

Forms of protest and tactics: a strategic interaction on the effects of
policing operations on tactical deployment operated by non-state
actors in South Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Israel: 1982-2011

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Forms of Protest and Tactics

**A strategic interaction perspective on the effects of policing operations
on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors in
South Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank, Israel: 1982 - 2011**

This research focuses on assessing the effects of policing operations on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors. The theory advanced by this work, labelled SMORG theory, is first and foremost an attempt to move from fragmented to comprehensive knowledge.

At the theoretical level, it provides policy makers and practitioners with a better understanding of policing instruments, and especially highlights the limits of coercion and deterrence when dealing with non-state actors. At the methodological level, it demonstrates how to scrutinise the protest space in its entirety, by providing an innovative set of tools to analyse the temporal and spatial distribution of forms of protests on diverse theaters. At the empirical level, it reveals the evolution of conventional, confrontational and violent forms protest in South Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel, during the period 1982 to 2011; it further precisely assesses the effects of policing operations on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors on the same theaters.

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PhD Thesis

University of St Andrews: School of International Relations

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This work focuses on assessing the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors. At the preparation stage of policing operations, police or military commanders usually ask strategic analysts to provide them with answers related to a common risk assessment question : *What should we expect?*

The literature on criminology asserts that modus operandi evolves through experience and learning.¹ Offenders make mistakes and learn from victim's responses. Contrary to the evolutive nature of the modus operandi, the signature of the offender remains stable and describes points unique to his personality. For example, a robber used to break windows to penetrate into houses. His modus operandi evolved with the time from using stones at the beginning to using screwdrivers at the end. However, his signature (a boot print in the soil) remains constant, enabling a link to all cases.

An organization known for riots may plan to demonstrate on a specific date. The *What should we expect* question could thus be answered by the study of the modus operandi and the signature of the organization. The study of the modus operandi would facilitate the deployment of policing counter-measures, while the study of the signature would enable the detection of members or crime related incidents. Traditionally, the assessments of the modus operandi are conducted with an historical perspective based on the actions, the structure, the ideology, the leadership, and the profile of members. Another avenue may also favor the study of the command and control processes during action, the routines, the targets, and the skills of members. The present work is a much deeper answer to the *What should we expect* question. It presents a complete change of perspective that may be summarized by:

What should we expect if we are part of the interaction process ?

More precisely, what will be the effects of the state policing actions on the tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? Being part of the interaction process completely alters the perspective. It turns the problem upside down by assuming that the policing actor exerts a direct influence on the modus operandi. From such a perspective, the state actor moves from a position of spectator to the one of essential piece in a strategic interaction game; and modus operandi translates into tactics. The importance of this subject is manifest. Although we know that non-state actors react when pressured by state policing actors; we do not precisely understand how, why, and when. Failing to understand the effects of policing on the development of different forms of protest is detrimental to peace. Furthermore, the interest of this research does not lie in identifying the triggers of a wave of violence, but rather on understanding its dynamics. As Tilly, a political scientist who worked extensively on contentious politics and social movements revealed: "The historical literature does not lack documentation or analysis of particular contentious forms. What it does lack is a systematic discussion of their covariation and change."²

1. Situational theories of opportunity can be linked to the works of Cohen and Felson, and Ratcliffe. Routine activity theory asserts that criminal acts result from the convergence in space and time of likely offenders, suitable targets and absence of capable guardians. (Cohen & Felson, 1979, p. 589), (Felson & Boba, 2010, pp. 25-48), (Felson & Clarke, 1998) / Police operations decrease crime in the targeted areas and diffuse benefits to the surrounding areas. (Ratcliffe & Breen, 2011, pp. 238-242) / Offenders interact with criminal opportunities: Spatial dependency of crime. (Ratcliffe, 2010) / Temporal constraints affect spatial offending patterns. (Ratcliffe, 2006)

2. (Tilly, 1995, p. 29)

This work focuses on the effects of policing operations on the tactical deployment operated by non-state actors, in the theaters of South Lebanon, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Israel. The period covered ranges from 1982 to 2011. It uses a mixed quantitative-qualitative methodological approach and addresses three central points. The first central issue, at a macro level, relates to the assessment of the repertoire of collective action in a given society. Does the repertoire remain stable through time? What is its content in regard to means of action? What could be stated about innovation? How is the repertoire geographically distributed? A second central issue, at a meso level, relates to the characteristics of social movement organizations (SMO), and scrutinizes their integration into the general protest dynamic highlighted at the macro level. What are the similarities and differences between SMOs operating in the same theaters? Does ideology matter? What could be stated about the influence of the organizational structure, processes of coordination and collective action? The third and central issue, at a micro level, concerns processes of interactions between actors. What are the effects of external factors such as policing variables on the forms of protest being waged by non-state actors? What could be stated about the influence of internal factors (structure - coordination - collective action) on the same tactical deployment?

1.1 THE ARGUMENT

Van Evera, in his study on methodology in political science, states that: "Theories are general statements that describe and explain the causes and effects of classes of phenomena."³

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The theory advanced in this work, labelled Social Movement Organization Leaning theory (SMORG theory), asserts first that policing has a direct effect on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors. Within the concept of policing is implied the regulation and control of a community for the maintenance of public order and safety.⁴ In conflict theaters, as the present research highlights, policing operations are conducted by the police, the military, and sometimes by paramilitary forces acting on behalf of the state.

Second, SMORG theory asserts that non state actors are organized into Social Movement Organizations (SMO). A SMO lies somewhere on the spectrum bounded by the two ideal types social movement (SM) and organization (ORG). In qualitative analyses, in order to increase contrast for theoretical development purposes, the two ideal type poles labeled SM and ORG are used. In quantitative analyses, the precise position of each SMO on the spectrum bounded by the two ideal types SM and ORG is assessed with the help of three scales (SMORG scales): the scale structure, the scale coordination, and the scale collective action. Low SMORG scale values imply a SMO with a strong SM leaning, while high SMORG scale values imply a SMO with a strong ORG leaning.

Third, SMORG theory contends that the impact of policing on tactical deployment is magnified by the extent of SM or ORG leanings (SMORG). This is where SMORG theory becomes explanatory. The SM or ORG leanings are the determinant factors in how tactics are deployed by SMOs. The following lines emphasize the prime hypothesis with related prime explanatory hypotheses.

3. (Evera, 1997, p. 8)

4. (Policing, 2013)

SMORG theory:

- **Prime hypothesis**

Policing → Non-state actor tactical deployment

X (Magnified by)

SMORG (Impact of policing on tactical deployment magnified by SM or ORG leaning)

I. Prime hypothesis

H1a Policing affects non-state actor tactical deployment.

II. Prime explanatory hypotheses

H2a Different types of policing cause different types of tactical deployments.

H2b SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployments.

H2c SMORG effects on tactics are read through tactical variations in time - space - substance.

H2d Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model (Chapter 3, p. 34).

H2e Tactical variations in space imply that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory (Chapter 3, p. 42).

H2f Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs (Chapter 3, p. 51).

Further explanatory hypotheses related to SMORG effects on tactical variations in time - space - substance are developed in Chapter 3: Hypotheses: Time (p. 41) - Hypotheses: Space (p. 50) - Hypotheses: Substance (p. 57).

Alterations in tactics caused by policing and further magnified by SMORG do not occur in a vacuum. Interactions between actors always occur in a context. Therefore, SMORG theory is tightly related to the innovative notion of protest space, in order to provide an efficient and elegant way to handle antecedent conditions.

The protest space should be conceived as a complex universe. It is insufficient to map distance between planets or factors that may have an influence on forms of protest being waged. What needs to be perceived are the phenomena of attraction, thus taking into account multidimensionality. To understand the mechanisms at work, the complexity of the protest space shall be broken down into three distinct subspaces: The repertoire subspace, the organizational subspace and the tactical subspace.

The repertoire subspace is a geometric space composed by means of action used by non-state actors and theaters, stratified by period. It describes the alterations in the repertoire of collective actions that is culturally grounded and subjected to long term incremental evolution.

The organizational subspace is a geometric space composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters and casualties, the whole stratified by period. It enables mapping of the distribution of

SMOs in the geometric space and further assess the influence of SMORG scale structuring factors.

The tactical subspace is a space of interactions between policing actors and SMOs. It describes first, the impact of external factors referred as policing variables on the hazard rates of different forms of protest. Second, it specifically underlines the effects of internal factors, referred as SMORG scales, on the same hazard rates.

The antecedent conditions related to means of actions used in specific theaters or by different organizations are investigated during the study of the repertoire and organizational subspaces. Once those antecedent conditions have been addressed, the study of the tactical subspace precisely assesses the effects of policing on tactical deployment. In this regard, the present work contributes both to theoretical and methodological developments into the field of political science. The literature review will further highlight this last point.

1.2 LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on social movements emphasizes three main theoretical lines of explanations for the rise of collective action. The relative deprivation line asserts that the gap between individual's expectations and achieved welfare produces variation in collective discontent. This approach contains the frustration-aggression theory or the effects of sociocultural/structural variables on the emergence of collective action.⁵ The weaknesses of this classical approach is its over-reliance on the influence of structural causes. Collective action may occur without frustration and/or could be part of daily life in some culture or conflict theaters; lessening the influence of structural causes. The resource mobilization line denounced the relative deprivation approach by considering instead collective action as a process, emphasizing the organization of discontent as central for the rise of collective action.⁶ In this regard, human and material resources are considered crucial for the development and sustainment of collective action. The major weaknesses of this second line is its centralized perspective on mobilization; rendering it unable to account for the rise of spontaneous collective action.⁷ The crowd dynamic line is the one followed by this research. It follows the insights of Snyder, a political scientist, who asserts that: "Once violence initiates, patterns of interactions among individuals and/or groups (including authorities) are likely to be important in determining regularities of escalation and deescalation."⁸ Therefore, this line does not focus on the structural causes of protests or the organization of discontent; it is about why political violence varies in scope and intensity during a state of conflictual interactions.⁹ The crowd dynamic line is thus perfectly adapted to the research question of this work assessing the effects of policing on tactical deployments. In this regard, the literature on tactics can further be divided into three main schools: the environment school, the strategic capacity school, and the strategic interaction school.¹⁰

1.2.1. Environment school

The environment school considers the action of an organization in its macro environment, analyses its concurrents, and defines threats and opportunities. The situating of tactics within the broader dynamic of protests has been addressed by Tarrow's concept of cycles of protest.

5. (Davies, 1969), (Gurr, 1968), (Gurr, 1970). For further references, see: (Snyder, 1978, p. 502)

6. (Tilly, 1978), (Tilly, 2003), (Oberschall, 1973), (Oberschall, 1993). For further references, see: (Snyder, 1978, p. 502)

7. (Snyder, 1978, p. 507)

8. (Snyder, 1978, p. 525)

9. (Gurr, 1986, p. 5)

10. These schools are inspired by the strategic diagnostic components mentioned by the literature on business organizations: Environment - Strategic capacity - Strategic intent. (Johnson, Scholes, Whittington, & Fréry, 2008, pp. 61-198)

Tactics are conditioned by broader dynamics. "Moments of madness do not transform the repertoire of contention all at once [...] but contribute to its evolution through the dynamic evolution of larger cycles of mobilization in which the innovations in collective action that they produce are diffused, tested, and refined [...] and eventually become part of the accepted repertoire."¹¹ Within these larger cycles, non-state actors rationally combine new forms of contention with old ones. The modularity of a type of collective action or, in other words, its capability to be used by different social actors against a variety of targets, helps to explain the persistence of specific modes of action and their spread from an epicenter.¹² The barricades that started in Paris, that later became a trans-neighborhood instrument of defense and mobilization to be finally diffused across Europe, is a good example in this matter.¹³

The notion of opportunity that qualifies the relationship between non-state organizations and their surrounding environment has first been highlighted by Tilly.¹⁴ The idea of political opportunity structure was later developed by Kitschelt and defined as the institutional arrangement characterizing the environment in which an organization operates. The political opportunity structure perspective concentrates on the external variables having an effect on the collective action of an organization and not on its internal variables such as incentives, recruitment, organizational structure, or particular skills.¹⁵ It is composed by an evolving balance between opportunities and threats that dictates when and how non-state actors conduct protests. In this regard, Alimi asserts that the first intifada, characterized by low intensity violence (demonstration, riots), was caused by Palestinian perceptions of the internal weaknesses of the Israeli society. The Palestinians perceived the opening of the Israeli political opportunity structure due to their knowledge related to Israeli politics. They started the uprising at the appropriate time and limited the violence to milder forms of protest in order to exploit the gaps of the Israeli society that did not know how to react.¹⁶

From another perspective, rather than focusing on the Israeli side, Mia Bloom focused on the Palestinian side of the political opportunity structure during the second intifada. She noted a process of internal competition among rival Palestinian organizations that endeavored to gain the public support of the Palestinian society through the accomplishment of violent deeds. In this regard, the political opportunity structure arose from a strong Palestinian public support to violent forms of protest carried out against Israel. Conditioned by a process of inter-organization dynamics, organizations outbid each other to gain public market shares and thus escalate violence.¹⁷ A last variation on this theme lies in the destruction of the political opportunity structure belonging to an opponent. Those types of actions are often referred to as spoiler attacks.¹⁸ A Palestinian Authority (PA) document observes, in this regard, the consistent timing of Hamas suicide attacks conducted with a deliberate intent to spoil the political process led by the PA.¹⁹ According to such a perspective, waves of suicide bombing were initiated by political, rather than military, considerations in order to destroy the structure of political opportunity enjoyed by a rival organization.

1.2.2. Strategic capacity school

The strategic capacity school asserts that if the environment dictates the opportunity structure of an organization, the strategic capacity of the organization is key to define its success.²⁰

11. (Tarrow, 1995, pp. 91-92)

12. (Tarrow, 1994, pp. 153-168), (Tarrow, 1995, pp. 91-92)

13. (Tarrow, 1994, p. 44)

14. (Tilly, 1978, pp. 7-8)

15. (Kitschelt, 1986, pp. 58-63)

16. (Alimi, Gamson, & Ryan, 2006, pp. 537-539,554)

17. (Bloom, 2004, pp. 65-74)

18. (Kydd & Walter, 2006, pp. 59-80)

19. (Regular, 2004a)

20. (Johnson et al., 2008, p. 113)

Therefore, the focus addresses the resources and competences of an organization related to the costs of its tactical deployment.

The main works on the matter originate from institutionalization theory. All organizations seek to institutionalize in order to gain intra-organizational cohesion, communal standing, and external recognition.²¹ In such an evolutionary process, organizations take specific internal measures in order to enhance the sustainability and the growth of their strategic capacity. Kurz Anat depicts the process of institutionalization of Fatah, and states that social movements or organizations are situated at different points in time on an evolutionary path of institutionalization. Any organization of popular struggle seeks to institutionalize and uses three bases of legitimacy: regulative (coercive mechanisms), normative (values and norms), and political (external recognition). The organization alternates from one base of legitimacy to the other, according to situational shifts in its environment. In such a theoretical construct, any change in the base of legitimacy involves a readjustment in the field of tactics. Indeed, to preserve or enhance its growth and strategic capacity, an organization will deploy different types of tactics, from non-violent to violent ones, at different points in time.²² Therefore, situational shifts in the environment related to the position of the organization on the path of institutionalization define the use of particular tactics.

The strategic capacity of an organization is not only linked to resources and competences but involves also the costs of tactical implementation. For Gamson, unruly organizations that use constraints or violent strikes score better chances of success. Indeed, "those who use more unruly tactics escape misfortune because they are clever enough to use these tactics primarily in situations where public sentiments neutralize the normal deviance of the action, thus reducing the likelihood and effectiveness of counterattack."²³ Lichbach's rational actor model further states that if the costs to use violent tactics become too high for insurgents, they will preserve their strategic capacity by moving to non-violent tactics in order to lessen the same costs.²⁴ Beitler follows this model by adding that a strong repression of organizations using violent tactics reduces the use of same tactics; and by way of consequence favors the development of milder forms of protest.²⁵

The main weakness of the institutionalization argument lies in the assumption that every organization seeks growth and institutionalization. As a matter of fact, in warfare some organizations may deliberately refuse uncontrolled growth in order to avoid any increase in signature that would cause their immediate destruction. Furthermore, the institutionalization process could also be impeded by a lack of resources and a specific ideology (strategic intent); as the precise case of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad refusing institutionalization to concentrate only on warfare demonstrates. The Lichbach rational actor model of costs/benefits and the deterrence model developed by Beitler are quite problematic as well. In the Palestinian case, such a model is not sufficient to explain the daring collective behaviors observed during the two intifadas where individuals would not consider the costs of their actions with regard to their own life.²⁶ 70% of the already wounded children thought that the probability of being wounded again were high, but were still going back out on the streets to riot.²⁷ During the most intense years of the first intifada, 1 out of every 22 children in Gaza had been injured or killed, and some children had repeatedly been wounded. Therefore, the deterrence effect of personal injury or death was almost non-existent for most of them.²⁸ As one child stated: "When we joined the in-

21. (Kurz, 2005, p. 153)

22. (Kurz, 2005, pp. 4-14,152-153)

23. (Gamson, 1975)

24. (Lichbach, 1987, pp. 279-283)

25. (Beitler, 2004, pp. 11-14)

26. For example, parents were watching their children throwing stones against soldiers firing back with guns. The parents and shahab kids were more entranced than scared. (Winternitz, 1991, p. 56)

27. (Rouhana, 1989, pp. 111-112)

28. Ali had been wounded seven times during the first intifada. (Andoni, 1997, p. 37)

tifada, we knew we might be shot or jailed or killed; but we felt that it was the right thing to do."²⁹ During the second intifada, despite the harshness of the Israeli countermeasures, Palestinian tactics reached unknown levels of violence instead of settling down to milder ones as Beitler's deterrence model would have expected.

1.2.3. Strategic interaction school

The environment and the strategic capacity of an organization influence its use of certain tactics. The last school of interest for this study is the strategic interaction school that considers how others respond to specific moves.³⁰

The strategic intent of an organization dictates its tactical deployment. In this regard, Pape argued that suicide bombings are efforts directed toward achieving particular political goals. In such a process, tactics are designed to coerce a target or a government to change its policy.³¹ On the other hand, contrary to Pape's assertion of tactics in tune with strategic considerations, Brym & Araj argued that suicide bombing may sometime take place for non-strategic reasons such as revenge and retaliations.³²

Analyses on the effects of policing on crowds or organizations have inspired many authors. Della Porta analysed the patterns of escalation and de-escalation within crowds. She observed that softer police behavior favors the diffusion of protest, while repressive policing discourages mass peaceful protests and fuel, at the same time, the more radical fringes. In such a setting, the reciprocal adaptations of police and protester tactics are continuous.³³ In a book entitled *Cases against paramilitary policing*, Jefferson argues that the constitution of highly specialized units and the acquisition of protective equipment by the London metropolitan police had a negative impact on the handling of confrontational and violent forms of protest.³⁴ On the other hand, Waddington developed the opposite argument by stating that the adoption of military methods of public order represents a measure of restraint in responding to the challenges faced by the police. From this perspective, the adoption of military methods of public order in fact regulates police wrongdoing. It enables the policing actor to specialize and empower specific elements which in return have to display higher competencies in the policing of protests and thus appease rather than fuel a wave of political violence.³⁵ The report of the *Kerner Commission* to investigate the cause of the 1967 racial riots in the United States, mentions that police actions increased tensions and led to collective violence in 12 of the 24 surveyed disorders. The commission called for an increase in training of the riot police and the use of non lethal weapons.³⁶

Strategic interactions related to the Palestinian theater were researched by Khawaja who concludes that repression reinforces popular resistance.³⁷ Qumsiyeh describes the development of popular resistance in Palestine that started under Ottoman rule to limit land acquisitions by the Zionist movement. This popular resistance continued to develop under British and finally Israeli rule. This author observed that: the harsher the repression, the stronger the resistance growth in its different forms.³⁸ The quantitative focus of Jaeger & Paserman, using Palestinian

29. (Mansour, 2008, p. 70)

30. The definition of strategic interaction in game theory is given by: (Bueno de Mesquita, 1996, pp. 62-63)

31. (Pape, 2003, p. 345)

32. (Brym & Araj, 2006, pp. 1973,1982)

33. Della Porta distinguishes two analytical levels that are: The opportunity structure such as the institutional features of a state (constitutional rights, law codes, police organization...), and the policing of protest which involves interactions between state actors and social movements (violence escalation or de-escalation between police and protesters). (Della Porta, 1995a, pp. 55-57,78-81)

34. (Jefferson, 1990, pp. 1-13,84-86)

35. (Waddington, 2003, p. 94)

36. (Kerner Commission, 1968, pp. 6,16)

37. (Khawaja, 1993, pp. 57-60,64)

38. (Qumsiyeh, 2011, pp. 228-231)

and Israeli fatalities indexes of the second intifada, mentioned that Israel's response to Palestinian violence is predictable. On the other hand, Palestinian violent responses appear not to be related to Israeli protest policing operations. The difficulties lie in predicting the timing of the Palestinian responses due to the operational complexity they face and the limited means at their disposal.³⁹ Finally, Kaplan et al. attributed the decrease in the rate of suicide bombings that occurred after 2003 not to the effectiveness of Israeli targeted killings, but to the preventive arrests of Palestinian activists conducted during large operations such as *Defensive Shield*.⁴⁰

1.2.4. Discussion

The environment school, the strategic capacity school and the strategic interaction school bring much insight into the field of tactics and policing.

The environment school highlighted the influence of context on tactical deployment. The present research, in order to address this issue, considers five different periods of analyses: a) Period pre-intifada: 1982 - 1987, b) Period first intifada: 1987 - 1993, c) Period Oslo: 1993 - 2000, d) Period second intifada: 2000 - 2006, e) Late period: 2006 - 2011. By selecting and analyzing each period separately, it seeks to achieve internal consistency and stability in regard to sociological dynamics.

The strategic capacity school emphasizes the influence of internal factors such as resources, competences, and the costs of tactical implementation. Institutionalization theory further mentions that strategic capacity has an impact on tactical choices. This work reflects much of such an insight. However it does not assume that social movement and organizations are situated at different points in times on the path of institutionalization. This research refutes the evolutionary process of institutionalization. Some social movements remain devoid of any kind of institutionalization process. The same could be stated with organizations such as the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, that remain strictly exclusive due to environmental and ideological constraints. The present research considers every organization as a Social Movement Organization (SMO), oscillating between the two ideal type poles of social movement (SM) and organization (ORG). Contrary to institutionalization theory, it does not make any assumption on structural evolution through time.

The strategic interaction school underlines the influence of strategic intent and policing on tactical deployment. To account for this, this research compares tactics deployed by SMOs with divergent ideology. Finally, authors emphasized the influence of policing on tactical deployment, but the rate of political violence was only broadly assessed and impedes the clear identification of links between policing and tactics. The present research remedies this gap by widening the spectrum and assessing the effects of different policing variables (arrests - curfews - search raids...) on the time between different forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent).

39. (Jaeger & Paserman, 2006, p. 49), (Jaeger & Paserman, 2008, p. 1602)

40. (Kaplan, Mintz, Mishal, & Samban, 2005, p. 225)

1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE WORK

The next chapters address the following issues:

Chapter 2 Research Methods and Procedures (p. 18) is a methodological chapter. It mentions the working definitions of policing actors, tactical actors and repertoire of collective action. It also details the quantitative and qualitative procedures used in the present work.

Chapter 3 Tactical variations (p. 34) is a theoretical chapter. Every SMO is balanced between both ideal types SM and ORG. To favor contrast, this chapter addresses the notion of tactical variations in time, space, and substance through the ideal type lenses of SM and ORG. This chapter addresses the effects of those two paradoxical poles on tactical deployment.

Chapter 4 SMO profiles (p. 58) details the evolution of protest on the Palestinian theater during both intifadas. The overarching commands of both uprisings are described, and each of the five SMOs (Fatah - PFLP - PIJ - Hamas - Hizballah) is qualitatively assessed. SMORG scale values are further assigned to each of them, by period.

Chapter 5 Repertoire subspace (p. 90) assesses the repertoires of collective action by period and further highlights their particularities when related to theaters. The repertoire subspace enables insight into the gradual transformation of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action through time and space.

Chapter 6 Organizational subspace (p. 103) refers more specifically to the analyses of SMOs in their operational environment. The organizational subspace composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters, casualties and periods facilitates the determination of the dynamics at work and SMO operational characteristics can be thoroughly assessed. It permits a multi-dimensional assessment of the influence of SMORG scales on tactical deployment.

Chapter 7 Tactical subspace: External factors (p. 117) explores the relationship of policing variables, momentum variables and day of the week with time between protests. The strategic game between state and non-state actors is precisely assessed and new findings related to the effect of policing on tactical deployment are detailed.

Chapter 8 Tactical subspace: Internal factors (p. 175) explores the relationship of SMORG scales to time between protests. Univariable analyses and multivariable analyses are conducted in this chapter. The effects of SMORG scales (structure - coordination - collective action) on the operational tempo for the waging of the three forms of protest are precisely investigated.

Chapter 9 Explanatory hypotheses assessment (p. 187) summarizes the findings of quantitative and qualitative analyses. Interviews are used to support and further develop the hypotheses related to SMORG theory.

Chapter 10 Conclusion (p. 209) lists the theoretical and practical insufficiencies. It further reviews the comprehensive response brought by SMORG theory in the theoretical field, methodological field, and empirical field.

Chapter 2

Research Methods and Procedures

2.1 WORKING DEFINITIONS

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? In order to better understand the research question of this work and the theoretical development, a few definitions need to be addressed beforehand. The working definitions relate to state policing actors, non-state tactical actors, and differences between repertoires of collective action versus tactics.

2.1.1. Policing Actors

The working definition of policing relates to the state deployment of means and procedures to maintain public order. Brewer et al. published in 1988 a comparative research on *Police Public Order* in Northern Ireland, Britain, Israel, South Africa, USA and China. Their findings revealed that an operational mix of police and military forces, when conducting policing operations, varied between and within states:

"Where external threats to the state combine with conflict founded upon internal divisions - as in Israel, South Africa and Northern Ireland - the linkages between the police and military are clearly evident, and the armed forces may emerge as the primary enforcers of order. In others such linkages are more discrete, and (as in Britain) police militarisation has become the preferred policy."⁴¹

In conflict theaters policing or the maintenance of public order may be conducted by the police, the army, and sometimes by paramilitary forces acting on behalf of the state.⁴² The four main categories of policing actors considered in this research are:

- Israeli military or police forces
- Palestinian Security Force (Palestinian Authority)
- Executive Security Force (Hamas government)
- Settlers

Settlers are a typical case of paramilitary force acting on behalf of the state. The Israeli Supreme Court's jurisprudence accepts that settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) can serve military or security needs.⁴³ Testimonies of ex-IDF Israeli soldiers having served in the OPT, collected by the Israeli NGO *Breaking the Silence*, further reveal that:

"Settlers often work in the Ministry of Defense as security coordinator for their settlement [...] The security forces do not see the settlers as civilians subject to law enforcement but as powerful body that shares the same goals [...] The settler violence against Palestinians is not treated as an infraction of the law [...] The settlers are not merely Israeli citizens entitled to protection by the army and rule of law: in practice, they are also partners in the military rule of Palestinians [...] Settlers are able to act in the Territories as representatives of Israel - as if they were a branch of the security forces."⁴⁴

41. (Brewer, Guelke, Hume, Moxon-Browne, & Wilford, 1988, p. 4)

42. For further discussions related to the issue of conflict policing, see: (Hill, 2010) / The higher the level of violence, the more difficult for the police to conduct routine law enforcement tasks. Past a certain threshold, it may require the support of the military. (Oakley & Dziedzic, 1996) / In many countries, such a process has been codified and known as *Military Aid to the Civil Power*.

43. (Tilley, 2012, pp. 56-59)

44. (Breaking the silence, 2010, pp. 5,286-287)

2.1.2. Tactical Actors

Three types of non-state actors may deploy tactics: A social movement, an organization, or a social movement organization. The differences among them are expressed in this work through the dimensions of structure, processes of coordination and collective action.

A social movement (SM) is characterized by a loose structure, informal processes of coordination, and collective action with strong popular involvement.⁴⁵ A SM is a dense informal network with a sense of collective identity.⁴⁶ First, the SM structure is not clearly defined and could be best described as a spontaneous convergence in space and time of diverse actors sharing a sense of collective identity to promote or oppose social changes. Therefore, a SM appears to be like a fluid phenomenon with no strict delimited boundaries.⁴⁷ Second, the SM processes of coordination are accomplished by informal connections among participants, through family, community, media, and new information technologies.⁴⁸ Third, SM collective actions are characterized by strong popular mobilization processes. For example, both intifadas clearly fit in the three parameters of a social movement definition. The collective actions during intifadas were more spontaneous in their nature and were clearly driven by the actions of heterogeneous non state actors united by a common goal and a general sense of collective identity.

An organization (ORG), on the other hand, is the antithesis of a social movement.⁴⁹ An ORG is characterized by a well defined structure, formal processes of coordination, and collective action with weak popular involvement. First, the structure of an ORG is well defined: a horizontal specialization through division of labor is conducted.⁵⁰ Status and procedures are formalized and membership remains highly selective for any new candidate. Second, the process of coordination of an ORG is characterized by a vertical specialization, that divides decision-making duties among strata and thus clearly defines hierarchical lines.⁵¹ Third, ORG collective actions are conducted through the actions of selected members and not by popular involvement. For example, Abu Nidal was an organization which acted on behalf of the governments of Syria, Iraq and Lybia during the 1980s. Those states provided it with training, logistical support, funding and used its guns for hire.⁵² An identification with its patron's cause was not necessary. This demonstrates that, contrary to a SM, an ORG's goal may be completely isolated from the broader popular or collective dynamics.⁵³ Abu Nidal was an exclusive well defined structure with formal processes of coordination and no popular involvement in its collective action.

The following graphs underline the main of difference between a SM and an ORG:

45. Oberschall noted the loose structure and the informal process of coordination. (Oberschall, 1993, p. 25) For the need of this research, a third dimension labelled *Popular involvement* was added. McCarthy and Zald defines a SM as: "Set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure, and/or reward distribution of a society." (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1217)

46. (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 21-22)

47. (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 26)

48. (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1221)

49. Zald & Garner mention than a SM differs from an ORG, as it seeks to change society or its members and does not provide regular services. (Zald & Garner, 1987, p. 123)

50. (Simon, 2000, p. 7)

51. (Simon, 2000, pp. 8-9)

52. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009)

53. (Hoffman, 2006, pp. 257-260), (Laqueur, 1987, p. 286)

Prism of social movement

Prism of organization




Figure 1 Prisms of social movement versus organization

This raises one of the main points of this research; the definition of a social movement organization (SMO). Social movement theorists, such as McCarthy & Zald, define it as a "complex, or formal organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement, and attempt to implement those goals."⁵⁴ Della Porta & Diani further add, that "any organization which is involved in social movement dynamic may be regarded as a social movement organization."⁵⁵ The present work considers a SMO as the convergence of both loose and well defined structure, of both informal and formal processes of coordination, and of both strong and weak popular involvement in collective action. First, the external structure of a SMO is fuzzy, fluid, and difficult to gauge as it rests on the support of the population, or in other words, on multiple and diverse participants. However, its internal structure remains well defined through statuses, procedures, division of labor, and membership criterion.⁵⁶ Second, externally, the processes of coordination of a SMO are informal. In this regard, networks between social movement participants are used to coordinate and steer waves of protest.⁵⁷ At the same time, internally, SMO processes of coordination are formal through the vertical specialization of specific members for leadership duties. Third, the collective action of SMOs can be characterized, on one hand, by a strong mobilization of social movement participants and, on the other hand, by precise operations carried out by the exclusive members of the organization. Hamas, for example, is a typical case of a SMO. Hamas was born on the wave of the first intifada and first capitalized on the flow of Palestinian collective action by the distribution of leaflets describing its ideology to heterogeneous intifada participants. Internally, Hamas also developed a well defined structure by dividing labor and leadership duties. It developed, among other things, a youth wing called *Al Ahdath* to lead street demonstrations. Furthermore, the process of selection of Hamas members was very exclusive.⁵⁸ Finally, its processes of coordination and collective action were both well defined with internal process for its members and loosely defined in regard to the coordination of social movement participants.

54. (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1218)

55. (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 26)

56. Kriesi mentions the internal and external structuration operated by SMOs. (Kriesi, 1996, pp. 154-155)

57. SMOs are interested in contentious collective action. (Tarrow, 1995, pp. 93-94)

58. (Chehab, 2008, pp. 30-32) / 40% of Hamas distributed leaflets contained directives for violent action. The left focused on confrontational forms of protest such as civil disobedience or non violent activities such as rupture of economic ties with Israel and promotion of intra-Palestinian solidarity. (Mishal & Sela, 2006, pp. 60-62)

Prism of SMO




Figure 2 Prism of SMO

For many, Hamas or Fatah are considered to be political parties. For the purpose of this work, an important distinction needs to be drawn between political parties and SMOs. Political parties have political goals but do not require the direct participation of their members to attain the same goals.⁵⁹ Therefore, parties are specialized in the political representation of their constituency and not on direct action. By limiting themselves to conventional forms of protest, the political parties do not possess the organizational structure required to lead the direct actions of their members at operational and tactical levels. On the other hand, SMOs are organizational entities that require the direct action of their members in order to reach their political goals. They dispose of an apparatus that could be formal (ORG) or informal (SM), enabling them to influence the direct action of their members. Political parties limit themselves to institutionalized channels to express grievances, whereas SMOs operate within the whole spectrum of protest; from conventional to violent forms of protest.

In this research, a SMO lies somewhere on the spectrum bounded by the two ideal types SM and ORG. In qualitative analyses, in order to increase contrast for theoretical development purposes, the two ideal type poles labeled SM and ORG are used. In quantitative analyses, the precise position of each SMO on the spectrum bounded by the two ideal types SM and ORG is assessed with the help of the following scales, labelled SMORG scales (See Figure 3):

Figure 3 SMORG scales example

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
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Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
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If the triple scale average amounts to 5, the SMO is characterized as having a strong ORG leaning. On the other hand, an average of 3 means a SMO with well balanced SM and ORG

59. (Kriesi, 1996)


leanings, while an average of 1 implies a SMO with a strong SM leaning. The assessment of SMOs through SMORG scale values highlights net benefits at the empirical level for the wag- ing of quantitative analyses.

This research states that the numbers of cadres in a SMO is not the main factor in the assess- ment of the effects of policing on tactical deployment, but that SM or ORG leaning are central in this regard. In Palestine, most of the SMOs account for a minimum of 1'000 members, as the cases of exclusive organizations such as Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) highlight. Therefore, in such a context, the number of members are of no help to assess tactical behaviors. The irrelevance of number could also be highlighted by the fact that mass may be divided into self-operating cells acting autonomously.

2.1.3. Repertoire of Collective Action versus Tactics

Another clear distinction needs to be made between the labels: repertoire of collective action and tactics. Both are found in different types of literature. Social movement theory emphasizes the use of repertoire of collective action, while military theory favors tactics and doctrine. However, a precise analysis of political violence in a civilian context, requires the integration of both in order to perceive the substance, and especially the dynamics, at work.

A repertoire of collective action is the substance of protest and is relatively static in essence. It contains the forms of protest and the means of action at the disposal of any SMO. A SMO may use one, two, or three different forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent) sepa- rately, sequentially, or simultaneously. The following graph summarizes the different forms of protest related to their attached means of action.



60

Figure 4 SMO Repertoire of collective action

The point to be emphasized is that repertoires of collective action are culturally grounded, and are thus subjected to long term incremental evolution. In this regard, Tarrow argues that reper- toires of collective action do not transform at once, but through the dynamic of larger cycles of mobilization in which innovations in collective action are tested and refined to become eventu- ally part of the accepted repertoire.⁶¹ To summarize, a repertoire of collective action should be considered as the substance containing the means of action.

60. (Tarrow, 1995, pp. 97,98) / The category violent forms of protest has been modified for the needs of this research: Attacks on civilians was added.

61. (Tarrow, 1995, pp. 91,92)

On the other hand, tactics differ with their related notions of dynamics, opportunity, and resource dependency. First, tactics are dynamic in essence. In a state of strategic interactions, tactics are a response to the previous move of an opponent or an anticipation of his next move.⁶² Second, tactics are opportunistic. Broadly speaking, the two main objectives of tactics aim at: a) Deploying forces in a coherent fashion to achieve principles such as economy of force, freedom of action, and surprise, b) Weakening the opponent by denying him the support of the same principles.⁶³ Tactics are thus a move through a window of opportunity, or a specific move to favor the creation of such a window to further act. Third, resources strongly condition the deployment of tactics and these resources are morale, organizational, human, and material.

Therefore, if a repertoire related to its means of actions can be considered as relatively stable, tactics are dynamic, opportunistic, and resources driven. Tactics do not demonstrate the long term evolution of a repertoire of collective actions, but exploit, in the short term, the means of actions contained within a repertoire of collective action.

The distinction between repertoires of collective action and tactics presented in this research has three main advantages: The first advantage is a clear separation between the substance and the dynamic of collective action. Such an approach highlights why tactics such as suicide bombing may be drawn from the repertoire of collective action of SMOs operating in the Middle East, and not from the repertoire of other SMOs (IRA, ETA) operating in Western Europe. Nevertheless, it might happen, that in a state of strategic interactions, tactics not grounded within a repertoire are independently developed and deployed by a SMO. In such a case, tactical innovation may have two consequences. The first could be either a cultural acceptance and integration of this new tactic as new mean of action within a repertoire of collective action of a given society. The second could be a cultural backlash that would condemn the use of such unorthodox tactic.⁶⁴ Distinguishing between the substance and the dynamics further allows the solving of a game theory dilemma. Indeed, not all actions are strategic because most of them are routine and communicative rather than directed toward the rational allocation of means toward a specific goal.⁶⁵ Therefore, by considering first the substance that is a repertoire of collective action culturally impregnated, and second the dynamics of tactics rationally deployed along a cost/benefit calculus, the cultural bias on the rational content of tactical actions is lessened.⁶⁶

The second advantage of a repertoire of collective action and tactics contrast is the appearance of a distinction between the types of constraints. A repertoire of collective action is established at the level of society, and is thus subjected to cultural constraints. On the other hand, tactics are undertaken at the SMO level and are subjected to resource constraints. Suicide bombings or armed assaults, for example, are two different means of action that are part of the repertoire of collective action of some societies. They belong to the category of violent forms of protest

62. Tactics are not a technique but a process; each situation is different because the adversary, its time and its place have to be considered anew. (Lind, 2005, pp. 22-23)

63. These principles, to be applied at the level of strategy, were enunciated by Foch. (Foch, 1996, p. 95) / They may perfectly be applied at the tactical level.

64. For example, IRA used the tactic of *proxy bomb* in 1990. It got such a cultural backlash that it was never integrated as a mean of action within the repertoire of collective action of SMOs operating in Northern Ireland. (Bloom & Horgan, 2008, pp. 594-603)

65. (Jasper, 1995, p. 12)

66. Tilly further mentions that: "The idea of repertoire implies that standards forms are learned, limited in number and scope, slowly changing, and peculiarly adapted to their settings." (Tilly, 1979, p. 131) This author adds that it differs from the image of calculating statisticians seizing every opportunity. The approach chosen by this research in fact links both repertoire and tactics, as it addresses the repertoire as the substance and the tactics as the dynamics. Last but not least, this two steps approach (repertoire versus tactics) is more parsimonious than other models of strategic decision making, such as the one elaborated by Freeman which includes mobilizable resources, constraints on these resources, SMO structure, internal environment, expectations about potential targets. (Freeman, 1979, pp. 172-173)

and can be used against civilians, authority, or antagonist targets. However, the translation of such means of action into tactics is strongly restricted by the resources that an organization needs to possess in order to deploy them. Successful suicide bombings involve the participation and coordination of a whole range of different individuals in order to buy explosives, build the bomb, recon the objectives, direct the bomber on target, and film the action for effective propaganda purposes.⁶⁷ Therefore, the constraints are not identical. If a repertoire is culturally constrained, tactics are strongly resource constrained.

The third advantage lies in the appropriateness of the distinction to a specific theater of operations and actors. The concept of standardized doctrine used by military actors cannot be projected to actors operating in a civilian environment. Indeed, there is no uniform doctrine for civilians, but only a repertoire of collective actions strongly embedded in the diversity of actors and cultures.⁶⁸ Furthermore, in a social movement there is no centralized hierarchical chain of command but a whole range of actors loosely connected to each other and relying mainly on societal culture for implicit coordination and action.⁶⁹ Culture represents the shared beliefs producing the means of action and thus delimits specific fields of action.⁷⁰ It is an acquired knowledge that people use to interpret experience and generate social behavior.⁷¹ Therefore, the notion of repertoire of collective action is perfectly adapted for the analysis of political violence on a civilian theater of operations, and the notion of tactics effectively complements it.

To summarize, the distinction between repertoire of collective action and tactics highlights their respective nature (*substance versus dynamics*), their structural constraints (*cultural versus resource*) and the importance of both for the analysis of forms of protest occurring on a civilian theater of operations.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

This research, driven by a positivist knowledge claim, reflects a deterministic philosophy in which causes determine effects or outcomes.⁷² It endeavors to bring with it the benefits of a coherent and systematic production of knowledge based on observations and measurements, as well as rigor in data collection to create a strong basis for the development of future research. However, if this work has been inspired by positivism, general laws have been substituted for middle-range typological theories, in order to contribute to more contingent and specific generalization that are of greater help for policy makers.⁷³ Furthermore, a mixed quantitative-qualitative method was applied. The main advantage of combining both quantitative and qualitative

67. (Hoffman, 2003, pp. 40-46)

68. The purpose of doctrine is to create a community of thought for action. As a concept, it does not say what to do, but rather how to do it. (Coutau-Bégarie, 2006, pp. 262,264)

69. Schelling defines tacit communication as mutually recognized signals that coordinate the expectations of each other. (Schelling, 1980, p. 53) / Crozier & Friedberg describe the game between actors as an essential element of organized action. A human construct linked to the cultural models of a society, structuring power relationships and conciliating freedoms and constraints. (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977, p. 113) / Culture provides the stability of constructs and the capacity to wage collective action. It implies a framework of thought, of values and of rules. (Amblard, Bernoux, Herreros, & Livian, 2005, p. 52) / For Peter & Waterman, culture permits loose-tight properties, enabling the highest levels of true autonomy. (Peters & Waterman JR, 2004, p. 105) / Weick states that culture creates homogenous sets of assumption and decision premises, invoked on a local and decentralized basis and preserving coordination. (Weick, 2001, pp. 340,341)

70. Pierre Bourdieu states that culture is part of the collective unconscious, integrated schemes from which particular schemes later emerged. In: (Reynaud, 2004, p. 64) / See also: (Schein, 1997, p. 12) and (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977, p. 210) / Kotter & Heskett further describe the two levels of culture that are shared values and norms of group behavior. (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, p. 4)

71. (Hodgetts, Luthans, & Doh, 1991, p. 94)

72. (Creswell, 2003, p. 7)

73. (George & Benett, 2005, p. 7)


methods lies in extending generalization without losing contextual sensitivity. Other important methodological points shall now be addressed.

2.2.1. Data

The data set for this work contains 60'423 events: 20'529 protest events and 39'894 policing events. In order to remove biases and improve exhaustiveness, both Palestinian and Israeli sources were utilized and merged. The Palestinian source refers to the Palestine Chronology published by the Journal of Palestine studies.⁷⁴ The Israeli source refers to the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism database.⁷⁵ Both sources provided articles, most in a format similar to newspapers, that had to be manually coded in order to create the database. Further details are available in the appendixes.⁷⁶

2.2.2. Protest variables

Forms of protest are composed by three main variables: conventional forms of protest, confrontational forms of protest, and violent forms of protest. They are indicated in blue on the following figure; their respective coding categories are indicated in grey.



74. (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011a). The detail of all references can be found in the appendix Palestinian source (p. 222)

75. (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2011). The author is grateful to ICT for providing a full access to their database.

76. SOURCE SELECTION (p. 222), DATABASE CREATION (p. 225), PROTEST DATABASE (p. 226), POLICING DATABASE (p. 232) and SYNERGY DATABASE (p. 237)

Figure 5 Forms of protest: variables

Further details related to the coding and the definition of protest variables are included in the appendix PROTEST DATABASE (p. 226).

2.2.3. Policing variables

Policing activities are composed of the main variables that are indicated in blue on the next figure; their respective coding categories are indicated in grey.




Figure 6 Policing: variables

Further details related to the coding and the definition of policing variables are included in the appendix POLICING DATABASE (p. 232).

2.2.4. Periods and Theaters

This work aims to achieve internal consistency and stability in regard to sociological dynamics. To achieve this, the whole study time span was divided into smaller periods, as detailed in the following table:

Periods	Dates	Description
Period 1 (P1)	24.02.1982-09.12.1987	The first period starts on 24.02.1982 and extends until the start of the first intifada. ⁷⁷ It contains 2114 days.
Period 2 (P2)	10.12.1987-13.09.1993	The second period starts with the first intifada and finishes on the date of the signature of the Oslo agreement in Washington. ⁷⁸ It contains 2105 days.
Period 3 (P3)	14.09.1993-28.09.2000	The third period extends from the signature of the Oslo agreement to the visit of Ariel Sharon on Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount). ⁷⁹ It contains 2572 days.
Period 4 (P4)	29.09.2000-25.01.2006	The fourth period starts with the second intifada and ends with Hamas victory for the PA legislative council. ⁸⁰ It contains 1945 days.
Period 5 (P5)	26.01.2006-15.08.2011	The fifth periods extends from the date of Hamas electoral victory until the end date of the research period. This period contains 2028 days.

Table 1 Division of the time span in periods

The choice of theaters was set on South Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Jerusalem was considered as a specific theater in itself due to the fact that it was methodologically impossible to precisely distinguish, from the sources available, whether attacks occurred in Eastern or Western Jerusalem. The label Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) used in this work is geographically limited to the Gaza Strip, West Bank and East Jerusalem.⁸¹

The inclusion of South Lebanon is also of prime importance. As Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 highlight, Palestinian tactics were subjected to a *Lebanonization* process. Therefore, the transfers of knowledge and financial support provided by Lebanese Hizballah to Palestinian SMOs is crucial for the understanding of tactical deployments in those theaters. The numbers of protest events by theater are mentioned in the next table.

Theater	Protest
Israel	2'781
West Bank	8'197
Gaza	3'798
Lebanon	3'427
Jerusalem	1'367

Table 2 Number of protest events by theater

77. (Kuttab, 1988, p. 21)

78. (Mattar, 2005, p. 66)

79. The riots of the second intifada started the following day in the old city of Jerusalem. (Mattar, 2005, p. 23)

80. (IICC, 2006f)

81. "Those are the territories in Mandate Palestine that Israel occupied in June 1967 and that lie beyond the ceasefire lines delineated in Israel's 1949 Armistice Agreements with Egypt and Jordan." The Golan Heights were treated separately, although occupied, given the fact that they were not part of Mandate Palestine. (Tilley, 2012, p. 4)

These five theaters were selected for the following main reasons:

- It enables the comparison of tactics deployed by SMOs, which vary in strategic capacities and strategic intents. This provides the possibility to extend the generalizability of the theoretical construct by having within-case analyses of SMOs followed by cross-case comparisons between them.
- The focus on those theaters enables a decrease of the possibility of environmental bias. Culture could be assumed to be reasonably uniform in those theaters. Time periods were implemented in order to account for sociological changes that occurred at the societal level.
- The data set is numerous, comprehensive, and reliable. It is comprehensive in the sense that all forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent) were considered, and reliable due to the consistent reporting by Palestinian and Israeli media centers.
- The analysis of the effects of policing carried out by one main policing actor, the Israeli security forces, diminishes potential biases that could arise from differences in quality, quantity, and doctrine.

To conclude, the case selection strategy endeavors to minimize differences among actors operating at the level of the independent variable *Policing*, and to maximize them at the level of the dependent variable *Tactics*. Therefore, any congruence in the causation links that arise from a multiple intercase comparisons of least similar groups extends the analytic-generalization of the theoretical propositions discovered during the within-case analysis.⁸² Finally, failure to generalize the theoretical construct from one case study to the other may also highlight new paths of investigation. The particularities related to quantitative and qualitative analyses shall now be addressed.

2.2.5. Quantitative approach

This work argues that the effects of policing on tactical deployment can only be understood through the study of the protest space composed by: the repertoire subspace, the organizational subspace, and the tactical subspace.

I. Repertoire subspace:

- Geometric data analyses

The repertoire subspace is a geometric space composed by means of action, and theaters, the whole stratified by period. The total number of protest events constituting the organizational subspace amounts to 20'529.

The label of space is not coincidental as space implies multidimensionality in itself. Regular experimental paradigms seek to study the effects of independent variables (IV) on a dependent variable (DV). However, geometric data analyses (GDA) are much more appropriate for the study of both the repertoire and the organizational subspaces for several reasons:

- The data represents the whole population of interest. Therefore, description and interpretation become of the highest importance.⁸³ No distributional assumptions are necessary, and the main objective lies in revealing the structure of a complex set of data without losing essential information.⁸⁴

82. (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 45-50)

83. (Greenacre, 2007, p. 7)

84. (Clausen, 1998, p. V)

- The ability to analyze complex tables, made of hundreds variables, and visualize their projection into space facilitates their interpretation.⁸⁵
- GDA simultaneously handles many different DVs and constructs a geometric space out of them. The status of the DV is attributed to the geometric space created, and the influence of the IV is assessed by the addition of supplementary variables into the same space.⁸⁶
- The particularities of the repertoire and organizational subspaces are defined by a precise selection of variables that determine the distance between points within each protest subspace.
- Descriptive analyses, contrary to inductive analyses, do not depend on sample size. Inductive analyses can still be conducted to further advance descriptive conclusions.⁸⁷
- GDA enables the study of two different strata: the strata of analytical categories and the strata of the events themselves.⁸⁸ Both strata are studied separately, and later divided into subclouds, in order to isolate the properties hidden within the data. To summarize, GDA permits a mapping of the distribution of events in the protest space and an assessment of the influence of SMORG structuring factors onto the same space.

In order for the variables to contribute equally to the variance, all variables are dichotomous.⁸⁹ Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA) was favored over Principal Component Analysis (PCA) due to the fact that MCA handles both nominal and ordinal measurements; and captures both linear and non linear relations.⁹⁰ For the interpretation of the axes, only the categories whose contribution exceeded the average contribution were selected.⁹¹ Throughout this work, the minimum value for a point to be plotted on the graphs was set to a quality of representation (squared correlation) higher than 10%.

II. Organizational subspace:

➤ Geometric data analyses

The organizational subspace is a geometric space composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters, and casualties, the whole stratified by period. The organizational subspace was created through the analysis of SMOs that were sufficiently active to have conducted a minimum of ten protest events during the entire course of the study.⁹² The total number of protest events constituting the organizational subspace amounts to 4'676. The reduction of 20'529 protest events to 4'676 is caused by the fact that some protests were spontaneous and did not imply the participation of SMOs; and that SMO identification was sometimes missing in the sources (ICT database and Palestinian chronology).

85. (Clausen, 1998, p. 1)

86. (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 253)

87. (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 81)

88. (Rouanet, 2006, p. 142), (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 194)

89. The variance is thus equal to one. (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 38)

90. (Nishisato, 2007, p. p71)

91. (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 52)

92. "The less frequent a category, the more it contributes to the overall variance." (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 39) / Empirical tests revealed that SMO with less than ten events should be discarded. All SMO > 10 events: Fat FatHawa FatAbuM FatAbuR FatAwda FatNathir FatSitta FatAnti FatPanth FatSept FatEagle FatForce FatHawk FatHillis FatStud FatTanz AMB Hamas HamESF HamIQB HamStud Hizb PFLP PFLPHaw PFLPRed PIJ Youth Student Amal Prisoner PSF ANidal PLO PRC Kach DFLP FNRL Committee FShia Sicari PFLPGC Keshet PLF Feb9 Kahane

The organizational subspace is analyzed in two phases. In a first phase, the subchapter DYNAMIC THROUGH TIME (p. 103) details the geometric spaces composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters, and casualties; stratified by period. The objective is to reveal the dynamics at work through time. In the second phase, the stratification by period is removed, and periods become an integral part of the newly created space. In this regard, the subchapter SMORG analyses (p. 109) details a geometric space composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters, casualties, and periods. The organizational subspace combines the status of the geometric dependent variable with the objective to define how SMORG scales, added as structuring factors, were scattered within the same space.⁹³ Descriptive and inductive analyses are conducted to support the findings.

III. Tactical subspace:

- Survival analyses: In survival analyses, the outcome of interest is time to an event.⁹⁴

The tactical subspace is a space of interactions between policing actors and SMOs. The tactical subspace describes the impact of external factors (policing variables) and internal factors (SMORG scales) on the hazard rates of protest.

Statistical models may either have predictive or an explanatory results.⁹⁵ Models aiming at prediction have little consideration for model structure, and seek to estimate precise parameters.⁹⁶ The emphases are set on model fit and prediction errors.⁹⁷ Models aiming at explanation focus on identifying key variables and interpretation.⁹⁸ The objective is to gain insights on the relationship between multiple IVs and an outcome. Epidemiologic studies, for example, are typically explanatory; disease causation is always multifactorial and the study explores whether IVs are associated with increased risk of outcomes.⁹⁹

In Chapter 7 Tactical subspace: External factors (p. 117), survival analyses focus on assessing the effects of external factors (policing, momentum and day of the week) on time between protests. An explanatory perspective was favored, as the development of each model implied the screening of the most significant variables from a pool that averaged 70 IVs by period. The model building strategy is exposed in the appendix at SURVIVAL ANALYSES (p. 240); the different phases are briefly summarised in the following lines:

- **Univariable analysis:** Assessment of each IV and recoding if necessary
- **Multivariable selection:** Due to the complexity in the data (ties) and the large amount of IVs, the selection was conducted in three phases: a) Stepwise selection at the 50% significant level (efron). b) Stepwise selection at the 20% significant level (exact marginal likelihood). c) Purposeful selection at the 5% level (exact marginal likelihood). This provided the preliminary main effect models.¹⁰⁰

93. (Rouanet, 2006, p. 142), (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 253) / Structuring factors are supplementary points that have a position but no mass. (Greenacre, 2007, p. 89)

94. (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & May, 2008, p. 2)

95. (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 23)

96. (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 18)

97. (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 18)

98. (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 18)

99. (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 18)

100. (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000, p. 97), (Hosmer et al., 2008, pp. 133-136)

- **Check of linearity assumption:** The scale of continuous variables was checked graphically (graphs of estimated coefficients versus quartile midpoints) and with fractional polynomials. This provided the main effect models.¹⁰¹
- **Check for interactions:** The decision to include interaction terms was based on statistical and practical considerations. This provided the preliminary final models.¹⁰²
- **Assessment of model adequacy:** Tests of proportional hazard assumption were conducted on each IV. Time-varying variables were created when needed. This provided the final model.¹⁰³

In Chapter 8 Tactical subspace: Internal factors (p. 175), survival analyses focus on assessing the effects of internal factors (SMORG scales) on time between protests. Subject knowledge of control variables was limited in the current field of study (effects of policing on tactical deployment). Therefore, the variables composing the final external factor models were considered as control variables for the assessment of SMORG effects on time between protests. The strategy used for assessing the effects of internal factors on time between protests is as follows:

- **Univariable analyses:** Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent) during the entire time span (1982-2011).
- **Univariable analyses by period:** Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest within each period.
- **Multivariable analyses by period:** Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest within each period, taking into account control variables.¹⁰⁴

The aim of these three distinct phases is to progressively refine the analysis to finally create comprehensive models composed by SMORG scales and control variables. These distinct phases were justified by the main obstacle faced during the analysis of internal factors: the insufficient sample size of the SMORG data set for the conduct of multivariable analyses by period and forms of protest.

As mentioned, the whole data set is composed by 60'423 events that contains 20'529 protest events and 39'894 policing events. The whole data set was used for the survival analyses and model developments related to external factors. For the analyses of internal factors, the sample size had to be reduced from 20'529 cases of protest to 2'989 cases, due to the fact that only protests conducted by five SMOs (Fatah - PFLP - PIJ - Hamas - Hizballah), with the definition of their related SMORG scales, could be used. This reduction in sample size created issues of low power and model instability. Therefore, only a few control variables could be added in each multivariable model; this justified in the end the importance of the two first phases in the overall assessment of SMORG effects on time between protests.

101.(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000, p. 97), (Hosmer et al., 2008, pp. 133-136)

102.(Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000, p. 98), (Hosmer et al., 2008, pp. 133-136)

103.(Hosmer et al., 2008, pp. 170-184)

104.The control variables are the external factors found significant for each form of protest by period, analyses conducted at Chapter 7 Tactical subspace: External factors (p. 117).

2.2.6. Qualitative approach

This work argues that the effects of policing on tactical deployment can only be understood through the study of the protest space. It further asserts that SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployment and that SMORG effects on tactics are read through tactical variations in time, space, and substance. Therefore, the quantitative approach, which focused on the analyses of the protest space, is complemented by a qualitative approach related to the analyses of tactical variations in time, space, and substance. The objective of the qualitative approach is to refine the theory and explore causal mechanisms beyond prior exposed correlations.¹⁰⁵ The application of process tracing, as a method, allowed such causal mechanisms to complement the quantitative findings.¹⁰⁶

SMORG scales and ideal types are used for analysis of the same elements. SMORG scales are used for quantitative analyses, while the ideal types SM and ORG are an equivalent to the lower or higher values of SMORG scales, but applied in a qualitative context.¹⁰⁷ The explanatory hypotheses related to SMORG effects on tactical variations in time, space, and substance are developed in Chapter 3: Hypotheses: Time (p. 41) - Hypotheses: Space (p. 50) - Hypotheses: Substance (p. 57). They are later qualitatively assessed in Chapter 9, with the help of interviews conducted in Israel and the West Bank.

Thirty three interviews were conducted for the purposes of this research.. The interviewees belonged to the following categories: Israeli academics and researchers, Israeli policing actors (police and soldiers), Israeli decision makers, Palestinian intellectuals or students, Palestinian academics, and Palestinian people approached in the street. The objective of those interviews was to deepen the understanding of the effects of policing on tactical deployment by transforming prior exposed correlations exposed at the quantitative stage into links of causation. The interview questions were semi-structured and open-ended, in order to explore the causal mechanisms and further detect contextual variables or intervening variables that might have been left out during the statistical analyses stage.¹⁰⁸ To summarize, this process tracing method was focused on revealing the whole uninterrupted chain of evidence, from policing actions to final tactical deployment operated by non-state actors.

The International Institute for Counter-Terrorism provided the platform to meet Israeli academics, policing actors, and decision makers. The Israeli NGO *Breaking the Silence* or *Combatants for Peace*, composed of ex-Israeli soldiers talking about their experience in the OPT, were also of great help. Finally, Palestinian interviewees were approached by personal contacts, either in East Jerusalem or within the West Bank. The main limitations and obstacles encountered during interviews arose from the fact that the conflict was still ongoing. The opinions were polarized into dichotomic readings of events. It was therefore sometimes difficult to move away from the political or ideological discourse, in order to address the core issue of this work (policing, interactions, mobilization, tactical deployment...). Furthermore, the safety of Palestinian interviewees had to be taken into consideration as well as avoiding the exposure of social stigmas among their own community.

105.(George & Benett, 2005, pp. 34,45)

106.(George & Benett, 2005, pp. 170-176, 205-223)

107.For further details, see: Chapter 2 / Research Methods and Procedures / WORKING DEFINITIONS / Tactical Actors (p. 19)

108.(George & Benett, 2005, pp. 21-22)

Chapter 3

Tactical variations

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The research question of this work could be directly answered by conducting statistical analyses in order to assess the effects of policing factors on tactics. Nevertheless, such a procedure would be wrong for two main reasons:

- Failure to handle antecedent conditions
- Failure to reveal hidden mechanisms

SMORG theory handles antecedent conditions by asserting that the protest space has to be decomposed into three different subspaces: The repertoire subspace, the organizational subspace, and the tactical subspace. The tactical, or effects of policing on tactical deployment, is only a part of the whole or, in other words, a subspace within the whole protest space. Therefore, before addressing the tactical subspace, antecedent conditions need first to be taken care of with the analyses of the repertoire and the organizational subspaces, as described in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

SMORG theory also handles hidden mechanisms by asserting that SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployment and that SMORG effects on tactics are read through tactical variations in time, space, and substance. The SMO ideal type leanings of SMs and ORGs highlight divergent tactical deployments. This chapter underlines the tactical variations to be expected by both ideal types in time, space, and substance.

3.1 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN TIME

Koopmans (2004), in his study of protest in time and space, underlines that:

"Instances of political contention are not independent events [...] Contention is highly unequally distributed across time and space, and that much of it is concentrated in intense waves of contention [...]"¹⁰⁹.

The particular dynamic of contention is referred to by social movement theorists as cycles or waves of protest.¹¹⁰ In social movement literature, a wave of protest depicts an expansion of contention across social groups and sectors, as well as borders, and a later contraction when it comes to an end. According to Koopmans, the expansive mechanism of a wave of protest can be explained by a scheme in three phases.¹¹¹ In the first phase, the political opportunity is created either by elites who choose to mobilize popular support, or by the pressure exerted by the people that will expose the weakness of a certain regime. In the second phase, the innovation (new actors, tactics, demands, interpretive frames) is responsible for the emergent and eruptive character of protest waves; and its further diffusion is socially embedded in network links and weak ties such as media. In the third phase, the mobilization produced by the diffusion of this innovation triggers a counter-mobilization of different groups that see their own interests or

109. (Koopmans, 2004, p. 40)

110. The concept of cycles was elaborated by Tarrow and the concept of waves by Koopmans. Both are based on the same foundations except that Koopmans removes the elements of cyclicity. (Tarrow, 1995), (Koopmans, 2004) / The culmination point of victory, in a war context, was developed by Von Clausewitz. (Von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 566)

111. (Koopmans, 2004, pp. 24-28) / Tarrow when speaking of cycles of protest, qualify them of "moment of madness that contribute to the transformation of the repertoire of collective action through the dynamic of larger cycles in which innovation in collective actions are diffused, tested and refined." (Tarrow, 1995, p. 91) / Tarrow does indirectly address resources constraints on the means of action by mentioning their modular aspect which is: "The capacity of a form of collective action to be utilized by a variety of social actors, against a variety of targets, either alone, or in combination with other forms." (Tarrow, 1994, p. 33)

constituency threatened by the innovative movement; and these groups further join and simultaneously adapt their strategies.¹¹² Finally, the contractive mechanisms of a wave of contention relates to conflict mediation and the re-routinization of patterns of interactions within the polity.¹¹³ A wave of contention can be visually represented by the following graph:




Figure 7 SM dynamic through time

The social movement approach is insightful in explaining the logic underlying a wave of protest; however, it misses a few points. First, the temporality between political opportunity and innovation could be very different, and by aggregating both it assumes that they are simultaneous. Second, the actions of a state actor (policing actor) is not considered as a main factor, but is indirectly integrated within the notion of political opportunities. This creates a fuzzy concept composed of various elements impeding a clear analysis of the process.¹¹⁵ Third, a strategic interaction focus would require integration of both state and non-state actors in the model. Fourth, explaining the expansion of a wave of protest by focusing on political opportunities, innovation, countermovements, and leaving aside the flows of forces having a direct effect on the level of contention may create spurious relationships.

This research does not refute the importance of innovation (new actors, tactics, demands, interpretative frames) in the process of mobilization of SM participants. However, the force interaction model presented by this work complements these parameters by addressing the notion of waves of protest in time through the concepts of offense-defense dynamics and sequence management, as detailed in the the next paragraphs.

3.1.1. Strategic level: Offense-Defense dynamics

The main feature of defense is the choice of terrain, while the main characteristic of offense is taking the initiative or the choosing of time.¹¹⁶ A wave of contention is thus a rupture in the es-

112.(Koopmans, 2004, pp. 32-33)

113.(Koopmans, 2004, pp. 36-39)

114.The level of contention axis depicts the number of confrontational and violent forms of protest.

115.Tilly and Tarrow consider that the political opportunity structure includes different regime properties: Independent centres of power, openness to new actors, instability of current political alignments, availability of influential allies or supporters, repression or facilitation done by the regime. (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007, p. 57) / Gamson and Meyer consider political opportunity as embedded in political institutions and culture. (Gamson & Meyer, 1996, pp. 275-290) / Kitschelt sees it as the specific configuration of resources, institutional arrangements, and historical precedents for social mobilization. (Kitschelt, 1986)

116.(Yakovleff, 2006, p. 479) / However, as Jomini highlights, the best type of defense is an active defense coupled with offensive comebacks in order to win the advantages of both systems. (Jomini, 2001, pp.

established order and develops along an offense mode. As Von Clausewitz observed, "Every engagement, large or small, is defensive if we leave the initiative to our opponent."¹¹⁷ Therefore, a SM indirectly seeks to take the initiative and provoke the reaction of state actors or different constituencies. A wave of contention under the offense/defense perspective that integrates time as a variable is demonstrated by the following graphs:




Figure 8 Offense-Defense dynamics

As demonstrated, the dynamics underlying defense and offense are inversely proportional, and if offense has an upper hand in early phases by the taking of the initiative, both forms converge in time passing toward a *culminating point* beyond which the scale turns to the advantage of defense; favoring, in the end, the reactive side which was initially weaker.¹¹⁸ The theory may be visualized as follow:

At time 0, a SM's offensive efficiency is at its maximum.¹¹⁹ The virtual quantity of resource is at its maximum and their cost at a minimum: The participants of a SM are potentially present but are nevertheless concentrated on other tasks linked with their daily occupations. This could be considered as a posture of *Attente stratégique (strategic awaiting)*.¹²⁰ On the other hand, a state actor's defense efficiency is at its minimum which is not 0, because the state security apparatus takes care of its usual missions of public order. As the lower graph highlights, the level of contention at T0 is minimal.¹²¹

129-132)

117.(Von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 358)

118.Offense - Defense dynamics and culminating point of victory are inspired by Von Clausewitz. It was adapted to SM, for the needs of this research. (Von Clausewitz, 1989, pp. 528,566-567)

119.Efficiency is defined by this ratio: Ressources available divided by the cost of their use.

120.Strategic awaiting *Attente stratégique*: Having prepared diverse modes in the use of force, the final choice is subordinated to the realization of certain conditions. (Camon, 1997, p. 77)

121.The level of contention is characterized by the numbers of the three different forms of protest.

At time 1, the offense efficiency of a SM decreases.¹²² Even if the virtual quantity of human resource equals the mobilized quantity, the costs increase rapidly because factors have been re-allocated from their everyday tasks to the operational tasks of the SM. This creates a cost on each member which grows exponentially with time.¹²³ On the other hand, the defense's efficiency increases.¹²⁴ The state security apparatus is simply adjusting in order to better cope with the threat.¹²⁵ Often, this does not necessitate the reallocation of external factors for the needs of security, but a simple adjustment of structures and routines in order to gain efficiency. The efficiency of defense is thus progressively rising. Finally, as the second graph highlights, the resources mobilized by the SM create a rise in the level of contention.

At time 2, the offensive efficiency of a SM keeps decreasing and the state's defensive efficiency keeps rising. Both are now converged at the *culminating point* of contention. Beyond this point, the efficiency of the offense will have its momentum broken and the defense will win the upper hand. The level of contention is therefore at its maximum.

At time 3, the offensive efficiency retains its downward trend. The costs increased so much that the SM factors are being reallocated from their SM activities to their their daily tasks. The defensive efficiency retains its upwards trend and keeps getting stronger. The level of contention decreases.

This strategic interaction perspective provides an alternative to social movement theory. The central point is the decreasing strength of the offense through time due to the diversion and re-allocation of factors and/or their production to the needs of a SM. Paradoxically, the strength of the defense rises by the gains in productivity done through the adjustment of structures and routines of an already dedicated security apparatus whose costs are funded.

An **ORG** disposes of a different dynamic. Research has shown that violent forms of protest that may be present from the very beginning of the wave had a percentage distribution that increased at the end of a wave of protest.¹²⁶ The next figure highlights this point.




Figure 9 ORG dynamic through time

122. For offense, at T1: Ress./Cost could be 1000/1, at T2:1000/10, at T3:1000/100.

123. Of course, gain of productivity could be accomplished by a SM with the adaptation of its structure and routines. However, this would still remain inferior to the costs of reallocation of factors from everyday activities to SM occupations. Therefore, for the clarity of the model, the gain of productivity have not be mentioned for SM offense.

124. On the other hand for defense at T1: Ress./Cost could be at 100/10, at T2: 100/5, at T3: 100/1. In this later case, costs sink due to the gain of productivity won through the adjustments in structures and routines.

125. (Israeli Police Officer 1, 2009), (Israeli Police Commander, 2010),

126. (Tarrow, 1995, p. 99)

While the level of contention decreases and the SM goes back to more institutionalized forms of action, clandestine ORGs resort to more organized and lethal forms of violence.¹²⁷ The explanations provided by the social movement literature is of socio-psychological order, and describes the process of encapsulation portrayed by Della Porta. In such a process, the SM participants go underground and progressively isolate from the outside world.¹²⁸

The force interaction model provides a different explanation: An ORG is a structure with resources permanently allocated for the needs of a struggle. Therefore, an ORG follows the same development as the one followed by the state security apparatus. Contrary to a SM, an ORG can gain in efficiency through the constant adjustment of its structures and routines over time. However, it should be noted that contrary to a state security apparatus, which may rely on a constant uninterrupted flow of resources, an ORG remains highly vulnerable to the alterations of resource availability.¹²⁹

The force interaction model addressed the relation of offense-defense dynamics along time at a strategic level. This model shall now be strengthened by applying the explanation to the operational and tactical levels.

3.1.2. Operational and tactical levels: Sequence management

As the following graph demonstrates, the level of energy deployed along time by a SM is not constant. Indeed, the curve of theoretical power corresponds to the total power delivered by actors and shows a succession of small indentations.¹³⁰

127. As an example, terrorism developed in Italy in the late sixties, at the end of the protest cycle. (Della Porta, 1995a, p. 53) and (Della Porta, 1995b, p. 111)

128. (Della Porta, 1995b, pp. 134-137), (Della Porta, 1995a, pp. 12, 134-135)

129. Leithes and Wolf describe insurgency as a system with a greater emphasis on supply, and the possibility of countering it by raising the costs of inputs or impeding the production processes (transformation of inputs into outputs). (Leithes & Wolf, 1970, pp. 28-45)

130. In a different context, Yakovleff speaks about curve of theoretical power when considering combat waged by different military units. (Yakovleff, 2006, pp. 134-144)




Figure 10 Sequence management

Three dimensions of time are related to the curve of theoretical power: The length of an action, the frequency which considers the time elapsing between two successive efforts, and the sequence which addresses the defined order of a particular set of actions.¹³¹

From a tactical point of view, each indentation on the curve of theoretical power could be viewed as the energy deployed by a group of individuals within a SM. Such a group moves to the offensive and deploys specific tactics; however, the weight of human and material losses, or simply the basic human requirements of rest, will quickly lower its potential. Nevertheless, a lower frequency between two actions provides the time necessary for recovery, and other groups or resources may join during the interval. Therefore, small indentations on the graph depicts the time between two successive efforts, or the frequency. The average growth of the curve depicts an increase in theoretical power provided by the convergence of new resources in the struggle. The decreasing trend of the theoretical power curve after T2 underlines the fact that physical and morale forces are victim of attrition, either through insufficient rest and/or lack of resource reinforcement.

From an operational point of view, the aim would consist in disrupting an opponent's system by the use of synergetic actions, as well as applying maneuver or attritional moves.¹³² To relate this to our example, this would imply focusing on the concentration of resource deployment in time to bring the curve of potential theoretical power to culminate at the chosen time T2, in order to maximize the effects on the state actor. On the other hand, if a dispersion of the force or a strategy of attrition were to be selected, the curve of theoretical power would not imprint one single point of culmination but a multiplication of points at lower levels, in order to hold contention for longer periods.

131.(Leonhard, 1994, pp. 56-106), (Yakovleff, 2006, pp. 134-144)

132.(Naveh, 1997, p. 14)

3.1.3. Discussion

The force interaction model demonstrates that a wave of contention can be successfully explained through time at the three levels of strategy, operations, and tactics.

For a SM, at a strategic level, the curve of contention is imprinted by the offense-defense dynamics. A SM's offensive efficiency decreases over time to meet with the rising efficiency of defense, causing the culmination of contention. At an operational level, a SM does not have the capabilities to carefully plan the concentration or dispersion of the resources in time; except by calling gatherings on a certain day. Therefore, the collective actions deployed by a SM are not the result of decisions taken at an operational level, but mainly the product of networking developed at a tactical level. Finally, at a tactical level, a SM does not master the requirements of sequence management and inflow of resources. Its curve of theoretical power will thus culminate and later fall due to attrition.

For an ORG, the higher percentage of distribution of violent forms of protests toward the end of a wave of protest was noted. At a strategic level, the offense-defense dynamic of an ORG differs from that of a SM. This variation is caused by the permanent allocation of resources that enables it to adjust its structures and routines along time, thus gaining offensive efficiency. At an operational level, an ORG's precise control on its resources allows it to formulate a clear operational strategy that will precisely influence the collective action waged at a tactical level. At this tactical level, a thorough control on sequence management and inflow of resources provides the ORG with the means to keep the attrition factors in check. Therefore, an ORG's ability to retain confrontational and violent forms of protest after a wave of contention is due to the permanent allocation of resources at a strategic level, as well as its operational mastering of the tactical requirements of sequence management and inflow of resources.

3.1.4. Hypotheses: Time

Based on the study of the force interaction model related to tactical variations in time at the three levels of strategy, operations and tactics for both SM and ORG, the following hypotheses are examined.

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: time

H2d Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model.

III. Explanatory hypotheses: time

Strategic level:

H3a SMs non-permanent allocation of factors increases the cost of participation

H3b State and ORGs permanent allocation of factors allows adjustment in routines and procedures

H3c ORGs protest frequency keeps increasing after the culmination phase (highest number of FCv-FCf)

Operational level

H3d SMs lack coordination at an operational level

H3e ORGs develop coordination at an operational level

Tactical level

H3f SMs do not master sequence management and inflow of resources

H3g ORGs master sequence management and inflow of resources

3.2 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SPACE

Tactics and space are indivisible. Tactics are supported by a certain kind of space which favors them. This does not mean that space causes tactics, but that tactics cannot be separated from the space in which they are deployed.¹³³ However, it should be mentioned that it is not so much the diverse locations that account for the variations in the use of tactics, but the flexibility of tactics to deal with the problem at hand in each alternate locations. Therefore, the adaptability of tactics to counter the moves of an opponent within a specific environment is key. For example, during the second Lebanon war in 2006, the firepower of the IDF (Israel Defense Force) was revealed as powerless against a well entrenched Hizballah operating on its own terrain. However, to avoid such shortcomings, terrain which was initially considered to favor defense could have been offensively exploited through the art of maneuver in order to produce initiative, surprise, and the destabilization of the opponent.¹³⁴ Therefore terrain can be seen as one of the most important force multipliers, but strengths and weakness remain a question of deployment of forces in an interactive game between actors.¹³⁵

3.2.1. Physical reality of space

The tridimensionality of an urban environment can be seen through the compartmentalization of space at ground level, the verticality of buildings, and the presence of different types of underground networks.¹³⁶ The architecture of a city is also determined by the functional requirements of its people, the system of construction used as well as their cultural and symbolic aesthetic needs.¹³⁷ By extension, a city disposes of different centers of gravity such as ethnic neighborhoods, economic, religious, or political centers. Therefore, the understanding of socio-cultural structures is of prime importance and it is from routine that the ordinary and the extraordinary develop.¹³⁸ Spatial routines of daily life shape the spatiality of contention.¹³⁹

SM conforms to attrition theory and the principle of mass.¹⁴⁰ The principle of mass states that power must be concentrated at the critical time and place for a decisive purpose.¹⁴¹ The unit of mass usually used is the individual, who remains constant in regard to strength.¹⁴² Therefore, within a SM, the addition and the spatial proximity of individuals creates mass. Participants of a SM intuitively look for density and concentrate their number at the decisive point in space

133. Alexander states that action and space are indivisible and that patterns of events cannot be separated from the space where they occur. (Alexander, 1979, pp. 69-71)

134. Too much reliance on shock and fire and an obvious lack of maneuver were to be blamed for the failure of the whole operation: Wegman Yehuda signals an emphasis on fire and not on maneuver; therefore rapid and deep ground maneuvers were lacking to bring down the collapse. (Wegman, 2007) / See also Segal who mentions the human ability to adapt to incoming fire, which implies that maneuver is necessary and decisive to collapse the ability to adjust. (Segal, 2008) / Kober on the other hand signals the strengthening of fire power relative to maneuver on the battlefield, which causes difficulty to maneuver under saturation fire. In the end, such a process makes it more difficult to translate battlefield decision into political achievements. (Kober, 2001, p. 192)

135. See Handel for terrain as one of the most important force multiplier and Sun-Tzu for the deployment of forces. (Handel, 2000, p. 231), (Sun-Tzu, 1993a, p. 165)

136. (Boulanger, 2006, pp. 254-260)

137. (Krier, 1991, p. 43)

138. (Tilly, 1978, p. 156)

139. (Sewell, 2001, p. 62)

140. For the definition of attrition see Dupuy, that considers it as a "reduction in the number of personnel, weapons, and/or equipment in a military unit, organization, or force." Attrition is thus seen as the difference between losses and return. The number of personnel as well as the number and types of weapons have the greatest influence on battle outcome, according to attrition theory. (Dupuy, 1990)

141. Definition of the US Army, FM 100-5, Operations of Army forces in the field, 1968, in (Alger, 1982, p. 266)

142. Simpkin would also add fighting multipliers that he calls organic weight per man, which is the airlift weight related to physical fighting power. For example, an airborne assault is 1 tonne/man, and a tank division would be 4 tonne/man. Therefore, the physical fighting power = organic weight per man X mass (number of men). (Simpkin, 1985)

and time to either gain a physical or morale ascendancy over the opposite state actor. With physical ascendancy, a shift of relative strength between the number of SM participants and state policing forces is looked for. The mass of a SM is used to seize and hold ground.¹⁴³ Mass will further favor shock over the opponent, to compensate for the SM's lack of mobility and ease the processes of command and control by having all participants united and moving together. In this regard, the command and control requirements, when compared to the one that would be required for the coordination of small and distant units, is far less demanding.¹⁴⁴ With morale ascendancy, mass is used to demonstrate to a state actor or other audiences, the legitimacy of the claim according to the number of participants mobilized.¹⁴⁵

At the level of the occupation of space, a crowd is not made of anonymous people. In fact most people do not converge individually on a location, but in small groups of friends and family.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, the reversal of the fear of being touched belongs to the nature of crowds. Contrary to normal human behavior, individuals in a crowd love density and actively converge to the spot or streets with the highest density of people.¹⁴⁷ A stagnating crowd is closely compressed and the longer it remains stagnant, the higher the state of mounting excitement leading to collective action.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, density in space is a critical factor for the deployment of SM tactics.

Given the fact that density is critical for a SM, spatial coordination leading to the gathering of SM participants is paramount. Spatial coordination can be executed in two different ways; either through explicit or implicit communications. Explicit communication is best exemplified by the distribution of leaflets or more simply by instructions given by word-of-mouth at the place and time of a certain gathering. Implicit communications, on the other hand, is the ability among SM participants to mutually recognize unique signals coordinating the expectations of each other.¹⁴⁹ Tacit signals could be observed during the first intifada when demonstrations or riots were known to begin after the Friday prayer in Jerusalem; at the time where people would exit the mosque.¹⁵⁰ Therefore, explicit communications among SM participants was reinforced by implicit communication and related spatial history of contention.¹⁵¹

Accessibility to the location of protest considers time-distance cost and spatial configuration. Both present opportunities and constraints to participants in public claim making.¹⁵² Time-distance cost reveals the time it takes for an activist to stage protest given the existing communications and transportation infrastructures.¹⁵³ However, an abolition of distance in time has to be noted; indeed, the reality effect replaces the immediate reality with the use of technologies of information and communication.¹⁵⁴ Tactics still remain constrained by opportunity and resource requirements, but the direct application of specific tactics can be instantly demonstrated online to a vast audience that is not physically, but virtually connected to the event. As a consequence, SM participants lacking spatial access to a specific protest zone, still retain the ability to mobilize and replicate the same tactics on their own accessible space. We may thus ob-

143. Simpkin mentions that mass is used to hold ground. (Simpkin, 1985, pp. 19-23)

144. Leonhard, when addressing the issue of mass linked to high intensity warfare, said that mass improves killing power, shock, certainty, compensates for the lack of mobility, favors command and control (C2) as well as morale. (Leonhard, 1998, pp. 96-114)

145. Mass, rallies, petition, marches instill confidence, hope of success, as well as safety resulting from large number. (Oberschall, 1993, pp. 274-275)

146. (McPhail, 1984, p. 91)

147. (Canetti, 1960, pp. 16,29)

148. (Canetti, 1960, pp. 34-39)

149. (Schelling, 1980, p. 53)

150. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

151. After a demonstration, some places can be sacralized as sites of transcendent significance. For example, the Tiananmen square that became a site of political discussion. (Sewell, 2001, p. 65)

152. (Tilly, 2000, p. 138)

153. (Stillerman, 2002, p. p68)

154. (Virilio, 1991, p. 24)

serve a spatial diffusion of mobilization and tactics in multiple hot spots, despite a physical separation between them. During the first intifada, the radio played an important role in the diffusion of protest, especially due to the Israeli censorship of the local Palestinian media and the containment of Palestinian villages through military checkpoints. The radio stations Al-Quds and Voice of the Palestine Liberation Organization diffused messages from the leadership in exile or specific calls to general strikes and forms of protest to be held within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT).¹⁵⁵

A SM will further maximize safety by choosing spatial locations offering protection against state surveillance or repression.¹⁵⁶ The SM will then seek to exploit the nature of terrain, which could be a specific built environment or an ethnic neighborhood insuring cover and support. On the other hand, a SM can also overexpose itself on zones with high media coverage or with symbolic popular resonance. In those spatial settings, the action of a state actor is more difficult and carries with it the potential of rapidly escalating the process of SM mobilization in response to policing actions. It should be noted that the mass of SM participants also offers safety in numbers, as it decreases the individual cost in case of confrontation against the policing actor.¹⁵⁷ In regard to safety and SM spatial deployment, places of riots within the old city of Jerusalem were identical during both intifadas. Riots mainly occurred in front of the Damascus and Herodes gates, due to the fact that these places enabled rioters to easily escape and seek safety in the streets of the old city in the case of police intervention.¹⁵⁸ Furthermore, such a spatial setting was favorable with regard to mobilization, due to the symbolic significance of the moslem holy sites. The few points related to the spatial deployment of a SM shall now be contrasted with those of an ORG.

ORGs conform to maneuver theory. The US army defines maneuver as a principle which the object is "to dispose a force in such a manner as to place the enemy at a relative disadvantage and thus achieve results which would otherwise be more costly in men and materiel."¹⁵⁹ Maneuver can thus be defined as a movement toward an objective in order to dislocate the adversary temporal, spatial, or morale setting.¹⁶⁰ In maneuver theory, the morale ascendancy primes over physical ascendancy, because maneuver targets the mind of the adversary, or its human dimension. Therefore, the key factors are not mass but velocity to effect upon the mind by attacking areas thought to be safe.¹⁶¹ Contrary to a SM which is looking for direct attrition/mass confrontation, an ORG seeks instead to dislocate, or in other words render the enemy's strength irrelevant.¹⁶² Dislocation is the opposite of direct attrition/mass confrontation which would be deadly for an ORG against a state actor. An ORG remedies its quantitative disadvantage by developing a qualitative edge to create three types of dislocations: a) A temporal dislocation, that implies that the moves of an actor have been rendered irrelevant through time. The subchapter TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN TIME (p. 34) demonstrates that an ORG endeavors to control its resources to retain a capability to act on the long term, at the time of its choosing and thus temporally dislocate the counter-moves of a state actor. b) A spatial dislocation implies that an ORG causes the state actor to be at the wrong place. The present suchapter TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SPACE (p. 42) demonstrates that an ORG

155.(Nakjavani Bookmiller & Bookmiller, 1990, p. 98)

156.(Tilly, 2000, p. 144)

157.(Oberschall, 1993, pp. 14-15) In Leninist states, it was observed that an expansion of networks implied a reduction of individual risk incurred during oppositional activities.

158.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

159.Definition of the US Army, FM 100-5, Operations of Army forces in the field, 1962, in (Alger, 1982, p. 263)

160.Leonhard reveals the three means of maneuver warfare which are preemption, dislocation and disruption. (Leonhard, 1991, p. 18) / The author of the present work has adapted this concept to non-state organizations and given the certain limitation of their resources when facing a state actor, only temporal dislocation - spatial dislocation and morale dislocation were retained.

161.(Leonhard, 1991, pp. 38-39)

162.For a precise description of dislocation and its types, see: (Leonhard, 1998, p. 64)

follows the principle of maneuver by avoiding the traditional attrition/mass confrontation undertaken by the SM, to favor instead maneuver. c) A morale dislocation entails that the physical strength of a state actor is rendered irrelevant by the defeat of its will. The following subchapter TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SUBSTANCE (p. 51), demonstrates that an ORG makes up for in intensity what it lacks in number. Tactics deployed by an ORG are highly skilled, planned, and further possess the potential to create high ratios of lethality. The seeking of morale dislocation can be heard through the words of Hizballah's general secretary: "The amount of losses the enemy incurred, and the fear it lived through, created enormous pressure on the Jews in the occupied territories; they, in turn, put a lot of pressure on their own government and forced it to withdraw."¹⁶³

At the level of the occupation of space, for an ORG, unity is more important than density. Therefore, the uncontrollable growth and the process of increasing density leading to SM collective action do not apply. An ORG never loses the sense of its own identity and always regroups in the face of danger or after it.¹⁶⁴ The PLFP strict admission policies of a six month trial period, linked with strong ideological indoctrination for anyone hoping to become a member of their organization, is quite telling on the matter of unity.¹⁶⁵ Rather than concentrating on space, an ORG further seeks the dispersion of its means to avoid having to bear with the firepower of a state actor.¹⁶⁶ A further point linked to the particularities of an ORG occupation of space relates to the fact that an ORG appreciates a base area or a safe haven to plan, train, rest, and marshall equipment. On the other hand, if devoid of a rear base and operating within a urban area, an ORG operates along the principle of maneuver theory in order to increase mobility and avoid detection.¹⁶⁷ In 1982, the entire PLO military apparatus rapidly disintegrated, except in Beirut where they exploited urban terrain to their advantage.¹⁶⁸ The operations carried out by the PLFP during this period fully conformed to the principle of maneuver theory, where the ORG strived to increase mobility in order to avoid detection. The head of the PFLP, George Habash, mentioned: "Tracked, we had to be constantly in movement [...] there was no other solution to avoid the Israeli bombings."¹⁶⁹

Spatial coordination, for an ORG, is well addressed by the concept of friction that represents a state of imperfection.¹⁷⁰ It depicts the accumulation of difficulties impeding a smooth application of one's own sequence of action.¹⁷¹ Friction in an ORG increases exponentially with the rise in the number of its members; the central issue an ORG faces is conciliation of the divergent orientations of its members toward achieving a common goal.¹⁷² The capability of an ORG to handle precise spatial coordination is linked with its capacity to deal with increasing complexity and requires proper administrative staff and dedicated chains of command. The armies of the 17th century needed to keep constantly on the move to stay alive because the administration and the storage systems were not sufficiently developed.

163.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1992c, p. 63)

164.Canetti does not speak about ORG but refers to *crowd of crystals*. Although he does not address the issue of tactics, he addresses the notion of unity - coherence - and identity present in *crowd of crystals*. He also developed the idea of the *pack* making up in intensity what it lacks in number. (Canetti, 1960, pp. 73-74)

165.(Habash, 2008, p. 109)

166.Overall, we have assisted to a progressive dilution of forces on the battlefield, due to the exceptional lethality of weapons and the improvement in the means of communication. (Yakovleff, 2009, p. 10)

167.(Guevara, 1998, pp. 25-29)

168.(Sayigh, 1983, p. 18)

169.(Habash, 2008, p. 170)

170.(Yakovleff, 2006, p. 79)

171.(Von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 119) In fact, friction plainly integrates the normal accident theory which highlights the limitations of high reliability organizations due to causes such as: Ill-defined preferences and conflicting goals at each levels within an organization, unclear technology, linear or complex interactions highlighting the presence of dysfunctions that nobody taught about or the simultaneous interaction of two unexpected dysfunctions, and also the vulnerability of tight coupling relying on time and behaviour dependent processes which invariance could be shattered by the mere presence of sand. (Sagan, 1993, pp. 250-279)

172.(Crozier & Friedberg, 1977, p. 15)

Furthermore, due to the state of exponential friction created by the rise in numbers, the commanders of the time were unable to concentrate more than 15'000 men in space.¹⁷³ To come back to the subject of this research, the organizational structure of the Hizballah military arm in Lebanon, called *Islamic Resistance*, is a semi-military structure with a chain of command moving from the Jihad council to regional commanders and sector commanders to team leaders in the field. Besides this highly centralized hierarchical structure, Hizballah possesses flexible specialized units trained to accomplish specific operations. For example, the unit who infiltrated Israel in 2006 to ambush and kidnap two Israeli soldiers.¹⁷⁴ To conclude, within a SM, the issue of spatial coordination is lessened by mass that is a defined entity; united and moving together. Paradoxically, an ORG that operates along the principle of maneuver needs to develop elaborate spatial coordination processes first to handle the complexity brought in by the rise in numbers and second by the fact that members do not act in shoulder tight proximity while carrying out operations. Therefore, one of the main strengths of Hizballah lies in its spatial coordination capabilities that add the power of sequential effects to the one of maneuver.

The accessibility of the protest location for an ORG also considers time-distance cost and spatial configuration. Nevertheless, due to a higher state of planning and resources, the existing communication and transportation infrastructure will not be as relevant as in the case of a SM. An ORG may plan and conduct the access to a target independently, or obtain the support of another ORG or criminal networks such as smugglers.¹⁷⁵ Hizballah regularly used fake passports to allow the infiltration of its operatives from Europe or Egypt into Israel.¹⁷⁶ Furthermore, Israeli civilians, both Jewish and Arab, also used criminal networks to infiltrate the border between Israel and Lebanon and contact their Hizballah handlers. The ORG was effectively using the drug smuggling network to move its cadres across the border, transfer intelligence material related to IDF military installations, and dispatch arms and ammunition.¹⁷⁷ Therefore, despite the security measures deployed by a state actor, the ORG procedures to reach its objective are much more elaborate, insidious, and spatially difficult to detect.

The last point of safety is insured by enhancing community security to avoid the disclosure of the ORG member's identities.¹⁷⁸ Most of the ORGs operating in Palestine have been known to execute suspected collaborators or, in other words, Palestinians cooperating with Israel. In leaflet 26, published in September 1988, the United National Command of the Uprising (UNC), which was the overarching command of the first intifada linked with Fatah, urged actions against collaborators.¹⁷⁹ Another example relates to Hizballah, as its general secretary stated:

"More important elements than mere technical details have led to the success of the Islamic Resistance, and the most important of them all is loyalty. This serious intent is the culmination of disciplined behavior, such as maintaining confidentiality and secrecy, which makes it impossible for the enemy to infiltrate the resistance. When a group of resistance fighters enters an enemy location, the local inhabitants do not feel their presence; neither do the army or other resistance groups. They do their job quietly and in secret, and the success of their operations is commensurate with the secrecy of their movements. Our

173.(Van Creveld, 1977, pp. 9-17)

174.(Hamzeh, 2004, pp. 70-72)

175.Hizballah relies on drug dealer to provide intelligence on targets within Israel. (Israel Security Agency, 2006, pp. 34-35) / Hizballah is known to have facilitated the crossing of the Lebanese-Israeli border to Palestinian infiltrators which later conducted an attack that killed 5 civilians and 1 IDF soldiers within Israel in 2002. (Karmon, 2005, pp. 2-3)

176.(IICC, 2009c), (IICC, 2003a)

177.(IICC, 2004a)

178.(Ney, 1961, pp. 26-27)

179.(Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 39)

fighters go in and out [...] and the enemy never has prior knowledge of their movements."¹⁸⁰

An ORG can further maximize safety by developing an intelligence wing and enhancing community security by punishing collaborators.¹⁸¹ Additionally, the interaction between movement, strike, and protection must be emphasized.¹⁸² An ORG that wants to maximize protection or safety will entrench itself in its own terrain, like Hamas currently demonstrates since it gained power in the Gaza Strip. Its military arm, al-Qassam, has developed a permanent military infrastructure composed by concrete outposts and launch sites for artillery and tunnels.¹⁸³ Nevertheless, such a defensive posture exerts a great cost on its striking and movement capabilities. In the case of an ORG operating in an offensive mode and further obeying to maneuver theory, strike and movement become its two main poles, while the third that relates to protection remains implicit as the operations conducted by PFLP or PIJ demonstrate. In this regard, during the strike and move sequences, safety is insured by the temporal and spatial dislocation of the adversary countermeasures.

3.2.2. Represented reality of space

Terrain dictates the possibility of approach, visibility, and cover for a given contingent.¹⁸⁴ The preceding paragraphs emphasized the physical reality of space. However, terrain is not only a given factor, but also a human representation of space which has, in turn, a direct influence on its subsequent use at the level of tactics.¹⁸⁵ The represented reality of space can be divided into two categories: the first being a striated representation of space, and the second a smooth representation of space.

In a striated represented space, movement is modeled to terrain.¹⁸⁶ The influence of terrain on the approach is binary as terrain dictates concentration versus dispersion. Like water, physical forces are channelled through the relief which provides the advantage of concentration, but at the same time impedes deployment and maneuver. In such a setting, a small contingent could easily contain a larger one which would be channelled and thus constrained.¹⁸⁷ The flows of SM participants converging toward a point in space, or of an ORG moving within the streets of cities are typical examples of approaches being constrained by terrain. The influence of terrain on visibility is also noteworthy, as it provides space for the exposition of forces in an open space and favors the morale force of a SM.¹⁸⁸ At the same time, an ORG may exploit the influence of terrain on visibility to hide and execute surprise ambushes. Both exploitation of terrain and visibility are thus paradoxical. A SM following attrition theory will seek to exploit the influence of terrain on visibility to create morale dislocation by exposing its participants. At the same time, an ORG following maneuver theory will exploit the influence of terrain on visibility to create spatial dislocation. The examples of SM demonstrations in the old city of Jerusalem, as well as the ambushes conducted by ORGs in Gaza are quite telling on the matter.

The influence of terrain on cover dictates the SM and ORG effectiveness of shock and fire. It might be less relevant for a SM which relies on mass for cover, but highly important for an

180.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1999, p. 201)

181.At least two dozens suspected collaborators were shot dead by Hamas during *Operation Cast Lead* and other shot in the knees. (Amnesty International, 2009)

182.(Fuller, 1926, pp. 83, 256, 335), (Leonhard, 1994, p. 21), (Simpkin, 1985, p. 74)

183.(IICC, 2010a)

184.(Von Clausewitz, 1989, p. 348)

185.Deleuze and Guattari pointed out the concepts of smooth and striated space. (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004)

186.This has been the traditional representation through centuries, as Sun Tzu mentions: "Water configures its flow in accord with the terrain." (Sun-Tzu, 1993a, p. 168)

187.Wu-tzu mentions narrow defile, passes, confined roads where a numerous opponent can be countered by a few. (Wu-tzu, 1993, pp. 220-221) Work written around 440 B.C.

188.In fact, terrain gives birth to measurement and measurement produces the estimation of forces. (Sun-tzu, 1993b, p. 340)

ORG which seeks protection from the firepower of a state actor. We shall now demonstrate how actors can enact the spatial environment rather than being constrained by it.

In a smooth represented space, terrain is modeled to maneuver. This is an inverse geometry where the conditions of approach, visibility, and cover are transformed by tactics. In an urban setting, approach is not restricted by physical structures because ORG members modify the physical structures and social spatial patterns to suit their tactical needs. Luttwack, in his work on strategy, used the concept of paradoxical logic of strategy mentioning that every action is opposed by the opponent's reaction. From such a perspective, a counter-intuitive action can be good precisely due to the fact that it is not expected.¹⁸⁹ In such a paradoxical logic and adherence to a smooth represented space concept, common social spatial patterns such as walking through streets, alleys, or doors is avoided in order to deceive an opponent and take him by surprise. For example, in the case of urban combat, holes may be opened through the physical structure such as housing walls, in order to favor the fluid movements of individuals from house to house and thus smooth the space of tactical deployment. Additionally, visibility is reduced to a minimum by having individuals remaining exclusively within buildings. Cover is brought to a maximum by the development of combat within those housing complexes.¹⁹⁰ Therefore, in a striated representation of space, the actors act within a represented reality of the space, which adheres to the nature of physical structures and social spatial patterns. In a smooth representation of space, ORG members following the paradoxical logic of strategy do not obey to the traditional representation of space because they adapt the physical structures and counter spatial social patterns to fit their tactical needs.

To summarize and attribute these few observations to the focus of this research, a SM operates within a striated represented space. SMs follow the main avenues and visibility is favored by gathering on large public places with cover provided by the mass of its participants. Therefore, SM's political and confrontational forms of protest are waged in open striated representation of space. On the other hand, an ORG can either move through a striated represented space or a smooth representation of space. If the ORG is constrained by the striated space that it cannot physically alter, it will decrease visibility and increase cover by moving through the larger crowd of SM members. If the ORG operates along a smooth representation of space, terrain will be modeled to its maneuver and tactics. This was precisely demonstrated in Jenin, where Palestinian ORGs opened breaches through walls, established pathways, and had snipers shooting from deep inside buildings with the use of openings cut through several layers of walls. These ORGs demonstrated their ability to operate in a smooth representation of space by completely remodeling the space to their maneuver and tactics.¹⁹¹

3.2.3. Discussion

This subchapter related to tactical variations in space underlined that tactics should be first studied according to the physical reality of space in which they are deployed. Both SMs and ORGs demonstrated paradoxical variations in the occupation of space, spatial coordination, accessibility, and safety. The following table highlights the main points:

189. Deception seeks to submerge the opponent with misleading signals. (Luttwak, 1987, p. 6) / Sun Tzu mentions that the engagement begins with the orthodox, and victory is gained through the unorthodox. (Sun-Tzu, 1993a, p. 165)

190. (Weizman, 2007, pp. 185-214)

191. (Weizman, 2007, pp. 201-205)

Physical reality of space		SM	ORG
		<i>Attrition theory</i> <i>Principle of mass</i>	<i>Maneuver theory</i> <i>Principle of maneuver</i>
	Occupation of space	Density	Unity primes over density
	Spatial coordination	No formal organizational structure	Formal organizational structure
	Accessibility	Constrained by time-distance cost and spatial configuration	Less constrained by these factors, due to planning and resources
	Safety	Use of terrain for protection Mass and high media coverage as safety nets	In a defensive mode, use of terrain for protection In an offensive mode, strike and move becomes paramount, while protection becomes implicit Community security by the targeting of collaborators

Table 3 Physical reality of space: Comparison table SM - ORG

However, as previously stated, the physical reality of space is not an end in itself. Physical structures are intrinsically linked with the social patterns of behavior of a given society. Therefore, the physical reality of space should be completed by the notion of represented reality of space that incorporates both the physical structure and the social patterns of behavior. In a striated represented space, maneuver is modeled to terrain. This is typically the case for a SM. However, an ORG obeying to the paradoxical logic of strategy may either operate in a striated represented space and adapt its own parameters of visibility and cover, as the following table highlights, or operate in a smooth represented space by modeling terrain to its maneuver and tactics.

Represented reality of space		SM	ORG
	Represented space	Striated	Smooth / Striated
	Approach	Maneuver is modeled to terrain	Terrain is modelled to maneuver
	Visibility	Exposition of forces in open space for morale dislocation	Visibility is reduced to a minimum for spatial dislocation
	Cover	Reliance on mass	Reliance on maneuver

Table 4 Represented reality of space: Comparison table SM - ORG

This subchapter described the characteristics of tactical deployments in space for both SMs and ORGs. The main points emphasizes that SMs conform to attrition theory while ORGs conform to maneuver theory.

3.2.4. Hypotheses: Space

Based on the study of tactical variation in space for both SM and ORG, the following hypotheses are supported.

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: space

H2e Tactical variations in space imply that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory.

IV. Explanatory hypotheses: space

Occupation of space

H4a SM density means higher probability of escalation in protest

H4b ORGs favor unity over density

Spatial coordination

H4d SM mobilization occurs in the same places, thus with little need of organizational structure

H4e ORGs require an elaborate organizational structure for the waging of attacks with tight spatial coordination and sequential effects

Accessibility

H4f SM gatherings are conditioned by time-distance cost

H4g SMs replicate similar tactics in other locations if access is restricted to the protest zone

H4h ORGs retain capabilities to wage protest, despite policing tightening in spatial control

Safety

H4i SMs use terrain, masses, and media as safety nets

H4j ORGs either establish a safe haven, or strike and move when operating on unfavorable ground

3.3 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SUBSTANCE

The tactical deployment of both SMs and ORGs also vary in their substance. Both ideal types rely on respective cultural/morale, organizational, and human/material resources.¹⁹² If the three categories of resources are similar for both ideal types, they are exploited differently by each and thus alter the substance of tactics.

3.3.1. Social movement

Cultural/Morale Resources: The cultural resources for a SM are to be found at the level of societal culture, frames, and ideology. Culture is an acquired knowledge that people use to interpret experience and generate social behavior.¹⁹³ Frames can be defined as specific accentuating devices applied in a particular discourse; for example the qualification of *Zionism*. Ideology is a whole coherent set of integrated principles. As the case of *Islamism* demonstrates, Islam can perfectly be used as an ideology to interpret the reading of current state of affairs.¹⁹⁴ Therefore, cultural resources like societal culture, frames, and ideology influence how SM participants identify the goals and support certain means of action that are morally acceptable. The cult of martyrdom present in the Palestinian society during the second intifada is a good example of cultural resources supporting the choice of specific means of action.¹⁹⁵ Everything from social clubs, to funeral marches, streets, and graffiti were named after martyrs.¹⁹⁶

Legitimacy, as a morale resource, widens the appeal of a movement. It improves its survival by developing its potential resource base.¹⁹⁷ Legitimacy may also justify the logic of direct action and attract recruits.¹⁹⁸ SM morale resources were demonstrated at the start of the first intifada: A traffic accident between an Israeli and Palestinian vehicle occurred on December 8, 1987; killing four Palestinians. Those four deaths were seen as non-innocent. Consequently, during the funerals at Jabalya, roads were blocked by Palestinians who threw stones at Israeli security forces who then replied with live ammunition, killing Hatem Abu Sisi, a 12 year old Palestinian. He was considered by many to be the first martyr of the intifada. This event sparked unrest that spread to other refugee camps and finally reached the city of Jerusalem two weeks later. A violent demonstration of 5'000 people took place on December 19, 1987.¹⁹⁹ The perceived legitimacy of a cause helped to fuel the mobilization and subsequent collective actions of heterogeneous SM participants.²⁰⁰ Fame is another morale resource that may also favor the participation of a diversity of actors in the movement.²⁰¹ The fame of a single word such as intifada implies strong symbols with deep historical meanings for Palestinians.

192. The five different types of social movement resources have been cited in: (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004, pp. 125-129) Their content has been altered for the needs of this research. / Cress and Snow mention four categories which are morale, material, informational and human. (Cress & Snow, 1996, pp. 1094-1095) In this research, informational resource are integrated within the organizational, human/material resources categories.

193. (Hodgetts et al., 1991, p. 94)

194. Islamism denotes the political use of religion. (Laurens, 2002, p. 9)

195. Della Porta states the importance of culture for the support of individual costs. (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 67) / Concerning martyrdom operations, Hafez mentions the importance of societal support and Mia Bloom states martyrs as the highest form of honour in the Palestinian society. (Hafez, 2006, pp. 6-8, 53), (Bloom, 2005, p. 30)

196. (Allen, 2008, pp. 462-467), (IICC, 2010b)

197. (Minkoff, 1993) / Zald and Garner mention that SMs lose members because of the discredit of organizational tactics employed in the pursuit of a goal. A SM may then search for new tactics or fall into quiescence. (Zald & Garner, 1987, p. 131)

198. (Lang & Engel Lang, 1973, p. 108)

199. (Bregman, 2002, pp. 179-193)

200. It could also be called a triggering event in an already unstable situation because Bregman states that the year 1986-87 demonstrated a 133% rise in violent demonstration, compared to previous years. Nevertheless, triggering event or not, the perceived legitimacy of a cause does provide morale resources to a SM.

201. (McAdam, 1982, p. 47)

Organizational resources: The structure of a SM is segmentary (composed of diverse individual and groups), polycentric (containing multiple and often temporary leaders), and reticular (presence of multiple non-hierarchical social linkages among participants).²⁰² A SM is characterized by a strong collective identity and a dense informal social network. This is crucial for an individual's involvement in collective action and the sustainment of activities over time.²⁰³ The linkages between participants of a SM are provided by personal relationships, traveling evangelists who carry information across the networks from group to group, large gathering such as conventions where people learn to know each other, as well as through media and communication technologies.²⁰⁴ The coordination apparatus is provided by informal networks that create opportunities for action with the circulation of information and provide social pressure or strong emotional feelings for the participating individuals.²⁰⁵ The first intifada was characterized by the loose commitments of its participants: Heterogeneous participants were acting within an implicit general framework that suggested the necessity to maintain an ongoing rate of protests against Israel. As a consequence, some local initiatives and capabilities did not necessarily reflect specific policies but were in fact local impulses given by a broad commitment to the general call for resistance.²⁰⁶ The coordination apparatus was thus provided by the connection of SM participants through informal networks.

Human/material resources: A distinction needs to be made between high versus low liquidity resources. High liquidity resources are ready for an immediate use, while low liquidity resources require their prior mobilization.²⁰⁷ In reality, a SM possesses low liquidity resources, and is thus weak on permanent personnel, money, property, equipment, and supply capabilities. Most of a SM's power comes from the fact that a spark can activate participants over whom subsequent control is limited.²⁰⁸ The snowball effect at the start of the first intifada is quite telling on this matter, with SM mobilization and protest igniting one refugee camp after another to finally reach Jerusalem a few weeks later. In addition, given the SM low liquidity resources, the process of mobilization remains of central importance in order to provide it with the human and material means required for collective actions. The human and material resources of a SM are thus mobilized through: a) The individual participation of members. b) Pre-existing relationships among SM supporters.²⁰⁹ c) The social appropriation of public sites for mobilization in order to overcome organizational deficit.²¹⁰ d) The reliance on public goods such as information technology or transportation systems.²¹¹ e) The reconversion of an estab-

202.(Gerlach, 2001, pp. 290-299)

203.(Della Porta & Diani, 2006, pp. 20,21) / Pre-existing relationships among supporters make the SM mobilization more likely and less costly in regard to human and material resources. (McCarthy, 1987, p. 55) / For the mapping of movement types of network, see: (Diani, 2003a, pp. 306-312) / For the socialization and decision shaping function of a network, see: (Passy, 2003, pp. 23-25)

204.(Gerlach, 2001, pp. 296-297) / On a broader scale, a countercultural network could also appear, based on the common cultural orientation of the people and their design of an alternative way of life. (Kriesi, 1988, p. 41)

205.(Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 116), (Diani, 2003b, pp. 7-9) / In a riot, the prior existence of groups is the nuclei of troubles from which other incidents develop. As the riots spread, the importance of leaders of small groups who act in concert increase: These groups seize opportunity, do not have a preconceived plan and keep the riots going. Even leaders without followers can be found, leading as long as they occupy the centre of the stage (first to commit a certain act or to be arrested...). (Lang & Engel Lang, 1973, pp. 99-100)

206.(Figchel, 2009b)

207.(Gamson, 1968, p. 95)

208.(Tarrow, 1994, p. 23) / Micromobilization link the *Political Factors* in the emergence of a SM with the *Individual Decisions* to participate (cognitive liberation, value expectancy). Three micromobilization contexts can be cited: the organization affiliations, the individual activists interpersonal contacts, and the subcultural world of the movement. Whatever macro factors underlie collective action (political opportunities, grievances, repression...), it is the microdynamic of mobilization and recruitment that produces and sustains a SM. (McAdam, 1988, pp. 127-143)

209.For the decreasing cost in human and material resources for the mobilization of a SM due to the importance of pre-existing relations among members of a SM, see: (McCarthy, 1987, p. 55)

210.(McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, pp. 43,44)

211.McCarthy mentions that a lack of social infrastructure meant a heavier reliance upon technologies to aggregate human and material resources. His example focused on the *Pro-Choice* SM. (McCarthy, 1987, p.

lished networked structure for a SM's own needs; such as the use of Islamic religious networks and structures as it occurred in the OPT.²¹² Mosques were often used for emotion laden sermons, and the muezzin's loud speakers were utilized to mobilize the SM.²¹³

Finally, a SM is inclusive and demands relatively little from its participants. For that reason, at an individual level, multiple memberships to other movements is common.²¹⁴ The SM's knowledge management is thus limited to previous experience, expertise, and skills brought voluntarily by heterogeneous participants from different backgrounds. The joint operations carried out during the second intifada were sometimes initiated at the operator level: By joint cells assembled on the spot and composed of heterogeneous individuals bringing their own capabilities to carry out a spontaneous collective action. Every participant in the SM would bring his or her own knowledge. This could occur without their respective organization's approval.²¹⁵ Such an example perfectly highlights the SM participant diversity and the loose knowledge management characteristics of a SM.

3.3.2. Organization

If the label of resources (*cultural/morale, organizational, and human/material*) for both SMs and ORGs are identical, their respective content is paradoxical.

Cultural/Morale resources: The cultural resources for an ORG are linked with organizational culture, defined by Hodgetts in his work on culture and behavior, as "shared values and beliefs that enable members to understand their roles and the norms of the organization."²¹⁶ The vectors of control of an ORG over its members rely on the establishment of both rules and organizational culture.²¹⁷ The stronger the dominance and coherence of organizational culture, the less need for rules such as policy manuals, organization charts, and detailed procedure.²¹⁸ People behave accordingly to a set of core organizational values, which insure the convergence of autonomous actions towards the goals set by the leadership. The organizational culture of Hamas is deeply impregnated by religion, and represents what could be expected of an organization stemming from the Muslim Brotherhood. A strongly ideologically rooted organizational culture helps to prevent disharmony among its in-groups and members.²¹⁹

Overall, three sources of organizational culture can be identified.²²⁰

- The beliefs, values, and assumptions of the founders of the organization: For example, Sheikh Yassin who stated that women were a tactical advantage for suicide bombing operations.²²¹
- The learning experience of group members as the organization evolves, exemplified by the return in 1992 of Hamas and PIJ deportees from Lebanon that favored the import of suicide bombing tactics in the OPT.²²²

50)

212. The reconversion of an established networked structure was cited by: (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a, pp. 70-74) / Group mobilization could also be mentioned, which means relying on pre-existing non-movement local groups that have heavy connections with adherents, as was the case with the KKK in the United States. (McCarthy & Zald, 1977, p. 1227) / The Qur'anic discussion groups of women in Yemen (Nadwas) provided an ideal micromobilization context for Islamists. (Clark, 2004, p. 170)

213. (Fighel, 2004)

214. (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b, pp. 164,165) / For minimum levels of initial commitment in inclusive SM, see: (Zald & Garner, 1987, p. 125)

215. (Fighel, 2009b)

216. (Hodgetts et al., 1991, p. 154)

217. (Clivaz, 2008)

218. (Peters & Waterman JR, 2004, p. 75)

219. (Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. 159) and (Hroub, 2006, p. 119)

220. (Schein, 1997, p. 211)

221. (Chehab, 2008, p. 89)

222. The deportation was key to the development of relationships with Hizballah and the subsequent import of its

- The new values and assumptions brought in by new members, for example the harder line followed by Hamas's outside leadership constituted by young educated technocrats.²²³

Concerning the organizational culture dynamic of change, the longer a specific solution works, the deeper it becomes embedded in the organizational culture.²²⁴ Organizational culture is thus central for an ORG as it creates efficient vector of control over its members and provides the cognitive resources necessary for the deployment of specific tactics.

The legitimacy of tactics are assessed along the organizational culture, which supplants societal culture and its inherent repertoire of collective action. From an ideal type perspective, this implies that tactics deployed by an ORG have the potential to be in full contradiction with the repertoire of collective action of a given society. In such a case, the legitimacy of tactics for an ORG is evaluated according to its adherence to the ORG's particular organizational culture. The PIJ was among the first ORGs to wage suicide bombing attacks in 1994.²²⁵ PIJ operators followed the organizational culture that considers armed struggle as a divine obligation that has to be effectuated immediately. Their initial choice was therefore not affected by the Palestinian societal culture at a time where it did not support martyrdom operations against civilians.²²⁶ The fame of an ORG favors its recruitment process and is another morale resource. Given the fact that the ORG's offer of limited membership is generally lower than the demand to join, the price of admission within an exclusive organization is much higher than within a SM. Therefore, a complete devolution of people to a cause or to the organizational culture dominates, and the price a member is ready to pay in term of psychological and physical integrity during the deployment of tactics is much higher.²²⁷ The importance of fame for an ORG can be exemplified by the development of suicide bombing tactics. It was first used by PIJ and Hamas to disrupt the Oslo peace process and pressure Israel. It later became a factor of distinction for Palestinian organizations using it. The fame of these ORGs grew with the use of this tactic, and this growing fame translated into a strong morale resource; maximizing the ORG's domestic support.²²⁸

Organizational resources: An interaction apparatus helps an ORG to maintain fluid interactions as answers to a disruptive environment. Internally this interaction apparatus balances between centralization and autonomy. Externally it considers the use of networks as well as the externalization of non-fundamental competences.²²⁹ The structures of an ORG are manifold: It could be a *functional structure* if the ORG has divided its labour to regroup it into main activities and had vertically integrated them, a *divisional structure* if the ORG has segmented its division along geographic areas with each division retaining all the necessary resources and functions to operate independently, a *matrix structure* if the ORG combines both functional and divisional attributes, and finally a *process based structure* if multidisciplinary temporary teams have been constituted for the time period of a mission.²³⁰ Hizballah is composed of a Shura Council of nine members with a general secretary Hassan Nasrallah. The next level

tactics. (Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. 64)

223.(Mishal, 2006) and (Mishal & Sela, 2006, pp. 166,167)

224.However, if organizational culture brings stability, it is not static by itself as crises constantly force its re-evaluation. (Kotter & Heskett, 1992, pp. 6-7)

225.(Hoffman, 2006, p. 150)

226.For PIJ divine obligation, see: (Ganor, 1993) / According to a poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in March 1996, suicide bombing was supported during the Oslo agreement period by only 21% of the Palestinian society in 1996, while it increased to 74.5% in 2003. (Hafez, 2006, p. 19)

227.For groups as psychological weapons, see: (Grossman & Christensen, 2004, pp. 207-208) / For the role of social learning in a military organization, see: (Grossman, 1995, pp. 317-319)

228.Mia Bloom describes the Hamas-PIJ competition and the bandwagoning of other groups such as AMB. (Bloom, 2005, pp. 29,30)

229.(Johnson et al., 2008, pp. 16-17,515-526,529,537-546)

230.(Cummings & Worley, 2008, pp. 316-334)

down in the structure is composed of five specialized councils which are, the jihad, executive, political, political advisors, and the judiciary councils.²³¹ Hizballah further disposes of a military arm within Lebanon with regional and sector commanders. Outside of Lebanon its structure consists of cells disseminated at the international level who answer directly to the Jihad council.²³² 51 Palestinian cells in Gaza and West Bank were affiliated with Hizballah in 2004.²³³ This example demonstrates that an ORG such as Hizballah may ally different types of functional, divisional, matrix, and process base structures simultaneously. For that reason, studying the structure of an ORG is only helpful as a way to infer its coordination apparatus or, in other words, its chain of command. In the case of Hizballah, the unitary single leadership of the Shura Council directs both the political arm and the military arm of Hizballah; its decisions are final and religiously binding.²³⁴ To conclude, the more sophisticated the organizational structure and its coordination apparatus, the more the strategic considerations will supplant the expressive considerations over the use of specific tactics.²³⁵

Human/material resources: The high liquidity resources at disposal of an ORG are noteworthy given the fact that resources are internalized. An ORG possesses permanent personnel, money, property, equipment, and supplies. In such a setting, the competitive advantage of an ORG lies on the efficient exploitation of its resources and the selection of tactics in regard to the relative cost of their implementation.²³⁶ The ORGs based in the OPT have been able to conduct horizontal and vertical divisions of labor by specializing their human assets. Within Hamas, highly skilled people are set at a regional level. The engineer is thus part of a hub manufacturing explosive devices that are later given to the cells. The same holds for PIJ where skilled individuals manufacture TATP explosives that are later distributed to field units.²³⁷

Single membership is prevalent because an ORG treats human resources as a zero-sum game.²³⁸ The competition between Hamas and Fatah caused the execution of so called collaborators by both ORGs, while in many cases they were in fact targeting each other.²³⁹ A good example is the take-over by Hamas of the last Fatah stronghold in the Gaza Strip in June 2007. This includes the execution of a prominent military commander of the Fatah military wing Al Aqsa Martyr Brigades, Samih al-Madhoun, by the Hamas military wing Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades. As demonstrated, an ORG requires dedicated commitment from its members and is exclusive.²⁴⁰

An ORG's knowledge management system is much more unified and professional than a SM. An ORG selects its members and develops its labor force with value added components such as experience, skills, expertise, and leadership. For example, Hamas training camps in Gaza serve to develop the indoctrination of radical Islamic ideology and to inculcate different types of fighting skills.²⁴¹ To summarize, tactics used by an ORG rest on higher human proficiency and stronger material capabilities. Tactics are planned, more lethal, and given the internaliza-

231.(Azani, 2006, pp. 5,6)

232.(Hamzeh, 2004, p. 70), (Azani, 2009b)

233.(Israel Security Agency, 2007, p. 20)

234.(Azani, 2006, pp. 5,6), (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 45)

235.This is to distinguish from expressive violence that could be demonstrated by a SM which may not be in touch with the positive or negative associated effects of specific tactics or strategy on the long term. An ORG does share a sense of responsibility. (Turner, 1973, p. 154)

236.For efficiency and exploitation of resources, see: (Barney & Clark, 2007, pp. 49-51)

237.(Figheh, 2009a)

238.(Zald & McCarthy, 1987b, pp. 164,165)

239.(Mishal & Sela, 2006) / A good example is the take-over of the Gaza Strip by Hamas with the execution of a prominent military commander of the AMB named Samih al-Madhoun, by Hamas military wing al-Qassam Brigades. (Baliani, 2007)

240.Because new recruits are subjected to a noviciate period and to the discipline of the ORG. (Zald & Garner, 1987, p. 125)

241.(IICC, 2008e)

tion of human and material assets. They are not subjected to a lengthy phase of prior resource mobilization. In such a setting, collective action requires less exogenous stimulus.²⁴²

3.3.3. Discussion

The previous paragraphs highlighted the difference in resources to expect for both ideal types of SM and ORG. The following table briefly summarizes the changes in resources at disposal of both ideal types:

<i>Resources</i>	<i>SM</i>	<i>ORG</i>
<i>Cultural/Morale</i>	<p>Societal culture</p> <p>Legitimacy: assessed along societal culture</p> <p>Fame: of a word / person / SM. Favors the SM process of mobilization leading to collective action</p>	<p>Organizational culture</p> <p>Legitimacy: assessed along organizational culture</p> <p>Fame: of a word / person / ORG. Favors domestic support for an ORG which wages its own collective actions and do not need social mobilization phases to carry them out.</p>
<i>Organizational</i>	<p>Structure: segmentary, polycentric, reticular</p> <p>Coordination apparatus: informal networks, media...</p>	<p>Structure: functional, divisional, matrix, process based</p> <p>Coordination apparatus: horizontal and vertical division of labor, chain of command</p>
<i>Human/Material</i>	<p>Low liquidity resources</p> <p>Multiple memberships: inclusive, low commitment</p> <p>Knowledge management: brought in by heterogeneous participants</p>	<p>High liquidity resources</p> <p>Single membership: exclusive, high commitment</p> <p>Knowledge management: development of members' added value components (training, skills improvement...)</p>

Table 5 Resources: Comparison table SM - ORG

The tactical variations in substance to be expected are strongly conditioned by the resources at the disposal of both ideal types. The resources available to a SM indicate that the nature of SM tactics is in tune with societal culture and is founded on the legitimacy and fame of a revolutionary call. Tactics emanate from a networked structure as well as informal processes of coordination, and are limited to the knowledge voluntarily brought in by multiple membership participants. The tactical deployment in nature of a SM thus corresponds to mass participation, street violence, and riots. This leads to a bottom up process of collective action being carried out on the spot by loosely connected heterogeneous actors. As a consequence, tactics deployed by SMs are low skill and spontaneous, lowering the ratios of lethality efficiency.

On the other hand, the resources at the disposal of an ORG indicate that the nature of ORG tactics are inclined to be in tune with the organizational culture rather than the societal culture. An ORG possess a clear chain of command with horizontal and vertical divisions of labor. It is a very well designed entity optimized for an efficient handling and allocation of the resources to the tasks at hand. The tactical deployments in substance for an ORG refer to assassination, suicide bombing, hijacking, armed assault with firearms or heavier weapons such as mortars. Overall, the tactics could be summarized by all types of collective action necessitating a precise handling of resources and a strong personnel involvement. As a consequence, tactics deployed by an ORG are highly skilled, planned, and further possess the potential to create high ratios of lethality efficiency. Their attacks appear like precise pinpoint operations.

242. Boudreau mentions that: "When activists could draw on stronger organizational resources, protest required less exogenous stimulus." (Boudreau, 2004, p. 242)

3.3.4. Hypotheses: Substance

Based on the study of tactical variation in substance for both SM and ORG, the following hypotheses are supported.

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: substance

H2f Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs.

V. Explanatory hypotheses: substance

Cultural-Morale resources

H5a SMs follow societal culture: tactics are socially legitimate

H5b ORGs follow organizational culture: tactics are innovative and socially not legitimate

Organizational resources

H5c SM tactics are spontaneous, made of local impulses

H5d ORG tactics are strategic and coordinated

Human-Material resources

H5e SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality

H5f ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality

H5g SMs have multiple membership participants

H5h ORGs have single membership members

The impact of policing on tactical deployment is strongly conditioned by the nature of non-state actors. This chapter underlined the tactical variations to be expected by both ideal types SM and ORG in time, space, and substance. The test of explanatory hypotheses will be qualitatively handled in Chapter 9.

The following chapters will:

- Describe the SMs and ORGs operating in the OPT (Chapter 4).
- Precisely assess the protest space in the OPT, through the study of the repertoire, the organizational and the tactical subspaces (Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7, Chapter 8).

Once the effects of policing on tactical deployment are highlighted by the study of the protest space, Chapter 9 will focus on testing the prime explanatory hypothesis *H2b SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployment* with the explanatory hypotheses cited in the present chapter.

Chapter 4

SMO profiles

Following the theoretical chapter of this work that mentioned the tactical variations to be expected by both ideal types SMs and ORGs (whose explanatory hypotheses will be later tested in Chapter 9), this chapter will focus on describing the development of SMs and ORGs in the OPT.

The first subchapter addresses the issue of various SM creation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The second subchapter details the characteristics of the overarching commands of the first and second intifada. It provides an operational perspective on the commands coordinating and impulsing the forms of protest to be waged on the ground. The third subchapter focuses on the tactical level, or in other words, on SMOs operating on the ground. Fatah, PFLP, PIJ, Hamas, and Hizballah are described. A quantitative approach follows and attributes SMORG scale values by period to each of them. The scale values assigned will be relevant for the quantitative analyses of the protest space (organizational subspace and tactical subspace: internal factors), conducted in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8.

4.1 PALESTINIAN SM CREATION

Daoud Kuttab rightly perceived the premises of the cause of the first intifada in an editorial published in May 1987. He asserted that Palestinians had lost hope for salvation coming from the Arab world and that the choice for Palestinians had become a strictly Palestinian choice. He added that young Palestinians aged under thirty made up more than 70% of the OPT population and were developing their own political opinion, independently of their parents and community leaders. They were conceiving a much more radical approach than the older Palestinians or PLO leadership.²⁴³ The first intifada started a few months later, in December 1987, and the extent of the Palestinian mobilization was unprecedented. Spatially, it reached over all the West Bank and the Gaza Strip from the biggest cities to the smallest villages or refugees camps. Temporally, the popular mobilization process lasted for years, and structurally, it brought all the different social classes of the Palestinian society together. So the question that could be asked at this point, even before addressing the issue of tactics, is what could enable such a comprehensive mobilization process?

A SM implies the presence of a social conflict, of actors sharing a collective sense of identity and the presence of networks facilitating the exchange of practical or symbolic resources.²⁴⁴ Networks play a mediating role in regard to connecting SM participants to opportunities of mobilization.²⁴⁵ At the beginning of the 1980s, the traditional Palestinian notables close to Jordan, Fatah, and indirectly supported by Israel, were lacking legitimacy among their own people in the OPT.²⁴⁶ Adding to the occupation-related issues, such as prohibition of Palestinian political activities, socio-economic problems were also rampant.²⁴⁷ The absence of state services created space for the development of alternative forms of institutions.²⁴⁸ The development of informal networks among people provided simple, practical answers to their daily life difficulties. Later, a distinct political perspective was added; which progressively transformed the original practical networks into politically motivated networks reaching deep into Palestinian

243. (Kuttab, 1987, p. 178)

244. (Diani, 2003a, pp. 301-304)

245. (Passy, 2003, pp. 24-25)

246. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991, p. 12)

247. Political activities were forbidden since 1967, due to the Israeli occupation and the rule by military decrees. (Gordon, Gordon, & Shriteh, 2008, p. 4)

248. (Rigby, 1991, p. 6)

society. The reconversion of the practical networks into political networks provided the backbone of the Palestinian SMs.

Medical relief committees were a response to the lack of proper health care in the OPT. The infant mortality per 1'000 during the period 1967-1987 reached 70% within the OPT, while only 55% in Jordan and 14% in Israel.²⁴⁹ Similarly, the number of doctors per 10'000 inhabitants amounted to 7 in the OPT, with higher rates of 22 in Jordan and 28 in Israel.²⁵⁰ In this regard, the *Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees* was created in 1979 in order to bring health care to rural areas.²⁵¹ Other committees were later founded, such as the *Popular Committees for Health Services* in 1981, that had members working on a part time basis.²⁵² 13 permanent clinics were established and affiliated with PFLP.²⁵³ In 1984, the *Health Service Committees* were created and affiliated with Fatah.²⁵⁴ In 1985, the *Union of Health Care Committees* was founded and affiliated with the Democratic Front of Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).²⁵⁵ Each health committee providing medical services was finally affiliated with a specific SMO from which it obtained funding. Therefore, if such networks were initially created to respond directly to the specific needs of the population, they developed a political agenda, over time, to demonstrate the prestige and the ability of their sponsor organizations in regard to providing welfare to the same population.²⁵⁶ The practical networks had thus been reconverted into political networks.

Agricultural committees were a response to the problems faced by Palestinian farmers with restrictions on the use of water, loss of labor, and lack of credit. Palestinians also felt that their markets were being flooded by foreign goods, had limited land availability, and that farmers lacked sufficient education.²⁵⁷ In 1984, a few Palestinian agricultural engineers created the *Palestinian Agricultural Committees*. It was later composed of 60 volunteers that offered technical advice to Palestinian farmers.²⁵⁸ Over time, the politicization of this practical network developed, causing a political split which resulted in a faction linked with the Communist Party to break away; the other factions remaining with the DFLP and Fatah.²⁵⁹ During the first intifada, the hidden leadership, labelled *United National Command of the Uprising (UNC)*, was calling in its communiqués for both self-sufficiency and the development of popular committees.²⁶⁰ The *Palestinian Agricultural Committees* supported those calls and helped to create a multitude of town, village, and camp level agricultural popular committees.²⁶¹

Professional societies: The evolutionary process of the medical society in Gaza is another example of a practical network reconverted into a political network; facilitating a SM mobilization in Gaza. In 1974, the salaries of the Gazan doctors went down. The doctors went on strike and succeeded in obtaining Israeli concessions in regard to salaries.²⁶² In 1981, some doctors founded a society, the *Gazan Medical Society*, when none of the 120 doctors with high education could find a job in the Gaza Strip.²⁶³ In addition to the defense of the professional rights of its members, this society was also a center for sport activities where members would

249.(Robinson, 1993, p. 302)

250.(Robinson, 1993, p. 302)

251.(Robinson, 1993, p. 304)

252.(Robinson, 1993, p. 305)

253.(Robinson, 1993, p. 306)

254.(Robinson, 1993, p. 308)

255.(Robinson, 1993, pp. 306-307)

256.(Robinson, 1993, pp. 302-311)

257.(Robinson, 1993, pp. 311-312)

258.(Robinson, 1993, p. 313)

259.(Robinson, 1993, p. 313)

260.(Robinson, 1993, p. 314)

261.(Robinson, 1993, pp. 314-315)

262.(Zahar, 2008, pp. 108-109)

263.(Zahar, 2008, pp. 110-111)

meet and bring friends from other professional associations.²⁶⁴ A change occurred in 1982, when the Israeli military authorities wanted to impose a value added tax. The *Medical Society* organized a strike of 21 days with all the pharmacists in Gaza joining them.²⁶⁵ During this process, a meeting with the leaders of ten other professional associations in Gaza was held and a general strike called in for the next Saturday. This general strike was a complete success in regard to participation.²⁶⁶ The strike was not an end in itself, as demonstrations and heavy rioting against the Israeli occupation accompanied the strike.²⁶⁷

This example demonstrates the process of a SM's emergence, and also clearly highlights different phases in the mobilization process. In the first phase, people with the same professional occupation joined together to express professional grievances or develop sport activities. In the second phase, a political reconversion was carried out and narrow professional grievances were transformed into a dynamic of political grievances, that moved from one professional organization to the other. In the third phase, a general strike was declared, and the population at large became involved either directly or indirectly. In the fourth phase, on the established day, the SM participants mobilized in mass and an overarching politicization process of *resistance to the occupation* took the lead and ended up with a conglomerate of heterogeneous actors clashing against the Israeli Authority.

Youth networks: The *Shabiba* is a youth organization founded in 1980 with a long term goal to end the Israeli occupation.²⁶⁸ At the start, a few cells were created and covered the Gaza Strip and the West Bank areas. The principle was that those cells would organize and create new cells that would each, in turn, multiply through the creation of additional cells. To accomplish this, each cell divided its own geographic area into smaller parts and thus steadily extended the depth of the *Shabiba* networks in all cities, refugee camps, villages, and neighborhoods.²⁶⁹ The *Shabiba* network succeeded in covering the depth of the whole OPT.²⁷⁰ The *Shabiba's* short term goal was to demonstrate to their Palestinian fellows that people had the power to change things if they worked together.²⁷¹ To accomplish this, the *Shabiba* organized groups to help farmers during harvest periods, clean up allies, and help build houses. All the work was voluntary, and thousands of young men and women became involved in the daily network activities of the *Shabiba*.²⁷² Step by step, distinct political views developed and the *Shabiba* became closer to the political views of the PLO. Once the *Shabiba* leadership felt that they had enough cells to plan a mass demonstration, they acted by calling a demonstration in Jerusalem in December 1983.²⁷³ The mobilization process was a complete success for the *Shabiba* network and brought thousands of youths parading and clashing with the border police in the streets of Jerusalem.²⁷⁴ Following this practical demonstration of their own mobilization potential, the *Shabiba* formally affiliated with the PLO.²⁷⁵

Student networks: High schools and universities are convenient mobilization opportunities due to the natural networking among students and the situational awareness that develops within those institutions. In the seventies, Abu Daqa was 15 years old and still in high school when

264.(Zahar, 2008, pp. 110-111)

265.(Zahar, 2008, p. 111)

266.(Zahar, 2008, p. 113)

267.Zahar Mahmoud became later one of the three members committee at the head of the Islamic University in Gaza, as well as a member of the Hamas steering committee. (Zahar, 2008, p. 113)

268.In arabic, Shabiba means young men from 16 to 35 years old. (Mansour, 2008, p. 66)

269.(Abu Khousa, 2008, p. 53)

270.(Abu Khousa, 2008, pp. 56-60)

271.(Abu Khousa, 2008, p. 53)

272.(Abu Khousa, 2008, p. 53)

273.(Abu Khousa, 2008, pp. 54-55)

274.(Abu Khousa, 2008, pp. 54-55)

275.Abu Khousa Tawfik, one of the four founders of the *Shabiba*. (Abu Khousa, 2008, p. 55)

she started to organize student demonstrations with the help of leaflets and graffiti.²⁷⁶ These students were not affiliated with any political organization at the time, but were already mobilizing their fellow students for either spontaneous demonstrations after a triggering event, or for planned demonstrations on specific dates.²⁷⁷ In 1977, leaflets were written by other high school students condemning the occupation. These leaflets, carbon copied and distributed in every classroom, could easily inform and quickly mobilize more than 1'700 Palestinian high school students.²⁷⁸ This growing mobilization followed the constant development of educational institutions since 1967. A decade later, the number of universities had risen from zero to seven in the West Bank. The student population in the OPT grew rapidly and reached 10'000 by the mid-eighties.²⁷⁹ Eleven months before the outbreak of the intifada, Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin stated that universities had become the primary center of unrest in the West Bank.²⁸⁰ When news of checkpoint incidents or detention circulated, a spontaneous rally could begin on campus and later spill out into the streets in the form of open demonstrations mobilizing thousands of students. In response, the Israeli military authority preventively closed the educational institutions during times with heightened tension.²⁸¹

Islamist welfare/religious network: The Islamist welfare and religious network that developed within the OPT arose from the Moslem Brotherhood Islamist network, founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hasan al-Banna. It focused on the struggle against the enemies of Islam. Due to strong setbacks endured with the development of nationalist/socialist ideologies during the course of the 20th century, and the severe physical repression that some Arab states deployed against them, the Moslem Brothers were forced, over the years, to adjust their strategy from direct confrontation to more peaceful means. In the Gaza Strip, two welfare societies affiliated with the Moslem Brotherhood developed during the seventies. The *Islamic Charitable League (al-Mujamma al-Islami)*, founded in 1973 by Sheikh Yasin, provided health care, education, and women's literacy courses. In regard to welfare support, it collected the zakat (donations) and later redistributed it to the needy.²⁸² The second society was the *Islamic Society*, founded in 1976 by Khalil al-Qoqa, which provided clinics, religious instructions, and assistance to poor families.²⁸³ Within the OPT, the influence of the Moslem Brotherhood network grew steadily with time. Their influence covered most of the mosques within the Gaza Strip, and the Moslem Brothers controlled the administration and the student council of the Islamic University, where they obtained 80% of the votes.²⁸⁴ Therefore, the Moslem Brotherhood, advertised as a welfare and religious network, was becoming increasingly politicized and starting to directly challenge the traditional political leadership within the OPT. In 1982, they took advantage of the PLO defeat in Lebanon and affirmed themselves as a credible alternative to the traditional PLO.²⁸⁵ Consequently, the politicization of the Moslem Brotherhood network at the start of the intifada constrained the leadership to adopt a more militant stance in response to the Palestinian popular feelings, thus calling for direct action against Israel. They finally succumbed to the pressure of young militants and created a separate organization called Hamas that would shield them from direct Israeli reprisals. The organization Hamas later overshadowed the social movement which created it by developing its own ideological and political stance.²⁸⁶

276.(Abu Daqa, 2008, pp. 32-33)

277.(Abu Daqa, 2008, pp. 32-33)

278.(Abu Khouza, 2008, p. 50)

279.(Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 3-4)

280.(Johnson, 1987, p. 135)

281.(Johnson, 1987, pp. 135-137)

282.(Lesch, 1990, p. 9)

283.(Lesch, 1990, p. 9)

284.However, it should be mentioned that they still remained weak in the West Bank, where the mosques and the universities remained out of their reach. For example, they only obtained 40% of the votes during university council elections in the West Bank. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991, p. 13)

285.(Ghazali, 1988, pp. 176-178)

286.(Mishal & Sela, 2006, pp. 36,37)

4.1.1. Discussion

These various cases demonstrate the dynamics at work in the Palestinian society that favored the creation of social movements. Practical, professional, student, and religious networks were reconverted into political networks. Linked with social conflict and actors sharing a sense of collective identity, those political networks formed the backbone of comprehensive SMs. A focus shall now be devoted to the overarching commands of the first intifada.

4.2 OPERATIONAL LEVEL

4.2.1. Overarching commands of the first intifada

The two overarching commands of the intifada were the UNC linked to the PLO nationalist current and Hamas linked to the islamist movement. Together, they had the capacity to mobilize masses throughout the OPT. The main means of communication between those commands and the masses were the publication of communiques or, in other words, leaflets that were widely distributed within the OPT. They called on people to undertake a specific form of protest on a specific date. No coordination developed between both commands during the initial years of the intifada, as their ideological divergences kept them on separate tracks. However, after some time, both decided to collaborate, for example on the fixation of specific dates for strikes in their respective communiques.²⁸⁷ An analysis of both commands is quite complex and this chapter presents a study of their communiques published during the first year of the intifada.²⁸⁸

During the first four weeks of the intifada, every PLO organization acted independently. After one month, the idea of a centralized command for the PLO membership organizations was introduced.²⁸⁹ The Labady brothers, Mohammed and Majid, created the UNC in Jerusalem and their first communique was published on the 8th of January 1988.²⁹⁰ In regard to size, the UNC was comprised of a single representative from each of the four main nationalist organizations (Fatah - PFLP - DFLP - Communists). These organizations still maintained their own leadership structure, members, and leaflet distribution network.²⁹¹ The UNC acted at an operational level by planning the different forms of protest to be adopted during the first intifada.²⁹² Due to the multiple arrests of the UNC leadership by the Israeli Authorities, a rotation system was developed in order to insure continuity in the publication of communiques.²⁹³ Overall, the UNC was an integral part of the PLO structure that operated at the three different levels of strategy, operations, and tactics. At a strategic level, Arafat and the PLO leadership in exile focused on the advancement of the Palestinian cause in the international arena.²⁹⁴ At an operational level, the UNC was responsible for the planning of protests within the OPT. Finally, at a tactical level, the PLO membership organizations directed the masses during demonstrations and conducted collective actions according to the prescription given by the UNC communiques.

287. (Mosab Hassan, 2010, p. 33)

288. The corpus of the communiques includes leaflets published during the period from Dec. 1987 to Dec. 1988.

The UNC published 47 communiques while Hamas 33. The collection and the translation of the original communiques from arabic to french was made by Legrain & Chenard. For the original communiques and their french translation, see: (Legrain & Chenard, 1991)

289. The main PLO organizations are: Fatah, PFLP, DFLP, Communist party.

290. (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1990, pp. 108-113), (Legrain & Chenard, 1991, p. 22)

291. (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 26-27)

292. (Rigby, 1991)

293. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991, p. 26)

294. After the third leaflet, a compromise was made between the internal and the external leadership of the PLO based in Tunis, along which the external leadership retained a certain control on the internal leadership, despite the absolute operational freedom of action of the internal leadership in regard to leading the intifada within the OPT. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991, pp. 17-20)

The second overarching command of the first intifada was Hamas, an organization formally created as the "powerful arms of the Moslem Brothers".²⁹⁵ The acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, HMS, was formally used by Sheikh Yassin at the beginning of 1988, a short time after the establishment of the UNC.²⁹⁶ If Hamas is compared to the previous PLO structure operating at three levels of strategy, operations, and tactics, Hamas operated simultaneously on all three levels. At the strategic level, Hamas did not possess a politburo abroad and the leadership was based in the Gaza Strip. At an operational level, Hamas was very active by printing communiques which were widely distributed within the OPT. At a tactical level, the Hamas SMO ORG leaning was still under-developed due to its recent founding and Hamas' inability to possess a tight control on the actions of its members. Further details are given in the later subchapters that addresses those characteristics at a tactical level. For now, the present analysis will concentrate on the operational level with the study of communiques published by both commands.

UNC - Hamas Communiques

The UNC and Hamas published respectively 47 and 33 communiques during the period from Dec. 1987 to Dec. 1988. In order to have a uniform base of comparison, the relative proportions are mentioned. The effective numbers can be found in the appendixes COMMUNIQUES (p. 238).

In the 47 communiques published by the UNC during the first year of the intifada, the UNC formally acknowledged the legitimacy of the external leadership in 96% of them; by mentioning the PLO as the sole legitimate and unique representative of the Palestinian people.²⁹⁷ What is striking and of interest for this work are the repeated calls of the UNC for the structuration of the resistance. In 72% of its communiques, the UNC enjoined Palestinians to create further popular committees and shock brigades. On the other hand, Hamas followed a different trend. It did not have the same references and was not explicitly referring to the structuration of the resistance apparatus or calling specific groups into action. (See table 6)

Table 6 Communiques: Structuration

Structuration	UNC	HAMAS
Reference to PLO	96%	0%
Structuration	72%	0%

The UNC was directly calling specific groups of the population to act and protest. As highlighted in the following table, the popular committees and shock brigades were the main arms of this operational command during the first intifada. On the other hand, the islamic current led by Hamas was different. The study of their respective communiques reveals the following results:

295. Communiqué HMS 04, in (Legrain & Chenard, 1991) / "The Islamic Resistance Movement is the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine [...] They have raised the banner of Jihad in the face of oppressors [...]" (Hamas, 1988) Articles 1 and 3.

296. (Schiff & Ya'ari, 1990, p. 222)

297. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991)

Table 7 Communiques: Calls to act

Calls to act	UNC	HAMAS
Popular committees	81%	0%
Shock brigades	60%	0%
Store owners	40%	9%
Workers	40%	3%
Students	28%	6%
Bus/Taxi drivers	6%	0%

The variations in the above table clearly highlight that UNC and Hamas had different ways of mobilizing the Palestinian masses during the first intifada. The creation and the use of popular committees was for example mentioned in 81% of the UNC communiques. As the following tables demonstrates, this analysis shall be complemented by a focus on the strategic objectives and the repertoire of collective actions of both operational commands.

Table 8 Communiques: Strategic objectives

Strategic objectives	UNC	HAMAS
Reference to strategic objectives (independence...)	89%	9%
National independence for a Palestinian state	83%	6%
Reference to the international community or politics	81%	30%
Right of return	43%	0%
Counter the politic of illiteracy	40%	30%
Self reliance (not on arab states)	21%	15%
End of Israeli repression	17%	3%
Free election in municipalities	11%	0%
Liberation of prisoners	9%	3%
End of corruption	0%	3%
End of settlements	6%	3%

The UNC's main objective, in line with the PLO, was the creation of a Palestinian state. To attain such an objective, the PLO was relying heavily on the international community. This can be observed by the vast international-related references made in their communiques. This may have been important in regard to tactics because awareness and reliance on the international community required the UNC to define, at an operational level, a repertoire of collective actions that could be accepted by the same international audience. The strategic objectives of Hamas are very different. A study of their charter highlights first that Hamas do not compromise:

"[...] the land of Palestine has been an Islamic Waqf throughout the generations and until the Day of Resurrection, no one can renounce it or part of it, or abandon it [...] the so-called peaceful solutions, and the international conferences to resolve the Palestinian problem, are all contrary to the beliefs of the Islamic Resistance Movement."²⁹⁸

In line with their absolutist ideology, it is natural that nationalist references, elections or concerns over the right of return remained absent from their communiques. It should also be noted that both SMOs are similar to each other when referring to countering the politic of illiteracy

298. Articles 11 and 13 of the Hamas Charter. (Hamas, 1988)

resulting from the closure of the schools and universities by the Israeli Authority. Jewish settlement notices also provide an interesting point, because despite the fact that settlements increased during the years preceding the intifada, they were by far not the main rhetorical focus in the processes of mobilization used by both commands.²⁹⁹

To complement the strategic objectives, a general analysis of the discourse used in the communiqués is also insightful. The following table highlights the related particularities :

Table 9 Communiqués: Discourse

Discourse	UNC	HAMAS
Appeal to the masses (people)	96%	9%
Victory discourse	89%	9%
Appeal to popular unity or cohesion	74%	45%
Victimization	2%	67%
Reference to martyrs	94%	85%
Reference to history	17%	79%
Reference to Islam	4%	97%
Coran extract	4%	97%
Appeal to moslem	2%	100%
Religious obligation or incitation to fight	2%	64%
Specific call to Jihad	2%	58%

When considering the discourse used by both SMOs, three divergences are striking: First, the UNC used an encouragement type of discourse to mobilize masses and constantly recalled the daily achievements made on the path of resistance. Conversely, Hamas conformed to an approach of victimization by precisely detailing each of the daily sufferings and humiliations endured by the Palestinians. The strategic intent of such a victimization discourse can be interpreted through a sentence of Sheikh Yassin: "When all doors are closed in the face of man, he will discover that God's doors are open to him."³⁰⁰ Therefore, a victimization discourse may have contributed to the islamization of the Palestinian society and thus also served the interests of Hamas. The second divergence lies in the fact that, contrary to the UNC that directly called on the Palestinian people or masses, Hamas focuses its calls on moslems; mentioning their historical and religious roots. Third, the religious obligation to fight was absent from UNC leaflets while it was mentioned in most of the communiqués published by Hamas. The religious incitation to fight present in Hamas' communiqués is not surprising given the fact that it is found at the core of the SMO as stated in its charter: "[...] waging Jihad against the enemy [...] this becomes an individual duty binding every Muslim man and woman [...] In order to face the usurpation of Palestine by the Jews, we have no escape from raising the banner of Jihad."³⁰¹

However, both operational commands converged on the need for social unity on the path of resistance and both called for popular cohesion instead of antagonism. Furthermore, both referred to martyrs in almost all their communiqués; with one difference being that the UNC used the concept of martyr without any religious note attached to it, by simply equating martyrs to national heroes who died or were wounded in combat.

299. For the increase in settlements during the period 1967-1977, see: (Lesch, 1977, p. 32)

300. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, in: (Ghazali, 1988, p. 179)

301. Articles 12 and 15 of the Hamas charter. (Hamas, 1988)

The importance of communiques can not be underestimated with both commands having the capability to mobilize the whole Palestinian society. As one interviewed Palestinian intellectual states:

"The first intifada was the result of a spontaneous explosion of popular anger coordinated on the long term by an hidden leadership. Every night, leaflets were distributed and we would find them the following day in the streets. The UNC communiques dictated the actions of resistance to undertake. They were scrupulously followed by the whole Palestinian population. Everyone would go into the streets on the specified day, and act according to the written instructions. That was the first time that Palestinians had a real leadership. If the leaflets said to throw stones after school, every student would do it. Everybody, really every Palestinian, obeyed to the instructions published by this hidden leadership than no one knew."³⁰²

This quote, and the extensive work conducted by Legrain & Chenard on the communiques of the first intifada, precisely demonstrate that the population was highly responsive to the instructions.³⁰³ Both commands had the potential to determine the repertoire of collective action of the Palestinian society at large and thus orient the Palestinian masses toward conventional, confrontational, or violent forms of protest. The study of each form of protest with their professed means of action reveals the following results:

Table 10 Communiques: Conventional forms of protest

Conventional forms of protest	UNC	HAMAS
Non-violent collective action	89%	79%
Strike	85%	55%
Demonstrations or mass sit-in	79%	15%
Boycott	64%	18%
End of payment of taxes or TVA	62%	3%
Self-reliance (for food or industry)	55%	18%
Martyr symbolic visit of tombs / Day of solidarity to support their families / Name streets with their names	51%	21%
Appeal to attend mosques on Friday or churches on Sunday	51%	15%
Appeals to functionaries to end their work in the administration or police	51%	0%
Appeals to the dissolution of municipal / village councils	51%	0%
Display flags	47%	21%
Civil disobedience	34%	0%
Stop production in Israel factories	32%	0%
Stop driving and circulation	19%	9%
Disrespect curfews by going out in masses	15%	0%
Symbolic burials	11%	0%
Graffiti	9%	6%

The previous and the next tables highlight that the calls for protests published in the communiques were mainly directed by both commands toward conventional forms of protest. Both called for non-violent collective actions, and striking was their main means of action when related to conventional forms of protest. The UNC was conscious of the need to keep the mobi-

302.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

303.(Legrain & Chenard, 1991)

lization alive on a longer term perspective. The UNC command was then planning the rhythm of protest by selecting the days on which the protests were to occur; and was also precisely detailing the forms of protest and the specific means of action that had to be used on specific days in their communiques. It kept the popular mobilization alive over long period of time by both restricting the days as well as the means of actions to be used. In this regard, the UNC demonstrated a clear concern over the issue of sequence management previously mentioned in Chapter 3 (p. 38). The further advantage of such a multidimensional approach to protest (conventional - confrontational - violent) was a net gain in regard to shocking the Israeli Authorities that had to deploy their resources on a much wider spectrum in order to counter those three different forms of protest being used simultaneously.

Hamas, by comparison, was not issuing specific instructions when related to the means of action. However, this does not mean that Hamas was absent, but instead that Hamas had a whole different approach to mobilization and confrontation. Hamas concentrated on the use of the Islamist networks and focused on general calls to Jihad. The temporal perspective of both commands are simply opposite. Hamas, through the words of Sheikh Yassin, implied that the more the people suffered, the more they would turn toward god.³⁰⁴ Therefore, Hamas was planning for a long term approach focusing on the re-islamization of the Palestinian society at large and the ultimate destruction of Israel.³⁰⁵ On the other hand, the UNC planned for a shorter temporal perspective by adopting a rational approach to mobilization and confrontation. It published detailed protest communiques while keeping in mind the ultimate objective to lead negotiations at an international level. The next table highlights the communiques content at the level of confrontational and violent forms of protest:

Table 11 Communiques: Confrontational / Violent forms of protest

Confrontational / Violent forms of protest	UNC	HAMAS
Appeal to the intensification of the struggle	89%	73%
Appeal to violent collective action	74%	61%
Appeal to combat or confrontation (means of action undefined)	66%	58%
Instill terror	0%	6%
Stones	72%	18%
Molotov cocktails	62%	3%
Barricades or road blocks	13%	0%
Arson (tire burning)	11%	0%
Knife	6%	6%
Iron bar	2%	0%
Gun	2%	0%

The UNC was much more active at the levels of calls for the intensification of the struggle, violent collective action, and combat. However, it is interesting to note that despite the high rhetoric used on the matter, the weapons prescribed for such a clash remained limited in the communiques to stones and molotov cocktails. Only one communique mentioned briefly the use of firearms, and this was simply a statement asserting Lebanon as a different theater of operations where guns were used. However, the UNC did not call Palestinians to use firearms. Instead, the focus remained on conventional and confrontational forms of protest such as riots and the creation of popular committees.³⁰⁶ Therefore, guns were not an issue for the Palestinian

304. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, in: (Ghazali, 1988, p. 179)

305. (Hamas, 1988, pp. 4-5)

306. CNU06A, 03.02.1988. (Legrain & Chenard, 1991)

population at large. The weapons that had to be used on the front line of the first intifada were to be stones and molotov cocktails.

Similarly, Hamas focused on general calls for Jihad and intensification of the struggle, but in a less drastic way. Despite a few instructions regarding specific means of action, Hamas still recognized stones as the main confrontational means of action of the first intifada. Another interesting point is the issue of instilling terror published in three of Hamas' communiqués. As matter of fact, *Strike fear in the hearts of the enemy* is a Qur'anic injunction. This duty begins at the preparation of Jihad and extends into the campaign itself.³⁰⁷

As mentioned, the calls and instructions published by both commands in their communiqués were not empty talks. First, they were freely followed by the population at large, as previously mentioned. Second, some pressure could sometimes be applied on specific categories of the Palestinian working class. For example, Palestinian merchants who refused to conform to the strike directives, could be directly threatened and harmed by the shock brigades of the UNC who were responsible for the implementation of the published directives.³⁰⁸ Third, Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the Israeli Authority could also be threatened or killed.³⁰⁹ The following table compare those issues for both commands:

Table 12 Communiqués: Enforcement

Enforcement	UNC	HAMAS
Threat of arms if no conformity to the calls (store owners...)	62%	15%
Threat to collaborators	21%	0%

The PLO operated on three different levels. The strategic level was left to the leadership in exile, while the operational level was determined by the UNC overarching command of the intifada. At a tactical level, the PLO nationalist organizations (Fatah - PFLP - DFLP - Communists) had a large freedom of action. On the other hand, Hamas was simultaneously active at the three levels of strategy, operations, and tactics. Before detailing the particularities of the SMO operating at a tactical level, the operational level of analysis of the first intifada shall be complemented by a focus on the overarching command of the second intifada.

4.2.2. Overarching command of the second intifada

The second intifada started at the end of the year 2000. Israel had redirected the peace process on a different path: Between the signature of the Oslo agreements in September 1993 and the time of the second uprising, settlements in the West Bank only had increased from 115'000 settlers in 1993 to approximately 200'000 in 2000.³¹⁰ The total number of settlers for the whole OPT and the Golan heights translated from 277'000 in 1993 to 381'181 in 2000.³¹¹

The PA was facing a dilemma whose main points are the following:

- Its authority was fragmented into non-contiguous enclaves with a strict control of Palestinian movement exerted by the Israeli Authority.³¹²
- The PA, led by Fatah, was increasingly being torn apart by internal pressures opposing the traditional PLO leadership anciently based in Tunis, represented by

307.(Bar, 2010)

308.(Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, pp. 37-38), (Peretz, 1990, p. 90)

309.(Peretz, 1990, p. 91)

310.(Graham, 2003, p. 22)

311.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

312.(Rabbani, 2001, p. 75)

Yasser Arafat, and the first intifada *inside* leadership represented by Fatah Tanzim and Marwan Barghouti.

- Tanzim leaders criticized corruption within the PA and took the lead of the conventional and confrontational forms of protest against Israel settlement policies during the years following the Oslo agreements. Tanzim leaders were also opposing the PA arrests of islamists and Fatah activists on the charge of terrorism activities.³¹³
- The internal pressure within the PA culminated with the Palestinian death toll that occurred during the 29-30 September 2000 riots and after the visit of Ariel Sharon on Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount).

To summarize, the PA was pressured by two opposite forces. The internal force was composed by the Palestinian grass roots activists asking for direct action. The external force arised from the law and order responsibilities that the PA contracted with the international community in the framework of the Oslo agreements.

The PA solved this dilemma by authorizing the Tanzim to create a coordinating body, or an overarching command, called National and Islamic Higher Committee for the follow-up of the intifada (NIHC). The PA also allowed the formation of grass roots militias to defend the Palestinian controlled towns and villages under its administrative and security responsibility. In this regard, two organizations were created that were soon to become detached from the control that PA initially had on them: the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) and the Palestinian Resistance Committees (PRC). Most of the operatives in both organizations came from the Tanzim and included ex-officers or active officers in the PA security apparatus. Arafat also left a certain freedom of action to his official PA security forces (*PSF* in Gaza and *Force 17* in the West Bank) for them to join the open confrontation against Israel.³¹⁴

The creation of the NIHC allowed Fatah to decrease the internal pressure among its members and momentarily avoided that the islamists took the lead of the nascent uprising. Furthermore, it allowed plausible deniability for the questions raised by Israel and the international community related to the waging of confrontational and/or violent forms of protest. The creation of the NIHC under the lead of the Tanzim resulted in 14 factions banding together with a predominance of Fatah and Hamas. The idea of joint operations developed and some operations were conducted by a mix of Hamas al-Qassam brigades and Fatah AMB operatives. 24 months after the start of the second intifada, Hamas prestige was dominant and this SMO was at the forefront of the struggle due to the consistent use of suicide attacks that outbid Fatah and all the other factions.³¹⁵

Contrary to the overarching command of the first intifada, the NIHC overarching command of the second intifada did not reach the masses with detailed communiques. It was loosely structured and focused on occasional coordination between SMO waging confrontational or violent forms of protest.

313.(Graham, 2000)

314.(Graham, 2003, pp. 22-28)

315.(Hroub, 2004, pp. 25-28)

4.3 TACTICAL LEVEL: SMO

As mentioned in the introductory part of this work, a SMO is balanced between the two ideal type poles of SM and ORG. If the SM ideal type is characterized by a loose structure, informal processes of coordination and collective action with strong popular involvement, the ORG ideal type is its antithesis. An ORG possesses a well defined structure, formal processes of coordination and weak popular involvement in collective action. First, in an ORG, the networks which are the backbone of a SM are replaced by formal structures with well defined statuses, procedures, and membership criterion. Second, the processes of coordination are vertical with a clear defined leadership at the head of the organization. Third, the ORG collective actions are mainly conducted by tightly selected members and not by participants.³¹⁶ It should be reminded that SMs or ORGs are simply ideal types enabling a better perception of the phenomena at hand.

Each of the five selected SMOs shall now be studied. The *nationalist SMOs* are Fatah and the Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), while the *Islamist SMOs* are Hamas, PIJ and Hizballah. The qualitative study of each SMO will be followed by the assessment of its SMORG scales values, by period.³¹⁷

4.3.1. Fatah

Fatah was founded in 1964 and from the start it advocated reliance on armed struggle. Its leadership included Salah Kahlef (Abu Iyad), Khalil al-Wazir and Yasser Arafat. The strategic intent of the organization was: a) The liberation of Palestine, b) The use of armed struggle, c) Palestinian self-reliance, d) Cooperation with friendly arab countries and international forces. Fatah, like many other Palestinian SMOs at that time, was deeply inspired by the successes of guerrilla warfare waged in Communist China and North Vietnam.³¹⁸ It carried out its first violent operation on 01.01.1965, by planting an explosive device along an Israel's main water pipe. Prior to the *Six Days War*, Fatah launched cross-border operations from Jordan to attack Jewish agricultural settlements.

By 1970, Fatah had become the richest and most successful guerrilla organization in the OPT. It progressively gained control of the Palestinian national congress and of the PLO executive committee.³¹⁹ Fatah evolved through different institutional phases. From 1965 to 1967, it focused on violent forms of protest. Over the course of the following decades, Fatah became progressively institutionalized.³²⁰ After the June 1967 war, Fatah decided to implement a strategy to incite a popular uprising within the OPT. This initiative subsequently failed due to Israeli countermeasures that forced its cells to quit the populated centers for the countryside. Having failed to instill such a popular uprising, Fatah resumed cross-border raids from Jordan and Lebanon in October 1967.³²¹ Fatah strongly reasserted itself after the battle of Karamah in Jordan, when it faced the Israeli army in battle. The propaganda effects were tremendous and strongly favored the recruitment and the overall growth of this SMO. The recruitment process of Fatah was quantitatively oriented. Fatah accepted anybody, unlike other SMOs such as PFLP that focused on quality, and recruited only highly skilled individuals.³²² The drastic inflows of recruits provoked a phenomena of uncontrolled growth that translated into the proliferation of suborganizations that later demonstrated a constant lack of unity among themselves. In such an unstable setting, Fatah's leadership was never entirely unified due to the dissolution

316. For more details, refer to the chapter Chapter 2 / WORKING DEFINITIONS / Tactical Actors (p. 19).

317. (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

318. In 1964, Khalil al-Wazir and Arafat visited Beijing where Fatah opened an office. Contacts were established with North Korea and with North Vietnamese Vietcong. (Kurz, 2005, p. 42)

319. (Hudson, 1972, p. 67)

320. (Kurz, 2005, pp. 16-22)

321. (Kurz, 2005, pp. 50,51)

322. (Katz, 1993, pp. 9-11)

of its command and control apparatus.³²³ At the beginning of the 1980s, Fatah interest in regaining its stature in the OPT was revived. The SMO strived to integrate and develop civic associations such as students unions, local youth councils for social activities, trade unions, and sport clubs.³²⁴ As a consequence of this indirect approach, by 1983 Fatah was the strongest organization in the OPT in regard to popular support; followed by other SMO such as the Communist party, DFLP and PFLP.³²⁵ At the start of the first intifada, the power of Fatah in the Palestinian streets could be felt on the ground. A SM participant in Gaza declared: "The whole community is united in one front. At the moment, it doesn't matter who the organizations are [...] The basic presence on the ground is of the Popular Front and Fatah, though in regard to numbers, Fatah is bigger."³²⁶

Nobody expected the explosion of popular anger and consecutive chain reaction process at the start of the first intifada. At a strategic level, the Fatah-led PLO leadership in exile was indecisive. After some time, the operational level was independently created within the OPT and took the name of UNC. The PLO strategic leadership managed to retain a degree of authority and control over the operational level of the UNC.³²⁷ In 1993, following the Oslo agreements, the Palestinian Authority (PA) was created and Fatah obtained the primacy within this new national structure. Fatah had to move against other Palestinian SMO such as Hamas or PIJ in order to detain their operatives who conducted violent forms of protest.³²⁸ In 2000, the failure of Camp David talks was followed by the start of the second intifada. During this time, Fatah took the lead of the Palestinian violent uprising.³²⁹ Fatah reoriented the PA security apparatus to lead the forces on the street and organize lethal attacks against Israeli troops. The PA's various armed bodies such as the civilian police, the preventive security agencies, and the factions of the Fatah Tanzim moved away from law and order when they took the role of coordinator/instigators of violent forms of protest.³³⁰ The PA's Fatah-led central command (NIHC) lost control over the uprising during the course of the ensuing months when Islamist SMOs, as well as PFLP and Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB) assumed the lead of the struggle with the use of suicide bombing tactics.³³¹ This loss of control was further reinforced by the fact that during the *Operation Defensive Shield* that occurred in 2002, 2'200 West Bank Fatah leaders were arrested. The vacuum created in Fatah's leadership favored a replacement by young inexperienced fighters, organized into local cell like structure of the type AMB, whose loyalty were more oriented toward their own clan or band rather than toward any kind of central leadership.³³² The assassination in 2005 of Moussa Arafat, the late Yasser Arafat's nephew, by 100 PRC members (an organization originally created by a Fatah Tanzim member), highlights the complete loss of control of the Fatah led PA over the actions of its suborganizations.³³³

Overall, the particularity of Fatah lies in the nature of its fuzzy organizational structure linked to uncertain chains of command and control over the suborganizations operating at a tactical level. Fatah was never a unified entity in the pure sense of the term, but rather an entity composed of disparate suborganizations on which Fatah leadership retained a more or less diffused control. A quick mention of Fatah's main suborganizations will highlight this point.

Al-Asifa waged the first Fatah attack in 1965 against a water installation in northern Israel. Given the fact that the core members of Fatah were still reluctant to claim violent attacks under

323.(Kurz, 2005, p. 56)

324.(Kurz, 2005, p. 112)

325.(Rigby, 1991, p. 8)

326. Words of a SM participant. (Khuri Makhul, 1988)

327.(Legrain & Chenard, 1991) and (Kurz, 2005, p. 118)

328.(Mishal, 2008, p. 62)

329.(Kurz, 2005, p. 22)

330.(Kurz, 2005, p. 138)

331.(Kurz, 2005, pp. 138-139)

332.(Graham, 2003, p. 34)

333.(IICC, 2005a)

the name Fatah, and that its Syrian sponsor wanted to keep a veil of secrecy, all the claims of responsibility for the cross-border attacks carried out from 1965 to the 1967 were done under the name of al-Asifa. These attacks were carried out across Jordanian, Lebanese, and Egyptian borders at a rate of approximately one dozen per year. Al-Asifa consisted only of underground cells made by dedicated members who operated in extreme secrecy. Those cells were supported by Syria, whose security elements directed the choice of targets. In 1966, al-Asifa numbered approximately 600 members.³³⁴

Black September: The formation of Black September was an answer to the calls of Fatah's younger generation who wanted to follow the footsteps of the PFLP and waged violent forms of protest in the international arena. The Fatah leadership supported the demand and created this clandestine organization in order to shield Fatah from potential reprisals.³³⁵ Black September conducted, among other things, the assassination of the Jordan's prime Minister in 1971 as well as the murdering of eleven Israeli athletes at the Munich olympic games in 1972.³³⁶ Black September managed to remain clandestine for years.

Fatah Hawks: The Fatah Hawks were active during the first intifada. The Fatah Hawks were disbanded and replaced by the Tanzim in 1995, in the wake of the Oslo agreement.³³⁷

Tanzim: The Tanzim were founded in 1995 by Yasser Arafat. The Tanzim benefitted from a strong popular support in the Palestinian streets; partly due to the fame of one of their West Bank leaders, Marwan Barghouti; who was perceived as a defender of Palestinian rights. The organizational structure of the Tanzim is disparate. Palestinian TV reported that every Fatah member imprisoned in Israel during the first intifada belonged to the Tanzim.³³⁸ It could thus be loosely qualified as a suborganization, organized at a local level. Indeed, Tanzim leaders may have great power and influence in their own city or villages but none outside of them. The case of Marwan Barghouti, located in Ramallah, who was not able to exert any kind of direct influence on other areas such as Nablus or Hebron, is quite telling on the subject. Therefore, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the areas are not controlled by the heads of Fatah Tanzim in both regions but by an array of Tanzim local leaders controlling their own locality.³³⁹ Fatah's strategic leadership had preserved and exploited the Tanzim for years to direct its street forces. The Tanzim used both confrontational and violent forms of protest. For example they led the Tunnel riots (Sept 1996) or the Nakba riots (May 2000) and moved to deadly attacks such as shootings and suicide bombings during the period of the second intifada.³⁴⁰

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AMB): AMB formed a network of loose units in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. From 2002 onward, the involvement of Hizballah and Iran in their activities grew. As stated by one AMB leader: "We do not hide the fact that some active operatives of our organization are financed and encouraged by interested parties, from senior Palestinians who finance operations to inflame the situation to operatives who are financed by Hezbollah and Iran."³⁴¹ An empirical example is the case of Majdi Kamal Abd al-Jabbar Amer, an AMB operative from the village of Qalil near Nablus, who contacted a Hizballah handler in Lebanon stating that his cell of seven people needed money. One month later, he received US\$ 1'500 from Hizballah to buy guns and explosives.³⁴² Zakaria Zubeidi, a chief of AMB in Jenin also mentioned in an interview published in a German newspaper that: "Without the assistance of our Hezbollah brothers, we would not have been able to persist with our struggle [...];

334.(Kurz, 2005, p. 38)

335.(Kurz, 2005, pp. 69,70)

336.(Yonah, 2003, p. 3), (U.S. State Department, 1973)

337.(Yonah, 2003, p. 25)

338.From Palestinian TV, published in MEMRI and quoted in: (Yonah, 2003, p. 7)

339.(Yonah, 2003, p. 24)

340.(Yonah, 2003, pp. 7-8) and (IICC, 2007b)

341.Statement of Abu Mujahid, senior AMB operative in Nablus, interview given to Ali Waqid of Ynet on Aug 4, 2004. See: (IICC, 2004b)

342.(IICC, 2005b)

Hezbollah gives us funds, arms, training, and support [...] We coordinate our operations with them."³⁴³ Therefore, over time, a gradual loss of control of the PA over AMB occurred. This was demonstrated by both the growing support of Hizballah/Iran to the loose AMB cells, and the non-respect of PA cease fire directives; for example when AMB activists kept parading and shooting in the streets contrary to the instruction delivered by the Fatah leadership.³⁴⁴ Entire areas in the Palestinian camps or cities were becoming controlled by gangs affiliated with AMB.³⁴⁵ AMB is a loose network of loosely connected cells, it is not a single network. They can act independently without central command. AMB remains less structured and organized than the PIJ.³⁴⁶ AMB counts approximately several hundred members within the Gaza Strip who do not function as an organization with a regular hierarchical structure but who act according to local and personal interests.³⁴⁷

The Palestinian Resistance Committees (PRC): The PRC is a suborganization operating from the Gaza Strip and established at the beginning of the second intifada by Fatah/PA security, Hamas, PIJ, and PFLP members. The founder of the PRC, Jamal Ataiyya Ziyad Abu Samhadana, used to belong to Fatah Tanzim. The Commander of the PRC in the northern Gaza Strip, Al-Abd Yussuf al-Abd Qoqa, was a member of Hamas in the past and was later officer in the PA security apparatus responsible for the production of weapons. The operative wing of the PRC is named the Salah al-Din Brigades. Despite the Fatah origins of its leadership, the PRC members later swore an oath of allegiance to Hamas who trained them and provided them with funding and weapons.³⁴⁸

Force 17 is the largest elite force of Fatah, founded in early 1970s as Arafat's bodyguard unit. It was also responsible for the internal discipline of Fatah. Force 17 killed Israeli civilians abroad in 1985 and also staged many bombings within Israel.³⁴⁹ After the creation of the PA, the Presidential security unit consisted mainly of Force 17 members. Given its unconditional loyalty to Arafat, it was used to arrest Hamas and PIJ members. During the second intifada, Force 17 conducted sniper and mortar attacks against Israeli settlements in the Gaza and against towns in the Negev. Some of their members received training from Hizballah. Force 17 played a key role in the coordination and facilitation of shooting or suicide bombings during the second intifada.³⁵⁰

In conclusion, Fatah was never monolithic. It was composed of various apparatuses and sub-organizations on which its control was never absolute. The values of Fatah SMORG scales in each of the different periods will be detailed. The values indicated by those scales will be relevant for the quantitative analyses of the protest space: organizational subspace that will be conducted in Chapter 6 SMORG analyses (p. 109) and tactical subspace that will be conducted in Chapter 8 Tactical subspace: Internal factors (p. 175). Those values are based on the preceding qualitative study. They were further reviewed and approved by the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), a research institute based in Israel and specialised in the study of the SMOs considered in this research.³⁵¹

343. Interview in Welt am Sonntag, see: (IICC, 2006j)

344. (IICC, 2007n)

345. (Kurz, 2005, pp. 140,147)

346. (Shahar, 2009)

347. (IICC, 2008b, p. 18)

348. (IICC, 2005i)

349. (Rubin, 1994, p. 155)

350. (Mannes, 2004, p. 254)

351. (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

Table 13 Fatah SMORG scales

Period pre-intifada: 1980 to 1987.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period first intifada: 1987 to 1993.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period Oslo: 1993 to 2000.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period second intifada: 2000 to 2006.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Contemporary period: 2006 to 2010.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4.3.2. Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)

The Arab defeat in the Six Days War provoked a refocus on the Palestinian question. In such a context, the PFLP published its first public announcement on 11.12.1967.³⁵² The founder and ex-general secretary of the organization, George Habash, defined the overall strategy of the SMO as the adoption of armed struggle against Zionism until it retreats; and emphasized the principle of self-reliance in the struggle. The PFLP endorsed a Marxist ideology and viewed the Palestinian situation as a broader revolution against Western Imperialism.³⁵³ It is one of the most radical factions of the PLO and it rejects the peace process.³⁵⁴ In April 1968, Ahmed Jibril left the PFLP and formed the Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PLFP-GC), which adheres to strong pro-Syrian positions.³⁵⁵ In the seventies, George Habash noted that all Palestinian factions were fighting against Israel by conducting cross-border guerilla attacks, and that these forms of warfare were becoming inefficient due to Israeli security counter-measures. Too many resources were being waged for meagre results and too many guerrilla fighters were getting killed. To avoid such a counter-productive strategy, the PLFP chose to adapt and conduct hijacking operations at an international level in order to publicize the Palestinian cause.³⁵⁶ After having observed the negative backlash in regard to diminishing international public support to the Palestinian cause, the PFLP stopped its hijacking operations in 1976.³⁵⁷

In the 1980s, the PFLP, like other Palestinian SMOs, became inspired by the successes of the Lebanese resistance model that had successfully forced foreign actors like the USA to retreat from Lebanon after 1982. Their general secretary, George Habash, stated: "We believe that the model of Lebanese resistance is an inspiration for our people's struggle and will directly affect the situation in the occupied homeland."³⁵⁸

Unlike Arafat's Fatah who strove for support among Arab countries, the PFLP looked for Russian and Chinese financial assistance. With the decline of the Soviet Union at the beginning of the nineties, the PFLP began to wane due to the rupture in its financial resources.³⁵⁹ Nevertheless, following its backing of Saddam Hussein during the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the PFLP received Iraqi funding to support the families of its members killed in operations.³⁶⁰ The overall membership of the PLFP nevertheless declined from what it used to be, and was said to count approximately 1'000 members at the beginning of the year 2000.³⁶¹

The nature of the PFLP as a SMO is difficult to establish because their members are very clandestine. On one hand, the SMO is strategically directed from its headquarters in Damascus for subjects related to political decision and the type of attacks to commit. At this level, some of the PFLP leaders publicly appear in rallies. On the other hand, at a tactical level, the PFLP is composed of highly committed professional fighters. Due to the thorough and professional nature of its violent operations, the PFLP is known to recruit mostly psychologically and ideologically secure individuals. The people selected have to be highly educated and to be able to carry out acts of violence.³⁶² Contrary to Fatah, the PFLP placed an heavy emphasis on political indoctrination.³⁶³ The PFLP members used to meet at least once a week in order to have a precise idea of the political line/challenges to cope with. Every new member has a probatory peri-

352.(Habash, 2008, pp. 67-68)

353.(AbuKhalil, 1999, p. 94)

354.(Levitt, 2002a)

355.(U.S. Department of State, 2009)

356.(Habash, 2008, p. 80)

357.(Habash, 2008, p. 80)

358.(Habash, 1985, p. 12@80)

359.(CDI Terrorism Project, 2003)

360.In such a ceremony held by the PFLP in 2002, each grieving families received US\$ 10'000.- with a picture of Saddam Hussein. (Israel Foreign Ministry, 2003)

361.(Cronin, Aden, Frost, & Jones, 2004, p. 78), (U.S. State Department, 2002)

362.(Katz, 1993, p. 11)

363.(Hudson, 1972, p. 78)

od of six months before being admitted. The PFLP attempts to affirm itself in the Palestinian arena are founded on a strong ideology and an organizational reputation of high proficiency.³⁶⁴

In the beginning, the PFLP simultaneously waged a guerrilla campaign in the Jordan valley and terrorist operations in Europe.³⁶⁵ The end of the Palestinian safe heaven in Jordan and Lebanon, as a launch platform to carry out guerrilla operations, implied that the Palestinian SMO had to change and become more secretive in order to operate from and within the OPT. The PFLP does not possess a combat arm, but is more organized into secretive cells like structure that are specialized in carrying out violent operations.³⁶⁶ After the start of the intifada, George Habash worked on the intensification of the struggle. For him, there were no contradictions between violent forms of protest carried out by the PFLP and actions carried out by the youth during the intifada.³⁶⁷ He asserted that the main benefit of the uprising was the shattering of the Israeli invincibility reputation by the demonstration of kids facing tanks with stones. Although the PFLP demonstrated, during the first intifada, some capabilities at popular mobilization and subsequent collective actions, popular actions are by far not the main area of specialization of this SMO; which remained focused on professional actions carried out by small specialized cells. The PFLP is very thorough in defining targets, getting information, training the personnel, and finally carrying out an attack. The multiple hijacking demonstrations of the 1970s, or even the assassination of Minister Ze'evi in 2001, shot in the head by two bullets fired from a gun with a silencer in his Jerusalem hotel, are informative in this regard.³⁶⁸ PFLP is small in size and highly focused on violent forms of activities.³⁶⁹ It concentrates more on quality rather than quantity when waging violent forms of protest.

The PFLP endured severe blows between 1991 and 1995, due to Israeli operations and overall financial crisis within the SMO. It managed to reconstruct its resistance apparatus and, after the Israeli targeted killing of the PFLP secretary general Abu Ali Mustafa in August 2001, it swiftly retaliated with the assassination of Minister Ze'evi.³⁷⁰ The PFLP's new general secretary, Ahmad Saadat, was subsequently arrested by the PA.

Despite the ideological trend of this SMO, PFLP has been known to conduct joint operations with Hamas, like a suicide bombing attempt in Tel Aviv in September 2007.³⁷¹ The following SMORG scales values are based on the preceding qualitative study. They were further reviewed and approved by ICT.³⁷²

Table 14 PFLP SMORG scales

Period pre-intifada: 1980 to 1987.

Structure: Multiple suborganizations vs unitary

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: Tactical freedom of action vs directive control

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: Action of masses vs hit teams

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

364. (Habash, 2008, pp. 110-112)

365. (Katz, 1993, p. 11)

366. (Fighel, 2009b)

367. (Habash, 2008, pp. 202-206)

368. (Shuman, 2001)

369. (Fighel, 2009b)

370. According to the words of the imprisoned PLPF general secretary, Saadat Ahmad. (Saadat, 2003, p. 1)

371. (IICC, 2007m)

372. (International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

Period first intifada: 1987 to 1993.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period Oslo: 1993 to 2000.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period second intifada: 2000 to 2006.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Contemporary period: 2006 to 2010.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

The two other factions of minor importance within PLO are the DFLP and the Communists. The DFLP was the first PLO organization to engage in extensive political mobilization. It formed the Labor Unity Bloc in 1978 and the Women Action committees.³⁷³ The other faction is the communist party that usually refrained from violent forms of protest such as terrorism, except for short periods in 1970 and 1973.³⁷⁴ The following focus of this chapter will be at the level of Islamist SMO.

373.(Frisch, 1993, p. 265)

374.(Frisch, 1993, p. 265)

4.3.3. Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

According to its charter, the PIJ is a "fighting movement that upholds Islam as a religion and a state and serves as the vanguard of the revolutionary Islamic movements."³⁷⁵ PIJ is a Sunni SMO that paradoxically uses a Shia model of Islamic revolution. The Moslem Brotherhood emphasizes the Islamization of the society by *da'wa*, which is a bottom up approach that concentrates on the Islamization of the community through social mobilization and religious preaching.³⁷⁶ Such a gradual reformist approach was practiced by the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and Palestine. It gave birth to the creation of the Islamic Charitable League in 1973 in the Gaza Strip, from which Hamas later emerged. On the other hand, a top-down approach to the Islamization of society is also manageable as the 1979 Shia Islamic revolution in Iran demonstrated. This revolutionary current was the one chosen by PIJ, a SMO created in 1981 within the Gaza Strip, from discontented members of the Moslem Brotherhood.³⁷⁷ Therefore, contrary to the progressive bottom-up approach favored by the Moslem Brothers, the PIJ considers the armed struggle as a divine obligation that has to be effectuated immediately.³⁷⁸

PIJ emblems shows a mix of nationalism with the inclusion of the map of greater Palestine and religious inspiration with the Dome of the Rock. PIJ has two inter-related goals which are the destruction of the state of Israel ("full liberation of the Palestinian Lands") and the consecutive establishment of a religious Islamic state.³⁷⁹ PIJ and its leaders focus primarily on a Palestinian agenda and strive for an Iranian style of Islamic revolution following a top-down approach.³⁸⁰

The PIJ clashed with the Palestinian Moslem Brotherhood at the beginning of the 1980s. The latter accused them of turning to Shia and even of heresy. Their general secretary, Ramadan Shallah, stated: "The way out of this negative situation of conflict was through taking the military initiative and moving to the phase of creating events rather than reacting to them."³⁸¹ This SMO carried out a number of attacks prior to the first intifada. A famous event that mobilized the Palestinian community was the fighting that developed in al-Shajja'iyya on the 6th of October 1987; when PIJ fugitives fought against the Israeli security forces in the streets. According to their general secretary: "This battle mobilized the Palestinian street and led to the eruption of the intifada."³⁸² In late 1987, the PIJ found itself in an inferior position vis-à-vis the PLO or Hamas, due to the clandestine nature of its organization and the limited resources at its disposal. The PIJ was nevertheless working to escalate the confrontation during the first intifada into a state of armed conflict, but remained far behind in regard to leading the uprising.³⁸³

Social and charitable work are not on the first order of PIJ priorities. Therefore, contrary to Fatah and Hamas, the PIJ does not restrain its fighting activities in view of political considerations or according to the needs of the population.³⁸⁴ According to their general secretary: "From the outset, this matter has been governed by our hierarchy of priorities and the availability of finances. For the traditional Islamist movement, charitable or associational work has been a priority [...] Had we followed this path, there would have been no need to form the PIJ and there would have been nothing new in the Islamist movement [...] this is why our legitimate and national convictions stressed that the call to Jihad and resisting occupation should precede all other activities."³⁸⁵ Therefore, the PIJ does not have a social arm because 99% of its

375.(Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 2001, p. 161)

376.(Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. 156)

377.(Mishal & Sela, 2006, pp. 27-31)

378.(Ganor, 1993)

379.PIJ charter, in (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 2001, p. 167)

380.(Ganor, 1999)

381.(Shallah, 1999, p. 62)

382.(Shallah, 1999, p. 63)

383.(Meir, 2001, p. 41)

384.(IICC, 2007l)

385.(Shallah, 1999, p. 64)

activities are combat oriented.³⁸⁶ The limitations in regard to resources and related impact on tactics adopted by the SMO have further been highlighted by the PIJ strategic leadership: "Given our limited resources, we had to channel all our energies toward mobilization and recruitment for the goal of Jihad."³⁸⁷ Subsequently, unlike Hamas, the PIJ does not possess major functional division in its organizational structure and remains focused on the waging of violent forms of protest.

The PIJ strategic policy is strongly influenced by Iran, given the fact that from all the Palestinian SMOs, it is the one with the closest ties to Iran and the one who receives the most Iranian aid.³⁸⁸ The strategic leadership of the PIJ, based in Damascus, and conducted by the secretary general Shallah, gives directions for the escalation of violence, expresses the political position of the SMO, and provides money or training to the cells based within the OPT.³⁸⁹ In the OPT, the organizational structure consists of small cells specialized in carrying out pinpoint attacks. All cells are confined and clandestine, but connected to each other or autonomous depending on the situation.³⁹⁰ The uncovering of PIJ cells based in Tulkarm, Jenin, and Hebron revealed that they benefitted from a large freedom of action and could also carry out operations independently, informing the strategic leadership of their responsibility in an attack a posteriori.³⁹¹ The PIJ infrastructure in the Gaza Strip is more developed than the one in the West Bank, due to a larger freedom of action within the strip since the Israeli withdrawal and Hamas' access to power.³⁹² Within the Gaza Strip, the PIJ trained its operatives in the manufacture of explosives and the use of weapons before sending them to the West Bank. This was done in order to establish new cells that recruited and dispatched suicide bombers into Israel.³⁹³

At the end of the first intifada, the PIJ did not accept the legitimacy of the Oslo agreements and intensified its violent forms of protest in order to sabotage the peace process through the use of suicide attacks.³⁹⁴ Such means of action were in line with the goals stated in its charter: a) Sapping the enemy forces, b) Spreading fear and anxiety among them, c) Obstructing the peace agreements between Arab regimes and Israel.³⁹⁵ This SMO requires from its members a strong dedication, obedience to the leadership, and self-sacrifice.³⁹⁶ To recruit members, it selects candidates from personal acquaintances established at the mosques, universities, or villages.³⁹⁷

Due to Israeli countermeasures that made suicide bombing more difficult to accomplish, the PIJ gradually adopted the firing of rockets as a tactic.³⁹⁸ At specific times, the PIJ may conduct joint operations with another SMO. For example, since 1988, it has conducted approximately twenty attacks with Hizballah; all directed against Israeli soldiers.³⁹⁹ Other joint operations

386.(Fighel, 2009b) / The PIJ charter also mentions that the leading priority is military activity, only after comes the civil activities, according to the resources and the capabilities at disposal of the organization. (Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 2001, p. 167)

387.(Shallah, 1999, p. 64)

388.(IICC, 2005f)

389.(Fighel, 2009b), (IICC, 2005c), (IICC, 2003b)

390.(Fighel, 2009b)

391.The PIJ policy in 2005 was of not formally renouncing to the lull while working to end it. The PIJ stated that it was committed to the lull but that attacks that occurred were related to their operative cells. (IICC, 2005c) and (IICC, 2003b)

392.Since the Israel withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and Hamas access to power in the strip, the PIJ retains more freedom of action than in the West Bank where Israeli forces and the PA regularly dismantle its apparatus.

393.(IICC, 2006o), (IICC, 2007i)

394.(Meir, 2001, p. 88), (IICC, 2003b)

395.(Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 2001, p. 163)

396.(Palestinian Islamic Jihad, 2001, p. 164)

397.(Fighel, 2009b)

398.(IICC, 2008g)

399.(IICC, 2003b) / The expulsion of its key leader, Dr Shiqaqi, by Israel to Lebanon in 1988, was key to the development of strong links with Iran, Syria and Hizballah. (IICC, 2003b) / The head of the PIJ infrastructure in Bethlehem, Muhammad Shehadeh, developed ties with Hizballah during his deportation to

were conducted with AMB, like a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on 25.01.2002 or an assault against the Kissufim crossing on 09.06.2010.⁴⁰⁰ Due to the clandestine nature and the actions carried out by its specialized hit teams, the PIJ structure is clearly defined. However, its coordination apparatus is a mix of relative command and control from the strategic leadership on the attacks conducted by its cells; since most of the cells remains largely autonomous at a tactical level. In 2008, the number of PIJ members based in the Gaza Strip was estimated at approximately 1'000 operatives.⁴⁰¹ The following SMORG scales values based on the preceding qualitative study, were reviewed and approved by ICT.⁴⁰²

Table 15 PIJ SMORG scales

Period pre-intifada: 1980 to 1987.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period first intifada: 1987 to 1993.⁴⁰³

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period Oslo: 1993 to 2000.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Lebanon with other Hamas cadres in 1992. When he died, his body was wrapped in a Hizballah flag and Hassan Nasrallah called his widow, stating that Hizballah would care for his family. (IICC, 2008c)

400.(IICC, 2007e)

401.(IICC, 2008b, p. 16)

402.(International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

403.The expulsion of two key leaders by Israel in Lebanon (Awda and Shiqaqi) in 1988 favored the establishment of a strategic leadership outside of the OPT. (Meir, 2001, p. 41) / This implies a larger tactical freedom of action for the cells remaining within the OPT.

Period second intifada: 2000 to 2006.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Contemporary period: 2006 to 2010.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4.3.4. Hamas

The growing politicization of the Moslem Brotherhood network constrained the leadership to adopt a more militant stance at the start of the first intifada. The leadership bent under the pressure of young militants and created a separate organization called Hamas in order to shield the SM from Israeli reprisals.⁴⁰⁴ The Hamas strategic leadership was represented by Sheikh Yassin. In 1989, Sheikh Yassin and 1'500 Hamas members were arrested. These mass arrests provoked a restructuring designed to increase the resilience of the SMO to future waves of arrests. The strategic leadership was divided into two heads, with one operating from the safety of foreign capitals like Damascus and the other remaining in the OPT.⁴⁰⁵ At an operational level, Hamas was very active in printing intifada communiques. At a tactical level, the SMO SM leaning was well developed due to its reliance on the islamist networks of the Moslem Brotherhood. Concerning the SMO ORG leaning, this was still under-developed during the first intifada given the fact that a tight control on the action of its members was not yet effective. From 1990 to 1992, most of the violent forms of protest were attacks conducted on personal impulses by Hamas members, rather than directed by the SMO leadership. For example, Imad Akel got a gun and created a small cell. He later moved with his cell from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank to conduct attacks, because potential targets were more numerous and the operational space wider to avoid detection. Hamas leaders, proud of his attacks, later created the combat wing of Hamas called Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades (al-Qassam) and named Imad Akel as the leader of this new wing.⁴⁰⁶ The al-Qassam kidnapping of an Israeli border policeman in December 1992 provoked a massive crack down on Hamas and the deportation of 415 Islamist leaders (Hamas - PIJ) to Lebanon. The deportation of these activists was key to the development of strong relationships with Hizballah and later the importation of suicide bombing tactics in the OPT.⁴⁰⁷

404.(Mishal & Sela, 2006, pp. 36,37)

405.(Tamimi, 2007, p. 60)

406.(Mosab Hassan, 2010, p. 48)

407.(Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. 64)

Hamas is used to competition with Fatah. At the end of the first intifada, the Fatah-led PLO found itself unable to provide social services to the population due to a lack of funding. Furthermore, a steady Iranian increase in financial and military assistance was gradually strengthening Hamas. In this context, the importance of Fatah social service steadily decreased, while Hamas' da'wa activities (charity, social work) increased drastically.⁴⁰⁸ At the beginning of the second intifada, in September 2000, Hamas joined the NIHC, coalition of 13 members including Fatah and PIJ. Nevertheless, each SMO retained the ability to conduct operations independently. The first armed clash with Fatah occurred in October 2001, when Col Rajah Abu Liyah from the PA security apparatus was killed by Hamas.⁴⁰⁹ In January 2006, the SMO won the election to the Palestinian legislative council and finally took complete control of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, after a series of violent clashes with Fatah.⁴¹⁰ Hamas later endeavored to move hostilities from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank.⁴¹¹ However, Fatah's control over key government institutions, its strong security forces, and a tight collaboration with Israel's security apparatus prevented it from doing so up to date.⁴¹²

Hamas' military arm, al-Qassam, is under tight control of the SMO.⁴¹³ Each of the seven districts of Gaza and the five districts of West Bank are divided into subdistricts, which are further divided into local units of villages or refugee camps. Each unit is headed by a supervisor responsible for two or three cells. At the cell level, each member only knows his cellmates and supervisor.⁴¹⁴ Hamas also developed other wings, such as the youth wing named Al Ahdath (younger than 18). Al Ahdath participates in conventional or confrontational forms of protest such as demonstration or riots and support of martyr's families. It also utilizes an intifada wing that is prestigious and highly secretive about the violent forms of protest it conducts, and a security wing that tracks and kills Israeli informers.⁴¹⁵ After the takeover of the Gaza Strip in 2007, Hamas started to model its organization on the Hizballah blueprint, along the principles of vertical hierarchy and horizontal division of roles, the conduct of training, explosive preparations, and sophisticated attacks planning.⁴¹⁶

The inflow of weapons into the Gaza Strip drastically increased during the second intifada as underground tunnels flourished in the Rafah region (on the Egyptian border).⁴¹⁷ The first use of al-Qassam rockets by Hamas took place in September 2001. The strategic utility of the rockets was published on the al-Qassam website in 2005, and stated: "Rockets [...] will be the next stage weapons, as the suicide attacks were the weapons for many years."⁴¹⁸ Due to improvements in their storage ability, Hamas developed the capacity to launch a multitude of rockets in

408. In 1991, the PLO was deprived of the financial support from the Gulf states after its open support to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. In 1993, Iranian financial and military assistance were reallocated to Hamas and PIJ who refused to join the Oslo peace talks. (Hroub, 2006, p. 90), (Chehab, 2008, p. 141), (Chehab, 2008, p. 129)

409. (Schanzer, 2003)

410. On 25.01.2006, Hamas won 74/132 seats to the legislative council while Fatah only 45 seats. (IICC, 2006f), (Al-Abdeh, 2007). For clashes with Fatah, see: (IICC, 2007j), (IICC, 2007g), (IICC, 2007k), (IICC, 2007h).

411. Hamas command abroad dispatched operatives in the West Bank during the year 2007, in order to rebuild the Hamas infrastructure, rejuvenate the organization's activity, and develop high-trajectory firing capabilities. (Israel Security Agency, 2007, p. 17). For efforts to export Qassam rockets to the West Bank, see: (IICC, 2005g). / For its infrastructure in Hebron and Ramallah, see: (IICC, 2005e). / For the establishment of an explosive laboratory in the basement of a mosque in Qalqilya, see: (IICC, 2009d).

412. (White, 2008)

413. (Hroub, 2006, p. 50)

414. (Mishal & Sela, 2006, p. 159)

415. (Chehab, 2008, pp. 30-32)

416. 150 al-Qassam members were trained from 2005 to 2008 in Iran by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Hamas modeled its military arm of 15'000 members on Hizballah. (Colvin, 2008), (Karmon, 2009a, p. 3) / For the modi operandi, see: (IICC, 2007b) / For an example of sophisticated attack planning, see: (IICC, 2008d) / For the use of explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) with know-how provided by Iran and/or Hizballah, see: (IICC, 2007a)

417. 94 tunnels were destroyed by the IDF during the period 2000 to 2004. (Chehab, 2008, p. 180)

418. (Fighel, 2005), (IICC, 2007f)

a single barrage.⁴¹⁹ The Israeli withdrawal in 2005 further expanded the ease of their local production and the production of other devices such as improvised explosive device (IED) and weapons.⁴²⁰

Media coverage is considered by Hamas as central to spreading their ideology. The fact that PIJ would get more news focus at certain times was considered by the Hamas strategic leadership as an unacceptable failure.⁴²¹ Operationally, Hamas defines the tactical deployments of its fighters by calculating the net gains in regard to public support. Sheikh Dokhan, Sheikh Yassin's deputy, declared at the start of the first intifada: "We used to wait for such opportunities in order to step-up our conflict with the enemy, encouraged by a larger consensual support."⁴²² Opinion polls validated Hamas' strategy. After its electoral victory in 2006, it lost 35% of its public support during the first six months. However, the opinions swung the other way around after the abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, enabling the SMO to regain the lost ground in the polls.⁴²³ Prior to the takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Hamas increased the launches of its rockets in order to divert the public attention from its violent clashes against Fatah, and thus hoped to redirect the Palestinian focus on the confrontation against Israel.⁴²⁴

Joint operations between Fatah and Hamas were carried out under the names of PRC during the second intifada. They claimed responsibility for mortar launches, shooting attacks, and smuggling operations across the Egyptian border.⁴²⁵ The PRC operative wing, the *Salahadin Brigades* were trained by Hizballah on tank ambush skills and succeeded in carrying out such an attack.⁴²⁶ The PRC serves Hamas as a front-line operational force able to carry out violent attacks, while avoiding having Hamas claim responsibility when not considered appropriate.⁴²⁷ The PRC counts several hundred operatives based in the Gaza Strip.⁴²⁸

Since the Israeli disengagement from Gaza in 2005, a unification of groups into one military wing occurred. In 2008, the entire strength of the Hamas military arm was estimated at 20'000 people. 10'000 belonged to al-Qassam and 10'000 to the Hamas newly created internal security force assuming the role of police in the Gaza Strip. Following the Hizballah blueprint, Hamas created territorial brigades of 1'000 operatives each. One brigade covered the Northern sector, two brigades covered Gaza city, one brigade covered the Central sector and two brigades covered the Southern sector. Each brigade is divided into battalions, companies and platoons composed of three combat teams, each having one anti-tank operative, fighters, and medic.⁴²⁹ Such a precise military structure enables Hamas to rely on a strong defensive posture while retaining the freedom of action to move to the offensive and conduct guerrilla/terrorist operations at the same time.⁴³⁰ The following SMORG scale values are based on the preceding qualitative study. They were reviewed and approved by ICT.⁴³¹

419.(Global Security, 2009)

420.(Chehab, 2008, p. 52)

421.(Regular, 2004b) / Hamas uses statistics to publicly demonstrate its greatest number of killed when compared to other SMO. See: (IICC, 2005h)

422.(Chehab, 2008, p. 22)

423.(Chehab, 2008, p. 202)

424.(Israel Security Agency, 2007, p. 8), (IICC, 2007j)

425.(Levitt, 2002a)

426.(Levitt, 2002b)

427.The PRC initially claimed responsibility for the abduction of Gilad Shalit in 2006. (Israel Security Agency, 2006, p. 20), (IICC, 2005i), (IICC, 2006a), (IICC, 2006l) / In April 2006, the head of the PRC, Jamal Abu Samhadana, was appointed general supervisor of the interior ministry and police by the interior minister of the Hamas government. (IICC, 2006k)

428.(IICC, 2008b, p. 16)

429.(IICC, 2008b)

430.The strategic leadership agrees on the targeting of both military and civilian targets, due to a state of insufficient power and parity. (Mishal, 2008, p. 63)

431.(International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

Table 16 Hamas SMORG scales

Period pre-intifada: 1980 to 1987.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period first intifada: 1987 to 1993.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period Oslo: 1993 to 2000.⁴³²

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period second intifada: 2000 to 2006.⁴³³

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
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432. Uncertainty remains about the degree of control that the inside strategic leadership or the outside strategic leadership have on al-Qassam. The control exerted by the PA avoided the action of masses sympathetic to Hamas

433. The use of suborganizations such as PRC or Salahdin Brigades enables plausible deniability but dissolves the unity of the structure and questions the degree of control of the strategic leadership on those suborganizations. Furthermore, the inside strategic leadership might control al-Qassam operations at certain point in time, while the inside leadership would disagree on the same operations. For example, the case of Gilad Shalit's abduction with a fuzzy mixed operatives team composed by al-Qassam, PRC, Army of Islam members, and the differential in willingness to release the hostage between both strategic leaderships is quite telling. (IICC, 2006m), (Heller, 2006)

Contemporary period: 2006 to 2010.

Structure: Multiple suborganizations vs unitary

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: Tactical freedom of action vs directive control

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: Action of masses vs hit teams

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

4.3.5. Hizballah

Hizballah is a Lebanese Shi'a organization that emerged in 1982. Its program was published in *al-Safir Beirut* in 1985, and states:

"We are often asked: Who are we, the Hizballah, and what is our identity? We are the sons of the umma (Muslim community) - the party of God (Hizb Allah) the vanguard of which was made victorious by God in Iran. There the vanguard succeeded to lay down the bases of a Muslim state which plays a central role in the world. We obey the orders of one leader, wise and just, that of our tutor and faqih (jurist) who fulfills all the necessary conditions: Ruhollah Musawi Khomeini [...] Our fight against Israel states that the Zionist entity is aggressive from its inception [...] our struggle will end only when this entity is obliterated."⁴³⁴

Hizballah is supported by Iran and Syria, which means that Hizballah is a non-state actor with state capabilities.⁴³⁵ The main objective of this SMO during the 1980s and 1990s was to expel the Israeli presence from Lebanon. To do so, it waged a strategy of attrition, as described by the words of their general secretary Hassan Nasrallah: "The war we want is the kind that makes the enemy bleed slowly, puts it under pressure, and forces it to leave the country."⁴³⁶ The Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon in May 2000 provided Hizballah with an aura of success. This won the admiration and support of the younger Palestinian population. Hamas leaders were further openly calling to the *Lebanonization* of the OPT.⁴³⁷

The strategic leadership of Hizballah is composed of the Shura Council with its general secretary, Hassan Nasrallah. Nasrallah was elected in 1992 and his term lasts three years with no limitation on renewal.⁴³⁸ The Shura Council is composed of nine members, seven lebanese and two iranian representing Iran's interest. This unitary single leadership directs both the political

434. Hizballah charter: (Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, 1985) / The Hizballah secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, further added in 1992, after the assassination of the previous secretary general Abbas Mussawi: "America will remain the nation's chief enemy and the greatest Satan of all. Israel will always be for us a cancerous growth that needs to be eradicated, and an artificial entity that should be removed." (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1992b, p. 54)

435. (Azani, 2009b) / "Iranian assistance is in any case available for Lebanon's mujahidin, regardless of whether Arab parties are willing to assist them or not." (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1992a) / "We see Syria as a genuine support for both Lebanon and the resistance." (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1992c, p. 73) / "Our relation with Syria is a strategic one [...] Hezbollah and Syria are standing together in the same genuine, existentialist and jihadist trench." (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1993b, pp. 140-141) / Ali Akbar Mokhtashemipour admits the Iranian delivery of long range missiles Zelzal 2 (250 km) to Hizballah, see: (IICC, 2006c) / For the use of Iranian doctrine in warfare, see: (IICC, 2006n) / For the use of weapons manufactured in Iran, see: (IICC, 2006d), (IICC, 2009a)

436. (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1996, p. 148)

437. Call to lebanonize the OPT in the May 2000 edition of the London-based Filastin al-Muslimah, main official organ of Hamas. See: (Paz, 2000b), (Paz, 2000a)

438. (Azani, 2006, pp. 5,6)

and military arm of Hizballah; its decision are final and religiously binding.⁴³⁹ The next level down is composed by five specialized councils:

- The Jihad council: terrorist operations in Lebanon and worldwide
- The executive council: social activity, manpower, education, territorial responsibilities
- The political council: Lebanon political arena
- The political advisors council: promoting SMO policies and interests inside and outside Lebanon
- The judiciary council: judicial system in the organization's controlled areas

All members of those councils are religious scholars, except the head of the jihad council previously headed by Imad Mugniyah.⁴⁴⁰

At operational and tactical levels, Hizballah is divided into two combat arms. The combat arm within Lebanon, called Islamic Resistance, is a semi-military structure with a chain of command moving from the Jihad council to regional commanders, and from there to sector commanders, and finally to groups in the field. Within this first military arm, Hizballah possesses four types of combat units: a) The martyrs units who lead suicide operations b) The commando or special forces units who are Hizballah elite fighters; for example the one who infiltrated Israel in 2006 to ambush and kidnap two soldiers c) The rocket launchers and fighters units with experience in all kinds of weapons d) The regular fighters units used for logistic, surveillance, and medical support.⁴⁴¹ The dedication of Hizballah's fighters is supported by the centrality of martyrdom in the ideology of the SMO. This ideology follows the historical example of Imam Husayn, who fought and died in Karbala in 680 AD.⁴⁴² The secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, declared in 1999: "The fighter's strength and superiority does not stem from the type of weapon he carries inasmuch as it stems from his will [...] and his advance towards death."⁴⁴³ Therefore, the characteristics of Hizballah are unique, due to the dedication of its fighters and its strict internal discipline.⁴⁴⁴ The Islamic Resistance is composed by both professional paid operatives and a militia mobilized in times of needs. It has further been complemented by a security organ, responsible for the collection of intelligence in Lebanon and world wide.⁴⁴⁵

The second combat arm, situated outside of Lebanon, consists of cells disseminated at an international level that answer directly to the Jihad council.⁴⁴⁶ Hizballah cells operating abroad are multifaceted: They are responsible for a variety of logistical, financial, and operational duties.⁴⁴⁷ Cells previously dedicated to raise funds have been known to facilitate offensive operations conducted by Hizballah hit teams flying from Lebanon to conduct attacks.⁴⁴⁸

In the 1980s, Hizballah was well coordinated and well organized. It was still a small fighting group. Over time, the organization grew and developed a centralized and coordinated leadership linked to a strong military arm. From 1989 onward, it became more social, more expand-

439.(Azani, 2006, pp. 5,6) and (Hamzeh, 2004, p. 45)

440.(Azani, 2006, pp. 5,6)

441.(Hamzeh, 2004, p. 70)

442.(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 127)

443.Nasrallah, Al-Hawadith, 19 March 1999 / The deputy secretary general of Hizballah states: "Jihad is a door towards life, not death. Even martyrdom is life, in the sense that it is the triumph of spending one's eternal afterlife in Paradise; and so are the verve, pride and victory of a nation influenced by the blood of its martyrs." (Qassem, 2005, p. 39)

444.(Hamzeh, 2004), (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1999, p. 201)

445.(Azani, 2009b)

446.(Azani, 2009b)

447.The Hizballah network discovered in Egypt in 2009 is such an example. (IICC, 2009c), (IICC, 2009e)

448.Argentina in 1992 and 1994 are such examples. (Levitt, 2005, p. 3) / See also the report of the Argentinian Attorney General's in: (IICC, 2006h)

ed, and less exclusive.⁴⁴⁹ The development of Hizballah could be depicted in five main stages.⁴⁵⁰ 1) The foundation stage from 1982 to 1983 characterized by the action of clandestine cells. The Iranian military elite branch IRGC provided them with funding, armament and military training.⁴⁵¹ 2) The formation stage from 1983 to 1985, when the SMO developed its ideological framework with the support of charismatic leaders and succeeded through guerrilla/terrorist operations; thus making the Multinational Force depart from Lebanon, and Israel retreats to a narrow zone in Southern Lebanon.⁴⁵² 3) The expansion stage from 1986 to 1991; characterized by a strong increase in the numbers of activists. For Hizballah's leadership, it is a duty for everyone to resist occupation. If not militarily active, everyone should assist by making resistance their priorities in political, cultural and educational fields.⁴⁵³ 4) The institutionalization stage, when Hizballah formally integrated the Lebanese political system in 1992 as an opposition party that won eight seats in the Lebanese parliament.⁴⁵⁴ Through all these different stages, the size of the SMO had grown to an extent that its ORG leaning was caught up by the development of a growing SM leaning, as echoed in the word of its general secretary Hassan Nasrallah:

"When we were just a small jihadi group fighting the Israeli enemy, we were able to hide underground whenever we read in the papers that there was reason for us to disappear; that was only possible when we were just a small jihadi group [...] But we soon became a movement as one that operates at the level of the entire Lebanese nation and people [...] it made it impossible for us to do our job from the underground [...] We have to balance between the stringency of the security measures we adopt and the need for us to maintain a public presence."⁴⁵⁵

In 1993, Hizballah achieved what could be qualified as a balance of force with the use of its rockets against Israel. In the words of Nasrallah:

"Israelis [...] were not able to stop the Katyusha bombardment of the settlements militarily [...] Israeli know that bombarding civilians will bring a resumption of the bombardment of the settlements in northern Palestine [...] The Katyusha bombardment has led to a new formula based on mutual force displacement, mutual destruction, and equal terror. This formula was imposed by the Katyusha, and not the operation of the resistance in the border belt."⁴⁵⁶

Following a tacit agreement between Hizballah and Israel in 1993, the fighting would continue within rules in which both sides agreed to refrain from direct attacks on cities, towns, and villages.⁴⁵⁷ Hizballah abided by such an agreement and this clearly emphasized the strategic control that the leadership disposes over the tactical actions of its field units. Most of the attacks carried out during the 1980s-1990s were meticulously planned and professionally executed.⁴⁵⁸ Compared to other Lebanese organizations, Hizballah demonstrated a much higher level of internal discipline and degree of preparedness. If other Lebanese SMOs such as Amal marched loosely during demonstrations, Hizballah members paraded with military precision and organized cordon for crowd control.⁴⁵⁹ Furthermore, the training camps of Hizballah focused on an horizontal specialization of their members in the fields of engineering, artillery, exploration, as

449.(Zisser, 2011)

450.(Azani, 2009a, p. 48)

451.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1986, p. 26), (Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1993b, p. 126)

452.(IISS, 2006, p. 187), (Ranstorp, 1997, pp. 31-32,36,40)

453.(Saad-Ghorayeb, 2002, p. 126)

454.(Hamzeh, 2004, p. 112)

455.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1992c, pp. 59-61)

456.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1993a, pp. 104-107)

457.(Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, 1993a, pp. 104-107)

458.(Norton, 2007, pp. 79-81)

459.(Norton, 2007, p. 58; Norton, 2007, p. 58)

well as on a vertical specialization for the hierarchical distribution of tasks in order to conform to battlefield requirements.⁴⁶⁰ Fighting discipline at the tactical level is prevalent. The organization requires from its members a high level of self control when firing with weapons. When Hizballah considered the use of martyrdom operations, they are required to be well designed in advance at the levels of planning, accuracy, follow-up, and accountability. Even if the strategy of Hizballah advocates continuous fighting, the SMO would not allow operations if they are not intended to cause the highest number of casualties or symbolic gains, and if the operation would not bear good probability of success.⁴⁶¹

Hizballah had always claimed its legitimacy by justifying its resistance apparatus to counter the presence of Israel in South Lebanon. To handle the strategic dilemma provoked by the end of the Israeli occupation in South Lebanon in 2000 and reaffirm its legitimacy, Hizballah re-focused its discourse on the Palestinian agenda.⁴⁶² It actively supported Palestinian SMOs during the second intifada through the funneling of Iranian money and the training of Palestinian operatives.⁴⁶³

Hizballah demonstrates both a well defined structure for its fighting apparatus while retaining a weak organizational structure in the form of party members or even sympathizers who are not tied by any formal affiliation.⁴⁶⁴ The coordination is insured both by well defined formal links with ORG members, and also by using informal links to communicate with SM participants. This is demonstrated by the strict guidelines required for the conduct of military operations and the loose guidelines applied into the fields of political and social activities.⁴⁶⁵ Hizballah exhibits both forms of collective action: where the public realm dominates in the forms of demonstrations, and strict organizational secrecy prevailing for fighting operations. In the words of its deputy secretary general: "We should distinguish between the public jihad mobilization of individuals and the publicizing of actual practical resistance steps, for the first is beneficial and the second is harmful."⁴⁶⁶ The following SMORG scales values are based on the preceding qualitative study. They were further reviewed and approved by ICT.⁴⁶⁷

Table 17 Hizballah SMORG scales

Period pre-intifada: 1980 to 1987.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
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Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period first intifada: 1987 to 1993.

460.(Qassem, 2005, p. 68)

461.According to the Deputy secretary general of Hizballah, Sheikh Qassem. (Qassem, 2005, pp. 50,71) / The planning and precision of Hizballah operations are noteworthy, see for example its attack and the abduction of two Israeli soldiers in July 2006. (IICC, 2006g), (IICC, 2006b) / For large scale military exercises conducted by Hizballah, see: (IICC, 2007d), (IICC, 2008a), (IICC, 2008f)

462.(Hoigilt, 2007, p. 125)

463.(IICC, 2004a), (IICC, 2004b), (IICC, 2004c), (IICC, 2005d) / Hassan Nasrallah stated in an interview: "Palestinian asked Hezbollah to send them money, and they would take care of things by themselves [...] they need financial, political and media support. We do not deny that we give it to them." Interview in Al-Safir, 27.04.2006. See in: (IICC, 2006e)

464.In this regard sympathisant and independently run organization in educational, cultural, health and the media fields observe simply a minimum of party guidelines. (Qassem, 2005, p. 61)

465.(Qassem, 2005, pp. 47-50 and 59-64)

466.(Qassem, 2005, pp. 173-174)

467.(International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2012)

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period Oslo: 1993 to 2000.⁴⁶⁸

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Period second intifada: 2000 to 2006.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Contemporary period: 2006 to 2010.

Structure: *Multiple suborganizations vs unitary*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Coordination: *Tactical freedom of action vs directive control*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

Collective action: *Action of masses vs hit teams*

1	2	3	4	5
---	---	---	---	---

468. The participation in the political arena with demonstrations indicates an increasing involvement of masses.

Chapter 5

Repertoire subspace

5.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter, Chapter 4, detailed how SMs and ORGs grew in the OPT. An operational focus further revealed how overarching commands were impulsing and coordinating forms of protests during both intifada. Finally, a tactical perspective, exposed the characteristics of the five SMOs considered by this research (Fatah - PFLP - PIJ - Hamas - Hizballah).

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The chapters that follow directly relate to the analyses of the protest space. SMORG theory handles antecedent conditions and assesses the effects of policing on tactical deployment by asserting that the protest space shall be decomposed into three different subspaces. The repertoire subspace will be assessed in the present Chapter 5. The organizational subspace will be addressed in Chapter 6, and the tactical subspace will be covered in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

The repertoire subspace, is a geometric space composed by means of action and theaters, stratified by period; this subspace is composed of 20'529 cases of protest. The repertoire subspace covers five different periods and relates to both Palestinian and Lebanese repertoires of collective action. The following table presents the five periods covered by this research:

Period 1	24.02.1982 - 09.12.1987
Period 2	10.12.1987 - 13.09.1993
Period 3	14.09.1993 - 28.09.2000
Period 4	29.09.2000 - 25.01.2006
Period 5	26.01.2006 - 15.08.2011

Table 18 Period definition with related dates

5.2 FORMS OF PROTEST

The three forms of protest used during the last 29 years, in the theaters of South Lebanon, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel are *Conventional forms of protest (FCv)* - *Confrontational forms of protest (FCf)* and *Violent forms of protest (FV)*. Overall, the violent forms were favored throughout the years as highlighted by a frequency of 9021 events.

Forms	Periods					Total
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	
FCv	460	1,058	502	458	1,020	3,498
FCf	782	2,225	552	1,351	1,817	6,727
FV	2,513	1,873	1,005	1,838	1,792	9,021
Total	3,755	5,156	2,059	3,647	4,629	19,246

Table 19 Frequency table: Forms of protest by period

The peak of general protest activities occurred during period 2 (P2) that covers the first intifada. It accounts for 5'156 events. Given the fact that a time period makes sense in a theoretical perspective but may vary in regard to total number of days, general rates of protest bring further insights:⁴⁶⁹

Number of Protest per Day				
P1	P2	P3	P4	P5
1.8	2.4	0.8	1.9	2.3

Table 20 Rates of all forms of protests per day, by period

The rate of protests observed within the OPT during the last period almost reaches the rates known during P2 related to the first intifada. The following graph highlights the trends for each forms of protest (FCv-FCf-FV) within each period. The five periods are delineated by vertical red lines.




Figure 11 Forms of protest: Average by semester (6 months) through time

It can be observed that P2 and P5 demonstrate higher proportions of FCf, while P1 - P3 - P4 highlight higher proportions of FV. Five different peaks can be identified on this graph: a) The first peak developed during P1 and is related to the war in Lebanon with higher levels of FV. b) The second peak signals the start of the second intifada at the end of the year 1987 and is mainly composed by FCv and FCf. c) The third peak occurred a few years later and shows that FCv and FCf were overtaken by FV in the years following the start of the first intifada. d) The fourth peak of FCf culminates in 2000 and relates to the second intifada. It should be not-

469. Ratio of total protests per day in each period.

ed that the milder forms of protest were overtaken again by violent forms of protest a few years later, at the end of 2001. d) The last peak that occurred around 2007 highlights high FV activity linked to inter-factional fightings that developed within the Gaza Strip at that time.

5.3 REPERTOIRE BY PERIOD

At the level of means of action, the five periods depict different features. Considering the columns of the following table, it can be observed that the means used the most during P1 are *Armed Assault* (31% of all protest events in P1, mainly due to the war in Lebanon) and *Riots* for P2 that is related to the first intifada (42% of all protest events in P2). The third period is shared between *Armed Assault* and *Riots* (26%) and *Demonstration* (20%). P4, encompassing the second intifada, and P5 show that *Riots* retook the lead and accounted respectively for 36% and 39% of all protests within each period.

Means of action	Periods					Total
	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5	
Assassination	19	33	9	15	13	89
Assa. Collaborator	9	174	11	29	7	230
Assault	8	6	9	7	11	41
Armed Assault	1,140	914	538	736	550	3,878
Bombing IED	930	451	261	466	256	2,364
Bombing Vectors	219	161	117	498	836	1,831
Curfew Violation	1	1	0	16	0	18
Demonstration	280	658	407	437	1,026	2,808
Forced Entry	10	2	7	24	22	65
Hijacking	11	2	3	2	0	18
Kidnapping	125	58	21	35	97	336
Obstruction	5	16	11	23	17	72
Riots	748	2,151	540	1,302	1,825	6,566
Strike	94	159	37	11	25	326
General Strike	39	219	41	5	9	313
Hunger Strike	42	36	14	8	2	102
Vandalism	36	68	9	9	17	139
Total	3,716	5,109	2,035	3,623	4,713	19,196

Table 21 Frequency table: Means of action by period

An examination of the rows highlights that *Assassinations* and *Assassinations of collaborators* (assassinations that directly target Palestinians perceived to collaborate with the Israeli authorities) peaked during the first intifada (P2). 76 % of *Assassinations of collaborators* were conducted during the first intifada (P2) and a further 13% occurred during the second intifada (P4). Tactics such as *Armed Assault* and *Bombing IED* were much higher during P1 due to the war in Lebanon and both later peaked again during both intifadas. An exponential increase in the use of *Bombing Vectors* should also be noted over the last three periods of this study. 46% of all *Bombing vectors events* occurred during the fifth period. Finally, *Hijacking* almost disappeared in later periods, while it was in vogue during P1 in which 61% of all of them occurred.

At the level of the mobilization of SM participants, an interesting note appears through the comparison of *Strikes* and *General Strikes* during the first two periods. If both were known prior to the start of the first intifada, general strikes were much less applied; strikes were thus not coordinated and were waged in isolation following local grievances. This trend became inverted during P2 where *General Strikes* took the lead. This demonstrates a clear reinforcement of Palestinian capabilities in regard to mobilization and collective action. What is further interesting is the fact that both strikes and general strikes almost vanished during the last period of this study. It highlights the presence of other mechanisms at work and fundamental changes in the

Palestinian repertoire of collective actions. Another interesting note is the differential between *Hunger strike* and other types of strikes, as it followed an inverted course during the first period. Hunger strikes were widely used during P1, which accounted for 41% of all cases of all periods, while *Strike* and *General Strike* were proportionally lower (29% - 12%). During P2, *Strike* and *General Strike* were at the forefront while *Hunger Strike* followed its downward trend. Hunger strikes were essentially a tactic used by Palestinian prisoners during P1 to protest against their conditions of detention and/or their detention without trial. This tactic was used again in 2012 and 2013 for the same motives.⁴⁷⁰

The trends in forms of protest being waged during the fifth period in the OPT are noteworthy. The fifth period contains the highest proportion of *Demonstrations*. The next table highlights the following rates:

Number of Demonstrations per Week				
P1	P2	P3	P4	P5
0.9	2.2	1.1	1.6	3.5

Table 22 Rates of demonstrations per week, by period

This means that the average of demonstration during P5 are 54% higher than the ones known during the period of the first intifada (P2).

Similarly, *Riots* highlight increasing rates during the last three periods:

Number of Riots per Week				
P1	P2	P3	P4	P5
2.5	7.2	1.5	4.7	6.3

Table 23 Rates of riots per week, by period

The average number of riots per week during the fifth period are very close to the ones known during the period of the first intifada (P2). The following graph highlights the trends and give the details of the constant increase related to the rates of *Demonstrations* and *Riots* during the last periods of this study.

470.(IICC, 2013, pp. 63-69)




Figure 12 Demonstrations - Riots: Average per week through time

The repertoire of collective action shall now be analyzed in its multidimensionality.

5.3.1. Correspondence analysis

The correspondence analysis (CA) that will be conducted is in fact descriptive statistics applied to a two-way contingency table.⁴⁷¹ Two categorical variables are selected: *Repertoire* and *Periods*. As mentioned in the introductory section of the present chapter, the repertoire subspace is composed of 20'529 cases of protest.

The main purpose of CA is to lessen complexity by expressing data in a pictorial form, in order to facilitate interpretation.⁴⁷² In CA, contrary to regression analysis, there is no response variable; fitting is done by minimizing the distances of the relative frequencies (profiles), perpendicular to the space being fitted.⁴⁷³ The revealed dimensions (the axes on the graph) are considered as explanatory variables explicating the projected data points.⁴⁷⁴ A selection of categories, whose contributions exceed the average contribution to each dimension, enables interpretation of the axes.⁴⁷⁵ Finally, the wider the distance between the projected data points depicting variable categories, the further apart they are in three or higher dimensional space.⁴⁷⁶

In the next plot, the first dimension (D1) contributes to explain 57% of the variance (spread of profiles on the same dimension) and is labelled *Evolution through time*. The second dimension (D2) contributes to explain 35% of the variance and is labelled *Intifadization*. This second axis illustrates the specificity of the repertoire of collective action used during the first intifada when compared to repertoires of other periods. The reader may refer to the appendix

471.(Greenacre, 2006, p. 41)

472.(Clausen, 1998, p. 1)

473.(Greenacre, 2007, p. 47)

474.(Greenacre, 2007, p. 47)

475.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 52)

476.(Nishisato, 2007, p. 82)

PROTEST DATABASE (p. 226) for details related to the labelling of graphical categories.

The CA highlights the progressive evolution of the repertoire of collective action with the disappearance of certain means of action such as hijacking (*Hijack*) to the profit of rockets or bombing vectors (*BVect*) through time.




Figure 13 CA: Repertoire by period

The upper quadrants highlight the specificity of the repertoire used during the first intifada (P2) with the cluster of the different forms of strikes and assassinations. In the lower right quadrant, the later periods P4 and P5 emphasize, on one hand, the persistence of the *Intifadization* process indicated by the cluster riots (*Riots*) and demonstration (*Demo*) and, on the other hand, the increasing reliance on bombing vectors (*BVect*) such as the firing of rockets or mortars shells. To summarise, the CA of the repertoire by periods underlines considerable changes in the content of the repertoire of collective action used by non-state actors through time. A further focus shall now be set on the spatiality of the repertoire within each period.

5.4 REPERTOIRE BY THEATER

Multiple correspondence analyses (MCA) will be used for the analyses of the repertoire of collective action by theater. The CA previously conducted applied to the analysis of two categorical variable, while MCA extends correspondence analysis to series of categorical variables. The principles of interpretation remain the same.

Two main concepts will be used in the analyses that follow. The first concept, *Hits in the depth*, is based on Naveh's work on operational theory. He revealed that Soviet military doctrine conceived the front as representing "the holding echelon - an element whose functional roots lay in the nature of tactical combat relying entirely on attrition."⁴⁷⁷ In this

477.(Naveh, 1997, p. 191)

work, SMO's carrying out violent forms of protest beyond the front lines or beyond their own borders, are said to wage hits in the depth.

The second concept of *Lebanonization* will be used to describe the influence of the Lebanese repertoire on the development of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action. For example, Hamas and PIJ deportees in Lebanon tied links with Hizballah in 1992. When the deportees returned in the OPT, they brought back with them the practical knowledge related to suicide bombings.⁴⁷⁸ In May 2000, the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon provided Hizballah with an aura of success and won the admiration and the support of the younger Palestinian population. At the time, Hamas leaders called for the *Lebanonization* of the OPT.⁴⁷⁹ From 2000 onwards, Hizballah contributed actively to the improvement of Hamas' capabilities at a tactical level, by providing knowledge for building home made rockets and improvised explosive device (IEDs).⁴⁸⁰ IEDs made of boilers filled with 200-300 kg of explosives, specially designed to destroy armored vehicle and tanks, are practical examples of knowledge transfers from one theater to the other. Such a means of action, originally used by Hizballah in Lebanon, was later imported into Gaza.⁴⁸¹ During the second intifada, Hizballah also provided training and funding to AMB and Fatah Tanzim, who were looking for substitutes to Fatah support and financing.⁴⁸² Finally, following the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, Hizballah moved to a support set at a strategic level, helping Hamas to make the shift toward conventional and guerrilla warfare, structuring Brigades, and fortifying the front line.⁴⁸³ All of these factors contribute to the concept of a *Lebanonization* of the repertoire of collective action for Palestinian SMOs. The MCA analyses that follow will further describe the transfers of means of action from one theater into another.

5.4.1. Period 1

The MCA of the first period reveals that Lebanon, West Bank, and Israel did not share the same repertoire of collective action at the beginning (P1). Moreover, it should be noted that the Palestinian repertoire of collective action that were to be used during the second intifada (P2) was already perfectly integrated within the Palestinian society during this first period.

478. Suicide bombings are an example, after the deportation of Hamas and PIJ members to Lebanon. (Berko, 2011) / Hizballah diffuses its tactical knowledge through internet or training of people within Lebanon or abroad. The culture of sacrifice has also moved from Iran to Hizballah, and finally to Palestinian organizations. (Azani, 2009b)

479. Call to lebanonize the OPT in the May 2000 edition of the London-based Filastin al-Muslimah, main official organ of Hamas. See: (Paz, 2000b) and (Paz, 2000a) / Hamas follows the examples of Hizballah. (Zisser, 2011) / Hamas uses the same Modi Operandi than Hizballah for training, indoctrination and intelligence activities. (Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

480. (Fighel, 2009a), (Fighel, 2009b)

481. (Kahati, 2010b)

482. (Fighel, 2009b)

483. (Fighel, 2009a), (Fighel, 2009b)




Figure 14 MCA: Repertoire by theater, period 1

In both quadrants on the right, the cluster made by mortar, anti-tank grenade launcher (*RTank*), artillery, kidnapping, improvised explosive device set on road (*IEDR*), improvised explosive device in vehicle (*IEDV*), gun and grenade, illustrates the violent forms of protests waged on the Lebanese theater at war.

On the opposite side, the higher left quadrant focuses on the West Bank and Gaza. It depicts a cluster containing the categories riots with the use of stone or molotov cocktail (*Molotov*), tire burning (*Tire*), obstruction (*Obstr*), hunger strike (*StrikeH*), and curfew violation (*CurfV*). This highlights that confrontational forms of protest were already being waged within the OPT. Such a finding is important as it precisely demonstrates the specificity of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action proper to the first intifada (P2), that was still to come. The repertoire of collective action to be used during the first intifada was already perfectly integrated within the Palestinian society, well before to the start of the general uprising.

Finally, the lower left quadrant shows that Israel and Jerusalem had a few cases of conventional forms of protest such as strike and demonstration (*Demo*). It should be noted that rocket and improvised explosive device (*IED*) are positioned between the two poles Lebanon and Israel. This highlights the *Lebanonization* process of the repertoire of collective action used by Palestinian SMOs waging violent attacks against targets situated within Israel. Rockets were already fired from Lebanon by PLO organizations and IED attacks were also conducted by SMOs such as Fatah Tanzim or PFLP at that time. If IED translated into the Palestinian repertoire of collective action, it shall be pointed out that it is absolutely not the case of specific improvised explosive device set on road (*IEDR*) or in vehicle (*IEDV*) which remained tied to the Lebanese repertoire of collective action proper to a war zone.

5.4.2. Period 2

The analysis of the second period highlights two main dynamics which are the first intifada and the continuation of the war in Lebanon.




Figure 15 MCA: Repertoire by theater, period 2

In the top left quadrant, the repertoire of collective action of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem is made of conventional and confrontational forms of protest. This is highlighted by the cluster: demonstration (*Demo*), general strike (*StrikeG*), riots with the use of stone or molotov cocktail (*Molotov*), and curfew violation (*CurfV*). Of note is the fact that assassination of collaborator (*AssaC*) occurred mainly in Gaza, while the utilisation of strike and molotov cocktail were more inclined to be used in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The position of Gaza when compared to the West Bank, indicates that it is closer to Lebanon and also closer to violent forms of protest when referring to the axis D1. It indicates the particularity of the Gazan theater when compared to the one of the West Bank, during this second period.

Violent forms of protest with the use of mortar, artillery, specific improvised explosive device set on road (*IEDR*) or in vehicle (*IEDV*), assassination (*Assa*), kidnapping (*Kidnap*), and gun still occurred, but mainly in Lebanon.

The *Lebanonization* of the repertoire of collective action for Palestinian SMOs operating within Israel increased with the use of anti-tank grenade launcher (*RTank*) and IED. It should be noted that Israel remained relatively immune to the conventional and confrontational forms of protest that were mainly contained within the OPT during this first intifada.

5.4.3. Period 3

The analysis of the third period highlights the continuation of the translation of the Lebanese repertoire of collective action into Israel.




Figure 16 MCA: Repertoire by theater, period 3

As described, the maps of the first two periods revealed the gradual *Lebanonization* or radicalization of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action for Palestinian SMOs operating within Israel.

The plot of the third period follows the same line, supporting the argument of progressive radicalization in forms of protest being waged into Israel. The cluster on both right quadrants is insightful in this regard as improvised explosive device in vehicle (*IEDV*), artillery, assassination, gun, grenade, mortar, anti-tank grenade launcher are more widely scattered between the both poles of Lebanon and Israel. Israel was also targeted by rocket and armed assault during this period, as indicated in both lower quadrants.

Finally, the cluster in the upper left quadrant indicates that conventional and confrontational forms of protest kept being waged, but more specifically in the West Bank.

5.4.4. Period 4

The analysis of the fourth period contains the events of the second intifada, the intifada al-Aqsa. It reveals a complete matching of the repertoire of collective action between Lebanon and Israel. It further highlights the relative specificities of the repertoire of the Gaza Strip and the repertoire of the West Bank that diametrically differ.




Figure 17 MCA: Repertoire by theater, period 4

The particularities of theaters can now be clearly demonstrated. In the lower right quadrant, the Gazan theater includes a repertoire of collective action containing means of action related to anti-tank grenade launcher, mortar, grenades, and kidnapping. The Gaza Strip fully conforms to the *Lebanonization* concept previously advanced and witnesses mainly violent forms of protest.

The repertoire of the West Bank remains clearly distinct and is characterized by riots with stone or molotov cocktail, and curfew violation. Therefore, with the exception of cases related to the assassination of collaborators, the cluster in the left quadrants attached to the West Bank is confrontational and not violent as found in the Gaza strip.

In the top right quadrant, Israel is found to be almost identical to Lebanon, reaching unknown degrees of violence. A full *Lebanonization* process took place, as highlighted by the cluster of IED, improvised explosive device set on road (*IEDR*) or in vehicle (*IEDV*) and rocket, around both countries.

To conclude, the first intifada had nothing in common with the second intifada. As demonstrated, the repertoires of both intifadas drastically differ and the theaters where the *effort principal* (main effort) occurred in the waging protests are not similar. If Israel was preserved during the first intifada, this plot demonstrates that it was fully hit during the second intifada, with unknown degrees of violence.

5.4.5. Period 5

The last period of this study highlights two evolving trends over time: on one hand *Hits in the depth* carried out fast, exclusively through the use of bombing vectors, and on the other hand the complete *Lebanonization* of the repertoire of collective action in the Gaza Strip that witnessed increasing violent forms of protest.




Figure 18 MCA: Repertoire by theater, period 5

The move from direct to indirect approaches is noteworthy in the upper right quadrant. The only forms of attacks waged within Israel proper during this fifth period emanate from bombing vectors such as rocket or mortar while IED or other violent means of protest almost disappeared from this theater.

In the lower right quadrant, the cluster composed by IED, improvised explosive device set on road (*IEDR*) or in vehicle (*IEDV*), anti-tank grenade launcher, assassination, grenade, kidnapping, gun and armed assault (*AssArm*) show a strong attraction toward Gaza and Lebanon. This highlights the complete *Lebanonization* process of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action in the Gaza Strip. There is no difference anymore between the Lebanese repertoire of collective action qualifying the Lebanese theater at war during P1 and the repertoire that developed within the Gaza Strip during this fifth period.

It should be noted that the West Bank, unlike the Gaza Strip, remained tied to the same particular repertoire of collective action bounded to conventional and confrontational forms of protest with the use of demonstration, general strike, and riots with stone or molotov cocktail.

5.5 DISCUSSION

This research argues that the protest space can only be understood through the study of the repertoire, the organizational, and the tactical subspaces. This chapter, devoted to the repertoire subspace asserted: First, to assess the repertoire of collective action inherent to each period. Second, to highlight the specificities related to each theater. Third, to emphasize the slow and gradual alteration in the Palestinian repertoire of collective action or in other words its *Lebanonization* process. Fourth, to depict the particularities of the repertoire proper to the West Bank, when compared to the Gaza Strip. Fifth, to highlight the move to hits in the depth of Israel carried out fast exclusively through the use of bombing vectors.

The next chapter, Chapter 6 will focus on the organizational subspace. It will complement the analysis of the repertoire subspace and bring a deeper insight on the forms of protest being waged, by precisely assessing the operational characteristics of SMOs operating on those theaters.

Chapter 6

Organizational subspace

SMORG theory handles antecedent conditions and assesses the effects of policing on tactical deployment by asserting that the protest space has to be decomposed into three different subspaces. The repertoire subspace was analyzed in the previous chapter and highlighted the main trends related to the repertoires of collective action by theater, through time.

The present chapter focuses on the organizational subspace and gets deeper into the understanding of protest dynamics. From a descriptive standpoint, the organizational subspace precisely assesses the operational characteristics of SMOs operating on conflict theaters. From an inductive statistical standpoint, it provides a way to map the distribution of events and statistically assess the effects of SMORG scales on tactical variations.


6.1 DYNAMIC THROUGH TIME

The repertoire subspace described in the previous chapter was a geometric space composed by means of action and theaters, stratified by period. The organizational subspace assessed in the present chapter is a geometric space composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters and casualties, all stratified by period.⁴⁸⁴ As mentioned in the methodological chapter (p. 29), the organizational subspace is composed of 4'676 cases of protest.

6.1.1. Period 1

The analysis of the organizational subspace during the first period reveals a first dimension opposing *Lebanon to Other Theaters* and a second dimension opposing *Local Actions to Hits in the Depth*.

484. Given the fact that the SMOs considered may operate outside of the five main theaters of this research (Israel - WB - Gaza - Lebanon - Jerusalem), operations conducted in Europe, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Syria, Morocco were also included to improve the quality of the subspace studied.



485

Figure 19 MCA: Organizational subspace, period 1

The cluster on the right hand side concerns SMOs operating in the Lebanese theater (Hizballah, Amal, PFLP-GC...) and violent forms of protest causing mainly military and antagonist casualties (*MilPoKill*, *MilPoInj*, *AntaKill*, *AntaInj*). By antagonist is meant cases of targeted non-state actors by other non-state actors. It could thus be cases of violence waged against collaborators, prisoners, or members of other SMOs.

The second cluster in the higher left quadrant relates to local action waged within the OPT. It contains categories such as Youth, Student and Prisoner conducting conventional and confrontational forms of protest during this period.

The cluster in the lower left quadrant, with the exception of Israeli SMOs such as Kach, Keshet and Kahane, depicts hits in the depth waged by Palestinian SMOs into Israel and Jerusalem. It highlights that violent forms of protest such as IED attacks were already conducted by Fatah Tanzim, PFLP, and Fatah Abu Musa; and that rockets were already fired by PLO organizations, Fatah Tanzim, and Hizballah in both theaters.

6.1.2. Period 2

The second period of the first intifada underlines the rise of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the heterogenous behavior of Fatah suborganizations.

485.MCA Var sup: Kahane (outlier)




Figure 20 MCA: Organizational subspace, period 2

The cluster Hamas, Fatah, Fatah Black Panther (*FatPanth*), Black September (*FatSept*), PFLP Red Eagles (*PFLPRed*), Youth and Student, appears in the upper left quadrant. This cluster is attracted to local actions waged in the OPT. Student demonstrations, in support of the Palestinian uprising, also occurred in Egypt. In this upper left quadrant, actors conduct local protests.

Of note is the presence of Fatah Tanzim (*FatTanz*) in the lower left quadrant. The dispersion of Fatah suborganizations in both upper and lower left quadrants signals the ability of Fatah to carry out local action within the OPT and hits in the depth of Israel. The positioning of PIJ close to the axis D2, separating the higher and lower left quadrants, also indicates the ability of this SMO to conduct both types of actions during this second period.

The last cluster on the right hand side (Hizballah, Amal, PFLP-GC, Abu Nidal...) stresses the SMO's main focus related to targets located on the Lebanese theater at war. Those SMOs targeted mainly military/police personnel, indicated by the proximities of the categories *MilPolInj* et *MilPolKill*. The presence of antagonist casualties (*AntaInj* *AntaKill*) on the Lebanese theater is also noteworthy. Those casualties were caused by internal strifes opposing Fatah to Fatah Revolutionary Council named Abu Nidal or Arafat loyalist to Abu Musa loyalists.

6.1.3. Period 3

The third period is characterized by the progressive disappearance of all Palestinian SMOs operating in the Lebanese theater to the benefit of pure Lebanese SMOs such as Hizballah and Amal. It also emphasizes the start of hits in the depth carried out by Hamas into Israel and Jerusalem.




Figure 22 MCA: Organizational subspace, period 4

Both quadrants on the right hand side highlight the violent turn undertaken by all Palestinian SMOs. In this regard, the upper right quadrant depicts the main focus of PIJ, Fatah Tanzim (*FatTanz*) and AMB on IED attacks or armed assault against civilian targets (*CivKill CivInj*) within Israel and Jerusalem. Therefore, the targeting of civilians within Israel and Jerusalem was widely adopted by Palestinian SMOs during this second intifada.

The lower right quadrant portrays violent local actions against military targets waged in the Gaza Strip by Hamas al-Qassam brigade (*HamasIQB*), the Palestinian Resistance Committees (*PRC*) and DFLP. The positioning on the plot of the Hamas category at an approximate equidistance from both Gaza and Israel, signals that, when compared to the cluster PIJ, AMB and Fatah Tanzim, despite the conducts of some actions into Israel, Hamas remained proportionally more prone to forms of protest carried out within the Gaza Strip.

Finally, both quadrants on the left depict a cluster made by Youth, Hamas student and Student that underlines the confrontational forms of protest waged in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

6.1.5. Period 5

The fifth period is characterized by the continuation of hits in the depth. However, to accomplish those attacks, contrary to the previous periods, SMO's translated to rockets and mortar fire instead of IEDs.




Figure 23 MCA: Organizational subspace, period 5

The cluster in both lower quadrants indicates that rocket and mortar became the means of choice for hits in the depth of Israel. It was widely adopted by the PRC, the PIJ, and Hizballah during this last period.

The upper quadrant on the right emphasizes the continuation of conventional and confrontational forms of protest waged by Students and Youth in the West Bank.

Both quadrants on the left demonstrate the higher level of violence developing within the Gaza Strip where clashes between antagonist SMOs occurred. The cluster Hamas - Hamas Executive Security Force (*HamESF*), Palestinian Security Force (*PSF*), Fatah indicates the internal strife between Fatah and Hamas at a time where the latter overtook the power within the strip.

6.1.6. Discussion

The objective of the study of the organizational subspace was to get deeper into the understanding of protest dynamics. First, a static perspective enabled to visualize, within each period, the operational characteristics of each SMO assessed in regard to the specific theaters of operations, the type of weapons used, and the kind of targets favored. A comparative approach between SMOs also highlighted the specificities of each of them when compared to the whole group. Second, a dynamic perspective was obtained by the screening of the frames provided by the periodic plots. It enabled to distinguish the strategic trends followed by each SMO through time. The study of the organizational subspace through periods also reveals that theaters exerted far more influence than ideology, on the choosing of specific means of action.

The understanding of SMO operational characteristics is a crucial step in the assessment of the protest space. This work argues that the effects of policing on non-state actor tactical deployment cannot be assessed before understanding first the repertoire subspace, second the

organizational subspace and third the tactical subspace. Before addressing the tactical subspace, the organizational subspace still offers the opportunity to test some hypotheses related to tactical variations in substance. This will be the subject of the next subchapter labelled SMORG analyses.

6.2 SMORG analyses

In Chapter 4, SMORG scale values by period were attributed to each of the five SMO's considered by this research (Fatah - PFLP - PIJ - Hamas - Hizballah). Those SMORG scale values will be used to quantitatively assess the following hypothesis related to tactical variations in substance:

- **H2f** *Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs.*
- **H5e** *SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality.*
- **H5f** *ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality*

The first subchapter, dynamic through time, focused on detailing geometric spaces stratified by period, composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters and casualties. The present subchapter removes the stratification by period to create a single geometric space, composed by: SMOs, means of action, theaters, casualties, and periods.

The single organizational subspace created takes the status of the geometric dependent variable with the objective to define how SMORG scales, added as structuring factors, are scattered within the same space.⁴⁸⁶ Le Roux & Rouanet define structuring factors in the following terms:

"A geometric data analysis brings out the structures of the table, that is, the relation between the two sets indexing rows and columns [...] By structuring factor, we mean relevant variables describing the two basic sets that do not serve to construct the geometric space."⁴⁸⁷

Therefore, SMORG scales, considered as structuring factors, were not used to define the distances between the points displayed on the graph and did not exert an influence on the determination of the principal axes.⁴⁸⁸

A further difference lies between the cloud of categories and the cloud of events. From the same data table (Protest events x Variables), the correspondence analysis plots can either project: a) A cloud of categories, whose points in the geometric space are equivalent to each category of the variables considered.⁴⁸⁹ All previously conducted CAs and MCAs displayed clouds of categories. b) A cloud of events, whose points are equivalent to each protest event displaying the particularities of the variables response pattern.⁴⁹⁰ This type of plot will be used in the next descriptive and inductive analyses.

486.(Rouanet, 2006, p. 142), (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 253) / Structuring factors are supplementary points that have a position but no mass. (Greenacre, 2007, p. 89)

487.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 251)

488. (Benzécri, 1992, p. 295), (Greenacre, 2007, p. 89), (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 68)

489.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 2)

490.The cloud of events is often referred as the cloud of individuals. (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 224)

By linking the lower and higher values of each SMORG scale (blue dashes), a directional trend is revealed. The SMORG scales structure and coordination have both lower values in the lower left quadrant (Str4 - Coor3), indicative of violent forms of protest carried out against softer targets, and higher SMORG values (Coor5 - Str5) in the upper quadrants, indicative of violent forms of protest conducted against harder targets. The SMORG scale collective action do not indicate any directional trend, due to the fact that it displays only one category.

The directional trends of both SMORG scales structure and coordination stresses that a SMO displays higher levels in structure (*from multiple suborganizations toward unitary structure*) and coordination (*from tactical freedom toward directive control*) when aiming at harder targets: the higher the levels of structure (Str5) and coordination (Coor5) as indicated by the directional trends of both SMORG scales, the harder the target.

II. Cloud of events:

Following the study of the graphical representation of the cloud of categories, a focus is set on the cloud of protest events. This has the advantage of not only confining attention to the mean points of the SMORG scales structuring factors, but also to consider their dispersion within the cloud of protest events. The analyses focus on four structuring factors (Str4 Str5 Coor3 Coor5). As previously stated, the other SMORG scale values did not have a sufficient quality of representation to be projected and analyzed.

The following plot shows the cloud of events with the mean points of the SMORG scale sub-clouds. Such a plot is useful to check the dispersion of the points in the space being addressed. The cloud of protest events shows a wider scattering in both quadrants on the left, toward *Violent forms of protest* as indicated by the first axis.




Figure 25 MCA: Organizational subspace, cloud of events

494. The SMORG scales structuring factors highlighted on the graph are only the ones whose quality of representation in the plane is >10%.

The mean points of the SMORG scales structuring factors are indicated in blue (Str4 Str5 Coor3 Coor5). Each of the four point represents a mean point summarizing a subcloud of events.

In order to discriminate between a specific subcloud from a whole cloud of events, concentration ellipses can be drawn around each subcloud. The next plot describes the concentration ellipses for events belonging to the structuring factor: SMORG scale structure. Two concentration ellipses that contains 86% of the points of each subclouds (Str4 Str5) were drawn. They provide a geometric summary of both subclouds.⁴⁹⁵




Figure 26 MCA: Organizational subspace, SMORG Structure

The previous plot indicates that the subcloud structure 4 (Str4) is slightly more concentrated than structure 5 (Str5). Most importantly, the subcloud Str5 lies above Str4, along the axis of the second dimension (D2). The position of the subcloud Str5, mostly within the upper left quadrant, indicates that it is more inclined toward violent forms of protest waged against hard targets.

The scaled deviation of one subcloud compared to the other is the difference between each subcloud's mean points, divided by the square root of the variance (inertia) of the axis considered.⁴⁹⁶ The scaled deviation of the subcloud Str5 when compared to the subcloud Str4 is very large: 52 times the standard deviation for the second dimension.

The next plot highlights concentration ellipses for protest events belonging to the structuring factor: SMORG scale coordination.

495.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 71)

496.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 380)




Figure 27 MCA: Organizational subspace, SMORG Coordination

The previous plot indicates that the subcloud coordination 3 (Coor3) is slightly more concentrated than coordination 5 (Coor5). Most importantly, the subcloud Coor5 lies above Coor3, along the axis of the second dimension (D2). The position of the subcloud Coor5, higher within the upper left quadrant indicates that it is more inclined toward violent forms of protest waged against hard targets. The scaled deviation of the subcloud Coor5 when compared to the subcloud Coor3 is very large: 78 times the standard deviation for the second dimension.

Descriptively, both SMORG scales deviations were found to be very large.⁴⁹⁷ SMO coordination characterized by directive control (Coor5) retains the highest influence when it comes to violent forms of protest against hard targets, as indicated by the previous analyses. Furthermore, SMO structure characterized by unitary structure (Str5), is also shown to be highly influential in this regard.

6.2.2. Inductive Analyses

Following the results of the geometric analyses, the objective of inductive analyses aims at extending the major descriptive conclusions mentioned in the previous section Descriptive Analyses (p. 110). Descriptive procedures do not depend on sample size and are based on relative frequencies only.⁴⁹⁸ Inductive procedures, such as the Chi2 test, do rely on sample size.⁴⁹⁹ As Le Roux and Rouanet puts it: "The main objective of inductive data analysis is to corroborate descriptive conclusions, allowing for non-controlled sources of variation."⁵⁰⁰

Typicality test: Can the most extreme SMORG subclouds be assimilated to the reference population, or are they atypical? The typicality test conducted on the subclouds Str5, Coor5 highlighted that all pvalue were highly significant on the second dimension. For the means on axis 2, both subclouds are atypical of the overall cloud of events on the *Hard Target* side, along the axis of the second dimension (D2).⁵⁰¹

497.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 380)

498.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 299)

499.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 81), (LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 299)

500.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010b, p. 300)

501.At the one-sided level .005. All are much larger than the critical value 2.58. Zobs for Str5=210, for Coor5=946.

Homogeneity test: Is the deviation between the means of both groups of the same SMORG scale, for example the deviation between Str4 and Str5 of the SMORG scale structure, statistically significant? The homogeneity tests conducted on the subclouds Str5 vs Str4, Coor5 vs Coor3 revealed that their respective deviations were all highly significant with $p=0.000$.⁵⁰² The confidence ellipses, drawn with the normal model procedure (Hotelling test), are depicted in figures 26 and 27.⁵⁰³ They should not be confused with concentration ellipses. Confidence ellipses describe a confidence zone around the subclouds mean point and are therefore much smaller.⁵⁰⁴ The following graphs highlight that they do not intersect, highlighting the significance of the deviation between Str4 - Str5 and Coor 3 - Coor5.




Figure 28 MCA: Organizational subspace, SMORG Structure - Confidence ellipse

502.Zobs for axis 2: Str5vsStr4=889, Coor5vsCoor3=1686.

503.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, p. 88) / "Hotelling's T-squared test of whether a set of means is zero or, alternatively, equal between two groups." (StataCorp LP, 2011, p. 312)

504.(LeRoux & Rouanet, 2010a, pp. 89,90)




Figure 29 MCA: Organizational subspace, SMORG Coordination - Confidence ellipse

To conclude, descriptive and inductive analyses provide the same results when it comes to the assessment of SMORG scales in the organizational subspace. Coordination is central for SMOs when it comes to waging violent forms of protest against harder targets, asserting the SMO's need for directive control. Structure along a unitary model, is also highly relevant for SMO waging violent forms of protest against harder targets. A SMO operating with multiple suborganizations, rather than a unitary entity, appears less adequate to hit harder targets.

6.2.3. Discussion

The SMORG analyses of section 6.2 focused on addressing the following hypothesis:

- **H2f** *Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs.*
- **H5e** *SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality.*
- **H5f** *ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality*

Those hypotheses were partially corroborated. The MCA descriptive and inductive analyses did not bring any insight in terms of lethality ratio; instead the correspondence analyses underlined the SMORG attributes of high levels of coordination and structure for SMO's hitting harder targets. The emphasis on the hardening of the target (soft - hard) instead of lethality ratios, has the advantage of removing a bias resulting from lower levels of lethality that may arise during the course of hitting harder targets. Therefore, the hardening of the target revealed

by the second dimension, appears to be a much more appropriate indicator of SMORG scale effects on tactical variations.

Descriptively, both SMORG scale deviations were found to be very large and were later supported by inductive analyses. Coordination characterized by directive control (Coor5) retained the highest influence when it comes to violent forms of protest against harder targets; structure in the sense of structuration along the model of a unitary organization (Str5), was also shown to be highly influential in this regard. These hypotheses and quantitative analyses will be completed by qualitative analyses conducted in Chapter 9.

The objective of the study of the organizational subspace was to get deeper into the understanding of protest dynamics. The subchapter dynamic through time provided a static and dynamic perspective on the operational characteristics of SMOs. It further revealed their respective strategic trends through time. The subchapter SMORG analyses, offered the opportunity to test some hypotheses related to tactical variations in substance. The next chapter will address the third subspace of the protest space, the tactical subspace.

Chapter 7

Tactical subspace: External factors

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The repertoire and organizational subspaces were studied in previous chapters. Following the handling of antecedent conditions with the study of both repertoire and organizational subspaces, the tactical subspace: external factors chapter will focus on assessing the following hypotheses:

- **H1a** *Policing affects non-state actors tactical deployment*
- **H2a** *Different types of policing cause different types of tactical deployments.*

The tactical subspace is a space of interactions between policing actors and SMOs. As such it focuses on tactical deployments. The goal of the present chapter, Tactical subspace: External factors, is to conduct survival analyses in order to assess the relationship of explanatory variables to survival time. The dependent variable is the number of days until the next form of protest. Three forms of protest are considered: *Conventional - Confrontational - Violent*. The independent variables are external factors: *Policing activities - Ground operation - Armored operation - Air operation - Demonstration/Riot policing - Delicts - Damage/destruction unrelated to the use of weapon - Administrative restriction - Movement restriction - Restriction eased - Arrest - Deportation - Injured - Killed*. The reader should refer to the appendixes Policing Variables (p. 232) for further details. Each of those variables are actions that the policing actor might take. A policing actor may be: *Israel security force - Palestinian Security Force (PSF from PA) - Executive Security Force (ESF from Hamas) - Settlers*. From each of those independent variables, three new variables were created on the base of their sum during the three weeks preceding the dependent event. For example, for a dependent variable of the type *Violent protest*, the sum of the independent variables during each of the three weeks preceding the event itself was summarized into: *Independent variable X (span 0-7), Independent variable X (span 8-14), Independent variable X (span 15-21)*. The obvious advantage of such a procedure is the ability to discriminate between immediate versus delayed effects. To account for momentum, three variables displaying the sum of the dependent event during each of the three weeks preceding the dependent event were added. The investigation was limited to three weeks for practical reasons (interpretation) and on statistical grounds (in order to avoid spurious relationships). Finally, the specific day of the week on which the dependent event occurred was also considered as an external factor. To summarize, external factors account for policing variables, momentum variables, and day of the week.

In this chapter, the study of each of the five periods covered by this work will be structured along the following mode:

- **Context** : The context provides the reader with a better appreciation of the environment in which the interactions between actors occurred.
- **Conventional forms**: Survival analyses assess the effects of external factors on the development of conventional forms of protest.
- **Confrontational forms**: Survival analyses assess the effects of external factors on the development of confrontational forms of protest.
- **Violent forms**: Survival analyses assess the effects of external factors on the development of violent forms of protest.

The details related to selection procedure and model building developments are available in the appendix Survival Analyses (p. 240).

7.1 PERIOD 1

• 7.1.1. Context

Lebanese theater: In Lebanon, Shi'ite and Druze militias took over most of West Beirut in 1984. The US withdrew from the capital and a new national unity government was formed.⁵⁰⁵ This year was difficult for the IDF, who endured 28 killed and 275 wounded.⁵⁰⁶ During the course of the following year, the IDF completed a three stage withdrawal and remained in control of the area South of the Litani river.⁵⁰⁷ The Hizballah further strengthened its territorial hold and took over the PLO positions in Maghdushah.⁵⁰⁸

Jewish settlements: In 1983, the Jewish settler population was estimated at 22'800 for the West Bank, 76'095 for East Jerusalem and 6'800 for the Golan Heights. The total number of Jewish settlers present in those three areas amounted to 105'695.⁵⁰⁹ In the West Bank, the year 1984 was marked by an escalation of attacks against settlers who threatened, in return, to conduct vigilante actions, unless protected by security forces.⁵¹⁰ The Jewish settlement process in the OPT grew.⁵¹¹ During the years 1985 to 1987, new settlements were inaugurated.⁵¹² Foreign Minister Shamir further stated that he would never concede territories in exchange for peace.⁵¹³ In 1986, the Israeli Housing Ministry announced that it wished to double the amount of settlers housings in the OPT and in Gaza.⁵¹⁴ The following year, four new settlements were approved in the West Bank.⁵¹⁵ Tensions between communities developed when 150 settlers occupied the Ibrahim mosque in Hebron.⁵¹⁶ In 1989, the settler population was estimated at 69'800 for the West Bank, 117'100 for East Jerusalem and 10'000 for the Golan Heights. The amount of settlers present in those three areas amounted to 105'695 in 1983, and reached a total of 196'900 in 1989.⁵¹⁷

Palestinian - Israeli events: Jordan increased its restrictions on the entry of pro-Fatah Palestinians in its territory.⁵¹⁸ In 1985, following public unrest in the OPT, the Israeli cabinet approved measures to restore public order. Those measures referred to the deportation of Palestinians constituting a security threat and the indefinite administrative detention of suspects.⁵¹⁹ In 1985, 18 Palestinians were deported, and in 1986, three were served with deportation or-

505.06.02.1984 - 08.02.1984 - 21.02.1984: S1 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984a) / 30.03.1984 - 31.07.1984 - 30.04.1984: S2 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984b)

506.20.12.1984: S5 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985b)

507.24.04.1985: S6 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985c)

508.30.01.1987: S13 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987b)

509.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

510.In Hebron 01.12.1983 - Nablus 03.12.1983: S1 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984a) and 31.01.1985: S5 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985b)

511.16.06.1985: S7 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d)

512.Settlements Adura and Dabboya in Hebron. 06.08.1985: S7 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d) and 20.01.1986: S9 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986b). The Israeli Authority approves four new settlement in the Jordan valley, Nablus, Bethlehem, Jerusalem. 17.08.1987: S16 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988a)

513.07.09.1986: S12 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987a)

514.24.09.1986: S12 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987a) / 08.10.1986: S12 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987a)

515.17.08.1987: S16 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988a)

516.14.11.1987: S16 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988a)

517.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

518.22.04.1986 - 22.04.1986: S10 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986c)

519.04.08.1985 - 06.08.1985: S7 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d)

ders.⁵²⁰ Clashes occurred between university students and Israeli forces in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and on the ground, the PLO strengthened its hold.⁵²¹ In 1986, a poll revealed that 93% of Palestinians favoured the PLO and that 78% of them supported acts of force.⁵²²

Economic situation: During the first period, the economic situation was dire. In Israel, the year 1985 was marked by a consumer price index rising by 19.4% in April. In May, the inflation grew by 6.8% and in July by 27.5%.⁵²³ The precarious economic situation incited the Israeli government to adopt an austerity program, devaluing its currency and increasing the price of subsidised products.⁵²⁴ The Israeli Authority also imposed increases in real taxes of 71% on Palestinians living in the West Bank, and of 670% on East Jerusalem merchants who started to protest against the measure.⁵²⁵ The weekly number of Palestinians working in Israel during this first period was estimated at 50'000 from the West Bank and 42'000 from the Gaza Strip.⁵²⁶

Following the description of the context in which interactions between actors occurred during this period, the hazard rates of external factors on conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest shall be addressed in the following subsections.

520.16.09.1985: S8 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986a) and 27.01.1986: S9 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986b)

521.05.12.1986 - 08.12.1986 - 10.02.1987: S13 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987b) and 08.04.1987: S14 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987c)

522.08.09.1986: S12 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987a)

523.16.05.1985: S6 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985c) and 14.06.1985: S7 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d)

524.01.07.1985: S7 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d)

525.13.12.1984 - 16.01.1985: S5 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985b)

526.21.04.1986: S10 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986c)

7.1.2. Conventional forms

Table 24 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCv, period 1⁵²⁷

Form: Conventional, Period: 1, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.435*** (0.035)	0.535*** (0.053)
Conventional Protest 8_14	0.112*** (0.027)	0.086** (0.029)
Ground operation: Settler 8_14	0.390* (0.188)	0.600** (0.193)
Policing: Isr 8_14	0.367** (0.134)	0.294* (0.136)
Day of the week: Monday	0.017 (0.233)	0.223 (0.238)
Day of the week: Tuesday	0.027 (0.219)	0.157 (0.224)
Day of the week: Wednesday	-0.393 (0.214)	-0.271 (0.215)
Day of the week: Thursday	-0.269 (0.222)	-0.139 (0.222)
Day of the week: Friday	-0.482* (0.245)	-0.479 (0.250)
Day of the week: Saturday	0.220 (0.240)	0.216 (0.243)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.054 (0.167)	0.128 (0.169)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	-0.347 (0.198)	-0.471* (0.203)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.362 (0.261)	0.408 (0.262)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 4	-1.222*** (0.341)	-0.856* (0.336)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=5	-0.995*** (0.293)	-0.637* (0.286)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: 1	0.074 (0.150)	0.080 (0.152)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: 2	-0.325 (0.199)	-0.204 (0.207)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: >=3	-0.472* (0.207)	-0.466* (0.214)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.504** (0.156)	0.210 (0.203)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.729*** (0.207)	0.708** (0.217)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.569* (0.262)	1.111*** (0.332)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=4	-0.158 (0.288)	1.397** (0.444)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:1)		0.163* (0.074)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:3)		-0.178* (0.070)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:>=4)		-0.304*** (0.079)
R-squared	0.551	0.593
N	329	329

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

527.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 25 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCv, period 1

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCv1_7Co	1.706991	.0901443	10.13	0.000	1.539147	1.893137
FCv8_14Co	1.089689	.0310798	3.01	0.003	1.030445	1.152339
OfGrS8_14Do	1.822413	.3510172	3.12	0.002	1.249384	2.658262
PolI8_14Do	1.342136	.1823195	2.17	0.030	1.028411	1.751564
DowCa						
1	1.249732	.2980259	0.93	0.350	.7831215	1.994364
2	1.169854	.2621463	0.70	0.484	.7540332	1.814984
3	.762632	.1642991	-1.26	0.208	.4999594	1.16331
4	.8700801	.193248	-0.63	0.531	.5629946	1.344666
5	.6194438	.1550132	-1.91	0.056	.3793083	1.011606
6	1.240744	.3015445	0.89	0.375	.7705662	1.997809
AdmI0_7Ca						
1	1.136259	.1925526	0.75	0.451	.8151377	1.583885
2	.6245574	.1265664	-2.32	0.020	.419833	.9291122
3	1.503984	.3937784	1.56	0.119	.9002824	2.51251
4	.4249799	.1428995	-2.54	0.011	.2198629	.821457
5	.5287293	.151232	-2.23	0.026	.3018318	.9261936
AdmI8_14Ca						
1	1.083527	.1642213	0.53	0.597	.8050634	1.458308
2	.8155288	.1692101	-0.98	0.326	.5430348	1.22476
3	.6277245	.1340442	-2.18	0.029	.413051	.9539694
RiotI0_7Ca						
1	1.233629	.2501667	1.04	0.300	.8290299	1.835689
2	2.029257	.441248	3.25	0.001	1.325102	3.107599
3	3.038565	1.009526	3.35	0.001	1.584409	5.827332
4	4.04449	1.796969	3.15	0.002	1.693069	9.661689
FCv1_7CoXRiotI0_7_1	1.177292	.0876103	2.19	0.028	1.017514	1.362159
FCv1_7CoXRiotI0_7_3	.8365755	.0588867	-2.53	0.011	.7287673	.960332
FCv1_7CoXRiotI0_7_4	.7381356	.0582009	-3.85	0.000	.6324412	.8614937

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

The upper table highlights the hazard rates of external factors on conventional forms of protest. Ground operations carried out by settlers (*OfGrS8_14Do*) increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 82%. Policing activities conducted by Israeli forces (*PolI8_14Do*) rise the hazard rate by 34%.⁵²⁸

b) Categorical variables

Saturdays (*DowCa5*) are associated with a lower hazard rate of conventional forms of protest than any other day of the week.⁵²⁹ Administrative restrictions imposed by Israeli forces

528. The increase in the hazard rate can be read in the column Haz. Ratio. It depicts the percentage increase over a null value of 1.

529. The intervals between dates of protest are counted in days. It should be reminded, that the shortest time interval between protest remains of one day. Therefore, if friday displays for example a significant hazard rate,

(AdmI0_7Ca / AdmI8_14Ca) appear to reduce the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest as well.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 243) highlight that with a dynamic of two conventional protests (*level 2*), the smaller riot operations (*Riot oper: Isr 0_7_1 = 1*) display a lower hazard rate. This could be seen as part of a deescalation process.

However, past a certain threshold of four conventional protests (*level 4*), the trend becomes inverted as riot operations waged on a larger scale (*Riot oper: Isr 0_7_3 = 1 / Riot oper: Isr 0_7_4 = 1*) display lower hazard rates, when compared to the ones of small and contained deployment of the same force.

If deescalation works better for low occurrences of conventional forms of protest (≤ 2 span 1-7), it fails for higher occurrences where escalation or larger deployment produce better results in reducing the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest.

this means that 1 being the shortest time interval in day between protests, the form of protest considered will occur on saturday.

7.1.3. Confrontational forms

Table 26 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCf, period 1⁵³⁰

Form: Confrontational, Period: 1, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Confrontational Protest 1_7	0.156*** (0.016)	0.398*** (0.033)
Restriction movement: Isr 0_7	0.497*** (0.103)	0.243* (0.111)
Ground operation: Settler 0_7	0.325* (0.157)	0.271 (0.161)
Restriction movement: Settler 15_21	0.770** (0.247)	0.724** (0.250)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.501*** (0.132)	0.274* (0.138)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.242 (0.158)	0.435 (0.225)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.164 (0.189)	0.995*** (0.284)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=4	0.108 (0.225)	1.950*** (0.348)
Injured: Isr 8_14 / Cases: 1	0.186 (0.119)	0.290* (0.122)
Injured: Isr 8_14 / Cases: >=2	0.223 (0.119)	0.337** (0.124)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:2)		-0.191*** (0.042)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:3)		-0.280*** (0.045)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 X Riot oper: Isr 0_7 (Cases:>=4)		-0.360*** (0.045)
R-squared	0.409	0.492
N	465	465

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

530.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 27 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCf, period 1

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCf1_7Co	1.488664	.0493858	11.99	0.000	1.39495	1.588675
MvtI0_7D	1.274638	.1411484	2.19	0.028	1.025955	1.583601
OfGrS0_7Do	1.310961	.2110798	1.68	0.093	.9561733	1.797393
MvtS15_21Do	2.063007	.5162874	2.89	0.004	1.263221	3.369164
RiotI0_7Ca						
1	1.315486	.1810583	1.99	0.046	1.004454	1.722829
2	1.544716	.3477249	1.93	0.053	.9936608	2.401371
3	2.704237	.7673718	3.51	0.000	1.550609	4.716146
4	7.027614	2.442342	5.61	0.000	3.556195	13.8877
InjI8_14Ca						
1	1.336169	.1628033	2.38	0.017	1.052321	1.696581
2	1.401201	.1742055	2.71	0.007	1.098181	1.787832
FCf1_7CoX_RiotI0_7_2	.8258667	.0349991	-4.51	0.000	.7600413	.8973931
FCf1_7CoX_RiotI0_7_3	.755422	.0339243	-6.25	0.000	.6917738	.8249264
FCf1_7CoX_RiotI0_7_4	.6976142	.0314938	-7.98	0.000	.6385395	.7621542

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

The restriction of movement category contains road blocks, checkpoints, sealing of perimeter, or the imposition of curfews.⁵³¹ Restrictions of movement conducted by settlers (*MvtS15-21Do*) create strong delayed effects (span 15-21) and expand the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 106%. Ground operations carried out by settlers (*OfGrS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 31% with immediate effects (span 0-7).

Restrictions of movement imposed by Israeli forces (*MvtI0_7D*) increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 27% (span 0-7).

b) Categorical variables

Casualties injured by Israeli forces (*InjI8_14Ca*), increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 33% in the case of one injury and 40% in the case of two or more injuries.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction term between confrontational forms of protest and riot operations conducted by Israeli forces (*FCf1_7CoXRiotI0_7_2...*) indicates a negative relationship between them.

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 244) highlight two main points: a) If the confrontational threshold level is initially too low (\leq level 2 for the table *Isr0_7_3 = 1*), riot operations will increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest, no matter the scale of the operation conducted. b) With a threshold of five and more confrontational protests reached, larger riot operations will decrease the same hazard rate ($\text{level} \geq 5$ for the table *Isr0_7_3 = 1* or $\text{level} \geq 7$ for the table *Isr0_7_4 = 1*).

531. See the appendix POLICING DATABASE (p. 232) for further details.

7.1.4. Violent forms

Table 28 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FV, period 1⁵³²

Form: Violent, Period: 1, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Violent Protest 1_7	0.249*** (0.021)	0.265*** (0.023)
Ground operation: Settler 0_7	0.767* (0.306)	0.752* (0.302)
Delict: Settler 8_14	1.204** (0.453)	1.127* (0.449)
Restriction Eased: Isr 0_7	-0.779*** (0.209)	-0.751*** (0.207)
Restriction Eased: Isr 8_14	0.479* (0.212)	0.513* (0.210)
Movement restriction: Settler 15_21	1.730** (0.567)	1.773** (0.556)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 1	0.424* (0.194)	0.379 (0.196)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 2	0.783*** (0.224)	0.770*** (0.224)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 3	1.333*** (0.322)	1.285*** (0.323)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 4	0.091 (0.325)	0.083 (0.326)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: >=5	0.220 (0.346)	0.826 (0.439)
Administration restriction: Isr 15_21 / Cases: 1	-0.519** (0.185)	-0.537** (0.185)
Administration restriction: Isr 15_21 / Cases: 2	-0.452 (0.250)	-0.476 (0.249)
Administration restriction: Isr 15_21 / Cases: >=3	0.093 (0.324)	0.220 (0.314)
Arrestation: Isr 15_21 / Cases: 1	0.445* (0.178)	0.381* (0.182)
Arrestation: Isr 15_21 / Cases: 2	0.320 (0.218)	0.358 (0.218)
Arrestation: Isr 15_21 / Cases: >3	-0.234 (0.231)	-0.246 (0.230)
Movement restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	-0.206 (0.194)	-0.194 (0.191)
Movement restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	-0.827** (0.257)	-0.772** (0.254)
Movement restriction: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >3	0.256 (0.280)	0.304 (0.280)
Conventional Protest 15_21 (>=5) X Violent Protest 1_7		-0.095* (0.047)
R-squared	0.223	0.226
N	1195	1195

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

532.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 29 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FV, period 1

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FV1_7Co	1.302882	.0302082	11.41	0.000	1.245	1.363455
OfGrS0_7Do	2.121871	.640305	2.49	0.013	1.17451	3.833374
Delis8_14Do	3.087836	1.387745	2.51	0.012	1.279689	7.450819
MvtS15_21Do	5.886931	3.275141	3.19	0.001	1.978475	17.5165
EasI0_7Do	.4718599	.0976342	-3.63	0.000	.3145488	.7078451
EasI8_14Do	1.66985	.3505977	2.44	0.015	1.106525	2.519961
FCv15_21Ca						
1	1.460714	.2859738	1.94	0.053	.9952216	2.14393
2	2.159421	.4846906	3.43	0.001	1.390855	3.352686
3	3.615378	1.167213	3.98	0.000	1.920198	6.807086
4	1.086912	.3538759	0.26	0.798	.5741971	2.057443
5	2.284712	1.002343	1.88	0.060	.9669282	5.398444
AdmI15_21Ca						
1	.584288	.108048	-2.91	0.004	.4066499	.8395242
2	.6213294	.1544567	-1.91	0.056	.3816991	1.011399
3	1.246636	.3909742	0.70	0.482	.6741911	2.305135
ArrestI15_21Ca						
1	1.463644	.2670341	2.09	0.037	1.023619	2.092824
2	1.430119	.3117906	1.64	0.101	.9328148	2.192546
3	.7817905	.1796836	-1.07	0.284	.4982572	1.226668
MvtI0_7Ca						
1	.8238496	.1571001	-1.02	0.310	.5669334	1.197192
2	.4621758	.1172063	-3.04	0.002	.2811546	.7597475
3	1.354755	.3791089	1.08	0.278	.7828237	2.344538
FCv15_21_5_X_FV1_7	.9089651	.0429446	-2.02	0.043	.8285747	.9971552

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Settlers restricting the movement of Palestinians (*MvtS15_21Do*) increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 489%. When settlers commit other type of delicts (*Delis8_14Do*), the hazard rate grows by 209% and when they conduct ground operations (*OfGrS0_7Do*) it rises by 112%.

Of note is the inverted relationship between ease of restriction and time. Ease of restriction (*EasI0_7Do*) lowers the hazard rate of violent occurrence during the first week while it appears to raise it again two weeks later (*EasI8_14Do*).

b) Categorical variables

Administrative restrictions are shown to decrease the rate of violent forms of protest by half, but the effect is delayed over time (span 15-21). Arrests on a low scale, carried out by Israeli

forces (*ArrestI15_21Ca*), increase the hazard rate while higher levels of arrests (≥ 2) do not indicate any significant effects at the 5% level.

The higher the number of conventional protests (*FCv15_21Ca* from 1 to 5), the higher the increase on the hazard rate of violent occurrences.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction table included in the appendix (p. 246) displays the negative interaction between conventional protest on a large scale (≥ 5) and violent protest (*FCv15_21_5_X_FVI_7*). It highlights that the decreasing hazard rates for large scale conventional protest is only significant for the occurrences of less than five violent protests. The effect of high numbers of conventional protest is decreasing to become statistically non significant with higher level of violent protest (span 1-7).

To summarize, the negative correlation coefficient highlights the fact that conventional protest waged on a large scale still has a negative effect on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest. However, when violent occurrences reach a certain threshold in regard to numbers, any further negative effects that conventional protest may have on violent forms of protest are nullified.

7.2 PERIOD 2

7.2.1. Context

Lebanese theater: In South Lebanon, Amal and Hizballah agreed in 1989 to end their clashes in order to unite and force the IDF to withdraw.⁵³³ In 1992, Hassan Nasrallah was elected general secretary of Hizballah and the SMO participated in the Lebanese parliamentary elections.⁵³⁴

Jewish settlements: During the period of the first intifada, the settlements kept growing. In 1988, Prime Minister Shamir pledged to build more housing units in the OPT. The Housing Minister Ariel Sharon called for the construction of 30 new settlements and the further expansion of the ones existing in East Jerusalem.⁵³⁵ The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics revealed a 10% increase in the number of settlers established in the OPT in 1988.⁵³⁶ At the end of the cold war, Soviet Jews started to immigrate to Israel and Prime Minister Shamir advocated for the expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem, with as many Jewish immigrants as possible.⁵³⁷ The Israeli Housing Ministry announced the construction of 2'000 housing units in the West Bank and a further 2'000 units in East Jerusalem.⁵³⁸ Despite the Palestinian unrest during the first intifada, the number of settlers kept increasing and the Israeli Housing Ministry accelerated the construction.⁵³⁹ The budgets related to settlements and roads were approved by the Israeli parliament.⁵⁴⁰ In order to defend the settlements from Palestinian protesters, the Israeli Defense Minister Arens consented to the constitution of Jewish civil guard units.⁵⁴¹ The expansion of settlers in the OPT was further correlated with the expansion of settler violence against Palestinians. In this regard, the Palestinian leader Faisal Hussein denounced the growth of settlers' violence. He requested the protection of the Israeli army and the assistance of an international peace keeping force.⁵⁴² In 1993, the settler population was estimated at 111'600 for the West Bank, 152'800 for East Jerusalem and 12'600 for the Golan Heights. The total amount of settlers in the OPT increased from 196'900 in 1989 to 277'000 in 1993.⁵⁴³

Palestinian - Israeli events: Following the start of the first intifada, the nonviolent civil disobedience movement created by Hanna Siniora, Mubarak Awad, and a few other Palestinian leaders spread during the year 1988.⁵⁴⁴ A boycott of Israeli soft drinks and cigarettes was announced.⁵⁴⁵ Disturbances were scattered across the OPT, and a few armed cells were discovered in the Gaza Strip.⁵⁴⁶ The Israeli government endorsed the *iron fist policy* to restore public order.⁵⁴⁷ Later, the Defense Minister Rabin announced a new policy of *might, power and beating* to replace the use of live ammunition for quelling riots.⁵⁴⁸ Many fractures and head

533.30.01.1989 - 05.11.1990: S28 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991a)

534.17.02.1992: S34 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992c) and 06.09.1992: S36 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993a)

535.06.11.1988: S20 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989a) and 29.03.1989: S22 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989c)

536.07.08.1989: S23 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989d)

537.05.03.1990: S26 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990c)

538.09.03.1990: S26 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990c)

539.10.04.1990: S30 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991c)

540.21.05.1990: S27 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990d) and 02.01.1992: S33 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992b)

541.01.01.1992: S33 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992b)

542.08.11.1993: S40 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994a)

543. (Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

544.05.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

545.07.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

546.08.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

547.10.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

548.19.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

wounds were reported.⁵⁴⁹ The number of Palestinian casualties, three months after the start of this first intifada, amounted to 75 people killed and more than 1'000 injured.⁵⁵⁰ The UNC called for Palestinians working with or for the Israeli authorities to resign from their function and 200 policemen as well as 19 village league members resigned.⁵⁵¹ The UNC also called to confront the IDF and attack Israeli appointed mayors.⁵⁵² During the same year, King Hussein of Jordan surrendered his claim of sovereignty over the West Bank.⁵⁵³ In 1989, Defense Minister Rabin issued orders to the IDF easing open fire regulations and allowing the demolition or the sealing of homes of stone throwers.⁵⁵⁴ The Israeli Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor, stated that, since the outbreak of the Intifada, 600 Palestinians had been killed, 10'000 wounded, over 40'000 placed under detention, 60 deported, and 350 houses demolished.⁵⁵⁵ The Minister of Justice further asserted that deportations were the best weapon to counter the intifada.⁵⁵⁶

In 1990, the Palestinians perceived a new emerging threat. During the first six months of 1990, 48'276 Soviet Jews emigrated to Israel.⁵⁵⁷ Leaflets from Hamas and the UNC called for attacks on settlers, mentioning that the settlements of Soviet Jews threatened the survival of the Palestinian people.⁵⁵⁸ The PIJ similarly called for attacks against Soviet settlers.⁵⁵⁹ The SMOs also perceived the threat posed by collaborators. In 1992, the NGO Amnesty International estimated that 170 Palestinians, most of them suspected collaborators, were killed by other Palestinians.⁵⁶⁰ In an effort to prevent infiltration of SMO cadres into Israel, the construction of a 52 km security fence surrounding the Gaza Strip started in 1993.⁵⁶¹ To further protect settlements, the IDF formally established Jewish civil guard units. Those settlers units were considered as reservists and operated under IDF control.⁵⁶² They were granted limited policing power, allowing them to search, detain, and arrest suspected Palestinians activists.⁵⁶³ In March of the same year, the Council of Jewish Settlements in West Bank and Gaza called on settlers to open fire if attacked with stones.⁵⁶⁴ At the end of the year, the Israeli-Palestinian declaration of principles focusing on the establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority in the Gaza Strip and Jericho was signed.⁵⁶⁵ The National Islamic Front, composed by Hamas, PIJ, DFLP, and PLFP, was founded in Damascus to counter it. Despite the opposition of the front, 68% of Palestinians still supported the agreement.⁵⁶⁶

In Israel, in the wake of the first intifada, the support for the right wing party Likud rose from 33% to 39%, during the first three months of 1988.⁵⁶⁷ A poll revealed, at the time, that 60% of Israeli citizens were willing to trade some land in the OPT for peace.⁵⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the support for the right wing was negatively altered with the continuation of the intifada. The propor-

549.21.01.1988 - 21.01.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

550.29.02.1988 - 11.02.1988: S17 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b)

551.14.03.1988: S18 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988c)

552.30.04.1988: S18 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988c)

553.31.07.1988: S20 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989a)

554.17.01.1989: S21 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989b)

555.17.11.1989: S35 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992d)

556.24.08.1989: S24 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990a)

557.19.07.1990: S27 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990d)

558.14.02.1990: S25 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990b)

559.06.05.1990: S26 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990c)

560.09.07.1992: S35 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992d)

561.03.01.1993: S37 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993b)

562.28.01.1992 - 31.01.1992: S33 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992b)

563.01.03.1993: S38 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993c) and 20.02.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c)

564.02.03.1993: S38 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993c)

565.13.09.1993: S40 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994a)

566.09.10.1993 - 24.09.1993: S40 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994a)

567.06.05.1988: S18 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988c)

568.14.10.1988: S20 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989a)

tion of Israelis ready to trade land for peace grew from 60% in 1988 to 74% in 1991.⁵⁶⁹ As a result, the Labor party asserted its victory at the 1992 parliamentary elections and Yitzhak Rabin was elected Prime Minister.⁵⁷⁰ Responding to the peace negotiations, Prime Minister Rabin called for one year of settlement construction freeze and asked his finance minister to stop the release of funds for settlement construction.⁵⁷¹ Due to this break in settlement constructions, the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) began to monitor the threat posed by the development of a radical and paramilitary Jewish underground.⁵⁷²

Economic situation: The first intifada exerted a heavy cost on the Israeli economy. In 1988, Defense Minister Rabin stated that the Israeli economy is in danger.⁵⁷³ For 1988, the bank of Israel assessed the economic cost of the intifada to be approximately US\$ 650 million.⁵⁷⁴ The standard of living within the OPT dropped by approximately 40%.⁵⁷⁵ Due to the support of the PLO to Saddam Hussein during the Gulf war, Arafat stated that the PLO funding from Arab states had decreased by more than 80%.⁵⁷⁶

Following the description of the context in which interactions between actors occurred during this second period, the hazard rates of external factors on conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest shall be addressed in the following subsections.

569.10.11.1991: S32 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992a)
570.23.06.1992: S35 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992d)
571.30.06.1992 - 07.02.1992: S35 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992d)
572.09.05.1993: S38 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993c)
573.07.04.1988: S19 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988d)
574.31.05.1989: S23 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989d)
575.30.05.1989: S23 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989d)
576.29.03.1991: S30 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991c)

7.2.2. Conventional forms

Table 30 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCv, period 2⁵⁷⁷

Form: Conventional, Period: 2, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.033 (0.017)	0.232*** (0.050)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X t	0.067*** (0.012)	0.056*** (0.012)
Conventional Protest 15_21	0.355* (0.143)	0.713*** (0.175)
Injured: Isr 0_7	0.395* (0.155)	0.342* (0.154)
Injured: Isr 8_14	0.078*** (0.011)	0.080*** (0.010)
Injured: Isr 8_14 (spike)	0.275 (0.154)	0.261 (0.155)
Killed: Isr 8_14	-0.870*** (0.167)	-0.776*** (0.170)
Deportation: Isr 0_7	-0.288* (0.133)	-0.282* (0.133)
Policing: Isr 0_7	0.379*** (0.108)	0.370*** (0.108)
Restriction eased: Isr 0_7	0.293** (0.097)	0.298** (0.097)
Riot: Settler 0_7	-0.555*** (0.151)	-0.517*** (0.151)
Destruction: Settler 8_14	-0.498** (0.156)	-0.445** (0.155)
Killed: Settler 8_14	-0.531*** (0.153)	-0.541*** (0.153)
Delict: Settler 0_7	0.856*** (0.225)	0.805*** (0.225)
Ground operation: Settler 0_7	0.423** (0.138)	0.436** (0.138)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	-0.268* (0.127)	-0.256* (0.127)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.347* (0.143)	0.392** (0.143)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.044 (0.176)	0.074 (0.175)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=4	0.677*** (0.167)	0.716*** (0.167)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Conventional Protest 15_21		-0.190*** (0.044)
R-squared	0.276	0.282
N	1922	1922

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

577.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 31 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCv, period 2

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCv1_7Co	1.261652	.0627042	4.68	0.000	1.14455	1.390735
FCv1_7Co_t	1.057703	.0126214	4.70	0.000	1.033252	1.082732
FCv15_21D	2.03938	.3571146	4.07	0.000	1.446921	2.874429
InjI0_7D	1.407706	.217488	2.21	0.027	1.039927	1.905553
InjI8_14C	1.08314	.0113486	7.62	0.000	1.061124	1.105612
InjI8_14D	1.29779	.2009797	1.68	0.092	.9580426	1.758021
KillI8_14D	.4604461	.0781279	-4.57	0.000	.3301779	.6421102
DeportI0_7Do	.7544462	.0999975	-2.13	0.034	.5818437	.9782507
PolI0_7Do	1.447067	.1569467	3.41	0.001	1.169954	1.789817
EasI0_7D	1.347275	.1311568	3.06	0.002	1.113248	1.630498
RiotS0_7Do	.5963489	.0898517	-3.43	0.001	.4438642	.8012181
DesS8_14Do	.6407423	.0999058	-2.88	0.004	.473248	.8675172
KillS8_14Do	.5820703	.0892984	-3.53	0.000	.4309117	.7862535
Delis0_7Do	2.236925	.5035794	3.58	0.000	1.438891	3.477563
OfGrS0_7Do	1.546367	.2134707	3.16	0.002	1.179797	2.026834
ArrestI0_7Ca						
1	.7745172	.0980993	-2.02	0.044	.6042533	.9927574
2	1.479908	.211666	2.74	0.006	1.118125	1.95875
3	1.076919	.1883253	0.42	0.672	.7644166	1.517177
4	2.045914	.342384	4.28	0.000	1.473801	2.840116
FCv1_7CoXFCv15_21D	.8269512	.0366607	-4.29	0.000	.7581307	.9020191

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Casualties highlight different types of effects on the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. Casualties killed either by Israeli forces (*KillI8_14D*) or by settlers (*KillS8_14Do*) are shown to decrease the rate of conventional forms of protest by approximately 50% with delayed effects (span 8-14). On the other hand, contrary to casualties killed, casualties injured (*InjI0_7D*) increase the rate of conventional forms of protest by 41% with immediate effect (span 0-7).

Policing operations carried out by Israeli forces (*PolI0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate of conventional occurrences by 45%, while deportations (*DeportI0_7Do*) lower the hazard rate by 25%. Both exhibit immediate effects on the hazard rate (span 0-7). During this period, ease of restrictions (*EasI0_7D*) increased the hazard rate by 35% with immediate effects as well.

Settlers committing riots (*RiotS0_7Do*) decrease the hazard rate of conventional occurrences by approximately 40%, while committing acts of destruction (*DesS8_14Do*) lessen it by 36%. On the other hand, ground operations carried out by settlers (*OfGrS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 54%, and delicts committed by settlers (*Delis0_7Do*) expand it by 123%.

b) Categorical variables

Arrests (*Arrest10_7Ca*) do not deter conventional forms of protest during this period, as the larger the number of arrests, the higher the effect on the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest that can double for four and more arrests.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The negative interaction coefficient between conventional protest span 1-7 and span 15-21 (*FCv1_7CoXFCv15_21D*), highlights the fact that when one goes up the other goes down, perfectly demonstrating the curve of theoretical power described in the theoretical chapter of this work.⁵⁷⁸

578. See Chapter 3 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN TIME Sequence management (p. 39)

7.2.3. Confrontational forms

Table 32 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCf, period 2⁵⁷⁹

Form: Confrontational, Period: 2, Theater: all

	Modell
Confrontational Protest 15_21	0.063*** (0.015)
Violent Protest 1_7	0.108*** (0.019)
Injured: Isr 0_7	0.078*** (0.020)
Ground operation: Isr 8_14	-0.096*** (0.024)
Ground operation: SLA 0_7	-0.426* (0.198)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7	0.637*** (0.178)
Policing: Isr 8_14	0.342 (0.195)
Destruction: Settler 0_7	0.526* (0.258)
Ground operation: Settler 8_14	0.592* (0.280)
Air operation: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	-0.598** (0.185)
Air operation: Isr 0_7/ Cases: >=2	0.441 (0.256)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 / Q2	1.244*** (0.240)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 / Q3	1.366*** (0.306)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 / Q4	1.205* (0.562)
Killed: Isr 0_7 / Q2	0.464* (0.223)
Killed: Isr 0_7 / Q3	-0.279 (0.265)
Killed: Isr 0_7 / Q4	0.668* (0.318)
R-squared	0.264
N	847

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

579.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 33 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCf, period 2

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCf15_21Co	1.065277	.0156068	4.32	0.000	1.035123	1.096309
FV1_7Co	1.114203	.0214374	5.62	0.000	1.072969	1.157022
InjI0_7Co	1.080606	.0219714	3.81	0.000	1.03839	1.124539
OfGrI0_14Co	.9081542	.0219716	-3.98	0.000	.8660957	.952255
OfGrL0_7Do	.6529889	.1290094	-2.16	0.031	.443339	.9617797
PolI0_14Do	1.407339	.2743366	1.75	0.080	.9604427	2.062176
RiotI0_7D	1.890286	.3371601	3.57	0.000	1.332611	2.68134
OfGrS0_14Do	1.808072	.5057773	2.12	0.034	1.044976	3.128418
DesS0_7Do	1.69266	.4366244	2.04	0.041	1.020941	2.806329
OfAiI0_7Ca						
1	.5499008	.1017832	-3.23	0.001	.3825888	.7903809
2	1.553772	.3979616	1.72	0.085	.9405291	2.56686
FCf1_7Co4						
2	3.470286	.8344468	5.17	0.000	2.166156	5.559564
3	3.921417	1.2012	4.46	0.000	2.151319	7.147947
4	3.33598	1.876485	2.14	0.032	1.107703	10.0467
KillI0_7Co4						
2	1.589654	.3539082	2.08	0.037	1.027537	2.459277
3	.7563418	.2005534	-1.05	0.292	.4497918	1.271817
4	1.950838	.6196187	2.10	0.035	1.046804	3.635608

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Riot operations conducted by Israeli forces (*RiotI0_7D*) expand the rate of confrontational forms of protest by 89% and their effect is immediate (span 0-7).⁵⁸⁰ Policing activities carried out by Israeli forces (*PolI0_14Do*) also expand the same hazard rate by 41% with delayed effects (span 8-14).

Destructions caused by settlers (*DesS0-7Do*) grow the hazard rate of confrontational occurrences by 69% with immediate effects (span 0-7). Delayed negative effects can also be observed with ground operations carried out by settlers (*OfGrS0_14Do*) that increase the hazard rate by 80%.

Ground operations conducted by SLA (*OfGrL0_7Do*) decrease the hazard rate of confrontational occurrences by 35% with immediate effects (span 0-7).

b) Categorical variables

A single occurrence of air operations (*OfAiI0_7Ca = 1*) causes a decrease in the rate of confrontational forms of protest, while a number of occurrences higher than one (*OfAiI0_7Ca = 2*), provoke an increase of the same rate by 55%.

580. Contrary to period 1, the interaction terms between riot operation and confrontational forms were not significant at the 5% level.

The quartile variable confrontational protest (span 1-7) (*FCfl_7Co4*) indicates a strong influence of momentum. Higher levels of confrontational protests increase the hazard rate by three to almost four times, when compared to that of the referent first quartile. Therefore, the higher the number of confrontational protests, the stronger the impact of momentum on the hazard rate.

The quartile variable casualties killed by Israeli forces (span 0-7) (*KillI0_7Co4*) signals that the higher the number of casualties, the more impact on the hazard rate of confrontational forms protest. The hazard rate can almost double in higher categories (*KillI0_7Co4 = 2 or 4*).

c) Continuous and interaction variables

One ground operation conducted by Israeli forces (*OfGrI8_14Co*) decreases the hazard rate of confrontational occurrences by 9%, with delayed effect (span 8-14).

One violent protest (*FVI_7Co*) increases the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 11%. Violent protest does not suppress milder forms of protest during this second period.

For each case of injury caused by Israeli forces (*InjI0_7Co*), an increase of respectively 8% occurs on the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest.

7.2.4. Violent forms

Table 34 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FV, period 2⁵⁸¹

Form: Violent, Period: 2, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Violent Protest 1_7	0.006 (0.061)	-0.240* (0.096)
Violent Protest 1_7 X t	0.095*** (0.025)	0.212*** (0.035)
Violent Protest 8_14	-0.116** (0.037)	-0.164*** (0.052)
Violent Protest 8_14 X t	0.059*** (0.013)	0.095*** (0.016)
Confrontational Protest 15_21	0.393** (0.152)	0.394* (0.154)
Movement Restriction: Isr 8_14	-0.462*** (0.134)	-0.484*** (0.134)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.068 (0.147)	0.038 (0.147)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.502* (0.204)	0.528* (0.205)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=3	0.777*** (0.196)	-0.617 (0.589)
Riot: Settler 0_7	0.402* (0.166)	0.430* (0.170)
Deportation: Isr 15_21	-0.671** (0.218)	-0.603** (0.219)
Violent Protest 1_7 X Violent Protest 8_14		0.042*** (0.010)
Violent Protest 1_7 X Violent Protest 8_14 X t		-0.021*** (0.004)
Violent Protest 1_7 X Arrest 0_7 / Cases: >=3		0.110* (0.044)
R-squared	0.164	0.178
N	2064	2064

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

581.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 35 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FV, period 2

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FV1_7Co	.7862497	.0753664	-2.51	0.012	.6515806	.9487523
FV1_7Co_t	1.235956	.043852	5.97	0.000	1.152928	1.324963
FV8_14Co	.8488282	.0444985	-3.13	0.002	.7659438	.9406816
FV8_14Co_t	1.099359	.0175723	5.93	0.000	1.065452	1.134345
FCf15_21Do	1.483559	.2285447	2.56	0.010	1.096922	2.006475
MvtI8_14Do	.6161975	.0824904	-3.62	0.000	.4739904	.8010698
ArrestI0_7Ca						
1	1.038799	.1531788	0.26	0.796	.7780639	1.386908
2	1.696318	.3484493	2.57	0.010	1.134116	2.537213
3	.5392954	.3176476	-1.05	0.294	.1700062	1.710758
RiotS0_7Do	1.537595	.2616482	2.53	0.011	1.101528	2.146291
DeportI15_21Do	.5469889	.1199327	-2.75	0.006	.3559132	.8406454
FV1_7XFV8_14	1.042969	.01075	4.08	0.000	1.022111	1.064253
FV1_7XFV8_14_t	.9791288	.0042096	-4.91	0.000	.9709127	.9874143
FV1_7XArrestI0_7_3	1.116178	.0487818	2.51	0.012	1.024548	1.216003

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Riots waged by settlers (*RiotS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 54%. The effect is immediate (span 0-7).

Delayed effects of up to two weeks can be observed with confrontational protests (*FCf15_21Do*) that increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 48%.

On the other hand, restrictions of movement conducted by Israeli forces (*MvtI8_14Do*) and deportations *DeportI15_21Do* are shown to significantly decrease the hazard rates of violent occurrences. Their respective effects are delayed in time (spans 8-14 and 15-21)

b) Categorical variables

Arrests conducted by Israeli security forces (*ArrestI0_7Ca*) may further expand the hazard rate of violent occurrences. One case of arrest during the preceding week does not produce any significant result. However, with two cases of arrest, the hazard rate increases by 70%. When three or more arrests are conducted they become correlated with the level of violent protest of the same week (*FV1_7XArrestI0_7_3*). From a theoretical perspective, this interaction makes sense as generally higher level of violence imply higher levels of arrests.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The effects on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest, from violent protests waged during the same week (span 1-7) and violent protests waged during the previous week (span 8-14), differ between themselves and through time.

The interaction tables (*FV1_7XFV8_14_t*) included in the appendix (p. 247) highlight that after two days of the occurrence of a violent form of protest, an increase of one event in violent protest during the same week (span 1-7) expands the hazard rates of violent forms of protest by 20%. By comparison, the growth would be of only 2% if the same violent protest event occurred during the previous week (span 8-14).

7.3 PERIOD 3

7.3.1. Context

Lebanese theater: In South Lebanon, the SLA was defeated in Tallusa by the constant improvements in tactics made by Hizballah.⁵⁸² Hizballah and Amal further held unity and coordination meetings to conduct joint attacks against the IDF and the SLA.⁵⁸³ In 2000, the IDF withdrew from South Lebanon and Hizballah retook the vacated areas.⁵⁸⁴

Jewish settlements: On February 25 1994, an Israeli settler named Baruch Goldstein entered the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron with an assault rifle. He killed 29 moslem worshipers and wounded 125.⁵⁸⁵ Following talks of the Israeli cabinet discussing the eventuality of removing settlers from the city of Hebron, Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren issued a ruling stating that such an act would require settlers to resist until death.⁵⁸⁶

Despite the fact that Arafat threatened to end negotiations, settlement construction within the OPT inflated during this period.⁵⁸⁷ In 1995, Prime Minister Rabin stated that the government would carry on with the construction of settlements in East Jerusalem.⁵⁸⁸ In 1996, after the election of Prime Minister Netanyahu, the Israeli cabinet decided to further increase the pace by lifting diverse restrictions on settlement building and reinstating subsidies for West Bank settlers, such as tax cuts and business grants.⁵⁸⁹ In 1997, Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet endorsed the construction of 6'500 housing units for 30'000 settlers in the settlement of Har Homa in East Jerusalem.⁵⁹⁰ Those facts prompted the UNGA to adopt a resolution condemning the Israeli settlement policy.⁵⁹¹ In 1998, the settlement process was further enlarged.⁵⁹² During a visit to West Bank settlements, Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that the dry days were over and that the policy was to grow and expand. He asked settlers to coordinate the process behind closed doors with the army.⁵⁹³ The same year, the Israeli Housing Ministry confirmed plans for 15'000 new housing units over the next two years, 60% of them in East Jerusalem.⁵⁹⁴ The tax cut incentives of 5% to 20% for settlements were extended until the year 2000, and the Knesset financing committee increased the construction budget for West Bank settlements by US\$ 524.6 million.⁵⁹⁵ In 2000, the settler population was estimated at 192'976 for the West Bank, 172'250 for East Jerusalem and 15'955 for the Golan Heights. The

582.17.02.1995: S46 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995c)

583.08.02.1996: S49 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996b) and 21.07.1998: S59 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998d)

584.22.05.2000: S67 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000d)

585.(Omer-Man, 2012), (Friedman, 2005)

586.06.03.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c) / 29.03.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c)

587.26.09.1994: S44 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995a) / 25.06.1994: S43 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994d) / 26.09.1994: S44 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995a) / 29.10.1996: S52 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997a) / 27.09.1999: S64 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000a) / 04.01.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

588.10.01.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

589.02.08.1996: S51 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996d) / 13.12.1996: S53 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997b)

590.19.02.1997: S53 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997b) and 14.03.1997: S54 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997c) / 04.09.1997: S56 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998a)

591.15.07.1997: S55 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997d)

592.16.12.1998: S61 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999b)

593.24.11.1998: S61 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999b)

594.27.01.1998: S57 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998b)

595.28.12.1998: S61 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999b) and 24.06.1998: S59 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998d) / 23.10.1996: S52 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997a)

total amount of settlers in the OPT increased during this period from 277'000 in 1993 to 381'181 in 2000.⁵⁹⁶

Palestinian - Israeli events: The support of the Palestinians for the Oslo Accords and the follow-up treaty concerning the Palestinian self rule in Gaza and Jericho, dropped from 68% in 1993, to 45% in 1994.⁵⁹⁷ The Fatah Hawks stated that they would no longer obey to the orders given by PLO chairman Arafat, and that they would escalate the struggle.⁵⁹⁸ The security situation within Israel worsened with the occurrence of a suicide bombing campaign started in April 1994, presented as a revenge for the Goldstein massacre.⁵⁹⁹ In response, Israel sealed the OPT and outlawed Hamas and PIJ charities.⁶⁰⁰ 1'500 Palestinians were arrested and the length of the administrative detention was extended from six months to one year.⁶⁰¹ Prime minister Rabin also suggested to build a security fence to separate Israel from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.⁶⁰² The Palestinian Authority (PA) reacted by incarcerating the authors of bombings.⁶⁰³ The opposition to the peace process also grew within the ranks of the Jewish settler community, who did not want to relinquish its pretensions on the OPT.⁶⁰⁴ In October 1995, the Shin Bet noted a growth in the number of attempts to attack Israeli political figures; waged by members of the Jewish right wing.⁶⁰⁵ The prediction was highly accurate, as three weeks later Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated in Tel Aviv by an Israeli citizen with ties to extremist settlers.⁶⁰⁶

In 1996, in the wake of a Hamas suicide bombing carried out on a bus in Jerusalem, Prime Minister Peres vowed to seal or destroy the houses of the bomber families and called for a total war on Hamas.⁶⁰⁷ The PA further detained 900 Hamas and PIJ members, including 35 of the 37 cadres wanted by Israel.⁶⁰⁸ In April of the same year, Hizballah fired rockets across the Northern border. The IDF launched *Operation Grapes of Wrath* that consisted of 17 days of extensive air raids and shelling on targets located in South Lebanon, the Beqaa Valley and Beirut.⁶⁰⁹ In September, despite the Shin Bet advices urging him not to do so, Prime Minister Netanyahu opened the Western Wall tunnel.⁶¹⁰ Thereafter, Palestinian riots triggered by allegations of Jews undermining Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), degenerated into gun battles killing 54 Palestinians and 14 Israeli soldiers.⁶¹¹ Dissensions related to the righteousness of PA arrests of Palestinian cadres belonging to Palestinian SMOs also grew within the ranks of the Palestinian security forces. Many opposed the security cooperation with Israel and the arrests of Palestin-

596.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

597.24.09.1993: S40 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994a) and 14.01.1994: S41 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994b)

598.03.02.1994: S41 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998b)

599.07.04.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c) / 14.04.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c) and 19.10.1994: S44 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995a) and 16.11.1994: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

600.10.04.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c) / 23.01.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

601.24.01.1995 - 29.01.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

602.24.01.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

603.25.02.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c) / 22.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c)

604.11.10.1995: S48 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996a)

605.11.10.1995: S48 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996a)

606.04.11.1995: S48 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996a) and (Aronson, 1995)

607.03.03.1996 - 03.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c) / 04.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c) / 19.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c) / 14.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c)

608.22.03.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c)

609.14.04.1996: S50 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c)

610.26.09.1996: S52 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997a)

611.(Romey, 2000)

ian SMO cadres. In 1998, more than half of the 850 Palestinian police officers resigned.⁶¹² The Wye agreement was nevertheless ratified by the PA and the crack down on Islamists continued.⁶¹³ In 2000, the peace process failed at camp David.⁶¹⁴ In September of the same year, Ariel Sharon visited Haram al-Sharif and the riots that followed signalled the start of the second intifada.⁶¹⁵

Economic situation: In 1994 the unemployment rates in the OPT averaged 25%, with a peak of 40% in the Gaza Strip.⁶¹⁶ The sealing of the OPT during the same year created a shortage of labor (Palestinian workers) for Israel.⁶¹⁷

Following the description of the context in which interactions between actors occurred during this third period, the hazard rates of external factors on conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest shall be addressed in the following subsections.

612.13.03.1998: S58 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998c)

613.30.10.1998: S60 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999a) / 03.11.1998: S60 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999a) / 19.12.1994: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

614.25.07.2000: S67 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000d)

615.27.09.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

616.02.05.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c)

617.23.10.1994: S44 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995a) / At the beginning of the year 1995, the entry of 12'000 foreign workers (Thai) was facilitated. 08.02.1995: S45 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b)

7.3.2. Conventional forms

Table 36 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCv, period 3⁶¹⁸

Form: Conventional, Period: 3, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.037 (0.028)	-0.195** (0.069)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X t	0.106*** (0.014)	0.335*** (0.038)
Conventional Protest 8_14	-0.812*** (0.177)	-0.327 (0.228)
Conventional Protest 8_14 X t	0.352*** (0.041)	0.354*** (0.048)
Conventional Protest 15_21	-0.397* (0.157)	-0.217 (0.164)
Conventional Protest 15_21 X t	0.135*** (0.025)	0.126*** (0.025)
Arrest: PSF 15_21	-0.305* (0.128)	-0.247 (0.128)
Injured: PSF 15_21	-0.730** (0.276)	-0.698* (0.279)
Killed: PSF 0_7	0.740*** (0.214)	0.664** (0.214)
Injured: Settler 0_7	0.243 (0.162)	0.328* (0.162)
Riot: Settler 8_14	-0.295* (0.133)	-0.317* (0.133)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Conventional Protest 8_14		0.218** (0.071)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Conventional Protest 8_14 X t		-0.240*** (0.038)
R-squared	0.146	0.164
N	2456	2456

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

618.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 37 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCv, period 3

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCv1_7Co	.8225083	.0564005	-2.85	0.004	.7190718	.9408238
FCv1_7Co_t	1.398186	.0536909	8.73	0.000	1.296817	1.50748
FCv8_14Do	.7212067	.1642436	-1.44	0.151	.4615426	1.126958
FCv8_14Do_t	1.424337	.0688383	7.32	0.000	1.295609	1.565854
FCv15_21Do	.8046698	.1321972	-1.32	0.186	.5831441	1.110349
FCv15_21Do_t	1.133791	.0286801	4.96	0.000	1.07895	1.19142
ArrestP15_21Do	.7811856	.1003716	-1.92	0.055	.6072767	1.004898
InjP15_21Do	.4976666	.1390298	-2.50	0.012	.2878352	.8604647
KillP0_7Do	1.942922	.4149712	3.11	0.002	1.278365	2.952948
InjS0_7Do	1.388777	.2251608	2.03	0.043	1.010714	1.908257
RiotS8_14Do	.7283428	.0970479	-2.38	0.017	.5609416	.9457013
FCv1_7CoXFCv8_14Do	1.243038	.0879324	3.08	0.002	1.082107	1.427901
FCv1_7CoXFCv8_14Do_t	.7866893	.0301412	-6.26	0.000	.7297773	.8480396

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Arrests (*ArrestP15_21Do*) and injured (*InjP15-21Do*) by the PSF have a net effect on the decrease of the hazard rate related to conventional forms of protest. On the other hand, when people get killed by the same force (*KillP0_7Do*), the hazard rate of conventional occurrence increases by 94%.

Casualties injured by settlers (*InjS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate by 39% with immediate effects (span 0-7). On the other hand, riots carried out by settlers (*RiotS8_14Do*) highlight a decrease by 27% of the hazard rate (span 8-14).

b) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 248) highlight the effects of momentum. Growths in conventional protest span 1-7 or 8-14 (*FCv1CoXFCv8_14Do_t*) expand the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. The hazard rate grows with time.

7.3.3. Confrontational forms

Table 38 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCf, period 3⁶¹⁹

Form: Confrontational, Period: 3, Theater: all

	Model1
Confrontational Protest 1_7	0.155*** (0.021)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 (spike)	38.629 .
Confrontational Protest 8_14	-0.720*** (0.199)
Confrontational Protest 8_14 X t	0.367*** (0.048)
Riot operation: PSF 8_14	-0.379* (0.191)
Arrest: PSF 15_21	-0.465*** (0.138)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7	0.596*** (0.148)
Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7 X t	-0.035* (0.015)
R-squared	0.241
N	2393

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

619.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 39 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCf, period 3⁶²⁰

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCf1_7C	1.167524	.0242278	7.46	0.000	1.120991	1.215989
FCf1_7D	5.98e+16
FCf8_14D	.4867559	.0969458	-3.62	0.000	.3294426	.7191884
FCf8_14D_t	1.442939	.0697014	7.59	0.000	1.312595	1.586227
RiotP8_14Do	.6843191	.1305064	-1.99	0.047	.4708972	.9944689
ArrestP15_21Do	.6278278	.0864754	-3.38	0.001	.4792898	.8223996
AdmI0_7Do	1.813941	.2677953	4.03	0.000	1.358184	2.422632
AdmI0_7Do_t	.966059	.0141064	-2.36	0.018	.9388029	.9941064

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Riot operations (*RiotP8_14 Do*) and arrests (*ArrestP15_21Do*) carried out by the PSF have an indisputable impact on the reduction of the hazard rate related to confrontational forms of protest during this period. Their riot operations lower the hazard rate by 32% and their arrests by 37%.

b) Continuous and interaction variables

The immediate effect (span 1-7) of one confrontational protest (*FCf1_7C*) is an increase of 17% in the subsequent hazard rate.

The delayed effect (span 8-14) of one confrontational protest (*FCf8_14D_t*) varies with time. As the interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 249) display, the larger the interval in days, the higher the effects on the hazard rate.

Administrative restrictions carried out by Israel (*AdmI0_7Do_t*) that interact with time, depict a decreasing hazard rate. The larger the interval in days, the lower the effect on the hazard rate. However, even if a decreasing trend is observed, it should be noted that administrative restrictions are not significant past ten days and that they still increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest between 30% to 70% during the first period of 0 to 10 days.

620.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

7.3.4. Violent forms

Table 40 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FV, period 3⁶²¹

Form: Violent, Period: 3, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Violent Protest 1_7	0.082** (0.027)	-0.214 (0.155)
Violent Protest 1_7 X t	0.087*** (0.011)	0.326*** (0.049)
Violent Protest 8_14	-0.008 (0.238)	0.482 (0.454)
Violent Protest 8_14 X t	0.174** (0.053)	0.240** (0.088)
Delict Settler 0_7	0.457** (0.174)	0.451** (0.174)
Violent Protest 1_7 X Violent Protest 8_14		0.295 (0.155)
Violent Protest 1_7 X Violent Protest 8_14 X t		-0.241*** (0.048)
R-squared	0.138	0.150
N	2503	2503

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

621.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 41 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FV, period 3⁶²²

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FV1_7Co	.8070896	.1250162	-1.38	0.166	.5957618	1.093379
FV1_7Co_t	1.385609	.0677695	6.67	0.000	1.258951	1.52501
FV8_14Do	1.619041	.7354125	1.06	0.289	.6646897	3.943635
FV8_14Do_t	1.270871	.1123332	2.71	0.007	1.068718	1.511262
Delis0_7Do	1.569809	.273822	2.59	0.010	1.115248	2.209642
FV1_7CoXFV8_14Do	1.343057	.2076076	1.91	0.056	.9920119	1.818326
FV1_7CoXFV8_14Do_t	.7857675	.037835	-5.01	0.000	.7150038	.8635346

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

The delicts committed by settlers (*Delis0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 57%. Their effects are immediate (span 0-7).

b) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 250) highlight the effects of momentum (*FV1_7CoXFV8_14Do_t*). Violent protests occurring during the preceding weeks increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest. The higher the intervals in days, the higher the hazard.

622.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

7.4 PERIOD 4

7.4.1. Context

Lebanese theater: In South Lebanon, the year 2000 is marked by the IDF withdrawal and the retaking of the vacated areas by Hizballah.⁶²³

Jewish settlements: The settlements in the OPT kept growing.⁶²⁴ In 2003, the Israeli Housing Ministry approved the construction of approximately 2'933 new housing units located in the West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements.⁶²⁵ In 2004, the Israeli Agriculture Ministry ordered the planting of 72'000 olives trees around settlements in the OPT, in order to transfer the ownership of the land into Jewish hands.⁶²⁶ The Defense Ministry also approved the construction of new places of residence for settlers in East Jerusalem.⁶²⁷ In 2005, settlement construction kept expanding, approved by Prime Minister Sharon and the Israeli Housing Ministry.⁶²⁸ In 2006, the settler population was estimated at 268'400 for the West Bank, 186'857 for East Jerusalem and 18'105 for the Golan Heights. The total amount of settlers in the OPT increased during this fourth period from 381'181 in 2000 to 473'362 in 2006.⁶²⁹

Palestinian - Israeli events: In the wake of the visit of Ariel Sharon on Haram al-Sharif, the security situation worsened in the OPT.⁶³⁰ Thousands Palestinians protested at different locations at the same time. The Palestinian means of action ranged from throwing stones, burning tires, to a few cases of live fire incidents; all major traffic arteries were blocked.⁶³¹ Prime minister Barak authorised the use of all means in order to quell the riots and save Israeli lives.⁶³² The IDF eased open-fire regulation and the Israeli government further warned that if clashes did not abate, the IDF would target Arafat's offices, his police stations and his top commanders.⁶³³ Prime Minister Barak approved the building of a security fence along the green line.⁶³⁴ Following Israeli air strikes on PA police stations, Hamas and PIJ prisoners were released by the PSF.⁶³⁵ The situation kept escalating; the National and Islamic Higher Committee for the follow-up of the intifada (NIHC) started to distribute leaflets in the OPT enjoining people to focus on attacks against IDF and settlers, to form local committees for the mobilization of masses, and to boycott Israeli and American goods.⁶³⁶ In 2001, despite Arafat's command to disband the resistance committees, Fatah Tanzim, Hamas, PIJ, and PFLP refused to follow the order.⁶³⁷ Thereafter, Prime Minister Sharon gave full freedom of action to the IDF for acting against Palestinian militants.⁶³⁸ A few months later, the Israeli cabinet implemented a new strategy designed to make Arafat choose between the full destruction of the PA or a cease

623.22.05.2000: S67 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000d)

624.11.09.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a) / 03.02.2003: S77 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003b)

625.01.06.2003: S79 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003d) and 02.10.2003 - 23.10.2003: S80 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004a)

626.27.07.2004: S83 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004d)

627.02.08.2004: S83 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004d)

628.21.03.2005: S86 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005c) / 05.09.2005 - 21.11.2005: S88 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006a) and 13.12.2005: S89 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006b) and 21.09.2006: S92 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007a)

629.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

630.29.09.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

631.(Or Commission, 2004, p. 29)

632.02.10.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

633.04.10.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a) / 08.10.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

634.13.10.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a) and 26.12.2000: S69 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001b)

635.12.10.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

636.05.11.2000: S68 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a)

637.29.04.2001: S70 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001c)

638.01.05.2001: S70 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001c)

fire.⁶³⁹ Owing to the effectiveness of the Israeli targeted killing campaign, Hamas, PIJ, and AMB offered to halt suicide bombings operations conducted within Israel, in exchange of a stop of the assassination campaign targeting their members.⁶⁴⁰

In March 2002, the IDF launched *Operation Defensive Shield*.⁶⁴¹ More than 5'000 Palestinians were detained in less than three weeks.⁶⁴² At the end of the operation, the IDF pulled out from the main Palestinian cities and divided the West Bank into eight isolated zones, imposing restrictions of movement on the Palestinian population. Those eight zones were Bethlehem, Hebron, Jericho, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm.⁶⁴³ The Mayor of Nablus still called his residents to conduct civil disobedience actions, instructing the population to disregard Israeli curfew orders.⁶⁴⁴ In 2003, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin publicly stated that Hamas would consider kidnapping Israelis in order to exchange them against the release of their cadres from Israeli jails.⁶⁴⁵ Bending again under the pressure of the Israeli targeted killing campaign, Hamas and PIJ later offered to halt bombings inside Israel if their members stopped being killed.⁶⁴⁶ In 2004, Prime Minister Sharon authorised the IDF to eliminate the top leadership of all terror organizations. Both cofounders of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel al-Rantissi, were killed.⁶⁴⁷ Following the growth of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip, Defense Minister Mofaz approved the expansion of targeted killings to SMO cadres and the creation of a buffer zone in the North of the Gaza Strip.⁶⁴⁸ In 2005, the Palestinian SMOs agreed to an informal month of truce and President Abbas pledged Israel to stop the targeted killing of SMO members.⁶⁴⁹ Ten months later, the PIJ offered again to halt its rockets attacks from the Gaza Strip, if Israel stopped assassinating their cadres.⁶⁵⁰ The unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was voted by the Israeli cabinet in September 2005.⁶⁵¹

Economic situation: In 2003 the prices of goods in the Gaza Strip soared. It increased by 53% for flour, by 24% for oil, and by 17% for bread.⁶⁵²

Following the description of the context in which interactions between actors occurred during this fourth period, the hazard rates of external factors on conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest shall be addressed in the following subsections.

639.09.08.2001: S71 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001d)
640.17.12.2001: S73 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002b)
641.28.03.2002: S74 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002c)
642.15.04.2002: S74 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002c)
643.07.05.2002: S74 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002c)
644.28.07.2002: S75 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002d)
645.12.01.2003: S77 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003b)
646.22.05.2003: S79 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003d)
647.22.03.2004 - 17.04.2004: S82 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004c)
648.04.12.2005 - 22.12.2005: S89 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006b)
649.24.01.2005: S85 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005b)
650.30.10.2005: S88 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006a)
651.11.09.2005: S88 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006a)
652.12.01.2003: S77 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003b)

7.4.2. Conventional forms

Table 42 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCv, period 4⁶⁵³

Form: Conventional, Period: 4, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.061** (0.023)	-0.173* (0.078)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X t	0.041*** (0.009)	0.304*** (0.037)
Conventional Protest 8_14	-0.750*** (0.208)	-0.184 (0.273)
Conventional Protest 8_14 X t	0.316*** (0.046)	0.333*** (0.059)
Violent Protest 8_14	-0.843* (0.331)	-0.996** (0.333)
Policing: Isr 0_7	0.477*** (0.137)	0.502*** (0.139)
Injured: Settler 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.157 (0.147)	0.171 (0.149)
Injured: Settler 0_7 / Cases: >= 2	0.410** (0.147)	0.456** (0.148)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Conventional Protest 8_14		0.223** (0.080)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Conventional Protest 8_14 X t		-0.265*** (0.037)
R-squared	0.130	0.159
N	1872	1872

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

653.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 43 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCv, period 4⁶⁵⁴

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCv1_7Co	.8412327	.0660144	-2.20	0.028	.7213059	.9810991
FCv1_7Co_t	1.355676	.0505816	8.16	0.000	1.260076	1.458529
FCv8_14Do	.8317721	.2272052	-0.67	0.500	.4869584	1.420747
FCv8_14Do_t	1.394466	.0826508	5.61	0.000	1.241529	1.566243
FV8_14Do	.369355	.1231392	-2.99	0.003	.1921595	.709947
PolI0_7D	1.65227	.2291352	3.62	0.000	1.259033	2.168327
InjS0_7Ca						
1	1.186181	.1763309	1.15	0.251	.8863724	1.587398
2	1.578374	.2336292	3.08	0.002	1.180907	2.109618
FCv1_7CoXFCv8_14Do	1.250354	.0999591	2.79	0.005	1.069015	1.462453
FCv1_7CoXFCv8_14Do_t	.7670988	.028474	-7.14	0.000	.7132725	.824987

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Policing activities conducted by Israeli forces (*PolI0_7D*) increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 65%.

Of note is the fact that violent protest discourage conventional forms of protest. Violent protest (*FV8_14Do*) decreases the hazard rate of conventional occurrence by 63%.

b) Categorical variables

Casualties injured by settlers (*InjS0_7Ca*) increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest with immediate effects (span 0-7). The larger the number of casualties injured by settlers, the higher the effects on the hazard rate that ranges from a growth of 19% in the case of one casualty, to 58% in the cases of more casualties.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 251) highlight that one increase in conventional protest in both spans (1-7 and 8-14) (*FCv1_7CoXFCv8_14Do_t*) expands the hazard rate by 84% on the second day and the hazard keeps rising as time goes.

654.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

7.4.3. Confrontational forms

Table 44 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCf, period 4⁶⁵⁵

Form: Confrontational, Period: 4, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Confrontational Protest 1_7	0.066** (0.025)	0.052 (0.040)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 X t	0.056*** (0.013)	0.128*** (0.021)
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.108 (0.093)	0.115 (0.092)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7	0.004 (0.035)	0.123** (0.044)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7 X t	0.023 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)
Riot operation: Isr 15_21	0.066*** (0.016)	0.051** (0.017)
Air operation: Isr 15_21	0.184* (0.081)	0.181* (0.081)
Destruction: Isr 15_21	0.515 (0.345)	0.791* (0.368)
Restriction eased: Isr 0_7	0.205* (0.084)	0.174* (0.084)
Arrest: PSF 15_21	-0.260* (0.120)	-0.246* (0.121)
Riot operation: PSF 15_21	0.971*** (0.191)	0.911*** (0.193)
Destruction: PSF 15_21	0.367* (0.170)	0.369* (0.171)
Policing: Settler 0_7	0.621* (0.242)	0.609* (0.242)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 1	0.212* (0.105)	0.254* (0.104)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: 2	0.284** (0.109)	0.269* (0.109)
Conventional Protest 15_21 / Cases: >=3	0.047 (0.128)	0.081 (0.128)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: 1	-0.009 (0.111)	0.056 (0.112)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: 2	-0.324** (0.113)	-0.259* (0.113)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14 / Cases: >=3	-0.308** (0.113)	-0.263* (0.113)
Riot oper: Isr 0_7 X Confrontational Protest 1_7		0.003 (0.004)
Riot oper: Isr 0_7 X Confrontational Protest 1_7 X t		-0.012*** (0.003)
R-squared	0.222	0.248
N	1939	1939

655.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 45 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCf, period 4⁶⁵⁶

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]
FCf1_7Co	1.053836	.0424307	1.30	0.193	.9738703 1.140368
FCf1_7Co_t	1.136982	.0242381	6.02	0.000	1.090455 1.185495
FCv1_7D	1.122094	.10378	1.25	0.213	.9360593 1.345101
RiotI0_7Co	1.130869	.049951	2.78	0.005	1.037085 1.233134
RiotI0_7Co_t	1.023107	.0145812	1.60	0.109	.9949234 1.052088
RiotI15_21Co	1.052346	.0175167	3.07	0.002	1.018568 1.087245
OfAiI15_21Do	1.198808	.0976315	2.23	0.026	1.021944 1.40628
DesI15_21Do	2.206091	.8116527	2.15	0.032	1.07264 4.53725
EasI0_7Do	1.18966	.0999115	2.07	0.039	1.009105 1.402522
ArrestP15_21Do	.7823029	.0947566	-2.03	0.043	.6169827 .9919206
RiotP15_21Do	2.486478	.4807303	4.71	0.000	1.702218 3.632068
DesP15_21Do	1.445996	.2473823	2.16	0.031	1.034053 2.022048
PolS0_7Do	1.839246	.4459202	2.51	0.012	1.143585 2.95809
FCv15_21CCa					
1	1.289746	.1345448	2.44	0.015	1.051254 1.582342
2	1.308116	.1427192	2.46	0.014	1.056277 1.619999
3	1.084447	.1385971	0.63	0.526	.8441528 1.393143
AdmI8_14CCa					
1	1.057712	.1182788	0.50	0.616	.8495362 1.316902
2	.7716217	.0870617	-2.30	0.022	.6185342 .9625984
3	.7684283	.0871597	-2.32	0.020	.6152548 .9597357
RiotI0_7CoXFCf1_7Co	1.003389	.004496	0.76	0.450	.9946154 1.01224
RiotI0_7CoXFCf1_7Co_t	.9877424	.0026014	-4.68	0.000	.9826569 .9928542

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Air operations carried out by Israeli forces (*OfAiI15_21Do*) increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 20%, while acts of destruction committed by the IDF (*DesI15_21Do*) expand the hazard rate by 121%. Their effects are delayed in time (span 15-21).

Ease of restrictions (*EasI0_7Do*) does not lessen the rate of confrontational forms of protest during this period. To the contrary, it increases the hazard rate by 19% (span 0-7).

Arrests conducted by the PSF (*ArrestP15_21Do*) decrease the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 22%. However, acts of destruction carried out by the PSF (*DesP15_21Do*) swell the hazard rate by 45% and their riot operations (*RiotP15_21Do*) increase the rate by 149%.

Settlers conducting policing operations (*PolS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate by 84%.

b) Categorical variables

One or more conventional protests (span 1-7) (*FCv1_7D*) increases the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 12%. The same is reported for one or two occurrences of con-

656. Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

ventional protest (span 15-21) (*FCv15_21CCa*), that expand the hazard rate of *Confrontational forms of protest* by approximately 30%. Nevertheless, three or more conventional protests do not produce any significant results on the hazard rate, highlighting a potential decline in the momentum effect of conventional protest past a certain threshold of activism related to conventional forms of protest.

Administrative restriction carried out by Israeli forces (*Adm18_14CCa*) reduce the hazard rate by approximately 22%.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 252) highlight that confrontational protest (span 1-7) contributes more to the growth of the hazard rate than riot operations (*Riot10_7CoXFCfl_7Co_t*). The immediate effects of one confrontational protest is an increase of the hazard rate by 36% after two days, while for one riot operation the growth amounts to only 18%. When both occur together during the same time period, the hazard rate increases by 58 % after two days.

7.4.4. Violent forms

Table 46 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FV, period 4⁶⁵⁷

Form: Violent, Period: 4, Theater: all

	Modell1
Violent Protest 1_7	0.189*** (0.015)
Destruction: Isr 15_21	-0.018 (0.025)
Destruction: Isr 15_21 X t	0.021* (0.009)
Injured: Isr 0_7	0.516* (0.261)
Administrative restriction: Isr 8_14	-0.379** (0.121)
Restriction movement: PSF 8_14	0.786* (0.327)
Day of the week: Monday	0.194 (0.194)
Day of the week: Tuesday	-0.009 (0.191)
Day of the week: Wednesday	-0.007 (0.208)
Day of the week: Thursday	0.110 (0.177)
Day of the week: Friday	0.192 (0.179)
Day of the week: Saturday	0.590** (0.197)
Ground operation: PSF / Cases: 1	0.359** (0.139)
Ground operation: PSF / Cases: >=2	0.124 (0.176)
Policing: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.082 (0.140)
Policing: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.518** (0.170)
Policing: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.067 (0.167)
Policing: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=4	0.140 (0.175)
R-squared	0.095
N	1944

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

657.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 47 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FV, period 4⁶⁵⁸

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FV1_7Co	1.208409	.0187114	12.23	0.000	1.172286	1.245645
DesI15_21Co	.9822317	.0248209	-0.71	0.478	.9347687	1.032105
DesI15_21Co_t	1.021143	.0088683	2.41	0.016	1.003908	1.038673
InjI0_7Do	1.675619	.4376914	1.98	0.048	1.004226	2.795884
AdmI8_14Do	.6844796	.0824945	-3.15	0.002	.5404711	.8668593
MvtP8_14Do	2.19509	.7167262	2.41	0.016	1.157508	4.162757
DowCa						
1	1.213998	.2358416	1.00	0.318	.8295766	1.77656
2	.9911929	.1892589	-0.05	0.963	.6817565	1.441077
3	.9931158	.206439	-0.03	0.973	.6607856	1.492585
4	1.115945	.1974139	0.62	0.535	.7889742	1.578421
5	1.211196	.2171924	1.07	0.285	.8522682	1.721283
6	1.804581	.3563059	2.99	0.003	1.225493	2.657309
OfGrP15_21Ca						
1	1.432511	.198845	2.59	0.010	1.091299	1.880408
2	1.131489	.1987869	0.70	0.482	.801874	1.596594
PolI0_7Ca						
1	1.084927	.1522241	0.58	0.561	.8240812	1.428338
2	1.679119	.2851546	3.05	0.002	1.203725	2.342265
3	1.069144	.1789676	0.40	0.690	.770106	1.4843
4	1.149948	.2015875	0.80	0.425	.8155707	1.621418

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Casualties injured by Israeli forces (*InjI0_7Do*) expand the hazard rate of violent occurrences by 68% and the effect is immediate (span 0-7).

Restrictions of movement (*MvtP8_14Do*) conducted by the PSF (span 8_14) increase the same hazard rate by 120%. On the other hand administrative restrictions (span 8-14) (*AdmI8_14Do*) reduce the hazard rate by 32%.

b) Categorical variables

Sunday (*DowCa6*), more than any other day of the week, displays the highest hazard rate of violent forms of protest and is related with a growth in the hazard rate of 80%.

Small scale ground operations conducted by the PSF (*OfGrP15_21Ca*) expand the hazard rate by 43% while larger deployment (≥ 2 ground operations) do not show any significant effect in this regard.

658.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The occurrence of one violent protest during the preceding week (span 1-7) (*FVI_7Co*) raises the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 21%.

The interaction table included in the appendix (p. 254) highlights the effects of acts of destruction committed by Israeli forces (*DesII5_21Co_t*) on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest. For one act of destruction committed (span 15-21), the hazard rate swells by 21% after 10 days, and by 49% after 20 days.

7.5 PERIOD 5

7.5.1. Context

Jewish settlements: In the OPT, the settlement process continued unabated. In 2007, the Israeli Jerusalem Construction and Planning Committee approved plans to build a new orthodox settlement neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, calling for the construction of 20'000 housing units.⁶⁵⁹ In 2008, the Israeli Housing Ministry approved the construction of thousands of places of residence for settlers, both in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.⁶⁶⁰ Following the election of Prime Minister Netanyahu, many other settlement constructions were authorised in East Jerusalem.⁶⁶¹ This decision was strongly criticised by the Palestinian Authority, the European Union, and the USA.⁶⁶² It did not have an effect on Israel settlement policy, as in 2010, the development of a new Jewish settlement neighbourhood in East Jerusalem was approved by the Israeli Authority and the settlement process kept growing.⁶⁶³ In 2010, the settler population was estimated at 314'132 for the West Bank, 198'629 for East Jerusalem and 19'797 for the Golan Heights. The total amount of settlers in the OPT increased during this fifth period from 473'362 in 2006 to 532'558 in 2010.⁶⁶⁴

Palestinian - Israeli events: In the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, the Hamas Change and Reform party won the majority scoring 74 seats (Fatah 45 seats, PFLP 3 seats).⁶⁶⁵ Refusing to submit to Hamas authority, the PA security officers took the control of the parliament building in Gaza.⁶⁶⁶ Tensions increased and Hamas acted on its own by creating a new force called the Executive Security Force (ESF). The ESF was made of Hamas and Palestinian Resistance Committee (PRC) members.⁶⁶⁷ On June 27, 2006, two days after the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Hamas, Israel launched the *Operation Summer Rains* in the Gaza Strip. It was the most significant ground operation conducted since the unilateral disengagement.⁶⁶⁸ A few days later, on July 12th, Hizballah kidnaped two IDF soldiers on the Northern Israeli border and fired rockets into Israel.⁶⁶⁹ Those events prompted Israel to launch its *Second Lebanon War* against Hizballah, that lasted 34 days.⁶⁷⁰

At the beginning of the year 2007, during the course of escalating tensions within the Gaza Strip, Fatah gunmen ordered Hamas to disband the ESF or face retaliations.⁶⁷¹ Hamas did not comply and further kidnapped Fatah members.⁶⁷² In June, Hamas took over the full control of the Gaza Strip by force, and 1'000 of Fatah's members fled, requesting Israel to allow their transfer to the West Bank.⁶⁷³ In 2008, the Israeli High Court of Justice supported the decision

659.10.05.2007: S94 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007c)

660.13.03.2008: S98 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008c) / 13.06.2008 - 09.07.2008: S99 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008d) and 31.03.2008: S98 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008c)

661.17.11.2009: S104 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010a) and 28.12.2009: S105 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010b)

662.28.12.2009: S105 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010b)

663.05.01.2010: S105 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010b) / 09.03.2010: S106 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010c) / 08.03.2010: S106 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010c) and 27.06.2010 - 02.08.2010: S107 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010d) and 14.09.2010: S108 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011b)

664.(Foundation for Middle East Peace, 2011)

665.25.01.2006: S89 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006b)

666.30.01.2006: S89 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006b)

667.17.05.2006: S91 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006d)

668.(Global Security, 2011a)

669.12.07.2006: S91 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006d) / (Global Security, 2011b)

670.(Charlaff, 2008)

671.07.01.2007: S93 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007b)

672.03.02.2007: S93 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007b) / 04.02.2007: S93 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007b)

673.12.06.2007 - 17.06.2007: S95 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007d)

of the Ministry of Defense to wage economic warfare against the Gaza Strip.⁶⁷⁴ Israel drastically reduced the electricity delivered and the sanitary situation deteriorated.⁶⁷⁵ The number of rockets fired from the Gaza Strip into Israel increased at the end of the year. On December 19 2008, the *Operation Cast Lead* was launched against SMOs operating in the strip.⁶⁷⁶ Airstrikes were followed by ground operations that ended in January 2009.⁶⁷⁷ After the operation, the blockade was maintained and the Israeli navy intercepted, at the end of the year, a boat coming from Egypt transporting Iranian weapons.⁶⁷⁸ In May 2010, an NGO flotilla of six boats tried to break through the blockade. They were intercepted by the Israeli security forces and nine passengers were killed during the boarding of one of the boats called *Mavi Marmara*.⁶⁷⁹ During the same year, the PA started to support conventional forms of protest, forbidding Palestinians to sell from a list of 500 products made in Jewish settlements, or be subjected to fines and jail penalties.⁶⁸⁰

The issue of collaborators remained a serious issue in the OPT. In 2008, an Hamas court in Gaza sentenced a Palestinian collaborator to death.⁶⁸¹ The following year, the PA did the same in Hebron, after the sale of private land by a Palestinian to a Jewish buyer.⁶⁸²

In the West Bank, tensions between settlers and the Israeli administration grew. In October 2008, clashes between the Israeli security forces and settlers occurred in Hebron. One of the Israeli policeman was seriously wounded and two settlers attempted to burn a police vehicle. They further rampaged through the Palestinian neighbourhood in revenge, slashing tires and vandalising a Moslem cemetery.⁶⁸³ This loss of control on the development of settler violence was also supported by the head of Shin Bet, who expressed his concern related to the growing probability of right-wing settlers attempting to assassinate pro-peace politicians.⁶⁸⁴

Following the description of the context in which interactions between actors occurred during this fifth period, the hazard rates of external factors on conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest shall be addressed in the following subsections.

674.30.01.2008: S97 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008b)

675.07.02.2008: S97 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008b) / 20.01.2008: S97 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008b)

676.27.12.2008: S102 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009b)

677.(Global Security, 2011c)

678.03.11.2009: S105 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010b)

679.27.05.2010: S106 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010c) / (Palmer, Uribe, Ciechanover Itzhar, & Özdem Sanberk, 2011, pp. 4-5)

680.18.05.2010: S107 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010d)

681.16.12.2008: S102 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009b)

682.28.04.2009: S103 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009c)

683.26.10.2008: S101 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009a)

684.26.10.2008: S101 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009a)

7.5.2. Conventional forms

Table 48 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCv, period 5⁶⁸⁵

Form: Conventional, Period: 5, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Conventional Protest 1_7	0.192*** (0.014)	0.129*** (0.023)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7	-0.048** (0.015)	-0.057*** (0.015)
ODcOfAiI0_7Do	-0.289** (0.101)	-0.649*** (0.158)
Injured: Isr 8_14	0.966* (0.387)	1.105** (0.391)
Riot operation: PSF 8_14	0.386* (0.193)	0.428* (0.195)
Killed: PSF 15_21	-0.271 (0.188)	-0.712** (0.252)
Arrest: PSF 15_21	0.448** (0.152)	0.448** (0.153)
Movement restriction: ESF 0_7	1.008*** (0.240)	1.127*** (0.242)
Policing: ESF 8_14	0.984*** (0.216)	0.982*** (0.216)
Riot operation: ESF 0_7	0.711*** (0.161)	0.610*** (0.165)
Day of the week: Monday	0.240 (0.214)	0.057 (0.218)
Day of the week: Tuesday	0.182 (0.206)	-0.044 (0.207)
Day of the week: Wednesday	0.709** (0.219)	0.624** (0.218)
Day of the week: Thursday	2.560*** (0.282)	2.429*** (0.281)
Day of the week: Friday	0.066 (0.171)	-0.104 (0.173)
Day of the week: Saturday	-0.063 (0.192)	-0.220 (0.193)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.187 (0.189)	0.109 (0.192)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 2	0.133 (0.179)	0.101 (0.180)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: 3	0.399* (0.190)	0.446* (0.190)
Arrest: Isr 0_7 / Cases: >=4	0.487** (0.181)	0.479** (0.181)
Day of the week: Thursday X t	-0.347*** (0.077)	-0.339*** (0.077)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Killed: PSF 15_21		0.163*** (0.043)
Conventional Protest 1_7 X Air operation: Isr 0_7		0.087** (0.026)
R-squared	0.160	0.169
N	1995	1995

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

685.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 49 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCv, period 5⁶⁸⁶

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCv1_7Co	1.137648	.0259553	5.65	0.000	1.087897	1.189674
RiotI0_7Co	.9450411	.0146085	-3.66	0.000	.9168384	.9741114
OfAiI0_7Do	.5224002	.0823894	-4.12	0.000	.3834931	.7116215
InjI8_14Do	3.019531	1.181945	2.82	0.005	1.40201	6.503214
RiotP8_14Do	1.533729	.298467	2.20	0.028	1.047377	2.24592
KillP15_21Do	.4907449	.1234763	-2.83	0.005	.2996988	.8035753
ArrestP15_21Do	1.565601	.2391303	2.93	0.003	1.160562	2.112
MvtE0_7Do	3.084975	.7453201	4.66	0.000	1.921339	4.953352
PolE8_14Do	2.670299	.5767236	4.55	0.000	1.748718	4.077556
RiotE0_7Do	1.839591	.3036605	3.69	0.000	1.33111	2.542312
DowCa						
1	1.058288	.2304168	0.26	0.795	.6906776	1.621559
2	.9574189	.1984884	-0.21	0.834	.637726	1.437374
3	1.866144	.4076596	2.86	0.004	1.216186	2.863454
4	11.35249	3.192663	8.64	0.000	6.541955	19.70038
5	.9011193	.1555514	-0.60	0.546	.6424624	1.263912
6	.8026766	.1546585	-1.14	0.254	.5502149	1.170978
ArrestI0_7Ca						
1	1.115353	.2136417	0.57	0.569	.7662456	1.623517
2	1.10588	.1994652	0.56	0.577	.7765664	1.574843
3	1.561804	.2960909	2.35	0.019	1.077094	2.264642
4	1.613874	.2924312	2.64	0.008	1.131445	2.302003
FCv1_7CoXKillP15_21Do	1.177573	.0503904	3.82	0.000	1.082838	1.280596
FCv1_7CoXOfAiI0_7Do	1.09047	.0287278	3.29	0.001	1.035593	1.148254
_IDowCa_4_t	.7121637	.0545272	-4.43	0.000	.6129246	.8274706

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Casualties injured by Israeli forces (*InjI8_14Do*) expand the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 202%. The effects are delayed in time (span 8-14).

Operations carried out by the PSF increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 53% for riot operations (*RiotP8_14Do*) and 57% for arrests (*ArrestP15_21Do*). The respective effects are also delayed in time (span 8-14 and 15-21).

Restrictions of movement undertaken by the ESF (*MvtE0_7Do*) expand the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 208%. Their policing activities (*PolE8_14Do*) increase the same rate by 167% and their riot operations (*RiotE0_7Do*) by 83%.

686.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

b) Categorical variables

Arrests carried out by Israeli forces on a larger scale (≥ 3) (*ArrestI0_7Ca3*) raise the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by approximately 61%.

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction tables included in the appendix (p. 255) highlight that killed casualties by the PSF expand the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 80% for conventional protest set at the level of eight (*FCvI_7CoXKillP15_2IDo*). It should be noted that the hazard ratios prior to eight cannot be interpreted as they are not significant at the 5% level.

Between two and four occurrences of conventional protests (span 1-7), air operations lower the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest (*FCvI_7CoXOfAi0_7Do*). However, past the threshold of 12 and higher occurrences of conventional protests (span 1-7), air operations increase the same hazard rate by at least 50%. This highlights the limit of deterrence when facing momentum.

Fridays (*IDowCa_4_t*) are associated with an increase in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 11.3 times. The hazard rates varies with time and confirms the importance of Fridays (days 0) at this level.

7.5.3. Confrontational forms

Table 50 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FCf, period 5⁶⁸⁷

Form: Confrontational, Period: 5, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Confrontational Protest 1_7	-0.009 (0.043)	0.147* (0.059)
Confrontational Protest 1_7 X t	0.103*** (0.016)	0.072*** (0.018)
Riot operation: Isr 0_7	-0.094*** (0.024)	0.031 (0.039)
Arrest: ESF 8_14	0.669*** (0.192)	0.694*** (0.194)
Ground operation: ESF 15_21	0.386** (0.124)	0.407** (0.124)
Deportation: Isr 8_14	1.108** (0.349)	1.114** (0.351)
Killed: PSF 15_21	-0.437* (0.219)	-0.478* (0.221)
Restriction movement: Settler 0_7	0.300* (0.138)	0.263 (0.138)
Day of the week: Monday	0.153 (0.198)	0.202 (0.197)
Day of the week: Tuesday	0.794*** (0.200)	0.834*** (0.200)
Day of the week: Wednesday	1.914*** (0.230)	2.029*** (0.235)
Day of the week: Thursday	1.047** (0.360)	1.095** (0.361)
Day of the week: Friday	0.318 (0.171)	0.376* (0.172)
Day of the week: Saturday	0.106 (0.183)	0.113 (0.182)
Injured: Settler 0_7 / Cases: 1	0.361** (0.121)	0.350** (0.121)
Injured: Settler 0_7 / Cases: >=2	0.240 (0.147)	0.280 (0.146)
Riot oper: Isr 0_7 X Confrontational Protest 1_7		-0.013*** (0.003)
R-squared	0.145	0.153
N	2022	2022

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

687.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 51 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FCf, period 5⁶⁸⁸

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FCf1_7Co	1.158862	.0683571	2.50	0.012	1.032339	1.300891
FCf1_7Co_t	1.075115	.0195715	3.98	0.000	1.037431	1.114167
RiotI0_7Co	1.031819	.0403419	0.80	0.423	.9557039	1.113996
ArrestE8_14Do	2.002075	.3881913	3.58	0.000	1.369106	2.92768
OfGrE15_21Do	1.502864	.1870988	3.27	0.001	1.177469	1.918182
DeportI8_14Do	3.046218	1.06839	3.18	0.001	1.53187	6.057593
KillP15_21Do	.6198289	.1368595	-2.17	0.030	.4020914	.955474
MvtS0_7Do	1.300488	.1792285	1.91	0.057	.9926519	1.703789
DowCa						
1	1.223372	.2406022	1.03	0.305	.832054	1.798728
2	2.303506	.4618425	4.16	0.000	1.554989	3.412333
3	7.605659	1.786	8.64	0.000	4.800133	12.05093
4	2.987724	1.078798	3.03	0.002	1.472284	6.063028
5	1.456539	.250845	2.18	0.029	1.03927	2.041343
6	1.119293	.2041643	0.62	0.537	.7828536	1.60032
InjS0_7Ca						
1	1.41871	.1719316	2.89	0.004	1.118761	1.799076
2	1.323649	.1938289	1.91	0.056	.9934061	1.763676
FCf1_7CoXRiotI0_7Co	.987387	.0032982	-3.80	0.000	.9809436	.9938726

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

The actions conducted by the ESF raise the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 100% when undertaking arrests (*ArrestE8_14Do*), and by 50% times when carrying out ground operations (*OfGrE15_21Do*). Their effects are delayed in time (span 15-21).

Deportations carried out by Israel (*DeportI8_14Do*) expand the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 205% (span 8-14).

Restrictions of movement imposed by settlers (*MvtS0_7Do*) increase the hazard rate by 30% with immediate effects (span 0-7).

When casualties are killed by the PSF (*KillP15_21Do*), the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest decreases by 38%.

b) Categorical variables

Thursdays (*DowCa3*), when compared to other days of the week, are associated with the highest hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest.

Casualties injured by settlers (*InjS0_7Ca*) expand the hazard rate of confrontational occurrences by approximately 35%.

688.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

c) Continuous and interaction variables

The interaction table included in the appendix (p. 256) highlights that the hazard rate for an increase of one Israeli riot operation is 3%. An increase of one confrontational protest expands the hazard rate by 34% after two days (*FCfI_7XRiotI0_7Co*).

7.5.4. Violent forms

Table 52 Relative risks (estimates) of external factors among FV, period 5⁶⁸⁹

Form: Violent, Period: 5, Theater: all

	Model1	Model2
Violent Protest 1_7	0.307*** (0.023)	0.311*** (0.023)
Conventional Protest 15_21	0.064** (0.020)	0.060** (0.020)
Policing: PSF 0_7	0.683* (0.311)	0.661* (0.312)
Restriction movement: ESF 0_7	1.161* (0.522)	1.202* (0.522)
Policing: ESF 8_14	1.112*** (0.328)	1.105*** (0.330)
Arrest: ESF 15_21	0.698** (0.224)	0.721** (0.225)
Armoured operation: Isr 0_7	-0.450** (0.143)	-0.483*** (0.144)
Air operation: Isr 0_7	0.384** (0.141)	0.389** (0.141)
Air operation: Isr 15_21	0.360* (0.140)	0.027 (0.220)
Air operation: Isr 15_21 X t		0.077 (0.040)
R-squared	0.140	0.141
N	1981	1981

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

689.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

Table 53 Relative risks (hazard ratios) of external factors among FV, period 5⁶⁹⁰

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
FV1_7Co	1.36452	.0311556	13.61	0.000	1.304802	1.42697
FCv15_21Co	1.061812	.0212912	2.99	0.003	1.020891	1.104373
PolP0_7Do	1.936747	.603823	2.12	0.034	1.051217	3.568235
MvtE0_7Do	3.3254	1.735918	2.30	0.021	1.195368	9.250948
PolE8_14Do	3.019385	.9958037	3.35	0.001	1.581937	5.762988
ArrestE15_21Do	2.056986	.4627143	3.21	0.001	1.323596	3.196739
OfArI0_7D	.6167461	.0887134	-3.36	0.001	.465231	.8176062
OfAiI0_7D	1.475671	.2087572	2.75	0.006	1.118339	1.947177
OfAiI15_21Do	1.026895	.226246	0.12	0.904	.66679	1.581478
OfAiI15_21Do_t	1.080279	.0429949	1.94	0.052	.9992132	1.167921

Interpretation of results

a) Dichotomic variables

Air operations carried out by Israeli forces (*OfAiI0_7D*) enlarge the rate of violent forms of protest by 48% while their armored operations (*OfArI0_7D*) reduce the same rate by 38%. Their effects are immediate (span 0-7).

Policing operations conducted by the PSF (*PolE8_14Do*) expand the hazard rate by approximately two times, and restrictions of movement run by the ESF (*MvtE0_7Do*) swells the same rate by 232%. Their effects are immediate as well.

Delayed effects can further be observed with ESF arrests (*ArrestE15_21Do*) and policing operations (*PolE8_14Do*), that respectively expand the rate of violent forms of protest by 106% and 202%.

b) Continuous and interaction variables

The effect of the momentum linked to violent protest (span 1-7) (*FV1_7Co*) is not that strong when compared to the upper mentioned effects. It increases the rate by 36%. It is interesting to note that conventional protests (span-15-21) (*FCv15_21Co*) increase the hazard rate by only 6%.

The interaction table included in the appendix (p. 257) highlights the delayed effects of air operations (span 15-21) (*OfAiI15_21Do_t*). They vary with time, the smaller the interval between two violent occurrences, the smaller their negative effects.

690.Exact marginal-likelihood method used to handle tied failures

7.6 TACTICAL ANALYSES: EXTERNAL FACTORS

If a few statements sufficed to describe the hazard rates of each single model, a comparison of models within and between periods requires the development of new analytical tools in order to better understand the mechanisms at work. Those analytical tools allow the assessment of the effects of external factors on the hazard rate of different forms of protest.

A careful distinction should be made between causes and effects. Momentum, like other external factors variables, are causes influencing the hazard rate of a specific form of protest. The effects of external factors on the hazard rate of forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent) can be of three types:

- **Internal effect:** The factor impacts only on the hazard rate of the specific form of protest being addressed.
- **Simultaneous effect:** The factor impacts simultaneously on the hazard rates of different forms of protest.
- **Translated effect:** The factor creates a drop in the hazard rate of the form of protest being addressed while causing a rise in the hazard rate of another form of protest.

Those analytical tools enabled both an empirical and theoretical break through, by precisely permitting an holistic assessment of the effects of policing on tactical deployment, moving away from single protest strata analysis to focus instead on the whole protest spectrum, from conventional, confrontational to violent forms of protest. The analyses of models within and between periods shall follow.

7.6.1. Period 1

a) Internal effect:

Jewish settler's activities are the main cause of conventional, confrontational and violent forms of protest during this first period. They have more influence on the increases in the hazard rates of different forms of protest than any other operation conducted by the Israeli security forces.

The influence of days of the week is significant. Saturdays are associated with a lower hazard rate of conventional forms of protest than any other day of the week. At the level of momentum, the effect of momentum on the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest is the strongest, when compared to other forms of protest.

Riot operations conducted by Israeli forces are shown to produce either negative or positive effects, depending on the scale of deployment and the number of confrontational or conventional protests occurring at the time. Deescalation (small scale riot operations) appears to work effectively for a low number of protest occurrences, but to be counter-productive for larger number of protest occurrences. Escalation (large scale riot operations) works better for a large number of protest occurrences, but is counter-productive for smaller numbers of protest occurrences. This is a sensitive point: For escalation versus deescalation in riot control, no doctrine works best. Everything rests on momentum. Escalation fails for smaller numbers of protests, while deescalation fails for larger numbers of protests.

b) Simultaneous effects:

Restrictions of movement carried out by settlers increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 489% and the hazard rate of confrontational forms by 106%. Settler ground operations also increase the hazard rates of violent forms by 112% times, confrontational forms by 31% and conventional forms by 82%.

Declines in the hazard rates of both violent and conventional forms of protest of approximately 50% are displayed following administrative restriction applied by Israeli forces.

c) Translated effect:

Stronger forms of protest rest on the momentum of milder ones, but not the opposite. A complex relationship was discovered between conventional and violent forms of protest. Conventional protest favors growth in the hazard rate of violent forms of protest, as long as the occurrence of violent protest during the preceding weeks is not too high (<5), as it would nullify any further negative effects that conventional protest may have in such a case. However, the occurrence of violent protest does not affect the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest.

A second observation related to translated effects on the hazard rates of different forms of protest was noticed with restrictions of movement. When restrictions of movement are conducted by Israeli forces, they lower the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by approximately 50% and expand, at the same time, the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 27%.

7.6.2. Period 2

a) Internal effect:

The limit of coercion and deterrence depends on the level of protest momentum. Confrontational forms of protest waged during the second intifada highlight this point. The higher the number of casualties killed or injured by the Israeli forces during this period, the higher the increase in the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest. In this regard, deterrence and coercion were useless, people were not afraid to die, and momentum took the lead.⁶⁹¹

The curve of theoretical power implies cycles of activity followed by recovery periods. This assertion is demonstrated by the negative interaction coefficient between conventional protest (span 1-7) and conventional protest (span 15-21). When one goes up, the other goes down.

The effect of momentum on the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest is the strongest, when compared to the effect of momentum on the other forms of protest during this period.

b) Simultaneous effects:

Ground operations carried out by settlers increase conventional forms of protest by 54% and confrontational forms by 80%.

During this second period, large scale arrests did not produce any significant results on confrontational forms of protest, while the larger the number of arrests, the larger the growths in both hazard rates of conventional and violent forms of protest. Given the nature of the second intifada mainly based on confrontational forms of protest, the point that arrests were not found

691. People were not afraid to die, see LITERATURE REVIEW (p. 12).

significant on confrontational forms is an indication that arrests served as a stabilizing factor at the level of confrontational forms of protest, while causing secondary inflations in the hazard rates of both conventional and violent forms.

Stronger forms of protest rest on the momentum of milder ones, but not the opposite. Confrontational protests increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 48%, while the opposite, or in other words the effects of violent protest on confrontational forms scores only an 11% effect. Softest forms, conventional protest, does not appear to be a significant factor in the increase or decrease of the hazard rate for both confrontational and violent forms of protest during this period.

c) Translated effect:

The higher the coercion, the stronger the translated effect on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest. Different translated effects on the hazard rates are observed during this period. Acts of destruction committed by settlers reduce the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 36%, while they expand the hazard rates of confrontational forms of protest by 69%.

Casualties killed by Israeli forces or settlers decrease the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by approximately 50%, while they swell the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by almost 100%.

Settler rioting creates a drop of 40% in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest, while it inflates the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 54%. This clearly highlights the importance of translated effects following escalation in the use of force.

7.6.3. Period 3

a) Internal effect:

The effects of momentum on the hazard rate of each form of protest are quite similar, highlighting no particular trend.

b) Simultaneous effects:

Arrests carried out by the PSF decrease the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 37% and of conventional forms by 22%.

c) Translated effect:

Perceived legitimacy in the use of force avoids translated effects on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest. It is interesting to note that casualties killed by PSF do not translate to more violent forms of protest, but stay at the level of a 94% increase in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. This asserts the perceived legitimacy of the PSF among the population during this third period and is further related to the will of maintaining the expression of grievances through conventional channels.

By comparison, translated effect to more violent forms of protest occurred in cases of settler activities: Riots carried out by settlers generate a drop of 27% in the hazard rate of the conventional forms of protest, while the delicts they commit engender a rise of 57% in the hazard rates of violent forms of protest.

7.6.4. Period 4

a) Internal effect:

Policing operations conducted by the Israeli forces increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 65%, and administrative restrictions carried out by the same forces reduce the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 32%.

Contrary to the decreasing trend in hazard rates consecutive to PSF operations during the third period, factors related to operations conducted by the PSF during the fourth period show the opposite trend; which is an increase in the hazard rates on all forms of protest. The only exceptions being the factor arrest, which reduces the rate of confrontational forms of protest by 22%. In addition to this, PSF small scale ground operations and restrictions of movement increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by respectively 43% and 120%. Their riot operations expand the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 149%.

Injured casualties by settlers increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 58% and settler policing operations inflate confrontational forms of protest by 84%.

Days of the week were found to be significant, as Sundays are associated with higher probabilities of violent forms of protest.

The effect of momentum on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest is the strongest, when compared to the effect of momentum on other forms of protest during this period.

b) Simultaneous effects:

Acts of destruction committed by Israeli forces increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 120% and the hazard rate of violent forms of protest (one act of destruction increases the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 21% after 10 days).

c) Translated effect:

Stronger forms of protest rest on the momentum of milder ones, but not the opposite. One conventional protest increases the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 12% to 30%, while violent protest discourages milder forms of protest with a drop of 63% in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest.

The higher the coercion, the stronger the translated effect on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest. The gradation between intensity in the use of force and translated effects to more violent forms of protest can be observed during this period with operations conducted by Israeli forces. First, policing operations display a 65% increase in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. Second, air operations and acts of destruction display a respective 20% and 121% increase in the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest. Third, casualties injured exhibit a 68% rise in the hazard rate of violent forms of protest. Therefore, the higher the intensity in the use of force, the higher the probability of translation to more violent forms of protest.

7.6.5. Period 5

a) Internal effect:

The main factors of influence during this period relate to operations carried out by the ESF and PSF. Settlers activities are only noteworthy on confrontational forms where casualties injured by settlers expand the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest by 35%.

The effect of momentum on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest is the strongest when compared to the effect of momentum on other forms of protest during this period.

The limit of coercion and deterrence depends on the level of protest momentum. Air operations carried out by Israeli forces decrease the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest below the momentum of eight conventional protests. However, past this threshold, it generates the opposite effect by expanding the same hazard rate to reach an approximate 50% increase at the level of twelve conventional occurrences and a 95% increase at the level of twenty conventional protest occurrences.

Days of the week were found to be associated with different forms of protest. Thursdays are associated with higher probabilities of confrontational forms of protest and Fridays with higher probabilities of conventional forms of protest.

b) Simultaneous effects:

Arrests conducted by the ESF expand the hazard rates of confrontational forms of protest by 100%, and of violent forms of protest by 106%. Policing activities conducted by the ESF increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 167%, and of violent forms of protest by 202%. Their restrictions of movement swell the hazard rates of conventional forms of protest by 208%, and of violent forms of protest by 232%.

c) Translated effect:

As highlighted in the previous paragraph, it is interesting to note the absence of rioting or confrontational forms of protest deployed against the ESF. It appears, with the exception of ESF ground operations and arrests, that the means of response chosen to oppose ESF actions are either set on conventional or violent forms of protest. The intermediate confrontational form of protest being quasi non-existent.

A partial response to this phenomena can be found with an analogy related to PSF during this period. When casualties are killed by PSF, the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest decrease by 38%, while first, the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest increase by more than 80% (for a threshold level for the interaction term set at eight conventional protest span 1-7), and second, the hazard rate of violent forms of protest increases by 93% following policing operations conducted by the same force. Again, a translated effect from the intermediate confrontational form of protest to the two poles conventional and violent forms of protest occurred.

Successful deterrence causes translated effects from intermediate to milder or stronger forms of protest. To conclude in both cases, either ESF or PSF, people were successfully deterred from waging intermediate forms of protest (confrontational) and this caused a translation to either more violent or more peaceful forms of protest. From a practical perspective, it makes sense that when facing a gun that may shoot, one may either choose to escalate countering force with offensive means to protect oneself behind a curtain of fire, or deescalate countering force with asymmetric socially legitimized means. In other words, it appears that deterrence worked during this fifth period, having for secondary effects a transition from the intermediate

confrontational forms of protest to both conventional and violent forms. It should further be underlined that deterrence did not work during the second intifada, when people accepted being shot at when throwing stones, and kept acting in mass on the confrontational plateau despite flying bullets and the *might, power and beating* policy applied. The second intifada successfully completes the assertion of the fifth period that is: Successful deterrence causes translated effects from intermediate to milder or stronger forms of protest, by supporting the idea that: The limit of coercion and deterrence depends on the level of protest momentum.

Air operations conducted by Israeli forces lower the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 48% while increasing violent forms of protest by approximately 50%. Contrary to air operations, armored operations carried out by Israel highlight a sharp drop of 38% in violent forms of protest and no significant translated effects.

7.7 DISCUSSION

The goal of the present chapter, Tactical subspace: External factors, was to answer the research question of this work related to assessing the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors.

In the first phase, survival analyses provided a detailed quantitative assessment of the effects of explanatory variables (policing - momentum - day of the week), on time between the three different forms of protest, by period. It further fully corroborated the following hypotheses:

- *H1a Policing affects non-state actors tactical deployment*
- *H2a Different types of policing cause different types of tactical deployments.*

In the second phase, a comparison of models within and between periods required the use of new analytical tools in order to better comprehend the mechanisms at work. Those tools enabled both an empirical and theoretical break through

The empirical breakthrough refers mainly to the effects of settler activities in the OPT. Some Israeli policy makers, such as Ariel Sharon, frequently argue that settlements in the OPT improve security and should therefore be expanded.⁶⁹² This research demonstrate that they do not. On the contrary, they are one of the main sources, if not the primary source of insecurity in the OPT and for Israel (as SMOs regularly wage violent forms of protests across borders). Settler activities highlighted a negative impact on the growth of the hazard rates of all forms of protest; with a greater influence than policing activities carried out by the Israeli security forces, the ESF or the PSF.

The theoretical breakthrough was enabled by the development of this holistic perspective on the effects of policing on tactical deployment. The main findings in this regard are summarized as follow:

- Stronger forms of protest rest on the momentum of milder ones, but not the opposite.
- The higher the coercion, the stronger the translated effect on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest.
- Successful deterrence causes translated effects from intermediate to milder or stronger forms of protest.
- The limit of coercion and deterrence depends on the level of protest momentum.

692.06.11.1988: S20 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989a) / 02.05.1994: S42 (Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c)

- The curve of theoretical power implies cycles of activity followed by recovery periods.
- Perceived legitimacy in the use of force avoids translated effects on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest.
- For escalation versus deescalation in riot control, no doctrine works best. Everything rests on momentum. Escalation fails for smaller number of protests, while deescalation fails for larger number of protests.

This analysis of the tactical subspace: external factors shall be complemented by a study of the tactical subspace: internal factors. The next chapter will assess the effects of internal factors (SMORG scales) on tactical deployment.

Chapter 8

Tactical subspace: Internal factors

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The analyses of the protest space addressed antecedent conditions through the study of the repertoire and the organizational subspaces. The tactical subspace: External factors, covered in the previous chapter, focused on assessing the effects of explanatory variables (policing, momentum, days of the week) on tactical deployment.

The present chapter, Tactical subspace: Internal factors, is centered on the effects of internal factors, qualified as SMORG scales, on tactical deployment. This chapter is divided into three subchapters:

- SMORG: UNIVARIABLE ANALYSES
Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest during the entire time span (1982-2011).
- SMORG: UNIVARIABLE ANALYSES BY PERIOD
Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest within each period.
- SMORG : MULTIVARIABLE ANALYSES BY PERIOD
Assessment of the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest within each period, taking into account control variables.⁶⁹³

The following figure is a quick reminder of the value that SMO SMORG scales may exhibit, with the characterization of their poles (SM leaning for lower values versus ORG leaning for higher values). Further details in this regard may be found in Chapter 2 Research Methods and Procedures (p. 19).

Figure 30 SMORG scales example

Structure: <i>Multiple suborganizations vs unitary</i>				
1	2	3	4	5
Coordination: <i>Tactical freedom of action vs directive control</i>				
1	2	3	4	5
Collective action: <i>Action of masses vs hit teams</i>				
1	2	3	4	5

The next subchapter will detail SMORG univariable analyses.

693. The control variables are external factors belonging to each model by period and form of protest developed in Chapter 7 Tactical subspace: External factors (p. 117)

8.1 SMORG: UNIVARIABLE ANALYSES

8.1.1. Conventional forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Conventional, Period: all, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	-0.50	0.22	0.61	0.02	0.40	0.92
Str4	-0.10	0.12	0.91	0.44	0.71	1.16
Str5	0.19	0.03	1.21	0.00	1.14	1.29
Coor1	-0.50	0.19	0.60	0.01	0.42	0.87
Coor2	-0.73	0.32	0.48	0.02	0.26	0.90
Coor3	-0.01	0.09	0.99	0.91	0.83	1.19
Coor4	0.25	0.05	1.28	0.00	1.17	1.40
_ICoor5Ca_1	0.27	0.16	1.31	0.10	0.95	1.81
_ICoor5Ca_2	0.74	0.21	2.10	0.00	1.40	3.15
Coll1	-0.73	0.32	0.48	0.02	0.26	0.90
Coll2	-0.50	0.19	0.60	0.01	0.42	0.87
_IColl3Ca_1	0.33	0.15	1.39	0.02	1.05	1.85
_IColl3Ca_2	0.79	0.19	2.21	0.00	1.51	3.22
Coll4	0.02	0.13	1.02	0.85	0.80	1.31
Coll5	0.22	0.05	1.25	0.00	1.14	1.36

Table 54 Relative risks of internal factors among FCv, all periods

Structure appears to have a significant relationship with the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. SMOs disposing of a unitary structure (*Str5: SMORG scale structure, value 5*) increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest by 21%, while SMOs balanced between unitary structure versus multiple suborganizations (*Str3*) highlight a drop in the same hazard rate of 39%.⁶⁹⁴ Therefore, unitary SMOs have a higher hazard rate in the waging of conventional forms of protest. In other words, structure underlines an higher operational tempo for unitary SMOs waging conventional forms of protest.⁶⁹⁵

Coordination is significant at almost all levels. The higher the level of control, the higher the effects on the hazard rates. SMO coordination characterized by directive control demonstrates growth in the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest from 31% to 110% (*_ICoor5Ca_1* or *Ca_2*), while SMO coordination inclined toward tactical freedom of action (*Coor1* or *Coor2*) shows a drop of approximately 50% in the same hazard rate. This demonstrates first a higher operational tempo for directive control SMOs, and second the importance of coordination for the occurrence of conventional forms of protest.

Collective action displays significant results. Of note is the fact that, contrary to the constant increase in hazard rates when moving from lower levels to higher levels of structure and coordination previously described, collective action is at its peak when balanced between both extreme poles (*Coll3Ca*). SMOs balancing collective action between hit teams and masses, have an higher operational tempo for the waging of conventional forms of protest.

694. The increase in the hazard rate can be read in the column HazRatio. It depicts the percentage increase over a null value of 1.

695. The US marine corps defines operational tempo (Optempo) as the frequency a unit goes to the field. (U.S. Marine Corps Dictionary, 2013)

To summarize, SMOs characterized by a unitary structure and coordination exerted through directive control, while still balancing collective actions carried out by specialized teams and masses, exhibit the ability to wage conventional forms of protest at an higher operational tempo.

8.1.2. Confrontational forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Confrontational, Period: all, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	-0.17	0.16	0.84	0.28	0.62	1.14
Str4	-0.44	0.18	0.64	0.02	0.45	0.92
Str5	0.16	0.03	1.18	0.00	1.12	1.24
Coor1	-0.34	0.34	0.71	0.32	0.37	1.39
Coor2	-0.19	0.16	0.83	0.25	0.61	1.14
Coor3	-0.21	0.13	0.81	0.10	0.63	1.04
Coor4	0.20	0.03	1.23	0.00	1.15	1.31
_ICoor5Ca_1	0.40	0.19	1.50	0.03	1.04	2.16
_ICoor5Ca_2	0.75	0.21	2.11	0.00	1.41	3.16
Coll1	-0.19	0.16	0.83	0.25	0.61	1.14
Coll2	-0.34	0.34	0.71	0.32	0.37	1.39
_IColl3Ca_1	0.22	0.20	1.25	0.25	0.85	1.83
_IColl3Ca_2	0.62	0.19	1.86	0.00	1.27	2.73
Coll4	0.01	0.16	1.01	0.95	0.74	1.37
Coll5	0.14	0.03	1.15	0.00	1.08	1.23

Table 55 Relative risks of internal factors among FCf, all periods

Structure is significant. The higher the structure (*Str5*), the higher the hazard rate of confrontational forms. SMOs with a unitary structure display higher operational tempo for the waging of confrontational forms of protest.

Coordination is not significant at the 5% level for lower values of the scale (*Coor1-2-3*). However, coordination characterized by directive control indicates a clear impact on the growth of the hazard rate, with rises of 23% (*Coor4*) to more than 50% (*_ICoor5Ca_1*, *_ICoor5Ca_2*). The higher the SMO's coordination through directive control, the higher the operational tempo related to confrontational forms of protest.

Collective action is significant at the intermediate level (*_IColl3Ca_2*). The findings are similar to the one found for conventional forms of protest. SMO's collective action, balanced between hit teams and masses, displays a higher operational tempo for the waging of confrontational forms of protest.

To summarize, SMOs characterized by a unitary structure and coordination through directive control, while balancing their collective actions between hit teams and masses, display higher hazard rates and have thus the capacity to wage confrontational forms of protest at an higher operational tempo.

8.1.3. Violent forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: all, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.04	0.07	1.04	0.60	0.91	1.19
Str4	0.11	0.08	1.11	0.16	0.96	1.29
Str5	0.11	0.04	1.11	0.02	1.02	1.21
Coor1	0.35	0.21	1.42	0.09	0.94	2.13
Coor2	-0.03	0.08	0.97	0.67	0.83	1.13
Coor3	0.16	0.05	1.17	0.00	1.06	1.30
Coor4	0.06	0.07	1.06	0.40	0.92	1.22
_ICoor5Ca_1	-0.03	0.07	0.97	0.62	0.85	1.10
_ICoor5Ca_2	0.05	0.13	1.06	0.68	0.82	1.37
Coll1	-0.03	0.08	0.97	0.67	0.83	1.13
Coll2	0.35	0.21	1.42	0.09	0.94	2.13
_IColl3Ca_1	0.01	0.07	1.01	0.87	0.88	1.16
_IColl3Ca_2	0.01	0.13	1.01	0.94	0.78	1.31
Coll4	0.09	0.07	1.10	0.17	0.96	1.25
Coll5	0.13	0.05	1.14	0.01	1.04	1.25

Table 56 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, all periods

Structure lacks significance at lower levels. Nevertheless, at higher levels (*Str5*), unitary structure indicates a growth of 11% in the hazard rate of violent forms of protest.

Coordination is significant for lower levels of the scale (*Coor1* - *Coor3*). The findings are counterintuitive given the fact that the hazard rate of violent forms of protest is 42% higher for SMOs relying on coordination through tactical freedom of action (*Coor1*), while it scores only a 17% growth in the same hazard rate for SMOs relying on coordination through directive control (*Coor3*). SMOs coordination, characterized by tactical freedom of action, displays a higher operational tempo for the waging of violent forms of protest.

Collective action displays the same directional trends as the scale coordination. SMO's collective action, inclined toward actions of the masses (*Coll2*), displays a 42% increase in the hazard rates of violent forms of protest. The ones inclines toward collective action through the use of hit teams (*Coll5*) score relatively lower, with a 14% increase in the same hazard rate. SMO's collective action, oriented toward actions of the masses, displays a higher operational tempo for the waging of violent forms of protest.

To summarize, the counterintuitive findings highlight that SMOs characterized by lower levels of coordination (tactical freedom of action) and lower level of collective action (operations conducted by masses) display higher hazard rates in the waging of violent forms of protest. Those SMOs have the capacity to wage violent forms of protest at an higher operational tempo.

8.1.4. Internal factor analyses

The dynamics at work for conventional and confrontational forms of protest are drastically different than the one observed for violent forms. On one hand, higher operational tempo in the waging of conventional and confrontational forms of protest are displayed for SMOs with higher structure (unitary structure), higher coordination (directive control), and balanced collective action. On the other hand, higher operational tempo in the waging of violent forms of

protest are displayed for SMOs with lower level of coordination (tactical freedom of action) and lower level of collective action (operations conducted by masses).

One line of explanation for this counterintuitive finding is that SMOs with strong ORG leaning (displaying maximal SMORG scale values) have the ability to conduct violent protest during periods of cease fire or between SM waves of protest. However, the quantity of operations they can conduct remains numerically limited when compared to SMOs with SM leanings (displaying minimal SMORG scale values) that exploit the SM dynamics of violence during periods of unrest, scoring higher on the hazard rates of violent forms of protest. This line of explanation will be further tested in the next subchapter: univariable analyses by period.

These analyses highlight the ability for SMOs with an ORG leaning to mobilize social masses for conventional and confrontational forms of protest with higher level of structure (unitary structure) and higher level of coordination (directive control) and balanced collective action; versus an ability for SMOs with a SM leaning to exploit social waves of contention related to violent forms of protest with lower level of coordination (tactical freedom of action instead of directive control) and collective action (operations conducted by masses instead of hit teams). Those statements related to the whole time span shall now be further investigated by conducting univariable analyses by period.

8.2 SMORG: UNIVARIABLE ANALYSES BY PERIOD

8.2.1. Introduction

Individual tables related to SMORG scale univariable analyses by period, for each form of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent), are displayed in a summary table in the next section Internal factor analyses. A short notice on methodology shall first be mentioned.

The interpretation of each SMORG univariable analyses per period and form of protest are conducted as follow:

- **Period 1 - Violent forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 1, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3Ca	-0.05	0.11	0.95	0.67	0.77	1.18
Str5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46
Coor5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46
_ICoor2Ca_1	-0.21	0.14	0.81	0.14	0.61	1.07
_ICoor2Ca_2	0.18	0.25	1.20	0.46	0.74	1.95
_IColl1Ca_1	-0.21	0.14	0.81	0.14	0.61	1.07
_IColl1Ca_2	0.18	0.25	1.20	0.46	0.74	1.95
Coll5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46

Table 57 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 1

SMORG scales at high levels (*Str5 - Coor5 - Coll5*) display significant effects at the 5% level. Each display an increase in the hazard rate of violent forms of protest by 21%.

A summary of the results that indicates the highest growths in hazard rate for the SMORG scale being addressed is summarized as follow:

➤ FV: Str: 5 Coor: 5 Coll: 5

If results are not significant for all values of the scale, a point (.) replaces the values.

All individual tables and interpretations can be consulted in the appendix (p. 258) of this work. After this short note on methodology, the next section will display the summary table of SMORG univariable analyses by period.

8.2.2. Internal factor analyses

The summary table of SMORG univariable analyses by period highlights the following results

• Period 1	FV:	Str: 5	Coor: 5	Coll: 5
• Period 2	FCv:	Str: .	Coor: 5	Coll: .
	FCf:	Str: 3	Coor: 2	Coll: 1
	FV:	Str: 3	Coor: 2	Coll: 1
• Period 3	FCv:	Str: .	Coor: 4	Coll: 4
	FCf:	Str: .	Coor: 5	Coll: .
	FV:	Str: .	Coor: .	Coll: .
• Period 4	FCv:	Str: .	Coor: .	Coll: .
	FCf:	Str: .	Coor: 3	Coll: .
	FV:	Str: 4	Coor: 3	Coll: 3
• Period 5	FCv:	Str: 5	Coor: 4	Coll: 5
	FCf:	Str: 5	Coor: 4	Coll: 3
	FV:	Str: 5	Coor: 5	Coll: 5

Figure 31 Summary table: SMORG univariable analyses by period

Violent forms of protest (FV)

- **A SMO's unitary structure (*Str5*) displays strong effects on the growth of the hazard rate of violent forms of protest.**

Leaving aside the third period that does not display significant results, the first intifada (P2) is the only period in which a balanced structure (unitary versus multiple suborganization: *Str3*) had stronger effects on the hazard rate of violent forms of protest.

- **A SMO's coordination, characterized by directive control (*Coor5*), scores higher on the hazard rates of violent forms of protest between SM waves of protest (first and second intifada: P2 and P4).**

Both intifadas (P2 and P4) are the only periods in which coordination was not at its maximum. Coordination in both periods moved from directive control toward tactical freedom of action (*Coor2* - *Coor3*). SMOs lowered their level of control to exploit SM waves of protests.

- **A SMO's collective action, carried out by hit teams (*Coll5*) instead of masses, had more leverage on the increase in the hazard rate of violent protest between SM waves of protest (P2 and P4).**

In all periods, except during both intifada (P2 and P4), higher levels of collective action (carried out by hit teams: *Coll5*) display stronger effects on the growth of the hazard rate of violent forms of protest. When addressing both intifada, the first intifada (P2) displays a stronger reliance on masses (*Coll1*) than the second intifada (P4) which is balanced between action of hit teams and masses (*Coll3*).

The specificity of SMORG scale levels during both intifada periods (P2 and P4) is noteworthy. The repertoire of collective actions of the first intifada was mainly set on confrontational forms of protest, while violent forms of protest dominated during the second intifada. SMOs, while still retaining a unitary structure, lowered the levels of control and collective action in order to exploit those SM waves of protests. This mechanism of lowering control and collective action levels during SM waves of protest is also supported by examples showing that, during the second intifada, SMOs were recruiting anyone willing to carry out suicide attacks. In this regard, due to the change in the social atmosphere, it was a matter of hours or minutes for SMOs to find a volunteer, equip and dispatch him or her to commit a suicide bombing. The usual long months of preparation were gone.⁶⁹⁶

Confrontational forms of protest (FCf)

- **A SMO's structure by itself does not play a strong role for the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest.**

A balanced structure (unitary versus multiple suborganization: *Str3*) increases the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest during the first intifada (P2) while a unitary structure (*Str5*) displays a stronger role during the fifth period. This emphasizes the institutional trend followed by SMOs such as Hamas and Fatah through time.

- **SMOs level of coordination required to wage confrontational forms of protest is lower than the one required to wage violent forms of protest.**

During the first intifada (P2), SMOs display a level of coordination inclined toward tactical freedom of action (*Coor2*). All other periods display higher levels of coordination for the waging of confrontational forms of protest. It has to be noted that the level of coordination required for the waging of confrontational forms of protest remains inferior to the one required to wage violent forms of protest.

- **SMO collective action conducted by masses (*Coll1*) was at its peak during the first intifada (P2).**

SMOs display the lowest level of collective (actions conducted by the masses: *Coll1*) during the first intifada (P2). The fifth period displays a balance between collective action carried out by the masses and hit teams (*Coll3*).

The specificity of the levels of SMORG scales during the first intifada (P2) is striking. During this period in which the repertoire of collective action was mainly set on confrontational forms of protest, SMOs lowered their levels of coordination from directive control to full tactical freedom of action; and their levels of collective action from hit teams to actions carried out by the masses, in order to exploit the SM wave of confrontational protest.

A broader perspective on all periods highlights that the SMO's levels of coordination required for waging confrontational forms of protest are less demanding than the one required to wage violent forms of protest.

696.(Berko, 2011)

Conventional forms of protest (FCv)

- **SMOs characterized by a unitary structure are able to wage conventional forms of protest at an higher operational tempo.**

SMOs characterized by a unitary structure (*Str5*) display significant results during the fifth period.

- **SMO coordination for conventional forms of protest was at its peak during the first intifada (*Coor5 - P2*), and remains relatively high during the third and the fifth periods (*Coor4 - Coor4*).**

During the first intifada (P2), SMO's coordination exerted by directive control (*Coor5*) displays the highest influence on the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest. During the third and fifth periods, the SMO's levels of coordination remain relatively high (*Coor4 - Coor4*).

The differences in SMO coordination levels for the waging of confrontational and conventional forms of protest during the first intifada (P2) are noteworthy. They emphasize that SMO coordination levels were much lower for the waging of confrontational forms of protest (*Coor2*), than for the conduct of conventional forms of protest (*Coor5*) during this period.

8.3 SMORG : MULTIVARIABLE ANALYSES BY PERIOD

The aim of SMORG multivariable analyses by period is to improve the SMORG univariate analyses by period with multivariable analyses by period, in order to assess the relationship between internal factors in models containing control variables.

The models developed in Chapter 7 Tactical subspace: External factors (p. 117) highlighted, for each period, the influence of external factors on the hazard rate of forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent). In the SMORG multivariable analyses by period, the previously selected external factors were considered as control variables and were added to the models containing internal factors (SMORG scales).

As described in the methodological section of this work, the analysis of the organizational subspace: external factors, was conducted on the full data set of 20'529 cases of protest and 39'894 policing events. However, the analyses of the organizational subspace: internal factors, could only be waged on a smaller data set of 4'676 events. Waging multivariable analyses on a smaller sample created issue of low power and instability. Therefore, only a few control variables could be added to each model. Those models are included in the appendix SMORG MULTIVARIABLE MODELS BY PERIOD (p. 265).

8.3.1. Internal factor analyses

A review of the SMORG multivariable models stresses that momentum is the most significant external factor. Furthermore, momentum displays higher hazard rates, when compared to the ones of internal factors (SMORG scales).

The effects of SMORG scales are still significant and noteworthy. The SMORG multivariable analyses by period, when compared to SMORG univariable analyses by period, highlight the following results :

- **Period 1** FV: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
- **Period 2** FCv: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
FCf: Identical (Str 3 - Coor 2 - Coll 1)
FV: Str (.) instead of Str 3
Coor 1 instead of Coor 2
Coll 2 instead of Coll 1
- **Period 3** FCv: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
FCf: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
FV: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
- **Period 4** FCv: No SMORG variables significant at the 5 % or 10% level. Momentum displays the highest hazard rate
FCf: Str: 3 instead of (.)
Coor: identical (3)
Coll: 4 instead of (.)
FV: Str: identical (4)

- Coor: identical (3)
 - Coll: identical (3)
- **Period 5**
 - FCv: Str: identical (5)
 - Coor: identical (4)
 - Coll: (.) instead of 5
 - FCf: Str: identical (5)
 - Coor: identical (4)
 - Coll: identical (3)
 - FV: Str: identical (5)
 - Coor: identical (5)
 - Coll: identical (5)

To summarize, the benefits that multivariable analyses by period brought for the analysis of internal factors were limited by the size of the sample. Nevertheless, multivariable analyses still enabled to demonstrate that: a) Momentum remains the most important control variable. b) SMORG scales, when found significant, displayed values very close to the ones found at the previous stage of SMORG univariable analyses by period; this confirms the univariable highlighted results.

8.4 DISCUSSION

The tactical subspace: internal factors chapter, focused on assessing the effects of internal factors (SMORG scales) on tactical deployment.

SMORG Univariable analyses assessed the effects of SMORG scale on the hazard rates of each forms of protest during the entire time span (1982-2011). SMOs characterized by high structure (unitary structure), high coordination (directive control), and balanced collective action (action of the masses versus hit teams), displayed greater conventional and confrontational forms of protest hazard rates. However, SMOs with lower levels of coordination and collective action displayed greater violent forms of protest hazard rates.

SMORG Univariable analyses by period assessed the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest by period. Those analyses refined the examinations conducted at the SMORG univariable stage. In general terms, SMOs characterized by a unitary structure (*Str5*), coordination through directive control (*Coor5*), and collective action carried out by hit teams (*Coll5*), display the ability to wage violent protest at an higher operational tempo between SM waves of contention (P1, P3, and P5). The specificities of SMORG scales levels during both intifada (P2 and P4) were noted. During the first intifada (P2), which was linked to a repertoire of collective action centered on confrontational forms of protest, SMOs that lowered coordination (*Coor2*) and collective action (*Coll1*), displayed an higher operational tempo in the waging of both confrontational and violent forms of protest. During the second intifada (P4), which was linked to a repertoire of collective action centered on violent forms of protest, SMOs that lowered coordination (*Coor3*) and collective action (*Coll3*) displayed an higher operational tempo in the waging of violent forms of protest. The SMOs lowering of coordination (*Coor3*) was also significant for the waging of confrontational forms of protest during this period.

SMORG Multivariable analyses by period assessed the effects of SMORG scales on the hazard rates of each form of protest by period, taking into account control variables. Those multivariable analyses, highlighted momentum as the most important control variable. It was the most significant external factor; it displayed higher hazard rates, when compared to the ones of internal factors (SMORG scales). SMORG scales, when found significant, displayed values very close to the ones found at the previous univariable analysis stages.

This chapter Tactical subspace: Internal factors, highlighted a major finding. This finding relates to the SMO's process of lowering levels of coordination (from directive control toward tactical freedom) and collective action (from actions waged by hit teams toward actions of the masses) during SM waves of protest. The junction of SMOs both lowering coordination and collective action linked to SM dynamics is a powerful line of explanation for the effectiveness of SMOs to increase their operational tempo during SM waves of protest.⁶⁹⁷

Having ended the study of the protest space (repertoire - organization - tactical subspaces), the next chapter will seek to move beyond correlations, in order to highlight hidden mechanisms. It will provide a qualitative assessments of the explanatory hypotheses of this work, developed in the theoretical Chapter 3 Tactical variations (p. 34).

697. The Israeli security agency were for example countering 60 to 80 suicide bombing attempts a day, at the peak of protests during the second intifada. The number provided by IICC. (Senior researcher at IICC 1, 2011)

Chapter 9

Explanatory hypotheses assessment

What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors? The study of the protest space enabled the managing of antecedent conditions and assessment of the effects of policing on tactical deployment. The repertoire subspace was analyzed in Chapter 5, the organizational subspace in Chapter 6, and the tactical subspace in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

The aim of the present chapter focused on hypotheses assessment is, according to the method labelled process tracing, to refine the theory and explore causal mechanisms beyond prior exposed correlations.⁶⁹⁸ After a quick reminder of SMORG theory, the SM and ORG divergent tactical deployments in time, space and substance will be addressed with the assessment of their respective explanatory hypotheses.

SMORG theory:

- **Prime hypothesis**

Policing → Non-state actor tactical deployment

X

SMORG (Impact of policing on tactical deployment magnified by SM or ORG leaning)

I. Prime hypothesis

H1a Policing affects non-state actor tactical deployment.

II. Prime explanatory hypotheses

H2a Different types of policing cause different types of tactical deployments.

H2b SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployments.

H2c SMORG effects on tactics are read through tactical variations in time - space - substance.

H2d Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model (Chapter 3, p. 34).

H2e Tactical variations in space imply that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory (Chapter 3, p. 42).

H2f Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs (Chapter 3, p. 51).

An interviewed Palestinian mentioned that during the first intifada, acts of repression motivated the population to resistance.⁶⁹⁹ Another Palestinian interviewee gave his perception related to the link between policing and tactical deployment:

698.(George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 34,45)

699.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

"In the West Bank, the situation related to the forms of protest being waged is different than in East Jerusalem. In the West Bank, there was a lot of bloodshed, and it made people more angry. As a matter of fact, during the first years of the second intifada, those people had absolutely nothing to lose [...] In Jenin, they were bombed everyday, they lost their businesses and their family members. Those people were willing to do much more than just going into the streets to demonstrate as other Palestinians would have done in East Jerusalem."⁷⁰⁰

He further adds:

"The more violent the Israeli response, the more hatred the response from Palestinians. There is an Israeli statement which says: 'What does not come with force, comes with more force.' It is part of the Israeli culture and mentality. They applied it a lot in the military and it worked very well at first. Nevertheless, when one now considers the example of Jenin, what we see is the bombing of Jenin, followed by suicide bombers, followed by bombings, followed by more suicide bombers, followed by more bombings [...] In such a context, the Palestinians from Jenin never gave up."⁷⁰¹

Those statements support the fact that policing does affect tactical deployment. It should be restated that policing is related to tactics, because tactics are dynamic, opportunistic, and resource driven. In this regard, both SMs and ORGs adjust their tactical deployment according to the policing actions undertaken. For example, in villages used to the presence of the Israeli army, whistling may indicate the arrival of the soldiers and coordinate the convergence of SM participants flowing into the streets to impede a military operation.⁷⁰² In this context, confrontational tactics such as throwing stones and molotov cocktails, while running away, were widely adopted by SM participants. The deliberate use of those tactics presented soldiers with a serious dilemma, as once a projectile is thrown, the protester becomes harmless as nothing is left in his hands. Such tactics neutralized the ability to use force and further enhanced media coverage when casualties occurred.⁷⁰³

ORGs also adapt their tactical deployments according to the specific types of policing actions. When going to court, lawyers of indicted ORG members receive files of the case with the elements of investigation. In many cases, those documents are later forwarded to the ORG, which then studies them in order to implement lessons to better counter policing actions in the future.⁷⁰⁴ Later, in prisons, ORG members question each other in order to identify the source that led to their arrest and learn from past mistakes.⁷⁰⁵ When waging an attack, an ORG may also take pictures and collect intelligence. If something went wrong, the ORG's tactics would be immediately altered for future operations.⁷⁰⁶ The Israeli security services observed that Palestinian ORGs successfully adapted to policing detection measures adopted to counter suicide bombers.⁷⁰⁷

To summarise, policing actions affect tactical deployment, and SMORG scales magnify its impact. Tactical deployment may thus be seen as a race for knowledge between policing actors and SMOs who learn from experience.⁷⁰⁸

700.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

701.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

702.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

703.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

704.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

705.(Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

706.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

707.(Israeli Police Officer 1, 2009), (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010a)

708.(Israeli Police Commander, 2010)

9.1 SMORG - TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN TIME

SMORG theory asserts that the impact of policing on tactics is strongly conditioned by the nature of non-state actors. From a qualitative perspective, SMO ideal type leanings of SM and ORG were adopted in order to highlight tactical variations in time, space, and substance.

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: time

H2d Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model.

III. Explanatory hypotheses: time

Strategic level:

H3a SMs non-permanent allocation of factors increases the cost of participation

H3b State and ORGs permanent allocation of factors allows adjustment in routines and procedures

H3c ORGs protest frequency keeps increasing after the culmination phase (highest number of FCv-FCf)

Operational level

H3d SMs lack coordination at an operational level

H3e ORGs develop coordination at an operational level

Tactical level

H3f SMs do not master sequence management and inflow of resources

H3g ORGs master sequence management and inflow of resources

9.1.1. Strategic level

The force interaction model related to tactical variations in time argues that policing is the main driver of tactical adaptation. At a strategic level, the offense-defense dynamic highlights that: a) The SM offense efficiency decreases with time due to the non-permanent allocation of SM factors (resources...). b) The state defense efficiency increases with time due to the permanent allocation of factors that permits gains in efficiency through the improvements in the handling of resources. c) The culminating point of the wave of contention lies at the intersection of the SM's decreasing offensive efficiency and the increasing state defense efficiency curves. d) The ORG permanent allocation of factors enables the improvement of efficiency and the continued waging of protest beyond the culmination point of the SM protest wave.

The SM's allocation of resources is non-permanent. It was witnessed that Palestinian demonstrations or riots decreased both during the period of Ramadan or during the harvest of olives.⁷⁰⁹ If Ramadan is based on religious ground, the harvest of olives is strictly dictated by economic motivations. For many Palestinians, olives are the main source of income, and the SM participants need to be with their families for the harvests.⁷¹⁰ The commercial strikes undertaken by SM participants during the first intifada were economically disastrous for Palestinian merchants in the long run.⁷¹¹ Shopkeepers had to adapt to avoid ruin by opening their stores

709.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

710.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

711.(Sharp, 1989, p. 12)

during short periods of time; between 09:00 and 12:00.⁷¹² During the second intifada, despite the fact that no leaflets were calling for commercial strikes, the economic damages were also catastrophic due to the loss of tourism following suicide bombing campaigns. The old city of Jerusalem was deserted, and as a Palestinian hotel owner mentioned, he needed to take credits in order to avoid permanent closure. Ten years later, the owner was still paying the debts that he contracted during this period and the other merchants who could not borrow at the time were ruined.⁷¹³ These few examples highlight the costs of mobilization incurred by SM participants and validate the decreasing trend followed by the SM offensive efficiency through time.

On the other hand, state defensive efficiency increases through time. During both intifadas, Israel was taken by surprise and the central question for the state was how to cope more effectively while still using the same resources; or in other words how to improve efficiency.⁷¹⁴ The adjustment was not as straightforward as it may appear, as it takes time. During the first intifada, the Israeli military doctrine had to be changed in order to cope with peace time missions such as the handling of riots or uprisings. The army further adapted by developing protective and non-lethal equipment.⁷¹⁵ During the second intifada, the first action of the Israeli military was a reoccupation of the OPT. Then, in order to decrease the material and symbolic costs of such an occupation, the state of Israel further adapted by developing specific military forces that were able to carry out pinpoint operations with great efficiency.⁷¹⁶ At a higher organizational level, the whole national strategy needed to be adapted in order to cope with terrorism. Terrorism exerted a cost on all aspects of life. Every sector of the state was impacted: the transportation system, the education system, the economic system, etc. In order to lessen the costs, the Israeli national strategy needed to grow in its capacity of resiliency. The central tenet of improving efficiency was applied to every sector of the state.⁷¹⁷

The culmination point of the SM wave of protest that lies at the intersection of the SM offense and state defense dynamics is theoretical. It results from the acceptance of the arguments concerning the dynamics of both curves. Beyond the culmination point, ORGs will display an ability to further increase their operational tempo for the waging of violent forms of protest. This fact is supported by the analyses of the protest space: repertoire subspace, as mentioned in Chapter 5 (p. 90). Within two years after the start of the first intifada, conventional and confrontational forms of protest were overtaken by violent forms of protest. The same occurred during the second intifada, when one year after the start of the uprising, the milder forms of protest were overtaken again by more violent forms of protest.

Field interviews revealed that the permanent allocation of factors for an ORG is partially true. Palestinian ORGs have lower level cadres who are completely integrated within the society and do work beside their ORG duties.⁷¹⁸ Even most of the members of one of the most famous Hamas combat units, the al-Qassam brigades, do work on the side.⁷¹⁹ However, the permanent allocation of factors still holds for high level cadres and operatives wanted by Israel.⁷²⁰ The high level cadres are fully focused on their organizational tasks within the ORG, while the wanted operatives need to remain on the move to escape arrest by the Israeli authorities.⁷²¹

712.(Peretz, 1990, p. 56)

713.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

714.(Deputy Head of the Israeli National Security Council (Ret.), 2010)

715.(Deputy Head of the Israeli National Security Council (Ret.), 2010)

716.(Deputy Head of the Israeli National Security Council (Ret.), 2010)

717.(Deputy Head of the Israeli National Security Council (Ret.), 2010)

718.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

719.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

720.(Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

721.(Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

9.1.2. Operational level

SMs lack coordination at an operational level. Spontaneous SM riots may arise when the IDF patrols the streets in Palestinian cities or villages. This is an impulsive reaction to counter army activities.⁷²² Upon receiving a signal, many Palestinians leave their homes and converge in the streets towards the incoming soldiers in an attempt to impede their freedom of movement and actions.⁷²³ Funerals may also be a base of spontaneous SM protest.⁷²⁴ During the first intifada, means such as word-of-mouth, faxes, phones, incitements in mosques or in public gatherings, graffiti, posters, and leaflets were used to coordinate the SM collective action in time. During the second intifada, those means were complemented by cell phones, emails, and the virtual network on the web.⁷²⁵ Nevertheless, simple means such as posters and graffiti were still used during both periods because they are cheap, quick to make, and very efficient.⁷²⁶ Generally, it can be said that SM mobilization is more spontaneous in villages, while protests are more coordinated in cities, with leaflets or other means calling for protests on a certain time and date.⁷²⁷

An ORG, on the other hand, is highly focused on coordination at an operational level. In Jerusalem, an ORG can activate the mobilization process for collective action through flyers and further order all merchants in the old city to close their shops before the start of protests.⁷²⁸ A shopkeeper cannot refuse. If he does, he would have his store burned the same day by the ORG's youth groups.⁷²⁹ SMOs such as Hamas have youth units to steer protests. Their cadres integrate into the crowd and hide within it.⁷³⁰ Hizballah has also been known to coordinate the occurrence of protests in order to create a diversion and simultaneously launch high intensity operations to kidnap Israeli soldiers.⁷³¹

Another organizational mechanism is the exploitation of spontaneous SM protests to further an ORG's specific agenda. During the first intifada, many conventional or confrontational forms of protest occurred spontaneously. Nevertheless, a constant remained: When a Palestinian was injured or killed during a SM spontaneous protest, the ORG would immediately join in by exploiting the deeds to further their own agenda and expand the SM protest's momentum. The ORGs were fully prepared to handle cases when SM casualties occurred.⁷³² The messages to be displayed on the posters were already arranged with quotes related to shaheeds (martyrs).⁷³³ The only things that needed to be added were the name and the picture of the person killed or wounded. ORGs visited the deceased's family to gather those elements.⁷³⁴ Then, the ORG's printing houses and distribution networks were immediately activated, often working through the night. The objective was to have the ORG posters hanging everywhere in the streets the following morning, with the name, picture, and the deeds committed by the wounded or killed.⁷³⁵

722.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

723.(Israeli Soldier 3, 2010)

724.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

725.(Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

726.(Weimann, 2010), (Israeli Soldier 2, 2010), (Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

727.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

728.ORG such as Hamas - Fatah - PIJ.

729.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

730.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

731.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

732.(Weimann, 2010)

733.(Weimann, 2010)

734.(Weimann, 2010)

735.(Weimann, 2010)

Overall, it can be stated that if most of SM actions came from the bottom, then exploitation of the deeds always came from the top, or in other words from the ORGs.⁷³⁶ The hypothesis H3d related to the spontaneous character of SM protest is confirmed. On the other hand, the hypothesis H3e addressing the ORG coordination at an operational level remains true but had to be complemented. As mentioned, an ORG's coordination in time is also executed through the ORG's exploitation of the deeds of SM participants. The exploitation of the deeds enables an ORG to indirectly coordinate protest in time, by hastening the protest momentum during the course of the following days. This also converges with the analyses of the protest space: tactical subspace internal factors, which highlighted the SMO's process of lowering levels of coordination (from directive control toward tactical freedom) and collective action (from actions waged by hit teams toward actions of the masses) during SM waves of protest.⁷³⁷

9.1.3. Tactical level

The SM does not master sequence management or the inflow of resources. The quantitative study of the protest space: tactical subspace external factors, highlighted the negative interaction coefficient between conventional protest span 1-7 and span 15-21, underlining the fact that when one goes up the other goes down.⁷³⁸ This demonstrates that when the number of conventional protests increases during one week, it lessens in later weeks, perfectly describing the curve of theoretical power.⁷³⁹

During both intifadas, spontaneous and coordinated SM protests occurred. The coordination in time executed by the operational overarching commands enabled SM protests to kept being waged on the long term. The ORGs were carefully planing protests or escalation phases, and the SM participants mobilized in mass following the ORG's instructions diffused through leaflets or other means.⁷⁴⁰ Therefore, the ORGs were clearly coordinating the operational tempo of SM protests.⁷⁴¹ The study of leaflets published by the overarching commands of the first intifada in Chapter 4 further supports this point. Over the long term, the ORGs exerted a decisive influence on the issue of sequence management and inflow of resources, which are both lacking in SMs.

The related hypotheses (H3f - H3g) addressing sequence management and inflow of resources, were supported by the study of both the strategic and tactical levels. At a strategic level, the costs of mobilization incurred by SM participants provoke a decreasing trend of SM offensive efficiency through time. At a tactical level, the decisive influence of ORGs on the SM issue of sequence management helped SMs to maintain their protests operational tempo for a longer term.

9.1.4. Discussion

Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model. This model demonstrates that a wave of contention can be successfully explained through time at the three levels of strategy, operations, and tactics.

At a strategic level, the hypotheses H3a *SMs non-permanent allocation of factors increases the cost of participation*, H3b *State and ORG permanent allocation of factors allows adjustment in routines and procedures* and H3C *ORGs protest frequency keeps increasing after the culmination phase (highest number of FCv-FCf)* were confirmed. The curve of contention is imprinted

736.(Weimann, 2010)

737.Tactical subspace: Internal factors / Internal factor analyses (p. 184)

738.See: Chapter 7 / Tactical subspace: External factors / PERIOD 2 / Conventional forms (p. 131)

739.Chapter 3 / TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN TIME / Sequence management (p. 39)

740.(Schiff & Ya'ari, 1990, p. 48), (Mosab Hassan, 2010, pp. 21,142)

741.(Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

by the offense-defense dynamics. The decreasing strength of the offense is caused by the SM reallocation of factors to their daily occupation. The increasing strength of the defense is produced by gains in productivity through the adjustment of the structures and routines of a state's dedicated security apparatus. An ORG, with resources permanently allocated for the needs of the struggle, follows the same logic, increasing efficiency through time, especially after the culmination point of the SM protest wave.

At an operational level, the hypothesis H3d *SMs lack coordination at an operational level* was supported. At the operational level, the collective actions deployed by a SM are not the result of decisions taken at an operational level, but mainly the product of networking developing at a tactical level. On the other hand, the hypothesis H3e *ORGs develop coordination at an operational level* needed to be refined. An ORG's precise control on resources allows ORGs to keep the attrition factors in check; and to precisely influence the collective actions waged at a tactical level. ORGs also exert an operational coordination in time, based upon an ORG's exploitation of the deeds of SM participants, in order to hasten protest momentum.

At a tactical level, the hypotheses H3f *SMs do not master sequence management and inflow of resources* and H3g *ORGs master sequence management and inflow of resources* were both supported. The decisive influence of the role played by ORGs to regulate SM sequence management, enabling the SM tactical deployments to hold for a middle and long terms, was emphasized.

After the review of explanatory hypotheses inherent to tactical variations in time, the next subchapter will focus on hypotheses related to tactical variations in space.

9.2 SMORG - TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SPACE

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: space

H2e Tactical variations in space imply that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory.

IV. Explanatory hypotheses: space

Occupation of space

H4a SM density means higher probability of escalation in protest

H4b ORGs favor unity over density

Spatial coordination

H4d SM mobilization occurs in the same places, thus with little need of organizational structure

H4e ORGs require an elaborate organizational structure for the waging of attacks with tight spatial coordination and sequential effects

Accessibility

H4f SM gatherings are conditioned by time-distance cost

H4g SMs replicate similar tactics in other locations if access is restricted to the protest zone

H4h ORGs retain capabilities to wage protest, despite policing tightening in spatial control

Safety

H4i SMs use terrain, masses, and media as safety nets

H4j ORGs either establish a safe haven, or strike and move when operating on unfavorable ground

9.2.1. Occupation of space

The IDF observed that patrols conducted in Palestinian villages during day time carried higher probabilities of escalation in SM protests. Day patrols create instant gathering: A crowd starts to surround soldiers and once a certain density is reached, the people encircling the soldiers may start to riot. To lessen the issues related to the density factor leading up to riots, the IDF adapted by conducting night raids.⁷⁴² An IDF soldier revealed during an interview: "Nobody really wants to wake up in the middle of the night and get out of his home, this is a natural behavior, people are tired and prefer to stay quiet in bed."⁷⁴³ Therefore, operating at night lessens density and by the same token, the potential opportunities for friction with a SM.

During Ramadan, 100'000 people converge every Friday in Jerusalem by bus, car, and foot.⁷⁴⁴ Furthermore, many people meet there on a regular basis and no demonstration or escalation occurs, despite the presence of Israeli security forces checking people at the gates in the old city.

742. (Israeli Soldier 2, 2010), (Israeli Soldier 3, 2010)

743. (Israeli Soldier 3, 2010)

744. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

In this case, density appears not to be a sufficient factor to account for escalation in SM protests. Nevertheless, in times of strain, the situation is drastically altered. The Israeli policing actors operate a careful handling of density in order to decrease the risk of demonstrations escalating into riots. Access restrictions through compartmentalization (checkpoints) are regularly used in times of tension.⁷⁴⁵ The hypothesis H4a is thus not fully supported. This hypothesis needs to be refined by connecting SM density to contextual sensitivity, for higher probabilities of SM protest escalations to occur.

The ORG's relationship to density is different. Dual membership in diverse ORGs does not occur.⁷⁴⁶ The ORG privileges a strict sense of belonging and thus an exclusive overarching unity links its members together. The role played by density in the ORG's tactical deployment should be further refined. An ORG will still look for density when waging an attack, but at a tactical level (concentration of the forces at the decisive point). Contrary to a SM, an ORG will avoid density at the operational level, in order to lessen its signature and decrease the probability of destruction by the state actor's superior firepower. In this regard, ORGs will seek to drop below the threshold of utility of the state actors weapon systems, and by moving within the space occupied by civilians, restrain the state actor in its use of military means.⁷⁴⁷

The use of human shields is regularly practiced by Hizballah's operatives who live and hide within villages. Hizballah's general secretary declared: "The organization's operatives live in their houses, in their schools, in their mosques, in their churches, in their fields, in their farms, and in their factories. You can't destroy them in the same way you would destroy an army."⁷⁴⁸ During the Israeli Operation Cast Lead in 2009, Hamas' military wing, al-Qassam Brigades, undertook the same strategy. Its cadres avoided direct confrontation and enticed the IDF into the heart of urban and refugee camps areas, regarded as focal points for the fighting due to the cover created by civilians used as human shields.⁷⁴⁹ To conclude, hypothesis H4b is partially supported by the facts. An ORG might still look for density, but at a tactical level. At the operational level, density is avoided in order to increase the chances of survival by lessening the ORG signature.

9.2.2. Spatial coordination

Spontaneous points of friction frequently arise in public places where soldiers control Palestinian pedestrians. When soldiers start checking clothes, the person or the bystanders sometimes start swearing. The uproar will get louder and other people will gather naturally at the point where the friction occurs, to observe the source of the tumult. Others will then profit from the spontaneously created mass to start throwing stones from the rear end of the crowd at the soldiers in the forefront.⁷⁵⁰ Places of worship are also regular starting points for SM protests. On Fridays, the prayer in mosques gathers many people.⁷⁵¹ On Sundays, the same occurs in Palestinian Christian churches in villages.⁷⁵² SM demonstrations or riots are prone to start from those places of worship.⁷⁵³

Other spots may also be chosen, according to settlement activities. In Jerusalem, some Palestinians are used to making prayers every Friday on the same site that settlers want to occupy.⁷⁵⁴ In Sheikh Jarrah in East Jerusalem, settlers invaded Palestinian houses. They were armed and

745. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

746. (Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

747. (Smith, 2006, pp. 270-278 , 297-301)

748. Syyed Hassan Nasrallah, Al-Manar TV, May 27, 2006, in: (Erich, 2006)

749. (IICC, 2009b)

750. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

751. (Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

752. (Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

753. (Israeli Soldier 2, 2010), (Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

754. (Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

the Palestinian owners of the houses were expelled. One of the Palestinians camped in a tent for two months, on the sidewalk in front of his home. Every Friday, international peace activists and other Palestinians joined him. The SM participants regularly met in the same location to support the people expelled and demonstrate their oppositions to illegal settler activities.⁷⁵⁵ The position of the security fence is another predictable location for SM protests. In 2002, the separation fence between Israel and the West Bank started to be built in the North, near Jenin. Wherever the wall went, it encountered some form of resistance. People, filmed by international media, would regularly demonstrate in villages.⁷⁵⁶ In East Jerusalem, some of the families who had their relatives on the other side of the wall, a few meters away, tried to knock down a portion of the security fence in 2013. They were stopped by the IDF who used weapons and deployed armored vehicle to prevent the break through.⁷⁵⁷ The hypothesis H4d addressing regular SM location of protest with little need of organizational structure is thus confirmed.

The hypothesis H4e related to the ORG requirement of organizational structure for the waging of attacks with tight spatial coordination and sequential effects has been corroborated by both the qualitative and quantitative elements of this research: a) The qualitative study of Hizballah and Hamas in Chapter 4 underlining the structuration of their military arms.⁷⁵⁸ b) The quantitative study of the protest space: organizational subspace in Chapter 6, emphasizing coordination and structure as central to the waging of protest against harder targets.⁷⁵⁹ c) The quantitative study of the protest space: tactical subspace: internal factors in Chapter 9, highlighting the effects of a unitary structure on the growth of the hazard rate of violent forms of protests.⁷⁶⁰

9.2.3. Accessibility

Usually, Palestinian SM participants demonstrate close to where they reside.⁷⁶¹ This localization of SM protests is due to two main reasons. The first reason relates to the particularity of the contention itself. The problems are not the same throughout the whole OPT. The most flagrant is the situational contrasts between Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip and Palestinians living in the West Bank. Even within the West Bank, Palestinians assess the problem of their fellows living in Nazareth to be different than the one living in Ramallah or Hebron.⁷⁶² The second reason linked to the localization of SM protest, arises from the Israeli Authority fragmentation of the West Bank in self contained enclaves. This fragmentation is conducted either through settlement policies aimed at encircling Palestinian towns, or through the erection of checkpoints regulating the transfer of people from one enclave into the next.⁷⁶³ Therefore, when a large demonstration is announced, for example in Ramallah, all checkpoints would immediately be closed by the IDF and the SM protests become self contained.⁷⁶⁴ SM protests occur locally and cannot get support from SM participants living in neighboring cities or villages.

In spite of compartmentalization, when the IDF restricts the access from one enclave to the next, the SM participants who cannot cross will usually demonstrate or riot at the checkpoints where they are stopped.⁷⁶⁵ SM participants still remain informed of events occurring in other cities through word-of-mouth, phone, or internet. If most of the Palestinian population does not

755.(Palestinian People 3, 2013)

756.(Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

757.(Palestinian People 3, 2013)

758.Chapter 4 / TACTICAL LEVEL: SMO / Hizballah (p. 85) and Hamas (p. 81)

759.Chapter 6 / Organizational subspace / SMORG analyses / Inductive Analyses (p. 113)

760.Chapter 8 / Tactical subspace: Internal factors / Internal factor analyses (p. 181) and (p. 184)

761.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

762.(Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

763.(Israeli soldier 5, 2013)

764.(Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

765.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

have computers or access to the web from home, the population is still highly exposed to the internet through cafés, libraries, schools, and community centers.⁷⁶⁶ To summarize, the hypothesis H4f related to time-distance cost is therefore not supported in the OPT, where fragmentation is the main obstacle to SM gathering and protests. However, the hypothesis H4g is confirmed. SM protests still occur locally and at checkpoints.

Paradoxically, ORGs retain capabilities to wage protests, despite the tightening of spatial control measures. Contrary to SM participants having a short range distance for protest autonomy, ORGs and their youth wings are highly mobile.⁷⁶⁷ During both intifadas, the increase in security measures undertaken by the Israeli Authority were in part designed to raise the difficulty level for ORGs wanting to infiltrate operatives into Israel. ORGs may still dispose of a support network in a city such as Jerusalem, where a strong percentage of the population is Israeli Arab and the tension between communities higher. However, Palestinian support networks are quasi non-existent in most of other Israeli cities.⁷⁶⁸ Therefore, ORGs will seek, in most cases, to infiltrate operatives into Israel in order to quickly commit an attack with a minimum of insider support.⁷⁶⁹ To undertake the infiltration of operatives, ORGs utilize regular smuggling infrastructures. In the South, bedouins are accustomed to constantly crossing the border separating Israel from Egypt. They extensively know the terrain, and some of them regularly smuggle goods across the border. Hamas first exfiltrated its operatives from Gaza into Egypt through tunnels, and second, infiltrated its cadres into Israel through the use of the bedouins smuggling infrastructure.⁷⁷⁰

Despite the fact that ORGs retain a wider operational space than SMs, an ORG's freedom of maneuver is nonetheless hampered. First, spatial control measures alter ORG resource consumption and exert a direct effect on their tactical deployment. ORGs have to consume more resources to achieve the same results as SMs. This leads ORGs to alter their tactics if the cost-benefit ratio is considered too high. The PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah commented in 2006 on the irregularities of the timing of their suicide bombing attacks into Israel. He stated that the separation fence was an obstacle to the resistance and that the situation would be entirely different if the fence did not exist.⁷⁷¹ In 2007, Hamas similarly mentioned that the number of its suicide attacks dropped due to the difficulties it had to face for the infiltration of its cadres into Israel.⁷⁷² In 2008, the PIJ leader Ramadan Shalah added, speaking of the security fence: "We do not deny that it limits the ability of the resistance to arrive deep within to carry out suicide bombing attacks, but the resistance has not surrendered or become helpless, and is looking for other ways to cope with the requirement of every stage [...]."⁷⁷³ As a consequence, the PIJ leader announced a translation in tactics, by indicating that rockets were to replace the previous stage of suicide bombings.

Second, besides the alteration in resource consumption and effects on related tactics, spatial control measures also directly affect the ORG SMORG scales. The compartmentalization of the cities in the West Bank by the Israeli Authority had unexpected consequences, such as the development of local warlords. This weakened the centralization of power within Fatah during the second intifada.⁷⁷⁴ Adding to the compartmentalisation issue, the corruption of Fatah made it much easier for Hizballah to fund loose Palestinian cells to commit attacks during the same period.⁷⁷⁵ To summarize, despite the wider operational space that ORGs retain when compared

766.(Weimann, 2010)

767.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

768.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

769.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

770.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

771.(IICC, 2006i)

772.(IICC, 2007c)

773.(IICC, 2008g)

774.(Karmon, 2009b)

775.(Karmon, 2009b)

to SMs, spatial control measures nonetheless: a) Hamper the ORG freedom of maneuver, b) Raise the cost - benefit ratio impacting directly on the ORG tactical deployment, c) Alter the ORG SMORG scales on a longer term perspective.

9.2.4. Safety

When asked about safety in waging forms of protest, a Palestinian SM participant answered:

First, the goal of every protest is to increase the cost on the occupier by using any kind of action. The occupier will thus have to recruit, mobilise [...] As a matter of fact, there is always a risk when waging protest. The acceptance of the level of risk that people will take can vary from one community to the other, according to the community's own grievances and context [...] The same applies at an individual level, for example in the same demonstration some people will be at the front and others at the back of the crowd to be safer [...] At the end, anyone involved into any kind of protest will have to be ready to pay the price. In other words, to be ready to be injured or even killed. Even in Bilain, where protests are peaceful, some people were killed. Furthermore, emotion during the event, may increase your risk taking, even more that what you thought would have been possible beforehand.⁷⁷⁶

SM safety nets are provided by masses, terrain, and media. SM protests occurring in schools and universities are perfect examples of SM use of masses and terrain as safety nets. The IDF adopted, as a matter of principle, to make its presence felt in order to keep a psychological ascent on the Palestinian population.⁷⁷⁷ During the first intifada, everyday at school break, the IDF soldiers parked their jeeps in front of the high school in the Shafat refugee camp. As a consequence, daily, the 500 kids whose average age was 12 years old, would start throwing stones at the soldiers, who would in return fire tear gas at them. It was like a game for the children throwing stones.⁷⁷⁸ They were exploiting both the masses by hiding within the crowd of their fellows schoolmates, and terrain by running back into the school as soon as the soldiers would advance. During the second intifada, the same conflictual interactions occurred. Everyday, the IDF soldiers parked their jeeps in front of the Al-Quds university at time break. Everyday, the students would feel provoked and start throwing stones at the soldiers, who would in turn respond by firing tear gas.⁷⁷⁹ The use of masses and terrain were thus favorable for the safety of SM participants in both cases.

To further the subject of safety through the use of masses, safety for SMs is first and foremost obtained by the number of participants. As a SM participant mentioned:

"Riots occurring at junctions will never start with only one person. It would be far too dangerous for him, and he would be quickly neutralised by the army. Riots always start with a group of people, usually with a minimum number of ten people. The bigger the number of people taking part in the riot, the safer it is for individual participants. It will avoid them being arrested."⁷⁸⁰

Safety thus exponentially increases with the size of the group; the larger the size, the more people feel safe to demonstrate or riot.⁷⁸¹ In Palestinian villages, masses are composed by inhabitants getting together and having the mindset that the IDF is invading their territory. Therefore, an instantaneous collective mobilization occurs with the entire villagers getting into the streets and gathering at the forefront of the soldiers.⁷⁸² The crowd of a SM is thus large in

776. (Palestinian Academic 1, 2013)

777. (Israeli Soldier 4, 2013)

778. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

779. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

780. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

781. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

number and heterogeneous. The group is mostly composed of youth, but older men and women also join in. At the same time, youths act in small mobile teams, hiding into the masses, throwing stones, retreating, and escaping when the army advances.⁷⁸³

Safety through the use of terrain was applied by SM participants during both intifadas. Demonstrations and riots regularly occurred in the same locations in Jerusalem. They took place in front of the Damascus or Herodes gates. The Lion's gate in the old city was another spot where clashes regularly occurred. Stones were thrown from every directions at soldiers checking people at the gates. The soldiers were easy and safe targets for the SM stone throwers who could exploit terrain by hitting static soldiers and escaping by different avenues.⁷⁸⁴ Road junctions were other locations of choice, privileged by SM participants seeking safety through the use of both masses and terrain. First, junctions are favored because people change buses in those locations. Therefore, spontaneous riots are easy to coordinate because everyone knows each other in the bus, and the critical mass of participants necessary for safety, as previously mentioned, can easily be reached. Second, junctions offer many avenues of escape, and stores close by may also serve as refuge to SM participants wanting to hide into them. Third, once the circulation is intentionally stopped by SM participants, sometimes by burning tires on the road, the cars jam the junction and all roads leading to it. The movement of soldier reinforcements is thus impeded, and the SM participants further exploit terrain by seeking cover behind cars.⁷⁸⁵

Another powerful tool increasing the safety of SM participants is media. In East Jerusalem, the media monitors every protest incident. Any blatant policing abuse in the public space would be primed to be immediately reported at an international level.⁷⁸⁶ In remote areas, the absence of media incited SM participants to use digital cameras to signify their potential to instantly diffuse images of policing abuses on the web. The Palestinian SM participants and inhabitants of a village in the South Hebron hills, whose houses and camp were condemned to be destroyed by military order, stated that the use of cameras was very powerful for their safety. They argued that it provided them with respect in front of the army and police.⁷⁸⁷

Safety for SM participants may also be increased by choosing less daring forms of protest. The Palestinians living in East Jerusalem were the last to join the ongoing protest movements during both intifadas. This is due to the fact that each of them felt under constant pressure knowing that the Israeli authorities knew every detail about them, and that they could further lose their residency status. Many of them felt that they were already resisting by not leaving East Jerusalem, despite the Israeli pressure to do so. In this regard, the SM participants adapted their tactical deployment to their safety parameters by taking less risk. They readjusted their forms of protest by never protesting against the state of Israel directly, but instead taking part in demonstrations for the support of certain prisoners or against specific laws.⁷⁸⁸

When operating on unfavorable ground, the ORGs strike and move. Many ORG members move constantly. Some of their operatives would not stay two nights at the same place in order to avoid people talking about their presence in the neighborhood. Bystanders may see some movement but would not know more about it.⁷⁸⁹ ORG cadres may also exploit terrain and masses to increase their own safety. As mentioned on the paragraphs related to ORG occupation of space using human shields, ORG members have been known to hide within the crowd

782. (Israeli Soldier 3, 2010)

783. (Israeli Soldier 3, 2010)

784. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013), (Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

785. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

786. Witnessed by the author during a riot in front of Damascus gate in June 2013.

787. (Israeli Soldier 4, 2013)

788. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

789. (Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

itself, sometimes with weapons; shooting at the army and using the mass of people as protection from returning fire.⁷⁹⁰

9.2.5. Discussion

Tactics cannot be separated from the space in which they are deployed. The adaptability of tactics to counter the moves of an opponent within a specific environment is determinant. The main issue related to tactical deployments in space is based on the fact that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory. The four parameters related to tactical variations in space are: occupation of space, spatial coordination, accessibility, and safety.

In regard to occupation of space, SM tactics rely on density. The explanatory hypothesis H4a *SM density means higher probability of escalation in protest* was partially corroborated and needed to be refined by connecting density to contextual sensitivity, for SM escalation in protest to occur. The hypothesis H4b *ORGs favor unity over density* was also partially supported. However, it needed to be deepened. On one hand, the dispersion of ORGs is justified at an operational level, in order to lessen ORG's signature and improve its chances of survival. On the other hand, at the tactical level, mass (concentration of the forces at the decisive point) remains central for ORGs waging confrontational and violent forms of protest, in order to impact on their targets.

Spatial coordination highlights the effects of friction on tactical deployment. The hypothesis H4d *SM mobilization occurs in the same places, thus with little need of organizational structure* and the hypothesis H4e *ORGs require an elaborate organizational structure for the waging of attacks with tight spatial coordination and sequential effects* were both supported. SM spatial deployments are operated through explicit and tacit communications. The principle of mass inherent to the SM, as a crowd moving together, lessens the issue of spatial coordination. On the other hand, the requirements of spatial coordination for an ORG are much more demanding due to the dispersion of its human and material resources at the operational level, and the paradoxical requirements to concentrate them at a tactical level.

Accessibility assesses the parameter of mobility for tactical deployment. The hypothesis H4f *SM gatherings are conditioned by time-distance cost* was falsified. If it is right to state that Palestinian SM participants demonstrate at the place where they live, it is wrong to relate the cause to the ratio of time-distance cost. In the Palestinian theater, the localization of SM tactical deployments are due, on one hand, to the particularity of the contention itself, varying at the community level, and on the other hand, to the fragmentation of the OPT in self contained enclaves created by the Israeli Authority and settlers. The hypothesis H4g *SMs replicate similar tactics in other locations if access is restricted to the protest zone* was corroborated by the occurrence of protests locally and at checkpoints. The last explanatory hypothesis H4h *ORGs retain capabilities to wage protest, despite policing tightening in spatial control* was confirmed, but needed to be expanded. In spite of the wider operational space that an ORG retains when compared to the one at disposal of a SM, spatial control measures adopted by a policing actor nonetheless: a) Hamper the ORG freedom of maneuver, b) Raise the cost - benefit ratio and directly impact on an ORG's resources and related tactical deployments, c) Alter the ORG SMORG scales in a longer term.

The last parameter, safety, relates to the choice of location for tactical deployments, that enables protection against the state surveillance or repression. Both hypotheses H4i *SMs use terrain, masses, and media as safety nets* and H4h *ORGs either establish a safe heaven, or strike and move when operating on unfavorable ground* were confirmed. SMs insure safety by choosing protest locations enabling the constitution of a critical mass of participants, insuring

790.(Israeli Soldier 2, 2010)

greater media coverage, and disposing of avenues of escape. ORGs, on the other hand, enhance safety by punishing collaborators, creating a safe heaven and operating along the strike and move principle.

After the review of the explanatory hypotheses inherent to tactical variations in space, the next subchapter will focus on hypotheses related to tactical variations in substance.

9.3 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SUBSTANCE

II. Prime explanatory hypothesis: substance

H2f Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs.

V. Explanatory hypotheses: substance

Cultural/Morale resources

H5a SMs follow societal culture: tactics are socially legitimate

H5b ORGs follow organizational culture: tactics are innovative and socially not legitimate

Organizational resources

H5c SM tactics are spontaneous, made of local impulses

H5d ORG tactics are strategic and coordinated

Human/Material resources

H5e SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality

H5f ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality

H5g SMs have multiple membership participants

H5h ORGs have single membership members

9.3.1. Cultural/Morale resources

The ORGs trying to reach a SM undertake two processes. The first is a legitimatization process. During the first intifada, ORGs were reinforcing the confrontational trend by glorifying, on posters, children having been killed or wounded. When casualties occurred, posters made by ORGs were displayed the following day in the streets, stating that the child was a hero, a *shaheed*, that went to heaven while throwing stones at the enemy. ORGs were not explicitly stating that people should throw stones, but were in fact rewarding the ones who did.⁷⁹¹ This legitimatization process reinforced the integration of the mean of action *stone* into the Palestinian repertoire of collective action of this period. During the second intifada, the legitimatization process was conducted in a similar way; by displaying verses of the Coran on posters beside pictures of martyrs. Suicide operations were legitimized through religious quotes and glorifying posters displayed in view for everyone.⁷⁹² Some have even been honored with military funerals and/or their names been used to label streets.⁷⁹³ In this regard, the legitimatization process reinforced the integration of the mean of action *suicide bombing* into the Palestinian repertoire of collective action of this period.

The second process used by ORGs to reach a SM is by lowering levels of coordination (from directive control toward tactical freedom of action) and collective action (from actions waged

791.(Weimann, 2010)

792.(Kahati, 2010a)

793.(Israeli Police Officer 3, 2011)

by hit teams toward actions of the masses) during SM waves of protest.⁷⁹⁴ This mechanism was discovered through the quantitative analyses of the protest space conducted in Chapter 8 Tactical subspace: Internal factors (p. 175).

These two processes are complementary. The integration of a specific mean of action into the repertoire of collective actions of a given society, linked to the lowering of the levels of coordination and collective action, are precisely what enables ORGs to reach a SM and exploit waves of protest. During the first intifada (P2), ORG's endeavors to reach the SM enabled them to take care of SM sequence management and to keep the confrontational protest dynamic ongoing for years. During the second intifada (P4), the lowering of the levels of coordination and collective action allowed ORGs, who had an exclusive approach during the previous third period, to adopt an inclusive approach in order to maximize the number of SM candidates to be integrated in their suicide bombing operations and thus wage violent forms of protest at a much higher operational tempo.⁷⁹⁵

The hypothesis H5a asserting that SMs follow societal culture is therefore supported by the facts. However, the hypothesis H5b stating that ORGs follow organizational culture is only partially corroborated. As the previous dual process highlights, during SM waves of protest (P2 and P4), ORGs seek to reach a SM through the legitimization of certain means of action and the lowering of their own levels of coordination and collective action. On the other hand, between waves of protest (P1, P3, P5), the study of the protest space: repertoire and organizational subspaces, highlighted that ORGs did employ tactics that were innovative and socially not legitimate at the time of their use.

9.3.2. Organizational resources

SM tactics are, for the most part, spontaneous and made of local impulse. During the first intifada (P2), the whole youth population was mobilized, and the *shabiba* were only a part of the whole protest movement.⁷⁹⁶ Youth would leave school to spontaneously challenge Israeli soldiers and throw stones. The course of events was becoming unforeseeable. At any time, an announcement about martyrs, or any other protest related event, could trigger spontaneous waves of demonstrations or riots.⁷⁹⁷ SM tactics related to local impulses may further be exemplified with the story of the merchants of Bethlehem. In 1986, the Israeli civilian administration increased the taxes of the Palestinian shop keepers. Many of them, who were already paying taxes to the Israeli Authority, did not have the financial capabilities to pay the extra amounts required. Furthermore, Palestinians who were used to import goods directly from abroad, were denied the right to do so by the Israeli Authority. They were instructed to order their raw material from Jewish intermediaries located within Israel at a much higher price. Through this process, 22 Palestinian craftsmen lost their work, and with it their only source of income to support their families. The few other merchants that managed to persevere could not pay the extraordinary taxes requested, and the IDF surrounded their homes to take their furniture. The Palestinian villagers wanted to react, and started to talk about throwing rocks at soldiers. Youth joined in spontaneous forms of protests and some of them got killed while throwing stones. Later, at the start of the second intifada, the poverty and hopelessness of many SM participants who did not have enough money to survive made them vulnerable to the financial incentives provided by Hamas for the execution of suicide bombings.⁷⁹⁸

794. Tactical subspace: Internal factors / Internal factor analyses (p. 184)

795. The deportation of Hamas and PIJ member enabled closer links with Hizballah. As a consequence, when those members returned to West Bank and Gaza, they brought back the innovative tactical knowledge that they were to deploy on the Israeli-Palestinian theater, at a time were the latter was still not socially legitimate (P3). (Berko, 2011)

796. (Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

797. (Palestinian Intellectual 1, 2011)

798. (Palestinian People 1, 2013)

The organizational resources of a SM, and its gradual transformation into ORGs, was favored with the incarceration of SM participants. One SM participant interviewee stated that he spent six months in jail at the start of the first intifada, being accused of throwing stones. This participant argues that the prison system was radicalizing and educating Palestinians.⁷⁹⁹ The mass arrests of SM participants favored the structuration of SMs, and their later transformation into different ORGs. The prison became an educational place for the SM participants who could study, exchange opinions, and develop strategies about future forms of protest. As a result, the entire leadership at the time of the first intifada had prior prison experience.⁸⁰⁰

Contrary to SM spontaneous impulses, ORG tactics are driven by strategic intent. An ORG has a rational perspective and will choose the best fitted tactics to reach its objectives, as would any regular military organization.⁸⁰¹ Chapter 3 TACTICAL VARIATIONS IN SPACE (p. 42) further mentions that an ORG conforms to maneuver theory and seeks the temporal, spatial, and morale dislocation of its adversary. An ORG trying to tap into a SM may also translate the pure military logic into one designed for propaganda purposes.⁸⁰² In this regard, an ORG may restrict itself to carrying out limited military activities sufficient for propaganda purposes, but insufficient to trigger harsh retaliations that would destroy its whole social-political infrastructure. Such propaganda deeds were achieved, for example, by Hizballah in South Lebanon, when the SMO conquered a small hill, displayed flags and took propaganda pictures.⁸⁰³

ORG tactics driven by strategic intent and the reality of SMOs, as a mix of SMs and ORGs, are perfectly demonstrated by the activities waged in Palestinian universities. Every university student entering a Palestinian university in the West Bank has three different choices of affiliation: the Left faction is usually chosen by the intellectuals, Hamas is chosen by moslem believers, and Fatah by the majority. A Palestinian student, at the time of the second intifada, states:

"The political party you join when entering the university provides you with a social group, money, and facilities within the university such as computers or photocopiers [...] Joining does not mean filling forms, it means hanging out with them, and by hanging out with them, you start being one of them. Even if it might seem vaguely affiliated, the same political group will come to you one day and tell you that they will demonstrate, for example, tomorrow evening and that they will meet at a specific junction. They will also issue a general call, to all students, not only to the one related to their own group, to announce a march from the university to that junction. Nevertheless, everyone knows how it will finish when the march arrives at the junction [...] As a matter of fact, the political groups could easily mobilise 200 people at will, when needed."⁸⁰⁴

He further adds the difficulties for students to remain outside of the protest dynamic:

"The political group exerts a strong pressure to commit, and in this regard the problem is not the pressure, but the danger that one will take when committing. Everyone see people dying everyday, the army is becoming more aggressive. At the age of twenty, it is serious business and kids are not playing around anymore [...] The political parties or groups have guns [...] The social dynamic is pushing everyone in the same direction. Someone saying no to his friend would be accused of not being strong enough to stand for his country. Everyone can say no, but the price to pay for saying no is very high, and the person would become instantly isolated from the whole group."⁸⁰⁵

799.(Palestinian People 4, 2013)

800.(Palestinian People 4, 2013)

801.(Berko, 2011)

802.(Zisser, 2011)

803.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

804.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

805.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

Within the university, there are student elections that elect the student representatives of each political group. The student representatives are extremely powerful. Through their contacts with their mother ORG, for example Hamas or Fatah, they have more money and power than the university itself.⁸⁰⁶ They provide the students with scholarships while the university is financially unable to do so. Those representatives are elected for three to five year terms; some of them finish their studies and remain in their function.⁸⁰⁷ The representatives are known to anyone and can even pass their exams without studying, because some universities are afraid of them.⁸⁰⁸ A balance of power is struck between the administration of the universities and the political groups. Those groups have the capacity to stop education at a specific time and date, across all universities in the OPT.⁸⁰⁹ They usually do it to facilitate the mobilization process and to maximise the number of participants taking part to their protest actions.⁸¹⁰ The university may still argue about the fixation of the time or date, but will have in the end, no other choice than agreeing to stop education.⁸¹¹ As the same student puts it: "The university has to compromise, it does not have any choice. If it does not, the student union may smash the whole university in the name of Palestine."⁸¹² This example perfectly demonstrates the essence of a SMO, as a mix of SM and ORG with the use of different types of organizational resources.

Therefore, the student political groups within the university, through their representatives, follow scrupulously the strategy dictated by their mother ORG. During the first and second intifada, the orders of protests related to the Fatah political group in the different universities were given by Arafat.⁸¹³

9.3.3. Human/Material resources

The hypothesis H5e states that SM resources remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in technical skills and lethality. In Hebron, 750 Jewish settlers live in the middle of a population of 175'000 Palestinians.⁸¹⁴ In this town, the main source of protests are not Palestinians but settlers.⁸¹⁵ In 1994, Baruch Goldstein murdered 29 Palestinians and wounded another 120 in a mosque in Hebron.⁸¹⁶ During this event, he was neutralized and killed by Palestinians bystanders. After his death, settlers in Hebron were seeking revenge. They started to regularly throw molotov cocktails, stones and shoot with their guns at Palestinian houses. Due to the fact that settlers were constantly hurling garbage and stones on the Palestinian market street from the top of the houses they occupied, the IDF had to install iron grids to cover the whole street and protect the Palestinians merchants. The IDF further closed hundreds of Palestinian shops and roads to Palestinians inhabitants, to segregate a whole neighborhood occupied by settlers from the rest of the city.⁸¹⁷ When asked about how Palestinians resisted the pressure exerted by the settlers and about the forms of protest they undertook, a Palestinian interviewee answered that nothing could be done. Palestinians were condemned to live in fear, because settlers were armed with guns and each one of them was protected by four soldiers.⁸¹⁸ In this example,

806.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

807.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

808.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

809.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

810.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

811.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

812.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

813.(Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

814.(Breaking the silence, 2010, p. 3)

815.Testimony no.9, 2008: (Breaking the silence, 2010, p. 20)

816.(Breaking the silence, 2010, p. 3)

817.(Breaking the silence, 2010, p. 4)

818.(Palestinian People 2, 2013)

the motivation to act was not lacking, but the capabilities of the SM participants were obviously insufficient.

The human and material resources brought by the SM are not only low skilled, but also diverse, depending on the knowledge and capabilities brought by heterogeneous participants. During the second intifada, every Palestinian was contributing in his own way to the support of the resistance to the occupation.⁸¹⁹ Some would be actively taking part in the waging of different forms of protest.⁸²⁰ During this period, the Palestinian population hid and protected the ones who shot at settlers or the Israeli army, visited the people having been injured, and provided the family of the deceased with money.⁸²¹ A Palestinian SM participant states that "at the level of the Palestinian community, it really was a mass movement."⁸²²

Contrary to hypothesis H5e *SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality*, this research previously highlighted that many SM protests occurred spontaneously and are therefore not tied to prior processes of mobilization. Nevertheless, SM tactics, as a general rule, remain low in regard to technical skills and lethality. For the most part, they belong to conventional and confrontational forms of protest. On the other hand, SM participants willing to conduct violent forms of protest in an efficient way (expand the ratio of casualties per attack), require the direct support of an ORG.⁸²³ The SM candidates for suicide operations were numerous during the second intifada. What they had to learn to perform their mission remained basic; for example learning to move through a crowd and bring a bomb on target. However, SM candidates were heavily relying on the support provided by ORGs in regard to technical skills and resources.⁸²⁴ As previously mentioned, many ORG resources are involved in suicide bombing operations: the recruiter, the ideologue, the media-propaganda team (persons making an interview of the candidate before action for later propaganda purposes and taking pictures or filming during action), the intelligence collection team, the guide or drivers who lead the candidate on target, and the engineering team specialized in bomb making.⁸²⁵ An ORG also takes care of the family of the deceased after action. ORG members visit the family, provide it with financial assistance, and rebuild its house if it was destroyed during retaliatory strikes by the Israeli security forces.⁸²⁶

The study of the protest space: organizational subspace highlighted that coordination was central for ORGs when it comes to waging more sophisticated types of actions; and especially when it comes to confronting harder targets such as military/police personnel or antagonists. Structure is also highly relevant to confronting harder targets, because an entity operating with multiple suborganizations without clear doctrine, rather than a unitary block with a unique doctrine, is less adequate for the creation of systemic damage against harder targets or the waging of sophisticated attacks.⁸²⁷

The membership requirements in both SMs and ORGs are different. If SM participants can easily be recruited by ORGs for low skilled missions alone during SM waves of protest, then ORG members are, on the other hand, carefully selected. In Islamic ORGs, members are chosen within small groups of people learning Islam (Ushra). Before being selected, the ORG has

819. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

820. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

821. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

822. (Palestinian Intellectual 2, 2013)

823. The word *efficient* was carefully chosen. SM participant may effectively act on the violent protest plateau by taking a knife or even a gun. However, it will not make the action efficient, due to the low cost/benefit ratio. The lack of training, experience and support limit the extent of damage that may be caused. Furthermore, sequence management is not taken care of and limits operational deployment on a long term perspective.

824. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010b)

825. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2010a)

826. (Israeli Police Officer 3, 2011)

827. Chapter 6 SMORG analyses (p. 109)

to know the candidate, his family, and his religious attitudes.⁸²⁸ Although ORG membership is unique, transfers from one ORG to the other may sometimes occur. Examples include membership transfers following social services provided by an ORG to the community. In Gaza, Hamas gave EUR 4000.- for a destroyed house, if the individual was an ORG member. If the individual was not a member of Hamas, he would then receive, for the same damage, only EUR 500.-. Therefore, consecutive to the financial advantages provided by Hamas and the further weakening of Fatah within the Gaza Strip, many Fatah members left their ORG to join Hamas.⁸²⁹ Nevertheless, if ORG transfers sometimes occur, or if a family may have relatives belonging to different ORGs, one individual is always a member of a single ORG at a time.⁸³⁰ Dual ORG membership does not occur.⁸³¹

9.3.4. Discussion

The tactical variations in substance are strongly conditioned by the resources at the disposal of both ideal types. Three resource parameters were studied: cultural/moral, organizational, and human/material.

The explanatory hypotheses related to cultural/moral resources, H5a *SMs follow societal culture: tactics are socially legitimate* and H5b *ORGs follow organizational culture: tactics are innovative and socially not legitimate*, were refined. The analyses revealed a dual mechanism used by ORGs : A legitimization process coupled with a process of lowering coordination and collective action. During SM waves of protest (P2 and P4), ORGs seek to reach a SM through the legitimization of certain means of action and the lowering of their own levels of coordination and collective action. On the other hand, between waves of protest (P1, P3, P5), ORGs employ tactics that are innovative and not socially legitimate at the time of their use.

The organizational resources available for both ideal types emphasized different types of linkage and coordination apparatus. The hypothesis H5c *SM tactics are spontaneous, made of local impulses* was supported by statements emphasizing that the course of events was becoming unforeseeable during the first intifada, or that in Palestinian villages, inhabitants would instantly gather into the streets to impede and challenge the presence of the Israeli army. The hypothesis H5d *ORG tactics are strategic and coordinated* was also supported. ORGs choose the best fitted tactics to reach their objective, as would any military organization. ORG strategic and coordination capabilities were also demonstrated in Palestinian universities, by the chain of command linking directly the ORG to the ORG student representative and the political groups.

The human-material resources explanatory hypotheses H5e *SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality* and H5f *ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality* were not fully supported. The study of the protest space (organizational subspace: SMORG analyses) in Chapter 4, revealed that the hardening of the target, defined by its level of protection (soft - hard), was a much more appropriate indicator than lethality. When addressing the processes of mobilization, this research highlighted that many SM protests occurred spontaneously. Therefore, contrary to hypothesis H5e, SM tactics do not remained tied to prior process of mobilization. However, the points of the hypothesis H5f addressing the ORG's readily deployable resources and high level of technical skills, were confirmed. The ORGs support SM participants with the material and technical skills necessary for SM participants to wage violent forms of protest.

828.(Figheh, 2009a)

829.(Karmon, 2009b)

830.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

831.(Israeli Police Officer 2, 2011)

After the review of the explanatory hypotheses inherent to tactical variations in space, time, and substance, the conclusion chapter that follows will provide an overview of SMORG theory.

Chapter 10

Conclusion

10.1 The theoretical and practical insufficiencies

It might be useful, in the final chapter of this work, to review what was undertaken and what has been reached. This research endeavoured to answer the question: *What are the effects of policing on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors?*

The examination of the literature related to the crowd dynamic theoretical line, asserting patterns of interaction between actors as determinant for the explanation of the fluctuation in collective violence, revealed mixed results. The environment school highlighted the dynamics of cycles of mobilization and the notion of political opportunity structures. The strategic capacity school emphasized the rational approach of cost - benefit calculus and institutionalization, as drivers of tactical deployment. The strategic interaction school, focusing on the effects of policing on crowds or organization behaviors, underlined the fact that soft police actions favor the diffusion of protests, while repression reinforces popular resistance.

What should a strategic analyst answer when a policy maker or a commander, under pressure for deploying forces on a specific theater, asks: *What should we expect?* The issue of political structure, cost-benefit calculus and broad assessments on the effect of repression on popular resistance are of little value in such a context. The central question as mentioned in the introduction section of this work transforms into: *What should we expect if we are part of the interaction process?* More precisely, what will be the effects of the state policing actions on tactical deployment operated by non-state actors.

It was found that theory addressing the effects of policing on tactical deployment was deficient in the requirements for policy relevance. Research to this date has done little in regard to comprehensive overview over both policing actions and tactics; especially about the effects of one on the other. Policing actions are not limited to a perspective opposing preventive to repressive policing. The policing spectrum is much wider, moving from regular patrol presence or regular policing activities, to riot control, ground operations, armored operations, air operation, movement restrictions, and different administrative measures. The tactical spectrum deployed by non-state actors is also not limited to one specific tactic, such as suicide bombings or specific acts of terrorism. The tactical spectrum is much wider, moving from conventional to confrontational and violent forms of protest. This does not refute the importance of focused research, but highlights the fact that comprehensive overviews are desperately needed in order to orient policy makers. To address this challenge, SMORG theory was proposed as a comprehensive response in the theoretical field, methodological field, and empirical field.

10.2 Theoretical field

In the theoretical field, SMORG theory asserts, first, that policing has a direct effect on tactical deployments operated by non-state actors. Second, that non-state actors are organized into SMOs with defined levels of structure, coordination, and collective action (SMORG scales). Third, that the impact of policing on tactical deployment is conditioned by SM or ORG leanings (SMORG).

The first tenet of SMORG theory, asserting the effects of policing on non-state actors tactical deployment, was precisely investigated during the study of the tactical subspace: external factors. The effects of explanatory variables (policing variables - momentum - day of the week) on time between protests (conventional - confrontational - violent) were thoroughly assessed within each period. Analytical tools further helped to magnify the effects of policing actions on

the whole protest spectrum (conventional - confrontational - violent); those tools refer to the concepts of internal effect, simultaneous effect, and translated effect. They provide a holistic perspective by simultaneously assessing the effect of policing actions on the whole protest spectrum. The theoretical findings are the following:

- Stronger forms of protest rest on the momentum of milder ones, but not the opposite.
- The higher the coercion, the stronger the translated effect on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest.
- Successful deterrence causes translated effects from intermediate to milder or stronger forms of protest.
- The limit of coercion and deterrence depends on the level of protest momentum.
- The curve of theoretical power implies cycles of activity followed by recovery periods.
- Perceived legitimacy in the use of force avoids translated effects on the hazard rate of more violent forms of protest.
- For escalation versus deescalation in riot control, no doctrine works best. Everything rests on momentum. Escalation fails for a smaller number of protests, while deescalation fails for a larger number of protests.

The above mentioned theoretical findings are important. They enable a linkage of coercion, deterrence, and momentum in a coherent whole. They further clearly highlight the limits of coercion and deterrence when facing momentum. Those theoretical findings provide new lines of explanation for the failure of the rational model to explain why, at specific times, people lose the fear of death, and coercion or deterrence are rendered powerless. It also provides more sensitivity to the policing doctrine in riot control operations; where both deescalation or escalation in the use of force may fail if the policing actor does not first consider protest momentum.

The second tenet of SMORG theory asserts that non-state actors are organized into SMOs, with defined levels of structure, coordination, and collective action (SMORG scales). SMORG scales place values for structure, coordination, and collective action on a spectrum, from 1 to 5, between SM and ORG for SMOs. The qualitative analyses of Fatah, PFLP, PIJ, Hamas and Hizballah provided their respective SMORG scales values through time (P1 - P2 - P3 - P4 - P5). This confirmed that contrary to institutionalisation theory, some SMOs do not seek growth but instead keep a low signature profile by avoiding collective actions by the masses to focus exclusively on collective actions waged by hit teams. The SMORG correspondence analyses, conducted during the analysis of the organizational subspace, further highlighted that coordination characterised by directive control (Coor5), displayed the highest influence for the waging of violent forms of protest against harder targets. Structure, along the model of a unitary organisation (Str5) was also shown to be influential in this regard.

The study of the tactical subspace: internal factors (SMORG scales) contributed to a theoretical finding. This finding relates to the SMO process of lowering levels of coordination (*from directive control toward tactical freedom*) and collective action (*from actions waged by hit teams toward actions of the masses*) during SM waves of protest. During SM waves of protest (P2 and P4), SMOs with lower coordination (Coor2) and collective action (Coll1), displayed a much higher operational tempo in the waging of both confrontational and violent forms of protest. By contrast, between SM waves of protest (P1, P3, P5), SMOs characterized by a unitary structure (Str5), coordination through directive control (Coor5), and collective action carried out by hit teams (Coll5), displayed the ability to wage violent forms of protest at an higher

operational tempo. This theoretical finding highlights the junction of both SMOs lowering of coordination and collective action linked to SM dynamics as a new powerful line of explanation for the effectiveness of SMOs to increase confrontational and violent operational tempo during SM waves of protest.

The third tenet of SMORG theory asserts that the impact of policing on tactical deployment is magnified by the extent of SM or ORG leanings (SMORG). The SMO ideal type leanings of SM and ORG highlight divergent tactical deployments in time, space, and substance.

Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model. This model demonstrates that a wave of contention can be successfully explained through time at the three levels of strategy, operations, and tactics. At a strategic level, the differential in the allocation of factors for SMs and ORGs was highlighted. The decreasing strength of a SM's offense is caused by the SM's reallocation of factors to their daily occupation and the increasing strength of defense by gains in productivity through the adjustment of the state actor structures and routines. ORGs, with resources permanently allocated for the needs of the struggle, follow the same logic. They increase efficiency through time, especially after the culmination point of the SM protest wave. At an operational level, the collective actions deployed by SMs are not the result of decisions taken at an operational level, but mainly the product of networking emerging at a tactical level. At the same operational level, ORGs follow a different path, keeping the attrition factors in check at an operational level and retaining an influence on the collective actions waged at a tactical level. Finally, at a tactical level, the decisive influence of ORGs to regulate SM sequence management enables SM tactical deployment to hold on a longer term perspective.

Tactical variations in space assert that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory. Tactics cannot be separated from the space in which they are deployed. The adaptability of tactics to counter the moves of an opponent within a specific environment is key. The four parameters of occupation of space, spatial coordination, accessibility, and safety were assessed. The parameter *occupation of space* emphasized that SM tactics rely on density. However, density needs to be connected with contextual sensitivity for SM escalation in protests. For ORGs, their resources are dispersed at an operational level in order to reduce their signature, but they still need to be concentrated at a tactical level in order to impact on target. The parameter *spatial coordination* highlighted the effects of friction on tactical deployment. For SMs, the principle of mass lessens the issue of spatial coordination. By contrast, for ORGs, spatial coordination is much more demanding due to the dispersion of resources at the operational level, and the paradoxical requirement to concentrate them at the tactical level. The parameter *accessibility* stipulates that SMs replicate their tactics to other protest zones, in cases of denied access to the main protest zone. ORGs still retain a wider operational range than SMs, but spatial control measures nonetheless: a) Hamper ORG's freedom of maneuver, b) Raise the cost - benefit ratio and thus directly impact on ORG resources and related tactical deployments, c) Alter their SMORG scales on a longer term perspective. The last parameter, *safety*, focuses on the choice of the location for tactical deployment. SMs were shown to insure safety by choosing protest locations that permit the constitution of a critical mass of participants, insure a high media coverage, and dispose of avenues of escape. ORGs enhance safety by punishing collaborators, creating a safe heaven and operating along the strike and move principle.

Tactical variations in substance are strongly conditioned by the resources at the disposal of both SMs and ORGs. The three parameters of cultural/moral, organizational, human/material resources were studied. The parameter *cultural/moral resources* highlighted that SM tactics are socially legitimate, while ORG tactics follow their own organizational culture and can therefore appear socially illegitimate at the time of their use. These hypotheses were supported and were further refined by highlighting the existence of a hidden dual mechanism. During SM

waves of protest, ORGs undertake a legitimization processes that favors the integration of specific means of action within the repertoire of collective action of a given society. This legitimization process is further coupled with the ORG process of lowering levels of coordination and collective action in order to reach the SM. To summarize, during SM waves of protest, ORG tactics follow a socially legitimate line, while, between waves of protest, ORG tactics can appear innovative and socially illegitimate. The parameter *organizational resources* focuses on coordination capabilities at disposal of both ideal types. While coordination is low for SMs, often occurring as spontaneous and local protests, ORGs demonstrate high coordination capabilities. The last parameter *human/material resources* underlined the low technical skills at disposal of SM participants. It further emphasised that ORGs support SM participants with the technical skills and the logistics they need for the efficient waging of violent forms of protest during SM waves of protest.

10.3 Methodological field

Policy-relevant research must provide both a comprehensive overview of policing operations and non-state actor tactical deployments on specific theaters. Besides the effects of policing on tactics, such a policy-relevant work must also account for antecedent conditions and hidden mechanisms. The concept of protest space, advanced by SMORG theory, is a methodological answer to address such a complexity. It argues that the protest space can only be understood through the simultaneous study of the repertoire, organizational, and tactical subspaces.

The repertoire subspace is a geometric space composed by means of action used by non-state actors and theaters, stratified by period. It describes the alterations in the repertoire of collective actions that is culturally grounded and subjected to long term incremental evolution. It provides a way to handle antecedent conditions by precisely describing, through time, the alteration in the repertoires of collective action on different theaters or among different communities. Geometric data analyses (CA and MCA) were found particularly well suited for these types of analyses.

The organizational subspace is a geometric space composed by SMOs, means of action, theaters, and casualties, the whole stratified by period. It enables mapping of the distribution of SMOs in the geometric space. It further gets deeper into the understanding of the protest dynamics, describing by period the operational characteristics of each SMO in regard to the specific theaters of operations, the type of weapons used, the kind of targets favored, and the relative specificity of the SMO when compared to the whole group. It further highlighted SMO respective strategic trends. Geometric data analyses (MCA) were found well suited for these types of analyses

The tactical subspace is a space of interactions between policing actors and SMOs. It allows the appraisal of the effects of external factors (policing variables - momentum variables - day of the week) on the growth or reduction of the hazard rate of forms of protest (conventional - confrontational - violent). The analytical concepts of internal effect, simultaneous effect, and translated effect facilitates the holistic assessment of policing on tactical deployment by focusing on effects along the whole protest spectrum. This subspace also provides a way to scrutinize the effects of internal factors (SMORG scales) on the hazard rates of the different forms of protest. Survival analyses were found well suited for these types of analyses

To summarize, the concept of protest space was developed for strategic analysts to provide policy makers with a comprehensive answer and overview following a *what should we expect* type of question. The division of the protest space into three distinct subspaces, enables a simplification of the multidimensional complexity of the protest space. In a first phase, the analysis of the repertoire subspace focused on assessing the repertoire of collective action in the theater of interest with the inclusion of neighboring theaters. The repertoire subspace analysis will

provide the cultural characteristics of the repertoires of collective action, its long term incremental evolutions, and the external sources having an effect on those incremental evolutions (import of new means of actions from one theater to the other...). In a second phase, the organizational subspace highlighted the capabilities and strategic intents of SMOs. It further expanded upon the dynamic of collaboration or competition between SMOs operating in the same theaters. This quantitative study is complemented by the qualitative assessment of each SMO, with the attribution of its SMORG scale values, in order to comprehend their evolution in regard to structure, coordination, and collective action through time. The completion of the first and second phases already provides a detailed indication of the tactical variations in time, space, and substance to expect, according to SMORG theoretical lines. Finally, the third phase, related to the analysis of the tactical subspace, emphasizes the effects of external factors and internal factors (SMORG scales) on the hazard rates of different forms protest. This third phase is completed by a qualitative assessment of hidden mechanisms through the conduct of interviews with locals.

10.4 Empirical field

The use of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was found well suited for developing and testing SMORG theory. It was particularly rich in forms of protest, policing actions, SMOs, and theaters of operation. The empirical findings allowed by the study of the protest space are detailed in the next paragraphs.

During the first period, the IDF endured many casualties in the Lebanese theater at war. Within the OPT, the amount of settlers amounted to 105'695 in 1983, and reached a total of 196'900 in 1989. The PLO strengthened its hold on the ground and clashes occurred between university students and Israeli forces in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Following the unrest in the OPT, the Israeli government approved measures to restore order, such as the deportation of Palestinians constituting a security threat or the indefinite administrative detention of suspects.

The analysis of the repertoire subspace highlighted that *Strike* and *General Strike* were already regularly practiced by Palestinians. The repertoire of collective action by theater highlighted, on one hand, a Lebanese repertoire of collective action proper to a war zone (*Mortar - RTank - Artillery - Kidnapping - IEDR - IEDV - Gun - Grenade*) and, on the other hand, a Palestinian repertoire of collective action centred on the use of conventional and confrontational means of action (*Riots - Tire burning - Molotov Cocktails - Obstruction - Hunger strike*).

The analyses of the organizational subspace, dynamic through time, demonstrated that Fatah suborganizations and PFLP already applied a strategy of hits in the depth with the commission of attacks against soft targets within Israel and Jerusalem. Hizballah and Amal were active in the Lebanese theater, where most of the military and antagonist casualties occurred. In the OPT, youth students and prisoners conducted both conventional and confrontational forms of protest.

The analyses of the tactical subspace revealed that settlers activities (ground operations, restrictions of movement) were the main cause of conventional, confrontational, and violent forms of protests. They had more influence on the growth in the hazard rates of different forms of protest than operations conducted by the Israeli security forces. The operations conducted by the Israeli forces produced both negative and positive effects, depending on the scale of the operation and the momentum of confrontational or conventional protests occurring at the time.

During the second period, Amal and Hizballah united their force in Lebanon to constrain the IDF to withdraw. Within the OPT, the total amount of settlers increased from 196'900 in 1989 to 277'000 in 1993. Following the start of the first intifada, the Israeli security forces tried to counter the waves of protests with the adoption of the *iron fist policy* to restore public order

and the later policy of *might, power and beating* to replace the use of live ammunition for quelling riots. The overarching commands of both UNC and Hamas effectively coordinated protests with the publication of leaflets.

The analysis of the repertoire subspace emphasised a clear reinforcement of Palestinian capabilities in regard to mobilisation and collective action during the first intifada (P2). This period contained the highest proportion of *General Strikes* and *Assassination of Collaborators*. The repertoire of collective action in the West Bank was mainly composed of conventional and confrontational forms of protest, while the repertoire related to the Gaza Strip was more inclined toward violent forms of protest.

The analyses of the organizational subspace revealed the heterogeneous behaviours of Fatah's suborganizations and the rise of Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Fatah and PIJ retained the ability to conduct both local actions within the OPT and hits in the depth against soft targets in Israel and Jerusalem. Students and youth were again very active within the OPT to wage conventional and confrontational forms of protest. Hizballah, Amal, PFLP-GC focused on hitting hard targets within Lebanon.

The analyses of the tactical subspace during this second period underlined both the requirements of sequence management for non-state actors waging conventional forms of protest as well as the limits of coercion and deterrence following operations conducted by the Israeli forces; the higher the number of casualties killed or injured, the higher the increase in the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest. Settler activities (ground operations, acts of destruction) decreased the hazard rate of conventional forms protest to simultaneously expand the hazard rates of confrontational and violent forms of protest.

During the third period, the IDF withdrew from South Lebanon and Hizballah reoccupied the vacated areas. The total amount of settlers in the OPT increased from 277'000 in 1993 to 381'181 in 2000. The massacre committed by an Israeli settler in the Ibrahim Mosque in Hebron triggered retaliations. A Palestinian suicide bombing campaign presented as a revenge started in 1994. The opposition to the peace process grew not only among Palestinian SMOs but also within the ranks of the Jewish settler community; Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated in Tel Aviv by an Israeli citizen with ties to extremist settlers.

The analysis of the repertoire subspace depicted the radicalisation, or the *Lebanonization*, process of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action for SMOs operating within Israel. Israel was also targeted by rockets during this period. The Palestinian repertoire of collective action proper to the West Bank remained set on conventional and confrontational forms of protest.

The analyses of the organizational subspace emphasised the change of strategic intent of Hamas that moved from local action to hits in the depth against soft targets in Israel and Jerusalem. The PIJ, PFLP, and Fatah Tanzim followed the same strategy. In the Lebanese theater, where most of the military and antagonist casualties occurred, the lead in fighting was overtaken by Hizballah and Amal.

The analyses of the tactical subspace revealed that, within the OPT, settler activities (casualties injured, delicts) were the main cause of the increase in the hazard rates of conventional and violent forms of protest. The effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of operations conducted by the PSF during this period, that decreased the hazard rates of all forms of protest, was also noted.

During the fourth period, the total amount of settlers in the OPT increased from 381'181 in 2000 to 473'362 in 2006. Following the start of the second intifada, the Israeli government authorised the use of all means in order to quell the riots and save Israeli lives. The building of

the security fence was approved and the IDF launched a major operation (*Defensive Shield*) within the OPT. Following the effectiveness of the Israeli targeted killing campaign, Palestinian SMOs offered to stop suicide bombings within Israel, in return of a stop on the targeting of their members. Israel disengaged from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

The analysis of the repertoire subspace revealed the complete *Lebanonization* process of the Palestinian repertoire for SMOs operating within Israel and the Gaza Strip (*IED - RTank Mortar - Grenades - Kidnap...*). It further emphasised the specificities of the repertoire of collective action of the West Bank, which remained characterised by confrontational forms of protest (*Riots, Molotov...*). This did not mean an appeasement at the level of activism within the West Bank, but a direct export of violent forms of protest into Israel where violent protests were waged.

The analyses of the organizational subspace witnessed the violent turn undertaken by all Palestinian SMOs. PIJ, Fatah Tanzim, and AMB carried out IED attacks or armed assault against civilian targets within Israel and Jerusalem. Hamas further demonstrated that it kept balancing between protests carried out both within the Gaza strip and in Israel. This period underlined the decrease of activities of Hizballah and Amal in the Lebanese theater.

The analyses of the tactical subspace revealed that PSF operations expanded the hazard rates of all forms of protest. Operations conducted by the Israeli forces followed the same trends, increasing hazard rates on all forms of protests, with the only exception being administrative restrictions that reduced the rate of violent forms of protest. Settler activities (casualties injured, policing operations) expanded the hazard rates of conventional and confrontational forms of protest.

During the fifth period, the total amount of settlers in the OPT increased from 473'362 in 2006 to 532'558 in 2010. In the West Bank, tensions between settlers and the Israeli administration grew. A loss of control on the development of settler violence occurred. The head of Shin Bet further mentioned the growing probabilities of right-wing settlers attempting to assassinate pro-peace politicians. Within the Gaza Strip, Hamas and Fatah clashed heavily. Hamas finally created its own security force (ESF) and took the full control of the Gaza Strip in 2007.

The analysis of the repertoire subspace highlighted that rockets replaced previous IEDs for violent forms of protest waged into Israel. The full *Lebanonization* of the Palestinian repertoire of collective action proper to the Gaza Strip (*IED - IEDR - IEDV - RTank - Assa - Grenade - Kidnap...*) was noted. The Gazan repertoire contrasted with the one of the West Bank, which remained mainly bounded to conventional and confrontational forms of protest. The average of *Riots* per week during this last period (P5) approximated the ones encountered during the first intifada (P2).

The analyses of the organizational subspace emphasised that the PRC, PIJ, and Hizballah preferred rockets and mortar fire for hits in the depth of Israel. The internal strife between Fatah and Hamas increased violence in the Gaza Strip. Students and youth kept waging confrontational forms of protest in the West Bank.

The analyses of the tactical subspace underlined the growth in the hazard rates of all forms of protest following operations conducted by the ESF. Casualties killed by the PSF increased the hazard rates of conventional and confrontational forms of protest. In regard to Israeli force's air operations, they created different effects on the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest, depending on the momentum of the same form of protest. Settlers activities (restrictions of movement) expanded the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest.

The empirical findings related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict underlined the particularities of the repertoire of collective actions for Palestinian SMOs. First, they highlighted that the means of actions used during both SM waves (P2 and P4) were already utilized in periods preceding the uprisings (P1 and P3). Confrontational means of action (riots, strikes, general strikes) were already used during the first period prior to the first intifada (P2), and violent means of action (suicide bombings, armed assault) were already used during the third period prior to the second intifada (P4). Therefore, SM waves of protest are not characterised by innovation in the means of action, but by drastic changes in regard to the acceleration of the operational tempo for the deployment of the same means. Second, the findings underlined the *Lebanonization* process that altered the Palestinian repertoire of collective action through time. It revealed that while the Gazan theater conformed to a full *Lebanonization* process, the repertoire of the West Bank remained oriented toward conventional and confrontational forms of protest. Those points emphasise the importance of studying the repertoire of collective action in a given society, which is culturally grounded and subjected to long term incremental evolution, in order to improve the understanding of tactical deployment in the same theaters.

The empirical findings related to the organizational subspace mentioned the operational characteristics of Palestinian SMOs. Hamas remained balanced between hits in the depth into Israel and protests carried out within the Gaza Strip through time. By contrast, PIJ and PFLP were far more focused on hits in the depth in Israel. Hizballah, highly active in the Lebanese theater, restricted its hits in the depth to the use of bombing vectors. Contrary to other Palestinian SMOs, it did not infiltrate deep into Israel to conduct violent forms of protest; nevertheless, it remained a technical, logistical and financial provider for Palestinian SMOs. The heterogenous behaviour of Fatah suborganization was further noted. Finally, youth and students were the principal actors for the waging of conventional and confrontational forms of protest in the OPT.

The empirical findings related to the tactical subspace are unequivocal. Despite the argument advanced by Ariel Sharon, settlements do not improve security. On the contrary, they are one of the main sources, if not the primary source, of insecurity in the OPT and for Israel. Settler activities in the OPT expanded the hazard rates of all forms of protest. They even demonstrated growths in hazard rates that were higher than the policing activities carried out by the Israeli security forces, the ESF or the PSF, through time. Settlers act like a paramilitary group disposing of weapons that they have been known to turn against the Israeli security forces, when opposed to government policies. The loss of control and the growing threat for Israeli pro-peace politicians were noted.

After the review of the contribution of SMORG theory to the theoretical, methodological and empirical fields, the last words of this work will describe the potential offered by SMORG theory to future research developments.

10.5 Future research

SMORG theory provides a methodological framework for future research developments. SMORG theory could be applied to other conflict theaters, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, in order to corroborate theoretical findings. It would bring, in this regard, an important empirical contribution on the effects of policing action on tactical deployment that could serve for future missions, or more specifically peace-keeping missions.

SMORG theory should also not be restricted to conflict theaters. The application of SMORG theory to policing operations conducted in Europe would be highly insightful as well. Such research would be of a great help to policy makers and policing actors, by providing them with a well established theoretical set of instruments, to avoid inappropriate actions susceptible to trigger escalation in protests during riot control missions.

A better understanding of policing options and of their consequences is a way to promote peace by avoiding unrestrained use of force. Deterrence and coercion have limits beyond which they do not operate.

Chapter 11

Appendix

11.1 HYPOTHESES

SMORG theory:

- **Prime hypothesis**

Policing → Non-state actor tactical deployment

X (Magnified by)

SMORG (Impact of policing on tactical deployment magnified by SM or ORG leaning)

I. Prime hypothesis

H1a Policing affects non-state actor tactical deployment.

II. Prime explanatory hypotheses

H2a Different types of policing cause different types of tactical deployments.

H2b SMORG magnifies the impact of policing on tactical deployments.

H2c SMORG effects on tactics are read through tactical variations in time - space - substance.

H2d Tactical variations in time operate along the force interaction model (Chapter 3, p. 34).

H2e Tactical variations in space imply that SMs conform to attrition theory and the principle of mass, while ORGs conform to maneuver theory (Chapter 3, p. 42).

H2f Tactical variations in substance entail tactics that are low skilled, spontaneous with low ratios of lethality for SMs, and highly skilled, planned, with high ratios of lethality for ORGs (Chapter 3, p. 51).

III. Explanatory hypotheses: time

Strategic level:

- H3a** SMs non-permanent allocation of factors increases the cost of participation
- H3b** State and ORGs permanent allocation of factors allows adjustment in routines and procedures
- H3c** ORGs protest frequency keeps increasing after the culmination phase (highest number of FCv-FCf)

Operational level

- H3d** SMs lack coordination at an operational level
- H3e** ORGs develop coordination at an operational level

Tactical level

- H3f** SMs do not master sequence management and inflow of resources
- H3g** ORGs master sequence management and inflow of resources

IV. Explanatory hypotheses: space

Occupation of space

- H4a** SM density means higher probability of escalation in protest
- H4b** ORGs favor unity over density

Spatial coordination

- H4d** SM mobilization occurs in the same places, thus with little need of organizational structure
- H4e** ORGs require an elaborate organizational structure for the waging of attacks with tight spatial coordination and sequential effects

Accessibility

- H4f** SM gatherings are conditioned by time-distance cost
- H4g** SMs replicate similar tactics in other locations if access is restricted to the protest zone
- H4h** ORGs retain capabilities to wage protest, despite policing tightening in spatial control

Safety

- H4i** SMs use terrain, masses, and media as safety nets
- H4j** ORGs either establish a safe haven, or strike and move when operating on unfavorable ground

V. Explanatory hypotheses: substance

Cultural-Morale resources

H5a SMs follow societal culture: tactics are socially legitimate

H5b ORGs follow organizational culture: tactics are innovative and socially not legitimate

Organizational resources

H5c SM tactics are spontaneous, made of local impulses

H5d ORG tactics are strategic and coordinated

Human-Material resources

H5e SM tactics remain tied to prior processes of mobilization, low in regard to technical skills and lethality

H5f ORG tactics are readily deployable, high in technical skills and lethality

H5g SMs have multiple membership participants

H5h ORGs have single membership members

11.2 ABBREVIATIONS

AMB	al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
CA	Correspondence analysis
DFLP	Democratic Front of Liberation of Palestine
ESF	Executive Security Force (Hamas)
ICT	International Institute for Counter-Terrorism
IDF	Israel Defense Force
MCA	Multiple Correspondence Analysis
NIHC	National and Islamic Higher Committee for the follow-up of the intifada (NIHC).
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territories
ORG	Organisation
PA	alestinian Authority
PFLP	Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front of Liberation of Palestine – General Command
PIJ	Palestinian Islamic Jihad
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PRC	Palestinian Resistance Committees
PSF	Palestinian Security Force (PA)
SM	Social Movement
SMO	Social Movement Organization
UNC	United National Command of the Uprising

The reader may refer to the appendix PROTEST DATABASE (p. 226) for further details related to the labelling of graphical categories used in CA and MCA, or to the appendix POLICING DATABASE (p. 232) for details related to the labelling of categories in survival analyses.

11.3 SOURCE SELECTION

In order to remove biases in the data and to further increase exhaustiveness, the database used in this research, labelled *Synergy DB*, was developed on both Palestinian and Israeli sources.

11.3.1. Palestinian source

The Palestinian source relates to the *Palestinian Chronology* published by the Journal of Palestine studies.⁸³² The *Palestinian Chronology* covers the three different forms of protest considered by this research (conventional - confrontational - violent) that occurred in Israel, Gaza, West Bank and Lebanon. It also addresses the policing actions undertaken by state actors in the same theaters. The time frame covered by this source starts on December 1983 and ends in August 2011.

11.3.2. Israeli source

The Israeli source relates to the informations contained in the database of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzliya/Israel.⁸³³ This source focuses on violent forms of

832.(Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1984c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1989d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1990d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1991d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1993d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1994d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1995d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1997d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 1999d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2001d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2002d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2003d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2004d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2005d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2006d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2007d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2008d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2009d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010a; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2010d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011b; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011c; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011d; Institute for Palestine Studies, 2011e)

833.(International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2011). The author is grateful to ICT for having provided a full access to their database.

protest and specifically on the ones that occurred in Israel - West Bank - Gaza and Lebanon. The period covered ranges from February 1982 to March 2011.

11.3.3. Merging of sources

Both Palestinian and Israeli sources were merged together. Given the fact that both sources covered violent forms of protest, the following rules of data selection were applied when related to violent forms of protest :

- If violent forms of protest occurred within Israel or Jerusalem, the Israeli source was considered more accurate and in the case of two violent protest events occurring on the same day, the event registered by the Israeli source was favored.
- If violent forms of protest occurred within the West Bank or the Gaza strip, the Palestinian source was considered more accurate and in the case of two violent protest events occurring on the same day, the event registered by the Palestinian source was favored.
- For violent forms of protest that occurred within Lebanon or elsewhere, if two events occurred in the same city on the same date, the event registered by the Israeli source was favored. In all other cases where the dates or cities were different, both sources were selected.

An exception was done for cases of *Assassination of collaborators*. In this regard, the ICT database was very precise and exhaustive. Therefore, both ICT and the Palestinian chronology sources were used to register those cases of assassination of collaborators that occurred in West Bank and Gaza. A manual check was conducted to avoid cases of double recording.

The precise details of the coding process related to the merging of the Palestinian and Israeli sources was mentioned in the previous paragraphs. Further details, in case of need, can be found in the following lines :

1. Same Date

1.1 Israel (RgCy="Israel" & Jerusalem (E-W undefined))

Choice: *ICT* database (ICT 1 & ICT 2)

1.2 Palestine (RgCy="Palestine")

Choice: *PalChro* database (ICT 0)

1.3 Lebanon and other countries

(RgCy Not "Israel" & RgCy Not Jerusalem (E-W undefined) & RgCy Not Palestine)

1.31 Same city

Choice: *ICT* (ICT 1 & ICT 2)

1.32 Different city

Choice: Take both *ICT + PalChro* (ICT 0 & ICT 1 & ICT 2)

2. Different date

Choice: Take both *ICT + PalChro* (ICT 0 & ICT 1 & ICT 2)

To conclude, if events occurred on the same date, priority was given for the theater of Israel to the Israeli source and for the Palestinian theater to the Palestinian source. This further solved the issue of location labeling that differ, given the fact that the same location may have a different name if one consider the Palestinian or the Israeli news articles.

11.4 DATABASE CREATION

11.4.1. Data entry

Both the Palestinian or the Israeli sources were a compilation of news articles. In both cases, the data were unstructured or insufficiently structured for the needs of this research. Therefore, the work had to be started from the bottom up, by exploiting the raw data contained in those news articles and classifying them. The two preliminary databases designed by the author are: The *Protest DB* and the *Policing DB*. They were to be merged later into a single database named *Synergy DB*.

Given the exhaustiveness in regard to both protest events and policing events that amount to approximately 60'423 events, the author is deeply indebted to the many people who helped to enter each news article into the designed databases. Without their data entry work, this research would never have been made possible. Given the fact that some of them want to remain anonymous, I will thank them by mentioning their first name : Philippe, Joanna, David, Anna, all the people of the Guisan library in Bern involved in this database project, as well as Kevin. If the design of the databases and the rest of the work was exclusively done by the author, that author is deeply indebted for the support received during the data entry phase.

11.4.2. Data cleaning

The data entry work was only the start. At the second stage of data cleaning, the observation of the records highlighted that: a) Some data were missing in the sources, b) Some data were falsely entered (wrong category), c) Some categories were missing and thus not covering important aspects of the data. As a matter of fact, quality checks and data cleaning were deemed mandatory. Furthermore, both quality checks and data cleaning needed to be automated at 97% due to the amount of data (>60'000). Therefore, the author conducted data cleaning by writing lines of code in SPSS. The number of lines of code or programming required for data cleaning amounted to far more than 80'000 lines. This was tremendously challenging and time consuming work.

Finally, if the author could automatize after programming the data cleaning process at 97%, the last checks needed to be done visually. The author conducted this final check on events and variables, and undertook recoding tasks when necessary.

11.4.3. GIS Coordinates

The *Synergy DB* contained in the *Protest* and *Policing DB* still lacked latitude and longitude coordinates necessary to conduct spatial analyses. Due to spelling issues according to Hebrew, Arabic, and English names for the same cities, GIS automated coding was ripe with errors and deemed useless. Therefore, the author had to execute a manual coding of GIS coordinates for each city, using the following source as geographical database: *GeoNames*.⁸³⁴

834.(GeoNames, 2012)

11.5 PROTEST DATABASE

Protest DB contains the three different forms of protest: Conventional - Confrontational - Violent. The list of variables composing each forms of protest is detailed in the following paragraphs.

11.5.1. Conventional forms of protest *FCv (0-1)*

➤ Formal Statements: *TPetit*

"Written or oral statements, whether by an individual, group or institution. Formal statements are verbal expressions of opinion, dissent or intention."⁸³⁵ This category contains letters of opposition, official complaints and petitions.

➤ Demonstration: *TDemo*

"Gatherings consisting primarily, though not exclusively, of individuals and/or collective behaviors of protest or celebration."⁸³⁶ This category contains marches and parades.

➤ Strike: *TStrike*

"The strike involves a refusal to continue economic cooperation through work. It is a collective, deliberate and normally temporary suspension of labor designed to exert pressure."⁸³⁷

➤ General strike: *TStrikeG*

"The general strike is a widespread stoppage of labor by workers in an attempt to bring the economic life of a given area to a more or less complete standstill in order to achieve certain desired objectives."⁸³⁸

➤ Hunger strike: *TStrikeH*

"The hunger strike maybe defined as a refusal to eat with the aim of forcing the opponent to grant certain demands but without any serious effort to convert him or to achieve a change of heart. The hunger strike may be undertaken for a set period of time, for an indefinite period or unto death if the demand is not granted."⁸³⁹

➤ Boycott: *TBoycott*

While the strike focuses on the suspension of labor, boycott implies a refusal to continue specific forms of relationship with the provider of medication or economic goods.⁸⁴⁰

835.(Sharp, 1973, p. 119)

836.(McPhail & Wohlstein, 1983, pp. 580,581)

837.(Sharp, 1973, p. 257)

838.(Sharp, 1973, p. 275)

839.(Sharp, 1973, pp. 363,364)

840.(Sharp, 1973, p. 219)

11.5.2. Confrontational forms of protest *FCf (0-1)*

➤ **Riots:** *TRiots*

"Riots refer to gatherings or demonstrations consisting primarily but not exclusively of individual and/or collective violence against person or property."⁸⁴¹ The violence implies the destruction of property, the wounding of people or the use of riot control equipment.⁸⁴² Given the fact that it was not possible to precisely estimate the number of people taking part in a gathering due to the data sources used, all cases in which weapons such as stones, bottles, tear gas and burning of tires were implied were considered as riot event.

➤ **Vandalism:** *TVandal*

Contrary to riots, vandalism acts are not directed against persons alleged responsible for some grievances.⁸⁴³ Acts of vandalism implies the destruction of public or private property in a non-riot environment. The cases of stealing or looting are also integrated within this category.

➤ **Obstruction:** *TObstr*

Obstruction implies the act of physically impeding movement. It could be through the construction of roadblocks or when demonstrators block streets.

➤ **Occupation:** *TForEntr*

Occupation of buildings or lands concerns only actions conducted without weapon. If weapons are used, the event are coded as: *Violent forms of protest - Armed assault category*.

➤ **Popular non-obedience:** *TCurfVio*

"Instances in which the general population, or part of it, has consciously disregarded and violated laws or regulations, but in ways which do not amount to civil disobedience [...] This method takes the form of unobtrusively ignoring the law or regulation in question, often by large numbers of people, as though it did not exist."⁸⁴⁴ Most of the cases in this regard where cases when the population openly defied a curfew by people converging into the streets all at the same time.

11.5.3. Violent forms of protest *FV (0-1)*

➤ **Assassination:** *TAssa*

"An act whose primary objective is to kill one or more specific, prominent individuals. Usually carried out on persons of some note, such as high-ranking military officers, government officials, celebrities, etc. Not to include attacks on non-specific members of a targeted group. The killing of a police officer would be an armed assault unless there is reason to believe the attackers singled out a particularly prominent officer for assassination."⁸⁴⁵

841.(McPhail & Wohlstein, 1983, p. 581)

842.(Hibbs, 1973, p. 8)

843.(McPhail, 1994, pp. 1,2)

844.(Sharp, 1973, pp. 304,305)

845.(Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 22)

➤ **Assassination of collaborator:** *TAssaCol*

Same type of event as assassination, except that it directly targets Palestinians perceived to collaborate with the Israeli authorities.

➤ **Hijacking:** *THijack*

"An act whose primary objective is to take control of a vehicle such as an aircraft, boat, bus, etc. for the purpose of diverting it to an unprogrammed destination, obtain payment of a ransom, force the release of prisoners, or some other political objective. Hijacking are distinct from hostage taking because the target is a vehicle, regardless of whether there are people/passengers in the vehicle."⁸⁴⁶

➤ **Kidnaping/Hostage taking:** *TKidnap*

"An act whose primary objective is to obtain political or other concessions in return for the release of prisoners (hostages)."⁸⁴⁷

➤ **Armed assault:** *TAssArm*

"An attack whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death directly to human beings by any means other than explosive."⁸⁴⁸ This category was restrained to cases where the following weapons were used: Gun, grenade, RPG, axe, knife.

➤ **Unharmful assault:** *TAssault*

"An attack whose primary objective is to cause physical harm or death, directly to human beings by any means other than explosive, firearm, incendiary, or sharp instrument (knife, etc.)."⁸⁴⁹ It includes cases where beatings, strangulation, seizure of weapons, clubs, or vehicle are used in a non riot environment.

➤ **Bombing vectors:** *TBVect*

Attacks in which the following weapons are used: artillery, missiles, mortar, rockets. The cases of anti-tank weapons such as RPG are not considered as bombing vectors but as cases of armed assault due to the close proximity of the target when used.

➤ **Explosives:** *TBIED*

Attacks in which improvised explosive devices *IED* (regular, parcel or vehicle IED) or mines are used.

➤ **Product tampering:** *TPrTamp*

This category contains the actions that were characterized by the poisoning of food and water.

846.(Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 22)

847.(Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 22)

848.(Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 22)

849.(Center of Excellence of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2010, p. 22)

11.5.4. Other variables used for qualitative analyses

- **Claim of responsibility:** *TClaim*

Claim made after the attack.

- **Threat:** *TThreat*

Threat of attacks made by SMO.

- **Infiltration:** *TInfiltr*

Infiltration is a covert penetration of defenses and implies stealth.⁸⁵⁰ It contains cases of cross-border secretive movement, smuggling or digging of tunnels.

- **Symbolic public acts:** *TSymb*

This category includes symbolic actions such as cases of flags raising. "The display of the flag of a national, religious, social or political group [...] is a common type of nonviolent protest. Such displays are often motivated by or arouse deep emotions."⁸⁵¹

- **Work accidents:** *TWorkAc*

Contains only cases of accident by non-state actor when preparing explosives or firing a weapon.

11.5.5. Perpetrator *Author1 Author2 Author3*

Name of the organization the perpetrators belongs to. If a joint attack was carried out, each organization was entered in one of the four columns. When state actors carried out FCv or FCf themselves, the event were coded in the *Protest DB*. The PA Palestinian Security Force (PSF) and Hamas Executive Security Force (ESF) were considered as state actors when and only when they undertook policing actions in the OPT. Settlers have also been considered as particular case of state actors, due to their repertoire of collective action and the joint operations they sometimes carry out with the IDF in the OPT.

11.5.6. Description *Descript*

Brief statement describing the facts, if needed.

11.5.7. Suicide attack *Suic (0-1)*

The definition used to consider a suicide attacker is the following: "An individual who willingly uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosives or explosive materials to attack, kill, or maim other [...] the death of the bomber being a necessary part."⁸⁵² In case of doubt or missing information, the code non-suicide attack was used.

850.(Leonhard, 1994, p. 146)

851.(Sharp, 1973, p. 135)

852.(Hafez, 2006, p. 4)

11.5.8. Target *Target1 Target2 Target3 Target4*

Five target variables were created:

➤ **RRTargetF1:** Contains eight subcategories:

Antagonist - Civilian - Country - IGO - Military - NGO - Official - Settlers.

The subcategory *antagonist* contains cases of targeted non-state actors by other non-state actors: Cases of violence against collaborators, prisoners, fighters or SMO.

The subcategory *civilian* contains targets related to: Airport/Airline, Business, Civilian, Civilian Bedouin, Civilian Christian, Civilian Druze, Civilian Jewish, Civilian Shia, News (media), Palestinian Refugees, Private property, Public property, Public transport, Public place, Religious figure, Religious site, School, Students, University/College, Workers.

The subcategory *country* is used when the target relates to general protest against a country.

The subcategory *IGO* contains targets related to international government organizations, such as UN or UNIFIL.

The subcategory *NGO* contains targets related to non government organizations, such as the red cross or other charity organizations.

The subcategory *Military* contains targets related to: Border/Security fence, Guard, Military, Military intelligence, Police, Police Border, SLA, Police PSF, Hamas ESF.

The subcategory *Settlers* contains targets related to settlement or settlers.

The subcategory *Official* contains targets related to Official administration/representatives, Prison, Symbols.

RRTargetF2: Contains the names of organizations and more details.

RRTargetF3: Contains further details on religion/ethnicity or specificity of workers.

RRTargetF4: Contain the precise qualification of the target, for example: car, bank, shops...

11.5.9. Age *AgeOp1 AgeOp2 AgeOp3*

When available, the age of the different perpetrators.

11.5.10. Origin *OriginOp1 OriginOp2 OriginOp3*

When available, the origin of the different perpetrators.

11.5.11. Name *NameOp1 NameOp2 NameOp3*

When available, the identity of the different perpetrators.

11.5.12. Number of perpetrators *Auth_Nr*

When available, the number of the different perpetrators.

11.5.13. Number of shells/rockets *ShellNr*

When available, the number of shells/rockets fired by the perpetrators.

11.5.14. Casualties

Casualties have been divided into four main subcategories:

- **Civilian:** Injured or killed *CivInj CivKill*
- **Antagonist:** Injured or killed *AntaInj AntaKill*
- **Military-Police:** Injured or killed *MilPoInj MilPoKill*
- **Official:** Injured or killed *OfficInj OfficKill*

11.5.15. Weapons

Automatic weapon: WAutWeap / **Axe:** WAxe / **Club:** WClub / **Grenade:** WGren / **Gun:** WGun / **Knife:** WKnife / **Road block:** WRdBlock / **Mine:** WMine / **Bombing aerial:** WBAer / **Explosive: IED:** WIED / **Explosive: IED Parcel (post):** WIEDParc / **Explosive: IED vehicle:** WVBIED / **Explosive IED Road:** WIEDRd / **Explosive IED Defused:** WIEDDef / **Artillery/Shells:** WArtillery / **Missile:** WMissile / **Mortar:** WMortar / **Rocket:** WRocket / **Rocket: anti-tank:** WRockTan / **Rocket: katyusha:** WRockKat / **Burn tire:** WBTire / **Bottle:** WBottle / **Stone:** WStone / **Tear gas:** WTear / **Molotov cocktail:** WMolot / **Poison:** WPoison / **Vehicle hit:** WVehic / **Strangulation:** WStrangu / **Seize weapon:** WSeizeW / **Incendiary device:** WIncend / **Beating:** WBeat / **Threat:** WThreat / **Vandalism:** WVandal / **Riots (weapon unknown):** WRiots / **Demonstration (none):** WDemo / **Strike (none):** WStrike / **Flag (none):** WFlag / **Assassination (weapon unknown):** WAssassin / **Kidnapping (weapon unknown):** WKidnap / **Hijacking (weapon unknown):** WHijack / **Claim of responsibility (none):** WClaim / **Missing weapon:** WMiss / **Curfew violation (none):** WCurf / **Petition (none):** WPetitio / **Looting (none):** WLoot / **Infiltration (none):** WInfiltr / **Forced entry (none):** WPenetr / **Occupation (none):** WOccup

11.6 POLICING DATABASE

The policing database contains policing actions undertaken by state actors. It includes actors such as Military IDF, Police Israel, PSF, ESF. It concerns routine operations of law and order. If the PSF moved away from law and order to choose open confrontation with antagonists, then those cases were recorded within the *Protest DB*. The same applies for Hamas ESF.

Settlers were considered as state actors due to the joint operations carried out with the IDF, the content of their repertoire of collective actions within the OPT, and the potential effect that their actions could have on the development of different forms of protest in regard to the Palestinian society.

11.6.1. Policing Variables

➤ ODCPol	Policing activities
CPatr	Patrol
CJtPatr	Joint Patrol
CIED	Defuse IED
CIEDRd	Defuse IED Roads
CVBIED	Defuse Vehicle IED
CKnife	Neutralize knife assault
CAxe	Neutralize axe assault
CCfWea	Confiscate weapons
CSymRem	Removal of symbols (flags, graffiti)
CTunDes	Destruction of tunnels
CChPFire	Gunfight at checkpoint
CSuicNeutr	Neutralize suicide bomber
CChpAtt	Neutralize attack at checkpoint
➤ ODcOfGr	Ground operation
CSearch	Search of houses, villages...
CArrest	Arrests
CRaid	Raid
CDeport	Deportation
CIncursion	Incursion
COperation	Operation
CTroops	Reinforcements
CUnderCov	Under cover or low profile operation
CartilFire	Artillery fire
CAssa	Targeted killings

CGunf	Gunfire
CGunfEa	Gunfire regulation eased
CProtecCol	Protection of Collaborator

➤ **ODcOfAr Armored operation**

CArmored	Armored vehicle (APCs...)
CTk	Tank
CTkFire	Tank fire

➤ **ODcOfAi Air operation**

ODcOfAi	Offensive Operation: Air force
CAirJet	Plane deployment
CAirJetFire	Plane fire
CAirHeli	Helicopter deployment
CAirHeliFire	Helicopter fire
CTrainDes	Air destruction of training sites

➤ **ODcRiot Demonstration / Rioting policing**

CWatCan	Water canon
CStGren	Stun grenades
CTrGas	Tear gas
CRubBul	Rubber bullets
CClub	Club
CStone	Stone throwing
CRiots	Rioting
CBeat	Beating
CRampage	Rampage
CDemo	Demonstration
CMolot	Molotov
CIncend	Incendiary device (non molotov)
CBottle	Bottle

➤ **ODcDeli Delicts – General activities**

CKidn	Kidnapping by settler
CVehHit	Vehicle hit by settler
CWoundCol	Arrests of collaborators by PA
CSym	Display symbols (flags, graffiti...)

CVandal Vandalism by settler (break windows, cars...)

➤ **ODcDes Damage/Destruction unrelated to the use of weapon**

CBulldo Use of bulldozer
CHomDes Home destruction
CHomDam Home damage
CHomSeal Home sealing
CCfHom Home confiscation
CAdFarm Impede harvest or farming
CAgDes Agricultural land or infrastructure destruction
CCfLd Land confiscation – expropriation
CLdDes Land destruction
CVehDam Vehicle damage
CCfMat Material confiscation
CMedDes Medical facility/vehicle destruction
CBusiDam Business damage
COffDam Office damage
CSchDam School damage
CMosDam Mosque damage
CChurchDam Church damage
CSynagDam Synagogue damage
CSetEr Construction of settlement
CRdSettl Construction of road for settlement

➤ **ODcAdm Administrative restriction**

CCfID Confiscate identity document
CAdRes Diverse administrative restriction (fees, taxes...)
CAdBusi Restriction business (sealing, force to close or open)
CAdScho School closure
CAdUni University closure
CAdDemo Ban public protest
CAdNew Censorship – closure of newspaper
CAdMosq Restrict access to mosque
CAdNGO Restriction NGO (closure...)
CAdOffic Restriction political office (closure...)
CWatCut Cut water
CEICut Cut electricity

CPhonCut	Cut phone
CSewCut	Cut sewage

➤ **ODcMvt** **Movement restriction**

CChPSet	Construction of new checkpoint
CChPStop	Bar crossing at checkpoint
CBordClo	Border closure
CRdBlk	Block road
CBarrier	Construction of security fence
CSePer	Seal perimeter
CCurfew	Curfew

➤ **ODcEas** **Restriction eased**

CCurfE	End of curfew
CMtE	End of movement restriction
CAdResE	End of administrative restriction
CSetRdE	Stop construction of road for settlement
CSetDes	Destruction of settlement
CWith	Withdrawal

➤ **Casualties**

ODcArrest	Arrest
ODcDeport	Deportation
ODcInjInjured	Injured
ODcKill	Killed

➤ **Author**

AcIsr	Israeli military or police forces
AcSet	Settler
AcPSF	Palestinian Security Force
AcESF	Executive Security Force (Hamas)
AcALeb	Lebanese army
AcSLA	South Lebanese Army (SLA)

11.6.2. Target

In the policing database, the policing variables already qualify the target. Therefore, only specific SMO targets variables were added:

- **Hammas:**

Hammas: TarHammas / **Hammas IZQ:** TarHammasIZQ / **Hammas ESF:** TarHammasESF

- **Hizballah:**

Hizballah: TarHizb

- **PIJ:**

PIJ: Tar PIJ

- **AMB:**

AMB: TarAMB

- **PFLP:**

PFLP: TarPFLP

- **DFLP:**

DFLP: TarDFLP

- **PFLP-GC:**

PFLP-GC: TarPFLPGC

- **Fatah:**

Fatah: TarFatah / **Fatah Force 17:** TarFatForce / **Fatah Black Panther:** TarFatPanth / **Fatah Hawks:** TarFatHawk / **Fatah Tanzim:** TarFatTanz / **Fatah Abu Musa:** TarFatMusa / **Abu Nidal:** TarAbuNidal

- **PRC:**

PRC: TarPRC

- **Amal:**

Amal: TarAmal

- **PLO:**

PLO: TarPLO

• PA:

Palestinian Authority: TarPA / **Palestinian Security Force:** TarPSF

11.7 SYNERGY DATABASE

The database *synergy DB* is a merge of the two aforementioned databases (*Protest DB - Policing DB*). The objective of the merge was to facilitate the conduct of statistical and spatial analyses.

It should be kept in mind to differentiate: a) Calculations related to protest events: They are only recorded under Tvariables and Wvariables. b) Calculations related to policing events: The latter concern cases of state policing actions as well as settler actions as well. Therefore, for riots or demonstrations where authors happened to be settlers, only CVariables were used in the calculations.

11.8 COMMUNIQUES

Table 58 Communiques: Structuration (effective numbers)

These numbers are out of a total of 47 communiques for the UNC and 33 communiques for Hamas.

Structuration	<i>UNC</i>	<i>HAMAS</i>
Reference to PLO	45/47	0/33
Structuration	34/47	0/33

Table 59 Communiques: Calls to act (effective numbers)

Calls to act	<i>UNC</i>	<i>HAMAS</i>
Popular committee	38/47	0/33
Shock brigades	28/47	0/33
Store owners	19/47	3/33
Workers	19/47	1/33
Students	13/47	2/33
Bus/Taxi drivers	3/47	0/33

Table 60 Communiques: Strategic objectives (effective numbers)

Strategic objectives	<i>UNC</i>	<i>HAMAS</i>
Reference to strategic objectives (independence...)	42/47	3/33
National independence for a Palestinian state	39/47	2/33
Reference to the international community or politics	38/47	10/33
Right of return	20/47	0/33
Counter the politic of illiteracy	19/47	10/33
Self reliance (not on arab states)	10/47	5/33
End of Israeli repression	8/47	1/33
Free election in municipalities	5/47	0/33
Liberation of prisoners	4/47	1/33
End of corruption	0/47	1/33
End of settlements	3/47	1/33

Table 61 Communiques: Discourse (effective numbers)

Discourse	<i>UNC</i>	<i>HAMAS</i>
Appeal to the masses (people)	45/47	3/33
Victory discourse	42/47	3/33
Appeal to popular unity or cohesion	35/47	15/33
Victimization	1/47	22/33
Reference to martyrs	44/47	28/33
Reference to history	8/47	26/33
Reference to Islam	2/47	32/33
Coran extract	2/47	32/33
Appeal to moslem	1/47	33/33

Religious obligation or incitation to fight	1/47	21/33
Specific call to Jihad	1/47	19/33

Table 62 Communiques: Conventional forms of protest (effective numbers)

Conventional forms of protest	UNC	HAMAS
Non-violent collective action	42/47	26/33
Strike	40/47	18/33
Demonstrations or mass sit-in	37/47	5/33
Boycott	30/47	6/33
End of payment of taxes or TVA	29/47	1/33
Self-reliance (for food or industry)	26/47	6/33
Marty symbolic visit of tombs / day of solidarity to support their families / Name streets with their names	24/47	7/33
Appeal to attend mosques on friday or churches on sunday	24/47	5/33
Appeals for functionaries to end their work in the administration or police	24/47	0/33
Appeals to the dissolution of municipal / village councils	24/47	0/33
Display flags	22/47	7/33
Civil disobedience	16/47	0/33
Stop production in Israel factories	15/47	0/33
Stop driving and circulation	9/47	3/33
Disrespect curfews by going out in masses	7/47	0/33
Symbolic burials	5/47	0/33
Graffiti	4/47	2/33

Table 63 Communiques: Confrontational / Violent forms (effective numbers)

Confrontational / Violent forms of protest	UNC	HAMAS
Appeal to the intensification of the struggle	42/47	24/33
Appeal to violent collective action	35/47	20/33
Appeal to combat or confrontation (means of action undefined)	31/47	19/33
Instill terror	0/47	2/33
Stones	34/47	6/33
Molotov cocktails	29/47	1/33
Barricades or road blocks	6/47	0/33
Arson (tire burning)	5/47	0/33
Knife	3/47	2/33
Iron bar	1	0/33
Gun	1	0/33

Table 64 Communiques: Enforcement (effective numbers)

Enforcement	UNC	HAMAS
Threat of arms if no conformity to the calls (store owners...)	29/47	5/33
Threat to collaborators	10/47	0/33

11.9 SURVIVAL ANALYSES

Modeling sequence: Cox Proportional Hazard Model and Extended Cox

11.9.1. Univariable selection and recoding

- **Continuous variable with zero spike definition:**

if $r(\max) > 10$ & $r(p25) \leq 2$ & $r(p10) == 0$ Spike

if $r(\max) > 10$ & $r(p25) \geq 2$ & $r(p10) \geq 1$ No Spike

- **Continuous variable with zero spike:**

Dichotomous var (VarDicho) added to the continuous var (Var) to handle the zero spike:⁸⁵³

stcox Var VarDicho - exactm

if Var Pval < 0.25 Both Var VarDicho kept

if Var Pval > 0.25 Fracpoly

if Wald fp1 and fp2 < 0.25 then

then both fp1-2 kept and VarDicho kept (fp solves the issue of non-linearity but not of zero spike)

if Wald fp1 and fp2 > 0.25 and Var Pval > 0.25 & VarDicho Pval < 0.25

then only VarDicho kept

if Wald fp1 and fp2 > 0.25 and Var Pval > 0.25

then dropped

- **Continuous variable without spike:**

if Var Pval < 0.25 Kept as such

if Var Pval > 0.25 Fracpoly

if Wald fp1 and fp2 < 0.25

then both fp1-2 kept

if Wald fp1 and fp2 > 0.25 & VarDicho Pval < 0.25

then only VarDicho kept

if Wald fp1 and fp2 > 0.25 & VarDicho Pval > 0.25

then dropped

- **Dichotomous variable**

stcox Var - exactm

if Var Pval < 0.25 Kept

853.(Robertson, Boyle, Hsieh, MacFarlane, & Maisonneuve, 1994, p. 169), (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2001, pp. pp.130-pp.138), (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000, p. 104), (Royston & Sauerbrei, 2008, p. 93)

if Var Pval > 0.25 Dropped

- **Categorical variable**

stcox Var - exactm

if Var Pval < 0.25 Kept

if Var Pval > 0.25 Dropped

11.9.2. Multivariable selection

- **First coarse preselection with Efron method to handle tied failures**⁸⁵⁴

Stepwise selection: stepwise stcox... efron pe(.5) pr(.9) forward lr

Test of term significance based on the likelihood-ratio test

- **Final selection with exact marginal-likelihood method to handle tied failures**⁸⁵⁵

1) **Stepwise selection:** stepwise stcox... exactm pe(.2) pr(.9) forward lr

2) **Purposeful selection:** manual selection of variables previously selected at the .2 level to reduce them to the .05 significance level.

3) **Preliminary effect model:** Developed on the results of the purposeful selection

Scale of continuous variables checks: Graphs of estimated coefficients versus quartile midpoints

Fractional polynomials

Ordinal variable creation based on quartiles, if non-linear and no zero spike

Ordinal variable creation based on manual recoding, if non-linear with with zero spike⁸⁵⁶

4) **Main effect model:**

Interactions checks: All possible two ways interaction reviewed and significance assessed with likelihood-ratio tests

854. This first stepwise selection was necessary due to the high number of variables considered, the many ties present in the data and the impossibility to use the exact method on such a high number of variables and ties.

855. The exact method involving an exhaustive enumeration of the possible risk set was used in a second stepwise selection, to refine the results and bring the significance levels of variables from 50% to 20%. Exact method were further used to lower the significance levels of variables to 5% and conduct the final purposeful selection of the variables.

856. Given the importance of the zero category (spike at 0), the quartile recoding can not be executed. A manual recoding dedicating the category 0 to the value 0 (spike) is executed in such a case.

5) Preliminary final model:

Last check on variable preselection:

All variables dropped during the multivariable selection stage are entered again one by one, to assess each variable significance on the base of the preliminary final model.

6) Assessment of model adequacy:

Final assessment of the proportional hazard assumption

Creation of time-varying variables if needed

Extended Cox Proportional Hazard Model

7) Final model

Interpretation of the model

Hazard ratios...

11.10 SURVIVAL ANALYSES: EXTERNAL FACTORS

11.10.1. P1 FCv: Interaction tables

Interaction: HazRatio for Riot oper: Isr 0_7_1 = 1 at various levels of Conventional protest 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.54	0.16	1.71	0.00	1.24	2.36
4	0.86	0.24	2.37	0.00	1.49	3.78
6	1.19	0.36	3.28	0.00	1.62	6.68
8	1.52	0.50	4.55	0.00	1.71	12.12
10	1.84	0.64	6.31	0.00	1.79	22.22
12	2.17	0.79	8.75	0.01	1.87	40.91
14	2.49	0.93	12.12	0.01	1.95	75.52
16	2.82	1.08	16.80	0.01	2.02	139.59
18	3.15	1.23	23.29	0.01	2.10	258.26
20	3.47	1.38	32.27	0.01	2.18	478.12

Interaction: HazRatio for Riot oper: Isr 0_7_3 = 1 at various levels of Conventional protest 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.75	0.27	2.13	0.01	1.24	3.64
4	0.40	0.28	1.49	0.16	0.86	2.59
6	0.04	0.35	1.04	0.91	0.52	2.08
8	-0.32	0.46	0.73	0.49	0.30	1.78
10	-0.67	0.58	0.51	0.24	0.17	1.57
12	-1.03	0.70	0.36	0.14	0.09	1.42
14	-1.39	0.83	0.25	0.10	0.05	1.28
16	-1.74	0.97	0.17	0.07	0.03	1.17
18	-2.10	1.10	0.12	0.06	0.01	1.07
20	-2.46	1.24	0.09	0.05	0.01	0.98

Interaction: HazRatio for Riot oper: Isr 0_7_4 = 1 at various levels of Conventional protest 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.79	0.34	2.20	0.02	1.13	4.30
4	0.18	0.29	1.20	0.53	0.68	2.13
6	-0.42	0.32	0.65	0.19	0.35	1.23
8	-1.03	0.41	0.36	0.01	0.16	0.80
10	-1.64	0.54	0.19	0.00	0.07	0.56
12	-2.25	0.68	0.11	0.00	0.03	0.40
14	-2.85	0.82	0.06	0.00	0.01	0.29
16	-3.46	0.97	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.21
18	-4.07	1.12	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.15
20	-4.68	1.28	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.11

Table 65 Interaction tables, external factors - FCv, period 1

11.10.2. P1 FCf: Interaction tables

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Riot operation: Isr 0_7_2 = 1 at various levels of Confrontational_Forms 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
1	0.24	0.20	1.28	0.22	0.86	1.88
2	0.05	0.18	1.05	0.77	0.74	1.50
3	-0.14	0.17	0.87	0.41	0.63	1.21
4	-0.33	0.17	0.72	0.05	0.52	1.00
5	-0.52	0.18	0.59	0.00	0.42	0.84
6	-0.71	0.20	0.49	0.00	0.33	0.72
7	-0.90	0.22	0.40	0.00	0.26	0.62
8	-1.10	0.25	0.33	0.00	0.20	0.55
9	-1.29	0.28	0.28	0.00	0.16	0.48
10	-1.48	0.32	0.23	0.00	0.12	0.43
11	-1.67	0.36	0.19	0.00	0.09	0.38
12	-1.86	0.39	0.16	0.00	0.07	0.34
13	-2.05	0.43	0.13	0.00	0.06	0.30
14	-2.24	0.47	0.11	0.00	0.04	0.27
15	-2.43	0.51	0.09	0.00	0.03	0.24
17	-2.82	0.59	0.06	0.00	0.02	0.19
19	-3.20	0.67	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.15
21	-3.58	0.76	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.12
23	-3.97	0.84	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.10
26	-4.54	0.96	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.07

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Riot operation: Isr 0_7_3 = 1 at various levels of Confrontational_Forms 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
1	0.71	0.25	2.04	0.00	1.24	3.35
2	0.43	0.23	1.54	0.06	0.99	2.41
3	0.15	0.21	1.17	0.46	0.78	1.75
4	-0.13	0.20	0.88	0.52	0.60	1.30
5	-0.41	0.20	0.67	0.04	0.45	0.98
6	-0.69	0.21	0.50	0.00	0.34	0.75
7	-0.97	0.22	0.38	0.00	0.25	0.59
8	-1.25	0.25	0.29	0.00	0.18	0.47
9	-1.53	0.28	0.22	0.00	0.13	0.37
10	-1.81	0.31	0.16	0.00	0.09	0.30
11	-2.09	0.35	0.12	0.00	0.06	0.24
12	-2.37	0.39	0.09	0.00	0.04	0.20
13	-2.65	0.43	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.16
14	-2.93	0.47	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.13
15	-3.21	0.51	0.04	0.00	0.01	0.11
17	-3.77	0.59	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.07
19	-4.33	0.68	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.05
21	-4.90	0.76	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03
23	-5.46	0.85	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
26	-6.30	0.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Riot operation: Isr 0_7_4 = 1 at various levels of Confrontational_Forms 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
1	1.59	0.31	4.90	0.00	2.65	9.08
2	1.23	0.28	3.42	0.00	1.96	5.98
3	0.87	0.26	2.39	0.00	1.43	3.97
4	0.51	0.24	1.66	0.03	1.04	2.67
5	0.15	0.23	1.16	0.51	0.74	1.82
6	-0.21	0.22	0.81	0.35	0.52	1.26
7	-0.57	0.23	0.57	0.01	0.36	0.89
8	-0.93	0.24	0.39	0.00	0.24	0.64
9	-1.29	0.27	0.28	0.00	0.16	0.46
10	-1.65	0.29	0.19	0.00	0.11	0.34
11	-2.01	0.32	0.13	0.00	0.07	0.25
12	-2.37	0.36	0.09	0.00	0.05	0.19
13	-2.73	0.39	0.07	0.00	0.03	0.14
14	-3.09	0.43	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.11
15	-3.45	0.47	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.08
17	-4.17	0.55	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.05
19	-4.89	0.63	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.03
21	-5.61	0.72	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
23	-6.33	0.81	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
26	-7.41	0.94	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Table 66 Interaction tables, external factors - FCf, period 1

11.10.3. P1 FV: Interaction tables

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Conventional_Protest_15_21_5 = 1 at various level of Violent_Protest_1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
1	0.93	0.05	2.53	0.00	2.31	2.77
2	0.83	0.09	2.30	0.00	1.91	2.76
3	0.74	0.14	2.09	0.00	1.59	2.75
4	0.64	0.19	1.90	0.00	1.31	2.74
5	0.54	0.23	1.72	0.02	1.09	2.73
6	0.45	0.28	1.57	0.11	0.90	2.71
7	0.35	0.33	1.42	0.28	0.75	2.70
8	0.26	0.37	1.29	0.49	0.62	2.69
9	0.16	0.42	1.17	0.70	0.51	2.68
10	0.06	0.47	1.07	0.89	0.43	2.67
11	-0.03	0.51	0.97	0.95	0.35	2.65
12	-0.13	0.56	0.88	0.82	0.29	2.64
13	-0.23	0.61	0.80	0.71	0.24	2.63
14	-0.32	0.66	0.73	0.62	0.20	2.62
15	-0.42	0.70	0.66	0.55	0.17	2.61
16	-0.51	0.75	0.60	0.49	0.14	2.60
17	-0.61	0.80	0.54	0.44	0.11	2.59
18	-0.71	0.84	0.49	0.40	0.09	2.57
19	-0.80	0.89	0.45	0.37	0.08	2.56
20	-0.90	0.94	0.41	0.34	0.07	2.55

Table 67 Interaction table, external factors - FV, period 1.

11.10.4. P2 FV: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Violent Protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.18	0.04	1.20	0.00	1.11	1.30
4	0.61	0.06	1.83	0.00	1.62	2.07
6	1.03	0.13	2.81	0.00	2.18	3.61
8	1.46	0.20	4.29	0.00	2.92	6.32
10	1.88	0.27	6.57	0.00	3.89	11.10
12	2.31	0.34	10.06	0.00	5.19	19.50
14	2.73	0.41	15.39	0.00	6.91	34.28
16	3.16	0.48	23.55	0.00	9.21	60.26
18	3.58	0.55	36.04	0.00	12.26	105.94
20	4.01	0.62	55.16	0.00	16.33	186.27

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Violent Protest 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.02	0.03	1.02	0.41	0.97	1.09
4	0.22	0.03	1.24	0.00	1.17	1.32
6	0.41	0.06	1.51	0.00	1.35	1.68
8	0.60	0.09	1.83	0.00	1.54	2.16
10	0.79	0.12	2.21	0.00	1.76	2.79
12	0.99	0.15	2.69	0.00	2.01	3.59
14	1.18	0.18	3.26	0.00	2.29	4.64
16	1.37	0.21	3.95	0.00	2.60	5.98
18	1.57	0.24	4.79	0.00	2.97	7.72
20	1.76	0.28	5.80	0.00	3.38	9.97

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in both Violent Protest 1_7 / 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.21	0.06	1.23	0.00	1.10	1.37
4	0.78	0.08	2.18	0.00	1.88	2.53
6	1.36	0.15	3.88	0.00	2.91	5.18
8	1.93	0.22	6.91	0.00	4.45	10.73
10	2.51	0.30	12.28	0.00	6.76	22.32
12	3.08	0.39	21.85	0.00	10.27	46.48
14	3.66	0.47	38.85	0.00	15.58	96.86
16	4.24	0.55	69.10	0.00	23.65	201.92
18	4.81	0.63	122.89	0.00	35.87	421.01
20	5.39	0.71	218.56	0.00	54.41	877.96

Table 68 Time interaction tables, external factors - FV, period 2

11.10.5. P3 FCv: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Conventional Protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.47	0.03	1.61	0.00	1.50	1.72
4	1.15	0.10	3.14	0.00	2.60	3.80
6	1.82	0.17	6.15	0.00	4.39	8.60
8	2.49	0.25	12.01	0.00	7.40	19.51
10	3.16	0.32	23.48	0.00	12.45	44.31
12	3.83	0.40	45.91	0.00	20.94	100.64
14	4.50	0.48	89.75	0.00	35.24	228.62
16	5.17	0.55	175.46	0.00	59.27	519.40
18	5.84	0.63	343.01	0.00	99.70	1180.10
20	6.51	0.71	670.56	0.00	167.70	2681.36

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Conventional Protest 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.38	0.17	1.46	0.03	1.04	2.06
4	1.09	0.17	2.97	0.00	2.15	4.10
6	1.80	0.21	6.02	0.00	4.01	9.04
8	2.50	0.28	12.22	0.00	7.08	21.08
10	3.21	0.36	24.78	0.00	12.21	50.32
12	3.92	0.45	50.28	0.00	20.82	121.42
14	4.63	0.54	102.01	0.00	35.32	294.61
16	5.33	0.63	206.95	0.00	59.73	717.05
18	6.04	0.73	419.84	0.00	100.81	1748.57
20	6.75	0.82	851.75	0.00	169.92	4269.41

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in both Conventional Protest 1_7 / 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.59	0.17	1.81	0.00	1.30	2.52
4	1.49	0.16	4.44	0.00	3.23	6.11
6	2.39	0.21	10.90	0.00	7.23	16.44
8	3.29	0.28	26.76	0.00	15.34	46.70
10	4.18	0.37	65.69	0.00	31.81	135.63
12	5.08	0.46	161.23	0.00	65.35	397.80
14	5.98	0.55	395.75	0.00	133.57	1172.56
16	6.88	0.65	971.35	0.00	272.22	3466.07
18	7.78	0.74	2384.18	0.00	553.83	10263.65
20	8.67	0.84	5851.96	0.00	1125.47	30427.72

Table 69 Time interaction tables, external factors - FCv, period 3

11.10.6. P3 FCf: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Confrontational protest 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.01	0.15	1.01	0.93	0.76	1.36
4	0.75	0.15	2.11	0.00	1.56	2.85
6	1.48	0.21	4.39	0.00	2.92	6.61
8	2.21	0.29	9.15	0.00	5.22	16.02
10	2.95	0.37	19.05	0.00	9.17	39.55
12	3.68	0.46	39.65	0.00	15.98	98.37
14	4.41	0.56	82.56	0.00	27.75	245.63
16	5.15	0.65	171.90	0.00	48.07	614.69
18	5.88	0.74	357.91	0.00	83.16	1540.39
20	6.61	0.84	745.20	0.00	143.73	3863.75

Relative risks at different times for an increase of >=1 in Administrative restriction: Isr 0_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.53	0.13	1.69	0.00	1.31	2.19
4	0.46	0.12	1.58	0.00	1.24	2.01
6	0.39	0.12	1.47	0.00	1.17	1.86
8	0.32	0.12	1.38	0.01	1.09	1.74
10	0.25	0.13	1.28	0.06	0.99	1.66
12	0.18	0.15	1.20	0.21	0.90	1.60
14	0.11	0.16	1.12	0.50	0.81	1.55
16	0.04	0.19	1.04	0.82	0.72	1.50
18	-0.03	0.21	0.97	0.90	0.65	1.47
20	-0.10	0.23	0.91	0.69	0.57	1.44

Table 70 Time interaction tables, external factors - FCf, period 3

11.10.7. P3 FV: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Violent Protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.44	0.10	1.55	0.00	1.28	1.87
4	1.09	0.12	2.97	0.00	2.36	3.75
6	1.74	0.19	5.71	0.00	3.90	8.36
8	2.39	0.28	10.97	0.00	6.29	19.13
10	3.05	0.38	21.05	0.00	10.04	44.13
12	3.70	0.47	40.42	0.00	16.00	102.15
14	4.35	0.57	77.61	0.00	25.43	236.82
16	5.00	0.67	149.00	0.00	40.40	549.52
18	5.66	0.76	286.06	0.00	64.14	1275.88
20	6.31	0.86	549.21	0.00	101.78	2963.45

Relative risks at different times for Violent Protest 8_14 >=1

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.96	0.34	2.61	0.00	1.35	5.07
4	1.44	0.29	4.22	0.00	2.39	7.47
6	1.92	0.34	6.82	0.00	3.48	13.36
8	2.40	0.46	11.02	0.00	4.46	27.22
10	2.88	0.61	17.79	0.00	5.39	58.70
12	3.36	0.77	28.74	0.00	6.37	129.71
14	3.84	0.93	46.42	0.00	7.43	290.08
16	4.32	1.10	74.97	0.00	8.61	652.99
18	4.80	1.28	121.08	0.00	9.93	1475.71
20	5.28	1.45	195.56	0.00	11.44	3343.47

Relative risks at different times for Violent Protest 1_7 =1 and Violent Protest 8_14 >=1

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	1.21	0.34	3.36	0.00	1.74	6.49
4	1.86	0.29	6.43	0.00	3.64	11.35
6	2.51	0.34	12.32	0.00	6.28	24.15
8	3.16	0.46	23.58	0.00	9.51	58.48
10	3.81	0.61	45.15	0.00	13.61	149.78
12	4.46	0.77	86.44	0.00	19.02	392.92
14	5.11	0.94	165.49	0.00	26.26	1042.92
16	5.76	1.11	316.85	0.00	36.03	2786.09
18	6.41	1.28	606.63	0.00	49.25	7471.84
20	7.06	1.45	1161.44	0.00	67.15	20088.47

Table 71 Time interaction tables, external factors - FV, period 3

11.10.8. P4 FCv: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Conventional Protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.44	0.05	1.55	0.00	1.41	1.70
4	1.04	0.10	2.84	0.00	2.35	3.44
6	1.65	0.17	5.22	0.00	3.77	7.24
8	2.26	0.24	9.60	0.00	6.00	15.34
10	2.87	0.31	17.64	0.00	9.55	32.56
12	3.48	0.39	32.42	0.00	15.19	69.19
14	4.09	0.46	59.58	0.00	24.14	147.06
16	4.70	0.54	109.50	0.00	38.35	312.64
18	5.30	0.61	201.24	0.00	60.92	664.76
20	5.91	0.68	369.86	0.00	96.77	1413.64

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Conventional Protest 8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.48	0.21	1.62	0.02	1.08	2.42
4	1.15	0.20	3.15	0.00	2.14	4.62
6	1.81	0.25	6.12	0.00	3.75	9.98
8	2.48	0.34	11.89	0.00	6.12	23.10
10	3.14	0.44	23.13	0.00	9.73	54.95
12	3.81	0.55	44.97	0.00	15.28	132.35
14	4.47	0.66	87.44	0.00	23.83	320.81
16	5.14	0.78	170.03	0.00	37.05	780.39
18	5.80	0.89	330.63	0.00	57.46	1902.52
20	6.47	1.01	642.93	0.00	88.99	4644.87

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in both Conventional Protest 1_7/8_14

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.61	0.20	1.84	0.00	1.24	2.74
4	1.35	0.19	3.87	0.00	2.64	5.66
6	2.10	0.25	8.14	0.00	4.99	13.28
8	2.84	0.34	17.11	0.00	8.80	33.27
10	3.58	0.44	35.98	0.00	15.12	85.64
12	4.33	0.55	75.67	0.00	25.66	223.11
14	5.07	0.66	159.13	0.00	43.30	584.79
16	5.81	0.78	334.65	0.00	72.81	1538.06
18	6.56	0.89	703.76	0.00	122.17	4053.86
20	7.30	1.01	1479.98	0.00	204.71	10699.68

Table 72 Time interaction tables, external factors - FCv, period 4

11.10.9. P4 FCf: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Confrontational Protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.31	0.02	1.36	0.00	1.30	1.43
4	0.57	0.06	1.76	0.00	1.57	1.97
6	0.82	0.10	2.28	0.00	1.88	2.76
8	1.08	0.14	2.94	0.00	2.24	3.87
10	1.34	0.18	3.80	0.00	2.67	5.43
12	1.59	0.22	4.92	0.00	3.17	7.63
14	1.85	0.27	6.36	0.00	3.77	10.72
16	2.11	0.31	8.22	0.00	4.49	15.06
18	2.36	0.35	10.63	0.00	5.34	21.16
20	2.62	0.39	13.74	0.00	6.35	29.73

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Riot operation: Isr 0_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.17	0.03	1.18	0.00	1.11	1.26
4	0.21	0.04	1.24	0.00	1.14	1.34
6	0.26	0.06	1.30	0.00	1.15	1.47
8	0.31	0.09	1.36	0.00	1.14	1.62
10	0.35	0.12	1.42	0.00	1.13	1.78
12	0.40	0.14	1.49	0.01	1.12	1.97
14	0.44	0.17	1.56	0.01	1.11	2.18
16	0.49	0.20	1.63	0.01	1.10	2.41
18	0.53	0.23	1.71	0.02	1.09	2.67
20	0.58	0.26	1.79	0.02	1.08	2.95

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in both variables

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.46	0.04	1.58	0.00	1.46	1.70
4	0.73	0.06	2.08	0.00	1.85	2.35
6	1.01	0.10	2.75	0.00	2.26	3.36
8	1.29	0.15	3.63	0.00	2.73	4.83
10	1.57	0.19	4.80	0.00	3.30	6.96
12	1.85	0.24	6.33	0.00	3.99	10.05
14	2.12	0.28	8.36	0.00	4.82	14.51
16	2.40	0.33	11.03	0.00	5.81	20.95
18	2.68	0.37	14.57	0.00	7.01	30.27
20	2.96	0.42	19.23	0.00	8.46	43.73

Table 73 Time interaction tables, external factors - FCf, period 4

11.10.10. P4 FV: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Destruction: Isr 15_21

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.03	0.01	1.03	0.02	1.00	1.05
4	0.07	0.01	1.07	0.00	1.04	1.10
6	0.11	0.03	1.11	0.00	1.05	1.18
8	0.15	0.05	1.16	0.00	1.06	1.27
10	0.19	0.06	1.21	0.00	1.07	1.37
12	0.23	0.08	1.26	0.00	1.08	1.48
14	0.27	0.10	1.32	0.01	1.08	1.60
16	0.32	0.12	1.37	0.01	1.09	1.72
18	0.36	0.13	1.43	0.01	1.10	1.86
20	0.40	0.15	1.49	0.01	1.11	2.00

Table 74 Time interaction tables, external factors - FV, period 4

11.10.11. P5 FCv: Interaction tables

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Killed: PSF 15_21 = 1 at various levels of Conventional Protest 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	-0.38	0.21	0.68	0.06	0.45	1.02
4	-0.06	0.19	0.94	0.77	0.64	1.38
6	0.27	0.22	1.31	0.22	0.86	2.00
8	0.60	0.27	1.81	0.03	1.08	3.06
10	0.92	0.33	2.52	0.01	1.32	4.81
12	1.25	0.40	3.49	0.00	1.58	7.69
14	1.58	0.48	4.84	0.00	1.89	12.40
16	1.90	0.56	6.71	0.00	2.24	20.08
18	2.23	0.64	9.30	0.00	2.65	32.64
20	2.56	0.72	12.90	0.00	3.13	53.15

Interaction: Hazard Ratio for Air operation: Isr 0_7 = 1 at various levels of Conventional Protest 1_7

Level	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	-0.48	0.12	0.62	0.00	0.49	0.79
4	-0.30	0.10	0.74	0.00	0.60	0.90
6	-0.13	0.11	0.88	0.23	0.71	1.08
8	0.04	0.13	1.04	0.75	0.80	1.36
10	0.22	0.17	1.24	0.21	0.88	1.75
12	0.39	0.22	1.48	0.08	0.96	2.27
14	0.56	0.27	1.76	0.04	1.04	2.97
16	0.74	0.32	2.09	0.02	1.12	3.89
18	0.91	0.37	2.48	0.01	1.21	5.10
20	1.08	0.42	2.95	0.01	1.30	6.70

Relative risks at different times for Day of the week: Thursday = 1

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
0	2.43	0.28	11.35	0.00	6.54	19.70
1	2.09	0.24	8.08	0.00	5.02	13.01
2	1.75	0.22	5.76	0.00	3.71	8.94
3	1.41	0.23	4.10	0.00	2.60	6.46
4	1.07	0.26	2.92	0.00	1.75	4.88
5	0.73	0.31	2.08	0.02	1.13	3.81
6	0.39	0.37	1.48	0.28	0.72	3.03
7	0.05	0.43	1.05	0.90	0.45	2.45
8	-0.29	0.50	0.75	0.56	0.28	1.99
9	-0.63	0.57	0.53	0.27	0.18	1.62
10	-0.97	0.64	0.38	0.13	0.11	1.33

Table 75 Interaction tables, external factors - FCv, period 5

11.10.12. P5 FCf: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of 1 in Confrontational protest 1_7

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.29	0.03	1.34	0.00	1.26	1.43
4	0.44	0.04	1.55	0.00	1.44	1.66
6	0.58	0.07	1.79	0.00	1.57	2.03
8	0.73	0.10	2.07	0.00	1.70	2.51
10	0.87	0.13	2.39	0.00	1.84	3.11
12	1.02	0.17	2.76	0.00	1.98	3.86
14	1.16	0.21	3.19	0.00	2.13	4.78
16	1.31	0.24	3.69	0.00	2.30	5.93
18	1.45	0.28	4.27	0.00	2.47	7.36
20	1.60	0.31	4.93	0.00	2.66	9.14

Table 76 Time interaction table, external factors - FCf, period 5

11.10.13. P5 FV: Interaction tables

Relative risks at different times for an increase of ≥ 1 in Air operation: Isr 15_21

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
2	0.18	0.17	1.20	0.28	0.87	1.66
4	0.34	0.14	1.40	0.02	1.07	1.84
6	0.49	0.15	1.63	0.00	1.21	2.21
8	0.64	0.20	1.90	0.00	1.28	2.83
10	0.80	0.27	2.22	0.00	1.32	3.74
12	0.95	0.34	2.59	0.00	1.34	5.01
14	1.11	0.41	3.03	0.01	1.36	6.75
16	1.26	0.49	3.53	0.01	1.36	9.14
18	1.42	0.56	4.12	0.01	1.37	12.40
20	1.57	0.64	4.81	0.01	1.37	16.85

Table 77 Time interaction tables, external factors - FV, period 5

11.11 SMORG UNIVARIABLE MODELS BY PERIOD

11.11.1. Period 1

Conventional and confrontational forms of protest could not be interpreted due to insufficient data.⁸⁵⁷

- **Violent forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 1, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3Ca	-0.05	0.11	0.95	0.67	0.77	1.18
Str5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46
Coor5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46
_ICoor2Ca_1	-0.21	0.14	0.81	0.14	0.61	1.07
_ICoor2Ca_2	0.18	0.25	1.20	0.46	0.74	1.95
_IColl1Ca_1	-0.21	0.14	0.81	0.14	0.61	1.07
_IColl1Ca_2	0.18	0.25	1.20	0.46	0.74	1.95
Coll5	0.19	0.10	1.21	0.05	1.00	1.46

Table 78 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 1

SMORG scales at high levels (*Str5* - *Coor5* - *Coll5*) display significant effects at the 5% level. Each display an increase in the hazard rate of violent forms of protes by 21%.

➤ FV: Str: 5 Coor: 5 Coll: 5

857. Respectively 2 and 10 failures.

11.11.2. Period 2
• Conventional forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 2, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.32	0.45	1.37	0.49	0.56	3.33
_IStr5Ca_1	0.11	0.75	1.12	0.88	0.26	4.90
_IStr5Ca_2	-0.38	0.86	0.68	0.66	0.13	3.68
Coor1	-0.43	0.31	0.65	0.17	0.35	1.20
Coor2	0.32	0.45	1.37	0.49	0.56	3.33
Coor3	0.28	0.75	1.32	0.71	0.30	5.76
Coor5	1.23	0.59	3.43	0.04	1.08	10.88
Coll1	0.32	0.45	1.37	0.49	0.56	3.33
Coll2	-0.43	0.31	0.65	0.17	0.35	1.20
Coll4	0.92	0.59	2.52	0.12	0.79	7.98
Coll5	0.28	0.75	1.32	0.71	0.30	5.76

Table 79 Relative risks of internal factors among FCv, period 2

None is significant at the 5% level. At the 10% level, higher coordination increases the hazard rates of conventional forms of protest.

➤ FCv: Str: . Coor: 5 Coll: .

• Confrontational forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 2, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.36	0.20	1.43	0.07	0.97	2.13
_IStr5Ca_1	-0.10	0.38	0.90	0.78	0.43	1.89
_IStr5Ca_2	0.40	0.50	1.49	0.42	0.56	3.94
Coor1	-0.37	0.38	0.69	0.34	0.33	1.46
Coor2	0.36	0.20	1.43	0.07	0.97	2.13
Coor3	-1.30	1.02	0.27	0.20	0.04	2.01
Coor5	0.49	0.35	1.63	0.16	0.83	3.21
Coll1	0.36	0.20	1.43	0.07	0.97	2.13
Coll2	-0.37	0.38	0.69	0.34	0.33	1.46
Coll4	0.49	0.35	1.63	0.16	0.83	3.21
Coll5	-1.30	1.02	0.27	0.20	0.04	2.01

Table 80 Relative risks of internal factors among FCf, period 2

None is significant at the 5% level. At the 10% level, average structure, low coordination and collective action increase the hazard rates of confrontational forms of protest.

➤ FCf: Str: 3 Coor: 2 Coll: 1

• **Violent forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 2, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.16	0.09	1.17	0.08	0.98	1.39
_IStr5Ca_1	-0.13	0.13	0.88	0.33	0.68	1.14
_IStr5Ca_2	0.27	0.19	1.32	0.14	0.91	1.90
Coor1	0.12	0.16	1.12	0.48	0.82	1.54
Coor2	0.16	0.09	1.17	0.08	0.98	1.39
Coor3	-0.15	0.29	0.86	0.60	0.49	1.51
Coor5	-0.03	0.11	0.97	0.80	0.78	1.22
Coll1	0.16	0.09	1.17	0.08	0.98	1.39
Coll2	0.12	0.16	1.12	0.48	0.82	1.54
Coll4	-0.04	0.11	0.96	0.76	0.77	1.21
Coll5	-0.15	0.29	0.86	0.60	0.49	1.51

Table 81 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 2

None is significant at the 5% level. At the 10% level, average structure, low coordination and collective action increase the hazard rates of violent forms of protest.

➤ FV: Str: 3 Coor: 2 Coll: 1

11.11.3. Period 3

• **Conventional forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Conventional, Period: 3, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str4	-0.23	0.24	0.80	0.34	0.50	1.27
Str5	0.14	0.14	1.15	0.33	0.87	1.51
Coor3	-0.22	0.21	0.81	0.31	0.53	1.23
Coor4	0.31	0.17	1.37	0.07	0.97	1.92
_ICoor5Ca_1	-0.21	0.33	0.81	0.53	0.42	1.55
_ICoor5Ca_2	0.05	0.60	1.06	0.93	0.32	3.44
_IColl3Ca_1	-0.58	0.39	0.56	0.14	0.26	1.20
_IColl3Ca_2	0.01	0.60	1.01	0.99	0.31	3.26
Coll4	0.31	0.17	1.37	0.07	0.97	1.92
Coll5	-0.09	0.20	0.91	0.63	0.62	1.34

Table 82 Relative risks of internal factors among FCv, period 3

None is significant at the 5% level. At the 10% level, SMO SM with stronger Coordination and Collective action increase the hazard rate of conventional forms of protest.

➤ FCv: Str: . Coor: 4 Coll: 4

• **Confrontational**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Confrontational, Period: 3, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str4	-0.77	0.56	0.46	0.17	0.15	1.39
Str5	0.26	0.33	1.30	0.42	0.69	2.47
Coor3	-0.80	0.50	0.45	0.11	0.17	1.19
Coor4	0.67	0.47	1.96	0.15	0.78	4.91
_ICoor5Ca_1	1.47	0.67	4.36	0.03	1.18	16.14
_ICoor5Ca_2	-0.04	0.84	0.96	0.96	0.18	5.02
_IColl3Ca_1	0.23	0.56	1.26	0.68	0.42	3.76
_IColl3Ca_2	-0.47	0.81	0.63	0.56	0.13	3.05
Coll4	0.67	0.47	1.96	0.15	0.78	4.91
Coll5	-0.30	0.51	0.74	0.56	0.27	2.03

Table 83 Relative risks of internal factors among FCf, period 3

Only Coordination is significant at the 5% level, indicating higher hazard rate for higher level of coordination.

➤ FCf: Str: . Coor: 5 Coll: .

• **Violent**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 3, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str4	0.24	0.17	1.27	0.15	0.91	1.77
Str5	0.03	0.09	1.03	0.75	0.87	1.22
Coor3	0.20	0.13	1.23	0.11	0.95	1.58
Coor4	0.04	0.10	1.04	0.70	0.85	1.27
_ICoor5Ca_1	-0.00	0.12	1.00	0.98	0.79	1.25
_ICoor5Ca_2	-0.08	0.18	0.92	0.65	0.64	1.32
_IColl3Ca_1	0.02	0.11	1.02	0.88	0.82	1.27
_IColl3Ca_2	-0.08	0.18	0.92	0.64	0.64	1.31
Coll4	0.04	0.10	1.04	0.70	0.85	1.27
Coll5	0.14	0.11	1.15	0.22	0.92	1.43

Table 84 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 3

None is significant at the 5% and 10% level.

➤ FV: Str: . Coor: . Coll: .

11.11.4. Period 4
• Conventional forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Conventional, Period: 4, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	-0.36	0.36	0.70	0.32	0.34	1.42
_IStr4Ca_1	-0.05	0.31	0.95	0.87	0.52	1.75
_IStr4Ca_2	0.54	0.47	1.71	0.25	0.68	4.28
Str5	0.21	0.18	1.24	0.24	0.87	1.77
Coor3	0.23	0.19	1.26	0.22	0.87	1.83
Coor5	0.07	0.31	1.07	0.83	0.58	1.97
_IColl3Ca_1	-0.07	0.31	0.93	0.83	0.51	1.73
_IColl3Ca_2	0.47	0.45	1.59	0.30	0.66	3.84
Coll4	-0.36	0.36	0.70	0.32	0.34	1.42
Coll5	0.23	0.19	1.25	0.23	0.87	1.81

Table 85 Relative risks of internal factors among FCv, period 4

None is significant at the 5% and 10% level.

➤ FCv: Str: . Coor: . Coll: .

• Confrontational forms

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Confrontational, Period: 4, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.53	0.58	1.71	0.36	0.55	5.33
_IStr4Ca_1	0.84	0.73	2.32	0.25	0.55	9.69
_IStr4Ca_2	1.07	0.73	2.92	0.14	0.69	12.30
Str5	-0.32	0.33	0.73	0.33	0.38	1.39
Coor3	0.76	0.30	2.14	0.01	1.19	3.86
Coor5	-12.40	3.22e+07	0.00	1.00	0.00	.
_IColl3Ca_1	0.27	0.72	1.32	0.70	0.32	5.39
_IColl3Ca_2	0.75	0.73	2.11	0.31	0.50	8.86
Coll4	0.53	0.58	1.71	0.36	0.55	5.33
Coll5	-0.31	0.36	0.73	0.39	0.36	1.49

Table 86 Relative risks of internal factors among FCf, period 4

Average coordination increase the hazard rates of confrontational forms of protest.

➤ FCf: Str: . Coor: 3 Coll: .

• **Violent forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 4, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str3	0.07	0.12	1.08	0.55	0.85	1.36
_IStr4Ca_1	-0.15	0.12	0.86	0.19	0.69	1.08
_IStr4Ca_2	0.51	0.17	1.67	0.00	1.19	2.35
Str5	0.10	0.08	1.11	0.20	0.95	1.29
Coor3	0.19	0.07	1.21	0.01	1.06	1.39
Coor5	0.12	0.12	1.13	0.31	0.90	1.42
_IColl3Ca_1	-0.11	0.12	0.89	0.33	0.71	1.12
_IColl3Ca_2	0.49	0.17	1.63	0.00	1.17	2.27
Coll4	0.07	0.12	1.08	0.55	0.85	1.36
Coll5	0.08	0.08	1.09	0.31	0.93	1.28

Table 87 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 4

SMO with relatively high structure (*Str4*) and average coordination and collective action increase the hazard rate of violent forms of protest.

➤ FV: Str: 4 Coor: 3 Coll: 3

11.11.5. Period 5

• **Conventional forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Conventional, Period: 5, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str5	0.15	0.04	1.17	0.00	1.08	1.26
Coor3	0.14	0.30	1.15	0.64	0.64	2.08
Coor4	0.15	0.06	1.17	0.01	1.04	1.31
Coor5	0.12	0.05	1.13	0.02	1.02	1.26
Coll3	0.12	0.06	1.12	0.04	1.00	1.26
_IColl5Ca_1	0.10	0.24	1.10	0.69	0.68	1.77
_IColl5Ca_2	0.59	0.26	1.81	0.02	1.09	3.02

Table 88 Relative risks of internal factors among FCv, period 5

SMOs with high structure, high collective action, and relatively high coordination increase the hazard rates of conventional forms of protest.

➤ FCv: Str: 5 Coor: 4 Coll: 5

• **Confrontational forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Confrontational, Period: 5, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str5	0.07	0.03	1.08	0.02	1.01	1.14
Coor3	0.34	0.34	1.41	0.32	0.72	2.77
Coor4	0.10	0.04	1.11	0.01	1.02	1.20
Coor5	0.03	0.04	1.04	0.39	0.96	1.12
Coll3	0.09	0.04	1.10	0.03	1.01	1.19
_IColl5Ca_1	-0.01	0.31	0.99	0.97	0.54	1.80
_IColl5Ca_2	0.46	0.31	1.58	0.14	0.86	2.91

Table 89 Relative risks of internal factors among FCF, period 5

High structure, relatively high coordination and average collective action increase the hazard rate of confrontational forms of protest.

➤ FCF: Str: 5 Coor: 4 Coll: 3

• **Violent forms**

Relative risks of SMORG variables / Form: Violent, Period: 5, Theater: all

Days	Coef	StdErr	HazRatio	P> z	CI95%L	CI95%U
Str5	0.26	0.03	1.30	0.00	1.23	1.37
Coor3	-0.29	0.12	0.75	0.02	0.59	0.95
Coor4	0.21	0.04	1.23	0.00	1.13	1.33
Coor5	0.24	0.03	1.27	0.00	1.20	1.33
Coll3	0.32	0.04	1.38	0.00	1.29	1.48
_IColl5Ca_1	-0.20	0.12	0.82	0.10	0.65	1.04
_IColl5Ca_2	0.55	0.15	1.74	0.00	1.29	2.35

Table 90 Relative risks of internal factors among FV, period 5

The higher levels of structure, coordination and collective action, the higher the increase the hazard rates of violent forms of protest.

➤ FV: Str: 5 Coor: 5 Coll: 5

11.12 SMORG MULTIVARIABLE MODELS BY PERIOD

11.12.1. Period 1

• Form violent

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Momentum displays the highest values.

11.12.2. Period 2

• Form conventional

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Momentum displays the highest value.

• Form confrontational

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.837656	.2464931	4.54	0.000	1.412826	2.390231
EvFCf15_21	3.220924	1.07664	3.50	0.000	1.672839	6.201644
Str3	1.520052	.3319727	1.92	0.055	.9907401	2.332154

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.858798	.2571739	4.48	0.000	1.417308	2.437811
EvFCf15_21	2.873989	.9164609	3.31	0.001	1.538343	5.369295
_IStr5Ca_1	1.120901	.4619039	0.28	0.782	.4998064	2.513811
_IStr5Ca_2	1.694355	.9015309	0.99	0.322	.5971696	4.807408

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.825852	.2412443	4.56	0.000	1.409285	2.365551
EvFCf15_21	2.869989	.9279811	3.26	0.001	1.522836	5.408881
Coor1	.8046505	.3218605	-0.54	0.587	.3673892	1.762334

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.837656	.2464931	4.54	0.000	1.412826	2.390231
EvFCf15_21	3.220924	1.07664	3.50	0.000	1.672839	6.201644
Coor2	1.520052	.3319727	1.92	0.055	.9907401	2.332154

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.818538	.2411091	4.51	0.000	1.402383	2.358187
EvFCf15_21	2.868008	.9189332	3.29	0.001	1.530616	5.374231
Coor3	.3303582	.338258	-1.08	0.279	.0444047	2.45777

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.877395	.2547167	4.64	0.000	1.439025	2.449306
EvFCf15_21	2.636841	.854391	2.99	0.003	1.397259	4.97612
Coor5	1.639301	.6244826	1.30	0.194	.7769593	3.45875

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.837656	.2464931	4.54	0.000	1.412826	2.390231
EvFCf15_21	3.220924	1.07664	3.50	0.000	1.672839	6.201644
Coll1	1.520052	.3319727	1.92	0.055	.9907401	2.332154

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.825852	.2412443	4.56	0.000	1.409285	2.365551
EvFCf15_21	2.869989	.9279811	3.26	0.001	1.522836	5.408881
Coll2	.8046505	.3218605	-0.54	0.587	.3673892	1.762334

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.877395	.2547167	4.64	0.000	1.439025	2.449306
EvFCf15_21	2.636841	.854391	2.99	0.003	1.397259	4.97612
Coll4	1.639301	.6244826	1.30	0.194	.7769593	3.45875

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.818538	.2411091	4.51	0.000	1.402383	2.358187
EvFCf15_21	2.868008	.9189332	3.29	0.001	1.530616	5.374231
Coll5	.3303582	.338258	-1.08	0.279	.0444047	2.45777

➤ FCf: Str: 3 Coor: 2 Coll: 1

• Form violent

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.533018	.0525897	12.45	0.000	1.433333	1.639636
EvFV8_14	1.213847	.0514443	4.57	0.000	1.117093	1.318982
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.962573	.0135195	-2.72	0.007	.9364367	.9894388
Str3	1.131745	.1007688	1.39	0.165	.9505144	1.347529

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.520149	.0520287	12.24	0.000	1.42152	1.625622
EvFV8_14	1.216354	.0513731	4.64	0.000	1.11972	1.321329
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9649475	.0132612	-2.60	0.009	.939303	.9912921
_IStr5Ca_1	.9197849	.1202514	-0.64	0.522	.7118711	1.188423
_IStr5Ca_2	1.110862	.2150363	0.54	0.587	.7601301	1.623426

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.538866	.0526534	12.60	0.000	1.439051	1.645603
EvFV8_14	1.2282	.0519987	4.86	0.000	1.130398	1.334463
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9628934	.0132506	-2.75	0.006	.9372699	.9892175
Coor1	1.390413	.2231522	2.05	0.040	1.015153	1.904392

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.533018	.0525897	12.45	0.000	1.433333	1.639636
EvFV8_14	1.213847	.0514443	4.57	0.000	1.117093	1.318982
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.962573	.0135195	-2.72	0.007	.9364367	.9894388
Coor2	1.131745	.1007688	1.39	0.165	.9505144	1.347529

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.52938	.0518965	12.52	0.000	1.430973	1.634554
EvFV8_14	1.21813	.0513277	4.68	0.000	1.121572	1.323001
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9638764	.0131982	-2.69	0.007	.9383524	.9900947
Coor3	1.154341	.3346269	0.50	0.621	.6540077	2.037442

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.534306	.0527478	12.45	0.000	1.434328	1.641252
EvFV8_14	1.220781	.051541	4.73	0.000	1.123829	1.326097
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9629373	.0133611	-2.72	0.006	.9371028	.989484
Coor5	.8777047	.1023408	-1.12	0.263	.6983898	1.103059

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.533018	.0525897	12.45	0.000	1.433333	1.639636
EvFV8_14	1.213847	.0514443	4.57	0.000	1.117093	1.318982
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.962573	.0135195	-2.72	0.007	.9364367	.9894388
Coll1	1.131745	.1007688	1.39	0.165	.9505144	1.347529

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.538866	.0526534	12.60	0.000	1.439051	1.645603
EvFV8_14	1.2282	.0519987	4.86	0.000	1.130398	1.334463
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9628934	.0132506	-2.75	0.006	.9372699	.9892175
Coll2	1.390413	.2231522	2.05	0.040	1.015153	1.904392

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.535253	.0528351	12.46	0.000	1.435113	1.64238
EvFV8_14	1.221022	.0515532	4.73	0.000	1.124047	1.326363
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9627602	.0133826	-2.73	0.006	.9368849	.9893501
Coll4	.866853	.1011362	-1.22	0.221	.6896606	1.089571

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.52938	.0518965	12.52	0.000	1.430973	1.634554
EvFV8_14	1.21813	.0513277	4.68	0.000	1.121572	1.323001
EvFV1_7XEvFV8_14	.9638764	.0131982	-2.69	0.007	.9383524	.9900947
Coll5	1.154341	.3346269	0.50	0.621	.6540077	2.037442

➤ FV: Str: . Coor: 1 Coll: 2

11.12.3. Period 3

• Form conventional

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Momentum displays the highest value.

• Form confrontational

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels.

• Form violent

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Momentum displays the highest value.

11.12.4. Period 4

• Form conventional

No SMORG variable is significant at the 5% or 10% levels. Momentum displays the highest value.

• Form confrontational

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	10.32119	8.697869	2.77	0.006	1.978816	53.83367
Str3	4.720578	3.678125	1.99	0.046	1.025099	21.73825

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	4.844031	3.674738	2.08	0.038	1.095155	21.42586
_Istr4Ca_1	1.119354	.9708784	0.13	0.897	.2044902	6.127203
_Istr4Ca_2	1.864529	1.526111	0.76	0.447	.3748553	9.274164

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	4.589278	2.990953	2.34	0.019	1.279363	16.46246
Str5	.7956905	.2675664	-0.68	0.497	.4116338	1.538074

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	4.575868	3.166222	2.20	0.028	1.178946	17.76041
Coor3	1.981232	.6247924	2.17	0.030	1.067836	3.675923

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	4.392608	2.847804	2.28	0.022	1.232746	15.65205
Coor5	8.41e-07	356.6307	-0.00	1.000	0	.

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	6.000513	4.518084	2.38	0.017	1.371755	26.24825
_IColl3Ca_1	.643267	.5406725	-0.52	0.600	.1238647	3.34068
_IColl3Ca_2	1.255476	1.0339	0.28	0.782	.2499383	6.306431

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	10.32119	8.697869	2.77	0.006	1.978816	53.83367
Coll4	4.720578	3.678125	1.99	0.046	1.025099	21.73825

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv15_21D	4.684151	3.060378	2.36	0.018	1.301669	16.85626
Coll5	.8132758	.3039293	-0.55	0.580	.3909627	1.691766

➤ FCf: Str: 3 Coor: 3 Coll: 4

• **Form violent**

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.252263	.0187468	15.03	0.000	1.216054	1.289551
Str3	1.113799	.1334224	0.90	0.368	.8807269	1.408551

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.248953	.0191073	14.53	0.000	1.212059	1.28697
_IStr4Ca_1	.9369295	.1101004	-0.55	0.579	.7441843	1.179596
_IStr4Ca_2	1.598313	.2832185	2.65	0.008	1.129354	2.262004

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.249881	.018742	14.87	0.000	1.213682	1.287159
Str5	1.036547	.0861031	0.43	0.666	.8808095	1.219821

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.249467	.0189043	14.72	0.000	1.212959	1.287073
Coor3	1.130254	.0831652	1.66	0.096	.9784619	1.305595

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.253114	.0188047	15.04	0.000	1.216795	1.290518
Coor5	1.174799	.1406832	1.35	0.179	.929034	1.485579

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.250925	.0192614	14.54	0.000	1.213738	1.289252
_IColl3Ca_1	.991226	.117145	-0.07	0.941	.7862778	1.249595
_IColl3Ca_2	1.614581	.2770144	2.79	0.005	1.153503	2.259961

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.252263	.0187468	15.03	0.000	1.216054	1.289551
Coll4	1.113799	.1334224	0.90	0.368	.8807269	1.408551

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.250939	.0188622	14.85	0.000	1.214511	1.28846
Coll5	.9990228	.0856242	-0.01	0.991	.8445408	1.181762

➤ FV: Str: 4 Coor: 3 Coll: 3

11.12.5. Period 5
• Conventional

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv1_7	1.355565	.0580071	7.11	0.000	1.24651	1.474161
ODcPolE8_14D	2.360855	1.125826	1.80	0.072	.9271605	6.011513
ODcRiotE0_7D	1.767267	.4839372	2.08	0.038	1.033271	3.022663
Str5	1.135078	.0516966	2.78	0.005	1.038145	1.241061

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv1_7	1.36654	.0584371	7.30	0.000	1.256674	1.486011
ODcPolE8_14D	2.325616	1.11301	1.76	0.078	.9102564	5.941722
ODcRiotE0_7D	2.070165	.5439597	2.77	0.006	1.236921	3.464718
Coor3RDo	1.131574	.344588	0.41	0.685	.6229804	2.055378

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv1_7	1.372014	.0584586	7.42	0.000	1.262091	1.491511
ODcPolE8_14D	2.016998	.9665012	1.46	0.143	.7885481	5.159203
ODcRiotE0_7D	1.77153	.4919613	2.06	0.039	1.027936	3.053027
Coor4	1.146735	.0788109	1.99	0.046	1.00222	1.312088

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv1_7	1.353577	.0579835	7.07	0.000	1.244572	1.47213
ODcPolE8_14D	2.53127	1.220977	1.93	0.054	.9834565	6.515112
ODcRiotE0_7D	2.076018	.5465632	2.77	0.006	1.239171	3.478011
Coor5	1.104545	.0669763	1.64	0.101	.9807743	1.243935

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCv1_7	1.372234	.0585281	7.42	0.000	1.262185	1.491878
ODcPolE8_14D	2.108089	1.007695	1.56	0.118	.8266511	5.380034
ODcRiotE0_7D	1.870819	.5083894	2.30	0.021	1.098299	3.186715
Coll3	1.112336	.0719088	1.65	0.100	.9799611	1.262593

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.23896	.038198	6.95	0.000	1.16631	1.316135
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.392367	.3494829	1.32	0.187	.8513396	2.277218
_IColl5Ca_1	.8581776	.2836238	-0.46	0.644	.449013	1.640195
_IColl5Ca_2	1.695029	.5496616	1.63	0.104	.8977399	3.200394

➤ FCv: Str: 5 Coord: 4 Coll: .

• **Confrontational**

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.225872	.0368389	6.78	0.000	1.155754	1.300243
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.521933	.3757678	1.70	0.089	.9380635	2.469213
Str5	1.081462	.035953	2.36	0.018	1.013242	1.154275

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.226887	.0362936	6.91	0.000	1.157776	1.300124
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.514052	.3715751	1.69	0.091	.9359244	2.449293
Coord3RDo	1.764485	.6203076	1.62	0.106	.8858834	3.514465

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.21849	.0358268	6.72	0.000	1.150256	1.290772
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.437751	.3562443	1.47	0.143	.8846548	2.336649
Coord4	1.094633	.0489621	2.02	0.043	1.002755	1.194929

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.223133	.0362759	6.79	0.000	1.15406	1.296339
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.535136	.3789808	1.74	0.083	.946258	2.490485
Coord5	1.045739	.0450681	1.04	0.299	.9610346	1.137909

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.219421	.0358642	6.74	0.000	1.151116	1.291779
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.463601	.3616304	1.54	0.123	.9017904	2.375417
Coll3	1.090178	.0496751	1.89	0.058	.9970372	1.192019

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFCf1_7	1.23896	.038198	6.95	0.000	1.16631	1.316135
ODcOfGrE15_21D	1.392367	.3494829	1.32	0.187	.8513396	2.277218
_IColl5Ca_1	.8581776	.2836238	-0.46	0.644	.449013	1.640195
_IColl5Ca_2	1.695029	.5496616	1.63	0.104	.8977399	3.200394

➤ FCf: Str: 5 Coord: 4 Coll: 3

• **Violent**

Structure:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.098109	.0087783	11.71	0.000	1.081038	1.11545
EvFCv15_21	1.07051	.0281329	2.59	0.010	1.016767	1.127095
ODcPolE8_14D	1.636787	.4185835	1.93	0.054	.9915398	2.70193
Str5	1.190303	.0377614	5.49	0.000	1.118546	1.266664

Coordination:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.106687	.0080931	13.86	0.000	1.090938	1.122663
EvFCv15_21	1.071406	.0285812	2.59	0.010	1.016827	1.128915
ODcPolE8_14D	1.541386	.3939427	1.69	0.090	.9340363	2.543659
Coord3RDo	.8618265	.1090263	-1.18	0.240	.6725702	1.104338

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.105023	.0082565	13.37	0.000	1.088959	1.121325
EvFCv15_21	1.073207	.0282145	2.69	0.007	1.019308	1.129956
ODcPolE8_14D	1.541469	.3931023	1.70	0.090	.9351108	2.541011
Coord4	1.0958	.0493347	2.03	0.042	1.003249	1.196889

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.104783	.008611	12.78	0.000	1.088034	1.12179
EvFCv15_21	1.069384	.0285024	2.52	0.012	1.014954	1.126732
ODcPolE8_14D	1.6361	.4186931	1.92	0.054	.9907855	2.701719
Coor5	1.215112	.0413353	5.73	0.000	1.136738	1.298889

Collective action:

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.100447	.008667	12.15	0.000	1.08359	1.117565
EvFCv15_21	1.074234	.0280134	2.75	0.006	1.020708	1.130566
ODcPolE8_14D	1.62116	.4143982	1.89	0.059	.9822978	2.675522
Coll3	1.186959	.0470341	4.33	0.000	1.098263	1.282819

_t	Haz. Ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z	[95% Conf. Interval]	
EvFV1_7	1.104044	.0082739	13.21	0.000	1.087946	1.120381
EvFCv15_21	1.070764	.028647	2.56	0.011	1.016064	1.128409
ODcPolE8_14D	1.575073	.404994	1.77	0.077	.9515547	2.60716
_IColl5Ca_1	.9155635	.1137661	-0.71	0.478	.7176619	1.168038
_IColl5Ca_2	1.340804	.2195661	1.79	0.073	.9726913	1.848228

➤ FV: Str: 5 Coor: 5 Coll: 5

Chapter 12

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