

“The Italian Occupation of South-Eastern France, 1940-1943”

Niall MacGalloway

Supervisor: Dr Stephen Tyre



**University of
St Andrews**

**This thesis is submitted in fulfilment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the School of History, University of St Andrews**

October 2015

Abstract

Between 1940 and 1943, Fascist Italy occupied south-eastern metropolitan France, a period which forms one of the principle lacunae in the historiography of both France and Italy during the Second World War. This thesis will examine the occupation in detail, examining how Italy governed her zone of occupation; how relations between the two states operated in the zone; what financial and economic gains Italy made in the occupied territories; and how Italian officials embarked upon a program of Italianisation and Fascistisation in the occupied communes. This thesis will bring together many sources for the first time in English, including principal Italian and French archives, coupled with local archival holdings. The thesis will argue that Italian efforts to create her own sphere of influence were hampered by German desires to put German interests first; and by Italy's inability to control the pace of the war. Nonetheless, it will also examine Italian projects in her zone of occupation in detail, showing that the dearth of historical scholarship – at least in English – is not down to a lack of activity within the zone.

In submitting this thesis to the University of St. Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to my thesis. I have obtained third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration.

Date: Signature of candidate

Embargo on all or part of print copy for a period of five years on the following grounds:

- Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher
- Publication would preclude future publication

Embargo on all or part of electronic copy for a period of five years on the following grounds:

- Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher
- Publication would preclude future publication

Date: Signature of candidate:

Date: Signature of supervisor:

Acknowledgements

Although writing this thesis has been a largely solitary pursuit, I have acquired a number of debts along the way. First and foremost, I wish to thank my supervisor, Dr Stephen Tyre, who has offered advice, guidance and has read the entirety of this thesis, in multiple drafts, often at very short notice. Much of his advice and encouragement has made writing this thesis a much less painful process than it might otherwise have been. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Professor Jill Stephenson and Dr Pertti Ahonen who kindly provided the original references for my application. I have benefitted from grants from the Russell Trust, the Society for the Study of French History and the Royal Historical Society, all of which have been gratefully received and went some considerable way to making possible several archival visits.

I have had the pleasure never to have encountered an unpleasant or unhelpful archivist, however special thanks should go to the staff of the Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri in Rome and the Archives Nationales in Paris where much of the most important files are to be found. Special thanks should also be extended to the staff of the Archives départementales des Alpes-Maritimes in Nice for aiding a young scholar on his first archival visit. Thanks also to the archivists at the Archives Municipales de Menton who provided uncatalogued documents that I would otherwise not have had access to. I would also like to take the opportunity to thank the staff of the institutions in which this thesis has been written: the National Library of Scotland, the libraries of the universities of St Andrews and Edinburgh, the Bibliotheque Sainte-Geneviève in Paris, and the Bibliotheque Louis Nucerà in Nice. Special mention should go to the staff of the Biblioteca di Storia Moderna e Contemporanea in Rome for providing a huge amount of material in a comparatively short space of time.

My fellow PhD students have also been a source of assistance and valuable information on a diverse number of topics. Chelsea Sambells and Colin Gilmour have answered my numerous queries on Nazism and Nazi governing practices. Luca Fenoglio gave me extensive advice on navigating the byzantine system of Italian archives. Jordan Girardin read sections of the thesis and provided a welcomed shared experience. Thanks also go to those who read chapters and sections of the work at various stages of readiness: Nick Brooke; Calum Daly;

Tom Foster; Yannick Longbottom; Robert Munro. My sister Erin read large sections of the thesis and made a number of suggestions for which I am grateful. I would like to add the usual academic caveat, that although all of the above have provided invaluable assistance, any errors which remain, be they of fact or of judgement, are mine and mine alone.

Special thanks should also go to my parents who have provided support and encouragement throughout the whole process. Their willingness to discuss a topic which could hardly appear more abstract or peripheral has been more beneficial than they may realise. My sincere thanks also go to Clara White. She has lived with this topic for three years now, tolerating my semi-frequent absences and near obsession with a single, obscure subject. Her willingness to put our lives together on hold has helped make the whole process possible and it is to her, and to my parents, that I would like to jointly dedicate the thesis in the hope that it generates a small return on the encouragement that they have given me.


Contents

Abbreviations	p. 8
Map	p. 10
Chapter 1. Introduction	p. 11
Chapter 2. Origins and Ambiguities	p. 31
Chapter 3. Government, Governance and Political Relations	p. 51
Chapter 4. Economic and Financial Relations	p. 74
Chapter 5. Italianisation and Fascistisation	p. 97
Chapter 6. Local Relations	p. 122
Conclusion	p. 144
Appendices	p. 152
Bibliography	p. 163

Abbreviations

ACS – Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome
ADAM – Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes, Nice
AMC – Archives Municipales de Cannes
AMM – Archives Municipales de Menton
AMN – Archives Municipales de Nice
AN – Archives Nationales, Paris
AP – Affari Politici
ASMAE – Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome
ASV – Archivio di Stato di Ventimiglia
b. – busta
BNL – Banca Nazionale del Lavoro
CB – Rappresentanza Diplomatica Francia, Parigi 1861-1950 (Carte Buti)
CDJC – Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine, Paris
CIAF – Commissione Italiana d’Armistizio con la Francia
DAGR – Divisione Affari Generali Riservati
DDF – Documents Diplomatiques Françaises
DDI – I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
DFCAA – Délégation française auprès de la commission d’allemande armistice
DFCIA – Délégation française auprès de la commission italienne d’armistice
DGFP – Documents on German Foreign Policy
DGPS – Divisione Generale Pubblica Sicurezza
DRA – Delegazioni Civili Rimpatrio e Assistenza
DSA – Direction des Services de l’Armistice
DSCS – Diario Storico del Comando Supremo
DWStK – Deutschen Waffenstillstandskommission
ENIT – Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche
ETCAM – Ente Turismo Costa Azzurra di Mentone
fasc. - Fascicolo
FN – Front National
GABAP – Gabinetto Armistizio-Pace
GAN – Gruppi di Azione Nizzarda
ISPI – Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale
LFC – Légion Française des Combattants
MA – Ministero Aeronautica
MAE – Ministero degli Affari Esteri
MI – Ministero dell’Interno
MINCULPOP – Ministero della Cultura Popolare
MUR – Mouvements unis de la Résistance
MVSN – Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale

NAS – National Archives of Scotland, Edinburgh
nd. – Undated document
NSDAP – Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei
OVRA – Organizzazione di Vigilanza e Repressione dell'Antifascismo
PCF – Parti Communiste Française
PCI – Partito Comunista Italiano
PNF – Partito Nazionale Fascista
SCAEF – Sottocommissione Affari Economici e Finanziari
SCAG – Sottocommissione Affari Giudici
SCS – Sottocommissione Scambi Commerciale
sf. - sottofascicolo
STO – Service du Travail Obligatoire
UC – Ufficio Coordinamento
UoE – University of Edinburgh Centre for Research Collections
Verbali – Verbali delle riunioni tenute dal Capo di SM Generale



Map found in J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne, Sud-est de la France, juin 1940 – septembre 1943*, Rennes (2010), p. 28

Chapter 1. Introduction

This study intends to examine the Italian occupation of south-eastern France which began shortly after Italy's declaration of war in June 1940 and ended with the Italian surrender in September 1943. It will examine a number of different facets of this occupation, taking a thematic approach in order to weave the various strands of the occupation together in the hope of constructing an overarching narrative. Whilst the study will make use of existing scholarship where available, it will also address key lacunae in the literature and make comparisons where relevant with both the German occupation of France in the north, and Italian occupations elsewhere. The comparatively small size of the Italian zone of occupation is undoubtedly one of the reasons that it has attracted relatively little academic attention. Nonetheless, other cultural and social factors have also contributed to this and help explain the lack of study, despite the extremely varied and wide-ranging archival holdings that have been available since the decades immediately following the war.

The dearth of scholarship on Italian occupations in Anglophone scholarship is largely a result of two primary reasons: the first is overwhelming focus on Germany's war effort – and, to a lesser extent in the United States, the Japanese war effort – which has left Italian actions as a marginal topic.¹ The second is a more complex reason, which is often difficult to gauge, but which has permeated the popular image of Italy in the Second World War: the myth of the *Italiani brava gente* (Italians as “good people”). This self-exonerating myth has been constructed upon the twin pillars that the majority of Italian soldiers had little or no faith in the Fascist system, and therefore no interest in fighting its wars, and that when stationed in occupying territories Italian soldiers did not commit massacres, reprisal killings or racial exterminations in the way that their German counterparts did. Direct comparisons constructed

¹ John Gooch's recent bibliographic essay on Italy's war effort begins with the assertion that, “For the reader with no Italian, coverage of Italy's war is patchy and generally unsatisfactory”, see bibliographical essay for J. Gooch, “Mussolini's Strategy, 1939-1943”, in J. Ferris and E. Mawdsley (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume I, Fighting the War*, Cambridge (2015), p. 727. There remains no equivalent to the multi-volume, *Germany and the Second World War*, Oxford (1990 -), the translation of which is ongoing. Italy's war effort is largely peripheral even in acclaimed and authoritative general works, see for example, R.J. Overy, *Why the Allies Won*, London (2006); G. Weinberg, *A World at Arms, a Global History of World War II*, 2nd ed., Cambridge (2006). A. Roberts, *The Storm of War, a New History of the Second World War*, London (2010), is a more recent and popularly acclaimed study which allots more space to some of the more prominent German generals than Italy's entire war effort. No sufficient single volume on Italy's war effort exists. J. Holland, *Italy's Sorrow, A Year of War, 1944-1945*, London (2008), is the most popular, but looks at Italy after the surrender of 8 September 1943; R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini's Italy, Life under the Dictatorship, 1915-1945*, London (2005), is a rare exception of an Anglophonic history of Italy during the period, but concerns the period as a whole. Most important historiography remains in untranslated Italian.

even whilst the conflict was taking place have given rise to what Filippo Focardi has termed the “cattivo tedesco” against the “bravo italiano” (“bad German” versus the “good Italian”).² This myth has been buttressed by the omnipresence of the Italian resistance, both in twentieth century Italian politics and scholarship.³ This focus has embedded itself so solidly in the Italian national consciousness that Italy’s leading military historian, Giorgio Rochat, has lamented 1940-43 as a “forgotten war”.⁴ This has been particularly true until relatively recently regarding the Italian occupations in Europe: even Renzo De Felice’s monumental biography of Mussolini, which often doubles as a history of the regime itself, makes very little mention of the occupied territories for a work of its size.⁵

The erosion of this myth has taken place only gradually. Angelo Del Boca’s *Italiani, brava gente?* (2005) has sought to examine Italian history from the vista of the entire twentieth century in an attempt to dispel misconceptions and assumptions regarding both Fascism and the Italian armed forces.⁶ It is perhaps unsurprising that early dents in the myth came from historians who had made their reputations primarily within the field of colonial history. Del Boca and others have attempted to expose war crimes in Italian colonies and during the conquest of Ethiopia in an attempt to show that massacres and racial persecution were not reserved to the Wehrmacht.⁷ Gradual acceptance in academic circles of colonial war

² F. Focardi, *Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano, La rimozione delle colpe della seconda guerra mondiale*, Rome and Bari (2013); F. Focardi, “La memoria della guerra e il mito del <<bravo italiano>>: origine e affermazione di un autoritativo collettivo”, *Italia Contemporanea*, 220-1 (2000); S. Hodzic and P. Vitali, “<<Italiani brava gente?>> Storiografia recente dell’occupazione italiana in Croazia durante la seconda guerra mondiale”, *Ventesimo Secolo*, 7 (2008); C. Fogu, “‘Italiani brava gente’, the Legacy of Fascist Historical Culture on Italian Politics of Memory”, in R.N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner and C. Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, Durham and London (2006). J. Foot, *Italy’s Divided Memory*, New York (2009), takes a broad look at problems in Italian collective memory as a whole, but singles out the Second World War and the legacy of the Fascist period in at least two chapters.

³ R.J.B. Bosworth, “Nations Examine their Past: A Comparative Analysis of the Historiography of the ‘Long’ Second World War”, *The History Teacher*, 29, 4 (1996), pp. 506-7; on the persistence of the Italian resistance in popular culture, see *ibid.*, and P. Cooke, *The Legacy of the Italian Resistance*, New York (2011). Mirco Carrattieri has argued that the Resistance occupies a less prominent place in the public understanding of the Second World War than it did a decade ago, nonetheless the study of the Resistance has continued, albeit in different perspectives, see M. Carrattieri, “La Resistenza tra memoria e storiografia”, *Passato e Presente*, 95 (2015).

⁴ G. Rochat “La guerra di Mussolini, 1940-1943”, in A. Del Boca (ed.), *La storia negata, Il revisionismo e il suo uso politico*, Vicenza (2009), pp. 152-4.

⁵ The occupied French territories come off particularly badly in this oversight, see R. De Felice, *Mussolini l’alleato*, vols. 1.1 and 1.2, Turin (1990). For a critique on these lines, see D. Mack Smith, “Le guerre del duce nella biografia di Renzo De Felice”, *Passato e Presente*, 53 (2001).

⁶ A. Del Boca, *Italiani, brava gente?* Vicenza (2005).

⁷ On war crimes committed by Italy in the colonies, see N. Labanca, “Colonial Rule, Colonial Repression and War Crimes in the Italian Colonies”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004); R. Pankhurst, “Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia: A History of their Discussion, from the League of Nations to the United Nations (1936-1949)”, *Northeast African Studies*, 6, 1-2 (1999); A. Sbacchi, “Poison Gas and Atrocities in the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936)”, in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller, *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke (2005); N. Labanca, “Il razzismo coloniale italiano”, in A. Burgio (ed.), *Nel nome della razza, Il razzismo nella storia*

crimes, however, was not replicated in the public consciousness. Del Boca has written of the “long battle for the truth”, accusing the Italian government of failing to accept the magnitude of Italian crimes in Africa.⁸ If this process of acceptance within mainstream Italian audiences remains ongoing at the time of writing, the extension of this process to include the Second World War, above all in the occupied European territories, continues to lag behind even this slow development. Many of those challenging this assertion have done so by investigating the concentration camps that Italy established throughout the Balkans. Carlo Spartaco Capogreco has noted that Italian war crimes in Europe have been “relativised” in order to diminish their severity.⁹ John Foot has noted that those camps established in the Italian peninsula itself have been largely forgotten as painful reminders of Italian war crimes in Europe.¹⁰

The treatment of both African and certain portions of the European populations that came under Italian dominance found its supposed justifications in changing Italian concepts of race.¹¹ As across Europe in the first half of the twentieth century, traditional ideas of colonial racism in Italy fused with emerging theories of eugenics to form pseudo-scientific concepts of race.¹² For many within the Fascist administration and the armed forces, racial prejudices could be equally applied in the de-humanisation of both Africans and Slavs.¹³ These new notions were often used to justify territorial aspirations, particularly in coveted territories

d'Italia, 1870-1945, Bologna (1999); A. Del Boca, *A un passo della forza: atrocità e infamie dell'occupazione italiana della Libia nelle memorie del patriota Mohamed Fekini*, Milan (2007); A. Del Boca, “The Myths, Suppressions, Denials and Defaults of Italian Colonialism”, in P. Palumbo, *A Place in the Sun, Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present*, London (2003). Literature on Italian colonialism in general is vast. For a good introduction see A. Del Boca, *Gli Italiani in Africa Orientale*, 4 vols. Rome and Bari, (1976-84). On war crimes committed by Italy in Greece, see G. von Fritjag Drabbe Künzel, “Resistance, Reprisals, Reactions”, in R. Gildea, O. Wieviorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006), p. 184 and in the Balkans, see M. Legnani, “Il ginger del general Roatta, le direttive della II^o Armata sulla repressione antipartigiana in Slovenia e Croazia”, *Italia Contemporanea*, 209-210 (1997-1998).

⁸ A. Del Boca, “Una lunga battaglia per la verità”, in A. Del Boca, *I gas di Mussolini, Il fascismo e la guerra d'Etiopia*, Rome (1996), pp. 153-4. See also, N. Labanca, “Perché ritorna la <<brava gente>>. Revisioni recenti sulla storia dell'espansione coloniale italiana”, in A. Del Boca (ed.), *La storia negata*.

⁹ C.S. Capogreco, “Internamento e deportazioni dei civili jugoslavi (1941-'43)”, in C. Di Sante (ed.), *I campi di concentramento in Italia, Dall'internamento alla deportazione (1940-1945)*, Milan (2001).

¹⁰ J. Foot, *Italy's Divided Memory*, p. 73.

¹¹ D. Rodogno, “Répression et représailles de l'Italie fasciste dans les territoires européens occupés en 1941-1943: buts et methods”, in B. Garnier, J-L. Leleu and J. Quiellen (eds.), *Répression en France, 1940-1945: actes du colloque international 8, 9 et 10 décembre 2005, Mémorial de Caen*, Caen (2007), p. 19, highlights similarities between repressive measures in Italy's African colonies and in the Balkans.

¹² G. Israel, *Il fascismo e la razza, La scienza italiana e le politiche razziali del regime*, Bologna (2010), p. 129.

¹³ A. Cohen, “La politique antijuive en Europe (Allemagne exclue) de 1938 à 1941”, *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 150 (1988), p. 48, states that the racism that did exist in Italy before the war was directed not at Jews, but at Africans. Whilst the idea of Italy as an anti-Semitic country is not shared by all scholars, the vast majority would agree that both Africans and Slavs were deemed racially inferior and suffered at the hands of this reasoning.

such as those in Yugoslavia.¹⁴ The use of racism as a concept to drive territorial expansion has often been forgotten, and Enzo Collotti has noted that the study of race in Italian Fascism has lagged behind the study of race in Nazi Germany.¹⁵

Italian ideas of race and racial superiority have rarely been applied by scholars studying Italo-French relations. Nonetheless, the idea of race was applied by racial theorists of the time; Corrado Gini, Italy's premier demographer of the 1920s, believed that nations such as France with low birth rates were "dying" and should relinquish territory to nations whose populations were on the increase.¹⁶ Despite the Latin connections between France and Italy, Italian racial theorists classed France at a lower racial level than Italy.¹⁷ The French were seen as falling into the "first circle" of Italian racial theory; that is to say, that they shared a common religion, but not language.¹⁸ France was placed on a similar scale to Spain by many Italian racial theorists.¹⁹ Those living in the coveted French territories, including, but not limited to, the Alpes-Maritimes, Savoie and Corsica, shared this level, but were considered to share enough racial characteristics with Italians to be integrated following a program of denationalisation.²⁰ Davide Rodogno's claim that for Italian theorists the *spazio vitale* was one indivisible concept must be moderated vis-à-vis France; it is perhaps true that the territories themselves in France were as coveted as those in the Balkans, but concepts of race were important in how Italy governed these territories and interacted with those who lived there. As will be argued in more detail in chapter three, negotiations and official relations that took place between France and Italy would simply have never taken place between Italy and any remaining Yugoslav officials due to considerations of race. Discussions of Slavic populations as having little economic or technical worth have no parallel in discourses and discussions on France.²¹ Nonetheless, the French were not seen as racial equals. Their placing on a racial scale below populations viewed as having the potential to be assimilated, including Malta and Cyprus, meant that a racial division between occupier and occupied

¹⁴ E. Collotti, "Sul razzismo antislavo", in A. Burgio (ed.), *Nel nome della razza*, p. 33.

¹⁵ E. Collotti, "Il razzismo negato", in E. Collotti (ed.), *Fascismo e antifascismo, Rimozioni, revisioni, negazioni*, Rome and Bari (2000), p. 355. It is strange that Collotti noted this in 2000, only one year after participating in A. Burgio (ed.), *Nel nome della razza*, an edited volume addressing this imbalance. Nonetheless, a single edited volume does not account for the different rates of examination in Italy and Germany.

¹⁶ A. Gillette, *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*, London and New York (2002), pp. 40-1.

¹⁷ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire, Italian Occupation during the Second World War*, Cambridge (2006).pp. 417-8.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 417.

¹⁹ Ibid, p. 417.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 417.

²¹ E. Collotti, "Sul razzismo antislavo", p. 41.

informed Italian attitudes in negotiations.²² In this sense, race has to some extent been overlooked in historiography concerning the occupation of France.²³

In France, different obstacles have made study of the Second World War difficult in the decades immediately following its conclusion. Scholars have been forced to overcome barriers constructed and bolstered by the scars of defeat, occupation and collaboration. The failure of the French population to come to terms with Vichy was only seriously challenged in the early 1970s with the publication of Robert Paxton's *Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order* (1972).²⁴ Paxton's work helped to overturn entrenched ideas of Vichy as a framework solely for the extreme-right. It benefitted from its timely publication, coming shortly after the death of de Gaulle and the pardoning of a former Vichy official, Paul Touvier, for crimes against humanity.²⁵ For many years, France's inability to come to terms with its own past has impeded study of the Second World War. Although Henri Rousso's "Vichy Syndrome" has arguably been cured, its effects on scholarship in the decades following the war are self-evident.²⁶

Scholars studying the *années noires* now rarely come up against the Vichy Syndrome; the post-war trials have allowed the French population to accept the Second World War and to accept the crimes of the French state in a way which Italy never has.²⁷ Nonetheless, the legacy of the Vichy syndrome is an imbalance in French historiography, attempting to forget the years of collaboration and deportations. Years of potential study on Vichy's role in the politics of collaboration have been lost, as has the opportunity to interview key figures in the

²² D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 417, places Malta and Cyprus into the "First Circle" of races, whilst France – excluding the border territories – falls into the "First/ Second Circle", along with Spain.

²³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, is, to some extent, alone in this. Chapter 2 of this work places France within the racial scale of Europe. Rodogno sets Italy's racial profiling of nations against the Nazi system described in M. Mazower, "Hitler's New Order, 1939-1945", *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 7, 1 (1996). This work was later incorporated into M. Mazower, *Hitler's Empire, Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe*, London (2008), the latter of which was published after Rodogno's own analysis.

²⁴ R. Paxton, *Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order*, New York (1972); the work appeared in French the following year as *La France de Vichy – 1940-1944*, Paris (1973).

²⁵ M. Temkin, "'Avec un certain malaise': the Paxtonian trauma in France, 1973-74", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, 2 (2003), p. 292.

²⁶ H. Rousso, *Le syndrome de Vichy, 1940-198...*, Paris (1987). In 1995, then-President, Jacques Chirac, apologised for the French state's complicity in rounding up Jews to be deported; in 2012, the newly elected President, François Hollande, described the deportation as a "crime committed in France by France".

²⁷ Whilst France has tried bureaucrats and statesmen for their crimes during the Second World War, there has famously been no parallel in Italy. On the lack of Italian war crimes trials in the military see, E.G.H. Pedalieu, "Britain and the 'Hand-Over' of Italian War Criminals to Yugoslavia, 1945-48", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39, 4 (2004); on the lack of trial in general see, M. Battini, *The Missing Italian Nuremberg, Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics*, New York (2007); F. Focardi and L. Klinkhammer, "The Question of Fascist Italy's War Crimes: the Construction of a Self-Acquitting Myth (1943-1948)", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004); M. Battini, "Sins of Memory: Reflections on the Lack of an Italian Nuremberg and the Administration of International Justice after 1945", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004).

regime who died in the post-war years.²⁸ Interest amongst the French public continues to lie with the resistance. In the Alpes-Maritimes, ninety-six per-cent of plaques, ninety-two per-cent of steles, and seventy per-cent of monuments commemorating the Second World War, commemorated the resistance or victims of the deportation.²⁹ The obsession with the resistance has certainly been of great value to those studying this topic, urging many historians to study these movements, but has, at times, threatened to overcome those interested in the occupation. Despite this, France has come to terms with its past in a far greater capacity than Italy ever has. The increasing rapidity of trials in the latter part of the twentieth century and the archival excavations carried out by those historians who were born after the traumas of the 1940s has forced France to deal with its past. In Italy, the Gordian knot of the *Italiani brava gente* myth continues to stifle popular acceptance of Italy's role in the Second World War. Kerstin von Lingen has argued that the lack of a large-scale trial in the shape of Nuremberg has allowed Italy to ignore her wartime position as a nation of "collaborators", and instead perpetuate the myth of the Resistance.³⁰ The extremely public nature of France's post-war trials has forced France to challenge this assertion, avoiding the problem of the *memoria divisa* – divided memory – which has emerged and has continued to exist in Italy.³¹

On a local level, the Italian occupation is rarely commemorated in the south-east, and as at a national level, the Second World War is almost entirely framed within the images and vocabulary of the German occupation. Events deemed worthy of national or local commemoration have largely concerned reprisal killings against civilians; resistance activities; and the deportation of Jews, particularly Jewish children whose experiences are commemorated in nearly all local schools in France. The Italian occupation did not witness violence or trauma on the level of the German occupation. This is not to say that tragedies and brutality did not take place in the south-east, but events significant enough to create a lasting *lieux de mémoire* largely occurred in the years when the region fell under German control. Instead, violence where it did occur under the Italian occupation took place against

²⁸ The most prominent of these figures is Pétain himself, the political bias in whose trial even de Gaulle conceded after the war. Those executed for treason and collaboration were also lost to oral historians.

²⁹ J-L. Panicacci, *Les lieux de mémoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale dans les Alpes-Maritimes*, Nice (1997), p. 7. As resisters were also deported, it has become commonplace for monuments relating to the deportation to also commemorate resisters. See also, J-M. Guillon, "Monuments et mémoire de la Résistance en Provence", *Provence Historique*, 193 (1997) and S. Frediani, "Les lieux de mémoire à Menton de 1860 à nos jours", *Recherches Régionales*, 162 (2002).

³⁰ K. von Lingen, *Nuremberg, Rome, Tokyo: the Impact of Allied War Crimes Trials on Post-war Memory and Identity in Germany, Italy and Japan after 1945*, Salford (2009), p. 23.

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 28.

individuals, or in different forms, for example, economic violence. Memories of the Italian occupation did not suddenly vanish, but local events have not been woven into the national consciousness. It is partly for this reason that the historiography on the Italian occupation has been dwarfed by that on the German occupation.

I

The historiography of the Second World War is vast, and any attempt to compile a complete survey would prove an impossible task. Nonetheless, literature directly concerning the Italian occupation of France is far less common, and the subject is often lost in more general histories of France during the period.³² English-language histories of the Fascist regime, even those focusing on the war, also fall short in this regard. While Denis Mack Smith's *Mussolini's Roman Empire* (1976) examines the drive for foreign conquest, analysis of the occupation of those territories is not the aim of the work.³³ The most comprehensive account in English is Davide Rodogno's *Fascism's European Empire* (2006), a work on Italian occupation policy across Europe and a translation from the Italian original.³⁴ Rodogno skilfully analyses the Italian occupation zones in France, Greece and the Yugoslav territories, setting them within the wider context of the Italian Empire, Fascist projects to remould Italian society, and the Fascist regime. While Rodogno's work examines collaboration, repression and resistance, economic exploitation and Italianisation, he concedes that the work was undertaken with the intention of examining the "whys", rather than the "hows" of the Italian occupations.³⁵ Moreover, sections relating to France form only a part of the study and are frequently overshadowed by investigative analysis into the Balkans and Greece, both due to the much larger size of these zones of occupation and their place in creating the *Italiani brava gente* myth.

If the "hows" remain largely unanswered vis-à-vis France, studies on many of the other

³² J. Jackson, *France, The Dark Years, 1940-1944*, Oxford (2003) shows the zone on a series of maps but does not analyse it; R. Vinen, *The Unfree French, Life Under the Occupation*, London (2006), pp. 106-7 is the sole mention of the Italian occupation. Many other studies fail to even render the occupation on a map.

³³ D. Mack Smith, *Mussolini's Roman Empire*, London and New York (1976). In this regard, Mack Smith's title is slightly misleading. A.A. Kallis' *Fascist Ideology, Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945*, London and New York (2000) is fairer in this regard, but studies similar themes.

³⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*. The original title is *Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo, Le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Europa (1940-1943)*, Turin (2003), and is itself based on Rodogno's PhD thesis, "Le politiche d'occupazione dell'Italia fascista nei territori dell'Europa mediterranea durante la Seconda Guerra Mondiale", submitted at the Institut de Hautes Études Internationales et du Développement (2001). This work remains the most important work published on Fascist occupations.

³⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 416.

Italian occupations in Europe are more common. Sheila Lecoœur's study on Italian-occupied Syros has allowed scholars a microcosmic view of Italian policy on one Greek island.³⁶ Pre-dating Rodogno's work by over ten years, Mark Mazower's study of occupied Greece provides some insight into the Italian occupation there, however its title reveals a far greater focus on the German occupation.³⁷ Works on occupied Yugoslavia have become increasingly common and many dissect the web of administrative policies skilfully, allowing historians to draw comparisons between the Italian and German occupations where appropriate.³⁸

As the *Italiani brava gente* myth has crumbled, Italian scholarship has grown in both scope and quality.³⁹ In addition to Rodogno's work, the Italian government has undertaken a study specifically focusing on Italian occupation policies in France. While Domenico Schipsi's work, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi* (2007), is a strictly military review which largely limits itself to the study of the zone from 1942 onwards, it makes laudable use of Italian military archives which Giorgio Rochat has unfortunately labelled difficult to consult.⁴⁰ Romain Rainero has produced a laudable and highly detailed study of the Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia (Italian Armistice Commission with France - CIAF), including a volume of documentation from precisely those military archives.⁴¹

In reality, however, Italian scholarship focusing singly on the zone of occupation in France is relatively young compared to those studies in France. It should be noted, however, that age does not denote worth, and Italian studies which take the occupation of France as

³⁶ S. Lecoœur, *Mussolini's Greek Island, Fascism and the Italian Occupation of Syros in World War II*, London (2009).

³⁷ M. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece, the Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944*, London (1993).

³⁸ Works on occupied Yugoslavia are becoming more accessible for those with no grounding in Slavic languages. In particular, see S.K. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder, the Second World War in Yugoslavia*, London (2008); J. Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, Occupation and Collaboration*, Stanford (2001); A. Osti Guerrazzi, *The Italian Army in Slovenia, Strategies of anti-Partisan Repression, 1941-1943*, London and New York (2013). While not a Yugoslav territory, B.J. Fischer's *Albania at War, 1939-1945*, London (1999) is helpful for the same purpose. Although English language works are catching up with their Italian counterparts, those who wish to understand the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia must consult studies which remain untranslated; Eric Gobetti's two works, *Alleati del nemico, l'Occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia (1941-1943)*, Rome and Bari (2013) and *L'occupazione allegra. Gli italiani in Jugoslavia (1941-1943)*, Rome (2007) have become the most important starting point.

³⁹ For an overview of Italian-language scholarship on territories occupied by Italy see F. Focardi, "Le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Africa e in Europa", *Italia Contemporanea*, 252-253 (2008) and H. James Burgwyn, "Italy's Rule in Conquered Territories During World War II: an Overview of Recent Scholarship", *Global War Studies*, 10, 3 (2013).

⁴⁰ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi, 1940-1943*, Rome (2007); G. Rochat, "La guerra di Mussolini", p. 154. While praising Italian archivists, Rochat has complained that a lack of funding and a shortage of staff has made Italian military archives difficult to use.

⁴¹ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain, Storia dei rapporti tra l'Italia e le Francia di Vichy*, Rome (1990-2), 2 vols. The second volume of documents neatly compliments the first, which is a more general history.

their focus are, at present, more useful than those written in French. Italian study of the Fascist regime, however, has provided important contextual pieces upon which the foundations for further study can be constructed. Insightful studies on the *Milizia Volontaria per il Sicurezza Nazionale* (MVSN – known commonly as the “Blackshirts” in English), various Italian policing organisations, and the *Partito Nazionale Fascista* (PNF - National Fascist Party) help establish the position of various Italian organs during the war.⁴² Although spearheaded by Italian scholars, work on the Fascist regime and on Italy during the Second World War is increasing in both Britain and the United States, and scholars such as MacGregor Knox are helping re-dress the long ignored Italian side to the Rome-Berlin Axis which has existed in Anglophone historiography.⁴³

Francophone scholarship has traditionally produced the studies which are the most focused on the Italian occupation in any language, however it largely remains the preserve of local historians. The most prominent historian of the occupation in any language is Jean-Louis Panicacci. His major works, *L'Occupation italienne, Sud-Est de la France*, (2010), *Les Alpes-Maritimes dans la guerre* (2013), *Les Alpes-Maritimes dans la tourmente* (1989), and *Menton dans la tourmente* (1984), form the backbone of French scholarly analysis on the subject.⁴⁴ Panicacci has punctuated his publications on the topic with regular contributions in French academic journals, however his focus remains invariably narrow with the majority of his investigations centred on Nice and the Alpes-Maritimes.⁴⁵ Despite his long-held interest in the Alpes-Maritimes during the Second World War, Panicacci's studies are often problematic. Although these studies are based on archival research, Panicacci seems to have

⁴² On the MVSN, see A. Rossi, *Le guerre della Camicie Nere, La milizia fascista dalla guerra mondiale alla guerra civile*, Pisa (2004); on OVRA and other policing organisations see, M. Canali, *Le spie del regime*, Bologna (2004), M. Franzinelli, *I tentacoli dell'Ovra, agenti, collaboratori e vittime della polizia politica fascista*, Turin (1999), and R. Canosa, *I servizi segreti del Duce, I persecutori e le vittime*, Milan (2000); on the PNF see, E. Gentile, *La via italiana al totalitarismo, Il partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista*, Rome (1995).

⁴³ M. Knox, *Hitler's Italian Allies, Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-1943*, Cambridge (2000); M. Knox, *Common Destiny, Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany*, Cambridge (2000) offers a comparative look at aspects of the two regimes. For an overview on the historiography of Italy during the Second World War, see E. Ragionieri, “L'Italie dans la seconde guerre mondiale, Essai d'historiographie”, *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, 92 (1973).

⁴⁴ J-L. Panicacci, *L'Occupation italienne, Sud-Est de la France, juin 1940 – septembre 1943*, Rennes (2010); J-L. Panicacci, *Les Alpes-Maritimes dans la guerre, 1939-1945*, Paris (2013); J-L. Panicacci, *Les Alpes-Maritimes de 1939 à 1945, un département dans la tourmente*, Nice (1989); J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente, 1939-1945*, Menton (1984).

⁴⁵ The majority of Panicacci's articles appear in *Recherches Régionales, Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, or *Nice Historique*, all of which are locally published. For examples of work on particular towns and areas featuring in these journals, see J-L. Panicacci, “Vence dans la tourmente (1939-1945)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 185 (2007); J-L. Panicacci, “A propos de Saint-Martin-Vésubie sous l'occupation”, *Recherches Régionales*, 182 (2006), and J. Revelant, “Grasse de 1939 à 1945”, *Recherches Régionales*, 163 (2002).

little or no discussion of historiographical debates surrounding his topics. He presents facts without analysis, and he is often too trusting of the local press, presenting information taken from wartime newspapers as facts without discussion of the possibility that articles in the press could be subject to wartime censorship or political partisanship. Moreover, Panicacci seems to have conducted his archival work in the 1970s and 1980s, but has relied upon this original research, rarely adding to his own findings. Thus, it is possible to see one of his most comprehensive bibliographies in his recent work, *En territoire occupé, Italiens et allemands à Nice* (2012), largely because it is a re-working of his doctoral thesis.⁴⁶ Despite these problems, Panicacci remains an accessible, if slightly unreliable, source and his works, despite some problems, are certainly the starting point for most scholars interest in the occupation. Although, by definition, slightly narrow, the trend for French *départemental* studies is useful to those studying the occupation, allowing historians to augment national panoramas with more detailed viewpoints.⁴⁷ Christian Villermet's *A noi Savoia, Histoire de l'occupation italienne en Savoie* (1999), has provided an account of Savoie under Italian rule which has greatly benefitted from intensive excavation in local archives.⁴⁸ This is supplemented by Gil Emprin's study on the Haute-Tarentaise (1985).⁴⁹ Similar studies provide background information on the Var.⁵⁰ Claude Barbier's article also provides an overview of existing historiography on Haute-Savoie during the Second World War.⁵¹ Series producing local histories of occupied towns help place these localities into their historical

⁴⁶ J-L. Panicacci, *En territoire occupé, Italiens et allemands à Nice, 1942-1944*, Paris (2012). This monograph is a re-working of his thesis, "Nice pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale de l'occupation italienne à la fin de la guerre, 11 Novembre, 1942 – 1er Septembre, 1945" Université de Nice (1970). The archival references in both are almost identical, despite massive re-organisation of various archives in the Alpes-Maritimes.

⁴⁷ *Départemental* studies on occupied France are a common way of historians investigating a topic that has become too large to study *in toto*. On the Loire, see R. Gildea, *Marianne in Chains, In Search of the German Occupation, 1940-1945*, London (2002); on the Basses-Pyrénées see, L. Poullenet, *Basses Pyrénées, Occupation, Libération, 1940-1945*, Biarritz (1995); on the Auvergne see, J.F. Sweets, *Choices in Vichy France, the French under Nazi Occupation*, New York and Oxford (1986); on Marseille and the Bouches-du-Rhône see, S. Kitson, *Police and Politics in Marseille, 1936-1945*, Leiden (2014); on the Alpes-Maritimes, see J-L. Panicacci's output above. E. Jennings, *Vichy in the Tropics, Pétain's National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944*, Stanford (2001), takes a similar approach to the French Empire.

⁴⁸ C. Villermet, *A noi Savoia, Histoire de l'occupation italienne en Savoie, novembre 1942 – septembre 1943*, Montmélian, (1999).

⁴⁹ G. Emprin, *L'occupation italienne en Haute-Tarentaise, 1940-1943*, Grenoble (1985).

⁵⁰ J. Maignon, *Toulon et la Var dans la guerre, 1939-1945, La vie quotidienne sous l'occupation*, Saint-Étienne (1991); D. Delmonte, "La ravitaillement à Toulon – 1940 – août 1944", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 7 (1973); J.B. Gaignebet, "Incertitudes de la paix, cruautés de la guerre (1929-1944)", in M. Agulhorn (ed.), *Histoire de Toulon*, Toulouse (1980). Much of the remaining literature on Toulon deals directly with the scuttling of the French fleet and makes little or no mention of the Italian occupation, see J-J. Antier, *La flotte se saborde, Toulon 1942*, Paris (1992), or for a more complete history of the French fleet see B. Costagliola, *La Marine de Vichy, blocus et collaboration*, Paris (2009).

⁵¹ C. Barbier, "Pour une historiographie de l Deuxième Guerre mondiale en Haute-Savoie", in C. Sorrel (ed.), *La Société Savoyarde et la guerre, Huit siècles d'histoire (XIII^e – XX^e siècles)*, Chambéry (1998).

contexts.⁵² Studies on the memory of the war in Italian-occupied regions have largely focused on the German occupation, the deportation of the Jews and the *Service du travail obligatoire* (Obligatory Work Service – STO).⁵³ Whilst laudable, many of these studies remain relatively local in their focus. Although this study will largely focus on the Alpes-Maritimes, it will also take a national panorama, examining Italo-French relations and Italian policies in France at both the national and local level. In this sense, whilst the methodology of examining the micro will be borrowed from *départemental* studies, this thesis will attempt to examine how far these policies also existed in the macro.

Increasingly open attitudes to the Second World War in France have created a wealth of contextual literature. As with Italian and Italian-speaking scholars studying the Fascist regime, historians working on France during the Second World War have provided increasingly frequent and meritorious outpourings of work both on occupied France as a whole, and the region in question. Work on the French Resistance, both in the occupied *départements* and beyond, has assisted scholars in producing a clear and robust picture of opposition to German and Italian occupation policies.⁵⁴ Of particular note in this vein has been Jean-Marie Guillon, whose work on the resistance groups, especially in the Var, are indispensable starting points for the Var under the occupation.⁵⁵ Despite scholarly interest in the Resistance, the movement itself was not a mass phenomenon until the end of the Italian occupation. Until November 1942, as Kedward states, the south was relatively untouched by occupation when compared to the north.⁵⁶ In this sense, there was no real reason for armed resistance to grow in the way that it did in the north. The Italians, therefore, moved in November 1942 into a region which possessed only nascent organised resistance. In addition to work on the resistance, Ralph Schor has provided essential information on Italian immigration patterns in the pre-war era which helped shape public opinion and perceptions of

⁵² For Nice see, J-L. Panicacci, “Nice de 1939 à 1953” in A. Ruggiero (ed.), *Nouvelle histoire de Nice*, Toulouse (2006); for Annecy see, P. Soudan, “Les années françaises de 1860 à l’aube du XXI^e siècle”, in P. Guichonnet (ed.), *Histoire d’Annecy*, Toulouse (1987); for Toulon see, J.B. Gaignebet, “Incertitudes de la paix, cruautés de la guerre”.

⁵³ See for example, P. Barrière, *Histoire et mémoire de la Seconde guerre mondiale: Grenoble en ses après-guerre, 1944-1964*, Grenoble (2004), and the PhD thesis upon which it is based, P. Barrière, “Formes et usages du passé: Grenoble en ses après-guerre (1944-1964)”, PhD thesis, Université Lumière Lyon 2, (2000).

⁵⁴ For more general works, see O. Wiewiorka, *Histoire de la Résistance, 1940-1945*, Paris (2013); O. Wiewiorka, *Une certaine idée de la Résistance, Défense de la France, 1940-1949*, Paris (1995).

⁵⁵ Guillon’s principal works are “La résistance Provençale: Essai de synthèse”, *Provence Historique*, 178 (1994); “Les étrangers dans la résistance Provençale”, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 36, 4 (1989); and “La France du Sud-Est”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des Années noires, Tome 2, De l’Occupation à la Libération*, Paris (1993).

⁵⁶ H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis*, p. 7.

Italy and of Italians, particularly in those regions bordering Italy.⁵⁷ Pierre Milza has provided similar studies on the status of Italians in France during the 1930s, as well as editing a volume providing extremely useful essays on this subject.⁵⁸

Until relatively recently, the bulk of literature on the Italian occupation has focused on the position of the Jews. The curious position of Jewish refugees in the region and their ambiguous status vis-à-vis the French and Italian regimes resulted in an almost immediate academic interest.⁵⁹ Italy's refusal to send Jews in their zones of occupation to the German death camps has ignited heated debates over whether this was due to an inherent Italian humanism or, as Rodogno has argued, because Jews were simply pawns in an Italo-German power struggle.⁶⁰ New generations of historians have contributed greatly to the historiography, both by examining the zone of occupation in France in particular, and by studying European deportations and exterminations through the prism of the Italo-German relationship.⁶¹ This sustained academic focus means that this study has decided to examine other aspects of the occupation. It is possible to argue that Italian policy towards the Jews in France requires a broader contextual framework of the occupation as a whole. This study hopes to construct such a framework and, in this way, will hopefully contribute in some way

⁵⁷ R. Schor, "Italiens des villes – Italiens des champs, l'accueil des immigrants italiens dans les Alpes-Maritimes et dans le sud-ouest (1919-1939)", *Recherches Régionales*, 79 (1982); R. Schor, *L'opinion française et des étrangers en France, 1919-1939*, Paris (1985).

⁵⁸ P. Milza, "Les Italiens en France dans les années trente", in P. Joutard and F. Marcot (eds.), *Les étrangers dans la résistance en France*, Besançon (1992); P. Milza (ed.), *Les italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986), contains a number of important essays, notably, P. Milza, "L'immigration italienne en France d'une guerre à l'autre: interrogations, directions de recherche et premier bilan"; É. Temime, "Les Italiens dans la région marseillaise pendant l'entre-deux-guerres"; P. Guillen, "Le rôle politique de l'immigration italienne en France dans l'entre-deux-guerres"; P. Milza, "Aspects économiques et sociaux de la présence italienne en Savoie (1860-1939)". See also, M. Amar and P. Milza, *L'immigration en France au XX siècle*, Paris (1990).

⁵⁹ L. Poliakov, *La condition des juifs sous l'occupation italienne*, Paris (1946). The English translation appeared later as, L. Poliakov and J. Sabille, *Jews Under the Italian Occupation*, Paris (1955). See also, G. Gobitz, "La déportation des juifs de Savoie en 1942", in C. Sorrel (ed.), *La société Savoyarde et la guerre*; J-L. Panicacci, "Les persécutions antisémites dans les Alpes-Maritimes (été 1940 – été 1944)", in R. Mencherini (ed.), *Provence-Auschwitz, De l'internement des étrangers à la déportation des juifs, 1939-1944*, Aix-en-Provence (2007); J-M. Guillon, "Les juifs dans le Var (1940-1944)", in R. Mencherini (ed.), *Provence-Auschwitz*.

⁶⁰ This is the argument of D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, whose final chapter is dedicated to the Italian treatment of Jews and refugees – who Rodogno sees as similar – in the occupied territories.

⁶¹ D. Carpi, *Between Mussolini and Hitler, the Jews and the Italian authorities in France and Tunisia*, Hanover and London (1994); M. Sarfatti, "Fascist Italy and German Jews in South-Eastern France in July 1943", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3 (1998); D. Rodogno, "La politique des occupants italiens à l'égard des Juifs en France métropolitaine, humanise ou pragmatisme?", *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire*, 93 (2007) and L. Fenoglio, *Angelo Donati e la <<questione ebraica>> nella Francia occupata dall'esercito italiano*, Cuneo (2013) are examples of the former, whilst J. Steinberg, *All or Nothing, the Axis and the Holocaust, 1941-43*, London and New York (2002) is the most prominent study of the latter. Davide Rodogno attempts to marry the two camps in his review of Fenoglio's book, see D. Rodogno, "Review of Luca Fenoglio, *Angelo Donati e la "Questione Ebraica" nella Francia occupata dall'Esercito italiano*", *Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History, Journal of Fondazione CDEC*, 7 (2014).

to the understanding of Italian policy towards the Jews, despite the focus of this study being elsewhere. Much the same can be said of Corsica, whose individual character and geographical isolation from the metropolitan territories gave rise to an Italian regime of a different nature. Italian occupying officials created separate delegations and control commissions for Corsica, and often distinguished it from metropolitan France.⁶² The large Italian community in Corsica, coupled with the size of the Italian garrison there during the war – 60,000 occupying soldiers for a population of 230,000 – also differentiated the island from the rest of France. Existing Francophone studies also tend to examine Corsica in its own right.⁶³ As with Italian policy towards the Jews, Corsica requires its own study, and it is for this reason that this thesis will not look at the occupation of the island.⁶⁴

II

One of the primary aims of this study has been to use a wide array of archival sources from both sides of the occupation. Traditionally, secondary literature has used either predominantly or exclusively primary materials from Italian or French archives. The most prominent work on Fascist occupations, Davide Rodogno's *Fascism's European Empire*, made extensive use of Italian archives, but did not consult archival material from any of the occupied territories.⁶⁵ The most prolific Francophone scholar, Jean-Louis Panicacci, carried out research in a number of Italian archives, but his theses are principally based upon French documentation. Few, if any, studies have thus far sought to bridge this gap, relying equally on Italian and French archives. It is the aim of this thesis to do so, bringing together a number of sources for the first time with the hope of creating a more thorough and complete image of how the occupation operated from the point of view of both the occupier and the occupied.

In the case of the occupier, the most important documentation is kept in the Archivio

⁶² Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), GABAP, b. 11, "Il Generale Designato d'Armata, Presidente della Commissione Italiana di Armistizio, Pietro Pintor, alla Delegazione mista per il Controllo della Corsica", 15.9.40. Regular reports relating to occupied France often included the caveat, "compresa la Corsica". Had Corsica merely been considered part of the occupied French territories, it would not have been necessary to make such a distinction, see for example, ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Notizario quindicinale 17, relativa alla Francia metropolitana, compresa la Corsica, 16.8.41".

⁶³ H. Chaubin, *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre, 1939-1943*, Paris (2012); H. Chaubin, "Les Italiens en Corse pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale", *Études Corses*, 57 (2004); and in English, K. Varley, "Between Vichy France and Fascist Italy: Redefining Identity and the Enemy in Corsica during the Second World War", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47, 3 (2012). For the size of the garrison, see AN F1^a CIII 1200, "Le Préfet de la Région de Marseille à Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement", 12.2.43.

⁶⁴ English-language scholarship is only now beginning to catch up with French, see K. Varley, "Between Vichy France and Fascist Italy".

⁶⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*.

Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), located in Rome. Much of this is kept in the Gabinetto Armistizio-Pace (GABAP) files which contain the correspondence between the Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia (Italian Armistice Commission with France – CIAF) and the Ministero degli Affari Esteri.⁶⁶ The GABAP files are largely limited to the period 1940-1942, with subsequent documentation distributed between the GABAP boxes and the Affari Politici, 1931-1945 series (AP), which also comprises files out with the immediate remit of the CIAF. As Davide Rodogno points out, the fact that all documentation is not kept in a single archival series is compounded by the additional problem that much of the documentation for 1943 is lost.⁶⁷ Additional series in the ASMAE allow scholars to augment these files and are significantly underused. The Ufficio Coordinamento (UC) files hold large volumes of files relevant to the coordination of the waging of the war. Whilst the majority of these files do not correspond directly to the occupation, there are valuable documents which are enlightening for those who wish to understand Italian policy towards both Germany and France at a high governmental level. These contain correspondence between Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister between 1936 and 1943, and his ambassadors in both Germany and France, and are invaluable in understanding Italy's entry into the war, despite lacking more precise documentation on the policy of occupation. The papers of the Italian ambassador assigned to Paris, Gino Buti, are also available in the ASMAE and form a correspondence which has no equivalent in either the GABAP files or the AP series. Buti's papers are useful in investigating Italian policy post-1942 when the re-organisation of the CIAF removed numerous matters out with the direct confines of the armistice from CIAF jurisdiction. Buti took up many of these functions, and his papers are, above all, useful if scholars wish to understand the plight of the Italian migrant community in France as well as Italian efforts to re-patriate and exploit the colony for political gain. Although Buti's papers in isolation could not be used to form a study of the broad issues raised by the occupation, they are useful in adding additional layers to Italian policies in and towards France.

The Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), also in Rome, contains the vast majority of Italian state papers and documents in practically any aspect of Italian history. As with the ASMAE, documents relating to the occupation are scattered throughout the various series, which is further compounded for the uninitiated scholar by its division into the Italian state

⁶⁶ The GABAP files are also archived as Ufficio Armistizio Pace. During the war the organisation was referred to as GABAP and has been referred to in this way in recent and prominent studies, eg. D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*. The author has retained this use purely out of convention.

⁶⁷ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 464.

ministries. The most valuable papers in the ACS relating to the occupation are those of the Commissariato Civile di Mentone, which are kept under the appellation of the CIAF. The broader heading is slightly misleading, as the vast majority of these documents relate specifically to Menton, but are extremely important in ascertaining Italian policies in the annexed territories. The Ministero Aeronautica (MA) has retained many of the regular reports distributed to the three branches of the armed forces; although many of these files are also kept in other archives, the ACS holdings are helpful for consulting these in a single location. The Ministero dell'Interno (MI) retains small holdings of CIAF documentation, whilst the files of the now-defunct Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MINCULPOP) are also available for consultation here. Despite its position as the State archives, the ACS files do not compare in importance to the holdings in the ASMAE and are to be used in conjunction, rather than solely, in examining the occupation. It is significant that Panicacci only consults the ACS archives, rather than those in the ASMAE, perhaps mistakenly attributing the same importance to the ACS as the Archives Nationales have in France. It is perhaps for this reason that Panicacci's studies do not provide enough insight into Italian policy during the occupation, and instead reflect a deeper interest in French reactions.

Important documents, however, remain closed to scholars in Italy. The archives of the Carabinieri, the Italian military police, are largely closed to scholars, whilst Emanuele Sica has expressed his dismay that the proceedings of the Italian military tribunals during the war have not been incorporated into the catalogue of the ACS as the Italian state does not have sufficient funds to provide an adequate classification.⁶⁸ It is a truism that there will always be documents which remain out of reach of the academic, whether due to a lack of funds, lost documents, or states' or organisations' over-zealous secrecy acts.⁶⁹ Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that there is much which may come to light on the Italian zone of occupation in France should these documents ever surface.

In France, the most valuable archive is undoubtedly the Archives Nationales (AN), which contain not only the correspondence between the CIAF and French authorities, but also

⁶⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 465 describes the potential holdings of the Carabinieri as "interesting", but laments that they are not accessible to scholars; that Rodogno repeats the claim in D. Rodogno, "Wartime Occupation by Italy", in R.J.B. Bosworth and J.A. Maiolo (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume II, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge (2015), p. 438, shows that little has changed in the twelve years between the publication of Rodogno's Italian original of *Fascism's European Empire*, and the current publication. See also, E. Sica, "Italiani brava gente? The Italian Occupation of Southeastern France in the Second World War, 1940-1943", PhD thesis, University of Waterloo (2011), p. 416.

⁶⁹ Neither France nor Italy should be singled out for such laws. In 1993, Mark Mazower stated that he was unable to examine SOE actions in Greece thanks to "Britain's absurdly restrictive official secrecy laws", see M. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, pp. 424-5.

internal communication between French organs affected by the armistice.⁷⁰ The files of the Ministère de l'Intérieur contain the propitious reports of the *Préfets* of all *départements* which experienced Italian occupation, as well as the *Préfet Régional* based in Marseille.⁷¹ The AN is arguably a more valuable resource than its Italian equivalent, as it allows scholars to examine an overview of all *départements* occupied, as well as to examine the policies of the French government from the broadest perspective. Although both the Ministère des Affaires étrangères and the Ministère des Finances maintain separate archives, this is largely reserved for more specialised documentation, with the AN providing ample evidence to understand the occupation in depth.

Perhaps more useful for a local perspective are the array of Archives départementales located in each of France's *départements*. This study has elected to examine one *département* – the Alpes-Maritimes – as a case study, comparing and contrasting this region, where relevant, with other *départements* as portrayed in the files of the AN. The decision to focus on this *département* was twofold: firstly, because the Alpes-Maritimes was one of the few *départements* which experienced occupation from the very outset, as well as undergoing a policy of annexation in a small portion of its boundaries; and secondly, because much of the secondary literature was based on this region, giving this thesis a broad base of scholarly opinion to respond to.⁷² The files of the Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes (ADAM) permit scholars to examine phenomena which are often characterised by distinct local circumstances; this study has found that a *départemental* approach to organisation such as the police and local authorities would have been simply impossible from the Parisian archives alone.⁷³

Augmenting these important archival sources are the much underutilised Archives Municipales. These archives often hold files which are helpful in placing the wider occupation into a localised framework. These often allow historians to observe how the

⁷⁰ These documents are found in the AJ 41 series and are filed thematically; documentation relating to the German armistice commission can be found in the AJ 40 series. Despite the well-organised AJ 41 series, there is undoubtedly more emphasis placed upon Franco-German relations which also have their own sub-series in the F1_a Administration générale series, see R.J. Young (ed.), *French Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, A Guide to Research and Research Materials*, Wilmington (1981), p. 62.

⁷¹ The Ministère de l'Intérieur documents are filed as F1^a CIII.

⁷² Much of Jean-Louis Panicacci's studies are based upon the Alpes-Maritimes, whilst Ralph Schor's work has focused on the Italian communities in the region.

⁷³ For regional works on the police, for example, see S. Kitson, *Police and Politics in Marseille*; S. Kitson, "From Enthusiasm to Disenchantment: the French Police and the Vichy Regime, 1940-1944", *Contemporary European History*, 11 (2002); S. Kitson, "The Police and the Deportation of Jews from the Bouches-du-Rhône in August and September 1942", *Modern and Contemporary France*, 5, 3 (1997); J-M. Guillon, "Le Var", in J-M. Belière and D. Peschanski (eds.), *La police française (1930-1950), Entre bouleversements et permances*, Paris (2000).

occupation was experienced by a single town or city, and contain correspondence between civilians and the local administration, which for many was the most important point of contact with government. Many of the files utilised in this study from the Archives Municipales have not been previously consulted by major studies. Jean-Louis Panicacci has limited his archival work in the Archives Municipales in Nice and Menton to the municipal council records.⁷⁴ Documentation from the Archives Municipales in Cannes seems to have been consulted solely by local historians, and has not yet been incorporated into broader studies.⁷⁵ The failure of preceding historians to incorporate these sources into larger works is perhaps merely a manifestation of the typical “top-down” approach to French archives where study in Paris is always of paramount importance. It is hoped, therefore, that the inclusion of both the Archives départementales and the Archives Municipales will add weight and depth to those documents in Paris which remain invaluable.

The decision by some scholars to use one nation’s archives whilst neglecting study in another can be down to a number of factors. Perhaps primarily, the language barrier afforded to practically everyone who studies the Italian occupation means that most historians must learn one, if not two, languages. Those whose native tongue is either French or Italian will almost inevitably spend more time in those archives whose language they share. It is hoped that since this author does not fall into either category, this study can be less partisan in archival preferences. Previous scholars have also bemoaned the inaccessibility and byzantine bureaucracy of Italian archives.⁷⁶ This has certainly been true in the past, with the vast majority of those utilising these archives undoubtedly Italians. This study has benefitted from being carried out at a time when Italian archives are more accessible than ever, even if they still lag some way behind their French counterparts. It is, therefore, hoped that these twin obstacles can be overcome in order to bridge a long-needed gap in the primary documents.

This study intends to tackle the occupation thematically. The first chapter will examine the origins of the zone, setting it into the wider context of Italo-French relations in the 1920s and 1930s, and dealing with the position of the large Italian migrant community in France at the outbreak of war. Moreover, it will attempt to establish a number of important distinctions

⁷⁴ J-L. Panicacci, *L’Occupation italienne*, p. 408; J-L. Panicacci, *En territoire occupé*, pp. 268-9; J-L. Panicacci, *Les Alpes-Maritimes dans la guerre*, pp. 440-1; J-L. Panicacci, *Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1939-1945*, p. 375.

⁷⁵ This documentation has been used in, for example, D. Digiuni, *Cannes, 1939-1945*, Cannes (2006).

⁷⁶ Primarily, M. Knox, *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War*, Cambridge (1982), pp. 365-6, but see also the aforementioned G. Rochat, “La guerra di Mussolini”, p. 154.

between the Italian zone of occupation and the German zone in the north, laying out important strands which run through the zone. The second chapter will examine the governing apparatuses that Italy established in France, analysing the role of the armistice, the armistice commission, and the Italian armed forces in the zone. It will attempt to understand how international relations between the two countries affected local politics in the occupied territories. It will argue that Italy's governance of the occupied territories was largely coloured by her perception of the war as a short-term state of affairs. Moreover, Italy's progress was hindered not only by this mistaken assumption, but by the actions of her German ally who abandoned unilateral Axis action in order to aggrandise Germany's status in Europe. The third chapter will examine economic and financial relations between the two countries, both at a national and a local level. This will involve an examination not only of national agreements made between Rome and Vichy, but how these agreements and Italian economic policies towards France played out at a local level. Chapter three will argue that Italy strove to forge her own path within the new Europe, coming to agreements with the French government without Berlin. It will argue that although Italy did not make financial gains on the scale of Germany from her French possessions, her actions represent a degree of autonomy which has often been disregarded or overlooked. The fourth chapter will explore the Italianisation and Fascistisation of the territories annexed by Italy. It will attempt to demonstrate that existing conceptions of the Italian occupations as mild and of carrying out little or no invasive policies must be moderated. The final chapter will focus on daily life under the occupation. This will involve a discussion not only of how French civilians lived under the occupation, but how occupiers and occupied interacted with one another.

It is also hoped that this thesis will make some contribution to the ongoing debate regarding the usefulness of labels such as "occupier", "occupied", "collaborator" or "resister". The region occupied by the Italian armed forces contained large Italian minority populations, many of whom found themselves torn between the forces of their *patria* and the communities of which they had become a part. Viewed by their former neighbours as fifth columnists, but often unwilling to become accessories to the Italian occupation, many ethnically Italian civilians found themselves between the labels of "occupier" and "occupied". Similarly, as with many civilians in France, Italians were unwilling or unable to join the armed resistance, yet their reluctance to provide any political or moral support to the aims of the Italian government or military makes labelling the Italian community as "collaborators" both misleading and unfair. These labels have played central roles in the historiography of the Second World War, to the extent that Part III of the second volume of

The Cambridge History of the Second World War (2015), is dedicated to “Occupation, Collaboration, Resistance and Liberation”.⁷⁷ Whilst these labels have opened up new avenues of debate when writing the history of occupation, discussion of these categories has increasingly pigeonholed individuals and communities into a single category. This thesis will highlight the shades of grey, particularly with regards to the Italian community in the south-east.

The primary aim of this thesis throughout, however, is to understand how the Italian occupation functioned in a broad sense. Principally, it takes as its starting point Davide Rodogno’s aforementioned concession that his own work focuses on the aims and reasons behind Italian occupation within Europe, rather than looking at means in which Italian control was implemented.⁷⁸ The thesis will, therefore, ask a number of important questions: how was the Italian zone of occupation, both in the territories annexed and those simply occupied, governed? How did policies differ in these two distinct spheres of Italian power? To what extent was the French government involved in the occupation? It will also seek to place the Italian occupation into the wider framework of the war, examining how what it can tell scholars about Italy’s place within the Axis as well as what role the zone of occupation played in Italy’s war effort as a whole. Importantly, these questions will be answered in a comparative sense where appropriate. Germany’s zone of occupation in the north formed the backdrop to the entire occupation, and it is important to compare and contrast the situation in the south-east with Germany’s own occupation. In addition, comparisons will be made with other Italian occupations in Europe. As we have seen, Italian scholarship on Italian occupations in Yugoslavia and Greece have long overshadowed scholarship on France, and those studying Italian military occupations during the Second World War will almost inevitably draw comparisons at some level to these zones. In order to ascertain how the Italian zone of occupation in France was governed, key governing apparatuses, such as the armistice commission and the Italian armed forces will be examined, in addition to more local organs, such as the police, local government and mayors. The thesis will examine how far Italo-French interaction took place in these spheres and how far the Italian occupation managed to make a mark in these areas. Finally, it is hoped that this thesis will go some way to redressing the imbalance between scholarship afforded to the German occupation and the

⁷⁷ R.J.B. Bosworth and J.A. Maiolo, *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume II, Politics and Ideology*, pp. 375-626, is dedicated to these themes.

⁷⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 416.

comparative dearth of scholarship on the Italian occupation.⁷⁹ My experience throughout this project is that the majority of people, even those in academic circles, have been unaware of the existence of the Italian participation in the occupation of France, or mistakenly believe that the comparative lack of scholarship indicates a lack of activity within the zone. This thesis seeks to shatter the illusion that a lack of scholarship indicates such a lack of activity. Instead, Italian officials and planners attempted to create their own sphere of influence in France, and achieve Italian war aims. The lack of a desire in Berlin to co-ordinate actions with Rome, the resurgence of French influence in wartime Europe, and the mistaken belief that the war would last months, rather than years, proved insurmountable obstacles to Italian ambitions in France. If the thesis widens awareness of the occupation, even only amongst academics of the period, it will arguably be its greatest success.

⁷⁹ A notable exception is Diane Grillère-Lacroix's PhD thesis, recently issued from Paris IV, D. Grillère-Lacroix, "L'occupation italienne face à l'occupation allemande. Analyse et enjeux de l'autre occupation en France métropolitaine, 1938-1943", PhD thesis, Paris IV (2012). Unfortunately, the thesis remains locked to those out with the library of the Sorbonne and the author has been unable to consult it.

Chapter 2. Origins and Ambiguities

The occupation of portions of south-eastern France coincided with enormous changes in French politics and society. Such profound political and social re-structuring was both accompanied and made possible by the total military collapse of the French armies and the national trauma that followed.⁸⁰ For ordinary citizens, this situation was exacerbated by the division of the country into zones of occupation, forcing millions to live under foreign control or unable to return to their homes. Scholarly work on France during this period has inevitably focused on the two largest zones: that in the north occupied by the Wehrmacht; and the so-called Free Zone, governed by the hero of the First World War, Marshall Philippe Pétain, based in Vichy. Much less academic attention has been devoted to the zone occupied by Italy. As H.R. Kedward has stated, “Experience of the occupation is normally measured in terms of the German experience... it is the constant German presence which haunts [France] and dictates the patterns of experience.”⁸¹ The relatively small size of the Italian zone of occupation has perhaps made it inevitable that to some extent it has been the subject of far fewer scholarly studies.⁸² Nonetheless, Italy’s zone of occupation was taken seriously by Rome and represented the first example of Italian annexation in Europe.⁸³ More recent studies have rightly pointed out that although Fascist zones of occupation were failures, they represent an important, and understudied, aspect of the Second World War in the Mediterranean, and deserve academic focus.⁸⁴ In the context of France, the zone is interesting because it represents an area of French territory that was governed by neither Germany nor France.

The purpose of this study is to focus on this zone in detail, examining how it was administrated, to what extent the Italian government relied upon existing French

⁸⁰ J-P. Azéma and O. Wiewiorka, *Vichy, 1940-1944*, Paris (1997), p. 15. On the trauma, see S. Hoffman, “La trauma de 1940”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des années noires*, Vol. 1, Paris (1993), pp. 131-3 and J-L. Panicacci, “Le traumatisme de la défaite de juin 1940, Perceptions et réactions de l’opinion azuréenne de l’été à l’automne 1940”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 74 (2007). For a contemporary French account of national soul-searching, see M. Bloch, *L’étrange défaite, témoignage écrit en 1940*, Paris (1946).

⁸¹ H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis, Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944*, Oxford (1993), p. 1.

⁸² D. Schipsi, *L’occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, pp. 12-3.

⁸³ Although Albania was ruled by Italy, it had more of a puppet state status, rather than being formally annexed. See, D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 59; A. Roselli, *Italy and Albania, Financial Relations in the Fascist Period*, London and New York (2006); B.J. Fischer, *Albania at War, 1939-1945*, London (1999).

⁸⁴ D. Rodogno, “Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée, 1940-1943: presupposes, idéologiques, visions et velléités”, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 55, 3 (2008), pp. 138-9.

governmental and administrative structures and what daily life was like for both sides under the occupation. In this way, a picture can be built up illustrating how far French citizens participated in or resisted the new administration. It will examine occupier-occupied relations in detail, not only in the higher echelons of government, but how and to what extent the local population and the occupying troops interacted. It will also look at Italian aims in the occupied territories, particularly Italianisation, and how far these can be judged to have been successful. This line of investigation will also look at whether Italian irredentist ambitions were fulfilled or not by the Italian occupying administration. It is hoped that this study will shine fresh light upon many of the less examined features of the occupation, building upon previous and recent scholarship, while at the same time shifting the focus from Italian migrants and Italy's role in the Holocaust, hitherto the two most common themes of study.⁸⁵

I.

The nature of the Italian zone of occupation makes it a difficult subject to examine. At different points during the war, the Italian zone of occupation encompassed different territories, making it difficult to talk about a single zone at any one time. Instead, the zone can be broadly divided into two temporal distinctions: those territories occupied from the signing of the Italo-French armistice in June 1940; and those territories which only came under occupation from November 1942. The initial zone of occupation comprised of only 83,217 hectares and 28,473 inhabitants, the overwhelming majority of whom lived in the border town of Menton.⁸⁶ Menton and the occupied communes in Savoie, Haute-Savoie and the Alpes-Maritimes remained the extent of the Italian zone of occupation until the Allied landings in North Africa prompted the Axis powers to occupy the remainder of unoccupied France in November 1942. Prior to this invasion, Italy's initial possessions had been treated as de facto annexed territories.⁸⁷ The expansion of the zone of occupation brought a further eight *départements* under the control of Rome in their entirety, and another three were

⁸⁵ For recent examples of recent study, see above. Davide Rodogno has lamented the lacunae in the historiography on the role of the Carabinieri, the MVSN and the Fascist Party in the occupied territories. See, D. Rodogno, "L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa", in M. Flores, S.L. Sullam, M-A. Matard-Bonucci and E. Traverso (eds.), *Storia della Shoah in Italia, Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni, Volume 1, Le premesse, le persecuzioni, lo sterminio*, Turin (2010), p. 479. Italy's migrant community will be examined where relevant throughout, but it will not be the focus of the thesis.

⁸⁶ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, pp. 12-3; J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, p. 22; J-L. Panicacci, "L'occupation italienne et ses ambiguïtés: l'exemple des Alpes-Maritimes", *Recherches Régionales*, 190 (2008), p. 66.

⁸⁷ See Ch. 5 for an exploration of these policies.

partially occupied.⁸⁸ Nonetheless, even after the expansion of the zone of occupation, the territories initially occupied by Italy continued to be treated as annexed territories and were governed by different laws and by different agencies. As a result, it is possible to speak, if not of two separate Italian occupations, then of an Italian occupation with two distinct sections.⁸⁹ Although governed by separate agencies, the two sections of the Italian zone of occupation existed simultaneously.

While the Italian annexed territories were subject to Italian law, this was never imposed on the occupied territories. Nonetheless, Italian organisations of law and order were present in these territories and Italian commanders did give orders to French administrative organs.⁹⁰ In reality, of course, the Italian military presence in the region made it difficult for most mayors and public servants to ignore the wishes of the Italian military entirely. The Vichy government's policy of collaboration with the occupiers in the hope that it would produce favourable results may also have created an atmosphere where such actions were acceptable.⁹¹ Unlike the annexed territories, however, any actions designed to co-operate with the Italian authorities were carried out thanks to the pragmatism of local government officials, rather than because they were legally obligated to do so: the legality of the Italian presence in the occupied territories had no real legal basis, especially in the armistice terms.⁹²

Despite her grandiose pre-war territorial ambitions, Italy opted for an initially small zone of occupation, most likely based upon pragmatism and economic and military realities.⁹³ These plans, agreed at the armistice signed in June 1940 at the Villa Incisa, outside Rome, included a number of smaller areas which determined what was legally permitted in which

⁸⁸ The *départements* occupied entirely were: Alpes-Maritimes; Basses-Alpes; Hautes-Alpes; Isère; Savoie; Haute-Savoie; the Var; and Corsica. Those occupied partially were Ain; Bouches-du-Rhône; Drôme; and the Vaucluse. On the expansion of the zone see P. Isoart, "11 novembre 1942, l'armée italienne occupe le Comte de Nice", *Nice Historique*, 435, 2 (2002).

⁸⁹ This is similar to the German occupation where two *départements* were governed from Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine were treated as annexed territories, and the remainder of the North was militarily occupied.

⁹⁰ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Le Préfet à le [sic] Sous Préfet à Grasse", 18.11.42; on OVRA and the Italian police, see ADAM 0616W 0241, "Maire de Saint-Agnès à le Préfet", 17.11.42; ADAM 0166W 0012, "Le commissaire de police à Monsieur le Préfet des Basses-Alpes à Digne", 24.6.43; J-L. Panicacci. *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 125-6. How effective these orders were often depended upon how co-operative the administration of each *département* was.

⁹¹ K. Varley, "Entangled Enemies: Vichy, Italy and Collaboration", in L. Bloch and A. Carroll (eds.), *France in an Era of Global War, 1914-1945, Occupation, Politics, Empire and Entanglements*, New York and London (2014), p. 153, suggests that collaboration with Italy was seen as a "contingency plan", to be activated if collaboration with Germany did not work. If this is true, collaboration between French local government officials and Italian troops was tolerated, if not encouraged.

⁹² The armistice terms can be found in *Documents diplomatiques française, Les armistices de juin 1940*, (hereafter *DDF*), Doc. 91, "Convention d'armistice avec l'Italie", Brussels (2003), pp. 167-73; D. Schipsi. *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, p. 27.

⁹³ A.A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology, Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945*, London and New York (2000), p. 175.

territories. Italian troops were stationed inside the *Linea verde* (Green line), which roughly corresponded to the final position of the Italian troops. Those territories stationed behind the *Linea verde* represented the extent of the initial zone of occupation, and the limits of Italy's policies of annexation. French civilians were permitted travel within the limits of the *Linea rossa* (Red line). In practical terms, this covered almost the same area as the *Linea verde*, but encompassed small additional tracts of territory designed to compensate for mountain routes that were impassable in winter. The *Linea viola* (Purple line) represented an area fifty kilometres from the frontier which was to be completely demilitarised by the French army.⁹⁴ The armistice was also to be rolled out over a number of months, with demilitarisation of the *Linea viola* given the highest priority.⁹⁵ In addition to these zones, a final *Linea azzurra* (Blue line) stretched far beyond the limits of the zone of occupation which gave Italian authorities the power to inspect French facilities as far afield as Lyon, Marseille and Toulon as well as Corsica.⁹⁶ Crossing the "frontier", as Italian officials began to refer to the demarcation line between the now-annexed territories and unoccupied France, was expressly forbidden to all of those without a pass.⁹⁷ While the Italian zone of occupation was, therefore, small, their powers were not inconsiderable. Indeed, with powers of inspection far beyond the point where Italian troops had reached, Rome's influence in the region was not limited merely to territories directly occupied, but stretched far beyond the reaches of the armed forces.

This mass influence was not matched, however, by French acceptance of Italy as a legitimate victor. The manner in which Italy had entered the war, striking whilst the French armies were perceived to be close to collapse, and the fact that the Italian armed forces had failed to achieve any large-scale victories, meant that very few French citizens had any real respect for the Italian occupiers.⁹⁸ Italian officials complained that anti-Italian songs mocking

⁹⁴ D. Schipsi. *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, pp. 11-2; J-L. Panicacci. *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 19-20, 26-8.

⁹⁵ AN AJ 40 1400, "Francia Metropolitana, Storia dell'Armistizio fino al 15 settembre 1941, Allegati – B".

⁹⁶ Ibid; J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 27-8; H. Chaubin, *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre*, pp. 47-8.

⁹⁷ There are dozens of examples of such passes in French archives. See, for example, ADAM 0616W 0262, no. 2389, 10.2.43 and ADAM 0616W 0262, no. 2390, 10.2.43, for two passes from the same day. The number of these passes in the Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes suggests that obtaining one was not too difficult.

⁹⁸ For anti-Italian sentiments within the civil population see, ADAM 0616W 0241, "Rapport du Capitaine Brodard", 15.3.41; J-L. Panicacci. *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 138-9; E. Sica. "June 1940: The Italian Army and the Battle of the Alps", *Canadian Journal of History/ Annales canadiennes d'histoire*, 47 (2012), pp. 373-4, states that the French were reluctant to conclude an armistice with Italy as she had not been defeated by Italy. On the Italian entry into the war see, I. Di Jorio, "L'attacco postumo alla Francia", in M. Isnenghi and G. Albanese (eds.), *Gli Italiani in guerra, Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni, Volume IV – Tomo2, Il Ventennio fascista: la Seconda guerra mondiale*, Turin (2008)

Italy's military performances in Greece and the Balkans were being sung to the melody of the Marseillaise.⁹⁹ This was compounded by attitudes in the French army, most notably in discussions during the Franco-German armistice negotiations when General Huntziger from the French delegation noted that, "Italy had declared war, but not made war upon [France]."¹⁰⁰ Such a lack of respect stood in stark contrast to popular perceptions of the Wehrmacht. Whilst it is true that the vast majority of French citizens felt unhappy with the experience of occupation, many knew that they had been beaten militarily by Germany, and that the performance of the German armed forces deserved a quiet respect.¹⁰¹ Davide Rodogno has quoted an Italian report noting that handshakes had been quickly re-instated between French and German officers, noting a degree of respect, if not cordiality.¹⁰² The issue of legitimacy, of course, changed over time and often corresponded to the vicissitudes of the war. By 1942, many felt that the Axis had lost the war, and feelings that either could represent a legitimate power base had eroded significantly.¹⁰³ The result was an increasing tendency of a section of French civilians to join resistance groups or to sympathise with them. As the Axis lost legitimacy within the zone, groups of this type grew in influence, especially after Axis military setbacks.¹⁰⁴

During all of this, the Vichy government worked to present itself as a legitimate replacement for the Third Republic, rather than a transient, wartime administration.¹⁰⁵ During this time, speaking out against the Italian occupying forces brought the danger of arrest, although speaking out against Vichy, Pétain, or the National Revolution was equally inadvisable.¹⁰⁶ At this point in the war, Vichy was still a relatively young regime and was desperately trying to build up its own legitimacy in the "New Europe". Coming down hard on critics, re-organising administrative and legal bodies and presenting a strong national image

⁹⁹ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Rapport du Capitaine Brodard", 15.3.41. The lyrics are given in full in ADAM 0104W 0002, "Nouvel hymn italien", nd, but presumably from around March 1941 when the Italians made their complaint.

¹⁰⁰ DDF, *Les armistices*, Doc. 66, "Procès-Verbal", 22.6.40, p. 111.

¹⁰¹ J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 138-9.

¹⁰² D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 179.

¹⁰³ N. Wouters, et al, "The War for Legitimacy at the Local Level", p. 128.

¹⁰⁴ O. Wiewiorka and J. Tebinka, "Resisters, From Everyday Life to Counter-State", in R. Gildea, O. Wiewiorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006), p. 159. For many, Stalingrad represented the turning point.

¹⁰⁵ This is one of the centrepiece arguments of Robert Paxton's monograph on Vichy, see R. Paxton, *Vichy France*. It has also been argued that the complete collapse of the Third Republic was capitalised upon by Vichy in order to portray itself as the legitimate government of France, see P. Romijn, M. Conway and D. Peschanski, "National Legitimacy – Ownership, Pretenders and Wars", in M. Conway and P. Romijn (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture, 1936-1946*, Oxford and New York (2008), pp. 68-9.

¹⁰⁶ One example can be found in ADAM, 0166W 0002, "Max de Onffroy de Verez à Monsieur le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Nice", 7.12.42, showing someone making "anti-national remarks" following the Allied landings in North Africa.

were seen as the best ways to do this by the regime.¹⁰⁷ In so doing, Vichy continually tried to assert its place as the legal government of France, balancing itself against the counter-claims of both Italy and Germany.

During this period, therefore, Italy found herself in an ambiguous position vis-à-vis France and her own position as a legitimate occupying power. Many in the French government and amongst the French population were resentful that Italy had been allowed to occupy territories in the south-east, but France's decision to sign the armistice – a decision that was made perhaps solely because Germany informed the French armistice delegation that a Franco-German ceasefire was dependent upon a similar agreement with Italy – gave Italy the legal grounds to do so.¹⁰⁸ As a result, Italy often found herself defending her legal right to occupy the territories in the south-east against a French government and population who felt that Italy had only been able to do so with the help of their more powerful German allies. This was exacerbated by the tenuous legitimacy of the Vichy government described above. As a government whose *raison d'être* was to rebuild French strength and prestige in Europe, many in the French government saw standing up to Italy and Italian demands as a way of asserting this strength and simultaneously legitimising the government.¹⁰⁹ Nonetheless, as we shall see, this conflict would take place almost entirely within the legal confines of the armistice and, as a result, permeated the various strands of Italo-French relations.

II.

The Italian desire for territory around Nice had long been an ambition of irredentist groups, both within the territory and in the Kingdom of Italy itself. The territorial demands on Nice and other parts of France were often justified with tenuous historical and linguistic links. The county of Nice was claimed as a former Piedmontese possession; Corsica's former status as part of the Republic of Genoa was highlighted; while Savoie's historical links with

¹⁰⁷ N. Wouters, "Municipal Government during the Occupation (1940-5): A Comparative Model of Belgium, the Netherlands and France", *European History Quarterly*, 36 (2006), pp. 233-41; N. Wouters, et al, "The War for Legitimacy at the Local Level", pp. 119-20.

¹⁰⁸ *Documents on German Foreign Policy* (hereafter, *DGFP*), Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 523, "German-French Armistice Treaty", 22.6.40, pp. 671-6; *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani*, (hereafter, *DDI*), 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di armistizio", 24.6.40, pp. 76-82.

¹⁰⁹ Standing up to the Axis powers was simply one way of Vichy presenting itself as the legitimate French government. This was coupled with the allegiance of the majority of the jurists and the clergy to Pétain, legitimising the regime both legally and spiritually, and Pétain's growing reputation as a leader, see D. Peschanski, "Legitimacy/ Legitimation/ Delegitimation: France in the Dark Years, a Textbook Case", *Contemporary European History*, 13, 4 (2004), pp. 409-10.

the House of Savoy were used as evidence that these territories too belonged to Italy.¹¹⁰ Similarities can certainly be drawn between Italian interwar revisionism and German demands for Austria, the Sudetenland and Memel, yet there were key differences.¹¹¹ Unlike German irredentist demands which were based on claims of “blood and soil”, ideas of *italianità* and an “Italian race” were based far more on the concept of *civiltà*. This was the case in Corsica, for example, where groups tried to “prove” that Corsicans were really Italian by using these ideas.¹¹²

In Italy, the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (Institute for International Political Studies – ISPI) produced scholarly works that worked hard to show these links. Gioachonno Volpe’s work, *Storia della Corsica italiana*, published in 1939, straddled this concept: while Volpe stressed that his work had not been to prove the *italianità* of the island, it certainly could have been used by the Fascist authorities in the event of an annexation.¹¹³ This work had come only fifteen years after the “Amici della Corsica” group had begun publishing a regular pamphlet from the “Archivio Storico di Corsica”.¹¹⁴ In 1943, the ISPI-produced work *Bibliografia della Corsica* showed that 229 works had been produced on the “*Italianità dell’isola*” and on autonomous and irredentist movements on the island.¹¹⁵ The work also shows that studies on Pasquale Paoli, the Corsican rebel who had fought French rule, were increasingly popular.¹¹⁶ Works on Napoléon favoured the Italian – and original - spelling “Buonaparte”¹¹⁷ Official backing for these efforts was unreliable at best before 1938.¹¹⁸ In Corsica, a *Comitato per la Corsica* was established with Francesco Guerri, an Italian of Corsican origin, at its head. The Comitato was given the task of encouraging

¹¹⁰ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 72; on Corsica’s incorporation into France see, M. Vergé-Franceschi, *Histoire de Corse, du XVIIe siècle à nos jours*, vol. 2, Paris (2007), pp. 359-417.

¹¹¹ For German inter-war revisionism see, M. Burleigh, *The Third Reich, A New History*, Basingstoke and Oxford (2000), pp. 268-77 and A. Lepre, *Guerra e pace nel XX secolo, Dai conflitti tra stati allo sconto di civiltà*, Bologna (2008), pp. 221-8; D. Rodogno, “L’Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa”, pp. 485-6.

¹¹² M. Cuzzi, “La rivendicazione della Corsica (1938-1943)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 187 (2007), p. 58.

¹¹³ E. Decleva, “Politica estera, storia, propaganda: l’ISPI di Milano e la Francia (1934-1943)”, *Storia Contemporanea*, 13,4 (1982), p. 730; R.J.B. Bosworth, *The Italian Dictatorship, Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretations of Mussolini and Fascism*, London (1998), pp. 90-1; in the preface to his *Italia moderna*, Volpe ignored Fascism or stressed his post-1943 opposition, see G. Volpe, *Italia moderna*, vol 1., Florence (1949), p. x-xii.

¹¹⁴ E. Decleva, “Politica estera, storia, propaganda”, pp. 729-30.

¹¹⁵ C. Starace, *Bibliografia della Corsica*, Milan (1943), pp. 631-50. This coincided with state-sponsored exhibitions on the *italianità* of Corsica, see M. Angelini, “Clio Among the *Camicie Nere*, Italian Historians and their Allegiances to Fascism (1930s-1940s)”, in G. Albanese and R. Pergher (eds.), *In the Society of Fascists, Acclamation, Acquiescence and Agency in Mussolini’s Italy*, New York and Basingstoke (2012), p. 222.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 363-400; F-S. Ferrandi, “Pasquale Paoli dans l’historiographie italienne de la période fasciste”, *Études Corses*, 58 (2004).

¹¹⁷ See, for example, G. Damerini, *Le isole Jonie nel Sistema Adriatico dal dominio Veneziano a Buonaparte*, Milan (1943).

¹¹⁸ See below for more on official backing.

feelings of *italianità* in the island's population in the event of a possible annexation.¹¹⁹ In coastal cities like Livorno, which had a high Corsican population, newspapers published irredentist articles, the majority of which appeared under pseudonyms or remained unsigned, thereby distancing them from the Italian government.¹²⁰

In Nice, irredentists used the fact that the territory had been a part of France for less than a century in attempting to justify its incorporation into Italy.¹²¹ Historical works produced under Fascism used a myriad of pseudo-historical reasons to argue that Nice and the surrounding region was actually Italian. The anonymously-authored *Nizza*, examined Roman geographers' tracts, including Strabo and Pliny the Elder, who argued that Nice had been considered more Ligurian than French.¹²² Ezio Maria Gray similarly asserted that the Var was "Liguria's river", and therefore Italy's traditional border.¹²³ Ermanno Amicucci argued that from a linguistic point of view, Nizzardo contained more similarities to Italian than to French, haranguing French linguistic experts who stated that Nizzardo bore more similarities to Provençal.¹²⁴ The fact that the city was the birthplace of Garibaldi was seen as another reason to consider the city as Italian.¹²⁵ Amicucci prefaced his work with a quotation attributed to Garibaldi stating that denying that Nice was Italian was like "denying that the sun gave light".¹²⁶ Garibaldi had, in fact, been the subject of much debate for years in Nice, with both sides laying claim to him. The 1891 dedication of Place Garibaldi in Nice had met with some controversy due to Garibaldi's opposition to the French annexation of Nice.¹²⁷ Despite this, however, many locals did continue to admire him. In Italy, during the war itself, those in favour of the Italian annexation of Nice held a commemoration in Turin for the sixtieth anniversary of his death.¹²⁸ Italian anti-Fascists, exiled in Nice, took the side of the French,

¹¹⁹ H. Chaubin, *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre, 1939-1940*, Paris (2012), pp. 38-41; M. Cuzzi, "La rivendicazione della Corsica", p. 58.

¹²⁰ M. Cuzzi, "La rivendicazione della Corsica", pp. 58-60.

¹²¹ On the incorporation of Nice into France see, P. Isoart. "Nice française: 1860-1914, Manifestations populaires et lieux de mémoire", in *Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1860-1914, Intégration et particularismes, Actes du Colloque de Nice 1987*, Nice (1988), pp. 157-8

¹²² *Nizza*, Rome (1940), p. 1. None of the secondary literature has revealed the identity of the author of this work.

¹²³ E.M. Gray, *Le terre nostre ritornano... Malta, Corsica, Nizza, Novara* (1940), p. 69.

¹²⁴ E. Amicucci, *Nizza e l'Italia*, Milan (1939), pp. 73-5. Amicucci was a journalist who met Mussolini whilst the two worked together at *Avanti!* and was a member of the PNF. He did, therefore, have some affiliation to the regime, but was distant enough that his work did not constitute "official" propaganda.

¹²⁵ P. Milza, *Garibaldi*, Paris (2012), pp. 7-14.

¹²⁶ E. Amicucci, *Nizza e l'Italia*, unnumbered page.

¹²⁷ S. Rodrigues. "Les réactions de l'opinion publique au moment de l'érection de la statue de Garibaldi à Nice", in *Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1860-1914, Intégration et particularismes, Actes du Colloque de Nice 1987*, Nice (1988), pp. 341-3.

¹²⁸ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Commémoration, en Italie, du 60 anniversaire de la mort de Garibaldi", 3.6.42.

claiming that a “hero of liberty” would not support a Fascist March on Nice.¹²⁹

Although part of these efforts certainly came from the irredentist communities themselves, the Italian government took an active interest in the debates, both prior to and during the occupation. In 1943, Arturo Codignola claimed that the catalogues of local libraries revealed that the cultural life of Nice was “profoundly Italian”.¹³⁰ Codignola, however, failed to mention, or was perhaps unaware, that the Ministero della Cultura Popolare (Ministry of Popular Culture – MINCULPOP) had been donating books to libraries or encouraging orders at cut-price rates from Italian publishers. The MINCULPOP noted that the Université Méditerranée de Nice had ordered twenty-five copies of Petrarch’s songs.¹³¹ It had earlier been noted that the MINCULPOP had donated copies of the *Enciclopedia italiana* and numerous other books to the university, and had suggested purchases of Dante, Machiavelli and Petrarch.¹³² In addition to this, the MINCULPOP financed translations of favourable studies of Mussolini and distributed them freely in France.¹³³ The efforts of MINCULPOP were augmented by the efforts of Nino Lamboglia, author of *Nizza nella storia*, who established a propaganda office in Menton and headed the Società Dante Alighieri in Nice.¹³⁴

Running parallel to these projects trying to “prove” that French territories were, in fact, Italian, were projects showing that Italian expansion in the Mediterranean was right and just. One work told the history of the Mediterranean, pitting France and Italy against one another and showing that France had repeatedly “humiliated” Italy in international relations.¹³⁵ Volpe himself, who denied producing Fascist propaganda through ISPI, wrote that France had “damaged economically and rendered difficult our progress in Africa”.¹³⁶ African possessions became an increasing source of tension between the two powers and though this was not caused by ISPI, it certainly reacted to it. Conflict between Italy and France over Tunisia not only stemmed from the large Italian population in the colony, but the breaking of a supposed

¹²⁹ ADAM 0616W 0241, “Le Préfet à Secrétaire d’Etat de l’Intérieur”, 2.6.42

¹³⁰ A. Codignola, “Nizza nell’età moderna”, in N. Lamboglia (ed.), *Nizza nella storia*, Bordighera (1943), p. 163.

¹³¹ ACS, MINCULPOP, DGPS, Prop. pres. gli stat. est., b. 87, fasc. 14, sf. 3, “Invio pubblicazioni al Centro Universitario Mediterraneo”, 27.10.42.

¹³² ACS, MINCULPOP, DGPS, Prop. pres. gli stat. est., b. 87, fasc. 14, sf. 3, “Appunto per l’Eccellenza il Sottosegretario”, 21.3.42; ACS, MINCULPOP, DGPS, Prop. pres. gli stat. est., b. 87, fasc. 14, sf. 3, “M. Rochira Valeri [MINCULPOP] al Generale Quinto Mazzolini”, 26.3.42.

¹³³ Mario Missiroli’s *La politica religiosa di Mussolini* was translated into French, see ACS, MINCULPOP, DGPS, Prop. pres. gli stat. est., b. 87, fasc. 14, sf. 3, “Direzione Generale per gli Scambi Culturali alla Commissione Italiana d’Armistizio con la Francia”, 23.1.43.

¹³⁴ P. Veziano, “L’échec du renouveau idéologique et matériel du fascisme dans les terres irredentes (Menton et Nice, 1940-1943)”, *Nice Historique*, 550, 2 (2004), p. 120.

¹³⁵ P. Silva, *Italia, Francia, Inghilterra nel Mediterraneo*, Milan (1936), p. 102.

¹³⁶ G. Volpe, *Vittorio Emanuele III*, Milan (1939), p. 64.

“gentlemen’s agreement” between the two powers that would have seen Italy gain Tunisia as a colony.¹³⁷ For many Italians, disputes over Tunisia were within living memory, or were at least recent enough to form a familiar point of reference. At least one work, Francesco Cataluccio’s *Italia e Francia in Tunisia, 1878-1939*, as well as numerous articles in ISPI’s journal, *Relazioni Internazionali*, stressed the rightful position of Italy in Africa and portrayed France as blocking that position, playing upon these fears and memories.¹³⁸ As in 1881, demands for Tunisia would cause discord between Paris and Rome.¹³⁹ The Gaullophobia of *Relazioni Internazionali* did not go unnoticed by Mussolini or by the French ambassador, François-Poncet.¹⁴⁰ Other works encouraged Italians living abroad to defend their Italian identity and to defend Italian politics, whilst studies on Machiavelli, particularly focusing on “balance” and “realism”, as well as his influence on a unified Italy became popular.¹⁴¹ While these works were not the root cause of tension between Italy and France, they certainly exacerbated the already tense international situation.

As we have seen, there was some level of official backing for these projects, but such backing often depended upon individual ministers, rather than a central government policy. Ciano in particular supported the demands for “Nice, Corsica, Tunisia, [and] Djibouti!” first in his capacity as Ministro della Cultura Popolare, then as Foreign Minister.¹⁴² Only days after the signing of the Italo-French armistice, however, Ciano was more open about Italy’s aims, confiding to Luca Pietromarchi, the head of the Ufficio Armistizio-Pace that Italy sought the annexation of the territory between the Var and Tinée rivers and all of Corsica. Moreover, Ciano envisaged widespread colonial changes including the alteration of the Tunisian-Algerian frontier and the creation of quasi-independent states in the former mandates of Syria and Lebanon which would be allied to Italy.¹⁴³ While Mussolini remained

¹³⁷ R.H. Rainero, *La rivendicazione fascista sulla Tunisia*, Milan (1978), p. 23.

¹³⁸ F. Cataluccio, cited in A. Giglioli, *Italia e Francia, 1936-1939, Irredentismo e ultranazionalismo nella politica estera di Mussolini*, Rome (2001), p. 423; E. Decleva, “Politica estera, storia, propaganda”, pp. 722-3.

¹³⁹ C.J. Lowe and F. Marzari, *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940*, London and Boston (1975), p. 11.

¹⁴⁰ E. Decleva, “Politica estera, storia, propaganda”, p. 722.

¹⁴¹ *Norme di vita Fascista all'estero*, Segreteria Generale dei Fasci all'Estero (ed.), Rome (1930), pp. 30-1; L. Malagoli, *Il Machiavelli e la civiltà del Rinascimento*, Milan (1941).

¹⁴² M. Ostenc, *Ciano, un conservateur face à Hitler et Mussolini*, Paris (2007), p. 161-2. National Archives of Scotland (hereafter NAS), CAB 65/7, “War Cabinet 146(40)”, 29.5.40; NAS CAB 65/7, “War Cabinet 120(40)”, 10.5.40; *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, “The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Ministry”, Doc. 193, 17.7.40, p. 252; W.I. Shorrock, *From Ally to Enemy, the Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy, 1920-1940*, Kent and London (1988), pp. 240-1; D.B. Cecchi, *Non bruciare i ponti con Roma, Le relazioni fra l'Italia, la Gran Bretagna e la Francia dall'accordo di Monaco allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale*, Milan (1986), pp. 18-9; H. James Burgwyn, *Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940*, Westport (1997), pp. 182-3 On Ciano’s career in general, see G.B. Guerri, *Galeazzo Ciano*, Milan (2011).

¹⁴³ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 114, “Il Ministro degli Esteri, Ciano, al Capo dell’Ufficio Armistizio-Pace, Pietromarchi”, 26.6.40, p. 105.

more cautious about openly declaring his position one way or the other even after the armistice came into effect, perhaps out of fear of isolating France, it is possible to ascertain at least a covert level of support from the number of ministers who endorsed such policies.¹⁴⁴

Giuseppe Bottai noted in his diary that he was reading Amicucci's work on Nice, suggesting interest in the subject.¹⁴⁵

It would, of course, have been impossible for the Italian government to support any kind of irredentist movement without an Italian community in the region. Although the Italian community in these territories intermingled with the French from the incorporation of the territories into France onwards, the huge Italian diaspora ensured that Italians constituted the most numerous foreign minority in France by the turn of the century.¹⁴⁶ Although, as we shall see in Chapter Six, Italo-French relations were relatively cordial at a local level, relations before the First World War were often more tense, and had actually culminated in the massacre of up to 150 Italian workers in August 1893.¹⁴⁷ Although this may seem a distant memory, it should be recalled that in 1940 this was within living memory. This large Italian population, of course, includes that the large number of Fascist intellectuals and politicians who fled to France as the Fascist repression in Italy became gradually worse, yet the majority were those who had gone to France had gone in search of work. In reality, the vast majority of Italians in the irredentist territories disapproved of Italian actions wholeheartedly. It should be remembered that developments in Italy were not always mirrored in the irredentist territories. In Nice, the main anti-Fascist organisation, "L'Unione Popolare Italiana" made a joint declaration with "L'Association Franco-Italienne des anciennes combattants" in *L'Eclairer de Nice et du Sud-Est* on 12 June 1940 calling on all Italians to support France and stating their opposition to Mussolini.¹⁴⁸ The anti-Fascist newspaper, *Unione del Popolo, Organe des libres italiens des Alpes-Maritimes*, produced articles defending French figures and attacking Italian policies.¹⁴⁹ On Corsica, only two hundred of the 6,000 Italians living on the island were members of the PNF, which the French police declared indicated a somewhat

¹⁴⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 222-3.

¹⁴⁵ G. Bottai, *Diario, 1935-1944*, Milan (1982), 14.7.39, p 150.

¹⁴⁶ R. Schor, "Les immigrés italiens au miroir de la presse française dans l'entre deux-guerres", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 85 (2012); E. Sica, "Italiani brava gente?", p. 27, 37. The attitudes of the Italian community vis-à-vis both the French population and the Italian occupiers is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.

¹⁴⁷ The incident is described in G. Noiriel, *Le massacre des Italiens, Aigues-Mortes, 17 août 1893*, Paris (2010).

¹⁴⁸ R.H. Rainero, *I piemontesi in provenza, Aspetti di un'emigrazione dimenticata*, Milan (2000), pp. 296-7. For a more complete history of the *Unione*, see É. Vial, *L'Union populaire italienne, 1937-1940: une organisation de masse du parti communiste italien en exil*, Rome (2007).

¹⁴⁹ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, "Arturo Vacca Maggiolini al Conte Ugo Cavallero", 18.4.42.

lacklustre support for annexation.¹⁵⁰ In Nice, only 1-2,000 Italians out of the 40,000 living in the city were believed to support Fascism.¹⁵¹ The French authorities certainly believed that the vast majority of the Italian population had no interest in acquiring Nice, Corsica and Savoie.¹⁵² Although gauging public opinion is extremely difficult, the number of Italians who declared their loyalty to France seems to indicate some truth in this.¹⁵³

The spread of irredentist groups in these territories, therefore, grew organically in their early days before being receiving some official aid in the form of propaganda. The largest group was undoubtedly the Gruppi d'Azion Nizzarda (Groups of Niçois Action - GANs). This collection of groups was headed by Ezio Garibaldi, a relative of Garibaldi himself who frequently called for a March on Nice.¹⁵⁴ Other groups, did however, exist elsewhere. The Gruppi d'azione irredentista corsa (Groups of Corsican Irredentist Action – GAIC), Azione maltese (Maltese Action – AM), and the Triumvirato d'azione tunisina (Triumvirate of Tunisian Action – TAT), were all examples of irredentist groups, most of whom enjoyed extremely little in the way of popular support.¹⁵⁵ It is important to note at this stage that the irredentist groups who existed within the occupied territories and across the Mediterranean were not linked in any real sense and were largely unaware of the actions of the other.¹⁵⁶ This closely mirrored the actions of the Fascist government vis-à-vis these groups, which were mostly individual efforts which followed no coherent or centralised policy.¹⁵⁷ Irredentism was, therefore, a transnational phenomenon. Groups in south-eastern France formed only one part of a wide array of groups across the Mediterranean calling for unification with Italy. Although these groups pushed forward their own particular agendas and their own individual justifications for the *italianità* of their territories, sentiments of the sort felt in France were not unique to those in the French territories alone. It is important to state at this stage that neither Fascist irredentist policy makers nor irredentist groups, therefore, followed a single set of orders or instructions and that there exists a danger of overestimating their influence at

¹⁵⁰ H. Chaubin, *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre*, pp. 36-7.

¹⁵¹ R. Schor, "Les immigrés italiens au miroir de la presse française".

¹⁵² ADAM 0616W 0241, "Les inspecteurs de police spécial à la Commissaire principal", 13.5.42.

¹⁵³ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Egildo Gavignazzi à le Ministeur de l'interieur", 6.6.40; ADAM 0616W 0241, "Robert e René Moraldo à la Commissaire de Police", 18.6.40; ADAM 0616W 0241, "Liste nominative des Italiens ayant fait une declaration de loyalsim, mais qui sont à considerer comme suspects", 20.6.40; R.H. Rainero, *I piemontesi in provenza*, p. 297.

¹⁵⁴ P. Laurano. *Consensus e politica di massa, L'uso del mito garibaldino nella costruzione della nazione*, Rome (2009), p 64; J-L. Panicacci, "L'occupation italienne et ses ambiguïtés", pp. 68-9; J-L. Panicacci. "De Ezio Garibaldi à Jacques Cotta, Nice de 1942 à 1945", *Recherches Régionales*, 39 (1971), p. 33.

¹⁵⁵ M. Cuzzi, *L'internazionale delle Camicie Nere, I Caur, 1933-1939*, Milan (2005), p. 356.

¹⁵⁶ D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée," pp. 138-9.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.* pp. 138-9.

an international level. In reality, such groups and any backing they received were largely for propaganda purposes as much as anything else, and very few had any direct influence on Italian policy making. Moreover, as the war went on, the Italian government became increasingly worried about stability in their zones of occupation and, as such, became progressively more selective about which groups to support. Destabilising their zones of occupation became one of the greatest fears for Italian military and administrative organisations, particularly into 1942 when political and military instability in the Balkans constituted an ever-growing threat.

Nonetheless, these groups did affect the general climate of the zone, particularly after November 1942 when the Italians extended their control over France, and it would not be true to say that they possessed no transnational clout whatsoever. Whilst more will be said about the impact of these groups on the population in the chapter on occupier-occupied relations, it is worth noting that their presence did not go unnoticed. The daily grumblings of *Il Nizzardo*, the Italian-language irredentist newspaper in Nice slowly eroded the credibility of the mayor of Nice, Jean Médecin, in the eyes of the occupiers.¹⁵⁸ In the occupied territories behind the *Linea verde*, the mayor of Menton, Jean Durandy, complained that frequent attacks in *Il Nizzardo* were making his position untenable.¹⁵⁹ These attacks were reprinted by Italian national dailys, including *Il Giornale di Genova*.¹⁶⁰ The local irredentist press, therefore, did possess some international influence, and messages printed for a local audience could be digested at the transnational level. Despite this, most Italian officials felt that supporting these groups in any significant sense represented too great a risk to stability.¹⁶¹ Relations between the two countries, therefore, declined not, as Ciano claimed, solely because of their opposing views in the Spanish Civil War, but for a plethora of reasons, aggravated by irredentism and propaganda.¹⁶²

Plans for an Italian-occupied France were incoherent and often dependent upon which particular individual or ministry was asked. Davide Rodogno has shown that by 1942, a time when Italy was practically subordinate to Germany, two plans – Plan A and Plan B – had

¹⁵⁸ J-L. Panicacci, “Un journal irrédentiste sous l’Occupation, *Il Nizzardo*”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 33/34 (1987), pp. 146-7.

¹⁵⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 61, “Il Commissario Civile, Frediani, alla Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia”, 5.10.42; ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 61, “Durandy al Sig. Commissario Civile [di Mentone]”, [7.9.42].

¹⁶⁰ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 61, “Il Commissario Civile, Dr Giuseppe Frediani alla Eccellenza, Prefetto Capo dell’Amm. dei Territori Occupati”, 6.9.42.

¹⁶¹ Quinto Mazzolini, the Italian consul in Nice, expressly forbade Italians from joining the GANs, see D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, pp. 222-3.

¹⁶² For Ciano’s views, see, D.B. Cecchi, *Non bruciare i ponti con Roma*, pp. 1-3.

been established. Plan A, also entitled “General Governorate”, foresaw a military occupation in which France would lose territorial sovereignty in the Nizzardo and Corsica, which would become Italian. French administrative staff would be dismissed, while 594 Italian officials, plus all Italian organisations, such as the carabinieri, would be sent to France. Plan B envisaged an amalgamation of the Alpes-Maritimes and Monaco. Parts of the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Haute-Alpes and Savoie would create the new province of Alpi Occidentali, containing 76,000 inhabitants with its capital at Briançon. This would become a full province of Italy, though difficulties were anticipated due to the sentiments of the population and communication issues. Corsica would be made autonomous, but dependent upon Italy.¹⁶³

These plans are interesting because they represent the uncertainty within Italy as to what to do with France. It is true that individual plans existed, but there were no real efforts made before the war to co-ordinate these or to develop an “official” policy. This was not unusual. With regards to Yugoslavia, different plans were drawn up, while in the end Italian planners ended up reacting to German plans, rather than enforcing their own.¹⁶⁴ In debating Italian projects in the Middle East and Africa, Italian planners failed to come up with a single vision for the occupied territories, with each ministry pushing their own plans.¹⁶⁵ Mussolini himself changed his own mind frequently. In October 1940, he wrote to Hitler stating that of the 850,000 Italians in France, 500,000 should be repatriated within the year. The resulting Italian and German territorial demands would reduce France’s population to thirty-four to thirty-five million.¹⁶⁶ He would later add that Italy’s territorial acquisitions would be restricted to the Nizzardo, Corsica and Tunisia.¹⁶⁷ Such bold statements came only months after reducing his much publicised territorial claims on France during the armistice negotiations.¹⁶⁸

III.

The Italian occupation of France must be placed within the wider context of the Italo-German alliance if Italian actions within the zone of occupation are to be fully understood. In

¹⁶³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, pp. 89-92.

¹⁶⁴ On the Yugoslav territories see, *ibid*, pp. 73-84.

¹⁶⁵ N. Arielli, *Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-1940*, Basingstoke (2010), pp. 169-72, provides a series of maps documenting the differing plans of the Ministero degli Affari Esteri, the Ministero per l’Africa Italiana, and the Regio Esercito.

¹⁶⁶ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 753, “Capo del governo Mussolini al cancellierie del Reich Hitler”, 19.10.40.

¹⁶⁷ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, vol. 7, doc. 79, “Direttive ribadite da Mussolini ad Anfuso”, 9.5.41.

¹⁶⁸ I. Di Jolio, “L’attacco postumo alla Francia”, p. 184; D. Mack Smith, *Mussolini’s Roman Empire*, pp. 222-3.

the course of the 1930s, Mussolini's traditional mantle as the senior of the two dictators slowly passed to Hitler. By 1940, Germany's enormous gains in power following the conquest of Poland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France and the Italian economic dependency had made the subordination of Italy to Germany practically irreversible.¹⁶⁹ The result was what Davide Rodogno has called *Minderwertigkeitsgefühl*, or an inferiority complex.¹⁷⁰ Italian pre-war planners and intellectuals had imagined a post-war world in which the Red Sea and the Mediterranean would be politically subordinate and economically dependent upon Rome. This situation would be cemented in the creation of a post-war "lira zone".¹⁷¹ Italian planners within the Ministero degli Affari Esteri envisaged close post-war relations with Germany, but she would not be granted access to the *spazio vitale* (living space). Moreover, Rome hoped to supplant Berlin in areas of pre-war German economic hegemony.¹⁷² When German economic expansion in the 1930s threatened to oust Italy, those within the Ministero degli Affari Esteri were displeased and felt threatened by the intrusion of Germany into the *spazio vitale*.¹⁷³ These perceived threats ensured that portions of the Italian community were already hostile and suspicious of Germany before the war began. The conquering of these territories was part of the process to create the Fascist *uomo nuovo* (new man), a hardened soldier with a new identity, born from war and conquest.¹⁷⁴ By intruding into these territories, Germany was blocking the creation of the *uomo nuovo* and barring him from areas already considered Italian by Fascist pre-war theorists. German expansion became an unknown factor in Italian planning, one which had not been taken into account when plans were drawn up and was too often ignored.

The result of these pre-war plans was that Italy was very much determined to pursue her path and fight a war based on Italian goals, both militarily and administratively. Mussolini coined the term *guerra parallela* (parallel war) to describe this.¹⁷⁵ While Hitler urged the

¹⁶⁹ G. Schreiber, "Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940", *Militär-geschichtliches Forschungsamt* (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War, Volume III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa. From Italy's Declaration of Non-Belligerence to the entry of the United States into the War*, Oxford (1995), pp. 25-6; G. Schreiber, "Les structures stratégiques de la conduite de la guerre de coalition italo-allemande au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale", *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 120 (1988), pp. 12-3.

¹⁷⁰ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 37.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 44-50; D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", p. 148.

¹⁷² D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", pp. 147-8. The term *spazio vitale* is a direct imitation of the German *Lebensraum*; A.A. Kallis, *Fascist Ideology*, pp. 116-7.

¹⁷³ D. Rodogno, "L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa", pp. 483-4.

¹⁷⁴ D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", pp. 140-1.

¹⁷⁵ For an overview of the *guerra parallela*, see A. Ciarrapico, "Il mito della 'guerra parallela'", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 13,1 (2009).

Italians to take action against the Suez Canal from Libya, Italy was more interested in drawing up plans against Greece and Yugoslavia ('Esigenza G' and 'Esigenza J', respectively). These represented long-held Italian ambitions to re-order the Balkans and Mussolini deliberately kept Hitler in the dark about this.¹⁷⁶ Maintaining some degree of independence from Germany would prove practically impossible as the war went on. Even before the Italian entry into the conflict, Mussolini had presented Germany with a list of material needs as a prerequisite for Italian support.¹⁷⁷ Italian military and economic weakness was well-known within the Comando Supremo (Italian High Command) and Mussolini's generals had advised him not to enter the war.¹⁷⁸ The result of this poor planning was that Italy was economically dependent upon Germany from their entry to the conflict, and Germany took advantage of this, rapidly completing her ascendancy to senior partner in the Axis. This gave her a political dominance in the occupied territories that Rome found difficult to swallow. As the war progressed, Italy became increasingly aware that many of the territorial expansions that she made came at the behest of Germany. In France, the expansion of the zone of occupation to the Rhône was made possible only by the German *diktat* given to Pétain only hours earlier.¹⁷⁹ Nonetheless, Italian subordination to Germany was once again demonstrated by the fact that Germany occupied the key cities of Avignon, Marseille, Lyon and Toulon.¹⁸⁰

Whilst trying to maintain a degree of independence in international affairs, Italy simultaneously tried to pursue her goals and enforce her own policies in her zones of occupation even as Germany's dominant position made this increasingly difficult. Many Italian officials felt that the best way to free the country of its "junior partner" label was to pursue actions that were often different or in opposition to those of Germany.¹⁸¹ In the dismembered Yugoslav territories, Italy attempted to halt the ethnic violence and advance of ultra-nationalist Croat and Serb groups who posed a serious threat to stability in the region.

¹⁷⁶ *DGFP*, Ser. D, Vol. X., "Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler", Doc. 388, 24.8.40, p. 538 shows that as late as August 1940 Mussolini was denying any plans to invade Greece; *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. VII, Doc. 37, 5.8.40, pp. 85-7; A. Ferguson, "Axis of Failure: Strategic Folly, Economic Incompetence, and Mutual Antipathy in the Italo-German Alliance, 1939-1943", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (2001), pp. 68-9.

¹⁷⁷ G. Schreiber, "Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940", pp. 25-6.

¹⁷⁸ On the shortcomings of Italian military preparedness for the conflict see, M. Knox. *Hitler's Italian Allies*, G. Rochat. "Il Fascismo e la preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale", in A. Del Boca, M. Legnani and M.G. Rossi (eds.), *Il regime Fascista, Storia e Storiografia*, Rome and Bari (1995), p. 160; G. Rochat, "L'esercito italiano negli ultimi cento anni", in *Storia d'Italia, Volume giunto, I documenti 2*, Turin (1973), pp. 1884-90.

¹⁷⁹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 33; on Italy's dependence see, F. Degli Esposito, "L'industria bellica italiana e le commesse tedesche (1937-43)", *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, 22, 2-3 (1993).

¹⁸⁰ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 33.

¹⁸¹ L.V. Ferraris, "L'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 14,4 (2010), pp. 144-5.

The fact that some of these groups were tolerated by Germany marks a distinction between the ways which these two neighbouring zones of occupation were run.¹⁸² In some parts of Greece, Italy attempted to keep German officials outside their zones of occupation altogether in order to curb German influence.¹⁸³

In France, Italy's first territorial acquisition of the war, Rome was acutely aware of the role played by Germany in the signing of the armistice. The French generals had been reluctant to sign an armistice with Italy, hoping that they could submit only to Germany, but German officials had made it clear that a ceasefire could only come about if France submitted to Italy.¹⁸⁴ Enzo Collotti believes these actions permanently conditioned the Italo-French relationship, since they made it clear that Italy hoped for a quick peace to end the uncertainty of realising her ambitions.¹⁸⁵ Italy, therefore, was determined to pursue her own policies in France. The most obvious example of this is the Italian policy towards Jews in the zone. In the years immediately following, scholars believed that the Jews were deliberately "saved" by the Italians, however more nuanced approaches by Davide Rodogno have shown that Italian Jewish policy owed more to a desire to exert sovereignty than the aim of protecting Jews.¹⁸⁶ These Jewish measures arguably owed much to an Italian "type" of anti-Semitism, which was much more concerned with discrimination than extermination.¹⁸⁷ In Italy, Jews had been expelled from many key positions in both the armed forces and the liberal professions.¹⁸⁸ The Racial Laws passed in 1938 also limited Jewish participation in public

¹⁸² G. Garello, "La guerra civile in Erzegovina nel 1941", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 9,1 (2005), pp. 129-30; L.V. Ferraris, "L'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia", p. 145; M. Kovic, "From Persecutors to Saviours: the Italian Occupation Forces of the Second World War in post-1989 Serbian Historiography", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 6,2 (2004), pp. 114-5.

¹⁸³ S. Lecoœur, *Mussolini's Greek Island*, p. 32.

¹⁸⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 26-7.

¹⁸⁵ E. Collotti, "L'Italia dall'intervento alla guerra parallela", in F. Tosi, G. Grassi and M. Legnani (eds.) *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale e nella Resistenza*, Milan (1988), p. 37.

¹⁸⁶ For these early views, see L. Poliakov, cited in D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 362-3. Rodogno's conclusions are shown in D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 364; D. Rodogno, "La politique des occupants italiens à l'égard des juifs en France métropolitaine", pp. 63-77; D. Rodogno, "Italiani brava gente? Fascist Italy's Policy Towards the Jews in the Balkans, April 1941 – July 1943", *European History Quarterly*, 35, 2 (2005); see also, D. Bloxham, *The Final Solution, A Genocide*, Oxford (2009), pp. 117-9. In reality, this idea that Italy saved Jews in their zones of occupation has persisted until relatively recently, see for example, S. Zuccotti, *The Italians and the Holocaust: Persecution, Rescue and Survival*, London (1987); although not the central argument, the claim is echoed in S. Zuccotti, *Holocaust Odysseys: the Jews of Saint-Martin-Vésubie and their Flight through France and Italy*, London (2007).

¹⁸⁷ This argument is made by A.J. Gregor, *Mussolini's Intellectuals, Fascist Social and Political Thought*, Princeton and Oxford (2005) pp. 216-7 and in M. Sarfatti, *La Shoah in Italia, La persecuzione degli ebrei sotto il fascismo*, Turin (2005), pp. 83-4.

¹⁸⁸ M. Sarfatti, *La Shoah in Italia*, pp. 86-7; M. Sarfatti, *Gli ebrei nell'Italia fascista, Vicende, identità, persecuzione*, Turin (2000), p. 144.

life.¹⁸⁹ Nonetheless, Italian anti-Semitism did not exhibit the same exterminatory drive that developed in Nazi Germany.¹⁹⁰ As Davide Rodogno has pointed out, this lack of large-scale Italian extermination of the Jews has helped cement the *italiani brava gente* myth.¹⁹¹ These measures, however, arguably formed part of an attempt by Fascist Italy to dictate its own laws and terms. Moreover, in many cases Italy was afraid of stirring up ethnic hatred in their zone of occupation unnecessarily, a move that could potentially destabilise their zones of occupation particularly in the Balkans.¹⁹²

German interference was particularly resented in the French zone of occupation due to the place that it held in Fascist pre-war planning. In the post-war Italian *Ordine nuovo* (New Order), Italy's newly conquered European territories would be divided between the *piccolo spazio* ("little" space) and the *grande spazio* ("big" space). The former would be where Italians would live and directly administrate, while the latter represented the area to be under Italian economic and political hegemony.¹⁹³ The Alpes-Maritimes, Savoie and Corsica made up part of the *piccolo spazio* and were, therefore, non-negotiable parts of the *Ordine nuovo*. It is, therefore, important to realise that in analysing the Italian zone of occupation in France, Germany was always a factor. France realised this early on and attempted to play one ally off against the other. Indeed, it was hoped that French collaboration with Germany may ultimately result in France achieving a stronger hand in negotiations with Italy. Germany, then, communicated more with France than Italy and France did with one another. Transnational and international factors were, therefore, crucial to the way in which the occupation was experienced and carried out. Developments throughout the war conditioned the way which in which the German government viewed her alliance with Rome. As Germany's military situation deteriorated, particularly on the Eastern Front, collaboration with France became more important to Germany than collaboration with Italy. As German officials became less concerned with respecting the *spazio vitale*, events in the transnational sphere increasingly limited what Italian officials were able to do in the local sphere. The Italo-German alliance forms, therefore, the backdrop to much of the Italian occupation.

¹⁸⁹ Italy's Racial Laws restricted the civil rights of Italian Jews and excluded them from public office and posts within education. Jews were also effectively expelled from the PNF. The level of support for the Racial Laws is a matter of historical debate, with figures as prominent as Italo Balbo opposing their introduction.

¹⁹⁰ On the similarities between the two Axis powers' approach to the so-called Jewish Question and the place of race in political relations between the two, see R. Pommerin, "Le controversie di politica razziale nei rapporti dell'Asse Roma-Berlino (1938-1943)", *Storia Contemporanea*, 10 (1979). On Italian anti-Semitism in the early years of the war compared to other belligerent nations, see A. Cohen, "La politique antijuive en Europe".

¹⁹¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 362, 400-7.

¹⁹² D. Rodogno, "*Italiani brava gente?*", pp. 226-7.

¹⁹³ The idea is explored in D. Rodogno, "L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa", pp. 486-7.

There were, therefore, a number of contributing factors which must be taken into account if a full investigation into the Italian occupation is to be made. Firstly, that unlike some German occupations elsewhere in Europe, the territories occupied by Italy in France – both those in July 1940 and in November 1942 – largely consisted of areas which Italy had earmarked for incorporation as Italian territories.¹⁹⁴ This was complicated by the large Italian migrant population who, as we shall see in chapter six, were used as political weapons by both sides. Their presence seemed to justify the occupation in the minds of Italian demographic planners who attempted to use the community and the historical and linguistic links between Italy and the territories to prove the *italianità* of the region. Nonetheless, a percentage of this community consisted of anti-Fascist exiles, who would protest against the Italian occupation, Fascist territorial ambitions and attempts to usurp the French state.¹⁹⁵ Throughout the occupation, these tenuous historical and linguistic links would be used by both sides in order to justify their own actions in region.

The second important contributing factor was the German occupation in the north of France and its influence on Italian actions. The Italian occupation must be placed within the wider context of both the war and of Italo-German relations.¹⁹⁶ The rapid subordination of Italy to Germany necessarily conditioned Italy's actions. Equally important, however, was France's rapid ascension to an effective third European partner in the Axis, quickly taking Italy's place as Germany's most important ally. This acquisition of French power and ability to influence Italo-German relations limited Italian actions in France, and helped condition what was possible during the occupation. Moreover, Italy continued to labour under the false pretence that Germany wanted Italy to make territorial and economic gains comparative to her own and would therefore support Italy in doing so.¹⁹⁷ In reality, Germany cared little for Italian gains and would increasingly support France in disputes between Vichy and Rome. Despite this adherence to the Axis, however, Italy continued in attempts to walk her own path

¹⁹⁴ Whilst Germany's territorial desires in Europe were substantial, there were areas which Germany occupied, such as Greece, over which she had no long-term territorial ambitions.

¹⁹⁵ Many of these anti-Fascists would go on to join the resistance in the area, see for example, J-M. Guillon, "Les étrangers dans la résistance du Sud-Est", in P. Joutard and F. Marcot (eds.), *Les étrangers dans la résistance en France*, Besançon (1992); J-M. Guillon, "Les étrangers dans la résistance Provençale"; A. Bechollini, "Antifascistes italiens en France pendant la guerre: parcours aléatoires et identités réversibles", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporain*, 46, 2 (1999).

¹⁹⁶ On Italo-German relations in general see, F.W. Deakin, *The Brutal Friendship, Mussolini, Hitler and the fall of Italian Fascism*, London (2000) and A. Ferguson, "Axis of Failure".

¹⁹⁷ D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", pp. 145-6, articulates this vision of separate Italian and German spheres of influence in Europe.

in France and never fully accepted her position as “Germany’s ignoble second”.¹⁹⁸ As we shall see in the following chapter, Italy attempted to impose her own style of government in the occupied territories in France as well as to establish her own organs to dictate Italo-French relations. Nonetheless, these attempts were never fully free of German influence which continued to determine the pace and scope of the war.

¹⁹⁸ The reference comes from an Austro-Hungarian official’s outlook on the alliance with Germany during the First World War, but was quoted by Ciano in reference to Italy’s position during the early years of the Second World War. It is quoted in R.J.B. Bosworth, *Mussolini*, London (2010), p. 357.

Chapter 3. Government, Governance and Political Relations

The signing of the Italo-French armistice on 24 June 1940 immediately brought about the issue of how to govern the occupied territories. Although vague ideas on how the *Ordine nuovo* would look existed within Italian government departments, no solid plan was ever drawn up prior to the conflict on how Italian rule in France would operate. This chapter will examine Italian governing practices in detail, constructing the changing Italian systems of governance and what these reveal about Italian conceptions of the war. It will argue that Italian officials were often led by what they perceived German actions to be in the north, mimicking governing organisations in an attempt to emulate German successes. Nonetheless, these governing structures also reveal the growing schism between the two Axis partners. German officials had no desire to afford Italian actions parity with their own, and instead strove to achieve maximum gains for Berlin, even if this came at the detriment of Rome. Moreover, Italian governing structures reveal the widely held belief in Italy that the war would be over in a relatively short space of time, and that temporary arrangements implemented by the Italian military would prove sufficient until a peace treaty could impose more concrete arrangements. This position was hampered by a fundamental flaw: it depended upon the pace of the war, something that was almost entirely out of Italy's control. By the time Italian officials fully accepted that the war would not be over in the proposed timescale, opportunities in France to gain political and economic capital had been almost entirely swallowed by Germany. The ability of Italian officials to carry out policy at the local level was, therefore, almost entirely dictated by transnational events. The result was that Italian actions were limited from the very outset.

The exact legality of Italy's position in the territories initially occupied by the army was questioned from the very outset. Contemporary international law did not permit a straight transfer of sovereignty over the occupied territories from the French government to Italy.¹⁹⁹ This was compounded by the fact that occupation, by its very nature, is a temporary, transient form of government. The natural progression for a military occupation is either outright annexation or the return of the occupied territories to the occupied nation after a period of time. This was an issue that the Italian government was acutely aware of, and may go some way to explaining why the Bando del Duce of 30 July 1940 – the document which concerned

¹⁹⁹ E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, Oxford (2012), p. 6; Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, Cambridge (2009), pp. 49-53.

the governance with the annexed territories behind the *Linea verde* - was issued with such rapidity following the armistice.²⁰⁰ Rome employed, without ever explicitly saying so, the legal principle of *debellatio*: that is, that the disintegration of the French Republic had eradicated any sovereign claims that France may have on the occupied territories, allowing this sovereignty to pass to Italy.²⁰¹ Such an argument can be framed within Tanisha Fazal's theory on "state death", in which it was possible to claim that the French Republic had died, despite its resurrection as the *État français*, and that Italy had assumed sovereignty over the occupied territories.²⁰² In legal terms, the creation of the *État français* did not completely dispel the possibility of Italy utilising *debellatio* as a justification for the occupation. Yorman Dinstein states that if an entire territory is occupied and the occupied government has passed out of existence then the occupier can legally claim sovereignty over the occupied territories.²⁰³ Legality over the occupation, therefore, was disputed over differing interpretations of whether Vichy was to be viewed as the successor state of the Third Republic.

Both state death and *debellatio* could also have been used to justify Germany's occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. Like the Italo-French armistice, the Franco-German armistice did not contain any single clause that pertained to the re-annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. Scholars have highlighted the fact that although the French government was far from satisfied with its inability to halt this process, they accepted it, perhaps due to the fact that those territories had been German within living memory.²⁰⁴ Although neither Italy nor Germany explicitly expounded the idea of *debellatio*, Germany's military performance allowed her to implement a harsh "victor's justice" on the French population, using their

²⁰⁰ The terms of the 'Bando' can be found in R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, "Bando del Duce sui territori occupati", pp. 91-100. A fuller discussion of the Bando and its individual clauses can be found below.

²⁰¹ E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, p. 8; Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, p. 2; Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, Cambridge (2011), p. 50. On the abolition of the Third Republic and the creation of Vichy, see J-P. Azéma, *De Munich à la Libération*, Paris (1979), pp. 81-3.

²⁰² T.M. Fazal, *State Death, the Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation and Annexation*, Princeton and Oxford (2007), p. 22.

²⁰³ Y. Dinstein, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, p. 50.

²⁰⁴ E. Vlossak, *Marianne or Germania? Nationalizing Women in Alsace, 1870-1946*, Oxford (2010), p. 253; H. Umbreit, "German Rule in the Occupied Territories, 1942-1945", in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War, Volume V, 2, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power*, Oxford (2003), pp. 29-31. Curiously, France spent time proving to Italy that the 1918 armistice legally permitted France to occupy Alsace and Lorraine, see ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Appunto", 31.7.42.

crushing victories as justification.²⁰⁵ Italy tried to employ the same concept in an attempt to assert herself not only as a victorious nation, but to implement pre-war theorists' proposals that France would be reduced to an "associate state" in the New Europe.²⁰⁶ Unlike Germany, however, Italy lacked a convincing military victory to enforce this attitude. In reality, both sides were acutely aware of this, resulting in an Italian desire to enforce her position as a victor, faced with a French reluctance to accept this state of affairs.²⁰⁷

French officials began a series of legal challenges to the occupation, which continued as the conflict went on. In May 1942, and again in June of the same year, French representatives presented theses arguing that the Italian occupation of the territories behind the *Linea verde* was illegal. French delegates argued that the Hague Convention of 1907 did not allow Italy to create a long-term substitute for French sovereignty, and that Article 43 of the Hague Convention stated that Italy held only temporary authority in the territory.²⁰⁸ French experts frequently cited Karl Strupp's *Éléments de droit international public*, stating that Strupp's theories on sovereignty aligned with the Hague Convention.²⁰⁹ These legal challenges were augmented by invoking the armistice agreement itself; French experts stated that Italy had indicated that they would merely *maintain* troops in the territories behind the *Linea verde*, rather than establishing an alternative governing system.²¹⁰ These challenges mounted by the French government were carefully crafted and indicate a great deal of effort and precision. Although Vichy was perhaps aware that the threat of legal action was hollow in what were clearly unusual circumstances, they presumably hoped that they would partially erode the legitimacy of Italy as an occupying power. The exact purpose of these challenges is unclear. It is extremely unlikely that anyone in the French administration believed that they would bring the occupation to an end, and archival sources do not indicate precisely why they were mounted. More likely is that French officials hoped that a lack of legal precedent for the

²⁰⁵ P.M.R. Stirk, *The Politics of Military Occupation*, Edinburgh (2009), p. 36. Paul Baudouin, France's foreign minister at the time, described the Franco-German armistice as a "Diktat", see P. Baudouin, *The Private Diaries (March 1940 to January 1941) of Paul Baudouin*, London (1948), 22.6.40, pp. 136-7

²⁰⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 52-3, describes France's position of "associate state" as an advanced nation which would be under Italian direction.

²⁰⁷ P. Baudouin, *The Private Diaries*, 22.6.40, pp. 136-7, relates the view of many of those in the French armistice delegation that Italy should not be permitted to put forward demands on the scale of Germany's. As was remarked at the signing of the Franco-German armistice, "En réalite, l'Italie nous a declare la guerre, mais ne nous l'a pas faite", *DDF, Les armistices*, No. 66, "Procès-Verbal", 22.6.40, p. 111.

²⁰⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Note de Renseignements", 15.5.42; AN AJ 41 2302, "Conference Interministrielle du 18 decembre 1941", 22.12.41.

²⁰⁹ K. Strupp, *Elements de droit international public*, 1930, French ed., quoted in ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Note de Renseignements", 15.5.42.

²¹⁰ AN AJ 41 1182, "La problème italienne", nd; *DDI, 9 Serie*, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di Armistizio", pp. 78-9; *DDF, Les armistices*, Doc. 91, "Convention d'armistice avec l'Italie", 24.6.40 pp. 167-73

occupation might bring about some form of mediation between the two sides.²¹¹

Italy responded to these legal critiques in a curiously contradictory manner. By the end of July 1942, Italian experts had constructed a legal rebuttal in which they argued that the armistice was signed after the occupation of the initial zone of occupation. Thus, the signing of the armistice did not alter their legal position.²¹² Moreover, Italian theorists stated that the armistice agreements had given Italy “tous les droits de la Puissance occupante”.²¹³ This, in effect, was an attempt by the CIAF to throw down a legal obstacle to further discussion. Nonetheless, this response came only two weeks after an order had been issued stating that CIAF officials must avoid entering any legal dialogue with France.²¹⁴ It is not clear why this order was not followed. It is possible that the Italian letter quoted above was never sent to Vichy, as no French reply to this appears in archival evidence. What is probable is that whilst the Italian government hoped to avoid legal discussion with France, there existed a grudging acceptance that they should at least prepare some sort of response.

As we shall see, the Italian desire to adhere strictly to the armistice was a sign of strength designed to mask inherent weaknesses in the Italian system of governance. Whilst Germany saw the armistice as a means to impose a wider system of Franco-German co-operation, Italy saw the armistice as the *sine qua non* of Italo-French relations. It was for this reason that Italy prepared a series of legal rebuttals when challenged by French experts’ readings on international law. If the armistice was successfully challenged, then the legal basis for the Italian occupation would crumble. As a result, Italian officials took these challenges seriously and went to great lengths to generate responses.²¹⁵

I.

The cessation of hostilities between Italy and France stemmed from the signing of the armistice, which would remain the cornerstone of all legal talks between the two nations and of Italo-French relations as a whole. The armistice was consciously based upon the Franco-German armistice, both as an attempt to present a united Axis front and to present France with a list of demands that she had already agreed to in principle with Germany. Italy had

²¹¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Note de Renseignements”, 15.5.42; AN AJ 41 439, “Note relative au régime des territoires places sous le contrôle militaire italien”, 21.1.43.

²¹² AN AJ 41 2302, “La problème italienne”, nd.

²¹³ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Appunto”, 31.7.42, quoted in French in the original Italian document.

²¹⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Arturo Vacca Maggiolini al Comando Supremo [e] al Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 22.7.42.

²¹⁵ AN AJ 41 2302, “L’Amiral Duplat à Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement”, 3.8.42.

followed the armistice negotiations between France and Germany from a distance, but with interest. Following the signing of the Franco-German armistice in Compiègne in June 1940, Ciano noted that he was extremely satisfied with how it had proceeded and with its results.²¹⁶

The armistice allowed the Italians to create the initial zone of occupation that they occupied from the signing of the armistice until the expansion of the zone in November 1942. This broadly corresponded to the area under occupation by Italian troops “in all theatres of operation”.²¹⁷ As described above, the Italians ordered the establishment of a demilitarised zone surrounding the zone of occupation spanning out fifty kilometres into the border *départements*.²¹⁸ Whilst this demilitarisation left frontier cities largely undefended, it was the additional clauses of Article X and Article XI which forced France to stockpile all military equipment and gave Italian military delegations the power to inspect French military facilities. This power of inspection stretched far beyond what Italy had occupied and brought Toulon, Biserta, Ajaccio and Mers-el-Kébir under this remit. It also outlawed war production of any sort in these territories.²¹⁹ Other articles ensured that Italy would remain in control of French mercantile traffic passing through the territories under Italian economic supervision, as well as all commercial traffic entering ports under Italian control.²²⁰

If the armistice was a useful administrative tool at the outset of Italo-French relations, it would become somewhat of a hindrance as the occupation went on. The turning of military fortunes in the Mediterranean theatre against the Axis in 1941 and 1942 meant that both Germany and Italy began to exert growing pressure on France to allow the Axis to requisition the French fleet at Toulon.²²¹ In Italo-French negotiations, however, French officials protested that Article XII of the armistice made it explicitly clear that the French fleet

²¹⁶ *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. 1, “The Ambassador in Italy to the Foreign Minister”, 23.6.40.. For the Franco-German armistice terms see, *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 523, “German-French Armistice Treaty”, pp. 671-6, and *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 69, “Convention d’armistice Franco-allemande du 22 juin 1940”, 22.6.40, pp. 123-30. For the Italo-French armistice see *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio tra il capo di Stato Maggiore, Generale italiano, Badoglio, ed il Capo della Delegazione francese per l’armistizio, Huntziger”, pp. 76-82, and *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, “Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”, 24.6.40, pp. 167-73. The Italians were handed the terms of the Franco-German armistice which can be found in ASMAE, UC, Germania, b. 17, “Convenzione di Armistizio tra Germania e Francia”, 25.6.40.

²¹⁷ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 5, “Testo definitivo della convenzione di Armistizio tra l’Italia e la Francia”, 24.6.40, p. 58.

²¹⁸ See Ch. 2; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 5, “Testo definitivo della convenzione di Armistizio tra l’Italia e la Francia”, 24.6.40, pp. 58-9; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 4, “Memoria Italiana sulla smilitarizzazione”, 24.6.40, pp. 54-7; *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, p. 77.

²¹⁹ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 5, “Testo definitivo della convenzione di Armistizio tra l’Italia e la Francia”, 24.6.40, pp. 60-1; *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, pp. 78-9.

²²⁰ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 5, “Testo definitivo della convenzione di Armistizio tra l’Italia e la Francia”, 24.6.40, pp. 61-3.

²²¹ *DSCS*, Vol. 2, t. 1, 1.10.40, p. 166, shows that the Italians are favourable towards the idea of the French being allowed to use their fleet for imperial defence.

belonged to the Vichy government.²²² One Italian official conceded that the only way to legally acquire the fleet would be to declare the armistice no longer valid.²²³ By mid-1943, France had made some concessions on naval co-operation with the Axis, but only if they were permitted to have some degree of freedom in rebuilding a Mediterranean fleet.²²⁴ The debate over the re-creation of a French Mediterranean fleet echoed many of the issues raised by France in numerous debates. As we shall see in the following chapter, the Italian desire to be paid an occupation cost like Germany led to France stating that such an agreement would so fundamentally change the armistice that it would effectively have been superseded.²²⁵ This debate over both the French fleet and occupation costs revealed two important points regarding the armistice: firstly, that French officials knew that if Italy insisted upon using the armistice as the legal foundation of all Italo-French relations, France could use the same agreement to ensure that Italy could not make gains that were intrinsically part of that agreement; and secondly, that Italy was unwilling to give up the armistice on that same basis.

This attitude exposed political pitfalls in Italo-French relations that both sides became increasingly aware of as the war went on. The armistice had been signed at a time when France had been militarily beaten and came largely at the behest of Germany, whose ceasefire with France was provisional upon a similar arrangement between Paris and Rome.²²⁶ Such an agreement was unlikely to have come about without this insistence, with Paul Baudouin describing it as “a necessity of fact and the lesser evil”.²²⁷ As the war went on, France became more useful, both politically and militarily, to Germany than Italy. As a result, France used her newly acquired position with Germany to gain concessions within the framework of the armistice at the expense of Italy.²²⁸ The waxing of France and the waning of Italy as Germany’s primary ally was widely recognised within the Italian government, and as a result Italy became increasingly reluctant to re-negotiate the armistice terms in any way. This stemmed from the fear that Italy would not be able to secure terms nearly as favourable as those in June 1940 without German support. For France, re-negotiation of the armistice terms was the only way to alter her position vis-à-vis the Italian government. Both the French

²²² ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, “Il Capo di Stato Maggiore al Comando Supremo”, nd; *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di Armistizio”, pp. 77-8.

²²³ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, “Il Capo di Stato Maggiore al Comando Supremo”, nd.

²²⁴ AN AJ 41 1177, “Entretien du Président Laval avec le Général Avarna di Gualtieri en date du 3 mai 1943”, 3.5.43; AN AJ 41 1177, “Le Général Représentant le Commandement Suprême Italien a Vichy à Général de Corps d’Armée, Bridoux”, 16.4.43. The desire for “une petite flotte symbolique” is related in E. Ortona, *Diplomazia di guerra, Diari, 1937-1943*, 30.4.43, Bologna (1993), p. 228, quoted in French in Italian original.

²²⁵ See Ch. 4.

²²⁶ *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 523, “German-French Armistice Treaty”, 22.6.40, p. 676.

²²⁷ P. Baudouin, *The Private Diaries*, 24.6.40, p. 142.

²²⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 210.

government and the French military justifiably felt constrained by an inability to re-arm, produce war materials, to access French military stockpiles, all of which could only be regained by an altered or abolished Italo-French armistice. For the Italian government, any re-negotiation would certainly be perceived as weakness, and would almost certainly have resulted in a fundamental change to Italo-French relations at the political and military expense of Rome.

The basis of Italian power in France was and remained, therefore, the Italo-French armistice. This insistence was in part due to Italy's conception of the war as practically finished by July 1940, which as we shall see was reflected in the composition of the CIAF.²²⁹ The Italian government believed that the armistice was naturally only the precursor to a general peace treaty, and that most of Italy's gains would be made at the peace table. This was not an unreasonable assumption. As Yoram Dinstein states, the only precedent to the June 1940 armistices was the 1918 armistice, which had led to peace negotiations. All legal precedence pointed to the fact that a peace treaty would quickly follow.²³⁰ Thus, the armistice was designed only to regulate the political and economic foundations of Italo-French relations until the signing of a peace treaty. Unlike Italy, Germany managed to turn this unusual state of affairs into an advantage, holding the threat of future peace negotiations over France to ensure adherence to their wishes and using it as political leverage.²³¹ The Franco-German armistice became a basis upon which further collaboration between the two states was based. The Italian administration in France failed to capitalise on this until later in the war, erroneously continuing to believe that a peace treaty would follow until much later.²³² This mistaken belief regarding the armistice, coupled with a desire to impose a "victor's justice", meant that Italy stringently clung to the armistice as the framework through which all Italo-French relations were conducted.

If the armistice was to become the cornerstone of Italo-French relations during this period, the declaration of the Bando del Duce on 30 July 1940 was seen by many in France as an illegal act which attempted to impose Italian sovereignty where Italian arms had failed. Comprising thirty-six articles, the "Bando concenente gli ordinamenti amministrativi e la

²²⁹ See below, Section II.

²³⁰ Y. Doram, *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, pp. 42-7.

²³¹ P. Jackson and S. Kitson, "The Paradoxes of Vichy Foreign Policy, 1940-1942", in J.R. Adelman (ed.), *Hitler and his Allies in World War II*, London (2007), p. 83.

²³² Military collaboration, however, did take place, see K. Varley, "Vichy and the Complexities of collaborating with Fascist Italy: French policy and Perceptions between June 1940 and March 1942", *Modern and Contemporary France*, 21, 3 (2013).

organizzazione giudiziari nei territori occupati” concerned the governing of those territories initially occupied by Italy behind the *Linea verde*.²³³ The Bando set out to establish governing practices in these territories, and primarily sought to subordinate what remained of the French administration to the Italian regime. As was widely recognised in France, the Bando, without ever explicitly declaring so, attempted to transform the occupation into an annexation.²³⁴ Although attributed to Mussolini himself, the Bando should be seen as forming part of the military government established in the occupied territories. Mussolini, after all, held the tailor-made post of Primo Maresciallo dell’Impero, a post he held jointly with the King, but which made him a military figure.²³⁵ Despite its profound impact on civilian life, the Bando originated, therefore, from the military, potentially allowing Italy to claim that it had followed the Hague Convention’s regulations on maintaining civilian life.²³⁶ Indeed, when questioned, the CIAF stated that the Bando emanated from Mussolini himself, and therefore fell out with their remit.²³⁷ For the French government, the issuing of the Bando was a sign of “arrogance”, completely disproportionate in its scope and severity to the amount of territory that Italy controlled.²³⁸ It was particularly despised by local French authorities as it seemed to have no legal basis and imposed a harsh program of Italianisation on the occupied communes. For Italian officials, however, the Bando represented an attempt to score a political victory in place of those military successes which had never materialised during the period of hostilities. If it appeared disproportionately stern, Italian officials felt that this was necessary in order to counterbalance Italy’s disappointing military performance in 1940.

The Bando, whose individual clauses will be dissected in the relevant chapters, had two extremely broad aims. Firstly, it placed all powers into the hands of Italian authorities, using

²³³ The text of the Bando, like the armistice, was widely distributed. One example can be found in ASAME, GABAP, b. 20, “Bando concernente gli ordinamenti amministrativi e la organizzazione giudiziari nei territori occupati”, 30.7.40, and published in R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, “Bando del Duce sui territori occupati”, 30.7.40, pp. 91-100 (hereafter, Bando del Duce). An abridged French translation can be found in J-L. Panicacci, *L’occupation italienne*, pp. 345-9.

²³⁴ AN AJ 41 2302, “Occupation de Menton par l’Armée Italienne, Note de Renseignements”, 28.7.41.

²³⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Bando del Duce”, 30.7.40.

²³⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Appunto”, 31.7.42, ignores the Bando, so it is impossible to know if this argument was explicitly made. E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, p. 78, states that it is the responsibility of the occupier to maintain civilian life under occupation.

²³⁷ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione AG al Signor Mouchet, Delegazione Francese presso la Commissione Italiana di Armistizio”, 25.7.40.

²³⁸ R.H. Rainero, “Une résistance silencieuse: la Délégation française auprès la Commission italienne d’armistice avec la France (Turin, 27 juin 1940 – 8 septembre 1943)”, *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 251 (2013), pp. 124-5.

the absence of French officials as a way of abolishing their authority.²³⁹ Secondly, it moved the focus of the occupied territories away from France and firmly into an Italian sphere of influence. Whilst it did not forbid the return of the evacuated population – quite the contrary, Article VII allowed it, and Article VIII dealt with safe conduct for their return – its clauses meant that many found their homes so changed that they voluntarily opted to remain in France.²⁴⁰ Italy, therefore, could claim that all French citizens had the option to return, however in practice only those prepared to accept de facto Italian rule – willingly or begrudgingly – made up the wartime population of the territories behind the *Linea verde*. The absence of the French authorities created a power vacuum, which the new Italian administration rapidly filled. In Belgium, similar circumstances arose on a much larger scale, where many state officials fled their posts, resulting in administrative pandemonium.²⁴¹ Whilst the administrative problems in Belgium took much longer to correct, the territories behind the *Linea verde* covered a much smaller expanse, allowing Italy to simply plug these administrative gaps and simultaneously mould local governments to their own vision.²⁴²

Italy's main source of control at a local level was the civil commissioners, appointed as head of the local administrations in each of the occupied communes. The first article of the Bando del Duce stated that all civil powers, in concurrence with the laws of war, would be exercised by the civil commissioners.²⁴³ In line with the wording of the Hague Convention of 1907, the role of the civil commissioner was to maintain public life and guarantee public order.²⁴⁴ Nonetheless, Article IV hands over government functions to the civil commissioners, whilst Article V states that he has the power to suspend laws and the sole authority to ratify them.²⁴⁵ The nomination of the civil commissioners occurred almost immediately following the occupation.²⁴⁶ Due to the size of the territory initially occupied by Italy, the only civil commissioner with any degree of power or responsibility was whosoever

²³⁹ This was not completely illegal. Y. Dinstein states that a new local government can be established in occupied territories during occupation under the terms of the Hague Convention, see Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, p. 58.

²⁴⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Bando del Duce", 30.7.40, Articles VII and VIII.

²⁴¹ N. Wouters, "Municipal Government during the Occupation (1940-5)", pp. 224-5.

²⁴² Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, pp. 133-4, states that the occupier must replace government officials in order to ensure the continuation of municipal life.

²⁴³ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Bando del Duce", 30.7.40, Article I.

²⁴⁴ Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, pp. 133-4; E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, p. 1.

²⁴⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Bando del Duce", 30.7.40, Articles III, IV and V, respectively.

²⁴⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Il Ministero dell'Interno alla CIAF, [e] al Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 3.12.40.

was assigned to Menton.²⁴⁷ This position was initially held by Aldo Loni, quickly followed by Virgilio Magris, who both held office for short periods, before the nomination of Giuseppe Frediani, a former PNF secretary in Verona, then in Pavia, and inspector of the Fasci Italiani dell'Estero in September 1941. Frediani was eventually replaced by the final commissioner, Gino Berri, in November 1942.²⁴⁸

Despite his position as a PNF party secretary, Frediani, as with all the civil commissioners, was subordinate to the Comando Supremo, which in turn exercised control over the semi-autonomous Amministrazione territori francesi occupati, and did not represent the PNF in any official capacity.²⁴⁹ Although the actions of the civil commissioners will be discussed in the chapter on Italianisation and Fascistisation, it is necessary to place them into the wider structure of the Italian governing system. Perhaps most importantly, the civil commissioners represented a figure to whom French local authorities could turn in order to deal with daily governance. For Jean Durandy, the mayor of Menton, Frediani was the first point of contact when complaining about slander in the irredentist and Italian national press.²⁵⁰ It is clear that Durandy and Frediani worked closely together and formed a working friendship.²⁵¹ Despite this friendship, however, Frediani and the other civil commissioners were agents of the CIAF who were employed to establish Italian rule in the annexed territories. They both owed their position to, and were executors of, the Bando del Duce, which was undoubtedly the most important development in the administration of the territories behind the *Linea verde*. It was this agreement, together with the armistice, both of which were issued very early in the occupation, which governed Italo-French relations during the occupation. Although the Bando del Duce was at the forefront of the minds of those whose hometowns were now governed by it, as well as French delegates to the CIAF, we should not overestimate the national awareness of its effects: Paul Baudouin does not mention it in his diary whatsoever, and was much more concerned with the effects of the armistice agreement, whilst Jean Barthélemy, Ministre de la Justice for two years is also

²⁴⁷ The nine civil commissioners were assigned to Menton, Fontan, Isola, Ristolas, Mongenèvre, Lanslevillard, Lanselbourg, Sééz and Bramans.

²⁴⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 126.

²⁴⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Bando del Duce", 30.7.40, Article II; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Organizzazione della CIAF al 15 ottobre 1941", 15.10.41.

²⁵⁰ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 61, "Durandy al Sig. Commissario Civile [di Mentone]", 7.9.42.

²⁵¹ J-L. Panicacci, "L'occupation italienne de Menton vue à travers le fonds Giuseppe Frediani", *Ou País Mentounasc*, 129 (2009), states that Frediani attended Durandy's wedding and arranged a papal audience for him on his honeymoon to Rome.

almost completely unconcerned with its effects.²⁵² For the majority of French civilians and politicians, the Bando del Duce, however intrusive, was a local affair.

II.

Whilst the armistice was the most important document in Italo-French relations, the primary organ in practical terms was the CIAF. Following the signing of the Italo-French armistice at the Villa Incisa outside Rome, the Italian government decided to establish the CIAF as a method of implementing and enforcing the terms of the armistice.²⁵³ This commission occupied a place in the very fabric of the armistice itself, guaranteed a place in Italo-French politics by Article XXIII of the agreement.²⁵⁴ Although the organisation would expand, adapt and inevitably vary in which personalities occupied which particular offices, the basic structure of the CIAF put in place in June 1940 would remain the basic outline for much of the war. The Commissione was led by the President, who was in turn joined by representatives of the three Italian armed forces; a representative of the *Deutschen Waffenstillstandskommission* (Franco-German Armistice Commission – DWStK); an Ufficio affari generali, assigned to discuss all non-military matters; and a number of sub-commissions, who represented issues and affairs raised in Libya, Somalia, Syria and French North Africa.²⁵⁵ From the very outset, the CIAF was a military organisation. The President, despite the fact that no one individual remained in the post for the duration of the war, always came from the ranks of the army and held the rank of General. The close involvement of the Comando Supremo and the representation of each of the three armed services cemented the organisation as subordinate to the military.

This military focus adds weight to the mistaken idea that Italy had that the French surrender represented the prelude to the end of hostilities in Europe.²⁵⁶ Germany's failure to successfully force Britain out of the war left the CIAF in control of French territory for over three years. Had the Italian government known that the war would have lasted this long, it is

²⁵² P. Baudouin, *The Private Diaries*, entries for 30 and 31 July 1940, pp. 184-5, do not mention the Bando; J. Barthélemy, *Ministre de la Justice, 1941-1943*, Paris (1989), pp. 383-4.

²⁵³ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunti circa la Commissione Italiana di Armistizio", 25.6.40.

²⁵⁴ DDI, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di armistizio", p. 82.

²⁵⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunti circa la Commissione Italiana di Armistizio", 25.6.40.

²⁵⁶ D. Grandi, *Il mio paese, Ricordi autobiografici*, Bologna (1985), p. 599, relates Mussolini urging Hitler to agree to a general peace treaty with France following the armistice. D. Alfieri, *Dictators Face to Face*, London and New York (1954), p. 62, shows Mussolini's ambassador in Berlin urging Germany to take a similar strategy. P. Badoglio, *Italy in the Second World War*, Oxford (1948), p. 15, shows Mussolini's flippant comment that the war would be over before it had really begun.

possible to argue that a more comprehensive system may have been put in place. It is important to note, however, that no evidence of what might have been established has been uncovered in archival sources. The Italian decision to establish an armistice commission was almost certainly based upon the German decision to do likewise.²⁵⁷ It was known, even at the time, that the Italian armistice terms had been largely based upon those made by Germany in her own negotiations.²⁵⁸ Whilst Italy knew the terms of the Franco-German armistice, and the fact that it contain a clause bring the DWStK into existence, the exact composition of the organisation remained almost completely unknown. The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, did not reveal until the full extent and scope of the DWStK until August 1940.²⁵⁹ Whilst the CIAF had an unmistakably military character, the *Militärbefehlshaber in Frankreich* (German Military Command in France – MBF) was far more inclusive in its personnel. In many cases, the MBF realised its deficiency in competent military administrators, and simply placed civilians in uniform.²⁶⁰ To those out with the MBF, Alfieri included, these bureaucrats were brought from the ranks of the military. The reality was therefore not known in Italy. Moreover, the MBF worked alongside, and often with, representatives from a wide range of Reich ministries. Representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the National Economy and the Ministry of Finance allowed a wide range of government departments to observe and participate in governing France. Additional flexibility came with the inclusion of a representative of the Four Year Plan Office and the Reichsbank.²⁶¹ Alfieri mistakenly believed that this myriad of ministries, offices and organisations all operated under the auspices of the DWStK, and that this comprehensiveness created a pan-Reich system that allowed Germany to govern her zone of occupation in a more rounded manner.²⁶² In reality, the DWStK operated parallel to, rather than in a superior position to, these organisations. Placed next to the MBF, therefore, Italy’s system of governance, operating almost solely through the CIAF, looks relatively simple.

Whilst the comprehensiveness of Germany’s governing structure was one of its principal strengths, it also sowed the seeds of petty squabbles and inter-departmental arguments and

²⁵⁷ The establishment of the DWStK was confirmed by Article XXII of the Franco-German armistice, as was ensuring conformity between the Franco-German and Italo-French armistices, see *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 523, “German-French Armistice Treaty”, pp. 671-6. Italy’s corresponding clause was Article XXIII, see *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, p. 82.

²⁵⁸ Hitler made it clear to Mussolini that the signing of the Franco-German armistice depended upon a similar Italo-French agreement, ASMAE, UC, Germania, b. 17, “Messaggio del Führer al Duce in data 22 giugno 1940-XVIII”, 22.6.40. See also, E. Jäckel, *La France dans l’Europe de Hitler*, Paris (1968), pp. 66-7.

²⁵⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Alfieri al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 27.8.40.

²⁶⁰ T. Laub, *After the Fall, German Policy in Occupied France*, Oxford (2010), p. 50.

²⁶¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Alfieri al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 27.8.40.

²⁶² *Ibid.*

rivalries that would be the hallmark of Nazi wartime government. Adam Tooze's portrayal of the Nazi war machine is characterised by frequent disputes, particularly between the Four Year Plan Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Reichsbank.²⁶³ Agencies would often overlap and compete for the same resources, prompting historians to note the adverse effects of the failure of ministries and ministers to put aside their differences and personal ambitions on providing an effective administration in France.²⁶⁴ By comparison, the CIAF seemed a relatively tranquil and serene working environment.

It has been suggested by some scholars that Mussolini deliberately chose to headquarter the CIAF in Turin, rather than in Rome, in order to distance it from potential inter-departmental disputes.²⁶⁵ This simultaneously seems to underestimate the power of ministers to become involved in projects that they wish to become involved in, and misunderstands Italian post-war plans for the occupied territories. The DWStK established its headquarters at Wiesbaden, a city some distance from Berlin, but did not escape ministerial infighting. Moreover, this idea also seems to underestimate the potential of individuals in the Fascist government to make trouble via telephone or post. Rather, it is possible to argue that Turin was chosen with more practical goals in mind. Both Plan A and Plan B, discussed by Davide Rodogno and recounted in the preceding chapter, established by the Italian government in 1942 reveal that any large scale incorporation of French territory would increase Turin's importance as a political, economic and, crucially, judicial centre.²⁶⁶ Although the process of integrating the occupied French territories with existing Italian provinces will be discussed in chapter five, it is necessary at this stage to suggest that Turin was chosen in order to begin a process of turning their political and economic foci away from France and towards Turin. It is also possible to argue that the position of the CIAF in Turin, instead of in French territory, or even in Menton, reveals a more subtle message. As all meetings took place in Turin, French delegates were forced to cross the border into Italy. In so doing, French delegates went to Turin as if attending court, subtly validating the sovereign power now held by the city.

France was certainly not a silent player in this field. As stipulated by the armistice agreements, Vichy created a *Délégation française auprès la Commission italienne*

²⁶³ Tooze uses Denmark as an illustrative example, although this situation could be equally applied to France, see A. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction, the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, London (2006), pp. 385-6.

²⁶⁴ A.S. Milward, *The New Order and the French Economy*, Oxford (1983), p. 46.

²⁶⁵ The claim is repeated by Emanuele Sica in "Italiani brava gente?", p. 97. Sica states that the claim was made in E. Costa Bona, *Dalla guerra alla pace, Italia e Francia, 1940-1947*, Milan (1995). Although Sica is not the originator of this claim, he does not challenge it, so it is not clear if Sica shares this opinion or not.

²⁶⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 89-92, discuss Plan A and Plan B.

d'Armistice (French Delegation to the Italian Armistice Commission – DFCIA) which allowed the French government to play a direct role in negotiations and represent French interests.²⁶⁷ This delegation, along with its equivalent sent to the DWStK, fell under the jurisdiction of the French *Direction des Services de l'Armistice* (Direction of Armistice Services – DSA) created in late June 1940 in order to try and ensure French participation in the occupation.²⁶⁸ Many in Italy, however, believed that the DFCIA was more than this. For many in the Vichy government, espionage was a suitable, and indeed only, substitute for direct military action. By May 1941, the *Ministero della Guerra* claimed that two members of the DFCIA had been monitored prior to the outbreak of war as spies.²⁶⁹ Around the same time, the new President of the CIAF, Arturo Vacca Maggiolini, stated in a letter to the *Comando Supremo* that a number of members of the DFCIA had been nominated for political reasons.²⁷⁰ There was little that the CIAF or the Italian authorities could do to stop this from happening, Italian authorities were vigilant, however. In Rome, one French delegate was found supposedly representing French commercial interests. The Italian authorities, however, were clearly unconvinced that this represented the extent of his actions and kept him under surveillance.²⁷¹ It is possible to see this as a kind of “official resistance”. Romain Rainero certainly believes that the DFCIA represented a form of resistance, citing the memoirs of one member, Marius Sarraz-Bournet, who claimed that the DFCIA attempted to resist Italy at every turn.²⁷² It may well be true that Vichy, the DFCIA or individual delegates attempted to carry out some form of resistance to Italy, but we should not overestimate its effects. Whilst Rainero believes Sarraz-Bournet’s claims of official resistance, he also points out that Henri Duplat, President of the DFCIA, claimed that meetings in Turin remained cordial throughout the war.²⁷³ This cordiality, however, should not be mistaken for trust. Although the CIAF and the DFCIA worked together on a daily basis, it should not come as a surprise to find that both did everything that they could to advance their own cause at the expense of their opposite

²⁶⁷ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, pp. 76-82.

²⁶⁸ D. Grillère, “L’occupation italienne en France de 1940 à 1943”, p. 6. The equivalent delegation sent to the DWStK was the *Délégation française auprès la Commission allemande d’Armistice* (DFCAA).

²⁶⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Il Colonello di S.M. Capo Servizio al Ministero della Guerra – Gabinetto”, 30.5.41. Simon Kitson’s monograph on Nazi spies in France makes clear that France was not averse to spying against the Axis powers as both France and the Axis powers spied on one another, see S. Kitson, *The Hunt for Nazi Spies, Fighting Espionage in Vichy France*, Chicago and London (2008).

²⁷⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Arturo Vacca Maggiolini al Comando Supremo SIM [e] al Ministero della Guerra – Gabinetto”, 4.7.41.

²⁷¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Ministero degli Affari Esteri alla Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia – Sottocommissione Affari Generali”, nd. Contained within the report is a quotation from November 1940, so the document is probably contemporaneous with this.

²⁷² R.H. Rainero, “Une résistance silencieuse”, p. 124.

²⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 122.

number. This had to be conducted within the framework of a tense working relationship. Communication between the two sides was common; the creation of new sub-commissions or delegations by the CIAF to deal with matters outside the terms of the armistice had to be relayed to the DFCIA.²⁷⁴ Whilst Rainero's claim that some form of resistance existed within the DFCIA, therefore, this claim must not overshadow the fact that the CIAF-DFCIA represented a functioning, but tense, working relationship between both sides, although soured by mutual suspicion.

Although the CIAF began as a military organisation strictly tasked with carrying out the terms of the armistice, it quickly expanded beyond this. By 1941, a booklet produced by the Italian government merely listing the names of those working for the CIAF extended to eighty-nine pages.²⁷⁵ These included, for example, two War Industry Control sub-commission units in Lyon and Avignon and a further three War Industry Control sub-commission units in Toulouse, Clermont-Ferrand and Bourges.²⁷⁶ As it became more apparent that the Italo-French armistice would not be replaced with a general peace treaty, the CIAF began to take on responsibilities for other aspects of Italo-French relations. These new duties were often carried out with the same vigour with which Italy ensured adherence to the armistice, and frequently attempted to frame them within its clauses. The Sub-Commission for General Affairs invoked and abused Article XXI of the armistice in order to represent the needs of Italians living in France. This was augmented by the creation of the Delegazioni Civili Rimpatrio e Assistenza (Delegations for Civilian Repatriation and Assistance – DRAs), which allowed the CIAF to enter civilian life.²⁷⁷ This new role in dealing with the Italian migrant community and its position vis-à-vis its French neighbours will be explored more fully in chapter six, but it is worth noting that this expansion of the CIAF revealed two important objectives of Italian policy. Firstly, that it allowed the CIAF to attempt to win over the Italian migrant population without causing significant military upheaval which might destabilise the region; and secondly, that it allowed the CIAF to challenge French sovereignty over areas which the Italians did not occupy. This was done by scolding not only French

²⁷⁴ See, for example, ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Il Marasciello d'Italia, Badoglio, al Presidente della CIAF e al Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 26.8.40.

²⁷⁵ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5 G, 2nd guerra mondiale, b. 114, fasc. 52, "Quadro dell'ordinamento della Commissione Italiana d'Armistizio e della ripatriazione del personale (ufficiale, funzionari e impiegati civili) alla data del 1 luglio 1941-XIX".

²⁷⁶ Ibid, in addition to these units were a liquid fuels control delegation based in Marseille and a War Industry Control delegation in Grenoble, to give the structure of just the Armaments sub-commission. For an expanded version of this chart, see Appendix III, or D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 428.

²⁷⁷ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 118.

organisations and governmental bodies, such as the police, but also key figures in the Vichy administration.²⁷⁸

The establishment of various sub-commissions further widened Italian power in France, but a failure to co-ordinate these groups led to schizoid policies. Vacca Maggiolini laid out the duties of each of the sub-commissions shortly after taking the helm in the CIAF: the Sottocommissione Affari Economici e Finanziari (Sub-commission for Economic and Financial Affairs – SCAEF) handled economic and financial concerns in the broadest sense of both terms, including regulating the property of Italians in France and the use of ports in the French colonies. Later, this went on to include regulating mercantile traffic and the recovery of goods and ships.²⁷⁹ The Sottocommissione Affari Giudice (Sub-commission for Judicial Affairs – SCAG) dealt with infractions of the armistice agreements, both those committed by the French state and by individuals; whilst the Sottocommissione Scambi Commerciale (Sub-commission for Commercial Trade – SCS) dealt with all trade matters.²⁸⁰ This splintering of the CIAF brought yet more Italian ministries into direct contact with what was going on in France. Vacca Maggiolini made it clear that the SCAEF was to liaise with the Ministero delle Finanze, bringing the bickering ministries of Rome into the equation.²⁸¹ There is no indication that this widening of the CIAF was an attempt to mimic the perceived breadth of the German system, but this slow erosion of the simplicity of the CIAF was not matched by an increase in efficiency. Italy failed to learn from Germany's decision to appoint civilian bureaucrats within the MBF. Instead, individuals often wrote directly to Luca Pietromarchi, head of the Gabinetto Armistizio-Pace, clamouring for positions.²⁸² Despite this expansion, the CIAF remained an overwhelmingly military organisation. Expansion, therefore, made the CIAF more capable of dealing with a wider range of issues, but brought problems of its own. Whilst Rodogno has claimed that part of the success of Vacca Maggiolini as CIAF president lay in his close relationship with Mussolini, Ciano claims that shortly after his appointment to the role, Mussolini described Vacca Maggiolini as an

²⁷⁸ This is expanded in Chapter 6, but see also ADAM 0166W 0028, “Le Procureur Général près de la Cour d’Appel d’Aix à Monsieur le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes”, 22.9.41; on disciplinary measures, see ADAM 0166W 0028, “Le Conseiller d’Etat, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Commandant Guret, délégation Française d’Armistice-1ère section”, 31.7.41.

²⁷⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Nuova organizzazione interna della CIAF”, 30.7.41; D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, pp. 118-9. ASMAE, GABAP, b. 14, “Il Generale Designato d’Armata, Presidente della Commissione di Armistizio, Generale Camillo Grossi, all’Eccellenza il Presidente della Delegazione Francese d’Armistizio”, 5.6.41, shows the CIAF complaining that their under-representation in key ports, such as Marseille, limited their power in restricting imported goods.

²⁸⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Nuova organizzazione interna della CIAF”, 30.7.41.

²⁸¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Vacca Maggiolini all’Eccellenza il Ministro Luca Pietromarchi”, 7.8.41.

²⁸² ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Umberto Bruni a Gabinetto di S.E. il Ministro [Pietromarchi]”, 21.5.41; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Enrico Liberati all’Eccellenza, il Conte Luca Pietromarchi”, 4.7.41.

“imbecile” who had no place in politics.²⁸³ Despite this discrepancy in opinion, Vacca Maggiolini became a far more stabilising influence on the CIAF than previous presidents, working together with the Sottocommissione Affari Generali to create a more harmonious working environment.²⁸⁴ Although archival sources do not mention it, the fact that Vacca Maggiolini was born near Turin may have played some role in his successes. After the First World War, Vacca Maggiolini returned to Turin to teach military history at the *Scuola di Guerra*. His proximity to the Italo-French border for much of his life may have given him a more pro-French outlook than officers from elsewhere in Italy may have had. Correspondance from Vacca Maggiolini to the DFCIA exist in French as well as Italian, however Italian documents do not indicate which letters were translations and which were originally written in French. Nonetheless, it is quite likely that Vacca Maggiolini could at least communicate to a basic level in French. Whilst historians can only speculate to what extent these considerations played a part in establishing more consistent relations between the CIAF and the DFCIA, it is clear that it was during Vacca Maggiolini’s tenure as President that these relations were at their most stable.

The increasing complexity of the CIAF was exacerbated by the creation of another source of political power. Although the Italian embassy in Paris re-opened in February 1941, it was not until February of the following year that political activity of any note resumed.²⁸⁵ The appointment of Gino Buti as ambassador made up in symbolism what it lacked in substance. Whilst Buti communicated with the CIAF, which maintained its position as primary, albeit no longer sole, interlocutor between the Italian and French governments, he was officially a representative of the Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MAE). This appointment represented an attempt by the MAE to wrest control of Italo-French relations away from the military and back into the diplomatic sphere.²⁸⁶ It also represented a further move by Italy to mirror Franco-German diplomatic structures. The arrival of the German ambassador to France, Otto Abetz, in 1940 had been an important step in promoting the

²⁸³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 213; G. Ciano, *Diario, 1937-1943*, 29.12.41, Milan (2006), p. 571.

²⁸⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, “Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Sottocommissione Affari Generali all’Eccellenza il Conte Luca Pietromarchi”, 21.8.41.

²⁸⁵ G. Bottai, *Diario, 1935-1944*, 22.12.41, Milan (1982), pp. 292-3; ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, “D’Ajeta a Alfieri”, 24.10.41.

²⁸⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 120.

policy of collaboration between Germany and France.²⁸⁷ This appointment heralded a tripartite state of German representation in France by 1940: the MBF, representing the military government; the DWStK; and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, personified by Abetz.²⁸⁸ Buti's appointment was an attempt to score some of the political successes that Abetz had achieved, which the MAE believed could be achieved merely through his appointment.

Buti's failure to achieve the heights that Abetz did was largely down to two inherent problems in his position: firstly, Buti was assigned with no real role to play in Italo-French relations. Instead, the embassy took on the responsibility of mediator between Italian migrants and French organisations, organising elements of the PNF, albeit in an extremely loose manner, and monitoring the French press.²⁸⁹ The second of these problems was that Buti lacked the contact with figures like Laval that made Abetz such a potent political force.²⁹⁰ Messages from Buti were generally sent directly to Mussolini himself, but rarely contain first-hand information of any worth. His reports containing quotations from Laval generally came from the French press or recorded statements, rather than from direct conversations between the two.²⁹¹ Other reports contained rumours and gossip from Paris regarding key political figures in the Vichy regime, particularly Pétain and Laval.²⁹² The very few occasions that Buti managed to directly meet French officials were at the numerous drinks receptions held at the Italian embassy, as Buti's unpaid champagne bills attest to.²⁹³ Of the few French collaborators in Paris who attempted to contact Italy, fewer still approached Buti. Former Action Française member and Cagoulard, Eugène Deloncle, wrote to Mussolini

²⁸⁷ T.J. Laub, *After the Fall*, pp. 53-4; B. Lambauer, *Otto Abetz et les français, ou l'envers de la Collaboration*, Paris (2001), p. 141.

²⁸⁸ N. Rich, *Hitler's War Aims, the Establishment of the New Order*, London (1974), p. 205.

²⁸⁹ On Buti's contact with the various Case d'Italia in France see, ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Il R. Delegato per il Rimpatrio e Assistenza, Gen. Quinto Mazzolini, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri [e] il R. Ambasciata d'Italia, Parigi", 6.5.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Telespresso, n. 3822", 8.10.42. On Buti's contact with the DRAs, see ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Il Comandante di Zona, E. Marchiandi, all'Ecc. Ambasciatore, Gino Buti", 18.8.42. On Buti's regulation of the press, see ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "Appunto per l'Ambasciatore Abezt", 21.1.41. This latter duty was co-ordinated with MINCULPOP and directly mimicked one of Abetz's roles.

²⁹⁰ N. Rich, *Hitler's War Aims*, p. 205; on Abetz's relationship with Laval, see *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 10, Doc. 187, "Buti a Mussolini", 3.4.43, p. 238.

²⁹¹ See, for example, ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 70, "Telespresso, n. 694/ 265", 16.2.43.

²⁹² *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 10, Doc. 248, "Buti a Mussolini", 20.4.43, p. 321, relates relations between Pétain and Laval and the state of their general dislike for one another; *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 10, Doc. 201, "Buti a Mussolini", 6.4.43, p. 255, relates the general mood in France vis-à-vis the war situation.

²⁹³ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "Emile Lechère à Monsieur le Duc del Balzo", 20.7.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "G.H. Mumm & Co. à Monsieur le Comm. Paveri", 15.5.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "Maison Mœt & Chandon à Monsieur le Duc del Balzo", 28.10.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "Maison Mœt & Chandon à Monsieur le Duc del Balzo", 26.8.42.

himself, completely by-passing Buti.²⁹⁴ Most importantly, Italy was unaware of the importance of Abetz as an individual, rather than his position. Jean-Pierre Azéma has described Abetz as “the most Francophile of the occupiers”.²⁹⁵ Buti, on the other hand, had no particular affiliation to France, nor did he have Abetz’s web of contacts. Rather, Buti was a career diplomat. He had previously directed political affairs at the Palazzo Chigi, and was considered distant enough to the Fascist regime that he became involved with the post-war United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation, communicating frequently with the United States.

Although Buti and his exact role in France is an extremely understudied subject – as yet there exists no monograph on his time in France, despite the availability of his ambassadorial papers in the Archivio Storico dell’Ministero degli Affari Esteri – we can use his appointment to gauge much about Italian political relations with France. His appointment to Paris came about not as a sudden change in Italian policy nor from a new desire for the MAE to become involved in France, but as the culmination of a process. Those in the CIAF noted as early as September 1940 that representatives from the MAE were accompanying military delegations sent to inspect French facilities.²⁹⁶ The CIAF immediately became defensive, zealously guarding its position as liaison between France and Italy. On a political level, the CIAF objected to the MAE interfering with what they clearly felt was their domain. On a more practical level, it was clear that the French police guarding facilities were confused by the myriad of different Italian officials all claiming to hold the power of inspection.²⁹⁷ The schismatic nature of Italian governance in France, therefore, was apparent even to very minor functionaries of the French government. Nonetheless, Buti’s offices were never completely separate from either the CIAF or, by extension, the Comando Supremo. Due to staff shortages, Buti was forced to request members of the military or the CIAF to serve in his offices.²⁹⁸ In mimicking the German system of government in France, therefore, Italy unintentionally inherited some of its inherent flaws, not least of all were the overlapping agencies.

²⁹⁴ ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, “Le Chef du Mouvement Social Révolutionnaire pour la Révolution Nationale, Eugène Deloncle, à [le] Duce”, 24.10.41; ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, “[Confalieri] a Filippo Anfuso”, 26.10.41.

²⁹⁵ J-P. Azéma, “Preface”, in B. Lambauer, *Otto Abetz et les Français*, p. 11.

²⁹⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione AG al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 21.9.40.

²⁹⁷ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Le Ministre Secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur à MM. les Préfets”, nd; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Appunto per l’Eccellenza, il Presidente CIA”, nd. Both documents are attached to letters dated November 1940, so it is reasonable to assume that that is roughly when these letters were written too.

²⁹⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Telespresso, n. 8/01416”, 17.2.41; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Appunto”, 5.1.41.

III.

The military, through its position vis-à-vis the CIAF and later in its own right, remained the most important and consistent player in Italian governing practices in France. The distinctions between the CIAF and the military, although always present, became more important following the expansion of the zone of occupation in November 1942. Less than one month after the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied *départements*, it became necessary to articulate these distinctions and clarify the position of the CIAF in relation to the armed forces. The commanding officer in France, Mario Vercellino, stated that the Italian army remained the sole Italian organ capable of disarming the French army.²⁹⁹ Italian commanders were told that officials and representatives of the CIAF would remain dependent upon Vacca Maggiolini, who in turn took orders from the IV Armata, the army group which occupied the expanded zone in France.³⁰⁰ At the same time, the delegations monitoring the French armed forces and war production were given direct instructions that they were now subordinate to the IV Armata.³⁰¹

Despite the opposition of Vacca Maggiolini, the CIAF was slowly dismembered.³⁰² In spite of the fact that the expansion of both zones of occupation had effectively broken the armistices, both Germany and Italy steadfastly insisted upon sticking to these agreements as the bases for their future relations with France.³⁰³ The near-total power of the Comando Supremo by the end of 1942, however, had practically obliterated any remaining pretence that the CIAF represented the sole legal conduit for Italo-French discourse. By March 1943, following a cabinet re-shuffle, Vittorio Ambrosio, the new Italian Chief of Staff, informed Vacca Maggiolini that the CIAF was tasked with regulating and ensuring adherence to the armistice. In matters relating directly to the armistice, military officials were to report to the CIAF for guidance.³⁰⁴ However, this was caveated by the point that disputes over the

²⁹⁹ This was co-ordinated with Germany, see *DSCS*, Vol. 8, t. 1, 28.11.42, p. 911.

³⁰⁰ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitan francesi*, D2V, "Il Generale Commandante, M. Vercellino al Comando del I Corpo d'Armata, al Comando del XV Corpo d'Armata", 3.12.42, pp. 663-4.

³⁰¹ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitan francesi*, D2V, "Allegato n. 2 al foglio 9497/Op. C in data 3 dicembre 1942 XXI del comando 4^a Armata", 3.12.42, p. 667.

³⁰² R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 59, "Processo Verbale del colloquio del Duce con il Gen. Vacca Maggiolini", 12.2.43, pp. 351-6.

³⁰³ From a legal point of view, Italy could point to the fact that the armistice would "rimarrà in vigore fino alla conclusion del Trattato di pace", which had not happened, despite the occupation of France. Moreover, whilst the armistice stated that Italy could denounce the agreements at any point, France was never given this option, see R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 5, "Testo definitive della convenzione di armistizio tra l'Italia e la Francia", 24.6.40, p. 63.

³⁰⁴ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 60, "I rapporti tra la CIAF e la IV Armata", 10.3.43, pp. 357-8.

armistice which could not be resolved between the CIAF and local French authorities would be passed on to the IV Armata.³⁰⁵ Ambrosio's sentiments that the CIAF had effectively outlived its use were confirmed when the military sub-commissions attached to the CIAF were abolished and their staff assigned to the military.³⁰⁶ This nebulous situation, difficult to piece together due to the constant movement of offices, functionaries and responsibilities, was even less clear at the time. Although key changes were announced, exact responsibilities were not made evident to French officials until such time as it was deemed necessary to do so. By the end of 1942, the DFCIA were at such a loss as to who truly represented Italy in France that they wrote to Vacca Maggiolini asking whether or not the CIAF even existed.³⁰⁷ The CIAF, however, was never abolished, and members of the Italian military were still writing to the CIAF in April 1943.³⁰⁸ The eclipse of the CIAF brought France in line with other theatres of Italian occupation. In the Balkans, where no Yugoslav state remained, there had been no armistice commission, leaving the Comando Supremo in near-total control. Moreover, Vacca Maggiolini's close relationship with Mussolini, important for Davide Rodogno in providing a stabilising force within the CIAF, was superseded by Mussolini's relationship with Ugo Cavallero, Chief of the Comando Supremo.³⁰⁹

The prestige not only of the CIAF, but the Italians as a whole, was eroded further by the presence of members of the Wehrmacht, the *Shutzstaffel* (SS) and representatives of the German economic delegations in key installations that they wished to protect. This was one of the most important developments of the occupation and represented the culmination of a process in substance which had previously existed in reality: the total subordination of Italy to Germany.³¹⁰ France had remained a relatively dormant territory by comparison during this period, and Italian subordination to Germany in France had partly, though not exclusively, been brought about by developments in other occupied territories. In the Yugoslav territories, Italy found herself playing second fiddle to Germany in military matters, unable to negotiate

³⁰⁵ Ibid, pp. 357-8.

³⁰⁶ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 61, "L'abolizione della sottocommissione militari della CIAF", 30.3.43, p. 359.

³⁰⁷ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 120. In January 1943, Ugo Cavallero noted in his diary his surprise that the CIAF still existed, see U. Cavallero, *Diario, 1940-1943*, Rome (1984), 30.1.43, p. 721.

³⁰⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 120; D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione dei territori metropolitani francesi*, D 10 VIII, "Documento tratto dai Diari Storici della 4^a Armata", 7.4.43, p. 707.

³⁰⁹ L. Ceva, *La condotta italiana della guerra, Cavallero e il Comando Supremo, 1941/1942*, Milan (1975), pp. 10-1, although Mussolini disliked Cavallero at times, he saw him frequently and only dismissed him in July 1943; D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 213.

³¹⁰ L. Ceva, *La condotta italiana della guerra*, p. 62, shows the subordination of the Comando Supremo to the OKW, the latter of whom frequently pushed their own plans, strategies and resource allocation at the expense of the former.

the boundaries of her own zone of occupation, and permitted only the most economically barren territories in which Germany had no interest.³¹¹ In Greece, the Italian failure to defeat the Greek army in a war completely of Rome's own making led to the German occupation of key strategic portions of the peninsula.³¹² By November 1942, this domination had transferred itself onto the Italo-German dynamic in France. Cavallero recorded his anger that Germany had decided to occupy Marseille, a decision made due to a German lack of confidence in the Italian ability to guarantee the security of the port.³¹³ German domination was even more apparent in Toulon, a city on the Italian-occupied side of the Rhône, but whose port the Wehrmacht occupied.³¹⁴ German troops requisitioned all private automobiles in the city, including those out with the port itself, and ensured that members of the *Armée de l'Armistice* registered their presence with German officials, rather than with their Italian counterparts.³¹⁵ Although MVSN battalions were placed in Toulon, partially due to the political implications of placing them in Nice, all Italian forces were officially subordinate to Germany in operational terms.³¹⁶

Developments in France demonstrated one of the fundamental problems encountered by Italy: that the real power, even in Italo-French relations, lay in Germany. As Davide Rodogno points out, Italy attempted to intervene and in some cases managed to carve out her own policy, but her opportunities to make a mark in France on a substantial level were limited by both the German and French governments.³¹⁷ Italy mistakenly believed that Germany always planned to make a peace treaty with France that would regulate Franco-Axis relations, giving Italy a permanent upper-hand in future negotiations.³¹⁸ In reality, Germany made her own

³¹¹ S. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, pp. 21-2; J. Tomasevich, *War and Occupation in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*, p. 94; V. Rothwell, *War Aims in the Second World War, the War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939-45*, Edinburgh (2005), p. 43. On the precise demarcation lines in Yugoslavia see, F.P. Verna, "Notes on Italian Rule in Dalmatia under Bastianini, 1941-1943", *The International History Review*, 12, 3 (1990).

³¹² M. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, p. 21, provides a map of the Italian, German and Bulgarian occupation zones in Greece; F. Cappellano, "L'occupazione italiana della Grecia (1941-43)", *Nuova storia contemporanea*, 12, 4 (2008).

³¹³ U. Cavallero, *Diario*, 27.11.42, pp. 597-8.

³¹⁴ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, pp. 191-2; J. Maignon, *Toulon et le Var dans la guerre*, p. 73.

³¹⁵ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, "Il R. Delegato ai Rimpatri all'Eccellenza Türr, Ammiraglio di Squadra-Comando, Piazza di Tolone", 17.12.42; ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, "Ordinanza concernente la dichiarazioni di presenza obbligatoria dei membri smobilitati dell'esercito di transizione francesi del 2 dicembre 1942".

³¹⁶ DSCS, Vol. 9, t. 2, Doc. 73, "Allegato 1 all'allegato 1922, Mario Vercellino allo Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito", 17.2.43; ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, "Colonello Reichel al Nucleo di Collegamento del Comando della 4^a Armata", 11.12.42; on the MVSN in Toulon, see. A. Rossi, *Le guerre delle Camicie Nere*, p. 187.

³¹⁷ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 210.

³¹⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 1, "Organismo di Controllo di Esecuzione Articolo XXI, Convenzione di Armistizio al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 18.12.40. For Laval's sentiments on a Franco-Axis peace, see ASMAE, AP,

arrangements, often leaving Italian post-war plans and territorial ambitions completely out of their own considerations. This reflected the shifting of Germany's primary ally from Italy to France. As in negotiations with Franco, German officials felt that it was more useful for Germany to placate France than Mussolini.³¹⁹ This undermined Italy's position vis-à-vis France, particularly as Italy's position of strength immediately following the signing of the armistice stemmed from their position as Germany's ally.

This loss in prestige convinced Italy that a hard-line approach to France was the only way of regaining her position of strength in Italo-French relations. Italy, therefore, stringently adhered to the armistice agreements in order to gain maximum leverage in France. Whilst this generated some political successes in France, notably that France was unable to end the Italian occupation, nor was she able to renounce the armistice accords despite her newly-forged role as Germany's ally, it would be less successful in the economic sphere. As we shall see in the following chapter, the Italian insistence upon observing the terms of the armistice to the letter would become a hindrance. In economic terms, Italy sought to create a suitable means of circumventing the terms of the armistice without renouncing it entirely. In both political and economic relations, however, Italy looked upon the German occupation in the north with envious eyes, attempting to mimic its structure in the hope of mirroring its success. Her inability to do so was partially due to her ignorance of how the German system really operated and her lack of military strength to impose such an agreement.

Francia, b. 59, "Calisse al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 23.10.42, though Laval's comments are almost always framed within Franco-German relations.

³¹⁹ P. Preston, "Franco and Hitler, the Myth of Hendaye, 1940", *Contemporary European History*, 1, 1 (1992).

Chapter 4. Economic and Financial Relations

Italy's economic views of France and their place in Italo-French relations were partially conditioned by the prestige that she felt that she would gain following an Axis victory. Italian post-war planners' view of Europe envisaged a series of economic spheres of influence, co-existing, but never overlapping. Italian economists imagined a large customs union forged together by a "lira zone".³²⁰ This single-currency unit would encompass and combine Italy's annexed territories in Europe and the territories in North Africa which they would acquire, supplementing their existing African holdings. These plans, however, were predicated upon the mistaken assumption that the Axis would win the war and hold a commanding position at the peace table. This assumption was augmented by the fact that Italy often looked at German gains with eager or jealous eyes, assuming that military victory alone had brought about these gains. As in political negotiations, Italy fundamentally misunderstood Germany's methods. Whilst she sought to mimic them to a lesser extent than she sought to directly mimic Germany's political apparatuses, Italy hoped that victory would bring about a radical shift in Italy's economic position vis-à-vis France.

Given the importance of occupation on the economies of Europe, it is perhaps surprising that more literature has not been produced on the Italian occupation and the economic dimensions of Italo-French relations.³²¹ Outside of Davide Rodogno's monograph, Diane Grillère has produced the only meaningful study for a number of years.³²² This chapter, however, wishes to place these developments within the wider context of Italo-French relations. As in political relations, economic discussions were framed within the terms of the armistice, even as it became rapidly more obvious that the armistice was wholly insufficient to be used as the sole basis of negotiation. This chapter will argue that the Italian government and its political and economic representatives within the zone were able to forge their own path at key moments, notably the independently negotiated Conference of Rome, discussed below. In addition, Italian economic inspectors and members of the CIAF and the Italian armed forces were able to make large-scale requisitions, often circumventing measures designed to limit Italian economic influence in the south-east. Nonetheless, it will also

³²⁰ D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", pp. 147-8.

³²¹ H. Klemann and S. Kudryashov, *Occupied Economies, an Economic History of Occupied Europe, 1939-1945*, London and New York (2012), is the latest overview emphasising the importance of occupation, but also stressing that it must be placed into wider trends.

³²² D. Grillère, "Entreprises françaises et occupation italienne: une politique économique de l'Italie fasciste au service des buts de guerre?", *Entreprises et histoire*, 62 (2011).

demonstrate that, as in the political sphere, Italian actions in the region were limited both by the ambitions of the various German ministries operating in France, and by the desire of those ministries to cultivate friendship with France in the post-war world. Thus, economic concerns were never far from the same issues that plagued political discussions.

I.

Italo-French relations at an official level largely centred on the issues of military stockpiles and war production. Article X of the armistice compelled France to stockpile all military equipment, giving Italy the power of inspection over these stockpiles and of war production facilities.³²³ This power of inspection spread far beyond the territory that Italy had occupied in 1940, and indeed far beyond what Italian irredentists had demanded prior to the outbreak of war. Cities and facilities as distant as Lyon, Marseille and Saint-Étienne now found themselves subject to the regular visits of Italian military inspectors.³²⁴ The pre-war irredentist targets of Toulon and Corsica were also visited regularly by economic inspectors due to their proximity to Italy and their strategically important positions on the Mediterranean.³²⁵ These inspections were carried out through the various *Sottocommissione* that reported to the CIAF. Even before the expansion of the zone of occupation in November 1942, therefore, Italian economic delegates and representatives of the CIAF could be found in Nice, Toulon, Grenoble, Annecy and Marseille.³²⁶ Unlike the two separate zones of occupation which remained separate until Italy's surrender in 1943, Italian and German inspectorial rights overlapped in France from the very outset. The appearance of German officials and economic inspectors in the south prompted concerned French officials to fear an 'invisible occupation' of the Free Zone.³²⁷ This was an ongoing problem for the French government, who issued orders to their generals that all Italian inspection teams must be

³²³ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di Armistizio", pp. 78-9; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, "Convention d'armistice avec l'Italie", 24.6.40, pp. 167-73; a similar clause can be found in Article XIII of the Franco-German armistice, see *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. IX, Doc. 522, "Record of the Second Day's Negotiations on the Armistice at Compiègne on June 22, 1940", p. 674.

³²⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Esperti della Delegazione di Marsiglia alla Commissione d'Armistizio di Torino – Sott. Affari Generali", 12.8.40, states that Italian economic inspectors should base themselves in Lyon due to the high volume of war production facilities in Lyon and Saint-Étienne.

³²⁵ AN AJ 40 1400, "Francia Metropolitana, Storia dell'Armistizio fino al 15 settembre 1941, Allegati – B"; J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 27-8

³²⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Organizzazione della CIAF al 15 ottobre 1941", 15.10.41.

³²⁷ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Capitano Malfatti alla Commissione Italiana di Armistizio, Sottocommissione Affari Generali", 4.10.40; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 4, "Il Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale al Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 26.12.41; D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 251.

accompanied by a French officer during visits to facilities.³²⁸ The economic dimension of the Italian occupation, therefore, must be seen as something more than simple inspection visits, but were often used in tandem with the DRAs by the CIAF to gauge public opinion in France and to ascertain how far the armistice terms were being followed.

Those tasked with implementing Article X shortly after the occupation in 1940 drew up a schedule for the demilitarisation of the territories behind the *Linea rossa*. Initial demilitarisation would take place between 29 June and 31 July 1940, followed by the transportation of war materials to Italy between July and October of the same year.³²⁹ Remaining material would then be consigned to assigned depots across France in order to facilitate transport to Italy.³³⁰ Nonetheless, this plan displayed the early fissures in relations over war material, which remained one of the most contentious sections of the armistice. The French government believed that material evacuated from the demilitarised zone would not come under Italian inspection, only to be rebuffed by Article XI of the armistice which stated that all material – including that in the “unoccupied territories” – would be subject to the scrutiny of Italian economic inspectors.³³¹

Article X was the subject of so much debate between the two governments that negotiations were proposed in order to clarify the terms, end dispute, and regulate the imposition of the armistice. By 1941, the suggested solution was a meeting, agreed upon by representatives of the Ministère des Finances, which would mimic the outlines of the abandoned Franco-German Paris Protocols, an attempt by the Ministère des Finances to reduce the daily occupation payments thereby regulating economic relations between Vichy and Berlin.³³² In reality, Article X had been a hindrance to both sides for some time: French officials felt that the Italian military wielded too much control over her military stockpiles, whilst Italian inspectors and economic planners desired a German-style occupation payment.³³³ The abolition of Article X and its replacement with a system of occupation

³²⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Le Ministre Secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur à MM. les Préfets”, nd; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Appunto per l’Eccellenza, il Presidente CIA”, nd. Both documents are undated, but attached to documents produced in November 1940.

³²⁹ AN AJ 40 1400, “Francia Metropolitana, Storia dell’Armistizio fino al 15 settembre 1941, Allegati – B”, nd.

³³⁰ Ibid. Depots were situated in Annecy, Chambéry, Digne, Grenoble, Gap, Fréjus, Vidauban, and Draguinan.

³³¹ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di Armistizio”, 24.6.40, p. 79; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, “Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”, 24.6.40, pp. 167-73.

³³² AN AJ 41 2152, “Note Verbale per il Presidente della Delegazione Francese di Armistizio”, 12.10.41. The Paris Protocols are discussed in R. Paxton, *Vichy France*, pp. 117-8, and in B. Lambauer, *Otto Abetz et les français, ou l’envers de la Collaboration*, pp. 339-50.

³³³ AN AJ 41 2152, “L’Amiral Duplat, Président de la Délégation Française à la Commission Italienne d’Armistice [à] Monsieur le Ministre, Secrétaire d’État à la Guerre”, 26.6.41; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “[Indecipherable] al Regio Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 28.8.41.

payments should have been an easy process, opposed by neither side. The disagreement over this procedure, however, gives us greater insight into the nature of the Italo-French armistice. As we have seen, Italy saw the armistice as a short-term agreement between Italy and France which would be discarded in favour of a more substantial peace treaty following the anticipated surrender of Britain in 1940. As a result, Article X was never intended as a permanent feature of Italo-French relations. By mid-1941, French officials stated that if Article X were abandoned, this would represent such an overhaul in Italo-French relations that an entirely new political framework should be constructed to replace the now-unrecognisable armistice.³³⁴ Serious concerns, however, existed within the CIAF that a serious shift in political relations between the two countries would lead to a new agreement substantially weighted in France's favour.³³⁵ It was decided that economic negotiations should be held in order to regulate and adjust existing economic agreements between the two sides. The Conference of Rome – the series of economic talks which were roughly the equivalent of the abandoned Franco-German Paris Protocols which took place in May 1941 – was conducted in pursuit of a compromise. Despite their similarities, the two conferences did differ in their perceived importance. Whilst the meetings pertaining to the Paris Protocols were attended by Darlan and Abetz prior to their abandonment, the Conference of Rome was conducted by officials of the CIAF and DFCIA and by economic experts from the two finance ministries. Nonetheless, the Conference of Rome would have far more influence over Italo-French relations than the Paris Protocols did over Franco-German relations.

The Conference aimed to sweep away existing Italo-French economic agreements that had lapsed. In August 1940, it was agreed that France would ship just over 120 million lire of industrial products and raw materials to Italy in return for substantial quantities of zinc. This agreement had been made with the intention of boosting trade, but in the end neither side had the inclination to carry out their side of the agreement. Davide Rodogno estimates that French payments only amounted to 50 million lire worth of goods and materials, whilst Italy reciprocated with only 30 million lire.³³⁶ The development of trade was championed by companies in both countries, but the lack of an overarching economic framework, which Germany had achieved in a very abstract manner in the form of collaboration, and a relationship hampered by strict adherence to the armistice meant that agreements often fell

³³⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Le Président de la Délégation Française, Duplat, à [Monsieur le Général] Vacca Maggiolini”, 30.8.[41].

³³⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Nota Verbale per l’Eccellenza l’Ammiraglio Duplat”, 23.8.41.

³³⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 249-50.

victim to lacklustre implementation.³³⁷ Many businesses were also afraid to trade with either Axis power for fear of being branded collaborators or profiteers.³³⁸ In addition, the failure to create a large-scale framework of economic collaboration between the two states compounded barriers between French and Italian firms. As Hervé Joly has pointed out, successful collaboration between businesses did not simply come from companies and enterprises alone, but from instances in which both businesses and the state pursued similar policies of economic co-operation.³³⁹

Whilst the Conference of Rome, which finally took place in late-1941, failed to address the lack of large-scale collaboration between businesses, it did agree that France would pay 2.6 billion francs in place of the aforementioned trade shipments, a much lower figure than the initial payment of five billion francs requested by Italy.³⁴⁰ Of this 2.6 billion, fifty-two per-cent would be allocated for occupation costs, awarding Italy 1.352 billion francs for occupying the territory behind the *Linea verde*.³⁴¹ These occupation costs were greatly overshadowed by Germany's own demands which amounted to 20 million Reichsmarks per day – a figure that increased as the war went on – and were far greater than what was actually required.³⁴² One of the fundamental differences in negotiations was that all agreements made between Germany and France were conducted in artificially overvalued Reichsmarks, whilst those made between Italy and France were often conducted in undervalued francs. Nonetheless, this would prove to be one of the sole financial strengths for Italy arising from the Conference of Rome. Thirty-two per-cent of the 2.6 billion francs were allocated for gold purchases. The price of gold was set at 57,681 francs per kilogram,

³³⁷ Ibid.

³³⁸ R. Gildea, D. Luyten and J. Fürst, "To Work or not to Work?", in R. Gildea, O. Wiewiorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006), p. 44.

³³⁹ H. Joly, "The Economy of Occupied and Vichy France: Constraints and Opportunities", in J. Lund (ed.), *Working for the New Order, European Business under German Domination, 1939-1945*, Copenhagen (2006), p. 101.

³⁴⁰ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, "I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma", 22.11.41, pp. 210-1; AN AJ 41 2152, "Compte-Rendu, n. 4, au sujet de la participation de la Délégation militaire à la Conférence", 22.11.41.

³⁴¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Ecc. il Ministro [degli Affari Esteri]", 22.11.41. This document is marked "Vista dal Duce", meaning that it would have been seen by both Ciano and Mussolini. See also, R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, "I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma", 22.11.41, pp. 210-1.

³⁴² G. Aly, *Hitler's Beneficiaries*, pp. 146-7; A.S. Milward, *The New Order and the French Economy*, p. 58; Davide Rodogno affixes the grand total paid to Germany by France at 120.4 billion francs, excluding goods and clearings, see D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 248. Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham calculate the costs paid from France to Germany as 35.25 billion Reichsmarks, see J. Noakes and G. Pridham (eds.), *Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, A Documentary Reader*, Exeter (2001) Doc. 635, "Payments of occupation costs in billions of RM", p. 295.

allowing Italy to expand her gold reserves at a cut-value, artificially-high lira-valued rate.³⁴³ Much of Italy's gold reserves had been spent fighting in Ethiopia and in the Spanish Civil War. The problem had been exacerbated by the severance of diplomatic ties with the Allied powers in 1940, precluding her from replenishing these stocks. This also aided the purchase of portions of French companies, which the remaining sixteen per-cent of the Conference of Rome payments were allocated for.³⁴⁴

The Conference of Rome provided benefits for both sides, yet neither could count it as an overwhelming political victory. For France, the agreement freed her from making regular deliveries of raw materials and goods. Moreover, it destroyed the possibility that Italy could remove materials from these stockpiles. This was particularly important for France, as the threat of such removal had ensured French adherence to the armistice. Whilst Italian officials retained some inspection rights over war production, she gained occupation costs on a far greater scale than was required and the right to purchase gold at an artificially favourable rate. Nonetheless, it did not form the basis of a new Italo-French political framework, as the French government would have liked, nor did it usher in an era of greater Italian economic exploitation, as Italy would have liked. Despite these shortcomings for both sides, it did signal a step forward in Italo-French negotiations, which had hitherto been sporadic or conducted under the shadow of Germany. What has been overlooked by contemporaries, however, was the degree of independent action by the Italian government that the Conference represented; it has been equally overlooked by historians.³⁴⁵ As late as November 1941, German officials contacted the CIAF requesting details of the proceedings and what the full financial implications would be.³⁴⁶ Despite the regular contact between the CIAF and the DWStK, the details of the Conference of Rome were not related to Germany by either Italian or French participants until both sides had come to an agreement. In this way, it challenges the view that Italy had no opportunity to exercise autonomous action in wider Franco-Axis relations.

This autonomy stood in stark contrast to many of the other economic concessions granted

³⁴³ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, "I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma", 22.11.41, p. 210.

³⁴⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Ecc. il Ministro [degli Affari Esteri]", 22.11.41; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, "I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma", 22.11.41, pp. 210-1.

³⁴⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, mentions the Conference, but does not fully explore its importance; J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, does not mention the Conference whatsoever; the Conference falls out with the remit of D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol 2, prints a number of documents pertaining to the Conference, but it is clear from the archival holdings that existing secondary literature has overlooked it.

³⁴⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Il Presidente della Sottocommissione, Liberati, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 18.11.41.

to Italy, which often came at the behest of Germany. From the early months of the occupation, Berlin sought to limit Rome's influence in French affairs. Both the OKW and the German Ministry of Economics initially hoped to keep all Franco-Axis economic and financial transactions solely in German hands. These same German bodies insisted upon maintaining total control over all of France's borders, including the Italo-French border.³⁴⁷ The decision to relent and allow Italy to control the Italo-French frontier, the Mediterranean coast, and to participate in German central economic control organisations in Paris, albeit in a small role, most likely came about in order to avoid embarrassing the Italian government.³⁴⁸ Even these small concessions came with German stipulations: Italian hopes that the demarcation line may become relaxed or even abolished were "out of the question if the control at the... Franco-Italian border is not carried out exclusively under German responsibility".³⁴⁹

Although the opposition of French businesses, ministries and politicians should not be underestimated or discounted out of hand, it was Germany that represented the most formidable obstacle to Italian economic penetration of France. There can be many parallels drawn between German actions to limit Italian economic gains in France and similar intentions in the Balkans, despite the radically different circumstances. Following the invasion and rapid collapse of Yugoslavia, Germany chose her spheres of influence extremely carefully, selecting economically rich territories which would present as few security problems for the Wehrmacht as was possible.³⁵⁰ Similar concerns were at the forefront of German planners' minds when territories were divided in Greece: within weeks of the commencement of the occupation, Germany had seized the entire Greek mining industry and controlled many of the major ports.³⁵¹ Whilst French businesses were allowed to operate with a far greater degree of independence than those in the Balkans, in both territories Germany used her influence and dominant position in order to ensure that she remained the pre-eminent Axis power.

³⁴⁷ *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. No. 337, "Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department", 13.8.40, pp. 474-5.

³⁴⁸ *Ibid*; *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. No. 360, "Confidential Protocol [signed at Berlin]", 17.8.40, pp. 503-4.

³⁴⁹ *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. No. 338, "Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department", 13.8.40, pp. 476-7.

³⁵⁰ S. Pavlowitch, *Hitler's New Disorder*, pp. 27-8; J. Vujosevic, "L'occupation italienne [en Yougoslavie]", *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale*, 87 (1982), pp. 33-6.

³⁵¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp 236-7; M. Mazower, *Inside Hitler's Greece*, pp. 15-22.

II.

Italy's powers outside the annexed territories differed greatly from what she exercised behind the *Linea verde*. The expansion of the zone of occupation following the Allied landings in North Africa brought direct occupation and greater control by the Comando Supremo into hitherto unoccupied territory.³⁵² The creation of this new zone of occupation was not accompanied by any change in legal status or the opening of dialogue between Rome and Vichy in order to establish what powers the Italian military and government were to acquire. This political uncertainty led – directly and indirectly – to similar debates and disagreements in the economic and financial spheres, both compounding existing problems and creating new ones.

The decision made by Hitler and the German armed forces to occupy the hitherto unoccupied south of France in November 1942 meant that French responses to the arrival of Axis troops were both sudden and taken at a local level. In those communes occupied by the Italians, French mayors received instructions that all requisition orders must be signed by the *Préfet*.³⁵³ At the same time, many of the *Préfets* were writing to the mayor of their *départements* to reiterate that the power to make requisitions did not rest with the Italian authorities, but only with the French government.³⁵⁴ These decisions, however, did not simply spring from the rapidity of the arrival of Italian occupying troops, but at least in part from the legal debates which had characterised political disputes earlier in the occupation. The abolition of Article X meant that Italy no longer controlled French military stockpiles, and materials under threat of requisition could only be taken from the demilitarised and reconstituted French *Armée de l'Armistice*.³⁵⁵ As we shall see, Italian economic inspectors increasingly shrouded requisition orders in ambiguous legal terminology and emergency measures that went far beyond the scope of the armistice.

This abuse of the requisitioning rights began almost immediately and took two principal forms. Firstly, Italy began requisitioning materials that had once belonged to the French army but had now passed into civilian hands. These items were simply labelled as military goods by the Italians, and therefore subject to requisitioning laws. The second principal form was

³⁵² D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitan francesi*, D. 3 IV, "Comunicato dell' Agenzia Inter-Allied Review in data 15 novembre 1942", pp. 656-7.

³⁵³ AMN 3H 065-2, "Le Colonel Labarthe, Commandant la Subdivision Militaire de Nice à Monsieur le Maire de la Ville de Nice", 13.11.42.

³⁵⁴ AMN 3H 065-2, "Le Conseiller d'État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Maire de Nice", nd.

³⁵⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Protocollo relative all' articolo X della Convenzione d' Armistizio italo-francese", nd.

the requisitioning of goods which served both a civilian and military purpose. In most cases, Italian officials treated any goods that could serve a military purpose as military material. Both practices took place even before the expansion of the zone of occupation, but were not directly requisitioned in the same way. More often, the Italian acquisition of raw materials in France took the form of purchases, often at a rate overwhelmingly favourable to Italy.³⁵⁶ Following the occupation of the hitherto unoccupied territories, however, Italy declared that any material deemed essential for the “defence of Europe” would be subject to requisition.³⁵⁷ This declaration, combined with the declaration of the Comando Supremo to the DFCIA that Italy would exercise all rights of an occupying power, created the framework for Italy to carry out these abuses.³⁵⁸

The first of these abuses is best exemplified by Italy’s large-scale requisitioning of horses and mules. As motorised transport became scarce and petroleum even more difficult to obtain, mules and horses were increasingly sought by both the Regio Esercito and the Italian authorities operating in France as alternative means of transportation. As pack animals were used by the French army, particularly following its demobilisation in 1940, they fell under the category of war materials, allowing the Italian armed forces and the CIAF to requisition them as military property.³⁵⁹ In some cases, Italy’s right to requisition military property had not been affected by the Conference of Rome as it had been regulated by Article XI of the armistice.³⁶⁰ Article XI had stated that materials taken from the demobilised French forces were to be collected and placed under the control of the Italian and German armed forces.³⁶¹ As a result, Italian officials were able to claim that pack animals that belonged to French farmers had once belonged to the French army and requisition them under the still-active Article XI. The invasion of the Soviet Union had blocked overland trade routes to Asia, whilst the entry of the United States into the war had strengthened the economic blockade. This abuse of requisitioning rights, therefore, increased as the war went on and the ability of

³⁵⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione, T. Pigozzi, alla Delegazione Economica Francese, Torino”, 5.11.41. The purchase of large quantities of magnesium is mooted extremely early on in ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Appunto per il Duce [dal Ministero delle Finanze]”, 12.7.40.

³⁵⁷ *DSCS*, Vol. 9, t. 2, Doc. 42, Allegato n. 1 all’allegato n. 1025, “Von Neubronn, Generale di OB West al Segretario di Stato presso il Capo del Governo, Ammiraglio Platon”, 27.12.42, pp. 105-6; AN AJ 41 1186, “Le Général de Brigade, Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri, à l’Amiral Platon”, 18.3.43.

³⁵⁸ *DSCS*, Vol. 9, t. 2, Doc. 22, Allegato n. 430-bis al Diario Storico, “Giovanni Magli, appunto per il Ministero degli Affari Esteri, al Segretario di Stato presso il Capo del Governo, Ammiraglio Platon”, 6.1.43, p. 54.

³⁵⁹ AN AJ 41 1177, “Le Ministre, Secrétaire d’État à l’Agriculture et du ravitaillement à Monsieur [les Préfets des tous départements occupés]”, 30.9.43.

³⁶⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Liberati al Regio Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 2.9.41; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, “I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma”, 22.11.41, pp. 210-1.

³⁶¹ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di Armistizio”, pp. 76-82; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, “Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”, 24.6.40, pp. 169-70.

the Axis to procure materials became progressively worse.

The French government fought to end the requisitioning of pack animals. In a long letter written in May 1943, French officials rejected the demands from the IV Armata to hand over 4,000 mules, instead proposing a counter-offer of 1,400.³⁶² This counter-offer was probably a closer figure to the true number of animals belonging to the military. According to post-Italian occupation figures, Italian forces managed to requisition 779 mules from the *Armée d'Armistice*, whilst seizing a further 513 which the French army had lent to farmers in order to aid agricultural production.³⁶³ Many of these mules had been removed from military service in order to combat food shortages, in part due to the mass recruitment for the *Service du Travail Obligatoire* (Obligatory Work Service – STO).³⁶⁴ Italy frequently bypassed her restrictions on requisitioning solely military material, employing the three-tiered categorisation of war materials governed by Article XI. The third of these categories – Type ‘C’ materials – included all goods belonging to the demobilised units of the French army.³⁶⁵ This interpretation of Article XI allowed Italy to requisition more than pack animals. In Grenoble, French authorities protested against the requisitioning of aluminium lunchboxes belonging to the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse*, refuting Italy’s claims that they were a military unit.³⁶⁶ In reality, Italian authorities were far more interested in the value of the metal itself than in seizing lunchboxes.

Despite pleas to halt their requisitioning of pack animals due to the effects on French agriculture, Italian officials continued to seek other ways of gaining as much material from France as possible.³⁶⁷ In an attempt to bypass legal restrictions on what Italy could requisition, she turned to clandestine purchasing, offering civilians good prices for their pack animals.³⁶⁸ These offers often turned out to be more financially sound for the Italian government than for the French economy as such purchases were often paid for in artificially-

³⁶² AN AJ 41 1177, “Memento, La question des quadrupedes”, 7.5.43.

³⁶³ AN AJ 41 1177, “Note pour Monsieur le Chef de la Section Militaire de Liaison”, 18.11.43.

³⁶⁴ AN F1^a CIII 1158, “Le Ministre, Secrétaire d’État a l’Agriculture et du Ravitaillement à Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement”, 15.12.42; AN F1^a CIII 1186, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 27 février 1943”; J-L. Panicacci, “Les Alpes-Maritimes”, in *Les temps des restrictions en France (1939-1949)*, *Cahiers de l’Institut d’histoire du temps present*, 32/33 (1996)

³⁶⁵ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “Appunto”, 30.9.41. The continued existence of Article XI had been guaranteed by the Conference of Rome, see R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 209, “I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma”, 22.11.41, pp. 210-1.

³⁶⁶ AN AJ 41 1178, “Compte-Rendu, No. 141”, 28.7.43. On Italy’s interpretation of the *Chantiers de la Jeunesse* as a paramilitary force see, ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 68, “Il Generale Commandante, Mario Vercellino, alla CIAF Presidenza [e] al Comando Supremo”, 7.6.43; ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 11, “Il Prefetto, G.B. Marziali, al Commissario Civile di Bessans”, 16.3.41.

³⁶⁷ AN AJ 41 1177, “Prelevements d’animaux français par les Italiens”, 13.10.43, reveals that French officials had informed Italy of the importance of these animals to French agriculture.

³⁶⁸ AN AJ 41 1177, “Compte-Rendu, No. 162”, 28.9.43.

inflated lire.³⁶⁹ Such purchases were not only inexpensive for Italy, they benefitted individual French sellers who reaped large amounts of foreign currency in the short term. In the long-term, however, such sales weakened the French economy and French agricultural output.³⁷⁰ These purchases, compounded by outright requisitioning, became such an impediment to French agricultural growth that the French government decreed that not only must all animals sold to the Italian administration be declared, but that it should also be declared whether or not these animals had at any point belonged to the French armed forces.³⁷¹ This not only allowed France to create a more accurate picture of how many animals the Italians had removed from France, but also to measure the effects on food production.³⁷²

In cases where goods served a dual civilian-military use, the Italian army could demand that such goods be put at their direct disposal, often avoiding outright requisitioning, but ensuring that Italian officials could fully exploit French services. In Nice, the mayor, Jean Médecin, complained that Italian authorities were using motor vehicles officially designated for the purposes of local authorities.³⁷³ Médecin complained to the *Préfet* of the *département*, Marcel Ribière that Italian officials had managed to travel 1,499 kilometres in one car, using 210 litres of petrol in the space of less than one month.³⁷⁴ Multiple letters from a myriad of departments in the Niçois government state that they did not necessarily object to Italian officials using governmental motor vehicles, but suggested that they should be asked to provide their own petrol.³⁷⁵ Use of French petrol benefitted Italy as it meant that she did not have to eat into her own ever-dwindling supplies. Requisitioning this petrol, however, became progressively more difficult for Italy as military stockpiles became increasingly attractive targets for resistance groups.³⁷⁶ As with pack animals, Italian officers and officials from the CIAF approached civilians and non-military groups with offers to purchase petrol

³⁶⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, “L’Ispettore Generale Capo, Tommaso Lazzari, al Ministero degli Affari Esteri e al Ministero delle Finanze”, 30.6.41, shows that the lira-franc exchange rate was pushed from 30:100 to 38:100 in an attempt to avoid decimating French commerce with Italy.

³⁷⁰ D. Veillon, *Vivre et survivre en France, 1939-1947*, Paris (1995), p. 91. Panicacci estimates that not only were pack animals being purchased, but that large quantities of straw and hay were also purchased, see J-L. Panicacci, *L’occupation italienne*, p. 175.

³⁷¹ AN AJ 41 1177, “Le Lt.-Colonel Gauthier, Chef de la Section Française d’Armistice d’Avignon à Monsieur le Secrétaire Général auprès du Chef du Gouvernement”, 25.6.43.

³⁷² AN AJ 41 1177, “Note d’information, No. 3340”, 28.9.43.

³⁷³ AMN 3H 65-2, “Le Sénateur-Maire de Nice à Monsieur le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes”, 6.2.43.

³⁷⁴ AMN 3H 65-2, “Services Techniques, Note pour M. le Secrétaire Général”, 20.1.43. This is an enormous distance and almost equals a journey between Nice and Palermo.

³⁷⁵ AMN 3H 65-2, “Fourniture d’une voiture au Bureau Militaire”, 24.5.43; AMN 3H 65-2, “Note à Monsieur Gitenet”, 24.4.43.

³⁷⁶ ADAM 0166W 0011, “Rapport à Monsieur le Commissaire Central, No. 3462”, 12.5.43; ADAM 0166W 0011, “L’Eclaireur de Nice et du Sud-Est de 13.5.43”.

stockpiles.³⁷⁷ Direct requisitioning of goods which could arguably serve a military purchase went further than petrol. In the Basses-Alpes, French officials objected that reserves of tear gas earmarked for requisitioning belonged to the police, and had never belonged to the military.³⁷⁸ These dual-purpose materials – civilian and military – were constantly interpreted by Italy in order to gain as much materially as she could. Petrol belonging to local administrations could not be definitively proven to have belonged to the military, whilst an Italian memorandum from June 1940 states that the armed forces and reserves must demobilise, whilst saying nothing of the French police forces.³⁷⁹ In addition, numerous forced purchases or outright theft at a local level augmented the Italian administration's national policy of making purchases from the French government directly. Many of these purchases undoubtedly flew under the radar of centralised French ministries, and form a patchwork of local transactions which sought to undermine the agreed Italo-French national agreement.

What do these requisitioning practices reveal about the Italian administration in France? Unsurprisingly, they show that Italy was not prepared to remain within her own self-imposed legal confines when it came to requisitioning materials. They also reveal why Italian officials were not prepared to discuss or modify Article XI at the Conference of Rome at a time when Article X was all but abolished.³⁸⁰ Nonetheless, they also reveal some of the weaknesses in the Italian system. This is particularly so when Italy's system of requisitioning is placed side-by-side with that of Germany. Although Italian officers managed to make purchases in order to circumvent legal barriers, her way of doing so seems far more inefficient to those carried out by Germany. Unlike Germany, Italy never managed to create a clearing system which had enabled Germany to purchase huge quantities of French goods at extremely favourable rates.³⁸¹ In negotiations prior to the Conference of Rome, both Italy and France discussed the possibility of credit in part-exchange for the abolition of Article X, but no system had been

³⁷⁷ AN AJ 41 1178, "Le Général de Corps d'Armée Bridoux à Monsieur le Général Représentant en France le Commandant Suprême Italien", 17.6.43.

³⁷⁸ AN AJ 41 1178, "Le Général de Corps d'Armée Bridoux à Monsieur le Général Représentant en France le Commandant Suprême Italien", 8.6.43.

³⁷⁹ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 4, "Memoria italiana sulla smilitarizzazione", 24.6.40, pp. 54-5; AN AJ 40 1401, "Appunto No. 12, Sull'attività svolta dalla Commissione Italiana di Armistizio nel periodo 1-15 Dicembre 1940 – XIX". No mention is made in the Italo-French armistice of the demilitarisation of the police, see *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di Armistizio", pp. 78-9; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, "Convention d'armistice avec l'Italie", 24.6.40, pp. 167-73

³⁸⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Liberati al Regio Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 2.9.41.

³⁸¹ P. Lieberman, *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies*, Princeton (1996), p. 41; M. Mazower, *Hitler's Empire, Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe*, London (2008), p. 271; A.S. Milward, *War, Economy and Society*, p. 137; A. Tooze, *The Wages of Destruction*, pp. 388-91.

developed by the time any agreement had been signed.³⁸² Instead, Italian practices bore more similarities to colonial requisitioning where occupiers could either take or purchase goods. To some degree, therefore, this system of purchases made under artificial economic conditions represented a layer of economic violence. French farmers confronted by units of the Italian armed forces offering them artificially over-valued lire would certainly have been intimidating and came about at a time of confusion for ordinary citizens. Whilst sources do not explicitly state that purchases were made at the end of the barrel of a gun, individuals more than likely feared confrontation with the Italian military. It was perhaps partially for this reason that the French government made French farmers declare the selling of pack animals to the Italian armed forces. Ultimately, however, Davide Rodogno is correct when he states that Germany, rather than France, formed Italy's most insurmountable obstacle in making headway in the French economy.³⁸³ The rising political worth of France to Germany, coupled with the fact that the majority of France's industrial and commercial basins fell under German control, inevitably limited Italy's influence. Moreover, the efforts of Abetz and others secured the support, or at least tacit complicity, of many French industrialists in a way that Italy failed to do. Despite these shortcomings, Italy wielded far more influence on the French economy than has previously been thought.³⁸⁴ Nonetheless, had Italy possessed the military or political capital that she often professed, she may have been able to claim far greater spoils from France.

The economic effects of the Italian occupation were naturally felt more rapidly in the territories behind the *Linea verde*. Although the full effects of Italianisation will be discussed in the following chapter, the economic consequences of the annexation were not limited to those communes directly occupied. The Bando del Duce, issued in July 1940, became the blueprint not only for political control in these territories, but the most important means of binding them economically and financially to Italy.³⁸⁵ The dual 'Bando' clauses of Article

³⁸² ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "[Indecipherable] al Regio Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 28.8.41; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Nota Verbale per l'Eccellenza l'Ammiraglio Duplat", 23.8.41; R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 33, "I protocolli degli accordi economici di Roma", 22.11.41, pp. 209-12.

³⁸³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 251.

³⁸⁴ Neither of the two volumes of Yves Bouthillier's memoirs mention Italy's occupation in any real capacity, focusing on the Protocols of Paris, and completely ignoring the Conference of Rome despite his capacity as *Ministre des Finances*, see Y. Bouthillier, *Le drame de Vichy*, 2 vols. Paris (1950-1). A.S Milward, *The New Order and the French Economy*, does not mention Italy or Italian exploitation at all, only P. Guillen, "La coopération économique entre la France et l'Italie de septembre 1939 à septembre 1943", in J-B. Duroselle and E. Serra (eds.), *Italia e Francia, 1939-1945, Vol. 1*, Milan (1984), gives any indication of Italo-French economic relations.

³⁸⁵ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, "Bando del Duce", pp. 91-100.

IX, which subjected the movement of goods between France and Italy to Italian law, and Article XII, which demolished existing impediments to the circulation of goods between Italy and the territories behind the *Linea verde*, attempted to shift the economic and financial focus of these communes in the direction of Rome.³⁸⁶ Italy quickly attempted to keep as much capital as possible in the newly annexed territories. Article XVII of the ‘Bando’ stated that French civilians could only remove 250 lire or 1,000 francs in cash from the annexed territories if returning to France.³⁸⁷ French officials complained that this effectively allowed Italy to keep the remainder of civilians’ bank accounts by freezing them and only releasing the remaining amounts if civilians were to reside permanently in Italy.³⁸⁸ Property was effectively seized as well by Article XI which forbade the movement of artworks and other valuable objects.³⁸⁹ Restrictions on the removal of property were eased as some Italian officials allowed French civilians to remove goods with little intrinsic economic worth, and as many former French residents realised that Italy’s occupation of these territories was not short-term. Requests of this sort were often for personal effects; in one case, a former resident of Menton was given permission to retrieve photographs of her son.³⁹⁰ In other cases, residents were permitted to return in order to reclaim furniture and household items.³⁹¹

In many cases, the requisitioning of goods and household items that represented relatively little in economic worth was far less important to Italian officials than the requisitioning of property. During the street fighting in Menton, looting by Italian troops had resulted in many everyday items being taken and never returned.³⁹² This looting was not limited to homes occupied in the territories behind the *Linea verde*, but extended to those dwellings temporarily occupied in November 1942.³⁹³ In homes occupied by the Italians in Menton and the other occupied communes, property was inventoried and placed in storage. Nonetheless,

³⁸⁶ Ibid.

³⁸⁷ Ibid. There was no limit stated in the ‘Bando’ if money was being moved from the annexed territories to Italy.

³⁸⁸ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, “L’Inspecteur Principal des Douanes à Monsieur le Délégué Royal au Raptiement près de la Délégation de la Commission d’Armistice Franco-Italienne à Modane”, 12.6.42.

³⁸⁹ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, “Bando del Duce”, p. 94.

³⁹⁰ ADAM 0397W 0059, “Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace di Mentone”, 7.2.41.

³⁹¹ AN AJ 41 2302, “Note pour son Excellence le Préfet, Chef de l’Administration des Territoires Occupés à la Commission Italienne d’Armistice”, 15.1.43; AN AJ 41 2302, “Vacca Maggiolini all’Eccellenza il Presidente della Delegazione Francese di armistizio”, 18.1.43; ADAM 0397W 0059, “Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace di Mentone”, 29.9.42.

³⁹² J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*, pp. 44-5; I. Calvino, “The Avanguardisti in Menton”, in I. Calvino, *Into the War*, London (2011), p. 27, provides a semi-fictional account of the looting. In May 1942, the PNF-backed newspaper, *Il Popolo d’Italia*, attempted to blame these thefts on Senegalese troops.

³⁹³ ADAM 0560W 0217, “Le Commissaire Principal, Chef du Services des Renseignements Généraux à Monsieur le Conseiller d’État, Préfet Régional”, 18.11.42; ADAM 0560W 0217, “Procès-Verbal, Commissaire de Police des Renseignements Généraux”, 18.11.42; ADAM 0560W 0217, “Procès-Verbal, Commissaire de Police des Renseignements Généraux”, 17.11.42.

claiming this property often proved extremely difficult without accepting permanent residence.³⁹⁴ Many former residents were extremely reluctant to live under Italian rule, but as the occupation began to be measured in years, rather than months, French civilians became increasingly worried about the state of their properties. By September 1942, Ribière brought one case to the attention of French officials of a former Menton resident who planned to return to the town in order to reclaim his two apartments.³⁹⁵

This gradual shift in property ownership formed a layer of economic Italianisation in the communes behind the *Linea verde*. Property was passed from French civilians to Italians, or at least to those willing to accept Italian rule. This process simultaneously strengthened Italian ties with the occupied territories, whilst severing existing links with France. Residents of the occupied communes were encouraged to denounce home ownership and apartments owned by enemy nations. In 1940, this meant seizing property owned by British pre-war *hivernants*, extending to property owned by citizens of the Soviet Union and the United States upon their entry to the war.³⁹⁶ Although it is not explicitly stated so in archival sources, it is likely that these apartments passed into the hands of the Italian administration and were probably used to house individuals connected to the CIAF. This process was Italy's most successful attempt to transfer wealth from France to Italy in the annexed territories as property, unlike household items, money and artwork, could not be transferred elsewhere. Although we should not overestimate the real value that can be placed upon these, the seizure of property represented not only the process of economic Italianisation, but a tangible incentive for former residents to return to their former homes.

III.

Financial relations between the two countries were at once connected and separate from economic issues. There was no armistice clause that directly dealt with future Italo-French financial dealings, a factor compounded by the involvement of individual banks, which were often out with the direct control of the Italian government.³⁹⁷ The imposition of the Italian lira

³⁹⁴ For inventories see, ADAM 0397W 00059, "Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace di Mentone", 20.5.41; ADAM 0397W 0058, "Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace di Mentone", 23.12.42.

³⁹⁵ ADAM 0560W 0217, "Le Conseiller d'État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Commissaire Principal, Chef du Services des Renseignements Généraux", 15.9.42.

³⁹⁶ ADAM 0397W 0059, "Il Capo della Segreteria Generale al Giudice di Pace", 18.6.42; ADAM 0397W 0059, "Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace, Mentone", 29.1.42.

³⁹⁷ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di Armistizio", pp. 78-9; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, "Convention d'armistice avec l'Italie", 24.6.40, pp. 167-73.

as the dominant legal currency in the annexed territories effectively hampered, or in some cases altogether eliminated, trade between those territories and France.³⁹⁸ The suggestion of Marziali, the *Prefetto* of the occupied territories, that French banknotes still in circulation in Menton be stamped further restricted the movement of capital.³⁹⁹ Such actions would have rendered their use extremely difficult in France, and have facilitated their detection by Italian customs officials. Nonetheless, the growth in Italo-French financial transactions was rendered inevitable by circumstances. France was unable to trade with neutral ports, and the possibility of trade with the Balkans meant that at the very least France would have to obtain transit rights from Italy.⁴⁰⁰ Moreover, the financial prospects of both nations were handicapped by the impossibility of trade with the United States. These factors, and the existence of pre-war trade between the two, meant that financial co-operation came about relatively quickly.

Both Italian and French banks, although initially apprehensive about collaborating, began to work together early in the war. The extension of Italian banks into the territories behind the *Linea verde* mirrored similar financial tactics employed in Italy's other territorial possessions. As early as 1939, the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro had opened its first branch in Albania; by 1942, the Banco di Napoli had twelve Albanian branches.⁴⁰¹ In Italian-occupied Dalmatia, the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, together with other Italian banks, was ordered to work together with existing financial and economic bodies to help integrate the annexed territories with Italy.⁴⁰² Whilst the actions of banks in Albania and in the Yugoslav territories had been made possible by the imposition of Italian rule there, it should be noted that the extension of Italian banking influence in France had developed organically before the outbreak of war. In this sense, the occupation merely presented banks with an opportunity to further pre-war strategies. Although the Italian government certainly encouraged such expansion, the strategy in France had existed independently.⁴⁰³

In France, financial collaboration between Italian and French banks took place on a closer and more equal footing than financial collaboration in the Balkans. In Yugoslavia, the almost-total absence of any single successor state meant that Italy could impose the kind of 'victor's justice' that she was unable to in France. This discrepancy between the two theatres

³⁹⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Bando del Duce", 30.7.40.

³⁹⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 2, fasc. 26, "Il Prefetto, G.B. Marziali, al Commissario Civile di Mentone", 17.11.42.

⁴⁰⁰ P. Guillen, "La cooperation économique entre la France et l'Italie", p. 142.

⁴⁰¹ A. Roselli, *Italy and Albania*, pp. 112-3.

⁴⁰² M. De Cecco and M. Rosario Ostuni (eds.), *Atti e Documenti, Volume III, La Bnl tra guerre colonial e guerra mondiale, 1937-1945*, Florence (1999), Doc. 131, "Verabile n. 1393 del Comitato esecutivo della Banca", p. 375.

⁴⁰³ V. Castronovo, *Storia di una banca, La Banca Nazionale del Lavoro e lo sviluppo economico italiano*, Turin (1983), p. 208.

was compounded by Germany's unwillingness to support the Italian exploitation of French banks, effectively allowing Laval to block potentially extreme measures.⁴⁰⁴ Despite these barriers, many Italian banks attempted to enter French financial markets in a more oblique manner, opening their own branches in French cities or operating in partnership with existing French banks. The Banca d'Italia investigated the possibility of opening a branch in Paris, in addition to examining the possibility of collaborating with French banks in Lyon, Nice, Marseille and Tunisia.⁴⁰⁵ Indeed, some degree of collaboration between the Banque de France and the Banca d'Italia was extremely likely, if not inevitable following the Conference of Rome. With thirty-two per-cent of Italy's promised 2.6 billion francs to be delivered in gold, the two national banks would almost certainly have some level of interaction. By mid-1942 Italian officials had tracked France's gold supply around the world and bemoaned that much of it was beyond Italy's reach. It was reported by Buti that France may have transported up to one-third of her gold supplies to British accounts or to the United States before the occupation; this was estimated as \$14,243,000 worth of gold from the Banque de France and another \$28,782,000 combined from other French banks in the United States alone.⁴⁰⁶ Even greater quantities were believed to be held in Canada.⁴⁰⁷ Although the extent to which French banks collaborated in gathering this data is not mentioned, it is clear that Italy would not have been able to track quantities to this level of detail without at least the tacit compliance of French banking staff.

Co-operation and communication between banking groups was not simply limited to the national banks; smaller Italian banks planned collaborative actions with French counterparts. In Paris and Lyon, the Banco di Roma, the Banco di Napoli, the Banco di Sicilia, the Banco Nazionale del Lavoro, the Banca d'America e d'Italia, and the Banca Nazionale d'Albania all began the process of seeking a financial presence in France.⁴⁰⁸ These approaches were not simply one-way actions. In France, the Société Générale pour favoriser le développement du Commerce et d'Industrie, the Crédit Commercial de France, and the Banque Française et

⁴⁰⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 248-9.

⁴⁰⁵ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5 2nd guerra mondiale, b. 114, fasc. 52, "Trasferimenti di fondi fra l'Italia a la Francia", 12.7.41.

⁴⁰⁶ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, "Buti al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 29.5.42; ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, "Telespresso, n. 02545", 4.2.42.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid. ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Instruction n. 13 relative à l'application des arrangements franco-italiens de 2 février 1941", nd, also gives a list of French and Italian banks seeking bilateral agreements.

Italienne pour l'Amérique du Sud all entered into negotiations with Italian banks.⁴⁰⁹ Although there is little in the archives to suggest that the majority of these projects moved past preliminary talks, there were notable exceptions. The Banco di Roma offices in France actually noted a considerable rise in holdings – 120,881,606.82 francs to 230,023,234.62 francs between December 1941 and December 1942.⁴¹⁰ The majority of this undoubtedly came from an increase in Italo-French commercial and financial transactions, as well as the use of the Banco di Roma by returning Italian migrants transferring their holdings to Italian banks. These actions were matched only by tentative expansion in more politically accessible territories. Plans drawn up by the Banca d'Italia to open branches in former Banque de France premises in Menton were frequently discussed, though progress did not often match the ambitions of banking directors.⁴¹¹ Far easier to occupy were branches of Lloyd's in Menton which served British *hivernants*, and over which France would raise no political quarrel.⁴¹² Both the Banco di Roma and the Banca Commerciale Italiana also sought permission from Buti to open branches in Monaco, who welcomed the move.⁴¹³ As Monaco remained out with the reach of the Vichy government, Italian banks may have felt that such actions presented less of a political threat to Italo-French relations than opening branches elsewhere.⁴¹⁴

Despite these proposals, Italian banking failed to make as great an impact as it hoped to in French finance. As with her failure to make as great a political impact as she might have wished, the main obstacle to Italian financial gains was Germany.⁴¹⁵ Italy's desire to coordinate financial actions with Germany, who had little interest in waiting for Italian bankers or industrialists, was based upon an Italian idea that Germany and Italy were equal partners in the Axis, an idea not shared by many in Berlin. As early as July 1940, Italian officials noted that Italo-German financial collaboration would be essential in France, particularly in

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. The Banque Française et Italienne pour l'Amérique du Sud was used by a number of wealthy Italian clients to transfer money, see ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, "Banque Française & Italienne pour l'Amérique du Sud à Monsieur [la] Ducadel Balzo", 19.12.42.

⁴¹⁰ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 324, "Banco di Roma (France) Assemblée Générale Ordinaire du 21 juin 1943, Rapport du Conseil d'Administration et du Commissaire sur le Bilan au 31 Décembre 1942, Résolutions d'Assemblée", nd.

⁴¹¹ D. Grillère, "Entreprises françaises et occupation italienne", pp. 99-100.

⁴¹² ADAM 0397W 0059, "Il Commissario Civile al Cancelliere del Giudice di Pace", 11.8.41; ADAM 0397W 0058, "Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace di Mentone", 13.1.43.

⁴¹³ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 324, "Telespresso, n. SL/RP", 9.2.43, unnumbered.

⁴¹⁴ Whilst it is true that many of Fascism's pre-war plans implicitly or explicitly included Monaco, there was no single decisive policy towards the Principality until November 1942 when Monaco was occupied at the same time as the previously unoccupied portions of France. The Italian consulate in Monaco remained open, and CIAF delegates regularly visited Monaco. For a more comprehensive examination of Monaco during this period, see P. Abramovici, *Un rocher bien occupé: Monaco pendant la guerre, 1939-1945*, Paris (2001).

⁴¹⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 251.

Paris.⁴¹⁶ The insistence of both the Italian government and the board of the Banca d'Italia in Rome upon waiting until co-ordinated plans had been established with Berlin meant that Italian plans failed to materialise.⁴¹⁷ In contrast with Italian inaction, by September 1940 German officials and government ministers were scrambling not to begin economic and financial collaboration and exploitation, but to co-ordinate it.⁴¹⁸ Banking collaboration on the scale that Italy hoped for in France would have been extremely difficult to have put into practice, at least before the establishment of a permanent peace settlement. German plans for joint banking projects between Germany, France and the United States prior to Washington's declaration of war in 1940 did not move beyond preliminary negotiations.⁴¹⁹ As Italian banking officials wisely noted immediately following the signing of the armistices, France was in a state of economic and financial re-structuring and long-term projects were difficult to envisage given this state of flux.⁴²⁰ Given the German Ministry of Economics' reluctance to co-operate with Italy on the question of operations on the Italo-French border, it is difficult to understand why Italian banking officials thought that Germany would be enthusiastic about co-ordinating all economic and financial activity, urging collaboration with Fünk above all other German ministers.⁴²¹ Although Germany did permit Italy to send a representative to the Banque de France and to the Ministère des Finances, German officials made sure that they were kept under very close supervision.⁴²²

Whilst Germany remained the main stumbling block in Italy's attempts to infiltrate French finance, French actions too limited these approaches. In the early months of the occupation, French officials had no real interest in making long-term deals with Italy, overwhelmed by a sense of bitterness over the way in which France had been treated by Italy following the armistice.⁴²³ Moreover, numerous French officials and businessmen believed that the way to restore French power in Europe was to usurp Italy as Germany's primary ally and carve out a

⁴¹⁶ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto n. 7/00292 per l'Eccellenza Pietromarchi", 5.7.40.

⁴¹⁷ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Eccellenza Vitetti", 2.7.40.

⁴¹⁸ N. Rich, *Hitler's War Aims, the Establishment of the New Order*, p. 206. ASMAE, AP, Monaco, b. 1, "Il Presidente della Sottocommissione, Liberati, al R. Consolato d'Italia, Monaco Principato", 3.4.42, shows German banks moving into Monaco without co-ordination with Italy.

⁴¹⁹ A. Lacroix-Riz, *Industriels et banquiers, Français sous l'occupation*, Paris (2013), pp. 534-7.

⁴²⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Eccellenza Vitetti", 2.7.40.

⁴²¹ *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. 337, "Memorandum by an Official of the Economic Policy Department", 13.8.40, pp. 474-5; on Italian desires to collaborate with Fünk see, ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Eccellenza Vitetti", 2.7.40.

⁴²² *DGFP*, Series D, Vol. X, Doc. 360, "Confidential Protocol [signed at Berlin]", 17.8.40, pp. 503-4.

⁴²³ K. Varley, "Entangled Enemies, Vichy, Italy and Collaboration", in L. Broch and A. Carrol (eds.), *France in an Era of Global War, 1914-1945, Occupation, Politics, Empire and Entanglements*, New York and London (2014), p. 158, states that Italy continued to view France as an enemy, stunting hopes of collaboration early on.

place for France in the New Order.⁴²⁴ In the early months of the occupation, therefore, when many of Germany's financial foundations in France were laid, no real incentive to collaborate with Italy in financial matters existed. Neither German nor French officials wished to encourage their Italian counterparts to enter financial talks of any significance. Whilst Germany was prepared to make concessions in the early months of the occupation, largely to save political embarrassment for Rome, as time went on both the German and French governments saw their relationship with one another as more important than any relationship with Italy would be. In bilateral banking negotiations, Italian bankers increasingly found themselves without an invitation to participate.⁴²⁵

Although the Conference of Rome marked the most important change in Italo-French relations, this did not come about until 1941 when many of Germany's most important financial relationships had already been built. Moreover, the Conference of Rome did not cover relations between individual banks, nor did it limit France's desire to collaborate with Germany. Italian inabilities to participate in French banking were not down to an unwillingness to become involved in these circles, therefore, but came about largely as a result of being frozen out of talks by their German and French counterparts. French banks, by contrast, were eager to regain their place in European banking negotiations and were often willing to enter discussions with German banks and organisations as the fastest way of doing so.⁴²⁶ By contrast, neither Germany nor France was willing to allow Italy to participate in such talks. As a result, Germany became the premier foreign trading partner for French banks, leaving little or no room for Italian investment.

Italian failures to make any notable gains in the French banking world were matched by her inability to produce any significant results in any negotiations with French businesses. This failure to invest in France, particularly in those territories which Italy had earmarked for long-term annexation, should be highlighted as one of the largest missed opportunities for Italy to make a financial return on her zone of occupation. Whilst it is true that occupation costs dealt a bitter blow to France's capacity to operate as a financially independent nation, businesses under the German occupation did not suffer the same economic or financial

⁴²⁴ P. Burrin, "Le collaborationisme", in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des années noires*, Vol. 1, p. 365.

⁴²⁵ A. Lacroix-Riz, *Industriels et banquiers*, pp. 514-8.

⁴²⁶ C. Andrieu, *La banque sous l'Occupation, Paradoxes de l'histoire d'une profession*, Paris (1990), pp. 166-7. ASMAE, UC, Germania, b. 17, "Général Huntziger à Monsieur le Maréchal [Pétain]", nd, shows Huntziger stating that a separate ceasefire between France and the Axis was the only way to rebuild France.

penalties as the state.⁴²⁷ Individual businesses could survive and actually thrive, if prepared to collaborate economically with the German occupation government.⁴²⁸ By comparison, one historian of the German occupation of the Netherlands has argued that many Dutch businesses, eager to expand following the depression of the 1930s, actually grew thanks to German orders and investment.⁴²⁹ It is difficult to transpose these same arguments entirely to France. As in the Netherlands, the multitude of organisations that were involved in occupying France allowed investment to come from a number of sources.⁴³⁰ Whilst the differing governing structures of the two zones accounts for some of the difference between the levels of investment, facile generalisations that structural factors alone made the difference must be avoided.

Initial Italian concerns regarding businesses were not focused on their own zone of occupation, but those which had come under German jurisdiction. In the months following the armistice, the Italian government was concerned with the potential effects of the occupation on businesses belonging to ex patriates. The CIAF's Ufficio Affari Generali noted with some concern that Italian businesses producing war material in France would effectively have their existing contracts cancelled due to the forced disarmament of France.⁴³¹ Of equal concern was that Italian businesses under German occupation could have their goods requisitioned or seized. This was an even greater worry due to the fact that these businesses could not communicate with Italy thanks to the impenetrable demarcation line.⁴³² Whilst Italian officials sought to protect businesses belonging to the Italian migrant community in the north, Germany was establishing and cementing economic connections. Italy's attitude to business largely mirrored her attitude towards banking: the expectation of co-operation and co-ordination with Germany was never realised, whilst German economic planners had no desire to involve Rome in their future goals.

⁴²⁷ R. de Rochebrune and J-C. Hazera, *Les patrons sous l'occupation*, Paris (1995), pp. 114-20; France's occupation costs were initially set at eighteen million Reichsmarks per day, a figure that was much higher when the overvaluation of the Reichsmark is taken into account, see M. Boldorf and J. Scherner, "France's Occupation Costs and the War in the East: the Contribution to the German War Economy, 1940-4", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47,2 (2012), pp. 295-6.

⁴²⁸ See, for example, T. Inlay and M. Horn, *The Politics of Industrial Collaboration during World War II, Ford France, Vichy and Nazi Germany*, Cambridge (2014).

⁴²⁹ H.A.M. Klemann, "Did the German Occupation (1940-1945) ruin Dutch Industry?", *Contemporary European History*, 17 (2008).

⁴³⁰ Y. le Maneur and H. Rousso, "La domination allemande", in A. Beltran, R. Frank and H. Rousso (eds.), *La vie des entreprises sous l'Occupation, une enquête à l'échelle locale*, Paris (1994), pp. 12-18.

⁴³¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Verbale della Riunione concernante alcune questioni sulle fidejussioni valutarie", 31.7.40.

⁴³² ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "Il R. Vice Console Reggente, Dr. Gustavo Orlandini, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 21.8.40.

The involvement of the DFCIA in expressing concerns over French business only came about months after the signing of the armistice. The lack of any single clause in the Italo-French armistice over the position of either Italian or French businesses meant that it had fallen out with the immediate remit of both the CIAF and the DFCIA.⁴³³ By November 1941, this state of uncertainty had been rendered serious enough for the DFCIA to make a series of broad requests on behalf of French enterprise. The majority of these did not deal with businesses in France, but those in Italy. These broadly stated that failing French businesses in Italy should be offered the chance to operate again before being liquidated, and that French citizens should be allowed contact with Italian running their business affairs on their behalf in Italy.⁴³⁴ It is interesting to note that no similar request was presented by the CIAF on behalf of Italian enterprise in France. Instead, Italy sought guarantees on the safety of Italian businesses in France from German officials, rather than from France. Moreover, the CIAF had little contact with the economic delegation sent by the DFCIA to Italy in early 1942. Whilst the CIAF, and by extension many of the delegates of the DFCIA, were headquartered in Turin, the French economic delegation established themselves in Rome.⁴³⁵ Italian and French delegates rarely saw one another, occasionally conducting their business through Buti in Paris, but turning to Germany for assistance more often than not.⁴³⁶ This made it difficult to conduct any serious negotiations on business.

Diane Grillère has argued that the deep resentment felt by France towards Italy coupled with political rivalries probably rendered Italo-French economic collaboration dead before it was ever seriously discussed.⁴³⁷ This is perhaps only part of the reason, however. Italy's actions in France suggested, as with her political actions, that she expected to make gains at the peace table. Moreover, the differences between Italian and German economic actions in France are at least in part due to the differing visions of post-war Europe in Rome and Berlin. Many Italian theorists believed that following a general peace settlement Europe would largely be divided into Italian and German economic spheres, existing simultaneously, but not overlapping.⁴³⁸ Many of Italy's post-war plans were predicated upon the idea that the

⁴³³ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, "Convenzione di Armistizio", pp. 78-9

⁴³⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Appunto per l'Eccellenza il Ministro", 10.11.41. The document is not clear with this is intended for the Ministro degli Affari Esteri or the Ministro delle Comunicazioni.

⁴³⁵ ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, fasc. 6, "Appunto per l'Eccellenza il Ministro [Ciano]", 15.1.42; ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, fasc. 6, "D'Ajeta a Buti", 26.1.42.

⁴³⁶ On Buti's role see, ASMAE, UC, Francia, b. 3, fasc. 6, "Appunto", nd.

⁴³⁷ D. Grillère, "Entreprises françaises et occupation italienne", pp. 105-6.

⁴³⁸ D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée", p. 147; D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 55-6. On German plans for the post-war integration of the European economy see, P. Fonzi,

south-east of France made up part of the *spazio vitale*, and that all economic activity in the area would, if not solely carried out by Italy, at least be co-ordinated with Germany. Italian documents describing the visit of German economic delegations to the south-east give the impression that Italy welcomed such visits, believing that they were designed to co-ordinate economic activity.⁴³⁹ Other officials, however, claimed that German investment in the south was blocking potential Italian actions in the *spazio vitale*.⁴⁴⁰ The comparative dearth of financial exploitation and investment in Italo-French and Franco-German business ventures were partially moulded by this difference.

In many ways, Italo-French economic and financial relations mirrored their political relations. Italy hoped to hold a strong position, adhering stringently to the armistice clauses which governed economic relations, whilst France sought to bypass these by using German influence as a counter-weight. Although Italy was prepared to engage in negotiations designed to alter Italo-French economic standings, she did so only with the intention of retaining her position of strength, artificially enhanced by her role as part of the Axis. In this way, Germany played as much of a role in Italo-French relations as either occupier or occupied did. In the next chapter we will see how Italy brought policies of forced Italianisation and Fascistisation onto the territories behind the *Linea verde*, where she played a far less constrained role. This less constrained role, however, should be seen within its geographical constraints. Italo-French economic agreements took place at a governmental level and affected a far wider range of territories. In this sense, both Italy's priorities and her possible results differed greatly from those potential results in economic or political negotiations.

“Nazional-socialismo e Nuovo Ordine Europeo. La discussione sulla ‘Großraumwirtschaft’”, *Studi Storici*, 45 (2004).

⁴³⁹ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, “Vitetti al R. Rappresentanza, Parigi”, 16.3.42.

⁴⁴⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 4, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione, Pigozzi, alla Sottocommissione Affari Generali”, 9.12.41.

Chapter 5. Italianisation and Fascistisation

The political and economic measures established by Italy in the early months and years of the occupation were largely implemented under the mistaken pretence that not only would Italy win the war in her capacity as Germany's ally, but that she would be permitted to gain large tracts of territory at the expense of France and many of the other European powers. In the territories behind the *Linea verde*, the Italian occupying administration carried out measures amounting to a de facto annexation under this pretence. Great efforts and financial expense were used in order to cement these territories as Italian possessions, not in a temporary sense, but with the post-war settlement firmly in mind. The Italian administration carried out these measures under the pseudo-legal protection of the armistice and the Bando del Duce, which made it clear as early as July 1940 that the territories would not willingly be returned to France. In annexing these territories and implementing these measures, however, the Italian government had a larger degree of freedom than she had in economic and political measures. Whilst some French officials remained behind and returned following the evacuation of the frontier communes, Italy's numerical strength and relative position of power in these territories made gains and measures easier to make.

The idea that Italy was annexing the territories behind the *Linea verde*, rather than simply occupying them is neither new, nor controversial. Indeed, French officials explicitly stated in July 1941 during a ministerial conference that Italy's occupation bore "all the characteristics of an annexation"⁴⁴¹ The tone with which this was stated makes it fair to assume that no-one in the conference was hearing these ideas for the first time, nor did it appear that anyone in the French government seriously debated the idea. The acceptance of this idea has been mirrored in the secondary literature, which makes clear that Italy went beyond policies of merely holding the occupied territories.⁴⁴² Nonetheless, the depths to which the Italian government went in Italianising these territories has been hitherto underexplored.⁴⁴³ Much of the secondary literature has been content to accept the changing of street signs and the enforcement of the Italian language as not only the most obvious signs of Italianisation, but

⁴⁴¹ AN AJ 41 2302, "Occupation de Menton par l'Armée italienne, Note de Renseignements", 28.7.41

⁴⁴² J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*; D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*; all accept the idea of an unannounced annexation.

⁴⁴³ D. Rodogno, "L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa", p. 481, states that despite important work in Italophone historiography, Italian military occupations remain a largely unknown phenomenon.

also the greatest extent. In reality, such changes were simply the clearest examples of a string of policies which seem to have lacked solid co-ordination, but when viewed together these measures portray the extent of what was undertaken in these territories.

Davide Rodogno has drawn comparisons between Italian actions in her annexed territories and those policies implemented in Germany's zones of occupation throughout Europe. He argues that Italy sought to transform the societies that she occupied, utilising ethnic and racial profiling in an attempt to expand the citizen body, paired with an intensive program of denationalisation.⁴⁴⁴ This thesis agrees with this interpretation at a fundamental level, but seeks to tease out unexplored strands of Italianisation that refer specifically to France. The orientation of the newly annexed territories as well as their long-term future as Italian provinces remain important manifestations of Italian post-war planning. Moreover, there were attempts to mould the population and the physical territory itself. These plans differed slightly from those in the Balkans in that mass population transfers or racial and ethnic segregation could simply not take place in France in the same way. This chapter does not seek to fundamentally disagree with Rodogno's theory that the *spazio vitale* was considered a single project and that distinctions should not be made between France and the Balkans, but it does seek to moderate it.⁴⁴⁵ Whilst it may be true that Italian planners saw the *spazio vitale* as a single project, the populations inhabiting these territories were viewed differently. Rodogno's own monograph provides a "racial scale" envisaged by contemporary racial theorists which clearly shows that those living in the French territories were far more racially akin to Italians than the Slavic populations of Dalmatia.⁴⁴⁶ Population policies differed and actions that would have been possible in the Balkans were never implemented in France as they were considered wholly unacceptable.

Instead, Italy's process of Italianisation – and to a lesser extent, Fascistisation, when these two campaigns did not precisely align – was based on a process of altering the demographic of the territories, integrating these communes with pre-war Italian provinces and a physical reconstruction of the territory. These were gradual processes that often commenced with long-term goals in sight. Nonetheless, the fact that so much effort and financial capital was invested in them has largely been overlooked by scholars and shows the extent of Italy's

⁴⁴⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 60-1.

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

⁴⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 417-8. D. Roberts, "Italian Fascism, New Light on the Dark Side", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44, 3 (2009), p. 532, criticises Rodogno's generalisations on race in the Balkans. This thesis does not intend to criticise Rodogno's conceptions or understanding of race, but it is useful to note at this point that other historians have challenged his theories on the importance of racial dimensions in the occupied territories.

Italianisation campaigns. It is important to state that although Italianisation and Fascistisation could share the same goals and even take overlapping forms, they were not identical processes. The fact that the annexed territories were governed by officials from the CIAF, which as we have seen remained under the jurisdiction of the Italian armed forces, coloured the extent to which policies implemented in these territories can be said to constitute Fascistisation. Many of those within the Italian armed forces were career officers, whose ideological commitment to Fascism was often, at best, passive.⁴⁴⁷ Nonetheless, the presence of members of the PNF in the local occupying regime, for example Frediani, means that we cannot ignore the influence of Fascistisation altogether. The appointment of Frediani, moreover, may have indicated a push towards a degree of Fascistisation of the occupying administration itself: the previous holders, Aldo Loni and Virgilio Magris, were the Vice Consul of the Alpes-Maritimes prior to the outbreak of war, and a bureaucrat in the Ministero dell'Interno respectively. No order indicates whether Frediani was brought in specifically to further the influence of the PNF in the occupied territories, however it should be noted that Frediani's appointment coincided with a period of increased Fascist activity within the territories behind the *Linea verde*.

I.

The efforts to bring Menton and the other annexed communes into the Kingdom of Italy has been discussed and suggested by Italian theorists and have been discussed earlier in this thesis.⁴⁴⁸ In 1938 and again in 1939, Mussolini had declared his aims for Italian expansion; by 1942, Italy was to have acquired Tunis, Corsica and, importantly, “everything on this side of the Alps”.⁴⁴⁹ Although Mussolini was prone to speak of foreign policy in broad strokes, amongst his other ambitions was to have acquired Albania by 1942, so it is impossible to discount Mussolini's declarations entirely as mere bravado.⁴⁵⁰ Regardless of how far Mussolini's declarations mirrored or even influenced foreign policy at its highest levels, it

⁴⁴⁷ J. Gooch, *Mussolini and his Generals, the Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922-1940*, Cambridge (2007), places as one of its central arguments, that Mussolini and the Fascist regime failed to create an ideological committed armed forces.

⁴⁴⁸ See Ch. 2.

⁴⁴⁹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 47.

⁴⁵⁰ How far Mussolini's political thought reflected Italian foreign policy has been argued over for decades and could easily be the subject of a monograph by itself. For the contours of the argument, see A. Cassels, “Was there a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty”, *The International History Review*, 5, 2 (1983); S.C. Azzi, “The Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy”, *The Historical Journal*, 36, 1 (1993); on the place of Mussolini specifically see the multi-volume R. De Felice, *Mussolini* (4 vols.).

certainly formed the policy backdrop for many of those involved in administering the occupied territories.

As we have seen, the Italian armistice commission and its French counterpart, the DFCIA, were based in Turin. This thesis has also repudiated the claim that Turin was chosen as the headquarters of the CIAF in order to distance it from inter-ministerial squabbles, viewing this as a by-product, but not the cause of this selection.⁴⁵¹ In addition to the aforementioned claim made in this thesis that forcing French delegates to cross the frontier in order to attend meetings in Turin was a subtle, and sometimes less subtle, way of validating Italian sovereignty, it also has implications for Italy's attempts to Italianise the territories they now held.⁴⁵² Davide Rodogno's Plan A and Plan B for the future incorporation of French territories were certainly one way to Italianise areas of France, but it was not enough for Italy simply to declare the existence of new provinces. Plan B was arguably the more extensive of these two options and involved the amalgamation of the Alpes-Maritimes and the Principality of Monaco, which would presumably be re-styled as Alpi Marittime. Tracts of the Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, the Haute-Alpes and Savoie, would also be combined in order to create a new province, Alpi Occidentali.⁴⁵³ Despite the capital of this new province being placed at Briançon, it is likely that the region would gravitate towards Turin as the most dynamic city in the immediate vicinity. Although Nice was a growing urban centre, both Turin and Genoa were larger and benefitted from Italian policies designed to push these new provinces towards Piedmont and, to a lesser extent, Liguria.

The introduction of Italian law to the annexed territories was both an immediate and invasive process for those French citizens still residing there. Although the vast majority of the population in France experienced an overhaul in public law as Vichy sought to replace *liberté, égalité, fraternité* with *travail, famille, patrie*, those living in the territories behind the *linea verde* underwent the dual trauma of changes in public law and foreign occupation. French citizens, hitherto operating within republican legal apparatuses, were now forced to conduct legal procedures entirely in Italian. Those who required documents to strengthen

⁴⁵¹ See, Ch. 3.

⁴⁵² Ibid.

⁴⁵³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 89-92. The wording of Rodogno's portrayal of Alpi Occidentali is unclear; "[Plan B] encompassed the Alpes-Maritimes, the Principality of Monaco and a mountainous zone comprising of parts of the three *départements* of Alpes-de-Haute-Provence, Hautes-Alpes and Savoie... This would constitute the province of Alpi Occidentali with sixteen communes and 76,000 inhabitants", p. 91. One reading of this implies that the Alpes-Maritimes and Monaco make up part of Alpi Occidentali, but this is impossible since the Alpes-Maritimes population alone constituted more than 76,000, even accounting for a drop in population due to Italian repatriation. More likely, two provinces were to be created; the Alpes-Maritimes (Alpi Marittime) and the new Alpi Occidentali.

their case were ordered to provide an Italian translation, with no financial assistance from the Italian state.⁴⁵⁴ By as early as 1940, one public prosecutor in Nice noted that the legal process in Menton and the other communes was unrecognisable, and operated purely under Italian law.⁴⁵⁵ Although the introduction of Italian law was undoubtedly a large part of the process of Italianisation, the measure went further than many scholars have previously acknowledged. The moving of the court of appeal to Turin was not only a policy designed to bring the annexed territories into the Italian legal sphere, but part of a wider strategy to integrate these territories with other Italian provinces.⁴⁵⁶ Although the creation of Alpi Occidentali was only planned in 1942, the moving of the court of appeal to Turin cements the idea that the province would be dependent, to some extent, on Piedmont, and would be administratively drawn towards Italy.

This theme of integrating these new provinces with existing Italian administrative structures had been a motif of Italian propaganda for some time. The region with its administrative capital at Imperia had been cast by some as ideal for integration with portions of the Alpes-Maritimes even during the war. In 1942, Italian theorists concluded that without the full integration of Nice, Imperia lacked an entrance as well as a university and moral centre.⁴⁵⁷ Moreover, Italian irredentists bemoaned Nice's lack of a sufficient port, airport, and daily newspaper.⁴⁵⁸ Although solutions were not proposed by these planners in this report, the inference was clearly that Nice had been mismanaged by France and that integration with Imperia would bring a stronger administration. It is not difficult to see an eventual transfer of the regional capital from Imperia to Nice in the long-term, given Nice's larger population and capacity to house administrative staff and resources for an enlarged province.

Services and public amenities which existed throughout Italy were extended into the annexed territories. Italian plans to open a post office in the occupied communes were noted with interest by the French, who felt that it was another attempt to move the administrative focus of the towns towards Italy and away from France.⁴⁵⁹ Greater changes were made by Italian banks who, as we have seen in the previous chapter, saw the change in international relations with France as an opportunity to expand at the expense of their French counterparts.

⁴⁵⁴ R. Klotz, "Les conditions de la justice à Menton pendant l'occupation italienne (1940-1943)", *Recherches Régionales*, 156 (2001), p. 87.

⁴⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p. 87.

⁴⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 87.

⁴⁵⁷ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, "Amministrazione di Nizza", 19.3.42.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid*.

⁴⁵⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 59, "L'Amiral Duplat à la Commission Italien d'Armistice [et] Vacca Maggiolini", 13.3.43; AN AJ 41 438, "Rapport présenté à l'Amiral Duplat, Président de la Délégation Française", 25.3.43. Italian post office opened in Menton and Séez, with plans to open them in Sallières-Sardières and Lanslevillard.

The Banca Commerciale Italiana made plans to re-open pre-existing branches in Menton, but were drawn towards Yugoslav expansion instead in the hope of greater financial rewards. The larger, and more financially able, Banca d'Italia explored the possibility of opening a network of branches throughout the annexed territories, backed by Italian officials who hoped that its presence would bring financial stability.⁴⁶⁰ Although the Banca d'Italia opened only a single branch in Menton, it was hoped that merely converting branches of the Banque de France would allow more rapid and commercially viable expansion of the Banca d'Italia.⁴⁶¹

Italian actions in Menton should be seen as laying the foundations for a full integration that would eventually be extended to Italy's future French territorial gains. In 1940, the *Prefetto* of Imperia warned that there might exist a core nucleus of 1,200 French and Italian Communists should the population return to Menton. The *Prefetto* made clear to the Ministero dell'Interno that his police forces will be overstuffed should this be allowed to occur.⁴⁶² The clear implication is that policing in the region has already been handed over to administrative bodies based in Imperia. Security issues in Menton, as well as political reports, are passed on to the Ministero dell'Interno by the *Prefetto* of Imperia, rather than the Civil Commissioner in Menton.⁴⁶³ Italian actions in the annexed territories are backed up by more specific details in Rodogno's Plan B. In addition to the creation of a Prefecture and a sub-Prefecture in Italy's new French provinces, provincial offices would be established. These are highlighted by Rodogno as specifically addressing "Public works, Finance, [and] Post and Education".⁴⁶⁴ As we shall see, these were the issues which Italy quickly addressed in the annexed communes and suggest that policies carried out in France were less organic than has been assumed. Although Plan B was not formulated until 1942 – at least on paper – it is probable that Italian actions in their occupied communes reflect a general, and perhaps difficult to define, plan to orientate the outlook of the communes towards Italy.

II.

⁴⁶⁰ D. Grillère, "Entreprises françaises et l'occupation italienne", pp. 99-100.

⁴⁶¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 280. The idea stemmed from successful Banca d'Italia expansion into the Yugoslav territories. On similar measures in Albania, see A. Roselli, *Italy and Albania, Financial Relations in the Fascist Period*, pp. 112-3 and B.J. Fischer, "Italian Policy in Albania, 1894-1943", *Balkan Studies*, 26,1 (1985).

⁴⁶² ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, "Il Prefetto d'Imperia al Ministero dell'Interno, Direzione Generale di PS", 13.8.40.

⁴⁶³ For example, the celebrations for Jean d'Arc, ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, 1943, b. 4, fasc. 3, "Il Prefetto d'Imperia al Ministero dell'Interno", 23.5.41.

⁴⁶⁴ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 91. Under more extensive plans, Italian officials envisaged a total of 594 officials and bureaucrats under the jurisdiction of twelve ministries being sent to govern Italy's new French territories, see D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 423.

As part of the process of Italianising their annexed territories, some Italian officials hoped to alter the demographic of these areas in order to integrate them more easily into the Kingdom of Italy. Demographic manipulation was unique neither to Italian actions in their annexed French territories, nor to Axis policies during the Second World War. Draconian German measures in tracts of Polish territory meant that Poles were forbidden from living in those areas which Germany hoped to annex.⁴⁶⁵ Whilst German demographic policies have received a great deal of academic attention, Italian actions have received comparatively little.⁴⁶⁶ Yet Italy was engaged in what scholars have called “demographic engineering”.⁴⁶⁷ It is important to make the distinction between what Paul Morland has described as “hard” and “soft” variations of demographic engineering. Whilst Italy did not bring policies of “hard” engineering to France – policies that would encompass population transfers, forced sterilisation of non-Italians, or ethnic cleansing – her policy on altering the Franco-Italian border arguably falls under the category of “soft” engineering.⁴⁶⁸ This process of demographic re-modelling came about at least partially through actions that lay outside of Italian control: the evacuation of French border towns and cities had been extremely successful, however the failure of the Italian armed forces to make substantial territorial gains in France meant that the majority of French citizens returned to their homes reasonably quickly. The Italian army’s occupation of Menton, however, meant that by 1940 the population was overwhelmingly Italian.⁴⁶⁹ By 1941, Italian officials estimated that the town’s meagre population stood at 6,709, including government administrators, but excluding the armed forces.⁴⁷⁰ It was clear to the Italian government, therefore, that the ethnographic balance of the town had been altered following the evacuation and had never returned to its pre-war balance.

⁴⁶⁵ R.C. Lukas, *The Forgotten Holocaust, The Poles under German Occupation, 1939-1944*, New York (1997) pp. 32-4.

⁴⁶⁶ Work on Italian population policy, however, is growing in influence and should be taken into account, see P. Ahonen, et al., *People on the Move*, pp. 44-5; *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 753, “Il Capo del Governo, Mussolini a Il Cancelliere del Reich, Hitler”, 19.10. 40, pp. 720-2, discusses mass repatriation of Italians.

⁴⁶⁷ M. Z. Bookman, *The Demographic Struggle for Power, the Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World*, London and Portland (1997); P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict*, Farnham (2014); M. Weiner and M.S. Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, New York and Oxford (2001); J. McGarry, “‘Demographic Engineering’: the State-Directed Movement of Ethnic Groups as a Technique of Conflict Resolution”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21, 4 (1998).

⁴⁶⁸ P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering*, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁶⁹ ADAM 0030W 0057, “Le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur l’Ingénieur en Chef des Ponts-et-Chaussées”, 8.6.40.

⁴⁷⁰ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5 G, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, “Il Prefetto [d’Imperia] al Ministro dell’Interno, Direzione Generale della PS”, 13.5.41.

Nonetheless, as Weiner and Teitelbaum state, demographic engineering can only be applied to deliberate actions taken by the state, rather than actions out with the state's control.⁴⁷¹ If we accept that the evacuation of Menton was outside the Italian government's control, is it still possible to speak of demographic engineering taking place behind the *Linea verde*? In order to do so, it is necessary not only to show that Italy sought to encourage Italians to settle in the town, but also that the Italian government hampered the return of the pre-war French population.⁴⁷² The evacuation of the Mentonnais offered the Italian government the opportunity to alter the demography of the town. Although attempts to change the demographic makeup of Italy's French territories have been hitherto unexplored, both the Italian army and government were perfectly capable of carrying out such policies and had done so elsewhere.⁴⁷³ Despite growth in these areas of study, the use and abuse of political demography is something that scholars have traditionally overlooked.⁴⁷⁴ Nonetheless, like the extensive urban changes that Italian architects planned, it adds an additional layer in the argument that those territories occupied by Italy in July 1940 were to be annexed in the long-term. Such demographic changes also took on greater meaning in establishing legitimacy for the regime in these new territories. As Maura Hametz as argued with regards to newly-won Italian possessions in the Venezia Tridentina and the Venezia Giulia following the First World War, educational and linguistic reforms helped to forge this legitimacy and bind the territories to the Kingdom of Italy.⁴⁷⁵

The clearest, and arguably most invasive, manifestation of Italian policy was the imposition of the Italian language, coupled with the banning of the use of French in public. Despite the fact that large portions of the population along the frontier territories could speak Italian or had inter-married with Italian families, the outlawing of French was a significant step forward in Italianising these areas. In reality, the introduction of the Italian language, despite constituting a "pull" factor in order to make these territories more attractive to

⁴⁷¹ M. Weiner and M.S. Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, p. 63.

⁴⁷² Both tactics exist within demographic engineering; if used together the policy is referred to as "substitution" in *ibid*, p. 56; Morland describes the tactics as a combination of "pull" and "push" respectively – that of making settling the territories attractive for Italians and unattractive for French citizens, P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering*, p. 28.

⁴⁷³ On Italian war crimes and population policy, see L. Santarelli, "Muted Violence: Italian War Crimes in Occupied Greece", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004); H. James Burgwyn, "General Roatta's War Against the Partisans of Yugoslavia, 1942", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004); P. Ahonen, et al., *People on the Move*, pp. 44-5.

⁴⁷⁴ Neither of Panicacci's two works focusing on Menton make any real attempt to analyse political demography, see J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*; J-L. Panicacci, "Menton et les Mentonnais de 1939 à 1945".

⁴⁷⁵ M. Hametz, "Naming Italians in the Borderland, 1922-1943", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 15, 3 (2010) p. 413.

Italians, was not particularly unusual. Indeed, in Menton in particular, where large numbers of Italian soldiers were stationed, it can simply be argued that for practical terms, a change in linguistic practices within the town was inevitable. Nonetheless, the banning of French in public and as a language of the administration means that Italian linguistic policy had moved beyond mere pragmatism and constitutes a “push” factor, forcing the French population and government out of the territories. The archives are strangely bereft of information about how the banning of the French language in public was enforced, nor how Italian was promoted in any meaningful way. This lack of information could be due to shortcomings in some archival holdings as described in Chapter 1, however it could also be that it was almost impossible to enforce in practice. The banning of French, however, could have been in order to set the political tone for citizens hoping to return to their homes. Those French citizens wishing to return to the territories did so knowing that a working knowledge of Italian was mandatory. Those who did permanently return tended to be those with close Italian familial ties who might easily be integrated into a new ethnically Italian populace.

The extension of the Italian language into schools reveals the extreme long-term plans envisioned, if not fully acted upon, by the Italian government. Recent work on daily life under military occupation has stressed the importance of schooling in moulding the minds and political outlook of the young.⁴⁷⁶ Indeed, if Italy sought to create an Italian community in the town, extinguishing any traces of French sentiments were best done before the malleability of young civilians was lost. Although change to the Italian curriculum in the 1920s and 1930s did not take place as rapidly or intensively as in Germany, schooling in Italy had slowly shifted to a Fascist education.⁴⁷⁷ Changes to the schooling system in the territories behind the *linea verde* were brought in quickly and thoroughly and sought to substitute one national curriculum for another.⁴⁷⁸ Italian authorities closed French schools upon the change in government, and stamped down on the existence of clandestine schools. One Francophone school was run by the parish priest, and attended by French children whose parents paid a

⁴⁷⁶ P. Vošahlíková, B. Rochet and F. Weiss, “Schooling as a Cultural Interface”, in R. Gildea, O. Wiewiorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006), p. 129.

⁴⁷⁷ R. Gentili, *Giuseppe Bottai e la riforma fascista della scuola*, Florence (1979). This work offers a subject-by-subject breakdown of the new Fascist curriculum, see pp. 162-84. See also, M. Ostenc, “L’education en Italie pendant le fascisme: Bilan et perspectives de recherches”, *Histoire de l’education*, 30 (1986). The debate over how successful the PNF was in penetrating the Italian curriculum is ongoing. For a more general debate on the PNF in education see, V. Zagarrío, “Bottai: Un fascista critico?”, *Studi Storici*, 17,4 (1976).

⁴⁷⁸ Italy was not alone in altering their curriculum, Vichy too was overhauling education. See, R. Paxton, *Vichy France*, p. 17. Teachers were forced to swear an oath to Pétain, remove Marianne from the classroom wall and teach a new curriculum. J-L. Panicacci, *L’occupation italienne*, p. 47, states that Italian officials objected to crucifixes on the classroom walls.

stipend for this underground education.⁴⁷⁹ Those underground French schools which did exist were not administrated by the French state; French officials declared months before this school was shut down that no functioning French schools existed in the area.⁴⁸⁰ By 1942, these had been replaced by seven elementary schools, in which classes were taught in Italian by Italian teachers, using Italian resources. The pupil to staff ratio was much lower than could be expected, with 595 pupils taught by sixty staff members.⁴⁸¹

In addition to altering the schools' professional makeup, textbooks were closely monitored by the Italian government. In territories occupied in 1940, the Italians began removing schoolbooks, often doing so whilst repairing damaged public buildings.⁴⁸² The Italians also complained that those textbooks found in the territories which came under their control were full of errors. One, *L'histoire de France*, by Bernard Redon was singled out as portraying Napoléon III's peace with Austria as honourable, rather than an abandonment of her alliances with the Italian states. Italian authorities also complained that the description of Caporetto as a "grave defeat" was an exaggeration.⁴⁸³ Other books were singled out for not taking into account Italians living in France, Albania, or Ljubljana when measuring the population of Italy.⁴⁸⁴ The singling out of these seemingly petty errors revealed the extent to which Italian officials wished to create a community which, in the long-term, could be ethnically Italian. Davide Rodogno's table of Italian theorists' racial scale places the population of the Alpes-Maritimes as potentially Italian only after a campaign of denationalisation and intensive Italianisation.⁴⁸⁵ Such changes should be seen in the light of Morland's "push" and "pull" tactics, creating a schooling system in which only Italian thoughts and ideas could flourish.⁴⁸⁶ Moreover, the Italian decision to interfere in schooling in the territories brought in an array of ministries – notably the Ministero dell'Educazione Nazionale and the MINCULPOP – that might otherwise have had no place in governing the occupied territories. Had Italy had no

⁴⁷⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 2, fasc. 21, "Il Prefetto, B. Marziali, al Commissario Civile di Mentone", 30.10.41.

⁴⁸⁰ AN AJ 41 2302, "Occupation de Menton par l'Armée Italienne, Note des Renseignements", 28.7.41; AN AJ 41 2302, "Note sur les revendications italiennes", 30.9.40; AN AJ 41 439, "Note relative au régime des territoires places sous le contrôle militaire italien", 21.4.43.

⁴⁸¹ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc 1, "Relazione sull'attività del Commissario Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 giugno 1942 – 31 gennaio 1943, Per contribuire alla storia dell'Armistizio Italo-Francese". The document does not distinguish between teaching and non-teaching staff.

⁴⁸² AN AJ 2302, "L'Amiral Duplat à son Excellence le Général désigné d'Armée, Pintor, Président de la Commission Italienne d'Armistice", 11.11.40; AN AJ 41 2302, "Le Préfet de la Savoie à Monsieur le Ministre Secrétaire d'État à l'Intérieur", 27.10.40.

⁴⁸³ AN AJ 2302, "Le Commissaire Principal, Chef du Services des Renseignements Généraux à M. le Préfet de la Savoie", 16.6.42. Naturally, classing these examples as "errors" is at best subjective, and at worst partisan.

⁴⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁸⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 417.

⁴⁸⁶ P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering*, p. 28.

interest in holding these territories in the post-war peace settlement it is extremely unlikely that the Ministero dell'Educazione Nazionale would have become involved. In this way, Italian policies towards schooling echo those already carried out in other Italian territories.⁴⁸⁷ The parallel policies suggest that the occupied territories were seen as part of Italy, and were treated as such.

The tactics are similar to those employed by Nazi Germany following the occupation of Alsace and Lorraine. These reforms stretched beyond compulsory schooling in German, but involved the appointment of teachers chosen by their racial purity, commitment to Nazism, and their willingness to spread Nazi racial gospel.⁴⁸⁸ In the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, existing textbooks which clashed with Nazi ideology were blacked out or banned altogether.⁴⁸⁹ Such tactics were carried out in those territories under German occupation which had been designated as part of "Greater Germany"; Italian efforts to pursue similar tactics suggest similar aims. Despite the obvious similarities in tactics, the comparatively small size of the Italian zone limits how far it is possible to contrast Italian and German actions. German officials made great efforts to ensure that universities in Strasbourg were Germanised and Nazified, to such an extent that the Université de Strasbourg fled to Clermont-Ferrand.⁴⁹⁰ The lack of any university in Menton means that it is impossible to definitively ascertain what Italian actions might have been, but the similarities in policy towards schools and youth education programs means that it is certainly possible to draw parallels between a long-accepted policy of Germanisation in Alsace and Lorraine, and the same unexplored issue in Italy's occupied territories.

These "push" and "pull" factors certainly discouraged some from returning to Menton, but it could not dissuade those who had lived or constructed their lives there from abandoning their town altogether. Even following the pronouncement of the Bando del Duce, French authorities noted that the majority of those expelled from the occupied territories had expressed a desire to return.⁴⁹¹ Nonetheless, by October 1941, the situation was still not resolved and Italy's unwillingness to implement a universal system for refugees from the occupied territories only added to administrative delays which inevitably had their roots in

⁴⁸⁷ Italian administrators brought in the new Fascistised Italian curriculum in the Dodecanese, overseen by quadrumvir Cesare Maria De Vecchi, see N. Doumanis, *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean, Remembering Fascism's Empire*, Basingstoke and London (1997) pp. 82-5.

⁴⁸⁸ P. Vošahlíková, B. Rochet and F. Weiss, "Schooling as a Cultural Interface", p. 130.

⁴⁸⁹ *Ibid*, p.141.

⁴⁹⁰ F. L'Huillier, "Sur la Nazification de l'Alsace", *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale*, 120 (1980), p. 65; *ibid*, p. 130.

⁴⁹¹ ADAM 0030W 0057, "Le Trésorier-Payeur Général à Monsieur le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes", 20.8.40.

the wider Franco-Italian conflict. At this time, the *Prefetto* of the territories occupied by Italy, Marziali, stated that he was willing to allow French citizens to return, but that the process could be regulated solely by the Civil Commissioner in Menton.⁴⁹² The process was slow, resulting in the Mentonnais population standing at only 6,697 by May 1942, compared with a pre-war population of around 23,000.⁴⁹³ Of the 6,697 permanent residents in May 1942, only 2,216 of these were French.⁴⁹⁴ This shows us that Italy had succeeded at one level of fulfilling its dual objectives; she had failed to increase the overall population of the town, but she had changed in altering the demographic. This demographic is altered even more radically when we take into account the fact that most population estimates for Menton and the other occupied communes did not include Italians stationed there temporarily as part of the army or involved in the administration.⁴⁹⁵

Italy was able to claim that she was co-operating in allowing families to return to the occupied territories. By 1942, offices for the *Assistenza e il Rimpatrio dei Mentonaschi* (Assistance and Repatriation of the Mentonnais) had opened. This organisation was run by pre-war residents and allowed those returning to claim refugee status including all rights to assistance that this status brought.⁴⁹⁶ Even pro-Vichy French officials were prepared to concede that those returning to Menton as refugees were treated well by Italian bodies.⁴⁹⁷ In addition, Italian officials could point to the fact that between April and May, 949 French citizens crossed the frontier between France and Menton.⁴⁹⁸ Although Italian officials quoted this figure in attempts to show the ability of French civilians to cross the frontier, it is misleading; this figure also takes into account members of the DFCIA and other French organisations who crossed the frontier on official business. Moreover, returning French civilians were often vastly outnumbered by Italians when we take soldiers temporarily

⁴⁹² ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Il Prefetto, G.B. Marziali, all’Istituto Centrale di Statistica e alla Presidente della CIAF”, 6.10.41.

⁴⁹³ ACS, CIAF, b.1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd; the pre-war population is given in ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, “Il Prefetto [d’Imperia] al Ministro dell’Interno, Direzione Generale della PS”, 13.5.41; AMM, 10272, “Commissariato Civile di Mentone, Ufficio Tecnico per l’Acqua, il Gas, e l’Elettricità, Rifonimento idrico”, 30.7.42.

⁴⁹⁴ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd.

⁴⁹⁵ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, “Il Prefetto [d’Imperia] al Ministro dell’Interno, Direzione Generale della PS”, 13.5.41 uses the standard figures of just under 6,700 residents. This document, however, specifies that this number does *not* include soldiers or administrators. It should be noted that this figure is calculated by the *Prefetto* of Imperia.

⁴⁹⁶ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd

⁴⁹⁷ AN AJ 41 2302, “Le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur l’Amiral de la flotte”, nd.

⁴⁹⁸ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd

stationed there into account. In the Basses-Alpes, the hamlets of Combe-Brémond and Maison-Méane had a combined pre-war population of 48. Whilst Italian officials were prepared to allow the entire population of these communes to return, they were occupied by between 250 and 300 Italian troops, overwhelmingly changing the demographic.⁴⁹⁹ Others complained that Italy's drive to bring pre-war populations back to the now-occupied regions focused overwhelmingly on those Italians who lived in the territories before the evacuation.⁵⁰⁰

These accusations were almost certainly justified and formed part of Italy's attempts to Italianise the demographic of their new territories.⁵⁰¹ Whilst Italy was keen to portray an attitude of pre-disposition to the return of those evacuated from the occupied communes, in reality many found that rarely were these words backed up with actions. Italy seemed to have no desire to establish a clear set of procedures for those returning to the occupied territories. As we have seen, Marziali had insisted that only the Italian-appointed Civil Commissioner had any authority to grant permission to returning French citizens.⁵⁰² Yet for many French citizens, the mayor and the *Préfet* remained their first point of contact with "authority" as they saw it. By October 1940, the *Préfet* of the Alpes-Maritimes was told by the French government that he had no authority to negotiate the return of the evacuated populations nor to retrieve their possessions.⁵⁰³ Despite this, the *Préfets* of other *départements* frequently harangued him to take his expelled population, whilst his own citizens implored him to assist them in their return.⁵⁰⁴ No single policy seems to have been established within the French government, and Italy only wished to regulate the flow of returning residents provided it was on Italian terms. Although by mid-1942 Italian officials were prepared to award returning residents with refugee status, there was little else in the way of assistance. Rome was not prepared to establish a commission to award compensation for those whose homes or businesses had been damaged by the fighting in Menton, whilst the Vichy government was not prepared to make pay outs to those who would immediately move into territories now

⁴⁹⁹ AN AJ 41 2302, "Note sur les problèmes soulevés par l'occupation et la propagande italiennes dans les Basses-Alpes", 10.12.40.

⁵⁰⁰ AN AJ 41 2302, "Note sur les revendications italiennes", 30.9.40.

⁵⁰¹ This also dovetails with Italy's campaign to re-patriate large swathes of Italians, encouraging them to settle in Italy, thereby weakening the French economy by depriving them of workers, and lower the population further.

⁵⁰² See above, and ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Il Prefetto, G.B. Marziali, all'Istituto Centrale di Statistica e alla Presidente della CIAF", 6.10.41.

⁵⁰³ ADAM 0030W 0057, "Le Commandant Curet à Monsieur le Conseiller d'État, le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes", 10.10.40.

⁵⁰⁴ ADAM 0030W 0057, "Le Préfet du Var à Monsieur le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes", 20.11.40; ADAM 0030W 0057, "Note pour le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes, FL/YB – No. 332", 11.9.40.

considered abroad.⁵⁰⁵ For Italians wishing to return to the annexed territories, however, there were considerable advantages. A re-evaluation of what constituted an Italian by the authorities in Rome meant that those with Italian grandparents prepared to return to the occupied territories qualified for Italian citizenship. In many cases, such individuals were given Italian status regardless of whether they had requested it or not, and were informed that the only way to have it revoked was to have the case heard before a French judge, none of whom could legally operate in the occupied territories.⁵⁰⁶ Although by 1943, Italian citizenship was more a hindrance, in the early years of the war qualifying for an Italian passport was a simple way to ingratiate oneself with the side which seemed most likely to win the war.

Economic measures discussed above were certainly beneficial to Italian residents, whilst simultaneously ensuring that those French citizens who did return did so fully aware that they were, in effect, accepting Italian rule, at least in practical terms.⁵⁰⁷ A large portion of those French citizens who chose to return did so for economic reasons. One former resident of Menton told French authorities that she was considering returning to the town because she had been forced to leave her apartment and her shop, which represented a loss not only of her home, but of her income.⁵⁰⁸ Many residents of the territories behind the *linea verde* were affected by Italian laws that limited the amount of capital that could be taken into France at 5,000 francs per household.⁵⁰⁹ As the limit was expressed in francs, rather than in Italian lire, this value was diminished further by Italian currency laws that had artificially inflated the value of the lira against the franc.⁵¹⁰ In addition to the 5,000 francs currency permitted to each household, only 1,000 francs worth of goods could be removed from the occupied territories by those wishing to move to France.⁵¹¹ Conversely, no impediment existed for those wishing to move goods between the occupied territories and the rest of Italy. Those returning to Menton found fewer administrative obstacles in trading with Sicily than with the

⁵⁰⁵ ADAM 0397W 0059, “Le Juge de Paix à le Commissaire Civile à Menton”, 31.1.41.

⁵⁰⁶ AN AJ 41 2302, “Le Chef de Batallion Curet, Officier de Liaison auprès de la Commission Italienne de Nice à Monsieur le Général d’Armée Olry”, 26.1.42; AN AJ 41 438, “Le Général d’Armée, Huntziger, à Monsieur le Président de la Délégation Française à la Commission Italienne d’Armistice”, 7.1.41, points out that the Italians can remove any judges who fail to meet their political approval.

⁵⁰⁷ These measures fall into Morland’s “push” and “pull” tactics, making the town attractive for some ethnic groups, whilst unattractive for others, P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering*, p. 28.

⁵⁰⁸ ADAM 0397W 0059, “Le Juge de Paix à le Commissaire Civil à Menton”, 30.1.41.

⁵⁰⁹ ADAM 0397W 0059, “Il Commissario Civile al Giudice di Pace”, 29.9.42; J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*, p. 49.

⁵¹⁰ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Bando del Duce”, 30.7.40.

⁵¹¹ *Ibid.*

Alpes-Maritimes.

The desire to keep wealth within the occupied territories is indicative of Italy's long-term plans for the growth of Menton and other towns behind the *linea verde*. Upon discovering that the population of these territories had left, Italy was faced with the dilemma of encouraging economic growth in territories which had experienced a rapid drop in population numbers. In attempting to ensure economic growth, Italy began a series of economic reforms within the occupied territories which would bring it in line with Italian commercial and economic law. As we have seen, the implementation of the lira as the primary legal currency was the beginning of this process. Although the franc was still accepted, its devaluation limited its uses and strongly discouraged even French traders from using it.⁵¹² The devaluation of the franc can be viewed as further evidence for Italy's long-term goals of Italianising the occupied territories. In other territories, Italy was less concerned with maintaining the economy of those territories they occupied on a more temporary basis and instead flooded the country with hyper-inflated "occupation currency".⁵¹³

Part of this strategy of long-term growth was to re-develop Menton's pre-war status as a tourist hub. When assessing repairs to be carried out in Menton, the CIAF highlighted hotels as priorities. This was not simply in order to house Italian troops, but also to re-ignite the pre-war tourist industry that had blossomed before the war. When assessing problems with the town's water supply, the CIAF clearly stated that Menton's "hotel character" must be taken into account.⁵¹⁴ In one sense, this emphasis upon the rebuilding of hotels was partially an economic measure, but also formed part of Italy's urban regeneration projects.⁵¹⁵ Nonetheless, by mid-1942 the hotel project was firmly pushed away from the sole aim of housing soldiers when the occupying Italian administration announced that they would be constructing a series of new hotels which would provide 990 beds for tourists.⁵¹⁶ In a rare fruition of Italian plans, twenty-five hotels did open that year.⁵¹⁷ This drive to re-establish and

⁵¹² Italian economists tinkered with the exact franc-lira exchange rate in an attempt to boost the value of the lira without ruling out trade with France altogether. See, ASMAE, GABAP, b. 13, "L'Ispettore Generale Capo, Tommaso Lazzari, al Ministero degli Affari Esteri e al Ministero delle Finanze", 30.6.41. The generally accepted exchange rate amongst scholars is between 30 and 38 francs per 100 Italian lire.

⁵¹³ The most famous example is in Greece, where useless Italian-issued drachmas flooded the country, devastating the economy. See, S. Lacouer, *Mussolini's Greek Island*, pp. 48-66; D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 248.

⁵¹⁴ AMM 10272, "Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Approvvigionamento idrico della città di Mentone", 30.7.42.

⁵¹⁵ See Section III, below.

⁵¹⁶ J-L. Panicacci, "Le tourisme à Menton pendant les années noires (1939-1945)", *Recherches Régionales*, 200 (2011), p. 58.

⁵¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 58.

improve upon the pre-war economy of the occupied communes formed part of Italian plans to retain as much wealth in Menton as possible. As we shall see below, however, it was also part of a plan to encourage Italians to think of the annexed communes as part of Italy.⁵¹⁸ As part of building the economy of the annexed communes, the Italian administration sought to raise the population of the town. As a result, when calculating the amount of resources needed to sustain the annexed communes, Italian engineers always factored in a tourist population on top of the pre-war population.⁵¹⁹ These attempts to re-construct the pre-war tourist-driven economy were part of Italy's "pull" factor to encourage Italians to visit and settle in the town and formed part of this process of demographic engineering.

III.

Italian attempts to re-shape the demographic of the occupied territories lay in more than these "push" and "pull" tactics in order to attract Italian residents. There were long-term issues of how Italy planned to develop the territories into functioning parts of the nation and the national economy. For one Italian official, Menton's problem was that the town had existed in the decades before the outbreak of war as a "parasite".⁵²⁰ This comment rested upon the fact that Menton had spent much of the pre-war era as a tourist destination, reliant upon foreign residents for its income and dependent upon the remainder of the Alpes-Maritimes for its services. The Italian desire to mould the occupied territories was not just in the classrooms and the national sentiments of those who resided there, but in the physical space. For many within the Fascist regime, the new science of *urbanistica* would not only create the ideal Fascist city, but would sweep away what some Italian urban planners saw as "degeneration" at once caused by and incubator for irrepressible and unregulated urban expansion.⁵²¹ Those communes which came under Italian control in 1940 were seen by some as French even in the very buildings and street plans. These large-scale urban planning projects were largely incomplete when Dino Grandi and his co-conspirators ejected Mussolini in July 1943, yet they represent an important layer in Italian plans for the occupied

⁵¹⁸ See Section IV, below.

⁵¹⁹ Italian planners, for example, calculated the ideal water supply for a population of 23,000, rather than Menton's pre-war population of 12,000, see AMM 10272, "Commissariato Civile di Mentone, Ufficio Tecnico per l'Acqua, il Gas, e l'Elettricit , Rifornimento idrico", 3.7.42; J-L. Panicacci, "Menton et les Mentonnais de 1939   1945", p. 3.

⁵²⁰ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, "Il Commissario per i Servizi Polizia Frontiera II Zona, P. Bologensi, all'Eccellenza il Capo della Polizia, Roma", 5.10.40.

⁵²¹ A.A. Kallis, *The Third Rome, the Making of the Fascist Capital, 1922-1943*, Basingstoke and New York (2014), p. 45.

territories. Italy went far beyond repairing war-damaged buildings and replacing politically unwelcome street names, pumping funds and effort into Menton and the other communes which would have been far better spent equipping the Italian armed forces with adequate supplies.

The decision to embark on these infrastructural projects was at least partially borne from necessity. France's decision to switch off the aqueduct which had hitherto supplied much of the Côte d'Azur with water forced Italian administrators in Menton to examine long-term solutions to the French stranglehold on utilities.⁵²² Italian engineers highlighted that without major French aqueducts, water supply to Menton could only be provided through one smaller aqueduct and three wells; the proposed solution was to construct at least two, or potentially three, additional wells, with an estimated cost of 300-380,000 lire.⁵²³ This project was to be augmented by substantial repair to the Pont de l'Union which had been damaged by the street fighting in Menton two years previously.⁵²⁴ Perhaps the most substantial of all, however, was the extensive repairs to the Ausonia water pump. This was singled out by Italian engineers as a particularly important factor if a substantial water supply was to be obtained. By mid-1942, the pump could only operate at 175 volts, a high that regularly fell to as low as 160 volts.⁵²⁵ The Ausonia water pump formed only the most important of the insufficiently powered water pumps in the town, all of which would require expensive long-term solutions.⁵²⁶ Gino Berri, the Civil Commissioner in Menton by 1943, noted that the cost of pipes, electro-mechanical parts and installation costs for the pumps alone would cost nearly 500,000 lire.⁵²⁷ Italian engineers, however, had advised that a budget closer to 900,000 lire was more prudent.⁵²⁸ These were not insignificant sums, particularly by 1943 when the Italian economy was experiencing increasing difficulties and a lack of funds. Many of the decisions taken for these projects were not taken simply at a local level, but were validated by the government in Rome. The construction of wells, for example, involved costs that were so high that those

⁵²² AMM 10272, "Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Amministrazione dei Territori Francesi occupati", 10.2.43.

⁵²³ AMM 10272, "Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Approvvigionamento idrico della città di Mentone", 30.7.42.

⁵²⁴ AMM 10272, "L'ingegnere capo al Signor Commissario Civile", 24.5.42; ACS, CIAF, b.3, fasc. 59, "Ufficio tecnico per l'acqua, il gas e l'elettricità, Relazione sull'acquedotto di Mentone", 21.10.41.

⁵²⁵ AMM 10272, "L'ingegnere capo al Signor Commissario Civile", 16.6.42.

⁵²⁶ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 59, "Ufficio tecnico per l'acqua, il gas e l'elettricità, Relazione sull'acquedotto di Mentone", 21.10.41.

⁵²⁷ ACS, CIAF, b.3, fasc. 59, "Il Commissario Civile, Gino Berri, al Commissario Straordinario del Comune di Mentone", 1.5.43.

⁵²⁸ ACS, CIAF, b.3, fasc. 59, "L'Ingenere Capo, A. Laudonio al Commissario Civile di Mentone", 30.4.43.

within the local administration had to have the project approved by central government.⁵²⁹ These projects, therefore, were not simply the result of local officials “working towards the Duce”, but were funded and supported by ministers in Rome.⁵³⁰

It is possible to argue that these projects were simply undertaken to stabilise Menton, a town that the IV Armata based itself in, and continued to base itself in after the enlargement of the occupation zone in November 1942. In reality, however, the Italian government chose a far more expensive option than was necessary. The Compagnie Générale des Eaux, who supplied the town and much of the Côte d’Azur prior to the occupation, were still prepared to supply Menton even under Italian occupation. The Compagnie Générale des Eaux offered to supply 2,500 litres of water per day, with 3,000 litres available in exceptional circumstances.⁵³¹ The price listed per cubic metre of water amounted to only 0.5 lire, allowing Italy to supply Menton with 2,500 litres daily for almost two years for the cost of replacing the water pumps alone.⁵³² Moreover, the highly inflated value of the lira against the franc imposed by the Bando made this situation advantageous to Italy.⁵³³ The Compagnie Générale des Eaux was undoubtedly prepared to make such an offer in an attempt to maintain operations in the town and prepared to accept overvalued lira in order to benefit when exchanging these into francs.

Construction of wells, bridges and water pumps alone does not constitute a program of Italianisation, but if set within the wider context of Italian urban projects within Italian imperial possessions it is possible to construct a more widespread praxis. On Rhodes and Kos, local residents recalled that the construction of adequate plumbing and toilet facilities had been a priority by Italian officials charged with developing the islands.⁵³⁴ The focus on plumbing and adequate water supply in both Menton and in the Dodecanese forms part of the Fascist science of *urbanistica*, which valued health and sanitation.⁵³⁵ No less prominent a

⁵²⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 59, “E. Stierlin al Commissario Civile di Mentone”, 6.2.43.

⁵³⁰ The phrase is Davide Rodogno’s, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 112, but is adapted from I. Kershaw, “‘Working Towards the Führer’, Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship”, *Contemporary European History*, 2, (1993).

⁵³¹ ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 59, “Accordo per il Provedimento del Servizio Distribuzione Acqua Portabile in Mentone”, 21.4.43

⁵³² Ibid.

⁵³³ R. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 9, “Bando del Duce sui territori occupati”, p. 93.

⁵³⁴ Doumanis, N. “Italians as ‘Good’ Colonizers: Speaking Subalterns and the Politics of Memory in the Dodecanese”, in Ben-Ghiat, R. and Fuller, M. (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke and New York, (2005), pp. 223-4.

⁵³⁵ A.A. Kallis, *The Third Rome*, p. 53; although not a discussion of sanitation, M.S Quine, “From Malthus to Mussolini: The Italian Eugenics Movement and Fascist Population Policy, 1890-1938”, PhD thesis, University College London (1990), includes efforts to improve sanitation as part of Fascism’s attempts to boost Italian birth

figure than Giuseppe Bottai stated in the 1930s that Fascist urban planning was to urbanisation what medicine was to infection.⁵³⁶ Moreover, in Italy's pre-war Greek holdings urban redevelopment had not only brought economic benefits, but had established some degree of Italian legitimacy amongst the local populations. In Rhodes, the level of investment from Italy in constructing a viable commercial port impressed those whose memories of the Ottoman occupation had been characterised with a complete lack of capital.⁵³⁷ Although the majority of Greeks continued to despise Italian rule, there was a grudging acceptance that in many respects they were economically better off than they had ever been, particularly in providing adequate sanitation.⁵³⁸

Urban measures in the annexed territories were also a way of physically remoulding the occupied communes to an Italian "style" of architecture that was never precisely defined. Donatella Calabi has argued that Italian urban planning was largely concerned with a re-organisation of transport and road systems in order to make city centres the focal points in a communications network.⁵³⁹ If this argument can be applied to plans to remodel both Rome and Milan city centres substantially, they can equally be applied to Menton.⁵⁴⁰ Italian plans for the town included large-scale demolitions and re-modelling of the centre. Streets that had developed organically would be swept away in place of wide boulevards and vast piazzas which would make the town both architecturally Italian and channel the spirit of *mediterraneità* which had grown in popularity in the 1930s.⁵⁴¹ The same document outlines changes that were to be made to the central railway station in Menton, which would be converted into a hub capable of handling international rail traffic.⁵⁴² This redevelopment of the railway station can also be seen as an attempt to integrate the annexed territories with Italy. Train services between Turin and Marseille all stopped at Menton, whilst the Italian

rates. The thesis accepts that many of these policies formed small portions of a "monumental social experiment" that was not solely limited to Fascism, but had roots in Liberal measures to improve public health, p. 9.

⁵³⁶ G. Bottai, quoted in *ibid*, p. 55.

⁵³⁷ N. Doumanis, "Italians as 'Good' Colonizers" pp. 223-4; N. Doumanis, *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean*, pp. 48-9.

⁵³⁸ N. Doumanis, "The Italian Empire and *brava gente*: Oral History and the Dodecanese Islands", in R.J.B. Bosworth and P. Dogliani. (eds.), *Italian Fascism, History, Memory and Representation*, Basingstoke and London, (1999) p. 166.

⁵³⁹ D. Calabi, "Italian Town Planning and the idea of the city in the early Twentieth Century", *Planning Perspectives*, 3, 2 (1988), p. 131.

⁵⁴⁰ The re-modelling of Milan and Rome are described in *ibid*. For a more specific case study on Rome see both A.A. Kallis, *The Third Rome*, and B.W. Painter Jr., *Mussolini's Rome, Rebuilding the Eternal City*, New York and Basingstoke (2005).

⁵⁴¹ AMM 10272, "Parere sul progetto di piano regolatore della città vecchia approvato con deliberazione municipal del 20 febbraio 1942 – XX", 18.4.42; A.A. Kallis, *The Third Rome*, pp. 68-9.

⁵⁴² AMM 10272, "Parere sul progetto di piano regolatore della città vecchia approvato con deliberazione municipal del 20 febbraio 1942 – XX", 18.4.42; AN AJ 41 2302, "Note sur les revendications italiennes", 30.9.40.

government ensured that regular trains ran between Menton and Genoa, Milan, Turin and Rome.⁵⁴³ Italian services which traditionally operated at railway stations, including tax offices, began to operate from the railway station in Menton, whilst companies establishing premises in the vicinity began to refer to the demarcation line as the frontier.⁵⁴⁴ This pushing back of the border reflects Menton's status as a borderland. Perhaps the most influential urban change in Menton was to move the international border from Menton's eastern end to its western end.

These urban planning projects have been largely overlooked by scholars focusing on the Italianisation of the occupied French communes. Jean-Louis Panicacci's book on Menton during the war reveals none of these details, instead focusing on more immediately visible changes such as the re-naming of streets and the implementation of Italian language and law.⁵⁴⁵ Davide Rodogno examines forced Italianisation projects in Italy's conquered territories in depth, but examines schooling policies and the opening of Fascist institutions in the occupied communes in place of large scale urban re-developments.⁵⁴⁶ Rodogno is, however, aware of the re-development plans as the plates in his monograph show photographs from the personal collection of Giuseppe Frediani, housed in the Istituto Pavese per la Storia della Resistenza e dell'età Contemporanea. These include an album, *Mentone dalla Ricostruzione alla Rinascita*, which outlines Fascist plans for the town.⁵⁴⁷ Rodogno's monograph, hampered by stricter confines of space due to the broader area of his topic, does not, however, deal with the urban regeneration program in detail. Yet despite the fact that it has too frequently been overlooked by scholars, this program of urban redevelopment reveals long-term post-war plans. If Rodogno urges us to remember that "we should not forget that the [Italian] regime did indeed partly achieve its 'historic objective' of territorial expansion", we should see these plans as the partial achievement of a pre-war program of Italianisation

⁵⁴³ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 4, "Il Presidente della Sottocommissione al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 21.1.42; ACS, CIAF, b.1, fasc. 1, "Relazione sull'attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 giugno 1942 – 31 gennaio 1943, Per contribuire alla storia dell'Armistizio Italo-Francese"; J-L. Panicacci, "Le tourisme à Menton pendant les années noires", p. 58.

⁵⁴⁴ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, "Relazione sull'attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 giugno 1942 – 31 gennaio 1943, Per contribuire alla storia dell'Armistizio Italo-Francese"; ACS, CIAF, b. 3, fasc. 59, "Bosco & Co., Ufficio Tecnico [a]l Commissariato Civile di Mentone", 19.7.43; AN AJ 41 438, "Le Président du Conseil d'Administration, Fournier, à le [Secrétaire d'État aux Communications]", 26.9.40; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, "Appunto per l'Ufficio del Cerimoniale", 17.3.41.

⁵⁴⁵ J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*, pp. 55-6. Notable street name changes included the transformation of the Promenade Georges V to the Passeggiata Italo Balbo, the Promenade du Midi becoming the Passeggiata Mare Nostrum, and Avenue Edouard VII's re-naming as via Francisco Franco.

⁵⁴⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 272-3.

⁵⁴⁷ Limited photographs are available on the ISPRC website, or in the plates of D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, between p. 266 and 267.

that would alter the long-term future of the territories.⁵⁴⁸

IV.

Italianisation had not only to occur in the territories themselves and in the minds of the former residents, but in the minds of the Italian population. The author Italo Calvino, who took part in the occupation of Menton, noted in a semi-autobiographical work that, “we all knew that [the occupation] was a charade, that Menton had not been conquered by anyone”.⁵⁴⁹ In practice, many of the projects described above were arguably aimed at Italians as much as at French authorities, helping to create the “pull” factor to attract Italians to visit and settle in the newly annexed communes. As we have seen, the construction of hotels formed part of this policy designed to draw Italians in, whilst a by-product of the extension of services such as Italian banks and postal services would be the facilitation of such visits. Moreover, the re-construction of hotels the hotel industry would help the economic recovery of the region.

The introduction of regular train services between Menton and many of the key cities of northern Italy not only bound the territories to Italy, but enabled those living there to visit the Côte d’Azur. This drive for tourism was spearheaded by Giuseppe Frediani, who created the *Ente Turismo Costa Azzurra di Mentone* (Tourism Board of Menton, Côte d’Azur – ETCAM) in March 1942.⁵⁵⁰ The activities of ETCAM went far beyond what Italy was obligated to do in the territories behind the *Linea verde* under the clauses of the Hague Convention.⁵⁵¹ ETCAM was given its own funds and personnel and used these funds to refurbish and maintain public gardens in Menton and beautifying the town as far as possible.⁵⁵² In addition to these projects, ETCAM began production of a range of postcards designed not only to be sold to tourists, but to solidify the concept of Menton and the occupied communes as part of Italy. One postcard bears the message “Saluti di Mentone Italiana”, whilst another proudly

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 8.

⁵⁴⁹ I. Calvino, “The Avanguardisti in Menton”, in I. Calvino, *Into the War*, London (2012) p. 27.

⁵⁵⁰ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd.; J-L. Panicacci, “Le tourisme à Menton durante les années noires”, p. 57. The activities of this board are strangely lacking in Frediani’s memoirs, G. Frediani, *La Pace separata di Ciano*, Rome (1990).

⁵⁵¹ E. Benvenisti, *The International Law of Occupation*, p. 1; P.M.R. Stirk, *The Politics of Military Occupation*, p. 18.

⁵⁵² J-L. Panicacci, “Le tourisme à Menton dans les années noires”, p. 57.

shows “La strada verso l’antica frontiera”.⁵⁵³ Although these postcards refer to Menton, they were produced in Turin and Milan, which were undoubtedly where they would eventually be sent to by tourists. These postcards, therefore, were not designed to Italianise Menton in the eyes of those living there, but in the eyes of those who would receive the postcards. ETCAM bore remarkable similarities in name to the *Ente nazionale per le industrie turistiche* (Italian National Tourism Board - ENIT), which had been established in order to promote tourism in the Italian annexed territories in 1919 in the Venezia Tridentina and the Venezia Giulia.⁵⁵⁴

In this regard, measures taken in the occupied territories echoed those taken in the colonies. In May 1935, Italo Balbo’s administration in Libya had established the *Ente Turistico ed Alberghiero della Libia* (Tourist and Hotel Board of Libya – ETAL).⁵⁵⁵ As in Menton, ETAL’s primary task was to ensure the availability of hotels and to ensure running water in rooms.⁵⁵⁶ The extension of Italian cultural propaganda into North Africa – cinemas experienced particularly high audience figures – were mirrored by the touring of Italian opera troupes in the territories behind the *Linea verde*.⁵⁵⁷ In the occupied territories, as in Libya, the process of Italianisation began to become permeated with the process of Fascistisation.

The construction of Menton and the other communes as part of Italy necessarily brought with it a series of programs that showed that these new territories subscribed to the state-endorsed ideology. It is in these programs that it is possible to see the degree to which Fascistisation of the communes took place more clearly. Factors discussed above, such as changes in law and schooling, inevitably brought systems that had been reformed before the war by the government. Nonetheless, it is more difficult to decipher exactly how far the PNF was carried into the occupied communes, partly due to the dearth of secondary literature on the PNF in any of the occupied territories.⁵⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the orientation of the communes behind the *linea verde* was further integrated with the neighbouring Italian provinces by the party. The opening of a *Fascio di Combattimento* in Menton signalled the introduction of the

⁵⁵³ “Greetings from Italian Menton” and “The road to the old frontier”, respectively. Although these postcards are preserved in the Archives Municipales de Menton, they have been digitised and researchers are not permitted to handle the originals. Some are re-produced as plates in J-L. Panicacci, *Mentons dans la tourmente*.

⁵⁵⁴ M. Hametz, “Replacing Venice in the Adriatic, Tourism and Italian Irredentism, 1880 -1936”, *Journal of Tourism History*, 6, 2-3, p. 115.

⁵⁵⁵ B.L. McLaren, “The Architecture of Tourism in Italian Libya: the Creation of a Mediterranean Identity”, in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, p. 169.

⁵⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁵⁵⁷ R. Ben-Ghiat, “The Italian Colonial Cinema: Audiences and Agendas”, in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller, (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, p. 183; ACS, CIAF, b. 1, fasc. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armistizio Italo-Francese”, nd.

⁵⁵⁸ D. Rodogno, “L’Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa”, p. 479.

PNF to Menton in a physical sense.⁵⁵⁹ The existence of the PNF in the towns did not come about due to the occupation, having existed both before the outbreak of war and out with the territories occupied by Italy until later in the conflict, but the arrival of Italian governance certainly encouraged a growth in members and influence.⁵⁶⁰ This government endorsement of the PNF and the opening of the Fascio di Combattimento were accompanied by the opening of a branch of the *Opera Nazionale del Dopolavoro* (National After-work Organisation – OND) and the introduction of Fascist youth groups.⁵⁶¹ These organisations also formed part of the process of integration between the newly annexed communes and Italy. The PNF organisations established in Menton and the other French territories were subordinate to their provincial capitals.⁵⁶²

It is difficult to make precise judgements on the role of the PNF and Fascistisation. The implementation of clear signs of Italianisation, such as the imposition of Italian law and language, are clear indicators for scholars that Italianisation was taking place. There are indicators, however, that this process of Fascistisation was far less successful than hoped for. Even with a substantially altered, largely pro-Italian demographic, PNF membership in Menton stood at a paltry 500.⁵⁶³ Moreover, complaints emerged regarding MVSN recruiting policy across the occupied territories, including those out with France, stating that the heavy handed tactics of the MVSN was alienating the local populations.⁵⁶⁴ The spread of the PNF was Italy's attempts to Fascistise the territories, although, as Rodogno points out, the most successful of these plans in the long-run would probably have been the introduction of Italian schools.⁵⁶⁵

Moreover, whilst Italianisation brought Fascistisation, such policies were rarely carried out simultaneously. Although this chapter is named after the two processes as if they were separate entities, in reality there were considerable overlaps between the two concepts. Measures that could be seen as Italianisation often bore some elements of Fascistisation, particularly if these elements had been Fascistised in Italy. In implementing Italian language, for example, some level of Fascistisation took place if the campaign to replace the traditional

⁵⁵⁹ ACS, CIAF, b. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armisitizio Italo-Francese”, nd; ACS, CIAF, b.2 , fasc. 19, “Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri al R. Console Berri, Commissario Civile [di] Mentone”, nd.

⁵⁶⁰ ADAM 0560W 0219, “Ufficio S.F. Posizione C.13/4818, BU/MAT”, 28.5.40.

⁵⁶¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 273.

⁵⁶² ACS, CIAF, b. 1, “Relazione sulla attività del Commissariato Civile di Mentone per il periodo 1 ottobre 1941 XIX – 31 maggio 1942 XX – Per contribuire alla storia dell’Armisitizio Italo-Francese”, nd.

⁵⁶³ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁴ A. Rossi, *Le guerre delle Camicie Nere*, pp. 58-9.

⁵⁶⁵ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 273.

“Lei” with “Voi” was carried into the occupied territories.⁵⁶⁶ Fascistisation, therefore, should not simply be taken simply to mean the introduction of the PNF and the OND, but to expand projects which had taken place in the Italian peninsula itself into the newly annexed territories. In Alsace and Lorraine, Germanisation and Nazification were far more synonymous, as party and state fused more successfully than in Italy.⁵⁶⁷ Alberto Aquarone and Emilio Gentile have questioned the success of the PNF in mirroring these measures.⁵⁶⁸ As we have seen, Davide Rodogno has noted that the PNF is one of the most under-explored Italian organs in the occupied territories, yet the expansion of organisations affiliated with the party must betray its involvement to some extent.⁵⁶⁹ Despite this lack of secondary sources, it is possible to insert the PNF into the process of Italianising the territories behind the *Linea verde* in the minds of Italians.

The Italianisation of the territories behind the *Linea verde* has, then, been a far more complex and comprehensive project than other historians have hitherto acknowledged. Attempts to transform the occupied communes into fully fledged Italian territories has been both explored and accepted in the past, however the extent to which this took place has often been under-examined. It is true that many of these projects were never completed, and a large number were never even started, however this should not detract from their impact in planning circles. Extensive documentation has pointed to the demographic and physical restructuring of the occupied communes and a series of multi-departmental efforts to extend Italian services into the territories for long-term changes in the region. Whilst Emanuele Sica has described these efforts as an “inchoate colonisation”, the truth is more complex than this, extending beyond the movement of peoples to a full scale annexation.⁵⁷⁰

Italian plans did not simply reduce the occupied territories to the status of a settler colony, but aimed at their long-term integration with Italy. The extension of the provinces of Piedmont and Liguria and the possible creation of the provinces of Alpi Marittime and Alpi Occidentali envisage an extension of metropolitan Italy at the expense of France. The creation and implementation of these plans would cause a seismic shift in Italo-French

⁵⁶⁶ P. Corner, *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy*, Oxford (2012), pp. 228-9, describes the “Voi” campaign as the butt of numerous jokes within the peninsula. Nonetheless, it is an example of the attempt to Fascistise Italian life.

⁵⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 126; M. Palla, “Lo stato-partito”, in M. Palla (ed.), *Lo Stato fascista*, Milan (2001), p. 17.

⁵⁶⁸ A. Aquarone, *L'organizzazione dello Stato totalitario*, Turin (1965), p. 164; E. Gentile, *La vita italiana al totalitarismo, Il partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista*, Rome (1995), p. 78.

⁵⁶⁹ D. Rodogno, “L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa”, p. 479.

⁵⁷⁰ E. Sica, “Italiani brava gente?”, p. 150.

relations. Such a change was almost completely dependent upon an Axis victory in the war. It was this inability to bring about such a victory that ultimately halted Italian plans in the long-term.

Chapter 6. Local Relations

Italo-French relations in the territories behind the *Linea verde* were of a complex artificial character that was made possible only by the near-complete absence of French officials. The Italian imposition of a harsh *diktat*-style regime designed to bind the territories to Italy took place over a period of three years, but in territorial terms represented only a small percentage of the Italian occupation. Moreover, the territories were unique in that the majority of the French population did not return to Menton or the other occupied communes making it difficult to ascertain the precise Italo-French dynamic at a local level. This chapter will explore local relations between Italy and the occupied populations, local French officials and the myriad of agencies employed by both sides. It will largely focus on the expanded zone of occupation, both prior to and after the invasion in November 1942, and aims to understand not only how local government functioned within the confines of military occupation, but how the French population related to their occupiers. The proximity of the zone to Italy itself and the high numbers of Italian migrants and second- and third-generation Italian migrants also affords us an insight into how the Italian community in France reacted to the occupation. Their relations with both the occupiers and their newly-occupied French neighbours were not replicated on a scale of this magnitude in Greece or the territories of the carved-up Yugoslavia. The traditional occupier-occupied dichotomy, therefore, actually becomes a trichotomy, with the migrant community often torn between their *patria* and their adopted homes. This trichotomy also demonstrates the problematic nature of labels such as “occupied” and “occupier”, labels which depended not only upon circumstances, but who assigned these labels and to whom. Although Italian citizens living in France may have fallen into the “occupied” category, by virtue that their homes and localities were occupied, there were doubtless many in the French communities who felt that these citizens had more in common with the “occupiers”. Prior to the expansion of the zone of occupation in November 1942, the Italian community may have fallen under neither the “occupied” nor the “occupier” label. Thus, the labels by which portions of the various communities in the region were assigned must be treated with caution.

The Italian general, Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri, stated that the “good nature” of the Italians

had given a uniquely compassionate element to the occupation of France.⁵⁷¹ In addition to falling into the *italiani brava gente* trap, this statement ignores the complexities of the trichotomy. Although it is important not to entirely dismiss friendships that formed during the occupation, at least in part due to a common culture, it is equally important not to excessively emphasise these improvements in relationships. Moreover, these friendships should appear as more isolated incidents when set against communities in which hostility and mutual suspicion soured relations from the very outset.⁵⁷² The transformation of the traditional occupier-occupied dichotomy into a trichotomy changed the dynamic in communities and exacerbated traditional xenophobic sentiments towards immigrant populations and caricature portrayals of fifth columnists.

I.

The expansion of the Italian zone of occupation into the hitherto unoccupied territories brought swathes of the French population under direct military control for the first time. In the south-east, the local administrations had undoubtedly been changed by the outcome of the French armistice, but had not had to deal directly with an occupying army. In some ways, therefore, the Italian occupation came across populations who had been relatively distant from the war, particularly compared with those in the north. Moreover, the arrival of the Italian armed forces into these territories directly challenged the legitimacy of the Vichy government.⁵⁷³ This undeclared challenge was a particular problem for local administrations who had been attempting to re-construct a semblance of post-war legitimacy in order to ease the transition from the Third Republic to the *État français*.⁵⁷⁴ Responses to this came from the *Préfets*, whose power and status in their communities had been strengthened in part to reinforce Vichy's legitimacy and authority.⁵⁷⁵ In the Alpes-Maritimes, Marcel Ribière wrote to the mayors of the *département* and stated that the Italian troops were not "*troupes*

⁵⁷¹ Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri, quoted in D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitan francesi*, p. 445.

⁵⁷² The *Préfet Régional* based in Marseille mentions the improvement of relations in the Var as worthy of note presumably because such relationships were far less noticeable in the other occupied *départements*, see AN F1^a CIII 1200, "Le Préfet de la Région de Marseille à Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement", 19.3.43.

⁵⁷³ P. Romijn, M. Conway and D. Peschanski, "National Legitimacy – Ownership, Pretenders and Wars", in M. Conway and P. Romijn, (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture*, p. 93.

⁵⁷⁴ On legitimacy at a local level, see N. Wouters, "The War for Legitimacy at the Local Level". See also, F. Bloch-Lainé and C. Gruson, *Hauts fonctionnaires sous l'occupation*, Paris (1996), esp. Ch. 4.

⁵⁷⁵ S. Mazey and V. Wright, "Les préfets", in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *Le régime de Vichy et les Français*, Paris (1992), p. 268; *ibid*, p. 116.

d'occupation”, but “*troupes d’opération*”.⁵⁷⁶ This apparently trivial semantic distinction encapsulates the attitude of the Vichy government at the time. Ribière also stated that the French flag was not to be removed from official buildings.⁵⁷⁷ In local affairs, French officials attempted to hold onto whatever semblance of sovereignty that they could. This desire stemmed at least in part from the Italian claim that the enlargement of the zone of occupation did not represent an attempt to fulfil Italian territorial desires, but was a pre-emptive measure in order to protect the population from an Allied invasion.⁵⁷⁸ Moreover, many Vichy officials were reluctant to accept the extension of the Italian zone of occupation as it explicitly broke the terms of the armistice, which Italy had stuck so stringently to as the only acceptable legal framework between Vichy and Rome.⁵⁷⁹

Despite these reservations, it would quickly become apparent to both sides that collaboration was necessary in order for local life to function. Italy’s near obsession with the legality of the occupation forced her, under the Hague Convention, to ensure the continuation of daily life.⁵⁸⁰ For both sides, collaboration was not only pragmatic, but was also seen as a way for both Italy and France to maintain a degree of sovereignty within the territory. This decision for the two governments to collaborate should not come as any surprise. It is possible that hostility within the regions on the Italo-French border helped incubate a sense that any level of co-operation with Italian forces was a sign of weakness, but this should be placed against the backdrop of collaboration and collaborationism as a policy. The concept of collaboration was a cross-party idea that punctured strict ideological constraints and appealed to those who felt that it was the only way of assuring and re-gaining France’s place in European affairs.⁵⁸¹ Collaboration with Italy was as much a part of this concept as

⁵⁷⁶ AMN, 3H 065-2, “Le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Sous-Préfet à Grasse et à Messieurs les Maires du département”, 18.10.42.

⁵⁷⁷ ADAM 0616W 0241, “Le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Sous-Préfet de Grasse et à Messieurs les Maires du département”, 18.11.42; ADAM 0616W 0241, “Le Maire d’Isola à Monsieur [le Conseiller d’État], Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes”, nd, however, shows that the French flag was removed from official buildings in some towns.

⁵⁷⁸ *DSCS*, Vol. 8, t. 2, Doc. 37, “Allegato n. 1 all’allegato 852 bis al Diario Storico, Hitler Proclama ai Francesi”, 11.11.42, pp. 97-8; on the extension to Monaco of the “laws of war”, see ASMAE, AP, Monaco, b. 1, “*Telespresso*, n. 42/ 21589”, 11.8.40.

⁵⁷⁹ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, 24.6.40, pp. 76-82.

⁵⁸⁰ Y. Dinstein, *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, p. 89; P.M.R. Stirk, *The Politics of Military Occupation*, p. 18.

⁵⁸¹ P. Burrin, “Le collaborationnisme”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des années noires, t. 1, De la défaite à Vichy*, pp. 363, 370; on collaboration and collaborationism, see E. Collotti, “Il collaborazionismo con le potenze dell’Asse nell’Europa occupata, temi e problemi della storiografia”, *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, 21, 2-3 (1992); J-P. Azéma, *Vichy-Paris, les collaborations: histoire et mémoire*, Paris (2012); on collaboration on the left, see J-Y. Boursier, *La politique du PCF, 1939-1945, Le Parti Communiste Français et la question nationale*, Paris (1992); R. Bourderon, “Une difficile articulation: politique nationale et

collaboration with Germany. Whilst the DFCIA and the CIAF collaborated on an almost daily basis through a combination of necessity and endless political wrangling, collaboration on a mass scale could only take place following the November 1942 expansion of Italy's zone of occupation. In addition, whilst the war had seemed a relatively distant concept to the population of many of the *départements* which came under occupation in 1942, many of the mayors and *Préfets* of the region had actually been in contact with Italian officials for some time. As we have seen, debate over the return of the populations of Menton and the other occupied communes had involved numerous officials at both national and local levels of government. These regular, if strained, discussions between the two governments coupled with Vichy's rhetoric on the importance of collaboration helped foster an atmosphere in which relations between the two sides could take place at a local level. Bilateral discussions and co-operation in governing practices should not be seen as a sign of weakness on the part of either side. Acceptance of collaboration with France in key institutions, such as the police, should not be interpreted as a concession to French sovereignty or an admission of Italian frailty. The idea that concessions made by Italy in important matters such as policing not only ignores the wider context of the war, but also similar concessions made by Germany. Co-operation between the French and German police was widespread even before November 1942, and has not been historically interpreted as a sign of German weakness.⁵⁸² Moreover, between November 1942 and the Italian surrender in September 1943, Italy found that the Eastern front and the ascendancy of partisan groups in Yugoslavia was consuming increasing amounts of manpower. For Italy, this shortage in manpower made collaboration with France in policing matters extremely beneficial.⁵⁸³ On 13 November 1942, only two days after the beginning of the Italian advance into French territory, it was recounted to General Parisot that Italian forces had been explicitly instructed to collaborate with the French civil and military authorities.⁵⁸⁴

It was with this backdrop that the French government made clear to Italy that they would

appartenance à l'Internationale", in J-P. Azéma, A. Prost, and J-P. Rioux (eds.), *Le Parti Communiste Français des années sombres, 1938-1941*, Paris (1986).

⁵⁸² C. Emsley, "Policing on a Dark Continent in the Ages of Extremes", in G. Oram (ed.), *Conflict & Legality, Policing in mid-twentieth century Europe*, London (2003), p. 202.

⁵⁸³ Following the German occupation of the region, Germany allowed France to police the region herself for similar reason, ADAM 0166W 0005, "Le Chef du Gouvernement, Ministre Secrétaire d'État à l'Intérieur à Monsieur le Directeur Général de la Gendarmerie Nationale", 23.9.43.

⁵⁸⁴ R.H. Rainero, *Mussolini e Pétain*, Vol. 2, Doc. 58, "Le relazione Parisot sull'occupazione della Provenza", 13.11.42, pp. 343-4.

retain ultimate sovereignty and jurisdiction in matters of policing.⁵⁸⁵ The French government continued to pass laws in the previously unoccupied territories, attempting to control the registration of weapons and the demobilisation of the *Armée de l'Armistice*.⁵⁸⁶ If French officials hoped that taking the lead in policing would sustain some semblance of sovereignty, Italian governing organs in the occupied territories saw French participation in law and order as an effective way of relieving Italy from the burdens of law enforcement. Following an increase on attacks upon Italian military authorities in Nice, a strict curfew was demanded by Italian officials.⁵⁸⁷ Despite the fact that the curfew was imposed by Italy, Italian military authorities reminded French officials that the onus of enforcing the curfew lay with the French police.⁵⁸⁸ In his way, the Italian military benefitted from a more secure city, whilst shouldering none of the responsibility for ensuring the conduct of civilians.

Collaboration, whether or not individual officials or functionaries subscribed to Pétain and Laval's political definition of the concept, was necessary for daily life to function in Italy's expanded zone of occupation. Unlike the territories behind the *Linea verde* where French functionaries had either fled or by their very return had been forced to accept, if not capitulate to, de facto Italian control, the mass of French functionaries meant that Italy could not simply bypass existing organs of the French government. Domenico Schipsi has stated that both French authorities and the French population strongly opposed the Italian occupation.⁵⁸⁹ Whilst Schipsi's argument that many within the south-east saw the occupation as indefensible given Italy's failure to occupy these same *départements* in 1940, the nature of this opposition must not be overestimated. It is clear that relations between French *Préfets*, the mayors and the Italian occupying authorities were cordial and largely without incident, and remained so for the duration of the occupation.⁵⁹⁰ Whilst some officials did express anger that orders were often given by the Italian authorities, rather than by those attached to Vichy, there seems to have been very little offered in the way of bureaucratic resistance amongst the *Préfets*.⁵⁹¹

⁵⁸⁵ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 64, "Il Presidente della Sottocommissione, Liberati, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 16.12.42.

⁵⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁸⁷ AN AJ 41 1183, "Il Generale di Brigata, Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri al generale di corpo d'armata, Bridoux", 7.5.43; ADAM 0166W 0011, "*L'Eclaireur de Nice et du Sud-Est*", 29.4.43;

⁵⁸⁸ AN AJ 41 1183, "Il Generale Commandante la Piazza al Signor Prefetto di Nizza", 28.4.43. Although Italian officials hoped not to become involved in imposing the curfew there is evidence that the Italian police did have to escort civilians home, see ADAM 0028W 0075, "Le Commissaire Central, Chef de la Circonscription à Monsiuer le Conseiller d'État, Préfet Régional à Nice", 12.4.43.

⁵⁸⁹ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, p. 421.

⁵⁹⁰ For the Basses-Alpes, see AN F1^a CIII 1136, "Rapport mensuel d'information de le 31 juillet 1943"; for the Isère, see AN F1^a CIII 1158, "Rapport mensuel d'information de 28 avril 1943"; for Savoie, see AN F1^a CIII 1186, "Rapport mensuel d'information de 5 janvier 1943".

⁵⁹¹ AN F1^a CIII 1186, "Rapport mensuel d'information de 24 février 1943".

Indeed, Schipsi's statement that the occupation was opposed by the French authorities must be tempered by the letter sent by Ribière, himself a hard-line supporter of Pétain, thanking the mayors and their administrations for co-operating closely with Italian commanders.⁵⁹²

Collaboration, therefore, was a practically daily occurrence in Italo-French relations at a local level. If we must be careful not to overestimate the official hostility to the Italian occupation, however, it would be equally prudent not to overestimate the level to which Italy was ready to collaborate with extra-governmental bodies. Davide Rodogno conceded that the French *archives départementales* could hold documentation that would reveal collaboration between Italian authorities and the Milice française or the *Légion française des Combattants* that his own thesis had failed to find.⁵⁹³ Although collaboration between the local community and the occupying forces will be described below, no such additional information has been found by this study.⁵⁹⁴ We must, therefore, frame Italo-French collaboration at a local level within its own limits. That is to say, that Italo-French collaboration largely remained a phenomenon borne from pragmatism than from political kinship.

In addition, by examining collaboration at a local level, it is possible to see how far the two states reached into the lives of those living under the occupation. In other Italian-occupied territories, notably Yugoslavia, the complete collapse of the state meant that civilians often encountered only Italian officials. In this sense, as we have seen, France avoided the “state death” experienced by Yugoslavia, and therefore forms an unusual case in examining Italian occupations.⁵⁹⁵ In France, local authorities survived the defeat of 1940, and were therefore faced with the choice of collaboration or some kind of passive bureaucratic resistance. The issue of collaboration in local government is particularly problematic as it falls between the categories of direct state collaboration – that is to say, the central regime itself – and individual collaboration. Michael Hechter has stated that these are the two broad categories into which those living under occupation fall into.⁵⁹⁶ By examining local authorities interactions with the occupying powers, however, it is possible to study

⁵⁹² AMN 3H 065-2, “Le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Sous-Préfet de Grasse et à Messieurs les Maires du département”, 18.11.42.

⁵⁹³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 329.

⁵⁹⁴ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 68, “Il Generale Commandante, Mario Vercellino, alla CIAF Presidenza [e] al Comando Supremo”, 7.6.43, shows Italian concern over the Milice; AN AJ 41 2152, “L’Amiral Duplat, Président de la Délégation Française à la Commission Italienne d’Armistice [à] Monsieur le Ministre, Secrétaire d’État à la Guerre”, 26.6.41; ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 68, “Wimmer, Generale di Squadra Aerea all’Ufficio di Collegamento Francese presso l’Aufstellengsstab del Comando III/a Flotta Aerea”, 16.2.43. On the Milice in general see, M. Cointet, *La milice française*, Paris (2013). As with the majority of scholarship on Vichy, there is no mention of relations between the Milice and Italian organs of any sort.

⁵⁹⁵ T.M. Fazal, *State Death*, pp. 2-3.

⁵⁹⁶ M. Hechter, *Alien Rule*, Cambridge (2013), p. 105.

collaboration in a broader sense.

II.

For Italians living in the occupied territories, the Italian declaration of war and subsequent territorial occupations brought about enormous changes as to their status in their communities. In the 1930s, substantial numbers of Italian immigrants lived and worked in the south-east, particularly on the Côte d'Azur; by 1931, when the influx of Italians reached its peak, around 808,000 Italian migrants lived throughout France.⁵⁹⁷ Of this number, the majority were overwhelmingly concentrated in the south-east, with some 40,000 living in Nice alone, representing twenty-three per-cent of the Niçois population.⁵⁹⁸ Although portions of French society harboured the abusive stereotypical view that Italians lacked personal hygiene, they were seen as pious Catholics who were culturally and religiously akin to the communities in which they lived.⁵⁹⁹ Moreover, Italian workers were well-regarded, with only around five per-cent considered to have given a negative impression to their employers.⁶⁰⁰ This positive image was slowly eroded by the worsening international standing between Paris and Rome. As increasing numbers of Italian political refugees crossed the Franco-Italian border, often pursued by OVRA agents, many French citizens felt that Italian domestic crises were being exported to France.⁶⁰¹ In an increasingly volatile political climate, Mussolini's declaration of war on France in June 1940 did not create the myth of Italians as "fifth columnists", but it helped solidify it.⁶⁰²

In reality, the vast majority of Italians living in France displayed no political leanings one way or the other. Many had left Italy in search of jobs and showed little or no interest in either Italian foreign policy or Fascism's attempts to overhaul Italian society. In fact, French

⁵⁹⁷ P. Milza, "Les italiens en France dans les années trente", p. 26; R. Schor, "Les immigrés italiens au miroir de la presse française dans l'entre-deux-guerres", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 85 (2012), pp. 103-5; P. Guillen, "L'antifascisme, facteur d'intégration des italiens dans l'entre-deux-guerres", *Recherches Régionales*, 79 (1982), p. 58.

⁵⁹⁸ R. Schor, "Italiens des villes, Italiens des champs, l'accueil des immigrés italiens dans les Alpes-Maritimes et dans le sud-ouest (1919-1939)", *Recherches Régionales*, 79 (1982), p. 47; J. Basso, "Jean Médecin: Pouvoir et action politique", *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 55 (1997), p. 93.

⁵⁹⁹ R. Schor, "L'image de l'Italien dans la France de l'entre-deux-guerres", in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, pp. 98-100.

⁶⁰⁰ Ibid, pp. 94-5.

⁶⁰¹ Ibid, p. 101; M. Franzinelli, *I tentacoli dell'Ovra*, pp. 125-30.

⁶⁰² Fifth columnist rumours were rife, particularly in the wake of the resounding successes made by the Wehrmacht, see D. Veillon, *Vivre et survivre en France, 1939-1947*, Paris (1995), pp. 43-5. The phenomenon of Italians becoming "fifth columnists" is not unique to France. For the same process taking place in Britain after June 1940, see W. Ugolini, *Experiencing War as the Enemy 'Other', Italian Scottish Experience in World War II*, Manchester (2011).

authorities noted that of the 40,000 Italians living in Nice, only around 1,000-2,000 supported Fascism in any way.⁶⁰³ In the days immediately following Italy's declaration of war, great numbers of Italians in the Alpes-Maritimes wrote to both the *Préfet* and the *Commissaire de Police* to declare their support for France. One couple, Robert and Renée Moraldo, although of Italian origins, stated that they considered themselves French, signing the letter as Robert and Renée, rather than Roberto and Renata.⁶⁰⁴ Another Italian, Egildo Gavignazzi wrote to the Ministère de l'Intérieur before war broke out in order to affirm that his loyalty lay firmly with France.⁶⁰⁵ These declarations followed campaigns by the principal Italian anti-Fascist organisations based in France, urging ex patriate Italians to support France against Mussolini.⁶⁰⁶ In Nice, the *Unione Popolare Italiana* made a joint declaration with the *Association franco-italienne des Anciens Combattants* in the daily newspaper, *L'Eclaireur de Nice et du Sud-Est* stating their unequivocal opposition to Italian aggression.⁶⁰⁷

For many within the French government, however, and despite the opinion of at least two high-ranking policemen that the vast majority of Italians did not wish to see Italian territorial gains in France, these declarations were insufficient and their authenticity and sincerity were often privately questioned.⁶⁰⁸ Lists existed of those Italians who had declared loyalty to France, but who the French police believed should still be monitored.⁶⁰⁹ Italian males between 17 and 60 were made to register at their local police station.⁶¹⁰ The image of the friendly Italian which had existed before the war had been slowly eroded, and finally destroyed by the breakdown in Franco-Italian relations. Many Italians, previously considered as not totally alien to the communities in which they had settled, were now viewed as dangerous outsiders.⁶¹¹ In many cases, Italians became pawns of both sides. Italy viewed them as political tools, launching campaigns to re-patriate them in order to raise the

⁶⁰³ H. Chaubin, *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre*, pp. 36-7. Chaubin does not reveal how French authorities ascertained who supported Fascism and who did not. It is likely that this figure is exaggerated as patriotic Italians were often equated with Fascists.

⁶⁰⁴ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Robert et Renée Moraldo à le Commissaire de Police", 18.6.40.

⁶⁰⁵ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Egildo Gavignazzi à le Ministère de l'Intérieur", 6.6.40.

⁶⁰⁶ For one such organisation, see É. Vial, "La Ligue Italienne des Droits de l'Homme (LIDU) de sa foundation à 1934", in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*.

⁶⁰⁷ R.H. Rainero, *I piemontesi in Provenza, Aspetti di un'emigrazione dimenticata*, pp. 296-7; see also, É. Vial, *L'Union Populaire italienne, 1937-1940: une organisation de masse du parti communiste italien en exil*, Rome (2007).

⁶⁰⁸ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Joseph Croix [et] Lucien Antoine à Monsieur le Commissaire Principal [à] Roquebrune-Cap-Martin", 13.5.42.

⁶⁰⁹ ADAM 0616W 0241, "Liste nominative des Italiens ayant fait une declaration de loyalisme, main qui sont à considérer comme suspects", nd; this situation did not change even after the arrival of Italian troops in the hitherto Free Zone, see ADAM 0166W 0002, "Rapport, n. 3582", 11.6.43.

⁶¹⁰ R.H. Rainero, *I piemontesi in Provenza*, p. 296.

⁶¹¹ AN AJ 41 432, "Rapport n. 4 sur l'activité des Commissions de contrôle italiennes (I)", 29.9.40, notes that some elements of the Italian community are hedging their bets, storing Italian flags in case of an occupation.

population of Italy whilst simultaneously lowering that of France. Italian officials also used the mistreatment of Italians living under French rule as an opportunity to undermine France and challenge her claims to sovereignty in the region. The French government viewed these Italian communities as potential fifth columnists and Fascist sympathisers, a perception that earned them the disdain of many within official organisations.

Italian migrants, whatever their pre-war political leanings, became targets both in their daily lives and for the resistance. Tensions began almost as soon as Italy entered the war.⁶¹² One Italian complained that his French neighbours were continually insulting him due to his nationality.⁶¹³ One Italian immigrant who had been employed in Nice for a number of years before the war was accused of “eating French bread” during food shortages in the city.⁶¹⁴ Italians who were considered friends and neighbours in the pre-war era, now found their caricatures warped by Rome’s external politics. These politics gave rise to a type of violence amongst neighbours. This could take the form of damage to property, assault on individuals, or verbal abuse. In his exploration of resistance groups, Olivier Wieviorka has raised the traditional Germanophobic sentiments of portions of the French population as a factor for joining the resistance.⁶¹⁵ Italophobia is a less useful factor in explaining why resistance developed in the south-east than Germanophobia is in the north, but it can be extremely useful in understanding why many French civilians turned on their Italian neighbours. Despite the pre-war positive images of Italians as devout Catholics and hard workers, traditional xenophobic fears over migrants’ threats to housing and job availability had affected Italo-French relations as much as it had affected French relations with other migrant communities.⁶¹⁶ Such concerns may reflect the position of the Alpes-Maritimes as a border region, where similar concerns over housing and employment are often articulated. Nonetheless, the example of the Italian immigrant accused of depriving French civilians of bread is one instance of simmering pre-war tensions between Italian and French communities boiling over. In many such instances, the demise of Italo-French international relations was merely the catalyst for existing conflicts in communities.

⁶¹² ADAM 0616W 0241, “Rapport à Cap d’Ail”, 9.11.40 shows Italo-French tensions in 1940.

⁶¹³ ADAM 0104W 0003, “Note de Renseignements, No. 548”, 28.4.42.

⁶¹⁴ ADAM 0166W 0028, “Note de Renseignements, No. 123”, 27.9.41; ADAM 0166W 0028, “Le Commissaire Principal de 1ère classe, Chef des Services de Police Spéciale à Monsieur le Conseiller d’Etat, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes”, 13.9.41. On food shortages see, J-L. Panicacci, “La vie quotidienne des Niçois de 1939 à 1945”, *Nice Historique*, 2 (2004), pp. 77-9.

⁶¹⁵ O. Wieviorka, *Histoire de la Résistance, 1940-1945*, Paris (2013), p. 88; O. Wieviorka, *Une certaine idée de la résistance, Défense de la France, 1940-1949*, Paris (1995), pp. 143-9.

⁶¹⁶ R. Schor, *L’opinion française et les étrangers en France, 1919-1939*, Paris (1985), pp. 377-8; Y. Gastaut, “Les tendances italophobes dans l’opinion Niçois à la Libération (1944-1946)”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 52 (1996), p. 54.

Many amongst the Italian community felt that the political implications of the occupation had given rise to anti-Italian sentiments within the police. The CIAF noted that although relations between Italy and France at a state level were always courteous, the same could not be said of the attitudes of the French police towards the Italian community.⁶¹⁷ One Italian, accused of insulting France and her military performance during the war, was continually investigated by the French police.⁶¹⁸ In instances, Italians complained that the French police were increasingly reluctant to assist Italians in domestic disputes with French civilians.⁶¹⁹ Some went as far as making official complaints to the regional authorities over their treatment by the police. In some cases, French policemen were disciplined by their French superiors.⁶²⁰ Nonetheless, anti-Italian bias existed within French organisations. Those Italians finally released from French internment under Article XXI of the armistice complained to Italian authorities that they were treated very badly. Many complained that their long-term pre-war employers refused to re-employ them.⁶²¹

Those who were perceived to be politically sympathetic to Mussolini's territorial ambitions in France or worked with Italian authorities became the most visible targets. In Beausoleil, one Italian, Jean Leoncini, had his garage broken into and two engines destroyed after it became apparent that he was repairing vehicles for both the Italian and German armed forces.⁶²² Another garage, owned by a known-Fascist militant, was destroyed after it became clear that the owner was repairing vehicles for the CIAF.⁶²³ In Monaco, the restaurant "Quinto's" was attacked as it was frequented by CIAF delegates and members of the Italian armed forces.⁶²⁴ Another Italian, Louis Bencivenga, a resident of Cannes for fourteen years, had his shop burned down after an explosion in the kitchen.⁶²⁵ It is not surprising that those Italians accused of aiding the Italian and German administrations became targets for the

⁶¹⁷ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 10, "Notizario quindicinale, 18, relativa alla Francia metropolitana, compresa la Corsica", 31.8.41.

⁶¹⁸ ADAM 0166W 0027, "Le Commissaire Divisionnaire de Police Spéciale à Monsieur le Conseiller d'État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes", 10.7.41.

⁶¹⁹ ADAM 0616W 0261, "Le Conseiller d'Etat, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur l'Intendant de Police", 4.12.42.

⁶²⁰ ADAM 0166W 0028, "Le Procureur Général près de la Cour d'Appel d'Aix à Monsieur le Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes", 22.9.41; on disciplinary measures, see ADAM 0166W 0028, "Le Conseiller d'Etat, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Commandant Guret, délégation Française d'Armistice-1ère section", 31.7.41.

⁶²¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 2, "Appunto No. 3, L'attegiamento francese verso l'Italia durante l'armistizio", nd, but within a folder marked "1942".

⁶²² ADAM 0166W 0001, "Rapport de l'adjudant Maurice, sur l'explosion de deux engins à Beausoleil", 27.4.43.

⁶²³ ADAM 0166W 0001, "Le Commissaire Central à Monsieur l'Inspecteur Général, Chargé des Services de Police Judiciaire", 3.11.42; ADAM 0166W 0001, "Renseignements No. 8374", 3.11.42; ADAM 0166W 0001, "Rapport du Capitaine André", 3.11.42.

⁶²⁴ ADAM 0166W 0001, "Rapport Journalier, No. 38" 21.2.43

⁶²⁵ ADAM 0028W 0075, "Le Commissaire Central de Police au 1er Arr. à Monsieur le Commissaire Central, Chef de la Circonscription de Cannes", 15.1.43.

resistance. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that many of these targets had been residents of France for a number of years. Louis Bencivenga had lived in Cannes for fourteen years before becoming a target for reprisal attacks, and although the owner of “Quinto’s” pre-war residential status is not given in the report, he had presumably lived in Monaco long enough to open a successful restaurant. Violence against political beliefs, or perceived political beliefs, could therefore occur across the south-east. Italians of all political viewpoints found their positions in their communities changed radically by the declaration of war. Those who had nothing to do with politics were the subject of verbal abuse, whilst those suspected of collaborating with the Italian authorities could find themselves targets of the resistance. On her work on the experience of Italians in Scotland whose status in the community was rocked by the same declaration of war, Wendy Ugolini has pointed out that the outbreak of war created or reinforced powerful distinctions between “us” and “them”.⁶²⁶ In France, as in Scotland, these distinctions were based on rapid conclusions which often did not take into account pre-war political allegiances or integration with adoptive communities. The result was that Italians were often cast together as a single group, who sympathised with Fascist aims and territorial ambitions purely down to factors of surnames and places of birth.⁶²⁷ Moreover, the position of Italians living in the south-east shows the relationship between the local and the transnational during this period. Seemingly calm pre-war local relations had been shattered by transnational events.

Unlike in Scotland, Italians, whether they supported the occupation authorities or not, found themselves in a position of relative strength. In Britain, the phrase “collar the lot” was used to support the mass internment of Italian civilians as potential fifth columnists.⁶²⁸ In France, the release of all Italian prisoners, whether civilian or military personnel, was written into the armistice.⁶²⁹ Italian authorities went to great lengths to ensure that Italians were not mistreated by the French police. Even before the occupation of Savoie, the CIAF demanded that the police forces would function “as normal” in the Haute-Tarentaise. Whilst this was

⁶²⁶ W. Ugolini, *Experiencing War as the ‘Enemy Other’*, p. 2.

⁶²⁷ The hardships facing the Italian community in Scotland described by Ugolini must be multiplied many times over in France. Ugolini estimates the Italian community in the entirety of Britain at around 35,000, with a further 10-15,000 second-generation Italians. This must be compared with 808,000 Italians in France, with 40,000 in Nice alone. See, W Ugolini, *Experiencing War as the ‘Enemy Other’*, p. 1.

⁶²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 96-7.

⁶²⁹ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di armistizio”, pp. 78-9; *DDF*, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, “Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”, 24.6.40, pp. 167-73. For the release of German POWs and civilian internees, see J-L. Panicacci, “La colonie allemande dans les Alpes-Maritimes de 1933 à 1945” in, J. Grandjone and T. Grundtner (eds.), *Zone d’ombres, 1933-1944: Exil et internement d’Allemands et d’Autrichiens dans la Sud-est de la France*, Aix-en-Provence, (1990).

partially to provide law and order, it also implied that Italians would be protected as they had in the pre-war era.⁶³⁰ A multitude of Italian organisations could become involved if Italian citizens required assistance in France. The most prominent of these were the DRAs, which fed into the programme carried out by Italy of encouraging mass migration of Italian immigrants from France back to Italy. As early as April 1941, the number of functionaries attached to each of the DRAs was doubled in the Alpes-Maritimes and Corsica, despite French protests.⁶³¹ At the same time, Italian officials were already looking to send additional delegations to Cannes, Annecy and Modane.⁶³² This could vary from those who had committed petty crimes to those who felt that they were the victims of official or unofficial anti-Italian campaigns. One Italian youth, Tullio Zendron, found himself accused of “violence” but was assisted by the Italian ambassador in Paris, Gino Buti, through his involvement with the DRAs.⁶³³ Many within the French police felt that the DRAs had great an influence in relations between the Italian community and the French police.⁶³⁴

The DRAs were only part of a network of Italian organisations that were designed to assist Italians living in France. Following the Conference of Rome, Vacca Maggiolini felt that it was possible to build upon advances in Italo-French relations and put forward a series of proposals that would better the lives of Italian migrant communities.⁶³⁵ In addition to a proposal for Italians to be treated as they had been before the war, Vacca Maggiolini wished to re-open the network of Italian consulates across France.⁶³⁶ In Monaco, the Italian consulate re-opened extremely quickly and would serve as the point of contact between Italy and the Principality.⁶³⁷ Previously, France had opposed the consulates for two reasons: firstly, because their re-opening would imply that Italians felt that they were being improperly treated by the French authorities and required the consulates to represent their views, an

⁶³⁰ AN AJ 41 2302, “Le Maire de Séez à Monsieur le Préfet de la Savoie”, 6.7.42.

⁶³¹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione AG, Liberati, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 11.4.41; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Il Generale Designato d’Armata, Presidente della Commissione Italiana di Armistizio, Camillo Grossi, all’Eccellenza il Presidente della Delegazione Francese di Armistizio”, 11.3.41.

⁶³² ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Il Presidente della Sottocommissione AG, Liberati, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 11.4.41.

⁶³³ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 322, “Telespresso, n. 1527 R.”, 16.11.42. No specific information is given on what “violence” Zendron was involved in.

⁶³⁴ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 7, “Il Capo dell’Organismo di Controllo, Confalonieri, al CIAF-Sottocommissione Affari Generali”, 7.2.42.

⁶³⁵ AN AJ 41 438, “L’Amiral de la Flotte de la Défense Nationale à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur, Direction Générale de la Police Nationale”, 12.12.41.

⁶³⁶ AN AJ 41 438, “Le Générale Designé d’Armée, Arturo Vacca Maggiolini, à son Excellence le Président de la Délégation Française d’Armistice”, 3.12.41.

⁶³⁷ ASMAE, AP, Monaco, b.1, “Il R. Console, A. Sanfelice, al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 11.8.40; ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Il R. Console [di Monaco] al Ministero degli Affari Esteri”, 11.8.40.

implication that France stringently denied; and secondly, because France – perhaps quite rightly – felt that consulates would create centres of power in major French cities which Italians could flock to.⁶³⁸ Moreover, French officials felt that Italy would use the consulates as propaganda centres to transform Italian opinion inside France against her.⁶³⁹

Despite French reservations, Italian consulates did re-open throughout France and worked closely with the DRAs on the mass repatriation plans drawn up before and during the war.⁶⁴⁰ Davide Rodogno has stated that “there was limited consular activity, and whatever existed concerned only an extremely small group of residents”, especially given that 150,000 Italians resided in the Alpes-Maritimes alone.⁶⁴¹ The claim is difficult to argue against as “limited activity” is not a precise figure, and the point where “limited” becomes “consistent” or any other level that cannot be directly quantified is subject to personal interpretation. Rodogno is correct in that Italian consular activity never amounted to what Italy had hoped for. Nonetheless, Rodogno does concede that other archival sources could reveal greater consular activity, singling out the French *départemental* archives as potentially useful in this regard.⁶⁴² In reality, the true scope of consular activity can be understood by examining Buti’s papers.⁶⁴³ Each of the DRAs submitted reports to Buti through the consulates that they were assigned to, and whilst some records are more complete than others it is possible to gauge the level of consular activity over a wide geographical area. In Toulon, for example, the most active period of repatriation was between 1 and 14 April 1942 when fifty-seven Italian migrants were repatriated.⁶⁴⁴ The least active period recorded was between 1 and 15 November 1942, when only thirteen Italians were repatriated.⁶⁴⁵ Direct comparisons are difficult as figures were displayed in different ways by different DRAs. Some chose to display figures on a two-week basis, whilst others did so on a monthly basis. Some DRAs experienced practically no level of repatriation activity. In Digne, for example, only a single

⁶³⁸ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “L’Amiral Duplat à son Excellence, Vacca Maggiolini”, 18.7.41. ASMAE, GABAP, b. 11, “Appunto per il Ministro Pietromarchi”, 29.8.41, shows similar fears that French consulates in Italy could send out the wrong signals to France over their international status.

⁶³⁹ ASMAE, GABAP, b. 20, “Le Ministre Secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur à MM. les Préfets”, n.d. The document is attached to other documents all dated from November 1940, so it is logical to assume that this letter was written around this time.

⁶⁴⁰ Consulates re-opened gradually, but in Chambéry was open by 1943, see AN F1^a CIII 1186, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 27 février 1943”.

⁶⁴¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism’s European Empire*, p. 329.

⁶⁴² Ibid, p. 329.

⁶⁴³ These are documented as “Rappresentanza diplomatica Francia – Parigi, 1861-1950” in the ASMAE, and hold the official papers of all Italian ambassadors to Paris from the unification of Italy to 1950.

⁶⁴⁴ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, “Il Delegato ai Rimpatri, G. Tiberi, al R. Rappresentanza Italiana in Parigi”, 14.4.42.

⁶⁴⁵ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, “Il Delegato ai Rimpatri, G. Tiberi, al R. Rappresentanza Italiana in Parigi”, 15.11.42.

Italian was repatriated in October 1942, whilst only a further five Italians were repatriated in November 1942.⁶⁴⁶ The official figure given by the consulate in Paris was that in the entire year of 1941, 7,156 individuals and 2,035 families were repatriated, bringing a total of 34,211,251.80 francs back to Italy.⁶⁴⁷ In reality, this is not a large number when we consider that the Italian population stood at 808,000 at its peak.

It is clear, therefore, that consular activity never reached substantial levels, and attempts to repatriate Italians *en masse* did not reach the levels that many in Rome had hoped for. Nonetheless these attempts represented part of Italy's long-term plans for France following a peace settlement. Italian population planners believed that mass repatriation of Italians living in France would not only serve to increase Italy's birth rates, but would deal a further blow to France's own fears of a decline in population levels.⁶⁴⁸ The idea that the repatriation of large numbers of Italians would assist Italy's position in Europe was partly tied up in Mussolini's rejection of Malthusian principles and forms an under-explored aspect of Fascism's "battle for births".⁶⁴⁹ Although policies resembling demographic engineering were carried out more readily behind the *Linea verde*, the task given to the DRAs of repatriating as many Italians as possible should be seen as a continuation of this policy. The allure of exchanging francs into highly valued lira may have been part of the attraction for some Italians, however if greater numbers of Italians had decided to return to Italy it may have been possible to argue that it constituted a large-scale, non-reciprocal, voluntary population transfer.⁶⁵⁰ If the DRAs failed to repatriate as many Italians as political demographers in Rome had hoped, there was substantial activity in assistance given to the migrant community. In Annecy and Modane, food was distributed by the Casa d'Italia – a kind of cultural institute designed to retain links with migrant communities - to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the March on Rome.⁶⁵¹ Modane's Casa d'Italia ran a successful kitchen that summer which attracted large numbers

⁶⁴⁶ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Il Delegato [a Digne] alla R. Ambasciata d'Italia, Parigi", 2.11.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Il Delegato [a Digne] alla R. Ambasciata d'Italia, Parigi", 3.12.42. This last letter puts the Italian population of Digne at around 3,500.

⁶⁴⁷ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Telespresso, n. 1052", 12.2.42. D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 328, states that the total number of Italians returning to Italy between July 1940 and April 1943 was 70,262.

⁶⁴⁸ On the decline of the French birth rate see, C. Dyer, *Population and Society in Twentieth Century France*, Bungay (1978), pp. 63-7.

⁶⁴⁹ M.S. Quine, *Population Policies in Twentieth-Century Europe*, London (1996), p. 17.

⁶⁵⁰ M.Z. Bookman, *The Demographic Struggle for Power*, pp. 33-4, suggests that economic measures to trigger a voluntary transfer of populations, whether by incentive or disincentive, can be considered part of the wider process of demographic engineering. See also, P. Morland, *Demographic Engineering*, p. 28, on "push" and "pull" tactics; M. Weiner and M.S. Teitelbaum, *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, p. 63, on the difference between the deliberate act of demographic engineering and the movement of peoples due to social or economic trends.

⁶⁵¹ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Telespresso, n. 9126", 5.11.42.

from the Italian community.⁶⁵² Italians who flocked to the Case d'Italia for assistance should not automatically be taken as Fascists, irredentists, or sympathisers. One article examining the Case d'Italia both before and during the war noted that the institutions had more success in defending Italian identity than exporting ideology.⁶⁵³ Food shortages were undoubtedly the primary reason that many from the Italian community went in the first place, and it would be facile to confuse political sympathies with need.⁶⁵⁴ Nonetheless, if Rodogno's assertion that consular activity was limited is to be confirmed vis-à-vis repatriations, it should also be noted that many DRAs spent more on assistance and food distribution than on repatriation efforts.⁶⁵⁵

The time, effort and finance that were used trying to win over the Italian migrant community were, ultimately, poorly spent. Most Italians were happy to receive food and assistance where possible from the Case d'Italia, but did not necessarily adhere to PNF politics nor did they join the associate organisations. By the end of 1941, the Casa del Fascio boasted only 750 members in Nice, and a further eighty-six in Cannes.⁶⁵⁶ Fascist youth organisations held even less allure, boasting 248 members across seventy-six branches.⁶⁵⁷ French police figures from the early weeks following the armistice that showed that the majority of Italians in France had no interest in Fascism or becoming part of Italy were, therefore, confirmed by Italy's own statistics. Poorly attended PNF organisations and disappointing numbers of those willing to be repatriated showed the Italian community desperately caught between the two sides. Their unwillingness, however, to back Fascism even at the peak of the Axis' strength reveals the failure of Italy to win significant sections of the migrant community. It also reveals the failure of the Italian regime to convert many Italians living in the occupied territories to "collaborators". The willingness of many Italians to utilise the resources of the Case d'Italia and to accept food from the Italian government whilst tacitly refusing to further Italian war aims in these territories exposes the difficulty of using labels such as "collaborator". That many Italians visited centres of propaganda operated by the Italian government is undeniable, but it should be acknowledged that very few Italians living in the occupied territories shared the ideological convictions of the government in

⁶⁵² Ibid.

⁶⁵³ C. Pane, "Le Case d'Italia in Francia. Organizzazione, attività e rappresentazione del fascismo all'estero", *Memoria e Ricerca*, 41 (2012), p. 180.

⁶⁵⁴ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 59, "Quinto Mazzolini al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 14.3.42, shows food shortages in the Alpes-Maritimes.

⁶⁵⁵ ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Telespresso, n. 9579", 20.11.42; ASMAE, Carte Buti, b. 319, "Telespresso, n. 10401", 22.12.42.

⁶⁵⁶ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 328-9.

⁶⁵⁷ Ibid.

Rome.

III.

One of the primary problems that would condition Italo-French relations at a local level was the French perception of the Italian army. As we have seen, few in France were prepared to deny that the French army had been beaten militarily by Germany, although fewer still were prepared to accept that the Italian army had achieved similar successes.⁶⁵⁸ This attitude amongst the French officer corps that Italy had not been beaten militarily rapidly trickled down to the French population who, by November 1942 when Italian troops entered the unoccupied zone, had already lampooned Italy's disappointing military performances.⁶⁵⁹ For many in France, the discrepancies between the Italian army and the Wehrmacht were vast. The Germans, heavily indoctrinated by Nazi propaganda, were imbued with the spirit and the aura of conquerors, which occupied populations failed to see in the Italian army.⁶⁶⁰ CIAF officials noted that there was a level of respect between French and German officers that had no parallel in Italo-French military relations.⁶⁶¹ Moreover, Philip Burrin's statement that relations between occupier and occupied are partially coloured by national stereotypes and previous experiences can be applied here.⁶⁶² Prussian militarism and military successes were contrasted by French officers with the perceived poor performances of the Italian armed forces.

This lack of respect amongst French government officials was mirrored within the French population who frequently abused CIAF officials even before the occupation of the former Free Zone. On a visit to a factory producing soap, CIAF officials were subjected to cries of "A bas Mussolini!" and demanded that the factory be closed as a recompense for the

⁶⁵⁸ DDF, *Les armistices*, No. 66, "Procès-Verbal", 22.6.40, p. 111, states that French generals believed that Italy had declared war on France, but had not fought a war against her ["En réalité, l'Italie nous a déclaré la guerre, mais ne nous l'a pas faite"].

⁶⁵⁹ ADAM 0104W 0002, "Nouvelle hymne italien", nd, shows a version of "La Marseillaise" with distinctly anti-Italian lyrics; ADAM 0616W 0241, "Rapport de Capitaine Brodard", 15.3.41, shows this as well.

⁶⁶⁰ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 181-2. The debate on how far the Wehrmacht was Nazified is ongoing and forms just one facet of the *Historikerstreit* that engulfed German historiography following the war. Few would debate, however, that the German army was more Nazified than the Italian was Fascistised, see O. Bartov, *Hitler's Army, Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich*, New York and Oxford (1991) and O. Bartov, *The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, Second Edition, Basingstoke and New York (2001). For an overview of the *Historikerstreit*, see R.J. Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow, West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape the Nazi Past*, London (1989).

⁶⁶¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 179.

⁶⁶² P. Burrin, "Writing the History of Military Occupations", in S. Fishman, L. Lee Downs, I. Sinanoglou, L.V. Smith and R. Zaretsky (eds.), *France at War, Vichy and the Historians*, Oxford and New York (2000), pp. 79-80.

affront.⁶⁶³ In the area around the port in Nice, CIAF officials were abused with anti-Italian slogans, including one fourteen year old boy, who the CIAF demanded be brought in for questioning.⁶⁶⁴ This lack of respect did not improve following the arrival of Italian troops, who were frequently lambasted by the local population. One citizen who shouted “Macaroni!” at Italian troops was actually imprisoned.⁶⁶⁵ Although German soldiers were also abused by French civilians throughout France during the occupation, the lack of respect for the Italian army made these incidents seem as though they might carry less severe consequences. Upon the arrival of the Wehrmacht in the Alpes-Maritimes, a list of potential offences and prison sentences were posted.⁶⁶⁶ Italian soldiers remained the subject of abuse despite the threat of arrest. When Italian soldiers entered a bar inebriated and attempted to sell two kilogrammes of meat – far beyond the weekly French ration allowance – one Frenchman was arrested for replying that the Americans would bring plenty of meat when they arrived.⁶⁶⁷

Italo-French relations at a local level could be extremely strained, both between official bodies and between civilians. In the Alpes-Maritimes and the border areas of Savoie and Haute-Savoie in particular, large numbers of Italian migrants meant that both French and Italian citizen bodies existed, and were therefore forced to co-exist, as well as the system of dual administration that arose after November 1942. Many French officials and members of the police force felt that they were not shown respect by both Italian soldiers and the Italian community, despite Marcel Ribière’s promise that the French government retained all legal sovereignty in the area.⁶⁶⁸ In situations involving Italian soldiers, French policemen could be frozen out or threatened. When an argument arose between an Italian soldier and civilian and a French cyclist over who should have right of way on the roads, a passing French police officer attempted to intervene, only to be told that the affair was none of his concern.⁶⁶⁹

Despite Italian assertions that the first few months of the occupation passed “without

⁶⁶³ ADAM 0104W 0002, “Rapport à Monsieur le Directeur de la Police d’État de Nice”, 9.5.41; ADAM 0104W 0002, “Procès-Verbal, n. 657”, 15.5.41.

⁶⁶⁴ ADAM 0104W 0002, “Ugo Federici al Comando Marina, Nizza”, 10.5.41; ADAM 0104W 0002, “Procès-Verbal, no. 646”, 9.5.41.

⁶⁶⁵ AN AJ 41 439, “Le Préfet de la Savoie à Monsieur le Chef du Gouvernement, Ministre Secrétaire d’État à l’Intérieur [et al]”, 23.3.43.

⁶⁶⁶ ADAM 0166W 0005, “Verordnungsblatt des Kommandaten des Heeresgebiets Südfrankreich”, 15.2.44.

⁶⁶⁷ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Le Commissaire Central à Monsieur le Conseiller d’État”, 26.12.42.

⁶⁶⁸ AMN 3H 065-2, “Le Conseiller d’État, Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes à Monsieur le Sous-Préfet de Grasse et à Messieurs les Maires du Département”, 18.11.42; *DSCS, vol. 9, t. 2, Doc. 22, Allegato n. 430-bis al Diario Storico*, “Giovanni Magli, appunto per il Ministero degli Affari Esteri, al Segretario di Stato presso il Capo del Governo, Ammiraglio Platon”, 6.1.43, p. 54, claims the opposite, however.

⁶⁶⁹ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Le Commissaire Central de la Police Urbaine de Nice à Monsieur le Préfet Régional, Intendance de Police”, 25.1.43.

incident”, disturbances were commonplace, if relatively minor.⁶⁷⁰ In December 1942, Italian troops were caught poaching by a group of French gendarmes. Following the incident, one of the officers and one of the soldiers involved went to one of the gendarme’s homes and threatened to arrest him and confiscate his rifle if he took the incident up with the Italian authorities.⁶⁷¹ Less than a month later, a group of French gendarmes was threatened with rifles when they found a small band of Italian soldiers stealing potatoes.⁶⁷² In another instance, an Italian officer ordered a tram conductor to stop his tram at gunpoint, and making demands afterwards that the tram conductor be formally disciplined.⁶⁷³ When confronted by French police officers or government, Italian soldiers would often pretend that they spoke no French at all or simply refused to respond. A trio of Italian soldiers did this in order to avoid speaking to the French police who had been called by locals to investigate their suspicious behaviour.⁶⁷⁴

It is clear that at a local level, both sides often held unfavourable views of the other. French documents on the incident with the tram conductor make clear that the Italian officer in question took the issue to extreme lengths.⁶⁷⁵ Following an argument between French citizens and Italian troops in Place Garibaldi in Nice, local authorities called upon the public not to escalate situations involving Italian soldiers.⁶⁷⁶ In many of the disputes mentioned above, the tone of French internal investigations presents one of the arrogant Italian soldier. This image often ruffled French officials further due to the fact that many felt that the Italian army had not earned the right to behave in this manner.⁶⁷⁷ Although we must be careful not to accept French assumptions about the Italian army wholeheartedly, there probably existed a traditional feeling of dominance which is typical of conqueror-conquered relations. As Davide Rodogno has pointed out, however, the Italian army failed to present themselves in such a manner, forced to wear shabby and torn uniforms due to a lack of supplies whilst their

⁶⁷⁰ ASMAE, AP, Francia, b. 68, “Relazione sulla situazione politico-economico in Savoia ed in Alta-Savoia durante il mese di Gennaio 1943-XXI”, nd.

⁶⁷¹ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Note n. 110/4 Compagnie du 26-12-42”, 26.12.42.

⁶⁷² ADAM 0166W 0010, “Le Commissaire Principal, Chef du Service des Renseignements Généraux à Monsieur le Préfet Régional, Intendance de Police”, 20.1.43. Theft by Italian soldiers was common enough that Vichy officials knew about it, see J. Barthélemy, *Ministre de la Justice, Vichy 1941-1943*, Paris (1989), p. 383.

⁶⁷³ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Le Commissaire Divisionnaire à M. le Conseiller d’État”, 30.11.42; ADAM 0166W 0010, “Procès-Verbal, no. 5”, 29.11.42; ADAM 0166W 0010, “L’Intendant de Police de la Région de Nice à Monsieur le Général Commandant de la Division d’Infanterie ‘Legnano’”, 8.12.42.

⁶⁷⁴ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Rapport à Monsieur le Commissaire de Police de Permanence”, nd.

⁶⁷⁵ ADAM 0166W 0010, “L’Intendant de Police de la Région de Nice à Monsieur le Général Commandant de la Division d’Infanterie ‘Legnano’”, 8.12.42.

⁶⁷⁶ ADAM 0166W 0010, “Rapport, les gardiens cyclistes, Durand, René, Chiodi, Jean, à Monsieur l’Officier de la Paix”, 9.12.42.

⁶⁷⁷ DDF, *Les armistices*, No. 66, “Procès-Verbal”, 22.6.40, p. 111.

officers feasted and drank fine wines.⁶⁷⁸

If there was a mutual disrespect between the two sides, however, it should be tempered by the level of cordiality that gradually grew between Italian soldiers and French civilians. The image of Italian migrants described above was not simply abolished overnight, and there remained ties between the two that both sides could recognise, notably religion and a “Mediterranean” link that is difficult to articulate, but which both sides conceded existed. Many Italian soldiers had familial ties in France, particularly in the Alpes-Maritimes and Savoie border regions. It is extremely difficult to quantify exactly how friendly Italians stationed in France became with their French neighbours. Whilst many *Préfets* noted a courteous relationship between French and Italian state organs, this could often be qualified by the caveat that the population displayed an indifference towards the occupiers.⁶⁷⁹ Equally impossible to quantify were relationships which sprung up between French women and Italian officers and soldiers. Although we do not have exact figures, these were judged common enough that the Ministero della Guerra ordered commanders in France to ensure that such relationships were not allowed to take place, and that those found flaunting these rules be punished.⁶⁸⁰ Moreover, there existed less of a racial prejudice amongst Italian troops in France than in the Balkans, where relationships with local women became so commonplace that the Comando Supremo bemoaned the amount of soldiers incapacitated by venereal disease.⁶⁸¹ A number of these relationships will inevitably have been based upon a portion of the Italian army abusing their status as conquerors, yet the majority probably developed organically.⁶⁸² Moreover, the fact that the Ministero della Guerra ordered a clamping down on relationships between soldiers and locals illustrates the growing network of friendship that existed between the two disparate groups.

The inherent difficulties in constructing a history of relationships are compounded by an almost complete dearth of sources.⁶⁸³ Sources produced by the French government at the time

⁶⁷⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 170-1.

⁶⁷⁹ See for example, AN F1^a CIII 1152, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 1er mai 1943”; AN F1^a CIII 1158, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 27 février 1943”; AN F1^a CIII 1158, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 28 avril 1943”; AN F1^a CIII 1136, “Rapport mensuel d’information de 31 mai 1943”.

⁶⁸⁰ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 165-6.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*, pp. 168-9.

⁶⁸² *Ibid*, p. 167 states that “although there were instances of innocuous familiarity between Italian soldiers and the women of Greece, France and Yugoslavia, it should be emphasized that rapes and other acts of sexual violence were committed during the occupations.”

⁶⁸³ F. Virgili, *La France ‘virile’, Des femmes tondues à la libération*, Paris (2000), pp. 325-31, speaks of the difficulties in studying sexual relations, particularly due to the post-war implications of the relationships. So-called “sexual collaboration” is discussed in H. Diamond, *Women and the Second World War in France, 1939-1948, Choices and Constraints*, Harlow (1999), pp. 82-6.

had no desire to highlight any instances of fraternisation between locals and occupiers, whilst the Italian government shared similar misgivings, albeit for slightly different reasons.⁶⁸⁴ The lack of any oral history project, in either French or Italian, robs historians of the opportunity to fully explore the experiences of those who might otherwise lack a voice in official documents. Historians are, therefore, left with fragments of sources. The aforementioned memorandum discouraging relationships between French women and Italian soldiers and the fact that Italian army chaplains were prepared to concede that troops' sexual desires had to be met are evidence of the fact that neither occupier nor occupied could inhabit completely different spheres of existence.⁶⁸⁵ These relationships, however, must be taken in context. Relationships between Italian soldiers and occupied populations have for too long now been used to propagate the *italiani brava gente* myth.⁶⁸⁶ The disparity between Franco-German relationships and Italo-French relationships, however, reveals an inconsistency in applying this theory: Franco-German wartime relationships were reviled, women's heads were shorn and they were branded as unrepresentative of the French population by French leaders in the post-war years.⁶⁸⁷ Italo-French relationships, on the other hand, have become a sign of friendship and supposedly reveal the "true character" of the Italian occupier. In reality, both were a sign of the shared spaces between occupiers and occupied. Relationships between the two sides were, therefore, inevitable on some level, as relationships were inevitable between French civilians and the Italian migrant community. Moreover, it is curious that historians brand relationships between Italian soldiers and French civilians as revealing a wider Latin culture, whilst not offering the same outlook to Franco-German relations. Liaisons between the two sides, therefore, cannot be put down to any characteristics of Italy, Italians, or the Italian occupation, but simply to the close proximity of the occupiers and the occupied. These relationships also help us nuance the label most often given to these women, "collaborator". In reality, the close proximity of the two groups makes this label unfair. The development of relationships rarely took on political form, and women did not choose to pursue these relationships because they were pro-Italian or pro-Fascist, per se. Rather, these labels have given political dimension to what was, to some extent, an inevitability: that the space shared between the two groups would inevitably lead to relationships of all sorts, and reflect the

⁶⁸⁴ Both D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 164 and E. Sica, "Italiani brava gente", p. 186 share the opinion that a lack of any real historical source or memoir of the Italian occupation of France make it extremely difficult to know the extent of sexual relations between the two sides.

⁶⁸⁵ E. Sica, "Italiani brava gente", p. 255 provides insights into the attitudes of the military chaplains.

⁶⁸⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 5-6, discusses relationships between Italian soldiers and Greek women and the effects of these upon the *italiana brava gente* myth.

⁶⁸⁷ F. Virgili, *La France 'virile'*, presents an overview on "shorn women", which is its English-language title.

many facts of human life.

Relations between both local governments and citizens with their Italian occupiers, therefore, was at least partially characterised by the trichotomy of the traditional occupier-occupied dichotomy and the Italian migrant community. Nonetheless, the addition of this community should not overwhelm conceptions regarding the occupation. Dialogue had existed between the Italian and French administrations long before the November 1942 expansion of the zone of occupation had brought officials directly into contact with one another. Although François Bloch-Lainé and Claude Gruson have spoken of the expansion of the zone of occupation as a turning point, we should accept that these contacts which had developed prior to this made the imposition of Italian officials easier in practical terms than it might otherwise have been.⁶⁸⁸

The arrival of Italian troops had different effects upon the local community, the vast majority of whom had had no contact with Italian officials in any more than in the most perfunctory sense. Italy's propaganda and presence on the frontier from July 1940 onwards had stirred up previously dormant hatreds and suspicions between the French community and Italian migrants who had, by and large, lived peacefully and amiably alongside one another until this time. As such, the Italian community must be considered a partially separate entity during the occupation, at once part of the citizen body, but simultaneously pulled towards the Italian side, often unwillingly used as propaganda tools. Italy's attempts to use them as part of a greater aim to lower France's population and increase Italy's own largely failed, yet it create greater schisms amongst the community and in their relations with France.

Ultimately, however, we should not aim solely to portray the uniqueness of the Italian occupation, but also what was similar. Whilst the presence of large Italian community in the south-east had no direct parallel with Germany's zone of occupation in the north, many of the same considerations can be applied. In most cases, collaboration between Italian soldiers and the ordinary civilian on the street occurred overwhelmingly due to the proximity of the two sides to one another, rather than out of any political sympathies. In this way, the Italian community mirrored their French counterparts. As Emanuele Sica rightly points out, the lack of support amongst the Italian community for Fascist organisations and projects in their regions rendered them of limited political use.⁶⁸⁹ It is important, therefore, to highlight the

⁶⁸⁸ F. Bloch-Lainé and C. Gruson, *Hauts fonctionnaires sous l'occupation*, pp. 113-27, discusses November 1942 as a turning point.

⁶⁸⁹ E. Sica, "Italiani brava gente?", p. 53.

importance of the Italian community and their role in transforming the traditional occupier-occupied dichotomy into a trichotomy, but it is equally important not to overemphasise their role. Additionally, the position of the Italian community in the south-east erodes the idea of “collaborators” as a monolithic term. Although, as we have seen, many Italians living in France utilised resources distributed by organisations such as the Case d’Italia, their ideological commitment to the regime was negligible. Their involvement with the Italian regime, therefore, was much more complex than simple collaboration; instead, many were simply opportunists, making use of resources afforded to them without subscribing to the ideological message that accompanied these resources. To label the Italian community as collaborationist would be to stretch the label to an extent that would render it almost useless.

Conclusion

The Italian occupation of France officially ended on 8 September 1943 following domestic turmoil in Italy, Allied landings in Sicily and the formal request for a cessation of hostilities between Italy and the Allies. In a meeting of the Fascist Grand Council in Rome on 25 July, a motion tabled by Dino Grandi to formally remove the armed forces from the control of Mussolini was passed.⁶⁹⁰ The following day Mussolini was arrested after his regular meeting with the King and Pietro Badoglio assigned as his replacement as Prime Minister.⁶⁹¹ The consequences for Italy's participation in the war were profound. Although Badoglio announced on the radio that Italy would continue the war, many in Germany and amongst the Allies interpreted the fall of Mussolini as the first step to an Italian armistice. In Italy, German troops crossed the frontier and garrisoned the peninsula in preparation for an occupation, whilst across Europe German commanders made preparations to assume positions in Italy's occupied territories.

In France, the fall of Mussolini prompted immediate action in Italy's zone of occupation. The *départements* occupied by Italy following the expansion of her zone of occupation in November 1942 were steadily occupied by Germany, ostensibly to relieve Italy from the burden of occupying them, but in reality in order to secure southern France in the event of an Italian surrender.⁶⁹² Italian officials stationed in France noted that only days after the dismissal of Mussolini, Italo-German relations were characterised by a deep level of suspicion.⁶⁹³ By the end of August 1943, Italian forces had withdrawn entirely to occupy only the area around the military harbour in Toulon and the area between the Tinée and Var rivers in the Alpes-Maritimes.⁶⁹⁴ CIAF officials noted that the French government were as aware of the tenuous political situation in Italy as the German and Italian governments were and by the

⁶⁹⁰ The meeting is recalled in G. Bottai, *Diario, 1935-1944*, pp. 404-21; D. Grandi, *25 luglio 1943*, Bologna (2003), makes the meeting the centre of the memoir; G. Ciano, *Diario, 1936-1943*, unfortunately ends before the 25 July meeting.

⁶⁹¹ E. Aga Rossi, *Una nazione allo sbando, L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943 e le sue conseguenze*, Bologna (2003), pp. 71-4; P. Morgan, *The Fall of Mussolini, Italy, Italians and the Second World War*, Oxford and New York (2007), pp. 11-7.

⁶⁹² D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitan francesi*, pp. 482-3.

⁶⁹³ AN AJ 40 1403, "Il Generale di Brigata, Alfredo Perrone, all'Eccellenza il Presidente della CIAF", 31.7.43; AN AJ 40 1403, "Il Generale designato d'armata, Arturo Vacca Maggiolini all'Ecc. il Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale, Comando Supremo", 31.7.43.

⁶⁹⁴ ACS, MI, DGPS, DAGR, A5, II guerra mondiale, b. 119, fasc. 66, "Il Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale, Ambrosio, allo Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito", 30.8.43; AN AJ 40 1403, "Il Sottocapo di Stato Maggiore Generale dell'Ufficio del Germanico presso il Comando Supremo Italiano", 28.8.43.

signing of the Italian armistice were making increasingly bold demands.⁶⁹⁵

The French population were not ignorant to the changes that were taking place in the international arena. Although German radio stations were notably quiet on the fall of Mussolini, local French newspapers placed it prominently on their front page.⁶⁹⁶ Whilst there was a noted increase in morale following the change of regime in Italy and an atmosphere that the Italian occupation would soon be over, it was accompanied by the threat of an impending German occupation in its place.⁶⁹⁷ Von Rundstedt's visit to Nice did not go unnoticed by locals, nor was the mass of the French population so ill-informed as to believe that the withdrawal of Italy from the war signalled an overall Axis defeat.⁶⁹⁸ The end of the Italian occupation, however, did signal profound changes in the south-east. As late in the war as September 1943, portions of the French population came under German occupation for the first time. As the war became progressively more desperate for Germany, the occupation became more severe for those who lived under it. By early 1944, those living in the south-east were informed that crimes that would be met with the most severe punishment included: sabotage and acts of violence; assisting the enemy; the non-declaration of an enemy aircraft; anti-German demonstrations; listening to Allied radio; and offences committed against the German army.⁶⁹⁹

By the time of the signing of Italy's armistice with the Allies, her troops were all but supplanted in the majority of the territories that the Italian armed forces had previously held. German forces moved quickly into the remaining Italian-held pockets and disarmed or captured those members of the Italian forces who remained, sometimes assisted by members of the MVSN who remained loyal to the Axis.⁷⁰⁰ This two-fold capitulation of Italy in France – the retreat into the Alpes-Maritimes in July, and finally the surrender in September – brought an end to the Italian occupation. Although the end of hostilities had undoubtedly been expected by both the French population and the Italian armed forces, the announcement of the surrender took many by surprise. Mario Vercellino, commander of the IV Armata, was

⁶⁹⁵ AN AJ 40 1403, "Pro Memoria per S.E. il Capo di Stato Maggiore", 8.9.43; ASMAE, AP, Francia, b 68, "[Illegible] al R. Ministero degli Affari Esteri", 11.8.43, shows some *Préfets* were willing to defy Italian orders and make arrests hitherto forbidden by the Italian armed forces.

⁶⁹⁶ On German radio silence see, AN AJ 40 1403, "Prot. 1201 [di] Alfredo Perrone", 26.7.43; University of Edinburgh, Centre for Research Collections (UoE), *Voices from Wartime France, 1939-1945, Clandestine Resistance and Vichy Newspapers from the British Library Newspaper Library at Colindale, London*, Microfilm Collection, Reel 63 (Nice), *Le Petit Niçois*, 27.7.43.

⁶⁹⁷ J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, pp. 253-4.

⁶⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁶⁹⁹ ADAM 0166W 0005, "Verordnungsblatt des Kommandaten des Heeresgebiets Südfrankreich", 15.2.44.

⁷⁰⁰ D. Schipsi, *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi*, pp. 496-7; A. Rossi, *Le guerre della Camicie Nere*, p. 187.

informed only after the official announcement had been broadcast on national radio.⁷⁰¹ As Italian actions in the early months of 1940 were limited by transnational events, notably the rapid ascent of Germany's position in Europe following her series of military victories, so the Italian occupation ended entirely as a result of international developments. When the Italian occupation came to an end, the Italian armies in France had not even engaged Allied forces militarily, let alone been defeated. For shocked generals, the end of the occupation was a stark reminder of how transnational events could dictate local politics in the Second World War.

What were the effects, therefore, of the Italian occupation in the south-east, and how did Italy govern her territories in France? As noted at the beginning of this study, H.R. Kedward stated with regards to the lack of study on resistance against Vichy as opposed to Germany, that the occupation of France during the Second World War has been almost entirely framed within the German experience.⁷⁰² It is undeniable that the Italian occupation has been the subject of far fewer historical enquiries, but it has perhaps too often been assumed that a dearth of literature has come about due to a lack of activity. Instead, this thesis has shown how Italian officials governed the zone and, just as importantly, that the various Italian organs operated relatively independently within the region, forging their own plans and agreements and working towards a distinctly Italian view of the post-war world. It has shown that despite tacit and sometimes open resistance to Italian plans by both Germany and France, Italian officials managed to create their own sphere of influence, however small.

Axis co-operation in France was always likely to encounter problems largely due to the different conceptions of post-war Europe between the two partners. The Italian government saw the future as one in which the two Axis powers would inhabit separate spheres of political and economic influence, existing side by side, but independent of one another. As Davide Rodogno points out, however, it was not until sometime after the fall of France that Italian planners realised that German planners had no interest in aligning Germany's future with Italy's own vision. Instead, Germany planned for a post-war world in which Germany alone would dominate, reducing Italy to a lesser-power status.⁷⁰³ Nonetheless, Italy never relinquished the idea that these plans could be realised. Indeed, Mussolini noted that the war

⁷⁰¹ J-L. Panicacci, *L'occupation italienne*, p. 286; S. Bertoldi, *Apocalisse italiana, Otto settembre 1943: fine di una nazione*, Milan (1998), p. 21, places the broadcast at around 6.30pm.

⁷⁰² H.R. Kedward, *In Search of the Maquis*, p. 1.

⁷⁰³ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 48. See also, D. Rodogno, "Le nouvel ordre en Méditerranée", pp. 145-6 for Italian conceptions of a post-war Europe.

presented Italy with an opportunity to realise these dreams.⁷⁰⁴

In the political sphere, Italy endeavoured to work towards independent agreements with France and to carve out her own zone of influence. She sought to create a long-standing re-arrangement of political power in Europe that would elevate Italy to a dominant level in co-operation with Germany. To this end, Italy continually sought a peace treaty with France that would move Italo-French relations away from the temporary armistice. She erroneously believed, however, that Germany sought the same goal and would work in tandem with Italy to achieve it. Instead she watched whilst Germany created a more encompassing political settlement with France, cementing German political clout and simultaneously restoring some semblance of participation of France in European affairs.

Italy was unable to create such a framework, partially due to the lack of respect afforded to Italy by France, and partially because she was kept almost entirely in the dark about how Germany had created her own encompassing arrangements. She was, instead, forced to improvise, mimicking German measures in appearance, but misunderstanding their substance. Her decision to send Buti to Paris in an attempt to reap the same political rewards that Germany had by sending Abetz, misunderstood that Abetz's Francophilia had helped sow the seeds of German successes. Moreover, Italy's insistence that all political dialogue be conducted through the legal framework of the armistice inhibited potential discussions between a range of government ministries that may have allowed Italy the political and economic flexibility that Germany had achieved. Despite these missed opportunities, however, we must recognise that Italy's actions were informed not only by her own perception of the war, but within her plans for post-war Europe.

The entry of Italy into the war in June 1940 had been almost entirely based upon the idea that the war would rapidly be over and that Italy could score political and military victories in a very short time span and with relatively few casualties. Italy's political framework in France reflected this conception, creating short-term solutions to Italy's problems of governance. This false conception was compounded by the fact that Italy failed to see that Germany strove to make gains for herself, even to the detriment of her Axis partner. Germany's increasingly frequent encroachments into Italy's *spazio vitale*, not only in France, but in the Balkans as well, undermined Italy's claims to equal-partner status within the Axis. Nonetheless, although Italy failed to escape the increasing subordination to Germany in political, economic and military terms, we should not see her merely as "Germany's ignoble

⁷⁰⁴ *DDI*, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 65, "Il Ministro degli Esteri, Ciano, al Capo del Governo, Mussolini", 19.6.40, pp. 50-2.

second”.⁷⁰⁵ Despite her inability to produce the material successes that Germany achieved, Italian officials managed to maintain an independence of action and consistently strove to achieve their own aims in the post-war *Ordine nuovo*.

This can perhaps be best seen in the economic sphere, where Italy came to a set of financial and economic agreements with France at the Conference of Rome. This set of agreements superficially resembled Germany’s abortive Paris Protocols, but in reality demonstrates the independence of Italian economic planners and officials. These agreements were carried out with such a degree of autonomy from Germany that German officials were forced to enquire what the terms of the Conference were. Although Italy never made economic gains on the scale that Germany did in France, she was far from a silent partner. Indeed, for those living under the Italian occupation, one’s possessions could be requisitioned or compulsorily purchased through enforced economic measures. For those living under the Italian occupation, the effects were real and widely felt. This was not simply the case for those upper-class citizens who had their cars and yachts requisitioned, but also ordinary civilians whose farming equipment and pack animals could be taken by Italy.⁷⁰⁶

Above all, Italy attempted to carve her own sphere of influence in physical form in the communes that she occupied along the Italo-French frontier. In Menton and the other occupied communes, Italy enacted a series of programmes of Italianisation and de-nationalisation which have been traditionally overlooked by historians.⁷⁰⁷ Political and educational reforms, coupled with long-term infrastructural projects, many of which were never fully realised, reveal the extent to which Italy sought territorial change in France. Attempts to shift the political and economic lives of the territories behind the *Linea verde* help augment the view that Italian planners and officials were attempting to fully integrate these territories into Italy itself and affect long-term territorial changes in Europe. These actions, though comparable with Germany’s own unannounced annexations of Alsace and Lorraine, were almost entirely independent of Germany and represent true independence from Italy’s yoke as the lesser of the Axis partners. Moreover, these actions represent a level of dominance over France in territories where the French state had all but ceased to exist. Although the legality of these actions has been questioned both within the confines of this

⁷⁰⁵ R.J.B Bosworth, *Mussolini*, p. 357.

⁷⁰⁶ AMC 4H-33, “Procès-Verbal”, 22.4.45; AMC 4H-33, “Procès-Verbal, Requisitions par les Autorités d’Opération du Canot ‘Ma Jolie’”, 4.3.43; AMC 4H-33, “Monsieur l’Ingénieur Mécanicien Maillard-Salin à [le] Police de Navigation, Cannes”, 8.12.43.

⁷⁰⁷ A fuller argument of the extent to which it has been overlooked can be found in Chapter V, but works specifically on Menton have not explored the extent to which extensive programs took place, see for example, J-L. Panicacci, *Menton dans la tourmente*, and J-L. Panicacci, “Menton et les Mentonnais”.

thesis and at the time, the actions themselves reveal the degree of autonomy which Italy possessed.

The Italian occupation of France is a small corner of the war and will almost certainly never attain the wealth and breadth of scholarship that has been afforded to the major battles, operations or political machinations of other theatres. Indeed, in Anglophonic historiography Italy has traditionally played a secondary role to her Axis partner and the extent of her actions in her zones of occupation remain largely in the domain of specialists. Nonetheless, despite the degree of specialism which the topic holds, there is much that an investigation into the Italian occupation can reveal. For French regional historians, an investigation into the Italian zone of occupation can help explain how the war was experienced by large portions of the French population. In *départements* such as the Alpes-Maritimes, the prospect of an Italian occupation remained a much greater and more realistic threat than a potential German occupation until much later in the war. As a result, the actions of Italian officials often played a greater role than decisions made in Berlin upon local political life. This distinctly local fear of potential Italian domination is particularly important for those studying border regions. Many of the concerns which existed in the Alpes-Maritimes stemmed directly from its position as a frontier territory. In this sense, transnational and international events, such as the Italian declaration of war, prompted developments in local history that differed from the more national fear of German actions. For those studying Italian occupation policies in a transnational comparative manner, France presents historians with a point of comparison with the far larger zones of occupation in the Balkans. Importantly, the zone of occupation in France represented an area where the two sides were perceived to be on a similar racial level to one another, in stark contrast to Italian racial perceptions of Slavic populations in the Balkans.⁷⁰⁸

Just as importantly, however, an examination of the Italian zone of the occupation in France reveals as much about Italo-German relations as it does about Italo-French activities in the region. Alexander Ferguson noted just over ten years ago that the Axis relationship itself lacked a thorough analysis.⁷⁰⁹ Whilst it may be true that there are few historical monographs dedicated to the Axis itself, it is possible to construct a picture of the Italo-

⁷⁰⁸ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, pp. 417-8. Those living in the French territories to be annexed were deemed to be "of Italian race"; the remainder of the French population were said to be "different by language, but of Catholic religion and of 'Latin race'"; those living in the Yugoslav territories were said to be of "Europoid race", whilst the Greek population were said to be of "Slavic and Hellenic race".

⁷⁰⁹ A. Ferguson, "Axis of Failure", p. 10.

German alliance by looking at how it operated in the various theatres of operation.⁷¹⁰ The Italian zone of occupation in France reveals much about the Axis itself and the dynamics within the Axis. Throughout the alliance, Italian officials sought to maintain parity between the two powers and a level of co-ordination in important policies. German officials and planners, on the other hand, sought to aggrandise Germany as far as possible, often at the expense of Italy. The destruction of this parity owed much to transnational events. Rivalries and squabbles in the Balkans and regarding the conduct of the war on the Eastern Front, raised the levels of tension between Italian and German officials in more local theatres. The most important example of these transnational events in disrupting Italo-German relations was the re-introduction of France into the New Europe, which took place much to the dismay of Italy. The waxing of France and the waning of Italy was indicative of the changing dynamics within the Axis which would later be echoed in the Balkans and in Greece. It also laid bare the contradictory policies followed by the two Axis partners: whilst Italy worked to keep France as a second-rate power in the *Ordine nuovo*, Germany saw France's place as an essential German ally.

Despite the increasing output of historical scholarship on the Italian occupation, the subject remains an isolated topic, even amongst specialists. Davide Rodogno has stated that the Italian occupation of France should not be studied in isolation and marked by the same aspirations and failures as those in the Balkans.⁷¹¹ Whilst it is necessary to acknowledge the similarities between the French case and those zones in the Balkans, it is equally necessary to acknowledge that in order to understand how the French occupation operated – the primary question of this thesis – it has been necessary to detach it in order to examine it more closely. Nonetheless, in examining the occupation of France care must be taken not to detach it too greatly. The Italian occupation of France, however small, plays a part in the great narrative of Italy's role in the Second World War, the Axis itself, and France's own narrative of the war.. Importantly, this thesis has demonstrated that the lack of historical scholarship on the Italian occupation – particularly in English – has not been down to a lack of activity within the zone,

⁷¹⁰ Much more has been made in the way of purely economic and commercial studies of the Axis, see for example, F. Degli Esposti, "L'industria bellica italiana e le commesse tedesche (1939-1943)", *Rivista di storia Contemporanea*, 22, 2-3 (1993) and A. Massignani, "L'industria bellica e la Germania nella seconda guerra mondiale", *Italia Contemporanea*, 190 (1993). See also, G. Schreiber, "Les structures stratégiques de la conduite de la guerre de coalition italo-allemande au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale", *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, 120 (1980).

⁷¹¹ D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 414.

but simply an oversight by historians. It is for this reason that the zone should be studied in detail, and should continue to be studied in future research

Appendix A

“Convenzione di Armistizio tra il Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale Italiano, Badoglio, ed il Capo della Delegazione Francese per l’Armistizio, Huntzinger [sic]”⁷¹²

Art. I. La Francia cesserà le ostilità contro l’Italia nel territorio francese metropolitano, nell’Africa francese del Nord, nelle colonie, nei territori protetti e sotto mandato. Cesserà ugualmente le ostilità contro l’Italia per mare e per aria.

Art. II. Le truppe italiane si manterranno all’entrata in vigore della presente Convenzione di Armistizio, e per tutta la durata dello stesso, sulle loro linee avanzate in tutti i teatri di operazione.

Art. III. Nel territorio francese metropolitano, la zona compresa fra le linee di cui all’Art. II, ed una linea corrente a cinquanta chilometri in linea d’aria da esse, sarà, per la durata dell’armistizio, smilitarizzata.

In Tunisia, sarà, per la durata dell’armistizio, smilitarizzata la zona compresa fra l’attuale confine libico tunisino e la linea segnata sulla carta annessa.

In Algeria e nei territori dell’Africa francese a sud della stessa, confinanti con la Libia per la durata dell’armistizio, sarà smilitarizzata una zona compresa fra il confine libico ed una linea parallela e distante da essa duecento chilometri.

Finché dureranno le ostilità dell’Italia contro l’Impero britannico e per la durata dell’armistizio, il territorio della colonia della Costa francese dei Somali sarà smilitarizzato per interno.

Per la durata dell’armistizio, l’Italia avrà pieno e costante diritto di usufruire del porto e delle installazioni portuali di Gibuti, e della ferrovia Gibuti-Addis Abeba nel tratto francese, per trasporti di qualsiasi specie.

Art. IV. Le zone da smilitarizzare di cui all’Art. III saranno, entro dieci giorni dalla cessazione delle ostilità, evacuate dalle truppe francesi, ad eccezione del personale strettamente necessario per la custodia e manutenzione delle opere di fortificazione, caserme, magazzini ed edifici militari, e delle truppe per il mantenimento dell’ordine interno che la Commissione italiana di armistizio di cui in seguito determinerà di volta in volta.

Art. V. Fermo il diritto di cui all’Art. X seguente, tutte le armi mobili e relative munizioni, esistenti nelle zone da smilitarizzare del territorio francese metropolitano e di quello adiacente alla Libia in più di quelle in consegna alle truppe che sgomberano, come detto sopra, i territori di cui si tratta, debbono essere evacuate entro un termine di quindici giorni. Le armi fisse delle opere di fortificazione e relative munizioni essere messe, nello stesso

⁷¹² DDI, 9^a Serie, Vol. 5, Doc. 95, “Convenzione di Armistizio tra il Capo di Stato Maggiore Generale Italiano, Badoglio, ed il capo della Delegazione Francese per l’armistizio Huntzinger [sic]”, 24.6.40, pp. 76-82.

termine di tempo, in condizione di non poter essere usate.

Nel territorio della Costa francese dei Somali tutte le armi mobili e relative munizioni in più quelle in consegna alle truppe che sgomberano il territorio, verranno depositate, entro il medesimo termine di quindici giorni nelle località che saranno stabilite dalla Commissione italiana di Armistizio, di cui in seguito.

Per le armi fisse e munizioni delle opera di fortificazione esistenti in detto territorio, vale quanto disposto per il territorio francese metropolitano e per quello adiacente alla Libia.

Art. VI. Finchè dureranno le ostilità fra l'Italia e l'Impero Britannico le piazzeforti militari marittime e le basi navali di Tolone, Biserta, Ajaccio ed Orano (Mers-el-Kebir) saranno smilitarizzate sino alla cessazione delle ostilità contro detto Impero. Tale smilitarizzazione dovrà essere attuata entro un termine di quindici giorni e dovrà essere tale da rendere dette piazzeforti e basi inutilizzabili agli effetti della loro capacità offensiva-difensiva. La loro capacità logistica sarà sotto controllo della Commissione italiana d'armistizio, limitata ai bisogni delle navi da guerra francesi che, a norma dell'Art. XII seguente, vi faranno base.

Art VII. Nelle zone, piazzeforti militari marittime e basi navali da smilitarizzare, rimarranno naturalmente in funzione le Autorità civili francesi e le forze di polizia necessarie al mantenimento dell'ordine pubblico; vi rimarranno pure le Autorità territoriali militari e marittime, che saranno determinate dalla Commissione italiana d'armistizio.

Art. VIII. La Commissione italiana di Armistizio, di cui in seguito, determinerà cartograficamente i limiti esatti delle zone, piazzeforti militari marittime e basi navali da smilitarizzare ed i dettagli delle modalità esecutive di smilitarizzazione. La stessa Commissione avrà pieno e costante diritto di controllare l'esecuzione in dette zone, piazza e basi di quanto stabilito agli articoli precedenti, sia a mezzo di visite di controllo, sia a mezzo di sue delegazioni permanenti sul posto.

Art. IX. Tutte le forze armate di terra, di mare e dell'aria della Francia metropolitana saranno smobilitate e disarmate entro un termine di tempo da fissare ulteriormente, ad eccezione delle formazioni necessarie al mantenimento dell'ordine interno.

La forza e l'armamento delle suddette formazioni saranno determinati dall'Italia e dalla Germania.

Per quanto concerne i territori dell'Africa del Nord francese, della Siria, e della Costa francese dei Somali, la Commissione italiana di Armistizio, nello stabilire le modalità di smobilitazione e di disarmo, terrà conto dell'importanza particolare del mantenimento dell'ordine in detti territori.

Art. X. L'Italia si riserva di esigere, come garanzia della esecuzione della Convenzione di Armistizio, la consegna in tutto od in parte delle armi collettive di fanteria e di artiglieria, autoblinde, carri armati, veicoli automobile ed ippomobili e munizioni appartenenti alle unità che sono state comunque impregnate o schierate contro le forze armate italiane. Le armi e materiali suddetti dovranno essere consegnati nello stato in cui si trovano al momento dell'armistizio.

Art. XI. Le armi, munizioni e material bellico di qualsiasi specie che rimangono nei territori francesi non occupati, ivi comprese le armi e munizioni evacuate dalle zone, piazzeforti militari marittime e basi navali da smilitarizzare, ed esclusa quella parte che venga lasciata in uso alle unità permesse, saranno riuniti ed accantonati sotto controllo italiano o germanico. La costurzione di material bellico di qualsiasi specie nei territori non occupati deve cessare immediatamente.

Art. XII. Le unità della Marina da guerra francese saranno concentrate nei porti che verranno indicati e saranno smobilitate e disarmate sotto il controllo dell'Italia o della Germania. Faranno eccezione quelle unità di cui i Governi italiano e tedesco conce dessero l'uso per la salvaguardia dei territori coloniali francesi. Sarà element determinante per l'indicazione dei porti di cui sopra la discolazione delle unità navali in tempo di pace.

Tutte le navu da guerra lontane dalla Francia metropolitana, che non siano eventualmente riconosciute necessarie alla salvaguardia degli interessi coloniali francesi, saranno fatte rientrare nei porti metropolitani.

Il Governo italiano dichiara che non ha intenzione di impiegare, durante la presente guerra, le unità della Marina da guerra francese poste sotto il suo controllo e che, del pari, non ha l'intenzione di avanzare pretese, alla conclusione della pace, sulla flotta francese.

Durante l'armistizio potrà però essere richiesto il naviglio francese necessario al dragaggio delle mine, di cui all'Articolo seguente.

Art. XIII. Tutti gli sbarramenti di mine saranno notificati al Comando Suremo Italiano.

Le Autorità francesi provvederanno, entro il termine di dieci giorni, a fare scaricare col proprio personale tutte le interruzioni ferroviarie e stradali, campi minati e fornelli da mina in genere, approntati nelle zone, piazzeforti militari marittime e basi navali da smilitarizzare.

Art. XIV. Il Governo francese, oltre ad obbligarsi a non intraprendere in qualsiasi luogo qualsiasi forma di ostilità contro l'Italia, si impegna ad impedire agli appartenenti alle sue forze armate e ai cittadini francesi in genere, di uscire dal territorio nazionale per partecipare comunque ad ostilità contro l'Italia.

Le truppe italiene useranno contro i trasgressori alla suddetta norma, e contro i cittadini francesi già all'estero che intraprendessero collettivamente o singolarmente atti di ostilità contro l'Italia, il trattamento riservato ai combattenti fuori legge.

Art. XV. Il Governo francese si impegna ad impedire che navi da guerra, aeroplane, armi, materiali bellici e munizioni di qualsiasi specie, di proprietà francese o esistenti in territroi francesi o comunque controllati dalla Francia, vengano avviati in territori dell'Impero britannico o in altri Stati esteri.

Art XVI. Divieto di uscita per tutte le navi mercantile della Marina francese sino al momento in cui i Governi italiano e tedesco consentissero la ripresa parziale o totale del traffico marittimo commerciale francese.

Le navi mercantile francesi che non si trovassero al momento dell'armistizio in porti francesi

o comunque sotto il controllo della Francia, saranno o richiamate in essi od avviate a porti neutrali.

Art. XVII. Tutte le navi mercantile italiane catturate saranno immediatamente restituite, con l'interno carico diretto in Italia che avevano al momento della cattura.

Dovranno altresì essere restituite le merci non deperibili, italiane o dirette in Italia, catturate a bordo di navi non italiane.

Art. XVIII Divieto immediate di decollo per tutti gli aerei trovantisi nel territorio francese o in territorio comunque sotto controllo francese.

Tutti gli aeroporti e tutte le installazioni nei territori suddetti saranno sotto il controllo italiano o tedesco.

Gli aerei stranieri che si trovino nei territori di cui sopra saranno consegnati alle autorità militari italiane o germaniche.

Art. XIX. Sino a quando i Governo italiano e tedesco non stabiliranno altrimenti saranno vietate le trasmissioni radio in genere, in tutti i territori della Francia metropolitana. Le condizioni nelle quali potranno effettuarsi le comunicazioni radio tra la Francia, l'Africa del Nord francese, la Siria e la Costa francese dei Somali saranno determinate dalla Commissione italiana di Armistizio.

Art. XX. Libertà di traffico delle merci in transito fra la Germania e l'Italia attraverso il territorio francese non occupato.

Art. XXI. Saranno immediatamente liberati e consegnati alle autorità militari italiane tutti i prigionieri italiani di guerra ed i civili italiani comunque internati, arrestati o condannati per ragioni politiche o di guerra o per atti comunque a favore del Governo italiano.

Art. XXII. Il Governo francese si rende garante della buona conservazione d tutto quanto deve o può dover consegnare in virtù della presente Convenzione.

Art. XXIII. Una Commissione italiana di Armistizio, alla dipendenza del Comando Supremo Italiano sarà incaricata di regolare e controllare, sia direttamente, sia a mezzo dei suoi organi, l'esecuzione della presente Convenzione di Armistizio.

Essa sarà altresì incaricata di armonizzare la presente Convenzione con quella già conclusa fra Germania e Francia.

Art. XXIV. Nella sede della Commissione di cui all'Articolo precedente si insedierà una Delegazione francese incaricata di far presenti i desiderata del proprio Governo relative all'esecuzione della presente Convenzione e di trasmetter alle Autorità francesi competenti le disposizioni della Commissione Italiana di Armistizio.

Art. XXV. La presente Convenzione di Armistizio entrerà in vigore all'atto della sua firma. Le ostilità cesseranno, in tutti i teatri d'operazione, sei ore dopo il momento in cui il Governo

italiana avrà comunicato al Governo tedesco l'avvenuta conclusion del presente Accordo. Il Governo italiano notificherà detto momento al Governo francese per via radio.

Art. XXVI. La presente Convenzione di Armistizio rimarrà in vigore fino alla conclusion del Trattato di pace. Potrà essere denunciata dall'Italia in qualsiasi momento, con effetto immediato, ove il Governo francese non adempia agli obblighi assunti.

I sottoscritti plenipotenziari, debitamente autorizzati, dichiarano di approvare le condizioni sopra indicate.

Roma, 24 giugno 1940, alle ore 19,15

F.to Il Maresciallo d'Italia, Pietro Badoglio
F.to Le Général d'Armée Huntzinger [sic]

“Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”⁷¹³

Entre le chef d'état-major général italien, chargé par le *Duce*, commandant des troupes italiennes en operations, et le chef de la delegation française pour l'armistice.

Article 1. La France cessera les hostilités contre l'Italie dans le territoire français métropolitain, dans l'Afrique française du Nord, dans les colonies, dans les territoires protégés et sous mandate. Elle cessera également les hostilités contre l'Italie par mer et par air.

Article 2. Les troupes italiennes se maintiendront, au moment de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention d'armistice, et pour toute la durée de celle-ci, sur les lignes qu'elles ont atteintes sur tous les théâtres d'opérations.

Article 3. Dans le territoire français métropolitain, la zone comprise entre le lignes visées à l'article 2 et une ligne située à cinquante kilometres de celle-ci, à vol d'oiseau, sera démilitarisée pour la durée de l'armistice.

En Tunisie, la zone comprise entre la frontière actuelle tuniso-libyenne et la ligne indiquée sur la carte annexée sera démilitarisée pour la durée de l'armistice.

En Algérie, ainsi que dans les territoires de l'Afrique française situés au sud de l'Algérie et confinant à la Libye, une zone comprise entre la frontière libyenne et une ligne parallèle distante de 200km sera démilitarisée pour la même durée.

Tant que dureront les hostilités entre l'Italie et l'Empire britannique et pour la durée du présent armistice, le territoire de la colonie de la Côte française des Somalis sera démilitarisée en entier.

L'Italie aura le droit, entier et permanent, pendant la durée de l'armistice, d'utiliser le port et

⁷¹³ DDF, *Les armistices*, Doc. 91, “Convention d’armistice avec l’Italie”, pp. 167-73.

les installations portuaires de Djibouti, et la voie ferrée Djibouti-Addis-Abeba sur le parcours français, pour des transports de quelque nature que ce soit.

Article 4. Les zones à démilitariser visées à l'article 3 seront évacuées par les troupes françaises dans les 10 jours qui suivront la cessation des hostilités, à l'exception du personnel strictement nécessaire pour la garde et l'entretien des ouvrages de fortifications, casernes, magasins et bâtiments militaires, et des forces pour le maintien de l'ordre à l'intérieur que la commission d'armistice déterminera chaque cas particulier.

Article 5. Sous réserve de l'obligation mentionnée à l'article 10 ci-après, toutes les armes <<mobiles>> et les munitions correspondantes existant dans les zones à démilitariser du territoire français métropolitain et dans celui contigu à la Libye, autres que celles dont sont dotées les troupes qui évacuent, comme il est dit ci-avant, les territoires en cause, doivent être évacuées dans un délai de 15 jours. Les armes fixes des ouvrages de fortification et les munitions correspondantes doivent être mises dans le même laps de temps en situation de ne pas pouvoir être utilisées.

Dans le territoire de la Côte française des Somalis, toutes les armes <<mobiles>> et les munitions correspondantes autres que celles dont sont dotées les troupes qui évacuent le territoire seront déposées, dans le même délai de 15 jours, dans les localités qui seront déterminées par la commission italienne d'armistice visée ci-après.

Pour les armes fixes et les munitions des ouvrages des fortifications existant dans ledit territoire, on appliquera les dispositions fixées pour le territoire français métropolitain et pour celui contigu à la Libye.

Article 6. Tant que dureront les hostilités entre l'Italie et l'Empire britannique, les places-fortes militaires maritimes et les bases navales de Toulon, Bizerte, Ajaccio et Oran (Mers-el-Kébir) seront démilitarisées jusqu'à la cessation des hostilités contre ledit Empire Cette démilitarisation devra être effectuée dans un délai de 15 jours et devra être telle que ces places-fortes et bases soient rendues inutilisables au point de vue de leur capacité offensive-défensive. Leur capacité logistique sera, sous le contrôle de la commission italienne d'armistice limitée aux besoins des bâtiments de guerre français qui, dans les conditions prévues à l'article 12 ci-après, y seront basés.

Article 7. Dans les zones, places-fortes militaires maritimes et bases navales à démilitariser, les autorités civiles françaises et les forces de police nécessaires au maintien de l'ordre public demeureront naturellement en fonction. Y resteront aussi les autorités territoriales militaires et maritimes qui seront déterminées par la commission italienne d'armistice.

Article 8. La Commission italienne d'armistice visée ci-après déterminera sur la carte les limites exactes des zones, places-fortes militaires, maritimes, bases navales à démilitariser et les détails des modalités d'exécution de la démilitarisation. Ladite commission aura le droit entier et permanent de contrôler l'exécution dans ledites zones, places et bases, des mesures fixées par les articles précédents, soit au moyen de visites de contrôle, soit au moyen de délégation permanente sur place.

Article 9. Toutes les forces armées de terre, de mer et de l'air de la France métropolitaine seront démobilisées et désarmées dans un délai à fixer ultérieurement, à l'exception des formations nécessaires au maintien l'ordre intérieur.

La force et l'armement de ces formations seront déterminées par l'Italie et l'Allemagne. En ce qui concerne les territoires de l'Afrique du Nord française, la Syrie et la Côte française des Somalis, la commission italienne d'armistice, en établissant les modalités de demobilisation et de désarmement, prendra en consideration l'importance particulière du maintien de l'ordre dans lesdits territoires.

Article 10. L'Italie se reserve le droit d'exiger, comme garantie de l'exécution de la convention d'armistice, la remise, en tout ou partie, des armes collectives d'infanterie, d'artillerie, autos blindées, chars, véhicules automobiles et hippomobiles et munitions appartenant aux unites qui ont été engages ou déployées de quelque façon que ce soit contre les forces armées italiennes.

Ces armes et ces matériels devront être remis dans l'état dans lequel ils se trouvaient au moment de l'armistice.

Article 11. Les armes, munitions et matériels de guerre de toute nature qui demeureront dans les territoires français non-occupés, y compris les armes et munitions évacuées des zones, places-fortes militaires maritimes et bases navales à démilitariser, à l'exclusion de la partie qui serait laisse à la disposition des unites autorisées, seront réunies et places sous contrôle italien ou allemande.

La fabrication du matériel de guerre de toute nature dans les territoires non-occupés doit cesser immédiatement.

Article 12. Les unites de la marine de guerre française seront concentrées dans les ports qui seront désignés; ells seront démobilisées et désarmées sous le contrôle de l'Italie ou de l'Allemagne.

Feront exception les unites dont les gouvernements italien et allemande autoriseraient l'emploi pour la sauvegarde des territoires coloniaux français.

L'emplacement des unites navales en temps de paix sera un élément determinant pour le choix des ports visés ci-dessus.

Tous les navires de guerre éloignés de la France metropolitaine qui ne seraient pas reconnus nécessaires à la sauvegarde des intérêts coloniaux français seront rappelés dans les ports métropolitains.

Le gouvernement italien declare qu'il n'a pas l'intention d'employer, pendant la présente guerre, les unites de la marine de guerre française places sous son contrôle et que, de même, il n'a pas l'intention d'avancer des pretensions, à la conclusion de la paix, sur a flotte française.

Pendant l'armistice, les navires français nécessaires au dragage des mines visés à l'article suivant pourront cependant être demandés.

Article 13. Tous les barrages de mines seront notifiés au Commandement supreme italien.

Les autorités françaises pourvoient, dans un délai de 10 jours, à faire décharger avec leur personnel toutes les interruptions ferroviaires et routières, champs de mines et fourneaux de mines en général, préparés dans les zones, places-fortes militaires maritimes et bases navales à démilitariser.

Article 14. Le gouvernement français, outre qu'il s'engage à ne pas entreprendre en quelque lieu que ce soit une forme quelconque d'hostilités contre l'Italie, s'engage à empêcher les membres de ses forces armées et les citoyens français en général, de sortir du territoire national pour participer d'une manière quelconque à des hostilités contre l'Italie.

Les troupes italiennes appliqueront contre ceux qui transgresseraient cette règle et contre les citoyens français précédemment à l'étranger qui entreprendraient collectivement ou individuellement des actes d'hostilités contre l'Italie le traitement réservé aux combattants hors-la-loi.

Article 15. Le gouvernement français s'engage à empêcher que des unités de guerre, des avions, des armes, des matériels de guerre et des munitions de quelque nature que ce soit, de propriété française ou existant dans les territoires français contrôlés par la France, soient envoyés sur les territoires de l'Empire britannique ou d'autres États étrangers.

Article 16. Aucun navire marchand de la marine française ne pourra sortir jusqu'à ce que les gouvernements italien ou allemand accordent la reprise partielle ou totale du trafic maritime commercial français.

Les navires marchands français qui ne se trouveraient pas au moment de l'armistice dans les ports français ou places sous le contrôle français seront rappelés dans ces ports ou dirigés sur des ports neutres.

Article 17. Tous les navires marchands italiens capturés seront immédiatement restitués, avec tout le chargement qui était dirigé sur l'Italie au moment de leur capture.

Les marchandises non-périssables italiennes ou dirigées sur l'Italie, capturées à bord de navires non italiens, devront de même être restituées.

Article 18. Il est fait défense immédiate de décoller pour tous les avions qui se trouvent sur le territoire français ou sur le territoire placé sous contrôle français.

Tous les aéroports et toutes les installations des territoires susdits seront placés sous contrôle italien ou allemand.

Les avions étrangers qui se trouveraient dans les territoires visés ci-dessus seront remis aux autorités militaires italiennes ou allemandes.

Article 19. Jusqu'au moment où le gouvernement italien et le gouvernement allemande fixeront d'autres dispositions, seront interdites les transmissions radio en général, dans tous les territoires de la France métropolitaine. Les conditions dans lesquelles pourront s'effectuer les communications radio entre la France, l'Afrique française du Nord, la Syrie et la Côte des Somalis seront déterminées par la commission italienne d'armistice.

Article 20. Le trafic des marchandises en transit entre l'Allemagne et l'Italie à travers le territoire français non-occupé sera libre.

Article 21. Tous les prisonniers de guerre et les civils italiens internes, arrêtés ou condamnés pour des raisons politiques ou de guerre ou pour des actes quelconques en faveur du gouvernement italien, seront immédiatement libérés aux autorités militaires italiennes.

Article 22. Le gouvernement français se porte garant de la bonne conservation de tout ce qu'il doit ou peut devoir remettre en vertu de la présente convention.

Article 23. Une commission italienne d'armistice dépendant du Commandement suprême italien, sera chargée de régler et contrôler, soit directement, soit au moyen de ses organes, l'exécution de la présente convention.

Elle sera également chargée d'harmoniser de la présente convention avec celle déjà conclue entre l'Allemagne et la France.

Article 24. Au siège de la commission visée à l'article précédent s'installera une délégation française chargée de faire connaître les *desiderata* de son gouvernement relativement à l'exécution de la présente convention et de transmettre aux autorités françaises compétentes les dispositions de la commission italienne d'armistice.

Article 25. La présente convention d'armistice entrera en vigueur au moment de la signature. Les hostilités cesseront sur tous les théâtres d'opérations, six heures après le moment où le gouvernement italien aura communiqué au gouvernement allemand la conclusion du présent accord.

Le gouvernement italien notifiera ce moment au gouvernement français par radio.

Article 26. La présente convention d'armistice demeurera en vigueur jusqu'à la conclusion du traité de paix. Elle pourra être dénoncée par l'Italie à tout moment avec effet immédiat, si le gouvernement français ne remplit pas les obligations assumées.

Les plénipotentiaires soussignés, dûment autorisés, déclarent approuver les conditions indiquées ci-dessus.

Rome, 24 juin 1940 – XVIII à 19h. 15.

(s[igné]

Huntziger

Badoglio

Appendix B⁷¹⁴

Army Sub-Commission

- 1 Alpine exchequer control delegation (Nice)
- 2 regional delegations (Marseille, Valence)
- 5 control sections (Nice, Marseille, Gap, Valence, Annecy)

Navy Sub-Commission

- 1 navy delegation (Toulon)
- 1 Italo-German delegation for the control of maritime traffic (Marseille)
- 3 control sections (Marseille, Toulon, Nice)
- 2 control units (Sète, Port Vendres)

Air Force Sub-Commission

- 1 air force control delegation, Provence (Marseille)
- 1 control section (Marignane)
- 1 flight assistance section (Lyon)
- 1 DWStK liaison unit (Aix-en-Provence)

Armaments Sub-Commission

- 1 War Industry Control delegation (Grenoble)
- 1 liquid fuels control delegation (Marseille)
- 2 War Industry Control delegations (Lyon, Avignon)
- 3 units at German War Industry Control delegation (Toulouse, Clermont-Ferrand, Bourges)

General Affairs Sub-Commission

- 1 control body, Art. XXI (Lyon)
- DRA's

Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Commission (SCAEF)

- 1 ship and cargo recovery delegation (Marseille)

Legal Affairs Sub Commission

- Sub-Commission based at Turin

Trade Sub-Commission

- Commercial Commissariat for France (Paris)

Mixed Control Delegation Corsica

- 2 maritime traffic control sections (Ajaccio, Bastia)

⁷¹⁴ Table originally appears as Table 19 in D. Rodogno, *Fascism's European Empire*, p. 428.

Italian Delegation at DWStK

Mixed delegations (Wiesbaden, Djibouti, Algiers)

Bibliography

Archival Sources

France

ARCHIVES NATIONALES (AN), PARIS

- AJ 40 1400, Storia dell'armistizio fino al 15 settembre 1941
- AJ 40 1401, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Appunti
- AJ 40 1402, Relazione mensile de la Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia
- AJ 40 1403, Le gouvernement Badoglio, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia
-
- AJ 41 432, Comportement italien
- AJ 41 438, Situation de la zone occupée
- AJ 41 439, Ordonnances italien, Incidents
- AJ 41 440, Demandes italiennes de renseignements, Requisitions
- AJ 41 1177, Animaux de l'armée d'armistice, Bateaux
- AJ 41 1178, Arrestations, dommages
- AJ 41 1179, Vols, pillages, Attitude italienne vis-à-vis des juifs
- AJ 41 1180, Attentats, frontier franco-suisse
- AJ 41 1181, Revue de la presse italienne, janvier – settembre 1943
- AJ 41 1182, Lettres de Général Avarna di Gualtieri
- AJ 41 1183, Lettres de Général Avarna di Gualtieri
- AJ 41 1184, Situation de la Corse
- AJ 41 1185, Troupes italiennes

AJ 41 1186, Troupes italiennes
AJ 41 1187, Troupes italiennes
AJ 41 1400, Commission allemande d'armistice
AJ 41 1401, Commission allemande d'armistice
AJ 41 2149, Correspondance de la DFCIA
AJ 41 2150, Entrevues de la DFCIA, Entrevues avec l'Amiral Valli
AJ 41 2151, Entrevues de la DFCIA, Entrevues avec le général Vacca Maggiolini
AJ 41 2152, Conférences de Rome, 1941
AJ 41 2153, Installation des Délégations italiennes, Convention franco-italienne d'armistice
AJ 41 2302, Communes occupées en juin 1940
AJ 41 2304, Services publics, Circulation

F1^a 3916, Informations généraux, Savoie
F1^a 3917, Informations généraux, Savoie
F1^a 3918, Informations généraux, Haute-Savoie
F1^a 3919, Informations généraux, Haute-Savoie
F1^a 3933, Informations généraux, Basses-Alpes
F1^a 3934, Informations généraux, Hautes-Alpes

F1^a CIII 1135, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de l'Ain
F1^a CIII 1136, Rapports périodiques du Préfet des Basses-Alpes
F1^a CIII 1137, Rapports périodiques des Hautes-Alpes et des Alpes-Maritimes
F1^a CIII 1143, Rapports périodiques du Préfet du Bouches-de-Rhône
F1^a CIII 1152, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de la Drôme
F1^a CIII 1158, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de l'Isère
F1^a CIII 1186, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de la Savoie
F1^a CIII 1187, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de la Haute-Savoie
F1^a CIII 1194, Rapports périodiques du Préfet du Var
F1^a CIII 1195, Rapports périodiques du Préfet de la Vaucluse

F1^a CIII 1200, Rapports périodiques du Préfet Régionale de Marseille

F12 10296, Conventions d'armistice, Rapports franco-allemands

ARCHIVES DÉPARTEMENTALES DES ALPES MARITIMES (ADAM), NICE

0028W 0075, Incidents avec les troupes italiennes

0030W 0057, Evacuations des populations

0104W 0002, Commission italienne d'armistice

0104W 0003, Commission italienne d'armistice

0104W 0005, Commission italienne d'armistice

0166W 0001, Rapports de police et de gendarmerie

0166W 0002, Activités des services de police

0166W 0005, Compte-rendus d'activités des services de police

0166W 0010, Occupation italienne

0166W 0011, Occupation italienne

0166W 0012, Occupation dans le départements des Basses-Alpes

0166W 0026, Commissions étrangères d'armistice

0166W 0027, Commission italienne d'armistice

0166W 0028, Commission italienne d'armistice

0166W 0029, Commission italienne d'armistice

0166W 0030, Commission italienne d'armistice

0397W 0058, Administration des territoires français occupés

0397W 0059, Administration des territoires français occupés

0560W 0217, Dommages causes par les troupes italiennes d'occupation

0560W 218, Maires et presidents des delegations spéciales des chef-lieux de cantons

0560W 0219, Militants fascistes

0616W 0113, Evacuations des populations

0616W 0114, Défense du territoire

0616W 0219, Destructions, Commission allemande d'armistice

0616W 0241, Relations avec l'Italie
0616W 0242, Relations avec l'Italie
0616W 0260, Commission italienne d'armistice
0616W 0261, Commission italienne d'armistice
0616W 0262, Commission italienne d'armistice
0650W 0001, Police politique

ARCHIVES MUNICIPALES DE CANNES (AMC)

1K 58, Elections municipales, 1937-1945
1K 63, Documents diverses
2J 33, Documents diverses
4H 31, Troupes italiennes
4H 32, Troupes italiennes
4H 33, Troupes italiennes
4H 34, Troupes italiennes
4H 45, Création comité Cannois du groupe collaborationiste

ARCHIVES MUNICIPALES DE MENTON (AMM)

1O 272, Occupation italienne, 1940-1943
"Occupation de Menton par les forces fascistes, 1940-1945" (Uncatalogued documents)

ARCHIVES MUNICIPALES DE NICE (AMN)

3H 061, Mesures de Police et d'ordre moral
3H 062, Statut des juifs
3H 063, Main d'oeuvre, 1941-1944
3H 065-1, Occupation allemande, 1943-1944
3H 065-2, Occupation italienne, 1942-1943
3H 066-2, Réclamations de particuliers suite à des actes de sabotage et de "terrorisme"

CENTRE DE DOCUMENTATION JUIVE CONTEMPORAINE (CDJC), PARIS

XXVa-320, Lettre de l'ambassade d'Italie au consulat générale à Paris

XXVa-339, Article de presse du 21/01/43

XLVIIIa-17, Lettre du Général Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri

XLVIIIa-21, Lettre du Général Carlo Avarna di Gualtieri

CXV-119, Jugement du Tribunal Civil de Nice, 12/04/1943

CCXVIII-22, Exposé, non daté, de Monsieur Donati

CCXVIII-58, Témoignage d'Henri Pohoryles, résistant juif

CCXVIII-66, Exposé, non daté, d'Angelo Donati

I-53, Note, datée du 02/08/1943(?)

I-59, Protocole de l'interrogatoire du 20/10/1943 de Germaine Meyer

I-62, Lettre de dénonciation, datée du 24/12/1943 concernant Angelo Donati

Italy

ARCHIVIO CENTRALE DELLO STATO (ACS), ROME

Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, 1940-1943 (CIAF)

b. 1, Commissariato civile di Mentone

b. 2, Commissariato civile di Mentone

b. 3, Commissariato civile di Mentone

b. 4, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Ufficio 1, Notiziarie

b. 5, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Ufficio 1, Notiziarie

b. 6, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia, Ufficio 1, Notiziarie

Ministero Aeronautica (MA)

Gabinetto, Commissione Italiana di Armistizio con la Francia (1941-1943)

bb. 1-8, Relazione mensile e notiziarie quindicinale, 1941-1943

Ministero della Cultura Popolare (MINCULPOP)

Divisione Generale, Servizi della Propaganda

Propaganda presso gli Stati Esteri

b. 85, Chambéry

b. 87, Nizza

b. 88, Tolone, Bastia e Ajaccio

Ministero dell'Interno (MI)

Divisione Generale Pubblica Sicurezza (DGPS)

Divisione Affari Generali Riservati, A5 G Seconda Guerra Mondiale

b. 114, f. 52, CIAF documenti

b. 119, f. 66, Territori occupati

Divisione Affari Generali Riservati, 1943

b. 4

ARCHIVIO STORICO DEL MINISTERO DEGLI AFFARI ESTERI (ASMAE), ROME

Affari Politici, 1931-1945 (AP)

Francia, b. 54

Francia, b. 59

Francia, b. 64

Francia, b. 68

Francia, b. 69

Francia, b. 70

Principato di Monaco, b. 1

Ufficio Armistizio-Pace (GABAP)

- Francia, b. 1, Corrispondenza relativa alla situazione politica in Francia
- Francia, b. 2, Corrispondenza relativa ai rapporti della Francia con l'Asse
- Francia, b. 4, Corrispondenza relativa ai questioni particolari
- Francia, b. 7, Rapporti inviati dalle delegazione della CIAF
- Francia, b. 10, Corrispondenza relativa alla Commissione Italiana
- Francia, b. 11, Corrispondenza relativa alle Commissione di controllo
- Francia, b. 12, Corrispondenza relativa alle questioni militari
- Francia, b. 13, Corrispondenza relativa alle questioni commerciali e finanziari italo-tedeschi
- Francia, b. 14, Corrispondenza relativa alle questioni commerciali, lug. 1940 – sett. 1942
- Francia, b. 15, Corrispondenza relativa alle questioni commerciali, lug. 1940 – mag. 1941
- Francia, b. 20, Corrispondenza relativa al trattamento della popolazioni civili

Ufficio Coordinamento (UC)

- Francia, b. 3, Corrispondenza relativa alle <<relazione italo-francesi>>, sett. 1939 – apr. 1942
- Germania, b. 17, Corrispondenza all'<<intervento>> in guerra dell'Italia

Rappresentanza Italiana in Francia, 1861-1950 (Carte Buti – CB)

- b. 319
- b. 322
- b. 324

ARCHIVIO DI STATO DI VENTIMIGLIA (ASV)

Partito Nazionale Fascista

- Fald. 17, Fasc. 1, Bolletino del Comando Generale della GIL
- Fald. 17, Fasc. 4, Foglio di Disposizioni, 1938-1939
- Fald. 18, Fasc. 1-4, Foglio d'ordine e di disposizione, 1940-1943

United Kingdom

NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF SCOTLAND (NAS), EDINBURGH

CAB 65/7, War Cabinet minutes, May-June 1940

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, CENTRE FOR RESEARCH COLLECTIONS (UoE)

Voices from Wartime France, 1939-1945, Clandestine and Vichy Newspapers (Microfilm series)

Published Sources

Diario Storico del Comando Supremo, Vols. 1-9, Rome (1986-2002)

I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani, 9^a Serie, Vols. 1-10, Rome (1960-87)

Documents Diplomatiques Français, 1940, Vols. 1-3, Brussels (2003)

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Series D, Vols. X-XII, London (1957-62)

De Cecco, M. and Rosario Ostuni, M. (eds.), *Atti e Documenti, Volume III, La Bnl tra guerre colonial e guerra mondiale, 1937-1945*, Florence (1999)

Noakes, J. and Pridham, G. (eds.) *Nazism, 1919-1945, Vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, A Documentary Reader*, Exeter (2001)

Diaries, Memoirs and Autobiographies

Alfieri, D. *Dictators Face to Face*, London and New York (1954)

- Badoglio, P. *Italy in the Second World War*, Oxford (1948)
- Barthélemy, J. *Ministre de la Justice, 1941-1943*, Paris (1989)
- Baudouin, P. *The Private Diaries (March 1940 to January 1941) of Paul Baudouin*, London (1948)
- Bloch, M. *L'étrange défaite, témoignage écrit en 1940*, Paris (1946)
- Bottai, G. *Diario, 1935-1944*, Milan (1982)
- Bouthillier, Y. *Le drame de Vichy*, 2 vols. Paris (1950-1)
- Cavallero, U. *Diario, 1940-1943*, Rome (1984)
- Ciano, G. De Felice, R. (ed.), *Diario 1937-1943*, Milan (2006)
- Grandi, D. *Il mio paese, Ricordi autobiografici*, Bologna (1985)
- Grandi, D. *25 luglio 1943*, Bologna (2003)
- Ortona, E. *Diplomazia di guerra, Diari, 1937-1943*, Bologna (1993)

Contemporary Literature

- Amicucci, E. *Nizza e l'Italia*, Milan (1939)
- Anon. *Nizza*, Rome (1940)
- Canevari, E. *La conquista inglese dell'Africa*, Rome (1935)
- Codignola, A. "Nizza nell'età moderna", in N. Lamboglia (ed.), *Nizza nella storia*, Bordighera (1943)
- Damerini, G. *Le isole Jonie nel Sistema Adriatico dal dominio Veneziano a Buonaparte*, Milan (1943)
- Gray, E. *Le terre nostre ritornano... Malta, Corsica, Nizza*, Novara (1940)
- Malagoli, L. *Il Machiavelli e la civiltà del Rinascimento*, Milan (1941)

Norme di vita Fascista all'estero, Segreteria Generale dei Fasci all'Estero (ed.), Rome (1930)

Silva, P. *Italia, Francia, Inghilterra nel Mediterraneo*, Milan (1936)

Starace, C. *Bibliografia della Corsica*, Milan (1943)

Volpe, G. *Vittorio Emanuele III*, Milan (1939)

Volpe, G. *Italia moderna*, vol 1., Florence (1949)

Secondary Sources

Abramovici, P. *Une rocher bien occupé, Monaco pendant la guerre (1939-1945)*, Paris (2001)

Aga Rossi, E. *Una nazione allo sbando, L'armistizio italiano del settembre 1943 e le sue conseguenze*, Bologna (2003)

Ahonen, P., Corni, G., Kochanowski, J., Schulze, R., Stark, T. and Stelzl-Marx, B. *People on the Move, Forced Population Movements in Europe in the Second World War and its Aftermath*, Berg, Oxford and New York (2008)

Aly, G. *Hitler's Beneficiaries, How the Nazis Bought the German People*, London and New York (2006)

Amar, M. and Milza, P. *L'immigration en France au XX siècle*, Paris (1990)

Andrieu, C. *La banque sous l'Occupation, Paradoxes de l'histoire d'une profession*, Paris (1990)

Angelini, M. "Clio Among the *Camicie Nere*, Italian Historians and their Allegiances to Fascism (1930s-1940s)", in G. Albanese and R. Pergher (eds.), *In the Society of Fascists, Acclamation, Acquiescence and Agency in Mussolini's Italy*, New York and Basingstoke (2012)

Antier, J-J. *La flotte se saborde, Toulon 1942*, Paris (1992)

Aquarone, A. *L'organizzazione dello Stato totalitario*, Turin (1965)

- Arielli, N. *Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-1940*, Basingstoke (2010)
- Azéma, J-P. *De Munich à la Libération*, Paris (1979)
- Azéma, J-P. and Wiewiorka, O. *Vichy, 1940-1944*, Paris (1997)
- Azéma, J-P. *Vichy-Paris, les collaborations: histoire et mémoire*, Paris (2012)
- Azzi, S.C. “The Historiography of Fascist Foreign Policy”, *The Historical Journal*, 36, 1 (1993)
- Barbier, C. “Pour une historiographie de l Deuxième Guerre mondiale en Haute-Savoie”, in C. Sorrel (ed.), *La Société Savoyarde et la guerre, Huit siècles d’histoire (XIII^e – XX^e siècles)*, Chambéry (1998)
- Bartov, O. *Hitler’s Army, Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich*, New York and Oxford (1991)
- Bartov, O. *The Eastern Front, 1941-45, German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare*, Second Edition, Basingstoke and New York (2001)
- Basso, J. “Jean Médecin: Pouvoir et action politique”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 55 (1997)
- Battini, M. “Sins of Memory: Reflections on the Lack of an Italian Nuremberg and the Administration of International Justice after 1945”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004)
- Battini, M. *The Missing Italian Nuremberg, Cultural Amnesia and Postwar Politics*, New York (2007)
- Bechollini, A. “Antifascistes italiens en France pendant la guerre: parcours aléatoires et identités réversibles”, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporain*, 46, 2 (1999)
- Ben-Ghiat, R. “The Italian Colonial Cinema: Audiences and Agendas”, in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller, (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke and New York (2005)
- Benvenisti, E. *The International Law of Occupation*, Oxford (2012)
- Bertoldi, S. *Apocalisse italiana, Otto settembre 1943: fine di una nazione*, Milan (1998)
- Bloch-Lainé, F. and Gruson, C. *Hauts fonctionnaires sous l’occupation*, Paris (1996)

- Bloxham, D. *The Final Solution, A Genocide*, Oxford (2009)
- Boldworth, M. and Scherner, J. “France’s Occupation Costs and the War in the East: the Contribution to the German War Economy, 1940-4”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47, 2 (2012)
- Bookman, M.Z. *The Demographic Struggle for Power, the Political Economy of Demographic Engineering in the Modern World*, London and Portland (1997)
- Bosworth, R.J.B. “Nations Examine Their Past: A Comparative Analysis of the Historiography of the ‘Long’ Second World War”, *The History Teacher*, 29, 4 (1996)
- Bosworth, R.J.B. *The Italian Dictatorship, Problems and Perspectives in the Interpretations of Mussolini and Fascism*, London (1998)
- Bosworth, R.J.B. *Mussolini’s Italy, Life under the Dictatorship, 1915-1945*, London (2005)
- Bosworth, R.J.B. *Mussolini*, London (2010)
- Bourderon, R. “Une difficile articulation: politique nationale et appartenance à l’Internationale”, in J-P. Azéma, A. Prost, and J-P. Rioux (eds.), *Le Parti Communiste Français des années sombres, 1938-1941*, Paris (1986)
- Boursier, J-Y. *La politique du PCF, 1939-1945, Le Parti Communiste Français et la question nationale*, Paris (1992)
- Bovis, N. “Le Petit Niçois et l’Italie, 1919-1939”, *Recherches Régionales*, 92 (1985)
- Burgwyn, H. James. *Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period, 1918-1940*, Westport (1997)
- Burgwyn, H. James. “General Roatta’s War Against the Partisans of Yugoslavia, 1942”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004)
- Burgwyn, H. James. *Mussolini Warlord, Failed Dreams of Empire, 1940-1943*, New York (2012)
- Burgwyn, H. James. “Italy’s Rule in Conquered Territories During World War II: an Overview of Recent Scholarship”, *Global War Studies*, 10, 3 (2013)
- Burleigh, M. *The Third Reich, A New History*, Basingstoke and Oxford (2000)

- Burrin, P. "Le collaborationisme", in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des années noires*, Vol. 1, Paris (1993)
- Burrin, P. "Writing the History of Military Occupations", in S. Fishman, L. Lee Downs, I. Sinanoglou, L.V. Smith, and R. Zaretsky (eds.), *France at War, Vichy and the Historians*, Oxford and New York (2000)
- Calabi, D. "Italian Town Planning and the idea of the city in the early Twentieth Century", *Planning Perspectives*, 3, 2 (1988)
- Calvino, I. "The Avanguardisti in Menton", in I. Calvino, *Into the War*, London (2011)
- Canosa, R. *I servizi segreti del Duce, I persecutori e le vittime*, Milan (2000)
- Capogreco, C.S. "Internamento e deportazione dei civili jugoslavia (1941-'43)", in C. Di Sante (ed.), *I campi di concentramento in Italia, Dall'internamento alla deportazione (1940-1945)*, Milan (2001)
- Cappellano, F. "L'occupazione italiana della Grecia (1941-43)", *Nuova storia contemporanea*, 12, 4 (2008)
- Carpi, D. *Between Mussolini and Hitler, the Jews and the Italian authorities in France and Tunisia*, Hanover and London (1994)
- Carrattieri, M. "La Resistenza tra memoria e storiografia", *Passato e Presente*, 95 (2015)
- Cassels, A. "Was there a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty", *The International History Review*, 5, 2 (1983)
- Castronovo, V. *Storia di una banca, La Banca Nazionale del Lavoro e lo sviluppo economico italiano*, Turin (1983)
- Cecchi, D.B. *Non bruciare i ponti con Roma, Le relazione fra l'Italia, la Gran Bretagna e la Francia dall'accordo di Monaco allo scoppio della seconda guerra mondiale*, Milan (1986)
- Ceva, L. *La condotta italiana della guerra, Cavallero e il Comando Supremo, 1941/1942*, Milan (1975)
- Chaubin, H. "Les Italiens en Corse pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale", *Études Corses*, 57 (2004)

- Chaubin, H. *La Corse à l'épreuve de la guerre, 1939-1943*, Paris (2012)
- Ciarrapico, A. "Il mito della 'guerra parallela'", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 13, 1 (2009)
- Cohen, A. "La politique antijuive en Europe (Allemagne exclue) de 1938 à 1941", *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 150 (1988)
- Collotti, E. "L'Italia dall'intervento alla guerra parallela", in F. Tosi, G. Grassi and M. Legnani (eds.) *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale e nella Resistenza*, Milan (1988)
- Collotti, E. "Il collaborazionismo con le potenze dell'Asse nell'Europa occupata, temi e problemi della storiografia", *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, 21, 2-3 (1992)
- Collotti, E. "Sul razzismo antislabo", in A. Burgio (ed.), *Nel nome della razza, Il razzismo nella storia d'Italia, 1870-1945*, Bologna (1999)
- Collotti, E. "Il razzismo negato", in E. Collotti (ed.), *Fascismo e antifascismo, Rimozioni, Revisioni, Negazioni*, Rome and Bari (2000)
- Cooke, P. *The Legacy of the Italian Resistance*, New York (2011)
- Corner, P. *The Fascist Party and Popular Opinion in Mussolini's Italy*, Oxford (2012)
- Costagliola, B. *La Marine de Vichy, blocus et collaboration*, Paris (2009)
- Cuzzi, M. *L'internazionale delle Camicie Nere, I Caur, 1933-1939*, Milan (2005)
- Cuzzi, M. "La rivendicazione della Corsica (1938-1943)", *Recherches Régionales*, 187 (2007)
- De Felice, R. *Mussolini, l'alleato*, Vols. 1.1, 1.2, Turin (1990)
- de Rochebrune, R. and Hazera, J-C. *Les patrons sous l'occupation*, Paris (1995)
- Deakin, F.W. *The Brutal Friendship, Mussolini, Hitler and the fall of Italian Fascism*, London (2000)
- Decleva, E. "Politica estera, storia , propaganda: l'ISPI di Milano e la Francia (1934-1943)", *Storia Contemporanea*, 13,4 (1982)
- Degli Esposito, F. "L'industria bellica italiana e le commesse tedesche (1937-43)", *Rivista di Storia Contemporanea*, 22, 2-3 (1993)

- Del Boca, A. *Gli italiani in Africa Orientale*, 4 vols. Rome and Bari (1976-84)
- Del Boca, A. “Una lunga battaglia per la verità” in A. Del Boca (ed.), *I gas di Mussolini, Il fascismo e la guerra d’Etiopia*, Rome (1996)
- Del Boca, A. “The Myths, Suppressions and Defaults of Italian Colonialism” in P. Palumbo (ed.), *A Place in the Sun, Africa in Italian Colonial Culture from Post-Unification to the Present*, London (2003)
- Del Boca, A. *Italiani, brava gente?*, Vicenza (2005)
- Del Boca, A. *A un passo della forza: atrocità e infamie dell’occupazione italiana della Libia nella memorie del patriota Mohamed Fekini*, Milan (2007)
- Delmonte, D. “La ravitaillement à Toulon – 1940 – août 1944”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 7 (1973)
- Diamond, H. *Women and the Second World War in France, 1939-1948, Choices and Constraints*, Harlow (1999)
- Digiugni, D. *Cannes, 1939-1945*, Cannes (2006)
- Di Jorio, I. “L’attacco postumo alla Francia”, in M. Isnenghi and G. Albanese (eds.), *Gli Italiani in guerra, Conflitti, identità, memorie dal Risorgimento ai nostri giorni, Volume IV – Tomo2, Il Ventennio fascista: la Seconda guerra mondiale*, Turin (2008)
- Dinstein, Y. *The International Law of Belligerent Occupation*, Cambridge (2009)
- Dinstein, Y. *War, Aggression and Self-Defence*, Cambridge (2011)
- Doumanis, N. *Myth and Memory in the Mediterranean, Remembering Fascism’s Empire*, Basingstoke and London (1997)
- Doumanis, N. “The Italian Empire and *brava gente*: Oral History and the Dodecanese Islands”, in R.J.B. Bosworth and P. Dogliani. (eds.), *Italian Fascism, History, Memory and Representation*, Basingstoke and London (1999)
- Doumanis, N. “Italians as ‘Good’ Colonizers: Speaking Subalterns and the Politics of Memory in the Dodecanese”, in Ben-Ghiat, R. and Fuller, M. (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke and New York, (2005)

- Dyer, C. *Population and Society in Twentieth Century France*, Bungay (1978)
- Emsley, C. "Policing on a Dark Continent in the Ages of Extremes", in G. Oram (ed.), *Conflict & Legality, Policing in mid-twentieth century Europe*, London (2003)
- Emprin, G. *L'occupation italienne en Haute-Tarentaise, 1940-1943*, Grenoble (1985)
- Evans, R.J. *In Hitler's Shadow, West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape the Nazi Past*, London (1989)
- Fazal, T.M. *State Death, the Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation and Annexation*, Princeton and Oxford (2007)
- Fenoglio, L. *Angelo Donati e la <<questione ebraica>> nella Francia occupata dall'esercito italiano*, Cuneo (2013)
- Ferguson, A. "Axis of Failure: Strategic Folly, Economic Incompetence, and Mutual Antipathy in the Italo-German Alliance, 1939-1943", PhD Thesis, London School of Economics (2001)
- Ferrandi, F-S. "Pasquale Paoli dans l'historiographie italienne de la période fasciste", *Études Corses*, 58 (2004)
- Ferraris, L.V. "L'occupazione italiana della Jugoslavia", *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 14, 4 (2010)
- Ferris, K. *Everyday Life in Fascist Venice, 1929-1940*, Basingstoke and New York (2012)
- Fischer, B.J. "Italian Policy in Albania, 1894-1943", *Balkan Studies*, 26, 1 (1985)
- Fischer, B.J. *Albania at War, 1939-1945*, London (1999)
- Focardi, F. "La memoria della guerra e il mito del <<bravo italiano>>: origine e affermazione di un autoritativo collettivo", *Italia Contemporanea*, 220-1 (2000)
- Focardi, F. "Le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Africa e in Europa", *Italia Contemporanea*, 252-253 (2008)
- Focardi, F. *Il cattivo tedesco e il bravo italiano, Le rimozioni delle colpe della seconda guerra mondiale*, Rome and Bari (2013)

- Focardi, F. and Klinkhammer, L. “The Question of Fascist Italy’s War Crimes: the Construction of a Self-Acquitting Myth (1943-1948)”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004)
- Fogg, S. L. *The Politics of Everyday Life in Vichy France, Foreigners, Undesirables, and Strangers*, Cambridge (2009)
- Fogu, C. “‘Italiani brava gente’, the Legacy of Fascist Historical Culture on Italian Politics of Memory”, in R.N. Lebow, W. Kansteiner and C. Fogu (eds.), *The Politics of Memory in Postwar Europe*, Durham and London (2006)
- Fonzi, P. “Nazionalsocialismo e Nuovo Ordine Europeo. La discussione sulla ‘Großraumwirtschaft’”, *Studi Storici*, 45 (2004)
- Foot, J. *Italy’s Divided Memory*, New York (2009)
- Franzinelli, M. *I tentacoli dell’Ovra, agenti, collaboratori e vittime della polizia politica fascista*, Turin (1999)
- Frediani, S. “Les lieux de mémoire à Menton de 1860 à nos jours”, *Recherches Régionales*, 162 (2002)
- Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, G. von. “Resistance, Reprisals, Reactions”, in R. Gildea, O. Wierviorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006)
- Gaignebet, J.B. “Incertitudes de la paix, cruautés de la guerre (1929-1944)”, in M. Agulhorn (ed.), *Histoire de Toulon*, Toulouse (1980)
- Garello, G. “La guerra civile in Erzegovina nel 1941”, *Nuova Storia Contemporanea*, 9, 1 (2005)
- Gastaut, Y. “Les tendances italophobes dans l’opinion Niçois à la Libération (1944-1946)”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 52 (1996)
- Gentile, E. *La via italiana al totalitarismo, Il partito e lo Stato nel regime fascista*, Rome (1995)
- Gentili, R. *Giuseppe Bottai e la riforma fascista della scuola*, Florence (1979)

- Giglioli, A. *Italia e Francia, 1936-1939, Irredentismo e ultranazionalismo nella politica estera di Mussolini*, Rome (2001)
- Gildea, R. *Marianne in Chains, In Search of the German Occupation, 1940-1945*, London (2002)
- Gildea, R., Luyten, D. and Fürst, J. "To Work or not to Work?", in R. Gildea, O. Wiewiorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006)
- Gillette, A. *Racial Theories in Fascist Italy*, London and New York (2002)
- Giolitto, P. *Grenoble, 1940-1944*, Paris (2001)
- Gobetti, E. *L'occupazione allegra. Gli italiani in Jugoslavia (1941-1943)*, Rome (2007)
- Gobetti, E. *Alleati del nemico, l'Occupazione italiana in Jugoslavia (1941-1943)*, Rome and Bari (2013)
- Gobitz, G. "La deportation des juifs de Savoie en 1942", in C. Sorrel (ed.), *La société Savoyarde et la guerre, Huit siècles d'histoire (XIII^e – XX^e siècles)*, Chambéry (1998)
- Gooch, J. *Mussolini and his Generals, the Armed Forces and Fascist Foreign Policy, 1922 – 1940*, Cambridge (2007)
- Gooch, J. "Mussolini's Strategy, 1939-1943", in J. Ferris and E. Mawdsley (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume I, Fighting the War*, Cambridge (2015)
- Gregor, A.J. *Mussolini's Intellectuals, Fascist Social and Political Thought*, Princeton and Oxford (2005)
- Grillère, D. "L'occupation italienne en France de 1940 à 1943, Administration, souveraineté, rivalités", *Diacronie, Studi di storia contemporanea*, 4, 3 (2010)
- Grillère, D. "Entreprises françaises et occupation italienne: une politique économique de l'Italie fasciste au service des buts de guerre?", *Entreprises et histoire*, 62 (2011)
- Guerra, G.B. *Galeazzo Ciano*, Milan (2011)
- Guillen, P. "L'antifascisme, facteur d'intégration des italiens dans l'entre-deux-guerres", *Recherches Régionales*, 79 (1982)

- Guillen, P. “La coopération économique entre la France et l’Italie de septembre 1939 à septembre 1943”, in J-B. Duroselle and E. Serra (eds.), *Italia e Francia, 1939-1945, Vol. 1*, Milan (1984)
- Guillen, P. “Le rôle politique de l’immigration italienne en France dans l’entre-deux-guerres”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Guillon, J-M. “Les étrangers dans la résistance Provençale”, *Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 36, 4 (1989)
- Guillon, J-M. “Les étrangers dans la résistance du Sud-Est”, in P. Joutard and F. Marcot (eds.), *Les étrangers dans la résistance en France*, Besançon (1992)
- Guillon, J-M. “La France du Sud-Est”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des Années noires, Tome 2, De l’Occupation à la Libération*, Paris (1993)
- Guillon, J-M. “La résistance Provençale: Essai de synthèse”, *Provence Historique*, 178 (1994)
- Guillon, J-M. “Monuments et mémoire de la Résistance en Provence”, *Provence Historique*, 193 (1997)
- Guillon, J-M. “Le Var”, in J-M. Belière and D. Peschanski (eds.), *La police française (1930-1950), Entre bouleversements et permances*, Paris (2000)
- Guillon, J-M. “Les juifs dans le Var (1940-1944)”, in R. Mencherini (ed.), *Provence-Auschwitz, De l’internement des étrangers à la deportation des juifs, 1939-1944*, Aix-en-Provence (2007)
- Hametz, M. “Naming Italians in the Borderlands, 1926 – 1943”, *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 15, 3 (2010)
- Hechter, M. *Alien Rule*, Cambridge (2013)
- Hodzic, S. and Vitali, P. “<<Italiani brava gente?>> Storiografia recente dell’occupazione italiana in Croazia durante la seconda guerra mondiale”, *Ventunesimo Secolo*, 7 (2008)
- Hoffman, S. “La trauma de 1940”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *La France des années noires*, Vol. 1, Paris (1993)
- Holland, J. *Italy’s Sorrow, A Year of War, 1944-1945*, London (2008)

- Imlay, T. and Horn, M. *The Politics of Industrial Collaboration during World War II, Ford France, Vichy and Nazi Germany*, Cambridge (2014)
- Isoart, P. “Nice française: 1860-1914, Manifestations populaires et lieux de memoire”, in *Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1860-1914, Intégration et particularismes, Actes du Colloque de Nice 1987*, Nice (1988)
- Isoart, P. “11 novembre 1942, l’armée italienne occupe le Comte de Nice”, *Nice Historique*, 435, 2 (2002)
- Israel, G. *Il fascismo e la razza, La scienza italiana e la politiche razziali del regime*, Bologna (2010)
- Jäckel, E. *La France dans l’Europe de Hitler*, Paris (1968)
- Jackson, J. *France, the Dark Years, 1940-1944*, Oxford (2003)
- Jackson, P. and Kitson, S. “The Paradoxes of Vichy Foreign Policy, 1940-1942”, in J.R. Adelman (ed.), *Hitler and his Allies in World War II*, London (2007)
- Jennings, E. *Vichy in the Tropics, Pétain’s National Revolution in Madagascar, Guadeloupe, and Indochina, 1940-1944*, Stanford (2001)
- Joly, H. “The Economy of Occupied and Vichy France: Constraints and Opportunities”, in J. Lund (ed.), *Working for the New Order, European Business under German Domination, 1939-1945*, Copenhagen (2006)
- Kallis, A.A. *Fascist Ideology, Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945*, London and New York (2000)
- Kallis, A.A. *The Third Rome, the Making of the Fascist Capital, 1922-1943*, Basingstoke and New York (2014)
- Kedward, H.R. *In Search of the Maquis, Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944*, Oxford (1993)
- Kershaw, I. “‘Working Towards the Führer’, Reflections on the Nature of the Hitler Dictatorship”, *Contemporary European History*, 2 (1993)

- Kitson, S. "The Police and the Deportation of Jews from the Bouches-du-Rhône in August and September 1942", *Modern and Contemporary France*, 5, 3 (1997)
- Kitson, S. "From Enthusiasm to Disenchantment: the French Police and the Vichy Regime, 1940-1944", *Contemporary European History*, 11 (2002)
- Kitson, S. *The Hunt for Nazi Spies, Fighting Espionage in Vichy France*, Chicago and London (2008)
- Kitson, S. *Police and Politics in Marseille, 1936-1945*, Leiden and Boston (2014)
- Klemann, H.A.M. "Did the German Occupation (1940-1945) ruin Dutch Industry?", *Contemporary European History*, 17 (2008)
- Klemann, H. and Kudryashov, S. *Occupied Economies, an Economic History of Occupied Europe, 1939-1945*, London and New York (2012)
- Klotz, R. "Les conditions de la justice à Menton pendant l'occupation italienne (1940-1943)", *Recherches Régionales*, 156 (2001)
- Knox, M. *Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-1941, Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War*, Cambridge (1982)
- Knox, M. *Common Destiny, Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany*, Cambridge (2000)
- Knox, M. *Hitler's Italian Allies, Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940-1943*, Cambridge (2000)
- Kovic, M. "From Persecutors to Saviours: the Italian Occupation Forces of the Second World War in post-1989 Serbian Historiography", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 6, 2 (2004)
- Labanca, N. "Il razzismo colonial italiano", in A. Burgio (ed.), *Nel nome della razza, Il razzismo nella storia d'Italia, 1870-1945*, Bologna (1999)
- Labanca, N. "Colonial Rule, Colonial Repression and War Crimes in the Italian Colonies", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004)

- Labanca, N. “Perché ritorna la <<brava gente>>. Revisioni recenti sulla storia dell’espansione coloniale italiana”, in A. Del Boca (ed.), *La storia negata, Il revisionismo e il suo uso politico*, Vicenza (2009)
- Lacroix-Riz, A. *Industriels et banquiers, Français sous l’occupation*, Paris (2013)
- Lambauer, B. *Otto Abetz et les français, ou l’envers de la Collaboration*, Paris (2001)
- Laub, T. *After the Fall, German Policy in Occupied France*, Oxford (2010)
- Laurano, P. *Consenso e politica di massa, L’uso del mito garibaldino nella costruzione della nazione*, Rome (2009)
- le Maneur, Y. and Rouso, H. “La domination allemande”, in A. Beltran, R. Frank and H. Rouso (eds.), *La vie des entreprises sous l’Occupation, une enquête à l’échelle locale*, Paris (1994)
- Lecouer, S. *Mussolini’s Greek Island, Fascism and the Italian Occupation of Syros in World War II*, London (2009)
- Legnani, M. “Il ginger del general Roatta, le direttive della II^o Armata sulla repressione antipartigiana in Slovenia e Croazia”, *Italia Contemporanea*, 209-210, (1997-1998)
- Lepre, A. *Guerra e pace nel XX secolo, Dai conflitti tra stati allo sconto di civiltà*, Bologna (2008)
- L’Huillier, F. “Sur la Nazification de l’Alsace”, *Revue d’histoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale*, 120 (1980)
- Lieberman, P. *Does Conquest Pay? The Exploitation of Occupied Industrial Societies*, Princeton (1996)
- Lowe, C.J. and Marzari, F. *Italian Foreign Policy, 1870-1940*, London and Boston (1975)
- Lukas, R.C. *The Forgotten Holocaust, The Poles under German Occupation, 1939-1944*, New York (1997)
- Mack Smith, D. *Mussolini’s Roman Empire*, London and New York (1976)
- Mack Smith, D. “Le guerre del Duce nella biografia di Renzo De Felice”, *Passato e Presente*, 53 (2001)

- Maignon, J. , *Toulon et la Var dans la guerre, 1939-1945, La vie quotidienne sous l'occupation*, Saint-Étienne (1991)
- Massignani, A. “L’industria bellica italiana e la Germania nella seconda guerra mondiale”, *Italia Contemporanea*, 190 (1993)
- Mazey, S. and Wright, V. “Les préfets”, in J-P. Azéma and F. Bédarida (eds.), *Le régime de Vichy et les Français*, Paris (1992)
- Mazower, M. *Inside Hitler’s Greece, the Experience of Occupation, 1941-1944*, London (1993)
- Mazower, M. “Hitler’s New Order, 1939-1945”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, 7, 1 (1996)
- Mazower, M. *Hitler’s Empire, Nazi Rule in Occupied Europe*, London (2008)
- McGarry, J. ““Demographic Engineering’: the State-Directed Movement of Ethnic Groups as a Technique of Conflict Resolution”, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 21, 4 (1998)
- McLaren, B.L. “The Architecture of Tourism in Italian Libya: the Creation of a Mediterranean Identity”, in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke and New York, (2005)
- Milward, A.S. *The New Order and the French Economy*, Oxford (1983)
- Milward, A.S. *War, Economy and Society, 1939-1945*, Oxford (1984)
- Milza, P. “L’immigration italienne en France d’une guerre à l’autre: interrogations, directions de recherches et premier bilan”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Milza, P. “Aspects économiques et sociaux de la présence italienne en Savoie (1860-1939)”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Milza, P. “Les italiens en France dans les années trente”, in P. Joutard and F. Marcot (eds.), *Les étrangers dans la résistance en France*, Besançon (1992)
- Milza, P. *Garibaldi*, Paris (2012)
- Morland, P. *Demographic Engineering: Population Strategies in Ethnic Conflict*, Farnham (2014)

- Morgan, P. *The Fall of Mussolini, Italy, Italians and the Second World War*, Oxford and New York (2007)
- Ostenc, M. “L’education en Italie pendant le fascisme: Bilan et perspectives de recherches”, *Histoire de l’éducation*, 30 (1986)
- Ostenc, M. *Ciano, un conservateur en face à Hitler et Mussolini*, Paris (2007)
- Osti Guerrazzi, A. *The Italian Army in Slovenia, Strategies of anti-Partisan Repression, 1941-1943*, London and New York (2013)
- Overy, R.J. *Why the Allies Won*, London (2006)
- Painter, B.W., Jr. *Mussolini’s Rome, Rebuilding the Eternal City*, New York and Basingstoke (2005)
- Palermo, E. “Les Italiens à Menton dans l’entre-deux-guerres (1919-1939)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 161 (2002)
- Pane, C. “Le Case d’Italia in Francia. Organizzazione, attività e rappresentazione del fascismo all’estero”, *Memoria e Ricerca*, 41 (2012)
- Panicacci, J-L. Nice pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale de l’occupation italienne à la fin de la guerre, 11 Novembre, 1942 – 1er Septembre, 1945” Université de Nice (1970)
- Panicacci, J-L. “De Ezio Garibaldi à Jacques Cotta, Nice de 1942 à 1945”, *Recherches Régionales*, 39 (1971)
- Panicacci, J-L. *Menton dans la tourmente, 1939-1945*, Menton (1984)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Un journal irrédentiste sous l’Occupation, Il Nizzardo”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 33/34 (1987)
- Panicacci, J-L. *Les Alpes-Maritimes de 1939 à 1945, un département dans la tourmente*, Nice (1989)
- Panicacci, J-L. “La colonie allemande dans les Alpes-Maritimes de 1933 à 1945” in, J. Grandjonc and T. Grundtner (eds.), *Zone d’ombres, 1933-1944: Exil et internement d’Allemands et d’Autrichiens dans la Sud-est de la France*, Aix-en-Provence, (1990)

- Panicacci, J-L. *Le lieux de mémoire dans de la Deuxième guerre mondiale dans les Alpes-Maritimes*, Nice (1997)
- Panicacci, J-L. “A propos de Saint-Martin-Vésubie sous l’occupation”, *Recherches Régionales*, 182 (2006)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Nice de 1939 à 1945”, in A. Ruggiero (ed.), *Nouvelle histoire de Nice*, Toulouse (2006)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Le traumatisme de la défaite de juin 1940, Perceptions et réactions de l’opinion azurée de l’été à l’automne 1940”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 74 (2007)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Les persecutions antisémites dans les Alpes-Maritimes (été 1940 – été 1944)”, in R. Mencherini (ed.), *Provence-Auschwitz, De l’internement des étrangers à la deportation des juifs, 1939-1944*, Aix-en-Provence (2007)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Vence dans la tourmente (1939-1945)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 185 (2007)
- Panicacci, J-L. “L’occupation italienne et ses ambiguïtés: l’exemple des Alpes-Maritimes”, *Recherches Régionales*, 190 (2008)
- Panicacci, J-L. “L’occupation italienne de Menton vue à travers le fonds Giuseppe Frediani”, *Ou Païs Mentounasc*, 129 (2009)
- Panicacci, J-L. , *L’Occupation italienne, Sud-Est de la France, juin 1940 – septembre 1943*, Rennes (2010)
- Panicacci, J-L. “Le tourisme à Menton pendant les années noires (1939-1945)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 200 (2011)
- Panicacci, J-L. *En territoire occupé, Italiens et allemands à Nice*, Paris (2012)
- Panicacci, J-L. *Les Alpes-Maritimes dans la guerre, 1939-1945*, Paris (2013)
- Palla, M. “Lo stato-partito”, in M. Palla (ed.), *Lo Stato fascista*, Milan (2001)
- Pankhurst, R. “Italian Fascist War Crimes in Ethiopia: A History of their Discussion, from the League of Nations to the United Nations”, *Northeast African Studies*, 6, 1-2 (1999)
- Pavlowitch, S.K. *Hitler’s New Disorder, the Second World War in Yugoslavia*, London (2008)

- Paxton, R. *Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order*, New York (1972)
- Pedaliu, E.G.H. "Britain and the 'Hand-Over' of Italian War Criminals to Yugoslavia, 1945-48", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 39, 4 (2004)
- Peschanski, D. "Legitimacy/ Legitimation/ Delegitimation: France in the Dark Years, a Textbook Case", *Contemporary European History*, 13, 4 (2004)
- Poliakov, L. *La condition des juifs sous l'occupation italienne*, Paris (1946)
- Pommerin, R. "Le controversie di politica razziale nei rapporti dell'Asse Roma-Berlino (1938-1943)", *Storia Contemporanea*, 10 (1979)
- Poullenot, L. *Basses Pyrénées, Occupation, Libération, 1940-1945*, Biarritz (1995)
- Preston, P. "Franco and Hitler, the Myth of Hendaye, 1940", *Contemporary European History*, 1, 1 (1992)
- Quine, M.S. "From Malthus to Mussolini: The Italian Eugenics Movement and Fascist Population Policy, 1890-1938", PhD thesis, University College London (1990)
- Quine, M.S. *Population Policies in Twentieth-Century Europe*, London (1996)
- Ragionieri, E. "L'Italie dans la seconde guerre mondiale, Essai d'historiographie", *Revue d'histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale*, 92 (1973)
- Rainero, R.H. *La rivendicazione fascista sulla Tunisia*, Milan (1978)
- Rainero, R.H. *Mussolini e Pétain, Storia dei rapporti tra l'Italia e la Francia di Vichy (10 giugno 1940 – 8 settembre 1943)*, 2 vols., Rome (1990-2)
- Rainero, R.H. *I piemontesi in provenza, Aspetti di un'emigrazione dimenticata*, Milan (2000)
- Rainero, R.H. "Une résistance silencieuse: la Délégation française auprès la Commission italienne d'armistice avec la France (Turin, 27 juin 1940 – 8 septembre 1943)", *Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains*, 251 (2013)
- Revelant, J. "Grasse de 1939 à 1945", *Recherches Régionales*, 163 (2002)
- Rich, N. *Hitler's War Aims, the Establishment of the New Order*, London (1974)
- Roberts, A. *The Storm of War, a New History of the Second World War*, London (2010)

- Roberts, D. "Italian Fascism, New Light on the Dark Side", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 44, 3 (2009)
- Rochat, G. "L'esercito italiano negli ultimi cento anni", in *Storia d'Italia, Volume giunto, I documenti 2*, Turin (1973)
- Rochat, G. "Il Fascismo e la preparazione militare al conflitto mondiale", in A. Del Boca, M. Legnani and M.G. Rossi (eds.), *Il regime Fascista, Storia e Storiografia*, Rome and Bari (1995)
- Rochat, G. "La guerra di Mussolini, 1940-1943", in A. Del Boca (ed.), *La storia negata, Il revisionismo e il suo uso politico*, Vicenza (2009)
- Rodogno, D. "Italiani brava gente? Fascist Italy's Policy towards the Jews in the Balkans, April 1941 – July 1943", *European History Quarterly*, 35, 2 (2005)
- Rodogno, D. *Fascism's European Empire, Italian Occupation during the Second World War*, Cambridge (2006)
- Rodogno, D. "La politique des occupants italiens à l'égard des Juifs en France métropolitaine, humanise ou pragmatisme?", *Vingtième Siècle, Revue d'histoire*, 93 (2007)
- Rodogno, D. "Répression et représailles de l'Italie fasciste dans les territoires européens occupés en 1941-1943: buts et methods" in B. Garnier, J-L. Leleu and J. Quiellen (eds.), *Répression en France, 1940-1945: actes du colloque international 8, 9 et 10 décembre 2005, Mémorial de Caen*, Caen (2007)
- Rodogno, D. "Le nouvel ordre fasciste en Méditerranée, 1940-1943: présupposés, idéologiques, visions et velléités", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 55, 3 (2008)
- Rodogno, D. "L'Italia fascista potenza occupante in Europa", in M. Flores, S.L. Sullam, M-A. Matard-Bonucci and E. Traverso (eds.), *Storia della Shoa in Italia, Vicende, memorie, rappresentazioni, Volume 1, Le premesse, le persecuzioni, lo sterminio*, Turin (2010)
- Rodogno, D. "Review of Luca Fenoglio, *Angelo Donati e la "Questione Ebraica" nella Francia occupata dall'Esercito italiano*", *Quest. Issues in Contemporary Jewish History, Journal of Fondazione CDEC*, 7 (2014)

- Rodogno, D. "Wartime Occupation by Italy", in R.J.B. Bosworth and J.A. Maiolo (eds.), *The Cambridge History of the Second World War, Volume II, Politics and Ideology*, Cambridge (2015)
- Rodrigues, S. "Les reactions de l'opinion publique au moment de l'erection de la statue de Garibaldi à Nice", in *Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1860-1914, Intégration et particularismes, Actes du Colloque de Nice 1987*, Nice (1988)
- Romijn, P., Conway, M. and Peschanski, D. "National Legitimacy – Ownership, Pretenders and Wars", in M. Conway and P. Romijn, (eds.), *The War for Legitimacy in Politics and Culture, 1936-1946*, Oxford (2008)
- Roselli, A. *Italy and Albania, Financial Relations in the Fascist Period*, London and New York (2006)
- Rossi, A. *Le guerre della Camicie Nere, La milizia fascista dalla guerra mondiale alla guerra civile*, Pisa (2004)
- Rothwell, V. *War Aims in the Second World War, the War Aims of the Major Belligerents, 1939-45*, Edinburgh (2005)
- Rouso, H. *Le syndrome de Vichy, 1940-198...*, Paris (1987)
- Santarelli, L. "Muted Violence: Italian War Crimes in Occupied Greece", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 9, 3 (2004)
- Sarfatti, M. "Fascist Italy and German Jews in South-Eastern France in July 1943", *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 3 (1998)
- Sarfatti, M. *Gli ebrei nell'Italia fascista, Vicende, identità, persecuzione*, Turin (2000)
- Sarfatti, M. *La Shoah in Italia, La persecuzione degli ebrei sotto il fascismo*, Turin (2005)
- Sbacchi, A. "Poison Gas and Atrocities in the Italo-Ethiopian War (1935-1936)", in R. Ben-Ghiat and M. Fuller (eds.), *Italian Colonialism*, Basingstoke (2005)
- Schipsi, D. *L'occupazione italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi, 1940-1943*, Rome (2007)

- Schor, R. “Italiens des villes – Italiens des champs, l’accueil des immigrés italiens dans les Alpes-Maritimes et dans le sud-ouest (1919-1939)”, *Recherches Régionales*, 79 (1982)
- Schor, R. *L’opinion française et des étrangers en France, 1919-1939*, Paris (1985)
- Schor, R. “L’image de l’Italien dans la France de l’entre-deux-guerres”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Schor, R. “Les immigrés italiens au miroir de la presse française dans l’entre deux-guerres”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 85 (2012)
- Schreiber, G. “Les structures stratégiques de la conduite de la guerre de coalition italo-allemande au cours de la deuxième guerre mondiale”, *Revue d’histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale*, 120 (1988)
- Schreiber, G. “Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939-1940”, Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War, Volume III: The Mediterranean, South-East Europe, and North Africa. From Italy’s Declaration of Non-Belligerence to the entry of the United States into the War*, Oxford (1995)
- Shorrocks, W.I. *From Ally to Enemy, the Enigma of Fascist Italy in French Diplomacy, 1920-1940*, Kent and London (1988)
- Sica, E. “Italiani brava gente? The Italian Occupation of Southeastern France in the Second World War, 1940-1943”, PhD thesis, University of Waterloo (2011)
- Sica, E. “June 1940: The Italian Army and the Battle of the Alps”, *Canadian Journal of History/ Annales canadiennes d’histoire*, 47 (2012)
- Simonnot, P. *Le secret de l’armistice, 1940*, Paris (1990)
- Soudan, P. “Les années françaises de 1860 à l’aube du XXI^e siècle”, in P. Guichonnet (ed.), *Histoire d’Annecy*, Toulouse (1987)
- Steinberg, J. *All or Nothing, the Axis and the Holocaust, 1941-43*, London and New York (2002)
- Stirk, P.M.R. *The Politics of Military Occupation*, Edinburgh (2009)

- Sweets, J.F. *Choices in Vichy France, the French under Nazi Occupation*, New York and Oxford (1986)
- Temkin, M. “Avec un certain malaise: the Paxtonian trauma in France, 1973-74”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 38, 2 (2003)
- Temime, É. “Les Italiens dans la région marseillaise pendant l’entre-deux-guerres”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Tizzoni, E. “Les politiques touristiques du fascisme et les relations internationales de l’Italie, entre diplomatie publique et creation d’une marque de destination-Italie”, *Cahiers de la Méditerranée*, 88 (2014)
- Tomasevich, J. *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945, Occupation and Collaboration*, Stanford (2001)
- Tooze, A. *The Wages of Destruction, the Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy*, London (2006)
- Ugolini, W. *Experiencing War as the Enemy ‘Other’, Italian Scottish Experience in World War II*, Manchester (2011)
- Umbreit, H. “German Rule in the Occupied Territories, 1942-1945”, in Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt (ed.), *Germany and the Second World War, Volume V, 2, Organization and Mobilization of the German Sphere of Power*, Oxford (2003)
- Varley, K. “Between Vichy France and Fascist Italy: Redefining Identity and the Enemy in Corsica during the Second World War”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 47, 3 (2012)
- Varley, K. “Vichy and the Complexities of collaborating with Fascist Italy: French policy and Perceptions between June 1940 and March 1942”, *Modern and Contemporary France*, 21, 3 (2013)
- Varley, K. “Entangled Enemies, Vichy, Italy and Collaboration”, in L. Broch and A. Carroll (eds.), *France in an Era of Global War, 1914-1945, Occupation, Politics, Empire and Entanglements*, New York and London (2014)
- Veillon, D. *Vivre et survivre en France, 1939-1947*, Paris (1995)
- Vergé-Franceschi, M. *Histoire de Corse, du XVIIe siècle à nos jours*, vol. 2, Paris (2007)

- Verna, F.P. “Notes on Italian Rule in Dalmatia under Bastianini, 1941-1943”, *The International History Review*, 12, 3 (1990)
- Veziario, P. “L’échec du renouveau idéologique et matériel du fascisme dans les terres irredentes (Menton et Nice, 1940-1943)”, *Nice Historique*, 550, 2 (2004)
- Vial, É. “La Ligue Italienne des Droits de l’Homme (LIDU), de sa foundation à 1934”, in P. Milza (ed.), *Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940*, Rome (1986)
- Vial, É. *L’Union populaire italienne, 1937-1940: une organisation de masse du parti communiste italien en exil*, Rome (2007)
- Villermet, C. *A noi Savoia, Histoire de l’occupation italienne en Savoie, novembre 1942 – septembre 1943*, Montmélian, (1999)
- Vinen, R. *The Unfree French, Life under the Occupation*, London (2006)
- Virgili, F. *La France ‘virile’, Des femmes tondues à la libération*, Paris (2000)
- Vlossak, E. *Marianne or Germania? Nationalizing Women in Alsace, 1870-1946*, Oxford (2010)
- Von Lingen, K. *Nuremberg, Rome, Tokyo: the Impact of Allied War Crimes Trials on Post-war Memory and Identity in Germany, Italy and Japan after 1945*, Salford (2009)
- Vošahlíková, P., Rochet, B. and Weiss, F. “Schooling as a Cultural Interface”, in R. Gildea, O. Wieviorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006)
- Vujosevic, J. “L’occupation italienne [en Yougoslavie]”, *Revue d’histoire de la Deuxième guerre mondiale*, 87 (1982)
- Weiner, M. and Teitelbaum, M.S. *Political Demography, Demographic Engineering*, New York and Oxford (2001)
- Weinberg, G. *A World at Arms, a Global History of World War II*, 2nd ed., Cambridge (2006)
- Wieviorka, O. *Une certaine idée de la Résistance, Défense de la France, 1940-1949*, Paris (1995)

- Wieviorka, O. and Tebinka, J. "Resisters, From Everyday Life to Counter-State", in R. Gildea, O. Wieviorka and A. Warring (eds.), *Surviving Hitler and Mussolini, Daily Life in Occupied Europe*, Oxford and New York (2006)
- Wouters, N. "Municipal Government during the Occupation (1940-5): A Comparative Model of Belgium, the Netherlands and France", *European History Quarterly*, 36 (2006)
- Wouters, N., Olseon, N.W. and Conway, M. "The War for Legitimacy at the Local Level", in M. Conway and P. Romijn (eds.), *The War on Legitimacy in Politics and Culture, 1936-1946*, Oxford and New York (2008)
- Young, R.J. *French Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, A Guide to Research and Research Materials*, Wilmington (1981)
- Zagarrio, V. "Bottai: Un fascista critico?", *Studi Storici*, 17, 4 (1976)
- Zuccotti, S. *The Italians and the Holocaust: Persecution, Rescue and Survival*, London (1987)
- Zuccotti, S. *Holocaust Odysseys: the Jews of Saint-Martin-Vésubie and their Flight through France and Italy*, London (2007)