DON PEDRO RONQUILLO AND SPANISH-BRITISH RELATIONS (1674-91)

Charles Findlay Scott

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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" DON PEDRO RONQUILLO

AND SPANISH-BRITISH RELATIONS (1674-91) ",

being a thesis presented by

CHARLES FINDLAY SCOTT,

to the University of St. Andrews

in application for the degree of Ph.D.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the following Thesis is based on the results of research carried out by me, that the Thesis is my own composition, and that it has not previously been presented for a Higher Degree.

The Research was carried out in national and private archives and libraries in Belgium, France, Great Britain, Holland and Spain.

CERTIFICATE.

I certify that Charles Findlay Scott has spent nine terms at Research Work in national and private archives and libraries in Belgium, France, Great Britain, Holland and Spain, that he has fulfilled the conditions of Ordinance No, 16 (St.A.) and that he is qualified to submit the accompanying Thesis in application for the degree of Ph.D.

CAREER.

I matriculated in the University of St. Andrews in October, 1946, and followed a course leading to graduation in Arts (Honours History) until June, 1950.

In September, 1951, I commenced the research which is now being submitted as a Ph.D. Thesis.

I was appointed in June, 1951, to a Stevenson Scottish-Spanish Exchange Scholarship, also receiving a supplementary grant from the University of St. Andrews. In July, 1952, I was appointed to a University Post-Graduate Scholarship tenable for one year by the University of St. Andrews, and this was renewed for another year in July, 1953.

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

1. a) Reason and Purpose .. .. .. (p 1)

b) Sources .. .. .. (p 5)

c) Treatment .. .. .. (p 9)

2. General Conditions .. .. .. (p 12)

3. Don Pedro Ronquillo: his background and his life until he arrived in England in 1675 (p 21)

4. The general situation in England with the Spanish approach to it; Don Pedro Ronquillo's orders .. .. .. (p 35)

THE REIGN OF CHARLES II - 1675 on

The First Embassy of Don Pedro Ronquillo in England (1675-6).

1. Political Outline with special emphasis on Don Pedro's relations with the spring and autumn sessions of Parliament in 1675 .. .. (p 46)

2. Relations with the King, Court and Ministry (p 62)

3. Working towards the approaching Congress of Nimeguen .. .. .. (p 76)

4. More Important Subordinate Negotiations. .. (p 80)

5. The Religious Aspect .. .. .. (p 82)

6. The Commercial Aspect .. .. .. (p 87)

7. The Personal Aspects; and Summary .. .. (p 95)

The Interim (1676 - 80).

1. Political Outline

a) The Conclusion of the Treaty .. .. .. (p 158)

b) Towards the Autumn Parliament of 1680.. (p 167)

c) Towards the Oxford Parliament and including it .. .. .. (p175)

d) The Prince of Orange's visit .. .. .. (p 192)

e) Towards the meeting of 6th February, 1682 (p 200)

2. Religion .. .. .. (p 212)

3. Commerce and Maritime .. .. .. (p 217)

4. Personal (including Accounts and Sum-up).. (p 223)

Non-Fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor (to the death of Charles II)

I Political Outline - 1682

1. Introduction to the period .. .. .. (p 231)

2. To the suspension of the siege of Luxembourg on March 10th, 1682 .. .. .. (p 234)

3. To the end of November, 1682 .. .. .. (p 241)

4. The Personal View of Don Pedro Ronquillo on Charles' Arbitration Suggestion.. .. .. (p 247)

5. Spanish Interests in British Domestic Affairs (p 255)

6. The Rumours of French Bribery in England (p 261)

7. Hispano-Dutch Relations in England .. .. (p 263)

8. Subordinate Negotiations.

a) Italy .. .. .. (p 266)

b) The Goodricke Incident .. .. .. (p 267)

c) The Falaiseau Affair and Ronquillo .. (p 274)

9. The End of 1682 .. .. .. (p 276)

II Political Outline - 1683

1. Chronology and Comments .. .. .. (p 281)

2. Domestic Events and Spanish Policy towards these in 1683 .. .. .. (p 290)

III Political Outline - 1684

1. Spanish-British Political Relations .. (p 298)

2. British Domestic Affairs and Spanish Policy

(a) The first Six Months of 1684 .. .. (p 311)

(b) The last Six Months of 1684 .. .. (p 315)

IV Maritime and Trade - 1682-5

1. Questions arising in Maritime and Trading Affairs

a) The Tangier Problem .. .. .. (p 321)

b) Piracy .. .. .. (p 324)

c) Trade Proper .. .. .. (p 329)

d) Naval Questions .. .. .. (p 331)

e) The Problem of Salutes .. .. .. (p 333)

2. The Spanish Policy

a) Spain using her Position Commercially as a weapon .. .. .. (p 335)

b) The Prospect of a Trading Company .. (p 340)

c) The Idea of Increasing her Naval Strength (p 340)

3. Summary .. .. .. (p 341)

V The Religious Aspect (1682 - 5) .. .. .. (p 342)

VI Personal Aspects

1. Personal Events .. .. .. (p 347)

2. Embassy Accounts .. .. .. (p 353)

3. Personal Ambitions and Sum-up .. .. .. (p 355)

THE ILLNESS AND DEATH OF CHARLES II .. .. .. (p 357)

THE REIGN OF JAMES II

I 1685

1. Political - International

a) The Immediate Reaction of Spain to James II's accession .. .. .. (p 365)

b) The Actual Situation in 1685 .. .. .. (p 368)

c) Spanish Policy confronting this .. .. (p 371)

d) The opposition by the French party to this, with its relative success .. .. .. (p 380)

2. Spanish Policy and Domestic Affairs

a) During the first months of 1685, (including the Spring Parliament). (p 385)

b) The Monmouth rebellion .. .. .. (p 390)

c) The question of a standing army, etc. - - to the end of 1685 .. .. .. (p 395)

3. The Religious Aspect .. .. .. (p 402)

4. The year, 1685, for Don Pedro Ronquillo as an individual .. .. .. (p 409)

II 1686

1. Political - - International

a) The struggle against French influence .. .. (p 414)

b) The ultimate policy of Spain .. .. .. (p 427)

c) The question of Anglo-Dutch relations to Spain .. .. .. (p 429)

d) Lesser Negotiations, e.g. involving the Papacy, etc. .. .. .. (p 433)

e) The position and public opinion of Spain in England .. .. .. (p 434)

2. Domestic Affairs and the Spanish approach to them .. .. .. (p 437)

3. The Religious Aspect .. .. .. (p 444)

4. The personal aspect; and general summing-up .. .. .. (p 452)

III 1687

1. Political - - International

a) Before Dijkveld's visit .. .. .. (p 455)

b) Dijkveld's visit .. .. .. (p 460)

c) The question of European treaties.. (p 471)

d) Spain against France in England, with the question of Spanish-British treaties (p 473)

e) Autumn, 1687 .. .. .. (p 474)

2. Spanish Policy and the Domestic Situation (p 476)

3. The Religious Aspect

a) Spanish views on James' principal politico-religious activity .. .. .. (p 485)

b) Lesser religious affairs: Anglo-Papal relations, the Spanish chapel, etc .. (p 487)

4. Don Pedro's Ronquillo's personal position (p 490)

IV Spanish-British Maritime and Commercial Relations (1685-7)

1. 1685 .. .. .. (p 492)

2. 1686 .. .. .. (p 499)

3. 1687: and summary .. .. .. (p 502)

"THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION" PERIOD

I 1688 -- Outline of Political and Religious Events with reference to Spanish Policy .. .. .. (p 511)

II 1689 -- Outline of Political and Religious Events with reference to Spanish Policy

1. First contacts between Ronquillo and William in 1689 .. .. .. (p 549)

2. The question of Spain's recognising William as King, and Don Pedro's position (p 554)

3. The problem of alliance with William .. (p 564)

4. Spain, William and the European campaign (p 568)

5. William, Don Pedro Ronquillo and the Spanish Queen's journey .. .. .. (p 571)

6. Spain and British Domestic Affairs

a) In general .. .. .. (p 574)

b) Spain and the Irish campaign -- Don Pedro's conscience problem.. .. (p 577)

7. Spain and Religious Affairs in Britain. (p 580)

8. Personal Aspects; and Summary .. .. .. (p 584)

III Spanish-British Maritime and Commercial Relations (1688-89)

1. 1688 .. .. .. (p 587)

2. 1689: and Summary .. .. .. (p 593)

THE REIGN OF WILLIAM III - - THE YEARS 1690 - 1

I Political - - International

1. The nature of these years in Spanish-British relations .. .. .. (p 603)

2. 1690

a) Spain and the war at sea .. .. .. (p 605)

b) Ireland .. .. .. (p 608)

c) The Defence of the Low Countries.. .. (p 613)

d) Savoy .. .. .. (p 617)

e) Ronquillo and the general strategy of the Common Cause .. .. .. (p 619)

f) Summary of Spanish-British political relations for 1690 .. .. .. (p 626)

3. 1691 .. .. .. (p 627)

II Spanish-British Maritime and Commercial Relations (1690 - 1) .. .. (p 631)

III Spain and British Domestic Affairs (1690 -1).. (p 636)

IV The Religious Aspect (1690-1) .. .. .. (p 640)

V The Personal Aspect (1690 -1) .. .. .. (p 643)

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS .. .. .. (p 651)

- - - - - - - - -

APPENDIX .. .. .. (p i)

BIBLIOGRAPHY .. .. .. (p lviii)

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NOTE.

For convenience 'New Style' has been adopted for the dating in this thesis because it is employed throughout the Spanish documents of the period. However, when both styles have been given in the originals - - as in British state papers, etc. - - both are supplied here.

INTRODUCTION.

"Don Pedro Ronquillo and Spanish-British Relations (1674-91)"

1. a. Reason and Purpose.

It is understandable that anyone should ask the reason for investigating the activities of Don Pedro Ronquillo and the relations between Spain and Britain from 1674 to 1691. The most natural answer is found perhaps in a short account of how this piece of research started, for it began in turn, just through asking questions.

It was during my "honours" year at the University of St. Andrews, as I listened to my professor in his study recounting the detailed story of the later Stuart Kings, that I first became aware of Don Pedro and his work as Spanish representative in London. For several years previous to this I had been actively interested in Spain and things Spanish, had learnt some of the language and had visited the country. Naturally enough, during such eventful years, I had pondered some of the problems arising between our two countries. It was therefore not remarkable that my attention while studying the later Stuarts and also the Spanish Succession should turn particularly towards anything to do with Spain. In our lectures on the Stuarts the small class grew to appreciate the value of Jusserand's able editing of the despatches of French envoys to the English Court at the time. Gradually, almost imperceptibly, the question/

/question became more pressing to me: What about Ronquillo and his despatches? He had undoubtedly been in the centre of affairs and had spent some time in England - how long I did not then know. If there were no biographies to be found, there might be a collection or collections of his letters. These might shed more light for me on England during one of the most fertile periods in its history. They might also, so to speak, complete a triangle. Jusserand and many others had examined minutely the relations between England and France; Mignet was only one who had worked assiduously on those of France and Spain. But what about Spanish-British relations at the time? They were by no means lacking in importance and were certainly the central theme of Ronquillo's mission. Final exams necessarily curtailed thorough searching then, but I had still discovered no biographies of Don Pedro, no editions of his letters and little on Spanish-British relations during the later Stuart period.

That summer of 1950, however, I found myself again in Spain, in Valladolid, and the question "Who was Ronquillo?" was still unanswered. Even historians met at the University there could tell me little though practically all knew of his name and his reputation as one of the last great diplomats of the House of Austria in Spain. There was no biography nor printed edition of his correspondence that I could then find, and little else that was directly relevant. This made me firmly resolved to take the opportunity of making inquiries at/

/at the nearby Archive General de Simancas with its practically inexhaustible store of original documents. And so, for the first of what was to be many times, I made the journey of ten kilometres to that lovely castle that gazes across and beyond the Pisuerga and the pine woods of its valley below; and received welcome from those who were later to be fast friends. Helped by these archivists and the catalogues, especially the archivists, I found that there were many letters of Ronquillo in at least forty legajos (bundles of papers); but that no one had ever made a systematic examination of all of them. A week or so later, in Madrid, at the Archive Histórico Nacional, I discovered that there were others in over twenty legajos. By this time I had no doubt that even more lay in other Spanish archives; and by then I had learnt the extensiveness of Don Pedro's stay in England, of over twelve years between 1675 and 1691. In other words, he had had the experience of being Spanish ambassador at the courts of Charles 11, James 11 and William 111. If he had been a good observer as his reputation and the documents I had already samples indicated, further research would be worthwhile. By the time I returned to Scotland, my questions had become blended with the desire to do this at one time or another in the future.

The Stevenson Trust and the University of St. Andrews made this possible the following year; the Spanish Government Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas were also willing to help financially./

Exactly a year after leaving Simancas, I was back again starting the research in earnest.

As the work has gone forward, I have gradually learnt how many writers have mentioned Don Pedro Ronquillo and his work: Macaulay, Sir James Mackintosh, Ranke and Klopp, not to mention others. However, they took what information they needed, leaving the rest, and often making mistakes while doing so. Now, thanks to the Duque de Maura, we have the edition of Don Pedro's complete correspondence with the Marqués de Cogolludo in Rome for the years 1689-91. In fact, we might say there is some resurgence of the interest in the period, and even in Don Pedro, that existed around 1875. There is however still no detailed examination of Ronquillo or of his activity. The Duque de Maura has pointed to this need in the introduction to his own work. In conversations with historians in Britain, Spain and Belgium, the writer himself has not only felt interest but a realisation of the need for this. Therefore in the light of these facts, he feels his research stands justified.

But there is perhaps also a justification beyond that. In pondering the activity of Don Pedro Ronquillo and Spanish-British relations during his time, I can only say that the study has illuminated for me in a measure their relations to-day. This is not the mere learning up of historical backgrounds with which to understand or even make present 'policies', for I have no axe to grind in such matters/

Nevertheless it is my hope that the reading of these pages should not stop there but stimulate efforts to think and act more understandingly in those matters in common between Spain and Britain. More intelligent and active good-will alone can solve the problems between our two countries and allow them both to claim their own good to the full, mutually help and inspire each other, and form firmer, closer links with which to strengthen the chain of world peace.

b. Sources.

However, before turning in thought to the 17th. Century, it will be well to know what channels of information have permitted this mental journey. Let us first consider the original material consulted.

At Simancas I sought out all the letters I could for the years of and between Ronquillo's two missions in England (of which more later) in the Sección de Estado, not only for Inglaterra, but also for Flandes, Alemania and Francia. The letters of the ambassador formerly in the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères in Paris, now returned to Simancas, were also examined as well as certain papers on the Ronquillo family. This body of largely regular diplomatic despatches forms the core of my research, notwithstanding the importance of despatches, private letters and papers found elsewhere that complement them.

In Madrid, at the Archivo Histórico Nacional, particularly significant/

/significant finds were the embassy accounts; and personal data on Don Pedro from the section of Ordenes Militares. There were also several interesting State letters and documents.

Through the generous courtesy of the Duque de Alburquerque, I was able to consult in his private archive some letters between Ronquillo and his life-long friend Pablo Spinola Doria, Marqués de los Balbases. These private letters, a good number of which are still in cipher, are particularly valuable for the Oxford Parliament period, filling a notable gap in the Simancas records. They also give a more intimate knowledge of Don Pedro as a friend.

At the Archive de Indias, Seville, I consulted legajos for the years under consideration from several sections, notably those containing consultations (consultas) of the Consejo de Indias and the Junta de Guerra de Indias and letters sent to the Council. This added greater knowledge of the mercantile and colonial aspects of Don Pedro's work.

By comparison, there are not a great deal of relevant documents at the British Museum and Public Record Office in London. At least what there is, has supplied further details on Ronquillo's contacts with British officialdom and of his life at the embassy. This is disappointing largely, I think, because so much arranging etc. was done by word of mouth rather than in writing.

What proved of much greater value were two months spent in/

/in Brussels, practically entirely in work at the Archives Générales du Royaume. In Spain, friends had assured me that the documents there would be mostly copies but that is not so. In the sections Archive de l'Ambassade d'Espagne à la Haye and Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre Espagnole (which includes the Archive de l'Ambassade d'Espagne en Danemark) are original papers of very great importance for our story. In particular, the letters between Ronquillo and Manuel de Lira, Spanish ambassador at the Hague are invaluable. They changed and clarified greatly my ideas on Ronquillo's first period in England (1675-6) and have illuminated his character as practically nothing else. Another outstanding 'discovery' was the unfinished manuscript memoire of Don Pedro by his secretary, undoubtedly Francisco Antonio Navarro, though unnamed. The two bulky volumes completed reach 1689 and include many copies of letters of Don Pedro. They are adulatory and not always reliable due to what the author called 'the fragility of memory' for they were written nearly thirty years after some of the events. Particularly interesting nonetheless are the accounts of Ronquillo's first years in Northern Europe, his mission to Poland, his relationship to Don Juan and Spanish government circles, and the burning of the London embassy in 1688.

Though Don Pedro Ronquillo in his letters spoke much of the contemporary Dutch envoys, examination of some of their letters in a week at the Hague did not reveal much written about him. This,

I/

/I feel, is partially due to the general brevity of their despatches in comparison at least with his and the fact that they so often worked and wrote 'à deux'. Apart from a few memoires sent by Ronquillo to the Dutch envoys, there are practically no copies of letters of his. While in Holland I was also graciously permitted to see a few papers in the Koninklijk Huis-archief.

Undoubtedly there are other letters of this indefatigable correspondent - - and recognised as such even in his own age. It was often he complained that people did not reply or did not write fully enough ! However, documents are consulted not for their own sake but to reveal men and problems of the past. To know these in every detail is not possible, necessary or even desirable. It seems to the writer that he has consulted enough to give an adequate picture of Don Pedro Ronquillo and Spanish-British relations (1674-91).

In attempting this, he has also been helped by printed sources, found mainly in the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, the Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique and the British Museum. First of all there were the works written by or ascribed to Ronquillo. There is the recent work of the Duque de Maura, which has already been mentioned. There follows Rodriguez Villa's editing of Don Pedro's letters to the Marquèse de los Balbases from Poland and concerning the burning of the Spanish Embassy. Odd copies of letters have been found or referred to in other works. The Bibliography, however, will give full information on these and their relative value to the task in hand.

I have also sought out opinions of Ronquillo from the writings of contemporaries. On a wider plain I have consulted as many opinions as possible on the period, and I owe much to conversation with better-informed friends. It has been my great desire to immerse myself, not only in the letter but in the spirit of the age - - in its art, its way of life about which there are several excellent books. History being, in general, the record of deeds, literature that of thoughts, some time has also been devoted to enjoying some of the 17th Century authors, which the literary-minded Don Pedro also appreciated.

c. Treatment.

The correspondence of Don Pedro Ronquillo is so voluminous and includes so many aspects that, in fact, several theses could be written from it. Yet Spanish-British relations were the theme of Don Pedro's mission - - and in just that order, for Spain's interest was always first as far as the ambassador was concerned. Due to the largely unknown nature of the subject, this thesis must first of all supply facts. Despite the great deposits in archives, there is still amazingly little Spanish historical literature on the reign of the last member of the Spanish House of Austria. Spaniards have, perhaps, naturally avoided the period as one of decadence, though its shamefulness can easily be over-emphasised. The considerable literature written by foreigners is largely unreliable, and bears too often the stamp of national bias and lack of sympathy. Picatoste has commented on the

almost malicious delight of some of these writers in the Spanish eclipse. At least this foreigner has endeavoured to avoid that pitfall.

I have based what I have written mostly on unpublished rather than on published material, for it has been my purpose to contribute something new. For example, in dealing with the years 1689-91, I have referred mostly to the documents I have personally seen rather than to the Cogolludo letters of the Duque de Maura, though many references to his work will be found in the notes. This thesis is also intended for a guide to future investigators on subjects that may touch its own, directing them to vistas yet to be followed up. Hence the notes and appendix. Through this provision the more ordinary reader will not be led off the main road of events. Only vistas which indicate the wide scope of the ambassador's labours will be shown to him in passing. Lastly, that the reader may be able to feel more at home and omit sections that do not concern or interest him, the following is the general plan of the work. The chapter headings follow the natural divisions of the story. There were differences of policy, naturally enough, in the conduct of Don Pedro's first and second missions to England. Each change of English monarch also brought certain changes in Spanish policy. The long period of the Treaty of Windsor falls into two parts; the signing and the hopes for its fulfilment; after 1682 when that hope was practically gone. When I started to

write, I began by using the analytical method of exposition and soon found it entirely unsuitable, for the central figure (Don Pedro) was suffering a second death instead of being resuscitated. Hence it has had to be written in great part as a narrative, also considering the little-known nature of the material. Thus the first sections of each chapter on the general international political aspect are almost completely narration; while the following more specialized sections on religions, maritime and colonial, English domestic and personal aspects, though more analytical, are also chronological to a certain extent. The number of these secondary divisions varies from Chapter to Chapter according to the nature of the material. There are short summings-up at the end of each section and chapter; but little pure analysis until the whole story has been told. In short, any analysis is approached most gradually from a solid and far more important basis of narrative.

2. General Conditions.

What is the place and influence of the individual in history? How do the individual's thinking and acting affect the course of human events? These questions are particularly pertinent when studying a diplomat and his work. Was he at the mercy of his home government or the other circumstances in which he found himself? To what extent did he play a positive part not only in carrying out but in moulding his country's policy towards the power to which he was appointed. It depends on the conditions of the period. In our case whatever importance Don Pedro Ronquillo possessed as will be seen through the magnifying glass of his letters, it is first necessary to examine the general atmosphere in which he worked.

Among the greatest monarchs of any age or race stand the founders of Modern Spain, Isabel and Ferdinand. These "Reyes Católicos" held to the good in the old, yet used unhesitatingly what appeared to them best in the new. Of course they were not perfect, but the high ideals which permeated their practise of government, their devotion of thought and deed to making justice actual for their peoples are outstanding. The united kingdoms of Castile and Aragon were, by the early 15th. Century, among the best governed in all Europe, and "el testamento de Isabel la Católica" looked forward to further progress. Yet gradually, despite the great reign of the Emperor Charles, the unprogressive elements that the Catholic monarchs had not recognised, or/

guillotine ?

/or had not had time to eliminate, managed to act as a gelatine to further development. Coupled to this Spain was now burdened with the problems of a world empire. By the middle of the 17th. Century, when Don Juan was asked how important decisions of state were reached, he answered that the Council of State consulted what the Emperor would have done and followed suit.(1) This phase of uninspired standardisation affected the whole nation more and more. It was losing sight of the living spirit of great ideas, the plasticity of thought that would enable it to grasp new ones and adapt itself to changing conditions. Spanish effort was therefore poured into unwise and unfruitful channels. And so, by the end of that century all appeared decadence to the point of devastation. When we witness that picture and the quick if partial recovery of Spain in the 18th. Century, her very survival as a nation seems a miracle - a proof, not only of the virility of Spain, but of something eternal at work in the human race.

Sometimes minimised, too often now over-estimated at the expense of the Bourbons, are the ideals of the House of Austria in Spain. Yet her salvation then lay with those men and women who, in the general demoralisation, remained true to those ideals, yet who also saw the need for their adaptation, for something more, who loved Spain and kept faith in her, and who were willing to work for her often without reward.

(1) Juderías, 232, from D'Aulnoy.

The Biblical lesson[1] of the few and poor wise men who saved the city was repeated. In late 17th. Century Spain, there were many poor, many mediocre and very few wise. But the wise helped delay France until they saw that in the House of Bourbon was the only practical answer. In one last and patriotic effort, the dying Carlos II ratified that feeling in his will. It was the qualities held by those Spaniards to a greater or less degree that helped preserve Spain's individuality against all powers, allied or enemy.

But in many ways, the importance of these men was greater due to the weakening hold of institutions. The importance of the "personality" in Spanish history, be he Cid or Caudillo, has always been great, particularly when local and national institutions are in flux. And if there ever was an epoch of that nature, it was the reign of Carlos II. Cánovas del Castillo divides it into the oligarchic anarchy of the King's minority, the total anarchy of his majority.[2] At any rate it was anarchy, if of a more somnolent variety than is usually associated with the word. There is no more concise picture of the government problem than Martin Hume's "power seeking for a centre".[3] A bureaucracy, built on and in by the supremacy of the monarch was disintegrating, as its energies, after turning to the erstwhile leader, and receiving no leadership there, turned into selfish channels. There were many opportunities for the active - - and too often the unscrupulous individual. And there never/

(1) Ecclesiastes 9: 14, 15.
(2) Cánovas, 360.
(3) Martin Hume: see chapter on reign of Carlos II.

/never was a time when Spain needed more the selfless service of true patriots in all spheres to infuse new life and inspiration into the body, politic, economic and religious. We know that there were not enough of these to stem the tragedy[1] and that too often poverty curtailed their efforts - - as in Don Pedro's case. Nevertheless they existed and had more influence than is sometimes supposed. And they certainly shine as lights in the darkness of those desperate years.

(1) Menéndez-Pidal, The Spaniards in their History, III, 227, also Picatoste, 9, 17-18, 217.

The 17th. Century has a great deal in common with the 20 th. In fact we might say that general currents appearing then, both good and ill, are still with us. Europe was menaced by the constant threat of universal dictatorship and international war. Particular alliances proved inadequate to oppose the ambitions of Louis and the Turks until, after sad experience, the other powers blended into larger combinations and finally into a common front against the foe. National selfishness seemed ever-present, but very gradually those same nations were learning the mutual benefit of co-operation and a sharing of power. And as the struggles went on endlessly, the peoples longed more and more for peace.

One anonymous writer who examined Spanish-British relations as a whole has pointed out that the two countries have been allies more often than they have been enemies.(1) But to be absolutely frank, their contacts at any time have never got beyond the average or mediocre. Bones of contention have always remained beneath the surface of "good relations" to be dragged forth in periods of stress. A real rapprochement has never eventuated, though the bonds of similarity of outlook are greater than would sometimes appear.

Generally speaking, the years from 1667 to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession make up a period of co-operation, if not of friendship. The Treaty of the Pyrenees ratified the decline of Spanish power. It was not long before, particularly under/

(1) España e Inglaterra, 5

/under the continued threat of France, Spain saw she needed the friendship of England. Stronger, insular, England, on the other hand, took longer to realise her need of Spain. This 'time lag' was to cause Don Pedro Ronquillo great disappointments and constant anxiety. Nonetheless the largely satisfactory commercial treaty of 1667 between the two nations heralded yet closer co-operation.(1)

3 words, next one.

Spain and Britain are really neighbours in the sense that only the ocean lies between them. In the 17th. Century, Spain's empire in America and her possession of the strategic Low Countries made it even more true that British contacts with her would be principally through trade. And it is in the trading and maritime communities that we find the two general British attitudes to Spain -- the more friendly and the more antagonistic, which of course had many different shades. Trade with Spain as well as with the Spanish Low Countries was one singularly suitable to both countries due to the complementary nature of their different products. Many established merchants had long realised the virtues of peaceful commerce with or through Spain, and were anxious to foster rather than disturb it or have it disturbed. As we shall see later, these well-off and influential gentlemen of the city -- who had sometimes gained a real affection for Spain if they had been there -- were never far from the Spanish Embassy in London, ever ready to placate or even help it. But there were the others, most of whom had not reaped the fruits of steady/

(1) See McLachlan, also for what follows re trade in this section.

/steady trade, who were, frankly, more or less pirates inflamed with inherited hates and jealousy, of the Spanish monopoly in Central and South America. These men often shared in the common suspicion of Popery. For them the past centuries, as for their lineal descendant and mouthpiece, Captain Charles Jenkins, had been years of exposing "Spanish cowardice" and England triumphing over "the haughty and insulting Spaniards".(1) These were constant troublemakers for Don Pedro and his mission. Officially, friendship was the keynote of Spanish-British and Anglo-Spanish policies, but as long as Spain controlled Latin America as she did, such animosities would not be entirely effaced.

As for the Spanish, they realised, despite English racketeering over the annual fleets to the colonies, the benefit of the trade with Britain, though to a lesser degree. It was however preferred to Spanish-French trade. But the attitude that the British were pirates was never far away. This was only half true, but was a natural feeling when Spain was not in the bargaining position. Despite the satisfactory treaty of 1667, bothersome mercantilist regulations on both sides, the lack of international agreements on the simplest problems, the lack of control of their nationals by nations, together with national pride, complicated efforts to work together. But politically Spain more and more keenly desired and required English naval and military aid.

We/

(1) Jenkins, see title of work.

We commonly take the year, 1648, the end of the Thirty Years War, as the close of the open struggle between the Reformation and the Counter Reformation, but, as always, it took longer for ordinary people to grasp the fact that times had indeed changed. In Spain, in spite of moral decay, religious exclusivism continued; but the more alert were seeing that a real 'modus vivendi' between their country and certain Protestant nations must be found. Division in the Catholic Church as it stood by movements like Gallicanism was felt more and more dangerous. In England, there had been for some time among the nobility and more educated those who admired Spain in other ways, for example her literature, and who desired a greater religious tolerance between the two countries.(1) Basically the individual religious aims and prejudices remained - as they have largely continued to remain; but there was a working towards common ground, above creed or sect, perhaps more truly moral and religious than before, where the two nations could work out their problems if not amicably, at least tolerantly. Religious toleration could help forward political needs of both and they in turn now had paramount importance.

In conclusion, in our examination of Spanish-British relations three themes will be constantly recurring: trade and commerce strong as ever; religion changing its tone and emphasis but always present and ever louder, more threatening, more all-pervading/

(1) Muñoz Rojas, 651 etc.

/pervading, the threat of Louis to both countries driving them together.

3. Don Pedro Ronquillo: his background, and his life until he arrived in England in 1675.

The Spanish monarchs, like other great dynasties, required a class of well-informed, law-abiding citizens who, more or less dependant on them for their livelihood, were nonetheless willing and able to serve their royal master. In Castile, it was the legal classes, los togados y letrados, who provided many of these men. They were of good but not noble birth. However, as time passed, through reward, marriage and, or, the growing mania for 'titles', many consolidated their position and infiltrated into the ranks of the lesser nobility. The Ronquillos were representative of such families.

We first hear of them as living in the town of Arevalo in the province of Ávila. Arévalo was a more important place then than it is now. The castle of the Catholic Queen was occupied frequently by Isabel as she indefatigably travelled through her kingdom. The town then possessed persons of importance, for we know that the Ronquillos were only one of its five "linajes".(1) They probably lived in the old house near the parish church of Santa María, with their crest above its doorway, which the family still owned two centuries later. In the rapid development of Castile into a world power, it was unlikely that enterprising men would remain limited to small circles of activity. This family's opportunity came in the early/

(1) A.H.N; Ordenes Militares - Santiago, 7234, f. 42.

/early years of the reign of the Emperor Charles V. Rodrigo Ronquillo found himself Alcalde de Casa y Corte in Valladolid, the capital, faced with the rising of the Comuneros, and orders for its suppression. With an unremitting energy and stern justice he did so. On the order of his master, he executed the rebel bishop of Zamora, to die avoided by all in his old age because of the deed. Yet no one could impugn the fidelity and capacility of such a man, and the Monarchy needed such servants. From then on, Arévalo was only to be the centre of the Ronquillos' ever widening activities. Scanning, for example, the three pages in "Espasa"(1) devoted to the more notable of that prolific family, we see reflected the rise and fall of the royal dynasty. The constant stream of Rodrigos, Gonsalos, Pedros and Antonios (to say nothing of the women) are almost equally divided in their careers between the three great interests of Spanish life - - the army, the church and the law. One member of the family was at Lepanto, a branch of it became conquistadores of the Philippines, and more and more they permeated the government. Slowly but surely they established and raised themselves in the social and economic scale. In the mid-17th. Century, the closely knit family group was further consolidated by the marriage of cousins. There were, as has been said, many Ronquillos and perhaps History has wisely consigned the black sheep to oblivion, but one gathers that they contributed more than an average share of good servants to the Spanish state. But Don Pedro's own/

(1) Enciclopedia Universal Illustrado Europeo Americana, Espasa Calpe, Bilbao, Madrid, Barcelona, 1926: Tomo XII. p. 268-71

/own generation will illustrate this in detail.

By the reign of Philip IV, several members of the family were at intimate court levels. However this had been won through the law and in particular through the merit of Don Pedro's father, Don Antonio. Contacts with Don Juan later on may have helped the family's rise.

Antonio Ronquillo was a distinguished man in his own right. A brilliant lawyer who had also written and lectured in his subject, he passed to the field of diplomacy after serving as oidor of the Cancelleria of Valladolid and fiscal of government councils. Abroad he acted as Grand Chancellor of Milan, representative of Spain at the fruitless Congress of Cologne (1638) and later as ambassador at Genoa and Rome. What was perhaps more important for the family was his last post as interim Governor of Sicily for Don Juan, and it was there he died in 1651. Naturally enough Don Juan was closely linked to the Ronquillos. Pedro's brother, José - - the one who married his cousin, thereby concentrating the family property, was a contemporary and companion of the young bastard prince. Through this friendship Don Jose first received the title of Vizconde de Villa de Farfón, and later, the other title being abolished, that of Count of Gramedo,[1] which has continued down into the 20th. Century.[2] Later, we shall speak more particularly of Don Pedro's own connection with Don Juan. Four other brothers were soldiers, one dying fighting the French,

two/

(1) Maura, (Correspondencia) I, p.19. The Duke's "introduction" has been very useful in compiling this section, although I have gone over personally many of the documents he uses.

(2) Ruvigny: look up "Gramedo, Count of"

/two falling on the Portuguese front. The better known, Antonio and Francisco, served in high official positions under the last Spanish Hapsburg and the first Bourbon. Antonio was member of various councils and witnessed the codicil of the famous will of Carlos II; Francisco rose from post like Corregidor of Madrid, where he gained some popularity and fame, to Presidency of the Council of Castile under Philip V. Then there were also the women of the family. The mother, on returning from Sicily to Madrid, was made dueña de honor to Queen Mariana, later being appointed to the Spanish Queen of France, María Teresa. One daughter, María, also served the mother of Carlos II, afterwards marrying a marquis; while another entered a Valladolid convent. But while the family's importance in Spanish affairs undoubtedly increased, its financial position in the general economic chaos, when almost everyone was poor, definitely worsened. Don Pedro often mentioned his having no inherited income (1) whereas his father had been qualified as "rico" (2). Lack of descendants was to diminish later influence, but the Ronquillos' importance in the reign of Carlos II is assured.

(1) e.g. Brussels, 27th. Sept. 1679; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3956.
(2) A.H.N. Estado, 6402.

Our first meeting with Don Pedro Ronquillo is in the parish church of San Martín in the city of Valladolid, where he was christened on February 1st, 1630.(1) Not much, however, can be told of his youth except to say that most of it was passed in the great cities of Italy. There he formed lasting associations with important Spanish and Italian families and also with ecclesiastical circles in Rome; and certainly this knowledge of the peninsula was to prove useful in the future. It seems unlikely he went farther abroad with his father at this time. (see appendix) In Italy he probably learnt the Italian he later spoke in Poland.(2) I have no knowledge of when he started to study the other languages he knew, but a word might be said in passing about these. Later on, Don Pedro undoubtedly possessed a very fine knowledge of French; but I have found no evidence of his understanding German and some that he did not - at least in Poland. (see appendix) Incidentally - we shall return to this - he admitted to not knowing English as late as March, 1686.(3) In fact, Ronquillo's position as a linguist can be, and has been, overestimated.

Returning to Spain, he studied law at Salamanca. From his letters one gathers that he entered the royal service in 1650 or 1651.(4) Among the legal posts he held were those of Alcalde de Hijosdalgo in the Cancellería de Valladolid and order in the Cancellería de Granada. Always interested in books, there is evidence that he cannot have been/

(1) A.H.N. Ordenes Militares - Santiago. 7234 (f.21-2).
(2) Rodriguez - Villa (Misión) 22.
(3) London, 18th. March (2), 1686; Ronquillo to Señora: Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961; see also p. ? of this work.
(4) 29th. Sept. 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552; 14th. Dec. (3) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor: Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

unresponsive to the literary "golden age" still in flower in Spain. It was during these years that he courted the well-born Madrid lady Doña Ana López de Mendoza, who bore him a son (in 1658) and a daughter.(2) Though he did not marry her, as promised, he did not forget his responsibilities towards the children. More important to us was his cementing friendships with influential Spanish families, like Medinaceli.(3) It must have been at this time that he came to be in close touch with Don Juan. At one time or another Don Pedro served him and they began a more or less regular correspondence about 1660. (see Appendix) In 1668, Ronquillo was appointed Superintendent of Military Justice in Flanders. The reason for this honour seems to have been his services in the recently closed war with Portugal, though Navarro, who was then on the point of becoming Don Pedro's secretary, does not guarantee this.(4) The prince had himself been appointed Governor of Flanders, and was delaying his departure, playing for power. Don Pedro's going was also retarded until November, 1670, but this could only be attributed to domestic reasons rather than any connection with Don Juan. Already, according to the decadent usage of the time, Ronquillo had become at the tender age of five, a Caballero of the Order of Alcántara.(5) Now the new Superintendent received a place in the Council of the Indies.(6)

After travelling through France, Don Pedro reached Brussels in late January, 1670, to begin in earnest his lengthy labours in what was called "the affairs of the North". He was soon busily

(2) A.H.N. Ordenes Militares - Santiago. 7234, f.11.
(3) Maura (Correspondencia) II, 12 etc.
(4) ibid f.154.
(5) A.H.N. Ordenes Militares - Alcántara 1315.
(6) A.H.N. Estado; L.3455.

engaged, not only in his work but in the active social life of the capital of the Low Countries, making lasting friends - - and enemies. But there is every indication that the new official was generally popular with both Spanish and Flemish alike, and he was a well-known figure in Brussels those days. The enemies, on the other hand, appear to have been made principally in the field of duty. The principal reason for this was his action over a certain legal case, the details of which are not important here. In it Don Pedro showed a doggedness worthy of his great-grandfather, the Alcalde, defending the rights of his position even against the then Governor, the Count of Monterey. Eventually Madrid decided in favour of the Superintendent's opinion. For the first time we see Don Pedro's carefulness on legal points, yet also his willingness to come to an agreement. However, the enemies made in the Low Countries were to prove an irritation from time to time throughout the rest of his life, though they cannot be said to have in the long run ever stopped his progress. Meanwhile at his post Don Pedro was learning about Flanders and its defence, no doubt improving his knowledge of French.

All this was to be invaluable to him in the future. Yet, as always, he was looking to the future. His real ambition was to enter the diplomatic field. Though he once wrote that he had never studied any book on diplomacy, he undertook an even better preparation for it, for at this time he began those extensive correspondences with Spanish representatives all over Europe, some of which he maintained

until his death. Manuel de Lira, then ambassador in the Hague was one of these to whom he wrote. Perhaps more interesting to us were the "large Packetts" every postexchanged between him and the Marqués del Fresno in London, and even remarked on in England.(1) Slowly, step by step, as Navarro says, he learned and attained to the heights of diplomacy; and it was not long before he had entered this sphere of activity once and for all. The Queen-Mother and the Council of Regency had, in the afore-mentioned Pacheco case, noted his activity favourably. He also had his supporters at the Court. In Brussels the Count of Monterey had been reconciled with him and had used him for more thanhis specific duties as Superintendent. During the Count's absence from the capital during the French War on Holland, he delegated Ronquillo and De Lira to act as an advisyy committee to the Countess.(1)

The summer of 1673 was one of intense diplomatic activity. Alarm at the strength of Louis XIV had re-intensified and before the impulsion of men like the Baron de Lisola, forerunners of the Grand Alliance were being formed. England was in process of peace conversations with Holland largely through the good offices of Spain. At Cologne that summer a congress was established under the mediation of the King of Sweden for peace between France and Holland; and it was more or less arranged that Don Pedro should beesent there with De Lira, but De Lira went alone.(2) However, Ronquillo's services were to be

(1) For details see Navarro I, f.5-35.
(2) Secretary Williamson's index to Spanish Government personalities: P.R.O. S.P. 9/163, f.197.

used elsewhere. The position was as follows. Spain and Holland had made an alliance and she was pressing the Dutch to make one with the Emperor, which they later did. But before that was completed, Spain herself made one with the Emperor Leopold. And it was Don Pedro who was chosen to go to help the Marqués de los Balbases in Vienna, who was the Spanish ambassador there and also one of Don Pedro's greatest friends.(1) Simultaneously with the order to depart at once came the honour of a place in the Council of Castile.(2) The Superintendent - - for Don Pedro still held that position - - was soon hastening across Europe. Arriving at Vienna early in August, he found it necessary to follow the Emperor on a royal progress through Bohemia. French-inspired efforts in the Imperial Court to wreck the Spanish plans were confronted and frustrated. Don Pedro personally drafted the greater part of the final agreement. This experience in the Empire was meanwhile supplying him with a wide knowledge of the persons, influences and cliques in that court. Returning to Vienna, and after being present at the Emperor's second wedding, he received orders from Madrid to adjust and conclude other alliances with Princes of the Empire.

This negotiation was part of a combined plan of the Spanish and Imperialists to strengthen their hands. Hence the current offers of mediation through the Swedish minister in Vienna, as well as those from France and the Papacy were refused. One of the chief alliances

(1) See now: Navarro, I, f.36-54 for Austrian Mission.
Sim. Estado (Ale) 2392, 2392.

(2) A.H.N. Estado, 6379.

the two branches of the House of Austria desired was one with Sweden and Brandenburg. Don Pedro, who now had the Emperor's confidence, and soon his own royal mistress's permission, was to go to Berlin secretly to confer with representatives of both powers.(1) However, Imperialist-Spanish friction, the death of Michael of Poland, and most important the renewal of the Brandenburg-Swedish alliance postponed matters indefinitely at the end of that year. Neither were the efforts to win over the Elector Palatine much more successful; and Don Pedro was only able to sign treaties with Neuberg and the Elector of Trier. All this time the Spanish envoys had been engaged in the desultory task of trying to get the "guarantee" between the Emperor and Spain finally arranged.

Discouraged by these negotiations and troubled for the first time by what was to oppress him so greatly in later years, namely the gout, Ronquillo despite the desires of his friend, the Marques, felt his work at Vienna was done and wrote to the Queen asking permission to return to his post in Flanders. So, when the orders fromSpain arrived, they greatly surprised Don Pedro for he was commanded not to go west but farther east - - to Poland to present official Spanish condolences to its widowed Queen and, what was more important, to observe and use influence in the election of a new King.(see Appendix) Though it may not have been obvious then, Ronquillo was now definitely embarked upon his diplomatic career. He left Vienna alone - - - on his own except for orders to co-operate with the Imperial and Lorraine envoys in securing the election of

(1) See.Sim.Estado(Ale) 2329: It was never the plan for Don Pedro to go as ambassador <u>to</u> Sweden, as is so often said.

Charles of Lorraine. The Polish Mission, as in fact all Don Pedro's experiences before he crossed the Channel, are only important to us as indications of what kind of man he was and what preparation he had for his years in England. But let it be said that there was no part of his life that was more "picturesque" than this: the difficulties of travelling through Poland; the election with the preparations for it; after the victory of John Sobieski, the escorting of the young widowed queen through a now none too friendly country. Though the mission failed, Don Pedro had performed his duty and learnt a good deal about Eastern Europe. No one claims he was always right or then at the height of his powers; but he was, without doubt, a promising young diplomat. Neither was Don Pedro Ronquillo's opportunity to be lacking.

In England Charless II had been forced to retreat from any straightforward fulfilment of the Treaty of Dover, and by February of 1674, the King had made peace with Holland. Briefly, it was now the aim of the three allies, the Emperor, Holland, and Spain, to get England into war against France on their side. Popular pressure had played a large part in obtaining the end of the Second Dutch War and the coming Parliament was the natural vehicle for bringing public opinion - - which was also largely anti-French - - to bear on the King's actions; and these powers were determined to use it to the full. For Spain, however, an awkward problem had arisen. Who was to re-

represent her in London ? The Marqués del Fresno was so incapacitated by illness, he could not even write, and, despite their unwillingness to do so, the Consejo de Estado had granted his license to return to Madrid. In Madrid any vacancy in government office — and that in London was an important one - - was now an occasion for bickering. But Don Pedro was ultimately chosen as a compromise candidate, whose stay in London was only to be temporary until a proper ambassador could be sent. Not only had the Queen Mother wished to calm matters by choosing someone from outside, but it was felt Don Pedro would be able to arrive sooner than one sent from Madrid! The Marquesa del Fresno and her husband's friends had been pressing the appointment for this last reason, hoping it would hasten the return of the sick ambassador to Spain. Godolphin, the English envoy, who reported these details, does not seem to have opposed the naming of Don Pedro, though he did that of others "knowing them to be disaffected to our interest and of mischievous principles(1)" The Consulta of the Consejo de Estado of June 30th, 1674, gives further information.(2) It was agreed that there were few suitable for a post of affairs there. The Council recommended his being sent as Envoy Extraordinary (instead of ambassador) to save expenses from the habitually, but at that moment acutely, empty 'Hacienda'. All members of the Council (which included the Conde de Ayala, one of Don Pedro's great supporters at court) except the Admiral

(1) Hispania Illustrata, 217.
(2) Sim. Estado (Ingl) 2550.

of Castile who never mentioned him at all, chose Ronquillo as their first choice. Of the Admiral's attitude, we shall have reason to speak later. While keen to fill the London post, Don Pedro was ordered to wait on in Poland until ordered to leave, that he might complete their courtesy to Queen Leonora.

It was in the last days of August, when the news of his appointment reached Ronquillo at Torun , with an order also to congratulate Sobieski on his accession. This was done quickly and adequately, if not personally, for Don Pedro wished to avoid falling into the hands of the Turks against whom the new King had now set forth. Ronquillo impatiently awaited the license to leave Poland for he and his followers had nothing to do except to attend on the Queen and winter was fast approaching. Moreover, he recognised the importance of a Spanish representative being in London as soon as possible. Then at last en route, he wrote the Marqués de los Balbases: "I must go forward with my shield in London.(1)" Finally, early in November, the order to depart arrived and "My Spaniards and companions in exile" (as Queen Leonore called them), quickly took leave of her. Winter had already closed in. With difficulty the party managed to cross the flooded Vistula; snow and ice caught them as they hastened through northern Poland and Germany. The discomforts of their earlier journeyings were a "niño de teta" (a suckling) compared with this: travelling over indescribable roads

(1) Rodriguez Villa, (Mision), 72. Rozanski, 41.

in indescribable weather, spending nights in sheds beside "the brother pig" and "the mother cow"; and even losing their way in the snow that Christmas Eve. But Ronquillo and his secretary have given us vivid descriptions already of that voyage, and the reader is now probably as anxious to see London as our envoy was. After a short stay in Hamburg, where the reorganisation of the household took place, they headed for Brussels, Don Pedro himself making a slight detour to confer with De Lira at the Hague.

When he reached the Low Countries, Ronquillo heard with great pleasure that the Duque de Villahermosa had been appointed in the Count of Monterey's place as Governor. The Duke had been one of Don Pedro's greatest companions in Brussels before, but from now on the envoy's enemies 'around the throne' spoiled that friendship somewhat and its possible good effects. They attempted at this time to get Don Pedro's departure delayed and De Lira sent in his place.(1) But what really prevented Ronquillo's going was something we will not hear of for the last time - - lack of supply and instructions from Spain. Arrears of eighteen months' pay were due him; he owed the wealthy Marqués de los Balbases money he had borrowed in order to be able to go to Poland; the Duque de Villahermosa could advance nothing; and money-lenders were as grudging as usual.(2) Yet the months in Brussels, no matter how frustrating they may have been to the eager envoy to reach London, were not entirely wasted, as he prepared for the future as best he could.

(1) Sim. Estado (Ingl) 2551 (various letters); 17th February 1676; Ronquillo to Balbases: A lb.

(2) ~~A.C.R. Manuscrits Divers [illegible]~~ Navarro, I, f. 83

4. The general situation in England with the Spanish approach to it; Don Pedro Ronquillo's orders.

There is no doubt that the first and continuing concern of Ronquillo during those months in Brussels was close observation of what was taking place across the English Channel, and, in particular, its relation to his country and his own future actions. By February, 1675, he was conferring on British questions and sending despatches on them to Spain (1).

Almost a year was to have elapsed between the Marques del Fresno's departure and Ronquillo's arrival. During that period the only continuous Spanish representative in London was the consul, Manuel de Fonseca. He had been serving his country in England since the time of the Conde de Molina, just after the Restoration. It was that ambassador who had started in earnest the bribery of Parliament members, which had become Fonseca's special care. A good knowledge of English and his many personal contacts made him useful. However, he was rather conscious of this and his untempered zeal had already got him into trouble with the authorities, as it was to once again. The Consejo de Estado were conscious of his limits and ordered the Governor of the Low Countries to send the Baron de Bergeyck from Brussels as interim-envoy to London until Don Pedro should arrive. This mediocre Fleming, who thoroughly disliked England and the appointment, spent the spring of 1675 there.

(1) The first letter on English affairs from Ronquillo is to Señora, 20th Feb. 1675; Sim.Estado(Ing) 2551.

All efforts were then being bent towards the preparation for the spring session of Parliament. Fonseca was hard at work and the Earl of Castlehaven (1), had come over from Flanders to help.

Spain's ultimate desire was to get England on to the allied side finally to force Louis to grant "a good peace", based on that of the Pyrenees, signed fifteen years before. The Marqués del Fresno had not been optimistic about her attaining this, for, even when he wrote, the Dutch as well as the Swedes were speaking of an immediate peace, and already various mediation suggestions were current (2). Spain could not hope to continue the war without these allies, and the Emperor alone was a broken reed on which to lean for support. These differences of aim were to have a distinctly divisive effect on the work of the allied ministers in London, as we shall see. Nonetheless, all could unite in attempting to reduce French influence in England and make her neutral in fact as well as in name. Both Charles and his court were highly suspect of being in touch with Louis. For example, the British troops serving in France in the late mutual war against Holland, had not returned, despite various proclamations. The anti-French party in the country were keen for such a policy, while others, wishing to curtail the royal prorogative and power (of which foreign affairs was still a field) would join their support. It was among these elements that the Spanish, and of course the other allies, particularly the Dutch, were working.

(1) The Earl commanddd English troops in Flanders. See article on him in D.N.B. for details.

(2) See various letters of the Marqués del Fresno in Sim.Estado (Ing) 2550.

It had been hoped that Ronquillo would arrive in time for the spring session of Parliament, but that was not to be. The Spanish were, however, able to do something there. Fonseca had encouraged the petitions of the Commons presented to the King asking the withdrawal of the British troops from France (1). On the occasion of its presentation in early May, Bergeyck persuaded the Dutch ambassador to accompany him to watch this. Not only was Charles annoyed at the petition as an attempted interference with his field of foreign affairs, but also at the foreign envoys' being present then. The Dutchman, keen not to irritate the King, thereupon blamed Bergeyck for suggesting their attending (2). On the other hand, the Spanish were taking such royal rebukes pretty lightly. But all in all, they had been able to do far less than they had hoped in the Parliament. This practically everybody was ascribing to the absence of the new envoy.

In fact the coming of Don Pedro was being keenly watched by all concerned. The 'opposition' were eager for his arrival, while the King and his officials were trying to find out more exactly what sort of a man he was and what attitude he would take up to the English situation. Rumours were, as always in that age of poor communications, very many and various and we shall not examine these in detail, though they form a large part of the correspondence on him; but what is important to consider is the British 'official' view as

(1) London; 22nd April, 1675; Fonseca to Coloma(Secretary of Consejo de Estado for Northern Affairs); Sim.Estado(Ing)2551.
(2) London; 3rd May, 1675; Bergeyck to Duque de Villahermosa; Sim.Estado (Ing) 2551.

gathered from Bulstrode, the English Resident in Brussels. A pretty general interpretation of Ronquillo was that he was coming to "wait upon the Parliament, not the King"(1). However, as time went on, reports did not entirely corroborate that the new envoy would be a troublemaker. A more accurate knowledge of his financial state and the money he was bringing to use in England, had been acquired through intelligence(2). Bulstrode reported him as passionate and talkative but friendly. Though many of the Parliament members were making Spain and Holland feel that their work was as good as done if the Parliament gave no money to Charles, he was not out to divide King and people but only to effect by fair means a British declaration in favour of the Pyrenean peace(3). His actions in a particular matter also spoke for him. Bulstrode had told him that his entrance into London would not be very "gratefull" unless the corsair problem was solved. Having examined it, Don Pedro was not reserved in his condemnation of the Spanish admiralty's actions and officials(4). In short, it appeared that the new envoy would be quite well received by both the court and the Parliament on his arrival in England.

Though the Spanish Council of State were slow in despatching Ronquillo's actual instructions, they were in close touch with him regarding his future mission. For example, they sent copies of three letters which they considered important, that had been sent

(1) Calendar of State Papers (Domestic), 1675-6, p.25.
(2) ibid, 143-4.
(3) "Some discourses and expressions uttered by Don Pedro Ronquillo on several occasions, sometimes in a little passion and without passion;" P.RO. S.P. 94/63, f. 156-8.
(4) See letters of Bulstrode in PRO S.P. 77/44; also those of Ronquillo in Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551, e.g. 6th March, (2)1675 to Senora.

secretly by the Venetian Resident in London to the Duque de Giovenazzo, who had in turn forwarded them to the Consejo de Estado.(1) They have interest for us as an independent general opinion of Spanish policy and for the effect they may have had on moulding Don Pedro's actions.

The first letter, of 24th January, 1675, urged that, even though Spain might have accepted the King of England's recent offer of mediation (as was then rumoured), it should not be her maxim to forsake vigilance. "If you disarm and become divided, the most Christian King will swallow you, one by one". Although the English were by no means satisfied with Spain, if the Governor of Flanders were to give some satisfaction in the matter of the Ostend corsairs and was more co-operative than previously, some agreement might be reached. Lastly it was pointed out that although the Government of England was in an unhealthy position, it considered the Spanish to be in a worse one.

On February 7th, the Venetian had written again: again criticising Spanish policy and this time on her action on the mediation proposals: that her wanting peace was only dissimulation and had complicated matters, particularly with the Dutch. "Indeed it is difficult to give you advice, for if peace is to be discussed, you send useless men as envoys and you continue the war to keep us actors in it. This is not the counsel of our convenience and necessity."

(1) Sim.Estado (Ing)2551. The dates are those when the letters were sent from London. They are digested and debated in the Cpnsulta of April 4th, 1675.

Yet, despite Spanish ministers' words and deeds, and the English crown's leaning towards France, much of the court was still for Spain. Then follows what the Resident called "a good piece of news". Internal affairs in England were leading towards the re-establishment of understanding with Spain, which had been believed lost to France in many ways. "The counsels of necessity have no law, and because it is superfluous to discourse on past events, I will only add that affairs, after making a large circle are returning to the centre, and all that remains to be desired is that Spain come to meet this disposition with open arms". This opportunity of winning over the English Court was not to be underestimated nor neglected, but it was not and would not be the result of Spanish activity and suggestion, but only because of the English "zeal for their liberty". Spain should not miss this opportunity, for reconciliation with the English court would be more difficult. In closing, the Resident advised that meanwhile no discussion should be opened with chief ministers and advocated confidences in negotiations, saying that "a secret message was better than the greatest gift."

The third letter (21st February, 1675) tackled the question of the spate of religious legislation being introduced in England. This was only "the antiphon of the psalm" being played in Parliament, in other words, it was only designed to please Parliament. Persecution, it was true, fell mainly on the Catholics, but the Spanish ministers

not becoming exasperated and using violent measures would be much the best policy. Then followed this timely wish and warning: "May God pardon those foreign envoys who have had a hand in introducing such passions and in confounding good order." But, lastly, the Venetian recognised that the Spanish now held the position of offense in England, while the French party were on the defensive.

For guidance on "the qualities and conditions" of the present ministers of the King of England, the Consejo de Estado received a letter from Joseph Bruñon, secretary to the Marqués del Fresno, who was still indisposed. This also had been forwarded to Ronquillo.(1) In form, it went through the ministers one by one. The power of Arlington, though not so obvious as previously, was not to be underestimated. He had chosen the change of position from Secretary of State to that of Lord High Chamberlain. Bruñon saw that, while he had done much to create the league with France, he had also helped break it up. Spain, therefore, unless the position were to change, should make much of him, thank him for his work on her behalf and treat him more carefully than other ministers.

Danby, the "extremely modest and temperate" Treasurer, was the rising star, whose financial reforms were recognised as putting the King and Duke of York much in his debt; though how long he could permit Charles to live without Parliament subsidies, Bruñon could not foresee. What was sure was that Ronquillo should keep close relations with Danby, knowing that the power in the King's Council was divided between him and his enemy, Arlington.

(1) Madrid; 19th March, 1675; Bruñon to Secretary Coloma; Sim.Estado(Ing)2551.

As for the other ministers: Finch of Daventry, Lord Privy Seal, not being firmly seated, did what the King wished; the Duke of Ormond was pro-Spanish with a popularity in the country which had brought him back into royal councils, but it had to be noted that his dislike of France sprang largely from his fear of Catholicism. Even though the "francesísimo" Lauderdale had not much influence now, the Spanish envoy "should help him to fall". The Secretary of State for Southern Affairs, Coventry, was liked and admired as being temperate and wishing peace and moderation; whereas his co-worker for the North, Williamson, was said to be pro-French.

Bruñon ended the letter by pointing out Charles' changeability, how he appointed men as ministers who had never been heard of before. He also said that there were no certain negotiations in England, with most lost and none gained without money.

The Instructions of Don Pedro Ronquillo (1), dated March 26th, 1675, reached Brussels about the same time as the above letters of the Venetian Resident and Bruñon - - the end of April. They included the following points.

In accordance with the traditions of the Catholic King, if not with its present importance in policy, religion was the first matter of interest mentioned. "Particular attention" was required in dealing with "a prince separated from the fold of the Church". The envoy was not only to provide Catholic services in his chapel and to welcome

(1) A.H.N. Estado; 3456, f.20.

priests there, but to be with his household a living example of their faith. This would encourage the many secret Catholics in England. Nevertheless, there was to be great reserve in supporting and extending English Catholicism; and voluntary undertakings in this field, motivated by indiscreet zeal and taking advantage of royal tolerance were discouraged. Past precedents for such action by previous Spanish envoys were not now to be followed, for they could result in a public persecution of the faithful (see Appendix).

The orders then went on to the general political situation. The Triple League as a guarantee was less trustworthy each day; repeated intimacies between England and France, even if openly aimed only at Holland, put Spanish interests in jeopardy. Sweden also, through lack of means, was vulnerable to Louis' bribes. Added to these, there was the perpetual incentive to lack of confidence in the English in the Indies. There, no treaties nor promises were sufficient to restrain them as long as they held Jamaica. Yet, despite the fact that Spanish tolerance was exhausted, their minister was only to complain, not to threaten. In these cases, the English usually blamed the pirates, though at this time some (including the infamous Morgan), were reported going to Jamaica with the island's new Governor. In such cases, Don Pedro might hint at a prohibition of English commerce in all Spanish dominions, in order to get action taken against the few buccaneers admittedly responsible. In other words, this fear would stimulate English self-control.

Especially interesting are the orders which follow for Don Pedro's handling of Parliament and the King. They stated that the forces which could aid Charles were divided; the King being swordless (without military support), was unable to control them and carry out his "secret maxims". This meant he had to work with Holland. And they continued: "It shall always be convenient that the minister of this Crown (Spain), who assists in London, should try to keep the King in the opposition in which he finds himself with his vassals." However, they also recognised that "the handling of such a delicate matter" required "particular prudence and discretion" for, if discovered, this would bring on Spain the hatred of both parties and facilitate Charles' desires for a closer union with France.

Certain specific matters are then mentioned. Ronquillo was not to encourage or discourage the already mooted marriage of William of Orange to Mary until more was known about it. This reflected not only anxiety about the possible effect of such a union on the English public, but also their own suspicion of the Prince's real intentions at the time. (see Appendix) Secondly, facing "the insatiable ambition of the most Christian King", Holland and the forces of alliance were to be supported, while Ronquillo was to be polite but firm with any proposals of mediation from Charles II or the Pope, smoothing over any suspicions of Spain's sincerity. Lastly, the new envoy was to become acquainted with and to use English personalities; and to keep in close touch with Spanish representatives at other courts.

And so, towards the end of May, 1675, with all this and more advice, and even more essential, with some money at last advanced, Don Pedro set out for Ostend, where the yacht of the English King was to pick him up. Not in robust health -- he was already calling himself "old" (1) -- but full of ideas and ambitions, he set forth. And, as we have seen throughout the above chapter, he went armed with a goodly preparation for the task ahead.

(1) See Polish correspondence.

THE FIRST EMBASSY OF DON PEDRO RONQUILLO IN ENGLAND - - - 1675 - 6.

1. Political Outline with special emphasis on Don Pedro's relations with the spring and autumn sessions of Parliament in 1675.

It was on the last day of May, 1675, that Don Pedro Ronquillo arrived in London, and that very evening he had his first of many conversations with the English King. Commenting on the speed with which the interview had been granted, Don Pedro wrote to De Lira, "as if I had a prettier face and skirts".(1) The talk was a long one and the two men were soon engaged in discussing the pros and cons of the European situation.(2) Charles first of all spoke of what he had done for Spain; how the first article of the treaty with France against Holland had dealt with the security of the Low Countries and asking why Spain was so suspicious. Ronquillo says he did not tell the King in turn what Spain had done for England, but did venture to say that her lack of confidence was understandable, for the world was full of rumours of a second treaty between Charles and Louis and events seemed to bear them out. Then Charles of course denied their truth. The next matter they turned to was the King's mediation proposal and Don Pedro, bearing in mind his orders, while he did not deny either Bergeyck or De Lira's encouraging replies to the King, was in a friendly way non-committal. Charles said that Spain's military

(1) London; 3rd June, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) See: 10th June, 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim.Estado (Ing) 2551 also: 3rd June, 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa; in Navarro I, f.86-91.

defeat made her requests for a peace based on that of the Pyrenees difficult of fulfilment(See Appendix). The best guarantee of the Low Countries was, he felt, his own and the Prince of Orange's suggestions for the frontier; though he quite agreed on the impossibility of accepting one with Ghent and Brussels on it. Ronquillo refused to be led into speaking of exchanges of territory for the vexed Duke of Burgundy title. He reassured the King that plenipotentiaries would be sent to make a decent peace, but that Spain did not want one reducible to "a scrap of paper". To Don Pedro's reasons for the English defense of Flanders -- presented for the first of numberless times, Charles pointed out his lack of money and that a few letters to Louis from him would be of little use. But the envoy said all steps might help make Louis reflect and wait before continuing his policy. And so the meeting ended. Commenting on it, Don Pedro told his royal mistress that it was one more experience bearing out that the King was "extremely inclined to and held in the interests of France," and that there was little to hope of him to Spain's convenience.

In the days following, Don Pedro excused himself from attending certain public ceremonies, largely, one gathers, to avoid rekindling the precedence dispute with the French ambassadors which had existed since Charles' coronation. Instead, he visited certain other members of the royal family, in particular the Duke of York.

James told Ronquillo that though a Catholic, the time for declaring himself more publicly on this was not yet; to which Don Pedro replied that while the Spanish Queen-Mother would be pleased to hear this, the Duke and his brother should not be "subalternos a Francia". York, however, promised to write to Louis the next day, and the English ambassador in Paris that very day, about the invasion of Flanders, but Don Pedro learnt later that this had not been done. To the envoy this was one more proof of the strength of the French party in England.(1)

Ronquillo found the Court, apart from the ministers, friendly in general. In the Parliament, friendship towards Spain, he wrote, ran of itself but that perhaps it would be wise for him to try and restrain its precipitation since he had not the orders, nor the means, to second its efforts.

These were Don Pedro Ronquillo's first impressions of the King, Court and Parliament of England.

The principal specific business to hand was the remainder of the spring session of Parliament.

As has already been mentioned, the Spanish and Dutch had interested themselves in the Commons' petition to the King for the recall of English troops serving in France. In the meantime a royal proclamation had been issued to this effect on 19/29 May but neither Ronquillo nor Van Beeuningen felt it strong enough. Neither did they

(1) 10th June, 1675; Ronquillo to Señora: Sim Estado (Ing) 2551.

feel the Commons should show themselves satisfied with it. In particular, the foreign envoys wished it declared that all who disobeyed would be treated as outlaws. However, only the King in Parliament could dispense capital punishment and, on learning this, they set themselves to obtaining a second revised and more stringent proclamation from Parliament which also included this point. Seeing the discord roused by the proposal of the Test Act and the privilege case of Shirley vs Fagg, Ronquillo was not hopeful that such a proposal would get far, and it did not. The Commons resolved accordingly but they were soon diverted to other matters. But Don Pedro felt that at least it had prepared the ground for the business being advanced further during the autumn session. Moreover, it had helped him keep in well with the friendly M.Ps.(See Appendix).

There was also a question of a declaration against French trade but this came to even less than that for the troops recall. But we shall deal with that in its proper place, and particular context of commercial affairs.

It was fairly obvious from the start that Parliament was in no mood to grant the supply requested by the King, and Don Pedro obeyed his orders of encouraging these sentiments. It was also clear to him that once Charles saw that obtaining money from it was impossible, the session would be at an end. But with every day

Ronquillo was becoming more and more alarmed at the explosive nature of the situation; he wrote that the King was in as great danger of a revolution as he had ever been, and that in such an event Charles' only alternative would be to turn to France for aid.

Certainly Spain would not be able to help him, and while the French were "weaving with the finest gold", the Consejo de Estado wanted Don Pedro - as he himself put it - to do so "with spiders' webs or sweepings".(1) Above all, Ronquillo did not want such a civil war in England and this made him increasingly keen to see the end of the session as the Commons grew more unmanageable. "Seeing affairs then in this dangerous state, I worked hard to dispose Parliament to the end that the King might raise the session to assure his own remedy."(2) And just past the middle of June the two Houses were prorogued until the autumn.

Briefly, Spanish activity in the Parliament session had been as follows. At its beginning, Spain had pressed forward her wishes, sometimes with too little caution. However, after the beginning of June, Ronquillo had modified the policy. With the Parliament in such an inflammatory state, there was no further hope then of obtaining more towards the recall of the troops from France or a prohibition of trade; whereas there was evidence that the French

(1) 14th June, 1675: Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye). 488.
(2) 21st June, 1675: Ronquillo to Villahermosa: A.G.R. (Etat).383.

were taking advantage of the discord; Besides, he, Don Pedro, had neither the money, nor the orders, to counteract or control this. This was why he worked in Parliament lastly for its prorogation. In fact, he hailed the event as a victory over the French party and in Spain's best interest. The probability of a civil war had been temporarily averted; the friendship of Parliament with Spain had been preserved for the next session, when, with help from home, he might be able to advance the negotiations already started and inaugurate new ones.

It was of great importance that Charles had been granted no supply to allow him to pursue an independent policy against Spain and the allies in the service of France. But Don Pedro also saw the value of Charles not having become alienated to Spain during the Parliament's deliberations; for she, in her weakness, needed every friend who might prove useful, and the new envoy was not underestimating the strength of English royal power.(See Appendix) All this is not to say that Don Pedro was satisfied with what had actually been attained during the session. He bewailed his late arrival, for that had hindered his getting to know many of the Parliament men and Ronquilo was cautious on this point. The lack of supply had made bribery practically impossible. He himself said that if he had arrived earlier with funds and orders, he might have carried out some great negotiation, even to a Spanish-British alliance. Fonseca wrote: "I

"I must say that a great chance has been lost," which expressed the position; but at least ground did not seem to have been lost otherwise, and other opportunities were at hand (See Appendix).

Little happened during the rest of the summer; it was a time of discussion and waiting for the autumn. The King was at Windsor, fully engaged in having a complete holiday -- of which Don Pedro conjured up for De Lira a voluptuous picture.(1)

Though Ronquillo let everyone know that he was "enjoying the fresh air in peace without any business,"(2) this was not absolutely true. Officially there was little activity. Almost immediately after the end of the Parliament session, Don Pedro was able to obtain a decree issued by Charles to counter any possibility of English aid to the French at Messina (17/27 June), but that was about all.(3) Unofficially, however, there was a great deal of discussion, and Don Pedro began to get his bearings on persons and problems. The core of most conversations between ministers and diplomats that summer centred round the offers of mediation. Ronquillo, lacking orders on the subject, was non-committal. He did, however, promptly counter any reports that Spain did not want Charles' mediation. Occasionally he entered discussions on the subject, but this, was so often, was censured by his home government, who ordered him only to listen, inquire and report. Personally, Ronquillo became more and more in favour of the Congress, though he thought all the representatives should go

(1) 23rd July, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(2) Calendar of State Papers (Venice), 1673-5, 440.
(3) See. Sim. Estado (Ing). 2551 for what follows.

together to its place of meeting to get the peace firmly and fairly settled without any private deals between particular powers.(1) Also he did not wish Charles to assume the leadership of the allies. Van Beuningen, the Dutch minister, with whom he worked, was anxious for a quick settlement and chafed at the caution and slowness of the Spaniards. This brought the two men into conflict with each other; and that summer we see the beginning of that 'accordion-like' relationship between them, sometimes pushed together and sometimes drawn apart, which certainly never helped Spanish-Dutch co-operation in London as long as they were together (See Appendix). Ronquillo also began to know Charles. In the Low Countries, the French troops had continued to advance, and when Limburg fell, Don Pedro felt the King's "eyes began to be opened."(2) Charles said, as so often before and after, that he wished "to be a good Englishman" and to keep these dominions in the possession of the Catholic King.(3) There was no sign of any action and Don Pedro was not blind to the majority of the King's ruses; but our documents do confirm what was rumoured in London and, of course, denied by Don Pedro, that in these days he had begun to try to woo the King and Court as well as the members of the autumn Parliament.(4) And it is to these two very important aspects that we now turn.

(1) Windsor. (5th Aug, 1675: Ronquillo to Señora) A.G.R. (Haye) 488
(6th Aug, 1675: Ronquillo to De Lira)
also Sim: Estado (Ing) 2551.
(2) 17th June, 1675, Ronquillo to Villa Hermosa: Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551.
(3) 6th July, 1675, Ronquillo to Señora (ibid).
(4) Cal. of State Papers (Venice), p.440.

Ronquillo was convinced that the approaching Parliamentary session must prove "The arbiter of all negotiations in England"(1) and for Spain "The effective means by which to compass this King".(2) But while to his eyes, the whole kingdom had no other anxiety than "to shake off the yoke of the monarchy", he saw too that Charles was ready to "prostitute" all the royal dignity and sell "the most sacred prerogatives of the Crown" without thought of his successors.(3) Herein lay a dangerous possibility; and not only that one. Danby was bribing heavily to increase the King's own party; and the French were as usual interfering.(See Appendix). And Don Pedro, with his aides, set themselves to confront the situation.

They did not underestimate the community of interest between the Spanish and the majority of Parliament members, but Ronquillo wrote to his Royal Mistress in early August " . . . although in other courts and kingdoms it might be considered lack of human faith to distrust the favorable opinions in which these M.Ps appear to persist, here it would be a mistake not to suspect and fear this".(5) Hardly had the spring session of 1675 come to a close when Don Pedro was pressing for funds for the next one. However, he wrote (later) that, contrary to what "all say", he did not require "millions" but that some was needful.(6) And we can be sure he knew ways, as in Poland, to

(1) 5th Aug. 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye)488; also Sim Estado (Ing) 2551.
(2) 22nd July; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim.Estado (Ing) 2551.
(3) See (1).
(5) 5th Aug.(1): Ronquillo To Señora; ibid.
(6)a 29th Nov. 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
b. 9th Dec; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim:Estado(Ing) 2552.

make one real worth three in such manipulation of Parliament.(1) We know also that, in comparison with royal and French bribery, Spanish payments were negligable. This was, of course, mostly due to the M.Ps interests largely coinciding with those of Spain; and Don Pedro could write in December "in nothing have I lacked up to now, thank God."(2) But the money, if enough, was not obtained easily: there is no record of any major payment being granted by the Consejo de Estado; English intelligence inside and outside the Embassy reported poverty and smallness of bribes.(3) It must have been got mainly on what was borrowed; and during the session Don Pedro complained to De Lira of the cost of entertaining the country party, especially when paid for on credit.(4)

In the handling of what funds he had and his contacts with the Parliament members - "mis guapos" (my bold fellows), Ronquillo used very great caution.(5) Early in September he returned to London from Windsor for business and "to see if I can bring three or four sinners home to dine one evening, in order to prepare them for the Parliament.(6) But once the houses were in session, he avoided seeing any M.Ps and, to use his picturesque phrase, "walked" with woollen feet".(7) They, however, visited the embassy and he was able to get a good idea of the session's day-to-day activities from their reports.(8) Don Pedro was also controlling Manuel de Fonseca, whose fidelity and utility he

(1) Rodriguez - Villa (Misión),17. (2) See 6(b).
(3) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1675-6, 257, 476.
(4) See 6(a). (5) Cal of State Papers (Venice)467, also "mis guapos"
(6) 10th Sept,1675; Ronquillo to De Lira ⌉ see letters to De Lira.
(7) 25th Oct; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye)488.
ibid.
(8) 29th Oct; ibid (enclosed copy of register of Parl.). See also, Cal. of St. Papers (Venice) 467

nonetheless commended, as one who knew everybody and the only person trusted by many English partisans in both Houses. The English authorities also recognised the Consul's activities and capabilities. SecretaryWilliamson attempted to find an excuse for expelling him; while Charles himself apparently tried to win him over with money. Fonseca, though "perishing" from want, refused, and Don Pedro mentioned this when urging the Consejo de Estado to grant him better wages and also the position of Agent in London. But Ronquillo would not let Don Manuel loose without an order.(1).

The opening of the Parliamentary session that October of 1675 impressed the still recently arrived Don Pedro and he wrote of it as follows: . . . "The day before yesterday the Parliament began. Wearing a crown and holding a sceptre, which it is not possible to rival, the King was clad in crimson velvet, lined with ermine that surpass (surpasses?) the terms of Gongora for so famous a purity; and (not to depart from that author) with a pomp equal to the sonnet which he wrote in honour of Queen Margarita Baeza, the King departed. The bishops and milords remained, the Commons went into sitting" . . . .(2) ~~They, however,~~

The "lapis angularis" of Spanish aims in this session was the same as that of the former one; namely to see that Charles was not granted supply. Despite his informant's assurances, Don Pedro was not certain of what the outcome would be, but during the first

(1) Re Fonseca: (a) 16th Aug, Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye)488.
(b) 29th Oct, ibid. (c) 5th Nov. (ibid) (d) 23rd Dec.
(e) Ronquillo to Señora: Sim.Estado (Ing) 2552.
(2) 25th Oct. 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

days of the assembly, the power of the opposition to the King became manifest.(1) Nonetheless our friend was still unsure as to the fidelity and permanence of such resistance and he decided to take advantage of it right away. About a week after the opening, the Commons having agreed to refuse to pay the royal debts, were discussing at length whether to vote on the King's subsidies, then and there or to delay this. Their decision was to vote then and they decided Charles should be granted none. Don Pedro wrote that he had procured this with every effort because " the King's party being very strong and of equal numbers (to the opposition), with a great purse open, it was most certain that votes could be lost (in future) and not gained." How much the discussion was due in fact to Ronquillo's machinations it is impossible to say, but it does show his attitude and feelings at the time.(2)

Then the Commons proceeded to new, more specific ground touching the royal prerogative, how the subsidies paid out for the enlargement of the navy should be administered. Various arrangements were suggested, and Don Pedro was keenly interested in them. At first it was proposed that special commissioners be appointed for this purpose. The second plan was that instead of special appointees by the Parliament, certain officials of the Treasury and the Navy should control the Treasurer's spending.

(1) See Appendix.
(2) 1st Nov 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
See Ranke IV, 15.

A few days later, this arrangement was changed to a much more rigid form but, as we know, nothing came of these attempts at a Parliamentary committee. Ronquillo favoured the second plan on the ground that these officials being wealthier, would not be so susceptible of bribery by the King as commissioners interested in lining their pockets and in their own personal advancement. Also the first innovation "shook the royal authority more than we required," he said. Evidently he had been able "for many considerations" to alter the naming of the commissioners to administer the £300,000 with the Treasurer; and the M.Ps had offered it him thus: However, after the second arrangement was changed, Don Pedro, like many, felt the business was going too far, and refused the offer of some controlling considerations on what was going forward. The Commons then proceeded to interfere in Charles' handling of the Custom revenues; and to Ronquillo, the King had then no other choice than to prorogue Parliament before it tried to take away any more money from him(1).

There was, of course, other business during the session that interested Spain. Ronquillo was anxious to obtain what he had failed to get from the previous one in the way of a revised declaration on the English Troops in France. Such a motion was popular in the house, but it could not become absolute law unless confirmed by the King and Charles would probably only grant his

(1) (a) 22nd Nov, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haya) 488.
(b) 25th Nov, Ronquillo to Señora: Sim: Estado (Ing) 2551.

confimation on receiving what he wanted himself, namely, supply. The declaration would also be complicated by the fact that any law made in neutral England against future levies would have to apply to the Spanish and her other allies as well as the French. All the same, Ronquillo favoured a strong prohibition. Later on he even thought of using this and a prohibition of French trade as a bargaining point with Charles for dispensing with the commissioners. But nothing eventuated from these discussions and plans.(1)

For the commercial and religious aspects of the autumn session, Spain's object was not to allow them to divert attention from the principal business mentioned above, nor to lose favourable support through the rousing of old and new antagonisms on such controversial ground. The incidents that did arise will be treated later against their own background.

Several writers have stated that Charles' prorogation of Parliament cast the Spanish embassy into confusion, but that was not so. (See Appendix) As already seen, Don Pedro anticipated it and saw in it the only step the King could take to save his interests. The main object of Spain, that Charles be granted no money, had been attained moreover, though she had not been able to obtain more.(2) Nor was Ronquillo sure what steps he could take in future on such matters as the prohibition of English troops in France.(3)

(1) 15th Oct, 1675: Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) 3rd Dec; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(3) 22nd Nov, 1675: Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

But his letters show no dismay. The fact that the prorrogation was for fifteen months was what was giving rise to most talk. Don Pedro regarded it as an error on Charles' part, committed in the disturbance and with his lack of fortune; in the Spaniard's eyes, a prorrogation for two or three months would have been just as effective, and the King could even have dissolved the old Parliament and called a new one. He did, however, view such a prospect for fifteen months away - and that also was rumoured - with apprehension: for in the meantime so much might have changed.(1)

London was full of reports that Charles had made a secret agreement with Parliament to enable him to dispense with Parliament - as was, in fact, the case. Don Pedro forwarded these to Madrid from time to time; a typical one was that the King was to send Louis 10,000 men, and twenty ships to Sweden, in return for £500,000. If such rumours were true, they spelt failure to Spain's plan of keeping Charles with as little money as possible, and Ronquillo did all he could, despite financial lack, to get to the bottom of them. He did find out - doubtless from his friends in the city - that large payments had been made from Paris, and said it was always necessary to fear the worst of Charles' "servitude" to France.(2) He also wrote De Lira: "What is

(1) 9th Dec: Ronquillo to Señora: Sim.Estado(Ing) 2552.
6th Dec: Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(2) 9th Dec(2) 1675: Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

current about this King having some treaty with France leaves me in little doubt but in my opinion it is not possible that it exceeds the limits of goodwill:" the Treasuries of France and Spain combined could not supply the money to allow Charles to make such a break as the rumours suggested, and supply his domestic needs.(1) Don Pedro's own concept of such an agreement was: that Charles might tacitly allow Louis to levy troops in Scotland and Ireland; forward the French King's ambitions at the approaching Congress for making the peace: and, perhaps, make an "inexpensive war in the Indies".(2) As for what Spanish policy should be towards this, while he advised alertness and investigation of reports, he firmly advocated helping Charles with arrangements for the Nimegan Conference, giving no evidence of lack of confidence in him. "For his ill must be cured with other medicines."(3)

(1) The Baron de Vique also says Ronquillo's suspicions of French aid were allayed by the feeling Charles would not "dare" accept it (P.R.O. S.P. 77/46. f.259).
(2) 6th Dec. Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(3) 23rd Dec.(2) 1675. Ronquillo to Señora: Sim.Estado(Ing) 2552.

2. Relations with the King, Court and Ministry.

It is now time to turn to Spanish relations with the King, his Court and his Ministers.

In the letters of Spain's diplomats and in the "consultas" of her Council of State during these years of the 17th Century, we find, with reference to England, a consistent horror at the Commonwealth and the execution of Charles I. There never existed the slightest desire to countenance the overthrow of a legitimate monarch; and this was often coupled with a fear of God's judgement if they did so. From time to time the anxiety of Ronquillo at the mounting domestic tension in Britain has been noted already. Doubts were appearing as to the wisdom of interfering in internal affairs - in which Spain had no definite interest - at the risk of civil war, from which only France could gain. Briefly the disturbances in Parliament were delaying rather than forwarding Spain's aims in England, even though they might prevent Charles' being granted money. His irritation might in turn drive him into the arms of Louis and be vented on Spain.

Weaker powers play safe and the Spanish realised their position to that extent. But behind it, there always was their fundamental attitude to royalty. Don Pedro expressed it this way to Manuel de Lira:-

"Although I wish to see the King in this new position (i.e.

(i.e. with commissioners controlling the Treasurer) so that his authority does us no harm, I do not want to see the royal dignity diminished so greatly. For, in addition to the most essential prerogatives they (the Parliament) now begin to take to themselves judgement and command of his revenues, which is to approach very close to that evil intent in which this Kingdom finds itself, of finishing with the Monarchy and becoming a republic."(1)

Practically everyone writing of the Parliament sessions of 1675 has spoken of Spanish activity during them to keep Charles penniless; but very few, if any, have mentioned the parallel negotiations of Don Pedro Ronquillo to win Charles' co-operation by attraction rather than force. For during all these months, Don Pedro had been as constant an attender at the Court as on the Parliament.

amicable With the King's ministers and courtiers, the Spaniard avoided all controversy and cultivated amiable relations (See Appendix) though he soon discovered his friends. That summer, Sir William Temple had returned from the Continent and Don Pedro was not long in forgathering with this chief official proponent of Anglo-Spanish co-operation. By the 9th of July they had had a long meeting"in which everything was discussed", and Sir William had spoken very much in favour of Spanish interests. Ronquillo was favourably

(1) 22nd Nov, 1675: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

impressed;(see Appendix) De Lira agreed with this view, feeling that if Temple had credit in the Court, he "would not be useless" to Spain. However, the ambassador at the Hague also thought that his having goodwill towards her would necessarily make his role small in the English official scene as it then was.(1) But already by the time of Don Pedro's next letter to the Hague, Sir William Temple had mentioned a possible alliance between England and Spain.(2)

As one of the Treasurer's supporters, Temple first told Ronquillo that Danby realised Spanish friendship was essential to England's preservation. Then, after speaking of the domestic financial position, he urged Don Pedro to speak to Danby in favour of Charles' declaring himself for a good peace and a defensive-offensive league with Spain and Holland. Sir William suggested that in exchange, the two powers should pay over five years the immense debt, for which the Treasurer could be executed. How much better, he went on - rather pointedly perhaps - for both powers to spend money in England that way than as they were doing. Ronquillo replied that he would be going to Windsor and agreed, generally, that it would be well to have such an alliance to wipe out the roots of discord in Europe and especially in America. (Temple knew, he says, that he was referring to Jamaica on this last point). This apparent sincerity and amiability of the envoy was really a

(1) 16th July: De Lira to Ronquillo: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(2) 19th July: Ronquillo to De Lira: ibid.

cloak for ignorance of what to say or do.[1] He still felt that the only way of winning Charles over was through Parliamentary pressure; but the door had not been closed on further discussion, and the leaven of the idea was at work in Don Pedro's thought.

By the middle of August, the various thoughts of Ronquillo on such a league had crystallised somewhat and they are expressed in a most important despatch to his great friend in Holland.[2]

Speaking first of the league between Spain, Holland and England, mentioned hitherto by Sir William Temple, Don Pedro said he would advocate making it for war and the payment to England of 200-300,000 escudos per annum, but felt such an argument was improbable. Otherwise, he would not counsel it for he felt the English position was too uncertain, and that Parliament, though it might co-operate with Charles at first, was perfectly capable of repeating its abandonment of the King, as in the recent Dutch war. What Ronquillo did advise was; that while Charles should be kept poor through parliamentary refusal to provide, any harm from his bad will should be forestalled by "a small secret gift" from Spain. "The rogue would rather have but 20,000 doubloons (?) without his prostitutes or the Treasurer knowing it, than so many millions more which might enter the Treasury publicly". Thus, Spain would not have an untrustworthy ally; there would be no need to spend on Parliament or ministers; and Charles would have been made a "King of Hearts".

(1) Writing of his lack of orders, Don Pedro said: We do not have any news of anything." (same despatch).

(2) 18th Aug, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

Don Pedro also felt that the rest of the Court, the Duke of York included, would have to fall in line with the arrangement, once it was made. Incidentally, he advocated the payment being dispensed doubloon by doubloon - that is to say, Charles should be kept on a string. "Until to-day, I had not thought of this for handling England" Ronquillo continued; and then asked for Don Lira's opinion of the plan, as the only other one to know of it.

Quickly an enthusiastic reply arrived from the Hague: "If you have not written of this to Spain, you are a traitor"; if the Spanish Government were wise, they would do this; but De Lira feared there was no money for it.(1)

Each day, the originator of the plan grew keener on it (2) and he was not long in passing his opinion on to the Consejo de Estado in Madrid and had begun to take the Duque de Villahermosa into his confidence. He also had developed some idea of a "pequeño concierto" (small agreement) with Charles to cover the period from then until the conclusion of the peace.(3) The plan expanded became: that if Parliament should not grant Charles supply that autumn, "a most important minister" should take the opportunity of getting the King to make a treaty with Spain; and that some agreement to last until the close of the approaching peace conference, be concluded then, while orders were coming for Spain or an English embassador was sent there for the negotiation.

(1) 23rd. Aug., 1675; De Lira to Ronquillo; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) 3rd. Sept; ibid.
(3) 24th. Sept; ibid.

Conditions envisaged were as follows:-

1) Absolute prohibition of military or naval aid from the three British kingdoms to France and her allies.

2) Charles to support Spain at the Congress until the terms of the Peace of the Pyrenees had been obtained; and that aims communicated to him to this end be fulfilled.

3) Close alliance later between Charles, both branches of the House of Austria and Holland.

4) Subsidies - and this was the essential point, Don Pedro recognised - would have to be paid the English King until the conclusion of the Congress, as well as pensions to the two English ministers handling the matter.(1)

Nor were these suggestions of possibilities the only ones available, nor did they all come from one source. While realising that the generally anti-Spanish and less powerful Arlington clique, could be ejected from royal councils, Don Pedro had followed his policy of good relations with all, and had refused to declare himself solely for Danby, despite Temple's urging(2) and we know that feelers for an Anglo-Spanish league were also reaching him from them that October. At the court, Ronquillo had been in touch with one, Robert Hobart, who following his pro-Spanish inclinations as well as his private interests, had sought out the envoy's friendship. Hobart was now suggesting his obtaining a league with Spain from the/

(1) 21st. Oct. 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) 23rd. July, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.

/the King with the help of Arlington who was his friend. Arlington could point out to Charles how the friendship with France harmed his financial position. Hobart's personal hopes lay in being chosen for an embassy to Spain to conclude a longer treaty later on. The advantages of this Plan, pointed out by Ronquillo in his despatch to Madrid, was that it would require no money and be a "great medecine" for Hobart and Arlington, with Arlington perhaps able to regain more of the royal favour. He also mentioned having written to De Lira and Villahermosa on the matter; and contact seems to have been kept up, for we hear of the proposal again later on.(1)

But, practically speaking, the avenue for any immediate agreement seems to have been the Treasurer's party. Yet, even there, things moved very slowly. Temple was away in Holland and Ronquillo felt there was no other English minister with whom to share his secret plans, though he had some hopes of ~~Leslie~~ Lesline Jenkins as a possibility.(2)

By the end of November, with the Commons in rebellion, Don Pedro wrote that what concerned the treaty neither advanced nor could be despaired of. Temple, he felt, was suitable for the business, but his hopes of Jenkins had lessened.(3)

As the year drew to a close, Spanish governmental opinions on his plans began to reach Don Pedro: the Duque de Villahermosa told him/

(1) 28th. Oct. (4); Ronquillo to Señors; Sim Estado (~~ilg~~ Ing.) 2551.
(2) 12th. Nov. 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye)488.
(3) 26th. Nov; ibid.

/him to do nothing as there was no money to do anything. This did not stop him however.(1)

While Ronquillo had spoken generally to Danby of an alliance, he had mentioned no express conditions. The Treasurer appeared to him not to be pro-french and to believe that friendship with Spain was the only way of escape from the impasse affairs had reached. However Danby knew Charles' nature, Don Pedro continued and feared it would be his ruin to declare himself. Therefore Don Pedro urged De Lira to get Temple in his letters to Danby to insinuate something of the plan, though not the secret itself, for he feared its leaking out to spoil Spanish opportunities at the Congress. This, the envoy at the Hague refused to do, saying that it would be impossible to keep the plan of a Spanish-British agreement half revealed.(2)

At this time, yet another parallel negotiation was current, for Van Beuningen and Ronquillo as well, were trying to get the King of England to agree to backing "a good peace" at a price. The Dutchman was optimistic and Don Pedro, though he felt Van Beuningen was for giving rather a high price, co-operated by letting him go forward, while keeping him in sight.(3)

In the early days of January, 1676, Ronquillo at last divulged his secret to Danby, largely owing to a suitable opportunity arising. Don Pedro had, as we know, wanted to bestow the secret on the most suitable minister, and now he was anxious that it be given with time/

(1) 3rd. Dec; ibid.
(2) Same despatch as for above paragraph, also 13th. Dec; De Lira to Ronquillo.
(3) See 13th. Dec; De Lira to Ronquillo; ibid.
31st. Dec; Ronquillo to De Lira; ibid.

/time for discussion before he himself left London to represent Spain at Nimeguen.(see Appendix) This step De Lira approved.

Ronquillo's attitude was still that of keeping Charles poor so that he would do Spain no harm, but through gaining and feting him.(see Appendix) He was also convinced of Charles' poverty and that the efforts at reforming royal salaries and expenses would not even permit the King's subsistance and only make enemies of his erstwhile friends.(see Appendix) This was, for Don Pedro, but one more reason for Charles making a Spanish alliance. There were also rumours of coolness between James and France.(See appendix) In fact hopes for a Spanish-British league were by no means dead; and in Madrid one of Don Pedro's brothers had been working for the plan's acceptance as a basis for negotiation.(see Appendix)

Just then, at the beginning of 1676, the opinion of the Consejo de Estado on the suggestion reached London. His fiat was that nothing special be done to win over the Kind "not to make Parliament jealous". Perhaps also, any money spent that way would be wasted and Spain could not afford the loss.(See appendix) Ronquillo's letter to De Lira after receiving this, illuminates his attitude to the government at home:- " - - - - I have received a despatch commanding me to withdraw from attracting this King to our party when the Parliament is in session, so as not to make it jealous. See how well they understand everything! And on what better occasion than that of the Parliament can one treat with the King? In fine, all/

/all is governed by some of the same measures, and if God does not look out for us, we shall certainly commit suicide. May His Divine Majesty not permit this - - - - ".(1) De Lira, evidently urged Don Pedro not to allow this order to hinder him since there was no Parliament in session then.(2) Though nothing further seems to have been accomplished on this particular plan, Ronquillo apparently took his friend's advice, judging from what follows. Meanwhile he also held to his part policy, expressed them to his Master as follows:-

"It is not all one for our interests that the King should be kept in a bad intelligence with his vassals so they do not assist him with supply. For, by this, they can damage our interests with the introduction of a civil war into England; and the smaller the King's party, the more support from France he will require, and that power will avail herself of his need, to take a part on this river - - I try to bear myself in a total independance of the (domestic) affairs of the Kingdom and to preserve the good acceptance I find with his Britannic Majesty as well as all who oppose him."(3)

More than ever, Ronquillo was convinced that the end must be either "A perfect union of King and Kingdom with Spain or a civil war". He noted also that this view of things was taken by many in the government, but also those who had fallen from it or desired to enter it. They saw in a league with Spain a means of holding their position, establishing or re-establishing themselves.(4)

(1) 4th. Feb. 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) 18th. Feb; ibid.
(3) 17th. Feb; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (ing) 2552.
(4) 6th. Mar; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.

And so, Ronquillo continued to listen carefully to any proposions from the English King or his vassals on the subject. Nor was it long before he could again report a discussion on a possible league between the two countries - this time with the Earl of Bristol.(1)

So let us go with Don Pedro on a late February day to the Earl's house, two miles from London, whither he had been asked "con gran secreto".

The Earl naturally enough was the first to speak; and Don Pedro was somewhat conscious of his orders merely "to hear and report". Bristol said that what he was saying and doing then was with the assent of Danby, who was in touch with the Duke of York, and who, if there were not these embarrassments with France, would, without doubt, be "the most powerful favourite ever seen in any monarchy."(2) He went on to say that this meant an alliance between England and Spain was needed, though, time for its adjustment would also be required. All would be easy if the bonds between James and France could be broken for, if Charles saw Danby and his brother convinced, he would also come over to this point of view. But Spain in her turn must make the same offers as France had.

Ronquillo replied to this that he could do nothing definite. It was not good for either Spain or England to separate brothers or the King and Parliament; and besides, he could not discuss terms, since he did not know those of the French treaties.

(1) 2nd Mar; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye)488.

(1) 2nd Mar.(4) Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado(Ing)2552.

(2) Ronquillo felt this last statement was true.

Of course, Bristol did not know these either, but he continued by admitting the necessity of unity between King and Parliament for Liberty of Conscience and the abandoning of France, if internal affairs were to be settled. The Earl concluded the talk by saying that this was not a conference or a proposition but a resolution taken with the Treasurer.

Soon after this first discussion with Bristol, Don Pedro visited Danby from whom he did not find out much more.

The envoy again went to see the Earl, who said that if the business could be kept secret in Madrid, Don Pedro should inform Carlos II of the idea. He, Bristol, would try to win over York before the Peace, for, otherwise, there would be trouble in the Indies, at least those parts producing treasure. And, at this point, the Earl went to a desk and brought out a book in manuscript stolen from Morgan who had got it in Panama. It included maps of all the ports in Spanish America, but Bristol also said Morgan did not now have a copy(1). When the Earl said Ronquillo's departure was a complication should negotiations be started, Don Pedro suggested his writing to him in cipher at Nimeguen, until assured of the Marquis de la Fuente, his appointed successor. With that, the second conference, which had lasted six hours, came to an end.

But this was not all. The night before the lengthy despatch of March 2nd was sent off with its news of the interviews with Bristol,

(1) Referred to in letter of Ronquillo to Don Juan, 21st June 1677; included in Navarro I, f.190.

Robert Hobart had called at the Spanish Embassy to tell Don Pedro that hopes for Spain with regard to Arlington were higher.

In concluding the despatch Ronquillo once again reiterated the popularity of such a league among the English ministries and his throne of alliance with Spain or revolution in England. Time would be needed for its conclusion, for a Parliament would be required (apparently to force the alliance or give it full effect); and if the King held to his decision on the length of the prorrogation, there was still much of this to run. Don Pedro recommended Spain getting in touch with the Emperor and Holland about such an important matter. Finally, he reaffirmed there was "no Prince who could injure France so profoundly as the King of England, especially in the field of commerce."

Let us now follow the despatch to the centre of Spain, to the Alcazar in Madrid, where the Consejo de Estado deliberated on it. Few "consultas" illustrate more clearly the muddled situation there - no less in the minds of the counsellors. As always, one is left with the feeling that foreign policy was not just one concern but one about which they thought little except when they had to. The opinions of the members were as follows. Both the Duke of Osuna and Marquis of de Astorga said it was best to keep England neutral; an alliance with her was not worth the excessive sums paid by Louis and the control of England would be more difficult for Spain than France. The Duke of

Alba felt it was a choice between such an alliance and the ones with the confederate powers, not both. So, as a body, the Council advised Don Pedro to do nothing but show good will to Bristol and Danby.(1)

At this time, an embarrassment arose with regard to such negotiations for the idea of convenient guarantees all round by Spain for the Congress, which were evidently still current, had leaked out. Ronquillo himself claimed Van Broeningen had divulged concerning subsidies for Charles, but the actual report seems to have originated in Vienna. Don Pedro of course denied its truth - and he told De Lira he was not lying in doing so, for he had not heard it was being discussed at the Imperial Court. But still he felt anxious, in that this was creating lack of confidence among the allies that Spain really wanted peace, and also a common lack of satisfaction with her(2).

With this we practically come to an end of what I have found on secret negotiations between Ronquillo and Court circles in England towards a closer rapprochement with Spain. (See Appendix).

(1) Consulta to letter of Ronquillo to Señor, 2nd March(4), 1676; Sim:Estado(Eng) 2552.

(2) 20th March 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488. also 24th March; ibid.

3. Working towards the approaching Congress of Nimeguen

The principal business of those months of 1675 and early 1676, apart from the Parliament session and Don Pedro's secret dealings with the Court, continued to be that concerning the Mediation of Charles II at the coming Congress of Nimeguen. Mutual suspicion had been paralysing or delaying action on all sides. As the autumn had advanced, Charles had become so dissatisfied with Spain's half-accepting but non-committal attitude to his proposals that he was refusing to discuss the matter with Don Pedro, saying that his Catholic Majesty had not definitely accepted his offer.(1) Even after acceptance was definite, Spanish delay in ordering its representatives to Nimeguen continued to irritate the English King.

Eventually Spain saw that there was no other choice, and that delay would only cause her to lose more rather than gain from future events. A great number of her people wished an immediate peace, and this was particularly true in The Low Countries, which had borne the greater brunt of the War and seen the fruitlessness of a struggle without support from the Peninsula. And practically everyone there from the Governor, the Duque de Villahermosa down, desired it as fast as possible.(2) In London, Don Pedro's attitude - not always understood, then or now - was that though he knew what he would have counselled, had things been otherwise, his country required peace then, and no temporary success or other circumstance (as for example Turenne's death) could blind him to that.(3)

(1) 11th Nov. 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim.Estado(Ing)2551.
(2) 26th Oct/5th Nov. Bulstrode to Home Government; P.R.O. S.P. 77/46.
(3) See despatches of November between Ronquillo and De Lira A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

From the Hague, De Lira also warned that Spain must not refuse the mediation offer frivolously.(1) The other two professed mediations were hopeless, largely through lack of support from other powers. Venice, like Charles, was suspected of being francophile as well and the House of Austria had been irritated by the molestation of German troops passing through her territory en route for Italy. Don Pedro and others might respect any proposal coming from the Holy See but they could not see its suitability, though it was to linger on, as an offer, for many months.(2) According to the Venetian Resident in London, it had made the whole English Court laugh;(3) and it must have been then that "the rascal Arlington" said the words which Don Pedro says he remembered whenever Papal offers were mentioned in future:- "You procure the mediation of the Pope and you do well, because he will be able to help you recover Messina with his five galleys, very well provided with a mob of friars and clerics, apostates and hypocrites."(4) The Catholic King still did not wish to flatly refuse such an offer but practical politics demanded a stronger mediator and one acceptable to more powers.

By the autumn at least, Don Pedro Ronquillo knew he had been chosen as Spain's second of three representatives being sent to the Congress at Nimeguen(5); but the Consejo de Estado did not issue the "plein pouvoir" until December 3rd(6), and orders for his despatch were delayed.

(1) ibid. cap. De Lira to Ronquillo; 19th Nov.
(2) 24th September 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; ibid.
(3) Cat. of State Papers (Venice);465, also 453 for Venetian mediation.
(4) Nimeguen 29th Dec,1676; Ronquillo to De Lira:A.G.R.(Haye)145.
(5) 29th Oct, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(6) Copy in B.M. Harleian 1518, f.206-21.

The decision, once reached, on the mediation, Don Pedro urged that every effort be made to get Charles' co-operation and he himself did all he could to smooth the path to the Congress, sometimes with the disapproval of his own government. This was so in the Prince of Furstenburg affair(see Appendix). He also concerned himself in the matter of Louis'/S high-handedness over the Duke of Lorraine's going to Nimeguen(1). Then there were the infinite difficulties arising over Spanish passports for the delegates passing to the Dutch town(2).

It was being rumoured in London that Ronquillo, by his delay, was trying in fact to delay the Congress meeting. One thing is certain that he did not want it to meet without a Spanish representative being present. As long as he (the available envoy) could not be at Nimeguen, he would not urge on the other countries representatives.(3) However, by his letters, we know he was pressing forward the Congress and striving to effect his departure. Early in 1676 his orders arrived with an adequate plein-pouvoir(see Appendix) but lack of funds with which to pay his debts was what delayed him most. Practically no financial help came from Spain, and the Duque de Villahermosa, though ordered to aid him, had not enough for his own needs,(4) and he was writing to De Lira that he hoped to enter "Brusselles (en route for Nimeguen) before the year - ".(5)

The rumour was dispelled at last by Don Pedro's suddenly departing for the Low Countries early in July (after an arrangement

(1) 25th Feb, 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(2) See for details:- letters esp. in Sim.Estado(Ing) 2551 and 2552; also Cal. of State Papers (Venice).
(3) 21st Oct, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(4) See Baron De Vique's letters in P.R.O. S.P. 77/48.
(5) 21st April 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye), 488.

with English money-lenders). Then they only said he was going to the Congress to cut the best figure he could before the other Spanish envoys arrived.(1) Others said - knowing some of the personal squabbles surrounding his appointment - that it was to forestall the moves of his enemies (see Appendix) Though personal ambitions may have entered in, Ronquillo's chief desire was, I think, to see that Spain had at least one representative at a Congress he considered more and more to be a necessity.

(1) Cal. of State Papers (Venice), p.484.

4. More Important Subordinate Negotiations.

Some mention should also be made concerning the subordinate negotiations in Ronquillo's hands during those last months of his first stay in England. They all reflect his general desire to placate Charles while remaining alert. The King might jokingly say he would not mind having been appointed one of the Spanish plenipotentiaries to the Congress;(1) and Don Pedro was open to admitting some substance for really believing him and doubting the King's pro-French tendencies; but day-to-day experience was by no means confirming Charles' complete impartiality.

There being no Parliament now, the business outstanding of France levying troops in Great Britain passed to the Court. At the close of 1675 or beginning of 1676, Ronquillo and Van Beeningen repeated complaints on this; and Charles promised Don Pedro they would be reduced to an insignificant number. Later on, the Dutch were not keen to press the request forward, fearing the reduction would also be extended to the many English troops serving in Holland. The Spaniard did not wish to go against their wishes and desisted also. At the same time, he was engaged in smoothing out Spanish levying of troops in the British Isles. It was a delicate situation therefore, and little more was accomplished before he left.(2)

A negotiation of the same type was that regarding ships and crews for Sweden from England and vice versa. Rumours were abundant/

(1) 7th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Inglatera) 2552

(2) 6th. Jan.(1) 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552

/abundant of Charles surrepticiously aiding his northern ally, who was also Louis, and in November, Ronquillo, keen to stop such a possibility, was sending down an observer to Chatham.(1) In this effort, Don Pedro was joined by the Dutch and Danish envoys. It was in May, 1676, that the matter came to a head. After an unimportant incident at Plymouth touching Swedish ships, Charles had made a decree that no British subject take patents of nor serve at sea any Prince or State at war with a friend or ally of His Britannic Majesty. This was not made particularly to France and Sweden, but to all, according to Don Pedro, so it would not have to be kept secret. He also says he had worked to make it as wide as possible, and that Spain's views were understood by the King. However, enforcement, he saw, fully depended on watchfulness in the future. An opportunity for specific application arose before he left. Several vessels with English crews were in the Thames, preparing to sail for Sweden; and the Danish and Dutch envoys, finding themselves unable to prevent their departure, got the also departing Ronquillo to stay his going to try and influence Charles. After some difficulties the ships were stopped and Ronquillo left. An interesting postscript is that the crews, now out of work, offered their services to Spain through Fonseca who stayed on in London.(2)

In April, 1676, disturbing reports reached Ronquillo from Ratisbon concerning the actions of Bevill Skelton, English representative there.

(1) 14th. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señora; ibid.
(2)a. 17th. May, 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
b. 25th. May (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552.
c. 3rd. Aug. Fonseca to Colona; ibid.

These, as well as those of other English envoys in Germany had roused Spanish suspicions and had caused the Marqués de los Balbases to write to his friend in London about them. Don Pedro immediately submitted a memoir on the matter to the authorities. He himself felt Charles' envoy had at least not been avoiding "the appearance of evil". At any rate, at the juncture of events then, Don Pedro thought it best just to accept the English explanations and not stimulate any lack of confidence in Charles that could be worked on by the friends of France.(1)

5. The Religious Aspect.

While the religious aspect of Don Pedro Ronquillo's missions in England is never primary, it nearly always sheds an interesting light on what was happening, and even more, on what people were thinking. For though Don Pedro's primary aim, as a practical politician, was not in the actual field of religion, this does not impugn his devotion, even ardent, Catholicism.

The aim of Spain in England in matters of religion was to protect the faithful remnant of Roman Catholics and to work for their peace and increase in so far as this did not stir up general opposition. Focus for such activity was the Spanish Embassy Chapel, the"Real Capilla de Londres" as it was called officially. In a letter shortly after his arrival, Don Pedro tells of his renewing its services which had lapsed with the departure of the Marqués Del Fresno/

(1) a. See enclosures in 13th. April (3); ibid.
also b. 10th. April; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.H.N. (Hayo) 488.
c. Memoirs of 6th. April; P.R.O. S.P. 94/63, also
Bodleian Mss. Rawl. A. 352, f.121.

/Frisno, and refers to it as "The only consolation of these few Catholics".(1) Ruvigny, being a Protestant, did not maintain the French Embassy Chapel, and the Portugese Ambassador had only three chaplains. "All come to my house", Ronquillo went on, and he asked money to keep up the chapel and its ten priests,"a small number for this important organisation."

It was a relatively peaceful time for the English Catholics, certainly in comparison of what had gone before and what was to follow. Sarotti, the Venetian Resident, writing of Ronquillo's re-opening of the Spanish Chapel, said not only how by doing so, Don Pedro had acquired "great credit and affection" with the faithful, but how the move had not affected the Catholic King's interest adversely in the spring session of Parliament. "There is no bad feeling among the generality of the nobility, nor of the people."(2) Nor did Don Pedro himself expect trouble over religion in the autumn session of 1675. However one case - "a devil of a happening" - did arise to disturb his other more important activities.

A Jesuit priest, St. Germain by name, had evidently attempted the forced reconversion of a convert to Protestantism, a M. de Luzancy, and the case was before the Lower House. In some of the statements on the business, Ronquillo was mentioned though not implicated, and the Ambassador feared, not only the effect on the Catholics, but lest the clamour roused in the Commons should alter "the reasonable state"/

(1) 15th. June, 1675; Ronquillo to Coloma; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551.

(2) Cal. of State Papers (Venice) 418

/state" in which the Spanish found themselves there. There was also the added danger of the French taking advantage of the opportunity. Don Pedro advocated to the M.Ps. the Jesuit's being punished should he be found guilty but that such an incident was no reason for the main body of Catholics who lived law-abidingly, suffering as a result. He also got in touch with his friends in Parliament and they proposed a law that no Catholic might serve in either House, on which the anger roused by the De Luzancy case might safely feast. Indeed, such a law would have had practically no effect, for the right of Catholic Lords to seats in the Upper House was inalienable, and the Commons itself had no Catholic members. Of this proposed bill, Ronquillo also wrote: "It is true that some measures in political interests have been turned aside for me by this, but Your Majesty will hold it good that I have placed those of the Catholic religion before all." In time the Consejo de Estado replied advising Don Pedro to keep to his orders and be very attentive that Catholic priests be prudent and not create suspicion.(1)

The envoy himself had a long-held dislike also of those Catholics who, while knowing little of politics, mixed in them with the prejudices of their over-sensitive consciences; and this extended even to those who were not definitely pro-French. In particular, he did not spare the Jesuits and Theatines.(2) Of the former, many of whom were pro-French, he wrote: "They regard the good of the Catholic/

(1) 25th. Nov.(2) 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552.

(2) The two orders were after confused, so Don Pedro may only be referring to the Jesuits.

"Catholic religion in a temporal light."(1) A fortnight before the Parliament he had told De Lira: "What I would like is for not a Theatinf to remain to me here during the time of Parliament, that God may exalt our sacred religion. The blessed Fathers make a scruple of co-operating with the non-conformists as presumptuous Calvinists - - - and do not make it with the Protestants (i.e. Anglicans) as if the devil was not going to carry both off the same way." The Non-Confirmists, in contradistinction to the Anglicans, were those who most wished liberty of conscience, which was, said Don Pedro, definitely in Spain's interests, and those of the average English Catholic.(2)

In the spring of 1676, Charles, after his brother's open avowal of Catholicism, reaffirmed at least for the sake of policy, his own Anglicanism at the expense of the Calvinists. He had made his nieces take the oath of allegiance and be confirmed in his chapel and was supporting the Test Act's enforcement. Ronquillo, though he did not meddle in these affairs, had his opinions of course. Personally, he wished liberty of conscience; but in the circumstances, he felt Charles must show his authority, though he also hoped without rousing a civil war in doing so. Meanwhile he, Don Pedro, would continue watchful for the case of the Catholics, for, he saw, the Presbyterians "and other fanatics" would not protect them if trouble arose. But the Catholics were also to blame for their difficulties: "They govern themselves so badly and in particular the Jesuits who, by the support/

(1) 29th. Oct; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) 15th. Oct; ibid.

/support they give to French interests, make themselves increasingly hated throughout the whole kingdom."(1)

A word should be said about Spanish relations with and opinions of the focal personality of English Catholicism, the Duke of York. Don Pedro's view of James did not change greatly from that gathered at their first meeting. (See Profit) Though their religion might be a common bond, it was still a weak one as long as James was pro-French. Of the Duke's open declaration of his faith, Ronquillo felt that if he was acting from conscience, Spain might expect good from the action for the Catholics. However the envoy had long known James'/ largely Catholic and Jesuit servants to be "the simplest and most ignorant in the Kingdom" and extremely francophile as well.(2) They and the French flattered James'/ vanity and his strength with the result he thought of working "with sword in hand". And having encountered James'/ stubbornness, Ronquillo did not know whether in his "obstinate head" he would listen to the idea of Spanish friendship.(3) Yet the Duke of York's sincere devotion to the Catholic religion always awoke some response in Don Pedro and other Spaniards, who felt he might yet be a great instrument in restoring England to the Roman fold.

But one thing was certain then, that religion though ever present in the Spanish thought of the time, took second place in the practical decisions of most Spanish politicians.

(1) Feb. 7th. 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
Feb. 14th. 1676; ibid.
Mar. 13th. 1676 (quotation); ibid.
(2) 29th. Oct. 1675; ibid.
(3) 14th. April, 1676; ibid. "cerradas sienes".

6. The Commercial Aspect.

Undoubtedly Spain's policy in commercial and maritime matters was mainly to avoid anything which might disturb her plans of "gran politica". This, translated into practice, was a constant effort to settle all complaints involving trade, etc. For this the existing standard naturally held to, was the real enforcement of the Treaty of 1667, a greater control over her own subjects with the avoidance of taking reprisals. This is not to say there was not often a considerable gap between intention and performance. Nor was this a weak-kneed policy, for though Spain was certainly weak, she was striving to hold her ground and recover what had already been lost.

It has already been seen how, even before reaching his post, Don Pedro had been co-operating with English officials in Brussells over the Ostend Corsairs problem (see p. 38). Trouble over these useful but unruly naval defenders of Spanish coasts dragged on. In August, 1675, Secretary Coventry presented a memorial to Ronquillo concerning complaints about them from the commercial classes and based on the Treaty of 1667 and also the Edict of Commerce and Navigation of Flanders of 1624 (see Appendix). The envoy decided on a piecemeal attack of the main differences, concentrating at first on the right of English vessels to carry goods between French ports. His attitude to handling such a

negotiation is expressed here: "We must not attend in England in commerce to attaining more than satisfaction; but rightly enough we must not accede to anything without reason; for this regulates the opinions of the Lower House, instils fear into the King so he does not try anything against the (Spanish) Monarchy, and protects us with our trading interests."(1) Don Pedro expected complaints over this policy from the Province of Vizcaya in Spain, where there were also many corsairs, but he knew some sort of an arrangement was absolutely necessary. "Some wealthy merchants and good (i.e. Hispanophile) Englishmen had visited him asking anxiously that the matter be settled immediately to avoid any complaint arising in the approaching autumn session of Parliament. He noted too the trading classes' practically universal feeling of good will toward Spain and was naturally keen not to disturb this, "these men not having any fixed point, except that which concerns their personal interests".(2) The matter was eventually settled and, according to Navarro, mostly owing to Don Pedro's efforts and in this way Don Pedro had brought one of the principal corsair captains to London to treat, and in a few weeks an arrangement was reached. However, in those few weeks a deadlock had arisen and the envoy, wishing a settlement, but not wanting the Ostenders to give up what was their right, had taken on himself to pay at great cost to his own

(1) Letter of 2nd Sept.

(2) 16th Sept(2) 1675; ibid.

purse some sums that helped lead to the eventual settlement.(1) At the same time, Don Pedro was occupied with other complaints concerning corsairs from Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, Mallorca and Italy.

Turning to the problem of piracy proper, Ronquillo was particularly anxious about the situation in the Indies, whither a knighted Henry Morgan ("a demon" to Don Pedro) had recently returned with the Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica. All that summer of 1675, he feared letters of reprisal would be granted in that island for real, fancied or invented depredations by Spaniards.(2) Above all, he did not want a "rumpus" (sarracina) to arise in Parliament as a result of all these complaints, as it looked very much like there would be.(see Appendix) The day before it started, Charles issued a proclamation against one Fitzgerald whom the English classed as a pirate. But Navarro, in one of his few notes, adds this: "Geraldini (Fitzgerald) was an Irishman that performed many services for Spain and did great damage to the English in the Indies, being very resolute and skilful in navigation. During my time in London, I knew a sister of his to whom the Spanish ministers in London, by express order of His (Catholic) Majesty gave a pension in order that she could subsist."(3)

As it turned out, the autumn session was not seriously disturbed by trouble over commercial and maritime affairs, but this shows too that Spain's views of who were pirates and who were not, did not always coincide with those of England.

(1) Navarro, I, f.103.
(2) 30th July; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(3) ibid.

We come therefore to the hard core of Spanish policy. Already we have seen signs of this in Don Pedro's advocating his country's trying to gain advantages in America through any general treaty of peace or alliance with England. He constantly complained of the sacking of Spanish cities in the Indies by Englishmen and consistently recommended to Madrid the colonies being ready for possible attack.(1) The English, on the other hand, of the said punishment would not let the evil doers settle down and would only drive them into serving the French. And Don Pedro always suspected any promises they made of punishing those English pirates who carried French patents.(2) Ronquillo also kept up a correspondence with the Governor of Jamaica's secretary, who kept him informed of the pirate position there. Basing his opinion on these letters, he advised Spain's capturing the English pirates base at Tortĕga as the complete solution;(3) but, on the other hand, he closed his despatch: "I must say to Your Majesty that it is unbelievable the harm these repeated complaints from all over do me in Parliament."

One more incident will serve to illustrate the relationship between commercial affairs and Spain's other interests in England. A vessel en route from Oporto to La Rochelle, belonging to Sir Patience Ward, then an alderman and later the Mayor of London, was pressed by a Spanish ship, the "Conapción" of

(1) 17th July, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
22nd July, Ronquillo to Señora: Sim. Estado(Ing) 2551.
(2) 16th Sept (1) Ronquillo to Señora; Enclosures; ibid.
(3) 14th Nov.(1); ibid.

Fuenterrabia, and the captured goods were sold in San Sebastian. Sir Patience happened to be one of the leaders of the pro-Spanish party in "the city", who had championed complaints against the French corsairs. Don Pedro felt the attack had no justification anyway as the vessel had been going from a neutral to a French port and not between two French ones, and he wrote to Madrid advising early adjustment. Not only that, just before he left England, he persuaded Ward not to complain to Charles and promised that full compensation would be given. As usual, Don Pedro's despatches were forwarded to the Junta de Guerra, where they languished unfruitfully. Eventually Charles II did forward a complaint to Spain on Ward's behalf. But on Ronquillo's part, at least, a real effort had been made to settle affairs fairly (see Appendix).

Spain in England was ready to husband any opposition to French commerce there, which was in fact strong at this time. The rise in French customs charges had long annoyed English traders (and there was a rumour the 'city' might petition against this to the Parliament); they were also alarmed at the expansion of the French merchant marine. Just after his arrival, Don Pedro was pleased to hear of three French ships having refused to lower the flag to a British man-of-war, and their opening fire in sight of Portsmouth; for he hoped such an incident would make people feel the danger of French commerce, especially in Flanders (see Appendix)

In August, the silk weavers, alarmed at French competition, rioted in London and presented a memorial to the King, asking the exclusion of French goods but Don Pedro wished this had occurred at the time of the Parliament.(1) In neither session of the Houses, however, was he able to obtain a declaration against French trade and ships, due to Parliament's dissensions and other business. Any possible favouring of France and Sweden was not allowed to pass unnoticed. For example, Spain could not permit three English ships near the Duke of Vivonne's fleet in a position where they could give it aid. England and her King were always interested in the Mediterranean trade and the Italian peninsula, and preferred it being controlled by a weak power (Spain) rather than a strong one (France). This was a parallel, if less intense feeling, to the one towards the Low Countries, but the Spanish played on it and it, in turn, helped them. This time, Charles made a proclamation and eventually he ordered the English Consuls in Cadiz, Italy and Marseilles not to allow British vessels bound for Sicily to carry aid to Messina. These instructions he issued despite French efforts to prevent it(see Appendix).

The general nature of the situation, maritime and commercial, between the two countries at the end of Ronquillo's first embassy is seen when Charles issued his declaration against French corsairs. This was made a "happening of consideration",

(1) 23rd Aug, 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.

when he refused to issue a similar one at the same time against the Spanish; and the newly-arrived French minister, Courtin, was, according to Don Pedro, rather discomfited by the event.(see Appendix) Ronquillo was trying to hold the ground won over the Ostend Corsairs and he reiterated to the home government the need for Flemish and Biscay authorities keeping the treaties. Coupled, however, with the royal declaration on the Swedish ships (see p.80) we can say that Spanish-British relations from the commercial aspect were hopeful and improving.

In all this work, Don Pedro felt himself handicapped by lack of assistants and saw the need for more consuls. England was a vital listening post for information on pirates and on other maritime movements, in particular those of France. In the Treaty of 1667 the British had only allowed one Spanish Consul in London while they themselves had many in Spain.

Ronquillo desired these aides, firstly, to protect trade interests, and secondly, to obtain news of shipping movements. These would also increase the speed and accuracy of his reports and complaints, and their lack had been particularly noticeable in the question of the Swedish ships at Plymouth. He would have liked twelve in Britain - at three or four English ports and also in Scotland and Ireland - and one in Jamaica. To avoid expense, he suggested that men should be got who would serve without salary for the honour of the post. Nothing came

of this, but it shows that the Spanish Embassy was looking forward to wider activities and to availing itself of greater opportunities in this field.(1)

(1) Re Consuls:
19th August (2) 1675; Ronquillo to Señora: Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551.
16th August; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.

7. The Personal Aspects; and Summary

That is ostensiblythe story of Don Pedro Ronquillo's first embassy in London, but the mere chronology and analysis of political, religious and commercial events do not complete the picture. The work of a diplomat includes many activities that do not fit into these confines; an understanding of the embassy machine and, not least of all, the personal position of the representative are also needed to give us a balanced idea of Don Pedro and the problems he confronted.

Two examples will suffice to show the breadth of Ronquillo's work. It was he who had to forward for the Lord Mayor of London to the Consijo de Estado, a letter that had come originally from an illegitimate son of Philip IV then in straitened circumstances in the Far East.(1) The other example was in what might be called cultural relations; the Duque de Arcos y Aveiro, whose Dutchess was a Lancaster, hence of Charles II's kindred, sent seven horses to the King and Ronquillo had to hand them over.(2)

To keep an embassy which would not disgrace his country's name was important toDon Pedro, though due to lack of funds, it proved to be a long and losing struggle to save his country's face. The house,of which our envoy rented but a part for his embassy, was called Wild House, on the present site of Little Wild Street, near Lincolns Inn Fields. His successor -

(1) 22nd July 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim.Estado(Ing)2551; see also Duquesa de Berwick y de Alba: 502.
(2) Hispania Illustrata: 240-1.

- predecessors while he was at Nimeguen did, in fact, grumble at the house's size, but we gather it had its advantages. A chapel had been specially built by the owner and the garden was, apparently, not only pleasant but useful for religious festivals, whereby Protestant sensibilities were unoffended. Accommodation for extra staff, like chaplains, was available in a house next door. Well-equipped with offices, stables, kitchen, cellars, what is described as a "patio", two secret stairs, etc., there seems some reason for the Consejo de Estado believing "no house was more suitable."(1) In those months, no doubt, Don Pedro began the new chapel's decoration in which he always took such an interest; and started to arrange his "famous library".

Don Pedro's large "familia" or household numbered fifty to sixty. Its chief member after himself was his "relative" or natural son, Pedro Francisco, now a boy of sixteen or seventeen, who evidently helped his father even at this time (see Appendix) Don Francisco Antonio Navarro, the faithful secretary to Ronquillo and Secretary of the Embassy, has already been mentioned. There was also the "caballerizo mayor", Don Pedro Alben; two friend-companions of Ronquillo, notably Don Francisco Pavon, and a Language secretary. These completed the principal members of the household. Below stairs, individuals and couples maintained the establishment - servants, cooks, grooms for Don Pedro's Spanish horses.

(1) See contract of rental in Accounts 1688-84.
Sim. Estado(Ingl) 3972.

It must have been a veritable Babel, for it included not only Spanish and English, but Flemish, French, Poles and Germans, the latter being especially commended by Navarro. (see Appendix) All these seem, despite lack of pay and other troubles, in the long run to have served faithfully. Above stairs there was also good fellowship among that little group of men. In one despatch of October, when storms were delaying letters from across the Channel, we get a glimpse of Don Pedro Albes complaining of this by the fire; while the winds obliged Don Pedro himself to warm fomentations on his "feeble body".(1) And how these good Spaniards disliked our filthy winter climate !

Much went on for this personnel within the embassy. Apart from routine writing of despatches, etc., there was receiving and entertainment: traders with complaints or coming to be 'courted' or pacified; spies with reports or plans for future work; foreign ambassadors for discussions with Don Pedro; M.Ps coming to dinner or to give information; Spanish notables en route between the Peninsula and the Low Countries. All this - especially the English habit of expecting invitations to dinner - was expensive.

Of course, there were unofficial officials of the embassy - the confidants (and we have already heard of these in Parliament). But often being "without a real" for this purpose(2) Don Pedro was

(1) 4th Oct., 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(2) "sin un real para dar a un espia" 23rd July, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: ibid.

unable to employ many good spies. We have also seen his efforts to rectify his channels of information by increasing the number of Consuls. He apparently had informants in France(1). In the realm of underground arrangements against France organised from England might be classed Don Pedro's talks with a certain Ronfars who was offering to conduct an expedition against Have de Grace. Ronquillo first dismissed the man but later gave him £400 on his being recommended by the Duque de Villahemosa(2). Four hundred pounds is not much but it does not seem to indicate as great an actual lack of funds as some of the letters to Madrid might make one think.

Yet Don Pedro's position was not assured nor entirely satisfactory to him at this time. Even before reaching Brussels en route for London, he had been telling the Consejo his dissatisfaction at only being named "envoy extraordinary" - how it would restrict his usefulness in England and how unworthy it was of a member of the Councils of the Indies and Castile(3). That he was not granted higher status was one reason why, throughout that summer of 1675, he was seeking recall to Spain. But in addition to that, ill health was dogging his steps and he had definitely joined what he called "the brotherhood of the gouty"(4), and the climate of London did not seem to suit him from the start. Then there was his financial position, for he depended entirely on his salary,

(1) 3rd Sept, 1675; ibid.
(2) 25th Nov.(4) 1675; Ronquillo to Señora: Sim.Estado (Ing)2552.
(3) 28th Dec, 1674; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim. Estado(Ing) 2551.
(4) 12th June, 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.C.R.(Haye) 488.

unlike De Lira to whom he wrote: "I do not have a thing with which to clean my teeth".(1) His official position was temporary and uncertain; The Admiral of Castile(2) and others, perhaps, were depreciating the value of his work. Hence, unwilling to expose himself to judgment on his work in London, Don Pedro only petitioned recall and did not send a memoir to the Queen-Mother seeking more money or better status.(3) However, by the autumn De Lira seems to have persuaded him that their continued presence and co-operation in the North was necessary, (see Appendix) and by then, Ronquillo was appointed to the Congress at Nimeguen. In December, the Marqués de la Fuente (soon to be the Duque de Benazuza) was appointed as "Embajador ordinario" to London.(4) Yet, despite his difficulties and any depreciations of his work, Don Pedro Ronquillo's conduct in Spanish-British relations was by no means discreditable, and there was no mark of any consequence against him. The Parliament had not granted money to the King, which may have been partially due to his work, while relations with Charles and his ministers were closer, clearer - somewhat better. Various possibilities were open for the future, and anti-French tendencies in Britain had been strengthened. A more honest attempt at the solution of commercial disputes was also in evidence as the problems of corsairs, consuls, etc. were tackled, not irritated nor left to fester. Neither had any "fire of religion" been kindled to aggravate more

(1) 9th Aug, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye)488.
(2) Consulta of 15th Dec, 1675 (on letter of 4th Nov.(3); Sim.Estado (Ingl)2551.
(3) 9th August, Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.(Haye) 488.
(4) Consultas of 21st Nov, and 3rd Dec. Sim.Estado(Ingl)2551.

important matters or the position of the English Catholics. Navarro speaks several times of Don Pedro's good relations with the Court as well as the Parliament and of the reason for this success; "To cast the stone and hide the hand, only Don Pedro Ronquillo knew how to practice this in England"(1). For in fact Don Pedro had been gaining a greater discernment of the realities of the English situation - of the importance of the King as well as of the Kingdom, and that Spain's new role there was civil harmony rather than strife. Looking ahead he feared civil war above all; and was apprehensive lest his immediate successor (and interim representative until the Marqués de la Fuente arrived) Bernardo de Salinas, should be guided overmuch by the impetuous Fonseca(2). He knew too the desperateness of the Home Government in Spain and its reputation(3). And though Don Pedro went to Nimeguen, he did not completely turn his eyes from the English scene nor his hand from English business.

Before going on to the next section, what can we say of Ronquillo's impressions of the English - a question that is often asked about him. It is one that must be answered gradually for of all men, his views changed and developed. In his letters of 1675-6 more particularly, generalisations are few and cautiously made. But Don Pedro was already convinced of one great generalisation which he always held to, that the only

(1) Navarro I, f.101-102; 123 (quotation).
(2) Ronquillo in letter of Baron de Vèque; 9/19 July,1676;P.R.O. S.P. 77/43.
(3) See letters to Balbases (Alb.) and De Lira (A.G.R.).

fixed fact in England and its character was changeableness. And he also had noted "the superstition with which this people adore and observe their liberty."(1)

(1) 14th Jan. 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira: A.G.R.Archive de l'Ambassade d'Espagne à la Haye, 488.

THE INTERIM (1676 - 80)

I. Political. a) A short outline of the period.

Don Pedro Ronquillo's passage to Flanders was a stormy one, andhe was still shaken by his near drowning when he got to Brussels. (see Appendix). There he was faced more fully with the problems of the Nimeguen Congress: passports, lack of orders, the fact that the Marqués de las Balbases was going to arrive late and the ever-thorny question of precedence. But let us return to Spanish-British relations.

"The Interim" - - which this interval between Ronquillo's two missions as Spanish representative in England might be called for convenience - - was also to be a stormy passage, a disturbed period of negotiation, and of a disorientated embassy with an uncertain policy, maintained by conflicting and often inferior personalities. Yet it has interest in relation to what was going on at Nimeguen and as preparation for the Treaty of Windsor of 1680, which immediately followed it. In the field of commerce, the signs of co-operation become much more marked, while religious questions harassed Spanish-British relations.

A brief account of the various representatives of Spain in London during those four years will provide a skeleton on which to hang any further information and remarks that may be relevant. His Catholic Majesty's new appointee, the Marqués de Fuente, (soon Conde de Benasuse) was writing regularly from Venice that he had

neither horse nor coach wheel and that, if no money arrived, he himself would not reach London in a hundred years.(1) The Governor of the Low Countries was therefore delegated to appoint an interim representative, Bernardo de Salinas, who has been mentioned previously. He was made "Resident" in London by the Consejo de Estado, and reached London very soon after Don Pedro's departure.(2)

Money continued not to reach the Marqués de la Fuente, and in August, 1676, the Council ordered the Baron de Bergeyck to London as "envoy extraordinary", at the same time making him a Count. This was done partly out of respect to Charles but it inflamed the wrath of Salinas, who pointed out how the new Flemish Count did not even know Spanish and had not served anywhere with credit or approbation.(3) However, by the time Bergeyck was on the English scene, April, 1677, despite the friends of Salinas(4), the Resident and Fonseca, the Consul, had got themselves expelled by an irate Charles for their interference in English domestic affairs. The Count's indifference to this and his actions on general policy alarmed the Duque de Villahermosa, who promptly sent an envoy of his own on the scene, and Marqués de Burgomayne, later to spend so many years at the Imperial Court of Vienna. (see Appendix)

(1) 11th July, 1677: De la Fuente to Bartolomé de Legassa at Naples; Sim.Estado (Ingl) 2552.
(2) Consulta of 30th May, 1677; Sim.Estado(Ingl)3972 (Accounts); also letters of August on in Sim.Estado(Ingl)2552.
(3) 14th Sept (4); ibid. / (4) P.R.O. S.P.77/51. Letter of De Vique.

Soon the Consejo de Estado recalled Bergeyck and the Burgomayne, though not satisfactory to either they or the English authorities remained as "enviado extraordinario" (1). By September, 1677, the Marqués de la Fuente was actually in Flanders and eagerly awaited by the English ministers. However, there was a plan for an Anglo-Spanish alliance on hand, and Villahermosa, together with a party in the North, did not wish the negotiation to pass through any other Burgomayne's hands. Therefore, despite orders for the Marqués de la Fuente to proceed to London, from Carlos II and Don Juan (now beside the throne), the Governor delayed him by force. Madrid showed its displeasure but accepted the position and the Marques was sent to the Nimeguen Congress as "an honourable put off" to pacify him. There, in effect, if not the letter, he took Don Pedro Ronquillo's place, who in turn passed to other occupations in the Low Countries (see Appendix).

As regards London, the Consejo de Estado refused Burgomayne's request to be made ambassador, appointing to the post the rather mediocre contemporary scion of the House of Hoorn, the Count of Egmont (2). He arrived at the end of May, 1678, while Burgomayne was kept on as "enviado extraordinario" -- a position which only led to squabbling between the two. Their work did not seem particularly fruitful or hopeful and both were requesting recall;

(1) Danby, 191. Hispania Illustrata, 347.
(2) Sim.Estado (Ingl)2555.

moreover, the Council soon saw the folly of having the two representatives there.[1] Egmont was sent to Sardinia as Viceroy, while the Italian Marquis stayed on at last as ambassador. That was in the spring of 1679.[2] In July, Don Pedro Ronquillo was named to take Burgomayne's place in London, this time as 'embajador ordinario'.[3] Despite having been appointed to Vienna and his haste to get there, the Marqués remained in London almost until Don Pedro's arrival in June, 1680; for, by then, important negotiations were seriously under way for the actual conclusion of the long desired Spanish-British alliance.

It is largely a dismal picture of diplomatic mishandling and misplacement, reflecting the total anarchy of Carlos' majority and the rise and rule of Don Juan. To recount the whole story of these years would not be relevant and extremely wearisome. It will be sufficient to follow the main channel into which practically all streams were designed to flow — the attainment of the alliance.

(1) Sin.Estado (Ingl) 3956 - Letters of March, April esp.1679.
(2) A.G.R. (Hayo) 214.
(3) Letters of July, 1679; Sin.Estado(Ingl)2956.
21st July, 1679; Burgomayne to De Lira: A.G.R.(Hayo)493.

(b) General Policy.

Spain had no consistent policy for obtaining England's friendship and alliance, but the same general approaches to the question applied as during the period of Don Pedro Ronquillo's first embassy there. These might be likened to those used in pushing a door open. Some applying pressure at the bottom of the door (Parliament) hoped this might also push the top (the King) open, and so the whole door. Others felt pressing from the top (with the King) might be more successful. Yet others felt equal moderated pressure on allsections of English power would best attain the desired result. This might be better said to be a matter of emphasis, for none could really ignore either the King or the Parliament and, of course, all was affected by what was happening at Nimeguen and elsewhere on the Continent, where things were not standing still by any means.

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(c) The Salinas and Fonseca period.

Bernardo de Salinas arrived in London at the end of July, 1676, and from the beginning, he did what Ronquillo had secretly expected he would -- he co-operated closely with Fonseca in stirring up the opposition to the King in order to force Charles to help Spain. "One can say with justice that they fomented very adroitly the divisions and outbursts that appeared then in the Parliament through the fear that existed that the French would entirely conquer Flanders and Sicily"(1). Yet their policy over-emphasised the power of the governed in contradistinction to those who governed.

The fifteenth month prorogation had still to run until February, 1677, but the two men found much to do preparing for it. What can be discovered of these preparations for that explosive spring session ?

Firstly, a letter of Fonseca is worth quoting at length for the light it casts on this. It was written on 28th September, 1676(2).

"And supposing that this King and his brother continue in close touch with France as until now, I believe the most effective policy will be to hinder his obtaining supply from his Parliament. And as we have experienced how, when Parliament makes difficulties over this, he prorrogues it so that there is no time to attain anything else, this idea has come to me these days from discussion with its most important and trustworthy members. During the

(1) Temple, (Memoires), 260.
(2) Sin.Estado (Ingl) 3956

(2) To Colma; Sin.Estado (Ingl)2552.

opening days of the session, one could dispose the Command to make a petition to the King, that since the security of this realm so greatly depends on the preservation of Flanders and since he is mediator, His Majesty should wish to establish the Peace as it was in the year '60 and in such a form that the universal domination of France need not be feared. Although . . . such a petition seems to strike in some way at the royal prerogative in that the Parliament interposes in a matter of peace or war without the King asking their advice, nonetheless I hold it practicable and make myself strong with a moderate assistance of means. To obtain this, as also that they pass to some favourable resolution against the troops serving in France now or in future, and at the same time managing something important in what concerns trade; all these things, although the Parliament session may last no longer than two weeks, I strengthen myself to accomplish at least in part if not wholly." And, with a note of pride; "Since, thank God, I can without vanity affirm that I believe these people will not undertake this except at my instigation; nor in many years here have they wished to confide in any other."

This shows us that the Spanish policy in Parliament was merely an intensification of that followed during the previous sessions. It also indicates that the Spanish had some part, at least, in

in originating the well-known Commons' petition on the position of Flanders, which was to anger Charles so much.

The Embassy accounts of these months yield us more information. In those from Salinas' arrival to October 24th, he speaks of £100 to "allies" etc.(1) In those for the next three months we find the item in cypher: £150 "to those who supply news of France and Scotland and for extraordinary expenses on the ministers of the allies and other private persons of the Parliament, whom it has been necessary to regale".(2) More interesting is a selection from these expenses between January 24th and May 10th, indicating as they do increased activity as the Parliament approached and arrived(3).

1. For invitations and gifts to ministers of the allies and other persons in Parliament -- £150.

2. For a pamphlet printed secretly in this court in favour and defense of Burgundy; to the printing press and for 250 copies, 150 of which were handed over to the Count of Bergeyck (i.e. on Salinas' departure) -- £25.

3. To an official of Secretary of State, Coventry, who provided news and to whom he had offered an annual pension of 1000 escudos (c.£250) -- could not give him more than £100.

4. To an official of one of the Secretaries of Parliament who every night during the session gave him news and copies of what had passed and who carried instructions to his confidants -- £50.

(1)26th Oct, 1676; ibid.
(2) Accounts, 1668-84: Sim.Estado.(Ingl)3972.
(3) ibid.

5. To those who provided news from different parts and ports of the British Isles, telling what vessels left the latter . . £25.

6. To two principal members of the Commons who introduced the matter in the House of withdrawing the troops that served in France, and the other proposals made to the King. Salinas says a considerable gift was offered to each one but that lack of means did not permit him to give them more than 500 escudos each -- that is £250 in all.

The Spanish envoy could not completely neglect using ministers for exerting pressure on the King to get him to co-operate more closely with Spain. He writes of dealing with Arlington: "I have encouraged this minister with security of a large gift and recognition in the name of Your Majesty, if he takes up your interests on his own account, and can reduce his master to a convenient negotiation."(1)

Nor did Salinas entirely ignore treating directly with Charles himself. Just over the new year on 4th January, 1677,(2) the Resident advocated Spain approaching Charles for an alliance of peace or one of war. In this he says he was also prompted by the Dutch minister and by Parliament men. The plan was to shame Charles into an agreement before Parliament met, as either step was favoured by sections of both Houses and if the matter was not raised, the Parliament would only speak of internal affairs, which was what the King wished. But such a negotiation would have to be undertaken

(1) 7th Dec, 1676. Salinas to Señor: Sim.Estado(Ing.)2552.
(2) 4th Jan, 1677. Salinas to Señor: Sim.Estado(Ing.)2553.

quickly. All was underlined by Salinas' wish to dissolve the fear in England that Spain did not want peace at all, whereas in fact she wanted it provided it was just. However, the Consejo de Estado ordered him to desist from such a negotiation and only "to hear and report". The air was in fact full of recommendations and plans for such an alliance and other Spanish diplomats in the North, including Ronquillo, were advocating it. (see Appendix) But for Salinas, his emphasis was always on forcing Charles rather than on attracting him into such a league. And, in truth, he and Fonseca's serious activities were practically all directed towards the Parliament.

These actions of both Spanish representatives were proving increasingly irritating to Charles and his ministers. Early in January, Salinas presented a memoir about the landing of Scots levies at Calais and making the accusation that these had been forced into service. (see Appendix) This was, of course, denied, but the way the protest had been made rankled with the King, and that was not the end of the matter, whough it was Fonseca who now assumed the chief role. Another shipload of 500 Scottish levies was en route for France, when it was intercepted and brought to Ostend.(1) Two captains of these men were brought over by the Consul to give evidence to the Commons if the levies' question arose. They were not called on, however, and then Fonseca tried to rid himself of them.

(1) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1677-78, 14-15; also B.M. Harl. 1516.

He nonetheless prided himself on having stopped these levies and of Parliament's work against them and, as we know, the Spanish Embassy had its spies in Scotland. Fonseca speaks of the King's party by now having him "very much between their eyes" to give the literal translation of the Spanish expression; and of the King's Council deliberating whether they could not imprison him as a private person. Salinas and he, however, had represented to the Secretary of State his authorised status (1).

Though this question of the levies definitely contributed to the expulsion of Salinas and Fonseca, it was not the primary reason and Salinas himself attributed the order to their having obtained Parliament's request to the King for aid to Flanders. It was an incident following this which provided Charles with his opportunity. There are different versions of the story but it is enough to say here that one evening, after dinner at the Duke of Ormonde's, Salinas seems to have told Lord Cavendish (Ormonde's son) that Charles had called those who had proposed the above petition "rogues" who would engage him in a war and then leave him in the lurch. The matter came to the King's ear, probably through Monmouth; and the Foreign Committee questioned Cavendish. What resulted was that the two Spanish representatives were ordered to remain within doors, and to leave the country within twenty days. (see Appendix).

(1) 22nd March, 1677; Fonseca to Coloma: Sim.Estado(Ingl)2553.

(d) Until the Popish Plot.

The arrival of the Count of Bergeyck in London two days after the expulsion order for Salinas and Fonseca did not improve matters and only served to weaken the Spanish party. Bergeyck went forward as though nothing had happened, not even mentioning the incident at his first audience with Charles (1). The bad relations between him and Salinas and Fonseca arising from this and other reasons, were scarcely veiled and certainly not in their letters (2). Hence contradictory reports of the expulsion and the Count's actions reached the Low Countries to disturb the Spanish leaders there. Some, like De Lira, longed for revenge on both Williamson and his master for the deed (3); the Governor wrote to Ronquillo to ask advice on how he should approach the matter. Don Pedro and Temple had discussed the incident amicably, eager that it should cause no discord between England and Spain. Not to protest against the action would, Ronquillo felt, lose Spain respect everywhere and "the hope of England absolutely". Moreover, the ardour of Parliament had already been tempered and many of the Spanish party might sell their support to the King; already Bergeyck's actions had caused uneasiness at the Congress. Yet Charles' mediation and friendship were needed and therefore his conciliation, and Don Pedro recommended amicable consultation with Charles and his ministers on the matter before it should be forwarded to Madrid (See Appendix). However, the affair dragged on for years and the Spanish protests were of no avail; and only after the alliance of 1680 was even

(1) 14th April, 1677; Ronquillo to Villahermosa; Sim.Estado(Ingl)2553.
(2) See April letters; ibid.
(3) 8th April, 1677; De Lira to Ronquillo; A.G.R.(Mayo)145.

partial settlement reached by Fonseca being allowed to return to London. Godolphin's efforts at the Spanish capital to get the two men punished were also fruitless. Naturally Spain was not keen to punish those zealous representatives she still possessed abroad; and, in truth, Madrid was far more concerned over the struggle between Don Juan and his enemies at the Catholic Court and this matter inevitably became mixed in its squabbles (1).

Borgeyck was a welcome change to Charles' supporters and one of them wrote of him as: "a man of temper and experience, as to take warning, we hope, and to avoid ye rocke his Predecessor has so unfortunately split upon" (2). He was convinced of the power of the King and it was with Charles that he negotiated principally; and this brought a cooling of confidence among the Parliament towards the Spanish Embassy (3). As a Fleming, he was extremely eager for a peace and was prepared to give more for it than most native Spanish diplomats, and his visits to the French ambassador had alarmed the allied representatives at Nimeguen, who feared lest some separate peace negotiation was on hand in London. However, the Count seems to have been working for a Spanish-English-Dutch alliance, if only at the Court (see Appendix).

Most of the envoys of Spain in the North, as well as the Prince of Orange, were behind the Duke of Villahermosa's sending the Marquis of Burgomayne to England in late May as his special representative (4). He came with powers from the Governor to conclude

(1) Hispania Illustrata; 299, 300, 320.
(2) 20th Mar. 1677; William to Jenkins or Temple; P.R.O. S.P.103/88; also B.M. Harl.1516.
(3) 13th Sept; De la Puntt to De Lira: A.G.R.(Hayo)144; "(Borgeyck) da por invencible al Rey y inutil al Parlamento:"
(4) A.G.R. ibid; Letters of Lira to Ronquillo: 20th May.

/conclude a treaty with England and they hoped he would foster what was now being neglected, the support of Parliament for this.(1) The order for the retiral of Borgeyck, later that summer, was naturally satisfactory to them.(2)

After Burgomayne's arrival, Charles denied that these 'powers' of the Governor were sufficient, but by August the envoy had received those of Carlos II himself. But his approach did not please the English authorities. In his memoires, he frankly accused Charles of connivance with Louis over the old problem of troops and not making a treaty. There were even rumours of Spain declaring war on England that summer and autumn.(3) Early in July, the Marquis had a memoire printed for distribution in the coffee houses (which justified Salinas and Fonseca)(4) and he was busy gathering up the strings with the Parliament members left by these two men and Ronquillo. (See appendix) Incidentally, Don Pedro had also been in touch by letter with some of its members, as also with Charles, pressing him to a more popular foreign policy. (see appendix) As the autumn of 1677 proceeded, it seemed that this might indeed eventuate. William and Mary were married at this time; and the following January, an Anglo-Dutch alliance was concluded. We have already seen how the Marqués de la Fuente was 'delayed' because the Governor of the Low Countries, anticipating a Spanish-British alliance, did not want envoys changed for the negotiation./

(1) B.M. Harl. 1516.
(2) A.G.R. ibid; July 29th, 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira.
(3) P.R.O. S.P. 103/93. Barillon to Louis XIV, 4th. Oct. 1677 in La Fuente, XI, 156.
(4) Jusserand, 204.

Representative of Spanish ideas for such a league was the project of Burgomayne that spring of 1678. Salient points of it are:

1. The desire for a defensive-offensive alliance that could be extended to include other powers; no separate peace until France defeated, and no separate treaties unless after mutual consultation.

2. England to send a fleet of 90 ships to cause a maritime diversion of the French that would be agrred on by the allies; as well as 30,000 troops.

3. Spain was to supply 20,000 troops in the Low Countries, make a strong diversion in Catalonia - with the aid of the English fleet - and lend more aid once Sicily was reconquered.(1)

Godolphin described this as "ten times more ridiculous", continuing "So unequal and extravagant a Plan for a Defensive and Offensive Alliance I think was never in earnest proposed."(2) Yet it was not so very different from what Coventry offered a little later for such a league with both branches of the House of Austria, though his did stipulate Imperial help.

1. A combined blockade of French trade.

2. Charles was to declare war on France immediately, supplying:

a) an army of 20,000 men, horse etc.

b) a fleet of 90 ships to be used in any way convenient to the Common Cause; twenty-five of a certain type were to be in/

(1) 23rd. Feb. 1678; P.R.O. S.P. 103/81
(2) Hispania Illustrata, 349.

/in the Mediterranean.

3. Spain was

a) to supply 20,000 "effective marching men"

b) to continue payment of subsidies to Holland for the maintenance of Dutch ships in the Mediterranean to act with the Spanish vessels there.

c) to grant a base with fortification to England at Mahon.

d) to grant facilities and freedom from taxes when the English established forts etc. on allied territory.

e) to continue subsidies to others in the Confederacy at present being paid. Holland was to be urged to do this also.

4. The Emperor was to supply 35,000 men.

5. Holland was to be pressed to join in this alliance.

6. No separate peace with France.

7. A Guarantee of mutual peace to protect it to be made when it was concluded.

8. All other treaties except those contradicting this alliance's purpose to remain in effect.

Finally, a separate article defined a "convenient peace" according to the terms of this treaty, mentioning places, the peace in Northern Europe and that if Holland would not join this treaty, this was not to affect the recently signed Anglo-Dutch alliance.(1)

Comparing/

(1) 20th. April, 1678; P.R.O. S.P. 104/180.

Comparing these two plans, anticipating what was to follow two years later, two things are very clearly recognisable. First, England was not going to give something for nothing: she had other interests than the Low Countries future, no matter how important that might be. Secondly, Spain would not be chosen as a sole ally, due to her present weakness, but only as one in a confederacy. But the time was not yet. The currents of eagerness for peace in England, as well as in Holland, were too strong just then. Godolphin in his straightforward way gives us some of the reasons and spirit behind this attitude, in a letter to Arlington from Madrid (12/22 March, 1678).(1) He did not favour Charles being hurried into an "unequal league with this Crown" and much more with all the branches of the Confederacy "without necessary Precautions or at least reciprocal conditions."... "But the Spanish Ministers in the North write to these here that the Stream is so powerful in England for a war with France, as that they need not give themselves the trouble of purchasing what will unavoidably happen of itself." And also in a letter to Coventry, (15th. May, 1678);(2) if France was of greater strength than Spain, the "malignity" of both toward England was equal. Spain was for "blowing us up into a war" . . . "Wherefore we ought in such a Method to balance the Power of our Neighbours, as may render them all subservient to our own interest; and to prefer the Rule in doing it of our own Convenience/

(1) Hispania Illustrata, 347.
(2) ibid; 388-9.

/Convenience, before that of the Party whom we assist. The Spaniards on the other side, endeavour to treat us rather as Instruments than Protectors; and observing the general animosity in England against the French, would use the same to transport us out of our own Advantage into a blind pursuit of theirs, without those necessary Precautions that may hinder the Remedies of saving Flanders from becoming more dangerous to us, than the Disease of losing it. They would tell us, for a Benefit, the admittance of our help; and for a regard to our Safety, that they come not to an agreement with France for the remainder of those Countries, although they have been long the Bulwark and Outguard of all their other Dominions; whereas I verily believe, had not the House of Commons appeared so eager in their behalf, Matters might have been so ordered as to have rendered our defense of them the exchange of many Considerable Concessions and Advantages to our State."

And in another letter to Coventry: (of 15th. May, 1678)(1):

"My opinion being that the surest League Defensive and Offensive between us and Spain, would be a League of Commerce, as the most effectual means of strengthening ourselves, and weakening our Enemies."

During this time, the Anglo-Dutch agreement, an important support for any alliance between England and Spain, was not ratified; the Estates suspected the terms and William of Orange, Charles' treachery./

(1) Ibid, 405.

And, in fact, the King had signed a new secret agreement with Louis. The Dutch were then heading swiftly for a separate peace when Louis' ambition reactivated allied opposition at the end of July, and Charles, partially through the influence of public opinion, abandoned his secret pact with the French King, and signed a second treaty with Holland. On seeing this determination, Louis climbed down somewhat and the Dutch made peace with him early in August, 1678. The Spanish followed suit a month later; and the Emperor over six months later.

In the spring months of that year, everyone had seemed to be trying to oblige everyone else to do things. Through pressure on the Duque de Villahermosa by the Prince of Orange, arrangements had been made for the reception of English troops into Ostend and other towns in Flanders.(1) Such things do not sweeten relations. Neither was the Marqués de Burgomayne any more popular, and Danby wrote: "The Marquis of Burgomayne has carried himself so very ill in all this matter that nothing can be said of it than he deserves;" and the Treasurer also felt his reports had had a harmful effect on the attitude of the Governor of the Low Countries. Charles and his party awaited the Marqués de la Fuente impatiently, and desired and were pressing for Burgomayne's recall.(2) However that year also witnesses a change in this feeling. The Marquis himself seems to have grown more tempered in his actions though he still continued to suspect the English and their King. (see appendix)

(1) Copy of agreement: P.R.O. S.P. 103/5
(2) Danby: 162-3, 191 (quotation)

Vol 3

Political change had also altered his position, and he became more popular with the authorities in England. During that summer he was selected for a mission with Feversham to visit William and the Duque de Villahermosa regarding the war.(1) There were unmistakable signs that Spain was learning or had learnt that in her dealings with England, she must cultivate all parties and with moderation; and that in her weakness, she must take every opportunity and avoid every risk.

Few peaces have had less illusions about them than the Peace of Nimeguen, and it was not long after the first relief from war, before Louis' actions were rousing renewed opposition to him - - which was in fact what many Spaniards, being the losers, wished. But with the peace, had also come what Spanish leaders had feared, great internal unrest in England. That witch's sabbath of politico-religionist turmoil, the Popish Plot, burst forth that autumn, and at no time did Catholic Spain have to tread with greater delicacy on English soil.

(1) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) (March to December 1678), 296 - 7.

c) The Popish Plot Period.

During the long drawn out months of the Plot, Spain maintained a policy of "toda indiferencia" -- complete indifference -- to the disturbance. Naturally this constricted her efforts for English support somewhat, but it did not stop them, though they were carried forward in a less ostentatious and perhaps more effective way than hitherto. Since May, the Count of Egmont had been in London, while the Marquis of Burgomayne, owing to his knowledge of English affairs, had been kept on to work for the desired and expectedly imminent Spanish-British alliance. Egmont, though rather stiff and inexperienced, does not seem to have harmed relations(1), while as we know the Marquis was now much more persona grata with the Court. Not that this meant that Burgomayne underestimated the importance of relations with the Parliament.(2)

In December, 1678, Burgomayne together with Egmont requested that the English troops garrisoned in the Low Countries should remain there for some time longer. Charles told Parliament that if they wished this (which many of its members did), they would have to pay for their upkeep. Further, any talk of armed resistence to Louis in these months was premature. Charles, as always, wanted peace; domestic turmoil was occupying the attention of the majority of his people, who, while anti-French and in favour of defensive alliances, did/

(1) See Sim. Estado (Ing) 2555 and 2556; 3956.
(2) "All is nothing here unless one keeps in well with the Parliament" (27th. Mar. 1679; Burgomyne to Señor; Sim. Estado. (Ing) 3956).

/did not feel the time was ripe. On Burgomayne's mentioning war to members of Parliament, they silenced him - he admits it - by pointing out Spain's past actions - how she made war only to make peace - and how she could not be trusted. Commons' support for Spain cannot be said to have been particularly constant at this time and any rumour could rouse their suspicion.(1) The marriage of Carlos II to Marie Louise of France is mentioned as having stirred it;(2) Burgomayne, for this reason also was anxious lest the Duke of York choose exile in Spanish dominions, particularly nearby Flanders or the coast of Spain.(3)

All this may seem pretty unimportant. Egmont felt it was so and that there was no need for Spanish ministers there in these circumstances. In fact, the Count did little, but his acting strongly over incidents arising from Popish Plot and involving the Embassy, made his colleague and the Consejo de Estado who still felt something might be accomplished, fear the effects on the super-sensitive state of British public opinion. So, as already mentioned, Egmont soon left for Sardinia.

All that spring and summer, the Italian Marquis continued to pursue a policy of moderation. He was careful about getting Parliament to suggest a break with France though he cultivated the party that would best serve Spanish interests. (see appendix) In the matter of the Exclusion Act, he took no part though personally he was for supporting/

(1) 16th. Dec. 1678; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3926.
(2) Letters of Sept./Oct. 1679; ibid.
(3) Letters of 8th. April, 1678; ibid.

/supporting York passively while avoiding all discussions.(1) He continued to warn of the danger of Louis not only in Flanders but also in Italy. It was a period of observation and quiet rehabilitation and upbuilding of English support for Spain as well as of the Embassy position. Ronquillo's reappointment to London was well received by both Court and Country parties. Thus time passed. However, even in November of that year (1679), Burgomayne was convinced Charles had a treaty with France. (see appendix)

(1) 22nd. May; ibid.

c) 1680: Steps towards the Treaty of Windsor.

Then came -- 1680 -- and Spain's opportunity at last. The Popish Plot was gradually dying down, allowing concentration on something other than domestic affairs. Meanwhile the threat of France in the Low Countries grew greater every day as Louis pressed the question of the Burgundy title and the reunions. English public opinion was therefore becoming roused. Even the King himself may have had some qualms about the danger, perhaps he had some vague ambition to become a leader on the European scene, or at least a mediator who could profit by his position. At any rate -- and this is certain -- Charles knew he needed national support and that he must give something in exchange. What he chose to give was a more popular foreign policy. Logically viewed, his plan of a new European confederacy or defence community was reasonable enough. It was certainly necessary and had to come in the face of continued French imperialism. But the shadow of the King's shifty political past was to dog the possible success of his plan. Aware of the suspicions of his own people, Charles maybe did not realise how much his own character had become suspect abroad. However that is not yet.

Spain would naturally be an essential link in such a European alliance and it was not long before discussion in earnest was quickened for her inclusion. If such a league was to have any success, it/

/it would have to be made as universal as possible and as quickly as possible. This was also clear to the Spanish authorities and diplomats in the North: Burgomayne, Villahermosa, Baltasar de Fuenmayor and Ronquillo, to name only a few. These men urged the plan on to each other but for a long time Burgomayne had to tell Charles and his ministers as well as the Dutch envoy, that neither he nor the Duke of Villahermosa had powers as yet to make such a treaty.(1)

The signs appeared favourable. Charles himself gave every sign of desiring the peace of Christianity, and was already suggesting the plan to the Emperor and other powers (see appendix). Even the Duke of York was telling the Marquis that such an alliance was the only way to preserve peace; James' mother-in-law, the Duchess of Modena, took the trouble to return to Italy via Flanders rather than through France, so as not to rouse English opinion. The Dutch - though still suspect to the Spaniards - were supporting Burgomayne through their envoys in London, while Fuenmayor in the Hague found them exceedingly co-operative, though their own policy was just to maintain the alliances they had made already. Yet the Spanish diplomats were not blind to the fact that Charles had the same ministers as when he had maintained his pro-French policy which had kept him so impoverished, and that the change was in all probability to court public opinion.(2) The last point is substantiated in published English letters to the Prince of Orange/

(1) Even on 5th. April, 1680; Sim Estado (Ing) 3957.
(2) 5th. April; ibid.

/Orange at this time: "In a word the King thinkes his owne and the goode of all Christendome depend on the alliances he is now making, and what he has already done towards that designe, with the care he has of late taken to compose things at home, have had so good an effect that all the countrys are in a very quiet and satisfied condition and give markes of it every day."(1)

Which Spanish minister was going to handle the negotiation? Hyde was sorry the Marquis of Burgomayne "a man whom we all know very well at court and is knowne and believed by the others too, should not stay to finish an alliance which hath been long wished for generally in the nation, or at least to bear witnesse for us, which I doubt we shall need, if we doe not succeed, that now the fault is not to be imputed to us." However Burgomayne once in Vienna would try to convince them there "that we are in good earnest to here." Then, mentioning Don Pedro Ronquillo's coming he described him as "a man that will please the King well, but I know not whether he will have the same credit out of the Court, where we have need of good certificates that we doe proceed da bonna fay."(2) The Marquis though he continued to prepare for such an alliance and kept up intimate discussions with the English ministers, was also very careful to watch and follow the French ambassador.(3) In Madrid too, suspicion of England did not entirely pass away. Goodricke, the new envoy of Charles there, was lodging/

(1) Letter of Sunderland to Orange; April 6th. 1680; in Groen van Prinsterer, 391

(2) Hyde to Orange, 16th. April, 1680; ibid, 394. This opinion of Burgomayne contradicts that of Navarro who believed the Marquis was not wanted in London for the making of the Treaty due to past experiences with him.

(3) 7th. April; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3597

/lodging complaints against the 'gazetas' interpretation of English affairs and in particular their still hinting Franco-British alliances.(1)

Nonetheless the alliance seemed to the Spanish diplomats in the North the one hope for their country, and the home government's delay in sending orders for its conclusion was irritating and worrying. Ronquillo warned that the opportunity could be lost as easily by dilatoriness as by directly refusing to send powers to treat.(2) In Madrid, the Consejo de Estado with its usual caution had first of all consulted a junta of ministers and theologians "if in conscience this league (a defensive alliance with non-Catholic princes) can be executed for the protection of the Monarchy." The royal conscience assured on this point, its first fiat (of 22nd. April, 1680) was that Charles should be told orally but not in writing that Spain would enter any defensive league, patterned on the Spanish-Dutch alliance of 1673 and the Anglo-Dutch alliance of 1678; and conclude a treaty of guarantee of the Peace of Nimeguen.(3) The only outcome of this was continued irritation in the North, and the Spanish diplmats finally taking matters into their own hands. Burgomayne replied that the name of 'Guarantee' instead of alliance was though ridiculous in England and would just annoy Parliament - to whose support Charles would look - in order to fulfil the agreements. He warned of the English/

(1) Goodricke's complaints in ibid (legajo)
(2) 10th. April; Ronquillo to Coloma; ibid.
(3) Consulta of that date; Sim. Estado (Ing) 359 F.

/English people thinking the delay was Charles's fault and returning to their former inquietude, so dangerous to Spain; the union of King and Parliament depended on this beginning and Charles was resolved not to call it until the alliance was made. Also, Louis - whose maxims in England were division - while active, was held back by the fear of this league. He had made peace only to strip Spain of allies and Spain's only remedy therefore was to seek new and powerful ones. But, the day previous to the Marquis's departure for Vienna, Charles's ministers (and the Dutch embassador) had still to grumble of the "phlegm" of the Emperor and Carlos II with respect to the English King's proposal.(1)

What sort of an alliance as far as Spain was concerned did her diplomats envision? A letter from Ronquillo to his master gives us some idea.(2) Firstly he recommended one based on the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1678 and stressed the following suggestions.

1. Articles of Perpetual Peace.

2. Mutual defence in Europe. Should this be extended to include the Indies? he wondered. However Don Pedro was decided that there must be nothing that could even vaguely imply aiding Charles against domestic rebels, for Spain had no desire to rouse Parliament where she possessed so many of her friends.

3. Exhibition of all other treaties before ratification.

Ronquillo/

(1) 24th. May; Brussels; Burgomayne to Señor; ibid.
(2) 27th. March; Brussels; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/Ronquillo also recommended a clause stipulating not having more treaties than were shown. If this could not be obtained, he advocated getting some idea somehow of England's agreements with France.

4. Auxiliary aids to be given before outbreak of war. Don Pedro said Spain should offer only what she could certainly supply, for example soldiers rather than sailors. (Ships and men had been stipulated in the Anglo-Dutch treaty.)

5. Fairness but firmness on trading questions. While it was not the time to modify English trading privileges in Spain, and certainly Anglo-Spanish commercial disputes harmed mutual friendship, Don Pedro suggested the making of a limited general ruling on English, Dutch and Spanish navigation to smooth out the difficulties arising from different admiralty codes.

We see in this plan a treaty designed to unite on as wide a common ground as possible. There is still the suspicion of Charles' French friendships and designs to forestall this. Spain also knew her weakness and realised it was better not to promise what she could not fulfil. Does not the trading clause and suggestion anticipate the submission of all disputes between the two countries to law? Any interference on the domestic scene was to be avoided: the unity of the three kingdoms with their king will from now on be more valuable to/

/to Spain than their discord.

As the spring passed busily and quickly, it became increasingly obvious that Charles' wish to make the alliance with both branches of the House of Austria "joyntly"(1) was not to be, though every effort was pressed by both English and Spanish to win the Emperor. Leopald was slow and suspicious: it was said he did not trust his envoy in London, but neither would he let Ronquillo act for him in the negotiation. Nevertheless the plan went ahead; the Emperor would surely come in later, it was hoped.(2) For Spain there was no better opportunity; she must have allies and none was more suitable than England. As such a chance must not be allowed to pass, she went forward alone. The tragedy was - though this could not be seen then - she went forward to be the only and rather ghostly member of Charles' planned confederacy, and its failure helped bring even more misfortune on her than she had already suffered.

(1) Godolphin (Sidney) to Orange; 2nd. April, 1680, in Groen van Prinsterer (389).
(2) See practically all letters of Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.

2. Commercial and Maritime.

Little of importance in maritime and commercial affairs took place during the Interim, though the forces behind a closer rapprochement were still at work.

The smoothing out of trading complaints continued and this was often attained, though generally despite Spanish procrastination. However, the major issues of difference had not yet been tackled and a mediocre situation between both countries in this field could persist, almost indefinitely, until they were (1).

The Indies went on being a trouble centre, and the centre of the trouble seems to have been English-owned Jamaica. Its continued use as a pirate base, or place where the marauders were protected, had not encouraged Spanish resignation to losing what was still looked on as an integral part of what God, through the Pope, had granted their country. Recently buccaneers had sacked Spanish Macaray and "attempted an invasion" of (or rather had landed on) Puerto Rico; to which complaint Coventry replied that the Governor of Jamaica would take action and the Council of Commerce also (2). Actually the pirate situation in the Caribbean had moderated somewhat, partly due to many of them passing to new territory on the west coast of South America. More will be heard of this, but already there had been reports from the Viceroy of Peru of English pushing through the Straits of Magellan to prey on the Chilean coast.

(1) See esp. the "Virgin" case contained (Cal. of State Papers (Colonial) 1675-6). English insult at Cadiz: 16th Nov. 1678. Egmont to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3956; and throughout relevant legajos.

(2) 23rd Nov, 1676; Salinas to Señor. Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552.

Don Pedro Ronquillo, just before his departure for Nimeguen, had been going to visit an English captain recently arrived from that region but had to leave before the interview (1).

But there were greater signs of co-operation from the English colonial authorities touching the menace. The Governor of Jamaica had already complained of Morgan, whose return to England Salinas had been pressing (2). We have heard before how Ronquillo maintained a correspondence with the Governor's Secretary. In this period, Burgomayne had got to know the new Governor, the Earl of Carlisle and his brothers. The Earl, soon despatched to Jamaica to put down the pirates, had promised the Marquis privately that he would act "like a good Spaniard". When Carlisle first arrived in the West Indies, the Spanish envoy was ordered not to write to him. Then, the Consejo de Estado told him to make some agreement through Carlisle's brothers; to which Burgomayne replied that such a thing was impossible in the English set-up. However, he continued to write to the Governor, taking care to avoid anything that might incriminate should the letters fall into the King's hands. This, the Council had to agree to, but as a matter of fact, little came of this (3). Yet more on both sides were feeling that piracy should be outgrown instead of being allowed to plague the relations of both countries.

Nevertheless, the Spanish still had hopes of regaining Jamaica, and reports of Charles II perhaps selling it to France made them

(1) 13th Oct, 1676. Antwerp; Ronquillo to Señor. ibid.
(2) 13th July; Fonseca to Coloma; ibid.
(3) For letters of Burgomayne see this see ibid; 3956.

especially watchful, for such an outcome would be even worse than the present situation. The Earl of Bristol, who was still in touch with Ronquillo regarding the possibility of a Spanish-British alliance, wrote that the anti-French feeling in England could perhaps be developed into willingness to sell the island back to Spain. This would, of course, have to be done for a price or no Englishman would dare to suggest it. However, there was a limited amount Spain could get Charles to do; it was not now suitable to speak of exchanging Jamaica while trying to persuade him to aid the Low Countries by declaring war on France; besides the Spanish had little money for this; and gradually the matter subsided (1).

Before leaving the Indies a word should be said of the altering of Spanish defence measures in America. As piracy extended to the South Seas and the French naval threat in the West grew, Spain was faced with either (1) changing her colonial policy and allowing some English trade in - - which would not have been natural in an age of mercantilism; or (2) improving her defences. At the time, the Spanish colonists themselves chose the latter course by helping revive that periodic fleet, the Armada de Barlovento, and other measures; but they never achieved much by any standard. Naturally, complaints of their harsh treatment or unusual enforcement of regulations were soon forwarded to the Spanish authorities by the British (2).

(1) The letter of the 'Confidant' (the Earl of Bristol) is enclosed with 15th Jan, 1677; Nimeguen; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid; 2553.
(2) See Arbiñano; Alsedo; and relevant legajos at Simancas.

The other focal point in Maritime affairs was the Mediterranean. One problem that arose was that of Algiers, whose corsairs had always caused Spain enough trouble; but most recently she had been giving refuge to French ships attacking Sicily during the rebellion there. Also the corsairs had been attacking British vessels, and this created a bond of feeling between England and Algiers in 1676 when the English had a fleet in the Mediterranean; but it was recalled. This was connected to the hope of some in Spain of buying Tangier from Charles II, but there was no money for this anyway, just as there was none available for the purchase of Jamaica (1).

Increasing French activity in the Mediterranean, the Indies and elsewhere, provided a focus for the other half of Spanish policy towards England in this field, namely, to stir up English opposition to French maritime and commercial growth. In the summer of 1676, Louis made a declaration permitting free trade to all warring and other nations, provided the merchants had passports from him and paid two and a half florins tax per ton of goods. This aroused the English who felt their passports were good enough and heartily disliked the second point. On September 14th, Salinas reported the London merchants mass meeting and their dis-satisfaction with the sufficiency of the royal complaints to Louis. The Consejo de Estado ordered Don Bernardo to be very attentive to these movements and to procure with every skill to foment hatred against the French (2).

(1) 14th Sept,1676; Salinas to Señor; ibid 2552.
28th Sept(3); ibid. 29th May, 1679; Consulta ibid. 3956.
(2) ibid; 2552.

Fonseca wrote then with reference to getting a break between England and France: "The principal point through which one can guide so great a business will be commerce, it being the one on which these nations are most sensitive and which necessarily must cause a rupture between them"(1). Though the Spaniard, then as now, was perhaps over-convinced of the influence of trade in the Northern European and particularly English mentality, there was some truth in it. The English maritime classes continued as friendly as ever to Spain and sailors wishing to get a blow at the French continued to offer their services to her through the London Embassy (see Appendix). Neither had any Anglo-French settlement on trade been concluded and this, too, helped put Anglo-Spanish relations in a better light.

But that is not all. In miscellaneous ways, contact between Spain and England in this sector was growing. For example, the Spanish were becoming interested in recent British inventions and there is evidence that the British favoured the Spanish market. Even before Don Pedro Ronquillo had left, two men had presented him with a memoire concerning their system for careening vessels and preventing barnacles(2). The Spanish were particularly interested in the artillery inventions of Prince Rupert with his new way of founding and tempering metals. Colbert de Croissy, when French ambassador in London, had tried to obtain information in vain, even with the use of bribery. At this time the Marquis of Burgomayne had got on/

(1) 20th. July, 1676; Fonseca to Coloma; ibid.
(2) See 17th. Feb. 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3955.
6th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid. 2552
3rd. Aug. Fonseca to Coloma; ibid.

What factory?

/on to workers at the factory and finally learnt details of these inventions.(1) From there the matter went quite far ahead. Other offers that might be mentioned, though not thought much of then, were those to salvage sunken ships off the Spanish coast.(2)

All this interchange as well as that of regular trade (details of which can be found elsewhere) demanded much consular work. Ronquillo's plan for more consuls and observers was not carried out, though Salinas did increase the number of observers.

On Fonseca's forced departure, an important gap was created. At length when the Consejo de Estado had decided that no compensation could be got for the Salinas-Fonseca incident, they decided to confirm the appointment of Phelipe de la Guerra to the post in 1679. (see Appendix)

During the Interim first attempts were made by the Marquis of Burgomayne to arrange a post service by frigate from Plymouth to Santander instead of the expensive, unsatisfactory and often insecure way through France.(3) However such a link had to wait for a more intense war and a more co-operative King on the English throne. That is our final harbinger of the closer contact and attention to basic problems which these years heralded for Spanish-British commercial and maritime relations.

(1) 15th. Feb. 1677; Salinas to Señor; ibid 2553.
(2) This would seem to refer to "princes metal" - See D.N.B. under "Rupert".
(3) 25th. Oct. 1677; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3955.

3. Religious Aspects.

During this period of revived anti-Catholicism, Spain's attitude on religious questions was "toda indiferencia" and her efforts were directed as far as possible to their elimination, as a factor in Spanish-British relations. The reactions of the envoys of the Catholic King to Titus Oates, Israel Tonge and Co. are full of interest however.

Though outwardly these years started quietly enough in the field of religion,(1) still it was evident that militant anti-Catholicism was a force which, once aroused, could not only call on its votaries for support but play on and exploit the feelings of many other Protestants, for the fear of forced reconversion was still very strong in the country.

In one of his earliest despatches from London, Don Bernardo de Salinas told of re-opening the chapel shut since Ronquillo's departure, partly because there was a lack of others. Recently, the Portuguese envoy had had the temerity to have ninety books explaining the mass printed for the Queen's servants and the almost immediate result had been the forced, if temporary, closing of his chapel.(2) Early in November, 1676, an order was issued that no English should attend, nor English priests officiate, nor English sermons be preached in embassy chapels. France and Portugal closed theirs completely/

(1) The Baron de Vique speaks of the tolerance of the English generally as a reason for a rapprochement with Spain. P.R.O. S.P. 103/80.

(2) 3rd. Aug. 1676; Salinas to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 2553, also 31st. Aug. ibid 2552.

/completely and immediately, but the Spanish did not do so, for Salinas did not feel the order applied to them as their chapel had always been tolerated "with particular respect." The envoy also considered these were ordinary preventive measures on the eve of Parliament, and that Charles was, as so often, justifying his Protestantism for ulterior motives by renewing and expanding old decrees on Catholic observance. Don Bernardo did not send away his English chaplains, like the others, for he feared for their safety; there were no English sermons preached at Wild House then to have to be discontinued.(1) Basically the Spanish attitude was and remained, that if an envoy was in residence and English people wished to attend mass at the Embassy, mass was there for them, and any prevention of their coming was the business of the English authorities. Therefore, the Spanish Embassy chapel continued quietly to afford religious service to the faithful, and when the Popish Plot started, Egmont and Burgomayne were maintaining twelve chaplains, whereas Barillon, the French minister only had four.(2) It also provided useful contact with the English public. For example, when Burgomayne arrived in June, 1677, he carried letters from Salinas and Fonseca for the Marquis of Winchester and Viscount Halifax which were handed over through Domingo de Guevara, an Embassy chaplain.(3)

With the autumn of 1678 came the murder of Sir Edmund Bury Godfrey/

(1) 9th. Nov. 1676; Salinas to Señor; ibid 3955.
(2) See P.R.O. S.P. 104/186.
(3) Letters of April/May, 1677; Sin Estado (Ing) 2553.

/Godfrey and its sequel. The plot itself was aimed in all directions at anything "popish" without regard to circumstances, nation or past friendships, and soon it touched Spain on several points. First of all, Don Juan was named as an accomplice in the accusations and immediately Danby was visited by Egmont about this. It was clear that as far as Charles and James were concerned, they did not believe a word of the accusation and Danby indicated the private policy towards the disturbance when he asked the Count not to agitate about the matter, saying that if Spain did so the 'discoverer' would be able to flee and the truth would not emerge.(1) In fact, what official England might feel was one thing, but difficulties in the face of popular suspicion could be expected; and exactly a week later the first of several incidents committed against the Embassy and its occupants took place.(2)

Repressive government measures against Catholics soon required alertness from the Spanish envoys.(3) These were largely forced on Charles and his ministers, but at first, though this was soon dispelled, the Spaniards feared that the King might use the false plot to manipulate the Lords and Commons against Spain's interests in the Parliament.(4) They meanwhile did all they could to protect the individual Catholic from persecution and inconvenience, though Burgomayne might feel Egmont's efforts on their behalf were unnecessarily/

(1) 24th. Oct. 1678; Egmont to Señor; ibid 3955.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) (March-Dec. 1678).
(4) Sim Estado. (Ing) 2556.

/unnecessarily strong. The Count said he feared many of the poorer R.C's would now turn to Protestantism in order to have peace.(1)

Matters continued in this state of siege for months, with accusation and counter-accusation, action and reaction. The Popish Plot was a ghastly farce, but that there was some basis for ultra-Protestant suspicions seems fairly certain. To say this is not to depart from the strictest impartiality. That individuals and groups actively promote ideals they believe in is natural, and the methods employed for this by both religious movements then were those of the time. Naturally Spain viewed sympathetically any prospect of England's return to the fold of Rome, but there were other considerations of a political nature that were more important. Throughout the plot, the Marquis of Burgomayne kept on dealing with the Presbyterians as well as the others in Parliament, urging them to see that the disturbances did not help Louis - - the core of Spanish policy.(2) Spain could believe Louis capable of almost anything and it was even suspected by her representatives that the plot was inspired by him for his own ends. As time went on, the Marquis noted with some pleasure the way persecution was hitting the French Jesuits and remarked that soon there would not be one left in the Kingdom.(3)

Yet accusations of Spanish complicity still kept appearing. This/

(1) Nov./Dec. 1678; ibid.
(2) 18th. Nov. Burgomayne to Señor; ibid 3955.
(3) ibid. 2556 for all above paragraph.

/This was so in the statements of Coleman, in whose activities lies any proof of a real plot. According to one of the Lords examining, Coleman stated he had received money from the Spanish as well as the French ambassador for banquets and the winning over of Parliament members. Burgomayne said in his letter that this was dictated by the wish to implicate Spain, but adds that the accusation would be disproved. "For I will conceal the name of the person through whom he asked a thousand pounds with which to entertain some M.Ps at dinner and gain their votes; to which I replied it was enough for him to be the pensioner of France without being that of Spain also; and I told the envoy of the Duke of Neuburg, who it was brought me this message that it amazed me greatly he should come to deceive me in this way." (See appendix)

Gradually such lies of the accusers became more obvious and patent to all. On November 21st, 1679, Burgomayne wrote of how the man who declared the "Judge" (Godfrey) had died in the Queen's Palace, had stated in the House that 20,000 Spanish pilgrims had gathered at Santiago de Compostella in Galicia, ready to embark at Corunna on a mission to aid the English Roman Catholics. 10,000 Spanish in Flanders were also reported as prepared to help consummate the pious end. To all -- all too conscious of Spain's military and naval position as well as her point of view -- this had caused "great amusement."

/amusement" though many Presbyterians were supporting the rumour from policy. The same night the Marquis wrote he had seen a letter of Coleman's from Père la Chaise Louis' confessor, who after speaking of what Louis could give for the enterprise, declared that all to be expected of Spain in this cause was her prayers.(1) That was nearer the truth but her spiritual support was also far from certain.

Attacks from time to time continued to occur well into 1679,(2) already two of the chaplains had been questioned by the Council,(3) and the Spanish that spring reduced the chapel staff as was requested by the English authorities.(4) Nevertheless the religious services continued. Once there was almost trouble when a Majorcan priest, unfamiliar with the law, had baptised a child in a private house, but the matter passed over.(5) Spain's desire to grant religious and other help to the victims of the plot is also seen in her offering asylum to any Catholics who might wish to emigrate to Spain, provided they had royal permission. (see appendix)

Yet despite this merciful attitude to their innocent coreligionists, the Spanish, from first to last refused to interfere or intercede in the question itself, and this is particularly obvious with respect to James, Duke of York, the storm centre of the religious struggle. Later on, and yes, before the Glorious Revolution, Ronquillo was to ascribe all the difficulties of the Roman Catholics/

(1) 21st. Nov. 1678; ibid.
(2) 24th. Jan. 1679; Egmont to Señor; ibid 3956.
(3) See ibid 2556.
(4) ibid 3956. Letters of Egmont; 27th. Jan; 27th. Feb; 10th. March.
(5) 28th. July, 1679; Burgomayne to Señor; ibid 3956.

/Catholics to his stubbornness (see appendix) and lack of tact. The Popish Plot had brought the Exclusion question to the fore and we have already mentioned Spanish desires on it. Papal and other efforts to get Spain to support York's stand for liberty of Conscience were fruitless. Egmont to be sure supported the idea, but Burgomayne and the Consejo de Estado felt the time for this was not yet ripe for advancing "so glorious an end."(1) The Papacy, through its nuncio in Madrid, was rebuffed several times on this. It also asked that Spain/ask that English Catholics be allowed to give their own defence to the charges made against them, in the disturbance. On 16th. December, 1679, the Council, in answer to these pleas recommended "that his Holiness, as Common Father and Head of the Church, being informed of what the French are procuring in England, should try to forestall the inconveniences that these can bring on Catholics and the Common Cause."(2) Spain's eyes were really fixed on the political but she felt too that her religious policy, though subordinate in fact, was in the real interest of individual Catholics and Catholic ideals.

(1) 8th. June, 1679; Consulta; ibid 3956.
7th. April. Letters of Egmont, Burgomayne and Consulta.
(2) 16th. Dec. Nuncio to Consejo de Estado and Consulta; ibid.

4. Personal aspects, including Don Pedro's activities in the field of Spanish-British relations during his absence.

What was Don Pedro Ronquillo doing during these years in the Low Countries? To follow his days at Nimeguen and after is not very rewarding, nor is it our concern except in so far as it forms the link between his two English embassies or helps our understanding of him or them.

Debts in London, Brussels and elsewhere plagued Ronquillo as he tried to reach the Congress, and his possessions left behind in England were threatened with confiscation by creditors who caused trouble to Salinas and the Marquis of Burgomayne. The Marquis complained of the threat to Spain's good name through these unmet (see appendix) obligations. In Belgium, the Duke of Villahermosa tried to avoid Don Pedro for fear he would ask him for money.(1) That autumn of 1676 however, changes at the Spanish court were apparently going to be helpful to him. In the governmental rumblings preceding the expulsion of Valenzuela and the rise of Don Juan, Don Lope de los Rios, a relative of our hero, was reappointed President of Hacienda; and in the revision of salaries, consequent on this, he did receive an increase though it does not seem to have been much more effective than heretofore.(2) Bulstrode speaks of Ronquillo being "almost chased out of town" (Brussels) by Villahermosa towards Nimeguen(3) but/

(1) P.R.O. S.P. 77/49. Letters of De Vique.
(2) 31st. Oct./11th. Nov. 1676; Bulstrode to Williamson; ibid. Maura (Carlos II), Vol. I; 237.
(3) 24th. Nov./4th. Dec; Bulstrode; P.R.O. S.P. 77/49.

/but there is every other reason for believing that the delay was due to lack of supply and that Don Pedro was extremely keen to reach the Congress. Before the end of the year Don Pedro did reach the Dutch city, where Jean Baptiste Chrysatin, the third plenipotentiary soon joined him. Being unsure how he should act in the absence of the Marqués de los Balbases and with his inadequate powers which have already been mentioned. The solution of his difficulties meantime was to remain incognito and use visits to Lady Temple as a channel of communication with official circles meantime.(1)

Ronquillo had not been long at the Congress when news reached him of Don Juan's becoming de facto prime minister to Carlos II. Like most of the conscientious compatriots of his day, he knew the need for a change and had hopes this would bring it, but he also hoped for more. He knew of the somewhat lengthy arrangements for the conferring of the title of Count of Granado on his brother Joseph, and he was soon pressing Don Juan to try and get rectification (see appendix) of his powers as the French were refusing to accept him at the conference on an equal footing. I think from the evidence that our friend was disappointed in the amount of support he received from the new prime minister, and the new 'plenipotencias' making all three representatives 'ambassadors' seem to have come largely through Balbases' instances. Neither does Don Juan's rise appear to/

(1) Temple, (memoires), vol 2, 204.

/to have helped his financial position greatly. (see appendix) For his own part, Don Pedro was, for several months, engaged as an intermediary between Don Juan and representatives of the Prince of Orange and this - - to omit the substance of the negotiation/ - - furnished him with valuable knowledge of the Dutch leader and his followers for later years. In his letters to Don Juan, he also touched on other interesting matters - as we shall see.(1)

As for the negotiations of the Congress itself, Ronquillo stood firmly for a "good peace", which he realised could not be got, either at the conference table or on the field, without the support of Holland. In war, subsidies from Spain to the allies in the North, especially the Dutch, were necessary. Otherwise, the States-General would not go on and as he wrote once "we will make a peace such as Master Louis may wish to cook for us."(2) But though punctilious, he did see that Spain must admit points like the parity of crowned heads to allow the Congress to proceed.(3) Any sign of weakness, of bending before France, such as he found too often to his liking in Chrystin, he criticised and opposed. (see appendix) Pressed from without and at loggerheads not only with the Dutch but with the representatives of the Emperor and also each other, the Spanish laboured on; the "grimaces"(4) were kept up and the gloom deepened. In the spring of 1678, when Louis presented an ultimatum, we got an expression of/

(1) ibid; Navarro I, f.141-194
(2) 21st. Sept. 1676; Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; A.G.R. (État)2559.
(3) Temple, 208
(4) 9th. July, 1677; Jenkins to Williamson; P.R.O. S.P. 103/86.

/of their dilemma and despair from Don Pedro who is said to have answered with resignation to the Papal Nuncio who told him the news: "What are we to do? It is better to throw oneself out of the window than from the top of the roof."(1) In brighter vein, they seem to have enjoyed an active social life in the town which our protagonist disparagingly referred to as a "corral de vacas"(2) and he himself obtained a good reputation, as at the actual conferences. (see appendix)

Navarro says that Don Pedro did most of the work for the Spanish delegation at Nimeguen,(3) which appears to be true enough, for he was certainly its most prominent member for the longest period. Apart from short visits to Brussels and the Hague, he remained at the Congress until mid-April, 1678. That spring, the Duke of Villahermosa, was finding it necessary to form an advisory Junta política to help him with the desperate problems in the Low Countries. Lacking suitable persons for this, he asked Madrid to let Ronquillo come to him at least temporarily, as the Marqués de la Fuente had already been diverted to Nimeguen. There seems to be no truth in his having been transferred because he favoured acceptance of Louis' terms.(4)

During the first meetings of the junta, Villahermosa had to complain of Don Pedro's pride and punctilio in them and there seems to have been some reason for his complaining. However, Ronquillo settled/

(1) La Fuente, Vol XII; 158.
(2) 19th. March, 1677; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.
(3) Navarro: I, f. 195
(4) St. Didier, 115. Navarro I, f. 266.

/settled down and his useful advice was freely sought for several years by the Governor and in that body. (see appendix)

The principal question of these early days of May, 1678, and the first one placed before the junta for deliberation was the pros and cons for war or peace and how to prosecute the first. Don Pedro gave a lengthy opinion, which, briefly, advocated not rushing at a peace but waiting until further information was available.(1) Within the next few days however, the situation in the Low Countries made Ronquillo alter his opinion as to the one generally held, that peace must be made at once. Nonetheless the rumour of his being in favour of continuing the struggle, placed his person in danger from the wrath of the Brussels burghers.(2) That summer, Don Pedro also conferred with the Dutch Van Beverningh at Antwerp. In September, the Treaty of Nimeguen began to be signed, and though our friend saw its necessity under the circumstances, he was grateful not to have to put his name to it.(3) For him it was but a preliminary to further action, and just after its ratification, he wrote: "With this (the ratification) we see ourselves beyond the care of so great business, though we cannot do less than enter another of no less an in quietude and size, for we must begin to rebuild from the foundations. But God, as Lord of all, will help us, that the justice of our cause be re-established once more."(4)

(1) Ibid. 655.
(2) A.G.R. (Haye) 212. (also Lonchay (correspondance) Vol.V.,p.302)
(3) Navarro I. f. 267
(4) 21st. Dec. 1678, Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3956.

From then on, apart from his work in the junta, Don Pedro was engaged with odd jobs. When the Marqués de los Balbases passed through Brussels en route from Nimeguen to Paris, he conferred with Don Pedro and Villahermosa on the arrangements for Carlos' II's marriage to Marie Louise. Navarro says his master formed the consulta of their decisions "as he executed it by my hand."(1) Afterwards, he was at least appointed to accompany the Duke of York in Flanders. (see appendix) By the end of 1678, he was petitioning the Consejo de Estado for a post.(2) His secretary tells us that Don Pedro personally hoped to be appointed to Vienna as ambassador. However, a Spaniard was not chosen, Navarro also says, owing to the strained relations over the breaking off of the long-intended Austrian marriage for Carlos and the conclusion of the French one;(3) and Don Pedro as one of the agents in forging the latter would hardly be very welcome then at the Imperial Court. He now accompanied the Governor about the Low Countries a considerable amount and at Ghent in March 1679, he helped greatly in obtaining a subsidy for the government of a size rarely obtained in better times. While there Villahermosa and Ronquillo learnt of the death of Don Juan. Navarro estimates that Don Pedro lost less through this than the Governor on the grounds that he had lacked the prince's support anyway principally in the unexpected departure from Nimeguen and the appointment to Vienna./

(1) Maura (CarlosII), II, 42. Navarro I, F. 269-270.
(2) 21st. Dec. 1678; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3956.
(3) Navarro I, f. 275.

By this time anyway, Ronquillo had made a name which none could gainsay. During these months his enemies in the Low Countries were at work, but though adept at forestalling them, Don Pedro tired of this and was glad, therefore, when news reached him of his re-appointment to England. But until his departure for London, though not in the junta, he continued to help the Governor unofficially. Neither his health nor his finances had improved and these combined to help to delay his going for ten months. (see Appendix)

Ronquillo's thoughts had never been completely divorced from the questions of Spanish-British relations during the interim. As we know, the contacts with the Count of Bristol "the confidant" were kept up, but with even greater secrecy for there was reason to believe that the French had got hold of Ronquillo's first letter on their meeting outside London.

In a letter written that summer of 1676, the Count felt that if peace were concluded before England was completely separated from France, Spain would be the loser from an attack on her in the Indies. An army of five hundred men were already prepared to force free trade there in the coming year. However, he continued, the francophobia general in England was favourable to Spain's regaining Jamaica if she would pay any sum the French would be willing to pay for it plus allowing free trade in the Caribbean. Two things were of prime importance to England:

1) the fear of French influence in Sicily and the Mediterranean, and

2) the hope of commerce in the Indies.

Bristol pressed that such arranging should be completed before Parliament met the next spring; and that there might not be "long deliberations to whose prolixity when there are deeds, are imputed all Spain's misfortunes", before obtaining "an indissoluble union" between England and herself.

Ronquillo's comments on this letter to the Consejo de Estado are more interesting to us. To begin with, he countered the Council's opposition to the arguments of the March letter; that a Spanish-British alliance would not be so valuable as the present ones; that it would alienate the other allies and require excessive subsidies; and therefore that the policy should remain one of keeping England neutral with Charles and Parliament divided. First of all, Don Pedro painted Spain's position in dark colours, one which was obvious to all. Such a treaty would not be merely the observance of what was stipulated on a piece of paper, because the regaining of Jamaica would eliminate the (at present necessary) expense of maintaining defensive fleets in the Indies. Parliament's fear of France would lead it to support any war with Louis, which would not be as expensive as one against Holland. As far as the allies and other powers were concerned, both the Dutch and Portuguese were keen enough and Holland might pay subsidies, while the allies in the north were worried by English aid to Sweden. The Balance of Power was important and it was changing.

Secondly, while Parliament could not propose the King's declaring war, it could oblige him, particularly in wartime, to execute justice on his vassals' behalf -- as for example in matters of trade. York could be neutralised and both brothers could work against France. Besides the conditions of British Catholics could be improved.

Thirdly, Don Pedro pointed out, the King and kingdom could not continue in the "slow disunion" of heretofore. On the one hand, Charles needed money; on the other, though interest and passion, and not because they loved the Spanish particularly, the English hated the French. To satisfy his subjects, Charles would have to separate himself from France and grant them practically all his prerogatives. He would then get what he wanted and more, if he would sacrifice a couple of ministers which would not be new nor difficult to do.

The alternative was the sale of Jamaica to France with Charles backing Louis, which would mean another English civil war with trouble for Spain, not only in America but in Europe -- for "the French King is at hand to take foot in England under the pretext of aiding his cousin." This would rouse the Dutch and Parliament might not then grant him money, but Charles would, nevertheless, be able to give Spain trouble if this happened. Then Don Pedro closed his letter: "If it is probable that in war an alliance with him (Charles) should be useful, it is clear that to preserve peace, it is necessary."

The Council's reaction to this plan was, that there was no money to bring England over to the Austrian party by this means just then. The confidant was to be kept in touch with for later on funds might be to hand for this. ~~In the future.~~ The Council of the Indies was also to be consulted on points in the letter touching its sphere (1).

In the middle of January, 1677, Ronquillo forwarded another letter from Bristol which described the situation and stressed the need of unity to defeat Louis -- a united England united to Spain and the confederates. He wrote: "The only way I can find to involve Parliament in making this salutary representation is through instances from the body of merchants who are disturbed at the present state of Sicily and alight with the hope of seeing the way opened for commerce with the Indies." However, the Earl still had to admit that the prospect of buying or selling Jamaica was still vague. Lastly he re-affirmed that any possibility of a treaty depended on the steps taken by Spain and what benefit England could promise herself from it (2).

The last letter of "the confidant" I have seen is of 1st February, 1677, which stressed the need for a Spanish minister of "capacity and authority" in London for anything to be attained, and ended with the warning that the present opportunities would certainly be lost if there was dilatoriness on Spain's part (3).

(1) 1st Sept, 1676; Ronquillo to Señor: Sim. Estado(Ing)2552.
(2) 15th Jan, 1677; ibid. Legajo 2553.
(3) 1st Feb., 1677; confidant of Ronquillo; ibid.

On 20/30th March, 1677,[1] Bristol died and Ronquillo told Don Juan that with this he was left without any useful correspondents in England, emphasising the importance of the loss of the Earl as sole advisor of the Treasurer, and of a correspondence thought proper by him (Danby).[2] Don Pedro had also been pressing Don Juan to use his influence on behalf of a Spanish-British treaty and final mention of this is found in a letter of 21st June, 1677, in which Don Pedro sums up information he had obtained on English plans in the Indies. According to Ronquillo, the English had an idea of having a viceroy over all the islands under their control; communications with the South Seas were to be encouraged as the possibility of new realms there was tempting to the English and particularly the Duke of York. These projects had been started by the renegade Peñalosa and Morgan had left them in the power of Bristol "in whose hands I saw some". The naming of such a viceroy was, in fact, being discussed just previous to Ronquillo's leaving London, and it had caused a struggle between York and Monmouth, which Don Pedro says he cunningly fomented to delay the matter, and the resolution was changed. Charles had asked for those papers from Bristol in order to take counsel on them.[3]

All these letters may seem a disjointed and unbalanced mass of vague plans, hypotheses and even lies -- and that is indeed just what they were. Yet they show the thoughts that were blowing in the wind,

(1) D.N.B.
(2) Navarro, I, f.179.
(3) ibid, 189-196.

the widespread preparation for some alliance between the two countries and Don Pedro's attitude towards it.

x x x x

And so it came about that the Duke of Villahermosa took matters into his own hands to press ahead this commonly-felt need by sending Ronquillo "the head of this negotiation" to London with the highest powers he, the Governor, could muster. In justifying his action he said it had already helped to stiffen the Dutch stand with France.(1)

Before closing this section, it might be mentioned that the Baron de Vique was prepared to go to London also to help on the alliance. Though delayed in fact by illness, he sent the English authorities some advice. ~~on any alliance.~~ He warned against the English accepting the inclusion of the Indies in it, which he said the Spanish would insist un; that they and the Dutch were keen to know all treaties "how secret soever with France"; that England could not expect Spain to supply forces equal to her own; that there was no thought, though they might seem inclined to it, of exchanging the Spanish Netherlands for anything else. Don Pedro himself was averse to the last point and "it is convenient his Majesty know that he is great with the Duke of Medinaceli, that his representations will carry great sway with the said first minister and the Council of Spayne,"

(1)10th May, 1680; Fuenmayor to Villahermosa: Sim.Estado(Ing),3957 - quotation.
22nd May: Villahermosa to Señor: ibid.

and "it is necessary that the King make much of him."

For the actual good of Spain, England must insist on the maintenance of a certain number of foot and horse in Flanders, and indeed the Governor there would be grateful for such a stipulation. As a last point, De Vique generalised that if there were to be universal resistance to Louis, he could be reduced to the terms of the Pyrenean peace, but if not he could be the master of Christendom.(1)

To start to win again what had been lost by his country since 1659 through doing everything possible to foster this universal resistance to Louis and to challenge universal domination by France was Don Pedro Ronquillo's uppermost thought as he hastened to the conclusion of the long discussed and anticipated alliance with England.

(1)15/25 May, 1680; Baron de Vique; P.R.O. S.P. 77/52

THE TREATY OF WINDSOR. 1680-2.

I. Political Outline.

a) The Conclusion of the Treaty.

It was on 24th May that Don Pedro Ronquillo arrived at Greenwich, after crossing the Channel from Ostend.(1) Immediately he sent off his aid-de-camp to Windsor, whither he himself followed the next day from Wild House. Then, after a few more days in London, while the English ministers gathered at Windsor, he returned there once again to take part in the negotiations in all earnestness. In London Don Pedro told Jenkins that "Charles must make an alliance with Spain and that it must not be a visionary one."(2)

The first report of Ronquillo's activities to his master in Madrid was his despatch of 3rd June;(3) and it gives us more light on why Villahermosa had taken the matter into his own hands despite royal orders to the contrary. Don Pedro says that the declarations of the French commissioner at the Conference of Courtrai had forced the Governor on ; (see Appendix) and how French troops' presence on the border certainly gave him reason to expect their threatened arrival in the Low Countries promptly after July 15th. Something had to be done to forestall Louis. Not only must the opportunity of the alliance not be lost, but slow action also risked the total separation of the Dutch from Spain. To wait for the Emperor in order to help unified action between both sides of the House of Austria -- a

(1) Navarro, I, f.282 et. seq.
(2) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic - 1679-80) in letter of Jenkins to Sunderland, p.494.
(3) 3rd June, (1) 1680. Ronquillo to Señor. Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.

reason put forward by Madrid - - would, claimed Don Pedro, be needless, since Leopold had already admitted the necessity for some type of agreement. However, Don Pedro was also careful to point out in this letter that the object of the alliance was "not to enter an immediate war with France, but to restrain her torrent and so stand by and preserve the peace." Without this alliance there would be no hope of England or Holland helping to save Spain.

As for Charles: if he was faithful, not only would Spain have a bulwark but he, himself, would have one against a civil war in England - - which it was also in Spain's interest to avoid. But, on the other hand, should he not be so, Spain would have proof of this and his own parliament and people would have "an irrefutable case" against him. And, ready for all eventualities, Ronquillo intended to keep on good terms with both parties in the country.

Don Pedro then returned to justifying the making of an alliance rather than a "guarantee". A simple guarantee of the Nimeguen peace could be interpreted by Louis or the Spanish in different senses. 'The obligation of the Guarantee is to the Peace, of the Defensive League to the ally". Also remembering Charles' actions in the past, Spain's confidence in just a guarantee was 'not even prudent'. Besides his people, on whose funds he would undoubtedly depend in any war on Spain's behalf, were warned by the past and would not grant supply to maintain a guarantee. Neither were

the Dutch interested in anything but an alliance. Reaching the conclusion of his despatch, the ambassador reaffirmed: "The only way to contain the ambition of France is to put her in fear, for in dealing with her, neither attention, nor courtesy, nor any other remedy is enough." No moderation could be expected from Louis unless England was not subjecting herself to his will and bribery. In short, the approaching alliance was viewed by Ronquillo as an absolute necessity.

The French ambassador, Barillon, was telling Charles that his master was merely taking over villages through the reunions, to which the King replied that one village and then another village soon made a whole country, and that he wished to know Louis' intentions. This kind of reply made Don Pedro hopeful for the future, though he was not free of anxiety, for Charles had told him that the powers of Villahermosa were not enough to conclude the league. It was three months since the Marquis of Burgomayne had written for royal powers which had not arrived and he, Charles, presumed that His Catholic Majesty did not wish an alliance. What also did not increase Ronquillo's confidence was Barillon's pressing this point with the King. And so, until the alliance was definitely arranged, he did not dare assure his master of anything.(1) Afterwards Don Pedro wrote that the negotiations had not gone sosmoothly as had appeared. What had been some of these difficulties ? (see Appendix)

(1) 17th June (1) 1680: Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado (Ing)3957.

Daily conferences had been taking place at Windsor between the ambassador and the leading ministers, both individually and collectively, though no final decision could be reached until the Council met on June 18th (1). At these it was first decided, on the word of the Dutch envoy, Ven Leeuwen, that the powers Ronquillo had with him were sufficient to proceed, for they had been enough to conclude the treaties of the North made during the previous war. What also appears to have contibuted to the decision was that Barillon had overpressed his argument that Villahermosa's were not adequate. Nonetheless, Don Pedro continued to urge Madrid to send those of Carlos II to make sure that every point was in order. This decision of the negotiators was, however, a major victory, eliminating as it did delay, when time was such an important factor.

The form of the league was settled as had been planned hitherto, and Charles himself felt it should be patterned on the Dutch treaty of 1673 since that had been made during and for a crisis.

One difficulty was that the English did not wish to include a clause for united defence of all parts of the Spanish Empire, but only one for those parts of it held peaceably. Ronquillo was able to win this point, but England wanted to be sure of Spanish defence preparations in Flanders, that Spain would be ready to do her part in any eventuality. For three days, the ministers held out for a stipulation, vital to the execution of the alliance by England or Holland (who was under existing arrangements committed to aiding Spain) namely that 35,000 infantry,

(1) 17th June(2); ibid.

5,000 cavalry and 100,000 reals per month subsidies be ready for any emergency. Don Pedro held that no sovereign could tell another how to defend himself and that if the English persisted in this demand, he would return to the Low Countries. At this threat, the ministers, he claims, backed down and only asked that his Catholic Majesty be told they had suggested this. It was finally agreed that England was to furnish 8,000 foot and 30 vessels for the defence of any part of the Spanish territories attacked; to be sent three months before open war was declared; while Spain herself promised to maintain an army of 12,000 men, her fortifications in a state of defence and 100,000 reals per month subsidies in readiness. Incidentally, Ronquillo was pleased that Charles anticipated the Dutch obligation to supply equivalent forces to England (1).

This stage reached, the whole project was minuted in French, and presented to Charles for study. This meant that Jenkins must now be called upon, as both Secretaries of State had to be commissioners of the treaty, and it was this just, if over-legally-minded and cautious man, who brought up an hitherto unforeseen point (2). The English ministers wanted Holland to declare that her treaty with Spain as well as her one with England implied guarding the Nimeguen peace. This, Jenkins affirmed, would mean a new treaty being made as, he claimed, the Spanish-Dutch alliance had expired because it was an offensive alliance, made only for war. It was evident that a clause touching

(1) 23rd June(2); ibid.
(2) ibid.

Holland would be null if Holland would not guarantee the Peace of Nimeguen. A new treaty, the impatient Ronquillo saw, would mean much passing through of hands and probably a division in Dutch backing; therefore he was for Holland not being included, at least for the present, in that way. The English ministers themselves were divided; Hyde and Sidney Godolphin stood by the Northern Secretary, while the others, including the powerful Sunderland, were of Ronquillo's opinion. Charles himself checked Jenkins for quibbling but the real deciding factor was Van Leeuwen backing Don Pedro, giving a minute to the Council, which was written down by Godolphin and only known to five of them and the King. Van Leeuwen was to go and see the Pensionary concerning it and the decision of the States General, and the way to settling this question harmoniously was begun (see Appendix).

And so, when on the evening of Corpus Christi, 20th June, and less than a month after his arrival, Don Pedro Ronquillo signed the alliance with Sunderland, Laurence Hyde, Jenkins and Sidney Godolphin, and "with the aid of God and His immaculate Mother", he had obtained for his country almost all he had aimed at (1). There are few letters of Ronquillo which reflect more triumph than the one of 23rd June when he officially reported the news to his King (2):

"I confess to Your Majesty that I made very particular efforrts, and even over resolute, than on this so solemn day of the highest devotion of Your Majesty, your forefathers and the whole Most August House,

(1) 23rd June (2); ibid. See P.R.O. S.P.104/187.
(2) 23rd June (1); Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado(Ing)3957.

there might be signed an alliance which has been so greatly desired and which is the first to be made with the Kings of the House of Stuart, since the other treaties have been only of peace and friendship. God, our Lord, sent forth and made great all the glorious ancestors of Your Majesty through their devotion to and veneration of the Most Holy Sacrament; His Divine Majesty has also granted that on the day on which this festival is celebrated by Christendom, the more solid foundations considered in this alliance might be laid that the Monarchy of Your Majesty and of all the House of Austria be re-established in its former ancient splendour; and that thereby they also in this Kingdom may begin to reflect on the Holy Catholic faith, for I hold that without doubt it is the most effective way to attain this Holy Intent."

What were the Spanish Council of State's reactions to their representatives' disobedient activity in the North ? On 10th June, they sent orders telling Ronquillo to proceed, but intentionally they did not commend Villahermosa's action in sending him to London with the gubernatorial powers. By twelve days later, however, not only had 'extraordinary' despatches been sent to commend Don Pedro for his work; but also to the Duke for his. When the news of the actual signing reached Madrid, the enthusiasm of the Council was obvious and they ordered the agreement not only to be ratified, but extended if possible to include other powers and a separate article on religion. (1)

(1) Consultas for 10th June; 22nd June; 14th July.
Sim.Estado(Ing) 3957.

In England Don Pedro was still attending to the minutiae of the alliance to see that its validity could never be challenged by any. The question of the correct powers was perhaps the most important. As requested by him, the royal powers arrived and the Dyke of Villahermosa's were returned, but when they came, it was found that they were dated after the actual signing of the alliance. Fearful of Jenkins' and others' "speculations", Don Pedro asked for new ones dated from 1st June, as well as duplicates and triplicates in case any further parallel treaties might be concluded in the immediate future. Another point was the mutual exchange of agreements already made by both countries. Spain had no reason not to make a clean breast of hers, and so she did; with Charles, honesty must have been more awkward, but Don Pedro seems to have believed the lie that he had made no arrangements with France since 1671.(1)

How was the conclusion of the alliance welcomed in England itself ? Officially, it was warmly received but only as a first step to something greater. There was no swashbuckling since its principal aim as far as Charles was concerned was to preserve peace. The English envoys abroad were ordered to acknowledge the treaty if questioned about it, but to answer in a peaceful way so as to annoy no one, not even the French. They were to,class it as "purely defensive and inducing no other obligation but that the Kings should defend each other in their present peace and possessions".(2) As for the country

(1) 26th Aug (4); 1680; Ronquillo to Señor. ibid.
(2) 11th June; Jenkins to Bevil Skelton; see Cal.of State Papers (Domestic) 1679-80, 509.
11th June: Sunderland to Bulstrode; P.R.O. S.P. 104/187.

itself, the Dutch ambassador wrote home that it had met with "seer groote approbatie" in the Kingdom and that he himself anticipated its proving a powerful means of uniting the people with their King.(1) But there also existed differing opinions which were to show themselves more clearly in the approaching Parliament sessions, and those who disagreed 'lived quietly' meanwhile biding their time and not averse to accepting or spreading rumours of a secret article in the new league. The French party were, of course, the mainstay of such an 'opposition'.

(1) 15/25 June; Van Leeuwen to States-General; R. Liassen (St. Gen), (England), 6926.

b) Towards the Autumn Parliament of 1680.

So intensive had been Don Pedro's labours for the signing of the Treaty of Windsor, that it is only after its conclusion that his letters provided much idea of the actual position in which he found himself.

The primary aim of his work that summer was to try as hard as he could to see the alliance just made include other powers, and he was optimistic regarding the future of such a confederacy. He wrote: "If God preserves us this summer, we can probably expect the preservation of the Peace, for it is common knowledge that this confederation alone can be the remedy for all that is suffered and feared from the pride and power of France"(1). Ronquillo thought Charles should devote his attention principally to the winning over of Leopold, since, then, many of the smaller powers, both within and without the Empire, would be encouraged to follow suit. Though Don Pedro was not to take part in the actual negotiations, still, he was to do all he could to encourage them; and the Consejo de Estado was in close touch with the Austrian authorities through Burgomayne at Vienna. Charles sent the Earl of Middleton, (incidentally formerly serving in the armies in Flanders and a friend of Ronquillo), to the Imperial Court that summer to replace someone untrusted by the Emperor. In turn, Leopold appointed Count Thun to London. Don Pedro says he got Charles to send feelers via Sidney, the envoy sent the Electors and Princes of the Rhine, to assure them of England's

(1) 23rd June (2), 1680; Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado(Ing)3952.

desire to maintain peace with non-aggression and so offset any French rumour of the formation of a Protestant league (1).

The success of these efforts, it was recognised by all, would be largely affected by the King's success in the domestic field, and Don Pedro was no less active here, though with his eyes ever on the continental horizon (see Appendix). Specifically, the ambassador put himself to obtaining a parliament as soon as possible and preparing for its support of the King and the alliances. He favoured, therefore, no new parliament being elected but the old one meeting in October, and, against the opposition of York's party, this was carried, largely on the grounds of external relations (2). Charles was trying to unite with the kingdom at almost any price short of accepting the exclusion of his brother from the succession and royal prerogatives. Only by this policy of reconciliation, Don Pedro pointed out, could he have any chance of winning the love of his vassals and clear them of the suspicion that he was conspiring against their liberty. He would insensibly always gain something this way whilst by the other in the past he had experienced a daily lessening of respect for the royal dignity. Charles assured Don Pedro that "neither woman, brother nor courtiers" would move him from the promise of a session that Autumn of 1680 (3). As a matter of fact, the Spaniard would have been glad to have seen it even earlier. He wrote: "My plan is to gain every possible instant in obtaining agreement between the King and

(1) 23rd June (3); ibid.
(2) Ranke, Vol.IV, 101.
(3) 8th Aug, 1680: Ronquillo to Señor. Sim,Estado (Ing) 3957.

and his kingdom, that England may the sooner be ready to face France and the necessary measures taken either by herself or her allies and that this may be disposed for March or April."(1) The alliance might be a defensive one on paper, but our friend looked on it as a probable means of regaining his country's former position -- in other words, as an offensive one as well.

However, he realised the fear of civil war among the majority who were trying to avoid an occasion for it. Approving of Charles' policy of legality, Ronquillo condemned York's actions in fulfilling France's wishes of setting discord between the Crown and its subjects, but he did not feel James would be so blind as not to know that "to change course and avail himself of France is to be lost forever" (see Appendix). As regards the ambassador's actual manipulation of the M.Ps, he was mostly in touch with the moderates, who, while wanting the King to go against France, were not bent on his ruin. He was able to get Fonseca allowed back as Resident in London for the Spanish Low Countries, in time to help him with this.(2) But Don Pedro was not to be uncriticised in this field. In Flanders it was said that the Commons were not as much in favour of Spain as he said, and that he himself was only attached to the King. (see Appendix)

By the end of August, things were more hopeful regarding "the foundation of this whole structure". The King and his brother were

(1) ibid. Charles promised an earlier session, should the
(2) Navarro I, f. 299-300. / Emperor enter the league at once. (12th Aug(1); ibid)

now favourable to an early session and the popular position seemed less threatening. Ronquillo claims that the people saw him as partially responsible for this early meeting, and that from this both Charles and his own royal master would derive profit (1).

Yet distrust of Charles continued and there was little action by the Emperor. For example, some of the Parliament members favoured an alliance with the Emperor, providing him with subsidies for an army, rather than trust their own king with one. This treaty could have been made that summer from the English side but Count Thun was long in coming and when he did, he arrived with orders only "to reconnoitre the state of the realm and report" (see Appendix). He had not reached London by 9/19 August, when the ratifications of the Treaty of Windsor were exchanged, and Jenkins writes of that event as follows:

> "The ceremony put us in mind of what the Spanish ambassador has promised us of the Emperor's speedy coming into the alliance. He was minded of it fully today. We are not much edified that Count Thun is so long coming." (2)

Even after the envoy had arrived, no powers were added to his commission, as week succeeded week and month passed into month, and there was also the possibility of the Count's leaving. Indeed the Emperor, like the other European nations apart from Spain, was waiting to see well what Parliament would do. Don Pedro understood this but felt Thun should at least have had powers that would allow immediate action on the proposal after seeing the turn the Parliament might take.

(1) 26th Aug (2); ibid.
(2) Cal. of State Papers - Domestic (1679-1680), 595.

He was beginning to feel that, in the circumstances, it would not be England's fault if she did not aid Austria before the French should have reasons for attacking her, and England also hinted the Emperor did not wish the alliance. The tragedy was that with every week, as the English King and ministers saw the cool reception in Vienna and elsewhere of their plan, they themselves began to grow cooler and to look around for alternatives. Then, when French aggression made the tardy Imperialists see the need for the league, the English official attitude and policy had changed (1). And the success of the Spanish treaty was inextricably connected with the conclusion of these parallel agreements.

(1) Rumours of a change in English policy were evidently current in Flanders as early as April, 1681. 'Memoires secrets d'Adrien Foppens' (for 27th April, p.418):
"Le roy d'Angleterre tesmoigne aussi ouvertement de ne plus vouloir faire aucune alliance avec l'Empereur, n'y avec les princes d'Allemagne."

However, as the autumn came and passed, Don Pedro was encouraged by the already mentioned Dutch support of the Treaty of Windsor -- though he knew that this had been obtained largely because there was no stipulation about subsidies.(1) Although no powers had yet arrived for Count Thun,(2) Don Pedro was now active in trying to forge yet another link in the league -- a defensive alliance between Spain and Portugal through the agency of Charles II. The Consejo de Estado duly sent powers and permission to Ronquillo to use "extraordinary" means for the agreement's conclusion, that is to say, he need not report to Madrid on the negotiations in any case of haste. There was talk of such an alliance for many months to come, but the San Gabriel dispute in America really ended the possibility (see Appendix).

On the domestic scene, the situation was now no more encouraging. Ronquillo had been optimistic, noting that the league was gaining popularity among the Parliament members,(3) but soon he saw them, not only all of differing opinions, but united in one which was not in Spain's interest. It was this, namely that despite any importance of the alliance just made, they must first settle domestic affairs, in particular the Exclusion question. But Don Pedro did what he could to turn their eyes away from such disturbing subjects towards the troubles of the Continent. The clearest exposition of his position is in a letter of November 4th, 1680:

(1) 4th Nov(3), 1680; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado(Ing) 3952?
(2) 21st Oct(7), ibid.
(3) 21st Oct (5); Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado(Ing) 3957.

"I have not spoken, nor shall I speak on this matter (the Exclusion) . . . Noting that I do not mix in their internal affairs, these men respect more highly that which concerns Your Majesty which is the execution of the League, to which, until now, I find in them no opposition but rather a particular inclination and desire to humble the pride of France, though always on the condition of first composing their domestic affairs. And I also abstain from this kind of conversation because I know that the Dutch do not dissent from the exclusion of the Duke of York and that if I were to take another line, it would disunite us. I also believe, like them, that whatever way the King and kingdom come to terms, our interests will then go well, and that as long as this King lives, the country will remain quiet. After that, in my opinion, the exclusion will touch the Duke of York but little, if in the meantime he knows how to govern himself within and without England with a real understanding of his interests." (see Appendix)

The Council in Madrid concurred in such a policy. However, there was little sign of any such composition and our observer was apprehensive about the ever-increasing indications of conspiracy, as well as strength, among the opposition. Yet though cold towards this opposition -- foreseeing that if they went too far they would only bring on themselves hatred and disunity -- he felt Charles was partially to blame by asking the impossible condition of an absolute assurance on the succession. In other words, Don Pedro, though basically favouring the royalists,

favoured concession from both sides in the domestic situation.(1)

This carries us right into the midst of the Autumn parliament of 1680. Charles in his opening speech urged unity, telling the Houses how keenly all Europe was watching them and the sessions result. If it was recalcitrant "gratifying our enemies and discouraging our friends", as the King put it, the world would see it was no fault (see appendix) of his. His supporters, among them Temple, who had not been sent to Madrid as envoy as planned, in order to be present to help, re-echoed this, and Sir William made a special reference to the hopes of the Catholic powers.(2)

Yet Ronquillo was becoming suspicious of Charles. On the evening of the presentation of his view on the exclusion of his brother, Charles did not seem so worried to the ambassador as he usually was after such an event.(3) Then, a few days later, came the dissolution and the calling of an entirely new parliament to Oxford for the coming spring. This was a hard blow to Ronquillo and he wrote to his master at 1 a.m. that night:

"This last event troubles me considerably: and even more the knowledge of the influence his brother's spirit has had with the King. And may this not be the avenue through which France can negotiate. But I must not give up until my final breath, particularly if the Most Christian King does not attack Luxembourg or that fortress is in a state of defence."(4)

(1) 9th. Dec. 1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Inglaterra) 3958.
9th. Dec. 1680; Ronquillo to Coloma; ibid.
(2) ibid, 415.
(3) 20th. Jan. 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Inglaterra) 3958.
(4) [redacted] 27th. Jan. 1681; ibid.

c) Towards the Oxford Parliament and including it.

France was increasingly taking advantage of the delay and uncertainty to keep Charles and his people divided and make them her tools. Ronquillo's opposition to this was to try and prevent French influences from reaching the easily approachable King, especially until the sewing up of the planned confederation. For example, Don Pedro claimed he had succeeded in getting the visiting Marquis de Bellefond's attendance at Newmarket -- ostensibly for the horse racing -- put off.(1) But such attempts often made the ambassador appear ridiculous and annoyed the English ministers. They also proved inadequate and impracticable, for the French agents who riddled the Court were still able to show Charles the riches he could gain by switching once more to co-operation with Louis and to point out that the monarchy would be finished should he make any concession on the Exclusion. James, they persuaded not to cede on any point; and they paid rash and unscrupulous radical M.Ps and told them that now was the time to press the Exclusion and their other pretensions. Our observer was quite aware of these activities, for he mentions them in his despatches.(2) Money, of course, was France's great key in these dealings -- and it was one which Don Pedro did not have. On 21st. October, he wrote that Barillon had received £1250 that week "to do much in Parliament, but more in the Court."(3)

(1) 9/23rd. Sept. 1680; ibid 3957
(2) 9th. Sept. 1680; ibid.
(3) 21st. Oct. (6); ibid.

Again on the 4th. of the month following, he mentions him receiving more than 500,000 crowns and that in four days, the previous week, the French minister had changed 70,000 guineas, more than 250,000 crowns, from silver into gold. These figures were probably not correct, but I give them to show that Don Pedro was alert to the danger and watching it. Of the anxieties all this produced in him, he wrote: "I do not fear the Parliament so much as the Court which has always been corruptible and those that persuade the King to this opinion are known for such. Not for that do I cease to have partliament members by whom convenient diligences are made to learn the discourses and bribes of the French ambassador." All this required money and Don Pedro indicated the moral with the fact of his financial lack: what were his reasonings worth against the gifts of France while the English were "the most mercenary people in the world?" The Council in Madrid said they would try and send something.(1)

Yet the Spanish alliance and friendly attitude to Spain had never been uncriticised throughout the country and now this helped the French party considerably. The roots of this lay deep in the Englishman's insularity, but practically speaking, the core of criticism was to be found in the following arguments. The Spanish allies might prove a burden from whom little good could be obtained in return. That clause of the treaty stipulating the defence of the whole Spanish Empire was particularly disliked; and many feared England's/

(1) 4th. Nov. (2); ibid.

/England's being dragged into the Spanish-Portuguese dispute over San Gabriel or into the current wrangle over the Brandenburgers pressing the Spanish ship, the "Carlos II" in Ostend, (see p.218). Such an article was also not popular with those who had ambitions on the trade and other riches of the Indies. All this the French party played up, saying that England had gained nothing by the Treaty of Windsor. They continued to abet the popular rumour of a secret article, covering mutual assistance in "intestine troubles"; and the fear of Spanish Catholic aid to Charles in any civil war was inherent in this. The King's ministers' slowness in submitting the alliance to Parliament was noted with suspicion, and many felt the Houses would have seen how useless the actual terms were to the projected aim of defending Flanders and preserving peace. For example, military aid had only to be sent within three months to the Low Countries which, they said, could be easily conquered in one. In short, though the English as a whole were for an alliance with Spain against France, not a few lacked faith in this one. It seemed but another method devised by Charles to raise money and an army to oppress them and probably aid France and Catholicism. By the autumn, they also saw how the other European nations were hanging back from joining the proposed confederacy for the same reason and thus ruining the plan. It was in fact the old story of the frequent liar who found himself unbelieved, even though this time he might be telling the truth.

And/

/And then domestic affairs seemed to make everybody in England
(See appendix)
forget everything else, outside the island.

And yet with every week, the clouds of continued French aggression gathered more thickly and darkly. In September, the Conference of Courtrai had been dissolved with the question of the Burgundy title ostensibly settled,[1] which later on, Don Pedro was to claim to his credit through the alliance he concluded, having given Louis pause.[2] But already transgressions of the Nimeguen peace by the French King were accumulating. Louis had now turned his main efforts towards dividing the Emperor and Empire, but from the middle of September on, Don Pedro had cause to present a regular flow of memoires to the English King and authorities. There was French interference in Sardinia;[3] in the Low Countries, the "chambers of reunion" continued to absorb Spanish territory. Louis' aim in Belguim was obvious to all who wished to see, namely the isolation of Namur and Luxembourg from the other Spanish provinces in preparation for their being taken over. For the Spaniards, each annexation meant plans of possible defence had to be altered. These measures were, it may also be said, dilatory and ill-managed, hampered by lack of funds and lack of leadership in the new Governor, the mediocre Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma. It was swiftly passing from a situation demanding Charles' interference as mediator at the Congress of Nimeguen to that as Spain's ally. On receipt of the Spanish memoires, the English authorities would apply more or less pressure in London or Paris to obtain settlement, but even from the start there was/

(1) The last Memorial of the Spanish Ambassador, p. 230.
(2) 17th. May (2) 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado. (Ing) 3959.
(3) 21st. Oct. (2) 1680; ibid. 3957.

/was annoyance at Don Pedro's importunity. People dislike being reminded of their duty at the best of times; and many felt irritated by the ambassador always pointing to England's need of the Low Countries, while Spain herself did so little to protect them herself. Then, were they so essential to England -- worth a possible war with France when the country was so divided over domestic affairs? The truth is that Ronquillo saw clearly enough Louis' master plan and complained on small points, knowing these would lead to greater breaches of the treaties -- but to many English ministers, not so vitally concerned, these memoires often just seemed picayune. There is one of these memoires that is typical however, worth consulting and easily available.(1)

The Spanish position was weakened considerably by the bickering amongst their own personalities. For example, in the spring, just before the Oxford Parliament, the Prince of Parma sent an emissary, the Count de Prades, to obtain a licence from Charles for the recruitment of three tercios of English troops. Not even Don Pedro had been consulted on this before the Count's arrival; and Ronquillo, fearful of Parliament's possibly being roused by suspicions of Charles and York in this, got Prades not to present a letter of credence, for it was quite possible to see the King without it. Instead, the ambassador himself saw the King, and Charles told him he was/

(1) The last Memorial of the Spanish Ambassador.

/was quite willing to agree provided current pay was assured and gave other reasons that afforded Don Pedro yet more satisfaction for having suspended the letter. Farnese was furious at "this attempt to destroy a treaty that suits us so in the present state of affairs, going over (i.e. Ronquillo) to the opposing party without attending to more than the violence of his own passion." Ronquillo was however supported by Madrid, which ordered the Prince of Parma in future to communicate with those concerned when taking steps touching on their spheres of activity. (see appendix) As a matter of fact, the recruiting of troops for Spain had long been proceeding regularly in Ireland and was being helped there considerably by the English authorities, especially the Duke of Ormonde.(1) The Count of Prades waited on until the Oxford Parliament, where we meet him again in passing - - and in effect all England and Europe were now awaiting the session with him.

(1) Cal. of Manuscripts of Marquess of Ormonde; Hist. Man. Comm. Vol. VI.

The Oxford Parliament was a crisis, a turning point. The closely-woven fabric of 17th. Century affairs becomes yet closer and more tangled. Hitherto Spanish diplomatic despatches being written according to subject has helped us keep the threads of internal affairs fairly clear from those of external. At this juncture however, it is not possible from the nature of Don Pedro Ronquillo's activities and his letters, nor desirable so to divide the complete spirit of those days.

Ronquillo wrote in February, 1681, that many, including himself, felt that Charles had no option but to dissolve the recent Parliament, and that its dissolution was preferable to its prorogation, "Because", he explains, "if it had been prorogued, although all its acts would be null, nonetheless being the same Parliament, it would think it must persist in the same opinion." And although many members might be re-elected for a new one, still business would have a new start and the King's proposals could at least be put in a different form from his past ones. Almost all the ministers were now changed; and summing up the position left by the last session, he continues:

"What one must consider is that never before has Parliament spoken so harshly to the King as the House of Commons have in this one, nor has any spoken so frankly against France. . . Notwithstanding this, with the dismissal of Parliament this last has had no effect whatsoever; from which it is easy to see that it was never convenient

to/

/to stir up the members excessively, and also the circumspection needed in treating with the King and his kingdom."(1)

Two weeks later, Ronquillo was reporting his policy:

"I do what I can that His Majesty hold to the opinion he has expressed, and that the spirits (of the Parliament members) moderate forwarding as they do the destruction of Christendom through their discord."(2)

Nor was Don Pedro without money for this handling of the M.Ps.(3) In this, he did not confine himself to one party - and this was liable to criticism from the royalists. That year, Bulstrode recalling the '70s referred to "the old leaven" in a Spanish minister, trying to cause division by making up to the Whigs.(4) Actually, it was a policy of caution to be ready for any outcome in the general uncertainty. Charles himself, Don Pedro went on to the Marqués de los Balbases, was making cuts in his household expenses "to remove the belief of his Parliament that want of money must draw him into accepting the Exclusion; and in closing the letter the ambassador showed what party he really supported, by saying: "Please God, he (the King) may have better success at Oxford."(5)

Three weeks before the sitting in the university town, he wrote to Spain that the elections had been in an even more extreme vein than previously. "The King does not discover the slightest sign of his opinion./

(1) 10th. Feb. 1681; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.
(2) 24th. Feb; ibid.
(3) 24th. Feb. 1681; Ronquillo to Don Antonio Ronquillo (his brother); Bod; Tanner XXXVI f.236-7
(4) Letter of spring, 1681. P.R.O. S.P. 77/53.
(5) 24th. Feb. 1681; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.

/opinion. On the contrary, one begins to suspect that he has changed from the decision he gave to understand he held, of making plausible propositions at the opening of the coming Parliament. At this point and in this state of affairs, I am watching what time itself will unfold and availing myself of any opportunities of impressing on these men the importance of no delay in their applying themselves to affairs abroad. The changeability of these folk does not permit one to establish anything until seeing the course they take at Oxford."(1)

On 24th. March, just before setting out for Oxford, he reported the Fitzharris Plot against the King and that there was news every day that seemed impossible to imagine. But despite his great forebodings, Don Pedro told the Marquis of Balbases he would not lose hope.(2)

Personally, due to ill-health and lack of effective funds the journey to Oxford was not an easy one. However, he was anxious to be present and was husbanding his funds and taking asses' milk for the stone so he would be well enough to be there.(3)

(1) 10th. Mar; ibid.
(2) 24th. Mar; ibid.
(3) Ibid; also 24th. Feb; Ronquillo to Don Antonio Ronquillo; Bod. Tanner XXXVI, f. 236-7

Just at this very time, matters in the Low Countries were rapidly worsening. Louis, pretty well assured of the result of the Oxford Parliament and English pre-occupation, was going forward with his own plans. Pushing forward in the district of Chiny, French troops were getting closer and closer to the coveted Luxembourg. Only since mid-December, Ronquillo had presented at least three memoires to Charles on these activities. In these, he spoke of the infractions of the Nimeguen peace by France as "against all reason and justice, human and divine," appealing to Charles both as late mediator and present ally.(1) Now, these events urged the ambassador on to Oxford where he arrived on the evening of Saturday, the 29th. of March.

That very evening, he visited Charles, begging him to take such resolutions as would conteract recent French actions, and that, in his speech to Parliament, he might not omit mentioning the importance of standing by the alliances with foreign powers including Spain.

The next morning, Sunday, the 30th., Ronquillo presented a formal memoire to the King on the "invasion" of Luxembourg and the billeting of French troops in the district, referring also to his most recent instances and demanding that aid be sent to the Spanish according to the new alliance. In response to this plea, Charles sent hurried orders to Savile, the English minister in Paris, to see Louis. He also promised to speak to Barillon, which was done on Monday, - - the day the Parliament started./

(1) See Lonchay (Correspondence), Vol. V, p.363 et seq. Memoires of 19/29 Dec. 1680; 12/22 Jan. 1681; 6/16 March, 1681; 30/30 March, 1681 (latter in Sim. Estado (Fla) 3866)

Next Don Pedro received a letter from the Spanish envoy in Paris, the Marqués de la Fuente, reporting troop movements now also believed to be in the direction of Alost in West Flanders. He at once made a new representation to the King who again spoke to Barillon, and according to Don Pedro "it must have been with effect for immediately after he came to see me and asked what I knew of this." The Spaniard told the Frenchman the injustice of his master's breaking the Treaty of Nimeguen, which was largely based on those of the Pyrenees and Aix-la-Chapelle, about which he and Courtin should know as they had both been at those negotiations.

Don Pedro also spoke to the King, the Marqués de la Fuente's continued complaints of Savile, but with circumspection, so as not to arouse Charles or annoy the individual in question. Ronquillo himself -- and everybody, he says -- had never held the English ambassador in Paris to be a supporter of France, not even in the early '70s when she had the greater number of partisans in the Court. The orders to Savile were repeated on the Thursday, April 3rd., to co-operate closely with the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors in Paris and to understand that the business was not just for England as a dependant of Spain or because of alliances but in her own interest. Jenkins promised a copy of this letter to Ronquillo and the ambassador felt he could do no more at the time.(1) In some circles at least it/

(1) 4th. April; Ronquillo to Parma; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3866.

/it was being said that the 8000 troops for Flanders were to be raised speedily. (see appendix) One doubts whether our Spanish friend was so hopeful as he looked on at the Parliament. Nonetheless he and his partisans since his arrival in Oxford had been working with the Court and its party in the Houses that money might be granted so Charles would be able to wage war. But, as Navarro wrote many years later, "God knows if within himself, the King conformed to this intention; for his conduct always gave occasion to doubt it."(1)

The Parliament was as recalcitrant as ever. Charles' opening speech was that of "a determined monarch" and the Parliament was annoyed at his casting the blame for the dissolution of the last one on them. The "rebels" also resented hints that they could speak on any subject, bar the Exclusion. Don Pedro besides being worried by these discords, was anxious lest religion enter the arena openly to complicate matters even further; for an individual was, he reports, giving information on the Popish Plot which involved some Jesuits.(2)

By Thursday, the 3rd. of April, the Commons were as truculent and rebellious to the King and his wishes as they had ever been. In a letter to the Prince of Parma, telling of this, Ronquillo wrote: "Recognising the great risk to our interests in the Parliament, I have begun to discuss (in case it should not go favourably for them) what must be done here with the King, should the French go so far as/

(1) Navarro I, f. 312.
(2) 7th. April; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.

/as to declare war; and I have not lost the opportunity of communicating this to one of those persons who can accomplish more in this matter. I told this person that I could not tell him for sure if we would need sea more than land forces, but that in my opinion it was necessary that the King manage to raise thirty ships and some infantry. This was because he (the confidant) did not feel he could speak to the King until seeing the path Parliament took, for it was not well to let them understand any disposition in the King to this end, lest this moderate the anxiety they are in over the entrance of the French cavalry into Luxembourg (i.e. province) and the threat in my memoire's final clause; and no less, lest they enter into greater suspicion that the King has no need of them and hence take stronger resolutions in order to control him more." The ambassador did not know whether Charles would be able to provide ships and infantry "nor even assure anything on the part of the King", but asked Farnese and Fuenmayor to tell him what type of aid would be needed most. In his own eyes, a diversion at sea was the most important point; it would also be less difficult for Charles to provide ships, because recruiting of troops would make Parliament suspicious; besides Holland could probably supply men more easily than vessels. He urged the Governor to see to the defence of Ostend and Nieuport -- both gateways from England as well as from Spain.

The/

The Count de Prades had now presented his letter to Charles. Any fears of Ronquillo on the delicacy of recuiting troops seemed proven for he continued in this letter to Parma as follows, "Already there have been some who begin to cry out that we wish to take into our service Milord Douglas, who was Lieutenant-General in France, Milord Dunham who was a Brigadier and other Catholics, allowing themselves get alarmed thinking this would be to have troops in favour of the King. And I pass this on to Your Excellency so you can see the jealousy of this people in what touches the army. . " Lastly he asked the Prince for orders regarding assistance in case the Parliament should persevere in its animosities.(1)

Of the Saturday, he was writing to the Marqués de los Balbases on the following Monday, April 7th:

"On Saturday, the House of Commons spoke of the security of the religion, government and life of His Majesty. There was a great controversy over the Exclusion or expedients. Finally the first was voted and there was a row in which, at the same time, the accusation against Fitzharris failed in the House of Lords. At this they (the Commons) broke out horribly and everything was ruined; and believing this contrary to the laws, the Commons met in the afternoon and there was extravagant behaviour. With this I judge to you the Parliament is finished." At such a juncture, the Spanish proposition was/

(1) 4th. April; Ronquillo to Parma; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3866.

/was useless and would be so, unless the Parliament became more composed -- which Ronquillo felt was an impossibility.(1)

Writing to Carlos II on the same day, Don Pedro told him that understandably enough Jenkins had not been able to give him the promised copy of the latest despatches to Savile. He also told of how, foreseeing the shortness of the session, he had already written to Farnese for orders regarding what to do on its probable dissolution.(2)

Later on that very same day, the 7th, he wrote of Charles' sudden and dramatic dissolution of what was to be the last Parliament of the reign.

"My suspicions that the King might dismiss the Parliament on account of the dissension of the two Houses were so well founded, that His Britannic Majesty, recognising at Parliament's opening this morning, the animosity of both Houses and that it was impossible to adjust their disputes, dissolved this Parliament verbally, after calling the speaker and some members of the Commons to the Lords. As a result of this, I am despatching a special despatch to catch the ordinary mail to give this news to Your Majesty, without having time to expand further on the circumstances. I believe it will not be so easy to call another Parliament so soon again and that these disagreements have reached such a point that it seems they cannot finish except in either the establishment of a republic or of an absolute monarchy./

(1) 7th. April; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.
(2) 7th. April (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3866.

/monarchy. And I am awaiting the reply of the Prince of Parma to see what I must propose to this King that he may assist us, if it is that he is in a state to do so."(1)

Charles hastily left Oxford that very day and all, not least we may be sure Don Pedro, were keen to follow close on his heels, and if possible, to his royal ear. In fact so many wanted to do so that there were not enough coaches to go round, for practically all had expected the Parliament to last at least two months and had made corresponding arrangements, bringing many servants and large amounts of luggage.(2) The chapter of the Oxford Parliament was officially closed and Ronquillo, so busily in the present, turned to his immediate tasks, among them sending the Secretary of the Dutch Embassy to Holland at his order and expense. (see appendix) However, he was compelled to stay three or four more days in the University city, as he wanted to leave with all his household at once. During that time he visited what was worthy of note and received the degree of Doctor of Laws. Then he "put himself on the return road to London, whither he arrived greatly regretting the miscarriage his desires and good dispositions had met with in seeking the greater service of the King, our lord, and of the Monarchy." (Navarro). (see appendix)

(1) 7th. April (2); ibid.
(2) Navarro I, f.315

d) The Prince of Orange's visit.

Louis was still advancing by means of the Chambers of Metz and cutting off supplies from Luxembourg.(1) "The times are so extravagant" wrote Ronquillo, "that a possession won a thousand years since is not held valid, and I do not believe that there is a king in Europe who cannot, on similar principles, say that everything is his".(2) Charles, evidently, was well aware of what the French King was aiming at, but his pressure on him to desist can hardly be called heavy. Still Don Pedro continued to do what he could to stimulate the king and kingdom into activity and to block the diligences of Barillon. However, he realised that the Spanish must somehow gather an army in Flanders as the only way "to involve neighbours and allies, and that the petitions and offices Don Baltasar de Fuenmayor and I are pressing in Holland and here may have effect."(3) But, as far as our narrative is concerned, during the remainder of the spring after the Oxford Parliament and the early part of the summer of 1681, the Spanish ambassador was apparently not engaged in any principal negotiation. (see Appendix).

The event of that summer for Ronquillo was the visit of the Prince of Orange to England. It re-activated negotiations and provided a rallying point for Don Pedro's activities. William was now a fully trusted supporter of a united front against France, and was fast becoming its natural leader. Ronquillo was already quite friendly with

(1) 8th June, 1681; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado(Flan)3866.
(2) ibid.
(3) ibid.

him and their co-operation in England now was but a foretaster of yet closer relations in later years. Both men were united in supporting peace only until resistance could be mustered and galvanised into waging "a good war".

William's time in England was divided between Windsor and London. The first days, he spent with the King and the Court at Windsor. There the two relatives became re-acquainted and various ministers and court factions attempted to get the Prince's ear. However, the natural caution of William, fortified by the advice of the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors, guided him through the visit. He refused to be led to commit himself on the Exclusion question, despite efforts to get him to declare for peace at any price less than concession. The days there provided him with useful information for the future; he does not appear to have made any enemies or blunders.

Charles, pleased with William's conduct, told him to go on to the capital and, acting contrary to his ministers' opinions, solicited a Lord Mayor's banquet in honour of his Dutch guest. The Prince set off for the capital - - and Don Pedro accompanied him at William's own request. Once in London, the visitor came in touch with the other side of the English scene - - the men of the opposition. At the last minute, before the banquet, Charles (probably under pressure from those around him), recalled William to Windsor. However, this was not before he had met many of the Whig leaders at a lavish dinner given in his honour by Ronquillo himself (see Appendix). Thus Orange was also able to get some idea of those opposing Charles.(1)

(1) 15th Aug (3), 1681; Ronquillo to Fuenmayor. Sim. Estado (Flan) 3868.

But what was Don Pedro's motive in trying to get the Prince not to commit himself on the domestic issue and yet to get to know the opposition? To Gratify the Whigs or the King's party? Certainly not. Nor was it only to allow William to get a clear indication of what was happening in England, though this was important. It was to see that the Common Cause and its leading protagonist should not be discredited in the eyes of any by being identified with any one political party. And this was but one more facet of the ambassador's striving for more internal unity in England and more support for that Common Cause.

Yet all this, concerned more or less with internal affairs was not what was most directly important to Ronquillo. Events near Chiny had not come to a standstill and bad news continued to arrive. On 10th. August, Don Pedro presented a memoire to Jenkins on what was happening there, and it was then decided that, the day following, the ambassador should attend a meeting of the King's Council at which the Prince of Orange would also be present - - as he was at several others during his stay.

This conference took place at Windsor as arranged. "His Excellency (Don Pedro) began it with a very large discourse", pointing to the various infractions of the Peace of Nimeguen, the patience of his master in face of these, and the "no-efficacy" of Charles' and the States-General's offices in the matter hitherto. The territory was vast/

/vast which was claimed by the French in the provinces of Luxembourg and Namur and this they were doing in order to starve those places into submission; and Don Pedro reaffirmed yet again the Dutch and English interest in the Spanish Low Countries remaining Spanish. He then made five requests which were as follows:

1) That Charles and the States-General should interpose more pressingly in the matter in question.

2) That they should propose that Louis specify all the points of difference between himself and the Spanish Crown.

3) That all violence, all "voies de fait" and all judicatures like the Chamber of Metz should cease while such negotiations were in progress.

4) That all matters of difference be sent to Charles and the States-General, to be settled by their arbitration; otherwise, that these two powers should take other measures.

5) That each power send 2000 foot to Parma to be disposed at his discretion in their garrisons; and these under the notion of men lent to him until the recruits now levying for the service of Spain be made up, and then the English and Dutch to be sent him again.(1)

These points were embodied in the memoire presented to Charles that day and it was decided that there should be a further meeting to discuss them.

This/

(1) From Summary of this Conference, P.R.O. S.P. 94/66. The same points are in a Spanish summary of the second conference of 12th. August at Ronquillo's house in Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3868.

This second meeting took place the next day, the 12th, at Ronquillo's house. The Spanish and Dutch ambassadors were present; Charles had named Halifax, Hyde and both Secretaries of State, Jenkins and Conway to be there. First of all, the English made it clear that they had not come to decide anything, but just to hear and discuss Don Pedro's propositions. They also commenced the discussion by accusing the Dutch of timidity and delay, which had, they said, weakened the effectiveness of Savile's recent memoire in Paris. This made it necessary now to calm Van Citters, the Dutch Minister.

Hyde disapproved asking France to declare propositions, for that would admit she had them. He felt it would be better to work for the suspension of the "voies de fait", and Halifax also joined in this view on the ground that such action would be more dignified.

Regarding arbitration, Jenkins said Charles could not act as a mediator; and Ronquillo did not push this point, he says, because (see appendix) he was suspicious of any possible English mediation.

All the English ministers were against granting the request for troops - - the one thing that would have put any 'teeth' in the negotiation. Don Pedro suggested troops from Ireland, but the English said there was the danger there of invasion by Louis, and recalled the Spanish attempts on that island in the past. The ambassador soon laid this petition aside, for he felt their refusal was reasonable enough/

/enough as to raise new levies was very expensive and not possible in England then. But the Spanish, as we already know, considered that war had even then broken out and Don Pedro evidently spoke in this way at the meeting. Jenkins took him up on this, by saying that he did not consider it open war, when there had not been a single musket shot. Ronquillo, in turn, explained to the Secretary -- no doubt somewhat acidly -- that the reason there had been no shooting was that his Catholic Majesty had counselled tolerance of the actions of the French. And as usual the English complained of the inadequacy of Spanish preparations for defence.

That is about all that can be said here on the meeting of the 12th. On the 13th, Don Pedro presented another memoire to Jenkins and the Prince of Orange started his return journey to Holland.(1)

What had been gained for the Common Cause by this visit? Probably its greatest contribution was to William himself. He had been able to observe the state of the country for himself, while by his caution, he had avoided entanglements or enmities; he had not contributed to the division in the country or alienated any from the Common Cause. Don Pedro says that his friendship with the King was closer than their opinions, particularly on domestic affairs.(2) He had learnt so much about the various parties and personalities that the ambassador felt his presence in England during the next session of Parliament would be quite an asset/

(1) See Summary of this meeting and letter to Parma from Ronquillo, 15th. Aug. (1); Sim. Estado. (Fla) 3868.
18th. Aug. to Señor; ibid.

(2) 15th. Aug. (3); Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; ibid; also 25th. Aug; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.)

/asset - - if it behaved. More immediately, William's coming had provided Don Pedro with a badly needed opportunity, because for months he had been seeking such a conference in vain. He refers to "this petition,(i.e. for a conference), that I have kept up since the Earl of Sunderland ceased to be first minister. For it is the rigid fashion of this Court not to be able to treat in any business except through requests or complaints, and a memoire does not include the answer to difficulties and discussing of expedients in order to come to a positive resolution."(1) The Spaniard was especially pleased at the co-operation between himself and William, and of this he wrote to the Prince of Parma: "It has not been judged bad this bet dividing the tricks among the very opposing humours that there are here and which do not like what the Prince of Orange and I went halves on."(2) Both men were bound by a common devotion to the Common Cause. Just now, both were against the suspectedly pro-French Skelton becoming British minister at the Hague. Orange had approved Don Pedro's memoire and demands from the English King, and he promised to submit them to the States-General on his return to Holland. Furthermore, he would make every effort that they should send instructions to Van Citters to support Ronquillo in his pretensions.(3)

Soon after William's departure, Don Pedro had audience with the King at which Charles - - as the Prince had expected - - definitely refused to send troops and Ronquillo accepted this for, he says, he now know/

(1) 15th. Aug. (1); Ronquillo to Parma; ibid.
(2) Ibid. Sunderland was dismissed from the Secretaryship for Southern Affairs on Jan. 31/Feb.10th. 1681.
(3) 15th. Aug. (3); Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; Sim. Estado. (Fla) 3868.

/knew that there were only 4000 then in the whole Kingdom.(1) Charles, however, urged him to get Parma to do all he could for the necessary defence line between Ghent and Luxembourg; and said that he, himself, only wished "to gain this year to settle the business with his realm", of which he had hopes judging from how he was gaining with his vassals. But Ronquillo closed: "I cannot assure you of these propositions. ."(2)

Meanwhile the ambassador was pleased at Charles allowing the Prince of Orange to submit Ronquillo's proposals to the States and his declaring he would agree to all that they would resolve on them. He felt this had settled the question between the two powers on which one should first undertake what must be done.(3) The Court also appeared to him to be in favour of the defence of the Low Countries and "that he who within himself thinks anything else does not declare it."(4)

Then it seemed that these combined efforts and feelings had achieved something after all. Louis paused in his advance on Luxembourg, temporarily recalling his troops from the district of Chiny.

(1) 25th. Aug; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.
(2) 22nd. Aug. (2); Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; Sim. Estado. (Fla.) 3868
(3) 25th. Aug; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.
(4) 15th. Aug. (3); Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; Sim. Estado. (Fla.) 3868.

Towards the Meeting of 6th. February, 1682.

At this time, Ronquillo's main aims can usefully be reduced to two in number. The first of these was for Anglo-Dutch co-operation with Dutch action at least in the Low Countries for the effect it might exert on Charles. Secondly, he desired a new Parliament. These two landmarks provide some guide in the tangled and twisty narrative that follows.(1)

Louis' expansion policy had not stopped in reality but had merely turned in another direction, and another spate of memoires began to flow from Ronquillo's pen during September. By now English officialdom were by no means united on whether the instances should be forwarded to Louis in Paris; and efforts were made instead to "satisfy Don Pedro of 'the unreasonableness of pressing groundless complaints.' " Conway also wrote: "The troublesome part of all is the Spanish Ambassador's memorial, in which he acts like scholars, who by sophistry will draw a conclusion not comprehended in the propositions." However what irritated English leaders more was Don Pedro's making accusations regarding what the "kind reception" of Barillon at Newmarket and his "extraordinary privacies" with Charles. He said the French envoy now had greater countenance than the Spanish and hinted that there were English ministers who were trying to get the King to break the alliance with Spain. Conway freely criticised Ronquillo's "acting/

(1) 18th. Aug; Ronquillo to Senor; ibid.

/acting with passion and concern like a Harlequin" and exception was taken to his conduct as well as to the political points in the memoires. However, Don Pedro was willing to correct these points so his instances might be more acceptable and eventually he went to Newmarket himself. There he had "a long discourse" with the King "in horrid pain all the while"; and Conway goes on "Monr. Barillon is very pert."(1)

It is true that too many memoires can weary kings and their ministers and lose their effect despite their inherent justice - - as our friend saw for himself later; that Ronquillo's passionate nature sometimes outstripped his logic and sense of proportion; that his information was not always correct. It is also the case that it was most unwise to attack what was happening at Newmarket, especially when it was only hearsay, no matter how reliable. Perhaps Barillon was not receiving more consideration than he got at Court. But in defence, Don Pedro was poor, weary and ill. Moreover the facts of the situation could not be altered: Louis XIV was advancing at Spanish and others' expense by hook and crook, and constituted a threat to the whole continent including Britain. Clearly to Don Pedro (as he expressed it in a memoire a month or so later), if Luxembourg was lost, in order to regain it, it would be necessary to eject France from all her other conquests that led up to it and others in his master's dominions; and if peace were made with the French entrenched/

(1) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1680-1, 468 etc.

/entrenched, it would never be rewon.[1] The main object was therefore not to lose it in the first place. Naturally Charles and his ministers denied French influence growing at the Court -- but that could not change the truth. And so, though one may not defend Don Pedro's passion and other mistakes, one can understand them. And, is there not always something to be admired in his unremitting struggle, often alone and without resources, for what he considered justice for his own country and in order to awaken others to the danger of universal monarchy by France? The practically simultaneous fall of Strasbourg and Casale on the last day of September, 1681, only underlined the basic correctness of his attitude.

These two ominous events caused alarm throughout Europe. They also led William of Orange to forge the first links of a "grand alliance" to confront the danger. The beginnings were humble enough and the Prince did not have united support even from his own country, but he managed to conclude a Dutch-Swedish guarantee almost immediately. Ronquillo was naturally trying to help forward the inclusion of England in this. The Dutch themselves wished to get England both into the guarantee and into action with all forces against France. However, Don Pedro felt they were approaching this too quickly by seeking both things simultaneously, thereby doing what was good for one negotiation and bad for the other; and his advice was taken when Van Beuningen[2] arrived.

(1) Memoire of 28th. Oct/7th. Nov. 1681; S.P. 94/67.
(2) 20th. Oct. (1) 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing.) 3958.

It was mid-November when Charles replied to the Dutch proposal that he join the Dutch-Swedish guarantee; and his answer appeared to both the Dutch and Spanish ambassadors to be very satisfactory. He stated he would enter the actual guarantee if the Emperor, Denmark and other considerable princes of the Empire entered it also; and that if Louis recommenced his aggressions in the Low Countries or put himself in possession of any considerable place there in any way, he, Charles, would immediately call a Parliament to obtain what was necessary to help his allies. To be sure, the King's first promise was not very promising, but Don Pedro was overjoyed at the second. "No such positive declaration" had been made hitherto and the Dutch were also "very happy" about it. Don Pedro was careful to again explain to the home government in Madrid, Charles' extremely difficult position with regard to obtaining troops, and said that though he had received no further answers to representations he had made on French activities in Belgium, he was waiting before presenting more. Continuing this despatch of 20th. November to his master, he went on:

"I do not found my opinions so unreflectingly as to wish to assure your Majesty that the heart of the King of England is entirely free from French influence, but I will tell your Majesty that the suspicions I have inclined to, proceeded from his not wishing to reach this resolution of promising Parliament's meeting. And I know that some days ago, I told your Majesty that I could not find nor infer any/

/any sign of the King of France's aiding him. For, in public affairs, in authority and in his lack, there has been extreme need and an unbelievable poverty, both to live honestly as well as for covering secret expenses - - of which I am informed very much from the inside by one who suffers from this penury. But I would never wish to assure your Majesty of anything more than effects with show." Ronquillo also said the King and his party had gained much by this declaration in the country and that if the Parliament proved refractory, it would only draw fire on itself. Even before Charles had given the promise, Don Pedro had written for money to help the election of Parliament members in the event of a session.(1)

But the Consejo de Estado was not so enthusiastic, for in their view the English King had only guaranteed the Low Countries by such a promise and not the whole Spanish Empire as the Treaty of Windsor stipulated. A junta of theologians was meanwhile to be consulted as to whether Spain herself could under conscience enter the guarantee.(2)

As for the guarantee, the same old story dogged it as had dogged Charles' plan of a European alliance. The Emperor would not join it unless Charles signed too; by then Charles said he would only enter the agreement should Bavaria and Saxony do the same.(3) Eventually Spain and the Emperor did join it but the whole plan was rendered useless by the Turk's march on Vienna. So few would take the first steps or the/

(1) 20th. Oct. (2); ibid.
(2) 20th. Nov; ibid.
(3) 12th. Jan. 1682; ibid.

/the slightest risks in opposing Louis; the spirit of a united front against such imperialism as Louis' had still great need of development.

And, by January, 1682, French aggression was once more in full flood. Even ~~in~~ the previous November, Louis had started the blockade of the actual fortress of Luxembourg in earnest.

Ronquillo was not slow in presenting yet another memorial on November 7th. in which he referred to two recent ones on the same subject, of August 11th. and October 5th. Again on December 11th. he issued still another "requiring from Charles in the name of the King, his master the execution of the Treaty of Alliance", for by now the ambassador was pinning his hopes to the alliance, rather than the "guarantee" or possible "association", as the probable "saviour".(1)

Don Pedro reported Charles telling Barillon that any further advance by Louis would mean war, and that all were resolved in such a situation that Parliament should be joined and the treaties fulfilled.(2) Though pressing for a session of the Houses, in company with Van Beuningen, other foreign envoys in London and two English ministers, and expecting it, he feared it. "Because", he wrote, "in addition to the domestic reasons that cause this, the diligence and money expended by France is great . . . " (see appendix)

At the end of January, 1682, all eyes were focussed on Paris, awaiting Louis' good pleasure. The English and Dutch envoys there were to present notes of protest on French actions together, but Louis would not admit this though he had not raised the point on a similar occasion the previous October. Both envoys had hitherto been working closely together and it was clearly a ruse, entailing yet one more express from Paris to London and a few more days' delay. "All is

delay/

(1) See P.R.O. S.P. 94/67 (memoire of 7th. Nov. 1681.) Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1648 - various letters etc., ibid. (Ing.) 3958.

(2) 15th. Dec. 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/delay and deception" wrote Don Pedro and he feared the delay would cool the ardour of opposition, real and potential, all over Europe.(1) But at length the Most Christian King replied to his cousin across the Channel - - or rather accepted Charles' own secret suggestion. That reply's effects mark a division in the story of Spanish-British relations and left an ineffaceable mark, I think, on the Catholic King's ambassador and his views of the country to which he was delegated.

Louis made his answer through the medium of his minister in London. He stated that out of his desire for peace, he was willing to abandon his rights according to the Treaty of Nimeguen which he had claimed at Courtrai; that now he would hand these differences over to the arbitration of the English King. He demanded that Luxembourg be given up to France though its fortifications and those of the surrounding villages still in Spanish hands should be dismantled. Guarantees would be given to England and Holland, and he, Louis, would allow the powers three months to decide on this before taking further measures. No mention was made regarding the fate of Namur nor of the land between the Meuse and the Sambre.

Secretary Jenkins presented a copy of the document to Don Pedro Ronquillo, and the very reading of the memoire immediately drove the Spaniard into action. Even on receipt of it, he frankly told the Secretary that it was so "artificiosa" that he could not admit such proposals/

(1) 26th. Jan. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/proposals and would not dare send them to Madrid or Brussels. On the day following, the presentation of the plan to Charles, he visited Van Beuningen, and together they sought and obtained a conference with the English ministers which was fixed for the day after. The despatch of February 6th, 1682, which recounts the meeting of that day, is one of the longest I have encountered among the letters of the ambassador and none is fuller of the spirit of the man who sent it - - late at night after one of his most tiring days, a man ill in body though unwearied in his righteous indignation. He wrote: "I am with such feelings that I do not remember my illness."(1) As a matter of fact, though recovering from trouble with his eyes, he was so crippled with gout that he was going everywhere "placed on the cushion of the chair." In this letter to Fuenmayor, a copy of which he also forwarded to his master in Madrid, he tells how the meeting lasted four and a half hours, three of which he was on his feet. It was so long that the weary Don Pedro wrote he could not give a complete relation of all that occurred during it, but went on for twenty-four sides of foolscap and more. Yet the sense of the conference was, and is plain, for they talked with "such clarity" that Don Pedro did not know whether it could be classed as abuse; and to the later reader, this letter certainly has the merit of being a revelation of actual thought in that tortuous and complicated period. So, let us join our/

(1) 9th. Feb; Ronquillo to Coloma; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/our Spanish friend as he went in the company of Van Beeuningen and Van Citters, to meet with the English ministers, who included among others, Halifax, Hyde and Secretary Jenkins. They foregathered at 10 a.m. . . .

Don Pedro was the first to speak. While stalwartly refusing to accept the memoire, he set himself to answering its "artful arguments". Louis, he said, offered no restitution for all the damage already done to person and property. Moreover the object of the French King was only to delay the meeting of Parliament which Charles had promised to call, should he continue his aggressions. Then the ambassador recounted reports of an agreement between England and France which had been forwarded to him and to Van Beeuningen - - for example, how the French minister at the Diet of Ratisbon had told the other deputies that the King of England would do nothing against Louis and that the envoy was amazed at the Spanish trusting Charles at all.

Van Beeuningen then gave his opinion which occupied an hour or more. He spoke of the need for the allies to remain united, the need to preserve the structure of alliances already built up, "the flexibility of England" and the fact that the Spanish would not admit the memoire. The Dutchman then proceeded to the question of the Parliament, the reason for the promise by Charles to call it and the fact that - - and this remark is interesting from the point of view of/

/of Constitutional History - -"for many years. . . His Majesty had not allowed a year to pass without joining it . . . " The conference was tense, the two ministers having spoken "quickly and with ardour", and at this point, Van Beeuningen "came to ponder the universal ruin should the King not call Parliament, even with shedding of tears."

Don Pedro then took up the thread once more. He said that to send the memoire to the Hague or to Madrid, was to wish to lose and disunite all, and spoke of how hard he and Count Thun had worked for the treaties "with great energy and abundance of words." The Parliament had been promised; not to call it was to accredit the rumours coming in regularly of a secret agreement between England and France. All the English ministers themselves said Charles would not lose by calling the expected session, and that, even if Parliament wanted him to make war on Louis, he would not have to do it. (This was of course obvious deceivery, for Don Pedro hoped and felt it could and would force the King's hand in the right direction.) He then exclaimed how chancy it was for an honourable man who fulfilled his obligations to deal with the present English ministry.

The English, who had remained silent until then, now withdrew to confer and when they returned, Halifax spoke for himself and his companions. Their view was that, in the light of the fact that all wished to avoid war, the memoire's propositions provided an opening for/

/for discussion although they might not be satisfactory as they stood.

Don Pedro, at this juncture, would have liked to summarily reject the memoire as well as the English King's suggestion on it, by a combined Spanish-Dutch representation. However, Van Beeuningen was not keen to take such a drastic measure on the spot and Don Pedro felt that Hispano-Dutch co-operation was worth more than pressing forward his own opinion. Ronquillo, however, was absolutely firm in his own refusal to accept the memoire, returning to Jenkins then and there the same copy he had been given. Van Beeuningen now pointed out how much the Dutch and Spanish had done for the peace and for Charles. (see appendix) He went on to say he was authorised to give the States' reply then. The English ministers thereupon asked him to put it in writing. Led aside to an alcove for this purpose Van Citters and Hyde spoke to him privately and when he returned to the rest, he said he would pass on to Holland what Charles wanted him to, although he would also give Don Pedro's opinion. (see appendix)

None of Secretary Jenkins' suggestions to Ronquillo after the meeting that if Luxembourg was allowed rations with the siege lifted, discussion and a treaty could be entered into, would move the Spaniard from his opinion. For him, the dependability of the Treaty of Windsor was now definitely illusory and his worse fears were being speedily confirmed.

Religion.

In 1680, the majority of Catholics were still wisely enough living quietly, and the Spanish Embassy reflected this attitude also.

There was nothing apologetic about Don Pedro's policy in religious matters but he was seldom anything but cautious. His first act on arrival back in London after his four years away, was to hear mass at his chapel; and in his first despatch he included a letter on the state of that section of the Embassy. He had celebrated the sacrifice "with the doors open", but assured his master that his Catholic zeal would pass to no indiscretion, affirming that "the surest way of edifying the Catholics and not irritating the Protestants is the example of righteous living given by the chaplains and their disinterestedness in the exercise of their ministry". And he began at once to do what he could to guide and support the religious activities of his embassy and thus remedy the state into which they had fallen during his absence. During the first week he inaugurated more masses, not only all Sunday morning but several during the week as well; sermons were to be avoided, however, as they annoyed the Protestants. On Don Pedro's arrival, there had been three feast days, when great signs of devotion were shown, largely owing to there having been during the past year only two Spanish clergy, who spoke no English, to take confession and give communion.

The matter of the chalpains required special attention for, as so often, it was a source of discord with the British population. From then on, Don Pedro said they were to take no money unless freely offered, which would seem to point to some internal abuses of their position. They were also to live in the Embassy so as to avoid rousing Protestants who, according to the ambassador, followed their customary liberty and license by picking quarrels with them.(1) One of the priests, Domingo de Santa María, also an honorary chaplain of His Catholic Majesty, had been named in the Popish Plot (as we have seen) and Ronquillo felt it best to send him away four months later, even though nothing had been proven against him.(2) The accusations of the Plot were wearing somewhat thin by this time, but Titus Oates was still able to get a hearing at a Council meeting to say that of the thirteen priests at the Spanish Embassy, only one was Spanish and the rest Irish, and moreover get Halifax and Bridgeman to see Ronquillo about it. So it was no time for taking risks in the matter.(3)

At this time money was asked for and sent from Spain for chapel expenses, in particular the costs of the chaplains and the re-equipping of the building itself.(4)

But, as noted before, the Spanish always hoped for the eventual re-establishment of the Catholic faith in the British Isles and regarded the Treaty of Windsor to a certain extent as a useful stepping stone towards that end.(5)

(1) 3rd June (3),1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado(Ingl)3957.
(2) 21st Oct,(3), 1680; ibid.
(3) Letter of Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, Sept 28th, 1680, in Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1680-1, p.42.
(4) ibid (1) and (2).
(5) See quotation of Don Pedro's letter on its conclusion; P.164 above.

One of the first reasons given in the Consejo de Estado in favour of the mooted Spanish purchase of Tangier was its being thereby restored to the Catholic faith.(1) It is true that there were still diehards in Spanish governing circles who were against any treaty with 'heretics', but those in favour of such agreements were not slow to point out their subsidiary value in this missionary process. It was hoped that the Treaty of 1680 would pave the way to further agreements, not only with England but with Holland, in the interests of Catholicism and Catholics in those countries.(2) There was, however, little support given to open proselytising, though all at the Embassy were, naturally, favourable to sincere conversion and ready to say a word in season in their religion's favour. For example, Ronquillo at once wished John Evelyn to apply to the Blessed Virgin to direct him after a friendly discussion on religion.(3) On the other hand, the Spanish were extremely careful lest the treaties provide any channel for heresy into their dominions. While exceedingly keen to receive armed aids they were also keen that it be of Irish and German Catholic troops alone.(see Appendix) This was natural in the intolerant spirit of the age, and perhaps also wise, since foreign troops of a different faith, without modern discipline, were quite capable of pillaging any sacred places of their allies.

Throughout these two years we can see Ronquillo's ever-increasing

(1) Consulta of 11th Mar,1681, on letter of Ronquillo,Dec 16th,1680.
(2) Consulta; 17th July, 1680: Sim. Estado(Ing)3957 (and other letters in this legajo).
(3) Evelyn, Vol.II,p.381, entry for 26th April, 1681.

fear of the French influence on English Catholics and of a schism in the Roman Church through Gallicanism and Jansenism.(1)

Ronquillo's main task outside the Embassy in the field of religion continued to be the protection of individual Catholics and, when possible, obtaining favours for them. At this time, Queen Catherine asked that her first doctor of the chamber, Dr. Fernando Mendez, who also attended on Charles and Don Pedro, be appointed "Médico de Cámara" to Carloss II with the pay and post of Doctor to the Spanish ambassador. This she did to protect him as a Catholic. Ronquillo recommended that this be granted, also from the desire to cultivate good relations with her in the hope she might use her influence for a Spanish-Portuguese agreement through England.(2) When Viscount Stafford was executed, one of Don Pedro's priests was with him.(see Appendix) Navarro tells us too something of his master and the execution of Oliver Plunkett, Archbishop of Armagh and Catholic Primate of Ireland. It was, according to the Secretary, pretty well a case of judicial murder, based by false accusations, including those by some of his clergy. Ronquillo had done all he could, to save him even to interceding with the King, but with no success. The venerable prélate met his death on 1/11 July, 1681, and Don Pedro left London the day previous so as not to have to witness the painful sight.(3) A long-term view was taken, nonetheless, on such intervention by the Spanish with an eye to possible repercussions. The Pope had been making

(1) Letters. Ronquillo to Marqués del Carpio at Rome 1681-2, Sim. Estado (Flan)3255.
(2) 15th July(2),1680; Ronquillo to Senor. Sim. Estado(Ingl)3957.
(3) Navarro I, f.344 et seq.

instances through his Nuncio in Madrid, that Don Pedro act with Count Thun in protecting this archbishop and all other persecuted Roman Catholics in the three kingdoms; His Holiness had also sent money to his apostolic delegate in Brussels for the purpose(1). Don Pedro was doing this according to his regular orders, but he was careful to recognise the shadow as well as the substance of the penal laws, and not to make himself unnecessarily prominent. And on no account would he get mixed up in any way with any political action regarding this, from York down. Meantime, his attitude to the Duke had changed not at all; James was still proving more of a nuisance than his Catholicism might prove an asset in the future(see Appendix).

This then is the modest policy of Spain towards English religious affairs in the Treaty of Windsor period.

(1) 1st April, 1681. Nuncio to Council. Sim. Estado(Ing) 3958.

Commerce and Maritime.

The Spanish were very keen that England should guarantee the protection of their entire empire and we have also noted how necessary it was for them to combat discontent with this and other phases of the agreement. Our fathers did not wish to be 'used' and they were insular in their outlook. The mercantile classes were amongst Spain's best friends in the country, but among them Louis' agents tried to forward the view that England had gained nothing in the realm of Indies' trade. This "fantasy", as Don Pedro called it, they largely recognised and knew (according to him) how much greater was their advantage in the goods being carried in Spanish ships rather than their own, and in legal trade.(1) It was only the poorer traders who could still be attracted by prospects of pillage. So, though complaints against the actions of Jamaicans and their Governor continued to come in regularly, as well as the usual trading ones, better relations between the two powers were beginning to reach even to the Western Hemisphere.(see Appendix) It was natural, too, in a period just following the making of a treaty, but generally speaking there was also the genuine desire that nothing extra disturb the peace. For example, English pirates had undoubtedly sacked Portobello, but the English authorities knew what might be the results and reprisals, and to avoid these took good resolutions at least. In effect, these resolutions were

(1) 12th Aug (2), 1680; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim. Estado(Ing)3957.

delayed by the Exclusion Bill's occupying all attention at the time, yet they show a greater official desire to co-operate than before.(1) Though in the future pirates were not to be inactive, and some of the old antagonism and deception remained, still the current of goodwill was flowing through this field as well.

A clearly noticeable factor in driving England, Spain and Holland together was the mutual threat from France and other interlopers in maritime and colonial affairs. Perhaps the most important incident of this was the Brandenburgers capturing the new Spanish vessel, the 'Carlos' II', in the roads of Ostend as a forced reparation for unpaid but promised subsidies in the late conflict. The allied powers were particularly keen to localise and settle the difficulty, fearful lest it divert Europe from the more important task of watching Louis and preparing to resist him. Both the Dutch and Charles feared the possible Spanish reprisal with the Governor of the Low Countries marching an army into Cleves - - a step which the French King would undoubtedly take advantage of. Also, in that autumn-winter of 1680, when the incident occurred, Brandenburg was still a possible member of Charles' new league. That shows us at least some of the factors involved. Don Pedro was customarily active in urging combined Dutch and English pressure on Brandenburg for a settlement. Hearing of Charles' and the States-General's decision to lodge similar complaints(2) in Berlin, he wrote to Sunderland asking that

(1) 21st Oct (8),1680; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado(Ing)3957.
(2) Such intervention was not uncriticised in England.
A. Collection of the Parl. Debates in England from 1668 to the present time, Vol,II,P.389.

Charles use the Prince of Orange's approaching visit to the Elector as a channel of mediation. The ambassador appealed to the newly-made alliance; he pointed out that some of his Britannic Majesty's subjects had interests in the lading and goods of the ship, making this "an affair of great consequence"; and it was a threat to the safety of all commerce; and that the King of Denmark might be involved.(1) The English Council ordered their envoy, at Berlin, Sir Robert Southwell, to intervene. Jenkins was also to write to William asking him to take up the matter as well. A few days later, Ronquillo was wanting the Secretary to send another "very earnest letter" to Southwell by Mr. Puckle, an English admiralty official in Brussels, who was being sent by the Duke of Villahermosa to Berlin to claim the ship because of the English property on it. However, the Secretary felt the Duke's sending Puckle on this mission was "somewhat extraordinary" and wanted to know King Charles' pleasure in the matter. I do not know what it was, but, to make a long story short, by the spring of 1681 the question had settled down and was being settled. Nonetheless, the threat of Brandenburg frigates continued to be viewed with anxiety by both England and Spain.(see Appendix)

Don Pedro and his aides went on fostering the even greater fear of France's ambitions in this line. In October of 1680,

(1) K.H.A. see below ( ).

Ronquillo tried to make clear to Charles that "the matter of greatest importance to himself and to England was to restrain the advance of France before she became mistress of the seas".(1). While Don Pedro tried to appeal to the undoubted maritime interests of the King, the trading folk continued to show themselves aware of the danger. On one occasion they told Ronquillo of French embargoes on Flemish goods before Parma had informed him. Incidentally, he waited to find out whether this had been done in reprisal for action taken first by the merchants of Bruges, before speaking to Charles about it; for there was still need for tact.(2)

One of the main areas of Spanish-British contact was Gibraltar, and Tangier. As for the Rock, the English desired to establish stores and armament depots for their fleet, just as they had at Mahon, in the war against Algiers. Don Pedro favoured granting this, for the fleet would keep the whole eastern coast of Spain free of Moors and other pirates; and he was conscious of his country's woeful lack of naval strength to do so. Under the Treaty arrangements, only six or seven ships were allowed into the harbout at one time, but this autumn of 1681 the Consejo de Estado extended it to include the whole squadron. This could not, however, obviate difficulties on the spot and we later hear of English complaints of the welcome received from the Governor by Admiral Herbert and his fleet.(see Appendix).

(1) 20th Oct (3), 1680; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado (Ing)3958.
(2) 14th July, 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Flan)3868.

In Tangier, trouble including fighting has arisen with the Moors and this led to mutual co-operation between English and Spanish against the common enemy. This was the one occasion where the Treaty of Windsor was executed during the reigns of Charles II and James II. Charles expressed his gratitude to Don Pedro for the Spanish military help sent to the town's aid when it was attacked in 1680, and asking that the Spanish officers, who had been there, be honoured by their King. The English public, as well, remarked on the fine quality of the cavalry sent and this gained the Spanish a better reputation than they often received. Some time later, the Spanish Council requested the English minister in Madrid, Goodricke, to get ships sent to help the defence of Larache, menaced by the Moors. However - - the Moors were increasingly inclined to peace; and Charles was finding the upkeep of Tangier a considerable expense. The majority of Parliament were more engrossed with the question of a Popish successor than with voting money to maintain the distant city. Hence the King was already reducing the number of his troops there and there were now rumours of the place either being abandoned or sold. Spain, as an interested party, was exceedingly watchful lest it fall into the infidel or be sold by the impecunious Charles to the wealthy Louis - - both of which possibilities would have been strategically dangerous to her. In fact, she was a possible buyer herself.

When first mooted, the Consejo de Estado grumbled at the prospect of the price it might cost, but later they would have been prepared to pay a good deal for it to forestall France. They were equally opposed to Charles incorporating this part of his dowry into the Crown to get Parliament aid for it, because then it would be just as impossible for Spain ever to have Tangier as Jamaica. Don Pedro was endeavouring to hinder this possibility and he kept in close touch with the Spanish minister in Lisbon and also the Portuguese envoy in London to exchange information with them on the subject. (see Appendix)

In many smaller ways too, there was increased peaceful contact. For example, when Parma was en route to his post in the LowCountries and the Brandenburg frigates were loose in the Channel, the British fleet sent ships to see that the Prince reached his destination safely. And this favour was obtained without much trouble on Don Pedro's part. (see Appendix) Ronquillo could be offered and accept the facilities of the Tangier mail.(1) In Spain, Goodricke petitioned the Consejo de Estado that English ships carrying cod from Newfoundland to Cadiz be warned of the danger of infection there, and this was done.(2) Talking of fish, we also know of course that the problem of taxing it in Spanish ports was still a knotty problem between the nationals of both countries(3), but the harbingers of more civilised Spanish- British relations in the colonial and trading worlds were plainly evident.

(1) 8th Aug, 1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado(Ingl)3957.
(2) Consulta 9th Sept, 1681; ibid 3958.
(3) ibid.

Personal (including Accounts and Sum-up)

The period Don Pedro Ronquillo had just passed through had been one of intense labour, and there is no other way to sum up these years of his life.

As for relations with the Council of State, they had, on the whole, been good. Naturally enough on the conclusion of the Treaty of Windsor, Don Pedro had been honoured by it; he was granted a full place in the Council of Castille of which he had simply been a councillor and an annual pension of 2000 ducats with military orders plus his regular salary.(1) Navarro says it was 4000 ducats income in commission from the military order of Alcántara to be enjoyed immediately with his salary. Be that as it may, the Secretary also gives us an interesting sidelight on the reward. He says that in Madrid there were those who were somewhat surprised at the negotiation not having been conducted by a more important person. However, Navarro continues, as Carlos and his ministers were very pleased over the Treaty, Don Pedro could undoubtedly have made his fortune then and there. But when his friends in Spain reproached him for not having done so, he replied that "having undertaken and concluded this business without the express order of His Majesty and without instructions, or orders as to what he should ask or concede, and for this reason was not sure of whether the thing would be well received, he had not wished to/

(1) Consulta of 17th. July, 1680; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957

/to expose himself, nor another person of higher rank to the risk of being under contempt."(1) Our friend perhaps did not manage to get more money and honour out of his efforts, but he did come from now on to be looked on as an expert on British affairs. He was of course still criticised. The Admiral of Castile had now returned to public activity and his stay on his estates at Medina de Rioseco does not seem to have improved his opinion of Ronquillo. Before the Oxford Parliament, he advocated that a representative of greater importance and capacity be sent to England, since peace depended on the success of the negotiations there; and he reiterated the suggestion early the next year.(2) As a matter of fact, Don Pedro himself had been agitating for his recall to Spain. The Marqués de los Balbases, now a member of the Consejo de Estado, asked him in a private letter to stop his instances, since granting the request at that time was not convenient. In reply, Don Pedro said he would cease them but asked him, as his friend, if not as a minister, to work for it.(3) Ronquillo met with other criticisms as well. The Council grumbled over the amount of domestic news it received in his despatches -- "cosas municipales" they called them --, probably not realising the importance of these to the success of their ambassador's activities.(4) They also felt, when Luxembourg was being pressed, that his efforts on the fortress's behalf were very lukewarm, and that Don Pedro's emphasising/

(1) Navarro, I, f. 294.
(2) Consulta on letter of 27th. Jan. 1681; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958 Consulta of 20th. Jan. 1682 (on letter of 15th. Dec. 1681; ibid
(3) 10th. Feb. 1681; Ronquillo to Balbases; alb.
(4) Consulta on letter of 9th. Dec. 1680; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/emphasising the meeting of Parliament with Charles was just to accept the place's loss.[1]

One of the principal reasons for Ronquillo seeking his return to Spain was indifferent health and in our narrative we have seen, from time to time, how he was plagued by "achaques" of the eyes, of gout and of the stone. And yet, though faint, how he unfailingly pursued the course he felt his duty.

The sphere of his position that was in a more satisfactory state than during much of his time in England was the financial. There are fewer complaints than usual in his letters on this ground, and the accounts for those years are the fullest and most informative I have found for his whole stay in England. Some of these expenses have figured in the story so far:- the money required to cover the Secretary of the Dutch embassy's voyage to Holland just after the Oxford Parliament; (see p. 191,) the cost of the cup given to New College ; (p. 191,) the cost of the dinner in honour of the Prince of Orange; (p. 193,) and the price of getting a naval escort for the Prince of Parma . (p. 222,) The "gastos secretos" are those most interesting to the historian, so here are some of the other secret payments made in 1680 and 1681, with some explanatory information. (see Appendix)

(1) To Mr. Brichemans (Bridgeman) "oficial mayor" of the Secretary of State, 200 guineas which were to be divided with the others who wrote out the treaty. This well-known member of the Secretariat did Don Pedro many favours and during this period

(1) Letter of 26th Jan(2), 1681 and Consulta of 19th Feb; ibid.

also received a gift of 300 guineas for himself from the ambassador. Four other ministers as well were meant to receive gifts for their part in concluding the Treaty of Windsor (which is spoken of as an English custom); and 4,000 doubloons was granted to be used as Don Pedro thought best, though no mention is made of payments here.(1)

(2) To a confidant to dispose Parliament to approve the Anglo-Spanish league and grant Charles the supply necessary to support it: £600 to begin the negotiation. This information is mentioned as having been given already to Carlos II through the current Spanish 'prime minister', the Duke of Medinaceli, a great friend of Ronquillo. (see Appendix).

(3) Another £600 for the "preparation" of the Oxford Parliament.

(4) To a confidant who negotiates with Parliament, that he might go to the election campaign, prepared to find out what was happening and dispose people to vote for certain candidates for the Commons, £200.

(5) To Robert Thomas, a confidant in the last two sessions of Parliament(i.e. winter and spring, 1680-81) for the information he supplied and the influence he used, £454.10/-.

(6) To Mr. Muller (or Mulliel), 'hombre de provecho' - - an honourable man,and formerly employed by the Marquis of Burgomayne, £150, paid at different times, for managing people and Parliament.

(1) also Consulta of 14th June, 1680. Sim.Estado (Ing) 3957.

(7) To Rumbold (a confidant of whom we shall hear more later) £110 on the order of the Duke of Medinaceli.

(8) To Gregorio Leti, £30. In a letter explaining his expenses and mentioned below, Don Pedro says he was an exiled natural historian from Geneva, who had been a 'great enemy' of Spain and whom Don Pedro felt it was convenient to hold in obligation through kindness. In the next list of secret expenses, he refers to him as "well informed". (see Appendix)

(9) To the Baron de Vique - - whom we know well - - £209.1/-.

In all, the total secret expenses amounted to £3,003. The Council had sent slightly more than 40,000 reales de a ocho (£8,000) exclusively for 'managing' the Oxford Parliament. On Ronquillo asking for more that autumn, in case of another Parliament, they asked for accounts and some explanation of how the money had been spent, and were not so generous. The ambassador replied on 1st December, 1681, that £3,003 of it had been accounted for (see above). Commenting on these accounts, he said he did not feel it suitable to name the confidant (see sections 2 - 4 above), and to give the name of everyone to whom money had been given by the agent would be difficult, as it had been divided among so many. The ambassador admitted that the rest of the £8,000 had been spent on the embassy, but there was money nowhere else.

Another expense worth mentioning is that of entertainment at the

Wild House. Just after the signing of the Treaty of Windsor, Ronquillo mentions this yet again, saying that Sunderland comes to dine, not when he is asked, but when he wishes. "In this country this (giving dinners) is the sign of greatest friendship"[1] The cost of the public entrance into London, the journey to Oxford, and the regular visits to Newmarket and Windsor also consumed money.

Nevertheless, Don Pedro seems to have managed fairly well and the payments do not seem meagre. Yet, in comparison with those that Barillon had at his disposal, they were small. There was not really enough for effective bribery in Parliament or elsewhere, nor for the obtaining of information; and these facts affected the success of his mission to some extent and also the value of his despatches at the time and at present. But the value of bribery must not be over-emphasised as an influential factor at the time for eventually public opinion prevailed over all the payments of France.

What more can be said of this period of the Treaty of Windsor to sum up?

A Grand Alliance against France under the leadership of a King of England had another decade to wait, largely on account of European suspicion of Charles II. If other powers, especially the Emperor and the Empire had come in to the extent Spain had, such a confederacy might well have resulted then. But men, or more exactly, not enough men, were ready to see the danger of not doing so, and the necessity

(1)28th June (1) 1680; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado (Ing) 3957.

of making sacrifices for the Common Cause. As Don Pedro so often said, they were asleep. The ambassador himself tried to create a foolproof agreement, and he almost did so -- as an agreement, pure and simple. It is true that Spain was making the mistake of expecting too much of her friends and allies, that she was lackadaisical about mustering her own defences; and Don Pedro was partially to blame for encouraging this by an optimistic attitude, though he never stopped warning the Home government of the need for strengthening the position of the Low Countries. Besides, we know his founts of information were not always of the best, due to lack of money, with the result neither he nor his secretary were ever completely sure of a secret agreement between Charles and Louis. (see Appendix) Before long, he was to say that if he had known the reports to be true, he would not have had the heart to persist. (see Appendix)

It is also true that Charles, his ministers, and his people became increasingly annoyed at these persistent and somewhat self-righteous memoirs of Don Pedro, who himself, in looking back later, felt his policy had been a mistake and that better success would be attained in England by preparing the way verbally for such instances.(1)

Still, the Treaty of Windsor had been made, and it could not be unmade. Although it was unfulfilled in this crisis, it still remained in the archives awaiting such fulfilment. And such it was to receive -- the identical Treaty -- by England under William of

(1) 14th Oct (2), 1686) Ronquillo to Señor. Sim. Estado(Ing) 3961.
11th Nov (3), 1686)

Orange. Though the way may appear tortuous, forces continued to drive the two powers closer together, forces that could not be stopped. As long as Louis XIV went on committing aggression, and the English people as a whole felt the way they did about this aggression, the future of the Treaty of Windsor, or of a counterpart agreement, was assured.

NON-FULFILMENT OF THE TREATY OF WINDSOR (TO THE DEATH OF CHARLES II)

I. POLITICAL OUTLINE - 1682.

1) Introduction to the period:-

Yet as Don Pedro wearily laid aside his pen that night of February 6th to 7th, 1682, after writing the long despatch to the Spanish envoy in Holland, it was no time for lengthy contemplation. Much less did it signify for him the end of a period, but rather another complication in his arduous labours. Still, the atmosphere contained even less hope than before and the orientation of Spanish-British relations was no longer the same. From then on, there were few really important negotiations, and the days that followed until the death of Charles II were filled with "small things" - - with adjusting, maintaining what Spain regarded as her completely justifiable position, with waiting and moderate hoping. In fact, the influence of France, domestic discord and isolationism were practically supreme in London - - and therefore, that of Ronquillo and Spain was very nearly nil. But that is not to say that all these things were unimportant or without effect, for they at least provide the necessary link to the more interesting years of the reign of James.

The confederates were in February, 1682, still endeavouring to extend the guarantee of the Treaty of Nimeguen, made to stem the tide of conquest of the "Roi Soleil", and above all, to secure the promise of/

/of Charles and England. And of course, Don Pedro was still pressing for the fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor. Now the despatch of Louis to Charles with its suggestion for the demolition of the defences of Luxembourg was to reveal the different views of the several Courts of Europe, and soon they were to be full of talk of possible arrangements. Generally speaking the official English stand was in conformity with Louis' offer and Charles himself, having suggested it, could not see anything against it. This clearly disclosed the difference of his attitude from that held by the Prince of Orange. However, the Dutch nation as a whole were in their congenital state of struggle between the party of the Stad holder and the burghers'. All in Holland were anxious about the fate of Luxembourg and the French advances in general, which had already through their own blindness brought disaster on them a few years before. But memory fades fast when peace comes. Through desire for trade, despite fear of France, who in turn fostered divisive party jealousies, as in England, continued temporising measures found support. Yet though they agreed somewhat with Charles' views therefore, the Dutch and their government were more anti-French and in favour of a united front against Louis. The young and virile King of Sweden was now behind fulfilment of the alliances and their recementing into the form of new agreements. Brandenburg and powers like Saxony were wavering before/

/before the blandishments of France. The Emperor was faced with the problem of a potential enemy on each side, unable to help his friends in the West though still neglecting the threat from the East. Finally, Spain stood depressed but generally if dreamily determined to stand by her honour, to cede her jealously held territories after a struggle rather than after unjust, unilateral arbitration, mediation or other negotiation. However, she continued to labour to avoid the necessity of war until it could be - - as Don Pedro so often referred to it - - "a good one"; and to remind the powers of their duties under the numerous treaties or of the dangers of Spanish dominions falling into French hands, so that they might be galvanised into fruitful action on her own and others' behalf.

2) To the suspension of the siege of Luxembourg on March. 10th. 1682.

Ronquillo's stand and suspicions continued. He says that some of the English ministers were afraid lest his reasonings should affect their informal King's views and that they therefore intensified their praise of the benefits of peace. Especially singled out for Don Pedro's displeasure was Secretary Jenkins, who was persistent in his efforts to sway Van Citters. He was also convinced that Chudleigh, the English envoy going to the Hague, was carrying other propositions than just ordinary instructions. Meanwhile, he continued his instances as word arrived from the Low Countries. However, with a difference, with more suspicion. For example, after forwarding a letter on Chiny to Jenkins, he was not convinced it would be faithfully reported, and at Court, pressed forward into a group where the King was in conversation to tell him the same news directly. On this, the English and especially the Dutch asked that the Prince of Parma suspend his projects for aiding Luxembourg. Don Pedro obliged them by passing the information to the Governor, never expecting it would have any effect on what he himself considered a perfectly justifiable move.(1) The spirit and letter of Ronquillo's stand during these days is seen in the followowing excerpt from a despatch to his master of February 16th:

"I keep myself in the same firmness of not wishing to listen to/

(1) See February letters, 1682, Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870.

/to the French proposition, of seeking a (new) Parliament and of giving you to understand the outrageous way in which his Britannic Majesty and this government go on both within and without this realm. Also I wish to confirm by a certain person the commonly-held opinion that he has an understanding with and is bribed by France or that this being a lie, they (the French) make it pass for truth. I continue to assure them besides that the Prince of Parma will attempt the succour of Luxembourg and that then they will be without a compromise and the Dutch obliged to a rupture with France as well . . . Among our greatest misfortunes the greatest is their not wishing to believe us capable of any vigorous resolution, persuaded by the knowledge of our weakness, without sufficing the reasons given that it is for the honour and interest of Your Majesty to lose Luxembourg and the Low Countries by arms rather than by treaties."(1)

However, the ground continued to fall from under Don Pedro's feet; the Prince of Parma unexpectedly delayed the help to the beleaguered fortress on receipt of the Dutch and English instances sent through Ronquillo himself.(2) This further weakened the Spanish stand.

Just then, the reply from the States-General on Louis' and Charles' suggestion was received. Literally, at least, it was all that Don Pedro could have wished and was clearly not based on the representations/

(1) 16th. Feb. 1682. Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) 20th. Feb. (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Parma; ibid (Fla) 3870.

/representations of Chudleigh. Holland said she could not give an opinion on giving away another's possessions and called on Charles to convoke Parliament and fulfil the treaties. William of Orange had plainly told the English envoy that he felt England had already gixed the matter up.

Don Pedro was immediately at work, for Van Beuningen apparently surprised by and not completely in accord with the answer from his masters, had wished to seek a conference at or after which the memoire could be presented. However, Don Pedro managed to get him to agree to present the States' reply first, and that then, he, Don Pedro, should present a memoire too calling on the English King to carry out his pledges. He was determined to go forward with this, should the Dutchman delay, demanding at the same time a written answer from Charles to the instance. He also knew that Jenkins was using his influence to make other ministers feel that the time for implementing the treaties was not yet - - and that Van Beuningen was not contrary to this opinion. (see appendix) Here we see the cracks gradually appearing in the unity maintained hitherto between the Dutch and Spanish in London. We also see the first of many attempts to get a written statement from Charles on his stand, which was to be always completely fruitless. But at the time, there was at least the encouragement of the States' reply, which incidentally had been unexpected and unwelcome in London.

The/

The ambassador was also encouraged by the fact that the English ministers were by no means unanimous in support, anyway in private, of their master's present policy. Four of five who had conference with the King felt that Charles' honour and authority would be lost by his not standing by his promises (though Don Pedro also says that no one trusted Spain's word or respected her). One "principal minister" had agreed with all Don Pedro had said to him about a Parliament's serving to encourage the Empire to stand firm against Louis' offers; and that any arrangement must be multilateral or "general" in nature otherwise it would be broken within a month. Ronquillo therefore hoped that these ministers might make their influence felt with the King on the planning of policy. But another "principal minister" to similar questions from the envoy did not know what to reply, and was against the Houses meeting.(1) The very fact of the King being on his spring holiday at Newmarket did not point to much action either in the realm of Parliaments or outside.(2) And what seemed clear to others in the country, must have been becoming clearer to Don Pedro himself namely that the King would not take his measures for calling a Parliament from foreign states and ministers. (see appendix)

In Madrid, the Council of State duly considered the despatches from the ambassador in London. Its combined opinion was that Ronquillo's pressing for a Parliament was only serving to annoy Charles and/

(1) Ibid.
(2) 23rd. Feb. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/and that he should leave those instances to the Dutch and concentrate on demanding the fulfilment of the treaties as such. They approved the suggestion that he use permission to withdraw from London as a threat in an eventuality. (see appendix) Already the Governor of the Low Countries, on March 15th, had forwarded a letter to Don Pedro which he could use for this purpose.(1)

Dissatisfaction with the Prince of Parma's mediocre handling of affairs in the Low Countries had however come to a head by now, and the Marqués de Grana, who was definitely more capable and with the advantage of many Austrian and Spanish connections, had been despatched to Brussels. The Consejo de Estado evidently found it difficult to find an excuse for the dismissal of Parma, so they had to force his resignation in a novel way.(2) En route for his duties, through Plymouth and London, Grana verbally reiterated to Jenkins and Halifax the Spanish position. (see appendix)

About the same time, in Madrid, Goodricke and the Marqués de los Balbases were conferring on the arbitration project. Carlos II's intention and unmoveable resolution as given by the Marquis, was to support the Treaty of Nimeguen "religiously". It was not however his object to ask for a Parliament which would disturb England, but that Spain might receive armed help, even if not the promised 8000 men. With regard to the arbitration, the Catholic King wanted everything restored/

(1) 15th. Mar. 1682; Parma to Señor; ibid.
(2) So says Navarro I, f. 3245.

/restored as it was according to the Nimeguen peace, and new peace talks that would include all interested powers after an interval of six months to a year.(1) Goodricke was doubtless beginning to run into the difficulties hinted at in a despatch from Jenkins a few months later:

"You cannot presse it (the acceptance of Charles' proferred arbitration) with much earnestnesse, in regard that properly speaking, it lies more upon the partys to deferre, than the arbitrator to invite."(2)

In London, Don Pedro was asking more specifically for 2000 men to garrison Ostend and Niewport, but Charles was still offering "las mismas imposibilidades." Fuenmayor in the Hague was also nagging the States-General for troops, but it was also evident that the Low Countries needed more men than Holland could provide alone.(3) All these conditions were making the eyes of Spain turn increasingly in the direction of the Emperor and Empire for armed help, rather than to England. On March 16th, Don Pedro wrote to the Marqués de Burgomayne in Vienna: "In my opinion the whole direction of affairs hangs today on the resolution of his Imperial Majesty and of the Empire." (see appendix) Yet these instances long going on from the western to the eastern side of the House of Hapsburg, though natural, were unfortunate for the Austrian branch and fruitless for the Spanish. The Marqués de Burgomayne, by directing Leopold's attention towards the West is in some/

(1) Balbases' report of this March conversation; ibid.
(2) 28th. Sept. 1682; Jenkins to Goodricke; P.R.O. S.P. 104/192.
(3) 23rd. Mar. (2) 1682 (Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
23rd. Mar. (3))

/some measure responsible for the neglect of the Turkish menace, for even up to December, 1682, he was doing so. Already the rest of the continent was becoming conscious of the threat and Louis was ready to take advantage of it in his own way. With a dramatic show of concern for the future of Western Civilisation, he suspended the siege of Luxembourg on March 10th., but to the discerning the reason given was not the real one. The English ministers told Don Pedro the action was due to Charles' instances, but this the Spaniard doubted. It was much more likely that Louis, apart from the publicity value of the declaration, was deferring to English and Dutch opinion, roused by the French advances, and hence dangerous to his having a free hand in the future. We already know the part Ronquillo and Fuenmayor had taken in manipulating these feelings; they therefore can be given some credit for obtaining the temporary reprieve.

3) To the end of November, 1682.

The question now was: would the time of temporary reprieve allow the finding of a peaceful solution?

Of course, Louis' and Charles' original arbitration offer still stood, but there was some chance it could be modified. Charles had told Don Pedro Ronquillo that he himself wished Dutch participation in any arbitration.(1) One minister of the Court whom Don Pedro had spoken to and describes as the one who would have to be the principal commissioner for England in any peace negotiation, asked that the breathing space be used by the Spaniards to send a garrison to Luxembourg with sufficient supplies to withstand a year's siege.(2) In Holland, Fuenmayor was in favour of a conference without admitting or refusing the Franco-British proposal.(3) This being the case it was not likely Spain would leap at the sole arbitration of Charles. For the more general and open the negotiation could be, the more powers involved, the greater were the chances of her getting justice. A policy of delay in the hope of something better turning up was therefore adopted. Meantime various plans were current: Van Beuningen proposed the united arbitration of Charles and the States-General;(4) the allied ambassadors in London, including the Spanish, supported the memoire of the Swedish envoy asking renewal of Anglo-Swedish agreements and Charles entering the guarantee of Nimeguen. As to the second, though Charles/

(1) 30th. Mar. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) 6th. April; ibid.
(3) From Consulta of 29th. April; ibid.
(4) 4th. May (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/Charles gratified the desire for negotiations between the two powers, these plans did not seem likely to mature in view of the recent alliance of Denmark, Brandenburg and France; and the guarantee appeared to have been definitely pushed aside.(1)

Finally, the reply from Madrid on the arbitration question arrived, and it said literally nothing and was satisfactory to none. Ronquillo was simply ordered to cling to the alliances, rally the allies and maintain good relations with the Emperor; he was not to commit himself, though he was to listen to any propositions and to tell inquirers that he had no orders for admitting any offers. Don Pedro replied at once to his master that some definite answer to the offer must be made, otherwise Louis would say Spain had refused - - as the French were already rumouring - - and the French King was acting quickly.(2) Some of the other powers were saying besides that Spain's refusal meant excusing the amicable settling of differences which both nations were to seek within three months according to the third and fourth articles of the Treaty of Windsor.(3)

What were the basic reasons for the Spanish holding back? First of all there was their suspicion of Charles and their steadfastly maintained protest to the fact that he was their ally and not their judge. Secondly, they knew the uses of delay, the value of waiting for something better to turn up. We have seen that there was some basis for their hope, and that the possibility of an approaching/

(1) 4th. May (2); ibid.
(2) 18th. May (2); ibid.
(3) 18th. May (3), 1682; ibid.

/approaching Parliament existed. One of the English ministers had expressed the opinion that if the Marqués de Grana had forces with which to resist, he would judge it well to gain the summer by delay, but not otherwise. Don Pedro personally felt that while England would not enter any war at the start, she might be brought in. At last, despite the coolness of relations between Madrid and London and Goodricke's memoires for their improvement, Charles would avoid the rumoured possibility of war with his Catholic Majesty. In addition, the Turks had not attacked yet and the Spanish still hoped the Emperor might come to their aid.

So it was not surprising on this reasoning that in early June, 1682, further orders from Madrid followed these lines. Briefly, the Consejo de Estado asked that the Emperor be consulted on the proposed arbitration. To this, Charles admitted that it was always good to gain time, and Ronquillo says that the King had never spoken to him with less irritation and more fully on the business in hand. The ambassador got the impression that Charles was not in a hurry and was getting things in order for an autumn session of Parliament. (see appendix)

Nothing of note occurred during that summer. Early in September, Count Thun received the reply from Vienna and immediately consulted Don Pedro about it, as evidently was often his habit. Leopold favoured a "general" arbitration held in a common meeting place. Participation as an arbitrator he refused, though he was willing/

/willing to keep in close touch. Thun delayed presentation of this reply until word was received from Madrid. Eventually a note arrived from Spain for Don Pedro stating that she would only enter a "general" arbitration under the English King; but since it did not contain any word of the mediation and other particulars about which Don Pedro had informed the Council, Count Thun did not present the Emperor's proposals.(1) Ronquillo therefore went ahead, giving in his own memoire on the 2nd. of October, which reached Charles on the 4th. After a long night session of the English ministers, their reply was delivered by Secretary Jenkins on the evening of the 5th. Acceptance of his Catholic Majesty's suggestions by Charles, according to Don Pedro, depended on whether the English King thought they would lead to peace. But Louis was still stubbornly against a general negotiation and meeting in a common centre; and Charles would take no risk of provoking general European hostilities, which he felt would upset the precariously balanced domestic apple cart, which was his chief care. It cannot have been surprising therefore that the English answer contained "not one good word". Nothing was changed; it merely said that Louis would not wait beyond the end of November, and had said nothing about Imperial participation; and asked that Spain send a representative to act on Louis' terms. Ronquillo went to see Van Beuningen at once only to be told by him that he had counselled/

(1) 7th. Sept. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
5th. Oct. (1); ibid and enclosures.

/counselled and approved the English memoire; after which Don Pedro refused to hear any paper by the Dutchman on the subject. The Spanish envoy was now more than ever a lone worker. He applied directly to the States-General through Fuenmayor, but they in turn answered by Van Beuningen that they were against war and would accept Charles' arbitration especially as he promised to guarantee the treaties touching the Empire and Italy.(1)

By this time Charles felt he had given to Louis all the Spanish reasons for their stand and that only arbitration would stop his siege of Luxembourg being resumed. The Dutch as well as the English also pressed this everywhere and Don Pedro himself was apprehensive.(2) The ambassador's next move was to try to extend the reprieve. Together with the Marques de Grana, he decided that, should no word be received from Spain regarding the arbitration, by the 22nd. of November, the two of them should request an extension of the time limit set by Louis for the end of that month. Their alibi was that more time was needed for sending Charles' last reply by Carlos II to the Emperor and the other allies. This was done and Charles, though not entirely satisfied but above all desirous of peace, passed the memoire on to Paris. The Marqués de la Fuente declared that Colbert de Croissy on seeing it had laughed loudly, seeing how, as he put it, Don Pedro wished and yet did not wish the extension./

(1) See also 5th. Oct. (2); 7th. Oct; 19th. Oct.(1); ibid.
(2) 19th. Oct. (3); ibid.
25th. Sept. 1682; Jenkins to Goodricke; P.R.O. S.P. 104/192.

/extension. However, Louis allowed yet another breathing space until the 15th. of January, 1683.(1) But Ronquillo, on thanking Charles for his intercession, refused to talk further of the arbitration, showing that the delay was purely a stop-gap.

(1) 30th. Nov.; ibid.
14th. Dec. (2) Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

4. The Personal View of Don Pedro Ronquillo on Charles' Arbitration Suggestion.

That is the story of the political events of Spanish-British relations during 1682. But is that all that can be said of Don Pedro's activity? Was there, for example, such complete unanimity between the Spanish government and their envoy on the refusal of Charles' arbitration, as the story would indicate on the surface? For, about this time, in December, complaints began to arrive from Vienna and Madrid of Don Pedro favouring acceptance of the offer. The rumour was also current in London and elsewhere in the North; it has also been repeated in modern works. However, only when reading the ambassador's life by his secretary, Navarro, did I find any definite lead on the subject. So now, the facts of the matter, as far as they are ascertainable from the various sources, appear to be as follows.

By the end of November, the Consejo de Estado in Madrid were forwarding charges on the supposed conduct of Ronquillo. These were in turn bolstered by complaints in Vienna at the same time, and Spain could not allow any breath of misunderstanding there while she still hoped for aid from the Emperor. During that month therefore, the Marqués de Burgomayne wrote Don Pedro two letters, telling him how he had been trying to convince the Emperor that Ronquillo was not acting in/

/in favour of Charles' proferred arbitration; the ambassador in Vienna also informed Madrid. Don Pedro's supposed conduct had been spoken about in an Imperial conference of state, and Leopold had said that if this meant a private agreement with England, the blame for what could happen would not be his. To prevent the pro-arbitration party in Vienna making capital of this to persuade the Emperor to it, the Marquis presented a memorial, which defended Don Pedro by stating how he had not approved Van Beuningen's actions in London, but had opposed them and complained of them directly to the States-General. (see appendix) Leopold appeared to be satisfied by this instance.

On December, 14th, Ronquillo himself replied 'by return' to charges made by the Spanish Council of State, and to justify himself more fully, he enclosed a letter written some days before in answer to those of the Marqués de Burgomayne.(1) As for the charges themselves, they were roughly two in number: 1) that Don Pedro had not dealt with a memoire of Charles as ordered; 2) and this really included the first - - that he had not obeyed orders.

Ronquillo said to begin with, that for him to make mistakes was not unusual, but defended himself in this particular case. He had kept the Council fully informed of Charles' actions and offers; on grounds of courtesy alone to the English King he could not refuse to pass these on to Spain. It was true he had given an official reply by/

(1) 14th. Dec. (3), 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959, and enclosed letter to Burgomayne.

/by word of mouth before answer had been received from Madrid, but this had been necessary and consulted on before with Grana according to the procedure allowed in emergencies. However he was now prepared to present the reply in writing should the Consejo de Estado wish it.

Regarding the more general charge of his having disobeyed orders by favouring the arbitration suggestion, Don Pedro gave the following explanations. In his despatch to Carlos II, he had given, he said, all the reasons in favour of the plan because he felt those reasons against it would already be well known to his master. The enclosed letter to Burgomayne dealt with his personal position more explicitly. Although he had read no book on the conduct of diplomats, he wrote, this did not mean he had not studied his obligations. An ambassador was sent by his master with letters of credence asking that the sovereign of the other country should listen to and believe what the envoy might say. However, it would be "pernicioso absurdo" should that ambassador possess the privilege not to receive the answer of the King to whom he was sent. Then, Ronquillo turned to his deeds as proof. He had advised that the Low Countries be readied for attack, that it was now a question, not of arbitration but of war, of deeds not words. He had also reprehended the unsatisfactory behaviour of Van Beuningen who advocated acceptance of the arbitration. Once again, Don Pedro returned to the more general ground of his defence. Suppose he had been/

/been in favour of the offer. What greater authority for this kind of difference of opinion had a Councillor of State in Spain or at Vienna, than he? He further justified some of his words on his persistent attempts to preserve what unity remained among the powers opposed to France. Disparagingly, he referred to the rumour of his trying to obtain a separate treaty -- "as if we servants could do other than what our Master commands us."

Don Pedro had felt these accusations deeply, at least on paper, and this feeling is unmistakeable in the last portion of his letter to Madrid. He had had, he said, some vanity that Carlos II would never be in doubt of his fidelity, and a passionate and lengthy pièce justicative follows; Early in January, 1683, he asked that he be conceded imprisonment and justice in Spain to see if he was guilty. If the charges were proven, "command my head to be cut off; if not, restore me to that point of reputation and credit I have deserved of your Majesty, of the late King our lord, may he be in glory, and of public opinion for the past thirty-two years since I began to serve without seeking satisfaction from your Majesty concerning my calumniators. . . "(1)

The matter was, however, smoothed over, and the Council, if only to keep Ronquillo from weakening his stand, consoled him and sent relevant documents to Vienna to clear him finally in the eyes of the Emperor./ (see appendix)

(1) 11th. Jan. (2) 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3959

But what had started the rumours? No murmur of condemnation had come in from the Marques de la Fuente in Paris, and it was clear that Burgomayne in Vienna found the report hard to believe; Don Pedro's friend, the Governor in Brussels, appears to have said nothing.(1) Don Pedro himself felt they proceeded mainly from the words and letters of Van Beuningen, who was abviously annoyed at Ronquillo's complaining direct to the Hague about his conduct.(2) He also claimed to possess evidence that others had played their part in this 'smear campaign'. In the Consejo de Estado, various suggestions on this subject were made. It was attributed by them among other reasons to the malice of the French -- who no doubt took advantage of it. Others thought it due to the Emperor's ministers being annoyed at Don Pedro's taking some steps without consulting Count Thun. It is certain that all over Europe, friends of Charles' and Louis' suggestion, if not directly of France, would make the most of the report.

That is where the matter might rest, were it not for the testimony of Navarro, which follows.(3) Don Pedro Ronquillo had been asked by Charles to participate the offer of arbitration to Spain, which he did. However, as well, he sent the Secretary of the Embassy -- that is Navarro probably -- to see the Marqués de Grana in Belgium to tell him there was no other way of saving Luxembourg except by accepting the/

(1) Consulta of 23rd. December, 1682, see (2)
(2) Letters of Ronquillo 1st. & 18th. May (3), 1682; Sim Estado (Ing) 3958.
(3) Navarro, I, f. 326-9

/the offer, asking also that the Governor support Don Pedro's instances to Madrid in its favour. Grana delayed but in a few days refused saying he had written to Ronquillo disapproving the idea and that he would never dare to persuade Carlos to accept such arbitration. The Marquis based his confidence on Dutch aid, evidently persuaded by Fuenmayor of the prospect of the States sending troops immediately should the fortress be further pressed. Though alone in his opinion, our friend continued these instances to Madrid until he presented the memoire to Charles of October 4th, 1682, containing the official Spanish reply to the offer. After this refusal of Madrid, Don Pedro just obeyed as a faithful servant. Navarro says also that all Spain's difficulties proceeded from not accepting it; and that in 1684 after the loss of Luxembourg, no aid having come from the Dutch, the Council went over the despatches of Ronquillo it had hitherto disdained. (see appendix) However, according to the Secretary, Don Pedro's credit had suffered from the incident, through his enemies saying he was partial to and deceived by Charles II. But by the end of the reign of Charles II, the Consejo de Estado had recognised his services, granting him a place in the Cámara de Indias, and raising him to the status of Ambassador Extraordinary.

What can we draw from all this information? Was Don Pedro really in favour of the arbitration suggestion of Charles and did he work/

/work for it? Bearing in mind that much data is still lacking to me (for example, the despatches Navarro says Ronquillo wrote on the question to Madrid) I think we can say the following. Some, even to modern times, have said that Don Pedro suggested the arbitration idea to Charles when the Prince of Orange visited England in August, 1681. This seems to me extremely unlikely. What Ronquillo suggested then was the combined arbitration of the English King and the States-General, hoping that Holland would outbalance any francophilia on Charles' part. (see p.196). One English authority writing just after the February 6th. meeting, says that Van Beuningen and Ronquillo , both in despair over the situation were for "accepting such conditions as his Most Christian Majesty will please to give them" - - but in order to reduce Charles to reason.(1) Chudleigh writing home during the following November speaks of the possibility of Charles arbitration still being accepted by Spain "if Don Pedro Ronquillo can prevayle to have it accepted."(2) It would seem to me that up to May or June, when the first answers from Madrid were received on the offer, Don Pedro was not actively at least in favour of the arbitration. It was then he probably sent Navarro to Brussels, and he could not have done so before April, until Grana was definitely established as Governor of the Low Countries. Certainly it would appear that the change in opinion could not have come later than early September.

But/

(1) 31st. Jan. 1682, letter from Earl of Longford to Ormonde, Hist. Man. Comm. New Series Vol VI.

(2) Letter of Chudleigh of 17/27 Nov. 1682. Plott-Chudleigh Corresp. p. 170.

/But I am convinced such a change in opinion did take place in Don Pedro, for he knew the situation, Spain's lack of preparedness, and making such an about-face in his views was not new, (see p. 149). It is most likely he discussed his views with the English and Dutch ministers, as well as with those in Madrid and Brussels; but that he ever acted contrary to his orders or slacked in obeying these, seems very unlikely. Once his country had made its decision, he went forward to maintain and fulfil it to the end. Some may ask finally why in his defence to the Consejo de Estado, he denied having supported Charles' suggestion though affirming his right to express an opinion. The answer to that, I think, lies in the character of government then.

We can agree, if we accept that Ronquillo backed Charles' arbitration, that he had been deceived by the English King and cannot have had any knowledge of Charles' arrangements with Louis. But also whatever his opinions were, that they had little effect on his faithful and arduous carrying out of the orders from Madrid. Therefore the record of his actions in 1682 stands substantially true, despite any qualms he may have had in obeying the Spanish Council of State.

5. Spanish Interests in British Domestic Affairs.

Except in so far as British domestic affairs during 1682 touched the general current of political negotiations between Spain and England, I have avoided them in order to avoid complicating the very complex story. There is a great amount of material in Ronquillo's letters on the internal situation besides that mentioned here as relevant to our subject, and this remains for a more detailed examination by someone in the future.

The central domestic question for the Spanish throughout 1682 continued to be the joining of the Parliament, for it was probably indispensable to England's full participation on the Continent.

After the decisive meeting of February 6th, Don Pedro continued to press for the promised calling of the assembly. The English ministers had said that their stand did not necessarily mean it would not meet, but Ronquillo prophesied nothing to Madrid.(1) Orders from home, as well as his own sense of the situation, soon made him desist from these instances altogether.(2) As for the position, it seemed unlikely anyway that Charles would call the Parliament merely because of foreign states and ministers;(3) and such instances, moreover, might annoy him. While in some ways the state of affairs generally seemed favourable for a peaceful meeting with more and more moderates supporting the King through fear of republican extremism, other opposing/

(1) 16th. Feb. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) 18th. Mar. Consulta; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870
(3) Earl of Longford to Ormonde in Hist. Mss. Comm. New Series, Vol. VI.

/opposing factors were at work to counteract any calming influences. For example, the arrival of the Duke of York from his semi-exile in Scotland was looked on as an unfavourable sign, for he was known to be against it. And by the end of February, the King had announced that there would be no session that spring. (see appendix) The decision roused active and latent fears of Charles desiring authoritarian government. Was the reason that Charles did not need the supply Parliament might grant, that he was pensioned by the French King -- even though there might be remarkably few signs of affluence at the Court? What of James' Catholicism, his leanings also towards authoritarianism and the fact he would certainly not give up any right to prejudice his regal powers in the future? Don Pedro tells us that in the two weeks following the King's declaration, there had appeared many sedicious pamphlets "very terrible and contrary to the Catholics", whereas during the six months previous, there had been none. Others of these claimed that with the Courts asking that the borough charters and privileges be handed over, there should be effective security given - that it should give with one hand if taking with the other. All this seemed to confirm to the Spanish observer that any Parliament then would probably never get near discussing foreign affairs, while its fiery discussion of domestic might still set off another civil war. There was also the danger of its being bribed by France. But there/

/there still remained hopes of an autumn session.[1]

Though there were continued signs of Charles winning his way throughout the country, Ronquillo's anxieties were not much lessened, for he feared the radical opposition would soon make difficulties to stem the pro-royalist tide, using the pretext of religion and the person of the Duke of Monmouth limiting the royal powers for him should they be successful. The policy of the Spanish was therefore to do nothing until war should break out and more pressure could be applied on the King and his ministers. And by the end of July, Don Pedro recognised that the anticipated session was to be further delayed.[2]

Don Pedro himself sympathised with the royal ideas as being in the real interests of the country. His attitude, for instance, was that the corporation privileges then being returned compensated them with benefits which were more useful to them and not harmful to the monarchy.[3] At a different level, Sunderland was getting back into favour with Charles through the Duchess of Portsmouth. But Don Pedro did not fear the ministry as francophile, and he thought no one else was competent to take the Earl's place in the Council. We get some idea of the ambassador's aims from the despatch of August 10th:

". . . What is convenient for us is that the King quieten his realm, because without this, it will not be possible for him to have anything for us, nor that his interposings and threats possess any force./

(1) 5th. June, 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) Ibid. 27th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) 10th. Aug. (1); ibid.

/forces. And he shall always be able to attain more, finding himself in a state of being able to accomplish than in that of this being impossible. I must also tell your Majesty that all that is now done is not done out of agreement with the Kingdom, but to assure people and draw them from the error they are in that the design of the King and Duke is against their liberty; and to persuade them that the plan of the opposition is to undo the monarchy and alter the established government and laws. All this is done so as to be able to call a Parliament and without entering into other disputes, to establish a firm settlement useful to both King and Kingdom by a law which may decide and govern all changes and pretensions. As this last point cannot be accomplished without a Parliament by other efforts, it is necessary for the Court to satisfy the non-conformists on religion and all the public on the security of commerce, which is their only interest and which cannot subsist without limiting the power of France so she may not become the arbiter of all."(1)

At this time, however, the steps of the Spanish envoy were made more difficult by the coincidence of the desire among the republican malcontents for war for their own purposes and Spain's wish for England to fulfil her alliance obligations. Don Pedro wrote:

"The declared designs of the malcontents in England are that they only wish war because they realise no other way remains to them than this to be necessary to the King, and to oblige him to greater losses of/

(1) 10th. Aug. (2); ibid.

/of his prerogatives, that they may raise on them the structure of a republic. This, they desire, not for Spain's sake, because in the same manner they would act against her to attain their object. For France has been known in the past to spend very large sums with the malcontents to foment what was taking place; but she will not be able to work for the present except according to law."(1)

He also had to try and dissipate the belief that Spain was hand in glove with the opposition. Charles had hinted to Don Pedro that the Republicans were persuading the Spanish that war was the only way their dominions could be saved and that he regretted Spain's believing them as they were partial to France. Don Pedro reported (and underlined) the King's referring to them as "our (Spain's)(2) men." In November of 1682, Charles told Ronquillo that to call Parliament then, while the republicans maintained their evil spirit, despite the improvement in his domestic affairs as a whole, would spell ruination to his interests and those of his Catholic Majesty.(3) One feels that perhaps Don Pedro sadly had to agree; and following orders he did nothing to hasten on its meeting.

With every passing day, the Spanish position in British domestic affairs was growing more devoid of hope. Spain still felt that without a Parliament there could be no really active war waged by England on her behalf. The people, however, could not force its being/

(1) 7th. Oct. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(2) 2nd. Nov. (2); ibid.
(3) 30th. Nov. (2); ibid.

/being called; while if it was called the two parties were still so equally divided that the subject of Exclusion could hardly be avoided, with the danger of armed strife following that of tongues. As long as there was no internal adjustment, the members of Parliament would not concern themselves with foreign problems, without having first brought forth every domestic one. And the longer the Houses did not meet, the more home questions there would be awaiting discussion and solution. The King himself could manage without a session, so it seemed, provided there was no war, which he certainly did not wish. If he had a Parliament before entering any war, it might force him into it; while if he declared war and then called Parliament, it might take away certain of his prerogatives. And so he did not wish any Parliament unless he should win the case of the privileges of London, which should open the way to his obtaining more favourable elections, but in this case the Houses following Charles would probably be willing for European peace at any price - - which would not suit Don Pedro. Indeed, it would take a tremendous threat from France in conquest, trade or religion, to jog England as a whole from its insular problems into fulfilling the Treaty of Windsor.

6. The Rumours of French Bribery in England.

The constant evasions by the English King of the fulfilment of his promises to Spain continued during the early part of 1682 to stir up the suspicions of many diplomats in other countries. There were continuous rumours everywhere of arrangements between Charles and Louis.

Early in February the Spanish Council of State forwarded Ronquillo a letter they had received from the Austrian, Count of Mansfeld, asking Don Pedro to govern his actions according to its contents and penetrate the basis for the lack of confidence in the English King. On March 9th, Don Pedro replied that Mansfeld's letter would have carried more weight with him if it had not classed Savile, the English minister in Paris, as French-inclined. For himself, the ambassador had noted no considerable sign of Charles' having more money, though he knew the King's secretive nature. Any suspicions proceeded from Charles having refused to call Parliament. In addition, the ambitions of the Duke of York were so exaggerated as to require French aid for their fulfilment, and both James and the French encouraged Charles' natural disposition to do little within or without the realm. This was also supported by those of his ministers, bribed by France, and "the women" at Court. Considering Charles word and honour were already compromised, Don Pedro could not deny that the King might have received a gift from France. (1) /

(1) 9th. Mar. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3869.

The ambassador had pretty good evidence of the still current rumour that Louis had paid Charles 600[illegible],000 reals. But against this he thought France had enough influence in England already and that Louis, knowing the nature of Charles, would not waste money. However the proof was detailed and ample and if it was true he felt he must "despair of all".(1) From Paris, the Marqués de la Fuente went on writing convinced of such arrangements.(2)

We know that Ronquillo's policy, while still uncertain of the truth of these reports, was to act as if they were untrue if only for the psychological stimulus this gave him. (see appendix) Nonetheless when the English complained of these reports being recounted in the Madrid gacetas, as Hyde did in April, Don Pedro pointed to English actions in the tenor of "what do you expect", and that if Charles wished a better reputation, he should avoid even the appearance of evil.(3)

While Ronquillo never was able to discover the facts of Louis' bribery of Charles, largely through lack of confidants, and his assumption was wrong, I think his reasoning at least shows a better legal mentality which demands evidence, than that of the many who leapt at conclusions from the reports.

(1) Feb. 20th. (1), 1682; Ronquillo to Parma; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870.

(2) 10th. Dec, 1682; Ronquillo to Marqués de la Fuente; Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1650.
The Marquis had said that in London nothing was done unless France wished it.

(3) 6th. April, 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

7. Hispano-Dutch Relations in England.

In 1682, the query of the Dutch position, which in many ways stood half-way between the Spanish and the English, was vitally concerning Spanish-British relations, and vice-versa. What caused especial anxiety to Don Pedro was Van Beuningen's attitude, who was now speaking often for himself and the burghers party rather than from his master's orders.(1)

Don Pedro said he had no views on which power, England or Holland, was most helpful to Spain in her troubles, which she regarded as to a fair extent their fault; what mattered was their actions.(2) In that lengthy February meeting examined in such detail, he felt that while the English had acted as "ignorantes", the Dutch had taken the part of profiteers.(3) But still he felt there was more hope of them helping Spain. With another ally, England or the Emperor, they would probably be prepared to stand up to Louis even to the extent of war. But as the danger of hostilities grew, Dutch aid did not materialise any more than English, and both Holland and England worked more closely to force Spain into sacrificing for the peace of Europe. And soon Don Pedro found himself without the aid of the Dutch envoys in London, owing no doubt also to his complaints at their discussing Charles' arbitration, which the Spanish refused even to consider. (see appendix) But it must be mentioned that on the first and unexpectedly firm reply/

(1) See letters in Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958, 3959.
" " (Fla) 3869, 3870.
(2) 9th. Feb. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) 13th. Feb. 1682; Ronquillo to Parma; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/reply from the Hague at the end of February, when Don Pedro noted there was annoyance among English governing circles with Holland as a result, he tried to moderate it.(1) He knew the value of Anglo-Dutch unity, and even in the months after, he never attempted to disunite, for after all, the position might change quickly and he wanted nothing that would divide the confederate powers in that eventuality. In fact we may now make this generalisation that Don Pedro rarely tried to disunite anywhere; it was nearly always his effort to achieve the unity that is strength. In this case, it was also vitally important that the Prince of Orange should not lose any of the credit and authority he had won in England, for this would undoubtedly affect his position in his own country. At this time Orange alone became more and more the core of Ronquillo's hopes of Holland - but William's time had still to come.

In the narration of events we have seen how our friend attempted with less and less success to moderate Van Beuningen's agreement with Charles' plan. There are two quotations that show his opinion on the Dutch envoy and his actions. According to the first, Van Beuningen was by no means a friend or supporter of France, but rather its enemy; no one was more inclined to Spain than he, except in the fear that a war with any chance of success could not be waged.(2) In the other despatch, Don Pedro wrote: "Van Beuningen is our destruction, and/

(1) 23rd. Feb. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870.
(2) 5th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/and although we cannot say he is pro-French, this does us more harm than if he were taken to be so, for his reasonings are believed the more on this account. But the principal point is that he prostitutes everything to the Peace which is the anxiety of this King and of his ministers. Not only do they believe him but make use of him in their Councils, and orders, in such a way that they can put pressure on the Dutch - - regarding whose decision I am in doubt."(1)

And though Don Pedro tried to work through Baltasar de Fuenmayor and the Dutch authorities in the Hague, and Van Beuningen was reprimanded, this did not change the course of affairs; Holland did not come to help the Spanish Low Countries.

(1) 14th. December (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3959.

8. Subordinate Negotiations.

The principal impression left with the examiner of these subordinate negotiations is that Charles desired peace with all parties, that he did not want Spanish-British relations to deteriorate and, hence, that if he could not gratify Ronquillo's main requests, he would try to accede to those in lesser matters. It is also seen how very bad relations had to become on the main issues before friendly co-operation and courtesy were sacrificed on all.

a) Italy.

It still suited England that Italy be controlled by his Catholic Majesty rather than the Most Christian King, and the importance of this question in Europe ranked only after those of the Low Countries and the Eastern Front. The loss of Casale into the French orbit of influence had jarred the potential opposition to Louis as much as the fall of Strasbourg, and a more direct invasion of the peninsula would certainly endanger the peace of the continent. It would also endanger English commerce in Italy, more immediately in Genoa. Charles told Ronquillo he did not know how to include the Italian princes in any defensive league as they would never help themselves, but with the Dutch he encouraged anything that would achieve the preservation of Italy. Spain seemed a natural focus for such an arrangement, but Don Pedro in his attempts to move this, stumbled over the same difficulty/

/difficulty as Charles: his Latin, he said, was not good enough to counteract this solid reason in his talks with the representatives of Venice, Tuscany and Genoa in London. That was in June. In September, the Duchess of Soissons, that intriguing Mazarin, more suited to the Fronde than to the more serious diplomacy of 1682, arrived in London, full of confidences regarding Savoy for the ear of the Spanish ambassador and hoping her son might be employed in some of the plans being hatched. The son was definitely pro-French, and Don Pedro, who did not think much of her information besides, did not follow up her revelations or implement her plots. However, he listened politely to her confidences so as not to alienate her. All this the Consejo approved, - - but the galvanising of resistance to Louis in Italy was not much further forward thereby. (see appendix)

b) The Goodricke Incident.

There was at this time one lesser negotiation of a more exclusively Spanish-British nature, concerning as it did the English envoy in Madrid.

Henry Goodricke was very English and very protestant rather than anti-Spanish. Appointed during the Popish Plot to replace the Catholic convert, Sir William Godolphin, he seems to have taken the role of the unrelenting Britisher abroad from the very start, and despite his petitions for the improvement of Spanish-British relations, his actions did not further these. (1)

(1) Goodricke's instances in March; 10th. June, 1682; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

/these. However, his demanding notes to the Spanish authorities and even his cook's having killed a man (for such things occurred even in the best regulated embassy) would all have been passed over, had it not been for the incident of that summer of 1682. One day then in the Plazuela del Gato, near the Calle de San Bernardo, an alguacil and a notary were engaged in the arrest of a woman selling tripe on the ground she was profiteering. At this moment, some of the English envoy's servants came to her rescue and appear to have taken her into the nearby embassy. Naturally enough the two officials visited Goodricke to complain, upon which they were summarily placed in a cellar looking out at a sort of pillory, and they themselves were threatened with the torture.(1)

This was officially, first, a question of baxuio and the Spanish authorities claimed the diplomatic limits of foreign embassies did not extend outside the actual houses; besides they looked on this imprisonment of his Catholic Majesty's servants as the greatest possible offence to his prerogatives. Therefore they promptly took action; the envoy was quickly sent to the Convent of the Hieronymites just outside Madrid, and a despatch was sent off to London, explaining their view of the incident and requesting Charles to recall Goodricke. Though feeling she had more cause to complain than Charles had had in the Salinas-Fonseca incident, Spain acted quite/

(1) Letters in ibid 3973 (on whole incident); P.R.O. S.P. 94/68.

/quite moderately, though this was not always understood even within her own dominions. Foppens, the Brussels commentator wrote critically in secret of the Consejo de Estado making an issue of the matter without considering the international situation and Spain's demanding so much from England at the time as it was.(1) But in fact, all parties seem fundamentally to have been keen "to lay this businesse asleep", as Jenkins put it. England did not want her instances for Spain's acceptance of "the arbitrage" disturbed, while Spain did not wish to annoy England; and Heemskerk, the Dutch envoy in Madrid, was also lending a hand to smooth the matter over.(2) Nonetheless, discussion dragged on.

Early in October, Ronquillo presented two memorials, one (already considered) with Spain's answer on the arbitration, the other on the incident. Charles, answering the second, asked time to investigate the offence and that meanwhile Goodricke be allowed to continue his work at the Spanish Court. The King also spoke to Ronquillo personally to get him to use his best offices for the affair's quick and quiet settlement. But the British authorities were not absolutely sure of their position. Jenkins, in writing to Goodricke, said that Charles was somewhat afraid the action could not be defended, for no precedent was involved and a definite insult had been committed. In a question of imprisoning officials, the business should/

(1) Foppens: letters of 13th, 27th. December, 1682, on p. 468 at seq.
(2) R. St. Gen. 6791.

/should have first been remitted to the English King or Spanish justice by way of complaint, because it was not an ambassador's place "to execute his own sentence." Nevertheless the deed had been done in zealous defence of the royal dignity, not his own, so he would not lack his master's protection. If he was convinced now that the excesses were his, he was recommended to give satisfaction "en cavalier", though not to bring in the King's name and dignity.(1)

Goodricke in due ocurse made his replies, which included criticism of Sir William Godolphin, now retired in Madrid, for having spread rumours about him and backing the Spanish opinion. These Don Pedro refused to see.(2) It was only in December that he could report Charles declaring he had given orders for his representative at Madrid to return and that he would soon appoint another. Ronquillo says that Jenkins, who definitely disagreed with the decision, and others in the Council who wished the matter further discussed, managed to delay these being sent off.(3) Rumours were still rampant of ẅhy the expulsion of Goodricke from Madrid had taken place. Some said, for instance, that it had been done out of revenge for the Salinas incident and because of Goodricke's part in pressing Spanish acceptance of the arbitration.(4) There were other rumours that it was Godolphin's work - - as Goodricke himself believed - - and that Carlos II was supporting Sir William's interests in resuming his/

(1) Letter of 25th. Sept. 1682; Jenkins to Goodricke; P.R.O. S.P. 104/192.
(2) 21st. Sept. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3973.
(3) 28th. Dec; ibid.
(4) D.N.B. v Goodricke, Henry.

/his former post. Ronquillo feared the effects of this last report and wrote at once asking his government to avoid even the appearance of this for the consequences it might bring in the religious field.(1) Our friend himself was fearful of retaliation measures to himself and these may in fact have occurred unofficially.(2) All this time, the French were taking advantage of the difference, trying to make Carlos even more displeased with Charles and the English people feel that the Spanish wished war with England. This last was an extravagant idea, but the fear on both sides that the difference might be magnified led to a quiet solution. Since the start of the case, the Duke of York had been in sympathy with Goodricke and had supported his brothers-in-law who were also making efforts to keep their relative at his post. (see appendix) But as time went on, Don Pedro recognised some moderation even in him. Thus the matter was laid aside provisionally, elbowed out by other business, and this permitted feelings to die down.

By early March, 1683, Goodricke was definitely ordered to retire, and the question was now mainly who should succeed him. Here there was again delay through actions on both sides. Papers reached Ronquillo again asking Charles to name a successor, but he did not present them for some time, sensing that the delay in London was out of vengeance and not wishing to give the English reason to believe Spain felt the lack of the envoy./

(1) 14th. Dec. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo 280.
(2) See P. also 28th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/envoy. Also under the circumstances of the envoy's creating another incident before leaving Madrid, Charles still held up the new appointment. Don Pedro of course showed his displeasure at this: he spoke to Charles of Louis having obtained satisfaction recently for a similar incident in Venice, and said that if Goodricke's behaviour had been unexampled, his master's lukewarmness in making amends had also been so. The King was not pleased at this frankness, but still wanted to have a minister at Madrid, and tried to talk of possible successors. Ronquillo listened but told him that such discussion on his own part was against his orders, though his master would be glad if another envoy to Spain was appointed.(1) Eventually, Lord Lansdowne was dilatorily sent to the Spanish Court - - but of this more will be said later.

Here we come to an interesting post-script. Before the end of that year Ronquillo was writing to the Duque de Medinaceli asking also that the contents of his letter be passed on to His Most Catholic Majesty. In it he told of Goodricke's "extraordinary anxiety" to get back to Madrid, and the ex-envoy's using Count Thun to see if his return to Spain would be well received. Don Pedro said he was making no reply, but spoke highly of Goodricke. However, the Consejo de Estado felt the matter should not be re-opened, as Don Pedro himself might be leaving, and, while it was true Goodricke had been pro-Spanish/

(1) 8th. Mar. 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3973.

/pro-Spanish, he had also been fussy over "his fancied rights."[1]

This last opinion of the Council probably expresses the facts of the matter, though it should also be remembered that Charles' envoys were not often trained diplomats, and Goodricke certainly was not. If that is the simple conclusion, why have I recounted all the extraneous facts and rumours connected with the incident? Merely because this thesis, if any, seems the proper place to try and clarify the involved disputes, sieving, retaining or rejecting oft-repeated stories and impressions.[2]

(1) Letter to Medinaceli; Sim. Tomo 280, f. 93. Consulta of 16th. December, 1683.

(2) The "History of the Goodricke Family" does not appear very accurate on the incident, though it tells a good deal about the man.

c) The Falaiseau Affair and Ronquillo.

Another incident for which it is difficult to find a logical place but which indicates well the general working conditions of our friend was that arising over the appointment of a Brandenburg minister to London. In the fall of 1682, the Elector named a certain Falaiseau as his minister in the English capital. This Falaiseau was a French Huguenot who had been secretary to Montagu, when the latter was English envoy in Paris. Some time after this he had left France, ostensibly on account of his religion. Moving to England, he was at this time director of his former master's and the Republicans' activities and also in close touch with Barillon. Charles did not wish to accept, but did not know how to refuse, the appointment; and all the envoys of the powers opposed to France in London protested -- except Don Pedro. But he was working in his own way. In a private conversation with the King, he reminded him of the order he had given that Falaiseau should not be admitted to the Court, and this excuse Charles used in refusing the appointment. In explanation to the Consejo de Estado why he had not joined the common protest, Ronquillo wrote that there was no ground to refuse a minister because he was not a native of the country he was going to represent. Also he did not feel it advantageous to Spain to publish abroad the reason against Falaiseau of his being the emissary of France to the republicans and/

/and enemies of the King; for Don Pedro was still endeavouring to keep in well with all sections of the British public, even though chary of the opposition. He pointed to the fact that his private instance had achieved what was desired, and that the other ambassadors, (see appendix) including Barillon, realised this.

It is quite likely that Don Pedro over-emphasised his part in this incident but not for that is it entirely insignificant. For we see again another indication that the ambassador was learning the value of preparing the ground privately and unofficially for his ultimate ends. We also see that Don Pedro was not completely ignored, that his knowledge and experience were coming to be more and more respected in London and that even in this time of his Country's great disappointment he was treated personally with respect.

This has carried us some distance into 1683, so let us now swing back into the main stream of British affairs for the end of the previous year.

9. The End of 1682.

Hopes of agreement with a peaceful resolution of the difficulties at issue in Western Europe seemed as faint as ever. Those for a "general" negotiation had practically faded, for just before Louis' latest reply had been received, news had come of the breaking off of the Conference at Frankfort which had seemed a possible vehicle for such discussion.(1) Meanwhile both France and Spain remained adamant. Further delay could only benefit the divided confederates if the time were well used, either to co-ordinate preparations for conflict or continued striving for a peaceful solution. Louis did not usually consent to anything unless it suited him, and this delay might be suiting him, and he might reap the fruits of it. Therefore, the English and Dutch diplomats keen for peace -- the English, above all, and the Dutch, above almost all, -- continued to seek possible solutions and to get Spain to be at least more amenable to these. Still there was one great point: peace had been preserved thus far.

Early in December, Charles sent a memoire to the States-General through his envoy in the Hague. Meanwhile Ronquillo hoped the arrival back in London of Van Citters would constrain Van Beuningen somewhat;(2) and he himself was trying to persuade the Dutchman at least "not to work against us"; but there was evidence to him of secret intercourse between Dutch and English. He knew the Dutchman "exaggerated" the poor/

(1) 30th. Nove. (2), 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.

(2) 14th. Dec. (1); ibid 3959.

/ppor situation of Spain to the English ministers. To Charles, the Spaniard was firm that no clause in his country's reply opened the way for further soliciting of his master on unilateral arbitration; and he was now unmoved by English promises of entering the Guarantee and a Defensive League later on. The King in conversation dwelt on Louis' having given proof of not wishing a general negotiation in November through dissolving the Diet of Frankfort. Ronquillo replied that this was the best news received and the most important in Spain's favour, because it clearly showed Louis' attitude of universal superiority; the German Princes would now take action and applaud Spain's. As for Spain, she would go ahead without the Dutch, for she would not cede Luxembourg even though Madrid might be lost.(1)

The same attitude was tabulated in more detail in a letter of Don Pedro to Secretary Jenkins on receiving from Van Beuningen (who gave it "with undue satisfaction") a copy of the memoire recently presented by Chudleigh to the States-General. In it, among other points he made, was one against accepting any "equivalent" for Luxembourg, for this would be no more just than if England was asked to give up Plymouth instead of Dover. He also expressed surprise at Charles' tone of threatening the States-General to make them retire from their treaty obligations to Spain, and wryly observed that even Louis was usually scrupulous in observing at least the letter of alliances./

(1) 14th. Dec. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/alliances. Don Pedro ended the letter by requesting that Chudleigh be ordered to resist from such instances and instead work for the Dutch fulfilling the alliances together with England.(1) Personally he felt the memoire had been devised as much for the ears of the British public and Louis, as for those of the States-General.(2) Navarro named it a result of Ronquillo's own memoire of 8th. November, presented on orders from Madrid, which had caused, the Secretary says, "muy malos efectos" in the mind of Charles, for it had not only restated the Spanish position but had also hinted the English King's bad faith.(3)

Be that as it may, the atmosphere must have been tense, for one friend whom he only describes as "firmer than Van Beuningen" counselled Don Pedro against making such determined demands for fear of exposing himself to an expulsion similar to that meted out to Goodricke, which was still rankling in many English minds. However our friend, while saying that the English treatment of him was that of yore, that is "with presumptious pride, either shouting or acting deaf", went ahead. For, he went on, "I am accustomed to speak with vigour (though they have made Your Majesty think otherwise) . . and on the other hand, I do not appear to them either to be seditious or an enemy of the King."(4)

The Marqués de Castelmoncayo from the Hague encouraged Ronquillo to/

(1) 5/15th. Dec; Ronquillo to Jenkins; Sim Estado (Fr) K. 1650 also in B.M. Additions 37,980, f. 252.
(2) 28th. Dec. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(3) Navarro I f.c. 330-340.
(4) 28th. Dec. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/to continue to give no sign of stepping down, as this stand would help dissolve rumours of this, and perhaps make the Dutch strengthen their's. France bolstered these that Spain's friends might abandon her, while also, with the same end, hinting she was impossibly warlike. The Marquis also felt Van Citters went to London well informed regarding the general situation, and the ways of Van Beuningen; that there was a swing in favour of general arbitration, even from Louis, who would not wish England pushed definitely into Spain's camp or Charles pushed out of England. (see appendix) Never could the Spanish diplomats in these discouraging negotiations be accused of lacking optimism.

On the last day of the year, Van Beuningen and Van Citters presented the States' memoire in answer to Chudleigh's. It contained briefly three main points. First, Holland desired to do what was convenient for Charles, but they had been unable to persuade Spain to accept his offer or anything other than a general arbitration. Second, if all else failed and Louis could not be persuaded to what Spain wished, they wanted Charles to make other suggestions. Third, they requested more time for discussion.

Don Pedro approved the first two requests, but not the third. He would not advise the Dutch ministers with whom he was in contact to threaten Charles, but he certainly advised readiness for war. Charles emphasised that his arbitration was the only way to preserve the/

/the peace, and that Louis had never said anything about a general one. Politely he told Van Beuningen and Van Citters that he had played his part and come to the end of this Latin and knew not what further to do; and he also hinted that the resolution of the States was one thing, their real intentions another. They consulted Don Pedro on whether they should press forward their proposed plan again, but he did not favour such badgering of Charles, for he had begun to see that this was not the way to handle him. He saw besides that though Van Citters might be keen, the wish to renew the recent instance showed the Dutch fear of war without England's help.(1)

Increasingly the way out of the impossible situation seemed to be being reduced to an appeal to arms.

(1) 1st. Jan. 1683; Ronquillo to Castelmoncayo; Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1650.

NON-FULFILMENT OF THE TREATY OF WINDSOR.

II. Political Outline - 1683: 1. Chronology and Comments.

The depressing situation continued. The Dutch envoys felt their efforts were in vain and they no longer courted Ronquillo's company, since he would only point out the old maxim "If you want peace, prepare for war." He told them that Spain had made her decision depending on the good faith of the Dutch and the Emperor, and that if they held to their present path, they would only dishonour Holland and encourage France. Don Pedro was also still trying to get Charles to give a reply in writing on his stand. (see appendix)

The first event of any moment was another reprieve for Luxembourg by Louis, beyond the January 15th. deadline. England and Holland had requested the French King once again not to disturb the Low Countries, and largely, we may feel through this suiting Louis, he did not resume the invasion. This did not greatly increase the chances of peaceful solution of the difficulties, for Spain would not alter her policy. Ronquillo craftily continued to tell the ministers of Holland and England that Spain would take nothing in exchange for Luxembourg, even though Antwerp were to be lost. For the loss of the coasts of Flanders and the banks of the Scheldt to Louis, was undoubtedly a latent fear with these powers which, once aroused, would prompt their positive action.(1) Don Pedro was convinced that Charles was receiving news of Louis' troop movements from/

(1) 1st. Feb. 1683 (Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado
5th. Feb. (or 8th.)) (Ing) 3959.

/from Barillon, and that the King was agreeing to these, accepting the premise (shared in Paris) that Spain had authorised its ministers abroad to back down from their stand at the last minute. (see appendix) However, on the Spaniard questioning him closely on these movements, Charles replied that if he had learnt anything in particular, he would have told him, for just because he was dissatisfied with Spain, did not mean he would forget his interests, especially those in the Low Countries.(1)

The strengthening of the confederacy, of the things that remained of allied unity, was still one of Ronquillo's tasks; and it seemed that winter and spring of 1682-3 that opposition to France was growing. It was then the "association" was concluded between Holland and the Emperor. Leopold himself was also attending to the very necessary piece of work for any action whether in the East or West -- the cementing of closer bonds with the different states of the Empire. He had made a new treaty with Bavaria and was arranging another with Hanover; there were plans afoot as well for others with the "circles" of Lower Saxony, Frankfurt, etc.(2) On his part in this, Don Pedro got Count Thun to restate the Austrian position to the English King. Charles, on receipt of the memoire, answered that, although he was not accepting gifts from Louis, and did not believe his offices with the French King would be effective, he would forward all written requests to Paris.(3) Nonetheless, Charles was at the point of refusing to discuss any more the question of a general arbitration. He was

(1) 8th Mar.(1); ibid.
(2) 5th Feb.(or 8th); ibid.
(3) 8th Mar.; ibid.

certainly against the latest diplomatic suggestion; the mediation of the Polish King, which made it seem as though he was not trusted. Finally, the Dutch appeared to be swinging back to favour general arbitration again (see Appendix).

One of the principal reasons for this Dutch and European reversion of policy was Louis' activity in the diplomatic field in Northern Europe, which threatened the United Provinces with encirclement. Ronquillo himself did not feel that war in the North (involving the Scandinavian powers) or in Italy was likely; but he was convinced that France would renew its attack on the Low Countries through Luxembourg sooner or later (see Appendix). The order of the day was therefore to redeem the time in negotiations, great or small, not only to increase allied unity but also to forestall any threats. For example, he paid a fair amount of attention to English and other royal marriages at this time, in particular the engagement of Anne to George of Denmark (see Appendix).

A sign of this increased co-operation came in June, when Ronquillo on behalf of Spain, together with the Austrian, Dutch and Swedish envoys in London, presented memoirs offering Charles general arbitration. Underlined in the copy of the Spanish one are words which state the purpose of any allied conference built around such proposals: "for the execution of the Treaty of Nimeguen and the consideration of it, as well as any other pretensions offering between the said princes" (1)

(1) Spanish: 19th June) See Sim.Estado(Ing)3959.
Austrian: 20th June)
Dutch: 22nd June)
Swedish: 23rd June)

The Dutch, through Van Citters, were also labouring to get Spain to help form a naval squadron, not only to help herself but even England in the maintenance of the Peace.(1)

All this, however, came to nothing for the start of summer saw the break-up yet again of plans to restrain Louis. In July, the Turks advanced on Vienna, which in turn eliminated any hope of support from Leopold and then William and the Dutch could not act alone. The plea of the privileges of London and especially the revelation of the Rye House Plot at that time involved England yet more deeply in domestic affairs. Even prior to this Ronquillo had confessed to the Marqués de Grana that he was far from attaining anything at Court; (see Appendix) Sunderland had told him that the Council was so engaged in Charles' winning the case of the capital's privileges that no other matter could be treated for want of time.(2) After the plot came to light, Don Pedro wrote that Charles could talk of little else.(3)

And so the summer continued. Charles, half-attentive to foreign affairs, complained as before at the confederates' distrust of his offer; but, in the interests of peace, he was still willing to pass on any positive suggestions to Louis. Ronquillo recognised the strength of French influence in England; so strong, he said, that English officialdom were convinced that only the offices and forces of France were capable of resisting the Turk. In no way could Charles

(1) 14th June (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(2) 28th June (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) 12th July (1); ibid.

be involved in defending Spain, and Don Pedro's talks to York, as one Catholic to another, did not modify James' views any more than they ever had. Sunderland and the Duchess of Portsmouth were, it seemed, securely established. Charles, at this time, suggested to Don Pedro the possibility of Spain exchanging Luxembourg for the forty-five villages of Longui. The ambassador replied that he had no orders to make treaties nor to propose or hear conditions, but that he would pass on any proposal to Madrid. The King had also been advocating the Emperor's sacrificing Strasbourg and Spain, Luxembourg, and there was talk of a monetary equivalent for these. Don Pedro still thought any question of equivalent was unjust, but he did not give a direct negative. (see Appendix) He justified his passing on the ideas to the Consejo de Estado by stating that, while it was necessary to maintain firmness, the door must not be closed on a negotiation that might prove useful to Spain in case of necessity or convenience. This was another manifestation of our friend's attempt to moderate Charles' displeasure with Spanish words and actions -- which would help nobody. The Council in Madrid was, however, resolutely against such conversations and Don Pedro came in for heavy criticism once again as being "pro-French".(1)

At the end of August the stalemate situation ended when Louis showed his true concern for the fate of Christendom by laying siege to Luxembourg once more. Memoirs again began to flow from the Spanish embassy to Charles and his ministers, demanding execution of Article IV of the

(1) 16th August(2); ibid) for all above paragraph
28th August; ibid) also letter.

Alliance; and examination of a letter from Don Pedro to Jenkins on one (see Appendix)
of these is revealing. The Secretary had replied verbally to the memoire but now Don Pedro said he required a written answer to send to Spain. He could not remember Jenkins' words, having been ill with gout and unable to visit him; and besides it was rather amazing not to receive a written reply to any of the four recent memorials he had submitted. (We know, of course, that this was Charles' policy; and perhaps Don Pedro's illness and this letter were a ruse to extract the answer in writing). However, as far as he was able to remember, the Secretary's reply could be reduced to four points, which he tabulates.

1). Charles had found Don Pedro's request strange when he knew the envoy was acquainted with the state of affairs in England.

2). Charles had said a few days before that he could not enter a "war abroad" and that the latest conspiracy had confirmed him in this opinion.

3). Charles' efforts had kept the peace for four years with good success, as the Spanish King had seen.

4). Don Pedro had pointed out that Charles' present policy was incompatible with the interests of himself, his kingdom and (see Appendix)
his vassals. Charles, now, did not like his vassals' desires being taken into account in such a matter.

Ronquillo replied to these points in detail:

a). In reality there had been war since the end of August. Meanwhile the Treaty of Windsor was, as it had always been, and the barrier in the Low Countries was just as important to England as to Spain.

b). Don Pedro claimed he had not spoken of domestic affairs, except in private conversation with the King and his ministers. But the plot had been squashed and a fleet prepared and it did not seem this position should hinder the fulfilment of the Treaty.

c). Charles had never told Ronquillo he would not enter a foreign war. It was not because ~~Charles~~ Carlos II wished war, but because Louis had started it, that it was necessary. In fact, it was Carlos rather than Charles who had sought peace. Moreover, it was in Spain's interest that England be united and able to fight.

d). Don Pedro regretted having displeased the King, but justified his memoire on the ground of past experience.

But nothing came of this. In his letters to the Low Countries and Spain, Ronquillo mixed a good deal of "gall in the ink", blaming Charles' proceedings, for which he could find less excuse than ever. Yet caution did not abandon him. He wrote to the Marqués de los Balbases in these days: " . . . It is certain that necessity and wish are equally contrary to us here. And in my opinion we must persuade ourselves that both things are true and on this base take our measures, not only now but in future, also considering our own unpreparedness and that in this realm the spirits are as hitherto with regard to sedition."(1)

(see Appendix)

However, the repulse of the Turks by the Polish and Imperial armies,

(1) 19th Sept; Ronquillo to Balbases; Alb.

as well as Leopold's interest in events to the West, inflamed Spanish hopes for the resumption and execution of an active "association". Madrid's apathetic pessimism, so usual now, gave way before extreme optimism and in December, 1683, Spain recklessly, if with reason, declared war on France. It was crystal clear that hostilities could not last long. For neither the English nor the Dutch entered them on Spain's side. Charles was still engaged with the aftermath of the Rye House Plot, in particular the vagaries of the Duke of Monmouth. As so often before, Charles avoided unnecessary negotiations and awaited the logic of events with remarkable placidity.

Clearly the happenings, great and small, of Spanish-British political relations and Don Pedro Ronquillo's activities in 1683, closely resemble those of the previous twelve months. They are not very interesting and there has been no necessity to separate them into 'major' and 'minor' negotiations. Perhaps the main reason for this was the ever-increasing involvement in her domestic affairs. For to all intents and purposes, after the discovery of the Rye House Plot, she ceased to play any active part whatever on the international stage, even as a potential participant. The volume of Spanish business with her after the month of July, as judged by the ambassador's correspondence, bears this out. Thereafter, to the end of the year, Charles and his ministers only gave opinions in the passing on what was happening across the Channel.

Spain's policy of firmly refusing the arbitration of Charles had been kept up throughout the year. We have also noticed that Don Pedro faithfully maintained this, but that all the same, he tried to close no doors on anything which might be useful for the future. He still engaged in those discussions of possible plans which the Council of State so disliked. He also sent out of his way to milden Charles' displeasure with Spain, for there was nothing to be gained from English annoyance, even though he might now be convinced of some co-operation between the King and Louis.

(see p. 281-2)

xx xx xx xx xx xx

2. Domestic Events and Spanish Policy towards these in 1683.

Spain's interests in the domestic affairs of the three kingdoms remained the same throughout 1683 as during the previous years: the maintenance and extension of the British public's generally favourable attitude to her and her needs; and, if practicable, a meeting of Parliament that would urge on or carry out English intervention on the Continent against France. She tried to keep good relations with all shades of domestic opinion, to work for their agreement, opposing civil war.

The domestic questions of the British Isles for that year can be divided into two types. First, there was Charles' continued efforts to gain control of local government in the main municipal centres, especially London; and secondly, the discovery of the plots against the King and Duke ofYork's lives, and the danger of armed republican rebellion. Ronquillo's interest in these was, as disturbances of the peace, threats of civil war and influences which might delay the meeting of Parliament.

By early June Charles had won the case of the privileges of London. ButDon Pedro recognised that this did not mean the King would have more time to devote to other affairs, such as, for example, the defence of the Low Countries, for he just became busy consolidating his gains. The ambassador's personal outlook was naturally authoritarian, he was never convinced of the value of English Common Law -- perhaps rightly so then -- (he also had several reasons of his own for disliking

London's municipal law); but he was a keen observer and one well-informed on things legal.

In a letter of 18th October he reflected somewhat on the decision concerning the privileges and liberties of the capital -- and he was by no means convinced of the value of Charles' victory. London now had the same government as "the most miserable town or corporation in the kingdom" and of all the armed forces (militia) of the city, there only remained afoot those independent of it and its magistrates. (see Appendix).

He then went on to say that the resolution of London appeared to him and others to have been induced by the Court. Yet he could not see the gain in this, since all that mattered to the King was having authority in the election of the magistrates. Besides, it had already brought heavy financial loss to the city's citizens and commerce, and though all was quiet, there were strong feelings about the change.

According to justice, the loss of the privileges might be just, but this alteration in the time-honoured government would result in an infinite number of legal suits with accompanying confusion. It would also be very difficult for the King or any new government to restore the status quo later on if they wished to. Turning to "what it is convenient for us to consider in this kingdom," Ronquillo did not know whether this decision would delay or push ahead Parliament's meeting. Just before the emergence of the plots, when Ronquillo told Charles in a conversation that it was not Spain's aim to force Charles to call Parliament, the King admitted he had paid out a million pounds sterling

since Oxford and spoke of how his interests and authority in the country had improved, and how he hoped to have a Parliament which would be good and do what was right. Such a session, the Spaniard felt, would, however, be concerned with domestic not Spanish interests, though it might be nearer these.(1)

But the discovery of the plots of royal assassination and armed rebellion had exploded any illusions of domestic calm and a prompt Parliament. Don Pedro himself had been at Newmarket at the time of the fire which turned aside the Rye House plot, through Charles and James returning to London a week before the time arranged. Naturally enough he knew the place where the assassination had been planned to take place. Cautious at first with the news of the conspiracy, he sent to Madrid, due to the many rumours, he gave in detail the reaction of the English public to it. He reported the at least cold indifference of the opposition and even of people not interested in politics to the near tragedy. Disturbance was universal and Don Pedro considered to his master the need for the protection of royal persons, and the difficulties of dealing with this particular situation. For it would not be possible to punish all, especially when it was believed they were in all parts of the country and many of the upper class.

What was to be the attitude of the Spanish government and their envoy to such an event ? The old Spanish respect for royalty and their perennial attitude towards family ties -- for Charles was their Queen's uncle -- certainly emerge from their actions, though practical

(1)18th Oct (1), 1683; Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado(Ing) 3959.

self-interest also played an important part.

The first consulta of the Consejo de Estado on the news opined that, even considered in the light of past occurrences, the nature of the English and the state of affairs in the North, this was an event of the greatest importance for the island. There was a feeling expressed that it might cause Charles to lose confidence in Louis. Ronquillo's orders were to keep in well with all parties, to take no steps except those needed to preserve Charles' confidence, but not to antagonise the opposition, in case France should undertake any demonstration on the King's behalf. In other words, Don Pedro was to preserve an entirely neutral position. (see Appendix)

However, the ambassador was to take a more definite stand. He congratulated Charles on his escape and recommended the Marqués de Grana to do the same. This he justified to Madrid by saying that if the opposition should come to power, this action would probably be passed over through their having more important things to do: the Republicans, if they came to power, would have to consider not the past but the present and the future and what was necessary for their establishment and preservation. They would have to base everything on commercial and other national interests and remember that it was Cromwell's embracing of the French party which had reduced him to dying oppressed with the sight of the commerce and wealth of the realm lost through the affiliation. Hence they would not wish to make the same mistake and incur the same ruin. More fundamentally, Ronquillo

felt that, despite the Republicans being in favour of war and a Parliament -- which only might serve Spanish interests -- they, as a disturbing element were no help in attaining his country's real ends (1).

On 12th July, Don Pedro had reported that another assassination attempt on the King had been uncovered, which was to have taken place the previous Wednesday at a bull-fight; he also supplied more information on the Rye House plot and the punishments being meted out. The Council in Madrid considered in its corresponding consulta "that these conspiracies against royal persons are a common offense to all sovereigns and that all should concern themselves in the punishment of such an execrable evil." They viewed this attempt as even more atrocious because some Presbyterians had hoped to place the burden of it on the Catholics, thus finishing with them at the same time. (see Appendix). (see Religion).

For all these reasons, Ronquillo had taken and continued to take an even more pro-Royalist stand. In an audience with Charles, he told the King that the Governor of the Low Countries would co-operate in handing back any conspirators that might seek refuge there. "On the advice of a person who wishes us well in everything, and with the assurance that the case would not arise, and that it was always good to forestall the artifices of France," the ambassador also tells us he offered Charles 3,000 men to include a body of infantry, to aid in the round-up of suspects. Charles, in reply, said that a list of

(1) 12th July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/traitors would be sent to the Marqués de Grana, and that none were to be protected save Monmouth and Lord Gray. He also thanked Ronquillo for the offer of men, but did not accept it. One feels that Charles must have done this with an inward sardonic smile, knowing the Spanish troops' situation in the Low Countries. Don Pedro reported as well that, despite the royal refusal, Barillon was not happy at the offset of the friendly offer. (see appendix) Of course such an offer was in line with the terms of the Treaty of Windsor, but it also showed there was some basis for the fear that Spain might intervene in England's domestic affairs on the King's side. But, as we know, such a thing was in fact very far from her intentions.

During these months, Don Pedro in his letters freely criticised the pardon or not of the plotters. Though, generally speaking, he felt the King's aim in the interest of future domestic peace was to punish only the most blameworthy, the treatment accorded Russell seemed to him incompatible with the freedom granted others.(1) At the end of July he wrote that the punishments proceeded badly, neither with great rigour nor great equity "extremes which, in this case, would be virtues because such lukewarmness as this encourage the evil and discourages the good."(2) As the years wore on, Don Pedro grew yet more critical of the proceedings and their possible effect on the British public. Especially did he feel the handling of Monmouth had been bungled. The more so, to see the accomplices in an undoubted conspiracy almost all at liberty, while/

(1) 12th. July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) 30th. July; Ronquillo to Grana; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3873.

there still languished in prison Catholic gentlemen and many others for the Popish Plot,"one indubitably false".(1)

After giving a long despatch on these domestic affairs, Don Pedro wrote at this time: "Much more could be told Your Majesty to prove that the Monarchy has never been in such great danger since the time of the late King (Charles II), and that matters have reached such a point and the malcontents such obstinacy that no sedition will be found out until after the blow has been dealt. Difficult it is for there to be a Parliament now, and although many believe it will be held in March, it will only take place so the King does not break the law for calling it every three years, and it will be dismissed immediately. But if it does meet, we cannot depend on these maxims and be unprepared . . ." (see Appendix) Indeed, the plots had finally ruined any faint hopes of English intervention on the continent and a Parliament in the country. With respect to the second, shortly after the conspiracies' discovery, Charles told Don Pedro they had only justified his dissolution of Parliament in 1681 and his view that the opposition's principal aim was against his position and his house. Any rumours of an early meeting being called while Charles was still popular after his escape, rather than the following spring when definitely due, did not materialise,and Don Pedro clearly did not have any great confidence in these, though reporting them. As we have noticed, he no longer pressed secretly or openly for a Parliament, for

(1) 13th December; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Ing) 3959.

Spain could do so little with the parties and it was so dangerous to meddle. The perplexity of the Spanish position is seen in a letter of Don Pedro's to the Marqués de Castelmoncayo: "I admit to you I do not know what to wish, because, although it has always been difficult to discover the basis to affairs in England, now it appears to me impossible and that there is none." (14th Dec, 1683: A.G.R. (Haye) 495).

Certainly it seemed as though all the stars in their courses were moving against Spain. Affairs appeared at an impasse from which some major event must rescue them before normal activity could be resumed. But then there was also the fear that so little might bring a civil war in England, and worse, for Spanish interests in England. (see Appendix)

xx xx xx xx xx

III. Political Outline - 1684.

1. Spanish-British Political relations in 1684.

Spain had been over-optimistic if she expected the other powers, in particular, England and Holland, to be forced by Louis' invasion to come to her aid. The Dutch men of state might be very alarmed at the Marqués de Castelmoncayo's threats that Spain would abandon the whole of the Low Countries to France, (1) -- but not enough, or maybe too much, to elicit action, certainly without English or Imperial aid. England on the outer penumbra was already trying to force her or get her forced into making peace. (2) Yet she still considered it was better to lose in war with honour than through a dishonourable peaceful arrangement. In one January despatch Ronquillo wrote: "It is better to lose only the Low Countries in war, rather than these together with our reputation through being deceived." (3) Therefore she decided to wait, making what resistance she could (as at Luxembourg itself), for invasion of her territories might still draw forth action from the allies. It was a more dignified position and she might receive more attention if she made the powers await her answer to any offers of a settlement. Moreover experience during the last twenty-five years of recurring alliances and treaties had bred in her a profound distrust of peace conferences where she was forced to give up more than she first intended. The Constable of Castile voiced this/

(1) Lonchay (Rivalité), p. 303.
(2) 13th. Dec. (1) 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(3) 24th. Jan; ibid.

/this in the Spanish Council of State when he gave the opinion, that since the Peace of Westphalia, "Your Majesty will find that they (the French) have usurped more than half of what your Majesty possesses. In negotiations, it is more possible that we lose than that we recoup what has been lost."(1) Hence Don Pedro Ronquillo's orders were in fact the same as before -- not to discuss anything but a general treaty, nor by word or letter any private agreement with France. His only weapon was withdrawal from London under an order which he could use when told to or should Charles remain obstinate. Personally Don Pedro looked forward to this for many private reasons, but its execution depended on whether money was received from the Marqués de Grana, who in turn had little to forward. (see appendix)

Not that Ronquillo despaired entirely of the situation. Though he reported rumours of new Anglo-French and Anglo-Danish alliances he was not convinced that official England agreed to the French propositions. (see appendix) Charles was obviously interested in the situation and watching what the other nations would do, and what the Marqués de Grana would achieve in the Low Countries on his own. Domestically there were signs that Charles did not merely follow the pro-French party of York and Portsmouth, but thought and decided for himself. Nonetheless the King still affirmed that the Low Countries were more the States' business than his.(2) In addition, the Dutch ministers

were/

(1) Consulta on letter of 24th. Feb. 1684, enclosing one of 22nd. Feb. (Ronquillo to Fuenmayor); ibid.

(2) 10th. Jan. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/were quite co-operative with him.[1] Undoubtedly there were those also in high positions in England who shared to some extent the Spanish views concerning the situation on the Continent. To illustrate, Don Pedro made every effort that his memoires should be read in the King's Council, and on one occasion he wrote: "I know that there will not be lacking someone who will give it consideration", even though Charles seems to have been in a mood that made him impossible for any one to treat with.[2] As for the English public, there was not wanting sympathy for Spain and fear of France: they had been angered at the printing in December, 1682, of recent French propositions and peace feelers.[3]

But the situation was obviously hopeless for long-continued Spanish resistance and peace propositions began to come in, which, despite any orders from Madrid demanded discussion. By February, Charles was suggesting a treaty of peace to the Dutch minister, which included what was actually to be the base of the Truce of Ratisbon -- a twenty year guarantee for Spain and the Emperor. Don Pedro felt at the time that the principal object of this was "to cham with the name of 'general treaty'" while in fact it would involve separate dealing with both powers concerned. This was according to the reports he got of what was being said in the English "gabinete" (cabinet) meetings about confidence in the French. Spain wanted to be/

(1) 7th. Feb. (1); ibid.
(2) 7th. Feb. (1); ibid; 24th. Jan; ibid.
(3) 1st. Jan; Carlos II to Ronquillo; précis in Lonchay (Correspondence) V. No. 1071.

/be sure of a genuine general peace congress with no separate deals. At a meeting of the Swedish, Spanish and Dutch ambassadors at the Dutch ambassador's house, all agreed it was not convenient to have any negotiation in London, due to the small amount of support the allies possessed among the English, and that the Hague would be definitely preferable.(1)

Early in March a memoire from the Dutch for a general treaty of 7-8 years was presented in London, and Charles spoke of the matter to Ronquillo, who, having no new orders could make no statement. The English reply Don Pedro classed as "malísima" but not so bad as it might have been. However he had also to console the Dutchman who felt the rebuff very keenly, and in his letter to Madrid he ended up on this note: "Neither he nor any other Prince is so lacking in experience of England that he does not take for most certain the opposity action to that which is promised."(2)

Also on 13th. March, Ronquillo wrote of another conference he was at and the excerpt below illustrates well his policy and position.(3)

"As they did not dare to speak to me about the Articles of Peace and I saw they were embarassed, I judged it convenient not to open their eyes by introducing disputes, and that it was best to let the time pass, leaving them in suspense and careful until Your Majesty replies." Don Pedro still only awaited money to be able to retire/

(1) 24th. Feb; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) 13th. Mar; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid (Fla) 3984.
(3) 13th. Mar; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Ing) 3959.

/retire from London by way of protest.

However, by the time the Council in Madrid came to consider this (April 20th.) a treaty with France was already in the offing, and Don Pedro was told not to declare himself or the order he had to leave until instructed.(1) The motive for stirring the English into activity through this or a trade embargo (see Trade), was ceasing in the light of recent decisions, and it was also important that Louis should not use this to worsen relations. But indeed the negotiations were to drag on for some time yet.

All these months of hostilities, the question of Spanish recruiting in the British Isles had continued to arise from time to time, and it was natural, with the Low Countries at such a pass, that it should come up again now. Ronquillo expressed his opinion to the Marqués de Grana that should the Spanish requests be refused, it would be because other countries were being denied the privilege. If, on the other hand, recruiting should be allowed, it would be France, among all the powers, who would have the advantage. The ultimate answer from Charles turned out to be half satisfactory to Spain; for while it did not give her a carte-blanche, it said specific requests would be granted on their merits. Immediately Spain, needing every soldier she could muster, began to lodge these. (see appendix)

By May Day, any opposition to France of any sort was crumbling. (see appendix)

Ronquillo/

(1) Consulta of 20th. April; ibid.

/Ronquillo wrote that the Dutch did not really care about the loss of Luxembourg;(1) the English official supposition was that Louis would be content with the fortress and that it should be given him. Inevitably, the news arrived of the fall of that strong and lovely city, and in the English Court, the making of peace was felt to be "an infallible necessity."(2) Though Ronquillo also admitted that his master would now have to adjust himself to the needs of the abandonment by his allies, his letter reporting the city's fall ends with a human note from the hard worker whose efforts had apparently been in vain: "I confess to Your Majesty that I am left most sorrowful by the loss of Luxembourg, as one who has valued this place most and laboured for its preservation among your royal dominions."(see appendix) Very shortly after that, the failure seemed complete, for the Dutch, unable to get united opposition to France, concluded a Twenty Year Truce with her; Don Pedro wrote three weeks after commenting on the fall of the city: "The loss of Luxembourg, so important is it, afflicted all good men, and the heart was completely rent last Friday by the perfidious resolution of the States-General."(3) The Marqués de Grana was now "without peace, without treaty, and without means, without troops and without the Dutch."(4) The blitzkreig of Louis XIV had succeeded again, both militarily and diplomatically.

The months of July and August were those leading to a settlement with/

(1) 1st. May (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) 5th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(3) 26th. June (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(4) 10th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3926.

/with France but Don Pedro's orders were still to stick by the Peace of Nimeguen and obey any from Vienna. Despite this official stand Ronquillo saw the need for some agreement which would settle as many problems as possible, and he feared that stubborn refusals might just drive Charles into the hands of the French, so great was the King's desire for peace. As so often the Council in Madrid thought he was going too far ahead, but nonetheless he was discussing certain of the problems of the approaching peace with Charles, trying to enlist his sympathy and support -- and this not entirely unsuccessfully.(1) For, Italy was still common ground. Don Pedro wrote that "nothing have the French more between their teeth"(2) than Genoa and such a state of affairs did not suit Charles or any Englishman. The King had "detested" the burning of the city by the French and praised the position taken by the Spanish on it, reassuring Don Pedro that never, now or later, could England abandon that republic, and that Louis knew this.(3) Charles also rejoiced over the victories of the Duke of Lorraine in Hungary, and our friend tells us how one evening that summer when he passed on the news of some defeat of the Turks, "in the presence of everyone including many French, he embraced me and turning to all said this was the work of the Duke of Lorraine and not the King of Poland" (whom Charles disliked).(see Appendix)

After the signing by all powers of the Truce of Ratisbon, there still remained several points outstanding that demanded decision, and/

(1) Ibid, and Consulta of 5th. Sept. etc; Sim Estado (Ing), 3959.
(2) 2nd. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) See also in Genoa & Italy:- 21st. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3926.

/and these the Spanish forwarded to Charles. Charles refused to perform this service though saying he would try to help forward solutions. His reason was that Spain during the blockade of Luxembourg had refused his arbitration when it was offered, she had disturbed the Ratisbon conference, and besides he had never wished to be an arbitrator, but a mediator since the first never satisfied anyone.(1) However a fair amount of the negotiating after the Truce took place in London, where Spanish, Austrian and Dutch ministers were hard at work trying to straighten matters out. And Charles himself proved quite helpful.

Perhaps the most important problem arising was to get the French troops evacuated from the territory they had invaded during the recent war.(2) These "such evil guests" were holding their ground until the Spanish should pay the indemnities, and they were even dismantling certain fortifications, principally at Courtrai. Ronquillo, supported by the Austrian and Dutch envoys, was prompt to agitate for English intervention in the matter and he knew the danger of delay in settlement. (see appendix) Many of the people were scandalised at Louis' conduct, and though Barillon, the Duchess of Portsmouth and Sunderland were calling the Spanish "stubborn and fools" for acting firmly, Charles seems to have been more sympathetic to them.(3) Don Pedro wrote that Charles knew the true situation, and that he was reported to have told/

(1) 27th. November; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959
(2) 4th. Sept; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid.
(3) 21st. Sept; Ronquillo to Grana; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3876.

/told one of his aides that the King of France was a "chicaneur" and of the unreasonableness of Louis' requests.(1) He had also admitted to the ambassador that Flanders in the hands of the Spanish was the bulwark and defence of England. Though unwilling to get involved, still it was clear that such a question must be settled in the interests of peace which were Charles' interests. Therefore, he had already sent a memoire to Paris, expressing that "there are considerations, Christian and political (which are not inferior). . . that it will not be a treaty until the Low Countries are free of troops."(2) Under these circumstances and despite deep personal financial difficulties, Ronquillo kept as close as possible to Charles that autumn, following him to Winchester and Newmarket. Don Pedro was keen to see him use his influence with Louis to get the exhorbitant amounts demanded by the French reduced, and the dates due extended; he also wished him to help get the troops evacuated and the demolition of defences stopped.

These efforts were not without effect. Despite the fear many at Court had of the francophile influences there, the Spaniard found some support. Early in October, he presented four memoires about the situation, and for one of these, he prepared the way by showing it to certain members of the Council who then offered not to work against it at that body's meetings. As a last effort, Don Pedro also made preliminaries/

(1) 28th. Sept; ibid.
(5) See 2nd. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/preliminaries in London should the Marqués de Grana wish to make private financial arrangements to help pay the French - - which he did not. By the end of the month, the armies were evacuating the Spanish territories, though the retreat was slow, and complaints still came in of French conduct there. The last we hear of this and Charles' part is in January, 1685, when the news of the almost complete demolition of Courtrai and Dixmunde reached Don Pedro. Once again, he went straightway to the palace and Charles promised he would speak to Barillon that very night. (see appendix)

Yet more of Charles' sympathy was obtained in the parallel problems of Genoa, which continued to drag on, and was so often discussed at the same interviews as the indemnities and evacuation question - - though here they are considered apart. The Genoese had sent their Secretary of State, Bernardo de Salvago, as a special envoy to London and Ronquillo worked with him closely, for a Spanish protectorate over the city had been established by the new Truce. At times, the Spaniard was not quite sure of the Italian, as he never was of the race; although ostensibly for inseparability from Spain in "so great and delicate a business", Salvago, being exceedingly clever, might not be able to forget the characteristic of his countrymen. Our friend was of course full of other fears, worried whether the Pope might not help barter Genoese independance for the comfort of the Church/

/Church in France, and so forth. The Genoese memorial presented to Charles in early December was similar to one given simultaneously by Ronquillo, though it was less anti-French. To this Charles showed himself favourable to Spanish interests, though not putting himself out particularly.. (see appendix)

Though there were rumours then of Charles and some of his ministers joining with William or Orange in another anti-French alignment, and since then, some discussion as to whether the King was changing his foreign policy in those months, there is little in the letters of Ronquillo to substantiate this.(1) The French party appeared supreme at many times throughout the reign, but Charles always thought for himself, though he might often fall in with others' views, thus saving himself quarrels and work. It seems most likely that he was now just showing his independance, rather than embarking on a new policy. (see appendix) Don Pedro does not appear to have had such hopes: he was merely continuing to husband anything in England which might help stop French imperialism at Spain's expense. He was only trying to win Charles' support on certain specific problems in which he knew Charles had common interests, which might lead to a certain amount of common action. His hopes of England's fulfilling the Treaty of Windsor, as long as Charles was on the throne, were no longer sanquinary. Sanguine

Of the more minor of all these not very important negotiations, there is only need to again mention Spanish-Portuguese-British relations. Of/

(1) 22nd. Dec. (2); ibid.

Of his country's connections with Portugal, he could still write: "I confess to Your Majesty that I apply all the vigilance possible to these dependencies, because it seems to me that there is to-day no Prince with whom it is more convenient to have friendship and good correspondence, than the King of Portugal."(1) "These dependencies" at this moment included the rumoured Franco-Portuguese royal marriages instead of with allied houses, such as Newberg. The matter had come to a head that year when Charles excused himself from supporting by word or writing the Duke of Newberg's proposals for this marital link. By this, Don Pedro said, the King was ignoring all he owed the Duke during his exile, and York's not marrying the present Empress who was also one of that House. A memoire of a decidedly pro-French was despatched to Lisbon, thought to be principally the work of Sunderland.(2) Ronquillo himself did not think the instance would carry much weight at the Portuguese Court anyway, due to the unsavoury treatment meted out by Charles to Catherine of Braganza; the difficulties over her dowry; and "the other ten thousand circumstances". He therefore did not lodge any complaints of what English ministers had done in favour of France in this matter; if anyone mentioned the affair, he did not pass to grumbling of how little had been done for Spain. The English Queen is mentioned as having made one of her rare interventions into political affairs when she/

(1) 24th. July (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) This was later denied by a henchman of Sunderland.

/she wrote her brother - - one of the intended grooms - - advising him not to conclude French marriages (see appendix). For this, the Consejo de Estado ordered her thanked by Don Pedro. As a matter of fact the English instances and actions of the French envoy in Lisbon had presupposed the affair much further advanced than it actually was, and the threatened marriages did not come off.(1)

There was also a report in June that Charles and the Portuguese King were co-operating in the pressing of Spanish ships, and Don Pedro naturally had to investigate this also. All the authorities denied it and Don Pedro doubted it himself on account of the distant relation between the English and Portuguese Courts.(2) Indeed, British-Portuguese relations could hardly imply co-operation that would provide either a channel for French ambitions or a rapprochement between the two peninsular Kingdoms.

With this, we now pass to the impact of British domestic affairs on the relations with Spain in 1684.

(1) See 10th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 26th. June (2); ibid, 3959.

2. British Domestic Affairs and Spanish Policy.

a) The First Six Months of 1684.

The last full year of Charles II's reign, though on the surface it appears uneventful domestically, was really full of uncertainty. It was an internal situation, so delicately balanced that anything might happen: the government could grow more or less authoritarian, with the possibilities of parliament or civil war or both; and with every day, Charles was growing older. In one of the first despatches of 1684 from Don Pedro Ronquillo, he reflects this feeling:

"In my opinion this mode of government cannot last more than this year without great confusion; and I do not expect any remedy, because one of the most effective would be a declaration of war against France. And as this cannot be done without Parliament, most of the ministers give themselves over to fear and the Duke of York, and he will inflame the wound the more because he does not wish quiet and will support the French party."(1)

Also he wrote of "the universal desires for this meeting" of Parliament in March. But the King announced his departure for Newmarket for the first of that month, and he continued to tell Don Pedro in their conversations the risk he was in, how resolute and strong the conspirators were in the realm and how much confusion existed. However, Ronquillo added, Charles did not say that "the greater/

(1) 10th. Jan. (2); ibid.

/greater portion of these ills proceeded from his leanings to France and in particular from those of the Duke of York, on whom they cast all the blame and against whom universal hatred grows with every day, since all believe his aim is to reduce this situation to confusion and avail himself of the forces of France to take this Kingdom by conquest. And that he has this project, I can almost assure Your Majesty from what he let fall in the conference I had with him."(1)

In another letter, Don Pedro refers to Charles' ideal of domestic peace continuing in spite of Barillon's efforts to impress on him the power of France, and also despite the "incorrigible" point of view of James, who approved all the French ambassador said "because he desires to fill each village of this Kingdom with as many corpses as the French have done in Luxembourg."(2)

Of course, we know that there were other factors and that these statements were exaggerated. Yet there was a great fundamental truth behind them, that as long as the King and the Duke were in agreement with France, they would be in disagreement with the great majority throughout the country.

In more detail, during these first months of the year, James and "La Posmit" (as Don Pedro referred to the Duchess of Portsmouth) abetted by Sunderland and Rochester appeared to control all, and the King rarely showed his independance. He might consult Arlington or outsiders/

(1) Ibid.
(2) 24th. Jan; ibid.

/outsiders about some matter, but that did not change the fact of their power.

They were turning any fear or discord with Spain to the advantage of France, and Don Pedro felt Charles' convenience, and often his real opinion, were being set aside by this extremist party even in domestic affairs.(1) In February, he had written of the great number of "irregularities" towards the government employees and people, and went on:

"In the midst of this the resources are nil. No one is paid and everyone discontented but fearful of being ruined, considering as they do, the ease with which accusations are brought forward and terrible condemnations dispensed, if not for slight cause at least for crimes that have not been punished here in many years or not so explicitly."(2)

This interpretation of justice would in time - - but not soon (in Don Pedro's opinion) - - produce fatal results. While the King's hold over the guilds and corporations of the kingdom might "smother" this, it would not "put out the fire", even though the opposition might have lost the means of operation and the Court be absolute. "To raise the flame again", either a rebellion or a parliament would be required, but the first was apparently becoming less likely, and the second would take place only if the Court judged it convenient.

The/

(1) 21st. Feb. (2); ibid. Re Arlington: 24th. Jan; ibid.
(2) 21st. Feb. (2); ibid.

/The people, according to our observer thought that the King would settle all by the meeting of Parliament, but Don Pedro doubted this, for he judged "the French, the French woman and her followers would make the King and his brother take risks," in that event.(1) That May, York, now in the Council, was made Lord High Admiral and Rochester, First Lord of the Treasury.(2) So, half way through the year there were no signs of francophile influences abating in strength.

In face of all these complications and considerations, Spanish policy could hardly change in domestic affairs. She feared a Parliament; she feared a rebellion; she disliked republicanism but also the francophile court; her friends in the three kingdoms seemed powerless. So Spain continued to wait, maintaining good relations with all parties, if quietly supporting, when possible and prudent, her true friends. But she was ready for the expected changes, when "friend" might become "foe" and "foe", "friend." For example, Don Pedro was quite prepared to try and please Sunderland, writing: "Although Sunderland does not deserve any favours from us, our not refusing them is always convenient, in case one of those serious turns the Duchess of Portsmouth, his only support, is accustomed to take should carry her off to another world."(3) And time was to show that this reading of the Earl's opportunism, even to the point of helping Ronquillo, was correct.

(1) 1st. May (3); ibid.
(2) 29th. May; ibid.
(3) 26th. June (3); ibid.

2. British Domestic Affairs and Spanish Policy (contd.)

b) The Last Six Months of 1684.

During the second half of 1684 however, the general atmosphere became less tense. Ronquillo attributed this to the Duke of York's becoming more cautious, as if in anticipation of his ascension to the throne, and as a result, more popular throughout the kingdom.(1)

Few changes took place among the ministers in these months; quarrels there might be, but the personel remained approximately the same. Don Pedro's view of their relations was that: Sunderland was keeping as close to Charles "as his Benjamin", though the attitude of James to the Earl was unknown. Sunderland was also busy trying to eliminate the competition of other ministers. Although Sunderland affected great co-operation with Rochester, Don Pedro said he knew he was privately trying to make York suspect his brother-in-law. Portsmouth ruled Sunderland, and Barillon directed both while James went on going out of his way to keep in well with the Duchess. The Duke of Ormonde had been sent back to Ireland - - in other words, out of the way.(2)

Our friend does however mention in some detail the changes at the Treasury, where the supremacy of the Portsmouth party was not so assured. Two of the five places of commissioner became vacant, and they were bestowed on a brother of the Lord Privy Seal and a cousin of/

(1) 24th. July (3); ibid.
(2) Ibid.

/of the Marquis of Halifax. This was obviously not inferable to the influence of the Duchess or the Duke, and despite the efforts of the francophile party to get the appointments changed, Charles refused to yield. There had already been great dissension between Halifax and Rochester on the royal income, how it could be increased and whether it should be rented out or managed directly, but Charles had eventually been won over to the Marquis' point of view. In this he had been supported by the Lord Privy Seal. James was worried after the decision because he had not hidden his feelings on the matter sufficiently, to maintain the public opinion that he controlled all. The Duke was also dissatisfied with his hand in running the Admiralty and now he would be so with regard to the Treasury. Charles had in fact once again shown his hand. Yet, in reality, he had only acted on sensible advice concerning financial affairs, for the Marquis had supported his remarks to the King by saying that only by such reforms and making the best of his own income, could Charles rid himself of the danger of Parliament to him. Hence although Halifax was a moderate, who was in general pro-Spanish and anti-French, this victory of his would hardly be called one for Spain. In fact, Ronquillo himself was not particularly pleased, for the reason that he had enlisted the support of York in the current matter of the indemnities. For if the question was not settled at Ratisbon and James'/

/James' power with Charles was lessened, it might cause a setback for the interests of the Catholic King.(1) This, in the light of what has already been said of the autumn of 1684, shows that Don Pedro had little hope of a general about-face in Charles' policy with France, but that he was continuing to try and get support for Spain wherever he could in particular problems.

Ronquillo was nevertheless mildly pleased at the appointment then of several 'neutral' and more pro-Spanish individuals to positions both in and outside the country. Rochester was replaced by Sidney Godolphin as First Lord of the Treasury - though Don Pedro did not think this meant very much, for Rochester was just made President of the Council, and Godolphin had been a Secretary of State and not pro-Spanish. He was, however, encouraged by the appointment of the Earl of Middleton as Godolphin's successor, (see appendix) and later the naming of Charles, Viscount Lansdowne, to the Madrid embassy. (see appendix) Both these men had close connections and sympathies with the House of Austria.

One thing that had united Charles and his brother increasingly was the reckless activities of Monmouth. That autumn, Argyll had been captured and more was learnt of the armed conspiracy in which the "Absalom" was said to be involved. What particularly affected Don Pedro was Monmouth's exile, for it posed a delicate question for the Spanish authorities at Brussels of how he should be received. On the Duke's/

(1) 21st. Aug; ibid.

/Duke's arrival in the Low Countries, the Marqués de Grana had thought it best to honour him with a banquet. Meanwhile Ronquillo had asked the Duke's father in London how he wished his sons treated in Spanish territories, to be told that Charles did not want him paid any special attention. Don Pedro wrote also that Sunderland was trying to work the matter up into a misunderstanding on the supposition that the Spanish Governor was supporting a rebel; that they were claiming in London that Monmouth was receiving a thousand crowns a month paid through Fonseca. Orders were received in time from Madrid to do Charles' pleasure in the matter, but by that time the Duke had left the Low Countries and there were only rumours of his whereabouts. The King replied on this to Ronquillo in a parenthesis to one of their conversations:

"It is certain that the Duke is not in Holland, nor the Low Countries nor any other of the places he could be, and I esteem the Duke of Monmouth so little that I do not care to know where he is."(1)

In line with such a statement, and Charles' instances, it was decided that should Monmouth come to the Low Countries again, he should be asked to leave. Thus, Spain cleared herself of having protected the rebel prince instead of just having admitted him to her national territory. (see appendix)

Winter gradually came and apart from rumblings in Scotland, the situation/

(1) 22nd. Dec. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

/situation seemed to be settling down into one of quiescence, which afforded neither new dangers, nor new opportunities. Charles was amiable but not really very helpful to her cause. James was also as usual: Don Pedro telling of a conversation with him and how, knowing his nature, he had made him no replies except to smile and agree with him in general.(1) There were more new appointments besides that already mentioned of Lord Lansdowne to Spain. Rochester was sent as Viceroy of Ireland replacing Ormonde with no more ado than to inform the Duke to make way for his successor - which seemed to the ambassador to show typical English ingratitude.(2)

But the future was still uncertain. "The King has made considerable gains, for every day there come communities to offer him their privileges and it is generally thought that there will not be a Parliament for several years . . . Nevertheless there are those who assured me that preparations for revolt have begun throughout the rest of the realm. I do not know what to affirm to Your Majesty, for while apparently there is no longer any great disturbance, there is something which is not revealed which threatens a great revolt; and conspiracy is now exhausted in Scotland which is being worked there in great secret."(3)

Yet not even openly was the Court party getting it all its own way, and an example of this follows - important particularly for Ronquillo's/

(1) 29th. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 8th. Dec. (1); ibid.
(3) ibid.

/Ronquillo's closing remark in reporting it. The Court at this time was wanting justice done on a merchant who was said to have lent money to conspirators in the most recent plot, but the jury had replied that there was not sufficient proof to convict him. Don Pedro said there were other opinions but he did not venture to give his own, except to say: "The experience I have had of England is that the laws are equally as strong as any partialities."(1) In another despatch he wrote: "Never will attempts against the fundamental laws of the realm attain their end."(2) This could well have been taken as a warning watchword by James and his friends in his swiftly approaching reign.

As for the situation within the Court, Ronquillo thought the Duchess of Portsmouth would be able to survive any disturbance and thereby stop Spain from reaping any benefits from any changes in the British Isles. (see appendix) This or Parliament seemed to have few possibilities improving the Spanish position. Despite her efforts, Spain was still suspected of fomenting sedition and encouraging the enemies of the Court. Charles joining, or being forced to join, through Parliament, revellion or desire, in the affairs of Europe by the side of His Catholic Majesty against the Most Christian King, seemed as far off as ever it had, though French influence in England was somewhat weaker.

(1) Ibid.
(2) 15th. Aug; ibid 3959.

IV. Non-Fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor - Maritime and Trade. 1682-5

1. Questions arising in Maritime and Trading Affairs.

While Spanish-British relations during 1682-5 possess little that is striking in the political field, the interest of those concerned with the commercial and maritime affairs revives after the previous period's quiescence. So let us scan the questions which arose between the two countries in the Eastern and Western hemispheres.

a) The Tangier Problem.

Spanish anxiety was increasing over the changing situation in Tangier morocco and the Western Mediterranean, where Charles II, pressed at home by domestic unrest and financial lack, wished his responsibilities lessened. But who would take his place? Would the Moors then be able to overrun, not only Tangier, but also the nearby Spanish possessions? Perhaps France would fill the vacuum, co-operating with them and menacing Spain from the south, perhaps gaining control of the Straits area and more. Then what of Charles' suspected alliance with Louis?

All these questions and reasons made Don Pedro Ronquillo exceedingly watchful.

In March, 1682, Charles and the Prince of Morocco concluded a peace treaty in secret. Don Pedro was able to learn the terms of (see appendix) this agreement, but it revealed little of importance, and in a bitter way/

/way our friend wrote that he did not know why the English had tried to keep the matter so secret unless to excuse making a treaty while not fulfilling another (i.e. the Treaty of Windsor). As for taking action on it, he presented a request to Secretary Jenkins which included three points which he wished considered by England. Firstly, if the Moors were forever entering Tangier with captured Christians, those offences done in Spanish dominions and against Spanish subjects should be taken exception to. He asked, in the second point, that free trade be preserved between Spanish ports in Africa and the hitherto free port of Tangier. Thirdly was the request for help in recovering the Mamora whenever Spain should attempt that. This would be because the region had been lost after the treaty was made with the Moors and in revenge for the Spanish having sent cavalry to aid beleaguered Tangier.(1) The Secretary reassured the ambassador that nothing would be done to injure Spain's interests. Personally, Don Pedro did not feel the peace made by England with Algiers and Morocco was ideal but he was almost sure it would be ratified.(2)

By December, 1682, although some officers and four hundred Irish troops were to be sent to Tangier, it was clear to Ronquillo that the King and Laurence Hyde "who is not less" felt holding the city was a waste of money. At the same time, Don Pedro was watching the French ambassador's/

(1) 9th. Mar. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) 1st. June (4); ibid.

/ambassador's attitude towards this very closely.(1)

During the summer and autumn of 1683, the problem of Tangier came up for definite solution in London, for the cost of supporting it was inordinate; and Charles himself complained of this, and gave figures to Don Pedro. But in Spain some of the members of the Consejo de Estado felt that the King's still having enough to send troops there, but not enough to send to Flanders, showed complicity with Louis. The French were already taking advantage of any such ill feeling between England and Spain to fabricate rumours, but this, Don Pedro discerned, and also that neither Charles nor his ministers knew where to look for supply to keep up the city. In April, 1684, some of Lord Dartmouth's fleet returned from Tangier and Ronquillo learned from some Admiralty officials the cost of the expedition and the details of dismantling the port. The Duke of York also told him that Tangier was not even suitable for harbouring a fishing boat. (see appendix)

But would France enter the vacuum? Sunderland told Barillon he believed Charles would sell Tangier to France though in fact the suggestion was refused. Yet despite the Spanish fears of this, we hear no more of Spain herself offering to buy the place after the autumn of 1683, when, Don Pedro had said there would have to be care in offering to do so, in case the French heard of the negotiation and tried to wreck it.(2) Without a doubt the expense of its purchase when the Spanish treasury was in even greater straits than the English was/

(1) 28th. Dec; ibid, 3959. See also re this subject:- 31st. May(1); ibid.

(2) 15th. Nov.

/was the major consideration in the decision. In England, Halifax and others criticised the cost of the demolition of Tangier's defences, but despite the later opinion of Captain Jenkins, there does not seem to have been much general criticism of giving up "so estimable a jewel"(1), due principally to public preoccupation with internal affairs. In short, the move, though undesirable for the two nations, was also understandable in the light of their position, financial and otherwise. It was, however, fortunate that neither France nor the Moors took full advantage of the opportunity the city's evacuation afforded them.

Incidentally, I have encountered no references to Gibraltar of any importance in the documents consulted for this period.

b) Piracy.

In the Indies, the pirates appeared to have taken a new lease of life, though in many ways it was to be a final fling. Even before 1682, when this period begins, news had filtered back to Europe of the buccaneers, curtailed and sorely divided in the Caribbean, passing to new fields in the South Seas.

In 1670-1, Morgan had sacked Panama, and this expedition had not been forgotten by the pirates. Ten years later, with the help of Indians, a party of buccaneers under the leadership of one, Sharp, succeeded in sailing and portaging across the Isthmus. Once across - this/

(1) Jenkins, 116.

/this was in the spring of 1680 - they plundered a fort, seizing among other things two vessels which they used for further piracy along the western coast of South America. Thanks to the efforts of the energetic Archbishop of Lima, acting-Viceroy of Peru, all the leaders in that expedition did not go unpunished, except Sharp himself, who returned to England via the Straits of Magellan, and the island of Antigua, bringing booty and slaves.(1) At this point the Spanish Embassy in London became directly concerned, and the first word of this in the correspondence is in a letter of June, 1682.(2)

Don Pedro Ronquillo reported that four of the marauders, among them Sharp, had returned to England, and also that four of their slaves- two creoles and two negroes - had been obtained as willing witnesses in a suit against their captors on behalf of the Spanish Embassy. The charge itself was that the pirates had seized two Spanish ships in the Indies and killed the commander of one of them.(3) However, the case failed and the Spanish lost £80 over the affair.(4) Don Pedro attributed this to the bribing of the jury and now we know that some of the English authorities and probably Charles himself secretly played their part in the decision.(5) But their official attitude was that the pirates were not their responsibility, that they were unmanageable and incorrigible men who recognised no superior.(6) Charles, true to type, agreed with the ambassador when he complained of/

(1) For further information see: Alsedo y Herrero, esp. 67, 147, 156-7, 164.
(2) 29th. June (2), 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(3) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1682; p. 234.
(4) Ordinary Accounts, 1681-3; A.H.N. Estado 1697.
(5) Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1682; p. 217, 234.
(6) Consulta, 20th April, 1684; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/of the case's outcome, but said the administration of justice was not his affair; and that also to seize these men would, in his opinion, have been only to drive them into the service of France, which would have been even more inimical to Spanish interests than piracy for personal gain. However the King promised he would try to prevent their returning to the Indies. Our friend accepted all this but told Charles that his master could not be satisfied with the judicial decision "when the injury was so great that no one could believe that from the authority which resides in his right alone to make peace and war, he could not carry out agreements. For otherwise this prerogative was worth nothing; and if he (Charles) did not possess the power to alter laws in order to observe treaties, neither should Your Majesty (CarlosII) have to observe treaty articles that derogated the laws of your own realms, and were so greatly to your disadvantage and the advantage of England." To this, Charles replied that there were also complaints against Spain and that no one knew better than Don Pedro the position he was in and how he was endeavouring to establish his authority and be able to keep his promises.

In conclusion to this June despatch, Ronquillo asked the Council to make representations to Goodricke in Madrid, as well as through him, for he felt this would make the English Government reflect more on the complaints than only protesting once. But he was against any reprisals/

/reprisals being taken. To him the incident merely showed "how inviolable is the miscarriage of justice here against foreigners." Nonetheless, public opinion was not solidly against the Spanish case; the trading classes who sustained regular commerce with the Peninsula, feared reprisal, and the legal decision had "scandalised" all the merchants and those who learnt of the case. In time, the Council of State, after considering how common it was in England to cover evil intentions under the cloak of justice, forwarded all this information to the Council of the Indies.

But the matter did not end there. Early in October, Don Pedro despatched the slaves homewards carrying letters to the Governor of Cadiz and the Viceroy of Peru.(1) Even more important was his obtaining the log book and map made by a pirate sailor describing the new passage "from the Northern to the Southern Sea", and recounting their experiences from the day they left Jamaica until they arrived at Antigua. Nor had he been the only intending purchaser of the diary; he reported a Frenchman had offered seventy guineas, while he himself had not enough, and might have to sell his bed in order to get it. The Council, in Madrid, though some of its members felt there would be other copies of it, since there had evidently been much talk about the matter in London, then ordered him to go ahead and get the book. Early in January, 1683, Ronquillo was able to inform them that he had at last/

(1) 28th. Dec. (2); 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/last obtained the original and that Charles was the only person to have a copy. He had used many persons in order to get it, but had eventually been successful even with the French offering more.(1) From the Embassy accounts we learn that the whole business cost £86.(2)

We see in the above incident that though Spain was not without her friends who could cometimes help her, nevertheless the pirates still managed to pursue their way in Britain unmolested. And that spring of 1683, Sharp was made captain of a ship bound for the West Indies, in the company of an English frigate of war.(3) This, despite Charles' promise was hardly reassuring to Ronquillo and his friends, when they knew the final destination was the South Seas and suspected that "royal patents" were carried. However, there is little more to relate here regarding piracy in the Indies.(4)

(1) ibid; 11th. Jan. (1) 1683; ibid; also: Cal of State Papers (Domestic) 1682; 217.
(2) Gastos Sencatos, 1681-3; A.H.N. Estado 1697
(3) 8th.Feb.1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado(Ing)3959.
(4) Only other mention of this: see docs.for Aug.1684;ibid.

c) Trade Proper.

Trade between Spain and Great Britain was increasing, and it is woven goods and wine which are principally referred to in the documents for these years which I have seen.

At this time, the Spanish Government sent its representatives abroad, including Don Pedro, orders regarding the "weight, number of threads and measurement that fabrics of silk, silver and gold, made in Great Britain and Ireland" were to possess for export to their territories. Ronquillo was keen on such definition, but he pointed out that it did not satisfactorily include stockings and other woven and woollen goods, which were of primary interest in Spanish-British trade. And concluding his letter, he stated: "I am ever firmer that the intensification of this commerce is the only thing in which the King and kingdom are equally interested."(1)

It has become customary to believe, due to her lamentable merchant marine and the power of foreigners in her commercial and industrial life then, that Spain was completely oblivious to her own interest. But she also worked to obviate disagreeable commercial regulations of the countries with which she traded, and one of these cases which began to concern Don Pedro then was the Canaries' wine trade. The Canary Islands had long depended on this commerce for their living, making two general types of wine; 1) "vinos viduños" which/

(1) 1st. May (1) 1684; ibid.

/which found a market in the West Indies, and 2) malmsey, long popular in England. Earlier in Charles II's reign, the King himself had prohibited this wine trade of the Canaries in Barbadoes as contraband traffic, which hurt principally the sale of the first type/of wine. In May-June, 1683, the ambassador in London asked Secretary Jenkins if there had been any specific order for this prohibition, to which Jenkins replied that he did not know, except that trade in all but English ships with the colonies was not permitted. The Secretary then complained of the treatment received by the English consul and juez conservador in the Canaries. Ronquillo concluded the conversation by saying that the English forbidding the trade was contrary to the Treaty of 1667.(1) More will be heard of this later.

(1) 14th. June (1), 1683; ibid.

d.) Naval Questions.

There were many other questions in trading and maritime affairs which arose for Ronquillo, but there are two which should be specially mentioned: naval operations and the problem of salutes.

The close relation between piracy and naval operations still caused confusion in maritime affairs, and there were undoubtedly connections between English pirates and the navy; the distinction between a pirate and a man-of-war depended very much on the circumstances and the point of view. Nonetheless there was coming to be a more definite difference, and many Spanish had begun to realise that all English seamen were not necessarily pirates. Don Pedro, though not always backed up by the Consejo de Estado, even now welcomed Charles' building up his navy, for apart from odd fears of French machinations, he was fairly convinced that no English fleet would be used against Spain. On the other hand, when any Spanish vessel was a rarity, such ships might be used to her advantage, protecting the coasts of Flanders or Spain from Moorish marauders or in any war with France.(1) Yet Don Pedro could still be uneasy when an English fleet was reported heading for the Western Hemisphere. (see appendix)

Nor was Don Pedro only watching the developments and movements of the British navy, but also making full use of his position to report and occasionally take action on the maritime activities of other powers./

(1) 22nd. Mar. 1683; ibid.

For example, in May of 1632, he learnt of five Danish frigates heading towards the coast of Andalucia to join certain others belonging to Brandenburg. Before he received the same orders from the Marqués de Grana, he had requested Charles to send a squadron to guard the Flemish coast and see that the ships were not received into British ports, for this had happened before with the Brandenburgers. The King replied that this would be difficult as the ships had as yet done no harm. However, on the Dutch joining the protest, Charles asked the Danish envoy to see that his country did not disturb nor embarass the Dutch or Spanish under any pretext. This reaffirms the fact that Spain had now begun to consider English naval power as an advantage and protection. For in general, England, Holland and Spain were united in distrusting these Brandenburg, Danish and French interlopers, in the maritime and trading world.

(see appendix)

e.) The Problem of Salutes.

In 1683, some typical incidents over salutes took place which prompted a more fundamental discussion of the question as a whole. An English ship had refused to salute a Spanish admiral's flag in Cadiz harbour; a little later, there occurred two parallel cases of the same sort. Don Pedro became fearful lest the French might play on these to provoke worse relations and even war between England and Spain; and reports from Count Thun at Windsor where Charles was holidaying increased this anxiety. Though having little money to buy the mourning demanded by court etiquette at that moment, (as so often), Don Pedro was reduced to the extreme of poverty to get to the country seat "without more means than confidence in Divine Providence." Charles was affable when Don Pedro started by presenting letters from Carlos II congratulating him on his escape in the Rye House Plot. Then the ambassador spoke as planned about the case of the "Tiger", the name of the English vessel which had acted so haughtily at Cadiz; and Charles mentioned his satisfaction over Don Pedro's letters to Spain having resulted in the immediate release of a ship stopped at San Sebastian. The conversation then passed to saluting in general. English captains still carried orders regarding this point which dated from the reigns of James I and Charles I, and the King said he had been speaking the day before with Navy officials, asking them to let him see these/

/these compiled so he could form a general rule for the avoidance of incidents in future. Ronquillo then told Charles that his master would not be displeased with a solution satisfactory to both parties - and indeed the ambassador had held orders ever since the conclusion of the Treaty of Windsor, to try and obtain this. Spain would thus be following in the steps of France who had agreed with England that their captains should excuse salutes altogether.(1) In this, the Spanish Junta de Saludos, to whom the matter was referred, did not feel it was simply that of a vessel wishing equality with a leading port of the realm, a standard or a squadron; it was reciprocity that they desired.(2) And though Don Pedro thought Charles really wanted an arrangement, the difficulty lay in the general pretensions of the English and the limits of the "British" sea (i.e. between Finisterre and Norway).(3) The particular case of the "Tiger" continued to give trouble, while these general discussions did not continue any further then; but we have seen there was a realisation of the problem and a mutual desire on the part of English and Spanish officials to get a systematised solution for the future.

(1) 9th. Aug. (2) 1683; ibid 3959.
(2) 22nd. Sept. (and 20th. Nov) 1684 - Consulta of the Junta de Saludos; ibid.
(3) 11th. Dec. 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

2. The Spanish Policy.

a.) Spain using her Position Commercially as a Weapon.

Pausing at this point, and mentally reconsidering what has now been said on these Spanish-British maritime and trading affairs, I think we can reduce Spanish policy to more simple definition. Primarily Spain endeavoured to obtain peace through settlement of such difficulties, and for this she saw she must make sacrifices. But there was a point beyond which she would not go, and certain rights she would not give up, while her fears of English intentions particularly in the Indies, were not completely allayed. In fact, her policy was more positive than is generally imagined, and now we turn to aspects which prove this even more.

Though Spain certainly valued English trade and preferred it to that with France, she also realised how much greater England's interest was in her commerce than vice-versa. And she was quite prepared to use this as a lever and as one of her few weapons, to improve her own position.

The influential English merchant classes were always afraid of Spain's restricting their commerce in the peninsula. In April, 1682, when relations were not good on account of the fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor, several English traders in Spain were arrested -- which was not an unusual event -- but which led to the rumour that she/

/she was about to close down English trade.[1] Indeed this was a move which the Spanish government could not seriously contemplate then, but it remained useful as a threat, and similar rumours recurred throughout these last years of Charles II's reign. We have already seen how quick the commercial classes were to try and settle any piracy charges from their fear of Spanish retaliation.[2]

But this using trading interests as a lever, is not all there was to Spanish commercial policy. The ministries of Medinaceli and of Oropesa were definitely wooed to the idea that positive reform measures must be taken; and the country itself was rife with plans of national recovery through reorganised trade which was a natural manifestation in an age of mercantilism. Ronquillo was convinced of the value of this, that the "key" to Spanish revival was the regulation of foreign commerce and the fostering of national industry, trade and transport. For this he advocated a reasonable resoluteness in enforcement but one which would allow of no exceptions. Writing to the Marqués de Grana on whether it should be Spain's policy for possible political advantage to woo certain sections of the northern nations, in particular Holland, by granting certain new trading rights, he stated:

"I have advocated very strongly that our King should restrain the trade of foreigners, not that we may revenge ourselves upon the English/

(1) 6th. April, 1682; ibid 3958.
(2) 21st. Feb. (2) 1684; ibid 3959.

/English and Dutch but in the first place, to establish our own commerce and factories and as a result the wealth and population of Spain. I do not believe it suits our King to grant certain advantages to Rotterdam which has been faithful to us, and thus to throw away not just the first but the only and true basis for our revival. One must see that it is enough for one town to be allowed more privileges than others, for everything won by the restriction of foreign commerce to be lost and all (bullion) entering Spain to leave her. For the merchants hold by no law nor fidelity save to their own gain, and especially so the Dutch who are content with much less profit than the other nations. Those granted privileges could be those who would introduce the goods of others whose trade is prohibited. Never have I thought that the new commercial regulations cease principally to concern the utility of His Majesty's dominions rather than the foreigner's hurt."(1)

And forthrightly in another letter to his master:

. . . "May Your Majesty give as many scratches as you can to the King and his vassals here by embarassing their trade without breaking the treaties, for this is the only way, if there be any, to adjust everything between us."(2)

These "new regulations" referred to in the first of the two quotations above, coincided with what might be called a naval and commercial blockade of France during the short war prior to the Truce of/

(1) 24th. July (1) 1684; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid.
(2) 15th. Aug. 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/of Ratisbon. Don Pedro had to play his part in this too. For example, sixty-four bags of wool belonging to Frenchmen had been sent to London from Bilbao to evade the Spanish embargo, and the embassador did his best to see they were stopped.(1) But there was nothing pugnacious in Don Pedro's attitude. He knew the English merchants' temperament pretty well with their approach to the current rumour that Spain would confiscate all the silver coming on the fleet from America, and he did not neglect the dangers of reaction.(2) One of the new regulations demanded that all British ships sailing to Spain from Great Britain, should hold certificates issued by the Spanish consul in London. Referring to their enforcement, Don Pedro wrote to Grana: . . . "I judge that certain orders which have arrived are aimed at investigating the goods belonging to Frenchmen. Hence I have not publicised them except to let the merchants know the form in which the ships must have their papers in order to be admitted to our ports."(3) But despite this care, the British traders were infuriated at the regulations and openly flouted them. In Bilbao, they were able to get their way by ill-treating one of their number who brought the certificates, and no others dared to carry them there after that.(4) Charles himself made it plain to the Dutch embassador (as Count Thun reported to Ronquillo) that, if the Spanish confiscated the wares of the English, he would deal them a blow in the Indies which/

(1) 2nd. June, 1684; Consulta of Junta de Represalias; ibid.
(2) 21st. Feb. (2); 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) 24th. July (1), 1684; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid.
(4) 8th. Dec. (2) 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid, 3960.

/which they would remember forever.[1] However, these regulations remained to be revived after 1689. Yet such opposition always made Spanish plans for recovery difficult to carry out.

(1) 10th. Jan. (2), 1683; ibid 3959.

b.) The Prospect of a Trading Company.

One prominent aspect of these was the establishment of the trading company which Spain had never had, and Don Pedro was one of those who supported the idea. In December, 1684, he wrote:

"The news is current and alarms all the trading classes here that an Indies company is being formed in Spain, which doubtless would (Ronquillo's underlining) lay solid foundations for our wealth, population and universal restoration. In this, they find no other consolation than this not appearing possible, since in Spain there is no fund large enough to establish it, nor enough firmness for its being carried forward."(1) The company, we know, was never to be established and the steps Spain took to use her position in world trade as a lever and foundation for national recovery met with little success.

c.) The Idea of Increasing her Naval Strength.

One last illustration of positive Spanish measures was the effort made to buy ships of war in London. There are two cases I have found of this for these years, in one of which Don Pedro had a personal interest, but again nothing came of the plans. (see appendix)

(1) Sth. Dec. (2); ibid 3960.

3. Summary.

Spanish efforts to settle her maritime and commercial differences with England firmly but peacefully, and systematise their relations for the future, had met with some success and co-operation from the other side. Yet many mutual suspicions remained to be erased and there was never complete certainty of Charles II's sincerity in supporting such settlement - as in so many other things during those years. Still, the two countries were growing closer together in this field like the others. But that is not all that can be deduced.

In the above pages, we have many evidences of the weakness and frustration, the "impossibility" in every way of Spain; but also proof once more that her "age of decadence" was not so black as sometimes painted. There is no fruition from these persistent ideas and efforts by some of her citizens, but we do not fail to discern in them signs of the continuing aliveness of the Spanish race with the promise of eventual national recovery. Spain had far more of a "policy" than she is generally given credit for.

V. The Religious Aspect (1682-5)

During the last three years of Charles II's reign, the peace and position of the Roman Catholics in Great Britain were slowly and unostentatiously restored. To the Spanish, this was gratifying but not fundamentally important, for it was always the political factor which made the decision, though at more uncertain junctures the religious had its influence.

The religious aspect of affairs in Britain continued to be inseparable from the activity of the Duke of York. In the spring of 1682, he returned to the English capital from Scotland and his coming and behaviour made Don Pedro fear for their co-religionists. At that time, the announcement of no parliament also drew forth a spate of anti-Catholic pamphlets, for it was known that practically all the faithful saw in co-operation with the Monarchy their only possible protection, and that Catholic elements were strong at Court. However, the division between the pro-French extremist party and the pro-confederate, pro-Spanish moderate party among these, was becoming daily more defined. The Duke was still leader of the first, and for himself, he would not comply with any limitation to his present or future power, no matter how little, which proceeded from his having embraced Catholicism; he would rather try for even higher prerogatives, casting prudent considerations to the winds. Ronquillo was plagued by/

/by this extremism of the over-zealous Catholics, who, knowingly or not, were subserving French interests; and the French thought more of their own political requirements than the real welfare of the British and Irish Catholics. All these difficulties and opinions Don Pedro faithfully reported to Madrid. (see appendix)

It seemed indeed that a period of renewed persecution might be in store for the Catholics with York's coming. Soon Secretary Jenkins asked Ronquillo and the other Catholic envoys to see that only foreigners were admitted to their chapels, and guards were posted to watch who entered them. Don Pedro however, politely refused as before to close his, and instead, just informed those who habitually attended of the order and continued the services as usual. The Sunday after this, few turned up at mass except the poorer worshippers, but they were not molested either on entering or departing. While Don Pedro did not place much confidence in this show of "compassion", he trusted the matter would die down as before. (see appendix) Also while still maintaining seven chaplains and an organist and singer, he housed the chaplains in the Embassy to avoid incidents.(1) In concluding the above despatch of April 20th, 1682, about the chapel, he wrote:

"I confess I cannot understand this uniting political considerations with religious, and I have witnessed that he who has observed this, has met with less censure and difficulties than those who have judged the/

(1) A.H.N. Estado 1697: Ordinary Accounts, 1681-83.

/the contrary, as at each disorder it is usual to give satisfaction with these demonstrations against the Catholics . . "

Barillon might close his chapel, but Don Pedro tried to keep political considerations separate from religious, and support the legitimate religious activities of fellow Catholics in a firm but unassuming way. Such a policy would best serve Spanish and Catholic interests. Gradually his religious zeal would be regarded as not seditious, and growing respect would allow greater peace and freedom for all concerned - together also with better opportunities for a real and irreversible reconversion of Britain.

Yet though Ronquillo had his very definite view on the extremist, pro-French Catholic party, he tried to work with its individuals and moderate their rashness. After February, 1682, and its political events, relations between Ronquillo and James cooled on these grounds, but the ambassador strove nevertheless for friendly intercourse with the heir apparent, and this was reciprocated somewhat. Don Pedro might speak to him occasionally "con razón de Católico"[1], but otherwise avoided mixing Catholic interests with political, domestic and foreign, in their conversations. Ronquillo did what he could to please James. During the years 1682-84, the Duchess of York and her mother the widowed Duchess of Modena were trying to secure permission from the Spanish authorities in the Low Countries for the foundation of a convent/

(1) 16th. Aug. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/convent school of Ursuline nuns at Malines; and Don Pedro backed this application on the ground it would help Spain's relations with the Duke, who after a year's delay pressed the matter himself in a letter to Carlos II. However, the request roused secular and ecclesiastical opposition in the Flemish city, and this was the reason the Consejo de Estado gave for refusing it, although they also expressed the Spanish King's regrets at not being able to grant the same. (see appendix)

The Rye House Plot was the next event to give rise to anxiety in religious matters, but it did not give much. Though attempting to do so, the plotters were unable to cast the blame on the Catholics and only discredited themselves. And moreover the innocence of the Catholics was justified for public opinion. Though later, somewhat resentful and suspicious of the leniency towards obvious plotters while Catholic peers still languished in gaol, the danger of a Republican or Monmouth victory to Catholicism did help sway Spain to making a pretty firm stand for Charles and the established monarchy.(1)

In the autumn of 1684, the peers were released and there was other amelioration of the Catholics' position.(2) Yet Don Pedro was still anxious. In Ireland three Catholic Colonels had been appointed, but, to balance this, the Duke of Ormonde had closed all Catholic chapels there. The result of this Ronquillo felt would be harmful. For while thousands were being deprived of mass, the three appointments would/

(1) 12th. July (1) 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
26th. July (2); ibid.
(2) 13th. Dec. (3) 1683; ibid.
21st. Feb. (2) 1684; ibid.

/would only annoy the Protestant elements in the North and around Dublin, who would be afraid for their property, formerly owned by Catholics now dispossessed. (see appendix) This gives us a foretaste of Don Pedro's standard in the next reign, when he wanted real advantages, which would bring peace to Catholics and country, and an atmosphere suitable for real conversion. Certainly he did not desire conspicuous honours for the few at the expense of the many faithful, the peace of the land and Spanish political interests.

At Christmas, Don Pedro was weak after being bled for the alleviation of his ailments and he did not possess a real with which to buy a chicken. But he was able to celebrate the feast and octave for the Conception of the Virgin "in keeping the faith and instructing so many poor Catholics in it who only have this asylum."(1) Despite any hopes held for British conversion, this was the active Spanish policy and position. Little was it realised the great changes awaiting the status of Catholicism in the coming years and the opportunities for the consummation or wrecking of the desire to bring these nations back to the Roman fold. Yet it must be admitted that Spain's actions as a whole had benefited rather than prejudiced the Catholic position in Great Britain.

(1) 25th. Dec. 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

VI. Personal Aspects.

1. Personal Events.

During the period of Don Pedro's long ambassadorial career was he in a worse position personally than in this. Not only was he plagued with worsening ill-health, but the extreme poverty which had engulfed his country's treasury during the first half of the 1680s had also engulfed him. In Madrid the last great writer of the era, Antonio de Solís, wrote of how he was awaiting the arrival of the fleet from the Indies before his coach could be mended.(1) For our friend, there was not only that 'time lag', but also the weeks and months necessary for supply to reach England and be made effective. In the uncertainty of affairs, the unfruitfulness of his labours and the many rumours, and as the servant of an inefficient governmental organisation of personalities and cliques, there was plenty of room for misunderstanding between Don Pedro and Madrid, as we have already seen. Out of all this were born yet other difficulties. But to-day the investigator can be grateful for these, for they reveal Ronquillo, the man, as nothing else could.

A consciousness of his noble antecedents, the dignity of his country and of his position as its representative, and also of the fact that he had done his best, characterised Don Pedro from the beginning of his life until its end. Already he was ambassador rather than envoy extraordinary: that round was won. In this period there/

(1) see Epistolario Español

/there was the threat of the dignity of his country and himself being cheapened by Charles according "royal honours" to the Duke of Savoy's envoy. Ronquillo even protested together with the French ambassador as well as Count Thun and the Portuguese ambassador, on this point.(1) To us these tiquismiquis of protocol may not seem important, but that in March, 1682, the representatives of two opposing powers like France and Spain could be united on them shows their place in the mentality of the time.

But of far greater importance and what injured Don Pedro and his position most of all were the attacks from within springing from suspicion of his own actions by his own country and the other allies, by disease and by poverty.

The first have already been dealt with elsewhere. As to Ronquillo's physical condition, there are the usual mentions of it in his letters - in the winter of 1683-4 he speaks of seven weeks' illness on a stretch.(2) This ill-health doubtless affected his work, but not as appreciably as later on in his career. However, it remained one of the reasons he gave to support his requests for recall.(3)

With every day, Don Pedro Ronquillo was deeper in debt (see appendix) and it was this which was to place him "in the greatest anxiety and affliction" he had suffered, in an incident in May, 1683. The occurrence was a curious mixture of the intricacies of English law, the position of/

(1) 9th. Mar. (3) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
(2) 10th. Jan. (2) 1684; ibid, 3959.
(3) 10th. July, 1684; ibid.

(see appendix)
/of Spain and the personal affairs of Ronquillo.

By May, 1683, the ambassador's debts amounted to thousands of pounds, and already groups of creditors had made petitions to the English King that they might be paid; but the only ostensible results had been long-drawn out discussions, worthless promises or invalid letters of credit from Spain. One of the principal debts was owed to a certain merchant woman of the city, Anne Smith by name. Don Pedro mentions her as having been extremely patient hitherto receiving payment only to be informed that the letters given her were not only not effective, but were explicitly not to be paid. In these days, she had called at Wild House to say that she had a creditor of her own and asking that the ambassador might send his "relative" to his house to assure this Samuel Bruster (perhaps this is Brewster) that of the first money arriving she might receive £900. This "relative" was of course none other than Don Pedro Francisco Ronquillo, natural son of the ambassador and "the principal gentleman of the family"; and he was induced to go into the city as requested. The interview ended, the young man was about to get into the ambassadorial coach with its lackeys in his father's livery, when a sheriff's officer took him up in his arms and bore him protesting into the municipal prison which happened to be across the street. The whole business showed careful planning, for not only had the creditor and her accomplices/

/accomplices chosen the city, where they felt municipal law would support their case, particularly in the light of current political conditions, but they had the additional alibi that the son had signed relevant papers with his father's signature, that is, omitting the "Francisco" of his own name. It provoked a veritable cataract of excited correspondence from Don Pedro himself with intricate and at times clever reasoning, but this is not the place to follow the story further in detail, though they are especially interesting to the investigator today (the reference to the law in particular Habeas (see appendix) Corpus). Eventually after delay and a split opinion among the (see appendix) King's advisers, Charles took the matter into his own hands and gave royal command for the release of Don Pedro Francisco; and an entry was put in the prison register "with which" wrote the father "is created a precedent which from henceforth will be the law of England." Mrs. Smith and Mr. Bruster themselves languished in prison for several months. The result seems to have been unexpected but welcome: Charles was glad to show his authority in his way; all reasonable men, traders with Spanish and foreign commerce, as well as the other diplomats are mentioned as being "unspeakably content" as much for their own interests as that there should not appear among peoples the brutality of those who think there is no other world than the continent of this island. Yet all this only postponed the debts having/

/having to be paid. And still no remittance came in the months following according to the documents I have seen - - the complaints continued, and I do not know whether Mrs. Smith ever received the nearly £3000 she was owed.

At any rate Don Pedro's poverty was not alleviated to any great extent. In August, 1684, he is writing to say that if money does not arrive, he will have to sell his coaches and retire to "a village".(1) His financial agent had to be dismissed for lack of funds with which to pay him. Though now depending on a long suffering money-lender Christopher Bodkin,(2) he was unable to keep up even the barest essentials. That same autumn, his family were still wearing mourning for the Queen of France, from want of money with which to buy other dress. In the six months previous, thirteen of his horses had died leaving only six, which he said was almost the same as having none. We have already mentioned the details of his Christmas Day that year. His mood was expressed to the Marqués de Grana:

"I assure Your Excellency that if he had neither a master nor his service to consider, Don Pedro would now have courage and patience to ask alms and hold this merited, finding himself reduced to such a state after thirty-two years in that service."(3)

Indeed Don Pedro Ronquillo had shared the bitter cup of ingratitude so often dispensed by Spain to her most faithful servants.

Has all this been a one-sided picture of Don Pedro's financial position?/

(1) 14th. Aug. 1684; Ronquillo to Botello; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) 1st. Oct; ibid.
(3) 6th. Oct. 1684; Ronquillo to Grana; Sim Estado (Fla) 3876.

/position? Can I be charged with writing in a blind admiration of the human focus of our subject? I would still say, no. Already it has been seen how seldom Madrid sent supply and how he could not depend on aid from Brussels either. It is true he had no wife and a personal family to support, but his household had still to be large. The most that can be said is that Don Pedro, like other Spanish men of good blood, had no idea of financial affairs; they in fact despised them. At least, he himself while he did not despise commerce, was clearly no financier. Moreover he had no private means, and, what is hardest, he had been used to them. Don Pedro had large ideas and unlike many of his contemporaries, he did not cease activity because there was no money. It may be claimed he was dishonest by his continual promises of payment, but it is difficult to see he had many alternatives in order that his most important work might go on.

2.) Embassy Accounts.

Finally, what of the embassy accounts for these years? Those of any real interest run from 1st. September, 1681, to the end of May, 1683.(1) We have already mentioned some of these regular and secret expenses. (see appendix) Included with the accounts are two letters to the Secretary Crispin Gonzalez Botello, and one to his "Señor" defending himself further against any charges of being extravagant. Any entertaining had been moderate and necessary, mentioning expense on chocolate as worthwhile, since it was popular with the King and Court who did not take it elsewhere. He had been forced to sell his Spanish horse to the King's natural son, the Duke of Richmond, as it was the only one suitable and was now used daily at the "Academia". The following are the more interesting expenditures of the secret payments:

1) To confidant, in order to begin to bribe M.Ps - - £200. This was given on the rumour of a Parliament approaching.

2) To Burgomayne's ex-confidant, Mr. Muller - - £43.

3) Two payments to Gregorio Letti, of £87: 2/- and £55 respectively.

4) To a regular confidant of the Embassy, William Rumbold - - £200, which include back salary.

5) To confidant for manipulating Parliament - - £150

6) To one called Marvell, who brings news of "the city" - - £25.

7) To one who supplies daily news of the French Embassy - - £20. (Perhaps this individual informed him of those who entered it, as for example/

(1) A.H.N. Estado 1697.

/example a confidant he also had in the Dutch Embassy to spy on Van Beuningen.(1)

8) In the way of New Year's gifts to those in the Secretariat of State who deal with Spanish negotiations -- £100. (Incidentally his friends in government departments would still supply him with documents when possible.)

There is little enough significance in these accounts, and none in those surviving for expenses during the remainder of Charles' reign. All they show is that Don Pedro continued to employ quite a number of confidants, and had gone on preparing the ground financially for any possible Parliament during or after the autumn of 1681.

(1) 10th. Dec. 1683; Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; A.G.R. (Haye) 495.

3. Personal Ambitions and Sum-Up.

Don Pedro Ronquillo felt his position and the ingratitude of his country towards him with bitterness. In 1683, saying that all he needed was regular pay paid regularly, he bewailed his "bad luck" in coming to the only court ~~country~~ that was opposed to Spain, save those of her direct enemies.(1) No honour had been bestowed on him, since he had been made a Councillor of the Indies sixteen years before, while others in Madrid had received these simply with the passing of time.(2) The next summer, Ronquillo straightly requested a permanent seat in either the Cámara de Castilla, or that of the Indies.(3) That November he got his wish by being made a member of the Cámara de Indias.(4) Doubtless Don Pedro wanted the money, but he wished too the dignity of his country and himself preserved, that England might see that he was still trusted and respected by his master.

In the light of the many difficulties of these years for him, it is not strange to find Don Pedro turning his eyes more and more towards Spain. From the spring of 1682 until the early summer of 1684, there was of course the possibility of his withdrawing as a political move. In the summer of 1684, at the same time as he asked for the place in one of the Cámaras, he requested money with which to pay his debts and return to end his days in the corner of Castile he could find near where he was born.(5) Again in October, he wrote that/

(1) 17th. May (2), 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
(2) 14th. June, 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; A.H.N. Estado 1697.
(3) 10th. July, 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959 (included in Accounts, 1681-3)
(4) A.H.N. Estado 3455.
(5) 10th. July, 1684; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

/that he awaited the royal pleasure for a new post, willing to go anywhere "although it be to the Grisons," which would be less desperate than London.(1) But the fact was, as Don Pedro recognised, England was a difficult country for Spain to understand and deal with; Carlos II lacked experienced diplomats; and with every passing day, he himself was becoming more and more experienced in handling his work. Nevertheless, he and his friends had hopes of meeting each other soon in Madrid. But the changes which the death of Charles II brought, definitely put an end to these.

Ronquillo had stood up well to the troubles which had beset him. In that age of decadence, we have in Don Pedro some glimpses of the old, the "eternal Spain", yes, of what is best in man brought to light through suffering. Not that he was humanly perfect; he made many mistakes; but constancy and courage, gaiety, intelligence and courtesy did bear fruit in those dark hours of his, as they always will, enabling him to continue the fight.

(1) 29th. Oct. 1684; ibid.

ILLNESS AND DEATH OF CHARLES II.

And then in the midst of the mingled desires and activities of those days a great change came.

In his informal way, with his also characteristic dignity and humour, yet not without pathos, Charles II took leave of the cares and pleasures of this world. On the first day of the King's illness, Don Pedro wrote immediately to Madrid:

"This morning at half past eight, His Britannic Majesty had an attack from which he lost consciousness and the power of speech. It happened very much by chance that there was a surgeon present to tell him of a new remedy, as he is curious regarding medical chemistry. This man had such boldness and good fortune that without consulting the doctors of the chamber, nor anyone else, he at once drew sixteen ounces of blood since he had the lancets in his bag. There is some difference between the doctors as to whether it is only paralysis or paralysis accompanied by apoplexy. The serious convulsions recurred leaving him without consciousness, speech nor understanding for almost five hours. Through bleeding, the continued application of purges and emetics resulting in copious stools and much water, he recovered speech at one o'clock. The doctors say that if the shock is not repeated which they fear would bring his end, he is out of the danger/

/danger he has been in. I was at the palace until two o'clock. Now it is six and I am returning there - - ".

In cipher, he expressed his anxiety in the case of Charles' death. After mentioning the importance of such an event as the King's illness when the Kingdom was so restless, and how business was at a standstill, he went on to say that Charles' demise would bring great difficulties, a new policy and the need for a parliament. With these, Don Pedro said he would be unable to deal for there was not money enough for his necessary participation, let alone that required for mourning and even food itself.(1) However, the following despatch sent by special courier probably reached Madrid before the first one. It read:

"Although on Monday I participated to Your Majesty the news of the serious fit of convulsions which attacked His Britannic Majesty that morning at eight o'clock, this letter will reach your royal hands sooner with the news of his having expired to-day at eleven, and of the new King having been proclaimed at four without any disturbance whatsoever."(2)

This was indeed "an occasion of such great expense, anxiety and risk" for Don Pedro, and he requested prompt supply and especially orders.(3) But there rings a more human note when he speaks of the anxiety and sorrow during the time of the King's illness. Though the two men had differed on many occasions, they were both gentlemen, knew/

(1) 13th. Feb. 1685; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 16th. Feb. (1); ibid; also 16th. Feb. (2); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid.
(3) Ibid.

/knew each other well, and undoubtedly in a measure each had come to respect the qualities of the other. Three days afterwards the embassador wrote again:

"On Friday, I gave account to Your Majesty of the death of King Charles of England, which took place to the great sorrow even of the most atheistic and soulless, on account of the calm resignation he showed during his last twenty-four hours. I can only say that some rumour regarding the religion in which he died proceeds from his not having wished to take the Protestant sacrament, but there were scarcely ever lacking bishops at his side and service - - -. The state in which London finds itself, is one of bewildered stunned quietude, partly out of feeling for the dead man for he was loved, and partly on account of the religion, resolution and firmness they see in his successor. Some believe that although the latter may be a Catholic, they will have a King who, in other matters, will work, trusting in himself to fulfil what he said he would before the peers in Council - - . As I was at the palace when King Charles expired, I was able to give my condolences immediately and satisfactorily both to the present King and also to the widowed Queen."(1)

It was not long before Don Pedro was able to confirm the rumour of Charles having died a Roman Catholic and to give more details:

"I could not tell Your Majesty last mail that King Charles of England/

(1) 19th. Feb. (2); ibid.

to

/England died completely reconciled/and in the profession of our sacred Roman religion, (although I insinuated it),because his brother did not hold it then to be suitable. But now this rumour is current among more than those few of us who knew this at the beginning. I therefore judge it my duty to give this consolation to Your Majesty that you may give thanks to the Divine for a consequence characteristic of His great mercy, and command to God the soul of your Uncle, though without demonstrations which are not convenient for the present. And as His Britannic Majesty told me, the Spanish are such good Catholics that they would begin at once to have processions and other solemnities and fiestas, which there is no need to fear from the French.

I must say to Your Majesty that I know of a surety that the mortal blow did not motivate the desire nor resolution of the dead King; it only forwarded their execution. I knew somewhat and in particular of his devotion to the Immaculate Virgin, but since his death, proof of this has been discovered.

The widowed Queen who was better informed through her piety and virtue, was more frightened at the attack in which he lost consciousness than at the greatness of her loss; and because of its violence, it was held a miracle his having regained consciousness and the power of speech. Immediately he recovered this, the Queen, assisted/

/assisted by the present King, began to make the diligences convenient. And on Wednesday, sensing the slight fever that brought his end, he extricated himself from all that deception in which the Duchess of Portsmouth had held him and began to turn indeed to what is most important and to make his reconciliation. His brother took care of this because the Queen had now become ill herself.

On Thursday, after midday, the Bishops pressed His Britannic Majesty to take the Protestant sacrament. And on their persuasion, he only asked that they might leave him, replying that he knew what he must do. The present King availed himself of this to tell him that well he knew what these instances signified; and he answered him that they were already late in bringing him Christ in the Eucharist, and he wished that this might be done in public. But well can Your Majesty recognise the strong reasons which prevented this, and above all the great commotion such could cause, altering the quietude in the succession of this King on whom it appears the re-establishment of our holy Catholic faith in those realms depends. During the evening, he took the Bread and received the Supreme unction; and all left the chamber, while the Count of Bath, sumillier de corps, and the Count of Feversham who was on Guard and another Bishop remained within. The present King told them openly that if they did not wish to see what was going to take place, they might go into the alcove, and to the bishop/

/bishop, although he was his henchman and servant, he spoke more strongly because he knew it was necessary.

Father Huddleston, a monk of the Order of St. Benedict entered to administer all the sacraments, he and the King remaining alone from now on. So great was the fervour of the deceased that not only did he make the profession of faith with tears, but vowed before/the most Holy Sacrament that if God gave him life, not only would he persevere in acknowledging our sacred religion, but would declare himself Catholic publicly.

This solemnity completed, which lasted a long half hour, the bishops re-entered and making greater instances to him to take the sacrament (Protestant) (as they suspected the reason for his having refused it) he said that he knew what was needed for his salvation, that he had hope in the merits of the blood of Jesus Christ, that he had made peace with His Divine Majesty, that he sought His pardon with all his heart, and also that of those men whom he had injured. After he had requested the sacrament (Catholic), he thought no more of the things of the world. Only after communicating, he entrusted his sons to his brother as I told Your Majesty in the last mail, and handed over to him the keys of his cabinet, telling him that there, there were many things that were more important for the Duke than for himself, since it was only important now for him to seek God's pardon and consider the/

/the nature of the world to come.

The form in which he sent to ask pardon of the Queen and pondered what he owed his brother, and how attentive he was to what the bishops were telling him until he expired, by words and by signs, paying no attention to what could offend our sacred religion and admitting all that were acts of contrition, - was something to be admired, and showed how well instructed he was in our precepts. And at the end, after he had received the sacrament, when his suffering from pain was so great, his acts of love and faith were the wonder of all, and even those who observe no religion were amazed. All were generally edified although they did not know he was now a Catholic, for those very ones who suspected the fact wished to conceal it, and the bishops have diverted attention by saying he did not communicate because he was not in a state to swallow the Bread.

This event has so many circumstances worthy of wonder that cannot be told nor yet omitted. This Father Huddleston was that priest who saved King Charles' life when he escaped after the Battle of Worcester; and God has granted him 84 years of age that now also he might save his soul. And that His Divine Majesty did not wish to lengthen the dead man's life, so as not to risk his soul; and that His Infinite Providence might shine the more in the firmness of his successor. And of all these marvels, this only is the reason for/

/for the quietude with which the Duke of York entered and continues his reign; and knowing this he has wished to begin to give gratitude to Our Lord God for it by the glorious resolution he took last Sunday." - - (there follows a description of James' first open religious observances as King)- -

"In all this I have governed myself by concurring with the action and with the Council only in that which this King has wished to use me without introducing myself to other matters, because here, opinions are not so united as thanks be to God they are in Spain. As also because it is necessary to follow the temper of this King who does not wish to be advised nor pressed unless to let him plan out his own action. I am trying to make sure that His Britannic Majesty may find me prompt with action and advice whenever he may wish to avail himself of me, both as Your Majesty's minister and as a private person."(1)

Despite the many anxieties at the Spanish Court, this news caused a certain quiet pleasure and anticipation. But already we have trespassed on the reign of James II.(2)

(1) 5th. Mar. 1685; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Etat) 384.
(2) Consulta of 26th. Mar. on above; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960. See also letters of Montalto :15th. (p.305) and 28th. March (p.307).

JAMES II. - 1685.

1. Political - International.

a.) The Immediate Reaction of Spain to James II's accession.

What echoes did these despatches of Don Pedro Ronquillo rouse in the Council Chambers of Madrid and Brussels ?

The passing of one monarch and the accession of another without incident -- apart from particular circumstances - meant far more then than now. It signified largely what a change in government does to-day. There would probably be the need for a new policy, or at least a revision of Spanish-British relations. The Duke of Montalto saw this and its involving our friend Don Pedro in much extra work.(1) An event at least had occurred which might shake Britain's isolationism and give Spain greater co-operation from her hitherto useless ally. All Spanish patriots prayed that their country would be mentally and physically able to utilise any such opportunities that might arise.

The central characteristics of the Consejo de Estado's discussions on receipt of the simple news of Charles' death and James succeeding peacefully to his throne, were anxiety and caution. One thing, however, was certain: Spain entirely accepted James as the legitimate monarch, but fears were expressed that the situation would soon be reduced to a struggle between him and the Duke of Monmouth, with France reaping the/

(1) Letter of Monalto to Ronquillo of 15th. March, 1685, p. 305.

/the benefit. William of Orange would also have to be considered. The Constable, whose opinion was followed by most of the other members, was doubtful of the wisdom of the new King's open practice of Catholicism, and thought it would possibly cause trouble soon; but if it did not "it would be miraculous and of great convenience to the Catholic religion". However that leads into a detailed question better handled later (see Religion).

Domestic unity and the strengthening of the King's position in Britain apart from France, was desired. Here Ronquillo was to support James, to try and get him to see the need for this and the peace by which to accomplish it, the danger of Louis taking advantage of discussions. Yet, they recognised the uncertainty of the position: they advised Don Pedro to offend no parties, not to make people think he counselled James' actions, and only to give him advice when asked. Thus, Spain would not be the loser in any disturbances there, and if the King was established, opportunities might be improved for England becoming the greatest enemy France could have. (1) As more word reached Madrid and Brussels telling of James' establishment and present prudence, Spain became more hopeful regarding the future of the whom Grana referred to as "the legitimate and Catholic King". (2)

In the realm of practical arrangements during the first two months of the new monarch's reign, Carlos II decided that Ronquillo should/

(1) Consulta of 4th. Mar. 1685; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 27th. Feb; Grana to Ronquillo; précis in Lonchay VI, p.815.

/should still continue in London - that is after reports were investigated and quashed that Don Pedro had supported the Exclusion Bill. (see appendix) The immediate need of money by Don Pedro for the many expenses to be expected was quickly surmised by the Council and remittances were ordered to be sent to Wild House, of 12,000 and 20,000 escudos respectively. (see appendix) Grana had promptly despatched the Count of Tilly to carry his condolences and congratulations to London. Carlos II appointed the Marqués de Valparaiso for a similar purpose, but the nobleman delayed his going awaiting the necessary funds for the long voyage. Meanwhile all eagerly awaited news and opinion from the ambassador in London

b.) The Actual Situation in 1685.

When Don Pedro had sent the immediate news of Charles' death and James' proclamation, he pointed out what/counterpoised/the danger of civil war. There was the almost universal interest of traders in domestic peace: among the Presbyterians were many rich merchants and others who saw it helping France and damaging commerce. Secondly, practically all were for the maintenance of the laws in which were "founded all government and justice", and these favoured the crown. Also, the Anglicans and the Roman Catholics were always for the royalist side. Meanwhile James' prudence and his resolution to call Parliament were winning popular confidence.(1)

Six weeks later, at the beginning of April, Ronquillo wrote more fully of what he discerned to be James' aims - to be free of both sides - "to re-establish once again in the Crown of England, the former glory of being the balance to all the rest and to preserve the present state of Europe, such as it is, until he sees himself able to work with authority and power." (see appendix)

Just after the Coronation, Don Pedro noted the King's great attention to business, also in his opinion, "making decisions which conformed much with Reason and Justice." He mentions too, that all James' pleasure and application are put into perfecting his troops. Nonetheless, he felt the King sincere in his protestation of desiring to/

(1) 19th. Feb. (2), 1685; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

/to bear not only his grandfather's name, but to deserve James I's title of "Peace-maker". But the ambassador also noted in him an ambition which desired to outdo his predecessors.(1)

By the autumn, despite the Coronation having passed peacefully, the backing of Parliament and people with the victory over Monmouth, there were signs that James' undesirable qualities were gradually appearing, and Don Pedro sensed this. He expressed to Madrid the hope that precipitation might not ruin James' surest plans, particularly on the questions of church and militia, for Ronquillo wanted nothing to divert James from being and acting as a "good Englishman and good King of England", and, if possible, against France.(2)

As the autumn passed, the difficulties increased. There were the many legal suits, the severity after the Monmouth rebellion, the question of religion, the fear awakened in some by the royal power. These made doubtful the success of the second Parliament, for though there were not lacking those who still counselled moderation, those who advised extreme measures were apparently increasing in power. Yet the fact of James holding a Parliament at all pleased the people. Ronquillo hoped too that Divine assistance might help the King to wise decisions since his object was so definitely the service of God.(3)

October/

(1) 14th. May; ibid.
(2) 3rd. Sept. (2), 1685; ibid.
(3) 29th. Oct. (4); ibid.

October and November, however, brought two disturbing events. Halifax, the one leading protagonist of the Empire, Holland and Spain in the Councils of England was summarily dismissed. At this time also the admission of a Papal envoy roused his anxieties. These steps Don Pedro, as we shall see, could not approve. He also mentions that James' distrust of Spain still existed whereas Don Pedro stressed common interests between the two nations, the King emphasized the differences. In fact, James was following his own will, and not keeping either Spain or France too close. Ronquillo had had experience of the former Duke's obstinacy and ambition, and as 1686 approached, he certainly still had his suspicions about the future of the reign.

That roughly gives an inkling of the situation Spain found in Britain, and we see how much was involved in the character and decisions of the man on the Throne.

(see appendix)

c.) Spanish Policy Confronting This.

Already we have observed the Consejo de Estado's orders to their ambassador in London, and touched on his advice. And what Don Pedro advised was followed out, namely a careful co-operation with and support of James, trying to strengthen him in unity with his realm and anti-French tendencies. Desire for England's conversion was, for the time being, kept in the background. This aim in fact changed little, but the day-to-day story of the policy's application shows far more than a dogmatic analysis of it could ever explain.

The ambassador was naturally keen to improve the acceptance he found with the King and his family, for this alone could create a friendly atmosphere from the top down in which to solve problems and achieve more for Spain in Britain. Don Pedro had always been polite, if sometimes distant with James, but now he was prepared to go out of his way to please him when possible. At the Coronation, he did his best to make as much of the occasion as possible. Though Ronquillo, to avoid recurrence of the vexed precedence problems with the French ambassador, did not attend any of the ceremonies, he saw that his son, the Secretaries of the Embassy with the Agent for Spain, De La Guerra, were in the corridor with other distinguished foreigners to pay their respects to the newly crowned King. Accommodation in a private house along the route was rented, from which the remainder of the more

(see Appendix)
important/

/important members of the ambassadorial family could hail the royal cavalcade on its way to and from the Abbey. During the long interval refreshments were served and those from round about, who naturally wanted to keep their places in the crowd, were also regaled. Don Pedro reports the King's satisfaction, as no other envoy had made so much of the celebrations. During the Monmouth rebellion soon after, Ronquillo was most solicitous and obliging in offering Spanish troops to quell it - but that touches on a deeper subject.

The ambassador's attentions included those near and dear to the King. María de Modena was always in close touch with her Italian relatives and they, like the other princelings of that peninsula, balanced between the House of Austria and France. Don Pedro continued to try and please the Queen while craftily counteracting any pro-French influences that might come through her family.(1) When James' two bastard sons visited the Court, Don Pedro also played his part in entertaining them: so hoping to ingratiate himself further with their father. (see appendix)

In short, particularly good personal relations with the King were maintained during this first year of his reign.

There remained of course certain negotiations interrupted by the death of Charles II, but only one is worth mentioning. Louis continued to commit minor infractions of the Truce of Ratisbon and the other agreements previous to that, and these aggressions were particularly directed/

(1) See 5th. Feb. 1685; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

/directed towards virtually powerless Spain in the Low Countries. As during the second half of 1684, Ronquillo had tried - not entirely unfruitfully - to get Charles to interpose on her behalf with the French King, so he continued to do with his successor hoping for better success.

On 28th. Feb./9th. March, Don Pedro presented a memoire referring to the one presented to Charles on 6/16 December of the previous year, for Louis still had not fulfilled the terms of the Truce of Ratisbon as to the restitution of Courtrai and Dixmunde /— and also in the provinces of Flanders, Hainault and Namur. The memoire asked that James, as the "sucessor universal" according to the dispositions of the Treaty, as an ally or by the most convenient way" should bring pressure to bear on France and give Don Pedro a satisfactory written reply. What is worth noting is its gentle tone and the way it was presented, for Ronquillo had given James the memoire asking him to read it and that if it was not to his taste, it could be changed or not presented at all. The King had read it and smiling - perhaps a little ironically - told Don Pedro it was "very good" and that he would hand it on to Sunderland himself, saving the ambassador the bother of doing so. But Ronquillo did not feel that, due to domestic affairs in general and the approaching Parliament in particular, James would do more then than interpose diplomatically with the French. This, apart from/

/from co-operating over continued Spanish recruitment in Britain, was in fact all he did. Don Pedro however, was quite satisfied with his reply, and felt the King would do more when affairs at home allowed. (see appendix)

In October, Ronquillo presented a memoire to James regarding French infractions of the peace in the region of Namur, including a copy of one recently presented to Louis by the Conde Del Val, the new Spanish ambassador in Paris.(1) But again, domestic reasons and probably James' own plans prevented any except verbal support being given to Spain in this; and as a matter of fact affairs in Flanders were getting straightened out and any "incidents" by the French, while annoying, were of small importance internationally.

(1) P.R.O. S.P. 94/72.

Spain had, however, more of a policy now than this with the new British monarch.

Immediately after Charles' death, Don Pedro recommended to his master a positive policy he felt possible of attainment. It was reducible to two points:

1) To get James to break with France, though this would be difficult, Ronquillo thought, as the King was sure that what he needed was peace to become established. Not only did he wish the income granted which his brother had had, but enough to support him for two or three years, before he would start on any foreign escapades. James also pondered to Don Pedro Spain's need of peace too to build up her forces, for neither power could confront France successfully alone. The ambassador and his country were not unconvinced either, that such an active peace was necessary; but the ultimate aim remained.

2) The other point was British-Spanish commerce, which Don Pedro saw as a tool for manipulating James to a degree. We shall consider that later.

Meanwhile Ronquillo could offer an important first step to any co-operation: the confirmation of the treaties existing between England and Spain with the new King. This was only started actively in the late summer, when domestic affairs had settled down somewhat; it was only offered to James for when it should suit him and was never pushed. / (see appendix)

Don Pedro counselled some revision of the Treaty of Windsor to some sophist interpretations that produced bad effects in the previous reign. For example, he advised obtaining a change in the 4th. Article, which specified that the English aid of 8000 men need not be sent to Flanders until war was "open and declared". Instead, he recommended the addition of the more specific clause "invaded or disturbed in the possession of dominions, rights, prerogatives and immunities". In future, Spain should be careful not to declare war as in December, 1683, and in fact in doing anything that might be termed aggression. Above all she should work speedily and strengthen her own military forces. (see appendix)

In early October, in answer to Ronquillo's repeated pleas, the Consejo de Estado sent powers to him to carry this more forward should the opportunity arise which they fully expected would be very soon. James was already delaying the negotiation but he knew and Ronquillo knew that one of the only ways he would get the nation to favour the armed forces he wished, would be on the pretext of aid to Spain and the allies. The ambassador waited in patiently while the powers were on their way. But in November, James still claimed as before that the time was not ripe. Nonetheless Ronquillo went his way, planning out the points from the instruction from Madrid in order to have them in readiness for the anticipated negotiations. (see appendix) Of his dealing with James at this time he writes:-

"The/

"The nature of this King is such that it is best not to press him and nothing attracts him more than confiding in him. Because of this and because there is no other way open, my representation never passes to instance, and I only discourse reasons in the conversation which offers. I could do badly following any other path, for this King, moreover, governs by himself, (which is the greatest consolation I have) and the ministers are almost the same as during the time of his brother. And ever aware of this, His Britannic Majesty has told me on various occasions that well he knows I must confer with him alone because there is no other I can safely consult with."(1)

During early December, in a long conversation with the King, Ronquillo did not mention the Treaty because he found James excited over the events of his second unfortunate Parliament and wanting to unburden himself with him: there was therefore little opportunity to introduce this or other Spanish business. It was in fact, the old story of domestic affairs pushing out foreign. The ambassador just had to go on waiting. At this time, the King told him he could not do all he (James) wished with the troop position as it was and that Spain must just build up her own forces for the present.(2)

By the day before Christmas, 1685, Don Pedro was writing:

"May God will that this King put himself in a state of making his interposing (i.e. on the continent) worth something; although I expect/

(1) 13th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 10th. Dec. (3); ibid, 3961.

/expect His Britannic Majesty will not admit anything that may contribute to maintaining the Treaty's (Peace of Ratisbon) observance."(1)

James' immediate activity in European affairs at Spain's side definitely appeared a thing of the future, but the ambassador's hopes regarding this were not so low as the year before at the close of Charles' reign.

These negotiations were not however, completely divorced from the efforts of the other allies. Almost immediately on James' accession, Van Citters and the Dutch had begun working carefully, and with Ronquillo, for the common end of getting the alliances renewed and James' more active support for the Common Cause.(2) The King was on fairly reasonable terms with the Prince of Orange and Ronquillo saw it needful for Spain to encourage this nor yet to permit any union between the Dutch and James in which she did not have some part. (see appendix) However, the two powers seem to have worked more separately than usual that year. By the end of August, the Dutch obtained a restatement and extension of their original treaty, involving peace, reciprocal guarantee and clauses touching maritime affairs, while Ronquillo was still impatiently awaiting powers to make the similar agreement for Spain.(3)

As before in Charles' reign, the Spanish were also keen that Portugal should enter such a renewed agreement with England, and Don Pedro fostered this in his negotiations with James; he paid particular account/

(1) 24th. Dec. (4); ibid.
(2) 2nd. March, 1685; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 384.
(3) 27th. Aug; ibid.

account (and on orders) to the widowed Queen Catherine partly for this reason and also kept on close terms with the Portuguese envoy in London. However, he mentions that British-Portuguese relations were not so sweet due to the King of Portugal's attitude and the delay of Lord Lansdowne at Lisbon en route for Madrid. The Consejo de Estado instructed their envoy, the Bishop of Avila to explore the possibilities of closer ties in Lisbon itself.(1)

"Time will tell" was still the dictum on all these negotiations.

(1) Consultas of 4th. March and 12th. Oct; Letters, Ronquillo to Señor; 6th. Aug. (3); 17th. Sept. (1); ibid.

d.) The Opposition by the French Party to this Policy with its Relative Success.

More broadly speaking what success was Spain's policy towards James having this first year of his reign ?

In particular, we naturally ask if any real headway was being made against the French influences which had hitherto been particularly supreme around the King when he was Duke of York.

Open hostilities between France and Spain might have ceased but Don Pedro Ronquillo continued to do all in his power to counteract and destroy these influences. Anything that would discredit France in the King's or his peoples' eyes, was an opportunity for the ambassador. For example, at the end of May, there was a rumour current of a French invasion of Spain, and of it Don Pedro wrote: "Although it is always good that there should not be any invasion of Spain, I will be pleased should the suspicion continue a few days longer so the animosity against France may increase the more."(1)

But the rumours that concerned the Spanish far more were those of Louis' bribing the new King and his people; and these were very rife in the months immediately following James' accession. Constant reports came in of Barillon receiving large sums of money from Paris. Don Pedro, judging from the price of gold in London and Paris, held a remittance certain; and reported the rumour of two payments of £24,000 and £30,000 from Louis to his ambassador. This was believed to/

(1) 28th. May (2); ibid.

/to be primarily for disturbing the coming Parliament, but Don Pedro and others felt none of it would be as powerful as the hatred of the nation for the French. The Consejo de Estado also were of the opinion that Ronquillo himself would gain more with 50,000 effective than the French with all their money, but whether Don Pedro ever received this amount is doubtful. (see appendix)

Of course, there were also reports of James himself being bribed. On April 2nd. Ronquillo thought the first despatch of Louis to Barillon on Charles' death said that if James needed help, Louis would supply 800,000 "Fs" (French livres?); but that when the French envoy saw the quietness of the King's accession and that he did not lack money, he made the offer with more circumspection. Our friend made many inquiries but he was unable to find out if payments had been continued nor how the offer had been received. According to appearances, however, it seemed that either Barillon had not "attacked" or the offer had not been well received. (1)

Two weeks later, Don Pedro wrote that it did not seem that James was bribed and that he feared instead the threats of it. For two days he had been trying to verify suspicions of some new negotiation by the French, but all he had been able to find out was: that Louis had given James to understand that, although he did not doubt friendly relations would continue as in the time of his brother, it/

(1) 2nd. April (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960

/it would be convenient that the motives for doubting it in other courts might be avoided. But this was as Ronquillo pointed out,/not much more than a courteous greeting.(1)

Van Citters evidently supplied Ronquillo with reports of James' agreement with France, but what made them suspect with our friend was their always assuming a "treaty of religion" (probably for the conversion of Britain). This he felt unlikely, since on this subject James confided in no one more than himself.(2)

Ronquillo's opinion therefore remained that of early March, when he wrote home:

"I cannot say yet if this King is or will be French-inclined or in favour of us, because I do not find enough reasons to assure myself one way or the other."(3) The ambassador realised that James, in these early months, would be unlikely to become too involved with either Spanish or French parties, while getting himself established in domestic affairs. For example, the King, he saw, would need to be careful with the French party for the present, since they would otherwise try to ruin the success of his Parliament. As time went on, Ronquillo saw James wanted to be a decisive force, free of both sides.(4) And thus he chose the friendly policy of taking for granted that the interests of Spain and England were indivisible, only asking that he be a good Englishman and a good King of England.(5)

The/

(1) 16th. April (1); ibid.
(2) 16th. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 384. See Religion.
(3) 5th. Mar. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960
(4) 2nd. April (2); ibid.
(5) 16th. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 384.

The French meanwhile continued to curry favour particularly in the Court, long their fortress.(1) Strong suspicions were abroad during the Monmouth Rebellion and were even voiced in Parliament that France was aiding the rebels, and James himself appears to have feared this - but we shall deal with this later under domestic affairs. The visit of any official of France, like the Maréchal de l'Orge in June gave rise to all sorts of rumours of alliances, threats by Louis etc.(2) Later on Ruvigny paid a visit and Marshall Humières did so too, setting tongues going once more; but Ronquillo was not alarmed. James had told him he had told the French he would keep friends with them as far as it was in the English interest.(3) In fact, the King seemed "peevish" with them, Don Pedro felt.(4) In December, James was convinced of French workings among Parliament members:

"I know that he is convinced twenty of the Commons have been doing the work of France, opposing him, that he knows well the Most Christian King would not waste his money at Whitehall because it would not profit him, but he was persuaded that it was being distributed at Westminster."(5) There seemed indeed no reason to doubt "the goodwill of this King."

Spain's position in England therefore was to all appearances quite healthy in 1683, though she did not feel ready to stir up precedence questions with the French embassador (see appendix); still she intended

to/

(1) 11th. June (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
(2) 25th. June (1); ibid.
(3) 20th. Aug. (1); ibid.
(4) 12th. Nov. (1); ibid.
(5) 10th. Dec. (3); ibid, 3961.

/to keep pace with him and his activities. As a sign of this, Don Pedro became Ambassador Extraordinary. (see appendix) She really seemed to be getting some consideration in England and her ambassador sensed he was receiving more respect from friends and enemies. When the Marqués de Valparaiso finally reached London to present his message to James at the beginning of September, the King gave him a great welcome, and though untaught, went out of his way to speak to the envoy in almost perfect Spanish. This precedent, Don Pedro said, had given rise to talk; in fact one partisan of France had told him that if the King spoke Spanish it would be necessary for all to learn the language. (see appendix) Of course, it might be said that Spain's improved standing in England was largely due to James' own policy of being King on his own and on good terms with both the confederates and France. This possesses truth, but certainly Spain was taking any wise advantage she could of the opportunities before her. Her activity touching domestic and religious affairs indicate this even more fully.

2. Spanish Policy and Domestic Affairs.

a.) The First Months of 1685 (including the Spring Parliament.)

The great interest of James' reign for us to-day is what it caused domestically in the short period of three to four years. Hence interest becomes particularly alive as Don Pedro tackles this subject; and with every passing year from then on, the ambassador devoted more space in his correspondence to the problem. Not only was this aspect becoming almost all important, but one senses Don Pedro's increasing confidence in his ability to judge the position.

On James' succession "very practical people" were prophesying (according to Ronquillo) that "according to the character of this King, he will come to be his own Council of State, but if they try to insult him, as until now they have done, he will dissolve it (the Parliament) with great resolution and perhaps for the whole of his reign."(1) But during the first year, these premonitions did not eventuate: James was popular and was appealing to purely constitutional methods for attaining his ends. Such being the case, considering him as a lawful King and a good Catholic, as well as the events which follow, Ronquillo increasingly if quietly urged and carried forward his support by Spain in this field. For, to Don Pedro, James stood for law and order, which Spain still desired in Britain. He also stood for the anticipated if distant reconversion of the country to Roman Catholicism; and this last point cannot be completely severed from/

(1) 19th. Feb. (2); ibid.

/from political considerations.

It was highly important to Ronquillo and Spain that James should firstly establish himself on the throne. French influence was strong, but there was no war at present to make it ultra-pressing, while a civil war might give rise to any amount of unexpected difficulties even internationally. Regarding dangers from inside, Don Pedro was always interested in James' health, anxious that he should not overstrain himself: as for example in sport, when he was in the saddle fifteen hours following a stag forty miles "without considering how important his life is."(1) The Queen's health was also of interest to him that year, even to the consideration of her illnesses, possible decease and successors.(2) Though unmentioned in his letters, there was always in the background the question of the successor to this aging couple. Don Pedro's views on this became expressed later on, but needless to say he was anxious for a male heir being born to the new King.

Immediately after James' accession, Don Pedro wrote: "Only a Parliament can give any fixture as experience has taught in this community."(3) The meeting in May was eagerly anticipated helping to make it the first really important political event of the reign.

Ronquillo noted that well-intentioned people were being elected but that the matters pending decision in the Houses' deliberations were/

(1) 25th. June (5); ibid.
(2) 2nd. April (1); 16th. April (3) and Consulta; ibid.
(3) 19th. Feb. (1); ibid.

/were of such weight and complicated by so many interests that he could not foretell the result.(1) As we have seen already, a good outcome was to Spain's benefit in every way, and Don Pedro's policy of internal unity meant not merely tending various parties, but moreover the attempt to get no more than one under the King's leadership.

But our friend was not only anxious about the reactions of the M.Ps. but those of James himself. What would be the royal policy ? On April 30th. he wrote: "During these past days, I heard him say that the first thing was to fill pockets to attain the rest." (see appendix) This was true in every sense. James needed a large grant from Parliament to attain his ends to become a strong King. But to get support there, he must spend money. This he did, and we know from letters and the Embassy accounts that Don Pedro helped him in this policy. (see appendix) But Don Pedro saw that the question of James' supply could not be severed from the religious, and that the opposition in Parliament, though small and not very influential, knew the laws, and the way to put across their views. It was necessary, he thought, to persuade the King that, although Parliament might assist him generously with means and give all tolerance in the exercise of Catholicism, the powerful Presbyterians and Anglicans would wish some guarantee of Protestantism. Ronquillo urged that James go slowly in employing Catholics without distinction in his household and military forces; the entrance of Catholic/

(1) 2nd. April (1); ibid.
13th. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 384.

/Catholic peers in the session was established certainly by law, but Parliament had to judge voluntarily on admission of Catholics to many occupations; at any rate, money should first be obtained before embarking on any forwarding of Roman Catholicism. Though it was not Don Pedro's intention to touch religion deeply (nor ours here) he advocated the quiet relaxation of the Penal Laws and James not beginning with more difficult attainments that would rouse the Protestants. Then, once the penalties were somewhat relaxed and Catholics could hold office in the Royal Household, it would "open the door" to the conversion of the "fearful" and "principal" persons, so laying a foundation for further advances. (see appendix)

Yet, despite Ronquillo's doubts of the success of the Parliament, the King's having patience etc., he was a staunch supporter of James during those days of the actual session. Several incidents illustrate this. For example, when the subsidies were being discussed, there was a question of the admission and taxation of Spanish wines, and many anxious and friendly M.Ps. were keen to press this forward. Goodricke, the former ambassador in Madrid, was ready to move a proposition and was loudly cheered in a speech he made for Spanish trade as against French in their favour. But Ronquillo saw that if the King's leading supporters opposed this important step, it would not be attained, and it was preferable also that the Commons should remain

on/

/on good terms with the King. The ambassador therefore went to see James, and asked his interest in protecting this commerce - which was promptly promised. Ronquillo was hopeful of a successful conclusion to the matter.(1)

On June 5th. there was an attempt to get James to make a proclamation to protect Protestantism and enforce the penal laws. Don Pedro found the King that night very disturbed and resolved to dismiss Parliament unless it revoked all it had done in the matter so far. Without dissuading him from this (and he adds "because I knew no mental reservations in matters of religion") the ambassador said it was just the work of a few ill-intentioned members, and due to care not being taken to prevent it by his supporters. James thereupon took upon himself as Don Pedro also did to try and reason with certain members the following day. What followed was that the House of Commons disapproved the motion and decided that the Speaker, when he carried the act on the royal vents before the King, should tell him that the Kingdom trusted more in his word than in the laws, and that their religion was as dear to them as their lives.(2)

And thus the important point about this Parliament session for us is that Ronquillo was trying to work for unity between King and Kingdom, even to active and financial intervention in order to avoid any rupture or clashes.

(1) 11th. June (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
11th. June (3); ibid.
(2) ibid.

b.) The Monmouth Rebellion.

The Monmouth invasion and the simultaneous rebellion under Argyll broke forth that June of 1685 while Parliament was in session, stimulating greater loyalty to the legitimate King. As we also know, the Spanish Council of State had anticipated this upheaval since the moment of James' accession. Spain, in accord with the late King's and his brother's wishes would not welcome the Duke of Monmouth on Spanish soil, particularly the Low Countries. The Marqués de Grana had later co-operated in the investigation at Liège as to whether Charles II had married the mother of Monmouth; he had also expelled the young Duke's lady friend, Madame Wentworth, - a relationship which Don Pedro perhaps unjustly attributed to her having money and the Duke none. (see appendix) It was therefore already decided that in any case of trouble, Spain would support James against his half-brother, for even to temporise with the latter would have brought no gain, and very possibly loss, internal disunity in the British Isles to the advantage of France, and great harm to the Catholic Cause there. As early as the beginning of March, Don Pedro wrote the Governor of the Low Countries that he had offered James specially picked troops; 2,000 Spanish and 2,000 Walloon infantry (or 4,000 Spanish) (see appendix) under the command of Grana himself, in the case of an attempt by Monmouth. Indissolubly connected with this was the hope of lessening French influence and reconciling James and William. (see appendix)

With/

With June and the actual rebellion, Don Pedro felt that its justification lay in its opposition to the Catholic Religion and James' practice of it, and that there must be care that this factor did not affect the loyal as well as those not so. He hoped that Parliament would act powerfully and rigorously. Indeed, both houses gave great signs of their loyalty, the King lacked neither spirit nor money. London also remained faithful and an early defeat of the rebels seemed assured. But what bothered many including the Spanish envoy was: where were the rebels obtaining financial help ? And many eyes turned toward France.

Domestic discord in Britain was certainly in her interest. Also noted there, were signs rousing suspicion, among them large despatches in cipher being sent to Paris by the French representatives. Ronquillo wrote that if this rumour was verified it would be the shortest way of getting the whole Kingdom to go against the rebels and finish with them.(1)

In those days Don Pedro reiterated his former offer of troops to James, which had already been approved by Madrid in a despatch of April 26th. Ronquillo however wanted to be sure the promise could be made effective. This is what he thought of the proposal:

"They (the troops) will have the merit and Your (Catholic) Majesty the glory of having aided a holy and heroic enterprise; holy because it is in defense of the Catholic Cause; and glorious because it/

(1) 25th. June (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960

/it is to fix the crown on a legitimate King who risks all to remain within the fold of the Roman Church; and that nevertheless the Kingdom supports the justice of his case, and declares itself through the resolutions of its Parliament against an ungrateful rebel, who founds his malignity in making war on the Roman Catholics in defense of those purely Protestant Calvinists. If God grants the King good success, as seems necessary in His highest justice, Your Majesty has a strong basis of hope for recovering once more that which the perfidy of the King of France has unjustly usurped."(1)

Regarding the practical details, since Grana had just died at Spa, his successor - still interim - and not yet Marqués de Gastañaga - Francisco Antonio de Agurto, was offered to lead the troops. The infantry would have been used as a personal guard for the King and the vanguard of his infantry. James received the offer with friendliness, but refused, which was perhaps just as well for Spain's good name. (see appendix)

The rebellion came to naught and with it Don Pedro's fears: Monmouth had not marched on London, and despite James lacking a good general, he had won. The women and many common people might have been for the upstart, but Parliament stood and the general fear of the republicanism of his religious supporters - as Don Pedro saw - greatly aided his defeat.(2)

Spain/

(1) 25th. June (4); ibid.
(2) 9th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

Spain continued to try to co-operate in every way. When the ship that had brought Monmouth to England, the "Helderenbergh", put into Santander, certain Irish merchants and others became suspicious that the vessel was involved in the Monmouth revolt or involved in piracy. They informed our old friend Francisco Antonio Navarro, who happened to be in Spain on business; they also went to the Corregidor, with the result the ship was held and the crew interned. Proofs on the spot and from England uncovered its identity, but the vessel seems to have managed to escape, though certain of its crew imprisoned at Bilbao were to be handed over to the British authorities. The Spanish in Flanders also returned an escaped rebel to James. The attitude to the severity of James' measures was not that they were repressive but necessary for establishing law and order. Carlos II sent the King congratulations on his victory. In fact, James had had Spain's complete support. (see appendix)

In early August, Ronquillo reported a discussion he had had with the King on whether there had been French financial aid given the rebels. James remarked on the small amount of money the rebels had had, and how he had proofs of supply from English and Dutch sources. However, he said he believed that if the revolt had continued, the French would have given help to keep Monmouth going; but that they had not begun, waiting to see how it went. Don Pedro, always/

/always optimistic, felt this most significant as it showed James' attitude to France. The ambassador rejoiced in the Spanish offer that it had forestalled the French doing so. He said they and their party in London seemed depressed as a result of this: "Those of that nation do not appear so full of spirit as in the time of the dead King." Each day he saw them receiving new proofs of their declining power in Court and British affairs. Disparagingly he spoke of those phrases of Barillon which are so ordinary, and which we now know by memory.(1) Spain and its representative were deeply satisfied with the result. England seemed more united behind her Catholic King; the rebellion had in fact helped his establishment. Moreover, the French had not taken advantage of the discord and had lost face. But time would tell the powers' real position in British affairs.

(1) 6th. Aug. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sin. Estado (Ing) 3960, also Klopp (III, 71).

c.) The Question of a Standing Army etc. to the End of 1685.

One important question that the Monmouth rebellion had brought to the fore was that of a standing army. Almost inseparable from this was the King's admitting Catholic officers into it. The people had always feared such a body enforcing authoritarianism on them, and now coupled with this was the fear of a forced conversion to Catholicism.

During the rebellion, it was natural that the King was allowed and could maintain a large number of troops. It was clear that James wished to maintain it, but whether for defence or his own ends was uncertain. He looked on the army as his security, and in this, Don Pedro thought, he thought rightly. The very fact of having it would assert his ability to be independant of French aid in any possible domestic emergencies. The ambassador also felt it certain that Parliament and people would not oppose this should the aim be to maintain the position of the Crown, and in particular to be ready to oppose France, and her intervention and to defend England's friends including Spain. Don Pedro "knew" James knew he must keep Parliament conscious of the last point. This, of course, gave a lift to Ronquillo's hopes for renewal of the Spanish-British alliance. Having such troops would certainly be convenient to James and his security, and also inspire some respect of him in Louis in the Council of State's opinion. (1)

However, as we have seen, our friend advised caution on the question/

(1) 9th. July; 6th. Aug. (3); 17th. Sept. (3); ibid.

/question of wholesale admission of Roman Catholics into the army. In the autumn of '85 however, he did not feel that Parliament would oppose this on the matter of the Test and the Oaths. But he did see the difficulty of them or others perhaps wishing to pass a law on the matter.(1)

The clouds were gathering on the whole question but James was determined. Don Pedro wrote at the end of November to keep his troops and thirty ships "although he have to reduce his table to one course".(2)

To restrain the King's untempered character and French influences at Court was a difficult and increasingly impossible task for Don Pedro. Then too, James discussed domestic matters with the foreign ambassadors, and it was difficult to side step these conversations. For example, Ronquillo might feel Albemarle (although a "beast") more suitable than the "Francés" Feversham for a certain office, but he, as well as the Consejo de Estado, hung back from interfering, while James went his way to dismiss Halifax that autumn.(3) Not that Don Pedro was in any way despairing of the King's having the sense not to go too far. The envoy discerned that one of James' first wishes was to modify Habeas Corpus but felt this was only to abolish it in cases of "Lese majeste".(4)

Nor was the ambassador depressed with the prospect of the autumn meetings of the Parliament. The Houses had adjourned in early July, three days before Sedgemoor in fact, until the middle of November. However, he knew that it would take work to purge the M Ps of their fear

(1) 17th Sept (3); ibid.
(2) 26th Nov. (4); ibid.
(3) 20th August (4); and Consulta of 18th Sept; ibid.
(4) 6th August (3); includes quite an interesting quotation on "Habeas corpus".

of Catholicism and perhaps more to see the King made convenient resolutions. Here for the first time he mentions "those who counsel only according to what he (James) wants to hear (and God knows with what aim) and flatter the pride of this King by telling him he does not need to consider more than his own wishes." . . . "In this I require great skill to govern myself with him when he confides these affairs to me; for it is necessary not to show him any weakness, nor that one considers the risk, and to guide these with the reason of his greatest convenience: and that on this depends the good of religion; and both on an arrangement on the troops, and that to attain this effective measures must be taken for Parliament's re-establishing them without mistrust; and that the rest must be decided according to what ease and opportunity offer. And thus I discourse to him with great courtesy that the most effective way is to assure his people that he is not a dependant of France. (1) "

At the end of October Don Pedro wrote:

" It is certain that so much enforcement of justice, such considerable imprisonments (i.e. after the Rebellion), the point of religion, the fear thatthe King's power causes some, and other apprehensions that he will want more than expected, make the result of Parliament doubtful. But, as the object of the King is so greatly to the service of God and the public weal, we must hope that he will have His Divine assistance. The people have great satisfaction in seeing the King is in favour of

(1) 17th Sept.(3); ibid.

Parliaments, which are their idolatry."(1)

The Parliament resumed on November 19th. James was immoveable: he would not hide his opinion judging any reserve to be deception or fear. Preston and Goodricke respectively were to propose and second a motion for arms aid to the King "and to forward those reasons with that of the interests of Spain." Don Pedro felt that this showed the good intentions of James towards Spain. However, opposition arose; Goodricke failed then at the crucial moment and the motion fell to the ground.(2)

Not even the prorrogation of the Parliament could discourage Don Pedro. To him the French were just making capital spreading the rumour that the prorrogation was to their great glory and James' misfortune. The British King possessed, in the ambassador's reasoning, "the master key of supply"; the animosity of Louis would be increased on account of what was said of the increased tariff put on French wines over Spanish. Perhaps with justice, we may curl our lips at Don Pedro's optimism, but let us remember that we do so from our vantage point of time, knowing that the Parliament was Prorrogued not just to 10/20 February, 1686, but for the rest of the reign.(3)

As the year drew to a close, Don Pedro strained to see the outcome of the next projected meeting of Parliament and did all he could to prepare for it. He prayed that the passions of all parties might moderate but was even firmer in that Spain must continue to work with the King.

(1) 29th Oct.(4); ibid.
(2) 26th Nov.(4); ibid.
(3) 3rd Dec. ibid, 3961.

Don Pedro felt that James would not return a Parliament without moral probability of success. The King's interposing would always have some strength and at no time could Parliament alone aid Spain. France would also take advantage of any weakening of the relationship with James. Besides, it was in their religion's interest. Ronquillo therefore continued to try to temper the Parliament members to agreement with the King; and, while assuring James of Spain's friendship, to show him the bounds of possibility. Parliament remained, for Don Pedro, "the only negotiation in which can be founded hopes of our (Spain's) betterment." The Council of State decided to send two effective letters of credit to the value of 7,000 and 8,000 escudos.(1) But the way was darker. It was, Ronquillo also wrote, impossible to judge where the question of the revocation of the Test Act would end. Loyalty to the King had been visibly weakened by his attitude on the standing army, the brutality of the punishments after the Monmouth rebellion and his open favour of Catholicism and Catholics. Public opinion was now stirred by the dismissal of Halifax and his speech on the Test as the wall of defence against Rome. "As studied as badly spoken" Don Pedro described it. The ambassador felt James still wanted unity with his people; that he realised the point of religion was less acceptable with them every day; and that he was making last attempts to pacify the Parliamentary parties and agree with the Bishops. "But still", the Spaniard wrote, "I do not know on what terms he wishes to agree". He knew how difficult it was for James to control himself and to some extent

(1)10th Dec.(3); ibid.

the King's ambitions - but he hoped for the best.

"Why I trust that His Britannic Majesty will embrace moderation is his having told me that all the troubles and persecutions he has been in in this life, never have they made him wish to give up nor disturbed for one instant his inner peace. But (he also said) that it had cost him a great battle with himself to postpone the keeping of th Catholic officers with consequently the preservation of the peace in which they find themselves today and the loss of the occasion for becoming the greatest King of England that has ever been, as he has dreamt and planned; since it was his aim to act with more respect than anybody and establish the former balance in this Court. And he told me this with such force and ardour that I confess to your Majesty nothing has touched me so much up until now as I live, because I know how high his high thoughts rise."

But Don Pedro himself favoured pardons and dispensations that would really assure the Catholics security rather than the actual abolition of the Test - "a matter more in the hands of God than of men."(1)

But, as we shall see more fully in the next section, James, swayed by the various opinions principally of his many and self-interested Catholic advisers, was, Don Pedro said, confused rather than making positive resolutions. The Catholics, by their other actions, were also rousing opposition. Nonetheless the ambassador was still reassured of the King's good faith.

(1) 10th Dec.(4); ibid.

The appointment of Sunderland to the Presidency of the Council had not been due to French or any other party's influence. Hence Don Pedro was still prepared to work for the King. He expected the Parliament to take place after the Test question was settled but now bewailed lack of funds for working:-

"I would like to have means with which to work and to speak with people, for it is necessary to begin conversations at the Table (as we have seen in the accounts for the first half of the year) and follow them up after having finished" . . . "Often I withdraw from speaking with this King so that he may not place me under the obligation of having to treat with persons whom I am not able to entertain."(1)

A letter of Ronquillo's last despatch that year voiced the actual situation, however, that all the King's affairs hung on this question of the Catholic officers.(2) Domestic events were really beyond the ambassador's control.

(1)24th Dec.(4); ibid.
(2)24th Dec.(6); ibid.

3. The Religious Aspect.

It is impossible to separate religion from political events in the reign of James, but so important is it for our subject, that we must also briefly consider it apart as well.

Already we are well acquainted with the hopes and fears the Spanish had in matters of religion in Britain, that the new reign was regarded as a great opportunity but one also fraught with dangers. The fact ~~that~~ of James Catholicism certainly, if nothing else, warmed Spanish feeling towards him in its hope of the ultimate reconversion of the islands; but civil strife stirred by this issue could bring not onlybad political effects on Spain, but worse conditions for the British Catholics, definitely retarding fulfilment of the sacred aim. Nevertheless, full opportunity was taken by the Spanish Embassy of the greater liberty allowed Catholics.

Very early in the reign, Ronquillo reported that the Chapel was flourishing, but that there was the need for funds. Don Pedro said he needed the money the more when there was such difference of opinion between the Catholics in Britain, the greater part inclining to the views of the Anglican Church. The threat of Gallicanism and French manipulation of the faithful was also ever before him from now on until his death. Hence the chapel must not only be a facility and protector for English Catholicism, but their educator into a more sensible, Papal and pro-Spanish - and yes - a more purely religious state of mind. At this time one of his chaplains, Padre Fray Domingo

de Guevara was made Archbishop of Armagh; Don Pedro asked that the grant this priest received as King's chaplain of honour should be continued, as he was sure he would continue in Ireland the great services he had done Spain previously; and this he seems to have done. (see Appendix) So, more than ever, the chapel at Wild House was (for the Spanish) a base of operations with English Catholics.

Don Pedro feared the religious factor intensely in the Parliament and the Monmouth Rebellion, as we have seen. To him it was no time for James to aid Catholicism as an organised movement. All that should be attempted was the protection and, if at all, quiet favouring of Catholics. He was even chary of the King's allowing Catholic conventicles to be opened in Scotland through a loop in Scots law, for he feared as in all these measures the possible reaction.(1) Caution made him, in 1685, sense any anti-Catholicism and do his best to temper it in the King's interest as, for example, with the M.Ps. But perhaps his main efforts were to moderate James' own actions.

The revocation of the Test Act had come up and Don Pedro opposed this. To him it was much more important that the Catholics should live in peace then than their necessarily having their freedom apparent, with legal permission to occupy every post available. The ambassador felt, however, some wise dispensations with the lesser penal laws might be possible.(2)

Yet, beside this, it is strange to note, even in these first months of caution, how the Spaniard rejoiced at outward signs of Catholicism that

(1) 28th May (2); ibid.
(2) 6th Aug (3); ibid.

were viewed with such suspicion by the Protestant population, and which also helped rouse opposition to the King. For example, Don Pedro welcomed the public celebration of mass at the palace and the punishment of Titus Oates. He also hoped the fidelity of the Catholics during the rebellion might also show the M Ps how much they merited the moderating of the Penal Laws.(1)

This question of the revocation of the Test with the moderating of the Penal Laws provided the first round in the struggle between the moderates and extremists in the Catholic party, and both fought for the ear of James, who would decide the policy. In July Ronquillo reported the King resisting the extremist forces pressing for a speedier reinstatement of Catholicism in the kingdoms.(2) As the year wore on, though his letters still bear an optimistic tone, he complains of this party among his co-religionists. On September 17th he wrote:

" On the point of religion, more than the Parliamentarians, I fear the friars, clergy and Catholics, because they only follow surface maxims without discussing the difficulties involved; the risk of the succession of this King; the case of a Protestant successor; and that for all these reasons it is necessary to do what is possible in its interest and what can endure since any other policy will be to undo the sure foundations that are being laid."(3)

Again, on December 10th, he speaks of these Catholics; clerical and lay, who were pressing forward the Abolition of the Test and who

(1)25th June (5); ibid. 20th Aug (3); ibid.
(2) 23rd June(1); ibid.
(3) 17th Sept(3); ibid.

"look more to ambition for places than the good of religion." And he continues, "And so that one may know they are English, I will tell your Majesty that when the Commons were considering granting the Catholic officers double pension for life, a thing which was to lower the King's reputation, they themselves solicited it !" (1)

Two weeks later, the day before Christmas, Don Pedro continues the subject by saying that the King has been surprised at this show of greed. The very Catholics were criticising the Kin g's use of pardon; and this was greatly discrediting the government because, "if the Judges and Counsellors have not sinned through malice, they have done so through ignorance." He feared that fewspoke to the King with sincerity. It was also pitiful that all, without distinction of religion or position, were mixing the making ofdecisions with stockjobbing; that most held differing opinions, each one believing that his would be followed. (2) With regard to conversions, Don Pedro was equally cautious. When it was reported in December that Sunderland and Bulgrave wished to become Catholics, he wrote, "It is said that these two persons wish to become Catholics and prove it with the truth that they have never had any religion and find their interest to be in accord with the King's. And if this is true, it would be much better that they remain Protestant." For Don Pedro foresaw the difficulties that could arise (as by their staying Protestant would be avoided) in the matter of the Test. (3)

(1)10th Dec.(4); ibid 3961.
(2) 24th Dec.(4); ibid.
(3) ibid.

It was indeed a disillusioning sight, and our friend was going to say harder things of the majority of English Catholics with the years. Of course, his principal anxiety was the effect on the principal director of events, James himself. Don Pedro knew the King's weaknesses pretty well by now; his stubbornness, his pride, his ardour often leading to precipitation, and yet his becoming muddled on listening to the opinions of so many. Nevertheless as we have seen, the ambassador trusted in James' good intentions and that he was not in the pay of France. The Spaniard also felt James had some idea of moderation before the rising opposition. There were several other signs that gave Don Pedro hope.

That autumn Louis had finally revoked the Edict of Nantes - a pattern which many Englishmen began to fear James would follow. However, the King - as well as Ronquillo - felt that what the French monarch was doing was "against all Princes, Christian and Catholic". This assured Don Pedro somewhat of James' moderation and his separateness from France. (see Appendix).

Another hopeful point of contact was James' extreme fidelity to the Holy See and hence opposition to French ecclesiastical views. In fact, the Pope with his generally pro-confederate and anti-French attitude, could perhaps be persuaded to guide the ardour of the new royal convert into paths of moderation. That autumn the opportunity presented itself, for a representative of the Pope, Count Adda, arrived in London in November, on a mission to King James. The Count was a

Milanese, hence a Spanish subject and already in acquaintance of Don Pedro (who had, as we know, been brought up in Milan). On his arrival, Don Pedro was among the first to speak with him and was able, in those first few days, to make his arrival as "quiet" as possible, thus prudently not to stir up popular opposition. Adda, whatever his opinions, on departurefrom the Holy City, soon came round to Don Pedro's views on the necessity for moderation. (see Appendix) James impulsively ordered him before the end of the year to take the full rank and treatment of Papal Nuncio, which, in fact, would have given rise to as great difficulties in Rome as in London. Adda consulted Don Pedro (who incidentally rejoiced in this real and supposed position as "mentor") - for the position was delicate, the Pope having ordered him to follow James' wishes. It was decided and carried out that the Count tell the King that, despite the above-mentioned orders, this would mean a fundamental change involving the detailed question of ecclesiastic representation in the constitution of the English Court and to ask him to permit reference being made to the Pope first. Proudly Don Pedro closed this passage:

"The King approved this and appreciated it, and told me the reasons appeared those of a man of very good judgment."

Don Pedro described the Court as "a great vassal of Your Majesty" in his letters to Madrid and claimed to have him working in line with moderation and Spanish policy. The Count was reported as promising to

tell James on the first suitable occasion that greater union with Spain would be most pleasing to the Holy Father; and of having assured Don Pedro that such was indeed the intention. "Finding this King embarrassed by the evil judgment and self interest of many Catholics and his having told me it was necessary to do what was most useful to Religion and not necessarily according to the views of his Council, it seemed very aprepos to tell him that none would be more suited to advise him on these matters than Count Adda, on account of the Count's position and the satisfaction he himself had of his prudence and sincerity. And the Count is forewarned of this and resolved, should the opportunity arise, to counsel the vanity of the King with his Parliament, introducing our resolution on the basis of what is most important for and can lead to the exaltation of our sacred religion." The Consejo de Estado in Madrid, on learning this, ordered Adda to be thanked on their behalf.(1)

But fear - that apparently eternal bogey of political relations - continued. There was the fear that Louis, unsuccessful in other ways, would use religion even further as a foil for political ends.(2) Would James, disappointed at the delay in attaining political and religious objectives, through constitutional and moderate means, grow impatient and recklessly follow the extremists, thus falling into the hands of France ? The position was by no means hopeless but clouds seemed to be gathering. It remained to be seen how James would weather the storms that were apparently approaching.

(1) 24th Dec.(3); ibid.
(2) 17th Sept(3); ibid.

4. The Year 1685 for Don Pedro Ronquillo as an Individual.

Briefly, what changes did the first year of James III's reign bring for Don Pedro Ronquillo individually?

Already the whys and wherefores of his not being recalled to Madrid or sent to a new post have been examined. During the rest of the year there was no mention of the possibility, though doubtless Don Pedro personally would have welcomed it (see Appendix). He meanwhile felt it necessary to reinforce his dignity. At the end of April he mentioned that there were now five ambassadors extraordinary in London, that there were rumours of Barillon and the Emperor's envoy receiving this and asked Madrid to honour him in this way as he did not wish to be the only "ordinary" representative among those of the greater powers. The Council at first refused this until it was definite the French and Imperial ambassadors had been given the title. However, in August the title was granted, for Barillon had received it, and it would probably be as well anyway, since renewal of the Treaty of Windsor seemed to be in the offing (see Appendix).

Early in September Ronquillo wrote that on Count Thun's returning to Vienna, the Emperor had asked him to assist the Secretary of the Austrian Embassy, John Philip Hoffman, in the interim and to obey any orders sent. Madrid agreed to this - though asking Burgomayne at Vienna to press forward a new appointment (see Appendix).

Thus Don Pedro's position was stronger in these respects. Earlier it has been seen how he had now attained a more equal position with

Barillon in negotiations than in the latter years of Charles II's reign.

But difficulties remained, both new and old.

One event that did not help Don Pedro was the death of his friend, the Marqués de Grana, and the appointment of Francisco Antonio de Agurto in his place as Governor of the Low Countries, though this was not immediately apparent. Nobody in Madrid seemed to wish the difficult post, both the Duke of Villahermosa (formerly in it) and the Marqués de los Balbases refused and, finally, the Consejo de Estado decided to appoint the acting Governor, Agurto, and make him Marqués de Gastañaga. Don Pedro had known the family and had, in fact, according to Navarro, helped the new appointee in his rise, through the position of Governorship of the Castle of Ghent, General of Artillery and Maestre de Campo, General de Flandes. In 1685 the two men were not on bad terms but the secretary tells us that once installed and surrounded by Don Pedro's enemies, he even led some of the attacks yet to be made on him. Meanwhile a good and firm friend in that post could have helped Don Pedro greatly. (see Appendix)

Don Pedro's health continued poor and it grew worse in the autumn of 1685. Gout, catarrh and eye trouble had the particular effect of helping to hinder his activities for the meetings of November and December, when his participation really had importance. (see Appendix)

However, financial lack which had dogged the ambassador's steps in past years, was what continued to hinder his progress and success even more. In the first few months after James' succession, the grants of

the Council of State did make a difference. They were not enough, nor were the orders always honoured in London, but they at least kept the creditors from the door. By early June, 32,000 effective pieces of eight had come (see Appendix); more than 50,000 were really required. However, the complaints had ceased of his not having enough money to buy more mourning.(1) Don Pedro had, by the way, felt it essential to recommend special mourning at Charles' passing, despite England's lack of attention to this point with regard to Spanish royal deaths. He was also able to spend some money, as we have already noted, on the Coronation and the Parliament. The "reales" arrival had, at least, delayed the risk in which he found himself in April and May as "the least contemplative Catholic."(2)

However, as the clouds gathered during the second half of the year in other ways, so they gathered for his economic position. Money ceased to come from Spain for the present, while the increased expenses of more ministers frequenting Wild House than in the previous reign continued (see Appendix). It has been noticed already the paltry £52 odd he was able to devote to intelligence and preparing for the Parliament and how this cramped his style in working for Spain and James. He was paying old debts as well, "20% to my money lender and I live his slave and even that of others."(3) By late November he was having difficulty paying for despatching his letters and had had to dismiss some of his chaplains.(4) James openly sympathised with Don Pedro

(1) 19th Feb.(3); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid.
(2) Re: Despatches from Spain of 29th April, 11th and 24th May; ibid.
(3) 1st Oct.; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(4) 26th Nov.(1); ibid and 26th Nov(2), to Botello; ibid.

and this must have even rubbed in the bitterness of a poverty discrediting not only himself but his country, as he said. This sorrow was never unmixed with anger for our friend well knew what went on in Madrid. Earlier that year he had written:-

"Ah, Dios mío ! How lost we are because in Madrid they think on nothing but that inferno of a Palace and Your Excellency (Grana) can see how, in order to get the cash for the journey to Aranjuez, some fiend will provide it and consume half the silver of a fleet, and Your Excellency meanwhile able to maintain neither yourself nor your own with anger and despair." (1)

Navarro says that, due to the peace on the Continent, the Ministry of his master until the end of James' reign, gave no great opportunities for Don Pedro to gain glory or even find much occupation in the negotiations which offered (2). That is probably overdrawn but it is certain that, while the King followed legality and friendship with Spain and less co-operation with France - as in 1685 - there was not the intensity of labour of other periods. Soon too, the hopes of any major swing by James to the confederacy - or even his ability to do so - faded. This year did, however, reinforce some of Don Pedro's opinions on England and the English; their greed for money and their keenness for Parliaments. He experienced a great disillusionment with regard to the English Catholics, as he saw their opportunism in/

(1) 9th. April; Roquillo to Grana; A.G.R. État. 384.
(2) Navarro, I, f. 372.

/in the face of opportunity - but this he attributed to their nationality. Perhaps his strangest and most valuable impression forced on him through that year was that the observance of established law in particular with respect to religion, must be maintained. Otherwise the King could not succeed and a reaction would ensue. We have already noted how often he pointed this out. His first biographer also saw that this was:

"The surest way of conducting oneself in the very broken and marshy terrain of that island where all its inhabitants, from the lowest labourer to the proudest Lord, are extremely jealous of their privileges and their liberties."(1)

(1) ibid, f. 375.

1. Political - International.

a.) The Struggle against French Influence.

That January of 1686, Louis despatched a special envoy to London to confer with James II and the English ministers. This visit of Bonrepaux, First Intendant of the French Navy, gave rise to numerous rumours of a new agreement between England and France; and these reports reverberated throughout most of the year.(1)

Don Pedro reported these; so did the embassy confidant, Rumbold,(2) and naturally enough the Dutch and Imperial representatives were also on the alert. According to Ronquillo, writing in early February, Barillon had been giving dinners every day during the past month instead of the usual once a week. In such uncertainty, Don Pedro had gone to see the King. There the ambassador, using the greatest care, gradually introduced the touchy subject. James thereupon denied the reports with the following words:

"I allow you to assure the King, my nephew, from me, so that neither Bonrepaux's visit nor any other negotiation with France may put him in any anxiety, that I shall never consent to anything directed against him either in America, Europe or any other part of the world; and God forbid that you begin to distrust me, for I shall never distrust you."(3)

Ronquillo did not wholly accept the rumours, but felt there might be/

(1) 21st. Jan. (5) 1686; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.
(2) Letters of Rimbold (or Rumbold) of 18th. Feb. and 4th. March, ibid.
(3) 4th. Feb. (4); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

/be something behind them, while all were conscious of the pro-French leanings of some of the ministers. At least, our friend was pretty certain that James would not break with France. It was, however, an ambassador's duty to go on trying to ascertain the facts, while at the same time giving the King no excuse for lack of confidence.

In mid-March, Don Pedro passed on a message to James from Carlos II saying that Spain would always be glad to help him. Despite the extreme circumspectness of the ambassador's questioning on the talks with France, James seemed annoyed at the very breath of suspicion, but did say that nothing more was being discussed than the settling of certain commercial affairs in America. This Ronquillo believed, but still did not like to see any smoothing over of relations between the English and French crowns. He also viewed with ever increasing apprehension the differences between James and his son-in-law in the Hague. Rumours were current as well of French naval preparations, and the ambassador feared a Franco-British attack on the Dutch or Spanish, though it did not seem likely that Louis would break the peace so flagrantly just then. And Spain did not wish war before she could carry through reforms and preparations for any possible struggle. James, in Don Pedro's estimation, seemed firmer every day in favour of the peace; at least more favourable to Spain and less so towards France, and

/without any/secret/agreement with Louis. But, all could so easily be reversed. Sunderland was increasing in power and the royal treasury's emptiness might force the King to follow the ministers' more pro-French and extremist counsels. Meanwhile, our friend was passing through a period of extreme poverty, unable to oppose French activity or carry out the slightest negotiation that demanded money.(1)

This opinion was not to alter greatly. At the beginning of April, basing this on the word of an authority he trusted, Don Pedro again disbelieved in any treaty between the two Kings. Bonrépaux/only had commission to speak on affairs in America. There were reports of discussion as well on treatment of each other's ships in the Channel; the handing over of some Huguenots and a request that James stop protecting them; that France be granted equal trading rights in England with Spain and Holland. But these subjects, Don Pedro said, had not been brought up, at least in the two conferences that Barillon had had recently with the Chancellor, Treasurer and Sunderland, the English commissioners for these discussions on America. However, he had reason to believe that the French had committed the suggestions to a partisan in the Court, who had continuously sought the royal opinion on them, but that James, still following his independant policy, had rejected them. The ambassador/

(1) 18th. Mar. (1); ibid.

/ambassador was nonetheless still curious to know what was being discussed or proposed regarding affairs in the Western Hemisphere. He was also anxious, for he noted the Court was French affected and James embarassed at his visits. "The ministers of France speak with such firmness that they make even those doubt who believe their words least."(1) Could James, enveloped by extremists, French partisans and his increasing difficulties, maintain his neutral stand ?

Bonrepaux still stayed on in London, and by the middle of April, an agreement between England and France on America was clearly being prepared. Don Pedro was particularly concerned over a clause pledging neutrality between the two crowns. James, in a conversation with the ambassador, told him that the treaty was not completed yet, but that nothing would be done against Spain's interest; that what was projected was neutrality in America, with France, if there was war in Europe - a clause which would be to Spain's advantage and not contrary to the treaties between her and England. Our friend was convinced there was nothing arranged as regards Europe, but still feared some word being included in the treaty to Spain's disadvantage by James' pro-French ministers, which the King might overlook. "For in truth, His Britannic Majesty is not so practical in matters of political policy and subtlety as in the more detailed affairs of war and finance."(2)

(1) 1st. April (2); ibid.
(2) 15th. April (2); ibid.

Aware of French bribes, he soon reported Bonrepaux had paid more than £6,000 (over £1,000 of it on copies of documents) to get information on British trade, administration, the value of the royal rents and the navy.(1) Don Pedro was not going to refuse to expend money to find out about this, and if necessary to remedy it.

By the end of the month, this "ruling on commerce" as the English preferred to call it, was a fact. It included the above mentioned agreement on neutrality, but did not - despite Don Pedro's queries to the King - "define" that word. The Consejo de Estado, when word of the agreement reached them, felt it bad news, and that in reality it was a Treaty of Commerce between France and England. Louis' hands might now be somewhat tied in the event of Louis restarting his aggression on the Continent.(2)

In August, new information roused Don Pedro's worst fears of French activity in England. And he was not alone: the Dutch and Imperial envoys were equally alarmed. On the 5th. he wrote Madrid that he had always said the coming of Bonrepaux had been more than it appeared, and now he was surer that it had been to get England to war on the Dutch; that propositions had been made to James through a minister urging this action and offering French aid of four million French livres for ships to aid in the destruction of Dutch trade. Persuasive points capitalised on were English/

(1) 29th. April (2); ibid.
(2) ibid and Consulta; ibid.

/English jealousy of Dutch commerce and irritation at Holland's approach to the Monmouth rebellion.(1) The despatch of a week later, with its interesting enclosure, expands this and is worth examining in more detail. (see appendix)

Ronquillo starts the lengthy letter by informing his master that though it had seemed he and his family would have to return to London, due to lack of funds, he has managed to stay on himself at Windsor, sending them off to Wild House. The reason for this was his recent discoveries. Partly by threats and partly by promises (which God and Your Majesty know whether they will be fulfilled, he adds in a cynical but lightsome parenthesis) he has obtained the paper which he encloses. It contained a French plan and offer to the King in Council, which, said Don Pedro, was only in the hands of its originators, himself and those to whom he had shown it.

The salient points of "The Paper" are addressed as follows.

To begin with, the writer points to the Dutch having helped foment Monmouth's rebellion, which was insupportable, and as they showed no signs of making any reparation for this, the Republic must be destroyed. For this the time was favourable: the Austrians were engaged against the Turks, who were not likely to make peace just then. If the opportunity was passed, the Dutch, as well as James' own disaffected subjects, would grow insolent; the faction of the Prince/

(1) 5th. Aug. (2); ibid.

/Prince of Orange would increase and contrive to change the royal resolutions on religion and the prerogative, getting him to hand over to Orange, his successor, all control of the government. Should James refuse the French King's friendship, which was essential to him, it would be lost; Louis would also suspect his acting with the enemies of France and perhaps oppose him himself. These reasons given, the writer details the proposal. James must ask money from Parliament, telling them frankly that if they do not grant supply, they must not be surprised if he gets it from his neighbour, Louis. It they do not co-operate however, the King must extend his prerogative to obtain it. Nonetheless, the King of France will provide enough for the war against Holland. Thus, James will be both powerful and formidable. Moreover afterwards, should the French try to overreach themselves with him, he will be able to oppose them. After the destruction of Holland, he will have time to unite with the House of Austria, to the great benefit of religion. Continuing to that theme, the writer admits that, to firmly establish Catholicism in Britain, it might be necessary for James to make himself in a manner dependant on France, and place in the hands of Louis, the decision on the succession. It would, however, be better that they should be the Catholic vassals of the French King than to remain as "slaves of the day" "that do not enjoy that great liberty which/

/which they abuse so much at present", but that there was nothing to fear of his seeing himself constrained to this.

Immediately on obtaining this document, Don Pedro showed it to Van Citters who, he says, was quite amazed. He then persuaded the Dutch ambassador to speak to the King, as it was more particularly his province - but also we can say to protect Spain and himself from being misunderstood by James. If it was necessary later on, Don Pedro was decided he would intercede as the ally of both powers. Meanwhile, he did not fail to mention to some how indispensable it would be for all Princes opposed to France to support Holland - but without mentioning the name of His Catholic Majesty.

Van Citters went before the King. James accepted what Holland had done to English rebels on her territory, and promised he had not undertaken nor would undertake any effort with France. He saw he had only obtained adjustment with the French on the commerce of each other's vassals, particularly in bordering territories. The Spanish differences with England were also to be straightened out as already promised and he would not countenance any extension of Louis' American territories. Friendship, not war, was in his interest due to his lack of supply and the disturbances existing in England. James may have realised the motive force behind the Dutch envoy's visit, for he said he hoped Ronquillo would believe him. Touching the/

/the point of religion, the King criticised the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and said that though he would be glad to see Catholicism embraced, he had no intention of following Louis' example and only desired the English Catholics to have equal rights with their Protestant countrymen. Van Citters then promised that Holland would not meddle in these internal religious affairs. . . . Finally, he exhorted the Dutchman to take counsel with Ronquillo and follow his example of moderation. Van Citters felt reassured. So did Ronquillo. James might not have told everything. Even though James had not confessed to Van Citters to have been presented with the French propositions, Don Pedro knew the King had received the paper, and probably (owing to its contents on religion) from a Catholic courtier. However James had admitted to partisans speaking to him on the matter; that these men were not only in the Kingdom but attended on the Queen and himself, though in time he would procure to show this. The Spaniard was still certain the King was firmly against French offers, and both ambassadors gave this as their opinion on James to their home governments.

Though their reports differ - Van Citters equally and suspectly taking all the glory on himself - both men were convinced of the paper's validity. Van Citters insisted on this to James himself, who said it was a fabrication either of gazetteers in Amsterdam or/

/or those in England, who wished to make him hated with his subjects. The Dutchman continued it was the work of the Catholic party and Court priests were offering to name the author - which offer was as Macintosh also says strangely enough, not accepted. James may not have seen the paper; it may have been spurious but Macintosh felt the "evidence internal and external is of its authenticity."

However, what is important in the whole incident is that it showed Don Pedro to his satisfaction what he had to oppose, the general aims of the French party in more detail and the danger to James' friendship with Spain and Holland. The French were definitely trying through the Court to get a league with the English King. Added confirmation of this for Don Pedro was the report from Constantinople that one of the reasons the French ambassador had given the Grand Vizier for continuing the war against the Emperor, was the making of a French-English alliance.

But what was Don Pedro going to do to oppose this ? He had returned to London, and it was doubtful whether he would be able to get enough money for him to return to Windsor; he feared the English and French might make further arrangements particularly concerning America in his absence; all this had made him ill in body and spirit. However, Don Pedro gave his general plan; he must try to "educate" the/

/the Catholic but politically unversed courtiers and the King. Specifically he suggested to Spain his writing a counter paper to the French one for this purpose.

When all this mass of detail had been considered in Madrid, the Council of State's opinion was as follows. In general it approved Ronquillo's trying to stop attack on Holland - with the rather ironical remark "For, although they so greatly deserve anything fatal that may happen to them, one must consider that their dominions are placed very close to our own and that from this disturbance can result serious inconveniences to the Most August House." More particularly they recommended Don Pedro trying to keep James and his ministers away from such propositions and pro-French influences; but without forming a public paper, for this they were sure, would bring "very serious inconveniences" and make the matter one of contention.(1) We may be sure our friend obeyed.

As the autumn came and went, further fears of Anglo-French co-operation continued to appear in addition to those of Louis going once more marching into the Low Countries.(2) Both Spanish and Dutch still feared an English fleet might join the French in attacks on their territories and trade, though personally, Don Pedro was conservative in accepting these. To him, the grievances at Bantam were scarcely enough to start a war; the unity between Dutch and English/

(1) Consulta of 12th. Sept; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.
(2) Re border problems at Namur; 28th. Oct. (4); ibid.

/English Protestants would be a barrier to such action. James' own inclination was, moreover, to peace. He continued more generally concerning such rumours. "All this proceeds from apprehension, partly based on reason, partly on fear, and all from a fatalism which leads us to let ourselves be carried away by any suspicion whatsoever, though it be invented by our enemies. Thus we lose the ground we hold and do not gain any elsewhere."(1) This sense of uncertainty, fear and futility, was in turn infecting the friends of Spain in England, and as always, it demoralized and weakened those who entertained it.

Two days before Christmas, 1686, Don Pedro was able to send a copy of the commercial agreement between England and France; and also to report a conversation between James and himself. The King was still firm that he would condone no further French conquests in America (as in the Bay of Espirito Santo), and accepted the terms of the well-known Bull of Alexander VI to which the Spanish continued to cling. The agreement was not contrary, he said, to the treaties with Spain, but useful to all concerned, particularly in its restriction of pirates (See Trade); and even so, the French by themselves could accomplish little harm there. It was only designed to avoid smuggling between each other's colonies and to assure peace. Don Pedro had/countered/that the King might have these intentions but they were not expressed in the terms of the agreement/

(1) 28th. Oct. (2); ibid.

/agreement: all that was specified was absolute neutrality in America in the event of European hostilities between the two powers. And the ambassador closed his despatch: "It is certain that the point of neutrality is the most harmful in this treaty."(1) And most certainly it was, for in a struggle between the great powers, in which Spain hoped England would fulfil her obligations as an ally, it would be most harmful if in America, she just sat watching French marauders pillaging Spanish ports or capturing the silver fleets. Besides, the Treaty of Windsor had specified the protection of the whole Spanish Empire.

(1) 23rd. Dec; ibid 3963.

b.) The Ultimate Policy of Spain.

In short, during 1686, the strength of the French party had been progressively revealed, and slowly if not yet decisively, it was gaining ground in the Court. Spain wanted England and the rest of Europe to remain at peace for the present, but this was to allow James, as well as the other allies, to prepare for any struggle with France. Though not keen that any differences between James and Louis should lead to hostilities before James was really ready, she did not necessarily wish them settled and more especially, any arrangement between them which might in future hinder complete fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor. By this Anglo-French commercial agreement, she feared this had already been prejudiced.

As in 1685, however, the ultimate policy of Spain in England was not merely to "stop" France, but rather to win James' friendship and co-operation - though this necessarily had to include that more negative aspect as precedent and concomitant. Counteracting the French party was still Don Pedro's principal activity.

The hopes of confirming and revising the Treaty of Windsor practically faded away. Early in February, James said the time was not yet for this and also that he knew too the French party opposing this were trying to influence him. And Don Pedro was still mildly optimistic that James really wished the alliance's renewal.(1) Yet as the/

(1) Klopp, III, 187.

/the year went on, and the King was obviously touchy on discussing alliances, inevitably connected with the suspicions of his having a French one, our friend avoided the subject. In December, he makes first mention of the possibility of a Spanish-English commercial agreement, presumably to counteract the one concluded with France, but this evoked no response from the Consejo de Estado at the time.(1)

(1) 23rd. Dec. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.

c.) The Question of Anglo-Dutch Relations to Spain.

One important aspect of international relations in 1686 was the worsening of Anglo-Dutch relations. We have also noted in passing that it caused Don Pedro and his countryman increasing anxiety and that their general policy was to try to reconcile the father and son-in-law. However, the Spanish reaction does merit a closer examination here.

The way was not easy. James, often rather self-righteously, pointed to the constant irritations, real and supposed, from William and the Dutch. He might admit grudgingly their rather belated co-operation after the Monmouth rebellion, but he was annoyed at many of them for believing an arrangement existed between (see appendix) him and Louis. Out of his fear of annoying James, Ronquillo did not then urge closer co-operation with Holland though he felt that was the desideratum. He did, however, recommend James clarifying certain statements he had made in order to assure the Dutch, on the ground that fear of the King's intentions, particularly on religion, was at the root of most Netherland's' suspicion, and inevitably the ambassador's work in this aspect increasingly became trying to straighten out misunderstandings between James and William, rather than being able to press forward positive plans for united action.(1) One of these incidents illustrates many of the above points:

It/

(1) ibid.

It was in September that Orange refused to accept the Earl of Carlingford to head the English troops in Holland because he was a Roman Catholic. James, who had made the appointment, was highly displeased. In a conversation he told Don Pedro that by actions like this, the Prince of Orange was trying to make himself head of the Protestants, and that he also suspected the talks between William and the Elector. The maxims of his son-in-law were clearly erroneous as well: for, while he, James, was busy strengthening the authority of the Crown, to be passed in time to William, the Prince wished to come to terms with those who wanted to lessen it and stir them to a disunity which would be of the greatest damage to both, as well as the Common Cause. And Don Pedro says the King gave other reasons too.

Ronquillo did not feel he could excuse Orange's behaviour. Carlingford had a creditable record: he and his family had served Spain; besides, William had Catholics holding important posts in his own army. The Prince had also aided the disaffected in England. But that the two men and the two countries be on friendly terms was what mattered above all and others were talking to the ambassador on the need for a remedy. In general and in particular Don Pedro tried to persuade James not to close the door should the Prince knock at it, but the King was unbending and said William was very obstinate, that he wished his son-in-law would be persuaded that his (James') interests were his and Spain's as well. On mention by Ronquillo of the French perhaps taking

advantage of this discord, the King replied, "with a contemptuous gesture" that no one who was His Catholic Majesty's enemy could be anything but his, for they had the same interests.

Don Pedro had written to the Consul Belmonte, acting Spanish representative in the Hague, to work passively. But the person (unnamed!) who, according to our friend, could have had most influence with William refused to intercede, distrusting the Prince's stubbornness. And thus the ambassador was left pretty much to his own devices. But one thing was needful for Spain: she must not separate herself from either the Duke or James: James must be kept disapp roving French actions and feeling Louis could not really help him; and any suspicion that the League of Augsburg was a secret Protestant League aimed at him must also be effaced. In addition, Don Pedro would try to press forward the recruiting of 4,000 men for the army in Flanders as a favourable action which would show James' favour for Spain publicly.(1) The fearful Prince and his people would gain confidence in him from this, for it was an action they could not censor nor disapprove. "The English against the King, who are not republican fanatics, desire this at bottom and know it". And Don Pedro closed the despatch with a sentence that might sum up the spirit of his negotiations in 1686: "And finally, My Lord, in a case of this King's need, I do not know how he will be able not to call on France, unless the Dutch and ourselves assist him." To keep concord, or rather, as it happened, to lessen discord between the three powers had to be his policy; not to

(1) Van Citters said Orange's reaction to Carlingford's homination really sprang from fear, and that he was really a "moderate".

rouse France while keeping her separate from England was another facet of it. Only thus could there be any hope of a real future co-operation between England and Spain, and the other powers of the League of Augsburg, to successfully win back his country's lost territories and glory. Which side - the allies or France - had England's support was a leading factor.(1)

(1)30th Sept.(4); ibid.

d) Lesser Negotiations e.g. involving the Papacy etc.

There were, of course, the lesser negotiations as well which in turn reflect the main trends already outlined.

We can say something more particularly, for example, of Ronquillo's specific work to keep and encourage European peace for the present. That autumn of 1686, as so often before, the French were spreading the rumour "everywhere" that Spain desired war. In fact, however, she was trying to help forward a truce between the Austrians and Turks, and also backing up the Pope and James who hoped for and expected a general peace on the Continent. As already noted for 1685, Don Pedro saw the value of pro-Spanish Papal influence on the English King. Unity of effort between them as well as Spain might greatly forward the attainment of peace. Basing his opinion on experience he was against the presentation of many memoirs by many individual powers, each working for itself. Hence he advised Count Adda to advise the Pope to pass no offices for peace in Paris unless James had been consulted previously. For Spain's part, he told his own master the frontier defences must be readied, the Low Countries aided and the League of Augsburg well supported. This would help to make Louis reconsider waging war.

Generally speaking, however, Don Pedro concerned himself very little with continental problems that year, apart from mentioning occasional events and keeping an eye on Portuguese relations. This was probably because peace was preserved largely in turn because Louis desired it. (see Appendix)

e) The position and public opinion of Spain in England.

Such is the purely political aspect of Spanish - British relations. It can be said right away that Spain was slowly, though not decisively, losing ground before French pressure. But is there anything in Don Pedro's letters to show us the attitude to his country in the English streets, as well as the corridors of James' court ? Indeed there is. The Upper Class wanted peace and order and, naturally, with their trading interests, still strongly supported Spain. At one point that year the ambassador wrote, "How favorable the people are to us - " and how important it was that James should assure them that he had no partiality to France.(1) However, public anxiety regarding Catholicism both at home and abroad began to cast some shadow over this friendship. One incident of interest illustrates rather well the attitudes of the different classes towards Spain at the time.

In mid-September when news came of Buda's recapture by the Austrians, Ronquillo was still helping to represent the Emperor as no new ambassador had yet been sent to London from Vienna; he therefore received congratulations from all the most important ministers and people of the court. He also felt he must stage some celebration of the event - in contradistinction, he says, to what was happening in Paris. On Lady Day, just before the end of the month, he held a Mass and Te Deum in the Embassy chapel; the windows of Wild House were illuminated and bonfires in braziers were in the street outside; and many friends were present, including the Under-

(1) 27th May and 24th June(2); ibid(Ing)3961.(quote from latter.)

Secretary Bridgeman. Half an hour after the windows had been lighted up and when the ladies and gentlemen were sitting chatting, a mob appeared and started to stone the embassy, shouting that Buda was better in the hands of the Turks than of the Papists; and that now there were seven Protestant churches lost in the city. Don Pedro's family and those in the house "with more ardour than was suitable" wanted to join in the fracas but the ambassador would not let them for fear they "closed" with those not responsible and this gave motive for later reprisals. Before the King's Guards, infantry and cavalry, had appeared on the scene, friendly folk from round about had made the hooligans withdraw. The guests continued with their refreshments, so much the more necessary, Don Pedro says, so as not to show fear before the little crowd. "In this country the fire of daring is maintained so long as no resolution is shown." For the same reason, the celebration was repeated the next evening and this was made possible by a man "whom I haven't spoken to twice" giving the impoverished Don Pedro one hundred guineas. This time all was quiet; men of good quality and burghers were in the street and neighbourhood to punish any disturbers of the peace and ladies asked for violinists to escort them home "with which the rejoicing was complete".

The following day, honours to those who had fallen in the siege passed off peacefully. As for the incident, Ronquillo wrote that it had disgusted the middle class and both parties; the King had said it was aimed at him rather than Ronquillo and was planning the punishments to be meted out; and

and Protestants also disliked this type of occurrence since it (see Appendix) discredited their party.

Yet it supplied a warning that might have been more seriously taken, that there still existed among the lower classes those who principally saw in Spain the hated Catholic missionary and enemy. If the fear of Catholicism was to grow, in an emergency or cessation of law and order, here was a source of danger. Nonetheless, apart from these elements and the small pro-French party, the English by and large remained just as friendly to Spain in 1686. They thought politically rather than religiously and their fear of France was equal to any fear of Catholicism. Besides, they probably knew of Don Pedro's moderation in religious matters and that he was not to blame for much of the Catholic extremism they were so firmly beginning to oppose.

2. Domestic Affairs and the Spanish approach to them.

To separate domestic affairs from religious affairs in writing of the year 1686 is almost impossible but for sheer convenience we shall now divide them into two complementary sections. In the first those affairs more particularly touching governmental and justiciary processes will be dealt with; in the second those more absolutely religious. But the religious aspect - as already witnessed - was infecting everything more and more.

In the early months of the year there seemed to be no "prime minister". Don Pedro wrote in the beginning of February: "Today there is no prime minister; and it is necessary to attend on all, and much more, some who do not appear:" the shadow of little known and unofficial advisers of the King was at hand (1). Halifax had now fallen but Sunderland was still consolidating his power. With regard to Sunderland, though Don Pedro always tried to court the Earl and his opinion of him differed from time to time, generally and increasingly he considered him - pro-French. At one point, probably in exasperation, he wrote: "Sunderland es todo de Francia"; the ambassador also remarked on his influence growing with every day. Acting as protagonist for the Catholics, he secured their support; he also had that of the Queen who believed him responsible for the recent expulsion of her husband's lady friend, the Countess of Dorchester from the court. (see Appendix)

Sunderland himself seems to have been quite affable to Don Pedro. Nonetheless James took advice from many and this was what made it especially necessary for Don Pedro to be close at hand to oppose French efforts to

(1) 4th Feb.(4); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado(Ing) 3961.

control him and his policy.[1] Incidentally, in the autumn, the ambassador was apprehensive at the forcing out of Rochester, the last friend of Spain and Holland in the "Cabinet".[2]

Parliament did not meet that year. It was not dissolved but merely prorrogued from its intended meeting in February to May and again until November, when it still did not convene. In April, when the second prorrogation of the year was announced, Don Pedro expected James would be ableto join it by November, and he would venture all in it to get some final resolution. According to our friend, it was not the nature of the King to undertake what he could not probably carry through and James appeared confident of this once affairs in Scotland and Ireland were adjusted.[3] Don Pedro also felt the Scottish Parliament, if called, would be subservient. That, of course, he admitted, was difficult to promise, but stated that the royal dignity had always possessed more power in Scotland than in England.[4]

However, by thr end of September, there had been practically nothing attained north of the border and a meeting of the English Parliament was unlikely.[5] Early in October, it was definitely prorrogued again until February, 1687, and Ronquillo wrote that he had solicited this prorogation a great deal on the grounds that its "certain disorder" would make another session even more difficult to hold; besides it might make Louis pause to know of a Parliament possibly approaching which could unite with the King, who also was not so obedient to France as his brother Charles.[6]

(1) 12th Aug; ibid (also in B.M. Additions 34,502 (Mackintosh)f.65-9 and 77-8.
(2) 28th Oct.(2); ibid and Mackintosh p.95-6.
(3) Letter of Rimbold; 4th Mar; ibid; Ronquillo to Señor; 1st April(3);ibid.
(4) 18th Mar (2); ibid.
(5) 30th Sept(2); and (3); ibid.
(6) 14th Oct.(1); ibid.

As the autumn continued, Don Pedro was apparently quite aware that the King, to be strong and independent, needed more and more the funds that Parliament alone could grant. (see Appendix) Still he opposed its meeting, for if it failed, it would mean "a declared disunity and His Britannic Majesty forced not to call Parliament in many years and consequently to lose respect within and without his realm." James would then be without money to work with or to support his troops. In the event of war or to put down a revolt these would not be enough without aid which Spain could not send. This would provide France with her opportunity. Briefly Ronquillo desired a Parliament session but only if it could be a successful and harmonious one, which would demand preparation beforehand. In his opinion James would not resolve the leading questions of the Test and the oaths without Parliament if possible and was trying to preserve unity, though he would stand up for the royal prorogative. Such being the case, Don Pedro also felt that if James could abolish the Test etc. in the Lords, he would get 20-30 of his supporters in to pass this "as all confessed was legal". Meanwhile the ambassador asked the Council of State in Madrid for funds to help prepare for such a meeting presumably to promote any unity between James and the kingdom. This aid was agreed to but the amount not specified.(1)

What was Don Pedro's attitude to these actual problems of the year which were rousing so much discord ? As James aims, in short, he discussed to be 1) the abolition of the penal laws, as well as the Test in Parliament,

(1) Consulta of 9th. Jan. 1687 on letter of 9th. Dec. 1686; ibid (Ing) 3962.

2) the use of the dispensing power for Catholic officers, to show he had not been contravening the laws nor acting contrary to his word.(1) Ronquillo still favoured the gradual modification of the penal laws and the granting of liberty of conscience, but not the actual abolition of the Test as yet. Nothing must be done that was illegal or which would cause any reaction; and he hoped the rebuffs would make the King consider his steps more carefully. To have granted liberty of conscience at the beginning of the reign, he said, would have been relatively easy; and would probably have won Catholic, non-conformist, and even some Anglican support; but now it was fraught with difficulties. The Protestants, who had not been united but had desired liberty of conscience then, were now uniting against James with the result the kingdom was manifestly disunited. In particular, the Bishops were uniting with the Presbyterians and Ronquillo says the evil intentioned would be waiting to exchange liberty of conscience for the King's disposing power. The only way out was to try and "unscramble the egg" i.e. to try and disunite Anglicans and non-conformists, winning the non-conformists over. Some of these men still came to Don Pedro to get him to support Liberty of Conscience and the abolition of the penal laws and this he always would support tacitly at least.(2)

Regarding the disposing power, the ambassador felt that if and where it was legal, it must not be given up by James, for to do so would/

(1) 4th. Feb. (3); ibid, 3961.
(2) 21st. Jan. (1); ibid.
4th. Feb. (3); ibid.

/would be to fall back into the position of his grandfather, father and brother, and injure the realm's real domestic interests. Nonetheless as the year passed, he sincerely hoped James would appoint no more Catholic officers for the present to let matters settle down.(1) In particular the Bishops were uniting with the Presbyterians and Ronquillo says the evil-intentioned would be waiting to exchange liberty of conscience for the King's disposing power.

Ronquillo also reported in December how many Catholics did not wish to become Justices of the Peace despite James. The religion which is most observed in England being self-interest (according to Don Pedro) many, especially the Catholic gentry, feared what might befall them after James' death, and preferred to live in safer anonymity, leaving place seeking to the court. He also wrote: "It is certain that there are Whigs (which are the disaffected) who are also Catholics, passionate for English liberty and Magna Carta. And what is more when the people made the King issue it (the Charter), there were no Protestants". "But", he closes with his opinion "it is always good to have Catholic Justices of the Peace, for they will be sure in the case of a rebellion - - "(2)

This fear of a rebellion persisted as before for Don Pedro. He did not feel certain about James forcing matters in Scotland: a revolt might start there, and England would always follow its bad example,/

(1) 7th. Jan. (1); ibid.
4th. Feb. (3); ibid etc.
(2) 9th. Dec. (2); (from Consulta of 9th. Jan. 1687); ibid 3962.

/example, if not necessarily its good. Around him there were many signs of opposition to the King. Nonetheless certain forces were working against this possibility. Among the Catholics, several good men were restraining the stupid, and even some of the stupid were repenting of their less considered past resolutions, though they felt they must support these not to lose ground. The wise Protestants would not back it, for another rising might help James as much as Monmouth's rebellion had. But could they control the fury of the common people ? Still, Don Pedro doubted that rebellion was imminent, though he reported James to be in "a state of universal distrust" and inspecting his troops in case of emergency.(1)

Spain's policy, therefore, in domestic affairs, continued as before to be the support of union between King and Kingdom, and quietly that of James and the royal dignity provided he followed moderate counsels and the course of law. Ronquillo tried to please him and was willing to work - as in Parliaments - to clear all misunderstanding away between him and his people. For example, the ambassador feared the effect of James renewing friendship with the Countess of Dorchester, since it could discredit him and the Catholic religion.(2) But Don Pedro also tried to preserve good relations with others. In fact he wrote: "Never will I hold it convenient to our interests to enter into partialities for until now I have never seen more fruitfrom these than becoming/

(1) 27th. May; ibid 3961.
30th. Sept (3); ibid.
(2) 4th. Feb. (2); ibid.
2nd. Sept. (3); ibid.

/becoming disliked by all, losing credit and gaining the reputation of being a talebearer."(1)

Apart from this, our friend could accomplish little in negotiations that year in support of national unity, but now we at least know his reactions to the domestic affairs of 1686.

(1) 4th. Feb. (3); ibid.

3. The Religious Aspect.

The examination of the international and English domestic aspects of Spanish-British relations has already shown us Spain's general attitude on religious affairs in England. It continued to be a careful, moderate and moderating approach. Don Pedro's letters show marks of great discernment, balance and good sense, and though there were also things to which he was blind, it would have been well had James taken more advice from him in this sphere.

James had told Van Citters, as he had told Ronquillo several times before, that his only aim in religion was to let the Catholics have the same rights as his other subjects; that he had no thought of forcing the conscience of anyone, although he would be glad of course to see his religion embraced by his people. The first involved the repeal of the Test Act and the penal laws. The first Don Pedro approved of in theory but disagreed on how quickly it should be done in practice. The ambassador also completely agreed with the second, and was willing to encourage the peaceful Catholicising of Great Britain, but saw more clearly than James at least that, while many might favour Liberty of Conscience, people were fearful and suspicious of the King's motives and actions. A firm unvacillating unretreating moderation had always been for Don Pedro the ideal royal policy. Now the many signs of resistance to what he believed had been in many ways forced policy/

/policy were signs of warning, not necessarily to withdraw, but to go slow. Nor did such resistance appear to him, as to James, always motivated by disloyalty. And Don Pedro was very aware of the opposition. In April, he mentioned the Protestants' growing unity; that their churches had never been fuller and that fewer were attending the English sermons at his chapel.(1) He also faithfully reported the religious position in Scotland and Ireland.(2)

Ronquillo's view of the Catholics around the throne and elsewhere did not improve. As we have seen, he knew the inadequacy of many of them for political posts - self-interested, untrained and inefficient - basing opinions and decisions on politics on theoretical religious assumptions. Nonetheless he cultivated them, hoping to wean them away from their extremist and pro-French tendencies.(3) Disunity among Catholics could be extremely harmful, meeting as they were with increasing resistance and greater Protestant unity; and what was worse, it was already evident. The Benedictines were quarrelling with the Jesuits. In the Court, since the beginning of the year, a struggle had been running between clerics at the court as to who should be almoner to the Queen, with the Jesuit confessor of María de Modena stormily opposing the appointment of the King's almoner to the post. The Spanish government on hearing of this, got in touch with the General of the Society in Rome, asking him to discupline these members of/

(1) 1st. April (1) and (5); ibid.
(2) 18th. Mar. (2); ibid.
(3) 12th. Aug; Ronquillo to Bernaldo de Quirós; ibid. (also in B.M. Additions, 34, 502, f.65-9, 77-8).

/of his order, and to this he agreed, Their aim of course went deeper than that. The appointee, Bishop Leyburn, was personally more pleasing to them, not pro-French, and/who, in all probability, would prove a friendly and moderating force. Also Ronquillo was by no means satisfied with the behaviour of some others of the order. They formed the majority of the six to eight priests who held posts and favour with James, and they were obviously serving French interests. The rank and file of English Catholics might recognise what they had received from Spain "perpetuamente", but not having access to the Palace held little influence. And so, Don Pedro, besides urging the Spanish agent in Rome, Francisco Bernaldo de Quirós, to intercede on the matter of the confessor, also asked him to persuade the Jesuit General to get the local members to assist Spain and help keep James in the same disposition. In England meanwhile, Don Pedro had tried to keep well with them, recognising their power and that they were "the principal foundation for the teaching of our sacred religion". He granted them special preaching opportunities in his chapel and continued to husband the friendship of Father Neoport, the Provincial, whom he had known in Spain. (see appendix)

These were not the only steps taken by Don Pedro facing the problem. We have seen how he worked for co-operation between the Pope and James for European peace, trusting to papal influence with the King. Here/

Here he advocated first of all Spain's courting the favour of Castlemaine, James's representative at Rome. The Pope himself should also be got to try and persuade the English envoy how much English-Spanish friendship mattered. Count Adda could also do the same with James, for, he said, neither the King nor even Sunderland, despite his French proclivities, would despise what Innocent or Adda advised. In London, Don Pedro continued to work very closely with the Court, trying to control the King and Catholic clergy. There continued as before to be reciprocity of feeling and action in this relationship, in the continued question of whether Adda should be declared official nuncio. James went on pressing for this but the Papal envoy was hedging cautiously, bringing up repeated points that demanded reference to Rome. That April, however, he definitely became a foreign envoy, though keeping his secular habit so that he might preserve, says Don Pedro, "that universal acceptance acquired since entering this Court." "But", continues the ambassador, now in cipher, "I am not convinced this King will rest until he is openly declared nuncio with manifestations that perhaps risk more than they assure the establishment of the Catholic Religion."(1)

In these circumstances, with the French using religion as a weapon against Spain, and Innocent favouring her, we see why, apart from all the religious considerations of Gallicanism, Don Pedro keenly supported the/

(1) 1st. April (4); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid - quotation.
(also 5th. April; Ronquillo to Bernaldo de Quirós; as above.)

/the Papal "prerogative of sole and absolute vicar of Christ."(1) Yet French extremist influences continued, if not yet decisively, to win favour in Catholic circles at the English court. The advice of the Papacy and the moderates among them including Don Pedro's, went largely unhindered, and James' relations with Pope Innocent did not improve.(2)

We can, in the light of the above, say that the Spanish government and the Spanish ambassador discerned the actual state of affairs in Britain, and the proper general policy towards it. They disapproved of any policy that might smack of what Louis was carrying out in France. They realised also that as long as the religious problem remained unsettled, no Englishman whatever his other feelings were, would think of coming to Spain's aid.(3) But that is not to say Ronquillo saw everything clearly.

In the first place, Don Pedro did not see that any Catholicising of Great Britain was anathema to the great majority of the inhabitants: he underestimated the latent and active power of Protestantism in the country. To him, and naturally enough, the eventual bringing of Britain back to the Roman fold, was something to be desired and worked towards, whereas this, even by more peaceful proselytising, was hateful to the majority. His more authoritarian and Catholic spirit was not at one with his surroundings. Hence, he agreed with, inaugurated and supported certain actions in matters of religion, not quite seeing that

they/

(1) 5th. April; Ronquillo to Bernaldo de Quirós; (as above)
(2) 24th. June (1); Ronquillo to Senor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.
(3) 2nd. Sept. (2); ibid.

/they helped to increase the disunity and discord in the country and its opposition to James and Catholicism.

Don Pedro, in spite of his prudence, rejoiced in the conversions.(1) Though condemning the re-established ecclesiastical commission,(2) he advocated the suppression of certain religious books.(3) The ambassador was glad to see the converted Dr. Walker allowed to continue as Master of University College, Oxford.(4) He anticipated the convenience of Catholic schools under the Fathers for bringing about unity of doctrine among the faithful more clearly than the opposition to which they gave rise. (see appendix) As we have already seen, he felt it a good [redacted] to have Catholic Justices of the Peace who would be faithful to James in a rebellion, forgetting once again the general impression caused by this. All along, Don Pedro recommended the King following the law to the letter though with moderation in carrying it out (as with the dispensing power. But in summing up, we might say he did not take its spirit sufficiently into consideration; he never seemed to see that packing Parliaments and Courts to get favourable decisions was not really legal or good policy; that taking every opportunity, not actually forbidden, to encourage Catholicism was unwise.

Perhaps the most concrete example of the last point was his own action regarding the Spanish chapel. Having easily got James' permission to have sermons in it - an unheard of thing since Reformation times/

(1) 21st. Jan. (3), 18th. Mar. (2), and 27th. May; ibid.
(2) 28th. Oct. (2); ibid.
(3) 1st. April (5); ibid and 27th. May; ibid.
(4) 18th. Mar. (2).

/times - he instituted three a week, two in English and one in French. There were also masses daily and catechism classes for the young and old. (see appendix) All this he did at considerable financial sacrifice. He did not however hold his Corpus Christi outside his embassy. Nonetheless, the common people of London watched and Wild House became known as a leading "mass house". When the Palatine minister's chapel was attacked that year, Don Pedro merely felt that the small disorder would assure quiet in future since the English people desired peace.(1)

Cautious, subtle, sometimes very wise, it seems sometimes that his reason was carried away by his own strong Catholic feeling. Often in his letters, after criticising some step of James' religious policy, he passes to glorying in the holy end in a way that always recalls to the writer the words of William Cowper:-

"God moves in a mysterious way
His wonders to perform."

And here is an example: After speaking of the mistakes of the Catholic party he continues:

"And thus I confess to Your Majesty that every day I am firmer in the belief that God, our Lord, wishes blunders to be committed that the advantages our Sacred Religion shall receive shall be completely due to His divine wisdom, and I find the King always in this opinion and in such firmness of desire to advance our Holy Faith that he deprecates the great consideration of not having sons which causes such/

(1) 1st. April (5); ibid 3961.
15th. April (1); ibid.

/such anxiety, and trusts that God will aid him in his cause as he desires."(1)

This almost mystical attitude and religious fervour, coupled with Spanish authoritarianism, perhaps blurred somewhat the ambassador's clarity of vision, but in truth, it has infected his letters with a particular interest and attractiveness not found, for example, in the more accurate despatches of Hoffman.

(1) 27th. May; ibid.

4. The Personal Aspect and General Summing-Up.

For Don Pedro Ronquillo as an individual, 1686, like the years before it, had its full budget of financial difficulties and ill-health. Worthy of note in particular is how this restricted his activity on his country's behalf, probably to its hurt. When he was trying to find out the details of any Franco-British agreements in April, he had to write:

"I am still in anxiety to know what is being discussed on the dependencies in America, but Your Majesty must not depend on this more than on the little a lame man can walk and how useless are the instances of this most miserable minister of Princes."(1)

In the same vein that autumn, he wrote looking to the future:

"How can one serve who contemplates a prison to which he must pass and from there to a heretic cemetery where they will bury me."(2)

One gathers, however, that the ambassador's financial position more than his health affected his work.

But to speak first of his health. Early in the year in January, Don Pedro himself definitely felt that his illness had harmed Spanish interests. There is mention of sores in his mouth that hindered his speaking, and the usual gout as the year proceeded. He wrote of how his years, habitual indispositions and bad convalescence did not allow him to attend at the palace and elsewhere at all hours as was necessary./

(1) 1st. April (2); ibid.
(2) 28th. October (4); ibid.

/necessary. But he recognised, as he had before, the truth that financial worries contributed very greatly to his melancholy and physical condition. To be unable to follow up negotiations on account of lack of money had always worried him greatly. To this was added that, to do what he could took "ten times" more work than hitherto, for now he had to visit ministers and private individuals, rather than invite them to his house. Though, he admits, they received him well, yet not with that former confidence and intimacy. All this must have fatigued our friend. Nonetheless, it can be said that by comparison with other times, his health was better than it often was. (see appendix)

Ronquillo's financial position was one of "absoluto abandono" by Spain, in which he could not live a zealous servant of his master nor "an honourable hidalgo of Old Castile." By the end of the year, his salary in arrears amounted to 114,000 escudos, and throughout it, his financial difficulties seem to have grown increasingly bad. Effective aid does not appear to have arrived despite grants from the Council of State or its orders to Castanaga to supply Don Pedro with funds. (see appendix)

How specifically, did all this restrict the effectiveness of his mission ? We have just seen how the inability to entertain English ministers affected his day to day activities. Meanwhile, Barillon was entertaining that spring more than usual. Ronquillo lamented then that he did not have a hundred guineas to risk on some enterprise./

/enterprise. The French were gaining advantages and he said he could gain similar with half the amount which, spent now, might save money on possible wars etc. later. That Don Pedro was still an expert in husbanding even the little he had is evident. His "threats and promises" had got him the "Paper" ostensibly presented by French agents to James - though just after, lack of money prevented his return to Windsor. Hoping for a grant of 3,000 doubloons to arrive from Spain, he said he would not refuse some expense to get information on the Franco-British commercial agreement. He still seems to have had his confidants. At any rate, there was Rimbold, official "confidente" of the Embassy, a Catholic ex-English Consul at Cadiz. No Parliament meeting required funds for its manipulation, but in December, in anticipation, Don Pedro asked these. The request was granted, amount unspecified, but the opportunity was not to arise. In fact, though our friend made a very good fight with what he had, financial lack undoubtedly restricted his activity and influence, and in general plagued his daily life. It is difficult to surmise what he might have attained with more funds, but certainly Spain's influence in Britain would have been greater.

(see appendix)

1. Political - International.

a.) Before Dijkveld's Visit.

In 1686, domestic and religious affairs became so intermingled as to become scarcely distinguishable. The same trend continued in 1687. What is more, those domestic-religious affairs entered the international field. All Western Europe at least grew increasingly interested in what James was goind in his Kingdom. At the time, the ordinary person rarely thought of Britain and the European situation and in fact political Spanish-British Relations without considering the domestic and religious position in the Islands. This unity must never be forgotten. Nonetheless, the writer can create divisions which, while artificial, do make the detailed subject matter more manageable and perhaps more readily understandable and able to be found. So let us proceed to Don Pedro's mission and Spanish-British relations for that year, in the international aspect first of all.

The policy of Spain and its envoy in London did not change from what it had been previously. Its cornerstone was still opposition to France, which meant in practice attempting to reduce French influence and win James, with British public opinion, over to support of Spain and the new League of Augsburg. James, as a Catholic, she still preferred on the throne, but unity with his people was necessary before the country's participation in any alliance could be fulfilled. Any rift/

/rift between James and the Spaniard's' ally William of Orange must be prevented if possible. But above all, France must be stopped and that factor outweighed in the ultimate analysis, all fears, preferences or prejudices.

Ronquillo's relation to James remained close but careful. The King discussed many things with him and Don Pedro answered frankly, but cautiously, "speaking only when spoken to." Though naturally finding his friends among the anti-French, even if anti-Dutch, elements around the throne, he made considerable sacrifices of his own opinion (as we shall see in considering domestic affairs) to help the King and national unity under his leadership. Perhaps the ambassador gave the King too many chances to deceive him, but he was after all delegated to try and oblige James. By that time, French influence at the Court was so strong that Don Pedro feared anything that might drive him into Louis' hands. He also realised the smallness and weakness of the King's party; and to whom would James turn but France if not supported by Spain and if possible Holland ? Then there was the fear of open rebellion. Who at that time could tell that William was to lead it ? There still remained in the background the feeling that James might still be the chosen vessel for the reconversion of Britain. Nonetheless, the ambassador never knowingly abetted any pro-French leanings in James for any religious or other reason; his policy/

was instead a constant attempt to restrain these and stimulate the King's good feelings towards Spain and always in a friendly manner. For example, Don Pedro went out of his way to oblige James' son, the young Duke of Berwick, who had already been on the Eastern Front serving the House of Austria against the Turks. Personal relations between the ambassador and the royal family continued intimate; the way was thereby kept open to "the King's ear". Ronquillo still could say that his position at James II's court was better than it had been at that of Charles II. (see Appendix).

Suspicion of Louis' aims and actions continued to be paramount with Don Pedro Ronquillo. Those winter and spring months of 1687 there was much discussion over the French King's truing to get the 20 year Truce of Ratisbon transformed into a Peace. Our friend felt such an agreement mattered little for Louis was just as unfaithful as ever and the French were saying "what they always tell us". In January and February he was afraid, not like so many, of Louis attacking the Empire or the Dutch, but of his attacking the Low Countries; that the settling of the Namur question had just been to deceive all, in particular the Pope, into ceasing to support peace on the Eastern Front, which Spain felt was essential to restraining France in the west. Don Pedro feared the question might cause a rift in the powers including the Papacy, already in opposition to France. He was also apprehensive of James following any mistaken Papal

decision, or vice-versa, for their relationship had its danger as well as its opportunities.(1)

The ambassador had still not been able to verify any of the supposed alliances between James and Louis. Despite the efforts of some to injure Anglo-Austrian relations over a question of the period of mourning for the Empress at the English Court, Mulgrave, Berwick and Carlingford, with Ronquillo, had managed to avoid that. The incident showed that the House of Austria still had its friends at the Court and James himself was still confidential with Don Pedro, for example giving him information on La Salle's discoveries and French activities in America.(2)

Relations between England and Holland were what gave our friend the greatest anxiety and the most work. The Consejo de Estado wished indifference at least between James and William, but then views diverged. Basically Don Pedro felt James must not either alter the succession or side with France for the Prince could take advantage of this. But suspicions of these did exist and Don Pedro's task was therefore to straighten out the resulting misunderstandings. He himself did not believe that James, on his own, would do either of these things but knew that this must be made clear to William. James must in fact show his position. But what positive steps could he take ?

Ronquillo had been, as we have seen, eager for recruiting in England for the English forces in Flanders. Like the anti-French but

(1) 3rd Feb; ibid.
(2) 20th Jan (1); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid.
20th Jan (4); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

but not pro-Dutch party at Court, he felt the King could thus be held in the policy of independence and indirect support of Spain. He therefore continued to work for this. The Dutch emissary, Dijkveld, in one of his conversations in London with Ronquillo in late June, also supported this plan of recruitment. His reasons were that it was generally popular and could be quite easily introduced. And, apart from the actual troops utility, the English regiment in Holland, which were rousing so much suspicion in James, could be added. This last step would remove one of the handles of the French party for influencing the King, whom Dijkveld still considered untied to France. Though orders had already been given in late April for the recruiting with the first funds sent to Flanders, we hear nothing more of it in the correspondence. At any rate, the delay itself showed Spain's powerlessness and James would be unlikely to choose to depend on such a weak ally.(1)

(1) 6th Jan; ibid. 31st Mar(3); ibid. 7th July(3); ibid.

b) Dijkveld's visit.

The most important diplomatic event in England during the first six months of 1687 was the visit of Everard van Weede van Dijkveld, who came to see and report to William the English situation. Don Pedro Ronquillo hoped and did all he could to see that this visit would lead to better relations between the King and the Prince. It was natural that Don Pedro, with his position and long experience in London, should be consulted by the Dutch envoy and he himself took full advantage of it. At the very beginning of the visit he wrote, "Up till now I have had no scruple in having exceeded the office of mediator according to Your Majesty's orders."(1)

Even before Dijkveld arrived, our friend was trying to smooth out a hitch connected with that; James, not wanting to receive the envoy until the Marquis of Albyville had been received in The Hague. However, William soon straightened this out to the King's satisfaction (and to the annoyance of the French, said Don Pedro, at seeing the two men agree)(2). Then the visit started in earnest.

The Dutch envoy and his Master wanted to assure themselves on roughly three points concerning the English situation: (1) On James' relationship to France; (2) On his attitude to the succession, and (3) his domestic and religious policy. The Prince hoped the first was as divided as possible; as regards the second, being husband to the heir, he wished no change made by James. As to the last point, he was quite willing to agree to Parliament

(1) 3rd Mar; ibid.
(2) ibid.

granting a general toleration, but in general he did not favour the abolition of the Test Act or the other penalties to Catholics. Dijkvelt himself was described by Don Pedro as "suspicious, not very fond of Catholics and very proud of his own opinion and credit in his native land" and as one who "apprehends more than he ought."(1) With that the stage was set for negotiations.

So let us now follow the relevant despatches of Ronquillo chronologically but in such a way that they show how opinions and actions evolved on these three points.

Negotiations did not really get under way until about March 20th due to Dijkveld's being indisposed. However, on the evening of the 15th, James and Ronquillo conferred. The King, among other things, told him how he looked on William as a son and therefore was in favour of friendship. He said that in the next interview he was to have with Dijkveld he would tell the envoy to tell William that the kingdom could not peacefully be possessed by him while he did not approve James' internal policy, which was only opposed by those who wished to have done with the monarchy altogether. Don Pedro recognised that the King spoke to him with sincerity and gave the opinion that if Dijkveld saw James was not out to change the succession, all would be settled. This was reported in the letter of March 17th.(2)

On March 31st, he wrote of having spoken to Dijkveld despite his own melancholy (due as so often to lack of money). At this point, Dijkveld

(1)26th May; Ronquillo to Señor; B.M.Add.34,502 f.72-6, 80-2.
(2)17th March (5); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado(Ing)3962.

was fearful of the Roman Catholics causing a revolt despite the law of succession and their being pro-French on William's probable accession to the throne. He was particularly apprehensive of the Jesuits but said his suspicions would ease if they were pro-Spanish like they used to be. Don Pedro tries to reassure him as he had before on this . The ambassador also wrote of his own feelings on affairs; that the Declaration of Indulgence, about to be issued, would appease William's fears somewhat, and show England itself that James was not French-inclined. As for the Dutch, he thought they now - like the Spanish - saw the need for not stirring up the disaffected but for friendship with the King. While Don Pedro did not wish them more influence than his own country in England, he was ready to help them become trusted by James to avoid the greater evil of the King turning to Louis. Spain, he said, was also seen as necessary to counterpoise France, even though little was thought of her strength. (1)

At this point, for immediate purposes, a little clarification must be given on the Spanish attitude to the abolition of the Test Act, a point to be treated in detail later on. Ever since the beginning of the year, James had been preparing for a Parliament in which to abolish the Test Act, and Don Pedro had been supporting this, though it is certain he would not push it at the risk of splitting the country. The Declaration of Indulgence he approved, but still supported the idea of James getting Parliament to permanently repeal the abolition of the penal laws against Catholics. As we know, the abolition of the Test itself was not so

(1)31st Mar (3); ibid.

important to him but he felt it worse to stand aside and perhaps drive James into French hands. It was his considered opinion that the longer he could stay at the King's side as a moderating influence, the better.

On 28th April Ronquillo reported the Dutch envoy appeared not so fearful of any secret union between England and France or of all Jesuits and Catholics being pro-French. If Liberty of Conscience was declared and enforced, how could there be an agreement with Louis who had so recently revoked the Edict of Nantes ? James in an interview also reassured Don Pedro on these points and encouraged him to speak to Dijkvelt. Ronquillo did not go immediately for he knew many of the Dutchman's apprehensions had already been put at rest, or were being so. However, he met him at the Palace by chance and Dijkveld was in haste to know of Don Pedro's talk with James as the mail for Holland was soon being sent off. Ronquillo told him little and Dijkveld was keen to see him again to discuss matters that concerned his master. But the Spaniard continued to avoid him, feeling it better "to be sought out rather than to seek out". In closing the despatch, he hoped in God that with a little time and patience Orange and the Estates might be reassured on the position and that the French might not take advantage of the bad relations with James to gain control over him. And particularly would this be so if his own master would take some step on which the English monarch could depend.(1)

No further mention is made of the visit or visitor in the letters I have seen until two despatches of May 26th. In the first letter Ronquillo

(1)28th April(2); ibid.

wrote that Dijkveld's suspicion of James had been reduced - through circumstances, and, in part, Don Pedro's own work - to that of the French at court. The envoy was also mentioned as being pleased that Liberty of Conscience favoured the Presbyterians. And, as a result, Dijkveld had written a satisfactory letter to William "although much pricked by the intimacy between the Earl of Sunderland and the French ambassador".(1)

The second letter is much fuller and more informative and is the one used by Mackintosh. It would seem to have been written later, perhaps nearer the date of despatch than the first. After ten days of not discussing matters with Dijkveld, Don Pedro encountered him excited over the point of Liberty of Conscience. Malcontents had evidently been at work for now the Dutchman was against the Declaration. He said that some Anglicans had told him in secret that after James' death, if these plans in religion were carried out, England would become a republic; moreover, one Catholic personage had insinuated this as a threat. All this would be even more harmful to the Estates than to Spain; and the Dutchman spoke as if he were recounting what was already established fact. Don Pedro says he was glad to see him like this without his usual other reasons, for it meant he would not disagree with him, that no measures should be taken then - for "so remote an event". The Spaniard went on to explain why the event would be remote, that it would take the years necessary in the time of Charles

(1) 26th May (1); ibid.

I and other measures which now they could not anticipate. Then probing deeper, he asked Dijkveld for details of what had made him change his mind. Dijkveld replied that it was those Anglicans who have "revealed" this to him. Ronquillo thtereupon took up his argument in earnest. The "revelation" was openly declared by all the Anglicans, he said. It might be a pity about the suspension of the Test And Oates but it was irremediable. The Anglicans had forced the Resolution on Liberty of Conscience by opposing the revocation of the Test. Nothing could establish James' authority like constancy in his resolutions, for to give ground might reduce him to the fatal end of his father, Charles I, or the abject position of his brother, Charles II. He - Ronquillo - knew the King hated fanatics and was inclined towards those Anglicans who were for the monarchy and ready to agree to Liberty of Conscience, provided the King would guarantee their present position. In fact, to prove this, James was now soliciting the present Parliament instead of dissolving it and having a new Presbyterian one elected. Though the Dutch envoy wanted Ronquillo to go on speaking, the Spaniard desisted because he told him frankly that he did not feel Dijkveld believed him. To himself, Don Pedro, felt Dijkveld could now verify what he had said and return later to be assisted with a freedom the Dutchman did not think him capable of.

Ronquillo's advice was not to doubt the firmness of England; his opinion, that if James was moderate on the point of religion the States would support him in any rebellion.

The ambassador told James of all his interviews and he noted a general appeasement between the King and the Dutch. Distrust of the French connection - Dijkveld was still only worried by the adherence of the Court to France - had also been set at rest by James' declaration when a guarantee of the Treaties had been proposed recently. Also in a conference in this James had told the Dutch envoy he hoped France would agree to the Spanish and Dutch memorials on the subject, which he approved as he did the attitude taken by Vienna. Dijkveld had replied that if France opposed these, it meant she would attack the Low Countries - to which the King said that in that case he would call Parliament and get money for war.

Lastly Ronquillo hoped Dijkveld would pay more attention to his views now. And James, he wrote, was recognising "the truth and sincerity" with which Don Pedro spoke to him because he knew a good understanding between England, Spain and the States-General was essential. (see Appendix)

The last mention I have found of Dijkveld's visit in the correspondence of Ronquillo examined, is in a letter of 7th July from Windsor. On arrival there, Don Pedro had found James extremely annoyed at Orange and the States. Dijkveld was now against the abolition of the Test and oaths as injuring the Prerogative. In addition, it had been reported to James Dijkveld's saying in a conversation that he had gained many Lords for Orange's party. Don Pedro having tracked down this matter, understood that the leaders of the opposition to the Court had resented this remark

and had said Dijkveld believed what he wanted not what was suitable for making himself plausible with the Prince. For indeed this Party while against the abolition of the Test supported the legitimate succession, remembering that Shaftesbury's supporters had lost all through trying to change it. Don Pedro then interspersed his view: "The Legitimate Succession will always prevail to the extent that if the King were to have a son, the whole Kingdom would be for him even though he was a Catholic." James had told Dijkveld this in order to calm him and a more "neutral" policy had been followed by the envoy. With regard to the first point of religious policy, Ronquillo also informed the Dutchman that there was no middle party, that all consisted in either being for or against the abolition of the Test. But he was dubious whether Dijkveld's self-esteem had permitted him to accept this.

Yet Don Pedro felt the envoy was returning to Holland very well informed. Dijkveld now did not think there was a French alliance or that James was inclined to France. However, Ronquillo feared that the King's well-intentioned decision could be sabotaged by the pro-French around him. At this point he gave his before-mentioned opinion on the tercios for Flanders as a means of separating James from France and smoothing his relations with Holland. But Ronquillo himself felt now, religion would in future continue to cause suspicion between James and William and hinder their having close relations. This being so, he thought the most reasonable position for William and the States-General to take up would be to maintain a passive attitude on the point of the

Test so the French could not take advantage of this to disturb their relations with James (1).

What can now be said in commenting on these letters, considering also what Mackintosh has said on Don Pedro's account of Dijkveld's visit ?

Firstly, is any more light shed on why Dijkveld concurred for a time with James' measures on liberty of conscience ? It should be said that there were many differing shades of opinion on James' proposed religious policy. We have already noted and will note again Don Pedro's attitude, supporting the King, hoping to be a moderating force and wanting the steps to be made legal, even though he might not fully approve the policy. For matters had come to such a pass that some step must be taken. A Parliament that would pass the abolition of the Test and oaths, thus sealing the King's Declaration of Indulgence, might bring that unity which Spain wished to see in Britain; it might also favour the establishment of the Catholic Religion. The actual Declaration itself might again prove to the Dutch that James had no agreement with France. It is quite likely Ronquillo and Count Kaunitz won Dijkvelt over to such a moderate opinion which was theirs - if not to full support of James' policy. But then, were Dijkveld's orders that spring so resolutely against any compromise on the point ? After all, one of the reasons for his visit was to ameliorate relations between James and William. But that leads us to fields outside our province.

Mackintosh also mentions James offering to join the confederacy

(1)7th July (3); Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado (Ing)3962.

upon the condition of William assenting ot the removal of the Test; and that the Spanish and Imperial ambassadors must have felt it "a most reasonable overture and urged its acceptance." No doubt they would and did - though the matter is not mentioned in any letters of Ronquillo I have seen. Then Mackintosh continues "By what arguments or promises, by what exercise of his authority or address, the Prince reconciled his Catholic confederates to his refusal has not appeared." I think the answer is quite simple. The attitude of Ronquillo and the Austrians to the revocation of the Test and James' other plans for religion was by no means so fixed as Mackintosh must have felt. This we will see later. Then, in the general atmosphere of the time, the political was a very much more important consideration, than the religious. An arrangement on such terms might only give rise to trouble and, besides, there might be other ways of attracting James over to the Confederacy. More important, William was now the acknowledged leader of the League of Augsburg and neither Spain nor the Emperor were going to break up its unity on a point like this. How could they know that their not-so-strong influence would make William agree ? How could they know that James would carry out such a promise ? And assuredly they were not going to do anything to weaken the League built up with such difficulty over a matter of religion, which Don Pedro and others constantly feared as a divisive force.(1)

(1) Mackintosh, p.388.

Anglo-Dutch relations did not seem by any means on the verge of breaking as yet. There might be the suspicions on both sides; there might also be trading disputes. The French party might be using the complaints against the English exiles in Holland to stir up trouble. Don Pedro himself disliked the "dangerous correspondence" these men maintained with people at home, mentioning in particular a Doctor "Bornet" (Burnett), a Scotsman, terrible in spirit and with the pen." But there were counter factors apart from any reassurance of the Dijkveld visit and that both James and William wanted peace. Most important, while a few in England were keen for a break with Holland, the royal income, even with Louis' aid, would not be enough for that war without the help of Parliament. And such assistance for such an aim was practically out of the question.(1)

(1) 21st July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
21st July (3); ibid.

c) The Question of the European Treaties.

Of course, during those months of Dijkveld's visit, there were other important negotiations that engaged Ronquillo's attention in London. There was, for example, the question of guaranteeing the Truce of Ratisbon. That the Truce might be made into a Peace seemed impracticable but that it might be "guaranteed" seemed feasible. In the early months of the year, memoirs were being exchanged between the Emperor and France through the former's representative in Paris, the Prince von Lobkowitz; the Spanish and Dutch were also interested observers. Don Pedro himself was profoundly suspicious. In principle he was against "further writing or treaties"; if matters were to be settled, all should be settled. At present success in the East and trying to assure one's position for war seemed to him the best guarantee. James, however, appeared favourable to the idea and Louis had sent encouraging replies to Vienna. Ronquillo, to preserve allied unity and perhaps to involve James more in European affair s, took the matter up. Both he and the new Austrian minister, Count Kaunitz, first carefully "sounded" the ground on James' attitude. They were especially encouraged by Sunderland's support. On the strength of this, they presented memoirs with the result that the English Council itself agreed to send a memoir to Paris. Don Pedro had gone ahead without orders from Spain: he knew such a guarantee would not guarantee the Treaty of Windsor but he felt the plan would give more hope of peace in Europe and if Louis

refused the proposals, James would still maintain his friendship with the House of Austria and France would be unable to alter this. However, Louis' reply in June was most unsatisfactory, the matter gradually dissolved and Ronquillo was censured by Madrid as having acted too hastily and was ordered to await the logic of events.(1)

(1) 17th Mar.(4); ibid. 17th Mar(6); ibid (re Kaunitz). 14th April (1); ibid. 26th May (2); ibid (with memoirs of 9/19 May).

d) Spain against France in England with the question of Spanish-British Treaties.

Spain continued of course to try and disturb Anglo-French relations. Despite the recent agreement between England and France of 1686, James had reason to complain to Louis that spring of French actions in Hudson's Bay. Bonrepaux was coming over to act with Barillon as commissioners for settlement. Don Pedro immediately visited James to see if there was any word of a new treaty and to point out how unfaithful the French had proved. The King replied he would make no new treaties and was going to be very firm with Bonrepaux in the French proceedings.(1)

There is no mention until August of Spain renewing the more positive policy of opposition to France by strengthening her own treaty ties with England. The question of renewing the Treaty of Windsor itself appears to have been dropped. But in August the Consejo de Estado decided to follow the opinion of Ronquillo and the Council of the Indies, who had been studying the Franco-British colonial and commercial agreement concluded the year before, and favoured the conclusion of a treaty of neutrality with England to counteract it. Don Pedro was first ordered to pass offices on the offensive points in the agreement of 1686 and how it contravened the Treaty of Windsor - primarily to see what James would answer. The second possibility was to get another treaty concluded. However, we hear no more of this treaty of neutrality negotiation.(2)

(1) 28th April (3); ibid.
(2) Consulta of 16th August; ibid.

e) Autumn 1687.

The autumn of 1687 arrived. Fear of the usual variety continued to rise and fall. Though Don Pedro still did not feel James had any pact with Louis, he did not deny the possibility and now had to admit that there were good relations between the two Kings. But he bewailed the fact of being unable financially to ascertain the true facts. (see Appendix)

In September William's refusal to approve the abolition of the Test in England or to receive English Catholics into his army helped widen the breach between him and James - to the anxiety of Don Pedro. The ambassador felt these declarations of the Prince were the "greatest blow the King of England could have received" not only for the present state of the Catholic religion because they cut across all his measures towards this end, but also to the tranquillity of the realm." James was now feeling he had done all he could to forget the Dutch moves against him in the past. And to Ronquillo, the Dutch, suspecting James of being allied with Louis (as Don Pedro did not), were driving the King into this very thing by their actions. James was also alarmed, he said, by rumours of William's forming a Protestant League against him. The Spaniard recognised the seriousness of the situation and advised Madrid to a policy of Indiferencia: meantime he would pass no public instances for fear of inflaming the situation further.

By no means should Spain complicate matters by championing a Catholic League. The most August House (which would be its principal

member) was in poor shape to support it in England. If things had been different, Spain might have been able to separate James from France by her power and authority and reduce him and the Dutch to reason. Whereas, in fact, France would urge the King beyond what was convenient "to make this fire the more inextinguishable." The Consejo de Estado ordered their new ambassador in the Hague, Manuel Coloma, to point out to William the need for unity with James, to avoid Louis' intervention. They also agreed regarding any Catholic League, the Constable saying that Louis would just cause havoc in it if it was made. (see Appendix)

Late in November a piece of very domestic news from London began to cause many surmises in international circles, for it was of international importance; the pregnancy of Queen María de Modena. Ronquillo reported it in extraordinarily intimate detail from then on; and felt, despite what was being said about the approaching event, that the birth of a Prince of Wales "would move many to consider more than twice the opposite to what they say today." Indeed an heir might prove a focus for antional unity. But María had had miscarriages previously and James was anxious about the future of any son of his. And so the story passes on to the affairs of 1688. (see Appendix).

2. Spanish Policy and the Domestic Situation.

Whether there would be a meeting of Parliament in 1687 continued to be a leading domestic question. Of even greater moment was what it would discuss - namely the political-religious matter of the Test and Oaths. In all this, Ronquillo's policy was very controlled, both by himself as well as other factors. Personally the ambassador felt caution was his wisest plan in the domestic field. He did not express the views he held to anyone for fear they pass them on to James. As to his own conferences with the King, he wrote in early January: "In all that touches his domestic dependencies, I maintain myself so passively that I never speak to him of them unless by way of reply, and then I do not bring up more points than those on which he speaks to me."(1) But that passivity did not involve absence of opinion or positive activity.

In January, the Parliament was further prorogued until early May. Ronquillo was of the opinion then, that should James be unsuccessful in securing the abolition of the Test and Oaths by this means, he would issue an Edict of Liberty of Conscience "like his brother, the revocation of which was the ruin of (Charles') interest."(2) Don Pedro was determined to aid James in his aim of Parliamentary abolition of these laws, as the only possible way out of an impossible position to obtain national unity. He saw however, how necessary it was that the/

(1) 6th. Jan; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
(2) 20th. Jan. (3); ibid.

/the methods employed for attaining this should be legal; and hence bent his efforts to help James prepare a favourable Parliament. But he was by no means certain of any session's success. Of his motives and policy, Don Pedro wrote to his master:

"I will not deny to Your Majesty that I apply myself much in the interest of unity between this King and his Kingdom by the only way available - the abolition of the Text; not only through this being to the greater service of God, but because this unity, once established, one could work with good heart towards that of Your Majesty with this King in any undertaking, and get out of our present position of conducting all negotiations against an alliance with France."(1)

In February, James told Don Pedro that such a Parliament was necessary before he could think of entering European politics in earnest - an oft told tale - but he permitted Ronquillo to urge national unity on the M.Ps. on this promise; and this the ambassador began to do.(2) Even though by March the King was on the verge of issuing his Declaration of Indulgence, he still seemed determined to have Parliament meet to formally abolish the Text and Oaths. Don Pedro hoped he would, to fully establish the step.

The Parliament members' action in any session, even of those who had given their word to vote for abolition, was uncertain. Ronquillo advocated as Royal policy, the winning or dividing of the Presbyterians - "the/

(1) 3rd. Feb. (2); ibid.
(2) 17th. Feb; ibid (Fla) 3879.

/"the most numerous and richest body in the Realm". If the wealthiest of these could be won over, this might help incline the scale. At that time, the sect was uniting more and more on political issues with the Anglicans, and that trend would have to be stopped. However, Don Pedro soon found he had to withdraw from treating much with these men, because they began to ask him for something for the expenses at the taverns where the meetings were held. Although with the information obtained, he was quite confident something would be accomplished in that quarter, he now dared not mention it to James for fear of being asked to follow up that which financially he could not pursue. It distressed our friend, when spoken to with great confidence by the King, to evade questions on the Presbyterians by saying he would find out facts which indeed he already knew. The Consejo de Estado could only approve their ambassador's action for they had no money "to contribute to so great a business as that of establishing the Catholic faith in England." It appeared that the King was making some progress with the Parliamentarians, but Don Pedro was by no means assured of the eventual outcome. Meanwhile Liberty of Conscience was also disturbing Scotland.(1)

In the latter half of March, James told the Council he was proroguing Parliament until early December and was going to issue a Declaration of Indulgence.(2) The Spaniard's attitude to this Declaration of Indulgence itself was one of doubt and little enthusiasm. Such an edict/

(1) 17th. Mar (1); ibid (Ing) 3962. (Also in B.M. Add. 34, 502, f. 93-5, 98-9)
(2) 31st. Mar. (2); ibid.

/edict did not give the Catholics much more liberty than they already had and that only for the King's lifetime. Though not condemning James' past actions, he could not but recall how much more could have been gained at the time of the last Parliament session in the autumn of 1685. The penal laws could have been revoked for ever instead of as now merely suspended by the Declaration; the King could have remained united with his Parliament, served by Halifax and the best men (unless they had spoken to him of the Catholic officers) and free to use the dispensing power. James himself was growing more and more suspicious and the reception of the Declaration by the country did not serve to give him much encouragement. The Presbyterians and sects took advantage of the edict but would not separate themselves from the Anglicans in maintaining that the Test and Oaths should not be revoked. There was no possibility of anyone uniting with the Catholics.(1)

What alarmed Don Pedro most was the possibility of James deciding to depend solely on the Declaration and do without Parliament. However, the ambassador, while bewailing his aloneness as a voice of warning crying in the wilderness of the place-seeking, fanatical and Francophile Court, still felt he must stay close to the King to encourage and help him in his efforts to win national unity. Nonetheless, the Council of State welcomed the Declaration when the news reached Madrid as being "very convenient for the growth of our sacred religion in (see appendix) that Realm"/

(1) Mat. Mar. (1); ibid - An interesting letter.

/Realm.

The ambassador still continued to keep in touch with the Presbyterians. On 12th. May, he said he must see the King to consult with him. The Presbyterians were putting up opposition to the direct revocation of the Test and Oaths by a Parliament, feeling this would be to declare themselves too strongly against the Anglican Church; but they were ready to pass the Declaration of Indulgence unaltered. This would make the Test and Oaths powerless in effect and anyone could be in Parliament. Don Pedro was of the opinion that James should accept such a compromise, if only after very careful consideration. His contact with the Presbyterians, he describes as "a man of importance, the leading layman who spoke in the representation, this religious party made to the King." But, this individual was not content with little and Don Pedro had nothing to give him. The night previous to writing the despatch, this confidant had called and Don Pedro was glad he had been out for this reason. But his Presbyterian informant had said his men were in good spirits and Ronquillo felt the opportunity must be taken to use and guide the confidant and his men to work with the Court. The Consejo de Estado decided to send money for this but no amount was specified.

In early July, 1687, the King dissolved the Parliament without its anticipated meeting, and it was now a question of whether he would have/

/have a new one elected. Don Pedro hoped so and prepared for such an eventuality as best he might. His negotiations with the Presbyterians proceeded. Ronquillo had to make clear to some of them who came to see him that, not only must they agree to the revocation of the Text but also the defence of the royal prerogatives, and government in order to offset the Anglicans' objections that, although they, the Presbyterians, would agree to the first, they would try to do so at the Monarchy's expense. But he could not say definitely what would be the Presbyterian attitude, "For", he wrote, "I flee from speaking with my correspondents, though the principal one kills me every day with letters, sometimes telling me what must be done for our interests, and others despairing with anger." The French, our friend mentions as being active at stirring up more difficulties that there might not be a session, or at least to disturb it if there should be. They were offering "considerable amounts" to the party heads, and were trying to flatter the Court by saying that the King could do by force whatever he wanted. The ministers were a danger for they were groping for power, knowing that once the King and Kingdom were united, all would be equal, James would be in control and they would not be so greatly needed. Moreover, even the Roman Catholics were divided on the abolition of the Text, the penal laws and the use of the dispensing power. For all these reasons, Ronquillo felt his master would know how little his endeavours could attain.(1)

(1) 4th. Aug. (1); ibid.

By September, the position was worsening. At least, a good Parliament would take time. What was happening, Don Pedro said, was what he had foreseen when James had proposed the keeping on of the Catholic officers in the session of autumn 1685. The non-conformists, though they said they would vote for the abolition of the Test, were feared because of their past records, and even if they did support the bill, they would introduce conditions "not only impossible, but more harmful to the end of advancing the Catholic religion than the Test itself." (see Appendix)

In October, Parliament seemed to Ronquillo practically certain because the French ambassador had begun to try and get persons of authority to help him. Don Pedro was also still trying to maintain his position. "They also spoke to me of soliciting the nomination of three or four members of Parliament and I have excused myself on the ground that it is better to spend in gaining some facts than in doing some deeds, for, although my misery is notorious, I have not yet had the heart to confess it." One of the principal Presbyterians had told him that the success of the bill to abolish the Test would depend on whom James named to manage the Parliament. "God will they be more suitable than those who are already known." The King might be confident of becoming master in the Commons but Don Pedro himself was doubtful. Nonetheless, he and his country eagerly wished that by a successful Parliament James might satisfy the English people he was

not pro-French and that united with them, he wanted to maintain the European balance of power. They also hoped for some partisans to back this maxim of unity with the King as well as with the Parliament.(1)

As late autumn passed into winter, matters did not improve. The French were unembarassed by lack of funds, while our friend's poverty increased. William's growing aversion to James' religious policy was disturbing. Though the people were quiet, it was an uneasy peace that did not indicate harmony.

Nonetheless Don Pedro kept on good terms with James and approved his policy of dividing the Protestants, and firmness in not revoking the Declaration of Indulgence at the Anglican request for religious liberty only for them and Roman Catholics; Sunderland was becoming more agreeable with our friend, who also was not going to lose any opportunity of obliging Father Petre. He was doing his part as well in entertaining the Duke of Berwick, recently returned from the Eastern Front and eager to return there; and James had expressed to Don Pedro, in front of all, his gratitude for what the Emperor, the King of Spain and their ministers had done for his son. The Council of State in Madrid, however, instructed Ronquillo to be careful with any promises to Berwick regarding service in Spanish armies, which could give rise to misunderstanding and recrimination in future.(2)

A despatch three days before Christmas will close this narration of domestic events for 1687. The people wanted a parliament but the

(1) 27th Oct; Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado (Ing)3962.
(2) 10th and 24th Nov; ibid.

the King would not expose himself to it unless there was some moral probability of success. But, did James want to hold it in order to blame its bad success on the Parliament members ? Ronquillo knew, (he wrote), James knew that in his army he had no security. And if in any trouble James had to summon French aid - which would be necessary - "all sects, the whole Kingdom, and all the plotters and even to the last Englishman would make up an opposing party". Meanwhile the French and the ministers continued their policy of "disunity" and the Dutch were not helping unity itself. William seemed ambitious for the throne and the malcontents were taking advantage of this.

In such a complexity of reasons, Don Pedro bore himself "very passively". If there was no Parliament he would have nothing to do with the people. If there was, he would apply himself to helping vanity by the revocation of the Test etc. and gaining advantages for Catholicism so that as many of these as possible should become the law of the Realm. Meanwhile, the ambassador kept on good terms with all parties, believing in the value of a son to the King for the sake of national unity. Four days later, in a letter to Coloma, he wrote that he felt an heir was James's only hope as nothing good could be expected from a Parliament. (see Appendix)

3. The Religious Aspect.

a) Spanish views on James' principal politico-religious activity.

What shall we say to such an intricate and tortuous narrative ? In order to give a balanced picture of domestic and political events for our subject, it has already been necessary to examine in detail the Spanish attitude to the Declaration of Indulgence and the abolition of the Test Act. Indeed a summary of this view is in many ways a summary of their ideas on the whole internal position in Britain.

Spain, above all, desired the unity of James and his kingdom - as a preparation for their participation on the Continent; and more than sympathised with him in his wish to ameloriate the Catholics' position - as a preparation for Great Britain's eventual reconversion. In this she was willing to support him, even though not approving all his methods. However, Ronquillo and his government were ready to make sacrifices of their individual opinion to keep the touchy King's confidence and unity among his supporters, and thus to continue to act upon them as a moderating force. For example, Don Pedro, this year supported the abolition of Test for he saw the King was bent upon it, though previously he had only advocated that of the lesser penal laws. Even now, he was still not convinced of the value of Catholics winning the right to every office and certainly not if it brought more discord with the danger of reaction. One point upon which he was certain, knowing the British mentality, was that all steps should be ratified legally. Let the abolition of the Test be duly passed in a

Parliament. If there had to be a Declaration of Indulgence as a definitely second best, let it be approved by Lords and Commons. An orderly unpretentious and secure establishment of Catholicism in Britain allowing no possible renewal, was still far more desirable to him and his country.

All these reasonable enough views, the Spanish men of state possessed, but their caution continued to have its other, more religious side. Spain, though moderating James' lack of wisdom, must not do anything that would delay the catholicising of Britain. While humanly the King's methods in religious affairs might seem ill-considered and reckless, still this might be God's way. In a consulta of the Consejo de Estado for 1687, we find this advice for Spain's trusting in the Divine and not delaying the holy aim, even though it appeared James was placing all his interests in danger and must throw himself into the hands of the French. For there was no doubt the speaker, the Duque de Osuna, said, that by adhering to such Catholic principles, results would follow which would favour Spanish desires even more.(1)

But caution, due to financial inability to do anything, dictated little action beyond opinion - as we have seen. This, looking to the coming revolution, was probably just as well for Spanish interests. For, unless Spain had been able to force British unity with James and William working together, lesser efforts might have weakened the alliances and injured her in 1688-9.

(1) Consulta on letter of 14th April(2); Sim.Estado(Ing)3962.

b) Lesser religious affairs. Anglo-Papal relations. The Spanish Chapel, etc.

The religious affairs of less importance illustrate the same general trends.

Don Pedro Ronquillo still kept close watch on James' relations with the Papacy. We have already seen his anxiety on their respective views on the European peace propositions current in the spring. He was relieved, if not very enthusiastic, over Count Adda's finally becoming nuncio to London without incident. However, Don Pedro's principal desire with respect to Anglo-Papal relations was to see the Papacy help win James over to the League of Augsburg and temper his impetuousness. Indeed James had been trying to make up to the Pope on account of the recent incident involving Castelmaine, the English envoy at Rome. Then, in August/September, the Holy Father directly refused to allow dispensation to Father Petre to become a bishop. InDon Pedro's opinion, this negative did the greatest harm to the advancement of Catholicism; for, coming so close on William's declaration against the Test, the opposition were now saying that its abolition and that of the oaths were merely the King's plan and not to benefit religion, with everything influenced by the Jesuits. On the other hand, James' wish would have been easy to grant and might have affected the King favourably, winning greater co-operation from him. (1)

(1) 12th May(1) and 26th May(3); ibid.
29th Sept; ibid (Fla) 3879.

The Catholics, as a body, appeared to Don Pedro more and more divided and with their place-seeking, etc. to be despised. Of the clergy as well as the laity, it could be said "each against the other and all against the Jesuits." Don Pedro even felt out of contact with the guiding Catholic circles, particularly at court, for - as he wrote - "one who has not the wherewithal to live with people, cannot knowwwhat goes on among them." However, he was certain of increasing Jesuit, extremist and francophile Catholic influences around the King. (see Appendix)

The Chapel had a varied history that year. In January Don Pedro was forced to close it, not only through not having the money to pay the chaplains but - as he put it - even to buy a "pound of wax". However, 12,000 reals arrived as a "miracle" to permit its reopening in time for Holy Week, with communion dispensed to more than ever before at that season, and not a few asking for instruction in the faith. This activity appears to have been maintained thereafter. The procession of the Holy Sacrament was celebrated in the Embassy garden with a large attendance. From October on there were six to nine sermons monthly and chapel expenses averaged £45-47 monthly, instead of £30-35 in Charles II's reign and £25 from 1689. A new nave was built and extensive repairs and redecoration took place. In short, during this period of freedom, the chapel was flourishing as never before. (see Appendix)

And Don Pedro, despite his political sagacity, though still more

alert, cautious and observant than some of his countrymen, was just as out of step with the religious spirit of James' realm. He might disapprove the Edict of Nantes and understand the reason for James' reception of the Huguenots but he could not help regretting the forced French converts to Catholicism reavowal of their former faith in London. "May God draw them from their error" he commented. This was the case with many other opinions of his.(1) Yes, as always, the reconversion of Britain was a holy aim to him. When a great hurricane that May had dried up the bed of the Thames so people could walk on it, as had not occurred since just before Cromwell's death, whereas a month previous two young daughters of Anne had died, he wrote: "I hope that if abundance of rain prophesies sharp sorrow and lack of it announced the end of Cromwell's tyranny, this now foretells the end of heresy."(2)

(1) 17th Mar (5); ibid.
(2) 26th May (3); ibid.

4. Don Pedro Ronquillo's personal position.

We have already seen how Ronquillo's work with the Presbyterians was restricted by lack of means, how he had to close the chapel for the same reason. His chief helper on financial matters, Charles Hugh Semple, found himself forced to abandon Don Pedro's service and write to him: "And now is passed the time for contenting oneself with hopes of the coming mail. That mail has made me groan, sigh and suffer thousands of times." (1) But his master still had to go on. By autumn, the stop-gap of 12,000 reals received in March had apparently been used up and Don Pedro was again in difficulties. "Please God I can have a servant that out of charity may wish to serve me, and that some morning they do not find me hung to a wall." (2) But he did not forget those faithful to him, like his secretary, Navarro, and when very ill in late December, he requested Carlos II to grant Don Francisco Antonio the salary of Secretary to His Majesty. Montalto's constant intercessions on his friend's behalf with the Duke's brother (see Appendix), the President of Hacienda, could avail little, when there was so little. Nonetheless 1687, like 1686, despite its bad beginning, financial worries and largely resultant ill-health, was by comparison an easier year for Don Pedro than some. His political position in England still was better than in Charles II's reign; and at home they had recognised tangibly how difficult his post would be to fill, by granting him the salary of his place in the

(1) 1st March; Semple to Ronquillo; ibid
(also in B.M. Add.34, 502, f.92-3, 97-8.)
(2) 27th Oct; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

Cámara de Indias, despite general orders to the contrary.(1)

(1)Consulta of 15th April; Sim.Estado (Ing),3962.

IV. Spanish - British Maritime and Commercial Relations.

1. 1685.

In a letter at the beginning of James' reign Ronquillo reduced Spanish policy towards England and its new king to two cardinal points: first, to get them to break with France; second, to encourage trade between England and Spain that would prove of mutual benefit. The second point was by no means the lesser in importance and perhaps the more possible of attainment. To Don Pedro the trade of England as well as of Holland, France and other nations, depended on Spain. For them, it possessed a unique importance, and for Spain, potential opportunity if she availed herself of it rightly. As before the ambassador emphasised that not the granting them wider privileges but the establishment of Spain's own trade should be the policy and that the vehicle for this should be an Indies Company. It was not the olive oil of Spain that enriched the nations but the silver and "more noble goods" from America. The more of these that remained in Spain the more foreigners would come bringing money and power to the country instead of only taking it out. "I confess to your Majesty that on considering this matter of commerce, I do not know how to contain myself". All this was nothing new but different conditions, even in Britain, might produce different results from the frustration of hitherto.(1)

A logical manifestation of such a policy was to stimulate the improvement of conditions for Spanish trade in Britain. And James II's

(1) 19th Feb (2): Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado (Ing)3960.

calling of Parliament that year provided an opportunity. The specific question was the taxing of Spanish wines in comparison with that on those of France. In the spring session, the Commons had been discussing the subsidies for the King when the matter was brought forward. Goodricke, the former envoy in Madrid, forgetting his expulsion from there, spoke, saying that the taxes should be applied more heavily to French wines with a lessening of duty on those from Spain. Spanish friendship should be courted, for they were England's allies, who had treated her well, while the French were much closer to being enemies. Goodricke's remarks were well received and any bill on this would have been passed; but Don Pedro, despite pressure from some members, discouraged the matter being brought up again or any motion going forward. His reason was that James' principal henchmen were making difficulties for this and that if this was recognised the matter would not succeed; and Don Pedro was far more anxious to see the King well supplied and united with his Parliament than anything else. However, he went to see James to speak of this and the King was most co-operative and promised that the rights of the Spanish wine trade would be protected.(1) There had also been a p rospect of a higher tariff being imposed by the Parliament on Flemish linen. Representatives of Flanders had come to get the duties lowered or equalised with those on French goods. The Customs authorities replied favourably but said any alteration in these would have to be done in Parliament, which would take time. Ronquillo secured James'

(1)11th June (1): 1685; ibid. 11th June(3); ibid.

co-operation while Henry Savile and Goodrick guided a bill through the House which lessened the taxes on linens five per cent and favoured other Spanish goods.(1)

Across the Channel the new Marqués de Gastañaga and Governor of the Low Countries was also anxious about the rehabilitation of Spanish and Low Countries Trade. In this, like Ronquillo, he felt that England and her King could play a part. To re-establish, in particular, the great but languishing port of Antwerp, the Scheldt, closed since the Treaty of Munster, would have to be re-opened. Gastañaga therefore wrote asking Ronquillo to try and get James to intercede. It would be a good opportunity for the principal opposition to be expected from the burghers of Amsterdam - was particularly odious to the King, owing to their part in the recent Monmouth rebellion. The Governor also thought that, in the case of the renewal of the Treaties, then on the agenda, a clause to this end might also be inserted. But no more is heard of the matter.(2)

Both these Spaniards were also attempting to get James to act on the renewed French violation of the Treaties in seizing goods belonging to inhabitants of the Low Countries and raiding the Flemish coast. EspeciallyGastañaga wanted James to send ships to help protect the Flemish convoys for Cadiz. The detention of a French ship at Coruña that autumn merely gave the French further excuses for their depredations. James at least got his ambassador in Paris to intercede on the last-named incident.

(1) 23rd July (1); ibid.
(2) Lonchay (Correspondence) VI, No.1945.

Ronquillo himself wished these clashes could be avoided until James was established enough to interpose really effectively; not that he expected any rushing from the English king to stand by the Treaty.(1)

That is about all worthy of note that happened in Europe in Spanish-British maritime and trading affairs. Of course, there were the usual commercial complaints but to an ever lessening degree. The question of saluting was less vexed but still unsettled. James and Sunderland said in the spring that they had ordered English captains to give Spanish ships the same honours accorded to French. But in this the English still demanded superiority in the British Sea, although willing to grant equality elsewhere.(2)

Before passing to the problems of Piracy, and the Indies, we can consider the question of Gibraltar. That autumn of 1685, as so often, James was preparing the way for the fleet going to the waters around Tangier and the Western Mediterranean; and he desired to establish stores at Cadiz or Gibraltar for the ships crossing the sea from Salé in Africa. The King preferred Gibraltar and referred to past favours granted there and at Minorca. Don Pedro had replied that Spain would fulfil what it had done on previous occasions and what it could. The Consejo de Estado, on the request, decided to make a full examination of past precedents. However, the ships were arriving soon and Don Pedro pled for a quick decision meantime to avoid

(1)ibid, Nos. 1951, 1952, 1953, 1955, etc.
(2) Consulta of 5th May, 1685; Sim.Estado(Ing): 3960; 29th Oct.(5); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

any incident through the Governor not having orders and perhaps refusing them entry. The ambassador also wrote direct to the Governor to put the case before him. Don Pedro did this largely at James' and Sunderland's request and not willingly but it could help relations and, moreover, he feared France making anything of this. He also wrote he could not doubt James' honesty nor that the English ships would not molest the Spanish coast. It was decided the English should be allowed what they had been before: namely to build sheds of canvas or at most wood outside the wall; the fortress was to be strengthened and no no account were powder or other arms to be stored within the rampart. James had also wanted some excusing of salutes in the port, but this was not granted. What are of more interest are the opinions sent in to the Council, as they contained their investigations into the matter for this and future occasions, and how both powers recognised the great strategic importance of The Rock. We see how the Spanish, in their lack of defence, feared attack on their ill-protected coast and particularly the loss of what one described as "by far the most important possession of this Crown" continuing that "whoever is master of it is also master of the two seas, The Ocean and The Mediterranean and, consequently, of commerce, being able to support the place at little cost." The Consulta on the subject is an interesting one - but here we must go on to other fields. (see Appendix)

In the Indies, piracy continued to be rampant, both on the part of

the buccaneers proper and the frigates of France, Denmark and Brandenberg. Spain was indeed plagued by the situation, but, whereas in Europe she was eager to call on English aid in maritime and commercial matters, in America she still felt differently. And this was moreover when James was willing to help, for even England was beginning to see the general nuisance of piracy. But there were signs that even the Spanish attitude was changing.

During the summer of 1685, James, following an unfulfilled idea of his brother, offered to send six frigates to the Indies, at Spanish expense, to help in the extirpation of the pirates. Don Pedro himself strongly advocated the offer's acceptance "to root out this pernicious family." It seemed to him a powerful remedy when the others offering were so weak, for the Armada de Barlovento was "of no service while a great expense". English laws also (particularly the municipal) favoured them. For example, one pirate in a case involving attacks on Spanish subjects had been acquitted on proving he had not harmed any Englishmen. According to the rights of Magna Carta, wrote Don Pedro, the departure of any individual could not be forbidden unless it was proved or probable he was going to commit piracy: and this was also the difficulty with respect to foreign pirates sailing from England. For James to declare against the pirates in this way would be to make them outright rebels and would take the decision of whether they were pirates or not out of the hands of any Jury. And the ambassador had other reasons in favour of the plan.

However, the offer met with strong opposition in Spain, including the special aid of that arch-adventurer in the Indies, the Marqués de Varinas. James was thanked but the matter was put off to a more convenient season. Spain had enough ships, they said, with the Armada of Barlovento and those from Guipúzcoa. Ronquillo was ordered, besides passing on the message, to get James to clear up the pirate position in Jamaica and get a new governor appointed there who would not support them. A question of purchasing negroes from the English rather than the Dutch and the extremely involved matter of the whole Asiento was to be further investigated. (see Appendix)

Apart from this there is little to record. It was mooted that some English intended to complain in Parliament of the already-mentioned invasion by the Spanish of the English (but also pirate) base of New Providence. The Council of the Indies were preparing ahead information to be presented to the English envoy in case the matter came to his attention. (1)

Though the year 1685 included no very important events and business in these maritime and commercial relations, still one sees in them more and more clearly the thread of increased co-operation and trade between Spain and Britain in both hemispheres.

(1) Consulta of Consejo y Cámara de Indias: 23rd July, 1685; ibid.

2. Maritime and Commercial.

1686. The Maritime, Commercial and Colonial aspect of Spanish-British relations in 1686 possesses little interest. By far the most important negotiation which concerned Don Pedro in that field has already been described in detail - the Franco-British Commercial agreement. Most of the other matters arising that year originated during the previous one or before.

The many rumours connected with the Franco-British discussions throughout that spring kept Don Pedro in a state of constant suspicion. James might pooh-pooh a report of a French fleet bound for American waters - but why, asked the ambassador, were the merchants so quiet about it when they had such interest in the safe arrival at Cadiz of the Treasure fleet ?His eyes were constantly on the English and French colonies in America that year: he noted the trade in "Hontze baye" (Hudson's Bay) and feared La Salle's finding away to the Gulf of Mexico "by some river or arm of the seas". Later on, the Consejo de Estado asked him to get a map of the French explorer's discoveries, which he did in early 1687. James endeavoured to reassure Ronquillo and gave (see Appendix)
him a copy of an account of these.

Don Pedro, meanwhile, continued to try to increase the market for Spanish products in Britain by securing better conditions, if possible at France's expense. He was relieved that no reduction on French imports was introduced, largely owing to the dependence of the royal rents on these.

The Spanish trade was a special concern, and that in Brandy from Barcelona increased three to four times over two - three years encouraged him especially. This would help Spain at the expense of France and he wondered if more trade could not be done in Castilian wines. On the other hand, the Canary trade was still languishing, for, in addition to the previous problems, the drinking of Sherry was replacing that of Malmsey. That was not so important for Spain as a whole, as Sherry was Spanish trade in itself, but the taxes on Canary at London had also been raised. These Don Pedro endeavoured to get lowered and the prohibition removed on Canary export into the English colonies like Jamaica, which was still in force from Charles II's reign. The Governor of the Islands, in writing to him, also told of the strained relations between the English traders and some of the population, resulting from these conditions. Don Pedro was therefore not only keen to establish their trade but to eliminate any such sore point between the two nations which could lead to further trouble. (see Appendix)

There were also the usual complaints of merchants molested. New monetary exchange regulations were gradually applied harmoniously. The question of saluting was not finally settled: though there was some easing of the question, Spain still did not feel she was getting equal treatment with France. This had arisen over the saluting instructions given the English fleet going to the Mediterranean that winter. James had seemed quite pleased, incidentally, on Spain's final decision

to his requests for storage places in Gibralter, and evidently regulations for 1687-8 in that regard were to be the same as the year before. (see Appendix)

Regarding piracy and the Indies there is little to record. A Cuban coastguard captain, captured preventing English trade with Cuba, had been sentenced to death in Jamaica; the French had designs on Santo Domingo - this information Don Pedro got from letters sent from Jamaica. He was as keen as ever that such matters should be settled quickly. Sharp, the pirate, had been active with the Governor of the Bermudas against Spanish interests and Ronquillo was able at some cost to get direct information on this and help secure, he says, the Governor's recall. The ambassador recognised James' wish to settle all these trading complaints, whether between Spain, England and France. That year in theautumn, James once more offered to "rent" Spain English frigates for the extirpation of the pirates and Don Pedro again felt it would be the cheapest way to get rid of them; but the Spanish government, though polite, held to its former decision. (see Appendix)

That is the record: briefly, another year of better relations if not of dramatic and radical solution of maritime and commercial problems between the two powers.

1687 - Maritime and Commercial.

The letters and other documents of 1687 available prove the year to have been a much more vital one in Spanish-British maritime and colonial relations than 1686. This is particularly apparent touching affairs in the Indies.

However, let us consider the European section of the work first. There were no changes in tariffs though later on Don Pedro was alert to the French trying to remove, in what seemed an approaching Parliament, taxes placed the year before on tobacco and sugar. In fact, further taxes on French goods were popular with the English people (1). Earlier there is long and interesting letter from Ronquillo on the Spanish wine trade in the country. Sherry and Protuguese wines had now replaced Canary at the King's table and they were the wines for courtiers and gentlemen, whereas Canary was only for "country folk and traders". The merchants of the now humbler drink were hit economically and, like the Governor of the Islands, were agitating for Don Pedro to do something. He referred them to the last Parliament's decisions on the wine tariff and that the taxes were really quite favourable. Ronquillo also did not feel he could press further the Canaries' trade with Barbadoes and Jamaica for the English were merely enforcing a monopoly similar to that of the Spanish in America. The Consejo de Estado commended the moderation of their embassador's actions in this, and reproved the Governor of the Canaries for writing Don Pedro without

(1) 27th Oct., 1687; ibid 3962.

consulting the Home Government first. But the question could not be so easily solved. That spring, Lord Lansdowne, in Madrid, had explained about the anti-English attitude in the Islands, which had no more motive, he said, than that the inhabitants wanted the traders to take their products at a higher price than they were worth. In fact, all parties were suffering from a position which would not sweeten Spanish-British relations, though it might not harm overall Spanish trade, as long as England drank Sherry instead.(1)

Complaints continued as before. The English grumbled once more on the "millions" tax on fish as being contrary to the treaties and royal schedules; there had to be further arrangements on payments agreed before the new exchange rates came into force; the English Consul at Cartagena had been imprisoned; and Englishmen were in the prison of the Casa de Contratación in Seville, awaiting transference to the galleys. (see Appendix)

In the Indies, the piracy question still called for solution. By April, 1687, news of Sharp's and other pirates' acquittal before a court on the island of Nevis had arrived in London. Ronquillo thought the trial had been a farce with the decision influenced by the Governor of the island himself; and he resolved to take action. First he was able to get papers on the case through the King in Council in order to have more information; he also consulted the legal authorities on whether the matter could be re-opened. He then presented a memoir to

(1) 12th May (2), 1687; ibid.
Consulta of 16th May; ibid.-- re Lansdowne's instances.

Sunderland, in May, requesting punishment of not only the pirates but also of the Lieutenant-Governor for an action as harmful to James' authority as to Spain's. The diligences (which had, incidentally, cost something) are mentioned no further in the ambassadorial correspondence. However, the case shows some co-operation from the English authorities. (see Appendix)

At the time there was further proof of this working together, and what was more, resoluteness by the colonial authorities themselves. Don Pedro had always felt that both Spanish and English governors could easily stamp out piracy and smuggling if they acted conscientiously instead of co-operating with the marauders out of personal greed. But here was an encouraging sign. The English frigate-of-war based at Jamaica for the purpose of restraining the pirates had actually followed the order of the Governor, Molesworth, by summarily executing some. The ambassador thoroughly recommended such immediate justice; he also advised the Spanish Consejo de Estado to send a medal or chain, worth 500 pesos to Captain Spratt, master of the vessel, and a letter of thanks from Carlos II to the Governor, which would be "more highly valued" by Molesworth "than many gifts". These suggested steps the Council implemented to encourage such forthright action in future. (see Appendix)

More revelatory of an actual plan to finally extirpate the menace were the discussions in late July/early August arising from another matter. Swan and his pirates, who had done so much damage in the South Sea off the Western Coast of South America, were now promising

James payment if the King would pardon them and let them settle down in Barbados. The King himself felt his refusal might only urge them to continue their piracy and perhaps serve France or Holland. However, he told Don Pedro that, as his real aim was to extirpate piracy, he had not wanted to do anything before seeing him. The matter was then passed on to the Earl of Sunderland, who was of the same opinion as his master, but who also sought the ambassador's. Ronquillo's viewpoint was that, while it was good to "unmake" pirates, this pardon would make many more by encouraging others to amass fortunes in the same way in the hope of similar indulgence and peaceful retirement. It was the Governorsand Magistrates who were those chiefly to blame for protecting them, but a final and effective decision that would include all was what was needed. Sunderland asked Ronquillo to make up a paper on the subject; and the ambassador, though he refused to submit an official memoir, agreed to give some "pointers" on his attitude. Before presenting these,he discussed all of them with the King; and they are as follows:

1) That a general pardon should be granted to all pirates presenting themselves within six months in England, or within three in the colonies, after the publication of the orders.
2) The pirates must give security of not returning to their former occupation.
3) Those who appeared in the colonies must, within another three months, appear in England or have proxies do so.

4) Otherwise, they would not be pardoned.

5) There was to be no piracy in this interim.

6) Those not presenting themselves should be declared guilty of High Treason and liable to summary justice if encountered.

7) The pain of death should be dispensed to all having dealings with them.

8) Colonial Governors should be deprived of office without more legal proof than the certainty that they had sheltered pirates.

9) A commissioner should be sent to visit the Colonies to see to the execution of the orders.

10) The orders should also be promulgated in Carolina, Pennsylvania, etc.

11) The granting of patents by American Governors should be stopped.

12) The King should employ his own authority, like other Princes, to see the pirates did not use the colonies.

James promised Ronquillo that he would do what he could but in passing depreciated the power of his Governors' patents. Sunderland, on receiving the paper, only observed that to be practical, one would have to consider what the laws would or would not allow to be done.

Don Pedro, commenting on these points to his own government, felt them of very great service in that all would have to be carried out by the English King in his own territory, unaided by the Spanish and without more authority than he possessed.

Most of the pirates were English and, even if aided by the French and Dutch, they would not be able to exist without the English colonies. He would like to have suggested, he said, the sending of four ships to aid this clean-up of piracy in their colonies - which was, of course, a modification of his plan in 1685 and 1686.

On receiving this news, the Consejo de Estado ordered Don Pedro to continue the same informal negotiations against piracy. They suggested his suggesting that known pirates be moved to England, where they could be easier controlled, than if they remained in the Indies. It was approved Don Pedro's not mentioning the four ships clause: for there were quite enough English ships there: no 100,000 pesos were available to aid such an enterprise, while already four Spanish ships were being fitted out to go to Cartagena and Portobello. The Council of the Indies, to whom Ronquillo's letter (see Appendix) was also passed, echoed these opinions.

Nothing more occurred, but the documents on the incident show us like no others Don Pedro's views on eliminating the pirate menace. They also show again the increasing measure of co-operation between Spanish and British authorities on the question.

Late that summer or early that autumn, rumours reached London of a company of English, Dutch and German Protestants planning to settle in Darien. Ronquillo immediately grew very excited about what he called "This horrible and formidable intent", busily seeking out secret

information and writing Manuel Coloma in the Hague to do all he could to help suppression of the plan in Holland. Besides he pressed for Robert Holmes, the oldest admiral in the English fleet going with a squadron of six ships to quash any piracy and prevent any such attempt at settlement. James continued to co-operate and Holmes began slowly to gather and equip the fleet. Eagerly Don Pedro wrote asking De Lira in Madrid to try and get money sent for this. "Never can we find a more favourable occasion in the King and in his Ministries to save America than we have now." Four years before this expedition had been projected which, if it had taken place, would have saved, he said, many times over what had been lost since then in money and goods, disturbance of commerce and the complete ruin of provinces. But indeed he feared the influence would not be wanting of those who (probably thinking of the Marqués de Varinas and company) would regard such a proposal as though it was still the time of Philip II. Nonetheless the Spanish government appear to have now agreed to send money for the expedition. Homes and his fleet, however, had not left by December and Don Pedro was still worrying and working on the matter. It seemed now as if the ambassador was about to see his favourite plan fulfilled - of an English fleet clearing up the pirates and othet threats in the Indies. (see Appendix)

The year 1687 brought up a problem not touched on before in detail: the recovery of silver lost in sunken galleons. The question

had arisen hitherto but that year it comes far more to the front, calling for examination. In June, an English vessel returned to London with silver salvaged from a galleon lost off Hispaniola in the year1641 or 1642. Ronquillo presented a memoir to James and at financial cost to himself made other instances, securing the ship's embargo (1). However, those concerned secured a counter-warrant; and Don Pedro decided to cease his instances and instruct his supporters not to mention the matter further for fear of Spain's enemies using the affair to stir up opposition to her in England. The English claimed the silver as abandoned property and appealed to freedom of the Seas; but the Spanish held the seas belonged to those who first discovered them. More alarming to Don Pedro was James granting further patents and having interests in renewed diving operations. He began, therefore, to press his country to commission ships for this purpose. Already three years before, he remarked, he had forwarded a reasonable offer for doing this. In August Don Pedro told of one party, including the Duke of Albemarle, newly appointed Governor of Jamaica, that had come seeking patents for this, who promised to give the King of Spain one half the profits and Don Pedro himself a tenth part of the half they themselves claimed. He says he angrily refused this bribe when the Duke offered it him, so His Catholic Majesty should not be surprised if they offered him a twentieth part more gain. On hearing these reports, the Consejo

(1)See Appendix note for p.504(i).

de Estado ordered Ronquillo to get on to James for the return of the galleon silver salvaged; and he was also to try and find someone, preferably Spanish, to undertake diving operations on Spain's behalf. There is little more about this that year, except that in December Don Pedro presented another memoir demanding galleon silver which had reached England (see Appendix). There is nothing very significant in this except that it indicates again Don Pedro's wish to help good relations while standing up for what he believed were Spanish rights.

All in all, however, the period of James' reign was one of great progress in Spanish-British maritime and commercial relations. Tariffs were reduced and trade increased. Of primary importance, a far more sincere desire in James, to better these relations, than there had ever been in his brother, seemed evident; and this was implemented by English authorities at home and abroad.

Don Pedro Ronquillo recognised this and it made him press on his government his positive and strong plans of co-operative effort to exterminate priacy and irregular trading in the Indies. He had said the days of Philip II were gone and he was right. Though not perhaps alive to every implied aspect of the policy, he did understand enough to know that while Spain must be strong in her dominions, she must and could help herself by fully co-operating with England in the Indies as well as in Europe.

THE GLORIOUS REVOLUTION PERIOD

I. 1688 - Outline of Political and Religious Events with reference to Spanish Policy.

The whole vast complexity of the reign of James II grew daily more complex and yet more unified, more interwoven into one fabric. Already the things of religion had become inextricably involved with domestic political events, and these together were now of international importance. Practically everything that happened in Britain was now being carefully noted by many eyes - with some hands ready - from across the Channel. With 1688 we cannot apportion events to academic sections any longer but must witness what ppssed as it passed before Don Pedro Ronquillo. Only in that way can we get any correct idea of the year and his work. Before such a tremendous European upheaval, it was also natural that maritime and trading affairs should meantime fade into the background as affairs of war.elbowed out affairs of peace. It is therefore logical that consideration of these be postponed until the more important occurrences of 1688 and 1689 are behind.

War was imminent even in January of 1688. In the North there was the dispute between Denmark and Holstein. Ronquillo believed Louis could not long leave the Emperor in peace to become so powerful as he undoubtedly would with complete control of Hungary. Basing his opinion on special information, he judged the French King's principal design was against the States-General. Meanwhile James would, in all probability,"keep separate from everything", being in no state either/

for offense or defence; even if he were to send out a squadron that summer, it would only be to guard the Channel, assure the commerce of his kingdom and keep himself in some respect. In such a position Don Pedro could only recommend his country once again that with little hope of help from others, she should muster her military forces and collect a fleet. As for himself, he would represent to James the disturbance that threatened Europe, not in the hope of his aid but that the King might see how important unity with his kingdom was for himself and all; he would show James the evil state England would be in should Louis extend his conquests into the United Provinces: and try to obtain more accurate information on Louis' intentions and what might happen.(1)

Domestically matters were also worsening with division everywhere. Catholics, doubtless with a premonition of what might come, continued to refuse to act as sheriffs, Don Pedro reported, for, as he told Coloma, "how little in essence the Catholic religion" had "grown in England."(2)(3) There was an unquiet calm in which the King still appeared to have hopes of a Parliament that spring, bu which to get the Test and oaths revoked. The Secretary of State for Ireland, Sheridan, had arrived to defend himself after being deprived of office by Tyrconnel, and Don Pedro expected he would do so well, for he alone had dared to oppose the Commons during the Popish Plot; now the circle seemed to have been completed.(4) All was additionally perturbed by the Dutch refusal to accede to the

(1) 19th Jan,1688; Ronquillo to Señor;Sim.Estado(Ing)3963.
(2) Macaulay, p.259b (Letter of 9/19 Jan, 1688).
(3) 27th Feb. 1688; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R.(Haye)496.
(4) 1st Mar, 1688; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Ing)3963.

English troops' recall and also to expel Dr. Burnet from the United Provinces. The fear of a war "to no one's advantage" between England and Holland now definitely complicated the scene. Ronquillo carefully kept before James William's usefulness to England with the popular hatred of religion and France, the possibility of revolution and the need for preparedness; he also agreed with and encouraged ~~with and~~ James' conviction that in war the Catholic cause in the country would be lost. Though not optimistic of success in this, he felt those who were most listened to by the King were of the same opinion.
"I have very few hopes that the father-in-law and son-in-law can be reunited on terms of affection. It will suffice that they adjust themselves so as not to do each other harm and that neither of them receive destructive impressions."(1) This could be hoped for from a meeting of the two men but that was almost impossible and the situation was complicated by each one's followers and French meddling. "All this shows the restlessness of the realm and makes it more desirable that God grant a Prince of Wales to this Queen, whose pregnancy advances with the greatest felicity."(2)

Constantly adding to and revising his information from the Continent and, therefore, his opinion on what might happen, Don Pedro continued certain that Louis would soon make war, if not as yet a "universal" one. Though the ambassador felt France's final aims were against Spain, he also thought Louis would first try to perplex

(1) 27th Feb. 1688; Ronquillo to Manual Colona; A.G.R.(Haye) 496.
(2) 1st Mar. 1688; Ronquillo to Señor. Sim.Estado (Ing) 3963.

and distract her by attacks elsewhere. Using the knowledge acquired as Superintendent of Military Justice in Flanders, he gave the Home Government advice on the disposition of forces in the Low Countries. He was now, as planned, pointing out to James the dangerous position, and the King appeared to him anxious about the preservation of peace. James feared the situation in Denmark and would intercede for peace there, though it was more than unlikely he would allow himself to become further involved than that for Prince George's interests in the northern kingdom. The risk to Modena also made him especially anxious about Louis' threats to Italy. He agreed with Don Pedro that Louis' designs on the Low Countries, though at first indirect, were the ultimate ones and that such an invasion would hurt England. Most important, he told the ambassador to assure Carlos II he had no negotiation or treaty with France, save that of 1686 and a settlement made very recently on differences in Hudson's Bay, nor did he intend to enter any others.(1)

Don Pedro, who had incidentally obtained a copy of the hushed-up Hudson's Bay agreement with difficulty, as well as other information on it, (see Appendix) tended to believe the King's protestations. But that did not mean hopes for closer links with Spain. The Consejo de Estado, in early March, also considering the treaties, noted that the same reasons remained which James had brought forward previously against "renewing" the Treaty of Windsor. In fact, these were so aggravated that the Council decided to defer any proposals on this until a more propitious

(1) ibid.

time. In short, to Don Pedro, the royal reasoning and decision on war would be as follows. Both the King and Queen knew how it would destroy the work accomplished for Roman Catholicism in Britain; that there was no money for hostilities, and that French payments would not be enough to supply this. Therefore they feared war, and in the event of it, James would probably just remain neutral and let the French do what they wanted against Holland.(1) The same currents ran on, the King still planning and preparing the way for a Parliament; disunity in Ireland; many Catholic but few Protestant officers and men returning from Holland, where the Prince could not compel them to obey James' call and was even suspected of detaining them(2) Don Pedro was, of course, trying to help patch up this last quarrel dispassionately, though to him as a Spaniard, the idea that a vassal could depart by choice from his obligations to his King by birth was abhorrent.(3) All the favourable news Don Pedro could send to Spain, he said, was the continuing fiberty of the Queen's pregnancy. But even this was hedged with fears. While Ronquillo believed that if the Catholic religion was really introduced into England the Protestant would weaken and disappear, the King was fifty-five now and a minority could endanger all.(4)

April was a relatively uneventful month. Ronquillo was still joping for no break between England and Holland that year. He criticised Albyville's fuss at the Hague on receipt of an unsigned letter threatening the King, similar to many pamphlets issued in England because such "unstable lack of affection and unnecessary fear" did not help relations.

(1) 1 Mar: Ronquillo to Señor, also Consulta of 12 Mar; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
(2) 15 Mar (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963. /also 29th Mar;
(3) 26 Mar; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid (Fla) 3881. /R. to Gastañaga;
(4) 29th Mar; ibid. /ibid (Fla) 3881.

Don Pedro also did not wish now a Parliament with its possibilities of a precipitate resolution produced by the obstinate negative of both Houses as well as the King. Every day, as he looked over to the Continent, there seemed more reasons why an English rebellion should be avoided. But each person he wrote to seemed interested in his own ends rather than national interests. (see Appendix) This extended to the King and Don Pedro was still perfectly frank about the harmfulness of many of James' inquisitions, manipulations and appointments. (1)

The correspondence of Don Pedro from London during May mentions little of interest, save of the Queen. María de Modena and the ambassador were on close terms and he was advocating Spain's granting her yet another favour to preserve andif possible extend good relations. He still did not feel either she or James were by any means completely pro-French in outlook: in fact Louis' pressure on Italy was causing them extreme anxiety. (2) The incident of the threatened miscarriage is described in detail and the Queen's recovery was ascribed to "the Immaculate Conception" for she had begun to rally immediately they began to make vows to the Virgin. Don Pedro himself still expected good effects from the birth of a Prince of Wales; and had "great confidence in the Holy Virgin, who is the special advocate in the succession of C Catholic Kingdoms, that what imports so much must succeed, namely the exalatation of our Holy Faith in this one and also what is best for its preservation and extension throughout the whole world." But he also had to report bickerings among leading Scottish Catholics. (3)

(1) Macaulay c.260b etc. Letter of 16/26 April, etc.
(2) 4th June; Ronquillo to Fuensalida, Governor of Milan: Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
(3) 24th May (3): Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

Then the pace quickened as decisive events began to follow one another. On June 20th Don Pedro was able to send off a special express to his master with the news of the birth to James and his Queen of a "male child, very handsome, large and complete in every way". Writing to the Secretary Botello, enclosing the letter for the King, he also described the Prince of Wales as "very well formed". In addition, he expressed the hope in God that he, Don Pedro, would soon be able to congratulate Don Crispín on a similar blessing for their own master. (see Appendix)

There is no doubt Don Pedro, Carlos II and the Spanish generally were pleased at the successful issue of Maria's pregnancy, and expected a favourable turn of events. Don Pedro was also glad to report that, thanks to the tactful intervention of a friend of Spain, the Pope rather than Louis had been aptly chosen as God-Father to this "child of a miracle", so saving appearances and bettering the Queen's opinion of Spain. The last point was most important, the ambassador felt, as her power and authority (1) over the King and others was bound to increase now. During the first few days the survival of the child from a sudden serious ailment was looked on as yet another miraculous sign. The Consejo de Estado when they heard the news of it were anxious lest a repetition of the attack should carry off the child, thus putting matters in a very bad state with the heretics attributing the event to a miracle in their favour. (2)

(1) 21st June; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid; 179 .
(2) 5th July(2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Ing) 3963; also 9th July; Ronquillo to Coloma: A.G.R.(Haye)496.

But the Spanish were not long in seeing that their hopes of the Prince's advent bringing unity were vain. Ronquillo, of course, held festivities for the occasion, using many of the decorations left over from an unusually complete celebration of Corpus Christi (1); but he noted the reaction in London itself. Following the royal command, the Mayor and corporation merely "provided two fountains of wine, which did not last longer than it took some apprentices who had arrived first to get drunk;" and the citizens celebrated more from obedience than wish (2). The child was not only "very beautiful" to Don Pedro when he saw it, but a promise, despite any disappointments, (3)

The other event which had been occupying much of the ambassador's time was the trial and acquittal of the Seven Bishops. His secretary Navarro could not but contrast the celebrations on their release with the half-hearted manifestations at the Prince's birth. The Consejo de Estado in Madrid felt this would have unfortunate results; the people would recognise James' irresoluteness and would attribute his favourable steps to fear of them; thus, the Crown would lose authority, with its subjects believing they could do what they wished. I do not know Don Pedro's exact opinions on the matter but they probably were the Council's, at least in part, for he always supported the maintenance of royal prestige. Nonetheless he also had recognised the moderation of many of the Anglican Opposition and their rightly demanding security for their church.

(1) Accounts for 1688 (first half); A.H.N. Estado 1697.
(2) 5th July (2): Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Ing) 3963.
(3) ibid.

In the meantime Ronquillo's policy towards any Parliament that might come had changed. To press the abolition of the Test then would definitely split the country further, with no possibility of uniting King and Kingdom. Don Pedro therefore tried to dissuade James from pursuing this. He pointed to the King's advanced age, coupled with the youth of the Prince of Wales. There was no time to prepare for it. Besides, to obtain liberty of conscience was far more important than for Catholics to be allowed to hold posts. He, Ronquillo, would help James win liberty of conscience through Parliament with the help of his friends, both M.Ps and others. But James just replied stubbornly, "Monsieur Ronquillo, I am determined either to win all or to lose all." (see Appendix) However, what stand he would finally take in another Parliament of James was one decision Don Pedro did not have to make.

At this time Barillon made the offer to James of sixteen ships. It also became current that the King had accepted and that the French vessels had already joined the English fleet off Dunes. Don Pedro, of course, did all he could to find out the facts, which he interpreted as follows. James had thanked Louis for the offer but had said he did not need the ships just then. None of these ships were in the ports of France nor any order to muster them; Louis had only decided not to dispense the Algiers fleet on its return until he knew whether James wished the vessels or not. Ronquillo saw in the whole exaggeration a French move to frighten the Dutch and make the English more suspicious.

But he felt too that the opposition by William and the States was merely serving the ends of France, and James thought the Dutch preparations were aimed at no other power. Meanwhile, the French party were trying to persuade James to do all he could to insult the Prince, to whom he was as yet acting in a fairly conciliatory fashion. Though not able to contradict the reasons against a close union with France, they were also trying to persuade James that in case of need, it would be necessary to avail himself of her aid as that of the strongest power. In fine, at this juncture, Ronquillo himself could not say positively that there was an alliance, or what was far more likely, some more informal understanding between the two Kings. But to him, on the other hand, all hopes of concord between James and William were vain, and he must now bend all his efforts to avoiding a definite break between them, which, he also pointed out, would bring so many embarrassments and cares on his master.(1)

The internal position was no better. Zulestein, who had come from William to congratulate James on the birth of the Prince, had said not one in ten believed the chold was born of the Queen; and Don Pedro added that what he said of the state of the English public opinion was strictly true.(2) But the Spaniard still believed that, with time, the Prince's birth might prove a blessing. He wrote to the Marqués de los Balbases on 8th August: "I have received with much pleasure the good Wishes Your Excellency is pleased to send me on the birth of the Prince of Wales. It must be that, with time, this can advance our

(1) 5th July (3): Ronquillo to Señor: Sim.Estado (Ing) 3963.
(2) Macaulay, 2676, quotes Ronquillo's letter of 26th July/5th Aug. in note.

Holy Catholic Religion, the unity of this kingdom, and perhaps prove to our own convenience. And I say "with time" for at present none of these things is at hand."(1)

That summer our friend was ill-prepared to meet its demands. Crushed by debt and scarcely able even to write - and his hand shows it when he had to - he also told the Marqués in the above quoted letter, that if his situation did not improve, it would be better to die than to lose his reason. Yet, as so often before, Don Pedro persisted.

However, Ronquillo seems in reality to have done little during the rest of August. In July he had passed offices with James for his intercession with Louis over the French embargo on goods in France belonging to Spanish subjects and the Bruges canal. James had made several instances on this though becoming tired of exposing himself to so many negative replies from the French King. He complained that the actions of William and the States-General were not allowing him to do as much as he would have liked in the matter - which was too true, Don Pedro said. Nonetheless, the envoy continued: "I will return to speak with the Earl of Sunderland, more for consolation than from any hope of satisfaction." Yet such willingness on the King's part to co-operate in protests to Louis did not make Ronquillo ready to accept any rumour of his having an alliance with France.(2)

The two men were on the same good terms, with James speaking to/

(1) 8th. Aug; Ronquillo to Balbases; in Rodriguez Villa (Atendado).
(2) 16th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3880.

/to Don Pedro in Spanish even in "the Queen's circle." James gave his reasons for believing the Dutch fleet was not against him, and Ronquillo supported this, "seeming to me", he told his master, "that in doubt being in this is best, and it was necessary to assure him (as is true) that I did not have any more news than the ordinary." The ambassador, as always, feared James being forced to become France's ally, and therefore Spain's enemy, for then, "it would not be a point of religion nor injustice our entering war against him." He told it to the King who did not disagree with this prophecy of what was actually to occur. Ronquillo was, however, careful to avoid a private audience then "because in these one is accustomed to use the opportunity for speaking overmuch." Don Pedro did not know why the Dutch would want to break with James. If they were considering a general conflict, a primary point was not to increase the number of enemies. If the war was to be against France, the Dutch would at least need the English ports in storms. Even should their aim be to stir up trouble in Britain, this action would rather unite the threatened nation than divide it, and moreover France would be England's ally. William, he felt, if he followed such a course, would see in time that the best policy had been to win James over by supporting his unity with the English parliament/

/parliament and people. Ronquillo admitted his lack of information, but judged it in his master's service to persuade without becoming further involved, that the Dutch preparations were not aimed at England unless she wished to enter into a close alliance with France. Common talk had it that such an agreement already existed, but to Don Pedro there was no proof of this then (August 30th.) apart from the French consorting with certain ministers. And even Sunderland was on better terms with the Nuncio and himself of late. Until July 8th. at least when James gave his word to it, Don Pedro could assure Madrid no alliance between England and France had been concluded.(1)

Our next news from Don Pedro is his despatch to Coloma in the Hague (of 10th. September). First of all he mentions that Louis' own preparations had temporarily reduced the fear that the Dutch fleet was against England, and therefore it might be against France. Once again the Spaniard reiterated it would be good for all to unite and turn against Louis. Internally there still remained certain promising signs. According to him, even the principal leaders of the opposition detested the claim that the Prince of Wales was supposititious, and he was sure Halifax, Nottingham, Shrewsbury (sic), Clarges, the Lauders and others were not for any rebellion nor doubtful of the Prince's birth. Many in the army, it was true, did not favour the King's religious policy, but it and the navy would surely defend their country in an invasion. The officers could be depended on and their men/

(1) 30th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro, I, f. 385-8.

/men would follow. But James would like more proof of Holland's friendship by the expulsion of the English exiles - whose influence Don Pedro also condemned -- and a censorship of books there. The King spoke of how he had confirmed the Anglo-Dutch Alliance (in 1685) and all he had done for a close friendship with William, whom he felt was now against him for some "private grudge." "The greatest contradiction" to all these reasons, the ambassador continued in his letter, was the presence of Bonrepaux. Don Pedro had already discovered "the large offers of the King of France" and that James had thanked him for them, but he had not yet been able to find out if James himself had made any, or whether an agreement had been concluded. He pressed Coloma to get William to give some sign of his honourable intentions in order to win James over to the common cause, saying "although they (the Dutch) suspect me through my being a good Catholic, they cannot suspect my being a bad minister of my Master; and, consequently, a good friend of the Prince and the States, desirous of their convenience which is that of all." We see here the beginning of Ronquillo's immediate plan to Get James and William even now to unite against France. The ideas were nothing new but the opportunity had not arrived.

We must remember, while following the succeeding tortuous negotiations, that above Don Pedro's own belief in the plan's merits, his feeling of duty towards James and his sympathy for the King's religious aims, there remained his devotion to the overall interests of Spain and the Common Cause.(1)

(1) 10th. Sept; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3880.

Then the chance came. The day previous to Don Pedro's writing to Colona, the Marquis of Albyville had presented a memoir in the Hague asking why the Dutch preparations were being made when England was a confederate but that James was having to prepare himself for anything. On the same day, D'Avaux, the French envoy presented a parallel memoir which stated the feeling that the fleet was aimed at England and that, in such an event, Louis would aid her because of "bonds of friendship and alliance". In fact, it was the actions of D'Avaux at this time which were going to embarass the independent James and shock him into some more ostentatiously independent action. (1)

The 10th of September, that day he wrote to Colona, Don Pedro had a two-hour interview with James at Windsor. And he had already (as he had told Don Manuel) found out some important facts despite the great secrecy surrounding them. Two persons - probably one of them was Sunderland - had given him some ideas, but he had desired to learn more. James had received him very pleasantly and "without difficulty" he writes, "I could get to the bottom of the whole affair."

France was offering her forces to James on the ground that the Dutch were about to make war on him. Bonrepaux had, in turn, asked reciprocal assistance from him. The King said he had thanked the envoy for the offer, which would be gratefully accepted should it be necessary but that the second point of England sending aid had been refused. For, if the Dutch were to make war on him, it would be for

(1) Copies of these memoirs; ibid.

everything - his person, kingdom and succession - whereas for the French it would be merely the defence of some city or province "acquired unscrupulously". James, therefore, said he was in the same position as on 8th July, when he had told Don Pedro that he had no defensive or offensive alliance with France. And if Bonrepaux had sent off a letter the day before, it would contain this news.

Then the ambassador spoke. He told the King that there had been great harm in the very fact that Bonrepaux had come at all, in view of the hopes for Parliament's success. James did not deny this, but said he had not known of it until informed by Sunderland the very morning of the envoy's arrival, otherwise he would have stopped this. However, Don Pedro was able here to catch the King lying, and said he knew very well Barillon had told him the news the night before Bonrepaux's arrival, because he (Don Pedro) had been present. But the ambassador did not press in the barb.

Don Pedro then passed to the designs of the Dutch giving many intricate reasons why he did not believe they were not going to attack England. Here let me interpose that there is absolutely nothing I have found in the correspondence which bears out Mackintosh's statement that Don Pedro did so "whilst he knew it to be false."(1) For Don Pedro/

(1) Mackintosh, 424.

/Pedro was himself still in doubt as to the fleet's destination and William's plans. But to continue: Ronquillo told the King he should understand Spain's carefulness when there were such motives for suspicion and the worsening relations with his son-in-law. James once again protested all the efforts he had made with Holland, but that now he wanted to see "deeds". However, he would never refuse them, especially since his wish was to unite with Parliament.

Ronquillo went on, in the same conference, to repeat he could not believe James, with his ambitions, would want to abandon himself to the absolute exultation of Louis; that this sending of Bonrepaux was to disturb the Parliament, for France did not wish him united with it.

During their talk, Don Pedro had also hinted to James that he and Sunderland, might be able to get into contact with William through Spain and Austria as mediators. This was an aspect of "The plan".

To all, James replied affably asking Ronquillo to tell his master he was King of England and that he, with the greatest impatience, asked for the end of the Belgrade campaign and peace with the Turks, and that this would indicate his attitude to France. He asked also that Don Pedro with his friends assist him for a successful Parliament.

Don Pedro, while not very hopeful of success in winning over James/

/James to active support of the Common Cause, felt forward steps were being taken, and asked his master whether it would not be a good idea to suggest to Holland the need of not making any more enemies and using the occasion of Parliament to attract James. Don Pedro also believed that his news would please the Prince of Orange. It is easy to say now that a remark like that shows how far moved from the reality of the situation the ambassador was. But let us remember the conditions and secrecy of William's expedition, and we shall see that the plan was not without some basis of hope.(1)

Before going forward with the narrative, it must be mentioned that the other Spanish diplomats in the North, were not of the same opinion as Ronquillo. Coloma, by the middle of September, was convinced that James was obviously against Spain and in alliance with France; he also had a fairly accurate picture of what was going to happen. (see appendix) From the beginning, he favoured the side of William. The Governor of the Low Countries, the Marqués de Gastañaga, who had quite recently conferred with the Prince, though less explicit and more co-operative than Coloma, veered to his opinion. These two men in vital positions, due certainly to circumstances, but also to inclination, did not give Don Pedro's plan the support which might have made it successful.

James continued resentful against France to the amazement of all/

(1) 13th. Sept. (1) and 13th. Sept. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3880.

/all, says Hoffman. Not only was the King annoyed by D'Avaux', but especially also by the news that Louis had sent an express to Gastañaga saying that if Holland made war on England or Fürstenberg Cardinal/ of Cologne he would have to attack her through the Low Countries. Don Pedro felt that if the French memoires made James and William stand together, they would have done good.(1) But James still did little apart from telling the Dutch ambassador his position.(2)

In domestic affairs, the King was paying great attention to Parliament. Don Pedro might hope the King would make acceptable propositions on religious affairs, but he also said the probability of success was not perceptible. Still the ambassador hoped, particularly in James' stand against France, but there were also many who doubted the King's sincerity. Hoffman was frankly cynical and wrote: "The Spanish ambassador flatters himself somewhat with this hope; let us hope that he is not mistaken as more than once already the event has not corresponded to his anticipations." (see appendix)

Letters however from Coloma and Gastañaga were to hasten the pace of Don Pedro's negotiations. The minister in the Hague had written that James' reasons would have been good two years ago, but not then. The Governor felt that James must make a greater show of annoyance with France. These opinions forced Ronquillo to take action. (see appendix) He went straight to James to get him to declare clearly/

(1) 29th. Sept; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
(2) 24th. Sept; Hoffman, in Campana de Cavelli, II, 260.

/clearly that he had no agreement with France and that there was no dissimulation as was spread abroad and suspected. The King must do something to make these disbelievers in his word appear merely malicious. The ambassador also got in touch with Council members; the result was that the Council decided to send a memoire to be presented to the Dutch by Albyville, stating His Britannic Majesty's willingness to take those measures necessary to maintain the Peace of Nimeguen and the Truce of Ratisbon. The ministers asked Don Pedro to write to Coloma to get him to help this on and clear up suspicions. Don Pedro readily did this as well to Gastañaga. He felt an important step had been taken, and in his letter to the Governor he wrote: "The Prince and the States will be able to know now that I am a good partisan of theirs, for I have reduced this King to giving satisfaction and offering to fulfil the treaties."(1)

During these first four days of October, even stronger steps were contemplated: the plan to send a minister with the memoire and also powers to negotiate. According to Navarro, James asked Don Pedro, whom he suggested for the mission, to Holland, and his suggestion of Sidney Godolphin was accepted. However, the day after agreeing to this, James, probably influenced by his clerical advisers, cancelled the whole project, telling the ambassador that "although he was King, he was also a gentleman and that it would not be/

(1) 1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid.

/be decent for him to do anything that might offend that position."
However, Albyville was ordered to present the conciliatory memoire.
It was also planned but also in vain to send another minister to Louis
(see appendix)
to tell him James' intentions, and to complain of French actions.

Don Pedro's secretary says that, after the King's decision not to despatch Godolphin, his master withdrew from advising James, but the events following do not confirm this. However, it might be said that he was gradually being forced by these happenings to withdraw. We know he continued to foster every anti-French tendency, and to try to keep the French party from the King's ear. In this he was consistently supported now by Sunderland and others. At least he felt all was being done that could be done, and that it was apparent
(1)
James had no alliance with France or, if he had, it was now renounced.

But Don Pedro's hopes were receiving severe blows apart from the decision not to send Godolphin to the Hague.

On the 3rd or 4th of October, he had become convinced that William was definitely preparing to sail for England, more, incidentally, on account of evidence he had of the Prince's agreement with certain Englishmen than because of news from Holland. Just then the mail from Spain arrived without money and this put Ronquillo into such a melancholy state that he would not form despatches nor sign them, refusing to eat and saying little. This, no doubt, injured his efforts
(see appendix)
at such a vital juncture.

(1) Navarro I, f. 396.
4th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Gastañaga; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3880.

Still Don Pedro persisted. He felt Louis' attack on the Rhine showed once more there was no alliance between James and the French. He could not see the advantage of William's plan to Spain or the Catholic religion - he told Coloma - who favoured it and was now convinced nothing could be gained by mediation. Gastañaga had sent a man to the Hague to observe and also be ready to help any negotiation forward; and Don Pedro still awaited his news with eagerness. In England he urged preparation for any attack while moderating fear or suspicion of the Dutch at the same time. (see Appendix) Though James still seemed to be for an adjustment and definitely divorced from France, he was doing little and Don Pedro was anxious. All that he had feared seemed to be eventuating. The forces he had hoped to see go against France were now turned against James, who would be forced into Louis' arms while the Emperor was having to fight the French alone; Holland and the Low Countries were also defenceless; and with Schomberg coming it looked like a war of religion under Protestant Princes which would injure both Catholic powers and individuals alike.(1)

But the ambassador did not merely stick to one plan. Immediately on ascertaining to his satisfaction (on October 3rd or 4th) that William was bound for England, Don Pedro began to consider going to meet him as a possible mediator. This, of course, would depend on whether money was available to do so but the ambassador was convinced that, as a good friend of both father-in-law and son-in-law, he could act in this capacity.

(1)18th Oct. Ronquillo to Gastañaga; Sim.Estado(Fla) 3880.

On the basis of an adjustment of religion, a free parliament and unity against France - what all English men of sense were in favour of - something might be worked out. It would, however, depend largely on the popular reaction and James' own willingness to compromise. At any rate it would be a case of some composition acclaimed by the people or ah absolute tragedy. (see Appendix)

But gradually the King was being swung back into French currents. Even by October 11th the ambassador was complaining of the "evil little brothers" around James and the King's not listening to reports from Holland. This was even while Ronquillo was working more and more with the English ministers and James was ostensible still doing so too for an agreement with Holland against France. On the 22nd Don Pedro was angered at "these clerics and friars and miserable Catholics who perhaps will have better fortune living during disturbances than in peace and who oppose any compromise for the supposed sake of religion. He also wrote "It is certain that this King was shewing the way in everything for all men of good judgment, but these "benditos" (simpletons) have diverted His Majesty and we do not yet know what will be the Queen's attitude."(1)

Yet another opportunity for possible compromise with William arose just before despatching his letter of the 22nd to Gastañaga, Don Pedro heard thatfthe Council had finally decided to send a Minister to the Hague to work for an anti-French League.

(1) 11th Oct; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid. 22nd Oct; ibid.

The ambassador realised how much better this decision would have been if taken three weeks before as planned but asked the Marquis to do what he could to help it on nonetheless. But that was not to be. Just then the States-General's awaited answer to James' memoir and offer of October 5th was received. Ronquillo described it as being "more like the preamble to the manifesto they intend to present than a reply to the business in question." Undoubtedly - and according to Sunderland - this affected the immediate royal decision. Yet up to the last moment on the Tuesday previous, James himself seemed in favour of sending Lord Preston. Then unexpectedly and against the opinion of Sunderland and others, he announced to the Council that he would not send him as to do so would be to show fear before the Dutch threat. And Don Pedro cynically adds here "as if he had not shown that already." (see Appendix)

The King was now working not so much in the hope of preventing William's landing as in a frantic final effort to get some support. He had perceived the general truth that the number of troops William had was unimportant. For, as Don Pedro said, if the English people and army supported James, 100,000 would not fulfil William's plans, whereas if they did not, 4,000 would suffice. Hence, during that month the King had been making last-minute concessions to win this popular support. But Don Pedro felt too that James was not giving enough that would really satisfy and convince the people of his sincerity. This was due to these "friars and little Italians, the

Queen, and some five or six crazy Catholic councillors" who agreed on the return of the London Charter and the royal reply to the Bishops, but opposed granting the rest. Thus they had gradually been able to win control over James on the question of the envoy to Holland as well. Don Pedro also wrote of these advisers: "What is worse is that when one speaks to them, telling them that they are right but that they offer ways of avoiding the destruction now in sight, they reply with the hope of a miracle and that they will give their lives, without considering that the good of Religion lies in the preservation of the Prince of Wales and this King. They do not see that doubtless the Parliament would abolish the penal laws and probably grant the King more posts for Catholics of those that there are, and all necessary for going against France. But it is now known that all their devotion is bent against this last point." Meanwhile, some of theseItalians and the Resident Rasigni ("Who is more minister of France than Barillon") had returned to the Queen persuading her that it was infamy to give way and that she should go to Portsmouth en route for France. Don Pedro himself felt that London was the safest place she could be.(1)

Nonetheless, though the French party were now once more so strong, Don Pedro did not give up the hope of perhaps meeting as mediator after the Prince should land. He did not mention this to James as the King was too angry at William trying to force him to agreement by an invasion, but he stood in readiness for such an opportunity.(2)

(1) 25th Oct.(2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid - quotes Navarro, I, f.392.
(2) 29th Oct; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R.(Haye)496.

Then, on November 6th, Sunderland was dismissed and the French party had won almost complete control. From then on, all the more moderate ministers were, as Don Pedro put it, "dumb" either through their not consulting the King nor being consulted by him, or their fear to say what they felt. The "first and only minister" became Melfort with Barillon more and more "el director". In such council as James now had and took, there was no room for expedients.(1)

But let us halt in our story to discover what reaction this torrent of dramatic news had on the Consejo de Estado in Madrid. It must always be remembered that they received it at least three weeks late and that it took six weeks for Don Pedro to get any reply to his questions. In such fast moving conditions, this delay hampered all concerned and often made the Council's orders out of date and useless. It was a constant effort for the ambassador to try to reconcile these with events but, as in previous emergencies, he was able to make many of his own decisions.

At first the King and Council - basing their decision on despatches up to mid-September - supported Don Pedro Ronquillo's plans for trying to get William to agree with James, James definitely separated from Louis and both going together against France. Don Pedro was also to cautiously sound the possibility with James of his fulfilling the Treaty of Windsor. That was on October 6th.(2) On November 4th the Council ordered him not to mention the Treaty.(3)

(1) 6th Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim.Estado (Ing) 3963.
(2) Consulta of 6th Oct; ibid (Fla) 3880.
(3) Mentioned in letter of 6th Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid(Ing) 3963.

The next Consulta to hand is of November 16th when the Council had news up to near the end of October. Obviously the letters of Colona and Gastañaga, as well as events, had had their effect and the Council's view was to disapprove of Ronquillo's plan for a possible alliance of England and Holland. Such might prove dangerous by giving an excuse to Louis to take the offensive. Don Pedro was not to be censured but Gastañaga was to do nothing if contacted by him on this matter. However, should the Governor be asked by the powers themselves , he was to seek orders from Madrid. (see Appendix)

It must have been about this time that Carlos II's personal offer of mediation between James and William was despatched, though this, in turn, was countermanded at the end of November with orders for a strict and inactive neutrality. But there was no question of the Spanish government having given up James or supporting William's expedition at any time - as has been hinted occasionally. Much later the Council approved Ronquillo's and Gastañaga's facilitating James' request for the return of Maestre de Campo Gage from Flanders to serve in England. However, we shall examine more carefully, later on, the basic attitude behind these decisions. (see Appendix)

In the days following the dismissal of Sunderland, James refused to hear any propositions of Ronquillo but the ambassador still stood prepared to forward any compromise. It was just as William was coming near London that Carlos II's offer of mediation arrived.

Ronquillo presented it to James, who thanked him but said he had first to await events. (see Appendix) To him King James was never looked on as deceitful but rather assdeceived by the friars and French party who played upon his pride and prejudices, fears and indecisiveness until he had no support anywhere or choice of any other policy than to turn to France. The Queen knew Louis' conduct but fear gripped her for the Prince, so she also gave up to French influence. As for Don Pedro, he had no way of stopping this, nor had his country had she so wished. He never felt James' action could be criticised under the circumstances. He wrote, "Being without army, vassals or Prince that can aid him, who can disturb or censure his turning to the Turks, how much less the French?" (see Appendix) If only, he felt, the States-General had taken James' memorial as a sincere offer to fulfil the Treaties than a fearful attempt to stop invasion. "I can only say to your Lordship", he wrote to Colona as late as 14th December, "that it was unfortunate they did not admit the proposition the memoir contained, for if they had listened to it, they would have been able to get a clear idea of this King's intentions. And I most morally believe, and through what I see happening, that it was so sincere that things would not have reached the state in which they are." (1) The ambassador was still by no means sure of the sincerity or usefulness to Spain of William's intentions in England.

The "Glorious Revolution" unfolded and its events are described

(1) 14th Dec; ibid.

in great detail in the despatches of Don Pedro, if not always with absolute accuracy.(1) Much of this, though interesting and worthwhile narration, must be passed over as not touching Spanish-British relations directly. However some points are worth mentioning here.

There was the question of a free Parliament which was "a universal desire". Among other demands it would force James to dissociate himself from France and go against her. Don Pedro did not ascribe this to English love of Spain or their commercial interests there (for England was not so dependent on these last and could easily advance them at Spain's expense). It was, he said, due to the harm the two brothers had received from France, the patience with which they (Charles and James) have watched the ruin of their neighbours, and what the Most Christian King had done; it was because Charles and James had thought for the last eight to ten years to introduce arbitrary government, an absolute monarchy, the abolition of Parliament and other liberties on the pattern and with the help of France. For these reasons the people would not be satisfied they were out of danger until all these tendencies had been rooted out. In such a Parliament, it would therefore be quite likely that the question of the alliance with Spain should be brought up. How could he, Don Pedro, complained to the Consejo de Estado, follow the orders of November 4th by not speaking of it ? Not to do so might allow the Dutch and English to agree on a partition of the Low Countries and pillaging Spanish Americas

(1) Foxcroft, II, p.8-9. Re Macaulay's use of Ronquillo's letter of 12/22 November, 1688.

Moreover, the latter was a standing invitation to the English, including James, and Father Petre had even spoken of it already.(1)

Ronquillo, knowing the councils of the King and the desperate state James was in, was not amazed at his decisions; but he was disgusted at the way the English turncoated from their natural sovereign.(2) The flights of James and the Queen and the Prince of Wales he described but did not blame. Navarro tells us that on the afternoon before the King's first flight, his vice-steward Porter came to the Wild House asking Don Pedro to issue a passport for three or four persons with assumed names. This, the ambassador immediately did and handed it over without, as would have been natural in ordinary circumstances, seeking to know the reason from Porter, who was also a very great friend. That evening, Don Pedro, still suspecting the truth, did not go to the Palace for fear James might tell him what was proved the next morning.(3) To know if James was bound for France, ten or twelve hours ahead of time, mattered little, whereas if he was going to Flanders Don Pedro did not wish to have to agree and become involved in the matter. Our friend knew the inconveniences that could arise for Spain from such a refugee on her territory.(4)

And then the conflagration enveloped Don Pedro. The common people, left without the authority of a King, burst forth in uninhibited rioting, giving vent to their passions and prejudices. At nightfall on December 22nd, after destroying the Chapel of the Franciscans, the mob

(1) 6th Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
(2) Chronicle of Events of 22nd Nov to 6th Dec; ibid. Navarro I, f.404.
(3) ibid; f.408.
(4) Ronquillo's letter of 24th Dec. quoted in ibid f.419-22.

/headed for the nearby Spanish embassy.

What followed has been recounted by Macaulay, Rodriguez-Villa, the Duque de Maura and others, and it is not my intention necessarily to repeat what they have said. But perhaps there are points that can be clarified, particularly in the light of Navarro's "life" and other documents.

Why were the crowd attacking Wild House ? Undoubtedly, the principal reason was hatred of Catholicism. It was certainly not just antipathy to Spain. As Don Pedro himself wrote to the Marqués de los Balbases: "For it cannot be doubted that this insult has been committed more through hatred of religion than any other pretext of those that can be considered; since the rabble when the tumult began shouted that they came, not to the house of the Spanish Ambassador, but to the Mass House."(1) And the Spanish chapel had certainly become one of the most important places of Catholic worship in London. We have noted Don Pedro's constant efforts to keep it open and increase its usefulness and how its activities had blossomed during the reign of James II. Though all was kept strictly within embassy precincts and rights, it was apparent to everybody. More immediately, at the end of November, James had ordered the chapels closed in his absence to oppose William and that the priests and furnishings be moved. The Franciscans - and many other priests as well - brought all their ornaments for safe keeping to the Spanish Embassy then. There was great fear that the armed mob who were rioting would attack the chapels and molest/

(1) Rodriguez Villa (Atentado) gives this letter of 24th. December.

Lord
/molest the priests, but the/Mayor and garrison were able to restore order. The Nuncio's house had also been threatened but Don Pedro had a part in obtaining his protection. The King being away the Sunday following, the attendance, particularly of priests, at the Spanish chapel was so large it was necessary to build a third altar for their use. (see Appendix) Soon after only the two royal chapels and those of the foreign ministers remained open, and, according to Don Pedro, the rest of these, for various reasons, did not serve all together the half that the Spanish Embassy chapel was able to. On the 13th. of December, he wrote to Madrid: "The chapel of this embassy now serves for all."(1) In fact, by the time of the attack on Wild House, its chapel was the "Mass House" in London.

Another leading reason for the incident was what the embassy contained. Not that Wild House itself can have housed anything of extraordinary value, though there was of course the well-equipped chapel and Don Pedro's library, "which, if it was not the most numerous, was certainly the most exquisite, precious and selevt anywhere in the possession of a private person".(2) But it was not books the mob sought. People had undoubtedly observed the Franciscans and other priests and individuals (even Protestants) coming to store valuables there in the weeks before, and this had often been without the ambassador's knowledge or permission. More important, James himself had sent the silver and furnishings of the Royal Chapel there, and the priest/

(1) 13th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Mayo) 496.
(2) Navarro I, f. 412.

/priest who had the responsibility, had them brought there at mid-day in five or six hired coaches. Although Don Pedro had hitherto decided not to accept them, he felt this would be "a scandalous act" that could give occasion for saying he also was abandoning the King, and so he received them.(1) It was therefore the greed for pillage that made the destruction so thorough. The plunderers were also spurred to pull up every board in the House after finding some gold under the floor of one of the chaplain's rooms. In the belief that the city without the King was without authority, all the disorderly elements so common in every city then, went their mile under the standard of religious feelings. Macaulay also assigns the reason of Ronquillo's extensive debts never having been paid,(2) and Van Citters at the time certainly speaks of Don Pedro as being obnoxious to the populace through being in debt to everybody and paying nobody.(3) We know also that Don Pedro's financial state that autumn was particularly bad. On October 25th. he told of being en route to the Palace when three or four wives of servants to whom he owed money, surrounded his chair shouting. Not being the time for such a disturbance - as he remarked - he just returned home and did not go to the Palace on the pretext of its being the day for sending off the despatches to Spain. We also remember how his son was imprisoned in 1682. Nonetheless I agree with the Duque de Maura that the statement/

(1) Ibid, f. 413.
(2) Macaulay, p. 317a.
(3) Mackintosh quoted letter of 7th. Dec. 1688 (p. 530).

/statement is a half truth and accept his reasons.[1] Recounting the tale to the Marqués de los Balbases, Don Pedro could write: "Even the very shopkeepers regret and abominate this incident."[2] Undoubtedly the principal motive for the attack was greed mixed with more or less religious passion.

The Spanish Embassy stood unguarded as the screaming horde broke in upon it, for unlike the other Catholic ambassadors' residences, it was not protected by English soldiery. The reason was that Don Pedro had not sought this protection like the rest, until the riot was under way. The two commanders of the troops in London merely laughed at the request when it came, saying that they themselves were thinking of going to Wild House as being safer than Whitehall. This had been Don Pedro's feeling, but now he was not so sure. Perhaps he should have taken warning from the mob's attack in 1686 at the celebrations for Buda's fall, but one cannot blame him. Others, as we have seen, including Protestants, had thought the Embassy so safe that they had stored their possessions there. But the lower classes, always slowest to change their ideas, were still infused with the Elizabethan and Puritan hatred of Popery and relatively untouched as yet by newer, more tolerant attitudes. This, Don Pedro forgot and this, with poverty and unrestricted greed, evolved the tragedy for the ambassador. While the chapel of the Franciscans was being destroyed, another/

(1) Maura (Correspondencia) I, 31 et seq.

(2) Rodriguez Villa (Atentado) gives this letter of 24th. Dec.

/another request was sent to the authorities and militia arrived on the scene only to aid the pillagers. One captain commanded his men to fire, but the soldiers said he could not order this and asked him to show his commission for doing so. Almost at once more than six hundred soldiers of those dismissed arrived on the scene to increase its disorder. The only precaution able to be taken by Don Pedro and his household was the consuming of the Host, and their escaping with their lives by various devious routes.

Nobody seemed to wish to house the homeless Catholics that night. Inhospitably received by the Earl of Craven's household and by the widowed Queen Catherine, refused help by the Lord Mayor, Don Pedro and his forlorn followers, now reunited, were finally taken pity on by the Council. Promptly they housed the ambassador at Whitehall in the Duke of York's suite with royal attention.

Surveying what was left, there was little, the survivors having only what was on them, to discover Wild House was burnt to the foundations and all that had been saved was the horses and some papers. Very little of what had been stolen was ever recovered, though some possibly (see appendix) was.

Almost immediately, apologies, offers of restitution and other aid began to come in. On the 24th. December, Halifax, President of the Council, came to visit Don Pedro, and tell him he must receive the fullest/

/fullest compensation possible, with the house rebuilt on the spot or elsewhere, as a reminder of the deed. All that could be done then - the imprisonment of the guilty - was ordered; and doubtless Parliament would give reparation since the amount was so large. Practically all, particularly the upper and middle classes, were sympathetic. The merchants were not only sorry but fearful of reprisals, and two deputations of those who traded with Spain and the Canaries, came and promised Parliament would make amends. The Dutch were also solicitous. A letter came from William of Orange in his own hand, which mentioned reparation to Don Pedro for his loss; a deputation from the States-General came over to request the same thing from the English government.

The remedy Don Pedro himself recommended was immediate firm but not vindictive reprisals on British goods and property on Spanish territory, to rebuild the Embassy, and pay all those who had lost property in the fire. This might force action from Parliament, and, at least, the Houses should confirm possession of the building. Don Pedro asked for 800,000 to a million escudos as fitting repayment for losses. The merchants who had called on him had begged he temper his representations to Madrid, but he had left them with their fears of reprisal. However, despite the ambassador's repeated counsel on this, the Consejo de Estado held to their opinion that this had been an/

/an act of the mob, and that especially in view of England's relationship with Spain, these steps could not be taken. Therefore what Don Pedro prophesied would happen, if they did not take his advice, took place, namely the English thought no more about the matter while Spanish weakness was once again despised. All that Don Pedro ever received, apart from any goods recovered, was £15,000 of William's "free guift and Royall bounty." (see appendix)

But Don Pedro did not merely remain within Whitehall Palace while such epoch-making events were in progress. His principal anxiety now was what he should do if William entered London. Already he had - as we have seen - been in communication with William, since the destruction of the Embassy, (see appendix) /but I can find nothing that could imply any "understanding" more than past friendship between the two.(1) Now, Don Pedro felt that the reason for Carlos II's order recently received, not to see William (that was for mediation) had ceased. For if the Prince entered London, he did so by consent of his father-in-law; if, on the other hand, the King had left, William would have to take over the government.(2) One event however, had especial weight with the ambassador: James, before departing from his capital for the last time, had told him to do so if he wished. Don Pedro merely wrote/ on December 28th that James had left London at noon that day. "He told me without another word that it would be convenient for me to see the Prince/

(1) Ranke hints this (IV, p. 479)
(2) Navarro I, f. 422 et seq.

(see appendix)
/Prince and do what I could with him." It was not a time when one could appeal to precedents. And so Don Pedro decided to see the Prince and to adjust himself to the status quo: the reign of James II was at an end, and William of Orange was in control.

The Consulta of December 31st. shows that the Consejo de Estado, even without the most recent news, was reaching the same point of view. While His Catholic Majesty could not on the scruple of conscience, openly support an attack on the Catholic religion executed by its enemies, and it would be a bad example to all sovereigns to co-operate in the deposition of a legitimate monarch, still the Dutch were allies and a passive attitude must be preserved. "Reason of State" demanded this, and in fact it was impossible to do anything else but wait to see who obtained control. Spain could not be an arbiter in this business, but would have to work with the master of events. And it was to the crown rather than the one who wore it that His Makesty sent his embassies. It was already clear that Spain would at least work with a "de facto" King of England. (1)

(1) Consulta of 31st. Dec. 1688; Sim. Estado (Ing.) 3963.

II. 1689 - Outline of Political and Religious Events With Reference to Spanish Policy.

1. First Contacts between Ronquillo and William in 1689.

With every new event of the Glorious Revolution, the more Don Pedro Ronquillo felt he must now get in touch with its leader. The orders from Spain not to see the Prince of Orange unless sent by James for some alliance or mediation, were hopelessly out of date already: James had been decisively defeated and William was in control. Besides, the ambassador recognised that all such decisions were founded in the fundamental of what would best serve his master. To be in close contact with the "de facto", even if temporary, centre of the English scene, (see appendix) seemed an obvious duty. As for William himself, he was extremely keen to be on good terms with the House of Austria. He knew that Ronquillo's opinion in Madrid carried a good deal of weight and also what his attitude had been to the Invasion. In fact, it was even rumoured that William was asking Don Pedro's recall. But beyond this, the Prince recognised in the ambassador a staunch supporter of the Common Cause against Louis XIV, who had helped, not only in international but in private negotiations, and who could prove a useful ally in England, and for dealing with Vienna and Madrid. Already Orange had shown his interest in the relationship by letters and/

/and his solicitude over the Embassy's destruction. These the Spaniard had answered in a courteous, if non-committal manner. Therefore, when Don Pedro, through their mutual friend Sidney, asked for an interview, William was glad and prompt to accede to the request. This first meeting took place on Thursday, December 30th. Although that is in the old year - and even more so by the Julian calendar - it marks for us a new start, a new epoch in Spanish-British relations and the career of Don Pedro Ronquillo.

The interview was simple and without formality. Ronquillo went in a hired chair with one lackey to St. James' Palace. After entering by a side door which led to Bentincks' room, where he had a few words with Bentinck, he went along the passages until he met the Prince at the door of his room. There were no servants around but our friend mistook William for one of them until he spoke, because he was wearing a wig. (The Prince told the ambassador he would return the visit in the same informal way.) Their discussion which followed was friendly though William's was "reserved and prudent" in his remarks.(1)

First of all he spoke much of James and said it was a calumny to say he had imprisoned him (as Ronquillo says he himself had said in a previous letter). Proceeding then to the violence Don Pedro himself had suffered, he recommended Spain's taking reprisal action to see/

(1) 3rd. Jan. (2), 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3882.

/see that the English did not forget to give compensation in the midst of their Parliament, saying that there was "more than enough cloth in Spain to cover any nakedness and settle the insult sufficiently."(1) William then spoke of his own affairs - how he had been invited to come to put a stop to the injury being done religion and the laws, and that he would see what the people did by themselves(2) - on which points the ambassador did not answer anything. Ronquillo himself then spoke of the need to oppose Louis, with which the Prince agreed wholeheartedly. Don Pedro also said that war against France would be supported by all parties, to which William also assented. The last matter discussed alone roused any note of discord. Orange asked about the Spanish fleet going to America and what the effect of the French War would have on this. When told of the temporising measures, William was annoyed at what he called the usual Spanish reply. Don Pedro hastened then to assure him that matters arousing his annoyance would be rectified. But as a whole, the meeting had been friendly and the Prince assured the ambassador he would return the visit in the same informal way.

Ronquillo intended returning to see William on January 2nd. on James' behalf at Lord Preston's request. However, he did not do so, feeling he might only be used as a tool for some dissimulations to facilitate James' flight and serve the French party. Don Pedro was soon/

(1) 3rd. Jan; Ronquillo to Balbases; in Rodriguez Villa (Atentado)
(2) Ranke mentions this: IV, 483.

/soon gratified at his foresight.

The ambassador, during those first days of January, was by no means certain of the outcome of events. However, he did not doubt William would attain his ends, though he could not guarantee this would be without a civil war. There might easily be some trouble with his armies which were difficult to control. Already the English were becoming jealous of the Dutch, and saying that while the native Catholics were being persecuted, foreign Catholic troops were allowed. Don Pedro said it was certain there were over 4,000 of these Catholic officers and men "who ask in the streets where mass is held as though they were in Amsterdam." But no doubt this and the fact that while Catholic property was being destroyed, no individual believers were being murdered, encouraged Don Pedro's hopes for the future of his British co-religionists. There were two possibilities, either civil war or hostilities with France. His only policy then could be to see that the national ardour against Louis did not cool during the session of Parliament, necessary for waging such a war.(1)

Two weeks later, on January 13th, a second conference between the two men took place. William was particularly keen to clarify for the House of Austria or other Catholic powers, his moderate attitude to religion. While Don Pedro did not thank him for what he had done to this end, but approved and encouraged his policy. Then they turned/

(1) 3rd. Jan. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla.) 3882.

/turned to the affairs of the Continent. Anxious about France perhaps invading Holland, William was planning to send English troops to Holland. Don Pedro gave some advice on how this should be done legally in accord with the Anglo-Dutch alliance so as to avoid difficulties, and William agreed. Close co-operation between William and Don Pedro in the affairs of the Common Cause against France, had been resumed in earnest. (see appendix)

2. The Question of Spain's recognising William as King and Don Pedro's position.

However, as far as the Spaniard was concerned, the position was still by no means clear cut. His opinion changed with events, which in his present position he merely had to await. Moreover he could not be sure what his country, also awaiting his reports, would decide to do. In fact, both Spain and its ambassador in London were reaching out for a decision. Let us first follow the steps by which Don Pedro Ronquillo reached his.

Throughout January, the ambassador was by no means sure of the eventual outcome of the Revolution. He wrote on January 25th. to his master: "But what seems to me to be without doubt is that although the conduct of the King (James) has been so pitiful, his right and zeal for the Catholic Religion must find in Divine Providence more admirable resolutions, however little we comprehend them." Those very persons who now prevented this, Don Pedro considered the ones by whom it would in the future be fulfilled, for the Prince of Orange could not satisfy all the injustices, differing opinions and greed for great fortunes amongst his present supporters. Thus a large party must arise to re-establish James in an ever more advantageous position than before. Peace between England and France would hasten this; war's breaking out delay it.(1)

Don/

(1) Letter in Navarro, II, f. 37-9.

Don Pedro's legal mind could never fully accept the specious but satisfactory arrangements of the Glorious Revolution. Navarro says that his master was always firm that it did not suit Spain to have this change of monarch on the British throne, though once it was accomplished he "desisted and separated himself entirely from the road he had taken hitherto", helping William to defend the Spanish Empire (see appendix) and France. He wrote in another January letter of 1689 that he had never let himself be led into "the ridiculous confusion" of believing that the Prince of Orange was only coming to make James break with France. All had thought that then, he said, but now that it had eventuated, they held their peace. But the attitude towards William was a difficult question for legitimate monarchs to decide, particularly when they needed allies and support against French aggression. At this time Louis was trying, with the help of the Spanish Queen, to engineer Spanish neutrality, and it was falsely reported in London as a fact. Don Pedro said that while he did not want to answer the proposal because necessity was the greatest law, he foresaw Spain's being mixed by it without being able to avoid war in the end. (see appendix)

During February, Don Pedro became more certain of William's aims against France and his ability as well as desire to protect the Catholics and avoid all idea of a Protestant League. To discourse the pros and cons of Spanish recognition of William was easy, but how/

/how to get out of the practical situation was not so. More and more James was handing himself over to France; Spain needed England's aid with that of Holland and the other allies to have any chance of recouping her fortunes. Such an opportunity should not be lost in standing by "a King who, although legitimate, has fled through lack of courage", he wrote, giving these reasons to a friend on 28th. February. William and Mary had already been crowned; he was the "de facto" King and approving the pretexts for this or not did not concern Spain. Not that Don Pedro's letters had not considered the legal aspect thoroughly to inform Madrid - but that in turn though interesting, does not concern us here.

Yet caution marks the ambassador's final opinion on policy: "I, if I were my Master, would make no public manifestations for just now. I would send a letter to my ambassador in reply to the one received (from William announcing his ascent to the throne) with the order that it be held secret and not presented until war was declared and all other matters arranged. Then it could be handed over and a public audience sought. I would admit his minister, should he send one, and at the same time have one from King James, telling both that His Majesty was not going to judge on who should have crowns or not, and that for this reason he was admitting the ministers of both kings, without prejudice to either. For, it appears to me, that to gain a power/

/power like England carries more weight than a courtesy, particularly when not taking away the right from one (James) through recognising the other (William), and not undertaking anything with Orange nor England in the way of alliance beyond the limits of the Treaty of 1680 against France. And other decisions of more or less convenience could be taken according to the counsel of time and events."(1)

Time and events however gradually counselled a more emphatic stand. On the Continent, Louis was a constant and growing danger to the Spanish Low Countries. There was the threat of the French fleet, and by the end of March, James' Irish Campaign was under way. Finally, the French King, finding his attempts to draw Spain into a position of neutrality or a Catholic League, forced the pace by declaring war on her on April 15th. In a despatch of two weeks later, Don Pedro was able to inform his government that, although it was not yet made public, William was ready to declare war on France and wished Carlos II and Leopold to know this intention. (see appendix) Moreover, Louis having forced war on an unwilling Spain, both England and Spain would have to do everything possible to tighten their relations. Immediate co-operative activity was essential.

In such circumstances, Don Pedro's unofficial position grew more and more difficult. He could only visit the Palace at awkward hours, could present no memoires nor undertake real official business communication/

(1) 28th. Feb. 1689; Ronquillo to a friend in Spain; in Navarro II, f. 84-5.

/communication with the home government. Madrid was practically cut off with all that involved. Useless orders or none at all were being received. Neither was money. Don Pedro was in great poverty; he had also had to move from the house he had gone to from Whitehall.(1) The Grand Alliance was speedily taking shape and questions were more insistent as to what Spain intended to do. To all this was added the anxiety of Don Pedro over William's increasing irritableness at receiving no reply from Spain to his solicitations, and his threats of not sending help to already threatened Flanders. (see Appendix)

Another factor in forcing fuller co-operation between the two men was the personal one. I do not only mean their great mutual interest in the common cause and their past co-operation on its behalf. It was the result of a combination of events. As we know, Don Pedro's views and policy in the Glorious Revolution had differed from those of practically all the other allied diplomats, including Spanish. When his plan failed and events went contrary to his anticipations, his personal position began to be threatened. In fact William himself seems to have suggested at one time Don Pedro's replacement.(2) The hint had hardly to be whispered before personal enemies added fuel to the fire. They complained of his not having sent enough news and for not having had some confident at Orange's side during the invasion.(3) Especially involved in these plottings was the Governor of the Low Countries, trying to get Don Pedro replaced by Baltasar de Fuenmayor, Marqués de Castelmoncayo and former envoy in the Hague

(Correspondencia)

(1) See Maura, I, p.48 et seq.
(2) Foxcroft, ibid. 22nd May; Botello to Juan de Angulo; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
(3) 26th Jan; Ronquillo to great friend in Madrid; in Navarro II f.39 et seq

Castelmoncayo had been keen for the post before this,(1) and now Gastañaga felt Don Baltasar would support his position in Flanders with William. He therefore sent an envoy to London who was to attempt to see the new King without seeing Don Pedro, and to ask him his choice in the matter. Bentinck, however, insisted on the envoy, the Marqués de Bruay, seeing Ronquillo first, which he did, presenting the ambassador with a letter designed for such an eventuality, telling of his only apparent mission; to compliment the Prince and ask for troops for the Low Countries. But this time, however, William had changed his mind and wished Don Pedro at his side. Not that the ambassador would not have liked, for personal reasons, to be released from what Navarro calls "his long slavery" in England (he now began to petition recall with increasing regularity) but he would not, at least, return disgraced, thanks in part to William's support. Nor was Don Pedro only being attacked from one side. When Louis XIV declared war on Spain, he specifically mentioned Ronquillo among others as stirring up hostility in France. In Spain pacifists, though now defeated on the neutrality resolution, made him the object of their attacks. (see Appendix) All these facts made it understandable why for personal as well as political reasons Ronquillo eventually supported the newly-ascended King. But, despite all these reasons, Don Pedro had his qualms about such a decision until it arrived from Spain. Of course he wished himself accredited and able to serve the

(1) 14th June, 1681; Canales to Fuenmayor; A.G.R.(Haye) 79, f.236.

political and military ends of the common cause, but he was not sure - at least from time to time, for Don Pedro's opinion changed on the many, many factors he considered - whether the actual recognition of William as King was the wisest step. He was only in favour of it if William's position seemed stable and permanent.(1) And even after the declaration of war on Spain by Louis, and William's decision to fight France, even despite the Emperor's exclusion of Shelton from Vienna, Ronquillo saw no reason to eject James' envoy from Madrid.(2) To recognise the de facto King might make as many enemies as friends. Though Don Pedro long advocated the policy of blockade, he feared the influence of the more self-interested traders. Could not Spain and the Emperor somehow co-operate with England in war without necessarily recognising William fully as King ? And in June such qualms were aggravated by the fear that William's position was not so secure. For there was widespread grumbling: Ireland was invadedwhile the rest of the British Isles were threatened.(3) But, while recognising these opinions of Don Pedro, one must not over-emphasise them for they were in a very personal sense immediate reactions to immediate events. What really matters, despite the interest of these, is that when his orders came to support William and fully recognise him, Don Pedro not only faithfully obeyed but with all his energy. But, as James became more and more identified with Louis, Don Pedro must have seen his uselessness to Spain. Moreover, as

(1)7th Mar; (1). Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro,II, f.86.
(2) 25th April; Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro, II, f.147-50.
(3) Maura (correspondencia),I,p.57,219.

he worked with William, he saw the new King's utility to Spain and Catholicism. In fact, events during the rest of Don Pedro's life confirmed this purely practical and inductive decision.

In the meantime, what had been the opinions and decisions of the Consejo de Estado, on receiving the abundant reports of Don Pedro ?At first, at the end of January, reading of their envoy's first interview with the Prince of Orange, they decided to wait and see the final result of the revolution. They had no desire to make themselves accomplices in William's deeds against religion and a legitimate King. Ronquillo's conferring with William was, however, approved. Then in February came the repudiation of neutrality but also the Queen's death, which, despite the fervent wish of Don Pedro, managed to waste time.(1) France declared war on Spain on April 15th; Spain on France on May 14th but we have seen already that such a decision and even the necessary concomitant one of co-operating in the Common Cause was separate from that of recognising William. According to the usage of the time, a committee of theologians was consulted on the question to settle the King's conscience. In lengthy, meticulous answers, they did so, recommending William's recognition as King and co-operation with him as an ally, but that no action be taken to maintain him on the throne. On the 23rd of April the Council made the following decisions. Ronquillo's actions were reviewed. He was approved for delaying William's despatch of an English envoy to Spain by suggesting to the new King that

(1) Maura (correspondencia) I, p.116.

affairs in Scotland should be settled first. (see Appendix) They were not so well pleased, however, by Don Pedro's forwarding a letter from the then Prince of Orange telling of his ascension to the English throne. He was to hide knowledge of its arrival for a while . (In time indeed an answer was sent, also informing William of the Spanish Queen's death but this had to be thrown overboard when the ship was attacked by the French en route. The reply finally reached the King at the same time as the letters recognising him and accrediting Ronquillo).

As far as actual policy went, the Consejo de Estado decided to await word on what attitude the Emperor intended to take up to the usurper; meanwhile they would try to keep William's confidence. Ronquillo was permitted to enter agreements with William, if necessary, but these must include conditions protecting the Catholics. In Vienna the same story was being repeated. Leopold had given James' and Louis' suggestions of a Catholic League short shrift and, eventually, Skelton, James' envoy was expelled from Austrian territory. But there, as well, a group of theologians had to be consulted.(1) In Madrid, aside from waiting for the Austrian decision, the Consejo de Estado expelled James' envoy in May,(though he did not leave until October), as he was clearly a French agent. But they grew impatient and fearful of William's reactions to the delay. At first they had sent Don Pedro letters for William, recognising him as King, to be presented when the Emperor's now obvious reply should be received in London. A week or so later, they

(1) 9th June; Burgomayne to Señor: Sim.Estado (Ing)3964.

sent new ones for him to present the letters without awaiting those from Vienna. (see Appendix)

On the 14th of July the first orders with the letters for the King arrived in London. The day previous Don Pedro had received one from the Marquis of Burgomayne in Vienna saying the Emperor had decided to follow the same policy as Spain. The ambassador decided to go ahead at once. (see Appendix) Soon arrangements were completed. The two letters addressed to William as Prince of Orange were presented in private. With the other two (one of recognition and the other his own credentials) Ronquillo made a modified but nonetheless elaborate public entry into the city to present them to the King. This was largely to please William. No expense was spared and Don Pedro received a good reception. On being drawn from the Tower to Whitehall by coach, he was followed by fifty others or more belonging to Peers and more than one hundred and fifty belonging to merchants.(1) Don Pedro said that, on the King learning of the House of Austria's recognition, he had appeared happier than since arriving in England. (see Appendix) The public reactions quieted the ambassador's fears of trouble, especially with the commercial classes. The opposition were not so vocal and the Parliament was to pay more attention to the prohibition of French commerce and to think of encouraging that with Spain. An important quandary was settled: at least Ronquillo's position was clear, with the way clearer before him.(2)

(1) 15th August; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R.(État)607 and enclosures.

(2) See Maura (Correspondencia) I, 57-8, 267-8.

3. The Problem of Alliance with William.

We have already seen how three separate but interdependant factors entered Spanish-British relations. There was the question of how, whether and to what extent to recognize William as King of England, Scotland and Ireland. Then follows what treaties could be used or made with him to strengthen the Common Cause? What practical military and naval steps were to be taken?

It seemed possible at first that the treaties might be implemented without recognizing the new King's position in England as strictly legal. William would probably have been willing to accept this, though such recognition naturally sweetened relations. However, since early in the year and even before, Spanish authorities and the King had been making practical arrangements both defensive and offensive for the Common Cause. For example, we have noted Gastanaga's continuing efforts to exchange cavalry for infantry with William for the defence of the Low Countries.(1) In March, the new King offered Spain 1,500 Irish Roman Catholic troops with which he was saddled, and to send them without cost to Oran for the defence of the Africa coast. (see appendix) Such arrangements can hardly be classed with alliances and appertain rather to their execution, but in the absence of these specifically they show the direction of affairs.

Before his country recognized William, Don Pedro was under orders to/

(1) Lonchay (Correspondance) VI, No. 1978.
See also p.559 above.

/to avoid any talk of a further alliance with England, for Spain feared trouble should William demand her support in any internal rebellion.(1) In May, he was again ordered to make no moves for the ratification of the Treaty of Windsor. However, that same month, the alliance between the States-General and the Emperor was concluded. The Dutch were to invite England to join it; Leopold, the Spanish. This somewhat lessened the danger of the question arising, but it was still there.

By September a new defensive-offensive alliance between England and Holland had been made, and William had resolved to enter the above mentioned Dutch-Imperial Alliance.(2)

In December, Ronquillo, carefully considering the whole matter to his government, could say that he had been able to avoid William's speaking of new alliances. There had only been one awkward incident so far. When Don Pedro was trying, with William to swing the Parliament into a declaration of war on France, the greatest opposition from the Commons was on the ground that it was first necessary for the Emperor and Spain to conclude a new alliance with William, promising no separate peace. However, the reasons Don Pedro appealed to against this were accepted by the Parliament members. The ambassador said he knew that, though William had never spoken of the matter, he always supposed Spain was favourable to him. Another reason/

(1) 9th. May; ibid.
(2) 12th. Sept. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 607.

/reason for delaying the ratification of the Treaty of Windsor or the conclusion of a new agreement, was Spain's hope of gaining some advantages in America. Don Pedro was not hopeful of this, but he felt the English and Dutch might agree to issue a prohibition of navigation in the South Seas and to crush piracy without concluding a new treaty.(1)

One aspect of Ronquillo's policy which remained absolutely constant throughout his mission in London was the effort to improve Anglo-Dutch relations. His letters in 1689 indicate his close watch for any sign of discord between the two countries,(2) but this did not mean he was blind to the possible danger of too close co-operation between them, particularly in the Indies. Don Pedro had sought a copy of an agreement made in April concerning their respective fleets. This was fruitless until a friend gave him one secretly. He immediately suspected one article (the fourteenth) on reciprocal aid between ships and the defence of the colonies; and felt that this was the reason the Dutch ambassadors had refused to let him have a copy. However, Don Pedro decided not to show he knew more than they had told him, so as not to lose his confidant's friendship, and not to give them the opportunity of mentioning a new treaty until orders came from Spain. The Consejo de Estado ordered him nonetheless to get clarification on all points. (see appendix)

In all this question of treaties, one can note how cautious Spain was/

(1) 3rd. Dec. (3a); Ronquillo to Señor. A.G.R. (État) 608. See "trade" also.

(2) 20th. June (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing.) 3964 etc.

/was, how anxious not to be compromised with William, and how watchful to gain something despite actual co-operation in the Common Cause. Yet this must not obscure the last point: Don Pedro was as anxious as anybody to unify and strengthen the allies and their attack on France - as his actions testify.

4. Spain - William and the European Campaign.

Ronquillo's despatches in 1689 were as full of hypotheses on possible strategy as they always had been and were destined to be. The ideal of his plans now was an invasion of France, and it did not change, though events might delay its fulfilment. From the first weeks of the year, he had been urging that William embark troops on the French coast.(1) A major blow to this design was the invasion of Ireland by James and the French. Yet up until May at least, Ronquillo was pressing that this plan still be attempted.(2) By June, however, he was practically convinced there would be no invasion of France from the West that year.(3) But "the most efficacious way of reducing the most Christian King to a just and stable peace" was still to Don Pedro "to make some noise in his house," perhaps from the North and East.(4) Though England might not be able to carry out the plan, her subsidies could help; and Don Pedro was eager for an invasion of France from the upper Rhine and was trying to hurry on English efforts to buy Swiss support. But, he wrote, "the slowness of this King and the phlegm of the English make me despair."(5) Don Pedro did, however, also realise how tied William was by domestic affairs and more and more the importance of the Irish campaign. Yet stalemate in Ireland as the year progressed, made him feel there should be a diversion elsewhere, and in December we find him supporting the instigation of a general rising of Huguenots near the Spanish border - similar in a sense to his earlier plan of invasion of France between/

(1) Maura (Correspondencia) I, 52.
(2) 9th. May; Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro II, f. 170-3
(3) 6th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
(4) 3rd. Dec. (8); Ronquillo to Señor. A.G.R. (Etat) 608.
(5) 6th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.

/between Bordeaux and Bayonne by English and Dutch troops. He also advocated another invasion of France by the Barbettes and hence supported the States-General's negotiations with the Swiss and the Duke of Savoy.(1) Incidentally, he had continued to act as an intermediary between Gastañaga and William for arranging the defence of the Low Countries.(2)

On the sea, Ronquillo pinned his faith to the Anglo-Dutch naval forces, and he constantly instanced their speedy preparation. Not only was he anxious that the French supplies to Ireland be stopped but that ships be sent to the Mediterranean to guard the Italian and Catalonian coasts. A no less important object of both fleets would be to blockade French commerce. That summer, however, the French squadron from Toulon was able to slip past Admiral Hubert's fleet into Bristol and Don Pedro could then see the advantages of keeping the whole Anglo-Dutch fleet together to protect the British Isles from so near and formidable an enemy. Nonetheless he had his orders to urge the sending of ships to the Mediterranean to act as an influence in an anticipated Papal election. Don Pedro told him that a favourable result at the conclave would depend on the presence of allied might. The King was, however, as keen as Spain that the next Pope be as anti-French and pro-confederate as Innocent XI. And so, all things having been considered, he decided to send a fleet to the Mediterranean.

(1) 3rd. Dec. (9); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Etat) 608.
(2) See Ronquillo - Manuel Coloma Correspondence; A.G.R. (Haye) 497.

As a matter of fact it could not arrive there in time, but even without its presence, a pro-allied Pope was elected; and favourable events to the Common Cause in Britain and on the Continent closed the year. (see appendix)

5. William, Don Pedro Ronquillo and the Spanish Queen's Journey.

One of the principal reasons for William's decision, apart from the approaching Papal election was his promise of a fleet to conduct the new Spanish Queen Mariana of Neuberg from Holland to Spain. It is to this delayed and infinitely bothersome negotiation that we now turn. Both Spain and Carlos II were eager for an heir to the throne and they had not been long in seeking and finding a new Queen. By August, the Count of Mansfelt, the Austrian minister to Spain, and master of the negotiation, was in London en route for Neuberg to see her married by proxy and escorted to her husband. The sea route from Holland to northern Spain had been decided on and so the Count was soliciting a fleet from William to protect their return from possible French attack. Though Mansfelt directed the preparations he depended considerably on the advice and support of Ronquillo in London and Coloma in the Hague. Don Pedro's special responsibility was to keep in close touch with William, and to see that the fleet was ready to meet and transport Mariana to her new home. The lengthy and detailed arrangements which stretched into the following year do not really concern Spanish-British relations to any important degree, and Don Pedro himself did not have to overcome any great difficulties despite its bothersome delay. Further details may, however, be found in abundance in various archives. (see appendix) What simplified the whole matter/

/matter for the ambassador was the English King's co-operative attitude from the start of the negotiations until their finish, though it was obvious that the delay moderated William's pleasure in affording every facility.(1) Don Pedro was not so sure of the "lying laziness"(2) of William's new subjects; he also knew the sailors concerned were merely eager for their remuneration and he urged Spain repaying them promptly; and this keeping English officialdom up to scratch necessitated several special journeys to Hampton Court and elsewhere. It was ultimately decided that the royal progress should anchor off Portsmouth en route for Corunna. Don Pedro was able to complete the arrangements , but even had the Queen arrived in December as expected, he would not have been able to attend on her. His old enemy, the gout, prevented his walking and even in early February when the Queen did finally reach Portsmouth, Navarro had to carry his respects to her. Then messengers from William and Mary, the Prince and Princess of Denmark and the widowed Queen Catherine also presented greetings. Don Pedro speaks of William's own "incomparable anxiety to see the Queen, our Lady in Spain"(3), and both men must have been relieved to learn the fleet had continued its tempestuous course south under Admiral Russell. The English officers were "all dissatisfied both with their presents and manner of reception"(4), and the whole affair must have strained William's patience/

(1) 29th. Nov; Ronquillo to Mansfelt; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
(2) 15th. Nov; ibid.
(3) 31st. Jan., 1690; ibid, 3965.
(4) Letter to Shrewsbury; 19th. April 1690; in Stanhope, p.4.

/patience - but it was just one more sign of increasing Anglo-Spanish co-operation, and the new King's willingness to satisfy Spain in the interests of unity for the Common Cause.

6. Spain and British Domestic Affairs.

a.) General.

During 1689, as his fat despatches bear witness, Don Pedro Ronquillo was carefully trying to give the fullest and most accurate account he could of domestic affairs. These extensive and interesting narratives do not concern us here apart from the policy they indicate Don Pedro took up towards British internal questions.

Spanish support of William was indirect, that is to say, while Spain fully supported the King in the war against France, she abstained from any step that would maintain him against James. If William was to speak of the suppression of his predecessor and possible Spanish action, Don Pedro was to point out carefully and with no sign of lack of confidence, that the defeat of France was the important point. Everything else was to be referred to Madrid. This policy, Don Pedro followed as far as possible throughout the year, for indeed problems arose which made its fulfilment more difficult. On December 3rd. he wrote of his general plan of action as follows: "William had never spoken hitherto of Spanish assistance for his preservation on the English Throne" and with particular care I abstain from speaking on the affairs of this Realm, but with attention that this does not appear a studied attempt to avoid doing so. For the few times this King has spoken to me on the matter, I have not excused myself/

/myself from saying what I think - - - And with the rest I keep silent saying that I know they do not like us foreigners to mix in their private negotiations. And in truth in this way I know more of their plans than if I were to ask them to tell me these. And to tell all, I do not hold it in Your Majesty's service for the English to say there is a Spanish Council as they say there is a Dutch one."(1)

All matters touching Parliament he avoided, save to try and direct its members' attention to the war against France and also to attempt to modify their actions against Catholicism and Catholics. (See later). Don Pedro knew many of the M.Ps. and was in close touch with them. Goodricke among others, still brought him information on the Commons' debates. However, there is little to indicate any bribery or serious manipulation on the ambassador's part. (see appendix) He was naturally pleased at Parliament's generousity with the King. So was the Council of State: it was left "with envy at the ease with which that King finds ten million pesos of subsidies - - ".(2) Don Pedro felt that all the past passion and hatred of the English for their recent Kings had been due to Charles and James not having wished to follow the wholesome desire of their vassals towards their preservation and that of all Europe. But despite such encouraging signs, Don Pedro was not completely assured. He was critical of the English ministers' lack of ability, particularly Shrewsbury (see later), and he wished some/

(1) 3rd. Dec. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
(2) 7th. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
Consulta of 12th. Dec; ibid.

/some of these could be demoted. While also not uncritical of the details of William's policy, he generously realised the immense problem before the King and the burden he bore. He feared, moreover, Jacobite and French intrigues and invasion in England, and even more in Scotland, for his opinion of the Scots had not improved. Their greatest fidelity was to money and he speaks also of their poverty and greed. Hence, Louis would be able to gain more with one escudo there than with ten in England.(1)

(1) 28th. Feb; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo, 283, f. 128.

b.) Spain and the Irish campaign - Don Pedro's "Conscience Problem"

Then there was the running sore of Ireland. Yet, if only the English were obedient and the government without a few of its ministers, the conquest of that island could perhaps be won in France. However, Don Pedro saw with time that, for William to turn his full attention to the Continent, the three kingdoms must be at peace under the new King with James thoroughly defeated.(1) Internal unity in the British Isles, that continuous preface to English activity in Europe, continued to be a cornerstone of Spanish policy there. And as time went on, Don Pedro strained the cautious orders and even his conscience to the utmost to help this on. Denmark had now joined in the struggle against France, and in August, William had concluded a treaty with its King. One of the terms included was the sending of 7,000 Danish troops, which were to be used in the Irish campaign. Ronquillo was pleased with the arrangement and appears to have helped it over difficulties. (see appendix) But he evidently wondered whether he should have done so, for on December 3rd. he wrote to his master as follows: "I would indeed like to see the Common Cause against France have the same opportunities (as elsewhere) in what concerns Ireland - - ". (William must be victorious there).. "And so, it is impossible on this principle, not to speak about the conquest of Ireland, and indirectly on forcing King James out of that Kingdom. And as this has me weary with/

(1) 3rd. Dec. (12); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 608.

/with some scruple, perhaps Your Majesty will allow me to give an example. It is what I solicited and encouraged in the adjustment of the 7,000 men from the King of Denmark, and other matters of this kind which are absolutely necessary to the Common Interest, to the preservation of the allies and to be able to wage a more vigorous war on the most Christian King - - -. It is certain that if the quarrel was simply between Kings James and William, I would let them follow their fortune, only observing and hearing what passes - - - And although Your Majesty is served to advise me that you have good reasons for your policy on these indirect cases, nevertheless for my greater peace of mind I send these (examples) to Your Majesty, so that being clearly informed on what I am doing, you may supply surer orders and rules for me to follow." On receipt of this, the Consejo de Estado immediately determined to examine the question in detail. It was first forwarded to the same three theologians as before, who had helped frame the previous orders on Spanish policy towards William. In time lengthy and detailed answers were returned to the Council and examined. Replete with illustrations, both historical, religious and otherwise, the opinions of the Archbishop of Caller and Padres Cornejo and Palazol more briefly added up to justifying Don Pedro's conduct. As for the Council as a whole, it agreed. Direct aid signified Spanish troops being sent to Ireland and could not be permitted/

/permitted, but indirect aid was allowable, hence Don Pedro had not incurred moral blame, through his decision to forward the despatching of Danish troops there. In future, he was to follow orders but they showed they understood and appreciated his superior knowledge of the situation for judging it. Fortunately, as was recognised, Spain did not have troops that could be requested for an Irish expedition, so the matter would be allowed to rest. But though this distinction between direct and indirect support of William against James never arose to really affect Spanish-British relations then or later; its very existence proves for us the attitude of Spain to the Glorious Revolution.

7. Spain and Religious Affairs in Britain.

When James left London for the last time, we know he left the Catholics in the ambassador's care. This, we also know, was nothing new, for his own master's instructions had ordered that from the beginning. Up to the very moment of William's arrival in London, Don Pedro was sure that the Catholics would reap the whirlwind of James' foolishness, but he was speedily disillusioned as to William's attitude, and soon saw that his co-religionists had only to act peacably to avoid being molested. He recognised that it was mostly the proclivities of some of these to France and James' absolutist tendencies rather than the quiet practice of their beliefs that roused public opposition. However, he also knew now that any Catholic proselytising would be opposed by all, that the majority were definitely against a reconverted Great Britain.(1) Commentators like Lord Macaulay and the Duque de Maura have directed our attention to quotations which show Don Pedro favourably compared the tolerance they enjoyed with the intolerance given the Protestants in an Ireland dominated by James; how the ambassador promised the Pope, through the Marqués de Cogolludo, that he would secure a better and more stable position for them than during the previous reign. Naturally Don Pedro's efforts were without fanfare but they must have had some moderating effect on inflamed Protestant passions now. Now assured there was no Protestant League, he/

(1) 14th. Jan. 1689; ibid (Haye) 496; also Maura (Correspondencia) I & II.

/he tried to remove all pretexts in internal British legislation, not only for the faithful being disloyal, but also for Catholic powers offended by it, forming a Catholic League with which Louis could play havoc. The French had also been trying to say all Catholics were for making peace, thus rousing the Protestants and disuniting the confederacy.(1) As a matter of fact, both he and Navarro still did not have much opinion of the English Catholics, and Ronquillo says they only believed what came from France.(2) He wished to "calm the bad judgement of the Catholics who do no more than talk without having done anything in the King's (James') service. It is impossible, but it would be of the greatest service to the Catholic religion for them to keep quiet so they do not suffer for it."(3) For this and toleration in England would protect the innocent and clear away any basis for French divisive arguments there and abroad. So Don Pedro directed his efforts to quietly championing tolerance.

In particular he tried to get the release of Catholics from prison, which was a policy of relieving the Catholics without embarassing the Government. In April he was requesting the freedom of Catholic ecclesiastics imprisoned at Newgate.(4) Early in November, when Hales and his brother and Dr. Walker, the Oxford Professor, were called before the Commons, and the Earls of Peterborough and Salisbury before the Lords, Don Pedro hoped to help to save them. (see appendix) And these are only a couple of instances.

(1) 7th. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
(2) 21st. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
(3) 14th. Mar. 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro II, f. 103-4.
(4) 6th. April; Ronquillo to Shrewsbury; P.R.O. S/P 100/55.

Though the ambassador did not meddle in the Parliament resolutions, he carefully watched anti-Roman Catholic Legislation. William himself was as co-operative as possible on this point, eager not to irritate his Catholic allies. A small instance of this concern of the King was seen when his Council was discussing the proposed royal address before the combined Houses in October. It was suggested that William be said to have preserved the Protestant instead of just the Anglican religion. The King had resolutely opposed this because it would make him appear a leader in a Religious War and thus sow distrust among his Catholic allies. And Don Pedro naturally applauded this sentiment.(1) Though Don Pedro did not feel any warmth of obligation towards the English Catholics as a whole, he still made great efforts to have a chapel since his and the Queen-Widow's were the only ones allowed. This would not only be to the service of God but that it might be seen how His Catholic Majesty always welcomed and protected Catholics. More than £800 of the money given by William for the destruction of Wild House was devoted to its construction and furnishing; some money was also spent to redeem some of the former chapel's ornaments which had been robbed. Though the same number of chaplains were maintained, its average monthly expenses from 1689 on were at their lowest for the whole period under consideration. No more sermons were allowed and one gathers that in general the Spanish chapel's activity had greatly decreased. (see Appendix)

(1) ibid.

In fact, with William's advent, Spain's policy in England reverted to that of quietly protecting the Catholics and avoiding religious controversies and troubles. There was no further word or opportunity of helping to advance their faith. Nonetheless Don Pedro realised that in time, with patience, the situation might be steadily improved by a more stable and salutory advance than in the previous reign.

8. Personal Aspects and Summing Up.

There is little more to say before summing up these eventful years for already we have noted how Don Pedro's poverty and health affected his work, and how he desired and requested retiral to Spain. But his experience and the respect he obviously received, not only (see Appendix) from the King but even from his English subjects, made the Consejo (see Appendix) de Estado keep him in London.

In contemplating the eventful years of 1688 and 1689, Don Pedro must have felt a mixture of distress and relief. From the personal aspect he would be distressed at the thought of having lost Wild House with his precious books and papers. He had never sought a change on the English throne and he had had to watch James throw away the opportunity of uniting with the allies and helping Catholicism in England, for his plan had failed. But, on the other hand, England was now, with Holland, fully supporting Spain against France. A Grand Alliance, such as he and others had worked for in the years before, was now a maturing reality. Moreover, William was proving a friend to Spain and himself, and protecting the Catholics. Don Pedro was enjoying a place in England beside its King he had never hadbefore; and his position of respect in Spain was undamaged by events. As for the relations between Spain and England, nothing had been able to stop the tide of closer co-operation. The Treaty of Windsor was now being fulfilled.

However, one point is also certain from the correspondence: relations with the England of James II had been an improvement on those with Charles II. Apart from a few diplomats, like Colona and Burgomayne, few in Spain desired the overthrow of James and the government itself had had no part in plotting it. And we have seen the care with which Spain recognised William and to what extent it did so. If any further proof of this is needed, the corrected minutes of letters to William from Spain then and later may be consulted.(1) Spain was, of course, not in a position to do much but she certainly never approved or encouraged the Glorious Revolution; she merely adjusted herself to it. The only effort at being a participant was as a mediator, and Don Pedro Ronquillo's "Plan" was the boldest attempt. Did it have any chance of success ? Navarro, perhaps over enthusiastically, claims that it did, that had James sent Godolphin in early October, things would have worked out differently. Knowing what we do now, we may doubt it, but that, on the information available to him, the plan would seem logical and natural, is also undeniable. Ronquillo was far closer to the facts of James' character and his relation to France than many: the opportunity was perhaps there. But maybe it was too late. And, of course, Don Pedro's sense of the English situation as a whole was inaccurate. Though Macaulay's attribute of "bigoted" is too strong to be applied to the ambassador, particularly (as the Duque de

(1) A.H.N. Estado 2787:7.

Maura points out)[1], considering the age, he did not understand what the English people really wanted . . . apart from war on France. Despite his frequent criticism of James and discernment into the religious and political affairs of the reign before the Revolution, a good number of his statements on these afterwards, which are frequently quoted, were wisdom following the event!
His strong, authoritarian and religious convictions vitiated considerably the value of his usually cautious and acute judgment. However, the plan itself with its aim was a worthy one and it, like these two years, reveals in a very special way the experience and subtlety of Don Pedro Ronquillo as a diplomat.

(1) Macaulay, 401, Maura (Correspondencia) I, 52.

III. Spanish-British Maritime and Commercial Relations 1688 - 1689.

1. 1688

Spanish-British trading and maritime affairs during the last year of James II's reign followed the same trends as they had hitherto; for of course, there was nothing to say that this would be its end. Seamen and traders, therefore, followed their occasions, lawful and unlawful, until conditions changed so speedily at the year's close.

British industry and commerce in Spain increased, partially because it tended to drift away from France. For example, the British merchants who had established the Brandy Factory in Barcelona two years before, now wished to move a soap factory there from Marseilles. There was also the question of another Brandy Factory being established at Malaga, Vélez or Marvella. The Consejo de Estado approved of such removal of commerce from France, and recognised the asset of such industry to the country. Though Spain granted such privileges, she also complained of the high taxes her subjects had to pay in England, and was considering what could be done; either to get these lowered or those for the English in Spain raised. (see appendix)

The usual trading disputes, but less and less of them each year, came up for solution. In June, Don Pedro had to present a memoire complaining of a British ship having carried from Mallorca, Jews/

/Jews fleeing from the Holy Office. The Viceroy had tried to interfere on the Inquisition's request, but to no avail, the English merchants appealing to the treaties. This memoire requested no recurrence in future of such incidents "so contrary to the service of God and His Catholic Majesty". The Spanish asked that no persons be taken abroad unless with His Catholic Majesty's licence; and claimed that their authorities could make inspections when "contraband" was suspected. The incident has little importance apart from showing the wide variety of these which took place. and the continued difficulty of interpreting the commercial agreements between England and Spain. (see appendix)

Far more important was the situation in the Indies. There, Don Pedro continued to feel, was the core of Spanish recovery, and with rumours of James allying with Louis, he did all he could to prevent this for fear of its effect in America. As we know, he had already recommended a Spanish-British agreement on American trade to counter the Anglo-French one of 1686. The Council of the Indies, however, was against this, not wishing to admit anything contrary to the famous Bull of Alexander VI. This last named document continued to be, therefore, the final appeal for Spain's possessions in America. (see appendix)

But in practice, co-operation and other intercourse continued as before. In the sphere of more "regular" trade, difficulty over the "Asiento" had arisen, but it was not to come to Don Pedro's attention until/

/until the following year. At this time, Don Pedro received direct information on the Indies from the agent of the "Asiento" in Jamaica, Santiago de Castillo, (see appendix) of whom more anon.

Piracy and illegal trading by both parties continued, and the usual difficulties arose. In may, a report reached London of a particularly violent incident. An English vessel, unable to carry out diving for silver, had taken on goods in the English colonies and was passing to trade illegally in Puerto Rico, when it was attacked by a Spanish vessel. The English ship was damaged and boarded, then the captain was hung and a large portion of the crew shot. This atrocity was ascribed to either the Armada de Barlovento or a Biscay vessel. Don Pedro said, however, that in London, practically no one, including the most anti-Spanish, were condemning the action itself, but only its cruelty. Felipe de la Guerra, the Spanish Consul in London, against Don Pedro's better judgement, had made an unsuccessful deal for a letter on the case; and the ambassador himself had been unable to secure any other information. Though reprisals were threatened, we see in this once again, the gradual change in the public attitude to such incidents by their not condemning the actual legality of the Spanish action.(1)

In the last section on trade, it was seen how Don Pedro's plan for an English fleet helping to clean up the illegalities in the Indies/

(1) 24th. May (5); ibid.

/Indies appeared to be on the verge of materialising. The Consejo de Estado had granted 60,000 pesos for Captain Robert Holmes[1] to try and prevent the founding of a Protestant republic on Spanish territory, and how the ambassador had hoped this fleet could also rid the Caribbean of some of its pirates. The Consejo de Estado, however, were firmly against this, saying that the Armada de Barlovento were already in the Indies for the purpose and four ships were being despatched to the Viceroy of Peru with the same object. (see appendix) Early in March, on receiving detailed reports from Ronquillo and Coloma that the plans for the Republic were not so far advanced as at first thought, they ordered Don Pedro to delay payment of the grant to Holmes meantime. (see appendix) The Council firmly stated again that it was not to be used to subsidise the fleet's going against pirates. This does not seem to have changed Don Pedro's opinion, however, and a little later we find that he provided letters of introduction to Spanish colonial governors, to one Steven Lynch, and other English who were going out to bring the pirates to order. The Council, filled with distrust of the Franco-British agreement on America and determined to allow no precedents in this for other nations, ordered their envoy to remedy what he had done if possible. The Governors concerned of Cartagena and Portobello were also written to, to prevent the matter going further. (see appendix) But it shows us how strongly Don/

/Don Pedro Ronquillo felt Anglo-Spanish co-operation in the Indies was the only way to root out piracy; and how independently he acted in the matter. Navarro speaks of how much his master did to stamp out piracy in the Indies and to cultivate better relations between the Spanish and English Governors out there.(1)

Of course, the closely related question of recovering silver from sunken galleons continued. In late December 1687/early January 1688, Don Pedro heard of men seeking permission to pass to the South Seas, some of whom were wishing to do this though all, he suspected, were as usual bent also on piracy. He immediately went to see James and spoke to the King of the serious consequences such a resolution might have on Spanish and also English commerce. James then summoned seven of the richest and leading merchants with Spain, and in their presence, declared against requests for permission to dive for silver, and that any who went to the South Seas were practically pirates. Don Pedro was delighted at this "business of great consideration", and wrote that "a declaration to equal this has not been witnessed nor been possible to obtain, even in times of the closest and firmest friendship". The ambassador also hoped that other nations would follow James' example. (see appendix)

In the meantime, Don Pedro, in fulfilment of orders from the previous year, had arranged with one, Don Joseph Azevedo, to go to Spain/

(1) Navarro, I, f. 430.

/Spain for this purpose. Our friend was eager that he should get there safely to take advantage of the summer weather for diving off the Spanish coast; and Azevedo left in early June, 1688. (see appendix)

By July, the threatening international situation in Europe, as well as the national situation in England, began to affect maritime and trading affairs.

Due to the rumpus over the Bishops and the Prince of Wales' birth, Don Pedro was unable to pass offices on a trading complaint.(1) And on 25th. October, he had to write that - "with the threats (i.e. of invasion) commerce has ceased".(2) Thereafter, the envoy does not mention the subject except to express the fear, if Spain was not alert, of England and Holland threatening her in the Indies.(3)

In summing up the trading and maritime affairs between England and Spain from 1685, we can only - as in the political - see improvement. This was due in no small part to the attitude of James II, which facilitated the solution or <u>at least the sincere attempt to solve</u> many points of difference on pirates, diving for silver, and so on. We have also noticed the same desire for settlement and order increasing throughout the nation. This spirit alone could unite with the willingness of Don Pedro to bring improvement. That does not mean that nearly all his or Spain's fears of England were set at rest, but a closer rapprochement was clearly evident.

(1) 21st. June; ibid.
(2) 25th. Oct (2); ibid (Fla) 3880.
(3) 6th. Dec; ibid (Ing) 3963.

2. 1689 - Maritime and Commercial.

The reign of William III was to pose new problems in maritime and trading affairs as circumstances forced these to pass from a peace-time to a wartime basis. This changeover was accomplished nevertheless without great difficulties arising between Spain and England. The closer co-operation in the political was reflected in the economic, and certainly William's own desire for this had a strong and healthy influence.

The era of a more total war was approaching. One of the new King's plans was a trade blockade of France by the allies. This was nothing new: we have already seen how even Spain had attempted it during 1684-5. We have also witnessed Don Pedro's fears of its effect on the merchants and trade of both England and Spain. The decision once made, however, trade in general adjusted itself to the conditions.(1) England prohibited commerce with France and Spain gradually followed, while both tried to intensify inter-allied buying. The loss of such trade to France was judged as more valuable to the allies than her trade had been to them. But this is not to say that merchants liked the position and did not sometimes try to evade the regulations issued by both countries.

It was soon after the Spanish and Imperial recognition of William in July that the English Parliament prohibited trade with France./

(1) 18th. July (1); 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 607.

/France. The Spanish were slower in enforcing such a prohibition and this gave rise to complaints from the English trading population who saw themselves deprived, while others enriched themselves. Don Pedro himself advocated such a prohibition by Spain and its strict enforcement; and several of his letters (particularly in December) deal with the subject. In November, the Dutch ambassadors had presented him with a copy of a letter from Spain saying that the Spanish authorities were going to allow for a consideration payment for French goods already in Spain when war was declared. William, influenced also by his Parliament's complaints spoke of this, asking that French commerce be prohibited as vigorously in Spain as in England and Holland. Some M.Ps. also mentioned the subject to Don Pedro. They did not mind the French goods already there being consumed in Spain or its colonies, so long as French property and debts were held there in conformity with the declaration of war. "The position is that the strength of commerce of all nations and particularly France's, depends on that of Spain." - - - "This laxity therefore offends them because they know that the most Christian King will never lack money while his Kingdom has trade. For as long as there is a real in it, even the last maravedi will enter his coffers, and this will not be so unless there is commerce - - - I give this account to your Majesty with the especial wish that everywhere/

/everywhere and particularly in Spain, they proceed with great severity against those who have trade with France, because I clearly see that there is no other way of waging war well on her except through this." Don Pedro then referred to the great efforts of the other allies in this, and also of the Marqués de Gastañaga's prohibition of French trade in the Low Countries.(1)

Yet our friend did not forget lesser Spanish interests in this. A couple of weeks after the above letter, writing to the Marqués de Gastañaga about reported evasions of such regulations at Ghent, he pointed out that the Spanish, compared with the other nations, had less to lose by its interruption due to their poor export trade.(2) Dealing with merchants of any nation was not easy then, and trouble also arose between English traders and Spanish authorities, who were trying to enforce the blockade. (see appendix)

Incidentally a lesser but important aspect of the embargo was also started that year; plans for postal services to avoid French territory were begun by William. (see appendix)

The question of the British fleet's movements has already been considered, for though this concerned maritime and commercial affairs, it had primarily political importance. I have not, however, mentioned an incident proceeding from the English request for reception of the fleet into Gibraltar, which has particular interest for the light it throws/

(1) 3rd. Dec. (5); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 608
(2) Lonchay VI, Nos. 1992 and 1993 (from Navarro II).

/throws on Don Pedro's opinion of Shrewsbury. That spring of 1689, plans were already under way for the fleet's passing to the Mediterranean, and in late April/early May, the newly-appointed Secretary for the Southern Department presented a memoire asking the continued protection of English ships in Gibraltar and Mahón. The style and form of the request were not very regular and this, Don Pedro felt, was due to the Earl's lack of experience. The ambassador did not, however, go to Shrewsbury, but showed it to Dijkveld, who was annoyed over the matter saying it was "no way to ask for things of such importance without telling Spain of their plans." Don Pedro sent the memoire to Spain as it was, but told the Dutchman he could not vouch for what answer it would provoke. Shrewsbury's style had also been no better in a similar memoire handed to the Florentine Resident for much the same facilities at Portoferrajo. Don Pedro did feel, however, that should Spain declare war (for this was before that) a record of all done and planned by the Dutch and English on this point would be given. In June, the Consejo de Estado ordered full co-operation though rigid maintenance of former (see appendix) arrangements and no questions to be asked on what England intended in the Mediterranean, except when she gave information.

Why this incident is relevant to mention is that Macaulay wrote that "nobody - - except the solemn formalists at the Spanish Embassy thought/

/thought his (Shrewsbury's) youth an objection to his promotion." (p. 349). Perhaps knowledge of this occurrence prompted his remarks, but it may also supply some validity to Ronquillo's (see appendix) objections.

Events of more importance took place in the Indies. It was quickly apparent after the Revolution that the English colonies were in favour of William. But the English and Dutch feared France getting power in America in the name of James, and William arranged to send a fleet of ten hired warships to America with Colonel the Governor of Jamaica. Despite their former opposition to foreign fleets in the Caribbean, the Council of the Indies, to whom the news was referred, made no complaint. (see appendix) In fact, the Spanish were relieved for already the Junta de Guerra had been wondering what attitude the fleet going to Nueva España should take to English ships. The royal decision was first an interim neutral one, namely that if the ships with patents from James also held patents from France, they were to be treated as enemies; otherwise whether they had patents from James or William, they were to be treated according to the treaties. (see appendix) By August, however, Spanish vessels were ordered to treat those in possession of patents from James as enemies. The Spanish feared the colonies being dominated by the French in the name of James, or becoming a free republic - - "to which New England has always had

a/

/a great tendency" and a danger to their own possessions.(1) And the fear had some foundation. In June, Don Pedro had reported two Irish officers having asked patents of James the previous December to go to the South Sea. James, while he had refused them, had said that if they returned they would be welcomed, though if attacked they could not be protected. This must have made Don Pedro feel not so sure of James' former sincerity in crushing piracy. At any rate, Jacobite privateers existed and the ambassador now bent his efforts to strengthening William's position in the West Indies. (see appendix)

It was with energy that Don Pedro again urged forward any steps with the new Government which might reduce piracy. In June when he told William of the Irish officers, the King was quite ready to prohibit navigation to the South Seas at once.(2) The envoy also feared the influence of the former Morgan and Albemarle parties regaining power in Jamaica, and he requested that he and Spain's feelings be consulted when new governors of Jamaica were appointed.(3) This was particularly relevant that summer, as the recently appointed Governor, Colonel Molesworth, had died suddenly, and to Ronquillo this was an almost irreparable loss, for the Colonel had, as we know, co-operated well with the Spanish. (see appendix) He asked that William should not choose anyone until they had conferred together on the matter, and this was conceded. That September, William O'Brien, Earl/

(1) 9th. Aug; Consulta of Junta de Guerra; ibid.
(2) Ronquillo's letter of 20th. June; ibid.
(3) 12th. Sept. (4); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.

/Earl of Inchiquin, was appointed. We also know that Don Pedro proposed instructions for the new appointee and asked to see the ones the governor was given when they were completed.

These instructions proposed for Lord Inchiquin give us a clearer picture of Don Pedro's ideas on the control of piracy. They stipulate the careful pardoning and settlement of the pirates, and that the Governor should forbid passage to the South Sea by Magellan Strait to all vessels, with the means of enforcing this left to him.(1)

Later that year, there were complaints about certain inhabitants of Nevis having passed to settle the Spanish Island of Vieques, off Puerto Rico, and his government ordered Don Pedro to ask William to send orders to have these persons dislodged and punished as pirates. Ronquillo moved cautiously by first trying to verify the rumour, for it was "better to answer unjust complaints than to make them". Besides, the inhabitants and Governor of Nevis were already in disfavour with William, and Don Pedro trusted the King would stick by justice and the peace treaties. The Council of the Indies approved this action. For us, it shows once again that reason was definitely coming to rule Spanish-British relations in the Caribbean. (see appendix)

It was during this year that Don Pedro had to help clear up certain complications over the Asiento that had long been brewing. The Asiento was then in Spanish hands, and its administrator, when our/

(1) Cal. of State Papers (Colonial Series - 1689-92) No. 704.

/our story starts, was Nicolás Porcio. His principal agent, its central figure, was Santiago del Castillo, who supervised the transport of the slaves for Jamaica to the Spanish colonies. While there, he heard that Baltasar Caymans had replaced Porcio and he decided to stay on in English territory awaiting Porcio's regaining his position. However, he had not despatched an account of his activities, and Caymans got orders sent to all the Indies' ports for his arrest and return to Spain. While in Jamaica, Santiago had acted patriotically; he had protected any Spanish subjects, actually saving some for the death penalty for piracy; he had erected and supported a Catholic chapel at his own expense; and he had also sent information to Ronquillo as we know. Albemarle, who was governor then, had come to hate the agent and at the instigation of a Protestant cleric, had got the chapel destroyed and his goods confiscated. The Spaniard was able to escape but had to leave behind his goods and slaves in the Asiento ship. He got to Havana where he sought passage to England to obtain justice. However, the Governor there, following his orders, sent him back captive to Spain and Cadiz prison.

At this point, Ronquillo was ordered by the Consejo de Estado to instance the return of Santiago del Castillo's goods. Don Pedro - warned by past experience - was determined not to use the law as such, for after conserving a lot of time and money, all would be lost/

/lost fruitlessly." Instead, it would be best for William to order Colonel Molesworth to hear and judge the case. He, therefore, sought evidence for Santiago de Castillo's case from this and said he would try and get this order put in Molesworth's instructions. Regarding the chapel, Albemarle had wished to suspend the ecclesiastical jurisdiction the agent's Catholic chaplain expressed from the Bishop of Cuba. Don Pedro now cautiously advised that this was not the time to speak of such a matter.

In the meantime, Porcio and Castillo had been reinstated and Castillo had in fact arrived in England in June to contract for negroes from the Royal African Company and from the Dutch. The agreement satisfied all concerned, but the delay of the Spanish Crown in sending despatches, expected in London when Santiago arrived, made Don Pedro anxious all that summer and autumn, lest the whole business fall through. This, he said, was not from any personal interest, but lest this important source of income be lost to his master, as it had been during the past five years through these quarrels and discord. One gathers, however, that the matter was finally arranged satisfactorily the next year. (see appendix)

The incident may have some value for students of the Asiento, perhaps to tell them where to look for further details. For us here, it is more important as showing the position in the Indies. The

Asiento/

/Asiento was the forerunner of inter-colonial trade, of closer contact and co-operation. Lawlessness there was, which still could include the Colonial Governors, but the end of this era was clearly at hand, and victory over this had really been won.

In summing up the first year of William's reign, it can only be said that Anglo-Spanish co-operation continued to increase visibly in all sections of trade and maritime affairs. Looking ahead, Don Pedro, while he could not see how Spain could gain anything in America by a new treaty, still felt a prohibition of South Seas navigation and of piracy might be obtained from the English and Dutch. The British regular traders would favour this, in the interest of peaceful commerce without reprisals for 'incidents', Don Pedro thought, as they had when it had been sought before in 1667. In fact, Spain, while she could not look forward to recouping her position in the maritime world, might now be able to look forward to a peace and cessation of persecution from England and Holland, which could help her even more.(1)

(1) 3rd. Dec. (13); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 608

The Reign of William III. The Years 1690 - 1.

1. The Nature of these Years in Spanish-British Relations.

1690 and 1691 passed very much as the final months of 1689 had done for Spanish-British relations. William III was firmly settled on the throne and Spain had decided what policy she would adopt towards him. The war was now in full swing; the transition from peace was virtually over. Much the same negotiations and problems continued; the fleets and alliances, Flanders and Ireland, and the blockade and so forth. It is essential to examine these years, for they illustrate Spain's attitude to and co-operation with William, and point to the future. They also close the story of Don Pedro's mission. However, by comparison with what has gone before, they are not so interesting for our subject, and lack the activity of the past. One important reason for this was the poor health of the central figure, Don Pedro Ronquillo himself. His letters continue to give long interesting accounts of affairs in England and on the Continent with hypotheses on what may come; they are more contemplative, replete with opinions backed up by the observations of a lifetime. They are more those of an observer - and still a keen-minded and active one - than those of a constant participant. Then, too, times had changed. England had decided on what course she would take against France. The path of our story is more direct and there is less intrigue by the way. Spain

did/

/did not now have to try and sway the British into European affairs as previously. What Don Pedro had worked for was now in an unexpected way, to be sure, a fact: England was in the forefront against Louis. All that remained in reality was to consolidate this intention into more fruitful co-operation.

2. 1690. Spain and the War at Sea.

We have already followed the Queen to Corunna; but there is more to be said of the fleet which escorted her, en route for the Mediterranean. It was a good fleet but no larger than that of the year before. Meantime, the French naval menace had increased, and aid from the Spanish allies was now required, or the coasts of Spain and the Mediterranean would be exposed to attack and England's Levant Trade might also be cut off. William, Portland and Dutch officials were therefore urging Ronquillo to write to Spain to get his government to furnish a supporting fleet. Indeed, only twenty of the English vessels escorting Mariana were proceeding to the Mediterranean. Fourteen of these were to patrol the sea keeping close watch on Toulon; the other six were to be engaged in convoy duty between Gibraltar and England. The English and Dutch wished fourteen or sixteen Spanish vessels to do defensive duty in the Mediterranean against the Moors and to patrol the Catalonian coast. For this coastal patrol work, lighter vessels such as the galleys, which always made up a part of the Spanish fleet, would be suitable. The northern allies originally would also have liked Spain to collect a fleet of sixteen ships of war to patrol between Gibraltar and Cape St. Vincent to forbid any French trade. Don Pedro was however, able to reduce William and Holland to contentment with only six ships of war. He recommended/

/recommended to the Consejo de Estado, in addition to the six ships of war, the supplying of fourteen galleys for the Mediterranean, with ten more for other coastal work in Spain, and he hoped his country would do this. His policy, it can be noted, was to promise little and see that the promise would be fulfilled rather than to promise much and hope that the home government would supply even a part. On the other hand, Cogolludo, on receiving this news, said he would have promised twenty ships of war instead of getting William and De Wilde, head of the Amsterdam admiralty, who conferred with Don Pedro, content to accept six. The Marquis also feared that if this help was not given, Spain would be "the laughing stock of Europe." (see appendix)

The Consejo de Estado did not at once make an allocation without seeing what they had; they merely ordered Don Pedro to hurry on the English fleet due to the danger from Louis and Tunis. Soon, that same February, the Council was willing to pledge twelve ships, plus some galleys. William could have been quite content with this, Don Pedro thought, but as so often then, despite his urging, one more Spanish promise was unfulfilled, and Spain could be derided.(1)

In the meantime the threatening position continued (it was the summer of the defeat off Beachy Head), and at every rumour of a French fleet, the Consejo de Estado "bloated" (there is no other word) for the presence of the English.(2) In August, a French vessel was pressed carrying/

(1) Consulta of 14th. Feb; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
15th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(2) Consulta of 8th. July; ibid.

/carrying despatches for their Admiral/Seignelay which recommended ships being sent towards Cadiz, and then to the Mediterranean, with costs covered by depredations on Spanish shipping. No fear of the allied ships there was expressed. Ronquillo knew, however, that the fleet from Nueva España (Mexico) was due to arrive soon. William, being absent in Ireland, he represented to the Queen how the English and Dutch usually sent fleets to await the arrival of the Treasure Fleet to carry away the silver due then, and that this year, it was even more necessary for reasons of defence. Mary and her consulting ministers agreed and said that the Anglo-Dutch fleet would control the enemy off the French coast. Don Pedro felt this was most important, and distructing from experience the dilatoriness of these English officials, he also wrote directly to Portland to get William concerned in the matter. The events feared did not eventuate however. That is all I have found on the subject in the documents personally examined. Ronquillo himself could do little, except to seek allied fleets in London and positive Spanish co-operation in Madrid.(1)

(1) 29th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

b.) Ireland.

The next question of importance in 1690 was Ireland. There, the situation had become a stalemate and the new English government wished to strike a decision blow. As early as the end of January, Don Pedro mentions William's intention to go there and from the beginning the ambassador was fairly sure William would make the trip unless prevented by greater obligations in England, Scotland or on the Continent. As yet, Don Pedro had not had his conscience set at rest on the question of Irish affairs and he maintained a passive attitude, though recognising the King's good reasons for going. On January 30th. he wrote:

"I do not weigh the reasons for one or other opinion, neither approve nor disapprove the resolution, for I think it of such importance that the King should not seek counsel on it nor be given this - - - And I am very content at being ill, in that this King cannot speak to me about the matter. However, I will say to Your Majesty that I hold the journey certain for one reason which seems stronger to me than the others; and it is that this King knows people are saying he lacks capacity, resolution and courage, that he lets things pass without remedying them, that he thinks out everything and resolves nothing - - - And this King's character being what it is, such a criticism of his ability and courage not only drives him on/

/on to vigorous resolutions like that of going to Ireland, but even to those that are bolder and more risky. I know also that he has said to a confidant of his, that he knew he had been no fool nor chicken-hoart in Holland and that he would carry out some action that would make the English see he was not that either in England."(1)

As the spring approached and advanced, Don Pedro became more and more certain that William's journey was essential. It would re-enhance royal prestige. Moreover, the Irish situation he felt must be settled before England could really move directly against France. This view was in contradistinction to that of many friends on the Continent, like the Marqués de Cogolludo, who only say in the plan William's turning his back on France and the Continent.(2) When the expedition was definitely decided on, Don Pedro offered to accompany the King, but William declined this on the ground no other foreign ministers were going. Later on, it was decided a Danish envoy should go, but our friend did not reintroduce the topic. At the time, he said, he was dragging his left leg around due to gout in the knee, so he might not be able to fulfil such a promise if he made it; besides it would be an expensive journey. Don Pedro did however, recommend sending a Spanish observer in his place.(3)

Another problem worrying both the King and the ambassador was the management of continental affairs in his absence. Both knew how/

(1) 30th. Jan. (2); ibid.
(2) See Maura (Correspondencia) II, 49, and the actual letters referred to.
(3) 14th. Mar. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.

/how little the English ministers knew about this, and William specially sought out Don Pedro to discuss the matter with him. Ronquillo in turn had determined neither to approve nor disapprove the journey as we know, but he was firm in the necessity of settling this point. At their conversation of 13th. March, when Don Pedro spoke of having orders to stay on in London for the duration of the campaign, William spoke of leaving a Foreign Affairs junta to include a very few of his ministers, a capable Dutch representative and Don Pedro himself. No more is heard of this, but later he wrote that he had had "some influence" in foreign affairs when William was in Ireland. (see appendix)

William at length departed for Ireland and the Battle of the Boyne was fought. Don Pedro reported events from across St. George's Channel with as much accuracy as possible, for he had been financially unable to send an observer with William's army. While the King was away, Don Pedro kept in close touch with him through Portland, largely because of his poor opinion of the ministers left in London, though incidentally, he commended Mary's qualities as Regent. (see appendix)

Ronquillo was pleased over the successes of the Irish campaign, but his opinion of James remained the same. The former king was qualified merely as "the poor and deceived".(1) Don Pedro's attitude to the Irish was also one of compassion. He might - like many others then - comment on their "poltroonery" in the struggle, but he had pity on/

(1) 8th. Aug; ibid.

/on them as Catholics and through recognising the dilemma they were in. He also saw the political stupidity of alienating them from the consideration of peace under William. When, in the autumn, Parliament was seeking ways of obtaining money, the more rapacious English elements wished to obtain it through confiscated Irish lands. Don Pedro pointed out to the M.Ps. of his acquaintance that this was most uncertain money and that threatening their livelihood would be to cut off the way for "that poor people's" possible submission. The threat of such action in Parliament then died down meanwhile.(1)

However, Don Pedro's orders were still not to mix at all in the affairs of Ireland. William's victory there still had its embarassments for him, therefore. For instance Gastañaga had impulsively despatched the Count de Bruay to London to congratulate William on his happy and safe return from the Irish campaign. But the Count, on hearing Don Pedro's orders on arrival, wrote back to Gastañaga, who then sent another letter commanding him to speak to William only on affairs in Flanders. This action, the Consejo de Estado approved. But William himself, had thought it necessary to send a letter to Carlos II giving account of his successes in Ireland. The Council, on receipt of this, decided that the King's confessor should be consulted as to whether a reply would be permitted in line with the scrupulous policy chosen towards William and Irish affairs; and if so, how it should/

(1) 7th. Nov. (2); ibid.

/should be done. Fray Pedro Matilla answered that it was "an action of mere politeness," that would have "no physical nor moral influence in the overthrow of King James nor in hindering the Catholic religion." He was of the opinion "that considering the alliance with King William, it would be a mistake politically to omit it." Hence a reply would be"allowable for the first reason and suitable for the second." This was, if cordial, a careful one, and judging from the minute or rough copy, still extant, there was some difficulty in framing it. (see appendix) This incident simply emphasises how non-committal Spain still continued to be in its attitude to William and his struggle against James, while recognising the implications of the Irish campaign for the Common Cause.

c.) The Defence of the Low Countries.

The main question on the Continent between Spain and England continued, as so often before, to be the defence of the Low Countries and their supply of Spanish and allied troops. Spain had various long and short term agreements with England, the States-General and the Northern German Princes for this, but William, as the real director of the Common Cause, was the controlling hand. It was through Don Pedro therefore, that most requests and complaints passed in the matter on Spain's behalf. Early in the year, the King found it necessary to withdraw 2,000 English troops from there, but these were to be replaced by twice the number from Brandenburg and Wolfenbüttel. William was finding difficulty in supplying so many troops, and as usual, Spain desired more than she could have. This is not the place to follow these intricate negotiations and incessant clashes of personality. However, William's relation to the Flanders' government has an interest when looking to the future. He was growing progressively more dissatisfied over Spanish delays there.(1) In may, he told Don Pedro that a new governor and government in the Low Countries had become a necessity. Ronquillo replied that, due to the necessary delay in naming another from Spain, Gastañaga must be kept on for the duration of the campaign, or replaced by the Marqués del Pico, who was already there. William thereupon asked why/

(1) 28th. Mar; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
5th. Sept; ibid.

/why the Elector of Bavaria could not come at once to fill the position. Don Pedro answered that this was a "very high" matter for him; and he swore he knew nothing of any matrimonial agreement of the Archduchess María Antonia. But he felt the upkeep of such a Prince would be greater than that of an ordinary Governor, which was expensive already. To this William remarked that the Archduke would be able to live 'of his own.' Don Pedro agreed that since a Governor with military gifts was essential, he would be satisfactory in that respect. The King then told of what he had done in the matter; how he had written asking that the Prince of Vaudemont be made general meantime, though it was more difficult to find a suitable leader for civil affairs. Don Pedro commented in his report of the meeting on William's stubbornness, and how the King had said things at it, which he would not dare to repeat to Carlos II.(1) At about this time, a special envoy, Lord Lexington, was sent to Spain and he pressed for the same requests. However, the friends of Gastañaga, including Manuel de Lira, the Secretario de Despacho Central, were able to delay the Governor's downfall. Ronquillo was meanwhile censured for what he had said. It does not appear, however, that Don Pedro, though as we know he had some reason, advocated the Marqués' dismissal at this time. That event was, however, merely postponed.

By December, the troops' situation in the Low Countries was critical/

(1) 22nd. May; ibid (Fla) 3884.

/critical and the land was virtually defenceless. William said, in discussing this with Ronquillo, that he could not send any men then and blamed everything on the Spanish home government; but also that he knew Gastañaga could not do more. This would indicate that his annoyance with the Governor had temporarily died down. But still, Don Pedro had never seen the King express himself so strongly before, (see appendix) and he urged the Marqués to do some of the miracles the crisis required. At this time, Don Pedro also feared that continuous failures on the Continent might make William neglect it and return to completing the conquest of Ireland instead.(1) The only recourse seemed to be the return of troops from Hanover, but could Gastañaga pay them to march if they came ? Another difficulty was that the Prince of Waldeck, who commanded the allied troops, was at loggerheads with the Governor. Already Gastañaga had had to refuse an offer from him of 1,000 cavalry for Namur, because there was no money to pay them. William tended to believe the Prince's complaints, and Don Pedro did not feel he could counter these when Waldeck was the King's great friend. Besides, he was unable to deny William's reasons for not sending certain troops to Flanders immediately. However, after the middle of December, William managed to send some infantry. Summing up the position, Don Pedro wrote: "Everything lacking everywhere is ascribed to Spain's carelessness, and, what is/

(1) ibid.

/is worse, is they place us lower than we actually are without wishing to hear or believe anything (to the contrary) - - - And the only consolation is that they think this proceeds, not from lack of ability, but from want of application; which, in a certain way, is a hope that they may not abandon us" - - - "I cannot say how greatly this King is losing patience over the interests in the Low Countries and Savoy." (see appendix)

d.) Savoy.

Throughout the year, Don Pedro took great interest and played his part in the affairs of Northern Italy. He did all he could to encourage William's supporting Savoy as well as the Barbettes and Huguenots; he kept in close touch with those on the scene, receiving and supplying information. The principal fear was that Savoy and other Italian Princes, if not helped, would go over to the side of France, particularly after the Duke's defeat that summer. Originally the plan had been for the British fleet to bolster an offensive into France from Northern Italy but this had not materialised for, as we know, the fleet had been delayed and amply occupied in the Atlantic. William and the Dutch were also finding difficulty in sending military and monetary help. Constant orders arrived from Spain pressing this aid and both the English and the Dutch were becoming irritated and mentioned the complaint from Italy of the lack of Spanish support then. William, early in December, when the question was especially to the fore, told Don Pedro with ill humour, that the Spanish were simply on the defensive and not, as in the times of Philip II. Our friend managed to calm him by showing the difference between the periods. In fact, all the envoy could do was to try to quieten down such accusations and urge on the allies, as well as his own government, to send aid to Savoy. And Don Pedro believed that his work had helped/

/helped forward continued aid to the Italian ally. But he knew, as he had always known, that Spain, sooner or later, must justify herself by her own deeds. (see appendix)

e.) Ronquillo and the General Strategy of the Common Cause.

In the above sections, we have seen enough to know some of the strains to the unity of the Common Cause during 1690. The question of how to preserve and strengthen the European alliances remained of primary importance. Ever since the time the then Prince of Orange had landed at Torbay, it had been a question when he would be able to return to the Continent to concert and carry forward the land war against the French. By now, there was a Permanent Congress of the Grand Alliance in the Hague, which Spain had joined in June of that year. A conference of the Allies, also at the Hague, with William present was anticipated however, for the purpose of planning the next year's campaign. After it, William could play his part in the actual military operations. Don Pedro Ronquillo had expected a European conference of some kind since the moment of William's victory in England. In the first months of 1689, when there was much talk of Spain remaining neutral, he felt he might in that event be called on to attent some sort of Peace conference. Later on, in August, 1689, when the Count of Mansfield was in London on his way to Neuberg, the two men discussed the question of a conference of the allies. Don Pedro was certainly in favour of this, but nothing had then been proposed to him about such a meeting by anybody. (see appendix)

In 1690, after William's campaign in Ireland, Ronquillo was convinced/

/convinced that the King must go to the Continent; and he did all he could to help this on. He hoped, among other things, that there the Spanish representatives, Manuel Coloma and the Marqués del Castelmoncayo would be able to give William a clearer view of Spain's position and smooth over the ruffled relations between them. "No one has worked more than I have in pushing ahead this King's journey to Holland," he wrote.(1) But, as Don Pedro recognised, to do this, William first required generous supply from Parliament in anticipation of his needs. And so he had written "I work and we shall all work for a good outcome to the Parliament."(2)

Don Pedro was again, as with the Irish campaign, faced with the question of whether to accompany William or not. To do this, at the best of times, would not have been essential, but now his decision was definitely in the negative. Ever since the first mention of a European conference in 1688, Don Pedro, while all in favour of the meeting, had had no desire to attend.(3) Now with his financial position and bodily health as bad and worse than ever, those factors were against the journey. William himself had not pressed the matter. Moreoever, the Consejo de Estado had not ordered his going, and he felt his decision to do so might be wrongly interpreted or badly received there and elsewhere. Don Pedro also felt it would be a good opportunity for his own departure for Spain. The campaign for that/

(1) 19th. Dec. 1690; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3990.
(2) 26th. Sept. (2) 1690; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
(3) See appendix above.

/that year was now over. Major negotiations would accompany William to Holland, and all that would remain in England would be "the risks of these people's changableness with nothing to do in the service of Your Majesty." The Consejo de Estado, if not unanimously, agreed that Ronquillo had made the right decision, but that in the present state of affairs, he should stay on in London to help in those affairs left behind by William.(1) And so, early in 1691, William of Orange took leave of Don Pedro - as it happened for the last time - and crossed to Holland.

What was Don Pedro's attitude to the overall situation of the Allies and their plans for the future ? A letter of his of August 15th. 1690, to the Spanish King indicates this "The conduct of the confederate Princes produces nothing but risks which confound unity or causes impossible situations which cannot be overcome." One particular difficulty arose, concerning aid to the lesser powers, such as Savoy. Of this he wrote: "The origin of these difficulties proceeds, in my opinion, from seeing the four leading powers unable to control the lesser and to make these powers relieve their forces whenever they consider this more necessary. And I believe that these lesser powers could be kept in unity and governed by reason if the four were to agree among each other what they themselves could do without any chance of non-fulfilment; and from this basis, not to take/

(1) 7th. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965. Consulta of 7th. Dec; ibid.

/take any more aid from the others than that which they really needed." Don Pedro then went on to specify more particularly. The Emperor should confine his activities against the Turks to those provinces he was sure he could keep, and instead build up his forces. William III should leave Ireland partially conquered and go against the common foe, aiding the Dutch - "those who do most"; the King would be content if Spain actually provided the naval forces she promised. As for his country, Don Pedro said his master must also provide the minimum estimates of military forces required, sending troops to Flanders, Milan and Catalonia. Thus he could protect Spain, defeat the enemy and defend his allies. But, the ambassador warned - "if this is impossible for the Monarchy to carry out, we must give in to everything and everybody, contenting ourselves with expecting no benefit whatever, either from war or peace." Of the lesser princes mentioned, he was particularly suspicious of the Elector of Brandenburg - "the most intractable of all - - - the vainest and most wasteful", the worst advised and most greedy of troops and gain, and the most subject to French machinations. (see appendix)

All this briefly adds up to greater control and greater unity through the actual fulfilment of, if necessary, a less ambitious programme than hitherto. But, what was important was that what was promised and arranged should take place. It involved greater leadership/

/leadership and responsibility being assumed by the great powers. And Ronquillo was sure a little later that for the military campaign in the West, William must direct "everybody and everything."(1)

Don Pedro continued to do all he possibly could to strengthen the Grand Alliance and common action against France even beyond what his own government felt necessary. An example of this follows. About a month before, William had set out for Ireland, an envoy for the Palatinate had arrived to see the King, but he visited Don Pedro first, to whom he confided his plans. The Elector Palatine wished to hire troops to William and also to make an alliance with him. As for the first, it was clear William had not the money, and as for the second, he, like Don Pedro, was against private leagues with Princes who should be incorporated in the Grand Alliance. Don Pedro recommended against the envoy's seeing the King about a negotiation, but offered, due to the Palatine being affiliated to the House of Austria, to pass on the Elector Palatine's intentions to William. This he did; William replied favourably, and the envoy departed satisfied. The Consejo de Estado thoroughly reprobated such negotiating in outside affairs when this was reported. The incident is of no importance here, apart from showing the keenness of Ronquillo to do everything possible for unity against France, and also the respect in which Don Pedro was held in such negotiations.(2)

With/

(1) 26th. Sept. (2); ibid (Ing) 3965.
(2) 4th. July; ibid.

With the European situation so evidently a stalemate, it was natural that offers of mediation should be current. In the autumn, a Papal offer of universal peace was dismissed by Spain, Don Pedro sending to William a copy of this refusal, said it showed how firmly Spain stood for the treaties. (see appendix)

At that time, the Swedes also offered mediation whenever William was clearly discouraged by the European situation. The Dutch had replied that they would inform the other allies of the offer, and the King was at first in favour of giving a similar answer. Ronquillo, visiting him on November 24th. had found him in this mind, and the ambassador put forward reasons to oppose it. William said he realised these and that he did not wish to make peace but complained that "no one was doing anything, that all wished to place all the burden on his and the States-General's shoulders; that the Emperor was just beginning late and from necessity to make some efforts; that the heavy and unequalled taxation in England would make him hated, and the Dutch also were paying heavy taxes, while in Spain no effort was evident, despite the fact that all its territories were those which were most threatened." "And Your Majesty" concluded Don Pedro, "will recognise through my reports and those of all your Ministers how they treat us - - ". However, the English reply on 30th. November was quite favourable in Don Pedro's eyes. William merely thanked the/

/the Swedes for the offer but stated that, due to his treaties, he could not accept it without the consent of all.(1)

And so the now weary war went forward into 1691.

(1) 19th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.

f.) Summary of Spanish-British Political Relations for 1690.

Ronquillo had no illusions over his country's position or the worsening of Spanish-British relations, with growing British impatience over Spain not fulfilling her promises. He saw that, while critics sometimes over-estimated the degradation of Spain in some ways, they also underestimated it in others. It was obvious to him how dependent she was on William and how if it suited the other powers, they would leave her in the midst of her difficulties. Yet reciprocity still existed: the alliances and many other matters had been adjusted after numerous delays. A new and acceptable British envoy, William Stanhope, was settled in Madrid; and Ronquillo still found acceptance in English circles.(1) French influence in Britain had been largely eliminated. The failures and defeats of the past year had been unfortunate, but now at least it was known in England that Louis XIV was the danger and deceiver, internally and externally; and the very threats of a French invasion had only intensified national determination in the struggle. In addition, Holland's staunch support, particularly at Beachy Head, had definitely bettered Anglo-Dutch relations. (see appendix)

But what would happen if Spain continued not to fulfil her pledges to England and the other confederates ?

(1) Documents of May/June, 1690; ibid 3965.
7th. Nov. 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Etat) 608.
(Don Pedro's opinion of Stanhope's appointment).

I. Spanish-British Relations in the Political-International Sphere (Contd.)

3. In 1691

As Don Pedro had foreseen, most business now passed to the Hague, and what the ambassador could do in 1691 was now seriously curtailed by his rapidly failing physical condition. Nonetheless, he continued to be occupied over two leading negotiations: the British fleet and the defence of Savoy; Flanders with the defence of Mons, After William's departure, Ronquillo was still in close touch with the English ministers left in London, and also tried to keep the Queen's ear. The second was important for though her regency was restricted, it was she who often wrote to the King on matters beyond her defined sphere of activity.

Don Pedro and Manual Coloma were ordered to get the English and Dutch to hasten on the spring fleet to the Mediterranean for protection against the French and to stimulate the resistance of Savoy. The Spanish authorities were also pressing this with the ministers of England and Holland in Madrid. Certain questions, like the everlasting one of salutes, were to be considered at the Conference in the Hague.

Differences soon arose over the Squadron which was first to go to Smyrna. Don Pedro asked Nottingham to tell him what the Spanish fleet would be required to do in the Mediterranean against France.

The/

The Secretary of State said it was to attack the French and bring captured merchant ships into Cadiz. Don Pedro replied that this was not what had been originally asked, namely to defend the coasts and make a landing in Provence; and it did not correspond to the instances for promptness in readying the galley, and only for the concurrence of the larger Spanish ships at Cadiz. Some of the Consejo de Estado's reaction was that the English and Dutch plan was merely designed to protect their Levant trade. (see appendix) The Anglo-Dutch squadron itself had left at the turn of the year; and after making the journey to Smyrna, it escorted the convoy of heavily-laden merchant ships on the homeward journey. The intention then was for it to pick up a Spanish fleet of ten vessels at Cadiz, and return to the Mediterranean, in particular to Italy, now endangered in Savoy from France and where a months-long conclave was choosing yet another Pope. However, on the arrival of the fleet, the Governor, Velasco, refused to admit the ships on the ground that they had come from a pest-ridden area, and the Consejo de Estado approved his action. Furious at this, the squadron continued with the merchant fleet to Kinsale in Ireland. It was, therefore, up to Don Pedro now to calm the universal English anger over the incident, for, as he pointed out, he himself knew the speciousness of the Spanish excuse. Before the ships had reached Spain, they had been permitted entry into Leghorn and other/

/other ports of the Levant, which were even more "escrupulous" than Cadiz, and in fact, the real reason had been that the ten Spanish ships supposed to be in readiness, had not in fact been ready. (see appendix)

Don Pedro at once set himself to soliciting the squadron's immediate return to the Mediterranean. As he said, their being somewhat dirty would not prevent them fighting. The Queen, Nottingham and others with whom he was in touch, were quite favourable to this, but were naturally insistent that the Spanish supporting fleet be prepared this time. Also, they could not promise the squadron's leaving before August. Don Pedro felt that the French could have caused much damage by then, but there was nothing to do except see that, on its arrival, it departed as soon as possible. Don Pedro was at least able to learn of its arrival just before his death. (see appendix)

Although the ambassador speaks of this as "the only negotiation offering" after William's departure, he was keeping a close watch on (1) the situation in Flanders, where the seige of Mons was the important event that spring. There was great anxiety among the English people concerning the city's fate, and special prayers were being offered in almost all the Protestant Churches. Although they may not be good intercessions, they show the common aversion towards that nation (France) and its King. Don Pedro had learnt from Paris that the (2) French knew of the disposition of affairs in that city, but in truth, (3) he/

(1) 29th. June; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid.
(2) 27th. Mar. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(3) 27th. Mar. (1); ibid.

/he himself could not do much. Despite William's orders from the Hague to send military aid to Flanders, the English ministers were most unwilling to obey and were delaying. Don Pedro, therefore, went secretly to the Queen, who promised to send ten troops of cavalry without consulting anyone.(1) But despite the Marqués de Gastañaga's word that it was "impregnable", Mons fell within a month, on April 12th. And the Marquis soon fell with it. Navarro says that despite all the Governor had tried to do against Don Pedro personally, it was against the ambassador's inclinations and wishes that he saw himself obliged to act as the instrument through whom William obtained Gastañaga's dismissal.(2) However, I have found nothing more on this point.

That is all that can be related as the last principal negotiations passing through Ronquillo's hands. The business of 1690 and 1691 has now spoken for itself as being comparatively unimportant, as Don Pedro himself admitted.(3)

(1) 27th. Mar. (2); ibid.
(2) Navarro, II, f. 103
(3) 29th. June; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.

II. Spanish-British Maritime and Commercial Relations 1690-1.

War was influencing the character of maritime and commercial affairs between Spain and England throughout 1690 and 1691. There is practically no mention of them apart from blockade enforcement and the usual complaints. The only exception in the documents I have examined is a request by the East India Company through Ronquillo to be allowed to establish a trading factory on Mindanao in the Phillippines.(1)

In the autumn of 1689, the Spanish Government re-introduced - as part of the trade blockade of France - compulsory certification of all foreign imports entering Spain: that they were not French nor for the benefit of France. These certificates were to be obtained from Spanish consuls abroad. The plan met with no better success in England then than during the short war of 1684-5. De la Guerra was given permission to name substitutes or vice-consuls for this whenever necessary, but this was not possible for financial reasons. He reported at the end of January, 1690, that while thirty trading vessels were in readiness to go with the Queen's envoy to Spain, only two merchants had come to seek the certificates. The English, he said, disliked the regulation, because it was a nuisance and also because it uncovered their frauds. Yet such certification against customs frauds was provided for by the Treaty of 1667, and De/

(1) 27th. Mar (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.

/De la Guerra strongly recommended the home government's refusing to unload the ships until such certification was received. He also pointed out that, while the English countered this with other Articles of the Treaty and a law of Parliament stipulating reciprocity, no such reciprocity in fact existed. For example, Spaniards, including their diplomats, had to pay a third more than the English, even if the goods imported were a gift. The Consul saw in all this only the effort to discourage Spanish commerce itself and take it all to themselves - which was probably the truth.(1) Some time later, the Spanish embassy in London received orders to send a list of all types of British goods being exported to Spain. Ronquillo himself criticised this as ineffective, but advocated the continued certification of these exports. Besides, he said, the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of Navigation of the previous August was eliminating many frauds involved in the execution of the terms of earlier agreements. Despite English opposition, the policy of certificates appears to have been carried on. However, in the autumn of 1690, Spain decided to allow the issuing of these by the magistrates of allied nations or their deputies. (see appendix)

Ronquillo and his assistants continued to do all they could to enforce the blockade in other ways. They were quite aware of how the French, despite regulations, were managing to trade, sometimes even with/

(1) 27th. Mar. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.

/with the connivance of the Spanish authorities. The English constantly and rightly complained of this, but sometimes their own merchants were implicated. For example, three Genoese ships with French goods had been captured and brought to Cadiz. There, the goods were being transferred on to an English and a Dutch ship taking advantage of the trade treaties. In November, 1690, the Spanish complained. The English were, however, quite ready to co-operate and Nottingham advised the Spanish just to confiscate the goods in line with the common blockade policy, as it was not a case for the usual peacetime agreements.(1)

As regards the postal blockade of France, further steps were taken for the regularising of Anglo-Spanish sea mail. (see appendix)

During these two years, there seems to have been a fair number of maritime and trading complaints.(2)

One from the Spanish, with a more political tinge, gave rise to a memoire in October, 1690. Two Dutch ships had carried an English representative from Cadiz to Salé to adjust the handing over of English prisoners by the Moors. This had been agreed on in exchange for arms, as had been done before. Spain asked that this cease, for the Moors were "perpetual and declared enemies of the Catholic King", and she did not wish trouble on the Barbary Coast as a result. Yes, the danger of the Moors was still almost as much/

(1) Consulta of 26th. Nov. 1690; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
13th. Feb. (1) 1691; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3966.
(2) Stanhope: 13th. Sept. 1690 to Nottingham, p. 8.
21st. Oct. 1691 to Nottingham, p. 24.

/much feared in Spain as that of the French.(1)

Another Spanish complaint showed the difficulties of commercial shipping in the blockade and how undeveloped law still was in such commercial cases. In 1689, at the beginning of the Irish campaign, a Spanish vessel carrying oranges and lemons from Vigo to London was pressed by an English ship on the pretext that it was going to Ireland. The Spanish captain, Cosme de Luc, spent fifteen months thereafter in London, seeking compensation. William had sent the matter to the Admiralty Court, who merely adjudged that the English King was not liable for damages to a ship which had never belonged to the Spanish King. De Luc finally gave up and returned to Spain, where in time, he was granted letters of reprisal. (see appendix)

From the English side, there were similar complaints. One which passed through Ronquillo's hands was a request for the payment of debts to a merchant with interests in the Canaries. Don Pedro recommended that this be satisfied, as the petitioner, Robert Roworth, had always shown himself most friendly towards Spain; and this favour could also prove useful, for he possessed great authority in London and was one of those very close to being an M.P. The Consejo de Estado made a decision in favour of Roworth.

In Spain, Stanhope and the English and Scottish Consuls in Cadiz were active over other complaints: the confiscation of goods from/

(1) Memorial (1) of 18th. Oct. 1690; Ronquillo to Nottingham; P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.

/from a Scottish vessel; the troubles of merchants with the Chancellery of Granada; the condemnation of Englishmen to serve in the Spanish galleys for piracy. Stanhope says that his publicising in Madrid the English Parliament's grants to William that autumn of 1690, had very salutary effects in speeding the solution of some of these. Finally, as regards piracy, though Spain was still determined to act firmly, there is nothing mentioned concerning trouble in the Indies. (see appendix)

That is all that I have found on maritime and trading affairs, and indeed there is nothing very interesting or important to record for these two years. The same repetitious incidents can be noted; but the the same trends were obviously with continuing war against France, forcing a closer and peaceful adjustment of the multifarious problem arising between the two countries. The very unimportance of so many of them also shows how much had already been settled. Not a word about the Indies ! It certainly seems more than twenty to thirty years since the heyday of Morgan. Indeed, it can be said that attitude and behaviour had changed for the better between Spain and Britain in the commercial and maritime world since Don Pedro had first arrived in London. One can also state that his activity and influence had not been negligible in attaining such results.

VII. Spain and British Domestic Affairs (1690-1).

Spain's decisions on how she should approach the British domestic and Irish questions were now behind. She was now merely interested in encouraging any steps that would help forward the Common Cause against France and protect the Catholics. For England to wage the war properly, peace and unity were essential, so it was natural that Spain grew more unsympathetic towards those who would disturb it and subserve the interests of Louis. Moreover, William seemed more and more securely established, and it was therefore, increasingly unlikely that Spain would witness James' restoration and have to answer for any suspicious support of the "de facto" monarch. But Don Pedro also knew the value of clemency with those Irish Catholics and others for attaining this desired unity and peace, as well as for the good name such a policy would preserve for William abroad.

Already we have noted some of the times Don Pedro carefully interceded in the Parliament sessions to serve these ends.

In the spring session of 1690, when some M.Ps. tried to bring up once more the abdication phrase of the law on William and Mary's elevation to the throne, Don Pedro, though also doubtful about its legal validity, hoped the question would cease for the sake of internal peace. His only actual interposition was on behalf of the Catholics. A Bill was proposed to fine all those who had served in/

/in the government since 1671 without having taken the Test and Oaths, the sum of £500. Many Catholics could naturally be convicted of this if it were passed; and they, through the Earl of Castelmaine, sought Don Pedro's intercession on their behalf. It was found possible "to entangle" the bill in the House of Lords and to persuade William of its inconvenience and not to support it. The bill which the Commons finally sent up was so mutilated, that Don Pedro did not believe it would pass in another session - for which it now had to wait while the King set off for Ireland.(1)

In the autumn session, Don Pedro interposed to my knowledge twice, and both occasions have been mentioned previously in passing. He encouraged the granting of large subsidies to allow William to get to the Continent, and be able to relieve as much as possible for the Common Cause. However, he discouraged such taxes proceeding from the confiscation and sale of Irish lands. On the first point, he was completely satisfied and temporary respite was obtained on the second. In none of these matters, can we say the ambassador played a decisive part, but the fact he did intercede has its importance and interest, in at least showing us his approach.(2) By the way, he still had reliable informants in the Parliament, Privy Council, Army etc. - as for example Henry Goodricke. (see appendix)

Don Pedro Ronquillo's general opinion of the British internal position/

(1) 25th. April (1) 1690; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
6th. June (3); ibid.
(2) 26th. Sept. (2); ibid.
7th. Nov. (2); ibid.

/position gradually grew more optimistic. Despite his consistent criticism of the King's ministers and the nature of the English people - their changeableness, their lack of application and their slowness - he felt William was fairly securely on the throne. Very few of those discontented with the Government, except the Catholics, wished James' restoration: and this was also unlikely from the religious aspect, especially since the English would never accept the Prince of Wales' education in his parents' faith.(1)

During the first half of the year, Don Pedro was anxious over the possible effects of William's lack of popularity, for the King was very reserved, hardly seeing or speaking to anybody. Even those who had been favoured by him were not contented, and Don Pedro felt that though not for James they might support him in an invasion. This spirit of melancholy seemed to have gripped everybody that spring, and Don Pedro was "trembling" in case of some betrayal or poison. The ambassador also thought William was not acting forcefully enough, and merely following the method he had employed in Holland of patiently awaiting the consummation of his wishes. He was letting Parliament go its way without using influence, "not knowing" wrote Don Pedro, "that this government demands more resolution and command than that of a republic."(2) But the Parliament soon gave proof of its fidelity, and with William's passage to Ireland, his popularity rose. France's threatened/

(1) 30th. Jan. (1); ibid.
30th. Jan. (2); ibid.
(2) 25th. April (2); ibid.

/threatened invasion of England further galvanised support around the King. The autumn session showed itself as faithful and co-operative as before and Don Pedro was surer of the stability of the new regime in England at least. He was, however, still alert to the dangers of a Jacobite invasion of England via Scotland "as the Scots desire and have desired it, to deal some blow that may rescue them from their poverty."(1) The complete pacification of the Kingdoms particularly the termination of the Irish campaign continued to the end to have importance for him. On July 17th. 1691, he wrote: "I do not enter discussions on this but (I can say) without doing any harm to anybody that the reduction of Ireland is one of the three principal points which I think can facilitate the war against France and make one hope with good reason for very good results".(2)

(1) 13th. Feb. (2) 1691; ibid 3966.
(2) 17th. July (2); ibid.

IV. The Religious Aspect.

Some of Don Pedro's efforts in Parliament for the Catholics in the spring and autumn sessions of 1690 have already been mentioned. In addition, at the spring session, when the Irish Catholic lawyers of the Temple and Inns of Court petitioned against a bill in Parliament for the prohibition of practice at the bar in Ireland by Catholics, a letter of support from Don Pedro was also included.(1) In the autumn he was glad to see the Earls of Salisbury and Peterborough released. Such a declaration would, he thought, be advantageous to the King, for such accusations so involved and delayed his ministers that they did not do what William really wanted and needed done.(2)

But Don Pedro had no hope of receiving much gratitude from the wealthier and largely Jacobite Catholics for his efforts. After working against the bill to fine those who had not taken the Test and Oaths, he wrote: "I am content to have done this service to God for the Catholics without expecting them to recognise it - - "(3)

In the summer of 1690 with the threats of invasion, various round-ups of Jacobites took place. In July, nineteen suspects were summoned, including four Catholics and also Preston and "that celebrated Quaker" Penn ("hombre muy artificioso"). As a result, the Widowed Queen went to Windsor and closed her chapel. The Spanish Embassy now possessed the only one open in London, and Don Pedro feared for its safety/

(1) 23rd. April, 1690: Petition of Irish Catholic Lawyers; P.R.O., S.P. 100/55.
(2) 14th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
(3) 6th. June (3) 1690; ibid.

/safety not from the government but from the mob. But to close it would be to give up the only (religious) immunity the Catholic ministers had; and "the greatest of all reason" against this was, as he wrote: "The poor will not have anywhere to go, and it is necessary rather to care for them, since it is they who cannot support priests nor have a house in which to say mass and are not accomplices in the ingratitude of the others."(1) And so, with all prudence, and as well as he was able, Ronquillo maintained the religious services of his embassy. Despite the Consejo de Estado's orders to do so, we know that no aid had or was to come from Spain for this until after his death; that the chapel was without the necessary vessels and ornaments, save old ones that had been borrowed. (see appendix) In fact, not only in Parliament and by his chapel, but by various means at his disposal, Don Pedro tried to protect the rights of Catholics, both clerical and lay, personally friendly or not. And this he did, while preserving absolute fidelity to William III.

A convenient transition from a consideration of the religious aspects of Don Pedro's last two years in England to that of his personal position in found in the following incident. Charles Hugh Semple, who administered Don Pedro's business affairs, was imprisoned in May for Don Pedro's debts by order of one, Lynch, the brother-in-law of Bodkin, the Spanish Embassy's principal money-lender. Then Nottingham/

(1) 1st. Aug; and consulta; ibid.

/Nottingham and the Privy Council were unwilling to intercede and obtain Semple's release on the ground of diplomatic privilege. Ronquillo, furious over the incident and, as he said, "demi-moribund", went at once to Whitehall, where he made his complaint to the Queen, almost weeping with rage. Mary then used her most obliging manners and eventually tried to get Nottingham to stop the servant's being sent to the public prison. But before that could take place, Semple, who feared he would be charged with yet other debts of his master, had paid Lynch caution money and been released. All the rest of Don Pedro's household were then aroused fearing what could happen to them if diplomatic privileges could be treated thus. The Privy Council then ordered a case against Lynch as a recusant. For it was evidently clear to them that this Irish Catholic was supported by some Jacobite cabal. But Ronquillo, in line with his policy of protecting all Catholics, protested that, if Lynch's punishment could not be accomplished by other laws and in virtue of duplomatic privilege, he should be let free. This plan was, however, in vain. It is an odd incident, but it shows how closely Don Pedro followed his orders for the protection of his co-religionists.

(see appendix)

V. The Personal Aspect (1690-1).

As far as Don Pedro Ronquillo's personal affairs were concerned, 1690 and 1691 were a constant effort to obtain his recall and to be financially and physically able to return to Spain. The Consejo de Estado were in a quandary. Don Pedro might be very useful in Madrid but to find someone to replace him in such an important post was not easy. The Marqués de los Velez' confession that it would be difficult for another in these affairs to accomplish in many years what Don Pedro could in a few days, was doubtless an overstatement, but the problem remained. In January, 1690, the Consejo de Estado ordered him to wait for a successor until the end of the year's campaign, and made him a grant of 40,000 escudos from the Asiento de Negros.(1) By April, Don Pedro was making a representation to his master for recall and again requesting a place in the Consejo de Estado. (see appendix) In the autumn, with the end of the campaign, he again asked permission to return to Spain. The Council was once more divided, but decided merely to thank him for his work, say they were considering possible successors and to hurry on the grant from the Asiento's being made effective.(2) When William left for the Continent, despite Don Pedro's renewed request, the Council ordered him to stay on in London meantime: that was early in December, 1690.(3) But at last, in considering yet another plea from the now ill ambassador of late November/

(1) Consulta of 21st. Jan. 1690; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
(2) 12th. Sept. 1690; Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta of 24th. Oct; ibid.
(3) 7th. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta of 7th. Dec., ibid.

/November, the Consejo de Estado agreed on January 4th., 1691, to choose another envoy and reward Ronquillo. As the constable said, it was "no use whatever nor of any service to Your Majesty that he remain there only to die." (see appendix) On the "carpeta" of a Consulta for the 16th. of the same month, we find in Carlos II's handwriting the new envoy named: "Nombro á D. Manuel Coloma."(1)

It is not necessary for us to follow the almost clerical details of Ronquillo's final months. Suffice it to say that the attacks of gout and the stone increased in severity, and were joined now by attacks of breathlessness. (see appendix) During the succeeding months, with less official business on hand, Don Pedro laboured incessantly to be able to depart.

In June, 1691, two events occurred which directly affected him. One was the death of his brother Joseph, which conferred on Don Pedro the title Conde de Gramedo. (see appendix) The second was his appointment on the 26th. June, to the Consejo de Estado. Military defeats were stirring the internal government of Spain. Gastañaga's fall had brought that of De Lira, the "prime minister". Oropesa went the same way soon after. A new Council of State was appointed to take over the conduct of affairs, and it was to this body that Don Pedro was named.(2)

When the news of his being so honoured reached him, we are told he was transported with joy, and it undoubtedly hurried on his preparations/

(1) Consulta of 16th. Jan. 1691; ibid 3966.
(2) A.H.N. Estado, 248.

/preparations for departure. He finally had prospects of a loan at 15 or 20% that would enable him to leave for Spain without his household.(1) Not that he was unfaithful to them to the last, for on 21st. of July we find an intercession to the Queen on behalf of an ex-servant.(2) However in the midst of all these plans, when it seemed as though Don Pedro would at last see Spain, his illness suddenly intensified. And at dawn on August 7th, 1691, having received the Holy Sacraments of the Church in full consciousness of his approaching end and resigned to it, Don Pedro Ronquillo Briceño, Conde de Gramedo, died without suffering; or, as his Secretary put it, he had now been called on to make a "longer journey" than that to the country he had served to faithfully. (see appendix)

In one of his many letters seeking supply from home, Don Pedro had foreseen his having to go to the debtor's prison and then to a "cemetery for heretics."(3) He was spared fulfilment of the first prophecy, but the second came to pass in this way. A final request of Don Pedro had been that he be buried in the Queen Widow's chapel at Somerset House, but this she refused. Perhaps she had her reasons for this decision with her approaching departure for Portugal and its then being closed, but public opinion condemned the action as inhuman. Certainly at least, since that night in December, 1688, when she inhospitably received the homeless ambassador and his family, she/

(1) Denbigh news letter of 7/17 July; Hist. Mss. Comm VIII, I, p. 5616.
(2) 11/21 July; Ronquillo to Queen Mary; P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.
(3) 28th. Oct. (4) 1686; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.

/she had shown little gratitude for the many attentions Ronquillo had paid her throughout the years. By this time, Queen Mary was protecting and providing for the embassy household as they were without funds and fearful of their late master's creditors, a kindness which she performed for six weeks or more. Hearing of the difficulties over the body's burial, she interceded. One observer said that if Mary had not been "kindness itself", she would have forced/interment at Somerset House, despite "the pitiable scruples" of Queen Catherine. And so, there being no other Catholic chapel in London, it was through the Queen's efforts, laid in Henry VII's Chapel in Westminster Abbey, to await being taken back to Spain. One hundred and twenty years later, due largely to the alertness of Admiral Apodaca, who had the task of transporting the body of another Spanish ambassador from Britain and Westminster Abbey, the mortal remains of Don Pedro Ronquillo were finally transferred to the city of Cadiz, where they still lie. (see appendix)

The other requests of the dying man did not have much better fortune. At the last, he acknowledged that Don Pedro Francisco, hitherto known as his nephew, was in fact his natural son, and to him he left all his personal possessions. Saying also that this son had been unable to follow a military or academic career due to ill health, and that he could leave him nothing else, Don Pedro beseeched his master/

/master to provide some way in or with which Don Pedro Francisco could live honourably. At least, this request was fulfilled, for Don Pedro Francisco received a habit of Santiago and later a government post in the province of Collaguas in the Viceroyalty of Peru.(1) The recently inherited title of course followed the legitimate family line and passed to the ambassador's brother, Antonio.

Ronquillo at his death was due 149,567 pesos de plata, which was all the money he left. Of this only a fractional part was ever paid and this only to the descendants of Christopher Bodkin, his money-lender, who were owed 61,345 pesos. Bodkin's daughter, Mary, spent at least thirty years of her life in Madrid, trying to get satisfaction for the debt.

Don Pedro's brothers received not one of the remaining 88,222 pesos now due them; they were hence unable to obey the rest of his will: to pay his other creditors and effect his religious bequests; to have what was left for themselves as a remembrance.(2) In England, recovery of money due the Postmaster-General for the despatch of letters (529: 14: 2d) was ordered by seizing Don Pedro's property in Jamaica in the Asiento. (see appendix) That is the miserable story of the close of Don Pedro Ronquillo's personal affairs.

Before passing to a more general summary of the life and work of Don Pedro Ronquillo in Spanish-British relations, let us pause to consider/

(1) Part of the will: A.H.N. Ordenes Militares - Santiago, 7234.
(2) See particularly Maura (Correspondencia) II, Introduction.

/consider what one might consider the political testament of the ambassador. Biographers love to seek out the last words of their heroes, because somehow these tend to possess a significance; for whether or not the individual was conscious of the coming event, whether the mental gaze was turned back or forward, these words have the importance of a last message.

In this case, we have examined Don Pedro's will, with all its pathos. We have also seen his personal desire to get to Spain. In political affairs, there was his anxiety over the French fleet, over the unity and progress of the Common Cause. But there is more that exists, thanks to those news letters of an English friend of the ambassador, and thought to have been sent to the Dutch minister, Dijkveld. One in particular has importance for us in the light of the great events before and after Don Pedro's death, and for the final glimpse it gives of his vital character.

On July 12th, 1691, the writer of the news letter had a long discussion alone with Don Pedro, trying to penetrate the principal reason behind the special mission of Lord Lexington to Spain. The Englishman first suggested that perhaps it was to persuade the King of Spain to give what remained of the Low Countries to the Elector of Bavaria, as Philip II had given them to his daughter and son-in-law. At this remark, Don Pedro began to grind his teeth and clench his fist;/

/fist; his eyes blazed with fury and he was almost throwing himself on the speaker. With a horrible oath, he said that if the King of England, the best friend of the Spanish King, was capable of making such a proposition, he would be a worse enemy than the King of France. If it was so, he, Don Pedro, would advise an immediate agreement with Louis, giving him the Low Countries; that Louis would easily give Casale, Pignevole, Perpignan and other provinces, as well as several millions for such a fine present. He went on to attack him for daring to speak of such a thing. By this time, the news letter writer was also shouting in anger - though without oaths - he carefully tells us - rebuking the ambassador for not listening to his ideas too in a free and inconsequential conversation. But he was still watching Don Pedro's fist. He then tried grumblingly to leave, but the ambassador prayed him to remain. Allowing himself to be presuaded several times, he finally stayed, and then asked if he was safe from Don Pedro's fist, to which Ronquillo admitted he had been on the point of striking him. The Englishman then said he was stronger than Don Pedro, and before help could have come, he would have been out of the house. At this, Ronquillo laughed, and little by little, their conversation settled down again. Don Pedro then tried to persuade him that the Low Countries were the fairest flower in the crown of the Spanish King, which would preserve his other possessions. The news/

/news letter writer then angrily asked why the King of Spain was not keeping them better by providing troops and money, and was depending on aid from William and the States-General. Don Pedro attributed that to the misery of the Spanish government and to the councillors of state, and said he would soon be of their number to change the conduct of affairs. (see appendix)

So ended the interview, but I think it shows that Don Pedro, like his brothers and so many other patriotic Spaniards, would have followed Philip V in the War of the Spanish Succession. And to corroborate this: on another occasion, Ronquillo contradicted Dijkveld's reasoning that the Spanish hated the French too much to wish to be governed by a duke of that nation, by saying that if they had a young French prince they would soon make him a good Spaniard. (see appendix) In fact, as so many of his countrymen, the ambassador was seeking the most utilitarian solution to Spain's difficulties which would preserve the unity of her possessions. But this was not to be his task. Whether our friend could have helped reform the Council of State in time and changed the course of events is doubtful in the extreme, but certainly he would have tried his best to continue serving his country.

General Conclusions.

There is now little more to be said. Spanish-British relations improved steadily in all fields during Don Pedro Ronquillo's time in London, and this despite the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Windsor in Charles II's reign. Though events were making this trend almost inevitable, Don Pedro had no little part in helping it on.

In many ways the rapprochement was not a real one that would or could last, but increased contact at least brought settlement of lesser differences and a co-operation which helped lay a foundation for the future. In maritime and trading affairs this was especially so. Though political interests more and more swayed decisions, the cloak of religious motives, albeit worn in places, still remained and one is surprised how divisive an influence religion still was between Spain and the Northern powers. It still affected the Spanish attitude, if not her eventual policy, and it quite often modified that policy. But, in truth, self-interest or rather the desire for self-preservation inspired her constant support of the Common Cause against Louis, for it seemed then her only hope of survival. However, this motive, in itself, could never be a permanent basis for Spanish-British friendship.

Of the more particular historical conclusions of general interest from the Ronquillo correspondence, I would pick out the following , and they seem to me to have been proved by all that has been quoted and discussed hitherto in the various sections.

In Charles II's reign, even from the beginning of Don Pedro's first period in London, Spain's policy was to unite king and country to go against France. The stratagem of keeping them divided in order to keep Charles poor and forced to fall in with national wishes, was soon seen to be dangerous, particularly by the ambassador who tried to keep in well with all and pacify them. This is not to deny that his sympathy as time went on was with the King's party.

Another significant point from this time was that Ronquillo was never convinced of an alliance between Charles and Louis, hence he always acted as though the King was faithful. This is proved, especially, by his ultimate willingness to accept Charles' arbitration offer of February, 1682; and this is principally due to his lack of funds to pay good informants.

Nor was the ambassador sure of any league between James II and the French King; in fact, to the end, he was convinced of James' sincerity with him. We have seen how favourable Spain really was towards Britain's Catholic monarch and how relations improved between the two courts. Castilian caution made the Spanish see and fear James' extremism, but their more authoritarian Catholic outlook coupled with lack of understanding of England, also blinded them to several dangerous aspects of the situation. Many of Ronquillo's keen reflections on James' reign given after 1688 were "wisdom afterthe event."

The attitude of Don Pedro and the Consejo de Estado to 'the Glorious Revolution' and the accession of William II as far as we go, to 1691, was far less enthusiastic and passive at the same time, than it has been painted. For, indeed, it gave rise to considerable soul-searching. Don Pedro Ronquillo's alternative plan to this is illuminating for the light it casts on this.

Throughout the whole story, the ambassador's dealings with the various Parliaments possess interest, though they were remarkably ineffective. Revealing, to me, was his activity on James' behalf in this respect from 1685-88. The more colourful accounts of chapel activity show the importance the Spanish government attached to that. Despite lack of wisdom in taking full advantage of the freedom in James' reign, peaceful protection of the faithful characterised its work in the main. In all departments, financial lack paralysed possible achievement through practically the entire period.

In maritime and commercial affairs the growth of peaceful settlement of disputes is remarkable. Don Pedro's views on a co-operative suppression of piracy with England showed the direction in which affairs were moving. Spain did not want disputes of this kind to harm general relations with Britain and was prepared to sacrifice to have this, but she had no lack of plans for a more positive policy, very few of which were actually tried.

What is our final estimate of Don Pedro Ronquillo ? Don Pedro was undoubtedly one of the very few Spanish diplomats of that period that can be called great, and in any age he would have been a leader. Outside conditions, particularly supply, curtailed his influence without a doubt, but these very difficulties also brought to light his resourcefulness and other very great qualities. These shine forth unhidden in their independence through his letters. In studying these, I have grown more and more aware of the great individuality of the man who wrote them. Full of character and humour, friendly and affectionate, he patiently persisted, whether on the heights of encouragement and success, or through the depths of depression. His pride and his warm nature did not make this easy, but he kept on with an almost unfailing application. In comparison with those of his time, he was not self-interested. His code of morality in politics and personal life was of the period, but in all he preserved a great sense of fidelity and fairness. As for his religious ideas, they were those of the devoted 17th century Spanish Catholic, but he could not, considering the age, be called "bigoted" as Macaulay called him. Don Pedro's judgement was often acute, though he talked a great deal and often changed his mind. Though critical, he had a streak of optimism which, while it helped him continue, sometimes deceived him. This quality of judgement was, of course, affected by circumstances, for, though he carefully sifted information, he was not often able to

secure really satisfactory confidants. This affects somewhat the value of his letters as founts of accurate facts, but this is also amply compensated for by his long experience in England, his cleverness and quickness. We may not like his generalisations about our forefathers, as lazy, greedy, phlegmatic, slow, inefficient, rebellious, and above all changeable, but they no doubt had some truth; and it seems interesting in comparison with the common view of Britain today as a pattern of stability. Can a national character, if there is such a thing, change ? Is trial and error with resulting disorder, essential to finding the most suitable governmental system ? But I digress. Don Pedro was equally critical of the Dutch, Italians, Poles, etc. and even of his own people. As a Roman lawyer, he could hardly be expected to advocate changing English law with Habeas Corpus, though, I think, he recognised something behind our legal and parliamentary system. The ambassador was in fact a man of varied aspects on which we could continue to elaborate, but the above will be enough. To sum up Don Pedro's character, I would say, if allowed to assume certain national similarities, that he was very Spanish in the best sense, with some of the failings. That his qualities and position were realised by many during his lifetime and after is clear. While treated with base ingratitude by the Spanish government and tardily honoured, he did taste some success and influence and his rise, if slow, was steady.

Does this seem a meagre number of 'conclusions' after so long and, perhaps, weary a pilgrimage ? Has an examination of as many of Don Pedro Ronquillo's letters as possible been worth while ? The writer feels that, if this thesis has any value, it is in making available facts on the whole case of so full a correspondence, long hidden in various archives, rather than the snippets of hitherto. Where else could one expect to find these except in a work such as this ? While there are few conclusions reached in the text, compared with its size, every effort has been made to see that these are sure. The chief hope remains that the information given prove useful in itself or else indicate the way to further facts which may help historians and others.

Key to Notes and Appendix.

The official letters of Don Pedro Ronquillo for Madrid generally left the Embassy in London every two weeks, with special despatches at special times carried by private messenger. A varying number, according to the amount of business, were sent each mail day, each letter usually dealing with a particular subject, for example, Parliament, a trading complaint, the position of the Catholics, and so on. In most cases they were addressed to the monarch or regent. Thus, at the beginning of our period, these were directed to "Señora", that is Mariana, the Queen-Mother, until Carlos II came of age when they were sent to him, "Señor". In reality they were principally the concern of the Consejo de Estado (The Council of State), though the royal decision on the particular matter was written on the outer cover or carpeta, sometimes in the royal handwriting. Other letters of a less important nature, often being covering notes, were addressed to the Secretary of the Consejo de Estado for Northern Affairs. The Council consulted on both types, forming a consulta on each or several letters, which included a precis of the communication(s), individual opinions of the councillors and their common recommendation to the King, whose final opinion was, as we have said, written on the carpeta. Original letters were usually placed inside the consulta. It seems, however, that representatives of below a certain standing, such as Fonseca, the Spanish consul in London, only addressed their despatches to the Northern Secretary.

Most of Don Pedro's letters were written by his secretary from dictated and often corrected minutes (e.g. see A.G.R.(État) 607,608), being signed by the ambassador, who occasionally added a particularly indecipherable postscript.

Ronquillo regularly or occasionally wrote to other officials and friends in Spain, though these letters often included portions of his official despatches. His erratic letters to the Governors in Brussels sometimes went as often as weekly. The most frequent correspondence he maintained, that is which I have seen, was with De Lira in the Hague in the years 1675-6, mail being sent off twice weekly in both directions.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes and appendix:

A.G.R. .. .. Archives Générales du Royaume, Brussels.

A.H.N. .. .. Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid.

Alb. .. .. Private Archive of the Duque de Alburquerque, Madrid.

B.M. .. .. British Museum, London.

B.N. .. .. Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.

Bod. .. .. Bodleian Library, Oxford.

B.R.B. .. .. Bibliotheque Royale de Belgique, Brussels.

Ind. .. .. Archivo de Indias, Seville.

K.H-A .. .. Koninklijk Huis-archief, The Hague.

P.R.O. .. .. Public Record Office, London.

R. .. .. Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague,

Sim. .. .. Archivo General de Simancas.

Add. .. .. Additional Manuscripts, British Museum, London.

Estado .. .. Sección de Estado, Simancas and Madrid.

(État) .. .. Secrétairerie d'État et de Guerre Espagnole, A.G.R. Brussels.

(Haye) .. .. Archive de l'ambassade d'Espagne a la Haye, A.G.R. Brussels.

St. Gen .. .. Staten-Generaal, R., The Hague.

(Ale) .. .. "Alemania" division of "Estado" documents at Simancas.

(Fla) .. .. "Flandes" division of "Estado" documents at Simancas.

(Fr) .. .. "Francia" division of "Estado" documents at Simancas.

(Ing) .. .. "Inglaterra" division of "Estado" documents at Simancas.

As the appendix is really a collection of the longer notes, they are interdependent, and the term "ibid" refers from appendix to notes and vice versa.

P. 25 (i) Despite the Duque de Maura (Correspondencia - Tomo I,20) this would appear true to me. Don Pedro was only eight or nine when his father made the journey to Cologne; and Don Antonio requested his return to Milan due to his wife being ill there and with so many small children (Cologne, 2nd July, 1638; Antonio Ronquillo to Cardenal-Infante Don Fernando; A.G.R. (Etat) 460).

P. 25 (ii) Ibid, 50 (I am not familiar with the evidence for the Duque de Maura's statement that he could speak German, and that this, together with his knowledge of French, helped him being chosen for his later missions in Northern Europe, to Poland and Sweden (?) See Maura (Correspondencia) I,20).

P. 26 Nimeguen, 1st Fe. 1677; Ronquillo to Don Juan; in Navarro, I, f.153. This letter is included in this, the first volume of Navarro's "life" from which much of the succeeding information in the section comes.

P.30 For Polish Mission consult:-
Sim.Estado (Alle) 2393; also (Ing)2550.
Navarro I, f.55-79.
Przezdziecki,
Rodriguez-Villa (Misión)
Rozanski,
etc.

P.43 This reflected a statement of the Marqués del Fresno of the year before: "To defend religion and (at the same time) to keep the Kingdom of England in favour of our interests is impracticable." The reasons given for this were that Charles and his Catholic brother (like the other forces of Catholicism in the country generally) were inclined to France. Much money would be required to win them or the ministers over, while Spain did not have enough for the bare necessities of diplomacy; much care would also need to be used. The recent break with France had largely been obtained through Protestant suspicions of her as a Catholic power. Spain could not afford to alienate such support as she had there, and lose the friendship of England. "The sacred obligation of our sacred religion" "the principal thing to which we must attend as guide in temporal affairs" was still honoured but the days of the Counter-Reformation were fast disappearing. (From letter of 10th May, 1674; Fresno to Señora; Sim.Estado(Ing) 2550).

P. 44 It was commonly felt in England that William might aid Charles to establish an autocracy with a view to his eventually ascending the throne himself. If Spanish support was mentioned in connection with such a plan, Spain might lose favour among her principal Parliamentary supporters. She herself suspected the Prince, particularly on account of his almost consistent defeats on the field of battle. The Marqués del Fresno had, however, recommended the match.

P. 47 This echoed a statement of Ruvigny to Ronquillo about the same time that it was necessary for the Spanish to undeceive themselves from thinking his master would give up by treaty what had been won with the sword - - 17th June, 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa; Sim.Estado(Ing) 2551.

P. 49 Sed: (a) 17th June, 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim.Estado (Ing)3955.
(b) 3rd June, 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa; in Navarro, I, f.86-91.
(c) Letters of Ronquillo to De Lira of 10th June, 14th June, 1675; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
(d) Calendar of State Papers, Domestic, (March 1st 1675 to Feb. 29th 1676) p.143-4. Letters of Pardini, English spy in the Spanish Embassy to Williamson (?)

P. 51 See in addition to the above-mentioned letters:-
1. Ronquillo to De Lira for:- 21st June; 9th July, 1675; A.G.R. (Haye) 488.
2. Ronquillo to Villahermosa for: 17th June, 1675, A.G.R. (Etat) 383.

P. 52 21st June, 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa: A.G.R. (Etat) 383.
20th June, 1675; Fonseca to Doloma; Sim.Estado (Ing)2551; also re bribery: Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1675-6, p.143-4 (Pardini).
I have found no accounts for this period, but all the letters appear to bear out the position pretty clearly.

P. 53 We cannot say there was enmity between the two men but there never was mutual regard or absolute trust between them. Don Pedro's opinion varied from letter to letter in these months. In the letter of 3rd. June to Villahermosa he wrote, for example: "There is no such pernicious instrument in the world, nor man so badly regarded by all." (Navarro I, f. 86-91).
Ronquillo's secretary gives this description: "a man of little ability and much presumption, a great talker and a great shouter, and who died eventually in Amsterdam having totally lost his reason." (f.90)

P. 54 In a private conversation at this time, Sir William Temple told Don Pedro that no one was desired in England so much as money, and that with this it was being firmly won over to the Lord Treasurer: (from: 22nd. July: Ronquillo to Señora; ibid)

P. 57 The Royal party, Don Pedro reported on October 21st, had 180 votes in the Commons. If then the Lower House had only 400 of its members attending, the "opposition" might have a hard time. However, he was assured that 238 of the "contrarios" were coming under oath. But again, on October 21st, he reported to the Duke of Villahermosa that in the week previous, it was said, the Court had paid out £80,000. See: 21st. Oct. 1675; Ronquillo to Villahermosa: A.G.R. (Haye) 488.

P. 59 At the time the arch-spy, the Baron de Vique - whose veracity in death as in life - is subject to suspicion - affirmed this, writing to London from Flanders with information supposedly based on letters he received from Don Pedro.
See P.R.O. S.P. 77/46, f. 259.

P. 63 For example, as early on as 10th. June, Ronquillo did not favour the dissension to be caused by the Commons attacking Lauderdale (10th. June; ibid). Indeed, he was quite content with the ministry as it was.
To the embassy celebrations on Carlos II's reaching his majority (in November), Don Pedro invited no Englishmen "to avoid giving offence with the numerous opposing factors." (Cal of State Papers (Venice), 477).

P. 64 Temple is also described by Ronquillo as "a strange fellow, who, on an attack of going to his garden, won't see anyone and lets no one visit him." (9th. July, 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488).

P. 70 (i) 14th. Jan., 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; ibid.
9th. Feb., De Lira to Ronquillo; ibid.
(ii) 31st. Dec., 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira; ibid.
(iii) 17th. Jan., 1676; ibid.
In another letter Don Pedro said the "auditor", the third most important official of the Treasury, had told him the financial position and that Parliament would have to be called to get supply, whether the King wanted it or not. (2nd. Mar. (3); Ronquillo to Senor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552)
(iv) 28th. Jan; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488).
(v) 26th. Nov., 1675; ibid.
(vi) Consulta of 13th. Dec., 1675; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551.
The Council, of course, had not heard then of Parliament's prorrogation.

P. 75 There is, in addition, a despatch of Don Pedro to De Lira that tells of Coventry coming to the embassy with "a very extravagant proposition" from Charles. A copy of this in cipher (which I have not decoded) was enclosed. However, Don Pedro at the time attributed very little importance to this and it is not referred to again (See 17th. May; ibid).

P. 78 See for details:-

Ronquillo to Señora in Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551, for 4th. Nov. (1).
" " Señor " " 25th. Nov. (3)
" " " " " 9th. Dec. (2)
" " " " " 17th. Feb., 1676 in ibid; 2552.

Also in Navarro, I, f. 103.

P. 78 (ii) Following the precedent of the Congress at Munster twenty eight years previously, Ronquillo was sent as second plenipotentiary but not as ambassador (only the first plenipotentiary was to have that title), while all the other envoys were named ambassadors. Don Pedro - seeing he was to be the first Spanish representative to arrive at Nimeguen, anticipated the difficulties to arise from this. For more on this see:- Navarro, I, f. 115 on, and letters of Ronquillo to De Lira, A.G.R. (Haye) 145.

P. 79 See Baron de Vigue's letters in P.R.O. S.P. 77/48. According to Navarro, the naming of Don Pedro to the Congress met with surprise in the Low Countries, where De Lira was felt to be the obvious choice. Later, through the work of his enemies, Madrid appointed De Lira and M. de Pape, President of the Privy Council of Flanders, to go to Nimeguen as interim envoys, should the others be delayed. Needless to say, these enemies did not facilitate Don Pedro's arrival, but De Lira was too firm a friend to mix in this, and the other appointee made no move either. (Navarro, I, f. 115)
In fact, early in December, De Lira urged Ronquillo to set out for Nimeguen even without orders. If there had been money, Ronquillo would evidently have been quite glad to do this, saying the best things both had done, had been done without orders. (17th. Dec., 1675; Ronquillo to De Lira, A.G.R. (Haye) 488).

P. 87 See Ronquillo's answer to Coventry; memoire of 18/28 Aug., 1675; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551. also letter of 2nd. Sept., to Senora, and a great deal of material in P.R.O. S.P. 104/183.

P. 89 4th. Oct., 1675; ibid.
In a letter to his Royal Mistress of 28th. October, and included by Navarro, Ronquillo wrote: "I do not believe any Parliament has ever started with the Court Party in such a strong position, nor in better spirits; neither have the interests of Your Majesty ever had such a concurrence of reasons alienating the minds of this people from them, for those intimate counsellors were strengthening complaints as much of Spain, Italy and Flanders, as of the Indies." (Navarro I, f. 92).

P. 91 (i) 6th. July, 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552.
26th. Oct. (3); Salinas to Señor; ibid.
30th. Mar. 1677; Charles II's memoire on Sir Patience Ward's behalf; ibid.
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1676-7, p. 196.
In one despatch Ronquillo (re Corsairs) wrote: "The English who are well-intentioned toward us say we make war on our friends, and not our enemies, that we capture those ships belonging to our friends and not those bearing men and provisions to France and Sweden" - - - (20th. Mar., 1676; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 488)

(ii) 1st. June, 1675; Ronquillo to Señora; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551.
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1675-6; 143-4 (letter of Pardine to Williamson).

P. 92 Ronquillo's complaint and Charles' answer: June, 1675; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2551. 13th. April (1) 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid. 2552.

P. 93 22nd. June, 1676; ibid. Charles' proclamation against the French Corsairs was issued on the first day of Courtin's ministry in England. Ronquillo states he said that if Louis did not give reparation for damage by French Corsairs, he would retire and the Spaniard hoped that would not be easy as the trouble at Messina was also involved. Incidentally, Don Pedro's opinion of Courtin may be of interest (20th. Jan. 1676; ibid.): "bold and meddling, he will win easy entrance among the women and in the houses of pleasure, both of which I have not held convenient in this kingdom, and with particular care I have avoided visiting any lady." As a matter of fact, Courtin's orders included that to "ménager les dames" (Jusserand: 217). In the above despatch Don Pedro also speaks of Courtin's predecessor Ruvigny's "great sagacity and activity with great dissimulation" and "superior intelligence." (See, for their relationship, Cal. of State Papers (Venice) 435).

P. 96 30th. Aug., 1675. De Lira to Ronquillo; A.G.R. (Hays) 488. The ambassador at the Hague said he wished copies of gazettes etc. forwarded twice weekly from London "although in the hand of Don Pedro Francisco when you do not wish to dictate them to Don Francisco Antonio (Navarro)".

P. 97 The Germans had been taken on mostly at Hamburg where Don Pedro had reorganised his household en route from Poland. In mentioning this, Navarro after making the generalisation that there are good people in every nation, went on, that all the servants of below stairs obtained there "bore themselves with such good order and such fidelity that many followed their new master until death separated them, and all, in time, adjuring the errors of Luther, were converted to our sacred Religion." Navarro I, f. 81.

P. 99 See letters in ibid for summer of 1675. Joking of their friendly co-operation in Northern Affairs, Ronquillo wrote on 19th. July to De Lira: "when your lyre (Lira) and my little more (Ronquillo) are now concerted in a firm and indissoluble consonance."

P. 102 22nd. July, 1676; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552. Navarro I, f. 118-121.
Other Refs: 10/20 July, 1676; Bulstrode to Williamson; P.R.O. S.P. 77/48.
22nd. Feb. 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 145.

P. 103 Letters of April, May, June 1677; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2553. Carlos d'Este, a member of the Italian House of Este, and Marqués de Burgomayne (or Borgomaneiro) went to Vienna in 1680 where he died in 1694. Eight years older than Ronquillo, he too was appointed a member of the Consejo de Estado in 1691, which position he, like Don Pedro, did not manage to take up. There was a long-maintained and, I judge, not particularly intimate correspondence between the two men.

P. 104 1. See Sim. Estado (Ing) 2555.
2. A.G.R. (Haye) 144 - Letters of De la Fuente to De Lira.
3. A.G.R. (Etat) 2554 - Letters of De la Fuente to Fuenmayor
4. ibid, 417 - Letters of Villahermosa to De la Fuente.
5. Navarro I, f. 262
6. Hispania Illustrata 347 ("an honourable put off").

P. 111 (i) See also P.R.O. S.P. 103/80.
"Reasons proving that the friendship of England is more advantageous to Spain than that of Holland". (June, 1677) by Ricardo de Whit (a brother of Baron de Vique)
(ii) Salinas had complained before and there had already been sharp interchanges on the question (see later refs. for sources).
(iii) For further details:-
Register of Privy Council of Scotland: 3rd. Series, Vol. V. 91-2.
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic), 1676-1677; 426 et seq., 560-1
Papers in B.M. Harl. 1516.
Also Sim. Estado (Ing) 2552-2553.

P. 112 See Also:
Sim. Estado (Ing) 2553;
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic); 1677-8.
B.M. Harl. 1516.
Letters of Ronquillo to De Lira etc. A.G.R. (Haye) 145.
P.R.O. S.P. 103/88.

P. 113 Letters of ibid esp. 8th. April; Ronquillo to Villahermosa. Sim. Estado (Ing) 2553.
B.M. Harl. 1516.
(P.R.O. S.P. 77/112)
Later on Ronquillo had criticised Salinas' blinding himself to the fact that Charles was "mad with hunger", his expecting the King to recall his troops just because of popular uproar, and ignoring the danger of civil war to Spanish interests. Don Pedro was equally critical of Fonseca and Bergeyck. In fact, his advise remained, to win every sector of the community by every means to hand, but with caution. (27th. May, 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 145).

P. 114 Ronquillo to De Lira letters in A.G.R. (Haye) 145. esp. 28th. April; 27th. May; July 29th.
Also 4th. June; Burgomayne to Villahermosa; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2553.

P. 115 (i) Burgomayne wrote that the M.Ps. were telling Bergeyck nothing, "They are highly suspicious particularly because he does not follow in the footsteps of Don Pedro Ronquillo and Salinas, who have certainly laid such very excellent roots here which as they are cultivated, can produce important results."
(ii) Letter of between 26th. June and 8th. July; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 145.

P. 120 After the visit to the Low Countries mentioned below, the Marqués wrote that those towns garrisoned by England fell easily to France, thereby implying Charles' collusion with Louis. (12th. Aug. 1678; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim. Estado (Inglaterra) 2556.
This feeling continued for he wrote on 30th. Jan, 1679:- "I also hold it infallible that he (Charles) is treating with the most Christian King who would pay Charles not to call a Parliament." (30th. Jan. 1679; ibid 3956.

P. 123 A despatch of 1st. May; ibid; tells how he made no protest on Danby's fall for fear of being mistaken about the situation; nor did he even visit the deposed minister. Speaking of visits, he did not call on the Duchess of Portsmouth, but did so on the Duchess of Cleveland and "la Comedianta". Through this he was no less popular, he said, with the King, while the people were delighted "to/

P. 123 (contd.)
/"to see disparaged a French woman who is the ruin of the realm." He went on, "Sire, many thanks that are done here appear irregular in courts where there is a King and a good government, but here, there is neither King nor government, and as there is a Parliament, one must govern oneself by other maxims. Mine will always be to keep Your Majesty well with the party that may be the stronger in future."

P. 124 (i) The terms of such an alliance were surmised as follows:
↓ Charles was
(a) to make no treaty nor alliance, nor to join Parliament, without Louis' permission.
(b) to support French conquests in Flanders.
(c) to help re-establish French commerce in England.
(ii) Louis was
(d) to make payments to Charles as previously.
(e) not to attack the Low Countries or Holland.
(f) to support the English legitimate succession.
(iii) The question of commerce in the Indies might also be included.
Coventry and Prince Robert ("un buen Austriaco"- a good supporter of the House of Austria) also something of this nature was afoot, but Burgomayne said the King did not share his confidence with them.

P. 126 By March, Charles had suggested this defensive league using either Ronquillo - who, we remember, the Emperor already knew - or another minister, and Ronquillo was asking Madrid what he should do if such powers were to be sent him from Leopold. 27th. Mar. (2) 1680; ibid.

P. 136 19th. Jan. 1677; Salinas to Señor; ibid. 2553.
The Council refused the idea on the grounds that it was not suitable to mix English sailors with those of the Spanish naval forces owing to "the difference of religion."

P. 137 Regarding this long-drawn out question of the Consul's appointment:
19th. Dec. 1678; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim Estado (Ing) 3956.
5th. June (1) 1679; ibid.
28th. Aug. 1678; Villahermosa to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 2137.

P. 142 18th. Nov. 1678; Burgomayne to Señor; ibid. 3955.
Coleman also said the Spanish ministers had spent more money than this in Parliament, which was surer ground, but Burgomayne wrote that this would be difficult to prove owing to the greatest caution with which any money passed through his hand. He added however, that much could be verified against France in this respect.

P. 143 ibid: Consulta of Jan. 1679.
8th. April; Egmont to Señor;
1st. May; Burgomayne or Egmont to Señor.
Few and mostly Flemish took advantage of the offer.

P. 144 "I hold it certain that if it were not for (York's obstinacy) the Catholics would be living in the same quiet as when I was here four years ago." (8th. Aug. 1680; Ronquillo to Senor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957).

P. 145 14th. Aug. 1676; Salinas to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 489.
12th. April, 1677; Ronquillo to Don Juan in Navarro I, f. 176.
11th. Dec. 1677; Burgomayne to Senor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 2555.

P. 146 Letters of 26th. Jan. 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira.
26th. June, 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira (re brother).
esp. and others in A.G.R. (Haye) 145.

P. 147 (i) On 6th. March, 1677, Don Pedro wrote De Lira; ibid.
"My pretensions with the King in this government and whatever number there may be from now until Antichrist are reduced to that of them paying me."

(ii) 31st. March, 1677; Ronquillo to De Lira; A.G.R. (Haye) 145.
"More than being useless he (Chrystin) is positively harmful"; and other letters in same liasse.

P. 148 Temple recommended him as "a man of good conversation" to D/Avaux and Colbert. (See Letters et Negotiations, Vol. II;66)
"Un des plus éclairés qui fussent dans un si celibre Assemblé". (St. Didier, 115)
Ronquillo's letters to De Lira speak of these particularly of his happy relations with the Marqués de los Balbases and his family. In two, he incidentally mentions "mi mujer"- my woman or wife - whoever she was. (22nd. and 25th. Feb; A.G.R. (Haye) 145).

P. 149 — A.G.R. (Haye) 212.
(Also in Lonchay (Correspondance) Vol. V, 291 et seq).
A.G.R. (État) 655, 656, 658.

P. 150 — According to Navarro, Don Pedro was to have accompanied York when he came with the auxiliary troops, but the plan fell through. That was in 1678; ibid.

P. 151 — ibid. Also re Ghent and Junta Politica:-
A.G.R. (Etat) 2559 (Letter to Fuemmayor of 13th. Mar. 1679)
A.G.R. (Haye) 656 and 658.
P.R.O. S.P. 101/6 (re Ronquillo going to England);
S.P. 77/52.
Navarro, I, f. 277 et seq.

P. 158 — On the Burgundy title and Conference of Courtrai see also:- 18th. June, 25th. June; (Letters between Villahermosa and Ronquillo); Sim. Estado (Flanders) 3865, and 26th. Aug. (3), 14th. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.

P. 160 — "It was not so easy as was being said, because although the spirit may be good, he who understands what treaties are, will know the great difficulties and distance there is between desire and execution." 29th. June; ibid.

P. 163 — 29th. June; ibid.
Don Pedro felt great gratitude to this Dutchman whom he describes as a man of talent and probity, zealous for the Common Cause and perhaps the best-informed of the Republicans. "For we have witnessed on many occasions how his vote has carried along the rest." Our friend hoped his master would command him to show royal gratitude for Van Leeuwen's friendly zeal during the negotiation. Ronquillo also requested Madrid to send with their "ratifications" of the alliance, a despatch for the States-General, and one for Charles, to be exchanged with these so that Spain would have no doubt about the extra condition. There was delay in receiving a definite declaration from Holland and in August, the ratification went forward without them. Finally, by early November, a memorial from Van Leeuwen stated the States-General's decision to stick by the treaties; and Don Pedro was more than satisfied with this, feeling it to be worth more than the hitherto projected separate act, since it proceeded from Holland itself. (See letters of 23rd. June (2); 29th. June; 12th. Aug. (2); 4th. Nov. (3); ibid.)

P. 168 Ronquillo provided a detailed despatch to his master on English personalities at this time on the domestic scene. 28th. June (3); Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.

Of Charles himself, he wrote: "I have found the King applying himself more to business and more happily, and not so prodigal nor so abandoned to pleasures and amusements as when I left him, although always paying much attention to the French lady, the Duchess of Portsmouth. Without difficulty and, apparently, without deceit, he is angry over the affairs of France and contradicts the French embassador, reproving him with arguments he formerly held as fables, and as prolixly as when he tried to embarass the treaty by saying that the powers of the Duke of Villahermosa were not enough."
The Duke of York "enjoys as ever being engaged in affairs, although in the understanding of them, I do not find him improved. He does not unbosom himself so much with the French as the King."
Don Pedro continued that he was firm for the newly-concluded treaty and that he had admitted to him how much his brother and he knew the restoration of their fortunes depended on friendship with Spain. James, however, still suffered from "bad servants and worse counsellors, delighting in persons of little ability and friars, who under the pretext of being Catholic, harm more than they profit him in the name of religion." Of his general nature, Ronquillo comments that, though his work was trustworthy, from experience he could also say, that the Duke took such pride in being a man of his word, that his constancy passed to obstinacy.

As for the royal ladies, the Queen was only at her devotions, the Duchess of York at parties and ceremonies, though Don Pedro said the latter could have had influence with her husband "because women have always been able to do much with him."

Turning from the royal family to the King's ministers, Ronquillo dealt with them in order of importance.

Sunderland, then Southern Secretary, was, he says, "the most powerful" minister at the time, possessing "entirely the grace and confidence of the King" and really "prime minister." Though formerly secretary to that always suspect French lady, the Duchess of Portsmouth, he no longer, at least for the present, shared business with her./

P. 168 (Contd.)

/her. Perspicacious and frank, in Don Pedro's eyes then, he had told him France was making offers which had been and were being refused. Bridgeman, Sunderland's secretary then or a kind of under-secretary of state, is also mentioned as doing much of the work - - but of him we shall hear more later.

Of the son of Clarendon, Laurence Hyde, Ronquillo wrote that "he had great understanding and ability", that he was "a mild, modest and reserved man." He had not great experience of affairs, but what he said on them was good. As First Lord of the Treasury, he was virtually in command of it. Charles was pleased with him, and York also wished to see him advanced. In fact, Charles and Sunderland were using him to reduce York to their opinion, as witness in the decision that no new parliament be called, but rather a session of the old one. Don Pedro lastly says of Hyde, that he had known him at Nimeguen and had forgiven him the anti-Spanish actions of his father.

Sidney Godolphin, in his opinion, knew little of external affairs. However, he was in the King's favour, possessed "perspicacity and reserve" and despite his "over-subtlety" had "great application to work." Probably in his favour with the Spanish ambassador, was that he got on badly with Barillon.

It was plain that Arlington was now a setting star. "He has nothing more to do than to keep himself in his post as Lord Chamberlain . . . he attends the Council very punctually, which is a sign of his not having much to occupy him." The Earl was playing no part in the negotiations, for he had done so in those with France and "although his ambition and his avarice are to an excessive degree, his fear is much greater as things are going the other way these days and Parliament and attacks ministers." Nonetheless he was speaking much about foreign affairs, about which he knows a great deal, and Don Pedro thought it suitable to keep up their friendship, and in fact, Arlington had spoken well for him on a certain point in the Council.

Though still supported by the Duke of York, Lauderdale was out of the picture, having little power remaining to him, ill and said to be losing his reason. The Spaniard was/

P. 168 (Contd.)

/was not visiting him "because he is so generally disliked by all that this would be enough to make (himself) odious."

Despite Leoline Jenkins quibbling during the negotiations for the Treaty of Windsor, Don Pedro gave him his due as "rectissimo in administering justice, so I would be very pleased were he the Commissioner of France at Courtrai."

Of the Chancellor, Heneage Finch, Don Pedro does not speak, "for he is a poor fellow and does what they tell him", which meant he would probably be in office for a long time. He was only difficult over affixing the Great Seal.

Finally, in this lengthy parade of leading personalities, Ronquillo gives three portraits of members of the Foreign Affairs Committee:

"Milord" Robartes, Don Pedro classed as "a man of honour, a good Englishman, but very silent also because he does not speak any other language than his own."

Essex, formerly one of the "Bands" know little of external affairs. "He is very timorous and for that reason left the post of First Commissioner of the Treasury, and now that some serenity has, it seems, been found, has returned to the Council and the Committee (of Foreign Affairs)."

Of his and Spain's friend, Sir William Temple, Ronquillo wrote: "Proud, he possesses a great free spirit; a good Englishman but a great enemy of the Duke of York; and, in my opinion, through what I have experienced here and at Nimeguen, I hold him to be a very Spaniard (i.e. Hispanophile)" He was trusted and would prove, Don Pedro thought, a good ambassador to Madrid - - which, however, was not to be.

Speaking more generally of the domestic position and the individuals involved, Ronquillo felt, that while outside they believed that York controlled all, hence that a Catholic managed all, really James was being careful to see that Sunderland was with him who in turn was using Hyde to accomplish the exact reverse, control of the Duke.

P. 169 (i) 12th. Aug. (1); ibid.

(ii) Memoires secrets d/Adrian Foppens p. 395, entry for 27th. Oct. 1680.
In summing up his policy in these months we have his own words:- "I am attempting to incline the King to it (an early session/

P. 169 (ii) (Contd.)
/session and the same parliament), to secure Sunderland and to gain the moderate party partly by uniting them in their wish for a session, and partly through the importance of containing France, which up till now has, I think, no considerable party here." (12th. Aug. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.)

P. 170 21st. Oct. (7); ibid.

P. 172 For projected Spanish-Portuguese alliance, see letters of:-
28th. June (2); 21st. Oct. (4); ibid 3957.
2nd. Dec; 15th. April, 1681 (1) and (2); ibid 3958.
Cal. of State Papers, Domestic; (1680-1); p. 453-4.

P. 173 4th. Nov. 1680; ibid 3960.
This despatch was later used to defend the "neutrality" of Ronquillo's attitude to James when the Duke succeeded his brother and Spain wondered whether to keep on Don Pedro as ambassador or not. (Consulta of 20th. March, 1695) see P. 367.

P. 174 A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates in England from 1668 to the present time, Vol. I, 310-12.
King's speech of 21st./31st. Oct. 1680.

P. 178 A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates in England from the year 1668 to the present time, Vol. II, from "A just and modest vindication of the proceedings of the two last Parliaments." (p. 375-437, esp. 389 etc.)
also:- 12th. Aug. (2) 1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957.

P. 181 24th. Mar. 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado(Fla) 3866.
26th. Mar; Parma to Señor; ibid.
22nd. April; Consulta; ibid.
Also see P.R.O. S.P. 77/53.

P. 187 Cal. of Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde, Hist. Mss. Comm. Reports, New Series, Vol VI, p. 6. Letter of Col. Edward Cooke to Ormonde, March 25th. 1681.

P. 191 (i) This item is found in the Embassy expenses as costing £47: 16/-. From secret expenses (May 25th. 1680 to end of Aug. 1681); A.H.N. Estado, 1697.

P. 191 (ii) Navarro, I, f. 315.
"With this (delay) there was time to see all that is most worthy of note in that University of Oxford, the first of those in England and one of those which possess a European renown. The ambassador had his lodgings in the new College which they call 'of our Lady"; whose rector gave him a great reception and who at the end arranged for the University to bestow on him the degree of Doctor of Laws, which is the most striking (eclatante) way in which that body shows the esteem it holds for persons of distinction. Our rector did not wish to hear a word on the matter of payment for lodgings: on account of this, and so as not to fail in paying the debt of gratitude, a cup of silver gilt was given him, which he said would only be used at the public banquets of the College. And mutual compliments having been passed between the ambassador, the Rector and members of the College, (Don Pedro) took leave of all of them and put himself on the road of return to London etc.
This handsome cup bearing the Ronquillo arms is still in the possession of New College. According to Embassy Accounts, it cost £27. Until quite recently, it was believed to have been presented by another Spanish envoy, the Conde de Molina, who lodged there during the Plague. More details of this I believe New College possesses.
A.H.N. Estado, 1697.

P. 192 There is also a lack of documents touching Ronquillo's work during these months. Navarro was faced with this too - but in fact the events do not seem to have had great importance. I, f. 320.

P. 193 This banquet cost £127 odd (Accounts in A.N.H. (Estado) 1697) In a letter two years later defending himself against the charge of prodigality, Don Pedro wrote of the entertainment as being unique: "the banquet which I had two years ago for the Prince of Orange which had to surpass abundance and be magnificent - - " (9th. Aug. (2), 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ale) 3925).

P. 196 It has been said that Ronquillo, by this fourth point of his memoire, suggested the arbitration Charles offered six month's later. However, here, Don Pedro was only proposing that of both England and Holland, trusting in the Dutch to swing decisions in favour of Spain. He and his country never opposed a general arbitration, one which would include other powers beside England. While it is true that later on, under the tremendous stress of circumstances - and of course not knowing Charles' secret arrangements with France - Don Pedro finally advocated Charles' suggestion as the only way to save Spain. There is nothing I have seen to indicate he knowingly suggested Charles' sole arbitration. But I anticipate - -

P. 206 19th. Jan., 1682; Ronquillo to Parma; ibid.
12th. Jan., 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3869. The letters from Don Pedro at this time report a fair account on the subject of French payments in England. In the above despatch, he continued: "Three days ago, a London money-changer counted out 6,000 pounds sterling in two or three payments to the order of the minister here, and to some few English, although of little importance, they promised as a first offer 30,000 for the business (for France) accomplished." In another despatch, he again mentions this last named amount, plus aid in abolishing the religious penal laws being promised M.Ps., should they not support the alliances. Ronquillo held these reports certain. He also said the Marqués de la Fuente told of great payments being made from Paris, which, according to others, reached 600,000 reals. (£120,000). To combat this, Don Pedro only had his meagre and ill-paid salary, and he sought in his letters home prompt means to do so, expecting the Parliament summons to be issued "from one moment to another." Already ignoring his poverty, he had bogun to do as much as appeared possible and to call together some M.Ps. to confer on Spanish interests. Of his experiences with these he wrote: "The people that last year were well disposed are, I find, of the same opinion, and all the large party of moderates who wish an arrangement with the King. These are embarassed more by the Duke of York's party than by the small one of the Republicans, not because together they would win, but lest, through raising a spark in the Parliament, they set it afire. What is worse is what France achieves with considerable and effective gifts and promises assuring very large sums for business done. (26th. Jan. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958).
Also/

P. 206 (Contd.)

Also on January 26th. Don Pedro wrote that he had never been more watchful on account of the French ambassador; working with three parties at the same time, trying to avoid the threatened session. These were: (1) The Duke of York's in the Court as well as those ministers who feared "the rigorous judgement" of the two Houses; (2) the Republicans who feel that sedition alone can help them; and (3) the French party proper created "with the influence of the women." The deciding factor remained, nonetheless, the King, and Don Pedro gives this picture of him then:-

"The King takes little pleasure in affairs and greatly dislikes the idea of a Parliament - - - And although it may be true what they wish to persuade us that the King does not listen to them (the women of the French party) he nevertheless grants such easy access to people of less consideration in his hours of recreation. And when he goes out for walks in the country, he is accompanied by those who have no more obligations than sharing his interest in mechanics, and they utter what seems best to them, telling stories and syppositions that add to the King's distrust of the Parliament coming to terms, being assured that it will always remain just as obstinate. By this, they work that the King, influenced by this fear, should decide not to call the Parliament except in the last extremity, and induce him to admit an arrangement with France, whose minister here publicises that his master wishes this. And although His Britannic Majesty and his ministers always affirm that they will carry out the word they have given - - ". Ibid. Indeed watchfulness in all sectors regarding French influence had to be the watchword then of one, who, as he phrased it, had "the obligation to know England." (20th. Nov. 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

P. 211 (i) VanBoenengen enlarged this by mentioning how, on the instances of Charles, through Count Thun and Ronquillo, the Emperor had pardoned certain Hungarian rebels (of the Nadasty and Zringi families) who had really committed "lèse majesté".

P. 211 (ii) For this long interview see principally:
6th. Feb. 1682; Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
9th. Feb; Ronquillo to Coloma; ibid etc.
also Sim. Estado (Fla) 3869 and 3870.

P. 214 At meeting of 12th. Aug. 1681; account in Sim. Estado (Fla) 3868. See p. 204-5.
It re-echoes the sentiments against the acceptance of Englishmen into the Spanish naval forces - p. 144 (3) above. (Swedish ships' crews).

P. 215 Copy of Spanish translation of Stafford's speech on scaffold in ibid 3958 (with letter of 20th. Jan. 1681); Cal. of State Papers - Domestic, 1680-1, p. 111.

P. 216 Don Pedro wrote: "I would wish too that he (The Duke) might consider that his too great zeal must be the cause that not a Catholic remain in the realm. For all the rigour that cannot be vented on the Duke, must be borne by them, etc. - - - apart from four or six that I know influence him, all the rest of the Catholics know better and the prudent among them understand that they have neither strength, wealth nor way for any such action." (12th. Aug. (1); 1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957).

P. 219 Consult:- (re incident and Brandenburg raiders generally.)
Letters of:- 21st. Oct. (1), 1680, including Brandenburg's reply to Charles II.
4th. Nov. (1), 1680.
18th. Dec. 1680 etc. (Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957).
6th. Dec. 1680, Ronquillo to Parma; ibid 3958.
14th. July, 1681; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
K.H.A. 16: 17; IX (a); 10:- This collection of relevant papers were those forward to inform William of Orange on the matter.
Also P.R.O. S.P. 94/65.
Cal. of State Papers - Domestic (1680-1) 22, 42.

P. 220 On Gibraltar at this time:-
19th. Aug. 1681; 8th. Sept; Consulta of 9th. Sept;
7th. Nov. (Jenkins to Ronquillo) in Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
Consulta on complete Gibraltar negotiations through the years:-
of May 6th. 1686; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.

P. 222 (i) Tangier:- 26th. Aug. (1) 1680; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957, and Consulta on it.
16th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3958.
17th. Jan. 1681; Letter of Charles II; ibid.
6th. & 16th. May, 1681; Consultas; ibid.
Also a Collection of Parl. Debates, Vol. I, 399-418.

P. 222 (ii) Re Meeting of Parma:-
It is Navarro who says there was little difficulty in obtaining this. However, Don Pedro felt he had to make various gifts, including one of silver, equal to £62: 10/- to Bridgeman, Secretary of the Admiralty, for his courtesy in soliciting the ships of war, and another (included in the envoy's ordinary accounts) to the commander. Navarro, I, f. 308.
and Accounts for 25th. May, 1680 to end of Aug. 1681, in A.H.N. Estado, 1697.
also K.H.A. 16: 17; IX (a): 10 (related to papers on Brandenburg raiders).
P.R.O. S.P. 104/187.

P. 225 9th. Sept. (2) 1680; ibid with memorials presented to Charles, etc. also through ibid 3958.
On Don Pedro making his public entrance into London at this time "una infinidad" of merchants with Spanish interests attended him (Navarro, I, f. 295).

P. 225 From here on: A.H.N. Estado, 1697. Regarding Bridgeman, Don Pedro wrote on 28th. June (1) 1680:- "I do not know how to return to Windsor without taking him a gift." (Sim. Estado (Ing) 3957).

P. 226 This and point 7 would seem to prove some direct correspondence between Ronquillo and Medinaceli (See Maura (Correspondencia) Vol. I, p. 8-9).

P. 227 This Milanese, Gregorio Leti, trained by the Jesuits became a Protestant, but left Geneva on not seeing eye to eye with the Calvinists there to wander through several courts. In London, he was presented to the King and ambassadors. Eventually, one of them complained to Charles of him, and he left for Amsterdam where he spent his remaining years. (See: Cameron i).

P. 229 (i) Throughout Ronquillo's correspondence, I have found no definite assertion of such an alliance. Navarro wrote: "Yo no lo digo ni lo contradigo."
(A.G.R. Manuscripts Divers, 950, f. 358).

P. 229 (ii) 23rd. Feb. (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870) :-
"In my opinion that safe conclusion is that if the agreement and bribery of France is uncertain, one can work with some hope, but if it be true, nothing will be enough to disturb it. The idea of a King prostituting himself to such ignominy is so horrible that although it is repeated so often and events all appear effects of what is divulged, I want to keep myself in doubt, that confidence may give me encouragement in my petitions. For otherwise, I could not resist despair."

P. 236 20th. Feb. (2) 1682; Ronquillo to Parma (ibid.
23rd. Feb. (1) ; Ronquillo to Señor)
Plott-Chudleigh Despatches, p. 43.

P. 237 See Ormonde letters; Hist. Man. Comm. New Series, Vol VI here, letter of Earl of Longford to Ormonde, 1st. Mar. 1682.

P. 238 (i) Consulta of 18th. Mar. 1682; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870.
See also Chudleigh to Conway, 14/24 March, 1682.
Chudleigh prophesied Spain through Ronquillo would demand fulfilment of the treaty, and if this was not granted categorically, would enter a protestation, declare he would leave the Kingdom, and that there was to be a Spanish prohibition of all English commerce. This would be done "with noyse", published abbut London and Ronquillo would make an appearance of packing his goods "in hopes att least to sett the people in a flame if he cannot otherwise bring the Court to comply." (Plott-Chudleigh, p. 75)
However, the ambassador does not seem to have taken such extreme measures that year at least.

P. 238 (ii) See March letter of Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
Also Cal. of State Papers - Domestic (1682), p. 115.

P. 239 16th. Mar; Ronquillo to Burgomayne; ibid.
See also 9th. Mar. (1), Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Fla) 3869.

P. 243 1st. June (2) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
12th. June ; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid.
Chudleigh, referring to Spain's appearing "irresolute" over the arbitration, repeated a current rumour that Ronquillo and Fuenmayor had written to each other for an explanation of the orders, so ambiguous had they appeared to them. (Plott-Chudleigh, p. 110).

P. 248 19th. Nov. (1) 1682; Burgomayne to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ale) 3923, including memoire of 15th. Nov. and Consulta of 23rd. Dec.

P. 250 Consulta of 13th. Jan. 1683; ibid; and one on 11th. Jan. (2) 1683; also Consulta of 23rd. December, 1682 in Sim. Estado (Ale) 3923.

P. 252 Navarro says this was according to a letter from an important personage in Madrid. The letter itself he also says was lost in the burning of Wild House in 1688 (ibid).

P. 256 9th. Mar. (3) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3869.
9th. Mar. (2) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
on this paragraph on Parliament prospects etc.

P. 262 20th. Feb. (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Parma; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3870.
23rd. Feb. (1) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid. (see p. 229).

P. 263 From 16th. Feb. on, anaway: (ibid to Señor)
"I find myself now almost without help from these Dutch ministers - - - ".

P. 267 29th. June (3) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor. (
also 7th. Sept. (2) " ") Sim. Estado
21st. Sept. " " ((Ing) 3958.

P. 271 11th. Jan. 1683; Ronquillo to Señor. (Sim. Estado
14th. Jan. : Ronquillo to Botello) (Ing) 3973.
also 14th. Dec. 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo 280, f. 62.

P. 275 16th. Nov. (2) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
8th. Mar. (3) 1683; ibid 3959.
Mentioned in letters in R. St. Gen (Engeland), 6296.

P. 279 22nd. Dec; Castelmoncayo to Ronquillo; ibid.
Ronquillo's letters, even the official ones, do not breathe so much optimism as the Marques's.

P. 281 11th. Jan. 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1650.
On these days, see also:
25th. Jan; ibid (Ing) 3959.
Klopp: II p. 378.

P. 282 18th. Oct. (2) ibid:-
"Never have I doubted that the King of England has known the movements of the French King's Troops, and since they are equally persuaded here as in Paris that Your Majesty has authorised us to make a last-minute adjustment, that he (Charles) has agreed to the entry of these troops (into the Low Countries)".

P. 283 (i) 22nd. Mar; ibid.
14th. May; Ronquillo to Fuenmayor; ibid.
14th. May; Ronquillo to Marqués de la Fuente; ibid.
also (for Polish King's mediation) 17th. May (3) Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

P. 283 (ii) 17th. May (3); Ronquillo to Señor; also 30th. May; ibid.
also 31st. May (1); ibid in which he wrote:-
"I confess to Your Majesty that I have Luxembourg always in my heart, remembering what it took past year to persuade them of that fortress' importance and the effort for the blockade's being raised. For it is infallible the minister that forced this then and formed the memoire sent to Paris on it, is hated by the French."

P. 283 (iii) The announcement in May of Anne's engagement to George of Denmark, now the satellite of Louis, came to Don Pedro as a surprise. He at once attributed it to the work of France (though also noting the favourable effect it might have on Amsterdam's attitude to the alliances). Indeed practically all felt the marriage would help Louis and the French party themselves were throwing out mysterious hints as to its value. Ronquillo went to consult Charles on the matter. The King said he did not doubt France was pleased but he could not avoid that; his word was what was of greatest importance and the union suited his private and domestic interests. For in view of the Duke of York's religion and his own lack of succession, he wished at least to assure himself of a Protestant branch of the family to support the Crown. There was little chance of Prince George succeeding to the Danish Throne, and in fact he had few ties there. Don Pedro himself felt Charles' interest in the Low Countries would outweigh any French influence coming from the Danish marriage; and was unable to ascertain the truth of rumours that French money was to supply the needs of Prince George. And so the matter settled down, and it seemed certain that in any eventuality the advantage of the greater England would outweigh/

P. 283 (iii) (Contd.)

/outweigh any French interests through Denmark.
Ronquillo at this time also reported a rumoured match between the Duke of Richmond (Charles' natural son by the Duchess of Portsmouth) and a daughter of Louis of the same category. The ambassador felt it unlikely, because of the different status enjoyed by the illegitimate offspring of monarchs in both countries. For on James' succession, the lot of the Duke of Richmond was dubious.
There was yet another report current of a French marriage for a Portuguese princess.
The French would naturally encourage such alliances; and minor negotiations though they might be, it was Don Pedro's business to oppose them.
For above see:
17th. May (1) (
17th. May (3)) ibid.
31st. May (1) (
14th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1650.

P. 284 14th. June (2); Ronquillo to Grana; ibid.
The Governor of the Spanish Low Countries was keen on this point of creating a naval force. However, the government in Madrid looked on the suggestion with disfavour, fearful as always of the possible danger from such a fleet to its Colonial possessions. (See Trade).

P. 285 9th. Aug. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3873.
For more information on this summer of 1683, see Letter of Fuenmayor to Carlos II of 24th. Aug. whose precis is in Lonchay (Correspondencia), V, 403.

P. 286 (i) 16/26th. Nov; Ronquillo to Jenkins; P.R.O. S.P. 94/69 on memoire of 4th. November, which recalled those of 6th, 13th and 21st. September. Klopp II: p. 401-2.

(ii) Referred to as well as other points and copy of 4th. Nov. memoire in 18th. Nov; Ronquillo to Marqués de la Fuente; Sim. Estado (Fr) K. 1651.

P. 287 Note of Bulstrode on back of Parma's memoire on clash between French and Spanish near Chiny, Dec. 1683, P.R.O. S.P. 77/53, f. 536.

P. 291 This fact made Don Pedro fear assassination of the King more than armed rebellion. 12th. July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

P. 293 For above information and more on the Spanish reaction to the Rye House Plot: Letters of 5th. July, 12th. July (1); in ibid.

P. 294 12th. July (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
Consulta of 4th. August; ibid.
Bullfight cancelled; Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) July 1st. to Sept. 30th, 1683, p. 232.

P. 295 26th. July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
also re handing over of conspirators: Navarro I, c.f. 340.

P. 296 27th. Dec: Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
This despatch of Don Pedro, with its numerous and intricate details, shows that he must have had quite good contacts there. Incidentally, the despatches on domestic affairs for this period are very full.

P. 297 How inextricably mixed the whole position, the plots and Charles' domestic policy were ! Looking to the future, Ronquillo wrote: "One can well believe that at present the flood can be stopped (with little effort) for it will not pass a flower of the field as long as the King lives. But I am in great doubt whether the torrent could be stopped should the Duke of York succeed to the throne. For I observe that all these declarations of submission, made by the city of London and other corporations, conclude with the wish that God preserve the King, the Royal Family, the church and the state as established by law. And these last two points are those which the malcontents use to attract the moderate party, because generally speaking none want Popery or arbitrary government . . . "
26th. July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.

P. 299 (i) See letter of 24th. Jan; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
Letter of 1st. Jan; Carlos II to Ronquillo; Precis in Lonchay (Correspondance No. 1071.) Also Klopp II, 426.

P. 299 (ii) For details, see 10th. Jan. (1) and 7th. Feb. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
Ronquillo's Memorial of 26th. Jan./5th. Feb; P.R.O. S.P. 94/70.
Don/

P. 299 (ii) (Contd.)

/Don Pedro asked in his memoire to know the articles of any Anglo-Danish agreement in fulfilment of Article X of the Treaty of Windsor, which specified the mutual exchange of all alliances made before or after its signing. He also declared that an alliance with Denmark (which had a defensive-offensive league with France) would produce irreparable effects.

P. 302 (i) For details, see:-
14th. April; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid. Consulta of 3rd. May, ibid. 24th. May; ibid. Consulta of 27th. May; ibid. 26th. June (5); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
Memoire of Ronquillo: 9/19 Dec. 1683; P.R.O. S.P. 94/69.
(re Gage)
Practically at once the Earl of Tyrconel, then serving the Spanish was made "maestro de campo", and was to get for his command a levy of 1,000 Irish infantry from Ireland. The request was to pass through Ronquillo, and in order to avoid any trouble, because of Tyrconel's family history and at his instance, Don Pedro referred to him in his memoire as "Don Hugo O'Donel". This seems to have been granted, for the only mention is in a letter of about a month later, that is in June. The ambassador had also spoken to the Duke of Ormonde, still Viceroy of Ireland, and to his son Arran, and both were willing to help, as the father had been two years before, when he had aided a similar scheme, even to lending his own money. (Ormonde Mss. 305).
A similar plan had been worked out for Scots levies, under the "Maestro de Campo" Gage, well-known later and mentioned further on. Just then Don Pedro was also being questioned on the recruiting convenient for the tercio of Irish serving in Catalonia under the "Maestro de Campo" Don Eugene o'Neill. Such arrangements certainly suited Spain, and incidentally they almost trespass on religious affairs. Ronquillo mentioned at the end of his 26th. June despatch about the troops for Tyrconel, that the Irish officers would be pleased with the plan, for they could not serve in England because of their religion; and also preferred to serve Spain than France due to Louis' dubious religious policy. So, among other things, Spain was gratifying her wish to aid the faithful of the three kingdoms.

P. 302 (ii) It was in April-May too, according to Klopp (II, 433-4), that Charles told Ronquillo, Spain must accept the French demands, how he was thinking ways of helping her day and night; that if she acceded to the French offers, he would call Parliament in three months and guarantee the whole House of Austria. But a Spanish-French peace was needed first for any meeting of the Houses to be fruitful.

P. 303 ibid;
Charles, says Klopp (II, 435), was angry at Grana for having surrendered the city; but Ronquillo in reply, acidly remarked that the Marquis would have liked to reinforce Luxembourg, and leave the rest of the Low Countries for Charles and the other allies to defend.

P. 304 On the Eastern Front:
7th. Aug; Ronquillo to Grana; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959, and 14th. Aug.
6th. Nov; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 383 etc.

P. 305 6th. Oct; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 383.
In fine, now and in the Peace of Nimeguen we have experienced that the more we delay in concluding the business, the more we pay for it ("con las setenas"). He feared a private Anglo-French arrangement on this question and Genoa.

P. 307 For this extremely complex question, see:
Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959 and 3960.
" " (Fla) 3876 and 3926.
A.G.R. (État) 383,
on which the above resume is based.

P. 308 (i) See: Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960;
6th. Nov; Ronquillo to Count Melgar at Milan;
29th. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señor (Quotation)
10th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor. (R's memorial of 9th. Dec.)
Consulta of 13th. Jan. 1685.

P. 308 (ii) The ambassador hated Charles' changeableness and never understood this characteristic of the English, that one does a thing according to actual circumstances, not necessarily according to past theories or even agreements. But he never gainsaid the fundamental independance and worth of Charles' judgement, despite the King's keenness for pleasure and willingness to listen to others and fall in with their views. After his death, as we shall see later, Don Pedro recognised what Charles had achieved domestically, and James was to throw away.

P. 310 Ronquillo, until his death, never neglected to husband her friendship, though this seems to have been about the only time it ever bore fruit, and her ingratitude to him personally was outrageous - as we are to see.

P. 317 (i) 4th. Sept; Ronquillo to Grana; ibid. Middleton had not only been envoy to Vienna in 1680, but at one time a Lieutenant-Colonel in command of a regiment at Bruges for some months. According to Don Pedro, he still remembered the Flemish with affection and felt for them in their plight.

P. 317 (ii) Charles, Viscount Lansdowne (1661-1701), was the elder son of a family which had long supported the monarchy, his father being the Earl of Bath, a First Gentleman of the Chamber and Sumiller de Corps (v. D.N.B. Grenville, John, Earl of Bath). Popular with the King, this young man (he was only 23 years) was the only Englishman to serve the Emperor the previous year remaining all through the campaign until the ritual of the Duke of Lorraine from the field. For this, he had received the inheritable title of Count of the Empire. Since his return from Italy, Lansdowne had been a Gentleman of the Chamber to Charles. Ronquillo spoke highly of his good judgement and behaviour to Madrid ("Neither has he ever been a member of evil society here, customary to the young men and even the older in England"); he had also been very pleasant to Don Pedro personally. It was planned in London that to make up for his lack of experience, Sir William Godolphin should act as his adviser in Madrid - which also shows how much conditions had settled down in religious matters since the Popish Plot. In short, Ronquillo was pleased with the nomination, referring to Lansdowne as "el mejor caballero que puede ser."
8th. Dec. (3); ibid 3960.
His deeds in the Eastern Front are honoured in an ode to him by his cousin, George Granville, also Lord Lansdowne.

P. 318 For this question: see: ibid; also despatches:-
1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Botello; ibid 3959.
22nd. Dec. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; also letter of 7th. Feb; Grana; ibid 3960.
1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Grana } Sim. Estado (Fla) 3876.
1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Señor etc. }
See: Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1684-5, p. 7.
News letter of John Squire 6th. May, 1684, entry for 3rd. April.

P. 320 19th. Jan. 1685; ibid.
"but always Portsmouth will save herself either through getting something out of the disturbances or accommodating herself to them; with which they will never succeed in the way we would require."

P. 321 Ronquillo, suspecting the alliance during the visit of the Prince of Morocco to London when it was concluded, made much of the Secretary of the mission. Navarro tells us he was a Morisco, a son or grandson of the last expulsion from Spain, who spoke Spanish very well. (Navarro, I, f. 365). Evidently £15 was sufficient to secure a copy of the agreement. (A.H.N. Estado, 1697; Gastos secretos 1st. Sept. 1681 to end of May, 1683).

P. 323 Letters of :-
9th. Aug (2), 1683;
16th. Aug. (1);
28th. Aug;
18th. Oct. (2) and Consulta.
15th. Nov;
10th. Jan. (2) 1684.
21st. Feb. (2)
17th. April (4) etc.
ibid.

P. 331 Letters of 16th. August (1) and 6th. Sept. (1) in which Ronquillo speculates on the ultimate destruction of Dartmouth's fleet which went to demolish Tangier.

P. 332 18th. May (4), 1682; ibid 3958.
Another example of the use Ronquillo made of his position in England to curb attacks by foreign powers on his country's shipping, is as follows:-
The report reached Don Pedro that an armed vessel of Dunkirk, having pressed a Spanish ship coming from Santiago de Cuba, was anchored off the Isle of Wight together with its prise. The French captain had already been in France and was returning to the ships, when the ambassador, using his agent, Don Felipe de la Guerra, got him arrested and the vessels detained. However, the information to hand was incomplete or partially false and the case fell through, the Spanish Embassy losing £105 over the affair.
See: 17th. April (2), 1684; ibid 3959.

P. 340 a) Regarding the purchase of a ship the "Lyon" in which transaction Ronquillo was the moving spirit.
See: Consulta of 7th. July, 1682; ibid, 3958.
also P.R.O. S.P. 94/69, f. 314 et seq.

b) Regarding the efforts of one Sigesmond de Rho, Baron of Villermin, to prepare an 80-ton vessel for the struggle against France off Spain and Portugal.
See: 9th. June, 1684; Ronquillo to Van Citters; R. St.Gen, 6927.

P. 343 (i) 9th. Mar. (2) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958.
9th. Mar; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3869.

P. 343 (ii) 20th. April, 1682; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3958
(See also for similar complaint in 1683:-
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) Jan.-June, 1683, p. 174).

P. 345 Consulta of 27th. Feb. 1683; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
4th. Oct. 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
13th. Dec. (2); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid.
28th. Dec. 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
Consulta of 24th. Feb. 1684; ibid.

P. 346 19th. Jan. 1685; ibid 3960.
In England and Scotland there had also been very "villainous" preachings against the Catholics. Both Ronquillo's money-lender, Bodkin, and the chapel organist had been in difficulties for their religion - though Charles had offered to help with regard to the first individual.
Letter of Ronquillo to Sunderland, 1/11 May, 1684;
P.R.O. S.P. 94/70, f. 106-7;
15th. Dec. 1684; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 383 - re organist.

P. 348 1st. June (3) 1682; Ronquillo to Señor;
29th. Aug; Ronquillo to De Lira;
2nd. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to De Lira; ibid 3958.
Don Pedro said that since November, 1681, only between a sixth and a seventh of his salary had been paid in English money with payment of the rest of the letters of credit from Madrid refused in London. (17th. May (2) 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3959.

P. 349 On the incident, see:
17th. May (2), 1683; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3959.
31st. May (2) ibid.
Consulta of 30th. June; ibid.
28th. June (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
26th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ale) 3925.
9th. Aug; ibid.
Consulta of 4th. Sept; ibid.
Ordinary Accounts (1681-3), A.H.N. Estado 1697 - (This tells us that Ronquillo also had to pay £20 for his relative's freedom).
Cal. of State Papers - Domestic (Jan.-June, 1683); see various letters, p. 199, 229-30, 249, 251, 253.
Cal. of State Papers - Domestic (July to Sept. 1683), p. 232, 318, 322, 328, 411.

P. 350 (i) These references to Habeas Corpus might be mentioned more explicitly.
At a meeting at Windsor the night after the incident, Jenkins spoke of the power of "this latest law of England called Habeas Corpus, through which the King has lost the greater part of his authority. And this law it is which makes me so anxious, for with it he cannot maintain the protection owed to public ministers and their immunities." (17th. May (2) 1682).
This referred to how the King could punish the merchant woman. Later on, Don Pedro said there was no use in Charles ordering her to be taken into custody "because through this new law of Habeas Corpus, dating from four years back, she can get out on bail within a quarter of an hour." (ibid).

P. 350 (ii) Don Pedro felt Goodricke's relatives were stimulating this in revenge for the incident in Madrid the previous summer. They might even have had a part in engineering the affront.

P. 353 Other expenses mentioned previously:
a) Bribe to Secretary of King of Morocco (p. 321-2)
b) Cost of suit against Sharp and the pirates (p. 325)
c) Cost of the pirates' log (p. 327-8).
d) Cost of arrest of French privateer's captain (See appendix for p. 332)
e) Cost to Don Pedro of Don Pedro Francisco Ronquillo's freedom. (See appendix for p. 349).

P. 367 (i) The proof of this appealed to was Ronquillo's despatch to the King of 4th. November, 1680 (see p. 173).
This, however, does not exactly corroborate Klopp(II, p. 291), who used mainly the reports of the Austrian envoys. He says Ronquillo presented a memo at this time to Charles in favour of the Exclusion Bill then before Parliament rather than later; and that the ambassador did so to help the avoidance of stronger bills being formed based on High Treason and conspiracy. Don Pedro felt (according to this Austrian report) that this bill could then be shelved more easily later on. He also feared that a later bill might also be aimed at the Queen. Specifically, however, any animosity to York personally on the Spaniard's part was denied.
Balancing both accounts, the Austrian seems to me quite likely (it was the later by a few weeks) though it may be somewhat exaggerated.

P. 367 (ii) These important despatches are mentioned by Macaulay (p.120), but incidentally, they were not sent from the Escorial.

P. 368 2nd. April (2) ibid.
At this time James told Ronquillo he was favourable to Spain and Austria and hoped they would regard his accession as miraculous, as he himself did. (Klopp, III, 44).

P. 370 29th. Oct. (6); ibid.
12th. Nov. (2); ibid and Consulta of 6th. Dec: re the dismissal of Halifax (see also Macaulay, p. 38) and the appointment of a Papal envoy. And other letters in same legajo.

P. 371 14th. May; ibid.
Those below stairs did not take part in these festivities and only those that were in positions where the King could see them were out of mourning for that day alone. Whether this was on general royal orders and to save money at the Spanish Embassy, I cannot say. Nevertheless, the celebrations cost £607: 7: 8d, for clothes, swords, food and the hire of balcony, six trumpeters and two drummers. Incidentally, the mourning had cost £569: 12/- in addition. A.H.N. Estado 1697. Cal of Tr. Books VIII, p. 907. R. like other ministers received medal.

P. 372 17th. Sept. (1); ibid.
These boys were probably James, the famous Duke of Berwick (1670-1734) and Henry, titular Duke of Albemarle and grand prior of France (1673-1702). "Six days ago there were seen publicly in the Court, two bastard sons of this King, who were at school in France, but they are not acknowledged, although their father has them with him and everybody makes much of them. The youngest shows great spirit and yesterday told me that on finishing his studies, he wants to go to Flanders to serve Your Majesty in the re-conquest of those territories, and this with as good grace and manner as could be, as if he were much older. Tomorrow, they will eat at my house. Their welcome in the Queen's chamber does not appear so cordial, although they were born before her time." This would be yet more interesting if it had been the elder brother who had said this.

P. 374 Letters of 12th. Mar. 1685 (incl. Memoire); 16th. Mar; 23rd. Mar; 6th. April; 9th. April; 23rd. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (Etat) 384.
In/

P. 374 (Contd.)
In a conversation over levying of troops with Don Pedro in April, James agreed over this under certain conditions. He was willing that Porter should be supported but not O'Byrne; he wanted the troops to be regularly paid. (6th. April).

P. 375 This was requested, according to Klopp, at the end of July - beginning of August. James, however, replied that discussion in secret would be necessary before the Treaty's renewal. (III: 75)

P. 376 (i) See Consulta of 18th. Aug., 1685; Consulta of 12th. Oct. on Ronquillo's letter of 3rd. Sept. (4); Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
It was generally agreed to avoid any clause involving internal affairs and intervention. In March, the constable had stated in the Council of State: "In the realms of Your Majesty, there are not these risks, while in England they are continuous." (Consulta of 20th. March; ibid).

P. 376 (ii) Consulta of 12th. October; ibid. Ronquillo's powers to make league to keep peace. A.H.N. Estado 2802: 2, 41.

P. 378 12th. March; ibid.
19th. March (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

P. 381 19th. March (3); ibid.
A friend reported to Don Pedro that the Council were thinking of this, but whether the money was actually granted, sent or made otherwise effective, I do not know. The accounts for this period - to be considered later - do not seem to corroborate, but perhaps all or part of such a remittance was devoted to paying past debts. (See: 6th. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (Etat) 384).

P. 383 Consulta of 8th. May on Ronquillo's letter of 16th. April; ibid 3960.

P. 384 (i) Letter of 30th. April (2).
Consultas of 17th. June; 18th. August; ibid.
15th. Oct; Carlos II to James II; P.R.O. S.P. 94/72.

P. 384 (ii) James spoke in Spanish "conquering the objection that no other King of England had ever done this, and of exposing himself to speaking a language in which he has received no instruction. And I know he was advised not to do this - - - He only had to hunt for one word." (3rd. Sept. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960).

P. 387 (ii) ibid Simancas.
In the accounts for the first six months of 1685, we find the entry for £250: 3/- to cover: 3 "mesas abiertas" (lit.open tables) in the city for M.Ps. to speak to them and induce them to our resolutions and also for persons that "bring news and carry orders."
For the second half of the year: £52: 13/- was paid to persons "who bring news of Parliament and manage elections".
A.H.N. (Estado) 1697.

P. 387 (i) 30th. April (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3760.
According to Klopp, James told the ambassador that, if Parliament would fill his purse, he could have a general congress and a real peace. (III: 37), which would prove an impetus to Don Pedro's support.

P. 388 See also: Letters of 28th. May (2); 11th. June (1) (Quotation); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
Also 12th. Mar; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. (État) 384.

P. 390 (i) The ambassador said that Grana had made "the lady whom Monmouth courts leave Brussels (because otherwise it was impossible to root him out from those provinces); for should love not act, the Duke's lack of means and the abundance of those of the lady would oblige him not to separate himself from her." Macaulay, 138.

P. 390 (ii) Klopp says, (III: 28) 3000 Spanish and 3000 Walloon, but his information was indirect, hence 2000 of each seems more likely.

P. 390 (iii) 19th. Mar. (1) and (2); 30th. April (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
12th. Mar; 9th. April; Ronquillo to Grana; A.G.R. État, 384.
Mortatto: p. 325.

P. 392. ibid.
Spain almost certainly could not have carried out this promise, at any rate with speed, and James was probably aware of this. Agurto, early in July, wrote Madrid that Ronquillo had suggested offering James a battalion of 800 Scots, Irish and English. He also said that he only had 500 and would have to supplement these with 300 Spanish and Walloons, but that this force could be sent equipped on two day's notice. This fact about the 300, however, he/

P. 392 (Contd.)
/he added, would have to be only for Don Pedro's ears, not those of the public or the King. From Madrid came the reply, ordering Agurto to try and get up to two of the four thousand promised, quickly over to England on request. But, by the time that order arrived, the rebellion was over. (6th. July; Ronquillo to Agurto; 11th. July; Agurto to Señor; Consulta of 9th. Aug; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3877. Klopp (XIX: 71); James replied to the offer: "As you wish me success, so I wish it you."

P. 393 6th. Aug. (1); 3rd. Sept. (2); 29th. Oct. (3); ibid. Part of letter of Navarro from Bilbao, 20th. July; P.R.O. S.P. 94/210.

P. 403 2nd. March; ibid 3960; also Navarro, I. f. 377. An example of Ronquillo using his influence with the Archbishop is as follows. Some of the Scots and Irish R.Cs. were opposed to Rochester's appointment to Ireland, but Don Pedro said in September that he had been able to persuade some, in particular Guevara, that the new Lieutenant-Governor would only follow James' orders. Thus our friend tried to help unify the King's supporters. (17th. Sept. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.

P. 406 Ronquillo himself did not have much sympathy for the Huguenots, however, perhaps naturally enough on religious grounds. Besides, he suspected some of the exiles not only of working for Louis, but having stirred up M.Ps. against the King during the Parliament meetings that summer. (2nd. April (1); ibid, 3960).
The Spanish did not persecute the Huguenots, but never encouraged them simply because they were on bad terms with Louis: this was despite rumours that they were aiding them in Spain or Flanders as the exiles fled to new homes. (Lonchay (Correspondence) VI. p. 825.
Incidentally, Don Pedro's attitude on this point rather disproves the proposition that he is the author of "The Idea of the Court of France" etc. as also the letter of Ronquillo to Bemaldo de Quirós of 5th. April, 1686. (See: Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961; also in: B.M. Additions 34, 502, f. 57-63 (incl. transl.); Macaulay used it (1778)).
But of course, his attitude <u>might</u> have changed on such a policy within a year.

P. 407 Don Pedro ebulliently claims this, but it seems to all intents and purposes to have been true enough. (Klopp III: 171). For this whole paragraph, see: 17th. Sept. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
26th. Nov. (3); ibid.

P. 409 (i) In March and April, when his financial situation, made worse by the expenses at Charles' death, had not yet been relieved, he even requested this. We wrote to the Secretario de Despatcho Universal, Botello:- "Besides the oppression one suffers (from debt) it is a terrible worry to see myself a slave bound to this awful country. May God permit me to step once more on ours and keep Your Lordship etc." (Sim. Tomo 280, f. 151)
However, we hear no more in this tone for the remainder of the year.

P. 409 (ii) 30th. April (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Consultas of 17th. June and 18th. Aug; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
15th. Oct; Carlos II to James II; P.R.O. S.P. 94/71

P. 409 (iii) 3rd. Sept. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960. We shall have occasion later to touch on Hoffman's clear discernment of "the Glorious Revolution" and his rather haughty estimation of Don Pedro's character and actions.

P. 410 (i) Re relationship etc. to Gastañaga: See: Lonchay's (Correspondence) Vol. V. No. 1217. VI, Nos. 1937, 1940, 1961.
20th. June; Agurto to Ronquillo; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3877.
16th. Nov; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; A.G.R. Etat, 384.
Navarro, f. 276.

P. 410 (ii) 15th. Oct; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
16th. Nov; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; A.G.R. Etat, 384.

P. 411 (i) 19th. March (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3960.
Consulta of 20th. March and 2nd. July; ibid.

P. 411 (ii) 29th. Oct. (2); ibid.
Another unexpected piece of hospitality that plagued our friend was the putting up and putting up with, the household of the Marquesa de Valparaiso, who came to London three months before her husband on his mission of condolence and congratulation to the King. (6th. Aug. (2); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid).

P. 419 12th. Aug; ibid and Paper.
Also: B.M. Additions 34, 502 (Mackintosh papers), f. 65-9, 77-8(Eng. Transl.). Mackintosh, p. 373-5.

P. 429 5th. April; Ronquillo to Bernaldo de Quirós; ibid 3961.
Also in B.M. Additions 34, 502. (Mackintosh) f. 57-63 (incl. transl.)
According to Ronquillo, the King was annoyed at Van Citters for not believing his word and writing to Holland that there was a French-English league. This would seem to contradict Mackintosh on Van Citters' attitude - but perhaps in the short interim of about three weeks, the Dutch envoy had changed his mind. (2nd. Sept. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid).

P. 433 16th. Sept; ibid.
28th. Oct. (3); ibid.
11th. Nov. (3); ibid.
Re Danish pretensions on Hamburg; ibid (Fla) 3878.

P. 436 30th. Sept. (1); ibid.
Campana de Cavelli: II, p. 119. (Letter of 19/29 Sept; Ronquillo to Sunderland etc.).
Montalto, p. 371. (Letter of 7th. Nov.) also Klopp III, 254.
In the Embassy accounts, the three night's festivity cost £432: 7/- plus a gift to the person bringing the news of Buda's fall. (A.H.N. Estado, 1697).

P. 437 18th. Mar. (1); ibid.
1st. April (5); ibid.
5th. April; Ronquillo to Bernaldo de Quirós; ibid.
(also in B.M. Additions 34, 502 (Mackintosh) f. 57-63).
Quotation.

P. 439 28th. Oct. (3); ibid. also 18th. Mar. (1); ibid and 23rd. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Fla) 3955.

P. 446 21st. Jan. (4); Ronquillo to Señor;
5th. April; Ronquillo to Francisco de Quirós;
(also in B.M. Additions, 34, 502, f. 57-63).
15th. April (3); ibid.

P. 449 9th. Dec. (1); ibid, 3962.

P. 450 See re the Chapel; 18th. Mar. (2); ibid 3961.
24th. June (2); ibid.
Don Pedro was particularly pleased about this, mentioning as he often did the ignorance of the English Catholics, the lack of united doctrine with many of the older Catholics not even knowing the Catechism.

P. 453 (i) 4th. March; ibid.
18th. March (1); ibid.
12th. Aug; ibid (also in B.M. 3 Additions 34, 502, f. 65-9, 77-8).
Montalto knew the connection between his financial worries and his health. (Letter of 14th. March, 1686).

P. 453 (ii) Re his financial lack:-
11th. Nov. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961 - quote.
23rd. Dec. (4); ibid 3962.
Lonchay (Corresp.) V, No. 1248.

P. 454 21st. Jan. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961.
18th. Feb. and 4th. March; Rimbold letters; ibid.
4th. Feb. (5); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
18th. Mar. (1); ibid.
12th. Aug; ibid (also in B.M. Add. 34, 502, f. 65-9, 77-8).
9th. Dec. (2) (in Consulta of 9th. Jan. 1687); ibid 3962.

P. 457 6th. Jan. 1687; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
20th. Jan. (1); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid.
24th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.

P. 466 26th. May; Ronquillo to Señor; B.M. Add. 34, 502, f. 72-6 and 80-2 (Mackintosh).
See also: Mackintosh, p. 383-4, 387.

P. 474 27th. Oct; ibid.
"I believe from what I have been able to gather that this King has no undertaking with the most Christian King that passes beyond good relations - - but I will not be sure until after verifying what is the case. I know the importance of the business and that on account of this and the state in which I find myself, I am incapable for it."

P. 475 (i) 15th. Sept; ibid (also in B.M. Add. 34, 502, f. 100-105, 124-126).
15th. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Haye) 496 - quote.
7th. Oct; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid.

P. 475 (ii) 24th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
22nd. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo 281, f. 211 - quote.
Ronquillo further describes the King's doubts in a letter of 22nd. Dec. quoted by Macaulay (254a).
Don Pedro himself despite his hopes regarding the effects of a male heir, also felt then that if it was not a son, the state of affairs would be worse than ever. (18th. Dec; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496).

P. 479 14th. April (2); ibid. A study of this long letter provides abundant additional details on this subject which are also of great interest.

P. 482 1st. Sept; ibid.
See also: 29th. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3879.
Among other domestic news, this gives Don Pedro's ideas on the pamphlet "Letter to a Dissenter."

P. 484 22nd. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo 281, f. 211.
18th. Dec; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.

P. 488 (i) ibid. (29th. Sept.)
This does not mean that Ronquillo looked on all Jesuits as pro-French. For instance, he favoured the appointment of James' new Jesuit confessor, Father Warner. He wrote he could not feel the former incumbent's removal was due to French machinations, as Father Newcastel had in fact been pro-French. James explained the position to Don Pedro, by saying that he needed an Englishman or someone who knew the language to act as an intermediary for secret messages. At any rate, according to our friend, Father Warner was "a person of excellent gifts", who had studied and worked in Spain and the Low Countries and was a friend of Father Newport, the leading member of the order in England, whom Don Pedro also admired greatly.
(17th. Mar. (1); ibid (Eng) 3962 (also in B.M. Add. 34, 502) (Mackintosh)) and 17th. Mar. (5); ibid.

P. 488 (ii) 20th. Jan. (2); ibid.
14th. April (2); ibid.
Accounts: A.H.N. Estado 1697.
It is interesting by contrast to turn to Madrid, where complaints were being lodged by the Council of the Inquisition against Lord Lansdowne for admitting heretics of different nations to the Protestant services at his Embassy. The Consejo de Estado warned him and ordered Ronquillo to mention the matter to James and insinuate that a Roman Catholic might replace the envoy. Don Pedro, however, knew affairs better than to do that. Instead, he spoke to Sunderland, a friend of Lansdowne, and this minister wrote telling him to stop this "unless he wished to be without his post and in perpetual disgrace with his master." Ronquillo explained to Madrid, that to complain to the King of a son of the Earl of Bath would have been to make enemies of the "reputable Protestants." Moreover, his action had courted Sunderland; and had avoided the contingency of the English sending "some evil beast" in Lansdowne's place; but if the envoy continued with what he was doing, Ronquillo promised to carry out the orders sent. (7th. July (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962).

P. 490 22nd. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Tomo 281, f. 204.
He described his secretary as "a servant in the doctrine of [illegible] disinterestedness"; and also wrote "if I have had some merit in the service of Your Majesty, he has had his part in this."

P. 496 5th. Nov. 1685; Ronquillo to Señor and Consulta; ibid.
10th. Dec. (2) (incl. letter to Governor of Gibraltar of 5th. Dec.); ibid 3961.
esp. Complete Consulta on Gibraltar negotiations with the English; 6th. May, 1686; ibid.

P. 498 Consulta of 15th. Dec. 1685; ibid.
Consultas of 3rd. Aug. 1685 and 6th. Sept. 1685 of Consejo Cámara de Indies on letters of Ronquillo forwarded by Consejo de Estado; Ind. Indiferente General 790.
(See also Varinas; p. 129).

P. 499 1st. April (3) 1686; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961 - rumours.
Re Hudson's Bay and La Salle discoveries:-
18th. Feb. (1); 15th. April (2); 28th. Oct. (2) and Consulta; ibid.
20th. Jan. (4); 1687; ibid, 3962.

P. 500 1st. April (2), 1686; ibid 3961 - re taxes on French goods.
Re Spanish wine trade:-
29th. April (1); Ronquillo to Botello; ibid - re Brandy trade, also in Tomo 281, f. 75.
28th. Oct. (5); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3962 - re Canary trade.
23rd. Dec; Governor of Canaries to Ronquillo; ibid (see also Tomo 281, f. 147).

P. 501 (i) Consulta on murder of British merchant at Malaga, in B.M. Add. 34,502, f. 83-9 (also in Sim. Estado (Ing) 3961).
23rd. Dec. (3); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962 - re financial regulations.
5th. Aug. (1); ibid 3961 - re saluting.
4th. Feb. (4) and 6th. May Consulta; ibid - re Gibraltar.

P. 501 (ii) 10th. June, etc; ibid - re clashes in Indies.
24th. June; ibid - re Sharp.
(also Accounts for 1687 (1st. half) A.H.N. Estado 1697)
5th. Aug. (2) etc; ibid - re James trying to settle complaints.
11th. Nov. (2) and Consulta; ibid - re James' renewed offer of frigates.

P. 503 Consultas of 16th. May; ibid - re "millions".
3rd. Feb. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid - re exchange.
17th. Oct; British Complaint at Madrid; ibid - re imprisonment of consul.
Consulta of 8th. April; ibid - re imprisonment of Englishmen at Seville.

P. 504 (i) 28th. April (3) and Consulta of 7th. June; ibid. (Copy also in Ind. Indiferente General Consultas of Consejo y Cámara de Indias, 790).
May; Ronquillo to Sunderland; P.R.O. S.P. 94/72.
Accounts of 1687 (first half); A.H.N. 1697:-
£20 for arrest of English ship arriving in England with the silver of the galleon lost on the reefs, and other diligences against Sharp, the Pirate.

P. 504 (ii) 9th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
(also in Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of Consejo y Cámara de Indias).

P. 507 4th. Aug. (3) 1687; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
(also together with relevant papers, in Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of Consejo y Cámara de Indias, 791.)

P. 508 Consulta of 6th. Nov; ibid.
13th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Lira (quote); and 13th. Oct. (2) to Senor, etc; Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of Consejo y Cámara de Indias, 791.
7th. Oct; 18th. Dec; 26th. Dec; etc., Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.

P. 510 23rd. June and 7th. July (2) and 4th. Aug. (2), and relevant Consultas; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3962.
Memorial of Ronquillo of 27th. June; ..R. St. Gen. (Engeland) 6929.
Memorial of Ronquillo of 10/20 Dec. 1687; P.R.O. S.P. 94/72.
Incidentally the Duke of Albemarle gained £40,000 from the first expedition mentioned. (See D.N.B.).

P. 514 15th. Mar. 1688; Ronquillo to Señor; Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of Consejo y Cámaras de Indias, 792.

P. 516 12th. April; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3987.
14th. April; Manuel Coloma to Señor; ibid.

P. 517 20th. June; Ronquillo to Botello; A.H.N. Estado 2661: 174.
20th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid: 175.
also 9th. July.

P. 519 ibid, and Consulta.
Navarro, I, f. 381-2 - quote, also quoted in Ranke, IV, p. 365.

P. 528 14th. Sept; Manuel Coloma to Señor; ibid:- e.g.;
"The idea is, Sire, (according to the most reliable reports) to send this fleet to England bearing among other troops, the six regiments of that nation, so as not to transgress the law which prohibits the entry of foreign soldiery; to set the voters of Parliament at liberty so they can meet without suspicion of violence on the King's part, to declare the Prince of Wales' suppositions, the Princess of Orange heir to the Throne, and the Prince (as her husband) Protector of the Realm and Religion; and once this is accomplished, to retire the King (James) for the crimes for which they will then judge him and declare war immediately on France. Maxims all, my Lord, which appear fantasies rather than resolutions taken by reasonable men - -".

P. 529 (i) 27th. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; B.M. Add. 34;502, f. 121-3, 133-4).
Hoffman's letters of 24th. Sept. and 1st. Oct. in Campana de Cavelli, II, 260 and 267 - (quote from latter).

P. 529 (ii) 24th. Sept; Gastañaga to Ronquillo; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3880.
1st. Oct; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid.

P. 531 (i) 4th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
4th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
25th. Oct. (2); ibid.
Navarro, f. 396-7.

P. 531 (ii) 8th. Oct; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
11th. Oct; Navarro to Botello; ibid,(also in Rodriguez Villa (Atentado)).

P. 532 12th. Oct; Manuel Coloma to Señor; ibid.
15th. Oct; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
8th. Oct; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
12th. Oct; Manuel Coloma to Ronquillo; ibid.

P. 533 4th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
4th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
5th. Oct; Ronquillo to Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
22nd. Oct; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3880.

P. 534 ibid.
25th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid - 1st. quote.
25th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid - 2nd. quote.
(See also: 14th. Dec; Ronquillo to Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496 re James' sincerity in sending memoire of 5th. October).

P. 537 (i) Consulta of 16th. Nov; ibid (Fla) 3880.
The opinions of the various members of the Consejo de Estado were divided and they illustrate somewhat Spain's uncertainty over James and the Glorious Revolution. For example, the Admiral of Castile took up an "I told you so" attitude, saying how he had feared the worst at James' accession and the Prince of Wales' birth and that remedies were now too late. On the other hand, the Marques de Mancera disapproved Ronquillo's trying to persuade James to make certain concessions on points of religion, even though on good political advice, for it was a dangerous policy.

P. 537 (ii) Consulta on letter of 14th. Nov; Gastañaga to Señor; ibid 3882 - re Gage.
Navarro, I, f. 397 - re Carlos II's offer.
Order of 30th. Nov; A.H.N. Estado, 3975 - re cancelling the offer. Evidently a letter from Manuel Coloma of 25th. Oct. had prompted this.

P. 538 (i) Letters of 9th. and 26th. Nov; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
Navarro says (I, f. 397) that Carlos II's offer helped at least to clear away reports current among English Catholics that Spain also was behind William's invasion. Such a policy never entered Don Pedro Ronquillo's mind.

P. 538 (ii) 3rd. Dec; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid (similarly in 6th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963).

P. 542 Chronicle of Events of 22nd. Nov. to 6th. Dec; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.

P. 545 Cal. of State Papers (Dom) 1689-90, p. 140.
"Warrant - - - to make search for goods belonging to the Spanish Ambassador."

P. 547 (i) Or £17,000. Whether it was also given as a "gratification" for Don Pedro's share in obtaining King William's recognition by the whole House of Austria is not quite so certain - despite Mackintosh.
For further details on the incident, consult:-
+ Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964: 9th. Feb. 1689; Botello to Lira; 26th. Sept. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta.
+ Sim. Estado (Fla) 3882: 3rd. Jan. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; Consultas of 29th. Jan., 21st. April and 23rd. April etc.
+ A.G.R. (Etat) 608: 10th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor;
+ P.R.O. S.P. 100/55: 25th. May/4th. June; Ronquillo to Shrewsbury.
Bod. Mss. Rawl A. 306. f. 41. Entry for 28th. Aug. 1689 - quote on 544.
+ Navarro, I, f. 410 et seq.
II, Letters of Ronquillo to Señor of 17th. and 25th. Jan. quoted, f. 18-20, 37-39; also f. 341-3.
Cal. of State Papers (Dom) 1689-90, p. 140.
Cal of Treasury Books, Vol. IX, part 1, p. 48, 235.
+ Maura (Correspondencia) I, Introduction 30 et seq.
+ Rodriguez Villa (Atentado)
Reresby, p. 537 (Entry for 10th. Dec. 1688).

P. 547 (i) (Contd.)

\+ Macaulay, 317 etc.
Ranke, IV, p. 479.
Mackintosh, p. 529-30.
Espana e Inglaterra, p. 43 etc.

\+ denotes especial importance.

P. 547 (ii) Don Pedro had also written to William regarding the difficulties of the escaping Papal Nuncio (Mackintosh 530-1).

P. 548 28th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3882. Navarro gives a more picturesque if probably less accurate account, of how Don Pedro accompanied James to the gate landing from Whitehall to the Thames, where the boats were awaiting the King and his followers. Before embarking, James turned to the ambassador, embraced him and said "Señor Embajador, if I had believed you and followed your good advice, I would not see myself in the sad and pitiable state in which I am. But that has no remedy now. It will be convenient for you to see the Prince and try to do with him what you can. Take good care to protect the Catholics and Good-bye." (I, f. 427-8)

P. 549 For Don Pedro did not know definitely of James' final arrival in France though he might suspect it, hence the legitimate King might still return"to-morrow". Ronquillo to Balbases; in Rodriguez Villa (Atentado). p. 68-70.

P. 553 14th. Jan; Ronquillo to Cogolludo; in Maura (Correspondencia) I. 14th. Jan; Ronquillo to Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496. These two letters are very similar.

P. 555 (i) Navarro, I, f. 429 et seq. The Secretary - a supporter of the Austrian Party in the War of Succession - declared that events proved the rightness of Don Pedro's opinion, for with James still King, there would have been no partition treaty nor reason for the publication of the "supposed" will of Carlos II.

P. 555 (ii) 26th. Jan. 1689; Ronquillo to a great friend of his "una persona de la primera elevación en Madrid", in Navarro, II, f. 39 et seq.

P. 557 29th. April; Ronquillo to Señora; in Maura, I, p. 173; also similar letter of same date to Burgomayne; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3882.

P. 558 ibid, 53.
also Foxcroft, II, p. 211. Entry for 4th. April of the Spencer House journals of converse between William and Halifax.

P. 559 Also concerning Ronquillo's possible replacement:-
Consulta of 2nd. May; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3882.
Navarro, II, f. 101-3.
Lonchay (Correspondance) VI, No. 1978.
Maura (Correspondencia) I, p. 54.
See France's Declaration of War on Spain. (in Navarro, II).

P. 562 For these decisions of the Consejo de Estado and the opinions of the theologians, see:- Sim. Estado (Fla) 3882.
Re Ronquillo's advice to William on the envoy being sent to Spain:-
7th. Mar. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro, II, f. 86.

P. 563 (i) Consulta of 9th. July on above; ibid.
also Maura (Correspondencia), I, for details.
Re expulsion of James' envoy from Spain:
Consulta of 16th. April; B.M. Add. 34,502, f. 83-7.
also 15th. May: John Stafford (the envoy) to Carlos del Castillo; Consulta of 17th. May; Letters of 22nd. and 24th. July etc; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.

P. 563 (ii) 18th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
also see Maura (Correspondencia) I.

P. 564 7th. Mar. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro II, f. 87.
As a matter of fact the Spanish accepted the offer too late when the troops had already been sent to Hungary.
(9th. May; ibid, f. 170-3).

P. 566 3rd. Dec. (3); ibid.
26th. Aug; Ronquillo to Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
3rd. Dec. (11); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Etat) 603.

P. 570 See Maura (Correspondencia) I, 58 and relevant letters.
- - -" I am certain this King will respond by sending a good number of ships to the Mediterranean and with full orders to hasten to the defence of the Church under our viceroy's orders. And I have no doubt because of their being Heretics that if the case should arise, they would fight for the authority of the Holy Church of Rome, and against those Catholics who wish to injure it."
(9th. Sept; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 497).

P. 571 e.g.,
Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964 and 3965.
A.G.R. (Etat) 496 and 497.
A.G.R. (Haye) 608.
A.G.R. (Haye) 7 etc.
and in particular, Maura (Correspondencia) I and II.

P. 575 7th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 608.
3rd. Dec. (12); ibid.
Maura (Correspondencia), I, p. 177
The "support" of a Parliament for six and a half months is mentioned among expenses, though no amount is given. This probably refers to entertainment at the Embassy, when Don Pedro would hear news of the session and probably drop an odd hint in favour of the King or the Catholics.
(10th. Oct. (2); ibid).

P. 577 Re the Danish troops and Don Pedro's "conscience" problem:-
12th. Sept; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; A.G.R. (Etat) 607.
12th. Sept. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
7th. Nov. (2); ibid.
3rd. Dec. (3); ibid - quote.
Consultas of 4th. Mar. and 6th. April, 1690; ibid.
Consulta of 6th. April with opinions ot theologians; ibid 3965.
Opinion of another theologian; ibid (Fla) 3882.
Also Maura (Correspondencia) I and II - references to Danish troops.

P. 580 Macaulay; 326.
Maura (Correspondencia) I and II.
3rd. Dec. (7); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Etat) 608.

P. 581 7th. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
See Maura (Correspondencia) I and II on this question.

P. 582 10th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (Etat) 608.
Also Accounts: A.H.N. Estado 1697.

P. 584 (i) 24th. Oct; Ronquillo to Señor; B.M. Add. 34,502, on Ronquillo's visit with William to Cambridge.

P. 584 (ii) Apart from the abundant and interesting details of Don Pedro's private life described in the correspondence with the Marqués de Cogolludo, edited by the Duque de Maura/

P. 584 (ii) (Contd.)

/Maura, many are to be found in his other private and official letters. These last include the following:-

On his financial difficulties:

6th. July; Ronquillo to Botello; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
12th. Sept; Letter of Rumbold; ibid.
26th. Sept. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
19th. Dec. (4); ibid, 3965.
Accounts: A.H.N. Estado, 1697.
15th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 607.
29th. Aug; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
10th. Oct. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 608.
(An interesting letter on how he obtained and spent William's gift of £15,000. It also speaks of his efforts to free himself from debt in order to leave London.)

On his request for recall:

21st. Nov. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
5th. Dec; ibid, 3965.
26th. Aug; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.
18th. July; Ronquillo to Botello; ibid (État) 607.
10th. Oct. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (État) 608.
Foxcroft, ii, p. 211 etc.

P. 587 Consulta of 1st. March, 1688; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963 (re soap factory).
Consulta on Ronquillo's letter of 26th. June, 1688; ibid (re brandy factory and taxes).

P. 588 (i) Memorial of 23rd. May/2nd. June, 1688; Ronquillo to James II; Bod. Mss. Rawl. A. 186, f. 300-301.

P. 588 (ii) 3rd. June; Report from Consejo de Indias on Franco-British Trade Treaty of 1686; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
30th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; in Navarro, I, f. 386-8.

P. 589 7th. June; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
By this channel, he also received a copy of a letter on the Lima earthquake of 1687, which he forwarded to Spain (ibid).

P. 590 (i) Letters of Ronquillo of Jan. 1688; ibid and Consultas.
2nd. Jan; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496.

P. 590 (ii) See February, March Consultas on this subject.
Navarro says that on Ronquillo's instances, James had issued edicts against the plan immediately, thus helping to make it flop for the time being.
The Secretary also speaks of the execution of the Darien scheme"in 1698 or 99", and how the Spanish Government there did not wish to believe "the person who forewarned it of this from Hamburg." As Don Francisco Antonio was himself then consul in Hamburg, this surely refers to his own action. (I, f. 430).

P. 590 (iii) Consulta of June on Steven Lynch; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
Perhaps these men were part of the Holmes' expedition.

P. 591 Consulta of 12th. Mar. on Ronquillo's letters of 5th. 12th. 19th. Jan. and 2nd. Feb; Also letter of 13th. May (2); Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
2nd. Jan; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 496 - quota.

P. 592 Consulta on letter of 8th. Dec; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3963.
Consulta of 22nd. April; ibid.
24th. May (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
7th. June; ibid.
5th. July (1); ibid.

P. 595 (i) 1st. Aug; 1689; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; A.G.R. (Etat) 607.
(incl. letter from Shrewsbury to Ronquillo of 15/25 July).

P. 595 (ii) 15th. Aug; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
25th. July and 12th. Aug; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.

P. 596 No more than eight ships were to be at Gibraltar, the rest would have to be at Cuelares and Algeciras etc.
(from Consulta below).

P. 597 (i) See: 9th. May; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964 - quota.
Consulta of 23rd. June; ibid.

P. 597 (ii) Consulta of 6th. Aug. on letter of 4th. July; ibid. (letter in A.G.R. (Etat) 607, also with Consulta of Consejo y Cámarade Indias in Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of Consejo y Cámara de Indias, 792.

P. 597 (iii) 14th. June, 1689; Consulta of Junta de Guerra, and Ronquillo's letter of 20th. June; Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas de la Junta de Guerra de Indias, 1879.

P. 598 (i) Ronquillo's letter of 20th. June; ibid. (also in Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964).
19th. Dec. (5); Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta of 3rd. June (1) 1690; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.

P. 598 (ii) 15th. Aug. 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 607.
also see Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas of the Consejo y Cámara de Indias, 792.

P. 599 24th. Dec. 1689; Ronquillo to Señor; Ind. Indiferente General, Consultas de la Junta de Guerra de Indias, 1879 (an original).

P. 601 Re this question of the Asiento:-
Consulta of 13th. April, 1689; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3964.
4th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; A.G.R. (État) 607.
15th. Aug. (1); ibid.
15th. Aug; ibid.
Cal. of State Papers (Colonial Series - 1689-92) No. 610.
Acts of Privy Council (Colonial - 1680-1720) No. 347.

P. 606 2nd. Jan. (1) and 16th. Jan. 1690; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
Maura (Correspondencia) II, esp. p. 87-91.

P. 610 (i) 28th. Feb. (2); ibid.
14th. Mar. (2); ibid.
29th. June, 1691; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; ibid 3966 - quote.

P. 610 (ii) 18th. July (1) 1690; ibid 3965.
(also see letters in Maura (Correspondencia) II).

P. 612 Consulta of 2nd. Oct; ibid.
18th. Sept; William III to Carlos II and Consulta of 23rd. Nov; ibid.
29th. Nov; Carlos II to William III; ibid 3977 (minute)
The importance of the abundant crossings-out in the minute must not be over-estimated. These points below stood out in my examination of the document (which is, incidentally, in Spanish):-

P. 612 (Contd.)

1) "Such favourable events" was changed to merely "events".
2) The Council was however happy to learn of all "events contributing to the immortal glory of Your Majesty."
3) Crossed out was the wish "that the former unity of those dominions annexed to the Crown of England, our ancient confederate, be maintained indissoluble".
4) It included: " - - - We only ask that on the occasions that can yet occur Your Majesty may not expose his person to such evident risks, whose preservation for many years our affection desires; and that Your Majesty may find himself free fully to aid the Common Cause effectively (as Your Majesty so offers)."

P. 615 "la alteracion del Rey Guillermo es la que jamás le he reconocido igual" (1st. Dec; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid 3990).

P. 616 5th. Dec. (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
5th. Dec. (2); ibid.
19th. Dec; Ronquillo to Gastañaga; ibid.
19th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid - quota.

P. 618 25th. Feb; Conde Rovero to Ronquillo; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
28th. April; Ronquillo to Conde Rovero; ibid.
9th. May (1); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
12th. Oct; Camero to Botello; ibid.
15th. Nov; ibid.
5th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid 3966.
12th. Dec; ibid.
Ronquillo's memorial to English Government re the defeat of the Duke of Savoy:- P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.

P. 619 26th. Jan. 1689; Ronquillo to a friend in Madrid, in Navarro, II, p. 39 et seq.
26th. Aug; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; A.G.R. (Haye) 497.

P. 622 15th. Aug; ibid.
(See also re Ronquillo's opinion of Brandenburg; 5th. Dec; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Fla) 3990).

P. 624 5th. Nov; Ronquillo sends copy of Spanish refusal of Papal offer; P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.
also, see Maura (Correspondencia) II.

P. 626 Ronquillo wrote:-
"The consolation I find in these unfavourable emergencies is to see the whole nation without distinction in a desperate fury against France, and against those not in favour of this government who give cause for her audacious actions. And, as well, the opposition to the Dutch has in general been removed and their (the English) obligation towards them is recognised without embarassment."
(14th. July, 1690; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3989).
also:-
"It is certain that France plays all its tricks to cause trouble (i.e. in the Parliament) but it is good that now they know from whence the wind blows."
(7th. Nov. (2); Ronquillo to Señor; ibid (Ing) 3965).

P. 628 2nd. Jan. 1691; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.
9th. Jan; letter of Camero; ibid.
16th. Jan; Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta of 22nd. Feb; ibid.

P. 629 (i) June and July letters; ibid.
Maura (Correspondencia) II, esp. p. 435.
Stanhope; letters to Nottingham of 7th. March etc.

P. 629 (ii) 29th. June; Ronquillo to Manuel Coloma; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.
10th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
17th. July (1); ibid.
(also see: Maura (Correspondencia) II).

P. 632 Consulta of 18th. Mar. 1690 on Ronquillo's letter of 13th. Feb; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) - 1690-91, p. 7.
News letter of 10th. May, 1690.
Memorial (2) of 18th. Oct. of Ronquillo to Nottingham; P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.

P. 633 1st. Aug. 1690; Memoire of Stanhope re English agent in Spain for this etc; ibid 3965.
5th. Sept; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
Stanhope: letter to Nottingham of 23rd. Aug. 1690, p. 8.

P. 634 26th. July; Ronquillo to Señor; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
Consulta of 12th. Oct; ibid.
Perhaps also referred to in Cal. of State Papers (Domestic) 1689-90, p. 315.

P. 635 Re Roworth:
Consulta of 22nd. Aug. 1690; Sim. Estado (Ing) 3965.
Re Pirates:
Consulta of 7th. Aug. 1691; ibid 3966.
(and other consultas in both legajos).
Stanhope: letter to Nottingham of 22nd. Oct. 1690, p. 10.

P. 637 28th. Feb. (1); ibid.
Goodricke brings news of troops being readied for Irish campaign.

P. 641 16th. Oct. 1691.
Statement on condition of the chapel by Padre Fray Gaspar del Anunciación; ibid 3966.
6th. Nov; Manuel Coloma to Señor; ibid.

P. 642 7/17 May, 1691; 10/20 May; 18/28 May; Ronquillo to Nottingham; P.R.O. S.P. 100/55.
Denbigh news letters of 19/29 May; 22nd. May/1st. June; Hist. Mss. Comm. Report, VII, p. 197 et seq.

P. 643 25th. April (2), 1690; Ronquillo to Señor; ibid.
Consulta of 8th. July; ibid.
When Don Pedro had first requested a place in the Consejo de Estado, I do not know. This would seem to modify his former claims that he was never a place-seeker.

P. 644 (i) 28th. Nov; Ronquillo to Señor; and Consulta of 4th. Jan. 1691; ibid 3966.
(Ronquillo's licence to return; ibid 3977).

P. 644 (ii) Letters of Ronquillo of: 5th. Dec. 1689; 31st. Jan. 1690 (to Mansfeld); 13th. Feb. (1); 12th. Sept; 7th. Nov. (1); ibid 3965.
28th. Nov; 27th. Mar. 1691; 22nd. May; 29th. June (to Manuel Coloma) and especially Maura (Correspondencia) II incl; (ibid 3966.) introduction.

P. 644 (iii) Re death of Joseph and family particulars: Sim. D.G. del Tesoro (Títulos de Castilla):-

I	24	-	L 686	-	f. 40
	24	-	711	-	105
	24	-	724	-	17.

Denbigh News letters of 3/13 July, 1691; Hist. Mss. Comm. VIII, I, p. 561b.

P. 645 — 14th. Aug; Manuel Coloma to Señor; Sim. Estado (Fla) 3990.
Denbigh News letter of 28th. July/7th. Aug. Hist. Mss. Comm. VIII, I, p. 561 b et seq.
Maura (Correspondencia) II. letter of Navarro to Cogolludo, p. 454.

P. 646 — Information in Sim. Estado (Ing) 3966.
P.R.O. S.P. 104/187.
Maura (Correspondencia) II, Introduction and letters.
Denbigh News letter (31st. July/10th. Aug. 1691);
Hist. Man. Comm. VIII, I, p. 564 b - quote.

P. 647 — Cal. of Treasury Papers (1556-7-1696), 6th. Nov. 1691, p. 200.
also 21st. March and 18th. May, 1693 entries.
Cal. of Treasury Books (1693-96), p. 812.

P. 650 (i) — Denbigh News letter of 3/13 July, 1691, Hist. Man. Comm. VIII, I, p. 561 b.

P. 650 (ii) — Legrelle, I, p. 473-5, quotes letter of Callières to Louis, of 24th. January, 1697.

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/desde principios del Año de 1675 que llegó a Flandes, hasta el de 1691 que murió en Inglaterra, exerciendo el cargo de embaxador extraordinario de España, Reynando en aquel Reyno el Rey Guillermo Tercero, y la Reyna María.
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Portrait of Don Pedro Ronquillo.

The only picture of Don Pedro I have been able to find mentioned is a mezzotint by H.H. Quiter. Singer said in 1933 (Allgemeiner Bildniscatalog von Hans Wolfgang Singer, Leipzig, 1933 -- Band X, p. 237) that copies were in Breslau, Coburg and Dresden. The one in Coburg, at least, is still available.

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