


# **EDWARD I AND THE CRUSADES**

**Bruce Beebe**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St Andrews**



**1971**

**Full metadata for this item is available in  
St Andrews Research Repository  
at:**

**<http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/>**

**Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:**

**<http://hdl.handle.net/10023/11414>**

**This item is protected by original copyright**

EDWARD I AND THE CRUSADES



I, Bruce Beebe, declare that this thesis has been composed by me, that the work of which it is a record has been done by myself, and that it has not been accepted in any previous application for a higher degree.

I, Bruce Beebe, have attempted to define and discuss as many aspects of English crusade policy in the late thirteenth century as the source material will allow. Following a brief chronological summary of Edward's involvement in the defence of the Holy Land, three sections form the framework of this examination of English crusading practice. The first consists of a narrative history of the Lord Edward's crusade of 1270-1272; the second deals with political factors which had relevance to English crusading activity throughout the period 1264-1307; and the final section includes a detailed examination of three important aspects of thirteenth-century crusading history: the contemporary relationship between theory and practice exemplified by English policies; the legatine authority and use of canonistic doctrines underlying English preaching and recruitment; and the machinery through which English policies were financed.

I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance General No. 12 on 1 November 1967 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. on 29 January 1969.

I certify that the conditions of the Ordinance and Regulations have been fulfilled.

.....

Dr. Jonathan S.C. Riley-Smith, supervisor.

# C O N T E N T S

	page	v
LIST OF MAPS AND TABLES		v
A NOTE ON NOMENCLATURE		vii
INTRODUCTION		1
I. <u>THE ENGLISH CRUSADE TO TUNIS AND LATIN SYRIA</u>	17	17
1. English crusading activity, 1264-1272	17	
a. The crusade of Pope Clement IV.		
b. The crusade of King Louis.		
c. The crusade of Charles of Anjou.		
d. The crusade of the Lord Edward.		
II. <u>THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN ENGLISH CRUSADING</u> <u>ACTIVITY, 1264-1307</u>	86	86
2. Domestic politics and the crusade of 1270.	86	
a. Baronial support or rejection of the crusade and its implications.		
b. Recruitment for the success of crusade and the safety of the realm.		
3. Edward's political relations on crusade.	117	
a. The English and Breton crusaders.		
b. The Church.		
c. The Military Orders.		
d. The crown and subjects of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.		
e. The crown and subjects of the Kingdom of Cyprus.		
f. Implications for English policies, 1272-1307.		
4. The crusade in conflict with English political requirements, 1272-1307.	154	
a. A new crusade vow: twelve years of delay and evasion.		
b. The vow unredeemed: the welfare of the realm and abandonment of the Holy Enterprise.		
c. Edward's manipulation of crusade finances.		
III. <u>PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ENGLISH</u> <u>CRUSADE POLICIES.</u>	208	
5. Edward I and contemporary theories of crusade administration and organization.	208	
a. Co-operation between European leaders.		
b. Intelligence and correspondence from the East.		
c. Military alliances with the Mongols.		
d. The concept of limited expeditions.		
e. The garrisoning of the Latin East.		
f. The need to hire mercenary troops on crusade.		

6. Preaching and Recruitment in England.	289
a. The authority and methods of papal envoys in England or Gascony.	
b. Preaching the cross and domestic peace.	
c. Spiritual benefits: the indulgence and papal composition.	
d. Commutation.	
e. Substitution.	
7. The financing of English crusade projects.	325
a. The cost of crusade activities.	
b. Means of meeting the cost of crusade activities.	
c. An estimate of the cost of crusade, 1270-1276.	
CONCLUSION	395
APPENDICES:	
I. Royal protections granted to English crusaders before August 1270.	401
II. Royal protections granted to English crusaders before March 1271	406
ABBREVIATIONS	408
BIBLIOGRAPHY	409

## LIST OF MAPS

- Fig. 1. Mamluk gains in the Latin East, page 59  
1263-1271
- Fig. 2. Division of territory according to the provisions of the truce of July 1268 (A) and those of the truce of April 1272 (B) 135

## LIST OF TABLES

- A. Rebels admitted to the king's peace and taking the cross before 1271. 90
- B. Royalists taking the cross before 1271. 90
- C. Crusaders possessed of former rebels' lands. 99
- D. Correspondence between Edward I and representatives in the East. 230
- E. Embassies and letters exchanged between England and Mongol Persia. 239
- F. Recorded expenditure of Edward on crusade, 1268-1274. ff. 394
- G. Revenue from grants or crusade subsidies, 1270-1296. ff. 394
- H. Recorded borrowing of English crusaders, 1271-1272. " 394
- I. Recorded borrowing of the Lord Edward, 1269-1276. " 394
- J. A Comparative Table of Values: Crown Revenues and Borrowing. " 394

### A note on nomenclature

The standardization of English, European and Arab names in the thirteenth century is a difficult task and the usage in this thesis requires some explanation. I have attempted such standardization with regard to place-names, using as a guide A History of the Crusades (ed. R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard), volume ii. European and Arab personal names have been standardized in accordance with this edition, although I have anglicized Christian names wherever possible. For all names of English extraction I have followed the entries in The Knights of Edward I (comp. C. Moor, Publications of the Harlean Society), volumes lxxx-lxxxiv.

## INTRODUCTION

. . . in omnem terram exiit fama ejus;  
unde si nos tacuerimus lapides acclamabunt.

-- Annalist of Dunstaple Priory

"Edward has a very modest place in the history of the crusades," wrote Sir Maurice Powicke.<sup>1</sup> A glance at recent historical literature reveals a climate of opinion favourable to this view among crusade historians as well as those involved in the study of English domestic and foreign policy. Nineteenth and early twentieth-century crusade studies have dealt summarily with the English project of 1270 and hardly at all with other activities sponsored by King Edward I.<sup>2</sup> More recent treatments of thirteenth-century crusades have dismissed Edward in terms similar to those of Prof. Joseph R. Strayer, whose contribution on the crusades of Louis IX includes the only full American account of Edward's 1270 expedition:

. . . while his record was better than that of the other kings he had drawn much the same conclusion . . . He would talk of regaining the Holy Land, but would always find some reason why it was impossible to make the effort. The age of the great crusades, led by the kings of the west, had ended.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

F.M. Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward, the Community of the Realm in the Thirteenth Century, ii, p. 600.

2.

See particularly R. Röhricht, Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem 1100-1291, pp. 957-65; R. Grousset, Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem, iii, pp. 659-64; M. Michaud, Histoire des croisades, viii, pp. 64, 66-74.

3.

J.R. Strayer, "The Crusades of Louis IX," A History of the Crusades, ed. R.L. Wolff, ii, p. 518.

Similarly, while Sir Steven Runciman has for the most part acknowledged the importance of English projects during the late thirteenth century, his description of the Lord Edward in the Latin East is cursory and often misleading.<sup>1</sup> A.S. Atiya's study of the crusade in the later Middle Ages fails likewise to comprehend the significance of English policies, while an important study on propaganda by Palmer Throop underestimates their influence upon contemporary European opinion.<sup>2</sup>

Modern British historians engaged in studies of domestic or constitutional issues have been more inclined to acknowledge the need for a study of Edward's crusading activities, although little of substance has yet been produced. The king's most important modern biographer, for example, has emphasized that the long correspondence between Edward and crusade planners in Rome during the 1280's ". . . has not been given the consideration which it deserves."<sup>3</sup> And fifty years ago Prof. T.F. Tout, in

---

1.

S. Runciman, A History of the Crusades, iii, pp.334-38.

2.

A.S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 3-29 and passim; P.A. Throop, Criticism of the Crusade. A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda, passim.

3.

Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, p. 727.

his authoritative analysis of English administration, pointed out that "the wardrobe accounts of Edward I's first keeper are of more interest to the historian of Edward's crusade."<sup>1</sup>

Attention must nevertheless be given to two historians who have touched upon the subject of Edward's crusade activities in some detail. In 1884 Reinhold Röhricht presented a narrative of the English expedition to Tunis and the Latin East drawn largely from Latin Syrian and Arab sources.<sup>2</sup> The value of this study, however, is minimized by Röhricht's ignorance of important source material in British archives -- much of which has since been made available in modern publications. Furthermore, his critical analysis of events was weak. Questions of military strategy, English politics, preaching, and finance remained unanswered and the role of the English crusade was ineffectively related to contemporary developments in the theory and practice of the crusades. A second series of studies touching on the more complex problems of English crusade policy during the period after 1272

---

1.

T.F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England: the Wardrobe, the Chamber and the Small Seals, ii, p. 6.

2.

R. Röhricht, "Études sur les derniers Temps du Royaume de Jérusalem; A. La Croisade du Prince Edouard d'Angleterre (1270-1274)" Archives de l'Orient Latin, i, pp. 617-32.

were published by Prof. William E. Lunt in the early decades of this century.<sup>1</sup> As full and authoritative as these contributions appear, Lunt nonetheless failed to come to grips with many of the real issues of crusade policy in England. The important role of the papacy was examined, but with little relevance to contemporary projects or to English crusading practice. In addition, Lunt made little attempt to relate canonical doctrine to the important subject of the financing of a crusade which he raised. While T.F. Tout's appeal to use archive material certainly found in Lunt an industrious adherent, a large number of important financial records concerning the English crusade project of 1270-1272 were not examined.

It is hoped that this thesis will demonstrate that the general lack of interest in Edward's crusade activities is unjustified. Important political, military, legal, and social aspects of English crusade policy are outlined. The implications of crusade

---

1.

See particularly W.E. Lunt, Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Studies in Anglo-Papal Relations during the Middle Ages, 1), pp. 230-38, 292-366 and passim; "Collectors' Accounts for the Clerical Tenth levied in England by Order of Nicholas IV," EHR, xxxi (1916), pp. 102-19; "Papal Taxation in England in the Reign of Edward I," EHR, xxx (1915), pp. 398-417; and "A Papal Tenth Levied in the British Isles from 1274 to 1280," EHR, xxxii (1917), pp. 49-89. See other related books and articles by Lunt in Bibliography.

recruitment in the aftermath of baronial rebellion during 1265-1270 are raised. The complex relationship between Edward and his crusaders and allies is examined, drawing some conclusions reflecting the legal and political position of an important crusader in the Latin East. The evolution of English crusade policies throughout the late thirteenth century is studied in the light of contemporary theory and practice. Aspects of the detailed correspondence between Latin Syria, Rome; and leaders in Western Europe is studied, while English contacts with Mongol rulers are related to the more important questions of military and political strategy. Preaching and recruitment in the British Isles are examined with reference to the canon law of the crusades. An analysis of financial records throws some light on contemporary crusading logistics and the obligations of leaders to troops or allies. It is also hoped that the figure of Edward himself is given a further dimension, so that <sup>The</sup> contemporary epithet "la meillierre lance to monde entier" may be more fully appreciated.<sup>1</sup>

This thesis thus attempts to define and discuss

---

1.

This praise of the Lord Edward was embodied in a Provençal ballad current in 1272. See "Un sirventes de Cardinal," ed. C. Fabre, A Miscellany of Studies in Romance Languages and Literatures presented to Leon E. Kastner, pp. 216-47.

as many aspects of English crusade policy in the late thirteenth century as the source material will allow. Following a brief chronological summary of Edward's involvement in the defence of the Holy Land, three sections form the framework for a detailed examination of English crusade practice. The first consists of a narrative history of the Lord Edward's crusade of 1270-1272; the second deals with political factors which had relevance to English crusading activity throughout the period 1264-1307; and the final section includes a detailed examination of three important aspects of thirteenth-century crusading history: the contemporary relationship between theory and practice exemplified by English policies; the legatine authority and use of canonistic doctrines underlying English preaching and recruitment; and the machinery through which English policies were financed.

It should be pointed out that material for such a study of English crusading activity is adequate. Narrative sources reflecting English, European, and Muslim views provide some contemporary evidence of Edward's crusade and his Eastern policies to the end of the reign. Accounts compiled in England by Walter of Guisborough, Thomas Wykes, and Bartholomew Cotton are reliable, and can be supplemented by other English

reports in the continuations of chronicles by Matthew of Westminster, Florence of Worcester, and Gervase of Canterbury. Of independent value are the London "chronica maiorum et vicecomitum," and the monastic "annales" collected at Dunstaple, Winchester, Waverley, and elsewhere in Britain. Latin Syrian chronicles dating from the late thirteenth century include two redactions of "l'Estoire d'Eracles empeur et la conquete de la Terra d'Outremer," along with that part of les Gestes des Chiprois attributed to the Templar of Tyre. Contemporary European narratives also illuminate English policies during this period. Chief among these are the German and French chronicles ascribed to Menko, John d'É Vignay, William de Nangis, and John de Joinville. Arab accounts, dating generally from the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, are still useful in that they incorporate contemporary, independent, and often more detailed views of events in the East. The preparation of a new edition of Ibn-al-Furāt's History has been of great benefit in this regard, while the narratives set down by al-Maqrīzī and al-'Ainī offer additional source material.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

See Bibliography.

Modern publications of collected documents, together with a quantity of contemporary material in British archives, are similarly useful in the study of Edward's crusading activities. Calendars and guides to English public records are augmented by a number of independent redactions from original documents. Wardrobe and exchequer reports in the Public Records Office are valuable, along with executive documents and correspondence relating to matters of English crusading practice. Episcopal registers are available in modern editions, incorporating valuable correspondence and reflecting contemporary clerical attitudes toward the crusade. Papal registers provide a substantial amount of thirteenth-century material of inestimable research value. Similarly, diplomatic correspondence between European heads of state is available in recent publications. Correspondence and legal material relating to events in Latin Syria is accessible in modern collections. Published letters and reports from leaders of the Military Orders in the East are also useful for an independent view of English crusading activities.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

See Bibliography.

Any analysis of the crusading policies and activities of Edward I necessitates an examination of events occurring over a period of forty years. In view of this limitation it may be helpful to give a brief chronological summary of English activity before proceeding to individual topics. The Lord Edward took the cross at the age of twenty-nine in a ceremony conducted by the legate Ottobuono in 1268. Binding himself and most of his baronial companions to the project of King Louis IX of France in 1269, Edward prepared to depart for the Mediterranean port of Aigues-Mortes. By September 1270 most of the English force had arrived in southern France to board vessels bound for Tunis. Military operations in northern Africa were already finishing, however, after the death of King Louis in August 1270. Upon arrival near Carthage the English crusaders discovered that Charles of Anjou and the new King of France had virtually abandoned the crusade and were preparing to return to Sicily in November. Edward and the leaders of contingents from Frisia and Flanders reluctantly joined the French and Italian forces and sailed for Trapani near the end of the year.

In March 1271 Edward received an appeal from Richard of Cornwall and other political advisors in

England to abandon plans for departure to Latin Syria. The prince consequently dispatched Henry of Almain West to strengthen government in England and Gascony. The murder of Henry in Viterbo failed to deter the English from sailing to Acre in May 1271. Edward's brother Edmund had already left Dover at the beginning of March to join the crusaders in the Holy Land. Edward himself arrived in Acre on 9 May 1271 with around 1,000 crusaders. For the next seven months operations by the Mamluks against Montfort, Acre, and Cyprus were countered by limited Latin raids toward St. George-du-Lebeyne and Cacho. The latter expedition seems to have been a serious attempt to seize and hold a strategic objective and was undertaken in conjunction with a Mongol raid through Syria toward Damascus. It appears that military service by the barons of Cyprus was secured for the Cacho raid only after arbitration by the Lord Edward concerning the nature of Jerusalemite law regarding such service. By April 1272 provisions for a truce and a new definition of local boundaries had been signed by the Mamluk and Frankish leaders, although Edward and some of his crusader allies seem to have opposed the terms. In spite of a similar truce between Muslim leaders and the Mongols, Edward appears to have continued the

policy of military alliance with Armenian and Mongol rulers until the attempt to assassinate him in June 1272. But the departures of Edmund, William de Valence, and John of Brittany during May-August 1272 heralded the conclusion of the English crusade, and on 22 September 1272 Edward left Acre with the remainder of his force, never to return to the Holy Land.

English interest in the defence of the Latin East, however, was by no means finished in September 1272. Adhering generally to contemporary theory and practice, Edward maintained varying degrees of involvement in the Holy Land for the remainder of his life. Although it may be safely asserted that during the period 1276-1293 English statecraft dominated European crusade projects and policies, for the first four years following his return to the West Edward seems to have genuinely rejected proposals for a return to Syria. This determination is reflected in his absence from the crusading council held at Lyons in 1274. It must be noted in this context that pressures upon the king to launch a new crusade were substantial and are reflected in the repeated efforts of Pope Gregory X and the frequent arrival of reports, letters, and embassies from the East. In addition, the establishment within England of a fund for new

expeditions following the decrees of the Council of Lyons may have encouraged interest in a new crusade destined to use clerical subsidies. Generally, however, the king and his advisors seem to have limited their response to a simple policy of support for the garrison in Acre.

Between 1276 and 1284 proposals for a new English crusade reached papal negotiators, although no personal commitment on the part of the king was at that point undertaken in spite of continued appeals from Rome and Acre. For the most part warfare in Wales during the years 1277-1278 and 1282-1283 seems to have rendered sizeable crusading projects unattractive to English leaders. Negotiations concerning the English use of the Lyons tenth, however, reveal a continuing interest in smaller expeditions. Efforts were made by King Edward to send his brother Edmund or brother-in-law John of Brittany at the head of a small English force to the Holy Land. It is possible that Edward's motives in this case were inspired by fear of wholesale appropriation of the Lyons' subsidy by papal or Angevin agents in order to finance their bitter Mediterranean struggles during the years 1279-1284.

During the period 1284-1293 the English king was

at last engaged in preparations for a new crusade under his personal leadership. In 1287 he took the cross at Blanquefort in Gascony, along with many leading French and English nobles. Efforts to secure peace between France and Aragon during this period reflect English goals for a united crusade to the Latin East. A sudden increase in the number of Mongol embassies during 1287-1291 indicates the additional desire of Edward and his advisors to prepare a military alliance in Syria. Concurrently, negotiations with Rome involved an unprecedented insistence that all crusade funds collected throughout Europe during 1274-1280 be turned over to the king for his immediate use as captain of the expedition. The sudden military threat to Acre following the Latin loss of Tripoli, however, resulted in new measures involving the dispatch of a small crusade under Odo de Grandison in 1290, which may have diverted vital English funds from the larger project in preparation at the time. In the end, distrust of the new crusade in France and Aragon, together with papal vacancies in 1287-1288 and in 1291-1294, may have held up the king's plans for departure, resulting in delays which finally proved fatal to the whole project. By 1294 increasing French pressure on

Gascony and naval clashes in the English Channel made it impossible for Edward to launch his new expedition. The decade of struggle in Wales, Scotland, France, and Flanders was upon him before his agreements with the papacy could be carried out.

By the time negotiations were reopened with Pope Boniface VIII, little hope remained that King Edward might leave on crusade. The monarch had seized crusade funds and had revealed his intention of keeping them without redeeming his vow of 1287. During the last years of his life Edward seems to have made some attempts to gain papal absolution from the vow made when he had been full of determination at forty-eight, and his ill-health prevented him from co-operating in a new project sponsored by Pope Clement V in 1306-1307. Near the age of seventy Edward died at Lanercost Priory, still unabsolved from his second vow to sail to the rescue of the Holy Land. He did, however, provide in his will that

. . . his heart should be sent to the Holy Land, and that 100 mercenaries . . . should be paid for one year to serve there the Cross of Christ . . . .<sup>1</sup>

King Edward seems rarely to have foresworn his

---

1.

Nicholas Trivet, Annales sex Regum Angliae, ed. T. Hog, pp. 413-14.

obligations to the defence of the Latin East. His contemporaries bore eloquent testimony to this long commitment to the ideals of crusade. A crusading treatise of the early fourteenth century was dedicated to him, while songs and poems about his zeal appear to have been widespread during his lifetime and shortly after his death. In one such eulogy Pope Clement V was depicted in grief over the loss of such a champion:

"Alas," he seide, "is Edward ded?"  
Of Christendome he ber the floure. . . ."

The Holy Crois, imad of tree,  
How fain thou woldest it have iwonne;

Jerusalem, thou hast ilore  
The floure of all chivalerye,  
Now King Edward liveth na more;  
Alas! that he yet shulde deye. . . .<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

Political Songs of England from the Reign of John to that of Edward II, ed. T. Wright, ii, pp. 224-25.

I.

THE ENGLISH CRUSADE TO TUNIS AND LATIN SYRIA

1. English crusading activity, 1264-1272.

a. The crusade of Pope Clement IV.

In June 1268 Cardinal Ottobuono Fieschi wrote to Pope Clement IV from England that he had placed the sign of the cross upon the Lord Edward, a knight whom he had found to be "a good and faithful champion of Christ."<sup>1</sup> On Midsummer's Day at Northampton the legate Ottobuono had preached the cross and had witnessed the taking of vows by Edward and a number of companions, marking the conclusion of more than three years of activity in the British Isles.<sup>2</sup> Although contemporary English and French formularies describe such investments with the symbols of pilgrimage and crusade, no actual record of the ceremony conducted at Northampton has survived.<sup>3</sup> It was reported, however, that nearly 120 English nobles swore to undertake the obligations of crusaders.

---

1.

"Letters of Ottoboni," ed. R. Graham, EHR, xv (1900), No. 26, p. 112.

2.

Thomas Wykes, "Chronicon vulgo dictum cronicon Thomae Wykes," ed. H.R. Luard, Annales Monastici (Rolls Series, 36), iv, pp. 217-18; Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," ed. B. Thorpe, Chronicon ex Chronicis (English Historical Society), ii, pp. 201-02. For a more complete analysis of the legate's crusading activity, see below, pp. 290-97. For an account of Ottobuono's remaining duties in England and the political background to this mission, see A. Lewis, The English Activities of Cardinal Ottobuono, Legate of the Holy See, (dissertation), pp. 15-45 and passim.

3. See J. Brundage, "Cruce signari: The Rite for Taking the Cross in England," Traditio, xxi (1966), pp. 289-90 ff. Florence of Worcester ("Continuation," p. 201) reported that "the king was holding a parliament of his barons."

Chief among them was the Lord Edward, who at twenty-nine was already recognized as the architect of military victory over the forces of Simon de Montfort, as the administrator of political reforms in the aftermath of civil war, and as the ruler of extensive continental possessions in his own right. Among other recruits at Northampton were Edward's younger brother Edmund, his uncles the Earls of Pembroke and Surrey, his cousins Henry of Almain and Edmund of Cornwall, together with many of the most influential barons in England, Scotland and Ireland. In addition, the prince was joined in his vow by his consort Eleanor of Castile, who at the time of the ceremony was around twenty-four.<sup>1</sup>

The crusade had been preached throughout the British Isles during a considerable period prior to the investment at Northampton in 1268.<sup>2</sup> There is evidence that Pope Urban IV had commissioned such activity before the outbreak of hostilities between the Earl of Leicester and the royalists. In 1264 John

---

1.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 217-18; Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 201; Flores Historiarum, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 95), iii, p. 14.

2.

See below, pp. 309-11.

de Valenciennes had entered the kingdom in an attempt to turn men's thoughts from the threatening civil war toward nobler crusading ideals. The mission of this former Lord of Haifa was one of reconciliation, following the cherished tradition of the crusade as an instrument of peace and alliance.<sup>1</sup> The brief of Pope Clement IV's new apostolic legate the following year points clearly to a continuation of this combined policy of encouraging peace and preaching the cross. Should the civil wars continue to threaten these projects, Cardinal Ottobuono held authority to preach the cross against the rebels themselves. Recruitment of English crusaders for personal service overseas was apparently discouraged, and Ottobuono was to concentrate upon the collection of funds through commutation or substitution.<sup>2</sup>

The papal appeal designed to bring local contributions to crusade projects forming in Europe nevertheless resulted in a personal commitment by many English leaders to campaign overseas for a dangerously

---

1.

Gervase of Canterbury, "Continuation," ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series, 73), ii, p. 234. See also a document in Foedera, conventiones, litterae et acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios, ed. T. Rymer et al., i, p. 437; and below, pp. 309.

2.

Money was to be raised initially for the payment of crossbowmen hired in southern France. See below, pp. 282, 284.

long period of time. It would appear from a letter of Pope Clement to King Louis in January 1268 that such a development would not have the approval of advisors in Rome. The pope pointed out that political instability might easily follow a departure of royalist forces on crusade, and that the English clergy were in no position to contribute to such an expensive enterprise.<sup>1</sup> Pope Clement and his advisors were, after all, aware of the bitter campaigns which had taken the Lord Edward and his forces as far afield as Wales and Northumberland. During the period in which Ottobuono had been active in England the prolonged civil wars had been aggravated by frequent intrigues and legal disputes in the Marches and by lingering rebel resistance on the Isle of Ely. As late as 1267 Ottobuono had reported despairingly of the rebel occupation of London and of his frustration over the mass of legal disputes obstructing domestic settlement elsewhere in the realm.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum, ed. E. Martene and U. Durand, ii, no. 583, cols. 563-64. See a summary in Pope Clement IV, Register, ed. E. Jordan, no. 198, col. 205. In most cases the correspondence of Pope Clement may be followed more completely in Thesaurus, ii, while abstracts alone are often encountered in the more up-to-date Register. Where additions or corrections have been noted in the latter details will be supplied in a footnote to this thesis.

2.

"Letters of Ottoboni," no. 33, pp. 116-17. For the civil wars of 1265-1267 see Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, pp. 456-551 and passim.

In view of the likelihood that papal authorities reflected concern for the safety of an English peace settlement and for the freedom of an oppressed clergy from crusade taxation, it is important to mention three independent sources of inspiration for the assumption of the cross on Midsummer's Day 1268. First, there were many political advantages for Edward's baronial supporters in such a move.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the inspiration of the legate Ottobuono cannot be underestimated. His preaching in London and Lincoln seems to have been instrumental in gaining important crusaders such as young Thomas de Clare, while his efforts to establish a fair and lasting peace cannot be divorced from his mission of recruiting for the crusade.<sup>2</sup> Thirdly, and perhaps most difficult of all to assess, is the influence of growing enthusiasm for a new crusade throughout Western Europe during this period. Certainly by the time Edward and his companions had taken the cross in June 1268 the growing crusade sentiment sweeping Europe was evident. Nearly all of the major leaders in the West were in some way committed to a new military project under the combined leadership of the Pope and King Louis of France.

---

1.

See below, pp. 93-102.

2.

See below, pp. 309-11.

Influential statesmen such as Duke Otto of Brandenburg, King James of Aragon, King Theobald of Navarre, King Charles of Sicily, and the Lords of Poitiers, Provence, Brittany, and Flanders had all taken the cross or were contemplating such action.<sup>1</sup> French purchasers were already busy securing transport and supplies in Genoa, Marseilles and Venice for the expedition against the Muslims. In Aragon preparations had advanced sufficiently for the dispatching of a force to Latin Syria the following year, while Flemish and German contingents were being equipped along the North Sea coasts for departure in 1270.<sup>2</sup>

Much of this activity had been the result of encouragement by Pope Clement IV, although the important role of French leaders cannot be ignored. As early as July 1265 the new pope had sent appeals to major European leaders, calling for immediate military aid to hard-pressed garrisons in the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup> In May 1266 he wrote to rulers in France and

---

1.

See Strayer, "Louis IX," pp. 508-12.

2.

King James of Aragon and his two sons sailed from Barcelona in September 1269. Most of the German contingents in 1270 seem to have come from Frisia and no more was heard of Otto of Brandenburg's vow. See Strayer, "Louis IX," pp. 510-11; and below, pp. 214.

3.

See, for example, contemporary papal correspondence (Thesaurus, ii, nos. 89, 110, 111, 293-94, 396-98, cols 153, 169-70, 335-37, 419-20).

Italy warning of military setbacks reported by leaders in Latin Syria:

. . . subjected to grave peril . . . [the Holy Land] laments daily of the immense forces pressing upon it, of the weakness of its people, of the flight of its inhabitants, of the emptiness of its towns, of the desertion of its villages, and of the lack of help for its vital defences . . . .<sup>1</sup>

Also in 1266 the Archbishop of Tyre was called West in order to join preachers of a new crusade.<sup>2</sup> Papal embassies and legations were active in all parts of Europe, including Scandanavia, Poland, and the Byzantine Empire. Pope Clement's influence lay behind relief operations designed to supplement the garrison in Acre during 1265 and 1266.<sup>3</sup> Another relief force was readied for departure in 1267, to be financed partly from English contributions.<sup>4</sup> In spite of a growing involvement in the complex politics of Italy and Sicily, the pope nevertheless continued his program of crusade recruitment in conjunction with concrete

---

1.

Thesaurus, ii, no. 293, col. 335.

2.

Annales ecclesiastici ed. C. Raynaldus et. al., 1265, nos. 37-38; Thesaurus, ii, no. 404, col. 424. Archbishop Giles preached the cross throughout Europe until his death in 1266. (Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 947-48).

3.

Thesaurus, ii, nos. 402, 425, cols. 422, 439. For the significance of these operations with regard to contemporary crusading theory and Edward's own activities see below, pp. 247-54.

<sup>4</sup>. Thesaurus, ii, nos. 402, col. 423. It is not clear whether this force was eventually dispatched from the West or absorbed into larger units forming the crusade against Tunis.

preparations by the King of France and his allies. By the end of 1268 leaders throughout Europe had been allied to the Holy Enterprise, including the princes and major lords of England.<sup>1</sup>

From the very beginning of the Pope Clement's appeal for a new crusade emphasis was placed upon the immediate relief of Latin forces in Syria and Palestine. There can be little doubt that reports and requests from Acre and Tyre in circulation throughout Europe during this period influenced the decision in Rome to encourage an expedition to the Latin East. Details of military disaster similar to those sent to the West by the Master of the Hospital in 1268 must have made clear the extent of Muslim success in campaigns against the Franks since 1265.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

See Strayer (pp. 509-12) for a discussion of preparations in France. For a detailed account of the political interests of Pope Clement during this period, see S. Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 98-103, 113-23.

2.

Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St-Jean de Jérusalem (1100-1310), ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx, iv, no. 3308, xx. Other examples of these reports may be studied in "Emprunts de Saint-Louis en Palestine et en Afrique," comp. G. Servois, BEC, xix (1858), pp. 283-93; "Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre Sainte à Charles d'Anjou," ed. H.F. Delaborde, ROL, ii (1894). Similar reports played an important role in the crusading activity of King Edward during the decade 1272-1282 and will be described below, pp. 229-36.

Strategy in Rome during the period 1265-1268 seems accordingly to have pressed for a crusade to Latin Syria. Yet aside from the French expedition of 1265-1266 and the small crusade of the Infantas of Aragon in 1269, little response seems to have attended the appeal for direct aid to states in the Latin East. Throughout 1267 and 1268 there is increasing evidence of a diverging view of strategy in Paris, where support for an expedition to Tunis may have already been expressed. The death of Pope Clement in November 1268 ushered in a long unpredictable vacancy which soon effectively settled the question of control and establishment of primary military objectives. From this point the crusade initiated and encouraged for three years by Pope Clement and his advisors in Rome was conducted almost completely by King Louis of France.

b. The crusade of King Louis.

Pope Clement's reliance upon the French crown and its allies had become apparent within a few months of his first appeals for a new crusade. As Archdeacon of Le Puy and later Archbishop of Narbonne, the pope had long been a familiar figure at the French court, and could probably count upon the continued support

of his patrons there for the new project.<sup>1</sup> In addition, it had become evident throughout the period 1248-1268 that the French monarchy was deeply committed to the defence of the Latin East and that preparations for a new crusade had occupied the attention of Louis and his brother Alphonse since their return from Syria in 1254.<sup>2</sup> By 1268 Louis and Alphonse, together with their brother-in-law Theobald of Navarre, had accepted major responsibility for financing, transporting, and directing military contingents of the new crusade.<sup>3</sup>

The type of control exercised by the French crown is illustrated by the crusading council-of-war held in Paris in 1269. In response to Louis's invitations European leaders were assembled in Paris during August to attend sessions with the French king and his advisors. Present at this Council were crusaders from Luxemburg, Flanders, Frisia, Brittany, Nevers, Bar, Gascony, Ireland and England. Indications are that the purpose of this gathering was to bind individual

---

1.

See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 95-96.

2.

Perhaps the most notable example of French Eastern policy during this period involves the presence in Acre of a substantial garrison. See below, pp. 268-69.

3.

See Strayer, pp. 509-10 ff. On the financial arrangements regarding the crusade to Tunis, See below pp. 339-46.

crusaders firmly to french plans, to assign individual roles and military objectives, and to arrange transport and provisions. As a result of the Paris talks contracts and agreements marking destinations and sailing dates began to mould the widely-scattered elements of the crusade into a military unit controlled by King Louis and his lieutenants.<sup>1</sup>

In August 1269 the Lord Edward and his advisors arrived in Paris in response to the French invitation to begin negotiations.<sup>2</sup> In Edward's party were many of the English and Irish crusaders who were destined to carry responsibility within the crusade forces of the prince. These included Edward's brother Edmund, who at twenty-five was the administrator of many of the richest lands formerly possessed by Simon de Montfort and other rebels; Henry of Almain, the eldest son of Edward's uncle Richard of Cornwall and a companion of the prince throughout the civil wars; Thomas de Clare, the younger brother of the powerful

---

1.

Examples of these agreements may be found in Foedera, (i, p. 481), in "Emprunts de Saint-Louis," (no. 3, pp. 285-86), and in Menko, ("Chronicon Werumensium," MOHS xxiii p. 554). See also Strayer, p. 514; Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 158-59 ff.

2.

Thomas Wykes, p. 230; Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 203.

Earl of Gloucester; John of Brittany, Earl of Richmond who had been recently married to the sister of Edward and Edmund; Roger de Leyburn, an elderly and respected Marcher Lord with a record of loyalty to the English crown; and Robert Walraven, a legal advisor and trusted agent of King Henry III. These crusaders were joined in Paris by Edward's French vassal Gaston de Béarn, whose ties with the English party had recently been strengthened by the marriage of his daughter Constance to Edward's cousin Henry of Almain.<sup>1</sup>

Before proceeding to a discussion of the talks in Paris it is perhaps useful to illustrate the ties binding the English and French royal families. It has been noted that Edward and Edmund were closely related to the heirs to Cornwall and Brittany. This relationship meant that all four were related to King Louis, since Henry III and his brother Richard of Cornwall had married two sisters of Queen Margaret of France. Edward, Edmund, and Henry of Almain were consequently nephews of Louis and closely related to another noted crusader, Richard of Cornwall. Their maternal aunt

---

1.

The members of the English negotiating party can be established through a list of witnesses to the document issued in Paris on 24 August (Foedera, i, p. 481), and in "Chronica maiorum et vicecomitum Londonarium, 1188-1274," ed. T. Stapleton, Liber de Antiquis Legibus (Camden Society, 34), p. 111.

Margaret, moreover, was herself renowned as the inspiration of the demoralized crusading army at Damietta and as a key figure in negotiations to free her husband and other Christian leaders from Muslim captivity.

Details of discussions held during August are embodied in a document signed by all parties on the 24th. From contemporary accounts, moreover, it seems that Flemish and German crusaders signed similar provisions around the same time.<sup>1</sup> With regard to English responsibilities on crusade four items are clear: Edward was to march with all the forces at his disposal to Aigues-Mortes, the port near Marseilles constructed some twenty years earlier for Louis's first departure for the Holy Land. On the march through southern France Edward was to be responsible for the discipline of his troops. He was to arrive at the Mediterranean port not later than 15 August 1270 where he was to board ships at the earliest opportunity. Finally, upon his arrival at French headquarters he was to serve directly under the command of King Louis ". . . in the same way as any of his other barons." Edward's theoretical allegiance to the

---

1.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 554.

in French crown/Aquitaine may account for this phrasing, although the question of his feudal obligations is one which existing documents fail to make clear. For his part, the King of France agreed to advance Edward 45,000 livres of Tournois. This loan was to be used "for his passage and for that of his men, who have promised to make the journey overseas with the king." Gaston de Béarn, after signing the same provisions, was to receive a similar loan of 25,000 livres of Tournois. The agreement signed at Paris guaranteed Louis's right to hold English possessions in Gascony should the terms of the contract be broken by Edward or his followers. Provision was also made for Edward's eldest son John to serve as hostage at the French court, but King Louis seems to have ignored this proviso.<sup>1</sup>

The financial terms of the Paris agreement will be treated later, particularly with regard to obligations of transport and arrangements for the repayment of the French loan.<sup>2</sup> Concrete military

---

1.

*Foedera*, i, p. 481. Thomas Wykes (p. 230) recounted the English offer of possessions in Gascony as security. It is perhaps noteworthy that Edward's holdings as Duke of Aquitaine should be offered in this manner to his theoretical overlord, the King of France.

2.

See below, pp. 339-46, 377.

proposals are more difficult to trace through the document signed in August. It is not apparent, for example, whether Edward was to command a single force at Aigues-Mortes or whether independent leaders might have signed separate military agreements with the French commanders. John of Brittany, for example, seems to have left independently in July 1270 but to have generally followed Edward's instructions on crusade. The important question of specific military objectives is likewise obscured. It is possible, for example, that the destination of the crusade was a carefully-guarded secret and that some contingents were not appraised of their landing points until far at sea.<sup>1</sup> There are no indications of disagreements in 1269 concerning the strategy of the new crusade. No record exists of attitudes in Paris regarding the failure of a crusading alliance with Aragon and the preparations there to launch an independent expedition to Latin Syria the following month.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

Indications of secrecy or confused orders concerning military objectives were reported by Thomas Wykes (p.237) Menko ("Chronicon," p.555), and William de Nangis (Chronique latine de 1113 à 1300 avec les continuations de 1300 à 1366, ed. P.H.J.F. Geraud, ii, pp. 235-36). See also al-Maqrīzī, Histoire des Sultans Mamelouks, trans. M.F. Quatremère, IB, p. 80.

2.

On the brief crusade of the Infantas of Aragon see below, pp. 214 . See also Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, p. 327-28.

It is possible that these matters and many others related to the coming crusade had been discussed in England preparatory to the beginning of strategy sessions in Paris. For on 7-8 August 1269 Edward and his negotiating party met at Northfleet with Richard of Cornwall, who had returned on one of his periodic visits from the Empire. The King of the Romans had journeyed from the Channel coast on 3 August for discussions with the crusaders. While there are no real indications that matters concerning King Louis's new project were treated at Northfleet, it is doubtful that a topic of such interest to Richard and the English crusaders should have been neglected only a few days before the sessions in Paris. On the morning of the 8th both parties separated and Richard continued to London to meet his brother the king. It is noteworthy that Richard remained in England until after the departures of Edward and Edmund, so that further discussions on matters of crusading practice are not improbable.<sup>1</sup>

Final preparations for the departure of Edward's

---

1.

The meeting of 7-8 August is described in "Chronica maiorum," pp. 110-11. Thomas Wykes (p. 225) described Richard's arrival at Dover on 3 August.

force were hastened in order to meet Louis's new timetable. These will be reviewed at length below.<sup>1</sup> But a brief look at some matters confronting administrators in England will serve to illustrate the immense task of preparing a crusading force in 1269-1270. Lists were drawn up recording royal protections and noting crusaders' attorneys. The vast back-log of pending court cases resulting from the civil wars was swelled because of postponements granted to crusaders until their return from the East. Contracts were negotiated between Edward and his baronial commanders in order to ensure their continued service overseas during the time the crusade should be active in the field. Loans were undertaken, possessions leased or sold, and merchants contacted in Gascony and Marseilles in anticipation of the march to Aigues-Mortes and the expenses that would follow. Parliamentary and clerical grants were secured, their collection begun, and the machinery set in motion for the uninterrupted flow of English money to bankers handling purchases and loans in the East. Finally, powerful and dangerous lords such as Earl Gilbert of Gloucester were committed to public support for the new project and a council of

---

1.

See below, pp. 103-13, 348-77

trusted magnates was established to govern in the princes' absence. Edward provided for his family and possessions, his uncle Richard being appointed guardian of his estates and of the realm in general. Finally, it was established clearly that Edward's son John should succeed as heir to the throne in the event of Edward's intervening death or permanent injury while on crusade.

Not surprisingly, the departure of the English crusade was subject to much delay in 1270. In the first place, attempts to secure Earl Gilbert's promise to leave England with Edward dragged on interminably. This affair necessitated the intervention of King Louis and was not settled until mid-June.<sup>1</sup> Prince Llewelyn of Wales was also a cause for concern through the spring and summer of 1270. As late as 24 July King Henry complained to the Welsh prince that Edward was bound by obligations regarding his departure, and that this embarkation had been "interrupted" several times already. Nonetheless, the king seemed prepared to ask his son to arbitrate in summer difficulties along the Marches.<sup>2</sup> Further setbacks, moreover, were

---

1.

See below, pp. 104-109.

2. Calendar of the Close Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 1268-1272, pp. 211-12.

encountered when the Lord Edward finally assembled English forces in late July. The crusaders waited idly at Portsmouth for more than a fortnight for winds to change to allow transport vessels to leave harbor. Finally, it was decided to break camp and march to Dover to board ships there before more delays made it impossible to keep to King Louis's schedule.<sup>1</sup>

The actual date and conditions of departure from England are somewhat obscured by contradictory accounts. Two reliable chronicles recorded that the crusaders sailed on 15 August, although one of these maintained that Portsmouth was still the port of departure.<sup>2</sup> Another chronicle recorded the departure of the crusaders from Dover on 11 August.<sup>3</sup> This conflict in dates may be resolved, however, if one accepts the assertion in the "Annales" of the Priory of Worcester that two crusading forces in fact set sail at different times. The second of these was reportedly captained by Henry of Almain, who had

---

1.

Close Rolls, 1268-1272, p. 290; "Chronica maiorum," p. 125.

2.

Thomas Wykes, p. 236; "Annales Monasterii de Oseneia," ed. H.R. Luard, Annales Monastici (Rolls Series, 36), iv, pp. 236-37.

3.

Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 205.

proceeded from Canterbury to Dover in order to board ships there.<sup>1</sup>

The crusaders landed in Gascony and continued their journey to Aigues-Mortes. In southern France the Lord Edward and Henry of Almain met their wives, who had sailed ahead of the crusading army during the summer.<sup>2</sup> Henry may have left his force when he settled his new wife Constance with her relatives in Béarn during his anticipated absence.<sup>3</sup> There is some evidence that Edward also left the crusading army in Gascony to return briefly to Canterbury. Failing there in his promotion of Robert Burnell for election to the vacant archbishopric, Edward apparently returned to his army ". . . full of indignation and anger."<sup>4</sup> The death of Archbishop Boniface in Savoy on

---

1.

"Annales Prioratus de Wigornia," ed. H.R. Luard, Annales Monastici (Rolls Series, 36), iv, p. 459. Thomas Wykes (p. 236) indicated a second force under Henry but gave only one date - 15 August - for departure. The accounts in The Flores Historiarum (iii, p. 19) and in Nicholas Trivet (p. 275) state that the crusade sailed in May 1270. Reports in the former, however, are frequently at variance with other reputable accounts concerning the English crusade, while Nicholas Trivet's narrative is generally thought to be unreliable for the period before the late 1280's.

2.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 236-37.

3.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 236-37.

4.

Bartholomew Cotton, Historia Anglicana, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 16), pp. 144-45.

18 July, however, suggests the acceptance of other evidence that Edward's encounter with the Canterbury canons took place just before his departure in mid-August.<sup>1</sup>

In company with his consort Eleanor and the main body of English crusaders Edward arrived in Aigues-Mortes on 29 September.<sup>2</sup> He was more than six weeks behind the schedule imposed in 1269 and his contingent was the last of King Louis's allied forces to enter the port for embarkation. The nature of the army which boarded ships at this time is difficult to describe with accuracy, although the absence of troops under Gaston de Béarn is immediately apparent. It is not clear under what circumstances the count had withdrawn from the project, although his French loan had been transferred to the Lord Edward's treasury by the time repayment was begun.<sup>3</sup> Troops under Edward's

---

1.

Thomas Wykes, p. 236. It is relatively certain, moreover, that Thomas was recording events during this period with a high degree of accuracy, while the account of Bartholomew Cotton appears to date from the 1290's.

2.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 238-39. Florence of Worcester ("Continuation," ii, p. 205) recorded 30 September.

3.

See below, pp. 109-111.

brother Edmund were also lacking, due to the fact that recruiting was still proceeding in England.<sup>1</sup> A small force raised in Gascony may have preceded Edward under the leadership of his companion and future Gascon administrator John de Grailly. In July 1270 John had left England in order to supervise purchases in Gascony. It cannot be demonstrated, however, that John raised additional crusaders or that he even waited for Edward's arrival before joining the French in Africa.<sup>2</sup> A force under Edward's brother-in-law John of Brittany had travelled down the Rhône to Aigues-Mortes, where they had departed independently in July.<sup>3</sup> From an examination of protection lists and other accounts

---

1.

It is possible to form separate crusade lists on the basis of royal protections granted before and after August 1270. On the influence of a papal vacancy in this matter of royal guarantees see below, pp. 124-28. For the lists themselves, see Appendices I and II below, pp. 401-407.

2.

Calendar of the Liberate Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, iv, no. 1069, p. 101. John administered Gascony in Edward's name following his return from crusade. He also served for a time as Seneschal of the Kingdom of Jerusalem around 1273-1274 and took an active part in crusading projects throughout the late thirteenth century. See below, pp. 136, 260-61.

3.

See the letter (Foedera, i, p. 504) in which John complained that his crusaders had been attacked while travelling down the Rhone in 1270. For evidence of the count's presence in Tunis see John of Vignay, "Ex primati chronicis," Rec. Gaul xx, pp. 44, 54. See also the list of "Chevaliers de l'hostel le Roix Croisies," Rec. Gaul xxiii, pp. 732-33.

of preparations in England, it is possible to suggest that Edward commanded around 250 knights or mounted men-at-arms, together with about twice as many infantry, when he prepared to board his ships at Aigues-Mortes.<sup>1</sup>

By the time the English crusaders had reached the Mediterranean, however, the expedition encouraged by Pope Clement and set in motion by King Louis had passed suddenly into the control of the king's brother Charles of Anjou, King of Sicily. The crusade against Muhammed al-Mustansir of Tunis has been the subject of more than one study, and needs only summarizing here with regard to the situation of the Lord Edward in late September. The expedition so carefully designed to ensure co-operation and timing had apparently fallen apart by the mid-summer of 1270. The French crusaders had sailed for Tunis on 1 July, aware already perhaps that the contingents from Flanders, Germany and England were behind schedule.<sup>2</sup> The Italian

---

1.

See the lists below, pp. 401-407.

2.

Northern European crusaders had been reported in Flanders by May 1270, but seem to have been delayed there. Arriving at Aigues-Mortes behind schedule, these units had then apparently sailed to Sardinia in search of news and information. (Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 554-555).

forces, commanded by Charles of Anjou, were short of transport as a result of his schemes to invade the Byzantine Empire across the Adriatic. They could not be embarked for Africa until late August. Meanwhile, undeterred by these delays or by the departure of Aragonese crusaders for an entirely different theatre of operations the year before, Louis and his allies had established a camp at Carthage and commenced the difficult siege of Tunis itself. While vital Italian reserves waited at Trapani for transport, disease struck the French camp, killing King Louis along with his son John and the papal legate. On 25 August Charles landed at Carthage ahead of forces still travelling from Flanders and England to learn of his brother's death the day before. Within a week of Edward's departure from England, therefore, the crusade of King Louis had been passed into the control of the King of Sicily and the new young ruler of France, Philip III.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

For Charles's delayed arrival see Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 159-60. Two fine accounts of the politics behind the crusade are those of R. Sternfeld (Ludwigs des Heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis 1270) and R. Röhrricht (Der Kreuzzug Louis IX, gegen Tunis in Regestenform). Strayer (pp. 510-13) is generally reliable but insufficient for any political background to the military operations.

c. The crusade of Charles of Anjou.

Almost certainly appraised of recent developments in Africa and any new situation which these foreshadowed, Edward and his forces left Aigues-Mortes within a few days of their arrival there.<sup>1</sup> There is no indication that English plans had been altered substantially, although confusion seems to have earlier beset German contingents passing from southern France to Tunis when they heard news of the French king's death. It was reported that Flemish and German crusaders had stopped briefly in Sardinia, where it had been argued that their crusade fleet should be directed towards Acre, not Tunis.<sup>2</sup> Edward's small

---

1.

Thomas Wykes, p. 238; Walter of Guisborough, Chronicle, ed. H. Rothwell (Camden Series, lxxxix), p. 205. It is perhaps useful at this juncture to point out the comparative reliability of these two chroniclers with regard to Edward's activities in 1270-1272. The narrative set down by Thomas Wykes ceases to report accurate details of the crusade following Henry of Almain's return from Sicily in 1271. This ties in with the assertion that Thomas's sources were close to Richard of Cornwall or his family and associates. On this subject, see N. Denholm-Young, "Thomas de Wykes and his Chronicle," EHR, lxi (1946), pp. 157-79. Walter of Guisborough's account remains full of details, which indicates that he had information from the East until 1272. C. Kohler ("Deux projets de croisade," ROL, x 1903-1904, pp. 406-57) has argued that an informant with experience in Latin Syria during 1270-1272 may have been responsible for an anonymous crusading tract written during the late thirteenth century.

2.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 555. The Flores Historiarum (iii, p. 20) recorded that the English crusaders anchored briefly off Sardinia, although the lack of substantiating evidence in more reliable English accounts weakens the authority of this report.

fleet of 13 vessels, however, reportedly completed an uninterrupted voyage in fine sailing weather and reached the camp at Carthage after ten days at sea.<sup>1</sup>

At this point, however, prospects for the continuation of the crusade were dwindling. To the discouragement of Flemish, Frisian and Latin Syrian leaders in the Christian camp King Charles and his nephew had started negotiations independently with Muḥammed al-Muḥtansir and a treaty was already near completion.<sup>2</sup> In return for the departure of French and Italian crusaders the Emir of Tunis was prepared to pay an annual tribute to Charles, to release a number of Christian captives, and to permit some missionary activity by specified religious orders. There remained little that the latecomers from Germany, Flanders, and England might do to continue the crusade after the conclusion of this treaty.<sup>3</sup>

We possess few documents of sufficient authority to venture a reliable conclusion concerning English

---

1.

Nicholas Trivet (p. 276) and Henry Knighton (Chronicon, ed. J.R. Lumby, p. 258) reported a calm voyage of ten days from Aigues-Mortes to Tunis. Walter of Guisborough (p. 207) recorded an English fleet of 13 vessels.

2.

Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 556-57; John Villani, "Cronica," RISNS, xii, 1, p. 128.

3.

See details in Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 160-61.

reaction to this state of affairs. Chroniclers writing in England were predictably hostile to King Charles's Treaty and they embellished accordingly in their accounts of the crusade. Walter of Guiseborough recorded the wrath of the English prince at a crusade council in Tunis: "What is this, noble lords", Edward is reported to have demanded, "have we not come together here and assumed the sign of Our Lord in order that we might proceed together against the enemies of the cross of Christ?" When faced with the reply that the treaty offered a satisfactory conclusion to the crusade, Edward apparently continued in his objections. "This counsel," wrote Walter, "did not please him, nor did he even offer his assent to this assembly, nor partake in any of the tribute. . ."<sup>1</sup>

That Edward and his advisors were upset with the treaty may be taken as reliable, particularly in view of the support expressed by the Count of Flanders and the Duke of Luxemburg.<sup>2</sup> Edward may well have shared

---

1.

Walter of Guiseborough, pp. 206-07. Thomas Wykes (p. 238) wrote that Edward "was full of resentment" over the treaty. The continuator of the Flores Historiarum (iii, p. 20) reported that "Edward, wishing to destroy the enemies of the cross of Christ, desired to lead his followers against the city of Tunis and to storm it; but King Charles hindered him...."

2.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 556; John Villani, p. 129.

with these leaders transport problems arising from any such abandonment of the crusade. Contracts, it seems, had been signed by the Germans and Flemish in which Genoese seamen had agreed only to deliver and return the crusaders once. Charles's proposals that the entire force return to Sicily for the winter left these leaders to secure new contracts the following spring - with the result that additional financial burdens loomed at the conclusion of a fruitless campaign.<sup>1</sup> Reports that Edward and his adherents did not share in the tribute are certainly accurate, increasing the probability that English as well as German or Flemish leaders were disgruntled about the whole affair.<sup>2</sup>

The Franco-Sicilian treaty was concluded on 1 November, and soon the entire crusade force camped along the shore near Carthage was prepared to sail

---

1.

See below, pp. 339-45.

2.

Flores, iii, p. 21; Thomas Wykes, p. 238. See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, p. 161.

for Trapani.<sup>1</sup> For the English leaders the decision to continue on to Latin Syria would have to await the spring of 1271, when French and Italian spokesmen indicated some desire to resume the crusade.<sup>2</sup> Edmund was still available with a small crusade force in England and subsidies were being collected for financing such an operation. An incident described in the chronicle of Walter of Guisborough may have served to discourage English enthusiasm in 1270, however. In the confusion of embarkation from the shores of Africa some 200 crusaders were reportedly stranded, clamoring wildly lest they be left behind.

---

1.

The dating of events between Edward's departure from Aigues-Mortes and his arrival with French, German, and Italian crusaders in Sicily is difficult. Thomas Wykes (pp. 238-39), for example, recorded that Edward left Aigues-Mortes within a few days after his arrival at the end of September; Thomas went on to place the English landing in Tunis around 9 November - a doubtful record in view of reports by Nicholas Trivet (p. 276) and Henry Knighton (p. 258) that the voyage took only ten days. Thomas Wykes described the departure of crusaders from Tunis "within a few days" of Edward's arrival there (pp. 238-39), indicating embarkation for Sicily around mid-November. Henry Knighton, (pp. 259-60), however, reported the crusaders sailing from Tunis to their anchorage at Trapani in October; he reported a voyage to Sicily of seven days, whereupon the island was reached on 30 October. It should be pointed out that Henry appears to have relied heavily upon accounts similar to those used by Walter of Guisborough, who failed to report any dates for these events. It seems reasonable to conclude that Edward left Aigues-Mortes at the beginning of October, arrived in Tunis around the 11 of the month, and departed within a fortnight of the conclusion of King Charles's treaty. After a voyage of seven days to Trapani, the crusader fleet was hit by a storm there in late November (see below, p. 47. )

<sup>2</sup>Walter of Guisborough, p. 206.

Walter recorded that the Lord Edward himself returned with some small vessels to take them aboard his own ships for the voyage back to Sicily.<sup>1</sup>

One final episode marked the conclusion of the expedition to Tunis. As the combined fleets of the crusaders entered the harbor at Trapani they were struck by a violent storm which wrecked many of the vessels before they could be anchored or unloaded. One English chronicler placed the loss of life above 120.<sup>2</sup> The storm apparently devastated the French fleet, killing the King and Queen of Navarre, the Count and Countess of Toulouse, and many others.<sup>3</sup> But of prime significance to embittered English chroniclers remained the destruction of those vessels carrying tribute from the Emir to King Charles:

. . . all the money of the Berbers was lost. The vessels of Edward, in the center of the others, were saved as if by a miracle . . . being spared very deservedly because he alone had not desired the money of the Berbers. He had only desired to restore to the Christians, as far as he was able, the land which had been stained with the blood of Jesus Christ . . . .<sup>4</sup>

- 
1. Walter of Guiseborough, p. 206.
  2. Walter of Guiseborough, pp. 206-07.
  3. John of Vignay, pp. 82-83; William de Nangis, p. 239.
  4. Flores, iii, pp. 20-21.

d. The crusade of the Lord Edward.

Between November and April 1270-1271 Edward and his advisors in Sicily dealt with the complex matter of whether to return to England or to continue on towards Acre in accordance with crusading principles. Rumors current in London during this period give an indication of the considerations predominant in these deliberations. Edward was reportedly aware of four distinct eventualities which might force an abandonment of the crusade: his own incapacity through illness or accident, his father's death, renewed civil war in England, and the failure to elect a new pope.<sup>1</sup> This last consideration in particular bears further analysis which will be undertaken later.<sup>2</sup> French and Angevin suggestions to postpone the crusade might have assumed added appeal after news was received in March 1271 that domestic control was slipping from the grasp of Edward's caretaker government.<sup>3</sup> This may have led to the reported incident in which Edward was reduced to personal appeals in order to maintain the

---

1. "Chronica maiorum," p. 131.

2. See below, pp. 124-28.

3. See Richard's letter (Foedera, i, p. 487). For a discussion of political conditions in England at this time see below, pp. 113-15.

allegiance of some crusading leaders in the English camp.<sup>1</sup> In this context, it should be pointed out that contracts between Edward and many of his commanders guaranteed their service with the prince overseas only until August 1271. Edward therefore faced the possibility that followers already nervous about lands or possessions in England might abandon the crusade in Acre and return home before much of military significance could be accomplished.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, advice to continue the crusade to the Latin East may have come from other quarters. It is often forgotten that active leaders from the Latin East were present in Sicily at this time. Renowned crusaders such as Erard de Valery, John de Grailly, and Oliver des Termes may have had some influence upon the decision to sail with reinforcements to Acre. Local officers of the Hospital and Temple or Eastern Lords such as Humphrey de Montfort may also have pressed for a continuation

---

1. William Rishanger, Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series, 28), p. 68.

2. See below, pp. 104, 332-34.

of the crusade.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, it will be noted that leaders from Flanders and Luxemburg had been particularly annoyed at the decision to abandon the Tunis expedition. There is evidence that while they faced the possible dissolution of their own forces during the winter they were nonetheless eager to continue to the East.<sup>2</sup> It must also be remembered that a second English crusade force remained under the leadership of Edward's brother Edmund. Plans and objectives for this company remain obscure, as do the personal considerations of Edmund himself in a new situation; yet the existence of these crusaders cannot be ignored in assessing the various pressures upon Edward to sail East.

Although it is impossible to determine when the decision to continue toward Acre was taken, events during March and April 1271 give an indication that Edward had earlier set such an objective. Richard

---

1.

The presence of these crusaders is verified by three contemporary accounts: John of Vignay (pp. 44-45); "Chevaliers de l'hostel" (pp. 733-34); William de Nangis, (Gesta Sancti Ludovici, Rec. Gaul, xx, pp. 456-57).

2.

Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 556-57. It is evident that many of the German crusaders joined forces under Charles of Anjou preparing for an attack upon the Byzantine Empire in 1271.

of Cornwall sent his letter recommending the return of English crusaders on 6 February 1271. Within a few weeks Edmund departed from the realm at the head of a small company bound for the East.<sup>1</sup> Within another few weeks the Lord Edward directed his cousin Henry of Almain to leave Sicily, while he retained the major portion of English crusaders on the island. Henry was instructed to administer Gascony and to assist his father and the other royal advisors in accordance with the requests in Richard's recent letter.<sup>2</sup> Finally, with such indications that by March the decision to proceed had already been taken, we are presented with the unshakable resolve of Edward upon hearing that Henry of Almain himself had been murdered on 13 March in Viterbo. Within a few days the English leaders were informed of the circumstances surrounding the murder - of Henry's mutilated corpse being dragged from the church in which he had been slain, of the complicity of Simon and Guy de Montfort, and of the personal implications for Edward of an

---

1.

Edmund's force left England between 25 February and 4 March 1271. See "Annales Monasterii de Wintonia," ed. H.R. Luard, Annales Monastici (Rolls Series, 36), ii, p. 110; "Annales Monasterii de Waverleia," ed. H.R. Luard, Annales Monastici (Rolls Series, 36), ii, p.377.

2.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 239-40.

attack upon his friend and representative, who wore still the protective sign of the cross.<sup>1</sup> Yet at the end of April 1271 Edward and his crusaders sailed for Latin Syria and the commencement of campaigns which would keep them in the field longer than the army of Richard Lionheart nearly a century before.<sup>2</sup>

Within a fortnight the crusader fleet had crossed the Mediterranean and lay at anchor off the coast of Cyprus, where fresh water and supplies were taken aboard for the rest of the journey to Acre.<sup>3</sup> Arab chroniclers reported a fleet somewhat expanded since the journey in 13 ships from Tunis to Sicily, describing 30 vessels of varying size and military capability.<sup>4</sup> There are indications that the voyage to Cyprus had been stormy and it is possible that one

---

1. Thomas Wykes, pp. 239-41; Walter of Guiseborough, pp. 207-08; William de Nangis, pp. 240-41.

2. Walter of Guiseborough, p. 207.

3. Thomas Wykes, p. 244. Walter of Guiseborough (p.207) reported a journey of fifteen days to Acre.

4. Ibn-al-Furāt, History, ed. and trans. M.C. and U. Lyons, historical notes by J.S.C. Riley-Smith (to be published), pp. 150 ; al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 86.

segment of the fleet had arrived in the East before the rest.<sup>1</sup> On 9 May 1271, however, the main elements of Edward's force were disembarked in the port of Acre and prepared to establish a camp and headquarters for the forthcoming crusade.<sup>2</sup>

The size and nature of the army arriving in May are difficult to reconstruct with accuracy. Latin accounts referred to as few as 300 or as many as 1,000 men travelling with the Lord Edward.<sup>3</sup> Arab sources stated a figure of 300.<sup>4</sup> It is possible that the two sets of figures represent the difference between mounted men-at-arms and the more numerous pedites which might have made up most of the crusade force. Crusade lists drawn up prior to departure from

---

1.

The voyage was reported so stormy that frequent bailing of some of the vessels had become necessary - ". . . que en son veage ot mout de tempeste de mer, que j sifon fery en sa nave que poy ne la nea." (Les Gestes des Chiprois, ed. G. Raynaud, p. 199). The arrival of a smaller fleet ahead of the Lord Edward's was recorded by Ibn-al-Furāt (p. 150) and al-Magrīzī (IB, p. 86). The latter wrote of Edward's "majordomo" commanding the advanced fleet (IB, p. 86).

2.

"L'Estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conquete de la Terre d'Outremer," RHC Oc. ii, p. 460; Marino Sanudo The Elder, "Liber secretorum fidelium crucis," Geste Dei per Francos, p. 224; Nicholas Trivet, p. 277.

3.

William of Tripoli (Tractatus de statu Saracenorum, ed. H. Prutz, Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge, p. 587) recorded 300 with Edward. Walter of Guiseborough (p. 207) reported 1,000 "viris electis." Marino Sanudo, (p. 224) reported that Edward arrived with a large number of English and Breton crusaders.

<sup>4</sup>·Ibn-al-Furāt, p. 150 ; al-Magrīzī, IB, p. 86.

England reveal that around 250 knights may have accompanied the expedition to Tunis, although there is no way of estimating the numbers leaving for home in March with Henry of Almain.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, the number of Flemish, German, French or Breton crusaders travelling with the Lord Edward is impossible to fix accurately, although some of these men may have arrived independently, accounting for the Arab reports of two separate fleets. It may be suggested that Edward's personal command extended over some 200-300 mounted knights and perhaps twice as many infantry.

It is possible that between 9 May and 2 June the King of Cyprus-Jerusalem was not in Acre.<sup>2</sup> At some time during this period Edward seems to have attempted an assertion of diplomatic authority which may point to the absence of King Hugh. It is apparent that he rebuked Venetian merchants shortly after his arrival in Acre. Discovering a flourishing arms trade between merchants in Acre and Muslim purchasers in Alexandria,

---

1.

See pp. 401-405.

2.

Les Gestes des Chiprois (p. 200) recorded only that King Hugh arrived sometime before November 1271 in company with Prince Bohemond of Antioch-Tripoli. The King was listed with those campaigning in Palestine during July, however (p. 200), and the names of King Hugh and Prince Bohemond appear on a witness list signed on 2 June in Acre (Cartulaire, iii, no. 3422, pp. 253-54).

the Lord Edward was ". . . greatly provoked by the Venetians," according to an Italian account.<sup>1</sup> An English chronicler continued his report of the incident by asserting that Edward "therefore punished . . . some of the Venetians who had supplied the Saracens with arms and provisions,"<sup>2</sup> although it is apparent that the leaders of the Venetian community in Acre appeal immediately to local political leaders. Confronted by the Venetian bailli Philip Beligno, Edward seems to have acknowledged the status quo and ". . . thus tranquility was restored."<sup>3</sup> Further relations between local authorities and the English crusaders following this incident will be studied in detail later in this thesis.<sup>4</sup>

By early June it is apparent that major Latin

- 
1. Andrew Dandolo, "Chronica Venetiarum," RISNS, xii, 1, p. 318.
  2. Flores, iii, p. 21. See also Nicholas Trivet, p.277.
  3. Andrew Dandolo, p. 318.
  4. See below, pp. 133-38.

Syrian leaders were in Acre.<sup>1</sup> Records to not exist of any crusading council-of-war, but it is probable that a number of divergent viewpoints dominated Latin strategy in 1271. For in the last two decades political and military changes had resulted from the continuing presence of Mongol armies northeast of Syria and the rise of powerful Mamluk leadership in Cairo and Damascus. Shifting allegiance by christian rulers had been a significant consequence of the powerful military position of the Mongols following Hulagu Khan's destruction of the Baghdad Caliphate in 1258. Within two years the Nestorian Mongol chief Kitbogha was riding in triumph through the streets of Damascus with new Mongol vassals King Hetoum of Armenia and Prince Bohemond of Antioch-Tripoli. Also at this time, traditional hostility towards Cairo was swept aside in Acre and a Mamluk field army was allowed to march through the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem to defeat Kitbogha and his Christian allies.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

Cartulaire, iii, no. 3422, pp. 253-54. This witness list of 2 June was signed by King Hugh, Prince Bohemond, Philip of Ibelin, leaders of the Hospital and Temple, and representatives of the Church in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem.

2.

For details, see Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, iii, pp. 584-85 ff.; H.H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, iii, pp. 399-400 ff.

By 1261 the Mamluks under new leadership from Sultan Baybars had commenced a military resurgence in Syria and had opened negotiations with enemies of the Mongol Khan. These moves brought a loose Muslim alliance with Hulagu's nephew Bereke Khan, ruler of the Golden Horde in southern Russia. By November 1262 Bereke's troops serving in Hulagu's armies were melting away to join Baybars's forces, where their leaders were subsequently appointed to posts of military importance. Many of these Mongols were taken into the elite Bāhrī regiment where they initiated military reforms which led to later successes against the Franks in Syria and Palestine. Between 1262 and 1265 this alliance brought about continuous civil war among the Mongols, the improved military capability of the Mamluk field armies, and Baybars's growing power and influence over the affairs of Syria.<sup>1</sup>

Khan Hulagu's death in 1265 encouraged the sultan to challenge Christian states allied to the Mongols or threatening Mamluk communications between Syria and

---

1.

See Grousset, loc. cit.; A.M. Poliak, "Le caractère colonial de l'état Mamelouk dans ses rapports avec la Horde d'Or," Revue des Études Islamiques, liii (1935), pp. 230-32 ff.

Egypt. The Hospital in particular seemed to favour a Mongol alliance, while the rulers of Antioch-Tripoli and Armenia had indicated clearly their intention of maintaining ties of allegiance and even vassalage with the new Khan. Mamluk campaigns during the years 1265-1268 consequently centered upon Frankish and Armenian territories with devastating results. A brief respite was gained for the Franks because of Baybar's concern for northern Syria and his holy pilgrimage in 1269, and because of the distant threat to Egypt by crusaders in Tunis the following year.<sup>1</sup>

By the spring of 1271, however, the sultan was ready to return to his attack on the Latin states along the coast. Invading what remained of the Principality of Antioch and the County of Tripoli in February, the sultan forced the surrender of Templar - held Chastel Blanc less than twenty miles from Tortosa. In the following month the massive inland fortress Crac des Chevaliers was invested and taken. Two months later the castle of Gibelacar fell to the Mamluks and the inland defences of Tripoli were crippled.<sup>2</sup> At the

---

1.

See Grousset, loc. cit.; Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, pp. 319-35. For Mamluk gains at the expense of the Franks during this period, see the map on p. 59.

2.

See Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, pp. 332-34.



end of May Baybars returned to Damascus, perhaps in response to the Lord Edward's arrival in Acre.<sup>1</sup> By 5 June the Mamluk field army had been ordered south to begin an attack upon the fortress of Montfort garrisoned by Teutonic Knights. The uninterrupted conduct of Siege operations little more than twelve miles from Acre reveals the confidence of Baybars and the military weakness of the Latin forces on the coast. On 12 June the fortress fell after heavy attack and the sultan at once ordered its complete destruction.<sup>2</sup>

It is noteworthy that for more than a week no forces left Acre to attempt the relief of Montfort. Unlike the incautious raiding policies of the Infantas of Aragon some eighteen months earlier, Edward's tactics reveal a desire to hold back untested English crusaders in the face of nearby Muslim aggression.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 87.

2. Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 151-52; al-Ainī, "Perles d'Histoire," RHC. Or. ii, pp. 247-48; Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 199-200; "Eracles," p. 460; "Annales de Terre Sainte" (ed. R. Röhricht and G. Raynaud, Archives de l'Orient latin, ii, p. 455) recorded Montfort's fall seven days after siege operations had begun on 8 June.

3. See accounts of the 1269 crusade in Les Gestes des Chiprois (pp. 183-85), where the campaigns are misdated; "Eracles," pp. 457-58; "Annales de Terre Sainte," p. 454.

Reasons for such a policy are not difficult to suggest. First, it is clear that two major components of Edward's military force had not yet arrived in Acre. The English army of the Lord Edmund had been delayed for unknown reasons and would not arrive in the East until September 1271, while it is probable that troops raised by the barons of Cyprus had similarly failed to arrive in Acre at this time.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, leaders of the Military Orders frequently advised caution to the commanders of smaller Western crusades. Tactics involving the impulsive commitment of raw European troops had failed dramatically in December 1269. It is also noteworthy that Oliver des Termes, who had warned Robert de Creseques to return to the city in 1269, was probably in Acre during June 1271.<sup>2</sup> Finally, as events were to reveal throughout subsequent campaigns in Palestine, the Latin field forces in 1271

---

1.

For Edmund's arrival, see Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 199; "Eracles," p. 461; Marino Sanudo, p. 224. The contingents from Cyprus appear to have been absent during the July raid towards St. George and it seems likely that they were only summoned to the mainland around August. See below, pp. 138-40.

2.

See John of Vignay, pp. 51, 53-55; William de Nangis, Gesta Sancti Ludovici, pp. 456-57. Oliver's role in 1269 is discussed in Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 183.

and 1272 were no match in open battle for the Mamluk army.<sup>1</sup> The inactivity of 5-12 June may, therefore, be seen as a reflection of consistent military restraint.

Within three days of the fall of Montfort the sultan ordered elements of his Syrian field army to form within sight of the walls of Acre.<sup>2</sup> Latin commanders, however, continued to refuse battle of any sort, much to the disgust of partisan European chroniclers far from the actual scenes in June:

..... the citizens, with the masters and counselors of the three Military Orders ... were not able, courageous, or bold enough to sustain themselves, or to carry battle outside the gates, which they were not even able to secure for their retreat.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

On the relative strength and tactics of Mamluk armies during this period, see a series of articles by D. Ayalon: "Le regiment bahriya dans l'armée Mamelouke," Revue des Études Islamiques, lxxii (1951); "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, xv/xvi (1953/1954); "The System of payments in Mamluk military society," Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, i (1958).

2.

al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 87; Ibn-al-Furāt, (p. 165 ) gave no specific date.

3.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 587.

It is possible that the demonstration before Acre was designed in part to screen a major naval offensive against the island of Cyprus. Apparently decided upon by Baybars and his military advisors during the siege of Montfort in May, the operation appears to have been launched in late June or July. The invasion, however, misfired completely. Pitch-covered vessels collided and ran aground in the stormy night and the startled Cypriots managed to capture hundreds of seamen and soldiers in the wreckage of 11 or more ships.<sup>1</sup> The departure on 6 July of the Mamluk force stationed outside Acre may indicate the arrival of this news on the mainland, although the actual conclusion of the whole affair is difficult to date. It is clear, however, that in early July Baybars withdrew his troops from Acre and returned through partially-destroyed Montfort to Damascus.<sup>2</sup> In answer to an announcement from King Hugh that his fleet and army had been defeated off the coast of Cyprus Baybars wrote indignantly:

---

1. al-'Ainī, pp. 240-42; Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 152-53; al-Maqrīzī, IB, pp. 87-88; Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 199 - which appears to place the event before the investment of Montfort in May; "Eracles," p. 460; "Annales de Terre Sainte," (p. 455) reported the invasion attempt as occurring in June.

2. al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 87.

. . . you told us how the wind destroyed a number of our ships and you rejoiced in the successful conclusion of this affair . . . Yet how can one who trusts in God and His sword be compared to one who trusts in the wind? It is not victory given by the wind which is noble . . . You may have seized a broken mast of ours, but how many populous cities of yours have we taken? . . . Had the king been a man of good sense, he should have remained quiet and not spoken at all.<sup>1</sup>

Against this background of Muslim reversal the leaders in Acre determined to launch a limited offensive towards the village of St. George-du-Lebeyne some fifteen miles to the east. The crusaders accordingly set out on 12 July, anxious perhaps to gain experience of operational difficulties in the East and to present a show of force in the vicinity of the city in view of the recent Muslim campaigns there during May and June.<sup>2</sup> A complete description of the force which left Acre in July is lacking in Western sources and Arab figures are undoubtedly inflated.<sup>3</sup> Frankish accounts mention "men of Acre" accompanying

---

1.

Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 153-54. The letter was also transcribed by al-A'inf (pp. 240-42).

2.

"Eracles," p. 461. "Annales de Terre Sainte" (pp. 454-55) recorded the raid as taking place on 20 July. Marino Sanudo (p. 224) recorded it as occurring on 22 June.

3.

Ibn-al-Furāt (pp. 155 ), for example, recorded a crusading force of 1,500 cavalry and many more infantry.

the expedition, along with detachments from the Hospital and Temple.<sup>1</sup> It is doubtful, however, that large units from the Orders were sent on the chevauchée, particularly with a danger that Baybars might return to an attack on Acre without warning. Lack of reports that any Cypriot troops joined the raid indicates that significant numbers of them had not yet crossed to the mainland, although the possibility of their presence in the city may not be excluded.<sup>2</sup> It is possible that the Lord Edward and some of his companions purchased the services of mercenary cavalry for the raid. It was well-established, for example, that many troops in Hospitaller and Templar forces were hired. Native cavalry known as turcoples could be hired along with small bands of Europeans available in the east throughout the mid-thirteenth century.<sup>3</sup> It is clear that Edward made use

---

1.

Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 200; "Eracles," p. 461.

2.

For the total numbers the Hospitallers and Templars were capable of putting into the field, see J.S.C. Riley-Smith, The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050-1310, pp. 325-26. It must be emphasized that nothing approaching total military commitment was necessary for such a raid. On the knights from Cyprus, see below, pp. 138-40.

3.

On the extensive use of mercenaries in Latin Syria, see R.C. Smail, Crusading Warfare (1097-1193), pp. 93-104 ff.; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 325-27; J.L. LaMonte, Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291, pp. 101-03 ff.

of such troops while in the East, although their presence on the St. George chevauchée is speculative.<sup>1</sup> In all, it is doubtful if more than a few hundred mounted knights or mercenaries with accompanying infantry left Acre with the English prince.

The crusaders seem to have destroyed crops and dwellings as they neared St. George and to have gathered an impressive number of beasts, conforming generally with accepted military practice on such raids.<sup>2</sup> Within a few days, however, the entire force returned to Acre suffering from heat, thirst, and sickness. One Latin chronicler reported that many of the English crusaders had unwisely eaten ripe fruit and had become ill as a result.<sup>3</sup> Another actually placed the losses of the expedition around 400, although it is difficult to believe this figure in the absence of any evidence for an encounter with the Muslims.<sup>4</sup> In any case, the chevauchée seems to have

---

1. See below, pp. 284-85.

2. Ibn-al-Furāt, p. 155. See also Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 156-58, 198-203.

3. "Eracles," p. 461.

4. Marino Sanudo, p. 224. Les Gestes des Chiprois (p.200), indicated an attack on fortifications near St. George and repeated the account of inexperienced crusaders suffering from indigestion.

produced little military reaction from Baybars, who left Damascus for Cairo on 21 July.<sup>1</sup>

The chronology of events in Acre between July and November 1271 is difficult to reconstruct with any accuracy. It appears, however, that Edward applied much of his energy to the task of securing troops and allies for an extended campaign in the autumn. In September Edmund arrived with "a small company" of English crusaders.<sup>2</sup> Around the same time an English embassy arrived at the court of "Camaker," probably a local military governor of the Mongols beyond Syria. A letter sent to Edward and later recorded in the London "chronica maiorum et vicecomitum" reveals that agreement had been reached concerning simultaneous attacks by crusaders and Mongols, probably in the autumn.<sup>3</sup> Finally, it appears that a legal dispute over the refusal of Cypriot barons to serve King Hugh on the mainland came to a head around August,

---

1. al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 100.

2. "Eracles," p. 461 Les Gestes des Chiprois (p. 199) and Marino Sanudo (p. 224) recorded his arrival in September.

3. "Chronica maior um," p. 143. See below pp. 240-41.

with the result that the English prince was called upon to hear arguments.<sup>1</sup>

The legal debate between James of Ibelin and King Hugh of Cyprus-Jerusalem in Edward's presence will be analysed in detail later.<sup>2</sup> The outline of events, however, requires description here, particularly with reference to Edward's role and its implications. Edward had been called upon to offer his interpretation of the laws of the Kingdom of Jerusalem with regard to feudal obligations beyond the borders of the realm. Such an interpretation, or reconoissance, involved his decision based upon the evidence of coutume and usage within both kingdoms. It had apparently been acknowledged that such an interpretation of precedent would be binding for all parties to the dispute pending a final decision by the High Court of Jerusalem meeting later in Acre. It is also clear that reconoissance might carry great weight in the final deliberations of the High Court. King Hugh, whose royal power had extended for two years over Cyprus and Jerusalem, argued that precedent and usage in both kingdoms revealed a clear obligation

---

1.

Walter of Guisborough (p. 208) dated the whole affair. Evidence for arbitration in Acre is drawn from a document in RHC Lois, ii, pp. 427-34.

2.

See below, pp. 138-50.

by the baronage of Cyprus to serve on the mainland provided that such service remained at the king's expense. James of Ibelin, representing a Cypriot baronage which had long maintained interests in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, nevertheless asserted that Cypriot service outside the island had traditionally been voluntary: while the barons of Cyprus had often sailed to the defence of mainland territories, this had always been at their own discretion and often at the expense of leaders other than the King of Cyprus.

Unfortunately, no record survives of the Lord Edward's opinion regarding usage in the two kingdoms. His decision may, however, be suggested from the final interpretation of the High Court in 1273. Under the presidency of John de Grailly, the Court admonished the Cypriot barons to serve with the king or his son during four months of the year beyond the confines of the island. This service was considered to be a right of the king, providing that he continued to maintain the barons at his own expense during this period.<sup>1</sup> If Edward's initial judgement may be traced from <sup>this</sup> later decision, one may conclude that the barons

---

1.

"Eracles," pp. 763-64; Marino Sanudo, p. 225.

faced a strong obligation on the basis of his reconnaissance to serve in Acre at King Hugh's expense in 1271.<sup>1</sup>

The immediate securing of Cypriot troops in 1271 may, however, have fallen beyond the scope of Edward's decision before a court in Acre. For it is evident that the prince's opinion might be regarded as highly influential, but not final.<sup>2</sup> While any conflict in interpretation prevailed over the legal obligations of the Cypriots to serve on the mainland in any other capacity than that of a voluntary commitment, Edward might be deprived of vital troops necessary for the autumn campaigns. As a result of this hypothetical state of affairs - and it must be emphasized that very little is actually known of Edward's legal decision or its effect at the time - it is possible that he issued an appeal directly to the barons:

. . . Edward sent for them that they should come at his command, to serve in that [area] . . . And they . . . [said] that they would hold to his command as they had been ruled by his ancestors in their own land, and that they ought always to be faithful to the Kings of England.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

See below (pp. 138-51) for a more detailed discussion of implications behind such a decision. King Edward, for example, seems to have faced very similar circumstances in England twenty-six years later.

2.

See RHC Lois, ii, pp. 427-34 and below, pp. 142-43, 146-50.

3.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 208.

The terms of this narrative, recorded soon after 1271 at the priory of Guiseborough, indicate a perplexing tone of command based apparently upon precedents dating from Richard I's original conquest of the island of Cyprus. The real possibility of Edward issuing such these instructions to the baronage in 1271 will be treated at length later.<sup>1</sup> For the present, it must only be asserted that either through Edward's request, demand, or reconnaissance the service of the Cypriots was obtained prior to November 1271. In the words of Walter of Guiseborough the Cypriots ". . . came <sup>CONTINUOUSLY</sup> ~~in an unbroken stream~~ with many soldiers saying that they would hold themselves to his command."<sup>2</sup>

While the Lord Edward seems thus engaged through the summer and early autumn in the complicated business of collecting men and materials for a new offensive, negotiations with the Mongols had apparently produced a commitment to open a second front in Syria. By the end of October a force of Mongol cavalry had rapidly pushed up the Orontes valley past Hamah. Brushing aside local Muslim garrisons they appeared to be concentrating for a raid upon Damascus. The governor of the city arrived with his forces on 9 November to

---

1.

See below, pp. 143-46.

2.

Walter of Guiseborough, p. 208.

find defenders in a state of growing panic. Clearly the memories of Kitbogha's conquest in 1260 were stirring popular fears in 1271. Baybars, however, seems to have been more concerned with limiting Mongol movements elsewhere into Syria, aware perhaps, that the enemy force of cavalry would find it difficult to sustain a siege of Damascus itself. Consequently, the city was left to the defence of the provincial garrison while portions of Baybars's main field army moved north and east into Aleppo and towards Edessa, Marash, and the borders of Armenia. This sudden move to block Mongol retreat forced the invaders to abandon their concentration around Damascus, and to retreat Northeast. Mongol forces were reported in full retreat towards the Euphrates by the end of November, leaving Baybars free to deal with a new Frankish threat from Acre.<sup>1</sup>

Around mid-November Edward with his crusaders and allies set out on the road leading south towards the Plain of Shaaron inland from the ruins of Caesarea.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>.The best accounts of this campaign come predictably from Arab sources, including those of al-Ainī (pp.245-46) and al-Maqrīzī (IB, pp. 100-02). A few details may be found in "Eracles" (p. 461). See also Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, iii, pp. 659-60.

<sup>2</sup>.Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 200; "Eracles," p. 461; Marino Sanudo, p. 224; "Annales de Terre Sainte," p. 455. The latter placed the major action of the raid on 29 November, while the remaining sources described the crusaders in the Plain of Shaaron on 23 November.

The objective of the crusaders appears to have been the investment of the tower-fort of Cacho, some forty miles from Acre, although the possibility cannot be ruled out entirely that simply another chevauchée into Muslim territory was intended.<sup>1</sup> The distance of Cacho from Acre, however, may be coupled with the fact that a large body of infantry seems to have accompanied the march south indicating that an attack upon the castle itself was planned.<sup>2</sup> Cacho had been captured by the Mamluks in 1265 and restored the following year as a base for raids into Frankish territory. Its strategic position on the plain between Caesarea and Arsur was of considerable military importance to the Muslims.<sup>3</sup> An archaeological survey undertaken in 1873 reveals something of the nature of Cacho at the time. The village was

---

1. "Eracles" (p. 461) referred to the expedition as a chevauchée.

2. "Annales de Terre Sainte" (p. 455) and "Eracles," (p. 461) stressed the presence of infantry.

3. al-Maqrizī, IA, p. 98. For further discussion of the attacking purposes of castles in the Latin East, see Smal, Crusading Warfare, pp. 204-14.

dominated by a solitary masonry tower, some 60 feet square at the base and perhaps 40-50 feet high. A stone stair led internally to the roof, where defenders might fire from behind stone battlements. The walls of the tower were some 15 feet thick at the base, rendering mining or battering extremely difficult.<sup>1</sup>

It is possible that the military objectives of the expedition in November were based primarily upon three considerations. First, the investment and capture of a Mamluk stronghold garrisoned by troops of a provincial emir was feasible during the absence of the Mamluk field army in Syria for a month or more. Second, the Mamluk encirclement of the remaining territory of the Kingdom of Jerusalem during 1266-1268 had been based upon the strengthening of the three fortresses of Safad, Beaufort, and Cacho, any of which might justify attack and recapture by the Franks. Third, of these three strongholds Cacho alone presented an inviting target in view of its position furthest from the Syrian field army. In

---

1.

C.R. Conder and H.H. Kitchener, The Survey of Western Palestine, Memoires, ii, p. 195. Les Gestes des Chiprois (pp. 200-01) reported a wide water-filled moat surrounding the tower.

addition, Safad and Beaufort were perhaps too strong for such an investment which had to be completed before a powerful Mamluk relieving force could be summoned.<sup>1</sup>

Throughout the Mongol campaigning of October and November, however, the troops within Acre seem to have made no move beyond the city.<sup>2</sup> Reasons for this delay are indeterminate, although the difficulty of dating the arrival of Cypriot contingents may allow the possibility that Edward and King Hugh commanded an army still under-strength throughout this period. When the crusaders at last set out in November they were apparently accompanied by units from the Military Orders, along with contingents

---

1.

For a discussion of the Mamluk "encirclement" of Acre during this period, see J.S.C. Riley-Smith's introduction to *Ibn-al-Furāt*, pp.       ; see also Small, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 204-14 ff.

2.

*The Flores Historiarum*, (iii, p. 23) described an attack upon Nazareth, although it is impossible to date such a raid. Walter of Guiseborough (p. 208) stated that Edward raided Nazareth on his return from St. George, which may explain the former account. The chronology of both narratives is extremely confused.

supplied by the men of Acre and the barons of Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> It is also possible that a number of mercenaries joined the forces at Edward's disposal.<sup>2</sup> A contemporary account described 400 infantry on the Cacho expedition, which may under the circumstances be considered reasonable.<sup>3</sup> Mounted troops are more difficult to estimate, along with the relative contribution of independent cavalry units such as those of the Military Orders or the barons of Cyprus. It is unlikely, however, that more than a few hundred knights left Acre with the Lord Edward in November 1271.<sup>4</sup>

As the army of crusaders neared the tower of Cacho on 23 November, scouts apparently returned with news of a sizeable encampment of Turcomans.<sup>5</sup> These

---

<sup>1</sup>•Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 200; "Eracles," p. 461. "Annales de Terre Sainte" (p. 455) mentioned the crusaders and members of the Military Orders only.

<sup>2</sup>.

See below, pp. 284-85.

<sup>3</sup>.

"Annales de Terre Sainte," P. 455. "Eracles" (p. 761) mentioned "many soldiers on foot."

<sup>4</sup>•In 1268 the Hospitallers may have been able to field 300 knights throughout the Latin East, along with a similar commitment by the Templars. It is extremely doubtful, of course, that such large forces accompanied the expedition towards Cacho. See Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 327 ff.

<sup>5</sup>•Les Gestes des Chiprois, (p. 201) and "Annales de Terre Sainte," (p. 455) reported two Turcoman encampments. "Eracles," p. 461; Marino Sanudo, p. 224.

nomadic Muslim tribesmen were periodically encountered on military campaigns in the Latin East and were regarded as dangerous marauders by Franks and Mamluks alike. Only a few weeks before the crusaders' encounter near Cacho elements of Baybars' Syrian army had attacked a Turcoman encampment southeast of Antioch.<sup>1</sup> The force discovered on 23 November was accompanied by a large herd of cattle and horses and it is possible that these were meant for the provision of the Cacho garrison.<sup>2</sup> The connection between the garrison and this local force of Turcomans is supported by Arab accounts reporting the presence of two provincial emirs besides the governor of Cacho himself.<sup>3</sup>

Relying apparently upon darkness and their undetected approach, the crusaders charged from ambush into the Turcoman camp. Amid the confusion of battle and poor light the Muslims fled, leaving their wounded and most of their livestock. The governor of Cacho and one of the emirs were killed in the attack, while

---

1. al-Ainī, pp. 245-46.

2. Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 200-01; "Eracles," p. 461; Marino Sanudo, p. 224.

3. Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 155 ; al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 101.

the second emir was wounded.<sup>1</sup> Inflated Frankish accounts placed the loss of Muslim troops around 1,000 and referred to the taking of over 5,000 cattle.<sup>2</sup> While these figures are doubtless exaggerated, it is nevertheless clear that the ambush of 23-24 November had increased prospects for a successful investment of Cacho.

The attack on the Muslim tower was interrupted, however, by the sudden approach of a relieving force.<sup>3</sup> It is probable on the basis of Latin accounts that the actual investment of Cacho was never seriously under way, and that the crusaders began a retreat toward Château Pélerin and Haifa almost as soon as the Turcoman ambush had been completed.<sup>4</sup> The move to abandon the siege of Cacho may have been advised by leaders of the Military Orders. The crusaders accordingly turned north, driving prisoners and the

---

1.

Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 155 ; al-'Ainī, p. 246; Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 200-01; "Eracles," p. 461.

2.

Les Gestes des Chiprois (p. 201) reported that 12,000 head of cattle were captured in the attack. "Eracles," p. 461; "Annales de Terre Sainte," p. 455.

3. al-Aini, p. 246; Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 201; Marino Sanudo, p. 224.

4. Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 201; "Eracles," p. 461; Marino Sanudo, p. 224. Walter of Guisborough (p. 208) indicated that the crusaders returned by way of Château Pélerin, while the Flores Historiarum iii, (p. 23) noted a return through Haifa.

large herd of cattle before them.<sup>1</sup> Arab chroniclers recorded that a Muslim force pursued the retreating army to free prisoners taken on the raid of 23-24 November. These troops seem to have been part of the force summoned to the relief of Cacho. Edward and his commanders apparently refused a Muslim demand for the prisoners, however, whereupon a rear-guard action developed in which a number of crusaders were killed and many horses were wounded.<sup>2</sup> Within a fortnight winter rains had compromised further military action against the Franks in Acre and Baybars left his army near Tripoli to return to Cairo.<sup>3</sup>

Three important developments which were to shape politics throughout 1272 resulted from the Mongol-Latin offensives in July, October and November. After seven years of relentless attack broken only briefly by a truce in 1268, Baybars was prepared to sign a long truce and to negotiate various points concerning the

---

1.

The Flores Historiarum, iii, p. 23, recorded that Edward had accepted the advice of "false brethren," leading to the tentative conclusion that leaders of the Military Orders had instigated the retreat. Les Gestes des Chiprois, (p. 201) and "Eracles" (p. 461) both referred to the presence of captured livestock in the crusader army.

2.

Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 155.

3.

al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 102.

frontier of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. On 21-22 April 1272 the sultan's representatives ratified a truce lasting ten years, ten months, ten weeks, ten days and ten hours. The provisions were signed by King Hugh and the leaders of the Military Orders.<sup>1</sup> In the words of one Arab account, however, ". . . King Edward, not being pleased about it, did not enter into the peace."<sup>2</sup> Within two weeks Baybars had negotiated a second truce with the Khan Abagha, perhaps because of Mamluk success in making peace with potential Mongol allies in Acre.<sup>3</sup>

The development of a serious split between Edward and leaders in the Latin East is difficult to substantiate. Three supporting arguments, however, may be stressed. First, there are no indications that the English prince participated in any negotiations of 1272 leading to the signing of the truce at Caesarea in April. The subsequent absence of Edward's assent to such a treaty is notable, particularly with regard to the political implications

---

1. "Eracles," p. 462; Marino Sanudo, p. 224. More complete Arab accounts of the treaty are al-Ainī, p. 247; Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 157-58. See below, pp. 134-36.

2. Ibn-al-Furāt, p. 159.

3. al-Maqrīzī, IB, pp. 102-03.

inherent in any crusader's isolation from the decisions of leaders of the Latin states on matters of foreign policy.<sup>1</sup> Secondly, the English leaders appear to have been advised by commanders in the military orders to cease active diplomacy and military adventures in the East and to return home for more men and supplies.<sup>2</sup> And finally, rejecting both the terms of the truce and the advice offered in Acre, Edward appears to have conducted negotiations with the Mongols and Armenians, with a view toward continuing a military offensive in 1272.<sup>3</sup> Edward's construction of new fortifications in Acre may also indicate his clear intent to remain militarily active after provisions with the sultan had been signed.<sup>4</sup> It is worth noting in the context of possible arguments over military policy that Edward's brother Edmund left Acre for unknown reasons in May 1272, arriving in England on 10 December.<sup>5</sup> There is evidence, however, that Edmund's abandonment

---

1. Menko ("Chronicon," p. 558) reported that Edward "did not restrain his indignation" over the truce. See below, pp. 134-36.

2. Menko, "Chronicon," p. 559. On the subject of Edward's relations with the Military Orders while on crusade, see below, pp. 128-31.

3. Walter of Guisborough, p. 208. See below, pp. 134.

4. See Francis Pipinius, "Chronicon," RIS, ix, p. 714. For further analysis of this contribution to the defence of Acre, see below, pp. 271-73, 338-39.

5. "Eracles," p. 462; "Chronica majorum," p. 156.

of the crusade was due to disagreements over his brother's handling of English crusade funds.<sup>1</sup>

Edward's threat to the truce appears to have caused concern among Baybars and other Muslim leaders, leading perhaps to the plot to assassinate him.<sup>2</sup>

Admitting a native confidant into his chamber late in the evening of 16 July, Edward was suddenly attacked with a poisoned dagger.<sup>3</sup> It is not clear if the assassin had entered the room alone or if an

interpreter were nearby, yet guards seem to have been sent away and Edward, dressed in light clothes in

readiness to retire at the close of day, interviewed the man.<sup>4</sup> The crusader was wounded in the abdomen and

right arm before wrestling his attacker to the ground and slashing him with the poisoned knife. At this

point attendants dashed into the room and the assailant

1.

See below, pp. 369-70.

2.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 208; Flores iii, p. 25; Nicholas Trivet, p. 278.

3.

The best accounts appear to be those of Walter of Guisborough, pp. 209-10; Thomas Wykes, pp. 248-50; "Eracles," p. 462; Marino Sanudo, p. 225; Ibn-al-Furāt, pp. 159; al-Ainī, p. 248. Two of the most intriguing reports of the identity of the assassin point to a native in Edward's personal service: William of Tripoli (p. 434) suggested that the attacker was Edward's own interpreter, while al-Ainī, (p. 248) wrote that the man had served the prince on the raid toward Cacho.

4.

Ibn-al-Furāt (p. 159) reported the interpreter in the chamber, Walter of Guisborough (p. 209) commented upon the lack of guards, while most Western sources mentioned Edward's dress.

was felled with a blow from a small nearby stool.<sup>1</sup>

Edward was examined and attended by doctors under the watchful supervision of the Master of the Templars. Eleanor was brought into the chamber briefly, as were the chief English and Latin Syrian advisors of the prince. The fear that Edward might not survive the operation to cut away infected areas around the knife-wounds prompted an assemblage of prominent witnesses in the chamber in order for a new will to be drawn up. Present on this occasion <sup>was</sup> ~~were~~ John of Brittany, William de Valence, Roger de Clifford, Payne de Chaworth, Robert Tybetot, Odo de Grandison, Anthony Bek, and Archbishop John of Tyre, along with Hugh Revel and Thomas Berard, the Masters of the Military Orders.<sup>2</sup> Finally, attended possibly by a Franciscan named William de Hidley, the Lord Edward was left in the chamber to be nursed by doctors and attendants.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

See particularly Walter of Guisborough, p. 209. Most sources indicate two substantial wounds, although "Chronica majorum" (p. 156) recorded four and Ibn-al-Furāt (p. 159) reported five.

2.

Most of those present may be verified from the witness list of Edward's will (*Foedera*, I, p. 495). See also Walter of Guisborough (pp. 209-10) who reported erroneously the presence of Edmund.

3.

Richard of Durham, *Chronicon de Lanercost*, ed. J. Stevenson, p. 281; Walter of Guisborough, p. 210.

His recovery from the attack of 16 June appears to have been rapid.<sup>1</sup> His wounds continued to trouble him periodically during the next two years, while personal feelings about his struggle in Acre perhaps prompted him to preserve the blood-stained tunic he had been wearing.<sup>2</sup> Messages of congratulation arrived continuously during July and August, along with an invitation from Pope Gregory X to attend a crusade council in the near future.<sup>3</sup> Nothing may have seemed more surprising, however, than a speech of sympathy and congratulations delivered in halting English by a messenger from Baybars himself.<sup>4</sup>

The English crusade was clearly finished. In relatively poor health during July and August, the Lord Edward could not hope to continue military campaigning on a large scale. His borrowing may have been approaching crisis levels by this time, and news

---

1.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 210. Within a fortnight the prince seems to have returned to reasonably good health.

2.

Thomas Wykes, p. 250. Edward's tunic was cataloged along with other royal treasures as late as the reign of Edward III; see The Antient Kalandars and Inventories of the Treasury, ed. F. Palgrave, iii, p. 174.

3.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 210. See below, pp. 155-59.

4.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 210.

had reached him over the summer that Richard of Cornwall had died and that King Henry was growing ill.<sup>1</sup> His brother Edmund had departed with a portion of the English crusade force earlier in the year, and there is evidence that other barons such as Thomas de Clare had also left.<sup>2</sup> Around mid-August, therefore, the troops which had arrived in May 1271 began to depart separately - indicating a reliance perhaps upon local merchant fleets or individually-contracted vessels.<sup>3</sup> Forces under William de Valence departed from Acre on 23 August, to be followed on 14 September by those under John of Brittany. A week later on 22 September the last remaining crusaders departed in company with the Lord Edward, his consort Eleanor, and an infant daughter Joan, born several months previously.<sup>4</sup>

---

1.

See below, pp. 114-15.

2.

The Flores Historiarum (iii p. 24) reported that Thomas arrived in London during 1272 bringing four Muslim prisoners with him.

3.

See below, pp. 345.

4.

"Eracles," p. 462; "Annales de Terre Sainte, p. 455, which recorded the respective departures as 13 August, 13 September and 23 September.

II.

THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN ENGLISH CRUSADING ACTIVITY

1264 - 1307

2. Domestic politics and the crusade of 1270.

As early as November 1267 the Lord Edward had written to Pope Clement IV seeking advice concerning an English crusade.<sup>1</sup> Some Barons, like Thomas de Clare who had taken the cross in May 1267, were already committed to obligations which might take them with their contingents overseas when the new expedition forming in Europe departed.<sup>2</sup> As Pope Clement later observed to King Louis, however, the "tender peace" of England at this time presented a substantial obstacle to such plans.<sup>3</sup> The Dictum of Kennilworth had only recently become operational throughout the realm and had by no means demonstrated its effectiveness in resolving the many involved court cases. Similarly, the important Statute of Marlborough was not issued until November 1267, at a time when the suspect loyalties of powerful barons such as Gilbert de Clare and John de Eyvill still posed ominous threats to domestic peace.<sup>4</sup>

---

1.

Allowing sufficient time for news of his intent to reach Pope Clement by January 1268. See the Pope's letter to King Louis, Thesaurus, ii, no. 483, col. 563.

2.

Flores, iii, p. 14. For crusade recruitment prior to the ceremony at Northampton, see below, pp. 310-11.

3.

Thesaurus, ii, no. 483, col. 563.

4.

See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, pp. 551-66; 568; E.F. Jacob, Studies in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion, 1258-1267, pp. 115-24.

In view of the obvious dangers inherent in Edward's determination to set out on crusade so soon after serious rebellions had flared in London, Ely and the Marches, it is important to examine some possible factors behind this response to preaching and recruitment. Following a brief examination of the political loyalties of individual crusaders in the Barons Wars, it will be possible to approach the question of enlistment from the standpoint of benefits available to those taking the cross. Inducements to crusaders offered by Edward and the English crown will be considered, and baronial reaction noted. Programs of recruitment and contracts associating major leaders in England and Gascony to Edward's new project will be outlined. Finally, the prince's domestic settlement and provision for a strong caretaker government during his crusade will be considered, together with the effect of such measures during Edward's absence from England.

a. Baronial support or rejection of the crusade and its implications.

The crusade planned in 1267-1270 appears to be unique among English projects of the thirteenth century

in that at no other time had preparations been conducted during such a prolonged papal vacancy.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps because of this state of affairs, royal agencies during this period appear to have devoted a great deal of attention to securing the rights and privileges of crusaders in the absence of traditional guarantees from the Holy See. It is possible consequently to compile a relatively complete list of English crusaders in possession of lands or goods sufficient to require such royal protection in 1270 and 1271.<sup>2</sup> Adding to this the results of research through the Patent Rolls, Close Rolls, and Liberate Rolls of the period under examination, a good idea of the response to the English crusade appeal may be gained.<sup>3</sup> A break-down of these lists on the basis of

---

1.

Taking into consideration the preparations in 1189-90, in 1216, in 1240 and in 1290. Preparations for Edward's second crusade were interrupted in 1287-1288 by a vacancy, although they do not seem to have been as advanced at that time as in 1268. See below, pp. 299-300.

2.

See Appendices, pp. 401-407.

3.

See Appendices, pp. 401-407, for documentation of crusade protections or other evidence of baronial commitment. For a useful guide to recruitment and to baronial loyalties during the civil wars, see Knights of Edward I, (Harlean Society, 1929-1932) 5 Vols.

records of support during the Civil War for the rebel or royalist causes may be studied in Tables A and B.

TABLE A. Rebels admitted to the king's peace and taking the cross before 1271

---

Richard de Afton	John de Ingold-	Jordan de Pyvelesdon
Robert de Cadamo	thorpe	Nicholas de Segrave
Peter de Champayne	Robert de Neuton	John de Vesci
Philip de Cole-	Reginald de Pavely	William Fitz Warin
vill	William de Pavely	Richard de Wykes
John de Gurney <sup>1</sup>	Nicholas Pesson	

---

TABLE B. Royalists taking the cross before 1271

---

Henry of Almain	Gerard de Fanecourt	John de St. John
Alexander Balliol	Geoffrey de Gacelyn	Laurence de St. Mauro
Eustace Balliol	William Giffard	Urian de St. Peter
Baldwin de Bass-	Ralph de Gorges	Thomas de Sandwich
ingburn	Geoffrey de	John de Scaccario
William Belet	Grenvill	Nicholas Sifrewast
Walter de Bibles-	Stephen de Houton	Robert de Stanton
worth	Adam de Gesemue	Hamo le Strange
Herbert de Boyvill	John Lovel	Robert le Strange
William de Boyvill	Roger de Leyburn	Luke de Tany
John of Brittany	Nicholas de Martin	Robert de Turbervill
Brian de Brompton	Adam de Monte Alto	Robert Tybetot
Richard Bruce	Berengar le Moyne	Robert de Ufford
Robert Bruce	William le Moyne	John de Verdun
Robert Bruce the	Robert Munteny	William de Valence
Younger	Hugh Fitz Otto	John de Weston
Robert Burnell	Oliver de Punch-	Ralph de Wodeburgh
Robert Charles	ardon	John de Wodestock
Payne de Chaworth	Ellis de Rabeyn	
Thomas de Clare	Richard de	
Roger de Clifford	laRochelle	
William de Detling	Mauger de St.	
	Albans	

---

<sup>1</sup>Records indicate the possibility of a second person of this name, not apparently engaged in the rebel cause. It is unclear which John de Gurney took the cross prior to 1271.

It can be seen immediately that few former rebels took the cross. The most important to do so were John de Vesci and Nicholas de Segrave, both young and active leaders who had put up serious resistance to Edward's forces in 1267.<sup>1</sup> Others, however, had been restored early to the king's peace. John de Ingoldthorpe and William Fitz Warin are examples of this more conciliatory faction among former adherents to the rebel cause.<sup>2</sup> Reasons for the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the crusade among recent opponents of Edward are not difficult to imagine. Pope Clement and his predecessor had been outspoken in their opposition to the rebel cause. Ottobuono had arrived in England in 1265 with instructions to preach the crusade against Earl Simon if necessary.<sup>3</sup> The Earl of Leicester, however, had been widely respected as a

---

1.

See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, pp. 439, 444, 544-46, 554, 698.

2.

See appropriate entries in the Calendar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Records Office, 1266-1272. It is perhaps of significance that John de Vesci, Nicholas Segrave, John de Ingoldthorpe and William Fitz Warin enlisted in the Lord Edmund's crusade force leaving England in 1271. See Appendix II, pp. 406-407.

3.

Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers: Papal Letters, i, p. 419. Ottobuono received these instructions in a letter dated 19 July, 1265.

crusader himself, and there is evidence that many popular preachers were open in their support of Simon and his adherents. At Lewes, for example, it was reported that the rebels had worn white crosses in response to popular appeals for a crusade against King Henry.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, suspicion of the new crusade was widespread among rebels who opposed Henry's French ties and who feared a return to his involvement in papal schemes in Italy or Sicily. These men were opposed to "Any preaching of the cross or departure of [native] crusaders . . . since this would allow foreigners to invade the land in their absence."<sup>2</sup> In the light of these fears and hostilities it is perhaps understandable that few former rebels joined Edward's new project in 1267-1271.

Of primary significance, however, is the simple impossibility of many of the disinherited undertaking such an expensive passage to the Holy Land. Many of them may also have found it difficult to commute crusade vows through substitutes or other monetary payment. Robert de Ferrers, the once-powerful Earl

---

1.

William Rishanger, "Chronicon," p. 26; Flores, ii, p. 495.

2.

William Rishanger, "Chronicle of the Barons' War," ed. J.O. Halliwell (Camden Society, 15), p. 65.

of Derby, provides a good example. Captured and imprisoned in 1265, the earl was ill-treated and then tricked out of his lands and inheritance four years later. Until his death in 1279 he was unable to regain his lost lands and revenues because of legal technicalities. He was certainly in no position to leave on crusade in 1270, less than a year after his release from prison.<sup>1</sup> Another example of the poverty of leading rebels may be taken from the case of John de Eyvill, a baron who did in fact take the cross. Even though his lands in Yorkshire and Nottinghamshire had been restored upon payment according to the Dictum of Kennilworth, he remained in such great debt that he had to borrow funds from Queen Eleanor. In November 1272 he still owed 380 of the 900 marks he had borrowed. Clearly his ability to finance his passage in company with Edward was limited.<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand the number of royalist adherents following Edward to the Holy Land was large. Reasons for this response may of course be closely tied to desires for prestige, glory, the friendship of the prince - in other words to aspirations within the party of Edward himself. It is possible, however,

---

1. See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, pp. 524-26.  
 2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 74, 181; Close Rolls, 1268-1272, p. 588.

that benefits were gained by royalist crusaders through the intricate system of protection and privileges guaranteed to soldiers of the cross. Former adherents to the cause of Earl Simon presumably found themselves unable to take full advantage of these rights and therefore had little reason for joining a crusade which may already have been preached at their expense.

Of primary importance with regard to crusade privileges was the express determination of Church and State to protect the lands and possessions of absent crusaders. Such protection as repeated in the papal documents Quantum Praedecessores, Ad Liberandam, and Afflite Corde, was by 1270 a fundamental part of canon law. In many cases specified ecclesiastical leaders were appointed guardians of individual crusaders' possessions, while in the case of more important pilgrims the pope could appoint a conservator cruce signatorum.<sup>1</sup> The 71st "constitutio" of the Fourth Lateran Council stated specifically that

---

1.

On the whole subject of crusader privileges see J.A. Brundage, Mediaeval Canon Law and the Crusader, pp. 163, 166-69 ff. For evidence of such privileges in use by English crusaders, see below, pp. 95-102.

Once they have assumed the Cross . . . they are to be defended by archbishops, bishops and all prelates of the Church, even should they have appointed their own protectors specifically for this task, so that their goods remain untouched and at peace, until it be known for a certainty either that they have died or that they have returned home.<sup>1</sup>

During 1268-1271, however, an awkward papal vacancy may have seriously limited ecclesiastical powers to carry out such protection, while English clerical opposition to taxation for the crusade may have led to a certain unwillingness on the part of prelates to become involved in this expensive and arduous task of wardship.<sup>2</sup> Whatever the reasons, King Henry and the Lord Edward seem to have applied the full powers of the State to the matter of protection, and crusaders were accordingly granted royal charters in 1269 and 1270 spelling out such provisions. The grant presented to Henry's son Edmund is illustrative of the royal attempt to parallel clerical protections:

. . . since our beloved son Edmund, a crusader, has vowed to go overseas in aid of the Holy Land, we undertake the protection and defence

---

1.

Conciliorum oecumeneconem decreta, (ed. G. Alberigo et al.,) p. 247. Similar protections were issued at the First Lateran Council in 1123 and again in 1245. See Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 166-169 ff.

2.

On clerical unwillingness in the matter of the crusade, see below, pp. 368-69. See also Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 298-304.

of the men, lands, rents, incomes and all possessions of . . . Edmund. And further, We command that [these] be maintained, protected, and defended. . . neither yielding them up to injury, molestation, damage, or grievance. . . .

In similar terms found among contemporary clerical protections, Edmund's grant was to take effect "from the time he begins his journey, and during all the time remaining to the completion of the agreed five years."<sup>1</sup> Clearly from the time each crusader left the realm until his return several years later lands and possessions in his control at the time of his departure would be guaranteed and his continued receipt of rents and revenues maintained by the crown.

Significantly included in this protection was a guarantee by clerical and secular authorities to suspend court cases brought against crusaders until they could return from the danger and expense of a campaign to the Holy Land. Canon law on the continent was explicit concerning the rights of those signed with the Cross. Such men retained the clerical privilegium fori - the right to be judged in

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 482. In view of the fact that similar grants extended almost universally over a period of four to five years, it is interesting to note that many crusaders did not return to the realm with Edward until 1274, preferring to remain abroad nearly two years after the crusade had finished in Syria.

ecclesiastical courts rather than secular ones. In answer to charges brought against him in a secular court, the crusader might answer "I will not reply, because I am a crusader."<sup>1</sup> In English usage the principle of extending such protection over a period of one year seems to have been in use during the late thirteenth century,<sup>2</sup> although ecclesiastical courts were generally less powerful than their counterparts in Europe and this practice may have been limited. An additional privilege granted in canon law to the crusader was his right to essoin or a delay of court cases until he should return from his pilgrimage. In England, however, such a delay might not apply if the crusader were summoned a reasonable time before his departure.<sup>3</sup> As in the case of protection of lands and possessions agencies of the English crown seem to have been prepared in 1270 to guarantee crusaders' rights to essoin, but

---

1.

"Le livre des constitucions demenees el chastelet de Paris," (ed. C. Mortet,) Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et l'île de France, x (1883), p.84.

2.

See particularly the opinions of Bracton and Beaumanoir, discussed in Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 173-74.

3.

See examples from the reigns of John and Henry III cited in Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 174-75.

there is no evidence of cases being referred to ecclesiastical courts at this time.<sup>1</sup> In the terms of Edmund's grant:

We promise, therefore, that the same Edmund . . . shall be quit of all pleas and actions of court, from whence he may derive nothing; of assizes of novel disseisin; and of all further presentments. . . 2

English crusaders in 1270 might, therefore, be guaranteed the full undisputed possession of lands or goods under their control from the time court cases had been suspended in anticipation of their departure. Such advantages to royalist victors possessing rebel lands as yet unreturned according to the Dictum of Kennilworth or the Statute of Marlborough were significant. During the time such a crusader campaigned overseas, moreover, advantages might increase. The death or disqualification of the rebel claimant might cause the case to be dropped permanently. Through lack of resources, the plaintiff might be forced to leave the realm and discontinue his case. And in any event, the protected crusader might continue to enjoy the undisputed rents and revenues of his new lands until his return after

---

1.

See below, pp. 100-101.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 482.

several years.

The number of crusaders in a position to enjoy the protections of Church and State in this matter is impressive (see Table C). The chief beneficiary

---

TABLE C. Crusaders possessed of former rebels' lands.<sup>1</sup>

---

William Belet	William Giffard	John de St. John
Walter de Biblesworth	Stephen de Houton	Laurence de St. Mauro
Robert de Boyvill	John Lovel	Nicholas Sifrewast
William de Boyvill	Roger de Leyburn	Hamo le Strange
Brian de Brompton	Nicholas de Martin	Robert de Turbervill
Robert Charles	Adam de Monte Alto	Robert Tybetot
Thomas de Clare	Berengar le Moyne	William de Valence
Roger de Clifford	Robert de Muntenty	John de Verdun
William de Detling	Mauger de St. Albans	Ralph de Wodeburg
Gerard de Fane-court		

---

of the political swindle involving the young Earl of Derby, to cite an important example, was Henry's son Edmund.<sup>2</sup> When the prince took possession of Robert's extensive holdings in Derby, Somerset, and elsewhere he was conceivably aware of the protection forthcoming from the crown within a year. Roger de Leyburn had gained the thirteen manors of Henry Fitz Aucher along

---

1.

Documentation of these holdings may be confirmed through numerous entries in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, passim; see also Knights of Edward I, passim.

2.

Flores, iii, pp. 11-12. See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 524-25.

with Peter de Montfort's hall in Westminster. Thomas de Clare held another manor of Peter de Montfort. Hamo le Strange possessed properties belonging to rebel Londoners. William de Valence had been granted manors of Henry de la Mare before the Dictum of Kennilworth could take effect. Roger de Clifford had gained many lands in Leicestershire and Warwickshire.<sup>1</sup>

Examples of royalist crusaders benefitting from grants of essoin are also notable. One such case involved Luke de Tany, a close friend of the Lord Edward and his seneschal in Gascony after the crusade. This royalist Lord had summarily executed a number of captives taken at Evesham. Yet his case was suspended when it was learned he was sailing for the Holy Land, and proceedings were eventually dropped later amid the confusion resulting from the Welsh wars.<sup>2</sup> It is likely that Robert de Ferrers faced the same delays in court with regard to his claims against Edmund and his accomplices.<sup>3</sup>

A final note concerning the possible benefits of

---

1. See Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, passim; See also Powicke, loc. cit.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 442.

3. See Powicke, p. 525.

crusade privileges to those gaining new possessions as a result of the civil chaos of 1264-1267 involves permission granted by Church and State to mortgage lands or possessions in order to raise funds for the pilgrimage overseas. Such privileges were commonly accepted by grateful crusaders whose budgets might otherwise have prohibited such crusading, and will be discussed at length in a later chapter dealing with finance.<sup>1</sup> One must allow for the possibility, however, that such a privilege was open to abuse during the papal vacancy of 1268-1271. There appears to have been no legal restraint, for example, placed upon crusaders mortgaging property or possessions as yet unrestored to former rebels. Examples of such activity may be seen in the sale or lease of rebel lands by Thomas de Clare, Eustace Balliol and Robert Charles.<sup>2</sup> Such dealings on a lower political level may well account for a strong warning issued by Pope Gregory X in September 1274. He commanded that all crusaders who had not fulfilled existing vows should be prepared to set forth for the Holy Land immediately.<sup>3</sup> In

---

1. See below, pp. 348-54.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 434, 441, 474.

3. Pope Gregory X, Register ed. J. Guiraud, No. 539.

England a scramble to redeem vows and commute them through money payments resulted. In the archdiocese of York, for example, no fewer than 300 persons were on record for purchases of crusade redemption in 1274-1275.<sup>1</sup>

It may be seen, then, that while proof of political motivation among English crusaders is lacking, evidence points to the fact that advantages were readily available for those, particularly among royalist adherents, who took the cross with the Lord Edward. The effect of these advantages, due in part to the papal vacancy which may have caused agencies of the crown to become responsible for crusade privileges, may be related to Edward's own position as a crusading commander in 1268-1272. On one hand, such royal authority over privilege and protection may have meant a greater degree of control by Edward over those of his adherents benefiting from them. On the other hand, however, it may be seen that many potential crusaders succeeded in avoiding the fulfillment of their commitments due to diminishing clerical authority during the long papal vacancy. This lack of control from Rome may either have weakened or

---

1.

Walter Giffard, Register, ed. W. Brown (Surtees Society, 109), pp. 277-81.

strengthened Edward's ability to recruit an effective crusade force by 1270 and 1271. Following the notion of royal guarantees of crusading protection or privilege, however, it is clear that these advantages offered alone were hardly enough to bind elements of the baronage to Edward's crusade.

b. recruitment for the success of crusade and the safety of the realm.

By 1270, the Lord Edward had made substantial efforts to enlist the full support of major baronial leaders for his new crusade. Such recruitment involved assurances that English lords would personally accompany himself or Edmund when they left the realm in August or in February or March the following year. Two motives behind such a policy of recruitment are obvious: the success of military operations on crusade and the safety of the realm resulting from the absence of important baronial trouble-makers who would be with the princes.

Gaining such assurances, however, was expensive and arduous. It soon became apparent, for example, that royalist adherents and personal friends of the prince required financial aid from the crown before

they could be induced to leave on crusade.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence in 1269 and 1270 baronial leaders signed contracts in which Edward guaranteed a specific sum for crusading expenses and these individual knights and their retainers agreed to serve under his command. One example of such a contract with Adam de Gesemue in 1270 illustrates the commitment undertaken:

. . . know that I have agreed with the Lord Edward. . . to go with him to the Holy Land, accompanied by four knights, and to remain in his service for a whole year to commence at the coming voyage in September.<sup>2</sup>

In return for this avowal of military service, the Lord Edward seems to have paid a flat rate of one hundred marks each to Adam and to all four of his knights. Similar provisions were signed with Edmund and fifteen other barons, together with their retainers.<sup>3</sup>

By far the most important English leader whom

---

1. See below, pp. 332-35.

2. Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22; reprinted and translated from the French in H.G. Richardson and G.O. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England, pp. 463-65.

3. Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, loc. cit.; contracts were negotiated with Henry of Almain, Roger de Leyburn, Brian de Brompton, Roger de Clifford, Robert de Munteny, William Fitz Warin, Thomas de Clare, Adam de Monte Alto, William de Huntercumbe, Walter de Percy, William de Valence, Richard de LaRochele, Payne de Chaworth, Robert Tybetot, and Hamo le Strange. See below, pp. 332-35.

Edward endeavoured to enlist was the twenty-four year old Earl of Gloucester, Gilbert de Clare. Although Gilbert had taken the cross at Northampton in 1268, it remained of vital importance for Edward to pin the powerful lord to a contract ensuring his personal attendance with the English forces leaving in 1270.<sup>1</sup> In this case, however, the task of the prince seems to have been complicated by mutual feelings of animosity. Since 1262, when Gilbert had suddenly inherited one of the most powerful lordships in England, clashes had seemed imminent. Edward's major English landholdings bordered upon Gilbert's domains in Gloucestershire and Prince Llewelyn's lands to the west. Encompassing the marcher holdings of Roger de Clifford and Roger Mortimer, this area had traditionally been a center of baronial intrigue and jealousy. There is further evidence that strained relations between Gilbert and the Lord Edward may have transcended politics. One English chronicler wrote of a suspected affair between Edward and Earl Gilbert's wife.<sup>2</sup>

Perhaps because of these feelings, Gilbert openly refused to attend a crusading council in London during

---

1. Thomas Wykes, p. 218.

2. Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 203.

the summer of 1269, saying that the Lord Edward ". . . wished him ill."<sup>1</sup> More signs that the earl would prove difficult regarding the matter of attendance on crusade were evident in his refusals to attend the Paris conference in August.<sup>2</sup> In February 1270 Gilbert personally visited King Louis in France concerning his departure with the crusaders. He returned, however, "refusing to accede to the French king's advice."<sup>3</sup> Gilbert's apparent rejection of proposals delivered by this influential crusader gives some indication of his firm resolve to follow an independent course of action. The earl's hostility toward Edward's proposals for the crusade continued during the prince's final preparations for departure. In the

---

1.

Thomas Wykes, p. 228.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 481. It is not clear, however, whether the Earl of Gloucester had in fact been invited to Paris.

3.

Gervase of Canterbury, "Continuation," pp. 249-50. It is clear that the earl had gone to Paris to discuss matters of crusade from his request for royal protection for one of his adherents on 20 February 1270:

"Because the king desires that the business of the cross, on which account Edward his son and G. de Clare, earl of Gloucester, are going to the King of France, should be promoted with all desires (totis desideriiis) and the said earl has requested the king to give licence for William de Monte Canisso to cross to the king of France with him; the King by these presents gives licence to the said William as requested."

(Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 410).

spring of 1270 Gilbert refused to attend another crusading parliament, excusing himself until letters of safe-conduct were issued to him and until an agreement had been drafted on the whole matter of his crusade vow.<sup>1</sup> So serious had the breach become that Richard of Cornwall was called in to mediate a settlement.

Edward's uncle attacked the matter with typical thoroughness and speed. By 7 June he had worked out the details and could present them for the approval of the two lords. Earl Gilbert was to receive 2,000 marks upon his departure from England for the Holy Land. This sum was to be increased to 8,000 marks if the earl would personally accompany the Lord Edward, instead of departing on crusade independently. Should Gilbert decide to crusade with Edward, he might also receive a suitable ship for his passage. The prince's obligation remained simply to pay the sums mentioned and to leave on crusade before September 1270. As additional insurance, both parties were to submit to a penalty of 20,000 marks for breaking the agreement, and Gilbert was provisionally to surrender

---

1.

Thomas Wykes, p. 231; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 369.

his castles of Tunbridge and Henley. These would be returned to him ". . . when it is known he is on the Greek Sea." Gilbert's lands and possessions were to receive royal protection, but only if he had left the kingdom by March 1271. Additional penalties of excommunication were added by the bishops of the realm in a separate document to further ensure that the agreement might be kept.<sup>1</sup>

Earl Gilbert promptly rejected certain terms of the settlement as ambiguous, but finally ratified the document at Reading on 17 June.<sup>2</sup> When another crusading parliament met during the summer the earl was at last present, although there remained "many disputes" between him and the Lord Edward concerning the crusade.<sup>3</sup> In August the earl returned to the West to prepare his own passage at a later date, and the possibility that he intended to leave with Edmund in 1271 cannot be ruled out altogether. The fact remains, however, that Gilbert never left

---

1.

Reprinted in Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (Rolls Series 61), pp. 27-32. It is interesting to note the overt threat by royal authorities to withdraw the crusade privilege of protection in the event of Gilbert's failure to leave on his pilgrimage. See above, pp. 102.

2.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 232-33.

3.

"Chronica maiorum," p. 122.

England on crusade, and does not seem to have been penalized for breaking Richard of Cornwall's agreement.<sup>1</sup> On 11 October 1270 his important new castle at Caerphilly was suddenly attacked and destroyed by Llewelyn of Wales. Open warfare broke out in the West and no more is heard in English records about the Earl of Gloucester's crusade vow.<sup>2</sup>

The Lord Edward may have been anxious to secure peace in his continental possessions through the same careful policies of recruitment he had used in England. Royal influence in southern France was vulnerable in the late thirteenth century. Seneschals in Gascony had traditionally encountered difficulties in securing the allegiance of proud and independent vassals of the Duke of Aquitaine.<sup>3</sup> Gascon revenues had more than once proved valuable to the English crown during the recent civil disturbances and it is evident that Edward intended to use Gascon taxation in order to finance many purchases on crusade.<sup>4</sup> The prince was therefore determined to secure the peaceful and

---

1. See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 579-81.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 234-36. See Powicke, loc. cit.

3. See F.M. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307, pp. 108-13, 274-80.

4. See below, pp. 377.

uninterrupted collection of revenues in his Duchy of Aquitaine and to ensure that the more independent vassals in southern France accompanied him on crusade to the East.

Chief among the dangers Edward faced in France was the independence of Gaston, Count of Béarn. In 1269 Edward strengthened his future allegiance through the double means of a marriage alliance and the use of French influence to encourage him to accompany the new crusade. Gaston's daughter Constance was married in that year to Henry of Almain. Henry was a cousin of the English prince; he stood to inherit extensive possessions in Cornwall and elsewhere, and enjoyed the prestige of a father who was a noted crusader, diplomat, and newly-elected King of the Romans; for the Count of Béarn, therefore, the marriage may have represented a major political achievement. To Edward, however, the marriage may have meant short-term success for his policy of linking English and Gascon aims. Benefitting from his position as son-in-law of the Gascon count Henry was later to be sent to administer Edward's continental possessions, although it is unlikely that such an assignment was considered before Edward learned of domestic trouble in March

1271.<sup>1</sup>

Of similar importance to Edward was the enlistment of Gascons in his crusade force during 1269. Largely through the agency of the French crown, the Count of Béarn was committed to accompany the new expedition in August, after receiving a loan of 25,000 livres of Tournois.<sup>2</sup> It is important to point out that Gaston was promised in Paris an amount equal to half the sum loaned to Edward himself before he would agree to accompany the crusade in person. Like Earl Gilbert de Clare, however, the Count of Béarn did not leave on crusade in 1270 or 1271. Edward remained in possession of the full 75,000 livres loaned by King Louis to both crusaders and continued alone to the East.<sup>3</sup> As the prince had feared, moreover, Gaston stubbornly resisted royal agents during Edward's absence and was engaged in open rebellion upon his return from crusade in 1273.<sup>4</sup>

1.

Thomas Wykes (pp. 239-40) specifically alluded to Henry being given instructions to govern Aquitaine in Edward's absence. For the marriage of Henry and Constance, see Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 583-84.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 481.

3.

See below, pp. 377.

4.

See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 614 ff.

The two major agreements designed to bring potential trouble-makers in England and Gascony along on the crusade were thus broken by 1271, revealing the political difficulties Edward continually encountered with regard to the peace of the realm. Perhaps in anticipation of many of these problems, Edward appears to have supplemented his recruitment policies by establishing a strong caretaker government in the form of an advisory panel to assist his father and Richard of Cornwall. In August 1270 he appointed four administrators to care for his lands and estates during his absence and to assist Richard of Cornwall in their capacity as royal counselors. In addition, they were to supervise the collection and distribution of crusade funds to the prince overseas. In 1270 this council included Walter Giffard, Archbishop of York and trusted friend of the royal family, who was assisted by Roger Mortimer, Philip Basset and Robert Walraven.<sup>1</sup> These powerful Marcher Lords were apparently capable of containing military threats from the Prince of Wales or Gilbert de Clare if necessary, while Archbishop Walter Giffard seems to have been chosen to administer the collection of crusade

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 484.

twentieths and to secure clerical support for the crown. Edward's own attempt to promote the election of his chancellor Robert Burnell as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1270 perhaps represents an extension of the policy of ensuring the loyalty of the English clergy.<sup>1</sup> After failing to secure Robert's appointment, the prince replaced Robert Walraven with his chancellor Robert on the executive council of four.<sup>2</sup>

England without Edward proved difficult to govern, as events during 1270 and 1271 demonstrate. It is apparent that the prince himself expressed misgivings in Sicily and made it known that the death of his father or an immediate threat of civil war would be sufficient to bring him home quickly.<sup>3</sup> Of primary concern to both Edward and his council assisting Richard of Cornwall was the physical condition of King Henry and the growing danger implicit in Gilbert de Clare's reluctance to leave on crusade. By early February 1271 it had become obvious that news of Edmund's imminent departure and rumours of the

---

1.

See above, pp. 37-38.

2.

Thomas Wykes, p. 236; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 650; Historical Letters from Northern Registers, p. 39.

3.

See above, pp. 48-49.

king's ill-health might touch off serious rebellion. Richard accordingly dispatched an appeal to Sicily on 6 February, recommending that the crusade be abandoned until the safety of the realm could be guaranteed.<sup>1</sup> Edward, as we have seen, replied by sending Henry of Almain back to the West. It is possible that Edmund's slowness in reaching Acre after his departure in late February or early March was due to his desire to remain available for a time in France should a further crisis develop.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout March and April 1271 Richard and his advisors encountered mounting difficulty. On 18 March it became necessary to issue mandates to local authorities to prevent local gatherings, for fear of possible conspiracies.<sup>3</sup> It is possible that the passing of Earl Gilbert's deadline in March to sail on crusade was behind many of these fears although little may be discovered from the sources. In any event, the recovery of King Henry seems to have led to a diminishing of tension and by the end of April he seems to have been able to carry out his few

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 487.

2.

Edmund did not arrive in the East until six months after his departure. See above, pp. 51, 61, 67.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 596.

remaining duties and to remain a visible sign of royal authority.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the remainder of 1271 Edward's council seems to have administered the realm with no more domestic trouble.

This return of equilibrium in England appears to have ushered in a period of strong effective administration by the council. The death of Richard of Cornwall in April 1272, followed by that of Philip Basset soon after, resulted in no domestic crisis. Ultimately, even the death in November of the King failed to shake the firm control of the remaining members of the council. Earl Gilbert de Clare, in fact, was the first to swear allegiance to the new King Edward.<sup>2</sup> Undoubtedly, news that the prince was in Italy on his return from crusade may have prevented any trouble, while Edmund and several other important crusaders arrived in December and January to further guarantee stability.<sup>3</sup> Edward's long absence with important allies and future administrators had resulted in only minor domestic insecurity, in spite of his initial failure to bind two powerful lords to

---

<sup>1</sup> Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 531, 574. Henry's authority seems to have remained very slight, while his budget appears to have been cut relentlessly in an effort to raise more money for Edward in the East. See below, pp. 357-58.

<sup>2</sup> See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 586 ff.

<sup>3</sup> "Chronica maiorum," p. 156.

his expedition or to personally continue the task of reconciliation and legal settlement in the aftermath of civil war. In the spring of 1274 he could return to his coronation at the head of a tested circle of friends and associates who had shared valuable experiences on crusade and who would in time assume important duties in his royal administration.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

See Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 698-712.

3. Edward's political relations on crusade.

In August 1270 the Lord Edward left England at the head of a crusading army to join forces already in northern Africa. He wore the respected sign of a crusader; he enjoyed the prestige of an alliance with King Louis of France and his cordial relationship with Richard of Cornwall; he commanded respect as Duke of Aquitaine and heir to the throne of England; he was already recognized as an able military commander and had built a baronial party whose loyalty had been tempered through the civil wars. Yet throughout the period Edward was politically active in Africa and the Latin East he encountered mounting difficulty establishing his influence in affairs vital to the success of English crusading objectives. He seemed powerless to challenge the decisions of Charles of Anjou and Philip III of France in 1270; he was apparently rebuffed in attempts to control the trade in armaments to the Muslims; his objections to the truce of April 1272 were overruled; and his own English crusaders departed independently after showing signs of wavering allegiance as early as 1270.

It is important in view of these apparent developments to examine in some detail the legal and political position of the Lord Edward on crusade prior

to his return through Italy in November 1272. It will be helpful to divide such a study into five sections, each outlining Edward's relationship with various elements within his own forces or in the Latin East. Under examination will be his position with regard to the English and Breton crusaders; his authority in canon law during the papal vacancy and in the absence of legates in Tunis and Jerusalem; his influence with leaders of the Military Orders in Latin Syria; his power over affairs touching the crown and subjects of the Kingdom of Jerusalem; and his authority over the barons of Cyprus. In approaching each of these relationships, Edward's legal position will be treated where relevant before proceeding to a discussion of his political or military influence. In a final section implications for English policies following Edward's return from crusade will be suggested, carrying further Sir Maurice Powicke's observation that "The importance of his crusade . . . lies . . . in what he saw and learned; and the state of affairs in Cyprus and cities on the Syrian coast must have taught him a great deal."<sup>1</sup>

---

1. Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, p. 604.

a. The English and Breton crusaders.

By the time of his departure from England in 1270, Edward had secured the promises of at least seventeen major barons in the realm and Brittany to ". . . go with him to the Holy Land . . . and to remain in his service for a whole year to commence at the coming voyage."<sup>1</sup> The prince had agreed in return to provide them with water and transport as far as the theatre of military operations.<sup>2</sup> It is clear from these contracts that individual knights accompanying the seventeen barons would be ultimately responsible to the Lord Edward and that their passages would be financed by him also. The total number so committed to such crusading service appears to be 105 although it is always possible that some individual contracts have been lost or destroyed.<sup>3</sup> Edward's obligation to finance these knights on crusade seems to have only extended to payment for transport, although one claim of restor, the lord's

---

1.

Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22. See above, pp. 103-104

2.

For a discussion of Edward's financial responsibilities, see below, pp. 332-35.

3.

See the list below, pp. 394 ff.

obligation to replace horses lost on campaigns in his service, was accepted by him in 1273.<sup>1</sup>

Edward's legal powers and responsibilities with regard to his own forces were outlined in King Louis's provisions of August, 1269. While the prince was required to serve the king of France ". . . in the same way as any of his other barons," he was to retain full jurisdiction over his own followers. Offences committed by English or Breton crusaders travelling through the lands of Christian princes or directed against other crusaders in northern Africa were to be tried by Edward, who was to undertake responsibility for their punishment.<sup>2</sup> An example of this jurisdiction may be found in Charles of Anjou's written recognition of Edward's right to judge cases involving his own crusaders while in Sicily during the period from November 1270 to April 1271.<sup>3</sup> Edward seems also to have been responsible for the protection

---

1.

Close rolls, 1272-1279, p. 100. See below, pp. On the payment of restor and the importance of replacing valuable mounts on crusade, see J. Richard, Le royaume latin de Jérusalem, p. 86, and Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 318-19.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 481.

3.

Foedera, i, p. 487.

of his followers as seen in John of Brittany's claims in 1273. At that time the Earl of Richmond sought retribution for an attack upon him and his crusaders travelling down the Rhone in 1270.<sup>1</sup>

Edward's power over his English and Gascon crusaders was nevertheless dependent upon circumstances beyond the scope of Louis's agreement or the individual contracts with his followers. It is important to remember that the influence of a strong and able military leader who was at the same time heir to the English throne would have been powerful among crusaders recruited largely from royalist adherents and former friends. His delegation of local responsibility to Henry of Almain in 1271 provides one example of his ability to detach crusading captains and their contingents on business involving English or Gascon affairs. As a result, it is never clear what powers were exercised by Edward's companions like Henry and John of Brittany, both of whom led separate forces in 1270.<sup>2</sup> Secondly, Edward's ability to finance affairs far beyond the scope of baronial budgets may also have been an important factor in his

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 504.

2.

See above, pp. 36-37, 39.

control of the English and Breton crusaders.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps as a result of these factors the prince on several occasions revealed a substantial degree of authority over his forces. In 1271, for example, he ordered Edmund of Cornwall to return to England with the body of Henry of Almain, prohibiting him from continuing to the Holy Land.<sup>2</sup> In the summer of 1271 Edward delegated English crusaders to lead an embassy to the Mongol leader "Camaker."<sup>3</sup> Finally, on 16 June 1272, the prince seems to have commanded an oath of fealty to his wife and absent son when it was feared he might not recover from the assassin's wounds.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of his obvious political advantages, however, it is clear that in some respects his authority over his followers was limited. During the winter of 1270-1271, for example, Edward seems to have found it necessary to deliver an impassioned plea

---

1.

On Edward's intercession on behalf of his barons in need of loans in the East, see below, pp. 336, 379.

2.

Thomas Wykes, pp. 243-44.

3.

"Chronica maiorum," p. 143. See below, pp. 240-41.

4.

Walter of Guisborough (pp. 209-10) seems to have mistakenly reported Edmund's presence at this time. Edward was reported to have administered the oath to former rebel John de Vesci as well.

to many crusaders in order to enlist their support for a continuation of the journey to Acre.<sup>1</sup> His brother Edmund apparently felt little restraint in leaving Edward's crusade force in May 1272.<sup>2</sup> Also, the arrival in London of Thomas de Clare reportedly leading four Muslim captives reveals an element of baronial independence on crusade.<sup>3</sup>

#### b. The Church

Of primary significance is the question of Edward's status as a crusader during the papal vacancy of 1268-1271. It can be seen immediately, for example, that he arrived in Acre during May 1271 at the head of a force determined to continue crusading activity after the original expedition had been abandoned in Tunis the year before; the legate appointed to accompany the African crusade had died in 1270, and it appears as though the authority of such a legatus a latere had anyway lapsed with the death of

---

1. William Rishanger, Chronica, p. 67-68.

2. "Eracles," p. 462. See above, pp. 85.

3. Flores, iii, p. 23.

Pope Clement IV in November 1268;<sup>1</sup> a new legate could not be appointed until a new pope had been chosen;<sup>2</sup> even the Patriarch of Jerusalem, holding authority as legatus natus in the kingdom, had died before 21 April 1270 and might not be replaced until Pope Gregory X could be consecrated in February 1272.<sup>3</sup>

The position of Edward or his followers in canon law during the years 1270 and 1271 was arguably obscured by the vacancy. Crusading vows taken in England prior to November 1268 were undoubtedly binding and the privileges of the Church were probably recognized. The status of those taking the cross after Pope Clement's death, however, may have been questionable. In the absence of any recognized papal legate with Edward's forces or in the Kingdom of

---

1.

The legate died in August, 1270 (Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 159-60). On the expiration of legatine authority, see F. Claeys-Bouvaert, "Légat du pape," Dictionnaire de droit canonique, vi, pp. 371-77; M. Villey, La croisade. Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique, pp. 132-33.

2.

Claeys-Bouvaert, "Légat du pape," loc. cit.

3.

See W. Hotzelt, Kirchengeschichte Palästinas im Zeitalter der Kreuzzüge 1099-1291, p. 219. The position of Thadaldo Visconti, former legate in England in 1267 and later elected Pope while in the East in 1271, is difficult to establish. A contemporary account written by the Polo brothers in Acre around 1269 described Thadaldo as "Legate for the whole Kingdom of Syria." See L. Gatto, Il Pontificato de Gregorio X, pp. 49-56.

Jerusalem, moreover, English crusaders might have had little defence against objections that they were interfering beyond their authority in Syrian affairs. It may be seen that leaders in the Latin settlement had occasionally raised such technicalities in the past. They had been quick to discredit the Emperor Frederick II on the basis of his previous excommunication for instance, when it had become apparent that he might threaten their political influence in Acre.<sup>1</sup>

While there is no direct evidence that such objections to Edward's diplomatic activities were raised, the implications of his dubious position are worth some attention. It is noteworthy that custom and usage allowed a crusading leader personally to possess territory and goods he had taken.<sup>2</sup> The Kingdom of Jerusalem itself was considered to be territory held by rights of conquest. Parts of it lost again to the Muslims might be possessed and dispensed by new crusaders when retaken.<sup>3</sup> Examples

---

1. "Eracles," p. 374-75; Historia diplomatice Frederici secundi, ed. J.L.A. de Huillard-Bréholles, iii, pp. 101 ff.

2. I am indebted to Dr. J.S.C. Riley-Smith for his introduction to this concept.

3. See examples in "Eracles," p. 389; Ernoul, Chronique d'Ernoul et de Bernard le Tresorier, ed. L'ide Mas Latrie, p. 449.

of this usage may be seen in the activity surrounding the recapture of Acre and the dispensation of conquered territory by King Richard I and Philip Augustus in 1191.<sup>1</sup> Richard of Cornwall's power over recaptured Ascalon is also illustrative of this practice.<sup>2</sup> Before his departure on crusade in 1248 King Louis IX wrote to the Sultan as-Salih, carrying his position in Latin Syrian and canon law perhaps to its limits:

You will be aware that I am the head of the Christian community, as I acknowledge that you are the head of the Mohammedan community . . . If this country falls into my hands, it will be mine as a gift . . . .<sup>3</sup>

Undoubtedly this concept enhanced the authority of a crusader upon his arrival in the East as a potential conqueror of new territory which he might then distribute to local political allies. King Louis, for example, reprimanded commanders of the Templars for their pursuit of a foreign policy that conflicted with his own.<sup>4</sup> Independent French embassies to the

---

1.

See Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, pp. 26-32.

2.

See S. Painter, "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, 1239-1241," History of the Crusades, ii, pp. 483-85.

3.

al-Maqrīzī, "Kitāb as-salūk fi Má'rifa ta'rīḥ al-Malūk," Arab Historians of the Crusades, ed. and Trans. F. Gabrielli (English Trans. J. Costello), pp. 300-01.

4.

See Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 182-83.

courts of the Mongols and Armenians also reflected Louis's authority on crusade.<sup>1</sup> While the strong position of leaders such as King Louis, King Richard I, and Richard of Cornwall may have been a result of factors beyond their status in Latin Syrian or canon law, it is still noteworthy that the Lord Edward may have enjoyed no such clear standing as a crusader. The risk of his rights regarding negotiations and possession of conquered territory being challenged in the East cannot be ruled out entirely as a factor bearing upon his political influence during 1270-1272.

c. The Military Orders.

As one might expect, Edward seems to have co-operated generally with leaders of the Military Orders on crusade, although contemporary accounts remain obscure regarding this relationship. Contingents from the Temple and Hospital in Acre reportedly accompanied Edward on campaigns toward St. George and Cacho.<sup>2</sup> Troops of the Teutonic Knights appear to have joined these forces on the Cacho expedition.<sup>3</sup> Advice

---

1.

See Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, p. 293 ff.

2.

Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 200; Marino Sanudo, p. 227. See above, pp. 65, 75-76.

3.

Marino Sanudo, p. 227.

seems to have been offered Edward in the face of Muslim advances upon Acre around June 1271, although conflicting evidence makes it impossible to establish if leaders in the Military Orders proposed a policy of attack or continued defence.<sup>1</sup> Finally, in the Plain of Sharon during November 1271 the English leader may have accepted military advice from advisors in the Military Orders, leading to the retreat from Cacho.<sup>2</sup>

In considering the truce signed by leaders of the Military Orders in April 1272 however, we are faced with Edward's objection to a foreign policy recommended by local commanders. In this context it must be pointed out that Hospitaller policy during this period tended to favour an active Mongol alliance, which Edward appears to have fostered through negotiations in 1272.<sup>3</sup> It is nonetheless

---

1.

Les Gestes des Chiprois (p. 200) reported commanders of the Military Orders in favour of attack in June. Menko, "Chronicon," (p. 557) reported advice to Edward involving military restraint.

2.

Flores, iii, p. 23. See above, pp. 79 n.

3.

See Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 103, 190, 194, 198-99.

apparent that recommendations from various leaders of the Orders in 1272 stressed the prince's financial and logistical inability to continue this military policy for long.<sup>1</sup>

Reasons for a close relationship between Edward and commanders of the Military Orders are not difficult to find. The prince's need for men and materials on crusade undoubtedly played a major role in this, as did his reliance upon the well-established communications network and influential embassies of the Military Orders in the East. More significantly, the ability of the Orders to finance sizeable loans during 1271 and 1272 may have increased Edward's dependence upon them during this period. The prince and his followers appear to have borrowed over £15,000 from the Hospitaliers and Templars, for example.<sup>2</sup> Finally, Edward's cordial relations with influential members of the Orders cannot be underestimated in this regard. A long correspondence, for example, continued through the 1270's with Hugh Revel, Nicholas Lorgne and Thomas Berard, all Masters of the Hospital or the Temple.<sup>3</sup> Joseph de Chauncy, treasurer of the

---

1.

Menko, "Chronicon," P. 558.

2. See below, pp. 379-80, 394 ff.

3. See below, pp. 229-34. According to Walter of Guisborough (pp. 209-10) Thomas Berard played an important role in supervising Edward's recovery from the assassin's attack in 1272. See above, pp. 83.

Hospital since 1248, may have been acquainted with the prince in Acre, for he returned to England in 1273 to become Edward's own treasurer until 1281.<sup>1</sup> Leaders and individuals in the English Order of St. Thomas the Martyr in Acre may also have played an important role in bringing Edward closer to the Templars and Hospitallers during 1271 and 1272.<sup>2</sup>

d. The crown and subjects of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

The relationship between Edward and his chief allies outside the Military Orders in Acre is a complex one which bears analysis from several stand-points. From a military point of view, the prince's ability to achieve success in the field was dependent upon good relations with King Hugh and the "men of Acre," who accompanied the expeditions toward St. George and Cacho. Edward's concern that trading in armaments should not jeopardize military campaigning required his diplomatic approach to Jerusalemite subjects in the Venetian Quarter of Acre.

Diplomatically, Edward's authority to carry out

---

1.

See Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 312.

2.

For a discussion of Edward's relationship with this order after 1272, see below, pp. 273-76. It is important to note that the Order of St. Thomas seems to have maintained close ties with the Templars (below, pp. 273-74, 275).

negotiations with independent commanders beyond Syria was of great strategic importance to the Latin rulers of Jerusalem and Tripoli. His exclusion from the treaty signed at Caesarea in 1272 demonstrates a significant breach of crusading privilege, and illustrates a further aspect of the prince's legal and political relationship with authorities in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

Three incidents help to determine what was the attitude of Edward on crusade in Acre. In the first of these, the prince appears to have reprimanded nominal subjects of the King of Jerusalem for openly trading with Muslims in Alexandria:

Edward . . . was greatly provoked at the Venetians, who at that time had sent only one ship to Alexandria. But Philip Beligno, the bailli of the Venetians, produced the privileges conceded to Venice by the King of Jerusalem and thus restored tranquility.<sup>1</sup>

English sources alone reported that Edward assumed the authority to punish the Venetians himself.<sup>2</sup>

Venetian or Syrian documents throw little light upon the specific nature of the privileges produced before the prince in 1271. It may be suggested, however,

---

1. Andrew Dandolo, p. 318.

2. Flores, iii, p. 21.

that Philip the bailli presented written evidence that the Venetians held rights in Acre to unload or transfer merchandise obtained in Muslim markets. Marsillius Giorgius described such agreements in the mid-thirteenth century:

. . . if any Venetian wishes to travel to Damascus or to any other territory of the Muslims and buy merchandise which he brings back to the port of Acre . . . he must pay 9 besants and 7 carats for every 100 besants of its value. And if he wishes to carry it on to Venice, he pays 4 besants and 4 carats for every 100 besants . . .<sup>1</sup>

It was perhaps made clear by the bailli that port taxes were augmented by Venetian trade, including traffic in arms and provisions, with Muslim merchants. In any case, Edward seems to have ceased further attempts to exert his authority over subjects of the King of Jerusalem in Acre.

Two additional matters shed some light upon the English crusader's conduct in foreign affairs from his base in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem. It is apparent from the letter dispatched by representatives

---

<sup>1</sup>. See Marsillius's Report, Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante, ed. G.L.F. Tafel and G.M. Thomas, ii, no. 300, pp. 397-98.

of the Khan Abagha in September 1271 that English initiative had played an important role in securing the Mongol alliance so important to the Franks.<sup>1</sup> The continuation of English negotiations after Mamluk truces with the Franks and Mongols had been signed in 1272 points to Edward's determination to revive the alliance in spite of peace terms already ratified by his allies in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup> His outspoken objections to these terms signed by King Hugh form the basis for perhaps the most important reflection of Edward's assertion of authority in Acre. Compared to treaties concluded in 1268 and 1283, the provisions of April 1272 seem to have applied to a small amount of territory.<sup>3</sup> The loss of Jerusalemite possessions around Scandelion had most probably resulted from the Mamluk destruction of Montfort in May-June 1271, while the few Latin gains southeast of Acre may have been due in part to

---

1. "Chronica maiorum," p. 143. See also Marino Sanudo, p. 224.

2. Walter of Guisborough, p. 208.

3. See the map on p. 135. The terms of the 1272 truce may be studied in Ibn-al-Furāt (pp. 157-58) and in al-Ainī (p. 247). For the provisions of treaties signed in 1268 and in 1283, see Ibn al-Furāt, pp. and Ibn 'Abd az-Zahir, Tashrif, 69r-85v, in Arab Historians of the Crusades, pp. 327-28.





FIG 2. Division of territory according to the provisions of the truce of July, 1268 (A) and those of the truce of April 1272 (B).

Edward's military activity in July and November. Of critical significance, however, is the fact that any terms which may have gained territory for the Franks were concluded over the objections of the crusader who may have been partially responsible for them.<sup>1</sup>

Of further significance in the relationship between the Lord Edward and authorities in the Kingdom of Jerusalem is the marriage in 1271 or 1272 of his companion Hamo le Strange to the heiress of Beirut, Isabella of Ibelin. Wed previously to King Hugh II of Cyprus, she represented the King of Jerusalem's richest political gift - since the Lordship of Beirut was the chief lay-fief in Jerusalem and King Hugh maintained rights of wardship over its heiress. Together with the appointment of John de Grailly as King Hugh's Seneschal in the kingdom, Hamo's introduction into the baronage of Jerusalem indicates some sort of favourable relationship between English crusaders and the king.<sup>2</sup> Cordial relations between Hamo le Strange and the King of Jerusalem did not long

---

1.

Ibn-al-Furāt, p. 159 ; Menko, "Chronicon," p. 558.

2.

For John de Grailly's post as Seneschal, see "Eracles," p. 463; Marino Sanudo, p. 225.

endure, however. Fearing the reversion of his fief to the Jerusalemite crown, Hamo made provision shortly before his death in 1273 for its protection by Sultan Baybars himself. When King Hugh attempted to seize the widow and her lordship, Baybars and the Templars forced him to recognize Isabella's independent rights in Beirut.<sup>1</sup>

In concluding it must be pointed out that we possess no comprehensive accounts of political affairs in Acre during Edward's crusade and that relatively few conclusions may therefore be drawn regarding his influence in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Clearly the prince attempted on several occasions to exert authority: he openly expressed his objections to Venetian trading practices and to the truce signed at Casesarea in April 1272; he seems to have taken the lead in negotiations with the Mongols and to have continued these diplomatic relations after a truce had been ratified by his Jerusalemite allies; his influence may even have resulted in the appointment of John de Grailly as Seneschal of Jerusalem and in the marriage of Hamo le Strange to Isabella of Beirut.

---

1.

Details of Hamo's political career in the Latin East may be followed in "Eracles," p. 462. See also Grousset, iii, p. 666 ff.

On the other hand, Edward's inability to win the diplomatic arguments he raised reveals an inadequate political position in Acre: the bailli in 1271 quickly produced support for the Venetians and Edward seemed content to remain silent; his objections to the 1272 treaty seem to have been tacitly ignored. In addition, Hamo le Strange eventually feared the authority of King Hugh to the extent that he negotiated a protective settlement with the Sultan of Egypt. On the basis of this evidence it may be suggested that Edward found little opportunity to exert real political influence over the king and subjects of Jerusalem, perhaps as a result of undisclosed factors such as his dubious status as a crusader during the papal vacancy or his limited authority over elements within his own command. It is only in the matter of his relationship with the crown and baronage of Cyprus that any indications of Edward's political influence in Latin Syria clearly appear.

e. The crown and subjects of the Kingdom of Cyprus.

As we have seen, Edward became involved in the complexities of a case regarding Cypriot service in

the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1271.<sup>1</sup> The prince's theoretical and practical influence in determining the military obligations of the barons of Cyprus is difficult to trace, since Latin Syrian and English accounts are in conflict over vital points. It is apparent from contemporary Eastern documents that Edward was called upon to give an opinion as to the explicit nature of Jerusalemite law regarding the feudal service of Cypriot knights within the Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>2</sup> It is not clear at what time or under what circumstances the dispute arose. There is, however, no mention in contemporary accounts of the Cypriot knights campaigning in the Kingdom of Jerusalem prior to November 1271. King Hugh himself seems to have accompanied the chevauchée toward St. George in July with vassals and subjects of the Kingdom of Jerusalem only.<sup>3</sup> By November the barons

---

1.

See above, pp. 67-71.

2.

See "Document relatif au Service militaire," RHC Lois, ii, pp. 423-34. It is made clear in the course of debate that this case was held in Acre to decide the nature of Jerusalemite usage. An understanding seems to have precluded this case in that both parties asserted that Cypriot usage tended to parallel that of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

3.

See above, pp. 64-66.

of Cyprus had apparently arrived and were present on the Cacho expedition.<sup>1</sup> Further evidence that the question of service was debated and resolved some time between July and November can be found in the chronicle of Walter of Guisborough, which remains the most detailed English account of the affair. After describing the November raid toward Cacho, Walter recorded that:

Meanwhile, the King of Jerusalem had arrived [and] he sent for [his] barons in Cyprus, that they should hasten to the aid of the Christians. At this they would not come, saying they did not wish to leave their country . . . . (emphasis added)<sup>2</sup>

While absolute dating is still difficult from this account, it appears as if the dispute arose prior to the departure for Cacho.

The fullest account of the legal proceedings held in Acre may be found in a brief transcript of the arguments presented to Edward. It appears from this that King Hugh and James of Ibelin each presented his view of the existing custom and usage of the kingdom ". . . in the presence of my Lord Edward, who now is King of England, when he was in Acre."<sup>3</sup> It is evident from the document that Edward's reconnaissance

---

1.

See above, pp. 75-76

2.

Walter of Guisborough, p. 208.

3.

"Document relatif au service militaire," p. 424.

was sought before a final interpretation might be requested from the High Court of Jerusalem. Some of the political implications of Edward's position will be outlined after a discussion of the case itself.

The arguments of King Hugh and his Cypriot vassal James of Ibelin rested primarily upon precedent and it seems likely that no written law concerning the technicality under consideration existed. The king's case for demanding service beyond Cyprus was built upon evidence that previous Cypriot monarchs had rightfully received such service upon command. Pointing out that Cypriot service on the mainland and elsewhere overseas was obligatory providing the king paid baronial expenses for transport, horses, and maintenance during the campaign, king Hugh concluded an impressive list of campaigns in which service had been successfully claimed with two examples of Cypriot vassals who had been deprived of their fiefs because of their absence in Syria without royal permission.

James of Ibelin substantiated King Hugh's list of campaigns which had taken the Cypriot barons from the island. On one vital point, however, he rested his case: That service in Jerusalem, Syria, Armenia,

Rhodes, Egypt and elsewhere had always been voluntary, and that no King of Cyprus had received knight-service overseas in an obligatory feudal sense. Reciting the king's examples of precedent, James argued that the baronage had offered military aid to crusaders and to allied mainland lords. ". . . for the Glory of God against the enemies of the Cross." Concerning the king's list of precedent, James remarked ironically that

We could also prove with certainty by the witness of persons still alive, that the vassals of Cyprus served outside the kingdom the house of Ibelin more often than my lord the King or his ancestors, so that if usage could make them subject to serve, by the same right the House of Ibelin could make the same demands of them as my lord the King.<sup>1</sup>

Edward's resolution of these differing interpretations of Jerusalemite usage and custom is impossible to determine. His juridical authority, as we have seen, apparently extended only as far as his recommendations for the guidance of a future court. The decision of that court in 1273, however, may indicate to a large degree many of the points made by Edward two years earlier. At that time it

---

1. "Document relatif au service militaire," pp. 434, 425-34. On the whole dispute, see G.F. Hill, A History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 168-70; J. LaMonte, Feudal Monarchy, pp. 131-32.

was decided that custom and usage within the Kingdom of Jerusalem dictated that service beyond Cyprus could be demanded of the baronage there for four months of the year. Feudal service outside the island remained at the king's expense, and he was required to lead the baronial contingents in person or through his son. The royal bailli or other representatives could not assume command. Of particular importance with regard to this final judgement is the fact that Edward's associate John de Grailly presided over the court in 1273 as Seneschal of the Kingdom and may have been influential in the final decision.<sup>1</sup>

One important piece of contradictory evidence, however, remains to be discussed in relation to Edward's theoretical position in the dispute over Cypriot service. Walter of Guisborough stated that

. . . Edward sent for them [Cypriots] that they should come at his request to serve in that part [of the East]. And they came continuously with many troops, saying that they would hold to his command as they had been ruled by his ancestors in their own land, and that they ought always to be faithful to the kings of England.<sup>2</sup>

There is no other evidence that Edward issued a

---

1. "Eracles," p. 463; Marino Sanudo, p. 225.

2. Walter of Guisborough, p. 208.

formal request in Cyprus on the basis of his descent from Richard Lionheart. The complete absence of proper documentation or of subsequent mention of the incident in Syrian chronicles seems sufficient grounds for concluding that legal grounds for such a request were never seriously claimed or considered in the Latin East. Support for a theoretical English overlordship, however, continued into the fourteenth century in the West and may have prevailed in many quarters of Britain in 1271. Edward III revived the claim, though without elaborating upon its basis, in connection with a proposed crusade with the King of Aragon in 1362. The English king at that time asserted that if Peter recovered Jerusalem, Cyprus should be given to him by right. The question of English suzerainty over Cyprus was raised again in 1516 and in 1522.<sup>1</sup>

Edward's authority in 1271 regarding service from the barons of Cyprus might have been strengthened by two legal assumptions. First, his right of inheritance might be claimed on the grounds that his grand-uncle Richard was never legally deprived of the island due to the confused sale and re-sale involving

---

1.

See Hill, History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 68-69, 326.

Guy of Lusignan, Henry of Champagne and the Templars.<sup>1</sup> This appears to have been the basis for Walter of Guiseborough's statement that the men of Cyprus "ought always to be faithful to the King of England."<sup>2</sup> Secondly, it might have been asserted in 1271 that King Aimery's agreement in 1195<sup>AD</sup> placed Cyprus under the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Emperor, and that as nephew of the titular King of the Romans the Lord Edward might in some way claim to be his representative. English claims on this basis, however, seem legally untenable. Although the Emperor Frederick II was recognized as suzerain,<sup>3</sup> Pope Innocent IV in 1247 formally absolved the king and baronage of Cyprus from King Aimery's bargain, presumably destroying any precedent English advisors might have considered viable in 1271.<sup>4</sup>

---

1. See Hill, History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 67-69.

2. Walter of Guiseborough, p. 208.

3. It is difficult to relate this to the question of service on the mainland. The evidence in 1228 (Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 47) refers to John of Ibelin and his party, many of whom were anyway vassals of the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

4. See the document in Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan, ed. L.<sup>de</sup> Mas-Latrie, ii, pp. 63-64.

Before attempting any conclusions regarding Edward's involvement in the dispute over knight-service in Cyprus and Jerusalem it will be helpful to outline the domestic situations in the Latin East and to suggest some possible motives behind the presentation of the royal and baronial cases. It should be appreciated, for example, that Edward arrived in the Kingdom of Jerusalem during a period of consolidation of royal power by King Hugh in response to the challenge by supporters of Maria of Antioch. This rival claimant to the throne of Jerusalem had the tacit support of the Templars and it is possible that the king wished to demonstrate his authority and to assert strong control over his Cypriot vassals in the event he needed their service to meet military threats to the Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> Edward's arrival in 1271 may have presented an opportunity for such an assertion of royal authority and for the resolution of Cypriot obligations within King Hugh's mainland kingdom. His reasons for perhaps raising the issue of knight-service from Cyprus at this time may have depended upon Edward's obvious need for troops. It may be suggested, for

---

1.

On the succession dispute, see Hill, History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 161-65; LaMonte, Feudal Monarchy, pp. 77-79.

example, that Edward would seem favourably disposed to the king's case on the expedient grounds that Cypriot service at Hugh's expense might present a financial savings to the English prince as well as an acceptable method for raising soldiers. Edward's anticipated support for the king in this case may even have prompted Hugh to use his influence in the appointment of the prince as a mediator in Acre.

From the standpoint of the barons of Cyprus the presence of the Lord Edward may also have seemed opportune. They may have been anxious to resolve any impending clash over service on the mainland as soon as possible, particularly following the near-invasion of Cyprus by the Muslims in June 1271. It may be suggested that their appeal to Edward lay in their emphasis upon voluntary service to crusaders in the Latin East. James of Ibelin, in his defence of the position taken by the baronage, stressed the willingness of Cypriot knights to serve personally leaders other than the King of Cyprus-Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> Should Edward regard James's case favourably, such voluntary service might be secured and the crusader's political position strengthened by the addition of

---

1.

"Document relatif au service militaire," pp. 430-33.

mercenary troops to his command. The Cypriot baronage, in other words, may have considered Edward's personal control of troops in the East to be an important English objective. One significant qualification is necessary, however, before accepting that James and the Cypriot barons were counting upon Edward's desire for volunteer Cypriot contingents. As James pointed out clearly in his arguments before the prince, whoever required Cypriot service on the mainland in any form must undertake the shipping and maintenance of military contingents during the campaign outside the island kingdom.<sup>1</sup> Clearly implicit in any political motives behind Edward's decision in 1271 was the cost of such service - to be borne either by King Hugh or by Edward himself, depending in part upon his interpretation of Jerusalemite law.

Having assessed the evidence for Edward's role and eventual decision in the case regarding Cypriot service in the Kingdom of Jerusalem it is possible to suggest a few conclusions. As has already been pointed out, however, the documentary material is limited and any suggestions must be made with care. On the basis

---

1. "Document relatif au service militaire," p. 433.

of contemporary evidence it seems reasonable to conclude that Edward's reconnoissance in Acre was the subject of some misinterpretation in English sources, leading to a continued claim of suzerainty over Cyprus by English monarchs into the fifteenth century. That Edward raised any such claim himself is dubious, although the tradition surrounding Richard Lion-Heart's conquest of the island may have been a factor behind the prince's appointment in Acre and may even have influenced his eventual decision. The decision itself appears to have favoured King Hugh. The only evidence pointing to Edward's rejection of the king's claims is implicit in Walter of Guiseborough's account that the prince compromised King Hugh's case by calling upon the Cypriots to serve him rather than the King of Cyprus on the mainland. It may be noted further that the possibility of Cypriot troops serving for pay in the forces of the Lord Edward cannot be ruled out even in the event that he rejected their case; for the final decision of the High Court requiring Cypriot knight-service was not given until 1273 and Edward may have been unable to secure their service in any other than mercenary capacity before the case had been officially resolved. Lack of evidence prevents further hypothesis beyond the simple assertion

that contingents from Cyprus did serve on the Cacho expedition in November and that Edward's political authority in the Cypriot case seems to contrast with his general failure to influence diplomatic affairs in the Kingdom of Jerusalem.

f. Implications for English policies, 1272-1307.

Three later developments in England are worth noting in the context of Edward's political experience on crusade. In the first place, it is interesting to note that James of Ibelin's attack on King Hugh's position in 1271 may have had considerable relevance to a legal dispute facing King Edward nearly twenty-six years later. James asserted that

. . . in my judgement there is no other land in the world where men owe such manner of service to their lord [as the King of Cyprus-Jerusalem has maintained]. I certainly know of none.<sup>1</sup>

In March and July, 1297 baronial opposition led by the Earl of Norfolk succeeded in effectively blocking reinforcements sailing for Flanders and Gascony. The earl and his adherents pointed out the legal

---

1.

"Document relatif au service militaire," p. 431.

restrictions against the king demanding English service in his lands in Gascony or for his campaign in Flanders. The barons observed that service of this kind had never been required on the continent and that they would only agree to serve voluntarily in a mercenary capacity.<sup>1</sup> Whatever Edward's judgement had been in 1271, he clearly faced a similar dispute at this critical juncture in 1297. His political action in the latter case, however, involved a hasty surrender of royal authority leading to the confirmation of the Charters.<sup>2</sup> His baronial opponents were satisfied and the case was dropped before formal debate could be entertained.

Of more significance with regard to later English crusading policies was the lack of papal authority Edward may have noted throughout the vacancy of 1268-1271. It is probable that papal vacancies in 1287-1288 and in 1292-1294 seriously delayed English preparations for departure to the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup> The king received the cross in 1287 from a papal legate whose authority was later questioned in the light of

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 865.

2.

On this whole affair, see Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 666, 678-79 ff.

3.

See below, pp. 170-73.

a vacancy in Rome.<sup>1</sup> Edward accordingly seemed anxious to gain Nicholas IV's affirmation of privileges and protections in 1288. The king's failure to continue preparations after Nicholas's death in April, 1292, may also have accounted for the ultimate abandonment of the whole enterprise. Throughout negotiations for crusade during this period the English king and his advisors seemed determined to avoid difficulties which might arise as a result of departure during a papal vacancy.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, the major lessons of English crusading activity during 1270-1272 seem to have been applied to preparations for future operations of this nature conducted by King Edward. Such factors as Edward's aggravation over Charles of Anjou's abandonment of the fragmented Tunis crusade, his awareness of the disadvantages of continuing to the East during a papal vacancy, his difficulty in challenging royal power in the Kingdom of Jerusalem, or his uncertainty in controlling English crusaders may have combined to bring about an important policy in England during 1276-1307.

---

1. See below, pp. 297-300.

2. See below, pp. 170-73.

For clearly during this period Edward determined to control firmly all major aspects of crusading recruitment, diplomacy, intelligence, military objectives and finance before setting out once more for Latin Syria.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

On the emergence of this policy of national control, see below, pp. 203-207.

- 
- 
3. The crusade in conflict with English political requirements, 1272 - 1307.

Edward I never returned to the Holy Land at the head of a European crusade, but his continuing interest in the defence of the Latin East is clear, and will be treated in some detail later in the context of contemporary theory and practice.<sup>1</sup> The failure of the king to lead a new crusade in person during the thirty-five years of his reign must be treated here against the background of the political interests of the English crown. In order to examine the relationship between crusading activity and English politics it will be necessary to examine three matters in detail. First, the decade of Edward's delay and refusal to take a new crusade vow following his return from Acre will be studied. Secondly, in view of the king's growing commitment to a new project during the period from 1284 to 1293, his ultimate abandonment of that enterprise bears political analysis. Finally, the whole question of Edward's domestic use of funds set aside for crusade must be discussed in the light of political developments, both in England and throughout Europe.

a. A new crusade vow: twelve years of delay and evasion.

On 22 September 1272 the Lord Edward left Acre,

---

1.

See below, pp. 208-89.

having fulfilled the vow made four years previously at Northampton. It was not until May 1284 that papal representatives again received serious proposals concerning the English king's personal leadership of a crusade.<sup>1</sup> In the intervening period, however, Edward was rarely free from pressure to assume the cross once more. Papal appeals began as soon as the new king returned through Italy. The pope pressed Eleanor and the king's companions on crusade, Anthony Bek and Gerard de Grandison, to present arguments to Edward concerning his resumption of the cross.<sup>2</sup> Pope Gregory's successors were no less eager to enlist the full support of the king. Prompting from John XXI, Nicholas III, and Martin IV continued until 1284.<sup>3</sup>

Appeals from the Latin East also contributed to the pressures for a new English crusade. As the truce signed in 1272 neared an end letters from the military leaders in Latin Syria carried requests for English aid. The Bishop of Hebron, for example, wrote to Edward in 1280 complaining that Charles of Anjou was far too involved in European politics to lead a

---

1. Foedera, i, pp. 641-42. See below, pp. 167, 188 ff.

2. Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, pp. 446-47.

3. Foedera, i, pp. 537, 560-61, 610, 624, 641-42. See below, pp. 181-88.

new expedition to the aid of his Kingdom of Jerusalem.<sup>1</sup> In the following two years the Masters of the Hospital and Temple wrote to the English king, describing campaigns in the East and recommending direct military aid or English financial assistance.<sup>2</sup> Joseph de Chauncy, after returning to the Hospitallers in Syria around 1281, reported that military relief was badly needed from England.<sup>3</sup> Thus it can be seen that Edward found himself in increasing demand as the leader of a new effort to dispatch relief to the Holy Land during the first decade following his return.

From the outset, however, the English king cautiously evaded proposals for his personal leadership of a new crusade. Perhaps nothing is more representative of this attitude than his refusal to attend the great crusading council at Lyons less than two years after his own expedition to the East had been concluded. In rejecting these plans for a new project, Edward appears to have abandoned one of the most zealous and concerned crusading popes of the

---

1.

Foedera, i, pp. 586-87. For details of this and subsequent correspondence from Latin Syria, see below, pp. 229-34.

2.

See "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades," ed. C. Kohler and C.F. Langlois, BEC lii (1891) i pp. 52-61.

3.

Cartulaire, iii, no. 3782.

late thirteenth century. Gregory X, the former Archdeacon of Liege, might have had good reason to hope for a greater degree of support from a crusader he had known personally since assisting the legate Ottobuono in England.<sup>1</sup> Having apparently arrived in the East in 1269 or 1270, he had been in Acre when Edward and his crusaders arrived in May 1271.<sup>2</sup> On 10 November 1271 he was notified of his elevation to the Holy See and returned to Rome to become Pope Gregory X. His devotion to the cause of crusade was possibly a factor in his election, while his moving farewell sermon on the theme "if I forget thee, O Jerusalem" held a clear promise of continued activity on behalf of the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup> Evidence of the new pope's concern for the success of Edward and his followers soon appeared, moreover, following his return to Italy. His immediate attempts to launch

---

1.

Flores, iii, p. 14. The Archdeacon left the realm in May 1267 to join King Louis's crusade preparing in France. See Gatto, Pontificio Gregorio X, pp. 44-47; A.G. Tononi, Relazioni de Tedaldo Visconti (Gregoris X) coll' Inghilterra, p. 45ff.

2.

For his crusade preparations in 1268, see Servois, "Emprunts de Saint Louis," pp. 285-86. The debate concerning his arrival in the Latin East at some time between early 1269 and 1271 may be studied in Gatto, Pontificio Gregorio X, p. 47ff.

3.

See Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 961-62; Throop, Criticism of the Crusade, p. 14.

military aid through appeals to European leaders indicate a clear intention to reinforce the English contingents remaining in Acre.<sup>1</sup> Edward's crusade was abandoned before material aid could reach Latin Syria, but the English king met with Pope Gregory in February 1273 on his return through Italy. The pope's subsequent arrangements to relieve Edward's financial distress reveal once more Gregory's determination to aid the English crusaders.<sup>2</sup>

It is not surprising under these circumstances to find that Pope Gregory quickly pressed the English king to attend the crusade council planned for Lyons. His invitations to attend the council had been issued as early as 31 March 1272.<sup>3</sup> Edward's immediate reaction to the plans for a council remain unknown. The absence of his written reply may indicate his intention of discussing the matter personally with Pope Gregory during his return through Italy. By the end of 1273, however, the pope had been informed that

---

1.

Pope Gregory X (Regs., nos. 159, 343, 344, 348, 351, 362) quickly made provision for Philip III to receive financial aid from clerical grants in return for his military assistance. See Annales ecclesiastici, ed. O. Raynaldus et al., 1272, no. 5. For details of these relieving forces in relationship to contemporary crusading theory, see below, pp. 247-66.

2.

For a complete discussion of the biennial tenth requested by the pope from English clergy in 1272, see below, pp. 368-69.

3. Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 160-61; Annales ecclesiastici, 1272, no. 2.

Edward intended to stay away from the council; he would be in London for his coronation while the delegates met.<sup>1</sup> Edward continued to evade proposals that he captain a new expedition after the council of Lyons, although he maintained a careful policy of subsidizing Syrian defences and offered financial backing for smaller enterprises of his own choice.<sup>2</sup>

An analysis of the contributing factors in Edward's rejection of proposals during the period 1272-1284 may be based upon five considerations, any one of which might have resulted in the postponement of an English crusade. First, the king's personal health following his attempted assassination in Acre may have caused concern particularly during the early years of Pope Gregory's pontificate. Secondly, the financial state of England during this period may have presented serious obstacles to any plans for a sizeable crusade. Thirdly, the political emergencies involving two Welsh wars in 1277 and in 1282 could have affected Edward's attitude toward the planning of a new expedition. Fourthly, the deteriorating peace of Europe during the closing stages of this period may have caused the king and his advisors to

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 508. Pope Gregory (Regs. No. 327) continued to request the king to attend, but in vain.

2.

See below, pp. 258-59, 272-77.

avoid the issue of a new crusade. And finally, there is a suggestion that Edward may have found the political situation in the Latin East unfavourable from the standpoint of successful English diplomacy there.

King Edward's absence from Lyons may have been affected by his continuing illness following the attempt on his life in Acre. Although his recovery had commenced by July 1272, there is evidence that he suffered serious relapses periodically for at least two years.<sup>1</sup> In fact, after meeting the pope in Italy, the English leader appears to have suffered some pain and illness from his wounds and the exhausting nature of the journey from the East.<sup>2</sup> Gregory's proposals for a return to Acre in the near future may not have been well-received in view of this. Returning as he was with Queen Eleanor expectant and an infant daughter born in Latin Syria to be cared for, Edward may have felt a desire to attend to his personal convalescence and to family affairs before considering the ardours of a new crusade.

Financially, Edward was faced with the sheer impossibility of organizing an English crusade in

---

1. Thomas Wykes, p. 263.

2. Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, p. 446.

1273-1276. Between 1271 and 1276, for example, the king repaid around £52,000 on loans, drawing largely upon English and Gascon revenues.<sup>1</sup> He may have been particularly anxious about the financial state of the English Church in this matter. Between the crown and the papacy, heavy tax burdens had been placed upon the clergy since 1266. They had paid tenths during five of the eight years prior to 1274, and had supplied a voluntary twentieths during two more. In all, four of these years of taxation had involved Edward's crusade.<sup>2</sup> At the Council of Lyons, English clerical resistance to new crusade levies was so strong that the pope was obliged to summon individuals for private consultations lasting eleven days before a unanimous grant could be approved.<sup>3</sup> Against this outcry the new English king may have hesitated to throw wholehearted support behind any new projects.

Edward's continuing ill-health and difficult recovery from the debts of crusade were soon aggravated

---

1.

See below, pp. 382-85, 394 ff.

2.

For a discussion of this early crusade taxation, see below, pp. 365-69 and Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 293ff.

3.

"Brevis nota. . ." published as "Relatio de Concilio Lugdonensi," MGH, Const. ii, pp. 513-16.

by a political emergency in 1277. The rebellion of Prince Llewelyn and subsequent military operations against the Welsh may have added to Edward's determination to delay preparations for new crusade projects. His loans from Italian merchants for the financing of the Welsh war exceeded exchequer receipts at a time when the indebtedness resulting from his first crusade continued to drain English resources.<sup>1</sup> By 1279, however, the rebellion had been crushed and the king at once began to respond to papal appeals for a new English crusade. John of Brittany received royal permission to prepare for an expedition to the Latin East, although serious negotiations with Rome on this matter did not get under way until 1281.<sup>2</sup> In 1282, Edward reopened plans for dispatching his brother Edmund at the head of a force bound for Acre. This idea had been introduced prior to the crisis of 1277, but had been abandoned due to the deaths of Pope Gregory X and Pope John XXI.<sup>3</sup> In 1282, however, a new Welsh crisis again disrupted Edward's plans. This

---

1.

See below, pp. 365-69, and Tout, Chapters in Administrative History, ii, pp. 88-89.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 573. See Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281 (p. 461) For John's intention to travel to Rome in November 1281.

3.

Foedera, i, pp. 537, 610.

second was certainly delayed crusade negotiations and even led Edward to disregard papal protection of the crusade tenth collected in England between 1274 and 1280.<sup>1</sup>

Affairs in Western Europe may not have encouraged Edward to plan a crusade during this period. Although a few rulers took the cross in 1273 and in 1275, it had become obvious by the close of Gregory's pontificate that these leaders had little intention of leading a force to the Holy Land. Monarchs like Rudolph of Hapsburg in Germany were already manipulating the crusade subsidy granted at the council of 1274.<sup>2</sup> By 1281 conditions for a combined crusade had worsened considerably. Philip of France and Charles of Anjou were becoming increasingly involved in the dispute with Aragon and crusade funds in Spain, France and Italy were rapidly disappearing into royal accounts for use in the conflict. This flagrant extortion of funds had a damaging effect upon public opinion throughout the West, and may have convinced English planners that the time was inopportune for launching

---

1.

See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 408 ff.; and below, pp. 185-87.

2.

See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 167-91, and passim.

a combined venture to aid the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup>

Finally, the political situation in Acre was changing rapidly during this period. Plans for any new crusade may have been affected when Roger of San Severino took over the government as Charles of Anjou's bailli in 1277.<sup>2</sup> Edward's relations with King Charles in Tunis had been reportedly stormy, while his discovery in 1273 that nothing had been done by Charles to punish the murderers of Henry of Almain had infuriated him.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, Edward's 1271-1272 Eastern policies had been undoubtedly at variance with professed Angevin goals of friendly relations with the Venetians and with the Mamluks in Cairo.<sup>4</sup> Roger of San Severino's baillage did not long remain unchallenged by King Hugh, and civil war

---

1.

For Edward's policies regarding the peace of Europe and recruitment of allies on crusade, see below, pp. 217-24. For a discussion of the appropriation of crusade-funds and its impact upon contemporary critics, see Throop, pp. 284, 287-91.

2.

See Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 206-07; "Eracles," pp. 478-79; "Annales de Terre Sainte," p. 456.

3.

See above, pp. 51-52, and Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 225-26.

4.

On King Charles's Muslim policies, see Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 177-79. Edward's relations with Venetians in Acre and his attitudes toward the Egyptian sultan have been reviewed above, pp. 132-38.

threatened the kingdom almost from the start of the Angevin take-over. In 1279 Hugh landed at Tyre with Cypriot troops to attempt a reassertion of authority in the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In spite of support from John of Montfort-Tyre, the king was militarily weak. In Acre, the Templars and men of the city continued to accept the bailli of uncrowned King Charles. Hugh could only return to his island kingdom in disgust.<sup>1</sup> As a consequence, military help from King Hugh or Angevin supporters for a new crusade may have seemed improbable during the late 1270's and early 1280's. Assistance from other quarters of the East may have also seemed remote during this period. In Tripoli, a long civil war between Count Bohemond and his vassal Guy Embriaco of Jubail flared up in 1277 and continued into the 1280's. The Genoese and Venetians continued lingering feuds and domestic stability was constantly threatened.<sup>2</sup> As a consequence of these military and political drawbacks, it may have been felt in England that delay might be rewarded eventually by more favourable political developments

---

1.

Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 207-08; "Annales de Terre Sainte," pp. 456-57.

2.

See the letter of the Bishop of Hebron, written to Edward in 1280. (Foedera, ii, pp. 586-87).

in Latin Syria.

b. The vow unredeemed: the welfare of the realm and  
abandonment of the Holy Enterprise.

From 1284 until 1293 King Edward devoted a considerable amount of time and resources to a projected crusade. An analysis of this English project in relation to contemporary theory and practice is undertaken elsewhere in this study.<sup>1</sup> It remains to determine the principal reasons for the king's ultimate failure to leave the realm by the appointed date of 24 June 1293 - or indeed, at any subsequent time until his death in 1307. In view of Edward's clear determination to aid the Holy Land throughout the period 1272-1293, it is dangerous to assume that simple lack of interest prompted his delay or the eventual abandonment of his enterprise in 1293.<sup>2</sup> It does appear as if political developments threatening the safety of the realm and the peace of Europe played a key role in this development and it is therefore essential to examine the complex political factors which may have influenced the collapse of a crusade project so carefully planned.

---

1.

See below, pp. 217-24, 261-66.

2.

As, for example, Strayer, p. 518. See below, pp. 217-24 and passim.

It is difficult to say when, and therefore more difficult to say why, Edward failed to carry out his crusade vow of 1287. The king had formally agreed to depart, however, before 24 June 1293.<sup>1</sup> This commitment was never fulfilled, nor did real preparations for crusade appear after the deadline had passed. The absence of grants for royal protection to crusaders similar to those issued during the papal vacancy of 1268-1271 indicates that real preparations had not been made as late as 1292 following the death of Pope Nicholas IV. The king's firm intention to sail to the Holy Land was announced publicly before a parliament in October 1290.<sup>2</sup> During the spring and summer of that year negotiations with Earl Gilbert de Clare indicate Edward's political preparations for departure. Gilbert was married to the king's eighteen-year-old daughter born in Acre; he was persuaded to sign provisions swearing support for the

---

1.

Foedera, i, pp. 714-15.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 747; Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 178-79.

young prince Edward; and he was committed to a crusade vow and the promise to accompany the king to the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup> In a letter dated 18 June 1292 Edward replied to an offer for military aid from King Andrew of Hungary, assuring him that his intended route to the Holy Land would involve a sea-voyage, but that the Hungarian king might send his promised troops to meet him in the East.<sup>2</sup> In May 1293 the King of Norway requested Edward's acceptance of one of his barons to accompany the expedition.<sup>3</sup> In March and December 1293 and in April 1294 baronial crusaders serving the King of Aragon were still writing to Edward with offers of military assistance on his projected crusade.<sup>4</sup>

It may be effectively argued that two major factors contributed to the king's initial delay and that one single development put an end to crusade plans in general. Sir Maurice Powicke and others have

---

1.

Foedera, i, pp. 721, 742.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 760. Royal protection for King Andrew's embassy to England was recorded in January 1291 (Close Rolls, 1288-1296, pp. 266-67).

3.

Foedera, i, p. 788.

4.

Foedera, i, pp. 793, 798. In June 1294 Edward wrote to Florentius of Hainault, Prince of Achaia, expressing regret at his inability to leave on crusade (Ancient Correspondence, Sci/13/66 and 67). I should like to thank Dr. Michael Prestwich for bringing this document to my attention.

tended to blame events in Scotland from 1290 onwards for Edward's decision to abandon his crusade.<sup>1</sup> While it is true that the Scottish question occupied much of the king's attention during this period, it is unlikely that the succession dispute, which was settled for the most part by late 1292, would have detracted Edward from an enterprise which had absorbed such attention for almost ten years; it may be argued in fact, that Edward had left the realm in more dangerous circumstances in 1270, when he impulsively set out on crusade during the tangled aftermath of civil war. It may be suggested, however, that domestic problems involving the government of Scotland delayed preparations for the crusade and led Edward to postpone his departure from 1291 to 1293.<sup>2</sup>

A second contributing factor in the king's delay may have been the death of Pope Nicholas IV in April 1292. This pope, an active and dedicated Franciscan, had been one of his greatest allies through his commitment to the cause of European peace, his sponsorship of Ode de Grandison's expedition to Acre

---

1.

Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 267-69; Lunt, Financial relations, pp. 355-57.

2.

Edward instructed royal negotiators in Rome on several occasions to extend his deadline for departure. See Foedera, i, pp. 660-61, 663, 705.

in 1290, and his material aid to John de Grailly and other crusaders active during his pontificate.<sup>1</sup>

Through the course of crusade negotiations with Edward, moreover, the pope had surrendered virtually every major point regarding finance and departure dates in the interest of furthering the new enterprise in England.<sup>2</sup> More significantly perhaps, Pope Nicholas's death ushered in another long vacancy which was not ended until May 1294. The English king may have reflected upon difficulties resulting from the papal vacancy of 1268-1271. His reluctance to continue preparations earlier, during the vacancy of 1287-1288, may suggest his uneasiness in the face of such a development in 1292.<sup>3</sup> The king was dependent upon Pope Nicholas's 1291 grant of a sexennial tenth throughout the British Isles. Without ratification by Nicholas's successor, however, collection from the reluctant English clergy might prove difficult. Should such difficulty emerge while the king were absent on

---

1.

See below, pp. 261-64.

2.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 338-73; and below, pp. 189-91.

3.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 337ff. For the possible effects of the vacancy of 1268-1271, see above, pp. 124-28.

crusade, excessive borrowing might become necessary and Edward could find himself burdened with another crusading debt some twenty years after his first costly experience.<sup>1</sup> It is possible, therefore, that the king delayed his departure in 1292 and 1293 until the vacancy might be filled and his position with regard to his tenth and crusading status might be safeguarded.

The opening of a new political crisis in May 1293, however, must be seen as the final deterrent to Edward's departure on crusade. Following a naval skirmish between men of the Cinq Ports and some Norman-French sailors, Philip the Fair and his advisors suddenly opened hostilities in reprisal throughout the English frontier in Gascony and Ponthieu. As the French king's diplomatic tone hardened, Edward dispatched his brother Edmund to Paris in July.<sup>2</sup> By October Philip's military operations foreshadowed more warfare and he was preparing a fleet with the aid of the Genoese to

---

1.

For a brief discussion of the matter of papal ratification of previous crusade arrangements, see F. Heidelberger, Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende des 13 Jahrhunderts, pp. 11-13.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 793; Lettres des rois, ed. J.J. Champollion-Figeac, i, pp. 404, 426-29.

harry the English in the Channel. By May 1294 Edward was in no position to reopen crusade negotiations with the new Pope Celestine V. The English monarch had been branded a defaulter before the French court and was ordered to appear before Philip. A force was already being prepared under John of Brittany and Robert Tybetot to sail for Gascony in July.<sup>1</sup> While the Scottish disputes and the papal vacancy may have led to delay of the English departure on crusade, the sudden French war stopped serious preparations for good.

Contemporary English sources support the view that Edward's resolve to depart on crusade was generally undeterred until the sudden interference of the French king. The metrical chronicle of Peter de Langtoft, for example, points to the French crisis as the chief obstacle to Edward's departure in 1293.<sup>2</sup> An elegy written a few years after Edward's death placed blame upon Philip for destroying the king's crusade plans:

---

1.

Rôles Gascons, ed. F. Michel and C. Bémont, iii, nos. 2932, 2933-38. See further C. de la Roncière, "Le Blocus continental de l'Angleterre sous Philippe le Bel," Revue des questions historiques, ix, (1896), pp. 402-41.

2.

Peter de Langtoft, Chronicle, ed. T. Wright (Rolls Series, 47) ii, p. 267.

Kynge of Fraunce, thou hevedest sunne [sin],  
 That thou the counsail woldest fond [seek]  
 To latte [hinder] the wille of kyng Edward  
 To wende to the holy londe:<sup>1</sup>

By March 1294 contemporary interest in the idea of a passage to the East had been supplanted generally by concern over the French crisis. At that time Bishop Oliver Sutton of Lincoln was requesting prayers for the king's activities in Gascony, for the Universal Church, and seemingly as an afterthought for the continuance of the "business of the Cross in England."<sup>2</sup>

Within months after the king had broken his pledge to sail in 1293 it was becoming increasingly clear that the defence of the realm and of Gascony held precedence over the crusade. In September Edward loaned his brother £10,000 for the defence of continental possessions under French military pressure. Significantly, the entire amount of this loan had been taken from the collectors of Nicholas's crusade tenth, with Edward's bankers giving the king's bond that it should be returned at some future date.<sup>3</sup> As the French crisis deepened Edward's crusade project was pushed further aside, until virtually nothing

---

1. Political Songs of England, p. 247.

2. Oliver Sutton, Register, ed. R. Hill (Lincoln Record Society iv, p. 175.

3. Foedera, i, p. 788; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, pp. 12, 576; 1301-1307, p. 115.

remained of the grand passage envisaged in 1287. Arguments with Pope Celestine V and his successor Boniface VIII did little to revive plans for a new project. Pope Boniface continually complained of Edward's unfulfilled vow but could do nothing beyond attempting to arrange peace during most of his pontificate.<sup>1</sup> There are indications that this warfare had an effect upon the Pope's ability to promote the relief of the Holy Land during this period. He often explained to rulers in the Latin East that his launching of new projects was dependent upon bringing peace to Western Europe.<sup>2</sup>

By the time hostilities had ended in 1303 Edward seems to have abandoned much crusading activity of any kind. While his distant concern for the Holy Land continued to manifest itself through letters and contacts, his implementation of military or financial support for new projects was nowhere in evidence.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

See Heidelberger, Kreuzzugsversuche, p. 11 ff.

2.

Pope Boniface VIII, Register, ed. G. Digard et al., nos. 868, 2653-54. See Heidelberger, loc. cit.

3.

See, for example, a summary of the king's letter from Stirling to Master James de Molay of the Templars in 1304 (Close Rolls, 1302-1307, p. 208). Edward's correspondence with the Mongols is also illustrative of his professions of interest. See below, pp. 239-47.

John of Brittany, however, took the cross in 1300 at the age of sixty-three. He had been inspired, perhaps, by news of the sweeping Mongol victory near Homs and subsequent Frankish military revival under Aimery de Lusignan of Cyprus.<sup>1</sup> Yet the aging Earl of Richmond seems never to have fulfilled his vow in person before his death in 1305, and Edward appears to have given him no sign of support. The English king sent an embassy to Rome in 1305, led by Odo de Grandison and the bishops of Worcester and Lichfield-Coventry. This delegation was to treat upon matters concerning Edward's vow, but the Pope later asked the king if he wished absolution.<sup>2</sup>

By 1306 Edward was growing ill and was involved continually in the struggle over control of Scotland. His interest in a new crusade had not manifested itself beyond formal statements of devotion and hopes

---

1.

Pope Boniface VIII, Regs., nos. 3719-20. On the reporting in England of Mongol successes, see a letter of Pope Boniface in April 1300 (Foedera, i, p. 919).

2.

Close Rolls, 1302-1307, p. 348, 351. Pope Clement V wrote to Edward in 1306 or 1307:

"il ad poer de assoudre de checun manere de peche, ne seint il ia se orible, sauue de ceus qi vowe al la Terre Seynte ou de ceus qi gunt grant peches en religion, mes de touz outres vous poez il assoudre; e il poet relessen penance done par euesques."

See Richardson and Sayles, "The Parliament of Carlisle, 1307 - some New Documents," EHR, liii (1938), p. 247.

for success in the East.<sup>1</sup> In Rome, a new project under the guidance of Pope Clement V was preparing. Bulls were issued and crusade studies commissioned in the interest of gaining a body of informed opinion.<sup>2</sup> There is little probability, however, that Edward could pay significant attention to the details of this new endeavour. At Lanercost Priory from Michelmas 1306 his attendants continued to nurse him until his death the next year.<sup>3</sup> After thirty-five years of delay, hope and finally disillusionment, the crusader died, leaving instructions that a garrison of 100 men should be financed for one year in defence of the Holy Land and that his heart should be carried to Jerusalem to remain forever.<sup>4</sup>

c. Edward's manipulation of crusade finances.

In October 1274 the Council of Lyons unanimously

---

1. Foedera, i, pp. 949-50; Close Rolls, 1302-1307, pp. 208, 348, 430.

2. See Heidelberger, pp. 24-28. It is interesting to note that at least one of the treatises around this time bore a dedication to King Edward himself. See below, pp. 209

3. Flores, iii, p. 134. Edward's final illness has been discussed, with informative insight into the king's religious frame of mind during this period, by J.R.H. Moorman, "Edward I at Lanercost Priory, 1306-7," EHR, lxxvii (1952).

4. Nicholas Trivet, pp. 413-14. See above, pp. 15

granted a sexennial tenth to be collected from clergy throughout Europe in aid of genuine crusaders. It is not improbable that the sudden rash of crusade vows taken in 1275 was connected with this legislation of the Church. Pope Gregory's provisions stipulated that funds were to be collected locally and were to be used by the ruler in each area only after he had contracted to lead a force in person to the defence of the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the late 1270's, however, papal appropriation gradually established a precedent for similar misconduct by crusaders who had no intention of fulfilling promises to sail East. Pope Gregory X's successors pursued a policy of involvement in the programmes of Charles of Anjou, for which much of the tenth collected in Italy was eventually used; Philip III of France used much of his grant in a fraudulent crusade against Peter of Aragon; and much of the crusade tenth collected in Germany and the Low Countries was lost or was confiscated to finance private schemes during this period. By 1283, little remained in France, Spain, Italy, and Germany of funds collected during the six

---

1.

Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 636, 945; Annales ecclesiastici, 1275, no. 44; 1276, no. 46.

years following 1274.<sup>1</sup>

King Edward I, as we have seen, openly refused to take a new crusade vow between 1272 and 1284. Until 1276 Pope Gregory's insistence that Edward should receive funds only when he had agreed to head a new expedition went some way towards ensuring the inviolability of the English tenth. In November 1275 for example, the pope issued strict orders to his English collectors that the king must assume the cross before portions of the Lyons subsidy might be made available to him in any form.<sup>2</sup> As long as both king and pope continued to be in agreement over this issue the English tenth was collected and stored in monasteries and cathedrals throughout the realm.<sup>3</sup>

Edward's growing need for money, however, soon rendered it inexpedient to abide by the pope's provision. The king's debts in 1276-1277 are well-attested and Archbishop John Peckham described in

---

1.

See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, p. 192 ff; Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 338 ff.

2.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 334. For Gregory's instructions to Edward, see a letter (Regs. no. 945) dated in November 1275.

3.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 330-31.

his register a degree of inflation during the period, which may have further increased Edward's difficulties.<sup>1</sup> The death of Pope Gregory X in January 1276 may have presented an opportunity for English administrators to reverse papal policy regarding loans from the proceeds of the Lyons subsidy. Within a few months of the pope's death Edward accordingly negotiated a loan of 2000 marks from the English collectors, promising repayment at an early date.<sup>2</sup> During the next few years arrangements for more loans were carried out by Gerard de Grandison, the chief papal collector in England and Edward's firm ally on crusade in 1270-1272. The money was to go directly to the king's Italian bankers, and may in fact have been used to alleviate other crusade debts still unsettled.<sup>3</sup> Again in 1276, Edward recommended to collectors that some funds might be removed from church depositories and be placed with the banking firm of Riccardi for safe-keeping.<sup>4</sup>

---

1.

John Peckham, Registrum, ed. C.T. Martin (Rolls Series, 77), i, pp. 17-20, 48-49. For Edward's crusade debts, see below, pp. 374-87.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 147; Issues of the Exchequer, comp. F. Devon (Pell's Records) iii, p. 91.

3.

Lunt, "A papal tenth," pp. 72, 73, 85.

4.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 214.

The outbreak of hostilities with Llewelyn of Wales in 1277 placed sudden new burdens upon the English exchequer. As a possible consequence, a commission from the king in June 1277 advised collectors to move all crusade funds to Edward's Italian banking firms for protection during the anticipated conflict. The king particularly suggested this course of action for those depositories in the vicinity of the Marches.<sup>1</sup> In the following year John of Darlington, who had assumed most of the duties of the retired Gerard de Grandison, was sent by Edward to appeal in Rome for a further royal loan from the proceeds of the English tenth.<sup>2</sup> John Orsini, the new Pope Nicholas III, had become involved in the schemes of Charles of Anjou in Italy and Sicily and seemed unprepared to release crusade funds for private use in England. On 1 August 1278 the pope accordingly dispatched special instructions to the Bishops of London and Hereford and to Arditto, his chaplain in charge of supervising collection; these representatives were ordered to present a formula to King Edward for taking the cross. Pope Nicholas firmly rejected

---

1. Lunt, "A papal tenth," pp. 75-76.

2. See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 313.

Edward's request for loans, but added that 25,000 marks should be made available on condition that the king pledged his personal leadership of a new crusade to the East. Edward was further enjoined to submit the names of Italian bankers who would be prepared to offer security for the king's agreement.<sup>1</sup> The brief relaxation of restrictions Edward had encountered during the short pontificates of Innocent V, Adrian V, and John XXI seemed at an end and the king faced a period of hard political bargaining.

Edward may have had alternative plans, however, regarding his use of the tenth. Previously, in a letter to Pope John XXI, the king had begun negotiations concerning the sending of Edmund to the Latin East at the head of an English crusade. Edward had offered the project with a view toward financing Edmund's expedition himself from England.<sup>2</sup> He continued to press this idea in embassies to Pope Nicholas and to his successor Martin IV, but met stern resistance in Rome. The pope's reply to an embassy sent in June 1282, for example, repeated the instructions Edward had listened to ever since his

---

1.

Foedera, i, pp. 560-61. for details of Pope Nicholas's political position and its consequences, see Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 202-11.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 537.

return to England in 1274. The king, reprimanded Pope Martin, should be well-aware that only he could attract enough baronial followers to justify the dispatching of a crusade to the Holy Land; He should be concerned over his failure to resume the cross in view of the Divine intervention which had brought about his miraculous recovery from wounds in Acre; moreover, the king's brother was unacceptable in his place; if Edward continued to persist in this idea, the English tenth might well be taken from the realm altogether and given to another crusader.<sup>1</sup>

King Edward did, however, continue his efforts to sponsor a small crusade with English clerical funds. In November 1281 John of Brittany prepared to set out for Rome to discuss plans for his use of a portion of the English tenth in order to finance his passage. Taking several leading barons with him, John was prepared for involved negotiations with apparently little royal interference.<sup>2</sup> Earlier, in 1279, he had been granted royal leave to go on crusade for five years secure in the knowledge that

---

1. Foedera, i, pp. 610, 624.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 461.

his ~~feudal levies~~<sup>OWN PERSONAL SERVICE</sup> would not be demanded in his absence.<sup>1</sup> Nothing, however, seems to have come of this attempt to use some of the tenth, and John returned to England and later visited the continent handling Edward's affairs until 1289.<sup>2</sup>

An important stimulus to these negotiations may have been the increasing evidence that Pope Nicholas and Pope Martin were considering the removal of funds from depositories throughout England.<sup>3</sup> Pope Martin's involvement in Italian affairs deepened while his manipulation of crusade revenues extended under cover of various banking schemes throughout Western Europe.<sup>4</sup> In 1282 Edward expressed grave fears that the money collected in England was being secretly removed to Italian firms in papal or even in Angevin control. He dispatched letters to his brother Edmund, to the mayor and sheriff of London, and to the wardens of the Cinq Ports to enforce royal restrictions upon funds from the tenth leaving England.<sup>5</sup> In March 1282

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 573. SERVICE BY HIS VASSALS, HOWEVER,

2. COULD BE DEMANDED.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1291, pp. 146, 295.

3.

Foedera, i, pp. 560-61, 624.

4.

See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 211-14.

5.

Foedera, i, p. 608; Close Rolls, 1279-1288, p. 157.

the Sicilian Vespers disrupted further Angevin projects and Pope Martin was drawn into the political complexities which preceeded war between the kings of Sicily, France and Aragon. By August the pope was clearly appropriating funds from the tenth in Italy and parts of Germany for these affairs and was forwarding them to Charles of Anjou.<sup>1</sup> In November Edward again warned clerics and royal officials that the tenth in England was in danger, and stricter embargoes were put into effect.<sup>2</sup> Early in 1283 he complained to the Cardinal Deacon of St. Maria in Portico that much of the English tenth was being transferred to papal bankers in Italy.<sup>3</sup>

But the Sicilian business, while representing a credible threat to funds collected in England, also coincided with a sudden emergency in Wales. More than a week before the Vespers shook Sicily, Edward was appraised of the revolt of David of Wales.<sup>4</sup> The

---

1. W.E. Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, i, p. 143 ff.

2. See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 336-37.

3. Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, pp. 477-79.

4. The Welsh leader began his uprising on 21 March, while the Vespers occurred on the 30th. See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, p. 217; Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 419.

king's speed in appropriating funds from the English tenth may illustrate his determination to avoid papal manipulation, but it is equally possible that the pope's activities simply provided an excuse and an example for the king and his advisors. In any case, Edward soon forced some of the custodians of the English tenth to loan funds in direct disregard for papal instructions over the previous five years.<sup>1</sup> On the 28 March 1283 soon after complaining about papal interference with the English tenth, the king seized money from collectors and guardians of the crusade subsidy in many parts of the realm.<sup>2</sup> Officially, Edward excused his action by stating that he feared the revenues might "suffer subtraction by malefactors and disturbers of the peace." The king, however, admitted other "undisclosed" reasons as well.<sup>3</sup>

When word of the confiscation reached the Archbishop of Canterbury, he demanded an immediate explanation from Edward's chancellor in London, Robert Burnell. The Archbishop's demands were not satisfied

---

1. Calandar of Various Chancery Rolls, 1277-1326, pp. 249-50.

2. "Annales de Wigorniae," pp. 486-87; John de Oxenedes, Chronica, ed. H. Ellis (Rolls Series, 13), p. 261; Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 229.

3. Close Rolls, 1279-1288, p. 235.

in a meeting on 13 May, as Edward had left the city for the campaign in Wales. Instead, Archbishop Peckham was sent to find the king there and to demand the return of funds in person. By the time he reached Edward, however, the rebellion had been crushed and the king's urgent need for money had abated. When the archbishop demanded that the funds be returned in two months Edward readily agreed. The king returned some £29,237 in old coinage and £10,559 in new. Much of the money was returned, moreover, in the original sacks with unbroken seals.<sup>1</sup>

Pope Martin heard of the appropriation quickly, and on 5 July he dispatched a letter to his archbishop instructing him to reproach the king for offering "frivolous excuses" and to demand the return of the money within the month.<sup>2</sup> By early 1284, however, Pope Martin had received assurances from Archbishop Peckham that Edward had given back the confiscated funds.<sup>3</sup> Further incidents involved royal officials laying hands upon the tenth in Llandaff and

---

1.

John Peckham, Registrum, ii, pp. 548-49, 565, 635-39; Close Rolls, 1279-1288, p. 206; Lunt, "A papal tenth," pp. 52-55.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 631.

3.

John Peckham, Registrum, ii, pp. 635-36.

in Canterbury in 1287. Over £495 in receipts was taken and no explanation or statement of intention to return funds appears to have been offered.<sup>1</sup> By that time, however, the king was already seriously engaged in new plans for a crusade and the matter seems to have been ignored by both royal and papal officials.

Once substantial negotiations had been opened in 1284 on the matter of Edward's new crusade, his indiscretions in 1276 and 1283 seem to have been dismissed by officials in Rome. Arrangements for the use of English subsidy funds on crusade continued in the normal course of negotiations.<sup>2</sup> From the beginning of discussions with Pope Martin in 1284, however, Edward demanded that the money collected throughout Europe between 1274 and 1280 should be made available only for the use of genuine crusaders setting out for the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup> The English proposals meant that all funds not already wasted in various political schemes in France, Italy, Spain or Germany would be turned over to English administrators unless other captains should appear to lead new expeditions. Pope

---

1. Lunt, "A papal tenth," p. 57.

2. See below, pp. 219-21, 261-63.

3. Foedera, i, pp. 641-42; Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum, ed. A. Theiner, pp. 128-29.

Martin, however, was involved deeply in a crusade which he had sponsored against Christian Aragon. At a time when European popular opinion appeared hostile to such political projects any such public distinction between crusades deserving of funds and those tainted by political intrigue would seriously undermine the Franco-Angevin effort.<sup>1</sup> Besides this, the precedents set by Pope Gregory X and the Council of Lyons expressly forbade such action. For one national leader to receive the receipts of six-years' clerical taxation from other countries in Europe was naturally regarded with suspicion and hostility in Rome and Pope Martin dispatched a negative reply to the English requests.<sup>2</sup>

But English ambassadors continued to press for unused portions of the Lyons tenth throughout Europe. Letters addressed to Pope Honorius IV requested such a grant,<sup>3</sup> but in a letter of June 1286 the new pope did not agree to these terms, and hard bargaining continued.<sup>4</sup> During their negotiations with Pope Nicholas IV the English continued to press for a clear

---

1. See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 309-11.

2. Foedera, i, pp. 641-42.

3. Foedera, i, pp. 653, 666, 675.

4. Foedera, i, p. 666-67.

grant of all the remaining Lyons subsidy. The pope refused again and the controversy ran on.<sup>1</sup> Edward's repeated request in February 1289 was followed by the news of the loss of Tripoli and the sudden threat to Acre. Pope Nicholas, concerned deeply for the success of current efforts to relieve eastern garrisons, finally agreed to the English provisions a year later.<sup>2</sup> The pope's assessment of the sum remaining in European vaults, however, seems to have borne out Edward's expressed misgivings about the appropriation of crusade funds in the West. Nicholas regretfully reported that virtually nothing of the 1274 tenth remained in France or Castile, that the king of Aragon had appropriated most of the levies in his kingdom and that very little could be gathered from storehouses in Northern Europe. Italian funds had either been spent or were marked for the use of John de Grailly's expedition in the East. The English portion of the tenth which Edward had been able to preserve was virtually all that remained from six years of heavy European taxation.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 708.

2.

Foedera, i, pp. 719, 746; Pope Nicholas IV, Register, ed. E. Langlois, nos. 2260, 4310. Pope Nicholas's accession to English terms may have been influenced by his interest in promoting a limited expedition under English leadership. See below, pp. 261-63.

3.

Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, p. 555. See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 341-42.

Further negotiations with Pope Nicholas in 1290 and 1291 soon resulted in a papal grant of the sexennial tenth requested by Edward, to be levied throughout the British Isles.<sup>1</sup> By June 1294 a considerable sum of money had been amassed throughout England. Five payments of the new tenth had been collected, representing nearly three full years of tax receipts. Papal bankers had released further sums to complete payment of English and continental funds from the Lyons subsidy.<sup>2</sup> In addition a lay-grant of a fifteenth in England and Wales had been collected in 1290 and 1291.<sup>3</sup> Upon the death of the pope and the subsequent vacancy in Rome, however, Edward appears to have taken control of English funds, appropriating or borrowing portions of the new tax collected for crusade. The political crisis over Gascony and the English Channel pressed upon Edward's reserves and in mid-1294 news from the continent must

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 750; Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 6668. For details of collection and an estimate of the amount gathered for use on crusade, see below, pp. 371-73.

2.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 341-42.

3.

The amount collected from this subsidy has been estimated at nearly £117,000. See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 511, and below, pp. 364-65.

have described the election of a new pope in May. The king consequently took decisive action. Writs were issued to collectors to relinquish money stored in churches to sheriffs for removal to London.<sup>1</sup> Depositories refusing to relinquish funds were to be taken over and held for the king.<sup>2</sup> The major appropriation was apparently scheduled for 4 July 1294. On that date and on 11 July depositories were raided and the funds from the tenth removed.<sup>3</sup> Edward's officers appropriated over £33,000 at that time: a healthy addition to royal finances with which to conduct the forthcoming campaign on the continent.<sup>4</sup>

Some clerical reactions were predictably hostile.<sup>5</sup> Other monastic writers, however, seemed angry only at the king's abrupt method of appropriation, failing to condemn his duplicity regarding the crusade vow he had made in 1287.<sup>6</sup> This apparent unconcern for crusade

---

1. Rôles Gascons, iii, no. 2679, 2680.

2. See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 352.

3. Flores, (iii, p. 274) reported the raid on 11 July. It was dated to 4 July by Walter of Guiseborough (pp. 248-9) Florence of Worcester ("Continuation," pp.271-272) Gervase of Canterbury ("Continuation," p. 306).

4. Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 356. See below, pp. 272-73.

5. See Walter of Guiseborough. (p. 248), for example.

6. Flores, iii, p. 274; "Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 36),iii. p. 390.

ideals may perhaps be explained by the reaction of the papal collectors themselves. For once assurances had been given by the king that he would challenge papal demands upon them to deliver the money they no longer possessed, the collectors in England made no attempt to thwart further seizure nor to press the king to return the funds.<sup>1</sup> Clearly the immediate defence of the realm was of prime concern to many chroniclers and collectors alike.

Pope Celestine V reacted with indecision to the English seizure,<sup>2</sup> and in late summer Edward dispatched negotiators to Rome. Unfortunately, little record of the discussions there survives. The Bishop of Winchester recorded a papal document indicating that Edward's negotiators had asserted that Pope Nicholas IV had allowed the king to use half of the tenth in England and that Edward had been merely taking full possession of what was his.<sup>3</sup> On this basis, Edward's

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1301-1307, p. 385. See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 363-64.

2.

See John Pontissara, Register, ed. C. Deepes (Canterbury and York Society, 29/30), ii, pp. 501, 502, 504-6.

3.

John Pontissara (Register, iiii pp. 503-04) revealed that Pope Celestine had accepted this situation. See Lunt (Financial Relations, p. 361) for Edward's claims in 1294.

ambassadors had apparently asked Pope Celestine to continue such an arrangement until the final payments had been made. The king may have given further indications that he might reconsider his crusade vow as soon as the current emergency had passed.<sup>1</sup> As a gesture of good-faith Edward agreed to suspend his planned appropriations of those crusade funds due to be collected by November 1294 until Pope Celestine could render a formal decision on the matter.<sup>2</sup>

By 2 October the new pope had issued his settlement, which represented a remarkable victory for Edward's negotiators in Rome: he renewed his predecessor's tenth with apparently little discussion concerning its use or Edward's redemption of his 1287 crusade vow.<sup>3</sup> During late 1294 the Pope seems to have been under the impression that Edward might yet be persuaded to conclude the French war and depart for the East.<sup>4</sup> By that time, however, real prospects for a new crusade had been further shattered by a Welsh

---

1.

Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 247-50.

2.

"Collectors' Accounts for the Clerical Tenth Levied in England by Order of Nicholas IV," ed. W.E. Lunt, EHR xxxi (1916), p. 106.

3.

Pope Celestine V in Regesta Pontificum, ed. A. Potthast, no. 23985.

4.

See the pope's letter (John Pontissara, Register, ii, pp. 509-11).

rising on 30 September, and King Philip had invaded Gascony. Pope Celestine, seemingly unable to cope in the midst of constant crisis, abdicated after a pontificate of seven months.<sup>1</sup>

When Pope Boniface VIII took up his new duties in 1295, the English situation confronting papal agents was complex. Five payments of Pope Nicholas's tenth had been seized by the king in July 1294. The papal grant of funds collected from the Lyons subsidy was also in Edward's possession. Similarly, a further £10,000 borrowed from the English collectors in 1293 for Edmund's use in Gascony still remained unreturned. The king had, however, suspended seizure of the tenth collected in November 1294. Further, he had put forward the idea of splitting future proceeds evenly with Rome. An account rendered in 1296, in fact, shows that approximately half of the first three years' proceeds had indeed been deposited with papal bankers and as yet remained untouched by Edward.<sup>2</sup> The Welsh rising, coupled with events in France and the growing independence of John Balliol in Scotland, must have indicated that Edward's return of the funds already in

---

1.

On the involvement of Pope Celestine with affairs pertaining to crusade, see Heidelberger, pp. 4-5.

2.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 356.

his possession was unlikely. The pope, moreover, might find it difficult to collect the remaining tenth in England in view of the attitude of the clergy and local papal collectors. Papal negotiators may have felt that the realm was united in support of the English King during the crises of 1294 and 1295, while clerical willingness to continue at the same time to pay sums toward a dying crusade project must have appeared minimal.

Pope Boniface's only action in 1295, therefore, was to carefully transfer funds being collected in Scotland to new "merchants of the papal chamber," the Spini of Florence.<sup>1</sup> Evidence points to the fact that Edward had anticipated this move, however, by appropriating £1,000 of the Scottish tenth in August 1295.<sup>2</sup> The pope's interference in collection throughout England and Wales remained negligible, due perhaps to his desire to remain on good terms long enough to bring the war between England and France to an end. Pope Boniface ordered collectors of the

---

1.

John de Halton, Register, ed. W.N. Thompson (Canterbury and York Society, 12/13), i, pp. 61-62.

2.

Close Rolls, 1288-1296, p. 423.

tenth to deliver money already in their possession to papal merchants but made no move to implement collection of the last three years of the grant. He refrained also from demanding Edward's immediate return of funds seized in 1294.<sup>1</sup> The king likewise seemed content to ignore the remaining payments of the tenth, perhaps because of his concurrent demands upon his clergy to help finance military campaigns. Church councils were summoned, for example, in 1294, 1295 and 1297 to treat upon matters relating to grants for the king.<sup>2</sup>

By 5 February 1300, however, Pope Boniface was ready to reopen the matter of Edward's abandoned crusade project. He ordered his principal collectors in England to begin taking proceeds from the remaining unpaid portion of the 1291 tenth, and to deliver all receipts to papal merchants and none to the King of England. Edward was ordered to return funds appropriated or borrowed from the subsidies of 1274

---

1.

Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, pp. 565, 587, 588; "Collectors' Accounts," pp. 109-19.

2.

Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae, ed. D. Wilkins, ii, p. 201; Flores, iii, pp. 90, 291; "Annales de Dunstaplia," pp. 404-05.

and 1291 on the grounds that he had long ago broken his agreement to use these funds on crusade.<sup>1</sup> Payments due from the fourth year of Pope Nicholas's sexennial tenth were to be deposited in January and April 1301.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, on 19 March 1300 the bishop of London and the canon of St. Paul's implemented the pope's new demand by ordering depositories to deliver up all portions of the unused tenth in their possession within two months.<sup>3</sup> By August new collection of the tenth owing from the fourth year of the 1291 grant was proceeding at least in Salisbury and accounts were being rendered showing the process of the collection of arrears. These early accountings reveal the difficulties of renewing an abandoned tax after six years of strife: the arrears gathered since collection had ceased in 1296 amounted to under £1,712.<sup>4</sup>

King Edward reacted quickly in the face of this sudden papal challenge. Perhaps feeling that his

- 
1. Pope Boniface VIII, Regs., nos. 3411-43.
  2. John de Halton, Register, i, pp. 141-43.
  3. Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albini, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series, 28), ii, pp. 29-31.
  4. "Collectors' Accounts," pp. 104, 110-12; Simon de Gandavo, Register, ed. C.T. Fowler and M.C.B. Dawes (Canterbury and York Society, 40/41), i, pp. 31-33.

clergy supported him wholeheartedly, late in 1300 he ordered the slowing-up of collection and delivery to the pope.<sup>1</sup> In January 1301 the king summoned a parliament at Lincoln to discuss the matter of the new collection and there may have discovered the true extent of clerical support for his actions against Pope Boniface.<sup>2</sup> An embassy under Odo de Grandison was already in Rome to negotiate in the light of new developments.<sup>3</sup> Edward's embarrassment over the new papal demands seems to have centered primarily around the return of money he had seized in 1293 and 1294. It is conceivable, for example, that the king had already spent most of this sum on his various campaigns in Wales, Scotland and France. On the other hand, Pope Boniface may have been in an unfavourable position as well. At a time when papal authority appeared to be challenged in the West he had demanded funds which the English king probably could not deliver immediately. This head-on collision with Edward following the king's victory over the bull Clericis laicos a few years previously might only bring delicate

---

1. See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 344.

2. See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 344.

3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1292-1301, p. 543.

matters of church-state relations to a head again. Against Edward's outright refusal, moreover, the pope would appear to have little defence. The English clergy clearly believed that the submission of their king would lead to three more years of heavy taxation from Rome and seemed openly hostile to Pope Boniface on this matter.<sup>1</sup> Support from major leaders of the West may have also been beyond reach, particularly as the French monarchy was on worsening terms with Pope Boniface.<sup>2</sup> Finally, public opinion deploring papal misuse of the crusade throughout the late thirteenth century may have mitigated against Pope Boniface in 1300-1301.<sup>3</sup>

The result of negotiations in Rome was a political victory for Edward. The process of settlement, however, was not smooth. It is possible, in fact, that John of Brittany's crusade vow in 1301 was simply a concession granted by the English negotiators to Pope Boniface at that time.<sup>4</sup> On 26 February the pope reached his first decision as to the state of the English tenth. Edward was allowed to retain the money

---

1.

See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 674-77; Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 364-65.

2.

For a discussion of the whole question of Pope Boniface's progress toward crusade in the French court, see Heidelberger, pp. 11-15.

3.

See Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, pp. 304-05 ff.

4.

See above, pp. 175-76.

he had seized in 1294, but must return the Lyons subsidy and any loans he had negotiated subsequently. But as the loss of the Holy Land ten years previously necessitated a new crusade project Pope Boniface ordered the continuation of the collection of the last three years of Pope Nicholas's tenth. Finally, the pope levied a new triennial tenth upon English clergy, to be collected concurrently with arrears from the 1291 grant. The new tenth was to run from 1301 to 1303 and all proceeds were to go to the papacy for the aid of the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup>

The levy of two simultaneous tenths upon the English clergy raised a predictable outcry, and the pope soon returned to negotiations for a more realistic settlement. The result appeared to be a final victory for Edward. Pope Boniface suspended collection of the 1291 grant once and for all, but retained the imposition of his new crusade grant. Edward was permitted to keep all funds, including unconditionally the portions of the Lyons subsidy paid in 1291 and 1292. A dispute lingered over the position of Edward's £10,000 borrowed for Gascon defence, but eventually the crown was allowed to keep this as well.<sup>2</sup> In one year of involved negotiations

---

<sup>1</sup>. Foedera, i, pp. 928-31; Historical Letters from Northern Registers, pp. 147-48.

<sup>2</sup>.

Foedera, i, pp. 930-31; Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 364-66.

the king had removed all trace of his obligations regarding the proper use of crusade funds. The principal of undisturbed English use of taxation collected in England and Wales remain<sup>d</sup>unchallenged. Ultimately the king's extortion of crusade funds had helped to finance six years of warfare during which interest in a new crusade project seems to have been subordinated to the political needs of the realm.

It has been necessary to review in some detail the complex argument over Edward's possession of crusade funds in order that the implications of English policy might be related to broader theories of crusade current in the thirteenth century. There has been no attempt to assess the motives of the king beyond a suggestion of day-to-day expedients which may have influenced his actions. The obvious question of King Edward's crusading zeal, for example, may not be debated until the full scope of English involvement has been examined.<sup>1</sup> In view of the preceding political analysis, however, some suggestions may be in order concerning one emerging political doctrine of the crusade in England.

First, it may be suggested that at every stage of

---

1.

See below, pp. 208-89.

the negotiations concerning a new crusade between 1272 and 1307 the political and military requirements of the realm and continental possessions remained paramount. Examples of this consideration may be seen in the king's delay in taking the cross, in his growing disinterest in crusade during the mounting crises of 1292-1294, and finally in his flagrant borrowing and appropriation of English crusade funds to meet the expense of domestic emergencies in 1276, 1282-1283, and 1293-1294. There is evidence, moreover that in this the king enjoyed the support of the English baronage and clergy.

Secondly, it may be seen that the moral climate in Europe regarding political use of crusade funds had a possible effect upon English policies in the late thirteenth century. The examples of Angevin and papal misuse of the Lyons subsidy appear to have prompted English suspicion followed by determination to ensure local retention of the tenth and its use by Edward alone. As Sir Steven Runciman has pointed out, the papacy in 1285 "emerged with its chief spiritual weapon tarnished."<sup>1</sup> While the ideal of aid to the Holy Land continued to thrive in contemporary theory

---

1.

Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, p. 311.

and practice, hypocrisy over the spending of crusade funds may have weakened the ability of the papacy to conduct such holy projects. As a result, a moral climate of opinion seems to have emerged according to which national leaders felt justified in regulating the ultimate destination of locally-collected crusade taxes.<sup>1</sup>

A doctrine may have consequently emerged in England whereby major control of crusading finance, logistics and diplomacy was assumed by the English crown or clergy. While proceeding cautiously through conventional approaches to papal representatives, the king and his advisors nevertheless seem to have pursued objectives designed to remove major control of the crusade to England and away from Rome. The first manifestations of this doctrine appear in Edward's rejection of proposals for a new crusade and invitations to attend the Council of Lyons. His requests that portions of the crusade subsidy be made available through loans reflects his continued drive for local control over crusading finances. His attempts to sponsor limited English expeditions under Edmund or John of Brittany reveal Edward's desire to use portions of the Lyons grant without committing

---

<sup>1</sup>.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 364-65.

himself to a new project which would interfere with domestic politics. When he finally agreed to crusade in person, Edward demonstrated repeatedly his intention of assuming full control of the new expedition. His requests for unused European crusading funds were accompanied by his increasing control over funds already collected in England, Wales and Scotland; his independent diplomatic offensives in Europe and his local authority over matters of preaching and recruitment were strengthened by Pope Nicholas IV's recognition of most English prerogatives in 1290 and 1291 and in 1301 by Pope Boniface VIII's acquiescence in Edward's seizure of funds; finally, after successfully altering his date of departure in 1287 and 1290, Edward assumed full authority to postpone the crusade indefinitely and to meanwhile use crusading funds for the resolution of domestic conflicts which purportedly delayed the enterprise. In response, then, to English attitudes and to European practice the crusade was increasingly bound to local requirements and to national objectives throughout the reign of Edward I. Such a conclusion may not be tested, however, until we examine the king's adherence to contemporary crusading theory, his sponsorship of national projects in response to papal

or European advice, his role in the preaching and recruitment of crusades in 1268, 1287 and 1290 and his ultimate financial commitment to the defence of the Holy Land. Only then may the pressures of local politics and national interest be fully related to the crusading practice of King Edward I.

III.

PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF ENGLISH

CRUSADE POLICIES

5. Edward I and contemporary theories of  
crusade administration and organization.

Near the end of King Edward's reign, a French propagandist, Peter Dubois, began his treatise on crusading practice:

To the illustrious and most Christian prince Edward . . . Now your wars have been successfully concluded by the favour of the Lord . . . But instead of seeking that ease which other princes have been accustomed to choose after such strenuous and even lighter labors, you are planning to devote your splendid energies to the recovery of the Holy Land and its deliverance from the hand of the infidel . . . and, being in full sympathy with your ambition, with the help and favour of God's boundless wisdom I will now proceed briefly to lay before one so experienced and prudent in warfare as your royal majesty certain proposals which seem to me necessary, convenient, and opportune for the recovery and maintenance of the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup>

Little, perhaps, better illustrates the English king's reputation throughout Europe during the forty years of his continuing involvement with crusades. Yet Peter Dubois's tract reveals more than his admiration for King Edward. It is one of many such treatises that make up a growing body of crusading theory in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, and as such highlights the importance of such contemporary thinking to the policies formulated by Edward and his crusade advisors. In a study of the king's projects

---

1.

Peter Dubois, De recuperatione Terre Sainte, ed. and trans. W. Brandt, pp. 69-70.

concerning the defence of the Holy Land, therefore, it is essential to include a detailed account of the relationship between current theories and English policies.

Undoubtedly, Edward was never free from the influence of such reports and projected theories. His own crusade in 1270 was preceded by a long tradition of military theory, evolving through practice on successive expeditions. In 1269 Edward seems to have held discussions with two experienced crusaders, Richard of Cornwall and King Louis of France. The results of expeditions as recent as those of the French in 1265-1266 or the Aragonese in 1269 may have influenced Edward's military and administrative policies. Upon his return from Latin Syria, moreover, the English king was invited to participate in a great Church council to discuss the future policy and administration of crusades. The ideas expressed at Lyons in 1274 may have influenced the king a great deal, inasmuch as they reflected the European reaction to his own crusade of two years before. Finally, a number of reports and advisory tracts following the loss of Acre and other mainland possessions must have circulated in England and may

have been considered by King Edward.

In studying the relationship between English policies and evolving crusade theory during this period it is possible to become sidetracked in a study of late-thirteenth-century crusade theory, to the practical exclusion of English activities.<sup>1</sup> It is proposed, therefore, to examine the two broad categories of preparation and military action in use and under discussion throughout this period and to relate these to Edward's policies by examining six specific concepts within the two categories: co-operation between European leaders; intelligence and correspondence from the East; Military alliances with the Mongols; the concept of limited expeditions; the garrisoning of the Latin East; and the need to hire mercenary troops on crusade. At every stage a discussion of crusading practice and opinion in the period 1270-1314 will first be undertaken before showing

---

1.

Such a study, in fact, is needed for the late thirteenth century. Throop (Criticism of the Crusade, passim) has dealt mainly with European projects during the pontificate of Gregory X, while Atiya (The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 37-88, 90 ff.) has studied briefly the activity following the loss of Acre in 1291. Additional material may be gathered from relevant sections of Grousset (Histoire des Croisades, iii), Runciman (History of Crusades, iii, and Sicilian Vespers), and Heidelberger (Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende des 13. Jahrhunderts).

how Edward's own policies are related to current ideas.

a. Co-operation between European leaders.

"Co-operation is of course necessary for the great task of recovery and maintenance," wrote Peter Dubois. "The Holy Land can never be regained and held if the war leaders and warriors under them rely on their own strength [only] and consider that sufficient to gain so great a victory . . . ." <sup>1</sup>

There can be little doubt that the French propagandist was supporting an important body of thirteenth-century crusade theory regarding the futility of fragmented expeditions poorly-organized and sent to aid the Franks in the East. Such mismanaged operations were generally condemned by theorists who felt that the recovery of Christian strongholds might only be achieved through the co-ordinated action of large European forces. <sup>2</sup> Co-operation in planning by secular leaders under the supreme guidance of an informed

---

1.

Peter Dubois, p. 88.

2.

See, for example, some of the arguments at the Council of Lyons (King James I of Aragon, Chronica, ed. and trans. J. Forster, ii, pp. 647-48). See below, pp. 248-53.

papacy was a widely-held ideal. Such an effort, however, entailed careful diplomacy in Europe before the combined project might succeed.

The Lord Edward's first experiences of crusade activity may have revealed to him the complexities of preparing such a combined expedition. King Louis IX, perhaps more than any contemporary crusader, openly advocated combined military planning. His industry in securing allies was evident in August 1269 when policies and strategy were agreed upon in Paris with leaders from Flanders, Frisia, Gascony, and England. King Louis initially maintained firm control of this combined operation, outlining arrival and departure dates, arranging details for the conduct of troops on the march through Christian lands, and even granting financial support to leaders of English and Gascon contingents.<sup>1</sup>

The king's attempt to co-ordinate European military efforts was finally clouded by failure, however. While negotiations were continuing in Paris during 1269 a crusade fleet was preparing to sail from Barcelona. This independent action of King James and his two sons reveals the difficulties inherent in

---

1.

See above, pp. 30-32, 121.

binding many leaders to a single objective.<sup>1</sup> Following the French king's departure for Tunis in July 1270, indications are that the remainder of Louis's allies were having difficulty in working according to pre-arranged plans. The Flemish and German contingents had not yet arrived in southern France by the French deadline of 24 June. When they eventually did sail for Tunis their fleet apparently anchored off Sardinia to debate an independent course of military action.<sup>2</sup> Charles of Anjou had made no real attempt to collect shipping in southern Italy until the French had sailed in July.<sup>3</sup> The Lord Edward was not prepared to sail from England until mid-July and bad weather delayed his departure another full month. Eventually, the French king's combined project splintered into four independent forces arriving in Tunis over a five-month period.<sup>4</sup>

---

1.

The Aragonese sailed in September, but were scattered by a storm in the Western Mediterranean. James's two sons carried out military activities after their arrival in Acre some time before December. See Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 183-85; "Eracles," pp. 457; "Annales de Terre Sainte," p. 454. See also above, pp. 23, 32.

2.

Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 556-57, See above, pp. 42.

3.

See Sternfeld (Kreuzzugs, pp. 201-02 ff.) for a discussion of the possible breakdown of communications between Charles and Louis. For Charles's political motives see Runciman, Sicilian Vespers, p. 158 ff.

4.

See above, pp. 35-36, 40-41.

Richard of Cornwall may have offered more advice concerning the disadvantages of a system of alliances prior to departure on crusade. The Earl's own expedition in 1240 had been exemplary of isolated, individually-run crusades. Richard had ignored advice from the pope to abandon his project and to send aid instead to the Latin ruler of Constantinople. In addition, prolonged negotiations with Frederick II had led to confused planning and a dispute over departure dates. Ultimately, the earl had sailed independently, ignoring alliances and co-operation with Pope Gregory IX, with the Emperor Frederick, and with the crusader Count Theobald of Champagne. Made up largely of local English and French recruits, his crusade had arrived in Acre just as other crusaders under Theobald of Champagne were departing for the West.<sup>1</sup>

Reports issued at the Council of Lyons in 1274 failed to come directly to grips with the problems of co-ordinating a new crusade, although military leaders

---

1.

On the Earl of Cornwall's crusade preparations, see Painter: "Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall," pp. 481-85. See also below, pp. 295-96.

reaffirmed the importance of combined efforts.<sup>1</sup> The clergy at Lyons attempted the remedy of one serious problem which had possibly effected the fragmentation of King Louis's crusade in 1270. They laid down careful provisions aimed at preventing a recurrence of the long papal vacancy of 1268-1271.<sup>2</sup> It might have been demonstrated, for example, that the absence of authority in Rome had prompted individual crusaders to ignore deadlines or to disregard plans worked out the previous year. It may have been thought less likely for expeditions like that of the Aragonese in 1269 to depart while a strong pope remained in active control of a combined project. The failure of the delegates at the council to recognize deeper problems underlying the administration of such combined crusades is nonetheless glaring. The absence, for example, of most European leaders should have emphasized the need for more secular initiative before a united project might hope to succeed.

Difficulties handicapping the ideal of a

---

1.

For a more detailed discussion of the military debates marking the Council of Lyons, see below, pp. 248-53.

2.

For the measures affecting a papal vacancy, see C.J. von Hefele and H. Leclercq, Histoire des Conciles, ix, pp. 29-36.

co-ordinated crusade may have increased after the Council of Lyons and may therefore have had a great impact upon the planning of King Edward in England. As European leaders became entangled in the struggle between Charles of Anjou and Peter of Aragon even the papacy sacrificed principles of unity to indulge in power-politics. When Edward opened negotiations for his crusade in 1284 he therefore faced serious problems with regard to forming a co-ordinated European project under the administration of Pope Martin IV. Unless the king wished to conduct a purely English expedition and to leave his kingdom unprotected in the dangerous atmosphere surrounding the Sicilian uprising, he would have to open a personal peace offensive on a wide diplomatic front.<sup>1</sup>

From 1286 until 1291 King Edward pursued the objective of European peace with determination. Charles of Anjou, Peter of Aragon, and Pope Martin IV had all died in 1285, clearing the way for serious proposals. There can be little doubt that Edward's efforts were connected directly with plans for his new crusade and with his search for prospective allies. In May 1286, for example, the English king

---

1.

See above, pp. 164-65, 188-89.

arrived in Paris for his first talks with King Philip IV. Peace between Charles of Salerno and the King of Aragon was discussed at length, but not before the English king had presented proposals for a combined crusade with King Philip.<sup>1</sup> In the following year Edward took the cross at Blanquefort in Gascony. This may have been an attempt to boost recruitment throughout that turbulent region, enabling the king to wedge his crusading goals between feuding parties in France and Spain.<sup>2</sup> On 25 July 1287 the English king negotiated the first of three settlements concerning European peace and the release of Charles of Salerno. It is significant that these initiatives were conducted in the absence of concerted guidance from Rome during the papal vacancy lasting until February 1288. In October 1287 Edward concluded a settlement at Canfran, exchanging hostages with Aragon in return for Charles of Salerno's release.<sup>3</sup> In the same month

---

1. Foedera, i, pp. 665, 672; Chancery Miscellanea, 29/2/2, summarized by M. Salt, "Embassies to France, 1272-1307," EHR, xliv (1929), p. 269.

2.

For Edward's assumption of the cross in Gascony, see below, pp. 297-300.

3.

For more detailed discussions of the king's attempts to bring peace and to secure the release of Charles of Salerno, see Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 256-63.

the king received a large Mongol embassy and talked at length about his plans for a great crusade passage.<sup>1</sup>

In 1288 Edward's plans for a combined crusade broadened, following his diplomatic successes. William de Hotham, a Franciscan friar upon whom the king placed great reliance during this period, was sent to Barcelona, ostensibly to visit friends. As events would show, however, it is more likely that he had instructions to discuss peace with France and Sicily, together with Edward's forthcoming crusade.<sup>2</sup> William returned in time to join a large embassy leaving southern France under Odo de Grandison. Odo and William carried instructions to outline the English crusade project to the pope and to continue independent talks with King Alfonso of Aragon.<sup>3</sup> The embassy set out on 8 May 1289 and had reached Pope Nicholas IV at Rieti by 26 August.<sup>4</sup> During the

---

1.

For Edward's meeting with the Mongols after he took the cross, see McLean, "An Eastern Embassy to Europe in the years 1287-1288," EHR, xiv (1899), pp. 312-15, and below, pp. 241, 244-45.

2.

Exchequer accounts, E 101/352, No. 18 m. 7. On William's relationship with King Edward, see A.E. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, 1282-1302, (Oxford Historical Society, xcvi), pp. 82-87.

3.

Foedera, i, p. 708; Rôles Gascons, iii, nos. 1488, 1495-96; Documents Illustrative of the History of Scotland, ed. J. Stevenson, i, pp. 90-91.

4.

Foedera, i, p. 708; Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 1351.

intervening summer Edward's ambassadors had stopped to negotiate at Gaeta with Alfonso concerning matters of European peace and a new crusade. Accompanied by Raymond the Catalan - probably an interpreter - the English ambassadors discovered King Alfonso's intention of pressing claims designed to take advantage of the recent defeat of French and Angevin forces by his father Peter. The King of Aragon offered terms so threatening to the diplomatic stability of Europe that Edward's ambassadors could hardly have accepted them without protracted negotiations. He offered to send thirty galleys with the English force and to sail in person with 300 knights and some 10,000 foot. In return, however, he demanded the overlordship of Tunis, recognition of the title of King of Jerusalem which he claimed to have inherited as a result of his father's victories over Charles of Salerno, and a firm guarantee of favourable terms in Sicily and Italy. Edward's ambassadors had little choice but to abandon talks and to push on into Italy for the projected meeting with Pope Nicholas.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

King Alfonso's offers may be followed in Bartholomew de Neocastro, Historia Sicula, ed. C. Paladino, in RISNS, xiii, pp. 11<sup>4</sup>-15; Acta Aragonensia... aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II, ed. H. Finke, i, pp. 2-7. Negotiations for Aragonese allies appear to have continued, most probably under the leadership of William de Hotham. See below, pp. 222-23.

The English king's projects for peace and his search for allies were suddenly interrupted in 1289 by news of the fall of Tripoli and of the immediate military threat to Acre. From this point Edward's close co-operation with Pope Nicholas may have led him to alter his crusade plans. Papal advisors were anxious to aid the Franks as soon as possible, sending small expeditions East to build up the garrison there. The king's plans, as we have seen, seem to have involved a negotiated settlement between France, Sicily, and Aragon leading to an alliance and co-ordinated crusade on a larger scale. Edward seems to have placed co-operation with Rome above his other schemes. Cutting into his own crusading funds, he arranged and helped to finance the hastily-prepared passage of a small crusade under Odo de Grandison. Finally, his support for a project under John de Grailly may have also involved English funds and local recruits.<sup>1</sup>

This diversion of English crusaders and resources may have handicapped Edward in the pursuit of his own objective of combined large-scale military action. For while peace between France, Sicily and Aragon was

---

1.

For details of Edward's support for Odo and John, see below, pp. 260-65.

formally arranged by February 1291, the English king seems to have discontinued negotiations with Philip, Charles and Alfonso for a passage to the East under joint command. The death of Pope Nicholas a year later may have further delayed plans for a co-ordinated passage due to the lack of active guidance from Rome.<sup>1</sup> The fall of Acre and loss of Frankish mainland possessions in 1291 may also have played an important role in the king's decision to abandon an active search for major allies. New military tactics were called for under these changed circumstances and allies who had recently concluded a war for naval superiority in the Mediterranean might engage in endless disputes over co-ordinating military operations at sea.

In 1293 and 1294, however, there is evidence that the king's search for allies had not been completely forgotten. Letters between Edward and rulers in Norway, Hungary and Achaia illustrate the king's diplomatic activity in this regard.<sup>2</sup> Edward's diplomatic offensive in Aragon seems to have been

---

1.

See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 282-83. On the possible effect of Pope Nicholas's death upon Edward's crusade plans, see above, pp. 170-72.

2.

Foedera, 1, pp. 760, 788; Ancient Correspondence, Sci/13/66 and 67. See above, pp. 169.

continued also, but with a shift in emphasis from alliance with King Alfonso to simple recruitment among his baronage. In March, Peter de Luna wrote from Sarragosa to demonstrate that the theory of a combined effort might yet be revived:

Your serene majesty has been notified by me, through the offices of the venerable brother of the Order of Friars Preachers [William de Hotham]. . . that I intend to serve under you at your expense, with 100 men, in your crusade army; your majesty might therefore heed my humble request to signify where and at what time [I should serve]. . . that I might prepare my troops.<sup>1</sup>

In the same year Philip de Gastro wrote from Aragon to express a similar desire to join a combined crusade:

Illustrious lord . . . I ask you to respond by letter saying where and at what time [I should meet your army] so that I . . . might be able [at that time] to come with my assembled knights . . .<sup>2</sup>

But by the time King Edward had received these offers, his crusade project had been seriously delayed and perhaps even abandoned. From the beginning of crusade negotiations in 1284 and 1286 Edward seems to have been faithful to contemporary theories of combined

---

1. Foedera, i, p. 787.

2. Foedera, i, p. 793. A third letter of this type has been reprinted in Foedera, i, p. 798.

administration. But resistance to these doctrines in France, Aragon and perhaps even in Rome may have contributed to the delay and eventual abandonment of his own crusade project.

b. Intelligence and correspondence from the East.

Proper administration of crusade projects during the thirteenth century depended increasingly upon preliminary groundwork. This was reflected primarily in the demand for correspondence with the East and the establishment of an active intelligence network there, provisionally keeping Western leaders informed on political and military developments. The necessity for such contact had become evident as political survival for the Latin states grew more dependent upon skillful use of diplomacy. The arrival of a crusade at the wrong time, for example, might upset months of careful negotiating in Acre concerning an alliance with Muslim States exploiting differences between local rivals. The widening gap, moreover, between the objectives of European crusaders and the diplomatic pursuits of military planners in Acre clearly necessitated a dialogue between the two factions before the departure of a new expedition. The view was

widely-held in Syria as well as in Europe, therefore, that crusaders should establish a working correspondence with leaders in the East before setting out in aid of the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup>

In response to this idea there had emerged by the mid-thirteenth-century a tradition of contact between East and West, exclusive of the extensive network of the papacy.<sup>2</sup> The impact of this tradition may be more fully related to the efforts of Edward during this period if the two examples of King Louis of France and Richard of Cornwall are examined. The French king's contacts with religious leaders and with the Military Orders are well-attested.<sup>3</sup> Before Louis's departure on crusade in 1248 extensive groundwork regarding diplomatic and tactical missions in the East had been laid through French correspondence. The king's preparations in Cyprus, for example, were admirable.<sup>4</sup> Contact between French and Latin Syrian

---

1.

See details of such correspondence during the twelfth century in R.C. Smail, "Latin Syria and the West, 1149-1187. TRHS, Fifth Series, xix (1969)."

2.

Perhaps the best discussion of papal correspondence with the East may be found in P. Pelliot, "Les Mongols et la Paupauté," Revue de l'Orient Chretien, xxiii/xxiv/xxviii (1922-1932). See also relevant sections of Throop, (pp. 258, 279-80) and Grousset, (p. 584 ff.)

3.

See Servois, "Emprunts de Saint Louis," passim; Strayer, "Louis IX," pp. 490-95.

4.

See John de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis et Credo, ed. N. de Wailly, pp. 46-47.

leaders continued after Louis's departure from the East because of the continuing presence of an active French garrison from 1254; this contact was broadened to include exchanges between Charles of Anjou and Syrian leaders in 1260, 1263 and 1270.<sup>1</sup> There is every reason for supposing that the Lord Edward himself may have drawn upon a significant amount of information regarding the situation in Latin Syria when he visited the French court on matters of crusade in 1269.

Richard of Cornwall reflected another aspect of this practice of exchanging information. We know little of the groundwork preliminary to his crusade in 1240, but it is significant that at least one contact made during his military activity continued to supply the earl with information long after his return. In 1257 a master of the English Order of St. Thomas brought information to England concerning new developments in the East and a description of the

---

1.

See, for example, "Lettre des Chrétienens," loc. cit.; Hill, History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 67-69. Geoffrey de Sargines remained after King Louis IX had departed from Syria in 1254, and was Seneschal of Jerusalem for a long period. His French garrison played an important role in Syrian politics throughout the decade preceding Edward's arrival in 1271. See references in Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 859, 878, 890 and passim.

arrival of the Mongols northeast of Baghdad.<sup>1</sup> It is possible that similar correspondence from sources cultivated while Richard was active in the East has been lost or undiscovered.

The growing importance of the views and opinions expressed by those in Latin Syria is more apparent at the great church councils summoned to discuss crusades during the thirteenth century. At the Council of Lyons, for example, Pope Gregory X clearly wished to supplement existing information gathered from papal informants in the Latin East and therefore summoned military leaders directly from Eastern Christian States. He called upon them to submit reports to the council which might then be available to new crusaders.<sup>2</sup> This emphasis upon accurate, up-to-date information clearly fits the emerging pattern of preparedness so strongly advocated with regard to new expeditions.

Throughout this period propagandists continued to emphasize the importance of a workable system of communication between East and West. Raymond Lull

---

1.

Matthew Paris, Chronica maijora, vi, pp. 348-50. On the Order of St. Thomas the Martyr, see below, pp. 273-77.

2.

See Throop, pp. 19-25, 214-20. For a partial listing of those military leaders present at the council, see below, pp. 248

and Peter Dubois perhaps represent a culmination of ideas of this nature. The maintenance of centres for gathering information throughout the East accompanied the former's advice to use minor clergy for conversion and religious education.<sup>1</sup> Peter Dubois stressed a reliance upon Eastern Christian informants, leading to an increased knowledge of diplomatic affairs through growing correspondence in hitherto unfamiliar Syrian dialects and languages.<sup>2</sup> Military advice echoed this idea of laying a proper foundation through correspondence. Fulk de Villaret, a master of the Hospital in the early fourteenth century, wrote to the King of France that a detailed account of political and military circumstances in the East was essential before any new project might be launched.<sup>3</sup>

Although there is little evidence that the Lord Edward especially followed contemporary advice during preparations for his first crusade in 1270, it is

---

1.

Raymond Lull, Disputation of Ramon the Christian and Hamar the Saracen, summarized in E.A. Peers, Ramon Lull, p. 331 ff.

2.

Peter Dubois, pp. 114-15.

3.

Cartulaire, iv, no. 4681.

probable that prior to his departure from Sicily in 1271 he received information from French or Syrian sources accompanying the crusade to Tunis. In Cyprus, Edward seems to have known where to take on fresh water and stores but he appears to have made contact with no one of importance before sailing on to Acre in May.<sup>1</sup> English attempts to correspond with Armenian or Mongol sources were under way by September 1271, when an embassy arrived at the court of the Mongol "Camaker."<sup>2</sup>

From the time Edward returned to England until preparations for his second crusade were well-advanced, he maintained an active and informative correspondence with various leaders in the Latin East. An examination of Table D will give some indication of the sequence and volume of this exchange during the decade following the king's departure from Acre. Edward's informants were military and political leaders of importance who were generally well-appraised of the situation in Acre. Hugh Revel and Nicholas Lorgne, for example,

---

1.

Thomas Wykes (pp. 244-45) reported that the prince was received "with honor" in Cyprus, but gives no indication of diplomatic contact with leaders there. It should be remembered that Syrian military commanders with local influence may have accompanied Edward from Sicily. See above, pp. 49-50.

2.

See below, pp. 240-41.

---

TABLE D. Correspondence between Edward I and representatives in the East

---

2 October, 1275	William de Beaujeau to Edward
30 September, 1275	Hugh Revel to Edward
25 November, 1276	Jean and Jacques Vassal to Edward
15 September, 1279	Robert de Cardocio to Edward
5 October, 1280	Bishop of Hebron to Edward
25 September, 1281	Nicholas Lorgne to Edward
5 March, 1282	Nicholas Lorgne to Edward
March, 1282	Joseph de Chauncy to Edward
26 June, 1282	Nicholas Lorgne to Edward
20 July, 1282	Edward to Joseph <sup>de</sup> Chauncy

---

were successive Masters of the Hospital.<sup>1</sup> William de Beaujeau was Master of the Temple.<sup>2</sup> Joseph de Chauncy, probably an Englishman, was Edward's treasurer and an influential member of the Hospital in Acre.<sup>3</sup> Robert de Cardocio was a brother in the Order of St. Thomas, exemplifying the continuing importance of members of the English Order since Richard of Cornwall's return from Latin Syria.<sup>4</sup> Finally, Jean and Jacques Vassal

---

1.

See the letters of Hugh and Nicholas in "Lettres inédites concernant les croisades," pp. 53-55, 58-61.

2.

See "Lettres," pp. 55-56.

3.

See Joseph's letter in Cartulaire, iii, no. 3782. See an English translation of this and of Edward's reply in Palestine Pilgrims Text Society, v, pp. 1-16. On Joseph's connection with the English king, see Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 312, 440, 442.

4.

Mas Latrie, Histoire, ii, pp. 82-83. On Edward's continuing relationship with the English Order see below, pp. 273-77.

were in personal contact with the Mongols, bringing news and information of a new embassy to the West.<sup>1</sup>

The value of this correspondence can be seen immediately. From Robert de Cardocio, for example, Edward learned in 1279 of the lingering civil war between Bohemond of Tripoli and his vassal Guy de Embriaco, Lord of Jubail.<sup>2</sup> Reports from Master William de Beaujeu in 1275 and from the Bishop of Hebron in 1280 carried news of diplomatic affairs and appeals for military and financial assistance.<sup>3</sup> Such information also kept the king up-to-date with regard to the maintenance of the truce signed in 1272. Letters from the Hospital in 1281 and 1282, for example, sounded a note of urgency as its date for conclusion neared.<sup>4</sup> Although Edward does not seem to have acted in response to these appeals, he

---

1.

"Lettres," pp. 56-57. On the Mongol embassy announced by them, see below, pp. 241.

2.

Mas Latrie, Histoire, ii, pp. 82-83.

3.

"Lettres," p. 55; Foedera, i, pp. 586-87. Joseph de Chauncy expressed similar complaints regarding a shortage of provisions in 1282 (Cartulaire, iii, no. 3782). It is significant to view the operations projected for Edmund and John of Brittany against this background of news from the East; See below, pp. 258-59.

4.

"Lettres," pp. 58-59.

nonetheless remained appraised of local feelings in Acre.

The content of letters received in England during the decade following Edward's return from crusade reveals their usefulness to the king and his planners. Written by leaders trained in the observation and reporting of diplomatic or military matters, the reports bear a stamp of documentary precision. Templar Master William de Beaujeau, for example, displayed a style of straightforward military briefing when he wrote to Edward in 1275:

If, as we hope, it should please your royal majesty to hear something about the state of the Holy Land, concerning whose affairs he has a special interest, we have undertaken below to write something on it, even if it cannot be offered in fine language . . .<sup>1</sup>

The master went on to describe in detail military actions covering the preceeding year, which included a valuable assessment of Mongol campaigns to the east of Syria.<sup>2</sup>

Another aspect of the valuable military appraisal conveyed through these reports may be seen in the dispatches of Nicholas Lorgne, Master of the Hospital. One such letter sent in September, 1281, reveals that

---

1. "Lettres," p. 55.

2. "Lettres," p. 55.

reports assembled in Acre were as up -to-the-minute as possible. His description of events to the time of writing seems to have been interrupted by the departure of the last west-bound European fleet of the year. Consequently, Nicholas' first report of the unfolding drama leading to the battle of the Chamelle near Homs failed to include an account of the engagement itself, which occurred in October after the fleet had sailed. Nevertheless, Edward might be satisfied that his dispatch from Acre contained vital information of important military developments sent apparently to the Master from sources within the Mongol forces:

. . . the Mongols have come, meeting little resistance - and Mangu-Timur, brother of Abagha their prince, was himself two days journey from Armenia with 2,000 Mongol horsemen on the day these letters [to us] were written; and [he] should ride through the lands of the Muslims and enter Syria during the month of October next. On the other side, the Sultan of Egypt with all his forces prepares in Damascus and [he] intends to do battle with them . . . .

Further news of the vital campaign could not easily be dispatched until March 1281. At that time, however, the master described to Edward the course of the battle in which contingents from the Hospital had taken part five months before:

The two armies met before the Chamelle . . . [where] the Sultan lost heavily . . . and of all those remaining there were not 500 on horseback who had not been slain or had not fled . . . [But the Mongols] from greed and a desire for booty raided [the Muslim camp] . . . and left the field, as ill luck would have it. For if they had remained on the field that night . . . all of Paganism could have been destroyed.

He concluded with an appraisal which might have influenced Edward and his advisors to consider reopening crusade negotiations with Rome a short time later:

We wish your royal majesty to know that the Muslims are greatly weakened by this coming of the Mongols, for they have suffered great damage - more than at any time since this land was in the hands of the Christians. And the condition of the Christians is therefore encouraged by this, so that if they should receive aid from men-at-arms from overseas they could so cripple Paganism that it could be constrained to do much of what we desire [of it]. . . <sup>1</sup>

The apparent cessation of active correspondence following Edward's receipt of this letter does not necessarily indicate a total abandonment in England of the principle of contacts with leaders in the East. It is possible that the king substituted better means

---

1.

"Lettres," pp. 58-59, 60-61. It is interesting to note that the general optimism expressed by the Hospitaller master is not borne out by subsequent events in the East. See particularly Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 103, 194-95.

of exchanging information during his crusade preparations from 1284 onwards. He maintained far more contact with Mongol embassies during the 1280's for example. Ambassadors may have carried information from sources as valuable as those used earlier, for they may have brought letters and even included personal representatives with whom information might be exchanged: such an ambassador as Gisolfo Buscarellus in 1291 might have carried important reports between London and the East.<sup>1</sup> Edward's increased contact with active crusaders in the late 1280's may also have kept up vital communication links with Acre.<sup>2</sup> And finally, exchanges of information through masters and brethren of the Order of St. Thomas need not have ceased after the letter from Robert de Cardocio in 1279. Members of the Orders were frequently in England on business, and may have carried notes and news back and forth continually throughout this period.<sup>3</sup> It seems probable

---

1.

See below, pp. 242.

2.

His association with John de Grailly, for example, bears examination during the period in which John was Edward's seneschal in Gascony. John's personal contacts in Acre may have been extensive as a result of offices held there in 1272-1274 and of his crusading activities during the late thirteenth century. See Bémont's introduction to Rôles Gascons, iii, pp. xxxiii-xlvii, and above, pp. 136.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 11; 1281-1288, p. 345; Close Rolls, 1279-1288, p. 532. For further contact between the king and the English Order, see below, pp. 273-77.

that contact fell off sharply following the loss of Acre and the collapse of Edward's crusade project, however, and the correspondence which had flourished so dramatically during the decade following his return from crusade was finally abandoned.

c. Military alliances with the Mongols.

Diplomatic and religious contact between Europe and the Mongol states in the East during the late thirteenth century has been the subject of numerous studies.<sup>1</sup> While such contact cannot be isolated from the desire for a purely military alliance, it is nonetheless beyond the scope of this study to discuss it in detail. Rather, an attempt should be made to abstract from the numerous embassies and letters exchanged an emerging doctrine of strategic and tactical co-operation between Mongol and individual crusading leaders. It may then be determined to what extent English crusade policies adhere to this concept and whether application of these policies by King

---

1.

See, for example, Pelliot, "Mongols et la Paupauté,"; J. Richard, "Le début des relations entre la papauté et les Mongols de Perse," Journal Asiatique, ccxxxvi-ccxxxvii (1948-1949); J.B. Chabot, "Relations du roi Argoun avec l'Occident," ROL ii (1894); J.B. Chabot, "Histoire de patriarche Mar Jabalaha III," ROL ii (1894); Grousset, Histoire des Croisades, iii, passim; C. Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, pp. 479-80 and passim.

Edward contributed in any way to the further evolution of the whole idea of military alliances with Eastern rulers.

By the mid-thirteenth century Western military leaders had become aware that a powerful new force was at work in the East. Ambassadors dispatched by the crusader Louis IX in 1249 reported that they had seen

. . . many cities the Mongols had destroyed, and great heaps of dead men's bones. They asked how the Mongols had come to acquire such authority and had killed and ruined so many people . . . And the Mongols answered that within [Central Asia] are enclosed the giant races of Gog and Magog, who are to appear at the end of the world, when Antichrist will come to destroy all things . . .<sup>1</sup>

Mongol incursions into Syria and Armenia brought home the military significance of this new force throughout the 1250's and 1260's. By the end of the century it was a well-established belief that a military alliance with these forces might bring untold military rewards to European endeavours in the East.<sup>2</sup> The theory constantly advanced by churchmen and military leaders throughout this period was enhanced by the assumption

---

1.

John de Joinville, pp. 168-69.

2.

Propagandists such as Raymond Lull, William Adam, and William Durant espoused such a course of action. Of the military and diplomatic recommendations of this period, reports by King Hayton II of Armenia and William de Nogaret followed a similar pattern. See Atiya, Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, pp. 54-56, 64-65, 67, 76.

that Nestorian Christianity had taken firm root in the Mongol hierarchy. Early diplomatic missions in fact relied heavily upon the religious exchanges between Latin ambassadors and Nestorian advisors of the khans.<sup>1</sup> A series of Mongol embassies added to this conviction, since they were headed by prominent Nestorian or Jacobite clergy who frequently confused the secular and religious objectives of their missions.<sup>2</sup>

European support for the establishment of a military alliance with Mongol leaders preparatory to launching new crusade enterprises came from many quarters. King Louis, for example, sponsored embassies to the Mongol court in 1249 and 1254, while other leaders such as King James of Aragon in 1267 followed this practice.<sup>3</sup> Military leaders within the Hospital in Latin Syria openly advocated alliances

---

1.

See, for example, the letter of Prior Philip (Matthew Paris, iii, pp. 396-97), and reports on the embassies of Fr. Laurence and the Bishop of Bethlehem (Annales ecclesiastici, 1247, nos. 30-34; Richard, "début des relations," p. 293).

2.

See Peliot op. cit.; Richard, "Début des Relations," p. 295 ff.; also McLean, "Eastern Embassy," p. 299 ff. See below, pp. 244-45.

3.

For details of the embassy of William Rubruck to the Mongols, see his Itinerarium, trans. W. Rockhill, pp. 163-64, 166-77, 211; King James's embassy was reported by al-Maqrīzī (IB, p. 77).

with the Mongols throughout the late thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup> The papacy continued to propound this doctrine of alliances, launching countless diplomatic missions and relaying letters and announcements of embassies from the Mongols to crusade leaders throughout Europe.<sup>2</sup> Finally, propagandists during the period echoed the support given to such projects by military and religious leaders.<sup>3</sup>

Edward's relations with the Mongols have been examined from the standpoint of cultural or diplomatic exchanges elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> It may be seen from the nature and volume of his contacts (Table E), however, that

---

TABLE E. Embassies and letters exchanged between England and Mongol Persia.

---

1271	English embassy to Mongols
1272	Mongol letter to England
1275	English letter to Mongol Persia
1276-77	Mongol embassy to England
1285	Mongol letter to England
1287	Mongol embassy to Gascony

(Contd.)

---

1. See Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 194-95.

2. See Peliot and Richard, loc. cit.

3. See the tracts of Raymond Lull, William Adam, and William de Nogaret, summarized in Atiya, pp. 54-56, 67, 76.

4. See Chabot, "Relations du roi Argoun," p. 568 ff.; McLean, "Eastern Embassy," p. 299 ff.; Turner, "Unpublished Notices," p. 48 ff.

---

 TABLE E. (Contd.)
 

---

1289-90	Several Mongol embassies to Gascony and England
1290	English letter to Mongol Persia
1290-91	English embassy to Mongol Persia (return to England, 1292)
1303	Mongol letter to England
1303	English letter to Mongol Persia

---

significant relevance to English crusade activity may be abstracted from individual letters and missions. It is noteworthy that interest in an alliance with the Mongols corresponds to crusading activity in England or the Latin East. Exchanges appear more frequent during the periods surrounding Edward's activities in Latin Syria and his preparation for a second crusade in 1285-1291. Additionally, it may be observed that the number of embassies, as opposed to correspondence, increased during periods when English interest in a new crusade was greatest. Negotiations at embassy level are undoubtedly symptomatic of a more meaningful exchange of military information and proposals, and their importance may be illustrated by a brief description of the negotiators taking part.

On 4 September 1271 the Mongols were prepared to reply directly to proposals offered by English

ambassadors at the court of "Camaker." Headed by a crusader, John le Parker, this embassy apparently consisted of two other English representatives, Reginald Russel and Godfrey de Waus.<sup>1</sup> "Camaker's" written reply was vague, although there can be little doubt that practical results of the exchange are evident in the autumn offensive of the Mongols through Syria.<sup>2</sup> Little is known concerning a Mongol embassy dispatched to the West in 1277, although Edward was clearly singled out as a prospective recipient of military proposals.<sup>3</sup> The next full embassy bearing concrete proposals for a military alliance is not encountered until 1287, when a large entourage from Persia toured European courts. Led by a Nestorian monk called Rabban Sauma, the Mongol ambassadors seem to have offered only vague military proposals, although it is impossible to determine the nature of private diplomatic exchanges.<sup>4</sup> Indications of a growing diplomatic offensive by the Mongols are apparent in the arrival of several important embassies

---

1. "Chronica maiorum et vicecomitum," p. 143.

2. See above, pp. 71-72.

3. "Lettres," pp. 56-57.

4. McLean, "Eastern Embassy", pp. 305-18; Chabot, "Histoire de patriarche Mar Jabalaha III," p. 74 ff.

in 1289 and 1290.<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the most important of these was headed by a Genoese named Gisolfo Buscarellus who arrived in London on 5 January 1290. Edward paid the expenses of this embassy during the twenty days the representatives remained in England, receiving them at court over a period of thirteen days.<sup>2</sup> The English king subsequently dispatched his first embassy to the Mongols since 1271. On 12 September 1290 Geoffrey de Langely and two companions set out for the court of Arghun Khan.<sup>3</sup> Geoffrey had joined Edward in the Holy Land in 1271 and seems to have been a close companion of the king's brother Edmund.<sup>4</sup> The English ambassadors joined Gisolfo and his entourage in Genoa and spent nearly two years travelling to Persia and back to England. Records reveal only that they brought a caged leopard for Edward and news of Mongol plans for combined military operations from the East.<sup>5</sup>

---

1. Foedera, i, pp. 713, 742-43.

2. Foedera, i, pp. 742-43; Wardrobe accounts, 18 Edw. I, m.6, summarized in Turner, "Unpublished Notices," pp. 48-49.

3. Close Rolls, 1288-1295, p.145. See Turner, "Unpublished Notices," p. 49 ff.

4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1268-1272, p.588; 1272-1281, p.433; 1281-1288, p.555.

5. See Turner, "Unpublished Notices," pp.47-50. It is possible that a further study of Geoffrey's travels in the East might throw light upon Charles Kobler's contention ("Deux projets," pp. 419-21) that an anonymous crusade tract of 1290-1291 originated from an Englishman in the Latin East who had probable experience earlier during Edward's crusade.

While these exchanges of ambassadors in 1271, 1277, and 1287-1292 undoubtedly point to an increasing discussion of military proposals, it is nonetheless difficult to extract concrete offers or projects for alliance from the vague descriptions accompanying contemporary reports of the missions. For any discussion of military significance, therefore, it is necessary to review some of the letters exchanged between England and the Mongols. Unfortunately, many English letters in particular were written at times when the king seemed determined to avoid concrete proposals on the grounds that he had no intention of departing on crusade in the immediate future.<sup>1</sup>

Several English and Mongol messages, however, do illustrate the degree to which specific proposals for an alliance were sometimes pursued during this period.

Details of English negotiations with "Camaker" in 1271 must, as we have seen, remain speculative, although there is every reason to suppose that a co-ordinated autumn offensive had been worked out.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

See, for example, messages dispatched to the Mongols in 1275 and 1303. (Foedera, i, pp. 520, 949). R. Röhricht, (Regesta, no. 1401) has correctly dated the first of these.

2.

See above, pp. 71-72, 240-41.

Four years later the king dispatched a reply to alliance proposals which outlined Edward's inability to finalize arrangements with Rome before his new military project could be launched from England. The Khan Abagha was simply enjoined to maintain whatever military pressure he might until more concrete English proposals could be offered.<sup>1</sup> In October 1287 English military proposals seem no less vague, in spite of the fact that the king had taken the cross at Blanquefort and appeared anxious to encourage the alliance. Edward is reported to have announced to Rabban Sauma and his emissaries that "we, the kings of these cities wear a cross upon our bodies, and we have no thought apart from this matter." He continued by encouraging the Mongols concerning his military resolve: ". . . and my purpose is renewed, since I have heard that what I planned the Khan Arghun has also devised."<sup>2</sup> No further evidence of English military proposals may be found before 1303, when royal plans for a new crusade were undoubtedly nebulous because the political needs of the realm dominated Edward's policies. Explaining to the Khan Gazan that he might

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 520.

2.

McLean, "Eastern Embassy," p. 314. See Chabot, "Relations du roi Argoun," p. 575.

not contemplate a new crusade while his realm was so impoverished and his enemies so active, Edward closed official contact with the Mongols over the idea of a military alliance in the East.<sup>1</sup>

Letters from the Mongols were generally designed for distribution throughout various European courts, and are therefore not surprisingly filled with vague proposals to be worked out in specific detail later.<sup>2</sup> Nevertheless, two examples provide insight into the type of military conditions offered by the Mongols and may be illustrative of contacts made at embassy-level as well. In 1285, for instance, representatives of Khan Arghun were prepared to offer the suggestion that European crusaders might ". . . send an army to Egypt, so that we, coming from one side, and you on the other, can both with good warriors conquer it."<sup>3</sup> An eye-witness to the encounter between Rabban Sauma and the English king two years later recorded that "when they [Mongol ambassadors] began to speak on the matter of Jerusalem his pleasure was increased."<sup>4</sup> Clearly some

---

1.

Foedera, i, p. 949.

2.

See, for example, letters printed in Chabot, "Relations," pp. 595-97.

3.

Chabot, "Relations," p. 571.

4.

McLean, "Eastern Embassy," p. 314.

concrete proposals may have been offered by the ambassadors in this instance. The most specific Mongol program<sup>me</sup> of military action was outlined in a letter arriving with the Genoese ambassador Gisolfo Buscarellus in 1290. In this message, Arghun Khan reviewed his position and his preparedness with regard to combined military action:

You have said, "When the troops of the Khan open the campaign against Egypt, then will we set forth to join him." Having accepted this message on your part, we announce that, trusting in God, we proposed to set forth on the last month of Winter in the year of the Panther [January 1291] and to camp before Damascus on about the fifteenth day of the first month of spring. If you keep your word and send troops at the appointed date, and if God favours us, when we have taken Jerusalem we shall give it to you. But if you fail to meet us our troops will have marched in vain. Which will it be?<sup>1</sup>

The value of such a military outline of proposals was significant to a crusader like Edward in planning departure dates and provisions in the Latin East for co-operation with the Franks. Coupled with reports from Acre such proposals might form the basis for a working alliance of great military value.

Edward, as we have seen, never departed for the East on crusade after his return in 1272. His proposals

---

1. Chabot, "Relations," p. 604.

for a military alliance with the Mongols therefore never again reached the stage of detailed negotiations apparently marking his first embassy to the court of "Camaker" in 1271. It is obvious, however, that his adherence to contemporary theory regarding such a military alliance followed his interest in a new project to aid the Holy Land. As that interest grew, so diplomatic contact with the Mongols increased, while his declining interest in a new crusade generally was accompanied by a lack of correspondence with them. The nature of proposals by the Mongols was frequently specific as to details of their intended military movements, but English response seems to have been vague in letters or to have been reserved for delivery by ambassadors in 1271 and 1290-1292.

d. The concept of limited expeditions.

Reports submitted at the Council of Lyons in 1274 represent one of the most obvious starting-points for any discussion of crusade policies specifically applied to military operations in the late thirteenth century. Two decades had witnessed the launching of military expeditions under King Louis in 1248, French crusaders in 1265, Aragonese leaders in 1269, and the Lord

Edward in 1270. During this same period, however, Muslim military success had been spectacular. The Christians had suffered total defeat at Damietta, had lost the great fortresses of Safed, Crac des Chevaliers, and Montfort, and had witnessed the collapse of important cities like Antioch, Jaffa and Caesarea. More recently, a combined operation against Tunis had splintered into fragmented crusades unable to furnish effective military aid for long and had gained little of material advantage to the Franks in Acre. At the Council of Lyons, however, all this was under careful review. Significantly, most of the military authorities involved were on hand to offer recommendations to the assembly. The Master of the Temple, William de Beaujeau, was accompanied by Brother William de Corceles of the Hospital. The Bishop of Tripoli was joined by crusaders like John de Grailly and Erhard de Valxery. King James of Aragon represented Western crusade opinion, while assembled clergy from all parts of Europe balanced these views with the feelings of various elements in contemporary society.<sup>1</sup>

---

1.

See "Eracles," p. 464; James of Aragon, Chronica, ii, pp. 647-48.

While little record of these military reports survives beyond the fanciful narration of King James's chronicle, it is nonetheless clear that basic concepts were changing. Criticism of the military handling of crusades was evident, for example, in many of the lengthy tracts submitted by clerical representatives in preparation for further discussion at the council.<sup>1</sup> Military reports delivered personally to the assembly concentrated upon the very nature of crusades, attacking policies in operation as recently as 1273. The most pointed of these was delivered by Erhard de Valjery. This knight was well-qualified to comment on the merits of current policies in 1274. He had taken part in virtually all of the expeditions to the Holy Land since 1248.<sup>2</sup> More significantly, he had participated in the crusade to Tunis in 1270 and probably had sailed on to Acre with Edward the following spring.<sup>3</sup> His attack went

---

1.

See the reports of Bruno of Olmutz, "Bericht an Pabst Gregor X," pp. 58-59, and passim; William of Tripoli, Tractatus de Statu Saracenorum, p. 588; and Humbert of Romans, Opus Tripartitum, p. 204-5.

2.

See Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 911, 915-17.

3.

See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 957n.

straight to the heart of one of the most important controversies over the concept of a general passage to the East, traditionally the objective of crusading kings and princes. "I will tell you what this is like," he argued; "it is like the little dog barking at the big great one, who takes no heed of him."<sup>1</sup>

Supporting recommendations issued by military leaders at the council repeated the idea of abandoning the old concept of a large combined crusade force sailing from Europe. The drawbacks of such expeditions were elaborated by Master William de Beaujeau, who stated that they were often costly, difficult to provision and maintain in the field, and did little long-term military good. He recommended as a partial substitute for this general passage the maintenance of permanent garrisons in Latin Syria. His support for the large expeditions was not completely lacking, but it was nonetheless modified by a newer concept of small periodical expeditions designed to maintain the defences of the Latin East.<sup>2</sup>

It was asserted in these and other reports that

---

1.

James of Aragon, ii, pp. 49-50. The sentence "ara si uos diray una semblanca del chen petit quant ladre al gran Ca [sic] e el non ha cura" has been omitted in the edition by M. Aguiló Y. Fuster (Chronica O Commentaris).

2.

James of Aragon, ii, p. 648.

three advantages might be derived from a policy of launching limited expeditions to the East. First, these smaller forces might act as a deterrent to Mamluk operations during the period in which a larger crusade force was being prepared in the West. King James of Aragon, for example, advised European military commanders to

send to the Holy Land 500 knights and 2,000 foot . . . Send at once that company as vanguard and set the others in motion to cross over. These first will not go to fight, but merely to garrison the fortresses and places needing it, and to hold them until the great expedition or crusade goes.<sup>1</sup>

William de Beaujeau recommended the dispatch of forces numbering between 250 and 300 mounted knights, accompanied by about 500 infantry. Crusades of this nature might be timed to arrive at crisis-points or simply to coincide with periods of manpower shortages in the East. They would be small and manageable, causing no serious drain upon valuable Syrian resources of arms and provisions. The period of time such crusades or expeditions might be required in the East was not stated, although this might presumably be determined by events relating to the preparations for other - perhaps larger - expeditions in Europe.<sup>2</sup>

A second advantage of limited expeditions was

---

1.

James of Aragon, ii, p. 646

2.

James of Aragon, ii, p. 648.

expressed indirectly by the Master of the Temple. He observed that ". . . an expedition to the land beyond the sea require [s] great consideration in matters of arms, food, and especially of men disposed to do the work."<sup>1</sup> Large military passages wishing to overcome these technical difficulties often took a long time to prepare. Even then, these enterprises soon ran short of supplies and willing crusaders upon their arrival in the East.<sup>2</sup> Smaller forces, however, might be recruited and provisioned in little time, would use fewer Eastern resources, and might function more efficiently for short periods than larger expeditions. Particularly in the face of a sudden military emergency in Syria, such forces would be preferable to the traditional large crusades launched in the past. Speed and efficiency, therefore, were advantages which larger undertakings could not offer in an emergency.

Thirdly, the application of the limited expedition concept fitted well with the theory of permanent garrisons so ardently espoused by Frankish leaders in 1274.<sup>3</sup> Experience had shown, for example, that European crusaders were often disposed to leave

---

1. James of Aragon, ii, p. 647.

2. See James of Aragon, ii, p. 648.

3. See below, pp. 266-71.

men and materials behind in Syria in order to reinforce Frankish garrisons there. Large crusades, however, tended to exhaust the financial resources which might otherwise be applied to the support of mercenaries and builders. Preparation of new crusades by major leaders required large amounts of capital which might otherwise be used by permanent garrisons in the East as well. A policy of limited expeditions spaced properly over a long period of time, however, might ensure that a steady supply of reinforcements were available at minimal cost to European rulers. Even smaller Western budgets might be able to cope with this new concept and funds would not be wasted on cumbersome expeditions which exhausted secular treasuries and created ill-will among the local hard-pressed clergy.<sup>1</sup>

The idea of limited expeditions gained acceptance almost immediately. By the end of the century rulers and propagandists were repeating the advice of the crusaders and leaders among the Military Orders at

---

1.

For a discussion of the advantages and emerging practice of garrisoning the East, see below, pp. 266-71.

Lyons in 1274. King Hayton II of Armenia, for example, advocated the launching of limited expeditions from Cilicia and Asia Minor in order to secure advance bases for reconquest.<sup>1</sup> Peter Dubois, in his crusade tract written in the early fourteenth century, appears to have taken for granted the concept of a steady flow of limited expeditions to the East:

Every powerful personage of either sex should be induced to promise that after the route has first been secured he will in any subsequent year provide and send at least to the coast as many warriors as possible, together with funds to aid them further . . .

The added advantage of such a policy in relation to reinforcement for existing Frankish garrisons was not lost on him, either:

. . .; if they should leave their armies on account of death or illness or homecoming, however motivated, they will leave there a specified number of warriors with their arms and banners, together with such outlay as they can conveniently provide.<sup>2</sup>

The practical application of the theory of limited expeditions had gained acceptance even before suggestions were offered at the Council of Lyons. Pope Gregory X seems to have been aware of a prevailing mood among European military leaders in particular when he initiated programs of limited endeavours to aid the Holy Land. He sensed the interest in crusade

---

1. King Hetoum of Armenia, "La Flor des Estoires," RHC arm. ii, pp. 243-276.

2. Peter Dubois, p. 84.

still apparent in the aftermath of the Tunis expedition and during Edward's continuing activity in the East. He was also aware, however, that many leaders were in no position to finance a great passage immediately. There are indications, for example, that King Philip III of France intended to continue his commitment to the crusade, but that the exhausted state of his treasury restricted his response to papal appeals.<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the new concept, Pope Gregory wrote to the French king in 1272, requesting immediate aid for the Lord Edward in the form of a limited military expedition.<sup>2</sup> By the end of the month, some 500 troops were ready to sail east under the leadership of the Patriarch of Jerusalem.<sup>3</sup> Much of this force had been financed by the king of France. It can be seen that the concept of limited expeditions supported current French policy with regard to maintenance of an Eastern garrison and

---

1.

On King Philip's pledge to renew the crusade made in 1271, see above, pp. 46, 48.

2.

Annales ecclesiastici, 1272, no. 5.

3.

Pope Gregory X (Regs., no. 159) described French aid for the expedition. For numbers and results see Röhricht, Geschichte, 965-66.

Philip dispatched skilled troops and technicians the following year also.<sup>1</sup> Pope Gregory's appeals continued to attract military support in the West. In April 1273 a force provisioned and financed by the Holy See and the King of France arrived in Acre under Oliver des Termes. This added a further 125 men to the garrison, although there is no indication of the number of mercenaries the leaders of such a force were capable of financing for a limited period.<sup>2</sup> Late in 1275 another force of 40 knights and some 460 foot sailed from Italy under William de Roussillon. Again papal funds contributed to the expedition, paying for 400 soldiers to serve in the East for one year. The remainder seem to have purchased their own passages and provisions.<sup>3</sup>

The death of Pope Gregory in 1276 seems to have dealt a blow to the application of the policy of limited expeditions. Although appeals continued to be sent from Latin Syria, as exemplified in letters received by King Edward in 1281 and 1282, no new projects set out from Europe. Within five years of

---

1.

Annales ecclesiastici, 1273, no. 35.

2.

See Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 796-803; Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 967-68.

3.

See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 968.

these last requests for material aid, however, European attitudes were changing. King Edward took the cross in 1287 and a long papal vacancy was ended when the ardent Franciscan Jerome of Ascoli assumed the title of Nicholas IV. The revival of a policy of limited expeditions from 1287 to the fall of Acre in 1291 was consequently the product of the English king and the crusading pope.

There is no real evidence that Edward had anticipated future criticism of the general crusade passage when he set out from England in 1270. On the contrary, his continuing support for the doctrine of a combined project of sizeable proportions marked much of English crusade policy throughout the late thirteenth century. Yet English military activity in 1270-1272 bears striking similarity to many of the concepts later apparent in the theory of limited expeditions. The size of Edward's force arriving in Acre in 1271 fits well the suggested proportions of William de Beaujeu at the Council of Lyons three years later.<sup>1</sup> Arab sources, moreover, reported that

---

1.

Edward, for instance, seems to have sailed to Acre at the head of a force of some 300 knights and 700 foot. Master William de Beaujeu (above, pp. 251 ) described an expedition of 300 knights and some 500 foot as practical militarily in 1274. King James of Aragon at the same time suggested an army of 500 mounted knights and around 2,000 infantry.

the prince dispatched a limited force ahead of his own at that time.<sup>1</sup> Edward appears to have left a smaller expedition in command of his brother Edmund, the military goals of which are nevertheless obscure.<sup>2</sup>

Whether or not the small English expedition of 1270-1272 consciously followed an emerging concept of limited efforts, support for such a theory most certainly appears in English crusade plans during the period following Edward's return from Latin Syria. In 1276, for example, the king opened the issue of a limited expedition to be led by Edmund.<sup>3</sup> This idea was reintroduced in Rome in 1280, followed by plans for the dispatch of John of Brittany with an independent force. The political implications of these requests have been outlined, and should not be discounted.<sup>4</sup> Yet there may be a real possibility that Edward found the doctrine of limited expeditions appealing, particularly in the light of letters and

---

1.

Ibn al-Furāt, p. 150; al-Maqrīzī, IB, p. 86. See above, pp. 52-53

2.

See above, pp. 61, 67. Edmund's force was described in a contemporary Frankish account as a "small company", and may have included some fifty to one-hundred mounted knights. See "Eracles," p. 461, and Appendix II, pp. 406-407.

3.

Foedera, i, p. 537. See above, pp. 182-83.

4.

See above, pp. 182-84.

reports from the East stressing the need for immediate military or financial aid.<sup>1</sup> The king's sincere desire to launch such an expedition is supported by the fact that John of Brittany was excused from <sup>PERSONAL</sup>~~important~~ military obligations in the realm for five years in 1279, possibly in anticipation of his projected crusade.<sup>2</sup>

The second Welsh war interrupted such plans and nothing came of the projected passages of Edmund or John. It is just possible, however, that King Edward continued to act as a motivating force behind new limited enterprises leaving Europe in 1287 and 1288. On 18 June 1287 Countess Alice of Blois landed in Acre at the head of a small crusade. In this force were Dutch leaders with whom the English king maintained close family and diplomatic ties.<sup>3</sup> While it is impossible to demonstrate actual English backing

---

1.

See the dispatches of Robert de Cardocio, the Bishop of Hebron, and Templar Master William de Beaujeau, above, pp. 230-32.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 573.

3.

"Annales de Terre Sainte," pp. 459-60; Marino Sanudo, p. 229. The son of Count Florentius of Holland was betrothed to Edward's daughter Elizabeth in 1285-1286. For more significant diplomatic relations regarding English wool trade with Holland see Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 606, 662-64.

for such a project, it is significant that the expedition of 1287 conformed perfectly to the emerging theory of limited enterprises. The major accomplishment of the crusaders, for example, consisted of a refurbishment of the garrison in Acre and the construction of new fortifications on the city's northeastern salient.<sup>1</sup> Count John of Blois provided funds for mercenaries after his return to the West, and Florentius of Holland followed suit.<sup>2</sup> In view of Edward's own assumption of the cross during this activity, it is not improbable that Alice of Blois's limited expedition followed a pattern based upon recommendations of 1274 - with reference to the larger English crusade scheduled to follow.

By September 1288 at least one more small force had set out for Latin Syria at a time when English sponsorship would appear opportune. An expedition was reported in Tripoli at that time under the leadership of John de Grailly.<sup>3</sup> During the 1280's John had

---

1.

Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 245. Alice died in the East on 2 August 1288 ("Annales de Terre Sainte," pp. 459-60; Marino Sanudo, p. 229).

2.

See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 994n.

3.

Les Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 237; Röhricht, Regesta, no. 1480.

acted in the important role of Seneschal of Gascony, serving until 1287.<sup>1</sup> It seems just possible on the basis of some English crusade protections granted during June and July 1288 that John had recruited in England and Gascony.<sup>2</sup>

During the early summer of 1289 news filtered back to the West of the failure of John de Grailly's efforts and of the fall of Tripoli.<sup>3</sup> The loss of this great seaport left Tyre and Acre alone as bases for use by crusaders such as the King of England. Pope Nicholas IV, who may earlier have pursued a policy of limited expeditions in supporting the force sent East under John de Grailly, clearly intended to implement such a practice in response to this new crisis. John had come West in order to organize a new crusade to reinforce the garrison in Acre.<sup>4</sup> The Bishop of Tripoli arrived to preach the cross in Romagna, Ferrara and Venice.<sup>5</sup> By late autumn, over twenty galleys had been

---

1.

See Charles Bémont's introduction in Rôles Gascons, iii, p. xxxvii ff.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1292, p. 297.

3.

The port fell on 26 April, 1289. For the best account, see Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 233 ff.

4.

Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., nos. 2162, 2252-58, 2269.

5.

Röhricht, Regesta, no. 1494; Andrew Dandolo, p. 402.

prepared and more were promised by the Venetians, among whom the new crusade appeal was having unlooked-for success. It soon became obvious that a limited expedition was to be launched in the spring or summer of 1290.<sup>1</sup>

In August 1289 Pope Nicholas may have urged Edward's negotiators Odo de Grandison and William de Hotham to help in the outfitting of a limited expedition.<sup>2</sup> While the king had generally offered support for the concept since 1276, it had never conflicted with the preparations for his own combined operation planned for the near future. By August 1289, however, negotiations over five years with the papacy had thus far failed to produce a satisfactory settlement concerning Edward's use of a new crusade tenth and arguments were still continuing over his receipt of portions of the Lyons subsidy. With financial matters in Rome still unresolved and with difficult diplomatic and military preparations continuing in England and throughout Western Europe, it was on the face of it dangerous for the king to

---

1.

Andrew Dandolo, p. 402; Röhrich, Regesta, no. 1496; Annales ecclesiastici, 1289, nos. 68-69.

2.

Pope Nicholas requested such aid from Edward on 13 August (Foedera, i, p. 712). For details of the English Embassy, see above, pp. 219-21.

divert resources to support Pope Nicholas's new limited expedition.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, it appears as if specific proposals involving the dispatch of an English limited expedition were worked out at this time. Edward's personal instructions to his negotiators Odo de Grandison and William de Hotham do not survive, although it is important to remember that the king was keenly interested in gaining a satisfactory crusade taxation grant.<sup>2</sup> It does seem apparent, however, that before his return to England in December 1289 Odo de Grandison had been chosen by the king and the pope to lead the new limited English expedition the following year.<sup>3</sup>

The crusade of Odo de Grandison has not been much studied.<sup>4</sup> It is advisable, however, to relate here only those activities in the East which apply specifically to the concept of limited expeditions,

---

1.

See above, pp. 190-91, 219-21.

2.

For a detailed account of Edward's attempts to gain financial concessions in Rome, see Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 339-40.

3.

After discussions with King Alfonso of Aragon, Odo had met the pope in August 1289. By 31 December he and his embassy were again in London. See Stevenson, documents, i, p. 136, and above, pp. 219-21.

4.

See C.L. Kingsford, "Sir Otho de Grandison," TRHS Third series, iii, (1909) which is generally unsatisfactory in its coverage of the English crusade. A valuable source has been published by Kohler ("Deux projets," loc. cit.)

reserving other important aspects of the crusade for examination elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> It can be shown, for example, that the preparation of this limited expedition matched the models outlined at the Council of Lyons. Odo's English crusade was readied in record time if one considers the fall of Tripoli to be the primary motivating factor. Within less than a year of the arrival of the news of the disaster, Odo and many leading barons of the realm had taken the cross, had made financial arrangements, had taken on provisions, and were ready to sail for the continent where vessels would be waiting to take them to Acre.<sup>2</sup> Negotiations with the papacy had been sliced to a minimum, thanks to the common interest of Odo, King Edward and Pope Nicholas.

The role of the English king in this matter of Odo's crusade bears further examination. It is clear that even a limited endeavour such as that projected in London and Rome would ultimately need additional financing. The arrangement of transport alone could be dangerously time-consuming without resources and hard cash ready to hand. Subsequent entries in papal records reveal that 3000 marks was granted from the

---

1.

See below, pp. 303, 305-07, 355-56, 367.

2.

See Kingsford, pp. 137-44, and below, pp. 303, 305-307.

English tenth to Odo de Grandison,<sup>1</sup> while King Edward showed further interest in the project by granting an identical sum in July 1290.<sup>2</sup> Edward's financial support extended to the additional grant of all crown revenues in Guernsey and Jersey during the period Odo was crusading in the East.<sup>3</sup> Additional grants, such as that of Archbishop John le Romeyne of York, may also have been encouraged by the English king.<sup>4</sup> Continuing royal support for the theory of a limited expedition may be seen in this financing and in English recruitment for the crusade of Odo de Grandison.

While the doctrine of limited expeditions to the East cannot definitely be shown to have motivated the Lord Edward in 1270-1272, he seems to have expressed interest in such operations during the remainder of his crusade activity. The support of popes like Gregory X and Nicholas IV may have encouraged English planners to consider such a policy.

---

1. Pope Boniface VIII, Regs., no. 4490.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1292, p. 373, listing the king's grant on 13 July 1290. On 14 October, the Ammanoti banking family of Pistoia received 3000 marks to repay the crown's debt to Odo (Extracts from the Liberate Rolls," ed. E.A. Bond, Archaeologia, xxviii (1840), no. XCII).

3. Rôles Gascons, iii, no. 1924.

4. See Kingsford, p. 137 n. and below, pp. 367.

In the case of Pope Nicholas, moreover, Edward seems to have been induced to abandon critical resources intended for use in his co-ordinated effort in 1290 and 1291. English initiative continued in spite of lack of support from Pope Nicholas III and Pope Martin IV. Perhaps in view of the ultimate failure of such limited expeditions in 1288 and 1290 to hold Tripoli or Acre, however, the king seems to have abandoned active support for the policy.

e. The garrisoning of the Latin East.

The launching of limited expeditions in the thirteenth century was closely allied to a more general concept of continuous support for the military defence of Latin Syria. Debates at the Council of Lyons stressed the importance of limited expeditions for reinforcing existing eastern garrisons until larger forces might be prepared.<sup>1</sup> As we shall see it was easier with limited finances to pay for mercenaries and to improve existing fortifications than to prepare large crusades. Such practices were traditionally encouraged by leaders of the Military Orders in whose interest was the improvement of defences in the

---

1.

See above, pp. 252-53.

Christian states in the East.

The practice of providing Latin Syria with continuous military and financial aid was carried out largely by crusaders who had played a leading role in great expeditions from Europe, but occasionally by lesser magnates and papal representatives as well. Fortifications were built and strengthened by European crusaders, mercenaries were left for campaigns and garrison duty after the departure of crusades, and funds were poured into Syria to maintain permanent bodies of armed men committed to the defence of the Holy Land. Coupled with similar aid from the Church, the contribution of European leaders to the garrisoning and fortification of the Latin East was considerable, and bears deeper examination.

Activity of this sort seems to have taken any of three forms. First, many crusaders financed the construction of new fortifications or the general repair and upkeep of existing defences in the Holy Land. With regard to the crusade of Theobald of Champagne, for example, Duke Henry of Burgundy began to repair the defences of Ascalon.<sup>1</sup> In the following

---

1.

See Runciman, History of Crusades, iii, pp. 217-18.

year Richard of Cornwall continued the expensive task.<sup>1</sup> In 1250 King Louis of France began perhaps the most ambitious of all European projects, fortifying Caesarea, Safad, Jaffa and Sidon during his stay in the East. He continued work on the defences of Acre and left behind personnel and resources for the construction of walls and towers in the city.<sup>2</sup> The work of his papal legate in 1254 reveals the extent to which relatively minor European leaders contributed to the defences and fortifications of the Latin East.<sup>3</sup> Later in the century Alice of Blois and her companions continued the tradition by fortifying Acre.<sup>4</sup>

Secondly, influential crusaders during this period maintained military units in the Holy Land, sometimes for long periods after their departure for the West. At times these troops were in the service of a lesser crusade leader who might remain in the East or periodically return west in order to prepare a limited expedition. Forces such as those commanded

---

1. See Painter, pp. 482-84.

2. See John de Joinville, pp. 184-85, 209-12.

3. John de Joinville, p. 218.

4. Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 245; see above, pp. 259-60.

by Geoffrey de Sargines, Oliver des Termes, William Roussillon and especially John de Grailly may be ranked in this category.<sup>1</sup> At other times a departing crusader left funds for the subsequent payment of garrison troops or independent crusaders willing to serve for pay in the East. Such garrison forces as those maintained by Florentius of Holland and John of Blois in 1287-1288 exemplify this practice.<sup>2</sup> Finally, usage established by King Louis and continued by the French crown provided for the maintenance of a permanent French garrison under the leadership of trusted allies or personal representatives. For over thirty years after King Louis's departure from Acre in 1254 this national garrison played an important role in the defence of the Latin East which has been insufficiently analysed.<sup>3</sup>

Thirdly, European leaders supported existing military bodies in the Latin East through contributions or direct political involvement. In the case of some

---

1. See Röhricht, Geschichte, pp. 890, 893-95, 951, 953, 976-77, 1003-08.

2. See Röhricht, Geschichte, p. 994n.

3. Röhricht (Geschichte, pp. 943-44 ff) remains possibly the best-documented study, although little analysis or interpretation has been attempted. See also Grousset, Histoire, iii, pp. 556-62.

nationally-based Orders, such as the Teutonic Knights or the Order of St. Thomas the Martyr, European contributions and political influence appear to have been strong.<sup>1</sup> There is additional evidence that Europeans supplied men and materials to organizations described as "confraternities."<sup>2</sup> Such bodies seem to have consisted of units recruited generally in European towns for the support of the Latin East. Although only eight confraternities are definitely known, there is evidence of their crusading nature and of their implicit connection with the theory of European garrisoning of the Latin East. The confraternity of crusaders from Chateaudun, recruited in 1247 on the basis of service to the defence of the Holy Land, illustrates the type of membership usually encountered in such organizations.<sup>3</sup> The confraternity of St. Spiritus seems to provide the best example of the crusading nature of these organizations. Composed

---

1.

See below, pp. 273-77. It is interesting to note that Edward I contributed forty marks annually to the treasury of the Teutonic Knights. This seems to have represented a continuation of English royal support in lieu of payments on English lands granted by Henry III. See Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, p. 98.

2.

On this subject see particularly Riley-Smith, "A note on Confraternities in the Kingdom of Jerusalem," to be published in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research. I am indebted to Dr. Riley-Smith for his permission to study this article before its publication.

3.

See a letter of Pope Innocent IV, (Register, ed. E. Berger, no. 2644).

of Italians, brethren were required to bear arms and to follow a standard into battle against the enemies of the Cross whenever campaigns were undertaken.<sup>1</sup>

The confraternity of St. Spiritus was important enough in 1291, moreover, to command a section of the walls of Acre in the custody of the Templars and to supply one of the eight commanders named for the defence of the city.<sup>2</sup>

With a tradition of various forms of assistance for the defence of Latin Syria firmly established in Europe by 1270, it is important to consider English policy from that point until the end of King Edward's reign. It will be seen that Edward in some manner implemented each of the practices discussed above. He provided for the continued defence of Acre by constructing important fortifications in 1271-1272, by promoting the affairs of the Military Order of St. Thomas, and by supporting one of the eight known confraternities in Acre. A discussion of these English policies may perhaps throw new light upon the

---

1.

From a letter of Pope Alexander IV (Register, ed. C. B. de la Roncière et al., no. 346).

2.

"De excidio urbis Acconis libri II," ed. E. Marténe and U. Durand, Veterum scriptorum et monumentum amplissima collectio, v, col. 766.

concept of garrisoning the Latin East in the late thirteenth century.

English and European sources reveal that the Lord Edward began the construction of a tower to strengthen the outer walls of Acre while he was in the East. The early fourteenth-century chronicler Francis Pipinius described how the English crusader had arrived in Acre and had "remained there nearly three years; and he constructed a tower in that place."<sup>1</sup> By 1278 work had been finished on "the tower which the king had caused to be built in Acre."<sup>2</sup> A map drawn around 1285 by Paulinus Puteoli indicates a "turris Anglorum" on the section of walls defended by Cypriot and Teutonic Knights in 1290-1291.<sup>3</sup> Marino Sanudo's well-known map of Acre, executed in the fourteenth century, shows a similar tower in this position, built adjacent to the tower built apparently by the Countess of Blois in 1287-1288.<sup>4</sup> The King of Cyprus apparently added

---

1. Francis Pipinius, p. 71<sup>4</sup>.

2. Patent Roll 7 Edw. I, no. 94, m. 26. See below, pp. 277, 338-39.

3. One of the redactions of Paulinus's map is provided by E. Rey in Mémoires de la Société nationale des Antiquaires de France, opposite p. 144.

4. Marino Sanudo, p. 14(a).

fortifications on the same section of walls during the 1280's.<sup>1</sup>

English interest in the concept of contributing to Eastern garrisons is illustrated by the activities of the Order of St. Thomas and the Confraternity of St. Edward the Confessor. English support for the Order of St. Thomas seems to have represented a tradition in evidence since the Order's foundation around 1191. Established largely as a result of English participation on the Third Crusade, the brethren of this Order assumed many traditional characteristics of the Temple and Hospital. They established a church and hospital in Acre, where their master "made it his business to attend the poor, and especially the burial of the bodies of those who had perished from disease, as well as those slain in battle."<sup>2</sup> There is little evidence of the precise time at which the Order assumed predominantly military characteristics, although brethren seem to have been early affiliated with the Templars.<sup>3</sup> In 1236 they

---

1.

See Hill, History of Cyprus, ii, pp. 68-69.

2.

Roger of Wendover, Chronica, sives flores historiaram, ed. H.O. Coxe, (English Historical Society), i, pp. 178-79.

3.

See Pope Gregory IX, Register, ed. L. Auvray, no. 3005. See W. Stubbs, "Introduction" Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi, in Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, (Rolls Series, 38), p. cxiii.

wore similar habits to the larger Order and Matthew Paris remarked on their close relationship with the Temple in 1238.<sup>1</sup> Throughout the thirteenth century brethren of the Order bore the title milites and there is evidence that they were active in defence of Acre in 1291.<sup>2</sup> Like other privileged Military Orders they guarded jealously their rights under the direct authority of Rome.<sup>3</sup>

The Order's English activities appear to have attracted most of Edward's interest and it is generally through this that a royal policy of involvement may be observed. One fourteenth-century account, however, described a real military contribution by the king to this English organization. It was reported that the Order of St. Thomas maintained a body of troops at Edward's expense during the final stages of the city's resistance in 1291.<sup>4</sup> Entries in English records

---

1.

See Pope Gregory IX, Regs., no. 3005; Matthew Paris, iii, p. 490. Matthew (v, p. 745) indicated that they sided with the templars in 1259 over local disputes.

2.

Pope Gregory IX, Regs., no. 3005; John Peckham, Registrum, i, p. 44.

3.

See a letter of Pope Gregory IX (Regs., no. 2944) supporting the Order in a claim against the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

4.

"Chronicon equites Teutonici," ed. P. Matheus, Veteris aevi analecta, v, p. cclxiv. See Kingsford, p. 139.

nevertheless reveal a high degree of political activity by brethren of the Order in Britain, while their role in the Latin East is rarely mentioned.<sup>1</sup> The king's interference in some of this activity may mark simply the tendency of the crown after 1286 to extend royal patronage at the expense of papal institutions within the realm.<sup>2</sup> This appears to be the case, for example, in a debate before parliament in 1314. It was claimed by the Order that King Edward I had appointed Henry de Dunholm as master of the brethren by letters patent, probably some time after 1292. The claim mentioned that Edward had also "set his hand against the Templars" in this affair, indicating perhaps the continuing tie between the two Orders. The king's appointment of Henry seems to have gone unchallenged until Henry's death and replacement by the legitimately elected Edmund of London.<sup>3</sup>

Evidence of the interest expressed by Edward in

---

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 11; 1281-1288, p. 345; Close Rolls, 1279-1291, p. 532.

2. See A. Deely, "Papal Provision and Royal Patronage in the early Fourteenth Century," EHR xliii, (1928), pp. 505-09.

3. Rotuli Parliamentorum, (Record Commission) i, p. 287.

members of the English Order may be taken from his correspondence with Robert de Cardocio in 1279 and from the use he made of skilled craftsmen and builders belonging to the organization.<sup>1</sup> Master Robert de Beverly and brother John, for example, held posts in 1276 supervising construction work in the Tower of London. At the same time, they were instructed to audit the accounts of royal and papal collector Giles de Audenarde; and here they seem to have been given substantial responsibility regarding his collection of the crusade tenth in England.<sup>2</sup> It is apparent, however, that Robert de Beverly maintained little contact with the Order in Acre. He was described as King Henry's plasterer during the period Edward was absent on crusade.<sup>3</sup> It is possible from these cases that Edward's relationship with members of the Order of St. Thomas was one of reliance upon skilled personnel, as in the case of Joseph<sup>de</sup> Chauncy of the Hospital, who seems to have acted as English treasurer for seven years following the prince's return

---

1.

On the King's correspondence with brother Robert de Cardocio, see above, pp. 230-31.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 123; Close Rolls, 1272-1279, p. 444.

3.

Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, pp. 43, 79, 80.

from crusade.<sup>1</sup>

King Edward's adherence to the policy of maintaining European garrisons in the Latin East is perhaps best represented by his support for the English confraternity of St. Edward. The king appointed a provost and members of the new confraternity in December 1278. They were specifically instructed "to preserve and maintain the tower in Acre which the king caused to be built."<sup>2</sup> No further indication of the function of this confraternity exists, although it is apparent that its defence of Acre was considered to be of importance. Of greatest significance is the fact that membership and leadership on the confraternity seems to have been English and that the king maintained the power to appoint members. Clearly Edward's authority over this body of troops may have given him an important link with the active defence of Acre. Together with his ties with the Order of St. Thomas and later his full or partial endorsement of crusaders such as Odo de Grandison and John de Grailly, this military presence in the East seems to provide an example of English support for the concept of garrisoning the Holy Land.

---

1.

See above, pp. 130, 230.

2.

Patent Roll 7 Edw. I, no. 94, m. 26.

f. The need to hire mercenary troops on crusade.

The application of theories involving the dispatch of limited expeditions and support for garrisons in the East depended to a large extent upon the use of paid mercenaries. Throughout the thirteenth century they played an increasing role in the Holy Land and elsewhere on crusade. By the 1260's, for example, a large portion of troops used by the Templars and Hospitallers were mercenaries. Garrison forces in Latin Syria were almost universally made up of regularly-paid troops often subsidized by European funds. Crusades formed during the thirteenth century recruited highly-paid bands of crossbowmen and military specialists before departing for the East. The advantages of skilled mercenaries had become increasingly apparent throughout Europe during this period, and their tactical role in the Latin East soon followed accordingly. It is hardly surprising to find growing concern among crusaders and Frankish military leaders surrounding the proper use of paid troops on campaigns in the Holy Land.

Three developments appear to have increased the reliance upon mercenary forces. The first involves

the logical outcome of crusade policies during the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. As great European crusades departed from the East arrangements were concluded for the continued defence of the Holy Land. A growing body of adventurers and experienced military men remained in Latin Syria. Following the Latin conquests in Greece and Cyprus the size of the pool of reserves increased as more mercenaries took service with princes and nobility in those areas. Together with a reserve of native mercenaries, these forces represented a body of local soldiery upon which crusaders might draw as long as wages could be provided or contracts maintained. Replying to the papal legate of King Louis's crusade in 1250, John de Joinville remarked:

. . . so let the king spend some of his own resources in procuring knights from the Morea and other parts overseas. When they hear that he is paying well and generously, knights will come flocking in from everywhere, so that, please God, he will be able to hold the field for a year.<sup>1</sup>

It was probably from such personnel that mercenaries were drawn for the garrison duty for which departing leaders often provided funds.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>. John de Joinville, pp. 151-52.

<sup>2</sup>.

See above, pp. 268-71. See also LaMonte, Feudal Monarchy pp. 166-167.

A second development in crusading practice involved the gradual abandonment of purely voluntary forces recruited for new crusades. Canonical doctrines of commutation and substitution quickly replaced earlier emphasis upon personal service. In the crusade bull of 1199, for example, appeals were made to European leaders to supply trained mercenaries at their own expense for a two-year period, in place of leaving by themselves on a general passage overseas.<sup>1</sup> In 1213 Pope Innocent III repeated this request, extending to three years the period during which skilled mercenaries might be required.<sup>2</sup> By the mid-thirteenth century crusade preaching had evolved careful doctrines expediting commutation of vows through a monetary payment or through the purchase of a skilled military substitute to serve in the East.<sup>3</sup>

The third development affecting the use of mercenary troops on crusade involved the rapid changes in economic and political circumstances throughout Europe at this time. Increased efficiency in taxation

---

1.

See E.J. McNeal, "The Fourth Crusade," History of Crusades, ii, p. 154.

2.

See T.C. Van Cleve, "The Fifth Crusade," History of Crusades, ii, p. 379.

3.

On the subjects of commutation and substitution, see below, pp. 317-23.

and the growing difficulties involved in obtaining traditional feudal service led to a generally-accepted practice of purchasing mercenaries for varying periods of service. By 1270 armies were largely made up of troops receiving payment of some kind.<sup>1</sup> In the crusading field, this development was accompanied by new systems of efficient clerical taxation. The first crusade tenth, levied in 1199, opened the way for sophisticated collection and dispersal of receipts directly to active crusaders in the East.<sup>2</sup> With a concurrent improvement in banking practices, these developments enabled European crusaders to draw quickly upon large reserves of cash. With these they might easily finance mercenary forces for long periods and could use skilled troops in place of unreliable volunteers.

Having examined briefly the reasons for the increasing use of mercenaries on crusade, it is important to look at the military personnel involved

---

1.

The best examples may in fact be drawn from the activities of Edward himself. His use of Gascon mercenaries in the 1260's was continued after his return from crusade and reached significant proportions during the Welsh and Scottish wars later in his reign. See Powicke, Henry III and the Lord Edward, pp. 47-48 ff.; J.E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I, pp. 132-33 and passim.

2.

For a discussion of this taxation and its effect in England, see Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 240-42, and below, pp. 367-73.

and at the methods used to contract them for service in the Latin East. In general, crusade leaders might draw upon four distinct categories of mercenary troops. In Europe, skilled technicians such as crossbowmen, engineers, or masons were often recruited to sail with a new crusade.<sup>1</sup> The Hospitallers in Acre relied to some extent upon mercenary crossbowmen, possibly recruited in Europe for permanent service in the East.<sup>2</sup> Upon arrival in Latin Syria, crusaders might secondly offer regular wages to troops already in the East. John de Joinville, for example, was requested by King Louis in 1250 to serve longer in the East although perhaps such service cannot be classed as strictly mercenary. "Certainly I can," he reportedly answered, ". . . either at my own expense or at someone else's". Ultimately, Louis's commanders had to admit that they ". . . dare not give him as much as he demands."<sup>3</sup> Thirdly, troops might be contracted from nearby Latin states such as Cyprus or the Morea. James of Ibelin, for example, pointed

---

1.

See, for example, Thesaurus, ii, no. 402; Pope Gregory X, Regs. nos. 796-803.

2.

Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 326n.

3.

John de Joinville, pp. 154, 156.

out to the Lord Edward in 1271 that the baronage of Cyprus had served King Louis for pay very much in this capacity.<sup>1</sup> Finally, European crusade leaders had the option of paying native forces, generally described as turcoples. These were usually native cavalry or garrison troops serving for regular pay. The Military Orders relied upon them to such a degree that the Hospitallers in 1248 maintained a special turcopolier for their command and organization.<sup>2</sup> In 1258 a number of these mercenaries were recorded in the Hospitaller garrison at Acre, and it is possible that their use by European crusaders was considerable.<sup>3</sup>

European mercenaries in the East were generally free to contract independently when new crusaders arrived. Mercenary contracts in the Kingdom of Jerusalem were by law renewed monthly and could not be broken before thirty days had expired. Cases involving breach of contract were reviewed before the High Court in Acre. Mercenaries themselves might terminate service for the purposes of entering a religious order, marrying, inheriting a fief, or

---

1. See "Document relatif au service militaire," p. 432.

2. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 325.

3. Les Gestes des Chiprois, p. 154.

taking the cross. Those who ended service for other reasons usually forfeited their harness and weapons. In cases of default by more common mercenary soldiers their hands were pierced with a hot iron.<sup>1</sup>

Evidence for Edward's adherence to accepted policies regarding the use of mercenaries on crusade depends primarily upon a study of his activities in 1271-1272. Incentives to proceed according to current usage were not lacking. As early as 1267, Pope Clement IV encouraged the purchase of English or French crossbowmen with funds collected for use on crusade.<sup>2</sup> In 1271 German crusaders took paid service with Charles of Anjou, and it is possible that some were paid to continue to Acre as well.<sup>3</sup> One English chronicler clearly alluded to Edward's use of paid troops during a part of his campaigning in Latin Syria at least:

. . . when Edward had been a long time waiting in Acre for aid from the Christians and the Mongols . . . he finally dismissed all of his mercenary forces [stipendiariis] at Acre and crossed the sea to land in the Kingdom of Sicily . . .<sup>4</sup>

Finally, in an undated letter of Pope Gregory to the

1. John of Ibelin, "Livre," pp. 211-12.
2. Thesaurus, ii, no. 402, cols.
3. Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 555-56.
4. Flores, iii, p. 29.

Patriarch of Jerusalem, some support may be found for the claim that the Lord Edward had in fact hired mercenaries on crusade. The pope complained to the legate preparing a new limited expedition that much of the money raised for King Louis's crusade had been wasted through the employment of ineffective mercenaries in the Latin East. It seems from the wording of this document that reference was being made to activities following the abandonment of the Tunis crusade.<sup>1</sup>

When Peter Dubois had completed his theoretical contribution to the conduct of crusade operations, he invoked King Edward ". . . After successfully concluding [your] wars, to demand that these things be done and to see that they are carried out."<sup>2</sup> This appeal to adhere to contemporary crusade ideas was addressed to a ruler who had obviously put many such theories into practice over a period of nearly forty years. From the time King Louis's death and the collapse of the Tunis crusade had placed him in a position of responsible command, Edward's actions

---

1.

Pope Gregory X, Regs., no. 797. It seems possible from the terms of this letter to place it with two others directing the hiring of mercenaries by Oliver des Termes in 1273 (Regs., nos. 796, 798).

2.

Peter Dubois, p. 72.

reveal some harmony with developing theory and established practice.

In the realm of pre-crusade administration the English leader followed theories advocating combined expeditions prepared after careful correspondence with the Latin East. Having decided to launch a second crusade in 1286 the king proceeded along a diplomatic course designed to bring about peace in Europe and to gain political allies for his new venture. European negotiations followed the political changes of 1285 as Edward sought a crusade alliance with rulers like Alfonso of Aragon and Philip of France. His search for allies continued in some respects after the fall of Acre and his increasing concentration on domestic issues in 1292. In 1292 and 1293 Edward was still receiving replies to this initiative from Hungary, Norway and Aragon.

King Edward's reliance upon up-to-date information from reputable Eastern sources was also in line with current theory. During the decade following his return from crusade, the king corresponded with military leaders in the Hospital, the Temple, and the Order of St. Thomas, as well as with churchmen and Mongol representatives in the Latin East. This

correspondence revealed to him important developments, including news of civil disputes, changes in foreign policy, military campaigns by the Mongols and the various attitudes of leaders in Cairo and Damascus. Such an exchange was undoubtedly useful to the king and his crusade advisors in formulating other policies throughout this period.

Contemporary advocacy of a military alliance with the Mongols was also accepted by Edward. The results of one embassy may have affected the Lord Edward's autumn campaign in 1271. This military alliance with Mongol leaders was pursued until 1303. Several Mongol embassies arrived in Europe to coincide with preparations for the English crusade during 1287-1291. Although Edward's correspondence rarely included specific details of allied operations, there can be little doubt that he fully appreciated the wisdom of contemporary thought in maintaining diplomatic contact with prospective Mongol allies.

In response to specific military recommendations put forward during the late thirteenth century, Edward seems to have implemented many aspects of current theory and practice. English programmes involving use of limited expeditions are illustrative of this adherence. The king proposed at least two

such expeditions prior to 1282 and may have at least approved of the efforts of Alice of Blois and John de Grailly in 1287-1288. When Acre appeared in danger in 1289-1290 the English ruler diverted important resources from his own crusade to support the limited expedition of Odo de Grandison.

Edward's adherence to doctrines involving the continued defence of the Holy Land is also manifestly evident. Following accepted policies in operation throughout the thirteenth century, the king constructed additional fortifications on the walls of Acre and supported the English confraternity of St. Edward to garrison his fortifications in the East. Together with his contacts in Latin Syria, this active concern for the continued defence of Acre demonstrates the degree of involvement Edward maintained in the military affairs of the Latin East.

6. Preaching and recruitment in England, 1265-1295.

Crusades were preached in England in 1264-1271 and 1289-1294. It is likely that preaching was carried out in Gascony during the same periods, as well as in 1237-1288 when King Edward took the cross there. Within a thirty-year period, therefore, crusade preaching and recruitment may be studied in some detail with a view toward determining the degree to which papal authority extended over the negotium Terrae Sanctae in the late thirteenth century, together with the effects of papal vacancies in 1268-1271, in 1287-1288, and in 1292-1294. At the same time it is possible to examine the apparently growing English control of crusade recruitment and finance against the background of diminishing papal authority in matters of preaching and the granting of inducements to crusaders. The application in England of contemporary canon law can also be studied, particularly with reference to those elements concerned with peace in Europe, crusade indulgences, papal composition, commutation and substitution.

a. The authority and methods of papal envoys to England or Gascony.

The legate of Pope Clement IV.

On 29 October 1265 Ottobuono Fieschi, Cardinal

Deacon of St. Adrian's, arrived in Dover as the apostolic legate of Pope Clement IV. Since the stormy career of the legate Otho in 1237-1241, no special papal representatives had been permitted within the realm. Pope Urban IV had dispatched Guy Fulquois to England in 1264, only to find that the Montfortian regime effectively opposed his entrance to the kingdom. Guy, however, was elected pope in the following year and as Clement IV he determined to ensure the full authority and power of his own legate Ottobuono.<sup>1</sup> The major purpose of Ottobuono's mission reflects the concern Pope Clement felt for the domestic state of English affairs. In addition to preaching the cross, the legate was to bring peace to the realm, restore the authority of the crown, and drive "that pestilent man" Earl Simon from the country.<sup>2</sup>

For the most part, Ottobuono's activities relating

---

1.

For an analysis of Cardinal Ottobuono's diplomatic career in Britain see Lewis, English Activities of Cardinal Ottobuono, p. 140 ff. For a discussion of the elements involved in the ban imposed upon the papal legate in 1264, see Historical Manuscripts Commission, Fourteenth Report, part xiii, pp. 173-74. Guy's mission seems to have been at least partially directed against the adherents of Simon de Montfort (Cal. Papal Regs., letters, i, pp. 396-400.) See further Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, ii, pp. 479-82.

2.

Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, pp. 419, 434; See Thesaurus, no. 148, cols. 200-201.

to the settlement of domestic strife in England need not concern us here.<sup>1</sup> His authority and manner of preaching Pope Clement's crusade, however, should be examined, bearing in mind the influence of the legate's primary mission of bringing peace to the realm. Cardinal Ottobuono held powers of jurisdiction in Norway, Flanders, Gascony, Britain and Ireland.<sup>2</sup> His authority to appoint preachers, notaries and collectors throughout these areas gave him full command of local organizations to be established for the purposes of recruitment and financing.<sup>3</sup> These powers involved the delegation of authority to relax penances, grant indulgences, receive crusade vows, and commute those vows through substitution or financial payment. In essence, no preacher, collector, archbishop, bishop or local cleric might conduct crusade affairs without Ottobuono's express permission, and all appointments and delegation of powers issued from him.<sup>4</sup>

One significant example of this authority is

---

1.

See Lewis, loc. cit.; Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 566-ff.

2.

Thesaurus, no. 148, cols. 200-201; Cal. Papal Regs., letters, i, p. 434.

3.

See Lewis, pp. 147-48 and passim for examples of these appointments and of the legate's organization at lower levels.

4.

See Thesaurus, no. 160, cols. 211-12; Ottobuono, "Letters," nos. 22, 29, pp. 108-09, 113; Vetera Monumenta, p. 107.

revealed in Ottobuono's instructions issued in a letter to his chaplain, Andrew of Piacenza. Andrew was sent to Ireland for the purposes of preaching the cross and of receiving vows and payments.<sup>1</sup> Within a year, however, Andrew and his various subordinates had come into conflict with preachers appointed by the Bishop of Lismore. The bishop had been collecting funds and receiving crusade vows since June 1266 throughout districts conterminous with local Dominican boundaries, although there is no evidence that members of the Dominican Order conducted these affairs as well. The manner in which the bishop of Lismore was challenging the authority of the legate Ottobuono is partly revealed in his signature of receipts connected with the commutation of crusade vows; he styled himself "executor negotii crucis in Hibernia a sede apostolica deputatus."<sup>2</sup> Ottobuono's objections to Rome soon resulted in a sustaining of his own legatine authority and the suspension of his rival's powers. In February 1268 the pope ordered the Bishop of Lismore to cease collection and to dispatch funds already gathered

---

1.

Ottobuono's letter to Andrew in 1267 establishes some of the chaplain's duties (Vetera Monumenta, pp. 107-108). His royal grant of protection was issued in February 1266 (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1258-1266, p. 560). See Lewis, pp. 143-46.

2.

Vetera Monumenta, p. 109.

directly to France for use on the crusade in preparation there. Pope Clement further ordered the bishop to send a full account of his previous activities to the legate Ottobuono and to consider himself subject to the Cardinal Deacon in all matters pertaining to the preaching of the cross.<sup>1</sup>

Recruitment for the crusade involved the conduct of ceremonies for taking the cross, the granting of spiritual rewards for such vows, and the handling of receipts connected with commutation or other contributions to the project. Generally, Ottobuono seems to have delegated such authority to local preachers among the English clergy and among the Franciscan and Dominican Orders.<sup>2</sup> Ottobuono's English penitentiary Ralph de Huntingdon seems also to have received vows and collected payments and in 1268 the legate invested him with full authority for preaching and recruitment before he left the realm.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. Thesaurus, no. 607, col. 577. See Lewis, loc. cit.

2. Ottobuono, "Letters," no. 29, p. 113; William of Newburgh, "Continuation," ed. R. Howlett, Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I (Rolls Series, 82), ii, p. 552; Bullarium Franciscanum Romanorum Pontificum, Constitutiones, Epistolas, ac Diplomata continens, ed. J.H. Sbaralea, iii, p. 201.

3. Godfrey Giffard, Register, ed. J.W. Willis Bund, Episcopal Registers, of the Diocese of Worcester, (Worcestershire Historical Society), i, p. 3. See Lewis, loc. cit.

With preaching and recruitment handled locally by his penitentiary and by delegates in the Dominican and Franciscan Orders, Ottobuono found time to preach some crusade sermons himself. An example of this occurred in October 1267 when the Cardinal addressed an assembly of priests, clerics, and important laymen at a monastery near Lincoln. It is interesting to note that the Italian legate found it necessary for the Dean of Lincoln Cathedral and two friars to translate his sermon for the assemblage.<sup>1</sup> Finally, Ottobuono conducted the most important ceremonies involving more noted crusaders, signing individuals with the cross at London and Northampton in May 1267 and June 1268.<sup>2</sup>

It is perhaps helpful to draw attention to some similarities in authority and method between the legatine missions of Otho in 1237 and Ottobuono in 1266. When Pope Gregory IX sent his legate a crusade

---

1.

"Barling's Chronicle," ed. W. Stubbs in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II (Rolls Series, 76), ii, pp. cxv-cxvi. It may be added that a similar situation was reported nearly a century earlier when the archdeacon of Bangor translated a crusade sermon delivered by the Bishop of Llandaff. See Gerald of Cambridge, "Itinerarum Kambriae," ed. J.S. Brewer and G.F. Warner in Opera (Rolls Series, 21), vi, pp. 14, 55.

2. Flores, iii, p. 14; Thomas Wykes, pp. 217-18. Florence of Worcester ("Continuation," p. 201), Reported that Ottobuono delivered a sermon on the theme "A good Shepherd."

was preparing in England and King Henry seemed in need of support from Rome in running the domestic affairs of the realm. While Otho's activities, like Ottobuono's, seem to have thus concerned primarily domestic issues he also assumed much authority over the preparations for crusade.<sup>1</sup> It is not clear, however, to what extent he held authority over preaching and recruitment for Richard of Cornwall's crusade, perhaps because of the fact that such activity had been continuing in England since 1234, when Matthew Paris described "preaching, supplicating, ordering, threatening and excommunicating" in connection with Pope Gregory's projects.<sup>2</sup> In spite of a lack of real evidence concerning the legate Otho's powers and objectives, it is apparent that they were similar to those of Ottobuono in 1265.

A further twenty years, however, were to pass before another papal representative would establish his authority in Gascony for the purposes of crusade

---

1.

For the few details relating the legate Otho's activities with regard to Richard of Cornwall's crusade, see Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, iv, pp. 46-47; Pope Gregory IX, Regs., no. 3580.

2.

Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, iii, pp. 279-80. Otho's mission has been discussed briefly in Painter, op. cit., p. 483; A. Gasquet, Hénry the Third and the Church, pp. 83-102.

preaching or recruitment. Papal envoys sent to England by Pope Gregory X need not be studied in great detail here, since they were concerned primarily with matters regarding collection of crusading taxes levied in 1272 and 1274. Local organizations established for the purposes of recruiting men or materials for current European projects were directed principally by the bishop elect of Verdun, Gerard de Grandison. He was aided in these endeavours by the archbishops of Canterbury and York, together with local representatives of the Franciscans and Dominicans.<sup>1</sup>

The legate of Pope Honorius IV or of "the Roman Curia."

By March 1285 King Edward had reopened negotiations with Rome concerning a new crusade.<sup>2</sup> Pope Martin IV, however, died before substantial settlement could be reached, particularly with regard to a new crusade tenth which the English king had requested. His successor, Pope Honorius IV, laid down specific proposals for Edward's assumption of the cross at any time before Christmas 1287, but died

---

1.

See Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 842, 913; Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 207-213.

2.

Foedera, i, pp. 641-42. See above, pp. 167, 188-89.

before the king was finally signed with the symbols of a crusader during the resultant vacancy between April 1287 and February 1288.<sup>1</sup> Most English sources place Edward's assumption of the cross at Blanquefort, near Bordeaux.<sup>2</sup> They mention the fact that the king had recently recovered from a grave illness, possibly referring to an accident involving a broken collar bone in February 1287.<sup>3</sup> The king's itinerary in 1287 reveals that between May and November he was occupied in southern Gascony on business pertaining to a peace settlement between Aragon and Sicily.<sup>4</sup> In addition, his statement before the embassy of Rabban Sauma in October indicates that he had already taken the cross at that time.<sup>5</sup> From this evidence it seems probable that the ceremony took place in April, before the king

---

1.

Foedera, i, pp. 666, 674-75.

2.

Flores, iii, p. 65; "Annales Waverleia," p. 404. See Bémont's introduction to Rôles Gascons, iii, p. xiii. Two sources disagree with this dating, although they are identical in content, indicating a single authority; William Rishanger (Chronica p. 116) and Nicholas Trivet (p. 314) placed the ceremony at Blanquefort on Christmas Day 1288. John de Oxenedes (p. 272) reported that Edward spent Christmas at Oloron in 1288.

3.

John de Oxenedes, pp. 269-70.

4.

See Bémont, Rôles Gascons, iii, pp. xiii, xiv.

5.

". . . we . . . wear a cross upon our bodies, and we have no thought apart from this matter of crusade." See McLean, "Eastern Embassy", pp. 314-15; and above, pp. 244-45.

left for the south.<sup>1</sup>

There is no real evidence as to the identity of the papal legate conducting the ceremony at Blanquefort.<sup>2</sup> The Flores Historiarum indicates that he was dispatched to Gascony by "the Roman curia" - possibly meaning, though it would be extraordinary, that he continued to hold some powers through special curial grant following Pope Honorius's death on 3 April.<sup>3</sup> The contemporary author of the Annales Waverlea emphasized that this legate held a "special" position at the time of the ceremony, which may be a reference to his powers held during a vacancy in Rome.<sup>4</sup>

Accounts reveal little of the ceremony connected with King Edward's vow in 1287, or of the powers of the papal legate regarding preaching or recruitment.

---

1.

It is nonetheless difficult to dismiss the accounts of William Rishanger and Nicholas Trivet entirely. Edward returned suddenly from Bonnegarde in the south after 13 December 1288, was reported at Blanquefort on 26 December and by 3 January had returned to the south. See Bémont, Rôles Gascons, pp. xiii-xv.

2.

Luard, in his edition of The Flores Historiarum, (iii, p. 66n) pointed to the probability that the papal legate was Gerard Bianchi, Cardinal Bishop of Sienna. I have found no substantial evidence to support this hypothesis, including any indication that Gerard held authority as a legatus a latere.

3.

Flores, iii, pp. 65-66.

4.

"Annales Waverlea," p. 404. On the lapse of legatine authority, see above, pp. 124-25.

The Flores Historiarum reported that

Edward . . . was signed with the cross, along with a great multitude of men, and was appointed captain of the army of the Christians by the legate of the Roman curia . . .<sup>1</sup>

One other account repeats this description, particularly with reference to Edward's appointment as captain of the crusading host.<sup>2</sup> It is significant to note this provision, for it indicates that the English king had been named to play a leading part in the organization and conduct of the projected crusade. This may have particular relevance to the suggestion that Edward was assuming local control of important aspects of the English crusade.<sup>3</sup> It must be pointed out, however, that reliance upon English narrative sources in this case weakens any assumption that Edward's powers extended beyond his English or Gascon crusaders. It may simply be inferred from this evidence that the ceremony involving the taking of vows and investment with scrip, staff, and cross was in 1287 perhaps modified to include formal pronouncement of the King of England as captain of the new crusade.

---

1. Flores, iii, p. 66.

2. "Annales Waverlea," p. 404.

3. See above, pp. 203-207.

The nuncios of Pope Nicholas IV.

No record of a single legate invested with powers of preaching or recruitment survives to indicate a continuation of Pope Clement's policy some twenty-five years later in 1290-1291. Outside the archbishop of Centerbury, who nominally held powers as legatus natus, clerics serving in special capacities in England were usually appointed to posts similar to that of Stephen de Maulay, the Archdeacon of Cleveland, who seems to have been assigned to accompany the crusade army itself and to have been given little authority to preach or to recruit.<sup>1</sup> Pope Nicholas's delegation of authority to Geoffrey de Vezanno seems to have applied only to collection of the crusade tenth, although the Italian cleric bore letters describing himself as "nuncio of the Apostolic See, executor in England of the business of the Holy Land with regard to the tenth and other things."<sup>2</sup> In 1291

---

1.

Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., nos. 5229-30, 6016. Stephen was issued royal protection for a journey beyond seas on 4 July 1292, (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1292, p. 497) although there is no real evidence to link this with any planned departure of crusade forces.

2.

Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani, ii, p. 29. Evidence is lacking to support the conclusion that ". . . other things" refers to activity regarding preaching or recruitment. See Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., nos. 4553, 4643, 4679, 4721, 6669, 6916, 6953.

the pope wrote of the recruiting activities of his Chaplain William de Montfort, The Dean of St. Paul's, of Brother Robert de Newmarket of the Friars Preachers, and of Brother John de Bekingherhyn of the Friars minor.<sup>1</sup> Members of the preaching and Military Orders were active in Britain as well; in August 1289 the pope sent Hugh Macon and Brother John of the Friars Preachers, Brother Peter Hezquam of the Hospital, and Brother Hertaud of the Temple into the realm.<sup>2</sup> In later instructions, the provincial heads of the Franciscans and Dominicans were ordered to make available fifty preachers from each Order for the purpose of furthering recruitment for the crusade.<sup>3</sup> But all of these appointments seem to have diffused authority over crusading activities. Pope Nicholas left the remaining responsibility for preaching and recruitment in England to local clergy meeting in synods throughout the realm.<sup>4</sup> The Archbishops of Canterbury and York dutifully held such convocations in 1292 and sent representatives to Rome to report on the progress of the preaching and the enrollment of

---

1.

Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 6664.

2.

Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., nos. 7509, 6692; Cartulaire, iii, no. 4094.

3.

Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, p. 553; Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 6692.

4.

Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 199-203.

men together with the collection of resources.<sup>1</sup>

It is interesting to note that before many of these appointments had been made the archbishop of Canterbury had taken much responsibility for preaching and recruitment himself. Early in 1290, for example, Archbishop John Peckham was enrolling crusaders in connection with the expedition of Odo de Grandison.<sup>2</sup> His leading role in the ceremonies connected with Odo's assumption of the cross also points to the authority assumed by the English archbishop, apparently on the basis of his status as legatus natus. The Archbishop of Canterbury placed the sign of the cross upon Odo, most of his followers, and upon Earl Gilbert de Clare and his new wife Joan, the daughter of King Edward born in Acre in 1272.<sup>3</sup> Archbishop John le Romeyn of York was also busy organizing recruitment by 1291. On 4 September he wrote that he was ready to begin preaching the cross personally throughout his archdiocese.<sup>4</sup>

Local English clergy assumed more complete

---

1. John Pontissara, Register, ii, pp. 477-78; John le Romeyn, Register, ii, p. 13.

2. Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 177-78.

3. Bartholomew Cotton, p. 177; see above, pp. 168-69.

4. John le Romeyn, Register, i, p. 113. See Letters from Northern Registers, p. 93.

authority over preaching and recruitment throughout the papal vacancy following Nicholas's death in 1292. The Archbishop of York, for example, directed members of the Friars Minor at York to preach the cross at Howden, Selby, and Pocklington on the same Sunday that he intended to deliver a sermon in York Minster. His own clergy at Southwell Minster, Beverley and Ripon were instructed to preach the cross at this time as well. His instructions included a description of the indulgences authorized by the pope and reveal how completely he commanded the local organization and activity of these preachers.<sup>1</sup> Bishop Oliver Sutton of Lincoln seems to have held full authority over the activities of local Franciscans, as well as instructing his own suffragans in matters pertaining to preaching and recruitment.<sup>2</sup> He also instituted exhaustive studies locally in order to record the number of potential crusaders in his diocese, the amounts of money available from obventions and legacies, and the details of crusaders' obligations remaining unfulfilled.<sup>3</sup>

---

1. John le Romeyn, Register, i, p. 113, ii, pp. 8-9.

2. Oliver Sutton, Register, iii, pp. 195, 157-59.

3. Oliver Sutton, Register, iii, pp. 157-59.

Pope Nicholas IV, therefore, seems to have relied to a great extent upon local representatives for preaching and recruitment. During the vacancy preceeding the election of Pope Celestine V increasing authority was assumed by English prelates. This represents a contrast to the powerful legatine missions of Otho and Ottobuono earlier in the thirteenth century. This degree of local autonomy may have resulted from the wishes and desires of King Edward himself. The crusade forming in 1290-1292 had largely resulted from the initiative of the king and his advisors. Edward had put forward proposals in 1284, had sent large embassies to Rome in 1285, 1288 and 1289, and had undertaken peace initiatives and diplomatic conferences in an effort to gain allies throughout the years 1286-1289. He had been appointed captain of the new expedition, if English sources may be trusted. His negotiations with Pope Nicholas in 1289 had resulted in agreement concerning the sending of Odo de Grandison to Acre and the financing of this expedition with funds from his own crusade. It is possible, on the basis of an understanding with Rome, that the king was in the position in 1290 to request a substantial degree of local English control over matters of preaching and recruitment.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>•For King Edward's political position at the time regarding negotiations with Rome, see above, pp. 189-91, 221-22.

The significant role which the king himself played regarding preaching and recruitment adds weight to the proposition that he may have influenced Pope Nicholas to invest local English prelates with more authority. There is some evidence, for example, that recruitment for Odo de Grandison's expedition was timed to coincide with Edward's own enlistment drive at a parliament held at Chepstowe in July 1290.<sup>1</sup> Some crusaders such as Gilbert de Clare taking vows at this ceremony may have been involved with Edward's crusade. It is certain, moreover, that the king was present in an effort to spur recruitment.<sup>2</sup> In September and October 1290 Edward visited religious shrines throughout the realm and constantly stressed the firmness of his vow of 1287.<sup>3</sup> At the October parliament summoned at Ashridge a representative of the king proclaimed for all to hear that Edward's vow should be kept and his arrangements with the pope carried out.<sup>4</sup> On the 25th Edward himself solemnly

---

1.

Bartholomew Cotton, p. 177; Interim Report of the committee on House of Commons Personnel and Politics, 1264-1832, pp. 64-65.

2.

Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 177-78.

3.

For a detailed discussion of King Edward's crowded schedule during this period, see Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 600-02.

4.

Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 177-78.

undertook before this parliament to sail to the Holy Land before his deadline in 1293, and he encouraged as many magnates as possible to aid his enterprise.<sup>1</sup> Finally, it is evident that the king paid for the publication of many copies of Pope Nicholas's crusade bull to be distributed throughout the realm by royal authorities in 1291 and 1292.<sup>2</sup> Clearly he may have felt it his right to direct recruitment himself, while Pope Nicholas supported this by investing considerable authority in local English representatives.

b. Preaching the cross and domestic peace.

The connection between the preaching of crusades and the pursuit of domestic peace was one of the most important elements of canon law. It was clearly apparent that a crusader's willingness to campaign for long periods was dependent upon the knowledge that his lands and possessions were secure. Therefore as Peter Dubois observed at the beginning of the fourteenth century

. . . it will be necessary for Christian princes to live in harmony and avoid war with one another. For if such people

---

1. Bartholomew Cotton, p. 178; Interim Report, pp. 64-65.

2. Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, pp. 105-106.

[crusaders] should hear that their homelands were being attacked and laid waste, they would abandon the Lord's patrimony and return to the defence of their own possessions. . .<sup>1</sup>

In many ways, however, the very preaching of a crusade might benefit local efforts to secure peace. Presented with the attractions of material and spiritual benefits offered to those who agreed to turn their warfare against the Infidel, civil lawbreakers might be convinced of the futility of their domestic squabbles and at the same time might be offered clerical and secular protection of their possessions when they agreed to take the cross. Should these inducements fail, local troublemakers might be portrayed to their peers as malefactors reluctant to endorse such a high and noble ideal as the rescue of the Holy Land. Finally, the crusade itself might be directed against rebellious barons or disturbers of the peace. The successful recruitment of crusaders might augment local peace efforts by removing some of the worst obstacles to domestic settlement in the aftermath of civil or national wars. Land disputes could be arrested, loans and debts

---

1.

Peter Dubois, p. 73.

might be suspended, and the clergy and laity of the realm might find a measure of peace during the period former troublemakers were absent on crusade.<sup>1</sup>

In England, examples of this connection between domestic peace and the preaching of the cross can be found in 1198-1199, in 1203-1204, and in 1216-1217. Clearly associated with such activity preceeding the Lord Edward's crusade of 1270 was the mission of John de Valenciennes in 1263-1264. This papal representative, who had been Lord of Haifa since 1257, left the East in 1261 to aid Pope Urban IV in his crusade appeal. John's mission to England, however, seems to have been particularly directed toward the adherents of Earl Simon de Montfort.<sup>2</sup> There can be little doubt that his activities in this regard bore directly upon the approaching civil war in England, for he was busy at his crusade task under the walls of Northampton when the royal forces broke in there in April 1264.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

On the theoretical benefits of preaching the cross as an instrument of peace, see particularly P. Rousset, Les origines et les caractères de la première croisade, p. 171 ff.

2.

Foedera, i, p. 437; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1258-1266, p. 317.

3.

Gervase of Canterbury, "Continuation," ii, p. 234.

Pope Clement IV, as we have seen, combined the projects of local peace and the preaching of a crusade in his instructions to the legate Ottobuono. While the legate's activities with regard to local peace have been well-researched, however, little attention has been given to the connection between these and the preaching of the cross during the crises of 1266-1268. It may be seen, for example, that the papal legate turned his attention towards crusade preaching often when local disturbances threatened to disrupt the tenuous peace. Ottobuono was in London when Gilbert de Clare suddenly moved into the city and joined forces with the rebels under John de Eyvill in April 1267. The legate's reaction was to commence crusade preaching locally and in the following month Gilbert's brother Thomas received the cross with a number of followers.<sup>1</sup> Within another month peace had been restored in London and Ottobuono could write to the pope that ". . . at last reconciliation had come from the hand of the Lord."<sup>2</sup> Crusade preaching continued to

---

1.

Flores, iii, p. 14.

2.

Ottobuono, "Letters," no. 35, p. 118.

follow other attempts to bring peace throughout the year. In October rebellion flared in the Lincoln area, and on the 18th the papal legate journeyed there to preach the cross in person.<sup>1</sup> By the end of the month, Ottobuono's efforts to bring about peace had been embodied in many sections of the Dictum of Kennilworth.<sup>2</sup> Within another two months Edward and royal advisors were apparently interested in reconsidering King Henry's unfulfilled crusade vow and their enquiries were in Pope Clement's hands by January 1263.<sup>3</sup> In June 1263 the papal legate signed Edward and many of his followers with the cross at Northampton, four years after Pope Urban's representative had conducted the business of the Holy Land there during the first engagement of the civil wars.<sup>4</sup> With the acknowledgement that he had recruited "a good and faithful champion of Christ," Ottobuono left the realm, having conducted his dual mission with considerable success.<sup>5</sup>

---

1.

"Barling's chronicle," ii, p. cxv-cxvi. For a discussion of the disturbances during the summer and autumn of 1267, see Powicke, Henry III and Lord Edward, pp. 542, 545-46.

2.

See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 209-13.

3.

Thesaurus, no. 583 col. 563. See above, pp. 87

4.

Flores, iii, p. 14; Thomas Wykes, pp. 217-18; Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," p. 201.

5.

Ottobuono, "Letters," no. 26, p. 112.

c. Spiritual benefits: the indulgence and papal composition.

Canon Law in the mid-thirteenth century provided a substantial number of inducements to those taking the cross and preparing to depart for the Holy Land. Many of the protections and legal expediciencies open to English crusaders, for example, have already been discussed and their political relevance noted.<sup>1</sup> Benefits deemed necessary for crusaders to finance their passages will also be treated more fully elsewhere in this study.<sup>2</sup> In the realm of spiritual inducements, however, the role of indulgences and papal composition is of great importance. The history of crusade indulgences has attracted much attention and need not be discussed here. A signal point of interest with regard to this practice in the thirteenth century is the fact that the amount of enjoined penance which might be relaxed varied according to the contribution of each individual crusader. Those offering gifts or commuting their vows for money payment received appropriate indulgences, while those paying for substitutes or travelling in

---

1.

See above, pp. 88-103.

2.

See below, pp. 348-54.

person to the Holy Land were endowed with more substantial spiritual rewards.<sup>1</sup> In the matter of papal composition, contemporary religious theorists recommended that devotion to a projected crusade might result in the lifting of excommunication or other injunctions levied because of transgressions against the Church. Release from these sentences might thus be secured by those taking the cross or contributing to crusade funds.<sup>2</sup>

Traditional grants of indulgences seem to have varied little between the English crusade preaching of 1266-1271 and that of 1290-1294. The instructions of Pope Clement IV and Pope Nicholas IV provided for the relaxation of enjoined penance for ". . . those truly confessed and penitent" crusaders in England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland and Gascony.<sup>3</sup> In 1266 Pope Clement stipulated that contributions toward the crusade should equal a quarter of each donor's goods and that indulgences should then vary according to the relative wealth of the person making

---

1.

See particularly the studies conducted by Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, i, p. 118 ff.; Brundage, Canon Law, p. 139 ff.; M. Villey, La Croisade, pp. 132-39, 145 ff.

2.

See Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 175-76.

3.

Thesaurus, nos. 401 <sup>421-22</sup> cols.; Bartholomew Cotton, pp. ~~133-202~~.

the offer.<sup>1</sup> This grading of indulgences seems to have been continued in 1292, when Bishop Anthony Bek published papal instructions throughout his diocese of Durham. The bishop specified varying amounts of penance to be relaxed and offered greater spiritual rewards for those crusading at their own expense or purchasing a substitute, while he recommended lesser indulgences for substitutes themselves or for those making only a partial contribution of money or property.<sup>2</sup> Of final significance in the matter of indulgences to be granted by English preachers is the fact that Pope Gregory X and Pope Nicholas IV granted partial indulgences to those attending crusade sermons or engaged in other matters connected with the preparation of the expedition, such as preachers or collectors.<sup>3</sup>

The practice of releasing individuals from

---

1. Thesaurus, nos. 306,<sup>401,</sup> cols. 341-43, 422.

2. Records of Anthony Bek ed. C.M. Fraser (Surtees Society, 162), pp. 26-27. This was undoubtedly an interpretation of Pope Nicholas's instructions to ". . . let people be induced to give a suitable offering according to their means, because the more they give the greater will be their indulgence." (Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 433-34).

3. Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 497, 502, 913; Records of Anthony Bek, pp. 26-27. In 1274, indulgences of at least 100 days were to be granted to those listening to crusade sermons in England, while preachers or collectors laboring for three consecutive years in the business of the cross were to receive the same indulgences as crusaders themselves. See Brundage, Canon Law, p. 154 ff.

sentences of excommunication in return for their acceptance of crusade obligations began around 1203 and was widespread by the mid-thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup> In England, the instructions of both Clement IV and Nicholas IV spelled out such inducements and preachers were enjoined to suspend sentences in matters which were not considered grave.<sup>2</sup> In 1292, for example, Robert de Sancto Albino, who had already accompanied Edward to the Holy Land in 1271, was absolved by papal representatives because of his intention of crusading again with the King. For some years he had illegally enjoyed the revenues of the Church at Essenden and of Church lands around Great Bowdon. Robert was released from the resultant excommunication because of his crusade vow and was also allowed to retain his income from these benefices.<sup>3</sup> Another case the following year involved the papal composition of a cleric who had ministered in Holy Orders while under sentence for disobedience to his superior. His release from excommunication was dependent upon his

---

1. See Brundage, pp. 155, 175; Villet, pp. 179-81.

2. Thesaurus, nos 300<sup>623</sup>, cols 341-43<sup>586</sup>; Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 486-87.

3. Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 6649; for Robert's earlier commitment, see Appendix, p. 401 and above, pp. 37, 113.

swearing in public to accompany the crusade or to name a specific substitute.<sup>1</sup>

Many relatively minor offenders were offered papal composition during the preaching of Pope Nicholas's crusade. In July 1290, for example, a man in Lincoln had been found guilty of striking a cleric. As a penance, he was instructed to stand bareheaded in church for three successive Sundays, and might be released from excommunication by taking the cross. At the same time, another lay man had been sentenced for punching the chaplain of Branston Church on the nose. The offender was released from his sentence by attending church on three Sundays with a lighted candle and accepting the symbols of a crusader. Peter de Mileham, excommunicated for striking a cleric in the face with a wax candle, was absolved in return for taking the cross, although he was given the option of sending a substitute or of paying two shillings to collectors of crusade funds in Lincoln. A rector at Woodford in Lincolnshire had struck a "proowler" by mistake, had been judged guilty of not recognizing his victim by starlight, and was finally released from his sentence by paying forty

---

1.

Oliver Sutton, Register, iv, p. 86.

shillings to crusade funds collected locally.<sup>1</sup>

One important observation on the granting of papal composition to crusaders is the degree to which secular practice paralleled Canon Law. It seems to have been common for minor civil offenders to be released from punishment in return for a vow to crusade.<sup>2</sup> In 1270, when final preparations were under way for the departure of the Lord Edward on crusade, a royal writ indicates English practice in this regard:

Whereas Peter de Basceles, archer, who has confessed to robberies, arsons, and other felonies, led by a spirit of repentance, has bound himself to go to the Holy Land in the service of the Crucified forever (as the king is informed on trustworthy testimony) pardon is granted to him of the said trespasses on condition that immediately after taking the cross he make his way to the Holy Land never to return to this realm.<sup>3</sup>

#### d. Commutation.

In 1213 Pope Innocent III wrote that "when dire necessity or plain usefulness may so require, the crusade vow may be commuted, redeemed, or postponed by apostolic command . . ."<sup>4</sup> Within half a century

---

1. Oliver Sutton, Register, iii, p. 20; v, pp.10, 19-20.

2. See Throop, pp. 97-100.

3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 456.

4. Patrologia cursus complectus . . . series Graeco-Latina, ed. J.P. Migne, cxvi, pp. 918-20.

the regular practice of commuting vows for financial payments had become standard. Pope Innocent's provision of apostolic command had degenerated until commutation was automatic upon request to local legates or their delegates. The advantages of such a system of crusade recruitment were apparent almost immediately. Crusades might now be provisioned and manned by skilled personnel from a steady fund of revenues, made up of money gained through commutation payments. Unsuitable crusaders who might otherwise abandon the expedition during critical campaigning were encouraged to commute vows and to provide resources for the hiring of more dependable mercenaries or technicians. By the time the Lord Edward had taken the cross in 1268, the practice of commutation was an accepted canonical doctrine throughout Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Specific examples of commutation in England during the late thirteenth century are numerous. The Bishop of Lincoln, for example, sent his preachers forth in 1291 with specific orders to encourage such payment

---

1. See particularly J. Brundage, "The Votive Obligations of Crusaders: the Development of a Canonistic Doctrine," Traditio, xxiv (1968), p. 94 ff.

among prospective recruits. He issued a detailed list of questions designed to aid these delegates in assessing the amount of money applicable in individual cases of commutation.<sup>1</sup> Earlier in the century, the legate Ottobuono had been called upon to direct funds raised through commutation toward purchases for the crusade preparing in southern France.<sup>2</sup> During the period of crusade recruitment following Edward's assumption of the cross in 1287 commutation was common enough to encourage the publication of a set formula, presumably for the guidance of preachers or collectors involved in the activity of recruitment for crusade:

Let it appear to all by the present, that we, Brother W. de Hoo, sacrist of St. Edmund's and archdeacon of the same place, as well as agent of that venerable man, Master Geoffrey de Vezanno, appointed nuncio of the apostolic see and executor in England of the affairs of the Holy Land, have received so much from N. de C., signed with the cross, for redemption of the cross . . .<sup>3</sup>

Commutation often led to abuse, particularly with regard to material benefits available to crusaders during the thirteenth century. In 1247

---

1.

Oliver Sutton, Register, iii, pp. 157-59.

2.

Thesaurus, no. 402, col. 723. See William of Newburgh, "Continuation," p. 553.

3.

See Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, ii, p. 517.

Pope Innocent IV actually urged a halt to abuses of commutations during preparations for King Louis's crusade.<sup>1</sup> In 1273 Pope Gregory X complained that some French crusaders had commuted their vows after they had sent away collectors with the excuse that as holy pilgrims they were exempt. Their commutation payments had proven to be cheaper than the taxes, and these shrewd and insincere crusaders had taken advantage of papal guarantees that crusaders must not be taxed by clerical collectors. The pope was enraged by the fact that the taxes thus evaded were designed to augment his new crusade project in France.<sup>2</sup> The possible abuse of crusade vows in England during the vacancy of 1268-1271 has been noted.<sup>3</sup> Pope Gregory's injunction in 1274, however, resulted in mass commutation of these unredeemed vows during the next year. By far the most common rate charged for such commutation seems to have been five shillings, yet the funds gained from such payments may have been significant since over 300 cases were reported by the

---

1. Pope Innocent IV, Regs., no. 305<sup>4</sup>. See Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 135-36.

2. Pope Gregory X, Regs., no. 322.

3. See above, pp. 88-103.

Archbishop of York alone in 1275.<sup>1</sup> While no complete figures are available with which to measure the importance of commutation in England during the late thirteenth century, it may be assumed that since the practice flourished during most preaching activity significant resources were made available to the crusade projects through such payments.<sup>2</sup>

e. Substitution.

The doctrine of sending a substitute to the Holy Land in place of an individual signed with the cross was one of the oldest of the crusade movement. It can be shown, for example, that tenth-century pilgrims found it possible to arrange for substitutes to make a journey in their place.<sup>3</sup> Practical application of this doctrine in England may be exemplified by the fact that William Marshall served as a crusade substitute for King Henry III early in the thirteenth century.<sup>4</sup> Although evidence points to the fact that the Lord Edward fully accepted that his vow

---

1. Walter Giffard, Register, pp. 277-81. See above, pp. 102.

2. See Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages, i, pp. 117-19.

3. Brundage, Canon Law, p. 131.

4. See. S. Painter, William Marshall, p. 54.

meant crusading in person, Pope Clement IV nevertheless was prepared to consider the prince as a substitute for King Henry again in 1268.<sup>1</sup> The king's vow to lead a projected crusade against Sicily in 1254 had never been redeemed, and this may in fact have posed a delicate problem for king and pope. There is little reason to believe that King Henry's personal fulfillment of his vow was seriously considered in 1268-1270. Yet he wasted no opportunity to emphasize publicly his provision of a substitute in July 1270:

Although the king, like Edward his son, has every desire to cross the seas in aid of the Holy Land, yet because it does not seem to the prelates, magnates and commonalty of the realm to be expedient or safe that both should be outside the kingdom in these times; the king, desiring that his vow should be fulfilled so far as he can and to take proper care of the realm by the counsel of the said prelates and magnates, commits the business of the cross with the sign of the cross to his said son, in his place . . .<sup>2</sup>

Other examples of substitutes in late-thirteenth century England are more difficult to provide, although contemporary formulas point to the widespread use of this convention. Pope Nicholas IV absolved a woman in Norwich from her crusade vow in return for her promise to support soldiers and their provisions on crusade or in garrison duty in the East.<sup>3</sup> A portion

---

<sup>1</sup>•Thesaurus, no. 587, cols. 621.

<sup>2</sup>•Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 452.

<sup>3</sup>•Cal. Papal Regs., Letters, i, p. 528.

of the agreement between the Lord Edward and Adam de Gesemue in 1270 also illustrates the use of crusade substitutes and illuminates some legal aspects of the practice:

. . . and should it happen that I am detained by sickness or any other accident, which God forbid, a knight in my place and in the place of my knights aforesaid will undertake his service fully for the year - or else I will return to Edward such money as shall be necessary to complete the period which is lacking from the year, and this shall be at my option . . .<sup>1</sup>

There is some indication of the legal aspects of substitution embodied in this agreement: just as commutation and substitution remained equally reliable methods of honoring a crusade vow, so they seem to have played an important role as optional conditions in legal agreements between crusading knights.

Two generalizations can be drawn from a study of preaching and the practice of recruitment in England during the late thirteenth century. First, it can be seen that the authority and local organization of papal envoys to England varied according to political circumstances and in response

---

1.

Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22. See above, pp. 103-104, for a discussion of the political relevance of this contact and below, pp. 332-35, for its financial importance.

to the problems posed by unexpected vacancies in Rome. The vast powers delegated by Pope Clement IV contrasted with the local autonomy assumed by the English clergy in the absence of a legate from Pope Nicholas IV. Independent English control appears to have increased in the periods when no pope could be chosen during a vacancy, and in many ways the political position of King Edward himself during later periods of preaching and recruitment may have lessened the authority assumed in Rome. Secondly, it is clear that canonical doctrine regarding preaching or recruitment during this period was followed closely in England, with the result that contracts embodying modifications of the clerical doctrines of papal composition and substitution may be found occasionally even among royal documents. Few significant changes in Canon Law seem to have occurred between the activities of 1266 and those of 1292, even though the authority and methods of papal representatives varied a great deal. It may be seen from these English examples that circumstances effected the appointments and activities of papal envoys but that canon law was generally well established.

7. The financing of English crusade projects.

" . . . it must be confessed that we are still conscious of the incompleteness of our information," cautioned Professor Walter Rhodes in his study of Italian financial dealings in England under Edward I.<sup>1</sup> This theme was repeated in 1925 by Sir James Ramsay, who complained that the objective of rendering useful summaries of thirteenth-century royal expenditure and income was ". . . a vast task, and one for which the materials of this reign do not exist."<sup>2</sup> Nearly a half-century later, documentation concerning English finance still remains insufficient to draw many reliable conclusions in discussing crusading policies during this period. It is true that the publication since 1925 of wardrobe accounts, issue rolls, liberate rolls, and miscellaneous exchequer documents has enhanced such a study. Individual items in the Public Records Office are also available and supply detailed accounts of English loans and expenditure with regard to crusade. Publication or reproduction of French, Italian and even Latin Syrian documents and accounts

---

1.

Walter E. Rhodes, "The Italian Bankers in England and their Loans to Edward I and Edward II," Historical Essays by the Members of Owens College, Manchester, ed. T.F. Tout and James Tait, p. 137.

2.

James Ramsay, A History of the Revenues of the Kings of England, 1066-1399, ii, p. 1.

has proved invaluable in recent decades. Yet the fact remains that an itemized summary and detailed analysis of crusade expenses and the means of meeting them must be preceded by a strong note of caution.

First, while it will be noted that figures available are included in a series of tables,<sup>1</sup> it must be pointed out that these are primarily for quick reference and comparison and should not be otherwise relied upon. Generally speaking, figures for this period are incomplete. They have been drawn from a variety of sources, ranging in reliability from narrative descriptions to cross-referenced exchequer and Italian receipt or payment rolls. In many cases accounts may overlap in some details, and thus any totals are suspect. There are few cases where summarized accounts are dependable, due to the fact that some evidence has been lost or was never even recorded. While historians have recently revealed new sources for the study of thirteenth-century finance, there can be still no assurance that summaries, estimates or totals are complete or accurate.<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

See below, pp. 394 ff.

2.

Professor William E. Lunt in particular made commendable use of such figures in his many studies on Papal and English finance. It is noteworthy, however, that his summaries are frequently qualified, and attempts are repeatedly made to delete overlapping material. See particularly Financial Relations, p. 135 ff.

Secondly, the historian of English finance in the late thirteenth century is faced with figures which often bear little or no relation to the facts he wishes to analyse. For example, little record of the individual items purchased in connection with crusades during this period may be extracted from contemporary accounts summarizing expenditure.<sup>1</sup> Often dates of contracts are difficult to determine from comprehensive account rolls. Payments have often been deleted and only totals recorded, while individual receipts are lost in condensed exchequer lists.<sup>2</sup> While figures are often authenticated in Italian, French or English accounts, there is still little possibility of relating them to the important issues of expense, repayment or the use of crusade funds.

Finally, with regard to the crusade policies of Edward I, it is often difficult to discover actual purchases, contracts or financial obligations during the period under discussion. In an effort to draw a meaningful picture of English crusade costs, therefore, examples have been provided from contemporary

---

1.

As, for example, in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, pp. 131-32, or in Liberate Rolls, v; nos. 1002, 1100, pp. 115, 126.

2.

As, for example, in Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, pp. 51, 52, or in Exchequer King's Remembrancer, Wardrobe, and Household Rolls, Bdle. 360, no. 20. See further examples of the difficulties of these lists and accounts in R.J. Whitwell, "Italian Bankers and the English Crown," TRHS, new series, xvii, (1903) pp.175-223.

activities of non-English crusaders. Caution must be employed in these cases, lest examples bear unjustifiable influence with regard to specific activities of Edward himself.<sup>1</sup>

One item remains before attempting an analysis of crusade costs and the methods employed in meeting them. The question of money, particularly with regard to contemporary rates of exchange and value in various European markets, is one which often serves to obscure an already complex field of study. In the interest of standardizing thirteenth-century currency into more workable units, figures where possible in the years 1268-1277 will be converted into contemporary pounds Sterling in brackets following the original sums. Such conversion is meant only to provide some basis for reliable comparison of amounts originally recorded in varying currencies and will be decimalized to expedite such comparison. It must be emphasized that original sums in thirteenth-century French, English and Eastern currency will still be used throughout the text for more reliable consultation. The rate of exchange involving French livres of Tournois in cases prior to 1277 will be evaluated at

---

1.

Particularly referring to the practices of King Louis IX and crusaders from Frisia in 1268-1270. See Below, pp. 334-35, 346-47.

four-to-one: 4 livres of Tournois to £1.00. This is based upon the most recent and reliable evidence relating to the period 1266-1277.<sup>1</sup> After this time, difficulties regarding inflation render such a categorical evaluation impossible, and no conversion will be attempted.<sup>2</sup> Figures in Saracen Besants will likewise carry no bracketed Sterling equivalent, due to the obvious difficulties involved.<sup>3</sup>

a. The cost of crusade activities.

Without doubt, one primary item of expense incurred by any crusader during the thirteenth century was his obligation to provide inducements, loans and

1.

See particularly Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 170-71, and Whitwell, "Italian Bankers and the English Crown," p.185, n. A loan negotiated by Edward at Orvieto on 18 February 1273 was repaid in Sterling at the exact ratio of 1:4 livres of Tournois. See Exchequer Diplomatic Documents, Treasurer's Rolls, Box 1, no.13.

2.

Inflation in France was particularly acute during the late 1280's, following the expensive foreign policies of Philip III. See Whitwell, pp.184-85; M.M. Postan, "Italy and the Economic Development of England in the Middle Ages," Journal of Economic History, xi (1951), p. 53 ff.

3.

John of Brittany's loan from the Templars in 1271 appears to be the only sum in Saracen Besants (See below, pp.394 ff). It is not clear whether this sum was paid in Cypriot, Jerusalemite, or actual Muslim currency, and equivalents for all three are difficult to render at any rate. See G. Schlumberger in Numismatique de l'Orient latin, pp. 130-43. C. Desimoni, ("Observations sur les monnaies, les poids et les mesures cités dans les actes du notaire gènois lamberto di Sambuceto," ROL iii, (1895), p. 6-7 ) has placed the value of a gold Saracen besant in 1301 at 7 grossi Tournois, based upon Genoese merchant accounts. See further Documents Chypriotes des Archives du Vatican au XIV et XV siècles, ed. J. Richard, p.16n.

wages in order to attract recruits and mercenaries to his force. Throughout the mid-thirteenth century the experiences of crusaders such as Richard of Cornwall and King Louis of France had shown that such obligations were costly yet vital to their ability to campaign overseas for any length of time. Between 1248 and 1254, for example, the French king had provided his followers with loans and even wages in return for their continuing service in the Latin East. Many of these expenses had been contracted before the crusade set out, while others grew from the rapid exhaustion of baronial resources and the king's need to provide for the maintenance of mobile or garrison troops.<sup>1</sup> Whatever the cause, however, commanders of military forces on crusade like Edward in 1270 or Odo de Grandison in 1290 could expect to bear a significant proportion of the expenses of their followers and allies.

As we have seen, the Lord Edward found it necessary in 1268 and 1269 to provide financial inducements to many crusaders before their services might be secured.<sup>2</sup> Grants to Roger de Clifford and to

---

1.

See Servois, "Emprunts de Saint Louis." For details of Louis's provision for mercenaries and for his own baronial followers, see John de Joinville, pp. 151-57, and above, pp. 282.

2.

See above, pp. 103-109.

Robert Charles, for example, were provided from the royal treasury in order to supplement their anticipated budgets.<sup>1</sup> In 1270 Gilbert de Clare was offered 8,000 marks (£5,333.33) and a suitable ship for transport in return for his promise to accompany the crusade in person.<sup>2</sup> It must be stressed that these financial arrangements involved outright grants and not loans which might be paid back at a certain time. From the three examples of Roger de Clifford, Robert Charles and Gilbert de Clare alone it can be seen that the promise of crusade co-operation cost the Lord Edward over £6,300 in royal revenues. Clearly the cost of inducements represented a considerable expense which must be borne before concrete plans for departure might be considered.

It is apparent from a study of exchequer accounts that further obligations toward individual barons were considered necessary before recruitment could be completed satisfactorily. In 1269 and 1270 the English prince contracted individually with his brother Edmund and sixteen other English lords for the payment of

---

1.

These grants are treated in more detail below, p. 355.

2.

These provisions were presented to the earl on 7 June 1270 and ratified on 17 June at Reading. See above, pp. 107-108.

their transport costs to and from the proposed theatre of military operations. These agreements featured grants of 100 marks (£66.66) to each lord and a further 100 marks (£66.66) to each of his knightly retinue. The Lord Edmund received 10,000 marks (£6,666.66) for his military contingent, although there is no evidence to support the suggestion that he brought 99 knights according to terms of other contracts.<sup>1</sup> One example of this type of agreement, signed by the Lord Edward and by Adam de Gesemue in 1270, illustrates the nature of this financial obligation of the prince:

. . . Know that I have agreed with the Lord Edward . . . to go with him to the Holy Land, accompanied by four knights, and to remain in his service for a whole year to commence at the coming voyage in September. And in return he has given me, to cover all expenses, 600 marks [£400] in money and transport - that is to say the hire of a ship and water for as many persons and horses as are appropriate for knights . . .<sup>2</sup>

---

1.

Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22. See also a brief summary in Turner, "Unpublished Notices," pp. 46-47. It is important to note that Robert Tybetot and Payne de Chaworth seem to have accepted their grants or equivalents thereof from the papal legate Ottobuono. See below, pp. 366-67.

2.

Pipe roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22. Adam de Gesemue, a magistrate holding lands around Newcastle, seems to have died prior to 23 April 1274 after receiving royal protection as a crusader in July 1270 (Charter Roll 54 Hen. III, m. 4; Calandar of Fine Rolls, 1272-1307, p. 21; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 440).

The Lord Edward was obliged to supply funds for transport to Tunis or the Latin East at a fixed sum, although in Adam's case the total seems to have exceeded the normal 100 marks (£66.66) per knight. In return, his baronial followers and their retinues guaranteed to remain with the crusading army until September 1271. Edward's obligations did not apparently extend beyond the provision of shipping costs and fresh-water stores. There is evidence, however, that other obligations were undertaken by Frisian and Flemish crusade leaders in 1269 and 1270. Individual crusaders enrolled in those contingents were supplied with a ham, a flank of beef, six jars of butter, and a half-measure of grain when they embarked by sea down the coast to northern France. These provisions were seemingly issued to all soldiers in the crusading army at the leaders' expense.<sup>1</sup> Presumably the Lord Edward undertook no similar obligations toward his followers, although the phrase "to cover all expenses" in most baronial contracts may have extended the prince's obligations in this respect.

The fact that English baronial contingents received transport allowances may represent a

---

1.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 554.

significant departure from established procedure in the mid-thirteenth century. John de Joinville, for example, stated that in 1248 ". . . when I went overseas [I had] to bear, in addition to my own expenses, the cost of keeping nine knights and two knights-banneret." He concluded that this was "After my ship had been paid for" out of his own funds.<sup>1</sup> While King Louis ultimately undertook substantial obligations toward his followers, it is evident that their initial passage was a matter of private expense. Edward, however, seems prepared to have contributed over £14,000 to his followers in order to finance their voyage to the East. Further, he was ready to offer Gilbert de Clare a "ship suitable for his passage" in addition to the substantial inducement of 8,000 marks (£5,333.33).<sup>2</sup>

Transporting the English crusade force to the scene of military operations therefore represented a considerable expense to be borne by the Lord Edward. Once campaigning had begun or additional transport became necessary, individual obligations to followers and even to allies multiplied. While there is no

---

1.

John de Joinville, p. 48. Crusaders arranging passage on Venetian vessels in 1268 seem to have also been responsible for their own payments. See below, pp. 341-42.

2.

See Table F, and also above, pp. 107-108.

evidence that the English nobles were directly subsidized by the prince in the East, he nevertheless maintained some of their activities through loans. In 1272, for example, Roger de Clifford borrowed 400 marks (£266.66) from Edward and other crusaders received loans from the Templars as a result of the prince's intercession.<sup>1</sup> Edward's obligation toward the contingents of Odo de Grandison in 1290-1292 must also be considered in this discussion of his subsidizing English crusaders or allies. Negotiations with Rome produced an English commitment to supply 6,000 marks (£4,000) from royal funds and money raised by the English tenth as a direct grant to the crusader.<sup>2</sup> In addition, revenues collected in the Channel Islands were farmed to Odo's bankers and creditors in the Latin East until 1292.<sup>3</sup>

Wages to household and mercenary contingents represented another expense borne by the English prince in Tunis and Syria. Edward's use of mercenaries

---

1.

Contracts in Antient Kalandars, i, pp. 80-81. Loans to English crusaders were granted by the Templars "ad instanciam Domini Edwardi . . . in partibus Terre Sancte existentis. . ."

2.

See above, pp. 264-65.

3.

Rôles Gascons, iii, no. 1924. William de St. Remy, bailli in Guernsey, was ordered by the English crown to collect funds for Odo, who was ".....in serious need of money."

on crusade has been discussed elsewhere.<sup>1</sup> To this expense, however, must be added the cost of maintaining and provisioning his personal retainers in Tunis and Syria, not to mention the expense of supporting the household of Eleanor and later her infant daughter. The names of a few servants or retainers maintained by the prince and his consort may be drawn from crusade lists of 1270. William Peche had served Edward on at least one occasion in Ireland.<sup>2</sup> John Ferre was a trusted ambassador who had brought the news in 1267 of the birth of Edward's first son.<sup>3</sup> Robert le Clerk and William de Yattinden listed themselves as yeomen of the consort Eleanor.<sup>4</sup> The expenses of Edward's household were summarized by Philip de Willoughby in 1272 at around £100.<sup>5</sup> Evidence is lacking to draw many conclusions as to the expense involved in supporting the prince's yeomen or military retainers, although it seems that his obligations toward these were significant. John de

---

1.

See above, pp. 284-85.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 257.

3.

Liberate Rolls, vi, no. 555.

4.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 480.

5.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 353. This account was recorded in 1279, although it is evident that the period of Edward's crusade alone was covered.

Gayton, for example, received payment at the conclusion of crusade activity for his horses lost in Edward's service. This payment of restor may have applied to other troops directly in the prince's service, and as such represents a financial obligation considered mandatory in many military campaigns of the late thirteenth century.<sup>1</sup>

It cannot be forgotten that the Lord Edward undertook continuing financial obligations concerning the fortification and garrisoning of Acre.<sup>2</sup> The expense of masons and builders in Syria may only be estimated, although a figure for similar construction of fortifications in 1254 is available. John de Joinville reported that the legate Odo of Chaterauroux had spent 30,000 livres of Tournois (£7,500) in constructing a gate and portion of the walls around Jaffa.<sup>3</sup> Edward's expenses may not have reached this

---

1.

Close Rolls, 1272-1279, p. 100. John received 70 marks (£46.66) on 1 October 1274, which may indicate that his wages and payment for lost horses applied to campaigning in Gascony. John did, however, take the cross before August 1270 and may have accompanied the English crusade. On the payment of restor and the importance of replacing mounts lost on crusade, see Richard, Royaume Latin, p. 87; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 318-19. For the importance of fine horses on the crusade of King Louis IX in 1270, see below, pp. 346-47.

2.

See above, pp. 272-73.

3.

John de Joinville, p. 201.

figure, it is true, but to any cost of this kind must be added the English crusader's continued support for the confraternity of St. Edward.<sup>1</sup> Additional English contributions to the Order of St. Thomas in Acre are difficult to verify, but there nonetheless emerges an overall picture of considerable financial obligation to the defence of Latin Syria long after Edward's crusade force had left in 1272.<sup>2</sup>

The important question of Edward's transport and supplies must be examined in detail before moving on to a discussion of methods employed in meeting crusade costs. In this matter it is essential to distinguish between the crusade to Tunis and the subsequent expedition from Sicily to Latin Syria. Concerning transport for the latter, we possess virtually no information. Moreover, the cost of transporting the English crusade force in 1270 from Aigues-Mortes to Tunis and Sicily is difficult to ascertain with clarity. It seems probable, however, that it was arranged and directed initially by the French King. That Louis considered this a primary

---

1.

See above, pp. 277. Edward appears to have financed part of the construction of fortifications through agents in the Hospital in Acre (Cartulaire, iv, no. 3653 bis).

2.

For English contributions to the garrison at Acre during the late thirteenth century, see above, pp. 272-77.

obligation to his major allies is evident from the agreement signed in Paris in 1269. The French crown loaned Gaston de Bearn 25,000 livres of Tournois (£6,250) and the Lord Edward 45,000 livres (£11,250) ostensibly ". . . for his passage and for [that of] his men, who have promised to make the journey overseas with the king." The English and Gascon crusaders were to receive a portion of the loan in 1269 and the rest upon reaching Aigues-Mortes in August 1270.<sup>1</sup> Similar provisions appear to have been signed with Frisian and Flemish leaders at the same time.<sup>2</sup>

No record exists of the actual purchase of Edward's ships in 1270. It is apparent only that he left southern France in thirteen vessels<sup>3</sup> which probably were of Genoese or Provençal ownership. High prices quoted to French purchasers in 1269 had discouraged King Louis from hiring Venetian transport, and the French and Sicilian crusaders had left during the summer of 1270 in Genoese and Provençal vessels.<sup>4</sup>

---

1. Foedera, i, p. 481. For the details of this agreement, see above, pp. 30-31.

2. Menko, "Chronicon," p. 554.

3. Walter of Guiseborough, p. 207. See above, pp. 43.

4. On French and Sicilian transport arrangements, see E.H. Byrne, Genoese Shipping in the 12th and 13th Centuries, p. 23 ff.; W.C. Hazlitt, The Venetian Republic, i, pp. 396-97. See also above, pp. 23, 40-41.

It is not unreasonable to assume that prices paid in 1268 and 1269 by French contractors might be similar to those encountered by English buyers at the same time. It is known, for example, that the French paid 7,000 livres of Tournois (£1,750) for a large vessel in 1269 and around 3,500 livres (£875) for a smaller one with two decks and a crew of fifty-five.<sup>1</sup> Although any hypothesis may be considered dangerous in view of the lack of direct evidence, it is nonetheless interesting to suggest an English purchase of thirteen vessels at 3,500 livres (£875) each, and to compare this total expense to the actual amount of Edward's French loan for transport in 1269. The hypothetical purchase price totals 45,500 livres of Tournois (£11,375), while the French loan compares favourably at 45,000 livres (£11,250). There is, of course, no means of discovering the size or cost of Edward's ships, nor of verifying beyond a single narrative source the number in his fleet in 1270.

It is not clear what arrangements were made concerning individual passage on board these ships in 1270. Venetian prices quoted to the French in 1268,

---

1.

Pacta Naulorum, ed. P. Jal in Collection des Documents inédits: Documents historiques, ed. J.J. Champolion-Figeac, i, nos. 2, 24, pp. 523-27, 599-603.

for example, included personal payment by crusaders themselves, their retainers, and their horses in various sections of each ship. These ranged in price from that paid for accommodation in cabins, to that below decks, or for standing room on the crowded top deck along with infantry and poorer pilgrims.<sup>1</sup>

Whether these arrangements applied to English crusaders leaving Aigues-Mortes is not clear. At the same time, Edward's contracted payment of 100 marks (£66.66) to individual knights in the English host was not necessarily spent on shipping in Genoa and Provence during this period.<sup>2</sup> If, however, it may be suggested that King Louis handled most of the negotiations involving the English fleet, certain generalities emerge which may clarify the conditions Edward faced in October 1270. Certainly his arrival in Aigues-Mortes two months late and his remarkably swift departure within three days lends support to the hypothesis that French or English buyers had already made careful

---

1.

Hazlitt, p. 397. Passage for a knight, his two servants, his groom, and his horse was assessed at  $8\frac{1}{2}$  Venetian marks, while a pilgrim on foot was charged  $\frac{3}{4}$  marks. It is apparent that food was inclusive in the case of the latter.

2.

See above, pp. 332-35.

arrangements and that thirteen ships of varying capacity were already waiting for the crusaders.<sup>1</sup> Likewise, the similarity between an estimated cost of the ships and the exact amount loaned to Edward renders such a conclusion attractive. At any rate, it may be pointed out that French contracts negotiated with the Genoese in 1268 and 1269 featured the agreement that a stipulated number of vessels would be made available irrespective of the number of projected passengers on each. Ships thus contracted were available for a limited amount of time and would carry crusaders to one destination, pick them up at any time, and deliver them to a second point. After this, the Genoese would consider renewing contracts at two-fifths of the original price. They were paid a lump sum in advance and the remainder when the vessels sailed for their first landing point.<sup>2</sup>

Of importance is the stipulation in Genoese contracts that crusaders would only be delivered to two points. While it cannot be shown that the English had endorsed such provisions, it is apparent

---

1.

Thomas Wykes (p. 238) recorded the speed with which the English were able to depart from Aigues-Mortes. See above, pp. 42, 46 n.

2.

See Pacta Naulorum, ms. 2, 27, pp. 523-27, 599-603.

that Frisian and Flemish contingents were soon at the mercy of such contracts in the spring of 1271. Following the return from Tunis to Sicily, a German account recorded that the Genoese vessels "were sent to various ports of Europe . . ." or were secured by Charles of Anjou for his anticipated campaigns in Greece.<sup>1</sup> This factor may have influenced the bitter disputes in Tunis in which English and Flemish leaders expressed fury at the abandonment of the crusade and return to Sicily. Clearly their dependence upon such contracts may have rendered their opposition to a final landing in Sicily understandable.<sup>2</sup> This might also explain their debate in Sardinia as to whether to continue on to Acre directly.<sup>3</sup> Edward found it difficult to commit his own followers to a further journey towards Acre in 1271, <sup>4</sup> which may support the hypothesis that such contracts had indeed been signed by the English and that new provisions for

---

1.

Menko, "Chronicon," p. 557. See above, pp. 43-45, 50.

2.

See particularly the vivid accounts of Thomas Wykes (p. 238) and Walter of Guiseborough (pp. 206-07). Menko ("Chronicon," p. 556) discussed the indignation of Henry of Luxemburg and the Count of Flanders, while John Villani (p. 129) clearly linked Edward's feelings with those of the German crusaders.

3.

Menko, "Chronicon," pp. 55. See above, p. 42.

4.

William Rishanger, p. 68. See above, pp. 48-49.

transport must be made in Sicily at two-fifths of the original price.

It is just possible that English contracts for transport had expired by the spring of 1271. If so, the hire of ships for the voyage to Latin Syria must have been considerable, especially if such expenses were unforeseen and had not been provided for in baronial budgets.<sup>1</sup> The expenses incurred by Edmund and his crusaders during the six months it took them to travel from England to Acre in 1271 must have boosted the total bill for transport.<sup>2</sup> Another major item of transport expense may have arisen from the fact that baronial contingents had apparently departed from Acre in 1272 in separate groups, indicating the independent contracting of vessels, perhaps at relatively short notice.<sup>3</sup> In short, unless the Lord Edward was able to avoid the difficulties inherent in Genoese contracts negotiated by French and German crusaders, his transport expenses of 1271 and 1272

---

1.

Arab sources, for example, recorded the size of Edward's fleet anchoring at Acre in 1271 as around 30 vessels, although this may be an exaggerated figure. See Ibn-al-Furāt, p. 150 and al-Makrizī, IB, p. 86.

2.

For a discussion of the Lord Edmund's passage, see above, pp. 51, 61, 67.

3.

See above, pp. 85.

must have been staggering.

Provisions and supplies for the sizeable army which accompanied the Lord Edward to Tunis and Latin Syria are impossible to evaluate with certainty. It is never clear, moreover, how expenses were divided between the French crusaders, Edward and his baronial followers. From the contracts made at the time and from previous experiences of crusaders, it would seem that food and military supplies - exclusive of fresh water - were the concern of individuals.<sup>1</sup> At any rate, loans contracted by English barons in 1271 and 1272 seem to bear out the probability that their own expenses were considerable.<sup>2</sup> As to the personal expense of the Lord Edward himself, wardrobe accounts yield nothing in the way of illumination. A requisition list of King Louis, however, gives an indication of many personal expenses facing a crusader King in 1269. He paid 783 livres of Tournois (£195.75) for a string of thirteen mounts to accompany him to Tunis. These included two expensive war-horses from Spain and Lorraine. French accounts reveal added

---

1.

Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22; John de Hoinville, pp. 48, 151-57; Servois, "Emprunts de Saint Louis," pp. 231-32.

2.

Antient Kalendars, i, pp. 80-81. See Table H, and below, pp. 379.

expenses connected with the maintenance of such vital animals, listing the costs for straw, mangers, hayracks, poles, ointment, lights and hired grooms. Armour and weapons also added to expenses, and King Louis provided for his personal smith and for the operation of his forge. Finally, clothing for such a long and difficult campaign cost the French king nearly 600 livres (£150), plus the additional expense of buying great chests in which to transport his belongings.<sup>1</sup> To these hypothetical costs and estimates in Edward's case must be added the expenses of embassies, particularly to the Mongols in 1271-1272.<sup>2</sup>

In general, it can be seen that individual items of expense regarding the English crusade activities in 1271-1272 are difficult to determine. It may be stated, however, that financial obligations involving inducements to individual crusaders and the provision of transport at least to Tunis and Sicily were talled even before the expedition left Dover in 1270. Once campaigning had begun personal expenses for supplies and wages to retainers were possibly

---

1.

From a list reproduced by Prutz, Kulturgeschichte, pp. 599-600.

2.

See above, pp. 134, 241.

undertaken by individuals leading ultimately to their contracting of substantial debts. The expensive journey to Acre and back in 1271 and 1272, involving transport for Edmund and individual crusaders in small fleets as well as for the Lord Edward's main force, may have combined with the funds paid out for supplies, horses, armor, and embassies to create considerable expense both for baronial leaders and for Edward himself. To expand further on individual expenses is impossible, yet the total cost of the crusade may be within reliable estimation. For this, however, it is necessary first to draw some conclusions from the accounts describing payment of crusade debts or listing the receipt of various funds to be applied to crusade loans.

b. Means of meeting the cost of crusade activities.

Leasing or sale of property.

One major problem facing a large number of crusaders during the thirteenth century resulted from the difficulties involved in raising money at short notice through the transfer or lease of lands and estates. Legal obstacles prevented alienation of much

property held by baronial or clerical landlords and thus rendered the financing of an expensive crusade difficult.<sup>1</sup> In addition, many crusaders found themselves unable to draw readily from sources which were normally available to more powerful magnates. Royal and clerical grants or sizeable loans from established Italian banking families were simply out of reach. The alleviation of many of these financial difficulties, however, had already been effectively brought about in 1145 with the publication of the bull Quantum praedecessores. This contained canonistic doctrine of significant benefit to relatively minor crusaders bound by rigid legal practices forbidding the alienation of property or fiefs:

. . . it shall be allowed to them also that when, after their relatives or the lords to whom their fiefs belong have been warned, if these people either cannot or do not wish to lend them money, then they may freely and without contradiction pledge their lands or other possessions to churches, to churchmen, or to any other of the faithful.<sup>2</sup>

The number of English crusaders enjoying this privilege in 1268-1270 is significant. Baronial crusaders whose means of raising capital were limited

---

1.

On English law regarding alienation of fiefs, see W.S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, iii, p. 132 ff.

2.

Trans. Brundage, Canon Law, p. 176. See further Villey, La croisade, pp. 72-73.

to the sale or mortgage of lands wasted little time in alienating property to ". . . churches, to churchmen, or to any other of the faithful." John Lovel, a royalist baron during the civil wars, was granted license to lease his manors at Southmere, Dorking, and Tichwell in 1270. His manor at Elcho might be leased for ten years on royal authority, in order to help finance John's transport.<sup>1</sup> Richard Maylard, a crusader who held royal fiefs, received permission to lease or sell his farm at Bridewell for a guaranteed annual income before he proceeded to the Holy Land in 1271.<sup>2</sup> David, Earl of Athelney, rented his manor at Chingleford for fifteen years in order to raise funds for crusade.<sup>3</sup> Herbert de Boyvill's manor at Thirling was sold outright to the Bishop of Norwich three years after Herbert had taken the cross in 1267.<sup>4</sup> Contracts were signed for the lease of John de Ardern's lands at Pleshy to two men for three years commencing in September 1270, in order to secure funds for John's

---

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 425, 514.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 503.

3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 422.

4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 62, 425.

passage.<sup>1</sup> William de Detling leased his manor at Rothwell in July 1270, while Robert de Munteny of York leased his holdings in Suffolk for four years in August.<sup>2</sup> Walter de Wygeton, Robert Charles, and Walter de Percy also contracted for the sale or lease of lands prior to their departure with the Lord Edward in 1270.<sup>3</sup> Finally, the former rebel John de Ingoldthorp raised funds for his passage with Edmund in February 1271 by leasing many of his lands for five years.<sup>4</sup>

There is ample evidence that the lease or sale of property was necessary for more powerful crusaders in England as well. Thomas de Clare sold lands at Cottesmore, Belawe, Playford, Wryesdale, and Weybridge in September 1269.<sup>5</sup> Eustace Balliol leased manors at

---

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 483-84.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 441, 454.

3. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 443, 434-35, 425. Robert Charles seems to have found it necessary to sell all of his property in order to leave with the crusade. See below, pp. Walter de Percy, although seemingly under contract with the Lord Edward to accompany the crusade, is found witnessing an English charter in February 1271 and travelling overseas on King Henry's affairs in May 1272. See Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 515, 653.

4. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 517. For a discussion of former rebels' participation in the crusade of 1270-1272, see above, pp. 91-93.

5. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 474.

Levering, Skelton, Gamlesby, Glasbury, and Quenington for four years commencing in September 1270.<sup>1</sup> It may be noted that the sale or lease of lands was useful in bringing vital funds to a crusader for meeting further expenses after he had paid the initial costs of his journey. In 1270 the Lord Edmund was granted permission to lease all of his lands in England for seven years in order to raise money as security for his expected debts. In the event of his death on crusade, his creditors might enjoy the revenues from these leased properties during the seven-year period.<sup>2</sup> There is no indication that the money thus raised by Edmund would be used directly on crusade at all, but it would be made clear to his future creditors that his guarantees for repayment were reliable.

One final example of the use of canonistic privilege in the matter of financing crusade activities remains to be discussed. Throughout the twelfth century the problem faced by clerics wishing to meet the expenses of crusade involved their inability to lease their benefices. By the time of the publication

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 441.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 448, 510-11.

of Ad liberandam in 1215, however, clergy had been granted permission to mortgage benefices for three years in order to raise funds for their passage to the Holy Land.<sup>1</sup> Since the early twelfth century they had been granted further permission to enjoy partial income from these benefices during their absence on crusade.<sup>2</sup> Coupled with their exemption from crusade subsidies or lay grants, this placed clerics in an improved position with regard to the raising of funds for activity overseas.<sup>3</sup> There is little record of English clerics actually benefitting from such leasing or mortgaging of lands under their administration, although in March 1292 it was made clear by the Archbishop of York that his ecclesiastical approval must be granted before such activity might be allowed. At that time the vicar of Hucknall Torkard was deprived of his benefice for leaving on crusade without permission from his archbishop. The vicar had presumably

---

1.

See Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 177-78.

2.

It was generally accepted that clerics might enjoy one-twentieth of the income from their benefices while on crusade. See Brundage, Canon Law, p. 179.

3.

Clerics who had taken the cross were exempt from Church grants such as that provided by the English clergy in 1270. See Brundage, Canon Law, pp. 178-79; Villey, La croisade, p. 75.

intended to finance a portion of his passage with Odo de Grandison to Acre.<sup>1</sup> In 1270 and 1271 many clerics took the cross, although there is little record to prove that they intended to accompany the English crusade in person. Their numbers may, however, serve to illustrate the extent to which canonistic doctrine formulated during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries affected the ability of such clerics to finance passage to the Holy Land.<sup>2</sup>

Royal grants and lay subsidies.

The extent to which English revenues were used to finance crusade activities throughout the late thirteenth century is of considerable interest and importance. Grants to baronial crusaders, as we have

---

1.

John le Romeyn , Register, i, p. 306.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 440, 480, 588.

Clerical crusaders in England included:

Rowland Malet, parson of the church of Quenton  
 Stephen of London, parson of the church of Lugwarden  
 William de Glesby, parson of the church of Bassingham  
 John de Erenfeud, parson of the church of Warblington  
 John de Briddeport, parson of the church of Axeminster  
 John de Badebury, parson of the church of Rudmerton  
 Alexander, parson of the church of Westiderleg  
 Benedict le Canun of Alfemeston.

seen, were significant in 1270 and 1290. An important feature of these gifts, moreover, was the way in which payment was made directly from royal funds in England. Robert Charles found himself in difficulty after selling all of his lands to go crusading in 1270. In June King Henry III granted him 400 marks (£266.66) from crown revenues received from escheats, wardships and marriages.<sup>1</sup> Roger de Clifford's grant of between £500 and £700 annually was issued from the same financial reserves, largely at the Lord Edward's suggestion.<sup>2</sup> King Henry's grants to his sons on crusade tapped similar crown resources. In February 1271 the king granted to Edmund between 2,000 and 2,600 marks (£1,333.33 to £1,733.33) from receipts of fines, amercements, and other eyre issues in the county of Lincoln. The money was to be used by Edmund when his own crusade force left the realm in February or March 1271.<sup>3</sup> Finally,

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 434-35.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 448. Roger's grant consisted of the returns from royal wardships, guaranteeing the crusader a minimum of £500 and maximum of £700 annually.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, (p. 514) released 2,000 marks (£1,333.33) for Edmund's use on crusade. For the discrepancy between the two figures, see the discussion of Edward's appropriation of his brother's funds below, pp. 369-70.

it can be seen that royal grants to Odo de Grandison in 1290 represent a continuation of this policy of financing by the English crown.<sup>1</sup>

King Henry's grants to his son Edward in 1270-1272, however, must be further considered in the light of the king's decision to regard Edward as his legal substitute on crusade.<sup>2</sup> While it is probable that royal policy during this period favoured the financing of English crusaders, grants to the Lord Edward may have assumed additional importance before canon law. From a practical standpoint, moreover, Edward's personal control of financial affairs in the realm following the civil wars provides still another factor behind his aged father's willingness to contribute crown resources to the crusade. Clearly these royal grants added to the fund of ready cash vital for Edward's conduct of crusade operations. Of the 6,000 marks (£4,000) which King Henry granted to Edward from taxes on the Jewry, for example, nearly 4,000 marks (£2,666.66) were quickly spent, and before June 1271 the prince had urgently requested that the

---

1.

See above, pp. 264-65.

2.

See above, pp. 321-22.

remainder be sent to him in Acre.<sup>1</sup> Three months later the king was prevailed upon "by common counsel of the prelates and magnates of the realm" to grant more crown revenues directly to the Lord Edward's bankers in the Latin East. Wardships and escheats belonging to the king in September 1271 were to be applied to ". . . the relief of the king's own estate and of his debts as well as for acquitting the expenses of Edward, his son, in the Holy Land." Additional revenues from the king's possessions were granted to his son, saving rewards for his household and £120 in pennies ". . . in parcels, at the king's will, for him to give away [on ceremonial occasions]."<sup>2</sup> By February 1272 the Lord Edward's constant need for money had resulted in King Henry's grant of proceeds from a royal tax on merchandise entering or leaving the realm. Funds thus raised seem to have been sent directly to agents in the Latin East of Edward's chief bankers.<sup>3</sup> In June 1271 royal officials directed that

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 545-76.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 531, 574.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 630. Such taxes on merchandise were a common method of repaying short-term debts to personal bankers during this period. Farming such taxes might also provide bankers with unspecified interest on loans. This was particularly likely in the case of loans to Edward, who carried the protection of the Church as a crusader exempt from interest payments. See Whitwell, pp. 184-86; Villet, La croisade, pp. 182-183. See also below, pp. 381-82.

funds raised through the administration of the vacant archbishopric of Dublin should be applied to the English crusade. The attorneys of the Lord Edward were even appointed to oversee these funds until the vacancy could be ended.<sup>1</sup> In January 1271 Edward personally acknowledged a grant to crusade funds by the Wardens of the Cinq Ports and assured them that it would be treated as a contribution which might not prejudice them regarding future taxation.<sup>2</sup>

By far the most significant contribution to Edward's crusade in 1270 resulted from the grant of a lay-subsidy prior to the prince's departure for Gascony. Machinery for the provision of such a substantial grant was set in motion soon after Edward and his followers took the cross in May 1268. By the autumn of that year forty-five magnates, including six bishops and three earls, had been ordered to discuss the possibility of a tax to help finance the new enterprise.<sup>3</sup> Backed by royal encouragement, the clergy and baronage of England were pressed to grant

---

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 540.

2. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 513.

3. Close Rolls, 1264-1268, pp. 557, 558-59.

twentieths on movable goods. The clergy were asked to approve such a grant of funds in convocation and the laity in parliament. Throughout 1269, however, King Henry's request for these grants "hung in suspense" until an assembly could be gathered during Hocketide of 1270.<sup>1</sup> At this parliament a crusade twentieth was granted by "all free men of the realm, in towns, and also in cities, boroughs, and elsewhere." The English clergy in convocation simultaneously matched this grant, and collection was under way before April 1270.<sup>2</sup>

Royal machinery established for the collection and forwarding of funds raised by the lay subsidy of 1270 has been the subject of considerable study, and need not be discussed in detail here.<sup>3</sup> It is important,

---

1. Bartholomew Cotton, pp. 143-44.

2. "Chronica maiorum et vicecomitum," p. 122. It is interesting to note that the Hocketide Parliament, apparently dominated by Richard of Cornwall, was continually split by the division between the Lord Edward and Earl Gilbert de Clare. While parliamentary negotiations went on apparently until 24 June, collection of the new twentieth had begun as early as 20 April. "Annales de Wigornia," p. 459; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 418. On the clerical grant of 1269 or 1270, see below, pp. 367-68.

3. See, for example, Lunt, "The consent of the English lower clergy to taxation during the reign of Henry III," in Persecution and Liberty: Essays in Honor of George Lincoln Burr; Financial Relations, p. 292 ff. See also Lancashire Lay Subsidies, ed. J.A.C. Vincent, (Record Society for the publication of original documents relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, xxvii, 1893), i, passim.

however, to observe the speed and urgency with which collectors were encouraged to provide funds for the English crusade. In May 1270 royal collectors in York were instructed to replace absent administrators immediately and to cease waiting until six or more collectors were present before levying the tax.<sup>1</sup> At Yarmouth citizens were caught up in the speedy collection by local collectors only to find that the sheriff was not far behind in an attempt to collect the same tax again.<sup>2</sup> Collectors in the important administrative area of London were instructed to avoid the cumbersome machinery of the exchequer entirely, and to pay the proceeds into the Priory of the Church of the Holy Trinity.<sup>3</sup> Further encouragement was given to collectors to pay directly to the three

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 424.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 525.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 431. Instructions to Hugh Fitz Otto and Giles de Audinarde for collecting the sizeable grant of 20,000 marks (£13,333.33) from the citizens of London reveal how thoroughly this collection was administered. They were to find ". . . how much has been received of the rich or the poor in the city . . . and what baillis and others received any money on that account, and by what warrant and how much each received and if any of it is in arrears - who has it and is answerable for it; and to audit and view how much has been delivered to divers persons and for what purposes . . ." (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 335).

supervisors of the twentieth, the treasurers of the Hospital and the Temple in England, and Giles de Audenarde, clerk and under-keeper of the wardrobe.<sup>1</sup>

Final arrangements for the sending of collected funds to the Lord Edward on crusade reveal a similar concern for speed and efficiency. Directed by Edward's caretaker governors, Robert Burnell, Roger Mortimer, and the Archbishop of York, funds from the lay and clerical subsidies were sent directly to Italian bankers handling the expenses of crusade. Before departing in August 1270 the prince had granted all proceeds to these bankers from the commencement of collection in May until early June 1271.<sup>2</sup> These provisions enabled payments to reach Edward rapidly throughout 1271 and 1272, and may have cut considerably his need to borrow money. Examples of this practice in operation may be seen in June 1271 when 300 marks (£200) of the twentieth levied in Norfolk was delivered directly to James de Lucca in

---

1.

In July, 1270. Giles de Audenarde played a leading role in the collection of later grants and subsidies as well. See Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 439; Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 312 ff.

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 442. For details on the nature and personnel of these banking firms, see below, pp. 381-84.

order to repay loans the prince had contracted from him.<sup>1</sup> Other payments, such as that of the burgesses of Grimsby in June 1271, were sent to Edward's attorneys at the New Temple in London for forwarding quickly overseas.<sup>2</sup>

The effect of such a large reserve of cash upon the financial success of Edward's crusade in 1270-1272 cannot be overemphasized. Auditors' accounts reveal that by early 1272 some 24,184 marks (£16,122.66) had been sent to Edward or to his buyers and creditors. The total collected from both lay and clerical subsidies amounted to £31,488 6s. 10d. (£31,488.34), although a very high proportion of this - over £15,309 - was used to pay collectors and administrators.<sup>3</sup> Nearly all of the funds sent to Edward seem to have been

---

1.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 539. Edward was apparently bound to James ". . . in a great sum of money."

2.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, pp. 538-39. The sum involved payment of 100 marks (£66.66) of a total 120 marks (£80) due from the twentieth.

3.

Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m, 6. See also Lancashire Lay Subsidies, i, p. 100. The individual salaries of collectors are difficult to determine, although records pertaining to collection of the Lyons tenth levied in 1274 are available for comparison: most collectors at that time received three shillings per day in wages drawn from the tenth itself, but Raymond de Nogaret, who headed collection in England, received eight shillings per day. See Lunt, "A papal tenth" pp. 51-55; Financial Relations, p. 314.

applied to short-term loans undertaken by the prince through his personal bankers, such as James and Luke de Lucca and Hugh Pape.<sup>1</sup> There can be little doubt that such a constant supply of revenue enhanced Edward's ability to arrange credit in the East during the period he was on crusade. Without such a source of finance it is doubtful whether the English leader could have continued operations, particularly with regard to negotiating low-interest, short-term loans so necessary at that great distance from reliable monetary reserves in England or Gascony.<sup>2</sup>

Finally, two additional lay-subsidies must be briefly discussed, although there is little evidence to tie them directly to English crusade activity. In 1275 a parliamentary grant of a fifteenth on movables added £81,201 13s. 7d. (£81,201.68) to the royal exchequer.<sup>3</sup> While it is not clear that this sum or

---

1.

See below, pp. 381-84.

2.

For additional information on the process involved in such loans, see below, pp. 381 ff. See also M.M. Fryde and E.B. Fryde, "Public Credit, with Specific Reference to Northwestern Europe," Cambridge Economic History of Europe, iii, p. 454 ff.; Whitwell, p. 177 ff.

3.

Ramsay, Revenues, ii, p. 8. The collection of this grant was apparently slow, adding perhaps as little as £20,000 to exchequer receipts within two years prior to the outbreak of the Welsh war in 1277. This has resulted in an inability to determine what portion of the grant was available for application to crusade debts. See below, pp. 389-90, 392.

any portion of it was applied to crusade debts, the fact remains that vast amounts remained owing to Italian bankers, and to them some of this grant may have been applied.<sup>1</sup> In similar fashion a parliament in January 1291 granted a fifteenth during a period in which crusade preparations and the financing of Odo de Grandison's expedition occupied a prominent place in royal affairs.<sup>2</sup> Again, no specific references exist to link this grant of an estimated £117,000 directly to Edward's crusade policies.<sup>3</sup> When the fifteenth was requested in Wales, however, royal officials specified that the grant was intended to relieve

. . . debts the king has incurred during his absence abroad in effecting the liberation of King Charles of Sicily, his kinsman, whereby the state of the Holy Land and of the Church was improved and peace secured.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of the unspecified nature of these requests by Edward, there can be little doubt that such lay

---

1.

Between June 1275 and January 1276 for example, over £16,000 was repaid to merchants from Lucca and elsewhere. See Table I, and further below, pp. 381-84.

2.

Interim Report, pp. 64-65; Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1292, p. 419. See above, pp. 263-65.

3.

See Ramsay, Revenues, ii, pp. 87, 37 ff.; Powicke, Thirteenth Century, p. 602.

4.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1281-1292, p. 419.

grants in 1275 and 1291 substantially supplemented the royal exchequer at a time when crusade debts and anticipated crusade expenditures were serious considerations for the king and his financial advisors.

#### Clerical grants and subsidies.

English clerical contributions toward the meeting of crusade expenses have been exhaustively studied by William Lunt.<sup>1</sup> It remains here to relate some of his findings to the specific crusade activities of Edward during the period 1270-1296. In the first place, it can be shown that four distinct types of clerical contribution mark the period under discussion. Individual clergy seem to have presented donations to specific crusade projects or seem to have granted them to individual crusaders. In contrast to these private gifts, the English clergy as a whole in 1270 and in 1272 acceded to requests from royal and papal representatives and granted funds voluntarily after discussion and debate in convocations at Canterbury and York. In 1274 the clergy of the realm joined churchmen throughout Europe by contributing funds in

---

1.

See "Collectors' Accounts;" "Papal taxation;" "A papal tenth;" Financial Relations.

response to the conciliar grant at Lyons. This subsidy ultimately made up a portion of the unprecedented grant of receipts gathered throughout Christendom to King Edward. Finally, in 1291 the English clergy were commanded by Pope Nicholas IV to grant a crusade subsidy for six years.

Private grants by individual English clergymen or papal representatives are in evidence with regard to the crusade of 1270 and that of Odo de Grandison in 1290. On their return from crusading in Latin Syria, for example, Edward's companions Robert Tybetot and Payne de Chaworth reminded Pope Gregory X that they had been promised 600 marks (£400) each by the legate Ottobuono. They explained that Pope Clement's representative had granted these funds in return for their participation overseas and the consequent fulfillment of their vows taken in 1268.<sup>1</sup> Unfortunately, there is no further record to verify the possible confusion of this grant with its exact counterpart by the Lord Edward in 1270; for Edward's provision of transport and fresh water to Payne and Robert matched the amounts these crusaders were

---

1. Pope Gregory X, Regs., no. 232.

demanding from the pope three years later.<sup>1</sup> Whether Cardinal Ottobuono voluntarily provided funds from his own treasury to match Edward's personal grant, or whether he in fact undertook to pay in place of the prince is uncertain. The facts seem to indicate only that private grants by the papal legate formed a portion of the funds raised to meet individual baronial crusading costs. Twenty years later, a voluntary contribution from John le Romeyn , Archbishop of York, aided the crusade project of Odo de Grandison. In order to meet some of the expenses of the expedition to Acre in 1290, the archbishop granted proceeds from the Archdeaconry of Richmond.<sup>2</sup> At that time too, Pope Nicholas IV personally granted annates of benefices and dignities falling vacant in the diocese of Bath and Wells between 1291 and 1294 in order that Bishop Robert Burnell might meet crusade expenses sustained by himself and a group of soldiers accompanying him to the Holy Land.<sup>3</sup>

Two clerical grants of a biennial twentieth in

---

1.

See also above, pp. 332-34.

2.

See Kingsford, "Sir Otho de Grandison," p. 138 n.

3.

Pope Nicholas IV, Regs., no. 2025.

aid of the crusade were the result of careful deliberations following special requests by Edward or his intermediaries. In 1269 or 1270, the English clergy answered King Henry's plea for an aid with which to meet the mounting cost of Edward's new expedition.<sup>1</sup> Collection was left in the hands of local clergy, although there is evidence that royal officials interfered in order to speed the sending of the proceeds to Edward's merchants and creditors in the Latin East.<sup>2</sup> With this collection hardly finished, moreover, the clergy received a second request for a biennial grant in aid of the English crusade. For on 3 September 1272 Pope Gregory X dispatched an appeal in the names of Edward and Edmund for a voluntary twentieth.<sup>3</sup> At Hilarytide 1273 the Archbishop of Canterbury and eleven suffragan bishops decided in convocation to ". . . let

---

1.

Concilia, ii, pp.19-20; Thomas Wykes, pp.227-28. See further S.K. Mitchell, Studies in Taxation under John and Henry III, p. 112 ff. for a discussion of the precedents involved in such a clerical grant.

2.

Thomas Wykes, p. 228. See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 299-310.

3.

Concilia, ii, pp. 24-25. Another letter dispatched on 30 September stressed the pope's intention to ask for an aid, not to demand it. See Pope Gregory X, Regs., no. 223.

there be done in these as in other things the pleasure and will of the Lord Pope."<sup>1</sup> And on 11 October the entire clergy repeated acceptance of the grant as "fitting to further the honour of God and His Holy Church," although by that time clerical murmers of dissent were distinctly audible.<sup>2</sup> As in the collection of receipts during 1270-1272, royal officials kept a watchful eye on proceedings, and destraint of clerical goods or property was occasionally enforced to ensure full payment.<sup>3</sup>

Serious abuses soon became evident regarding the spending of these clerical crusade contributions. On 30 November 1273 the pope wrote to Edward concerning Edmund's complaints that he had received none of the subsidy collected since 1272. It was apparent that a serious quarrel had broken out between the brothers over Edward's appropriation of clerical funds and Pope Gregory notified Edward that an advisor was on the way

---

1.

Concilia, ii, p. 24. See also "Annales Wigornia," pp. 462-64; and "Annales Wintoniae," p. 115.

2. Concilia, ii, p. 26; Godfrey Giffard, Episcopal Registers, ii, p. 58. Complains about the subsidy "commanded" by the pope may be found in "chronica maiorum et vicecomitum," p. 157; "Annales Osniae," p. 256. The Flores Historiarum (iii, p. 32) stressed the pope's intention to "compel" the English clergy to pay.

3.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 321-22.

and that appeals had been directed to the dowager Queen Eleanor in order that she might bring her two sons together over the issue.<sup>1</sup> In July 1274 the affair was still dividing the crusaders and Pope Gregory dispatched his chaplain to ensure that Edmund received an adequate portion of the funds, to be applied to his crusade debts.<sup>2</sup> There is evidence in the following year that Edward had appropriated others of Edmund's funds besides those received from clerical taxes; in June 1275 the king's brother complained that he had received only a small portion of King Henry's grant from the issues of eyre in the county of Lincoln.<sup>3</sup> Of 2,600 marks (£1,766.66) which had been granted to him, Edmund claimed that only £600 had been delivered by Edward's attorneys.<sup>4</sup> He had to wait over a year before Edward in November 1276 made the first payment toward the alleviation of his debt.<sup>5</sup>

Finally, the clergy of England faced mandatory contributions in 1274 and 1291 as a result of papal

---

1.

Pope Gregory X, Regs., nos. 328-29.

2.

See Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 236 n.

3.

Close Rolls, 1272-1279, pp. 182-83. See above, pp. 355.

4.

Close Rolls, 1272-1279, pp. 182-83.

5.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 167. This first payment was nonetheless a substantial sum of £833.

pressures for aid to new crusade projects. During the six years from 1274 to 1280, and during a subsequent five years from 1291 to 1296, clerical tenths were levied in England. These subsidies were collected during periods of considerable domestic expense, in which additional contributions were demanded of the clergy for financing two Welsh wars, an invasion of Scotland, and a bitter and protracted war with France.<sup>1</sup> The circumstances surrounding these subsidies as well as the clergy's fierce resistance to such measures have already been discussed.<sup>2</sup> It remains only to emphasize the significant contribution of such funds towards meeting English crusade expenses, and to point out once more the unprecedented grant of all unused portions of the 1274 subsidy to King Edward in 1291. It is important to note also that the English monarch seems to have applied virtually none of the 1274 or 1291 grants toward projects designed to aid the Holy Land. Instead, provoking a decade of political controversy, he seized

---

1.

See above, pp. 196-98, for Edward's additional levies upon the clergy of the realm.

2.

See above, pp. 197 . See also Lunt, "Two crusading tenths," in Financial Relations. T.F. Tout, (Collected Papers, ii, pp. 113-14 ff.) has added a valuable contribution to the study of crusade finance in Scotland illustrating the disproportionately large amount of subsidy money gathered north of the English border in 1291-1296.

a large portion of Pope Nicholas's 1291 grant and refused to return proceeds granted from the Lyons subsidy. The money was presumably used to finance campaigns in Gascony, Wales and Scotland during the last years of his reign.<sup>1</sup>

Lunt has rightly pointed out that clerical crusade taxation in England increased in volume and efficiency throughout the late thirteenth century. The method of valuation established in England during 1291-1293 in fact provided a working model for assessment by crown and papacy which was to last throughout the Late Middle Ages.<sup>2</sup> The English clergy had contributed heavily to the crusade during the twenty-six years following the Lord Edward's departure for the Holy Land. Fifteen of those years had witnessed the levy of grants or subsidies in aid of Edward's various projects, including the solid decade of clerical taxation which had surrounded the crusade of 1270-1272. Proceeds from the two year twentieth levied in 1272 at the request of Pope Gregory X yielded nearly £22,000, most of which may have been applied directly to crusade debts by King Edward.<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

See above, pp. 191-203.

2.

For the valuation and comment upon its significance, see Lunt, Financial Relations, pp. 666-75, 353-54.

3.

This is the considered estimate of Lunt (Financial Relations, pp. 236-37).

Six years of contributions in accordance with the tenth levied at Lyons in 1274 returned over £128,000 in revenues, although Edward was apparently only able to receive 100,000 marks (£66,666.66) from this fund in 1291.<sup>1</sup> And Pope Nicholas's levy of a tenth in 1291 yielded £60,226 from English collection of which the king siezed £43,033 in 1293 and 1294.<sup>2</sup> No doubt collection in 1291-1296 was complicated by the domestic crisis and the clergy's absolute resistance to further taxation during this period.<sup>3</sup> In all, however, it can be seen that the Church in England contributed over £225,000 in grants and subsidies, most of which was applied either to crusade projects in England, or to those involving papal politics in 1280-1285, or to the expensive wars of King Edward from 1293 to the end of the reign.<sup>4</sup>

---

1.

See Lunt, "A papal tenth," p. 58, and also above, pp. 190-91.

2.

See Lunt, "Collectors' Accounts," pp. 117-19, and above, pp. 191 ff.

3.

On the resistance to taxation see Lunt, Financial Relations, p. 245 ff.; Tout, Collected Papers, p. 113 ff. See also above, pp. 197.

4.

This figure is, of course, exclusive of those grants, both lay and clerical, received by the king in 1275, 1283, 1290, 1297 and 1300. For additional information on the amount received from the English clergy throughout the reign of Edward I, see Ramsay, Revenues, ii, pp. 87-88 ff.

## Loans.

" . . . to which merchants the king owes a great sum of money," is perhaps one of the most repeated phrases in the account and issue rolls of the first few years of the reign of Edward I. A brief examination of English loans provides some indication of the extent to which such financing was relied upon by crusaders in 1269-1273.<sup>1</sup> It is important to point out immediately, however, that borrowing by individuals concerned with financing military projects was by no means unusual in the late thirteenth century.<sup>2</sup> Unexpected costs and inflated prices were a common hazard, to which the number of times King Henry III pawned the royal jewels bears ample witness.<sup>3</sup> The advantages of quick, on-the-spot loans - particularly from banking societies which charged little interest in return for royal patronage - were apparent to any European leader planning costly projects during this period.<sup>4</sup> Under such circumstances it is understandable

---

1.

See Table I.

2.

See, for example, M.M. and E.B. Fryde, "Public Credit," pp. 454-57.

3.

See Powicke, Thirteenth Century, pp. 220, 503; and above, pp. 339-46.

4.

See Rhodes, pp. 137-38; Whitwell, pp. 178 ff.

that Edward should have received considerable amounts from various bankers during the years of crusade activity in 1269-1273. It may be seen, moreover, that this financial aid often extended to followers of the prince enjoying his intercession for necessary loans.<sup>1</sup> Others, such as the Lord Edmund, clearly anticipated such debts and provided for a substantial credit-rating before setting out for the Latin East.<sup>2</sup>

Regardless of whether loans were arranged before the crusade set out or whether they were undertaken on short notice as expenses arose, a clear picture emerges of English crusaders becoming heavily indebted to various individuals or firms throughout the period 1269-1276. In general, it may be said that six lending "institutions" played a major role in this process. Crusading loans seem to have been received from the English crown, from the French crown and bankers of King Louis IX, from other English crusaders, from the Military Orders in Acre, from individual merchants in Latin Syria, and from powerful banking families and societies in Lucca, Florence, Genoa and Pisa. While a listing of such loans cannot

---

1. Antient Kalandars, i, pp. 80-81. See above, pp. 336

2. See above, pp. 352.

possibly claim to be complete or accurate, it is nonetheless valuable to examine in some detail the nature of individual transactions and the circumstances surrounding their formation during the period of the English crusade.<sup>1</sup>

The debts of English crusaders listed in exchequer documents in both England and France bear witness to the importance of crown revenues for meeting the expenses of the expedition to Tunis and the Latin East. King Henry III, for example, provided funds even before the crusade set out, in order that the Lord Edward and his associates might travel to Paris for a planning session in August 1269. It is interesting to note that the 207½ marks (£137.69) advanced to Edward upon his return from Paris represented funds which English treasurers soon found to be non-existent:

since the treasurer and chamberlains have not the money in hand, as the king is certainly informed, they are to borrow it by all means from merchants or others till a fixed day, repaying them out of the first moneys brought to the exchequer, according to the king's letters patent.<sup>2</sup>

In August 1271 the Lord Edward was loaned a further 3,000 marks (£2,000) from finances largely controlled

1.

These have been listed for convenience in Tables H and I.

2.

Liberate Rolls, vi, no. 1002, p. 115.

by King Henry III. At that time executors of the will of Archbishop Boniface of Canterbury advanced this sum to the English crusader in Acre.<sup>1</sup> At the Paris conference King Louis loaned the crusaders 70,000 livres of Tournois (£17,600), outlining in detail the conditions regarding repayment at the conclusion of the crusade.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Jean-Paul Trabut-Cussac has described the process of repayment, beginning with 5,086 livres (£1,271.50) in 1277 and finishing with John le Rede's payment of 1,200 livres (£300) in April 1289.<sup>3</sup> It might be pointed out that customs collected during 1270-1274 at Bordeaux in Edward's Duchy of Aquitaine were applied directly to other French debts incurred on crusade, while a substantial amount of King Louis's loan was repaid over twelve years from the same funds.<sup>4</sup>

Once military operations were under way, borrowing often became difficult for crusaders without an adequate source of capital near at hand. Italian

---

1. Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 568.

2. Foedera, i, p. 481. See above, pp. 30-32.

3. "Le financement de la croisade Anglaise de 1270," ed. J. Trabut-Cussac BEC, cxix-cxx (1961-1962), p. 122 ff.

4. "Le financement," pp. 118-19. See the original contract in Foedera, i, p. 485.

merchant-bankers generally restricted their lending to those crusaders who represented little financial risk,<sup>1</sup> with the result that baronial leaders often found themselves short of reliable prospects for loans. One method of meeting this financial problem may be illustrated by a loan of 600 marks (£400) received by Thomas de Clare in the Latin East. This sum was advanced by another crusader, William de Valence, and arrangements for Thomas's repayment were under way in England by May 1273.<sup>2</sup> The Lord Edmund tapped similar private sources for a loan of 1,000 marks (£666.66) in August 1271. Edmund at that time received money from the former crusader Richard of Cornwall, apparently after a personal request for funds.<sup>3</sup> Finally, as we have seen, the Lord Edward himself loaned Roger de Clifford 400 marks (£266.66) in Acre in 1272.<sup>4</sup>

More frequently, crusaders short of ready funds found the treasuries of the Military Orders in Latin Syria to be of value. With a European network of

---

1.

Guarantees of royal patronage were important factors in securing loans from these merchant-bankers. See below, pp. 381-82.

2.

Close Rolls, 1272-1279, p. 45.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272, p. 566.

4.

Antient Kalandars, i, pp. 80-81. See above, pp. 336, 375

financial resources available to them, the bankers of the Temple and Hospital in Acre loaned considerable sums to English crusaders during the period 1271-1272. English and Gascon barons in financial difficulty, such as Hamo le Strange, Payne de Chaworth, John de Vesci, Odo de Grandison, John of Brittany, and John de Grailly, relied primarily upon the Templars during this period. The Lord Edmund borrowed similar funds from the Templars, bringing the known record of such loans to over £3,000.<sup>1</sup> Edward, too, borrowed heavily from the Military Orders. In 1272 he authorized his chancellor to begin repayment of 28,189 livres, 7s., 2d. of Tournois (£7,047.36) to the treasurer of the Temple at Paris ". . . on account of a loan made to him while he was in the Holy Land and also in France."<sup>2</sup> In April of the same year Edward instructed his attorneys in England to start repayment of 5,000 marks (£3,333.33) which he had borrowed from the Hospitallers

---

1.

Antient Kalandars, i, pp. 80-81. See Table H.

2.

Devon, Issues of the Exchequer, p. 86. The wording of this entry leads to the assumption that the loans in France refer to sums borrowed before the English crusade force sailed for Tunis in 1270. A portion of this loan may have been repaid in 1279 when instructions were given to release 3,355 marks (£2,236.66) to the Templars for loans contracted in Latin Syria (Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 353).

in Acre, and there is evidence that a further 2,000 marks (£1,333.33) was added to this amount later.<sup>1</sup>

There is some evidence that merchants in the Latin East were also willing to extend credit to hard-pressed crusaders. Again, however, it is clear that those in need of loans were required to offer substantial guarantees before credit might be granted. An illustration of this type of short-term borrowing may be seen in Edward's repayment of debts to Eastern merchants at the great fairs of Laon and Provence in 1274. The English king authorized payment of £880 at Laon and of £1,333 6s. 8d. (£1,333.34) at Provence to various "merchants of Acre" for provisions and supplies previously purchased on crusade.<sup>2</sup> It is probable that Edward's consort Eleanor found herself indebted to such merchants as well. In 1275, for example, Edward granted her permission to use revenues from Cheshire for five years in order to repay her debts, including ". . . those incurred by reason of her pilgrimage with the king lately in the Holy Land."<sup>3</sup>

---

1.

Cartulaire, iii, nos. 3445, 3465, pp. 266-67, 272-73.

2.

Patent Roll 4 Edw. I, p. 32. For a good account of the financial role of such fairs, see A.P. Usher, The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe, i, pp. 120-34.

3.

Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1272-1281, p. 79. This entry seems to duplicate a similar agreement made by the Lord Edmund in 1271. See above, pp. 352, 375.

Finally, Edward's great burden of indebtedness to Italian merchant-bankers bears some analysis. Edward's continuing relationship with these financiers forms the basis of several competent studies, and need not be discussed in detail here.<sup>1</sup> It is important to observe, however, that loans advanced by Edward's leading bankers, Luke and James of Lucca and Hugh Pape of Florence, during the period of crusade activity seem to have included no interest charges, since crusaders were regarded as exempt from interest charges, although a guarantee of English royal patronage was almost certainly demanded. Patronage may be illustrated with regard to the crusade tenth levied in England during 1274-1280. King Edward had received permission in 1277 to place much of the administration of the collection in the hands of his bankers, at this time primarily the Ricciardi and

---

1.

See particularly those studies by Whitwell, Rhodes, and Bond, loc. cit.

2.

Whitwell, pp. 177-79. Two major groups of banking families seem to have handled most of Edward's financial matters. Hugh Pape and his associates provided loans and made purchases in 1269-1271, while the bankers of Lucca took over activities while the prince was in the Latin East.

Cardelini of Lucca, the Buonsignori of Sienna, the Amannati of Pistoia, and the Scotti of Piacenza.<sup>1</sup> This arrangement was soon extended to include storage of funds with various bankers under royal patronage. Such an agreement meant that large sums of capital were made available for the activities of these financiers, at little expense to themselves. Thus money collected from English clergy for use on proposed crusade projects was available for circulation in Lucca, Sienna and Piacenza. In addition, the English king soon found to his advantage that papal schemes in the Mediterranean could draw funds from these carefully-farmed proceeds only with difficulty.<sup>2</sup>

The major obstacle involved in summarizing Edward's borrowing from Italian merchants in 1270-1276 lies in the necessity to use separate payment notices which may conceivably be duplicated in large wardrobe sums. It is advisable, therefore, to discuss specific loans mentioned in the liberate or patent rolls, before proceeding to the more general wardrobe accounts of the period. Loans undertaken by merchant-bankers in

---

1.

Lunt, "A papal tenth," pp. 77-80.

2.

Lunt (Financial Relations, pp. 641-45) reprinted a report of 1283 outlining this process. See also Lunt, "A papal tenth," pp. 67, 72-73, 85.

Lucca provided perhaps the most significant amounts for crusade use. Listed primarily in the names of Luke or James de Lucca, these included £200 advanced as early as 1271.<sup>1</sup> Edward paid back considerable quantities between 1273 and 1276 to these Lucca bankers: £1,000 on 18 April 1273; £400 on 25 October 1274; 1,000 marks (£666.66) on 28 December 1274; £2,000 on 26 April 1275; 1,000 marks (£666.66) on 13 June 1275; £3,066 .3s. 4d. (£3,066.66) on 28 October 1275 and £8,000 on 23 January 1276.<sup>2</sup> It can be seen that during this period Edward was indebted to Lucca merchants for over £16,000, most of which had probably been applied directly to crusade expenses.<sup>3</sup> To various merchants of Florence he repaid loans of 2,000 marks (£1,333.33) in 1273 and, on 15 October 1274, a loan which had apparently been directed towards the relief of the debts of Robert Tybetot.<sup>4</sup> Edward borrowed 1,000 marks (£666.66) from a certain Berengar of Genoa, which was repaid in 1272.<sup>5</sup> More

---

1.

Pipe Roll 5 Edw. I, no. 121 m. 22.

2.

Bond, "Extracts from Liberate Rolls," nos. L, LVII, LXI, LXV, LXVIII, pp. 273, 275-77. Cal. Pat. Rolls 1272-1281, p. 74. 14th Report, Comp. Deputy Keeper of Public Records, p. 173.

3.

See Table I, and a summary in Rhodes, pp. 155-56.

4.

Patent Roll 3 Edw. I, m. 17. Bond, "Extracts from Liberate Rolls," no. LIII, p. 274.

5.

Patent Roll 4 Edw. I, m. 32.

loans repaid in that year included 943 livres, 12s. 5d. of Tournois (£235.91) to merchants in Pisa.<sup>1</sup> On his journey back through Europe to Gascony and England, Edward returned more sums contracted as a result of short-term loans in the East. The Scotti of Piacenza received £2,000, while Bonasio Bonzani and his associates were repaid 50 marks (£33.33) in October 1274 and £1,467 the following year.<sup>2</sup> In Rome, Tegro Anatori was repaid/<sup>70 marks</sup> (£46.66) on 17 October 1274 and the expenses of Edward's homeward journey were met after contracting a loan of 1,210 marks (£806.66) from Theobald Malagalye.<sup>3</sup> While it must be pointed out that the total figure for recorded Italian loans - over £37,500 - has been arrived at without consideration for missing or destroyed account rolls, this nonetheless may be taken as an indication of the considerable sums borrowed by Edward largely in order to meet his crusade expenses.<sup>4</sup>

An independent tally of wardrobe expenditure during the period 1270-1276 may also be useful, although one is faced with serious problems. First,

---

1. Reprinted in Royal and other Historical Letters, ed. W.W. Shirley (Rolls Series, 27), ii, pp. 350-51.

2. Exchequer Diplomatic Documents, T.R. Box I, no.13; Bond, "Extracts from Liberate Rolls," nos. LIV, LIX, pp. 274-75.

3. Bond "Extracts from Liberate Rolls," nos. LV, LXVII, pp. 274, 277.

4. See Table I.

there are in existence no wardrobe accounts for the crucial period 1270-1272 and those rendered by Philip de Willoughby in 1274 are in poor condition.<sup>1</sup>

Secondly, although accounts summarize the total amounts paid to Italian merchant-bankers during the period from 1272-1276, there is little indication as to which payments were aimed at settling those crusade debts mentioned in other accounts.<sup>2</sup> As a result, it is impossible to isolate loans incurred by crusade expenses in 1270-1272 and most payments to individual Italian merchants are obliterated in the records of 1272-1274. Wardrobe totals, however, seem to reflect accurately the whole amount applied to Edward's Italian loans during two biennial periods ending in 1274 and 1276.<sup>3</sup> Together, these were recorded as nearly £52,000, and represent a considerable amount of borrowing during the period surrounding Edward's crusade.<sup>4</sup>

The actual relationship between totalled wardrobe

---

1.

Exchequer Accounts, E 350/3. A summary of the totals rendered in this account survives intact, but a large portion of individual payments and loans were recorded on a section of parchment badly destroyed.

2.

Exchequer Diplomatic Documents, T.R. Box I, no.13; Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 6; Pipe Roll 5 Edw. I, m. 22.

3.

Exchequer Accounts, E 350/3.

4.

See Table I.

accounts and individual repayments to Italian merchants is, however, difficult to demonstrate with accuracy. Faced with a lack of specific evidence for expenditure because of the missing wardrobe accounts of 1270-1272 and because the lists of 1272-1274 are partially destroyed, it is impossible to detect duplicated figures from the equally incomplete list of individual Italian contracts. In addition, it must be remembered that portions of the 1270 and 1272 crusade subsidies may have paid some of Edward's debts, causing sums to go unrecorded in these wardrobe accounts or in the list of specific entries from the liberate rolls.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, all that may be concluded from this exploration of the evidence for borrowing seems to be: that Edward and his fellow crusaders borrowed over £21,000 from crown revenues in England and France; that over £15,000 was borrowed from the Templars and Hospitallers in Latin Syria; that £2,000 in credit was extended by merchants in Acre; that a further £37,000 was borrowed from various Italian bankers and applied to crusade expenses generally; and finally that even though many of these loans may have been duplicated in wardrobe

---

1.

See above, pp. 358-61, 367-70 and Table G.

accounts related to crusade borrowing, the accounts total nearly £52,000 during the period 1272-1276.

c. An estimate of the cost of crusade, 1270-1276.

As we have seen, the cost of crusade cannot be estimated through a study of specific crusade expenditures like Edward's financial obligations toward baronial and mercenary contingents or his overall payment for transport. Similarly, the cost of projects endorsed and financed by Edward following his return from Acre is difficult to estimate accurately.<sup>1</sup> With regard to the amounts raised to meet these expenses, however, we are in possession of a considerable variety of documents, a summary of which may offer some reasonable estimate of the cost of the crusade to Tunis and the Latin East. By grouping these recorded sums into three categories, they may be related to one another to form a total estimate of crusade expenditure.

One category may be formed of money likely to have been applied to crusading expenses before 1271 and which therefore was not applied to payment on other loans:

---

1.

See above, pp. 330-48.

Section I

French loan to Edward in 1269	£ 17,500
Royal grant to Edward in 1270	£ 4,000
Royal grant to Edmund in 1270	£ 1,733

Several assumptions have been made in order to fix items in this category. It has been suggested that Edward's French loan and his grant from the Jewry by Henry III were applied directly to initial crusade costs and therefore were used up before more loans were contracted in 1271 and 1272. The same assumption has been made with regard to a grant of some 2,600 marks (£,733.33) to the Lord Edmund. This has resulted in the formation of a category of money apparently used immediately by the English crusade leaders, which may have accounted for purchases of supplies and transport as well as for the Lord Edward's individual grants of 100 marks (£66.66) to each knight accompanying him on crusade.<sup>1</sup> This category of funds remains totally separate from those regarding the repayment of debts for two reasons: if this money were spent before 1271 it cannot have been applied to payments in Sections II or III; and King Louis's loan of 1269 drew no subsidy money before 1277.

---

1.

See Table F, and above, pp. 332-34.

A second category has been made up from individual notices of borrowings by Edward and his followers prior to 1276:

Section II

From the English crown	£ 4,700
From the Military Orders and Frankish merchants	£ 17,000
From Italian bankers	£ 37,000 -
	£ 52,000

The discrepancy between the total of loans to individual merchants<sup>1</sup> and the sums recorded in wardrobe accounts<sup>2</sup> has created a minimum-maximum range in this category, revealed in the figures applying to borrowings from Italian bankers. It must be pointed out, moreover, that evidence is lacking to show that all of these loans had been taken to pay for crusade expenses.

Finally, a third category involving the collection of English clerical and secular grants for the repayment of loans helps to substantiate figures totalled in section III:

Section III

1270 subsidy	£ 31,000
1272 subsidy	£ 22,000
estimated portion of 1275 subsidy	(£ 20,000)

---

1.

See above, pp. 384.

2.

See above, pp. 385.

It is reasonably clear that the sums raised by the subsidies of 1270 and 1272 were applied to crusade costs or debts before 1276, while the tentative addition to this category of a portion of the 1275 subsidy has been based upon the fact that exchequer and wardrobe receipts were unusually inflated up to the outbreak of the Welsh war in the spring of 1277.<sup>1</sup> Since, however, there is no real evidence to demonstrate that any portion of this 1275 subsidy was applied to the English crusade debt, a minimum-maximum figure must be used in the totalling of this section also.

In finally estimating the cost of crusade prior to 1276, it has been considered necessary to render two separate totals, both including the constant figure from section I:

Combined total of I and II	£ 82,000 - £ 95,000
Combined total of I and III	£ 76,000 - £ 96,000

These totals have to be listed on a minimum-maximum basis in view of the discrepancies already explained within sections II and III. Although the totals in these last two sections are remarkably similar (loans

---

1.

Pipe Roll 7 Edw. I, , m. 23. See Ramsay, Revenues of the king's of England, pp. 8-9.

£58,700 - £71,700; subsidies £53,000 - £73,000) there is no firm basis for assuming either to be correct. The resultant tally of figures from all three sections, however, leaves us with a suggested range of crusade expenditure during the period 1270-1276.

Some general qualifications must immediately be noted, beyond those reiterated throughout this discussion of crusade finance. In view of the possibility of duplicated figures or of the application of certain portions of section I to payment for items listed in section II, it might be suggested that the total estimate is high. There are, however, several factors which would lead one to believe that the estimate is far too low. With regard to section I, involving funds available for crusade use before 1271, it must be pointed out that many baronial crusaders raised considerable sums themselves which have been nowhere recorded for application here. There is no evidence, moreover, to show that Edward's outlay of some £14,000 in grants for transport and water<sup>1</sup> should not be further

---

1.

See above, pp. 332-34 and Table F.

added to this total. There are obvious lacimæ in the documents relating to loans recorded in section II. The discrepancy of some £13,000 between totals of individual borrowings and wardrobe payments reveals some of these important missing sums. In addition, the absence of wardrobe returns for the critical period 1270-1272 cannot be stressed enough. Finally, figures tallied in section III may be low because it is impossible to measure accurately what amount of the large lay subsidy of 1275 was actually applied to crusade debts. While Dr. Ramsay's £20,000 seems a reasonable minimum estimate, there are arguments for raising this figure in view of the overall grant of some £31,000 and the passage of nearly two years between the start of its collection and the outbreak of Welsh hostilities with their resultant diversion of money.

Working only with figures at our disposal we may conclude that the crusade of 1270-1272 and the return of Edward and his followers through Europe in 1272-1274 cost between £76,000 and £96,000. It is reasonable to raise this initial total, and a considered estimate in the neighbourhood of £90,000 to £100,000 may be given as the cost of the English crusade.

In terms of thirteenth-century finance, it can be seen that this figure represents a considerable expenditure.<sup>1</sup> It may be noted, for example, that a figure in this region represents nearly four times the annual revenue of the English exchequer and wardrobe during the period 1273-1276. This amount moreover, apparently exceeds the total of crown receipts during two years of considerable expense during the Welsh war in 1277 and 1278, receipts which were swelled by the payment of a portion of the fifteenth levied in 1275 for crusade. It may also be seen that Edward borrowed funds on crusade far in excess of those he later borrowed for the Welsh war. Existing records of his debts to Italian bankers alone during the period 1271-1276 reveal a total expenditure larger than that resulting from borrowing in 1276-1278. And finally, it may be seen that crusade costs and the accompanying expenses of a caretaker government and

---

1.

See Table J. Exchequer and wardrobe receipts were taken from Ramsay, Revenues of the Kings of England, ii, pp. 88-89, and represent only those amounts sufficiently well-documented to warrant inclusion. Edward's borrowing during the Welsh war may be followed in T.F. Tout, Chapters in Administrative History, ii, pp. 88-89.

Edward's return from Latin Syria inflicted upon the laity and clergy of England five full years of heavy taxation, and left a lingering crusade debt to the French crown which was unredeemed for nearly twenty years.

TABLE F. Recorded expenditure of Edward on crusade, 1268-1274.

Item of expense	Amount	(Sterling)
Transport of Henry of Almain	1,500 marks	£1,000.00
" of Roger de Leyburn	1,000 marks	666.66
" of Brian de Brompton	200 marks	133.33
" of Roger de Clifford	1,000 marks	666.66
" of Robert de Munteny	300 marks	200.00
" of William Fitz Warin	300 marks	200.00
" of Adam de Gesemue	600 marks	400.00
" of Thomas de Clare	1,000 marks	666.66
" of Adam de Monte Alto	200 marks	133.33
" of William de Huntercombe	300 marks	200.00
" of Walter de Percy	400 marks	266.66
" of William de Valence	2,000 marks	1,333.33
" of Richard de la Rochelle	300 marks	200.00
" of Payne de Chaworth	600 marks	400.00
" of Robert Tybetot	600 marks	400.00
" of Hamo le Strange	1,200 marks	800.00
" of the Lord Edmund	10,000 marks	6,666.66
Wardship returns to Roger de Clifford	£700	700.00
Escheats from wardships and marriages to Robert Charles	400 marks	266.66
Arrears of wages and replacement of lost horses to John de Gayton in Edward's service	70 marks	46.66
Expenses of the crusade wardrobe	£100	100.00
Expenses of the Paris crusade conference	207½ marks	138.34
Purchases in Gascony, 1270	1,000 marks	666.66
Purchases in Acre, paid at the Fair at Laon	£880	880.00
Purchases in Acre, paid at the Fair in Provence	£1,333.6s.10d.	1,333.34
Loan to Roger de Clifford in 1272	400 marks	266.66

TABLE G. Revenue from grants or crusade subsidies, 1270-1296.

Grant or subsidy	Amount received	(Sterling)
Grant by Henry III to Edmund	2,000 -	£1,333.33 -
	2,600 marks	1,733.33
Grant by Henry III to Edward, from the Jewry	6,000 marks	4,000.00
Lay-clerical subsidy of 1270	£31,488.6s.10d.	31,488.34
Clerical subsidy of 1272	£22,000 (est.)	22,000.00
Lay fifteenth of 1275	£81,201.13s.8d.	81,201.68
Clerical tenth of Lyons	100,000 marks	66,666.66
Lay fifteenth of 1291	£117,000 (est.)	117,000.00
Clerical tenth of Pope Nicholas	£43,033	43,033.00

TABLE H. Recorded borrowing of English crusaders, 1271-1272.

Loan	Date	Amount	(Sterling)
Edmund from Richard of Cornwall	1271	1,000 marks	£666.66
Edmund from the Templars	1272	1,000 marks	666.66
Hamo le Strange from the Templars	1271	£250	250.00
Payne de Chaworth from the Templars	1272	£283	283.00
John de Grailly from the Templars	1272	1,000 marks	666.66
John de Vesci and Odo de Grandison from the Templars	1272	£830	830.00
Thomas de Clare from William de Valence	--	600 marks	400.00
Roger de Clifford from the Lord Edward	1272	400 marks	266.66
John of Brittany from the Templars	1271	1,500 Saracen besants	--

TABLE I. Recorded borrowing of the Lord Edward, 1269-1276.

Loan from	Date	Amount	(Sterling)
King Louis of France	1269	45,000 livres	£11,250.00
King Louis of France, originally to Gaston de Bearn	1270	25,000 livres	6,250.00
Merchants of Lucca	1271	£200	200.00
Executors of the will of Archbishop Boniface	1271	£2,000	2,000.00
The Templars in Acre	1272	3,355 marks	2,236.66
The Templars in France and in Acre	1272	28,189 livres, 7s. 2d.	7,047.36
The Hospitallers in Acre	1272	7,000 marks	4,666.66
Merchants of Pisa	1272	943 livres, 12s. 5d.	485.89
Philip Berengar of Genoa	1272	1,000 marks	666.66
Merchants of Florence	1273	2,000 marks	1,333.33
The Scotti of Piacenza	1273	£2,000	2,000.00
Merchants of Lucca	1273	£1,000	1,000.00
The Hospitallers	1273	1,000 marks	666.66
Merchants of Florence, for Robert Tybetot	1274	70 marks	46.66
Merchants of Lucca	1274	£400	400.00
Merchants of Lucca	1274	1,000 marks	666.66
Bonasio Bonzani	1274	50 marks	33.33
Tegro Amatori and his associates	1274	70 marks	46.66
Merchants of Lucca	1275	£2,000	2,000.00
Merchants of Lucca	1275	1,000 marks	666.66
Bonasio Bonzani, Odo de Gaski, and Tegro Amatori	1275	£1,467	1,467.00
Theobald Malagalye for expenses at Paris	1276	1,210 marks	806.66
Merchants of Lucca	1275	£3,066.13s. 4d.	3,066.66
Merchants of Lucca	1276	£8,000	8,000.00
Wardrobe account of Philip de Willoughby*	1272-1274	£27,823.16s. 0d.	27,823.80
Wardrobe accounts of Italian and other loans*	1274-1276	£23,364. 4s. 2d.	23,364.21

(\* may include some of the above individual loans.)

TABLE J. A Comparative Table of Values: Crown Revenues and Borrowing.

Source	Amount	(Sterling)
Exchequer and wardrobe receipts, Easter, 1273-1274	£24,666. 1. 9 $\frac{1}{8}$	£24,666.09
Same, Easter, 1275-1276	24,661. 1. 9 $\frac{1}{8}$	24,661.09
Same, Easter, 1276-1277	46,441.16. 2 $\frac{1}{8}$	46,441.81
Same, Easter, 1277-1278	30,767.16. 4 $\frac{1}{8}$	30,767.82
Same, Easter, 1278-1279	36,605.19. 5 $\frac{1}{8}$	36,605.97
Loans for the conduct of war in Wales, September, 1276-1277*	23,809. 2. 3.	23,809.11
Loans for the conduct of war in Wales, September, 1277-1278*	18,233. 5. 6.	18,233.28

(\* included in the receipts above.)

## CONCLUSION

Jerusalem, tu as perdu  
La floure de ta chivalrie;  
Rey Eduard le viel chanu,  
Qe tant ama ta seigneurie.

-- Lament on the death of Edward I

Edward's concern for the defence of the Holy Land cannot be denied. His adherence to accepted practice and to recommended policies was noted by contemporaries and may be traced in most of his crusading activity, while the English contribution to the defence of the Latin East can be classed as significant. He commanded a military force in Palestine for a longer period of time than either Richard Lionheart or Richard of Cornwall. While crusading in Latin Syria he followed accepted military practices and in some respects his campaigns and the alliance with the Mongols may have been responsible for the Latin gains embodied in the truce of 1272. His arbitration in Acre seems to have influenced an important debate concerning Cypriot knight-service in Jerusalem. At the same time he began the construction of a tower on the northeast walls of Acre which he later provisioned and garrisoned with English members of the confraternity of St. Edward. After his departure his continuing correspondence with military leaders in Acre and his contracts with Mongol representatives revealed that he was alive to developments vital to the survival of a Latin presence in the East. Again in accordance with current theory and practice he suggested the use of limited English

expeditions to assist the Latin East and in 1290-1292 he gave considerable financial and military assistance to the crusader Odo de Grandison. Preparations for his own combined crusade with the kings of France and Aragon in 1286-1293 conformed to accepted procedures: a diplomatic effort to secure European peace; a careful maintenance of communications with Rome and the military leaders in Syria; and a determined attempt to form a workable Mongol alliance. The importance of the English commitment to the defence of the Holy Land can be seen in the amounts spent on crusade in 1270-1274, estimated at £90,000 - £100,000, and in the additional English funds poured into projects such as Odo de Grandison's expedition.

As Edward's military and diplomatic projects kept pace with current ideas and practice, so also did the recruitment and financing of the English crusades. The privileges and protections issued to crusaders in 1268-1271 and in 1290-1293 conformed to usual standards, while the preaching missions directed by legates and nuncios from Rome reflected current doctrines in canon law. Practices such as papal composition, commutation and substitution were widely employed in England and preachers offered the usual

spiritual inducements along with clerical and even royal guarantees of protection for crusaders' lands and possessions. Edward and his crusaders raised money to meet their expenses through the established practices of requesting lay and clerical subsidies, receiving personal or royal grants, leasing or selling property, and borrowing substantial sums from individuals, banking societies, treasurers of the Military Orders or the governments of England and France.

In several important respects, however, the English crusading activity of 1264-1307 was idiosyncratic. Local conditions affected the ways in which crusading privileges and protections were applied. There is evidence that enlistment in the crusading forces during the period 1267-1271 was profitable to royalist adherents who after the civil wars were in possession of disputed rebel lands. The guarantee that their holdings would not be challenged during the period in which they were absent on crusade may have been an inducement for taking the cross and joining the Lord Edward overseas. It is apparent also that domestic issues in 1277, 1283, and 1293 outweighed the desire for further crusading and political considerations played a leading role in

Edward's abandonment of his promised crusade in 1293. This is not to say that Edward neglected his commitments entirely, for he seems to have increasingly brought such matters under local English control. By the time the lengthy negotiations with Pope Nicholas IV were concluded in 1291 the practical results of his attempt to retain English diplomatic, logistic and financial control over the crusade were evident: as captain of a new project since 1287 and as the sponsor of Odo de Grandison's crusade in 1290, he had assumed major responsibility for recruitment, keeping a watchful eye upon the preaching and enrollment conducted largely by representatives of the English Church; he had made personal efforts to secure European peace and crusading allies; he had requested and had received a new tax in England and the use of European funds designed originally to meet the expenses of other crusaders. With the French crisis of 1293-1294, however, Edward abandoned his preparations without consulting Rome. Crusading funds were put to other uses by him and he never redeemed his vow of 1287, although negotiations of this matter continued until his death. The history of Edward's participation in the crusading movement is that of an English king always concerned with the defence or recapture of the

Holy Land, but at the same time anxious to secure proper local administration of crusading projects

APPENDIX I. Royal protection granted to English  
crusaders before August 1270.

Crusader	Date protection issued	Reference in
		Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1266-1272.
Richard de Afton	16 July 1270	page 440
James de Aldithele	10 July 1270	480
Alexander, Parson of church of Westiderleg	10 July 1270	480
Benedict le Canun of Alfemeston	28 June 1270	480
Henry of Almain	20 Feb. 1270	411
Randolf de Ardern	12 May 1270	479
David, earl of Ateles	26 April 1270	422
Osbert de Augo	12 May 1270	428
Robert Aumary, of Lincoln	10 May 1270	425
John de Badebury	28 June 1270	480
Alexander Balliol	12 May 1270	426
Eustace Balliol	20 Feb. 1270	411
John de la Bare	28 June 1270	480
Ralph Barry	28 June 1270	480
John de Baskervill	28 June 1270	480
William Belet	20 Feb. 1270	411
William de Bevill	16 July 1270	440
Walter de Biblesworth	26 June 1270	480
John de Blankeneye	10 July 1270	480
William le Blond	10 May 1270	425
Robert de Bodeham	28 June 1270	480
Thomas Boter	12 May 1270	426
Richard de Boys	16 July 1270	440
Herbert de Boyvill	10 May 1270	425
Brian de Brompton	3 March 1270	411
Bartholomew de Brianso	16 July 1270	440
John de Bridgeport	10 July 1270	480
Richard Bruce of Annadale	12 May 1270	479
Robert Bruce the Younger	10 July 1270	480
William le Brun	16 July 1270	440
Henry de Burghill	16 July 1270	440
Robert Burnel	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Cadamo	16 July 1270	440
Walter de Cambou	16 July 1270	440
Alan de Castell, of London	25 May 1270	480

<u>Crusader</u>	<u>Date of protection</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Peter de Chalons	10 July 1270	page 480
Peter de Champayne	20 Feb. 1270	411
Robert Charles	June 1270	434
Harvey de Chaworth	16 July 1270	440
Patrick de Chaworth	16 July 1270	440
Payn de Chaworth	16 July 1270	440
Gilbert de Clare (1)	16 July 1270	440
Thomas de Clare	16 July 1270	440
Robert le Clerik, yeoman of Eleanor	28 June 1270	480
Roger de Clifford	16 July 1270	440
William Fitz William de Coleston	10 July 1270	480
Philip de Colevill	28 June 1270	480
Ralph de Cotum	28 June 1270	480
Robert Colier	10 July 1270	480
Robert le Cook	25 May 1270	780
Nicholas Crok	28 June 1270	480
Robert Crok	28 June 1270	480
William de Detling	15 July 1270	441
Bertram de Draycot	20 Feb. 1270	411
John de Ernefeud, parson of Warblington	28 June 1270	480
Richard de Eyr	26 June 1270	480
John de Espenyol	10 July 1270	480
Gerard de Fanecourt	16 July 1270	440
John Fantellun	16 July 1270	440
Giles de Fienles	16 July 1270	440
William de Fenes		403
Richard Filliol	16 July 1270	440
John Ferre	16 July 1270	440
Geoffrey de Gacelyn	20 Feb. 1270	411
Richard de la Garderobe, the queen's tailor	10 July 1270	480
Hamundus de Gayton	10 May 1270	479
John de Gayton	16 July 1270	440
Walter de Gayton	10 July 1270	480
Adam de Gesemue	16 July 1270	440
William Gifford	10 May 1270	479
William de Glesby, parson of church of Bassingham	28 June 1270	480

1.

See text, pp. 104-109.

Crusader	Date of protection	Reference
Godin	20 Feb. 1270	page 411
John de Goer	16 July 1270	440
Ralph de Gorges	10 July 1270	480
William Grandin	16 July 1270	440
William le Grant	16 July 1270	440
John de la Grave	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Halton	10 July 1270	480
Henry Hay	10 July 1270	480
Stephen de Hegham		616
Walter son of Hildebrand	16 July 1270	440
Jul' Fitz Walter Hok	20 Feb. 1270	411
Henry Fitz Geoffrey de Horsede	28 June 1270	480
Stephen de Houton	16 July 1270	440
William de Huntercombe	12 May 1270	479
Geoffrey de la Hyde	16 July 1270	440
Henry Jordan	10 July 1270	480
Simon de Kelworth	28 June 1270	480
Philip de Lacy		428
Henry de Langdon	16 July 1270	440
William le Latimer	10 May 1270	479
William Leoyne of Brampton	25 May 1270	480
Roger de Leyburn	12 May 1270	479
Stephen of London, parson of Lugwarden	16 July 1270	440
Laurence de Lovershale	16 July 1270	440
Alexander Luterel	16 July 1270	440
Richard Fitz Henry Malesours	16 July 1270	440
Siward de Mapledurham	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Marisco	26 June 1270	480
William le Mareschal	26 June 1270	480
Nicholas de Martin	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Martin	16 July 1270	440
Thomas Maudut	16 July 1270	440
William de Mazun	10 July 1270	480
Robert de Mitteford	20 Feb. 1270	411
Adam de Monte Alto	20 Feb. 1270	411
John de Monte Alto	20 Feb. 1270	411
Simon de Monte Alto	20 Feb. 1270	411
Richard de la More	10 July 1270	480
Berenger le Moyne	16 July 1270	440
William le Moyne	18 July 1270	443
John de Mumbray	12 May 1270	426
Ralph de Mumbray	12 May 1270	426

<u>Crusader</u>	<u>Date of protection</u>	<u>Reference</u>
William de Mumbray	12 May 1270	page 426
Arnulf Munteny	16 July 1270	440
Robert Munteny	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Murisien	10 July 1270	480
William Fitz Laurence de Naffreton	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Neuton	16 July 1270	440
Alan de Nevill	12 May 1270	426
Adam de Northampton of Winchester	28 June 1270	480
William de Norton	10 July 1270	480
John de Obeston	16 July 1270	440
Hugh Fitz Otto	16 July 1270	440
William de Pageham	16 July 1270	440
John le Parker	12 May 1270	479
William Patrick	28 June 1270	480
Reynold de Pavely	28 June 1270	480
William Pavely	28 June 1270	480
Geoffrey Payne	28 June 1270	480
John de Payton	10 May 1270	479
William Peche	16 July 1270	440
Walter de Percy	10 May 1270	479
Henry de Peremore	16 July 1270	440
Nicholas Pesson	10 July 1270	480
Hugh de Plugenet	16 July 1270	440
Odo de Polecote	28 June 1270	480
Roger de Portes	16 July 1270	440
Walter de Portes of Flemstead	16 July 1270	440
Oliver de Punchardon	16 July 1270	440
Thomas de Pyne	16 July 1270	440
Jordan de Pyvelesdon	10 July 1270	480
Ellis de Rabeyn	3 March 1270	411
Roger de Reymes	16 July 1270	440
Peter Fitz Robert, citizen of Lincoln	10 May 1270	479
John Rok	10 July 1270	480
Richard de la Rochelle	16 July 1270	440
Ellis de Rolleston	10 May 1270	479
Hubert de Rolly	3 March 1270	411
John le Romeyne	28 June 1270	480
John de St. John	10 July 1270	480
Abbot and convent of St. Mary - St. Peter sur Dives	10 July 1270	480

Crusader	Date of protection	Reference
Richard de Salisbury	20 Feb. 1270	page 411
Thomas de Sandwich	28 June 1270	480
Richard Saundon	16 July 1270	440
Ralph le Sauser	28 June 1270	480
Hugh Savage	16 July 1270	440
Richard le Savage	16 July 1270	440
Geoffrey de Scofinton	10 July 1270	480
Stephen de Sele	16 July 1270	440
Nicholas Sifrewast	10 July 1270	480
Henry Fitz Henry de Stonebroak	28 June 1270	480
Richard de Styveton		423
Peter de Swafham	16 July 1270	440
Luke de Tany	28 June 1270	480
William Thurbert	16 July 1270	440
Geoffrey de Towchester	28 June 1270	480
Thomas Tredgold	28 June 1270	480
Roger de Trompiton	28 June 1270	480
Robert de Tybetot	16 July 1270	440
Robert de Ufford	12 May 1270	479
William de Valence (1)		
John de Verdun	16 July 1270	440
Henry le Waleys	16 July 1270	440
Eudo Fitz Warren	16 July 1270	440
William de Westenton	10 July 1270	480
John de Weston	16 July 1270	440
Phillip de Willoughby (2)		
Ralph de Wodeburgh	10 July 1270	480
John de Wodestock (3)		
John son of Thomas de Wrastulingsworth	16 July 1270	440
Robert son of Simon de Wye	28 June 1270	480
Walter de Wygeton	18 July 1270	443
William de Yattinden	10 July 1270	480
John de Yavensworth	10 July 1270	480

1. See text, pp. 19.
2. See text, pp. 337, 385.
3. Liberate Rolls, vi, no. 1180.

APPENDIX II. Royal protection granted to English  
crusaders before March 1271.

Crusader	Date protection issued	Reference in <u>Cal. Pat. Rolls,</u> 1266-1272.
Thomas le Archdeacon	17 Feb. 1271	589
Peter de Ardern	30 Jan. 1271	588
John de Ardern	10 Feb. 1271	588
Peter Fitz Serlo de Arunbouch	10 Feb. 1271	588
Robert de Ashedon	12 Jan. 1271	588
Hugh de Aungerville	10 Feb. 1271	588
Walter Basset	25 Jan. 1271	588
Baldwin de Bassingburn	10 Feb. 1271	588
Walter de Batonia	10 Feb. 1271	588
William de Belchford	10 Feb. 1271	588
William de Blyburgh	12 Jan. 1271	588
William de Boyvill	19 October 1270	465
John of Brittany	10 Jan. 1271	615
Robert Bruce of Annadale	19 October 1270	465
Roger de Coiners	10 Feb. 1270	588
John de Everle	12 Jan. 1271	588
Guy Ferre		512
Matthew de Gelham	10 Feb. 1271	588
Richard de Glen		589
Gerard de Grandison	30 Jan. 1271	588
John de Gurney	10 July 1270	480
John de Heynouz	2 December 1270	495
William de Holm	10 Feb. 1271	588
John de Ingoldthorpe	28 June 1270	480
Geoffrey Fitz Geoffrey de Langley	10 Feb. 1270	588
John Lovel	16 July 1270	440
Richard Malet	12 Jan. 1271	588
Richard Maylard		503
Walter de Morton	10 Feb. 1271	588
John de Neiwenton	12 Jan. 1271	588
Thomas le Norreys	2 December 1270	495
William de Northdie	12 Jan. 1271	588
Richard de Pouton	12 Jan. 1271	588
William Fitz Ralph	19 October 1270	465
Mauger de St. Albans	30 Jan. 1271	588
Laurence de St. Mauro	12 Jan. 1271	588
Urian de St. Peter	25 Jan. 1271	588
John de Scaccario	10 Feb. 1271	588
Nicholas de Segrave	25 Jan. 1271	588
Robert Selisaule	30 Jan. 1271	588

<u>Crusader</u>	<u>Date of protection</u>	<u>Reference</u>
Nicholas Shelton	10 Feb. 1271	page 588
Adam Skirlock of Ainstaple	10 Feb. 1271	588
Hugh de Spelding	10 Feb. 1271	588
Robert Spencehose	10 Feb. 1271	588
Robert de Stanes	10 Feb. 1271	588
Robert de Stanton	10 Feb. 1271	588
Hamo le Strange	25 Jan. 1271	588
Robert le Strange	10 Feb. 1271	588
Robert de Turbervill	25 Jan. 1271	588
John de Vesci	25 Jan. 1271	588
William Fitz Warin	19 October 1270	465
John de Warwick	12 Jan. 1271	588
Richard de Wykes	30 Jan. 1271	588

ABBREVIATIONS

The full title is not given here if the work is listed in the Bibliography.

<u>BEC</u>	<u>Bibliothèque de l'École des Chartres.</u>
<u>EHR</u>	<u>English Historical Review.</u>
<u>MGHS</u>	<u>Monumenta Germaniae historica: Scriptores.</u>
<u>MG Const.</u>	<u>Monumenta Germaniae historica. Constitutiones</u>
<u>Rec. Gaul.</u>	<u>Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France</u> , ed. M. Bouquet et al., 24 vols. Paris, 1737-1904.
<u>RHC</u>	<u>Recueil des historiens des croisades.</u>
<u>RHC arm.</u>	<u>RHC. Documents arméniens.</u>
<u>RHC Lois</u>	<u>RHC. Les Assises de Jérusalem.</u>
<u>RHC Oc.</u>	<u>RHC. Historiens occidentaux.</u>
<u>RHC Or.</u>	<u>RHC. Historiens orientaux.</u>
<u>RIS</u>	<u>Rerum Italicarum scriptores.</u>
<u>RISNS</u>	<u>Rerum Italicarum scriptores. Nova series</u> , ed. G. Carducci et al. Citta di Castello/Bologna, 1900 ff.
<u>ROL</u>	<u>Revue de l'Orient latin.</u>
<u>TRHS</u>	<u>Transactions of the Royal Historical Society.</u>

BIBLIOGRAPHYI. Unpublished Materials.Exchequer Accounts, E 101/352.Exchequer Accounts, E 350/8.Exchequer Diplomatic Documents, Treasurers' Rolls, Box 1, no. 13.Exchequer King's Remembrancer, Wardrobe and Household Rolls, Bundle 360, no. 20.Patent Roll 3 Edw. I, m. 17.Patent Roll 4 Edw. I, m. 32v.Patent Roll 5 Edw. I, m. 22v.Patent Roll 7 Edw. I, m. 26.Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 6v.Pipe Roll 1 Edw. I, m. 22.Pipe Roll 5 Edw. I, m. 22.Pipe Roll 7 Edw. I, m. 23.II. Collections of Materials and Documents, Regesta, etc.Acta Aragonensia. Quellen zur deutschen, italienischen, französischen, spanischen Kirchen- und Kulturgeschichte aus der diplomatischen Korrespondenz Jaymes II. (1291-1327), ed. H. Finke, 3 vols. Berlin/Leipzig, 1908-22.Annales ecclesiastici, ed. O. Raynaldus et al., Bar-le-Duc/Paris, 1864.The Antient Kalandars and Inventories of the Treasury of his Majesty's Exchequer, together with other Documents illustrating the History of that Repository, comp. F. Palgrave (Record Commission, iii), London, 1836.

- Arab Historians of the Crusades, ed. and trans. Francesco Gabrieli (English trans. E.J. Costello), London, 1969.
- Bullarium Franciscanum Romanorum Pontificum, Constitutiones, Epistolas, ac Diplomati continens tribus Ordinibus Minorum, Clarisarum, et Poenitentium a seraphico Patriarcha Sancto Francisco institutis concessa, ed. J.H. Sbaralea. Rome, 1768.
- Calandar of Entries in the Papal Registers relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, ed. W.H. Bliss and J.A. Twemlow, 1, London, 1893.
- Calandar of the Close Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 1264-1307, prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records. London, 1892-1908.
- Calandar of the Liberate Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 1268-1272, prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records. London, 1964.
- Calandar of the Patent Rolls preserved in the Public Record Office, 1266-1307, prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records. London, 1893-1913.
- Calandar of Various Chancery Rolls, Supplementary Close Rolls, Welsh Rolls, Scutage Rolls, preserved in the Public Record Office, A.D. 1277-1326, prepared under the Superintendence of the Deputy Keeper of the Records. London, 1912.
- Cartulaire général de l'ordre des Hospitaliers de St. Jean de Jérusalem (1100-1310), ed. J. Delaville Le Roulx. Paris, 1894-1906.
- Chancery Miscellanea (Lists and Index Society, 38), part iv. London, 1968.
- "Collectors' Accounts for the Clerical Tenth levied in England by Order of Nicholas IV," ed. W.E. Lunt, EHR xxxi (1916).
- Concilia Magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae, ed. D. Wilkins, ii. London, 1737.

"Documents et mémoires servant de preuves à l'histoire de l'île de Chypre sous les Lusignans," ed. L. de Mas-Latrie, Histoire de l'île de Chypre.

"Documents chypriotes du début du XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle", ed. C. Kohler, ROL xi (1905-08).

Documents illustrative of the History of Scotland from the death of King Alexander the Third to the Accession of Robert Bruce, MCCLXXXVI-MCCCVI, ed. J. Stevenson. Edinburgh, 1870.

"Emprunts de Saint-Louis en Palestine et en Afrique," comp. G. Servois, BEC xix (1858).

"Extracts from the Liberate Rolls relative to Loans supplied by Italian Merchants to the Kings of England, in the 13th and 14th Centuries; with an introductory Memoir," ed. E.A. Bond, Archaeologia, xxviii (1840).

"Le financement de la croisade Anglaise de 1270," ed. J. Trabut-Cussac, BEC, cxix-cxx (1961-62).

Foedera, conventiones, litterae et acta publica inter reges Angliae et alios, ed. T. Rymer et al. and Record Commission. London, 1816-1869.

Gesta Dei per Francos sive orientalium expeditionum et regni Francorum Hierosolymitani historia a variis sed illius aevi scriptoribus litteris commendata, ed. J. Bongars. Hannau, 1611.

Historia diplomatica Frederici secundi, ed. J.L.A. de Huillard-Bréholles. Paris, 1852-1861.

Issues of the Exchequer, being a Collection made out of his Majesty's Revenue from King Henry III to King Henry VI inclusive, comp. F. Devon, (Record Commission). London, 1837.

Lancashire Lay Subsidies, ed. J.A.C. Vincent (Record Society for the Publication of Original Documents relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, xxvii). London, 1893.

Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine (Rolls Series 61). London, 1873.

"Letters of Ottoboni," ed. R. Graham, EHR xv (1900).

"Lettre des Chrétiens de Terre Sainte à Charles d'Anjou," ed. H.F. Delaborde, ROL ii (1894).

Lettres des rois, reines et autres personnages des Cours de France et d'Angleterre, ed. J.J. Champollion-Figeac (Collection de Documents inédits). Paris, 1839.

"Lettres inédites concernant les croisades," ed. C. Kohler and C.F. Langlois, BEC lii (1891).

List of Diplomatic Documents, Scottish Documents and Papal Bulls preserved in the Public Record Office (Lists and Indexes, xlix). London, 1923.

List of Exchequer K.R., Memoranda Rolls, and Exchequer L.T.R., Chancellor's Rolls, Memoranda Rolls, Originalia Rolls, and Pipe Rolls (Typed 1926) in Exchequer K.R. and L.T.R. Memoranda Rolls (Lists and Index Society, 4). London, 1965.

List of Various Accounts and Documents connected therewith formerly preserved in the Exchequer and now in the Public Records Office (Lists and indexes, xxxv). London, 1912.

Monumenta Germaniae historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum medi aevi, ed. G.H. Pertz et al. Hanover/Weimar/Berlin/Stuttgart/Cologne, 1826 ff.

Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum separatim editi. 1840-1937.

Scriptores rerum Germanicarum, nova series. 1922-1959.

Political Songs of England from the Reign of John to that of Edward II, ed. T. Wright (Camden Society, 6).

Recueil des historiens des croisades, ed. Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres. Paris, 1841-1906.  
Historiens occidentaux, 5 vols. 1844-1895.  
Historiens orientaux, 5 vols. 1872-1906.  
Documents arméniens, 2 vols. 1869/1906.  
Lois. Les Assises de Jérusalem, 2 vols. 1841/1843.

Regesta regni Hierosolymitani 1097-1291, comp. R. Röhricht. Innsbrück, 1893. Additamentum, 1904.

Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab A. Christum natum MCXCVIII ad A. MCCCIV, ed. A. Potthast. Berlin, 1874-1875.

Rerum Italicarum scriptores, ed. L.A. Muratori. Milan. 1723-1738.

Nova series, ed. G. Carducci et al. Citta di Castello/Bologna, 1900 ff.

Reports, comp. Deputy Keeper of the Public Records. London, 1840. ff.

Reports (Third, Fourth, Ninth, Fourteenth), comp. Historical Manuscripts Commission. London, 1874-1895.

Rôles Gascons, ed. F. Michel and C. Bémont (Collection de Documents inédits). Paris, 1885-1906.

Rotuli Parliamentorum, ut et Petitiones et Placita in Parlamento, comp. Record Commission. n.d.

Royal and other Historical Letters illustrative of the Reign of Henry III, ed. W.W. Shirley, (Rolls Series, 27). London, 1862-1866.

Thesaurus Novus Anecdotorum, ed. E. Martène and U. Durand. Paris, 1717.

Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venegig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante, ed. G.L.F. Tafel and G.M. Thomas (Fontes rerum Austriacarum Sectio 2, xii-xiv). Vienna, 1856-1857.

Vetera Monumenta Hibernorum et Scotorum Historiam illustrantia, ed. A. Theiner. Rome, 1864.

Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum amplissima collectio, ed. E. Martène and U. Durand. Paris, 1724-1733.

### III. Individual Sources.

- al-Ainī, "Perles d'Histoire," extracts, RHC Or., ii.
- Pope Alexander IV, Register, ed. C. Bourel de la Roncière et al. (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, sèr. 2). Paris, 1902-1931.
- Andrew Dandolo, "Chronica Venetiarum," RISNS, xii, 1.
- "Annales Monasterii de Oseneia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 36), iv. London, 1869.
- "Annales Monasterii de Waverleia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 36), ii. London, 1865.
- "Annales Monasterii de Wintonia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 36), ii. London, 1865.
- "Annales Placentini Gibellini," MGHS xviii.
- "Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series, 36), iii. London, 1866.
- "Annales Prioratus de Wigornia," Annales Monastici, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series 36), iv. London, 1869.
- "Annales de Terre Sainte," ed. R. Röhricht and G. Raynaud, Archives de l'Orient latin, ii (1884).
- "Barling's Chronicle," ed. W. Stubbs in Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II (Rolls Series 76), ii. London, 1882.
- Bartholomew Cotton, Historia Anglicans, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series 16). London, 1859.
- Bartholomew de Neocastro, "Historia Sicula," RISNS xiii, 3.
- Pope Boniface VIII, Register, ed. G. Digard, M. Faucon, A. Thomas, and R. Fawtier (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, sèr. 2). Paris, 1884-1935.
- ["Brevis nota eorum quae in primo Concilio Lugdunensi generali gesta sunt"], published as "Relatio de Concilio Lugdunensi," MGH Const. ii.

- Bruno, Bishop of Olmutz, "Bericht an Papst Gregor X über die kirchlichen und politischen Zustände Deutschlands bei der Thronbesteigung Rudolfs von Habsburg," ed. C. Höfler, in Abhandlungen der Philosophisch-historischen Klasse der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ser. 3, iv. Munich, 1846.
- "Chevaliers de l'hostel le Roi Croisies," Rec. Gaul xxiii.
- "Chronica maiorum et vicecomitum Londoniarum, 1188-1274," ed. T. Stapleton, Liber de Antiquis Legibus (Camden Society, 34). London, 1846.
- "Chronicon equites Teutonici," ed. P. Matheus, Veteris aevi analecta, v.
- Pope Clement IV, Register, ed. E. Jordan (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, sēr. 2). Paris, 1893-1904.
- De excidio urbis Acconis, ed. E. Martène and U. Durand, Veterum Scriptorum et Monumentorum Amplissima Collectio, v.
- "L'Estoire d'Eracles empereur et la conqueste de la Terre d'Outremer," RHC Oc. (volume ii only referred to in notes).
- Florence of Worcester, "Continuation," ed. B. Thorpe, Chronicon ex Chronicis (English Historical Society). London, 1849.
- Francis Pipinius, "Chronicon," RIS, ix.
- Geraldus of Cambridge, Opera, ed. J.S. Brewer and G.F. Warner (Rolls Series 21). London, 1887.
- Gervase of Canterbury, "Continuation," ed. W. Stubbs, Historical Works (Rolls Series 73). London, 1880.
- Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani a Thoma Walsingham, regnante Ricardo Secundo, ejusdem Ecclesiae Praecentore, computata, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series 28). London, 1867.
- Les Gestes des Chiprois, ed. G. Raynaud (Société de l'Orient latin: série historique, 5). Geneva, 1887.
- Godfrey Giffard, Bishop of Worcester, Register, ed. J.W. Willis Bund/

J.W. Willis Bund, Episcopal registers of the Diocese of Worcester, Register of Bishop Godfrey Giffard, September 23d, 1268, to August 15th, 1301 (Worcestershire Historical Society). Oxford, 1902.

Pope Gregory IX, Register, ed. L. Auvray (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2 s<sup>er</sup>.). Paris, 1896-1908.

Pope Gregory X, Register, ed. J. Guiraud (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2 s<sup>er</sup>.). Paris, 1892-1906.

Henry Knighton, Chronicon, ed. J.R. Lumby (Rolls Series, 92). London, 1889.

Heṭoum (Hayton), "La Flor des Estoires de la Terre d'Orient ou Flos historiarum terre Orientis," RHC doc. arm., ii.

Humbert of Romans, Opus Tripartitum, ed. E. Brown, Appendix ad fasciculum rerum expetendarum et fugiendarum. London, 1690.

Ibn al-Furāt, History, ed. and trans. M.C. and U. Lyons, with historical notes by J.S.C. Riley-Smith. To be published.

Ibn 'Abd-az-Zāhir, Life of Baybars, ed. and trans. S.F. Sadéque, Dacca, 1956.

King James I of Aragon, Chronicle, ed. M. Aguiló y Fuster (Biblioteca Catalana). Barcelona, 1873; and ed. and trans. J. Forster. London, 1883.

John de Halton, Bishop of Carlisle, Register, transcribed W.N. Thompson (Canterbury and York Society 12/13). London, 1906-1913.

John d'Ibelin, "Livre," RHC Lois, i.

John de Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis et Credo, ed. N. de Wailly. Paris, 1874.

John de Oxenedes, Chronica, ed. H. Ellis (Rolls Series, 13). London 1859.

John Peckham, Archbishop of Canterbury, Registrum epistolarum, ed. C.T. Martin (Rolls Series 77). London, 1882-1885.

John de Pontissara, Bishop of Winchester, Register, ed. C. Deedes, (Canterbury and York Society 29/30). London, 1914-1924.

John le Romeyn, Archbishop of York, Register, ed. W. Brown (Surtees Society 123/128). Durham 1913-1917.

John of Vignay, "Ex primati chronicis," MGHS xxvi.  
Second part in Rec. Gaul xx.

John Villani, Cronica, RISNS, xii, 1. Florence, 1823.

Liber Memorandorum ecclesie de Bernewelle, ed. J.W. Clark. Cambridge, 1907.

"Le livre des Constitutions demenées el Chastelet de Paris," ed. C. Mortet, Memoires de la Societe de l'histoire de Paris et l'Ille de France, x (1883).

al-Maqrīzī, Histoire des Sultans Mamelouks, tr. M.E. Quatremère. Paris, 1837-1845.

Marino Sanudo the Elder, "Liber secretorum fidelium crucis," Gesta Dei per Francos.

Pope Martin IV, Register, ed. G. Digard et al. (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2 s̄r.). Paris, 1901-1935.

Matthew Paris, Chronica maiora, ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series 57). London, 1872-1883.

— Flores Historiarum (attributed to Matthew of Westminster), ed. H.R. Luard (Rolls Series 95). London, 1890.

Menko, "Chronicon Werumensium," MGHS xxiii.

Pope Nicholas III, Register, ed. J. Gay (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2 s̄r.). Paris, 1898-1932.

Pope Nicholas IV, Register, ed. E. Langlois (Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, 2 s̄r.). Paris, 1886-1905.

Nicholas Trivet, Annales sex Regum Angliae, ed. T. Hog. London, 1845.

- Oliver Sutton, Bishop of Lincoln, Register, ed. Rosalind Hill (Lincoln Record Society). London, 1935ff.
- Peter Dubois, De recuperatione Terre Sancte, ed. and trans. W. Brandt (Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, 51). New York, 1956.
- Peter de Langtoft, Chronicle, ed. T. Wright (Rolls Series 47). London, 1866-1868.
- Ralph of Diceto, Historical Works, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series 68). London, 1876.
- Richard of Durham (to 1297) and continuators, The Lanercost Chronicle, ed. J. Stevenson (Maitland Club). Edinburgh, 1839.
- Richard of Gravesend, Bishop of Lincoln, Register, ed. F.N. Davis, et al. (Canterbury and York Society 31). London, 1925.
- Richard de Swinfield, Bishop of Hereford, Register, ed. W.W. Capes (Canterbury and York Society 6). London, 1909.
- Robert Winchelsey, Archbishop of Canterbury, Register, ed. Rose Graham (Canterbury and York Society 51/52). London, 1917.
- Roger of Wendover, Chronica, sive flores historiarum, ed. H.O. Coxe (English Historical Society). London, 1841-1844.
- "Un sirventes de Cardinal," ed. C. Fabre, A Miscellany of Studies in Romance Languages and Literatures presented to Leon E. Kastner, ed. M. Williams and J. Rothschild.
- Simon de Gandavo, Bishop of Salisbury, Register, ed. C.T. Flower and M.C.B. Dawes (Canterbury and York Society 40/41). London, 1914-1932.
- Thomas de Cantiloupe, Bishop of Hereford, Register, ed. W.W. Capes, (Canterbury and York Society 2). London, 1907.
- Thomas Wykes, "Chronicon vulgo dictum chronicon Thomae Wykes," ed. H.R. Luard Annales Monastici (Rolls Series 36), iv. London, 1869.

Walter Giffard, Archbishop of York, Register, ed.  
W. Brown (Surtees Society 109). London, 1904-1928.

Walter of Guiseborough, Chronicle, ed. H. Rothwell  
(Camden Series, lxxxix). London, 1957.

William de Nangis, Chronique latine de 1113 à 1300  
avec les continuations de 1300 a 1366, ed. P.H.J.F.  
Geraud. Paris, 1843.

— Gesta Sancti Ludovici: Gesta Philippi III, Rec. Gaul. xx.

William of Newburgh, "Continuation," ed. R. Howlett,  
Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II and  
Richard I. (Rolls Series 82). London, 1885.

William Rishanger, Chronicle of the Barons' War, ed. J.O.  
Halliwell (Camden Society 15). London, 1840.

— Chronica et Annales, ed. H.T. Riley (Rolls Series 18).  
London, 1865.

William of Rubruck, Itinerarium, trans. H. Rockhill  
(Hakluyt Society, 2 ser.). London, 1900.

William of Tripoli, Tractatus de statu Saracenorum,  
ed. H. Prutz, Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge.

#### IV. Secondary Works.

Atiya, A.S. The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages.  
London, 1938.

Ayalon, D. "Le regiment bahriya dans l'armée Mamelouke,"  
Revue des Études Islamiques lxxii (1951).

— "Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army,"  
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African  
Studies, xv/xvi (1953/1954).

— "The system of payments in Mamluk military society,"  
Journal of the Economic and Social History of the  
Orient, i, (1958).

Barthold, W. "Turkomans," The Encyclopedia of Islam,  
ed. M. Th. Houtsma et al, iv. London, 1934.

Bernardet, D.E. "Croisade (Bulle de la)," Dictionnaire de Droit Canonique contenant tous des termes droit canonique avec un sommaire de l'histoire et des institutions et de l'état actuel de la discipline, ed. R. Naz et al., iv. Paris, 1949.

Brundage, James A. "Cruce signari: The Rite for Taking the Cross in England," Traditio, xxii (1966).

---- Mediaeval Canon Law and the Crusader. Madison, 1969.

---- "The Votive Obligations of Crusaders: The Development of a Canonistic Doctrine," Traditio, xxiv (1968).

Byrne, E.H. Genoese Shipping in the 12th and 13th Centuries, (Mediaeval Academy of America). Cambridge, Mass., 1930.

Cahen, C. La Syrie du Nord a l'époque des croisades et la principauté franque d'Antioche (Institut français de Damas. Bibliothèque orientale, i). Paris, 1940.

Chabot, J.B. "Histoire de patriarche Mar Jabalaha III," ROL ii (1894).

---- "Relations du Roi Argoun avec l'Occident," ROL, ii (1894).

Claeys-Bouvaert, F. "Légat du pape," Dictionnaire de droit canonique, ed. R. Naz et al., vi. Paris, 1957.

Conder, C.R., and Kitchener, H.H. The Survey of Western Palestine. Memoirs on the Topography, Orography, Hydrogeaphy and Archaeology. (Palestine Exploration Fund). London, 1881-1883.

Deely, A. "Papal Provision and Royal Patronage in the early Fourteenth Century," EHR xliii (1928).

Denholm-Young, N. "Documents of the Barons' Wars," EHR xlvi (1933).

---- "Thomas de Wykes and his Chronicle," EHR lxi (1946).

- Desimoni, C. "Observations sur les monnaies, les poids et les mesures cités dans les actes du notaire gènois Lamberto di Sambuceto," ROL, iii (1895).
- Deschamps, P. Les châteaux des croisés en Terre Sainte. I. Le Crac des Chevaliers. II. La défense du royaume de Jérusalem (Haut Commissariat de la République française en Syrie et au Liban. Service des Antiquités et Beaux-Arts. Bibliothèque archéologique et historique, 19/34). Paris, 1934-1939).
- Erdmann, C. Die Entstehung des Kreuzzugsgedankens (Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte, 6). Stuttgart, 1935.
- Fryde, M.M. and E.B. "Public Credit, with Specific Reference to Northwestern Europe," Cambridge Economic History of Europe, iii, Cambridge, 1963.
- Gasquet, A. Henry the Third and the Church. London, 1905.
- Gatto, L. Il Pontificato de Gregorio X (Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo. Studi Storici, 28-30). Rome, 1959.
- Gottlob, A. Die päpstlichen Kreuzzugs-Steuern des 13. Jahrhunderts. Heiligenstadt, 1892.
- Gough, H. Itinerary of King Edward the First throughout his Reign A.D. 1272-1307. Paisley, 1900.
- Grousset, R. Histoire des croisades et du royaume franc de Jérusalem. Paris, 1934-1936.
- Hazlitt, W.C. The Venetian Republic, its Rise, its Growth and its Fall, 421-1797. London, 1900.
- Hefele, C.J. von, and Le Clercq, H., Histoire des Conciles d'Après les Documents Originaux. Paris, 1907-1921.
- Hill, G.F. A History of Cyprus. Cambridge, 1940-1952.
- Holdsworth, W.S. A History of English Law. London, 1903-1925.

Hotzelt, W. Kitchengeschichte Palästinas im Zeitalter der Kreuzzüge 1099-1291 (Palästinahefte des deutschen Vereins vom Heiligen Land, 29-32). Cologne, 1940.

Howorth, H.H. History of the Mongols. London, 1876-1888.

Heidelberger, F. Kreuzzugsversuche um die Wende des 13. Jahrhunderts (Abhandlung zur Mittleren und neuern Geschichte). Leipzig/Berlin, 1912.

Jacob, E.F. Studies in the Period of Baronial Reform and Rebellion, 1258-1267. (Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, 8). Oxford, 1925.

Kingsford, C.L. "Sir Otho de Grandison," TRHS, Third Series, iii (1909).

Kohler, C. "Deux projets de croisade en Terre Sainte composés à la fin du XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle et au début du XIV<sup>e</sup>," ROL, x (1903-1904).

La Monte, J.L. Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100-1291 (Monographs of the Mediaeval Academy of America, 4). Cambridge, Mass., 1932.

Lane Poole, S. A History of Egypt in the Middle Ages. London, 1925.

Lewis, A. The English Activities of Cardinal Ottobuono, Legate of the Holy See, (dissertation). Manchester University Library, 1937.

Little, A.G., and Pelster, F. Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282-1302 (Oxford Historical Society). Oxford, 1934.

Lunt, W.E. "The Account of a Papal Collector in England in 1304," EHR, xxviii (1913).

---- Financial Relations of the Papacy with England to 1327 (Studies in Anglo-Papal relations during the Middle Ages, 1). Cambridge, Mass., 1939.

---- Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages. New York, 1934.

- "Papal Taxation in England in the Reign of Edward I," EHR, xxx (1915).
- "A Papal Tenth levied in the British Isles from 1274 to 1280," EHR xxxii (1917).
- McLean, N. "An Eastern Embassy to Europe in the Years 1287-8," EHR, xiv (1899).
- Mas-Latrie, L. de. Histoire de l'île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan. Paris, 1852-1861.
- Mayer, H.E. Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge. Hanover, 1960.
- "Literaturbericht über die Geschichte der Kreuzzüge," Historische Zeitschrift, Sonderheft 3. Munich, 1969.
- Mitchell, S.K. Studies in Taxation under John and Henry III. New Haven, 1914.
- Moorman, J.R.H. "Edward I at Lanercost Priory 1306-7," EHR, lxxvii (1952).
- Morris, J.E. The Welsh Wars of Edward I. Oxford, 1901.
- Painter, S. "The Crusade of Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall, 1239-1241," A History of the Crusades, ed. R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard, ii. Philadelphia, 1962.
- Peers, E.A. Ramon Lull. A Biography. London, 1929.
- Pelliot, P. "Les Mongols et la Papauté," Revue de l'orient Chretien, xxiii/xxiv/xxvii (1922-1932).
- Poliak, A.M. "Le caractère colonial de l'état Memelouk dans ses rapports avec la Horde d'Or," Revue de Etudes Islamiques, liii (1935).
- Postan, M.M. "Italy and the Economic Development of England in the Middle Ages," Journal of Economic History, xi (1951).
- Powicke, F.M. King Henry III and the Lord Edward. The Community of the Realm in the Thirteenth Century. Oxford, 1947.

- The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307. Oxford, 1962.
- Prutz, H. Kulturgeschichte der Kreuzzüge. Berlin, 1883.
- Ramsay, J.H. A History of the revenues of the Kings of England, 1066-1399. Oxford, 1925.
- Rey, E.G. Étude sur les monuments de l'architecture militaire des croisés en Syrie et dans l'île de Chypre (Collection des documents inédits sur l'histoire de France, ser. 6. Publications archéologiques). Paris, 1871.
- Rhodes, W. "The Italian Bankers in England and their Loans to Edward I and Edward II," Historical Essays by the Members of Owens College, Manchester, ed. T.F. Tout and J. Tait. London, 1902.
- Richard, J. "Le début des relations entre la papauté et les Mongols de la Perse," Journal Asiatique, ccxxxvii (1949).
- Le royaume latin de Jérusalem. Paris, 1953.
- Richardson, H.G., and Sayles G.O. The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna Carta. Edinburgh, 1963.
- "The Parliament of Carlisle, 1307 - Some New Documents," EHR, lii (1938).
- Riley-Smith, J.S.C. The Knights of St. John in Jerusalem and Cyprus, c. 1050-1310. London, 1967.
- "A Note on Confraternities in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem," to be published in Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research.
- Röhricht, R. "Études sur les derniers Temps du Royaume de Jérusalem. A. La Croisade du Prince Édouard d'Angleterre (1270-1274)," Archives de l'Orient Latin, i. Paris, 1881.
- Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem 1100-1291. Innsbruck, 1898.
- Der Kreuzzug Louis IX. gegen Tunis in Regestenform, (Kleine Studien zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge). Berlin, 1890.

Roncière, C. de la, "Le blocus continental de l'Angleterre sous Philippe le Bel," Revue des questions historiques, ix (1896).

Runciman, S. A History of the Crusades. Cambridge, 1951-1955.

---- The Sicilian Vespers. A History of the Mediterranean World in the Later Thirteenth Century. Cambridge, 1988.  
Penguin Books,

Rousset, P. Les origines et les caractères de la première croisade. Neuchatel, 1945.

Salt, M. "Embassies to France, 1272-1307," EHR, xliv (1929).

Schlumberger, G. "Monnaies inédites des Francs en Orient," Mélanges numismatiques, 1 (1874-1875).

---- Numismatique de l'Orient Latin. Paris, 1878; supplement, Paris, 1882.

Smail, R.C. Crusading Warfare (1097-1193). A Contribution to Mediaeval Military History (Cambridge Studies in Mediaeval Life and Thought. New Series, 3). Cambridge, 1956.

---- "Latin Syria and the West, 1149-1187," TRHS, xix, 5 ser. (1969).

Sternfeld, R. Ludwigs des Heiligen Kreuzzug nach Tunis 1270 und die Politik Karls I von Sizilien. Berlin, 1896.

Strayer, J. "The Crusades of Louis IX," A History of the Crusades, ed. R.L. Wolff and H.W. Hazard, ii. Philadelphia, 1962.

Stubbs, W., Introduction to Itinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis Ricardi, Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I, (Rolls Series 38). London, 1864.

Throop, P.A. Criticism of the Crusade. A Study of Public Opinion and Crusade Propaganda. Amsterdam, 1940.

Tononi, A.G. Relazioni de Tedaldo Visconti (Gregoris X) coll' Inghilterra 1259-71. Parma, 1904. Reprinted from Archivo Storico per le Provincie Parmensi, new series, iii (1903).

Tout, T.F. Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England. The Wardrobe, the Chamber and the Small Seals. Manchester, 1920-1933.

---- Collected Papers. Manchester, 1934.

Turner, T.H. "Unpublished Notices of the Times of Edward I, and of his Relations with the Moghul Soveriegns of Persia," Archaeological Journal, viii (1841).

Usher, A.P. The Early History of Deposit Banking in Mediterranean Europe (Harvard Economic Studies). Cambridge, Mass., 1943.

Villey, M. La croisade. Essai sur la formation d'une théorie juridique. Paris, 1942.

---- "L'idée de croisade chez les juristes du moyen âge," Relazioni del X congresso internazionale di scienze storiche. Rome, 1955. Vol. III: Storia del medio evo. Florence, 1955.

Whitwell, R.J. "Italian Bankers and the English Crown," TRHS new series, xvii (1903).

Wiet, G. "Baybars I," The Encyclopedia of Islam, new edition, ed. H.A.R. Gibb et al., i, London, 1960.

Weske, D.B. Convocation of the Clergy. London, 1937.