NATION-BUILDING AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE KURDS IN IRAQ AND TURKEY

Miwa Saito

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews

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Nation-building and Conflict Resolution: The Kurds in Iraq and Turkey

Miwa Saito

12 January 2002

Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews
Declarations

(i) I, Miwa Saito, hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, that it is the record of work carried out by me and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

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(ii) I was admitted as a research student in September 1995 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph. D in July 1997; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between September 1996 and January 2001. Minor corrections to this thesis were made between November 16th 2001 and January 12th 2002 by request of the examining committee.

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of national integration policies as a method of conflict resolution. It assumes that a nation can be multiethnic and integrative, rather than ethnically homogeneous and exclusive. Instead of seeking outright separatism for ethnonational conflicts, it explores ways to integrate sizeable ethnic groups through suitable nation-building policies, in this case, the Kurds.

To justify the above hypothesis, this study analyses two theoretical frameworks, first, the prototypical national integration theory based on Karl W. Deutsch’s work, and second, Revolution from Above based on Ellen K. Trimberger’s work. This study regards Revolution from Above as an effective method for newly established states to consolidate administrative capabilities, which are vital to political institutionalisation. Particularly, nation-building through Revolution from Above is deemed suitable for redressing the problems posed by arbitrarily drawn national borders, as reforms conducted by such governments are designed to compensate for the lack of pre-existing national unity, such as provision of national education, welfare, and economic development.

This study then examines two specific cases of nation-building, in Turkey and in Iraq, and in particular how they faced the challenge of integrating their substantial Kurdish minorities. Turkey is treated as a representative case of nation-building through Revolution from Above, and Iraq is treated as an example in which equivalent nation-building measures to the Turkish case were absent, owing to the mandate rule by Britain in its earliest period. This empirical chapter will be presented in four key phases which are: (1) The Legacy of Ottoman Centralisation, (2) State Formation, (3) Political Mobilisation, and (4) Integration or Containment?.

Finally, this study will examine the impact of foreign intervention on the relations between governments and minorities. The failed national integration that is manifest in totalitarian state-structure will be discussed, as it may trigger political and military interventions by foreign powers. The final chapter examines the two test cases, based on Kurdish nationalists’ contacts with foreign states and organisations in the 1920s and in the 1990s.
Chapter 1

Theoretical Framework

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to explore conditions under which ethnically and socially distinct groups can be brought together through suitable nation-building policies, on the assumption that nations can be multiethnic and inclusive. The case study to substantiate the above proposition is based on the problem of Kurdish integration in Iraq and Turkey where the same ethnonational conflict has been protracted under two contrasting political systems. By viewing nation-building as a method of conflict resolution, I intend to study an alternative solution to that of separatism. There may be numerous cases of protracted conflict in which separatism can be the only practicable solution. In this study, however, I start from the fact that so-called nation-states are historical creations and that they exist today as a result of national integration processes that often brought together diverse ethnic groups. Because of this essentially dynamic nature of a nation, it is not unreasonable to envision that the ethnically and socially diverse groups in a given state can be potentially and eventually integrated.

The reason for putting the emphasis on national integration instead of separatism is this: not only it is highly impracticable to divide territory strictly according to ethnic groups, but such a policy would also increase racial intolerance. People who desire ethnic homogeneity may justify endless attempts to divide state territory and support ethnic cleansing, which could possibly result in ‘over-fragmentation of the state systems’ (Etzioni 1995). A state’s possession of ethnic homogeneity in itself is not a
panacea; however, many social and economic problems can be much better dealt with if national integration is successful. The benefits of successful national integration are many. If there were, for example, feudalism in the society of a certain ethnic group, such a social structure problem can also be alterable through national integration, and formerly isolated members of the minority group are brought to participate in wider economic as well as educational opportunities. Also, if there were a regional gap in economic development that overlapped with the ethnic cleavage, such a gap could also be modified by improving the region in conjunction with the expansion of a nation-wide economy. It must be brought to attention once again that what matters most is not the ethnic homogeneity of a state, but how capable the state’s political system is of integrating the diverse groups in a given territory under equal citizenship.

Different Approaches to Conceptualising Nations

There are two major approaches to nations and nationalism, namely, the constructivist approach and the perennialist approach. Since this work has been informed by both and since both schools’ authors examine the same variables (e.g. modernisation), if with different emphasis, it is important to situate the view of a nation presented here in the wider debate over nationalism.

Most fundamental to the constructivist approach to nationalism is to see it as the outcome of modernisation and certain historic processes. Representative scholars of this school are Karl W. Deutsch, Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Karl Deutsch’s pioneering work was his study on social mobilisation in which he clarified the factors which would lead to linguistic and political assimilation or differentiation (separatism) under the dynamic conditions of a modernising state (Deutsch 1953).
More literary than scientific, Anderson's 'Imagined Communities' (1991) treated the evolution of various nationalisms in a universal perspective, allowing the readers to understand the historicity of a nation-state. The following summarises this school's approach, which is, 'to pay greater attention to the ways in which nationalisms are historically constructed, initially by certain sociopolitical forces with their own agenda(s), by means of selective appropriations of elements and interpretations of the past within a specific historical conjuncture and in relation to (and competition with) many other discourses and practices of identity' (Lockman 1997: 270-1).

On the other hand, perennialist scholars' view of a nation is that it has always existed and that what we see today as nations are the result of an 'awakening' through political and historical events. The representative scholars of this school are Elie Kedourie, Hans Kohn and Walker Connor. The fundamental characteristic of the perennialist approach is to see ethnicity, kinship and culture as perennial components of a nation. For example, Kedourie equates the so-called primordial entity with a nation (Kedourie 1985); thus preexisting characteristics of a nation such as language and religion are seen as unchangeable. Because of their emphasis on those characteristics related to ethnicity and kinship, the perennialist scholars do not view the modern territorial state as having the potential to integrate primordial groups, but rather, see groups based on ethnic and kinship ties as continuing to exist unaffected by nation-building. Furthermore, the perennialist scholars see modernisation as a contributing factor in making people more aware of their ethnic differences, and have a tendency to put great emphasis on the emotional power of ethnicity (as in Connor 1987).
My above statement that a nation can be integrative belongs to the former constructivist approach. I would like to add, at the same time, that even if I take this approach I would not regard relatively new nations as being artificial and acknowledge that they can have organic roots with a sense of membership shared by its citizens. The Revolution from Above, to be discussed below, is representative of ‘deliberate’ efforts at nation-building through ‘top-down’ policies in new nations. These new nations cannot necessarily be accused of lacking strong popular roots simply because nation-building is led by a small elite. As will be discussed, elite-led revolutions have often been necessitated due to the social structure in many parts of the non-Western world, and can be said to substitute for the mass revolutions or national movements that has been more common in the West.

**Approaches to Study of the Kurds**

The existing works on the Kurds consist mainly of three types. The first is historical, including anthropological works. The second is made up of political analyses, and the third type comprises sections written on the Kurds that appear as part of studies on individual countries in which the Kurds reside as a minority.

Martin Van Bruinessen’s ‘Agha, Shaikh, and State’ (First Edition, 1973 and Second Edition, 1992) belongs to the pioneering work in Kurdish studies that dealt primarily with the social structure of Kurdish society. Bruinessen’s work brought previously little-known information about the internal structure of the Kurdish society to our knowledge, and his insight into the relation between primordial loyalty and the modern state contributed not just to the field of anthropology but also to political studies. Other pioneering work includes ‘People without a Country - The Kurds and
Kurdistan' edited by Gerald Chaliand (First Edition, 1979). Although the book consists of essays by different authors, the work has historic importance in its treating the Kurds as a separate nation from as early as the 1970s, and it integrates scattered information about the Kurds in different countries with political analysis. The work by Derek Kinnane, ‘The Kurds and Kurdistan’ (1964) consists mostly of historical accounts and is deemed to be the general point of reference. Other historic works include William Eagleton’s ‘The Kurdish Republic of 1946’ that examined the history of the Kurdish state that briefly existed in the Iranian city of Mahabad between 1945 and 1946. Eagleton’s work has a unique position as the only book that gives a full account of the Mahabad Republic.

More recent works include Michael M. Gunter’s series of political analyses on the Kurds. Gunter’s sources are extensively based on contemporary press materials such as summaries of broadcasts and intelligence briefings, and his work in itself has an archival value. David McDowall’s ‘The Modern History of the Kurds’ (1996) is written based largely on historic archives from the nineteenth century and is perhaps the most comprehensive work as a single book entirely dedicated to the history of the Kurds. Kirsci and Winrow’s study of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey ‘The Kurdish Question in Turkey’ (1997) also uses an extensive amount of primary sources, especially Turkish archival material, and is perhaps one of the most comprehensive works that specifically deals with Turkey’s Kurdish conflict.

It is a general tendency, however, that the works focused on the Kurds ignore the rationality behind the nation-building policies of the states in which the divided Kurds live and have a tendency to demonise their governments. Given the appalling
treatment of the Kurds by successive regimes, this is understandable. However, the
treatment of Kemalist policy as simply 'racist' (as in McDowall 1996: 192), for
example, falls short of grasping the true nature of the conflict. The authors who take
an ostensibly sympathetic view of the Kurds often fail to acknowledge the
significance of nation-building from the viewpoint of the existing states in which the
Kurds live. On the other hand, the works focused on these individual countries have a
tendency to take the state as something self-evident and legitimate from the
beginning, and treat the Kurds merely as a tribal group resisting modernisation. The
country-study literature fails to address why the state failed to politically integrate the
Kurdish people or understand how their nation-building policies contributed to
delaying the detribalisation of the Kurds compared to other citizens who were more
successfully integrated.

In order to redress the gap in existing perspectives, I have aimed to assess the
rationale behind the strategies of nation-building adopted by Iraq and Turkey, and at
the same time examine the problems that accompanied those policies by contrasting
them with the Kurdish perspective. This approach aims to evaluate national
integration policy without losing the perspective of practicality: it is easy to criticise
the authoritarian policies of state-building as having curtailed the rights of ethnic
minorities. However, it is a reality that devolving authority to minorities and regions
is often an impracticable option under early phases of political development.
Therefore, it misses the point if we treat those countries' political systems from a
Western perspective. This study is focused on examining integrative nation-building
policies that are deemed practicable even for the relatively young states whose
political institutions are often weak and whose depth of political participation is still limited.

Starting Point: ‘Imposed Community’

The state as an international legal entity came into being in the Middle East after the First World War. There was, however, a variation with regard to the degree of independence enjoyed by the new states. Some states won complete independence immediately, while some remained under the trusteeship and mandate system that was not unlike a new form of colonialism (Emerson 1960: 309-312). The mandate system, to be discussed in Chapter IV, was widely applied in the Middle East. Furthermore, often, the state borders had been arbitrarily drawn and had no full legitimacy among the local population. The international recognition of state sovereignty, however, contributed to formalising the relation between those who ruled and those who were ruled more than ever before. State sovereignty enabled the ruling group to instantly and legally monopolise the resources for the purpose of nation-building by their own design.

The mandatory power of the 1920s complicated social problems by empowering the existing elite for the purpose of conveniently governing the local population through it. The elite were often tribal chiefs and feudal landowners. This policy worsened social problems by widening the dichotomy between the rich and the poor. In a way, by empowering the feudalistic elite, the representatives of the Western democracies did the ‘opposite’ in these territories to what they did in their own country where they had destroyed or weakened the feudal or aristocratic classes. As a result of this policy, the conservative elements were disproportionately strengthened during the mandatory
era, which caused ‘disillusion, bitterness and also to the weakening of liberal nationalists within the pro-change elite’ (Cottam: 19). For this reason, the former colonies and mandate territories often inherited at independence highly unequal social structures, posing challenges to post-colonial development.

Although all the existing states are indiscriminately acknowledged to enjoy statehood, nation-building in the new states took a considerably different course from their European counterparts: in Europe, the coincidence of language and territory had already been high in the nineteenth century as a result of centuries of integration. Thus many ‘nation-states’ were already existent by the time of mass politicization and democratisation. This was not the case in many other parts of the world. Such self-generated integration was necessarily obstructed because the people in those areas were assigned territory first, then faced the task of creating a national community within these boundaries. Therefore, there was no congruence between a nation and a state. Myron Weiner identified several patterns of artificial borders: (1) Countries in which a single group is dominant in numbers and authority and there are one or more minority groups, (2) Countries in which a single group is dominant in authority but not numbers, (3) Countries in which no single group by itself commands a majority nor is a single group politically dominant, and (4) Countries of any combination in which one or more minorities cut across international boundaries (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 184). The Kurds in Turkey and Iraq fall into the types (1) and (2) respectively, as well as (4).

For an ethnic group forced into a state not of its own choice, the state system meant nothing but an ‘imposed community’. The Kurds are the most prominent such case, as
the new state borders imposed after the First World War completely cut across the area where the Kurdish people lived. Indeed, the Kurdish population constitute the fourth largest group in the Middle East, and the largest ethnic group in the Middle East denied a state (MacDonald: 236). In this sense, the conventionally-used term to describe the Kurds, ‘minority’, is in fact not the correct expression. The historical truth was that the Kurds were ‘reduced’ to the status of a minority.

To be sure, in 1920 there were many Kurdish notables who sided with the Turkish nationalist, Mustafa Kemal; also the Kurdish leaders in Iraq failed to unite among themselves when they were presented with an opportunity for independent statehood. Furthermore, the transnational Islamic legacy of the Ottoman Empire seems to have considerably weakened the political unity of the Kurds. These facts partly explain why the Kurds were not fully ready for independent statehood in the 1920s. The real problem, however, began after those states became independent, and Kurdish national rights became objects of suppressive nation-building policies.

Defining Nation-building/National Integration

The concept of national integration puts priority on creating territorial unity or the political integration of the state and in this study, it is used interchangeably with the concept of nation-building. Myron Weiner states, ‘integration may refer to the process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single territorial unit and the establishment of a national identity. Integration generally presumes the existence of an ethnically plural society in which each group is characterised by its own language or other self-conscious cultural qualities, but the problem may also exist in a political system which is made up of once distinct independent political
units with which people identified. National integration thus refers specifically to the problem of creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows-or eliminates-subordinate parochial parties' (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 180-81).

National integration is also a way to establish the state's legitimacy. Anthony Birch states the political significance of national integration: 'our concern is with the way in which ethnic and cultural groups have become wholly or partially merged into national societies so as to support the political organisation of the national state. National integration is a process common to virtually all national states, for only a handful of them are ethnically and culturally homogeneous. Integration is the only secure basis of political authority' (Birch: 36). Gellner's definition of nationalism describes the above aspect of a nation, that one has to be a member of the national community which s/he regards legitimate. Gellner defined, '(Nationalism is) a principle that the political and national unit should be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1).

Myron Weiner categorises national integration policy into two basic types: (1) The assimilationist type, in which the distinctive cultural traits of minority communities are eliminated through assimilation into that of the dominant cultural group and (2) The policy of 'unity in diversity', 'ethnic arithmetic' or 'integrative pluralism', in which national loyalties are established without eliminating subordinate cultures (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 185). It is often the assimilationist policy that becomes dominant in the nation-building strategy of relatively new states, in their hasty attempts to secure territorial integrity. However, one need not assume that securing territorial integrity requires all sub-national identities to be eliminated. What matters most is political unity, and as long as it remains viable, cultural pluralism is possible,
as we witness in the successfully integrated countries that have democratic government capable of accommodating the needs of an ethnically plural population. In short, successful nation-building allows us to have integrative pluralism.

In the following section, the path of successful national integration or prototypical national integration, pioneered in the ‘old states’, is compared with that of Revolution from Above, typical of many ‘new states’. There are of course other paths of nation-building adopted in the Third World, for example, through rentier monarchy, Communism, or the pluralist-consociationalism as conceptualised by Lijphart (World Politics, Jan. 1969); however, Revolution from Above seems most applicable to the cases of Turkish and Iraqi nation-building. In this study, a model of Revolution from Above is employed to understand the strategy of state builders. The prototypical model of successful integration is developed as a model of the desired, ultimate outcome, and Revolution from Above is seen as a method to ultimately reach such an outcome, but also is critically evaluated in order to assess the steps needed to close the gap between means and end.

Part 1. Prototypical National Integration

A Nation as a Community

In order to explain the process of integrating culturally and socially distinct groups into a politically united state, I would like to develop a general model of the experience of early nation-builders, identifying several phases or aspects of prototypical integration based on Karl W. Deutsch’s theory of social mobilisation and
political assimilation (1953). An integrated nation is defined by Deutsch as: ‘an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes linked to regional centres and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse both indirectly from link to link and directly with the centre’ (Deutsch 1953: 101). In his work, Deutsch demonstrated the crucial importance of ‘social communication’ for the establishment of a sense of community among the people in a given territory. Deutsch’s concept of communication is sometimes misunderstood as superficially referring to telecommunication (as by Hobsbawm 1990: 3). However, it encompasses a wider meaning of communication, including economic activities, geographic mobility, literacy, the spread of education, and broadened political participation.

Why a Nation can be Integrative: The Relation between Communication and Common Culture

We normally assume a nation is characterised by the common features shared by its members, such as religion, culture, and language, which I would like to denote as ‘ingredients’ of a nation for the convenience of explanation. However, without our ability to share these ingredients, we will never learn how we are common or not. The perennialist view of a nation as being in permanent existence overlooks this very mechanism that anything we perceive as common is shared as a result of communication. Indeed, it is communication which shapes commonality. Deutsch states, ‘To explain a nation as the result of shared experiences presupposes already this ability to share experience, which is the very thing that cannot be taken for granted’ (Deutsch 1953: 19).
Thus what are conventionally seen as common, permanent and self-evident characteristics of a given society involve, in fact, communication. Our perception of common culture is being reinforced through our constant exposure to it, which means communication and culture have a mutually reinforcing nature. The reinforcement of culture through communication makes culture appear permanent, but essentially, culture is subject to change depending on our priorities in life. For example, a person’s habitual language is likely to change if s/he emigrates to a different country. This example illustrates the fact that a person’s language is in fact constantly reinforced through its everyday use. Similarly, religious practice may be weakened or strengthened depending on the value attached to it in people’s lives. Thus the things we usually perceive as stable characteristics have in fact a dynamic nature and can persist only for so long as they are continuously used and valued. If we lose our capability to do so, a culture’s significance will be reduced and replaced by an alternative one that assumes a greater priority in people’s lives.

This means a community is sustainable only through continuation of communication. Accordingly, a common culture or a community can be conceptualised as something dynamic, not as something perennial or automatically sustainable on its own. The definition of common culture by Deutsch expresses this dynamism in a comprehensive way. A common culture is defined as: ‘a common set of stable, habitual preferences and priorities in men’s attention and behaviour as well as in their thoughts and feelings’. Then he goes on to point out that many of these ‘preferences’ may make it easier for men to communicate within the same culture (i.e., the same set of priorities in life), and that communication facilitates a sharing of common culture. Hence there is a reinforcing feedback relationship between a community and a
common culture (Deutsch 1953: 88-9), implying that changing priorities in men's lives will create a new culture. The possession of a common language is certainly a crucial element for a politically united nationhood. However, the means of communication that enable people to communicate effectively are in fact more important, such as the readiness of a physical, economical and technical environment that facilitates people's transactions and communication. Therefore, people's capability for efficient communication is actually more important than the mere possession of commonality itself.

A Nation is Not an Ethnic Group

The above mechanism can be applied to the communication that takes place within any given ethnic group: if the ethnic group is capable of having only a limited level of internal communication, even if this group is clearly distinguishable from neighbouring peoples in physical and linguistic features, it is unlikely to achieve a political unity that goes beyond its immediate surroundings, such as village and tribal unit. Because their capability to share the commonality is limited, ethnicity and even a common language themselves alone will not automatically facilitate political unity of an ethnic group. The ethnic group whose members live isolated from each other may have a largely self-contained form of civilisation that involves few contacts with even their closest neighbours, such as the people in the next village, or a different tribe. Thus it can happen that people from remarkably close geographical areas share no fraternal political feeling.

We should remember that commonness of ethnicity and even language in themselves are not automatic unifying factors. Hence, an ethnic or linguistic group and a nation
are not equivalent. As regards this point, A.D. Smith raises illustrative examples of Latin American states and of Arab states. In the former case, ethnic diversity is not a politically divisive issue, and in the latter case, possession of common language is not a sufficient factor for political unity. Smith points out that despite the fact that Latin American society is multi-ethnic, Latin American states are not faced with serious separatist movements. On the other hand, the Arabic language, despite its universality among Arab people, in itself does not politically unite the Arab people now living in some twenty different states. Smith states 'what these examples illustrate is not only the variability of effects that identical cultural factors may produce, but the need to examine them in relation to the sense of historical unity (or lack of it) among a given population, and the particular historical configuration of that community' (Smith 1981: 49-51).

Furthermore, peoples who speak different languages can have a single nation-state (multi-lingual state). Referring to the Swiss example, Deutsch points out 'what counts is not the presence or absence of any single factor, but merely the presence of sufficient communication that facilitates enough complementarity to produce the overall result. The Swiss may speak four different languages and still act as one people, for each of them has enough habits, preferences, symbols, memories, patterns of landholding and social stratification, events in history, and personal associations, all of which together permit him to communicate more effectively with other Swiss than with the speakers of his own language' (Deutsch 1953: 97, quoting Max Huber).

Possession of common language and bilingualism are certainly essential elements of communicative efficiency. It must be noted, however, that such complementarity is
not necessarily an automatically unifying factor. It can be divisive as well. Effective communication is not viable unless complementarity is valued. Deutsch gave the example of the negative reaction towards the rise of Zionism by some Jewish groups in Western Europe and said ‘In this case, Zionism drew attention to a cultural distinction which these groups felt to be disadvantageous ... Only if nationality is valued; if it is seen as a winning card in the social game for prestige, wealth, or whatever else may be the things culturally valued at that time and place ... only then does it seem probable that consciousness of nationality will strengthen its development’ (Deutsch 1953: 178). For the same reason, it is highly unlikely the Scots would have adopted the English language and eventually the British nationality were it not for the factors that facilitated economic integration of the United Kingdom. Benedict Anderson wrote that the linguistic assimilation and increased convertibility of different languages can take place in a non-conflicting way, describing it as a ‘gradual, unselfconscious, pragmatic, not to say haphazard development’ (Anderson: 45). In Scotland’s case, already in the early seventeenth century there was an ‘immediate access to print-English, provided minimum literacy existed, ... Anglicization was essentially a byproduct’ (Anderson: 85-6).

These examples show that even though the presence of common factors is essential for communicative efficiency, for the people to politically unite, such commonality must, first of all, be valued through political, economic and social contexts. Conversely, wherever such value is existent in the society, peoples from different cultural and even linguistic backgrounds can form a unified state. This underlines the fact that ethnicity and language in themselves alone do not create a politically united nation, but instead, nations can be constructed around the community that is deemed
valuable, and that in turn will enhance people's communicative efficiency thereby facilitating bilingualism and linguistic assimilation.

The Making of an Integrative Nation: Political Mobilisation and Socialisation

Thus the crucial factor that distinguishes one community from another is the degree of communication and its continuity, sustainability and the value attached to it. Due to the limited scope of communication, in a non-industrialised society, the sphere of community is mostly confined to the locality. As Gellner describes it, 'the basic circle in agrarian society is locked, is complete, and it is difficult to see how one could break out of it' (Gellner 1997: 19). However, in an industrialised society, the scope of communication will invariably become greater, and this facilitates drastic changes in men's preferences and priorities in life, in other words, a configuration of common culture.

Industrialisation and the need for intense division of labour through an expanded economy socially mobilises the mass of people out of their small local communities and brings them to work and live with others from different origins; this so-called 'uprooting process' will unavoidably speed up the socialisation of previously unconnected peoples. This communication is specifically conceptualised as 'social communication', that takes place among a 'group of individuals connected by an intense division of labour, and separated from other societies by a marked drop in this intensity' (Deutsch 1953: 87). As this process continues, people are reorganised into several classes, which may be described as a 'horizontal' alignment alongside 'vertical' ethno-linguistic cleavages or which potentially cross-cut and dilute ethnic-linguistic cleavages. This was the result when European states went through the
Industrial Revolution. The impact of the Industrial Revolution can be summarised as follows: (1) A demographic shift ... Industrialisation required a large number of workers concentrated in cities to work in the factories, (2) The creation of new wealth by new groups, and (3) The emergence of a number of new social classes ... the entrepreneurial classes as new rich, the new middle class of managers and civil servants, professionals, and the proletariat of industrial workers (Snow and Brown: 106-7). Thus, economic modernisation generated middle and working classes that cut across 'vertical' ethno-linguistic cleavages. This meant that the social structure change facilitated the dilution of preexisting ethnic or sectarian differences and European society's structure became more suitable for absorbing culturally diverse groups.

In the above process, bilingualism, linguistic assimilation, or both, are facilitated as long as they are associated with the above-mentioned social winning card, or the actual advantage in adopting such change. In other words, adopting a new language may be indispensable to social mobility in the new division of labour. If industrialisation turns out to be successful, the peoples originally drawn from different parts of the country would increase their complementarity through their participation to the same economic process. When this process results in creating a middle class, such a class will become politically powerful enough to counter the existing aristocracy and other oligarchical groups, and become a potential force for integration.

Thus economic and social structure changes, in fact, facilitate a political change and integration of diverse groups into a nation that dilutes preexisting sectarian division.
In other words, a political change is facilitated by, and is a byproduct of, the above mentioned socioeconomic change, epitomised in the political development after the Industrial Revolution. The link between industrialisation and political change is summarised in the following paragraph: ‘The emergence of these new classes as challenger to the old social order provided the major social dimension of change. For the old, conservative elite, the new classes were an unwanted intrusion on their positions, and they resisted the movement to a more egalitarian order. Where they were successful (in Holy Alliance countries such as Austria and Russia) the price was less economic modernisation. Where they failed, economic modernisation and redistribution of social status occurred’ (Snow and Brown: 107). Both the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire were loosely integrated since delayed modernisation retarded an integrative division of labour and limited social mobility for minority groups in the periphery. The two empires’ failure in political integration was manifest in the existence of a number of potential successor states in their territories, such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia (the Austro-Hungary Empire) and some fifteen republics, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, and Georgia out of the former Soviet Union territory that succeeded the Russian Empire.

The above transformation is crucial in making the nation integrative, where people will become part of the common economic process. In the prototypical national integration, a nation allows coexistence of multiple identities so long as there is an overriding political unity that is deemed more valuable than subnational units. As a result of successful industrialisation, the class stratification would dilute ethnic divisions and in turn, the more powerful the middle class, the more viable the prospect
for democracy. In short, democracy is part of the larger results of national integration that tolerates multiple identities. Thus an economically sound nation has a greater chance to be multi-ethnic and democratic. As Nathan Glazer points out, because of its trans-ethnic nature, class-based politics is in many ways more compatible with political stability or integration. Glazer suggests people will become more rational by focusing on economic interest. This will prevent isolation, exploitation or discrimination against any element of the population on communal grounds. He lists reasons why it is safer to focus less on ethnicity: (1) Greater emotional weight is attached to ethnic connections than to a class, (2) The fact that people can change their class position, or be expected to change, rather more easily than they change their ethnicity, (3) A class in a minority position may hope to become a majority by modifying its politics so as to include those close to it in class position, and (4) Class-based politics permits slicing the pie and rational discussions as to who will get how much under which circumstances (Glazer in Elazer: 51-2).

In this process of creating a new integrative national community, the possession of print language is crucial in giving fixity to the language of a nation. Benedict Anderson summarises three distinct ways print language contributed to national consciousness. In Europe’s case, ‘First and foremost, they created unified fields of exchange and communications below Latin and above the spoken vernaculars. Speakers of the huge variety of Frenches, Englishes, or Spanishes, who might find it difficult or even impossible to understand one another in conversation became capable of comprehending one another via print and paper. Second, print-capitalism gave a new fixity to language, which in the long run helped to build that traditional image of antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation. Third, print-
capitalism created languages-of-power different from older administrative vernaculars' (Anderson: 47-48). Print capitalism accompanied economic modernisation and was inseparable from it.

The Variable Outcomes of Modernisation: National Assimilation or Ethnic Differentiation

Industrialisation and modernisation do not, of course, inevitably or automatically lead to political integration; indeed the opposite is possible. They do invariably lead to a marked increase of communication, part controllable, part not. The processes of urbanisation, greater geographic mobility, mechanisation, and the increase of literacy are collectively conceptualised as ‘social mobilisation’. As the people are socially mobilised, greater communication makes it obvious more than ever how they are similar or different. Thus, if social mobilisation outpaces ‘assimilation’, or more specifically, the process of assimilating people to the dominant language and culture (Deutsch 1953: 117-8), the social mobilisation will make salient the people's ethnic differences and may result in differentiation or even disintegration of a society (Deutsch 1961). This is typical in new states where exceptionally rapid modernisation stimulated from contact with the West may well exceed the normally slower process of linguistic assimilation. Walker Connor specifically focused on this differentiation in his article ‘Ethnonationalism’ (1987). Connor basically stressed only one side of Deutsch's conceptualisation by stating greater communication leads different groups to become aware of what makes them distinct rather than what they have in common. Connor seems to overemphasise the emotional power of ethnicity without paying due attention to the condition under which such an emotional power is activated or mitigated. Because of the slow speed of assimilation, differentiation triggered as a
result of social mobilisation has a potential to cause ethnic, religious and other sectarian conflict, especially when these factors and class inequality overlap, and such ethnic differentiation could potentially reverse the national integration. Gabriel Ben Dor points out that differentiation is accelerated by insecurity from rapid changes in society. ‘These transformations have occurred in societies undergoing rapid change, creating insecurity and thereby encouraging people to go back into their relatively safe shells at the expense of larger political communities’ (Ben Dor 1999: 7). Thus, people are competing more in the larger society for scarce resources than before social mobilisation. Similarly, when geographic mobility is greater than the expansion of economy, inter-ethnic competition might emerge in a rapidly urbanised society. Thus the different ethnic groups compete for employment and other economic resources. This contributes to ‘modernise ethnocentrism’ (Geertz in Welch Jr.: 215).

Social Reinforcement Learning: Prolonged Ethnic Differentiation

In the following section, I discuss one of the most serious obstacles to national integration, that of overlapping cleavage. Overlapping cleavage happens when a certain ethnic group is over-represented in certain strata, such as low-income groups.

What is particularly obstructive to national integration is the fact that overlapping cleavages can persist for a considerably long time. This mechanism can be explained in the following; Deutsch conceptualised the phenomenon of overlapping cleavages with the phrase ‘social reinforcement learning’. He points out that the following factors make people sharply aware of their unequal circumstance: ‘stratified rewards, insecurity, density of settlement, high volume of transactions, equalisation of aspiration, impersonality, and competitiveness’ (Deutsch 1979: 71). The prolonging
of these conditions contributes to conditioning people’s reaction towards others, which Deutsch compares to the reaction of Pavlov’s dog to certain signals. ‘While Pavlov’s dogs can be taught to give a physical reaction to a ball or a buzzer, simply because it happens to be associated with food ... You could subject populations to Pavlovian conditioning by combining visual signals about race with other perception of competition, insecurity, threat, fear, social distance, or whatever was salient to them’ (Deutsch 1979: 71). In other words, let us say, the factor ‘crime’ starts to be associated with a certain ethnic group. People would associate the group automatically with a feeling of insecurity by merely seeing them. Social conflict can be aggravated by the ethnic factor, such as Kurd workers attacking the wealthier Turcomans, as will be discussed in the series of riots that have occurred after the Iraqi revolution of 1958. Because factors such as ethnicity and religion represent the most visible signals, unless political equalisation measures are taken, these divisions may persist in the society over a very long period of time.

Ethnic differentiation is an alarming phase of modernisation from which protracted ethnonational conflict can develop. If a state fails to provide reasonably equal access to tangible rewards such as greater employment opportunity and provision of welfare, particularly, the ethnic group whose culture is different from that of the governing group, is most likely to be alienated from nation-building. Alternatively it may be that the modernising state often sees such a minority group simply as a feudal group needing to be destroyed.

An ethnically differentiated population may deny the state’s legitimacy: ‘at bottom, the popular acceptance of a government in a period of social mobilisation is most of
all a matter of its capabilities and the manner in which they are used ... that is, essentially a matter of its responsiveness to the felt needs of its population. If it proves persistently incapable or unresponsive, some or many of its subjects will cease to identify themselves with it psychologically; it will be reduced to ruling by force where it can no longer rule by display, example, and persuasion’ (Deutsch 1961). As Myron Weiner puts it, the problem of national integration is basically ‘the problem of linking government with the governed’, and if the gap between them persists, this creates a condition linked to internal war, which we customarily speak of as ‘disintegration’ (Weiner in Welch Jr.: 180-181). The decisive factor that determines assimilation or differentiation of a modernising society thus seems to be the government’s responsiveness and is dependent on how successfully the state handles the volatile phase of social mobilisation and ensures a reasonable level of social equality. The state must also take political measures to prevent inter-ethnic competition in a rapidly modernising society from leading to inter-ethnic conflict.

If inequality persists, neither bilingualism nor linguistic assimilation are seen as a ‘social winning card’ by the alienated population. As a result, a condition is created in which linguistic pluralism is directly linked with separatism. ‘If the non-assimilated group forms a large part of the population, it follows that it cannot be assimilated, that national predominance relations will be challenged and may even be reversed’ (Deutsch 1979: 283). Gellner also points out ‘If they (a minority) can distinguish themselves culturally from their exploiters and oppressors, it is very much to their advantage to hive off politically, when the opportunity arises, and to modernise under their own flag, in their own sovereign territory’ (Gellner 1997: 35).
In Azar and Burton’s summarisation, that ‘the source of protracted social conflict is the denial of those elements required in the development of all people and societies, and whose pursuit is a compelling need in all. These are security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity, and effective participation that determine conditions of security and identity and other such developmental requirements’ (Azar and Burton 1986: 29). The ultimate truth, as Deutsch describes it, is that the motives of the assimilating population and those seeking separation are the same in the sense that they are both seeking a greater share of wealth and opportunities: ‘The motives for this secessionist nationalism are thus to a significant extent the same motives that would lead, under different circumstances, to national assimilation’ (Deutsch 1979: 22).

Interim Summary

We have seen that a nation is not merely an ethnic group, but the community of people that is linked by intense communication. When the socially mobilised population start to become beneficiaries of industrialisation, they will be ready to submerge preexistent sectarian identities in favour of an emerging new common identity, and that is when people’s priorities in life will change, hence creating a new culture and thus a new community of people - an integrative nation.

Part 2. Revolution from Above

The Revolution from Above is a type of modernisation typical in newly developing states conceptualised by E.K. Trimberger from her comparative study of four cases of
modernisation in Egypt, Japan, Peru and Turkey. It denotes the whole process of economic, social and political change in modernising states facilitated by the policies designed by military bureaucrats who have taken over the government by extra-parliamentary measures. The following section will examine whether these elite-led nation-building strategies are capable of redressing the problems posed by arbitrary state borders and how far these strategies can be expected to eventually facilitate the organic growth of a national community.

What distinguishes Revolution from Above from other revolutions is: (1) The fact that the initiation of economic, social, and political change is organised and led by military and often civil bureaucrats from within the state apparatus of the old regime, (2) Little or no mass participation is required in the revolutionary takeover and in the initiation of change, (3) The extralegal takeover of power and the initiation of change is accompanied by very little violence, (4) The initiation of change is undertaken in a pragmatic, step-at-a-time manner with little appeal to radical ideology, and (5) Military bureaucrats who lead a Revolution from Above - as opposed to a mere coup d'état - destroy the economic and political base of the aristocracy. The deliberate attempt at class destruction is an important feature of the Revolution from Above, though there are variations (Trimberger: 3).

The Revolution from Above, as is evident from the above characteristics, is basically a 'top-down' revolution, essentially aimed at nation-building in relatively younger states. From a historical perspective, it can be said that the states that have gone through prototypical national integration or nation-building 'from below' were uncommon. In nineteenth century Europe, the social change resulting from
industrialisation came basically as a 'bottom-up' phenomenon. However, in most of Asia and in African countries, it had to be the 'other way round'. Because of the abrupt beginning of the current international state system, often, the new states had little choice but to adopt modernisation programmes directed by elite bureaucrats. Many of these new states were states only in the territorial sense, not already-integrated nation-states. The 'revolution' was led by a handful of elites because no politically significant stratum existed that was equivalent to the powerful middle class that appeared in European states after the Industrial Revolution. In this respect, Revolution from Above is a highly universal phenomenon in the less developed world.

Survival and Stabilisation of the System

A strong central government is essential for the survival of a new state. Hence, it must typically be the first priority of state-builders. The citizens of such a new state often have little experience in political participation, and often political institutions are weak or nonexistent. Thus, it is essential for the state to complete the task of centre-building for the purpose of its own survival. In this process, some form of authoritarianism often becomes a matter of necessity in order to preserve political instability in the early phase of state formation. The new regime may not be able to broaden political participation for a certain, perhaps a long, period of time, as long as the legitimacy of government is under threat by competing social forces, often those loyal to the old regime. Where there are no strong political institutions, political opposition poses the direct threat of counter-revolution. Under these circumstances, very often, the single party system becomes almost a matter of inevitability (Foltz:
303). Trimberger conceptualises this authoritarian phase as ‘preemption of the organs and symbols of the old regime’ (Trimberger: 14).

The opposite scenario to this case is a decentralised state. In multi-ethnic societies, it might be thought that de-centralised government, according autonomy to minorities in particular regions, might be most suitable. However, devolving measures and federalism are not likely to be effective unless a strong government authority is first established at the national level. Without this, decentralisation will lead to the disintegration of a state. D.L. Horowitz suggests that for regional autonomy or federal structure to work, the central government needs to retain ultimate control over the powers of regional governments (Horowitz: 624).

Once the centre is built, state authorities attempt to penetrate into the ‘periphery’. The representative measures in this second phase are, for example, the provision of education and welfare, creation of bureaucratic organisations, and improvement of infrastructure in general, such as roads, public transport and sanitation. By demonstrating that the state is capable of doing these tasks successfully, the government’s legitimacy would, for the first time, be recognised by its citizens. According to Almond and Powell, this phase of rural penetration signifies the beginning a state building. They state:

‘State building occurs when the political elite creates new structures and organisations designed to “penetrate” the society in order to regulate behaviour in it and draw a larger volume of resources from it. State building is commonly associated with significant increases in the regulative and extractive capabilities of the political
system, with the development of a centralised and penetrative bureaucracy related to
the increase in these capabilities and with the development of attitudes of obedience
and compliance in the population which are associated with the emergence of such a
bureaucracy’ (Almond and Powell: 35)

The Role of the Military in Revolution from Above

The military has a pivotal role in Revolution from Above. Firstly, the institution
facilitates political socialisation, and secondly, it creates political leadership,
substituting for the middle class, which in developing countries is often too weak to
assume this role.

In developing countries, often, political socialisation of the rural population takes
place faster in a military institution than in other organisations in a society, such as
corporate bodies. As a result of universal conscription, military institutions reflect
broad social composition. Under Revolution from Above, the military officer corps
are expected to become instructors of nation-building through which a new salaried
middle class is formed. This new class is recruited from the lower middle class and
often peasantry, hence it is populist in orientation as well. Because of this, military
revolution in the modern Middle East was something of a substitute for mass
revolution (Baer in Gerber: 2). In other words, the military in Revolution from Above
substitutes for the role assumed by the European bourgeoisie in the eighteenth
century, in which they destroyed the aristocracy and other oligarchic groups in order
to facilitate more equal national integration and economic growth to expand the power
base of a more democratic government.
Institutionalising Mass Political Participation

Then how can the new government bridge the gap between state and citizen? In order to avoid fragmentation of a state, the government needs to encourage political participation through political institutions (Huntington: 397). And if the state fails to accommodate broadened political participation, this will result in a situation of praetorianism (Huntington: 192-3). Praetorianism is 'the absence of effective political institutions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political action' including that of ethnic groups (Huntington: 196). In the case of authoritarian Revolution from Above, often, political institutions are not well established, so the sheer expansion of political consciousness/activism may very well trigger a counter-revolution or the fragmentation of the state. If a government seeks to counter fragmentation and opposition through repression, it puts its citizens' civil liberties at risk and is unlikely to acquire the legitimacy or support to govern effectively. Ideally, the population should be organised into a nation-wide political party or parties in order to establish the direct state-citizen link. Powell's study found that the most successful case of such peasant mobilisation through a national party was found in Italy where the Communist party and later the Christian Democratic party successfully organised peasants at the national level. However, such political mobilisation cannot be successful without utilising the preexisting organisational framework, Communist and Christian organisations in this case (Powell 1970). In the Middle East, modernising regimes attempting Revolution from Above have typically started with a period of single party rule and only later permitted the pluralisation of the party system. It would have been ideal if the Kurdish peasants were organised into a nationwide party as well as in peasant unions whose membership is shared by both Kurds and Arabs or Kurds and Turks, for example. Instead, the Baath party is
dominated by Sunni Arabs, whereas Turkish political parties, even after the pluralisation of the party system, do not advocate Kurdish national rights. Birch points out that institutional arrangements can be successful if 'the regions or minorities are represented by national parties, but (it can be) disintegrative if they are represented by regional or communal parties' (Birch: 42). Thus by not accommodating Kurdish rights through the national institution the two states risk encouraging communal parties, hence increasing the chances for separatism.

In conclusion, institution building and economic development should progress, ideally, simultaneously. A nation must eventually be substantiated by citizens of the state and not by the government. This will be discussed in a later section.

Flaws in Revolution from Above

State formation through Revolution from Above, however, is not free from problems. The following is a list of typical problems that accompany this type of nation-building.

1. Weak State-citizen Links

A prevalent phenomenon in Revolution from Above is its weak state-citizen link due to the new regime's initial lack of a mass power-base. The new regime may concentrate its effort on creation of an educated middle class so that they will constitute a viable support base for the new authority. However, the creation of a politically significant middle class is a slow process, as it needs a significant enough expansion of education and economic opportunity to facilitate such social structure change. In order to establish itself and carry out essential development programmes in
the 'periphery', the new regime may be forced to make some compromise with the existing old elites who often have control over the means of production. They may be the local notables, heads of aristocratic families, tribal chiefs or the feudal landlords.

The weakness of the state-citizen link implies that these traditional elites may effectively create a barrier between the two. They have real influence over the mass of people in their locality, and they can turn them against the government at will. Utilising this local authority, they can often extract favourable terms from the new government. Reliance on intermediaries is, in a way, unavoidable in Revolution from Above, from the fact that it is not a mass revolution. Paul Brass quotes India's example: ‘The struggle between the centre and the localities may take the form of conflict between elites at the centre allying with forces in the localities opposed to the locally dominant elites or of conflict between the civilian bureaucratic apparatus or local political party organisations and local notables’ (Brass: 273). He also remarks that ‘Elites who seek to gain control over the state or who have succeeded in doing so must either suppress and control central and local rivals or establish collaborative alliances with other elites’ (Brass: 275). Thus even though Trimberger’s theory envisions the Revolution from Above as destroying the aristocracy, the destruction could be confined to their political power. Their traditional monopoly of functions in the locality may remain and the conflict between the state and local elite persist on an informal basis.

Middle East Manifestations of the Weak State-Citizen Link

With regard to the nature of relation between central government and local notables, there are some characteristics that stand out in the Middle Eastern cases.
A. Tribe and State

The first characteristic is the long history of coexistence of tribes and states. In the Middle East, tribes and states coexisted for centuries without merging and established a reciprocal symbiosis. In other words, local elites’ dealing with ‘central’ authority has never been a new phenomenon, rather it constituted an active part of tribal life. Richard Tapper argues that, ‘In the Middle East, groups referred to as tribes have never, in historical times, been isolated groups of “primitives”, remote from contact with states or their agents; rather, tribes and states have created and maintained each other in a single system, though one of inherent instability. If the rulers of the Middle East have been preoccupied by a tribal problem, however, the tribes could be said to have had a perennial “state problem”’ (Tapper in Khoury and Kostiner: 51-2). Under this ‘tribe-state symbiosis’, tribal leaders chose in a rational calculating way to serve the state most favourable to them. This was not mere opportunism but was a matter of necessity and survival of the tribe. The symbiosis was also beneficial to the state because it could preempt tribal rebellions. Because of this reciprocal coexistence, the states (empires), unlike in Europe, made no special effort to formally integrate the tribes until the relatively recent past. For centuries there was no need for such Ottoman ‘subjects’ to identify with the state.

B. Land Ownership

Another outstanding characteristic of the Middle East is the great inequality in the form of land ownership. The degree of concentration of private land is varied, but it is indisputable that national integration in the two states (Iraq and Turkey) has suffered heavily from this. The concentration of private estates originated from failures of land
registration policies of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century. The literate notables took advantage of their knowledge and registered the tribal-communal land in their own name. This is evident in both today’s Iraq and Turkey. However, the impact seemed to have been more severe in the Iraqi area. It is said that ‘In Iraq, the impact of state policy on landownership was far-reaching. When Midhat Pasha, the Ottoman Governor in Iraq (1869-1871) implemented the Land Law of 1858, almost an entire class of landlords was created out of tribal shaikhs and townspeople who were in a favourable position vis-a-vis the government’ (Issawi 1966, 166-69 as in Harik 1972: 354). The concentration of wealth in the hands of notables changed the face of society. Instead of creating a mass of independent agrarian proprietors, as the law had originally intended, the land registration aggravated the division between the rich and the poor, and created a class of powerful notables obstructing the access of the state to its potential citizens.

C. Uneven Development and the Survival of Intermediaries

As the state goes through modernisation, it often experiences uneven development, which leaves some regions of the state marginalised or deprived and hence the inhabitants of such region are more likely to become dependent on traditional leaders. It strengthens the relative importance of the role of local notables as a substitute to the state-citizen link. Even though such minority groups’ social structure may be feudal and unequal, its members will look more to their own leaders than to a state. For this reason, the old-feudal social structure is more likely to persist among the alienated groups. In such a case, the alienated ethnic group often suffers its own lack of social homogeneity, such as a sharp division between the rich and the poor, and is vulnerable to the so-called divide-and-rule policy by state elites. When socio-
economic divisions cut across ethnicity, this creates cross-cutting cleavage which, in theory, should dilute conflict. However, in developing states with enormous gaps between rich and poor, class formation facilitates fragmentation instead of national integration. Thus social mobilisation can be linked with complex ethnonational and social conflict, and this is the feature evident in both the Turkish and Iraqi cases of Kurdish conflict. This ‘state-elite (local notable)’ relation persists over a long period of time as opposed to the ‘centre-citizen’ link that is equivalent to integrative nation-building.

The relation between the state and notables is viable as long as there is a reciprocity between the two. This means that unless the state becomes capable of integrating the people through greater economic mobility and political participation, old elite continue to dominate regional administration, directly affecting the local people. To make the matter more complex, the state authority may promote an identity alien to certain groups. This is when the government is run by a group whose culture and language is different from those groups. In such a case, the intermediaries also play the role of cultural gate-keeper. So long as the central government remains weak and un-responsive, the relative importance of the intermediaries will not diminish.

Delayed, dependent economic development also obstructed the integration of the state. The gradual subjugation of the Ottoman economy to European products kept the manufacturing industry weak, and furthermore, those who made profits from trades failed to reinvest in the enterprise. Rather than stimulating the economy and leading to prosperity, the domestic market and export trade superimposed a modern system of commercial transactions on a primitive system of production. The capital created by
the price of crops was shared by the merchant and the landlord and failed to revert to productive enterprises in agriculture or industry. The city manufacturers (of goods) [sic] such as textiles, declined, and those which survived, such as soap, tobacco, and to a certain extent silk, did not offer great investment opportunities' (Harik 1972: 359).

This uneven economic structure laid the groundwork for traditionally powerful families to create an economic base even under the contemporary economy, by their becoming moneylenders and real estate brokers. The wealth, often by inheritance, allowed them to become even more influential on a new social basis. Ghomeny’s study on the poverty in the Middle East treats this subject extensively. He writes, ‘they (the notables) granted land to influential family heads, senior officials, and religious leaders in exchange for their political support. By virtue of their official and social status, the new class of landlords were able to accumulate more land, either free of charge or at low prices, with tax concessions’ (El-Ghonemy: 32). Thus the traditional elite continue to be influential under the framework of a modern economy. In such a case, the economic projects formulated at the national level often feed into preexisting patterns of rivalry (Hopkins: 10-11). An important feature is that they are not only economically influential but also have cultural significance: ‘even where there has been considerable migration into towns and cities, traditional loyalties to rural kinship and tribal groupings remain. Investment in land and property is valued more than putting funds into productive enterprises, as there is a physical acquisition that can be used for the benefit of the immediate family and more distant relations ... For this reason, most businesses in the Middle East are family-owned and run, and rely on internal sources of finance’ (Wilson 1995: 14-5).
All of the above factors, consequentially contributed to weaken the emergence of the so-called civil society in the Middle East. As pointed out by Black and Brown, it deprived the Middle Eastern society at large of ‘a corporate, autonomous, intermediary social structure operating independent of government and playing a cushioning role between the state and individuals’ (Black and Brown: 200).

2. Military Regimes and Assimilationist Policies

Even today, the Kurds are often described as ‘more’ tribal than the Arabs (Bengio 1999: 155). Why is it so? Because the nation-building resources have been monopolised by the non-Kurdish ruling groups for the past eight decades. If the same quality of nation-building resources had been available to the Kurds, the Kurdish people could be less reliant on tribal society today. This continuing strength of tribalism among the Kurds may, in turn, manifest the inadequacy of both the Iraqi and the Turkish national integration policies. Despite its potential contribution to the integrative socialisation, however, the military often pursues an assimilationist policy and imposes an exclusively nationalist ideology. This seems particularly to be the case when the officers are acutely aware that the new state lacks national unity.

The assimilationist policy attempts to forcibly match people with the territory, notably through linguistic assimilation. As a result of the regime’s control over the media and education, the print language will become available only in the ruling group’s language, and the minority’s language and cultural development will be obstructed. The language of the state is the language of education, employment, printing and the media, so the dominant group more readily feels an advantage, and its preexisting
sectarian identities may soon weaken. However, an ethnic minority group whose language is different from the dominant group tends to be systematically and involuntarily alienated from the socialisation needed to promote its identification with the state. Jobs, especially in the state sector, are contingent on command of the official language, as is access to other public resources and the justice system. This causes a bifurcation between official and unofficial languages, and speakers of the minority language will suffer obstacles to greater social mobility. This is evident in the case of Turkey’s Kurds. Thus the social communication needed for national integration is more likely to take place primarily among the population that belong to the ruling ethnic group.

The relative advantage of the Iraqi education system was that it at least recognised the existence of the Kurdish language. Although education’s priority was Arabic, Iraqi policy at least allowed Kurdish to be used publicly in regional offices and in schools, if on a limited scale, and contributed to increasing bilingualism between Kurdish and Arabic. In the same way, Kurdish students taught in a bilingual environment could proceed into higher academic institutions where Arabic is used. This is not to suggest the dominant language may always supersede the minority’s language. Instead, it is to suggest that bilingualism is mutually reciprocal.

3. High State Autonomy and Totalitarianism

Failed national integration has become more or less a ‘permanent’ phenomenon over the past decades from the state’s failure to accommodate political participation. Especially in a country like Iraq, the state structure evolved into that of totalitarianism. Totalitarianism, by definition, is distinguished from authoritarianism
by the extent of control by the state over its populace. While authoritarianism allows some pluralism, totalitarianism creates party and mass organisation which is based on ideology, is designed to control the political orientation of the populace through the use of propaganda and terror, and temporarily, at least achieves a higher level of institutionalisation and penetration of society, but at the cost of stifling civil society (Macridis 1986: 126-7). The Iraqi Baath regime since 1968 can be described as typically totalitarian.

Totalitarian states are only capable of pursuing an assimilationist policy and are perhaps the most formidable obstacle to multi-ethnic integration. The authorities of these states are not constrained by the need to integrate diverse groups, but rather, they choose to eliminate them with force. In the Iraqi case, the state structure has evolved into its current shape over the past eight decades, and it is extremely difficult to modify it through either internal or external pressures. When the state monopolises a commodity such as oil, it can ‘afford’ to be less concerned about its legitimacy, as the Iraqi Baath government’s case shows. In its earliest days the Iraqi state was fragmented by the lack of a strong state centre. After the 1958 revolution, and especially after the nationalisation of the oil industry, greater allocation of funds to the development programme was made possible through oil revenue. By the 1970s, however, the Iraqi regime became virtually autonomous from any other social forces and became capable of suppressing all political opposition. In contrast, it appears that a state that has more diverse economic resources has more potential to create a politically influential middle class, as is arguably, so in Turkey.
Conditions under which Revolution from Above can Stimulate Successful National Integration

We have seen that state formation through Revolution from Above has advantages in centralising the state’s power but also has a potential to create long lasting obstacles to national integration. The measures to broaden the elite-led revolution into a wider integrative nationhood, as in the prototypical model, can be summarised as follows from the above arguments:

(1) Once state institutions are established, broaden political participation, (2) Eliminate regional gaps in economic development, (3) Ensure means of social mobility such as bilingual education and employment in the state sector in order to assist a minority group’s social participation, and (4) Avoid the imposing of assimilationist policy in order not to alienate minority groups.

Failed Nation-building and Foreign Intervention

Problems from failed nation-building such as ethnic cleansing and refugee exodus have increasingly been dealt with by various forms of intervention by external powers, either by the United Nations, by the hegemonic states, or by non-governmental organisations. As I used the description ‘various forms of intervention’ to convey the fact that the term encompasses broad meaning, the concept needs some clarification.

Ramsbotham and Woodhouse identified the two basic types of intervention in their study of the concept of humanitarian intervention (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996). According to the two authors, essentially, there are ‘coercive’ and ‘non-
coercive' interventions: the former is implemented without the consent of the government of the state in which interventions are carried out (such as military intervention and economic sanction), and the latter is done with the consent of the government (such as the UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief operations) (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 115). Referring to the Kurdish refugee crisis of 1991, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse state that this case produced both coercive and non-coercive forms of intervention; while the Allied states forcibly created the safe haven for returning refugees against the wish of the Iraqi government, the UN continued to work with the Iraqi government by negotiating the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding, to be discussed in Chapter IV. Both types of interventions were carried out for humanitarian purposes. However, the 'humanitarian' nature of forcible intervention is put in doubt because there is no clear legal definition of humanitarianism, and even though the sufferings of persecuted people are considerably relieved as a result of such forcible intervention, the authors imply its long-term effect is questionable noting that: 'whether a failure to address the underlying political conditions which stimulated the humanitarian concern in the first place means, paradoxically, that the situation in the end is worse than it would have been without the intervention remains to be seen' (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 75).

Others have a more critical view. Mohammed Ayoob attempted to categorise types of intervention into 'politically motivated' and 'politically innocent' in his article in 1995. However, Ayoob concluded there was no such thing as humanitarian intervention, and therefore all forms of intervention were political (Ayoob in Weiss: 13-30). Ayoob takes a particularly critical view toward forcible intervention. He states 'when political interests of a great power are the major reason for humanitarian
intervention, the latter loses its legitimacy in the eyes of most people. Such actions tend to create the greatest unease in Third World capitals' (Ayoob in Weiss: 23). This observation applies almost exactly to the political problem which arose from the continuous military action by the Allied states against Iraq after the Gulf War. Quoting Michael Mandelbaum, Ayoob even warns that the so-called 'humanitarian' intervention may aggravate existing political problems, and that the truly responsible intervention, in fact, requires establishment of a working government by the external powers: 'Unless the UN and/or the intervening powers are willing to undertake and complete those tasks (guaranteeing the borders of countries under challenge and constructing an apparatus of government in places where it is absent), humanitarian intervention could either reward aggression, as in Bosnia, or leave the political situation more confused and internal conflict more intractable than was the case before the intervention, as in Somalia' (Mandelbaum 1994 quoted in Ayoob: 23-4).

Thus, essentially all interventions are politically motivated or at least have political consequences. Then what does the act of intervention mean to nation-building? From the perspective of applying national integration techniques as a method of conflict resolution, it appears highly desirable that interventions facilitate nation-building. In the ideal world, all interventions by the external bodies should contribute to reconcile the relationships between the persecuted group and the government and should facilitate policies which would integrate such groups into the national community. In reality, however, interventions often only serve the political interests of great powers. Or, when such ostensible political motives are absent, interventions may be restricted by the policies of the host government, and indirectly serve the host government's political interests. In either case, the welfare of persecuted minorities is sacrificed.
Considering the above-mentioned reality of external interventions, the best possible strategy for improving national integration through external intervention seems to require minimising their negative political impact through constant negotiations among local political parties, while military protection provided by the external bodies should be fully taken advantage of for humanitarian relief operations. In this respect, the self-government run by the Iraqi Kurds after the Gulf War presents a test case as to whether external interventions are actually contributing to promote successful national integration of Iraq.

Summary
The essence of multi-ethnic integration lies in its dynamism, and that is what makes nations integrable and inclusive. What is specific about Revolution from Above is the significance of policy factors orchestrated by state bureaucrats, rather than an autonomous civil society. The state has an important role in building institutions and facilitating political socialisation. Because of its monopolised form of power, however, the state can alienate, rather than integrate minorities by pursuing assimilationist policies. Furthermore, if the state structure develops into a totalitarian form, it creates formidable problems which are very difficult to modify.

A nation is not an ethnic group. Even a common language in itself is not a politically unifying factor. We now know that ‘communication’ in the meaning described above is the key to uniting ethnically, religiously, and even at times linguistically diverse peoples into a national entity. Countries like Belgium, Canada and Switzerland have shown even speakers of more than one language can coexist in one state. Given this
empirical evidence, it seems viable to believe the same mechanism applies even to cases of protracted ethnonational conflict, in which people are divided according to sectarian groups based on one’s ethnicity or religion. If they desire it, the distinctiveness of subnational groups should be preserved. However, as Deutsch states, there is no reason to believe such subnational divisions are permanent, and a greater emphasis should be put on improvement of our living conditions to create an integrative nation: ‘We can do much to change economic and social conditions, and we can find the strength to change our habits. We may venture to believe that man’s mind is greater than the collection of habits and preferences which it has accumulated at any one time, no matter how deeply ingrained they may seem at the moment. Too often men have viewed language and nationality superficially as an accident, or accepted them submissively as fate. In fact, they are neither accident nor fate, but the outcome of a discoverable process; and as soon as we begin to make this process visible, we are beginning to change it’ (Deutsch 1953: 164).

**Methodology and Plan of the Study**

In this study I analyse nation-building in the cases of Iraq and Turkey using published sources to assess the following variables that determine the outcome of national integration. First, what were the ‘ingredients’ of a nation, such as the religious and ethnic composition of the population, and its social structure? Second, what was the nation-building strategy? How did the regime succeed in building state institutions? Third, how effective were language and education policies as vehicles of social communication? Fourth, what was the degree and the outcome of social mobilisation? Fifth, were there regional gaps? Sixth, how successful was political integration? Did the regime succeed in broadening political participation? Seventh, was nation-
building through Revolution from Above substantiated by the emergence of an organic civil stratum, or a civil society that is capable of acting independently of the state? In order to assess the degree of success in national integration from the perspective of the minority group, I have included the views of the Kurds from both published and unpublished sources. The latter include both historic and contemporary archives and information obtained from interviews.

Chapter II is primarily concerned with the origin of the Kurdish people and its geopolitical environment. It deals firstly with its internal structure, secondly its relation with the Ottoman Empire up to the nineteenth century, and thirdly the historic factors that contributed to weakening the political unity of the Kurds, which became evident in the weakness of early Kurdish nationalist organisations.

Chapter III deals with the record of nation-building policies in Iraq and Turkey and their attempts to integrate the Kurds within their boundaries. Turkey is treated as a representative case of nation-building through Revolution from Above under Ataturk that later evolved in a pluralist direction. Iraq is treated as a case that failed to create a strong state-centre (equivalent to the Ataturk revolution) because of the experience of mandatory rule during state formation, and also as a case that evolved to a 'totalitarian' state as an outcome of the Revolution from Above, because of the government's control over the oil-based economy. This chapter will be presented in four major phases, that of: (1) 'The Legacy of Ottoman centralisation', to provide information about the preexistent social structure of the area wherein these two states were created, (2) 'State Formation', to examine the new governments' policies and the resistance to them, (3) 'Political Mobilisation', to assess the impact of social and
political mobilisation resulting from modernisation after statehood, and (4) ‘Integration or Containment?’, to assess the two states’ increased capability to either integrate or contain/repress Kurdish nationalism up to the 1990s.

Chapter IV deals with the impact of foreign intervention on this ethnonational conflict and the role of international organisation in redressing the problems posed by failed national integration. It shows that foreign interventions are based on the interest of intervening powers, instead of a persecuted minority on whose name intervention is carried out, with negative consequences for nation-building and the welfare of ethnic ‘minorities’. It will compare two separate cases of intervention, during the First World War and in the Gulf War.
Chapter II

The Kurds as a Nation

Introduction

This chapter presents general information about Kurdish society while highlighting the weakness of pan-Kurdish political unity up until the time immediately before the First World War. The Kurds are often stereotyped by reference to the divisive features within Kurdish society, such as tribalism, distinct dialects, a feudalistic social structure and religious diversity. Seemingly, those features are posing key obstacles to pan-Kurdish unity. However, having internal division is by no means a specifically Kurdish phenomenon: even nations that are thought to be highly homogeneous, such as Japan, have gone through a long history of internal warfare before coming into their current shape. As discussed in the theoretical framework, merely having all of the potential ‘ingredients’ of a nation in itself is not enough for the establishment of a politically united nation. The ability to share experiences is crucially important. Therefore, rather than the differences themselves, it is necessary to look at the historical process that the Kurds have gone through which explains why they have failed to bridge their internal divisions. To better understand the Kurds’ behaviour during the First World War, Foreign Office archives were consulted.

Geopolitical Location

The etymology of the name ‘Kurd’ is thought to stand for ‘a people’, or derives possibly from the Persian word ‘gord’ that means a ‘hero’ or a ‘warrior’ (MacDonald, quoting Limbert: 234). The oldest recorded evidence of the existence of the Kurds dates from 2000 B.C. In a Sumerian inscription, it appears as a country named
‘Kardaka’ (Arfa: 3). Also, there were names for the Kurds such as Karda, Garda, Qurti, and Guti used by various peoples who invaded the region. The Kurds were also known as the Medes that conquered the Assyrian Empire in 612 B.C. The Europeans started to use the name ‘Kurd’ from around the seventh century A.D. The most important festivity of the Kurds is Newruz, which is based on the legend that derives from the Medes’ conquest of Nineveh, the capital of the Assyrian Empire. Newruz, meaning the New Year, is celebrated on 21 March by the kindling of fires on hillsides. It celebrates the victory of a smith named Kawa over the tyrannical king Zaehak who lived on human sacrifices he had been forcing upon the people. According to the legend, after Kawa’s hammer killed Zaehak the Kurds began to prosper.

Since before the nation-state era, the region where the Kurds live has been denoted as ‘Kurdistan’ or the ‘country of the Kurds’. Even though the term does not appear in today’s official documents, Kurdistan is still widely used to denote the area, which consists of high mountains and hinterland. The Kurds now live in the area that consists of today’s eastern Turkey, northern Iraq, northeastern Syria, northwestern Iran, part of the former Soviet Union, and around Armenia. Historically, the area had been exposed to various invaders: the Selucids, Parthians, Sassanians, Armenians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, Seljuks, Mongols, and the Ottomans. Among them, the Seljuks in the twelfth century used the name ‘Kurdistan’ for the first time, when its Sultan created a province of that name (Kinnane: 21). Because Kurdistan stretches from the high mountains to fertile plain suitable for agriculture, the Kurdish economy has been traditionally based on a mixture of animal husbandry and cultivation. This semi-nomadic civilisation produced expressions to denote the two distinct groups among the population. One is ‘dundok-khwar (eater of wheat cake of the plain)’ and
the other is 'doshab-khwar (eater of grape syrup of the hills)' (Hay: 40).

The Kurdish population in each country where they live is estimated to be: 6,500,000 in Iran, 4,400,000 in Iraq, 1,100,000 in Syria, 14,300,000 in Turkey, and 500,000 in the former Soviet Union, and 1,700,000 elsewhere totaling 28,500,000 (Washington Kurdish Institute, WKI). The size of the Kurdish population generates controversy, as governments of the Middle Eastern countries have a tendency to minimise the figure. For example, Turkey counts only those Kurds who do not speak Turkish at all as Kurds (Dewdney 1972 and McDowall 1996). One estimate suggests the percentage of the Kurdish population against the entire population of each country is: Iran (10 per cent), Iraq (23 per cent), Syria (8 per cent), and Turkey (22 per cent), and it is expected to increase (WKI). By 2020, the percentage of the Kurds is estimated to be: Iran (12 per cent), Iraq (24.5 per cent), Syria (9.8 per cent), and Turkey (36.9 per cent) (Izady 1992: 119).

Linguistic Diversity

Kurdish is an Indo-European language and is categorised in the northwestern or southwestern group of Persian. Due to the widely scattered settlement and tribal structure of the society, many different dialects developed which are sometimes 'mutually unintelligible or very partially understandable' (Bruinessen 1992: 21). Furthermore, Kurdish is incomprehensible to Arabic and Turkish speakers. However, because of the Kurds' diversity of dialects, either Persian, Turkish or Arabic was used as a medium among the Kurdish tribes who spoke different Kurdish dialects. It was said at the time of the British occupation in the 1920s that the sole medium of communication among the tribes in Sulaimaniya was Persian, and a British officer
persuaded them to use Kurdish instead (Hay: 36-7). Sulaiman and Blau (p. 154) comment that the 'constant resort to languages other than Kurdish does reflect the high status of these (Arabic, Turkish and Persian) languages'.

Martin van Bruinessen categorised the major Kurdish dialects into three groups: (1) The Kurmanji group - the northern and northwestern dialects (spoken in northern Iraq close to Turkey and southeast Turkey), (2) The Sorani group - the southern dialects (northern Iraq close to Iran), and (3) The southeastern dialects (along the eastern border of Iraq) which are closer to modern Persian than the other two. Besides those three groups, two other dialect groups, Zaza and Gurani are spoken in Kurdistan. Zaza is spoken by a large number of tribes in today’s eastern Turkey, and has three distinct sub-groups, that of greater Dersim, Siverek and Modki. It is said that the native speakers of Zaza learn to speak Kurmanji Kurdish rather easily, whereas Zaza proves to be extremely difficult for the native Kurmanji speakers. Gurani-speaking areas only exist today as enclaves throughout Turkey.

Kurdish literature has been mostly orally inherited except for a few representative works that have been written and passed down from earlier generations to this day. Obstructed by the frequent use of non-Kurdish languages as a medium, it seemed to have been a revolutionary step for Kurdish writers to produce their literary works in Kurdish. The first Kurdish poet who expressed Kurdish national feeling and the distinctiveness of the Kurds as a nation was Ahmad Khani who lived in the sixteenth century. Khani’s ‘Mam u Zine’ is considered by the Kurds as equivalent to how the work of Homer is revered by the Greeks, according to Sulaiman and Blau. ‘By using Kurdish as the medium of his poetry, Khani was fully aware of its role as an identity
maker of his own people. He was also aware of how revolutionary a vision this new
departure was' (Sulaiman and Blau: 155). Ahmad Khani played a pioneering role in
expressing the Kurdish identity in Kurdish. However, his view was not universally
shared by his fellow Kurds of the same period. Even in a later century, the Kurdish
poet Hajji Qadir Koyi (d. 1894) still lamented the ‘neglect of the Kurdish by the
Kurds’ (Sulaiman and Blau: 156). Koyi wrote, ‘Do not say: The Kurdish language
does not attain the purity of Persian. It possesses an eloquence that reaches unequalled
heights, but lack of solidarity among Kurds, has debased its value and price’
(Sulaiman and Blau: 156). Thus, the status of the Kurdish language was low, and it
was not able to foster the Kurdish national identity, even during the nineteenth
century.

The dissemination of Kurdish as a common medium of the Kurdish people was
obstructed by its impracticality in transcription. Kurdish did not have its own
alphabet, and inscription had to rely mostly on the Arabic alphabet. The British officer
W. R. Hay points out that the lack of suitable vowel script in Arabic made the
transcription of Kurdish ‘extremely awkward’, and this was one of the reasons that
Kurdish was rarely written. Hay also pointed to the impact of the Ottoman Empire’s
Pan-Turanism policy of the time, saying that they ‘did their best to suppress the
Kurdish’ (Hay: 37). Today, Kurdish is written in three different alphabets: The Arabic
alphabet in Iraq, Syria and Iran, and although the publication of Kurdish is prohibited,
a modified version of the Latin alphabet is used among the Kurds in Turkey, and the
Cyrillic alphabet is used among the Kurds in the former Soviet Union. Kurdish lacks
the ‘print culture’ seen by Benedict Anderson as a basis of national consciousness.
Social Structure

Historically, Kurdish society was characterised by its stratification into landless peasants and militarily superior tribesmen who treated peasants as their assets. However, an important feature was this division was not necessarily permanent: there was a mobility among different ‘castes’, and change of position between peasants and tribesmen was not impossible (Bruinessen 1992: 120-121).

Traditionally the Kurds’ semi-nomadic economy had been sustained through the unique division of labour between two distinct groups among the population, that of tribally-organised nomads and the sedentary cultivators. Bruinessen showed that, because of this stratification, Kurdish culture is a cross-fertilization of at least two originally different cultures, and over time it developed a distinctive structure that can almost be described as ‘two-caste’ (Bruinessen 1992: 105). The most obvious characteristics of the relation between nomads and cultivators is said to be the latter’s total subjection to the former. The discriminatory terms such as ‘guran’ and ‘miskin’ exist to denote the peasants who were treated as sheer property, comparable to slaves. The non-tribal Kurds were usually landless, and are not tribally-organised, hence lacked the capacity of self-defense. According to Bruinessen, these peasant Kurds have been treated merely as a ‘productive asset’, and are ‘not unlike a flock of sheep’ (Bruinessen 1992: 105).

Despite the above-described social division, the ‘crossing of castes’ became commonly noticeable from the late Ottoman era. Bruinessen (p. 121) pointed out Ottoman law-books contained frequent warnings against peasants to assume Sipahi (cavalrymen - as in Chapter III) status and possess a fief. This was owing to the fact
that structure of the Kurdish society was configured mainly by political, rather than
genealogical factors. ‘Kurds do not remember their genealogies as scrupulously as
many other tribal peoples do, so that for kinsmen further remote than, say, second
cousins one does not bother to trace the exact relationship. Actual political allegiance
to a lineage becomes more important than real kinship’ (Bruinessen 1992: 51). With
regard to the above-mentioned political allegiance, Barfield also underlined genealogy
was not a decisive factor. Instead, he referred to mediating skills as being the most
important quality for Kurdish tribal leaders to possess. ‘Leaders gained their positions
by displaying special skills in mediating problems within the tribe or successfully
organising raids and wars. It was an achieved status not automatically inherited by a
man’s sons, for there were always potential rivals ready to seize any opportunity to
replace an incumbent or his heir. Leadership rarely remained for long in a single
lineage’ (Barfield: 162).

The above information suggests that the Kurds have a good chance to become a
politically united nation because a man’s position in the Kurdish society is not
determined by his genealogy. Depending on the impacts of political and economic
changes, the Kurds’ social division may be amenable. However, if such impacts were
weak or absent, it is likely that feudalistic division within the Kurdish society would
remain unaltered.

Leadership

Leadership in Kurdish society can be characterised by both tribal and Islamic origins,
especially that based on Sufi orders. The most prominent of these are, the agha,
mullah and shaikh.
First of all, every village has an agha. Generally, the title agha encompasses broad meaning, denoting the leader of a tribe, lineage, a village, a family, or even a confederation of tribes. It is known that the Kurdish terminology does not distinguish these (Bruinessen 1992: 80), and all are simply called agha, and in modern times the meaning of ‘landlord’ is attached to an agha (Gerber: 112). Presumably the process of sedentarisation and acquisition of large tracts of land by aghas in the latter part of the nineteenth century contributed to the additional meaning (Gerber: 111-112). An agha is responsible for politically representing the village, taking care of visitors and dealing with officials. He usually leads a sedentary life, possesses a magnificent guest house and deals with outsiders. An agha possesses a considerable number of villages, and every sub-chief is the client of the agha (Hay: 84).

For a long time, aghas exercised arbitrary and absolute authority in Kurdish society. Even though they have started to become obsolete in recent years, their personal and patriarchal influence seems to have remained strong. Kinnane comments on this transformation: ‘On the whole the system was acceptable to the peasants when the agha ruled more than the state. The coming of the gendarmerie and the advent of motor transport, bringing remote villages into contact with the big towns with their opportunities for employment, have subverted the function of the agha. But loyalty to tribal leaders remained very strong... the agha or shaikh may be feared and hated but his followers continued to submit to his authority and leadership’ (Kinnane: 14-5).

An agha is assisted by a mullah. A mullah has a role in religious functions, such as education as well as acting as an advisor to the agha. Hay wrote that nearly every
good tribal chief he knew had ‘good old mulla’ behind him (Hay: 39). He also wrote that a mullah provided the ‘sole source of education’ in the village. Thus a mullah was the village’s ‘best educated man’ (Bruinessen 1992: 209) and was capable of dealing with both religious and secular matters.

A shaikh in Kurdish society means a holy and venerated man, and denotes particularly the leader of a Sufi order, especially that of the Qadri and Naqshbandi, the two sects that flourish in Kurdistan. The former was founded in the eleventh century and the latter in the fourteenth century. A shaikh is not the same as the Arabic shaikh, which applies to a tribal chief. The shaikh’s role has become more political in recent times. The Ottoman campaign in the nineteenth century initiated structural change in Kurdish society. Because the chiefs of the emirates (detailed later) were defeated, each tribe became the maximum organised unit of Kurdish society. In this leadership vacuum, shaikhs strengthened their influence over the community through their mediating power and became spokesmen for proto-Kurdish nationalism. Describing shaikhs’ increased influence, Bernard Lewis described those Kurdish provinces after the Ottoman campaign as ‘Dervish dynasties’ (Lewis 1968: 409).

Sectarian Division

Even if a shaikh can unite more than one tribe through his mediating power, because the Sufi order itself is divided between two competing rival sects, a shaikh in one Sufi sect is not capable of winning the followers in a tribe of the rival sect. The rivalry between the Naqshbandi and Qadri branches of the Sufi order is well known. All major Kurdish rebellions in the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, to be discussed in Chapter III, suffered either tribal or religious division, including such cases as the
Shaikh Ubeydullah rebellion in 1880, the Shaikh Mahmoud rebellion in 1920 and Shaikh Said rebellion in 1925. For example, a British officer records Shaikh Mahmoud’s unpopularity among the Kurdish tribes neighbouring Mahmoud’s area of influence in Sulaimaniya. Sir A.T. Wilson, formerly an acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia said that the Kurdish tribes outside Sulaimaniya area preferred not to come under Shaikh Mahmoud’s rule and that ‘he had been continuously in revolt against Turkish rule, though it was whispered that the people in Sulaimaniya had suffered more from the tyranny of their own chiefs and the Sayids than from the Turkish officials’ (Wilson 1931: 130-133). Because the British authority happened to give Shaikh Mahmoud a large area to administer, this brought him immediately into conflict with other Kurdish tribes (O’Ballance 1996: 19). It seems to be the case that Kurdish tribal leaders in general were often not suited to governing an area beyond their own locality because of tribal and sectarian division.

The persistent sectarianism among Kurdish tribes has been a continuous feature in the nation’s history. Even though the leaders spoke up for Kurdish nationalism, they failed to mobilise the Kurds that belonged to rival tribes or rival religious orders. The tribal division is still fierce today. For example, an aid worker who had been to northern Iraq in 1994 said the Kurds did not trust the aid mission that had contacted the rival tribe. For many ordinary Kurds who have no specific political adherence, this internal rivalry was ‘as much of a traumatising factor as the government oppression’ (Qassemlou 1970 as in Khasan and Nehme: 132).
The Pre Nation-state Era: Coexistence of Tribes and States

The following section analyses the wider organised units of the Kurds such as the tribal confederacy (emirate) and the Kurds’ relation with the Sunni Ottoman Empire, which had an important political impact on events in the early twentieth century, in which the Kurds ultimately failed to achieve an independent Kurdish state.

From the Seventh to the Sixteenth Century

The history of the Kurds in the pre-nation state era has two important phases: The first phase starts from the Kurds’ conversion to Islam in the seventh century, and the second from the Kurds' inclusion into the Sunni-Ottoman sphere of influence in the sixteenth century.

The Kurds’ conversion to Islam was accomplished in the seventh century when the Arab army occupied three cities in today’s northern Iraq: Arbil, Mosul and Nisibin. By this Islamic conquest, the Kurds’ pre-Islamic ancient religious practice such as Zoroastrianism was weakened considerably. It was not totally eliminated, however, and some established a hybrid religious sect between a pre-Islamic cult and Islam. An important feature of this Islamic Arab conquest was that the Kurds were undeniably integrated into the Islamic world but the Arabs did not actually attempt to colonise the Kurdish region, and neither did they show any interest in controlling the Kurds. The conversion to Islam was done in a way that tolerated preexisting Kurdish culture, and ever since, the Kurdish leaders were allies of the Arab Muslim army (Arfa: 6).

Between the tenth and eleventh centuries, several Kurdish emirates emerged out of
tribal confederacies. The rulers of these emirates acknowledged the Abbasid Caliphate. These emirates usually consisted of a number of tribes. The representative Kurdish dynasties include: Aqqonyunlu, Qaraqoyunlu, Ayyubi, Botan, Bitlis and Bradost. The most famous one was the Ayyubis which produced Salah ed Din who reigned over the Middle East between 1169 and 1250, although Salah ed Din himself was estimated not to have had a sense of Kurdish identity. The chiefs of tribal confederacies had lesser chieftains under them as vassals and such confederations had basically a feudal character (Arfa: 16). After enduring the Mongol invasion between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the Kurdish culture flourished in what is today’s eastern Turkey, in the area of Bitlis, Hakkari and Botan. In 1596, the ruler of Bitlis, Prince Sharaf Khan Ibn Shams al-Din Bidlisi (d. 1604), wrote ‘Sharafname’, a history of the Kurdish emirates. The language he used, though, was Persian. (Sulaiman and Blau: 154)

The cycle of rising and falling of these dynastic emirates was repeated over the centuries. It was said that each Kurdish emirate ‘might last about a century before succumbing to the attacks of an imperial power, rival Kurds or the two in alliance’ (Kinnane: 22). One hundred years was a considerable length of time. However, the persistence of intra-Kurdish fighting obstructed the emergence of a stable pan-Kurdish state. It was a common practice of rival Kurdish emirates to ally with foreign powers. Thus even if these emirates could be called ‘proto Kurdish states’ and their ethnic composition was unmistakably Kurdish, often, ‘it was easier for a Kurdish prince to be vassal to a foreign overlord than to give up his struggle with a rival Kurd’ (Kinnane: 22). Thus, there was no impetus for the Kurds to ‘unite as the Kurds’ during this era.
One factor that historically contributed to the Kurds’ failure to develop pan-Kurdish political unity also derives from the unique fact in the Middle East that for centuries tribes and states coexisted in a reciprocal manner, as briefly mentioned in the theory chapter. Thus there was no need for states (or empires) to rigidly rule the tribes, nor did the tribes have the need to unite against foreign powers. In short, the Kurds were in an environment whose primary loyalty centred around the tribe and there was not much practical need to be loyal to any other authority than their own tribe. A British political officer, W.R. Hay, described the lack of political solidarity among the Kurds in the Arbil division between 1918 and 1920: ‘They are a collection of tribes without any cohesion, and showing little desire for cohesion. They prefer to live in their mountain fastness and pay homage to whatever government may be in power, as long as it exercises little more than a nominal authority. The day that the Kurds awake to a national consciousness and combine, the Turkish, Persian, and Arab states would crumble to dust before them’ (Hay 1921: 35).

Barfield points out that the long coexistence of large empires and small tribes within a common territory is almost exclusively a Middle Eastern phenomenon: ‘Only in the Middle East did tribal peoples remain a permanent presence, both on the frontiers of the region and within the boundaries of every state. In other areas of sedentary civilisation tribalism was long on the wane, limited to marginal areas of little significance’ (Barfield: 153). How could this unique coexistence have continued, for centuries? How could the small tribes retain their cultural and political autonomy without being absorbed into the hierarchical structure of the empires?
One obvious reason is the geopolitical factor: even for a large powerful empire it was difficult from a practical standpoint to extend its authority into the rugged mountainous region. Thus the large empires needed to secure, to a great degree, the cooperation of the local leaders which in turn accorded such leaders a recognition of their authority. In other words, the recognition of power by an external authority was constituted an active part of tribal life. Indeed, it is emphasised that ‘Kurdistan’s political history of the past five centuries ... shows how the important developments among the tribes were always in response to developments at the state level’ (Bruinessen 1992: 134).

Another reason, less evident than the former, is the very fact that the lack of political unity among the tribes themselves contributed to obstructing the stabilisation and/or formalisation of a hierarchical relationship between tribes and empires, and hence the development of wide-scale political integration: ‘(T)heir lack of formal political organization made it difficult (for the empires) to use their leaders as efficient tools of indirect rule because they could only persuade their followers, not command them’ (Barfield: 179).

As mentioned earlier, the leadership was an achieved, rather than inherited, status. What does this imply about the Kurdish tribes’ internal and external relations? In short, this dynamism in tribal leadership had, as a consequence, obstructed the development of a stable, large-scale hierarchical organisation. It also did not help to stabilise the Kurdish tribes’ relations with external powers. Referring to the Middle Eastern tribe-state symbiosis Barfield states: ‘Empires that dealt with these types of tribes tended to work around them - to control them in areas of vital interest and
engage in punitive military campaigns periodically - but in general to leave them alone (a policy still considered wise today) ... and supra-tribal political organisation was often the product of religious leadership' (Barfield: 179). His reference to the importance of religious organisation highlights the fact that such organisation was politically crucial and, historically, it was the most effective instrument to provide a broader organisational framework. This explains why in later decades the Kurdish sufi shaikhs would play an important role in the nationalist movement. Until secular Kurdish nationalism gained currency among the masses, the nationalist movement would rely on the shaikhs' spiritual power which had crucial impact on the masses.

Finally, the relation between availability of material resources and relative size of a political organisation seems to explain why historically the Kurdish dynasties, to be mentioned below, have been relatively short-lived and less stable compared to their Turkish and Persian counterparts. According to Barfield's anthropological study, there are two major patterns of the Middle Eastern peoples: the Arab-Kurd type and Turco-Persian type. The former applies to the organisational pattern of a people who live in an area with scarce resources (thus making mediating power of crucial prerequisite for a leadership), and the latter to those in fertile region, thereby enabling them to construct a large scale dynasty (through a network of gifts and patronage).

From the Seventeenth to the Nineteenth Century

The events in the sixteenth century caused a major change in the position of the Kurds. The struggle for regional ascendancy between the two major powers, the Ottoman and Persian Empires, had created some form of balance of power in the region. The area inhabited by the Kurds became a natural frontier between the two
Empires. As a result of the Battle of Chaldiran (1514) the Kurds, who were predominantly Sunni Muslims, were persuaded to act on the side of the Ottoman Empire. About three-fifths of the Kurds were said to be Sunni Muslims and one-tenth Shias. As a result, most of the Kurdish region came under the strong influence of the Ottoman Empire. The Kurds in today’s Turkey, Syria and much of northern Iraq are Sunni, while Kurds in the eastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan (known as Fali Kurds) and in Iran are mostly Shias. The Ottoman and Persian empires formally demarcated their frontier in 1639. The Ottoman rulers recognised sixteen autonomous Kurdish emirates and many smaller fiefdoms. The Persian rulers also had client Kurdish chiefs and tribes. By the nineteenth century there were nine major Kurdish emirates and many lesser ones, two within the Persian sphere of influence and the rest within the Ottoman Empire.

Inclusion in the Sunni Ottoman Empire meant the beginning of active religious persecution of those Kurds who belonged to heterodox Islam and non-Islamic religions. There are Kurds who belong to Christianity and Zoroastrianism. Among Muslim Kurds, too, there are followers of several heterodox sects. According to Bruinessen there are three major heterodox Islamic sects followed by the Kurds: (1) the Alevi Kurds in Anatolia, (2) the Ahl-e Haqq in southern and southeastern Kurdistan (North East Iraq), and (3) the Yezidis in the mountains around Mosul. (Bruinessen 1992: 24) Ahl-e Haqq means ‘People of Truth’ and was branded by both Shia and Sunni Muslims as heresies (Hosseini in Kreyenbroek and Allison: 111). Yezidism is known to occur only among Kurds since its instruction is conducted in the Kurmanji dialect of Kurdish. Yezidism is said to have originated from an extremist Sunni sect. The differentiation between the Yezidi Kurds and Sunni Kurds was known to be
remarkable. The Yezidi Kurds were persecuted by the Ottoman authority and their Sunni Kurdish neighbours and insulated themselves mostly in the Sinjar mountains that lie between northern Iraq and Syria.

Interim Summary

The isolated and scattered geographical environment made the Kurds’ internal communication poor, and interaction among the tribes was weak or even hostile, resulting in constant tribal wars. There was little chance for the Kurds to develop pan-Kurdish political unity. Furthermore, historically, the surrounding empires found it most practical to rule Kurdistan through the Kurdish leaders, hence Kurdish national rights itself rarely became the object of political struggle. Because of their long isolation from neighbouring peoples, Kurdishness at an individual level was always evident. However, political unity was very weak. This seemingly paradoxical phenomenon can be explained by reference to nation-building theory, which warns that an ethnic group by itself does not automatically evolve into a politically united nation. Perhaps the Kurds are one of the most prominent cases: they are distinct from their neighbours, occupy a sizable area and speak the branches of the Kurdish language, yet they failed to politically unite.

It is also important that Islamic conversion was done without changing the social and cultural features of the Kurds. The Islamic religion thereafter constituted an important part of the Kurdish culture. On the other hand, for the Kurds who belonged to non-Islamic or Islamic heterodox religions, it was natural for them to differentiate themselves from the Sunni Kurds who actively persecuted them. Kurdish unity was further obstructed by the subsequent pan-Islamic policy taken by the Ottoman Sultan...
in the late nineteenth century. The pan-Islamic policy was effective because it was easy for the Kurds to associate themselves with Islamic religion.

The Birth of Nationalism and Competing Identities

The years leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire are highly important in the sense that they determined the factors decisive to delineating today's state borders. The prominent examples are that of Balkan nations that won independence after centuries of Ottoman rule. The less obvious case, however, is the Kurds. Despite the fact that the Kurds had long constituted a linguistically distinct group from their neighbouring peoples, their tribal rivalry and predominantly Muslim composition seem to have deterred a comparable the growth of explicitly Kurdish secular nationalism. In this transitional period, a number of competing identities, such as the new secular nationalism (both Kurdish and Turkish), Ottomanism, and pan-Islamism would affect the Kurdish identity. The following section gives an account of the important events that took place before, during and after the First World War. It firstly explains the state of the early Kurdish nationalist movement and their weakness of popular base as the result of Islamic and tribal factors.

Early Kurdish Nationalist Organisations

Most of the early Kurdish nationalists belonged to aristocratic families who resided in Istanbul. They were originally from the Kurdish region but became exiles after the Kurdish emirates were defeated by the Ottoman campaign in the middle of the nineteenth century (as in Chapter III). The Kurdish intellectuals were greatly
influenced by the same political events that affected the Turkish intellectuals of the time. The intellectuals, however, did not exercise significant influence over the mass of the rural population. The rural community was still deeply Islamic and was dominated by religious leaders, who often actively supported the Ottoman Sultan. This seemed to be particularly the case as during the second half of the nineteenth century, repeated wars with Russia and separatist movements by Balkan nations provided fertile ground for the revival of conservative Islamic ideologies that consequentially contributed to the blurring of Kurdish identity. Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s (r. 1876-1909) resort to pan-Islamism is the most well-known case.

As a consequence, the aims of early Kurdish political movements were strongly Ottoman and less specifically Kurdish (McDowall 1996: 89). Turkish intellectuals of the same period opposed Abdul Hamid II’s despotism, and Kurdish nationalists were their great sympathisers. One group was growing influential after 1906. A faction of Ottoman army officers led by Talaat Bey had established a group called the Ottoman Freedom Society in order to restore the 1876 Constitution (Macfie 1994: 25). This would later come to be known widely as the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP).

The Badr Khans were a powerful Kurdish family who reigned over today’s eastern Turkey until they were defeated by the Ottomans under Sultan Abdulmejid in 1840. In 1889, Badr Khan’s family members were caught by the authorities for their involvement in anti-government activities. However, those who escaped overseas commenced the publication of ‘Kurdistan’, which was a bilingual journal (in Kurmanji Kurdish and Turkish). ‘Kurdistan’ supported the causes of both the CUP
and Kurdish nationalism. The Badr Khans had a family member who was actively
Islamist as well, and this signifies the powerful influence of Islam at that time. Osman
Pasha, an Islamist son of Abdulrahman Badr Khan, suppressed the Armenians and
was disowned by his father in 1900 (Ramsaur Jr. 1965: 63).

Abdallah Jawadat and Ishaq Sukuti were other Kurdish-Ottoman reformists. Both
worked with the nucleus members of the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP)
and organised the opposition movement to Sultan Abdul Hamid in 1889. Jawadat and
Sukuti were students of Military Medical School in Istanbul. Later, they served in
Ottoman embassies abroad. Other nationalists, the Nihris (Shamdinans) had a
federalist ideal that advocated greater autonomy for the Kurds within the Ottoman
Empire. The most active member of the Nihri family was Shaikh Abdul Qadir who
was a son of Shaikh Ubeydullah who led the anti-government rebellion in 1880.
Abdul Qadir was known to be an enthusiastic supporter of the CUP. He was arrested
in 1896, and his family was exiled, but they were allowed to come back to Istanbul
after the Young Turk revolution of 1908. To the detriment of those who shared the
reformist ideal, the Badr Khans and the Nihris were frequently rivals, and they did not
cooperate with each other.

The Young Turk Revolution in 1908 led by the CUP had a considerable effect in
liberating the political climate. It restored the constitution suspended by Abdul Hamid
II and stood for political modernisation. Many more Kurdish political organizations
were formed after this, some by urban intelligentsia, some by army officers and some
by aristocratic notables. However, those organisations had weak roots with the
masses. In particular, the political organisations founded by urban intelligentsia were
small, and their attempts to reach the tribesmen were thwarted by aghas, who saw their authority threatened, while those led by aghas were never free from tribal strife (O’Ballance 1996: 9).

One such early nationalist organization, ‘Taali we Terakii Kurdistan’ (Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan), published a journal in Turkish called ‘Kurdish Mutual Aid and Progress’. Emin Ali Badr Khan (the leader of the Badr Khan family mentioned earlier), General Sherif Pasha, and Shaikh Abdul Qadir (of the Nihri family) were founding members. These nationalists supported the Young Turk regime, and in their journal discussed subjects such as problems of Kurdish culture, the language and national unity (Kendal: 27). As mentioned earlier, the use of Turkish instead of Kurdish implies the low status of Kurdish as a language of publication. Moreover, Bruinessen comments that ‘these aristocrats shared the Ottomanist ideals of the Young Turk movement but not its liberal ideas. Their attitude towards the common Kurdish people was extremely paternalistic ... the society remained an exclusively upper-class concern’ (Bruinessen 1992: 275-278). There was also an organisation called the ‘Kurdish Committee for the Diffusion of Learning’. The activities of these organisations, however, were obstructed by personal rivalries between the Badr Khan and Nihri families. It is known that Kurdish nationalist organisations were formed outside Istanbul, too. Branches of the Kurdish Club (Kurt Kulupleri) were established in Bitlis, Diyarbakir, Mus, Erzurm, and in Mosul. The Kurdish Club, too were more Ottoman-reformist than specifically Kurdish nationalists. They were influenced by the Young Turks (Kendal: 25), and included fervent CUP supporters (McDowall 1996: 123).
Islamic Reaction to the Young Turks

For the majority of the religious rural population, the Young Turk revolution had a different meaning. It effectively violated the sacredness of the Sultan Caliph. The Young Turks themselves were Muslims. However, their action against Sultan Caliph's authority was met with considerable hostility. The revolution seemed to have hardened Islamic sentiment in traditional areas. The following British records depict such a reaction to the Young Turk revolution among the Kurds in rural areas.

‘Mersina, January 21, 1911 ... a few evenings ago a ‘mollah’ from the top of a minaret in Adana proclaimed death to the ‘giaours’, which, he said, comprised such Turks who, by their ideas of reform in the Turkish Empire, abandoned the old conservative spirit prescribed by the Koran. As a result the ‘mollah’ was imprisoned’ (FO371/1244/3430, 22 January 1911).

The following words are from the song heard in the town where the above incident took place:

‘They (Young Turks) bound Sultan Hamid, and gave him thirty times thirty strokes: He was delivered into the hands of the Young Turks. O Hurriet (Liberty)! Why did’st thou this? Why madest thou Sultan Hamid a scandal and the religion of Islam of no account?’ (FO371/1244/3430, 22 January 1911).

Islamic revival among the Kurds spurred by The Young Turk regime threatened the security of Armenians, as Christian-Muslim conflict pushed the Kurds to an Islamic identity rather than secular nationalist. The British recorded that the
Young Turk regime 'tolerated' such songs cited above, possibly because the regime was 'unwilling to give the Kurds any provocation at present' (FO371/1244 4279). Another report said, 'Yesterday it was noticed in the neighbourhood of the Armenian mission in Adana on several doors of Armenian houses which had not been burnt during the last massacre a red paint mark in the shape of a cross' (FO371/1244 3430, 22 January 1911).

Even after the Young Turk revolution, Ottoman society as a whole including the Kurdish community remained deeply Islamic. This can be observed from the fact that the Young Turks did not disband the infamous Hamidiye Cavalry that used to act as a spearhead of Abdul Hamid II's pan-Islamic policy. The regiment was retained simply by changing its name to 'Ashiret Alaylari (tribal regiments)' (Arfa: 25). After all, as Bernard Lewis points out, the Young Turks continued to use Islam for the purpose of winning sympathy (Lewis 1993: 137-8).

Turkish Ethnonationalism

The rise of Turkish ethnonationalism among Turkish intellectuals impacted the Kurds in two important ways. Although Lewis comments that it was basically confined to intellectuals (Lewis 1968: 351), it was unmistakable, firstly, that the Young Turks became increasingly intolerant of non-Turkish political activities from this era. Secondly, the Turkish nationalists had an overwhelming strength in championing the Islamic cause as 'their own' cause, and their use of Islamic ideology had a containment effect on Kurdish nationalism. Archival evidence implied that the Kurds were generally susceptible to Turkish-Islamic influence. For example, a 1910's
British document suggests: 'The Kurds, except those of Maku, (north Persia) do not appear to be susceptible to foreign political influences other than that of Turkey' (FO371/953, 14 February 1910 Smart to Barclay). This overlapping nature of Turkish nationalism and Islamic cause is estimated to have contained the spread of Kurdish nationalism considerably.

While mobilising the Kurds by Islamic propaganda, the Young Turk regime strengthened the ban on Kurdish political societies and suppressed Kurdish ethnonationalism. The ethnonational Turkish movement slowly became a systematic political activity, represented by a theoretician such as Ziya Goklap. Bernard Lewis points out that the first of Turanist publications started in December 1908 when the Turkish Society was founded in Istanbul and began to publish a journal (Lewis 1968: 349-351). The reason why the Young Turks threw themselves into the Turkish ultranationalist line cannot be separated from international events. Those were the heightening of political Zionism and escalation of the secessionist movements among minorities, including the Muslim minorities (such as Albanians, Kurds and Arabs).

After the Kurdish organisation ‘Recovery and Progress of Kurdistan’ was closed down, it was succeeded by the Kurdish students union called Heva (Hope) in 1912. Jamil Pasha from Diyarbakir, who used to serve the Ottoman establishment, took the leading role in founding Heva. Most other members were also the sons of urban Kurdish notables, and their contacts with the common Kurds remained superficial. In its attempt to appease Kurdish nationalism, however, the Young Turk regime briefly adopted a policy which was more tolerant on the Kurds (Kendal: 28). Heva was legalised again, and between 1913 and 1914 it published a Turkish-Kurdish bilingual
journal. With the outbreak of the war in 1914, however, Heva members were drafted into the Ottoman army and the organisation was dispersed.

Summary
As a whole, pre-First World War Kurdish nationalist activities were all short-lived and confined to elite circles. The organisational weakness of Kurdish nationalists seems to have been inevitable, partly from the Ottoman society’s Islamic nature, and partly from their aristocratic roots and internal rivalry. As the First World War would increasingly appear as a war between the Islamic state and the Christian states, Kurdish nationalism was submerged in the Islamic context of the war. This would leave the Kurds singularly unprepared at the end of the World War I to take advantage of the opportunity to found their own national state.
Chapter III

Nation-building of Turkey and Iraq

Introduction

This chapter analyses the history of the Kurds in the context of the nation-building of Turkey and Iraq and explores alternative methods of politically integrating a sizable ethnic group. Neither of the two states has resolved the Kurdish conflict even after eight decades of state formation, indicating serious shortcomings in their national integration policies. In order to guarantee territorial integrity, the governments of both states have either actively implemented a cultural assimilationist policy (Turkey) or imposed totalitarian policies through violence (Iraq). It is hoped that this analysis of the nation-building process of both states may allow more insights into the requirements of successful national integration as a method of the resolution of protracted ethnonational conflict. The following sections will focus on the relation between the two states’ national integration policies, these policies’ effect on the Kurds and how Kurdish national rights may be achieved within the context of Iraqi and Turkish national integration. The ideal course of political development is these two states’ transition from authoritarian state formation through Revolution from Above to the prototypical national integration which would allow cultural pluralism, in which Kurdish national rights would be fully protected within the systems of these states. However, the two states’ nation-building continues to manifest the problems associated with Revolution from Above discussed earlier. The analysis is presented in four phases, to match the processes of nation-building against the theoretical framework: (1) The Legacy of Ottoman Centralisation, (2) State Formation, (3) Political Mobilisation, and (4) ‘Integration or Containment’.
1. The Legacy of Ottoman Centralisation

Introduction

This first section aims to sketch important outcomes of the Ottoman Empire’s centralisation that took place in the latter half of the nineteenth century, in order to explain changes in the social composition of the areas that have become today’s Turkey and Iraq. The Ottoman centralisation campaign considerably changed the social structure of the area, and the impact of the campaign is worth including in the nation-building chapter, even if these two states did not formally exist until the 1920s. There is a continuity in the social structure, and it is a major factor that would affect the outcome of national integration in later decades.

Turkey

Decentralised Structure

The territory that was later to become today’s Turkish Republic (hereafter, Turkey) was composed from the mid-sixteenth to the late nineteenth century of a number of semi-independent units known as millets. The millets, a type of religious community, were the basic units of de-centralised Ottoman administration which allowed various communities considerable internal autonomy. The most dominant millet was that of the Muslims, including the Turkish, Arab and Kurdish peoples. Other sizable ethnic and religious groups were the Armenians, the Jews, the Caucasians, and the Greeks. The area populated by the Kurds heavily overlapped with that of the Armenians;
however, the millet system guaranteed the internal autonomy of each group and allowed for their coexistence.

What seems to be particularly important is the fact that even among the Muslim millet, the Kurds enjoyed a great degree of autonomy. One might have assumed that membership in the same Muslim millet might have contributed to submerging the ethnic differences between the Turkish and the Kurdish peoples, and consequentially to integrate them. However, the Ottoman Empire regarded the tribally organised Turcoman and Kurdish groups as ‘boz millet’ and ‘kara millet’ respectively and they enjoyed a special degree of autonomy (Karpat 1973: 38). Therefore, even under an Empire based on Sunni Islam that was supposed not to make distinctions among the Muslims, the Kurds maintained a great degree of autonomy and were not incorporated into the rest of the Turkish Muslim population within the Ottoman Empire. The Empire needed the Sunni Kurds’ cooperation for the defence of the eastern border, thus the two maintained reciprocal relations for centuries.

External Threat and Internal Decay

The partnership between the Kurds and the Ottoman Empire, however, changed considerably in the nineteenth century. The independent Kurdish principalities were militarily crushed by the Ottoman authorities during their centralisation campaign, and the era of Kurdish autonomy came to an end by the mid-nineteenth century.

The change was necessitated for the following reasons: firstly, the Ottoman Empire was forced to reform and centralise its internal structure in order to cope with the increased European threat. From the eighteenth century onwards, the expanding
European economy slowly enervated the Ottoman Empire's strength. The Ottoman Empire's industry was weakened and subjugated by the influx of European goods. Europe's economic expansion was linked with separatism among the Balkan nations and the dominance of Christians over commerce and industry at the expense of Muslims.

Secondly, there were domestic problems that undermined the empire's strength. In fact the Ottoman Empire's administration was already decaying well before the above-mentioned European expansion. One of the important causes was the financial deficit. The fief system known as the Timar had long lost its key function as the pillar of the Ottoman feudal system. The Timar was introduced in the sixteenth century. The system granted land to the cavalryman known as Sipahis in return for military service; thus they were bound to the state. The prominent feature of this feudal system was the direct linkage between the state and its local forces. The land was distributed to soldiers and officials for the purpose of administering authority. In Harik's judgement, 'significantly, it (the Timar) prevented the rise of a stable rural aristocracy until the nineteenth century' (Harik 1972: 339).

As its central authority was weakened through the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Ottoman Empire lost its control over the remote provinces, and tax farmers increased their holdings and security of tenure. They won a virtual autonomy at the beginning of the eighteenth century (Lewis 1968: 446). The direct link between the state and its local forces was slowly undermined by tax-farming, through which the state revenues were skimmed off by intermediaries. As a result of this change, the power of local notables who constituted such intermediaries was
considerably strengthened (Karpat 1973: 32). From this strata of tax farmers emerged a group of landed notables who were called Ayan. The Ayan began to exercise autonomous power in local administration, and they effectively replaced the state’s authority in rural areas. It was said the rule by the Ayan was almost indistinguishable from a quasi-state; ‘in some areas, especially in Rumelia (a European province of the Ottoman Empire), some of the Ayan maintained their own private armies, levied taxes, and dispensed justice’ (Lewis 1968: 447).

On the other hand, a large part of Anatolia had come to be dominated by Derebeys. Derebeys were a kind of feudal vassal princes ruling over autonomous and hereditary principalities (Lewis 1968: 447), and they, too, had interrupted state revenue in the same way as the Ayan. Derebeys ruled the vast area of Anatolia. It was said that by the beginning of the nineteenth century almost the whole of Anatolia was in the hands of various Derebey families. Their power reached its peak during this time, and the Ottoman government was made to acknowledge their status publicly, with great reluctance. In Constantinople (Istanbul), an official conference on the Ayan and Derebeys was held in 1808, in which their power was recognised by the government (Lewis 1968: 447-8).

Thus, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the Ottoman government’s authority was not functioning in vast provincial areas, which was the case in both the Balkans and in Anatolia. Kurdistan, which lay further afield, was another area in which the government was not even able to appoint a tax farmer. There was no indication that the Kurds had been paying a tax to the Ottoman government. Thus from the government’s point of view, Kurdistan was the least integrated area of the empire’s
territory, even less than the area dominated by the Ayan and Derebeys.

**Centralisation Campaign**

Attempts at centralisation had been made by several generations of Sultans. The earliest attempt was by Sultan Selim III (ruled 1789-1807). Although Selim still did not have enough power to militarily subjugate the Derebeys and Ayans, he initiated important reforms which were to be continued by his successors. Particularly, Selim III’s attempt to reform the armed forces was the first step of the Ottoman Empire’s centralisation. Selim III was known to have been in frequent contact with the European monarchs, and this allowed him to introduce modern equipment and military training techniques from Europe. Control over the armed forces was a serious agenda, as by Selim III’s era, the Jannisary corps known as Yeni Ceri had been growing autonomous and posing a political threat to the Sultan. Selim III’s attempt to directly control the armed forces was fiercely opposed by the Yeni Ceris, who feared the loss of their political power. Furthermore, Selim III’s modernisation programme was met by opposition from the conservative religious hierarchy. Selim III was assassinated in 1808 without seeing the completion of his attempted reforms.

The two Sultans who succeeded Selim III, Mahmud II (ruled 1808-1839) and Abdulmejid I (ruled 1839-1861), continued their predecessor’s centralisation programme. It was during Mahmud II’s era that the armed autonomous groups were defeated: firstly the Ayan and Derebeys (in 1826) and secondly the Yeni Ceris (also in 1826) and Kurds (throughout 1830-40s). For the campaign in Kurdistan, Mahmud II appointed Rashid Muhammad Ali, who was known for his outstanding military skill. Rashid Muhammad Ali launched attacks from southeastern Anatolia into northern
Mesopotamia, and by this campaign the autonomous Kurdish emirates were all defeated. The prominent Kurdish families defeated by this campaign were the Badr Khans, the Botans and the Bradosts, as recounted in Chapter II. The Badr Khan family had resisted the government’s offensive until as late as 1847. Some of these notable Kurdish families were sent into exile in Constantinople and thereafter led an Ottomanised aristocratic life. Some were appointed governors in Kurdistan, as even after the successful campaign the Ottoman government still found it more convenient to rule Kurdistan through Kurdish governors (Bruinessen 1992: 176).

During the above campaign in the provinces, the state continued internal reforms. Education, which used to be provided at the responsibility of each millet, was slowly modified to include a more secular curriculum. This was done through establishing various vocational schools. This step, however, seems to have been confined to urban areas. It was said that public education under the Ottoman Empire was ‘quite small and frail until well into the twentieth century’ (Frey: 34). Thus the limited degree of secular education introduced at this time did not have a significant impact on the lives of the rural population. Education in late nineteenth century Ottoman society was still predominantly dependent on clerics and was also funded by religious foundations, known as Waqfs. As a result, the curriculum consisted almost entirely of religious instruction, and its method was basically a ‘memorising of Koran through oral citation’ (Frey: 34). This Koranic education had influenced the Ottoman political arena as well. It created the elite intellectuals called the Medrese hierarchy (Frey: 34), and this elite class opposed expansion of secular schools, seeing them as a threat to Islamic values. Thus, secular reforms were not simply religious matters, but affected the political balance between ‘traditional’ and ‘modernising’ forces.
The above-mentioned efforts toward secularisation, as a whole, had a historic significance, however, because they undermined for the first time the traditional administrative principle of the Ottoman Empire, namely, the autonomy enjoyed by various religious and ethnic groups (Karpat 1973: 84). While in reality, centralisation and secularisation did not completely eliminate the pre-existing political structure, they challenged and posed a threat to it for the first time. Well into the Ataturk period and beyond, the above-mentioned Medrese-trained intellectuals would constitute an important core of the Turkish elite and continue to oppose secular policies.

A New Landed Class

Through the above-mentioned military campaign, Mahmud II succeeded in confiscating the Timar land in 1831. However, as a whole, attempts to assert central control over land turned out to be ineffective, and the state authority was required to enact land registration law twice during the nineteenth century alone (1831 and 1858). Throughout the nineteenth century, privately owned land known as ‘mulk’ in the hands of the new notability had been increasing dramatically, and the state was incapable of controlling this. Indeed, the state authority was partially responsible for the concentration of land ownership. Lewis summarised the contributing factors: (1) Increased sale of state (miri) land by the government to meet deficits in the treasury, and (2) The sale and auction of a special kind of lease conferring very extensive rights and powers on the purchaser (Lewis 1968: 448). The old autonomous groups successfully reestablished themselves as a land owning class by utilising the liberal land lease system. As a result, across Turkish speaking Anatolia the regime of the new land owning class was established, in which the former Ayan and Derebeys
practically regained their power.

The positive aspect of land registration was that it stimulated commercial agriculture to some extent. A demographic study suggested that ‘during these decades in the nineteenth century commercial agriculture had taken root in West, Central and South Anatolia, and the mobility of Turkish/Muslim labourers was well established’ (Akgunduz: 107). With increased demand for commercial crops from the European market, Ottoman agriculture went through a major transformation. ‘Commercial and financial developments, including the increase of agricultural exports, brought a flow of ready money and created a class of persons with sufficient cash to bid for leases, buy estates, and lend money on land’ (Lewis 1968: 450). This expansion of commercial agriculture was mostly confined to the Turkish speaking area. There was no indication that Kurdistan was involved in this development. Needless to say, regions of the former Kurdish emirates were still resisting centralisation during this period and remained unaffected by economic expansion which, in Turkish speaking areas, had contributed to labour mobility.

In its second attempt to control land ownership, the government issued a Land Registration Law in 1858. Tapu, which was a conditional allocation of state land to individuals, was introduced by this law. Also, this law explicitly prohibited the acquisition of a whole populated village by an individual. This provision appears to reflect the alarm of the authorities at the increasing number of large estates (Lewis: 449-450) The land registration law, however, failed to achieve its original target. Instead, it created a new land owning class out of rural notables and religious shaikhs who happened to be literate and therefore could register the land owned by a tribe as
'their own' property, at the expense of the vast majority of peasants and tribesmen. Also, the law stipulated Tapu could be transferred to other individuals by sale without any conditions, and hence in reality did not differ significantly from private property (Batatu: 53-5). Although the Arab provinces, including Iraq, were more severely affected by this change, creating a considerable feudalistic class (Karpat in Polk and Chambers: 94), Kurdish shaikhs and aghas were also involved in this process, and it was described, ‘the actual tillers of the land only realised what had happened when it was much too late’ (Bruinessen 1992: 183).

The strengthening of an oligarchic landowning class posed a considerable challenge to national integration, as it would become extremely difficult for the state to carry out effective land reforms in later centuries. It also had a negative effect on the evolution of Kurdish nationalism, as it created internal division among the Kurds. The dichotomy between pro-government land-owning Kurds and non-land-owing Kurds made the Kurds as a whole more vulnerable to the government’s divide-and-rule policy.

Ottomanism

During the same time as the above-mentioned centralisation attempts, the government tried to promote a sense of loyalty to the Ottoman state among its subjects through propagating the secular concept of citizenship, known as Ottomanism. The first attempt was made when the government tried to tame Balkan separatism by decreeing the Imperial Rescript of Gulhane, which declared the equality of all its Ottoman citizens (1839). Bernard Lewis found that the word Vatan or fatherland, only appeared in the Ottoman press for the first time around the year 1840 (Lewis 1968: 81)
Ottomanism included measures such as removal of the dress code on non-Muslims, appointment of non-Muslims to governmental councils and opening of secular schools equally to both Muslims and non-Muslims (Davison in Haddad: 39).

Because the introduction of Ottomanism coincided with the military campaign in Kurdistan (1840s), it can be assumed that the proclamation of equality of citizenship did not have any significant immediate impact on winning the loyalty of the Kurds. The Kurds resisted centralisation fiercely, and the concept of territorial patriotism had weak roots in the mass population. As a whole, Ottomanism even ended up ‘alienating the majority of Muslims’ (Macfie 1998: 238). Military service, unsurprisingly, caused fear and anxiety among many people (Davison in Haddad: 28). Since loyalty could not be guaranteed, military service was said to have ‘remained confined to Muslims, and mostly to Turks’ (Karpat 1973: 101), and the areas exempt from conscription included the Kurdish areas (Karpat 1973: 101). Even later under the CUP had little desire to undertake conscription of minorities into the national army. They ‘took steps to enable the non-Muslims and incidentally Muslims to buy their way out by paying a special tax to avoid military service’ (Macfie 1998: 61).

Abdul Hamid II’s Era (1876-1909)

Abdul Hamid II’s era is most known for his pan-Islamic policy, and the Kurds were greatly affected by it. Abdul Hamid II’s era is characterised by both modernisation and autocracy. It was during his era that the Ottoman Empire’s communication and railroad networks had greatly expanded, and secular education, especially that of the training of military officers, continued to expand. Abdul Hamid II was conscious of the need to compete with Europe. While introducing Western technologies, Abdul
Hamid II suspended parliament and censored the press. Abdul Hamid II’s era is also known to have had critical financial problems as well. In 1881, the Ottoman Empire became unable to repay their debts from abroad, which led to bankruptcy. This forced approximately one-quarter of the public revenue under direct foreign control, further stimulating nationalist sentiment (Harris: 47).

Abdul Hamid II’s pan-Islamic policy was a reaction to the failure of Ottomanism and the rise of ethnic nationalism among the Christian minorities while at the same time, accelerating this tendency. As early as the early 1820s, the Armenian community began to look to Czarist Russia as a better alternative to the Ottoman Empire when the Russians invaded the Caucasus (Harris: 46). Throughout the nineteenth century, Armenian nationalist organisations burgeoned. The Greeks and Albanians too became increasingly intolerant of the Islamic policies of the empire. On the other hand, the economic division between Muslim and non-Muslim populations became highly visible and became the target of Muslim-nationalist resentment. The non-Muslim communities benefited from the increasing European economic, cultural and political expansion, and this helped to create a prevailing anti-European mood by the 1870s (Kushner 1977: 4). This also strengthened not only pan-Islamism but placed an emphasis on Turkishness. The evidence of this trend is given by Kemal Karpat’s study on the change of classification in the population census: in 1831 and 1841, the population was classified according to religious groupings, while after 1870 and 1871, it was classified by religious, linguistic, and ethnic affiliations (Karpat 1973: 92). At the same time ‘vestiges of the Millet system were wiped out and the principle of provincial - vilayet - representation was enforced by 1908’. Autonomy of non-Turkish groups became the subject of tighter control.
In reaction, traditional leaders of minority groups, such as the patriarchs and their supporters, including the wealthy merchant class, sought to preserve existing privileges against state penetration (Macfie 1998: 60). This was the case for the Kurds, too, among whom there was an anti-Ottoman rebellion in the late nineteenth century.

Their rebellion was led by a Kurdish leader, Shaikh Ubeydullah, and it lasted from 1872 to 1882. Ubeydullah’s rebellion can be seen as the Kurds’ resistance against centralisation by both the Persian and the Ottoman empires. Ubeydullah was a Naqshbandi Shaikh, and he originally rebelled against the Persian government’s taxation attempts. Ubeydullah then sought assistance from the Ottoman Sultan, and even cooperated with the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878. However, he refused to be ruled by the Ottoman government as well. It is known that Ubeydullah contacted the British consul in 1879, claiming that the distinctiveness of the Kurds was based on the ‘great political and religious tradition of Islam’ (Kinnane: 24). In 1882, Ubeydullah’s forces were encircled by both the Ottoman and the Persian armies, and he was arrested.

Abdul Hamid II was continuously threatened with waves of separatism in various Ottoman provinces that yet remained in the Empire (Davison in Haddad: 50). In order to counter this move, the Islamic regiment known as Hamidiye Cavalry was established in 1890. A number of Kurdish tribes in Erzerm were recruited for this and in fact were recruited specifically from the Kurds and used for anti-Christian operations that resulted in a number of the Armenian massacres. The Armenians were
especially repressed around Eastern Turkey between 1894 and 1896. A similar attempt - to use Islam as a unifying ideology - was made in Constantinople and Baghdad when Abdul Hamid II established tribal schools in those cities in 1892. Through this institution Abdul Hamid attempted to win the Arabs’ and Kurds’ loyalty to the empire (Kinnane: 24). The Hamidiye Cavalry turned out to be successful from Ottoman government’s perspective. Because of the Kurds’ geographical proximity to Russia, they were ready to fight the Armenians supported by Russia. It was said the Kurdish tribal chiefs in the Hamidiye regiment were well paid and decorated with honours, and Abdul Hamid II was seen as a ‘benefactor’ (Kendal: 25).

Thus the Hamidiye mobilisation could not be entirely attributed to the mere success of Islamic propaganda. The Kurds who lived in the contested area had been experiencing a number of Russian invasions during the Russo-Turkish war. Because of this, they wanted to participate in such anti-Christian operations. There have been isolated cases in which the Kurds tried to protect their Armenian neighbours (as in the Noel report, FO371/4192). However, the broader picture was that a considerable number of the Kurdish tribes had participated in the anti-Armenian operation. The Ottoman government deported the Armenian population from eastern Anatolia where they had resided for centuries. Similarly, World War I had broken out in the above anti-Christian context. The religious difference between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied states, particularly Russia, gave rise to the revival of Islamism after an era of secular reforms. Of little wonder, the Kurds were greatly affected by this Sultan’s Islamic portrayal of the war. The Ottoman government presented the First World War as ‘al-jihad’, or the Islamic holy war, and as a consequence the war boosted the government’s legitimacy (Kinnane: 25).
Summary

The overall impact of Ottoman modernisation on the Kurds can be summarised as follows: First, the Kurdish land-owing class was created out of aghas and shaikhs, and the emergence of this class contributed to weaken the Kurds’ political unity as a whole. As recounted in Chapter II, these aghas and shaikhs thwarted young Kurdish nationalists. Second, although it was incorporated into the Ottoman state, the Kurdish area was still less integrated into the state compared to the Turkish-speaking sector where some labour mobility was established by the mid-nineteenth century. This delay in economic modernisation of Kurdistan appears to have created a regional gap between the Turkish and Kurdish sectors of Turkey that is visible even to this day. Furthermore, the Young Turk regime did not make serious efforts to recruit the minorities and tribal population into the Ottoman army, which meant the Kurds’ integration to the Ottoman state was further delayed. Third, the only effective policy that mobilised the Kurds and evoked their loyalty to the Ottoman state was pan-Islamic policy. This meant that the Kurds were strongly influenced by Islamic propaganda on the eve of the First World War, and this nullifying of Kurdish nationalism seems to have assisted the Ottoman state’s cause considerably, at the expense of the Kurdish state.

Iraq

‘Iraq’ in the Nineteenth Century

Mesopotamia was governed by Mamluks between 1704 and 1831. These Mamluks originated from Georgia and were slaves trained to be officials under the Islamic
system who in time took governing power. The Mamluk regime was an autocratic one and facilitated little participation by the local population (Marr 1985: 21). Although the Ottoman administration replaced the Mamluks in 1831, the region was still loosely bound to Constantinople and government control was only nominal. The three vilayets; Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul, were under token control of the central authority. Major cities and adjacent regions of the ‘future Iraqi state’ (hereafter, Iraq) were governed by powerful local families and tribal chiefs within regionally confined spheres of influence. It has been said that the ‘rural area was composed of a series of largely independent chiefdoms with overlapping spheres of control and influence’ (Sluglett 1976:1-2). The cities and tribal countryside coexisted without being integrated. The Sunni ulama families reigned in Baghdad, whereas once outside the city, the Shia Arab and Bedouin tribes dominated. In the north, Mosul was ruled by the powerful Jalili tribe (Kurdish) along with Ottoman Jannisaries. The cities formed state-like ‘enclaves’, through which Muslim traders and Jewish and Armenian merchants traveled to Anatolia, Persia, and the Gulf region (Hourani, in Polk and Chambers: 51).

Ottoman Campaign

The history of modern Iraq began with the impingement on it of the Ottoman campaign in the late nineteenth century. The expedition to Mesopotamia was part of a simultaneous campaign in Turkey by which Ayan, Derebeys and the Kurds were defeated. As happened in Turkey, all the important Kurdish strongholds, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Arbil, were defeated and captured by the mid-nineteenth century. S.H. Longrigg records that the campaign was carried out effectively as the Ottoman officials recruited able officers from the local Kurds who successfully brought those
cities under Ottoman control (Longrigg 1925: 285). Mosul fell to such a Kurd officer
appointed by the governor of Baghdad, Ali Ridha in 1835. After capturing Diyarbakir,
this general, Rashid Muhammad Pasha, pushed to the south from Anatolia, supported
by the Ottoman garrisons in Mosul and Baghdad. In 1837 Jabal Sinjar, and in 1838
Amadiyyah, Aqrah and Dohuk, all Kurdish towns, fell to the Ottomans.

Emergence of Quasi-feudal Class

The military campaigns contributed to the sedentarisation of the Kurdish tribes. The
defeated tribes were forced to settle, and in many cases the tribal chiefs turned into
landlords through the same land-registration process as in Anatolia. The Land
Registration Law of 1858 came into effect slightly later in Iraq, during the reign of
Midhat Pasha (1869-1872). The Ottoman authority intended to prohibit excessive land
holdings, but it was too weak to do so. ‘The Turkish authorities, for the sake of peace,
registered whole groups of villages in the name of the notables of Mosul, Erbil,
Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniya’ (Warriner: 108).

The following paragraph describes the above process’ impact on Kurdish society:
‘Rather than becoming the owners of lands that they had traditionally cultivated (as
the 1858 land code had intended), many Kurdish peasants became sharecroppers or
hired labourers on land owned by others. The local shaikhs, often Kurdish, were
among those who reaped the benefits from these changes. They increased their
individual landownership ‘from gifts, sale or usurpation’ (Bruinessen 1992: 318). In
short, the Ottoman Land Law of 1858 disrupted the traditional pattern of the nomadic
economy and ‘helped to usher in a new system of village stratification where effective
economic power was wielded by either powerful local shaikhs or by urban-based
absentee landlords’ (Kazemi, in Kazemi and Waterbury: 115).

The urban areas, too, were affected. The campaign ended up creating a new Ottomanised elite known as the effendis. ‘(T)he effendis formed a great part of the social element receptive of Turkish culture, and acted as the main bridge between Turk and Arab. The effendis, barely literate, but persistent Turkish speakers, were too frequently corrupt and remote from all spirit of public service’ (Longrigg 1953: 36) The meaning of effendis slightly changed over time as the educational system began to take root in the late nineteenth century: it came to denote, especially in Iraq, ‘a Westernised land-owner, generally living in the city in which his sons (or perhaps he himself) held positions within the administration or were in some way close to the ruling circles’ (Eppel in IJMES, May 1998: 228-9).

Thus, all over the country, the north and south, urban and rural sectors of Iraq were affected by the same process, which ended up disproportionately empowering the local notables at the expense of the vast majority. Those tribal chiefs gained political power on a new basis; ‘the Ottoman rule remained tenuous, and the real power fell to the aghas and begs of the constituent tribes and the chiefs of the mystic paths. Into the same hands passed also the bulk of the land in this area’ (Batatu: 76). This centralisation drive was everywhere obstructed. Longrigg states ‘there straggled now on both sides of the Mosul frontier a regime of fragmented tribal life and feudal authority penetrated, sometimes half-effectively, sometimes nominally, by the agencies of the Turkish government’ (Longrigg 1953: 14-15). As was the case in Anatolia, the Ottoman government often relied on local notables to govern the region, and its rule remained indirect. Combined with their economic power of the notables
derived from land, the above changes in the nineteenth century established in Iraq a quasi-feudal system.

‘The military confederations and principalities were destroyed. In their place arose a multitude of antagonistic tribes and tribal sections ... the groundwork for the economic growth of the shaikhs and aghas was laid ... in utter disregard of the prescriptive right of rank and file tribesmen or nontribal cultivators’ (Batatu: 77-78).

Having gone through Mamluk’s exploitative rule and the Ottoman rule that followed, Iraq was considerably impoverished by the late nineteenth century. There was universal poverty and a constant threat to security (Longrigg 1953: 30). The only noticeable economic developments that took place in the nineteenth century were the introduction of steamships on the Tigris, the construction of a railway by the Germans, and increased demand for Iraqi crops which was facilitated by the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 (Theobald and Jawad: 195-6). These developments, however, seem to have had no impact on the welfare of the population. There was no significant local industry, and almost nothing was mechanised (Longrigg 1953: 33-4).

Summary

As a result of the Ottoman centralisation, the shaikhly families, tribal chiefs, and urban elites emerged as the oligarchic class in Iraq during this era and this included many Kurdish notables. Although this new class cut across the Arab-Kurdish ethnic cleavage, such a small oligarchy could have no positive impact on integrating the country; quite the contrary. It is vital for national integration to have a reasonable level of social equality if every member is to have a sense of being part of a
community. However, the sharp dichotomy created between the rich and the poor during the nineteenth century excluded the vast majority of the population from what is supposed to be a 'national community' and obstructed social reforms attempted by successive regimes.
2. State Formation

Introduction

This section treats the impact of state formation. It will compare the costs and benefits of national integration through Revolution from Above (in Turkey) with the absence of a strong state (in Iraq) due to mandatory rule by Britain. As seen in the theoretical framework, a certain degree of political intervention through authoritarianism becomes almost inevitable in the early phase of state formation through Revolution from Above. Turkey’s Kemalist regime was representative of such a case, and Mustafa Kemal exercised almost unchallengeable political power during his presidency. The cost was that the Kurds as well as supporters of the old regime saw the state as an imposition by an alien regime and the new Kemalist government as a threat. As such, the government’s suppression of the Kurdish revolts during this period needs to be analysed in the overall context of state formation. By contrast, in Iraq, the state was a mere amalgam of the three former Ottoman provinces, no centre of power equivalent to that of Kemalist Turkey existed and the population remained divided along sectarian lines. Furthermore, the monarchy relied heavily on oligarchic groups which seem to have further aggravated the division within the society. Although periodisation for the analysis is based on the same historic event (state formation), it must be noted that in terms of overall strength of state infrastructure, Turkey was in a far more advanced position than Iraq, as the basic state institutions of independent Turkey were derived directly from the remnants of the Ottoman bureaucracy.
Turkey

‘Turk’ as an Ideal Citizenship

The most symbolic aspect of Turkey’s nation-building was the adoption of the new identity ‘Turk’, which was promoted by the government with the famous phrase ‘Happy are those who call themselves Turks’. ‘Turk’ was a deliberately adopted identity, for as Bernard Lewis showed, to call Turkish speaking people ‘Turk’ had historically been a strangely European phenomenon. It even had a slightly derogatory meaning, and its usage was confined to denoting illiterate peasants in Anatolia (Lewis 1968: 1-2). The popularity of more ethnonational ‘Turanism’ had been confined to intellectuals who were conscious of their Turkish origin, and the Turanist ideologues did not become a socially significant force since the majority of the Ottoman citizens still identified themselves as Muslims. Atatürk’s concept of Turk departed both from the empire’s Islamic past and from the ethnonational concept of being Turkish in two ways. He confined ‘Turk’ to people living inside the territory of the Turkish Republic; and under the Turkish constitution every person bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship was a Turk. Thus, Turk was a synonym to Turkish citizenship, and strictly speaking was not based on ethnicity, however, it was strongly associated with the Turkish-speaking people. Moreover, the Kemalist regime propagated the new identity by imposing a monolingual policy and banned the use of non-Turkish languages. The regime tried to strengthen the territorial integrity of a state through a policy that was intended to create linguistic homogeneity. In reality, approximately 22 per cent of the entire population was Kurdish (as in Chapter II). They also happened to be concentrated in southeast Anatolia. The government’s monolingual policy heralded the beginning of an era of cultural suppression for the Kurds, and caused
great inefficiency in education, to be discussed below.

**Secularisation and Centre-building: A Strong State**

In coming to power, Mustafa Kemal succeeded in completely secularising the political system. This process was in fact a culmination of the reforms that had been continuing since the eighteenth century. Mustafa Kemal’s reforms would not have been possible without his predecessors’ attempts and gradual achievements. It must also be noted that secularisation had a political, rather than a religious, impact. The Kemalist regime was faced with a need to curb the political power of the Islamic elite who supported the old Sultanate regime. Mustafa Kemal himself was not opposed to Islam purely as a religion, as evident in his frequent emphasis on his belief in the Islamic faith (Macfie 1994: 137). All he wanted was to exclude the Islamic elite from the political arena.

**Kemalist Reforms**

As his popular title ‘Ghazi’ (warrior) showed, Mustafa Kemal’s popularity rested on his successful military career and his leadership of the war of independence especially after he had defeated the occupying Greek army in 1922. However, Kemal’s secularising reforms, which were initiated after the foundation of the republic, were met with great hostility by the majority of Muslim citizens. Zurcher explained that all these reforms were implemented in two phases: the first wave was secularisation of the state institutions, and the second wave was secularisation over areas which directly affected society, such as family law (Zurcher: 180). Also, the regime’s attempt to forge a strong administrative centre triggered a series of major Kurdish rebellions.
Following the deposition of the Sultanate in November 1922, the Caliphate was abolished in March 1924. This was followed by the law of Unification of Education in March 1924. By this law, all curriculae were to be taught in Turkish and at state-designed schools. The usage of non-Turkish languages in schools and local offices was completely banned. This measure effectively prohibited the Kurdish language from being used for instruction. Kirisci and Winrow state that the closure of religious schools ‘may have also indirectly led to the closure of such schools where the language of instruction was Kurdish’ (Kirisci and Winrow 1997: 45). Although it was said the effectiveness of the education reform was still ‘urban-biased’ (Macfie 1994: 146), this reform undoubtedly accelerated Turkification of the entire education system. The introduction of monolingual policy made a contrast to the Iraqi case: in Iraq, the Kurdish language was at least officially recognised as one of the languages of the state, owing to the prerequisite required for Iraq’s entry to the League of Nations. For Turkey, the language policy was a purely domestic concern.

In September 1925, religious shrines and dervish convents were closed. Mustafa Kemal equated civilisation with Western civilisation. He was also known to have harboured strong hostility to tribal shaikhs and Sufi instructors for promoting superstitious beliefs (Macfie 1994: 137-8). In the same year, the use of the Fez, the hat symbolic of the Ottoman past, was banned. Sufi orders were officially banned in 1926 as being unscientific. Following this move, the Gregorian calendar and the Swiss penal code were introduced. It must be noted, however, that in practice it was extremely difficult to completely eliminate the strong Sufi network in which the Kurds were heavily represented. After 1926, the Sufi network went underground and
began operating through private schools, foundations, and Koranic courses.

Among the new reforms, the introduction of the Latin alphabet (Romanicisation) in 1928 had a profound effect on the Kurds in Turkey. This meant that the common script used by the Kurds in Syria, Iran, and Iraq, which was the Arabic alphabet, was removed from their everyday lives (Arfa: 38). For the new government, on the other hand, Romanicisation constituted the pillar of the language reform. The Kemalist regime also attempted to ‘Turkify’ Turkish by eliminating the vocabularies derived from Arabic and Persian. In principle, the Romanicisation in itself alone could have had a potential benefit for the Kurds, as it was more suited for transcribing Kurdish. This was not a feasible scenario, however, as the use of the Kurdish language had been banned. By abolishing Arabic letters, Turkey succeeded firstly in obliterating its Islamic-Ottoman past from public life, and secondly in cutting the potential trans-state bond between Turkish Kurds and Kurds elsewhere based on shared printed publications.

How Mustafa Kemal managed to carry out all those radical reforms can be explained by Frey’s reference to the relatively low percentage of the educated elite in the entire population: ‘the bifurcation in Turkish society between the educated elite and uneducated masses actually provided Mustafa Kemal with a rather convenient “halfway house” in the reshaping of the country. He could, to a large extent afford to forget about the submerged masses and concentrate on solidifying his hold over the dominant intellectual groups’ (Frey: 41). This was, however, only the first phase of Kemalist reforms. To quote Frey again, the second phase of the reforms lay in the far more complex task of actually widening political participation: ‘modernising the ill-
educated masses of the society and of involving them in the political process ... was an incredibly complex and delicate, even dangerous, assignment. But the fact that the process had been able to be divided into two stages, rather than compounded by being telescoped into one, may partially account for the relative Turkish success compared with most other "emergent" nations' (Frey: 42-3). Although Frey did not directly mention Revolution from Above, he attributed the Kemalists' success essentially to their accomplishment in centre-building.

Regional Gap

The Kemalist revolution may have indeed paved the way for broader political participation through modernisation and authoritarian nation-building policies. There was, however, limits to it as well. It was primarily an urban-biased revolution. The population in the countryside of Anatolia was still deeply religious, and these conservative people constituted the bulk of the peasants controlled by village aghas. Feroz Ahmad stated that despite the nation-wide campaign for increased literacy, the education project in village areas largely failed. This was a clear contrast to the dramatic increase in literacy in the urbanised part of the country, which rose from 8 per cent in 1928 to 30 per cent in 1935 (Ahmad 1993: 83). Ahmad also pointed out that a political factor contributed to create this regional gap. In his words, 'the idea of awakening the peasants by teaching them to read and write, teaching them about health care and efficient agriculture, in short giving them a new sense of self-reliance and confidence, was dangerous in the opinion of the conservatives ... (after World War II) providing to the peasants (an education) made them an easy target for "undesirable ideologies" (code words for socialism or communism) and incited class conflict' (Ahmad 1993: 83). The loss of the revolution's radical impetus was evident
in the party programme of the Republican People’s Party that dropped its strong anti-
capitalist tone by 1935. It simply emphasised equality before the law and advocated 
rejection of class conflict (Ozbundun: 88).

Taking these political factors into consideration, it was reasonable to estimate that the 
Kurdish peasants in southeast Anatolia were put in the least desirable environment to 
benefit from the new reforms, especially in the area of education. Firstly, education 
was monolingual, and their first language, Kurdish, was never to be used even for the 
purpose of learning Turkish. As Hassanpour stated ‘little would benefit from the 
education taught in the language they did not understand’ (Hassanpour 1996). This 
‘non-education’ of the Kurds continued to be a serious problem throughout the 
following decades, to be discussed below. Secondly, because of the deeply religious 
and conservative culture surrounding the rural peasants, acquisition of knowledge 
through secular institutions was not encouraged.

On the other hand, many of the educated and secular-minded Kurds trained in the 
Ottoman army were alienated by the Kemalists’ nation-building policy. 
Representative of them was Ihsan Nuri, a former Ottoman officer who served 
throughout the First World War. The following section will include accounts of the 
major Kurdish revolts between the years 1924 and 1937, in which the tribal leaders 
and educated nationalists like Nuri jointly opposed the Kemalists’ nation-building 
policies.

Major Resistance to the State

The most conventional explanation for the Kurdish rebellions throughout the 1920s
and 30s was that they resulted from the abolition of the Caliphate, as it removed the important religious symbol which bound the two (the Kurdish and Turkish) communities together (Zurcher: 178). The Caliphate may have indeed constituted an important bond, but deeper examination of the Kurdish revolts during this period reveals that they were not entirely religious. Even though Islamic organisations and religious rhetoric were used in the Kurds’ opposition to the government’s policy, the seemingly religious rebellions were in fact organised in conjunction with the secular-nationalist group. It is also important to note that because nationwide discontent towards the regime’s policies during the same time period was led by the Islamists, the Kurds were identified with this reaction against secularisation. Yet while the Kemalist regime identified the Kurds as reactionary and backward, in fact, the Kurds’ demands were in defense of Kurdish national rights. These two simultaneous oppositions (the Kurds and Islamists) were not readily comparable, one based on national and another on religious claims. However, because the Turkish government saw them collectively as a threat, there was also a need to analyse the government’s authoritarian measures from the perspective of the regime’s need for consolidating the state’s central administration. Thus it appears historically inaccurate to state that in 1924, ‘Kurdish' schools and publications were forbidden. This would give the impression that ‘only’ the Kurds were suppressed by the government. However, this was not the case. The Kurds happened to constitute part of the opposition that threatened the new government. Therefore, examples of Islamic opposition need to be recounted first before examining the Kurdish rebellions.

The Islamic elite had always been powerful in Turkey. The Medrese-trained intellectuals, mentioned earlier, constituted an important part of the overall educated
elite. In fact, the conflict between the secular and Islamic elite had been a marked feature of political competition since the nineteenth century, as secular education threatened their very intellectual base. ‘Muslim youth who after 1860 attended the state schools where science was being taught, conceived the idea that Islamic teaching was an obstacle to progress and truth. ... So the Medrese graduates clearly perceived the growing system of nonreligious, Westernised education as a threat to their Islamic conception of the proper path for the Ottoman Empire’ (Halide Elib in Frey: 34).

The depth of Islamic dissent could be seen in incidents such as the following, which took place in a town in western Turkey. In December 1930, a Dervish monk of the Naqshbandi order in a town near Izmir, called for the restoration of Islamic law and the Caliphate. An army officer, identified as an agent of the state, was captured and was executed by the monk (Ahmad 1993: 60-1). Ahmad indicated incidents like this were not isolated. He stated that ‘the reforms undertaken in the second half of the 1920s had not taken root and that the state’s secular approach to religion and to ideology in general had proved a failure. The mass of the people, even in the more advanced parts of the country, did not identify with the new state’ (Ahmad 1993: 60-1).

There was opposition even from within the Kemal’s Republican Peoples Party. In November 1924, the Progressive Republican Party was established from among the members of the Grand National Assembly opposed to Mustafa Kemal. They stood for limiting state intervention in the economy and increasing freedom of religion, thus expressing reservations concerning the statism and the secularism advocated by the RPP (Tachau 1994: 587).
At this time, the new government had been threatened by a Communist-inclined group called the Green Army as well. In short, the Kemalists faced three opponents simultaneously: the Islamists, the communists, and the Kurds. The outbreak of the major Kurdish revolt led by Shaikh Said (1925) thus gave justification to the government to impose emergency rule and hunt down all the opposition altogether and with the harshest and most indiscriminate methods.

Kurdish Rebellions 1924-1937

The Kurds reacted to the new Turkish Republic by staging almost continuous revolts throughout the 1920s and 30s. The major ones were the Shaikh Said rebellion (1925), the revolt in the Mount Ararat by the Jelali tribe (1930) and the revolt in Dersim by Saiyd Reza (1937). However, the main characteristic of these Kurdish revolts was that despite their relative success in widely mobilising participants, the rebellion could not be sustained owing to the Kurds’ internal divisions, notably, tribal and religious rivalries.

The first rebellion was launched by the former Ottoman officer, Ihsan Nuri who mobilised the Kurdish garrison in August 1924 at Beytussebap in eastern Turkey in an abortive uprising. Shortly after this move, a Kurdish nationalist group called Azadi (Freedom) was organised and sought the cooperation of the powerful Kurdish leader, Shaikh Said. Kurdish officers who were disillusioned by the Kemalist policies participated in Azadi. These officers also felt betrayed by the Treaty of Lausanne’s silence on Kurdish autonomy, which had been agreed between the Allies and the Kemalists earlier. The key agendas of the Azadi members were: the Turkish state’s
language policy, denial of the existence of Kurdistan (removal of the geographical names), manipulation of intra-Kurdish tribal conflict, and discrimination against the Kurdish officers in the Army (Bruinessen 1992: 280-1).

The Kurdish officers were well aware of the need to cooperate with the shaikh in order to mobilise large numbers of participants. The secular concept of Kurdish nationalism did not have much influence over the majority of Kurdish people of that time. Azadi held its first congress in 1924 in which Shaikh Said was invited. Shaikh Said was a son of the chief of the Naqshbandi order and was known to be particularly influential among the Zaza-speaking Kurdish tribes in eastern Turkey, in the region between Lake Van and the western Euphrates. Shaikh Said’s Tekke (dervish monastery) was frequented by Kurds and even Turks from all over the country, and the shaikh was much respected as a religious chief (Arfa: 34). Therefore, the shaikh’s cooperation with Azadi was deemed essential; the dervish order was the only organisation that transcended tribal differences (Zurcher: 178).

In February 1925, the revolt broke out prematurely, owing to a clash between the Turkish army and the tribes under Shaikh Said’s influence. Shaikh Said proclaimed a Jihad (Islamic holy war) against the ‘Godless Turkish administration’. He called on the government to reinstate the Sultan-Caliph and also called also on Turkish Muslims to join his revolt. The revolt spread rapidly, and the rebels’ original number of seven thousand increased to more than ten thousand with the addition of several local tribes (Arfa: 36).
Although almost all of eastern and central Anatolia had been affected by the Shaikh Said revolt, the rebellion did not last long. Since Shaikh Said’s key role in the revolt was to mobilise different Kurdish tribes through the dervish network, it also meant the revolt was to suffer from religious sectarianism. The Alevi Kurds, for example, kept aloof towards the Naqshbandi rebels. It was said ‘the Alevis either remained neutral or actively assisted the government forces... Moreover, some Kurdish Sunni tribes, such as Reman, Penchinaran, and Reshkotan, that had promised to join the rebellion remained aloof, gave only token support, or joined the Turks when the uprising began’ (Olson 1989:96 quoted in Kazemi: 109). Thus the Kurdish tribes belonging to orthodox Sunni Islam aligned with the Turks instead of the tribes mobilised by a Naqshbandi network. Also, most of the participants were motivated by either religious or tribal reasons, rather than by Kurdish national rights. Because of their sectarian motivation, some of the rebel-occupied areas were simply taken over by banditry and reduced to a state of sheer violence (Zurcher: 178).

The incident hardened the government’s suppressive policy towards the oppositions. The government used this crisis to implement the Law on the Maintenance of Order in March 1925. This law had allowed the government to proceed more vigorously than ever in enforcing its policies (Arfa: 38). The Kemalist government attributed the revolt to an alleged backwardness of the Kurds. The Turkish Foreign Minister of the time was known to have stated: ‘in the Kurdish case, their cultural level is so low, their mentality so backward, that they cannot be in the general Turkish politics. They are economically unfit for the competition with the more advanced and cultured Turks’ (FO371/12255, as in McDowall 1996: 200).
The government suppressed the rebellion with aerial bombardment, and by adopting a military solution, ignored the cause of the problem: the question of Kurdish national rights. Shaikh Said was captured on 27 April 1925, and many leaders involved in the rebellion were executed. It is pointed out that Kurdish nationalism was the crucial point that alarmed the state authorities. As Bruinessen stated, the Shaikh Said rebellion was distinct from the late nineteenth century's major revolt by the Kurd leader, Shaikh Ubeydullah (1880), who rebelled against encroachment of the central authority. Bruinessen pointed to the fact that the revolt was prepared by a secular organisation, Azadi, which qualified it to be considered a national rebellion (Bruinessen 1992: 280-282).

Another major Kurdish revolt broke out in 1928. It took place on the slopes of Mount Ararat (Agri Dagh) and was staged by Jelali tribes. This too had been planned by both Islamic and secular organisations. The organisers of the Mount Ararat revolt included former officers of the Turkish Army who hoped to bring the case of Turkish suppression of the Kurds to the League of Nations. They distributed the following manifesto in Turkish Kurdistan, Iraq, Syria, Beirut, Paris, and to the League of Nations:

‘Brother Kurds, you must be worthy to become a great nation, How can you allow the noble Kurdish nation to live as slaves under the bondage of the Turks, while all other nations have won their independence? A large free territory between Iran and Iraq had been promised to us. Unite in the struggle we have started to liberate our brothers from the Turkish yoke, in order to liberate these lands which have belonged to us for many centuries’ (Turkischer Post. 29 July 1930, as in Arfa: 41).
Hasan Arfa noted that the Mount Ararat revolt facilitated trans-border cooperation between the Kurds for the first time, even among those not related to one another by local or personal interests (Arfa: 42). This meant the revolt clearly had an element of secular nationalism not motivated by tribal or religious adherence. It took two years for the government to completely suppress the revolt, and in fact, it only did so with assistance from the Iranian government. It was requested that Iran cede the territory on the eastern slopes of Mount Ararat so that the area occupied by the Kurds could be encircled (McDowall 1996: 15). On 23 January 1932, the two states signed an agreement by which Turkey gained certain Iranian territories around Mount Ararat, and Iran received other territories around Lake Van (Kendal: 56). This Turkish-Iranian treaty became a precursor to the similarly anti-Kurdish Saadbad Pact to be signed in July 1937 by Iraq, Iran and Turkey.

In 1937, another major Kurdish revolt broke out in the Dersim area in central Anatolia, led by Saiyd Reza. Saiyd Reza, an Alevi shaikh, was a powerful leader who enjoyed wide authority among the Kurdish tribes in eastern Turkey. The revolt also drew considerable sympathy from the Kurds in Syria and Iraq. On 11 August, the Iraqi newspaper ‘Rabitah-el-Arabiyyah’ published a declaration by two Kurdish political leaders asking the Iraqi Government and the representatives of foreign powers in Baghdad to intervene against the Turkish policy of extermination of the Kurds and alleged inhuman treatment of the Kurds by the Turkish government (Arfa: 43-4). In the end, in 1937, Saiyd Reza was lured with promises of a negotiated settlement and was captured and killed with his followers.
After the 1930s, Kurdish rebellions in Turkey had ceased because of a thorough suppression of them by the government and the strengthening of border security that cut off mutual support among the Kurds in neighbouring states. From this era, the Kurds’ cross-border movements became increasingly difficult. Afterwards, for decades the Turkish Kurds would have to pursue political activity without reference to their specific ethnicity.

**Propagation of Kemalism**

After the years of the Kurdish rebellions, the policies of Kemalism or Ataturkism, were vehemently promulgated from the 1930s onward. This was intended to eliminate alleged religious fanaticism and backwardness. This era also saw an increase of xenophobic measures such as the Law on Settlement, that limited new immigrants into Turkey only to those whose ethnic origin was Turkish (Akgunduz: 112). Turkish villages were renamed too. For example, Dersim that meant ‘silver gate’ in Kurdish was changed to Tunceli, which roughly means in Turkish ‘I will destroy you with an iron hand’ (SRWA: Aug. 1991).

The well-known six principles of Kemalism were: republicanism, rationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionary reformism. In 1937, these were incorporated into the Turkish constitution’s Article 2. The principles of populism and nationalism were politically instrumental in two ways. These principles laid the basis for greater political participation, but also served to neutralise any move that could be interpreted as ‘divisive’ to the unity of the Turkish state. Without directly attacking Kurdish nationalism, Kemalism denied the rights of any nation other than that of the Turks. Arfa stated that in response to these measures, it was from this era that the
Kurdish movement became ‘entirely nationalistic as well and completely lost its religious characteristics’ (Arfa: 38).

Other Opposition to the Republican People’s Party

Despite the Kemalist triumph, oppositions to the Kemalist regime persisted. Among others, the following party appears to have represented the voice of the moderate majority. There was a short-lived opposition to the Republican People’s Party (RPP) in the 1930s, which was called the Liberal Republican Party (LRP). This party never cast doubt on the legitimacy of the RPP government but opposed its authoritarianism. The LRP was founded on 12 August 1930 and was differentiated from the RPP in the following points: (1) a negative attitude to statism and an emphasis on private enterprise, and (2) more explicit insistence on political individualism, individual rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of ideas, and freedom of assembly, popular control over administration, women’s rights and direct elections (Frey: 340). However, the relationship between the RPP and the LRP deteriorated rapidly, and the LRP was dissolved in December 1930, only four months after its foundation. The RPP accused the LRP of utilising religious and social reactionaries (Frey: 341). The LRP was basically a precursor of the Democrat Party that would be established in the 1940s. Although it was short-lived, the LRP’s claims were highly indicative of the Democrat Party’s platform which would enjoy high popularity after Turkey’s transition to the multiparty system.

Summary

The centre-building of the Turkish state seems to have been largely successful. The state established its legitimacy without being fatally threatened by the opposition
forces. However, the Kemalists’ policy alienated the Kurds completely, and that included both the secular as well as traditional leaders of the Kurds. Prominent figures, such as Ihsan Nuri, could have been the Kemalists’ allies for the regime was threatened by an Islamic elite, and the support of Kurdish intellectuals trained in secular institutions would have assisted the regime’s goal of Turkish nation-building on the European nation-state model. Turkey’s early integration policies could have been made more acceptable for the Kurds simply by allowing, at least, the use of the Kurdish alongside Turkish in the schools. A prominent Kurdish writer in Turkey, Yasar Kemal, commented on this aspect: ‘During the War of Independence we fought shoulder to shoulder. We established this state together. Should a man cut out the tongue of his brother?’ (as in Meiselas: 366). The Kemalists’ failure in integrating the Kurds through bilingualism left the mass of illiterate Kurds even more strongly under the influence of their feudal leaders.

The Kurdish experience in the early Turkish Republic showed that the imposition of new national identity by sheer force would not promote integration of an ethnic minority. Integration of a minority group needs to be substantiated by various social and economic measures. When the government banned the Kurdish language, the only alternative was to learn all subjects in Turkish, a language the majority of the Kurds did not use or understand. In doing this it fatally circumscribed their prospects for the socio-economic mobility and political access on which their integration depended.
Iraq

Compared to Turkey, which inherited the Ottoman government apparatus, Iraq was a fragmented state from the beginning. It was a mere amalgam of the three former Ottoman vilayets, bound together by the decision of the British government. Unlike Turkey, it was heavily affected by the policy of the Mandatory power, Britain, at the phase of state formation. After 1926, Iraq’s key role in British thinking was firstly as a bulwark against Communism, and secondly, against radical Arab nationalism. The demarcation of the Iraqi-Turkish border in 1926 revived the British-Turkish alliance against the Soviet Union as in the pre-WWI period when the Ottoman Empire and Britain allied against Russia. Internally, Britain was firmly committed to propping up the pro-British Hashimite monarchy. As a result, veterans of the Arab Revolt who followed Faysal from Syria came to dominate the political elite of Iraq. They were joined by the landowing tribal chiefs, that included many wealthy Kurds and Shia Arabs as well.

A State of Minorities

The state consisted of three sizable groups; the Shia Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. Iraq’s ruling group, the Sunni Arabs, were a minority of the population. The Arab population constituted approximately 75 to 80 per cent of the total population, of whom 70 per cent were estimated to be Shia Muslims. The census gave no details of the membership of the two main branches of Islam, the Sunni and the Shia, but the Shia Arab in Iraq formed the clear majority and were estimated to be more numerous than those in any other Arab country (Lawless 1972). The smaller groups ethnic and religious minorities included many groups of Christians (the Greek Orthodox
community, Assyrians, Armenians and Syrian Jacobites), the Jews, Sabians, Turcomans, and Yezidi Kurds who, though of Kurdish stock, had traditionally differentiated themselves from the Sunni Kurds. The Turcomans were found concentrated in the towns between Baghdad and Mosul and were in general wealthy Sunni Muslims which contributed to the Turcomans' over-representation in the government compared to their numbers (Marr 1985: 9).

The integration of Iraq faced serious obstacles from the very beginning. First of all, the state encompassed the above mentioned three sizable groups arbitrarily thrown together in a single state and who also had weak mutual contacts prior to state formation. Secondly, King Faysal, who was a foreigner brought in by the British, lacked local support. Third, from the beginning politics was centred on the independence struggle and political debates were concentrated on the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which appeared to have diverted attention from the national integration of the ethnically and religiously plural state. And fourth, all the key state institutions were created from scratch, including the Constituent Assembly and the army. As a result, the state was very weak, and no significant nation-building measures equivalent to that of the Kemalist Turkey were undertaken.

**Elite-biased Integration**

The incorporation of the societal elite into the Iraqi state was accomplished through the monarchy's cooption of the oligarchic class made up of Kurdish and Arab tribal shaikhs and aghas. These Kurds in the oligarchy, also called 'Ministeral Kurds', were not representative of the Kurdish people as a whole: they were Kurds by descent alone and not by identity (Dann 1978).
The Landed-class

It needs to be explained why Arab and Kurdish shaikhs constituted a significant part of Iraq's landowning class. As mentioned, this was partly a consequence of the Ottoman land registration. In addition, British tribal policy, adopted from India, was particularly favourable to local oligarchic groups. Described as a 'combination of convenience and economy' (Hemphill in Kelidar: 75 - 77), it meant indirect rule through local notables and tribal chiefs, a policy which suited the political and economic needs of Britain after the First World War when she was in a severe financial crisis. The tribal shaikhs' military power had been waning over time, but their political and economic power remained intact. Hanna Batatu recounted that, among other things, the economic power of tribal shaikhs increased their political power, and this was derived from implementation of the land settlement policy implemented in the 1930s (Batatu: 108).

The Land Settlement Law of 1932 was introduced by Britain owing to the complex claims to land sparked by the growth of interest in commercial agriculture. Under this law, a new form of tenure (Lazmah) was granted to all individuals who used their land for over fifteen years, and it was stipulated that the sale of the land outside the tribe required government approval. When this law was implemented, however, it was manipulated by urban investors and tribal shaikhs who succeeded in securing legal titles, and as a result, ordinary tribesmen were reduced to the status of sharecropping tenants (Marr 1985: 62-3). Many tribesmen were already in a deplorable condition owing to the impact of the Ottoman Land Registration Law of 1858, and the new 1932 land registration law ended up aggravating their condition further.
The concentration of land ownership remained considerably high throughout the monarchical era. Prior to the 1958 revolution, it was recorded that 2 per cent of landowners possessed 68 per cent of all arable land, whilst 70 per cent of the population owned 3.3 per cent of the land (Theobald and Jawad in Niblock: 197). The condition of the tribesmen, now reduced to unskilled cultivators, deteriorated further as a result of the introduction of the Law Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators in 1934, which stipulated that the cultivators who were indebted to a farm owner could not leave his employment until the debts were paid off (Sluglett 1976: 251, Theobald and Jawad, Ibid.). The landowners were also very lightly taxed but continued to exploit the cultivators at the same old rates (Batatu: 105).

Among the 49 leading land owning families (excluding the two in the south), who owned between them more than 300,000 dunums, at one dunum/ 0.618 acre), 11 were identified as Kurdish, of which two were described as ‘Arabised’ (Batatu: 58). Thus, in pre-revolutionary Iraq, approximately one out of five large-scale landowners was Kurdish.

The increased economic and political power of the shaikhship, deriving from profitable commercial agriculture and exploitation of their tribesmen, facilitated a demographic revolution in the late 1930s when the mass of destitute peasants began migrating to the cities. The migration was particularly phenomenal from the poverty-stricken southeast region (Amarah) inhabited by the Shia Arabs. This demographic move was known to have affected many aspects of life in Baghdad. Particularly, this made the capital a ‘ready pool’ from which radical movements like the Communist
Party recruited its membership in later decades (Batatu: 133 and 473).

The Constituent Assembly and Tribal Politics

Iraq’s first cabinet was created by the monarchy whose first task was to negotiate the terms of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The cabinet was weak, and the general policy pursued by the government was a ‘cooperation with Britain and pursuit of independence for Iraq at whatever pace Britain seemed to be dictating’ (Sluglett 1976: 141). Opponents of the government’s pro-British policy formed political organisations in 1921, and they became Iraq’s first political parties. The representative ones were the Nationalist Party and the People’s Party. However, often, the government arbitrarily banned opposition parties from participating in parliamentary elections (al-Adhami 1979), and thus, political parties and the Constituent Assembly did not fully accommodate the political needs of the people. Furthermore, many people did not participate in the electoral process as they feared the voting registers would be used for conscription (al-Adhami 1979).

On the other hand, tribal representatives became influential in parliamentary politics, as they were bribed by pro-British politicians and were able to form a block against the nationalists (Longrigg 1953: 191). For example, ‘at the Constituent Assembly that met on 26 March 1924 to ratify three instruments: the Anglo-Iraq Treaty of 1922, the constitution, and the election law, only about 15 were known to be opposed to the treaty of the 100 delegates in Baghdad; the majority of the delegates were tribal shaikhs and Kurdish leaders on whom the British felt they could depend for support’ (Marr 1985: 45). On many occasions during the 1920s, the landowing shaikhs and urban notables withheld support for the nationalists and remained loyal to the pro-
The government also forbade organised political activity in the countryside, by only allowing the government-authorised party, which was called the Constitutional Union Party (Batatu: 104-108). Political socialisation was thus delayed, and the state authorities continued to rely on the rural elite to govern the people. This was typified by the following example: ‘the paramount Shammarite (the powerful Arab tribe) cultivated influential contacts in high places and through them acquired land. This was given to him (the leader) in order that he might settle his tribe and persuade them to give up their old habits of marauding’ (Batatu: 114).

Fragmented State of the Army

As recounted earlier, armed forces in a developing state have a special role in state-building in the area of education and political socialisation. However, since its foundation the Iraqi army was an internally fragmented institution: during the mandate, the British authorities wished to keep it weak, while after independence, the tension between growing Arab nationalists and the more moderate Iraqist wing generated a number of coups d’etat, to be discussed below.

Originally, the creation of the Iraqi Army was decided at the Cairo Conference of 1920. By the Military Agreement of 1924, it was stipulated that Iraq would be obliged to take full responsibility of her own defence within the next four years, and recruitment to the nucleus of the Iraqi Army began. However, the British, as a mandatory power, showed reluctance to allow the expansion of the Army. The British officials were opposed to either increasing the numbers of the Army or widening its
functions as they thought it would enhance the power of the nationalists (Sluglett 1976: 260). On the other hand, the key police force, the Levies came to be almost entirely staffed by Assyrians by the late 1920s. Soon, the Assyrians came to be seen as agents of the occupying power, and the Levies’ status among the local population remained extremely low (Wilson 1931: 69-70). Thus, to characterise the early phase of the Iraqi armed forces as a whole, the pro-British Assyrians were concentrated in the Levies, whereas the Arabs and the Kurds came to be more represented in the nucleus of the national Army.

Meanwhile, King Faysal and the nationalists pressed for a National Service Law as a prerequisite for full independence. The law was enacted in 1934, but the plan to expand the Iraqi Army through conscription was faced with considerable opposition in tribal areas, as it meant forcing the tribes to surrender their men. Some British officials feared it would also result in strengthening the power of shaikhs, as they would pay off old scores by picking tribal sections led by their rivals and sending them off to the army (Sluglett 1976: 144). In practice, conscription was implemented in a far from ‘universal’ way. A British official recorded, ‘wide tribal areas were in practice exempt; the accessible and the weak were exploited. Armed resistance was not infrequent, desertion was common, and the payment of a low exemption fee to escape service was habitual’ (Longrigg 1953: 246).

The Iraqi Army, initially staffed by former Ottoman officers, came to be dominated by Arab recruits from northern provinces. The Pan-Arab ideology, to be discussed below, was supported by these Arab officers who suffered from the partition of the Arab area of the Ottoman Empire. Before the First World War, they had been
economically linked with Syria and Palestine. However, the new frontiers which divided the Arab East cut them off from these regions, inflaming Arab nationalism among them (Batatu: 29). The early Sunni dominance in the army naturally prevented Shia Arabs from rising up to higher ranks and the Iraqi Army continued to be dominated by Sunni Arabs. Though it was stated that ‘some’ Kurdish officers were brought in as well, the Kurds and the Shia Arabs generally remained in lower ranks (Marr 1985: 37).

Thus, the armed forces, supposed to be one of pillars of state formation, were prevented from acting as a integrating institution: first, there was a sectarian tension inherited from the mandate era; the Assyrians were concentrated in the Levies and were associated with British control. Second, the officer corps was dominated by the Sunni Arabs, the military elite from the Ottoman era. This resulted in a relatively low representation of the Kurds and the Shia Arabs in the higher ranks. And third, conscription was incomplete, and tribal leaders, who controlled the vast majority of rural population, remained practically untouched by it.

Failure of Integration: Major Communal Resistance to the State

While the monarchy had succeeded in incorporating the landed class drawn from both Kurds and Arabs, opponents to the Iraqi government never ceased their resistance. Compared to Turkey, the opposition to the government was more ethnically and religiously diverse, indicating the plural nature of the populace.

(1) The Assyrians

In terms of incorporation to the new state, the most problematic and tragic case was
that of the Assyrian community. The indigenous Assyrians in Iraq used to be confined only to the extreme north. However, large Assyrian communities from eastern Anatolia (Hakkari province) were repatriated by the British during the First World War, a direct consequence of their siding with Britain against Turkey during the war. The settlement of the northern border with Turkey (1926) sealed any possibility of these Turkish Assyrians’ repatriation to eastern Anatolia. However, their settlement in Iraq, scattered them around the Kurdish-inhabited areas of Zakho and Dahuk. The settlement of Assyrians was ‘deeply resented by the Muslims, and especially the Kurds in whose area they were settled’ (Marr 1985: 11). Furthermore, Assyrian Levies, mentioned above, were frequently used to suppress the Kurdish rebellions. This greatly contributed to worsening the relations between the two peoples. A British official later commented ‘their (the Assyrians’) retention as British-administered imperial troops, the many contrasts and the sour ill-feeling between them and the Iraq Army, and their repeated use against the Kurds were all, it would seem in retrospect, to be regretted’ (Longrigg 1953:197).

As Iraq’s formal independence approached in 1930, the Assyrian patriarch was alarmed by the removal of freedom in internal affairs which used to be acknowledged by the British mandate authority. In 1929, the nationalistic patriarch, Mar Shamun demanded the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by his community be guaranteed under the new Iraqi government. This claim was based on the fact that the Assyrians had officially acted as Allies during the First World War, and also the Levy’s outstanding service throughout the British mandate (Longrigg 1953: 198-199). These claims were not unreasonable, but the level of their autonomy was deemed unsuitable to Iraq as it almost equalled that of an independent state. In the latter part of 1932, the
patriarch even journeyed to Geneva to plead his case to the League of Nations but without success (Marr 1985: 57). At the height of their ferment the Assyrian nationalists made a cross-border protest and entered into Syria in 1933. This contributed to stirring up local sentiment considerably, and the protesters were brutally suppressed by the Iraqi Army and also by many Kurdish irregulars (Marr 1985: 58). The Assyrian community continued to harbour anti-government sentiment thereafter. On occasion they cooperated with the Kurdish nationalists (as in the 1960s), but the Kurdish-Assyrian relations too remain sensitive even to this day.

(2) The Yazidi Kurds

The Yazidi community launched a major resistance to the state in the early 1930s. The Yazidis were Kurds by ethnicity but kept their unique sectarian identity throughout the Ottoman period. They insulated themselves in the Sinjar mountains bordering Syria and did not assimilate with their Sunni Kurd neighbours. As the Syro-Iraqi border was settled in October 1932, Yazidis on both sides of the border resisted the penetration of state authorities. Specifically, a major disturbance started when thousands of Syrian Yazidis defied the conscription law imposed by the Syrian government. Similarly, the Iraqi Yazidis fled to Syria when the Iraqi authority imposed universal conscription (Fuccaro 1994).

By the joint operation of the Iraqi and Syrian governments in 1937, the Yazidi migration to and from Syria came to a halt. However, the Yazidis remained alienated from an Iraqi state dominated by the Sunni Arabs. From around the 1950s the Yazidi community finally began to mingle with the neighbouring Sunni Kurdish community (McDowall 1996). Throughout Iraqi history, anti-government rebellions by the
Yazidis broke out from time to time. In the 1960s, some 50,000 Yazidis rebelled against the government and this rebellion was known to have caused much disruption to the Iraqi Army fighting the Kurds in the same area (O’Ballance 1973: 126).

(3) The Kurds

Compared with the widespread revolts by the Kurds in Turkey, Iraqi Kurdistan during the first ten years of state formation was relatively quiet. A British official recorded that Iraqi Kurdistan was generally ‘unaffected by the uprising and repression in Turkish Kurdistan’ and ‘normal administration of an elementary type prevailed in all four of the Kurdish provinces’ (Longrigg 1953: 157).

The new Iraqi government issued an announcement guaranteeing that Kurdish officials were to be appointed in Kurdish areas, and the Kurds’ rights to their own language were to be protected by the Local Languages Law (1926). These positive measures were intended to satisfy the prerequisite for Iraq’s entry into the League of Nations. According to the Local Languages Law, the Kurds could use Kurdish for primary education and for publishing. It also instructed that the elections in all Kurdish areas were to be held under Kurdish control. However, these measures were viewed with suspicion by the Arabs: the Arab ministers in Baghdad, of whom the majority were Sunni, tended to dismiss Kurdish national rights as having no foundation except in the minds of the British advisers who were anxious to weaken national unity (Sluglett 1976: 183). Kurdish national rights were thus associated with Britain’s alleged intention to weaken the solidarity of the state. Moreover, the Shia Arabs were estimated to be particularly sensitive to the autonomous status given to the Kurds. The British administration feared that ‘privileges granted to the Kurds
would be demanded immediately by the Shias of the Euphrates, whose watchful jealousy remained a major element in the Arab-Kurdish question’ (Longrigg 1953: 196).

Meanwhile, the end of the Mandate and the signing of the 1930 Anglo-Iraq Treaty brought strong tension to the north. In an effort to emphasise Iraqi citizens’ equality, the Anglo-Iraq Treaty contained no reference to the Kurds’ distinct status within Iraq. The treaty’s silence on Kurdish national rights was also due to Britain’s decision to support the Iraqi government’s foreign policy, particularly its alignment with Turkey which was sensitive to the Kurds’ autonomous status (Lukitz: 33). In consequence strikes and demonstrations were carried out by townspeople, traders and workers broke out in the Kurdish forum of Sulaimaniya. Significantly, these protests were not dominated by tribal Kurds, and manifested ‘perhaps the first evidence’ of popular Kurdish nationalism (O’Ballance 1996: 20).

Anti-government rebellion broke out in the tribal mountainous area as well. The first major one was led by Shaikh Mahmoud. Mahmoud had originally been appointed as a governor by the British administration, but he continuously disobeyed the British and Iraqi authorities, detesting any elements of foreign rule. When Mahmoud was defeated, his rebellion was succeeded by Shaikh Ahmad Barzani, an elder brother of the future Kurdish nationalist leader Mustafa Barzani. Despite the fact that the Barzani tribe belonged to the landowning class of the Kurds, the Barzanis had less property to protect and distinguished themselves from other landlords by being Kurdish nationalists (Jawad 1981: 53). Shaikh Ahmad Barzani’s rebellion took place between 1932 and 1933. Assisted by tribes hostile to the Barzanis and by the Royal
Air Force, the Iraqi government mounted punitive attacks into Barzani territory. The bombardment was severe and up to eighty per cent of all living quarters were destroyed (Schmidt: 99). Barzani resistance continued until 1934 when the Iraqi government issued an amnesty to Shaikh Ahmad and Mustafa Barzani on condition that the family would leave the Barzan territory and go further south to Sulaimaniya. These Barzanis remained under house arrest until they escaped the city in the mid-1940s to resume the rebellion.

In the late 1930s, sporadic Kurdish rebellions took place mostly around the mountainous area between Iraq, Iran and Turkey. The Kurdish fighters’ crossing into the neighbouring states alarmed all three governments, and they concluded a 1937 Saadbad Pact, in which defence policies against the Kurds were coordinated. The Saadbad Pact of 1937 dealt a considerable blow to the Kurdish nationalists by obstructing cross-border movements and by removing their shelters in the neighbouring states (Entessar 1992: 54).

The Rise of Pan-Arabism

After independence, the conflict between the more moderate Iraq-first policy, based on territorial state unity rather than pan-Arab unity and radical Pan-Arabism created a constant tension in domestic politics. Of particular importance, the Iraq-first policy was advocated by the moderate socialist group, Ahali, whose priority in policy making was socioeconomic reforms. The Ahali group was founded in 1930 and was supported by urban intellectuals. The group’s publication became highly influential in Baghdad (Penrose: 87, Khadduri 1960: 69).
The ideologues of the Ahali group first seized political power in the coup of 1936, which was Iraq’s first military coup. The general who led the coup, Bakr Sidqi, was an ethnic Kurd but described as an Iraqi patriot. Hikmat Sulayman, Sidqi’s civilian collaborator, took responsibility in political affairs. In accordance with the Fabian-style socialism, Sulayman’s government advocated a land redistribution policy. Hikmat Sulayman’s cabinet attempted to get hold of the vast Lazmah titles acquired through personal connections. However, the cabinet was resented by Arab nationalist circles, and also by the conservative landowners who feared the regime’s policy would result in the loss of their properties (Marr 1985: 76). Bakr Sidqi was identified as a ‘Kurdish upstart’ by his political opponents and was accused of favouring a pro-Kurdish policy, as many Kurds were awarded promotions in the army (Lukitz: 87). Sidqi was known to have responded to such criticism by emphasizing his half-Arab origin. His view focused on ‘Iraq’ instead of ‘Arab unity’ and could be summarised by the following quote ‘I keenly sympathise with the Arab cause; however, I feel compelled to establish my own country first on a firm footing’ (FO371/20015 as in Lukitz: 87). In 1937, Arab nationalists pressed for removal of Sidqi’s adherents from top political posts, and he was assassinated. Iraq entered an era of instability marked by a number of military coups.

Pan-Arabism particularly gained popularity during the 1940s due to the second British occupation during the Second World War, and also due to the deplorable treatment of Palestinian refugees. The Arab nationalist, Rashid Ali, rose to power out of the confrontation between pro-British politicians and nationalistic army officers. The British requested that Iraq break its diplomatic relations with Italy, and this heightened tension among army officers who favoured Germany and other Axis
countries. In May, British attempted a military intervention to overthrow Rashid Ali. The nationalist Iraqi government, in turn, warned that British planes would be fired upon if they used any Iraqi air base. The warning was interpreted by Britain as a declaration of war and therefore Britain occupied Iraq once again. This second British occupation was deeply resented by the Iraqis, even by the moderate intellectuals (Penrose: 92). It must also be noted that the ongoing Arab-Israeli war helped spread radical Arab nationalism, and soon the Iraq-first policy lost its appeal (Khadduri 1969: 247). By 1939, the pan-Arabist group established a firm stronghold in the Army especially among the younger officers educated in Baghdad (Tachau 1994: 178). Despite the above trend, however, it must also be noted there had always been advocates of the Iraq-first policy, even though they never became a dominant faction. Batatu commented that such Iraqists embraced ‘officers of Kurdish, Turcoman, or mixed ethnic origin, or Arab officers - Shia or Sunni - who, for one reason or another, desired no change in the existing distribution of social power’ (Batatu: 29).

**Interim Summary**

Kurdish integration to the Iraqi state was initiated through recruitment to the army on the one hand and the empowering of the landed shaikhs on the other. However, political socialisation through the military did not facilitate a significant integration of the Kurds because their representation in the army was relatively low, and also the staff college discriminated against the Kurds from the time of the 1940s Barzani rebellion. National integration was problematic in Iraq for several reasons. The problem was not simply in the fact that the state was artificially comprised of several sizable minorities. Rather, the obstacles seem to have been mainly political: First, the state institutions had come to be dominated by the Sunni Arabs. This dominance,
particularly in the armed forces, appeared to have alienated the Shia Arabs and the Kurds. Second, pan-Arabism gained considerable popularity in the broader population owing to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, and also through opposition to British occupation. And third, social reforms that might have benefited ordinary Kurds were never carried out because of the combined opposition posed by the radical pan-Arabists and the conservative landowners who sided with them.

**The Kurdish Democratic Party**

A series of international events in 1945 and 1946, as a result, contributed to establishing the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the Kurdish nationalists’ first political party. By the 1940s the wave of modernisation had created a new generation of Kurdish nationalists who began to question the authoritarian decision-making methods of the senior nationalist leaders whose followers were mostly tribally motivated.

Events leading to the establishment of the KDP began with the resumption of the Barzani rebellion in the early 1940s. Since the mid-1930s, Mustafa Barzani had been under house arrest and was still there when the revolt led by his brother Shaikh Ahmad Barzani was crushed by a joint Turkish-Iraqi campaign in 1935. In November 1943, however, Mustafa Barzani decided to flee his forced residence in Sulaimaniya. After escaping the arrest, Barzani and his followers began attacking Iraqi army and police posts.

Britain advised the Nuri al-Said government on a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish revolt, and the Minister of State, Majid Mustafa, who himself was of Kurdish origin,
was sent to negotiate. Not much is published about Majid Mustafa, but it is known that he served the Iraqi state on the conviction that doing so would advance the long-term interest of the Kurds within Iraq (Dann 1978). Although the Hashimite monarchy’s overall policy on the Kurds was elite-biased, the role played by an individual like Majid Mustafa manifested a real, if limited, potential for political integration. Nuri al-Said’s government showed a conciliatory attitude, agreeing to measures such as the appointment of more Kurds to public offices, and the building of more schools and hospitals in the Kurdish region (Schmidt: 100). However, the negotiation did not succeed because the Iraqi government was soon replaced by Arab nationalists, who undertook repressive policies towards the Kurds.

The confrontation between Barzani’s forces and the government continued, and the Kurdish tribes hostile to Barzani were used for the government’s operation. Hostilities continued throughout the summer of 1945, and Mustafa Barzani was encircled by the government and anti-nationalist tribes. It was said that the Iraqi government concentrated a force of 30,000 (Schmidt: 101). On 7 August 1945 the government army attacked Barzani territory and caused heavy losses. Mustafa Barzani and his brother Shaikh Ahmed finally decided to move outside Iraq in January 1946. On crossing the Iranian border, they joined the founders of the Mahabad Republic.

The Mahabad Republic had been founded in 1945 in the city of Mahabad in northern Iran, with strong Soviet backing. The republic provided a sanctuary for the Iraqi Kurds, and the Kurdish Democratic Party was established in its capital. The republic, however, collapsed within less than a year when the Soviets withdrew their support and the city was taken back by the Iranian forces. The Kurdish Democratic Party in
Mahabad was closed down, but its branch in Iraq survived. The KDP's 'Iraqi branch' (thereafter, the KDP) absorbed a section of the Hewa (Hope) group, which was one of the earliest Kurdish political parties, established by the Iraqi Kurds during this period. Hewa was composed of lawyers, teachers, and journalists and had been based in Kirkuk. The organisation evolved into two main offshoots, one was a moderate nationalist group, Rizgari (liberation), and the other an ostensibly Marxist group, Sharash (revolution). The latter was later absorbed into the Iraqi Communist Party (Khadduri 1978: 91-2). Thus even though the Mahabad Republic was eliminated from the map, its first political party survived in Iraqi Kurdistan to be joined by local nationalists.

**Weak Mass Base**

The KDP's activity in Iraqi Kurdistan was not free of Kurdish society's internal divisions. Even after the KDP was established, party members found it difficult to organise the mass of people into the party. This was because the majority of the Kurds then had been left under the direct influence of tribal leaders and remained tribally motivated as well as deeply religious (Jawad in Niblock: 47). Since the state's foundation, public education had not advanced much in the north. Although the Iraqi education system allowed Kurdish to be taught in the first four grades in primary schools, the general level of education remained the lowest in the country (Lukitz: 125).

A gulf was created between the traditional leadership represented by Mustafa Barzani and the small intelligentsia, who tended to look down on Barzani's tribal and religious background. At the same time, the tribal leaders viewed the younger members of the
KDP and their socialist beliefs with suspicion, and as a result they became unpopular among the tribal Kurds (Jawad 1981: 160). The infusion of socialist-inclined ideology was partly a consequence of the disparity between the rich aghas and the poverty-stricken peasants, which appears to have been worse in the irrigated zone of lowland Kurdistan (Gabbay: 102). Particularly after the Iraqi revolution, these aghas became aware that the revolution had unleashed 'forces that were inimical to them' (Pelletiere: 152-3).

The KDP, however, knew they depended for strength on cooperation with the tribes and avoided direct confrontation with the tribal leaders or any direct mention of class struggle within Kurdish society. Overall, the tribal system remained unopposed by the party (Jawad 1981: 21-2). Even if aghas and shaikhs were detested on ideological grounds, they still exercised authority in the community.

However, the absence of Mustafa Barzani during his twelve-year exile in the Soviet Union after 1946 facilitated leftist-domination of the KDP leadership, and the gap between the tribal chiefs and the party activists widened. Because of this, on his return from the Soviet Union in 1958, Mustafa Barzani became a mere 'nominal chairman' of the KDP, and spoke bitterly of the 'alleged cowardice, inefficiency and intellectual presumptuousness of the KDP politicians' (Dann: 335). Mustafa Barzani's acceptance of the 1964 ceasefire with the Aref government even though it contained no explicit mention of Kurdish autonomy, was criticised by the KDP's leadership (Jawad:153), Ibrahim Ahmad, Jalal Talabani and many others who raised questions about Barzani's unilateral decision (Khadduri 1978: 92). Intra-Kurdish fighting continued during the truce, but subsequent wars with the government forced the Kurds to set aside their
internal division. For example, the large-scale confrontation with the government in the 1960s pushed the antagonism below the threshold and made it increasingly unpopular to fight against Barzani-led Kurdish nationalists (Bruinessen 1992: 91). Mustafa Barzani was almost a born-leader of the Kurdish nationalists and was far more capable of drawing support and loyalty from his followers than the young intellectuals (Khadduri 1969: 177). This appears to have led the Kurdish leadership to be over-dependent on Barzani’s charisma and obstructed the development of an organised form of decision making. As will be recounted, the Kurdish nationalists were divided over the Baath regime’s proposal of an autonomy plan in the 1970s. On this occasion, too, Barzani was solely responsible for negotiations with the Baath government, and he proved incapable of rallying young men under his leadership which was considered too authoritarian (Khadduri 1978: 92). It was not until the heavy defeat in 1976 that the alternative leadership (the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the PUK) was established by Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani but this merely divided the Kurdish national movement. Thus the persistent division in the Kurdish nationalist movement originates in the 1940s. In later decades it blended into personal rivalries between the Barzani and Talabani factions within the nationalists.

Summary

Under the monarchy, the Kurds in Iraq were clearly divided into the pro-government landed class and the Arab nationalists. The Kurdish landed elite were coopted into the state, but they distanced themselves from the Kurdish nationalists, and thus Kurdish nationalism was in no sense incorporated into the Iraqi state, even though the Kurds made up a considerable part of the landed elite. The Iraqi Kurds were able to retain their language and culture, in contrast to Turkish Kurds who were subject to an
assimilationist policy under Kemalism. However, this relative advantage did not become the foundation for Kurdish integration into a bi-national Iraq, because firstly the Anglo-Iraqi relations occupied the primary political agenda, and secondly the tension with Britain and the Arab-Israeli wars made inflamed radical Arab nationalism among the opposition and within the Army which was intolerant of minority rights. Thus, on the whole, Iraq became an elite-biased and Sunni-Arab dominated state. The government’s ban on political parties further diminished the prospect for accommodating the needs of the poorer majority as well as Kurdish nationalism. Under the monarchy, not only did Arab and Kurdish nationalism became irreconcilable, but also the gap between the rich and poor widened sharply.
3. Political Mobilisation

Introduction

This section is about political mobilisation between the 1940s and the 1960s. From the 1940s, Turkey moved to a multi-party system, and political participation broadened considerably. Turkey also experienced major economic development and allowed greater geographic and social mobility to its citizens, although such development was less evident in the Kurdish southeast region. In contrast, the Iraqi government strengthened the ban on political parties from the 1940s and failed to accommodate political opposition to its parliamentary system. The Iraqi government also did not take heed of an increasing demand for social reforms and thereby prompted the revolution of 1958, which ushered in a period of intense instability and military rule. Thus, both political socialisation and economic development were delayed in Iraq. The two countries appeared to be taking very different paths to national integration.

Turkey

From Elitism to Clientelism

The Kemalist revolution, despite its radical appearance, had too conservative a nature to call it a true revolution. The Kemalists did not, after all, mobilise the greater part of the rural peasants for fear of politically alienating the powerful rural gentry. The Kemalist regime’s relative neglect of the countryside resulted in major centre-periphery gaps. As Joseph S. Szyliowicz wrote, ‘despite developments in the 1930s, only a limited degree of government penetration had occurred. Much of the rural
populace as we have seen, remained largely isolated from national trends. Ataturk's successor and close associate, Ismet Inonu inherited a situation in which serious problems, especially possible inter- and intra-elite conflict, could be expected' (Szyliowicz, in Tachau: 41). The failure to politically integrate peasants meant the clientelistic bond between the rural gentry and the peasants was to be strengthened, especially under multi-party competition, to be discussed below.

The Democrat Party and Multi-Party Competition

Transition to the multi-party system was made possible by Ataturk's successor Ismet Inonu, who allowed the establishment of the Democrat Party (DP) in 1946, led by Celal Bayan and Adnan Menderes. The DP had emerged from the following social context. After the Second World War, Turkey's merchants emerged immensely richer in both urban and rural areas. The wealthy merchants resented the RPP's statist policy and sought greater economic freedom through the alternative party. Their voice coincided with the demand for greater religious freedom as well, which had been suppressed under the previous Kemalist regime. These two social forces found their political expression in the DP. As already seen in the example of the short-lived Liberal Republican Party (LRP) established approximately a decade earlier, the social forces that had been silenced by the RPP's secular-statist policy remained strong, and their demands for greater economic and religious freedom needed to be accommodated in the political system. The multiparty system gave them the legitimate channels to express their political demands, and, at the same time, the Turkish state thereby institutionalised enough political participation and avoided the path to a praetorian regime.
The ranks of the DP were recruited primarily from rural notables, and in cases of the Kurdish southeast, from shaikhs and tribal chiefs. Because of their overwhelming influence over the villagers, these local leaders provided ‘ready vote banks’ in the elections (Sayari: 107). Those Kurdish notables that joined the DP were said to be ‘Kurds in ethnicity, but not necessarily advocates of Kurdish national rights’ (Kirsci and Winrow: 105). Rather, because of the weak penetration by the state into the periphery, they continued to assume the functions which should normally be performed by the state, such as distribution of justice and maintenance of law and order (Sayari: 110).

At the same time, patronage and clientelism became rampant. Slow economic development seemed to have been the primary factor that facilitated the spread of clientelism. Political participation in general was mainly motivated by material benefits, instead of the ideology of a political party. For example, there were instances of different party affiliations within the same family to ensure that whatever party won the elections, the family’s honour, prestige, and economic interests would not be affected (Sayari: 108). Also, Heper and Keyman noted, ‘a highly unequal distribution of income placed many in need of special favours; the multi-party system created incentives to use the resources of the state to win political competition; and the increased scope of the public sector facilitated the need to meet the localised and particular demands of the constituencies through political patronage’ (Heper and Keyman 1998: 261-2).

Thus, it was unmistakable that political participation had been considerably broadened by the transition to the multi-party system. The new democratic system,
however, did not go as far as to accommodate Kurdish national rights. It remained largely a means to material gains needed for the everyday lives of the people in the countryside, owing to the weak government penetration of such areas. Furthermore, local notables’ political importance had increased as vote-providers. Thus the state failed to establish a direct ‘state-citizen link’ and made the people even more reliant on local notables.

Islamic Revival and the Kurds

The restriction put on Islamic organisations was greatly relaxed during the DP’s era. The teaching of Islam in Turkish schools began in 1948, and the DP took a far less secular approach towards Turkish society as a whole. As Kinnane described, ‘the policies of the DP went further towards easing the pressure of “modernisation” on the lives of villagers, religious functionaries and the remaining nomads. It also tolerated a remarkably vigorous religious reaction to the years of laicism. The dervish shaikhs reappeared and political power began to return to them and the village notables’ (Kinnane: 31). Kurdish shaikhs were no exceptions and that they too benefited from this era’s Islamic revival (Bruinessen 1992: 253). The degree of relaxation was such that: ‘the radio station began broadcasting recitation of Quran and call to the prayer was heard in Arabic again ... Islam was no longer frowned upon. Islamic sects remained illegal, but in fact were tolerated and edged their way onto the political scene’ (MER July-August 1988).

This religious freedom facilitated some Kurds’ participation in organised political activity through Islamic groups. A remarkable example was the Nurcu movement, which meant the followers of Nur (divine light). The Nurcu movement was founded
by a Kurd who was known to be a reputable Islamic scholar, Said Nursi (1873-1960), also known by his adopted name, Said Kurdi. The Nurcu movement grew rapidly during the 1950s and 60s. Nursi maintained an opposition to Kemalist reforms and adopted a modern interpretation of Islam. Though once a supporter of Mustafa Kemal during the Turkish War of Independence, Nursi had fallen out with Mustafa Kemal because of his secularist views. Nursi had also been active in Kurdish nationalist organisations in the early twentieth century, but he was known to be 'more interested in the education and moral uplifting of his fellow Kurds than in separatism' (Bruinessen 1992: 258). The movement followed by both the Kurds and the Turks incorporated broad segments of Turkey's multi-ethnic society. It was said there was 'no clear centre of gravity (in the movement's adherents), but Kurds seem to be slightly over-represented in the movement' (Bruinessen 1992: 259). In later decades, one of the offshoots of Nurcu (Fethullah) had come to own its own TV channel, publishing company and also the influential daily Zaman (Zubaida, MER April-June 1996). It seemed Islamic organisations were highly effective in accommodating the Kurds' political participation in the framework of mainstream Turkish politics, if only by completely avoiding direct mention of Kurdish national rights. Today, Fethullah is known as a strong supporter of the centre-right True Path Party, and has influential connections within the party.

Regional Gap

Meanwhile, national service and expansion of the telecommunication network began to change rural life. Expansion of rail and road networks gave people greater opportunity to migrate to the cities. Also, conscription to the military gave the Turkish youth a merit-based opportunity and provided them with education and vocational
training. Rapid advances in communication mobilised the people in the countryside to participate in national politics.

'Radios were soon to be found in every coffee house or party locale. The army, reorganised and modernised with American support, proved to be an important means of reinforcing the changes taking place in rural areas for the peasant draftees became part of a new environment in which they were exposed to modernism. Long isolated from national life, the rural masses now began to develop political awareness and, as a result of the DP's organising efforts, gained a channel through which to articulate demands' (Szyliowicz in Tachau: 43).

The military was also potentially the strongest vehicle of disseminating Turkish 'nation-state' nationalism because of the broadness of the social stratum from which the recruits were drawn. As Frey wrote: 'The army had always drawn its recruits from a wider circle than the religious hierarchy, with its entrenched dynasties of rank and wealth, or the bureaucracy, with its inevitable bias in favour of the capital and its insistence on traditional, formal education' (Frey: 138). This certainly seems to have facilitated political socialisation; however, the beneficiaries of this greater geographic and social mobility were rather confined to the population whose first language was Turkish. It was because public education, based on monolingual policy, turned out to be highly inefficient in educating the Kurdish children. Secondly, the geographic mobility of the Kurdish region remained lower compared to other parts of the country.

As for problems generated by monolingual education, a Kurd from Turkey who was 44 years old (in 2000) recalled:
'I was born in 1956 in Cermik, that was the Kurdish name, but the town's name was changed to Bingol later. Until I entered primary school at the age of seven, I could not speak Turkish at all. In school, it was not even possible to ask questions in Kurdish. I had to learn Turkish by force. It was difficult. It took me about ten years to be able to master Turkish. Some pupils still could not speak Turkish even years after starting the school education. The government established boarding schools in many parts of the country, primarily in the southeast, in cities such as Erzerum, Malatya, and Mersin. I went to one of them. I was brainwashed, and believed that we were the Turks. At the age of twelve to thirteen, I thought we were the real Turks. It created a conflict within the family, because our parents could not speak Turkish at all' (Kerim Yildiz).

Because the ability to speak Turkish well was a prerequisite to the economic opportunities, the Kurds who grew up in an overwhelmingly Kurdish-speaking environment were at a considerable disadvantage. Furthermore, because of slow expansion of the economy, there were weak environmental factors that facilitated the Kurds' speaking Turkish. After decades of armed revolts, the economic development of the southeastern region was lagging behind. 'In spite of the railways and roads, the inherent financial difficulties of the Turkish Government has precluded an extensive programme of industrial and agricultural renovation in the eastern vilayets, such a build-up being chiefly confined to the western provinces inhabited by Turks, where great progress has been realised during the last thirty-five years (since the 1930s)' (Arfa: 45). Thus, the Kurds in the southeastern region were less socially mobilised and less economically developed, constituting a serious challenge to national
integration. Even in 1955, as many as one-half million people in Turkey listed Kurdish as their mother tongue and another 225,000 Turkish speakers claimed it as a second language (Frey: 110). This suggests that the monolingual policy was not as effective as it was envisaged to be.

The evidence of concentrated land-ownership also underlined the continued impoverishment of the rural area. Between 1947 and 1962 only 1.8 million hectares were distributed under land reform to 360,000 families, with only 8,600 hectares being taken from privately owned land (Ahmad 1993: 115). These statistics did not apply to the entire region, however. Inequalities of land tenure were much more severe in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces (Sayari: 110). The living conditions of rural Kurdish peasants did not improve despite the growth in the agricultural industry during the 1950s. Turkish agriculture underwent an export boom in the 1950s, but the method of production was primitive, and it simply relied on increasing the amount of newly cultivated area, which had swelled from 13,900,000 hectares in 1948 to 22,940,000 hectares in 1959 (Ahmad 1993: 116). The agricultural export boom that followed the 1950s mostly benefited the landlords and merchants. Moreover, the newly growing economy expanded faster in western Turkey than into the predominantly Kurdish southeastern region. A village study indicated that modernization of agriculture and improvement in transportation after 1930 contributed to the replacement of a dominant stratum of aghas by a rising group of merchants in western Turkey. In such areas, the people had stopped working for aghas and were integrated into a national economic system (Hopkins: 21-2). On the contrary, mechanisation of farms in Diyarkakir, known for its predominantly Kurdish
population, reduced villagers to the status of wage labourers and thus, modernisation there had a considerably different outcome (Hopkins: 21-2).

A demographic study also showed the lower mobility of the Kurdish region compared with the rest of the country. The gap was noticeable from the male-female percentage. Generally, in most of the provincial areas, there was an excess of female population where the male population was thought to have left for work in the cities. However, in the predominantly Kurdish southeastern Anatolia, the picture was different. An excess of male population was characteristic, which was attributed to the low rate of labour migration and also to the possible under-recording of females (Dewdney in Clarke and Fisher: 40-67).

Interim Summary

The monolingual policy inherited from the previous regime, particularly the complete exclusion of Kurdish from schools, caused great learning problems and consequentially created a great obstacle to Turkish national integration. This was made worse by the slow expansion of the economy as employment opportunities that would otherwise have encouraged the Kurds to learn Turkish were few.

As evident in the informant’s (and his peers’) experience, in order to learn Turkish successfully, school classes must be taught in combination with Kurdish. The failure of state education in this crucial aspect reduced the prospects for Kurdish speakers’ successful integration, which was aggravated by the slow expansion of the economy. The state’s failure to carry out effective land reforms also appears to have played a part in the poverty in rural areas. It must be pointed out that unlike costly land
reforms, bilingual education was readily realisable. Bilingual education would have facilitated faster integration of the bulk of the poorer stratum of Kurds to the Turkish economy. Instead, the illiterate Kurdish people working under aghas were caught in between assimilationist policies of the state on one hand, and exploitation by their aghas on the other.

The 1960 Military Intervention

The 1960 military intervention against the DP government was facilitated by both economic and political factors. There were chronic inflation and social instability throughout the 1950s. The rapid growth rate of the Turkish economy had slowed down from 13 to 9.5 per cent but with inflation spiralling at a rate of 18 per cent a year (Ahmad 1993: 116). Major cities began to develop slums and the dichotomy between the rich and the poor widened. At the same time, the DP’s rule became increasingly corrupt and the party began to repress all political oppositions. The DP government started to impose authoritarian measures over the bureaucracy, press and judiciary, which alienated both military and civilian organisations. Relations with the military were particularly made worse because the DP historically had weak ties with the military. The event that directly triggered the military intervention was said to be the DP’s move toward restriction on parliamentary activities (Harris: 158). In April 1960, the government banned all political activity outside the parliament, which was a move indirectly targeted at suppressing the rival RPP’s activity. Following this measure, riots and disturbances spread across the country, and finally the military decided to intervene on 27 May 1960. The new military regime executed the former premier Adnan Menderes on the charge of bringing the country into a national crisis.
Kemalism Restored

The military regime basically aimed at a restoration of Kemalism, consisting of the famous Six Principles (republicanism, rationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism), and took the same approach to the Kurds. The Kurdish shaikhs, on the other hand, considered the new military regime ‘irreligious and radical’ (Arfa: 46). The military’s treatment of the Kurds was harsh all the more because many Kurdish notables were in the ranks of the DP. It was said that of those shaikhs who were arrested, ‘all but one had been members of the DP’ (Gunter 1997: 8). About 485 Kurdish notables were arrested, of whom 55 were highly influential ones. They were deported from southeastern to western Anatolia, to cities such as Bursa and Izmir (Gunter 1997: 8). Although the suppression of the Kurdish shaikhs was based more on ideological than ethnic grounds, the subsequent Turkification of the southeastern village names indicated that these suppressive measures were taken for the purpose of eliminating the Kurdish culture. The regime suppressed the Kurdish shaikhs for their alleged corruption and backwardness; however, the Kurdish culture itself also became the target of suppression. In the campaign to rename Kurdish villages, for example, the Kurdish town name ‘Dersim’ was renamed to the Turkish ‘Tunceli’ which is still in use today. The military regime threatened armed intervention against any disturbances in reaction to these measures (Barkey and Fuller: 14).

Thus the 1960 military regime treated Kurds in the same manner as the Kemalist regime did in the 1920s, simply labelling them as reactionary. Indeed, from the viewpoint of the military, the religious shaikhs who benefited from the patronage of the DP may well have been ‘reactionary’. However, it was also true that so long as the state authorities failed to penetrate the Kurdish region, many Kurds were reliant on
such notables for their livelihood. The source of problems was not in the Kurds’ religiosity, but in the social structure which the Turkish state failed to reform. As Mesut Yegen put it, ‘when the Kurdish question is identified with reactionary politics, tribal resistance and so on, the Turkish state is enunciating an attack on the social space wherein Kurdishness is constituted’ (Yegen 1996). The following account showed that the policies taken by the 1960 military regime only alienated the bulk of the Kurds:

‘The deportation of the patriarchal chiefs of clans created discontent among their relatives and retainers several thousand of whom were likewise deported to the west which was a great hardship to them. Instead of decreasing, the discontent of the Kurds took a more violent form: hold-ups and armed robberies became such a frequent occurrence that the Government discouraged tourists from travelling in the eastern provinces’ (Arfa: 46).

Had the Kemalist’s modernisation policies been more suitable to the Kurds, the structure of Kurdish society could have been different, and thus less reliant on the tribal leaders. Just as the old social structure of the village in western Turkey collapsed rapidly with the expansion of new economy, there was a possibility that the Kurdish region could have changed in a similar manner. The Kurdish question and the society wherein the Kurds live are in fact inseparable, and it misses the point if the Turkish authorities merely denounce the Kurdish patriarchial chiefs for being tribal or reactionary.

Legacies of Military Intervention
The military regime itself was short-lived, and political power was voluntarily relinquished to the civilian government in October 1961 after the general election. However, the military regime set an important precedent that would affect the political life of Turkey over the next decades. The key legacy was, first of all, the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC). In this body, the leaders of the armed forces asserted the right to consult with, and be consulted by, the civilian political leadership over matters deemed to affect national security, and constitutional backing was given to the NSC’s views. In other words, in any matters deemed by the NSC as a ‘threat’ to national security, the military would enjoy constitutional rights and authority. The NSC would use this authority largely to repress political activity it considered subversive, including especially Kurdish nationalist activism.

The second important legacy of the military intervention was constitutional amendment. The 1961 Constitution provided for unprecedented political freedom as it modified party law so as to facilitate formation of new political parties. Also, by amending a majority-list system, the electoral system came to be based on proportional representation. On top of this, the Constitutional Court was established to curtail the potential abuse of power by the government. These reforms were aimed at preventing the re-emergence of authoritarian government and were also attempts to re-institutionalise the state in Turkish politics (Heper and Keyman 1998). As a result of the expanded scope of rights and liberties, new capacity was given for various political groups that raised their own political agendas. Thus, ‘democracy flourished, but so did dissident groups’ (Landau: 314). This also accelerated activities of ideologically motivated groups, such as Marxists, the Right Wing Turkish nationalists, Kurdish nationalists and Islamists, to be discussed below.
The Justice Party

After the 1961 election, a coalition government was formed between the newly formed Justice Party (a successor of DP) and the Republican People’s Party. Ismet Inonu was elected as the prime minister. The popularity of the JP began to outstrip the RPP, and by the general election held in October 1965, Ismet Inonu was defeated by Suleyman Demirel, who had been elected the leader of the Justice Party. In this election, the Justice Party obtained as much as 52.9 per cent of the total vote and 240 seats out of a 540-seat parliament. Not surprisingly, the JP, as a direct heir of the DP, was closely linked to financial circles, multinational companies, and major Kurdish notables (Kendal: 83). The JP attracted high support in the Kurdish region throughout the election campaign through its promise of investment programmes and economic development. However, being the mainstream Turkish political party, the JP never explicitly advocated Kurdish national rights.

Suleyman Demirel was the leader of the generation, and in a way, he embodied increased social mobility in the Turkish-speaking population by proving that those who are of humble origins could rise to the top. He built a fortune in the construction business and became increasingly popular among urban migrants as a symbol of the ‘self-made man’ (Ahmad 1993: 139). The rise of Suleyman Demirel was symbolic of the socioeconomic change in the 1960s and 1970s. Characteristic of the Turkish economy during these decades was its substantial growth in the agricultural sector due to the spread of new technologies such as irrigation, introduction of high-yield wheat, and increased use of fertiliser. The increased construction of dams contributed to the spread of irrigation (Harris: 77). It was also an era of overall industrial growth as well.
Turkey’s GNP increased by 7 per cent. However, the high growth was also accompanied by high inflation, which was inherited from the DP’s economic policy. The JP government could not solve the problems such as high unemployment and growing income disparity, and the benefits of economic development were not evenly distributed (Tachau 1994: 571).

Revival of Kurdish Nationalism

The new phenomenon of the 1960s was the resurfacing of Kurdish nationalism. Armed rebellions by the Kurdish nationalists had been almost completely silenced since the late 1930s. However, the 1960s political reforms and socioeconomic change generated revival of Kurdish nationalism from a completely new strata; not from tribal shaikhs or from Ottoman army officers, but from leftist intellectuals and politicised workers. As Szyliowicz wrote, ‘In 1964 workers numbered almost a million, 34 per cent of whom were unionised ... only after the 1960 revolution, when unions were granted new rights, did the labour movement become a potent economic and political force’ (Szyliowicz in Tachau: 57). Another contributing factor to the resurgence of Kurdish nationalism in the 1960s was Mustafa Barzani’s military success against the Iraqi government (Bruinessen 1992: 32-3). Everyone knew of his military success against the Iraqi government, and Turkey could no longer insist ‘there were no Kurds’. Many of the Turkish workers, highly critical of the government's policy, disapproved of the official attitude towards the Kurds and openly said that there were Kurds in Turkey. Turkey's political left continued to be active throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as will be discussed in a later section.

Growth of Islamic Opposition
By the late 1960s the Justice Party had come to be increasingly identified with big business in Istanbul and among foreign investors. Demirel, facing growing opposition, strengthened his ties with the military and began to adopt its Kemalist ideology. The official ideology taken by the Justice Party was ‘everybody who lived in Turkey was a Turk’ (Kendal: 83). Demirel sacrificed relations with his political opponents in favour of the military (Ahmad 1977: 240-241). The Islamist challenge first surfaced inside the JP itself as well. It was because the JP was a ‘catch all party’ propagating a broad ideology which aimed to embrace ‘secularist intellectuals and reactionary Islamists, officers and the anti-military, former Democrats of all hues and those new to politics’ (Ahmad 1993: 240). The cost of this was the lack of cohesion within the party, and the Islamist, or Caliphatist as they were sometimes called, led by Kadri Erogan, threatened his Demirel’s leadership.

The Caliphatist challenge, however, was not just a matter of intra-party competition. It indicated the growing trend of Islamic revival in Turkish society as a whole. For the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, an Islamist Party (the National Order Party) was established in 1970 by a leader of the Naqshbandi order, Mehmet Zahit Koktu. The National Order Party appealed to people who were uprooted from their traditional community through migration and settled in the cities, living face to face with strangers. ‘Semi urbanised and urban Muslims began using diverse cultural categories to construct new identities to deal with the challenges presented by industrialisation, migration from traditional villages to urban centres, the expansion of state power, and the popularisation of knowledge through mass communication’ (Yavuz 1997: 66).
The National Order Party was one of the newly established Islamist parties which represented the interests of medium to small business against big business based in Istanbul, which largely supported Demirel. The National Order Party would be immediately banned after the 1971 military intervention, to be discussed later, but would re-establish itself in 1972 as the National Salvation Party (NSP).

Summary

With the introduction of a multi-party system and political liberalisation, the Kurds were accommodated into the Turkish political system in several different ways. The first was through political patronage, the second through Islamic movements, and the third through leftist organisations. Of all, patronage politics appeared to have been most dominant, as the Kurdish region remained less developed which made the people more reliant on local notables than in the rest of the country where greater mobility was being established. The language problem appeared to have aggravated the regional gap: when everything was delivered in Turkish, the Kurds who did not know a word of Turkish were less socially mobilised and remained in a less economically developed environment. It was phenomenal of this era that the Islamic organisation became a growing counter-weight to the military establishment to which a considerable number of Kurds were attracted as well. The resurgence of Kurdish nationalism and leftist ideology among urban workers, on the other hand, showed that urbanised Kurds were susceptible to advanced politicisation.
Iraq

By the late 1950s there was a universal feeling in Iraq that the parliament and the cabinet were corrupt and had turned into enclaves of privilege. That sentiment was strong in the army, in which the bulk of officers were drawn from the poorer strata of the society (Batatu: 764-765). While there was growing discontent, the government failed to broaden political participation. Instead, it banned all political oppositions in 1954. In the following year, Iraq's proposed entry into the Baghdad Pact, which involved military cooperation with Britain, added fuel to the growing unpopularity of the government. While the declaration of the United Arab Republic was made between the radical Syrian and Egyptian regimes, the Iraqi government made a counter-proposal to unite the two monarchies of Jordan and Iraq. It was said that these moves provided momentum for the opposition groups to carry out the coup d'état that ended the monarchy in July 1958 (Penrose: 202). From the perspective of political development, the 1958 Revolution completely eliminated the British influence and paved the way for state-building by the hands of Iraqis. In other words, Iraq, as a state, only entered the phase of centre-building as completed by Ataturk in Turkey in the 1920s at this late date. However, unlike Turkey both ideological and socio-economic divisions ran deep, inherited from the elite-biased integration policy during the monarchy. The political mobilisation unleashed by the revolution exceeded state building and lead to chronic instability. Unable to integrate antagonising groups, the first revolutionary regime lasted for only five years. This section examines why the diverse sectarian groups failed to unite under the republican regime.

Free Officers
The Free Officers movement began its political activities in 1952. The organisation was completely clandestine and represented only five per cent of all Iraqi Army officers, numbering between 172 and 200 (Batatu: 783). It was predominantly Sunni Muslim and Arab in composition as well. There was no Kurdish member in its central organisation (the Supreme Committee), though 'a few Kurdish officers supported the movement hoping that it would be sympathetic to Kurdish national aspirations' (Khadduri 1969: 30-31). Generally, the percentage of both the Kurds and the Shia among higher-ranking army officers had long been low. It was also owing to the fact that from the mid-1940s, fewer and fewer Kurds had been admitted into the staff college (Batatu: 765). Among the fifteen members of the Supreme Committee, only three, including the chairman Abdul al-Karim Qassem, had 'non Arab-Sunni' roots (Batatu: 887, table). The political orientation of the key figures of the Free Officers varied: Qassem belonged to the moderate liberalist group while Abdul Salem Aref and Rifat al-Hajj Sirri were pan-Arabists.

National Union Front

As a whole, ideologies of the Iraqi opposition groups were diverse. In 1957, an umbrella organisation was established in order to coordinate different groups, which was named the National Union Front (NUF). Earlier, the two main opposition parties, the National Democrat Party (NDP) and the Independent Party, had applied for a merger. The government refused their application, however, and the two parties secretly established the NUF. Two other parties became members of the NUF, the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) and the Arab Socialist, or Baath, Party (Jawad in Kelidar 1979: 171-182).
The NDP was in close contact with Qassem, the chairman of the Free Officers movement. The NDP advocated moderate socialism and was also described as 'the true heir' of the Ahali group, which was influential during the 1930s among Baghdad’s urban intellectuals (Batatu: 305). Earlier in 1955, the NDP and the Independent Party formed a joint platform which included the concept that Kurds and Arabs were ‘partners’ in the Iraqi homeland (Jawad 1981: 22-23). This was a significant clause for the Kurds, however, the KDP’s application for the entry to the NUF was rejected as it was not able to obtain unanimous consent from the parties involved. Jawad also pointed to the fact that generally, during the pre-revolutionary era, the Kurdish conflict was a marginal issue in Iraqi politics as a whole (Jawad 1981: 22-23). However, the KDP then was closely affiliated with the ICP. Ideologically, the KDP’s top leadership was dominated by leftist intellectuals (especially during Mustafa Barzani’s exile years) and the ICP’s platform was very close to the KDP’s in all but Kurdish nationalism (O’Ballance: 65). The two parties had a Covenant of Cooperation, and the ICP had a section entirely dedicated to the Kurdish issue. Thus even if the KDP was not able to participate in the NUF, it can be assumed that the ICP substituted for its role.

Even after the NUF was established, however, opposition groups were far from united. Particularly, the ideological rift between the Baath Party and the ICP was irreconcilable. The Baath Party denied the class struggle among the Arab nation, and aimed to create an ‘Arab classless society’. The party also supported Iraq’s union with the United Arab Republic (Khadduri 1969: 114-6). The Iraqi Baath Party then was a relatively new organisation. The original branch of the Baath Party was originally founded by a Syrian teacher, Michael Aflaq and his colleagues in April 1947. The
founding members of the Syrian Baath Party had both Christian and Muslim backgrounds and advocated Arab secular nationalism transcending religious and sectarian differences. Class conflict too was rejected on the ground that it could be divisive to Arab unity. The Baath Party’s Iraqi branch was established by Fuad al-Rikabi in 1952, who was a Shia Arab from Nasiriya in Lower Euphrates. The original members of the Iraqi Baath Party were known to number only about one hundred (Tachau 1994: 190).

The July 1958 Revolution

The coup leaders of the Free Officers entered Baghdad in the early hours of 14 July 1958. The brigade led by Colonel Abdul Salam Aref seized the radio station and announced the fall of the Hashimite monarchy. The violence continued for a few days after the coup, but no large-scale resistance occurred. It was said that the general response to the coup was a favourable one and was ‘apparently popular among the people of Iraq of nearly all political points of view’ (Penrose: 207-8). The Second Infantry Division, a predominantly Kurdish unit based in Kirkuk, debated for ten hours before telegraphing their loyalty to the new regime (Zeidner 1959: 30), an ambivalence which possibly reflected their marginal participation in the Free Officer’s movement. It was known that even the less radical older generation of the Kurds expressed support for the revolutionary regime (Khadduri 1969: 175).

Early Days: Arab-Kurd Partnership

Abdul Karim Qassem, formerly the chairman of the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers movement, represented the newly created Sovereign Council of the state and became the Prime Minister. A Provisional Constitution was promulgated within
two weeks. Its third article declared that the Arabs and the Kurds were ‘partners in the common Iraqi homeland’. The new government strove to gain the support of the Kurds by appointing four Kurds as members of the first cabinet. The new Kurdish ministers were: Khalid an-Naqshbandi, Mustafa Ali, Dr. Muhammad Salih Mahmud and Baba Ali, a son of the Kurdish leader Shaikh Mahmud who rebelled against the British in the 1920s. An observer recorded ‘pains have been taken to popularise the concept of Arab-Kurdish cooperation and equality of rights under the Republic by frequent reference to this concept in the provisional constitution, in government decrees and in the public utterances of its spokesmen’ (Zeidner 1959: 30). The impact of these gestures was immense. It was a historic occasion as well, when the Iraqi state formally stipulated that the Kurds and the Arab were partners.

The provisional constitution, however, also declared that Iraq was part of a larger Arab nation (Article 2). This would later pose a conflict between the Kurdish nationalists and the government (Edmonds 1971). However, the initial euphoria of the revolution marginalised the discourse. By strengthening the Kurds, Qassem himself was thinking about a completely independent Iraq, free from Nasser’s influence. He genuinely wished for a reconciliation of the centrifugal force that made Iraq fragmented (Dann 1978).

The KDP welcomed the republican regime in its July 16th declaration which stated: ‘the KDP, the vanguard of the Kurdish liberation movement ... hails as a solid base for the welfare, freedom and equality of the Kurdish and Arab peoples the increasingly important Arab liberation movement, its success in liberating Iraq, the establishment of the Republican regime and the withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact...
ours party is determined to maintain and defend the Iraqi Republic with all its capabilities and power’ (Talabani 1971, quoted in Jawad 1981:37-8). It insisted the ‘Kurdish autonomy’ it wanted, did ‘not mean separation, nor a step towards it. Autonomy only means having a local identity within the Iraqi State. This aim has been adopted after a full consideration of our (Kurdish) people’s circumstances, and of those of the fraternal Arab people in Iraq’ (Jawad 1981: 93).

Indicative of the rapid political mobilisation that followed the revolution, the ICP’s membership swelled from about 500 during the previous decade, to 20,000 to 25,000 (Tachau 1994: 192). This seems to reflect its key role in the revolution and the magnitude of secretly-affiliated supporters it mobilised. As Batatu puts it, revolution ‘aroused to political life thousands of people from the manual labouring classes, and many of these had turned toward the Communists’ (Batatu: 849). These labouring classes vehemently attacked both urban and rural landlords as a symbol of exploitation. The revolutionary government, too, took anti-landlord measures, for example, by reducing the cultivators’ rents down by 20 per cent from the original rents (Penrose: 212).

Divisive Issues

The downfall of the monarchy, however, removed the ‘common enemy’ which held various opposition groups together whose individual goals were, in fact, incompatible. The Arab unionists and the Baath party were identified with the Sunni Muslims and naturally, the Shia Arabs and the Kurds were alienated from these groups (Dann 1969: 164). On the other hand, Qassem’s ideological position only became clear to everyone by the end of the summer of 1958; he had thrown his weight on the side of
particularism (Iraqism) and become the centre of its hopes (Batatu: 818). This approach was supported by the Arab Christians and Jews as well as Kurds and the Communists (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett: 77). Qassem’s policy of increasing minorities’ appointments to public posts, on the other hand, offended the Arab unionists (Penrose: 234). However, it must be pointed out that he did so in the belief that the ‘Iraqi people’ should enjoy complete equality of rights, and equality stood for the assimilation of varying groups to the vanishing point. For example, it was known that he assured a Kurdish delegate that the Kurds were an indivisible part of the Iraqi people (Dann 1969: 63). For the same reason, Qassem showed reserve towards the proposed Union with Egypt and Syria based on Arab nationality. Qassem’s views on the UAR were summarised as follows: ‘Union’ he declared on July 27, ‘is something not for one individual (Nasser) but for the peoples of the Arab states to decide’ (Al Hayat, Beirut, No. 3765, 27 July 1958 in Batatu: 818). The conflict soon appeared in the form of a personal contest between Qassem and Aref, who was an avowed Nasserist. In order to create a political balance, Qassem purged hardline Arab nationalists from the army and also made an effort to curb extreme leftist activity as well.

Thus, in the early years, the main opponents of Qassem were the Arab nationalists, Baathists, and significantly, the conservative class who were critical of the regime’s socialist policies. By contrast, Qassem was highly popular and even idolised among the poorer strata of the population. At the height of his popularity, the Baathists unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate him in 1959.

**Riots in Mosul and Kirkuk**
Two serious riots took place in 1959 alone, one in Mosul, and another in Kirkuk. Both cities became arenas of confrontation between antagonistic ideological and ethnic groups, and these riots considerably destabilised the regime.

The Mosul revolt was planned and carried out by a group of Arab nationalists. Being located on the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions, some Mosulite Arabs were sharply inclined to Arab nationalist ideology. The actual disturbance started from a political rally held on 6 March 1959. The pro-Communist demonstrators clashed with the local residents, and this caused Col. Wahhab Shawaf, the Arab nationalist commander, to impose a curfew. Shawaf was an avowed supporter of Iraq’s union with the United Arab Republic and took this opportunity to announce his intention of seizing power in Baghdad (O’Ballance 1973: 66-7).

An important feature of the Mosul revolt was feudal landlords’ participation to the Arab nationalists’ side, as shaikhs with large properties resented the revolutionary regime. For example, the officers’ group secured military support from the Shammar tribe and Syria. Although, some of the officers did not hide their uneasiness in cooperating with the ‘old class’ (Batatu: 871), the Mosul revolt was led by the Arab nationalist officers and was joined by feudal tribal chiefs. Batatu stated:

‘Among its (the participants’) chief figures was Ahmad Ajil al-Yawer, paramount shaikh of Shammar: The new agrarian law threatened the very core of his social position but the real lever of the revolt was an army group ... who cared very little about the large proprietors’ fear for their land or the probable forfeiture by the shaikhs of their tribal position’ (Batatu: 870).
In some instances, class divisions also aggravated the violence. Batau points to the overlapping cleavage manifested among the participants of the riots:

‘What added to the acuteness of the conflicts was the high degree of coincidence between the economic and ethnic or religious divisions. For example, many of the soldiers of the Fifth Brigade were not only from the poorer layers of the population, but were also Kurds, whereas the officers were predominantly from the Arab middle or lower middle classes’ (Batatu: 866).

The followers of Shawaf unsuccessfully made attempts to bomb the capital. Anarchy broke out in the streets of Mosul, and Qassem brought it under control with the assistance of the Kurdish nationalists. At this revolt, the Kurdish nationalists and the Communists acted on behalf of Qassem. Thereafter, Qassem leaned sharply towards the Communists and the Kurds after the Mosul revolt. For a period, the Communists were considerably empowered by the hands of the regime. As for the Kurds, attempts were made at the Ministry of Education to improve the position of the Kurdish language and literature. Qassem eased restrictions put on the Kurdish press by the previous regime and, as a result, a number of Kurdish journals flourished (Penrose: 279).

The riot in Kirkuk in July originated from a Communist rally that celebrated the anniversary of the revolution, in which they called for the purge of the ‘reactionaries’. Kirkuk’s location on the ethnic boundary of the Kurds, Arabs and the Turcomans added tension to the political rally. Turcomans traditionally constituted an elite
minority in the city, and the Kurdish population who migrated from the surrounding area constituted the lower class. Thus the two groups had traditionally been antagonised. Soon after the rally began, street fighting broke out between the wealthy Turcomans and the Kurds who constituted the majority of the oil workers (O'Ballance 1973: 67). Taking this opportunity, the extreme right wing who had been suppressed by the regime sought revenge against the Communists as well. As the political rally turned into a general riot, the Kurds attacked the Turcomans, and the Arab nationalists attacked the Communists.

After the Kirkuk revolt, Qassem took actions to curb the activities of the Communists. He did so by releasing the political enemies of the Communists held in prison and also by making the ICP illegal (O’Ballance 1973: 68). The use of excessive violence by the Communists aggravated relations between the NDP and the ICP. The Communist violence also caused many Kurdish sympathisers to turn against them as well (Kinnane: 62). From this time on, the KDP dropped its ostensibly Marxist-Leninist tone and became a purely Kurdish nationalist organisation. The KDP was legalised in 1960, and secretary-general of the KDP Ibrahim Ahmad expressed his loyalty to Qassem.

**Slow Economic Expansion**

The revolutionary regime took a cautious approach to economic policy and declared that it would limit confiscation of private properties to only the ones inimical to public interest. Extensive private estates were confiscated for redistribution purposes; however, the regime did not risk nationalisation of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). Iraq was seriously in need of oil revenue to proceed with numerous
development programmes and was still reliant on the IPC for the production and the sale of oil. The regime declared that the existing contract would be honoured until the time of its renewal in 1959.

New negotiations with the IPC began in the Spring of 1959. Iraqi demand for greater output was frustrated by the concerns of the oil company, which was already worried about oil's falling price. Furthermore, the IPC upset the Iraqis by unilaterally cutting the posted price. This prompted the government to promulgate Law 80 in December 1961. The law was designed to dispossess the oil companies of all land not yet used for oil production, and its enforcement amounted to the dispossession of 99.5 per cent of the area over which the companies held prospecting rights under the oil agreements (Khadduri 1969: 164). The law enjoyed high support among the population, and no subsequent government could ever reverse the terms.

The development programme was somewhat erratic. The finance was drastically diverted from agriculture to the industrial sector: the proportion allocated to agriculture was reduced from 39 per cent to 12 per cent despite the fact that still half the total workforce was contained in the agrarian sector. This, however, was amended shortly afterwards to create a better balance. Overall, the Qassem regime did little or nothing to substantially improve economic and social conditions. Those projects completed under Qassem, such as the Darband-i Khan dam near Sulaimani, had been planned by Nuri Said's Government (Kinnane: 61).

Agrarian Reforms and Kurdish Resistance
Land reform constituted part of the regime's key reforms. Its outcome showed, however, that the simple redistribution of land did not facilitate greater independence of impoverished peasants. The impact of agrarian reform turned out to be political as well, as it directly touched the rural community and potentially undermined the traditional society. It instantly created hostility to the regime because it attempted to change the existing social order. Qassem’s agrarian reform in the Kurdish region did exactly this; the policy was met with increased hostility from the Kurds, as much of Kurdish society had been still dominated by traditional tribal leaders. The following section will firstly explain the general failure of the agrarian reforms at a state level before explaining the particular difficulty encountered in the Kurdish region.

Iraqi land reform was based on the Egyptian model, although the conditions of the two countries were known to be very different: 'it (the Iraqi land reform law) provided for the expropriation of 75 per cent of the privately owned arable area of Iraq (over nine times the area that had been expropriated in Egypt). However, except for differences in the maximum holding of irrigated and non-irrigated land, the law took no account whatsoever of the great regional differences in Iraq, the wide variety in the conditions of tenure, in the role of landlords, and in the circumstances affecting different crops ... There were pitifully few people capable of effective farm management, organising marketing or credit, or even of giving advice to farmers, and in some areas peasant were still dependent on tribal ties' (Penrose: 241-4).

Several other factors obstructed the effectiveness of the 1958 agrarian reform. The primary factor was the lack of planning skill, as the state's agency was incapable of substituting for the landlords' function to sustain production. The dispossessed
landlords were simply 'persuaded to continue to manage their lands and to provide the
necessary agricultural requisites and guidance to the peasants at reduced remuneration
and in conditions of the utmost insecurity' (Penrose: 241-2). Essential functions such
as the supply of seeds, fertilisers, credits, maintenance of agricultural machinery, and
irrigation facilities could not be sustained by the Ministry of Agriculture. The co­
operative movement also turned out to be unsuccessful in organising the deeply
traditional peasants who feared communism: 'the peasants themselves did not
understand the meaning and functions of co-operatives and feared the collectivisation
and political organization that the militant communists were attempting to promote'
(Penrose: 244).

After experiencing a number of practical difficulties, the landlords in many places
informally reestablished their clientelistic control over peasants (Penrose: 246). Thus
the reform did not lessen the power of the landlords, rather, it caused general
confusion that necessitated reinstallation of landlords. Historically the village was the
key system in agricultural production, and landowners were in charge of management
and supervision (Lawless: 111). Particularly in irrigation zones, peasants were heavily
dependent on these managerial functions of the landlords.

Even though extensive land-ownership was common in Kurdistan, the Kurds resisted
the agrarian reforms for the following reasons. The highland Kurdish region is rain­
fed, and the peasants there were more capable of sustaining a higher degree of
independence of landlords. The rental shares in the Kurdish region were lower than in
the south, and this also allowed the peasants to have stronger bargaining powers vis-à­
vis the landlords (Lawless: 117). Therefore, the Kurds feared that reforms would
bring disruption of production and the collapse of traditional social structure. In September 1958, Abdul Salam Aref toured Kurdish territory and promised land reform. However, this announcement upset not only the Kurdish shaikhs and landowners, but also many of the tribal Kurds who feared Arab domination as a consequence of such reform, as it would allow penetration of the region by state authority (O’Ballance 1973: 65). Kinnane pointed to the importance of emotional loyalties to feudal leaders: ‘In the country, the people were and still are conservative and largely attached to the feudal order by their social and economic condition. In the towns the “progressive” intelligentsia could expect support from the middle class and part of the lower artisan class. However, a Kurdish proletariat scarcely existed. The Kurds working in the oil industry … did not make up a politically formidable working class’ (Kinnane: 61). Thus even though feudalism and extensive land-ownership existed, the system was accepted by the people. The government’s policy to introduce agrarian reforms into such an environment, only invited hostility from the Kurds.

**Final Days of Qassem Era**

By the early 1960s, Qassem was no longer able to balance antagonising ideological groups. Qassem’s favourable relations with the Kurds too had broken down. By the middle of March 1961, five key members of the KDP were arrested, and the party ceased to operate publicly. The communists, too, were suppressed and removed from the high posts.

The tension between the Kurds and the government was heightened from the early summer of 1961. During the Kuwait crisis, Qassem had refused to meet the delegation of the Kurds in June 1961 who were pleading for Government price control of the
tobacco crop. This refusal from Qassem prompted Abbas Muhammad, agha of Sulaimaniya, to launch an armed resistance. Government troops were immediately sent against him. In August, Mustafa Barzani sent an ultimatum to Qassem, demanding an end to the ‘transitional period’ (Qassem’s sole rule) (Kinnane: 65). Finally, the Kurdish-government war, which was to continue for the next seventeen months from September 1961 was ‘triggered’ by a tribal chief who was disgruntled by the land reform. The chief of the Ako tribe persuaded Barzani to join the war against the government. Initially Barzani was known to have resisted participation in the war. However, armed confrontation became inevitable when Ako ambushed an Iraqi military post in Barzani’s territory (Pelletiere: 128). Some of the landowning Kurdish shaikhs who fled to Iran after the revolution had returned and joined the nationalists as well (Jawad 1981: 77-79).

In sharp contrast to the quickly mobilised tribal forces, however, there was a debate among the younger intellectuals of the KDP who did wish not to participate in the war. For example, the secretary of the KDP, Ibrahim Ahmad, did not want the KDP to join the forces led by Mustafa Barzani. Ibrahim Ahmad considered that, ‘what was taking place in the mountains was purely a tribal affair and Barzani was setting himself up as a traditional war leader and expanding his landholdings at the expense of his enemies’ (Pelletiere: 130-1). Thus it was evident that the top leadership of the KDP was still loyal to Qassem and was reluctant to go into confrontation with the government. Earlier, in October 1961, Qassem closed down the KDP, which completely alienated the Kurds. The KDP tried at best to hold to a policy of non-belligerence but as the war intensified, it finally decided to join Mustafa Barzani in December 1961 (Dann 1969: 338).
The war quickly escalated, mostly over the mountainous tribal region. This also reflected the fact that the majority of the Kurds still lived in the tribal society and that economic and social reforms set out by Qassem failed to reach the countryside. Dann commented that tribal loyalty was still prevalent even among the sedentarised tribes: ‘it was a testimony of the persistence of tribal loyalties among Kurds that the largely settled Ako (tribe) were prepared to follow their agha to war on such an issue’ (Dann 1969: 336-7). The chief of the Ako tribe, Abbas Muhammad Agha was known for refusing for years to heed the Iraqi army’s call for conscription, thus, such tribes were the least integrated into the Iraqi state. When Abbas Muhhamad sent his tribesmen to the army in later years, it was only in order for them to have military training in the use of modern weapons (Schmidt: 192).

The war prompted many Kurds in the Iraqi Army to desert and join the Kurdish nationalists (Marr 1985: 178). The Assyrians also joined the Kurdish nationalist forces, as they showed no loyalty to the revolutionary regime (Pelletiere: 128).

Fighting continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1962. In an effort to demoralise the Kurds, the government used heavy aerial bombardment on thousands of the defenceless mountain villages. The Kurds fought back by seizing gendarmerie posts, closing roads, and eliminating isolated military units. The prolonged war in the north increasingly contributed to Qassem’s unpopularity. Many Kurdish civilians were forced to flee their homes and became refugees. International rescue operations were hampered, as the Iraqi Red Crescent Society refused to invite the International Committee of the Red Cross to enter the country (Kinnane: 67, also Schmidt: 243).
It is important to note that even during the fiercest confrontation with the government, Barzani's forces did not attempt to flout Baghdad's sovereignty. Barzani only tried to contact, unsuccessfully, the United Nations to protest against the bombing of Kurdish villages (Schmidt: 69). He clearly denied intention to secede from Iraq, and he deprecated the prospect of creating a pan-Kurdish movement: 'those other Kurds (in neighbouring states), have no means of helping us. Sometimes an individual comes to us from Turkey or Iran. Some of them are outlaws in their own countries and come to fight with us. Then we keep them here. But in general we have no contact with them. We seek no help from them. They will be better off if they settle their problems with the governments of the countries in which they live' (Schmidt: 206). Barzani also said 'I have no relations with Iran or Turkey. I am in this [Iraqi] situation, and I want to make this [Iraqi] situation better. I am not concerned with people living outside this country. I am living in Iraq and dealing with problems in Iraq' (Schmidt: 242, February 1963). Thus the Kurds avoided any action or statement which would provoke the Ankara or Teheran regimes to act against them, and insisted their fight was only concerned with the fate of the Iraqi Kurds (Kinnane: 70).

Anti-nationalist Tribes

In his final days, Qassem actively supported the Kurdish tribes that had traditionally been hostile to the Barzanis. Qassem thought the Barzanis were becoming too powerful a faction within Iraq, and to reduce their influence he began playing the anti-nationalist tribes against them (O'Ballance 1973: 69). Thus, it appeared the Qassem regime no longer cared about its ideological position, but became totally reliant on balancing one force against another. Qassem's government even armed the Arab
Shammar tribe; however, they showed no interest in fighting the Kurds. The most effective method was to use Barzani’s traditional rival tribes, such as the Rikanis, Zibaris and the Barwaris. This was basically the same old policy made by the monarchy (or even before) for containing the Kurdish nationalists. When most of the Kurdish tribes rallied under the nationalists, the pro-government tribes, such as the Zibaris, Herkis and Baradosts supported the government as they were assured that they could retain their land as a quid pro quo (Jawad 1981: 69). At the same time, a division like this demonstrated Kurdish society’s low degree of mutual contacts: it allowed the government to resort to a divide and rule policy with ease.

**Alliance against Qassem**

In the end, the social forces that rallied to remove Qassem were composed of the Arab nationalists, the Baathists, and the old conservative class seeking to reverse his policies. His reforms also provoked the conservative Shia ulama in the south who founded the Islamic Party of Iraq and declared nationalisation and land redistribution ‘haram’ or religiously forbidden (Hiro 1990: 23). The Kurds also cooperated with the anti-Qassem forces, in the hope of stopping the war. Unfortunately ‘the only obvious partners for the Kurds were, paradoxically, the Baathists and the (Arab) nationalists, in spite of their apparent lack of enthusiasm for any concrete acknowledgement of the validity of Kurdish national aspirations’ (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett: 80). When the Baathists started attacking Qassem’s headquarters on 8 February 1963, a mass demonstration broke out in Baghdad still in support of him. Qassem’s era ended on 9 February 1963 when he was shot and killed by the Baathists.

**Summary**
Given his general inexperience in government and lack of economic resources, Qassem’s era was too short to substantially alter the social structure. It did not go beyond destroying the existing social structure. Hanna Batatu comments, ‘(T)he revolution upset the old power structure and the old class configuration, has disturbed the delicate balance between the Arabs and Kurds and the Shias and Sunnis, mainly owing to the unevenness in the social development of these communities’ (Batatu: 807). The key beneficiaries of Qassem’s policies were confined to the deprived population in urban areas, who did not even believe the news of his death. As many historians acknowledge, Qassem was genuinely concerned about the poor, and made a spectacular and permanent change to urban slums through extensive public housing projects.

As a whole, the Iraqi revolution and the Qassem era can be characterised more by the balancing of antagonising groups than integrating them, even though Qassem’s belief in Iraq-first policy was unmistakable. The revolutionary regime was equivalent to Turkey’s state-formation period under Ataturk, but was far less successful. However, Iraq’s state-building suffered heavily from colonial legacy. Its society was divided between the rich and the poor, and due to slow economic integration, different ethnic and religious groups kept their own identities and interests. On top of this, strong foreign influence from Arab countries disturbed the potential incentive for Iraqi integration. Not only were political institutions weak, but the pillar of it, the army was dominated by the Sunni Arab group. As a result, Qassem became insecure and relied on the support of certain groups while unable to reconcile the antagonistic group. The 1960s revolt was also a result of Qassem’s failure to integrate the younger generation of Kurdish nationalists, despite the loyalty shown him until the last moment.
It is more important, however, to evaluate the precedents he established in his attempt to unite a country that lacked a significant preexisting unity rather than simply note the little actual progress he made in national integration. These precedents included an effort to appoint more Shias and the Kurds to public posts, acceptance of minorities, recognition of the Kurdish nation, greater political freedom, exercise of sovereignty over the oil company, and above all, an Iraq-first policy. Except for the nationalisation of the IPC, no subsequent regimes have promoted those policies and as a result they have fallen into a dictatorship by the Sunni minority. In this sense, both the Kurds and Qassem lost an important ally in each other.
4. Integration or Containment?

Introduction

This section discusses the two states’ increased capability to either integrate or contain Kurdish nationalism in recent decades. What seems common to both states is increased Kurdish and other political mobilisation and increased institutional development, if of a different variety - one more pluralistic, another more totalitarian. Turkey had never officially abandoned the secularism set out by Mustafa Kemal; however, it was during this era that the Islamic religion gained political instrumentality as a counter-leftist and counter-ethnonationalist ideology and began to be actively used by the state authorities. Still, in Turkey, the debate over the Kurdish question in general had become increasingly common as the calls for democratisation increased since the mid-1990s, a sign of the country’s transition to prototypical national integration. In contrast, the Iraqi government led by the Baath Party strengthened state autonomy by making use of the dramatic increase of oil revenue since the 1970s, and succeeded in muting practically all domestic opposition. It was from this decade that the government’s Kurdish policy became extremely suppressive and involved repeated use of chemical weapons. This was one manifestation of the totalitarian state structure.

Turkey

The 1971 Military Intervention

By the late 1960s, the system of proportional representation, originally introduced in 1960 to prevent one-party dominance, accelerated political fragmentation and led to
weak coalition governments of the centre-right. The relative waning of the Cold War also contributed to boosting the activities of leftist organisations (Harris: 161). Social disorder spread among ideologically radicalised youth and labour organisations. Finally, an uncontrollable state of violence provided the context in which the military-dominated National Security Council issued an ultimatum to the prime minister Suleyman Demirel, forcing him to resign on 12 March 1971. This military takeover was also known as 'Coup by Memorandum'. Although the civilian administration was maintained throughout the military takeover, the NSC exercised strong influence from behind the scenes. The intervention resulted in a number of arrests of politicians and political activists. Military rule would last until the October 1973 general election.

**National Salvation Party (1972)**

The Islamist party that had been increasingly influential throughout the 1960s finally entered public life after 1971. The former National Order Party re-established itself as the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972. The NSP broke the historic barrier with the secular and centre-left RPP and formed a coalition with it in 1974. The NSP's supporters were found in the lower-middle class, and among small traders and other persons of modest income from rural areas. They were the social groups hardest hit by Turkey's periodic economic crises and the ones who were least able to defend themselves through existing social institutions. These groups felt not only their economic welfare but also their traditional institutions and values to be under attack. They saw the growing socialist movement as a threat to the family, religion and cultural values (MER July-August 1988). The NSP had strong influence in the Kurdish region as well, indicative of the still strongly Islamic nature of Kurdish society in rural areas (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 103).
The NSP came to acquire the third largest representation in both the 1973 and 1977 parliamentary elections (Landau: 318-9). The rise of the NSP also facilitated the revival of the Islamic culture and seemed to have facilitated the marriage of Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism in general. Turkey's Islamic nationalists, belonging to the lower to middle class, resented the foreign-backed big business in Istanbul and growing atheistic leftist organisations. Consequentially, the NSP came to have broad support, from the nationalist far-right to the Islamic majority. During the 1970s, Turkey witnessed a Mosque construction boom, and it even became fashionable for government officials to fast during Ramadan. Many educated people could be seen at Friday noon prayers, which was described as, 'inconceivable in Atatürk's lifetime' (Harris: 129).

**Political Right Wing and the Islamists**

Soon after the restoration of civilian rule in 1973, street violence resurfaced, and many militant groups resumed their activities. There was a rapid increase in extremist political activities - both right and left - in the years that followed the general amnesty of 1971. The memorandum of 1971 changed nothing in terms of either the political structures or party activity (Tachau 1994: 551). It was during this decade that the polarisation of extreme-right and extreme-left became most preeminent. The important feature of the 1970s' political violence was a sharp increase of right wing motivated violence, unlike that of the previous decade which was dominated primarily by the leftist organisations (Laquer: 241).
The right wing increased their inclination towards Islamic ideology. The Nationalist Action Party sponsored extra-parliamentary youth violence, whose ideology was based on Islamic and Turkish nationalist lines (Landau: 319). The ultra-nationalist Sunni Islam organisations increased their attacks on the heterodox Alevi sect and also on the Kurdish nationalist and Turkish leftist organisations. Turkey's Alevi sect belongs to a branch of Shia Islam, and encompasses both Kurdish and Turkish followers. Because of their experience of religious persecution under the Ottoman Empire which was based on Sunni Islam, Alevis traditionally supported secularism under the Turkish Republic. The clash between Alevis and Sunni fundamentalists in December 1978 was known to be the most spectacular example of religious conflict in modern Turkey, which prompted the authorities to declare martial law (Harris: 15).

The Turkish Left and the Kurdish Nationalism

Both legal and extra-legal leftist parties were active since the 1960s. Of the former, the Turkish Workers Party was born of the political liberalisation following the 1960 coup. It was the first legal political party in Turkey that recognised the existence of the Kurds. At its fourth congress, in 1970, it claimed: ‘there is a Kurdish people in the cast of Turkey ... The fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected the Kurdish people to a policy of assimilation and intimidation which often invited a bloody repression’ (Gunter 1997: 8, also Kirsci and Winrow: 108). The Turkish Workers Party was closed down in 1971.

Over time, however, the Turkish left evolved toward Marxism, and stated that the solution to the Kurdish conflict was achievable through class struggle. For this reason, many leftists considered Kurdish demands as ‘untimely if not reactionary’.
(Bruinessen 1992: 32-3), and regarded Kurdish nationalism as a secondary issue next to the Marxist revolution. The Kurdish leftists, on the other hand, regarded the recognition of Kurdish nationalism as the first priority and aimed to lead the Kurds' own version of a proletariat revolution (Kirisci and Winrow: 110). Thus it was important to note that Turkey's political left was divided into factions each with a different emphasis on Kurdish nationalism. For example, the Revolutionary Left, a Marxist-Leninist organisation, came into being in 1978. Its key ideologue, Dursan Karatas, was an ethnic Kurd, and he publicly declared that he was a Kurd and that Turkey was a country with two nations - the Kurds and the Turks. Yet, Karatas rejected a form of organisation based on ethno-nationalism (Yonah and Pluchinsky: 243) and indicated that emphasis on Kurdish nationalism divided the working class on ethnic lines. In his words 'the liberation of the Kurdish and Turkish people today is possible only through a joint organisation. This is the way to self-determination for the Kurdish people. As a separate initiative, liberation is impossible' (Yonah and Pluchinsky: 243).

The Rise of the PKK

On the other hand, a Marxist, yet more specifically Kurdish, organisation emerged in the same year as the Revolutionary Left and was known by its Kurdish acronym PKK, or the Kurdish Workers' Party. From the 1970s, many Kurdish groups began to speak up for Kurdish national rights, which made a sharp contrast to the pre-1970 period when the demands of the Kurds were confined to a basic concern for economic development of the Kurdish provinces (Bruinessen 1992: 32-3). The PKK's core members had been gathering together since the early 1970s. The founder of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was originally involved in a Turkish leftist organisation when he
was a university student in Ankara. The members of the PKK were drawn almost exclusively from the lowest social classes. They were 'the uprooted, half-educated village and small-town youth who knew what it felt like to be oppressed, and who wanted action, not ideological sophistication' (Bruinessen, MER July-August 1988). The organisation saw Kurdistan as a 'classic colony', and labelled feudal Kurdish landlords 'collaborators of the government and exploiters (Bruinessen, Ibid.).

Over time, the PKK became the most influential organisation among the poorest stratum of the Kurds in southeastern Turkey. The rise of the PKK demonstrated that Turkish integration policies had failed to incorporate the most neglected. A Kurd from Turkey gave his personal view about the PKK phenomenon:

'The PKK was the first Kurdish organisation that was able to continue its struggle without a break. There were large numbers of Kurdish organisations in Turkey aiming to protect and develop the rights of the Kurds. There were Kurdish leaders who led the revolts against the government, but they had feudal and tribal mentality. However, the PKK involved, for the first time, women in its struggle and organised the national struggle differently. This ability to continue the struggle was what distinguished the PKK from other nationalist organisations' (Kerim Yildiz).

The following is a comment from a young woman involved in the PKK:

'We support the PKK because they are the only ones who remained inside Kurdistan. ... The intellectuals who ran the Kurdish national movement were talking when the situation was calm, but when conditions became difficult they fled to Europe and spent their time in obscure quarrels' (TME December 1987).
Both comments indicated that the PKK was closely associated with the most neglected and deprived Kurds in Turkey. The emergence of the Kurdish nationalist organisation based on Marxism could be explained by the slow speed of economic development in southeastern Turkey. The economic development of the southeastern region constantly lagged behind the rest of Turkey. During the 1970s, both light and heavy industries expanded greatly under the third Five-Year Plan (1973-78). Despite the fact that redressing of income disparity was one of the targets of the plan, little progress was made in the southeast, and a great imbalance remained (Harris: 82). While the literacy rate in the 1960s was around 40 per cent and rose to 70 per cent over the next twenty years, the lowest rate was in the predominantly Kurdish southeast Anatolia, and illiteracy among women was double that of men (Harris: 23).

Interim Summary

Rapid industrial growth and class stratification could be given as major characteristics of Turkish society in the 1970s, at least in its urban sector. This appeared to have diluted the pre-existing ethnic and sectarian differences in Turkish society. However, the picture was not so straightforward. Certain classes or ideologies had come to be associated with certain ethnic or religious groups, thus creating overlapping cleavages in a rapidly modernising society. For example, the deprived stratum of the Kurds was attracted to Turkish leftist organisations and/or Kurdish nationalist organisations that advocated Marxism. On the other hand, the political right wing attracted conservative Sunni Muslims who, at the same time, were often ultra-Turkish nationalists. Another example was the heterodox Alevi Muslims, whether they were Kurdish or Turkish, attracted to political parties that advocated secular ideology. This relatively high
coincidence of ethnicity and political allegiance intensified ideological conflicts. However, the leftists’ representation of the Kurdish cause could certainly be seen as a sign that integration could dilute ethnic differences.

The 1980 Intervention

By the late 1970s, political violence became a fact of life in Turkey, particularly in urban areas. It was said that the Turkish street scene became a free-for-all and law and order broke down. It was not only extreme left and right groups that became violent. All kinds of communal and ethnic riots took place also (Laquer: 241). Suspected terrorists were hunted down and censorship was tightened. In 1978, the state authorities finally declared martial law. However, this affected only the legally operating organisations. Activities of underground organisations continued unabated. In a way, the violent situation reminiscent of the pre-1971 period resurfaced again. The cause of the 1980 intervention was summarised by Tachau as, ‘liberalisation of the regime encouraged the further fragmentation of the party system through the formation of additional parties. Frequent elections made party rivalries a common feature of Turkish politics’ (Tachau 1994: 551). The Turkish army finally intervened on 12 September 1980 to take over a government which was no longer capable of containing the violence. For the next three years, all political power would be concentrated in the hands of the military-dominated National Security Council (NSC). Less than a decade after the military intervention of 1971, another intervention was required in order to restore public security. The intervention was said to be largely welcomed by the public, including even those who espoused leftist ideology and those who despised the military (LAT 14 Sept. 1980). However, the draconian measures
taken by the military regime, to be discussed below, created long term problems in the area of civil liberties.

**Turkish-Islamic Synthesis**

One important feature of the national integration policy of the 1980 military regime was the 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis', which was a deliberate encouragement of Islamic social forces by the state. It was aimed at countering both the leftist and the 'separatist' ideologies. In this aspect Turkish-Islamic synthesis was not unlike Abdul Hamid II’s pan-Islamism, which had served to contain Kurdish nationalism almost exactly a century before. The state authority was alarmed by the spread of ideologically motivated violence to the small towns which had been dominated by conservative social forces. Particularly, the combination of leftist ideology and Kurdish nationalism alarmed the state authority (Landau: 318).

The state authority's increased tolerance towards the Islamic religion had already been a continuous trend since the 1960s, and this had continued during the 1980s as well. The Third Turkish Republic actively fostered Islam, portraying it as a defender of national unity. The regime ‘saw great merit in encouraging Islamic ideas and education as an antidote to Marxism’ (MEI 11 July 1997). In 1982, the teaching of Islam was made compulsory in secondary education, and during the three years of direct military rule the number of Islamic faculties at university-level education rose from two to eight (MEI, Ibid.). Similarly, the number of ‘imam-hatip’ schools providing religious education established by the government increased from 72 in 1970 to 374 in 1980 (Zubaida 1996). These measures created large numbers of educated Muslim intellectuals who constituted a viable counter-force to Kemalism.
and the Western orientation of Turkish educational and political culture in general (Zubaida, Ibid.).

**Structural Reforms**

The 1980 regime dramatically changed Turkey’s political scene by imposing radical reforms. First, it banned all political parties for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic (Landau: 319). All the existing political parties were dissolved in October 1981. Second, responding to the late seventies’ political disorder, the 1982 constitution heavily emphasised the unity of the country. The preamble of the new constitution proclaimed ‘the determination that no protection shall be afforded to thoughts or opinions contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the existence of Turkey as an indivisible entity with its state and territory’ (as in Gunter 1997: 9). Article 118 of the constitution institutionalised the military’s predominant position in the country through the National Security Council (Gunter 1997: 9). In coming to power, General Kenan Evren diagnosed Turkey’s illness as having stemmed from constitutional inadequacies and partisan practice (Harris: 169). Thus, the following the six-point program was given as a remedy to cure the problems: to preserve national unity, restore security, reinvigorate state authority, ensure social peace, apply social justice, and reinstate civilian rule (Harris: 169-70). Article 5 of the constitution defined the fundamental tasks of the Turkish state as the safeguarding of ‘the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic’ (as in Kirsci and Winrow: 111). It is important to note that this change affected areas that were traditionally under civilian control, such as determining the school curriculum, regulating TV stations’ broadcasting hours, and abolishing the penal immunity of members of parliament (Sakallioglu: 158).
Article 26 prohibited the use of Kurdish, including private use. It reads: ‘No language prohibited by the State shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought’. ‘Any written or printed documents, photograph records, magnetic or video tapes, and other means of expression used in contravention of this provision shall be seized’ (Gunter 1997: 9). Accordingly, Newruz, the Kurdish celebration of the New Year on March 21, was banned, and the Newruz festivity became the rallying point for the Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state. Under Article 28, ‘publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by law’. Many people were indicted for allegedly weakening national unity by showing sympathy to the Kurds, including the Turkish writer Ismail Besikci (Zurcher: 312). The ban on non-Turkish languages was reinforced on 22 October 1983 by Law 2932. The law asserted Turkish to be the native language of Turkey’s citizens and prohibited the use of other languages, including participation in activities that would promote their use (Gunter 1997: 98). The law would remain in force for the next eight years.

Not unnaturally, the new constitution enjoyed a lower approval rate in the 15 predominantly Kurdish southeastern provinces, with ‘no’ votes at 11.9 per cent compared to the country average of 8.6 per cent (Kirsci and Winrow: 111) Yet, across the country, the new constitution was approved by 92 per cent of the voters (Finkel and Hale: 111). However, it was also pointed out that in 1982 when the referendum was held, any campaign against the military was simply ‘unthinkable’ (Finkel and Hale: 111).

**Transition to Civilian Rule**
In the attempt to prevent fragmentation of political parties, a 10 per cent barrier was imposed on all political parties as a prerequisite for entry into the national assembly. Under this measure, it became almost impossible for the smaller and regional parties to enter the parliament. Civilian rule was restored after the November 1983 election, and legislation was passed to allow the establishment of the new political parties (April 1983). However, at the general election, only three officially authorised parties were allowed to run. They were the Motherland Party (MP), the National Democracy Party (NDP), and the Populist Party (PP). Other key parties, such as the True Path Party (TPP) and the Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) were able to compete only in municipal elections (Finkel and Hale: 105). Because of this, the result of the municipal election was regarded as the more accurate reflection of the voters’ will.

In the first local election (March 1984), the MP remained the majority but the TPP showed considerable strength. An important feature of this local election was that the two officially created parties, the NDP and the Populist Party, both failed to clear the 10 per cent barrier, and therefore, both parties were totally discredited by the electorate. In November 1985, following its defeat in their first local election, the Populist Party decided to merge with the SDPP. For a while, the MP maintained its majority. However, from the late 1980s, its main competitors - the TPP and the Welfare Party - began to show strength against it (Finkel and Hale: 124). By contrast, the leftist strength remained weak and divided; this resulted from the establishment of the Democratic Left Party, a rival to the SDPP. On the other hand, in a clear contrast to the weak leftist camp, the Islamic Welfare Party strengthened its share in the vote in the 1991 election.
Escalation of Terrorism

Meanwhile, the PKK had been carrying out a series of terrorist attacks from the early 1980s targeted at government forces as well as pro-government Kurds and villages under their control. To counter the PKK insurgency, Turkish troops of about 220,000 were concentrated in the southeast region excluding the special counter-guerrilla force and the Village Guards, to be discussed below (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 140). By 1996, around 3,000 villages were reported to have been rendered uninhabitable by the military’s scorched-earth policy which was aimed at cutting off the PKK’s logistical base by burning entire settlements. Thus, the regime persecuted the mass of civilians. It created displaced Kurds seeking shelter and food and facilitated rapid migration to the cities by these Kurdish refugees who feared being caught in the war between the security forces and the PKK (MEI 7 June 1996). The displaced people were soon concentrated in the neighbouring big cities in the region, such as Diyarbakir and Adana. It is also important to note that there are other Kurdish nationalist groups besides the PKK who advocated the independence of all Turkey’s Kurds. It is known that there is an anti-PKK Kurdish organisation called Tevger, strengthened by the PKK defectors. However their influence was confined to Europe and as a result, PKK became the ‘only’ organisation which enjoyed broad support in the Kurdish region of Turkey (Zurcher: 314).

Public opinion had hardened over the ten years of terrorism and counter-terrorism campaign. As terrorism became a serious problem, all opposition parties began criticising the government’s inability to restore the law and order. The expenditures on the military campaign eroded the Turkish economy: ‘Ten years of military effort, at an estimated cost of 74 billion dollars, may have prevented the spread of terrorism,
but it did not provide a solution and it transformed the conflict into a mass insurrection. Moreover, the government, by spending 33 per cent of its total revenue on this problem, neglected education and health services. The war against the Kurds was itself creating a ‘war economy’ in the southeast: the longer the war continued, the more funds were funnelled to the military. The whole country was affected by the Kurdish problem. This has created an anti-Kurdish backlash among the Turkish population and further polarised the situation’ (Yavuz: April 1996).

Roots of Insurgency and Social Structure Problem

The escalation of the conflict led, in 1986, to the creation of the Village Guard system recruited from pro-government Kurdish tribes. The number of Village Guards was about 60,000. They were generously paid and were ready to support the Turkish military’s operation against the PKK. The PKK carried out intensive attacks on those Village Guards in 1987, and in many cases killed their whole families including women and children (Zurcher: 313). It is particularly important to note the structural foundation of the Village Guard system.

The Turkish Republic constantly failed to modify the sharp social division resulting from excessive concentration of land ownership. From the time of the Ottoman administration the tribal chiefs have benefited from extensive landownership and continued to prosper under the modern economy. Those who became the PKK’s target were often wealthy landlords. The income disparity between the Kurds remained stark even in the 1980s. Exploitation by the landlords even accelerated the involuntary migration. The Turkish newspaper Aydinlik’s report on ‘Causes of Migration from East’ (3 July 1980) reads, ‘landownership is everything in the East
today. The landlords make the peasants under their patronage work like slaves and use various methods to make them dependent on the landlords. A peasants’ debt to the landlords whose fields he works can never be paid off. The landlords apply every kind of pressure to the peasants who work for them, including economic exploitation’ (as in WER 1611, 20 Aug.1980). The PKK emerged as a counter-force on the side of these peasants. An anonymous Kurd from Turkey, who is from a shaikhly family states these days aghas enjoy less authority from the people.

‘When I was nine or eight years old, I remember old men were kissing my hand, because I was from a shaikh’s family, and people respected us. Right now, aghas and shaikhs no longer have the same influence that they used to have. It’s changed since the appearance of the PKK in 1984. Even they (the aghas and shaikhs) have joined the Kurdish struggle. They are no longer respected just because they are shaikhs and aghas. The PKK also forced the people to choose their side. It became impossible to be somewhere in between. For the Kurds or not, the PKK forced the choice’.

With regards to the above point of forcing the ‘choice’, it was reported that some Kurdish clans in the southeast divided leadership roles among kin in order to avoid retaliation from either (the state or the PKK) side:

‘Fikri Agha’s sons in Hakkari (a Kurdish town) had one brother support the pre-1980 Republican People’s Party as the candidate for local elections, the second brother was active in a right wing political party organisation, the third managed the property in the village, and the youngest supported one of the clandestine Kurdish
nationalist groups. When the youngest was at one point sought by the military authorities for his alleged political involvements, he had no problem seeking refuge among his tribesmen' (Yalcin-Heckmann 1990).

Public projects were planned with an attempt to develop the southeast region, but such projects too only benefited these landlords. The South East Anatolian Development Project (Turkish acronym, GAP) was commenced in 1983 with a 32 billion dollar investment. It was an ambitious project that aimed at harnessing the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In completion, it was estimated that the region would have 21 dams and 19 hydroelectric power plants and a network of irrigation canals, thus providing infrastructure to the underdeveloped region. The project channelled a huge amount of public spending to the Kurdish region, but did not produce any significant impact on the economy of the region as a whole. It was calculated that between 1983 and 1992 the ratio of expenditure to revenues was higher in the eastern and southeastern regions than any other part of the country, and so was the per capita public investment spending (Kirisci and Winrow: 124). However, the unemployment rate remained extremely high (36 per cent) and also private investment remained very weak (Kirisci and Winrow: 125). It was also pointed out that unskilled workers, as a result of non-education, would never benefit from the project (Randal: 291). The mass evacuation resulting from the war between the armed forces and the PKK continued unabated. Furthermore, the land subject to the GAP was privately owned. It was once again a handful of private landlords who could make a fortune from the project. Ahmad (1993: 204) pointed out:
1) The pattern of income distribution was altered in favour of the rich at the expense of those in the middle and lower classes, many of whom were pushed down to the level of the poor.

2) Modern, economic liberalisation and structural adjustment exacerbated nationwide inequality: the main losers were the peasants (whose subsidies were reduced) and workers, and the beneficiaries were of those who engaged in big business and industrial enterprises. World Bank reports placed Turkey amongst the seven countries with the worst figures for income disparity.

An informant commented that exploitation by village aghas is still severe even to this day. However, the state fails to take any effective action largely for political reasons:

'Under aghas, people are working like slaves. Those slave-like people are theoretically entitled to go to school and receive education, but practically, the war and conflict between the Kurdish nationalists and the government closed down the schools in the area. Aghas are also the government's puppets. The real power is in the National Security Council, but they find it easier to control the population through aghas. Most of the Kurdish landowners are pro-government' (Kerim Yildiz).

For reasons which were greatly to do with the social structure, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey can not be spoken of simply in terms of confrontation between an ethnic group and the government. There was a socioeconomic division that cut across Kurdish society, but the state so far failed to integrate the Kurds who belonged to the poorest stratum. The failure in education policy seems to be seriously affecting the Kurds' social mobility. A Kurdish student who applied to the Diyarbekir Technical
College said he was selected because ‘I was the only one who spoke Turkish well enough’ (TME April 1986). This was the circumstance in as late as in the 1980s. Also, a political refugee in Switzerland who used to be in the teaching profession in Turkey recalled ‘I hated my profession. Because I had to teach the children in Turkish; it was absurd to explain things to the children in Turkish, when they only understood Kurdish’ (SRWA August 1991).

Turkish State and the Right Wing

An important characteristic of the Turkish authorities’ response to the PKK’s violence was that the state became involved in the right-wing Islamist group, known as Hizbullah (Party of God). Emergency rule in the southeast region was enacted in 1987 under the premiership of Turgut Özal. It was during this period that the special counter-guerrilla team was established as a hit squad geared at attacking the PKK. At the same time, from the year 1990 onward, the political murders of human rights activists and sympathisers dramatically increased. The unaccounted killing of pro-Kurdish journalists and human rights activists continued to rise. Attacks on pro-Kurdish newspapers such as ‘Ozgur Gundem’ (Free Agenda) and ‘Yeni Ulke’ (New Country) multiplied, along with attacks on PKK members and alleged sympathisers of the PKK. It was widely known that Hizbullah was behind those murders. Hizbullah is operative in key Kurdish cities in the southeast. It is suggested that Hizbullah is comprised of the right wing religious nationalists among the Kurds (Bruinessen: MER April-June 1996). They are joined by former state police and security officials purged from the government in 1991. The state actively utilised Hizbullah’s hatred of leftist ideology and their hostility towards PKK sympathisers including numerous journalists and intellectuals (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 72-3). The government allowed those
militia to operate freely, trained them, and closed their eyes to these groups’ extra­legal violence. ‘While more than 4,000 “separatist suspects” had been detained since January 1992, not a single one of the slayings of the Kurdish leaders or sympathisers resulted in an arrest’ (Gunter 1997: 105).

The link between the state’s security force and those gangsters was gradually brought to the light after a series of incidents. In November 1996, the former head of state security in charge of the eastern region and a wanted gunman were killed in a car crash and were thus found to have been travelling in the same car. One of the victims, who escaped with serious injuries, was Sedat Bucak, an MP and hereditary Kurdish chief with a 10,000-strong militia behind him. The Bucak affair brought to the light the close connection between the state, the right wing, and the pro-government Kurds more obviously than any other evidence. Hugh Pope summarises: ‘At the heart of the matter is whether Turkey is increasingly harbouring an unholy alliance of right-wing extremists, corrupt security chiefs and state-backed Kurdish feudal lords, a kind of state within a state formed under the pretext of the 12-year old war against Kurdish rebels and a longer struggle with left-wing militants’ (MEI 22 Nov. 1996). Another incident was an arrest of another wanted fugitive in August 1998 who was arrested in France and found carrying three passports, one with diplomatic privilege. Nobody can doubt that the state is connected to Islamic right wing criminals, and they are used for anti leftist and anti Kurdish operations.

Internationalisation of the Conflict

The cycle of the notorious scorched earth policy followed by the Turkish army in their hunt for suspected PKK sympathisers created internal displacement in a large number
of Kurdish villages in the southeast. Thousands of people had to be evacuated by trucks to nearby cities, such as Adana and Diyarbekir. The vicious cycle of violence, village burning by the army and the PKK's attacks on village guards created a refugee problem that spilled over to the Kurdish territory in Northern Iraq for the first time during the 1980s. Civilians in both territories were caught between the Turkish Army and the PKK.

The first border incursion by the Turkish army took place in May 1983. Turkish forces launched major reprisal attacks against the PKK 18 miles into Iraqi Kurdistan. This was prepared by an accord that had been concluded between Turkey and Iraq in 1978 to pursue 'subversive elements' 9 miles into each other's territory. However, this was extended in 1984 to 18 miles (Hiro 1990: 149). The Iraqi Kurds suffered heavy casualties from the operation of the Turkish army. In response, the KDP made an agreement with the PKK to allow them the use of northern Iraqi territory which it controlled. While the PKK-KDP relations deteriorated over time through the PKK's violence toward Iraqi Kurdish villagers a similar protocol was made with the PUK in May 1989. This coincided with the PKK's concluding an alliance with Turkish leftist organisations such as Dev Sol. The PKK stopped its attacks on the villagers but continued to cause havoc in the Iraqi Kurdish villages under the KDP's control.

First Official Recognition

The series of conflicts sparked an inflood of Iraqi Kurdish refugees into Turkey. Turkey had long denied the existence of the Kurds and kept calling them 'mountain Turks'. However, it was hard to maintain this stance after the two Gulf Wars. During the final phase of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, there were 36,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees
in Diyarbekir who fled Saddam Hussein’s chemical attacks. The Gulf War in 1991 also ended with half a million Iraqi Kurdish refugees pouring into Turkey, whom Turkey originally tried to refuse entry. These events prompted the then Turkish Prime Minister Turgut Ozal to take a far more ‘realistic’ policy towards the Kurds. Ozal met the Iraqi Kurds' leaders and also granted amnesty to the Turkish Kurds, including former Diyarbekir mayor Mehdi Zana. Turgut Ozal launched his first initiative in reversing the state’s policy toward the Kurds in 1989; in a statement he said ‘if in the first years of the Republic, during the single-party period, the state committed mistakes on this matter, it is necessary to recognise these’ (Briefing, Oct. 2, 1989, as in Gunter 1997: 98).

Turgut Ozal himself had a Kurdish connection. In his announcement, Ozal publicly admitted his grandmother was Kurdish. Although he was elected from Istanbul, Ozal maintained close ties with his locality, Malatya, one of the major cities in the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey. Ozal was a technocrat of the same generation as Suleiman Demirel and served the State Planning Organisation from 1961. Ozal’s brother was well connected in the Islamic National Salvation Party, and Ozal himself had had strong connections in the Turkish conglomerate Sabanci group.

Ozal’s liberal statement on the Kurdish issue, however, was followed by introduction of a draconian law that enabled the government to hunt down any political activist thought to be a terrorist. In February 1991, the government indeed repealed the law which had banned the use of languages other than Turkish. However, simultaneously, the Anti-Terrorism Law went into force, and this enabled the authorities to consider even mere verbal or written support for Kurdish rights as subject to terrorist charges.
Ozal’s initiative did ease the restriction on the use of the Kurdish language. However, the restriction on Kurdish political activism was in fact strengthened under his premiership.

Initiatives for a Solution from Mainstream Political Parties

The following are notable initiatives for a solution to the Kurdish conflict from the mainstream Turkish political parties. An important feature of this decade was that both centre-right and centre-left political parties put the Kurdish issue on the political agenda. This seems to be particularly important as it shows that Kurdish national rights are no longer only the concern of the extreme left.

The Motherland Party and Social Democrat Populist Party were the two mainstream political parties who on occasion advocated cultural pluralism as a solution to the Kurdish conflict. The Motherland Party has many Kurdish MPs and is more rooted in rural areas than its main rival TPP, though none of the Kurdish MPs in the Motherland Party publicly express their personal views about Kurdish nationalism (Kirsci and Winrow: 144). In 1991 the Motherland Party’s Turgut Ozal, then president, even suggested teaching Kurdish as a second language at schools. However, this angered the hardliners among the Turkish nationalists and ended up polarising the parliament. (Kirsci and Winrow: 137).

The SDPP too advocated more cultural autonomy for the Kurds. The party on occasion advocated the opening of schools taught in Kurdish. The secretary general of the SDPP declared that if the party came to power everyone would be able to speak his own mother tongue (Finkel and Hale: 120). In 1988, several parliamentary
deputies of the SDPP voted in favour of the ‘minority languages’ report of the Council of Europe. As a result, they were accused by the state authorities of ‘having fallen prey to the conspiracies of Europe’ (Kirsci and Winrow: 112). The party also issued a comprehensive policy report on the Kurdish issue in 1990 (Gunter 1997: 99). Also, until they resigned in March 1992, the MPs of pro-Kurdish HEP, to be discussed below, entered parliament on the SDPP’s ticket.

Expansion of the Islamist Party

Meanwhile, the Islamist party became strong in the Kurdish region, which was part of a nation-wide phenomenon as well. The Islamic Welfare Party succeeded in establishing grass-roots support all over the country. The party did not make a direct statement on Kurdish rights but appealed to Islamic values. The Kurdish members of the Welfare Party worked in Kurdish neighbourhoods of major cities, which allowed them to address their particular problems and frustrations in the Kurdish language (Zubaida 1996). The Islamic party won the support of a considerable number of Kurds by appealing to Islamic justice, which enabled it to avoid alienating its traditional Turkish Sunni supporters while recruiting among the Kurds (Yavuz April 1996). The party stressed Islamic brotherhood rather than giving any hint of recognising Kurdish nationalism. It was pointed out that: ‘the Welfare Party favoured the lifting of emergency rule, abolishment of the village guards, and finding “just” solutions to the conflict. The party used the term, “just solution” widely to many other problems, and the Welfare Party’s proposal for the Kurdish issue remained ambiguous’ (Kirsci and Winrow: 139-45). In the December 1995 general election, the Welfare Party won as much as 21.4 per cent of the vote, which exceeded both the Motherland Party (19.7 per cent) and the TPP (19.2 per cent) (as in Yavuz April 1996).
Thus, as in the 1970s, Islamic ideology once again proved to be highly instrumental in neutralising Kurdish nationalism in the political arena. An observer pointed out that, ‘not only would Islamic values enhance the conservative elements of society - both Turkish and Kurdish - but the “Turkish” components of the synthesis would discourage the seeds of Kurdish nationalism’ (MER 11 Dec. 1998). Moreover, the Welfare Party was by no means an advocate of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey or Iraq. For example, alarmed by the Iraqi Kurds’ increased engagement with the West, the Welfare Party opposed Operation Posed Hammer, which provided air patrol for the Iraqi Kurds that necessitated the use of a Turkish airbase (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 102).

Pro-Kurdish Political Parties

It was historic that in 1989 Turkey’s first pro-Kurdish political party, the People’s Labour Party (HEP) was established. The origin of the HEP can be traced back to the Erdal Inonu’s Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP). The SDPP expelled the members who attended the Kurdish Conference in Paris for their alleged link with the PKK, and these members established the HEP in the fall of 1989. In the October 1991 general election, twenty-two members of the HEP, who formed an electoral coalition with the SDPP, were elected to the Parliament as Turkey’s first legal Kurdish deputies. There were already many Kurdish MPs in the Parliament, but they refrained from speaking out on the Kurdish question. The HEP made a difference by basing its platform on Kurdish nationalism (Bruinessen MER April-June 1996). The two MPs from the HEP, Hatip Dicle and Leyla Zana, caused an uproar by mentioning the word ‘Kurd’ when they were sworn in: ‘I swear ... before the great Turkish nation, the
indivisible integrity of the country and nation. I take this oath for the brotherhood of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples’ (Gunter 1992: 103). Layla Zana is married to Mahdi Zana, who was elected mayor of Diyarbekir in 1978 as an independent candidate and was imprisoned following the 1980 coup for his activities advocating Kurdish national rights. When her husband was arrested, Layla Zana was a complete stranger to the world of politics. It was also known that she could neither read nor write Turkish. During one of her visits to the prison, she herself was arrested for allegedly provoking a riot. Layla Zana slowly gained public acclaim for her commitment to human rights and became the first Kurdish woman to be elected to the Turkish Parliament. The HEP members resigned and parted from the SDPP in 1992 when the SDPP’s centre-right coalition partner the True Path Party extended emergency rule in the Kurdish southeast and refused to abolish the Village Guard system.

In July 1993 the HEP was closed. It was succeeded by the short-lived Democracy Party (DEP) in January 1994. The Constitutional Court accused the DEP of being a branch of the PKK (Kirsci and Winrow: 146-7). The National Security Council also made a decision to remove parliamentary immunity from the DEP MPs, and following this, eight Kurdish MPs were arrested and imprisoned in 1994 (Sakallioglu 1997). After this move, the DEP was succeeded by the HADEP, or the People’s Democratic Party.

It was known that the HADEP maintained a distance from the PKK and avoided any discourse that could be construed as separatist. Instead, the party advocated a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question without resorting to terrorism (Kirsci and Winrow: 146-7). However, Layla Zana and her colleagues were accused of separatism in the
middle of their term and were arrested in March 1994. These HADEP MPs were convicted and are at the moment serving a fifteen-year sentence in the prison in Ankara.

There is also a party called the Democratic Mass Party (DKP), led by Serafettin Elci. Elci was the first parliamentarian to declare that there were Kurds in Turkey and that he himself was a Kurd. He was a cabinet minister between 1978 and 1979 under the Bulent Ecevit government. Elci was convicted after the military regime removed his immunity in 1981. After serving his prison sentence, Elci established a moderate party that advocated Kurdish nationalism. The DKP was founded in 1994. It rejected the violent methods taken by the PKK but considered the DEP and the HADEP as ‘Marxist parties’ and too radical (Barkey and Fuller 1998: 80). Elci’s stance was criticised by the sympathisers of the PKK as divisive of the Kurds as a whole (Kirisci and Winrow: 147). Elci stated, ‘my proposals were very mild things, like lifting the ban on the Kurdish language, broadcasting from the state-owned media in Kurdish, and educating the Kurds in Kurdish. These are very natural rights. The government, even today, is very far from giving these rights to the people. If you deny your Kurdish identity in Turkey, all paths are open to you. If you appear with your Kurdish identity, all doors become closed to you’ (Meiselas: 298, an interview with Elci in October 1993).

Hurdle to the National Assembly

The Turkish electoral system was not free from the legacies of the 1980 military intervention and its reforms. Relatively new parties like the HADEP were particularly hard hit by the 10 per cent barrier imposed as a prerequisite for entry into the National
Assembly. The authorities also pended the decision whether or not to let the pro-Kurdish Party run in the election. For example, the HADEP was eventually permitted to run in the December 1995 election after suffering attacks from state-connected right wing groups, including over 20 assassinations of its members as well as arrests of its deputies (Bozarslan). It was suggested that the HADEP was allowed to participate in the election in order to reduce the popularity of the Welfare Party (Yavuz April 1996).

At the December 1995 election the HADEP obtained only 4.2 per cent of the total vote, which fell well short of the 10 per cent required by the constitution. Given the fact that the Kurdish population who reside in Turkey constitute approximately 20 per cent of the entire population, in theory the HADEP had the potential to mobilise enough support to overcome the constitutional hurdle. However, the party fared badly particularly in the urban areas. It was pointed out that the Kurds who migrated to major cities either voted for various Turkish parties due to assimilation or in order to avoid political confrontation. Also, the conservative Kurds voted for the Islamic party or according to tribal adherence (Yavuz April 1996). However, the HADEP took as much as 46.7 per cent of the vote in key Kurdish cities such as Diyarbekir. The party enjoyed considerable support in other Kurdish cities as well (22 per cent in Mardin, 26 per cent in Sirnak, 27.7 per cent in Van, 37.4 per cent in Batman, and 54.3 per cent in Hakkari) (as in Bozarslan). Just four years after its foundation, the HADEP has gained considerable strength in the Kurdish region and in one case even won the support of a tribal leader (Ibid.). In view of the regional diversity in the election result, there was criticism from some Turkish media that the threshold for the National Assembly was set unfairly high (Kirsci and Winrow: 148).
Pressure from Industrialist Organisations

It appeared to be an important event that a group of industrialist, acting independently of the state authorities, began to question the wisdom of the state’s intransigent policy towards the Kurds from the late 1990s.

The 1981 Constitution was amended in July 1995, enabling greater political participation of groups such as professional associations and trade unions (Gurbey: 11-12). Furthermore, as a result of strong European pressure, Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law was amended in October 1995. As a result, the maximum prison sentence was lowered from five to three years (Gurbey, Ibid.) Even with these reforms, advocacy of Kurdish nationalism is still illegal; nonetheless this constitutional relaxation stirred wider discussion over the Kurdish question. It is a promising sign of successful national integration that the Turkish industrialists now began to pressure the military for greater political freedom, and gave more hope for a democratic solution to the conflict. The Turkish business communities, though they themselves are not ideologically unified, are now capable of proposing alternatives to the military solution.

Firstly, the Turkish Chambers of Commerce and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) prepared a report on the Kurdish question in August 1995. This was commissioned by then-Prime Minister Tansu Ciller from an academic, Dogu Ergil. The report was based on the field survey of 1267 subjects (Turkey’s Kurds) and indicated that the majority advocated a solution without changing the Turkish boundaries and that few of them advocated having talks with the PKK. Known from its Turkish acronym, the
TOBB report criticised the government’s policy and argued that it was wrong to call the Kurdish conflict simple terrorism (Kirsci and Winrow: 149-150).

A similar report by the industrialists followed. In January 1997, TUSIAD (the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association) published a report on comprehensive democratisation. This report was not specifically prepared for the Kurdish question, but it did, however, criticise the military’s interference in politics and argue that Turkey could not take up the economy of the West and leave out its democracy. It appears that the debate over Kurdish national rights was no longer uncommon in Turkey. According to a Kurdish observer,

‘It is unmistakable that discussion has started about the Kurdish issue. However, Turkey is not in a position to implement all these new ideas suddenly after telling its citizens there were no Kurds for seventy years. However, it is possible to create the platform with the Turkish people who will support the democracy. 10 years ago, they were saying there was no Kurd. Now, the people are saying we need the solution. They have identified the problem, and are trying to define the solution’ (Kerim Yildiz).

The main obstacle seems to be the still prevalent Turkish nationalism, which became even more visible at the time of the capture of the PKK leader in February 1999. The demonstrations throughout the country showed that the public regarded the PKK leader only as a common criminal, and demonstrated the depth of resentment against the PKK. However, now that the PKK has been dissolved (September 1999), the hope for conflict resolution lies in a political solution more than ever. It is a positive move
that Turkey's industrialists in recent years have started to speak up for greater democratisation.

Summary

The Islamic party seems instrumental in accommodating the Kurdish political demands where the Kurdish nationalist party is deemed still too radical. However, so long as Islam continues to neutralise Kurdish nationalism, it also serves the state's 'Turkish-Islamic synthesis'. It appears that Islam still constitutes a powerful counter-leftist and counter-ethnonationalist ideology for the state authorities.

Economic development of the southeast region had been advocated since the 1960s, and in recent years through large-scale public projects. Unless the Turkish state becomes capable of compensating the landlords, an effective land reform will never be likely to take place. This means the number of beneficiaries of those public projects is limited, and it underlines the importance attached to bilingual education, which would assist the Kurds with access to greater employment opportunities. Measures to increase social mobility of the Kurdish speaking population, first by bilingual education, second by land reforms where possible, and third by economic development, seem crucial for Turkey's transition to prototypical national integration. It is impossible for anyone to master a foreign language without being able to consult one's first language. The military's rejection of any form of Kurdish nationalism alienated the Kurds and only aggravated the PKK's problem. Even if the PKK began to disintegrate, sympathisers to its cause could not be eliminated. So long as serious inequalities remain, a group like the PKK may reappear at any time.
Iraq

Totalitarian State

Because of the dramatic increase in oil revenue in the 1970s, the Iraqi state became capable of carrying out a number of development programmes without burdening the population. From the structural perspective, however, this high degree of state autonomy heralded an era of totalitarianism, as defined in the theoretical framework. The very capability of the state to silence domestic oppositions removed any serious incentive from the government to accommodate Kurdish aspirations.

The First Baathist Regime

The first Baath regime (February-November 1963) was not a stable one. The party organisation was still weak and lacked a popular base. The Baath oppressed its political opponents, especially the Communists, through the use of terror. In order to increase popular support, the Baath regime put the avowed pan-Arabist, Abd al-Salam Aref, as the head of the state (Khadduri 1969: 196-7).

The Kurds welcomed the overthrow of Qassem and declared a ceasefire but did not accept the Baath rule and demanded constitutional government as a condition for a final settlement (Penrose: 306). The Baath Party then was not internally consolidated and contained members with varying degrees of willingness to negotiate with the Kurds. At least the party showed some willingness to restore peace in the north. Tahir Yahya from the Baath Party became a negotiator with Mustafa Barzani in 1962. He was willing to proceed with a wider decentralisation programme that would allow the Kurds to have limited autonomy. However, the hardline Arab nationalist group
opposed any measures that would be conciliatory to the Kurds and no agreement was reached. It was rather ironic that the Kurds assisted the Baath Party in overthrowing Qassem. Ideologically, the Pan-Arab Baath posed an even worse problem for the Kurds. The party even took an assimilationist view. As Penrose states, 'the Baathist sentiment tended to ignore the existence of any other national groups in the community ... occasionally the claim was made that Kurds were in reality of Semitic or Arabic origin’ (Penrose: 307).

With the failure of negotiations, the Baath government launched a military campaign against the Kurds in the summer of 1963 in which they tried to rally support by characterising Barzani’s followers as ‘tribal, feudal and allies of “imperialism” and Zionism’. The Baath Party also accused the Kurds of harbouring the Communists. The government offered a 100,000 pound reward for Mustafa Barzani and launched an offensive that far surpassed any of Qassem’s campaigns against the Kurds (Kinnane: 75). The state used both air and ground forces to destroy Kurdish villages. However, the Baath government failed to defeat the Kurds.

The Iraqi Baath Party had a problematic relationship with the Nasserists, too. It was because at that time, the Syrian Baath Party was increasingly critical of Nasser whom they alleged ‘authoritarian’. The delegates from the Iraqi Baath Party were associated with them and thus not welcomed by Nasser at Cairo. The Iraqi Baath Party was put in an awkward position as it attempted to coordinate the two – the Syrian and the Iraqi Baaths’ stance with regard to the pan-Arab policy (Khadduri 1969: 206). The Baath’s quarrel with Nasser, who was at the peak of his popularity, created a favourable environment for the Nasserist Aref to purge Baathists from the
government. In November 1963, Aref established contacts with Mustafa Barzani, not out of his willingness to accept Kurdish autonomy, but in order to oust their common enemy, the Baath government. It was known that Aref asked Barzani to resist the Army offensive in order to discredit the Baath government for its weakness (Jawad 1981: 155). Following this move, Aref succeeded in ousting the first Baathist regime with ease.

Aref Brothers’ Regime (1963-8)

In coming to power, Abd al-Salam Aref purged officers with radical ideologies and declared that no more socialist measures were going to be taken (Khadduri 1969: 252). The Republican Guard was strengthened by an infusion of men from aj-Jumailah, Aref’s own tribe, and the officers from Aref’s home region in northwest Iraq which constituted his primary supporters (Batatu: 1132). Thus the Aref regime was basically sustained through ‘tribal, regional, sectarian, professional and nationalist loyalties’ (Batatu: 1132). It revived conservative elements which had been suppressed under Qassem considerably. They were even described as ‘neo-monarchist’ (Al-Aref 1982: 96). The Baathists made an attempt to oust Aref in 1964, but the plot did not succeed.

Aref and Barzani agreed on a temporary ceasefire in February 1964. However, no effective measures were taken to follow it up. Meanwhile, the anti-Kurdish officer, Ghanem al-Uqaili, set out on an offensive in the spring of 1965. The government offensive failed and the public had become weary of the Kurdish war and even suspected the officers of secretly benefiting from the funds allocated for the military operation (Penrose: 335).
It was under the Aref regime that the anti-nationalist Kurdish tribes were formally organised in a form of government gendarmerie. In 1963, these tribes became the gendarmerie called 'al-fursan' (the knights), which the Kurdish nationalists referred to as the johsh or donkeys. The johsh is known to desert the government troops instantly at the time of confrontation between the Kurds and the government forces, although it could also engage in ruthless banditry and violence on Kurdish villages. In Jawad's judgement, 'their motivation remained tribal and materialistic. In no sense were they unified and the tribes dealt separately with the government. Their relations with the government depended mostly upon the strength or weakness of the government. Many of the al-Fursan/johsh, fearing reprisals from Barzani’s forces under a weak Iraqi regime, secretly established friendly relations with Barzani' (Jawad 1981: 53).

Bruinessen also points to the fact that an ‘informal agreement’ existed between the Kurdish nationalists and johsh to avoid each other, though at times fierce fighting has took place between them (Bruinessen 1992: 40). Tribesmen’s reasons for enlisting in to the johsh were rather complex, as shown by McDowall. One prominent motive was economic and another was to avoid retaliation by the government. The johsh provided tribesmen with employment, and as long as they were serving the government, the tribe was safe. The other prominent reason was tribal rivalry: several known tribes such as Surchi, Harki and Zibari had long-standing enmity to the Barzanis, which the government could exploit. The government richly rewarded them for their services, and they received lucrative factory licenses, land grants, or export/import privileges (McDowall 1996: 354-357).

Brief Initiative for Peace
Not all Aref’s ministers were against Kurdish autonomy: there were individuals seriously concerned about the weakening of the Iraqi army as a result of prolonged conflict in the north (Penrose: 338). Meanwhile, the first Aref regime ended with his sudden death in April 1966, when a helicopter crashed under suspicious circumstances. This brought about a power struggle between an ostensibly anti-Kurdish officer, Ghanem al-Uqaili, and Aref’s brother, Abd al-Rahman Aref. Against the wishes of the hardliners within the military circle, Aref’s brother was chosen the new president. He himself had a more moderate attitude towards the Kurds. The new Aref regime approached Talabani’s group within the KDP, who seemed to be more willing to negotiate with the government. This led to the proposal of a Twelve Point Programme in 1966 for a negotiated settlement of the Kurdish conflict. The programme was developed under the strong initiative of the civilian prime minister, Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz.

Al-Bazzaz (21 September 1965 - 6 August 1966) struggled against military hardliners and set out important steps towards the solution of the Kurdish conflict. The June 29 Agreement, also known as the Twelve Point Programme, was presented by al-Bazzaz’ government in 1966. It starts ‘In its desire to put an end to the unnatural conditions in certain parts of the north … to preserve the unity of Iraqi soil and to achieve national unity, to conform the existing bonds between Arabs and Kurds - which require them to act sincerely and persistently in the interest of their common homeland, this Government announces the following programme and declares its categorical determination to abide by it and to apply it in letter and spirit as soon as possible’ (Khadduri 1969: 274-276).
Summary of the Twelve Points Programme (29 June 1966):

1) The Government has recognised Kurdish nationality in the amended provisional constitution and is ready to clarify this point in the permanent constitution. Kurdish national rights within the Iraqi homeland, which includes two main nationalities - Arab and Kurdish - will be recognised, and Arabs and Kurds will enjoy equal rights and duties.

2) Provincial law will be promulgated on a decentralised basis. Each administrative unit will have its own elected council, which will exercise wide powers in education, health, and other local affairs, in addition to anything that has any connection with domestic and municipal affairs as detailed in the said law.

3) The Kurdish language will be recognised as an official language in addition to Arabic. Education will be in both languages, in accordance with the limits defined by law and the local councils.

4) The Government intends to hold parliamentary elections within the period stipulated in the provisional constitution and the cabinet policy statement. The Kurds will be represented in parliament proportional to their percentage of the population.

5) The Kurds will share with their Arab brothers all public posts in proportion to their population, including ministries, public departments, and judicial, diplomatic and military posts, with due regard for the principle of efficiency.

6) A number of scholarships, fellowships, and study grants will be made available at all levels' education for the Kurds, who are to be sent abroad for specialisation with due regard for efficiency and the country’s needs.
7) Government officials in the Kurdish provinces, districts and subdistricts will be Kurds. Such posts will not be given to others unless it is in the interest of the region.

8) The establishment of certain political organisations to accompany parliamentary life will be permitted. The press will be enabled to express the people's desire. The political and literary press in the Kurdish regions will be in the Kurdish or the Arabic language or in both.

9) General amnesty will be given to all who participated in violent acts or who had any connection with them. All Kurdish officials and employees will return to their previous posts and employees will be treated with justice. The Government will do its best to return all dismissed Kurdish workers.

10) Kurdish personnel of the armed forces and the police force will return to their units. Those returning will be treated sympathetically. All those who resume a normal life should surrender all their equipment, arms and ammunition to the Government.

11) Funds spent for military operations will be spent for reconstruction of the north. A special organisation will be formed to reconstruct the Kurdish region in the north. The Government will do its best to compensate all those who suffered damage to enable them to return to a productive and useful life in security and peace.

12) Individuals who have left or evacuated will be resettled with the aim of re-establishing a normal situation.

The programme, however, never materialised. It was because the government was faced with Arab hardliners' opposition to it, who advocated a military solution of the
Kurdish conflict. The Bazzaz government was replaced by another, which was headed by an army officer, Naji Talib. Talib was known to have been the least conciliatory to the Kurds. The Arab army’s defeat by Israel in 1967 added fuel to a heightened Arab nationalism. By then, Abd al-Rahman Aref was increasingly reliant on the military for support. A total of four new governments succeeded Bazzaz. Each of them declared its allegiance for the Twelve Point Programme, but it was said, ‘none of them found the time or the courage either to carry it out or to impose a new plan of settlement, by force if necessary’ (Khadduri 1969: 277). As the government weakened, the second Aref regime was overtaken by a coup in July 1968.

The Second Baath Regime (1968 - present <03/31/01>)

The Baathists took over the Aref regime through the two-phased coup on 17 July 1968. After the takeover, a campaign of terror was initiated against the political opponents of the Baathists. Many officers who led the coup against Qassem in 1963 were reinstated. This second Bathist coup was ‘not a result of popular rising, nor did it produce popular rejoicing’ (Penrose: 357). The second Baath regime consolidated its power through a group of army officers from Takrit, president Hasan al-Bakr’s home town in northwest Iraq, which was know as a traditional Sunni stronghold.

The 1970 Autonomy Plan and Baath Motives

After nearly a decade of fighting and inconclusive ceasefires throughout the 1960s, the Kurdish Autonomy Plan was promulgated on 11 March 1970. The Baath regime had its own motives and rationale in issuing the Manifesto. First of all, there was a phenomenal rise in oil prices which provided Iraq with the means to meet the economic demands of the Kurds without sacrificing the Arab interests in the country.
Secondly, the Baath feared being discredited in the eyes of the Army, if it proved unable to conclude the Kurdish war. And thirdly, the Kurdish insurgents’ threat to Iraq’s overall security overstretched Iraq’s military capabilities (Edmonds 1971: 102).

In the Manifesto, the Baath Party overtly recognised the cultural rights of the Kurds in the constitution promulgated in July 1970. Edmund Ghareeb’s argues that ‘the Baathists believed that the March 11 manifesto went beyond the transitory goal of ending the fighting and laid the groundwork for a permanent solution to the Kurdish problem’ (Ghareeb: 92). The Baath also tried to win the favour of the more progressive Jalal Talabani’s group. To this end, the Manifesto attacked feudalism and advocated implementation of land reforms. Also, the Baath’s glorification of ‘Arab and Kurd brotherhood’ had a strongly anti-Zionist tone as it depicted Iraqi territory as the forefront of the Arab world confronting Israel (Ismael 1976, as in Appendix: 144).

The key promises made by the Baath’s Revolutionary Command Council were as follows:

1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic language, be an official language in the areas populated by a majority of Kurds.

2) Eliminate any discrimination between Kurds and other nationals in regard to holding public offices, including sensitive and important ones such as cabinet ministers, army commands etc.

3) Amend backwardness experienced by the Kurds in cultural and educational domains through:
a. Implementation of resolutions in regard to the language and cultural rights of the Kurds, and preparation of programmes on Kurdish national affairs on the radio and TV networks by the Directorate General of Kurdish Culture and Information,
b. Reinstating of students who had to leave school because of the violence, and
c. Building schools in the Kurdish area.

4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish majority, appoint Kurdish government officials.

5) Recognise the Kurds’ right to set up student, youth, women’s and teachers’ organisations of their own.

6) General amnesty to all those who took part in past hostilities.

7) A committee of specialists to speed up development of the Kurdish areas attached to the Ministry of Northern Affairs. Economic plan to ensure equal development. Provision of state pension to the families of the Kurds who died in the conflict. Relieve aggrieved conditions of the people through housing and other appropriate aid both in cash and kind.

8) Repatriation of villagers.

9) Speedy implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish areas. Liquidation of all feudalistic relations.

10) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish nationality. Article (4) of the Constitution will include ‘The Kurdish language, beside the Arabic language, shall be an official language in the Kurdish areas’. All this shall be confirmed in the Permanent Constitution.
11) The broadcasting stations and heavy arms shall be given back to the Government.

12) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic will be a Kurd.

13) The Governorates Law shall be part of the text of this Manifesto.

14) The High Committee will supervise the implementation of the Manifesto.

As self-rule is to be established within the framework of the Republic of Iraq, the exploitation of the natural riches in the area shall obviously be the prerogative of the authorities of the Republic.

15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative branch in proportion to the ratio they have to the population of Iraq.

The Kurds' Divided Response

Immediately after the proposal, both sides were satisfied and agreed on many secondary issues that dealt with cultural affairs’ side. During the four years of the moratorium period, Kurdish culture truly flourished and Iraq became a refuge for other states’ Kurds who suffered cultural suppression (Sulaiman and Blau: 161).

However, the deadlock came when the two parties tried to define the boundary of the Kurdish autonomous region and which cities were to be considered ‘inhabited by a Kurdish majority’. The status of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, with a mixed population of Arabs, Kurds, and Turcomans, was to be decided by a future plebiscite. But this never took place. Also, the Kurdish autonomous region measured approximately 8.5 per cent of Iraq, whereas the percentage of the Kurdish population in Iraq was far more than that. The boundary was thus drawn unilaterally by the Baath government with a view to keeping the Kurds as confined as possible (Dann 1978). Furthermore,
the legislative branch as referred to in Article 15 of the Manifesto had no real power. and members were ‘virtual nominees’ or the mere prerogative of the Regional Command of the Baath Party (Nouri Talabany, also Vanly: 156). Mustafa Barzani was determined to prevent Kirkuk from being taken by the Baghdad regime. Barzani refused to close the border with Iran, established contacts with Israel, and set up his own intelligence apparatus against the government (Ghareeb: 132-133). Then followed a transitional period which was described as neither peace nor war.

Some of the KDP members opposed Barzani’s stance, and his authoritarian leadership was much criticised. His critics included his own eldest son, Ubaidullah Barzani. He said, ‘he (Mustafa Barzani) does not want self-rule to be implemented even if he was given Kirkuk and all of its oil. His acceptance of the (autonomy) law will take everything from him, and he wants to remain the absolute ruler’ (Ghareeb’s interview with Ubaidullah Barzani in July 1974: 155). Others who broke off from Barzani included Aziz Aqrawi, who stated ‘(W)e realised it would be treason to wreck the March 11 declaration and to become tools in the hands of Israel, Iran, and imperialism ... Of course there are things which are lacking, but these could be solved by trust on both sides ... Barzani’s claims are far from reality. He does not seem to realise that he is being supported by forces that work against Iraq and do not want to see the Kurds enjoying their national rights’ (Ghareeb: 155). It was said that Barzani shared none of his decision-making with fellow Kurds (Randal: 164). The Kurdish nationalists were once again faced with internal problems similar to those evident from the 1940s.

**Resumption of War and Defeat**
During the transitional period, the government embarked on an active Arabisation of Kirkuk by bringing in Arab settlers in place of the Kurds. Furthermore, several attempts were made on Mustafa Barzani’s life by unknown agents, believed to be Baghdad’s by the Kurdish nationalists. The relations between the government and the Kurdish nationalists had deteriorated to an unrecoverable level by the time the law was unilaterally promulgated in 1974, and the war between the Kurds and the government resumed.

When the hostility broke out, the Kurds were assisted by countries hostile to the Iraqi Baath regime of that time, including Iran, Israel and the United States. Barzani was criticised by the Arab states’ leaders for receiving these countries’ aid (Jawad, in Niblock: 51-2). This external aid, however, was suddenly cut off in 1975 when the Iraqi government decided to reach an agreement with Iran over OPEC and over the disputed boundary of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In exchange for accepting Iranian terms, Iraq secured agreement from Iran not to support the Kurds any longer. This was finalised in the Algiers Agreement in 1975. The Kurds suffered a catastrophic defeat. The Kurdish fighters fled to Iranian Kurdistan, and later Mustafa Barzani fled to the US, where he died in exile.

Later, Mulla Mustafa Barzani was known to have lamented his complete refusal of the terms of the Manifesto. He was quoted to have said, ‘were it not for the American promises, we would never have become trapped and involved to such an extent’ (Ghareeb: 159). Without the military aid, it appears possible that Barzani might have at least extended the negotiation period before plunging into a total conflict. But it was also true that Barzani had in fact very few options (Vanly: 158). The fighting
prompted a mass evacuation of Kurdish peasants fleeing the violence. Pelletiere contrasted this with the 1960s war when most of the peasants remained in the mountains and supported the nationalists. He commented that the military aid may have contributed to the nationalists’ neglect of local economy’s capacity for sustaining the national rebellion. A Kurdish fighter was quoted, ‘Why purchase peasants’ tobacco when American cigarettes were in plentiful supply?’ (Pelletiere: 175).

Establishment of PUK
The Kurds’ defeat in 1975 was a turning point for the Kurdish nationalists because it allowed them to focus more on the political struggle. After the collapse of the resistance in 1975, the Kurdish leadership was reorganised. Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani finally set up a new political party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), to start a more party-based political struggle. The KDP was led by Mustafa Barzani’s two sons, Idris and Masoud. Jalal Talabani was emerging as a spokesman for a new generation of Kurdish nationalists.

Jalal Talabani’s view is summarised in the following quote:

‘The policies they (Kurdish politicians from prominent families) followed and their status prevented the nationalist organisations from being representative of the masses. They could not lead the masses and could not organise the people to the needs of political organisations. Kurdish aghas and chieftains cannot provide leadership for Kurdish national liberation movements’ (Rizgariya Kurdistan June 1981: 14-8).
Always critical of the authoritarian leadership of Mustafa Barzani, the socialist-oriented PUK could have championed the Kurdish nationalist movement as an alternative to Barzani’s leadership and could have been more successful in mobilising the peasants. However, this was not entirely to be the case, and the reality was ‘localisation’ of the two parties’ sphere of influence: the KDP became the dominant power of northwest Kurdistan and the PUK of the southeast region near Iran. The difference of the Kurdish dialects spoken in the two parties’ spheres of influence was analysed to be partially responsible for this. Jalal Talabani’s districts are Sorani speaking, while Barzani’s districts are Kurmanji speaking (Bruinessen in MER July-August 1986). This seems to reflect the still strong tribal base of both parties.

Totalitarian Structure

As against Kurdish nationalists’ fragmentation, the Baath regime erected a monolithic regime. The Baath party constitutes an organisational hierarchy based on two to three person cells at the lowest level. The cells are grouped in branches headed by the Regional Command from which the party discipline and command flows downward. Characteristic of totalitarian regime it mobilised the youth. It was said, ‘no previous Iraqi rulers - excepting Qassem - have used as effectively modern organisational weapons or mass mobilisation’ as the second Baath regime (Batatu: 1088). Despite its lack of popular support, the relative stability of the Baath regime in the 1970s was thus mostly attributed to a high degree of political institutionalisation.

Yet, during the two decades of Baath rule since 1968, the regime has largely alienated the Shia and the Kurds. Despite the fact that it calls for unity of the Arab nation, the Iraqi Baath’s scope for secular Arab integration seems to be sectarian and
ideologically narrower than the one envisaged by Michael Aflaq, due to its domination by the Sunni Arabs. The second Baath regime tried to restore traditional Sunni dominance in the government to reverse the increase of Shia in public posts effected by Qassem’s policy (Penrose: 358). The Kurdish officers who were promoted during the Qasim era were ‘all forced to retire and sent to the southern part of Iraq’ (Nouri Talabany). In the late 1970s, the Shia Arabs were increased once again only for strategic purposes. According to the study of representatives of the National Assembly, it is estimated that in 1980 about a 40 per cent Shia contingent existed in the Assembly (Marr 1988: 194-5).

The Baath Party also tried to recruit Kurds. According to Kurdish informants, this was done mostly through bribes. An Iraqi Kurd woman recalls, ‘How they recruit the Kurds - it's all money. The Baath heavily pay and bribe the Kurdish members. They give them cars, nice houses etc. And the Kurdish members of the Baath start behaving like they were Arabs. Also there are certain clans who traditionally support the government, like Zibaris. They are like black sheep. Whenever there is a big fight, the government gives them money to spy. [As a result] nobody trusts anyone’ (‘Zuzan’, pseudonym).

Another Iraqi exile commented,

‘The Baath party recruit the Kurdish members with bribes and interest. They are traitors to the cause of the Kurds. Regrettably, there are many former Baath members in the KDP. In general, the Baath Party could not possibly be more unpopular with the
Kurdish people. The Baathist regime has been responsible for the destruction of more than 4500 villages and the deaths of many thousands of Kurds’ (Nouri Talabany).

Control over the Society

As state oil revenues increased dramatically in the 1970s, almost everything became reliant on government funding. It was said, ‘most of the economic growth has been in public administration and defence rather than in industry’ (Marr 1985: 248). Genuinely private enterprises were eliminated from Iraq. At the same time, party membership in the Baath became a ‘prerequisite for promotion in the army and bureaucracy’ (Marr 1988: 188-9). The government sector swelled: by the end of 1977, ‘something like one-fifth or perhaps one-fourth of the inhabitants of Iraq would be depending directly upon the government for their livelihood and their life chances. In the town, more than one-third of the employed persons are already employees of the government’ (Batatu: 1123). Thus, the whole country was, in one way or another, regulated by the state. The extent of totalitarianism can be seen from the following experience of a university professor:

‘I was forced to retire as a professor of law at Baghdad University in 1982, because I was not a Baathist. 32 professors and members of staff were also forced to retire and deported to southern Iraq. There were concentration camps to detain the Kurds. My relatives were also killed. I am still alive because I was not involved in politics’ (Nouri Talabany).

The middle class under the second Baath regime was characterised as more or less a ‘creation’ of the state. The state succeeded in marginalising the political activities of
the trade unions. The state used, ‘distributive policies to create economic groups as a base of social support. Explicitly designed to depoliticise the population, these distributive policies forestalled the emergence of class conflict and public debate about the ends of development and growth’ (Chaudry). Marr asserted that the changes made under the second Baath regime promoted ‘integrating the Kurds and Shia into the middle class’ (Marr 1985: 248). However, it must be noted that the middle class created under this circumstance was neither autonomous nor politically significant. Thus, sponsorship became synonymous with economic control by the state. The state kept the clientelist ties to the economic proprietors as a ‘sole’ provider of capital (Chaudry).

Monopoly of Economic Resource

The second Baath regime implemented a five-year development plan between 1970-1975. The rise of oil prices allowed greater allocation of funds for economic development. According to Marr’s study, health and education in the north improved greatly in the late 1970s (Marr 1985: 285). During these years, Iraq had strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union and reached a bilateral alliance treaty in 1972. The Rumeila oil field in southern Iraq was developed with Soviet backing. Increased economic independence gave Iraqi leaders confidence that they were no longer dependent on the West and facilitated their decision to completely nationalise the Iraqi Petroleum Company in 1972 (Hiro 1992: 25).

The conclusion of the Kurdish war in 1975 brought some development programmes into the north but also accelerated the government’s Arabisation policy. After the collapse of the Kurdish resistance in 1975, the government implemented policies of
deportation of the Kurds living in the strategically important cities with mixed populations of Arabs and Kurds (Chaliand: 196-201). During this decade at least 500 villages were razed to create a security zone between Iran and Iraq, and 600,000 villagers were moved to collective resettlement camps (MRG: 25). In 1975, when the autonomy law was (unilaterally) enacted, a large percentage of the Kurdish population was transferred to an area more accessible to the government (Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett: 187).

The second Baath regime was not successful in improving agrarian production. The agrarian law of 1970 was known to have adopted a more sophisticated form of land categorisation in an attempt to avoid over-fragmentation of land ownership. Also, between the years 1970 and 1975, as much as 22 per cent of the total development budget was allocated for agrarian infrastructure, compared to 11 per cent from 1961 to 1965 (Theobald and Jawad in Niblock: 203). Under the 1975 law, the big estates of tribal leaders, including those of Kurdish leaders, were forcibly broken up (Penrose: 459). In theory, the reform could have had a profound effect on the rural society, because as late as the 1970s, almost half the workforce was contained in the agrarian sector (Penrose: 482). Covertly, however, the landlordism persisted. Agricultural output remained low, and in many places the landlord restored an informal tie with the former tenants. Those landlords continued to enjoy high esteem among their former tenants (Rassam: 162). It was argued that the Iraqi peasants’ strong attachment to kin organisations, such as tribes, was the preeminent factor that preserved the old structure even after the introduction of agrarian reform (Theobald in Jawad: 210-1).
Another factor that obstructed agrarian production under the Baath was the regime's policy of keeping food prices deliberately low in an attempt to keep industrial wages at competitive levels (Wilson in Niblock: 230). This created few incentives for agricultural producers to participate in the market economy, and the result of such policy was a sharp increase in the food-import bill (Wilson in Niblock: 230). This accelerated the trend of turning Iraq from a food-exporting country to an importing country, leading to continued neglect of the agricultural sector in the coming decade.

Interim Summary

The rise of the Baath regime coincided with a dramatic increase in oil revenue, and this allowed the government to impose unilaterally a development programme that would threaten Kurdish autonomy. The dependence on oil shaped a state structure that would practically silence all political opposition in the society. It had become extremely difficult to establish a civil organisation that was completely unaffected by the government’s power.

Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988)

The Iran-Iraq war began shortly after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Saddam Hussein attacked Iran in a bid to secure the disputed Shatt-al-Arab waterway. The new Iranian regime responded to the Iraqi attack, calling for a holy war. Iraq was known to be the first to play the Kurdish card, when the Iraqi government established a supply route to the Iranian Kurds fighting the Iranian government (January 1981) (Entessar 1989: 95). The same tactic was soon used by the Iranian regime vis-a-vis the two Iraqi Kurdish factions fighting for autonomy.
Kurds and Iran

As the Iran-Iraq war began, the Kurds resumed their fight for the first time since the catastrophic defeat in 1975. The Iranian Islamic Republic, despite its own suppression of the Kurds in Iran, supported Iraqi Kurds throughout the Iran-Iraq war in order to weaken Iraq and further its attempts to advance into the eastern front of Iraqi territory. The Western states and the Soviet Union, alarmed by the leader of the Iranian Revolution (1979), Ayatollah Khomeini, poured military support into Iraq (Karadaghi: 224). Although the Iraqi Kurds received support from Iran, it was obvious that this support was a token one and that Iran was not committed to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq.

As the war progressed, however, Jalal Talabani's PUK broke with Iran. Talabani sought peace with Baghdad in (December 1983), and had indeed reached a temporary agreement on the terms of limited autonomy for the Kurds (Entessar 1984: 922). At this time, Talabani accused the KDP of establishing a complete alliance with the Iranian forces. Thus by January 1984, the war had come to bear an obvious proxy character, with Iraq pouring support into the PUK and Iranian Kurds led by Abdulrahman Ghassemlo, and Iran to the KDP (Pelletiere: 178).

Turkey and Iraq

Agreement between the Kurds (the PUK) and Baghdad, however, alarmed Turkey which was troubled by its own Kurdish separatist movements. Turkey feared that the stronger position enjoyed by the Iraqi Kurds would encourage the Turkish Kurds' separatist activities. Fearing this, Turkey joined Iraq in a bilateral agreement to contain the Kurdish movement by a bilateral agreement. In May 1983, the Turkish
troops infiltrated Iraqi territory with the agreement of Saddam Hussein. In fact, this agreement dated back to 1978, when the two states secretly agreed on pursuing ‘subversive elements’ up to nine miles inside each other’s territories (Hiro 1990: 149). The same agreement was formally signed in October 1984, which permitted cross-border operations into each other’s territory up to eighteen miles. Baghdad sought to secure Turkish support by demonstrating that it would not commit itself to Kurdish autonomy in Iraq. Soon after the agreement, the Iraqi government started deporting Iranian Kurds who were seeking shelter in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Kurds completely stopped negotiations with the regime of Saddam Hussein. It was characterised as ‘the end of a period during which some at least of the Kurdish group entertained the illusion that they could negotiate with Saddam Hussein’ (MER 19 Sept. 1985, as in Chubin and Tripp: 104). In 1985 Masoud Barzani stated that ‘we will live with the Arab people in the state of Iraq, but not with a dictatorial regime’ (MER 19 Sept. 1985, as in Chubin and Tripp: 104). The government’s continuous suppression of the Iranian Kurds finally forced the PUK to cut off their contacts with the Iraqi government in 1986. It was at this time that the union of the two main Kurdish parties, the KDP and the PUK, materialised in the form of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF). The IKF was to last until the time of the Gulf War in 1991.

Ethnic-cleansing Policy

From the 1980s onward, the state was increasingly equipped with modern weapons and resorted to a genocidal policy against the Kurds. The earliest incident took place in 1986 around the Arbil governorate. The same campaign led to the genocide in Halabja in March 1988. The brutality of the retaliation adopted by the government
was epitomised in the name of the anti-Kurd campaign ‘Anfal’ which meant ‘spoils’ of the war and was derived from the eighth chapter of Quran (HRW: 1). The campaign was well-planned, and although it was supposed to target only those Kurds who assisted the Iranian troops, it was in fact indiscriminate and was aimed at destroying whole sectors of the Kurdish population (Cook: 110-111). The evidence of systematic genocide became public knowledge through the capture of Iraqi government documents, in the course of the 1991 uprising. The research on the captured documents by the Human Rights Watch revealed that the Halabja’s tragedy (March 1988) was only one of the systematic acts of genocide conducted by the government beginning in March 1987. Chemical weapons were extensively used along with other conventional weapons. The Human Rights Watch admitted that the government ‘retaliation’ took place in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. However, even though the retaliation was part of the Iran-Iraq war, it went too far (HRW: 17).

The Anfal campaign constituted part of the regime’s resort to an Islamic appeal. As the Iran-Iraq war dragged on, Saddam Hussein reversed Baath secularism and resorted to manipulating Islamic symbols. In 1986, the government ordered strict observance of the Islamic fast, closed down night clubs and deported foreign barmaids (Hiro 1990: 179). Saddam Hussein claimed descent from the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and had himself photographed in Mecca (Randal: 246). Thus Saddam Hussein increasingly resorted to ‘nationalising Islam’, meaning, emphasising the religion’s Arab origin against Iran (Tripp: 60). This was intended to unite the Shia Arabs that share the Shia faith with Iranians.
The looting and burning of villages during the Anfal campaign was undertaken by the Kurdish militia called the johsh, mentioned earlier. Unlike the army, the johsh unit, depended upon recruitment by local leaders. There were evidences of tribal chiefs who were ‘forced’ into cooperation: ‘we wanted to keep our people safe. There was no work in Kurdistan and no way to get money. The government was bringing men from Sudan to work but would not take Kurds. By enrolling in the johsh the Kurds did fifteen days duty per month. Many had escaped from the army. They were all asking me for safety so as not to be killed in the Iran-Iraq war. So we defended them by putting them in the johsh’ (McDowall 1996: 355). Addressing Kurdish nationalists rhetorically, another tribal chief declared: ‘my villages are still standing and are still wealthy, my people still dress as Kurds, speak Kurdish and have a good life. Look at what your nationalism has done for you. Your villages are destroyed, your people have been forcibly resettled, you live in exile and you have nothing left. Why call me a traitor?’ (McDowall 1996: 377). Furthermore, in an interview with McDowall, Masoud Barzani claimed that integrating the fighters from the johsh deserters into the nationalist forces would undermine the effectiveness of the pershmerga (Kurdish fighters) forces, as some johsh acted as informers (McDowall, Ibid., interviewed on 10 October 1991).

Incompatible Opposition Groups

Basically, current Iraqi opposition groups can be categorised as: (1) Islamic Shia, (2) Kurds, (3) Arab nationalists, and (+) the Communists (Karadaghi in Chaliand: 214-230). The Arab nationalists in this category is opposed to the Baath rule, and is composed of army deserters. These groups experience constant disunions on ideological, religious and national grounds, and even as a whole are a weak
opposition. The Shia Arabs constitute the majority of the population and thus are deemed to provide the most viable potential opposition. However, they are divided along tribal rivalries and some are actively pro-government (Bengio in Baram and Rubin: 60-61). Furthermore, the Shia opposition group is almost entirely dependent on Iranian military support (Bengio, Ibid.). This meant, the Shia opposition's only hope was to establish a viable link with the Kurds. However, no such link existed between the Shia and the Kurdish parties. Furthermore, the objectives of the two oppositions are dramatically different and are in fact incompatible. The Shia group envisages establishment of the Islamic government, which is known to be no more tolerant of Kurdish autonomy than is the current Baath government. The lack of cooperation among opposition groups also appears to reflect the fragmented nature of the Iraqi society.

Summary

With its overwhelming state autonomy, Iraq evolved into a totalitarian state. Totalitarianism also affected the nature of Iraqi society resulting in the complete absence of civil organisations which could act autonomously from the state. The fragmented state of opposition groups also demonstrated the failed integration of Iraq, and thus the ethnic and religious sectarian division remained strong. In Turkey, the Kurdish issues from the 1990s have become part of the agendas of the industrialist organisations, which are keen to establish a democratic framework. In Iraq, no equivalent developments have taken place: the industries were completely controlled by the state, and the politically viable working class was weak. The Baath party succeeded in political institutionalisation to a great extent, but its rule depended on a combination of political mobilisation and sectarian control and clientelism: the Baath
Party relied on rural notables to govern the countryside. It appears Iraq’s national integration under the Baath Party continues to be weak.
Chapter IV

Great Power Intervention and Nation-building

Introduction

This chapter is an examination of great power intervention’s effect on the nation-building efforts of an ethnic minority. Two pivotal cases of external powers’ involvement in the Kurdish nation-building will be discussed, firstly events over the First World War, and secondly after the Gulf War of 1991, both instances when the Kurds seemingly had a chance to acquire statehood or at least substantial autonomy.

During the First World War, the issue of self-determination of non-Turkish peoples was used to justify the Allied states’ involvement in the anti-Ottoman Arab and Kurdish nationalist movements. However, once the war was over, the principle of self-determination withered away, and national independence of these national groups was arbitrarily denied or left entirely to the great powers’ decisions. In the case under discussion, the Allied states and Turkey, not the Kurdish people, decided that there would be no Kurdish state after the First World War. Thus, external interventions in the 1920s ended up devastating Kurdish nationalists’ aspirations.

As for the most recent case, the eventual outcome of the Allies’ involvement in the de-facto independence of the Kurds since 1991 is not yet known. In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, it appeared that the Allies’ military intervention was effective in protecting the Kurds from the Iraqi government’s persecution. However, ten years after the ceasefire, external interventions by the Allies and by the United Nations now appear to have largely failed in facilitating a viable solution to the crisis.
affecting the Kurds, to be discussed below. This chapter, consisting of two parts, analyses foreign interventions from the perspective of whether or not they have either facilitated national independence for the Kurds or alternatively facilitated a viable relation between states and ethnic minorities within their borders. Foreign Office archives were consulted for the first part of the chapter.

Part 1. The First World War

Introduction

The following section outlines the international context of the First World War in the Middle East, especially the role of Britain, Iraq’s former mandatory power which took direct responsibility for delineating the state borders of the region. This process was illustrative of how intervening powers would put priority on their national interest, at the expense of that of the local peoples’. Kurdish demand for self-rule was deemed instrumental by Britain at one time, when it was thought to counter the pan-Islamic movement, but was deemed disturbing to its interests afterwards, when Britain decided to create Iraq, whose territory encompassed large areas inhabited by the Kurds. In order to clarify the overall context in which the Kurdish state was eventually denied, the following narrative includes Britain’s contacts with Turkish nationalists and the Arab insurgents as well.

Secret Diplomacy

Before the First World War, the Ottoman Empire constituted a strategic buffer among the European states competing for colonies, as they wished to secure the Empire on
their side against rival states. The Ottoman Empire remained inviolable, even though it was so weak that it was called the ‘sick man of Europe’ (Kedourie 1987: 11). However, once the First World War had broke out, the Empire’s territory suddenly became an object of colonial designs.

A plan to divide the Ottoman Empire was prepared by Britain and France, but this was not revealed to the anti-Ottoman insurgents. Instead, the promise of independent statehood was given to the Arabs in order to keep them on the Allies’ side during the war. One of the most important diplomatic agreements reached between the Allies and anti-Ottoman Arab insurgents was the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence. It denotes a series of correspondence exchanged between Sherif Husein of Mecca and the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry McMahon, who then was in Egypt. The correspondence was exchanged between 1915 and 1916, and in it, Britain pledged that if Hussein proclaimed an Arab revolt against Ottoman rule, it would provide military and financial support during the war, and after the Allies’ victory it would help to create an independent Arab state in the Arabian Penninsula and the Fertile Crescent.

There was a simultaneous arrangement underway at that time. At the very moment when Britain pledged the creation of an Arab state, Britain and France concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement (May-October 1916). It allocated most of the Arabian peninsula, Mesopotamia, Transjordan and Palestine to Britain, and Lebanon and Syria to France. Thus the agreement totally ran counter to the pledge made to the Arabs who were fighting the Ottomans in their large-scale revolt started in 1916. The Sykes-Picot Agreement also divided the Kurdish area between Britain, France and Russia. The city of Mosul, later to be contested between Turkey and Britain, was put under
the French sphere by this arrangement. Thus, Britain and France promised creation of an independent Arab state and at the same time planned the partition of the same territory. This had been planned from a fairly early stage of the war, and it appears that the Sykes-Picot Agreement reflected the great powers’ initial plan most accurately.

On the other hand, British contacts with Kurdish nationalists at the early phase of the War was not as obvious as that with the Arab nationalists. It is estimated that initially, the Kurdish area was of secondary strategic importance to Britain, whose primary concern was concentrated on the Gulf (Marr 1985: 31-1). In Kurdistan there were many powers competing to secure support from Kurdish tribal leaders including the Ottoman government, the Germans, and the Russians. For the most part, the Kurds’ actions in the First World War were pro-Ottoman, but not unanimously so. Some Kurdish tribal chiefs sided with the Ottomans but some, particularly tribes around Dersim, were known to have refused to assist the Ottomans and sought safety with the neighbouring Russian people (Kendal: 31).

The Wilsonian Principle and Self-Determination

The First World War turned into a war of attrition, during which the Russian regime changed from Tzarist to Soviet. The Bolshevist Revolution had a crucial impact on the war when the new government revealed all the secret treaties made under the Tsarist regime. This had a totally demoralising effect on the anti-Ottoman rebels, who were fighting against the Ottoman Empire for the promised independent statehood. The US-led peace initiative, known as the Fourteen Points was presented by the US President Woodrow Wilson on 8 January 1918. This was intended to promise national
independence to all the non-Turkish peoples formerly governed by the Ottoman Empire. Wilson declared his support for an 'absolutely unmolested opportunity for autonomous development for them, and laid plans for a comprehensive peace (Gelvin: 13). The first on the list was a call for an end to secret diplomacy, symbolised in the phrase coined by Wilson 'open covenants, openly arrived at'. This clause was proposed in the belief that secret alliances might lead to another world war and also was intended to calm the shock shared by the public after the Boshevik revelation of secret treaties (Nolan 1995: 277). Another important clause was number ten, in which self-determination of the non-Turkish people of the former Ottoman and Austrian Empires was stipulated.

Application of self-determination principles, however, was done differently in Europe than in the Middle East. In Europe, all small nations under the Austria-Hungary Empire achieved national independence after the war. In the Middle East, the independence of non-Turkish peoples was compromised through the Mandate system, in which colonies and territories taken from the Central Powers were administered by the states appointed by the League of Nations, which included Britain, France, Australia, Japan, and South Africa. The problem with the Mandate system was that although it was designed to allow progressive steps for complete independence for newly established states, at the same time, it allowed considerable room for control by former colonial powers. In fact, Britain and France displayed great ambivalence to the principle of self-determination (Gelvin: 13).

Furthermore, despite Wilson’s attempts to halt secret diplomacy, it was continued even after the war. The making and the revelation of the Lloyd-George Clemenceau
Agreement (December 1918) is an illustrative example. The agreement was necessitated after the armistice (the Mudros Armistice, 30 October 1918), when the British had accidentally occupied territory that was supposed to put under the French according to the prior (Sykes-Picot) agreement. The British-occupied territory included the oil-rich city of Mosul. The two premiers, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, held a talk and agreed that Mosul would be annexed to the British territory. In exchange, France would have a share in oil resources from Mosul. It was also agreed that the French would have a mandate control over Syria. At the San Remo Conference which was held in 1920 (April 19-26, Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece and Belgium), the form of mandates of the Middle Eastern territory was discussed and was officially decided. With little surprise, Britain was assigned mandates over Palestine and Mesopotamia and that of Syria and Lebanon were assigned to France. On top of this, the French oil rights in Mosul were publicly acknowledged. Thus, the San Remo Conference gave a token recognition to the secret agreements already concluded between Lloyd George and Clemenceau two years earlier.

New Developments in Anatolia

Meanwhile, after the Greek landing on Izmir in May 1919, Mustafa Kemal successfully put together the demobilised Ottoman army and numerous irregulars to fight the occupying forces. It must be pointed out that Kemal’s forces included many Kurdish chieftains who felt threatened by the Allies’ occupation. Shortly after the armistice, anti-foreign propaganda was spread by the Turkish nationalists. In this, the Turkish nationalists called for the Kurds to join them:
‘In Diyarbekir the agitation started by the Unionists [Kemalists] produced a certain unrest among the Kurds, which proclaimed Turco-Kurdish independence. The line taken was that if the Kurds were not to remain under Turkish rule, they should not allow foreigners to govern them. The Turks and Kurds of Urfa openly declared they would not tolerate Allied interference’ (FO 371/4157, 4/3/1919 GHQ intelligence summary).

The British officials observed widespread influence of the CUP among the Kurds, and listed the names of prominent Kurdish activists in Anatolia who opposed the Kurdish representatives who were negotiating for the creation of an independent Kurdish state at the Paris Peace Conference (FO371/4193). Britain summarised the circumstance as follows: ‘Kurdistan was split into two groups; the pro-Kurdish, who, under suitable management, might be pro-British, and the pro-Turkish party who were fanatically inclined anti-Christian’ (FO371/4193). Among the pro-British Kurds were the Badr Khan family, mentioned earlier. The Badr Khans pledged their loyalty to the British government and distanced themselves from the Kemalists.

While the Kurdish political activists’ general contacts with the majority of Kurds remained weak, Kemal’s calls for national independence deeply penetrated to the hearts of the people in Anatolia, including the Kurds, who feared foreign occupation. As a result, Kemal succeeded in allying a considerable number of Kurds on the Turkish nationalists’ side. It was said that already by the end of 1919 at least seventy Kurdish tribes had declared their support for the Turkish nationalists (Macfie 1998: 214). In order to win Kurdish support, the CUP’s propaganda had been modified to emphasise the Islamic cause, instead of Turkish nationalism. British intelligence
reports summarised: ‘Faced with personal danger, within and without their own country, they (CUP) now perforce to attempt to win the support of the people which had before been immaterial to them ... Since this anti-Christian movement requires the co-operation of the Kurds, who have their own aspirations which vary considerably, it has become necessary for the CUP element to pretend to support the [not explicitly Turkish] policy, as far as this race (Kurds) is concerned’ (FO371 4157, GHQ intelligence summary March 1919). Thus, the propaganda to mobilise the Kurds was largely anti-Christian.

Furthermore, the statement issued by the Kemalists, ‘the National Will’, portrayed the pro-Western Kurdish nationalists as traitors. Members of Badr Khans were accused by them of ‘working for the sake of British Gold and Englishmen whose aim was to create disturbances in our country, promising the formation of a Kurdistan’ (FO371/4193/149271). Once again, it was based on the claim that creation of Kurdistan was inimical to the country which was based on Islamic religion. The Kemalists’ statement continued, ‘they (the Kurdish nationalists) even persuaded some of our Muslim brothers to join them, and tried to raise up the Muslims against each other thereby causing the country to be occupied’ (Ibid.). British intelligence judged that ‘the idea that the British were encouraging the establishment of an independent Kurdistan had aroused serious alarm, and, as a consequence it had stimulated further anti-British propaganda’. Also that, ‘any form of foreign intervention would have the same effect as putting a match to a barrel of gunpowder’ (FO371 4193 153094, 153673). The intelligence report concluded, ‘no organisation for counter [Kemalists] propaganda exists. The Kurdish intelligentsia, the majority of whom have been
vanished [sic (have vanished)] from their country, are debarred from all
communication with their compatriots' (FO371/4193/163038).

It was under the above mentioned circumstance that the Sevres Treaty (1920) was
signed at the Paris Peace Conference. It must be pointed that even though the Sevres
Treaty had endorsed the creation of a Kurdish state, the Kurdish nationalists’ base of
support in Anatolia was weak. Muhammad Sherif Pasha, a Kurd from the aristocratic
Baban family, represented the Kurds. It was known that he was a staunch supporter of
Abdul Hamid and had a diplomatic career in the Ottoman government. As a political
figure, Sherif Pasha was a cross between an Ottoman loyalists and a Kurdish
nationalist.

The terms agreed to in the Sevres Treaty would have created independent Armenia,
Mesopotamia, Syria, and Kurdistan. The clause most relevant to the Kurds reads:

‘A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed
by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six
months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy
for the predominantly Kurdish area lying east of the Euphrates, and north of the
frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and
(3)’.

‘If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council
of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the
population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these people are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas’ (Article 64).

The issue over where to draw the boundary between the proposed Armenian and Kurdish states was disputed. The area where the Kurds and Armenians lived considerably overlapped. The Sevres Treaty’s section on Armenia (Article 89), however, allocated several territories whose population was mainly Kurdish to Armenia (Kendal: 35). In this regard the drafters of the treaty appear to have favoured the peoples under European protection. Members of the British Foreign Office had been debating this issue from 1919, in which opposition to the creation of a Kurdish state was raised on the grounds that such a state would threaten the interests of Christian peoples in the area (FO371/4193, Interdepartmental Conference of the Middle Eastern Affairs).

Furthermore, those who opposed the creation of a Kurdish state, such as Col. Wilson, did so on the ground that it would result in depriving Iraq of economically-important cities, many of which were located in Kurdistan, from Iraq. Particularly, Sulaimaniya and Mosul were deemed vital to the economic prosperity of Iraq. Thus Wilson argued that the Kurdish inhabited region must become part of Iraq (Wilson: 133). It appeared that the British debate over the creation of a Kurdish state was mostly focused on such a state's instrumentality, not the fulfilment of Kurdish aspirations. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of Colonies, envisaged creating a Kurdish state which would serve as an ethnic buffer between Iraq and Turkey (LP&S/10/782): ‘The potential advantage
of excluding it (Kurdish state) from Iraq ... I had in my mind the picture of a buffer state ethnologically composed of non-Arab elements and interposed between Iraq and Turkey ... I realise that our programme must be more attractive than any alternative Turks might offer and must be broad enough to satisfy more ambitious Kurdish nationalists’ (L/P&S/10/782).

On the other hand, British officials sympathetic to the Kurds, such as Major E.W.C. Noel and Simon Montagu, supported the creation of at least the Southern Kurdish state (that excluded Turkish Kurdistan) located in northern Iraq. Also, Col. C. N. French, who was then in Egypt Force, rightly predicted in 1919 that ‘to include Iraq certain rich Kurd district [sic] in order to enrich an Arabian Mesopotamia was hardly in accordance with the principles of self-determination laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations ... there should be no Kurdish territory in Iraq, otherwise a sort of Kurdistan irredenta would be created ... they would prove a source of weakness in every other way. I consider that any attempt to administer Kurdistan and Armenia by Western methods would be a mistake’ (FO371/4192). Col. French recommended leaving it to some form of native administration run by the local inhabitants, but his recommendations were not reflected in actual British policy.

However, one thing was certain: nobody - even among those who supported some form of Kurdish independence - was ready to create the Kurdish state that encompassed all areas inhabited by the Kurds, a real Kurdish state for all Kurds. It also became obvious that no state authorities wished to assume a mandate over such a Kurdish state (FO371/4193). To make the circumstance worse, there was no satisfactory Kurdish leader who was deemed capable of representing all the Kurds.
during this crucial period. The two prospective Kurdish leaders of that time: Sherif Muhammad Pasha and Sheikh Mahmoud, to be discussed below, were both seen as totally unsuitable for the task of governing the entire Kurdish people (FO371 4193). As a result, by 1921 the British Foreign Office’s discussion had already started to focus on the viability of the Iraqi state, instead of whether or not to create the Kurdish state.

Developments in Northern Iraq and the Syrian Region

Meanwhile, as the occupation of Mesopotamia continued, British relations with the local Iraqi population began to deteriorate. Britain’s mandate over Iraq formally commenced on 1 May 1920. The formal announcement of the mandatory power, however, triggered a widespread rebellion throughout Iraq in the summer of 1920. Iraq was not yet a sufficiently unified state to call it a ‘national’ rebellion; however, various groups inside the country spontaneously opposed the foreign rule imposed by the League of Nations. The early Iraqi nationalist organisations such as ‘al-Ahd al-Iraqi’ played a key role in this revolt, which was characterised as, ‘a struggle for liberation from external rule, the achievement of independence, and the establishment of a local government’ (Tauber: 315). After suppressing the 1920 rebellion, Britain adopted the policy of buttressing the moderate Arab nationalists on one hand, and appeasing tribal leaders on the other.

In August 1921 the throne of Iraq was presented to Faysal I of Mecca by the British High Commissioner. It was done under the following circumstance: Faysal represented the entire Arab people’s cause at the Paris Peace Conference in 1918 and entered Damascus to establish the Arab state. Shortly after, however, he was driven
out of Syria by the French army in 1920. France established its mandate over Syria, and also signed an agreement with Turkey in October 1921. By this agreement, the predominantly Kurdish Jazireh and Kurd-Dagh provinces were annexed to Syria while other Kurdish districts remained a part of Turkey. The Kurds were thus partitioned between Syria and Turkey. National independence for the Arabs and the Kurds, as envisaged by the Fourteen Points, was thus compromised by the great powers.

On the other hand, the British administration set up in northern Iraq had been made less stable by the Kurdish tribes led by Shaikh Mahmoud. Because of his extensive influence, Britain briefly appointed Mahmoud as a governor of Sulaimaniya. However, he disobeyed British officials and was soon dismissed. In 1922, Mahmoud claimed to be the king of Kurdistan and shortly after became uncontrollable by the British authorities. Britain suppressed his followers with an RAF bombing which was also the first case in history where an air raid was conducted against a people.

This Kurdish rebellion, however, appears to have affected British foreign policy in two aspects. The first was it gave Britain leverage over Arab nationalists in Iraq, and it affected Britain’s negotiation with Turkey over Mosul (Ali 1997: 528-530). First, Britain took advantage of the military dependency of the Iraqi Arab nationalists, as they alone would have had no way of suppressing Shaikh Mahmoud. Because of this, Britain did not suppress the rebellion instantly, and thus Mahmoud was left rebellious until Iraq was brought to sign the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty in 1924. And second, Britain did not wish to endanger its position in the ongoing Lausanne negotiation with Turkey, to be discussed below, by using its force against the Kurds. This would have allowed the
Turks to portray Britain as a non-legitimate ruler over the Kurdish region. Thus, with the signing of Anglo-Iraq Treaty and with the conclusion of the border dispute with the Turks, Britain no longer had the need to allow Shaikh Mahmoud to threaten its administration in Iraqi Kurdistan.

The Turkish-British Handshake

There was, meanwhile, a new advance made by Turkish nationalists. By August 1922 Mustafa Kemal successfully drove the occupying Greek Army out of Anatolia, and the Kemalists’ victory won them international recognition as the official successor authority to the Ottoman Empire at Lausanne in 1923. Because of this successful assumption of authority, Turkey became the only country defeated in the First World War to abrogate the terms imposed by the Allies. By the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey gave up nearly all claims to the former Ottoman lands in Europe. However, in its effort to secure the core Anatolian territory, the Turkish delegate led by Ismet Inonu, who was an ethnic Kurd, emphasised that ‘the government of the Great National Assembly was the government of both Turks and Kurds. Although Turks and Kurds spoke different languages, those two peoples were not significantly different [from one another] to form a single bloc from the viewpoint of race, face, and custom’ (Ismet Inonu’s speech in Lausanne on 23 Jan. 1923, as in Kendal: 49). After months of negotiation, the Treaty of Lausanne was eventually signed in July 1923. Although the treaty contained provisions with regard to the protection of ethnic minorities, it only affected the non-Muslim minorities, such as the Armenians and the Greeks. The fact that the Kurds were an ethnic minority was disregarded by the Turkish government on the ground that the Kurds governed Turkey as equal partners with the Turks (Kendal: 51).
The terms of the Treaty of Lausanne superseded the provisions of the Sevres Treaty and annexed most of the Kurdish territory to the current Turkish Republic, except the city of Mosul, which was retained by Iraq.

This was a vital period for Kemalist Turkey as it was in the early phase of state formation, struggling to establish the government’s uncontested legitimacy. Because of this, during the war of independence Mustafa Kemal refrained from alienating Islamic sentiments shared by the majority of Kurds, and he did not embark upon secularising reforms aimed to establish the Turkish Republic modelled after the Western style nation-state. Upon consolidating his power, Kemal, for the first time, started a series of reforms. By the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, many Kurds were severely alienated. This triggered a major Kurdish rebellion throughout eastern Anatolia in February 1925, which was led by Shaikh Said. However, the disturbance appears to have affected the Turkish-British negotiation over northern Iraqi border as well. The details of the Shaikh Said rebellion are given in Chapter III-2.

The Shaikh Said rebellion posed the first major threat to the newly established Turkish government. The protracted negotiation over Mosul was ongoing throughout the crisis, during which Britain showed its determination to include Mosul in Iraq. A British official recalled: ‘we were now engaged upon what was for Iraq a life-and-death struggle none of us had any doubt, for we were convinced that Basra and Baghdad without Mosul could, for economic and strategic reasons, never be built up into a viable state. Although the world press was wont to represent the battle as part of a gigantic struggle for the control of oil it is interesting to look back and recall how
very little oil figured in our calculations ... as distinct from the general patterns of trade, both import and export, which made the three vilayets a single and indivisible economic unit' (Edmonds: 398) It was also widely believed in Turkey that the Shaikh Said revolt was partly assisted by Britain (Bruinessen: 275, Barkey in Olson 1996: 67). The negotiations finally ended in December 1925. Following this, a bilateral treaty between Turkey and Britain was signed in June 1926, by which Turkey gained 10 per cent of Mosul's oil concession from Britain and furthermore, Britain promised to refrain from agitation on behalf of the Kurds and Armenians in the future (Bruinessen: 275). Thus the Kurdish rebellion was used to further the British position in Iraq. It was also obvious that Turkey was diplomatically weak at that time and had little control over its periphery. The government was also threatened by counter-revolution as well. These factors all appear to have contributed to the settlement of the Iraqi-Turkish border. The exact depth of British involvement in the Kurdish rebellion was not known. However, as pointed by a few observers, Kurdish rebellions during this period appear to have been highly instrumental as cards for negotiation among stronger powers surrounding the Kurds.

Summary of Part (1)

We have seen that the potential Kurdish state, even if on a limited scale, was completely eliminated from the map because of changes in the strategic priorities of Britain. This was combined with the fact that many Kurds chose to side with the Turks for fear of foreign occupation. Kurdish nationalism was acceptable to Britain only for so long as it was instrumental to the overall British policy towards the Middle East, and the Kurds’ right to self-determination was essentially a secondary issue, even though there were sympathetic individuals in the British government. The
disappearance of independent statehood was in fact, not an exclusively Kurdish experience. A few years prior to the Kurdish case, the Armenian Republic, briefly became independent after WWI, and shared a similar fate. Just as the potential Kurdish state was not materialised due to the coincidence of interest among the surrounding powers, the short-lived Armenian Republic was crushed after an agreement was reached between Soviet Russia and Turkey in 1921: Turkey refrained from interference in the Armenian secessionism in the Caucasus area, and, in exchange, Soviet Russia recognised the authority of the new Ankara government. Thus the interests of small nations who occupy strategically important locations are sacrificed by the work of more powerful states that surround them. No external state truly cared about the self-determination of the Kurds as a first priority.

From the point of view of Kurdish nation-building, the post-WWI period was crucial because it divided the Kurdish people more or less permanently. The loss of the Kurdish state meant perhaps the greatest obstruction to physical, social, and political development of Kurdish nationhood. The Kurds were not the only tribal people in that area. There were equally strongly tribal people, for example, in southern Iraq and rural Turkey. But opportunities for detribalisation were made greater for the Arab population by having an Iraqi state that was governed by the Arabs. Turkey became a spectacular example of a new state that devoted state resources to create a new Turkish national identity through education, social reforms, and economic development. All those possibilities were drastically reduced for the Kurdish people, firstly from the sheer loss of independent statehood, and secondly from the hostile nation-building policies of the states the Kurds were divided among. Why are many of the Kurdish people tribally organised to this day? It is not because they are the Kurds,
but because they were deprived of the government apparatus that is capable of
representing Kurds on a different, modern basis. This point was examined in Chapter
III.
Part 2. The 1991 Gulf War

Introduction: The Kurds Between Western Intervention and Iraqi Threat

The experience of the Iraqi Kurds since the end of the Gulf War in 1991 presents, as during the 1920s, a case illustrative of external intervention’s contribution to the welfare of ‘minorities’.

In recent decades, the role of the Kurds in the Great Powers’ policy was that of a ‘pawn’. The Kurds have been supported while they were instrumental, and have been abandoned when their goals no longer coincided with that of the intervening states. This was not a new phenomenon in the history of the Kurds. As seen in Chapter III, during the 1974-5 Iraqi civil war, Kurdish leaders were supplied with considerable military aid from Iran, Israel and the United States. However, once Iran and Iraq struck an accord at Algiers in 1975, all the military aid to the Kurdish guerrillas was suddenly cut off resulting in their complete defeat.

Another example could be found in 1988. In the final stage of the Iran-Iraq war, the notorious Anfal campaign by the Iraqi government destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages along the Iranian border. France and the US condemned the attack but no sanctions were imposed on Iraq. The West simply would not allow Khomeini’s Iran to win the Iran-Iraq War. In 1988, the US Senator Claiborne Pell introduced the Prevention of Genocide Act to put pressure on the Iraqi regime, but the Bush administration had the measure killed (Zunes MEP Jun. 1998, also Halperin: 39). The West ignored the Iraqi use of chemical weapon against the Kurds that had already been confirmed by 1986. Furthermore, the Soviet Union and France continued to
supply arms to Iraq despite the fact that France condemned Iraq’s attacks on the Kurds (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 73). The West armed Iraq heavily and closed their eyes to its genocidal policy toward the Kurds. Until as late as 1989, this policy was continued; the Bush administration pushed new loans through to the Iraqi government in order to facilitate US-Iraqi trade and actively supported the Iraqi regime’s procurement of weapons (Zunes, Ibid.)

The events in 1991 came in this context. In 1991, at the outbreak of the second Gulf War, the Allied states encouraged Iraqi oppositions to rise up and overthrow Saddam Hussein. However, once the ceasefire was reached no ground forces were deployed to protect the rebels. On 1 April 1991, the KDP leader called for assistance, but all Western governments gave no response (Aburish 2000: 312). The result was the Iraqi government’s complete victory over the opposition groups and the exodus of two million refugees into neighbouring states.

For almost a decade, however, the Allied states have been enforcing a No-fly zone above the 36th parallel and restricting Iraqi military activities there. Because of this operation, the Iraqi Kurds have been enjoying greater security, and this appears to be a positive factor for the welfare of the Kurds. At the same time, it must be noted that the Iraqi Kurdish leaders have been denying any intention of establishing a state completely independent from Iraq. This means that their tie to Baghdad is crucially important, and all intervening bodies, in this case - the Allied states and the United Nations - should concentrate their efforts on improving relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government, if they seek a workable solution to the problem of the Kurds’ place in Iraq. While at the same time, however, as long as the current Iraqi
regime's totalitarian structure remains in place, it is questionable if a viable solution for the Kurdish conflict in Iraq can ever materialise. In this respect, if only the minority group in question could benefit from it, some form of external intervention seems desirable. This would lead us to a question of the 'quality' of intervention; it must be remembered that a truly responsible external intervention is capable of providing a working government framework, as recounted earlier. When this is not possible for any intervener/s, the external intervention should, at least, not aggravate existing political conditions affecting the minority group. This principle, however, seems to have been hardly achieved in the Kurdish experience of external interventions. As mentioned above, intervening states always abandoned the Kurdish nationalists once these states' own political interests no longer coincided with that of the Kurds. If this continues to be the case, ultimately, the current de-facto independence of the Kurds will prove fragile. The basic security of the Kurdish Regional Government remains entirely dependent on the support of the intervening external powers. The decision to intervene taken by the states involved in this case is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it argues, as a minimum requirement of intervening bodies, all interventions should be conducted in a manner which would give the interest of the local people priority, instead of theirs. Based on this proposition, the following section will examine whether or not the ongoing external intervention conducted for the Iraqi Kurds, first, through the Allied states' military actions and second, through the UN economic sanction regime (including the Oil for Food Programme) is truly serving the interest of the Kurds or establishing a viable relation between the Kurdish areas and the rest of the Iraqi state as a whole. This chapter will firstly analyse military actions taken by the Allied states after the Gulf War in response to the refugee exodus triggered by the 1991 Kurdish rebellion, and
secondly it will examine these actions’ impact on the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Finally it will assess whether or not all these acts of intervention have contributed to the workable welfare of the Kurds and the Iraqi people as a whole.

**Iraq’s Suppression of the Kurdish Uprising in 1991**

Before Iraq had recovered from the Iran-Iraq War that ended in 1988, the outbreak of Gulf War in 1990 once again devastated the country’s war-torn infrastructure. The Iraqi casualties from the Gulf War were estimated to be at least 65,000 and many of the victims died in the trenches along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. Many of the Army conscripts sent to the most dangerous front line were either Kurdish or Shia soldiers (Pilger 1991), reflecting the lower status of these groups within the Army. It must also be pointed that the war had been waged by the Iraqi government, not by the Iraqi people. By the late 1980s, Iraq’s state structure was already totalitarian, and the majority of ordinary Iraqis had no control over the government’s decision to occupy Kuwait. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait invited much criticism abroad, and facilitated even the Arab states to participate in the Gulf War Coalition against Iraq.

As the Gulf War ended in total Iraqi defeat in late February 1991, two revolts against president Saddam Hussein broke out; first in southern Iraq predominantly inhabited by the Shia Arabs, and second, in the Kurdish north. The first revolt was initially triggered by a group of retreating Iraqi soldiers from Kuwait. The anti-government revolt started by these soldiers was joined by the Shia opposition group, the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution (SAIRI). The disturbance spread quickly across key cities in the south, such as Nassiriyah, Karbala and Najaf.
The Kurdish revolt began on 14 March 1991. Momentum was given to it when the 100,000-strong government gendarmeries, johsh, switched sides to the Kurdish nationalists. Because the Western promise of backing for the Kurdish revolt appeared almost certain at that time, it was said that even the anti-nationalist tribal chiefs joined in the nationalists' uprising (Hiro 1992: 405, also in Randal: 44-5). In fact, the Western states encouraged the Kurds and other Iraqi opposition to rise against the Baath regime. For example, on 15 February 1991 the US president George Bush was reported to have said, 'there is another way for the bloodshed to stop, and that is for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and comply with the United Nations' resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations. We have no argument with the people of Iraq. Our differences are with that brutal dictator in Baghdad' (as in Halperin: 40). By late March, the Kurdish nationalists had succeeded in controlling major cities in the north, such as Dohuk, Arbil, Zakho and the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.

To the surprise of many, however, despite being completely defeated by the Allied states, the Iraqi government was still capable of mobilising its armed forces to suppress these rebellions. The suppression was rapid. The Shia rebellion in the south had been completely suppressed by the Republican Guards by mid-March. After this operation, the government troops were concentrated in the north. From 22 March, the government began reorganising the troops in the Mosul region. By the end of March, the Iraqi Army had taken back all key cities occupied by the Kurds, including Kirkuk. It was known that the government used heavy weapons and helicopter gunships, and a few thousand civilians were killed (Hiro 1992: 405). As the Iraqi Army advanced further towards the mountains, Kurdish civilians flooded into the borders of the
neighbouring states. There were no Allied troops to protect the fleeing Kurds from the advancing Iraqi Army. One witness recalled:

‘When the fighting began between the Kurdish nationalists and the government in the south of Mosul, people started realising there was no way that the nationalists were going to win the war. Within a week, the town (Mosul) was like a ghost town. We did not want to leave, and we were probably the last family still remaining in the town. But one morning when shells started reaching the basement where we were hiding, we decided to flee. We fled to Dohuk on foot and with some pick-up transport. We walked and walked, there was no more road, then we arrived in Sirsensk. We were very angry that the West was not going to support the Kurds’ (‘Zuzan’, pseudonym).

Another Kurd who fled to the Iranian border commented:

‘I felt betrayed by the West. I had to stay in the camp in Iran for several months. The condition was so bad. But I was very scared to go back to my home in Kirkuk, and I went to Arbil (further north) instead. Even today I feel the West is not serious enough about supporting the Kurds’ (Nouri Talabany).

The number of Kurdish refugees who fled Iraq during this exodus was estimated to be up to two million, or half the population of the region, of whom, 500,000 crossed the border into Turkey while more than a million fled to Iran. Between 2,000 and 3,000 refugees were known to have died daily from exposure and also from an outbreak of spreadable disease while they waited entry into the two countries (Hear: 69). Turkey
adopted a hostile attitude to the refugees by refusing their entry. However, owing to the mounting international pressure, it finally opened the border. A witness recalled:

'I knew Turkish soldiers shot some people who were trying to get food. We were so fed up with the camp. It was so miserable. I stayed there about a month and a half. They were looking for someone who could interpret, and I volunteered. I myself was very sick from dysentery. We eventually decided to go back, when the Iraqi government said the Kurds can come back. Actually, the Kurdish nationalists said people should stay in the camp, as it was getting so much attention. But we did not want to stay any longer' ('Zuzan', pseudonym).

The exodus was taken advantage of by the Iraqi government when it strengthened the 'Arabisation' of the economically important city, Kirkuk. The government did not allow refugees from Kirkuk to return to their city. The report compiled by exiles from Kirkuk gave evidence that refugees from Kirkuk were given two options before returning to Iraq; the first option was to go to southern Iraq, in which case they were allowed to collect and bring their belongings from Kirkuk. The second option was to move to either of the two Kurdish governorates farther north (Arbil or Sulaimaniya), in which case all personal property would be confiscated by the government. Through this policy, 15,615 families (92,712 people) were expelled to Sulaymaniya governorates, and 913 families (5,811 people) were expelled to Arbil governorates between May 1991 and October 1999 (KTRS: May 2000). This indicated the Iraqi government intended not only to Arabise Kirkuk, but also to de-populate the Kurdish inhabited area as much as possible.
Military Actions after the Ceasefire

One important feature of the 1991 Gulf War, particularly relevant to this study, was the fact that the Coalition forces did not actually topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. The Coalition forces concentrated their effort on liberating Kuwait, and the Iraqi regime that caused the very crisis was left intact once the occupying forces were driven out of Kuwait. Why did the Coalition not replace the Baath regime when they were badly defeated, the time when it was most vulnerable? In fact, the agreement of ceasefire made at that stage (February 1991) aroused some criticism in the states that participated in the Coalition, that it was premature and that the Coalition forces should continue their actions until they toppled Saddam Hussein (Record 1993: 52). However, not only was there strong reservation towards further deployment of troops, but there also was a strong concern over Iraq's political instability which could result from the fall of the regime. In short, 'a central government of almost any stripe in Baghdad was preferable to Iraq's disintegration into a Lebanon writ-large' (Record 1993: 108). In light of the fragmented state of Iraqi opposition groups, it was highly likely that Iraq could have faced an era of political instability if the existing government was removed. It would have left Iraq without any viable centre of power. Thus a partial restriction of the Iraqi military activities through the No-fly zone, instead of a full occupation of the country, was deemed most viable for all parties.

If the Allied states were not committed so far as to the actual occupation of Iraq leading to the establishment of an alternative government, was 'non-intervention' a viable option? Without doubt, the humanitarian relief operations provided for the millions of refugees have been vital and essential. This was materialised through Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) that began on 16 April 1991. The Allies' action
prevented the further spread of the refugee crisis and saved the lives of many people who otherwise would have been left to die. It should be noted, however, that OPC initially met strong reservations expressed by some Western leaders, who feared such an operation would entangle them into Iraq’s domestic affairs. When the European states eventually agreed to create a Safe Haven for the refugees, the US administration expressed strong reservations. This was because the US had been advised against intervention by regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, who feared assisting the Iranian backed Shia and the Kurdish independence movements would lead to the fragmentation of Iraq (Hiro 1992: 406).

However, the US and European governments finally reached an agreement to take military action. It was decided that this operation would exclude Iraqi government activities above the 36th parallel. After this announcement, severe fighting took place between the Kurdish nationalists and the Iraqi Army. In the end of April, the Kurdish nationalist parties finally called for the ceasefire with Iraqi authorities in order at least to facilitate the return of the refugees. By this time, the Shia Arabs, too, could no longer sustain the anti-government activities (Hiro 1992: 401). Even after the ceasefire was declared, however, many of the Kurds did not trust the Iraqi government at all and saw the Allied troops as their only protector (Hear: 70).

Safe Haven and its Legal Basis

It is unmistakable that the Allied states’ intervention was one of essential factors that facilitated repatriation of the refugees. A study conducted between May and June 1991 summarised the five conditions that were crucial in repatriation: (1) The restriction of Iraqi military activity, (2) Agreement between the UN and the Iraqi
government, (3) Control of a substantial part of Kurdish territory by the Kurdish nationalists, (4) Negotiations between the Iraqi government and the Kurdish leaders, and (5) Deteriorating condition of refugees in the recipient countries, especially Turkey (Hear: 72-3).

Thus the Allied intervention has played a crucial role in minimising the crisis, however, it also involved a certain political risk, namely the military action’s incompatibility with the UN Charter. The Charter regulates military actions taken by the member states against one another as follows.

First of all, the UN Charter prohibits the use of force by member states against other members except in the case of receiving an armed attack waged by them. Because the military action against Iraq by the Allied states was conducted after the ceasefire, it did not satisfy this provision (Cook: 52-3). Also, the UN Security Council Resolution 688 adopted on 4 April 1991, on which the Allied states based their action, had not been passed under the UN Charter’s Chapter Seven, the only chapter that allows legitimate use of force.

Provisions in Chapter Seven gives authorisation to use force only as a last resort, provided all non-military measures had failed. These are listed in its Articles 41 and 42, which read:

'Article 41 ... Measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed ... these may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relation.

Article 42 ... Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security'.

Technically speaking, military actions taken for the Kurdish Safe Haven did not comply with the above conditions.

The Security Council Resolution 688, on which the Allied states’ military actions are based, needs some examination. It reads:

The Security Council ... Recalling Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the Charter of the United Nations, gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, most recently in Kurdish populated areas, which led to a massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions, which threaten international peace and security in the region ... Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering involved ... Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Iraq and all States in the area ...

1) Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas, the consequences of which threaten international peace and security in the region.
2) Demands that Iraq, as a contribution to remove the threat to international peace and security in the region, immediately end this repression and express the hope in the same context that an open dialogue will take place to ensure that the human and political rights of all Iraqi citizens are respected.

3) Insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary facilities for their operations.

4) Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his humanitarian efforts in Iraq and to report forthwith, if appropriate on the basis of a further mission to the region, on the plight of the Iraqi civilian population, and in particular the Kurdish population, suffering from repression in all its forms inflicted by the Iraqi authorities.

5) Requests further the Secretary-General to use all the resources at his disposal, including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.

6) Appeals to all Member States and to all humanitarian organisations to contribute to these humanitarian relief efforts.

7) Demands that Iraq co-operate with the Secretary-General to these ends.
8) Decides to remain seized of the matter.

(Abridged from the full text in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 71).

An important aspect of this resolution was that the UN made a formal request to the Iraqi government on behalf of the persecuted civilians inside Iraqi territory. With this resolution, the UN had gone far to request that swift action be taken by the Iraqi government, but averted measures which would require the use of force sanctioned by Chapter Seven.

As mentioned in the preamble of SCR 688, Article 2 of the UN Charter’s Chapter One stipulates the inviolability of state sovereignty. The only exemption to this provision was, once again, chapter seven which authorises the use of force if certain conditions are met. The following is a relevant passage from Chapter One:

‘Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter seven’.

Thus, any military action taken by the UN member states was deemed legal only when it complied with the Security Council Resolution passed under the UN Charter’s Chapter Seven. Yet, in reality, it is rare that all five Security Council member states, each with veto power, would unanimously agree on a resolution to be passed under Chapter Seven. At the same time, the outdated provisions of Chapter Seven did not
meet the scale and the speed of contemporary humanitarian crises: it would have been totally inhumane to wait until all the non-military measures were exhausted whilst leaving the refugees to suffer every day. As a result, the Allied states interpreted the SCR688 on their own terms in order to materialise swift actions. Military actions against Iraq, taken even after the ceasefire, was thus deemed a ‘means to an end’, i.e., the means to enforce the terms listed in SCR 688. This approach was evident in the statement by the US administration made in April 1991, that the Allied action was ‘consistent’ with the UN Resolution 688 (Cook: 41).

The UN Secretary-General of that time, Perez de Cuellar, however, distanced himself from the view taken by the Allied states. He was quoted as saying, ‘Foreign military presence in Iraq required either Iraqi consent or separate Security Council authorisation. Verbal consent was never granted, nor was authorisation given’ (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 77). Thus the UN took the view that the Allies’ action was basically unilateral, and so did the Iraqi government. This difference over interpretation of the SCR 688 created a decade-long problem among the Allied states, the UN, and Iraq, to be discussed below.

The UN Sanctions Continued

The international economic sanctions on Iraq had originally come into effect at the time of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (August 1990). This constituted part of the non-military measures defined in the chapter seven. The sanction, however, was sustained even after the war for the purpose of demilitarising Iraq. Under this, exports of oil from Iraq, as well as all imports to Iraq were to be banned except for humanitarian materials. A list of conditions were set for the removal of the sanctions with which
Iraq had to comply. These were: (1) The destruction of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), (2) Iraq’s acceptance of Kuwaiti sovereignty, (3) Repatriation of Kuwaiti personnel held in Iraq, and (4) Deduction of 30 per cent of all Iraqi oil revenue for compensation to Kuwait.

In order to carry out the inspection of the complete elimination of Iraq’s WMD, the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) was established in 1991. This was set up to identify and destroy products of Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical programmes, and the sanction regime would not be lifted unless Iraq complied with disarmament.

Although the UN sanctions aimed to force the Iraqi government to comply with the demilitarisation programme, its impact on Iraqi civilians including the Kurds turned out to be extremely severe. Under the sanctions, the Iraqi population were reduced to live in an unprecedented level of poverty. For example, Iraq’s GDP per capita in 1989 had been $2,849, however, this had dropped to $200 in 1997 (Centre for Economic Social Rights 1997, as in MER Spring 1998). The damage to Iraq’s infrastructure was severe. The water system and other facilities were destroyed by bombing during the war, however, they could not be repaired afterwards owing to the sanctions. The loss of generating capacity particularly affected the quality of sanitation, which relied mainly on electric pumps (Graham Brown: 157). In turn, the lack of clean water and deteriorating health services caused preventable childhood diseases to spread rapidly. A survey conducted by health experts in fourteen major Iraqi cities, including the southern cities of Basra, Nasiriya, Najaf, Kerbala, and the mostly Kurdish northern cities of Kirkuk, Sulaymaniya, Arbil, Mosul, Dohuk, and Amadiyyah, showed that
many of the hospitals had been reduced to 'mere reservoirs of infection', due to the shortage of medicine, surgical supplies, food, water and electricity (Simons: 151). The first nation-wide survey on health problems was conducted in August 1991 by the International Study Team (IST). The survey results indicated that malnutrition had sharply increased, particularly among young children, who suffered diarrheal disease (Graham-Brown: 317). The infant mortality rate between 1989-90 had been 80 per 1,000. However, this figure had doubled between years 1994-95, up to 160 per 1,000 (Centre for Economic Social Rights 1997, as in MER Spring 1998). Also, the ban on imports created a generation of Iraqi children who were completely denied access to the knowledge of events outside Iraq. It was also pointed out that the number of deaths that occurred as a result of the UN sanctions was higher than those caused by the war in 1991 (Graham-Brown, quoting Garfield 1999: 92).

The broader picture was that Iraq turned out to be particularly vulnerable to the comprehensive trade embargo. Prior to the UN sanctions, Iraq was importing some 70 per cent of its food. Iraq's import-biased economy also contributed significantly to making people dependent on high technology. On top of this, the socialist regime's subsidies aggravated people's lack of skill to deal with the shortage. A UN staff remembered:

'I was reconstructing the water system. I do the same work in Africa as well, but there the system is very simple. In Iraq, it was all reliant on modern technology, and this caused a particular problem. For example, there were sewage pumps, but because of one small pipe that was missing between them, the machines did not work. That pipe was made in a very high tech company abroad and used to be imported. In
the past they could afford doing like that because of oil money. People were used to getting everything for free as well under the socialist government’ (‘Steve’, pseudonym).


To the extent UN relief operations were to comply with the UN charter, all agencies operating in Iraq were to be dependent on the Iraqi government’s consent. Thus, to implement the humanitarian relief effort envisaged in the SCR 688, it was necessary for the UN to obtain agreements from the Iraqi government. This was done through negotiating the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The first MOU came into effect in May 1991. The essential feature of the MOU was that it was based on the understanding that humanitarian assistance was impartial and that all civilians in need were entitled to receive it (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 81). With this agreement, for the first time, the UN was able to set up a hundred civilian-run camps inside Iraq. Also, other humanitarian organisations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Red Crescent Society were allowed into the Iraqi territory. In the ICRC’s case, it took the form of the Iraqi Red Crescent’s Society giving an invitation to the ICRC. Through the MOU, the Iraqi government also agreed to withdraw its military and police forces from the area near the Turkish border. As soon as the emergency relief operation was over, UNICEF took over the UNHCR’s task to focus more on long-term reconstruction programmes.

The level of protection available for aid workers agreed by the MOU, however, was fragile. The presence of foreign troops, including armed UN police was refused by the Iraqi government. It took more than one month after the first MOU was agreed for
UN Guards to eventually be accepted (25 May 1991) on the condition that they carried only personal weapons (Ramsbotham and Woodhouse: 82). By international standards, the UN Guards’ status ranked lower than the level of the UN Peacekeepers. This was because the UN Guards were to deal only with humanitarian issues, and were hence not authorised by the Security Council (Morphet: 220).

Furthermore, the arrival of the UN Guards to the crisis-affected region came late. Also, their manpower fluctuated according to the level of funding available to the UN Humanitarian Programme. The poorly equipped UN Guards was not comparable with the Allied states’ contingents, which had 20,000 troops at its height (Cook: 46-7). UNICEF staff considered the UN Guards’ existence to be almost a symbolic one: "The UN Guards were really weak. They were only allowed to carry pistols and were not very trained in the job. They were not given much mandate either. Furthermore, because they were so visible, wearing the UN uniform, on occasion they were bombed in a car, probably by the Iraqi government, as they did not like the UN Guards. But for the local Kurdish people they symbolised that the UN was here" (‘Steve’, pseudonym).

Iraq showed an uncooperative attitude towards the UN by refusing the renewal of the MOU in November 1991. The new MOU was eventually signed in October 1992, and after this agreement expired in March 1993, no further negotiation took place. The MOU was never renewed afterwards. It was pointed out that 'the UNHCR's withdrawal may have sent a signal to the Iraqi government that the emergency was over and the situation had “normalised” (Graham-Brown: 269). Without the MOU,
The unresolved legal basis of humanitarian operations made the aid workers increasingly vulnerable (Cook: 54-5).

The Iraqi government began a campaign of protest against the No-fly Zone. The presence of international organisations on Iraqi soil was increasingly detested, especially those in the Kurdish governorates that relied on the Allied states' protection. Saddam Hussein was quoted comparing the Kurdish region to 'a termite that will devour the whole of Iraq' (NYT, 12 March 1992, as in Keen). All foreign organisation, including the UN, were associated with the threat to Iraq's sovereignty and the Kurds were seen as agents of the Western states hostile to Baathist Iraq. The distribution of humanitarian goods came to be constantly obstructed by the Iraqi government. It was said that the scarce resources were unequally distributed to those who were Baath Party loyalists, and also punitive measures were taken against the southern and northern part of the country that attempted to rebel against the regime (Cook: 62).

From the aid worker's point of view, security was vital to the successful relief operation. A former NGO member emphasised the vital importance of military protection to humanitarian relief operations.

'I knew the Allies' Military Coordination Center was my real protector. Now I work in Sierra Leone as well, where there is no military protection. There, only small areas are safe. Whereas in Iraq under the area covered by the military we had a total access to all these vulnerable groups. Without the military, it (the Kurdish operation) could have been a failure. There are idealists in the UN who think that the
humanitarian mission should have nothing to do with the military. In the Kurdish operation, for example, the Red Cross refused to attend any meeting where the military was present. After the Kurdish operation, the UN realised the importance of coordinating the activities of different parties involved, including the military and the media, and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs created an Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). There was no such body before’ (‘Steve’, pseudonym).

Apparently there is a ‘hybrid’ situation; even though the military intervention was conducted without a definite legal framework, it was vital in alleviating the refugee crisis swiftly. On the other hand, the Iraqi government remained capable of arbitrarily obstructing the relief operation conducted through the UN. The security of the UN-based operation was increasingly put at risk.

Impact of Intervention on the Kurds

(1) Establishment of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)

Under Allied protection, the Kurds established a semi-independent government (the Kurdish Regional Government). This was the first autonomous government run by the Kurds that had been realised since establishment of the state system after the First World War. Although the KRG had no formal link with the Iraqi government, the UN still treated the KRG as part of Iraq. However, the UN also established direct communication with the KRG bypassing the Iraqi government, so in reality, its status was more than just that of an Iraqi province.
The ground security of the KRG was almost entirely reliant on the Kurdish pershmergas, because even though the Allies' Military Coordination Center (MCC) was present in Zakho, a town near the Turkish border, the extent of its patrol area was limited. Originally, the Allied states planned to deploy a 5,000 strong rapid reaction force. However, the plan was withdrawn in September 1991 and was switched to air patrols alone (Cook: 45). Under this scheme, the area north of the 36th parallel was patrolled daily by the Allies' planes. The US, UK, Turkey and France (until 1996) contributed to this operation known as Operation Poised Hammer. The air patrol, however, only covered about 40 per cent of the Iraqi Kurdish population and was thus rather limited to the border region with Turkey.

The formation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) was declared prior to the election of the first Kurdish Parliament (May 1992). The IKF was composed of eight different parties including the KDP, PUK, and smaller parties such as Kurdistan Socialist Party (PASOK), Kurdistan Popular Democratic Party (KPDP), Kurdistan Toilers Party, the Iraqi Communist Party's Kurdistan branch, and the Assyrian Democratic Movement. By establishing the IKF, the rival pershmerga forces from the KDP and the PUK were formally unified. After the May 1992 election, the Kurdish Parliament was sworn in July 1992. Arbil was chosen as the capital of the KRG.

The result of the election was an almost a 50-50 split between the KDP and PUK in the 105 seat parliament. The votes for the parties that did not receive 7 per cent of the total votes were added to either that of the KDP or the PUK's according to party adherence. As a result, 50.22 per cent went to the KDP and 49.78 per cent to PUK (Gunter 1993, quotes AFP 22 May 1992). It was decided that 50 seats went to the
KDP, another 50 to the PUK, and the remaining 5 seats were allocated to the Assyrians' party. The Kurds' first "free election" was, however, less than it seemed. There was virtually no secret voting, and a great deal of communal and family voting took place (Cook: 77). A Kurdish woman who participated in the election also admitted that she voted according to the tribe and also that it was everyone's knowledge that the votes were being manipulated ('Zuzan', pseudonym).

On 4 October 1992, the KRG declared the establishment of federalism in Iraq as its eventual goal, thus affirming that it did not aim at becoming completely independent from Iraq. The two leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani emphasised this point (Gunter 1996). However, their approach to the Baath regime varied; the KDP's Masoud Barzani was relatively more willing to continue negotiations with Saddam Hussein, while the PUK's Jalal Talabani insisted on ruling out any negotiations with him (Freij quoting the MEI 23 Oct. 1992).

The draft constitution of the KRG was based on federalism. Its Article 1 declared that Iraqi Kurdistan was a 'Region of the Federal Republic of Iraq'. In terms of its relation with the rest of Iraq, it stipulated 'The people of Iraqi Kurdistan enter into a voluntary federation with the Arabic part of Iraq within the framework of a Federal Iraqi Republic'. In its Article 2, however, it also defined Iraqi Kurdistan to be part of (the entire) Kurdistan (Revised Version, October 1992). The draft constitution, however, was supported by only 33 out of 105 members of the Parliament. This was owing to the reservations by the MPs who were susceptible to Turkish pressure which opposed a Kurdish federal government in Iraq (Nouri Talabany). The KRG EU representative also admitted that the KRG was not in a position to confront Turkey. 'Our relations
with Turkey remained difficult. We could say, at best, that we kept a “friendly” relation with Turkey. We have our representatives in Turkey, and we allow the Turks to cross to our territory as well’ (Jaf).

(2) Kurds and the UN Sanctions

Since the KRG was established, the Kurds were put in a political dilemma; while they enjoyed the Allied states’ protection, they were damaged by the economic blockade imposed by the Iraqi government targeted at the KRG in October 1991. This was clearly a retaliatory measure taken against the Kurds’ contact with the Allied states. The Iraqi government told the Kurds the embargo would not be lifted unless they cut off all foreign contacts (21 April 1991, The Observer as in McDowall 1996: 376).

The combined embargoes: the one imposed by the UN that affected all of Iraq and another imposed by the Iraqi government specifically on the KRG, damaged the nascent Kurdish regime and especially the poorer strata of Kurdish society. The KRG had to survive on limited funds amidst unstable political conditions. Between 1991 and 1996, the main revenue of the KRG was drawn from the transit tax imposed on trucks entering from Turkey, which provided about one million dollars per month (NYT 28 Jun. 1994). UN relief funds also provided another 200 million dollars a year, of which 40 million was from the United States (NYT Ibid.) The UN also assisted the Kurds with relief operations such as the shelter programme (1991-1992) and food and fuel distribution operations (1993). However, some international agencies did not operate in the Kurdish region because the Iraqi government did not allow them to. This was so of the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation (Keene: 175). Furthermore,
the traditional dependence of the Kurds on government subsidies aggravated the shortage. Since the internal embargo had begun, the Kurds’ income from the Iraqi public sector was wiped out. The economic blockades affected various services that had previously been provided by the Iraqi government, such as electricity, water, sanitation, health services, veterinary services, subsidised food, welfare payment and education. Another serious damage to the local economy was the Iraqi government’s withdrawal of the original Iraqi dinar’s 25D note in May 1993. This currency happened to be the most commonly circulated in Kurdistan. It was estimated to have wiped out 20 million dollars of Kurdish savings overnight (Keene, quoting Hawkar July-August 1993). When the Turkish-based PKK sealed off the Turkish border, it was said that the Iraqi Kurds suffered a ‘triple embargo’; the UN embargo, the Iraqi embargo, and the loss of illegal trades with Turkey (Cook: 52). A UN staff member recalled that humanitarian aid was vital particularly for the poorer people:

‘I was in Iraq between 1992 and 1994. I arrived in northern Iraq on New Year’s Eve of 1992. The refugees were returning from the camps in the summer of 1991. There was no water system, no fuels, and people were collecting wood from the mountains. The food supply was not enough. In their first spring, farmers sold their grain to the Iraqi Arabs, not to the Kurdish people because they could not buy it. There were no government jobs anymore, so they were both very poor people. If the Kurds had been left on their own after the war, it could have been very bad. The international aid just got to the very poorest people. The shortage was exacerbated partly because the Kurds destroyed everything that was associated with the Iraqi government, for example, the president’s palace. But also Kurdish leaders stole and sold the equipment, like garbage trucks and cranes. ‘There was an open market across
the Iranian border in a car park like place, and there they were, all the machines and trucks that were given to them as an aid’ (‘Steve’, pseudonym).

Thus, until the Oil for Food Programme began (1996), the Kurdish Regional Government was not unlike a sealed enclave. The harsh economic condition fuelled fighting among the rival Kurdish parties over scarce resources, and destabilised the fledgling government. By 1993 the attempt to unify all parties’ peshmergas had largely failed. It also became obvious that the KRG’s revenue had come to be monopolised by the KDP. It was because the KDP happened to control the northwestern area along the Turkish border, the location that allowed them to control the trade with Turkey. Thus the PUK that mostly controlled eastern provinces near the Iranian border was excluded from the trade.

An exile criticised the KDP’s action: ‘the people in Sulaimaniya under the PUK suffered a lot of casualties during the Iran-Iraq War. I think the KDP treated them very unfairly. They betrayed the most patriotic people’ (‘Zuzan’, pseudonym). The resumption of internal war dismayed many Kurds. A university student, who, two years earlier, clamoured to work in the Kurdish parliament lamented the situation: ‘we waited 200 years for this opportunity (of autonomy) and now our leaders destroyed it’ (NYT 28 Jun. 1994). Under the stark economic conditions, militias became the main employment for the young Kurds, and thus the violence came to feed itself. A guerrilla leader was quoted, ‘There are only two places to find jobs now - in the militias (of either of the two factions). If you are not on one side or another, you will lose’ (NYT, Ibid.). The first major fighting between the two rival parties broke out in May 1994. Soon, the Safe Haven came to be dominated by their rival fiefdoms. The
intra-Kurdish fighting almost completely destroyed the autonomous government. One report indicated that there were 650,000 internally displaced people in northern Iraq, of whom, two thirds were displaced since 1991, meaning, since the ceasefire of the Gulf War (Adebajo: 1998).

Foreign States’ Motives

The KRG’s existence and the Allied states’ protection were inseparable. While the Allied states desired the Kurds to form a viable opposition against the Iraqi regime, their greater autonomy alarmed the neighbouring states that were eager to contain the Kurdish dissidents inside their territories. The following is a summary of foreign states’ motives and the Kurds response to their support/non-support.

(1) The West

The US administration has long admitted financing covert operations against the Iraqi regime. The most recent example was its funding of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an umbrella organisation of various Iraqi opposition groups. The INC was established in 1992 with the backing of the US Central Intelligence Agency. It was desired the INC would settle the feud between the two Kurdish parties so as to provide a viable forum for popular opposition to Saddam Hussein (16 Sept. 1996 IHT).

The INC, however, was not as nearly as effective as it was expected to be. It was wrecked by internal disputes (MEI 12 Sept. 1997). One observer stated it included at least 80 groups (Aburish 2000: 357). Its president, Ahmad Chalabi, attributed the INC’s weakness to a lack of funding, and this led him to focus on a judicial campaign
(INDICT) against the Iraqi ruler from power, but the campaign remained completely ineffective. The Iraqi National Accord (INA), based in Jordan, conducted an extensive media operation by publishing an opposition newspaper. However, overall, opposition groups outside Iraq were all extremely weak (MEI 12 Sept. 1997). The goals of the different Iraqi opposition parties were incompatible and they failed to establish a united front.

As the Kurdish parties started infighting, the Western plan to overthrow the Baath regime was no longer realistic. Furthermore, after May 1994 the KDP overtly started receiving military aid from Baghdad, a move that coincided with the intensification of the KDP-PUK strife (8 Nov. 1996 MEI). This caused the INC to suffer catastrophic damage when the KDP invited the Iraqi Army to the Kurdish territory in order to defeat the rival PUK (August 1996). As a result of this action, the INC was completely penetrated by Iraqi security forces. Between 1991 to 1996, despite the international sanction, the Iraqi Baath regime had proved resilient, and the KDP leader did not hesitate to ally with it. On the other hand, the PUK allied with the PKK and Iran. These Kurdish parties’ divisions stymied the Western states’ anti-Baath operation. Shortly after the collapse of the INC, the Allies’ Military Coordination Center (MCC) in Kurdistan was closed down, and France withdrew its air force from the OPH. The US had to evacuate several hundreds of the Kurds who worked for the CIA, as the Iraqi government excluded those Kurds from political amnesty (Randal: 246). In response to the fierce criticism for allying with the Iraqi government, Masoud Barzani justified himself saying that he ‘did not intend to be used as a card for a certain time to put pressure on Baghdad and then be abandoned’ (IND 21 Sept. 1996). It appeared that unless foreign states were committed to assisting the Iraqi opposition
militarily, the Kurds had little choice but to opt for the Iraqi regime even on a temporary basis.

The US sponsored a series of peace talks among the Kurds in the hope of eventually uniting the Kurds against the Baath regime. In August 1995, talks between the KDP and the PUK was hosted by the US in Drogheda, Ireland. The two parties pledged to maintain a ceasefire but it did not last long. Another major round of peace talk was held on 17 September 1998 in Washington, where the two parties signed the Washington Peace Accord, in which, according to the KDP spokesman 'both parties (KDP and PUK) have agreed to work for a united, pluralistic and democratic Iraq that would ensure the political and human rights of the Kurdish people on a federal basis and maintain the nation’s unity and territorial integrity’ (MEI 2 Oct. 1998). However, this ceasefire also soon collapsed.

(2) The Regional States

The reason behind the US reluctance to supply military aid to Iraqi opposition groups, including the Kurds, was the pressure from Turkey. The US and Turkey were NATO allies, but had conflicting interests regarding the Kurds. It was reported that Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria had repeatedly engaged in a series of national security consultations since the end of the Gulf War (Olson 1994, MEP). Turkey threatened the continuance of the OPH in December 1992, when it declared its right to revoke the right of Allied states to use its air base (Cook: 45). Though it allowed the operation to continue, it was the first time Turkey had subordinated Western interests to its own. From its very beginning the KRG's existence was severely constrained by the intentions of the Turkish state. Because of the extraordinary situation that came
out of the Gulf War in which the Iraqi sovereignty was limited, Iraqi Kurds needed to secure Turkish cooperation despite the fact that it rejected the principle of federalism. Without Turkish approval, the air operation is not sustainable. For this reason, Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds were often described as de-facto allies. A KDP spokesman was quoted as saying ‘Turkey is our lifeline to the West and the whole world in our fight against Saddam Hussein ... If Poised Hammer is withdrawn, Saddam’s units will again reign in this region and we will lose everything’ (Gunter 1993: citing FBIS-WEU 9 Apr. 1992). However, if we look at the events during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980s, Turkey and Iraq acted as allies, and at the deepest level, they still share an interest against Kurdish federalism. Kurdish federalism in Northern Iraq is the last thing Turkey would want to see because of its potential impact on Turkey’s own Kurdish conflict.

The Turkish Prime Minister at the time of the Gulf War, Turgut Ozal, pursued a liberal approach towards the Kurds, such as meeting with the Iraqi Kurdish leaders and granting amnesty to the Kurds held in Turkish prisons. But overall, Ozal secured the cooperation of the Iraqi Kurds for the purpose of suppressing the PKK. It was even reported that some 30,000-strong Iraqi Kurdish pershmergas were engaged in patrolling the border, and they were ‘backed by and possibly paid for by Turkey’ (Pope 6 Nov. 1992 IND). A newspaper report in 1995 said, ‘some 24,000 Iraqi Kurdish soldiers will replace the Turkish invasion’ (11 Apr. 1995 IND), meaning, the Iraqi Kurds would substitute for the Turkish army in fighting the PKK Kurdish guerrillas. The relations between the PKK and Iraqi Kurds had been cool from the mid 1980s when the PKK’s guerrillas spread mines and attacked women and children in northern Iraq. It was reported some Iraqi Kurds were as afraid of the PKK as they
were of the Iraqi security forces (Guardian 14 Aug. 1991). The KDP leader Masoud Barzani loathed the Marxist ideology adopted by the PKK and was quoted as saying that the refugee camp of Turkish Kurds was becoming ‘a seedbed of Stalinism’ (28 Nov. 1995 IND). The two Kurdish parties’ relation is described as ‘ambivalent’ at its best (TME Nov. 1998). The Iraqi Kurdish authority made an agreement with the Turkish authorities rather than with the PKK. The 1991 Iraqi Kurdish front issued a warning to the PKK that ‘if it failed to cease activities against Turkey, it would be purged from the region’ (FBIS-WEU Jun. 29, 1992, as in Gunter 1993: 110).

Turkey carried out major cross-border pursuits of the PKK after the KRG was established in northern Iraq. The first in 1995, code-named Operation Steel, took place deep into Iraqi Kurdish territory. Another operation, code named Operation Sledge-Hammer, was carried out in 1997. Amid the confrontation of multiple parties, northern Iraq’s Turkish border area was devastated by both Turkish and Iraqi forces, the Marxist PKK, and the more conservative Iraqi Kurdish groups which opposed them. And even though the Iraqi Kurds were now able to communicate directly with the Turkish authorities, their position was vulnerable. Once the UN sanctions were lifted, there was little reason to believe Turkey would continue to ally with the Iraqi Kurds, as such action potentially contributes to strengthening Kurdish autonomy in Iraq.

Iran was apprehensive of greater Western presence in Iraqi Kurdistan. The Iran-based Islamic Party of Kurdistan became increasingly militant since 1993. The Islamic movement secured control over substantial areas in eastern and southern Kurdistan with Iranian backing. The growth of the Islamic party in the Kurdish-controlled
region was something new in Kurdish politics: 'the steep rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Kurdistan was something unexpected before the imposition of UN sanctions. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan made concerted efforts for the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK) to gain a psychological hold over the Kurdish population. Many poor families became dependent on the IMK simply to survive. Those who agreed to bear arms for the Islamic fighters were paid an attractive salary' (Laizer 1996: 117, also in al-Khafaji MER Oct.-Dec. 1996).

**Oil for Food Programme (1996 – present <31/03/01>)**

The existing terms of international economic sanctions on Iraq (SCR 687) were modified by the UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 986, which was adopted in April 1995. Better known as the Oil for Food Programme, the SCR 986 allowed Iraq to export a limited quantity of oil to purchase humanitarian goods, mostly food and medicine, raw materials and parts for civilian needs. Through this programme, Iraq could sell two billion dollars worth of its oil every six months. Fifty per cent of the proceeds would be allocated for use by the Iraqi government, for the humanitarian needs of the entire country except the three Kurdish governorates. The three Kurdish governorates were allocated a 15 per cent (later modified to 13 per cent) share for use for similar humanitarian needs. 30 per cent went to the Kuwait Compensation Fund, and the remaining 5 per cent was spent for the UN to cover costs of administration. The share that went to the Kurdish sector came directly through the UN's Humanitarian Programme which operated in the north, not through the Iraqi government. In that sense, the resolution acknowledged the 'de-facto' independence of the Kurds. However, it also stated clearly that nothing in the resolution should be taken as construing infringement of state sovereignty or territorial integrity of Iraq.
Thus, even if the UN Programme bypassed Baghdad in funding the Kurds, it acknowledged Iraqi sovereignty throughout.

The Oil for Food Programme contributed greatly to modifying the severe economic disparity aggravated during the years between 1991 and 1996. The Kurds had suffered both internal (imposed by the Iraqi government) and international (the UN sanctions) economic blockades. Since the UN Oil for Food Programme began, the Kurdish Regional Government started internal trading with Baghdad through the purchase of electricity and fuels. It began to have regular contacts with Baghdad through this trade, which was done in dollars. This was because the two parties no longer had a common currency; the area controlled by the government and by the KRG each had a different type of dinar. In 2000 between 80 and 100 Iraqi government dinar was 1 Kurdish dinar (Jaf).

The stronger currency allowed the KRG to reconstruct the countryside that was destroyed by the government's deportation campaign in the past decades. Also, the revenue enabled them to pay for basic health services and salaries of KRG employees. The Oil for Food Programme stabilised economic conditions and allowed more equal distribution of revenues and aid materials. The Iraqi government did not permit part of the sale of oil to be used for the demining programme along the Iranian border or for the treatment of victims of chemical weapon used against the Kurds by the Iraqi government in the 1980s. It was because the Iraqi government did not recognise their responsibility in causing these damages. The KRG, with the EU’s backing, privately invested in the demining programme to a UN commissioned company.
On the other hand, the abundance of food-stuff, particularly wheat supplied by the UN, began to undermine the self-sufficiency of local Kurdish agriculture. The Kurdish government raised this issue formally to the UN in its memorandum prepared in March 1999: ‘Imported food and grain should supplement, rather than substitute, for what is locally produced. Over the past seven years, the international community has assisted in the rehabilitation of the rural economy and rebuilding of hundreds of villages destroyed by the Iraqi government during the 70s and the 80s. The present UN program, which involves the importation of large quantities of grain and other food stuff, undermines the rural economy in a serious way, and could instigate a reverse migration of the farmers back to the major urban centres’ (Joint memorandum by KDP and PUK on behalf of the authorities of the KRG to United Nations Review Panels on Iraq, 11 March, 1999, 5-4). Newspaper reports indicated that the local economic problems were aggravated by the excessive aid. ‘So awash were the free goods from the UN programmes that some of the goods entered the smuggling trade. The farmers sold their land and moved to cities to collect aid. The UN acknowledged that the nine kilograms of wheat flour and one kilo of rice per month it distributes to each person in Kurdistan were more than people need’ (WSJ 6 Jan. 2000). The report summarised that the Kurds developed an ‘unhealthy dependence on the spoils of the embargo’.

Foreign Interventions’ Impact on Iraq

The Iraqi regime remained intact throughout the past decade, and furthermore, it increased its surveillance power over the people, because of its control over the rationing system. A decade-long economic sanction caused considerable harm to ordinary Iraqis who had no means of influencing the government’s actions. The UN
sanctions further removed the Iraqi people from a means of resistance as their lives began to be focused on day-to-day survival. The FAO mission in 1997 found chronic energy deficiency among 25 per cent of young men and 16 per cent of young women, with particular deficiency in vitamins A and C (MER: Spring 1998). The inhumane result of the economic sanction even caused the UN Humanitarian Coordinator Denis Halliday to resign the post in August 1998. In his interview Halliday stated:

‘The sanctions were failing in the purpose they were set up for back in 1990-91. They weren’t leading to disarmament and, second, the cost of sanctions was completely unacceptable – killing 6-7,000 children a month. Sustaining a level of malnutrition of about 30 per cent for children under five leads to physical and mental problems. It’s incompatible with the UN Charter, with the Convention on Human Rights, with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and probably with many other international agreements. I just found that impossible to accept as the head of the UN in Iraq’ (MEI 13 Nov. 1998).

As mentioned, economic sanctions on Iraq originally constituted part of the non-military measure to pressure the Iraqi government to give up its occupation of Kuwait. It is doubtful whether the sanctions achieved their goal, as they punished the wrong people. Unlike those in democratic countries, people in Iraq have no control over the government. There were NGOs that started to campaign against the economic sanctions on Iraq on the grounds that they breached the Geneva Convention’s article 54 that prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare (Mutawi: MEI 10 Apr. 1998). In December 2000, Iraq suspended all oil exports to protest the continuance of the UN sanctions (MEI 8 Dec. 2000). Once again, Iraqi authorities showed their
ability to unilaterally affect its citizens, in this case, through eliminating funds from the Oil for Food Programme.

It is doubtful foreign interventions conducted during the 1990s contributed to improving the relations between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. However, it also seems to be the case that the military protection for the Iraqi Kurds, should at least, be continued until a workable agreement is reached between the Kurds and the Iraqi government. The KRG’s EU representative stated that the most important problem in negotiations with the Iraqi government was the issue over security, and that the air patrol by the Allied states were essential for the KRG’s existence: ‘Baghdad wished to reinstall the Iraqi Army in Kurdistan, but we wanted to manage our own army. We are willing to contribute the Kurds’ army to the federal state. Because there is no trust between us yet, we must build the mechanism of security slowly’ (Jaf). The Kurds’ task was to reach a stable accommodation with the Iraqi government.

On the other hand, the US and UK have been almost continuously at war with Iraq since December 1998 with the aim of destroying the regime. Newspaper reports described military confrontations were taking place roughly once every three days, and Baghdad claimed that more than 200 civilians were killed (7 Dec. 1999 IND). An aid worker stated the people in Iraq did not understand why they were bombed and simply believed the information provided by the government. The Allied military actions did not enjoy unanimous international support as well. Unlike the Gulf-War coalition, fewer and fewer states showed their support for the use of force against Iraq (15 Feb. 1998 IND).
It is still the case, however, that the Kurds need security from the Allied states. Rather than allowing themselves to be used against Iraq, they should make best use of the military protection as they continue the dialogue with Baghdad. Earlier, the KDP leader showed such a determination by stating that he would no longer allow any foreign states to use Kurdistan as a base for plots against Saddam Hussein and said 'we were in dialogue with Baghdad, but it was not yet at a phase where we could say we reached an agreement' (MEI 2 Oct. 1998). So far, the Kurds have been used by the foreign states. However, it now seems there is an opportunity for intervening states to contribute to the security of the KRG while the Kurdish-Baghdad negotiations continue.

The Socioeconomic Base of the KDP and the PUK in the 1990s

Although the Kurds have had control of northern Iraq for almost a decade (since 1992), the likelihood of a united and economically independent Kurdistan remains low. The weaker control by Baghdad did not necessarily mean that the Kurds had become more autonomous and politically united. The tribal, territorial, and cultural differences still run deep between the two major Kurdish political parties even without the reach of official Iraqi control; the two rival parties, the KDP and the PUK maintain armed checkpoints to restrict the movement of the peoples living under their spheres of influence (RFE/RL Sept. 28, 2000).

Masoud Barzani’s KDP continues to be a dominant party in the Bahdinan region, which shares a border with Turkey. To this day, the followers of the KDP are generally thought to be more traditional and religious than their rivals (Barkey, January 1997). The two small Islamic parties in the Kurdish region, for example
(Kurdish Hizbullah and Revolutionary Hizbullah), are both headed by Barzani's relatives and are often in conflict with Jalal Talabani's PUK. The PUK, on the other hand, continues to attract more followers from the urban middle class than the KDP. though the PUK, too, relies on some tribal connections based in eastern parts of the Kurdish region (Barkey, Ibid.). The PUK is particularly popular among wealthy Kurds in such cities as Sulaymaniya, Arbil, and Koisanjaq. It also attracts unemployed youth who are paid a basic wage to serve as armed combatants for the party (Laizer: 128).

The source of the two parties' conflict is financial as well as cultural and tribal. Even after the signing of the 1998 Washington accord in which the two parties were to share the transit customs more equally, the KDP has made only one revenue-sharing payment to the PUK so far. The KDP, however, is now hit by a dramatic reduction in traffic between Turkey and the Bahdinan region and thus is even less likely to divide its revenues with the PUK (RFE/RL June 23, 1999). Approximately 2,000 trucks used to cross the lucrative Turkey – Bahdinan border per day, but the number has now dropped to 250 (RFE/RL Ibid.). Meanwhile, Iraq has begun to redirect its oil smuggling routes, firstly to Syria and secondly to an alternative road under construction that bypasses the Kurdish-controlled area, in order to deprive the Kurds of transit customs from oil-smuggling trucks (BBC, Aug. 31, 2001). When the construction of such road is complete, the economy of Kurdistan is likely to suffer serious damage, and the Kurds will be left even more vulnerable to economic and political control by Baghdad.
Chapter V

Conclusive Remarks

1) The Costs and Benefits of Authoritarian State Formation

In cases of state formation through Revolution from Above, we saw that the newly established government’s resort to authoritarian measures was largely inevitable and even essential. The contrasting paths of state formation taken by Iraq and Turkey showed that without establishing a strong state, the authorities’ ability to implement crucial nation-building measures such as provision of national education, welfare, and economic development would be considerably obstructed.

Thus, through the RPP’s single-party rule, the Turkish authorities succeeded in secularisation, unification of the national curriculum, reforms of the Turkish language, and defining Turkish citizenship (pp. 93–95). Because religious power was synonymous with political power under the Ottoman Empire, deposition of the Caliphate was the first step to be taken in creating a modern, secular state. This move also meant thwarting the Islamic political elite that grew powerful under the Sultanate system (p. 98). Socially, the new concept of citizenship provided an alternative to the Caliph’s authority to which the people could psychologically attach themselves. Strong emphasis was put on ‘Turk’ citizenship defined in territorial and linguistic terms (p. 93). Also, enhancement of literacy through language reforms was carried out with profound effects. The introduction of Roman alphabet which was more suited to transcribing the Turkish than Arabic letters was a radical step. These were all far-reaching reforms and yet were accomplished within just a few years. However, the Turkish authorities were in a relatively advanced position compare to other new
nations, as it could inherit the government apparatus of the Ottoman Empire and immediately make use of it. Moreover, the centralisation efforts had been made by several generations of the sultans since the 18th century (pp. 77-79).

On the other hand, the authoritarian measures taken by the Turkish authorities involved the problems of assimilationist policies such as the ban on non-Turkish languages and abolition of Kurdish town names (p. 95 and 106). This was partly owing to the essentially elitist nature of Revolution from Above which required little or no mass participation, and partly owing to the state's 'legitimate' fear of politicised Kurdish nationalism as the conflict grew unmanageable.

Because of the highly political nature of Kurdish nationalism, there are pros and cons of Kurdish identity in terms of culture and language recognitions. For anyone who lives under democratic government it is hardly imaginable that a mere expression of one's own culture and language would lead to a political persecution. Beginning from the late 19th century, however, the Kurdish communities were inseparable from political insurrections led by semi-autonomous leaders such as shaikhs and aghas, at least in the eyes of the Ottoman and later the Turkish authorities (pp. 101-105). The state authorities regarded Kurdishness, per se, as a threat to national unity. For this reason, the Kurds in Turkey have long been denied basic cultural rights to declare themselves Kurds and speak Kurdish in public.

Contrary to the authorities' intention, however, the monolingual education and other cultural assimilationist policies including the re-naming of Kurdish villages appear to have obstructed Kurdish integration to Turkey considerably. Many Turkish Kurds
were culturally alienated but were also denied the opportunity to participate in Turkish society because of their language barrier (this excluded the completely assimilated Kurds, such as Ismet Inonu and those who deliberately hid their Kurdish origin). The Kurdish children often did not understand the things taught only in Turkish and even if they did, with greater difficulty. College exams naturally favoured those fluent in Turkish (pp. 180–184). In this respect, the Kemalist regime appears to have had a better chance of successfully integrating the Kurds by at least allowing the use of Kurdish as a second language at schools where the most Kurdish-speaking Kurds were exposed to Turkish for the first time. Ideally, the Turkish regime could have realised that cultural diversity in itself posed no political threat or at least that bilingual education would be beneficial. Ironically, it was the state’s adherence to assimilationist policies – which were intended to preserve national unity - that worsened the divisions within the state as it failed to modify the unequal social structure. As a result, the dominance of feudal Kurds over the illiterate masses resulted in a protracted Marxist-terrorist problem represented by the PKK.

By contrast, the Iraqi society was characterised by its fragmentation: the monarchy, the pro and anti British, feudal landowners, tribal leaders, and numerous minority religious sects and ethnic groups that distanced themselves from the state (pp. 116-121). In the case of the Yazidi Kurds, they even differentiated themselves from the Sunni Kurds (p. 118). There was no leader equivalent to Mustafa Kemal in Turkey who could strongly press for national unity. As a result, strong subnational identities were preserved at the expense of an all-encompassing Iraqi citizenship.
The most noticeable Kurdish policy in terms of cultural and language recognition was implemented in 1926 when the Local Languages Law was introduced (p. 119). On an individual level no Kurd was barred from speaking Kurdish, which in theory, could have contributed to the Kurdish integration into the Arab part of Iraq by promoting Kurdish-Arabic bilingualism. But in reality, insufficient resources were allocated to the Kurdish region for education, and general impoverishment could not be modified because of successive military conflicts over the control of Kurdish territory rich in natural resources. In contrast to the Turkish Kurds who had to fight for cultural recognition, the Iraqi Kurds' struggle has been characterised more by their actual need to protect their territory from monopolised control by the state.

The Sunni-Arab dominance also caused a problem in Iraq, which became particularly apparent from around the 1940s. This was not so much a result of the institutionalisation of assimilationist policies, but instead, was a result of the original ethnic composition of political elite, the elite Sunni Arab officers of the former Ottoman Army. The Sunni Arabs were in fact a numeric minority in Iraq. However, they managed to remain in power by dominating the army and other state institutions (pp. 121-123).

The division in Iraqi society was 'horizontal' as well as 'vertical'. It not only cut across different ethnic groups but also across inside of each sectarian group between the rich and the poor. The elite-biased integration pattern caused the non-governing groups, such as the Kurds and the Shia to be divided among themselves. Thus the Shia and the Kurdish landlords shared more interests with the Sunni Arab landowners than with their religious or ethnic kin (pp. 110-112). This vertical division was
evident in the post-revolutionary as well as the pre-revolutionary era (pp. 153–155). To a lesser extent the feudal culture was present among the Kurdish nationalists as well, as seen in the weak mass-base of the Kurdish Democratic Party (p. 124). As a whole, the Iraqi society was divided into the wealthy oligarchy and the poorer masses who constituted the majority. At the same time the minority rule by the Sunni-Arabs alienated not only the Kurds and Christian minorities but also the Shia Arabs. The Sunni Arabs also maintained tribal and clientelistic control even after modern political parties were created, as seen in the example of the Baath Party. Thus the lack of authoritarian state formation in Iraq left the state ill-equipped for integrative nation-building and allowed a monopoly of power by an oligarchic ruling group.

2) Institutionalising Mass Political Participation

Political authoritarianism was a necessary evil until the state established viable political institutions which allowed mass political participation. Otherwise, the regime would fall into the state of praetorianism (p. 30). Thus, by the time Turkish authorities introduced a multi-party system, few doubted the legitimacy of the Turkish Republic, and political oppositions were absorbed into the system established by the state. As a result, since 1946, even the supporters of the Islamists, the arch-enemy of the RPP, have been part of the parliamentary system. It was a significant move, as the opponents to the RPP's statist and radical-secularist policies constituted a significant part of the population, as evident in the considerable support the Democrat Party enjoyed (p. 131). As the multi-party system took root, even the Kurdish nationalists became capable of legally articulating their demands, firstly through the leftist parties and in later decades through the parties more specifically focused on Kurdish
nationalism (p. 190). In all cases, however, the direct mention of Kurdish national rights had to be avoided.

Turkey, however, repeatedly manifested its authoritarianism through periodic coups. The first one was in 1960, followed by the 1971 and the 1980 coups. Prior to every coup sectarian violence became uncontrollable. In other words, sufficient political assimilation had not yet taken place that would have absorbed the impact of social mobilisation. However, Turkey also increasingly showed its democratic forces by allowing the parliamentary system to continue after the interruptive period, and followers of the banned political parties could resume most of their activities under the new party names. The democratic framework continued to grow. In recent decades, even the mainstream Turkish political parties discuss solutions to the Kurdish conflict (p. 188) along with the ostensibly pro-Kurdish political parties, though they are frequently subject to harassment and abuse by the state and its associated agents (pp. 184-185). The constitutional amendment in 1995 made a significant impact in liberating the scope of political debates (p. 194). Prior to this, a mere expression interpreted by the authorities as divisive to the national unity was subject to prosecution according to the controversial Anti Terrorism Law set in 1991.

In sharp contrast to Turkey's move to the multi-party system, the Iraqi authorities arbitrarily banned political opposition from the 1940s. Furthermore, the authorities empowered tribal shaikhs and the landowning elite and ruled the populace through them while allowing only the government-authorised political party to exist. As a result, the Iraqi society remained largely fragmented, social problems were aggravated, and eventually, clandestine political movements became the only way to
oppose the government, in this case, the Free Officers' movement (p. 147). Thus, the failure to broaden political participation proved fatal to Iraq's monarchy and ushered in a decade of revolutionary instability in which successive military regimes sought to contain Kurdish insurgency. The successive regimes after the 1958 revolution also failed to broaden political participation. Except for the early period of the Qassem regime, all the revolutionary regimes suppressed political oppositions by force. For the Kurds, limited autonomy proposals were made in 1966 (pp. 201-204) and again in 1970 (pp. 204-207). Neither proposal worked (or both missed the opportunity to work) as seen in the strong opposition by the Arab hard-liners (p. 200). In response to the 1970 autonomy proposal, the Kurds gave a divided reaction, reflecting the degree of dissent among the Kurdish nationalists who were opposed to Barzani's authoritarian leadership. In theory, the government could have attracted those who sought more egalitarian leadership. However, what followed in reality was the Baath's resort to Arabisation and ethnic cleansing policies which gained momentum after the defeat of the Kurdish nationalists. The PUK was established in 1976 as an opponent of the KDP as well as of the Baathists (pp. 208-210).

As those two contrasting examples showed – one allowing a parliamentary system to develop and another banning political oppositions by force - the institutionalisation of mass political participation appears to be vital for the survival and stabilisation of new regimes. With numerous antagonising and often counter-revolutionary forces competing for power, establishment of a single legitimate system capable of accommodating alternative demands seems to be vital, even if further authoritarian measures have to be taken to maintain the minimum law and order.
3) **Economic Development and State Structure**

Economic development facilitates national integration when it promotes social structure change and creates a politically viable middle class. As was the case in many European states, strong economic growth speeded up assimilation of different ethnic and, on occasion, linguistic groups. On the other hand, in the Middle East, economic development followed by more rapid social mobilisation led diverse sectarian groups to differentiate themselves from each other. Economic development was either weak or uneven, and this led different ethnic and religious groups to compete for the scarce resources.

The above circumstance, that is, more rapid social mobilisation than assimilation, was made worse by the pre-existing problem, namely, the unequal social structures inherited from the Ottoman administration in the nineteenth century (p. 79). In Turkey, the state largely failed to integrate, particularly the Kurdish peasants who worked in slave-like conditions under the village aghas. In rural areas those aghas were superior to the state in terms of decision-making and everyday livelihood of the people dependent on them. The contrast was clear between the western and the southeastern parts of Turkey in the way that the peasants were or were not integrated to the nation-wide commercial economy (pp. 134-138). In the Turkish-speaking western region, people had simply stopped working for aghas and switched to more profitable commercial agriculture; in the Kurdish-speaking southeast, the people were still dependent on the old social structure, and labour mobility was markedly lower than other regions. This regional gap was made worse by the state’s dependence on feudal leaders to control the population; the authorities often saw it as easier to control the Kurds through intermediaries who were often pro-government tribal chiefs. The
state’s reliance on such feudal leaders, in turn, made the emergence of terrorist groups like the PKK almost inevitable (p. 171). And the PKK contributed to polarising the Kurds by indiscriminately attacking the pro-government tribal chiefs and those under their influence.

Over time, however, Turkey’s growing industrialist groups such as TUSIAD successfully established a civil society capable of voicing opposition to the military (p. 194). This contributed to activating debates over the Kurdish conflict through a perspective other than that of the military. This was noticeable particularly from the mid-1990s when the constitutional amendment was made.

On the other hand, Iraq, with its oil resources, evolved into a totalitarian state (pp. 211-216). The Baath regime’s monopoly of economic and political resources allowed successive governments to pursue an Arabisation policy, whilst giving the Kurds a token share of autonomy. This was a regrettable development as most Kurds in Iraq were bilingual due to the unique fact that Kurdish had been allowed in schools, universities and government offices located in the Kurdish region. Provided that state authorities made appropriate use of their resources, the potential for economic integration and cultural assimilation of the Kurds was greater in Iraq than in Turkey. What happened instead was the Sunni-Arab dominated government’s pursuance of ethnic cleansing policies on one hand and their control of the pro-government tribes on the other. Through these policies, the state succeeded in eliminating and dividing the opposition (p. 221). Because no significant economic integration had yet taken place, the unequal social structure continued to allow the state to manipulate the feudal leaders through bribes and other material benefits.
The organising of labour movement signifies an important phase of social structure change, that is to connect peoples from different social, racial, and geographical origins under a common cause. In a similar development to Turkish leftist parties’ sympathetic attitudes towards Kurdish rights, the ICP began to address the Kurdish issue from the 1950s. However, it appeared that Turkey’s working class was far more politically viable than that of Iraq, and these two labour movements were not readily comparable. The Turkish workers became important political factors even in small towns, while those in Iraq were mainly confined to urban areas (p. 144). Needless to say, from the 1980s, the Iraqi authorities became capable of silencing political opposition, including that by trade unions, through distributive policies and violence that made them powerless and politically insignificant (pp. 214-216).

It is not necessarily the case that countries with a single economic commodity will evolve into totalitarian states. However, in a fragmented political environment like that of Iraq, the chances are greater that anyone who comes to the power will seek to monopolise the economic and political resources. Where national integration or the initiative towards it is absent, the fragmented and antagonising groups would compete for political resources. It may be not impossible to say that the Iraqi Kurds could have taken advantage of the limited autonomy arrangements more than they did; that they could have settled for the less-than-satisfactory offer in exchange for peace. However, given the increasingly totalitarian nature of the government, the chances for full national integration based on equal partnership between the Kurds and the Arabs appeared to be slim.
4) Foreign Intervention and Nation-building

As problems resulting from failed national integration became more common in recent decades, so did the opportunities for foreign intervention. Foreign intervention can affect nation-building through military and economic means - it can either boost, weaken, or topple the government as well as the minorities in question. The causes and consequences of intervention vary, but it is often political and is deemed that there is no such thing as a genuinely humanitarian intervention (p. 41), although political intervention accomplishes the humanitarian purpose sometimes more efficiently than the United Nations.

On many occasions the Kurds have been heavily affected by foreign intervention because of their geopolitical instrumentality. In the 1920s, the Kurds constituted what was envisaged by the British an ‘ethnic buffer’ to counter the Islamism (p. 232). And in later decades, the Kurds were often pawns to weaken the Iraqi regimes; against Qassem, Aref, and the Baathists.

One cannot blame, however, every defeat suffered by the Kurds entirely on the foreign powers. During the 1990s, it was the Kurdish leaders themselves who started internal wars by failing to reach an agreement despite the fact that the official control by Baghdad had practically ceased, and that the Kurds had the opportunities to run their own government through freely elected representatives (pp. 260–262). The main revenue from lucrative border trade had come to be monopolised by the KDP, as were the MPs in the KRG itself. The PUK struck an alliance with the PKK and Iran, while the KDP allied with Turkey and at times with the Iraqi security forces to win the internal fights.
Still, the impact of foreign intervention is unmistakably significant for the ethnic minorities for both good and bad reasons. As was shown in the case of Kurdistan after the Gulf War, the military intervention was vital to successful humanitarian operations in a rapidly developing crisis (pp. 249–250). The intervention had unmistakably internationalised the Kurdish case and brought the suffering of the refugees to worldwide attention. It was also symbolic that the UN, for the first time in its history, adopted a Security Council Resolution on behalf of the civilians under attack by state authorities whose sovereignty it recognises (pp. 250-253). While the swift repatriation of the two-million Kurdish refugees manifested the positive side of such intervention, the foreign states also appear to have taken advantage of intervening opportunities to add pressure to the Iraqi regime, in which the Kurds, once again, were pawns of great powers. The Kurds constituted key position in the western states’ anti-Baath campaign. However, none of them dared to militarily assist the Kurdish nationalists for their own political reasons (pp. 266–270). This attitude crippled the Iraqi opposition and pushed the KDP further to Baghdad.

As a whole, it appears that the long-term effect of foreign intervention on nation-building will depend on whether it eventually helps to create a viable relation between the minority and the government. Depending on the way it is conducted, foreign intervention is potentially capable of improving a government-minority relation by physically protecting vulnerable groups. For a successful intervention, foreign powers must commit themselves until a workable government apparatus is established. The Allies, therefore, must at least continue the air patrol if they claim to care about protecting the Kurds from the current Iraqi regime and refrain from manipulating the
Kurds against Baghdad. The security of the Kurdish region must be guaranteed until a workable agreement between the Iraqi government and the Kurds is reached. And most essentially, the main Kurdish parties need to reach an agreement to stop the infighting, make the Kurdish parliament truly representative, remove armed borders between the rival factions, and make Kurdistan a safer and united place.

5) Notes on Interviewees’ Objectivity

One technical problem that must be mentioned here is the lack of objectivity in the views of some of the interviewees. Namely, the comments taken from the representative of the KRG were largely pro-KDP, and to a lesser extent those from the Kurdish Human Rights Project were pro-PKK, and therefore some of them had to be omitted. To maintain the overall objectivity of the study, the comments from those with opposing or alternative views should have been taken as well, but only a limited number of interviews were taken due to time and financial constraints.

To be fair, however, it appears that the very circumstances the Kurds are in, such as the lack of a territorial state, unending conflicts, political and cultural suppression and discrimination, etc., almost inevitably make the Kurds more political and therefore less objective than those who reside in ‘normal’ circumstances. In other words, their political and often physical environments do not allow the Kurds to ‘sit back and talk objectively’ over crucial issues in which they are voluntarily or involuntarily involved. To speak of a Kurdish state can be a crime depending on where s/he is; to not help fellow Kurds can be treachery depending on where s/he is; to support the Kurdish nationalists is just as legitimate a behaviour as to support the governments and vice versa. The famous saying ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom
fighter’ appears to be the central issue here, and all that is possible is to present the diverse views. There are also the Kurds who do not fit into any of the above categories. Among those who were least political, a Kurdish woman said, ‘the people who are fighting in the mountains for all their lives are not suited for running a democratic government. You need to have an objective mind to run a democratic government’. How much such a balanced view is shared by other Kurds remains to be a subject of future studies.

6) From Revolution from Above to Prototypical National Integration

This study has demonstrated that Revolution from Above has the potential to create the conditions of prototypical national integration, which is the creation of a community bound by intense communication beyond one’s race, religion, or even a language. We have seen that nations are historical creations and that the peoples who belong to the same ethnic and language group have been split over their tribes, religious sects, and mere geography. We have also seen the state of Kurdish national rights being increasingly discussed among the non-Kurdish peoples, firstly by the Turkish workers who became concerned about the rights of their countrymen in the 1950s and 1960s and in more recent decades by some of the Turkish political parties and the industrialists who are both eager to achieve a democratic framework in the country. We have also seen a brief period of Arab and Kurd partnership in Iraq in the late 1950s when the Iraqi constitution defined Kurds and Arabs as ‘brothers in the same homeland’.

But a successful outcome of nation-building through Revolution from Above is by no means inevitable. Iraq’s initially promising start, acknowledging Kurdish identity,
was squandered by its resort to totalitarian state formation. On the other hand, Turkey's refusal to acknowledge Kurdish identity means it has not been able to use its pluralistic political institutions to effectively integrate the Kurds. Though less influential than in the past, the Turkish military still reserves the ultimate right to intervene into parliamentary activities. And also, the hard-core nationalist opinion is difficult to change overnight especially since terrorism generated the evil cycle of violence and counter-violence. On the other hand, the Iraqi case showed the sheer extent of control that a totalitarian state could have over its population: the political ideology was indoctrinated through mass party organisations; the oil money allowed everything to be imported instead of manufactured on its own soil, including food and labourers; the domestic economy had been weakened through distributive policies; and 'rebellious' minorities had been suppressed through bribery and ethnic cleansing. There was no nation but a dictator and divided communities. It was, however, the western nations who continued to trade with Iraq in the 1980s and made sophisticated weapons available to the totalitarian regime.

As for the impact of foreign intervention, it is rather idealistic to envisage that all interventions will contribute to improving government-minority relations. However, they may, at least be able to guarantee the security of vulnerable groups and humanitarian operations until a workable agreement is reached between conflicting parties. In this sense, the lifting of the UN sanctions towards Iraq - still unforeseeable at the time of writing - will be a crucial moment to test the quality of foreign intervention and how it can keep the Kurds secure after resumption of full Iraqi control.
So far, we have seen the United Nations and various international aid organisations whose staff and contributors have no ethnic connections to the Kurds continuing to provide aid to Kurdistan. And such activities are not limited to Kurdistan; with or without success, many nations contribute to dangerous peacekeeping missions, disaster relief, and development programmes. These activities are not free from criticisms such as political decision-making, bureaucratic inefficiency, and creating an aid-dependent economy. However, it appears these activities at least manifest the existence of a community - which may correctly be called the international community - bound by the bond of communication and humanity.
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Key to Abbreviation
IHT … the International Herald Tribune
IJMES … International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies
IND … The Independent
LAT … The Los Angeles Times
MEI … Middle East International
MES … Middle Eastern Studies
NYT … The New York Times
SRWA … The Swiss Review of World Affairs
TME … The Middle East
WER … The West European Report
WSJ … The Wall Street Journal