenium* to the detriment of faith.

In Bernard’s view, Abelard finds himself in opposition with the entire patristic tradition, when he decides to prefer to the unanimous patristic consensus about a particular doctrinal matter\(^{101}\), his own opinion stated repeatedly with the phrase *ut nobis videtur*\(^{102}\). Against Abelard, Bernard firmly reasserts the strong tie existing between the patristic authors and the biblical authorities, and emphatically demonstrates that the univocal position of the former is deeply rooted in Scripture\(^ {103}\). He confronts Abelard with the testimony of the Old Testament: *Ad Prophetas te ducam*\(^ {104}\), and just in case Abelard might find their authority insufficient as well, Bernard provides additional evidence from the New Testament in support of the patristic consensus questioned by Abelard: *Veni mecum et ad Apostolos*\(^ {105}\).

Bernard was also alarmed by Abelard’s audacity in scrutinising anew sacred matters left deliberately unsolved by the patristic authors, without any authoritative support only by means of reason and mere human ingenuity. What was considered for centuries a matter of faith, Abelard dared to explore rationally, deriding the patristic authors “because they held that such matters are better allowed to rest than be resolved”\(^ {106}\).

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\(^{101}\) The power of devil over human being.

\(^{102}\) *Ep.* 190.11.

\(^{103}\) While I acknowledge the merits of Pranger’s analysis, I nevertheless disagree with his conclusion stating that Bernard’s confidence in the attack he directs against Abelard derives only from his appeal to the biblical authority presented in a highly dramatic manner in order to impress his readers. In my opinion, it is not the manner of the presentation of the biblical authority that provides the key to Bernard’s resounding success in his scolding of Abelard; more important than the rhetorical impact of his address on his readers is the reason that lies behind the emphatic appeal to the biblical authority, which is invoked especially because for Abelard as well it represents the supreme authority, see *Sic et Non*. Prologus. Boyer & McKeon (1976) 101. Bernard’s main point is that going against the patristic authors who echo the Scripture, Abelard is opposing the scriptural authority also. As it has been observed, *auctoritas* in the twelfth century is made out of “whole cloth”. See Otten (2004a) 360 and p. 22, n. 66, above. There is continuity and uniformity between its different segments and they need to remain in harmony, otherwise turning against one of its segments, it may discredit the others. The rhetorical wrap of Bernard’s attack contributed without any doubt to a certain extent to Bernard’s victory over Abelard, but it is not because of Bernard’s rhetorical skill that Abelard was condemned. Bernard’s accusations from the *Epistula 190* raised against Abelard have to do both with the content of his teaching and with his theological method.

\(^{104}\) *Ep.* 190.13.

\(^{105}\) *Ep.* 190.14.

\(^{106}\) *Ep.* 188.1.
In contrast to Abelard’s approach, Bernard preferred to underline his inability in saying anything new and worthy, by means of his own talent, without the aid coming presumably from God and the biblical and patristic authorities: “I do not pretend that left to myself, I can make any new discovery, for the reason that I lack sufficient depth and power of penetration”\textsuperscript{107}.

Surprisingly for the modern reader, Bernard manifested more concern when he discovered that he had proposed an opinion, which lacked the support of patristic authorities, than when he followed a source without acknowledging it:

In another place I wrote something about the Seraphim, which I have never heard anyone say and nowhere read. At this point may my reader pay attention to the fact that I said, ‘I believe’, wishing to indicate that this was only my opinion, because I could not support it from Scripture\textsuperscript{108}.

And yet, in spite of these major concerns not to add anything new to the teaching of the patristic authors, Bernard’s use of the biblical and patristic sources was in no respect rigid or narrow. He took liberties \textit{vis-à-vis} the biblical and patristic authority, and accommodated them to his own narrative. Bernard justified his freedom in using the sources by declaring that: “If something is said after the Fathers, which is not against the Fathers, I do not think it ought to displease the Fathers or anyone else\textsuperscript{109}”.

Bernard’s respect of the patristic consensus and of the view established by tradition is transparent also in the way in which he deals with a controversial author such as Origen, “who enjoyed something of a renaissance in the twelfth century and among the first Cistercians”\textsuperscript{110}. The interest of Bernard’s disciples and contemporaries in Origen extended beyond the safe reading of his commentary on the Song of Songs to Origen’s more controversial writings, whose content was likely to trouble or do harm to the readers, who approached these texts without caution. This happens in fact to Bernard’s monks who read a difficult passage from Origen’s homilies on Leviticus, prompting thus Bernard’s reaction:

\textsuperscript{107}SC. 10.1: Non sum ego profundi sensum, neque adeo perspicacis ingenii, ut novi quippeam ex me adinvenire queam.
\textsuperscript{108}Hum. Retractatio.
\textsuperscript{109}Miss. 4.11: Sed si quid dictum est post Patres quod non sit contra Patres, nec Patribus arbitror, nec cuiquam duplicere debere.
I do not think I should be silent on this matter, for the authority of the Fathers warns us that he wrote some things which are clearly against the faith and that he is therefore not to be read without caution.\textsuperscript{111}

Bernard succeeds in elaborating a nuanced attitude towards Origen’s problematic teaching which allows him to make extensive use of Origen while remaining on a wholly traditional ‘orthodox’ ground. On a few occasions, Bernard refutes categorically controversial aspects of Origen’s teaching.\textsuperscript{112} In other circumstances he deals with the difficulties encountered in the Origenian text in the same way in which he deals with obscure biblical passages, trying to disentangle the subtleties of the argument. He may even attempt to make an apology for this important Christian thinker, by saying that: “It may be perhaps that he spoke hyperbolically. In any case, it is his business, not ours.”\textsuperscript{113}

Finally, he does not see any harm in drawing extensively on Origen’s commentary of the Song of Songs especially in his \textit{Sermones super Cantica Canticorum}.\textsuperscript{114} Bernard’s major concern toward Origen regarded the effect that his teaching might have had on his monks, leading them astray from the right faith. However, he never recommends them not to read Origen, on the contrary, he has to be read, but with discernment, cautiously, meaning that they need be aware of those doctrines condemned by the Church. We may assume that this is how he himself read Origen on whose assistance he relied in his commentary on the Song of Songs.

In conclusion, Bernard’s attitude towards the patristic authors may be seen as continuing a long practice in the Church. He respects their judgment, entertaining no doubts about their authority. He does not go against them by teaching novelties likely to

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Div.} 34.1.

\textsuperscript{112} In \textit{SC.} 54.3 Bernard speaks directly against \textit{apokatastasis} and in \textit{Div.} 34.2 he opposes the idea implied in Origen’s text that there is sadness in heaven.

\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Div.} 34.1: \textit{Potuerit forsitan hyperbolice loqui. Ipse viderit, nihil interest nostra}. Henri de Lubac has pointed out that Bernard borrows here the expression \textit{Ipse viderit} from Rufinus’ \textit{Apology}. See De Lubac (1998) 205.

\textsuperscript{114} During his lifetime, Bernard was even accused by Berengar, Abelard’s disciple, of having plagiarized Origen’s commentary on the Song of Songs in his own sermons on the Song of Songs. See Berengar, \textit{Apologeticus}. PL 178:1863B. Modern scholars however cannot take this accusation seriously as Berengar himself later recanted his entire work written against Bernard. See Luscombe (1966) 319-337. For evidence of Bernard’s use of Origen in his \textit{Sermones super Cantica Canticorum} see Leclercq (1962) 283-285 and 287-290. Also on the similarities between Bernard and Origen in their interpretation of the Song of Songs, see Brésard (1982) 113-130; 192-209 and 293-308.
contradict their teaching. In dealing with contradictory patristic views, he bluntly refuses to favour the position of one patristic author to the detriment of another.

5. Bernard and Augustine

It is beyond doubt that like the rest of the Western medieval theologians, Bernard is indebted to Augustine. However, it remains a difficult task for modern scholars to estimate the extent of Bernard’s direct knowledge of Augustine. As a young monk, Bernard might have had access to the large collection of Augustine’s volumes available at Citeaux. A fragmentary catalogue of the library of Clairvaux, discovered and minutely analysed by A. Wilmart, provides valuable information with regard to the manuscripts available to Bernard during his abbacy. Only two pages survived from this ancient catalogue, but they indicate that in the Clairvaux collection, the *Libri sancti Augustini* followed immediately the six volumes of the *Libri textus divini*. Like in other medieval monastic libraries, in Clairvaux as well, the manuscripts were not arranged in alphabetical order, but in an order that reflected the relative importance of various authors. The third position on the list of patristic authors present at Clairvaux, was occupied, surprisingly, by the *Libri Origenis*, situated ahead of the manuscripts of other Latin patristic authors, such as Hilary, Ambrose, Jerome or Gregory the Great. This testifies for the popularity of Origen among the patristic authors read in the monastic environment.

A significant aspect of Augustine’s presence at Clairvaux is that the library of this monastery did not only possess a simple collection of some of Augustine’s works, but,

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115 The library of Cîteaux boasted a collection of forty volumes containing Augustine’s works. See De Ghellinck (1950) 72.
116 Wilmart (1917) 127-190. This study was reprinted in *COCR* (1949) 101-127, 301-319. Other important studies on the library of Clairvaux at the time of Bernard, are De Ghellinck (1950) 63-82; Vernet (1979); Bouhot (1992) 141-153.
117 We encounter exactly the same situation at the library of the monastery Pomposa in the eleventh century. See Leclercq (1982a) 97.
118 The *Libri Origenis* at the library of Clairvaux consisted of eight manuscripts, containing, apart from the commentaries on the Old and New Testament, the *Periarchon* as well as Pamphylos and Eusebius’s *Apology* of Origen in Rufinus’s Latin translation. See Leclercq (1982a) 94.
quite exceptionally for the period, a complete edition of Augustine’s *Opera omnia*. The works of Augustine were gathered in almost fifty volumes, among which seven volumes contained Augustine’s short works assembled under the title *Opuscula Augustini*. The final volume of the *Opuscula Augustini* finishes at Clairvaux with the *Conlatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo*, the *Contra Maximinum Arianum* and the pseudo-Augustinian work *Contra Felicianum*.

More evidence for the presence of Augustine’s works at Clairvaux during Bernard’s life comes from a document dating from 1147-1148, discovered by Jean Leclercq. According to this document, the prior of Clairvaux informs the abbot of the monastery of Lissies that it would be difficult to send him the works of Augustine that he requested, since they are inserted in volumes of large format. The prior suggests that a monk should be sent to Clairvaux in order to transcribe Augustine’s works needed in Lissies.

In light of this evidence, Bernard appears to have had ample opportunity to consult directly a wide range of Augustine’s works, both at Cîteaux, in his early years as a monk, and at Clairvaux, during his abbacy. However, as Bernard’s busy life as an abbot could not have offered him the sufficient leisure necessary for solitary study, the Augustinian texts that the modern scholars contend that Bernard certainly knew, were mainly his homiletic works included in the liturgy and in the Office of the Vigils.

Throughout Bernard’s writings, Augustine’s name occurs nearly twenty times. No other patristic author is mentioned by Bernard quite as much. Apart from referring to him simply as Augustinus, at times, Bernard adds to his name the epithet *beatus* or *sanctus*. Frequently Augustine is named together with other important patristic authors. Thus, in *Epistula 77*, apart from quoting (in an unusual way for him) entire passages from

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120 De Ghellinck (1950) 63.
121 Wilmart (1949) 115 mentions forty three manuscripts gathered in forty six volumes; Bouhot (1992) 148 inexplicably mentions fifteen. In *retr*. 1.1, Augustine speaks of having written *opuscula, libri, epistolae* and *tractatus*. It is likely that Augustine’s seven volumes of the *Opuscula Augustini* represent the work of the same librarian monk, see De Ghellinck (1950) 70-71.
122 Bouhot (1992) 149.
123 Leclercq (1952) 52.
125 Gregory the Great follows Augustine with thirteen occurrences.
126 *Div.* 102.1; *Ep.* 2.7; *Ep.* 3.
127 *Hum.* 1.14; *Div.* 2.1; *Ep.* 77.7; *Pre.* 20.61; *Pre.* 17.52.
Augustine, Bernard refers to him and to Ambrose as representing the “pillars” of the Church\textsuperscript{128}. In the\textit{ Sententia} 51, Augustine, Jerome and Gregory the Great are named “great harvesters” (\textit{messores magni}). In\textit{ Parabola} 6, Augustine, Ambrose and Hilary are addressed as “holy doctors and magnificent confessors of faith” (\textit{sancti doctores et magnifici confessores})\textsuperscript{129}. Bernard acknowledges Augustine’s individual merits as a combatant against the heretics in the\textit{ Sermo super Cantica Canticorum} 80, where he refers to Augustine as “the mighty hammer of heretics” (\textit{validissimus malleus haereticorum})\textsuperscript{130}. It has been observed that Bernard mentions the name of Augustine in mainly three situations: as a founder of the monastic order, as a defender of the orthodox faith and as an authority on biblical exegesis\textsuperscript{131}.

In the Latin West, Isidore of Seville (c. 560-636) was the first to have given explicitly to Augustine pride of place among patristic authorities, both Greek and Latin\textsuperscript{132}. In the subsequent centuries Augustine consolidated his position as the greatest of the patristic authors, his authority following immediately that of the apostles\textsuperscript{133}. Bernard must have been totally aware of the way in which the bishop of Hippo was generally perceived in relation to the rest of the patristic authors; however, he makes no explicit reference to Augustine’s privileged status. The fact that Augustine is often mentioned by Bernard in the company of other representatives of the Christian tradition, without any declared intention in singling him out and making him the supreme authority among the others, may very well indicate that, in naming authorities, Bernard was interested in underlining that the faith of the Church is based on a multitude of patristic views, rather than being identified solely with the views of a particular author. Once again Bernard’s attitude seems to reflect a well-established tendency within the Church, which refuses to reduce the Christian doctrine to the teaching of a single author, even if that author happens to be Augustine\textsuperscript{134}.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[128] \textit{Ep.} 77.8: \textit{Ab his ergo duabus columnis, Augustinum loquor et Ambrosium, difficile, crede mihi, avellor.}
\item[129] Here the term \textit{confessor} refers particularly to confession of faith. For the threefold meaning of the words \textit{confiteri}, \textit{confessio} and \textit{confessor}, see Courcelle (1968) 13.
\item[130] \textit{SC.} 80.7.
\item[131] Rigolot (1992) 136.
\item[132] Isidore of Seville, \textit{Etymologiae} 6.7.3. PL 82:237B.
\item[133] Marrou (1957) 155-160.
\item[134] In the West, the Church progressively selected a group of \textit{maiores doctores}, consisting of Augustine, Ambrose, Jerome and Gregory the Great, see Marrou (1957) 155. It may be said that William of St. Thierry
\end{footnotes}
The few acknowledged quotations from Augustine are usually too short to be considered as conclusive evidence for a direct reading of Augustine’s works they derive from. In one of his sermons, Bernard repeats the famous phrase of the *Soliloquies: noverim me, noverim te*\(^\text{135}\). In his early treatise *De gradibus humilitatis et superbiae*, he borrows from Augustine the definition of pride (*superbia*) as “the love of one’s self-excellence” (*amor propriae excellentiae*)\(^\text{136}\). Against Abelard he probably quotes from memory Augustine’s definition of faith understood as “certain knowledge”, as he respects the sense of Augustine’s sentence, but changes its wording:

*Ep. 190.9:*

\[Fides, ait, non coniectando vel opinando habetur in corde in quo est, ab eo cuius est; sed certa scientia, acclamante conscientia\]

*Trin. 13.1.3:*

\[Non sic videtur fides in corde, in quo et, ab eo cuius est; sed eam tenet certissima scientia, clamatque conscientia.\]

Bernard makes use of Augustine against Gilbert of Porée, when he quotes a sentence from the *De Trinitate* in a slightly abbreviated form, preserving only the theological content and leaving outside the philosophical element present in Augustine’s phrase:

*SC. 80.7:*

\[Deus nonnisi ea magnitudine magnus est quae est quod ipse. Alioquin erit maior magnitudo quam Deus.\]

*Trin. 5.10.11:*

\[Deus autem quia non ea magnitudine magnus est quae non est quod ipse est quasi particeps eius sit deus cum magnus est; alioquin illa erit maior magnitudo quam deus.\]

The *Epistula 77* contains the most extensive quotations from Augustine. Bernard quotes verbatim a passage from Augustine’s *De Baptismo* 4.29 and another short passage from the *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum*, 3.84:

accepted the same attitude as Bernard, since in his writings he usually claims to follow the patristic authors in general rather than a particular patristic author, see Déchanet (1972) 141-143.

\(^{135}\) *Div. 2.1; sol. 2.1.1.*

\(^{136}\) *Hum. 1.14; Gn. litt. 11.24.25.*
Ep. 77.7:

‘Baptismi, inquit, vicem aliquando implere passionem, de latrone illo, cui non baptizato dictum est: Hodie mecum eris in paradiso, beatus Cyripiannus non leve documentum assumit’. Et addit: ‘Quod etiam atque etiam considerans invenio, inquit, non tantum passionem pro nomine Christi, id quod ex baptismate deberat posse supplere, sed etiam fidem conversionemque cordis, si forte ad celebrandum mysterium baptismi in angustiis temporum succurri non potest’.

Et infra: ‘Quantum itaque, ait, valeat etiam sine visibili sacramento baptismi quod ait Apostolus: Corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confession fit ad salutem, in illo latrone declaratum est. Sed tunc, inquit, impletur invisibiliter, cum mysterium baptismi, non contemptus religionis, sed articulus necessitatis excludit’.

bapt. 4.29:

baptismi sane vicem aliquando implere passionem de latrone illo, cui non baptizato dictum est: Hodie mecum eris in paradiso, non leve documentum idem beatus Cyripiannus adsumit. quod etiam atque etiam considerans invenio non tantum passionem pro nomine Christi id quod ex baptismo deberat posse supplere, sed etiam fidem conversionemque cordis, si forte ad celebrandum mysterium baptismi in angustiis temporum succurri non potest’. (…) quantum itaque valeat etiam sine visibili baptismi sacramento quod ait apostolus: corde creditur ad iustitiam, ore confession fit ad salutem, in illo latrone declaratum est. sed tunc impletur invisibiliter, cum ministerium baptismi non contemptus religionis, sed articulus necessitatis excludit.

qu. Lev. 3.84:

(proinde) colligitur invisibilem sanctificationem quibusdam adfuisset atque profuisset sine visibilibus sacramentis, quae pro tempore diversitate mutata sunt, ut alia tunc fuerit et alia modo sint’. Et paulo post: ‘Nec tamen, inquit, visibile sacramentum omnino cemendnum, nam contemptor eius invisibiliter sanctificari nullo modo potest.

The relatively long and exact quotations indicate that most likely Bernard had Augustine’s texts in front of him when he wrote this letter. He also recommends the reading of the Book 4 of Augustine’s treatise De baptismo137, which suggests that, in order to give such advice, he probably had a good knowledge of the entire tract.

From the perusal of these sparse quotations, it seems as if Bernard usually reproduced some of Augustine’s famous brief phrases which did not require any particular investigative efforts on his part and which he had most likely picked up from

137 Ep. 77.7.
the general usage and easily memorized. However, especially the last example presented above demonstrates that when required to help in finding the canonical solution to a doctrinal debate, Bernard carefully researched his patristic sources, from which, contrary to his habit, he quoted accurately in order to support his position.

6. Methodology

It has certainly become obvious by now that, because of a multitude of reasons having to do with various issues (the education of the author, the habits of reading of authoritative texts in the cloister, the complexity of the process of composition) Bernard’s works do not lend themselves easily to an investigation of their sources or to a study of the means of transmission of ideas. Methods that have successfully helped to discover the sources of other medieval authors may prove totally inconclusive when applied to Bernardine texts. Thus, the method of textual parallels, declared by Pierre Courcelle\textsuperscript{138} as most reliable in helping to determine not only the ultimate but also the intermediary sources of an author, may fail lamentably when applied to Bernardine texts, since the possibility of finding long quotations or paraphrases of passages from patristic authors is minimal. On the other hand, the method of doctrinal similarities considered by Courcelle as extremely unreliable, as it determines the mere consonance or similarity of ideas, may be more relevant for tracing down a source in Bernard since, as a general rule, he alters dramatically the expression of an idea coming from an author, while conveying faithfully its content\textsuperscript{139}.

However, as neither the method of textual parallels nor that of doctrinal similarities can shed significant light on Bernard’s use of Christian authors, in the concluding remarks of his study on the problems of Bernard’s sources, Jean Leclercq proposed a new method for achieving progress in this area of research:

S. Bernard ne donne presque pas de références (…) Mais il dépend, certainement, des Pères; l’un des indices de cette dépendance est dans sa façon de citer l’Écriture comme tels auteurs, qu’il fréquente, l’on fait avant lui. De ce point de vue, l’identification de ses variantes scripturaires dans les témoins de la littérature chrétienne antérieure à lui- celle des Pères ou du moyen âge- donnera des possibilités dont on peut attendre beaucoup: si un progrès peut être fait dans la

\textsuperscript{138} Courcelle (1969) 6.

\textsuperscript{139} See the discussion above p. 22.
In Leclercq’s view if any progress is to be made in determining Bernard’s sources this can be achieved especially through an examination of his biblical quotations. The French scholar did not develop this suggestion any further but it is not difficult to see the advantages of pursuing this path in the investigation of Bernard’s sources and especially in the investigation of Bernard’s use of Augustine, because both authors were excellent interpreters of the Bible supporting each idea of their teaching with biblical quotations. As it has been already explained in this study, Bernard’s vast knowledge of the biblical text is largely due to his exposure to the liturgy and to the writings of the patristic authors. This had a decisive influence on the way in which Bernard quoted and interpreted the biblical text. It is not surprising then, that the examination of the scriptural quotations can reveal a different source than the Bible itself. Thus, small identical alterations of a scriptural quotation unattested by any versions of the Bible may be sometimes the unique evidence for a direct relationship between two authors. Resembling contexts or a similar way of interpreting the same biblical verses may also be indicative of a specific intertextual relation between Bernard and a patristic source. Clusters of identical biblical quotations present in two different writers should also be taken into consideration since they may indicate a possible link existing between the author and his source.

In searching for traces of Augustine’s ideas in the articulation of Bernard’s mystical thought it is especially this last method suggested by Leclercq and based on the examination of some of Bernard’s key scriptural quotations (1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10, Rom 5:5, Sg 2:1, 1 Cor 6:17, Ps 72:28 and Ps 63:9) that is going to be extensively used in this thesis. The methods of textual parallels and of doctrinal similarities are not going to be disregarded but used either in conjunction with the main method or whenever it may seem appropriate.

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140 Leclercq (1962) 318.
141 See above, p. 17.
Chapter 1: Image and Likeness: The Anthropological Grounds of Bernard’s Mysticism

It has been accurately observed that the mystical theology of the great Cistercian authors cannot be properly understood apart from their teaching on the soul and its powers. The centrality of anthropology for the understanding of Bernard’s mystical theology cannot be denied, although, unlike other great twelfth century theologians, he never wrote a work dedicated exclusively to the nature of the soul, its faculties, its functions, etc. in the fashion of the technical anthropological tracts circulating at that time especially under the title De anima. He has, nevertheless, frequently in his works reflected upon anthropological matters, approaching them from various perspectives and with different purposes, almost always in an unsystematic way. As a result of this modus operandi, Bernard left us distinct anthropological accounts which are difficult to reconcile and which cannot be always harmoniously organised in a coherent and cohesive synthesis. Thus, there is significant discrepancy between what Bernard has to say on the theme of humanity created in the image and likeness of God in one of his early treatises, De gratia et libero arbitrio, and his reflections on the same topic contained in the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum 80-83. Already his contemporaries raised objections against the inconsistencies of his anthropological teaching. Bernard defended himself arguing that the accounts on this topic that he had produced during the years might be different but they must not be considered as contradictory, they are diversa... sed, ut arbitror, non adversa.

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141 Le Bail (1937) 1472.
142 Some of the theologians of the twelfth century contemporaneous with Bernard left us anthropological treatises: William of Champeaux, De origine animae and Hugh of St. Victor, De arrha animae. Among the early Cistercians, William of St. Thierry wrote De natura corporis et animae, Isaac of Stella, Epistola de anima and Aelred of Rievaulx, De natura animae.
143 Bernard’s most extensive anthropological reflections are to be found in Gra. 9-10 and SC. 80-83. Casual and usually undeveloped statements of the anthropological theme are to be encountered in Hum 7.21, SC. 5, SC. 11, SC. 18, SC. 21, SC. 24-27, SC. 34-38. For a discussion of all the passages from the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum see Casey (1988) 131-190. Other important scholarly treatments of Bernard’s anthropology are Standaert (1947) 70-129, Von Ivanka (1953) 202-208, Hiss (1964), McGinn (1988) 3-50, McGinn (1994) 168-174, Anderson (2004) 265-301.
144 SC. 81.11.
teaching one modern scholar, M. Standaert, observed that “Bernard does not have one doctrine, but several doctrines of God’s image and likeness in human beings”\textsuperscript{145}.

Needless to say, the present investigation does not pretend to be exhaustive and to take into consideration all the various facets of Bernard’s anthropological teaching. As the main goal of this chapter is limited to understanding the role played by Augustine’s works in enabling Bernard to “locate mystical consciousness within the process of the restoration of the likeness to God”\textsuperscript{146} we will turn our attention mainly to one of Bernard’s works where he is most indebted to Augustine: the early treatise \textit{De gratia et libero arbitrio} (1128)\textsuperscript{147}. Augustine’s impact on Bernard’s \textit{De gratia et libero arbitrio} was under scholarly scrutiny\textsuperscript{148} in the past and this chapter goes along the lines indicated by Bernard McGinn in a recent article, where he looks at the reception of Augustine by some of the great medieval mystics\textsuperscript{149}, while seeking to bring more evidence on Bernard’s use of Augustine’s ideas and to reflect upon the way in which he handles the ideas he selects from Augustine’s works.

\textit{De gratia et libero arbitrio} is addressed to William of St. Thierry whose theological knowledge is highly praised by Bernard and who is required to intervene in the text and to make emendations of the obscure statements. It is difficult to estimate nowadays the extent of William’s contribution in establishing the final version of this important Bernardine text, but it is essential to bear in mind the communication existing between the two friends on theological matters, in order to grasp the way in which their theological thought was shaped by their interaction.

\textsuperscript{145} Standaert (1947) 100. However, Standaert also recognises that a basic consistency underlies these various treatments of the \textit{imago-similitudo} theme. In his opinion, Bernard did not intend to formulate a unique and definitive position on the anthropological theme, but he attempted merely to present a set of variations on a basic triple pattern: \textit{formatio}, \textit{deformatio} and \textit{reformatio}. The tendency to underline the consistency of Bernard’s approach, in spite of the different formulations of his views continues in more recent scholarship. Thus, Robert Javelet is one of the scholars who compared the two seemingly irreconcilable views presented by Bernard in \textit{Gra.} 9-10 and in \textit{SC.} 80-83 and he concluded that: “Il est évident qu’il use des même matériaux, des mêmes idées pour le traité et pour les sermons”. See Javelet (1967) 194-195.

\textsuperscript{146} McGinn (2006) 7.


\textsuperscript{148} The most extensive study of Augustine’s influence on Bernard’s early treatise is Faust (1962).

\textsuperscript{149} McGinn (2006) 7-11.
Certain scholars viewed the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* as Bernard’s *De anima* treatise\(^{150}\), an opinion which was contested by others who considered it rather to be Bernard’s commentary on Romans due to the fact that the Epistle to the Romans provides the main scriptural material for this work\(^{151}\). If it proved difficult to determine the literary genre to which this work belongs, it is perhaps safe to say that this treatise is more dogmatic\(^{152}\) in character than mystical; nevertheless “it is essential in understanding the place of mysticism in his theology“\(^{153}\).

Already the title of Bernard’s early work points in the direction of Augustine, who entitled identically a work he wrote late in life (426-427), dealing with problems raised by monks in Africa and Southern Gaul, who believed that Augustine’s teaching on grace destroyed free choice. The issue at stake in these two works separated by almost eight centuries is also identical: both authors write with the declared intention of explaining that one must not deny free choice in defending grace. Their methods are, however, different. Augustine opts for a demonstration based on scriptural evidence that proves the existence of free choice and the necessity of grace. Bernard, concerned not to repeat unnecessarily what has been treated by others\(^{154}\), takes for granted the existence of free choice and focuses on the way in which free choice and grace act together, attributing the initiative to divine grace. Bernard relies more on one of Augustine’s works occasioned by the reception of his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, the *De correptione et gratia* (426-427), which is Augustine’s answer to the objection that his doctrine of grace renders any rebuke meaningless. Bernard borrowed from this work Augustine’s distinction between the grace that Adam had in paradise (*posse non peccare*) and the grace that human beings will enjoy in heaven, but to whom some are already entitled after having been redeemed from the fall through the coming of Christ (*non posse peccare*) and loosely structured his

\(^{150}\) Le Bail (1937) 1472; Venuta (1953) 17, n. 1; Schaffner (1950) 45.

\(^{151}\) Bernard makes use of the Epistles to the Corinthians and to the Galatians as well, but the Epistle to the Romans is most extensively referred to. McGinn (1988) 5 identified fifteen explicit quotations in this early work and twenty-five implicit references. His point of view that the *De gratia et libero arbitrio* should be rather seen as Bernard’s commentary on Romans seems also to be more appropriate, if we look at this work in the light of Bernard’s theological dialogue with his friend William. The latter started writing his own *Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos* roughly at the same time when Bernard sent him his own account on grace and free choice.

\(^{152}\) McGinn (1988) 3 refers to the treatise as “the most profound and influential of the Abbot of Clairvaux’s dogmatic works”.


\(^{154}\) *Gra.* Prologus.
treatise around the figures of Christ and Adam. The larger context of Bernard’s discussion of these two types of grace is represented by Augustine’s teaching on the creation of human beings in the image and likeness of God. In speaking of the roles of free choice and divine grace in the history of salvation, both Augustine and Bernard depend on the Pauline Epistles, especially the Epistle to the Romans. Finally, Bernard adopts Augustine’s emphasis on the human being’s impossibility to perform any good in his fallen state without the intervention of divine grace. However, in spite of the significant similarities existing between the two authors, there are no direct quotations from Augustine in Bernard’s treatise. Moreover, Augustine’s ideas are not merely repeated but integrated as old bricks in a totally new edifice.

In order to understand the way in which Bernard uses Augustine’s ideas in articulating his own anthropology with mystical accents and innovative developments, it is also necessary to deal with Augustine’s ideas in somewhat more detail regarding his teaching on the creation of humanity ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei. Augustine’s treatment of the imago - similitudo theme had a great impact on the subsequent medieval theologians who extracted and developed especially three elements of Augustine’s influential teaching based on the biblical verse\(^\text{155}\): Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram (Gn 1:26). The first element, deriving from Augustine’s attempt to explain the use of the plural verb faciamus and the plural pronoun nostram, is represented by the trinitarian aspect of the image\(^\text{156}\). According to Augustine’s great theological work De Trinitate, the three facets of the image which mirror in the human being the three persons of the Trinity are memoria, intelligentia and voluntas\(^\text{157}\). A second influential element of his teaching is related to the way in which he understood the relation between the terms imago and similitudo, presented as referring to two distinct yet connected features of human life. In Augustine’s view, only the similitudo Dei is lost as a result of the fall, while the imago Dei is permanent in the human being, despite being deformed

\(^{155}\) Michael Casey noticed the presence of these three elements in the theological reflection of the twelfth century but he did not connect them directly with Augustine’s teaching on the image and likeness. The following references to Augustine’s works enable us to claim that these elements of patristic anthropology popular among twelfth century theologians are primarily based on Augustine’s thought. See Casey (1988) 136-137.

\(^{156}\) Trin. 7.6.12; Trin. 12.6.7.

and obscured as a consequence of the lost likeness\textsuperscript{158}. The image is gradually reformed and the likeness restored only by means of Christ’s grace. The third element is the dichotomy developed by Augustine especially in the first half of his career as a Christian writer, between Christ representing the perfect *imago et similitudo Dei* and the human being created merely *ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*\textsuperscript{159}. As a consequence of this emphasis on the creation *ad imaginem*, the human being was perceived as possessing a sort of innate tendency toward the image, that is, the Word. This tendency towards the Creator transpires in the famous introductory phrase of the *Confessiones*: *Fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te*\textsuperscript{160}.

While all these three elements of Augustine’s anthropological teaching are exploited in various degrees by Bernard throughout his works, in his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, it is that of the endurance of the *imago Dei* and of the loss of *similitudo* as a result of the fall that provides the framework for Bernard’s discussion of human freedom and allows him to concentrate on the dynamic aspect of the restoration of the likeness to God by means of Christ’s grace.

The most important contribution of Bernard’s treatise\textsuperscript{161} is a threefold distinction of the states of freedom in their historical dimension, on which he relies in his explanation of how the fallen human being is unable to perform good by his own will. Locating the freedom at the level of *voluntas*, Bernard refers to the first type of freedom.

\textsuperscript{158} On the indestructible character of *imago Dei* see *Trin*. 14.2.4; *Trin*. 14.4.6; *civ. Dei* 22.24; *spir.et litt.* 28.49. On how the permanence of the *imago Dei* is an aspect developed especially in Augustine’s mature works see Sullivan (1963) 42-44.

\textsuperscript{159} R. A. Markus (1964) 132-135 observes that after Augustine’s rereading of the Pauline Epistles around 390’s, he is no longer reluctant in considering the human being the image of God based on Col 1:15 and 1 Cor 2:7. However, Augustine struggles to maintain an underlying distinction between the Word as the perfect image of God and the human being created *ad imaginem Dei*. Bernard also dealt with the theme of the human being as being created *ad imaginem* in the SC. 80-83.

\textsuperscript{160} *conf*. 1.1.1. Commenting on SC. 80, Javelet (1967) 1:192 notices the dynamism attached to the human condition by the stress placed on the preposition *ad*. The natural orientation of the human being is toward the Word, the real image of God. For Bernard’s reading of this famous line from Augustine see below, p. 73.

\textsuperscript{161} Bernard’s originality in operating this threefold distinction has been subject to scholarly debate. O. Lottin discovered in 1940 a text coming from the school of Laon, entitled *Sententia de triplici libertate*. If the text belongs to Anselm of Laon who died in 1117, Bernard might have borrowed it from him. However, Bernard’s dependence on this text cannot be confirmed since the text does not appear in any of the early Sentence collections which can be connected to Anselm. Moreover, the fact that the texts contain striking verbal similarities is another argument against Bernard’s dependence on the *Sententia de triplici libertate*, since he always transformed his sources and never quoted *verbatim*, without indicating the source. For a larger discussion see McGinn (1988) 20 and Rydstrøm-Poulsen (1992) 133-134 and 329.
by coining the expression freedom from necessity (libertas a necessitate) and he attributes it to our nature. A superior type of freedom is the freedom from sin (libertas a peccato) corresponding to the state of grace. On the highest level, the freedom from sorrow (libertas a miseria) is reserved for the life in glory\(^\text{162}\). For Bernard, the freedom from necessity, by which the will can judge itself as good or bad, defines in the best way the essence of free choice (liberum arbitrium)\(^\text{163}\). The freedom from sin and the freedom from sorrow more fittingly can be called liberum consilium and liberum complacitum\(^\text{164}\).

In chapters 9-10, Bernard connects these three types of freedom with the traditional anthropology of the human being’s creation in the image and likeness of God, based on Augustine:

\[\text{I believe that in these three freedoms there is contained the image and likeness of the Creator in which we were made; that in the freedom of choice lies the image and in the other two is contained a twofold likeness}^\text{165}.\]

Bernard agrees with Augustine regarding the permanence of the image of God in the human nature after the fall and this leads him to the conclusion that the freedom of choice (liberum arbitrium) is the only unalterable faculty of the human soul preserved after the fall:

\[\text{Maybe, therefore, the reason why free choice alone suffers no lessening or falling away, is that in it, more than in the others, there seems to be imprinted some substantial image of the eternal and immutable deity}^\text{166}.\]

He observes that in contrast to the lasting character of the liberum arbitrium the two higher types of freedom, which form the likeness are not only subject to diminution but also to total loss. They were totally lost as a result of the original sin, but through the coming of Christ they can be restored by Christ’s saving grace\(^\text{167}\).

\(^{162}\) Gra. 3.6-7.
\(^{163}\) Gra. 4.11.
\(^{164}\) Gra. 4.11.
\(^{165}\) Gra. 9.28.
\(^{166}\) Gra. 9.28.
\(^{167}\) Gra. 9.28.
Both Augustine and Bernard situated the image of God in the spiritual nature of the human being\(^{168}\). While Augustine situated the image of God in the finest part of the soul, which most often he identifies with \textit{mens}, Bernard designates the \textit{liberum arbitrium} located at the level of \textit{voluntas} as the precise site of God’s image. However, one should not interpret this difference as a disagreement with Augustine as some scholars were inclined to argue\(^{169}\), by examining only this early text without any attempt to consider Bernard’s other anthropological statements scattered throughout his works. In \textit{Sermo super Cantica Canticorum} 81, the site of the image of God which is again identified with \textit{liberum arbitrium} is \textit{mens}\(^{170}\). Some of Bernard’s works clearly testify that he was familiar with the “official” view of the three-fold affinity of the human soul to the triune God based on Augustine\(^{171}\). Bernard’s emphasis on \textit{voluntas}\(^{172}\), at the level of which he locates the image of God, at the expense of memory and intellect, needs to be understood within the larger picture of his mystical agenda. In Bernard’s view, the image of God consisting of the \textit{liberum arbitrium} endows the human being with the capacity to will. The preservation of the image after the fall shows clearly that he retains this capacity even in this fallen state. In fact, as a result of his creation, the human being is not only able to will, he is unable not to will. As Gilson has pointed out that by suppressing the will one suppresses the human being too\(^{173}\). Due to understanding will as a rational

\(^{168}\) Augustine places the image of God in \textit{intelluctus} in \textit{ep. Jo.} 8.6; \textit{Jo. ev. tr.} 3.4; \textit{en. Ps.} 48 s. 2.11; \textit{homo interior} in \textit{ep. Jo.} 8.6; \textit{ratio} in \textit{en. Ps.} 42.6; \textit{en. Ps.} 48 s. 2. 11; \textit{Gn. litt.} 3.20.30; \textit{Trin.} 15.1.1; \textit{spiritus in div. qu.} 51.4; \textit{spiritus mentis} in \textit{Trin.} 12.7.12; \textit{intelligensia} in \textit{Gn. litt.} 3.20.30; \textit{Trin.} 15.1.1; \textit{animus} in \textit{Trin.} 15.1.1. For more references on Augustine’s site of the image see Sullivan (1963) 44-49 and 73, note 26. In \textit{SC}. 24.5 Bernard speaks generally of the site of the image of God as being \textit{in spirituali portione tui.}

\(^{169}\) Simonetti (1984) 353-356 speaks of a “silent disagreement” between the two authors.

\(^{170}\) This emphasis on \textit{voluntas} led modern scholars to speak of Bernard’s “voluntaristic anthropology” like Boquet (2003) 191, or of Bernard’s “anthropology of desire” like Casey (1988) 131, or to define the Cistercian spirituality in general as “une spiritualité volontariste” like Javelet (1971) 1431-1434, differentiating it from the “spiritualité noétique” of which Bernard’s contemporaries, the Victorines, are an example. However, Bernard’s main focus on \textit{voluntas} does not lead to a total neglect of the other two components of the image of God. For a discussion on the need to have a “blanched” memory so that the soul may return to God see Coleman (1992) 180-184.

\(^{171}\) Conv. 6.11: \textit{Denique tota ipsa [i.e. anima] nihil est aliud quam ratio, memoria, et voluntas. Div. 45: Est Trinitas creatrix: Pater Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, ex qua cecidit creata trinitas: memoria, ratio et voluntas. Pent. 1.5: Monet memoriam, rationem docet, movet voluntatem: In his enim tribus tota consistit anima nostra. In SC. 11.5 Bernard contrasts the \textit{beatificans Trinitas} with \textit{mea misera trinitas} and mentions again the three functions of the soul \textit{memoria, ratio} and \textit{voluntas.}

\(^{172}\) Gilson (1940) 49-50.
movement\textsuperscript{174}, for Bernard the image has a dynamic character. In the act of willing the human being moves either away from or towards God. It is this dynamism that led Bernard to focus specifically on \textit{voluntas} in his understanding of the ascent of the soul to God. The dynamic character of the image is usually neglected by scholars, who content themselves with observing the relevance of the dynamism of the process of restoring the likeness for Bernard’s mysticism\textsuperscript{175}.

While the \textit{liberum arbitrium} is responsible for the ability to will, it is not sufficient for willing the good:

Let no one imagine therefore that free choice is so called because it concerns itself with good and evil with equal power or facility. It was indeed able to fall of itself; but could rise up again only through the Spirit of the Lord\textsuperscript{176}.

This passage is clearly inspired by Augustine’s standard answer directed not only against Pelagius and his followers, but also against those “who so defend God’s grace as to deny free choice”\textsuperscript{177}. According to Augustine “the human being when he sins must impute the fault to himself” and a “work is then good when a person does it voluntarily”\textsuperscript{178}, meaning that freedom of choice is not totally abolished by the work of grace. In the same work, Augustine’s final reconciliation between human freedom and divine grace is expressed in the distinction between operating and co-operating grace: “He [i.e. God] operates without us in order that we may will, but when we will, and so we will that we may act, he cooperates with us. We can however, ourselves do nothing to effect good works of piety without him either working that we may will, or co-working when we will”\textsuperscript{179}. Although Bernard does not quote this passage, the gap indicated by Augustine between will and performance occurs in Bernard’s treatise as well. Bernard attributes the ability to will which resides in free choice to what he labels as creative grace (\textit{gratia creans}) while the achievement of will, or the ability to will the good belongs to the saving grace (\textit{gratia salvans})\textsuperscript{180}. These two are so connected that without the free choice providing the ability to will, the saving grace has nothing to act upon, on the other hand the free choice alone

\textsuperscript{174} Gra. 2.3: \textit{motus rationalis}.
\textsuperscript{175} Boquet (2003) 190.
\textsuperscript{176} Gra. 10.35. For Augustine see \textit{conf.} 7.21.27; \textit{corrept.} 3.
\textsuperscript{177} gr. et lib. arb. 1.
\textsuperscript{178} gr. et lib. arb. 4.
\textsuperscript{179} gr. et lib. arb. 33.
\textsuperscript{180} These technical terms do not occur in Augustine, although they reflect Augustine’s teaching.
without the help of the saving grace can only fail\textsuperscript{181}. The textual parallels proved not very helpful in revealing a clear dependence on Augustine’s text, but the fact that these ideas are present in the latter’s treatise which provided the title and the rationale for Bernard’s own work, might constitute an important argument for Bernard’s direct reading of Augustine.

Having been created in the image and likeness of God, Adam was endowed initially not only with \textit{liberum arbitrium}, but also with the two other higher types of freedom: \textit{liberum consilium} or the freedom from sin and \textit{liberum complacitum} or the freedom from sorrow, which formed his likeness with God. As a consequence of the original sin, he lost these freedoms and found himself and the entire humanity in the region of unlikeness (\textit{regio dissimilitudinis})\textsuperscript{182}. Étienne Gilson first noticed Bernard’s use of this expression and connected it to Augustine’s \textit{Confessiones} 7.10.16\textsuperscript{183}. The expression occurs several times in Bernard’s works\textsuperscript{184} and Pierre Courcelle put to rest scholarly speculations\textsuperscript{185} regarding the likely sources for the presence of this expression in Bernard’s works. He demonstrated persuasively that at least in \textit{Sermones super Cantica Canticorum} 36.5 it was possible to provide clear evidence indicating Bernard’s direct textual dependence on Augustine\textsuperscript{186}. As usual, Bernard does not quote Augustine \textit{ad litteram}, instead he manifests an impressive synthetic skill, by merging several paragraphs from the \textit{Confessiones} in one single phrase\textsuperscript{187}. As for Augustine, the \textit{regio dissimilitudinis} applies simply to the human being’s existence in this present world. However, for Bernard the expression is void of the philosophical connotations, which are contained in Augustine’s text, and refers only to the human being’s sinful condition.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{181}] Gra. 1.2. This passage seems to have been inspired by a few paragraphs from Augustine’s s. 156.11-13.
\item[\textsuperscript{182}] Gra. 10.32.
\item[\textsuperscript{183}] Gilson (1940) 45, 115-117 and 224-225; Gilson (1947) 108-130. For a discussion of the \textit{regio dissimilitudinis} in Augustine and adjacent scholarly literature, see O’Donnell (1992) 2:443-444. For Bernard’s treatment of the \textit{regio dissimilitudinis} theme and an extensive literature see Casey (1988) 171-182.
\item[\textsuperscript{184}] Gra. 10.32; SC. 72.6; Div. 40.4; Div. 42.2-3; Sent. 3.21; Par. 1.2; Ep. 8.2; Ep. 42.8.
\item[\textsuperscript{185}] Déchanet indicated William of St. Thierry’s \textit{De natura corporis et animae} as the most likely source for Bernard’s use of \textit{regio dissimilitudinis}. See Déchanet (1953) 72, note 5. Gilson himself after having connected the expression with the \textit{Confessiones}, considered that Bernard borrowed it from an intermediary text, a book of service, not directly from Augustine’s autobiographical work. See Gilson (1951) 233-234.
\item[\textsuperscript{186}] Courcelle (1963) 279-283.
\item[\textsuperscript{187}] The passages identified by Courcelle appear to have been used in the following order: \textit{conf.} 7.20.26; 8.7.16; 7.10.16 and 7.17.23.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
The way out of the *regio dissimilitudinis* to the restoration of likeness and to regaining the freedom from sin and the freedom from misery lost by Adam is ensured as for Augustine only by means of Christ’s grace\(^{188}\). Although in the region of unlikeness the human being preserves his freedom of choice, his capacity to will is held captive\(^{189}\) and finds itself in need of a liberator not from necessity but from sin and from the penalty of sin\(^{190}\). Bernard emphasises the central role of Christ in liberating the human will, since apart from Adam, he alone enjoyed all three types of freedom: the freedom of choice in virtue of his human and divine nature combined and the freedom from sin and the freedom from misery by reason of his divine power\(^{191}\). However, the likeness restored through the activity of Christ, is not the likeness that was bestowed on Adam at his creation, but is much greater. Adopting Augustine’s idea that the renewal of the image which entails the restoration of the likeness is not a *renovatio in pristinum*, but a *renovatio in melius*\(^{192}\). Bernard attempts to give an explanation for Adam’s fall. He relies in his demonstration on Augustine’s *De correptione et gratia*, where this idea is contained in Augustine’s account of the historical stages of the freedom of choice (*liberum arbitrium*). According to Augustine, Adam was created with free choice\(^{193}\) and the ability not to sin (*possit non peccare*)\(^{194}\). His fall from Paradise was caused by his own free choosing and resulted in the loss of this ability both for himself and for the rest of humanity\(^{195}\). In the new fallen state he preserved the free choice which is “sufficient for evil, but not sufficient for good”\(^{196}\) and without God’s help to do good became enslaved to sin. By Christ’s grace however, the human being does not only recover his lost freedom, but this second grace being greater than that bestowed on Adam, enables the

\(^{188}\) *Gra.* 10.32-33; *quant.* 28.55; *Trin.* 7.3.5.

\(^{189}\) *Gra.* 6.16.

\(^{190}\) *Gra.* 3.7.

\(^{191}\) *Gra.* 3.8.

\(^{192}\) G. Ladner showed that Augustine developed his view on the reformation and renovation of the image of God in the human being differently from the Greek patristic authors. The latter’s view was deeply rooted in the doctrine of Incarnation and envisaged the possibility of the human being’s return to a condition corresponding to that of Adam in Paradise, characterised by the total recovery of the original likeness of the human being to God. The emphasis on Christ’s passion and crucifixion in Augustine’s theology determined him to develop a view on the renovation of the image of God in the human being, which does not entail merely the recovery of the paradisiacal condition, but it involves more than that. In Augustine’s own words it is a *renovatio in melius*. See *Gn. litt.* 6.20.31. See also Ladner (1954) 2:867-871 and Ladner (1959) 154.

\(^{193}\) *corrept.* 28.

\(^{194}\) *corrept.* 33.

\(^{195}\) *corrept.* 28.

\(^{196}\) *corrept.* 31.
human being not only to attain the good but to persevere in good\textsuperscript{197}. Christ’s grace does not restore merely the paradisiacal ability not to sin (\textit{posse non peccare}), but makes the human being unable to sin (\textit{non posse peccare})\textsuperscript{198}.

Augustine’s ideas regarding the difference between the grace of Adam and the much greater grace of Christ are used by Bernard in order to show the levels existing in the \textit{liberum consilium} and \textit{liberum complacitum}:

Each of them has two degrees, a higher and a lower: The higher freedom of counsel consists in not being able to sin, the lower in being able not to sin. Again, the higher freedom of pleasure lies in not being able to be disturbed, the lower in being able not to be disturbed\textsuperscript{199}.

At his creation, Adam received apart from the full freedom of choice the lower degrees of each of these freedoms, namely the ability not to sin and not to be disturbed. By his free choosing he lost them both and he fell from the state of being able not to sin and being able not to be disturbed into that of not being able not to sin (\textit{non posse non peccare}) and not being able not to be disturbed (\textit{non posse non turbati})\textsuperscript{200}. This state of the inability not to sin and not to be disturbed does not put an end to free choice. However, free choice is not sufficient for the human being to escape from this state in which he is bound to sin. Only Christ who possesses fully and perfectly the three freedoms, is able to perform the restoration of the freedom of counsel and freedom of pleasure. By Christ’s grace the lost freedoms are going to be restored to an extent that surpasses the level of freedoms possessed by Adam in paradise\textsuperscript{201}. However, their perfect restoration is reserved for the next life. In the present life, a few spiritual souls who have battled the passions and desires through a life of virtue and who are overcoming sin with the help of grace may regain partially freedom of counsel. Since sin cannot be totally eradicated in this life the freedom of counsel cannot be perfectly achieved in this worldly existence. This is the reason for praying “Thy kingdom come”. The kingdom of God comes closer and closer every day through the restoration of the likeness in the souls that struggle toward

\textsuperscript{197} corrept. 31.
\textsuperscript{198} corrept. 33.
\textsuperscript{199} Gra. 7.21. The pair of expressions \textit{posse non turbati}/\textit{non posse turbati} does not occur in Augustine. Apart from \textit{posse non peccare}/\textit{non posse peccare}, Augustine speaks of \textit{posse non mori}/\textit{non posse mori}, meaning the possibility and impossibility to die and \textit{bonum posse non deserere}/\textit{bonum non posse deserere} referring to the possibility and impossibility to forsake the good. See corrept. 33.
\textsuperscript{200} Gra. 7.21.
\textsuperscript{201} Gra. 8.26.
perfection\textsuperscript{202}. What Bernard McGinn names “mystical consciousness”\textsuperscript{203} needs to be discussed in the context of the restoration of the highest form of freedom, the freedom of pleasure (\textit{liberum complacitum}). While freedom of counsel is possessed in some degree by all righteous human beings, freedom of pleasure is attainable only by a few perfect souls on the rarest occasion:

Even in this present life, those who with Mary have chosen the better part, which shall not be taken away from them, enjoy freedom of pleasure; rarely however and fleetingly. This is undeniable. For those who now possess that which shall never be taken away, plainly experience what is to come: in a word, happiness. And since happiness and sorrow are incompatible, through the Spirit they participate in the former, as often as they cease to feel the latter. Hence, on this earth, contemplatives alone can in some way enjoy freedom of pleasure, though only in part, in very small part and on the rarest occasion\textsuperscript{204}.

Bernard’s description of what takes place when the human being experiences true happiness is in total conformity with the way in which Augustine refers to the immediate contact with God. Like Augustine, Bernard distinguishes between the momentary experience of heavenly bliss attainable in the present life and the enduring experience of the kingdom of heaven, which is possible only in the life to come. The “excess of contemplation” is a foretaste of the eternal felicity to be found in heaven, granted scarcely to a few perfect human beings who enjoy it occasionally and only for a fleeting moment. Augustine would have agreed with Bernard’s use of the term happiness (\textit{felicitas}) in order to refer to the highest state available to human beings on earth\textsuperscript{205}. The verb used by Bernard in order to define the experience of the freedom of pleasure is \textit{frui}, which according to Augustine means to love something for its own sake and is applied properly

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{202} Gra. 4.11-12.
\item \textsuperscript{203} McGinn (2006) 10.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Gra. 5.15.
\item \textsuperscript{205} The term for happiness used by Bernard in this passage is \textit{felicitas}, a term which occurs much more frequently than \textit{beatitudo}, which is used nevertheless in order to designate the vision of God like in the following passage from Mart. 1: \textit{Semper enim vident faciem Patris, quem videre perfecta beatitudo, aeterna Gloria, summa voluptas est}. A brief look at Augustine’s use of the terms \textit{felicitas} and \textit{beatitudo}, shows that the former occurs more frequently in his preaching where apart from being used with a negative connotation, namely transitory happiness, it can also refer to the highest state of the soul such as in \textit{s. 19.4: Res enim bona et magna est felicitas, sed habet regionem suam}; \textit{s. 32.22: terrena felicitas spernenda, superna desideranda}; \textit{s. 396.1: felicitas quae non habet finem}; \textit{s. 213.5: aeterna felicitas}; \textit{ench. 5: summa felicitas}; \textit{ep. 18.3: sine fine felicitas}.  
\end{itemize}
to God alone\textsuperscript{206}. It is sure that Bernard knew at least one of Augustine’s accounts of his mystical encounter with God, as presented in the \textit{Confessiones}, since the expression \textit{regio dissimilitudinis} which we discussed above occurs in one of these accounts of the mystical episodes. However, he retained only some general traits for his description of the highest form of contact with God, without a particular interest in following more closely the texts from the \textit{Confessiones}. This makes clear that Bernard resembles more the late Augustine, who speaks of the contemplation from a more objective perspective and not longer in the first person as the Augustine of the \textit{Confessiones}.

Bernard situates the mystical encounter with God within an anthropology heavily influenced by Augustine’s dynamic view of the gradual restoration of the likeness of God, based on what has been called the “radical principles”\textsuperscript{207} of the image and likeness, namely Christ’s grace and free choice. Bernard’s approach resembles that of the late Augustine, especially from the treatises \textit{De gratia et libero arbitrio} and \textit{De correptione et gratia}. In his way of operating with Augustine’s ideas Bernard is far from copying or merely repeating what his predecessor had taught. His three-fold distinction of the human freedom is adapted to the traditional anthropology of image and likeness and also matches Augustine’s historical stages of free choice found in the \textit{De correptione et gratia}. Although Bernard’s formulation is original, content wise he does not cross the boundaries set by Augustine. The essence of Bernard’s teaching is clearly based on Augustine although he does not follow Augustine \textit{ad litteram}.

\textsuperscript{206} \textit{doc. Chr.} 1.4.4.
\textsuperscript{207} Sullivan (1963) 59-61.
Chapter 2: Love

One of the areas of Bernard’s mystical thought, where Étienne Gilson admitted that Augustine’s influence is conspicuous, is that of the abbot’s teaching on love. Far from being an aspect of secondary importance, the doctrine of love lies at the very heart of Bernard’s mysticism, which is usually defined as a Liebesmystik. Both Augustine and Bernard wrote extensively on the theme of love, without any attempt to present in a systematic way their teaching, which is nevertheless coherent as a whole. However, some of their writings are more relevant for the discussion of this subject than others. Thus, Bernard’s most important treatment of love occurs in the treatise De diligendo Deo and in the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum 83-85. Augustine focused more on love in his treatises on the Gospel of St John and in his homilies on the first Epistle of St John. The aims of this chapter are to identify what elements from Augustine’s rich and elusive doctrine on love were used by Bernard and how he incorporated them to his own teaching on the subject.

1. A few considerations on Bernard’s terminology on love

From the outset, it should be accentuated that the set of terms forming Bernard’s vocabulary on love, such as: affectus, affectio, amor, dilectio, caritas, desiderium, are by no means specific to him, rather they are part of a long terminological tradition shaped by the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great.

It is difficult to find an appropriate correspondent in the modern languages able to convey the exact meaning of the terms affectus and affectio. Affectus denotes the state produced in the soul as a result of an exterior influence. Affectio denotes the active process of influencing and by extension it began to be applied to the effect of the

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208 Gilson (1940) 220-221.
209 Ruh (1990) 229. For the central place of love in Bernard’s mystical thought see also Bouyer (1958) 41 and McGinn (1994) 193.
210 Casey (1988) 63-64. I will deal here only with those aspects of Bernard’s terminology on love, which can be traced back to Augustine. For a detailed study of Bernard’s vocabulary of desire, see Casey (1988) 63-130.
influence on the soul\textsuperscript{211}. For pragmatic reasons, in what follows, whenever I choose to translate the terms in English I will refer to \textit{affectus} as affective state and I will translate \textit{affectio} with affection. Bernard usually treats the terms \textit{affectus} and \textit{affectio} as partial synonyms, using them frequently interchangeably. Like for Augustine, their partial synonymy is based on the fact that both terms can be defined in terms of \textit{voluntas}\textsuperscript{212}. Thus, Bernard asserts that “\textit{affectus} is the will”\textsuperscript{213} and describes \textit{affectio} in a more precise manner as “the intention of the will”\textsuperscript{214}. Since the human beings are endowed with the ability to will as a result of their creation in the image and likeness of God, they are also created with \textit{affectus} and \textit{affectio}, without which, says Bernard the soul cannot subsist\textsuperscript{215}. It is important to stress that for Bernard and the Augustinian spirituality these terms have an ontological dimension indicating “fundamental dynamisms of the soul and not our perception of them, though, of course they are often experienced in a sensible way”\textsuperscript{216}. The traditional division of the four affective states of the soul in \textit{cupiditas, laetitia, timor} and \textit{tristitia} coming from the Stoics and discussed by Augustine in the \textit{De civitate Dei}\textsuperscript{217} is mentioned by Bernard in several occasions. While Augustine termed the four affective states \textit{affectus}, Bernard applies to them the term \textit{affectio}\textsuperscript{218}. Most often he enumerates the affective states as being \textit{amor, laetitia, timor} and \textit{tristitia}\textsuperscript{219}. In another occasion the list is slightly different: \textit{amor, timor, gaudium} and \textit{tristitia}\textsuperscript{220}. While these affective states are all good in themselves, their moral quality derives from the object towards which they tend. Thus, an \textit{affectus} becomes vitiated and inordinate if it turns toward an inappropriate object\textsuperscript{221}. On the contrary, if the \textit{affectio} are oriented with the help of divine grace toward good and preferably toward the supreme good, which is God, they are ordered and

\textsuperscript{211} Casey (1988) 95.
\textsuperscript{212} \textit{civ. Dei}. 14.6. For a more detailed discussion of these aspects see below, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Asc}. 3.2: \textit{Affectus id est voluntas}.
\textsuperscript{214} \textit{Dil}. 10.28: \textit{intentio voluntatis}.
\textsuperscript{215} \textit{Div}. 50.2.
\textsuperscript{216} McGinn (1994) 500-501, note 212. See also Von Ivanka (1953) 202; Casey (1988) 94-114; Stiegmann (1995) 89-98. Blanpain (1974) 59 observed that if the ontological dimension of these terms is neglected and they are understood from a scholastic perspective as referring exclusively to “feelings”, it is easy to see Bernard, in a misleading way, as the initiator of a tradition of affective piety in the West.
\textsuperscript{217} \textit{civ. Dei}. 14.7.
\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Dil}. 8.23; \textit{Div}. 50.2; \textit{Div}. 72.4.
\textsuperscript{219} \textit{Div}. 50.2; \textit{Div}. 72.4.
\textsuperscript{220} \textit{Quad}. 2.3.
\textsuperscript{221} \textit{Div}. 6.3; \textit{Div}. 13.4.
become virtues\textsuperscript{222}. These ideas are entirely based on Augustine, who trying to counter the Stoic ideal of apatheia (the absence of all affectus), argued that cupiditas, laetitia, timor and tristitia can be good if the will is directed towards a good object\textsuperscript{223}. The necessity of divine grace in orienting the soul’s affects toward good is also a fundamental aspect of Augustine’s thought.

The principle of ordination of the fundamental affective states of the soul, inspired by Augustine’s ideas, is paramount for the understanding of Bernard’s mystical thought\textsuperscript{224}. He explains that, as the whole heart is contained in these four affectiones, one needs to understand the scriptural commandment of turning with the whole heart to God, as including all these affective states\textsuperscript{225}. According to Bernard, it is primarily in affectus that God can be experienced. The presence of God in the human soul is indicated by the movement of the heart (ex motu cordis)\textsuperscript{226} and the Bridegroom in his visit to the soul speaks to the affect not to the intellect\textsuperscript{227}. This is the reason why, in order to prepare for the visit of the Word to the soul, the affective states must be cleansed and ordered\textsuperscript{228}. Finally, Bernard famously formulated his definition of deification in affective terms: Sic affici, deificari est\textsuperscript{229}.

Since the term affectus is passive in form, while affectio is active, Bernard attempted at times to distinguish between them. The main difference is that affectus cannot be attributed to God: Non est affectus Deo, affectio est\textsuperscript{230}. This is another idea whose roots are partly to be found in Augustine who said that God cannot be disturbed by any affectus\textsuperscript{231}. However, although at least theoretically, Bernard acknowledges the distinction between affectus and affectio, in practice, he seems to employ these terms guided by the laws of assonance. Thus, as it was observed by J. Châtillon, Bernard is

\textsuperscript{222} Gra. 16-17; Div. 50.3.
\textsuperscript{223} See below, p. 141.
\textsuperscript{224} For a detailed discussion of this aspect see below, pp. 78-87.
\textsuperscript{225} Quad. 2.3.
\textsuperscript{226} SC. 74.6.
\textsuperscript{227} SC. 67.3: Affectus locutus est, non intellectus.
\textsuperscript{228} Div. 50.2.
\textsuperscript{229} Dil. 10.28.
\textsuperscript{230} Csi. 5.17.
\textsuperscript{231} See below, p. 142, n. 201.
inclined to use rather *affectio* when the word *ratio* occurs in the same context, and he tends to use *affectus*, when the word *intellectus* appears somewhere in the same phrase. Bernard’s primary focus on *affectus* and *affectio* (and of the all affective states on *amor* in particular) in the search of the soul for God and in the soul’s highest experience of God, led certain modern scholars to label Bernard’s mysticism as “affective” and thus, to a certain extent different from the intellectual mysticism, whose main exponent is considered to be Augustine. However, although Bernard does not enter into a detailed discussion about how love and knowledge are related in the fleeting moment of the union of the soul with God, he insists nevertheless that the ascent to *unitas spiritus* involves both the affective and knowing powers of the soul. Quoting Gregory’s phrase “love itself is a form of knowing” (*amor ipse notitia est*) Bernard intends to show that both love and knowledge are fulfilled in the embrace of the Word and the soul. In the *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 49, Bernard speaks of the ecstasy as taking place not only in *affectu*, but also in *intellectu*. These aspects of Bernard’s mystical thought where the knowing powers are involved together with the affects in the experience of God, made other scholars to regard with circumspection the label “affective mysticism” applied to Bernard. At the same time, the view that Augustine must be read as an intellectualist, has been challenged by a multitude of studies, which highlight the centrality of love in Augustine’s thought.

Bernard’s use of the terms *amor*, *dilectio* and *caritas* is also consonant with that of Augustine. Bernard does not operate rigorous distinctions between *amor*, *dilectio* and *caritas* and the few nuances that slightly differentiate these terms should be considered “rather as preferences or tendencies in language than an inflexible semantic rule”. Thus, *caritas* has exclusively a spiritual meaning, given the fact that it is related

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232 Châtillon (1938) 2288-2300.
235 *Div.* 29.1.
236 SC. 49.4. This teaching is in accordance with that of Augustine, see below, p. 91.
238 Especially Bochet (1982); Bell (1984) 55-62; McGinn (1991) 257-262. Other important studies on Augustine’s teaching on love, Burnaby (1938); Combès (1934); O’Donovan (1980).
239 For Augustine’s own treatment of the meaning of these terms see *civ. Dei.* 14.17. Also see below, p. 176.
always with noble objects, such as the neighbour or God. It is more difficult to grasp the differentiating nuance between *amor* and *dilectio*, which in the twelfth century were used indiscriminately, as well as sometimes in Augustine. Bernard prefers to speak of the mystical love as *amor*, as this term has a note of greater warmth and intensity than *dilectio*. The latter term is free from the potential sexual connotations which the term *amor* can have, which at first glance might have recommended it as more appropriate for being applied to the mystical love, but the fact that *dilectio* also possessed a rational and calculated dimension limited its use in mystical contexts. Bernard differs from Augustine, however, when he uses the term *amor* in order to refer to both the Word of God and the Holy Spirit. Augustine has never spoken of the Word of God as *amor* and the terms he applies to the Holy Spirit are only *caritas* and *dilectio*.

Finally, one of the key concepts of Bernard’s mysticism is that of desire (*desiderium*). Like Augustine who defined desire as the longing of the soul for things, which are absent *desiderium est rerum absentium concupiscientia*, Bernard understands desire as an experience of absence or privation which makes the soul feel restless. The dynamism denoted by the *desiderium* led Bernard to understand this term as love-in-progress as differentiated from fulfilled love: “Just as faith leads to understanding, so desire leads to perfect love”. However, Casey observed that most often Bernard tended to use the term *desiderium* interchangeably with *amor*, while *dilectio* was far less used in such way.

### 2. The stages of the love’s progress towards God

Like many other Christian mystical thinkers, Bernard manifested a strong penchant for charting various itineraries and descriptions of the soul’s journey to God. The various gradational schemes containing Bernard’s mystical thought had largely a pedagogical function in assisting the memory of his disciples. At the same time they had

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243 *SC*. 8.2; *SC*. 8.4.
244 *en. Ps*. 118 s. 8.4.
246 *Div*. 118.
the role of offering them a general sense of what they might encounter in their spiritual journey. However, these itineraries and descriptions must not be confused with the journey itself, which remains a unique experience for each soul\textsuperscript{248}. We have already discussed in the previous chapter Bernard’s threefold distinction of the human freedoms, each corresponding to different stages of the soul’s progress to God. We find various other numerical patterns when Bernard develops the theme of love. Thus, in the *Sermones de Diversis* Bernard speaks of a fourfold division of the modes of love: *amor carnalis carnaliter, amor carnalis spiritualiter, amor spiritualis carnaliter* and *amor spiritualis spiritualiter*\textsuperscript{249}. This fourfold scheme presents certain similarities with Bernard’s most famous description of the four stages of love from the *De diligendo Deo*: the love of self for the sake of self, the love of God for the sake of self, the love of God for God’s sake, the love of self for God’s sake\textsuperscript{250}. Concomitantly with this fourfold distinction, Bernard presents in the same work a threefold division of love, as love of slave, love of mercenary and love of son\textsuperscript{251}. He returns to this distinction in the *Sermones super Cantica Canticorum* and alters it by placing the marital love as the higher degree of love to be enjoyed in this life\textsuperscript{252}.

As it is difficult in this maze of classifications to find any pertinent hints of Bernard’s dependence on Augustine, it is necessary to go beyond the various distinctions of love and unravel the theological foundation of Bernard’s teaching on love, which remains constant independently of the various patterns in which it is presented.

Let us begin our discussion with one of the most important aspects of Bernard’s mysticism: his understanding of the relationship between the devout soul and God in the highest kind of mystical encounter as a “spiritual marriage”\textsuperscript{253}. The idea is also present in Augustine and Gregory the Great, but they did not develop it\textsuperscript{254}. Augustine’s approach to the Song of Songs, which he considered a difficult book, was mainly theological and

\begin{itemize}
  \item McGinn (1994) 183.
  \item Div. 101.
  \item Dil. 8.23-10.29.
  \item Dil. 12.34.
  \item SC. 83.5.
  \item SC. 61.1; SC. 83.3; SC. 85.13.
  \item Butler (1922) 160.
\end{itemize}
ecclesiological\textsuperscript{255}. Therefore, in the majority of his interpretations the Bridegroom is Christ, while the bride is the Church. This interpretation is the prevailing one in Bernard as well\textsuperscript{256}, although scholarship has hitherto not paid sufficient attention to this aspect. However, following Origen, and especially in mystical contexts, he uses a different allegorical interpretation, according to which the Bridegroom is the Word and the bride is the human soul.

In the \textit{Sermones super Cantica Canticorum}, Bernard stresses the idea that only by love human beings may deal reciprocally with God and that marital love expresses this mutuality in the best way\textsuperscript{257}. Only by loving God back with a disinterested love like the bride, the soul can respond to God’s love “even if not on an equal basis”\textsuperscript{258}. Although Bernard emphasises the mutuality and the reciprocity of the Word and the soul united in ‘marital’ love, he nevertheless maintains the difference between the Creator and the finite creature by mentioning two important aspects. One refers to the measure of love: “the creature loves less because it is less, still if the Bride loves from her whole self, nothing is lacking where everything is given. Loving in this way I said is being married”\textsuperscript{259}. The other important aspect of this ‘marital’ love is that in spite of the reciprocity existing between the Bridegroom, Word, and the bride, soul, the divine love is prior to the human love. Bernard’s development of this theme is based on elements of Augustine’s theology.

\section*{3. The priority of God’s love}

The priority of divine love over human love developed from the idea that love cannot have its beginning in the human beings. The Bible teaches that the “love comes from God” (1 Jn 4:7) and that “God is love” (1 Jn 4:8). Having solid biblical roots this theme of the priority of divine love is common to many Christian thinkers, but in both Augustine and Bernard there is a special emphasis on God’s prior love for the humankind. Three biblical passages are mainly used by both thinkers to underline this

\textsuperscript{255} Casey (1988) 47. Augustine uses the images of Bridegroom and bride in order to develop his views on the union of the Divine Word with the flesh and on the union of Christ with the Church. See Bochet (1982) 382-396. For Augustine’s use of the Song of Songs with an ecclesiastical purpose, in order to preserve the unity of the Church and to refute the Donatists, see Cameron (2001) 99-127.

\textsuperscript{256} Moritz (1980) 3-12.

\textsuperscript{257} SC. 83.4-6.

\textsuperscript{258} SC. 83.3-4.

\textsuperscript{259} SC. 83.6.
idea: *Deus Caritas est* (1 Jn 4:8), *Ipse prior dilexit nos* (1 Jn 4:10) and *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum* (Rom 5:5). They encapsulate the essence of Augustine and Bernard’s views on the priority of God’s love and at the same time underline three important aspects of this theme:

3.1. *Deus caritas est* (1 Jn 4:8)

Augustine does not cease to repeat throughout his works that because God is charity, human love has no other source than the charity which is God\(^\text{260}\). Being bestowed gratuitously on the human beings by divine grace, the charity is also a gift of God (*donum Dei*), which enables the human beings to love God in return\(^\text{261}\). This theme is famously formulated in a memorable phrase of the *Confessiones*: *Sagittaveras tu cor nostrum caritate tua*\(^\text{262}\), long before he began his series of biblical commentaries and long before he developed his theology of love. Augustine elaborated his views on God’s prior love especially in his commentaries on the Gospel and the First Epistle of St. John and touched upon it frequently in his *De Trinitate*. In his later works the priority of divine love became a significant topic for refuting the Pelagian claims according to which love has its beginning in human beings and only its perfection comes from God\(^\text{263}\).

In the *De Trinitate*, the verse *Deus caritas est* (1 Jn 4:8) enabled Augustine, to define the relations between the three divine persons and to elaborate his doctrine on the Trinity, thus, establishing the basis on which he then developed his view on how God loves the human beings first. Augustine uses 1 Jn 4:8 in order to argue that God’s substance is charity\(^\text{264}\). As such, charity does not apply to one person of the Holy Trinity but to all of them indiscriminately\(^\text{265}\). The important identification of the Holy Spirit with charity in Book VI of the *De Trinitate*\(^\text{266}\) takes place in the context of Augustine’s endeavours to demonstrate the unity and equality of the divine persons of the Holy Trinity. Therefore, although he makes clear that the Holy Spirit must not be confused

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\(^{260}\) *c. ep. Pel.* 2.21. For the frequent developments of this ideas see especially *Jo. ev. tr.* and *ep. Jo.*

\(^{261}\) *s. 156.5.*

\(^{262}\) *conf.* 9.2.3.

\(^{263}\) *c. ep. Pel.* 2.21.

\(^{264}\) *Trin.* 6.5.7.

\(^{265}\) *Trin.* 15.5.28.

\(^{266}\) *Trin.* 6.5.7.
with the other two persons, in this passage the emphasis falls on the Holy Spirit’s equality with the Father and the Son and his sharing in the same divine substance. The Holy Spirit may be understood as the unity (unitas), holiness (sanctitas) or love (caritas) of the two other divine Persons, but this love is consubstantial, belonging to the essential nature of the Father and the Son. As undoubted testimony for his claims he quotes 1 Jn 4:8. The understanding of the Holy Spirit as unitas has also biblical roots, signaled by Augustine’s quotation of Eph 4:3 unitas spiritus in vinculo pacis (“the unity of Spirit in the bond of peace”). While human beings are capable of loving God and their neighbour, as the two precepts of the law command, only by divine grace and by a gratuitous gift from God (ipsius munere), the divine unity is not the result of participation or of a gift of some superior (dono superioris), but consubstantial love\textsuperscript{267}, because of 1 Jn 4:8 Deus caritas est.

Augustine returns to the exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8 in the last book of the De Trinitate. His intention is this time slightly different. He begins by stressing the charity as the substance of the Holy Trinity\textsuperscript{268}, but he continues by defining the Holy Spirit in relation with the other divine persons as being distinctively called charity\textsuperscript{269}. The line of the argument in this paragraph is strikingly similar with some passages from Augustine’s In Iohannis epistulam tractatus, written probably earlier than the Book XV of the De Trinitate\textsuperscript{270}. He interprets 1 Jn 4:8: Deus dilectio est in the light of 1 Jn 4:7: Dilectio ex Deo est, 1 Jn 4:10: Ipse prior dilexit nos and 1 Jn 4:13: Cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis. The contextual reading of 1 Jn 4:8 with 1 Jn 4:7 and 1 Jn 4:13 enables him to maintain that, among the three divine persons, it is the Holy Spirit the one particularly called love. 1 Jn 4:7 indicates that the biblical text cannot refer here to God the Father since it is not possible to say of him alone that he is God from God. 1 Jn 4:13 makes it clear that 1 Jn 4:8 does not refer to the Son of God but the Holy Spirit who is given to human beings as the gift of love. Next, Augustine quotes 1 Jn 4:10 in order to underline the priority of divine love and concludes

\textsuperscript{267} Trin. 6.5.7: The Holy Spirit is both named caritas and communio consubstantialis.

\textsuperscript{268} Trin. 15.17.30.

\textsuperscript{269} Trin. 15.17. 31. Augustine uses both the terms caritas and dilectio.

\textsuperscript{270} ep. Jo. 7.4-7. Augustine has finished his commentaries on the First Epistle of St. John around 407 in the period of his life when he was actively engaged in refuting the Donatists, while the work to the De Trinitate, lasted from 402 to 422. See La Bonnardière (1965) 42-43; Dideberg (1978) 207.
the paragraph with Rom 5:5: *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis* which confirms entirely his interpretation.

In discussing briefly these passages from Augustine’s *De Trinitate*, my intention was to underline the significant link existing between Augustine’s doctrine of Trinity and the priority of divine love. Being aware of this link will help us understand why Augustine defended so fiercely the priority of divine love against the Pelagians. As Mandouze has well observed: «C’est en définitive la nature même de l’Amour de Dieu qui se trouvait mise en question par Pélage: et non point seulement l’amour que les hommes lui rendent, mais L’Amour qu’Il leur donne et qu’Il est»271.

Bernard’s exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8 follows that of Augustine, insofar as he used it in order to apply it both to the doctrine of the Trinity and the priority of love. Although in his writings Bernard did not show a particular interest for speculation on the divine nature and on analyzing the divine attributes, in an important passage from his treatise *De diligendo Deo* one reads the following:

> What else maintains that supreme and unutterable unity in the highest and most blessed Trinity, if not charity? Hence it is a law, the law of the Lord, that charity which somehow holds and brings together the Trinity in the bond of peace. At the same time, let nobody think I hold charity to be a quality or a kind of accident in God. Otherwise I would be saying and be it far from me, that there is something in God which is not God. Charity is the divine substance. I am saying nothing new or unusual, just what St. John says: God is love. It is rightly said that charity is both God and the gift of God. Thus, charity gives charity; substantial charity produces the quality of charity. Where it signifies the giver, it takes the name of substance; where it means the gift, it is called a quality272.

Notwithstanding the almost scholastic distinction drawn by Bernard between love as substance and as quality, this passage shares more than one similarity with Augustine’s treatment of the essential nature of charity in the Holy Spirit from Book VI of the *De Trinitate*273. Bernard does not mention the Holy Spirit either274, but as shown above, in

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271 Mandouze (1968) 395.
272 *Dil.* 12.35.
273 See above, pp. 59-60.
274 Bernard does not develop Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love, although he demonstrates he was aware of it, as he mentions it sporadically in his works. In *SC.* 8.2 Bernard refers to the Holy Spirit as *gluten firmum, indivisibilis unitas, individuus amor*, and in *SC.* 8.4 as *utriusque siquidem amor et benignitas Spiritus Sanctus est*. In *SC.* 11 he mentions Augustine’s threefold image of God in human beings.
Augustine’s passage the emphasis falls rather on the essential nature of charity in the
divine being and hence on the unity and equality of the divine persons. Bernard speaks of
charity as the unity of the Trinity, quoting exactly like Augustine Eph 4:3, as a biblical
confirmation of the unity existing within the Trinity. The central part of Bernard’s
passage speaks of the substantial nature of charity in God, quoting 1 Jn 4:8. And he
immediately adds a phrase which although not to be encountered in Augustine is very
Augustinian in character: Caritas dat caritatem, emphasizing God as the source for
human love. He then goes further to make a distinction which exists in Augustine’s
passage but which is not formulated in the same words: charity as God and charity as the
gift of God.

Due to the similarities that were signaled in both authors, it is likely that
Bernard’s passage from the De diligendo Deo was inspired by Augustine’s passage
speaking of charity as the unity and substance of the divine Trinity, from Book VI of the
De Trinitate. An additional argument for Bernard’s knowledge of Augustine’s text is
provided by his interpretation of another Pauline verse: Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus
est (1 Cor 6:17) where without any doubt he relies on the same Book VI of Augustine’s
De Trinitate.

3.2. Ipse prior dilexit nos (1 Jn 4:10)

Both Augustine and Bernard fully agree when they insist that God loved us first:

Ipse prior dilexit nos (1 Jn 4:10). This Johannine verse is always quoted by Bernard with

as formed of memoria which corresponds to the Father, ratio, corresponding to the Son, and voluntas
Corresponding to the Holy Spirit.  

275 M. B. Pennington remarks the similarity of Bernard’s passage with one passage from William of St.
Thierry’s treatise De natura et dignitate amoris 15. See Pennington (1980) 281-285. The similarity of the
two texts is undeniable, but Pennington’s analysis fails to give any viable solution for whom of the two
authors, might have written the passage first. One important impediment is that he considers the treatise De
diligendo Deo as being written the earliest towards 1125 and coming a few years after William’s treatise on
love. From this perspective Bernard appears to follow William. However, Pennington seems to forget that
Bernard’s treatise includes Epistula 11, a letter addressed by Bernard to the prior of the Carthusian monks
written much earlier than the treatise itself. The passage quoted above is a part of this letter. According to
the critical editions of Bernard’s letters from Sources Chrétienes, this letter might have been written
between 1115 and 1117 at the earliest. Jean Leclercq indicates 1120 as the date of the letter. If this dating
of Epistula 11 is accurate then, the letter was written before William’s treatise on love and as such, William
seems to follow Bernard, whose source most likely was Augustine.

276 For Bernard’s likely direct reading of Book VI of De Trinitate for his distinction between unum and
unus spiritus, see below, pp. 95-103.
the adjective *prior* although this adjective appears only in the late versions of the Vulgate. The *Vetus Latina* does not have it nor the Greek New Testament has *protos*, but the patristic authors, and especially Augustine, interpret 1 Jn 4:10 in the light of 1 Jn 4:19 where the *Vetus Latina* version of the Bible says *Ergo diligamus Deum quoniam Ipse prior dilexit nos*. It is very likely that Bernard does not quote here the text of the Vulgate but follows the patristic sources, primarily Augustine (since other Latin authors did not quote this verse extensively) and he also introduces *prior* when quoting 1 Jn 4:10.

According to Augustine there are two aspects of the priority of the divine love. The love manifested in creation and the love manifested in redemption. God loved human beings before the creation of the world and he did not cease to love them after the fall when as a proof of his great love for humankind he sent his only begotten son in order to redeem the world:

> The love of God is incomprehensible, but it is unchangeable. He has not begun to love us since we have been reconciled to him through the blood of his Son. He loved us before the foundation of the world, so that we too might share sonship with the Only begotten son, before we were anything at all. We should not understand our reconciliation to God through the death of his Son, as though the Son has enabled Him to begin to love those whom, he hated. God never hated the human, his love for his creatures is unchangeable, rather the human beings were at enmity with God because of the sin.

Thus the human beings were created from the beginning with a noble purpose to share sonship with the only begotten Son or as Augustine put it in the first paragraph of the *Confessions*: *Fecisti nos ad te*. God created human beings towards himself, for himself. After the fall humans were deviated from their noble goal and instead of aiming toward God, they turned towards created things and became the slaves of sin and the enemies of God. They were in need of a redeemer, who would return the creature to the correct path to God, as by their own powers human beings were not able of this conversion. This is another manifestation of God’s prior love for humankind, since he has sent his own Son and delivered him up for all human beings. In Augustine’s view, the reason for God loving human beings is to make them godly, to make them righteous, to make them whole, to enable them to achieve the noble purpose for which they were created in the first place, and the coming of Christ is the equivalent of a new creation. God is the maker

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277 *Jo. ev. tr.* 110.6. See also *Trin.* 13.11.15.
and the remaker (Qui fecit refecit) Augustine states frequently throughout his writings\textsuperscript{278}, and the second creation is no less important than the first.

Both aspects of God’s love for human beings before the creation of the world and God’s love expressed in the deliverance of his Son to death in order to save humankind are present in Bernard’s teaching. Thus, in Sermo super Canticum Canticorum 71, he states that: “the human being truly abides in God from all eternity, for he is loved from all eternity, if he is one of those who say that God loved us and accepted us in his beloved Son before the foundation of the world”\textsuperscript{279}. In the introductory chapters from the treatise De diligendo Deo, Bernard argues that the reason for loving God is God. Developing this answer he makes use of the Johannine text: Ipse prior dilexit nos, and asserts that “when seeking why God should be loved, if one asks what right he has to be loved, the answer is that the main reason for loving him is “He loved us first”\textsuperscript{280}. The divine love is manifested in the redemption work, says Bernard, following Paul, when God did not spare his only son but sacrificed him for us\textsuperscript{281}. And later in the same work when he speaks of the human being who lost the initial glory he was created for, Bernard reworks the Augustinian idea of Qui fecit, refecit, saying: “It was less easy to remake me than to make me”\textsuperscript{282}. We have here the same idea existing in Augustine that he who makes, remakes, but with a special emphasis on the difficulty of the latter and Bernard continues in his own way: “It is written not only about me but of every created being He spoke and they were made. But he who made me by a single word, in remaking me had to speak many words, work miracles suffer hardships”\textsuperscript{283}.

3.3. Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis (Rom 5:5)

\textsuperscript{278} ep. 231. 6: Qui fecit refecit; ep. Jo. 3.9: Quia ipse nos fecit, qui nos refecit; en. Ps. 95.15: ille refecit qui fecit; en. Ps. 144.10; s. 379.3-4.
\textsuperscript{279} SC. 71.10: Sed homo quidem ab aeterno in Deo, tamquam ab aeterno dilectus, si tamen ex illis sit qui dicunt quia dilexit et gratificavit nos in dilecto Filio suo ante mundi constitutionem.
\textsuperscript{280} Dil. 1.1.
\textsuperscript{281} Dil. 1.1.
\textsuperscript{282} Dil. 5.15: Nec enim tam facile refectus, quam factus.
\textsuperscript{283} Dil. 5.15.
In an article on Rom 5:5, Anne-Marie La Bonnardière\textsuperscript{284} counted more than two hundred occurrences of this Pauline verse in the works of Augustine. She observed that while the biblical verse appears often in Augustine’s early works, its frequency increases substantially after 411 reaching its greatest intensity in Augustine’s writings directed against Pelagians and continues being quoted until Augustine’s last works. The French scholar has identified eleven contexts in which Augustine used Rom 5:5. Among these, the themes of the divine initiative in offering gratuitous gifts to humanity and the human love for God as a gift of the Holy Spirit are mentioned as being developed by Augustine after 411. Very often these two themes are interconnected, as the following passage from the \textit{De trinitate} shows, by linking the priority of God’s love with the reason for the human love of God: “the human being has not whence to love God unless from God; and therefore he [i.e. the evangelist] says ‘Let us love him, because he first loved us’. The Apostle Paul too says: ‘The love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us’\textsuperscript{285}.

Burnaby\textsuperscript{286} observed that Augustine’s exegesis of Rom 5:5 by which he interprets \textit{caritas Dei} not as a possessive genitive meaning “the love of God for human beings”, but as an objective genitive with the sense “the human love for God” is erroneous. According to Burnaby, the immediate biblical context of Rom 5:5 does not support such an interpretation of \textit{caritas Dei}. He suggests that in the Epistle to the Romans \textit{caritas Dei} may be understood as a genitive of origin, “the love from God”, indicating the source from where the love springs. However, because Rom 5:5 represented the chief biblical argument against the Pelagians, Augustine preferred to interpret \textit{caritas Dei} not as the love by which God loves humankind, but as the love by which human beings love God. In comparison with Augustine’s wide use of Rom 5:5, Bernard quotes the Pauline verse less frequently. However, perusing the Bernardine contexts where Rom 5:5 occurs, it seems that, like Augustine, Bernard reads \textit{caritas Dei} as referring to the human love for God. Thus, in \textit{Sermo super Cantica Canticorum} 8, Bernard quotes Rom 5:5 as a biblical argument for his claim that “the revelation which is made through the Holy Spirit, not only conveys the light of knowledge, but also lights the fire of love, as the Apostle says:

\textsuperscript{284} La Bonnardière (1954) 657-663.
\textsuperscript{285} \textit{Trin.} 15.17.31. See also \textit{ep. Jo.} 7.6-7; s. 34.2; \textit{gr.et pecc.or.} 1.27.
\textsuperscript{286} Burnaby (1938) 99.
The love that has been poured into our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us⁹²⁸⁷. As Bernard terms the love in his own text as *amor* and moreover equates it with knowledge (*agnitio*) it is clear that he refers here to nothing else than the human love for God.

This is not an isolated passage in Bernard’s works; similar interpretations of the Pauline verse occur in *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 19 and in *Epistula* 107. In the first text, Rom 5:5 is quoted in an allegorical passage and refers to the love of the Bride and her maidens for the Bridegroom⁹²⁸⁸. In the second text, Bernard discusses in parallel the roles of Christ and the Holy Spirit in shaping human love:

> Readily the love of God for us precedes our love for him and it also follows it (…) Oh double and irrefutable argument of God’s love for us! Christ dies and so deserves our love. The Holy Spirit works upon us and makes us love him. Christ gives us a reason for loving him, the Spirit the power to love him. The one commends his great love to us, the other gives it. In the one we see the object of our love, by the other we have the power to love. The former provides the occasion for our love, the latter provides the actual love itself. How shameful it would be to look with ungrateful eyes upon the Son of God dying! But this easily happens if the Spirit should be lacking. Now, however, because ‘The charity of God has been poured fourth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which has been given to us’, being loved we love in return and loving we deserve to be still more loved⁹²⁸⁹.

It is surprising that Bernard quotes Rom 5:5 in such contexts in which he explicitly speaks of the human love for God rather than God’s love for us. His exclusive reading of the biblical text must have restricted the sense of *caritas Dei*, to either a genitive of possession or to a genitive of origin. However, by understanding *caritas Dei* as the human love for God, Bernard’s exegesis of Rom 5:5 indicates another source than that of the Bible, and most likely this source is Augustine. As many other mystics, Bernard was more concerned with exploring the human love for God than with inquiring about the nature of God’s love. Thus, he might have found Augustine’s interpretation of Rom 5:5 more appropriate for his mystical interests.

⁹²⁸⁷ *SC*. 8.9: *…revelatio quae per Spiritum Sanctum fit, non solum illustrat ad agnitionem, sed etiam accendit ad amorem, dicente Apostolo: Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis.*


⁹²⁸⁹ *Ep*. 107.8. The same ideas are repeated in *Dil*. 7.22.
In the light of the analysis of the three biblical passages used both by Augustine and Bernard to sustain their teaching on the priority of divine love, it is possible to argue that Bernard’s view on how God loves human beings first, is shaped by Augustine’s interpretation of the biblical material.

4. The Paradox of the Search for God

A theme closely related to that of the priority of divine love in Bernard’s works is that of the search of the soul for God. In a passage from the De diligendo Deo which begins by emphasising the priority of God’s love for human beings in words similar to what he had said in Epistula 107.8, Bernard concludes his argumentation in the following way:

No one has the strength to seek you unless he has first already found you. For you wish to be found in order that you may be sought, and you wish to be sought in order that you may be found.

These concluding sentences do not belong to Bernard. They derive from Augustine’s In Johannis evangelium tractatus. Referring to the search of God, Augustine said “we seek you because we were sought” and later in the treatise he added “let us search for that which has to be found, let us search for what has been found”. The first sentence occurs during the discussion of the episode of Nathanael, who has been seen first by Christ under the fig-tree. The second sentence appears in a passage where Augustine speaks of the difficult task of the soul engaged in searching for the knowledge of an infinite God. The same idea is repeated in the De Trinitate, with the sole exception that in this text it is rather the incomprehensibility of God which represents the object of the soul’s quest. It is interesting to observe that Augustine develops the theme of ‘seek and find’ in relation to the object of this search which is not so much the love of God, as it is

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290 See below, p. 66.
291 Dil. 7.22: ...nemo quaerere te valet, nisi qui prius invenerit. Vis igitur inveniri ut quaeraris, quaeri ut inventaris.
292 Jo. ev. tr. 7.21: quaerimus quia quaesiti sumus.
293 Jo. ev. tr. 63.1: quae ramus inveniendum, quaeramus inventum.
294 Trin. 15.2.2.
the knowledge of God. Although Augustine does not link explicitly the theme of ‘seek and find’ with that of the priority of divine love, it is without doubt that he would have agreed with Bernard’s interpretation based on Augustine’s own idea of the necessity of divine grace for the soul’s progress towards God.

Bernard’s most developed treatment of this theme occurs in Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 84. Bernard begins his sermon asserting that it is a great good to search God. The quest for God is the first gift to the soul, but among all the goods that the soul has received, it remains the last to be perfected. The starting point of Bernard’s exegesis of the biblical verse “In my little bed nightlong I sought him whom my soul loves” (Sg 3:1) may be seen as a meditation on Augustine’s quaeerimus, quia quaesiti sumus: “The soul seeks the Word, but only that soul which has been first sought by the Word”. This means that in Bernard’s interpretation the soul has been granted the will to seek God, on the condition of having first been visited and sought by God. As a result of this first divine visit, the soul possesses the will to seek God, but still lacks the power to act in accordance with its own will. Bernard speaks of a second grace, by which the soul seeks God according to its own powers, “provided it remembers that it was first sought, as it was first loved, and provided it remembers that it is because of this that it both seeks and loves”. The soul’s search and love for God are both the result of God’s seeking and loving human beings first. The love and the quest of the soul for God are not considered by Bernard as being identical, however they are closely connected inasmuch as “the love is the reason for the search and the search is the fruit of love”. He concludes his reflections on how God sought human beings first by saying: “From this [i.e. love] comes the zeal and ardor to seek him whom your soul loves, because assuredly you were not

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295 The search for God retains however for Augustine a strong affective element being used often as a synonym for desiderare. As Isabelle Bochet has observed, quaeerere Deum represents the positive dimension of the desire for God, which is usually understood as the experience of something absent. See Bochet (1982) 143.

296 SC. 84.1.

297 SC. 84.4: Quaerit anima Verbum, sed quae a Verbo prius quaesita sit.

298 SC. 84.4: tantum se meminerit quaesitam prius, sicut et prius dilectam; atque inde esse, et quod quaerit, et quod diligit.

299 SC. 84.5: dilectio causa quaesitionis; quaeostio fructus dilectionis est.
able to seek unless you had been sought and also now when sought you cannot but seek.”

Although Bernard mentions in passing the soul’s search for the vision of God, it is primarily the love of God that the soul seeks. The love of God is both at the beginning and at the end of the soul’s quest. The love of God as the primary object of soul’s quest is probably the most important aspect that distinguishes Bernard’s treatment of the theme of ‘seek and find’ from that of Augustine.

However, both Bernard and Augustine would agree that God’s initiative in both loving and seeking human beings, has the role of grounding ontologically the human desire for God so that as Bernard said “when sought you cannot but seek.”

5. Desiderium

Together with amor and dilectio, Bernard employed the term desiderium in order to designate the human response to God’s prior love for humanity. The love, which has been planted in human nature by divine initiative, when turned towards God, propels the soul on an ascending path whose final stage can never be fully enjoyed in this life.

Since the soul cannot experience fully the love for God during its earthly existence, Bernard’s predominant conception of Christian love is that of desiderium understood as “that spark of unfulfilled love which divine grace causes to exist in the human heart.” As usual with Bernard, he found support for developing his own view on human desire in the wealth of scriptural and theological reflection on this subject.

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300 SC. 84.5: hinc [sc. a dilectione] zelus, hinc ardor iste quaerendi quem diligit anima tua, quia profecto nec non quaesita quaerere poteras, nec non quaerere quaesita nunc potes.
301 SC. 84.4.
302 SC. 84.5.
303 McGinn (1994) 196-197 remarks on the existence of a progression in Bernard’s works regarding his view on the possibility of attainment of the highest degree of love in this life. His view changes from the early letter to the Carthusians where he reserves the highest stage of love for the future life to the numerous passages in the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum which seem to affirm the possibility of enjoying the highest state of love in this life, if only during rare fleeting ecstatic experiences.
By the twelfth century the concept of desiderium had already a venerable history, grounded both in the biblical books (especially the Psalms and the Pauline epistles)\textsuperscript{305} and the works of the ancient philosophers\textsuperscript{306}. It was subsequently developed in monastic texts such as Cassian’s Conferentiae and came to a climax in the writings of Augustine and Gregory the Great. Augustine especially played a major role in shaping the medieval views on desiderium and his influence is conspicuous at the level of vocabulary, imagery and theology of the concept. His great impact may be explained not only through a direct knowledge of his works, but also through the massive incorporation and absorption of his ideas on this matter in other influential texts, such as the Regula Sancti Benedicti and the writings of pope Gregory the Great\textsuperscript{307}.

Augustine’s most substantial texts on desiderium, discussing the concept especially in a biblical context, derive from the major works of his mature period, such as the Confessiones, the De Trinitate, the Enarrationes in Psalmos, the In Johannis evangelium tractatus and the In epistulam Johannis ad Parthos tractatus\textsuperscript{308}.

Intimately intertwined with the theme of the soul’s quest for God and with that of the Christian life as pilgrimage, desiderium helped Augustine to emphasise the inherent dynamism of the human soul towards God. According to Augustine, the human soul is created with a tendency towards its Creator, which cannot be fulfilled with anything less than God himself: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until its rests in you”\textsuperscript{309}.

For Augustine, desiderium is a particular form of voluntas\textsuperscript{310} being defined as longing for absent objects (rerum absentium concupiscientia)\textsuperscript{311}. He compares it with

\textsuperscript{305} The Pauline expressions desideria carnis (Gal 5:16; Eph 2:3), desiderium cordis (Rom 1:24) and desideria saecularia (Tit 2:12) are recurrent in Augustine’s and Bernard’s writings.

\textsuperscript{306} Cicero, Plotinus, Porphyry, to mention at least those who might have influenced Augustine in his treatment of desiderium.

\textsuperscript{307} Casey (1992) 610.

\textsuperscript{308} Isabelle Bochet’s admirable study on Augustine’s concept of desire is based mainly on the same works. For a compelling argument regarding the reason for selecting these particular works, see Bochet (1982) 18-21.

\textsuperscript{309} conf. 1.1.1: ...fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.

\textsuperscript{310} Speaking of desire in general (cupiditas), joy (laetitia), fear (metus) and sadness (tristitia), Augustine defines them all in terms of will, see civ. Dei 14.6: Voluntas quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.
hunger\textsuperscript{312} and thirst\textsuperscript{313}, suggesting that by desiderium the soul experiences an essential lack. This longing is neither good nor bad in itself. As with volontas it is the object of longing, which determines the moral quality of desiderium\textsuperscript{314}. While the soul preserves its inherent tendency after the fall, in the earthly region of unlikeness the soul is incapable of directing its longing towards something good or towards the supreme good which is God except through the redeeming grace of Christ\textsuperscript{315}. When through Christ’s grace the object of the soul’s longing is God, “the whole life of the good Christian is a holy desire”\textsuperscript{316}. As such, the Christian life is one of unsatisfied longing for something one does not possess yet, but believes and hopes to possess in the future.

Augustine had recourse to the metaphor of pilgrimage in order to describe the condition of the homesick Christian. As long as the soul is a pilgrim in this world, far away from its homeland, the desire cannot be fulfilled. Following Plotinus\textsuperscript{317}, Augustine insists that the return of the pilgrim soul to its homeland must not be understood in spatial terms: “we go not by walking but by loving”\textsuperscript{318} or “we do not run by feet but by desire”\textsuperscript{319}. While in this life the soul may be granted a momentary glimpse of the homeland\textsuperscript{320}, the pilgrim and homesick soul attains its destination in the afterlife, in the face to face vision of God, in the perfect restoration of God’s image and likeness and in the fulfilment of the soul’s love for God. By situating the consummation of desire in the future, after death, Augustine’s treatment of desiderium is profoundly eschatological.

\textsuperscript{311} en. Ps. 118 s. 8.4.
\textsuperscript{312} Jo. ev. tr. 15.1.
\textsuperscript{313} en. Ps. 41.3.
\textsuperscript{314} When desiderium is directed towards unworthy objects, Augustine speaks of desideria carnalia: en. Ps. 26.2; 7.5; 76.1; 102.5; 103.16; 136.9; Jo. ev. tr. 30.5; desideria illicita: en. Ps. 136.9; 147.10; desideria vitiosa: civ. Dei 14.3; desideria mala: c. Jul. 6.60; desideria saecularia: en. Ps. 53.5. When the object of desire is, on the contrary, a noble one, Augustine speaks of desideria bona: en. Ps. 83.3; desideria caelestia: s. 221.3; sanctum desiderium: ep. Jo. 4.6.
\textsuperscript{315} This is exactly the main point of Augustine’s Confessiones, which may be read as the quasi-autobiographical story of his renouncement to the various tempting desires of this world for the only worthy desire which is God, through his discovery of Christ’s role as a mediator.
\textsuperscript{316} ep. Jo. 4.6: Tota vita christiani boni sanctum desiderium est.
\textsuperscript{317} Plotinus, Ennead 1.6.8; conf. 1.18.28. See also Clark (2004) 149-151.
\textsuperscript{318} ep. 155.4.13: Imus non ambulando sed amando.
\textsuperscript{319} en. Ps. 83.4: …non enim pedibus sed desiderio currimus. Various formulations of the same idea occur in Jo. ev. tr. 26.3; 32.1; 36.8; 48.3.
\textsuperscript{320} In en. Ps. 41. 9 the theme of the pilgrimage provides the context for the human soul enflamed with desire to ascend to God. The encounter with God although fuelled by desire takes place at the level of the mind or intellect.
Finally, an additional aspect of *desiderium* should be mentioned although Augustine did not develop it fully in his works: the idea that even in the highest stage of the soul’s ascension to God, reserved usually for the afterlife, love and desire will continue to grow. This idea is already present in his early work *Soliloquies*, where distinguishing between three stages in the ascent of the soul to God, namely to have eyes (*habere oculos*), to look (*aspicere*) and to see (*videre*), Augustine mentions the role of faith, hope and love for the soul’s vision of God. During this life all three theological virtues are needed so that the soul might see God. However, in the life to come love alone will persist and will grow greater and greater. The same idea is repeated in the *De doctrina Christiana* together with an explanation regarding the continual growth of love. According to Augustine the reason for the incessant growth of love lies in the difference between temporal and eternal things. Temporal things are desired more before they are reached, but once they are attained their value proves worthless. On the other hand, eternal things are loved with greater ardour when they are in possession, than when they are still an object of desire, for “however high the value any human being may set upon it when he is on his way to possess it, he will find it when it comes into his possession, of higher value still.”

In his homiletic works speaking of the transformation of desire to enjoyment (*delectatio*) when the longing soul finally possesses the object of its desire, Augustine observes that this is not a state of satiety, rather “such will be the enjoyment of that beauty that it will ever be present to you and you shall never be satisfied, indeed you shall be always satisfied and yet never satisfied.” A similar idea is present in one of his sermons where he describes the life of the resurrected souls. In the presence of God who will then be seen face to face they will sing praise to God, not by means of sounds, but by

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321 Augustine’s constant teaching is that only very few souls are granted to experience the divine being in this life, very rarely and only for a fleeting moment.
322 With very few exceptions, modern scholars regularly overlook this aspect of Augustine’s understanding of desire. A brief discussion of this aspect occurs in Bochet (1982) 193-194, while Casey (1988) 69 simply acknowledges the presence of this element in Augustine. In the East, the idea of the unending desire for God termed as *epektasis* features in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa. See Daniélou (1944) 291-307.
323 *sol. 1.6.12-7.14.*
324 *doc. Chr. 1.38.42.* See in Pollmann (1996) her chapter on *caritas*.
325 *Jo. ev. tr. 3.21:* talis erit illa delectatio pulchritudinis, ut semper praesens sit et nunquam satieris; immo semper satieris, et nunquam satieris.
affection\textsuperscript{326} and in doing this they will experience an insatiable satiety (\textit{insatiabili satietae})\textsuperscript{327}.

The texts dealing with the unending growth of \textit{desiderium} are not numerous, however it appears clearly that Augustine maintained the existence of desire in the future life, although not as a longing for absent objects, since the soul finally finds itself in the presence of God, but simply as the expression of an ardent love.

Turning our attention to Bernard now, it is important to note that in spite of the disconcerting absence of direct quotations deriving from Augustine’s writings, Bernard’s view on \textit{desiderium} presents striking similarities with that of his predecessor. This situation may be explained, as Michael Casey suggested, through Bernard’s drawing on a “diffuse Augustinianism” rather than on the works of the master himself\textsuperscript{328}. While this presumption is absolutely plausible, one should keep in mind, however, that Augustine deals at length with the concept of \textit{desiderium} in his homiletic works, which in Bernard’s time were extremely popular among monks\textsuperscript{329} and which were read on a regular basis during the liturgical services\textsuperscript{330}. Therefore, it is highly likely that Bernard’s familiarity with Augustine’s view on \textit{desiderium} is also based on the former’s immediate exposure to Augustine’s ideas, not so much through solitary reading perhaps, as through direct aural contact in a liturgical context.

Bernard follows Augustine in his insistence on the ontological dimension of human desire. The concept of \textit{desiderium} cannot be understood separately from God’s prior love for humankind: “It is his desire that creates yours”\textsuperscript{331}. God is the source and the object of human desire: “he makes you desire, he is what you desire”\textsuperscript{332}. Or in a formulation that echoes an expression from the letter of Severus, bishop of Milevis,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{326} s. 369.29: \textit{Non sonibus transeuntibus dicemus Amen et Alleluia, sed affectu animi.}
  \item \textsuperscript{327} s. 369.29.
  \item \textsuperscript{328} Casey (1992) 610.
  \item \textsuperscript{329} Leclercq (1982) 97; Casey (1988) 27.
  \item \textsuperscript{330} Benedict, the Father of Western monasticism recommended in his rule the reading of the patristic authors during the Divine Office. See RB. 9. In the secondary literature this aspect is briefly dealt with by Lackner (1971) 30 and Waddell (1985) 105-106
  \item \textsuperscript{331} \textit{Dil.} 7.19: \textit{Illius desiderium tuum creat.}
  \item \textsuperscript{332} \textit{Dil.} 7.21: \textit{Ipse facit ut desideres, ipse est quod desideras.}
\end{itemize}
addressed to Augustine: “The reason for loving God is God and the measure of loving him is without measure”

The great love that God had for humankind before the creation of the world determined him to create the human being in his image and likeness and therefore with an inherent capacity for God himself. As the image of God is preserved after the fall, the human being retains his capacity for God, consisting in his ability to will, to love, to fear and in his endowment with the affectiones naturales. However, without the essential grace of Christ, the soul is unable to will the good, to love and fear God and to order its affections. Having been created from the beginning with a capacity for God the human soul tends restlessly towards its goal and no other object can satisfy it than God himself: “For God is love and there is nothing in all created things which is able to fill the creature which has been made to God’s image except the love which is God.” The same idea of the inability of the soul to be satisfied with anything else than God is developed in a passage clearly inspired by Augustine’s famous phrase from the Confessiones: “our heart is restless until it rests in you.”

By that law of his own cupidity according to which in all other things a person thirsts for what he does not have more than for what he has, and feels distaste more for what he has than for what he does not, so that everything in heaven and earth is no sooner obtained than disdained, finally, beyond, the shadow of a doubt, he should run up against him whom alone of all things he is still lacking, namely God. There he should rest, for just as no rest calls him back on this side of eternity, so no restlessness in the hereafter troubles him anymore.

The first part of this passage also makes clear the fact that Bernard, like Augustine, understood desire primarily as a longing of the soul for things it does not possess.

Bernard also shares with Augustine an inclination for the use of the imagery of the pilgrimage and of the soul’s quest for God in order to designate the soul’s tendency

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333 *Dil. 1.1*: *Causa diligendi Deum, Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere.* Emero Stiegman compares the first part of the Bernardine sentence with *en. Ps. 72.32: Praemium Dei ipse Deus est.* See Stiegman (1995) 164, n. 81. In *ep.109.2* writing to Augustine, Severus refers to the way of loving God “without measure” (*sine modo*).

334 See above, pp. 63-64.

335 *Gra.* 1.2.

336 *Gra.* 6.17.

337 *SC.* 18.6: *denique Deus caritas est, et nihil est in rebus quod posit replere creaturam factam ad imaginem Dei, nisi caritas Deus.*

338 *conf.* 1.1.1.

339 *Dil.* 7.19.
towards God. Following in the footsteps of Augustine, the term *peregrinatio* is used in the sense of being away from home, being also associated with the idea of exile. During this period of absence the soul longs for its homeland and its ultimate desire is to return there. Identifying the soul’s destination with the life of the saints in heaven and claiming that the soul will perfect its love for God after resurrection, Bernard adds a strong eschatological element to his understanding of desire.

The return to the homeland or the search of the soul for God needs however to start in this life and the way suggested by Bernard is reminiscent of Augustine: “God is not sought by the movement of the feet but by desires.” It is not by movement in space that the soul looses the likeness with which it was created but by means of affections, which, when oriented in an inappropriate way, may better be called defections:

The soul does not make itself degenerate when it strays by wandering from place to place or by walking, but when it strays as it is the nature of a spiritual substance to stray when it departs for the worse in its affections or rather in its defections away from itself somehow and when it makes itself dissimilar to itself through the depravity of its life and morals.

The idea that the proximity or distance from God does not refer to the soul’s location in space, but needs to be understood in terms of likeness and unlikeness also has its roots in a wealth of examples deriving from Augustine. Surprisingly, in spite of Augustine’s insistence that it is through love that the image and likeness of God in the human soul is restored and that the soul draws near to God, he did not refer to the ascent of the soul to God as an ascent of love. The main accounts of Augustine’s ascent of the soul to God present mainly in the works from the first half of his creative period describe an intellectual ascent of the soul to God, deeply influenced by his discovery of the books

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340 SC. 62.1.
341 Dil. 10.33.
342 SC. 84.1: *Non pedum passibus, sed desideriis quaeritur Deus*. For Augustine see above, p. 70, n. 319.
343 SC. 83.2.
344 en. Ps. 34 s. 2.6; en. Ps. 94.2; Trin. 7.6.12; civ. Dei 9.17.
345 sol. 1.6.12-7.14; quant. 33. 70-76; conf. 7.10.16; conf. 7.17.23; conf. 9.10.23-24. The famous ascension narratives from the *Confessiones* are based on a threefold Plotinian pattern, which begins with a withdrawal from corporeal reality, continues with the entry into the depth of the soul and culminates with the ecstatic movement beyond the mind to the divine level. There are also a few examples of the same threefold Plotinian pattern of the soul’s ascent to God present in Augustine’s homiletic works, see s. 52.6.16-17; en. Ps. 41.7-10; Jo. ev. tr. 20.2.11-12.
of the Neoplatonic philosophers\textsuperscript{346}. Bernard differs from Augustine in the particular interest he shows for the various stages of the love’s progress towards God and in the way in which he understands the return of the soul to God fundamentally as a loving ascent\textsuperscript{347}. It is essentially due to this difference that Bernard’s mysticism has been labelled as “affective” and contrasted with Augustine’s “intellectual mysticism”\textsuperscript{348}.

Finally, as Bernard mentions occasionally in his works that the desire has no end\textsuperscript{349}, some scholars thought to have discovered an element of \textit{epektasis} in his treatment of the concept, which they attributed to the abbot’s reading of Gregory of Nyssa\textsuperscript{350}. In Bernard’s time the only work of the Greek author available in Latin due to the translation of Eriugena was his anthropological treatise \textit{De opificio hominis}, known in the West under the title \textit{De imagine}. According to A. Wilmart, the library of Clairvaux possessed this translation at the time of Bernard’s abbacy\textsuperscript{351}. However, references to the concept of \textit{epektasis}\textsuperscript{352} as well as discussions of the unending aspect of human desire are totally absent in this text. Daniélou’s analysis of the concept in Gregory of Nyssa is based on the Cappadocian’s \textit{In Canticum Canticorum homiliae 15, De Vita Mosis} and \textit{Dialogus de anima et resurrectione}\textsuperscript{353}. Needless to say, none of these texts were translated into Latin in the twelfth century. Furthermore, in Gregory of Nyssa’s treatment of the subject, the theme of unending desire is inextricably intertwined with that of the increasingly deeper penetration into divine darkness, expressing the fact that the soul can never experience a total knowledge of God\textsuperscript{354}. There is no evidence to support the idea that Bernard might

\textsuperscript{346} conf. 7.9.14 narrates Augustine’s discovery of the \textit{libri Platonicorum}, which is followed by two mystical experiences in Milan which help Augustine to come to grips with a transcendental and spiritual understanding of divinity.

\textsuperscript{347} In SC. 49.4 Bernard speaks of two types of ecstasy, one taking place \textit{in intellectu}, the other \textit{in affectu}. However, it is the ascent of love that received overwhelming attention from the part of Bernard.

\textsuperscript{348} Louth (1976) 1-11.

\textsuperscript{349} The major text where Bernard speaks explicitly of undending desire is SC. 84.1. He also speaks of growing desire in SC. 31.1, of \textit{imperfecta perfectio} in QH 10.1, or referring to the life after the resurrection he speaks of \textit{satietas sine fastidio} “satiety without disgust” and \textit{desiderium nesciens egestatem} “desire knowing no want” in \textit{Dil. 33}.

\textsuperscript{350} McGinn (1994) 217 speaks as if Bernard was familiar with Gregory’s understanding of the notion of \textit{epektasis}. Casey (1988) 69 on the other hand is more cautious and suggests Augustine and Gregory the Great as Bernard’s more likely sources.

\textsuperscript{351} Wilmart (1949) 302.

\textsuperscript{352} The term \textit{epektasis} occurs only once in Gregory of Nyssa, \textit{De creatione hominis sermo alter}. GNO, suppl. 47.3.

\textsuperscript{353} Daniélou (1944) 291-307.

have known any of Gregory’s works, which discuss the aspect of the unending desire\(^{355}\). Additionally, nowhere in his works does Bernard refer to divine darkness or to God’s unknowability, the main elements closely related with the idea of unending desire in Gregory. Against this background it is highly likely that in touching upon the aspect of desire’s unending growth Bernard follows other sources. A careful look at Bernard’s most relevant text dealing with this subject leads us again to Augustine:

> What boundary can be set for anyone who does seek him? The Psalmist says “Seek his face always”. Nor, I think, will a soul cease to seek him even when it has found him. It is not with the steps of the feet that God is sought but with the heart’s desires; and when the soul happily finds him its holy desire is not quenched but kindled. Does the consummation of joy bring about the consumption of desire? Rather is the joy oil for the desire; for desire itself is the flame. So it is. Joy will be fulfilled, but there will be no end to desire and therefore there will be no end to the search. But consider, if you can, this zeal for searching, without wanting and this desire without anxiety: the former is indeed excluded by his presence, the latter by his abundance\(^{356}\).

Extracted from a sermon dealing with a number of themes which can be traced back to Augustine\(^{357}\), this passage presents some intriguing similarities with a text from the latter’s commentary on the Gospel of St. John\(^{358}\). Like Augustine, Bernard uses the biblical verse *Quaerite faciem eius semper* (Ps 104:4) as scriptural basis for the development of his ideas on the soul’s quest for God. To the idea of seeking God even when he was found corresponds Augustine’s famous phrase *quaeramus inveniendum quaeramus inventum* “let us search for what has to be found, let us search for what has been found”\(^{359}\). In addition, Augustine himself insists that since God is infinite the soul’s search for him will be without end. The main difference between the two texts is that while Bernard speaks clearly of the unending desire being preserved in the life to come, in this text Augustine confines the endless search of God to this life. However, Bernard’s understanding of the unending desire as no longer being a yearning for something absent is in accordance with Augustine’s reflections on this aspect.

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\(^{355}\) On Bernard’s reading of Gregory see below p. 12, n. 8.

\(^{356}\) SC. 84.1.

\(^{357}\) The theme of seeking and finding God and that of approaching God be desire rather than by moving in space.

\(^{358}\) Jo. ev. tr. 63.1.

\(^{359}\) Jo. ev. tr. 63.1. See the discussion on the paradoxical search for God above pp. 67-69.
The presence of these similarities seems to indicate that in articulating his own thoughts Bernard might have been inspired by a text he probably did not have in front of him and whose content he attempted to reconstruct relying on memory alone.

What is particularly striking about Bernard’s treatment of desiderium is that he does not borrow simply some disparate elements from his main source on this subject. In making use of the most important aspects related to desiderium in Augustine, Bernard gives the impression of having a comprehensive knowledge of his predecessor’s general treatment of the problem. This comprehensive knowledge enables him not only to follow closely Augustine but also to spot the existing disruptions in Augustine’s dealing with this concept and to discreetly attempt to fill these gaps.

6. Ordinate in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 VI)

The ontological restlessness existing in the human being (his velle, affectio, amor or desiderium) as a result of his creation must be channelled towards God with the help of divine grace, so that the lost likeness is restored by the union of human and divine will in what Bernard names unitas spiritus. Bernard refers to the proper orientation of desire towards God employing an expression with biblical roots: ordinatio caritatis. P. Delfgaauw notes that in Bernard’s thought ordinatio caritatis involves two aspects: first, it represents the turning of the carnal love from its fallen state where it was reduced by original sin to spiritual love, which is the love of God; second, it refers to the ordering of love in affectu in relation to love in actu, or in other words, to the complex relation between one aspect of contemplation and action. As Bernard’s development of the latter aspect of ordinatio caritatis does not make substantial use of material which can be traced back to Augustine, in what follows the discussion will be limited to the former aspect, namely that of the turning of the inherent dynamism of the human soul towards God by means of divine grace. Moreover, this is the aspect of ordinatio caritatis that

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360 The expression ordinatio caritatis derives from the biblical verse Ordinate in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 VI) or Ordinavit in me caritatem (Sg 2:4 Vg). Bernard quotes most often the Vulgate, but in Gra. 6.17 he quotes the biblical passage according to the Vetus Latina. The Sources Chrétiennes edition of Bernard’s treatise indicates in this case a patristic source for Sg 2:4.
361 Delfgaauw (1953) 235-6.
362 SC. 50.2: Est caritas in actu, est in affectu.
Bernard deals with most extensively and most frequently at the same time. He defines *ordinatio* as “every kind of conversion of the will to God and its total voluntary and devout subjection”\(^{363}\). According to Bernard, this conversion is a process that lasts for the whole life\(^{364}\). Delfgaauw\(^{365}\) has also pointed out that at times Bernard tackles this subject from a metaphysical perspective and then he speaks of love’s return to its beginning, its origin, its source\(^{366}\). On other occasions, Bernard accentuates the psychological side of the process by speaking of the purification and ordering of the affections\(^{367}\). However, the fundamental underlying idea of all these different approaches is that of the perfecting of the will after having been turned properly toward God by divine grace\(^{368}\).

More than Augustine, Bernard manifested a special interest in mapping the unfolding of human desire in its progress towards God. In Bernard’s view “love is a great reality. But there are degrees to it”\(^{369}\). The manifold enumerations of the stages of love in its ascent or return to God abound in Bernard’s works\(^{370}\) and this prolific diversity must not be seen as “the result of inconsistency or confusion, but rather [as the result of] the richness of the subject and the insight of the enumerator”\(^{371}\). Among Bernard’s various maps of the degrees of love, the one briefly outlined in a letter sent to the Carthusian monks of Mont-Dieu\(^{372}\) and developed subsequently in the treatise *De diligendo Deo*, dedicated to Cardinal Haimeric, seems to have been inspired by some of Augustine’s ideas. In this treatise, Bernard discusses four degrees of loving God: the human being loves himself for his own sake (*homo diligit se propter se*), the human being loves God for his own sake (*homo diligit Deum propter se*), the human being loves God for God’s sake (*homo diligit Deum propter seipsum*) and the human being loves himself for the sake of God (*homo diligit se propter Deum*). In order to understand how Bernard in articulating his fourfold division of the stages of love depended on elements that can be

\(^{363}\) *Gra.* 6.19: *Est autem ordinatio, omnimoda conversio voluntatis ad Deum, et ex tota se voluntaria devoteaque subiectio.*

\(^{364}\) *Quadr.* 2.4: *Spiritualis conversio non una die perficitur: utinam vel in omni vita qua degimus in hoc corpore, valeat consummari.*

\(^{365}\) Delfgaauw (1953) 236.

\(^{366}\) *SC.* 7.2; *SC.* 83.4.

\(^{367}\) *Div.* 50.2: *purgatae et ordinatae affectiones; Gra.* 6.17.

\(^{368}\) For a similar idea but a different approach to the order of love see below, pp. 175-181.

\(^{369}\) *SC.* 83.5: *Magna res amor; sed sunt in eo gradus.*

\(^{370}\) See above, pp. 56-57.

\(^{371}\) Sommerfeldt (1991) 98.

\(^{372}\) *Ep.* 11.
traced back to Augustine, it is necessary to have a brief look at Augustine’s main ideas concerning the ordered love\(^{373}\).

In spite of Augustine’s rather sparing use of the Song of Songs, he did shape one of the important themes of the Song of Songs tradition in Western mysticism, namely the non-erotic theme of the order of love (ordo caritatis) based on the biblical verse *Ordinate in me caritatem* (Sg 2:4)\(^{374}\). Apart from *ordo caritatis*\(^ {375}\), Augustine refers to this theme employing various other expressions such as *ordo amoris*\(^ {376}\), *ordinata dilectio*\(^ {377}\), *caritas ordinata*\(^ {378}\), *amor ordinatus*\(^ {379}\). He summed up his teaching in *De civitate Dei*: “So it seems to me that a short and true definition of virtue is the order of love. This is why in the holy Song of Songs, the bride of Christ, the city of God, sings ‘Order charity in me’\(^ {380}\).

Some of Augustine’s most influential ideas on the order of love are contained in the first book of *De doctrina Christiana*, where he differentiates between “things which are to be enjoyed” (*res...quibus fruendum est*) and “things which are to be used” (*quibus utendum*)\(^ {381}\). The verb *frui* (“to enjoy”) is defined as “clinging to something in love for its own sake”\(^ {382}\). The sense of *uti* (“to use”) is “to apply whatever it may be to the purpose of obtaining what you love - if indeed it is something that ought to be loved”\(^ {383}\). In the light of this distinction, for Augustine *fruitio* designates a type of love according to which something is loved on its own account (*propter se*), while *usus* denotes a form of love according to which the object of love is loved on account of something else (*propter aliquid*). In addition to the basic distinction between things which are to be enjoyed and those which are to be used, Augustine differentiates four possible objects of love, which he enumerates in the following order:

\(^{373}\) There is a large secondary literature on this aspect of Augustine’s teaching of love, see especially Burnaby (1938) 113-141; Holte (1962) 275-281; O’Donovan (1982) 361-397.
\(^{375}\) *b. conjug.* 3.
\(^{376}\) *civ. Dei.* 15.22.
\(^{377}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.2.28; *c. Faust.* 22.28.
\(^{378}\) *ep.* 140.4; *ep.* 243.12.
\(^{379}\) mend. 41.
\(^{380}\) *civ. Dei.* 15.22: …unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis ordo est amoris; propter quod in sancto canticco canticorum cantat sponsa Christi, civitas Dei: ordinatu in me caritatem.
\(^{381}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.3.3.
\(^{382}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.4.4: frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui re propter se.
\(^{383}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.4.4: uti autem, quod in usum venerit ad id quod amas obtinendum referre, si tamen amandum est.
that which is above us (quod supra nos est)
that which we are (quod nos sumus)
that which is close to us (quod iuxta nos est)
that which is below us (quod infra nos est)\textsuperscript{384}

Augustine stresses the idea that the human beings need no commandment (praeceptum) for loving themselves and for loving what is beneath them (i.e. their bodies) since they do this in accordance with the unshakeable law of nature (inconcussa naturae lege)\textsuperscript{385}. Nevertheless they need a commandment for that which is above them (i.e God) and for that which is at the same level with them (i.e. neighbour) and to this purpose they received the commandment contained in the biblical quotation: Diliges Dominum tuum ex toto corde tuo et ex tota anima tua et ex tota mente tua, et diliges proximum tuum tamquam teipsum. In his duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et omnes Prophetae (Mt 22:37-40)\textsuperscript{386}. According to Augustine, God alone is the proper object of enjoyment (fruitio) or of love for his own sake (propter se)\textsuperscript{387}, whereas the neighbour and the self ought to be loved only for the sake of God (propter Deum)\textsuperscript{388}. The love of neighbour and self not on account of God is termed by Augustine cupiditas\textsuperscript{389}. In contrast to cupiditas, he defines caritas as “the movement of the soul which aims at enjoying God for his own sake and the enjoyment of self and neighbour for God’s sake”\textsuperscript{390}. The human being who loves with an adequate love God, the neighbour and the self neither enjoying what ought to be used nor using what ought to be enjoyed is said to possess ordinata dilectio\textsuperscript{391}. Additionally, the ordered love also requires an adequate measure. Therefore “the human being who loves orderly neither loves what he ought not to love, nor fails to love what he

\textsuperscript{384} doc. Chr. 1.23.22.
\textsuperscript{385} Augustine mentions this idea three times, see doc. Chr. 1.23.22; 1.26.27 and 1.35.39.
\textsuperscript{386} doc. Chr. 1.26.27. See Pollmann (1996) 143-146.
\textsuperscript{387} doc. Chr. 1.5.5.
\textsuperscript{388} doc. Chr. 1.22.21.
\textsuperscript{389} doc. Chr. 3.10.16: cupiditatem [voco] autem motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore, non propter Deum.
\textsuperscript{390} doc. Chr. 3.10.16: caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deum propter ipsum et se atque proximum propter Deum. For the same understanding of caritas and cupiditas see Trin. 9.8.13 and s.164.6 O’Donovan has observed that in this definition of love written many years after launching the famous distinction between frui and uti, Augustine uses solely the verb frui both in relation to God and in relation to the self and the neighbour. He argues that the strong instrumental sense of the verb uti made Augustine avoid it in his later writings, although he continued to differentiate between love propter se and love propter aliud. See O’Donovan (1982) 361-397.
\textsuperscript{391} doc. Chr. 1.27.28.
ought to love, nor loves that more which ought to be loved less, nor loves that equally which ought to be loved either less or more, nor loves that more or less which ought to be loved equally."

The same teaching on the order of love is succinctly presented in a passage from the *De Trinitate* where Augustine speaks again of the measure and the type of love due to God, neighbour and self: “Now we do not need let that question worry us about how much love we should expend on our brother, how much on God. On our brother as much as on ourselves; and we love ourselves all the more, the more we love God. So with one and the same charity we love God and neighbour; but God on God’s account, ourselves and neighbour also on God’s account.” It is abundantly clear that for Augustine a perfectly ordered love of self derives solely from the love for God. Only by loving God, the human being is able to love himself and his neighbour properly and orderly. To love one’s self in any different way than with a love for God is rather to hate one’s self. On the other hand to love one’s self with a love for God means to love less what is one’s own (*proprium*) and in this way to cleave more to God.

Finally, in one of his letters Augustine speaks of the Christian perfection as transference of weight from *cupiditas* to *caritas*. If we replace these concepts, which represent the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of the perfection process, in accordance with the definitions given to them by Augustine in the third book of the *De doctrina Christiana*, it is possible to describe the evolution of the Christian soul towards perfection as the transition from love of self not on account of God to love for God on account of God and love of self and neighbour on account of God. But this simple replacement provides us already with three out of four degrees of love outlined by Bernard in the *De diligendo Deo*, as the following schema clearly indicates:

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392 *doc. Chr.* 1.27.28.
393 *Trin.* 8.8.12.
394 *ep.* 155.15; also see *Jo.ev.tr.* 87.1. Burnaby (1938) 121 has pointed out that from the *De moribus ecclesiae* onwards the idea stating that the proper love of self is the love of God becomes a constant of Augustine’s teaching.
395 *Trin.* 12.11.16: *Tanto magis inhaeretur Deo, quanto magis minus diligitur proprium.*
396 *ep.* 157.9.
397 See above, p. 81, n. 390 and n. 391.
Although Bernard does not use explicitly Augustine’s pair of terms frui/uti in his treatise, the above layout shows clearly that the main principle of Bernard’s enumeration is based on Augustine’s definition of these terms as love of an object on its own account (propter se) and love of an object on account of something else (propter aliud). In fact, this claim is confirmed by Bernard himself who sums up the difference between a superior and a subordinate form of love in a way that echoes Augustine’s distinction between fruitio and usus: “Whatever you seem to love because of something else, you do not really love; you really love the end pursued and not that by which it is pursued”\(^{398}\). Furthermore, the above schema enables us to recognise that Bernard’s first degree of love of self for the sake of self corresponds to Augustine’s understanding of cupiditas, while the last two stages of love totally coincide with the two aspects which Augustine’s definition of caritas involves, namely love of God for the sake of God and love of self for the sake of God\(^{399}\).

Other significant similarities with various aspects of Augustine’s doctrine on love present in the description of Bernard’s stages of love may be brought as supplementary

\(^{398}\) *Dil. 7.17: Nam quidquid propter aliud amare videaris, id plane amas, quo amoris finis pertendit, non per quod tendit.*

\(^{399}\) Stiegeman (1995) 183, n. 298 suggests himself Augustine’s Jo. ev. tr. 12.13: *Oportet ut oderis in te opus tuum et ames in te opus Dei* as the source for Bernard’s fourth degree of loving God. However, in my opinion, Bernard’s use of an almost identical terminology as in *doc. Chr. 3.10.16* and *Trin. 8.8.12* recommends rather these texts as more likely sources for Bernard.
evidence in favour of a conspicuous dependence of the abbot of Clairvaux on his predecessor. Thus, in Bernard’s first account of the stages of love sketched out in the letter to the Carthusian monks, he explicitly mentions *cupiditas* as the love of self for its own sake. According to Bernard this is the beginning of love: “since we are carnal and born of concupiscence of the flesh, our cupidity or love must begin with the flesh.” Some commentators reading Bernard from a scholastic perspective on nature and grace and totally neglecting his links with the previous theological tradition (i.e. Augustine) have reproached him for beginning the ascent to God from carnal love (*amor carnalis*) or self love, which in their opinion belongs to nature alone. Delfgaauw has convincingly refuted these positions pointing out that for Bernard there is not such a thing as “pure nature” and that nature includes necessarily grace. The inability of these scholars to perceive how the carnal love of the human being for himself may ever turn *recto ordine* toward God is also due to the narrow meaning they attributed to self-love, which is defined solely in terms of egoistic love. However, exactly like Augustine, Bernard has a more nuanced understanding of the concept of self-love, whose sense is not limited to one single meaning. With regard to Augustine, Burnaby singled out three main meanings of the term self-love: “the first natural and morally neutral, the second morally wrong and the third morally right.” The first sense corresponds to what Burnaby names the instinct of self-preservation, according to which the human being does not need any commandment in order to love himself. The human being loves himself in the second sense when he incorrectly assumes to be pursuing his own advantage. Finally, the proper self-love that merits to be so called in Augustine’s view is the love of God.

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400 *Dil.* 15.39.
401 *Dil.* 15.39: *quia carnales sumus et de carnis concupiscentia nascimur, necesse est cupiditas vel amor noster a carne incipiatur.*
402 Pourrat (1928) 2:47-48; Rousselot (1908) 52.
403 Delfgaauw (1953) 238 points out that the metaphysical distinction between nature and grace in terms of natural and supernatural virtue is not present in the twelfth century, being developed only a century later by scholastic theologians.
404 *Dil.* 8.23.
405 Delfgaauw (1953) 238.
406 The expression belongs to Bernard, see *Dil.* 15.39.
407 Burnaby (1938) 118.
409 *s.* 96.2; *ep.* 118.15; *Gn. litt.* 11.18. See Burnaby (1938) 118-121.
410 *ep.* 155.15; *Trin.* 8.8.12; 12.11.16. See Burnaby (1938) 121-126.
It is not difficult to discern the same meanings of self-love in Bernard. In his description of the first degree of love, Bernard speaks of the carnal love (amor carnalis) by which the human being loves himself ante omnia, for his own sake (propter se) and observes that this love is not given by any commandment, but it is planted in the human nature\(^{411}\). Bernard’s terminology may easily mislead the readers, but the larger context makes it clear that he refers here to self-love in a neutral sense. As such, self-love represents the beginning of love and it may be said that it is already ordered, since it constitutes the first degree of loving God. Gilson\(^{412}\) found a text in Augustine, which may have helped Bernard in his understanding of self-love as the norm of every other love: “Therefore the love of each one begins with love of one’s self and it cannot begin in any different way but with love of self, for nobody is reminded to love the self”\(^{413}\). A last important aspect of the self-love understood in a natural and neutral sense, is that it is the result of that grace which is, as Bernard puts it, “inserted into nature”\(^{414}\).

Bernard warns that self-love should not turn towards sensual delights and that it should guard itself from carnal desires which war against the soul\(^{415}\). Failure to do so would result in a disordered love, which would also be deprived of the assistance of grace and which would find it impossible to turn in any way towards God. This is self-love understood in what Burnaby calls “the morally wrong sense”. Those commentators who have reproached Bernard for having placed the carnal love at the beginning of the ascent towards God have also failed to see the difference between the ordered self-love which is the result of gratia creans and the disordered self-love which is the result of the soul’s own will, supposing that he started his ascent to God from the latter rather than the first.

Finally, at the highest level of the loving ascent towards God, Bernard places the love of self for the sake of God. By claiming that this is a stage which is largely reserved for the hereafter and that in this life only a few privileged souls are rarely and briefly granted the experience of this type of love, Bernard takes the discussion to a level which

\(^{411}\) Dil. 8.23: Nec praecetto indicitur, sed naturae inseritur.

\(^{412}\) Gilson (1940) 221, n. 24. Although Gilson doubts the authenticity of this sermon, he supposes that Bernard would have read it as having been written by Augustine.

\(^{413}\) s. 368.4: Ergo dilectio uniciuitque a se incipit et non potest nisi a se incipere, et nemo monetur ut se diligat.

\(^{414}\) Dil. 8.23: quae [sc. gratia] naturae insita est. See above the important distinction between gratia creans and gratia salvans, p. 46.

\(^{415}\) Dil. 8.23.
is not present in Augustine. While there is agreement between Augustine and Bernard that the perfect love of self is solely the one on account of God (*propter Deum*)\(^{416}\), Augustine deals with this concept predominantly at a moral level\(^{417}\), but also at an eschatological level\(^{418}\). Bernard on the other hand discusses the realisation of the love of self on account of God in a clearly developed mystical context where he also adopts Augustine’s eschatological ideas.

Turning our attention to other passages from Bernard’s works where he deals with *ordinatio caritatis*, it is possible to discern further similarities with Augustine’s ideas on the order of love presented in the *De doctrina Christiana*. Thus, in one of his *Sermones de Diversis*, Bernard provides a brief definition of the ordered love (*amor purgatus*) which seems directly inspired by Augustine’s view on *ordinata dilectio*: “If we love the things that should be loved, if we love more the things that should be loved more, and if we do not love the things that should not be loved, love will be purged”\(^{419}\).

Bernard also makes use of the pair *uti* / *frui* in a passage from another sermon where he speaks of the ordered love (*amor ordinatus*) as the discernment between the things which are to be used (*utenda*) and those which are to be enjoyed (*fruenda*)\(^{420}\), which shows clearly that he was familiar with Augustine’s distinction.

Before concluding this section it is worth mentioning Bernard’s original use of Augustine’s quadripartite division of the objects of love\(^{421}\), although, unlike his predecessor, he does not discuss it in the context of *ordinatio caritatis*. As this division was popular among medieval authors, it is thought that Bernard did not borrow it directly from Augustine, but from an intermediary source, namely a ninth-century commentator of the Rule of Saint Benedict named Hildemar\(^{422}\). However, Bernard’s use of Augustine’s scheme remains unique in the Middle Ages, since he does not merely quote it like the other authors, but structures his entire treatise *De consideratione* around it. While the

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\(^{416}\) *Dil.* 10.33; For Augustine see *doc. Chr.* 3.10.16; *Trin.* 8.8.12.
\(^{417}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.22.21. See also Burnaby (1938) 118.
\(^{419}\) *Div.* 50.2: *Si amamus quae amanda sunt, si magis amamus quae magis amanda sunt, si non amamus quae amanda non sunt, amor purgatus erit.*
\(^{420}\) *SC.* 50.8.
\(^{421}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.23.22.
other medieval authors continue to speak, like Augustine, of four types of objects of love, Bernard speaks of objects in general and transfers the whole discussion to an epistemological context. Moreover, he alters the order of the objects enumerated by Augustine so that they match his contemplative method. Thus, while Augustine’s classification begins with the objects which are above the self and finishes with those which are below, Bernard begins from the self and ascends to what is above the self:

Bernard:

- *te*
- *quod sub te est*
- *quod circa te est*
- *quod supra te est*

Augustine:

- *quod supra nos est*
- *quod nos sumus*
- *quod iuxta nos est*
- *quod infra nos est*

This ascending order suggested by Bernard corresponds to his view of the mystical life, which has its beginnings in self-knowledge and ends with the knowledge of what is above, that is *contemplatio*.

On the basis of the evidence presented and discussed so far, it is possible to conclude that Bernard developed his view on *ordinatio caritatis* by drawing inspiration from a multitude of aspects involved in Augustine’s discussion on the crucial distinction between *uti* and *frui*. Most importantly, the starting point for Bernard’s best-known map of the stages of the order of love is represented by the definitions of *cupiditas* and *caritas* given by Augustine in the *De doctrina Christiana*. Stiegman referred to Bernard’s fourfold loving ascent as the result of “an intensely analytic effort”\(^423\). In my opinion, it is rather the result of an intensely synthetic effort, since most of the elements of the edifice already exist in Augustine, but it is Bernard’s merit to have brought them together and presented them in a way, which does not merely repeat but harmoniously complement and enrich what his predecessor has taught.

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Chapter 3: The Soul’s Direct Encounter with God

Bernard speaks often of the soul’s encounter with God in this life treating the subject from a variety of perspectives, which render his vocabulary of the mystical encounter extremely complex. So far, we have had the possibility to touch upon Bernard’s views on the soul’s encounter with God when speaking of the third degree of freedom or liberum complacitum in the De gratia et libero arbitrio\(^{424}\) and of the fourth degree of love in the De diligendo Deo\(^{425}\). In the Sermones super Cantica Canticorum the relationship between soul and God is depicted in metaphorical terms as the relationship between the bride and the bridegroom. In this context, the highest type of love that the soul may experience is that of marital love\(^{426}\), while the direct encounter of the soul as bride and of the divine Word as Bridegroom is expressed by using the erotic images of the “kiss of the mouth” (osculum de osculo)\(^{427}\) and of the “embrace” (amplexus\(^{428}\), complexus\(^{429}\)). Furthermore, the most ardent desire of the loving soul is to become unus spiritus (1 Cor 6:17)\(^{430}\) with its divine lover. The experience of the marital love involves rapture (ecstasis, excessus)\(^{431}\) and is identified both with the contemplation and vision of God. The majority of these terms (except perhaps for liberum complacitum\(^{432}\)) are not specific to Bernard but are deeply rooted in the Western mystical tradition\(^{433}\). Since unlike Bernard, Augustine was reluctant to employ erotic images from the Song of Songs in order to describe the soul’s experience of God, the following investigation will deal with those terms, which occur in Augustine’s works, such as contemplatio, ecstasis, excessus, visio Dei, or with terms such as unitas spiritus, which, although not used by Augustine in a mystical context, have been redefined in the twelfth century with the help of Augustine’s theology.

\(^{424}\) Gra. 5.15.
\(^{425}\) Dil. 10.33.
\(^{426}\) SC. 61.1; SC. 83.3; SC. 85.13.
\(^{427}\) SC. 3.5-6.
\(^{428}\) SC. 12.11. The most important treatment of the erotic image of the embrace is to be found in SC. 52.2 where Bernard depicts the soul sleeping in the arms of the Bridegroom (inter brachia propria dormientem).
\(^{429}\) SC. 83.3.
\(^{430}\) For a detailed discussion of this aspect see below, pp. 95-103.
\(^{431}\) SC. 52.3-4.
\(^{432}\) See above, pp. 43-44 and n. 162.
\(^{433}\) Leclercq (1963).
1. *Contemplatio, Ecstasis and Visio Dei*

One of the most distinctive elements of Augustine’s contemplative narratives is his use of the threefold Plotinian pattern of the ascent of the soul to God, which involves in the first place an withdrawal from the physical world, followed by an inward movement into the depths of the soul and which reaches its climax in an ascending movement beyond or above *mens* to the vision of God\(^\text{434}\). It is precisely the Plotinian element present in these narratives, which has determined modern scholars to interpret Augustine’s ascent of the soul to God in *intellectual* terms\(^\text{435}\). Moreover it has been observed that apart from being read as mystical narratives, it is also possible to interpret these passages as containing the stages of Augustine’s investigation of knowledge represented by bodies, sensation, inner sense, judgment, pure thought, intuition\(^\text{436}\). As such, Augustine’s approach to the contemplative experience has been labeled as *intellectualist*\(^\text{437}\) and sharply contrasted with Bernard’s approach to contemplation full of passionate intensity and ardent love\(^\text{438}\).

Bernard’s accounts of the contemplative experience do not make any use of the triple pattern of the soul’s ascent to God, which is so frequent in Augustine. Nevertheless, the two approaches share more than one similarity. Both describe the contemplative experience as an extraordinary transcendental event for the soul\(^\text{439}\), totally ineffable\(^\text{440}\) and which takes place interiorly\(^\text{441}\). Granted by divine grace\(^\text{442}\) extremely rarely and only for a brief moment\(^\text{443}\) to only a few of the more perfect souls\(^\text{444}\), the contemplative

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\(^{434}\) *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 7.17.23; *conf.* 9.10.24-25; the famous search of the soul for God in *conf.* 10; *en. Ps.* 41.7-10; s. 52.6.16-17; *ev. Jo. tr.* 20.2.11-12. P. Henry (1938) was the first to indicate with exactitude that in his accounts of the mystical experience from the *Confessiones*, Augustine is strongly influenced by Plotinus. The Plotinian influence on these texts from the *Confessiones* has been subject to intense scholarly scrutiny. See especially Mandouze (1954) 1:67-84; Courcelle (1968) 157-167; Sorabji (1983) 157-171; O’Donnell (1992) 2:434-446, 454-459, 471-475 and (1992) 3:122-137; Kenney (2005). For Augustine’s use of the threefold Plotinian ascent of the soul to God in his sermons see Poque (1975) 187-215.

\(^{435}\) Bonner (1963) 83; Sorabji (1983) 170.

\(^{436}\) Carré (1944) 7-8; Bonner (1963) 84 and (1982) 148-149.


\(^{439}\) *SC.* 52.4. *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 7.17.23; *conf.* 9.10.24-25.


\(^{441}\) *SC.* 31.4; *SC.* 31.6. *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 1.17.23; *conf.* 9.10.24-25.

\(^{442}\) *Hum.* 8.22; *SC.* 52.5; *SC.* 8.6; *SC.* 69.2. *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 1.17.23; *conf.* 9.10.24-25.

\(^{443}\) *Csi.* 5.14.32; *SC.* 23.15; *SC.* 85.13. *conf.* 7.10.16; *conf.* 1.17.23; *conf.* 9.10.24-25.

\(^{444}\) *SC.* 4.1. *quant.* 33.76; *Gn. litt.* 12.27.55; *ep.* 147.32.
experience in this life is nothing else than a foretaste of the happiness which will be enjoyed in the life to come\textsuperscript{445}. Although only a few souls are granted the direct experience of God, both Augustine and Bernard were confident that each human being was created with the capacity of and tendency towards God. As such their message on contemplation envisages universal possibilities\textsuperscript{446}.

Bernard’s emphasis in his accounts of the contemplative experience tends to fall overwhelmingly on the affective side of the mystical experience, so that a fragmentary reading of these texts outside their theological context may easily lead to the conclusion that he is an “affective” mystic, in the worst possible sense, which takes the affectus or affectiones to refer solely to “feelings” and separates them from their ontological and volitional ground. These labels apart from being inaccurate are also reductionist and fail to accommodate texts such as Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 49, where Bernard explicitly speaks of the contemplation which involves two forms of ecstasy, one in intellectu, the other in affectu\textsuperscript{447}. They also seem to disregard Bernard’s approach to contemplatio in his treatise De consideratione, where he deals with the concept from an epistemological perspective. Comparing it with consideration, he defines the latter as “the thought searching intensively for the truth or the stretching out of the soul in the search for truth”\textsuperscript{448}, while contemplation is defined as “the true and certain sight of the soul about something or the apprehension beyond doubt of reality”\textsuperscript{449}.

In a series of articles dedicated to Bernard’s mysticism, John R. Sommerfeldt succeeded in demonstrating what he calls the “epistemological value” of Bernard’s mystical thought\textsuperscript{450}. In the contemplative experience the soul is not only filled with love, but also filled with knowledge: “And the knowledge she [sic!] receives is on a truly cosmic scale. Not only are the nature of reality and the reality of nature known in

\textsuperscript{445} Hum. 2.4. conf. 10.40.65.
\textsuperscript{446} ep. 120.1.4. McGinn (1992) 238 emphasises the universality of Augustine’s message on contemplation, by pointing out that many of his sermons deal with the subject, demonstrating that contemplation was by no means meant solely for a spiritual elite. See also Casey (1988) 199-200 for a discussion of the same aspect in Bernard.
\textsuperscript{447} SC. 49.1: \textit{Cum enim duae sint beatae contemplationis excessus, in intellectu unus et alter in affectu}. See also Asc. 3.2.
\textsuperscript{448} CSI. 2.2.5: \textit{intensa ad investigandum cogitatio, vel intentio animi vestigantis verum}.
\textsuperscript{449} CSI. 2.2.5: \textit{verus certusque intuitus animi de quacunque re, sive apprehensio veri non dubia}.
contemplation, the right ordering of things, justice, is open to the contemplative gaze.\footnote{Sommerfeldt (1992) 81. See SC. 23.11; OS. 4.4 and Par. 2.4.} In his descriptions of contemplative experience Bernard does not neglect knowledge but ties it up with love like in the following example: “For the favor of the kiss bears with it a twofold gift at the same time: the light of knowledge and the fervor of devotion… So let the bride, about to receive the twofold grace of this most holy kiss, set her two lips in readiness, her reason for the gift of knowledge, her will for that of wisdom.”\footnote{McGinn (1992) 233-243 and 258-262. See also Teselle (1984) 28-30, who highlights the role of the affections for Augustine’s mysticism, bringing evidence from the mystical accounts of the Confessiones, Augustine’s commentary on the First Epistle of St. John and Book VIII of the De Trinitate.}

On the other hand, Bernard McGinn in his examination of Augustine’s famous contemplative accounts from the Confessiones, has pointed out that they do not totally overlook the role of love in the experience of God.\footnote{McGinn (1992) 235.} Apart from the vision of Milan, which mentioned in passing that love knows the vision (caritas novit eam)\footnote{conf. 9.10.24: erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in idipsum.} he observes that the Ostia account is “pervaded by language of affective intention”\footnote{conf. 9.10.24: attigimus eum modice toto ictu cordis.}, calling the attention of the reader to phrases such as: “raising ourselves up by a more burning affection to the Self-Same [i.e. God]”\footnote{conf. 9.10.25: sed ipsum quem in his amamus, ipsum sine his audiamus.}; “we touched her [i.e. Wisdom] slightly with the whole beat of the heart”\footnote{conf. 9.10.25.}; “that we may hear him whom we love in these creatures, though without their interference”\footnote{conf. 7.10.16.}. As Augustine describes the mystical experience both as an ictus cordis and as a rapida cogitatio\footnote{McGinn (1992) 235.}, the conclusion drawn by McGinn is that in Augustine’s mystical consciousness love and knowledge are closely intertwined.\footnote{McGinn (1992) 235.}

In the light of this evidence it is difficult to accept those scholarly views, which oppose Augustine to Bernard, claiming that the former is an intellectual mystic why the latter is an affective mystic. The categories of “intellectual” and “affective” mysticism are inadequate for these two authors, whose extremely rich mystical thought defies any sort of narrow labeling.

\footnote{Sommerfeldt (1992) 81. See SC. 23.11; OS. 4.4 and Par. 2.4.}
\footnote{McGinn (1992) 233-243 and 258-262. See also Teselle (1984) 28-30, who highlights the role of the affections for Augustine’s mysticism, bringing evidence from the mystical accounts of the Confessiones, Augustine’s commentary on the First Epistle of St. John and Book VIII of the De Trinitate.}
\footnote{conf. 9.10.24: erigentes nos ardentiore affectu in idipsum.}
\footnote{conf. 9.10.24: attigimus eum modice toto ictu cordis.}
\footnote{conf. 9.10.25: sed ipsum quem in his amamus, ipsum sine his audiamus.}
\footnote{conf. 9.10.25.}

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Both for Augustine and Bernard contemplation involves rapture, being an ecstatic experience (*ecstasis, excessus*). Gilson\(^{461}\) claimed that the presence of the term *excessus* in Bernard must be due to his reading of a passage from the *Ambigua* 2 of Maximus the Confessor in the translation of Eriugena. This contains apart from the term *excessus* two other ideas, which seem to have been used by Bernard in his description of the fourth degree of love in the *De diligendo Deo*\(^{462}\). First the image of air illuminated by light and that of iron totally melted by fire, but which continue to remain air and iron respectively\(^{463}\). The second element is the concept of deification\(^{464}\). Indeed Bernard seems to follow Maximus when he describes the direct contact of the loving soul with God using the image of iron, which becomes like fire and of air, which seems transformed into sunshine during a sunny day\(^{465}\). But he adds another image, which Maximus does not mention and which is that of the drop of water disappearing in a great quantity of wine\(^{466}\). Gilson may be correct in his assumption that Bernard’s famous definition of deification, *sic affici deificari est* (“to be affected like that is to be deified”)\(^{467}\) is the result of his reading of Maximus the Confessor. But, one has to remark that although rare the term *deificari* and some of its derivates occur in Augustine’s works as well\(^{468}\). Bernard himself uses the term explicitly only in two occasions, without further development of the subject\(^{469}\).

The term *excessus* is not to be found in this passage from the *De diligendo Deo*. Bernard uses this term as well as its Greek correspondent *ecstasis* throughout his works, but it does not necessarily mean that his extensive use may be explained by his reading of an isolated work of Maximus the Confessor. More recent scholars\(^{470}\) have refuted Gilson’s claim and they have turned to the Bible, Augustine and the subsequent Western tradition in order to find the source for Bernard’s use of this term. McGinn has shown

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\(^{461}\) Gilson (1940) 26-27.
\(^{462}\) *Dil.* 10.28.
\(^{463}\) *Ambigua* 2. PL. 122:1202B.
\(^{464}\) *Ambigua* 2. PL. 122:1202D.
\(^{465}\) *Dil.* 10.28.
\(^{466}\) *Dil.* 10.28.
\(^{467}\) *Dil.* 10.28.
\(^{468}\) *Dil.* 10.28; *Asspt.* 1.
\(^{469}\) On Augustine’s view on deification see Capanaga (1954) 2:745-754; Folliet (1962) 225-236; Bonner (1986) 369-386.
that there are a staggering number of occurrences of the terms *ecstasis, excessus* and the verbal form *exedere* in Augustine’s works\(^{471}\). Augustine defined *ecstasis* as that which occurs “when the soul’s intention is completely turned away or snatched from the body’s senses”\(^{472}\). He equated this state in which the soul is totally detached from the life of the senses with a temporary death. This allowed Augustine to reconcile a number of biblical passages, which offered conflicting testimony regarding the possibility of seeing God in this life\(^{473}\).

Bernard agrees with Augustine in his understanding of *ecstasis* as a form of death, when he affirms that: “It is not absurd for me to call the bride’s ecstasy a death then, but one that snatches away not from life but from life’s snares”\(^{474}\). According to Bernard, in the ecstatic state the soul is “snatched away from itself by a holy and vehement thought so that it surpasses the common use and the custom of thinking”\(^{475}\). In addition, like Augustine, Bernard speaks of a total separation of the soul from the corporeal life connected to the senses\(^{476}\).

Further similarities between the two authors may be observed in their treatment of another important aspect of the mystical experience, the vision of God. In Augustine’s thought the perfect vision of God is equated with perfect likeness\(^{477}\), and reserved for the life after resurrection. Only the nature of the resurrected body does not conflict with the soul, since it is no longer prone to concupiscence, which is considered the main obstacle for the soul’s persistence in its full experience of God\(^{478}\). In this life a few perfect souls may be granted rarely and briefly glimpses of God’s substance, but their weakness will make impossible for them to enjoy an enduring vision of God. Perfect vision is also equated with love\(^{479}\), which by growing and perfecting itself restores the likeness of the

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\(^{471}\) McGinn (1992) 417, n. 134 and n. 135 has indicated eighty-seven occurrences of the term *ecstasis*, sixty-three appearances of the term *excessus* and sixty-nine appearances of the term *exedere* in Augustine’s writings.

\(^{472}\) *Gn. litt.* 12.12.25: *quando… penitus avertitur atque abripitur animi intentio a sensibus corporis.*

\(^{473}\) *Gn. litt.* 12.12.55; *ep.* 147.13.31.

\(^{474}\) *SC.* 52.2: *Proinde et ego non absurde sponsae extasim dixerim morte, quae tamen non vita, sed vitae eripiat laqueis.*

\(^{475}\) *SC.* 52.4: *…quotiens sancta aliqua et vehementi cogitatione anima a seipsa abripitur (…) ut hunc communem transscendat usum et consuetudine cogitandi.*

\(^{476}\) *SC.* 52.4.

\(^{477}\) *Trin.* 14.17.23: *In hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit Dei similitudo, quando Dei perfecta erit visio.*

\(^{478}\) *ench.* 23; *f. et symb.* 24; *civ. Dei.* 22.19-21.

\(^{479}\) *sol.* 1.7.14; *doc. Chr.* 1.38.42.
soul to God\footnote{ep. 92.3.}. In a passage from his famous letter on seeing God, Augustine identifies vision with love as follows: “The Lord is Spirit and so whoever adheres to the Lord is one spirit with him. Hence the person who is able to see God invisibly can adhere to God incorporeally\footnote{ep. 147.15.37: \textit{Dominus enim spiritus est: unde qui adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est. Proinde qui potest Deum invisibiliter videre, ipse Deo potest incorporaliter adhaerere.}}\footnote{SC. 7.7: \textit{Neque enim aliud est inhaerere Deo, quum videre Deum; quod solis mundicordibus singulari felicitate donatur (…) Mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est. Videndo adhaerebat, et adhaerendo videbat.}}\footnote{SC. 82.8.}.

Bernard uses exactly the same language of “adherence” in order to refer to the vision of God:

This adherence to God is nothing else than that vision of God granted as a unique favor only to the pure in heart (…) It is good for me to cling to God. He adhered by seeing and saw by adhering\footnote{Dil. 10.30.}.

Bernard speaks of the equivalence of vision, love and likeness in the \textit{Sermo super Cantica Canticorum} 82:

Totally admirable and wonderful is that likeness which goes with the vision of God, which indeed is the vision of God. I say it takes place in charity: charity is that vision and that likeness (…) When that which is perfect comes, what is partial will be destroyed; there will be chaste consummated love one for the other, full knowledge, manifest vision, firm joining together, indivisible society, perfect likeness\footnote{SC. 82.8.}.

While Augustine considers that the perfect vision and likeness are attainable only in the resurrected body, Bernard argues similarly that the fullness of love is reserved for the state awaiting the souls after the resurrection of the body\footnote{Dil. 10.30. The term \textit{proprium} derives from Augustine, see above, p. 82, n. 396.}\footnote{Gn. litt. 12.6.15-7.16.}. Only the resurrected body lacks the \textit{proprium} or the concupiscence, which does not allow in this life or in the life after death the soul to love God perfectly.

Finally, Bernard seems to have been acquainted with yet another aspect of Augustine’s teaching on the vision of God, namely his discussion of the three types of vision from the \textit{De Genesi ad litteram}\footnote{Gn. litt. 12.6.15-7.16.}. In this work, Augustine distinguishes between three kinds of visions: corporeal, spiritual and intellectual. The corporeal vision deals
with objects, which are present to the senses. The spiritual vision deals with objects, which are absent from the senses but present in memory or in imagination. Finally, the highest and most excellent vision is that which does not act by way of images and it is described by Augustine as “an intuition of the mind”. Bernard seems to follow this pattern in his most detailed account on the types of vision, which is to be found especially in *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 31*. Here Bernard speaks of three fundamental ways of seeing God in this life. The first kind of vision is accessible to all and is best defined by the Apostle Paul: “The invisible attributes of God have been clearly perceived in the things that have been made” (Rom 1:20). Another kind of vision is not apparent to everybody, takes place externally through images or spoken words and this was the way in which God showed himself in the days of the Patriarchs. Finally the highest kind of vision takes place interiorly when God deigns himself to visit the soul. Concerning the third kind of vision, which he also calls union, Bernard warns that it must not be concluded that it is possible to see something corporeal or perceptible to the senses. It is a completely spiritual vision in accordance with the words of the apostle Paul: “The one who cleaves to the Lord becomes one spirit with him” (1 Cor 6:17).

### 2. *Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est* (*1 Cor 6:17*)

Apart from using several terms pertaining to the traditional contemplative vocabulary, Bernard also described the direct encounter of the soul with God in terms of union. The Pauline verse 1 Cor 6:17 *Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est* (“The one who cleaves to the Lord is one spirit [with him]”) served as the scriptural basis for the development of Bernard’s views on the subject. It has been observed that the concept of union is a new element in twelfth century Western mysticism, not having been used previously in order to describe the soul’s immediate contact with God. The most important authors for Latin mysticism such as Augustine, Cassian or Gregory the Great

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487 SC. 31.3-4.
488 SC. 31.6.
489 A large portion of the material contained in this section in a slightly altered form has been published in a recent article, see Cvetković (2009) 192-205.
490 In quoting 1 Cor 6:17, Bernard frequently replaces *Domino* with *Deo*, probably under the influence of Ps 72:28 Mihi, autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est. See Casey (1988) 201, n. 23.
did not pay attention in their works to the union of the soul with God. With regard to Augustine, there has been an attempt to demonstrate that although he does not employ the term explicitly, there are, however, some passages in his writings that express this idea. More recently Bernard McGinn has questioned this claim, pointing out that it is not the language of union that Augustine uses for his descriptions of the immediate experience of the divine presence, but the language of vision, touching (attingere) and in particular that of clinging and cleaving to (adhaerere), embracing and sticking to (agglutinare) God.

The widespread interest in the union of the soul with God noticeable in the Latin West of the twelfth century has been partially explained on the basis of the nascent influence of some Greek patristic sources, especially the De mystica theologia of Denys the Areopagite and a number of texts of Maximus the Confessor available in Eriugena’s Latin translation. While the writings of these Greek authors might have facilitated the addition of the new concept of union to the list of traditional terms forming the Latin contemplative vocabulary, they had a rather insignificant impact on the content of Bernard’s teaching on the union of the soul with God. Consequently, in examining the way in which Bernard deals with this notion, one cannot totally disregard the role played by some more likely Latin patristic sources. In the following pages I attempt to present the way in which, by elaborating the theology of a new concept, Bernard turns again to Augustine, using as source of inspiration the bishop’s exegesis of 1 Cor 6:17.

Augustine quotes 1 Cor 6:17 frequently throughout his career. In a small number of occurrences it is coupled with the precedent Pauline verse 1 Cor 6:16 Qui adhaeret meretrici unum corpus efficitur (“He who is joined to the harlot becomes one body”) in order to underline the contrast between the life of virtue on the one hand and fornication and lust on the other. However, a significant number of times 1 Cor 6:17 is yoked with Jn 10:30 Ego et Pater unum sumus (“I and the Father are one”). Thus, the biblical texts offer

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492 Butler (1923) 62-64. He quotes conf. 9.10.25; s. 52.16; c. Faust. 22.42; 22.54.
493 McGinn (1987) 8; (1992) 253. He acknowledges however, that Augustine speaks of being one with God in heaven in en. Ps. 36 s. 1.12.
495 For the influence of Denys and Maximus on Bernard p. 12, n. 8. Bernard might have known Maximus since he uses two metaphors in his description of the highest degree of love, which corresponds to the state of unitas spiritus. However, apart from these metaphors there is no substantial evidence that he uses Maximus in developing this subject, see the discussion above, p. 92. For the influence of Greek authors on William see below, pp. 107-115.
a solid basis for the distinction between the summit of the virtuous life represented by the union of the human soul with God and the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son.

One of Augustine’s most important texts discussing the latter distinction is to be found in the De Trinitate. In Book VI, speaking of the unity between the Father and the Son, Augustine argues that solely in their case it is possible to assert that they are “one” (unum). For this claim, he adduces as biblical evidence the Johannine quotation “I and the Father are one” (Jn 10:30). In Augustine’s view two things are “one” only “by way of being, not by way of relationship”496. Moreover, when several things are described in Scripture as “one” without further specification, the “one” refers to the “sameness of nature and being without variance or disagreement”497. When a specification is added to “one”, the united things must be understood as having different natures498. When he speaks of nature or substance, Augustine does not have a fixed terminology. He uses as synonyms the terms natura, essentia and substantia, without any intention of making a rigorous distinction between these concepts.

Then he illustrates the distinction between unum and unus spiritus with two biblical passages. When Paul says that “He who is joined to the harlot becomes one body” (1 Cor 6:16), according to Augustine, Paul adds the word corpus so as to make it clear that they are not “one”, which would imply the same nature or substance. Unum corpus renders the idea that it is “one body composed by being joined together of two different bodies, masculine and feminine”499. Augustine claims that the Pauline verse that follows, that is Qui adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est, must be understood in the same way. Again the apostle does not say unum, an expression reserved only for the union of the same natures, because “the spirit of God and the spirit of the human being are different in nature, but by being joined (inhaerendo) they become (fit) one spirit of two different spirits, so that the spirit of God is blessed and perfect without the human spirit, but the spirit of the human being cannot be blessed without God”500. Therefore, unum represents the union between the Father and the Son who are consubstantial while unus spiritus represents the union of different natures between the spirit of God and the human

496 Trin. 6.2.3: Secundum essentiam, non secundum relativum.
497 Trin. 6.3.4: Eadem natura atque essentia non dissidens neque dissentiens.
498 Trin. 6.3.4.
499 Trin. 6.3.4.
500 Trin. 6.3.4.
spirit. In addition, when describing how the human soul becomes one spirit with God, Augustine uses the verb *fieri* (“to become”), thus suggesting that this union only begins in time, and is thus different from the eternal union (*aeterna connexio*)\(^{501}\) existing within the Trinity.

Augustine also adds that the Father and the Son are not only ‘one’ but also ‘one God’, *unus Deus*\(^{502}\), thus making it plain that he is addressing potential Arian readers, who understood the expression *unus Deus* as referring to the Father alone. The Arians were mentioned at the beginning of Book VI, and it is certain that Augustine develops this interpretation having them in mind\(^{503}\). In fact, Augustine returns to the distinction between *unum* and *unus spiritus* based on Jn 10:30 and 1 Cor 6:17 in two of his late works directed against the Arian bishop Maximinus, namely the *Conlatio cum Maximino episcopo Arianorum*\(^{504}\) and the *Contra Maximinum Arianum*\(^{505}\). These texts contain no significant changes of the exegesis presented in the *De Trinitate*. They only make more explicit the fact that the Arians did not interpret differently Jn 10:30 and 1 Cor 6:17, and that they described the unity between the Father and the Son as a *unitas voluntatis* and not as a unity of essence. In light of these observations, it appears clearly that Augustine’s distinction between *unum* (i.e. unity of the same essence) and *unus spiritus* (i.e. the union of different essences) was supposed to constitute a refutation of the Arian views on the type of union existing within the Trinity. Augustine’s intention to refute the Arian position also explains why he discusses the unity of essence in more depth, while paying no particular attention to the union between the soul and God.

On the very rare occasions when he turns his attention to this aspect, Augustine asserts that the human being and God become *unus spiritus*, “by a union in which the soul

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\(^{501}\) *Trin*. 6.4.6.  
\(^{502}\) *Trin*. 6.3.4.  
\(^{503}\) It has been claimed that Augustine’s references to Arians in his *De Trinitate* are nothing else than a literary artifice. However M. R. Barnes and Lewis Ayres convincingly demonstrated the authentic polemical dimension of the treatise, showing that the bishop of Hippo wrote against a specific group of Arians, named Homoians. See Barnes (1993) 185-195; (1999) 43-52; Ayres (2000) 63-37. The Homoian theologians accepted that the Son is “like” (*homoios*) the Father but not with regard to his substance. Although they spoke of the God Son, the “one God” is only the Father. On Homoian theology see Hanson (1988) 562-572.  
\(^{504}\) *conl. Max*. 14.  
\(^{505}\) *c. Max*. 1.10.
cleaves to God\textsuperscript{506} and he briefly describes this union, using a sequence of biblical quotations:

\ldots with him we are one spirit (1 Cor 6:17), because our soul is glued on behind him (Ps 62:9). And for us it is good to cling to God (Ps 72:28)\textsuperscript{507}.

Apart from 1 Cor 6:17, Augustine quotes the Psalm 62:9 in a form which is unique to him, using the verb \textit{agglutinare} instead of \textit{adhaerere}\textsuperscript{508}. Augustine used this psalm as biblical support for the development of a minor but not insignificant theme in his thought, that of \textit{gluten caritatis} (\textquotedblleft the glue of love\textquotedblright)\textsuperscript{509}, and he also applied it to the soul\textrsquo;s yearning for God\textsuperscript{510}. The last biblical quotation is a fragment of one of Augustine\textrsquo;s favourite Psalm texts: \textit{Mihi, autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est} (Ps. 72:28). Quoted often in contexts in which Augustine speaks of the vision of God\textsuperscript{511}, this psalm is also used in a philosophical context in order to biblically justify the concept of participation of human beings in God\textsuperscript{512}. In the passage quoted above, it may therefore implicitly suggest the fact that unlike the consubstantial unity of the divine persons, the soul is united with God only by participation.

Against this background, it is obvious that Augustine\textrsquo;s interpretation of 1 Cor 6:17 was shaped by his polemic with the Arians, where he strongly affirms the Nicene orthodox position of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, and the fact that the Trinity is \textit{unus Deus}. With regard to the notion of the union of the soul with God, the passages discussed so far seem to contradict those scholarly views which maintain that Augustine did not know this concept. Although he does not use like the later mystics the term \textit{unio} or the language of union, the notion of the soul\textrsquo;s union with God is clearly expressed in these passages, being termed biblically \textit{unus spiritus}. Augustine refers to it as a union of different substances, thus carefully preserving the ontological gap between the human nature and the divine nature and underlining their distinction even in their union. He developed the distinction between \textit{unum} and \textit{unus spiritus} not in order to look

\textsuperscript{506} c. Max. 1.10; \textit{per copulationem qua homo adhaeret Domino}.

\textsuperscript{507} \textit{Trin.} 6.5.7. These are not integral quotations, but it is not unusual for Augustine to adapt the biblical verses to his own style.

\textsuperscript{508} Lienhardt (1993) 379.

\textsuperscript{509} \textit{en. Ps.} 62.17-18.

\textsuperscript{510} See also Lienhardt (1993) 379.

\textsuperscript{511} \textit{en. Ps.} 43.2; \textit{en. Ps.} 72.34; \textit{en. Ps.} 104.3.

\textsuperscript{512} \textit{en. Ps.} 118.16.
in a systematic way at the difference between the two types of union, but in order to refute the Arian heretical claims that the Father and the Son do not share the same essence and that they are not one God. Therefore, Augustine’s main interest in elaborating this interpretation was to define the inter-Trinitarian relationships which at that time constituted the reason for many heretical divisions in the body of the church.

Turning our attention to Bernard, let us begin by observing that 1 Cor 6:17 is one of the most significant biblical texts in Bernard’s mystical theology, his ‘signature text’ for describing the union between the human soul and God. My examination of this biblical verse confines itself to several passages from what is usually considered Bernard’s most important text on union, Sermo super Cantica Canticorum 71, written somewhere around 1148. Explaining how eating is to be understood as a metaphor for uniting with or being in God, Bernard pauses in order to make a comparative digression about the way in which the Father and the Son are in each other in perfect mutuality. In the same way, the soul “whose good is to cleave to God” (Ps 72:28) will not consider itself united with him unless it perceives that it is in God and God in it. But like Augustine, Bernard is careful to underline that the unity of the Father and the Son, expressed in the text Ego et Pater unum sumus (Jn 10:30) is not identical with the union of the human soul with God as expressed in the text Qui adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est (1 Cor 6:17).

Bernard insists that nothing can be more different than the unity of many and the unity of one, the unity of one mode of being and the unity of different modes of being. The Father and the Son have the same nature or substance and the same will. Like Augustine, Bernard is not preoccupied with differentiating between natura, substantia and essentia. He uses these terms interchangeably. The divine unity does not become (finit), therefore it is not temporal, it simply exists (est). It is not brought about by the act of uniting but it exists from all eternity. The Father and the Son are in one another in an ineffable and incomprehensible way. Having one essence they are consubstantial, and having one will it is possible to refer to their unity as a unity of will (unitas voluntatis)

514 SC. 71.9: Unitas plurium et unius.
515 SC. 71.8: Est Patri Filioque natura, essentia voluntas, non modo una sed unum.
516 SC. 71.9: Non unitione constat, sed exstat aeternitate.
517 SC. 71.7: Non solum ineffabili sed etiam incomprehensibili modo.
but not as unity of wills (*unitas voluntatum*)\textsuperscript{518}. The term that designates this unity is *unum*. Like Augustine who argued against the Arians that the Father and the Son is *unus Deus*, Bernard claims that through an extension of meaning it is possible to say that the Father and the Son are not only *unum* but also *unus Deus*, in that there is one Lord, one God, and in that there are other characteristics which may be attributed to each of them and not to one in particular\textsuperscript{519}.

The union between the human soul and God differs from the divine unity because the former supposes two radically distinct substances and two drastically distinct wills\textsuperscript{520}. There is an ontological gap between creature and Creator. In the mystical union there is no confusion of the divine and the human substance\textsuperscript{521}. Bernard understands the union between the human soul and God as the perfect agreement of the wills\textsuperscript{522}, whose intention and object coincide, while they continue to be distinct in their substances\textsuperscript{523}. The union and unity of the Father and the Son is described by Bernard as *consubstantiale*, whereas the mystical union of wills is merely *consentibile*\textsuperscript{524}:

Between the human person and God on the contrary there is no unity of substance or nature and it cannot be said that they are One, albeit it may be said with certainty and perfect truth that if they are attached to each other and bound together by the glue of love then they are one spirit. But this unity results rather from a concurrence of wills than from a union of essences\textsuperscript{525}.

To Augustine’s distinction between the unity of substance (*unum*) and the agreement of wills (*unus spiritus*) Bernard adds another Augustinian element: the glue of love (*gluten amoris*)\textsuperscript{526}. The mystical union between God and creature is effected by and through love. It is love that enables us to be in God and God in us. The biblical passages enumerated in Augustine, *De Trinitate*, Book VI, included Psalm 62:9 *agglutinatur anima mea post te*. The Augustinian expression *gluten amoris* (“the glue of love”) used by Bernard may very

\textsuperscript{518} SC. 71.9.
\textsuperscript{519} SC. 71.9.
\textsuperscript{520} SC. 71.10.
\textsuperscript{521} SC. 71.10.
\textsuperscript{522} SC. 71.10: *Communio voluntatum*.
\textsuperscript{523} Gilson (1940) 123.
\textsuperscript{524} SC. 71.7.
\textsuperscript{525} SC. 71.8.
\textsuperscript{526} In Augustine’s writings this expression is mainly used in the ablative such as *glutino* or *glutine*. See *Trin.* 10.8.11; *en. Ps.* 62.17-18.
well be a reminiscence of the biblical text quoted by Augustine, or, even a deliberate replacement with an expression that explicates the meaning of the biblical text and that Bernard might have considered more appropriate for the spiritual edification of his brethren monks. In fact, Augustine himself explicates exactly the same biblical line by arguing that this glue is charity itself in his *Enarratio in Psalmum 62*\(^{527}\), a commentary that Bernard was likely to hear either read during the liturgical services or read during the meals, as it was customary in the monasteries. However, no matter whether Bernard’s reasons in using this expression were pedagogical concern, or an interpretative technique in which biblical passages are explained through words of patristic authorities, or simply an association triggered by the presence of a similar word, it is clear that Bernard reads and comments the Bible with Augustine’s assistance. At the same time he uses Augustine as patristic support in the articulation of his view of the mystical union. Exegesis and mystical theology are closely connected.

Finally, the third psalm quoted by Augustine in his succinct enumeration *Mihi, autem, adhaerere Deo bonum est* (Ps 72:28) figures also in Bernard’s text. Michael Casey observed that Bernard regularly joined 1 Cor 6:17 with Ps 72:28 and occasionally added Ps 62:9, although in quoting the latter he replaced the verb *agglutinare* with *adhaerere*\(^{528}\). Thus, “adhesion” becomes the theme connecting all these biblical quotations. Ps 72:28, apart from being applied, like 1 Cor 6:17, to the union of the soul with God, serves to emphasize the actual experience of the mystical union.

Happy is this union if you experience it (*si experiaris*), but compared with the other it is not union at all. There is a saying by one who experienced it (*vox experti*): For me it is good to cleave to God (*mihi autem adhaerere Deo bonum est*)\(^{529}\).

The emphasis on the experiential dimension of the mystical union is the distinctive hallmark of Bernard’s mysticism and in a certain way marks a new departure in the history of Western mysticism\(^{530}\). Although accounts of mystical experience were present in the Latin patristic literature beginning with the famous Augustinian passages from

\(^{527}\) *en. Ps. 62.17: Ipsum gluten caritas est.*

\(^{528}\) Casey (1988) 201.

\(^{529}\) *SC*. 71.10.

\(^{530}\) McGinn (1994) xiii. The major study on the role of experience in Bernard is Köpf (1980).
Loquor vobis experimentum meum quod expertus sum.

The collection of Augustine’s works finished at Clairvaux with a volume, which included the works Conlatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo and Contra Maximimum Arianum. As this sermon is one of Bernard’s late texts written towards 1148, he might have consulted in the library of his monastery the two small works directed against Arians, since it is almost certain that at that time Clairvaux’ library contained these texts. See above, p. 33.
Conclusion

It seems that Adolph von Harnack did not exaggerate when he named Bernard Augustinus redivivus. From all that has been discussed so far in the previous pages, there can be no doubt that Bernard’s mystical thought is deeply inspired by Augustine on many levels. The direct quotations deriving from Augustine are scarce indeed, but this does not mean that Bernard was not directly acquainted with the works of his predecessor either through solitary study or through aural exposure to his texts during the liturgical office. Large collections of Augustine’s works were available for Bernard’s perusal both at Cîteaux in his first years as a monk and later at Clairvaux during his abbacy. Among the patristic authors, it is Augustine that Bernard mentions by name most frequently.

The scholars who investigated Bernard’s sources normally spoke of a diffuse Augustinianism present in his works and limited Bernard’s knowledge of Augustine to the homiletic texts read during the liturgy. Although it is still difficult to estimate the extent of Bernard’s personal reading of Augustine, as a result of our investigation it is safe to claim that Bernard’s interest in Augustine’s texts is fairly broad and cannot be reduced to a particular period or to a particular genre. Augustine’s late Pelagian works De gratia et libero arbitrio and the De correptione et gratia provide the chief material for Bernard’s treatment of grace and free choice. In addition, they provide the terminology that helps Bernard to refer to the direct and momentary encounter with God in this life and to the human condition after the resurrection as a state of non posse peccare. The De Trinitate inspires Bernard’s views on the image and likeness, the primacy of divine love, and his understanding of the unitas spiritus. The De civitate Dei offers the ground for Bernard’s understanding of the main affectus. Augustine’s commentaries on the Epistle of St. John, the Gospel of St. John and Psalms shape Bernard’s themes of the search for God and of desiderium. The De doctrina Christiana helps Bernard developing his teaching on the ordinatio caritatis. Finally it is most likely as a result of his direct reading of the Confessiones that Bernard borrows the important notion of regio dissimilitudinis. It is also the reading of this work that made him understand the direct encounter of the soul with God as a fleeting moment of happiness, which is nothing else than a foretaste of the life after the resurrection. Overall it is because of his dependence on Augustine’s thought
that Bernard is cautious to preserve the ontological gap between the human being and God in the highest union of the soul with the divine being.

Apart from this thematic reception of Augustine, Bernard also structures some of his treatises on ideas that can be traced back to his predecessor. Thus, Augustine’s definition of cupiditas and caritas coupled with the distinction between uti and frui from the De doctrina Christiana inspires Bernard’s fourfold division of the stages of love from the De diligendo Deo. Augustine’s quadripartite division of the objects of love from the same work inspires the structure of Bernard’s treatise De consideratione. Augustine’s ideas on the loss of likeness with God as a result of the fall and of the preservation of the image of God in the human soul coupled with his understanding of Adam and Christ as representing two stages of the human condition posse non peccare and non posse peccare are the main structural principles of Bernard’s treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio.

The examination of key scriptural quotations such as 1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10, Rom 5:5, 1 Cor 6:17, Ps 62:9 and Ps 72:28 has demonstrated that Bernard does not read the Bible without patristic support and in this case without Augustine’s support. Bernard’s emphasis on the priority of divine love is not only the result of his reading of the First Epistle of St. John, but also of his reliance on Augustine’s exegesis of the quotations deriving from this biblical text. In the same way, he develops his view on the unitas spiritus primarily on the basis of Augustine’s interpretation of 1 Cor 6:17.

Gilson’s attempt to pin down Bernard’s rich and elusive mystical thought by speaking of the interplay of three doctrinal blocks, allegedly represented by Bernard’s main sources, namely the First Epistle of St. John, The Rule of St. Benedict and St. Maximus’s doctrine of deification, needs to be dealt with in a circumspect way. It has been demonstrated that in reading the First Epistle of St. John Bernard relies on Augustine’s interpretation, which particularly emphasizes the priority of divine love. The Rule of St. Benedict, undoubtedly an important source for Bernard, does not deal with the soul’s search for direct contact with God and cannot account for Bernard’s particular interest in the subject. Finally, it is possible that Bernard knew some of Maximus’s texts, but one cannot speak of a significant influence of this Greek author on his thought. The notion of deification is mentioned once or twice in Bernard and the term might very well come from Augustine’s works.
In order to seize upon the essence of Bernard’s mystical thought, like Gilson I also suggest speaking of the interplay of three “doctrinal” blocks represented, in my opinion, by a) his teaching on image and likeness; b) his doctrine on love; c) his view on the direct contact of the soul with God (which apart from the bridal imagery is also referred to as contemplatio, ecstasis, excessus, visio Dei, unitas spiritus). One main source is discernable behind all these doctrinal blocks and that is Augustine. Moreover some modern scholars have spoken of an “optimistic” and “dynamic” aspect of Augustine’s thought, which is grounded in his doctrine of the image and likeness that has as its ultimate goal the direct contemplation of God. This aspect may be summed up in the famous phrase of the Confessiones: “You made us for yourself and our heart is restless until its rests in you”. It is the contention of this study that this is the principle that inspired Bernard’s mystical theology. Contemplation is the true end of the human being, which has been created with the capacity and the tendency for God.

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535 conf. 1.1.1.
Part II: The Pneumatic Mysticism of William of St. Thierry

Preliminary Remarks

After many centuries in the shadow of his intimate friend and protector Bernard of Clairvaux, William of Saint Thierry is now largely considered as one of the profoundest and most sophisticated mystical theologians of the twelfth century. His marginalization was due to the fact that several of his important works circulated in the Middle Ages under the more attractive name of Bernard of Clairvaux, thus enjoying large readership\(^1\). With the revelation of the true, but, alas, for many unknown author, in the person of William of Saint Thierry, these works were condemned to oblivion for a long time\(^2\). The author and his writings were rediscovered at the beginning of the last century and since then there was a constant and increasing scholarly interest in his difficult, yet so rewarding thought.

The pioneers in the rediscovery of William of Saint Thierry’s works were the French scholars Marie-Madeleine Davy and Jean-Marie Déchanet. The latter, regarded for a few decades as the major authority for the medieval writer, in spite of his indisputable contribution to William’s study, was also accused by more recent scholars of being responsible for a “precipitated rush to search pèle-mèle for Greek sources for William’s works”\(^3\). Although accepting the Augustinian influence in the case of William,

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\(^1\) Three of William’s works circulated in the Middle Ages under Bernard’s name: the early treatises *De natura et dignitate amoris, De contemplando Deo* and the late work *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei*. Beginning with the second half of the twelfth century William’s early treatises and Bernard’s *De diligendo Deo* formed a triptych known under the title *De amore Dei*. See Hourlier (1953) 223. The replacement of William’s name with that of Bernard at the beginning of the *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei* was facilitated by the fact that the appendix of Bernard’s treatise *De diligendo Deo* was also entitled *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei de caritate*. The attribution of William’s work to Bernard apparent in the second half of the twelfth century, becomes definite in the subsequent centuries so that beginning with the fourteenth century William’s name is no longer mentioned in any manuscript. See Déchanet (1980) ix-x.

\(^2\) In 1662, Bertrand Tissier an editor of William’s works reattributed the *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei* to its real author. For a survey of the tumultuous history of this work see Déchanet (1980) ix-xiii. Also in the seventeenth century, the Maurist scholar Jean Mabillon, although publishing these three works of William together with other Bernadine works under the title *Opera Omnia S. Bernardi* (Vol. 5), he indicates William as the real author in the notes from the preface to the texts. For more details see Bell (1981) 28-29.

\(^3\) Anderson (1976) 243.
Déchanet seemed more attracted to evince that Greek philosophers and theologians, such as Plotinus, Athanasius, Origen, Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, Evagrius, Denys the Areopagite, also influenced William, who might have been reading them in the translations of Rufinus, Jerome or John Scot Eriugena⁴. He also added to the list of influences John Scot Eriugena not as a translator of a number of Greek authors but as the author of the Periphyseon (also known as the De divisione naturae)⁵. Some of Déchanet’s followers, taking his hypotheses for a fact and surpassing him in enthusiasm, went so far as to contend that William might have had a direct knowledge of Plotinus, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa⁶ and that he might have even been able to read and translate Greek⁷. Of all the Greek authors mentioned above, William’s use of Origen and Gregory of Nyssa was confirmed, although the extent of their influence was reevaluated. The other Greek sources indicated by Déchanet required new scrutiny. More recently, Goulven Madec⁸, Bernard McGinn⁹, J. D. Anderson¹⁰, E. R. Elder¹¹, D. N. Bell¹² and S. R. Cartwright¹³ have laid emphasis on the necessity of looking for William’s sources among the Latin writers and they have unanimously indicated Augustine as the primary source for William’s both doctrinal and spiritual works.

As many medieval writers William felt no constraints generally in indicating his sources, thus giving rise to modern speculations and debates about what manuscripts or what authors might have been available to him. Only two works make exception to this rule and they are the De sacramento altaris and the Disputatio adversus Petrum Abelardum. All the evidence comes in both works from Latin authors and primarily from Augustine. In other works William is just mentioning in general his indebtedness to the previous patristic sources. Thus, he announces in the prologue of his anthropological treatise De natura corporis et animae:

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⁴ Déchanet (1940); (1946) 241-60.
⁶ Fiske (1961) 5; Schmidt (1968) 72.
⁷ Daniélou (1955) 296 claims that Bernard knew Gregory of Nyssa through William’s translation. Déchanet (1946) 259 leaves the question of whether William knew Greek or not open, but he does argue that William may have had an incomplete text of the Enneads.
¹¹ Elder (1976a) 254-266.
What you read is not my own; rather have I gathered here in one place what I have taken from the books, partly of the philosophers and physicians, partly from ecclesiastical teachers, and not merely their sense but their spoken and written words\textsuperscript{14}.

Three types of sources seem to be recognized here by William: philosophers, physicians and ecclesiastical teachers. Consulting the index of the critical edition of this work from \textit{Corpus Christianorum Latinorum Continuatio Medievalis}, it is obvious that when William mentioned the philosophers he did not think of Plato or Plotinus, but philosophers writing in Latin, such as Pliny the Elder, Macrobius, Nemesius or Boethius. William also unabashedly confesses that in drawing from these writers he had no scruples in using them verbatim.

In the preface to his \textit{Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos} William claims that his purpose was to:

\begin{quote}
Weave a continuous commentary that is not original, but which combines certain opinions and statements of the holy Fathers, especially blessed Augustine. They have been gathered from their books and tracts for our modest work by omitting the troublesome questions in them. The resulting commentary should be much more acceptable to the readers since it is not founded on novelty or vain presumption but is recommended by the profound authority of outstanding teachers such as blessed Augustine, as I have said, and also Ambrose, Origen, and some other learned men, even some masters of our own day, who, we are certain, have not in any way transgressed the limits set by our Fathers\textsuperscript{15}.
\end{quote}

In this paragraph the intentions of the writer are set out explicitly and they could not be more different from those of a writer of modern times. William does not seek for originality or innovation nor does he intend to place under scrutiny problematic topics encountered in the earlier ecclesiastical writers, referred to by him as \textit{patres} (“Fathers”)\textsuperscript{16}. Augustine, Ambrose and Origen are seen as authorities and shapers of the Christian tradition. It is to their writings and to some writings of his contemporaries that have

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Nat. corp. 2.}
\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Exp. Rom.} Praefatio.
\textsuperscript{16} For a discussion of the concept \textit{patres}, see above, pp. 23-32.
\end{flushleft}
respected the boundaries set by these predecessors that William turns in order to teach his fellow monks.\(^1\)

The broad and accurate knowledge of the mainly Latin Patristic authors, may have been the result of William’s training in the schools of his time, most probably in the school of Reims, rather than Laon.\(^2\) He compiled a series of extracts from Augustine’s works under the title of *Sententiae*, which are unfortunately lost. He also produced two compilations of the works of Ambrose and Gregory the Great on the *Song of Songs*, which he had probably used as valuable material in order to write his own commentary. In addition, some of his works, such as *De natura corporis et animae*, *Aenigma fidei*, and *Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos*, gather many quotations from the patristic authors, but they also show William as an original thinker who knows how to control his sources. When compared with Bernard who was the product of monastic training, William seems to offer more consistent but still not sufficient evidence to modern scholars regarding his sources, and his confessions of the use of patristic authors proved to be more tantalizing for modern scholarship than helpful.

For many of the “Greek sources” indicated by Déchanet and his followers a Latin and most frequently an Augustinian source has been identified instead. The suggestion that one of William’s more important sources was Plotinus and that William actually had a direct knowledge of this pagan philosopher, from an unrecorded text of the *Enneads*, was totally dismissed. For it could be demonstrated that neither at the school of Laon, nor at the school of Reims, the study of Greek was available to students in William’s time, which would have been necessary for reading Plotinus in the original.\(^3\) At the same

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1 As an abbot of the Benedictine monastery of St. Thierry and later in his life as an old monk of the Cistercian foundation of Signy, William addresses the majority of his works to his brethren monks. In his polemical works such as *Disputatio adversus Petrum Abaelardum* and *De erroribus Guillelmi de Conchis*, he does not address directly those whose teaching he condemns, but important figures of the Church. Thus the first polemical work was written for Geoffrey, the bishop of Chartres, and for William’s friend, Bernard of Clairvaux. The second work was addressed to Bernard of Clairvaux. William’s dispute with Abaelard looms large as the background of two other important works, the *Speculum fidei* and *Aenigma fidei* but the primary audience is not the controversial theologian but William’s monastic community as the author himself makes it clear in *Ep. frat. Prologus* 4-7.

2 For a more detailed discussion concerning the possible place of William’s education see Bell (1979) 230-235. According to this article, earlier writers, such as Tissier, Mabillon, Ceillier, Clement maintained that William’s education took place at Reims. Déchanet (1972) 2-3 accepted the version of Adam (1923) 29 who suggested that William was educated at the school of Laon.

3 Bell (1979) 230-235. For a pungent critique of Déchanet’s claims regarding William’s reading of Plotinus see also Madec (1978) 302-309. In spite of the conclusive evidence countering the claims
time, a Latin manuscript of the Plotinian text that could have been available to William, as implied by Déchanet, was never found. Finally, from the many examples listed by Déchanet as proof of William’s dependence on Plotinus, a great number of them such as punctum unitatis, regio dissimilitudinis, the description of God as id quod est, the pair of terms anabathmon/catabathmon, the distinction between vera vita and falsa vita, etc. may be localized in the Augustinian writings.

It has also been signaled that the few elements of negative theology that can be encountered in William’s work need not come from his reading of Eriugena’s translation of the Corpus Areopagiticum, as Déchanet would have us believe. A more plausible source is Augustine who uses the same expressions found in William, nesciendo scitur, and docta ignorantia and who refers to the incapacity of human words to express the divine nature or to incomprehensibility as the truest mode of the knowledge of God. It was also suggested by Déchanet that the section on the “divine names” from Aenigma fidei is another instance of the Dionysian influence on William, via Eriugena’s translation of the Greek author. Although the expression nomina divina used by William may reflect that he was aware of the Dionysian tradition, it was demonstrated that the

Bell (1979) 222.
Med. 11.25. For Augustine see quant. 11.17-12.21.
Med. 4.9; Nat. Corp. 118. For Augustine see conf. 7.10.16. Déchanet’s claim of Plotinian influence on William’s use of regio dissimilitudinis was dismissed by Courcelle (1968) 417, n. 1; Madec (1978) 305; Bell (1979) 242. Courcelle (1968) 440 claims that apart from the only occurrence of regio dissimilitudinis in Augustine’s Confessions, other sources, such as Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Ambrose’s De Philosophia must be taken into consideration for justifying the success of this expression in the Middle Ages. For a detailed bibliography concerning regio dissimilitudinis see O’Donnell (1992) 2:443.
Spec. 121. For Augustine see conf. 7.10.16; 7.17.23.
For anabathmon see Nat. corp. 115; for catabathmon see Nat. corp. 118. Augustine uses only the first term anabathmon in en. Ps 38.2 and en. Ps 119.1. Courcelle (1957) 18 suggested that William might have formed the second term himself.
Spec. 112. For Augustine see Jo. ev. tr. 22.3; s. 84; s. 306 4.4-8.7.
Med. 7.9. For Augustine see ord. 1.16: …de summo illo Deo, qui scitur melius nesciendo.
Exp. Rom. 5.8.127. For Augustine see ep. 130.28.
c. Adim. 11.
en. Ps. 85.12.
Déchanet (1940) 46-47; (1942) 205.
vocabulary and the concepts present in this section from *Aenigma fidei* are Augustinian, and they were drawn from Augustine’s *De Trinitate*\(^{32}\).

The suggestion that William was profoundly influenced not only by the translations but also by the writings of John Scot Eriugena was another stumbling block in the analysis of William’s sources. The roots of this suggestion are to be found once again in the works of J.-M. Déchanet\(^{33}\) and they were taken for granted and reinforced by Dom Odo Brooke\(^{34}\), and Dom Hourlier\(^{35}\) who in his introduction to *De contemplando Deo* argues that it is possible to feel Eriugena’s influence in this treatise almost on every page\(^{36}\). Such an enthusiastic view was tempered in an excellent article by David N. Bell, who has shown that the claims of Déchanet, Hourlier and Brooke, although not completely incorrect, were certainly far too exaggerated. However, he also proved that an important bulk of the evidence adduced by these three scholars in favor of Eriugena’s influence points in the direction of Augustine.

To those who attuned William’s theology to Greek theology, sometimes misunderstanding the latter\(^{37}\), J. D. Anderson\(^{38}\) replied pointing out that William was a representative of Western theology which was shaped by Augustine’s teaching in the first place. Thus, William embraces the incriminating doctrine of *filioque* in the eyes of the Greeks, and makes use of the formulas *ab utroque procedens* and *principaliter a Patre*, the latter having its source in Augustine’s *De Trinitate*\(^{39}\). Another theological element present in William’s work and which is not common to the Greek theological tradition is the Augustinian doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love of both the Father and the Son: *unitas amborum, sive sanctitas, sive caritas*\(^{40}\). In his preface to William’s *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*, Déchanet misrepresented Orthodox teaching when he considered the doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love in accord with traditional theology and with that of


\(^{34}\) Brooke (1960) 205 n. 69, 209-210 and (1966) 299, n. 68.

\(^{35}\) Hourlier (1959) 41-43.

\(^{36}\) Hourlier (1959) 41.

\(^{37}\) Brooke (1960) 207, n. 77, claiming that this is the case in the Greek theology, attributed incorrectly the formula “ex Patre, per Filium, in Spiritu”, to the internal processions of the Persons as well as to the economy *ad extra*.


\(^{39}\) Trin. 15.17.29.

\(^{40}\) Trin. 6.5.7.
the Greek Fathers in particular\textsuperscript{41}. This doctrine is western; it originates apparently with Marius Victorinus\textsuperscript{42} and was largely developed by Augustine in his later works\textsuperscript{43}. It is highly unlikely that William could come across it reading Greek sources. This doctrine plays a paramount role in the understanding of William’s mystical theology and it will be discussed in depth later in this study.

Another example of Latin theology is William’s treatment of the question of \textit{visio Dei} in this life. He is inspired again by an Augustinian text, \textit{Epistula} 147. He also makes use of a distinction between three types of vision present in another Augustinian work, Book XII of \textit{De Genesi ad litteram}. William’s answer is Augustine’s answer, God can be seen \textit{sicuti est} or in his substance in this life, only in ecstasy. In the treatment of this question William is, according to J.D. Anderson, “the child of Augustine”\textsuperscript{44}.

Finally, William acknowledged to have read and used Origen in one of his works directly, but still this remark has to be treated with caution. It is true that the twelfth century manifests a genuine interest in the works of Origen, in the translations of Rufinus and Jerome, and as a result of this increased interest many Origenian manuscripts emerge, incomparably superior in number to those of the previous centuries\textsuperscript{45}. In the monastic circles Origen is a common presence and among the Greek authors he is most extensively read\textsuperscript{46}. William could certainly have read some of his works, since the library of Clairvaux and later that of Signy where he spent the last years of his life boast an important collection of Origen’s works. However, because of the controversial personality of Origen, considered a heretic in the East and condemned by the 5\textsuperscript{th} ecumenical council, there was a general awareness among twelfth century monks of reading his works with caution (\textit{caute legatur!}). Origen is extensively used by William in the \textit{Expositio super epistulam ad Romanos}, a work which was considered for many years to be a compilation. Here Origen represents the second most quoted source after Augustine who offers 50\% more material to William than the Alexandrian writer\textsuperscript{47}. In spite of this statistical supremacy, William’s use of Origen was considered more tempting

\textsuperscript{41} Déchanet (1962) 40-42.
\textsuperscript{42} B. McGinn (2006) 15.
\textsuperscript{43} These works are \textit{De Trinitate} and \textit{In epistulam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus}.
\textsuperscript{44} Anderson (1978) 250.
\textsuperscript{45} Leclercq (1951) 427.
\textsuperscript{46} Leclercq (1982) 94-97.
\textsuperscript{47} Cartwright (2003) 32, n. 12.
to explore than the Augustinian material. Some scholars have seen in this work a “synthesis” of Augustine and Origen and used this more as an excuse to concentrate their research on the latter. To this view a new view was opposed stating that in this work in spite of the long quotations from Origen, William is thoroughgoing Augustinian following his Latin master in the treatment of topics such as original sin, Trinity, sacraments and predestination. Not only did he borrow more extensively from Augustine, but he did that without altering or adapting Augustine’s thought. Passages from Origen, on the other hand, are often corrected by introducing an Augustinian term or expression, which gives them a more western theological flavor. Apart from the *Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos*, two other works are relevant for the impact of Origen on William, the *Epistula ad fratres de monte Dei* and the *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*. The Origenian influence on William’s mystical works was confirmed by the work of Paul Verdeyen, but following in Déchanet’s footsteps, he argues that William broke with the Western tradition shaped mainly by Augustine and Gregory the Great, in order to inaugurate a new Origenist mysticism which later influenced the Rhineland and Flemish mystics of the thirteenth and fourteenth century. These claims have been rejected as too exaggerated, although there is a general consensus among scholars that Origen is important for understanding William’s mystical theology, as well as another Greek ecclesiastical author, Gregory of Nyssa.

This survey of the recent results regarding the debate over William’s sources does not represent an attempt to demonstrate that apart from Augustine other influences are of no significance. My intention is rather to consolidate Augustine as William’s primary source.

As David N. Bell wrote a magnificent study dedicated to the Augustinian spirituality of William of Saint Thierry in which he touches upon the same themes I am going to discuss in the following pages it would seem that there is not much left to say on this topic. This chapter however would like to go a step further with the help of the already existing research and to ponder on issues related to Augustine’s reception in the

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48 Déchanet (1942) 35-36.
49 Déchanet (1972) 36; Bouyer (1958) 84-85.
52 McGinn (1994) 515, n. 10.
mystical theology of William of Saint Thierry. Thus, I am interested in seeing how William adapts Augustine to his own purposes, by quoting verbatim or by paraphrasing him in different contexts. A comparison with the mystical theology of his friend Bernard could also be of interest, since they both draw extensively on the same source but exploit it in different ways, emphasizing different aspects of the Augustinian spiritual tradition.

Before concluding this section, a few brief remarks should be made about the methodology that is going to be adopted in order to determine William’s dependence on Augustine. It has been observed that like other medieval authors, William was not in the habit of naming his sources. However, as William was trained in the town schools where he learned how to compose compilations, some of his major writings follow this method of composition and abound in substantial and frequent quotations from the previous Christian authors. Against this background, the most adequate method for determining William’s use of Augustine seems to be the method of textual parallels which enables us to see distinctly not only what sort of material William borrows from his predecessor, but also it offers us a clear picture of the way in which William incorporates this material to his own writings, by connecting it either with quotations from different other authors or by using it as a solid basis for establishing some of his own doctrinal views. Indicating distinctly how closely an author follows his sources, the method of textual parallels will also help us to determine whether William quoted Augustine from memory, from an intermediary source or as a result of his direct reading of the bishop’s works. The method of textual parallels applied to William’s works based on the technique of compilation may also reveal the main sources that lie behind some of the ideas presented by William in his treatises in which rather than borrowing the voice of his predecessors, William prefers to express himself in his own words.
Chapter 1: Image and Likeness: The Anthropological Grounds of William’s mysticism

In order to understand William’s mysticism, it is not sufficient to examine solely the accounts relating the immediate encounter of the human soul with God. William’s treatment of the mystical experience is deeply anchored in his anthropology, especially in his teaching of the humanity created in the image and likeness of God. In addition, the mystical experience cannot be understood in the absence of a discussion of the correct way that leads to it. This is the way of love, revealed to the humanity fallen in the regio dissimilitudinis through Christ Incarnate. Therefore, before any attempt is made to consider William’s treatment of the union of the soul with God, it is necessary to scrutinize these two crucial aspects attached to the mystical experience, the image and likeness and the love of God.

William did not deal with the theme of humanity created in the image and likeness in a systematic way, in spite of writing, probably during his time at Signy, an anthropological treatise, entitled De natura corporis et animae. For this reason, we need to collect evidence for his doctrine on image and likeness from passages scattered throughout all William’s works.

1. The general notion of image

In his treatment of the notions of imago and similitudo, William follows a direction initiated by Augustine in the patristic tradition, which sees a connection between the two terms53. While especially in the East, following the example of Irenaeus, there was a tendency to differentiate between the two terms, Augustine developed his own view on imago and similitudo under the constraints of the Latin language, which made it almost impossible for him not to see a link between these two notions54. In advancing his understanding of the image and likeness he was not content to argue solely

53 Markus (1964) 126; Sullivan (1963) 11.
54 Markus (1964) 127.
on linguistic grounds, but he verified his arguments against the scriptural text\textsuperscript{55}. However, since in the biblical verse of Gn 1:26 the term \textit{similitudo} is added as if \textit{imago} was not sufficient, Augustine found a solution which complies both with the Latin usage of the two terms and with the biblical context. According to Augustine all images are likenesses but not all likenesses are images\textsuperscript{56}. This principle makes the likeness the broader term. Although William does not feel the need for a re-evaluation of the relation between \textit{imago} and \textit{similitudo} from a philosophical point of view, he places himself in the tradition that can be traced back to Augustine by his choice to understand the likeness of the human being with God as a consequence deriving from the quality of image. As with Augustine, there cannot be images which at the same time are not also likenesses. However, the reverse is not possible, for William sees many likenesses or similarities to God in creation which cannot be called images of God\textsuperscript{57}.

Apart from the linguistic insights and biblical support for his understanding of the relation between image and likeness, Augustine also reflected on these two terms in a philosophical context, where the key concept was participation. According to Augustine the corporeal world is organized after the model of divine ideas which exist in the mind of God and as a result of this, there is a necessary likeness to God in every department and category of nature that renders this world intelligible\textsuperscript{58}. Everything that exists in the universe participates in God in different degrees and therefore each creature is like God to a certain extent, but not all of these creatures can be considered images of God.

Although William does not develop an explicit theology of participation, it has been demonstrated that this notion plays a crucial role for the understanding of his views on image and likeness\textsuperscript{59}. In his anthropological treatise \textit{De natura corporis et animae}, William makes use of a fourfold participatory ladder following Claudianus Mamertus, who in turn was inspired by Augustine:

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{qu. Deut. 4.}
\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Gn. litt. imp. 16.57.}
\textsuperscript{57} William counts several such similarities of the soul to God: unity, ubiquity, dignity, royalty, liberty, incomprehensibility.
\textsuperscript{58} \textit{div. qu. 46.2}
\textsuperscript{59} Bell (1984) 89-98.
Anything in order to exist must participate in esse, therefore there are vestiges of God in all things. But this is the lowest stage of participation corresponding to the stones. *Vita seminalis* designates a higher degree of participation than *esse* and is characteristic of the life of plants. *Vita sensualis* defines the life of animals while on the highest level *vita rationalis* corresponds to the human beings and represents a more comprehensive participation in God. On this ontological ladder everything exists by participation in God, and as a consequence of this everything in creation reflects God, and therefore the Trinity. But for Augustine and William it is only the human being alone who participates in *vita rationalis* or *intellectualis*, and therefore the human being alone can be called the image of God. Consequently, the image represents the highest level of participation and brings more resemblance with God.

William also embraced some of the remarks of Gregory of Nyssa in the translation of Eriugena on the relation between image, likeness and participation, which he probably saw as complementing what he could read on this subject in the West:

> For in this, that man is said to be made to the image of God, it is as if it were said that God made human nature sharer in every good. For God is the fullness of all

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60 Nat. corp. 104: *Sicut nihil sine creatore Deo, ipsa scilicet sancta Trinitate existit, ita nihil omnino esse potest, quod non et unum sit et trifarium consistit.*
goods and man is the image of God. Therefore, in that he is capable of the fullness of every good, the image is like unto his exemplar\textsuperscript{61}.

Reflecting on the relationship between \textit{imago} and \textit{similitudo}, Bernard McGinn has pointed out that they refer to slightly different types of participation. Thus, the image “emphasizes the essential or original share in the divine nature that makes each human person open to God, while the similitude primarily concerns the participative or perfecting activity by which we do or we do not resemble God in how we love and act”\textsuperscript{62}.

There are a few conditions that Augustine has isolated in order to attribute to a likeness the status of image: a) as a general rule an image is normally imperfect and unequal with its prototype, although there can be some images equal with the prototype\textsuperscript{63}, such as Christ\textsuperscript{64}, b) it must exist a relation of origin between the image and the prototype, which Augustine calls “generation” or “expression”\textsuperscript{65}, c) there should be no creature interposed between the image and the prototype\textsuperscript{66}. William does not discuss these conditions from a theoretical point of view but he appears to have known them, since he uses them in practice. In his reflections on the notion of image in general William argues that the image needs to be different from its prototype, in order not to be identical to the prototype\textsuperscript{67}. He has probably encountered this idea reading the Greek authors, Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. Augustine does not mention it\textsuperscript{68}. According to the Greek tradition, an image must not be like its archetype, because “if the image resembles its archetype it would no longer be an image”\textsuperscript{69}. In spite of adopting this eastern idea in his understanding of the difference between image and its archetype, William shapes this distinction also by introducing the term \textit{aequalitas}, which is reminiscent of Augustine’s innovative treatment of the image, which stands in sharp contrast with that of the philosophers, who could have not understood the concept of “equal image”. Augustine introduced the term \textit{aequalitas} in order to distinguish between Christ as the real image of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Nat. corp.} 86. William quotes almost verbatim Gregory of Nyssa \textit{De imagine} 17. Cappuyns (1965) 234.
\item \textsuperscript{62} McGinn (1994) 229.
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{div. qu.} 74.
\item \textsuperscript{64} \textit{Trin.} 6.10.11.
\item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Gn. litt. imp.} 16.57.
\item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Trin.} 11.5.8.
\item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{Nat. corp.} 72.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Bell (1984) 100, n. 54.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Lossky (1957) 119.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the Father and the human soul\textsuperscript{70}. The latter is also said to be the image of God, although very imperfect and remote, or to have been created \textit{ad imaginem Dei}. Especially in his later works, Augustine overcame his fears and began to speak more boldly of the human soul as \textit{imago Dei}\textsuperscript{71}. The term \textit{aequalitas} helped him in this situation since he claimed that only the Son is considered to be the equal image of the Father, while the human soul is an unequal image of its creator. William seems to have known this distinction since in one of his early treatises he refers to the human being as being created \textit{ad imaginem Dei} and as such being different from Christ who is \textit{imago Dei}\textsuperscript{72}. In another work he claims that the human soul is an image unequal to its prototype\textsuperscript{73}. He continues with what seems to be the reason for this inequality: although “the soul has its beginning from God, it is not out of him”\textsuperscript{74}. This vague phrase can be understood better in the light of another text from the same work, where the same idea is presented in a slightly altered form:

\begin{quote}
You, rational mind, with your thought and your love are one human being, made to the image of your Creator, though not created his equal. You have not been begotten, you have been formed\textsuperscript{75}.
\end{quote}

In this passage, apart from the term \textit{aequalitas}, the term \textit{genitus} is of great significance for the distinction between Christ and the soul as images of God. It is a term that Augustine also used in his description of Christ as \textit{imago genita}. Therefore, the human soul is not equal with the real image, since it is not begotten (\textit{genitus}) as the Son is, but created (\textit{formatus})\textsuperscript{76}. These passages from \textit{De natura corporis et animae}, do not come directly from Augustine, but as the index of the critical edition of this work from \textit{Corpus Christianorum Latinorum Continuatio Medievalis} indicates, they were drawn from Claudianus Mamertus. One of the reasons that may have prompted William to follow this source was that preparing a work on the body and the soul, he relied on the existent works dealing with this subject. Augustine wrote several works on the soul, but nothing too systematic, hence the difficulty in adopting a coherent and all-encompassing

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Trin.} 7.6.12.
\textsuperscript{71} Markus (1964) 132-135. For more details, see above, p. 43, n. 160.
\textsuperscript{72} \textit{Nat. am.} 34.
\textsuperscript{73} \textit{Nat. corp.} 99.
\textsuperscript{74} \textit{Nat. corp.} 99: \textit{quia etsi ab illo coeperit, ex ipso tamen vel de ipso non est}
\textsuperscript{75} \textit{Nat. corp.} 102: \textit{Tu vero mens rationalis, cogitatio, dilectio tua, unus es homo, ad similitudinem auctoris tui factus, non ad aequalitatem creatus, nempe non genus. Formatus es.}
\textsuperscript{76} Augustine’s terms are \textit{imago genita} and \textit{imago facta}, see \textit{qu. Deut.} 4.
Augustinian view on the soul for the later writers who used his works. However, it is recognized that Claudianus Mamertus follows Augustine in his work *De statu animae*, simplifying him\(^{77}\).

Finally, the last condition indicated by Augustine in order to speak of an image consists in the necessity not to have any intermediaries between the image and the prototype. In the case of the soul, God alone must be superior to the image. Augustine’s terminology concerning this matter, such as *nulla natura interiecta*\(^{78}\), or *nulla interposita creatura*\(^{79}\) is not to be found in William, but he does mention that the only thing which is superior to the mind is God alone\(^{80}\).

### 2. The site of the image

Adopting the Augustinian participatory scheme, William is led to the conclusion that only the human soul participates in *vita rationalis* and therefore it is the image of God. The rational element distinguishes it from the other creatures on the ontological ladder and then it is no surprise that like Augustine\(^{81}\), William does not place the image of God in the body, but naturally sees the site of the image in the rational soul (*rationalis animus*)\(^{82}\), or in the spirit (*spiritus*)\(^{83}\) or in the mind (*mens*)\(^{84}\). In addition to this, William applies to *mens* the same metaphors like Augustine, referring to it as “the head of the soul” (*caput animae*)\(^{85}\), as well as “the eye of the soul” (*oculus animae*)\(^{86}\). Basing his argumentation on the etymology of *mens*, which he saw as deriving from *memini*, William identifies *mens* with *memoria*, for “what is called mind is ‘that which remembers’”\(^{87}\). For William, *memoria* is one of the privileged places for the presence of God\(^{88}\) and this shows again how close he follows Augustine, who in the *Confessiones*,

\(^{77}\) McGinn (1977) 44.
\(^{78}\) *Trin.* 11.5.8.
\(^{79}\) *vera rel.* 113; *div. qu.* 51.4.
\(^{80}\) *Ep. frat.* 206.
\(^{81}\) For the site of the image in Augustine, see above, p. 45, n. 169.
\(^{82}\) *Ep. frat.* 208-209.
\(^{83}\) *Sacr. alt.* II: *Nam et spiritus noster, in quo ad imaginem Dei conditi sumus.*
\(^{84}\) *Cant.* 22; 64-65.
\(^{85}\) *Nat. am.* 20. For Augustine see *en. Ps.* 3.4.
\(^{86}\) *Spec.* 3. For Augustine see *sol.* 1.6.12; *Gn. litt.* 12.7.18; *Jo. ev. tr.* 35.3.
\(^{87}\) *Nat. am.* 28: *quae cum ideo mens dicatur, quod meminit.*
\(^{88}\) *Cant.* 55; 64.
Book X, was searching for God in his memory. For both Augustine and William, \textit{memoria} acts as a force driving the soul toward its Creator due to the fact that it carries the memory of God.

In an article on the Cistercian spirituality of William of St. Thierry, Andrew Louth places William in the tradition of intellectualist mysticism as initiated by Augustine, because of William’s understanding of \textit{mens} as the privileged place where the soul meets its Creator. In Louth’s opinion, William differs from other Cistercian mystics and especially from Bernard, who broke with an intellectualist form of mysticism, to inaugurate an affective mysticism claiming that love and feeling unite us with God. While it is entirely correct that William, following Augustine, pays more attention than Bernard to the mystical role of \textit{mens}, the distinction “intellectualist” vs. “affective” mysticism is too narrow to do justice to the rich and complex thought of these authors. Thus, in William’s view the function of \textit{mens} is not restricted to remembering God. As it contains in its highest part (\textit{principale mentis}) the seat of love, \textit{mens} represents that power of the soul by which the human beings cleave to God, or the secret place where the bride soul is looking for the divine Bridegroom and unites herself with him.

3. The Image of Trinity

3.1. Memory, Intellect, Will

Augustine contended that the human being was not only the image of the Son alone, for being created \textit{ad imaginem} or only of one God but also of the whole Trinity, according to Gn 1:26 which says: \textit{Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem}

\textsuperscript{89} For a discussion of Augustine’s views on memory as the place where God dwells, see Gilson (1955) 594.  
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Nat. am.} 5; For Augustine see \textit{Trin.} 14.15.21.  
\textsuperscript{91} Louth (1984) 262-270.  
\textsuperscript{92} For a critique of what is often called Bernard’s “affective” mysticism, see above, pp. 89-91.  
\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Nat. am.} 20.  
\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Nat. am.} 28: \textit{Est enim mens vis quaedam animae, qua Deo inhaeremus et Deo fruimur.}  
\textsuperscript{95} Cant. 64; 188.
Augustine’s innovative approach to image, understood as an illustration of the Trinity, proved to be very influential in the West.

The Trinitarian aspect of the image is a significant Augustinian element imported by William in his teaching. Like Augustine he sees the divine image in the human soul as being formed most often from *memoria, intellectus* and *amor*. Since we have seen that in certain situations William identified *mens* with *memoria*, in some cases the first term of the triad is *mens*. Sometimes *intellectus* is replaced with *ratio*, *intelligentia*, *cogitatio* or *consilium*, but the terminological variations do not cause dramatic changes to his doctrine. Sometimes instead of *amor*, William uses *voluntas* or *dilectio* as the third term of the created trinity. This terminological variation is not caused by an attempt to discover which faculties of the soul form a more accurate image of God in the soul, as Augustine might have done. The latter started by looking at Trinitarian images in the outer human being, then he turned his attention toward the inner human being and he advanced from the trinity of faith to *mens, notitia sui, amor sui*, and later to *memoria, intelligentia, voluntas sui* until *memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, voluntas Dei* in his search for a more accurate image of God. There is no trace of such a search in William, although he alludes to it in his *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum* where he claims that in this life the soul ascends to God by means of images which gradually become closer and more faithful to God. In this respect, Odo Brooke was correct to remark that for Augustine “the created image” was the center of attention, whereas for William it was the point of departure for the final resemblance. However, he was not right in assuming that this description of Augustine’s thought as centered

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96 *Trin.* 12.6.7.
97 *Cant.* 76; 89; 122.
98 *Nat. corp.* 102.
99 *Nat. am.* 3.
101 *Nat. corp.* 102.
102 *Nat. corp.* 105.
103 *Ep. frat.* 242; 251.
104 *Aenig.* 26.
105 *Trin.* 9.4.4: *igitur ipsa mens et amor et notitia eius, tria quaedam sunt et haec tria unum sunt; et cum perfecta sunt, aequalia sunt.*
106 *Trin.* 14.8.11: *Ecce ergo mens meminit sui, intelligit se, diligit se; hoc si cernimus, cernimus trinitatem; nondum quidem Deum, sed iam imaginem Dei.*
107 *Trin.* 15.20.39.
108 *Cant.* 22.
109 *Brooke (1959)* 97.
around the Trinity in creation can be generalized and that it can be applied in an absolute way to the entire Augustinian doctrine of image. Even in *De Trinitate*, to which Brooke’s observation refers in particular, one can find abundant evidence for the restoration of the image and likeness which underlines the dynamic tendency of the image towards the Trinity. Mary T. Clark commenting in general on the *De Trinitate*, pointed out extremely accurately that: “Although Augustine seeks the image of God in the human person as an analogy of the divine processions, he cannot forget what scripture has revealed of the historical course of the human image from its beauty and defacement in Adam to its renovation through the grace of Christ. These discussions are not digressions”.

In addition to the material available in Augustine’s doctrinal treatise there is plenty of evidence for the historical evolution of the image in Augustine’s preaching or other spiritual writings. William does not follow Augustine in his search for a better image of Trinity in the human soul, because that was a direction that helped Augustine to formulate his doctrinal position on the Trinitarian image. William accepts without bringing into question the results of Augustine’s search for a Trinitarian image in the human soul. Since he was addressing a monastic audience who was familiar with the elements of Christian doctrine he did probably not need to argue why the image consists of memory, intellect and love. Their theological education would have taught them that already. William did, however, write for the spiritual edification of his brethren monks and for a community concerned with Christian perfection and it is highly likely that this aim made him select among Augustine’s two aspects of the doctrine of the image, i.e. the search for traces of the Trinity in the soul and the restoration of the Image, the latter aspect which accentuates the goal of the image and likeness in God.

Returning to our analysis of the way the two authors dealt with the Trinitarian image it is important to notice that Augustine emphasizes the inadequacy of even the best created image to represent the simple and eternal triune God. Augustine looked into the human person to “show that there are three things which can both be separately presented

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110 Sullivan (1963) 17-25 highlighted the dynamic aspect of Augustine’s notion of image. McGinn (1994) 230-231 remarks that the dynamism of Augustine’s views on image and likeness is particularly manifest in his presentation of the Trinitarian anagogies from the last book of *De Trinitate*. For a critique of Brooke’s claims see Bell (1984) 102, n. 67.

and also operate inseparably”⁴¹¹². While indicating memory, intellect and will as the three activities of the soul that fulfill this condition, which also defines the way in which the three persons of the Trinity are interrelated, Augustine warns against a direct association between the terms of the created image and the Persons of the divine Trinity: “I do not say the Father is memory, the Son is intellect, the Spirit is will; I do not say it- understand it as you will- I do not venture to assert it”⁴¹¹³. The reason why Augustine is reluctant to make such straightforward associations is that they might suggest that what corresponds to one divine person does not correspond to another, thus damaging the principle of Trinity⁴¹¹⁴. Augustine conceives all these three factors as something that all the divine Persons possess, so that what can be said of one can be applied to the other two. However, after insisting on this commune share of the three factors, he concedes that it is not incorrect to say that The Holy Spirit principaliter or proprie corresponds to love and so on⁴¹¹⁵.

William has no such hesitations in his dealing with the Trinitarian image. Already in his early treatise on love, he does exactly what Augustine seemed reluctant to do: associating directly the persons of the divine Trinity and the factors of the created image. The memory that corresponds to the Father begets reason “immediately and without delay”⁴¹¹⁶, then the will proceeds from both memory and reason. The relations between the three members of the created image are described in the same language that is characteristic of the relations between the divine Persons. Memory, reason and will “are one yet effectively three, just as in the supreme trinity there is one substance and three persons”⁴¹¹⁷. William is more preoccupied with emphasising that the Trinitarian image enables the human soul to ascend to a union with God because of the capacity of the image “to act as a means toward union with the Trinity”⁴¹¹⁸. However, one must not

⁴¹¹² s. 52.10.23: …ostendimus tria quaedam separabiliter demonstrari, inseparabiliter operari.
⁴¹¹³ s. 52.10.23: Non dico, Pater memoria est, Filius intellectus est, Spiritus voluntas est: non dico, quomodo libet intellegatur, non audeo.
⁴¹¹⁵ Trin. 15.13.22- 19.37.
⁴¹¹⁶ Nat. am. 3.
⁴¹¹⁷ Nat. am. 3: Et haec tria unum quiddam sunt, sed tres efficaciae; sicut in illa summa Trinitate una est substantia, tres personae.
⁴¹¹⁸ Brooke (1959) 89.
believe that the human soul can adhere to God by its own powers, the initiative lies with God:

In order for the rational soul created in the human person to adhere to God, the Father claims memory to himself, the Son the reason and the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from both, claims the will proceeding from both\textsuperscript{119}.

In his anthropological treatise \textit{De natura corporis et animae}, William summarises Augustine’s doctrine of the presence of the triune God in creation. He progresses from the traces of Trinity, “since nothing can be which is not both one and threefold”, to the Trinitarian image in the body, or what Augustine would call the “outer man”, formed by measure, number and weight, and finally he arrives at the soul which subsists in memory, deliberation and will\textsuperscript{120}. This outline of the Augustinian pattern just as the theme of the image imprint that follows comes to William through a different source, Claudianus Mamertus\textsuperscript{121}. Dom Déchanet\textsuperscript{122} and Odo Brooke\textsuperscript{123} attributed the theme of the image imprint to the Greek Fathers and indicated Gregory of Nyssa through Eriugena’s translation as the source of this idea in William. Although William could not have remained unaffected by his reading of Gregory of Nyssa, through Eriugena’s translation, a closer look at the text where this idea appears may point to other sources too. As it was already noticed, Claudianus Mamertus, whom William follows in these lines, suffered the heavy Augustinian influence\textsuperscript{124}. The whole passage pulsates with Augustine’s ideas: the traces of the trinity in creation, a Trinitarian image in the outer man, the image of the Trinity in the inner person. The theme of the image imprint itself is expressed in pure Augustinian fashion, \textit{caritatis ponderes impresseris}\textsuperscript{125}. It is true that Augustine does not mention the image as imprint, but there is a line in the \textit{De Trinitate}, which refers to the likeness as being impressed by God in the human person: “For the true honor of the human being is to be the image and likeness of God, which likeness is preserved only by

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{119} \textit{Nat. am. 3}. \\
\textsuperscript{120} \textit{Nat. corp. 104 -105}. \\
\textsuperscript{121} Claudianus Mamertus \textit{De statu animae 2.6}. CSEL 11:119. \\
\textsuperscript{122} Déchanet (1940) 15. \\
\textsuperscript{123} Brooke (1959) 89, n. 16. \\
\textsuperscript{124} See above, p. 121, n. 77. \\
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{conf. 13.9.10: pondus meum amor meus}; \textit{civ. Dei 9.16}: \textit{pondus voluntatis et amoris}.
\end{flushleft}
relation to Him from whom it is imprinted”\(^{126}\). Although I anticipate the discussion on likeness it worth mentioning that for William, the borders between the image and likeness blur as his terminology attached to these terms appears to be confused. Thus, Augustine speaks only about a likeness of beasts (*similitudo pecorum*), whereas William also employs the expressions *imago pecudalis* or *bestialis* as well as *imago pecudum*\(^{127}\). At the same time he applies the consecrated imagery to likeness as well when saying *per omnia bestiae et pecudis similis*\(^{128}\).

While in this summary of Augustine’s teaching William is content to follow the account of Claudianus Mamertus, he speaks with his own voice when he reflects on the relation between the created image and its prototype:

> As the soul contemplates all these things by discernment, it is no longer delighted in its own beauty alone, but also in the Form that gives form. By contemplation of that Form it becomes more beautiful; for to aim at that Form is to be formed. Whatever is drawn toward God is not its own, but his by whom it is drawn\(^{129}\).

There is an element of passivity existent in this relation between the soul and God. The soul is the object of formation, it is “affected” by God, meaning etymologically that it is stricken, wounded, united with God. William uses here the untranslatable verb *affici*, which expresses both the idea of union and the idea of blow or wounding\(^{130}\). It is according to this principle that the soul is joined to the Trinity and it was possible to see this principle at work in William’s first treatise on love, where the Father claims the memory for himself, the Son the reason and the Holy Spirit the will. In spite of his all-encompassing notion of grace it is difficult to find a passage where Augustine speaks emphatically of the soul’s passivity in its encounter with God; however the prayer that concludes the *De Trinitate* implies that the help comes from the divinity: “May I remember you, understand you and love you. Increase these gifts in me until you have

\(^{126}\) *Trin*. 12.11.16: *Honor enim hominis verus est imago et similitudo dei quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quao imprimitur*.

\(^{127}\) *Nat. corp.* 74.

\(^{128}\) *Nat. corp.* 119.

\(^{129}\) *Nat. corp.* 105-106.

\(^{130}\) McGinn (1977) 147, n. 33.
reformed me completely." And Augustine insists that the image must not be concerned with itself, that it must not have as finality to remember itself, understand itself and love itself, since this is foolishness. Its wisdom and its only goal must be to remember God, to understand God and to love God.

Along these lines, there is without doubt in both authors a dynamic aspect of the image whose natural tendency is to return to its exemplar. William states that by the divine image present in the summit of the mind, the human beings were created to be like God:

For to this end alone were we created and do we live, to be like God, for we were created in his image.

The same idea is expressed in the *Meditativae orationes*:

We were created for you and to you is our return.

As Odo Brooke has observed the concept of image in William is less philosophical and essentially historical, being usually placed in a context that recounts the history of the soul from creation through the fall to redemption. The human being was created in the image and likeness so that “by this image…had he chosen to do so, might have adhered indissolubly to God, his creator, as like reverts to like”. However through sin the human beings lost the natural endowment that enabled him to return to his creator and saw himself separated from God, exiled in the region of unlikeness:

Created in the image and likeness of the Creator, through sin we fell from God into ourselves, below ourselves into such an abyss of unlikeness that there was no hope.

The sin that expelled the human being from paradise was caused by an inordinate desire for the Image and Likeness itself, says William. In other words, the human being

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131 *Trin.* 15.28.51: *Meminerim tui, intellegam te, diligam te. Auge in me ista, donec me reformes ad integrum.*
134 *Med.* 1.3: *Ad te creati sumus et ad te conversio nostra.*
135 Brooke (1959) 91.
136 *Nat. an.* 3.
137 *Cant.* 83: *Conditi sane ad imaginem et similitudinem Creatoris, cecideramus a Deo in nos per peccatum, et a nobis infra nos, in tantum profundum dissimilitudinis ut nulla spes esset.*
aspired proudly to the status of god reserved only for the perfect Image and Likeness. The consequence of this sin was the fall without hope into the region of unlikeness, from where the human being cannot return to God relying on his own powers. The only way out from misery is through Christ, the Son of God who in order to redeem the humanity became a human being himself, showing thus that the way back to God is through humility. William discusses at length the role of Christ as the mediator between God and the human person:

So the Son of God girded himself in this certain way and drew near through humility to save him who was to be saved and has perished through pride. Making himself the medium between God and man, he who came from God was seized and bound by the devil and in this way he put on the person and deed of the good mediator. He was made man

There is no other way for the restoration of the destroyed image and the recovery of the lost image than the one indicated by the perfect Image and Likeness itself, that is by following Christ.

Augustine also was very fond of connecting the redemption scenario with the theme of image and likeness as it follows from Book XII of the De Trinitate, where exactly the same stages of the history of the soul are delineated: the creation of the human being in the image and likeness in paradise. His proud aspiration to be like God and the Fall “into himself”, his inability to return to God except by the grace of God through Jesus Christ. In both authors we notice the emphasis on the role of Christ in the restoration of the image and the recovery of the likeness.

3.2. Faith, Hope, Charity

William differs from Augustine, however, when he suggests that the three theological virtues, faith, hope and love can form also an image of the divine Trinity. Augustine has denied in his De Trinitate the status of image to the trinity of faith, which he found in the inner man. His main concern was that faith had a temporary nature, whereas the created trinity he struggled to discover was supposed to have permanent

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138 Nat. am. 34.
139 Nat. am. 35.
140 Trin. 12.11.16.
141 Trin. 14.2.4.
roots in the human being. William seems to ignore Augustine’s position on this point from *De Trinitate* and in his formulation of the doctrine of the created image that consists of faith, hope and love presented in the *Speculum fidei*, he rather relies on an early Augustinian text, the *Soliloquies*.

In this early text, Augustine speaks of three distinct conditions that the soul needs to meet in order to see God: to have eyes (*habere oculos*), to look (*aspicere*) and to see (*videre*). Moreover, in order to see, the soul needs sound eyes, which according to Augustine are healed with the help of faith, hope and charity. Once it has sound eyes, the reason helps the soul to look. As not everyone who looks, also automatically sees, it is virtue, identical with perfect reason, that is needed for the soul’s vision of God. During this life all three theological virtues are indispensable in order that the soul might see God. However, in the life to come, faith and hope are no longer necessary and charity alone will persist and will grow greater and greater.

In his treatise *Speculum fidei*, William uses the entire passage on the soul’s vision of God from the *Soliloquies* with minimal modifications, but he focuses especially on the theological virtues, claiming that in creating the human being *ad imaginem et similitudinem Dei*, God placed the trinity formed by faith, hope and charity in the mind of the faithful subject as a means for his salvation. In contrast with Augustine who sees faith and hope as transient virtues of the soul, William considers that when the soul is able to see God “faith and hope will not disappear completely but they will be transformed into their own object, so that what is believed will be seen and what is hoped will be possessed”¹⁴⁵. By adopting this position, William still supports Augustine’s idea that the image must be found exclusively in eternal things.

William’s choice of the theological virtues as an illustration of the image of God in the human being and his special emphasis on faith in his treatise *Speculum Fidei*, can be also seen in the context of his fight against the new directions in theology initiated by Abelard, which celebrated reason to the detriment of faith. The selection of this passage from Augustine’s early work, the *Soliloquies*, and its alteration to serve his own purposes

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¹⁴³ See especially *Spec*. 3-4.
¹⁴⁴ *Spec*. 1.
¹⁴⁵ *Spec*. 2: *Nec tamen fides et spes peribunt, sed in res suas transibunt, cum quod credebatur videbitur, habebitur quod sperabatur.*
might have been dictated by William’s concern to rely on one of the most respected authorities of the Church in the answer he gives to his adversary.

4. Likeness

It has been observed that Augustine employs solely the concept of *similitudo* without mentioning *imago* very frequently, in order to refer to the growing resemblance of the human being to God\(^\text{146}\). Having preserved the image of God after Adam’s fall the human being retains also the capacity of becoming like God: “he approaches him [i.e God] by a sort of likeness. For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from him is by unlikeness”\(^\text{147}\). This quotation embodies the essence of Augustine’s teaching on likeness and this idea is abundantly present in his writings being expressed in various ways.

William seems to have been very fond of this idea, which recurs in his writings relatively frequently like in the following passage, which is inspired by Augustine’s *De civitate Dei* and which, highly likely, was reproduced from memory\(^\text{148}\):

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Exp. Rom. 1.1.18:} & \quad \text{civ. Dei 9.17:} \\
In tantum enim a Deo longe efficimur, & Si ergo deo quanto similior, tanto fit 
quantum dissimiles. & quantum similior, tanto fit 
in quantum ei similes quisque propinquior; nulla est & similiores, in tantum propinquamus. & longinitas quam eius dissimilitudo.
\end{align*}\]

William also echoes Augustine’s famous claims that it is not through space that we approach nearer to God but by love\(^\text{149}\). The following chapter will explore in detail William’s development of this Augustinian principle.

While in general William’s view on likeness coincides with that of Augustine, it is possible to see his own contribution to the development of this concept in his late work, *Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei*. William describes three progressive stages of likeness. At the lowest level he places a natural likeness, as a result of the presence of God in

\(^{146}\) Sullivan (1963) 12.
\(^{147}\) Trin. 7.6.12: *sed quadam similitudine accedit. Non enim locorum interuallis sed similitudine acceditur ad deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo.*
\(^{149}\) Nat. corp. 99: Intelligensque de se quia etsi non movetur per locum, movetur tamen per affectum. For Augustine’s view on how the soul moves towards God by means of *affectus*, see below, p. 141, n. 199.
everything that exists. This likeness is lost only with the life itself and since it is neither from will nor effort, but received in a natural way, the human being has no merit for it.\textsuperscript{150} At this level there are several similarities or analogies\textsuperscript{151} to God which can be found in man as a consequence of his natural participation in God. D. Bell has noticed that William was interested in seven such similarities: unity, ubiquity, royalty, dignity, stability, liberty and incomprehensibility.\textsuperscript{152} Gregory of Nyssa as well discussed such similarities in some passages from the treatise on soul\textsuperscript{153}, which William follows in the translation of Eriugena. For our purposes, we will just look at ubiquity and incomprehensibility, since it is mainly here that William follows Augustine.

“Ubiquity” is the resemblance of the soul to God, which is present in the body in the same way in which God is present in the world.\textsuperscript{154} Déchanet\textsuperscript{155} and following him, Saword\textsuperscript{156} attributed this resemblance between God and the soul to the influence of Gregory of Nyssa on William. However, the terms used by the abbot are almost the same terms that Augustine uses frequently in his attempts to describe God: \textit{ubique totus} and \textit{ubique praesens}. Although I was unable to find these terms together in William’s texts, he does employ similar terms such as \textit{ubique existens} and \textit{ubique totus}, or \textit{ubique locorum} and \textit{ubique totus} and, as an Augustinian reminiscence, William groups them stylistically in pairs opened each time by \textit{ubique}. He goes beyond Augustine in the analogy between the ubiquity of God in the world and the ubiquity of the soul in the body. However, this analogy can be considered merely a logical extension of his reasoning and confirmed by his reading of Gregory of Nyssa.

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\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Ep. frat.} 260.
\textsuperscript{151} Déchanet (1940) 36 has used the term “analogy” for referring to these similarities which are a consequence of the natural likeness.
\textsuperscript{152} Bell (1984) 119.
\textsuperscript{153} Gregory of Nyssa \textit{De imagine} 4.7-8 and 17. Cappuyns (1965) 213-215 and 232-236. For a discussion of these similarities see Déchanet (1940) 36-46.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Ep. frat.} 260: scilicet quod, sicut ubique Deus est, et ubique totus est in creatura sua, sic et in corpore suo monis vivens anima; \textit{Nat. corp.} 27: Anima Dei spirituallis est substantia ad imaginem Dei facta, Deo simillima, sic quodam modo se habens in corpore suo sicut Deus in mundo suo, in corpore scilicet ubique existens et ubique tota; \textit{Sacr. alt.} II: Nam et spiritus noster, in quo ad imaginem Dei conditi sumus, cum secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum, in regno machinae corporalis, cui praest, sic quodammodo se habeat quomodo Creator in regno creaturae suae, ut, sicut ille ubique locorum est et totus est, sic iste in toto corpore suo sit et ubique totus sit, licet ratio humana non comprehendat modum quo id fiat
\textsuperscript{155} Déchanet (1940) 42.
\textsuperscript{156} Saword (1976) 267-303.
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Nat. corp.} 27.
\textsuperscript{158} \textit{Sacr. alt.} II.
\end{flushleft}
“Incomprehensibility” is the similarity of the soul to God which states that since God is unknowable, the human being who is the image of God, is unknowable to himself. Augustine said something similar when he observed that the mind cannot understand itself, because it is the image of God. Déchanet, like always, points only to Gregory of Nyssa, and this time he has textual support, for William copies a whole passage from the Greek writer referring to this subject. However, in all the passages analyzed so far and which were attributed to the Greek writer, William never takes from Gregory something which is not also present in Augustine.

At a higher level, William speaks of another likeness, which is closer to God since it is due to the human’s free will and it consists in the life of virtue. It is here that the human being makes most progress in the restoration of the image and the recovery of the lost likeness. It is at this level that he approaches nearer to God, he becomes more like him and experiences the divine nature to a higher and higher degree.

Finally, the higher level is reserved for a likeness which is so close in its resemblance to God that it is called unitas spiritus. At this level of union with God, the soul is submitting its will entirely to the divine will, not only by willing the same thing as God, but by being unable to will anything else. In William’s opinion, this likeness is nothing else than perfection:

> Resemblance to God is the whole of the human being’s perfection. To refuse to be perfect is to be at fault. Therefore the will must always be fostered with this perfection in view and love made ready. The will must be prevented from dissipating itself on foreign objects, love preserved from defilement. For to this alone were we created and do we live, to be like God; for we were created in his image.

This paragraph sums up William’s entire spiritual doctrine: created in the image of God, the human being was created with one purpose, to be like God. It is wrong to refuse perfection, because in this way the human being reiterates Adam’s sin. However, following Christ who offered to humanity the example of a life of disciplined will and

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159 symb. cat. 2: Ideo mens ipsa non potest comprehendi nec a se ipsa, ubi est imago dei
160 Nat. corp. 72-73; Gregory of Nyssa De imagine 11. Cappuyns (1965) 221.
161 Ep. frat. 261.
162 Ep. frat. 262.
163 Ep. frat. 259.
ordered love the human being restores the image and his likeness to God which grows greater and greater to attain the perfection for which he was created. Although the perfect likeness is not reserved for the earthly existence, the recovery of the lost likeness has to begin in this life:

That likeness is in the interior human person by means of which the human person is renewed from day to day in the recognition of God according to the image of him who created him. And the more we make progress towards his recognition the more we are made more similar to him; and the more we are made more similar to him by recognizing and loving him, the more we see him in closer vicinity and familiarity.\[164\]

Following Augustine, whom William quotes almost verbatim, the likeness is placed not in the body but in the inner person, where the resemblance fosters the gradual renovation of the soul according to the Image of God. The growth in likeness occurs by means of love and knowledge and the goal of the renovation is the vision of God “face to face”. Therefore, likeness means both perfection and vision since as William claims quoting Augustine more we are like God more we see. Like Augustine, in support of this affirmation, William quotes as a scriptural warrant a text from the First Epistle of St. John: “We will be like him because we will see him as he is (Similes ei erimus quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est 1 Jn 3:2). The canonical interpretation of this text was established by Augustine and William adopts it without any changes.

As with Augustine, for William also to see (videre) is to know (cognoscere, intelligere) and the perfect “likeness with God” and “the vision of God” also become synonymous with “knowledge of God”:

There [i.e. in heaven] to be like God will be to see God or to know him. He who will know him or see him will know or see him as he will be like him, and to the extent that he will be like him to that degree he will know him or see him. For there, to see or know God is to be similar to God, and to be like him is to see or know him.\[165\]

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\[164\] Aenig. 6 quotes almost verbatim a long passage from Augustine’s ep. 92.3.

\[165\] Spec. 107.
William proves his originality when he compares the vision between the Father and the Son with the vision that is accessible to the human being in heaven, or as the passage seems to imply in an ecstatic experience:

There, just as in the Trinity, which is God, the Father and the Son mutually see one another and their mutual vision consists in their being one and in the fact that the one is what the other is; so those who have been predestined for this and have been taken up into it will see God as he is and in seeing him as he is they will become like him. And there, as in the Father and the Son, that which is vision is also unity; so in God and the human being that which is vision will be the likeness that is to come. The Holy Spirit, the unity of the Father and the Son, is himself the love and likeness of God and the human person.\(^{166}\)

Whereas the mutual vision of the Father and the Son is identified with unity in God, in the human being the vision is identified with likeness. This difference might have originated from his concern to maintain an ontological gap between the Trinity and the created image. William’s most important observation is that the unity of the Father and the Son is the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit is also the love and likeness of God and the human being. In making this distinction, William seems also to imply that there is a difference between the Holy Spirit who is a Person of the divine Trinity and who acts as the bond of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit that operates as love and likeness in the human beings during the ecstatic experience. These aspects will be considered in a future chapter, but it has to be mentioned nevertheless that in these passages William’s force and depth of his mystical thought is to be found.

Likeness is not only vision or knowledge but also fruition as William mentions several times throughout his *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum.* Thus, in the opening paragraph of his commentary, William claims that “no one who contemplates you reaches fruition of you save insofar as he becomes like you”\(^{167}\). And in another paragraph he explains again that to be the image and likeness of God supposes to reach fruition by means of love and knowledge:

\(^{166}\) *Aenig.* 6.
\(^{167}\) *Cant.* 1: *quem nemo usque ad fruendum contemplator, nisi in quantum similis tibi efficitur.*
The human being was created to the image of God for this purpose, that, devoutly mindful of God in order to understand him, humbly understanding him in order to love him, and loving him with ardor and wisdom until he attains to possession and fruition of him, he might be a rational animal. For this is to fear God and keep his commandments, which is the whole of the human being’s duty. And this is the image and likeness of God in the human person\(^\text{168}\).

According to Augustine frui means “to cling to something by means of love for its own sake” \((\text{frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter se ipsam})\)\(^{169}\). Frui or the enjoyment is reserved for God alone, while all the other created realities are not to be enjoyed, but only used \((\text{utuntur})\) for the sake of God\(^{170}\). Relying on Augustine’s definition of frui as the love of God for his own sake, William applied this term to the highest level of the human love for God, the one that does not seek reward and coincides with perfect likeness and perfect vision of God.

In conclusion, William demonstrates to have a broader knowledge of Augustine’s views on image and likeness than his friend Bernard. He used Augustine both directly and through intermediary sources, such as Claudianus Mamertus. He also made efforts to incorporate the views of Greek patristic authors, such as Gregory of Nyssa, which were intended to blend harmoniously with the predominant Latin sources that helped him to elaborate this subject. One of the fundamental aspects of William’s anthropology is his appropriation of Augustine’s view with regard to the image of God as being formed of memory, intellect and will. Unlike Augustine, however, William manifested no particular interest in pursuing a more adequate image of God in the soul. Following Augustine’s example from Book XV of the *De Trinitate*, he focused especially on the dynamic aspects of the image since they matched his contemplative goals. While William’s treatment of the notion of *similitudo* presents original aspects, he continues to follow Augustine when he claims that the soul approaches God by likeness, or when he considers that the highest likeness corresponds to perfect vision and perfect love.

\(^{168}\) *Cant.* 88.

\(^{169}\) *doc. Chr.* 1.4.4.

\(^{170}\) There is a large bibliography dealing with the Augustinian distinction *uti/frui*. For a detailed bibliography on this subject see Canning (1999) 861.
Chapter 2: Love

William was preoccupied with reflecting on the role of love in the ascent of the soul to God at an early stage of his career\textsuperscript{171}. While his first work *De contemplando Deo* deals with the highest stage of the spiritual journey, namely the experience of God, *De natura et dignitate amoris*, widely recognized as his next work\textsuperscript{172}, is looking particularly at love as the main element of the spiritual ascent, investigating its origin, its stages and its goal. The ideas outlined in the early *De natura et dignitate amoris* will be developed later throughout his writings and the basic elements of William’s teaching on love will not undergo considerable changes throughout his career. One of the fundamental ideas of Augustinian origin which will accompany William in articulating his spirituality is that the transition from the potentiality of the image of God, preserved in the human soul even after the fall, to the restoration of the likeness, lost by the fallen soul, is realized by means of love.

As we have looked at William’s understanding of image and likeness in the previous chapter, it is time now to turn our attention to the role of love in the restoration of likeness. This section is not intended as an integral exposition of William’s theology of love, but as an outline of his use of Augustine’s ideas on the same subject and as a reflection on the way in which he uses the material provided by his predecessor.

A good starting point for our discussion is offered by the numerous and various definitions of love we encounter throughout William’s works. These definitions, far from being exhaustive, accentuate different complementary aspects of the same concept. Thus, we will follow William in his description of love as will (*voluntas*), weight (*pondus*), movement (*motus*), affect (*affectus*), sense (*sensus*), and intellect (*intellectus*). A special

\textsuperscript{171} William’s treatise on love, *De natura et dignitate amoris*, was probably written around 1120, preceding by several years Bernard’s treatise discussing the same subject and which could have been written the earliest around 1125.

\textsuperscript{172} Although this order of William’s earliest treatises is in theory accepted by the majority of the scholars, there are some voices who contest the primacy of *De contemplando Deo* and who claim that *De natura et dignitate amoris* is William’s first work. Rozanne Elder is one of the supporters of this latter view and her main argument is content based, pointing to the fact that the treatise on love presents the spiritual itinerary that leads to the mystical experience and that it is logically followed by the treatise on contemplation which discusses the experience of God. See Elder (1976b) 89, n. 22.
place will be reserved for the discussion of love as God and particularly of love as the Holy Spirit.

1. Love as *voluntas*

Following Augustine\(^{173}\), William considers love a kind of will. Most frequently he will define it as a vehement will (*vehemens voluntas*\(^{174}\)), occasionally he will refer to it as a well-ordered will (*bene ordinata voluntas*\(^{175}\)) or a good will (*bona voluntas*\(^{176}\)). The will or the good will is considered to be the beginning of love\(^{177}\). In certain occasions William feels the need for a more precise terminology and then he develops distinctions such as that between *amor* and *desiderium*\(^{178}\). The former is defined as good will (*bona voluntas*) the latter is defined as vehement will (*vehemens voluntas*). Furthermore, *amor* refers to an object which is present, while *desiderium* is directed towards an absent object (*ad absentem*). Understanding the desire as an experience of absence, William like Bernard\(^{179}\) is in perfect agreement with Augustine’s definition: *desiderium est rerum absentium concupiscentia*\(^{180}\).

2. Love as *pondus*

It is relatively simple to discern Augustine also behind William’s definition of love as weight (*pondus*). In a famous passage from the *Confessiones*\(^{181}\), Augustine observes that each body by its weight moves towards its proper place in order to find rest,

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\(^{173}\) *Trin.* 15.20.38; *quid est aliud caritas quam voluntas*; *Trin.* 15.21.41: *voluntatem nostram, vel amorem seu dilectionem quae valentior est voluntas*.

\(^{174}\) *Contemp.* 11: *Nichil enim est amor quam vehemens (...) voluntas*; *Med.* 12.20: *Sola quidem vehemens voluntas a diffinientibus amor diffiniri soler*; *Spec.* 19: *Amor siquidem vehemens voluntas*.

\(^{175}\) *Contemp.* 11.

\(^{176}\) *Cant.* 76.

\(^{177}\) *Spec.* 19: *Voluntas siquidem initium amoris est*; *Cant.* 76: *Sed bona voluntas, iam initium amoris est*.

\(^{178}\) *Cant.* 76.

\(^{179}\) *Dil.* 7.19; see above, p. 56, n. 246 and p. 74.

\(^{180}\) *en. Ps.* 118.8.4.

\(^{181}\) *conf.* 13.9.10: *Amor meus pondus meum*. The comparison occurs also in *Gn. litt.* 4.4.8; *civ. Dei* 11.28; 13.18; *ep.* 55.10.18; *ep.* 157.2.9; *mus.* 6.11.29. For a survey of *amor-pondus* in Augustine’s works, see O’Donnell (1992) 3:356-359.
since things which are not in their intended position are restless. They find their rest only when they find their proper place. The weight of a body determines its movement which can be downwards as in the case of the stone, or upwards as with fire. Augustine names love his weight and observes that by the love of God he is carried upwards towards the house of God. The house of God is his proper destination and there he will be at rest.

The same ideas are to be found in the opening paragraphs of William’s early treatise *De natura et dignitate amoris*, where he considers love as being a power of the soul directing it by a natural weight to its proper place\(^\text{182}\). Like Augustine, William considers that every creature has both a place towards which it tends and a weight that leads it there. In the case of the human being, the *locus* for the body is the earth from where it was created, while the *locus* of the soul is God who created it. Therefore the body moves downwards toward the earth and the soul moves upwards toward God. But not always is the soul able to return to its destination, although by its natural gravity it is inclined to do so. The fallen soul, corrupted by sin does not know how to return to God in spite of the natural weight of love implanted in the human soul by God as the “author of Nature”\(^\text{183}\). After the fall, the soul is in need of a redeemer and of a teacher\(^\text{184}\).

3. Love as *motus*

In the Augustinian tradition both the will and the love are defined as movements of the soul (*motus animi*)\(^\text{185}\) and it is highly likely that William was familiar with these definitions\(^\text{186}\). However, his definition of love as *motus*, does not follow directly Augustine but an intermediary source, namely, John Scotus Eriugena\(^\text{187}\). Most likely Eriugena’s work *De divisione naturae*, where the text on love as *motus* occurs, was not read by William in its entirety. More plausibly, David Bell suggests the possibility that William encountered the definition of love in one of the Erigenian *florilegia* circulating in

\(^\text{182}\) *Nat. am.* 1: *Est quippe amor vis animae naturali quodam pondere ferens eam in locum vel finem suum.*

\(^\text{183}\) *Nat. am.* 2.

\(^\text{184}\) *Nat. am.* 2.

\(^\text{185}\) *doc. Chr.* 3.10.16: *Caritatem voco motus animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter Deum.* See also *civ. Dei* 14.6.

\(^\text{186}\) See below the section on *affectus*.

\(^\text{187}\) Eriugena, *De divisione naturae* 1.74. Sheldon-Williams (1968) 210: *Amor est naturalis motus omnium rerum, quae in motu sunt, finis quietaque statio, ultra quam nullus creaturae progreditur motus.*
the twelfth century. He indicates two florilegia containing this text, which might have been available for use to William. The latter echoes Eriugena in speaking of love not only as movement, but also as a quiet abiding (quieta statio) and as an end (finis). The last two elements can also be traced back to Augustine who repeatedly speaks of love as finis and as a state where one can find rest.

4. Love as affectus

William also speaks of love as affectus, a term semantically so rich that it is difficult to find a single word in modern languages able to render all its meanings. It derives from the verb afficere which means “to make an impression on, to influence, to affect, etc.” and it represents a physical, emotional or mental state caused in the recipient as a result of an external impulse, force or influence.

As a concept linked to the ancient philosophical tradition Augustine was familiar with it and used it frequently in his works. As a general rule he considers affectus and affectio as synonyms and uses them in order to translate into Latin the Greek philosophical concept of pathe, which was also rendered by the terms perturbatio (“disturbance”) or passio (“passion”). But while Augustine confers to perturbatio exclusively a pejorative meaning, he employs the terms affectus and affectio both in a positive and a negative way.

188 A ninth century florilegium discovered and published by G. Mathon contains the extract, see Mathon (1953) 306. A florilegium from De divisione naturae also contains the passage, see Marenbon (1980) 274, 276. It is Bell’s contention that the influence of Eriugena on William is far more limited than scholars such as Déchanet, Hourlier, Brooke and Leclercq claimed and that it is highly likely that William’s use of Eriugena was mainly fragmentary, by the intermediary of florilegia. See Bell (1982) 26 and (1984) 127, n. 10.

189 Contemp. 11: Est enim amor animae rationalis sicut dicit servus tuus, motus, vel quieta statio, vel finis, in id ultra quod nil appetat: vel appetendum judicet voluntatis appetitus.

190 ep. Jo. 10.5: ...dilectio. ibi est finis: propter hoc currimus; ad ipsam currimus; cum venerimus ad eam requiescemus. See also en. Ps. 31.2.5.


192 For a survey of Augustine’s use of affectus see O’Daly & Zumkeller (1986) 166-180.
At a basic level, Augustine considers *affectus* and *affectio* as being *motus animi*, neither good nor bad in themselves. However, they cannot exist in this neutral state. What separates then the good movements of the soul from the bad ones is the direction of the will: “For if it [i.e. the will] is perverse, it will have these movements as perverse ones; but if it is righteous, they [i.e. the movements of the soul] will be not only blameless, but also praiseworthy. The will is in fact in all of them; indeed all of them are nothing else than wills.” It is clear from this passage that apart from being *motus animi*, *affectus* and *affectio* can also be understood as will (*voluntas*). Since a good will is considered by Augustine to be a good love and the bad will is respectively a bad love, one can consider love also a kind of *affectus*: “A righteous will, then is good love; and a perverted will is an evil love. Therefore, love striving to possess what it loves is desire; love possessing and enjoying what it loves is joy; love fleeing what is adverse to it is fear; and love undergoing such adversity when it occurs is grief. Accordingly, these [i.e. affections] are bad if the love is bad and good if it is good”. Augustine follows here the Stoic classification of *affectus* in desire (*cupiditas*), joy (*laetitia*), fear (*timor*) and sadness (*tristitia*). But while the Stoics considered all these *affectus* to be bad and their philosophical programme envisaged the replacement of these *affectus* by the state of *apatheia* (the absence of all *affectus*), Augustine considers that *cupiditas*, *laetitia*, *timor* and *tristitia* can be good if the will is directed towards a good object. In opposition to the Stoics, Augustine considers that the state of *apatheia*, understood as the total absence of all good *affectus*, is insensitivity worse than all vices. Moreover, he redefines *apatheia* understood as a life without those *affectus* contrary to reason as a desirable condition.

Depending on the direction of the will towards a good or a bad object, the *affectus* determine the human distance or nearness to God for they represent the “feet” that lead the human soul either towards God or far away from him. The soul is moved in the
direction of his *affectio*, for the *affectio* is the place (*locus*) of the soul\textsuperscript{200}. If *affectio* equals the pleasures of this world, the soul moves away from God towards a place where it does not belong by nature; if *affectio* is God, the soul approaches its natural place.

Finally, God cannot be said to be disturbed by any *affectus*, not even when in the Scriptures he is described as angered, “for this word is used to indicate the effect (*effectus*) of his vengeance, rather than any disturbance of his own”\textsuperscript{201}.

A significant portion of Augustine’s treatment of *affectus* and *affectio* occurs in a philosophical context, in which he constantly draws parallels or makes comparisons with the use of these terms by the ancient philosophers, especially the Stoics and the Platonists. Augustine approaches the ancient philosophical tradition critically in order to consolidate a distinct view of *affectus* and *affectio* appropriate to a Christian philosophy.

Like his friend Bernard, William sees a difference between *affectus* and *affectio* in theory, but does not seem to be consistent either when it comes to applying it in practice. In William’s view, “*affectus* is something which possesses the mind by a kind of generalized force and perpetual virtue, firm and stable and maintained through grace. Affections are things which vary according to the various occurrences of things and times”\textsuperscript{202}. According to this definition, the main difference between *affectus* and *affectio* is the stability of the former and the mutability of the latter. Moreover, *affectus* addresses the noblest part of the soul, its mind, and its stability is ensured by the role played by grace. Although in this definition *affectus* appears to be a more positive term in comparison with *affectio*, *affectus* can also acquire negative meanings, especially when it is encountered in expressions such as *affectus carnis*\textsuperscript{203} or *affectus peccati*\textsuperscript{204}. On the other hand, *affectio* can have positive meanings when we read about the “holy affectiones”\textsuperscript{205} or the “loving affectiones”\textsuperscript{206}. However, *affectus* is more often encountered in expressions such as *affectus amoris*\textsuperscript{207}, *affectus caritatis*\textsuperscript{208}, *affectus

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{200} *en. Ps. 6.9: animo autem locus est affectio sua.*
\textsuperscript{201} *civ. Dei 9.5: hoc verbum vindictae usurpavit effectus non illius turbulentus affectus.*
\textsuperscript{202} *Nat. am. 14.*
\textsuperscript{203} *Nat. corp. 74.*
\textsuperscript{204} *Exp. Rom 1.1.32; 2.4.6-8.*
\textsuperscript{205} *Cant. 2.*
\textsuperscript{206} *Cant. Expositio.*
\textsuperscript{207} *Nat. am. 21; Cant. 89; Med. 12.29.*
\textsuperscript{208} *Nat. am. 23.*
\end{footnotesize}
mentis\textsuperscript{209}, affectus cordis\textsuperscript{210}, all having a positive meaning. William does not feel constrained by these definitions, and at times, when convenient for him, he will continue to use the terms affectus and affectio as synonyms.

Like Augustine, who considered the will as a motus and therefore as an affectus or affectio, William considers the will a simplex affectus “given to the reasonable soul so that it can be equally capable of doing bad or good”\textsuperscript{211}. The will was given to the human being together with the memory and understanding when the human being was created in the image and likeness of God. From its creation the will was constituted free much as the Pythagorean letter Y, William informs us\textsuperscript{212}, thus symbolising the two possible directions that the will can follow: one towards good, another towards evil. However, the will can do good, become a virtue and transform into love, only when it is helped by grace. Left to itself, it chooses evil, becomes a vice and it is transformed in cupidity\textsuperscript{213}. One can recognize here the Augustinian principle according to which the human soul helped by grace is capable of doing good but relying only on its own power cannot but fall\textsuperscript{214}.

Depending on the will which either can act on itself without the divine assistance or acts by cooperation with the divine grace, or is entirely passive in front of the divine initiative, David Bell\textsuperscript{215} argues that one can find basically three types of affectus in William’s thought: an active affectus, a cooperative affectus and a passive affectus. Affectus in its potentiality that is, before choosing between God and the rest, remains as we have seen a matter of grace. The active affectus corresponds to the state of the human being who in spite of the natural bent towards God given by creative grace, acts alone without God’s assistance\textsuperscript{216}. The actualisation of affectus’s potential to deliberately turn

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{209} Cant. 129; Ep. frat. 256.
\item\textsuperscript{210} Nat. am. 25; Med. 11.18.
\item\textsuperscript{211} Nat. am. 4: sic animae rationali inditus, ut sit capax tam boni quam mali.
\item\textsuperscript{212} Nat. am. 5.
\item\textsuperscript{213} Nat. am. 4.
\item\textsuperscript{214} The examples illustrating this principle abound in Augustine’s works. We will limit ourselves just to one example for the necessity of grace in order to do good, and another example for the inability of the human will to do other than evil: corrept. 3: Intellegenda est enim gratia Dei per Iesum Christum Dominum nostrum, qua sola homines liberantur a malo, et sine qua nullum prorsus sive cogitando, sive volendo et amando, sive agendo faciunt bonum; lib. arb. 3.1.2: nulla re fieri mentem servam libidinis, nisi propria voluntate. This principle lies at the heart of Augustine’s reaction against Pelagius who considers that in every good action the power to do good comes from God but the will and the performance of the action itself come from the human being. See Bonner (2007) 27.
\item\textsuperscript{215} Bell (1984) 131-132.
\item\textsuperscript{216} For examples and comments on this aspect see Zwingmann (1963) 10-11.
\end{footnotes}
to God with the aid of grace represents the cooperative affectus. The passive affectus corresponds to the mystical state, characterised by a passive will and a superabundance of grace that raps one up into God. The terminology of this classification does not belong to William, but it may be said that it summarises William’s understanding of affectus.

Like for Augustine, not only the will but also amor can be termed as affectus. Although William identifies in some passages amor with affectus\(^{217}\), at times he also distinguishes between amor and affectus amoris. Amor is a natural thing\(^{218}\) implanted in the human soul by God when he created the human being, who is also God himself, hidden in the depths of the soul. Affectus amoris is the manifestation of this hidden love, given by grace\(^{219}\). While the human beings have always God as love with them, they do not always return their love to God. But when they do it, when they love God affectu amoris\(^{220}\), they encounter God in their love\(^{221}\). Like Augustine and Bernard, William does not attribute affectus to God. God loves us not affectu amoris, that is by a change or movement on his part, but effectu caritatis, which means that he creates in us the affectus amoris, which enables us to love God in return\(^{222}\). By the distinction between amor and affectus amoris, Bell observed that William distinguishes between love-in-potentiality and love-in-action\(^{223}\). The transition from amor to affectus amoris does not depend on the vehemence of one’s will, because as William observes one’s will might be to love God, but one might not always be affected by God, meaning that the will is not transformed in amor by a superior kind of grace. The affectus amoris depends entirely on grace and the love-in-potentiality becomes love-in-action when the Holy Spirit blows wherever, whenever and to the extent that he wills so\(^{224}\). This is not to say that the presence of amor in the human souls is not also a matter of grace. As we have already seen apart from amor William considers the affectus in its potentiality and the free will to be also the gifts of the creative grace.

\(^{217}\) Contemp. 8: affectui inquam qui amor in nobis dicitur; Ep. frat. 170: sic affectus hominis qui amor dicitur.
\(^{218}\) Med. 12.29.
\(^{219}\) Med. 12.29.
\(^{220}\) Contemp. 11.
\(^{221}\) Med. 12.29.
\(^{222}\) Contemp. 11; Aenig. 100.
\(^{223}\) Bell (1984) 130.
\(^{224}\) Med. 12.30.
The idea of drawing near or away from God by means of *affectus* is another similarity between Augustine and our Cistercian author. Augustine preferred to refer to the *affectus* as the “feet” that lead one away from or closer to God adding that they can direct one either towards *cupiditas* or towards *caritas*225. William does not use the Augustinian comparison of the *affectus* with the feet, but he definitely describes the spiritual journey as one formed of various *affectus*. This idea is frequent in his writings and occurs as early as *De natura et dignitate amoris*, where William indicates four *affectus* which lead to God: *voluntas*, *amor*, *caritas*, *sapientia*226. They must not be understood as the steps of a ladder, warns William, since the transition form one step or stage to a higher one does not mean that the lower step is not needed any longer in the ascent227. These “affective” steps must act as the “united cords of a net drawing us up toward our goal”228. William returns frequently in his works to the discussion of these stages, which will be examined in due course229.

So far it is possible to observe that in his treatment of *affectus* William follows the lines of interpretation established by Augustine. Both describe *affectus* in terms of *voluntas* and *amor*, both consider that there are good and bad *affectus*, and that one approaches or distance himself from God by means of *affectus*. Also *affectus* is an entirely human characteristic not applicable to God. Unlike Augustine however, William does not have references to the philosophical context from which this term originates. His treatment of *affectus* is not philosophical, but in general theological and in particular, mystical. William’s favorite verb used in the description of the mystical union is *affici*230. Regarding this aspect he is not different from his friend Bernard who refers to the mystical state with the words *sic affici, deificari est*231. William depicts the state of union of the soul with God in strikingly similar manner making use not only of the same *affici*, but echoing the syntax of the Bernadine phrase as well *sicque afficiant, ut perficiant*232.

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225 *en. Ps.* 64.2; *ep.* 157.4.
226 *Nat. am.* 28.
227 *Nat. am.* 45.
228 McGinn (1994) 251.
229 See below, pp. 175-181.
230 *Ep. frat.* 263: Dicitur autem haec unitas spiritus, non tantum quia efficit eam, vel afficit ei spiritum hominis Spiritus Sanctus…
231 *Dil.* 10.28.
232 *Ep. frat.* 212.
The mystical aspect of *affectus* was already present in William’s early works where he teaches that *affectus caritatis* unites to God\textsuperscript{233}. In his mature works he directly associates *affectus* with the mystical union: the human being is drawn to God, that is, he becomes one spirit with God\textsuperscript{234}.

One final important aspect derives from the mystical capacity of *affectus*, which demonstrates the originality of William’s mystical theology. In uniting the human being with God, *affectus* provides the former with a certain knowledge of the divine being\textsuperscript{235}. According to William, the *affectus* is more appropriate for the knowledge of God, than it is the sense (*sensus*) for perceiving the corporal things or the intellect (*intellectus*) for perceiving the rational things\textsuperscript{236}. Moreover, this type of knowledge is superior to that obtained by *sensus* or *intellectus* since it both contributes to and stems from the unity of the soul with its object of knowledge and affection which is God: “and the human being becomes one spirit with God to whom he is drawn”\textsuperscript{237}. For William, the mechanism of this cognitive process based on *affectus* is analogous to that of the sense perception. Therefore, in order to understand how this type of knowledge operates, we need to turn our attention to a new aspect of love, that of *sensus*, not before concluding briefly this section.

The similarities existing between Augustine’s and William’s treatment of *affectus* must not necessarily be understood as a direct impact of the former on the twelfth century author; rather William’s dealing with *affectus* seems to correspond to that of some of his contemporaries, particularly Bernard. The presence of Augustinian elements can be explained better by William’s and Bernard’s attachment to the same Augustinian tradition. While for both William and Bernard *affectus* is linked with the mystical state, it is only William who develops a new cognitive dimension of this concept, holding it responsible for a new superior type of knowledge: the knowledge of love.

\textsuperscript{233} Nat. am. 23.
\textsuperscript{234} Cant. 94: Fit homo Deo affectus, hoc est cum Deo unus spiritus.
\textsuperscript{235} Med. 12.15.
\textsuperscript{236} Spec. 99: Plus in hoc valens amantis affectu, quam vel sensu in corporalibus vel in rationalibus intellectu, et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur.
\textsuperscript{237} Spec. 99: et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur.
5. *Sensus amoris*

*Sensus amoris* is an expression which does not appear in Augustine, but which is employed by William in order to refer to a type of knowledge of a superior kind whose object is God. The knowledge of love is based on William’s conviction that “only love can fully understand the divine things”\(^{238}\). In William’s view there is a certain analogy between the knowledge of the senses and the knowledge of love. He is able to sustain and develop such an analogy by claiming constantly throughout his writings that love is a sense (*sensus*) of the soul\(^{239}\). The implications of this statement are that its mode of operation must then be similar to that of the corporeal senses.

Already in the early *De natura et dignitate amoris*, William draws a parallel between the corporeal senses and the spiritual senses, teaching that “as the body has its five senses by which it is joined to the soul by the instrumentality of life, so, too, the soul has its five senses by which it is joined to God by the instrumentality of charity”\(^{240}\). He goes further listing the five senses of the soul and their corresponding corporeal senses: the love of parents is compared with touch, social love or the love of the brothers\(^{241}\), corresponds to taste, natural love by which every human being is loved is paralleled with smell, spiritual love or love of enemies is compared with hearing and, finally, divine love corresponds to vision\(^{242}\).

In the *Speculum fidei*, William speaks again of the senses and he distinguishes between an exterior corporeal sense that perceives corporal objects (*corporalia*) and a bifurcated interior sense. The interior sense that perceives rational, divine and spiritual things (*rationabilia, ac divina vel spiritualia*) is named *intellectus*. However, in order for the creature to sense the Creator, a higher and purer sense than the intellect is needed and

\(^{238}\) *Cant.* 24: *nisi amor plene capiat quae sunt divina.*  
\(^{239}\) *Med.* 3.8: *Sensus enim animae amor est; Spec.* 96: *Amat enim, et amor suus sensus suus est; Spec.* 97: *In eis vero quae sunt ad Deum sensus mentis amor est.*  
\(^{240}\) *Nat. am.* 15: *Per quinque sensus corporis, mediante vita, corpus animae conjungitur; per quinque sensus spiritualia, mediante caritate, anima Deo consociatur.*  
\(^{241}\) William terms the love for the brothers as *amor fraternus*, without any attempt at clarifying whether this expression refers to the brother monks or to biological brothers.  
\(^{242}\) This passage is very similar to one from Bernard’s sermon *Div.* 10. It is difficult to say which text was written first, but William’s treatment of the subject is more detailed and better biblically documented than that of Bernard. For a parallel of the two texts and a more in depth discussion see Pennington (1980) 276-281.
that sense is love\textsuperscript{243}. William is careful to add that the Creator is perceived within the limits of the human condition (\textit{quantum sentiri vel intelligi potest a creatura Deus}). He also refers to the knowledge offered by \textit{intellectus} using the verb \textit{intellego} while the knowledge offered by \textit{amor} seems to have an experiential character and the verb associated with this type of knowledge is \textit{sentio}. A perfect knowledge of God implies that \textit{intellectus} and \textit{amor} as the two branches of the same interior sense are intended to work together in order to both experience and understand God. The collaboration of \textit{amor} and \textit{intellectus} in the cognitive process will be investigated shortly\textsuperscript{244}.

No matter how important are the consequences of the identification of \textit{amor} and \textit{sensus} for William’s spirituality, my intention is to demonstrate that this identification is by no means the only factor that led William to developing an analogy between the mechanism of sense perception and that of the knowledge of love, or what he terms as \textit{sensus amoris}. Although some scholars, such as Déchanet have seen the latter type of knowledge sharing affinities with “St. Gregory and the whole Greek tradition”\textsuperscript{245}, I intend to demonstrate that like many other aspects of William’s theology which have been attributed to an eastern influence, in the end, when confronted with textual evidence, one must admit that the main source that William constantly follows is Augustine. \textit{Sensus amoris} makes no exception to this rule.

Let us begin by looking first at Augustine’s opinion with regard to the sense perception, as it is expounded in the second half of the \textit{De Trinitate} (11.2.2 – 11.2.5). Searching for a Trinitarian image in the exterior human being, Augustine comments upon a trinity of the external senses and decides to focus on the act of seeing as it is considered to be closest in nature to the vision of the mind\textsuperscript{246}. The members of this trinity are the thing we see (\textit{res quam videmus}), next there is the actual act of sight or vision, which did not exist before the object presented to the sense was perceived (\textit{visio quae non erat priusquam rem}). Thirdly, there is the soul’s intention (\textit{animi intentio}) or the will (\textit{voluntas}) that fixes the sense of the eyes on the visible object as long as it is seen.

\textsuperscript{243} Spec. 97: \textit{major tamen et dignior sensus eius et purior intellectus amor est}. 
\textsuperscript{244} See the section \textit{Amor ipse intellectus est} below, pp. 155-164. 
\textsuperscript{245} Déchanet (1970) xxiii. See also Louth (1984) who attributes William’s use of the doctrine of spiritual senses only to his reading of Origen and Gregory the Great. 
\textsuperscript{246} Trin. 11.1.1: \textit{is enim sensus corporis maxime excellit et est visioni mentis pro sui generis diversitate vicinior}. 

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Augustine observes that the members of this trinity are all different in nature and on account of what is proper to each of them. The act of seeing is produced both by the one who sees, to whom the sense and the will pertain, and by the visible thing. The latter begets a form or a likeness of itself which emerges in the sense of the one who sees. Augustine insists that without the likeness of the visible thing formed in the sense it would be absolutely impossible to perceive anything. Next, he remarks that although the substances of the three elements involved in the act of vision are distinct, they still come together in a kind of unity (in quandam unitatem) since the form of the visible body which is seen and the image or likeness which arises in the sense of the seer can hardly be separated from each other. In addition, the will forcefully unites the two other members of the trinity, applying the sense to be formed to the thing that is being looked at and holding it there. And Augustine goes on to add that if this will is so strong as to be called love or lust, it will affect the rest of the subject’s body and it will change it into a similar appearance and colour. He gives two example in order to support his claim: the chameleon that changes its colour depending on its surroundings and the biblical episode of Jacob who in order to have coloured lambs, placed coloured rods before the eyes of the sheep and she-goats in the water troughs, so that they would gaze on them as they drank at the time they had conceived.

The purpose of Augustine in describing how the act of seeing operates has less to do with the sense perception per se; rather it seeks to find a suitable metaphor that will enable his readers to understand the way in which a superior kind of vision, namely the vision of God functions. In singling out the act of seeing, he has already mentioned at the outset of this discussion that sight is the closest in nature to the vision of the mind. The relation between these two types of vision was thoroughly examined by Margaret Miles in an article entitled “Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in

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247 Augustine uses interchangeably the terms species, imago, similitudo without distinguishing between them.
248 Trin. 11.1.1. The idea is already present in sol. 1.6.12-1.6.13, where speaking of the preparation of the soul for the vision of God, Augustine lists three important conditions that the soul needs to meet: to have eyes (habere oculos), to look (aspicere) and to see (videre). The theological virtues and the prefect reason play a central role in assisting the soul in its progress from one step to another. William knew well this text and he uses almost the entire passage in Spec. 3-4, but he discusses it in a different context, focusing on faith, hope and charity as forming the image of God in the human being. See above, pp. 129-131. For a discussion of Augustine’s early account on the vision of God from sol. 1.6.12-.1.6.13, see Otten (1999) 444-446.
Augustine’s *De Trinitate* and *Confessiones*’. She claims that it is “Augustine’s understanding of the physics of vision which enables him to describe a process by which one comes to a vision of “That which is” or to put it more plainly, the physical vision serves as a model for Augustine’s description of the vision of God. There are a number of similarities between these two types of vision which she discusses in detail: the same triad formed of the visible object, the seeing individual and the will, the difference in nature of the members of this triad, the role of the will in applying the sense to the object, the transformation of will in love or desire depending on its intensity and finally the will that unifies. Since Augustine does not deal systematically with this analogy, but mentions it occasionally without much elaboration, the material that Margaret Miles brings as evidence for the similarities between the two types of vision, originates, apart from the *De Trinitate* and the *Confessiones*, in the *Enarrationes in Psalmos*, the *Sermones*, the *In epistulam Joannis ad Parthos tractatus*, and even the *Soliloquies*.

Turning now to William, we find him making general observations on sense perception only to compare it always with the sense of love perceiving God. A close look at the texts dealing with this topic will demonstrate this as well as William’s indebtedness to the Augustinian sense perception theory described above. We will begin with a short passage from *Meditatio* 3 in which William presents the analogy between the corporeal act of seeing and the operational mechanism of the sense of the soul which is love:

> Every bodily sense, in order to be a sense and to perceive must be changed by means of a certain sensible impression, into the thing it perceives (...) For, unless the sense informs the reason about the thing perceived and unless the soul, perceiving by a certain transformation of itself, is changed into the thing or into the quality of the thing perceived, it is neither a sense nor it is able to perceive. In the same way, if it [i. e. the soul] perceives the good God by means of love which is its sense and if it loves him because he is good, it is only able to do this because, communicating through affection to him who is good, it becomes good itself. (...) For this is true in a certain way about the sense of the soul. For the sense of the soul is love: by this [i. e. sense of love] it perceives whatever it perceives, either when it is pleased or when it is offended. When by this [i.e. sense of love] the soul reaches out to anything, it is transformed in that which it loves by

249 Miles (1983) 125-142.
250 Miles (1983) 125.
251 *Trin.* 11.1.1; *Trin.* 12.15.24 in the context of divine illumination.
252 William mentions the cognitive process several times in his works: *Med.* 3.9 -10; *Cant.* 94 and *Spec.* 96.
a certain transformation of itself, not that it becomes the same in nature, but that it is conformed by its affection to the thing which is loved. For it cannot love a good person because he is good, without being itself made good through that same goodness253.

In this text William seems to refer to only two elements involved in the cognitive act, the one who senses and the thing which is sensed. No act of perception takes place without a certain sensible impression on the perceiver that changes him to a certain extent either into the thing perceived or in the quality of the thing perceived. Augustine at his turn spoke of a form, likeness or image of the thing seen imprinted in the subject that can affect the seeing individual if the will is vehement. William seems to argue for the same thing insisting more than Augustine on the centrality of the transformation of the subject that senses into the thing which is sensed. He moves then from the corporeal level to the spiritual level, saying that in the same way the sense of soul, which is love, operates. Loving God, the human soul is affected to a certain extent by the object of its love, so that it is somehow transformed not in God himself, because it does not become of the same nature as God, but “by its affection it is conformed to that what it loves”. Here the object of love being God, this phrase strikingly resembles one of Augustine’s claims that “by love we are conformed to God”254. The ontological gap between creature and Creator is maintained and William adds that by loving God, the soul does not change into god but becomes good as God is good. One could say that this principle of transformation parallels Augustine’s examples, since a chameleon for instance by changing in accordance to its surroundings, maintains its chameleonic nature, while conforming only its colour to that of the things perceived.

In the Speculum fidei William discusses again the same process in similar terms. He begins by summarising the functional principle of the act of sensing, insisting again on the transformation of the one who senses into the thing which is sensed taking place while the sense is produced and also emphasizing that the transformation is a necessary condition in order for the act of perception to be produced. A short paragraph is dedicated to the greatness of will which unites things, by attracting them to itself by means of senses. The ideas presented here are without any doubt inspired by Augustine and a

253 Med. 3.9-10.
254 mor. 1.13.23: Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur deo...
comparative look at the two texts will convincingly illustrate William’s direct source, although he never explicitly acknowledges Augustine as his source:

Spec. 100:

Habet enim voluntas animae ad copulandas res etiam corporeas vim tantam, ut sensibus eas admoveas, tanta nonnumquam intentione sensus ipsos in eis formatos detineat, ut voluntas ipsa efficiatur amor, vel cupiditas, vel libido; ferventiore intentionis vehementia in tantum rebus senses inhians, ut de eis ipsum corpus inhiantis vel amantis sic afficiat vel inficiat, ut aliquando illud in similem vel speciem vel colorem transfundat. Non hoc latuit patriarcham Iacob, qui colores quos volebat artificiali et naturali machinamento pecudibus nascituris indidit, ne hominis barbaris nequitia laboris sui mercede defraudetur.

Trin. 11.2.5:

...voluntas autem tantam habet vim copulandi haec duo, ut et sensum formandum admoveat ei rei quae cernitur et in ea formatum teneat. et si tam violenta est ut possit vocari amor aut cupiditas aut libido, etiam ceterum corpus animantis vehementer afficit, et ubi non resistit pigrior duriorque materies in similem speciem coloremque commutat. (...) sunt exempla quae copiose commemorari possint, sed unum sufficit de fidelissimis libris quod fecit Iacob ut oves et caprae varios coloribus parerent supponendo eis variata urgulta in canalibus aquarum quae potantes intuerentur eo tempore quo conceperant.

William’s dependence on Augustine is quite apparent in this section, where he seems to have conveyed the essence of Augustine’s text, if not his exact wording. He has eliminated some of Augustine’s explanations and retained only as much as it sufficed for him to make his point. He kept only one of Augustine’s examples, namely the episode of Jacob’s sheep and she-goats. In addition, he used this Augustinian passage in order to make the transition to a different, also Augustinian aspect of the will, namely that of the Holy Spirit as will or love. Next, he smoothly moves to a description of the spiritual cognitive process in which the human soul loves God and its spiritual sense (amor) is fixed on the object of its desire by the will which is the Holy Spirit itself:

This [i.e. the transformation of love] takes place more powerfully and more worthily when the Holy Spirit himself, who is the substantial will of the Father and the Son, so draws the human will to himself, that the soul loving God, and perceiving him by loving, is transformed suddenly and totally, not indeed into the nature of divinity, but still into a certain form of beatitude above what is human
and below what is divine, into the joy of illuminating grace and the knowledge of the enlightened conscience.\textsuperscript{255}.

In this passage, there are three elements involved in the process of love’s transformation: the soul, God and his substantial will, namely the Holy Spirit. The human will is also mentioned but it is presented as being entirely passive in face of the divine initiative, almost annihilated by the Holy Spirit, which attracts it to himself. This superior act of knowledge is ultimately a gift of superabundant grace. Applying the principle of transformation of the one who senses into that which is sensed, the result, as David Bell observed, is “that the ‘object’ and the ‘sense’ are in the last analysis the same thing”\textsuperscript{256}, though the sense was not transformed by nature into the thing sensed. The will that unites the two is as we have seen not the human will but the Holy Spirit. This leads to a kind of unity and there is no wonder that William refers to the result of this affective and at the same time cognitive process as \textit{unitas spiritus}\textsuperscript{257}, paralleling Augustine’s comment that in spite of the diversity of natures, the three elements involved in the act of seeing form a kind of unity. Evidently, it is just a formal parallel, but one could argue that William arrived at this result combining Augustinian elements such as the operational principle of sense perception and the idea of the Holy Spirit as love.

Finally a third text we need to look at briefly is an excerpt from the \textit{Expositio super Cantica Canticorum} \S 94 which apart from the usual information on the theory of perception contained in the texts already discussed, also explains what William has in mind when he claims that there is no sense without the transformation of the subject which senses into that which is sensed (\textit{transformetur sentiens in id quod sentitur}). The transformation William is speaking about so often is a “certain similitude of the thing sensed” (\textit{quaedam sensae rei similitudo}) which is formed in the mind (\textit{in ipsam mentem}) or in the soul of the one who sees (\textit{formetur in anima videntis}). This likeness, by which the one who senses is transformed into that which is sensed (\textit{per quam transformetur sentiens in id quod sentitur}) conditions the act of sensing.

The similarity of these ideas with those of Augustine’s contained in the \textit{De Trinitate} 11.2.3 is obvious when we compare the two texts. Although Augustine never

\textsuperscript{255} \textit{Spec.} 101.  
\textsuperscript{256} Bell (1984) 165.  
\textsuperscript{257} \textit{Spec.} 99: \textit{et unus spiritus efficitur homo cum Deo, cui afficitur}. 
uses such strong expressions as to speak of a “transformation” of the seeing individual into the object which is seen, he, nevertheless, considers that the act of seeing takes place by having a likeness (similitudo) or an image (imago) produced or imprinted in the sense of the one who sees. He also insists that one cannot possibly sense unless some likeness of the object observed is produced in one’s sense. William following Augustine says exactly the same thing when he repeatedly informs his readers that without the transformation of the one who senses in the object sensed (which implies the presence of some likeness of the object perceived in the soul or mind of the one who senses) there can be no sensing. From the corporeal level, William moves again to the comparison with the sense of love which has God as its object, accentuating its superiority in contrast with the other senses, by the use of the introductory expression: sic et multo magis. The vision or the knowledge of God which takes place in “the sense of love” (in sensu amoris) is superior to any other kind of knowledge or vision. The likeness and transformation that each act of sensing God requires, analogically to the corporeal act of sensing, makes the human being become, in the vision of God, one spirit with God, that is to become like God, not by nature, but by grace. Visio Dei and unitas spiritus refer to the same privileged state of superior knowledge. Elevated to this condition, the human being becomes the recipient of “a certain and clear experience of God” (certam de Deo et manifestam experientiam) not sensed by any other sense except by sensus illuminati amoris and not understood by anything else except by intellectus illuminati amoris. Both expressions sensus amoris and intellectus amoris seem to refer to the same process, but when William wants to emphasise the experiential dimension of the process he will use rather the expression sensus amoris and the corresponding verb sentio. When he wants to underline that it is a real knowledge, he uses the expression intellectus amoris and the corresponding verb intellego. The latter aspect of the superior cognitive process is also summarized by William in the famous formula which became his mystical signature: amor ipse intellectus est.

In conclusion, it is possible to claim that William’s understanding of sensus amoris has deep Augustinian roots, which do not pertain only to William’s reading of a

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258 Cant. 94; Spec. 97; McGinn (1994) 253-254 observes the contextual use of sensus amoris and intellectus amoris.
particular text, namely that of the De Trinitate 11. Undoubtedly, William knew extremely well Augustine’s view on the mechanism of sense perception more fully articulated in this text, but he also had a profound and wide knowledge of Augustine’s other works and this familiarity with Augustine’s works in general enabled him to draw more boldly connections between different aspects of Augustine’s teaching. In order to assert such an analogy between the two types of vision, William needed to rely on disparate passages from Augustine works, since this analogy is not treated systematically by Augustine. William demonstrates again that he is not merely a compiler, drawing on Augustine’s passages without any attempt to understand those passages in a larger context.

6. Amor ipse intellectus est

Amor ipse intellectus est is a slight adaptation of an expression pertaining to Gregory the Great amor ipse notitia est259, as William himself acknowledges in his work Disputatio adversum Abelardum260. However, the principle conveyed by this succinct expression has a long history and its roots must be traced back before Gregory. Augustine wrote a great deal on the interaction between love and knowledge and the principle of the knowing love appears already in one of his works although in a different formulation from that of Gregory: Qui novit veritatem, novit eam [sc. lucem incommutabilem]; et qui novit eam, novit aeternitatem. Caritas novit eam261. Among William’s contemporaries there are many who make use of the Gregorian formula and of the principle it conveyed262.

Employed merely four times by William263, who used it in parallel with the equivalent expression intellectus amoris264, the dictum amor ipse intellectus est retained the attention of the modern scholars, who made it the core of their debate. David Bell has shown that this phrase can be understood in more than one way, due to the ambiguity of

259 Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia 27.4. SC 522:170.
260 Disp. Ab. 2: In huiusmodi etenim, sicut dicit beatus Gregorius, amor ipse intellectus est.
261 conf. 7.10.16.
262 Unlike William, Bernard quotes Gregory in a correct way, see Div. 29.1: Exponit beatus Gregorius, quia amor ipse notitia est. For a list of twelfth century writers who make use of this idea see Bell (1984) 232-233.
263 Cant. 57; 76; Disp. Ab. 2; Ep. frat. 173.
264 Cant. 21; 105.
the verb *esse* which can be used either denoting identity like in the statement “John Smith is a man”, or denoting inseparability like in the statement “The rose is red”\(^{265}\). One of the first scholars to pay attention to this phrase and to comment upon it was P. Rousselot, who suggested that it had to be interpreted as representing a formal and conceptual identification between love and understanding\(^{266}\). M.-M. Davy, who did not recognise love as a cognitive faculty, argued that the phrase *amor ipse intellectus est* must be understood metaphorically\(^{267}\). More recently and under the influence of Malevez’s position\(^{268}\) these early scholarly positions have been refuted and there seems to be a consensus among scholars nowadays (Déchanet, Brooke, Bell, McGinn\(^{269}\)) that the type of knowledge conveyed by the expressions *amor ipse intellectus est* and *intellectus amoris* must be understood not as an identification, but as an “interpenetration” of love and understanding. Moreover, *amor-intellectus* is accepted as to refer to experiential, non-discursive, non-conceptual, suprarational knowledge, yet knowledge in the strict sense of the term, and not to have been used by William merely as a kind of metaphor. The real character of this type of knowledge is also due to its eschatological dimension being regarded as an anticipation of the beatific vision and therefore offering not merely knowledge about God, but a direct knowledge of God as he is in himself: *ipsum vero idipsum quod est*\(^{270}\). Finally, the result of this type of knowing does not reveal the Trinitarian mystery, but remains obscure, or, as William puts it using an Augustinian expression, offers a *quaedam docta ignorantia*\(^{271}\), which is more a recognition of God’s incomprehensibility.

After this summary of the conclusions reached by modern scholars regarding William’s doctrine of *amor-intellectus* it is the moment to inquire whether Augustine in any way might have contributed to the development of William’s doctrine of *amor-intellectus*. We have seen that William himself attributes the formula *amor ipse intellectus est* to Gregory the Great, but apart from the terminological similarity, one

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\(^{265}\) Bell (1984) 238.
\(^{266}\) Rousselot (1933) 76.
\(^{268}\) Malevez (1932) 2:277-279.
\(^{270}\) *Ep. frat.* 292. See also Brooke (1980) 28.
\(^{271}\) *Exp. Rom.* 5.8.27. William quotes here a larger text from Augustine’s *ep.* 130.28 which contains the expression *docta ignorantia*. 
cannot detect important Gregorian elements in William’s treatment of this idea. Therefore, it is necessary to search for his source of inspiration in other authors, while acknowledging, at the same time, William’s original contribution in developing this idea further than it had ever been done before him.

The perusal of the contexts in which this formula appears brings forth an idea regarding the relationship between love and knowledge that is very similar to ideas about love and knowledge expressed by Augustine. Thus, in paragraph 57 from the *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*, William discusses how the soul begins to know and love God after it has previously been known and loved by God. Knowledge and love are directly interconnected because the degree of love increases with the increase of knowledge.

The mutuality of love and knowledge is emphasised in another passage from the same work representing a direct explanation of the dictum *amor ipse intellectus est*:

The love of God is itself knowledge of him: unless he is loved, he is not known, and unless he is known, he is not loved. Indeed, to the extent he is loved, so much is he known, and to the extent he is known so much is he loved.

This way of describing the relationship between love and knowledge echoes Augustine. In his attempt to demonstrate the link between love and knowledge, Augustine frequently makes use of the principle that no one loves that which one does not know. Giving the example of an unknown word of which one knows that it is a sign and therefore that it signifies something, he shows that “the more a thing is known but not fully known, the more the mind desires to know the rest.” In this case knowledge increases love, but the opposite seems to function as well and Augustine, beginning from the same principle that nothing can be loved unless already known, reaches the conclusion that love increases knowledge: “For that cannot be loved which is altogether unknown. But when what is

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272 Cant. 57.
273 Cant. 76.
274 *Trin.* 10.1.1: *nam quod quisque prorsus ignorat, amare nullo pacto potest*; *Trin.* 10.1.2: *certe enim amari aliquid nisi notum non potest*; ibid. *quoniam firmissime novimus amari nisi nota potest*. This idea occurs constantly in *De Trinitate* throughout books 8 to 10: *Trin.* 8.4.6: *sed quis diliget quod ignorant*?; *Trin.* 9.3.3: *nam quomodo amat quod nescit*?; *Trin.* 9.12.18: *amor (...) quo id quod notum est, amatuar*.
275 *Trin.* 10.1.2: *quo igitur amplius notum est sed non plene notum est, eo cupit animus de illo nosse quod reliquum est.*
known, in however small a measure, is also loved, by the self-same love one is led on to a better and fuller knowledge.”

Augustine also connects love and knowledge with likeness and according to him a gradual progress in the knowledge and the love of God determines a greater likeness to God. The human being becomes like God by knowledge of him, for “insofar as we know God we are like him.” In addition, the human being becomes like God also through love of God and there is no doubt that for Augustine this is a prime aspect, for “it is through love that we become conformed to God.” William has no disagreement with Augustine in sustaining that the more human beings progress in the knowledge and love of God, the more like him they become. The passage where this idea occurs is almost taken verbatim from Augustine’s Epistula 92:

Aenig. 6: 

In interiore ergo homine similitudo ista est, qua renovator homo de die in diem in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ubi tanto ei efficiimur similiores, quanto magis in eius cognitionem caritatemque proficimus...

Ep. 92. 3:

(...) in interiore igitur homine ista similitudo est, qui renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creavit eum. et tanto efficimur similiores illi, quanto magis in eius cognitione et caritate proficimus...

For it is in the inner human being that that likeness exists by which the human being is renewed day by day in the knowledge of God according to the image of him who created him. And it is there that we become more like him as we progress more in knowledge and love of him.

In the inner human being therefore is this likeness, which is renewed in the knowledge of God according to the image of him, who created him. And so much we become more similar to him, the more we progress in the knowledge and love of him...

Apart from the peculiarly similar ideas to those of Augustine on the interaction between love and knowledge presented above, this direct use of the Augustinian text referring to

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276 Jo. ev. tr. 96.4: Non enim diligitur quod penitus ignoratur. Sed cum diligitur quod ex quantulacumque parte cognoscitur, ipsa efficitur dilectione ut melius et plenius cognoscatur.

277 Trin. 9.11.16: Quocirca in quantum Deo novimus, similares sumus.

278 mor. 1.13.23: Fiet ergo per caritatem ut conformemur Deo...
the same matter, confirms that, among the various sources that William might have used in understanding the love-knowledge relationship, Augustine played an important role.

Turning now to the mechanism of *amor-intellectus*, it is noteworthy to observe that it is exactly the image of God formed of memory, intellect and will, as expounded by Augustine in the *De Trinitate*, that William takes as his starting point in order to explain what he understands by knowledge of God or *intellectus amoris*, although he does not mention the latter expression explicitly in the paragraph we are going to look at. There is no doubt however that this is what he has in mind. In a very significant passage from the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* (242-251), William endeavours to describe two types of knowledge: one ordinary, the other having God as object. William’s starting point of the discussion is anchored in Augustine’s understanding of cogitation as the unity of a trinity formed by memory, inner vision and will which he discovers in the inner human being. William in his turn defines cogitation in exactly the same way with the single exception that the elements involved in the act of thinking belong to the most accurate image of God to be found in the human soul: memory, understanding and will. Like Augustine, William considers that the word *cogitatio* derives its meaning from the verb *coago* “to compel”. For both Augustine and William it is the will which compels the other elements of the image and by uniting them leads to the formation of *cogitatio*:

*Ep. frat.* 242:

*Voluntas cogit memoriam, ut proferat materiam; cogit intellectum ad formandum quod profertur, adhibens intellectum memoriae, ut inde formetur, intellectui vero aciem cogitantis, ut inde cogitetur.*

*Trin. 11.3.6:*

*voluntasque ipsa quomodo foris corpori obiecto formandum sensum admovebat formatumque iungebat, sic aciem recordantis animi convertit ad memoriam ut ex eo quod illa retinuit ista formetur, et fit in cogitatione similis uisio.*

The will compels the memory to bring... And the will itself, as it moved the sense to...

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280 *Trin.* 11.3.6: *atque ita fit illa trinitas ex memoria et interna uisione et quae utrumque copulat voluntate, quae tria cum in unum coguntur ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur.*
282 *Ep. frat.* 242: *...a cogendo cogitatio nomen accepisse videtur.* see *Trin.* 11.3.6: *...ab ipso coactu cogitatio dicitur.*
forth the matter; it compels the intellect to form what is brought forth, applying the intellect to memory, so that the concept is formed, and applying the acuteness of the thinking subject to the intellect, so that it is thought.

De Trinitate 11. 8. 15:

Voluntas porro sicut adiungit sensum corpori, sic memoriam sensui, sic aciem cogitantis aciem memoriae.

Furthermore, just as the will applies the sense to the body, so it applies memory to the sense and the acuteness of the thinking subject to the memory.

It is the will for both William and Augustine that applies the intellect or the *acies cogitantis* to the memory so that the thought might be formed. The human beings are unable to think without willing to do so. The formation of thoughts is a willed one. Although William does not quote Augustine verbatim and although he feels free to adapt the Augustinian model of thought formation, by introducing intermediary stages which do not appear in the Augustinian text, the definition of the cogitation as a unity of the members of *imago Dei*, the use of the expression *aciem cogitantis*, as well as the rendering of the main idea concerning the role of the will in the formation of thought confirms William’s familiarity with and partial dependence on the Augustinian theory of cognition from Book 11 of the *De Trinitate*.

In the same way as it was the case with the *sensus amoris*, William uses the mechanism of this ordinary type of knowledge as the basis for the knowledge that has God as its object. The same elements of the *imago Dei* are present in this higher kind of knowledge: memory, intellect and will. The main difference, however, is that it is not any longer the human will that acts upon memory and intellect, but the consubstantial will of the Father and the Son, namely the Holy Spirit. As soon as the Holy Spirit acts upon

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memory, it transforms it into wisdom (*memoria efficitur sapientia*\(^{284}\)). This transformation occurs “when the good gifts of God in a sweet way are wise towards wisdom and, what has been thought through those good gifts apply to the intellect, as something that has to be formed into affection” (*cum suaviter ei sapiunt bona Domini, et quod ex eis cogitatum est formandum in affectum adhibet intellectui*\(^{285}\)). The next stage marked by the repetition of *efficitur* takes place when “the intellect of the person thinking turns into the contemplation of the one who loves” (*intellectus cogitantis efficitur contemplatio amantis*\(^{286}\)) again under the compelling of the Holy Spirit. The result of this stage is “certain experiences of spiritual and divine sweetness” (*quasdam spiritualis vel divinae experientias*\(^{287}\)), which “affects the sharpness of the thinking person” (*afficit ex eis aciem cogitantis*). Finally the *acies cogitantis* becomes (the third *efficitur* in the construction of this passage) joy of the one who is enjoying (*gaudium fruentis*\(^{288}\)).

Augustine is barely recognizable in this passage, but seen in a broader context the mechanism of the knowledge of God described in this passage is based on that of the ordinary type of knowledge, which is definitely rooted in Augustine as we have shown above. Moreover, in developing his theory of sense perception and that of cognition Augustine was keen to show a strong link existing between sense and thought and that as a general rule the latter derives from the former\(^{289}\). Applying this model to William’s ideas about *sensus amoris* and *intellectus amoris*, the result would be that what is sensed by means of *sensus amoris* is understood by means of *intellectus amoris*. William is not very consistent with the terminology and sometimes he treats the two expressions as synonyms\(^{290}\), but he makes a difference between them when he describes the process that corresponds to each of them. For *sensus amoris*, the process is based on Augustine’s theory of sense perception\(^{291}\), for *intellectus amoris*, the process is based on Augustine’s theory of cogitation or thought formation.

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\(^{284}\) *Ep. frat.* 249.

\(^{285}\) *Ép. frat.* 249.

\(^{286}\) *Ep. frat.* 249

\(^{287}\) *Ep. frat.* 249.

\(^{288}\) *Ep. frat.* 249.

\(^{289}\) *Trin.* 11.3.6.

\(^{290}\) *Cant.* 21; 105.

\(^{291}\) See the section on *sensus amoris*, pp.147-155.
Apart from the Augustinian pattern of the process of knowledge which forms William’s scaffolding of this text it is necessary to observe in the construction of this paragraph and of those that immediately follow, the presence of a few other likely Augustinian elements, such as the notions of wisdom and contemplation, the transformative character of the knowledge of God, the gracious nature of the divine knowledge which cannot be acquired simply by human will but has to be granted by the Holy Spirit and finally, the most important aspect of all, the identification of the Holy Spirit with will and love.

The transformations of memory into wisdom and that of the intellect into contemplation presents similarities with what Augustine discusses in Book XII of the *De Trinitate*, regarding the knowledge of the temporal things which he calls *scientia* and that of God and the eternal things, which he calls *sapientia*. According to Augustine, action is the activity of *scientia*, while contemplation is the activity of *sapientia*. However, few are those who reach this state of wisdom by means of contemplation and when they achieve this as far as it is possible for them, they have not the strength to abide in it and the result is only a transitory thought about a non-transitory thing which is committed to memory.

Augustine’s claim of the transformative character of the knowledge of God is based on his own theory of sense–perception according to which when one sees an object a likeness of this object is formed in one’s sense and committed to memory. But the image of the body in the memory is better than the reality itself because it is in a better nature.

By the same token when we know God although we are indeed made better ourselves than we were before we knew him, especially when we like this same knowledge and appropriately love it and it is a word and becomes a kind of likeness to God; nevertheless it remains inferior to God because it is in an inferior nature.

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296 *Trin.* 9.11.16.
William subscribes to the idea that the knowledge of God has a transformative character and in the text we have just discussed above, he simply hints at this by using the term *afficit* which indicates that the thinking subject is affected as a result of this experiential knowledge. In other texts describing the highest state of knowledge for the human being, especially those texts where he addresses the issue of the *unitas spiritus*, William also considers that a sort of likeness of God is impressed in the human souls and thus gives to the human beings the possibility to experience the union with the divine persons²⁹⁷.

Although the human beings need to prepare each element that constitutes thought by cleansing the memory of idle and unnecessary business, the intellect of anxieties and the will of foreign attachments, it is not in their power to raise themselves to knowing God²⁹⁸. The direct knowledge of God, the *intellectus amoris*, is entirely a gift of grace. In stressing the gracious character of this type of knowledge which is based on a direct encounter with the divinity William is in agreement with Augustine who from the first experience of God he was granted when he was not yet a Christian in Book VII of the *Confessions*, recognized the role of the divine assistance in the soul’s ascent to God²⁹⁹.

Finally, the essential element of *amor-intellectus* is, as Odo Brooke pointed out³⁰⁰, the Holy Spirit. It is under that influence that the image of God is restored and in being restored succeeds to know God through love and to love God by knowing him. The *amor-intellectus* is to a certain extent the Holy Spirit³⁰¹, the mutual knowledge and love of the Father and the Son and their unity. Behind this idea we find again Augustine in whose view it is the Holy Spirit who loves and knows God through us³⁰². William adopted this idea and made it the core of his mystical theology, as we shall see next. As he approached this topic from different perspectives such as *amor intellectus, unitas spiritus*, or love of God, it is quite difficult to pin down his doctrine in a systematic way or to give a comprehensive account of it by considering it only from one angle.

²⁹⁷ See above, p. 148.
²⁹⁸ Ep. frat. 251.
²⁹⁹ conf. 7.10.16.
³⁰⁰ Brooke (1959) 113.
³⁰¹ Brooke (1959) 113, n. 137, considers that William does not speak of an identification between *amor-intellectus* and the Holy Spirit, his intention being that of suggesting that *amor-intellectus* is a real participation in the life of the Holy Spirit.
³⁰² See the discussion about the Holy Spirit below, pp. 167-169.
Therefore, a change of perspective is needed at this stage in our discussion, not before concluding briefly.

In reflecting upon the state denoted by intellectus amoris, William relies directly on Augustinian texts which treat of the relation between love and knowledge, makes use of various Augustinian elements (the triune created image of God in the human being, the concept of wisdom, the role of the Holy Spirit in the act of loving and knowing), follows Augustine’s operational cognitive principle and in general arrives to surprisingly original results by reading Augustine with Augustine’s help.

7. The Holy Spirit as love

One of the most distinctive, even unique elements of Augustine’s Trinitarian doctrine is the appropriation of love to the Holy Spirit. Although far from being systematic or fully elaborated, this aspect of Augustine’s treatment of the Trinity had a significant impact on medieval thought and William is a case in point. In this section, we will present briefly the main lines of the discussion of the Holy Spirit as love in Augustine. Then we will observe to what extent Augustine’s ideas are used by William. The material considered in this section will serve as a basis for the discussion of the role of the Holy Spirit in the union of the soul with God, which William terms as unitas spiritus.

In articulating his teaching on the aspect of the Holy Spirit as love, Augustine cannot benefit from biblical support since he himself acknowledges that nowhere in the sacred text is to be found explicitly stated that the Holy Spirit is love303. Therefore, he relies on two ideas which he combines in order to demonstrate the legitimacy of such a statement: the idea of the Holy Spirit as gift of God (donum Dei) and that of the Holy Spirit as the link between the Father and the Son304. The first idea is rooted in Scripture305 and was also remarked and commented upon by Christian Latin authors who preceded

303 Trin. 15.17.27.
304 Burnaby (1938) 173.
305 See the biblical narratives of the Samaritan woman in Jn 4:10 and that of Simon Magus in Acts 8:20.
Augustine\textsuperscript{306}. The second idea seems to be of Platonist origin and suggested to Augustine by the reading of Marius Victorinus\textsuperscript{307} and Porphyry\textsuperscript{308}.

In Book V of the \textit{De Trinitate}, these ideas appear together as different steps in an argumentation that aims at introducing the theme of the Holy Spirit as love\textsuperscript{309}. Beginning with the biblical evidence of the Holy Spirit as \textit{donum Dei}, Augustine meditates on the nature of the gift and this allows him to make a smooth transition to the theme of the Holy Spirit as the bond of the Father and the Son: “to speak of the gift of the giver and the giver of the gift is to use terms that are relative one to another. Therefore the Holy Spirit is a certain ineffable communion of the Father and the Son”\textsuperscript{310}. Augustine insists throughout the \textit{De Trinitate} that the Holy Spirit is that which “is common to both Father and Son and therefore properly called that which both have in common”\textsuperscript{311}, “an inseparable and eternal connection”\textsuperscript{312}, “the unity of both”\textsuperscript{313} Father and Son, or that the third Person of the Trinity is “a certain ineffable embrace of the Father and the image [i.e. the Son]”\textsuperscript{314}.

Because the terms \textit{communio, complexus, connexio} or \textit{unitas} reveal something of the nature of love “which is a kind of life which binds or seeks to bind some two


\textsuperscript{307} Marius Victorinus, \textit{Hymn} 1.3. CSEL 83/1:285 speaks of the Spirit as \textit{copula} while \textit{Hymn} 3.242-345. CSEL 83/1:303 refers to the Spirit with the terms \textit{conexio} and \textit{complexio}.

\textsuperscript{308} TeSelle (1999) 435 observes that Augustine might have had this notion from Porphyry, whom he quotes in \textit{civ. Dei} 10.23 referring to the Father and the \textit{paternus intellectus} and the \textit{medium} between them.

\textsuperscript{309} The idea of the Holy Spirit as love is already present in Augustine’s early works such as \textit{f. et symb.} 19 (regarding the Spirit’s activity \textit{ad extra}) and \textit{mus.} 6.56 (as a substantive term), but in the \textit{De Trinitate} we witness the whole argumentative process that supports Augustine’s claim that the Holy Spirit is love. For more examples of the Holy Spirit as love in Augustine’s works preceding the \textit{De Trinitate}, see Cavallera (1930) 382-387. Among Augustine’s predecessors who wrote on the Holy Spirit, such as Hilary of Poitiers, Dydimus the Blind and Ambrose, none of them identified the third person of the divine Trinity with love. Ambrose, however, goes further than the others when commenting on Rom 5:5 and emphasizes that the Holy Spirit is “the dispenser and abundant fount of divine love”, see \textit{De Spiritu Sancto}. 1.5.66. PL 16:721A. For a more detailed discussion of the treatment of the Holy Spirit in these authors preceding Augustine see Wilken (2000) 1-8.

\textsuperscript{310} Trin. 5.11.12: \textit{Donum ergo donatoris et donator doni cum dicimus relative utrumque ad invicem dicimus. ergo spiritus sanctus ineffabilis quaedam patris filiique communio...}

\textsuperscript{311} Trin. 15.19.37: \textit{Quia enim est communis ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprius quod ambo communiter.}

\textsuperscript{312} Trin. 6.4.6: \textit{...inseparabilis atque aeterna connexio.}

\textsuperscript{313} Trin. 6.5.7: \textit{unitas amborum.}

\textsuperscript{314} Trin. 6.7.11: \textit{... ineffabilis quidam complexus patris et imaginis.}
together"\textsuperscript{315}, in Book VI of the \textit{De Trinitate}, Augustine relies on this point in order to introduce the notion of love in relation to the Holy Spirit:

The Holy Spirit, therefore is something common to the Father and the Son, whatever that is. And this communion is consubstantial and co-eternal; which, if it may appropriately be called friendship, let it be so called; but still more aptly it is called love. And this love is also substance, because God is substance, and God is love, as it is written\textsuperscript{316}.

In this paragraph which culminates in the famous quotation from 1 Jn 4:16, \textit{Deus caritas est}, love, although identified with the third person of the Trinity, does not reveal the relationship of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son, rather it is a “substantive” term which like Wisdom or Power can be applied to all members of the Holy Trinity\textsuperscript{317}. Augustine comes back to the idea of the Holy Spirit as love only in the last book of the \textit{De Trinitate}, where he is in search of what forms the \textit{proprium} of the third person of the divine Trinity in relation with the other two persons. His identification of the Holy Spirit with love is made in the light of his long discussion of the analogies of the image of God in the human soul, where the third component of the image during the inward search was constantly will or love. However, his main argument for the appropriation of the term love to the Holy Spirit is entirely exegetical, being based on 1 Jn 4:7 “love is of God” (\textit{dilectio ex Deo est}) and on 1 Jn 4:8 “God is love” (\textit{Deus dilectio est}), which Augustine inverses to “love is God”\textsuperscript{318}. Therefore, in Augustine’s own words “God from God is love” (\textit{deus ergo ex deo est dilectio})\textsuperscript{319}. As it is not possible to say of the Father that he is God of God but only of the Son or of the Spirit, Augustine concludes that the Apostle must be referring to the latter since the biblical context, which explicates the expressions “love is of God” and “God is love” continues like this: “‘In this’, he said, ‘we know that we abide in him and he in us because he has given us of his Spirit’. Therefore the Holy Spirit, of whom he has given us causes us to remain in God and God in us. But love does this. He is, therefore, the God who is love”\textsuperscript{320}.

\textsuperscript{315} \textit{Trin.} 8.10.14: \textit{quaedam vita duo aliqua copulans vel copulari appetens}
\textsuperscript{316} \textit{Trin.} 6.5.7.
\textsuperscript{317} Burnaby (1938) 174.
\textsuperscript{318} On the inversion of 1 Jn 4:8 see Teske (2008) 49-60.
\textsuperscript{319} \textit{Trin.} 15.17.31.
\textsuperscript{320} \textit{Trin.} 15.17.31.
The intratrinitarian distinctions of the Holy Spirit from the other two persons of the divine trinity (namely the gift of God, the ineffable communion of the Father and the Son, the love), which forbid the confounding of the divine persons, have also consequences regarding the salvation economy, that is, regarding God’s dealing with his creatures. As gift of God and love, the Holy Spirit pours the charity of God in the hearts of the human beings, according to the biblical passage which states that: *Caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum* (Rom 5:5). In this way, the Holy Spirit is the source of every true love (love for God and love for one’s neighbour) since, as Augustine repeats incessantly, the human beings do not have from where to love God, except from God himself\textsuperscript{321}.

In Augustine’s view, however, the gift of God is not only the source of our love for God, he goes further than that, identifying the gift of God with the act of loving God, or in other words, the human love for God is the gift of God: *Amare Deum donum Dei est*\textsuperscript{322}. And since “the gift of the Spirit is nothing else than the Spirit himself”\textsuperscript{323}, it follows that our love for God is God, the Holy Spirit himself. Thus, rather than giving to human beings anything created or inferior, God gives God: “Is he not God who gives the Holy Spirit? Nay, how great a God is he who gives God”\textsuperscript{324} exclaims Augustine. This idea is also present in some of Augustine’s sermons in very bold formulations:

He whom we have loved has given us himself, he has given us that from where we may love (...) so that we love God through God, because the Holy Spirit is God and we cannot love God except through the Holy Spirit\textsuperscript{325}.

…or even a more radical statement:

That you may love God, let him dwell in you and love himself through you\textsuperscript{326}.

According to the passages quoted above our act of loving becomes the Spirit’s act of loving or to put it in a different way, when God is the object of our love, God loves God in us and through us. In addition to this, since in Augustine’s view we cannot love what

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{321} *Trin.* 15.17.31.
  \item \textsuperscript{322} s. 297.1.
  \item \textsuperscript{323} *Trin.* 15.19.36: …*sic donum spiritus sancti nihil aliud est quam spiritus sanctus.*
  \item \textsuperscript{324} *Trin.* 15.26.46: *Quomodo ergo Deus non est qui dat Spiritum Sanctum? Imo quantus Deus est qui dat Deum.*
  \item \textsuperscript{325} s. 34.2-3.
  \item \textsuperscript{326} s. 128.4: *Ut ergo ames Deum, habitet in te Deus, et amet se de te.*
\end{itemize}
we do not know, the Holy Spirit manifests himself not only in the act of loving but also in that of knowing. Thus, in contemplation the Holy Spirit takes over the human cognitive capacity in such a way that it is not the contemplative soul who knows or sees God but God who sees himself through the human soul. Augustine refers to this aspect of contemplation in a passage in the *Confessiones*:

To those who see your works through your Spirit, it is you who sees in them. When they see that the works are good, you see that they are good; and whatever delights you through your Spirit, delights you in us (...). When I ask why “‘No one knows what belongs to God but God’s Spirit’ (1 Cor 2:11), and therefore how shall we know what are the gifts that God has given us?” the answer is that what we know through his Spirit is only known by the Spirit of God (...). Therefore, whatever they see in God’s spirit to be good, it is not they but God who sees that it is good.  

These are very striking ideas suggesting that in the act of loving God and knowing or seeing God, it is the Holy Spirit, the gift of God, who loves and knows through human beings, rather than anything related to the human capacity of doing so. These radical formulations can be seen as the logical consequence of Augustine’s constant conviction and response against the Pelagians that of his own power the human being “made it possible to fall, but is not able to generate his resurrection” and that everything good is the work of God in his creatures.

By emphasizing that it is the Holy Spirit who works in human beings in order that they may love God or that it is God who loves himself in human beings, it is important to observe that Augustine avoids to draw any distinction between the love of God which the Spirit pours into the human hearts or the love for God on the one hand and the love which is God himself on the other hand. Augustine’s silence in this aspect gave rise to controversy in the twelfth century with opinions ranging from complete identification of the virtue of charity with the Holy Spirit, as in the case of Peter Lombard, to sharp

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328 *en.* Ps. 129.1: *idoneus potuit esse homo ad casum suum; non est idoneus ad resurrectionem suam.*
329 Burnaby (1938) 174.
distinction between created and uncreated love as in the case of Abelard\textsuperscript{331} and Rupert of Deutz\textsuperscript{332}.

Finally, apart from being the consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, in his activity \textit{ad extra} the Holy Spirit as the gift of God is intended to bring human beings in communion with their creator:

That which is common to the Father and the Son, through this they have willed that we should have communion with one another and with them, [they have willed] that we should be brought together into one through that gift which they both have as one, that is through the Holy Spirit, God and God’s gift\textsuperscript{333}.

The divine intention in giving the Holy Spirit as gift of God to humans was to enable them to participate in the Trinitarian life. This idea is mentioned also in the \textit{De Trinitate} where Augustine says:

Love therefore which is from God, and which is God, is in the true sense the Holy Spirit, through whom is poured into our hearts the charity of God, through which the whole Trinity dwells in us\textsuperscript{334}.

It is therefore by means of love which is the Holy Spirit that we are united to God. The communion or unity consisting of the Holy Spirit and existing within the Holy Trinity, to which Augustine refers by using the term \textit{unum}, based on the biblical verse \textit{Ego et Pater unum sumus} (Jn 10:30), is entirely different from the unity between God and the soul, brought about by the same Holy Spirit and to which Augustine applies the term \textit{unus spiritus} (1 Cor 6:17). In the first unity there is sameness of nature, while in the second there is difference in nature. By love which is the Holy Spirit the human soul is joined to God and although the natures remain distinct, as a result of this unity, the human soul undergoes a certain transformation. Like in the case of vision, where the viewer is affected by the object which is seen\textsuperscript{335}, Augustine is convinced that the object of love affects the lover: “Do you love the earth? You will be earth! Do you love God? What shall I say? You will be God? I do not dare to say it from myself, let us hear the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{331} Abelard, \textit{Epistola ad Romanos} 2.5. PL. 178:860.
\item \textsuperscript{332} Rupert of Deutz, \textit{De divinis officiis} 11.7. PL. 170:300.
\item \textsuperscript{333} s. 71.18.
\item \textsuperscript{334} \textit{Trin.} 15.18.32.
\item \textsuperscript{335} See the section on \textit{sensus amoris}, pp. 147-155.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
scriptures: I said you are gods and all of you children of the Most High (Ps. 81:6)\textsuperscript{336}. Of course, Augustine is careful to add that human beings become merely gods by grace and not by nature\textsuperscript{337}, since in the unity brought about by the Holy Spirit as love, the natures remain always distinct.

Turning to William, it is important to observe that he refers to the Augustinian doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love already in his first writings. Thus, in De natura et dignitate amoris he makes the third element of the Augustinian image of God in the human being, namely the will or love, correspond to the Holy Spirit\textsuperscript{338}. But he does not discuss the mystical implications of such a statement. In this early work, the accent seems to fall more on God in general being called love\textsuperscript{339}. In the De contemplando Deo of the same period, William goes much further when dealing with the same topic and offers to his readers a comprehensive summary of the Augustinian teaching on the Holy Spirit as love. The idea that the Holy Spirit is love is repeated several time throughout this paragraph and examined from different perspectives. Thus, William defines substantially the Holy Spirit as love like in the following passage:

Therefore, you love yourself, oh lovable Lord, in yourself, when from the Father and the Son proceeds the Holy Spirit, the love of the Father towards the Son, and the love of the Son towards the Father, and the love is so great that it becomes unity; and the unity is so great that it is homoousion, that is, the same substance of the Father and the Son\textsuperscript{340}.

William uses the expression amor tuus to refer to the Holy Spirit in his intratrinitarian operation: “But your love is your goodness (…) the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son”\textsuperscript{341}. However, amor tuus as the third person of the Trinity may also act in creation by his dwelling in the human beings: “And when your love, the love of the Father towards the Son and the love of the Son towards the Father, the Holy Spirit,

\textsuperscript{337} en. Ps. 49.2: Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus: sed hoc gratiae adoptantis, non naturae generantis.
\textsuperscript{338} Nat. am. 3.
\textsuperscript{339} Nat. am. 12.
\textsuperscript{340} Contemp. 14.
\textsuperscript{341} Contemp. 14: Sed amor tuus, bonitas tua est (…) spiritus sanctus a patre procedens et filio.
dwelling in us, he is towards you that which it is, that is, love". By his activity *ad extra* the Holy Spirit entrusts to the human hearts the charity of God, according to the biblical verse from Rom 5:5 to which William alludes repeatedly, so that we love God *affectu amoris* which has been implanted in us by God. Human beings have not just received love from God, they have received the love which is God, since the love we have for God, which William likes to term *amor noster*, is also the Holy Spirit: “For he [i.e. the Holy Spirit] is our love by which we reach out to you, by which we embrace you”. The logical conclusion of this reasoning, repeated by William four times in this paragraph alone, is that to love God is identical with saying that God loves himself in or through us: “we love you or you love yourself in us”.

And yet in spite of this identification of *amor tuus* with *amor noster* or of God’s love for us with our love for God, there seems to be a difference in the way these two types of love operate, for William tells us that we love God *affectu*, while he loves us *effectu: nos affectu, tu effectu*. Like Augustine, he considers *affectus* a term which cannot be applied to God, since this would suggest that God is liable to change. Therefore God’s love for his creatures will not affect him in any way. To love *effectu caritatis*, explains William, means that God loves us by making us his lovers: “You love us therefore in as much as you make us lovers of you”. This is not an original idea by William. It is already to be found in Augustine’s interpretation of the expression *caritas Dei* from Rom 5:5 which represents in Augustine’s view “not the love by which God loves us but the love by which he makes us his lovers”.

On the other hand our love for God is transformative, we love *affectu amoris* and are affected by the object of our love: “When we love you, our spirit is affected by your

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342 Contemp. 17: *Cumque amor tuus, amor Patris ad Filium amor Filii ad Patrem, Spiritus sanctus, habitans in nobis ad te est quod est, id est amor.*
343 Contemp. 14: *et Dei in nos caritas commendans;* Contemp. 17: *per quem [i.e. spiritum sanctum] habitantem in nobis caritatem Dei habemus diffusam in cordibus nostris.*
344 Contemp. 14: *Sed nos te diligimus affectu amoris a te nobis indito.*
345 Contemp. 17: *Ipse enim est amor noster quo ad te pertingimus; quo te amplectimur.*
346 Contemp. 17: *Amanus te vel amas tu te in nobis;* Contemp. 14: *Amas et te ipsum in nobis, mittendo Spiritum Filii tui in corda nostra;* Contemp. 14: *immo sic teipsum in nobis amas;* Contemp. 15: *Tu teipsum amas in nobis et nos in te cum per te amabimus.*
347 Contemp. 17.
348 See above, pp. 144, n. 222.
349 Contemp. 15: *Amas itaque nos in quantum nos efficis tui amatores,* spir. et litt. 56: *... non qua nos ipse diligit, sed qua nos facit dilectores suos.*
Holy Spirit and we are united to him. It is important to note that already in this early work the long discussion of the Holy Spirit as love is nothing else than a prelude to the theme of the soul’s unity with God. The final aspect of this journey which has started with God’s love for his creatures is that through the unity with him realized by love, i.e. the Holy Spirit, we may be transformed into gods as well. William quotes as support for this idea Ps 81:6, which appears in a similar context in Augustine. And also like for Augustine, human beings become gods or children of God only per adoptionis gratiam while Christ is God and the Son of God per naturam.

Along these lines, I dare to argue that already at this early stage in his career as a writer William had a comprehensive view of the fragmentary and unsystematic Augustinian doctrine of the Holy Spirit as love. In spite of not containing explicit quotations from Augustine’s works, the central chapters from the De contemplando Deo contain a concentrated summary of the most important Augustinian ideas on love.

It is possible to bring more substantial evidence that the ideas presented in this early work are based on Augustine by looking at some of William’s later works, where he quotes directly from Augustine. One may rightly ask why William, who seems to have known Augustine’s ideas regarding the Holy Spirit already quite early in his career, uses them explicitly particularly in his later works. When attempting to answer this question, firstly, one needs to take into account the genre of William’s works. It is known that a significant part of William’s works consists to a great deal of compilations, as for instance the Sacramentum altaris, the Expositio super Cantica Canticorum and the Aenigma fidei. Secondly, the main works written during the time when William was still abbot of St. Thierry do not have a polemical dimension. Later in his career, becoming entangled in theological disputes against Abelard and William of Conches, his works begin to acquire a more polemical dimension, in addition to the explicitly acknowledged goal of theological edification. This is the case with a treatise such as the Aenigma fidei, which was probably written with the undeclared intention of refuting the Trinitarian

351 Contemp. 17: Cum te amamus, afficitur quidem spiritus noster, Spiritui tuo sancto.
352 Contemp. 15: Genus, inquam, sumus Dei, dii et filii Excelsi omnes. William quotes Ps 81:6 slightly different from Augustine using the term excelsi instead of altissimi in order to refer to the Most High.
353 See above, pp. 169-170.
354 Contemp. 14: The idea appears almost in the same formulation at the end of the Aenigma fidei in a very Augustinian context. William tells his readers that God loves us non affectu sed effectu caritatis. See Aenig. 100.
teaching of Abelard\textsuperscript{355}. In opposing Abelard, William had to make sure that the words of his treatise acquired a transparency which allowed a versed theologian immediately to identify the authoritative voice that stands behind these words. Thus, in the \textit{Aenigma fidei} he makes ample use of the books V, VI and XV of Augustine’s \textit{De Trinitate}. From Book VI for instance, he uses the substantive definition of the Holy Spirit as love:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Aenig.} 98:
\textit{Trin.} 6.5.7:

\textit{Cum ergo sit Spiritus Sanctus spiritus Patris et Filii et ab utroque procedat sitque caritas et unitas amborum, manifestum est, quod non sit aliquis duorum, quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur, genitoremque suum diligat, ut sint non participatone aliena sed propria essentia, nec alterius dono sed suo proprio servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis.}

\textit{quapropter etiam spiritus sanctus in eadem unitate substantiae et aequalitate consistit. sive enim sit unitas amborum sive sanctitas sive caritas, sive ideo unitas quia caritas et ideo caritas, quia sanctitas, manifestum est quod non aliquis duorum est quo uterque coniungitur, quo genitus a gignente diligatur generatoremque suum diligat, sintque non participatione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio servantes unitatem spiritus in vinculo pacis.}
\end{quote}

William’s dependence on Augustine is also clear from his use of the ideas of the Holy Spirit as the gift of God, the source of the human love for God and neighbour, the Holy Spirit as love itself and in the particular emphasis that the human being has not from where to love God except from God himself:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Aenig.} 99:
\textit{Trin.} 15.17.31:

\textit{Sanctus enim Spiritus caritas est Patris et Filii, qua se diligunt, et unitas qua unum sunt. Hic cum datus fuerit homini, accendit eum in dilectionem Dei ac proximi. Et ipse ipsa dilectio est quia Deus caritas est; nec habet homo unde diligat Deum nisi ex deo.}

\textit{Deus igitur spiritus sanctus qui procedit ex deo cum datus fuerit homini accendit eum in dilectionem dei et proximi, et ipse dilectio est. Non enim habet homo unde deum diligat nisi ex deo.}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{355} Although William has never made clear the relation existing between this work and his polemic with Abelard, the academic consensus sees this treatise as being a part of William’s polemical work against Abelard. See Brooke (1960) 194; Brooke (1963) 188; Anderson (1974) 10.
In the same work William borrows from Augustine other crucial ideas with regard to the Holy Spirit, namely the idea that the Holy Spirit is that which is common to the Father and the Son:

*Aenig. 97:*

*Cum autem unusquisque eorum sit Spiritus et utique sanctus, est Spiritus Sanctus qui communis est duorum et proprio censetur eo nomine, quod commune est amborum sicut ipse commune est amborum quicquid commune est eorum, divinitas eorum, caritas, suavitas, beatitudo et caetera.*

*Trin. 5.9.12:*

*Nam hoc ipse propriæ dicitur quod illi communiter quia et pater spiritus et filius spiritus et pater sanctus et filius sanctus. ut ergo ex nomine quod utrique convenit utriusque communio significetur, vocatur donum amborum spiritus sanctus. et haec trinitas unus deus, solus, bonus, magnus, aeternus, omnipotens; ipse sibi unitas, deitas, magnitudo, bonitas, aeternitas, omnipotentia.*

Augustine’s ideas on the Holy Spirit as love which William adopted and comprehensively presented in his early treatise *De contemplando Deo* remain a constant motif in his works, as one of William’s last works demonstrates:

For the love of God or the love that is God, the Holy Spirit, infusing himself into the human being’s love and spirit, attracts him to himself; and God loving himself through the human being makes him and his spirit and his love, one with himself. For as the body has not from where to live apart except from its spirit, in the same way the human being’s *affectus* which is called love, does not live, that is to say, it does not love God, except from the Holy Spirit.\(^{356}\)

That the love of God is the love which is God, namely the Holy Spirit, is one of the major ideas that Augustine bequeathed to the Middle Ages not without complications though, for it gave rise to a lively debate among William’s contemporaries regarding the nature of the two loves. Peter Lombard maintained the identification of the two while Abaelard and Rupert of Deutz\(^\text{357}\) distinguished between the love which is God the Holy Spirit as *substantialiter amor* and the love for God which is merely *accidentali dono*\(^\text{358}\). William persists in the ambiguity which characterized Augustine’s view on this topic. More than

\(^{356}\)Ep. frat. 170.

\(^{357}\)See above, pp. 168-169, n. 330, n. 331 and n. 332.

\(^{358}\)Brooke (1980) 56, n. 137.
Augustine, however, while stressing that it is the same Spirit in both our love for God and the love which is God, William also seems to acknowledge that the two types of love are not identical. Thus, he speaks of the distinction between divine love and human love in terms of substance and quality, unity and likeness, consubstantiality and grace, essence and participation. At the same time in the same context while mentioning these differences, William stresses that nevertheless “it is the same, completely the same Spirit.” David Bell solved this ambiguity at the heart of William’s spirituality in a convincing manner, which he has demonstrated also to be in line with the Augustine’s position on this subject: regarding the question whether our love for God is or is not the Holy Spirit “we are forced inexorably into answering both yes and no: yes, our love for God is the Holy Spirit, but no, not in the same sense in which the Holy Spirit is the consubstantial love of the Father and Son. Our love is not the Holy Spirit by essence, nature or substance; it is the Holy Spirit by participation (...) If God is love, love is like God in that it is what it is only by participation in him who is love, but as we saw in the case of Augustine, uncreated love always remains greater.

It is noteworthy that in making use of Augustine’s ideas on the Holy Spirit as love, William did not single out a particular aspect of them; rather he embraced them in their entirety and made them the cornerstone on which he based his discussion of the mystical union of the soul with God. This direction had already been indicated by Augustine but it remained William’s task to develop it fully.

8. Amor, dilectio, caritas

Repeatedly throughout his works, from the early De natura et dignitate amoris to the later Epistula ad fratres de monte Dei, William presents his readers an ascending scale of several stages representing the order of love, which, in spite of some variations from one work to another, contains, nevertheless, as the most usual elements: amor,
dilectio and caritas. These significant terms of the vocabulary of love have been singled out and commented upon in the Western tradition, and already by Augustine on several occasions. Depending on the context he was either prepared to claim that they were synonymous, or he considered it relevant to point out the different nuances carried by each of these terms. Thus, caritas is the easiest to be distinguished from the other two terms, since it is always related to worthy objects such as God, the neighbour or the soul. Augustine shows no resolve to introduce a clear distinction between amor and dilectio, which, he observes, are used in Holy Scripture both in a good and a bad sense.

In spite of the indiscriminate use of amor and dilectio, the former seems to be the “neutral” term, covering a wider area of meanings and is more the correspondent of the Greek term eros, while the latter together with caritas, because of their predominant use in a positive context, is more the analogous term for the Greek word agape. Furthermore, Augustine considers dilectio and caritas as total synonyms when he is quoting the very important biblical verse of 1 Jn 4:8, both as Deus dilectio est and as Deus caritas est, but he never uses amor in this context. These vague distinctions between amor, dilectio and caritas have been observed in the tradition after Augustine and the fluctuation in their use is observable, for instance, in the works of Bernard who does not show a particular interest in trying to cut a sharper distinction between them.

In general, William’s use of the terms amor, dilectio, caritas, goes along the lines indicated by Augustine. When he speaks of love in general, like for Augustine, amor is the term serving all purposes, while dilectio and especially caritas are used only in relation to superior and worthy objects. While William uses amor and dilectio as perfect synonyms on many occasions, one has to observe, nevertheless, his preference of the former term together with its derivative verb amare over dilectio/diligere. This

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365 The stages of the order of love are voluntas, amor, caritas and sapientia in Nat. am. 3; 4 and 28. In Cant. 6 William mentions only amor, dilectio and caritas. In Ep. frat. 49 he speaks first of voluntas ad Deum, amor and caritas and later in the same works he will present an order of love formed of four stages amor, dilectio, caritas and unitas spiritus.
366 civ. Dei 14.7; Jo. ev. tr. 123.5.
367 div. qu. 36.1; en. Ps. 31 s. 2.5.
368 civ. Dei. 14.7
369 Burnaby (1938) 115.
preference can be explained by the fact that \textit{amor} conveyed a certain warmth for and closeness to the object of love which recommended it for being used particularly in mystical contexts. \textit{Dilectio}, on the other hand, in spite of being perceived as synonymous with \textit{amor}, had a more calculated, rational dimension, which reduced its use considerably\textsuperscript{373}. Such loose distinctions between the three terms allow William to affirm that \textit{amor}, \textit{dilectio} and \textit{caritas} can be used interchangeably in order to designate the love of God, or the love by which God is loved, since it is the same Spirit present in all of them\textsuperscript{374} and since, we can add, according to Augustine and also William, they are all basically a form of will\textsuperscript{375}. As a matter of fact, in order to emphasise the will as the subsistent factor of our return to God, William endeavors to depict the ascent of the soul to God only in terms of will. Thus, in his \textit{Meditatio} 12, he speaks of a threefold ascent to God formed of the successive stages of \textit{magna voluntas}, \textit{illuminata voluntas} and \textit{affecta voluntas}\textsuperscript{376}. A similar threefold progression of the will in its ascension toward God is to be found in the \textit{Epistula ad fratres de Monte Dei}. According to this text, the will advances from \textit{voluntas ad Deum}, to \textit{voluntas ratione formata}, and finally to \textit{voluntas illuminata}. William makes correspond the first level, that of the will turned to God, to simplicity, while the will formed by reason corresponds to \textit{amor} and the illumined will corresponds to \textit{caritas}\textsuperscript{377}. In view of these texts, it is clear that terms such as \textit{amor} and \textit{caritas} are only partially synonymous, in so far they are both a form of \textit{voluntas}.

More than Augustine and Bernard, William shows a particular interest in employing \textit{amor}, \textit{dilectio} and \textit{caritas} together with a few others terms in order to delineate several stages in the development of love. However, such a position is again supported by an idea deeply rooted in Augustine according to which we draw near to God not in spatial terms but in terms of \textit{affectus}\textsuperscript{378}. Embracing this idea, William claims in his early treatise \textit{De natura et dignitate amoris} that four \textit{affectus} are demanded from human beings in their entirety: \textit{voluntas}, \textit{amor}, \textit{caritas} and \textit{sapientia}\textsuperscript{379}. These steps operate in the following way: “the will first moves the soul towards God, love advances it, charity

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{373} Casey (1988) 90.
\item \textsuperscript{374} \textit{Cant.} 6.
\item \textsuperscript{375} See above, p. 138.
\item \textsuperscript{376} \textit{Med.} 12.16.
\item \textsuperscript{377} \textit{Ep. frat.} 49.
\item \textsuperscript{378} See above, p. 144.
\item \textsuperscript{379} \textit{Nat am.} 28.
\end{itemize}
contemplates and wisdom enjoys”\textsuperscript{380}. That Augustine’s idea of the \textit{affectus} leading to God is paramount for William is proven by the fact that the entire structure of the \textit{De natura et dignitate amoris} is dictated by the four stages of the growth of the same affective movement to God, which William parallels with the ages of the human being, advancing from birth and infancy (\textit{voluntas}), to youth (\textit{amor}), further to maturity (\textit{caritas}) and finally to old age (\textit{sapientia}). This early treatise was described by J.-M. Déchanet as “a concentrated synthesis of Augustine’s best thinking on the love of God”\textsuperscript{381}. A brief look at the order of love exposed in this early work will demonstrate that, although William cannot find a similar gradation anywhere in Augustine, his teaching of the different levels of love nevertheless roots deeply in Augustine’s thought.

William’s point of departure in his discussion about love is represented by a famous idea of Augustine which defines love in general as weight which carries the soul to its proper birthplace, namely God\textsuperscript{382}. Next, William connects the idea of the gravity of love which carries the soul towards God with another theological element from Augustine, namely, the presence of the Trinitarian image, formed of memory, reason and will, in the human soul as a consequence of the soul’s creation in the image and likeness of God. \textit{Voluntas} is given therefore by God and when the human being receives it, it is free, in the sense that it has the capacity to turn either towards good or towards evil. However, in accordance with Augustine’s teaching, on its own, the will can head only to perdition. One is in need of grace in order to direct the will toward God\textsuperscript{383}. Since for the movement of the will there are ultimately only two options, away from or towards God, Déchanet claims that one can safely argue that in William’s understanding of the nature of love, there are only two types of love\textsuperscript{384}. One arises when the will is left to itself, and some of the names for its forms are cupiditas, avarice, lust. The other type of love born from a will accepting the divine grace enjoys a natural development that leads the soul through the successive stages of love, charity and wisdom to its proper place, which is God. The Christian perfection which is the goal of the cloistered life is understood then as advancement in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{380} \textit{Nat. am.} 28: Primum enim ad Deum, voluntas animam movet, amor promovet, caritas contemplatur, sapientia fruitur.
\item \textsuperscript{381} Déchanet (1972) 14.
\item \textsuperscript{382} For more details on the theme of love as \textit{pondus}, see above p. 138-139.
\item \textsuperscript{383} See above, p. 143.
\item \textsuperscript{384} Déchanet (1980) xxv.
\end{itemize}
the positive ascending direction. Similarly, Augustine defined the Christian perfection as a “transference of weight”\textsuperscript{385} from \textit{cupiditas} to \textit{caritas}.

More elements stemming from Augustine’s thought may be encountered in the description of the remaining stages of the order of love. For instance, there is no doubt that \textit{amor} defined as “will ardently fixed on something good” is reminiscent of Augustine\textsuperscript{386}. \textit{Caritas} described as God and gift of God, apart from the biblical support echoes Augustine\textsuperscript{387}. In addition, one may also find Augustinian roots for the idea that makes \textit{caritas} correspond to the contemplation and vision of God. In one of his first works as a Christian, the \textit{Soliloquies}, the highest stage in the ascent of the soul to God is represented by contemplation or vision of God, and the virtue corresponding to this stage is primarily \textit{caritas}\textsuperscript{388}. William knew well this text, and although here he merely alluded to it, in one of his later works, the \textit{Speculum fidei}, he dealt with it at length\textsuperscript{389}. Finally, William’s elevation of wisdom to the highest position and its description as fruition is also of Augustinian origin. In \textit{De doctrina Christiana}, Augustine was presenting an ascent of the soul to God consisting of seven steps.\textsuperscript{390} Wisdom represents the highest stage, following immediately after the contemplation or vision of God, and at this stage, like in William’s description, the soul enjoys God\textsuperscript{391}.

William appears to have considered the order of love as quite important since he returns to it in his later works, but then changes the names of the stages that lead to God to a certain extent. Thus, in the \textit{Epistola ad frateres de Monte Dei}, the stages of the progress of the soul to God are \textit{amor}, \textit{dilectio}, \textit{caritas} and \textit{unitas spiritus} and they are mentioned twice in the course of this work. William first describes these stages in the following way:

When this [i.e. the will] stretches upwards like fire to its own place, that is when it is joined with truth and is moved to higher things, it is \textit{amor}. When it is suckled by grace so that it might be moved on it is \textit{dilectio}. When it seizes its object, when

\textsuperscript{385}Burnaby (1938) 94.
\textsuperscript{386}See above the section on love as \textit{voluntas}.
\textsuperscript{387}See above, pp. 164-165.
\textsuperscript{388}\textit{sol.} 1.7.14.
\textsuperscript{389}\textit{Spec.} 3. For a longer discussion of William’s treatment of Augustine’s passage from the \textit{Soliloquies}, see pp. 128-129.
\textsuperscript{390}Pollmann (2005) 225-230.
\textsuperscript{391}\textit{doc. Chr.} 2.7.11: talis filius ascendit ad sapientiam, quae ultima et septima est, qua pacatus tranquillusque perfruitur. \textit{Nat. am.} 28: sapientia fruitur.
it takes hold of it, when it enjoys it, it is caritas, it is unitas spiritus, it is God, for God is charity.\textsuperscript{392}

The first half of the definition of the first stage of amor as “will which stretches upwards like fire going to its own place” is reminiscent of Augustine and although the word pondus is not mentioned here, the comparison with the fire that mounts up to its own place, shows clearly William’s dependence on Augustine.\textsuperscript{393} At the highest level, caritas is identified with unitas spiritus and described by making use among others of the verb frui, which was assigned in the earlier works to the stage of wisdom. While in this passage caritas and unitas spiritus seem to coincide, in a later section of the same work, William introduces a certain difference between the two stages:

Amor is a great will to God; dilectio a clinging to him or conjunction to him; caritas, fruition. But for the human being who has his heart on high, unity of spirit with God is the perfection of the will that progresses into God, when not only does it will what God wills, but it is so much not affected but perfected in affection that it cannot will anything save that which God wills.\textsuperscript{394}

Again amor is the first stage of love described in Augustinian terms as magna voluntas. At the second level, dilectio described as adhaesio echoes Augustine’s reference to dilectio using exactly identical terms.\textsuperscript{395} William is not saying anything new not even in the description of caritas as fruition, but merely alludes to the famous definition of caritas given by Augustine in the De Doctrina Christiana according to which caritatem voco motum animi ad fruendum deo propter ipsum et se atque proximo propter deum.\textsuperscript{396}

Finally, the definition of William’s fourth and highest stage of the ascent of the soul to God, that of the unitas spiritus, as the inability to will anything else but what God wills, needs also to be understood, as Bell has convincingly argued,\textsuperscript{397} against the backdrop provided by Augustine’s writings. Thus, in one of his later works directed against the Pelagians, the De correptione et gratia,\textsuperscript{398} Augustine drew a distinction between the type

\textsuperscript{392} Ep. frat. 235.
\textsuperscript{393} conf. 13.9.10.
\textsuperscript{394} Ep. frat. 257.
\textsuperscript{395} s. 216.5: Mihi adhaerere Deo, bonum est; hanc adhaesionem, illa dilectio praestat.
\textsuperscript{396} doc. Chr. 3.10.16.
\textsuperscript{397} Bell (1984) 193-195.
\textsuperscript{398} Bernard follows this text also in his treatise De gratia et libero arbitrio. He uses the expression non posse peccare in order to describe the highest state of freedom that the saints will enjoy in the kingdom of God as a result of their renovatio in melius and which he terms liberum complacitum. See the discussion
of free choice enjoyed by Adam in paradise and the free choice that the predestinated saints will possess in the kingdom of God as a result of the *renovatio in melius*. To the former correspond the activities of *posse non peccare, posse non mori, bonum posse non deserere*, while to the latter correspond the activities of *non posse peccare, non posse mori, non posse deserere*. The difference between the two states is rendered by the contrast between *posse non* and *non posse*, or in other words, by the opposition between possibility and impossibility. By stating that *unitas spiritus* represents the impossibility of willing anything else but what God wills, and by using the expression *non posse* William alludes to Augustine’s description of the condition of saints after the resurrection. Moreover, William’s decision of defining the *unitas spiritus* in these Augustinian terms, can also be explained by the fact that this highest stage of the development of love is also identified by William with the highest type of similitude with God, but, ultimately, the highest similitude with God is nothing else than our *renovatio in melius*.

In conclusion, although Augustine never arranges the term *amor, dilectio* and *caritas* in an ascending order in his works, it may still be argued that William’s view on the progress of the will has its roots in the thought of the bishop of Hippo. William’s profound knowledge of Augustine’s writings enabled him to use scattered Augustinian material referring to different aspects of love, which he organized in such a way that the result of his work of synthesis was a new and innovative one. However, all the elements, of his new edifice are traditional and may be traced back to Augustine.

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above, pp. 47-48. For a comparative look at Bernard’s understanding of *liberum complacitum* and William’s view on the *unitas spiritus*, see below, p. 201.

399 correp. 33.

400 Ep. frat. 262.
Chapter 3: The Soul’s Direct Encounter with God

At the end of the section dealing with William’s anthropology, several passages stating the identity between likeness and vision were presented, for as William himself put it “a clearer vision brings a clearer likeness”\(^{401}\). As it was possible to see in the second section of the present chapter this likeness is restored by means of love, which springs from a correct orientation of the will helped by grace toward God. The will then increases as to become *dilectio*, *caritas* and finally *unitas spiritus*. William speaks about the *unitas spiritus* (which sometimes is equated with charity\(^ {402}\)) as belonging to the highest type of likeness available to the human being. Therefore, likeness, vision and the perfection of love attained in the *unitas spiritus* may all be considered as referring to the same state of human perfection looked at from different perspectives\(^ {403}\). As we have already discussed the highest type of likeness in our treatment of William’s view of the creation of the human being in the image and likeness of God\(^ {404}\), the remaining tasks of this chapter are to explore the notions of *visio Dei* and *unitas spiritus*, as they were understood by our author, and to determine what role Augustine played in the articulation of William’s teaching on these topics.

1. *Visio Dei*

In dealing with this subject, it is necessary first to have a look at what Augustine had to say regarding this matter, since his theory of seeing God, both in the present life and in the next, played a significant role in the Western medieval discussion regarding the *visio Dei*\(^ {405}\). It has been noticed that throughout his works, from his early to his mature texts, from his sermons and letters written in a more accessible style to the more intellectual discourse of his treatises, the preoccupation with happiness and hence with

\(^{401}\) Ep. frat. 271.

\(^{402}\) Ep. frat. 235 and 263.

\(^{403}\) On the identity between vision and likeness see Spec. 107; Aenig. 5; Ep. frat. 210 and 271. On the identity of vision and love see Contemp. 4; Nat. am. 20. On the identity between vision, love and likeness see Ep. frat. 267-275.

\(^{404}\) See above, pp.133-136.

\(^{405}\) For an introduction to the medieval debate on *visio Dei* see McGinn (2007) 15-34.
the vision of God is a constant feature in Augustine’s thought. Augustine was the architect of a theory on the vision of God, which rejected all possibility of seeing God corporeally, either in the present life or in the future life, while, maintaining, nevertheless, that it was possible for the human being to see God invisibly. Basing his argumentation on the biblical text, Augustine claims that it is only the pure of heart who will see God, but not with the eyes of the body; God is seen exclusively by the inner human being, in this life through a glass darkly, while in the life to come the vision will be face to face. Augustine describes the state of the beatific vision at the end of the De civitate Dei in the following words: “Restored by him and perfected by a greater grace we shall rest forever and see always that he is God (…) There we shall be at rest and see, shall see and love, shall love and praise! This should be in the end without end!”.

Regarding the vision of God in this life, Augustine articulated a theory which attempted to harmonize conflicting scriptural passages about whether the human being could really see God here below. In his attempt to reconcile biblical texts such as: “No one shall see my face and live” (Ex 33:20), “No one has ever seen God” (Jn 1:18), and “I was speaking to God face to face as one is speaking to a friend” (Ex 33:11) or “Blessed are the clean of heart because they shall see God” (Mt 5:8), (to quote just a few examples) Augustine finds a solution to the conflicting scriptural verses, by introducing two useful distinctions: one between seeing God in specie and in substantia and the other between glimpse and

\[406\] O’Connell (1968) 205. Augustine’s earliest accounts on the notion of seeing God are sol. 1.6.12-7.14 and quant. 33.70-76. These two works were known and used by William, the former in Spec. 3-4, the latter in Nat. corp. 108. Augustine’s main works focusing particularly on visio Dei are Gn. litt. 12, ep. 92, ep. 147 from which William quoted extensively in his own treatment of this subject presented in Aenig. 3-6. Augustine discusses also the notion of visio beatifica in ep. 148; ep. 162; s. 277; civ. Dei 22.29. The kinds of visions attainable in this life are examined in en. Ps. 41.2-10; 99.5-6; 134. 6; Jo.ev.tr. 20.11. Augustine’s major work on Trinity offers also extensive material for the notion of seeing God scattered throughout its fifteen books. Finally, the autobiographical accounts of Augustine’s direct encounter with God from conf. 7.10.16; 7.17.23; 7.20.26; 9.10.23-9.10.26 as well as his searching for God in memory in Book 10 of the Confessiones, are also connected with the vision of God, the brevity of these experiences being explained mainly as the inability to gaze on the unchangeable light. For Augustine’s notion of vision of God see especially, Bell (1984) 65-89; McGinn (1991) 232-243; Teske (1994) 287-309.

\[407\] ep. 147.37.

\[408\] ep. 92.4; ep. 147.15. These are Augustine’s arguments against a belief spreading in his time among the cultivated roman people, who claimed that God is seen in this life by the mind and in the afterlife by the body. Moreover they considered that the wicked will see God in the same manner as the good. See Brown (1967) 273.

\[409\] civ. Dei 22.30.

\[410\] Bell shows that the term species is used by Augustine with one of the following meanings: 1) in relation to the face to face vision, so that in specie is equivalent to in substantia 2) species as referring to Ideas and
As a general rule he states that no human being is allowed to see God in substantia, in natura, in essentia, or sicuti est in this life and live through the experience. In the majority of the examples of the vision of God presented in the Old Testament, God showed himself to the Patriarchs not in his substance but under the appearance (in specie) which he willed, thus confirming the authority of the negative biblical evidence. However, Augustine grants some exceptions to this rule, for he admits that it is possible in exceptional conditions to see God in substantia or sicuti est when “the human mind is divinely caught up from this life to the angelic life before it is by our death freed from the body”. This occurs in advanced ecstasy, when the mind is withdrawn from this life and when there is a complete separation of the mind from the body as happens in real death. The biblical statement that “No one shall see my face and live” has to be then understood not as a total negation of the possibility of seeing God in his substance in the present life, but as a reward granted to few in the state of ecstasy understood as a temporary death. Therefore, it is possible for very few to see now in a glimpse “That which is”, but the gaze is reserved for the afterlife. The main difference between the vision in this life as opposed to the next seems to lie in duration; as Andrew Louth observed: “ecstasy is something which if it went on for ever would be indistinguishable from the joys of heaven. But it does not, it is fleeting. Ecstasy is something that brings to Augustine’s mind the thought of the beatific vision, but it is other than it”.

A summary of Augustine’s views on seeing God may be found in Book XII of the De Genesi ad litteram, where a threefold ascending typology of visions is set forth. Augustine differentiates between corporeal, spiritual and intellectual seeing. The first category, that of the corporeal visions refers to corporeal objects which can be seen naturally through bodily eyes. At the next level, the spiritual visions refer to corporeal

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412 All these terms are synonyms.
413 ep. 147.19.
414 ep. 147.31: nisi quia potest humana mens divinitus rapi ex hac vita ad angelicum vitam, antequam per istam communem morte carne salvatur.
415 Augustine maintains that Moses, Paul and John were granted such experiences.
images of absent objects, either preserved in memory or fashioned by the imaginative power of the mind. Finally, the highest type of seeing called intellectual is extra-conceptual. Ecstasy belongs to the higher two types of seeing, being therefore either spiritual, such as the revelation given to John in the Apocalypse\(^{417}\), or intellectual, when God speaks face to face to human beings deigned worthy of such vision\(^{418}\), such as Moses and Paul.

Let us now turn to William’s view on seeing God and begin by saying that early in his career he manifested a particular interest in discussing this theme, since one of his first treatises bears the title *De contemplando Deo*, while another relatively early work, the *Meditativae orationes* is constructed around the idea of the contemplation of God’s face. The most extensive and clear evidence for William’s dependence on Augustine in his understanding of the vision of God is offered in his mature treatise *Aenigma fidei*. William’s view on this matter is presented in the larger context of the discussion of the human being’s inability to penetrate the mystery of God. William gives the impression that he has little to say on his own accord since almost the entire section is a mosaic of phrases extracted directly from Augustine’s *Epistula* 147, *Epistula* 92 and the Book XII of the *De Genesi ad litteram*. The twelfth century author’s contribution seems minimal, being reduced, at first glance, to the modest attempt of providing the link between the disparate Augustinian quotations. A parallel look at William’s text and at the original Augustinian texts will clearly show the extent to which William relies on Augustine when he discusses this topic. At the same time this comparative look will offer us an idea of the method used by William in dealing with his sources. In the first column William’s text quoted integrally, is presented in a way that facilitates the recognition of the passages which belong to William and of those which he extracts from Augustine:

\[\begin{align*}
\textit{Aenig. 3-6:} & \quad \textit{ep. 147.3:} \\
\textit{Si enim quaeritur utrum in hac vita mortali credimus videri deum nunc; num quia} & \quad \textit{credimus videri deum nunc; num quia} \\
\textit{a mortali homine potest videri Deus, vidimus el per oculos corporis, sicut} & \quad \textit{vidimus el per oculos corporis, sicut} \\
\textit{respondemus: potest. Sed non corporeis} & \quad \textit{respondemus: potest. Sed non corporeis} \\
\textit{videmus hunc solem, vel mentis obtutu,} & \quad \textit{videmus hunc solem, vel mentis obtutu,}
\end{align*}\]

\(^{417}\) *Gn. litt.* 12.23.53.  
\(^{418}\) *Gn. litt.* 12.23.54.
oculis, sicut videmus hunc solem; vel
mentis obtutu, sicut unusquisque
semetipsum videt aliquid quaerentem aut
scientem;
sicut se quisque interius videt uiuentem,
videt volentem, videt quaerentem, videt
scientem, videt nescientem?
sed fide, quae canonarum Scripturarum
auctoritate muniatur.

ep. 147.20:

Visus est tamen a Patribus, sed ea specie
quam voluntas elegit, non natura formavit.

Deum enim nemo vidit umquam, ait
evangelista Ioannes; utique sicut videntur
ista quae visibilia dicuntur. Propter quod
et continuo subiunxit:

ep. 147.22:

Unigenitus qui est in sinu Patris,
narratione ineffabili, creatura rationalis
munda et sancta impletur de visione
ineffabili.

ep. 147.29:

Quae sic potest intelligere narrantem,
sicuri est verbum, non sonus auribus
strepsens, sed imago mentibus innossecens,
ut illud ei interna et manifesta lucet
clarescat, quod dictum est a Domino:
Philippe, qui videt me videt et Patrem.

ep. 147.20:

Desiderium enim veraciter piorum, quo
videre deum cuiuspiam, non, ut opinor, in eam
speciem flagrat contuendum, qua quando
vult sicut vult quod ipse non est, sed in eam
substantia qua ipse est id quod est.

Videri enim hic mundo corde potest,
comprehendi non potest.

Sed in hac quaestione Deum videndi, plus mihi videtur valere vivendi modum quam loquendi. Nam qui dicerit a Domino Iesu Christo mitis esse et humilis corde, plus in hoc cogitando et orando proficiet quam legendo vel audiendo, quamvis nonnumquam et legendo et audiendo proficiat.

Nemo autem se dicat velle Deum videre, qui mundando cordi curam tantae rei dignam noluerit impendere.

Nemo enim valet Deum videre et vivere; quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita mentem, qua in illius visionis ineffabilitatem assumitur.

Alterius namque et potioris vitae est visio illa,
quae in futuro promittitur, sed iam hic in cunctis filiis gratiae inchoatur.

Unigenitus ergo Filius deiitatis natura atque substantialiam insonabiler narrans dignis idoneisque oculis tanto conspectui etiam in hac vita, invisibiliter monstrat. Et qui potest Deum invisibiliter videre, potest etiam ei invisibiliter adhaerere.

Aliud est enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere.

ep. 147.1:
quam ob rem primum mihi videtur plus valere in hac inquisitione vivendi quam loquendi modum. nam qui didicerunt a domino Iesu Christo mites esse et humiles corde, plus cogitando et orando proficiunt quam legendo et audiendo.

ep. 147.31:
nemo potest faciem meam videre et vivere, quia necesse est abstrahi ab hac vita mentem, quando in illius ineffabilitatem visionis adsumitur...

ep. 147.32:
alterius potioris vitae illam esse visionem.

ep. 147.37:
unigenitus autem filius, qui est in sinu patris, deiitatis naturam atque substantialiam insonabiler narrat et ideo dignis idoneisque tanto conspectu oculis etiam invisibiliter monstrat. ipsi enim sunt oculi, de quibus apostolus dicit: inluminatos oculos cordis vestri et de quibus dicitur: inlumina oculos meos, ne umquam obdormiam in morte. dominus enim spiritus est; unde, qui adhaeret domino, unus spiritus est; proinde, qui potest deum invisibiliter videre, ipse deo potest
Deus enim invisibilis et incorruptibilis, qui solus habet immortalitatem, et lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quem nemo hominum vidit vel videre potest, per id quod videt homo corpore corpora, per hoc ab hominibus videri non potest. Qui si et mentibus piorum esset inaccessibilis, non diceretur: Accedite ad eum et illuminamini. Et si mentibus piorum esset invisibilis, non diceretur: quia videbimus eum siciuti est. Perspicianus totam ipsam epistolam Ioannis. Dilectissimi, inquit, nunc filii dei sumus, et nondum apparuit quid erimus. Scimus autem quoniam, cum apparuerit, similis ei erimus, hominum videbimus eum siciuti est. In tantum ergo eum videbimus, in quantum similis est erimus, et inde eum videbimus unde similis erimus, mente scilicet: quia et nunc in tantum non videmus, in quantum dissimiles ab eo sumus.

Qui autem vel dementissimus dixerit corpore nos similares Dei fore? In interiore ergo homine similitudo ista est, qua renovatur homo de die in diem in agnitione Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ubi tanto similiores efficirum, quanto magis in eius cognitionem caritatemque proficicimus; et in tantum eum propinquimus ac familiae videmus, in quantum cognoscendo eum ac diligendo efficirum similiores. In quo quantuscumque hic perfectus fuerit, longe est ab illa perfectione, qua Deus videbimus siciuti est facie ad faciem (...).

Aenig. 7:
Sed aliter in summa essentia, aliter in inferiore natura.

Ibi enim videbitur claritas Domini, non per visionem significantem sive corporalem, Ibi videtur claritas domini non per

ep. 92.3: Non ita est deus invisibilis et incorruptibilis, qui solus habet immortalitatem et lucem habitat inaccessibilem, quem nemo hominum uidit nec videre potest. Per hoc enim videri ab homine non potest, per quod videt homo corpore corpora. Nam si et mentibus piorum esset inaccessibilis, non diceretur: accedite ad eum et inluminamini, et si mentibus piorum esset invisibilis, non diceretur: videbimus eum, siciuti est. Nam perspice totam ipsam in epistula Ioannis sententiam: dilectissimi, inquit, filii dei sumus et nondum apparuit, quod erimus. Scimus, quia, cum apparuerit, similis erimus, hominum videbimus eum, siciuti est. In tantum ergo videbimus, in quantum similis erimus, quia et nunc in tantum non videmus, in quantum dissimiles sumus.

Inde igitur videbimus, ubi similis erimus. Quis autem dementissimus dixerit corpore nos similares deo? In interiore igitur homine ista similitudo est, qua renovatur homo de die in diem in agnitione Dei, secundum imaginem eius, qui creavit eum. Et tanto efficirum similiores illi, quanto magis in eius cognitionem et caritate proficicimus, quia, etsi exterior homo noster corrumpitur, sed interior renovatur de die in diem ita sane, ut in hac uita, quantuscumque prorectus sit, longe ab sit ab illa perfectione similitudinis, quae idonea erit ad videndum deum, sicut dicit apostolus, facie ad faciem.

Gn. litt. 12.26.54:
sicut visa est in monte Syna, sive spiritualem sicut vidit Isatas, vel Iohannes in Apocalypsi, sed per speciem; non per speculum sed et in aenigmate, sicut hic videtur ab hominibus qui digni sunt hac visione, quantum eam capere potest mens humana secundum assumptis gratiam, sed facie ad faciem.

In the few paragraphs quoted above, which contain the whole discussion of the vision of God here and in the hereafter, William succeeds in offering an accurate summary of Augustine’s view on seeing God as well as adding his own distinctive mark, by distinguishing between the vision existing within the Holy Trinity and the human being’s vision of the Holy Trinity. Thus, borrowing Augustine’s voice, William begins by saying that God can be seen in this life by the human beings, although not with the eyes of the body. However, some of the patres were able to see God, but under the appearance (in specie) which he willed and not in his nature. But truly religious persons long not after the form in which God deigns to appear and which is not God himself; instead, their desire is to behold God in his substance, through which God is that which he is. William like Augustine considers that the pure of heart may see the substance of God in this life, although they cannot comprehend it. William’s interpretation of the biblical verse “No one shall see my face and live” is that of Augustine. The vision of God in this life in his substance happens during ecstasy “because it is necessary for the soul which is taken up into that unspeakable vision to be drawn out of this life.” Another biblical verse, “because we shall see him as he is” (1 Jn 3:2) helps establishing the link between vision and likeness and a large passage from Epistula 92 speaking about becoming like God in the inner human being is quoted to this effect. Also by quoting Augustine, William distinguishes between the vision of God which already can be granted here but which is far from the perfection of the beatific vision which is going to be possessed in

419 Aenig. 3 quotes ep. 147.3.
420 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.20. William extracted these lines from a context in which Augustine speaks of Moses and John. William himself mentions John by name, making it clear that in speaking of patres, he refers to biblical figures and not to patristic authors.
421 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.20.
422 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.21.
423 Aenig. 4 quotes ep. 147.31.
heaven\textsuperscript{424}. Finally the series of quotations from Augustine ends with a passage from the \textit{De Genesi ad litteram} which refers to the three types of vision, corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual, and applies the latter to the direct vision of God “face to face” which is going to take place in the future life\textsuperscript{425}. William continues in his own words in the next paragraphs to explain why a stable vision of God is not possible in this life and his answer is once again Augustinian: human beings are impeded by their \textit{concupiscentia carnis}. However, by the grace of God, the soul can rise above this carnal cloud and being granted a glimpse of the truth, then returning immediately to its weakness, but yearning to be allowed this experience again\textsuperscript{426}.

William’s own contribution, wedged between two quotations from Augustine, risks to pass unnoticed. He speaks first of the mutual seeing of the Father and the Son within the Holy Trinity which is identical with their substance and their unity and which is the Holy Spirit. Next, turning his attention to the vision between the human being and God, William observes that their mutual seeing is also the Holy Spirit, but not as substance and unity like in the divine Trinity, rather it is the Holy Spirit as love and likeness\textsuperscript{427}. It is possible to recognize here one of William’s most profound and daring ideas on the vision of God according to which to see God is to be what he is. William developed this idea on the basis of a scriptural text which had already received some attention from previous Christian mystics\textsuperscript{428}, but which represents for him one of the biblical roots of his Trinitarian mysticism: “Nobody sees [knows, Vg.] the Father, except the Son, and the Son except the Father” (Mt 11:27)\textsuperscript{429}. According to William’s constant interpretation of this key biblical text\textsuperscript{430}, the mutual knowledge or vision of the Father and the Son is not different from their substance, since “this is what is to be the Father, that is, to see the Son and to be the Son is to see the Father”\textsuperscript{431}. Presenting this idea

\textsuperscript{424} Aenig. 6 quotes \textit{ep.} 92.3.
\textsuperscript{425} Aenig. 7 quotes \textit{Gn. litt.} 12.26.54.
\textsuperscript{426} Aenig. 8.
\textsuperscript{427} Aenig. 5.
\textsuperscript{428} Verdeyen points out to Origen’s exegesis of Mt 11:27 from \textit{In Canticum Prologum}. PG 13:72D-73A and \textit{De Principiis} 2.4.3. PG 11:202BD and contends that William follows in his footsteps when he interprets the same biblical verse. See Verdeyen (1990) 87-89.
\textsuperscript{429} William quotes this verse both as \textit{Nemo vidit Patrem nisi Filium, et Filium nisi Pater} in \textit{Med.} 3.8 and \textit{Nemo novit Patrem nisi Filium, et nemo novit Filium nisi Pater} in \textit{Contemp.} 17.
\textsuperscript{430} \textit{Contemp.} 17; \textit{Med.} 3.8; \textit{Spec.} 106.
\textsuperscript{431} \textit{Med.} 3.8.
already as early as in the *De contemplando Deo*, William links it explicitly with the human being’s vision of God in another of his early texts, the *Meditatio* 3. In this text he observes that the biblical passage of Mt 11:27 continues by adding that the mutual vision of the divine persons may be revealed by the Son to those to whom he wills to reveal it. But the Son’s will coincides with that of the Father and is the Holy Spirit. Therefore, the mutual vision or knowledge of the Father and the Son and consequently also their substance is revealed through the Holy Spirit to the human being. The human being sees then the Father as the Son and the Son as the Father but not in every way (*sic omnino, sed non per omnem modum*)\(^{432}\). While asserting that the vision of God will be one of substance, William is nevertheless cautious to add that it will be different to some extent from that of the Father and the Son, *sed non per omnem modum*, because the ontological gap between God and the human beings remains. At the same time, as William explains in another text, the Holy Spirit acts in one way in the divine substance, where he is consubstantially united with the Father and the Son and in a totally different way in the inferior nature\(^{433}\). In the remainder of the *Meditatio* 3, William endeavors to explain the way in which the vision of God takes place. He relies in his demonstration on the familiar analogy, inspired by Augustine\(^ {434}\), between the mechanism of the bodily senses and that of the spiritual senses. Each sense in order to sense anything at all needs to be transformed into what it perceives for sensation to take place. This transformation is not one of substance, rather is a conformation of the sense to the object perceived\(^ {435}\). As the mechanism of the human vision of God is similar to that of corporeal vision, it follows that the consequence of the vision of God is not a substantial transformation of the human being into God, rather it manifests itself as a kind of likeness of the visible object in the seeing individual and as a union of the elements involved in the act of vision\(^ {436}\). Vision of God, likeness and union with God refer ultimately to the same reality. It is this last aspect, namely the union of the soul with God which remains to be discussed in the next pages, not before concluding briefly this section.

\(^{432}\) *Med.* 3.8.
\(^{433}\) *Spec.* 107. The same idea is present in *Aenig.* 5 as well.
\(^{434}\) See section on *Sensus amoris*, pp. 147-155.
\(^{435}\) *Med.* 3.8.
\(^{436}\) See for instance, p.149.
In his treatment of the *visio Dei*, William proves that he has a thorough knowledge of Augustine’s major texts written on this topic and he quotes at great length from them in his mature treatise *Aenigma fidei*. While extracting the phrases out of their context, the result of William’s “cut and paste” writing method is a surprisingly accurate summary of Augustine’s view on seeing God. He also inserts discretely his own opinion based on the biblical verse from Mt 11:27, exposed previously in other of his works, which fits perfectly in the Augustinian patchwork, by adding a Trinitarian note to the vision of God *sicuti est*.

2. *Unitas spiritus*

Throughout his writings, William, even more than his friend Bernard, gives explicit and detailed analyses of the nature of *unitas spiritus*\(^{437}\). Both Bernard and William grounded their doctrine of the union of the soul with God biblically in the Pauline verse *Qui adhaeret Domino, unus spiritus est* (1 Cor 6:17) and in the Pauline expression *unitas spiritus* (Eph 4:3). However, while Bernard draws on Augustine’s anti-Arian exegesis of 1 Cor 6:17 in order to develop his view on the unity of the soul with God\(^{438}\), William makes use of other aspects of Augustine’s theology, of which that of the Holy Spirit as love is without any doubt the most significant\(^{439}\). Their dependence on different aspects of Augustine’s thought as well as their different ways of reading Augustine with Bernard *selectively* extracting the elements he needs from their original context while William *synthetically*, proving that he reads Augustine as a whole, makes them present distinct accounts of the *unitas spiritus*. These differences have prompted scholars such as Paul Verdeyen to argue persuasively that Bernard’s and William’s different views concerning their understanding of the *unitas spiritus* might have led to a controversy that undermined their friendship towards the end of their lives. As there is no historical evidence available for such a disagreement between the two friends, Verdeyen

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\(^{437}\) *Contemp.* 10-17; *Cant.* 130-131; *Nat. Corp.* 107; *Ep. frat.* 235, 257-258 and 262-263; a longer discussion concerning the mechanism of *sensus amoris*, the nature of the Holy Spirit, the vision of God and finally the state referred to as *unus spiritus* takes place in *Spec. fid.* 101-111.

\(^{438}\) *Trin.* 6.3.4-5.7; *conl. Max.* 14; *c. Max.* 1.14; *ep.* 238. 28. See in this thesis the section *Qui adhaeret Domino unus spiritus est* (1 Cor 6:17), pp. 94-102.

\(^{439}\) In the previous pages of this thesis, different aspects of William’s view on the *unitas spiritus* have already been touched upon when discussing the *sensus amoris*, the *intellectus amoris* and the Holy Spirit as love.
relies in his assumptions exclusively on their different theological accounts of the mystical union. As the core of his argument he opposes two texts written roughly in the same period (1145-1148) and which he interprets as being clearly antagonist: Bernard’s *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 71 and William’s *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* 262-3. Verdeyen would have us believe that the differences between the two views on the mystical union are due to different patristic influences. In his opinion, Bernard remains faithful to Augustine\(^{440}\), while William owes much to Origen for the way in which he understands the intertrinitarian relationships which also play an important role in the mystical union\(^{441}\).

No matter how attractive such a theory of controversy would seem, the intention of this chapter is to argue against it, in favor of a freedom in dealing with the biblical and patristic sources of which the medieval authors were fully aware\(^{442}\) and which allows different views to coexist within the same theological tradition\(^{443}\). Moreover, I will try to see whether the views of Bernard and William are truly irreconcilable as Verdeyen claims. Finally, an attempt will be made to question Verdeyen’s claim that William’s different account on *unitas spiritus* is mainly the result of an Origenian influence.

One of the main difficulties in accepting Verdeyen’s position regarding the likely controversy between Bernard and William is that in building his argument he relies solely on a single passage from each author ignoring the previous accounts on *unitas spiritus* given especially by William during his theological career. It is important to notice that although in each situation William might highlight different aspects of the mystical union, overall his teaching does not undergo considerable changes during time\(^{444}\). Therefore, an analysis of one particular paragraph dealing with this subject should not ignore the existing links with other passages from William’s works treating the same topic. Jean-Marie Déchanet was absolutely right when he observed that William’s work

\(^{440}\) Verdeyen (1990) 72.
\(^{441}\) Verdeyen (1990) 70-71, 87.
\(^{442}\) Bernard claims that if something is said after the Fathers without contradicting them, it should displease neither the Fathers nor anybody else. See *Miss.* 4.11. See above, p. 30, n. 109.
\(^{443}\) Bernard defended himself before the attacks of those who accused him of presenting different accounts of the human being created in the image of God, by saying that they are *diversa sed non adversa*. See *SC.* 81.11. See above, p. 39.
\(^{444}\) This is an aspect that Verdeyen himself is ready to recognize. See Verdeyen (1990) 107.
Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei cannot be properly understood without recourse to his other writings.\(^{445}\)

Furthermore, while assuming that there was discord between the two friends due to their opposite views on the mystical union, Verdeyen avoids, nevertheless, to explain clearly, which of the two texts was written as a reaction to the other. Sometimes he seems to consider that William’s account of the *unitas spiritus* from the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* is a refutation of the Bernardine position.\(^{446}\) But as many scholars have already observed William speaks constantly about the *unitas spiritus* throughout his writings, without changing his position radically, apart from the unavoidable additions, resulting from the author’s constant reflection on this topic, and which come to enrich and consolidate the primary teaching. The main elements of his understanding of the mystical union are already present in one of his first works, the *De contemplando Deo*.\(^ {447}\) There is evidence that Bernard knew William’s early work on contemplating God and, far from reacting against it, he integrates, in his own treatise on love the *De diligendo Deo*,\(^ {449}\) William’s description of the *unitas spiritus* as the means by which the soul “loves in God solely God and does not love some of its own goods and loves itself in God.”\(^ {450}\) Instead of considering William’s account of the *unitas spiritus* from his late work the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* as directed against Bernard’s position expressed in *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 71, it seems more likely that it represents simply a concentrated summary of what William had said in his previous works on this subject.

If, on the other hand, it is Bernard who reacts against his friend’s position, as Verdeyen seems to imply somewhere else in his interpretation,\(^ {451}\) the situation becomes even more problematic. How could one then explain Bernard’s obvious change in attitude

\(^{446}\) Verdeyen (1990) 71: «Nous voulons démontrer d’abord que Guillaume tenait particulièrement à ces recherches trinitaires jusqu’à engager à ce propos une controvertue avec son meilleur ami, l’abbé de Clairvaux».
\(^{447}\) *Contemp.* 10-17.
\(^{448}\) Hourlier (1968) 85, n.1.
\(^{449}\) *Dil.* 9.26; 10.28.
\(^{450}\) *Contemp.* 10: per unitatem spiritus in deo solum amet deum non suum aliquod privatum, nec nisi in deo amet seipsum. It has been remarked that this description of the *unitas spiritus*, coincides with the final two degrees of the affective ascent of the soul to God in Bernard’s *De Diligendo Deo*. But as the latter work was written at least five years after William’s it is clear that Bernard is inspired by his friend in drawing the ascending stages of the soul’s itinerary to God. See Hourlier (1968) n.1, 85.
\(^{451}\) Verdeyen (1990) 73: «Voici la position de Guillaume que saint Bernard n’a pu ignorer et qu’il rejette au moins implicitement». 
towards the ideas of a book he enthusiastically embraced early in his career but allegedly refuted years later? Finally, how does one interpret the fact that several of William’s works including the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei circulated for centuries under Bernard’s name? If the two accounts on the mystical union were so contradictory, how was it possible that the differences remained unobserved for so long? Is it not more likely that they were perceived for centuries as belonging to the same author, namely Bernard, exactly because of what these views had in common and not because their theology was seen as incompatible?

Let us begin our analysis by looking at William’s first detailed discussion of the unitas spiritus which occurs already in his early treatise De contemplando Deo. Embracing Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love, William goes on to expound two parallel two types of unity, one existing in God and which he introduces with the words: “Thus, you love yourself in you” (amas ergo te ...in te ipsum) and the other existing between human beings and God which he refers to as: “you love also yourself in us” (amas et teipsum in nobis). The former is the Holy Spirit himself, the unity of the Father and the Son, homoousion, the substantial unity of the Father and the Son. The second type of union occurs when the Holy Spirit who was sent as a gift to humans and implanted in their hearts, enables them to become lovers of God (nos efficiens tui amatores). As a result of this: “you love yourself in us and us in you, when we love you through you and we are made one with you insofar as we are worthy to love you; and we will be made partakers, as it was said, of that prayer of Christ your Son: “I wish that, in the same way as I and you are One, so these also may be one in us (Jn 17:22).” William makes a clear distinction between the divine unity which is consubstantial and the mystical union which is participation (participes efficiemur) to the Trinitarian life, due to the role of the Holy Spirit “who is called the love, the unity and the will of the Father and the Son, and who, dwelling in us by his grace and implanting in us the charity of God and reconciling him [i.e. God] to us through this very love, unites us with

452 See above, p. 107, n. 1 and n. 2.
453 Contemp. 14.
454 Contemp. 14.
455 Contemp. 15.
God⁴⁵⁶. William also refers to the mystical union using some Augustinian terms such as *adhaesio* and *fruitio* and finally considers it a kind of *unitas* quoting Jn 17:22: “I will that they may be one in us as you and I are one”.

In my opinion there are several ideas in William’s first account of the mystical union which can be related to Augustine. First of all, while interpreting verse Jn 17:21 in his dispute with the Arians, Augustine also speaks of the divine unity which is consubstantial (he uses the term *homoousion*) and which cannot be understood as participation⁴⁵⁷. As Augustine’s main focus is the intertrinitarian relationship, he does not go further in showing how the union of the human soul and God should be understood, but one can guess that is understood as participation, which, as he warns, cannot be attributed to the divine unity. William differs from Augustine and Bernard in the use of the terminology. He uses indiscriminately the terms *unum* and *unus spiritus*. The biblical passage Jn 17:21 enables him to refer to the unity between the soul and God not only as *unus spiritus*, like Augustine and Bernard, but also as *unum*. But because he is applying this term, reserved by Augustine and Bernard exclusively for the consubstantial unity, to the mystical union, this does not necessarily mean that William is confusing the two types of unity. In fact, he is always making efforts in his writings to distinguish between them.

Although William does not strictly follow Augustine in his terminological distinction between *unum* and *unus spiritus*, he definitely relies on him in his description of the mystical union as “God loving himself in us”. It is possible to show that William borrowed this idea directly from Augustine by looking at a relatively early text, William’s compilation, the *Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos⁴⁵⁸*:

*Exp. Rom. 3.5.5:* s. 128.4:

*Vis enim hoc et vehementer vis ut per spiritum tuum amorem tuum, ames nos in te et ames te de nobis et in nobis… Da ergo Ne putaret quisque a se sibi esse quod diligit deum, continuo addidit, per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis ut ergo ames*

⁴⁵⁶ *Contemp.* 14.
⁴⁵⁷ *ep.* 238.28.
⁴⁵⁸ This work was written probably immediately after William entered the Cistercian abbey of Signy in 1135. However, according to Anderson (1980) 4, William’s interest in the *Epistle to the Romans* seems not to be connected so much with the early Cistercians, whose object of exegesis was almost exclusively the *Song of Songs*, but with the school of Reims which William attended before he became a Benedictine monk. This makes Bell argue that William might have been collecting materials for his compilation already during his student years. See Bell (1984) 183, n. 51.
Although William does not follow the exact wording of the original text, it is obvious that Augustine is the primary source for an idea that William repeats not less than three times in the passage where he discusses the mystical union.

Another idea of major significance present already in this early account on the unitas spiritus, namely that of the Holy Spirit as love, unity and will of the Father and the Son, whose role it is to implant charity in the human hearts so that the human beings may be reconciled with their Creator and ultimately united to him, may also be traced back to Augustine. The confirmation of William’s direct reading of Augustine comes again from his compilation, the Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos, where he quotes almost verbatim from one of Augustine’s sermons:

Exp. Rom. 3.5.5:  

...Quod communis vobis est, sancte Pater, sancte Filii, per hoc nos vultis habere communioinem inter nos et vobiscum, cum per illud donum nos colligere in unum, quod ambo habetis unum? In hoc enim divinitati reconciliamur...

s. 71.18:  

...Quod ergo commune est patri et filio, per hoc nos voluerunt habere communioinem et inter nos et secum, et per illud donum nos colligere in unum, quod ambo habent unum, hoc est per spiritum sanctum deum et donum dei. In hoc enim reconciliamur divinitati eaque delectamur.

Verdeyen is totally right in signaling the importance of the scriptural text Nemo novit Pater nisi Filius et nemo novit Filius nisi Pater (Mt 11: 27), already present in this early treatise and which helps William to define better the intertrinitarian relationships and the role of the Holy Spirit in the economy of salvation459. According to William’s teaching, the Holy Spirit is the mutual knowledge of the Father and the Son, and by becoming unus spiritus with God, the human beings participate in the knowledge of the Father and the Son, in the same way in which they also participate in the love of the Father and the Son460. But while Verdeyen is probably correct in detecting William’s dependence on

459 Verdeyen (1990) 87.
460 Contemp. 17.
Origen’s exegesis of this biblical text⁴⁶¹, his claim that William’s position regarding this doctrinal matter rests exclusively on Origen has to be dismissed as an exaggeration. It is impossible not to observe that the exegesis of Mt 11:27, which supports the idea that the Holy Spirit is the reciprocal knowledge of the Father and Son, harmoniously completes Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit representing the mutual love of the Father and the Son, and moreover everything that is common to the Father and Son. If indeed William follows Origen in his understanding of Mt 11:27, he definitely does this not because Origen is the only ancient ecclesiastical writer to have understood the relations between the divine persons and the operational role of the Holy Spirit ad extra in such way, but because his teaching is compatible to that of Augustine⁴⁶².

This early understanding of the *unitas spiritus*, according to which the Holy Spirit is the mutual love and knowledge of the Father and the Son, who conforms us to God and unites our spirit with him⁴⁶³, represents the basis to which William returns often in his later writings, never in order to contradict it, only in order to add some new and profound insights.

One of William’s constant struggles in his writings is to distinguish between the two types of union. While the divine unity is always consubstantial, he describes the unity between the human being and God as *unitas voluntatis*⁴⁶⁴ or as *unitas similitudinis*⁴⁶⁵.

In a passage from the *Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*, a work written earlier than the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei*⁴⁶⁶, speaking about the ordered love of the Bride who loves God and herself in God and her neighbour as herself, William observes how when “she begins to will what God wills then through likeness of will she becomes one spirit

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⁴⁶¹ Origen, *In Canticum Prologum*. PG 13:72D-73A; *De Principiis 2.4.3*. PG 11:202BD.
⁴⁶² In a recent article on the reception of Origen in *Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos*, Thomas Scheck observes that, as a general rule, William’s use of Origen is realised by the adaptation of his thought to that of Augustine, never the other way around. See Scheck (2004) 236-256.
⁴⁶³ *Contemp.* 17.
⁴⁶⁴ *Cant.* 130-131; *Nat. corp.* 107.
⁴⁶⁶ As William himself acknowledges in *Vita prīma* 12.59, this work was conceived as early as his first visits to Clairvaux. The conversations he had with Bernard, while being both ill, inspired him in writing this book, which he will never finish as he interrupted his work on it in order to refute Abelard’s perilous theology.
with God”467. Therefore the soul is united with God “through likeness in willing the same thing from whom it withdraws by unlikeness in willing”468. Here William merges two Augustinian ideas we have encountered before: one that the human soul draws near to God by likeness to him and distances itself by unlikeness, the other that the human soul draws near to God by means of affectus. But we have seen that the affectus are basically a form of will, therefore the distance or the closeness to God is determined by willing as well469. According to William’s early treatise on love, the will has only two possibilities: to turn either towards God or away from him. In the first case it becomes, amor, caritas and unitas spiritus, in the second less fortunate situation, it becomes, concupiscientia. He warns his readers that the levels of voluntas, amor, caritas and unitas spiritus must not be understood as the steps of a ladder, clearly separated one from the other470. They lead, they follow, often the last becomes the first and the first becomes the last. This is also true about concupiscientia, or the will in its negative way of operation. For no matter how much the soul advances through the ascending affective levels towards God, while it is still in the flesh, the concupiscientia cannot be eliminated. It can be diminished, by advancing the spiral of the ascending levels of love, by God’s grace, but it cannot be integrally eradicated. The idea of the persistence of concupiscientia as long as human beings are alive is rooted in Augustine, as the following brief phrase from the Speculum fidei, demonstrates it:

Spec. 12: s. 151.5 :

Quamdiu enim hic vivitur, carnalis …quia ipsa concupiscientia, cum qua nati concupiscientia minui potest, frenari potest, extingui vero non potest.

William was not alone in following Augustine on this point; Bernard also shares the same view when he makes the distinction between voluntas propria (the will turned on itself

467 Cant. 130: incipiat tunc velle quod vult Deus. Et tunc per similitudinem voluntatis unus cum Deo spiritus fit.
468 Cant. 131.
469 See above, p. 143.
470 Nat. am. 45. See also above, p. 145.
which leads to *concupiscen
tia*) and *voluntas communis* which is charity\(^\text{471}\). Since
*concupiscen
tia* or *voluntas propria* will endure as long as the human being’s life in the
body, William’s choice of speaking even of the state of *unus spiri
tus* as a likeness of the
human will with the will of God appears more justified. The passage from the *Expositio
super Cantica Canticorum*, finishes with another description of the mystical state which
presents similarities with that of Bernard from *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 71:

> Whoever is a Bride then has but one sole desire and aspiration: that her face be
> joined continually to your face in the kiss of charity- that is that she becomes one
> spirit with you through the unity of the same will\(^\text{472}\).

While at first glance the expression *per unitatem eiusdem voluntatis* stands in opposition
to Bernard’s expression applied to the mystical union, that of *conniv
tentia voluntatum*\(^\text{473}\) or *communio voluntatum*\(^\text{474}\), one needs to understand this passage not as a perfect identity
of the human will with the will of God, but in the light of what William said just a few
lines earlier in the same paragraph, when he clearly indicates that one becomes one with
God “by likeness of willing the same thing”. As Bernard wrote his account on the *unitas
spiritus* later than William, he might have well been inspired by this passage from the
*Expositio super Cantica Canticorum*. Opting for the plural *voluntatum*, he is more
explicit than William in stating that there is no perfect identity between the human and
the divine will. The barrier in both cases is *concupiscen
tia* or *voluntas propria* which
persists as long as the life in the flesh.

William returns to the ideas he presented in the *Expositio super Cantica
Canticorum* in his late work *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei*. He discusses the *unitas
spiritus* in the larger context of the three likenesses of the human being to God\(^\text{475}\). He
considers the third likeness to be so close in its resemblance to God that it deserves better
to be referred to as *unitas spiritus*. As the starting point of this discussion, it is possible to
recognise the central idea on the mystical union from the *Expositio super Cantica

\(^{471}\) *Pasc.* 2.8. For a discussion of *voluntas propria* and *voluntas communis* in Bernard see Gilson (1940) 54-59. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect common to both William and Bernard, see Bell (1984) 186-193.

\(^{472}\) *Cant.* 131.

\(^{473}\) *SC.* 71.10; *SC.* 71.8.

\(^{474}\) *SC.* 71.10.

\(^{475}\) *Ep. frat.* 257-263. See above, p. 133.
Thus, to be like God, William says is to will what God wills. However, he refines his understanding of the unitas spiritus, by claiming in a way that is reminiscent of Augustine that unitas spiritus is not only unity of willing the same thing, but inability of willing anything else than what God wills. It is not excluded that William had direct knowledge of Augustine’s text making a distinction between the paradisiacal state, whose main characteristic was the possibility of not sinning expressed by posse and the eschatological state of the renovatio in melius whose characteristic is the impossibility of sinning expressed by non posse. At the same time an equally probable source for this division between posse and non posse might have been Bernard himself. In the treatise on the De gratia et libero arbitrio which is dedicated to William, Bernard himself made use of the Augustinian expression non posse peccare in order to refer to the mystical union. The inability to sin (non posse peccare) is termed by Bernard liber complacitum, and he admitted that although this state is reserved for the life to come, a few perfect souls enjoy it rarely for a fleeting moment in this life. By understanding the mystical union as inability to will anything else than what God wills, it seems as if William refined his initial view on the unitas spiritus in the light of what Bernard has to say on this subject with the help of Augustine.

The passage from the Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei on the unitas spiritus continues in the following way:

It is called unity of spirit not only because the Holy Spirit brings it about or inclines a human being’s spirit to it, but because it is the Holy Spirit himself, the God who is Charity. He who is the Love of the Father and Son, their unity, Sweetness, Good, Kiss, Embrace and whatever they can have in common in that supreme unity of truth and truth of unity, becomes for the human person in regard to God in the manner appropriate to him the same what he is for the Son in regard to the Father or for the Father in regard to the Son through unity of substance. The conscientiousness in its happiness finds itself standing somehow midway in the Kiss and the Embrace of the Father and the Son. In a manner which exceeds description and thought, the human being of God is found worthy

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476 Ep. frat. 258.
477 Augustine provides him with the distinction between posse and non posse present in corrept. 33; see Bell (1984) 193-195; see also the discussion of the unitas spiritus in the context of the order of love, pp. 180-181.
478 Gra. 7.21. See above, pp. 48-49.
to become not God, but still what God is – that is to say he becomes by grace what God is by nature.⁴⁷⁹

Bernard showed that the unity of spirit is realised through the bond of love (*glutino amoris*). But while for Bernard love is the intermediary that enables God and the human being to unite their wills, for William love is the unity itself. Furthermore, relying on Augustine⁴⁸⁰, William strongly emphasises that the Holy Spirit is love and therefore that the unity of spirit is the Holy Spirit himself, the God who is charity. Although there is evidence that Bernard was familiar with Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as love, since he referred to the third person of the divine Trinity as the ‘kiss of the Father and the Son’⁴⁸¹ and also as the love of the Father and the Son⁴⁸², he never engages in theological explorations of this idea. Contrastingly, William bases his entire mystical theology on the identification of the Holy Spirit with love. This will take William a step further than Bernard. However, while engaging in speculative theology William does not exceed the boundaries of ‘orthodox’ theology, and remains firmly grounded in the Augustinian tradition as he carefully preserves the ontological gap between the human being and God.

William finds himself in agreement with Augustine and Bernard in the distinction between the temporal character of the mystical union conveyed by the verb *fit* and the eternal aspect of the divine and consubstantial unity expressed by *est*. In the human being the Holy Spirit becomes (*fit*) what he is (*est*) in the consubstantial union between the Father and the Son. More than that, the Holy Spirit becomes for the human being *suo modo* in a manner appropriate to him, while in the divine unity he represents the consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son. *Suo modo* hints at the fact that the human being becomes merely by participation and by grace what God is by nature.

One passage from the *Speculum fidei*⁴⁸³, a work written between 1140-1143 confirms that William was preoccupied with the understanding of the *unitas spiritus* as participation in the Holy Spirit which offers a glimpse of the Trinitarian life, before writing the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei*: here William distinguishes between the

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⁴⁷⁹ Ep. frat. 262.
⁴⁸⁰ On William’s dependence on Augustine regarding the idea of Holy Spirit as love or charity, see above, pp. 164-175.
⁴⁸¹ SC. 8.2.
⁴⁸² SC. 8.4.
⁴⁸³ Spec. 107.
Holy Spirit in God and the Holy Spirit in the human being, as there is a difference between the Holy Spirit as the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son, and the Holy Spirit in the inferior nature, between the Holy Spirit in the Creator and the Holy Spirit in creature, between what he is in his own nature and what he is in grace, between what he is in the Giver and what he is in the recipient, between what he is in the eternity and what he is in time. In God, the Holy Spirit is naturally and consubstantially mutual love, unity, mutual knowledge, and everything that is common for both Father and Son. The Holy Spirit bestows all these things by grace on the human being, and in doing so he dwells in the human being. In turn the human being, in whom all these things occur and who is thus transformed, dwells in the Holy Spirit. This indwelling does not entail a transformation of the human soul into divine nature, but William admits that while not reaching the divine beatitude this is nevertheless a state that surpasses exceedingly the human beatitude\textsuperscript{484}.

William goes on then to describe the \textit{unitas spiritus} as a state of supreme happiness in which the soul finds itself included in the Embrace and the Kiss of the Father and the Son, being deigned worthy of a taste of the Trinitarian life\textsuperscript{485}. However, such a description comes only after he took serious care to emphasise the differences which exist between the Holy Spirit as consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in his operation \textit{ad extra}. This daring description of the \textit{unitas spiritus} occurs in a shortened form in the passage from the \textit{Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei}, we quoted above and which Verdeyen wanted to see as contradicting Bernard’s account of the \textit{unitas spiritus}, which does not allow that in this privileged state the soul reaches such an intimate relation to God\textsuperscript{486}:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Ep. frat.} 262: \\
\textit{Cum in osculo et amplexu Patris et Filii medium quodammodo se invenit beata conscientia.}\textsuperscript{487}
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Spec.} 111: \\
\textit{(…)} in amplexu et osculo Patris et Filii qui Spiritus Sanctus est, hominem quodammodo invenire se medium et ipsa caritate Deo uniri qua Pater et Filius unum sunt.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{484} \textit{Spec.} 101.  \\
\textsuperscript{485} \textit{Spec.} 111.  \\
\textsuperscript{486} SC. 71.9-10.  \\
\textsuperscript{487} \textit{Ep. frat.} 263.
The fact that William repeats ideas he presented before in earlier works, seems to confirm the impression that far from reacting to the position of his friend, he is offering a concentrated summary of what he has said before on this subject. He might have felt the need for recapitulating his ideas on this subject in the same way in which he presents in the preface to the *Epistola ad fratres de Monte Dei* a list of all his works, out of concern for the Carthusian monks, the beneficiaries of William’s letter, who probably did not have an integral knowledge of everything he had ever written.

In conclusion we can state that in developing his view on the *unitas spiritus*, William seems to have relied primarily on Augustine’s idea of the idea of Holy Spirit as love and subsequently on that of God who loves himself in us, on Augustine’s view on will in general, on Augustine’s distinction between the divine unity and the mystical unity, where the first is always consubstantial, while the second is participation. His use of Origen is dictated only insofar as his Trinitarian insights are compatible to and complete Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as everything which is common to the Father and the Son. Williams seems to have influenced his friend Bernard in his description of the mystical union as a communion of wills, but at the same time he also appears to have been influenced by Bernard. As a result of this influence he refined his position on the mystical union seeing it not merely as willing the same thing as God but as an impossibility of willing anything else than what God wills. In addition, there is no quarrel between the two friends in acknowledging the eternal character of the divine unity as opposed to the temporal character of the mystical unity. They both choose to express this significant difference by adopting Augustine’s opposition between *est* and *fit*.

The present analysis attempted to show that Bernard’s and William’s views on the mystical union, far from being irreconcilable, share many common elements and by highlighting the fact that these two authors influenced each other an important argument has been found in order to support the idea that between them there was rather dialogue than dispute.
Conclusion

William’s knowledge of Augustine is vast and thorough. Early in his career he compiled a series of excerpts from Augustine’s works, under the title Sententiae, which, unfortunately, are no longer extant today. He quoted Augustine extensively in his works based on the method of compilatio, but apart from his De sacramento altaris and his Disputatio adversus Abaelardum, where he indicates the provenance of each quotation, as a general rule he does not name his sources. However, it has been demonstrated that Augustine provides the main material for those of William’s treatises in which he collects excerpts from the writings of the patristic authors, such as the Expositio super Epistolam ad Romanos and the Aenigma fidei. Augustine occupies pride of place also in the treatises where William chooses to speak with his own voice rather than with that of his patristic predecessors. Thus, even Jean-Marie Déchanet, who was more inclined to search for William’s Greek sources admitted that his early treatises De contemplando Deo, De natura et dignitate amoris and Meditativae orationes are “nettement augustiniens”.

William draws on a large number of Augustine’s texts, from the early treatises to the late anti-Pelagian writings and from the bishop’s major works such as the Confessiones, the De Trinitate, the De Genesi ad litteram, the De civitate Dei to his biblical commentaries and his letters. Apart from a broad knowledge of Augustine’s numerous works, William seems to have had something even more valuable - a synthetic view of his mind and teaching. While relying on disparate quotations from a wide range of Augustine’s works in many of his compilations, William’s arrangement of these fragments is carried out in accordance with his reading of Augustine synthetically, as a whole.

Although William attempted to achieve a synthesis of different patristic views in his works, in general, it is Augustine who sets the theological tone to which all other patristic voices need to attune. Thus, William relies both on Augustine and Origen in his treatment of the grace of God; he consults Augustine together with Basil when speaking

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490 Déchanet (1940) 57, n.1.
491 Déchanet (1972) 143 made this observation about William’s knowledge of patristic authors in general. As a result of this investigation, I can argue that this is particularly true of his knowledge of Augustine.
of Trinity; he merges the views of Augustine and Gregory of Nyssa on the nature of the soul, etc. As David Bell has remarked, William uses Greek sources “not to construct but to elaborate his basic Augustinian scheme”492.

While William’s depends on Augustine in his treatment of a large number of theological themes, in the present thesis we have explored his reliance on his predecessor only in those topics, that help us to understand his teaching about the path to attaining union with God, namely the image and likeness, the doctrine of love and the vision and union with God.

The first chapter devoted to the exploration of William’s anthropological principles explained how William embraced Augustine’s doctrine of humanity being created in the image and likeness of God as the framework for his discussion of the soul’s encounter with God. William demonstrates a detailed knowledge of Augustine’s teaching on the subject, taking for granted Augustine’s claim that the most accurate image in the human soul is formed of memory, intellect and will, which can never be erased. What was lost as a result of Adam’s fall is the likeness. However, due to the permanence of the image of God in the human soul, the likeness may be restored. Augustine’s hesitation in drawing too direct an analogy between the three elements of the created image and the three persons of the Holy Trinity is totally set aside. William speaks confidently about this analogy, but his main interest like that of Augustine in the last book of the De Trinitate, is to use it as a solid foundation for a Trinitarian anagogy, which will result in the restoration of the lost likeness. William brings his own insights to the discussion when he distinguishes between three levels of likeness and identifies the highest with the unitas spiritus, which represents the soul’s union with God. While William considers that all three divine persons play an important role in the restoration of the lost likeness and in attaining union with God, he focuses especially on the activity of the Holy Spirit, which, following Augustine, he identifies with love.

The second chapter explored the notion of love in William showing that like in the case of the doctrine of image and likeness, he displays a profound knowledge of the subject, following Augustine in his understanding of love as voluntas, pondus, motus or affectus. More than Augustine, William emphasises the cognitive aspect of love and

draws inspiration from the theory of sense perception and of thought formation from Book 11 of the *De Trinitate* in order to explain the mechanism of what he names *sensus amoris* or *intellectus amoris*. However, the crucial element of William’s teaching on love with major consequences for his understanding of the soul’s encounter with God is his appropriation of Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. Three main aspects of Augustine’s unsystematic teaching are present in William: the understanding of the Holy Spirit as the consubstantial bond of the Father and the Son; the understanding of the Holy Spirit as *donum Dei*; and the idea that in loving God is rather God who loves himself through us. Based on these elements William insists that human love for God is the Holy Spirit. This claim must be understood not as referring to human love as the Holy Spirit by nature, essence or substance, but as referring to the Holy Spirit by participation, as David Bell has demonstrated. It is exactly through the human being’s participation in the Holy Spirit that the likeness is restored and the *unitas spiritus* realised.

Finally, the last chapter dealt with the vision of God and with the *unitas spiritus*, both of which represent the stage of the perfect likeness with God. William’s discussion of the vision of God is based directly on Augustine’s *Epistula* 147, from which he quotes extensively, offering a summary of his predecessor views on the subject. However, William brings his own contribution to the discussion by reflecting on Mt 11:27: “Nobody sees the Father, except the Son and the Son except the Father”. This enables him to carry out a distinction between the mutual seeing of the Father and the Son within the Holy Trinity, which is identical with their substance and their unity and which is the Holy Spirit, and the human being’s vision of God, which he also equates with the Holy Spirit, but not as substance, rather, as he himself puts it, as likeness and love.

Since following Augustine William adopted the view that each vision involves a sort of *unitas* brought about by the will, which unites the seeing individual with the exterior object, it follows that the perfect vision of God is nothing else than union with God, or *unitas spiritus*. While the vision of God is based on the understanding of the Holy Spirit as the mutual vision of the Father and the Son according to Mt 11:27, the *unitas spiritus* is based on Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. However,

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493 Bell (1980) 139-140.
494 *Aenig.* 5.
William goes further than Augustine when he claims that to be united with God is to participate in the Holy Spirit, which is the consubstantial love of the Father and the Son. He remains in agreement with Augustine when he maintains the ontological gap between the human being and God in the *unitas spiritus*, claiming that one who experienced this state can become god, but not by nature, only by grace. Finally, the description of the *unitas spiritus* as the impossibility of willing anything else than what God wills alludes to the way in which Augustine refers to the human condition at the end of *renovatio* as *non posse peccare*⁴⁹⁵. A direct source for this idea could be his friend Bernard who, following Augustine, described himself the highest state of freedom (*liberum complacitum*) as *non posse peccare* in the treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, which he dedicated to William.

⁴⁹⁵ corresp. 33.
EPILOGUE

The present thesis examined the role played by Augustine in the articulation of the mystical thought of Bernard of Clairvaux and William of St. Thierry. In this study I have argued that the cohesion of the mystical thought of these medieval authors is ensured by their appropriation of the “guiding principle of Augustine’s mystical theology”\(^1\), summed up by the bishop of Hippo himself in the first lines of his *Confessiones*: (1) “You made us for yourself and (2) our heart is restless until (3) it rests in you”\(^2\). Consequently, following Augustine, both Bernard and William consider the human being (1) to have been created with a natural tendency towards God (2) that renders him unable to be satisfied with anything other (3) than God himself. Accordingly, the central theological themes of their mystical thought are: (1) the creation of humanity in the image and likeness of God, (2) love and (3) the direct encounter of the soul with God. These themes are inextricably bound up together, discussing (1) the grounds for the soul’s encounter with God, (2) the means to attain it and (3) the nature of this encounter, which represents the ultimate goal of the human being to be fulfilled completely only after the resurrection.

Gerald Bonner has repeatedly pointed out that the aforementioned principle (i.e. *conf* 1.1.1) governs what he has designated as the “optimistic” or “dynamic” field of Augustine’s theology, apparent especially in the bishop’s early and mature writings, which speak confidently of the true end of the human being as the eternal enjoyment of God. However, by contrasting the field of Augustine’s spirituality with that of his dogmatic theology dealing with the notions of grace, predestination and original sin, which he labels as “pessimistic”, Bonner presents a polarized picture of Augustine’s

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\(^1\) Louth (2006) 129.
\(^2\) *conf*. 1.1.1.
thought\(^3\), which has been increasingly questioned in recent years by scholarly endeavors which advocate the coherence of the bishop’s teaching\(^4\).

This contrasting picture suits perhaps better Augustine’s reception in the West than his actual writings. Along these lines, Aimé Solignac has observed that the different facets of Augustine’s views in regard to the nature and destiny of the human being are reflected in what he named “la double tradition augustinienne”\(^5\). Thus, on the one hand he has spoken of a “tradition lumineuse” stemming from Augustine’s anthropology that affirms the dignity of the human being as image of God, considering him created for a noble destiny. To this tradition belong the great mystics of the Western Christendom, the Cistercians, Bernard and William, the Victorines, Hugh and Richard, the Franciscan Bonaventure and the Dominican Meister Eckhart, who have primarily seen Augustine as the *doctor caritatis*\(^6\). On the other hand, Solignac has spoken of a “tradition ombreuse” based on Augustine’s more sombre anthropological views, which consider humankind as having inherited Adam’s original sin, underline the helplessness of the human condition without divine grace, and reject the universality of salvation. The history of the pessimistic tradition founded especially on Augustine’s late works written during the Pelagian controversy begins with Prosper of Aquitaine and includes names such as Anselm of Canterbury, Luther, Calvin and Jansen, to mention just a few\(^7\).

The result of the present research confirms Solignac’s observation that Bernard and William pertain to the “luminous Augustinian tradition”. However, it is important to add that while Bernard and William adopt the fundamental principle of the optimistic tenor of Augustine’s theology as the underlying principle of their mystical thought, they completely disregard its frictions with some of the sombre aspects of Augustine’s theology. Indeed they manage to make use of some of Augustine’s later works by completely ignoring their negative conclusions. For instance, Bernard and William focused particularly on the problem of grace, each of them devoting lengthy treatments to this subject. Bernard followed the late Augustine in his *De gratia et libero arbitrio*,

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\(^3\) Bonner (1987) 203-215. More recently, he returned to this problem in a book-length study, see Bonner (2007). Other scholars have observed the same tension between Augustine’s reading of the First Epistle of John on God’s love and his reading of Paul on predestination, see Rist (2001) 3.

\(^4\) See above, p. 6.


\(^6\) Solignac (1985) 67-68.

\(^7\) Solignac (1985) 71-77.
which also borrows the title of one of Augustine’s anti-Pelagian treatises. William drew extensively on the late Augustine in his *Expositio super Epistulam ad Romanos*, where, apart from concentrating on the problem of grace, he also quoted Augustine on other anti-Pelagian issues such as original sin and predestination. Furthermore, Bernard and William integrated into their mystical thought views on grace shaped by reading the late Augustine, emphasising the need for grace at each stage of the ascent of the soul to God and underlining the inability of the human soul to turn towards God by relying solely on its own will. This demonstrates that, unlike modern critics of the bishop of Hippo who often signal tensions and even self-contradictions in Augustine’s teaching, Bernard and William approached his works with an absolute confidence that they form a homogenous and coherent body of doctrine.

Although both Bernard and William established their mystical thought based on the same categories of (1) image and likeness, (2) love and (3) direct encounter with God, quite often they used Augustine differently in the elaboration of these themes. Thus, William pays much more attention than Bernard to the image of God in the human soul as being formed of memory, intellect and will. He sees a direct analogy between the three factors of the created image and the three divine persons and understands the image as a means of union with the Trinity. Bernard, in turn, although acquainted with Augustine’s classical view on the Trinitarian aspect of the created image, identified the image of God with free choice and located it at the level of will. However, like William he followed Augustine in his understanding of *imago Dei* as the human capacity for God persisting in the human soul in spite of Adam’s fall, which caused only the loss of the likeness to God. Also as a consequence of their use of Augustine, both Bernard’s and William’s concept of image is dynamic, in the sense that as a result of his creation in the image of God, the human being tends naturally towards him and finds satisfaction in nothing other than God. As with Augustine, the dynamic aspect of Bernard’s and William’s teaching on the image is strengthened by their additional emphasis on the restoration of likeness as a process. The soul’s return to God from the *regio dissimilitudinis* where Adam’s sin condemns it to fall is possible only through Christ’s redeeming grace, which will also restore the human being to a greater dignity and a greater likeness than that with which God endowed Adam. Again in accordance with Augustine’s teaching Bernard and
William understand the restoration of likeness as a *renovatio in melius* and they define it in Augustine’s terms as a state where it will be impossible for the soul to commit sin (*non posse peccare*). Finally, the perfectly restored likeness implies the perfect vision of God and perfect love.

Embracing Augustine’s principle that the soul approaches God not by spatial movement but by affections, which when correctly ordered by Christ’s grace foster the restoration of the likeness, Bernard and William focused particularly on the role of love in the soul’s ascent to God. In spite of the similarities presented by their doctrine on love that contributed to a certain extent to the incorrect attribution of some of William’s treatises to Bernard for centuries, their views on the subject are at times different. The distinctive nuances of their teaching on love are also manifest in the way in which they use different material from Augustine. Thus, Augustine’s exegesis of 1 Jn 4:8, 1 Jn 4:10 and Rom 5:5 asserting the primacy of divine love forms the bedrock of Bernard’s views on love. The human being is able to love God only because he was loved by God first. Following Augustine, Bernard argued that God loved human beings before the foundation of the world and he manifested his love by creating them in his own image and likeness. His divine love is also manifest in the redemption work, when God delivered up his Son for the benefit of humanity. In Bernard’s view the capacity of the human being to love God in return (his *velle, affectio, desiderium, amor, dilectio, caritas*) is a consequence of his creation in the image of God; however this capacity which in the beginning is a disordered dynamism in the nature of the human being, which makes him tend restlessly towards his real end, needs to be oriented with Christ’s grace towards God in order to become perfect love of God. While Bernard envisaged numerous itineraries mapping the return of love to God, I have argued that his most famous ascending pattern of the soul’s loving ascent to God presented in his treatise *De diligendo Deo* is inspired by Augustine’s description of the Christian perfection as an advancement from *cupiditas* to *caritas* and by the definition of these two concepts as exposed in Augustine’s treatise *De doctrina Christiana*. As such the human love progresses from the stage where the human being loves himself for his own sake to the stage where the human being loves himself for the sake of God.
Like Augustine, William defined love as a form of will imprinted in the human being as a consequence of his creation in the image and likeness of God. In order to suggest the dynamism inherent in the concept of love, William followed Augustine in his understanding of love as *motus* and especially as *pondus*, which draws the human soul upwards towards its proper resting place, which is God. William also provides itineraries of the soul’s ascent to God and although the stages of this ascent may vary from one work to another, they are usually identified as *voluntas*, which under the influence of grace progresses to *amor, dilectio, caritas* and/or *unitas spiritus*. William differs from Bernard when, relying on Augustine’s theory of sense perception and thought formation, he insists on the cognitive character of love. He also differs from his friend in the appropriation of Augustine’s idea that the Holy Spirit is love. Although Bernard was acquainted with this aspect of Augustine’s teaching, mentioning it occasionally in his works, this idea does not play any role in his mystical thought. For William, however, it represents the cornerstone of his mysticism. It is the appropriation of this idea that enables William to claim that when the soul loves God, it is rather God who loves himself in us. In William’s view, the human love for God is to a certain extent the Holy Spirit, but not as substance as it is in the consubstantial union with God, but as likeness.

The growth of human love for God restores the lost likeness of the soul with God and at this stage the soul sees God and is united with God. This state is rarely experienced in this life, only by a few exceptional human beings and only for a fleeting moment. Its full realisation is reserved for the life of the just after the resurrection, i.e. it is subject to eschatological suspense. However, both Bernard and William are in agreement with Augustine that the process of restoration of the likeness must begin in this life. While Bernard identified likeness with vision, he did not develop this aspect in his works. However, he seems to have known Augustine’s distinction of the three types of vision from the *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book XII where Augustine differentiates between corporeal, spiritual and intellectual vision, which Bernard mentions in his *Sermo super Cantica Canticorum* 31. In turn, William was familiar with Augustine’s major texts on vision, such as *Epistula* 147, *Epistula* 92 and *De Genesi ad litteram*, Book XII. He quoted extensively from all these works arranging the material in a synthesis which,
while capturing the essence of Augustine’s teaching, also allowed him to add his own contribution in a way that was not discordant with the views of his predecessor.

Bernard and William developed the union of the soul with God, a concept that is absent from Augustine’s works, drawing nevertheless again on different aspects of Augustine’s thought. Bernard followed closely Augustine’s exegetical distinction between *unum* and *unus spiritus* based on Jn 10:30 and 1 Cor 6:17. Augustine developed this distinction in order to refute the Arian claims that the union between the Father and the Son is merely a unity of will and not one of substance. Bernard seems to have read Augustine fragmentarily by selecting only those aspects that deal with the differences between the two types of union while ignoring some other important aspects discussed by Augustine in the same passage, namely the idea that the Holy Spirit is the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son. Like Augustine, Bernard strongly maintains the ontological gap existing between the human being and God even in their union. Thus, he speaks of the union of the soul with God as the perfect accord of wills in the glue of charity, and differentiates it from the consubstantial unity existing within the Trinity. In turn, William totally ignores the exegetical distinction established by Augustine and he refers to the union of the human soul with God both as *unum* and as *unus spiritus*. He also focuses on the idea of the Holy Spirit as love, which enables him to describe the union of the soul with God not as totally distinct from the consubstantial union of the Trinity, but as participation in the consubstantial life of the Trinity. Like Bernard and also in agreement with Augustine, William maintains the ontological gap between the two types of union, claiming that while the result of this union is deification, the human being does not become God by substance, he becomes only God by grace.

It is especially the way in which Bernard and William draw on different aspects of Augustine’s teaching that makes them adopt different positions in regard to the notion of the soul’s union with God. Following closely Augustine in his exegesis of 1 Cor 6:17 Bernard finds himself bound to maintain not only the radical difference of natures between God and the soul in *unus spiritus* which is only a union of the wills in the bond of love, but also he denies that the soul which is granted to experience this privileged state may have access in any way to that simple unity which is the Holy Trinity. For this reason Bernard’s view on *unus spiritus* has been described as the union of two beings by
juxtaposition. William in turn, by adopting Augustine’s idea of the Holy Spirit as love and by emphasising also like Augustine that in loving God, it is God who loves himself in us, describes the union of the soul with God as being nothing else than the Holy Spirit himself, the consubstantial unity of the Father and the Son. While William does not go so far as to identify the soul with God, taking care to maintain the ontological gap between creature and Creator, he differs from Bernard in his understanding of the mystical union as the soul’s participation to the consubstantial life of the Holy Trinity.

Finally, Bernard and William differ not only in the way in which they select different material from Augustine and adapt it to their contemplative goals, but also in the way in which they approach the works of the bishop of Hippo. For Bernard, Augustine is the authoritative guide to his interpretation of the Scripture. He follows closely the bishop’s exegesis of a few biblical verses which play an essential role in Bernard’s mystical thought so that the result of his approach is an “exegetical” mysticism deeply anchored in Augustine. In turn, William, who consolidated his knowledge of Augustine’s enormous oeuvre in the course of writing his numerous patristic compilations, acquired a synthetic view of the bishop’s thought which enabled him to bring together the multiple facets of particular theological issues that Augustine had never attempted to expound systematically. William’s appropriation of Augustine’s teaching on the Holy Spirit as love as the foundation for his “pneumatic” mysticism is largely based on his synthetic reading of the bishop’s scattered passages dealing with this issue. Bernard’s and William’s different ways of reading Augustine reflect two different personalities and also bring testimony for a freedom in dealing with the patristic sources that allows different views to coexist within the same theological tradition.
Latin Appendix

Introduction

Introduction, note 1:

Ep. frat. 16: Aliorum est enim Deo servire, vestrum est ADHAERERE. Aliorum est Deum credere, scire, amare et revereri; vestrum est SAPERE, INTELLIGERE, COGNOSCERE, FRUI (...) Ep. frat. 25: Ipsa enim est professio vestra: quaerere Deum Iacob, non communi omnium more, sed QUÆRERE FACIEM DEI Iacob qui dicit: Vidi Dominum facie ad faciem et salva facta est anima mea.

Part I - The Exegetical Mysticism of Bernard of Clairvaux

Preliminary remarks, note 29:

Vita prima 1.4.24: Canonicas autem Scripturas simpliciter et SERIATIM libentius ac SAEPUS legebat, nec ullis magis quam ipsarum verbis intelligere se dicebat (...) SANCTOS ET ORTHODOXOS EORUM EXPOSITORES HUMILITER LEGENS, NEQUAquam EORUM SENsIBUS SUOS SENSUS AEQUABAT, SED SUBJICIEBAT FORMANDOS: et vestigiis eorum fideliter inhaerens, saepe de fonte unde illi hauserant, et ipse bibebat.

Preliminary remarks, note 30:

Hum. Retractatio: …improvide quiddam aposui, quod in Evangelio scriptum non esse postea deprehendi. Nam cum textus habeat tantummodo: neque filius scit, ego deceptus magis quam fallere volens, LITTERAE QUIPPE IMMEmOR, SED NON SENsUS: Nec ipse, inquam, filius hominis scit.

Preliminary remarks, note 90:

Ep. 77: Ideoque non quaerimus pugnas verborum, NOVITATES quoque VOCUM iuxta apostolicam doctrinam evitamus. PATRUM tantum opponimus sententias ac verba proferimus et non nostra: NEC ENIM SAPIENTIORES SUMUS QUAM PATRES NOSTRI.

Preliminary remarks, note 99:

SC. 5.7: Videntur Patres de huiusmodi diversa sensisse, nec mihi perspicuum est unde alterutrum doceam, et nescire me fateor. Sed et vestris profectibus non multum conferre arbitror harum rerum notitiam.

Preliminary remarks, note 108:
Hum. Retractatio: Alio quoque in loco quamdam de Seraphim opinionem posui, quam nunquam audivi, nusquam legi. Ubi sane lector meus attendat, quod proinde temperanter «puto» dixerim, volens videlicet non aliud quam putari, quod certum reddere de Scripturis non valui.

Preliminary remarks, note 111:

Div. 34.1: Quamvis ne hoc quidem silendum arbitror quod evidentissime illum contra fidem nonulla scripsisse sanctorum Patrum tradat auctoritas, atque ideo non sine circumspectione esse legendum.

Chapter 1, note 165:

Gra. 9.28: Puto autem in his tribus libertatibus ipsam, ad quam conditi sumus, Conditoris imaginem atque similitudinem contineri, et imaginem quidem in libertate arbitrii, in reliquis autem duabus bipertitam quamdam consignari similitudinem.

Chapter 1, note 166:

Gra. 9.28: Hinc est fortassis, quod solum liberum arbitrium sui omnino defectum seu diminutionem non patitur, quod in ipso potissimum aeternae et incommutabilis divinitatis substantiva quaedam imago impressa videatur.

Chapter 1, note 176:

Gra. 10.35: Nemo proinde putet ideo dictum liberum arbitrium, quod aequa inter bonum et malum potestate vel facilitate versetur, cum cadere quidem per se potuerit, non autem resurgere, nisi per Domini Spiritum.

Chapter 1, note 199:

Gra. 7.21: Habet siquidem unaquaeeque illarum duos gradus, superiorem et inferiorem. Superior libertas consilii est NON POSSE PECCARE, inferior POSSE NON PECCARE. Item superior libertas complaciti NON POSSE TURBARI, inferior POSSE NON TURBARI.

Chapter 1, note 204:

Gra. 5.15: Hi plane, quod negandum non est, etiam in hac carne, raro licet raptimque, complaciti libertate fruuntur, qui cum Maria optimam partem elegerunt, quae non auferetur ab eis. Qui enim iam tenent quod auferendum non est, experiuntur utique quod futurum est. Sed quod futurum est felicitas est; porro felicitas et miseria eodem tempore simul esse non possunt. Quoties igitur per Spiritum illum participant, toties istam non sentiunt. Itaque in hac vita soli contemplativi possunt utcumque frui libertate complaciti, et hoc ex parte, et parte satis modica, viceque rarissima.
Chapter 2, note 272:

Dil. 10.35: Quid vero in summa et beata illa Trinitate summam et ineffabilem illam conservat unitatem, nisi caritas? Lex est ergo, et lex Domini, caritas, quae trinitatem in unitate quodammodo cohibet et colligat in vinculo pacis. Nemo tamen me aestimet caritatem hic accipere qualitatem vel aliqaud accidens – alioquin in Deo dicerem, quod absit, esse aliqaud quod Deus non est -, sed substantiam illam divinam, quod utique nec novum, nec insolitum est, dicente Ioanne: Deus caritas est. Dicitur ergo recte caritas, et Deus, et Dei donum. Itaque caritas dat caritatem substantiva accidentalem. Ubi dantem significat, nomen substantiae est; ubi donum qualitatis.

Chapter 2, note 277:

Jo. ev. tr. 110.6: Quapropter incomprehensibilis est dilectio qua diligit Deus, neque mutabilis. Non enim ex quo et reconciliati sumus per sanguinem Filii eius, non coepit diligere; sed ANTE MUNDI CONSTITUTIONEM DILEXIT NOS, ut cum eius Unigenito etiam nos filii eius essemus, priusquam omnino aliquid essesmus. Quod ergo reconciliati sumus Deo per mortem Filii eius, non sic audiatnr, non sic accipiatur, quasi ideo nos reconciliaverit ei Filius, ut iam inciperet amare quos oderat; sicut reconciliatur inimicus inimico, ut deinde sint amici, et invicem diligant qui oderant inimicos; sed iam nos diligenti reconciliati sumus ei, cum quo propter peccatum inimicitias habeamus.

Chapter 2, note 283:

Dil. 5.15: Siquidem non solum de me, sed de omni quoque quod factus est, scriptum est: Dixit, et facta sunt. At vero qui me tantum et semel dicendo fecit, in reficiendo profecto et dixit multa, et gessit mira, et pertulit durum.

Chapter 2, note 285:

Trin. 15.17.31: non enim habet homo unde deum diligat nisi ex deo. propter quod paulo post dicit: nos diligamus quia ipse prior dilesit nos. apostolus quoque Paulus: dilectio, inquit, dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis.

Chapter 2, note 289:


Chapter 2, note 339:
Dil. 7.19: *Ea namque suae cupiditatis lege, qua in rebus ceteris non habita prae habitis esuwire, et pro non habitis habita fastidire solebat, max omnibus quae in caelo et quae in terra sunt obtentis et contempatis, tandem ad ipsum procul dubio curreret, qui solus deesset omnium Deus. Porro ibi quiesceret, quia sicut citra nulla revocat quies, sic nulla ultra iam inquietudo sollicitat.*

Chapter 2, note 343:

*SC. 83.2:* Non mota quasi locis migrans, aut pedibus gradiens; sed mota, sicut substantia utique spirituali moveri est, cum suis affectibus, immo defectibus, a se quodammodo in peius vadit, cum se sibi vitae et morum pravitate dissimilem facit, reddit degenerem.

Chapter 2, note 356:

*SC. 84.1:* Quis terminus quaerendi Deum [adscribi possit]? Quaerite, inquit, faciem eius semper. Existimo quia nec cum inventus fuerit, cessabitur a quaerendo. Non pedum passibus, sed desideriis quaeritur Deus. Et utique non extundit desiderium sanctum felix inventio, sed extendit. Numquid consummatio gaudii, desiderii consumptio est? Oleum magis est illi: nam ipsum flamma. Sic est. Adimplebitur laetitia; sed desiderii non erit finis, ac per hoc nec quaerendi. Tu vero cogita, si potes, quaeritandi hoc studium sine indigentia, et desiderii sine anxietate: alterum profecto praesentia, alterum copia excludit.

Chapter 2, note 392:

*doc. Chr. 1.27.28:* Ipse est autem qui ordinatam habet dilectionem, ne aut diligat quos non est diligendum, aut non diligat quod diligendum est, aut amplius diligat quod minus diligendum est, aut aequiter diligat quod vel minus vel amplius diligendum est, aut minus vel amplius quod aequiter diligendum est

Chapter 2, note 393:

*Trin. 8.8.12:* Nec illa iam quaestio moveat, quantum caritatis fratri debeamus impendere, quantum Deo. Fratri enim quantum nobis ipsis; nos autem ipsos tanto magis diligimus, quanto magis diligimus Deum. Ex una igitur eademque caritate Deum proximumque diligimus, sed Deum propter Deum, nos autem, et proximum propter Deum.

Chapter 3, note 452:

*SC. 8.6:* Utrumque enim munus simul fert osculi gratia, et agnitionis lucem et devotionis pinguedinem. (...) Quamobrem geminae gratiae sacrosancti osculi susciipientae paret e regione duo labia sua quae sponsa est, intelligentiae rationem, sapientiae voluntatem…

Chapter 3, note 483:
SC. 82.8: Admiranda prorsus et stupenda illa similitudo, quam Dei visio comitatur, immo quae Dei visio est, ego autem dico in caritate. CARITAS ILLA VISIO, ILLA SIMILITUDO est (...)

Siquidem veniente quod perfectum est, evacuabitur quod ex parte est; etrique ad alterutrum casta et consummata dilectio, agnito plena, visio manifesta, coniunctio firma, societas individua, similitudo perfecta.

Chapter 3, note 500:

Trin. 6.3.4: Diversum enim natura spiritus hominis et spiritus dei, sed INHAERENDO fit UNUS SPIRITUS ex diuersis duobus, ita ut sine humano spiritu beatus sit dei spiritus atque perfectus, beatus autem hominis spiritus non nisi cum deo.

Chapter 3, note 507:

Trin. 6.5.7: cum illo autem UNUS SPIRITUS, quia AGGLUTINATUR anima nostra post eum. Et nobis HAERERE Deo bonum est.

Chapter 3, note 525:

SC. 71.8: Quo contra homo et Deus, quia unius non sunt substantiae vel naturae; UNUM quidem dici non possunt, UNUS tamen SPIRITUS certa et absoluta veritate dicitur, si sibi GLUTINO AMORIS inhaereant. Quam quidem unitatem non tam essentiarum cohaerentia facit, quam CONNIVENTIA VOLUNTATUM.

Part II - The Pneumatic Mysticism of William of St. Thierry

Preliminary remarks, note 14:

Nat. corp. 2: Scias autem quae legis non mea esse, sed ex parte philosophorum vel physicorum, ex parte vero ecclesiasticorum doctorum, nec tantum eorum sensa, sed ipsa eorum sicut ab eis edita sunt dicta vel scripta quae excerpta ex eorum libris his in unum congresi.

Preliminary remarks, note 15:

Exp. Rom. Praefatio:...sed ut aliqua sanctorum Patrum, et MAXIME BEATI AUGUSTINI, sensa in eam, vel scripta ex libris eorum et opusculis hinc inde collecta in unum hoc opusculum compingentes, suppressis quae in ea sunt quaestionum molestiis, unam continuam non nostrum, sed ipsorum texamus explanationem. Quae tanto debeat gratior esse lectoribus, quanto eam non novitas vel vanitatis praesumptio adinvenit, sed magnorum doctorum magna commendat auctoritas, praecipue, sicum dictum est, beati Augustini, dinde vero Ambrosii, Origenis et nonullorum aliorum doctorum; aliquorum
etiam magistorum nostril temporis, de quibus certum habemus non praeteriise eos in aliquot terminus quos posuerunt Patres nostri.

Chapter 1, note 61:


Chapter 1, note 119:

Nat. am. 3: Ut ergo Deo inhaeret creatae in homine rationalis anima, memoriam sibi vindicavit Pater, rationem Filii, voluntate ab utraque procedentem ab utroque procedens Spiritus sanctus.

Chapter 1, note 129:

Nat. corp. 105-106: Haec omnia anima intellectu conspiciens, non iam tantum delectatur in sua formositate quam in forma formatrice, cui intendendo semper effectur formosior. Ipsum enim intendere formari est. Quicquid enim ad Deum afficitur non est suum, sed eiu a quo afficitur.

Chapter 1, note 139:

31. Nat. am. 35: Accinxit ergo se quodammodo Dei Filiius, et aggressus est per humilitatem recuperare eum, qui recuperari poterat, qui per superbiam perierat. Itaque inter Deum et hominem medium se faciens, qui recedens a Deo, captus erat et ligatus a diabolo, hoc modo mediatoris et personam induit et actum.

Chapter 1, note 163:

Ep. frat. 259: Et haec hominis perfectio est, similitudo Dei. Perfectum autem nolle esse, delinquere est. Et ideo huic perfectioni nutrienda est semper voluntas, amor praeparandus; voluntas cohibenda ne in aliena dissipetur; amor servandus, ne inquinetur. Propter hoc enim solum et creati sumus et vivimus, ut Deo similes simus. Ad imaginem enim Dei creati simus.

Chapter 1, note 164:

Aenig. 6: In interiore ergo homine similitudo ista est, qua renovatur homo de die in diem in agnitione Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit eum: ubi tanto ei efficimur similiores, quanto magis in eius cognitionem caritatemque proficimus; et in tantum eum
propinquius ac familiaris videmus, in quantum cognoscendo eum ac diligendo efficimur ei similiores. Compare with Augustine, ep. 92.3: In interiore igitur homine ista similitudo est; qui renovatur in agnitionem Dei, secundum imaginem eius qui creavit illum. Et tanto efficimur similiores illi, quanto magis in eius cognitione et caritate proficimur.

Chapter 1, note 165:

Spec. 107: Similem enim ibi esse Deo, videre Deum, sive cognoscere erit; quem in tantum videbit sive cognoscet qui cognoscet vel videbit, in quantum similis erit; in tantum erit ei similis, in quantum eum cognoscet vel videbit. Vide namque ibi seu cognoscere Deum, similem est esse Deo; et similem ei esse, videre seu cognoscere eum est.

Chapter 1, note 166:

Aenig. 6: Ibi enim sicut in Trinitate que Deus est, mutuo se vident Pater et filius et mutuo se videre, unum eos esse est, et hoc alterum esse quod alter est; sic qui ad hoc predestinati sunt, et in hoc assumpti fuerint videbunt Deum sicuti est, et videndo efficientur sicut ipse est, similes ei. Ubi etiam sicut in Patre et Filio, que visio, ipsa unitas est; sic in Deo et homine, que visio, ipsa et similitudo futura est. Spiritus sanctus unitas Patris et Fili, ipse etiam caritas et similitudo Dei et hominis.

Chapter 1, note 168:

Cant. 88: In hoc etenim homo ad imaginem Dei conditus est, ut pie Dei reminiscens, hoc est ad intelligendum, humiliter intelligens, hoc est ad amandum, ardenter ac sapienter amans, usque ad fruendi affectum, animal rationale existeret, hoc est enim Deum timere, et mandata eius observare, quod est omnis homo. Et haec est imago et similitudo Dei in homine.

Chapter 2, note 194:

civ. Dei 14.6: quia si perversa est, perversos habebit hos motus; si autem recta est, non solum inculpabiles, verum etiam laudabiles erunt. Voluntas est quippe in omnibus; immo omnes nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt.

Chapter 2, note 195:

civ. Dei 14.7: Recta itaque voluntas est bonus amor et voluntas perversa malus amor. amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est. proinde mala sunt ista, si malus amor est; bona, si bonus

Chapter 2, note 202:
Nat. am. 14: Affectus est qui generali quadam potencia et perpetua quadam virtute firma et stabili, mentem possidet, quam per gratiam obtinuit. Affectiones vero sunt quas varias varius rerum et temporum affert eventus.

Chapter 2, note 253:

Med. 3.9-10: Omnis sensus corporeus, ut sensus sit et sentiat, oportet ut quadam sensibili affectione aliquomodo mutetur in id quod sentit(...). Nisi enim, rem sensam sensu rationi renuntiante, anima sentiens quadam sui transformatione mutetur in rem vel rei qualitatem quae sentitur, nec sensus est, nec sentire potest. Ideoque si sentit amore, qui sensus suus est, Deum bonum, et amat quia bonum, non hoc potest nisi, bono ipsi affectu communicans et ipsa bona efficiatur. (...)Sic enim est quodammodo de sensu animae. Sensus enim animae amor est: per hunc, sive cum mulcetur sive cum offenditur, sentit quicquid sentit. Cum per hunc in aliquid anima extenditur, quadam sui transformatione in id quod amat transmutatur, non quod idem sit in natura, sed affectu rei amatae conformatur. Utpote non bonum aliquem amare potest quia bonus est, nisi et ipsa in ipso bono bona efficiatur.

Chapter 2, note 255:

Spec. 101: Quod multo potentius digniusque agitur, cum ipse qui est substantialis voluntas Patris ac Filii, Spiritus Sanctus, voluntatem hominis sic sibi afficit, ut Deum amans anima, et amando sentiens, tota repente transmutatur non quidem in naturam divinitatis, sed tamen in quandam supra humanam, citra divinam formam beatitudinis; in gaudium illuminantis gratiae, et sensum illuminatae conscientiae

Chapter 2, note 273:

Cant. 76: Amor quippe Dei, intellectus eius est; qui non nisi amatus intelligitur, nec nisi intellectus amatur, et utique tantum intelligitur quantum amatur, tantum amatur quantum intelligitur.

Chapter 2, note 296:

Trin. 9.11.16: ita cum deum novimus, quamvis meliores efficiamur quam eramus antequam nossemus maximeque cum eadem notitia etiam placita digneque amata uerbum est fitque aliqua dei similitudo illa notitia, tamen inferior est quia in inferiore natura est.

Chapter 2, note 316:

Trin. 6.5.7: Spiritus ergo Sanctus commune aliquum est patris et filii, quidquid illud est, aut ipsa communio consubstantialis et coaeterna; quae si amicitia convenienter dici potest, dicatur, sed aptius dicitur caritas; et haec quoque substantia quia deus substantia et deus caritas, sicut scriptum est.
Trin. 15.17.31: *In hoc, inquit, cognoscimus quia in ipso manemus et ipse in nobis quia de spiritu suo dedit nobis. Sanctus itaque spiritus de quo dedit nobis facit nos in deo manere et ipsum in nobis. Hoc autem facit dilectio. Ipse est igitur deus dilectio.*

Chapter 2, note 325:

s. 34.2-3: *dedit se ipsum quem dileximus, dedit unde diligeremus (…) ut quia Spiritus Sanctus Deus est, nec diligere possumus Deum nisi per Spiritum Sanctum, amemus Deum de Deo.*

Chapter 2, note 327:

conf. 13.31.46: *Qui autem per spiritum tuum vident ea, **TU VIDES IN EIS. Ergo cum vident, quia bona sunt, tu vides, quia bona sunt, et quaecumque propter te placent, tu in eis places, et quae per spiritum tuum placent nobis, tibi placent in nobis (…). Et admoneor, ut dicam: certe nemo scit, quae Dei sunt, nisi spiritus Dei. Quomodo ergo scimus et nos, quae a Deo donata sunt nobis? Respondetur mihi, quoniam quae per eius spiritum scimus etiam sic nemo scit nisi spiritus Dei (…). **ITA QUIDQUID IN SPIRITU DEI VIDENT QUA BONUM EST, NON IPSI, SED DEUS VIDET, QUA BONUM EST.*

Chapter 2, note 333:

s. 71.18: *Quod ergo commune est patri et filio, per hoc nos voluerunt habere communionem et inter nos et secum, et per illud donum nos colligere in unum, quod ambo habent unum, hoc est per spiritum sanctum deum et donum dei.*

Chapter 2, note 334:

Trin. 15.18.32: *Dilectio igitur quae ex Deo est, et Deus est, proprie Spiritus Sanctus est, per quem diffunditur in cordibus nostris Dei caritas, per quam nos tota inhabitat Trinitas.*

Chapter 2, note 340:

Contemp. 14: *Amas ergo te, o amabilis Domine, in teipso, cum a Patre procedit et a Filio Spiritus sanctus, amor Patris ad Filium et Filii ad Patre; et tantus est amor ut sit unitas; tanta unitas ut sit omousion, id est eadem Patris et Filii substantia.*

Chapter 2, note 356:

Ep. frat. 170: *Amor enim Dei, vel amor Deus, Spiritus sanctus, amor hominis et spiritui se infundens, afficit eum sibi; ET AMANS SEMETIPSUM DE HOMINE DEUS, UNUM SECUM EFFICIT et spiritum et amorem eius. Sicut enim non habet corpus unde vivat nisi de spiritu suo, sic affectus hominis qui amor dicitur non vivit, hoc est non amat Deum nisi de Spiritu sancto.*
Chapter 2, note 392:

Ep. frat. 235: Haec, cum sursum tendit, sicut ignis ad locum suum: hoc est, cum sociatur veritati, et movetur ad altiora, amor est; cum ut promoveatur, lactatur a gratia, dilectio est; cum apprehendet, cum tenet cum fruitur, caritas est, unitas spiritus est, Deus est, deus enim caritas est.

Chapter 2, note 394:

Ep. frat. 257: Magna enim voluntas ad Deum, amor est; dilectio, adhaesio sive conjunctio; caritas fruition. Unitas vero spiritus cum Deo, homini sursum cor habenti, proficientis in Deum, voluntatis est perfectio, cum iam non solummodo vult quod Deus vult, sed sic est non tantum affectus, sed in affectu perfectus ut non possit velle nisi quod Deus vult.

Chapter 3, note 409:

civ. Dei 22.30: A quo refecti et gratia maiore perfecti vacabimus in aeternum, videntes qui ipse est Deus (...) Ibi vacabimus et videbimus, videbimus at amabimus, amabimus et laudabimus. Ecce quod erit in fine sine fine.

Chapter 3, note 455:

Contemp. 15: tu teipsum amas in nobis et nos in te cum te per te amamus et in tantum tibi unimur in quantum amare te meremur; et participes efficiemur, ut dictum est, orationis illius Christi filii tui: Volo ut, sicut ego et tu unum sumus, ita et ipsi in nobis unum sint.

Chapter 3, note 456:

Contemp. 14:… qui amor dicitur Patris et Filii et unitas et voluntas, per gratia suam nobis inhabitants et Dei in nos caritatem commendans, et per ipsam ipsum nobis concilianus, Deo nos unit…

Chapter 3, note 472:

Cant. 131: Ideoque quaecumque Sponsa est, hoc solum desiderat, hoc affectat, ut facies eius faciei tuae iungatur, jugiter in osculo caritatis hoc est unus tecum spiritus fiat per unitatem eiusdem voluntatis.

Chapter 3, note 479:

Ep. frat. 262: Dicitur autem haec unitas spiritus, non tantum quia efficit eam, vel afficit ei spiritum hominis Spiritus sanctus, sed quia ipsa ipse est Spiritus sanctus, Deus caritas; cum qui est amor Patris et Filii, et unitas et suavitatis, et bonum et osculum, et amplexus et quicquid commune potest esse amborum, in summa illa unitate veritatis et in veritate unitatis, hoc idem fit homini suo modo ad Deum, quod consubstantiali unitate Filio est ad
Patrem vel Patri ad Filium. Cum in osculo et amplexu Patris et Filii medium quodammodo se invenit beata conscientia; cum modo ineffabili et incogitabili, fieri meretur homo Dei, non Deus, sed tamen quod Deus est: homo ex gratia quod Deus est ex natura.
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