MOBILISATION AND IDENTITY WITHIN THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN LEBANON

Maria Alexandra Siemer

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

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Mobilisation and Identity within the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon

Maria Alexandra Siemer

Submitted for the degree of Ph.D., University of St Andrews

10 February 2005
Abstract

This thesis examines political mobilisation into secular groups within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. It focuses on context and identity in order to find out why and how Palestinians in the camps mobilise into these groups. The thesis uses a framework that incorporates three levels of analysis: structural; organisational; and individual. An ethnographic methodology is deployed involving interviews and participant observation in refugee camps in Lebanon. The thesis starts by looking at what sort of theoretical framework is necessary in order to understand the three key levels of analysis, including literature focusing on opportunities and constraints; human needs; resources; recruitment; social construction; and identity. The next focus is on context, looking at both the legal issues surrounding refugees – international, regional and local – as well as the historical context. The last three chapters examine the three levels of analysis individually, using them in conjunction with ethnographic research data to find out why and how Palestinians in the camps mobilise. The conclusion shows that, contrary to what one would imagine from most of the mobilisation literature, the Palestinians in the camps are not mobilising as would be expected. Instead the ethnographic research results found that the political groups within the camps are not as politically and militarily active as would be presumed. Mobilisation into these political groups is happening for different reasons than in previous findings – focusing instead on solidarity and social issues. This change has happened for contextual and financial reasons, including the end of the Civil War and the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon, as well as a severe lack of resources available to the political groups. The research results found that although there is still mobilisation into the political groups, there was also disillusionment among many youths at the political groups’ inability to facilitate their return to Palestine from Lebanon, as well as dismay at what they saw as disunity between the Palestinian political groups.
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been written without the encouragement and support of many people. I would like to thank the people of Shatila camp, who welcomed me to their camp and homes, and supported me throughout my trips to Lebanon. Shatila was the first camp I visited, and where most of the ethnographic research took place, and I am forever thankful and grateful for their support, encouragement and friendship. I would more specifically like to thank Abu Moujahed for arranging most of the interviews I had with the Palestinian political leaders. I would also very much like to thank Salah for accompanying me to many of these interviews. A big thank you to my ‘extended family’ in Shatila camp; the family of Abu Samer. Words cannot explain how much I appreciate their kindness and generosity. To everyone I visited in Bourj, Ein El Helweh and Mar Elias, as well as Robin Cook, Abdullah Farhat, and Professor Khashan – thank you so much for welcoming me and your honesty.

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Finally, a special thank you goes to Anders Strindberg, for his support, particularly during the early phases of this project. It was his encouragement that led me to pursue this topic and for that I am so grateful.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Arab Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMAL</td>
<td>Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnanija</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANM</td>
<td>Arab Nationalist Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOLP</td>
<td>Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>Alliance of Palestinian Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYC</td>
<td>Children and Youth Centre, Shatila Camp</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRA</td>
<td>Directorate General of Palestinian Refugee Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESM</td>
<td>Economic Survey Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNM</td>
<td>Lebanese National Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSM</td>
<td>New Social Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAP</td>
<td>Organisation of Arab Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organisation for African Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDFLP</td>
<td>Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP-GC</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLF</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNSF</td>
<td>Palestine National Salvation Front</td>
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</table>
POLP – Popular Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine
PPSF – Palestinian Popular Struggle Front
PRC – Palestinian Return Centre
RM – Resource Mobilisation
UAR – United Arab Republic
UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNCCP – United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency
WHO – World Health Organisation
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Introduction

Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon and Mobilisation:

In 1993 an era came to an end when Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), signed the Declaration of Principles with the Israeli Prime Minister, Izhak Rabin. The Declaration of Principles marked the end of forty-five years of denial of each others’ existence and the start of further discussions about peace agreements to come. The PLO which initially arose as a refugee organisation based in exile, has now returned to Palestinian soil. However, the famous handshake outside the White House was reluctant on both parts. What was considered a breakthrough has only led to more unhappiness. After several more agreements it has become very apparent that these so-called peace agreements are not securing peace for anyone: Palestinian or Israeli.

This is the scene where this thesis has its beginning. This thesis is set in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and researches why and how Palestinian refugees within these camps join political groups. Much of the literature on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has a different historical context: that of the Palestinian Revolution\(^1\) or the Lebanese Civil War.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The Palestinian Revolution refers to the time following the 1967 War when the Palestinian Resistance was particularly active. The Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon can be understood to have finished in the years 1982 and 1983 when the PLO was forced to move from Beirut.

\(^2\) The Lebanese Civil War had two distinct phases in an otherwise complicated history: the years 1975 to 1976 and then again 1978, with fighting going through various stages until the Taif Agreement was signed in 1989.
There are two major authors dealing with the Palestinian experience during these years and as well as the years prior to the Revolution. They are Rosemary Sayigh and Julie Peteet.

Rosemary Sayigh’s first, and landmark, work *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* is based on what she calls ‘peoples histories’ and focuses on issues related to the life led by the refugees in the former Palestine, the exodus, the reality of their new life in the refugee camps in Lebanon prior to the Revolution, as well as focusing on the effects of the creation of the PLO on the refugees living in the camps. Prior to the Palestinian Revolution she finds that the major themes in the lives of the refugees include ‘loss of respect’, ‘social isolation’, ‘political repression’ and ‘family disruption’. Her other book *Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon* is based on the history of Shatila camp with particular emphasis on events following the 1982 Israeli invasion and ending with the ‘Battle of the Camps’. Again, this work is based on oral histories and the main themes that arise from the Palestinian experience during these years is the loss of political and state protection which left the Palestinians in Lebanon vulnerable in a hostile environment. Following the withdrawal of the PLO they were subject to massacres and sieges of their camps and were left without protection and unrepresented.

Julie Peteet’s *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement* is based on research carried out between the years 1980 and 1982, although her book focuses on the period from 1968 to 1982. Her work shows how changes occur.

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in gender relations during crisis. There is a focus on political consciousness and how, during these years, there was a process of the development of a culture of resistance. This development led to changes in the role of women in Palestinian society in Lebanon as well as changes in the relations between men and women. Women now had the role of not only mothers and housewives but also as activists and fighters. Her insight into the roles of Palestinian women during the Palestinian Revolution and the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War shows that there was no either/or relationship regarding the two roles above. The Palestinian women were for example both housewives and fighters at the same time.

These works are similar to mine in the sense that they use an anthropological approach – speaking with people, observing and participating. However, the time of their research has a bearing on their findings. During these works, the Palestinian Revolution was in its hey-day, the PLO was still in Lebanon, and it was well funded. Today the PLO has left Lebanon, and the refugees are left in a precarious situation, with no real representation or legal status and devastating socio-economic conditions.

Another important work regarding this period of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon is Rex Brynen’s work Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO Experience in Lebanon.6 This work, however, focuses on the PLO’s relationship to Lebanon as opposed to that of the refugees. It looks at the interpretations of Lebanon as a sanctuary for the Resistance Movement during the years 1969-1982, where the PLO institutionalised a Resistance Palestinian identity and put the movement on the

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political map. His analysis of sanctuary involves both state support and popular support, as well as issues of risk for the host state regarding the target state, their military capabilities and acceptable risk. Brynen thus focuses on the role of the PLO in the Lebanese Civil War – the way it perceived its' Lebanese environment and responded to it.

Yezid Sayigh’s *Armed Struggle and the Search for a State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949-1993* is a political-military history of the Palestinian movement. It focuses on state-building outside of one's own state as well as on the armed groups and the notion of armed struggle to the Palestinian Resistance. Although not solely based in Lebanon, this work contains a comprehensive examination of the 1965-1976 phase of the Lebanese Civil war and the 1982 Israeli invasion and its effect on the Palestinian Movement.

These books set the background for the Palestinian experience in Lebanon as opposed to how things stand today. There are other books too that, although not based on the Palestinian experience in Lebanon, have similar methods or topics to this thesis. These include Laurie Brand’s work *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State* in respect to certain theoretical frameworks and Rashid Khalidi’s work *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* in respect to understanding identity.

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8 Brand, Laurie *Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State* (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988)
Laurie Brand’s work focuses on institution building in Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan. She details the origins and evolution of the socio-economic institutions (students, women, teachers and workers) that served as a basis for the re-emergence of the Palestinian National Movement. Her central argument is that the greater the degree of economic or political marginality, the greater the likelihood that independent institutions may emerge. This is where her theoretical framework has similarities to mine as she focuses on Tilly’s political model and argues that the emergence of social or political movements involve three elements: 1) motive, 2) opportunity and 3) resources.

Khalidi’s work is a challenge to the idea that Palestinian Identity arrived with the Palestinian Revolution. Indeed, during the Palestinian Revolution there was a ‘Palestinian reawakening’, however, the creation of a distinct Palestinian identity had started long before this period. Khalidi points to identity formation and consciousness in Palestine from the Ottoman period onwards. He does point, however, to two critical periods of time that were very important in shaping the re-emergence of Palestinian identity; the years of the British Mandate and what he calls the ‘lost years’ between al-nakba and the formation of the PLO. His understanding of the concept of ‘identity’ as a flexible concept that is subject to change, overlaps, as well as having several competing identities, is also accepted in this thesis.

This brief review reveals the lack of literature on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon following the Civil War, instead recent literature has focused on the Intifada, state-building and refugees within the (still) Occupied Territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The literature that does exist on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon tends to
be in the form of articles or research papers focusing on single issues. These issues include, for example, legal issues including the right of return, compensation and Lebanese laws towards the refugees, most notably by Salman Abu-Sitta, Susan Akram, Donna Arzt, Rex Brynen, Michael Fischbach, Don Peretz, Wadie Said, Salim Taman, and Elia Zurieki. Other issues include socio-economic conditions and host-state relationship and perspectives on the refugee issue as outlined, for instance, by the FAFO Institute for Applied Social Science, Lina Abu-Habib, Simon Haddad, Hilal Khashan, Julie Peteet and Rosemary Sayigh.

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10 See for instance Abu-Sitta, Salman “Restitution and Compensation” Ottawa Workshop on Refugees (Workshop on Compensation as Part of a Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, Ottawa, 14-15 July 1999)
12 See for instance Arzt, Donna “Refugees or Citizens? The Cornerstone of Middle East Peace” Canadian International Development Research Centre (Hull, 18th June 1997) and “The Right to Compensation” Ottawa Workshop on Refugees (Workshop on Compensation as Part of a Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, Ottawa, 14-15 July 1999)
15 See for instance Peretz, Don “Palestinian Refugee Compensation” Ottawa Workshop on Refugees (Workshop on Compensation as Part of a Comprehensive Solution to the Refugee Problem, Ottawa, 14-15 July, 1999)
17 See for instance Tamari, Salim “Return, Repatriation, The Future of the Refugees in the Peace Negotiations” Final Status Strategic Studies (Institute for Palestine Studies, April 1996)
Indeed much of this is relevant to this thesis, though there are other issues that are important in understanding how and why people join groups and become mobilised into action.

Although the situation has changed drastically for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon since the Palestinian Revolution, there still exists the popular image of the refugee camps as hotbeds of militant activity. The concept of the ‘refugee warrior’ emerged with reference to refugees being driven from their homes by violent conflict and forced to reside in refugee camps. For multiple reasons these camps then became militarised, posing a threat to the host community.\(^{25}\) With particular reference to Palestinians in Lebanon there still exists the popular image of the poverty stricken refugee camps as ‘hotbeds’ for angry and militant activity. There is a widespread image of the Palestinian refugee with “either a Kalashnikov or an RPG in the squalid refugee camps of Lebanon”.\(^{26}\) Without questioning this image, without proving otherwise, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are destined to be

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\(^{23}\) See for instance Peteet, Julie “From Refugees to Minority Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon” *Middle East Report* (200, July-September 1996)

\(^{24}\) See for instance Sayigh, Rosemary “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future” *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. xxv, No. 1, Autumn 1995) and “Greater Insecurity for Refugees in Lebanon” *Middle East Research and Information Project* (MERIP Press Information Note 17, March 1\(^{st}\), 2000) and “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Implantation, Transfer or Return?” *Middle East Policy* (Vol. viii, No. 1, March 2001) and “No Work, No Space, No Future: Palestinians in Lebanon” *Middle East International* (10\(^{th}\) August, 2001)

\(^{25}\) The term refugee warrior was first used by Zolberg, Aristide *Escape from Violence: Conflict and the Refugee Crisis in the Developing World* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1989). It is also a term that is commonly used in humanitarian literature that focuses on ‘complex emergencies’ and how humanitarian aid can at times exacerbate the problems and actually be a continuing factor in the conflict. See for instance Terry, Fiona *Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action* (Cornell University Press, London, 2002)

\(^{26}\) Schultz, Helena Lindholm *The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) p. 124
viewed as militants or even potential terrorists,\textsuperscript{27} for the foreseeable future. My research discredits this image. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are people who live in terrible conditions and despite that, the majority of them are waiting: waiting in hope to return to Palestine.

In researching how and why Palestinians in Lebanon mobilise, I found that the usual channels for mobilisation are to some degree still in place (although resources are at an all time low) and refugees are indeed joining groups. However, I did find one interesting diversion from this trend. There were some, particularly among the youth,\textsuperscript{28} who were not interested in joining groups. Looking at the historical and present contexts of the Palestinian situation and the conditions in the camps, this evidence of many youths not wanting to join political groups does not match what would be presumed to be a highly-charged, highly-mobilised atmosphere. Indeed all refugees are highly politicised, and most do join groups, but there seemed to be a number of youths who viewed the political groups in the camps with disillusioned eyes. There have also been changes in governmental policies regarding Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.\textsuperscript{29} Today the Cairo Agreement that allowed the Palestinians to run their own affairs and carry out revolutionary activity has been abolished. Instead the Lebanese government is keen to prevent the Palestinians from having access to Lebanese services and employment as well as political activity. Previous studies on political activity in refugee camps in Lebanon, as well as much of the mobilisation literature, would not correspond with the findings of the field work presented here: something that leaves many questions unanswered.

\textsuperscript{27} I am very uncomfortable with this word and its applicability to Palestinian refugees. Nevertheless, I have used it here as this is a very common assumption and view of Palestinian refugees.

\textsuperscript{28} By youth I am referring to people in their late teens to mid-twenties.

\textsuperscript{29} Field work carried out 2001-2003
‘Mobilisation’, ‘identity’, and ‘social movements’ are terms that are used frequently within this thesis. I will use them with specific meanings; therefore the next section shall examine what these concepts refer to with reference to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

**Definition of Terms:**

*Mobilisation*

Mobilisation can be understood in different ways. For the purposes of this thesis, I shall use it in terms of being a process used by organisations, as well as being a concept which motivates people to join groups. Mobilisation in its general form refers to:

The process by which a population is brought into the political arena by the formation of new parties and other political institutions. The ‘mobilisation system’ is the ensemble of values, institutions and groups which are organised to achieve societal goals.\(^{30}\)

Mobilisation is looked upon as the precursor of collective action. It is seen as the process by which people become involved with political groups and movements. The mobilisation process is different depending on the angle one takes. Looking at it from an organisation’s or group’s point of view, one could use Tilly’s definition of mobilisation as:

The process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. Those resources may be labour power, goods, weapons, votes, and any number of things, just as long as they are usable in acting on

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shared interests. ... The analysis of mobilisation deals with the ways groups acquire resources and make them available for collective action.\textsuperscript{31}

This definition relates mobilisation to resources and organisations. More simply one can define mobilisation in relation to political groups as the process by which these groups manage to recruit and persuade people to join them. In a sense it is about how the political groups bring people together in order to achieve the collective will, or put simply, their goal. This can be either in the form of a group or a movement.

Or, alternatively, one could look at mobilisation at the individual or collective 'people' level and define it thus:

examines the microevents that operate linking individual and sociocultural levels in the operation of identity, solidarity, and consciousness processes. It is social psychological in its attempt to understand the social interaction and group processes involved in collective action.\textsuperscript{32}

The interaction by which individual and sociocultural levels are brought together. It draws especially on those long-standing social psychological traditions that illuminate the operation of face-to-face encounters and group dynamic. The key concept is the mobilising act: words or deeds that further the mobilisation process among some set of potential challengers.\textsuperscript{33}

Within this definition mobilisation is explained on a people level – individual and collective. Mobilisation on the individual and collective level is about what it is that makes people want to join groups; it involves concepts of identity and solidarity. These concepts involve how the collective understand themselves and their surroundings but also how they understand the political groups that they may or may not be joining. It is also about the individual’s relationship with the socio-cultural environment.

\textsuperscript{31} Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1978) p. 7
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. p. 71-72
Mobilisation can be looked at from two angles then. First, within Tilly's definition, we see that mobilisation depends on the resources available. This is connected to two different levels of analysis, the structural (societal) and the organisational. The societal structures explain what resources are available. The organisational structures explain how these resources are used. Gamson's definition is on a 'people' level, whereby mobilisation is understood in terms of individual and collective identity. These identities are formed by social interaction. Mobilisation is necessary for social movements in that it is the 'raw meat' of whether social movements rise, decline or stay at the same level.

Identity

From the above explanation of the term mobilisation, we can already see how the concept is important, not only by and in itself, but also in conjunction with identity. A definitive explanation of identity is hard to come by, as it has so many facets. The various forms of identity will be focused upon within the section on social constructionism in Chapter One. However, for the time being, a simple understanding of what the term refers to will be given. Within the context of this thesis, identity refers to an understanding of oneself, the collective one is a part of, and the various 'others'. One can have multiple identities. It is also possible that one's identities change over time. Identity is seen as a continual construction that may remain stable or change. Identity is also only possible by social relations. This means that identity construction happens within social relations; how one understands oneself as part of a collective happens within a relationship. This is also true of individual identity: understanding one's individual identity comes from
relationships with others. One cannot understand oneself without understanding who one is different from, and where one stands in society. Similarly how one is identified by others happens because of social relationships. Della Porta and Diani explain this well when they say:

[Identity] is the process by which social actors recognise themselves – and are recognised by other actors – as part of broader groupings. On the basis of such allegiances, they give meaning to their own experiences and to their development over time. It is worth noting the complexity of the relationship between the individual dimension and the collective dimension in processes which define identity. On the one hand, through the production, maintenance and revitalisation of identities, individuals define and redefine individual projects, and possibilities for action open and close ... On the other hand, the construction of identity cannot simply be reduced to psychological mechanisms; it is a social process. The rediscovery of oneself becomes possible as a result of collective processes.34

What is the connection between mobilisation and identity? This question will become more apparent as the various social movement theories are explained in the theoretical framework in Chapter One, particularly within the social constructionism section. For the moment we can see the connection through the terminology I have adopted. If we consider the definition of mobilisation as the process by which political groups manage to get people to join their groups, as well as how people become involved with political groups and movements, and the definition of identity as the social construction of the self, the collective and the other, then it follows that identity and mobilisation are necessarily linked. In other words, mobilisation stems from how people and political groups understand and construct ‘the self’, and also their views of ‘the other(s)’, in an historical and present context.

34 Della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario Social Movements: An Introduction (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999) p. 85
Social Movement(s)

Social movements are important to this thesis in the sense that all of the political groups are part of a wider social movement. I will often refer, for example, to the Palestinian Resistance by which I mean all of the various Palestinian groups, no matter what their political preferences are. The Palestinian Resistance can be seen as a social movement. Furthermore, much of the theoretical literature on mobilisation is related to social movements.

The term social movement can have a variety of meanings. The most straightforward of definitions could be a social movement as “a sustained, organised collective effort that focuses on some aspect of social change.” This definition also includes various forms of social movements such as reform and resistance movements, where the former focuses on social change and the latter (usually) does not want change. Within this definition social movements are seen as a source of social change as well as, at times, social conflict. The term ‘social movement’ can also be seen another way as simply referring to:

... the expression of the collective will

In this case, whether social movements are involved with change, resistance, or other forms of societal issues, all of these are seen as ‘collective will’. Social movements only exist because a collective group of people have a ‘will’ for something within society.

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35 I use social movement to represent all groups although many of the groups belong to different alliances, for example pro- or anti-Oslo.
Social movements, however, need not be more complicated than the above definition has us believe. Various concepts exist related to social movements, as well as different types of movement. Wilkinson, for example, has dedicated a whole book to the concept of social movements. Wilkinson gives us a working concept of social movements which involves a number of characteristics:

1) A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into 'utopian' community.
2) A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organisation, though this may range from a loose, informal or partial level of organisation to the highly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and the corporate group.
3) A social movement's commitment to change and the *raison d'être* of its organisation are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement's aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members.38

This definition is, of course, rather vague. What is the difference, for instance, between a social movement and, say, a pressure group or trade union? Wilkinson's reply is that there is a difference although these terms may overlap at times. For example, there is a difference between a pressure group and the definition given above. In the case of a pressure group, for example, the social movement's area of action allowed in the above definition would be restricted. If the social movement were to become a pressure group they would not be able 'to promote change in any direction by any means', as they would be bound to be dealing with the government in power. Therefore a social movement is not the same as a pressure group, although a resistance movement, for example, may have pressure groups working for them. Having said this, however, Tilly does liken social movements to political campaigns. Although there are important differences, the parallels can help in understanding the term:

A social movement is a kind of campaign, parallel in many respects to an electoral campaign. This sort of campaign, however, demands righting of a wrong, most often a wrong suffered by a well-specified population. The population in question can range from a single individual to all human, or even all living creatures ... A social movement ... [transmits] the message that its supporters are WUNC – 1) worthy, 2) unified, 3) numerous and 4) committed. 39

WUNC is very important to a social movement both in terms of external perceptions of the movement as well as internal members’ perceptions of the movement. According to Tilly all of the WUNC must be included in the social movement for its survival; however they do compensate for one another in certain circumstances. For instance, a low level of numbers can be compensated for by a high level of worthiness. However, “a visibly low value on any of them discredits the whole movement”. 40

This working concept of social movements is useful in understanding what is needed for social movements to exist. Within social movements there also exist specific types of movements. Wilkinson gives a list of different forms social movements can take:

1. Religious movement, millenarism and sect
2. Movements of rural and urban discontent
3. Nativist, nationalist and race movements
4. Imperialism and pan-movements
5. Class and occupational interest
6. Moral protest and reformist movements
7. Revolutionary, resistance and counter-revolutionary movements
8. Intellectual movement
9. Youth movement
10. Women’s movement 41

40 Ibid. p. 88
41 Wilkinson, Paul 1971 op. cit., p. 51-52
It is unlikely that any social movement can be simply categorised into any single one of these types. However, they can overlap into several of them. If we consider the Palestinian Resistance Movement, we can already see that it does not fit into any one of these categories, but several. Where the Palestinian Resistance Movement stands in regard to these categories, one would include many of these categories including nationalist, imperialism/pan-movement, class, revolutionary/resistance, women's movement and with regard to some groups, for instance Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, religious. Nevertheless, the Palestinian Resistance as a whole tends to have 'resistance' as its main aim. Although, having said this, this thesis will show that these sorts of definitions can be rather problematic when dealing with the Palestinian groups, particularly the ones that are based outside Palestine.

**Organisation of the Thesis**

This thesis is split into three parts: 1) theory and method; 2) legal and historical context; and 3) field work. The first part sets the framework of the thesis, which in turn aids understanding of Part Two and Part Three. The method explains how the research was carried out and the potential problems with regard to methodological issues in general, as well as potential problems with the field research itself. The second part examines context. Much of the current literature that exists on this issue is about various legal issues concerning Palestinian refugees, and this creates a context within which we can understand how the refugees live in terms of status, as well as what rights they are, and have been for many years, entitled to. The
historical context examines the history of the Palestinian refugees since 1948. The content of this chapter has, by necessity, been very condensed and reduced despite the fact that the history of the Palestinian refugees is very complex. Nevertheless, this chapter tries to show the main events having an impact on the refugees as well as on the political groups. It also explains how previous works - anthropological, sociological and political - interpreted the Palestinian revolution, the civil war and Palestinian mobilisation as being widespread and part of their identity and struggle. Part Three is based on field work carried out in the refugee camps in Lebanon. It has been split into three chapters – examining structures, organisations, and collective identity. Each of these chapters represents a different level of analysis of the question of Palestinian refugee mobilisation. Each chapter stresses different issues: Chapter Five, relating to structures, stresses socio-economic and regional issues; Chapter Six, relating to organisations, stresses for the most part recruitment; and finally Chapter Seven, relating to collective identity, concentrates on identity formation, and the view of the ‘self’ and of the ‘other(s)’.

By examining mobilisation and identity in the refugee camps I am also highlighting other important issues, such as the devastating socio-economic conditions, lack of protection, and the general precariousness of their situation. The situation has been thus for over fifty years and is clearly not sustainable, though as this thesis illustrates, this is not because these camps are rife with violent or even terrorist activities, but because such conditions can never be accepted as permanent by their inhabitants.

42 These works are many and include those by for example: Rosemary Sayigh, Laurie Brand, Julie Peteet and Rex Brynen. Works relevant to mobilisation and identity will be used as comparisons within Part Three dealing with the field work.
Chapter One

Theories of Mobilisation

Introduction

In examining mobilisation of refugees living in the camps into political groups, this thesis looks at three different levels of analysis: structural, organisational and individual. I will outline theories of mobilisation that can be used in order to make a framework that will help understand how and why Palestinian refugees mobilise. It will become apparent as the different theories are examined that each is found to be lacking in some sense. This problem is usually because they focus on one level of analysis at the expense of others. Therefore I suggest a framework that encompasses many of the different theories in order to understand mobilisation at all levels. The chapter will begin with theories that consider emotions and deprivation as conditions for mobilisation. Many of these theories were the first such frameworks explaining mobilisation and social movements. The second part focuses on the importance of resources in the mobilisation process. These theories arrived following the student movement of the 1960s. The third part examines new social movement theory(ies) which looks at the changes that arose within social movements following the student movement. The fourth section deals with social construction and identity. The concluding part of the chapter will look at how these theories can be used in order to create a working framework from which we can reach an understanding of mobilisation within the refugee camps.
The Breakdown of Social Arrangements, Emotions and Deprivation

The following theories argue that social movements come into being and people join them as a result of changes in society and "breakdown of social arrangements and bonds associated with social change". Key concepts include "strain, stress, mass society, emotion, irrationality, contagion, alienation, frustration and relative deprivation". In simple terms, this approach sees people as responding to societal changes by, for example, feeling alienated or frustrated by their society which is changing due to "disruptions or strains to the social system". There is also discussion about contagion and irrational behaviour where social movements come into being, or at the point when people join social movements. These theories stress:

The irrationality of the crowd and the vulnerability of the masses to manipulation and authoritarian control ... [Theorists analysing the breakdown of society approach] emphasised the aberrational, the bizarre, and the potentially totalitarian and stressed what came to be called collective behaviour

There are two theories that especially stand out and need clarification, both because they are complex and because they will give a good idea of what this 'breakdown of society' approach entails. These are the theories of Neil Smelser, who is associated with the concept of collective behaviour, and Ted Robert Gurr, who is associated with the approach known as relative deprivation. Following the discussion of these two theorists, the 'human needs approach' will be examined.

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2 Ibid. p. 200.
3 Ibid. p. 291.
Smelser and Collective Behaviour

Neil Smelser's *Theory of Collective Behaviour* details six stages which must occur in order for collective behaviour to arise. The stages are:

a) Structural conduciveness; referring to the setting and the characteristics within it (for example Shatila camp in Beirut).

b) Structural strain, referring to a situation in which there is disorder or disorganisation. In Smelser's words "an impairment of the relations among and consequently inadequate functioning of the components of action" (for example, the refugees not having any rights in Lebanon).

c) Growth and spread of generalised beliefs, which shows the source of the 'strain' and gives 'strain' its characteristics and possible responses (for example, is there a belief that armed struggle is necessary?)

d) Precipitating factors; this refers to an event that triggers collective behaviour, for instance an arrest or assassination that could set off action like, for example, a riot.

e) Mobilisation of participants for action, referring to the beginning of the action. Once all of the above stages have occurred, then the only remaining stage is mobilisation for action to occur. This stage is "[T]he first beginnings of actual collective behaviour".

f) The operation of social control. This stage sits apart from the other stages, but refers to processes that try to stop the collective behaviour, in other words "social processes at work at all stages to inhibit and contain collective behaviour both

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6 Ibid. p. 47
before and after it takes place”.8

Smelser splits these different types of collective behaviour into:

a) ‘The panic’ which refers to a “collective flight based on a hysterical belief”.9

b) ‘The craze’ referring to “mobilisation for action based on a positive will-fulfilment belief”.10

c) ‘The hostile outburst’ looking at mobilisation for action under “a hostile belief”.11

This type of collective behaviour could also involve the two forms above. Smelser mentions that panic and craze often happen in sequence. With this type of collective behaviour one could link the three for example by seeing “craze followed by panic, and panic followed by hostility”.12

d) ‘The norm-oriented movement’ involves an attempt to “restore, protect, modify, or create norms in the name of a generalised belief”.13 And finally:

e) ‘The value-oriented movement’ refers to “a collective attempt to restore, protect, modify, or create values in the name of a generalised belief. Such a belief necessarily involves all the components of action; that is, it envisions a reconstitution of values, a redefinition of norms, a reorganisation of the motivation of individuals, and a redefinition of situational facilities”.14 Each of these types of collective behaviour is shown to us by using the six stages above. For the Palestinian groups, it seems that the latter two are relevant.

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8 Rule, James. B op. cit., p. 162
9 Smelser, Neil op. cit., p. 131
10 Ibid. p. 171
11 Ibid. p. 226
12 Ibid. p. 222
13 Ibid. p. 270
14 Ibid. p. 313
There are various criticisms of Smelser’s theory of collective behaviour. First, it does not allow for the idea that collective action could be something that happens for a good cause or because values change. In other words

In assuming a means/end distinction and in confining conflict to the realm of means, Smelser assumes a basic consensus underlying potential differences. He has ruled out by definitional fiat the possibility that collective action could be innovative in the sense of being oriented to new values or pointing beyond the boundaries of the social system.\(^\text{15}\)

This kind of understanding of collective behaviour that arose during the 1960s made social movements understood as symptoms of social strain, as “symptoms of the breakdown of communal ties in ‘mass society’,\(^\text{16}\) as a species of ‘deviant behaviour’, as phenomenon needing to be treated or controlled”,\(^\text{17}\) or generally as a group of irrational people under the influence of a mistaken generalised belief. In a sense, one could understand the norm- and value-oriented movements to make up for this criticism, as they are attempts to restore, protect or create values or norms that may not be related to ‘deviant behaviour’ for example. Another criticism is that, for Smelser, collective action does not happen without strain. This rules out any collective behaviour that happens without strain, which is rather difficult to accept.

\(^{15}\) Scott, Alan Ideology and the New Social Movements (Unwin Hyman, London 1990) p. 40
\(^{16}\) Mass society approaches derive from Kornhauser’s The Politics of Mass Society (1959), where the basic argument is that people on the margins who are socially isolated become involved in collective action. In relation to this approach is Le Bon’s psycho-pathological approach to crowd disturbances, where fears and rumours usually articulated by leaders make crowds join movements. This approach sees social movements as “microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled bodies. The movement a civilisation begins to decay it is always the masses that bring about its downfall” (Le Bon, Gustav The Crowd (Ernest Benn, London, 1896) p. 18). This approach condemns movements as destructive to civilisation, but is used in various fashions today albeit with less drastic connotations. See for example Jerold Post “Terrorist Psycho-Logic: Terrorist Behaviour as a Product of Psychological Forces” in Reich, Walter ed Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990)
\(^{17}\) Darnovsky, M et al op. cit., viii
Another problem with his theory is his distinction between norm and value-oriented movements. It is often very difficult to designate a movement as belonging to only one classification. "[S]ocial movements are rarely one-dimensional; they tend to be multi-dimensional. That is to say they may be concerned simultaneously with values, norms, forms of organisation and material conditions and resources".\(^{18}\) Furthermore, Wilkinson points out that in "practice one movement's norm may be another movement's value. It depends where you are standing at the time".\(^{19}\) Values and norms are constantly changing, and therefore it would be better to have a more precisely defined meaning of these norm- and value-oriented movements.

If we take away the deviant behaviour and the abnormality of collective behaviour, Smelser's six points do have something in common with recent theories. Within social construction literature there has been a renewed focus on the 'grievances' of individuals, albeit in a way that does not stress and focus on irrationality and crowd mentalities.

**Gurr and Relative Deprivation**

Ted Robert Gurr's theory of Relative Deprivation explains civil unrest in terms of people resisting a perceived injustice. The relative deprivation approach rests upon the psychological concept of 'frustration-aggression'. This term is relatively straightforward and refers to civil unrest occurring because people are frustrated for reasons of their perceived injustice and begin to feel (and become) aggressive. In

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\(^{19}\) Ibid. p. 25
other words, "the manifestation of feelings of deprivation experienced in relation to other social subjects and of feelings of aggression resulting from a wide range of frustrated expectations".  

Gurr’s theory involves more than the assertion of relative deprivation and frustration-aggression. Because of Gurr’s definition of relative deprivation as perceived injustices related to changing expectations and capabilities, he distinguishes types of deprivations including:  
1) Decremental deprivation; where “a group’s value expectations remain relatively constant but value capabilities are perceived to decline”.  
2) Aspirational deprivation, where there is “an increase in men’s value expectations without a concomitant change in value position or potential”. In other words, people’s and groups’ expectations are increasing and the capabilities remain constant.  
3) Progressive deprivation, where there is “a prolonged period of objective economic and social development … followed by a short period of reversal”. This version is linked to a theory commonly known as the J-curve. Aspiration deprivation is related to a  

more or less steady improvement in people’s value position [which] generates expectations about continued improvement. If value capabilities stabilise or decline after such a period of improvement, progressive RD (relative deprivation) is the result.  

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20 Della Porta, Donna and Diani, Mario Social Movements: An Introduction (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1999) p.4  
22 Ibid. p. 50  
23 Quote by Davies, Toward a Theory of Revolution p. 6 in Gurr, Ted Robert 1970 op. cit., p. 52.  
24 Gurr, Ted Robert op. cit., p. 52
In other words, progressive deprivation refers to capabilities that are increasing but not to the level of expectations. These differences in forms of relative deprivation have a bearing on different kinds of social action. However, relative deprivation and perceived injustice relates to people’s and group’s discontent and this creates, according to Gurr, the potential for social action and political violence. Gurr further distinguishes between three justifications that are used in order to understand potential and actual social action and political violence:

1) Normative justifications for violence, which Gurr refers to as psycho-cultural justifications. In this justification Gurr looks at individual aggressiveness (psycho-pathological approach) and cultural traditions of political violence.

2) Utilitarian justifications for violence, which Gurr refers to as ‘politicisation of discontent’. This is linked to people and groups with political motivation for their action.

3) (Degree of) legitimacy of political systems. This refers to “the balance between coercive and institutional resources of the rebels vs. the state”.

There have been various criticisms of Gurr’s theory. Klandermans argues that Gurr’s theory can be criticised for seeing “relative deprivation [being] deduced from the presence of conditions which are assumed to being about deprivation rather than measured at the individual level”. In other words, relative deprivation is a subjective condition, i.e. it is a perceived injustice. Therefore it is hard to understand how this perceived relative deprivation can be based on objective and structural

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25 Gurr, Ted Robert op. cit., p. 160
26 See footnote 16
27 Gurr, Ted Robert op. cit., p.177
28 Klandermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 202
29 Ibid. p. 202
conditions. Nevertheless, the notion of injustice seems to be a mobilising factor, especially in the case of the Palestinian Resistance.

**Human Needs Theory**

The human needs approach is concerned with locating what it is that is universally essential to human life. It is about human behaviour and relationships, looking at the individual as a whole within a societal context. There is some, although no full, general agreement on the nature of these needs, and there is wide discussion of these needs in relation to values, interests and identity.

For human needs theorists there is a difference between a ‘want’ and a ‘need’. A want may express a person’s needs and it may not. A need is something that is necessary to human life.

[A want] is subjectively felt and articulated: they may express needs, but they also may not; and there may be needs that are not thus expressed. Thus there is no assumption that people are conscious of their needs.\(^{30}\)

We should be aware that not all wants correspond to things that are necessary. But what is necessary? For human needs theorists, the term necessary and needs refers to what it is that is needed to be human. These needs are universal and stretch beyond boundaries. A ‘need’ refers to something that is necessary to life. After the biological ‘needs’ such as air and food, there are further needs that are essential to human life. These other needs include societal needs such as security and identity.

The human needs approach believes that individual humans must be in interaction with other humans. In other words, human life involves relationships, and one cannot understand one's values, beliefs and needs if one is not in interaction with others.

Much of the work on human needs is based on the work of Maslow. The different needs that he pointed to were:

1) Physiological needs, which include food and air, what is needed for physical living.

2) Safety needs which refer to "security; stability, dependency, protection, freedom from fear, from anxiety and chaos; need for structure, law, limits; strength in the protector".

3) Belongingness and love needs are the third need. For Maslow, once the first two needs have been met, people will start to have a need to belong, form relationships, love and be loved.

4) Esteem needs refers to the need for "a stable, firmly based, usually high evaluation of themselves, for self-respect, or self-esteem, and for the esteem of others". He classifies these needs into two sets. First, is the need and desire for "strength, for achievement, for adequacy, for mastery and competence, for confidence in the face of the world, and for independence and freedom". The second is about gaining esteem from others. This set is about prestige, reputation, attention and appreciation. These needs are very important for humans, because without it people will feel helpless and inferior. The last of Maslow's needs is:

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32 Ibid. p. 39
33 Ibid. p. 45
34 Ibid. p. 45
5) Needs for self-actualisation. Maslow points out that even though we have all of
the other needs "we may still often (if not always) expect that a new discontent and
restlessness will soon develop, unless the individual is doing what he individually is
fitted for ... What a man can be, he must be. He must be true to his nature".35

Other theorists have expanded upon Maslow's needs. For Sites, needs, apart from
physiological-biological needs, are about emotions. He is

arguing that human needs are ontologically grounded in emotions and that
negative emotions are triggered in humans where there is a threat to survival of
either the physical organism or the developing self.36

Similarly to Maslow, Sites distinguishes the following:

1) Security Needs, referring to the emotion of fear.

2) Meaning Needs, referring to the emotion of anger. This need refers to societal and
individual values where people have the need for meaning.

3) The third need is the need for self-esteem, referring to the emotion of depression.

4) Finally, the need for latency. This need refers to the emotion of satisfaction and
happiness. In relation to this need Sites explains how, in today's (western) world
this need is becoming more and more difficult to satisfy. Many people do not have
enough time, and suffer from stress. He explains "[w]hen people are experiencing
stress the latency need obviously cannot be gratified, and this is perhaps why
continuous stress may produce physiological as well as psychological damage".37

35 Maslow, Abraham op. cit., p. 46
36 Sites, Paul "Needs as Analogues of Emotions" in Burton, John ed Conflict: Human Needs Theory
(Macmillan, London, 1990) p. 16
37 Ibid. p. 21

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Furthermore, Sites explains that all of these needs are interconnected and they are not easily separated. For example:

people may have fears that self-esteem will be damaged or meaning systems destroyed. By the same token, people may become angry when self-esteem is threatened. Or people may become depressed if they are forced to live under constant fear ... primary emotions and their need analogues are intertwined.\(^{38}\)

Added to this, Sites suggests the need for stimulation, corresponding to the emotion of boredom. However, he does note that if the other needs above are satisfied, this need and emotion may not be present.

Although Sites’ needs are similar to Maslow’s, what Sites is most famous for is what he calls the need for of control. For Sites, the need for control is of the utmost importance and would be the first human need, if one were to prioritise them. This is because in order to satisfy the needs listed above, people need control. Control refers to being able to understand, predict and control one’s environment and society; one can also control the satisfaction of ones needs. People who do not have adequate control over other people’s responses are in fear and insecure. To further the argument of control, Sites introduces us to Goffman\(^{39}\) (who is discussed in more depth within social constructionism). What Sites essentially takes from Goffman is his idea that “there tend to be tacit agreements among people that each will not expose another as each attempts to ‘present a self’”.\(^{40}\) For example in everyday life we tend to ‘let things pass’ where a statement or action may be potentially embarrassing. This sort of behaviour is mutual and universal, most people reacting

\(^{38}\) Sites, Paul 1990 op. cit., p. 22
\(^{39}\) In this case Sites is referring to Erving Goffman’s work in the area of interaction and the self, including The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Allen Lane The Penguin Press, London, 1969) and Strategic Interaction (Blackwell, Oxford, 1970)
\(^{40}\) Sites, Paul 1990 op. cit., p. 25
in the same way. This is explained by the fact that people would want others to do the same to them, if they were the ones who were saying or doing something embarrassing. Site's concept of control spreads across all the various needs. For instance, the need for meaning can only be met if people have control of the(ir) construction of reality, both individual and social. Regarding Palestinian mobilisation in Lebanon, their control mechanism with regard to the Lebanese government is that they know that the Lebanese government does not want them to mobilise and be active. Would this sense of control, of knowing the reaction of the Lebanese government, prevent them from mobilising? This is an important question and will be examined in Chapter Five.

Burton too, believes in universal human needs. His list similarly includes 1) consistency in response; 2) stimulation; 3) security; 4) recognition. From these four needs, more needs arise: 5) distributive justice (for Burton not just merely coming out of consistency of response, but also from an expected and appropriate response); 6) appearance of rationality (again referring to consistency in response from others); 7) meaning (again consistent response); 8) control (a defence mechanism in case all of the other needs are not met, which is hardly ever the case). However, Burton adds another different need: that of 9) role defence. This refers to protecting and keeping all of the above needs once they have been acquired.41

The human needs approach relates to the political realm as its basic premise regarding political behaviour is "that political behaviour and political beliefs have their basis in a set of ontological needs which are universal, and therefore shared

across cultural and economic divisions".42 This implies that the human needs involved in this theory are innate and universal, for instance the kind one finds in Hobbes' state of nature; however, these needs are not about competition, but about belonging.43 The variety of needs including security, belonging, and self-esteem are important as they relate to the perception of the self and the other: one's identity. Because of this theory's focus on relationships and society it implies that these needs are inherently political; man can only pursue his human needs in a social context through human interaction. The human needs approach thus allows for an insight into how and why individuals act the way they do. In other words "A focus on the pursuit of individual human needs and values and the network of group relationships between individuals allows one to study how people become mobilised to form social aggregations and how and why such systems of action become disaggregated".44 In relation to Site's notion of control, it is only through interaction with others within society and in society itself that we can gratify our human needs.

The concept of identity is inherent within most of the human needs. For example, the security need implies an identity. The need for security "is not totally satisfied in a society which simply preserves law and order. Security involves more than the preservation of life; it also involves preservation of liberty and its possible expansion so that the individual is confident that he can not only choose whatever

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42 Jabri, Vivienne Discourses on Violence: Conflict analysis reconsidered (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996) p. 121-122
43 The difference between competition in a Hobbesian state of nature and belonging within the context of human needs is eloquently explained in Clark, Mary E Meaningful Social Bonding as a Universal Human Need in Burton, John ed "Conflict: Human Needs Theory" Macmillan, London, 1990
way of life he prefers, but also maintain it".45 The implication of this is that if a human’s security need is met, he will feel that he is in a society/place where he knows, understands and can predict the responses of others and that others can do the same with him. He feels safe, he understands his environment, and his way of life, the way he wants to live suits that environment. The individual can only understand the concept of security if he knows what this concept means. Understanding what security means to the individual can only be done through the possession of a self-identity.

The identity needs may be attainable through societal structure, but identity in itself is understood at an individual level. If structure prevents the formation of social relationships, and thus one’s identity, there could be serious repercussions. This focus of needs theory is referred to as the ‘pathological’, and is often linked to conflicts that arise within a community or country. When the basic need for identity has not been fulfilled then the result is “psychological stress for the individual, conflict within the community, and ultimately intense violent conflict between communities”.46 This particular strand of human needs theory is not necessarily bound to conflicts within one society but can also be between countries, as for instance, in the Israeli-Palestinian, Cyprus, and Northern Ireland conflicts where these conflicts are seen as being “based on the need for identity which humans will seek to satisfy irrespective of contextual circumstances or degrees of coercion”.47 People need to have an identity, and a belonging to a community as part of their

46 Jabri, Vivienne op. cit., p. 122
47 Ibid. p. 123
basic human needs. Furthermore, the implication is that if this basic human need of identity is not met, there may be conflict.

Potential problems arise with human needs theory once one starts to question cultural contexts. Human needs could perhaps be seen as culturally relative, and understood differently by different people. Therefore the priority of needs and their satisfiers can differ depending on context and place. Cultural and contextual considerations also have implications for the means and ways in which people may pursue these human needs. Some of the needs and their satisfiers may need to be adjusted for the context of the refugee camps. For example, the need for stimulation-meaning-freedom\(^48\) usually refers to needs that are based upon actors. However, in the refugee camps in Lebanon, many of the different facets of this particular need are based upon structures. Despite this shortcoming, the human needs perspective can nevertheless be illuminating when examining Palestinian refugees within the refugee camps in Lebanon with reference to deprivations and socio-economic conditions that may or may not by themselves explain mobilisation in the camps. Have the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon been able to satisfy these human needs? Which ones do they have and which ones are they deprived of? These questions should be able to help understand why Palestinians mobilise and also, perhaps, why they do not mobilise. For example, does lack of security within the camps affect mobilisation? Is the identity of the Palestinians within the camps recognised from the outside? What does this mean for them? Is this a factor in their mobilisation and so forth.

\(^{48}\) Word is different depending on whose version of human needs one is using.
Resource Mobilisation Theory

Resource Mobilisation (RM) theory developed following the student movement in the 1960s, shifting attention away from deprivation, collective and irrational behaviour theories. Many of the founding scholars of RM had been part of the student movement in the 1960s and realised that deprivation and irrationality was not necessarily the case in mobilisation and action in political groups.

There are four main movements that made this shift in theory occur: the student movement, the women’s movement, the peace movement, and the environmental movement. However, the movements of today have already changed; as Klandermans reminds us “The student movement is the only one of the four that no longer exists as such, the women’s movement and the peace movement have declined almost everywhere in their original forms. The environmental movement is still very much alive”. ⁴⁹

RM theories tell us that “grievances are ubiquitous in every society and that as a consequence, grievances alone can not be sufficient conditions for the rise of social movements. The availability of resources and opportunities for collective action were considered more important than grievances in triggering social movement formation”. ⁵⁰ In other words, one can have all the grievances in the world, but if there are no means by which to express this grievance, there is nothing one can do about it. These means include: rational behaviour and resources; political structure

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 24
opportunity; and lastly the movement organisation itself. What all three of these theories have in common is that they see collective action not so much as being fuelled by grievances but more as a means to achieve a goal.  

The Rational Actor

The rational actor approach leans heavily on the idea that the individual joining and participating in a political group is rational. The term ‘rational’ refers to calculated self-interest. The rational actor model incorporates the following assumptions:  

1) what must be explained is action, that is behaviour that reflects purpose or intent;  
2) the action is chosen as a calculated solution to a strategic problem;  
3) it explains what goal a government or movement is pursuing when it acts and how the action is a product of a reasonable choice, given the objective. Given these assumptions the basic concepts of rational action is the following. First you need to know your goals and objectives. This implies that the actor thinks hard about which route he/she will pursue in accordance to how much ‘utility’ he/she can get out of that particular action. Second, a rational actor must choose from a range of alternatives. Third, the rational actor takes into account the consequences of each alternative action. And fourth and finally is the choice. “Rational Choice consists simply of selecting that alternative whose consequences rank highest in the decision-maker’s payoff function”. Being rational implies that one acts and makes choices to receive the

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51 Klandermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 203  
53 Ibid. p. 30
best payoff available, within certain contexts. There may be costs involved so the actor must choose the action with the maximum utility.

According to social theorists, rational choice theory assumes that “social systems are organised in ways that structure the alternatives and consequences facing individuals so that they behave rationally”.\textsuperscript{54} Decision theory is linked to rational choice theory through the choice of alternatives. It refers to “gathering information about past, present, and likely future events and conditions; listing options and ranking them in order of relative desirability of their most likely consequences; and making a final decision intended to produce the best possible outcome”.\textsuperscript{55}

The major problem here is the free-rider problem. In order to deal with this problem RM theory leans on Olson's logic of collective action\textsuperscript{56} “particularly his distinction between collective and selective incentives... The core argument of Olson's theory is that rational individuals will not participate in collective action unless selective incentives encourage them to do so”.\textsuperscript{57} In other words, collective incentives are good, but do not necessarily always encourage people to participate, whereas a selective incentive is necessary to encourage participation. This seems to reinforce the argument made above, that grievance is not enough for mobilisation and action, there must be more to it, and this is where selective incentives come in. Therefore grievances about the nakba, lack of statehood (Palestine) and lack of civil and human rights may not be enough to mobilise the Palestinians in the refugee camps in

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. p. 225 Similar to game theory and prisoners dilemma
\textsuperscript{56} Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965 and 1968)
\textsuperscript{57} Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 24 (italics are my emphasis)
Lebanon. The political groups may need to encourage mobilisation and participation through collective and selective incentives.

Although this is a good explanation and shows why people do not join when there are no selective incentives, the problem remains that sometimes people do decide to join even though there are no selective incentives. People joining groups and movements without selective incentives must have other reasons. These reasons include an understanding by the participant that without his or her participation the collective good cannot be realised. However, “given the multiplicative relationship between the value of the collective goal and its possible realisation, for some people the goal is so valuable that even a slight chance of success is enough to motivate participation”.58 Thus the actor is rational, not necessarily for his or her own direct benefit, but there may be a feeling that the cause is important enough and therefore one can rationally come to the conclusion that the more people who participate without being selfish, the better.

There are further criticisms, some of which it is possible to overcome within the discussion of other theories below. First, the criticism that there is more to a rational decision than a person or group thinking in terms of utility maximisation. Institutional roles, for example, have an impact upon rational decision making. In other words, structures of different kinds, including state, societal and so on, also have a bearing on decision-making. It is not enough to look solely at the individual rational choice, to understand a person's behaviour.

58 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 25
Second, there may be more than self-interest involved in a decision. Rational Actor theory thus does not account “for the actor’s goal and desires, as well as her /his beliefs”\textsuperscript{59}. In other words, it does not explore the motivations of the decision maker. The theory leaves unexamined the origins of the desires and beliefs which form the reasons for the actions whose rationality is being assessed. The focus of investigation is ‘how’ an actor best achieves her or his goals irrespective of the origins or merits of these goals. It does not attempt to uncover ‘why’ the actor held the goal preferences she or he did nor does it question the beliefs underlying her or his choice of action.\textsuperscript{60}

This implies that there are factors involved in decision-making that are both internal and external to the individual.

Action can have multiple causes, and decision-making in relation to action is not always consistent. Rather, decision-making is influenced by multiple factors including intuitional roles, societal norms, and ideology, for instance.

Furthermore, with collective action into movements it is difficult to determine costs and benefits appropriately, as collective action into and within social movements, as well as determination over a group’s or social movement’s goals, develops over time. “On the one hand, there is the certainty of engagement and of the acceptance of risk in the short term; on the other, the unknown territory of results which are not only difficult to calculate, from the point of view of the individual but whose

\textsuperscript{59} Jabri, Vivienne op. cit., p. 62
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. p. 62-63
achievement also seems a distant prospect. The existence of collective identity enables these difficulties to be overcome.  

The Political Model

Tilly's political model lists five major components of collective action: interests, organisation, mobilisation, opportunity and collective action itself. Interests refer to the reasons why people decide to mobilise and participate. Organisation (which will be looked at in more depth below) refers to the organisational structure of the group that people are mobilising and participating in. More directly this is about "leadership, community resources, structures already in place." This also refers to the extent of a common identity of the members and the leaders, and also to what extent this is seen as a unifying structure. Mobilisation refers to "the process by which a group acquires collective control over resources needed for action." These resources could be anything from weapons to votes. The resources' importance lies in whether they are usable or not to further the interests of the group. Opportunity refers to "primarily the degree of coercion or repression that may be used against the contender." In other words, what the highest institutions (in the community, country, region or even world) can do to stop you mobilising into groups and being active. For example, what steps can the Lebanese government take

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61 Collective Identity will be looked at later on in this chapter.
62 Della Porta, Donnatella and Diani, Mario op. cit., p. 104-105
63 Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1978)
64 Brand, Laurie Palestinians in the Arab World: Institution Building and the Search for a State (Columbia University Press, New York) 1988 p.18
65 Tilly, Charles 1978 op. cit., p. 7
66 For Tilly, collective action and violent action stem from the same conditions. Collective violence is seen as another form of collective violence.
67 Brand, Laurie 1988 op. cit., p.18
to prevent demonstrations by Palestinian refugees? If the refugees are aware of all the steps the Lebanese government can take, they can then plan their activities. This does not mean that no mobilisation occurs if the government is coercive, on the contrary, sometimes that is the whole point of the action to show people how coercive a government may actually be, if at all.

The Political Model looks at “political institutions and their effects on the opportunities, constraints and channelling or social movement organisation, forms of action and outcomes.” Tarrow reminds us that looking at the effects of political institutions on mobilisation and action is important; when mobilisation and action are compared between two different places with two different sorts of political institutional structure and/or arrangements, the differences in political institutions and arrangements “correspond to differences in style, strategy or outcomes [of social movements] that individual or group variables within systems frequently fail to explain”. In other words, this approach stresses that opportunity is about the interaction between mobilisation and action between the movement and the authorities. This is an attractive approach if one wants to understand how movements are able to do what they do.

For Tilly, it is the last four of the five big components that are of utmost importance if there is to be collective action. Interests are important for collective action; however, without the other four components, it is not possible. The last four components are “the variable determinants of collective action. If a particular

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69 Ibid. p. 401
category of people is unorganised, it has no hopes of pursuing its interests; indeed it may be unaware of them, or even of its own collective identity. If the group is organised, it may still be unable to mobilise resources to realise its interests. Thus Tilly's political model is about structures and organisation and the resources available.

A point which is interesting in Tilly's work is that he sees no difference between collective violence and collective action. Hence the ease with which resources mentioned above range from weapons to votes. All collective action, non-violent or violent, requires that people feel they have an entitlement that they are not receiving or a sense of (in)justice. These senses of entitlement and justice "arise out of ongoing group life". However, we have to remember that this is not enough to produce collective action or violence and the other four big components are necessary.

**The Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach**

The organisational approach tends to stress issues of "organisation dynamics, leadership and resource management. It uses economic and organisational theories to study social movements." This approach sees organisation as an important resource for social movements both for mobilising and for active participation. "Organisation decreases the costs of participation; it is important in the recruitment

70 Rule, James. B op. cit., p. 178
71 Ibid. p. 175
72 Denton, Margaret "Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements" New Zealand Sociology (Vol. 13, No 2 November 1998) p. 220
of participants; and in the opinion of most students, it increases the chances of success. Zald and McCarthy vividly contrast the new RM approach from the old traditional approach with regard to ‘organisation’. The traditional approach did not really emphasise organisation, whereas RM theory sees organisation in relation to strategy and tactics as well as in relation to society in a larger context:

[In relation to strategy and tactics] social movement organisations [have] a number of strategic tasks. These include mobilising supporters, neutralising and/or transforming mass and elite publics into sympathisers, achieving change in targets. Dilemmas occur in the choice of tactics, since what may achieve one aim may conflict with behaviour aimed at achieving another. Moreover, tactics are influenced by inter-organisational competition and cooperation.

[In relation to larger society] Society provides the infrastructure which social movement industries and other industries utilise. The aspects utilised include communication media and expense, levels of affluence, degree of access to institutional centres, pre-existing networks, and occupational structure and growth.

Organisation is thus an important feature in mobilising the masses but also for conducting action. This version of resource mobilisation does not necessarily neglect the traditional aspect of potential and actual participants needing grievances in order to mobilise and act. Rather there may or may not be grievances, there may be what McCarthy and Zald call ‘conscience constituents’ who support and join a movement for reasons of what they believe to be right. However, in order to aggregate resources there needs to be some sort of organisation. Furthermore, one can have all the grievances and dreams in the world but if there is no (organisational) structure in which one can discuss and act upon these grievances or dreams, not much can be done about them. The Palestinian Resistance which started in the 1960s gave the structure that enabled people to do something about their grievances. However, the previous Intifada showed that people are sometimes

73 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 25-26
willing to act collectively without a formal organisation. Nevertheless, we do not know what effect the Palestinian Resistance had on the Intifada, in terms of (learning from) experience, knowledge, maybe disillusionment with the Resistance and so forth. In other words, Palestinian Resistance activity before the Intifada may (or may not) have had an effect on the Intifada. Just because there is a supply of social movements or political groups does not necessarily mean that people will join, again referring to the lack of focus on grievances, emotions and ideology. Already, we can see a gap in this theory. The reasons for mobilising are not present; it is just assumed that they exist. Nevertheless this organisational approach to RM theory brings to light the organisational features that are needed in social movements.

**Why We Need to Include Another Approach**

RM theory focuses on the meso-level at the expense of important insights into the other micro and macro-levels of analysis. This makes sense as RM theory focuses on resources and organisation. However, ignoring these other levels of analysis can be seen as a critical flaw in trying to understand mobilisation. The reason for the lack of interest in micro-level analysis is that RM theory developed in reaction to social-psychological explanations of collective action. Similarly, the macro-level analysis of the pre-RM years of ‘social disorganisation and breakdown’ was something the RM theorists were trying to move beyond. However, this led to a near absence within RM theory of “the ‘larger’ questions of social structure and historical
change, and ‘smaller’ issues of individual motivation and social interaction”. The micro- and macro-levels of analysis are important in seeing the ‘bigger picture’. Without an inclusion of these other two levels of analysis, RM theory becomes a theory that shows us organisations with actors without any regard for the larger cultural and structural constraints and without any social or historical context. Thus it seems that RM theory would greatly benefit, and become more complete, by incorporating the micro- and macro-levels of analysis.

Another problem is the self-interested actor who thinks about maximising his or her utility before engaging in any action. For many people, emotion does play a role in their daily lives and in the decisions that they make. Jaggar has argued that:

> oppressed people particularly, need and value emotions as a means of affirming the values and people that the rational standards of culture demean. When rationality is defined to include the reasoned choice of values as well as the selection of means, emotion may be an indispensable aid rather than a hindrance to reliable judgment. 76

Rational people have values, however, and these values are defined by experience and how we perceive this or that experience. “Emotions and values are closely related … emotions provide the experiential basis for values. If we had no emotional responses to the world, it is inconceivable that we should ever come to value one state of affairs more than another”. 77 People are people, and in the end it is emotion that will drive someone to do something, which does not mean that they are irrational or necessarily act in accordance with the theories of societal breakdown.

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Nevertheless, having said this, RM theory does open a window for examining the organisational level, although we must not forget to look through the other windows of the ‘social’ and the ‘structural’ as well.

**New Social Movement Theory**

Participation in a social movement is not only a means to an end but a fulfilment.

During the same time that RM theory was developing in North America, New Social Movement (NSM) Theory was emerging in Europe. Scholars saw that the new protests of the 1960s and 1970s could not be explained by traditional Marxist theory and that the protesters themselves were no longer working class people wanting better labour conditions. For the new scholars there seemed to be new reasons for mobilising and collective action; there were new grievances and new aspirations among the new generation of protesters. In general, one can say that NSM theory focuses on the ‘cultural’ at the macro-level of analysis.

The term NSM theory may be somewhat misleading. In reality NSM theory should be more correctly called NSM theories. Common themes include first, new values and new issues. There is no longer a focus on production and distribution of goods as in the working-class movements, but rather a focus on other issues, such as the environment or peace, which is due to globalisation and increased awareness about

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79 Darnovsky, M et al op. cit., p. xiv
wider (world) issues. A related concern is that with the decline of working-class issues, there arose increased prosperity which “has caused the demands for scarce goods to grow. Many of these are positional goods (e.g. cars). When used extensively, they become an obstruction to satisfaction of other needs (traffic jams). The general result is increased competition, which in turn produces more grievances”.

In other words, in today’s world, we have different needs from yesterday’s world. Our grievances are caused by our new needs as they clash with other needs. A second theme is the new forms of action, using different forms of action and protest to those used by the labour movement. The new movements “prefer small-scale, decentralised organisations, they are anti-hierarchical, and they favour direct democracy”. According to Melucci the “actor’s participation within movements is no longer a means but an end”. Lastly, there is also a new constituency, again shifting from working class to middle class, as well as people suffering from the effects of modernisation. According to Touraine, defining the constituency of the new social movements can only be done by looking at what the social movements themselves are doing. Within the context of the post-industrial society of today, the protest of social movements has shifted from economics to culture. All of these new changes are to be found within the cultural sphere of life, rather than the political.

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80 See Melucci, Alberto Nomads of the Present (Century Hutchinson, London, 1989) for more detail.
81 Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 28
82 Ibid. p. 27
83 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 5
84 See for example, Plotke, David “What’s so new about social movements?” Socialist Review (Vol. 20, 1990) who argues that the focus on the novelty of these movements is overstated. See Beuchler, Steven 1995 op. cit., for a brief review of the arguments.
Differences within New Social Movement Theory: Two major theorists:

Melucci and the Cultural

The argument of Melucci is that in the world of today there are “new forms of social control, conformity pressures, and information processing to which new social movements respond”\textsuperscript{85}. These issues relate to the ‘new themes’ of social movements. In contrast to old theories of social movements that draw from class bases, these new social movements draw across the classes and across regional boundaries. New social movements come from the grass-roots of society. Whereas the old social movements such as trade unions were hierarchical, the new social movements tend to be more informal. Melucci criticises the RM approach for focusing only on how social movements develop and act, but not on the question of why. His work is a new framework, within which he explains how one is able to understand both questions of how and why. Although his approach focuses on the cultural, he does understand that there is a deep political element to social movements as well in their ability to, at times, change policy and so on. However, he emphasises the cultural and non-political sides of social movements.

For Melucci, social movements are concerned with the ‘everyday life’ of people. This means that there are aspects within the ‘everyday lives’ of people that may become social problems. There are also individual needs that need to be taken into consideration. Individual needs are examined within a context of culture where one can understand these needs more thoroughly.

\textsuperscript{85} Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 446
According to Melucci, social movements are social constructions in so far as they are constructed and built by actors. The cultural is of utmost importance to Melucci, as we have just seen. He places extreme importance on collective identity, an aspect that we shall be looking at more closely within social constructionism below. For Melucci, collective action is not solely a product of resources, but of identity. New Social Movements “act rather than react”.87 Their concerns are different from the social movements of the past. “In post-material society, there emerges a further type of right, a right to existence, or rather, to a more meaningful existence”.88 This is one of the major points within NSM theory. Society has changed and with it goals, meanings, values, and issues for the people who live in it. Furthermore, for Melucci, the new social movements are social constructions, and should be seen as “ongoing social constructions rather than as unitary empirical objects, givens or essences or historical personages acting on a stage”.89 In other words, new social movements are based upon social constructions and identity. These social constructions are ongoing and fluid, and it is from this that collective action stems, not from formal organisation and structure. The starting point is the social construction of collective identity (which will be expanded upon later), and it is both a prerequisite and a function of the social movement. Social movements are able to achieve collective action with on-going social constructions as the stem of the collective action. Resources and structures are important, but secondary. In terms of the Palestinian Resistance, this argument shows that first and foremost it is an ongoing process of

86 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 119
88 Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 178
89 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 446
social constructions and understandings which are built into the collective identity of the members. The formal processes of the various organisations and their resources become secondary.

*Sociological Intervention and Touraine*

For Touraine society, social action and social movements are all intertwined with each other; he says: “social movements are the expression of the collective will”.\(^{90}\) For Touraine, social movements are “the organised collective action by which a class-actor struggles for the social definition of historicity in a given historical ensemble”.\(^{91}\) Touraine’s theory of social movements is concerned with “the glue of social relations”.\(^{92}\) For Touraine, “people do not act in a social structure, the structure of society is the structure of how a group moves; it has an identity only by virtue of its movement ... To answer ‘What is the structure of a modern trade union?’ Touraine would respond, ‘The question can only be answered by looking at what the unions are doing: how they are acting and reacting, to other groups, at a given moment of their history, that is what they are’.\(^{93}\) What should be kept in mind when trying to understand Touraine’s work on social movements is that his idea of structure may differ from the one that we think of. Structure relates to social movements and social action. New social movements are located “between two logics: that of a system seeking to maximise production, money, power and information, and that of subjects seeking to defend and expand their individuality”.\(^{94}\)

Issues have changed from being based on labour and class to other issues, issues that

\(^{90}\) Touraine, Alain The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981) p. 29
\(^{92}\) Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., (forward by Richard Sennet, p. x)
\(^{93}\) Ibid. p. x
\(^{94}\) Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 444.
are ‘culturally orientated’.95 The concern of new movements shows evidence of “a
displacement of protest from the economic to the cultural realm, accomplished by
the privatisation of social problems”.96

Social movements include three points: ‘identity’, ‘opposition’ and ‘totality’; which
are the three necessary ingredients for social movements. Identity and opposition
explains who one is and who the ‘other’ (the enemy) is. Totality refers to the
grounds on which one is fighting against the opposition. In terms of Palestinian
Refugees within the refugee camps in Lebanon, this synthesis within social
movements refers to 1) what constitutes the collective identity (how the refugees
define themselves and their situation); 2) how the refugees view the ‘other’, the
opposition; and 3) on what grounds they are mobilising. This latter point refers to
the framing of the opposition as well as to the participant’s view of the ‘stakes’ of
mobilisation and participation. Regarding this latter point Touraine would say:

what characterises the social movement is primarily the fact that what is at stake
is represented by historicity itself and not by institutional decisions or
organisational norms, and that the actors are therefore classes, the only actors to
be defined by their conflictual relations with historicity.97

In other words, if one is active in a social movement one should know on what
grounds, in what name and against whom, one is acting. These three concepts are
important because:

first, it limits the range of ‘true’ movements to relatively few, thus excluding a
large number of phenomena that are at the heart of American (and other
European) studies; second it draws attention away from the individual, to the
extent that all three of Touraine’s principles are collective properties of the

95 Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., p. 80
96 Buechler, Steven 1995 op. cit., p. 445
97 Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., p. 81
movement; third, it implies a progression from lower forms of collective behaviour to higher ones, with the highest forms of all the social movements that can be proven to embody all three of the principles in their entirety.96

Sociological intervention is needed for groups to understand ‘identity, opposition and totality’. It refers to self-analysis of participants in collective action with more emphasis than solely the situational context or the opinions of the participants. “Such an analysis requires the assistance of the researcher who can not watch the movement as an object, but rather, has to intervene into the field he is studying although he may be rejected and the results of his intervention may be neutralised”.99 This means that the researcher has to try to be two people at once; to be a researcher but also to be an actor. “It is this new conception of the researcher as neither observer nor ideologist that most clearly distinguishes intervention from other methods”.100 The researcher is thus the actor of intervention and stimulates the self-analysis of the group helping the group go through ‘conversion’, which in turn helps the participants in the group to understand their own actions. However, it is important that the researcher goes through the ‘conversion’ him or herself first. Through this ‘conversion’ the group will (hopefully) start to realise the meaning of its action and also then realise Touraine’s principles of ‘identity’, ‘opposition’ and ‘totality’. It is necessary to reach this place of ‘identity, opposition and totality’ if the group would like to become a movement.

In criticism of Touraine’s approach it seems that the researcher seems required to take on an almost ‘God-like’ and patronising role, where the researcher has to help the actor to figure out the meaning of his own action and beliefs, or in the words of

98 Tarrow, Sidney 1991 op. cit., p. 397
100 Ibid. p. 374 - Taken from Touraine, A 1981 op. cit.,
Melucci, take on a ‘missionary role of the researcher’. This aside, Touraine’s principles of identity, opposition and totality are key concepts for social movements.

**Why NSM theory does not give a full picture either**

If RM theory focused too much on the ‘how’ of mobilisation, NSM theory focuses too much on the question of ‘why’, with too little emphasis on the ‘how’. However, there are even criticisms that apply to NSM theory where RM theory does not hold the answers.

What neither approach has done is “demonstrated much awareness for the fact that social problems are not objectively given”.\(^{101}\) This means that neither approach looks into how certain problems become issues and how others do not. Furthermore, even if there is a social problem, it may not bring a social movement into being. There is no real micro-analysis into the construction of identity, ideology and looking at the individual in mobilisation and participation. As Hastings puts it “[W]hilst theorists stress the construction of a collective identity within social movements, there is a tendency to ignore the way that political action is involved in constructing the identity”.\(^{102}\)

Another important issue that NSM theory does not look into is the issue of power at the meso-level of analysis. There is no examination of the group’s power relations within itself, which is just as important in understanding the group’s dynamics,

\(^{101}\) Klandermans, Bert 1991 op. cit., p. 30
\(^{102}\) Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 213
tactics and general ideas. Finally, although NSM theory offers an explanation of social movements from a ‘cultural’ point of view, it is mainly set in a ‘western’ context in a post-industrial, post-modern setting. In relation to the Palestinian Resistance Movement, the context is somewhat different. Nevertheless, there are important insights to keep in mind, such as the various areas of debate including types of action, social bases of movements, and level of analysis.

**Social Constructionism**

Social construction literature attempts to fill the gaps in both RM and NSM literature. Social construction theory stresses that social movements “actively engage in the production of beliefs and grievances, of ideas and meaning, for themselves and for others”\(^\text{103}\) thereby being an alternative to beliefs that mobilisation is due to structurally given interests, selective incentives, rational actors, and institutional and structural reasons for mobilisation. With social construction literature, we seem to have gone full circle in a sense, returning to ideas and grievances as mobilising forces. In filling the gaps in RM and NSM theory, social construction literature has rediscovered Goffman’s work.

This section will address the core assumptions of social construction theory. The basic assumption of this theory is that in order for people to mobilise and act they must *collectively* see the situation as ripe for action.

\(^{103}\) Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 225
The main area of interest has been in micro-mobilisation processes; how people in social movements interact and communicate in such a way as to produce a congruence between the changing interests, values and beliefs that individuals involved in a social movement have and the activities, goals and ideology that are being defined and redefined for the organisation. These processes are referred to as ‘frame alignment’.

The two major themes of construction theory (Snow and Bedford’s work, as well as Klandermans’ work), emphasise on the one hand the ‘persuasive communication by movement organisations’ in relation to the framing of situations. The other strand focuses on collective identity. Two other issues will also be explored: recruitment and ‘the other’.

**Collective Action and Frame Analysis**

Social Construction theory often uses ‘frame analysis’, which originates from Erving Goffman. It is important to keep in mind that

the social constructionist approach rejects any category that sets forward essential or core features as the unique property of a collective’s members. From this perspective, every collective becomes a social artefact - an entity moulded, refabricated, and mobilised in accord with reigning cultural scripts and centres of power.

Social construction theory’s main concern is to understand and explain how social movements produce “beliefs and grievances, ... ideas and meaning, for themselves

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104 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 226
and for others".\textsuperscript{107} The concept of ‘frame’ can be described and understood as “an interpretative schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment”.\textsuperscript{108} Goffman explains that frames allow people “to locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences”\textsuperscript{109} or events within their immediate surroundings or the world at large. This interpretive schemata helps people to clarify, analyse and articulate their experiences. ‘Collective action frames’ according to Snow and Benford are “emergent action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns”.\textsuperscript{110} They do this by ‘framing’; by simplifying the ‘world out there’. Benford takes these frames even further, explaining that even with the above mentioned job of collective action frames, they have three further main tasks. The first task is diagnostic framing, which is, as the name suggests, finding out the problem(s) in the social situation and (perhaps) the reason for it; meaning finding who is to blame for the problem, and then diagnosing the problem. The second is prognostic framing, which identifies the problem and its diagnosis, and then “includes the specification of strategies, tactics and targets”.\textsuperscript{111} The third task of collective action frames is what Snow and Benford call motivational framing. This “entails a call to arms or rationale for engaging in ameliorative action. The diagnostic and prognostic framing tasks focus on achieving what Klandermans refers to as ‘consensus mobilisation’. The

\textsuperscript{107} Denton, Margaret op. cit., p.227
\textsuperscript{109} Goffman, Erving 1974 op. cit., p. 21
\textsuperscript{110} Benford, Robert “‘You Could be the Hundredth Monkey’ Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement” The Sociological Quarterly (Vol. 34, No 2, 1993) p.199
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid. p. 199
latter task, which addresses 'action mobilisation' supplies the motivational impetus for participation".¹¹²

These concepts show how social movements and their "agents frame or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilise potential adherents and constituencies, to garner bystander support and demobilise antagonists".¹¹³ For example, the Palestinian Resistance frames the event of an Israeli destruction of a refugee camp in Gaza in order to mobilise the people.

Another important aspect of mobilisation and participation is what is called 'Vocabularies of Motive'. As Benford tells us

> In the course of interacting with one another and their significant others, movement actors and recruits socially construct rationales and justifications for their movement participation (or lack thereof). These vocabularies of motive provide participants with 'good reasons' for identifying with the goals and values of the movement and for taking action on its behalf.¹¹⁴

These sorts of vocabularies of motive come into question when others question the participation of the participant, but also when the participant questions him or herself. Together with framing, described above, vocabularies of motive are the prime movers behind micro-mobilisation.

Klandermans also developed tools called consensus mobilisation and action mobilisation. The concept of consensus mobilisation refers to the diagnostic and prognostic frames, whereas action mobilisation refers to the motivational frame.

¹¹² Benford, Robert 1993 op. cit., p. 200
¹¹³ Ibid. p. 200
¹¹⁴ Ibid. p. 200
However, a few years later, Klandermans explained this further by emphasising the difference between consensus mobilisation and consensus *formation*:

the former is defined as a deliberate attempt by a social actor to create consensus among a subset population; the latter concerns the unplanned convergence of meaning in social networks and subcultures. To further refine the concept of consensus mobilisation, he identifies two aspects: consensus mobilisation in the context of the formation of mobilisation potential in a society and consensus mobilisation in the context of action mobilisation.\(^{115}\)

Regarding the first of these, Klandermans seems to be referring to people who are likely to join the group because of their beliefs. Regarding the second, it seems to point towards the actual action of the participants within the group, which legitimates all the prior meanings, and seems to be similar to the motivational frame analysis of Snow and Benford, where the beliefs and ideas, as well as the participants, are in place. The last step is also in place, namely the goals, direction and means to be used.

**Collective Identity**

Regarding work done on collective identity, Alberto Melucci, stands out from the crowd. He is, however, standing on a line between being a NSM theorist and a social construction theorist, and it is not always easy to tell the difference.

Identity is a social construction. It is formed through constant interaction with other(s). The framing of the self, the question of 'who am I', is organised around the

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ideas we have of ourselves and our surroundings. Mead’s\textsuperscript{116} early notion of identity was based on the notion of the ‘self’ (he didn’t use the word identity). There is the self as, for example, mother or teacher. However, one does have multiple identities. There is also the notion of identity as a social identity, as in identifying oneself as a group as shown in self-categorisation theory.\textsuperscript{117} Collective identity is about qualities of ‘sameness’ of people within the collective, rather than the more individual ‘self-identity’ referred to above. Melucci defines collective identity thus:

Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place.\textsuperscript{118}

Collective identity is a construction which is negotiated into place through various descriptions of ‘us’ or ‘we’ giving meaning to the collective identity. Melucci explains that social movements, mobilisation and collective action are related to collective identity. He explains that an “on-going process of construction of a sense of ‘we’ can succeed for various reasons ... for instance, because of effective leadership, workable organisational forms, or strong reserves of expressive action. But it can also fail, in which case collective action disintegrates”.\textsuperscript{119} Thus collective action is not possible without collective identity. Similarly, the construction of a collective identity is a central task of social movements. Therefore Melucci argues that collective identity is an extremely important aspect of successful mobilisation

\textsuperscript{116} Mead, George Herbert Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (University of Chicago Press, London, 1967)
\textsuperscript{118} Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 34
and collective action, as well as emphasising that collective identity is important in its own right. "The creation of an ongoing collective identity that maintains the loyalty and commitment of participants is a cultural achievement in its own right, regardless of its contribution to the achievement of political and organisational goods". Therefore participants within groups and movements are constantly engaged in the process of the construction of meaning and of collective identity. In order to do this "a group must define itself as a group, and its members must develop shared views of the social environment, shared goals, and shared opinions about possibilities and limits of collective action". Collective identity is seen as a process leading to collective action. In other words, only in understanding 'we' can a collective group develop their expectations, their orientations, and decide on their actions. Therefore collective action cannot be comprehended without an understanding of collective identity and the processes it involves. For example, a member of the Palestinian Resistance must understand what his or her collective identity is, and through that, understand what he or she is trying to accomplish. Only through understanding this collective identity can one understand why someone acts the way they do.

**The Other and the Looking Glass Identity**

The constitution of the 'I' is acknowledged to come about only through the discourse of the 'other'.
In relation to identity it is through relationships with other(s) that we manage to define ourselves and our collective: by understanding what we are a part of, and what we are not. In terms of organisations and social movements, ‘the other(s)’ are the ‘targets’ of the organisations, including, for instance, employers, government institutions, political parties and so on. The ‘other’ is also related to diagnostic framing. In the case of the Palestinian Resistance, the target changes according to the tactics and the issue and agenda of the day. For instance, the hijackings by various groups within the Resistance during the 1970s targeted the international community. The Resistance wanted to show the international community that they existed, and were willing to take severe measures to do so. This tells us that ‘the other’ is not always just understood within an organisation and social movement. The message of ‘the other’ is constructed within a community, but the message is not always intended solely for the supporters but also for the opponents: ‘the other’.

Construction of the collective identity is a process that happens through constant interaction. In order to understand the ‘we’ in collective identity, or the ‘me’ of individual identity, one must understand who one is in relation to the ‘other(s)’. The implication of this is the necessity for an understanding of who the ‘other(s)’ are, what they stand for, and through that understanding, one defines who one is not.

There is also a different notion of ‘the other’, this time in relation to the construction of the self. The looking-glass self, as originally formulated by Cooley, is about the perception of the ‘self’ through what we believe ‘others’ are thinking about us.

"Every new person is a fresh glass in which he is impelled to see himself". Our notion of ourselves is thus in part created by how we think others perceive us. To restate the important point: the self is created through relationships. "We have no means of knowing our self except by observing how others respond to it".

Triandafyllidou argues that nationalists form a national identity based on the notion of defining who ‘we’ are and who ‘they’ are. In order to understand the we-they dichotomy, national identity must be seen from within and without. From within, "the national bond may relate to a belief in common descent and/or to a common culture, namely a system of traditions, ideas, symbols, and patterns of behaviour and communication that are shared by the members of the community". National identity is also associated with a piece of territory: a homeland. Each of these elements is involved in national identity, although some may be stronger than others. For example, within some national identities, ethnicity is stronger than territory, and so on.

The other notion of ‘they’ is related to the definition of national identity from without. This is because identities are negotiated by interaction. By understanding and defining the ‘other’, one can define oneself. National identity can be defined in "contrast to other communities". The ‘other’ can also signify more than a distinction from the national identity. The ‘other’ can be perceived as a threat to the national identity in question, either by being a dominant force within society that

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125 This corresponds to identity as explained within human needs theory.
126 Cooley, Charles Horton op. cit., p. 198
128 Ibid. p. 599
ignores the minority national identity, or stretching further, is seen as a threat intending to ‘wipe out’ the national identity in question. Thus the concept of the ‘other’ has wider significance than solely in shaping one’s national identity.

Constructing Recruitment

There is another view within social constructionism that points to issues of solidarity when trying to answer questions about recruitment. Solidarity relates to the organisation’s use of “pre-existing social relationships”. This means that recruitment is often done through friends and family, often because of shared values. “The argument that recruitment to a movement follows lines of pre-existing social relationships and that recruitment networks are a critical part of the mobilisation process has become part of our shared knowledge. Strong, pre-existing friendship ties seem especially important when the risk is high”\(^{130}\). This may be the case in many instances; however, it is important that one keeps in mind the ability of organisations to frame debates, as referred to above in relation to framing. Cultures, communities, friends and family, often have different values. Therefore, one refers back to the way that issues and debates are framed. Laitin argues that “people with strongly opposed views can share a culture and that people with similar views can come from different cultures”\(^{131}\).

\(^{129}\) Triandafyllidou, Anna op. cit., p. 603
\(^{130}\) Gamson, William 1992 op. cit., p. 61
Concluding Remarks on Social Constructionism

We have seen how social construction theory is essentially about the production of beliefs, grievances, and identity. It is about "how people in social movements interact and communicate in such as way as to produce a congruence between the changing interests, values, and beliefs that individuals involved in a social movement have, and the activities, goals and ideology that are being defined and redefined for the organisation". This is what we saw within Goffman’s frames and frame alignment.

Potential problems with this theory arise when one looks at what actually constitutes these frames. Is it a structure? If so, that goes against what social constructionists seem to be standing for. Furthermore, as Hastings points out; “Given that people are quite capable of retaining incongruous and at times conflicting values, beliefs and ideas in their minds, how well integrated does a set of ideas have to be to form a ‘frame’?”

Groves points to another issue in relation to social construction theory. In his analysis of animal rights activists, Groves argues that social constructionists focus too much on ideas and not enough on emotions. Both ideas and emotions “emerge and develop as a result of the interactive processes within social movements”.

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132 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 226
133 Ibid. p. 226
135 Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 227
turn, the beliefs and the meanings created by these processes "become attached to these emotions."\textsuperscript{136}

Another point to think about is whether or not the construction of identity is solely produced in the sphere of symbolic codes, as Melucci would say. One could also argue that collective identity may be shaped by "political struggle and the relationship between political and cultural dimensions of a movement."\textsuperscript{137} There seems to be, especially within Melucci's collective identity concept, too sharp a distinction between "political action and collective identity formation".\textsuperscript{138} This is important to keep in mind, and is similar to the criticisms of NSM theory and RM theory, in that each of them seems to be focusing on one particular aspect at the expense of others. However, because NSM theory and social constructionism stress the cultural, the symbolic and the social construction of identities, this does not necessarily mean that actors do not use rational choice as outlined earlier on. Rather, as Gamson tells us

\begin{quote}
Nothing in this argument denies that social movement actors make strategic judgements based on their expectations about costs and benefits. The point is, rather, that any strategic paradigm necessarily presupposes a theory of identity ... When people bind their fate to the fate of the group, they feel personally threatened when the group is threatened. Solidarity and collective identity operate to blur the distinction between individual and group interest, undermining the premises on which the utilitarian models operate.\textsuperscript{139}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{136} Denton, Margaret op. cit., p. 227
\textsuperscript{137} Bartholomew, Amy and Mayer, Margit "Review Article: Nomads of the Present: Melucci's Contribution to 'New Social Movement' Theory" Theory, Culture and Society Vol. 9, 1992, p. 152
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid. p. 152
\textsuperscript{139} Gamson, William 1992 op. cit., p. 57
Conclusion: How can we examine mobilisation?

The approaches to social movements "compensate each other rather than compete"\(^{140}\)

How are we to examine mobilisation within the refugee camps in Lebanon? The theories outlined above are found lacking and wanting. Most focus on one level of analysis at the expense of other levels. Therefore I suggest that the framework that should be used needs to encompass all of them in some way. Some of the theories outlined above are methodological. This will be reiterated in the next chapter on methodology; however the line between theory and methodology is an extremely thin one. What follows is my suggestion for splitting the framework into three sections: structures, organisation and the individual.

The Structural

Starting with the macro-level of analysis, this encompasses most theories within the NSM approach as well as the Political Model within the RM approach. The Political Model is of interest as it brings to light the issues of resources and societal constraints, particularly relating to 'opportunities'. Opportunity can refer to resources, but also to coercion, for instance the Lebanese government constraining Palestinian political action. This may be a demobilising factor, but at the same time it might have the opposite effect.

The structural level is also seen within NSM theory(ies). From the NSM perspective the 'cultural' refers to changes within society as a whole. NSM theorists noticed a

\(^{140}\) Klandermans, Bert 1997 op. cit., p. 205
change in society’s and people’s values, interests, issues, and so forth. Touraine believes that collective action is inherent in the social structures, maintaining in this case that “people do not act in a social structure, the structure of society is the structure of how a group moves.” Structures are important, and for a fuller understanding of mobilisation into political groups, structures, in whatever form they may take, need to be taken into consideration. Structures also explain how mobilisation is possible. At times structures also explain, by implication, why people would mobilise into groups. Again to use the example above, the Lebanese government’s coercion of Palestinian mobilisation may actually make Palestinians want to mobilise even more. Also linked to issues of structures is the human needs perspective. There will be an examination of what human needs are met within the camps and what effect, if any, the existence or lack of these human needs has on the refugee population.

Looking at structural constraints and human needs can show reasons and explanations for both how and why people mobilise. However, this may not be enough. Individual motivations and participation can also be due to other factors, such as organisational recruitment and resources.

The Organisation

The Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach within the RM approach as well as sections dealing with recruitment within the NSM theories deal with the organisational level of analysis. Issues of recruitment are one focus within this level

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141 Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., (foreword by Richard Sennet, p. X)
of analysis. Within the Organisational-Entrepreneurial Approach, the focus is on the importance of ‘organisation’ within social movements; this stresses that these organisations are what manage to mobilise people into the groups, apply for funds and so forth. What the organisations do to get support is also important in the mobilising process. Similarly, what resources are available to the organisations is an important recruitment factor.

The structural argument within this level of analysis, often referred to as the ‘network’ account, explains recruitment and collective action not on the individual level where the explanations draw from issues of identity and social construction, but rather on organisational issues such as agents, organisation information and so forth. This theory also stresses what we looked at above – how relationships (friends and family and so forth) impact upon recruitment and mobilisation. In other words, network accounts show that recruitment and mobilisation “cannot occur without prior contact with a recruitment agent”\(^{142}\). Structural accounts also look at facilities that organisations have in order to recruit potential members. These include, as we saw earlier, finances, famous members and so forth. This corresponds to issues of solidarity and ‘pre-existing social relationships’. Similarly, how the organisations are able to frame events that correspond to the potential participants’ framing of events is important.

\(^{142}\) Friedman, Debra and McAdam, Doug “Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices and the Life of a Social Movement” in Morris, Aldon and Mueller, Carol Frontiers in Social Movement Theory (Yale University Press, New Haven 1992) p. 158
The People

The micro-level of analysis analyses how actors define themselves and others, but also 'the self through the looking glass'. However, by negotiating one's individual identity, collective identity and the view of the 'other', context is important. The macro- and the meso-levels of analysis give us this context. They give us the societal structures, the culture and the role of the organisations that help people define who they are. Therefore a lot of research at the people level relies upon structural and organisational understanding and knowledge.

In looking at the individual level, in this research there will be a focus on concepts of:

a) The self: including the notion of 'I' but also more specifically the notion 'we'. This is related to the idea of one's social identity being defined in how one identifies oneself as part of a group. This group identity is a construction, as shown by Melucci when he tells us that collective identity "is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place".¹⁴³

b) The other: which is about who the people are that are different from the 'we' as well as, in many cases, who is to blame for a particular problem. This relates to issues referred to above in the discussion on the 'we-they dichotomy' where identity is seen from within and without. 'From within' means that identity is related to a belief in common descent or culture as discussed in, for example, the self. 'From

¹⁴³ Melucci, Alberto 1989 op. cit., p. 34
without’ is about contrasting oneself or one’s identity with that of ‘others’. This relates to Giddens who tells us “[t]he constitution of the ‘I’ is acknowledged to come about only through the discourse of the ‘other’”.\textsuperscript{144} And finally:

c) ‘The self through the looking glass’ which is concerned with how we define ourselves through what we believe others perceive of us, and also how they respond to us. For example, Palestinian refugees being perceived as unwelcome outsiders in Lebanese society can have an impact on their identity and willingness or unwillingness to participate in changing this perception.

All of these concepts, the self, the other, and the self through the looking glass, relate to collective framing of the situation and within these frames it is possible to see notions of perceived social reality and injustice.

\textsuperscript{144} Giddens, Anthony op. cit., p. 38
Chapter Two

The Methodology

Introduction

How is one to examine 'how and why' Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps in Lebanon mobilise? My framework suggests that this is best done by examining different levels of analysis as developed in my previous chapter: “1) the actors and their definition of the situation, 2) the institutional and formal movement organisations within which they act and 3) the overarching societal context”.¹ How can this be done? I argue that it requires a methodology that is interdisciplinary and intersubjective. Interdisciplinary usually happens because of the question being asked. Intersubjective means subjective ideas as understood by individuals. By implication this denies complete objectivity.

Human intersubjectivity manifests itself as an immediate sympathetic awareness of feelings and conscious, purposeful intelligence in others ... On it depends cultural learning and the creation of a 'social reality' of conventional beliefs, languages, rituals and technologies.²

Examining the how and the why of Palestinian refugee mobilisation will depend on an intersubjective understanding on the part of the researcher of refugee discourses, as well as of organisational leaders, and local leaders.

Within the social sciences there are usually two different lenses that the researcher can use.\textsuperscript{3} The two different schools are the positivistic and the hermeneutic.\textsuperscript{4} The first tradition, positivism, is “an epistemological position that advocates the application of methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond”.\textsuperscript{5} In other words it is a position that uses the same methods as the natural sciences. This means that

\begin{quote}
[t]his perspective holds that there are regularities and laws inherent in social processes, as in the natural world, and that these may be isolated, frozen, and studied. Social scientists may then stand back from the process under observation and explain complex phenomena with some precision, detachment and objectivity.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

This approach is like taking a portrait of a particular culture and its social reality and then, from a detached, objective stand, describing what is going on in the portrait and explaining why. Criticism of this approach argues that people are not static and it is impossible to be objective when dealing with people and social situations.

The hermeneutic school of thought argues that whereas positivists seek to find an explanation of human behaviour, it is preferable to find an understanding. Hermeneutics is an interpretive approach where the researcher’s motives lie in understanding how communities and their actors interpret and assign meaning to events and actions. In this case the researcher understands that he/she can not be completely objective and realises that he/she is subjective. It is therefore impossible to be objective when dealing with people. As Clifford has said, people and cultures

\begin{itemize}
\item[6] Rothman, Jay op. cit., p. 71
\end{itemize}
can not and do not “stand still for their portraits”. Cultures and people are constantly changing and a precise representation is not possible. The positivist notion of truth and objective ‘fact’ is also in question through the hermeneutic lens:

Meaning is found within the realm of social intention and experience and not, as had been posed by empirical science, as a natural rule-conforming phenomena. “Facts” therefore are seen to be related to, or derived from, given contexts and interpretation about them. In other words, certain groups in certain times and given places gain a common understanding of specific phenomena and call them “facts”. Different groupings in different settings might come up with different understandings that to them would also be “factual”.

The hermeneutic approach sees people as interpreting themselves and their surroundings rather than by the other way around. As will become apparent, this thesis is based on the hermeneutic approach. This is because people can not be researched in a positivist, objective, natural science, kind of way. Rather, people are naturally subjective, including myself, and people interpret their surroundings and themselves in different ways.

The Method

Case Study

First, this work is what is called ‘case study research’. This term has different connotations and meanings depending on what lens one sees it through. However, “usually, ‘case study’ refers to research that investigates a few cases, often just one,
in considerable depth”. Case studies also usually imply the collection of unstructured data and a qualitative analysis. There are various types of case study. Hammersley and Gomm present these differences as:

1) in the number of cases studied, and the role of comparison, 2) in how detailed the case studies are; 3) in the size of the cases; 4) in the extent to which researchers document the context of the case, in terms of the wider society and / or historically; 5) in the extent to which they restrict themselves to description and explanation, or engage in evaluation and prescription.

Case study for the purposes of this research involved fieldwork, which was conducted in camps in Lebanon including Shatila, Bourj el Barajneh, Mar Elias and Ein el Helweh camps through 2001 to 2003. The cases are described in as much detail as possible in order to help investigate the research questions asked in this thesis. The size of the cases differs. For example, most of the participant observation was done in Shatila camp, and many interviews with political leaders in Mar Elias. Visits to Bourj el Barajneh and Ein el Helweh camps were less frequent, and resulted in visits to particular places and people’s homes, and in some cases informal interviews or solely observation. Context is of great importance to this thesis, and is taken into account fully in terms of history and society. This thesis does not aim to give prescriptions but rather to create an understanding, albeit of an interpretive nature, of the hows and whys of Palestinian Refugee mobilisation.

This thesis uses the qualitative methodology of ethnography. If this were a quantitative work, the method used would be comparative social survey research. This means using surveys and structured interviewing. Using surveys implies that

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10 Ibid. p. 3
11 Ibid p.4
there would be a standardised questionnaire or interview that are identical in wording and sequence and that very often have fixed answers that are then coded and aggregated to form some opinion result. This can lead to misleading findings for several reasons: quantitative analysis produces results that tend to be shown in such a way as to be seen as ‘true’ representations of the issues at hand. The justification for this is that all the interviews and questionnaires have the same wording, sequence, and so forth. However, what is often forgotten is that interviews and questionnaires are only done on a sample of the population and therefore do not show the full picture. The second problem is the standardised questionnaire and interview itself. Respondents may misinterpret the questions. This may have to do with issues of different religions, ideology and so forth, where the interview and questionnaire questions are not sensitive to the range of differences within the respondents’ identity(ies). Third, having fixed answers (assuming this is the case) that respondents can choose from is highly problematic. The answer that the respondent is looking for may not be there and he/she then may either choose the answer that is closest, or the next best answer. Because of problems such as these, and because of this thesis being an interpretive work, it deploys a qualitative research method that is not based on survey research. If we are to believe that people and cultures can not ‘stand still for their portraits’ then we need to find another way to conduct the field work that allows for a fuller understanding of people and their situation. It is important to stress that each case, by its very nature

in being based on people, is unique, and any conclusions reached must not be seen as ‘the way it is’ as a whole, but rather it should be remembered that the information gathered is subjective and was gathered not from all refugees but only from a sample of them.\textsuperscript{13}

**Ethnography – Participant Observation and Interviewing**

This thesis uses ethnography. Ethnography and field work usually refer to the same method, the former term being used by anthropologists and the latter by sociologists. Ethnography requires the researcher to enter the setting of the researched, in order to find out the hows and whys of a particular people. Ethnography involves the researcher going into the community and observing and participating in various activities. For Shaffir, on his first ethnographic experience, this meant that as he was researching Hasidic Jews, he started off by visiting their synagogue. Shaffir does admit that this advice is vague, however:

> There is simply no formula, scientific or otherwise, to follow to achieve the best results. Of course, even the most seasoned field researchers, if given the chance to start over, might approach the setting and individuals differently.... But if we are honest with ourselves, we realise that as the chief instruments of our research, the personal qualities that we bring to our work usually override the professional claims that we present about it\textsuperscript{14}

It is often quite difficult to distinguish between ethnography and participant-observation. Both terms require the researcher to immerse her/himself in the field setting “observing behaviour, listening to what is said in conversations both between

\textsuperscript{13} This is the same problem that would be encountered by quantitative work.

others and with the fieldworker, and asking questions”.15 If a strict difference had to be made between participant observation and ethnography, it would be that the former refers to just that: participating in the field, like Shaffir attending the Synagogue, and observing the actions and conversations between people in the field. The latter, ethnography, refers to the two methods of participant observation and interviewing. For this research in particular, ethnography refers to:

1) Being immersed in the social setting of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
2) Observing the behaviour of the refugees within the camps.
3) Listening to, as well as, engaging in conversations.
4) Interviewing refugees who are willing about issues that have not been visible through participant observation, or about issues that are unclear to the researcher.
5) Reviewing the overall setting, history, and culture of the refugees and their behaviour within this context.16

Furthermore there are different roles the researcher can have. These roles have to do with the degree of attachment the researcher has while in the field. They are: complete participant (where the researcher is completely immersed in the field and his/her identity is not known to the people of the community), participant as observer (where the researcher is as immersed in the field but the members of the community are aware of who he/she is), observer as participant (where the researcher is mainly involved in interviews and there is observation but not too much participation), and complete observer (where the researcher does not interact at all with the members of the community). The role taken in this research was that of participant as observer. This involved interacting and participating in the daily

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15 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 291
16 This list was found and amended in Ibid. p. 291
lives of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon where they were aware of my role as a researcher. The method of participant as observer was used mostly in Shatila camp where I spent most of my time and was a volunteer at a youth centre. This included visiting dozens of families and as well as their friends from Shatila and their visitors from other camps. Participant as observer was used for the most part in the homes of the refugees. These family visits included most often the entire family, in other words all age groups and both sexes. In Shatila camp I also attended weddings, political meetings, followed children to and from their UNRWA school, and during Eid, I visited many families with the youth centre as is the tradition. In the other camps, Bourj Barajneh, Ein el Helweh, and Mar Elias, I also visited several families as well as another youth centre in Bourj Barajneh. Another youth centre I visited was the AJYAL Centre in Beirut (located in the Cola district) run by Salah Salah. The youth in this centre tended to be a bit older (in their twenties) than in the youth centre in Shatila camp, and many were sponsored to work on specific projects relating to Palestinian refugees, through this youth centre. Many of the members of this particular youth centre were not living in refugee camps, but in other clusters (informal camps) where refugees live in Beirut. This method of participant as observer did not always entail interviewing, but rather a combination of observing, listening to, participating in conversations and at times, where the refugees would allow, interviews.

Further explanation is warranted at this point regarding interviewing. The role of participant as observer was also taken when conducting interviews. Interviews with the refugees were on issues regarding mobilisation, issues that were unclear through participant observation alone and on other issues that I was unclear about. This is
called a 'semi-structured interview' or in other cases an 'unstructured interview'.
The semi-structured interview refers to an interview where the researcher already
has some general questions but does not necessarily use them in any particular
sequence. The researcher is also able to come up with further questions during the
interview. An unstructured interview usually involves the interviewer having a few
topics that they ask about in an informal way. The form of the question itself is
developed during the interview. These two interview types, that is semi-structured
and unstructured interviews, are used for different reasons. The semi-structured
interview come about when doing interviews or if the researcher has observed
something that needs further questioning or if there is something the researcher does
not understand. Using the semi-structured interview also allows for what I call
'setting sensitivity', meaning that some people need to be asked the same question
but in different ways. For example the way I would ask questions to a ten year old
girl in a youth organisation may well differ from the way I would ask questions to a
grown man who is a member of one of the local political groups. Regarding the
unstructured interview, this is a method that is important in a field such as a
Palestinian refugee camp as it allows the researcher to ask general questions in an
informal way.

Interviewing was not restricted to the refugees. There was also interviewing of
Lebanese and NGO officials, as well as Palestinian organisational leaders. The sorts
of interviews that were held in these cases varied between semi-structured and
unstructured depending on the circumstances. However, where possible, the
questions were as alike as possible for each of the officials. The reason for not
wanting to use a fully-structured interview for officials is because each official has a
different role to play and has a different agenda and may even be hostile. Similarly, depending on the official's role, his/her interpretation of a specific question may be different from that of another official, thus the need to vary the way questions are asked depending on who one is talking to. The colour red has different shades depending on who sees it, thus the need to be culturally and individually sensitive. Likewise with organisational leaders. However, if these people were met in a sudden or random way, then an unstructured interview is likely to take place.

The Post-modern Debate

Post-modernism questions the research and methods of the researcher as well as their writing. The essence of post-modernism and its effect on methodology is,

A position that displays distaste for master-narratives and for a realist orientation. In the context of research methodology, post-modernists display a preference for qualitative methods and a concern with the modes of representation of research findings.17

This definition implies that post-modernism wants to deconstruct realism. According to post-modernism there does not exist one objective reality, but many different experiences and points of view. All of these different experiences and points of view cannot be easily categorised to one reality. Post-modernism seems to question 'findings' and 'truths' and feel more at ease with offering 'interpretations' of social actors and social reality. Post-modernism can, therefore, be seen as working with the hermeneutic and qualitative methods.

17 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 506
Post-modernism is quite critical of ethnography. It urges the ethnographer to give up his/her realist pretensions, as it were, and see the work as only an interpretation of the situation. The post-modern critique regarding ethnography has to do with 'truth claims', meaning that the ethnographer thinks he/she is representing reality. For post-modernists it is arrogant to assume that one knows the truth. What an ethnographer sees is an interpretation of the social lives of the people being researched. It follows that in the course of writing up what the researcher has seen is only a representation of social reality. It is not necessarily the truth but only one interpretation of the many ‘truths’ that exist in the interpretation of people and their cultures. All in all, post-modernism leaves us with a sense of uncertainty. Questions of how one is ever to explain social reality are not answered. The only form of knowledge we are left with is that all interpretations and “all texts are socially, historically, politically and culturally located. We, like the texts we write, can never be transcendent”.  

How Far Should We Take Being Post-Modern?

It does seem, however, that if one completely follows the post-modern approach, there may seem to be no point in doing anything at all, since everything is just one person’s interpretation and there are no truths. I agree that it is arrogant and elitist to believe that ethnographic or qualitative research can have a truth claim and that what is represented in any ethnographic work is an interpreted representation of many different representations and interpretations of that particular study. However,

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18 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 470
some people would argue that there needs to be a point to any given work. David Karp explains that even if all realist pretensions must be given up it would be foolish to give up the belief that careful observers can systematically gather data that, in turn, can be used to catch important regularities in the way human beings collectively achieve a common sense about their shared worlds.\textsuperscript{19}

Karp’s idea here is a middle way between modernism and post-modernism, and also as he puts it “an appeal to avoid the excesses of both positivism and post-modernism”.\textsuperscript{20} Keeping in mind the problems presented by the post-modern critique, every effort needs to be made to keep interviews as value-free and unbiased as possible, as well as, retaining constant consciousness of why the researcher is in the field in order to prevent what is often called ‘going native’ (see below). What I will be presenting in this thesis will be reported approximations of people’s lives in their social world. My ethnographic field research and interviews should not necessarily be interpreted as ‘the truth’ and how it is. They are my subjective observations on refugee mobilisation. Having said this, I hope that this thesis will prove to be valuable in that it may evoke important issues about the Palestinian refugee issue, as well as contribute to understanding the hows and whys of mobilisation in the camps.

\textsuperscript{19} Karp, David “Social Science, Progress, and the Ethnographer’s Craft” \textit{Journal of Contemporary Ethnography} (Vol. 28, No 6, December 1999) p. 599. For more on this issue and a defence of realism see Fine, Gary Alan “Field Labour and Ethnographic Reality” \textit{Journal of Contemporary Ethnography} (Vol. 28, No. 5, October 1999)

\textsuperscript{20} Karp, David A op. cit., p. 599
Potential Problems of Methodology in the Camps

Suspicion

The first issue that may present the researcher with potential problems is 'suspicion'. By this is meant suspicion on behalf of the refugees under study, as they may wonder where the researcher's motives lie. Alice Bloch explains the problems of an academic study doing research on refugees:

"... because the research was policy oriented and there was funding available to implement policy recommendations, some of the gate keepers commented on the significance of the research for members of their own communities as well as refugees more widely, and therefore encouraged participation in the study. It might have been more problematic to negotiate access for a purely academic piece of work."\(^{21}\)

A problem that the researcher may have lies in the fact that the researcher is in the field solely for academic study, and there are no promises of funding for the refugees and so on. This may present a problem. Problems may also arise in interviewing leaders of Palestinian Organisations and Lebanese officials, who may feel that the issues being discussed are of a somewhat delicate nature.

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Seduction

...seduction is a dimension of fieldwork that is especially prominent in research on violent political conflict because the interlocutors have great personal and political stakes in making the ethnographer adopt their interpretations. 22

It will no doubt be of utmost importance to be aware of the concept of 'seduction'. Robben explains the term thus to avoid confusion over its meaning:

I have chosen the word seduction to describe those personal defences and social strategies because it means literally "to be led astray from an intended course". Seduction is used here excessively in its neutral meaning of being led astray unawares, not in its popular meaning of allurement and entrapment. I prefer seduction to other terms, such as concealment, manipulation, or deception, that carry negative overtones and suggest dishonesty or malintent. Seduction can be intentional but also unconscious and can be compared to the ways in which filmmakers, stage directors, artists, or writers succeed in totally absorbing the attention of their audiences.23

This aspect of seduction is a problem as the researcher may not notice that he/she is being seduced. Robben mentions the ethnographic issues of 'empathy' and 'dehumanisation'. Empathy combined with detachment is what the ethnographer is supposed to achieve. In other words the ethnographer must establish good relationships with the people under study and yet at the same time remain detached. It may sometimes be the case that in ethnographic observation, where the human senses are used at their highest level (sight, hearing), seduction takes place in order to make the ethnographer think he/she is seeing something that is through the eyes of the observed, whereas what the ethnographer is really seeing is something that the observed (interlocutor) diverts the ethnographer’s eyes to. In other words:

23 Ibid. p. 83
We believe to be seeing the world through our interlocutor’s eyes. Yet these eyes are looking away from that which we think we are seeing.  

With particular reference to the Palestinians, Jean Genet’s book ‘Prisoner of Love’ is illuminating. The book is about the last part of Genet’s life which he spent in the ‘field’ with the Black Panthers in America and the Palestinians in Jordan and Lebanon. He formed a great attachment to both groups of people, although he tells us he understood himself to be an outsider in these milieus. His book is inherently personal and very emotional. Although Genet’s work is not strictly ethnographic, the question of emotions is valid for anyone working with Palestinians. Swedenburg, an anthropologist working with Palestinians, tells us how he managed to work in a “geographic/academic area that seems so emotionally and politically overcharged and so excessively violent”. For Swedenburg it comes down to his personal history of having visited the Occupied Territories from a young age, as well as being enrolled at the American University of Beirut (AUB). His personal history helped him in his fieldwork.

The point is simply that my Beirut friendships and experiences were crucial to my subsequent fieldwork project in the West Bank - because they ensured support networks and thus enabled my understanding of, and capacity to manage, life under military occupation.

This sort of understanding of the anthropologist is important not only because of the implication of being too emotionally involved, but understanding this sort of history is of importance when reading and understanding his work. He admits that looking into personal history and a researcher’s previous links to the subject may be seen as

24 Robben, Antonius C G M op. cit., p. 85
25 Genet, Jean Prisoner of Love (Wesleyan University Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1992)
27 Ibid. p. 29
not 'academic'; however, in cases where the so called 'field' is not virgin territory so to speak, explaining personal history can be seen as important.

Another issue, somewhat connected with seduction and especially with regard to Palestinian refugees, is where a "heroic aura might become attached"\(^{28}\) to the researcher (commonly termed 'going native'). The term means that the researcher may become so involved in his/her research and in the research subjects' lives, that he/she in a sense loses their role as impartial researcher. This is a risk as the researcher has prolonged stays in the field where he/she immerses him/herself in the setting and tries to see the world through the eyes of the people under research. In trying to avoid 'going native', researchers need to keep on reminding themselves why they are in the field.

**Conclusion: Researcher Reflexivity**

Keeping in line with the post-modern approach, I will aspire to researcher reflexivity. Researcher reflexivity refers to the researcher being reflective about the research he/she is conducting, by reflecting upon personal values, decisions made in the field and the methods used. Reflexivity refers to:

\[
\text{a greater awareness and acknowledgement of the role of the researcher as part and parcel of the construction of knowledge ... The researcher is viewed as implicated in the construction of knowledge through the stance he or she assumes in relation to the observed and through the ways in which an account is}
\]

\(^{28}\) Swedenbrug, Ted op. cit., p. 29
transmitted in the form of as text. The understanding entails an acknowledgement of the implications and significance of the researcher's choices as both observer and writer.29 This implies that the researcher must keep the readers aware of personal values and biases, and decisions made in the field and methods used30 31.

In terms of personal values and biases I have tried my best to be as reflective about this as I can while conducting the research and writing up. It is difficult not to become emotionally involved when working in refugee camps. Furthermore, as a volunteer in a youth organisation in Shatila camp, I became attached to many of the children and their families and continue to have contact with them and visit them. For these reasons I am involved emotionally and socially with people in the refugee camps. However, I have kept this in mind and have tried my best not to be too emotional in my work. My attachment to the refugee camps does not involve political work or any attachment to a particular political group.

Although I believe the ethnographic and interviewing methods used to be preferable in examining mobilisation in the camps, there are various shortcomings: First, I am alone in conducting fieldwork of an interpretive nature. This has the obvious

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29 Bryman, Alan op. cit., p. 470
30 Taking the argument even further to include an ethnographic work on the 'self' (as researcher) and the 'other' (the researched) together see Tedlock, Barbara “From Participant Observation to the Observation of Participation: The Emergence of Narrative Ethnography” Journal of Anthropological Research (Vol. 47, No. 1, Spring 1991) This is extremely interesting, however, this thesis shall be more conventional and focus on being reflexive while doing the research.
shortcomings of potential misunderstanding, as I said earlier; the colour red has different shades depending on who sees it.

Another issue is related to suspicion. Suspicion was not a big problem that I had to deal with. I was open about what I was researching and that did not create any problems. I was able to interview many of the political leaders. The ethnographic research in the camps in general was not problematic. One main reason for the relative ease with which interviews and ethnographic research were achieved, I believe, was because I was a volunteer, and people knew who I was or knew of me. There was one issue involved in volunteering at the youth centre. The youth centre is secular and it was therefore thought best that I speak only to secular groups and avoid religious groups. Due to ‘setting sensitivity,’ I agreed to this. Nevertheless, I was able to overcome the lack of interviews with the leaders of the religious groups during my field research because of my method of participant-observation. Although I was able to observe the religious groups, this thesis still focuses on the secular groups, as those are the ones with whom I was able to interview, although I do refer to the religious groups where they are particularly relevant.

When interviewing Lebanese officials I did sense some suspicion, although to a lesser degree than anticipated. In relation to interviewing, in particular the organisational leaders and Lebanese officials, there could be the potential for over or understatement of various issues. I was fully aware of this, and this is one of the reasons why examining mobilisation through the three different levels of analysis is so important.
Another issue that women within the field may face, particularly in the Middle East, is being treated as the third sex. I did not perceive this to be the case during my research. During most of the interviews with political leaders I was accompanied by Salah, a young man from the youth centre, and although I was the only woman in these interviews, I never felt I was a third sex. I believe that this was the case for several reasons: 1) As mentioned earlier many of the political leaders already knew who I was (a volunteer at the youth centre) and 2) I was integrated in the society in the camp and I respected the refugees. I followed their rules and customs and this brought about a certain amount of respect as a foreigner and as a woman.
Who is a Palestinian refugee? This question is of particular importance because it explains much of the context surrounding the refugees, which in turn has a bearing upon their identity as well as mobilisation. The legal context of the Palestinian refugees’ lives is important in understanding identity and mobilisation as it relates to both their actual legal constraints and (lack of) adequate protection as well as relating to how the refugees frame and understand their surroundings and identity.

In looking at the question of who is a Palestinian, the question can also be split into two: first, what constitutes being Palestinian, and second, what constitutes being a Palestinian refugee. In answering the first question, ‘Palestinian’ will be interpreted as belonging to the non-Jewish Arab population who resided in Palestine under the Mandate including people who escaped later from what became the State of Israel, and later, from the West Bank and Gaza, and their descendants. A Palestinian refugee implies any Palestinian, as described above, who fled from the area of what was formerly the Mandate of Palestine.

However, the legal definition of who constitutes a Palestinian refugee is more complicated. Generally speaking in international legal parlance, 1948 refugees are
considered refugees,\(^1\) whereas 1967 refugees (most of whom fled from the West Bank and Gaza), some of whom had to flee for a second time, are considered displaced persons.\(^2\)

Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon are exposed to multiple layers of laws concerning their status, laws which at times conflict, both in terms of the national laws of their host country, regional arrangements by the Arab League, as well as international laws. Starting with the latter it is imperative to explore where a Palestinian refugee stands in terms of his or her international legal status, rights, the refugees’ expectations from international laws, and what is expected of the refugees themselves. As these various laws (international, regional and local) are defined and analysed, the Palestinian refugees’ legal status, rights, and expectations to and from these laws, will come to light. An understanding of these issues will show how Palestinian refugee status is precarious as they lack sufficient protection for their civil and human rights. These laws conflict with each other, and, at times some of these international laws are not implemented by the host states, making the lives and livelihoods of the Palestinian refugees difficult and uncertain. This issue is of importance and relevance because an uncertain present and future for Palestinian refugees has an effect on how the refugees define their surroundings and their identity. Furthermore, an understanding of what it means to be a refugee is important, as it is one of the many identities the Palestinian refugees living in refugee camps have.

\(^1\) According to the UN agency which is in charge of the Palestinian Refugees in the Arab World the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA, the only Palestinians who are considered refugees are the ones who registered as refugees with them following the first Arab-Israeli war. Complications thus arise when one estimates the number of refugees and so forth.

\(^2\) This is because of registration with UNRWA originally set up for the 1948 refugees.
The lack of statehood for the Palestinians has created a group of people who, especially in Lebanon compared with other diaspora Palestinians in the Arab world, remain stateless. In general, local integration, which was encouraged in the early years of the diaspora, has not proved viable, not only for the host states (all except for Jordan which up until 1988 gave citizenship to Palestinians) but also for the refugees themselves. An answer to statelessness could be to allow Palestinian self-determination. There has been mutual recognition between the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and subsequent interim agreements leading to the introduction of limited self-rule in the Gaza Strip and certain areas of the West Bank. These agreements only transfer limited self-rule, power and responsibilities to the ‘Palestinian Authority’ (PA) which as such, can not be seen as a legitimate state. Thus, at the time of writing, it seems the situation is such that there is no sovereign Palestinian State. Nevertheless, for the time being, parts of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank are under PA limited ‘self-rule’.

4 Declaration of Principles, Cairo, Oslo II, Wye, the Roadmap and so forth have not in my view led to statehood.
5 Although there are still question marks as to whether or not the PLO is considered the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
6 The Palestinian Authority, although it has responsibilities, does not have the power of a sovereign state. The Israeli Defence Forces, IDF, have entered areas under Palestinian Authority Control when they consider it necessary.
International Law

There are several aspects within international law which are relevant to the topic of refugees, and in particular for Palestinian Refugees. The legal aspects of refugee status in general, and Palestinian refugee status in particular, have a bearing on all aspects of Palestinian refugee life; socially, economically and politically. There are several other issues under international law which are also of importance and have particular relevance to Palestinian refugees, including the issues of ‘the right to return’, ‘compensation’, ‘nationality and statelessness’. These issues are important as they are the building blocks behind ‘refugee’ status, for any possible solution to the Palestine issue, as well as being contributory factors in identity.

Who is a Refugee?

Within international law there is a specific definition of the concept of a refugee, and hence international recognition as well as international protection of who is, and who is not, considered a refugee is based on this definition and various international agreements.

Convention describe refugees in the same way. They both see a refugee as a person who:

A. For purposes of the present convention, the term "refugee" shall apply to any person who:
   (1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organisation. Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organisation during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee being accorded to persons who fulfil the conditions of paragraph 2 of this section;
   (2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

The UNHCR and the Statute relate to the same people, in other words refugee status occurring before 1 January 1951. It was not until the adoption of the 1967 Refugee Protocol that refugee status occurring after this date was formally included. In other words, within the 1967 Refugee Protocol the time line was removed. This was necessary as new refugee situations had arisen that were not covered by the Refugee Convention.

For purposes of the present Protocol, the term 'refugee' shall, except regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person within the definition of article 1 of the Convention as if the words "As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and ....." and the words "... as a result of such events", in Article 1 A (2) were omitted.

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8 See Chapter II, 6 (i) and (ii) of the Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees adopted by General Assembly resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950 for a similar (using almost the same words) definition.
9 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; entry into force 4 October 1967, Article 1 (2).
Nevertheless, an important feature of the above definition to keep in mind is that the description describes refugees in an individual way, as opposed to groups of people. Goodwin-Gill asks the following question regarding this issue:

Wherever large numbers of people are affected by repressive laws or practices of general or widespread application, the question arises whether each member of the group can, by reason of such membership alone, be considered to have a well-founded fear of persecution; or does persecution necessarily imply a further act of specific discrimination, a singling out of the individual?\(^\text{10}\)

It would seem wrong to do so. However, the law does seem to be rather specific. Refugee status is determined on an individual basis. Although the UNHCR and the 1967 Refugee Protocol have their definition of the term ‘refugee’, this is not, and should not be, considered a strict definition. The term can be modified and the High Commissioner can, by adopted resolutions in the General Assembly, lend his/her ‘good offices’ to refugees who fall outside the strict and technical definition as given by the UNHCR/1967 Refugee Protocol. Apart from the UN good offices, there has been another attempt to widen the definition of refugees. This was carried out by the Organisation for African Unity\(^\text{11}\) (OAU) in 1969 in the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of the Refugee Problems in Africa.\(^\text{12}\) This convention in its first part “outlines the term in a way similar to the 1951 Refugee Convention/1967 Refugee Protocol”.\(^\text{13}\) However, the second part of this definition refers the concept of refugee as the following:

\(^{11}\) Now called African Union (AU)
\(^{12}\) Available on Amnesty International Norway website [www.amnesty.no](http://www.amnesty.no)
\(^{13}\) Melander, Goran “The Concept of the Term ‘Refugee’” in Bramwell, Anna *Refugees in the Age of Total War* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1988) p. 11
[the] term ‘Refugee’ shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality.\textsuperscript{14}

This definition attempts to fill some holes within the previous definitions. It is “an attempt to describe in legal terms the refugees and/or displaced persons, assisted through the good offices of the UNHCR”.\textsuperscript{15}

Although this is a regional agreement and is not binding on the international community. Returning to the international agreements on refugees, Akram tells us that some very important changes to the definition of refugees were made to the Refugee Convention compared to earlier agreements. Akram explains these changes as:

a shift in emphasis from returning refugees to their places of origin to a principle of non-refoulement (non-return) against the refugees’ wishes, as well as a new emphasis on resettlement in third states. …. [I]nstead of addressing refugee problems in an ad hoc fashion involving only the states directly affected, the new approach viewed these problems as being the responsibility of the entire world community.\textsuperscript{16}

The principle of non-refoulement is about the ‘prohibition of expulsion or return’. It can be interpreted as being the “foundation stone of international protection”,\textsuperscript{17} because through this principle, refugees are not forced to return to their country if they would face persecution or torture. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention explains non-refoulement thus:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa entry into force June 20th, 1974 (article 2)
\item Melander, Goran op. cit., p. 11
\item Akram, Susan “Palestinian Refugees and their Legal Status: Rights, Politics and Implications for a Just Solution” \textit{Journal of Palestine Studies} (XXXI, No. 3, Spring 2002) p. 36
\item Goodwin-Gill, Guy op. cit., p. 30
\end{enumerate}
No contracting state shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.\textsuperscript{18}

The Refugee Convention, because of its principle of non-refoullement gives refugees certain rights when they enter another state. Because the refugees are not required to return to their country if they are under threat of persecution, states, because of the convention, need to grant the refugee a number of rights. These rights include the "freedom of religion (Article. 4); rights in movable and immovable property (Article. 13); access to courts (Article. 16); freedom from undue restriction on employment (Article 17); primary education (Article 22); and identity papers (Article. 27)".\textsuperscript{19,20} These issues and rights of the refugees are secured in order to make sure that the refugees are guaranteed their human rights, while remaining refugees in a state other than their own.

The issue of human rights is also linked to that of protection, in this case international protection.\textsuperscript{21} The international protection aspect is heavily incorporated within the UNHCR Statute of 1950. The UNHCR emphasis on international protection of refugees has two main aspects. One is protecting refugees on a human rights basis. This means that day-to-day issues, such as schooling, employment, and so forth for refugees having entered other states, as mentioned above in the Refugee Convention, are addressed and refugees protected. The other main aspect is trying to find solutions for the refugees, depending on what is possible. In other words,

\textsuperscript{18} Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951; Article 33
\textsuperscript{19} Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37
\textsuperscript{20} Lebanon does not provide these rights to the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon. However, Lebanon is not a signatory.
\textsuperscript{21} We shall see later within the Historical chapter just how important international protection for refugees is.
whether the refugees should settle in their host country, go back to their own

country, or resettle somewhere else.\textsuperscript{22}

The UNHCR statute does, however, specify more regarding the protection of
refugees. These aspects include “promoting international agreements for refugee

protection, supervision and monitoring compliance with those agreements, assisting
governments and nongovernmental organisations in the voluntary repatriation of
refugees or in their resettlement in host or third states, and assisting refugees in

protecting their properties, such as restitution or transfer of assets left in their states

of origin”.\textsuperscript{23} These aspects highlight the UNHCR Statutes’ basic principles of

protecting refugees’ day-to-day lives as well as finding solutions regarding their

future settlement.

**Who is a Palestinian Refugee?**

The United Nations Relief and Works agency (UNRWA) was established by

General Assembly Resolution 302 (IV) in December 1949, beginning its operations

in May 1950, to provide relief for the Palestine refugees. The international regime
described above regarding refugees as set up under the Refugee Convention 1951,

and the UNHCR mandate, is not wholly applicable to Palestinian refugees. The

Statute has a special provision where it does not include refugees

\textsuperscript{22} Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37-38

\textsuperscript{23} Akram, Susan op. cit., p. 37
who continue[s] to receive from other organs or agencies of the United Nations protection or assistance.\textsuperscript{24}

Since 1950, UNRWA's mandate has been continually extended as a temporary organisation and a subsidiary organ of the UN. This has been because of the absence of a workable solution to the Palestine problem, especially regarding the Palestinian refugees. Thus UNRWA's role is to "carry out direct relief and works and to plan for the time when relief is no longer needed".\textsuperscript{25} UNRWA is not only involved in direct relief of refugees but also 'works'. Works refers to a series of work programmes that aim to 'integrate' the refugees into the working and economic life of the host countries and the Middle East. It is/was, hoped that the 'works' programme would sufficiently integrate the refugees to remove them from needing relief. As we shall see later, the 'integration' into Lebanon has proved difficult.

UNRWA works in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Today UNRWA is the main agency dealing with Palestinian refugees. Before the creation of UNRWA there was another agency that was set up to deal specifically with Palestinian refugees, called the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine (UNCCP). This agency was set up under United Nations General Assembly resolution 194 (iii), the same resolution that called for the Palestinians to be able to return to their homes and be compensated for any losses. Its role was to try and achieve a peaceful settlement. Its instructions were to

\begin{quote}
Facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{24} Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; adopted by General Assembly Resolution 428 (V) of 14 December 1950; Chapter II, 7 (c)

\textsuperscript{25} Besson, Yves "UNRWA and its role in Lebanon" \textit{Journal of Refugee Studies} (Vol. 10, No. 3, 1997) p. 336
the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations.\textsuperscript{26}

The UNCCP tried to negotiate several proposals on the above issues, however it was not possible to "reconcile the positions of the parties"\textsuperscript{27} involved. The UNCCP understood that this problem could not be solved quickly. Other agencies became involved, such as the Economic Survey Mission (ESM), which concluded that the refugee problem could not be solved immediately and that they were in need of general aid and "a programme of public works, to increase the productivity in the area".\textsuperscript{28} Thus came about the resolution 302 (iv) of 8 December 1949, to create UNRWA.

We know from the above quotation from the Statute that UNHCR does not have the mandate to deal with refugees that receive aid from other agencies.\textsuperscript{29} The agencies and their regimes are "grounded in special principles enunciated in a series of UN resolutions concerning refugees".\textsuperscript{30} The agencies and their regimes are grounded in the principles of the resolutions that founded them. For example, Resolution 302 (iv) along with setting up UNRWA, is also guided by resolution 194 (iii) that calls for the right of return of Palestinian refugees.

\textsuperscript{26} United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) Paragraph 11, part 2, 11th December 1948.

\textsuperscript{27} Takkenberg, Lex The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998) p. 25

\textsuperscript{28} Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 26

\textsuperscript{29} Akram believes that this is a misinterpretation, that in fact part 1D of the Convention explicitly says that it is a fall-back in case the other agencies (i.e. UNRWA) can not protect them and bring about what is called for in resolution 192. Akram, Susan op. cit.,

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid. p. 38
Although this is the case, another look at the requirements for the determination of refugee status under the UNHCR is helpful in gaining an understanding of how the determination of refugee status comes about.

Recalling the previous section, there are four conditions within the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: first that

she must be outside her country of nationality or her country of former habitual residence; second, she must be unwilling or unable to avail herself of the protection of that country; third, her unwillingness or inability must be attributed to a 'well-founded fear of persecution' and; four, the persecution must be individualised and based on reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.31

The problem with this definition in relation to the Palestinian refugees is that they are unable to fulfil all of the conditions. With regard to the Palestinians who fled to Lebanon in 1948 two problems in particular arise: first, these Palestinians are not able to show that when they fled they had a 'well-founded fear of persecution' for reasons of being Palestinian.32 The second point is linked to the first one: even if the Palestinians who fled to Lebanon could prove that they left Palestine because of fear of their lives being threatened by the Israeli military, it is difficult for them to show that they feared 'individualised persecution'.33 However, it is difficult to draw a line of distinction between individual and groups of refugees. The reason for this is that often within groups of refugees there are individuals who 'left their country of origin', owing to a 'well-founded fear of persecution'. This issue of 'fear' still

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32 Fear is difficult to prove because they left in a war zone, and the discussion of whether they were forced to leave, left under encouragement, or left voluntarily is ambiguous.
33 At this point we need to remember from the previous section that the UNHCR recognises refugees individually and not collectively.
remains a problem, particularly regarding the argument that many Palestinians remained in the newly founded State of Israel and actually became Israeli citizens.

The above mentioned dilemma(s) of ‘fear’ as well as the individual definition of refugees to the determination of the status of refugees has been clarified to a certain extent by other means within international law.\textsuperscript{34} UNRWA has its own definition for Palestinian refugees. Palestinian refugees include:

any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 and 15 May 1948, and who has lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.\textsuperscript{35}

This UNRWA definition helps the Palestinian refugees in that they do not have to fulfil the requirements of the convention. This definition also includes descendants as well as non-refugee wives of registered refugees. Nevertheless, this definition is not without problems either as this UNRWA definition of Palestinian refugees does not include all refugees. There are two categories of refugees: 1) Palestinian Arabs who left what was to become Israel; and 2) the refugees that are eligible for UNRWA services. The refugees that are eligible for UNRWA services are the ones who registered when they arrived in the host countries, that is, for the most part ‘camp’ dwellers, but may also include later arrivals from 1967 (if they were already registered). This means that UNRWA took the ones in need, and thus have never had jurisdiction over the total number of refugees.\textsuperscript{36} This is unsettling for a number

\textsuperscript{34} These solutions are not without their own problems. For example the above mentioned OAU convention of 1969, may be informally recognised but it is still not part of the international regime on refugees. Melander, Goran op. cit., p.13
\textsuperscript{35} Neither resolutions 194(iii) nor 302(iv) defined the term refugee. This definition became the working definition of UNRWA in 1952 Takenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 72
\textsuperscript{36} In Lebanon many Christian Palestinians were given Lebanese citizenship during the 1950s and 1960s. This has to do with the confessional of the Lebanese political system and its changing demographics according to different sects. See Sayigh, Rosemary \textit{Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon} (Zed Books, London, 1984) p. 23 and 33. And Maktabi, Rania
of reasons. First, not all refugees are entitled to help from UNRWA unless they or their families registered in 1948 and, second, this makes it difficult to know the exact number of refugees. Thirdly, the legal status of those who are not registered remain stateless and, in Lebanon, they are regarded as illegal immigrants.

**Nationality and Statelessness**

Another issue regarding the international legal status of Palestinian refugees relates to citizenship (known in legal contexts as ‘nationality’) and the opposite, statelessness.

According to the Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons of 28th September 1954 article 1, a stateless person is

>a person who is not considered a national by any state under the operation of its law.\(^{37}\)

One would expect that this Convention would apply to Palestinian refugees; however, within the next article it says:

> This Convention shall not apply: (i) To persons who are at present receiving from organs or agencies of the United Nations other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees protection or assistance so long as they are receiving such protection or assistance.\(^{38}\)

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\(^{38}\) Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, 1954, Article 1, Paragraph 2 (i)
Hence, because Palestinian refugees are receiving help and aid from UNRWA, they are not allowed to come under the protection of the Convention on Statelessness. Palestinian refugees particularly in Lebanon could be considered stateless, as they do not have Lebanese passports nor do they have the right to work and other civil rights. This Convention, therefore, could have limited their suffering greatly had it been applicable to them, as it stipulates certain rights for stateless persons. These rights are included within various articles of the convention and include rights such as non-discrimination (Article 3), exemption from reciprocity (Article 7), residence and acquiring property (Article 13), employment (Article 17 and 18), welfare (Chapter IV, Articles 20, 21, 22, 23, 24), freedom of movement (Article 26), identity papers (Article 27), travel documents (Article 28), and naturalisation (Article 32). All of these rights are applicable as far as they are already applicable to the citizens (or in other cases such as employment to that of other legal aliens) of that particular state. For example, the right to movable and immovable property (Article 13) states that:

The Contracting States shall accord to a stateless person treatment as favourable as possible and, in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens generally in the same circumstances, as regards the acquisition of movable and immovable property and other rights pertaining thereto, and to leases and other contracts relating to movable and immovable property.³⁹

This article makes sure that the stateless person residing in the host country is not discriminated against and makes sure that he/she is treated the same as other legal aliens. The Convention also stipulates in other areas that the stateless person is treated the same as other citizens and not punished for being a non-citizen. For example Article 29 dealing with fiscal charges says that

The Contracting States shall not impose upon stateless person's duties, charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are or may be levied on their nationals.40

What these two examples show is that the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons protects stateless persons residing in host states – providing the host states are contracting states.

However, a major problem with international law with regard to nationality and statelessness is that it is unable to intervene as nationality comes under the jurisdiction of domestic law. Another problem arises as there is no Palestinian state, and arguably has never been one as Palestinians were previously citizens of the Palestine Mandate, and therefore Palestinian nationality becomes non-existent. Palestinian refugees, who have not acquired the nationality of another state, remain stateless, without the support of this convention.

Another legal document which relates to this issue of statelessness is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, more specifically Article 15. Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right to a Nationality”. Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is considered, or at least parts of it, as evidence of customary International Law, this sentence is rather ambiguous and difficult to implement as it is not binding. Furthermore, because of the ambiguity in the sentence ‘Everyone has the right to a nationality’ there are two obvious questions that arise: what is the meaning of nationality? Who is in charge of, or responsible for granting nationality? Regarding the latter, it is not

the international community, so the only answer to this is that it is the country concerned, in this case, Lebanon (discussed below). Article 15 does try to diminish statelessness by stating that 'No-one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality'. However, this has only a minimal, if any, effect in that it can work as a disincentive to create statelessness. There is nothing in this that forces states not to make persons stateless. Regarding the former question on what the actual meaning of nationality is within article 15, there are no set answers. It is ambiguous because of its relationship to the term citizenship. However,

when it [the term nationality] appears in a human rights text, it is clearly intended to refer to rights rather than whose subject the person is, and it goes beyond the question of diplomatic protection in international relations. Although admittedly there was some ambiguity in the positions of those who drafted the text, the only reasonable meaning of the word *nationality* in this human rights provision is the right to citizenship.  

The parallels that can be drawn between the concepts of refugees and stateless persons is that sometimes people can be both refugees and stateless. The problem is that

refugees and stateless persons are similarly situated, for they both suffer from a lack of national protection. While initially no distinction was made between refugees and stateless persons, later the stateless were included in the group receiving international protection only if they could fit into the narrower definition of refugee; statelessness alone was not decisive.

The concept of statelessness with regard to all stateless people, including the Palestinian refugees in question, makes any international protection of these groups

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of people very difficult as nationality is what links people to international law. Nationality is thus imperative if people want protection under international law.

**Right of Return**

The issue of the Palestinian ‘Right of Return’ is one of the most important issues to Palestinian refugees.

The right of return cannot easily be discarded by Palestinians. Since 1948, it has (concept of right of return) acquired emotional connotation of such significance that the term became the basis of Palestinian nationalism in much the same way that the return to Eretz Israel became the foundation of Zionism. The concept of return permeates modern Palestinian literature; it is at the core of history taught to children in refugee camps throughout the region, and is usually the first thought expressed by average Palestinians when discussing Middle East problems. To many, the right of return is an important symbol; recognition would remove the stigma of second class citizenship imposed on Palestinians, a stigma that exists even in Jordan, where by law the refugees have equal rights. 43

Under international law the issue of return tends to be somewhat ambiguous, even more so when one relates this issue to the case of Palestinian refugees. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, established on December 10th 1948), which is a relevant, although again non-binding, international legal document, in this case states that ‘Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and return to his country’. 44 Knowledge of the history of the Mandate of Palestine and the partition plan tells us that the Palestinians who fled

44 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13, Paragraph 2.
from this land did not strictly leave from their ‘own country’, because their ‘own’
country did not exist. This is obviously most unsettling to most Palestinian refugees;
however, under international law, this issue is resolved to a certain extent under
other General Assembly Resolutions. Further questions arise, such as can
descendants of these Palestinians who fled, have a right to return? These
descendants have never lived in Palestine and thus never left their ‘own country’.
With regard to descendants, modifications were made to the language of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights of December 16th, 1966,45 (ICCPR) saying “No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”.46 There are two main
issues with the ICCPR: first, it is considered a binding international law, although it
was only ratified by Israel in 1992. Second, although this may make matters easier
for descendants of refugees,47 this Covenant does not change the ‘right of return’ for
Palestinian refugees, as ‘own country’ implies that they had or have (as has already
been mentioned, it is arguable whether what they have now can be considered a
country) one. Thus, international law does not seem to give the Palestinians a ‘right
of return’, as they technically did not have a ‘country’ to start with when they left.
On the other hand it is clear that international law, with regard to human rights, is to
be understood in humanistic terms, rather than strictly technical. Artz argues in this
context that with regard to the Palestinian refugees, the phrase “‘one’s own country’
should be interpreted liberally, to include a homeland with which one has ancestral,
religious and cultural, if not geographical and political ties”.48 Unfortunately

45 Arzt, Donna op. cit., p. 64 (the ICCPR had entry date into force March 23, 1976)
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political rights, General Assembly Resolution 2200 (xxi),
47 Because the word ‘return’ has been changed with ‘enter’ thus not implying that the refugee would
have had to have lived there before.
48 Arzt, Donna op. cit., p. 64

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international law with regard to this issue is commonly understood to mean that a refugee can enter or return to his/her pre-existing country.

There is, however, another international legal document, which is the one that is most relevant to Palestinian refugees. Although this legal document is considered 'soft' international law, it is one that has a lot of relevance to the 'right of return'.

This document is General Assembly Resolution 194, and in particular part (iii) paragraph 11, of this resolution which

Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under the principles of International Law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

By reading this we can see at once the problems this sort of language has in sustaining a firm understanding of what paragraph 11 of General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) actually means. First, regarding the actual issue at stake here, the 'right to return', it is omitted from this resolution. The word 'should' is used instead, which is a non-compliable word when taken in relation to other words that could have been used, such as 'right to' or 'shall'. Secondly the term 'refugee' is by itself, meaning that it could include both Jewish and Palestinian refugees, and the 'governments and authorities' written in plural could also refer to both Israeli and other Arab governments. Finally there is a condition attached to the return of refugees that they 'live at peace with their neighbours'. For many years, this

49 'Soft' international law refers to nonbinding declarations made by the UN General Assembly and other international organisations. On the other hand, what we have seen above may be referred to as 'hard' international law which consists of binding treaties.

50 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (iii) Paragraph 11, 11th December, 1948

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resolution was viewed as not doing anything for the Palestinian refugees’ case concerning the right to return, not only because of the ambiguous language used, but also for what they saw as the illegal existence of the State of Israel. This has been Israel's case for a long time against Palestinian 'right of return', namely that a 'right of return' for Palestinian 'refugees' would mean the end of the State of Israel, as the Palestinians (and to a large extent the Arab world)\textsuperscript{51} did not accept the existence of the State of Israel. However, in 1988 the PLO, which was at this time based in Tunis, issued the Palestinian Declaration of Independence\textsuperscript{52} within which they recognised the UN Partition Resolution 181 of 1948. This in itself, recognised the State of Israel, as this document calls for 'two states, one Arab and one Jewish'. This may then complicate the final status issues on the 'right to return', as the Israelis can claim that not all Palestinians can come back as this might ruin the demographics of the Jewish-Arab ratio in Israel.

Returning to Resolution 194 and regarding a right of return, this is also part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 13 states:

Everyone has the right of freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state; Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.\textsuperscript{53}

This corresponds to the ICCPR looked at earlier. There are discussions as to what exactly 'his own country' refers to. Although there has been, as yet, no precise explanation of the term, the definition is considered "at a minimum [to include] ...\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{51} Egypt and Jordan were the first to recognise Israel by accepting Resolution 242 following the 1967 War. This was followed by agreements between the two countries and Israel later on.
\textsuperscript{52} Available on the internet on the Palestine Ministry of Information site. In particular paragraph 6. www.pna.ig/mininfo
\textsuperscript{53} Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Article 13 (i) and (ii).
in addition to the State of which the individual is a national, the country in which he or she permanently resides. It has also been suggested that one’s ‘country’ is to be equated with ‘a country which one considers ‘home’ and to which one is connected through history, race, religion, family, or other ties’\(^5\). An important event took place in 1974 when the UN General Assembly recognised the PLO and the rights of the Palestinian people.\(^5\) Through General Assembly Resolution 3236 (xxix) Palestinian ‘right of return’ was linked to the principle of ‘self-determination’. The resolution:

Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine including: The right to self-determination without external interference; The right to national independence and sovereignty. [It also] Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return\(^5\); Furthermore, this resolution does not distinguish between 1948 and 1967 refugees, but rather, refers to them as a single group. As we can see from the reference above, there is no talk of Palestinian refugees, which would make the determining of who is and who is not a refugee into a question. General Assembly Resolution 3236 speaks about the Palestinian people, removing in the process questions about who is and who is not a refugee, as well as moving the debate from individuals to a group of people. This resolution has been described as yet another “milestone toward the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People in Palestine including the right to self-determination, the right of national independence and sovereignty,

\(^5\) Lawand, Kathleen “The Right to Return of Palestinians in International Law” International Journal of Refugee Law (Vol. 8, No 4, 1996) p. 551: This definition is, to reiterate, only part of various interpretations as there is no formal definition.


\(^5\) General Assembly Resolution 3236 (xxix). Question of Palestine, 22 November 1974. Point 1a and b, and point 2.
the right to return to their homes, the right to regain their rights by all means".57 However, again, this resolution is not binding. Nevertheless, the right to national self-determination and return are thus rights that are "enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Resolutions 194 and 3236".58 These resolutions and international agreements need to be on the agenda of any future peace talks as they are considered to be, as said above, the international recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian People.

Compensation

Compensation for Palestinian refugees is also an issue of huge importance, usually referring to monetary compensation. It is linked to the right of return both in terms of property and human damage for returning refugees, and also as being a potential alternative to the right of return. Therefore the term is associated on its own or in combination with the 'right of return'.

By itself compensation is linked to UN Resolution 194 (iii) where it says "that compensation be paid for the property of those [refugees] choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible".59 Again the problem arises of resolution 194 being non-binding. Nevertheless,

compensation has to do with the principle of restitution. Exactly who is the responsible government or authority in this case is a matter of opinion. Most Palestinians and Arab states view the Israeli government as being responsible and therefore as the state liable to pay compensation. The Israeli governments “since 1948 have disclaimed responsibility for the refugee departure, placing the blame on the Arab states and Arab leaders”. This disagreement stems from the differing perspectives, Arab and Israeli, on why the refugees left Palestine in 1948 during the first Arab-Israeli War. However, Peretz does note that there has been a change in Israeli public opinion. This has to do with the various findings of the New Historians, who have been using official Israeli archives in their research and have refuted the opinion that the Palestinians left voluntarily or under Arab leadership (telling them to). Instead, what the New Historians have found is that many Palestinians were forced to leave their homes and livelihoods. Whatever the opinion about responsibility, the payment of compensation to Palestinian refugees would have a large psychological significance and would be a large step towards creating an atmosphere for possible negotiations. The issue of compensation has been left for final status negotiations and therefore has not been an issue at the moment.

Restitution and compensation is also anchored within other parts of international law. Within humanitarian law, the fourth (civilians) Geneva Convention prohibits "extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military

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61 Ibid. p. 89
62 The New Historians are looked at within the Chapter Four.
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly’. Again there is a problem of interpreting how the Palestinians lost their land and livelihoods. The fourth Geneva Convention is linked to armed conflict and there needs to be proof of state action in this regard. The case is similar within human rights law, as both within the UDHR and the ICCPR for instance, there is the right to restitution. The restitution in this case is linked to the right to own property and property having been taken away illegally.

Nevertheless, several ideas have been put forward regarding how compensation might work when and if applied in any final status negotiations. The first issue is about how much the Palestinian compensation claim ought to be. Estimates vary, and are usually based on the losses made in 1948. There has been difficulty getting an accurate evaluation of Palestinian refugee property as “most Arab property was absorbed into Israel’s economy, and has been transformed, often beyond recognition. In many cases it has passed through several owners and has been classified and reclassified under a variety of Israeli laws”. There were early attempts by the UNCCP to locate, identify and evaluate land and property abandoned by the Palestinian refugees. The UNCCP failed in its mission, though its efforts may not have been in vain, as “the documents generated by the body’s Technical Office detailing the refugee property losses constitute an indispensable resource for any future talks on compensation”.

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64 Peretz, Don 1993 op. cit., p. 86
Rashid Khalidi for instance tells us that

A third element is reparation for all those who will not be allowed to return, and compensation for those who lost property in 1948. Given that most refugees will not be able to return, the sums involved are large indeed, according to the most authoritative recent estimate of property losses alone. Depending on the criteria used, they range from $92 billion to $147 billion at 1984 prices, when the study was done.\(^6\) Even if one uses an entirely different approach, $20,000 per person for an arbitrarily chosen figure of 2 million eligible refugees and their descendents yields a figure of $40 billion. However, lest it seem like a great deal of money, we should recall that it amounts to little more than a decade worth of US aid to Israel.\(^6\)

The figures are based on estimates of Palestinian losses, but according to Brynen there could perhaps also be an attempt here to “place an appropriate price tag on a historical injustice”.\(^6\) (Khalidi’s figure is just $40 billion). Gazit, an Israeli researcher, has suggested that Israel should pay up to “$7 to 10 billion in compensation, or alternatively $10,000 per family”.\(^6\)

After having established the varying estimates of various scholars and researchers, Brynen points out that there has been too little attention paid to how this compensation will be paid. In other words, what resources are available to pay this sort of compensation? Brynen points out that, at the time of writing in 1997, only $2.5 billion had been pledged to support the West Bank and Gaza for the duration of the Oslo process, a quarter of which is in the form of loans. The amounts of money that were referred to above therefore, seem rather unlikely. His estimates for likely

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\(^6\) Khalidi is referring here to a study done by Hadawi, Sami and Kubursi, Atif Palestinian Rights and Losses in 1948 (Saqi Books, London, 1988)


\(^6\) Brynen, Rex “Imagining a Solution: Final Status Arrangements and Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon” Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxvi, No 2, Winter 1997) p. 50

\(^6\) Gazit, Shlomo The Palestinian Refugee Problem Final Status Issues Study, No 2, (Tel Aviv, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1995)
available funding for compensation is as little as $1.2 billion. This amount works out at $358 per UNRWA registered refugee. Already we can see the problems here. This is obviously not an adequate amount, and while compensation is about psychological significance as well as compensation for lost property and livelihoods, amounts this size are most likely to be viewed as insulting. What are the solutions, if any, to the compensation issue? The peace process is currently off track, and the final status negotiations seem a long way away. However, there are various interpretations to these questions. First, one needs to figure out who gets the compensation and how much they get. The involved parties are the Palestinian Authority (PA) if the refugees return to the West Bank and Gaza, and different amounts of compensation for different refugee choices. In other words, refugees deciding to return get less and refugees deciding to stay where they are get more. Other parties may include the host governments if refugees decide they would like to stay. All of these questions remain to be solved. Furthermore, the issue of how to finance compensation remains as well. However, as Brynen points out, there is an imperative issue that must be tackled regarding this issue which is that

Any compensation fund must be designed so as to maximise the prospects for Israeli, regional and international contributions. This inevitably will involve addressing a number of apparent contradiction: Compensation must be seen by Palestinians as satisfying their desire for some expression of Israeli responsibility for the refugee problem, be seen by Israel as admitting no such blame, by Arab and international donors as contributing to peace and regional development rather than representing third party payment of Palestinian property claims arising from Israeli actions.

70 Brynen, Rex The Funding of Palestinian Refugee Compensation available at Palestinian Refugee Net www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/new_prrm
71 Brynen, Rex 1997 op. cit., p. 52
Another issue that needs to be sorted out is the question: does compensation mean that there is no right of return? Or does compensation mean resettlement either in host countries or third countries? Judging from my research in the refugee camps, I argue that the refugees would not be happy to receive compensation instead of a right of return. Similarly Lebanon would not be happy to resettle Palestinian refugees permanently on their territory. Judging from recent events, it seems that compensation would mean that there would be no right of return, if indeed compensation is considered appropriate by the Israelis in the first place. Recent events make resolution of both the issues of compensation and of the rights of return rather unlikely.

**Regional Arrangements: The Arab League**

The Palestinian refugee burden is one that has mostly been carried by various Arab states, especially those neighbouring the State of Israel: Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank), as well as Egypt, Libya and Iraq. Many refugees have moved from these countries to the Gulf countries, making their legal status a little bit more complicated. The UN has been responsible for the Palestinian refugees through UNRWA. However, both the refugees and many Arab states view the UN with suspicion, as the UN was involved in the creation of the State of Israel. Furthermore, as seen above, the Palestinian refugees do have a ‘right to return’
through various UN Resolutions, however, for various reasons (i.e. Israel), the implementation of these resolutions has been prevented. Thus the host countries have had to deal with the Palestinian refugees until such time occurs when they can return to their homes, or to a Palestinian State. Reactions to the Palestinian refugees have varied from country to country, from on the one hand being extremely accommodating, to the other hand where the refugees have been treated as a threat to the political system.

The question of Palestine has always been one of the main concerns of the Arab League. Since 1952, there have been a series of resolutions regarding Palestinian refugees.72 There seem to be two guiding principles of the Arab League with regard to the Palestinians. First, there is a great deal of Arab solidarity with and sympathy for the Palestinians and the whole question of Palestine, in other words seeing the Palestinian refugees as their fellow brothers.73 Secondly, the members of the Arab League regard the preservation of Palestinian identity as essential (with the exception of Jordan). This preservation of identity seems to be thought to be the one issue that will make sure that the Palestinians are not ignored. Thus, their identity has been preserved “so as to avoid providing Israel with an excuse to evade its responsibility for their plight”.74

The Arab League has tried through various resolutions and agreements to ensure some sort of minimum standards of treatment for the Palestinians within the various Arab states. However, these resolutions and agreements seem to be more of good intent and good will, as treatment of Palestinians is largely determined by political

72 As well as the important Casablanca Agreement in 1965  
73 Opinions on this vary. See Chapter Four.  
74 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 133
conditions and policies towards the refugees within each host state, and this can differ from being extremely accommodating, meeting the conditions of the 1951 Convention for example, to the extreme opposite. Treatment of the Palestinians depends on political conditions within the host country and their policies as well as the relationship between the governments in question vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees and also the PLO. Policies towards Palestinian refugees may also differ between refugees living in refugee camps and those who do not.

Takkenberg points out that a possible explanation of why the Arab League has been unable to create a well-defined legal status for Palestine refugees in Arab states could be due to the attitude of the Palestinian leadership itself (PLO) vis-à-vis the Palestinian refugees.

For many years the PLO was reluctant to see individual Palestinians recognised as refugees. The PLO has on some occasions explicitly given instructions to Palestinians residing in Western states not to apply for refugee status. On at least one occasion, the PLO explicitly requested UNHCR not to resettle Palestinian refugees in Western countries. Formally granting refugee status would imply individual rather than a collective approach. *In the view of the PLO a solution to the Palestine question should not focus on the individual refugees, but rather on the Palestinian people as a whole....* Only in the early 1980's does the PLO appear to have come to the conclusion that these two approaches are not necessarily contradictory, but they may very well complement each other.75

As with international law, Arab League laws and agreements are not fully binding. Members do not have to ratify the agreements and refugee status and rights come under domestic jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the regional legal framework is useful for its contextual background.

75 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 134
Arab League Arrangements Relating to Palestinian Refugees

The Arab League was founded in Cairo, on March 22nd 1945. It was the first regional organisation to come into existence following World War Two, even before the UN. Nevertheless, it did account for the future existence of the UN, and incorporated this within several provisions. The League is considered a regional arrangement and has a ‘permanent observer’ in the UN as well as numerous agreements with the specialised agencies within the UN. Article 1 of the Charter of the League of Arab States opens with the notion that every independent Arab state has a right to join. There is a special annex regarding Palestine, which says that Palestine, although not an independent Arab country, may have one representative anyway. These representatives tended to be appointed on an ad hoc basis. In 1964 the Arab League supported the formation of the PLO, which soon thereafter, in 1974, became the representative for Palestine, in the same year that the PLO was

76 The members states include, here in the order in which they joined; Egypt (1945 Founding Member, was temporarily suspended following Camp David from 1979-1990); Iraq (1945 Founding Member); Jordan (1945 Founding Member); Lebanon (1945 Founding Member); Palestine (1945 Founding Member-see below for details); Saudi Arabia (1945 Founding Member); Syria (1945 Founding Member); Yemen (1945 Founding Member as the former Yemen Arab Republic; Yemen's People's Democratic Republic joined in 1968); Libya (1953); Sudan (1956); Morocco (1958); Tunisia (1958); Kuwait (1961); Algeria (1962); Bahrain (1971); Oman (1971); Qatar (1971); United Arab Emirates (1971); Mauritania (1973); Somalia (1974); Djibouti (1977);
77 For example, if there is a regional conflict the relationship between the UN and the League is such that it relies on Articles 33, 34, 35 and 52 of the UN Charter. For instance, article 33 refers to the parties seeking help and a solution through a regional arrangement and article 52 similarly refers to the parties first seeking help in a regional arrangement before going to the UN. This does not mean, however, that the UN may not intervene at all as all the same article 52 allows the Security Council to investigate as well. For more information on this as well as examples of regional conflicts see Hassouna, Hussein The League of Arab States and Regional Disputes (Ocean Publications, New York, 1975)
78 Agreements with for example UNESCO, ILO, WHO. Another important treaty between the Arab League and the UN is that Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950. This treaty is important in that it allowed the League to qualify as a regional arrangement within the UN.
79 Available on www.araleagueonline.org
80 The Charter of the League of Arab States; Annex on Palestine: which states ... “Even though the outward signs of [Palestine's] independence have remained veiled as a result of force majeure, it is not fitting that this should be an obstacle to the participation of Palestine in the work of the League ... Therefore, the States signatory to the Pact of the Arab League consider that in view of Palestine’s special circumstances, the Council of the League should designate an Arab delegate from Palestine to participate in its work until this country enjoys actual independence”

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granted observer status in the UN. However, as of 1988 when the PLO declared unilateral statehood, Palestine has been a full member of the Arab League, with Yassir Arafat, the chairman of the PLO, acting as Palestine’s President. As we shall see, Palestinian refugees have always been a main concern of the Arab League, although the extent to which the League is capable of enforcing its resolutions and agreements on this issue are at best debatable.

There was no detailed action taken by the League regarding criteria and procedures for the issue of travel documents for the refugees until 1954, when they issued the League Council Resolution 714 on the ‘Issue of Unified Travel Documents for Palestinian Refugees’. This is of extreme importance as the majority of Palestinians, as we have seen above in the section on International Law, are regarded as stateless. The resolution stipulates that the member states of the League have agreed that they will issue Palestinian refugees living in their territory with temporary travel documents upon their request, providing the Palestinian refugee had not already been granted citizenship from another country. With regard to the Arab states, this included Palestinian refugees in Jordan who had been given citizenship. However, as seen above with the international agreements, Brand points out that “[i]n all cases, Arab League decisions were nonbinding and, therefore largely ignored. No country wanted to be perceived as accepting the status quo and no country but Jordan had any desire to lay the ground work for permanent incorporation of the Palestinians”. Despite the desire of the League to provide uniform identity papers and travel documents for the refugees, this has not happened: to reiterate, the refugees come under domestic jurisdiction.

81 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., (Appendix 3)
One of the most important agreements made by the Arab League is the Casablanca Protocol of 1965. It was an attempt to develop and strengthen the regional regime for Palestinian refugees. Takkenberg states that “although it contains only 5 articles, the Casablanca Protocol has been the clearest manifestation of the intent of Arab states to provide for the treatment of Palestinian refugees”. The Casablanca Protocol does not explicitly make reference to Palestinian refugees, instead using the term ‘treatment of Palestinians’. This could be for a variety of reasons. However, the most obvious one is that the legal status, as well as the social conditions, of Palestinian refugees is as close to the legal status of non-refugees (as referred to above, only 1948 refugees are considered refugees, whereas 1967 refugees and all others are not). As this document is regarded as one of the most important made by the Arab League concerning Palestinian refugees, it merits a closer look.

Article 1 envisions ‘National Treatment’ of the Palestinian refugees with regard to economic activity. This means that Palestinian refugees are not supposed to be discriminated against or even treated differently from nationals, when it comes to obtaining jobs. With reference to this Article 1, Takkenberg points out the interesting fact that with regard to this issue of economic activity, the Casablanca Protocol is even more generous than the 1951 Convention. Many Arab countries have complied with this, not only because of signature, but also because they have found having Palestinians in their labour force has helped their markets and economic life. This, however, varies from country to country and according to the political situations within the countries, and to changes in these.

83 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 141
Article 2 of the Casablanca Protocol is rather similar to the UDHR article 13, paragraph 2: “Palestinians residing at the moment in [whatever Arab country] in accordance with the dictates of their interests, have the right to leave and return to this state”. On the other hand, UDHR article 13 states “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”. This Article has been rather more difficult to implement as movement in and out of other countries is subject to internal immigration laws which vary from country to country.

Article 3 grants Palestinians movement throughout the member states of the Arab League. However, the right to reside in any Arab League country is rather more difficult than that. Similar reasons to those above make this article difficult to implement fully, because the right to reside in any of the Arab League countries depends upon the internal immigration policies of the various host states, which can contradict each other, as well as this article in the Casablanca Protocol. Takkenberg calls this article “Good intent rather than as a hard commitment on part of most member states”.

The last two articles, articles 4 and 5, deal with travel documents for Palestinians. Article 4 obliges the member states of the League to give travel documents to Palestinians residing in their country. The “country of first refuge remains primarily

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85 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 13
86 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 142
responsible for the issue and extension of travel documents”. 

This is where there seems to be rather a big difference between the Casablanca Protocol and other international agreements relating to refugees, this time the 1951 Convention. “While the 1951 Convention provides for the transfer of responsibility in respect of the issue and renewal of travel documents, the Casablanca Protocol leaves this responsibility with the original host countries”.

Article 5 similarly relates to travel, but with respect to equal treatment for Palestinians and other Arab League nationals when it comes to visas and residency. This has always been a rather ambiguous article. However, it was clarified in December 1982 by a resolution made by the League. It states that

Bearers of these travel documents residing in LAS states receive the same treatment as all other LAS state citizens, regarding visa, and residency applications.

This is not the case in Lebanon, for instance, even where the refugees have been able to obtain travel documents. The intention of the Casablanca Protocol may be well and good, but how binding is it? It was accepted by majority decision of the Council and is thus only binding if the member states accept it. Acceptance can be in full, or with reservations. Only seven states, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt and Yemen (the first two of which are major host states), accepted and ratified the Protocol in full without reservations. Kuwait, Libya and Lebanon have ratified the Casablanca Protocol with reservations. Saudi Arabia and Morocco did not ratify the Protocol. All other members of the Arab League joined after the

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87 Ibid. p. 143
88 Ibid. p. 143

123
Casablanca Protocol was signed. Unfortunately, whether the Casablanca Protocol has been ratified or not, commitment to the Palestinian refugees with regard to the issues taken up by the protocol has not been consistent for all the member states who signed it. In Lebanon, for example, the protocol has never been fully implemented.

Palestinian legal status as understood by the Arab league became complicated after the 1967 War when Israel occupied the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. This war caused a huge displacement among many Palestinians. Palestinians

lost their right to reside there as this was only granted by the occupying authorities to those present during a census carried out shortly after the suspension of hostilities. Displaced Palestinians from Gaza, and especially those who either as students or workers found themselves in the Gulf States, were beginning to face problems with the Egyptian authorities in having their travel documents renewed or reissued. As Palestinians in possession of Jordanian national passports were not facing similar problems, a number of ex-Gazans requested the Jordanian authorities to provide them with a Jordanian document instead. In response, the Jordanian authorities started to issue temporary Jordanian passports, valid for one year, to those Palestinians who had lost residency in Gaza and who were in possession of a valid employment contract in an Arab country.\(^90\)

However, the Palestinian refugees in the various host countries continue(d) to face difficulties in getting a clear legal status with regard to employment, and with regard to renewing travel documents and ID cards. The PLO decided to raise the matter of Palestinians who had problems with their legal status with the Arab League. A series of bilateral agreements were made between the various host countries and the PLO, through the Arab League. For example, the Cairo Agreement of 1969 between the PLO and Lebanon had important consequences for Palestinian refugees in the country.

\(^90\) Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 145
It was realised that implementation of the Casablanca Protocol needed to be carefully watched. To this end, Arab League representatives travelled to various signatory states of the Protocol to see what progress was being made, and what could be done better. Unfortunately this was very slow due to several delays and the Arab League could not directly enforce the various issues regarding the Palestinian refugees under the Casablanca Protocol. In the following years concerns have been raised by the League over treatment of the Palestinians. However, again the League is largely unable to do much about it. Other declarations have been made by the Arab League concerning refugees and displacement in the Arab world in general, within which there are usually articles referring to the implementation of the clauses in the Casablanca Protocol relating to the treatment of refugees.91

The PLO decision to support Iraq during the Gulf War in 1991 had severe consequences for Palestinian relations vis-à-vis many of the Arab host states.92 The PLO decision to back Iraq caused Arab support for them dwindle, and they had to start to rely on themselves. It can be argued that it was because of this realisation of dwindled support, both psychologically and financially, that the PLO agreed to enter negotiations with the State of Israel. However, apart from this, an important resolution was passed on 12 September 1991. The relevant passage is paragraph 7 which concerns the treatment of Palestinians in Arab States. It states that:

Having taken notice of the memorandum presented by the delegation of Palestine, the Conference expresses the hope that all Arab states, in spirit of brotherhood and solidarity, will seek to abide by the Protocol Relating to the

92 For an analysis on the motivations of the PLO and the consequences of their support of Iraq see Khalidi, Rashid “The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis” Current History (Vol. 90, No. 55, January 1991)
Treatment of Palestinians [in accordance with the rules and laws in force in each state]93, and calls upon Arab states to overcome the negative impact of the Gulf crisis, as regards the implementation of this Protocol in respect of the Palestinian people.94

Commentary on the meaning of this paragraph differs. Takkenberg argues that this resolution does not change the meaning and importance of the Casablanca Protocol. This seems to be a recommendation and the Casablanca Protocol an international agreement. Therefore Takkenberg understands the Casablanca Protocol still to be valid. Shiblak, on the other hand, understands this resolution to be such that it revokes the Casablanca Protocol, which, according to this resolution, has been superseded by the internal laws and policies regarding Palestinians in the various host states. He puts it very clearly when he says

For some time, the Arab states on an individual basis had been annulling by administrative decree the rights accorded the Palestinians under the Casablanca Protocol; after the Gulf War, this trend culminated in the adoption by the host countries of the Arab League Resolution 5093 officially revoking the protocol, which has been superseded by the internal laws of each host state.95

No matter how one interprets this resolution, events of the past show (as was reinforced by the Gulf war), that the Casablanca Protocol has not had the kind of strong influence that had been envisioned in terms of having a positive impact on the life of many of the Palestinians in the various host countries. Most Palestinian refugees, especially the ones who reside in Lebanon, still live in precarious conditions.

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93 Addition made by the Arab League Council.
94 League of Arab States Resolution 5093 of 12th September 1991; taken from Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 149
Laws and regulations regarding Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

Unlike the Jordanians, who had a government policy of integrating Palestinian refugees into their society, the Lebanese have done their best to prevent any sorts of integration of Palestinian refugees into their country. The Directorate General of Palestinian Refugee Affairs (DPRA) within the Ministry of Interior is responsible for the Palestinians in Lebanon.\(^{96}\) When the Palestinians arrived in Lebanon in 1947-48, they constituted approximately 10% of the population. Since their arrival, the Lebanese government has viewed them as a threat to the balance between Christians and Muslims in the country. In the 1950s and early 1960s the Lebanese government did give citizenship to a large segment of the Christian Palestinian population in Lebanon.\(^{97}\) This has resulted in the Palestinians being seen as a threat to both the political and social balance in the country. Their situation has been often described as precarious.

Legal Status: Foreigners, ID Papers and Travel Documents:

Regarding the legal status of the Palestinian refugees, they are subject to the same legal status as other foreigners. However, as will be discussed shortly, from 1969 to 1987 the Palestinians were regulated by the Cairo Agreement. Decree number 319 from 1960 is the general guide to foreigners in Lebanon:

\(^{96}\) On 31 March 1959, Decree No 42 was issued which established the Palestinian Refugees Department within the Lebanese Ministry of Interior. Kassim, Anis 2000 op. cit., p. 215

\(^{97}\) Makiabi, Rania op. cit., p. 156 Also in Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 23 and p. 33.
Les non-Libanais se trouvant au Liban doivent régler leur situation en ce qui concerne leur résidence. Ils rentrent dans une des cinq catégories suivantes: (1) Etrangers résidents en vertu de visa de transit ou de séjour provisoire apposé sur leur passeport; (2) Etrangers détenteurs de passeports, résidents en vertu de cartes de résidence pour une durée déterminée et non délivrées par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et des Emigres ou par la Direction de la Sûreté générale sur base de leurs passeports; (3) Etrangers non détenteurs de papiers d'identité de leurs pays d'origine et résidents au Liban en vertu de cartes de résidence délivrées par la Direction de la Sûreté générale ou de cartes d'identité délivrées par la Direction générale de l'Administration des Affaires des réfugiés palestiniens au Liban; (4) Etrangers dont l'entrée au Liban est autorisée sur présentation de leurs seules cartes d'identité et séjournant dans le pays en vertu de cartes de résidence temporaires ou permanentes; (5) Etrangers détenteurs de pièces d'identité de leurs pays d'origine ou d'organisation dont ils dépendent et qui résident au Liban en vertu de documents provisoires vésés par les Services de la Sûreté générale.

Article three is relevant to Palestinian refugees as they do not carry identity papers from their country of origin and are, therefore, considered foreigners, and need to apply to the Directorate of the Affairs of Palestinian Refugees.

From article four we can see that Palestinians were urged to settle their legal status and obtain temporary or permanent residents permits. This article does provide for "the issuance of special Palestinian refugee identity cards which provide the holder with permanent or temporary residence." Although the majority live in Lebanon legally, there are others, such as those who are not registered with UNRWA or are 1967 refugees, who are not legal residents. Although these identity and travel cards help the situation of the refugees by allowing them to travel, they still remain stateless.

98 As this is the important point with reference to Palestinian refugees the translation is "Foreigners who do not have documentation from their country of origin, and who live in Lebanon (by virtue on the basis) of resident cards issued by the Directorate of Sûreté Générale, or identity cards issued by the Directorate of the Department of the Affairs of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon". This decree can be found in Takkenberg, Lex The Status of Refugees in International Law as well as Said, Wadie "The Obligations of Host Countries to Refugees Under International Law: The Case of Lebanon" in Aruri, Naseer ed Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return (Pluto Press, London) 2001
99 Takkenberg, Lex op. cit., p. 163 (emphasis added: taken from UNHCR Centre for Documentation on Refugees)
100 Said, Wadie op. cit., p. 136
As understood by the above only Palestinians who came to Lebanon during or immediately after the 1948 War are considered legal residents in Lebanon. In other words, this includes those who either registered with UNRWA or those who managed to obtain Lebanese citizenship. There are two other categories of refugees who are not considered legal residents in Lebanon. These two categories are “refugees who arrived in Lebanon from second or third countries ... this category includes those not registered with UNRWA, even though they may benefit from UNRWA services ... The [other] category covers the 1967 refugees who are not registered with UNRWA”.

Those who came later have been denied legal residency.

Property, Employment, Social Security, and Health.

Even those Palestinian refugees who are considered legal residents are considered foreigners. This has a range of implications with regard to property, employment, social security and health care. Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon are not allowed to acquire immovable property without presidential consent, which is not easily obtained. Similarly, following the Civil War, UNRWA and the Palestinian refugees were not allowed to rebuild the camps that were destroyed. The refugees displaced from destroyed camps, either moved into other camps where space permitted, or squatted in empty buildings around the country. Most refugees have

101 Zureik, Elia op. cit., p. 33
now moved back into the already crowded refugee camps.\textsuperscript{102} The right to work and employment in Lebanon is also very difficult.

The right to work in Lebanon is regulated by the Labour Law of 1962. This law sets out the principle that a foreigner is allowed to work in Lebanon provided \((a)\) his country allows Lebanese to work in that country, and \((b)\) he obtains in advance a work permit.\textsuperscript{103}

Regarding point \((a)\), Palestinians in Lebanon are unable to practice any of the legal professions due to a lack of reciprocity.\textsuperscript{104} Furthermore, considering point \((b)\), getting a work permit is extremely difficult for Palestinian refugees considering that the Lebanese government has issued "a list of about sixty\textsuperscript{105} activities for which work permits were not to be issued to foreign workers. The list excluded virtually all menial jobs".\textsuperscript{106} Thus, with work permits from the Ministry of National Economy being difficult or almost impossible to obtain, many Palestinian refugees are forced into working illegally. Brynen sees the situation as such: the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were routinely denied documentation necessary for legal employment in the country. In 1969, only 3,362 of the tens of thousands of Palestinian workers in Lebanon had legal work permits. Similarly, many Palestinian professionals were prohibited from working, or were forced to do so under restrictive circumstances. Palestinian teachers, for example, required an annual license from the Lebanese Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs if they wished to work.

\textsuperscript{102} This issue will be examined later on. However suffice to say at the moment, following the civil war there were many displaced people. Both Palestinian and Lebanese. There is now a Minister of the Displaced that deals with these issues. Regarding the Palestinian displaced there was the (in)famous Qurai’a project envisioned by Walid Joumbatt, then Minister of the Displaced, to build new houses for the refugees, however this never flourished and most refugees have now had to move from the abandoned buildings in the cities into the refugee camps, as the Lebanese authorities are dealing with the reparation of a post-civil war country.

\textsuperscript{103} Kassim, Anis F op. cit., p. 215

\textsuperscript{104} At this point it should be noted that within international law, Article 7 (ii) of the Refugee Convention, it says: "After a period of three years’ residence, all refugees shall enjoy exemption from legislative reciprocity in the territory of the Contracting States"

\textsuperscript{105} The exact number of professions was hard to obtain. From my interviews they ranged within the seventies. Haddad sites ‘more than 72’. Haddad, Simon “The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon” Middle East Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 3, September 2000) p. 27. The Lebanese law restricts the practice of professions such as medicine, engineering, law, to Lebanese citizens. Non-Lebanese must obtain work permits for construction, agriculture and sanitation.

\textsuperscript{106} Kassim, Anis F op. cit., p. 216
in the private sector. Private schools were limited to a maximum of two 'foreign' (including Palestinian) teachers. Under regulations issued by the Lebanese Ministry of Education, many Palestinian teachers were prohibited from teaching in the social sciences or other politically sensitive subjects. Political activity was expressly prohibited, and teachers hired by UNRWA required advance clearance from the Deuxième Bureau (Lebanese Military Intelligence). Such legal status reflected and reinforced the adverse economic status of the Palestinians in Lebanon.107

Not only have the Palestinians in Lebanon been in a precarious situation vis-à-vis the state, but they have also, since the early 1970s, been affected by various conflicts in the country. First in 1972, the Israelis started to attack refugee camps in Lebanon, apparently as retaliatory measures for various raids made by Palestinian commandos from Lebanon into Israel. The Lebanese Civil War that lasted from 1976 to 1991 resulted in enormous human suffering and displacement for the Palestinian refugees as well as many Lebanese. The attacks on Sabra and Shatila in 1982 are an example.108

If we move back to 1969, the situation for Palestinian refugees changed to a small degree. The Cairo Agreement between the PLO and Lebanon was signed on 3 November 1969.109 It was meant to give Palestinians in Lebanon the right to work, the right of residence and movement in Lebanon, and especially interestingly, the right to take part in the Palestinian revolution. Under the Cairo Agreement the PLO was able to gain compete control of the then fifteen refugee camps in Lebanon. The PLO was also allowed to engage in guerrilla attacks against Israel from South Lebanon, together with the Lebanese army. However, apart from the PLO's control

108 This will be looked at in more detail within the Chapter Four.
109 The Cairo Agreement was a result of bilateral contacts mediated through the Arab League.
over the camps, life in terms of residency and work did not change too much for the Palestinian refugees. The Civil War that started in 1975 had severe consequences for the refugees in terms of human life and suffering as well as general conditions (in terms of living standards and Palestinian refugee/PLO relations vis-à-vis the Lebanese government). In May 1987 the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies unilaterally abrogated the Cairo Agreement with President Gemayel officially confirming this abrogation a month later.\textsuperscript{110}

Even during the ‘life’ of the Cairo Agreement, after the Israeli invasion in 1982, the Palestinians in Lebanon found it difficult to renew their travel documents. UNRWA intervened several times on their behalf (through protests and representations to the government); eventually the problems were solved, and the travel documents were again issued, and this time extended for one year at a time.

In September, 1995, the Lebanese government decided to tighten the measures again regarding Palestinians wanting to travel. The Lebanese government managed to prevent Palestinians with Lebanese residency from returning to the country without obtaining re-entry visas. This new policy was issued by the then Minister of Interior, Michel El-Murr. The background to this confusion was Colonel Gadhafi’s message to the people involved in the Israel-Palestine Peace Process, when he announced the deportation of all foreigners from his country. The Palestinians were unable to enter the Gaza Strip or the West Bank, and thereby his message that the Israel-Palestine

\textsuperscript{110} The Cairo Agreement was nullified by the ‘Resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies, 21 May 1987’, where it states in article two; ‘The agreement signed on 3 November 1969 between the head of the Lebanese delegation General Emile Bustani and the Chairman of the PLO and which is know as the ‘Cairo Agreement’ is hereby null and void as if it had never existed. Further, all annexes and measures related to the Cairo Agreement are hereby null and void as if they had never existed’. Taken from Appendix in Brynen, Rex 1990 op. cit.,
Peace Process was a hoax was ‘proved’. However, this had enormous consequences for the refugees: all Palestinians who usually resided in Lebanon and were outside the country were unable to return, unless they had already received this re-entry visa. Palestinians who then wanted to leave Lebanon had to first obtain their exit-re-entry visa before they could leave, in case they found themselves unable to return. This ruling was overturned in 1999.111

Conclusion

Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon lack adequate international protection. They are not protected by the UNHCR because of the creation of UNRWA. The time-line on the Refugee Convention makes this convention inapplicable. UNRWA is mainly concerned with elements of relief and ‘works’. Issues such as right of return and compensation are covered by various General Assembly Resolutions. However, these are considered non-binding. The issues of right of return and compensation have been drafted as final-status issues that are to be negotiated when and if the time comes within the Peace Process. The Arab League has tried to fill certain loopholes within the international law definitions of refugees. They created the Casablanca Protocol to provide for adequate treatment of Palestinian refugees. However it too is non-binding. Many of the provisions and agreements envisioned by the Arab league have not been implemented as many of the issues are dictated by domestic circumstances. The situation of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is an example of domestic circumstances which have led to an inadequate legal status for

111 Haddad, Simon op. cit.,
the refugees. In the case of Lebanon, Palestinian refugees remain in effect stateless and do not have basic civil and human rights. They have difficulty acquiring travel documents. They lack access to employment, health and social services and cannot own property. All in all, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon lack adequate legal status, internationally, regionally and locally. This lack of adequate legal status leaves the Palestinian refugees, particularly in Lebanon, in an extremely precarious situation. This context is important as it has a bearing upon why Palestinian refugees would choose to mobilise or not. As I emphasised earlier, an uncertain present and future for Palestinian refugees has an effect on how the refugee define their surroundings and their identity.
Chapter Four

The Historical Context of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Introduction

The historical framework is part of the context within which the Palestinians in Lebanon find themselves. The history of the Palestinian refugees, starting in 1948, defines their refugee status, is part of their recent national narratives, and is part of their identity.

The first part of this chapter will focus on why the Palestinians left Palestine. Was it by force or voluntary? This is important for understanding the concept of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, as well as of responsibility. The first section will explain the various myths surrounding the exodus. The second section will look at the rise of the Palestinian Resistance Movement prior to the 1967 War, the events surrounding the 1967 War, and those of the September 1970 Civil War in Jordan. These two wars had an effect on the Palestinian Resistance Movement in terms of PLO bases in the Arab world, PLO policy and opinion, as well as physical movement yet again of Palestinians. The third section will look at the history of the refugee camps in Lebanon. A brief account will be given of the major events that have affected the refugees. These events are significant in that they raise a number of questions about mobilisation in Lebanon. For example, how far was the PLO really defeated in 1982, and does this defeat apply to the opposition groups as well? What events
during and after the civil war have had a significant bearing upon refugee mobilisation into groups and why? Within the field work chapters we shall see how these events affected mobilisation and identity of Palestinian refugees. The historical context shows that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in a precarious situation which has a bearing upon why they would choose to mobilise or not.

*al-nakba: The 1948 War*

There are many different versions of the events leading to and following the creation of the state of Israel. Essentially whether any of these viewpoints are correct or not, does not really matter. What matters to the refugees is what they themselves (and their Lebanese hosts) believe to be true and it is this belief that helps them understand themselves, others, and their surroundings.

Nevertheless, there are several accounts of these historical events: Israeli, Palestinian and Arab literature, as well as new revisionist Israeli literature. This revisionist Israeli literature started in the late 1980s when Israeli and British archives had passed their thirty-year embargo and were opened to the public. What the revisionist historians\(^1\) found within these archives was evidence that both the Israeli and Arab/Palestinian histories of the events of 1948 were based on a series of myths.\(^2\) Flapan "set the agenda when he reduced the historiography of the

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\(^1\) The Israeli New Historians include most notably, Ilan Pappe, Avi Shlaim, Benny Morris, Simha Flapan, Tom Segev and Anita Shapira.

\(^2\) It should be remembered that these works focus on Israel and other great powers such as Britain as the archival evidence is from these countries.
foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 to seven myths: that the Zionists accepted the UN partition resolution and planned for peace; that the Arabs rejected the partition and launched the war; that the Palestinians fled voluntarily intending reconquest; that the Arab states had united to expel the Jews from Palestine; that the Arab invasion made war inevitable; that a defenceless Israel faced destruction by the Arab goliath; and that Israel subsequently sought peace but no Arab leader responded". Slaim has shown us that the war between Israel and the Arabs was not one of an Arab Goliath and an Israeli David. Furthermore, he points out that the myth of Israel being ready for peace following the war, and that none of the Arab leaders wanted peace, is untrue. Pappe has pointed out that the myth believed within Israel that Britain was against them building their own state is also untrue. Morris argues that it is Israel who bears responsibility for the refugee problem.

Some of the myths pointed out by the New Israeli Historians had already been refuted by other Arab and Palestinian historians. The Palestinians in the refugee camps are very adamant when they tell us that they were forced out of their country. Critical historians also exist on the Arab and Palestinian side regarding the 1948

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6 Morris, Benny The Birth of the Refugee Problem (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987) as well as numerous articles on subsequent research involving various operations that point towards a ‘blueprint’ regarding movement of Palestinians out of Palestine. He has recently changed his mind regarding some of these issues which will be addressed later on.
War. Although many of these works\(^7\) have been influential in the Arab world, Walid Khalidi points out the main problems that arise from these are that they portray the Zionist forces as mere terrorist gangs which had been surrounded in all directions by the Arab armies in the first phase of the war (15 May – 11 June). The Egyptian vanguard had reached the southern suburbs of Tel Aviv, the Iraqi advanced forces had come very close to the Mediterranean coast to the west of Qalqiliya and Tulkram, and the Jordanian Arab Legion had reached the eastern suburbs of Tel Aviv. All that was needed was a few more days to deal the enemy the mortal blow which would decide the matter once and for all when international pressure escalated into threats and menaces and imposed the first truce on the Arabs. Thus the Zionist enemy snatched victory from the jaws of inevitable defeat.\(^8\)

There are certain parallels between the Arab and Israeli literature. Sela\(^9\) points to a focus on collective memory in Arab and official Israeli literature on the birth of the State of Israel. The problem that critical Arab historians have is their lack of material. They do not possess the same archival material, and where it may exist in other countries it is not open to the public. Hence the problem of historiography of the Palestine War. Bearing these problems in mind, the next part of this chapter will focus on the events of the 1948 War in relation to the refugee flow out of Palestine.

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\(^7\)For instance Constantine Zurayq and Musa al-Alami, who wrote on the nakba during the immediate years following the events of 1948. Among the more recent Arab literature regarding the nakba, are for instance Walid Khalidi, Rashid Khalidi, Nur Masalha and Issa Khalaf.


The Voluntary Exodus?

The Palestinian refugee problem was born of war, not by design, Jewish or Arab\(^\text{10}\)

The quote above by Morris is controversial for Palestinians and Israelis. Israeli history emphasises that the Palestinian exodus was a result of instructions given to them by Palestinian and Arab leaders. Israeli New Historians and Arab Historians challenge this myth by pointing to mass expulsions, massacres and other atrocities committed by the Israelis during the war. The major challenges that occur when looking into why the refugee flow in 1948 and 1949 happened are twofold: first the idea of Zionist transfer thinking that arose during the 1930s and 1940s and whether or not this idea of ‘transfer’ of Palestinians out of Palestine was articulated as a policy or not. The second issue is that if ‘transfer’ was not a policy, how widely held was the view among the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), Haganah and the Irgun that it happened anyway, or if indeed it happened at all.

Morris\(^\text{11}\) stands on a line between the views of scholars who believe that, on the one hand there was a direct policy of expelling the Palestinians, and on the other hand, that there was not one. His work has changed over the years, starting with *The Birth of the Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (The Birth)*, various additions to *The Birth* found in journals and edited books, and now there is *The Birth Revisited*. In this new book Morris has added a chapter on transfer thinking. However he does not


seem to conclude that transfer thinking has a direct link to what actually happened, although it seems to have had an impact.

Morris in *The Birth* tells us that the refugee problem was an outcome of war. It was the outcome of shooting and bombing, and the fear that this engendered in the Palestinians. The refugee problem was also an outcome of incompetent Palestinian leadership.\(^{12}\) Although originally Morris points to the refugee flow being an outcome of the war, and not of design, the evidence he points to even as early as in *The Birth*, shows otherwise. Morris revised *The Birth* after having had access to even more archival material which reinforce[d] the version of events of those who would stress the Yishuv’s and Israel’s part in the propulsion of the Palestinian Arabs out of the areas that became the State of Israel, rather than that of those who would reduce Israeli responsibility for what happened.\(^{13}\)

How does Morris reach this conclusion? He looks at the nature of ‘Transfer Thinking’ amongst the Zionist leadership before the war, in the years between 1937 and 1947. Morris stresses that Transfer Thinking “goes to the heart of Zionism and to the root of the Zionist-Arab conflict”.\(^{14}\) For Morris the connection between Transfer Thinking and what actually happened in 1948 is only connected indirectly;

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\(^{12}\) Khalidi and Khalaf also point to Palestinian Society when looking at the Palestinian defeat in 1948. Khalaf points to uneven development within Palestinian society and class dimensions within Palestinian society. There was disintegration between rural and urban workers, landowners and peasants, a schism between rich and poor that made Palestinian society vulnerable. Khalidi points to structural weaknesses within Palestinian institutions and factionalism amongst the Palestinian notables and political parties. For more information see Khalaf, Issa *Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration 1939-1948* (State University of New York Press, New York, 1991) as well as “The Effect of Socio-economic Change on Arab Societal Collapse in Mandate Palestine” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* (Vol. 29, 1997) and Khalidi, Rashid “The Palestinians and 1948: The Underlying Causes of Failure” in Rogan, and Shlaim ed 2002 op. cit.,

\(^{13}\) Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 38

\(^{14}\) Ibid. p. 39
there was no formal policy of transfer. Why? Morris points to reported speeches and
the diary of Ben-Gurion in demonstrating whether or not there was a transfer policy.
For instance from the diary of Ben-Gurion dated July 12, 1937, where he is referring
to the Peel Commission Report of 1937 about the recommendation of the transfer of
at least 225,000 Palestinian Arabs out of the proposed Jewish state Ben-Gurion
notes:

And we did not propose this – the Royal Commission ... did ... and we must
grab hold of this conclusion [i.e., recommendation] as we grabbed hold of the
Balfour Declaration, even more than that – as we grabbed hold of Zionism
itself, we must cleave to this conclusion, with all our strength and will and faith
because of all the Commissions conclusions, this is the one that alone offers
some recompense for the tearing away of other parts of the country."15

For Morris, this diary entry in itself does not prove that Transfer Thinking was a
policy, but it does prove that the Transfer Thinking was there as an idea. There is
much material that gives the general meaning of what was shown above. According
to Morris there were ideas about ‘transfer’, but no policy. The thinking in itself
generated a consensus whereby there was support for it and it was carried out by
Israeli troops. This is Morris’s general idea in his new work The Birth Revisited.
However, even before this work Morris added ‘Operation Hiram’ into the picture.
Operation Hiram is viewed as being different from a direct policy or ‘master plan’ to
transfer the Arab population. Morris tells us that there is evidence that from April
1948 many Palestinian villages and towns were subject to concrete expulsions. This
had to do with the individual Israeli commanders and their view of expulsion and
how they viewed the situation in each village and town. Morris adds; “the
proportion of the 700,000 Arabs who took to the roads as a result of expulsions

15 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 42 Taken from Ben-Gurion’s diary, 12th July, 1937, Ben-Gurion
Archive, Sede Boker.
rather than straightforward military attack or fear of attack etc. is much greater than indicated in *The Birth*. Similarly, the new documentation has revealed atrocities that I had not been aware of while writing *The Birth* ... Those atrocities are important in understanding the precipitation of various phases of the Arab exodus*.16 Morris’ point here shows that evidence now exists that there were more atrocities carried out in other Arab towns and villages.17 Previously, Morris believed that Operation Hiram did not instruct the IDF to drive out Palestinians from their homes and villages. The expulsion of Palestinians from their villages was haphazard, some staying and some leaving. However, with newer material available, Morris explains that “there was a central directive by Northern Front to clear the conquered pocket of its Arab inhabitants”18. There were direct orders given to expel the Palestinian Arab population in the various villages.19

This, however, is not the end of the story. IDF expulsion of local populations from villages did not end after the operation was finished. There were ‘acts of cruelty’ and ‘lack of restraint’20 by IDF troops after the fighting had stopped. Morris is referring to a “series of massacres carried out ... mostly after the end of the

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16 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 49
17 In other words, towns like Lydda and Ramle were cases of fighting. Other towns and villages, under Operation Hiram witnessed massacres. An interesting case related to this is Katz’s work on oral histories where he found that overwhelming evidences pointing to a massacre having taken place in a town called Tantura. This was not mentioned in Khalidi’s *All that remains*. This points to further massacres that took place during the 1948 War. Katz’s thesis was published as an article and he was sued for libel. It became a messy case, however, the evidence he uses seems valid. (Katz, Theodore “The Exodus of the Arabs from Villages at the Foot of Southern Mount Carmel – University of Haifa, 1998 – Summary in Ma’ariv article) Pappe, Ilan “The Tantura Case in Israel: The Katz research and trial” *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. xxx, No. 3, Spring 2001)
18 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 51
19 At this point Morris refers to orders given out by General Moshe Carmel at the end of October, and Yigael Yadin (IDF OC Operations at the time) in addition to Major Moda’i’s description of events. For example Yadin issued an order saying “we are not interested in Arab inhabitants [in Israel] and their return [to Israeli territory] must be prevented at all costs” IDFA 922/75/189 ‘Operation Hiram’ a report by Major Moda’i – cited in Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 52
20 This is taken from the Israel State Archives (ISA), Foreign Ministry (FM) 186/17, 18th November 1948. It by Shimoni (acting Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry’s Middle East Affairs Department) in a letter to Eytan the ministry director general.
The question arises whether these massacres were direct orders or whether they were carried out by individual localised battalions. Morris believes the general lines of what happened are clear, pointing to orders made as being command enough for the various battalions to interpret how they liked. There are two things that indicate that these orders were interpreted as the right to expel: "the patterns of the actions and their relative profusion; and the absence of any punishment of the perpetrators". The impression one is left with is that because no one was punished for this, the action is interpreted as being the result of an order. The massacres were all similar in their pattern:

the uniform or at least similar nature of the massacres points to a belief, among the perpetrators, of central direction and authorisation ... Almost all the massacres followed a similar course: a unit entered a village, rounded up the menfolk in the village square, selected four or ten or fifty of the army-aged males ... lined them up against a wall and shot them.

On the link between transfer thinking and actual movement of Palestinian refugees, Morris states in his new book that

transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s was not tantamount to preplanning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan of expulsion ... But transfer was inevitable and inbuilt into Zionism – because it sought to transform a land which was ‘Arab’ into a ‘Jewish’ state and a Jewish state could not have arisen without a major displacement of Arab population ... Thinking about the possibilities of transfer in the 1930s and 1940s had prepared and conditioned hearts and minds for its implementation in the course of 1948 so that, as it occurred, few voiced protest or doubt; it was accepted as inevitable and natural by the bulk of the Jewish population.

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21 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 54
22 In other words, whether or not the orders were precise regarding expulsion is not as yet clear as most of the sources are come from Arab oral and written testimony, United Nations and Israeli documents, the latter of which are limited. Most IDF documents are still classified.
23 Morris, Benny 2002 op. cit., p. 54
24 Ibid. p. 55
25 Morris, Benny 2004 op. cit., p. 60
Arguing, on the other hand, that there was indeed a Jewish policy to expel the Palestinians, stand Walid Khalidi26 and Nur Masalha.27 Most Israeli and Palestinian writers would agree that the massacre at Deir Yassin28 had the effect of precipitating the Palestinian exodus. That, however, is their only point of agreement. Whereas the Israeli history will stress that this massacre was carried out by dissidents, the other historians would argue that the Haganah was in charge and knew what was happening, and depending on the version, that they had a direct policy in Deir Yassin. This direct policy was called Plan Dalet or, Plan D. According to Pappe, the massacre “was carried out by a group of soldiers belonging to the Irgun ... The Irgun later claimed that its operation had been authorised by the Haganah and was part of a larger Jewish operation in Jerusalem”.29

The essence of Plan D, according to Khalidi, was an “all-out offensive to conquer and hold territory in the wake of the retreating British forces ... the purpose of Plan D was ‘control of the area given to [the Israelis] by the UN in addition to area occupied by [the Israelis] which were outside these borders’”.30 This seems explicit enough to Khalidi. He maintains that Plan D was indeed a blueprint, a plan that was the last of many plans to destroy the Palestinian population.

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27 Masalha, Nur Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of ‘Transfer’ in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948 (Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington DC, 2001)
28 Deir Yassin is an infamous massacre by the Irgun where an estimated “250 residents, mostly women, elderly people and children were slaughtered” Masalha, Nur Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (Pluto Press, London, 2000) p. 44. For an eyewitness account a few days following the massacre see Jacques De Reynier “Deir Yassin” in Khalidi, Walid From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948 (Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington 1987)
30 Khalidi, Walid 1988 op. cit., p. 16
Plan D was the name given by the Zionist High Command to the general plan for military operations within the framework of which the Zionists launched successive offensives in April and early May 1948 in various parts of Palestine. These offensives, which entailed the destruction of the Palestinian Arab community and the expulsion and pauperisation of the bulk of the Palestine Arabs, were calculated to achieve the military fait accompli upon which the state of Israel would be based.

Masalha argues that Deir Yassin and Plan D must be seen in the light of an already aggressive policy and strategy adopted by the Haganah, starting as early as December 1944. Masalha points to archival sources revealing that there was a premeditated plan to massacre the residents in Deir Yassin. A lot of information is taken from Ben-Gurion’s war diary where he says that he “had no qualms about clearing scores of Arab villages from what he called the Jerusalem corridor”. This is seen as referring to Transfer Thinking and as a background for Plan D and the expulsion of the Palestine Arab population. According to Masalha, Transfer Thinking is almost as old as political Zionism itself, having particular roots with Hertzl and Ben-Gurion. Although Transfer Thinking was not always in the foreground of discussion, it was an essential part of the 1948 War, as the Zionists wanted as homogenous a state as possible. Although there is no written document, there seems no doubt for Masalha, that the shared understanding of the concept of transfer was enough to cause the Palestinian exodus.

The fact that no written blanket orders unambiguously calling for the wholesale expulsion of the Arab population have been found has been cited as indicating an absence of premeditated design; in similar vein, the inconsistencies in the

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31 Khalidi, Walid 1988 op. cit., p. 8 (emphasis mine)
32 Nur Masalha points out that although Plan D was adopted by the Haganah in March 1948 it had been envisaged and planned in 1944. She gets her information from an interview with Haganah OC operations officer Yigael Yadin who states that ‘I prepared the nucleus for Plan Dalet in 1944 when I was head of planning in the underground’, taken from Banks, L “Torn Country: An Oral History of the Israeli War of Independence” Franklin Watts, New York 1982 p. 110; in Masalha, Nur 2001 op. cit., p. 177.
behaviours of various field commanders are given as proof that the exodus was born of the exigencies of war. But the exodus was not the less the result of painstaking planning and an unswerving vision: ... it is the tenacity of a shared understanding, stated and restated with almost tedious repetitiveness for almost 50 years. The exodus is nothing if not testimony to the endurance of a vision that runs in an unbroken line from the early days of Zionist colonisation to this day.35

For Shlaim, Plan D represents a strategy whose main aim was to “to secure all the areas allocated to the Jewish state under the UN partition resolution as well as Jewish settlements outside these areas and corridors leading to them ... its objective was to clear the interior of the country of hostile and potentially hostile Arab elements, and in this sense it provided a warrant for expelling civilians”.36

On the other hand Shapira37 argues that the Zionist leadership at the time, including Ben-Gurion, did not take the idea of Transfer Thinking seriously and that there is no link between the idea as formulated in the 1930s and 1940s and what actually happened in 1948 and 1949.

Whether or not Zionist Transfer Thinking was an official policy is difficult to know completely, considering that the academics working on this issue cannot agree. Admittedly, there are agendas on both sides of the argument, one side stressing Palestinians as victims and Israelis as aggressors and the other side stressing that Israel did not force the majority of Palestinians from their homes and livelihoods. Nevertheless, the Palestinians with whom interviews and ethnographic research was held would tend to agree with the former, i.e. the Palestinians were forced to flee

35 Masalha, Nur 2001op. cit., p. 208
36 Shlaim, Avi 2000 op. cit., p. 31 (My emphasis)
from their homes and livelihoods, by what was an unfair UN decision to partition Palestine, as well as by an aggressive Israeli policy.

In the end, whether or not Plan D, Operation Hiram or Transfer Thinking were for the purposes of ‘uprooting, expulsion and pauperisation’ of the Palestinian community, there is no doubt that the war led to Palestinians fleeing their towns and villages. There is also evidence of massacres. The reasons behind it may not be clear, but the effects of it are.

The Palestinian Resistance: The Importance of the 1967 and 1970 Black September War

The Palestinian Resistance Prior to the 1967 War

The PLO was founded on June 1st, 1964 in Cairo, with Ahmad Shukairy\(^{38}\) as its first Chairman. The Palestinian Resistance can be seen as a reaction to the events that took place in 1948 and as being driven by a motivation to recover lost land and rights of the Palestinian people. Politicisation had happened prior to the formation of the PLO. In 1951, King Abdullah of Jordan was assassinated by a Palestinian.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{38}\) Shukairy was a Palestinian lawyer, originally from Acre. He was one of the founding members of the Istiqlal, party, one of the important political parties during the Mandate which was critical of the Mufti and the Husseini-Nashashibi rivalries. For more information on this period of time see Mattar, Philip The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Haji Al-Husseini and the Palestinian National Movement (Columbia University Press, New York, 1988).

\(^{39}\) According to Nassar, the assassination was in reaction to what was widely believed to be King Abdullah’s secret negotiations with Israel. This led to feelings of betrayal among many Palestinians.
With the arrival of Nasser in 1954 and Egypt’s subsequent unity with Syria in 1958, Arab unity was on the agenda.

The initial creation of Fatah occurred separately from the creation of the PLO. Fatah originally started as the ‘Movement for the Liberation of Palestine’, and consisted of eight core members: Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khalid al-Hassan, Farouq Qaddoumi, Zuhair al-Alami, Kamal Adwan, and Mohammad Youssef. Their origins can be traced back to 1958, however, they became famous after their first (fake) communiqué in 1965, when they claimed to have made a raid inside Israel. The reason for this communiqué was ‘to make the group known in the Arab world’, after which they became known as al-Fatah. It wasn’t until after 1967 that the PLO became an umbrella organisation encompassing Fatah. Once inside the PLO, Fatah quickly became the dominant party.

The Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM) was established in the early 1950s and was supported by President Nasser of Egypt. The core of the group was predominantly Palestinian, mostly students at the American University of Beirut. It was dedicated to Pan-Arabism and changing Arab governments (before the liberation of Palestine).

40 Nasser was Prime Minister from 1954-1956. In 1956 he became President.
42 Ibid. p.44
43 Becker claims that the communiqué was fake from the start, although Cobban tells us that it was an actual operation but went wrong, and the communiqué was sent out anyway as if it had been successful. Cobban, Helena The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) p. 33
It was the main alternative to Fatah. However, Fatah was the leading force at this time (pre-1967).\textsuperscript{44}

Following the break-up of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961, questions started to arise as to whether pan-Arab unity was really a prerequisite to the liberation of Palestine. The years following the break-up of the UAR “revealed growing differences within the ANM between those who advocated closer identification with Nasir (Nasser) and their opponents – mainly Palestinians – who now sought to assign a higher priority to armed struggle and Palestine”.\textsuperscript{45} There was a ‘left’ and a ‘right’ within the group. The leftist current was anti-communist and supported Nasser’s socialist reforms\textsuperscript{46} and was represented by Muhsin Ibrahim and Mohammad Kishli and later on Nayif Hawatamah, who started the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP, later the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine - DFLP) in 1969.\textsuperscript{47} The more conservative rightists were dominated by George Habash, Wadi Haddad and Hani Hindi. The right wanted to focus more on Palestine and wanted to create a separate Palestinian branch of the ANM, which happened in 1964. “The structure of the Palestinian command, dispersed as its sections were, paralleled that of regional commands. There was a separate Palestinian military action committee, based in Lebanon and headed by Haddad”.\textsuperscript{48} This separate Palestinian command branch of the ANM was not supported by the left because they felt it caused divisions within the ANM. This

\textsuperscript{44} For more information on the ANM prior to 1967 see Sayigh, Yezid “Reconstructing the Paradox: The Arab Nationalist Movement, Armed Struggle and Palestine, 1951-1966” \textit{Middle East Journal} (Vol 45, No. 4, Autumn 1991)
\textsuperscript{45} Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p. 614
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. p. 616
\textsuperscript{47} Muhsin Ibrahim and Mohammad Kishli although Lebanese remained trusted confidants of the DFLP. They later were the heads of the Organisation of Lebanese Socialists.
\textsuperscript{48} Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p. 618
division within the ANM changed its objectives. "Palestine was now the means. Arab unity the end".49

Fatah, on the other hand, was not as ideological as the ANM: it has not defined its ideology in explicit terms.50 In the beginning they were influenced by the Algerian example, particularly Fanon's51 approach.52 However, there is no ideology in Fatah, their reasons being "that if it adopts an ideology, it would contribute to more splits within the Palestinian movement".53 It sees itself more as a nationalist movement, not an ideological party.

The Effect of the 1967 War

In the space of only six days between 5 and 10 June 1967, the IDF shattered the armed forces of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and occupied large tracts of their territories54

Apart from the many casualties for all parties involved, the 1967 War also had consequences in terms of international, regional and domestic politics within Israel and the Arab states, as well as consequences for both the Arab and Palestinian National Movements.

49 Sayigh, Yezid 1991 op. cit., p. 619
50 Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 80
51 Fanon, Frantz The Wretched of the Earth (Penguin Books, London 1990 (1961)) where the solution to being colonised is through violent struggle.
52 Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 80
53 Ibid. p. 80
The first major consequence was the movement, yet again, of Palestinians out of Palestine. There are important differences between the movement of Palestinians in 1948 and 1967. First, the movement of Palestinians during the 1948 war took place over an entire year, whereas in the 1967 War it was the result of a single campaign. The second difference is that the Palestinians who fled their homes in 1967 did so, knowing that the Palestinians who fled in 1948 were unable to return to their homes. One would have expected the 1967 refugees, having this knowledge, to have thought twice before leaving their homes. Various questions arise: why did they leave their homes? Was it by force, was it a result of war, or did they flee voluntarily? The evidence is unclear, although as during the 1948 War, the IDF seems to have been involved in the new refugee flow, in some cases levelling entire villages. Morris points out that

in several locations Arab houses were deliberately destroyed after the fighting ended. A number of IDF commanders, apparently without cabinet authorisation, though most probably with Dayan's approval, tried to repeat the experience of 1948 – to drive the Palestinians into exile and demolish their homes. Altogether, some 200-300,000 Arabs fled or were driven from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.55

Morris and Hirst56 report IDF loudspeakers ordering people in the West Bank to leave and go to Jordan. There were also free, Israeli-organised buses taking Arabs from East Jerusalem to the Allenby Bridge. Some of the Palestinians who fled were already refugees, having fled to either Gaza or the West Bank during the 1948 War. There is a conception that the Palestinians who became refugees during this war were mostly refugees from the 1948 War, that they were poor and lived in refugee

56 Hirst, David The Gun and the Olive Branch: The Roots of Violence in the Middle East (Faber and Faber, London, 1977) p. 227 (more details about how the Palestinians fled, see pages 224-229)
camps on the West Bank. However, contrary to popular belief, this is not necessarily the case. Dodd and Barakat point out that the 1948 refugees were in fact fewer than half the number of 1967 refugees. It is estimated that about 200-250,000 people went into exile.

In terms of regional consequences, Sayigh explains that the 1967 war “moderated the attitude of key Arab states towards Israel, but at the same time complicated the peace process by enmeshing it with superpower rivalry. The humiliating defeat of Nasser's Egypt and the Ba'th's Syria heralded the decline of interventionism between Arab states.” The death of Nasser and the arrival of Sadat was also a factor contributing to the retreat of Pan-Arabism.

An important factor in regional politics was the creation of UN Security Resolution 242 in November 1967, which calls for Israeli withdrawal from the newly-occupied territories, and recognition of Israel by the surrounding countries. Both Egypt and Jordan accepted this resolution, showing that they were willing to moderate their

57 Most writers on this issue have an assumption when dealing with the 1967 refugees that most of them were previous 1948 refugees. For example Frangi, Abdallah The PLO and Palestine (Zed Books, London, 1983)
58 Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim River without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees (The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1969). This report is based on a series of interviews and visits to Jordan, where they interviewed refugees living in refugee camps as well as those not living in refugee camps. They tested for four theories of why Palestinians left during the 1967 war (shock-panic, riff-raff, previous refugee, and nomadic mentality) finding each one wanting. Some of these imply a socio-economic condition where the refugees had no steady jobs, no real property; where a decision to leave their homes in the face of danger would be made easier. Their conclusions, apart from raising many more questions, were that many of the refugees indeed did have their own property, did have jobs and income thus they did leave something behind and they also, importantly, have something they wish to return to. Their answers to why people left is later explained in this section, but it happened as a result of situational pressures generated by airborne attacks, including use of napalm, destruction of their villages, and detention of many male civilians. They were not equipped to resist these situational pressures and were taken by surprise.
59 Dodd, Peter and Barakat, Halim op. cit., p. 6
60 Morris, Benny 2001 op. cit., p. 328
61 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 141
policies regarding the Palestine question. Syria rejected it. The Palestinians were not asked whether or not they accepted it.

Regarding domestic consequences and those for the Palestinian Resistance, the 1967 war created instability in the Arab states surrounding Israel. This domestic instability “only encouraged a greater focus ... on raisons d’etat, at the expense of rhetorical commitment to Arab unity and the Palestine cause”.63 Whereas previously the Palestinian Resistance had been reliant upon, and worked in conjunction with, Arab states, they would now have to work more independently. In other words; “after the defeat of 1967, Palestinians began to combine their longing for ‘return’ with emphasis on the maintenance of their identity. Thus Palestinian nationalism began to replace ... Arab nationalism which had dominated Palestinian political culture prior to 1967”.64 There are two important issues here: Palestinian identity and lack of Arab commitment. Regarding the former, it was made all the more important because there was a complicit lack of international recognition of the Palestinian people.65 This lack of recognition was important in the reassertion of the notion of Palestine first, and the emphasis of a distinct Palestinian identity.

On the other hand the lack of commitment to the Palestinian cause by Arab States was reinforced following the war, especially in Jordan. The Palestinian movement was seen as a destabilising factor within these countries. Sayigh points out that the

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63 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 141
65 For example UN Security Council Resolution 242 which addresses the war and its consequences for Palestinians made no mention of ‘the Palestinians’ as a people, only as refugees. Similarly, it was around this time that Golda Meir made her infamous speech saying that the Palestinian people did not exist. “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them” (Sunday Times, London, 15th June 1969)
rise of the Palestinian (guerrilla) movement “challenged the diplomatic moderation and particularistic national agendas of the confrontation states”.66 This refers to the Arab states realising that they needed international backing, and seeing that they were unable to confront Israel and win.

This had implications for the Palestinian Movement. However, they tried their best in “turning defeat into opportunity”.67 The Palestinian Resistance was disappointed with the Arab governments, and the conclusion of the war showed that the Palestinian Resistance would have to become self-reliant and find a new way to struggle against Israel. Armed struggle became the answer in the end.68 The Arab armies were unprepared and too weak to resist the Israeli army. Their interest in the liberation of Palestine was only indirect and not sufficiently sustained. “The Palestinian people needed a new organisation under Palestinian leadership to set it on the path back to Jerusalem. By the defeat of 1967, the Arab governments had forfeited all claims to speak or negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people”.69

Now that the West Bank and Gaza were under Israeli control, there was the opportunity for Palestinians to carry out raids within Israel. Fatah decided to launch what it called ‘popular rebellion’ inside Israel. “In September [1967] there were thirteen acts of sabotage against Israeli targets”,70 almost all of which were inside Israel proper. They continued into October, November and December. The Israelis, however managed once again to get the upper hand. “By the end of 1967 the Israeli

66 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 141
68 Kamal Nassar sees the popularity of armed struggle being reinforced by the battle of Karameh in 1968. Nasser, Kamal 1997 op. cit.,
70 Morris, Benny 2001 op. cit., p. 366
security forces had arrested about one thousand Palestinian operatives and killed about two hundred. In January 1968 the Palestinians launched only six attacks. By then the Fatah leadership had acknowledged defeat: The popular uprising had failed to materialise.\(^7^1\)

The effect of the war on the ANM was devastation. The ANM had been extremely close to other Arab nationalist groups in the neighbouring states and the defeat in the war came as a major shock. Within the ANM there emerged different political groups following the 1967 War. Habash founded the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Under the PFLP banner many other smaller Palestinian groups that had emerged prior to the 1967 War (such as the Vengeance Youth, Heroes of the Return and Ahmad Jibril’s Palestine Liberation Front) also joined.\(^7^2\) This new coalition, however, suffered from fragmentation, especially during the arrest of Habash in Syria. As in the ANM a left- and a right-wing emerged within the movement. The left was led by Hawatamah and the right by Habash (by his supporters while he was in prison). Before Habash’s return in the autumn of 1968, Ahmad Jibril, an important military leader and strategist, defected and created his own organisation called the PFLP-General Command (PFLP-GC).

Another split occurred following Habash’s return, this time due to Nayif Hawatamah, who created the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, PDFLP (later to be known as DFLP). The following year Hawatamah’s group was recognised by the PLO. They kept relatively quiet during the time that Fatah was trying to unleash its ‘popular uprising’. However the PFLP was to take

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\(^7^1\) Morris, Benny 2001 op. cit., p. 366

\(^7^2\) Established 1959. Joined the PFLP and the ANM in 1967 then defected forming the PFLP-GC in 1968. Not to be confused with the Iraqi sponsored Palestine Liberation Front.
the lead in the years between 1968 and 1971, in bringing the Palestinian Resistance Movement to international attention through international hijackings.

Another effect of the 1967 war on the Palestinian Resistance was the addition of Syrian- and Iraqi-sponsored Palestinian groups. Syria supported the formation of Saiqa (Vanguards of the Popular Liberation War – Saiqa literally meaning lightning bolt) in 1968, headed by Dafi Jamani. Saiqa’s view of the two other main groups, Fatah and the PFLP, meant they tended to agree more with the former (at least at this time). According to Quandt:

politically, Saiqa initially tended to side with Fatah, supporting the doctrine that the liberation of Palestine must precede the settling of ideological quarrels. Saiqa was generally hostile to the PFLP, reflecting Syrian attitudes toward a former rival, the ANM, but was usually cooperative with Hawatamah’s PDFLP [later called DFLP] and particularly with Jibril’s PFLP-General Command. A major difference between Saiqa and these fedayeen groups however, was the presence of a large population of non-Palestinians in their rank.73

Syria’s Baathist rivals in Iraq created the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) in 1969. These groups however, never had very large popular support. Although not created by Iraq, Iraq supported another newly created Palestinian group, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF) led by Bahjat Abu Gharbiyyeh.74 The Iraqis were also sponsors of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) with Muhammad Abbas Zaydan75 as its secretary-general.

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74 Gharbiyyeh was an ex-ba’athist from Jerusalem. His successor was Samir Ghosheh.
75 Zaydan was the former spokesperson for the PFLP-GC. The power-sharing within the PLF was between Zaydan and Tal’at Ya’qub and Abd al-Fattah Ghanim both also former PFLP-GC members.
Another effect on the Palestinian Resistance of the 1967 war related to the PLO. Following the war Shukayri resigned. There was a lot of turmoil within the PLO, and finally in January 1969, “the PLO executive committee announced that the composition of the new congress had been agreed on and the fifth session of the National Congress would be held in Cairo in February. Fatah received the highest number of seats, followed by Saiqa and the PFLP ... The PLA and the PLF received only fifteen seats between them, and in reaction refused to participate, as did the PFLP”. Fatah was able to take advantage of this boycott and Yasir Arafat, head of Fatah, was elected as the Chairman of the PLO. The Executive Committee was mainly made up of Fatah, Saiqa and other former members of the Executive Committee, much to the preference of Fatah, but much to the dismay of the PFLP and the other groups who did not side with Fatah.

Once the Palestinian Resistance realised the difficulty of guerrilla activity within the Occupied Territories, they became more reliant upon other Arab states. Although disappointed with the Arab states, the 1967 war gave the Resistance Movement

new leverage with Arab governments. The latter either lacked the political and physical strength to deny the guerrillas use of their territory or saw positive benefits in aiding guerrilla activity.

The Resistance Movements’ influence grew in Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The Egyptians helped both Fatah and the ANM with their activities in the West Bank following the war. The Egyptian military intelligence even “posted an officer to Amman as a permanent liaison with them. It also sent two planeloads of military supplies to

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76 Yahya Hammuda took his place. Nassar, Jamal 1991 op. cit., p. 54
77 Quandt, William op. cit., p. 71
78 Sayigh, Yezid 1992 op. cit., p. 258
Jordan for their use, although the real surge in material support for Fatah was not to
start until December”79. In Syria there was a power struggle between President al-
Atasi and assistant secretary-general of the Baath party, Salah Jadid, against the
Defence Minister al-Asad. Nevertheless, the Palestinian resistance was able to forge
a link with the Syrians as well. Fatah supplied the “Syrians with fresh information
on Israeli dispositions (remember Syria had lost the Golan). In return, Fatah was
permitted to maintain a high level of activity at its training camps in Syria and to
bring in hundreds of new recruits”.80 The ANM was also allowed to “resume
activity on Syrian soil and [was] formally assigned an officer to liaise with the
Syrian authorities. It also benefited from the covert assistance of sympathetic
officers in the Syrian army”81.82 Iraq also gave help to the Palestinian Resistance. In
the months following the 1967 war “Iraqi trucks carried guerrillas and trainees …
between Syria or Iraq and the Jordan River to evade Jordanian checkpoints”.83
Because of the Resistance’s influence in these three countries, as well as the help
they received from them, they were able to work more freely in Jordan and
Lebanon.

Thus, their influence in Egypt, Iraq and Syria helped them in their relationship with
Jordan and Lebanon, where guerrilla activity had not previously been endorsed.
Jordan and Lebanon did not like Palestinian guerrilla activity on their territories.
Following the war the guerrilla movement became more active and this resulted in
both governments cracking down on them again. King Hussein announced in
September that he opposed “any military activity that was not part of an overall Arab plan”. However, for all the government measures that were taken, the guerrillas, especially in Jordan, kept on with their activities.

The Effect of Black September

The PLO and the Palestinian Resistance were powerful in Jordan following the 1967 War. As Abu Iyad explains:

The Six Day War opened before us a new horizon for development. The Jordanian regime became too weak to challenge our program. King Hussein released hundreds of Palestinian nationalists who had been imprisoned in the years preceding the conflict. He also closed his eyes to us when we embarked on establishing bases along the River Jordan [on the eastern side] to be used as staging points for our commandos. Neither did we lack the support or sympathy of the local inhabitants nor the support and sympathy of the Jordanian army with whom we had established excellent relations.

The Jordanians and the Palestinians worked together in the battle of Karameh in March 1968 against Israel. The rapid growth of the Palestinian Resistance Movement, particularly the commando units, did cause King Hussein to question his own authority.

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84 Ibid. p. 260-61
86 Although not a military victory the Battle of Karameh in 1968 was one that gave the Resistance an enormous boost. The Israelis attacked Karameh in March 1968 and were met by resistance from the Palestinian commando units and the Jordanian army. This boost in morale mobilised Palestinians into joining the Resistance. Hudson points out that prior to Karamah Fatah had about 2,000 men. Following the battle the number increased to 15,000. Hudson, Michael “The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis” Middle East Journal (Vol. 23, Spring 1969) p. 300
The resistance movement was responsible for administering and organising life in the refugee camps. Heavily-armed Palestinian commando groups demonstratively patrolled the streets of the capital, Amman. Open conflicts and armed clashes between Jordanian state forces and these commando groups became increasingly frequent.87

Because of the growth of the Resistance, King Hussein and the “Jordanian state apparatus could no longer impose the rule of the royal family as absolutely as before”.88 However, he had a dilemma: about half of his country’s population was Palestinian.

According to Quandt, the PFLP sparked the match for later conflict between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian Resistance by executing “its own program to bring down the Jordanian regime, to embarrass Fatah, and to stall the movement towards a peace settlement with Israel”.89 There were three international hijackings on September 6th, two of which landed in the Jordanian desert. Three days later “another plane was also hijacked to Jordan”.90 The situation in Jordan between the authorities and the Palestinian groups deteriorated as a result. By mid-September King Hussein called for a military government. There were negotiations with the Resistance but to no avail.91

The fighting continued. The war lasted 10 days and ended on September 27th. The Palestinian groups “had been placed on the defensive throughout Jordan, and with no Arab support in sight, they agreed to a cease-fire”.92 The agreement signed by Arafat and King Hussein in Cairo, called for “the two parties to terminate all hostilities and media campaigns. The army had to withdraw from Amman to their

87 Frangi, Abdallah op. cit., p. 115
88 Frangi, Abdallah op. cit., p. 115
89 Quandt, William op. cit., p. 125
90 Ibid. p. 126
91 Ibid. p. 126
92 Ibid. p. 128
previous positions. The fedayeen had to evacuate Amman to new bases reflecting
the appropriate fedayeen activity outside the cities”.

In the aftermath of the war the Resistance Movement underwent changes. Many of
the smaller groups disappeared “as autonomous parts of the Palestinian
movement”, either disappearing or joining Fatah. The Jordanian authorities were
not satisfied that the Resistance had left Amman, and they did not want guerrilla
groups on any of their territory. In July 1971, the Jordanian authorities asked the
guerrilla fighters to leave Ajlun (a strategic mountain north of Amman). The
Palestinian guerrillas did not leave, which resulted in heavy fighting during the
following days. This battle was to be an important one in terms of the Palestinian
Resistances’ relationship with Jordan, as well as for the Palestinian Resistance as a
whole:

The battle of Ajlun marked the final destruction of the guerrilla movement’s
principal Arab sanctuary. This represented the defeat of the strategy of people’s
war championed by the various guerrilla groups since 1967, and posed a
fundamental challenge to their professed aims, political programmes, and
organisational structure. Both in reaction and as a means of obscuring their
predicament, the guerrilla groups launched a campaign of sabotage and
subversion against Jordan in mid-August that was to continue sporadically for
the next 20 or so months.

The Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian authorities were again engaged in talks
in Cairo during the following months. The Jordanians were not willing to have the
PLO return to Jordan. Prime Minister Tal was involved in these talks, but was
assassinated by ‘Black September’, a newly-formed group that took its name from

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93 Abu Odeh, Adnan op. cit., p. 185
94 Quandt, William op. cit., p. 129
95 Quandt gives examples of small groups that either disappeared or joined Fatah as the Iraqi ALF,
The Action Organisation for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP), the Organisation of Arab Palestine
(OAP), the Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Popular Organisation for the Liberation of
Palestine (POLP). (p. 129)
96 Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 280
the events in Jordan on 28th November 1971. This was the end of any negotiations over the PLO presence in Jordan. The PLO offices in Amman were closed down and the Resistance moved out of Jordan. As a result, the Palestinian Resistance became more dependent upon their bases in Syria and Lebanon.

The effects of the September war were many. First, it sparked a "new phase of Palestinian violence" as it had brought into existence the group calling itself 'Black September'. This group was responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, as well as its well-known operation in Munich in 1972.

Second, the PLO had to close down its offices and stop military attacks from Jordan into Israel. This meant that more attacks were to be launched from Lebanon. Although Syria had a new leader, al-Asad, who had taken command in the autumn of 1970, it still allowed the Resistance to continue its activities and receive support.

Third, they had learned more lessons from the September war. Again they realised that they could not count on Arab leaders in their struggles. Similarly, they were made acutely aware of how they would be 'disowned' if the host state authorities suddenly decided that they were no longer willing to support them. This was to be made even clearer in Lebanon in the following years.

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97 Hirst, David op. cit., p. 310
Arriving in Lebanon: A History of the Refugee Camps

The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon have been there for over fifty years. Although meant to be temporary, they have become permanent sites of residence. This section emphasises the state of affairs following the 1967 and Jordanian Civil wars. It is during this period of time that the Palestinian organisations and the refugee camps played a larger role in the political reality.

Most of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon arrived during the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948. Most of the refugees came from northern Palestine and the areas along the coast, parts of Palestine that today constitute Israel proper. When the refugees first arrived, most of them settled in refugee camps around the larger Lebanese towns of Tyre, Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli, as well as in other camps scattered throughout the country. These camps were for the most part taken care of by UNRWA, which was set up to fund emergency relief for the refugees. The refugee camps were established as temporary accommodation consisting mainly of tents. The chart below shows the various official UNWRA-supported Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.98

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98 Beirut and Mount Lebanon have been put together as one section as I believe that most of the camps put in the Mount Lebanon section actually belong to Beirut. The sections on this table regarding the surface area has been taken from Abbas, Mahmoud et al “The socio-economic Conditions of Palestinians in Lebanon” Journal of Refugee Studies (Vol. 10, No 3, 1997) p. 379 and the latest population numbers have been taken from UNRWA: Registration Statistical Bulletin for the third quarter 2003 (3/2003). Department of Relief and Social Services, UNRWA – HQ (Amman), given to me at the Beirut Field Office, November 2003.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DISTRICT</th>
<th>CAMP</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>SURFACE (SQ. M)</th>
<th>UNOFFICIAL REGISTERED PERSONS</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>Al Buss</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>1,010</td>
<td>10,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Rashidiye</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>367,200</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>25,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bourj el Shemali</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>134,600</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>18,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ein el Helweh</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>301,039</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>45,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nabatiye</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>103,455</td>
<td>(destroyed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mieh Mieh</td>
<td>1956</td>
<td>54,040</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>5,015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut / Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>Mar Elias</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td>5,400</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>1,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bourj El Barajneh</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>5,174</td>
<td>20,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dbayeh</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>83,576</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>4,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shatila</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>39,567</td>
<td>4,116</td>
<td>12,156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tal al Zaatar</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td></td>
<td>Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jisr al Basha</td>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
<td>Destroyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>Nahr el Bared</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>198,129</td>
<td>1,531</td>
<td>30,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baddawi</td>
<td>1955</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>16,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bekaa</td>
<td>Wavell-Galilee</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>43,435</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>7,521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16,560</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The refugee camps are scattered around the country. Some of the camps were destroyed during the civil war, thus creating displaced refugees who now inhabit different camps, sometimes split from their families.

In addition to this, informal Palestinian refugee camps or gatherings also exist in Lebanon. Informal camps are usually areas surrounding the refugee camps, for example Sabra (or Daouk) next to Shatila camp, or clusters found close to towns and cities. In most of the informal camps, or clusters, Palestinians reside with Lebanese, as they are usually located within suburbs or very close to villages. The conditions tend to be comparable with refugee camps, although the refugee camps tend to be better equipped with better community services than informal camps. As these are informal, the population numbers of the people living within each camp are only estimates, thus making it difficult to be sure of the exact numbers of Palestinians living in these informal camps. The latest estimate from 1993 numbered the people in the informal camps and clusters at 38,200.

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99 Ugland, Ole ed Difficult Past, Uncertain Future: Living Conditions Among Palestinian Refugees in Camps and Gatherings in Lebanon (FAFO-Report 409, Centraltrykkeriet AS, Norway, 2003) p. 205. The refugee camps are better equipped as they have popular committees, youth clubs and social and political groups.

100 Abbas, Mahmoud et al. op. cit., p. 380
Significant Events Prior to the Lebanese Civil War

Until the Cairo Agreement came to fruition the refugee camps in Lebanon were governed by the Deuxième Bureau and the Ministry of the Interior. During the 1950s and 1960s

[s]ecurity posts of the ... Forces de Sécurité Intérieure existed in and around the Palestinian camps. Palestinians were routinely questioned at army checkpoints around the refugee camps and on major roads; during some periods of political tension during the 1950s and 1960s Palestinians required permission to travel within Lebanon itself.101

The political situation of the Palestinians began to change in the mid-1960s with the formation of the PLO as an armed resistance group.

The Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon had been growing since the late 1960s, particularly following the Cairo Agreement in 1969 which allowed the Palestinians to carry out operations from Lebanon.102 They were using Lebanon’s southern border to carry out attacks into Israel. These attacks, however, had consequences, as the Israelis retaliated with air raids into Lebanon. Although Syria had always been considered the Resistance’s main sympathiser and most secure base, Lebanon did have the advantage of having a larger border with Israel. The Resistance was able to continue its attacks on Israel and operate independently because they had popular support.

The fedayeen were able to capitalise on the strong backing of the Muslim half of the population, which identifies itself closely with pan-Arab national issue,

102 See Chapter Three.
and on the strong general feeling of dissatisfaction with the government’s reaction – or rather lack of it – to the devastating Israeli raid on Beirut Airport on December 28th 1968. Moreover the growing number of disaffected intellectuals of all creeds who have become estranged from the political system ... found in the issue of freedom of action for the fedayeen from Lebanon a rallying cause with which to challenge the ‘establishment’.

Already by 1968, there was the potential for problems between the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese authorities. The PFLP attacked an El Al airliner in Athens. Israel retaliated by attacking Beirut International Airport. This was Israel’s first intervention into Lebanon, before the Cairo Agreement and before the Lebanese Civil War. However, this did not lead to a crack-down on the Resistance, but rather the opposite with the making of the Cairo Agreement.

Five months prior to the Cairo Agreement there was a similar agreement proposed by General Boustany called the 7 Clause Agreement, in April 1968. Although the Cairo Agreement was accepted on 3rd of November 1969, the rejection of the 7 Clause Agreement which was similar to the Cairo Agreement, shows the uncertainty which some of the Lebanese authorities had in granting the Palestinians various rights. Nevertheless, the Cairo Agreement came to fruition in November 1969, granting the Palestinians rights, including the right to carry arms and attack Israel (although in coordination with the Lebanese army). This marks a vast change in

104 The universities played an important role in the mobilisation process in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Many of the different student and left-wing groups supported the Palestinians and the Palestinian Resistance. See the chapter by el-Khazen ‘The Age of Ideology and Mass Politics’ in el-Khazen, Farid The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon: 1967-1976 (I B Tauris, London, 2000)
106 Sayigh 1999 op. cit., p. 190 does not name the agreement but mentions that there was one between Boustany, President Helou and Arafat and that it did not take place. Al Jazeera in its documentary harb-lubnan gives this agreement the name of the ‘7 Clause Agreement’ and explains that it was Prime Minister Karameh who rejected it.
107 See Chapter Three.
the lives of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, both on an individual basis, regarding the right to work and so forth, as well as on a collective political basis, where the Palestinian Resistance was given the opportunity to run the camps as well as conduct a revolution.

With hindsight, one can see that there was potential for problems deriving from the Cairo Agreement. In a sense, mixing the Lebanese state and Palestinian revolution together triggered problems for all parties involved: Lebanon, the Palestinians and Israel. Israel was attacked by Palestinian guerrillas and Lebanon became the victim of Israel's revenge attacks.

There was trouble brewing among these three parties even before the start of the civil war. The PLO moved its headquarters to Beirut in 1972. The Palestinian Resistance started to become more active towards Israel. Following the Munich Olympics attack, Israel started bombing southern Lebanon as revenge:

In September 1972, Lebanon paid a heavy price for PLO-Israeli violence. In direct retaliation for the Munich operation, Israel carried out the most intensive land and air raid in south Lebanon to date. The operation went on for two days and resulted in a high casualty toll.108

The attacks from Israel into Lebanon continued. The following year, on April 10, 1973, Israeli Special Forces killed three PLO leaders in Beirut. This affair has many different interpretations.109 However, the effect of it was increased instability within

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108 el-Khazen, Farid op. cit., p. 198 (NB! This author is known for his pro-Maronite views. Nonetheless, many of his contributions are valid; however, in relation to specific viewpoints, his bias should be kept in mind).
109 The Israelis landed in Beirut by sea meeting other Israelis already in Lebanon using false European passports. The attacks on Mohammad Youssef al-Majjar and Kamal Adwan from Fatah and PLO spokesman Kamal Nassar took place in Verdun and Sabra, both in Beirut. Among others killed were al-Majjar's wife, and three Palestinian guards. In the Verdun area one Lebanese
Lebanon, which had been taken by surprise. The next turning point for the Palestinian refugees was the Lebanese civil war.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{The Start of the Lebanese Civil War}

The Civil War is often blamed on the Palestinians because the PLO had become such an organisational force, with such a significant political influence, that it was considered a state within a state and thus a threat to the delicate nature of the Lebanese sectarian democracy.\textsuperscript{111} It is often thought that the Lebanese civil war started with Phalange (Maronite Militia) reacting to a shooting in a church in East Beirut by shooting at a bus carrying Palestinians on their way to Tal al Zaatar camp in April 1975. The shooting was also in part due to a general feeling among the Phalange that the PLO had become an uncontrollable force in Lebanon.

Following the start of the Civil War, Palestinian camps in East Beirut witnessed sieges. The refugee camps of Tal al Zaatar and Jisr al Basha in East Beirut, as well as Dbayeh camp close to Tripoli, suffered several sieges by the Phalange before they were eventually destroyed:

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\textsuperscript{110} The 1973 War (Yom Kippur) started on October 6\textsuperscript{th} 1973 when Egypt and Syria attacked Israeli troops on their territory occupied in 1967. There were 19 days of combat ending with a cease-fire brokered by Kissinger and Kosygin on October 21\textsuperscript{th}. For the PLO the war had consequences in that what followed was various diplomatic processes from which they could benefit. Peace talks were proposed by Kissinger and Gromyko in December 1973, however these never flourished as there were questions as to who would represent the PLO (the PLO itself? But that would contradict its covenant and so forth) See Becker, Julian 1984 op. cit., p. 102-105 for more detail and other conferences.

\textsuperscript{111} See for example Bulloch, John op. cit., 1977 Although it may be correct to assume that PLO armed resistance presence was a factor there are other issues too that are relevant, such as student protests, protesting not just in solidarity with the Palestinians, but raising other important issues, such as the need to reform the sectarian democracy, the need for more equality.
On 3 January 1976 the Maronite militias started a full blockade of food, fuel, and medical supplies to the Tal al-Zaatar, Jisr al-Basha, and Dbayya refugee camps.\footnote{Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 372}

This action led the Resistance to resort to using force against the Lebanese Phalange. Fighting continued the whole month of January. While this was happening in Tal al-Zaatar camp, joint Palestinian and Lebanese groups within the Lebanese National Movement\footnote{The LNM worked together with the PLO in what is called the ‘joint forces’. The Mourabitoun was also involved with the joint forces. The Mourabitoun was a Nasserist organisation led by Ibrahim Kleilat. Their alliances during the war were mostly with the joint forces and, following the Israeli invasion, with the Druze.} (LNM) attacked Damour and neighbouring villages.\footnote{Salibi, Kamal 1976 op. cit., p. 150} These villages are south of Beirut and are part of a Christian enclave. It was meant as a diversion to the Christian militias who were attacking Tal al-Zaatar camp.\footnote{More detail on military engagement of the two sides during the Tal al-Zaatar and Damour conflict available in Bulloch, John op. cit., p. 100-106} Immediately following the Damour attacks there were massacres in Karantina as yet another diversion, this time carried out by the Christian militia.\footnote{Karantina was a poor shantytown. During this episode there were also attacks on equally poor neighbouring Maslakh. Bulloch describes Karantina thus; “pitiful shanty towns, inhabited by the poorest of the poor – so abject was the poverty of Karantina that a previous government surrounded it by a high wall to prevent it offending the eyes of motorists” Bulloch, John op. cit., p. 194} There were indiscriminate killings of residents and bulldozing of most homes. These diversions did not stop the blockade of Tal al-Zaatar camp. By mid-March the Maronite Militias had reimposed their blockade on Tal al-Zaatar refugee camp and the district of Naba’a. In Tal al-Zaatar camp the situation went from bad to worse. By June, the smaller of the two camps, Jisr al-Basha, had fallen. Tal al-Zaatar camp was still under blockade and there was a serious shortage of medical supplies, food and water.\footnote{The lack of water and medicine had severe consequences; malnutrition and diseases. For more on this particular siege, referred to as ‘the siege of Tal al-Zaatar see Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 398} The end of the siege came in mid-August when the last water tap ran dry. Defenders of the camp could no longer fight and the camp fell to the Maronite
militias. Syria intervened in Lebanon, and a cease-fire was implemented. The cease-fire and settlement that was worked out resulted in a revised constitution and a new, written, national covenant, and the Cairo Agreement was fully implemented.

The 1982 Israeli Invasion

The immediate background to the Israeli invasion raises a variety of issues. The most immediate was the assassination attempt in June, 1982, on the Israeli Ambassador to London, Shlomo Argov, by a Palestinian group led by ‘Abu Nidal’. This gave the Israelis a pretext to invade Lebanon in order to wage a war on the Palestinians there. The other reason was that, prior to 1982, there was growing activity between the IDF and the Palestinians. Israel hoped it could secure a friendly northern neighbour by supporting the Christian Lebanese Forces. As the Israeli forces moved up the country it had to go through and ‘capture’ various towns and refugee camps. The longest battle between the PLO and the IDF was in Rashidiyyeh camp where the PLO managed to hold out an entire week. The Israelis

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118 The ICRC evacuated 334 wounded and 500 children in August. Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 400
119 Syria intervened prior to the fall of Tal-al Zaatar in June. In January they sent in Syrian backed Palestinian forces, and in June Syrian forces entered Lebanon. For more detail see Dawisha, Aeed _Syria and the Lebanese Crisis_ (St Martin’s Press, New York, 1980) p. 99-139. Most of the groups accepted Syrian intervention (even Maronite groups) except for Shamoun. Salibi op. cit., p. 155-159.
120 Salibi, Kamal op. cit., p. 159
121 According to British police it was Iraqi intelligence, not the PLO, who was behind this assassination attempt. (Guardian 7th March, 1983; also Sayigh 1999 op. cit., p. 523). Apparently the Israelis had been preparing their invasion prior to this event.
122 Researchers from Israel’s Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies name the main goals under the vision of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon as 1) creating a 28 mile PLO free zone in southern Lebanon; 2) making sure Syrian troops leave Lebanon; 3) destroying the PLO forces especially in Beirut; and 4) making a peace treaty with the Maronites, who they wanted as leaders of Lebanon. They mention two other implicit objectives by Sharon that would be the outcome of the other four; complete and eternal Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza strip, and the making of a Palestinian state in Jordan. For more information see Feldman, Shai and Rechnitz-Kijner, Heda _Deception, Consensus and War: Israel in Lebanon_ (Paper No. 27, October 1984, Tel Aviv University Press, Israel, 1984).
managed to move northwards eventually reaching Beirut. Originally, it seems that, the IDF was not intending to go all the way to Beirut, but to stay approximately 40 kilometres from the border.\(^{123}\) Whatever the motive, the IDF decided to attack Beirut. During ‘The Battle of Beirut’ the PLO and other Lebanese militias cooperated, depending on what area they were defending. For example in the southern suburbs the Shiite group, AMAL, helped defend the area with the PLO. There was also help from the LNM in other areas.\(^{124}\) The IDF had the Christian Lebanese militia (the Lebanese Forces) on its side.

In August 1982 the United States brokered a deal between the Israeli government and the PLO. The PLO was forced to move its forces, along with Chairman Arafat, out of Lebanon. They eventually moved to Tunis. ‘The United States promised safety and security for the Palestinians left behind, as the PLO would not be there to protect them. A multinational force was sent in’\(^ {125}\). After the evacuation of Chairman Arafat and the PLO, Lebanon elected a new President, Bashir Gemayel.

The sequence of events leading up to the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, the next major event, are as follows: on 10 September, US Multinational forces left. On 14 September, Italian, British, and French multinational forces left and the newly-elected President Gemayel was assassinated. On 15 September the IDF entered Beirut once again and surrounded Sabra and Shatila refugee camps (Bourj el Barajneh camp was surrounded by the Lebanese army at this point). At this stage

\(^{123}\) Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 528
\(^{124}\) Sayigh, Yezid 1999 op. cit., p. 528
\(^{125}\) Siegal, Ellen 2001 “After Nineteen Years: Sabra and Shatila Remembered” Middle East Policy (Vol. VIII, No 4, December 2001) p. 90 As an eyewitness, she remembers water, electricity, food and medicine being cut off by the IDF in West Beirut.
there was no strong PLO or Multinational Force to protect the refugees from what was about to happen.

On 15 and 16 September, Eitan and Amir Drori, commander of the IDF northern front, met Lebanese Forces intelligence chief Elie Hobeika (Hobayqa) ... and agreed that the militia would enter Sabra and Shatila to kill and capture remaining PLO personnel. The IDF transported several hundred militiamen to Shatila in the morning of 16 September, and provided wireless communications, ammunition, food rations, and night-time illumination for the next 48 hours while the Lebanese Forces conducted a systematic slaughter of every living thing, human or animal, they met. Much of the killing took place on the main road of Shatila, in plain view of Israeli posts on the ridge above. Israeli roadblocks in Sabra turned back terrified refugees trying to flee, and hundreds of prisoners were herded into the nearby sports stadium, where, in the presence of Israeli officers, Maronite gunmen led young men away for execution.126, 127

Estimates vary of the number of refugees who died in this massacre. Many refugees were missing and others were found dead in mass graves. There is the conservative Israeli estimate of 700 people dead; however, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported 1,500 dead and an independent international commission reported 2,750.128

Following the massacre the multinational forces decided it would be wise to return to Beirut. The Israeli troops withdrew from Beirut on 29 September, and stayed just south of Beirut for the following year.

126 Yezid Sayigh (Sayigh tells us that the Israelis also contributed to interrogation in the sports stadium; which is also documented in Schiff and Ya'ari Israel's Lebanon War (Unwin Paperbacks, London, 1986)
127 For eyewitness reports, see Shahid, Leila “Testimonies: The Sabra and Shatila Massacres: Eye-Witness Reports” Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxxii, No 1, Autumn 2002)
128 Sayigh, Yezid, 1999 op. cit., p. 539 (the international commission count is taken from “Israel in Lebanon: The Report of the International Commission to enquire into reported violations of International Law by Israel during its Invasion of Lebanon” (Ithaca Press, London, 1983)
What were the consequences of the PLO withdrawal from Beirut in 1982? First, they did not completely withdraw. Arafat returned to Tripoli. There were continued battles in Tripoli, particularly between Fatah and dissidents of Fatah. The second consequence of the PLO withdrawal was the marking of the end of the phase of the ‘hey-day’ of the Resistance movement in Lebanon. Lebanon was no longer a state of ‘sanctuary’ for the Resistance Movement. The Resistance had been active in armed action for over fifteen years, and the end of this phase was marked by major choices for the Resistance movement regarding what methods and programmes it should henceforth adopt. It was now scattered among various Arab states, and its options for the immediate future were difficult to assess.

**AMAL and the War of the Camps**

Between 1985 and 1987 another longer battle was to take place. This time the battle was between the Shiite group Afwaj al-Muqawama al-Lubnaniya, better known by its acronym AMAL, and the Palestinian refugees within the camps in Beirut and in Southern Lebanon. This confrontation is referred to as the ‘War of the Camps’, and

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129 For a general assessment of the Palestinian military performance see Sayigh, Yezid “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. xii, No. 4, Summer 1983
130 The argument started with a memorandum given by Abu Musa in 1983, discussing the problems the Resistance had faced since the Israeli invasion. The problems encountered were fragmentation of political parties and criticism of the Fez Accord calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; thereby implicitly acknowledging Israel). For excerpts of the memorandum see “Arab Reports and Analysis” in *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol. xxiii, No. 1, Fall 1983) (NB! Abu Musa was within the opposition inside Fatah when he opposed the Fez plan. The PFLP, PFLP-GC, Sai'qa and PPSF also opposed the plan) For more on the PLO following its withdrawal from Lebanon see Sahliyeh, Emile *The PLO After the Lebanon War* (Westview Press, London, 1986)
led to the destruction of many camps and wide dispersal of, and casualties among, the Palestinians.

The Shiite - Palestinian relationship is a complicated one. Initially it seems that Palestinians and Shiites, particularly in Southern Lebanon, got along and "Palestinian organisations had successfully recruited Shiites into their ranks for several years. At the same time, however, Palestinians competed with Shiites in the local labour markets, engendering resentment". The Shiites started to feel that they were being dominated by Palestinian forces in their own country. This may seem strange as the PLO and armed guerrillas were forced to leave Lebanon in both 1982, from Beirut, and again in 1983, from Tripoli. However, armed fighters had returned again and there was rearming within the camps.

AbuKhalil explains the re-emergence of the AMAL movement and sympathy for it by the common perception that the PLO was guilty of excesses and misconduct which in turn alienated the Lebanese majority in Southern Lebanon. When the Israelis first invaded in 1978, they were able to manipulate and take advantage of the rift between the Lebanese inhabitants of Southern Lebanon and the Palestinians.

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133 For evidence of this Brynen points to Israeli intelligence that estimated that about 2000 Palestinian fighters had returned to Beirut by 1984. Whereas the Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS-Dayan Center, Tel Aviv 1984-85) estimated that there were about 10,000 armed Palestinians in Lebanon. However how many of these fighters were returning fighters and how many were Palestinian residents in the camps that took up arms to protect themselves in the war of the camps, remains unknown. Brynen, Rex 1990 op. cit., nt 30, p.230
134 AbuKhalil refers to two other factors involved in the re-emergence of AMAL. The Iranian revolution and the charismatic leader Musa al-Sadr. AbuKhalil, As'ad “Shiites and Palestinians: Underlying Causes of the AMAL Palestinian Conflict” p. 10 in Hagopian, Elaine AMAL and the Palestinians: Understanding the Battle of the Camps (Arab World Issues, Occasional Papers, Number 9, Association of Arab-American Graduates Inc, Massachusetts, 1985)
Thus, according to AbuKhalil, initially, it seemed that the Lebanese inhabitants in Southern Lebanon welcomed the Israelis, although this was to change later on.\textsuperscript{135}

The War of the Camps included Sabra and Shatila and Bourj el Barajneh in Beirut and Rashadiyeh in Southern Lebanon. Bourj el Barajneh suffered several sieges, when food and fuel were not getting into the camp and there was constant shelling and sniper fire.\textsuperscript{136} Shatila camp too was under siege several times during this phase of the war.\textsuperscript{137} There were several ‘rounds’ of this war and several sieges. The first one began on 19 May, 1985,\textsuperscript{138} in Sabra camp and then moved on to both Shatila and Bourj el Barajneh. This round of fighting ended on 17 June, 1985, with a ceasefire between the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF)\textsuperscript{139} and AMAL in Damascus. With this agreement the Palestinians agreed to give up their heavy weapons.\textsuperscript{140} There were still clashes between AMAL and the Southern Camps

\textsuperscript{135} AbuKhalil in discussing AMAL attitudes to the Israeli invasion, mentions that although not uniform, many AMAL regional leaders and members initially welcomed the Israelis, because of the three factors referred to above (PLO excesses and misconduct, Iranian Revolution, and the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr), although AMAL did eventually shift to an anti-Israel posture. AbuKhalil, As'ad 1985 op. cit.,

\textsuperscript{136} There are witness accounts of the sieges of Bourj el Barajneh see Rosemary Sayigh’s article “The third siege of Bourj Berajineh camp: a woman’s testimony” Race and Class (Vol. 29, part 1, Summer 1987). The sieges were not yet over when this testimony was written. For another eye-witness account see Cutting, Pauline Children of the Siege She was a nurse who stayed at the hospital in Bourj el Barajneh camp during the sieges. Both testimonies cooperate certain gruesome elements of the siege, for example, during cease-fires when women were supposed to be allowed to leave the camp to get food (fuel was not allowed) they would be sniped at and killed. Many were not allowed to return and some had their accompanying children killed in front of them.

\textsuperscript{137} There are eyewitness accounts of the Shatila sieges too; Sayigh, Rosemary Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (Zed Books, London, 1994), and Giannou, Dr. Chris Besieged: A Doctor’s Story of Life and Death in Beirut (Olive Branch Press, New York, 1990).

\textsuperscript{138} This is the day the actual fighting began, however, AbuKhalil traces the beginning of this first round to May 12\textsuperscript{th} when the new leader of AMAL in the south, Daoud Daoud pronounced “We want their [Palestinians] return, but only to punish them” (Al-Nahar 13 May 1985). AbuKhalil, As’ad 1985 op. cit., p. 12

\textsuperscript{139} At the time the PNSF consisted of the PFLP (rejoined PLO in 1987), the PFLP-GC, the PPSF, Saiqa and the Fatah dissidents of Abu Musa (later called Fatah Intifada). These groups were pro-Syria.

\textsuperscript{140} This clause seems irrelevant as the Palestinians did not have any heavy weapons in the refugee camps. As one journalist put it “the Palestinians ... will be able to keep their assault rifles, and other light personal weapons which leaves the situation exactly how it was before the siege began” Kifner, John Palestinians in Settlements Bitter at Syria’s Role New York Times, June 24\textsuperscript{th}, 1985. in Hagopian, Elaine ed. op. cit.,
following the agreement and again in Beirut in September and March 1986. On 19 May, 1986, the second round began. As before, AMAL surrounded the camps with tanks and the fighting started. Syrian troops intervened and the fighting died down in late June. However, more fighting began in what was to be called the third round, which

began with an incident September 29 at the Rashidiyya refugee camp ... in which Palestinians allegedly fired on an AMAL patrol. AMAL immediately surrounded the camp, demanding the surrender of all arms inside it. The demand was refused. By late October, the fighting had spread to Sidon and Beirut. In an effort to relieve the pressure on Rashidiyya, Palestinian forces in Sidon broke through AMAL lines November 24 to seize the strategic hilltop village of Masdusha, overlooking the coastal highway south of the city. AMAL's military weaknesses became evident, Syrian special forces reportedly aided it in the battle for Shatila. At Sidon, Israel launched multiple air-strikes against Palestinian positions around the city.\(^{141}\)

The Beirut camps were heavily shelled and there was a blockade of food and medical supplies. Refugees died, not only due to fighting but to starvation and sickness. Again, Syria intervened and on April 7 lifted the sieges on the refugee camps.

There are many important issues regarding the War of the Camps. First, AMAL and their Shiite counterpart, Hizb'allah, were fighting throughout the 'War of the Camps'. Therefore, AMAL was fighting on two fronts. In addition, the Mourabitoun\(^{142}\) were also supporting the Palestinians, thereby adding an extra enemy to fight. Second, Syria intervened several times on behalf of AMAL and helped to negotiate cease-fires. Syria's role in the War of the Camps is instructive, not only when looking at the bigger 'Lebanese picture', where Syria allied itself with different sects, but also when looking at the 'Palestinian picture'. Regarding the

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\(^{141}\) Brynen, Rex 1990 op. cit., p. 190
\(^{142}\) See footnote 113
former, Syrian intervention on behalf of AMAL was not necessarily because AMAL was one of its closest allies, but because Syria did not want the Palestinians and the leftist Lebanese groups, including the Mourabitoun,\(^\text{143}\) to take control. This leads to the ‘Palestinian picture’, where the Syrians wanted to disarm the Palestinian militants. There is also another factor: the opposition groups supported by Syria. In effect, Syria wanted to get rid of Fatah activists, but during the battle of the camps, the Palestinian groups, united in order to survive. This was a miscalculation on Syria’s and AMAL’s part.\(^\text{144}\)

In April, 1987, Syria took up positions surrounding the camps in Beirut and managed to bring an end to AMAL’s sieges of the camps. Later in April the Palestinians and AMAL negotiated an end to the siege of the camp in southern Lebanon. The siege was officially over. According to Abbas, the War of the Camps led to 80% of Shatila being destroyed, 60% of Bourj el Barajneh, and 40% of Rashidiyeh.\(^\text{145}\)

However, Syrian forces were now present. Brynen explains that “in the context of continued tensions between the PLO and Damascus, the Syrian (and AMAL) presence in Beirut meant the continuation of a de facto siege of the West Beirut refugee camps”.\(^\text{146}\) In May, 1987, the Cairo agreement was abrogated by a resolution adopted by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. This was very

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\(^\text{143}\) It is not entirely known how much the Mourabitoun and the LNM helped the Palestinians during the ‘war of the camps’. The Mourabitoun admitted in interviews with al-Jazeera (harb lubnan) that they did help (from outside the camps) the Palestinians.

\(^\text{144}\) For an insight into Syria’s role in the first round of the war of the camps (also a brief analysis on Syria’s earlier interventions) see Aruri, Naseer “Pax-Syriana and the Palestinians in Lebanon” in Hagopian, Elaine ed 1985 op. cit.,

\(^\text{145}\) Abbas, Mahmoud et al. op. cit., p. 381

problematic for the various political groups left in Lebanon. In addition to these external problems, the PLO in Lebanon suffered internal problems too. There were revived problems between Fatah and Abu Musa’s Fatah (Fatah dissidents, pro-Syrian) in May 1988 in Shatila camp and Bourj el Barajneh camp. The latter conquered over the former. However, in the southern camps, the situation was different as they were still being occupied by Israel and did not have Syrian intervention. Therefore, the Arafat loyalists had more power there although power struggles also occurred there during this time. Fatah’s stronghold still remains in the south.

**Post-Taif**

The Taif Agreement marks the end of the Civil War in Lebanon. It was signed in Taif, Saudi Arabia, in 1989. It stipulated more distribution of power among the various sects in Parliament. The sectarian system was to stay in Lebanon for the time being: the troika remains the same - the President is Maronite, the Prime Minister Sunni, and the Speaker of the House remains Shiite – although the powers given to each of these positions changed to allow more equality. Following the war, there were many important issues to be dealt with, such as rebuilding Lebanon and dealing with the Lebanese displaced by the war. The Palestinians were, however, not part of the Taif agreement and their status in Lebanon remained, and still remains, precarious. They are no longer governed by the Cairo Agreement and therefore do not have any rights in Lebanon. Instead they are governed by various
laws issued by the Ministry of Interior regarding their status, including issues of land ownership, work permits, and travel documents.

Although the Civil War in Lebanon is over, Syria’s role in Lebanon is not. Since its first intervention in 1976, Syria has had extensive influence over Lebanon and Lebanese politics. Syria’s interests in Lebanon extend from security issues to economic and political ones. In relation to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon Syria’s sponsorship of the ‘rejectionist groups’,147 as well as its hard line towards Israel, makes it perceived as the country that, as Bashar Asad has said, ‘will never be a sword to stab the Palestinians in the back’.148 This may be the case, but what does it really say about Syrian intentions towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? Syria has a firm hand regarding the current ‘peace process’ and what it believes the outcome should be for the refugees: 1) the refugee problem must be solved as a whole (not on a country by country basis); 2) the solution to the refugee problem must be based upon the ‘right of return’; and 3) the Palestinian Authority should not be alone in agreeing the fate of the refugees with the Israelis. The Arab host countries must also be involved in these negotiations.149 Syria also has other intentions with the ‘peace process’, namely to recover the occupied Golan Heights. There are two main arguments regarding Syria’s intentions vis-à-vis the ‘peace process’. Some argue that Syria wants to keep the Palestinians in Lebanon as a card to play against Israel in order to recover the Golan Heights. This relates to point three above, namely that any agreement with Israel about refugees should include

147 The ‘rejectionist groups’ or the Alliance of Palestinian Forces is an alliance of Palestinian groups who oppose the Oslo process. They are based in and sponsored by Syria. These groups will be further explained below and in Chapter 6.
148 Interview with Bashar Asad in al-Hayat by Joseph Samaha, October 27th 2000. Taken from Sayigh, Rosemary “Palestinian refugees in Lebanon: implantation, transfer or return?” Middle East Policy (Vol. 8, No. 1, March 2001)
149 Sayigh, Rosemary 2001 op. cit., p. 7
the Arab host states. Others, (including Lebanese Maronites and others who are sceptical to Syria’s intentions both in Lebanon and regarding the ‘peace process’ as well as the pro-Oslo Palestinian groups) argue that Syria prioritises itself over the refugee issue. According to this view, it is argued that “Syria ... values relations with Shiite and Maronite leaderships more highly”\textsuperscript{150} than with the ‘rejectionist’ groups.

In terms of Palestinian politics much has happened since the end of the Lebanese Civil War. The PLO moved to Tunis in 1982 and 1983. As we have seen in this chapter, they were unable to protect and (in many cases) provide for the refugees who remained in Lebanon. Meanwhile, in the Occupied Territories an Intifada (popular uprising) broke out in 1987. The PLO remained in Tunis but returned to the Occupied Territories in 1994 after they had signed in 1993 their first, of many, peace treaty with Israel. This ‘peace process’ between the PLO and Israel started in 1991 with an international peace conference, sponsored by the US and the Soviet Union in Madrid. Israel and Arab delegates (Palestinians represented alongside Jordan – not independently) were invited; however, these talks did not prove successful. They did, however, lead to secret negotiations between the PLO and Israelis in Oslo which did end with an official agreement – The Declaration of Principles. In this agreement, there was official mutual recognition, in other words, the PLO recognised the state of Israel and the Israelis recognised that there did exist a Palestinian people with a right to self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza. The agreement stipulated that during a five year interim period, Israel would gradually withdraw from parts of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Other issues

\textsuperscript{150} Sayigh, Rosemary 2001 op. cit., p. 7
related to the conflict, such as, Jerusalem, settlements, security arrangements, borders, and importantly in the context of this thesis, refugees, were to be dealt with at a later stage. The withdrawal from the Occupied Territories came with several conditions, mostly about securing Israeli security. Because this treaty was the result of secret talks, there was no referendum by the Palestinian people. Similar agreements were signed in 1995 and in 1998 in Wye. These agreements re-state that Israel will withdraw from the Occupied Territories conditional upon Israeli security, however; again the important issues to the conflict were not properly addressed. Similarly, life for the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza did not improve. Although the Israeli army had withdrawn from some towns and villages in the West Bank and Gaza, these towns and villages were isolated from other towns and villages, with the Israelis controlling the areas around them as well as the main roads. Palestinian sovereignty, or at least partial sovereignty, was supposed to have happened by 1998. This partial-sovereignty had not happened by 1998, nor has it happened today as the Palestinian Authority (PA) is unable to have jurisdiction over its people, unable to provide security, unable to allow its people to travel freely within what is meant to be its own territory, and, as we have already seen in the previous chapter, unable to provide basic provisions of citizenship such as passports.

The year 2000 proved to be a year that started with hope for Israeli withdrawal but ended with violence, reoccupation, and failed peace plans. In May, the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak announced the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Southern Lebanon after 22 years of occupation. This was greeted by Palestinians as a sign of Israeli intentions to withdraw from Arab lands including their own. In July, Arafat and Barak met in Camp David to discuss yet another peace treaty. The Camp David
talks collapsed, as the two parties fail to agree on, most notably, Jerusalem. Two months later, Ariel Sharon151 visited the al-Aqsa mosque, provoking violent reactions from Palestinians. A second intifada began and fighting erupted between Palestinians and the Israeli army. In response Israel decided to re-occupy the Palestinian Territories. The next month Egypt hosted a peace summit at Sharm el-Sheikh trying to end the confrontation between the two parties, but the plan did not succeed.

The following years are marked with violence as well as the Israeli construction of a wall to enclose the West Bank. In 2002 there was a marked increase of assassinations and imprisonment of Palestinian leaders by the Israelis. Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah was besieged with most of it demolished and Arafat unable to leave. Reoccupation of land as well as assassinations of Palestinian leaders continued by the Israelis as well as violence from the second intifada and suicide attacks by Palestinians. In 2003, an Arab peace initiative to the Arab-Israeli conflict was proposed in Saudi Arabia called the Saudi Plan. It insists on Israeli withdrawal from the Occupied Territories in return for Arab recognition of Israel. The latest peace treaty is the Roadmap presented to the PA and the Israelis in 2003. Again this treaty is not without problems, the main ones including vagueness on definitions, sequencing (who does what when), and the lack of real issues like refugees, as was the problem with all of the agreements above. The agreement is more about ending violence, halting new settlements, reform of the Palestinian institutions and Israel’s security. All the other issues are to be addressed in final status negotiations.

151 Sharon has been accused of being a main player in the Sabra and Shatila Massacre, see p. 174-175.
Although unofficial, the Geneva initiative, signed by Amran Mizna and Qadoura Faris in 2003, is the agreement that actually deals with most of the vital issues. In it Jerusalem is addressed whereby Jerusalem is to be split. East Jerusalem will be the capital of the Palestinian State, although the Jewish quarters in this area will be under Israeli control. The Old City is under Palestinian control with two exceptions, the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter. Refugees are also addressed – with the solution to the problem being according to UN General Assembly Resolution 194 and Security Council Resolution 242. Palestinians may receive compensation and they will be able to return to the new State of Palestine. Refugees wanting to return to Israel will have to gain the approval of the Israeli authorities. Although this solution remains unpopular for refugees wanting to return to their original homes, this agreement does at least try to deal with the issue. Nevertheless, the fact that this agreement was made unofficially shows how broken the peace process is at the moment.

What seems to be the problem with all of these agreements (save the unofficial Geneva accords which has other problems) is that they all neglect the important issues such as refugees, Jerusalem, and borders, which are the core problems to the conflict. In addition the agreements are conditioned upon Israeli security, which the PA cannot guarantee. The PA cannot guarantee this security for practical reasons, such as not having jurisdiction in towns, police stations being demolished by the Israelis and so forth. Arafat, for example in 2003, was accused of ‘not doing enough to stop terror’, while he was imprisoned in his Ramallah compound. There are other, more serious, reasons too, that may be related to this, including disunity between Palestinians of those who believe in the peace process and that Israel will eventually
withdraw, and those who do not.

As a result of the many peace agreements signed by the PLO and Israel, there exist many groups who oppose this peace process. These groups joined to form the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) in 1993 and originally include ten factions: the PFLP, the DFLP, the PFLP-GC, the PLF, the PPSF, the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party, Fatah Intifada, Saiqa, PIJ, and HAMAS. The APF is based in Damascus and has Syrian sponsorship. The relationship with Syria is not new as many of the groups were already headquartered in Syria or Lebanon prior to the formation of the APF. As we shall see later, many of these groups are popular in Lebanon, not only because many of them were actually founded in Lebanon, but precisely because they do not agree with the Peace Process.

The Peace Process and its many agreements, as well as the events in the Occupied Territories are worrying for the Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon for several reasons:

1) The failed peace agreements, the continued Israeli occupation and the intifada show the refugees in Lebanon that Israel is not willing to make peace with the Palestinians. Even if the Israelis were willing to follow the agreements a second point is that:

2) None of the agreements bring up the refugee issue properly by addressing how the refugee issue might be resolved. Furthermore, the status of Palestinians who were displaced by the 1967 War is not addressed at all in any of the agreements.

3) The agreements stipulate a two-state solution where a Palestinian state is based in parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thereby worrying refugees originally from what is considered Israel proper about being able to return there.
4) Based on point three the entire issue of right of return and compensation, as outlined in the previous chapter, has not been adequately discussed. The Roadmap stipulates an ‘agreed, just, fair, and realistic solution to the refugee issue’ which is not only worrying as it does not mention ‘the right of return’ but also because the word ‘realistic’ is perceived to be in the Israeli sense. In other words, the perception is that the Israelis consider a right of return and adequate compensation as ‘unrealistic’.

5) Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are in a highly precarious situation. Many worry that, hypothetically, if a provisional Palestinian state were occur because of the Roadmap and be able to grant citizenship or at least passports, at the same time as the refugee issue is not resolved the “[G]overnment of Lebanon might attempt to deport some Palestinians to the new entity … Indeed, a protracted scenario where final political agreement on the refugee issue might be delayed for many years could create serious problems for refugees in Lebanon. Faced with a lack of imminent resolution of the issue, the Lebanese government might intensify economic and legal pressures on Palestinian refugees to encourage them to leave the country by whatever means possible” 152. This scenario does not seem implausible considering what has been shown in both this chapter on the historical context as well as the previous chapter dealing with the legal issues surrounding the Palestinian refugees.

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152 Brynen, Rex "The Roadmap and the Refugees” Presentation at the Stocktaking Conference on Palestinian Refugee Research Ottawa, Canada, June 17-20, 2003, p. 5-6
Conclusion: Understanding the Palestinian Situation in Lebanon

The historical context surrounding the Palestinian refugees involves international, regional and local dimensions. In the section of this chapter focusing on the nakba, the myths surrounding the 'Voluntary Exodus' are challenged. The literature focusing on voluntary migration seems to be vulnerable to the new documents that have been declassified. There is still discussion as to whether the refugee flow occurred because of policy, or whether it was an outcome of the war. No matter which viewpoint one takes, the Palestinian refugees have not been able to return.

The second part of this chapter focused on the formation of the Palestinian Resistance, the 1967 War and the Jordanian Civil War. Prior to the 1967 War the Palestinian Resistance believed that pan-Arabism was the answer to their problems. Others within the Resistance were sceptical about pan-Arabism. The 1967 War had several consequences: first, Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip and more Palestinians became refugees. Second, the Arab states were faced with the new reality of Israeli power and occupation. Third, the Palestinian Resistance, because of this second point, realised that they had to be more independent and fight for Palestine before the Arab world could change, as had been the ideal of pan-Arabism. Another issue was change of location of the Resistance from Palestine to other host states. The September war in Jordan forced the Resistance to change their base of operations, and again reinforced the view that they could not always rely on the unending support of Arab regimes. The Palestinian Resistance did try to take the initiative from inside Israel and the Occupied Territories, and pursued military campaigns from there. However, this did not succeed, so they shifted their bases to Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. "From then on it was the reality of exile that shaped
strategy and tactics and determined the balance between military, political, social, and institutional activity".\(^{153}\) This also involved them in the Arab politics of their host countries and they were thus “exposed to massive Arab state intervention”.\(^{154}\) The move from Palestinian soil to host countries had massive implications for the movement, and for the Palestinians in exile, in particular during the September War in Jordan and the Lebanese Civil war.

The period starting from approximately around the time of Black September until 1982 was marked by increasing political, organisational and military activity in Lebanon. In addition to this, it was a time that included “union action, cultural endeavours, and the building of social institutions”.\(^{155}\) Apart from this, the Palestinian Resistance was joined by other Lebanese groups and parties who were disillusioned with the status quo. The Lebanese civil war changed the situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon drastically. There were many massacres and sieges at different camps, and the PLO was forced to withdraw. The end of the Cairo Agreement meant that they could no longer carry out their revolution from Lebanon. The Taif agreement ended the war in Lebanon. The Palestinians living in post-civil war Lebanon do not enjoy the rights they had during the Cairo Agreement. Meanwhile, the PLO has moved back to Palestinian soil and is involved with a peace process that, so far, has not been able to adequately address the refugee issue. All of the above sets the scene for, and gives a context to, the Palestinian refugees living in the camps today. Today, they live, after over fifty years in exile, in harsh and uncertain conditions.

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\(^{153}\) Sayigh, Yezid 1992 op. cit., p. 265

\(^{154}\) Ibid. p. 265

This chapter seems to indicate many reasons for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon to mobilise into groups and (re)act against their conditions. There is clearly a perceived injustice, not just in terms of their general living conditions and lack of adequate legal status and protection, which are all consequences of this historical context, but also in terms of a) isolation, alienation, and (often) hostility from their host state and b) the 'bigger picture' of the injustice done to them throughout their diaspora history – the nakba, their experiences in Jordan as well as their experiences in Lebanon. All of these experiences – forced migration, hostility from host states, massacres - are added to the Palestinian refugee (collective) identity. With nothing much left to lose, it would seem likely that the refugees in Lebanon would try to not only mobilise, but to act on this (perceived) injustice.
Chapter Five

The Structures Surrounding the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Introduction

The societal context is of utmost importance in any kind of understanding of a) people’s definition of themselves, b) people’s definition of their collective identity, and c) people’s definition of who constitutes the ‘other’ and potential threats. With an understanding of the societal context, these questions can all be answered. However, the societal context by itself may also be able to create an understanding of political mobilisation. By itself it can explain the social forces at work in the surroundings of the Palestinian refugees living in the refugee camps. These social forces, it will be argued, do in fact have a bearing upon mobilisation. These social forces include the present structural context as well as historical and legal contexts outlined earlier. Structures will be looked at through the lenses of Lebanese governmental policies for Palestinians and the Palestinian refugee’s interpretation of these policies. As we saw earlier in the historical chapter, policies regarding Palestinian refugees have changed during the years, for instance regarding laws treating them as foreigners in comparison to the more tolerant years of the Cairo Agreement. UNRWA and its role in the camps and lives of the refugees will also be examined. The structural context also allows for an examination of human needs: what needs are met and what needs are not met. This final part on human needs will be useful for the next two chapters on organisations and identity, as human needs (or
lack thereof) are also subject to interpretation, and can be seen as mobilising factors in and of themselves.

**Governmental Policies Towards Refugees and *tawteen***

When the refugees arrived in 1948 most of them believed their situation to be temporary. The UN too believed it to be temporary. Even after the creation of UNRWA there was no comprehension that the refugees would still be living in refugee camps over half a century later. The conditions in the refugee camps in the early years were improvised and primitive, as it was originally thought that the emergency relief and tents were needed only on a temporary basis.

I am Palestinian and my family came here in 1948 like most of the other Palestinians [here in Lebanon] ... The situation was very miserable [then] ... We lived and still live in a situation that is non-human, a very terrible situation. During my childhood ... we lived in tents between the sewage and when it used to rain everything including the tents used to float.¹

Today the tents have been replaced with concrete blocks or mud and wooden structures with tin ceilings. The standard of living remains rather basic. In Lebanon the camps are restricted in size and are not allowed to move outwards, therefore the concrete shelters have had to be built upwards. Water, sewage and electricity are available, although not in constant supply. The Palestinian Return Centre (PRC)

¹ Interview with Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila Camp, Interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
reports that there is a lack of ‘general basic environmental prerequisites for healthy living’ in the camps in Lebanon.\(^2\)

The lack of proper drainage, pure drinking water, and the proliferation of garbage dumps have made all the camps enormous health hazards...

Throughout the camps, the issue of electricity supplies has reached its most critical and disturbing stage. For despite the growing need for electricity, a great many Palestinians were unable to renew their supplies with the various networks in Lebanon after failing to pay their monthly bills ... [T]he companies ... have totally ignored the economic hardships facing the refugees. For one thing, the mere instalment of a meter costs half a million liras...

Additionally, it should be noted that the running of telephone lines to the camps is absolutely forbidden,\(^3\)\(^4\)

The Lebanese government does not help the Palestinian’s social conditions in the camps. Reasons for this vary, the most common reason being that Lebanon does not have the finances to help the Palestinians. They have too many problems with the reconstruction work following the war. There is also an element of not wanting the Palestinians to settle in Lebanon, therefore, giving them civil and human rights in terms of better social conditions and in terms of their rights to work and so forth are not priorities, as many believe this would give the wrong picture to the Palestinians and the world. This issue is called ‘tawteen’, meaning Palestinian settlement in Lebanon, and is discussed in greater length below.

\(^2\) For more general information see Rosemary Sayigh who describes the general conditions of the refugee camps in the 1980s in her section on ‘Camp as Habitat’ in her book Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (Zed Books, London, 1994) p. 38-41. There doesn’t seem to have been that much change in the general conditions. The main difference is that the camps are more crowded due to natural increase of refugees as well as other refugees from destroyed camps moving into the surviving ones. See also UNRWA web-page www.unrwa.org

\(^3\) Exclusive Report on the Palestinian Camps in Lebanon’. The research conducted for this report was by Majed al Zeed. Available at www.prc.org.uk

\(^4\) During my research I too witnessed what this report is referring to. The smell of the rubbish dumps is overwhelming. The rivers of rats that appear in the evening are evidence of the poor environmental conditions. Water and electricity are in short supply. I was told though, that a lot of the electricity in the camps is there illegally. When I asked what this meant people explained that they were bringing it in through using extensions to the various existing circuits and lines. Phone lines are indeed still forbidden, and when I asked why I never got a clear answer, apart from hearing complaints by Lebanese that the Palestinians do not pay their bills.
In contrast to present conditions, the Palestinians did enjoy some years of better civil rights. In 1969, Lebanon and the PLO signed the Cairo Agreement.\(^5\) The Cairo Agreement meant that the Palestinians had rights in Lebanon, including the right to work and the right to residence, and also autonomy of the refugee camps. Commando activity by the Palestinian resistance was also allowed. With the Cairo Agreement the Palestinian refugees and the Palestinian Resistance were given opportunities and chances in both the political and socio-economic sphere. These chances and opportunities included the start of the Palestinian Revolution, where the Palestinian Resistance Movement was able to operate politically within the camps and carry out raids from Southern Lebanon into Israel. Furthermore, with autonomy of the camps, there was a flourishing of popular committees, run by the various political groups in the camps. People were able to rebuild their homes, hospitals were opened by the Palestinian Red Crescent society\(^6\) and so forth. This ‘liberation’ of the camps did go through difficult periods. This was felt on two levels, that of the individual level and at the Palestinian Resistance Level. On the individual level, regarding the rebuilding of houses, people were ecstatic as building materials previously not allowed could now be obtained. But there arose clashes. One man told Sayigh:

> When the Revolution came to the camp, everybody wanted to build. This created problems between neighbours; ‘You are too close to me!’; ‘You shouldn’t open a window here!’; It was the role of the Kifah Musellah\(^7\) or the Popular Committee to solve such problems.\(^8\)

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\(^5\) This is also explained in Chapter Three.


\(^7\) Kifah Musellah refers to the Palestinian Military Force of the Armed Struggle. They were part of a special unit drawn from the PLA and had been trained in Iraq, Syria and Egypt. Sayigh mentions that there were very often rifts between the Kifah Musellah and the residents in the camps as the camp residents felt that the Kifah Musellah were arrogant and treated the residents as if they were living in a barracks expecting to be saluted and so forth. Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 94

\(^8\) Abu Mohammad in Sayigh, Rosemary 1994 op. cit., p. 92
For the Palestinian Resistance Movement immediately following the Cairo accords, the trial and error of liberation was about how to deal with the autonomy of the camps. The most pressing issue was the establishment of the 'local committees' that were mentioned in the Cairo Accords. The popular committees still exist today serving 'quasi-municipal' \(^9\) functions.\(^{10}\)

Through the Cairo Accords then, the Palestinian refugees in the camps were given the green light to run their own affairs, politically, militarily and socially within the camps. Similarly the Palestinian people were given more civil rights. This atmosphere enabled a 'revolutionary environment' to exist, where the political and social groups could build schools, hospitals and so forth within the camp. All of this was possible while Lebanon remained a 'sanctuary'.\(^{11}\) As we saw in the history chapter this did not last very long. Even before the Lebanese Civil War started there were troubles between the Palestinian Resistance and Israeli retaliation as well as between the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese government. Brynen sites Chairman Arafat saying the following after the implementation of the Cairo Accords:

Commando action in Lebanon is an established fact, as evidenced by our presence in the streets, in the camps and in the border villages. However we cannot base our action in Lebanon on the *fait accompli* alone. The commando movement needs to deepen itself from the human, ideological, and struggle point of view. This cannot be achieved, either in Lebanon or anywhere else, except through the commando movement tying itself to the masses. To depend


\(^{10}\) For more information on popular committees see Chapter Six.

\(^{11}\) Brynen in his book describes Lebanon as a sanctuary for the Palestinian Resistance Movement during the years between 1969 and 1982 where the PLO in a sense 'institutionalised' a Resistance Palestinian Identity and put the movement on the political map, regionally and internationally. His analysis of sanctuary involves both state support and popular support, as well as issues of risk for the host state regarding the target state, their military capabilities and acceptable risk. Brynen, Rex *Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon* (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990)
on the *fait accompli* itself alone means depending on force alone. Force evokes force, which means a clash between us and the Lebanese army. Even if we win in this clash we must ask ourselves: what next? Lebanese territory is not what we want. What we want is Palestinian territory. The Lebanese army is not our enemy, but our enemy is Israel. We were forced to fight Lebanon despite ourselves, and in order to stop what we thought were attempts to liquidate the Palestinian revolution there. We have to stop those attempts, and to draw the attention of the Arab nation to what was happening\(^2\)

One of the interesting points within this extract from Chairman Arafat's statement is when he talks about the commando movement tying itself to the masses. This relates to the political consciousness and the willingness to participate of refugees within the camps during this time. From my field work the impression relayed to me was that all of the men as well as most of the women who were of age during the revolution participated. It was a time when there was hope and a belief that the Palestinian Resistance was capable of, if not winning all the battles, then at least becoming known to the world and showing the Israelis that they were a movement capable of resistance. This picture is a complete contrast to how things stand today, where Lebanon is no longer considered a 'sanctuary' state. Regarding the rest of Chairman Arafat's extract, it was rather prophetic of the events that were to come.

The Lebanese Civil War was a long war that had devastating consequences for everyone involved. For the Palestinian refugees there was increased insecurity as allies and enemies were constantly changing. Worse still, the reality of the Palestinians being unpopular in Lebanon came to the fore. With the sieges and massacres of various camps\(^3\), the Palestinians, although they still had light weapons for their protection, were unable to defend themselves properly. With the end of the Civil War, so too came the end of the Cairo Agreement: no more commando activity

\(^{12}\) Arafat in al-Ahram (newspaper published in Cairo), 7 November 1969, from Brynen, Rex 1990 *op. cit.*, p. 52

\(^{13}\) For example Tal al Zaatar, Shatila, and Bourj Barajneh Camp. See the Chapter Four for more detail.
on Lebanese soil, no more guns for Palestinians. There is a marked change in attitude towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon following the Civil War. The Taif Agreement that governs post-Civil War Lebanon ended the allowances made to Palestinians under the Cairo Accords to one where various Lebanese laws were issued to govern them. As pointed out in the Chapter Three, Palestinian refugees are now treated as foreigners and do not have the right to work or own property. The camps in the south have checkpoints upon arrival and departure. Why is the Lebanese government so strict towards the Palestinian refugees? Apart from public opinion, Lebanon does have domestic and international pressures. Domestically, there are three issues to problems vis-à-vis a) giving Palestinians civil rights and b) going further and allowing permanent settlement (tawteen). These issues are economic as well as a combination of demographics and politics. Regarding the former, relating to both economic and financial issues, the Lebanese government is trying to rebuild its country following a long civil war and therefore has pressing issues with its economy. The second (and third) reason is demographics. Because of the delicate nature of the Lebanese political system, giving Palestinians civil rights or accepting permanent settlement would have serious repercussions as this would imbalance the different sects. This issue of tawteen is extremely sensitive in Lebanon. It is sensitive to other Arab governments as well as to Palestinians themselves. It is a term that “is generally used in connection with the long-held assumption among Palestinians and Arab governments that the international community intend to liquidate the ‘refugee problem’ by incorporating the Palestinians within the host states (Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon) and the areas of Palestine in which they sought refuge (the West Bank and Gaza)”.

demographic issue is sensitive, particularly to the Christian Maronite population which would be in a minority, and the whole political system would probably need to change.\footnote{Lebanon is a sectarian state based on the 1932 Census where it showed that the Maronites constituted 29\%, Sunni Muslims 22.5\% and Shiite Muslim 20\% of the population. The rest of the population as stated in the 1932 Census include minority religious groups: Druze, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Protestant, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholic, Jews (still a small community in Beirut), Syriac Orthodox, Syriac Catholic, Chaldean Orthodox, Chaldean Catholic and various other sects. Since 1943, when Lebanon gained its independence, it has relied on the confessional National Pact which stipulated that political representation is based on the sizes of the various sects as shown in the 1932 Census. There has not been a new Census since the one in 1932 and there has been obvious emigration by various sects, whereas others have increased. The fact that there has not been a new census shows the sensitive and delicate nature of the Lebanese state and this has consequences for issues of citizenship, immigration and refugees.}

Change in the demographic structure would perhaps have limited political significance if there was one group in Lebanon that had an absolute numerical majority; if national reconciliation had really taken place following the ending of military confrontations; if Lebanon enjoyed sovereignty, which translated into the ability of the government to make final decisions on domestic and external matters; ... Unfortunately these conditions are lacking. Post-war Lebanon is highly factionalised.... For these reasons, decisions imposed on Lebanon which will alter the demographic structure of the country will be greatly destabilising.\footnote{El-Khazen, Farid Permanent Settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon: A Recipe for Conflict (Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 10, No 3, 1997) p. 281 NB! El-Khazen has been criticised for being too critical towards the Palestinians and their role in the Civil War. He has a pro-Maronite bias in his work, nevertheless, he brings up important issues, such as the Palestinians being blamed for the war. With or without proper evidence this is still a popular view among some Lebanese. We shall see this more clearly when Lebanese public opinion is discussed.}

In general Lebanese opinion towards integration of Palestinians is negative. The Lebanese government line is against any resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon.\footnote{The Lebanese government is against any resettlement of Palestinian refugees. Recently, the Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, has had discussions with both European Union diplomats and American diplomats referring to Lebanese rejection of resettlement and demanding the establishment of a Palestinian state. (Daily Star, Beirut 14/11/03). This comes after proposals of settling Palestinian refugees in their host countries, as a possible solution to the Palestine-Israel problem. This is not considered an option in Lebanon.}

The widely-held governmental conception has been articulated by Tourism Minister Ali Abdullah, saying that “We the Lebanese, are at a domestic level in unanimous agreement on rejecting resettlement for two reasons: one is local and the other is...
The local reason refers to economics and demographics, and the regional reason refers to the right for the Palestinians to have their own country. One interesting event took place in 1994, when the then Minister for the Displaced, Walid Joumblatt, “in his attempts to evacuate the buildings illegally occupied [by Palestinians] during the war, came face to face with the problem of re-housing the 6,000 displaced Palestinian families”. There were plans to build new houses for the displaced Palestinians in the Chouf Mountains. The destroyed camps of Tal al Zaatar, Jisr al Basha, Dbayeh, and Nabatiyeh were all built on land belonging to the Maronite church which had been leased to UNRWA. Following the war, rebuilding the camps on Maronite land was seen as too politically sensitive. Resettling the refugees in other camps was not an alternative either, as they could not accommodate all the families (that is, there was a lack of space for 6,000 families). After negotiations back and forth with UNRWA on the funding and building of the camp in July 1994 it was decided that the project should go ahead. Joumblatt had the backing of Prime Minister Hariri. However, the building of modern houses for Palestinians caused much controversy.

The creation of a new, permanent housing area was seen as confirmation that the Palestinians were being resettled in Lebanon and that the problem of the refugees was being resolved at Lebanon’s expense. There was fury over the fact that the Minister for the Affairs of the Displaced was giving priority to the Palestinians over the problems faced by displaced Lebanese.

Both Palestinians and Lebanese opposed this plan, which was called the Qurai’a project. The Palestinians felt that this was part of a larger plan to move all the Palestinians to this site, especially Palestinians from camps in Beirut as the new

18 Daily Star, Beirut, 08/11/03
20 This shows the more accommodating attitudes of the Druze and Sunnis.
21 Nasrallah, Fida op. cit., p. 352
post-war government has been rebuilding its image in Beirut. This suspicion came about as the site was seen as far too large for the intended number of families.

Some Lebanese seemed to believe that Joumblatt was trying to settle Palestinians in the largely Christian Chouf Mountains in order to balance the Christian-Muslim population in the area. Some Christians believed that Joumblatt was blaming them for the displacement of the Palestinians and was thus resettling them in the Chouf. Still others argued that resettling the Palestinian in more permanent housing would give Israel the signal that the refugees could stay in Lebanon, thus removing the refugee card from the Peace Process. Others argued that Joumblatt thought that he would get money from Israel and the international community for this project. The arguments against the project continued thus: in the end the project was abandoned. The displaced Palestinians were forced to settle within existing refugee camps. In Shatila for example, UNRWA built two apartment houses by the entrance for displaced families, mainly former Beirut camp residents who had taken lodging in Rouche and Ain Mreisse (empty houses by the sea). The Qurai'a project shows how many problems beset the Palestinians. The reaction of the Lebanese people (media and government) shows the Palestinians that they will never be settled in Lebanon.

There have also been opinion surveys done on the Lebanese population, regarding the idea of Palestinian settlement in Lebanon. Overall, these are consistent with the governmental position of being against settlement. Questionnaires have been carried out, asking the various sects in Lebanon about their opinions on tawteen. The

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22 Various conversations including UNRWA spokesperson in Beirut (November 2003).
overall result was negative. Haddad’s survey shows that the Sunni Muslim population has more sympathy towards the Palestinians than the Christian (mostly Maronite) population. The Shiite population was not as sympathetic as the Sunni’s, though they were more so than the Christians. The Shiite and Christian negative attitudes towards Palestinians have been thus since the Civil War. As outlined in the history chapter, the Maronite Militia besieged and slaughtered refugees in Tal al Zaatar in 1976 and Sabra and Shatila in 1982. The Shiites were involved in the ‘War of the Camps’ in the mid-1980s. However, all in all, Haddad’s study shows that all Lebanese groups “showed a lack of enthusiasm to resettling the Palestinians in the sense of granting them citizenship and political rights”. However, granting the Palestinians civil rights was welcomed by the Sunni Muslim and Druze population. Khashan’s survey shows similar findings to Haddad’s. He too found that the Sunnis and the Druze were the segments of the population that were the most positive, although most tended to oppose the idea. The fears of the Lebanese population regarding Palestinian settlement includes: a) fears that it would upset the domestic situation and might even result in another civil war; b) economic worries. “The resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon was viewed by many as an unbearable burden on a country that is still unable to launch programs of recovery of its shattered economy”. There was also a fear that it would upset the demographic balance.

This negative opinion of tawteen on the part of both the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government has consequences for the Palestinian refugees in terms of the

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24 Haddad, Simon op. cit., p. 97
25 Although the most welcoming in comparison to others, it is important to note that the opinion welcoming rights for Palestinians were still under 50% within each of these two groups.
26 Khashan, Hilal 1994 op. cit., p. 10
governmental policies that are issued for them. The Lebanese governmental policies towards the Palestinian presence in Lebanon make their lives incredibly difficult. Because the Palestinians do not have the right to work, they remain poor, often having to resort to illegal jobs or even crime. The policy of treating Palestinians as foreigners makes life extremely difficult, resulting in unemployment and poverty. A recent example of Lebanese policy towards Palestinian refugees concerns university fees. Before this new policy Palestinians could attend university by paying Lebanese fees. Today, this has changed and Palestinians have to pay foreign fees.\(^{27}\) This makes it almost impossible for any Palestinian to attend university. During the Cairo Agreement and during the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon, Palestinians received a very good education. The UNRWA schools were better funded and the PLO and other organisations, as well as supporting countries, helped in financially supporting some of the refugees to go to university, for example. Today, the picture is very different. The political groups are not as wealthy as they used to be, therefore, the refugees are forced to rely on UNRWA and other aid agencies for their survival. This is so for a variety of reasons, most notably their prevention from being allowed to work in the country. Similarly the groups have had to change their tactics. As they are no longer governed by the Cairo Agreement, they no longer have the right to carry weapons and carry out armed struggle against Israel from Lebanese soil.

The Lebanese government is against military work from here ... It has no problem with media work. And the Lebanese government considers itself non-responsible for our camps. It doesn't provide any work for Palestinians ... Other things around the camp are provided by UNRWA and other organisations.\(^{28}\)

\(^{27}\) This was an issue that was brought up during almost every interview I had. It was also an issue that was depressing the youth. The PRC tells us that the increase in tuition fees amounts to an increase of 500%; Hanafi, Mahmud The Decline in Education Standards Among Palestinians in Lebanon... Why? Available at www.prc.org.uk

\(^{28}\) Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Moujahed's office in Shatila camp, 10/10/02
Lebanese policies and Lebanese opinions towards the Palestinian presence is one of not wanting them to integrate. Reasons for this vary. As we saw above, this has to do with demographics and politics as well as economic reasons. However, tawteen was not very popular with Palestinians within the camps either. Questions regarding tawteen varied:

There are some solutions like emigration and nationalisation. I am not ready to migrate or become a Lebanese citizen; the solution is to go back to Palestine.29

We can not accept tawteen, no matter what it gives us ... The situation we are living in reminds us that we should go back to Palestine.30

Tawteen, therefore, is not seen as an option, by Lebanon or the Palestinians. Nevertheless an important question for Palestinian refugees is whether or not they perceive a difference between tawteen and the Lebanese authorities giving citizenship.31 The answers for the most part were that this would either make the Palestinian plight of returning to Palestine diminish, as implied by the statement above by Abu Hasan when he argues that the conditions the refugees are living in remind them that they have to return to Palestine, or that accepting tawteen would make it harder for their plight of a ‘right of return’ at a later date. However, there were some who did ask for human and civil rights understanding that these were basic rights that should be given to all, although this too was seen as separate from tawteen. In other words, having civil rights does not necessarily mean becoming a Lebanese citizen. A common view is as follows:

29 Interview with Naji Dawali, Leader for the PFLP in Shatila camp, interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
30 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias Camp, 12/10/02
31 The difference between citizenship and tawteen is the assumption that tawteen would mean permanent settlement.
I am against *tawteen*, but I am for people to have their political and civil rights.\(^{32}\)

The leader of Fatah in Shatila, however, was one of the few who had a different answer to the question ‘does *tawteen* necessarily mean that you give up your right of return?’ when he answered

For the Lebanese government, from their view yes. But for me it is not, because the Palestinians living in the United States and elsewhere are still asking for their right of return.\(^{33}\)

Regarding Palestinian attitudes towards Lebanon in general, most people saw a difference between the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government.

The relations with the Lebanese people are not the same as with the Lebanese government. We have lived together with the Lebanese people for 54 years, as with the Lebanese government, but it is more difficult [and complicated] ... Not all Lebanese people love the Palestinian people, but most of them [have supported] us for 54 years and still do. The difference with the Lebanese government is more complicated. We are forbidden to work. Some procedures and laws that the government are taking are not in the interest of the refugees [and do not help the refugee situation]. We do not have the right to own property. Regarding universities, the Lebanese government have increased the price [for us; we now pay the more expensive foreigners fees]. They say they support the Palestinian case but they make it quite difficult [for us].\(^{34}\)

Some but not all of the Lebanese public opinion is supporting the Palestinians, they lived the same as the Palestinians during the war in Lebanon.\(^{35}\)

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\(^{32}\) Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party in Shatila camp, interview held in his office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02

\(^{33}\) Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02

\(^{34}\) Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, leader of the DFLP for Lebanon, interview held in his home in Shatila camp 07/10/02

\(^{35}\) Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp. 12/10/02
These opinions show how the Palestinian refugees distinguish the Lebanese people from the Lebanese government. Most see the people as supporting their cause. The Lebanese government, however, is making the lives and livelihoods of the Palestinians difficult. Regarding activities of Palestinian political groups, the Lebanese government makes this difficult as well. Military activity is forbidden. The Revolution and the Resistance has had to move elsewhere in their battle against Israel. However, as Mr Hisham implied above, the groups are able to organise other activities within the camps that are not considered to be threatening. Through my interviews I also realised that some people joining Palestinian political groups were watched carefully by the Lebanese government.36 This adds another element into the mobilisation process: fear. The willingness to obstruct this fear will be looked at later on. However, the question which is relevant to this section regarding mobilisation is whether or not the host country context allows Tilly’s notion of ‘opportunity’ to mobilise.37 It would seem that the Palestinian refugees are controlled under a rather tight regime when it comes to revolutionary activity. Palestinian refugees and the political leaders told me that members of the various groups were watched by the Lebanese authorities. But is this a factor that would constrain mobilisation? In the West Bank and Gaza strip this does not seem to be the case. The Intifada is still continuing despite Israeli crack-downs and re-occupation of various towns and villages. Political repression in Lebanon prior to the Palestinian Revolution through the Deuxième Bureau managed to keep the Palestinians constrained.38 However, after 1967 and Black September, when the

36 For more on this see Chapter Seven.
37 Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1978). Tilly’s notion of opportunity is linked to – ‘the degree of coercion or repression that may be used against the contender’. See Chapter One.
38 For more information on political oppression during the 1960s under the deuxième bureau see Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., esp. p. 130-136

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Resistance came to Lebanon the times had changed, and soon after the Cairo Agreement was implemented. Thus, in Lebanon there is no precedent for comparison of the mechanisms of Lebanese control over the Resistance movement before and the ways things are now. It was only a few years before the Cairo Agreement was implemented that the PLO was created and the Resistance came to Lebanon. Therefore a comparison as to whether or not constraining Lebanese policies have had an impact on suppressing the Palestinian revolution in the early days is difficult. However, what we can see is that the Lebanese government realised that the Cairo Agreement did not help their own situation, but rather brought them closer to other conflicts in the Arab world. For example, carrying out revolution and armed struggle from Lebanon brought the wrath of the Israelis upon them.39

Nevertheless, the political groups40 can organise certain activities on a social and political level within the camps. As long as these do not cause any disturbance to Lebanon, they can continue. But are these activities enough to mobilise a population that have lost their country, lost their civil rights, and lost their livelihoods? These are important questions, and the answers will become clearer in the subsequent chapters. What can be seen from the structural context is that 'opportunity' for political mobilisation into political groups is present but would have consequences: consequences for what action is viable and consequences in being watched by the authorities. This might cause some people to want to mobilise even more, though

39 This was the basic argument of Minister of Displaced, Abdullah Farhat (Interview, Beirut, 24/11/03), although the terms used are my own.
40 The ones I interviewed - Fatah, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Communist Part, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General-Command (PFLP-GC), Saiqa, and Fatah Intifada.
there are past experiences and present conditions to take into consideration. Nevertheless, this statement by the leader of Saiqa affirms the point:

No Palestinian group can give the Palestinian people all of their demands. We are not in a position of authority or power. Therefore... we cannot tell the Lebanese government to revoke some decisions it has taken in parliament such as the decisions made regarding fees for Palestinians going to university, the right to work or the right to own property.\textsuperscript{41}

On the other hand, this situation also gives rise to such views as the following:

My situation in Lebanon is a reason to rebel against my situation.\textsuperscript{42}

These two statements show the contrasting views of the effects of societal structures as enforced by Lebanese policies towards the Palestinians. The opportunities and constraints that the Lebanese government enforces upon the Palestinians can have a dual effect as we just saw: the harsh reality of the policies can either make people comply with them, or on the other hand, make them want to react. This important question of motivation will be explored further within the next two chapters.

Another factor involved in Lebanese governmental constraints and mobilisation of the Palestinian political groups is the role of Syria. As mentioned earlier, Syria has considerable influence, not only in Lebanon, but also vis-à-vis the Palestinian groups that are members of the ‘Alliance of Palestinian Forces’ (APF). Although Syria’s intention towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is hard to understand, it is

\textsuperscript{41} Interview with Abu Hasan leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office, Mar Elias Camp, 12/10/02

\textsuperscript{42} Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Moujahed’s office 10/10/02
clear that Syria, too, is opposed to *tawteen* in Lebanon. Rosemary Sayigh explains that for Syria, although:

Palestinian national politics remains a primary concern, the community in Lebanon does not appear to be a key factor ... An incontestable Syrian aim has been to exclude ‘Arafatism’ from the camps, a task greatly facilitated by Oslo. Though some Palestinians hoped that Damascus would use its influence to have the Lebanese extend to its refugees the rights they enjoy in Syria, there has been little to encourage this optimism. However, Syrian opposition to *tawteen* may be deduced from its refusal to meet RWG {Refugee Working Group} missions, its opposition to the rehabilitation of the camps; it is likely that, in a final settlement, Syria would refuse the naturalisation of refugees both in Lebanon and in Syria. While Syrian interests and influence in Lebanon are indisputable, policies towards particular parties or on specific issues remain hard to detect.

Sayigh’s explanation leads to the following three points:

1) Syria would like to see the camps following APF groups that oppose the peace process; in other words, groups sponsored by itself.

2) Syria is opposed to *tawteen* in Lebanon.

3) Because of the point above, Syria also opposes the rehabilitation of the camps, something that Lebanon agrees with. The argument is that rehabilitation of the camps implies a more permanent condition.

In addition to this, there is also the assumption that because one of Syria’s main reasons for being in Lebanon includes security issues, point one of the above is of utmost importance. Palestinian presence in Lebanon is viewed, by many Lebanese, as a disruptive force to the delicate balance of Lebanon’s various sects. By being able to control the APF, Syria can thereby also control its own security situation vis-à-vis Lebanon as well as Lebanon’s situation vis-à-vis Israel. For instance, the

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Palestinian groups being prudent and not undertaking any military action from Lebanon.

**UNRWA's Impact**

UNRWA was set up by General Assembly Council Resolution 302 (iv). It provides relief, aid and social services to the Palestinian refugees in the region. UNRWA has three main programmes; Relief and Social Services (RSS), Health, and Education. They work on donations and cooperate with host country authorities in making these three programmes work. In terms of contextual structure, UNRWA is part of the setting in which the refugees live. Each refugee who is registered with UNRWA receives a registration card (or is added to his or her father’s, or that of her husband depending on situation, age and marital status) that allows the person/family access to UNRWA’s three programmes.

When it comes to determining who needs help for special hardship cases, the criteria go by family. There must be one man in the family with an income (in Lebanon, even if he drives a lorry illegally he is considered employed). If there is no man in the family, if he is in prison or deceased for example, then the family can apply for ‘special hardship assistance’.

The foundation for the current Special Hardship Case (SHC) Programme was laid in 1978 when welfare workers registered 27,196 families as ‘hardship cases’. As of 1983 UNRWA officially restricted rations and direct relief only to those families undergoing special economic hardship. ... Since then the refugee

44 Providing he or she can satisfy UNRWA’s definition of who is a Palestinian refugee (see legal chapter)
The SHC is positive in that it is an extra programme that helps the very desperate families within the camps. SHC families receive food rations, and higher subsidies for medical care and shelter repair. However UNRWA only has funds from donors, and thereby has limited funds, and is currently facing cutbacks. Because of UNRWA’s financial difficulties and cutbacks even people registered under the SHC may not be receiving enough help.

For the Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon the criteria for SHC are most unsettling as most families cannot find legal work. Many, however, do manage to find illegal jobs which help with their income. For example driving lorries (illegally), being a guard at a school (also illegally), are forms of income. However, these jobs are risky as they lack any guarantees in many areas, including payment, and there is a threat of being fired, as well as being in trouble if the authorities find out that they are working.

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45 UNRWA: UNRWA: The Relief and Social Services Programme: a journey of dignity, resilience and success (Department of Relief and Social Services, UNRWA HQ Amman, 2000)
46 Ibid. p. 8
47 Ghandour, Nahla “Meeting the Needs of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon” in Aruri, N ed Palestinian Refugees: The Right of Return (Pluto Press, London, 2001) For more information on the limitation of UNRWA funding see for example Albrecht, Kirk “UNRWA’s Uneasy Future” Middle East Today (No 245, 1995) on information of changes in UNRWA after the beginning of the Peace Process; See also Cutbacks in UNRWA services – where to? (Published 5th February 2004) Available on www.prc.org.uk for more on cutbacks in UNRWA.
48 I have used these examples as they are jobs of two of the people I interviewed
The following chart shows how many refugees and families are registered in the SHC and how many rations are available.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Widows</th>
<th>Orphans</th>
<th>Aged</th>
<th>Medical</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>347</td>
<td>44</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>1,446</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>550</td>
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<td>687</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>4,138</td>
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<td>452</td>
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<td>660</td>
<td>160</td>
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<tr>
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<td>237</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>914</td>
<td>1,859</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FIELD TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons</td>
<td>3,383</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>10,727</td>
<td>7,564</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>22,207</td>
<td>44,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rations</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>8,731</td>
<td>7,529</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>21,098</td>
<td>41,276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Families</td>
<td>1,451</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>4,502</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>3,137</td>
<td>10,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart corresponds to the quotation above, showing that there are not enough rations for individual persons suffering from SHC. However, the chart also indicates that people within the same family suffer from, for example, illnesses (medical). This implies that a family with for example two sick children may only be receiving rations for one.

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Data taken from UNRWA Registration Bulletin (for the third quarter 2003) Department of Relief and Social Services, UNRWA HQ, Amman.
Although UNRWA’s main office is not within the camp, the UNRWA officials do meet with the popular committee within the camps and speak with them mostly about social issues. The popular committee brings up special needs and cases, as well as general issues that are affecting the people in the camp. UNRWA makes a point of speaking to all of the political groups in order to try and deal with the social issues and problems that arise.

What impact does UNRWA have in the lives of Palestinian refugees? UNRWA is part of everyday life. UNRWA’s impact starts at the beginning of a child’s life when he or she is added to their parent’s registration card, when going to school and further gains an impact when leaving and starting a family. As most of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not allowed to work, they need to register with UNRWA for their vocational training, medical and social services.

In the early years, UNRWA was viewed with suspicion. As one refugee told Sayigh:

We felt that UNRWA had a certain policy that aimed at settling us. They wanted us to forget Palestine, so they started work projects to give us employment.

However, today, UNRWA is a symbol of Palestine and being Palestinian, through its mere existence and resilience within the international community. In other words,

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50 Interview with Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut. Interview held in his office (17/11/03) For example the PFLP is not on the popular committee in Shatila camp, but they too speak with UNRWA.
51 Interview with Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut. Interview held in his office (17/11/03)
52 Palestinian activist from Tripoli in Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., p. 109
UNRWA still exists and shows the world by its mere existence that the Palestinian refugee problem remains and is still on the agenda. Although there was suspicion in the early years, UNRWA did symbolise something that helped the community. The schools, for example, “though not under Palestinian control were the foci of national consciousness”.54 This refers to teachers teaching national songs, history, and through memorial days.

Nevertheless, as with all organisations, UNRWA has come under attack by disappointing the people in the camp. One family, for instance, where the wife was expecting a baby, were having arguments with UNRWA about the delivery of the baby. UNRWA is understaffed and this family was not considered a special (hardship or medical) case, so they were not guaranteed hospital space and care when the time arrived. Besson, in his work on the major problems facing UNRWA in Lebanon, confirms this problem with hospital care for Palestinian refugees: “According to World Health Organisation (WHO) norms, the ratio of hospital beds to the population should be a minimum of 2 per 1000 persons. In Lebanon, the subsidized number of beds which the agency could afford is far more scarce, at 0.25 per 1000. Priorities have been established for emergencies and life-saving cases while waiting lists become longer and longer”.55 Similarly, with health care in general. Regarding health care, one resident of Shatila had this to say:

> UNRWA can not cover all of the services for the patients. Just the people who have the strongest [worst] diseases. So like me, I can't go to UNRWA because they don't have the medicine that I need. They just have paracetamol for all the

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53 Interview with Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut. Interview held in his office (17/11/03)
54 Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., p. 133
patients. ... Sometimes they give you a prescription to buy medicine from outside the camp, but they can’t cover it.56

The state of affairs in the UNRWA schools has also faced immense criticism. The problems included:

There are fifty students in the same class and the periods run for one hour. If each student asks a question there will be no time left for teaching.57

Besson too raised this issue. He explains:

UNRWA’s education programme runs 75 schools with an enrolment of 35,000 pupils and student; it operates one vocational training centre, offering 19 different courses to 635 students, and provides 40 university scholarships with only partial coverage of tuition fees (worse now, this was 1997). Over recent years, this programme has faced serious problems of double shifts and overcrowding, lack of up-to-date teaching facilities, inadequate physical facilities, and freezing of training places at vocational installations.58

Rosemary Sayigh has commented on what she calls ‘the education crisis’. She indicates that there is a smaller proportion of children from each age group attending school in comparison with other Arab host countries. She also found that “a recent survey suggests a rising Palestinian illiteracy rate in Lebanon, alone among host countries”.59 She also comments on the ending of PLO and UNRWA scholarships to university.

56 Interview with Abeer, Palestinian from Shatila camp. Interview held in her house in Shatila camp, 27/11/03
57 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader for Fatah in Shatila camp. Interview in his home, Shatila camp 15/10/02 (he spoke now on a personal level, not political, with reference to his worries about his children who were attending UNRWA schools)
59 Sayigh, Rosemary “Palestinians in Lebanon: Harsh Present, Uncertain Future” Journal of Palestine Studies (Vol. xxv, No 1, Autumn 1995) p. 49. She is referring to a survey done by the PLO Central Bureau of Statistics in 1994. Also an unpublished survey looks at six UNRWA schools in Ein el Helweh camp where the drop-out rates are very high.
The following chart indicates how many health centres and schools exist in each of the camps.60

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAMP</th>
<th>NUMBER OF HEALTH CENTRES</th>
<th>NUMBER OF DAILY VISITORS (average)</th>
<th>NUMBER OF ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS</th>
<th>NUMBER OF STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dbayeh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0 – children attend an elementary school in the Bourj Hammoud area</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj El Barajneh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar Elias</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shatila</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mieh Mieh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nahr el Bared</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baddawi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wavell-Galilee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Buss</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein el Helweh</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bourj el Shemali</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rashidiyeh</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As has already been mentioned Palestinians have no right to social services and education in Lebanon, which is something that leads to these educational problems within the UNRWA schools. The Lebanese state schools are not available to Palestinians. Some private schools are available but have very high school fees. A typical UNRWA school in Shatila camp is overcrowded, with minimal physical space in the classrooms. The school works in shifts with girls in the morning and boys in the afternoon. The teachers are overworked. The students face an extremely challenging curriculum yet are given hardly any teaching time. If a student fails his

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60 Information taken from Hajjaj, Nasri Saleh “Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon: Until When?” Shaml Publications (July 2000). The figures are based during the years 1998-99.
or her exam, they cannot repeat the year. This leads to disillusionment and apathy. First, there is no need to try hard and succeed as you will not be able to do anything with your education once you finish school. The schools only go up to ninth grade and it is unlikely that you will have funding for a private Lebanese school. Even if you are lucky enough to receive funding, you probably will not be able to receive further funding for university, and the Lebanese government does not allow you to work. Even if there was a will to do well in school (as some of the children I spoke to had), their disillusionment came after graduation with the realisation that they could not do anything with their education.

What implications, if any, does UNRWA have for the mobilisation process? UNRWA is certainly a part of everyday life for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Although it may be inadequate, it does provide a lot for the refugees. However, even with the existence of UNRWA the socio-economic conditions remain poor. It would seem to exist to ensure the survival of the Palestinians, more to the extent of physical survival than meeting many other needs the Palestinians may have (see below under human needs). UNRWA and its assistance to the refugees leads to other problems and issues such as refugee reliance upon, and the politics of, assistance. The politics of assistance refers to assistance which is externally funded and designed but tends to both reduce capabilities and also increase vulnerabilities of the refugees.61 Reduction of capabilities refers to, for example, the setting up of refugee camps which isolate refugees in terms of employment, thereby preventing them from improving their status. This isolation then increases refugees’ vulnerabilities, as they are more accountable and reliant upon the outside agency

than their own communities and political organisations. In other words, outside assistance reduces refugee autonomy and their capacity to organise themselves within their host countries. For the Palestinian refugees, the assistance structure leaves little room for meaningful Palestinian refugee “representation or accountability to the refugees themselves. Their role is to sit in camps, receive what medical, educational or economic assistance is deemed necessary for them, and wait for the resolution of their ‘crisis’. However, this is not solely due to UNRWA, but also due to the harsh Lebanese governmental policies toward the Palestinians. Within this sort of structural framework, the refugees are marginalised not only in their daily lives but also in their specific diaspora role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, the Palestinian refugees living outside Palestine as parties to the conflict have become side-lined.

This is all part of the socio-economic dimension of the situation of the Palestinian refugees. The refugees themselves are unable to help their situation, but neither is UNRWA their very own international agency. Not only is UNRWA unable to help their situation further, but even the United Nations cannot help them, even though they have international law and resolutions on their side. The international structures surrounding the Palestinians are paralysed and unable to help them, in turn prolonging their situation as refugees with no civil rights.

With reference to the mobilisation process, UNRWA is not directly involved, although it works with the popular committees. However, what UNRWA stands for

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62 Ibid. p. 311
63 Ibid. p. 311
64 Referring back to the Chapter Three and the discussion about the UN being unable to guarantee rights to the Palestinians as they are not covered by the UNHCR and other international mechanisms.
can be seen as a mobilising factor. The mobilising factor is two-fold and has to do with what UNRWA as well as what the United Nations (in)directly stands for. First, as mentioned above, by its mere existence, UNRWA reminds the world that the refugee issue still exists. Second, the United Nations stands, through its various resolutions and the creation of UNRWA, for five main principles: solving the Arab-Israeli conflict; refugees and their right of return; the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people; violations of human rights; and general peace in the Middle East.65

Human Needs?

Do the Palestinians who live in the refugee camps in Lebanon have their basic human needs satisfied? What human needs are satisfied and which ones do they lack? At this point reference is made back to the human needs approach outlined by Maslow, Sites, Burton and Galtung.66 The four basic human needs are security-survival, welfare-sufficiency, identity, and freedom-choice. Identity is seen as the key issue as to whether or not there is conflict: an issue that could be a result of mobilisation.67 However even lacking some of these human needs could be enough

67 Although mobilisation may not always lead to conflict; the assumption is that if basic human needs are lacking, people will become angry, mobilise, and act. As discussed in Chapter One regarding the
to sufficiently frustrate the population to mobilise into political groups hoping that they can help them with their human needs.

Table 1.1

**A List of Basic Human Needs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Needs:</th>
<th>Satisfiers:</th>
<th>Refugee Camps:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Needs (Survival Needs) to avoid violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against individual violence (assault, torture)</td>
<td>Police</td>
<td>X - No -- there exists a security committee but it is unable to provide this security need.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against collective violence (wars, internal, external)</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>X - No -- not allowed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Welfare Needs (Sufficiency Needs) to avoid misery</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For nutrition, water, air, sleep</td>
<td>Food, air, water</td>
<td>* Yes -- available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For movement, excretion</td>
<td>? -- But not sanitary in all cases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For protection against climate, environment</td>
<td>Clothes, shelter</td>
<td>? -- There exists shelter, and religious groups, UNRWA and so forth give out clothes. However heating in winter is lacking and the warm summer months are excruciating.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For protection against excessive strain</td>
<td>Labour-saving devices</td>
<td>X - No -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Galtung, John op. cit., p. 136. I have check marked the chart below with stars, crosses and question marks. (* refers to the fulfilment of a human need; x refers to inadequate or non-existence of human needs, and ? refers to somewhere in between).*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Need</th>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For protection against diseases</td>
<td>Medical treatment</td>
<td>? – UNRWA provides basic healthcare, but only to people who are very sick. Have inadequate funding and physical space. UNICEF gave vaccines to the camps a few years back.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For self-expression, dialogue and education</td>
<td>Schooling</td>
<td>? – Schooling provided by UNRWA. University normally unavailable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Needs (Needs for closeness) to avoid alienation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For self-expression, creativity, praxis, work</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>X - No – not legal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For self-actualisation, for realising potentials</td>
<td>Jobs and leisure</td>
<td>X - No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For well-being, happiness, joy</td>
<td>Recreation, family</td>
<td>X - No – no recreational activities available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For being active and subject, not passive, client, object</td>
<td>Recreation, family</td>
<td>X - No – Lebanese government does not allow very much for Palestinians. With hardly any income, any social recreational activity is not available.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For challenge and new experiences</td>
<td>Recreation</td>
<td>X - No – people are poor and live in camps. Very few venture out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For affection, love, sex, friends, spouse, offspring</td>
<td>Primary groups</td>
<td>* Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For roots, belongingness, support, esteem; association</td>
<td>Secondary groups</td>
<td>? – Yes these exist but because of the general conditions in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>with similar humans</td>
<td>camp.....</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For understanding social forces, for social transparency</td>
<td>Political activity</td>
<td>? – groups exist, how much they can do is debatable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For partnership with nature</td>
<td>Natural Parks</td>
<td>X - No -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For a sense of purpose, of meaning with life; closeness to the transcendental, transpersonal</td>
<td>Religion, ideology</td>
<td>* Yes – available through the Mosque and the political groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom Needs (freedom of choice) to avoid repression</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice in receiving and expressing information and opinion</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>* - Yes - As much as anyone else is able to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of people and places to visit and be visited</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>X - No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice in consciousness formation</td>
<td>Meetings, media</td>
<td>? – Only in camps. Restrictions on how much can come out of these meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice in mobilisation</td>
<td>Organisations, meetings</td>
<td>? – Only in camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice in confrontations</td>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>X - No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice in occupation</td>
<td>Labour marker</td>
<td>X – No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of place to live</td>
<td></td>
<td>X – No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of spouse</td>
<td>Marriage market</td>
<td>? – Not always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of goods and services</td>
<td>(super) market</td>
<td>X – No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choice of way of life</td>
<td></td>
<td>X – No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table shows a marked lack of basic human needs for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

First, with reference to the security needs, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not covered at all by this vital need. Although the security need is dependent upon actors in order to function, it is also dependent upon structures for its existence, especially in the refugee camps. The police and military are structural in the sense of a being state-led force that can maintain the security needs of the population. Palestinians have no influence over, or are able to work within, the Lebanese police or army. Neither are they guaranteed protection by them; the Lebanese police force do not enter or deal with issues in the camps. It is unlikely that the military would protect the camps in case of any internal or external war. This seems evident if one draws conclusions from the previous war in Lebanon, but also in conjunction with Lebanese laws regarding Palestinians. Although the camps do not control their areas as they did during the Cairo Agreement, safety for their inhabitants is maintained by the internal popular and security committees. Unfortunately, the security committee is unable to secure the need against individual violence (protection). 69

The chart also shows that welfare needs are only partially met. Welfare needs are dependent upon structures and what is available for the refugees. UNRWA in this case is the body responsible for satisfying these needs. As we have already seen, UNRWA is facing immense financial difficulty, something that is clear from the table of welfare needs. Lebanon is also not considered to have the ‘emergency’ status that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are enduring at the moment. Another factor that has contributed to continual and increasing poverty in Lebanon is the loss

69 We shall see the opinions of camp residents regarding this issue later on. During my field research I did not encounter the security committee being capable of doing very much; there were several murders and a child who was killed by an old bomb within the camp during one of my stays.
of income from relatives that used to reside in the Gulf states. During the Gulf War in the early 1990s many Palestinians were expelled from the Gulf countries and, once back in Lebanon, have been unable to return.

The identity needs are also dependent upon structures, and apart from primary groups, none of these needs are being met. In this case this is due to many of the Lebanese governmental policies towards the Palestinians that keep them in abject poverty and thereby do not satisfy these important needs. Originally, the freedom needs on the chart represent needs that are based on actors. However, in the case of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, these particular needs are again linked to structures. As the refugees are confined to the camps, and cannot compete with the rest of society as integrated citizens, these needs cannot be fully satisfied. This does of course differ from camp to camp. Most of the camps in Beirut are relatively open so people can leave when they please. The southern camps are much worse off, with check points at the entrances.

Returning to security needs, there is the additional issue of what is termed 'perceived threat'. Threats may be real or imagined; however, whether or not the case is one or the other does not really matter. If a threat is perceived, it means that there is a view that a threat actually exists. This issue will become more clear within the next two chapters; however at the moment I would like to link the notion of perceived threat to Sites' notion of control. Sites' notion of control is relevant to how the refugees can understand and predict their environment. This is relevant to

70 Galtung, Johan op. cit.,
71 Sites, Paul op. cit.,
mobilisation in the sense of predicting what might happen if one joins a political
group within the Palestinian resistance. For Sites, control refers to

The possibility of gratifying each of the needs discussed depends, in large part,
upon the degree of control people have over their environment. If people
cannot control the responses of others, they can be expected to be in constant
fear that the actions and/or words of others directed towards them will damage
either their physical bodies and/or themselves.72

In other words, control is about interpreting and predicting the responses of ‘others’,
and the impact this has in controlling one’s own life. The ‘others’ include UNRWA,
the Lebanese and the International Community. The interpretation of the ‘other’ is
further explored in Chapter Seven. With reference to the politics of assistance
referred to above in the discussion on UNRWA, it is clear that UNRWA assistance,
although useful for survival needs, reduces the refugees’ control over their own
lives, their capabilities to establish themselves within Lebanon and their ability to
have autonomy. Regarding control over predicting ‘others’ responses, what can be
understood from the structural context is that if the prediction of being politically
active is that the Lebanese government will put you under surveillance and possibly
put you in jail, would this motivate or de-motivate people from mobilising and
wanting to join political groups? This is an important question which has come out
of the structural context, and which is linked to identity.

The table raises a number of questions. There are a number of human needs that are
lacking fulfilment for the Palestinian refugees within the refugee camps in Lebanon.
What impact does this have on mobilisation, if any? Clearly the lack of fulfilment of

72 Ibid. p. 25
human needs raises concerns among the residents and the political groups in the camps. Each of these classifications, security, welfare, identity and freedom, have an impact on people and their potential to mobilise into groups. This is, of course, if they believe the group is capable of changing the situation. This will be one of the focuses within the following chapter on ‘groups’. What we can already see from this human needs section is that there is an obvious lack in satisfying human needs, as well as the ability to ‘control’ these needs.

Themes Resulting from the Structures and their Relation to Mobilisation

What themes arise from these structural conditions on the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and do these conditions constrain or facilitate mobilisation within the refugee camps?

Within the context of the structures surrounding the Palestinians, there are two main points to be made: the United Nations has (made) international resolutions and laws for the Palestinians but is unable to enforce them and; second, their host country Lebanon provides them with very few rights. In a sense they are a people who have no civil and political rights whatsoever, for the rights not granted to them within Lebanon cannot be enforced by the international community. Similarly, the protection rights and their right to return to their homes and livelihoods are guaranteed in various UN resolutions. However the United Nations cannot enforce
these guarantees. The situation for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is extremely insecure, something that is a result of the lack of basic human needs. This state of affairs has been such for over fifty years.

The themes that can be drawn from this chapter are political oppression, lack of human and civil rights, alienation, and devastating socio-economic conditions, all of which are inter-linked in some sense. In terms of political oppression, the Palestinians are aware that their political groups are, in a sense, paralysed. Unlike the years during the Cairo Agreement, the Palestinians now face a different reality. During the 1950s and early 1960s when refugee affairs were governed by the Deuxième Bureau, there was also political oppression. However, during those years “there was nothing Prussian or systematic about their oppression”.73 The head of the Deuxième Bureau was strict however, and during this time there were no organised political groups; the PLO and the various other political groups within the Palestinian Resistance had not yet come into existence. “The methods used by the Lebanese authorities in their struggle to control the Palestinians give insights into traditional and neo-colonial Arab political behaviour. Although outright violence was not avoided, subtler techniques of persuasion and manipulation were also used”.74 Sayigh cites an example of when the head of the Deuxième Bureau visited a camp and gave a speech in front of a crowd of Palestinians. The older residents knew not to question anything he said; however, a young man did ask him some questions. He was later summoned to the Deuxième Bureau, but never went. A few years later when he wanted to visit Syria he was refused papers and a permit. Today, the situation is different. There are more concrete laws that govern what the

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73 Sayigh, Rosemary 1979 op. cit., p. 131
74 Ibid. p. 132
Palestinians can and cannot do. This regards political groups as well. They are under tight control over what they can and cannot do. The groups cannot participate in their main goal of struggle: to fight for Palestine. Potential members face surveillance. This can act as a suppressant of mobilisation. However, for the time being it is difficult to say whether or not this constrains mobilisation, as there needs to be further examination of the political groups and the people who join them.

The next three themes are closely interlinked; they are the lack of human rights, leading to appalling socio-economic conditions and alienation. These three themes arise from the lack of basic human needs resulting from inadequate protection of the lives and livelihoods of the refugees. Their legal situation is precarious, protection offered by the UNHCR is unavailable and UNRWA only helps in ‘relief and works’. This leaves them in a situation where as non-citizens of Lebanon, they are completely reliant upon outside agencies and the international community for their continued existence. In this case it would seem that primary groups as well as social and political groups (identity groups) would be important in general social contact and some sort of emancipation. Furthermore, according to human needs theory societies “that fail to meet the needs of their members become unstable over time” implying that the refugees may mobilise for change. However, the refugees are not considered fully-fledged members of Lebanese society. They are marginalised, alienated and live in appalling conditions.

All in all, what seems clear after examining the structural context is that the degree of coercion by the Lebanese government regarding the livelihoods and political activity of the Palestinian refugees suggests that political mobilisation is highly

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constrained by outside forces. In addition, many of the groups are sponsored by Syria who does not want to see turmoil in Lebanon yet again. Whether or not these constraints lead to mobilisation is difficult to examine at this level of analysis. There needs be an examination of what the refugees, as well as what the political groups, see as viable and possible. The structural constraints and the societal context show us a picture where the refugees lack civil rights and are constrained from political activity by the Lebanese authorities. On the other hand, by being repressed, alienated and lacking in civil rights, it could also be assumed that joining identity and political groups would help in other ways, for example social contact and emancipation. The next two chapters will examine the political groups that are active within the camps as well as refugees’ perceptions of these groups and their willingness to engage in political activity and join the political groups.

76 Corresponding to Tilly’s argument on the degree of opportunity. Tilly, Charles 1979 op. cit.,
Chapter Six

The Organisations and Recruitment

Introduction

This chapter will examine the political groups within the refugee camps and their role in the mobilisation process. Therefore the main question for this chapter is what the political groups do, if anything, to mobilise the population in the camps. This question requires an examination of recruitment methods. The framework used will be the organisational-entrepreneurial approach by McCarty and Zald,\(^1\) recruitment as dealt with within new social movement theory, including Touraine's principles of what is needed for successful social movements,\(^2\) and recruitment as dealt with within social construction literature, including networks and relationships and solidarity.

This chapter will be split into the following sections, each one focusing on a different area of recruitment. The first section focuses on the function of the groups within the camps as an incentive in, and of, itself to join. What do the political groups do within the camps that motivates people to join them? This section includes the themes of resources and social functions. The second section examines the role of the family in the mobilisation process. How far does the family decide whether or not you are politically active and which particular group you join? The

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\(^1\) McCarthy, J and Zald, Mayer "Resource Mobilisation and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" American Journal of Sociology (Vol. 28, 1977) For more explanatory detail see Chapter One. Their approach is part of the resource mobilisation theories.

\(^2\) Touraine, Alain The Voice and the Eye (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981). Again see Chapter One. He is a new social movement theorist focusing on identity, opposition and totality.
third section focuses on solidarity and the belief in the common good as a reason for joining. The concluding section of this chapter will look at what the field research found was the most common theme of recruitment: ‘no strategy needed’.

The political groups that I interviewed include: Fatah, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Palestinian Communist Party, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Saiqa, and Fatah Intifada. All of these groups reject the Oslo accords and the current Peace Process, apart from Fatah and sections of both the PPSF and the PLF. The rest of the groups represent the forces in the Palestinian resistance that form what is known as the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF) that act as a united front known as ‘the rejectionists’. These groups are based and sponsored by Syria. Two groups are no longer formal members, the PFLP and the DFLP, as they engaged in dialogue with the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1999.  

The following two charts provide an overview of the Palestinian groups. The first chart outlines the groups that are part of the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), otherwise known as the Damascus 10. The second chart shows the groups that support the Oslo process and a two-state solution.

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4 More explanation on their formation and previous alliances available in Chapter Four. The PFLP is closer to the Damascus 10 than the DFLP.
### Chart 1: Palestinian Groups in Lebanon Opposing the Oslo Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Established</th>
<th>Current Leader(s)</th>
<th>Additional Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| PFLP                          | Established by George Habash (as well as Hani Hindi and Wadi Haddad) in 1967 in the wake of the 1967 War. | - Habash resigned in 2000 and was succeeded by Mustafa Ali Qasim Zabiri (Abu Ali Mustafa).  
- Zabiri was assassinated in his office in 2001 and was succeeded by Saadat in 2002.  
- Saadat was detained in 2002 by the PA. | - When the PFLP’s deputy secretary-general met with Arafat in Cairo in 1999, they were considered to be out of the alliance. However their stance is that ‘dialogue does not always mean agreement’.  
- Saadat opposes Oslo. |
| PFLP-GC                       | Split from PFLP in 1968 - headed by Ahmad Jibril                           | - Secretary-General Ahmad Jibril.  
- Deputy Secretary-General Talal Najj | - Is said to lack broad presence inside the Occupied Territories but has tried to reassert itself with the second intifada by carrying about attacks against Israel. |
| DFLP                          | Split from PFLP in 1969 with Nayef Hawatamah in the lead, forming the PDFLP. Changed its name to DFLP in 1974 | - Nayef Hawatamah                                                        | - Joined APF to oppose the Oslo process and the Declaration of Principles in 1993.  
- Reconciled with Fatah in 1999 – thus considered to be out of alliance at present  
- In 2000 the DFLP sent a delegate to Camp David, but withdrew before they concluded. |
| PALESTINIAN REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY | Formed in 1982 by Arabi Awwad                                             | - Arabi Awwad                                                              | - Although not very large, it is a ‘veteran’ of Palestinian politics as it has its beginnings already in the 1920’s. It emerged out of the traditional communist party in 1982.  
| SAIQA                         | Formed in 1968 to rival Fatah. Original leadership consisted of Dafi Jamani, Youssef Zuaddin and Mahmoud al-Maayaia, but were replaced by Zuhair Muhsin after 1970 coup in Syria. | - Secretary-General since 1979 Issam al-Qadi  
- Sami al-Atari and Majid Muhsin are leaders for Lebanon. | - A member of the PLO until 1983  
- Sponsored by Syria |
| **PLF** | Formed in 1977 by Muhammad Zaydan (Abu Abbas) and other dissenters from the PFLP-GC. | -Opposition led by Abu Nidal al-Ashqar  
-PLO faction led by Omar Shibli (Abu Ahmad Halab) | -This group suffered many splits.  
-Today opposition is led by Ya'qoub and Abd al-Fatah Ghanim with head office in Damascus.  
-There used to be three factions to this group:  
1) Led by Tal-at Ya’qoub (who died in 1988 of a heart attack - Abu Nidal al-Ashqar took over) and  
2) Led by Abd Fattah Ghanim – (pro-Damascus and now allied with Ya’qoub faction) and  
-Almost no presence in the Occupied Territories, but has support in Lebanon. |
| **PPSF** | Established July 1967 by Dr. Samir Ghosheh and Bahjat Abu Gharbieh | -Pro-Oslo led by Dr. Ghosheh  
-Pro-Damascus led by Khaled Abd al Majid. | -Today has both pro- and anti-Oslo factions.  
-In the 1990’s Dr. Ghosheh supported the PLO’s acceptance of Resolution 242.  
-The opposing group in Damascus is led by Khaled Abd al Majid who coordinates their links with the Damascus 10. |
| **FATAH INTIFADA** | Formed in May 1983 by Abu Musa (Sa’id Musa Murgha). | Leader today is Abu Khaled al-Umla | The following of this groups seems to be for the most part in the refugee camps in Lebanon. |
| **HAMAS** | Formed in 1988. Emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood in response to the outbreak of the intifada. | -Sheikh Ahmad Yasim, assassinated in March 2004 by the IDF.  
-However not based in Damascus, but Gaza.  
-Main activity in Occupied Territories, however, have representatives and supporters in Lebanon as all. |
PIJ  
Formed in 1979 by Fathi Shiqaqi and other Palestinians in Egypt. Expelled from Egypt in 1981 and Shiqaqi returned to Gaza to form the PIJ.
Shiqaqi assassinated in Malta by Israelis in 1995 and was succeeded by Dr. Ramadan Abd Allah Shallal, with headquarters in Damascus.
-Group operates mainly in the Occupied Territories, however has representatives and a following in Lebanon as well.

Chart 2: Palestinian Groups in Lebanon supporting the Oslo Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ESTABLISHED</th>
<th>LEADER(S)</th>
<th>ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fatah</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Head of Fatah is Farouq Quadoumi. Other prominent leaders are Yassir Arafat (late-President of the PA) and the current President of the PA Mahmoud Abbas.</td>
<td>The leaders of this group were the main actors in the Oslo Accords and the 'peace process'.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLF</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Mohammad Zaydan (Abu Abbas) died in 2004. Omar Shibli (Abu Ahmad Halab) replaced him.</td>
<td>This group is split between supporters and non-supporters of the Peace Process (See chart above).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPSF</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>Dr. Ghosheh</td>
<td>This group is split between supporters and non-supporters of the Peace Process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the charts indicate, some of these groups have split into pro- and anti-Oslo factions. In addition some of the groups are almost solely based in Syria and Lebanon, such as the sections of the PPSF, Saiqa, Fatah Intifada, sections of the PLF, the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party, and the PFLP-GC (although it does have presence in Occupied Territories, it is more popular in Lebanon and
Syria). One could potentially split the chart and the groups into four more subsections in order to make their allegiances clearer:

1) Fatah and PLO groups: Including the pro-Oslo offshoots of the PPSF and the PLF. These groups believe that the realistic solution to the current Arab-Israeli conflict is based upon UN Resolutions 194 and 242. This implies that there will be limited, if any, right of return for refugees. They do have a following throughout Lebanon, however, the most substantial following is in the south.

As will be shown below, different groups within the Resistance Movement have prominence in the various camps depending on geography. In other words, Fatah and other PLO groups have prominence in some camps whereas in most of the other camps the opposition groups have prominence. This has to do with the Lebanese Civil War, where in some cases Fatah was the strongest force and in other cases the Palestinian groups having their support from Syria were the strongest force.

2) The Opposition groups: Including the PFLP-GC, the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party, Saiqa, Fatah Intifada and the Damascus led sections of the PPSF and the PLF. These groups consider armed struggle the best means to liberate Palestine, however, they are not carrying out any military raids at the moment. They are against the Oslo process as they believe that 1) It does not represent the Palestinian people and 2) It is a surrender to the Israelis. These groups are for the most part based in Syria and Lebanon and this is where their support base comes from (save the PFLP-GC who has support and conducts activities within the Occupied Territories). This support is not surprising as it is the Palestinian refugees who have been the most neglected within the peace process.

3) The Religious groups: Including HAMAS and the PIJ who have representatives and followers in the camps in Lebanon, however, their main activity is focused in
the Occupied Territories. Nevertheless, they do have support and a following and this is due to the same reasons as the above. These groups reject the Oslo process and believe that liberating Palestine is a precondition to unity of the Islamic world.

4) The PFLP and the DFLP. The fact that the PFLP entered into dialogue with the PA does not necessarily mean that they agree with them or a two-state solution. It is seen more as a necessity because of the current realities on the ground. In other words, although they are committed to liberating all of Palestine, they believe that it is wise to be adaptable as well as being involved in the decisions being made. The DFLP, however, has a more pragmatic outlook, calling for a solution based on UN Resolution 242.

**Incentives? The function of the political groups in the refugee camps**

Today the PLO has left Lebanon; the Cairo Agreement no longer exists to allow commando activity. The Soviet bloc no longer exists to fund the organisations. What exactly do these organisations do? The evidence that I found within Shatila camp did not correspond to that from earlier phases of their existence in Lebanon.

The organisations only really exist in the camp and the organisations are providing protection in the camp ... Because there is no Palestinian authority in the camp, [the residents] see the organisations as a small authority that [they] should be under to get protection. This condition in Lebanon is completely different to the conditions in Syria and Jordan. In Lebanon, all the Palestinian people are organised. But the people in Syria and Jordan, although they are politicised in the Palestinian case, they are not organised in the Palestinian organisations. [This is] because they have better living conditions and more rights than the Palestinians here; they can work and do their jobs like any other
citizens. But here it is not like that. But [no matter where Palestinians live] they are with Palestine and the Palestinian cause.

The political organisations in Lebanon can, therefore, be seen as small authorities that take care of day-to-day issues. This leads to the first major function of the political groups: popular committees.

**Popular Committees**

As the Lebanese authorities do not involve themselves directly in refugee camp affairs, there is a popular committee and a security committee that consists of members and leaders of each political party that organises life to a certain extent within the camp. The various political groups “listen to people, and bring up important issues” to the popular committee. There is no other authority in the camps. The political groups therefore provide help and protection, and are thus part of the establishment within the camps.

The political groups, individually and as part of the popular committees, negotiate with UNRWA in order to help needy people with housing and so forth, even though they may not always be as united on the popular committee as people would like them to be. People do also negotiate with UNRWA themselves.

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5 Interview with the leader of PPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed office in Shatila camp, 10/10/02
6 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Communist Party in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02

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The situation and effectiveness of the popular committees vary from camp to camp and region to region. In Ein el Helweh, a camp situated close to Saida (Sidon) for instance, there are several popular committees competing with each other. The official popular committee is run by opposition groups, 'in particular Saiqa', and PLO loyalists have set up their own popular committee, as well as the PFLP together with the DFLP. According to Suleiman the other camps in the South, Bourj el Shemali and Rashidiyeh are run by PLO popular committees. They do not suffer from the multiple popular committees of Ein el Helweh camp as they 'never fell under Syrian control'. Within the northern camps, there is hardly any PLO presence and the popular committees are run by opposition groups. This also has to do with the historical context. It was in the northern camps, specifically the ones in and around Tripoli, that the discussions between Arafat and Abu Musa took place during 1983, causing a split within Fatah. In the Beirut camps, where most of the field research was done for this thesis, the popular committees seemed to be all-encompassing. Both the opposition groups and Fatah work together on the popular committee. However, Fatah was not considered to be one of the bigger groups in Beirut. Suleiman explains that in the Beirut camps "Fatah does maintain low-profile offices and individual supporters". The differences between the regions are that in Ein el Helweh, the largest of the camps, there are competing committees. In the south the popular committees are PLO-controlled, while in the north, the opposition are in control, and in Beirut the popular committees have most groups together on

8 Suleiman, Jaber op. cit., p. 77
9 See Chapter Four.
10 Suleiman, Jaber op. cit., p. 77 This may well be the case. From my interviews, Fatah did not seem to be the most popular of the groups. But I found that most of all of the other offices were also rather low-profile, Fatah not being any more low-profile than any others. It was just not the most popular group. I just wanted to point this out in case there was a perception of Fatah being intimidated by the other groups, as that was not my interpretation.
one popular committee. This shows how the groups compete against each other in order to represent the Palestinian refugees in the camps.

This competition can cause problems for the inhabitants, especially where there are multiple popular committees. The differences in popular committees throughout the camps in Lebanon raise an important question: who is the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon? This question will have wider connotations when the Palestinian refugee issue is finally brought to the negotiating table.

There is also a security committee that is supposed to help sort out various issues within the camp such as theft, fights and so forth. During my fieldwork, I noticed that this committee was not highly regarded, with answers such as ‘if you know the people, if they are your friends, or if you are a member of the group that has the people in the security committee you can do as you please and so forth’.11,12

Whether or not the popular committees being the quasi-political authority within the camps was enough for people to join political groups, remains to be seen. However this is an important function of the political groups within the camp. However, the question still remains as to what else the groups provide that could make people want to join.

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11 This is from various informal interviews as well as conversations recorded in diary.
12 During my stay in the autumn of 2002 there was a murder during the night in Shatila camp. The next morning there was blood all over the street. When I tried to find out what the security committee was doing about it I was told that they were doing nothing. The one who had killed the other one was a friend of the people on the committee and therefore nothing was done about it.
Activities

The groups were able to do a lot more in the years prior to and even during the Lebanese civil war due to more funding and the Cairo Agreement that gave the Palestinians more rights.¹³ Today the situation is different. With reference to the political groups, they no longer have the right to carry arms and carry out their revolution on Lebanese soil. From the interviews I had, it seemed that the political groups did respect this fact and had come to the conclusion that, militarily, they could no longer act from Lebanon. But they could act with regard to social issues.

Regarding what activities the organisations have that may make people want to join, the political leaders told me that they still do have certain activities for members, and help their members as much as they can:

The Democratic Front comprises of many groups; for example the women's group and the youth organisation. Each organisation has its own programme. The youth organisation for instance] tries to see what the youth's problems are and try to change them. They have some classes for the youth. The youth, they need something like this.¹⁴

We in the PFLP, study the situation of the camp and the poor living conditions in the camp and give descriptions of it outside the camp to try and raise money. We also] have a big hall here in the camp for the youth. The hall has table tennis and games, and we give extra lessons to the children because the schools are so crowded. There are problems with the schools and therefore we give them extra lessons. If someone wants to have a wedding in the hall, the hall costs $50. It can also be used for funerals. When the children finish school we bring in teachers and friends of the PFLP to help them. We have lectures and political demonstrations to explain to the youth the situation in Palestine, about the Zionists and about the right of return.¹⁶

We have some social activities in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon. We have some ... clubs, we have representatives in the Popular Committees in that

¹³ For more information on Palestinian groups and politics in exile following the 1967 War up to the mid-1980's see for instance Sayigh, Yezid "The Politics of Palestinian Exile" Third World Quarterly Vol. 9, No. 1, January 1987
¹⁴ Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, the leader of the DFLP for Lebanon. Interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 07/10/02
¹⁵ This was the only such hall in Shatila camp that was used for almost every political activity, not necessarily by the PFLP.
¹⁶ Interview with Naji Dawali leader of the PFLP in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
camps that deal with issues of cleaning, unemployment and so forth. We have some teachers that help the small children. We help with some health care in the hospitals.

In the south, our organisation defends the people inside the camp ... in the south we have some military work, but in all the other camps we have media work, we have lectures, concerts. We also have social work.

The latter of these statements confirms the research done by Professor Khasen, who has been researching the mobilisation of potential suicide bombers from Rashidiyeh camp, a refugee camp very close to the Israeli border. He shows how the living conditions are very different in Rashidiyeh camp in comparison to the other camps in Lebanon: the conditions there are much worse. He calls the refugee camps 'breeding grounds' for producing suicide bombers. The conditions in the camps in the south, in particular Rashidiyeh camp, are worse than other camps in Lebanon where “because of their proximity to Israel, the Lebanese army literally puts them under siege”. There is a checkpoint at the entrance gate and Palestinians witness mass delays in their movements because of this. In Rashidiyeh camp the Lebanese authorities are so strict with them that they “do not allow the Palestinians to repair their residential quarters and to perform basic maintenance tasks. For example, the government restrictions do not allow Palestinians to even bring nails and hammers into the camps close to the Israeli border”. This level of severity is particular only to camps close to the Israeli border, while the other camps where I conducted my research had different circumstances. The Beirut camps, Shatila, Bourj el Barajneh

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17 Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed’s office 10/10/02
18 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02
19 See for example Khasan, Hilal “Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings” Third World Quarterly (Vol. 24, No 6, 2003)
20 Khasan, Hilal 2003 op. cit., p. 1056
21 Ibid. p. 1056
22 The camps situated in the south include Ein el Helweh, Rashidiyeh, Bourj el Shemali, Al Buss.
and Mar Elias were all open with no checkpoints. Ein el Helweh was more severe, with checkpoints at the entrance.

What Khashan found, however, in Rashidiyeh camp was that people were willing to become suicide bombers inside Israel for reasons of frustration. The issue of deprivation was discussed in the previous chapter in the human needs section. The next chapter will examine the potential for frustration within the Palestinian population. Nevertheless, Khashan’s findings I believe to be particular to Rashidiyeh camp, and most Palestinian military activity has been mainly confined to Palestine at this moment in time.23

Returning to the quotations above by some of the political leaders, what they show is that the political groups try as best they can to help the conditions in the camps. These conditions are outlined in the previous chapter in more detail, and include problems relating to the UNRWA schools and problems with healthcare. In raising these issues and trying to combat the problems the groups are creating collective incentives for joining their organisation.24 The collective incentives for joining one of these groups are many, including receiving help with school work and education through youth clubs, women’s groups, help with financial issues wherever possible, incentives through an ideology that one believes in, and also the incentive to be an active member of the community. As indicated above, for many of the people in

23 I did meet with Professor Khashan at the AUB and he confirmed that he had only studied this camp with respect to this issue and he too believed the situation to be different within other camps in Lebanon. His conclusions will be examined further within the next chapter and more fully within the conclusion. However one important point to note is the difference between actual participation and endorsement. From my research, most refugees do support suicide bombings, not only in Rashidiyeh camp. This has to do with identity and perception of the situation which will be looked at in the next chapter.
24 Collective incentives are fully explained in Chapter 1. It is about incentives for the entire collective to join the groups as opposed to selective incentives. Based on Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1965 and 1968)
Shatila, who can not (even illegally) work, they have nothing to do but wait for their return to Palestine. Joining an organisation helps them achieve at least some immediate satisfaction. They learn more about Palestine, about the Lebanese government, and about their own state of affairs.

Parents take advantage of the extra teachers and send their children to the youth clubs where the extra school teachers are provided by the political organisations. The socio-economic benefits do provide incentives for joining. Why individuals decide to join or not join groups is the focus of the next chapter however in regard to these incentives, the people who were already politically active and already mobilised were positive and recognised the benefits available to them through some of the social work done by the organisations, whereas the people who were not members of political groups, particularly among many of the youth, did not believe that that was enough reason for joining. This aspect will be looked into more closely below.

Regarding social work done by the political groups in the camps, I noticed that the two religious groups, HAMAS and the PIJ, were also providing assistance to needy people. Their social work, as with the secular groups, did provide incentives for joining. Another religious group that is active in social work in the refugee camps is the Lebanese group, Hizb'Allah. This group provided on numerous occasions during my stay clothing, shoes, and food for the refugees. This group, however, did not distinguish between members and non-members. Anyone who was needy was able to benefit from their charity. For example, during one of my stays in Shatila camp, Hizb'Allah donated shoes to everyone in need, not necessarily Hizb'Allah
followers. A young woman from one of the families I often visited had been given a big bag of shoes to distribute to the people in living in her building. Hizb’Allah is very popular with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, not only because of the social work, but also in relation to 1) its role in the liberation of Southern Lebanon (where many Palestinians joined) and 2) its stance towards Israel and the Palestinian refugees (meaning its supportive stance towards the refugees and their right to return to their homes).

The political groups also help in sustaining the Palestinian identity. The question of how far the political groups have a role in creating Palestinian identity, and how far it is a result of the structural context, will be looked at in the next chapter where the focus is on identity. However the political groups re-affirm Palestinian identity by way of reinforcing and commemorating local histories in terms of histories from Palestine, and more recent (usually negative) histories for the Palestinians in Lebanon as well as celebrating Palestinian holidays.25

The immediate goals of the groups lie in their everyday functions. Awdah (return) and Tahrir (liberation) are still the ultimate goals, but the political groups realise that from Lebanon, they are unable to facilitate this goal. This is due to the structural constraints, including their base in Lebanon where governmental policies are not in their favour, as well as lack of funding.

Because of these two issues the priority for their limited funds is in helping the people in the refugee camps cope with their lives in these difficult conditions. It can be argued, therefore, that the functions of the political groups do act as collective

25 For example in Shatila camp, there is always a commemoration for the Massacre. The different groups hold meetings and many foreign visitors are invited from various embassies and NGO’s. Other holidays are also important. During the Eid, after Ramadan, most groups go to their members with small gifts. This is also part of Arab tradition.
incentives for joining them. However, there are other dynamics to mobilisation that are important too. Thus the function of groups and collective incentives do not show the whole picture.

Family

Within social construction literature Gamson tells us that organisations use “pre-existing relationships” as a basis for recruitment, through friends and family. Is this the case in Lebanon and how far do people within the same family unit join the same groups? Indeed in many cases joining groups seemed to be a family affair. In other words, people joined groups because their family were members. Nevertheless, although family ties to formal membership within organisations seemed to be rather high, there were more cases than expected where family members belonged to different groups. Looking back to the early 1980s Peteet, in her work on women in the camps, found that

Mobilisers often say that the easiest girls to mobilise are those who have active male family members and those who are employed in the Resistance offices or institutions. Living in a family where brothers (or sisters) are active may draw women into the resistance. Kin ties can be endowed with more direct significance. When Rima, a seventeen year-old student, wanted to attend meetings, her father opposed it on the

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27 NB! Her research was done before the PLO left Lebanon. Before 1982, the PLO in Lebanon was well funded and provided employment for Palestinians within their offices and various institutions.
grounds that politics are not a girl's concern. Her elder, activist brother mediated with their father, convincing him that her attendance would not be harmful and emphasising his own support for her actions. Eventually her father conceded and she became a member.

However, having said this, she noticed that while the family can be encouraging and bring about female involvement in political groups, the family can also hinder it.

The family has a double-edged role in mobilising women; it is crucial in both facilitating and obstructing it. The family is the primary social institution entrusted with the task of enforcing society's normative order on women. Accordingly, seldom do women join the Resistance without arousing family opposition. Few families readily confer approval on a kinswoman's decision to engage in political activism. In many cases they are effectively able to hinder women's actions; in other cases women engage in protracted and occasionally volatile conflicts with their parents for permission to participate.

Peteet emphasises the role of the family. Family ties, or kin ties, as she calls them, play a two-sided role. On the one hand, families may encourage women to join resistance groups (political groups) and on the other hand they can obstruct it. The family hinders women in joining for many reasons, the main reasons being the role of the woman in traditional society and fear of scandal as a hindering factor within the camp.

However, regarding Peteet's research, it is important to emphasise the time and context within which she was doing her research on women and the Palestinian resistance movement. Her research took place from September 1980 to June 1982. This places the time of her research during the time of the Lebanese civil war, which has a bearing on her results. In addition, during these years, the Palestinian

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28 This shows how family members, especially brothers, can be extremely important when it comes to mobilisation of themselves as well as other family members.
30 Ibid. p. 135
revolution was in its hey-day. The PLO was still in Lebanon, and they had various offices and institutions where Palestinians could seek employment as well as receive help. This probably had an influence on the mobilisation process, especially regarding women. Peteet in her explanations on mobilising women refers to women, for instance, who were employed by the Resistance institutions and offices, and how easily they were mobilised. At this time as well, there was money and education available through the PLO, which could also be a mobilising factor. Peteet for example mentions social institutions as one of the channels to mobilisation.31 These social institutions were built and funded by the PLO and were closely linked to the Palestinian political groups. She looks at how the “step from employment to affiliation or membership [was] fairly easy and widely encouraged by the responsible in the workplace”.32 Yet these institutions either do not exist today, or if they do, they exist with hardly any funding and employment.

Similarly, because the time frame of her research was during the civil war, there are other considerations to be taken into account as well. In times of crisis, people, men and women, are needed in political groups in order to organise and secure the camp. Thus that period was also one when it would be expected that people should mobilise and join political groups.

In relation to women in particular, I attended a DFLP women's meeting in Shatila camp. The theme of the meeting was women and mothers of the massacre. I had accompanied a young woman to the meeting who was giving one of the speeches. In this instance, the young woman had strong support from her mother in going to this meeting and making the speech, thereby eliminating any issue of going against the

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31 Peteet's channels to mobilisation of women include; university student, self-critique, mass work, kin ties, and social institutions,
32 Peteet, Julie op. cit., p. 120
family. The young woman, however, was not a member of the DFLP and when interviewed at a later date, she considered herself to be non-political in the sense of not belonging to a political group.

I think all the groups are for Palestine, so it is not necessary to be in a group. I am for Palestine.³³

In other words, you do not need to be a member of a group in order to share the ideals of the common good.³⁴ On the other hand, there was more to this young woman’s reasons for not joining.

The groups need to be in one hand and not fight each other³⁵

What this young woman has said raises three related points: first, ‘the common good’ which is held by all of the political groups as well as people who are not members of groups, i.e., returning to Palestine; second, disunity between the groups; third, being very politicised although not a member of a group, an aspect due to the very nature of the refugee camps, knowing from birth that you are a Palestinian refugee with no rights automatically makes you politicised. You are, in a sense, politicised by birth in this situation.

Is family as important in the mobilisation process as Peteet tells us? Is family important to the involvement in political activity and membership of the resistance groups today? As I briefly pointed out earlier, I found conflicting evidence as to

³³ Interview with Abeer, Palestinian living in Shatila camp. Interview held in her house, Shatila Camp, 27/11/03
³⁴ The common good refers to a two-fold issue; first the common good within the camp situations, making life as bearable as possible and; second, the common good in supporting the Palestinians inside Palestine in their struggle against dominance and occupation as well as their struggle for realising statehood.
³⁵ Interview with Abeer, In her house, Shatila Camp, 27/11/03
exactly how big a role the family plays in this issue. For Peteet and her women, the family played an important role, particularly because of her focus on women. Although Peteet’s analysis had a different emphasis, her findings are revealing in that she too found multiple channels for mobilisation, including self-mobilisation, kin ties, social institutions, mass work, university students and self-critique. In other words, family and kin ties are not the only existing mobilising factor. Although my focus is different and the time and setting have changed, I would agree with her that there are multiple channels of mobilisation. With my focus on why Palestinian refugees join the Resistance in general as well as particular groups, the evidence regarding family ties was ambiguous. On the one hand there was evidence pointing to the importance of family unity when joining groups, but on the other hand there was evidence pointing to people making their own decisions and in some cases members of the same family having joined groups that are politically opposed.

However, what I did find was that having a politically-active family member does produce a social politicisation, which comes from family members being exposed to political discussions and the activities of the politically-active family member. This social politicisation has an impact on the type of political action and the political group people chose to belong to.

For members of the PFLP-GC, the whole family should be in the group. If this leader, or that member, couldn’t convince his own family, then there is a problem.\(^{36}\)

In Abu Akram’s opinion all family members should be members of the same group. This creates social cohesion within the group.

\(^{36}\) Interview with Abu Akram, political leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, Mar Elias Camp, 10/10/02
On the other hand, while the family may play an important role in raising political consciousness, the choice of which group to join can also be of the person’s own making.

It is open to everyone. I am from Fateh Intifada. It allows Muslims, Christians, intellectuals, you name it. You don’t need to be anything in particular to join the group. About the question of family being members of the same group; it happens. I grew up with Fateh Intifada, but there are splits in families. My mother did not follow my father for instance.

Sobheyne’s choice of political group was Fateh Intifada. Her father also belongs to this group, although her mother belongs to another group. Her uncle, her father’s brother, is the Ambassador for Palestine in Italy and belongs to Arafat’s Fatah, a clear contrast to the Fateh Intifada that arose out of opposition to Fatah. Sobheyne’s statement indicates that some people within the same family can join whatever group they prefer, in this case groups that openly oppose each other. Although, having said this, it is still important to remember that the family may have a bearing to a certain extent on which group one joins, as one usually grows up within a family unit.

During my research I found that the issue of whether or not whole families joined one particular group, or whether family members joined different political groups, varied, thus making generalisation impossible. As explained above, family ties with political groups and political activity definitely had an impact upon political consciousness. With the (older) members that I interviewed (i.e. those who were of age during the revolution and the civil war) family membership of the same political groups seemed to matter more than to the younger generation (who were very young.

37 Interview with Sobheyne, member of Fateh Intifada, in her home in Shatila camp, 23/10/02
38 See Chapter Four
during the civil war). Nevertheless, there is always more than one reason why people decide to join political groups. In addition there is the question of why some of the youth of today, who had politically active parents, are deciding not to join the political groups. There are indications here of clear contrasts between the generations, between the generation that was active during the Palestinian Revolution and the Civil War, and the youth of today. This will be further explored in the next chapter.

The common good

Solidarity is also a reason for joining the political groups. Although most people realise that they cannot do much for their quest to return to their homes while in the context of living in Lebanon, some of the groups saw solidarity with Palestinians inside Palestine as a reason for joining a political group. Mobilising for solidarity is viewed as mobilising for the common good. The groups and the people agree on what the common good is – returning to Palestine, and while in Lebanon, making life as bearable as possible. This is the same vision within each of the groups. In that sense there is not always a need for incentives, as the process is in a sense ‘natural’.

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39 Post-active members that I interviewed had for the most part wives who were members of the same political group.
40 For more on this see Chapter One, particularly social construction literature by Gamson, William 1992 op. cit.,
It is natural that any people are against tyranny ... And what is going on in Palestine, with the Israelis killing the Palestinians, the Palestinians [here in Lebanon] feel that they need to join these groups to fight this.\footnote{\textit{Interview with Mohammad Afifi, Fatah leader in Shatila, interview held at his home in Shatila camp 15/10/02}}

This issue of ‘what is going on in Palestine’ was one that is repeated often.

\textit{The situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon is in second place to the Palestinians inside Palestine.}

The common good in this sense is related to solidarity in Palestine. Palestine, as will be further examined in the next chapter, is the core of the refugee’s life, identity, and future. The refugees see what is happening in Palestine, through the media, television and newspapers, but also through family members who may be there, as well as through the political groups. As mentioned earlier, one of the functions of the political groups is to hold historical events in memory of Palestine, but also to be concerned with what is happening today. There are gatherings and speeches and, unbelievably, fundraising for Palestinians in Palestine, whom the refugees in Lebanon consider worse off than they themselves are at the moment.

Regarding ‘what is happening inside Palestine’, the religious groups (PIJ and HAMAS) seem to be gaining more support and credibility in Lebanon. This is noticeable as most of the Palestinian political groups that have support, and that were actually established in Lebanon, have been secular. Support for these religious groups is not only because of the social work that they do (as indicated earlier) but also because of their political action inside Palestine. They are regarded as the

\footnote{\textit{Interview with Mohammad Yassin, PLF leader for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp; 16/10/02}}
groups who are actively ‘doing something’ for the Palestinian cause, by way of interacting in the political process inside Palestine as well as martyr and self-sacrifice operations. This seemed to be the case from participant-observation particularly in the Beirut camps of Shatila and Bourj. One man explained why he believed that the religious groups had found following in Lebanon:

The religious groups are getting more popular, more convincing, because of Hizb’Allah. People saw that Hizb’Allah was religious but was able to take action and help the situation in the south as well as here in the camps for us. I think this is why people are trusting and supporting the religious groups now. 43

Whatever the reason, the religious groups seem to have the same function in the camps as the secular groups in terms of ‘solidarity with Palestine’ and ‘social work’.

For all of the political groups what can be understood is that at the same time as the issue of what is happening in Palestine is important, as seen above, the political groups try to make the conditions in the camp as bearable as they can by helping their members with their problems, either by themselves or through UNRWA where possible.

43 Diary 16/11/03
No strategy needed?

The Palestinian resistance groups within the refugee camps are still very much alive. However, the level to which there was recruitment and mobilisation of the masses did not seem to me to be as high as would be expected in these circumstances. There did not seem to be any formal recruitment strategy:

...there is no strategy because the person who joins the group [does so] according to the conviction of his ideas. 44

Most of the leadership and the refugees, members and non-members, seemed to be of the opinion that people could choose for themselves which groups they wanted to belong to. 45 It was clear to me that the people who joined understood and comprehended what they were doing and why. A motivating factor that was not a result of a direct recruitment strategy, was that the political nature of their situation by itself could be enough to make them join:

Each Palestinian has a belonging 46 to a group.... People who see the news and see what is happening in Palestine, this will make them want to join. 47

This relates to what I mentioned earlier. Palestinian refugees are in a sense politicised and mobilised by birth. According to many of the political leaders, they believe that 'the situation' and their circumstances are such that the people need to join a group. The statement above implies that every Palestinian who is politically

44 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader of Saiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02
45 To what extent this is the case is always in question: other reasons and motivations for joining are looked at below under incentives, family ties, the common good.
46 As I understood it 'belonging' in this case refers to a natural bond with the political groups.
47 Interview with Haj Salem, leader for Fatah Intifada in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 07/10/02
conscious will have the motivation to join a group. This, however, does not explain why people do not join groups even though they are politically conscious. As mentioned above, many of the political leaders believed that people would join because of their specific beliefs, strategies and ideology.

You can’t just bring people from the street ... They need to understand what the communists need and want. 48

In this sense there is no direct recruiting of people from the alleyways in the camps. People need to learn about the organisation and understand and agree with their specific beliefs and strategies. Some groups rely on knowledge of the group history to make potential members want to join, remembering the popularity of the resistance during the Palestinian Revolution, the hey-day of the nationalist movement. They also rely on the other factors outlined above: family ties and belief in the common good.

The people know that the Front [Palestine Liberation Front] has fought to protect the camp, has responsibilities in the camp. ... [This knowledge will help people decide] if they want to join the group. 49

This statement emphasises what the group did in the past, as well as the responsibilities that it has today. In other words, these include memories of the hey-day and the Palestinian Revolution, as well as the functions and responsibilities the group has today within the refugee camps. These memories include the organisation of the camps following the Cairo Agreement when the political groups created popular committees, youth groups, women’s groups, medical services and military

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48 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Communist Party in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
49 Interview with Mohammad Yassin leader of the PLF for Lebanon. Interview in the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
training. The arrival of the fedayeen⁵⁰ and the basing of the political groups in Lebanon are remembered fondly. As a man from Tal al Zaatar put it in 1978:

I saw the Palestinian flag instead of the Lebanese flag, and a group of Palestinians in fedayeen clothes instead of the Lebanese police. As I moved through the camp I saw happiness on people’s faces... The sheikh in the mosque now spoke clearly about the homeland – in the past he couldn’t do this... In the homes the mothers spoke clearly with their children about Palestine – before this was only done in a whisper... Before the Revolution, meetings in the camps were limited to social problems; after it, discussion became political – the land, the nation, the Revolution.⁵¹

A fedayeen in Bourj el Barajneh described the situation from another point of view thus:

The people didn’t sleep for weeks afterwards, from happiness at seeing their [people] carrying arms to liberate the homeland. They were in total support of the fedayeen, and showed this by bringing them food, tea, coffee.⁵²

Sayigh calls the hey-day the ‘people’s new consciousness’. It was indeed, and the fedayeen were seen as ‘quasi-mystical icons’.⁵³ The political groups had widespread support during this era. I would argue that they still do have this support, and people do remember this age. However, the situation today is different to the mass mobilisation that took place during the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese Civil War. This is because of reasons listed above, for example there is no need for

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⁵⁰ Fedayeen is an important term. It is the plural of fida’i, having its roots (f-d-y) meaning to sacrifice or redeem something. Within the Palestinian Resistance it is a sacred symbol representing Palestinian nationalism and Palestinian aspirations. It is most commonly used to represent a fighter for the Palestinian revolution, however, although less frequently, it can also be used to represent a fighter who fights for Palestine in the jihad, making a fida’i and a moujahed (same roots as jihad, a fighter in a holy war, in Palestinian parlance more connected to fighters during the Arab Revolt in 1936 and those fighting in 1948) For more information on this see for example Johnson, Nels “Palestinian Refugee Ideology: An Enquiry into Key Metaphors” Journal of Anthropological Research and O’Balance, Edgar Arab Guerrilla Power (Faber, London, 1974)


⁵² Ibid. p. 165

⁵³ Kimmerling, Baruch and Migdal, Joel Palestinians: The Making of a People (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1994) p. 233
immediate mass mobilisation as there is no longer an immediate fear for one’s life as there was during the civil war. Similarly mass mobilisation as was possible through various PLO institutions is no longer available. However, the political groups in Lebanon have already been through this mass mobilisation process and that may be one of the reasons why most of the refugees belong to the groups. In other words, most refugees who are parents and grandparents are, or have been, members of the various political groups and through ‘family ties’, their children and grandchildren are recruited. On the other hand, where ‘family ties’ may not prove viable, the political groups do still rely on ‘no strategy needed’; this is not only because of their reputations and their social functions, but also because there is the assumption that every Palestinian is naturally political and in a sense born into the part of the Resistance.

‘No strategy needed’ also referred to people joining on their own accord, because of the above notion of being naturally political. There was also a sense that people joined whichever group because of their own political or ideological convictions. Some organisations make the potential member go through various tests and ensure that he or she fully understands and agrees with their programme before joining. This can occur even if the potential member was a member of the youth group.

Every Palestinian ... is most welcome to join the PFLP, under certain conditions. Conditions including that he [or she] must be above eighteen, he should continue his studies, he should know [about the ideology of] the PFLP, and he should have a positive image in the community. ... There are tests; in relation to his comrades in the PFLP, in relation to the people in the camp, and whether or not he is [enthusiastic enough]about being in the PFLP ... He should be convinced of the opinion of the PFLP.54

54 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila camp. Interview held in his office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
There are some conditions for someone who joins the group. First the one who is joining the group should have faith in the group and in the efforts of the group. Second ... to be a member, he should be ready at all times to do what the organisation needs him to do; according to what is good for Palestinian interests. 55

What this indicates is that the political groups want to have members who care about their beliefs and ideology and are willing to help in the organisation. Similarly, as shown above, the organisations help their members. 56 As shown by Haj Salem above when he says that every ‘Palestinian has a belonging to a group’, it shows that the political groups rely on their reputations, their history and the ‘situation’ when understanding why people want to join. It is this political, unjust, and poverty-ridden situation that make the Palestinians politically conscious. Because of the situation in which the refugees are living it does not seem necessary to recruit members, as the refugees are in a sense members of the resistance from their birth.

Themes of Recruitment

The Palestinian political groups do still exist in the refugee camps. They have certain functions ranging from managing day-to-day affairs in the popular committees, and arranging various activities for children, women and the poor. Their resources are at an all-time low, and their abilities have dwindled in

55 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon. Interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
56 The Palestinian political groups in Lebanon however, have fewer resources than they used to and can not help as much as they used to. For example, a family who are supporters of the PFLP I visited and interviewed have a son with a birth defect. When he was small (early 1980s) the PFLP sent them to Germany for an operation. Expensive trips like this are no longer available. However, as we have seen in the section on the functions of the political groups, they try to help through the popular committee, through the various associations that they have, and through their (limited) funds.
comparison to the situation during the Palestinian Revolution during the hey-day in the 1960s and 1970s. Nevertheless, the functions of the political groups, although diminished in comparison to what they were, are important and still include social and political activities and in some instances protection, and serve as collective incentives for people joining and being active within their groups.

Are the political groups in the refugee camps the ‘glue of social relations’ as Touraine believes they should be?\textsuperscript{57} Furthermore, do the groups have the three necessary ingredients for survival: identity, opposition and totality?\textsuperscript{58} The first two of these, identity and opposition, refers to whom the groups represent, their collective identity, and who the ‘opposition’ is. The groups manage to fulfil these requirements as the political groups themselves were part of the Palestinian identity during the hey-day and still are to a certain extent. Problems arise as to how much they are actually able to do. Who and what the opposition is, is also obvious. This was made clear in the previous chapter. The Lebanese government is obstructing and making life extremely difficult for the refugees. However, the biggest opposition is Israel and the international community. The former still occupies land and uses force toward Palestinians within the territories, and the latter seems unable or unwilling to help the Palestinian cause. Touraine’s third ingredient of ‘totality’ refers to the grounds on which people decide to mobilise and what the ‘stakes’ of mobilisation are. This will become clearer within the next chapter; however, at the moment, there are certain issues that we can draw from both this chapter and the previous chapter. Grounds for mobilising exist in the view of the opposition, views

\textsuperscript{57} Touraine, Alain 1981 op. cit., (foreword by Richard Sennet p. x)  
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid.
of the ‘others’, issues related to socio-economic conditions and having a voice in what happens within the camps. In other words, the functions of the political groups.

Regarding the recruitment methods used by the political groups, there was no clear strategy. Most groups relied on their reputation from the hey-day during the Palestinian Revolution as well as their day-to-day functions within the refugee camps. Solidarity with the Palestinian Resistance as a whole seemed to be assumed, and therefore no strategy was or is needed. In this case solidarity relates to the image of the Resistance from the hey-day, their identity, the problems in the camp, as well as solidarity with Palestinians inside Palestine. Family ties can be related to which particular group people decide to join. In most instances family members were members of the same political group; nevertheless, there were also cases where family members chose different political groups. What the family contributes to mobilisation is politicisation (although this is done through other channels as well) and support for joining groups, particularly regarding women.

The general function of the political groups, family ties, solidarity, and issues related to the common good were thus the main mobilising forces. From the organisations’ point of view there did not seem be a need for a clear strategy of recruitment. The Palestinians are recruited to the Palestinian cause in a sense at birth, but does this necessarily mean they will join a group? The search for and the acquisition of one’s identity, which is the focus of the next chapter, can be achieved by joining a group. However, by living in the camps, by being forbidden to have civil rights in Lebanon, by having family members scattered in different camps, in different countries as well as within Palestine, this all reaffirms their Palestinian-
ness without their necessarily being a member of a political group. At the same time, however, because of the history of the Palestinian Resistance, particularly in Lebanon during the hey-day, they are indeed part of every-day life, and thereby a part of their identity whether or not they are formally a member. In a sense the acquisition of identity is enforced upon the Palestinians by the structural context in a negative way, instead of a positive one. Today, the political groups exist in the camps to help alleviate some of the harsh living conditions. The next chapter will focus on what people have to say about their situation, their identity and the political groups.
Chapter Seven

Identity of the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon

Our objective number one is to survive as a people, united, maintaining our identity. The objective set by the enemy is to end our identity.

Introduction: Framing of the situation

This chapter examines the Palestinian refugees' interpretation of their situation and of the political groups. It looks at collective identity and interpretation of the 'other(s)'. Social construction literature is used as a framework with emphasis on how situations are framed. How do the Palestinian refugees in the refugee camps frame their situation? The concept of 'frame' refers to:

an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the 'world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment. In Goffman's words, frames allow individuals 'to locate, perceive, identify, and label' events within their life space or the world at large.

Following on from this are collective action frames, split into three parts, diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. This refers to both individual framing as well as group framing. This in turn relates to how people and the political groups "assign

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1 Salah Ta'amari speaking in Lynd, Stoughton, Bahour, Sam, and Lynd, Alice Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians (Olive Branch Press, New York, 1994) p. 145
3 Benford, Robert “You could be the hundredth monkey” The Sociological Quarterly (Vol. 34, No 2, 1993). See Chapter One for more detail.
meaning to and interpret relevant events and conditions which can be seen as mobilising factors.

When framing a situation, questions arise such as who am I, who are we and who are the others that are different from us? With these questions we are moving on to questions of the self and of the other. The concepts of self and other are important to identity construction as they represent similarity and difference. The self is organised around these questions that identify the ideas we have about ourselves and our surroundings. Mead’s early notion of identity was based on the notion of ‘the self’ (he did not use the word identity). There exists the self as, for example, mother and teacher. This notion of self is based upon individual identity which can be made up of a variety of ‘selves’ making multiple identities. However, there is also the notion of identity as being a social identity, in other words, identifying oneself as part of a group as shown in self-categorisation theory, as a Palestinian and as a refugee. Also, Cooley’s classical notion of the ‘looking glass self’ is important to how one identifies the self. This refers to how people believe other people view them (although one’s perception of how others view oneself may, or may not be, the actual case). All of this is part of the (subjective) understanding of the self.

Furthermore, the perception of the ‘other’ is also important to collective identity. As Giddens tells us “the constitution of the ‘I’ is acknowledged to come about only

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4 Benford, Robert op. cit., p. 200
5 Mead, George Herbert, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist (University of Chicago Press, London, 1967)
through the discourse of the ‘other’”. I found that the refugees’ understandings of all of these questions on the self and the others, although they varied, corresponded to the various viewpoints of the political groups.

This chapter on identity will be split up into the following sections: first there is a section on the Palestinian refugees’ interpretation of ‘the self’. This includes themes involving al-nakba, socio-economic conditions, foreigner status, and the future. The second section deals with ‘the other’; who ‘the other’ is and how they are interpreted. The third section deals with people’s perception of the political groups. The conclusion will try and incorporate the information given in this chapter on the self and the other into collective action frames for mobilisation.

**The Collective Self**

The situation in which the refugees live is an interpretation of the ‘self’. This section focuses on ‘the self’, looking at questions dealing with: who am I? And who are we? The answers to these questions give an insight into what the refugees’ interpretation of their situation within the camp is, as well as their interpretation of their situation as Palestinian refugees and their experience with both of these issues. It is also an interpretive frame that the organisations use. From the various interviews I conducted with people living in the refugee camps as well as with political leaders from the refugee camps, I recognised that suffering and endurance were major themes of people’s lives.

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Who am I and who are we? ‘We are Palestinians first of all’

During the field research, I found that being Palestinian comes before anything else:

My identity is Palestinian. My political belonging is the Democratic Front. 9

I am Palestinian. I was born in Lebanon but my identity is Palestinian. I am from Acre. I feel bonded to the land that I come from ... I was born in Lebanon by force. I wish to be back in Palestine with my people. 10

Palestine and being Palestinian come before everything else. This aspect has been so for a number of years. 11

The Palestinian accent is another distinguishing feature the refugees have in Lebanon. The people in the camp have kept their accents. The reason for this is two-fold: first, as they are living in the camp with other Palestinians, it is natural to keep the accent, and second, it is a way of maintaining one’s identity. Some of the youth were discussing this issue during my stay in Shatila. Refugees living in Shatila are exposed to other nationalities living within the camp, such as Lebanese, Kurds and some Egyptians. 12 Nevertheless, although there are other nationalities living within the camp, the Palestinian identity remains overwhelming. For example, Ayman, one

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9 Interview with Mo’taz Mar’ouf, DFLP leader for Lebanon, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 07/10/02
10 Interview with Mo’taz Mar’ouf, DFLP leader for Lebanon, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 07/10/02
11 There is a widespread view that Palestinian consciousness and Palestinian identity arrived with the Palestinian Revolution. Indeed during the Revolution there was a Palestinian reawakening, however, how far the Palestinian identity started in the 1960s is challenged by Rashid Khalidi in his work. He puts particular emphasis on Jerusalem (where his family comes from) and challenges this myth by pointing to identity formation and consciousness in Palestine from the Ottoman Period and onwards. He points, however, to two critical periods of time that were very important in shaping the re-emergence of Palestinian identity; the years of the British Mandate (p. 177) and what he calls the ‘lost years’ between al-nakba and the formation of the PLO (p. 178). Nevertheless, the construction of Palestinian identity had already started prior to this time. Khalidi, Rashid Palestinian Identity: The construction of Modern National Consciousness (Columbia University Press, New York, 1997)
12 This ‘multiculturalism’ is peculiar to Shatila camp, although the majority of residents are Palestinian. The other camps remain Palestinian.
of the young Palestinian men at the youth centre in Shatila, was being picked on for changing his Palestinian accent to a Lebanese accent when he was outside the camp. The reason for this, he explained, was because it made life easier. Later on when I spoke to him about it he told me that the people at school\textsuperscript{13} were making fun of him for being Palestinian.

They called me Abu Ammar [Arafat]. Even though I don’t like him, they were calling me that.\textsuperscript{14}

Therefore, he changed his accent at school and when he was out of the camp. The argument he had with the other youth at the centre was about him not being proud of being Palestinian and that he somehow was embarrassed about it. It was interpreted as some sort of betrayal. However, for Ayman it was not about being embarrassed but inconvenience.

The accent keeps the identity. I prefer to speak Palestinian.\textsuperscript{15}

Ayman seemed to be one of a few people who changed their accent. Most of the people, the ones who do leave the camp, do not always change their accent. Identity is then reinforced by the Palestinian accent when outside the camp. Regarding this issue, there is also the infamous example of ‘banadura’, during the civil war. This example is widely known and often repeated:

I think it was 1974. There was a bus that came from Tal al Zaatar, a camp. It was in an area where most of the people were Palestinian. Suddenly the bus stopped at a bus stop. Several men came into the bus. One man was carrying a

\textsuperscript{13} He was attending a Lebanese school funded by the youth centre that I was volunteering at.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Ayman, at his home in Shatila camp, 18\textsuperscript{th} November 2003
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
tomato and he started asking each one of the people on the bus, ‘What is this?’ Palestinians say ‘Bandura’. Anybody who was Lebanese would say ‘Banadura’. The man would tell him, ‘Get out of the bus’. Of course nobody knew why they were saying that. After they took all the Lebanese off the bus, they started shooting everybody in the bus with machine guns. Forty people in that bus were killed and all of them were Palestinians.17

The accent defines and reinforces the Palestinian identity, for both good and bad. This example re-affirms what was said at the start of this chapter by Salah Tamari: that the most important objective is to maintain the Palestinian identity. This remains the objective, no matter what happens, as it is a way to survive as a people.

Poverty, suffering, and endurance: self within the future

Another part of refugee identity has to do with the socio-economic conditions and Arab and Lebanese policies towards the Palestinian refugees.

The meaning of refugee [for me] is that my family and I were kicked out of our country. We [the Palestinians] went to different countries, like Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon ... We had a miserable childhood. We missed all the comforts of being a child. There were some camps [but] there were no buildings, just tents ... What can define more than a refugee, than we as refugees who have seen everything of poverty and tyranny? You have seen for yourself in Shatila, Bourj, and here in Mar Elias, how the conditions are.18

As a refugee there is nothing stable here in Lebanon, not for me and not for my children. Living here as a refugee is obligatory. I am obliged to be a refugee here ... We are suffering compared to other people who have all their rights: civil and political rights.19

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16 The difference in English is something resembling, ‘tomeyto’ and ‘tomahto’.
17 Um Sa’ad, Palestinian Refugee who used to live in Lebanon. In Lynd, S, Lynd A and Bahour, S ed op.cit., p. 101
18 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader for Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office, Mar Elias Camp, 12/10/02
19 Interview with Abu Akram, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, interview held in his office, Mar Elias camp, 10/10/02

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There seems to be a strong Palestinian identity stemming from how the refugees are living and how they are treated in Lebanon. This has many factors: first, not having any civil rights, like the right to work, makes the Palestinian refugees know that they are not Lebanese but Palestinian refugees seen as outsiders, foreigners. Their poor living conditions, being forced to stay and live in camps, reinforces that they are foreigners and not wanted. Second because of the lack of political rights, the Palestinian refugees have been unable to participate in the political process, either in the government or by having the right to vote. This makes them aware, again, that they are not Lebanese, but Palestinian. Third, remembering where one is from, being brought up in households where the families talk of their former homes, villages and towns in Palestine, being brought up in schools that educate the children on Palestine. This all reinforces the Palestinian identity.

A lot of this reinforced Palestinian identity also has to do with Palestinian recent history in Lebanon. During the civil war, the Palestinians were often singled out for various attacks. The attacks on various refugee camps are an example. Many of the people I spoke to had previously lived in Tal al Zaatar camp, witnessed the siege there, then moved to Shatila and witnessed the siege there too, although were lucky enough to stay alive. Many had then moved out of the camps and occupied various empty buildings in and around Beirut, before moving back to the camps in and around Beirut. One family, for example, told me that since their arrival in Lebanon they had been forced to move several times:

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20 Interview with leader of the PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Moujahed’s office, Shatila camp, 10/10/02
First in 1948 we moved to Baalbek. Then in 1960 we moved to Tal al-Zaatar. When it was destroyed in 1975 we moved to Damour. There were problems there too. Then in 1982 we moved to Shatila right before the massacre. After the massacre we moved to Rouche. Then we moved back here. Every time we tried to make a home for ourselves, it was destroyed and we were forced to move.  

The identity image of the concept of ‘suffering’, apart from the implications made above, is also included within the context of the poor socio-economic conditions. ‘Suffering’ is also seen within the context of the Palestinian struggle for Palestine. Many families have martyrs and have lived through the Lebanese civil war. But, when asked about this, there was always reference to Palestine, and what the Palestinians within Palestine were facing too. Although the refugees in Lebanon suffered greatly in the past, they believe the Palestinians inside Palestine are suffering more than they are. There is a shared image of Palestinians in the diaspora as people who suffer and are waiting to return. The concepts of ‘waiting’ and ‘patience’ were common both among people who were not members of political groups as well as people who were. Waiting and patience seemed to be key points in the refugees’ lives and identity.

We can wait another fifty years.

We will get Palestine back by time not by strength. In time we will able to go back.

21 Interview with Abu Samer, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 28/11/03
23 Not necessarily what Westerners tend to think of Martyrs (i.e. a suicide bomber, terrorist or someone fighting for Jihad), but in this case it refers to someone who died in the Palestinian Resistance. It could be referring to casualties from fighting during the Civil War for instance.
24 Interview with Abeer, in her home in Shatila camp, 27/11/03
The Palestinian Resistance has existed since 1917, 1919, 1936, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1974 and still exists. We will have victory even though it may take many more generations.  

Our rights [of returning to Palestine] will not come back to us in two or three years. We have to work for many, many years.

These statements show the high degree of patience in their wish and struggle to return to Palestine. Nevertheless, it should not be confused with giving up the struggle of return to Palestine. It was more of a fatalistic attitude. Schultz too, in her work done in the West Bank and Gaza came across these important concepts. She writes that the Palestinian struggle is about ‘suffering and sacrifice’. She explains that:

A Palestinian ‘is’ someone who resists, either with a Kalashnikov or an RPG in the squalid refugee camps of Lebanon, or with stones and Molotov cocktails in Gaza and/or someone who suffers because of dispossession, longing, injustice, and death.

The image of the Palestinian resisting in the refugee camps in Lebanon is very different today. However, Schultz is not very wrong in mentioning it, as it is a widely popular image, albeit outdated, especially when considering what I found to be the case in the camps. This image, however, is a symbol of the courage and the struggle of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, particularly during the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese civil war. Nevertheless, she has a point. In Palestine, the Palestinians are resisting Israeli occupation and force. They are suffering greatly from dispossession, injustice, and death. This view of the suffering of Palestinians

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25 Interview with Tarek, in his shop in Shatila camp, 11/12/02 (NB! He implied throughout our conversation that God was involved in being able to return to Palestine)
26 Interview with the leader for Lebanon of the PPSF, in Abu Moujahed’s office, 10/10/02
27 Interview with Haj Salem, leader for Fatah Intifada in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home in Sabra, 07/10/02
28 Schultz, Helena Lindholm The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between Revolution and Statehood (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999) p. 123
29 Ibid. p. 124
as being part of their identity is certainly so, and was perceived as such by the refugees. The waiting and patience that is implied within the statements above are also connected to this notion of suffering. It is about believing and hoping that one day they will return to Palestine, as well as having patience and endurance to wait as long as they can, that makes the suffering possible.

One major difference to Schulz’s work in the West Bank and Gaza was with regard to the notion of ‘struggle’. This means that the Palestinians are struggling precisely because they are Palestinians. Schultz found that in the West Bank and Gaza more recently, struggling is connected to political and military action and to the intifada. In the Occupied Territories the notion of struggle is to “not shy away from militant struggle and to be sensitive to what it may cause”. Yet, the Palestinians in Lebanon do not seem to be involved in a militant struggle. But this does not necessarily mean that they do not interpret themselves as struggling and suffering.

Shatila is an example of suffering. Even though the situation now is much better, some years ago the situation was very, very bad. Now you can see water in some houses.... This is the suffering part of the camp, but the enlightening part is that the Palestinian people still have the will to continue their lives.

The Palestinians are suffering but they have endurance. Their struggle today is in their daily lives. The answer to this daily struggle is to return to Palestine.

30 Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 124 (‘sensitive to what it may cause’ is referring to death)
31 Although Khashan, Hilal “Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings” Third World Quarterly (Vol. 24, No 6, 2003) mentioned in the previous chapter found militancy to be high in Rashidiyeh camp in Southern Lebanon. I would argue, and indeed Khashan agreed with me, that this is something specific to Rashidiyeh camp.
32 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
One of the main themes expressed by both political groups and refugees was a belief that everything would be better in the future when they return to Palestine. Returning to Palestine is the only solution to all of their problems. There was a view of the self by visualising a future return to Palestine.

The situation here is getting worse .... The only solution is to go back to our country.33

Every Palestinian here, in Syria, and elsewhere, looks forward to returning to Palestine. All their thoughts and struggles [are] for the right of return.34

A person without land is nothing. [Land] is his life; it is his grandfather’s life. I think a person without his land must have dignity.35 I live for Palestine 24 hours ....

All of these statements refer to the question of ‘who am I’ through lenses of what one used to have, what one does not have today, and what one will hopefully have one day in the future. They are in a country where they do not belong, and wish to be back in Palestine.

For me Palestine is life. It is the air I breathe. If it wasn’t, I would not be in the Palestinian Resistance from 1973 until now.37

Realising this future goal involves struggle, suffering, patience and endurance. The self, both the individual and the collective, is someone who has suffered injustice

33 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party in Shatila camp, interview held in the communist office in Shatila camp 09/10/02
34 Interview with Abu Akram, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp, 10/10/02
35 My understanding of dignity in this context is of the necessity for the Palestinians to have dignity, and be dignified, even though they are living outside their homeland and unable to return. In other words, just because they are refugees and, for the moment at least, have lost their homeland, their homes, and their livelihoods, does not mean that they should not be dignified and proud of who they are.
36 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF in Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
37 Interview with Mohammad Affifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02
but who will one day receive what is their right. Again the return to a fatalistic approach. This fatalistic view was not necessarily pessimistic but rather, the opposite, optimistic. Fatalistic in this sense seemed to refer to their return to Palestine as being inevitable in the future. This had to do with their sense of their situation as being unjust and therefore in time, they would be able to achieve their rights. Many of the refugees viewed God as having pre-determined their return.

There is also something else that is very important within these statements: the refugees somehow identifying themselves with the land of Palestine; the actual soil and the use of their senses. This is something that is strongly part of the Palestinian identity and is a constant theme in much Palestinian poetry. Darwish, considered national poet of the Palestinians, for instance, in one of his poems tells us that:

One’s land is inherited as one’s language.\(^{38}\)

This repeated line throughout the poem is revealing about the closeness between the Palestinian identity and the actual land of Palestine: they are one, unified. Another poem from his years in Beirut, written in 1977, serves as an example of how much Palestine and its soil is important. In this case Palestine and its land is a part of, and an extension of, himself:

I call the soil an extension of my soul
I call my hands the walkway of wounds
I call the pebbles wings
I call the birds almonds and figs
I call my ribs trees
And I pluck a fig branch from my chest
And throw it as a stone

And blow up the conquerors tank

This bond with the land in Palestine is very strong. It is part of the Palestinian identity, by nature of being what the Palestinians are deprived of and long for. The Palestinians in Lebanon, even the ones too young to remember Palestine, feel this bond.

Foreigners- Self through looking glass

Being a foreigner in a country does inflict a certain identity upon people, especially if they are unable or unwilling to integrate.

I feel like I am nothing here in Lebanon. I don’t feel like I am living. I can’t work. Even if you are lucky enough to get a job outside the camp, it will be a bad one.

The Lebanese government is not prepared to give citizenship to Palestinians in Lebanon... The Lebanese government is afraid [of allowing the Palestinians to become citizens because] they represent a social sect, we are all Muslims almost... Lebanon has sect problems, the Muslims have become more than the Christians.

The proof is in the recent decisions about the university and the property rights. The Palestinians can no longer go to the university like the Lebanese and they can not own houses. Within the Lebanese constitution, the Palestinians are deprived from working in 77 or 78 jobs. They can’t have a passport, they can’t work, as doctors, teachers, lawyers, and even the employee is not allowed to work. And the police, if they catch a Palestinian working, they will put him in jail, because they are not allowed to work. While Lebanon has the market for people from Sri Lanka, Kurdish people, people from everywhere, but not for Palestinians.

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40 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party, interview held in the Communist Party office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02
41 Interview with Muhammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
42 By employee the leader of the PPSF means other non-professional worker such as blue collar workers, secretaries and other workers.
43 Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Moujahed’s office, Shatila camp, 10/10/02
This was confirmed by various other people in the camp as well. For example, Abu Samer, who is head of a large family, works as a guard at a school. He helps children cross the street, and makes sure they do not leave before school ends. Even this job, he explained, was insecure. If the police found out that he was working they would put him in jail.

In other words:

I tell you ... I don't [even] have animal rights, so it is not correct to call me a refugee.44

How did the refugees think that they were perceived by ‘others’? Many were concerned about their image of being looked upon by the international community (West) as terrorists, people who are somehow different from other people in the world.

The media in Europe is giving a bad image of the Palestinian people. They think that the Palestinian people are bad and killing the Israelis, when it's the complete opposite.45

The world is totally against the Palestinians and for the Israelis ... We are decent people who love to live in peace and love our children... We are the only people who are still outside our country and cannot return to it, even though it still exists... We are people, we should have rights, and the world should stand with us, not against us. We are not enemies of anyone. We are not occupying any land, and killing is not our hobby. But we are being killed everyday since 1948. No one is supporting us and telling the world that we have rights.46

The image of being viewed as terrorists and killers is frustrating for the Palestinian refugees in the camps. The (symbolic) interaction between the Palestinians and the

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44 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02
45 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party for Shatila camp, interview held in the Communist Party office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02
46 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02
rest of the world seems in their view to have gone horribly wrong, although many 
refugees do believe that this is slowly changing in Europe. Why though, do the 
refugees when gazing though the looking-glass, have this conception? The answer 
seems to be that the international community is not helping their situation regarding 
their rights to return to their country, nor are they helping them receive civil rights. 
This lack of action on the part of the international community is viewed as 
confirmation that the international community sees them thus. The image in the 
looking glass may not be correct. Indeed, for the Palestinian refugees, this image 
that they see ‘others’ perceiving is not correct. It is not correct in the sense that the 
‘others’ do not understand the injustice done to the Palestinians. This perception can 
be related back to Site’s concept of ‘control’. \(^{47}\) Control, for Sites and human needs 
literature, refers to being able to control, understand and predict one’s environment 
and society. For Sites this is the priority of all of the human needs, and is needed in 
order to fulfil all of the other needs — security, welfare, identity and freedom needs. 
How far can the refugees predict the behaviour of the outside world? In a world 
dominated by the West, this has an important bearing, as the West includes the 
powerful ones who can, if they wish, change their situation. By perceiving the 
international community as not caring about their situation, they are left with the 
impression that they are destined, at least for the time being, to be refugees — not 
being able to return to their homes. This perception of the refugee community in the 
camps can lead to the ‘outside’ perception of the Palestinian refugees being 
frustrated; leading perhaps to what Gurr terms ‘frustration-aggression’. \(^{48}\) There is an 
obvious perceived injustice, yet there is no aggression. Similarly although there is 
mobilisation, there are a growing number of youths who are not interested in joining 

\(^{47}\) Sites, Paul “Needs as Analogues of Emotions” in Burton, John ed Conflict: Human Needs Theory 
(Macmillan, London, 1990) 
groups. This puzzle should become more apparent in the section on perception of groups.

Framing of the other: Why are we here?

…the constitution of the I is acknowledged only to come about through the discourse of the ‘other’.  

This section focuses on the following questions: why are the Palestinians where they are? Who is responsible for al-nakba? These questions are involved with the construction of the ‘self’ that can be contrasted to the ‘other(s)’.

Because of al-nakba,

The people who were born here do not [know or remember their] land. But if you ask the older ones, they can give you another concept. When you see someone else having your country it feels very sad. My land [country] Palestine is being occupied by foreign people.

This statement is related to the perception of the self through the framing of the situation. In other words the framing of the situation of being a refugee in this instance is done through the concept of al-nakba and occupation. The understanding of the self comes about because of al-nakba. He is a refugee whose land is being

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50 Haj Salem, leader of Fatah Intifada in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Sabra, 07/10/02 (although some of the youths and others who do not remember Palestine may disagree with the first part of his quote)
occupied by other people; this is who he is. He seems to feel that he is being held captive somewhere he does not belong, while other people occupy his home and homeland.

Related to this is the situation in which the Palestinians are living within the camp, which to many refugees is interpreted as a situation which is forced upon them, something that is out of their control:

I am living here in Shatila camp because I am forced to live here. [Because] I am Palestinian.

This statement again relates back to human needs: there is a lack of control of destiny for the Palestinian refugees, precisely because of their being Palestinian.

But by whom are they forced to live in this condition? Who is the other? The ‘other’ includes the Lebanese government, the Arab World, Israel, Europe, the United States and the UN.

The answer to the question of who is responsible for the current state of affairs regarding both the refugee situation and the Peace Process varied from Israel, the Arab states, to the international community. Taking each of these in turn, how do the Palestinians view Israel as an ‘other’? Here I am going to turn one of the statements quoted above, regarding the self, into a statement of the other, when Abu Hasan explains that the Palestinians are

not occupying any land, and killing is not our hobby.

51 Interview with Abeer, Shatila camp, in her home, 27/11/03
52 Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02
This statement carries two issues: 1) it is a description of what the Israelis are doing to the Palestinians. It is the Israelis who are occupying land and killing Palestinians.

2) It is also an interpretation of 'the self through the looking glass'. In other words, it is how the Palestinians believe the rest of the world views them; as killers and terrorists.

Furthermore the Palestinian refugees view Israel as a responsible other, responsible in the sense of the ones who created and now sustain their situation as refugees:

There are a lot of UN decisions, but Israel is following none of them.53

We are people who adore peace but we were deprived from peace [by the Israelis]. We used to live with Jews...we are not enemies [with the Jewish people we used to live with] ...But the [Israeli] Jews who came from other countries and occupied our land.54

There are two issues regarding the Israelis. First, that they occupied the refugees’ land and homes and forced them to become refugees, and second, that they are not following UN General Assembly Resolutions that would allow Palestinians to return. However, there was a strong sense that there is not a problem between Arab Christians and Muslims versus Jews. It was made clear to me that they used to live together and in some cases that there would be no problem living together again. The emphasis was that it was the Israeli ideology that was the problem: Zionism. Shultz, too, in her work in the Occupied Territories came across similar views where Palestinians made a distinction between Jews and Israelis (Zionists).55 Opinion on the ‘Peace Process – on whether or not there should be a two-state solution – is also

53 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party in Shatila camp. Interview held at the Communist party office in Shatila camp 09/10/02

54 Interview with Haj Salem, leader of Fatah Intifada in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Sabra 0710/02

55 Shultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 152
related to this discussion. The discussion in my case related to the majority of refugees wanting to return to their original homes – most of which were around the Acre region inside what today constitutes Israel proper. Many were willing to live with Jews but not Israelis or Zionists. In other words, if there is to be one Palestine comprising all of the land, many said that they could live with the Jews (now Israelis) as long as the Israeli state, that subordinates the Palestinians in its present form, would be dismantled. They would then have a democratic state where everyone was free.

Views on the Oslo Agreement and the Peace Process were thus usually negative, with common views being the following:

I would like to ask Sharon about Oslo. First of all, the Oslo Agreement and the following agreements gave nothing to the Palestinians. We were against it from the beginning ... What did it give the Palestinian people? Nothing! No state, no borders, no authority. Gaza and the West Bank have no link ... even Arafat cannot move between the two or even within one. He needs to ask for special permission. ...There are no positive sides to Oslo, and in the end, Sharon has ruined it. Oslo is a shame for the Palestinian people. It is a bigger shame for the people who signed it. It gave away the rights of the Palestinian people.

I do not believe Palestine should be divided. My comrades and I are from Acre, and more than five million refugees are from what the Oslo Agreement considers to be Israel, more than sixty percent of the refugees.

We are suffering because of Oslo. After the Oslo agreement the Palestinians divided into two camps – one with the agreement and the other against the agreement ... The Oslo agreement was a catastrophe for the Palestinians, it did not give us our own land. Now it is history anyway because Sharon has neglected it.

56 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa in Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias Camp 12/10/02
57 Interview with Hisham Najem, leader for the Communist Party in Shatila Camp, interview held in his office 09/10/02
58 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader for the PLF in Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp. 16/10/02
59 Interview with Haj Salem, leader of Fatah Intifada for Shatila camp, interview held in his home. 07/10/02
I do not believe in the Peace Process, because every time they do a peace agreement, there is still killing and they {the Israelis} continue to shoot people in their homes. The lives of the Palestinians is the same, with or without it.60

When asked why they believed the Oslo Agreement was signed in the first place common opinion and statements were the following:

You have to ask the people who signed it ... I think Arafat thought he could do something with this process.61

The reason why the Oslo Agreement was signed is part of the Palestinian-Palestinian conflict which still exists today ... The people who signed it, they sold the Palestinian case. War is not our hobby but it is our right to fight for Palestine.62

Who signed Oslo? Just a few people, Abu Mazen and so forth and the Israeli government. The Palestinians were not in this agreement, Nobody asked the Palestinian people what they wanted. Many Palestinian people thought that after the agreement there would be a Palestinian state. This was Arafat's delusion. He thought that he was going to have a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. He got out his red carpets and his body-guards. They were all killed and now he cannot move out of his small square.63

Fatah, the PFLP's and the DFLP's views were the only ones that had some sort of support for the Oslo process, however even this support seemed limited. This support did not necessarily mean that they believed the peace process would work, but more in the sense of believing that the basis of the peace process, i.e. a two-state solution, was correct or at least the only option at present. All in all, there was a sense that the peace process was not going where it should have been going.

We have been working with the Israelis on this agreement for many years ... We gave them many years of peace but they didn't accept it. They gave me

60 Interview with Abeer, in her home in Shatila Camp. (27/11/03)
61 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa in Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias Camp, 12/10/02
62 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader for the PLF in Lebanon, interview held in the PLF office in Shatila camp. 16/10/02
63 Interview with Haj Salem, leader of Fatah Intifada for Shatila Camp, interview held in his home in Shatila camp. 07/10/02
shame because there was supposed to be a Palestinian state, a solution for the refugees and Jerusalem, but...

Oslo is dead because of the tanks of Sharon. He is the one who opposes it. They didn't give us the West Bank or Gaza – only pieces of them. Oslo is what you are seeing on TV ... The PLO believed that in this agreement they would find peace and a Palestinian state, but they were wrong.

I am against the Oslo agreement but for the UN decisions for the Palestinians. Because of the forced (im)balance of relations, the only solution is a two state solution.

This difference in opinion, i.e. pro- and anti- two-state solution, is particularly interesting in Lebanon, where most of the refugees come from what would be considered Israel proper, under such a solution. I would argue from my participant-observation research that most of the refugees would agree with returning to their previous homes, within the whole of Palestine. Nevertheless, some (not most), did not see this wish to return to the whole of Palestine as realistic, and that was why they would support groups that believed in a two-state solution. However, it must be remembered that the camps in the south are the ones that are, for the most part, Fatah controlled. Although I saw some of this dynamic in Ein el-Helweh, most of my research was based in and around Beirut. From my observations in the south, the support for Fatah did not necessarily have to do with the Oslo process – but more about their history in the camp and what they are able to do in the camps today.

Although the peace process and 'what is going on in Palestine' is important, the refugees have other pressing concerns as well. Suleiman had similar observations on the differences between the political groups and their changing views: “In general,

64 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02
65 Interview with Mo'taz Ma'rouf, leader for the DFLP for Lebanon, interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 07/10/02
66 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader for the PFLP in Shatila camp, interview held in his office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02
however, it should be noted that the realignments and political machinations have little effect on ordinary camp residents’ lives, the political groups by and large remaining distant from their concerns\(^\text{67}\).

Returning to the issue of ‘others’ and responsibility, the blame for \textit{al-nakba} does not necessarily always rest on Israel, but it is also apportioned to the European community and in some instances the Arab community for not helping more than they did.

The International community, especially the European community should feel guilty about what happened to us. Israel is still asking the European community to give them compensation for the holocaust. The Europeans are still doing this and paying for their weapons. As a Palestinian, they are responsible for what happened to me. You have democracy in Europe, and we dream that some day that democracy will help change the opinion of the Europeans, but so far we have seen nothing.\(^\text{68}\)

However, on the other hand, precisely because of this European responsibility for the creation of Israel, there were some who viewed the Europeans as their new ‘hope’.

I think that the European community, not the International community, can help the Palestinian case. The Europeans are feeling guilty because they facilitated Jewish immigration to Palestine. And what is going on in Belgium, wanting to put Sharon to the court, this has made many demonstrations in Belgium, France and Italy for the Palestinian case. These demonstrations, they pressure the European system to make decisions against the Israelis\(^\text{69,70}\).


\(^{68}\) Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02

\(^{69}\) Interview with Abu Akram, Leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, Mar Elias Camp, 10/10/02

\(^{70}\) He is referring here to the concern raised about the Sabra and Shatila massacre to the Belgian Prosecutors Office. A formal complaint was made which charged Sharon with War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity and Genocide. The Belgian Supreme Court, however, ruled on the 24\textsuperscript{th} of...
The Arab community and their leaders had a varying impact on the Palestinians' forced situation as refugees, depending on whom I spoke to. The interpretation of the Arab governments ranged from being fully supportive of the Palestinian cause (although very few thought this), being paralysed because of the West, to the opposite view of solely paying lip service to the Palestinian cause and being more concerned with themselves.

Some believed the Arab government to be non-supportive in the sense that they are not physically capable of being supportive.

The Arab community, because of the development project, has no time to give or to defend Palestine. He is just defending himself against imperialism.71

In other words, the Arab community is paralysed because of Western (US) hegemony. There is only so much they are able to do in a world dominated by the West. However, some believed that the Arab governments were not being supportive at all and were only paying lip-service so to speak to the Palestinian cause:

The Arab regimes give nothing to the Palestinian cause except talk. They are obliged to help the American system [imperialism – hegemony] to stay in authority (power). We can not count on Arab leaders [but the Arab people support us]. Unfortunately they do not have democracy, so they can do nothing ... Any political movement will be threatening to the Arab leaders.72

September 2003, that they no longer had any jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the massacre. For more on why this investigation and prosecution failed to materialise see Walleyn, Luc The Sabra and Shatila Massacre and the Belgian Universal Jurisdiction

71 Interview with Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila, interview held in the PFLP office in Shatila camp, 09/10/02

72 Interview with the leader of the PPSF for Lebanon, interview held in Abu Moujahed's office, 10/10/02
Almost all the Arab leaders are not supporting the Palestinian cause, but they are hitting it in the back. And what’s going on in Palestine, the massacres, killings, it shows us what the Arab leaders are not doing. … We witnessed demonstrations in Europe and even America, supporting the Palestinian case and denying what is going on in Palestine. But on the contrary, in the Arab community, some leaders prevented their people from making demonstrations. 74

We don’t count on the Arab leaders, because they are having the Palestinian cause in order to gain their own interests. 75

If you want to go back to ‘the catastrophe’, al-nakba, the conspiracy was that the Arab leaders, they knew about it. 76 77

These statements raise a number of issues: the major theme of Arab governments’ inability to help the Palestinian cause is seen as being because of Western (US) hegemony. There is power politics involved here, where the hegemonic power can do as it pleases in the region. It does not need to listen to grievances in the region. The Arab leaders know who the hegemon and super power is and realise that, if they are to stay in power and realise certain of their goals, they cannot deviate too far from the line set by the hegemon. The second issue is a lack of democracy in the region. The interpretation here is that if there was democracy and if the Arab leaders listened to their people, they would be forced to help the Palestinian cause. Finally, the Arab states are interpreted as being responsible for the Palestinian dispossession, as seen in the last statement – ‘the conspiracy was that the Arab leaders knew about it’. The implication of this is that the Arab states do not care about the Palestinians; they even knew about the nakba and did nothing to stop it. Whatever reliance was

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73 In this context denying refers to being against what is being done to the Palestinians by the Israelis.
74 Interview with Abu Akram, Leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon, Mar Elias Camp 10/10/02
75 Interview with Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila camp, interview held at his home in Shatila 15/10/02,
76 Meaning that the Arab leaders are in the hands of the West who want to redraw maps and have control over petroleum
77 Interview with Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon, interview held at the PLF office in Shatila camp, 16/10/02
ever put upon the Arab governments, is now different. The Palestinians have realised that in order for change to occur, they must act by themselves.\(^{78}\)

Why were these perceptions so and why did they differ from people living in the same situation? The most obvious answer in this case, is that it depends on what political group the people were a member of, if any. By this I mean that some of the Palestinian groups are still supported by various Arab regimes.\(^{79}\) However, this perception also comes from years of disappointment in the Arab regimes manipulating the Palestinian cause, sometimes supporting them and sometimes neglecting them.

A distinct Palestinian identity was formed as a result of this; in other words from a more pan-Arab identity to a Palestinian identity. The inconsistent Arab support has meant that the Palestinian movement has had to be able to rely on itself. It was also this history of inconsistent Arab support that helped the (re)development and emphasis of a distinct Palestinian identity. At this point remembering some of the events outlined in the history chapter can help in understanding why this is the case. The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 War and the subsequent instability for Palestinians within the Arab host states forced the Palestinian Resistance to emphasise their ‘Palestinian identity’ precisely because of what they saw as a lack of commitment by the Arab states. This emphasis on Palestinian identity was also important because there was a complicit lack of recognition of the Palestinians as a distinct ‘people’. The UN Security Council Resolution 242 that addressed the 1967 War and its consequences, made no mention of ‘the Palestinians’ as a people, only

\(^{78}\) This is in clear contrast to some of the groups believing in pan-Arabism during the 1960s. See Chapter Four
\(^{79}\) See Chapter Four
as refugees. The Arab states were asked to accept this resolution: Egypt and Jordan did, Syria did not. The Palestinians were not asked whether or not they accepted it. This was a strong message to the Palestinians that they were not recognised as a people – thus the need to emphasise and maintain their identity. This lack of recognition was further emphasised by Golda Meir in 1969 in the infamous article to the Sunday Times: “It was not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them.”

Nevertheless, at the same time as there is a distinct Palestinian identity, both with regards to the notion of identity itself, as well as with regards to the theoretical implications of identity, it should be remembered that people can have overlapping and multiple identities. Although there exists a distinct Palestinian identity, this does not mean that the Palestinians do not consider themselves to be Arabs, for example. Indeed this is also an important part of their identity. This Arab identity is closely linked to what was outlined earlier; including the refugees’ views on what they perceived as support and solidarity by the Arab people as opposed to many of the Arab leaders.

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80 Sunday Times, 15th June 1969.
Returning to view of ‘the other’, the Arab states were not considered the only guilty party. The international community too, was seen as responsible for their situation today.

The international community should take most of the blame.\(^{81}\)

However, the international community is also believed to be the most capable of doing something to help their situation. When asked about how the refugees could return to Palestine, the answer was,

The strategy is for the international community to wake up and know that we exist. To be convinced of the wrong the Israelis have done to us and realise that we should go back. As Palestinian refugees we have the right to return to our land like any other people. We are not asking for more than our human rights.\(^{82}\)

Regarding the perception of the Lebanese as ‘others’, most did see a difference between the Lebanese government and the Lebanese people. There was also the understanding that there were differences within the Lebanese population.

We have shared sometimes the bread and the blood with the Lebanese people, especially against the occupation and the people who help the occupation. There are some of the Lebanese who have killed us...\(^{83}\)

This statement is related to the civil war in Lebanon, but nevertheless is also about today. The perception is that there are people in Lebanon who do support and care about the Palestinian cause, but there are also those who do not do so, and who have taken drastic measures to make their opinion clear. In other words, there are

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\(^{81}\) Interview with Abu Samer, interview held at his home in Shatila camp
\(^{82}\) Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held at his office in Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02
\(^{83}\) Interview with Haj Salem, leader of Fatah Intifada in Shatila camp. Interview held in his home in Sabra, 07/10/02
differences between Lebanese people, and as we saw in the history of the camps section in Chapter Four, there have been events that have made this perception particularly strong. The Lebanese political group that Palestinians most approved of was Hizb’allah, as it was seen as being particularly supportive and helpful to the Palestinians.\(^{84}\) This is a Shiite group, which has prominence in the south but also within the refugee camps in Beirut, particularly Shatila camp which has Lebanese Shiite inhabitants, and in Bourj el Barajneh where the population is Palestinian but the camp itself is situated in a Shiite area.

**Incentives or Disincentives? People’s perception of the political groups**

In relation to the previous chapter on organisations, as well as the sections examined in this chapter on the perception of the self and the other, this section will look at peoples perceptions of the political groups. Are there incentives or disincentives to joining political groups? Do people feel that the political groups can give them what they need? When speaking to and interviewing people in the refugee camps what would at first glance seem to be the biggest disincentive of the political groups, their paralysis today in comparison to the hey-day, was not necessarily seen as such. The methods of recruitment – family ties, common good, reputation and ‘no strategy

\(^{84}\) This was a general impression as well as results from interviews. Hizb’allah gives clothes and sometimes medical services to the refugees. For example, Sobhaye, member of Fatah Intifada said that the people in Lebanon who are good to the Palestinians are Hizb’allah (Interview 23/10/02).
needed' – as outlined in Chapter Six, as well as the political groups' general functions of improving the socio-economic conditions within the camps proved to be enough to make most refugees either stay with, or join, the political groups.

Most people are members of the political groups because there is nothing else to do with their time and their lives. The political groups provide services and make people feel alive.\textsuperscript{85}

Nevertheless, there was a diversion from this general attitude displayed by many youth who complained of the disunity between the groups. However this complaint about disunity contradicts what was shown in the previous chapter with regard to both the functions and aims of the groups: all groups seemed to be in agreement. The unity between the groups stems from the perception that the groups and residents in the camp know that the common good (which is returning to Palestine and, while in Lebanon, making life as bearable as possible) is the same vision held by each of the political groups. We saw in Chapter Six how the view of the 'common good' is a widely-held view and a potential recruiting factor. Similarly, all the groups are fighting the same battles. The battle against the poor living conditions in the camp, the battle against poor education, and the battle for their right to return to their country. The political groups hope to alleviate, as far as they can, the pressures of the bad socio-economic conditions, as well as supporting the Palestinian cause. There are fond memories of the hey-day where the groups were able to do much more than they are capable of today. Nevertheless, today most of the political groups have a representative on the popular committee which tries to deal with various issues within the camp such as social issues relating to water distribution and electricity. They communicate with UNRWA, and when possible

\textsuperscript{85} Interview with Abeer, in her home, Shatila Camp, 27/11/03
and necessary, with the Lebanese authorities. As we saw earlier, different camps in Lebanon have different problems with the popular committees themselves, depending on where they are situated and which groups are on the committee. However in the Beirut camps and in the Shatila camp, for instance, most of the political groups are members.\(^{86}\) How much they are able to do is debatable. However they do in some sense have the role of being the representatives of the refugee camps. These functions, as well as issues of family ties and solidarity outlined earlier, do make people join these groups. Adults remain members and most send their children to their particular groups’ youth organisations, where they receive help with homework and recreational activities. Most children who have grown up within these youth organisations move on to joining the political groups when they grow up. Nevertheless, some of the youth were not convinced by the work that the political groups do, pointing to the disunity among the groups.

Unity of political groups is very important to a Resistance and Revolutionary Movement. The importance of the unity of the groups can be seen as far back as the civil war when unity was a vital factor. Dr Giannou, in his book about his time in Shatila during the AMAL sieges, explains that in this situation, the political groups cooperated out of necessity. Dr Giannou explains that during one of the sieges of Shatila camp, the Syrians gave food for the groups within the National Salvation Front (NSF).\(^{87}\) This could be dangerous, as it could have led to internal fighting within the Palestinian groups in Shatila during the siege, weakening their protection

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\(^{86}\) The PFLP is not on the popular committee “because of some arguments and problems”. -- see section on the function of the political groups, above.

\(^{87}\) What Giannou refers to as the NSF, more specifically the Palestinian National Salvation Front (PNSF), is the group of rejectionist political groups that had close links to Syria. The PNSF is the pre-runner to the Alliance of Palestinian Forces (APF), although the PNSF still exists and it is represented within the APF.
and defence of the camp. Thus the various leaders of the groups within the NSF in Shatila decided that this was against their common good.

Omar restored order. ‘The camp is still under siege, the battle continues. As far as I’m concerned, there is no question of applying political pressure on anyone until the end of hostilities’. He spoke for all of those present. ‘And we will not be part of this campaign. We refuse our quota of the NSF supplies. All foodstuffs should have been given over to the popular committee for distribution, equally to everyone in the camp’.

Whatever their differences with the Fatah Arafat leadership, these men knew that negotiations taking place in Algeria would probably result in Palestinian reconciliation, and that the Fatah people in Shatila were every bit as patriotic as they, had sacrificed and bled and died, were the essential pillar, in numbers, finance, and means, of the resistance of the camp.

The leaders of the three ‘democratic’ factions of the National Salvation Front ... told their ... Syrian allies that they had been eating from Fatah stores for weeks on end, and that the ammunition they had to defend the camp also came from Fatah. Either all of the supplies that had been delivered on the two trucks would be distributed to everyone in the camp on an equal basis, or they and their men would refuse their portion of the NSF supplies.

Cooperation in times of war, where there are questions of life and death, is vital. During the civil war the disunity of the groups only went so far. When the situation became unbearably harsh the groups turned to each other and realised that they had to stick together. As this case shows, the groups within the camps looked beyond their politics – internal and regional - in a time of war when the situation was so grave that it was a fight for survival. Had the internal feuding prevailed during this time, it could have had disastrous consequences for the inhabitants of Shatila, as their defence and resistance to AMAL would weaken. This, however, was a localised Shatila issue that did not impact upon the actual disagreements and differences in alliance that the political groups formally had.

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88 Giannou, Dr. Chris, Besieged: A Doctor’s Story of Life and Death in Beirut (Olive Branch Press, 1990) p. 168
89 Ibid. p. 170
90 Ibid. p. 170
This example is from the Civil War, which is now over. The political climate in Lebanon is relatively stable. The function of the political groups has changed. They no longer have to defend the camp as in war times. Today, the groups have a different role: trying to make life in the camps as bearable as possible, as well as keeping the idea of returning to Palestine alive (although this is not really necessary: it is perhaps more a reminder of the revolutionary hey-day). Although the previous chapter on organisations outlines the political groups’ common goals, disagreements between them still exist. For example those groups that favour the Oslo process and those that do not, but this did not seem to be the aggravating factor of the perceived disunity of the political groups.

An example of the aggravation of the disunity of the political groups came from a resident of Ein el Helweh who complained about the worker’s unions. He is a pharmacist and had been trying to make a unified ‘doctors-nurses-pharmacists’ union. However, he became very dismayed when he found that all the different political groups preferred to have their own such unions instead of uniting to make one union for doctors, nurses and pharmacists, no matter which political group one belonged to. For him, this would have been the most practical and effective solution to the worker’s union. However, he felt that the different groups somehow became possessive of their unions, thus ruining the chance of an effective union representing everyone of all political shades and colours.91 This unfortunate example shows the problems that disunity of the political groups has on refugees in the camps. The ‘disunity’ issue of the political groups was the main complaint mostly from the youths who did not want to join the groups. Disunity among the political groups can,

91 Diary, 02/11/02
therefore, be seen as a disincentive for people joining the groups. Another example is the young woman whom I accompanied to the DFLP meeting. She told me that she did not want to join any of the groups, because the groups were not united enough – 'the groups need to be one and not fight with each other'. Similarly, another young man told me that he saw the political groups as 'silly', explaining that whenever there was a commemoration day, all the political groups stand there with their little identifying flags saying 'here I am!'. Apart from the pharmacist, most of these perceptions were from youths, ranging from mid-teens to late twenties.

The 'age factor', or the generational shift, may have something to do with this issue of the older generation being (or having been) members of groups because they were of age during the revolution and civil war. Some of the younger generation today seemed more sceptical. For example, a head of a family who was previously a politically active member of the PFLP told me first his reasons for membership:

I chose the PFLP because it had the clearest strategy. They were a serious group committed to its ideology and cause. ... The PFLP was very independent. It did not take help or supplies from other Arab governments, but rather from NGO's and so forth. If the PFLP had taken funding from the other Arab countries, it would mean that they would have to follow their lines and rules. Because the PFLP did not do this, they were able to stay independent.

Then following the civil war, he stopped being a member of the PFLP, although he had obvious admiration and respect for the party:

Now I feel like I am too old to join the group again ... Now it is very hard to join groups. If you join you must be careful not to register, because if you do

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92 See Chapter Six – family ties
93 Interview with Abeer, in her house, Shatila Camp, 27/11/03
94 Diary, 2001-2003
95 Interview with Abu Samer interview held in his home 28/11/03
you will be under observation, even the young people who have never been parts of groups before.96

The implication here is that there is an issue of danger in joining the political groups today, even for the younger generation who have no previous record.97 When speaking to his son about joining political groups he had this to say:

I don't think the political groups are doing anything... Maybe they used to do something during the war in Lebanon and in the south, but now they are doing nothing... They don't have the means to do anything from here. They are doing some things, but not from here, from Palestine... I don't like the groups. They are working for Palestine but at the same time they are just showing off and trying to compete with each other.98

Several of the key issues are involved here regarding both the father’s and son’s statements. First is the ‘danger’ issue of being under observation because of the Lebanese strict policies towards Palestinian political groups and action. The second is the disillusionment with the groups due to two factors: a) their inability to do anything from Lebanon due to both lack of funding and, again, the Lebanese policies towards them. And b), again reiterating the youth being disillusioned by the competition and disunity between the political groups. The third issue relates to a theme looked at in the previous chapter: family. In this case, the son has not joined the group that his father belonged to. This is not due to the son wishing to join another group but for the reasons just outlined. The fourth issue is again related to the age factor, the generational shift.

96 Ibid.
97 The older generation may have more of a danger factor involved in joining political groups again as they were most likely to have been involved in the war, and had to give up their guns with the ending of the Cairo agreement.
98 Interview with Ayman. Palestinian living in Shatila camp. Interviewed at his home 07/11/03
On the other hand was there mobilisation without groups? In other words, do some of these youths who are not members of the political groups act politically, even without being members of political groups? The answer is yes, as is implied from some of the statements above, as well as the notion of being ‘politicised by birth’: the youth do go on protests, have discussions, celebrate and commemorate certain days related to the history of Palestine pre-nakba, as well as dates important to the Arab-Israeli conflict, without necessarily being members of political groups. These activities, by their nature of being caused by the injustice done to the Palestinians, are political. How far are these activities political mobilisation or just political consciousness? Does political activity necessarily mean that one is a member of a group? Or can mobilisation also relate to political activity outside a group?

Political consciousness refers to

First .... an awareness of one’s position, as an individual or as a collectivity, in the prevailing global or local power structure and an understanding of the actions necessary to transform them. Second, it refers to a sense of communal solidarity. Last, political consciousness should logically lead to and inform social practice; otherwise it remains unactivated, uncommitted, and thus underdeveloped. 99

This means that, in order for mobilisation to occur, there must exist a politically conscious community, or political consciousness within the people who join particular groups. Peteet’s statement indicates that political consciousness is the awareness of one’s identity, regarding the self, the community, and the other. This is where mobilisation actually starts, making people aware of who they are, why they are in the present condition and who are the people or mechanisms responsible for them being in their present condition. Once this is realised and a programme

established, which is understood, believed and followed, then the action can start. In this case it is the politics of the Palestinian Resistance as well as the politics of the refugees' specific rights such as right of return and compensation. Peteet argues:

Being well versed in political theory and using political discourse to conceptualise and make sense of the world is evidence. It refers to someone who keeps abreast of developments in the regional and international political arena; it indicates a clear knowledge of who is the enemy and why and what is the nature of the struggle, both politically and militarily, to create a new power order, and it should include a social practice that confirms ones ideology. Knowledge of one's society, its social composition, particularly the distribution and meaning of power, the cultural system, and how the particular formations affects the course of national liberation is indeed the high mark of political consciousness. (italics are mine).100

As this chapter has shown, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do have a clear idea about their collective identity. They understand who 'they' are and also who the 'other(s)' are. Furthermore, they understand what the nature of their situation is. There was political activity among people who did not want to join any of the political groups. They join demonstrations, listen to talks, and participate in activities that are Palestinian. For example, on commemoration day for the massacres in Sabra and Shatila, all of the political groups have speeches and so forth. Even people who are not members go and listen to these speeches. This is precisely because of what we saw above, the concepts of solidarity and the 'common good'. As we saw in the previous chapter in the section on family, for instance, the young woman who made a speech at the DFLP woman's meeting did not consider herself to be political: this is not always considered to be political activity. Their definition of political action is related more to membership of particular groups and activities therein. However, making political speeches, joining

100 Ibid. p. 68
protests, and so forth are more part of the enforced (because the situation is not their fault), politicised nature of the Palestinian refugees’ lives.

At this point looking at resource mobilisation theory regarding supply and demand raises some important questions. Essentially resource mobilisation theory tells us that where there is a supply of social movements and organisations, there will exist a demand. There are certainly political organisations in supply within the camps, and the demand also exists, but to a certain extent the groups are paralysed from being able to solve the people’s aggravations and problems. Are there too many ‘non-unified’ groups that have the same goal? And is it because there is such a high supply of groups and not enough action that people to become disillusioned with them? These questions are important precisely because of some of the youths’ perceptions. Although the majority of refugees are still members or a part of the political groups, the concerns raised by the youth did seem to be genuine. Although for the time being the political groups have popular support for what they are able to do in Lebanon, the complaints by the youth does, at the same time, raise important questions if the trend remains and grows.
Conclusion: Do collective action frames and identity encourage mobilisation?

This chapter has shown the main themes of Palestinian collective identity. Key themes include insecurity, poverty, self as victims of 'others', struggle and endurance. The stringent and harsh policies of the Lebanese government reinforce their Palestinian-ness. Through the looking-glass, the Palestinian refugee sees him or herself as a foreigner, inferior, in a country where they are not wanted but also in a country where they themselves do not wish to be. They wish to be back in their own country: Palestine. The responsible 'others' include Israelis, Europeans, Arab leaders and the International Community. Their situation is not only a harsh one where the Palestinian refugees lack fulfilment of their basic human needs, but also one of frustration. However, at the moment, this lack of human needs and frustration over their situation has not led to violent or militant activity. There exists international resolutions that would a) facilitate their return and b) give them human rights in Lebanon, neither of which are being implemented. All of these issues within the Palestinian refugees' collective identity would seem to be enough to presume that the refugees would be mobilising and trying their best to achieve these rights. This was not necessarily the case. Collective action frames may help in understanding why.

The three main tasks of collective action frames are: diagnostic, prognostic and motivational. For Klandermans,\textsuperscript{101} the first two are a part of consensus mobilisation

whereas the last one is action mobilisation. The first two are necessary for the last one.

What were the diagnostic frames of the situation? In other words, what is the problem and the reason for the problem? From the frames above, we can see that the problem is the continued situation of people being refugees, and Israeli occupation. Within the context of the refugee camps, both of these issues dominate, however with emphasis on the poor living situation in the camps, but also solidarity with the Palestinians inside Palestine.

What were the prognostic frames of the situation? In other words how can this situation change? As we have seen within the different frames above regarding the self and the other, the prognostic frames differ. What people can do to help their situation in the refugee camps seemed rather limited. The prognostic frames were therefore impractical, in the sense that there was a fatalistic approach to them. There was a strong belief in armed struggle inside Palestine; however, revolutionary action within the camps suffered from paralysis caused by structural constraints and lack of resources of the groups. The main aim remains as it has always been:

We have one main aim, and that is to liberate all of Palestine.\textsuperscript{102}

Nevertheless, both the political groups and the refugees understand their limitations in achieving this goal from Lebanon. ‘Improving socio-economic conditions’ as well as ‘solidarity’ did seem to be the major motivational frame for joining groups.

This is because of the themes outlined within this chapter, but also in chapters Five

\textsuperscript{102} Interview with Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon, interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp 12/10/02
and Six. The themes include suffering, alienation, and disillusionment with the political groups but also with the world. There was a strong solidarity with Palestinians inside Palestine, frustration with their situation as refugees (though not necessarily aggression), and a lack of human needs. These themes would seem to represent issues both within motivational frames and mobilising factors, as they are seen by various scholars as the building blocks of collective action. Suffering and alienation as well as a lack of human needs could bring people to mobilisation. Linking this with frustration, the likelihood would be even higher. Solidarity inside Palestine, with nothing to lose in Lebanon, could also be seen as a mobilising factor. Khashan,\textsuperscript{103} for instance, saw these factors as contributing to the endorsement and indeed willingness of youth to participate in suicide bombings in Rashidiyeh camp close to the Israeli border. What was different in the Beirut camps?

There was disillusionment on the part of both the refugees and the political groups regarding their situation, where, at least for the foreseeable future, nothing could be done. There was also disillusionment among many refugees regarding the political groups and their capabilities, although this did not necessarily dissuade them from joining. Solidarity, as well as the help, although limited, supplied by the political groups was enough for the refugees to want to join. There was, however, evidence of people, particularly among the youth, not wanting to mobilise and join the political groups. Although they did not always consider their behaviour as political, people were mobilised into protesting, marching, celebrating holidays and so forth. Nevertheless, although mobilisation into the political groups was for the most part as would be expected, there was a deviation from this trend by many youths.

\textsuperscript{103} Khashan, Hilal 2003 op. cit.,
Regarding the state of affairs of those youth who, at least more of them than would be expected in this situation, did not seem to be willing to join political groups, what may be disillusioning them may be explained by New Social Movement theories. In other words, today there exist new issues, new values, and perhaps a change in identity. They are a challenge to the popular image, cited earlier quoting Schultz, of the Palestinian refugee “who is someone who resists, either with a Kalashnikov or an RPG in the squalid refugee camps of Lebanon”, ¹⁰⁴ although this new image of the non-party-affiliated, non-militant Palestinian may not be one that they wish to portray. Indeed they do wish that they were able to do something about their situation, but they, as the political groups, are paralysed from action. In other words, they do not want be seen as being compliant with the situation; however, they do not see any other choice. Joining one of the political groups, in their minds, seemed to mean that they were not able to do anything more for Palestine than if they were not a member. The new issues therefore relate to how they are living in a post-war condition, and the how Lebanese government is constraining them. The new values could imply that no one is willing to pay the price for participation. This leads us back to cost analysis. Do the costs of participation outweigh the benefits? Today the costs of involvement in the political groups in Lebanon do not necessarily involve physical fighting and potentially dying for the cause. However, the cost is related to the ‘fear’ factor of being watched and bullied by the Lebanese authorities. In other words, there are too many costs in joining one of the political groups that do not even have as many functions as they used to. But is this what is stopping many youths from joining groups? The answer is not necessarily. It is related to, as

¹⁰⁴ Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 123-124
mentioned, new issues. The previous generation had access to good education and during Cairo, were able to work. Similarly, during the Civil War, most refugees were active within their political groups fighting the enemy. Today, the youth do not have the access to the education that their parents had, the political groups are poor and their hey-day is over. Disillusionment with both the situation and the political groups has developed. This situation would very often suggest a potential resort to violence but this has not happened. It would seem that the Lebanese government’s stringent policies and punishments, as well as Palestinians having been involved in and suffered in the long civil war, is keeping the refugees from militant activity. There has also been a re-introduction of (lack of) issues related to human needs. These issues will be outlined below, as they are relevant to all refugees, although many of the issues are particularly relevant to the disillusionment suffered by the youth.

Another issue relating to the generational shift is that the groups are still led by the older generation who were active either during the Revolution or during the Civil War. There did not seem to be any ‘young blood’ willing to take over any of these political groups and perhaps change them to suit issues that are seen as more important to the youth. This is interlinked with the youth’s general view of their situation as well. New problems have arrived in the camp, again particular to the youth. These problems include formerly taboo subjects such as alcohol, drugs and

105 During my work at the youth centre and through discussions with many of the youth in general there were four main issues that they considered to be the main problems they were facing; 1) unemployment; 2) educational problems (bad school, if you fail your exams you are out, high drop-out rate); 3) emotional problems (depression, nervousness, feeling tense); and 4) environmental problems (no trees, rubbish everywhere, rats). These were the main problems regarding their situation in Lebanon and in the camps (Diary 5/10/02). I also attended a meeting at a youth organisation in Bourj el Barajneh where these same issues were reiterated. Nevertheless, an interesting difference in Bourj el Barajneh was the different priorities that were attached to the same issues. There was much more focus on return and Palestine (Diary 31/10/02).
prostitution. These new problems show the severity of the appalling socio-economic conditions and the lack of human needs available to the Palestinian refugees. These conditions lead to depression and apathy instead of mobilisation. Among many of the youth, depression was widespread. There were problems and pressures in the overcrowded homes, bad schooling and in general no hope. Joining a political group and being active could perhaps alleviate some of these pressures. Although this was the choice of most youths, there were still many who were disillusioned with the disunity of the political groups, but also some saw them as old-fashioned and paralysed. There is another important issue regarding the youth: emigration. Many of the youth see emigration as their only solution at the moment. This however, is a difficult and dangerous option because of their lack of identity papers and travel documents, and also because of stringent immigration rules around the world. Emigration from Lebanon in the 1970s happened usually via East Berlin and into the Federal Republic of Germany where many were able to claim asylum and settle or move to other countries. During the Lebanese Civil War, especially during the 1982 Israeli Invasion and during the War of the Camps, many managed to seek asylum. Today, however, emigration from Lebanon is in the form of illegal migration. This is particularly the case with the youth. Dorai in his work on emigration of Palestinians from Lebanon mentions reasons for emigration as related to the themes within this thesis: poverty, suffering, disillusionment. He specifically refers to the end of the Civil War bringing about increased discrimination against the Palestinians, the Oslo agreement not giving any solution to the refugee situation,

106 Dorai, Mohamed Kamel “Palestinian Emigration from Lebanon to Northern Europe: refugees, networks and transnational practices” Refuge (Vol. 21, No. 2, February 2003)
107 For example, there were two brothers in their early twenties from Shatila who I knew well from my fieldwork in the autumn of 2002. When I returned in the autumn of 2003 they were gone. They lived together and had sold their little flat in Shatila for a tiny amount of money, used this money to try to get to Greece illegally. They left two weeks prior to my arrival. They came back a week after my arrival. They were found and stopped in Turkey and sent back. Now they are in Shatila with no home.
the worsening economic situation in Lebanon, and the lack of work available to Palestinians.¹⁰⁸

Again we see how the lack of human needs has a bearing on one’s identity and psychological well-being. However, in contrast to what may be assumed – that people are willing to fight for their human needs – this is increasingly not the case on two levels. The first level is related to the people who do mobilise and are members of groups. They are not violating any of the rules imposed by the Lebanese government and are not seen as a threat. The second level is related to many of the youth who are not mobilising at all. They lack their human needs too, yet are still not willing to join any political groups.

¹⁰⁸ Dorai, Mohamed Kamel op. cit.,
Conclusion

The Dilemmas of Mobilisation

Introduction

By examining political mobilisation in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, this thesis has challenged the general assumption that they are automatically highly charged, highly aggressive, 'breeding grounds' for militant activity. This assumption was challenged by ethnographic and interview fieldwork in some of the camps in Lebanon. Through this fieldwork, the nature of how and why political groups mobilise and how and why people join political groups was explored, revealing a state of affairs that is very different to previous studies, most of which were conducted during the Lebanese Civil War or during the Palestinian Revolution. The nature and the functions of the political groups have changed following the civil war, however the refugees remain highly mobilised and many are members of the various political groups. 'Politically active' is used in the sense of being involved with, and members of, the various political groups in the camps, and applies to the majority of the refugees: adults, youth and children. Yet, although most people were members or active within the various political groups, I did find one interesting deviation: there seemed to be a growing number of youths who were not willing to join political groups.
How was mobilisation in the camps examined?

The thesis began by developing a suitable theoretical framework in which to examine mobilisation. Mobilisation was defined on two levels: the organisational level and the collective – people – level. The former refers mostly to recruitment strategies, and the latter to actually joining and being active within the political groups. Much of the existing literature on mobilisation, collective action and identity is found wanting in some way – usually focusing on one level of analysis at the expense of other levels. Therefore, I decided to use a framework that included many of the different theories in order to look at all levels of analysis. In looking at the overarching societal context – the structures – the political model by Tilly was especially helpful,¹ and in particular, Tilly’s notion of ‘opportunities’, referring to both societal constraints as well as opportunities. Within the structures we could also examine human needs – what needs are available and what needs are not.

Regarding the organisational level of analysis, the resource mobilisation approach and recruitment methods were seen as useful in understanding mobilisation. For the collective – people – level there exists social construction literature relating to identity. As part three of this thesis, dealing with the field work, indicates, it was very important to look at all three levels of analysis. If, for example, only structures and organisations were studied mostly by interview methods, and the ethnographic research within the camps was ignored, the results would have been considerably different. It would have indicated a population that is highly political and mobilised into groups, as well as a population that is potentially aggressive and militant. This would have been misleading.

¹ Tilly, Charles From Mobilisation to Revolution (Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1978)
Context: legal, historical and overarching societal factors

The next section of the thesis examined context – legal and historical. The legal context showed how the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon lack many rights that they are indeed entitled to. Because of the creation of UNRWA they are unable to receive protection from the UNHCR and the rights that come with that protection. According to UN General Assembly Resolutions they do have the right to return to their country as well as the right to compensation. However these resolutions are not binding resolutions; they are considered ‘soft’ international law. The Arab League has tried to fill some of the loopholes in the international law regime regarding Palestinian refugees; however, their agreements too, are non-binding. Most have not been implemented because of domestic circumstances within many of the Arab states. In Lebanon, the Palestinian refugees remain stateless and have no basic civil or human rights. They have difficulty in acquiring travel documents and do not have the right to work or own property and have no access to social and health services.

Chapter Three, which examined the legal context surrounding the Palestinian refugees, showed that they lack an adequate legal status on all the various levels, internationally, regionally and locally within Lebanon.

The historical context also includes international, regional and local dimensions. The historical context outlined the various literatures on *al-nakba*. Much of the new literature challenges work that focuses on voluntary migration – stressing instead forced migration due to a variety of factors, including various massacres and a direct or indirect policy to expel Palestinians from what was to become the state of Israel. The second part of the historical chapter focused on the ‘Palestinian reawakening’ in
the 1960s with the formation of the Palestinian Resistance. It also looked at the 1967
War and the 1970 War in Jordan and its consequences for Palestinian refugees, as
well as the Palestinian Resistance. The last section of this chapter examined
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon with particular emphasis on events following the
Cairo Agreement and the Lebanese Civil War. The Cairo Agreement gave the
Palestinians the 'opportunity' for mass mobilisation and mass political activity, as it
allowed Palestinians to manage their own affairs and carry out revolution. The Civil
War changed this Palestinian independence radically. In 1982 the PLO was forced
to withdraw and the Palestinian refugees who remained in Lebanon were subject to
massacres and sieges of their refugee camps. It was during these periods that much
of the literature regarding identity and political mobilisation was produced. Today
the situation is very different for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Life for the
Palestinian refugees following the end of the Civil War is now characterised by a
return to harsh conditions and a lack of political opportunities – similar to life prior
to the Cairo Agreement.\(^2\) However, the difference today in comparison to that time,
is that the Palestinian refugees now have a memory of the mobilisation and activity
during the hey-day of the Palestinian Revolution. Many of the refugees were a part
of this revolution, thereby making their lives very difficult when one considers that
many of the rights that they were granted in the 1960s and 1970s have been taken
away from them.

The first chapter in Part Three relating to the field work also examined context. The
structures focused on the overarching societal context, specifically looking at

\(^2\) Remembering from the Chapter Four that the Deuxième Bureau was in charge of the Palestinian
refugees during the 1950s and early and mid 1960s. There were stringent policies regarding the
refugees. There were security posts in and around the camps. During this time Palestinians were also
routinely questioned and were not free to travel, even within Lebanon. Brynen, Rex Sanctuary and
Lebanese governmental policies, the role that UNRWA plays and an examination of what human needs the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have, and which ones they do not have. What we saw in this chapter was that the Lebanese government has created considerable constraints for the Palestinian refugee population as well as the political groups. Syria is involved both in Lebanon and with political groups belonging to the APF. Syria’s role in Lebanon involves security, political and economic issues and therefore Syria is keen to keep Lebanon as stable as possible. This means that the Palestinian refugees and the political groups are constrained by Syrian needs in Lebanon. UNRWA is inadequate in its provision of services and the Palestinian refugees lack most of their human needs. This would indicate a population that is being coerced by outside forces and living in extremely harsh conditions. Regarding mobilisation in this situation, it could go either way: either people would try to act in order to change their situation, or they might follow the rules that are given to them. Could Bourdieu be correct, then, when he tells us that ‘resistance can be alienating and submission can be liberating. Such is the paradox of the dominated and there is no way out of it’? Or is the opposite view correct? It would seem from this thesis that Bourdieu is incorrect: incorrect in the sense that although the Palestinians may not be directly resisting both the Lebanese authorities and the occupation of their country, this submission, if that is what it is, is certainly not liberating.

Judging from the historical, legal and present context, the assumption of a highly-charged refugee population is understandable. Indeed, a population which is lacking

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4 Whether or not it is ‘submission’ is discussed further below under ‘conceptual problems’
most of their basic human needs is easily assumed to be particularly active. Nevertheless, the next two chapters in the section relating to the field work provided contradictory evidence.

**Dilemmas of Mobilisation**

**Channels of Mobilisation**

Despite, or precisely because of, the harsh living conditions and stringent policies issued by the Lebanese government relating to social, economic and political issues, the refugees within the camps are highly politicised. Their historical context, their legal context and their present conditions lead to a collective identity based on insecurity about their current and future status. Further key factors of this collective identity include poverty, victimisation and struggle. The groups within the camps try and alleviate, as far as they can, some of the results of this insecurity. As was seen in Chapter Six which focused on organisations and recruitment methods, many of the functions of the groups act as incentives for joining and participating in political groups. Most groups are members of popular committees that deal with issues related to the camps. These include, for example, issues relating to housing, rubbish collection and negotiations with UNRWA. The groups have other functions too, that try to alleviate some of the suffering of the refugee population in the camps. They have youth groups, women’s groups and sports clubs. Some political groups have school teachers that help children with their school work as the state of the UNRWA schools leaves much to be desired. *The function of the political groups in the camps, therefore, seems to be more social than political*. There is no military activity from
the camps. Apart from the functions of the political groups as incentives to join them, there are also other channels of recruitment. These include 'family ties', the 'common good' and 'no strategy needed', the latter of which was actually some sort of idea of recruitment. Regarding 'family ties' as a mobilising factor, for many of the refugees this was indeed the case, as would probably be expected. Nevertheless, there were also families where people of the same family joined different groups. Joining a group was part of 'their own conviction of their own ideas'. The 'common good' is related to two issues: that of solidarity and that relating to the framing of the situation. The latter more specifically relates to understanding the situation as one where the Palestinian refugees are living in inhuman living conditions, and do not have any rights that they are entitled to. As one political leader put it; 'it is natural for people to be against tyranny'. This is a mobilising factor. The former refers to both solidarity with the Palestinian Resistance as a whole, and also to the Palestinians suffering within the Occupied Territories. The last issue of recruitment was 'no strategy needed'. This relates to an issue that was brought up many times: that Palestinian refugees, by the very nature of their being deprived of many rights that they are entitled to, are in a sense mobilised and recruited from birth. All Palestinians, whether members of political groups or not, are considered to be part of the Palestinian Resistance, by their very nature of being Palestinian refugees outside their home.

5 At least not within the camps where I conducted my research. However it seems doubtful that there would be much militant activity within the camps following the Civil War as well as potential acts against Israel as the Lebanese government has sealed off the border with Israel as far as they can, thereby diminishing the wrath that would come from Israel as revenge.
6 Interview with Abu Hasan, political leader for Saiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in his office in Mar Elias camp, 12/10/02
7 Interview with Mohammad Affifi, Fatah leader in Shatila, interview held in his home in Shatila camp, 15/10/02
Both the groups and refugees had a shared collective identity, which is also part of the issue of 'recruitment at birth', and which comes about because of their structural surroundings. Their shared identity included an understanding of the self as first and foremost Palestinian. 

_There was also a view of themselves in the future: that all of their problems will be solved when they return to Palestine._ They saw themselves as people living in poverty who are 'suffering' but have 'endurance'. This relates to human needs and its aspect relating to identity. In Lebanon, the Palestinian identity is reinforced by their lack of integration. The Palestinian identity is reinforced in a negative way in the sense that the Palestinian refugee sees him or herself as a foreigner, an outsider, someone who is not welcome. This reinforced (negative) identity could lead to the presumption that apart from being highly mobilised, as the Palestinian refugees are, they are also militarised and suffering from Gurr’s concept of frustration-aggression. Indeed there was a high degree of perceived injustice regarding their situation, but not the Gurr-ian notion of aggression and violence.

The conception of the ‘others’ was, again, more or less the same for the refugees and the political groups. The difference came about in discussions about who was more to blame for their situation: Israel, the Arab Community, Europe, the US or the International Community. Nevertheless, all of these ‘others’ were included in constructing the ‘self’.

Peteet’s work can be used as a comparison to a certain extent of the issues raised in this thesis. She has told us that the channels for mobilisation (for women) in the 1980s included universities, self-critique, mass work, kin ties, and social

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8 Not to be confused with not being proud of being Palestinian.
institutions. Today only one of these fully exists for the Palestinian refugees who live in the refugee camps. The reasons why these channels have changed since the time of Peteet’s analysis is due to the legal, historical and structural context of today, as outlined earlier. During the 1980s the Civil War was raging and there was mass work to be done. The mass work was of an urgent nature to help the survival of the camps. Similarly, during and also prior to this time, the PLO and the other groups were well funded. They paid for Palestinians to go to universities and they had several institutions where the refugees could find employment. Thus, during the 1980s, Tilly’s notion of opportunity was very much the case. Similarly, Touraine’s notion of social movements being the result of the collective will was also very much the case during this time. His notions of identity, opposition and totality were all present, and the political groups could, therefore, following his terminology, be considered to be part of a ‘true’ social movement. In other words, there was a clear view of the collective identity, a clear view of who the opposition was, and therefore a clear understanding of on what grounds the struggle with the opposition was based. Today as well, these notions of identity, opposition and totality are present; nevertheless, the groups remain rather paralysed from acting on this identity. Furthermore, the channels for mobilisation are fewer. This does not mean, however, that the population is not highly political and highly mobilised: indeed they are. Nevertheless, this issue raises the importance of the concept of social movement and its relevance to this case, something that is further discussed below.

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The Generational Shift

The generational shift in attitude among some of the youths towards the political groups was an issue that stood out, particularly since mobilisation and being part of one of the political groups was so much part of the daily lives of most other refugees in the camp. There was disillusionment among some of the youths regarding the political groups, and this was seen as the main reason for not joining them. The youth of today seem to have different worries in comparison to their previously politically-active parents when they were their age. In other words, there is no 'mass mobilisation' as there was during the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese Civil war. The youth of today have grown up in a post-civil war country. They are growing up during a period of time when the Palestinian political groups do not have the same amount of finances and power to run Palestinians' own affairs as they used to. Depression and apathy are key issues involved in the general disillusionment of the youth of the political groups and for their lives in general.

But where was this disillusionment coming from? Is it due to new issues and values that have changed? These are sets of questions that I can only attempt to answer. Regarding new issues and values of today's youth, this can be related to New Social Movement theory, but only to a certain extent, remembering that New Social Movement theory arrived on the scene during the time that the youth's parents were active. However, understanding that issues and values change through the generations is useful in attempting to understand the youth of today. Their changed values perhaps came about because of the change in situation in comparison to the Cairo years. In addition, during the Lebanese Civil War, there were direct physical
threats towards the Palestinian refugees in the camps, thus mobilisation and protection of the camps were vital. This situation has changed today. The youth have no direct enemy to fight. Similarly, they realise the desperation of their situation: they cannot work, they cannot leave Lebanon (except illegally) and they know that the refugee question has been sidelined in the Peace Process. They do not see any bright immediate future. Additionally they are fully aware that the political groups, although active inside Palestine, are unable to change their situation in Lebanon.

**Conceptual Problems?**

The definitions used for mobilisation within the introduction to this thesis were two-fold: the first related to organisations and how political groups managed to recruit members, and the second related to the Palestinian refugees, looking at what it is that makes them either join or not join organisations. Because of my definition, in answering the question whether or not the Palestinian refugees mobilise into groups, the answer would be yes, certainly there is mobilisation into groups, although how much these groups are able of doing to change the status quo is questioned.

Looking at the concept of social movements we can refer to the discussion above about Touraine and ‘true social movements’. In light of the results found in the fieldwork, this thesis has raised problems with the traditional definitions of ‘social movement’ given in the introduction. First it was claimed that social movements are
“the expression of the collective will”. In relation to the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, this claim is more or less true: the political groups within the Resistance and the refugees stand united in relation to the ultimate goal: to return to their homes— it is the means by which the ‘collective will’ can be achieved that is made difficult by the political groups’ lack of funding. It is also a function of Lebanon’s harsh policies, of Syrian needs in Lebanon which necessarily creates constraints on Palestinians, but first and foremost of Israel. It is Israel that is preventing them from returning to their homes. In other words, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can not return and they can not ‘act’ on their wish to return for all of these reasons. However more problems arise when Wilkinson tells us:

1) A social movement is a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change in any direction and by any means, not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal into ‘utopian’ community.

2) A social movement must evince a minimal degree of organisation, though this may range from a loose informal or partial level of organisation to the highly institutionalised and bureaucratised movement and the corporate group.

3) A social movement’s commitment to change and the raison d’être of its organisation are founded upon the conscious volition, normative commitment to the movement’s aims or beliefs, and active participation on the part of the followers or members.

From reading the various chapters in this thesis, one can see how problematic this definition is: or is it that the Palestinian political groups in Lebanon no longer qualify as a social movement? The Palestinian Resistance as a whole is indeed a social movement, its representatives in the West Bank and Gaza strip are indeed following the first part of Wilkinson’s definition: trying to actively promote change. Nevertheless, the resistance groups in Lebanon, although previously active, are not what would be presumed to be ‘actively’ seeking to promote change. They are

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11 Touraine, Alain op. cit., p. 29
trying to survive by bettering their socio-economic conditions, although obviously there is solidarity with the rest of the movement, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza. Nevertheless, having said this, the view that the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon is not seeking to promote change is misleading. Throughout its existence the Resistance has indeed been based in different locations, with its strategy to promote change varying from country to country, depending on where they had 'sanctuary'. In other words, the Palestinian Resistance has existed in various countries at the same time since its inception; however, direct military or political action may only have taken place from one particular country at a time. Does this necessarily mean that the Palestinian Resistance based in a country that, for a period of time, is not involved in direct action gets ruled out from being a part of the Movement? I would hesitate to agree with this. As Chapter Six suggests, the Palestinian refugees and the political groups still consider themselves as ‘resisting’ the situation – a concept that is part of their identity and also, importantly, part of the movement’s identity. (This issue is further discussed below.)

Wilkinson’s second and third points regarding what constitutes a social movement do not pose the same sorts of problems as the first. Regarding the second point of having a degree of organisation, the political groups in Lebanon do have a level of organisation. Events are organised, the popular committees are (for the most part) organised and there is correspondence among the political groups in Lebanon, the political groups in other Arab countries as well as the ones in the Occupied Territories. The raison d’être of the movement is founded on the aim of the Palestinian refugees: to return home. The movement may have changed its base - it is now on its own soil - but it is nevertheless a movement that includes the diaspora
Palestinians. I argue this on the basis of the refugee issue still needing to be resolved, as well as the political groups within the movement still existing in other countries where Palestinian refugees reside. This brings us back to the pro- and anti-Oslo process groups that are in disagreement about how the conflict and the refugee issue will be resolved. Although both the pro- and anti-Oslo groups disagree on how to work out a solution, they both claim to represent all Palestinians, both inside and outside of Palestine. The raison d'etre of the movement is also apparent within chapters Five, Six and Seven. They exist because the Palestinian predicament - lack of adequate statehood and continued dispersion and refugee status of Palestinians - still exists. A consequence of these issues not being solved is the lack of adequate human rights and protection, a lack of human needs, and this makes the political groups and the movement as a whole try to alleviate this immediate problem as far as they can. The last part of Wilkinson's third point refers to 'active participation on the part of the followers or members.' Similarly to above, I would argue that although the Palestinian Resistance and its members in Lebanon may not be militarily active, this does not necessarily imply they are not participating in the aims of the movement. Indeed, if they could do more than they are doing at the moment, they would. They, both the members and the political groups in Lebanon, are acting within their constraints however this does not mean that the political groups in Lebanon do not constitute a part of the Palestinian Resistance.

In the introduction, Tilly's view of social movements was also discussed. His concept of WUNC (worthy, unified, numerous, and committed) is important for the survival of a social movement. As far as possible, all four of these components of WUNC are present within the camps in Lebanon. 'Worthiness' varies, depending on
setting, but includes a certain standing of the movement in the community. The Palestinian Resistance certainly has a standing as was seen through the themes of ‘solidarity’, ‘reputation’, and ‘social work’. ‘Unity’ refers to speaking together and collaborating through the same actions. Regarding this point, questions are raised, as this was one of the main concerns of many of the youths that were not joining the political groups. The example of the pharmacist from Ein el Helweh camp in Chapter Seven who was dismayed at the political groups’ inability, and indeed unwillingness, in having one single union for pharmacists, nurses and doctors stands out as an example. Nevertheless, the example from the siege of Shatila camp shows that the groups act together when they must. Another uniting factor shown in Chapter Six was that the identity and vision within each of the political groups was more or less the same regarding each other, but also regarding the refugee inhabitants of the camp. Tilly’s third point of numbers is equally important. It is important to show that the Social Movement has support. Nevertheless, each of these concepts can compensate for the other to a certain extent, as was said in the introduction: a high level of worthiness can compensate for a low level of numbers. Finally, ‘committed’ refers to participants’ willingness to bear the costs of participation in the movement. Again, the concerns raised by the youths not willing to join the political groups point to the problem of people not being willing to take the risk and bear the potential costs. Again, though, it should be reiterated that most people do join groups and these youths were in a minority. Similarly, the youth who were not involved in the political groups, were just as politicised as the refugees who were. Nevertheless, taking into account the context of the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, I would argue that this specific context changes the concept of ‘committed’ in that it should not only be limited to understanding the members’
willingness to analyse the costs, but also that of the group. It is the groups that are
deciding their tactics in Lebanon and they have seen that some actions are too
costly. In other words, the groups have the experience and the knowledge of mass
political and military activity, but have now decided that these may not be the best
tools to be used at this point in time: considering the legal status and the refugees' 
lack of protection, it seems they believe that it is wise to be prudent in their actions.
The lack of adequate funding, the lack of international support, Lebanon's
governmental constraints and their recent history seem to dictate that they should
not take too many risks in their struggle to return home. Another important point is
that just because some risks are judged to be too big, does not necessarily mean that
the refugees and the groups are any less committed than the Palestinians living in
the West Bank and Gaza. They - the refugees, the political groups, as well as the
youths who are not willing to join the groups - are all committed to the goals of the
Palestinian Resistance Movement.

The final definition of the Palestinian groups as belonging to the many different
types of social movement given to us by Wilkinson is not as problematic as it may
seem at first glance. In the introduction, the Palestinian Resistance was seen to
include many categories because of the wide variety of groups within it: nationalist,
pan-movement, class, revolutionary-resistance, women's movement as well as
religious. The main problem stems from the name of the social movement itself: the
Palestinian Resistance Movement. With regard to the part of the movement in
Lebanon, the question arises as to what it is resisting, and how. The answer to this
question would have been rather straightforward had it been asked during the
Lebanese civil war, but today it may seem to raise some eyebrows. Yet I argue that
it is still a resistance movement, even in Lebanon. The Palestinian Resistance movement in Lebanon may not be involved in physical resistance; however, evidence given in Chapter Seven in the discussion on Palestinian identity is important, and challenges the assumption that it is not a resistance movement, even in the diaspora. The Palestinians, inside or outside their country, are resisting their situation. Again to quote Schultz, a “Palestinian is someone who resists”.\textsuperscript{13} It is a part of their identity. The Palestinian Resistance Movement thus turns into a movement that is about resisting the current situation through the concepts that are key to Palestinian identity: these concepts include the notions of ‘solidarity’ and ‘suffering,’ not necessarily physical resistance as we know it. In other words, although the Palestinian Resistance Movement in Lebanon does not physically resist their situation, they are still a resistance movement by the mere fact that their plight continues to exist and this reinforces their identity.

\textbf{Two indirect issues}

There are two further issues that have been brought up indirectly throughout the thesis, particularly regarding the field work. 1) The difference in Rashidiyeh camp in comparison to the camps where I did my research and 2) Schultz’s work in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Regarding the former, I feel Khashan is worth mentioning again because his results seem so different from mine. Khashan proposes that Islamic Militancy, poverty, youth and personality patterns contribute

\textsuperscript{13}Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 124
to Palestinian willingness to engage in, as well as support of, suicide bombings.\(^{14}\) His sample was conducted in both Rashidiyeh camp and Ein el Helweh camp. The survey is based more on refugee mentality rather than actual behaviour, as the Lebanese government has sealed off the border as far as they can to prevent attacks from Lebanon, thereby also preventing the large-scale retaliation that Israel would return. I therefore find the article somewhat problematic as it is trying to explain why Palestinians in Lebanon engage and support suicide bombings within an environment where it does not take place. In other words, he is perhaps trying to explain what is happening in the West Bank, and particularly the Gaza strip, with research from Lebanon. Nevertheless, his results may not be as different from mine as they would seem at first glance. First, the conditions, particularly in Rashidiyeh camp, are very different to other camps in Lebanon. The camp is heavily guarded by the Lebanese army and the inhabitants are restricted in many more ways than residents living in the other camps in Lebanon. As was explained in Chapter Five, within this camp, the Lebanese army is so strict that the inhabitants are not even allowed to bring tools into the camps with which to carry out maintenance. Ein el Helweh camp is also different from the Beirut camps. I did carry out research in this camp, and the major difference within this camp is its size. It is the largest of all the camps, and as explained previously in Chapter Five it has tensions between the political groups, as it has multiple popular committees. This explains the setting. His work was survey-based whereas my work was more qualitative; therefore, I will now focus on his propositions. For Khashan part of the reason for the support of, and willingness to participate in, suicide bombings, is Islamic militancy. My research only focused on secular groups, nevertheless when conducting the

\(^{14}\) Khashan, Hilal "Collective Palestinian Frustration and Suicide Bombings" Third World Quarterly (Vol. 24, No. 6, 2003)
ethnographic research I was able to observe Islamic groups as well. In relation to all of the previous literature on the Palestinian revolution and the rise of the PLO and the opposition groups, the impression one might be left with, particularly relating to refugees in Lebanon, is that the Resistance is mainly secular in orientation. Events in the West Bank and Gaza lead one to assume that Palestinians in other Arab countries too, are supporting Islamic militancy. Indeed this is the case. The Islamic groups, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and HAMAS are all considered to be part of the Palestinian Resistance, and therefore representatives of the Palestinian people as well: for people living within and outside the Occupied Territories. Most refugees are religious; there were even people who are or were members of Marxist-Leninist groups who were religious. But I am not certain that it is only political Islam or the Islamic groups that foster support for suicide bombings in this case. Suicide bombings are considered to be a form of resistance to harsh Israeli policies towards Palestinians, and for that simple reason, I believe, they are supported. I say this because during my ethnographic research many refugees who were not particularly influenced by Islamic groups and political Islam supported suicide bombings. Being willing to become a suicide bomber is something different, and here Khashan proposes that it is again related to political Islam. No doubt political Islam can motivate people to become suicide bombers; nevertheless, it is not the only motivating factor. I would argue that the ‘Palestinian situation’ - appalling socio-economic conditions for many within and outside the Occupied Territories, lack of statehood, continual dispersal of refugees, and inadequate refugee status - is enough to motivate anyone to potentially become a suicide bomber. The problem with Khashan’s conclusions is that they seem to be misleading - misleading in the sense that it gives rise to assumptions that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are
potential, and perhaps even actual, suicide bombers. In my research, there was indeed support for suicide bombing; nevertheless, there was no express will to become a suicide bomber as this was not an option for them. From Lebanon, most political activity is paralysed.

Schultz’s work, on the other hand, was rather similar to my research with regard to themes of identity. She mentions similar notions such as ‘to struggle’ and ‘to suffer’. However, she also has an interesting section regarding the inside-outside dichotomy. This is related to the perception by West Bank and Gaza Palestinians of ‘other’ Palestinians living outside Palestine, as well as the returnee Palestinians mostly from the PLO who returned to start rebuilding their state in the Occupied Territories. She explains how this dichotomy represents tensions for the Palestinians living inside the Occupied Territories:

‘Inside-outside’ represents a tension on two levels: (1) regarding identity, that is, who is the better Palestinian, who has struggled and suffered more; and (2) on position and influence. ‘Insiders’ feel that returnees came and took positions without deserving them; returnees feel it was the other way round. For returnees, societal transformations in the West Bank and Gaza can be as disturbing an experience as for the ‘insiders’ watching the ‘outsiders’ coming back.15

In this finding Schulz sees the problems that arrive with exiled movements that return to their original territory. It is also rather a sad finding – that there should be such a difference between people who are all Palestinian and who all want the same end goal: a Palestinian state. This notion does make sense, however, as the Palestinian Resistance that grew up in exile was always outside the land – Palestine. Whereas, the insiders were always present.

15 Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 142-143
With regard to who is the ‘better’ Palestinian and who has ‘suffered’ the most, Schultz explains that Palestinians inside Palestine feel that, because they suffered and struggled through the first Intifada, many of the ‘outsiders’ were able to return. On the other hand, as was shown in Chapters Six and Seven, the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon did not seem to be expressing whom they thought were the ‘better Palestinians’, by who had suffered the most. The Palestinians in Lebanon, who have suffered so much in the past and are still suffering, interpreted the suffering of the Palestinians inside Palestine at the moment, as worse and harder than their own. There was immense solidarity with, and support for, the Palestinians inside Palestine. The concept of ‘suffering’ also relates to the suffering by the Palestinians inside Lebanon due to their inability to help their situation. In other words, feeling that one is unable to help the situation both with regard to Palestine, as well as the situation inside Lebanon, is also ‘suffering’.

Apart from the issue of who has struggled more, this dichotomy of insider-outsider is important if and when there is to be a Palestinian state. As we saw in Chapter Seven, the relationship to Palestine of the refugees in Lebanon is one of longing for Palestine and its actual soil, whereas the Palestinians who stayed in the Occupied Territories have a direct connection with the land of Palestine. The ‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’ also have widely different experiences with regard to authority and power structures. The ‘outsiders’ have the experience of the Arab regimes (differing obviously from country to country) whereas the ‘insiders’ have the experience of Israeli rule. With regard to the PLO leadership who have already returned to Palestine, Schultz asks the following important questions:
How much does struggle of exile count among 'insiders' and vice versa? Has there been a process of accommodating different experiences during the years of division?¹⁶

She is referring here to the PLO leadership that returned to Palestine; nevertheless, these are important questions and issues that could have consequences for Palestinian society, if and when the refugees return.

Conclusion

The Palestinians in Lebanon: From Peasants to Revolutionaries to a State of Paralysis?

Have we turned full circle? Has the Palestinian refugee experience in Lebanon moved from being, in Rosemary Sayigh’s terms, ‘peasants to revolutionaries’¹⁷ to now being in a situation of paralysis? Rosemary Sayigh’s important work *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries* focuses on issues related to the life led by the refugees in the former Palestine, the uprooting, the reality of living in the refugee camps in Lebanon prior to the Revolution, as well as having a focus on the effect on the refugees of the creation of the PLO during the Palestinian Revolution.¹⁸

She points to some major themes that, prior to the Palestinian Revolution, had

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¹⁶ Schultz, Helena Lindholm op. cit., p. 143
¹⁷ Sayigh’s terminology of ‘peasants’ is based purely on their experience in Lebanon, post-nakba. Indeed, Palestinians residing in Palestine had been actively resisting for quite some time prior to the nakba, for instance – 1917 Balfour Declaration; 1919 resisting the British and the third Aliyah (until 1923); 1929 Zionist claim to Wailing Wall; 1936 Strike and Arab Revolt.
effects on Palestinian refugee life: 'social isolation', 'loss of respect', 'family disruption', and 'political repression'. All of these problems still exist in the camps today, although the intervention of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese Civil War made other issues more urgent. However, the difference is that today the refugees have lived through a time in Lebanon where they managed to achieve many of their rights and satisfy at least some more of their human needs. After having had this, the current situation is seen and interpreted as very hard and very humiliating. There is an atmosphere of paralysis in the camps in relation to life in general, but also regarding the political groups. It is in this context that many of the youths of today look at their situation and look at the much-diminished political groups with disillusioned eyes. This thesis has shown that although the usual channels of mobilisation still exist and do manage to keep their adult members, as well as recruit new members among the youth and children, there exist a growing number of youth who are not willing to join the political groups. However, their hopes and dreams remain the same as those of the political groups: returning to Palestine and improving their living conditions. Nevertheless, they understand the political group's inability to facilitate their return to Palestine from Lebanon.

All in all, this thesis has shown that the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon suffer from a lack of human and civil rights and are unable to satisfy most of their human needs. There is a sense of hopelessness and helplessness because of the lack of control over their situation. This resignation comes about as the refugees and the political groups feel that they are unable to change their situation or contribute to the struggle to return home. A young man from Shatila camp wrote me a poem describing these feelings of helplessness, as well as the longing to return home:
The Pearl
My homeland is like a pearl which is far away in the sea
We have to fight the sharks, the crazy waves and the whales to try and get to it
It is in our lives but untouchable - in the distance
It is in our hearts but we still can not touch it
The feeling is there but we still can not get to it
(Ayman Dahar, Shatila Camp, December 2002 – 21 years old)

Despite their inability to change their situation, at least at this moment in time, there still remained hope and faith that one day they would return: what I called ‘fatalistic’ in Chapter Seven. Fatalistic in this sense refers more to optimism than pessimism, in that there would be a return to Palestine one day – whether it be in ten or another fifty years.

However, this thesis has also highlighted that, despite the sense of helplessness on the part of the refugees as well as the political groups, the political groups do still manage to keep and recruit members and there is a high degree of political awareness among the refugee population. Nevertheless, many of the youth are suffering from disillusionment with the political groups and their situation in general. In examining mobilisation and identity within the refugee camps, the appalling socio-economic situation was revealed. Similarly the Palestinian refugees’ lack of protection by international, regional and local laws make their situation extremely precarious, especially considering their historical context in Lebanon. The refugees have been, and are still, waiting to be granted their rights in a hostile environment. Their lack of any adequate legal status and their failure to achieve most of their human rights has been thus for over fifty years. Although the Palestinian refugees are not engaged in any militant activity and thereby are not considered a direct threat, this situation is not sustainable. The refugee issue is at the
heart of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians and should therefore be at the core of any future peace process. The Palestinian refugee issue involves people who are particularly vulnerable and insecure as they lack any rights of protection, and it is therefore of particular importance that their needs be made a priority.
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Formal Interviews

William Lee, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Jordan Field Office, Amman (21/03/02)

Åge Arild Tiltnes, Regional Representative for FAFO. Interview held at his home in Amman, Jordan (22/03/02)

Gro Hasselknippe, Researcher for FAFO. Interview held in her home in Amman, Jordan, (22/03/02)

Haj Salem, leader for Fatah Intifada in Shatila Camp. Interview held in his home, Shatila Camp (07/10/02)

Mo’taz Ma’rouf, leader of the DFLP for Lebanon. Interview held in his home, Shatila Camp (07/10/02)

Hisham Najem, leader of the Palestinian Communist Party in Shatila Camp. Interview held in his office, Shatila Camp (09/10/02)

Naji Dawali, leader of the PFLP in Shatila Camp. Interview held in his office, Shatila Camp (09/10/02)

Abu Akram, leader of the PFLP-GC for Lebanon. Interview held in his office, Mar Elias Camp (10/10/02)

Leader of the PPSF for Lebanon. Interview held in Abu Moujahed’s office, Shatila Camp (10/10/02)

Abu Hasan, leader of Saiqa for Lebanon. Interview held in his office, Mar Elias Camp (12/10/02)

Mohammad Afifi, leader of Fatah in Shatila Camp. Interview held at his home, Shatila Camp (15/10/02)

Mohammad Yassin, leader of the PLF for Lebanon. Interview held at the PLF office in Shatila Camp (16/10/02)

Abu Moujahed, former head of all popular committees in Lebanon, now head of the Children and Youth Centre (CYC) in Shatila Camp (18/10/02)

Sobhaye, Palestinian resident in Sabra. Young woman (late 20’s), unmarried and has a job with UNRWA. Interview held in her home, Sabra (23/10/02)

Tarek, Palestinian Resident of Shatila Camp. Young man, unmarried, works in his aunt’s pharmacy shop in Shatila. Interview held in his shop, Shatila Camp (11/12/02)

Richard Cook, Director of UNRWA Affairs, Lebanon Field Office, Beirut (17/11/03)

Ayman, Palestinian Resident of Shatila camp. Attended the Children and Youth Centre in his youth, has now finished school and has no work. Mid-twenties, unmarried, still visits youth centre to ‘hang out’ and meet friends. Interview held in his home, Shatila Camp (18/11/03)
Hussein, Lebanese Resident of Shatila Camp. Early twenties, but still visits youth centre. Interview held at the CYC, Shatila Camp (19/11/03)

Rabieh, Palestinian Resident of Shatila Camp. 17 years old. Still at school, dreams about a better life with a job abroad. Interview held at the CYC, Shatila Camp, (20/11/03)

Abdullah Farhat, Minister for the Displaced in Lebanon. Interview held in his Office, Beirut, (24/11/03)

Abeer, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp. Mid-twenties, unmarried, helps to organise events for children in the youth centre. Interview held in her home, Shatila Camp (27/11/03)

Abu Samer, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp. Head of a family, previously politically active but seems to have retired from politics now. Interview held in his home, Shatila Camp (28/11/03)

Informal Interviews


Olfat Khalil Mahmoud, Director for the Women’s Humanitarian Organisation (that also runs a youth centre). Interview held in her office, Bourj Barajneh Camp, both on (28/07/01) and (30/10/02)

Salah Salah, Director of AJJAL Centre (Palestinian Non-Governmental Organisation – Statistics and Documentation Office – based in Beirut). Interview held at his office in the Cola District, Beirut, (31/10/02)

Sara, Palestinian living in Cola district, member of the AJJAL Centre. Late twenties, unmarried, spends time in the AJJAL centre. No job. Interview held at the AJJAL Centre, Beirut (04/11/02)

Walid, Resident of Ein el Helweh camp, living at the time in Beirut. Late twenties, unmarried, spends his time at the AJJAL centre. Interview held at AJJAL Centre, Beirut (07/11/02)

Haj Salem, (see above – Leader for Fatah Intifada) Multiple occasions in Shatila Camp and Sabra in the autumn of 2002

Ahmad, Resident of Ein el Helweh Camp. Early thirties, married, has an illegal job driving lorries. Interview held in a friend’s home, Ein el Helweh Camp (11/11/02)

Mohammad, Resident of Ein el Helweh Camp. Mid-thirties, unmarried, no job. Interview held in a friend’s home, Ein el Helweh Camp (12/11/02)

Ayman, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp.(see above) Numerous almost daily conversations and informal interviews during autumn 2002 and 2003, as well as MSN interviewing on particular issues and opinions.

Salah, Palestinian living in Shatila Camp. Used to attend the youth centre, now he helps Abu Moujahed when he can. Accompanied me to many of my interviews with political
leaders. Numerous almost daily conversations and one informal interview during autumn 2002 and 2003, as well as MSN question and answers on particular issues and opinions).


**Conversations and Topics Recorded in Diary**

Included here are people who wished to be completely anonymous (no tape recorder or names) as well as people who wanted the topics that we spoke about, if referred to at all, be referred to in a general way but with no reference to their identity.

Also included are my personal observations, impressions and thoughts on my visits to the camps as well as post-interviews.