New South Asian Security
Six Core Relations Underpinning Regional Security

by
Chris Ogden
Introduction
Recasting South Asian Security

CHRIS OGDEN

This edited book recasts the interpretation of security and international relations (IR) in South Asia. By explicitly moving away from the traditional focus of most analyses upon India–Pakistan relations, the contributors recognise the unique confluence in the region of two of the international system’s rising great powers—China and India—and two of its failing and most unstable states—Pakistan and Afghanistan (Failed States Index 2013). This approach reasserts the region’s wider dynamics, both broadens and redefines our sense of South Asia, and underscores our increased need for regional understandings concerning its security and stability. The importance of this new emphasis has been heightened by the continued withdrawal of a variety of external actors from Afghanistan in 2014 and 2016. It is these factors, combined with improving our understanding of the role that major Asian powers can play to ensure mutual stability in South Asia, that are the chief analytical motivations for the research of this edited book.

To heighten our appreciation and understanding of these dynamics, the volume evaluates and compares the core norms (broadly defined as historically-derived values, principles and interests) underpinning the six bilateral relations present between the four indicated states. These theoretical foundations rest upon utilising a norm-based and identity-driven account of security that scrutinises multiple norms simultaneously. Such an approach highlights the historical experiences of each state’s major political actors both in terms of how they perceive their own security, but also their relationship with other neighbouring states. It will be argued that these ideational factors provide a superior understanding of regional security dynamics by highlighting the impact of temporal factors (such as
history, experience and interaction) in the analysis of international relations in South Asia. Employing this methodology further indicates how norms can often have primacy over material, systemic and economic factors.

The six bilateral relations highlighted in this volume range from being very well-documented (between India–Pakistan, and India–China), to being well-established but under-researched (China–Pakistan), to being largely under investigated and relatively unknown (Afghanistan–Pakistan, India–Afghanistan and China–Afghanistan). Through an initial outlining of their historical state-to-state interaction (from the pre-1945 era through to the Cold War, post-Cold War, and post-9/11 periods), each expert contributor uses these foundations to analyse the core contemporary strategic norms and identities integral to each relationship. Through the direct bilateral comparison that is integral to the analytical focus of each chapter, the authors draw out points of convergence, divergence and ambiguity between their chosen protagonists. The conclusion then draws together the findings of each chapter, and synthesise them to show which key norms and interests are shared by all four regional actors. These commonalities will then be used to indicate (policy) pathways for enhancing regional cooperation and stability in the future.

After discussing the need for a new approach concerning the study of South Asia, and the imperatives central to such a recasting, this Introduction then details the theoretical framework of this volume. Resting upon the use of norms to highlight the centrality of history, interaction and experience to understanding the policy behaviour (and potential trajectory) of states, it provides a methodology for how such an analysis will be undertaken by the contributors to this edited book. The Introduction ends by outlining the volume’s structure, orientation and constituent chapters.

**Towards A New South Asia**

This volume highlights several dimensions critical to the study and investigation of contemporary South Asia. These dimensions in turn directly relate to our intended theoretical and empirical approach—namely carrying out state-specific analyses that are historically rich and longitudinal in nature. This section pinpoints South Asia’s criticality in these regards, by focusing on; i) its historical relevance and contemporary
importance; ii) the presence of two rising and two falling states; iii) the importance of inter-connectivity concerning the analysis of collective dynamics rather than singular issues; and iv) the necessity for crafting a regional solution to regional issues. From this basis, there is a further acknowledgement that because of our regional to global emphasis, some South Asian relations are more critical than others. Given the volume's focus and aims, there is therefore an implicit need to side-step any analysis of the relations of the smaller South Asian states, such as Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives.

South Asia’s importance has long been apparent within international affairs. Such a criticality has rested upon the sub-continent’s geo-strategic position as a bridge between East Asia and West Asia (the Middle East), whilst providing access northwards into Central Asia. The region also borders the oil rich Arabian Gulf, and physically dominates the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)—a crucial area for ensuring the energy and trade security of many states. In the nineteenth century, Afghanistan was central to strategic rivalries between Great Britain and Russia (the ‘Great Game’), whilst British India was regarded as the strategically essential ‘Jewel of the Raj’. This significance continued through the Second World War, whereby India became a critical bulkhead against Japan’s westward expansion and for supplying nationalist forces in China. Here we can see South Asia’s importance to the short, medium and long terms interest of many states—strategically, economically and militarily; essences that have endured until the present day.

During the Cold War, the region maintained its relevance to global affairs. This centrality rested upon its proximity to one of the superpowers vying for supremacy (the Soviet Union) but also China and West Asia, which provided clear strategic benefits for the involvement of major external and regional actors. Oscillating Pakistan–US ties (and some India–US linkages) from the 1950s, along with China’s alignment with Pakistan dating from the 1960s, and India’s 1970s tilt towards the Soviet Union, typified this inter-reliance. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the US response to fund a proxy campaign via Pakistan to oust them, was further emblematic of such wider geo-political import. Although relatively neglected after the end of the Cold War, the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, India and Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests, and the September 11 2001 (9/11) attacks that pre-cursed the US’s global ‘war on terror’ (and their invasion of Afghanistan), all reasserted South Asia’s
global centrality. An emergent New Great Game in Central Asia, centring upon the contestation for the region’s energy resources by Russia, China, the US and the European Union (EU), further underscores this prognosis.

Beyond this historical relevance, this research also acknowledges the region’s present status as being at the fulcrum of contemporary IR dynamics and global trends. These trends range from the phenomenon of rising great powers, the criticality of globalising liberal economics and the emergence of an Asian Century; to the threat posed by international terrorism, the instability caused by nuclear proliferation, and the need to manage energy security demands (particular for large transitioning economies). Through this volume’s collective approach, such factors again highlight how the underlying nature, current orientation and future trajectory of South Asian security are all of (mounting) significant to international affairs. These attributes also neatly fit with definitions of the region as a (nascent) security complex, whereby states ‘whose major processes of securitisation … are so interlinked that their security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed apart from one another’ (Buzan et al. 1997: 201). Thus, by re-conceptualising South Asia’s contemporary and ongoing relevance to global politics, we underscore the necessity for scholars and practitioners alike to achieve a better understanding of the region’s central relations.

We attempt to recast South Asian security in a number of innovative ways. While various texts have considered South Asia from some of its various core bilateral perspectives (for example, India–Pakistan—see Cohen 2010; Ganguly 1994; Paul 2005; India–China—Frankel and Harding 2004; Smith 2007; Winters and Yusuf 2007; Pakistan–Afghanistan—Khan 2011; Gartenstein-Ross et al. 2010; Rashid 2009; and Pakistan–China—Small 2014), no analyses have yet focused upon a selection of these in a collective/inclusive manner. Scholars have also not fully acknowledged both Afghanistan and China as being critical factors for the long-term stability of the region, despite their clear inter-connections with India and Pakistan. This book thus brings both Afghanistan and China into the study of South Asian relations, whilst confirming the criticality of both—two of the international system’s largest and two of its most unstable states to regional politics. As per our recasting of South Asia as a larger region, it uses their inclusion to construct a deeper unified understanding of the strategic interests integral to regional security practices.

Our analysis also specifically focuses upon the region’s internal dynamics, identities and trajectory as the primary mode of investigation,
rather than looking at specific issues in isolation—such as insecurity and terrorism (Barthwall-Datta 2012; Paul 2010) or nuclear and energy (Ebinger 2010; Lall 2008; Sagan 2009). Such a differing approach also applies to previous investigations that have rested upon describing regional institutions (for instance Chaudhury 2006; Dash 2008; Sáez 2012) or overtly US/external perspectives (see Nye et al. 2011; Rashid 2013; Riedel 2012). Instead, the writings in this volume derive new ways of conceptualising the region as a co-dependent entity, in order to lead to a more efficacious, detailed and realistic analysis of South Asia’s contemporary importance and its inherent challenges. This intellectual foundation further contrasts to seeing the region via the prevailing global context (as per the approaches undertaken in Hagerty 2005; Hewitt 1997) and instead insists upon a clearer inside-out perspective whereby South Asia security is a significant influence on the world rather than purely vice versa.

Regarding the region as being inter-connected also pinpoints both positive and negative portents concerning relations between the major actors noted in this volume. On the more negative side, Afghanistan and Pakistan have become founts of regional instability via the mounting incidence of terrorism and insurgency within and across their borders. Such threats have periodically over-spilled beyond their boundaries, impacting upon both India and China and present major domestic security concerns, particularly in their Kashmir and Xinjiang regions respectively. More positively, both India and China are focused upon their mutual fiscal modernisations as a pathway to greater global influence and standing. Securing a peaceful neighbourhood is central to such aims, and Beijing and New Delhi’s continued economic success can have commensurate trade, internal stability and greater development benefits for all of the region’s actors. Heightening economic linkages, increasing levels of investment and forming regional associations can thus potentially inculcate greater prosperity, viability and self-sufficiency in a new South Asia.

Bolstered by the current exodus of various extra-regional powers from South Asia, we ask more fundamentally how the states analysed in the volume can be integral to any solution concerning regional stability. Unlike those actors who have only been involved intermittently in the region, for China and India the proximity of Pakistan and Afghanistan (and vice versa) makes them permanent features on their strategic horizons. This geographical reality underscores the need for a long-term vision for the
region that is mutually inclusive and mutually beneficial to those within it. Indicating common values, principles and interests is a key starting point to realising such a process, and underscores this volume’s emphasis upon normative conceptions as a means with which to understand the region’s six key state-to-state relations. Taken collectively, these six bilateral understandings can then be co-joined to facilitate a multi-dimensional appreciation of regional dynamics, and its intrinsic self-conceptions, interests and worldviews. Focusing upon identities and norms is the key theoretical approach to realising such an aim.

IDENTITY AND NORMS

An identity-driven account of international relations is aimed at isolating and analysing the normative beliefs underpinning state security practice. Compared with more conventional accounts (that emphasise material and structural factors), this volume instead stresses the primacy of ideational factors in determining international affairs. These ideational factors (primarily identities and their composite norms) provide a superior understanding of regional security in the South Asian context by highlighting the impact of temporal factors, and successfully linking domestic ideologies with foreign policy behaviour. Focusing upon the dominant historically derived beliefs inherent to regional security, this analytical approach is dependent upon an appreciation of events and their historical chronology/frequency, as well as an understanding of foreign policy making from within our six highlighted states. As such, we predominantly place emphasis upon domestic/internal factors (within states and within South Asia) rather than on external determinants emanating from the international structure/system.

An emphasis on norms also counteracts those analyses that focus only on the immediate short-term repercussions of an event at that time rather than investigating how that event impacts throughout history. Through such presentism, there is little recognition of the dynamism of history, particularly in terms of how it is remembered and how this impacts on present and future policy practice. Indeed, most analyses insist upon the criticality of a certain singular event—the end of the Cold War or 9/11, for example—as a particular ‘turning point’ in a state’s security practice. Such approaches contrast to conceptualising the ongoing influence of
history as a whole on a state’s security policies, and explaining regional security as being in response to domestic influences. As such, this volume aims to see foreign policy and security behaviour as something embedded from experience and interaction, and dependent upon how states conceptualise themselves (their self-image) and others. Using norms thus acknowledges the domestic roots of security policy fanning outwards, and appreciating how its core principles have continued and changed over time and, critically, across different political leaders and different political generations.

Within international relations, constructivism provides the most fruitful avenue from which to situate our theoretical framework, given its focus upon history, domestic factors, learning, identity and norms. Our emphasis eschews any comparison with liberalism, which is largely based upon economic cooperation, multilateralism and the maximisation of interests (Baldwin 1993; Brown 2005; Weber 2004). It also differs from (most) realist accounts which treat states as identical ‘black boxes’ within an ahistorical and acultural setting (Glaser 1994/5: 55), whereby wider system-level/structural dynamics, balances of power (Walt, 1998: 31) and ‘the distribution of objective material power capabilities’ (Legro and Moravcsik 1999: 34) predominant as the means to evaluate and determine state-to-state relations. Interests are generalised/fixed across states and ‘formed prior to any social interaction or historical evolution’ (Oros 2008: 29), indicating that realism in general cannot adequately account for change and evolution in the study of international affairs (Copeland 2000: 190). Most strands of realism are thus incompatible with the aims of this research, but it does however have some similarity with classical realism, which acknowledges how ‘identities and values (a)re more important determinants of policy than the constraints and opportunities of the external environment’ (Jackson et al. 2004: 346).

Locating Norms: Interaction and History

Constructivism is concerned with ideational factors (such as identities and norms) rather than with objective or material conditions. It is founded upon ‘a cognitive, inter-subjective conception of process in which identities and interests are endogenous to interaction’ (Wendt 1992: 394). Constructivists declare that states are social constructions based upon
historically contingent conceptions of the self, the international system and their mutual relationship. Intrinsic to this approach is the importance of exogenous and endogenous change whereby the previous interaction that has taken place in between the system’s states cannot be seen as ‘ahistorical givens’ (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 232) but as precedents and normalising forces. This approach recognises the importance of continuity and change concerning the self-conceptualisation of states, how they regard the world around them, and how they behave inter-nationally. The interests and identities of states are thus not only specific to each state but are malleable through the temporal process of history.

From this basis, the social-psychological milieu is noted to be of ongoing significance to international relations, as are its incumbent identities and norms, which are constructed and reconstructed through enduring social interaction. Through an emphasis on identity and the role of history, constructivism has the ability to theorise and analyse change by focusing upon ‘the dynamic, contingent and culturally based condition of the social world’ (Adler 2002: 96). Via precedent, interaction and experience, history has an indicatory strength along with an ability to isolate and explicate change rather than asserting a unitary realist viewpoint (Snyder 2004: 61). Furthermore, constructivism links and concurrently analyses domestic and international change (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994: 234; Zakaria 1992: 188). In turn, levels of analysis and agency-structure debates are seen as relational and co-constitutive, rather than oppositional, forces (Checkel 1998: 325; Hay 2002: 127, 191)—again stressing interaction and change over stasis.

Constructivism uses norms to trace and structure its ideational accounts of international affairs. Norms can be defined as ‘intersubjective beliefs about the social … world that define actors, their situations, and the possibilities of action’ (Wendt 1995: 73–74). Norms can also be seen to represent ‘a particular set of interests and preferences’ (Hopf 1998b: 175). These include regulative norms—norms that order/constrain behaviour and ‘are intended to have causal effects (such as) getting people to approximate the speed limit’ (Ruggie 1998: 871). In turn, constitutive norms ‘define an identity by specifying the actions that will cause Others to recognize that identity and respond to it appropriately’ (Hopf 1998b: 173). Additionally, evaluative and prescriptive norms act to respectively assess and regulate social behaviour (Axelrod 1986: 1097). In this study focusing upon the security behaviours of particular states, our emphasis
is on regulatory and constitutive norms as encapsulating notions of continuity and change rather than any norms that are proscriptive or evaluative (moralistic) of practical action.

Central to regulative and constitutive norms is experiential learning that underpins both the development and solidification of new or existing beliefs. This learning primarily stems from interaction, whereby states ‘not only accumulate experience but also learn from it’ (Gaddis 1992: 16). In turn, learning is a fluid behavioural guide inherent to preference formation as ‘which behaviours are conceivable, that is which norms are accepted, varies over time’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 366). Therefore, ‘norms constitute social identities and give national interests their content and meaning’ (Adler 2002: 103), whilst presenting shared ideas as a causal force separate from material structures (Copeland 2000: 189–90). Both states and the international system are constructed through interaction. Furthermore, interaction highlights dominant values and beliefs that then become norms, and which in turn structure identities. From this basis, and as Hopf notes, ‘by providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty’ (quoted in Duffield et al. 1999: 167) and act as ordering mechanisms of constitutive norms.

Within the context of six specific bilateral relationships, the overarching focus of this volume is ‘a concern with explaining the evolution and impact of norms on national and international security’ (Farrell 2002: 72). Through a focus upon internal factors concerning the delineation of security policy, encompassing the viewpoints of policymakers/elites from the capitals of our core states—Beijing, Islamabad, Kabul and New Delhi—will give them greater prominence and credence, allowing for our analysis to embrace clear state- and region-specific perspectives. In turn, the varied backgrounds of this volume’s contributors also adds extra nuance to this approach. Furthermore, by drawing out the range of interaction between states across many decades, our contributors will be able to isolate, determine and analyse ‘which norms matter, why and how’ (Risse and Sikkink 1999: 236). Via a norm-based framework of analysis, such a state-focused and state-driven approach will unveil how security in a new South Asia is not only highly inter-connected but is also deeply co-dependent in terms of its provenance and orientation.

Norms are the core components of state identities and specify the practices associated with that identity, not only through their recording of interaction and experience but also their indication of interests. It is
interaction that leads to the formation of norms, encouraging ‘certain
dispositions and orientations whilst opposing and de-legitimising
others—a process that is neither deterministic in its operation nor totally
hegemonic in its consequences’ (Campbell 1992: 10). Consequently,
norms are essentially collective meanings that guide state-to-state
behaviour through their constitution of social knowledge that establishes
the rules and practice dictating interaction. State identities are thus
compound entities, ‘socially constructed by knowledgeable practice’
(Wendt 1992: 392). History traces interaction and is the process by which
both interaction and experience are recorded and recollected. Formative
interaction shapes international history, providing the defining inference
points of what states are. Thus, history (and its recollection) is the kinetic
force behind norm continuity and change, whereby ‘history is a process
of change that leaves an imprint on state identity’ (Katzenstein 1996: 23),
and thus on security policy. Importantly, history is not a collection of facts
but a collection of interpretations whereby meaning and importance are
attached to events, and is a distilled stimulus upon norm-based analyses.
History is also overarching, linking together different historical eras and
encompassing various specific events.

Adding to these important socialising forces, notions of self/other
capture where and how identities diverge. The logic of identity requires the
ascription of boundaries that enable comparison and difference, meaning
that no definition of the self can be asserted ‘without suppositions about
the other’ (Campbell 1992: 70). Furthermore, the importance of self/other
to a norm-based account of security is that it is ‘the medium by which they
[states] determine who they are, what they want and how they should
behave’ (Wendt 1999: 332). This pinpointing allows for ‘the construction of
various mutually reinforcing dichotomies’ (Campbell 1992: 65) that stratify
distinctions between actors and their related security interests. Security
is also dependent upon how states read the internal self-images of other
states (Nau 2003: 220), ideas salient to the formation of threat perceptions
based upon fear and differentiation of core strategic interests. Conversely,
comparison investigates similarities and can lead to cooperation and inter-
dependence via mutual identification, as evidenced by the presence of
shared normative beliefs. A visual conception that is emblematic of these
major themes, and which highlights the interplay of norms across political,
physical and perceptual dimensions can be seen below.
Through these key socialising forces, the analysis in each chapter will be able to derive a detailed understanding of the security practice of the two states in each bilateral pairing. Deploying a longitudinal lens of analysis is essential, and will primarily date from the 1940s when the majority of our four states began their modern incarnations (Pakistan and India in 1947, and China in 1949). Our norm-based approach will thus show how interaction and experience have impacted upon regional security practice across a long time period. Some of this interaction may be positive, built upon close collaborative ties and shared threat perceptions (such as in Pakistan–China relations) or negative; based upon continued enmity, punctuated by repeated conflict and a mutual demonisation (as between India and Pakistan). Importantly a norm-based framework of analysis allows us to see how relationships fluctuate over time, how states learn from each other and how their short, medium and long-term interests evolve in response to domestic, regional and systemic determinants. Self-image, social differentiation and social similarity will also be evident, as identities and their incumbent norms variously compete and coalesce with each other.
OUTLINE AND STRUCTURE

Each chapter will investigate in turn one of the six key bilateral relationships. In Chapter 1, David Scott analyses the India–China relationship through a three-fold prism of historical origins, contemporary essence and future trajectory. He argues that at the global and rhetorical level there is convergence of values, but at the regional level there is a significant norm divergence and geo-political competition, along with the issue of whether or not a democratic China will eventually emerge. In chapter 2, Michael Semple gives an account of the evolution of Afghanistan–Pakistan state-to-state relations since the 1947 foundation of Pakistan, along with a parallel narrative of economic, social and cultural relations between the populations on either side of the Durand Line. The chapter demonstrates that the state-to-state relations have been adversarial through much of the period, despite many elements of commonality and significant levels of cross-border interaction.

In chapter 3, Runa Das depicts perceptions of India and Pakistan’s insecurities as being ideologically and discursively interpreted, which have—in conjunction with regional, global, domestic, historical, and technological factors—created a complex political-ideological context. Her analysis recasts the dynamics of the insecurities inherent to India–Pakistan relations from a more non-traditional angle and draws attention to how the ideological underpinnings of policymakers impact inter-state/regional nuclear security affairs. In chapter 4, Jingdong Yuan shows how China’s relations with Afghanistan have remained largely limited, low-profile and stable, as Beijing’s policy approaches to its war-torn Central Asian neighbour have been largely cautious and aloof. He notes that relations are predominantly focused on resource development projects and how they will affect China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang, where ethnic issues remain one of the core security concerns for the Chinese central government.

In chapter 5, Andrew Small evaluates how the China–Pakistan relationship has evolved in light of internal security problems in Pakistan and China’s fears over broader instability in the region. Critically, he traces how the rise of the Pakistani Taliban, tensions in Xinjiang, and the anticipated US withdrawal from Afghanistan have all placed China’s concerns about Islamic militancy as the principal new factor in relations. In chapter 6, Avinash Paliwal and Harsh V. Pant then demonstrate how
India has tried to be active in Afghanistan since the 2001 fall of the Taliban and how a broad-based interaction is taking place between the two states, based upon the forging of economic, military and institutional linkages. They observe that a combination of material and ideational factors present a fuller account of the way Indian policy towards Afghanistan has evolved, as well as the challenges that it poses.

Overall, it is through an emphasis upon constructivist accounts within international relations, that our analytical framework will highlight the norms central to the security practices of Afghanistan, China, India and Pakistan via the interplay of their various bilateral affairs. Accentuating ideational and interactional elements (as opposed to material and generalist considerations), history, learning and self/other dichotomies will all be critical processes underpinning this normative approach. Tracing the formation and solidification of multiple security norms via a rich empirical account (through the detailed use of primary and secondary sources), each chapter will delineate these norms for each state based upon three key parameters. From this basis, a direct comparison and evaluation of state-to-state relations in each bilateral pairing—as derived from their composite norms and worldviews—will be realised. Carrying out our analysis over the same historical period will furthermore isolate different state responses to the same (structural) events, validating the strength of an ideational account of security in South Asia.

From this basis, the conclusion will merge the findings of our six analytical chapters, so as to produce indications of regional commonalities from which greater stability may be derived. Referencing how history can be utilised as a ‘conscious effort to place actions of the past into a coherent explanation of use to the present’ (Hill quoted in Gong 2001: xii), we find that both China and India—potentially through collective action—are the best placed regional actors to inspire a more settled future for South Asia. Thus, their shared Panchsheel values, along with mounting global great power statuses co-joined with growing economic prowess, all provide clear motivations for them to act together. We also note though that the role of their relative relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan adds some complexity to accomplishing such a synergy, especially given the historically (and contemporarily) fraught nature of India’s relations with the latter state, although these can possibly be balanced out through Beijing’s ever close ties with Islamabad.