Beyond the security paradox: ten criteria for a socially informed security policy

Abstract

This paper investigates the normative and procedural criteria adopted by European citizens to assess the acceptability of surveillance technologies. It draws on qualitative data gathered at twelve citizen summits in nine European countries. The analysis identifies ten criteria, generated by citizens themselves, for a socially informed security policy. These criteria not only reveal the conditions, purposes and operation rules that would make current European security policies and technologies more consistent with citizens’ priorities. They also cast light on an interesting paradox: although people feel safe in their daily lives, they believe security could, and should, be improved.

Keywords

Public engagement, surveillance technology, security, privacy preference
Introduction

Over the past twenty years, but especially since 9/11, security policies in western societies have increasingly adopted pre-emptive measures which are reliant on Surveillance-Oriented Security Technologies (SOSTs). This shift has had controversial consequences, with scholars highlighting a variety of concerns they associate with pre-emptive security and surveillance practices (Hoijtink, 2014, De Goede, 2014, De Goede and Randalls, 2009). As new SOSTs facilitate the collection, storage, processing and combination of personal data by security agencies and commercial organizations, their impact on established civil and political rights (Friedewald et al., 2010), social sorting (Strauß and Nentwich, 2013, Lyon, 2007a), and on individual privacy (Lyon, 2002) has been criticized.

With so many concerns raised by technologies over which citizens have little control, it would be reasonable to expect Public Engagement with Science (PES) studies to have scrutinised how people assess these technologies and their implementation. However, SOSTs have so far received relatively little attention (Martin and Donovan, 2014, Pavone and Degli Esposti, 2012). Inspired by an unquestioned acceptance of the trade-off between privacy and security, early studies tend instead to consider the extent to which citizens are willing to trade their privacy in exchange for greater security (Bowyer, 2004, Jain et al., 2005, Strickland and Hunt, 2005). More recent studies have focused on the decision-making process involved in the development and implementation of SOSTs.

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of SOSTs (Hempel et al., 2013, van Lieshout et al., 2013, Wright and Friedewald, 2013, Wright et al., 2014, Michael Friedewald et al., 2017).

The present study hopes to contribute to this line of inquiry by focusing on an interesting paradox: although people feel safe in their daily lives, they believe security could, and should, be improved. Evidence of this paradox can be found in Eurobarometer 432—Europeans’ attitudes towards security (EC, 2015). The report indicates that, although the large majority of respondents consider their countries secure places (89 percent; n = 28,082), and agree on saying that their immediate neighbourhood, city, town or village are safe places to live in (82 percent), a large percentage of them think that security agencies are not doing enough to fight crimes such as corruption (52 percent), human trafficking (47 percent), money laundering (46 percent), drug trafficking (41 percent), or cybercrime (40 percent), and that citizens (79 percent) and citizens’ associations (64 percent) could also help and play a role in safeguarding public security. Furthermore, the majority of European citizens (55 percent) consider that fundamental rights and freedoms have been restricted as a result of current security policies. This negative perception of the effect of security policies on individual freedoms seems to be worse in 2015 than it was in 2011, when only 48 percent considered their liberties to have been restricted for reasons related to the fight of crime and terrorism (EC, 2014). These findings seem to suggest that current security policies and solutions are somehow perceived as inadequate by citizens, whose demands, opinions and perceptions need to be further explored and included in future security policies. In pursuing this objective, PES studies can stimulate productive and insightful discussion about the politics and purposes of science and technology (Stirling, 2008). They also have a role in producing new and socially responsible knowledge that can underpin innovation (Owen et al., 2012),
governance (Macnaghten and Chilvers, 2014) and policy-making (Jasanoff, 2003, Hagendijk and Irwin, 2006).

Through the adoption of an adapted version of the citizen summit methodology, this paper analyses the multiple ways in which citizens interpret security and privacy and assess and evaluate SOSTs. Drawing from qualitative data gathered at twelve citizen summits in nine European countries, this article presents ten general criteria used by citizens to assess the adequacy of SOSTs. On the one hand, the analysis confirms the appropriateness of policy actions undertaken in the area of data protection; on the other hand, it also suggests alternative normative and procedural principles, which could be adopted in the design, deployment and management of security technologies and that can increase the acceptability of future security solutions.

**Exploring SOSTs from a public engagement perspective**

Over the past twenty years, the concept of security has undergone multiple reformulations. It has shifted from territorial integrity and national sovereignty to human security and, after 9/11, to a new concept of homeland security. New security policies have particularly encouraged pre-emptive security measures, enacted through the development of data-intensive security technologies and public-private security collaboration. These measures have been introduced within policy frameworks which justify the restriction of individual privacy and freedom; a matter of political concern (Beck and Lau, 2005, Richards, 2012, Cohen, 2014, Lyon, 2007b, Lyon, 2013, Friedewald et al., 2010). Some scholars argue that new holistic security policies suffer from a democratic deficit (Zwolski, 2012, Eriksen et al., 2003, Tonra, 2011); they also tend to reduce democratic scrutiny in other policy domains by framing social problems

Security solutions which rely heavily on digital surveillance have been especially criticized for different reasons. First, they privilege pre-emptive approaches based on pattern discovery over forms of targeted and historically motivated tracking (Lyon, 2014). Furthermore, their impact on crime reduction is contested (Welsh et al., 2015) and can encourage crime displacement (Johnson et al., 2012). Finally, more recent studies of privacy concerns demonstrate that most people feel resigned and powerless when confronted with the current reality of mass dataveillance (Degli Esposti, 2014, Turow et al., 2015).

Despite the relevancy of the topic and the need to investigate public perceptions of security technologies, most studies in the area suffer the limitations of having replicated policymaker discourses concerning the existence of a trade-off between privacy and security (Strickland and Hunt, 2005). In framing security and privacy as interchangeable goods, these studies have not explored, for instance, whether security technologies actually address citizens’ security needs and priorities (Jain et al., 2005), how privacy is conceptualized, or whether citizens actually frame the latter in opposition to security (Strickland and Hunt, 2005). Furthermore, these studies have contributed to perpetuate security policies that considerably reduce privacy without offering significant gains in security (Mitchener-Nissen, 2014, Pavone et al., 2016). In fact, studies based on the
privacy-security trade-off inevitably require citizens to decide which liberties could be sacrificed to meet security needs (Bowyer, 2004).

The present article tries to overcome these shortcomings by applying an adapted version of a specific type of public engagement method, the citizen summit (Bedsted et al. 2011). Public engagement exercises have proved effective in increasing democratic participation and raising awareness. However, they have also been criticised as the data gathered is often not sufficiently robust to feed scientific research and guide policy development (Sturgis, 2014, Sturgis and Allum, 2004). In this respect, public opinion surveys have been more successful in collecting reliable quantitative data, but their success came at the expense of public participation and debate (Macnaghten et al., 2005). Moreover, survey methods tend to gather opinions related to a predetermined set of options and scenarios, while the conceptual and analytical dimensions that underpin these opinions remain out of sight and unexpected views can be marginalized. Not unexpectedly, only a few studies within this literature have specifically explored the social, ethical and cultural criteria adopted by different publics to assess the acceptability of technologies and innovations, such as future energy options (Butler et al., 2015, Zoellner et al., 2008), waste management (Garnett and Cooper, 2014), health policy issues (Street et al., 2014), or electricity grid options (Schweizer and Bovet, 2016).

Innovative public participation methods adopted in the study of surveillance technologies allow to create new space for discussion and negotiation, where divergences and conflicts are not silenced (Hempel et al., 2013). New societal impact assessment methodologies, for instance, feature ethical dilemma scenarios to assess the ethical, social and other implications of SOSTs (Wright and Friedewald, 2013, Wright et al., 2014). On
this basis, attempts have been made to develop decision support systems capable of reconciling security and privacy (van Lieshout et al., 2013).

In our study, too, a traditional public engagement method, the citizen summit, has been specifically revised to allow participants to frame the issue of how to assess the acceptability of SOSTs in their own terms and express informed opinions after having had the chance of discussing the topic with other people attending the event. This new version of the citizen summit combines informed engagement with deliberative participation, enabling a two-way exchange of knowledge and expertise: from scientific experts and/or policy makers to citizens; and from citizens to experts and/or policy makers. Reconciling public participation and deliberation with the needs to gather reliable scientific data, our study casts light on the normative and procedural criteria adopted by European citizens in assessing the acceptability of three specific SOSTs, which are deep-packet inspection, geolocation through smart phones, and smart CCTV.

Data gathering procedure and analysis

This study applies an adapted version of the citizen summit method to collect both quantitative and qualitative data. Between January and March 2014, 12 summits took place in nine EU countries, each of which was attended by around 200 participants (see table 1). The recruitment strategy was inspired by the principles of maximum variation sampling (Creswell, 2013). In order to achieve the broadest variety of opinions, each country’s sample represented the local socio-demographic breakdown.

2 Each country organised one citizen summit except for Switzerland, which held three citizen summits, and the United Kingdom, which held two citizen summits.

Table 1. Number of Citizen Summit participants per Country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Invited/registered</th>
<th>Participants</th>
<th>Date and location</th>
<th>SOSTs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>18/Jan, Aarhus</td>
<td>GEO &amp; sCCTV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>25/Jan, Budapest</td>
<td>DPI &amp; GEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>1/Feb, Oslo</td>
<td>DPI &amp; GEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1/Feb, Madrid</td>
<td>sCCTV &amp; DPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>8/Feb, Florence</td>
<td>sCCTV &amp; DPI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>22/Feb, Vienna</td>
<td>DPI &amp; GEO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>1&amp;15/Mar, Birmingham</td>
<td>GEO &amp; sCCTV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>8/Mar, Zürich; 22/Mar, Iverdi; 29/Mar, Lugano</td>
<td>GEO &amp; sCCTV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>29/Mar, Kiel</td>
<td>GEO &amp; sCCTV</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to make sure that participants were familiar with the use, functions, benefits and limits of the SOSTs under consideration, they had received an information magazine, which includes a summary of the European Security policy and focused on the use, functions, benefits and limits of the SOSTs under consideration, prior to attending the event. A short film about each SOST was also shown at the summit.

Each summit was a day-long event which was divided into three sessions. Upon arrival participants were placed in discussion groups. Each summit featured approximately 25 discussion groups, each comprising eight participants, a note-taker and a facilitator. In the two first sessions, participants viewed one of the documentary films, discussed the content in their table groups and then answered questions in plenary using an audience response system. They, then, made policy recommendations concerning security solutions during the third session. The facilitators ensured that the discussion flowed and that all participants expressed their views, while the note takers wrote down

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4 The magazine and an overview of the films can be found at: http://surprise-project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/SurPRISE-D4.3-Information-material-and-documentary-films.pdf

5 The films can be viewed at: http://surprise-project.eu/dissemination/information-material-from-the-participatory-events/
the main arguments discussed by their groups. During each summit, participants discussed two of the three SOSTs explained in the magazine they received before the event (see table one).

Three types of qualitative data were gathered: (i) a summary of the participants’ discussions as documented by note-takers sitting at each table, including some verbatim quotes; (ii) the verbatim transcription of each group’s recommendations collected on a standard template by table facilitators; (iii) the verbatim transcription of the summit postcards, on which participants were encouraged to voice more detailed opinions or dissent.6 (iv) Project reports written by national research partners, which included details on national controversies related to privacy and security themes and other cultural and contextual information in addition to specific information on the participatory event. The data were analysed using thematic data analysis, which is a flexible method for identifying, analysing, and reporting themes within qualitative data [Marshall and Rossman, 2011]. An inductive logic was followed. Initially, themes were identified from the analysis of all qualitative data gathered in each country. This approach allowed the identification of recurrent topics in the main arguments expressed by participants in their discussions and in their recommendations. Recurrent themes were identified and grouped within categories called criteria. In the analysis researchers paid attention to those principles used by citizens when deciding whether or not they consider the security measures to be acceptable. Criteria indicate standards on which a particular judgment or a decision is based; these criteria encompass the legal, ethical, economic and procedural

6 Both the summary of the arguments of the discussion groups and the recommendations and postcards were recorded in the original language of each citizen summit. Postcards and recommendations were translated into English. The main arguments from the discussion groups were analysed according to coding categories agreed among those who eventually wrote the different national reports, which were written and circulated among all of the partners in English.
standards consciously used by citizens to explain their views about the acceptability of SOSTs. Whilst each summit revealed national specific criteria and provided interesting insights into national approaches to security (Degli Esposti, 2017; Degli Esposti, 2015), this study specifically addresses European security policy; the main focus, thus, is on the criteria that emerged consistently in all of the countries and which applied to the three technologies. Once the criteria had been identified, they were compared between the summits. It was immediately apparent that ten of these criteria featured in all of the countries studied. It is these common criteria which form the basis of the discussion in this paper. These criteria contribute to a fine-grained exploration of what norms and procedures the participants adopted when assessing the deployment of security technologies. They provide a cogent portrait of how participants experience, frame and assess the SOSTs that are used to enhance European security policy. They also offer a distinctive picture of how participants would revise these security measures if given a chance to shape European security policy.

Towards a socially informed approach

This paper argues that a socially informed approach to the public understanding of security policy needs to go beyond questions of the security/privacy trade off and the security paradox. Previous studies which have simply focused on citizen attitudes to security and privacy miss the opportunity to surface more rich and nuanced views. Indeed the results of the current study demonstrate variability in the notions of privacy and security in European comparative perspective which are not captured by previous work. Security, for instance, was sometimes understood as personal security, and other times as national security; two aspects of security which do not necessarily converge (Pavone et al., 2016). While the Hungarian and Spanish participants considered SOSTs to be more
acceptable if used to improve national security, German and Austrian participants considered their use acceptable only if they increased personal security. Other countries adopted an intermediate position in which SOSTs were considered acceptable as long as they increase both national security and personal safety. Only Smart CCTV was considered effective in improving personal safety, while Geolocation and DPI were considered acceptable only when used to safeguard national security (Strauss, 2015).

Variation of meaning was also observed in relation to the concept of privacy. Participants in Switzerland, Germany and Austria tended to frame privacy as a right to be left alone, as expressed by a note-taker in Germany: “citizens feel a chilling effect on their behaviour, deriving from the wish to be left alone. Many citizens at the summit said that they perceive the increasing use of new SOSTs as the rise of a big brother creating an atmosphere of mistrust already experienced in the German history”. In contrast, participants in Spain and Hungary were more inclined to frame privacy in terms of control over personal data, as expressed in the following note-taker’s reflection in Spain: “[…] whilst many participants asked for severe punishment for the security agencies and the commercial actors who break the law, they also asked for a more thorough control over who, why and for what purposes, accesses their information. At the same time, they also asked for better and more extensive access to their own data, wherever they may be stored in order to increase control of their data and their own information.” Participants in other countries adopted an intermediate position, with the UK positioned closer to Spain and Hungary, and Italy and the Nordic Countries in the middle (see figure 1).

*Figure 1. Defining privacy*
Furthermore, in spite of producing more evidence of a security paradox (Eurobarometer 2015) the qualitative methods deployed by the paper demonstrate that there is more to be understood in relation to citizen assessments of SOSTs. It was not surprising to find that a large majority of study participants said that they felt safe in their daily life (69 percent) and considered that their countries were safe places in which to live (66 percent). Despite feeling safe, the majority of study participants said that SOSTs should be routinely implemented to improve national security (59 percent), even though they are concerned that the use of SOSTs is eroding their privacy (67 percent). They suggested that alternative approaches to security, which do not involve surveillance technologies, should be given priority (69 percent). The criteria, however, reveal that there are is more nuance to the participants’ views.

The rest of the discussion is devoted to the presentation of ten criteria, which have been identified in all countries where the participatory events were organised. These criteria provide a promising benchmark that could be taken into consideration when assessing any other kind of technological security solution.

**Ten criteria for a socially informed security policy**

From the analysis of the qualitative data gathered across the twelve citizen summits, a set of common criteria emerged. These criteria captured the circumstances and principles
considered necessary by all participants to implement SOSTs in an acceptable way. They constitute the baseline from which European security policies should be built. The criteria are grouped into three core themes: the first relates to the normative and legal context in which SOSTs operate; the second relates to the fair management and protection of the data used by SOSTs; whilst the third concerns SOSTs design and deployment. Sub-criteria are listed in figure two, and presented in detail in the following theme-specific sections.

Fig. 2. List of criteria

Normative criteria

The acceptability of SOSTs was often linked to the normative context in which the technologies are operated. National and international regulations, transparency and private-public separation were fundamental criteria used by the large majority of participants to say how SOSTs should be managed.
International legal framework

Despite the technical challenges created by ubiquitous computing and trans-border data flow, regulation is still seen by citizens as a powerful mechanism to ensure that technological risks are contained and managed (Falkner 2012). International laws are considered necessary to limit the sovra-national ubiquitous, digital surveillance. Specific laws should also be introduced to reduce massive surveillance and limit the impact of SOSTs beyond national borders: “we need a new and international legal frameworks.. it is important.. and even more an oversight body that could intervene if someone broke the law when using deep packet inspection in an illegal way” [Norwegian National Report, p.17]. Given the global nature of security threats and security strategies, the national fragmentation of regulations and data protection authorities was perceived as an obstacle to both security strategies and data protection7: “Legal guarantees should safeguard citizens' rights in the entire EU region. A body at a EU-level must give out licenses to set up surveillance cameras, oversee accountability, and protection of personal data” [Recommendation, Hungarian Citizen Summit].

Transparency and accountability

Many participants perceived that SOSTs are used in situations in which information, transparency and responsibility are poor or missing. They suggested that SOSTs should only be introduced after providing detailed and accessible information about operation modes, operators, rules, domains and purposes to the public: “the use of SOSTs is opaque, responsible authorities are not known to the public. We need the creation of national

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7 The new EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) establishes the creation of such supranational authority.
agencies to scrutinize both the use of surveillance-oriented technologies and the compliance with legal regulations” [Recommendation, Austrian Citizen Summit].

Citizens demanded more transparency about the actors involved in security operations, their role and level of accountability. “Organizations, both private and governmental, which collect data, must be open about [data management]. They should state what kind of data they collect and why. Several groups made a concrete suggestion to create a “My page”, where one can see a list of everyone who have stored your personal data, and a log of when it is used. One should also be able to block certain actors from using your personal data” [Norwegian Country report, p. 27].

Information campaigns were seen as a potential solution to generalised lack of knowledge of data protection legislation and as a way to enhance the overall security accountability chain. Such action would help ensure that clear responsibilities could be identified when things go wrong: “Transparency here is absolutely essential: people want to know what data are being collected, who is responsible for them and what purposes they are intended for” [Swiss National Report, p. 36]. The need to know who is behind security operations to foster accountability was widely recognised: “We need a law of transparency, as much as we have a law on data protection” [Spanish National Report, p. 43]. Furthermore, surveillance technologies should only be used when it is necessary: “evidence is needed before initiating surveillance and greater transparency from companies and authorities on what the surveillance is used for” [Recommendation, Danish Citizen Summit].

Public-private separation

Transparency of operations and international regulations were deemed crucial but not
sufficient requirements. The involvement of private actors in security operations and in the management and use of SOSTs generated particular anxiety (Zedner, 2006). Participants did not trust for-profit organisations and were not happy to assign to them the responsibility to enact security measures and/or operate security technologies: “citizens were also concerned about the actors which use surveillance-oriented security technologies, and many tables mentioned the need for oversight bodies to ‘watch the watchers’. They suggested the establishment of such bodies on an international or European level [Norwegian National Report, p. 26]. Only public bodies that are independent from political control were considered suitable to perform an oversight role: “monitoring and protection of personal data must be conducted by public bodies. Outsourcing such services to the private sector should never be an option [Postcard, Spanish Citizen Summit].

People expressed additional concerns related to the use of data gathered by SOSTs for marketing purposes or about the release of people’s data to security agencies. The outsourcing of the security function to private firms was considered especially problematic: “No security services should be outsourced to private companies!” [Postcard, UK Citizen Summit]. In circumstances where the involvement of private actors is absolutely necessary, stricter requirements were considered necessary to ensure transparency and accountability.

Data protection criteria

Although participants recognized that informing citizens about the installation and operation of SOSTs might be challenging in the security domain, characterised by high

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8 Effectively, European and National security agencies have to comply with the new European Directive on Data Protection (2016).
The level of secrecy, they considered necessary to inform the public about how security agencies operate and respect people’s rights. Information on how data protection rights, for instance, are safeguarded during police investigation can help diminish citizens’ concerns about the data privacy. The purpose and conditions under which people’s data were processed in security investigations represented a very relevant and controversial theme. Blanket surveillance was especially criticised not only for its impact on privacy and human rights, but also for its effectiveness.

Notice and consent
A major source of concern for all participants was the fact of not being aware of being a subject of surveillance. They consider unacceptable that, because of new digital means, people can be constantly monitored without their knowledge. “Conditions of data gathering must be defined: who, where, when, for what purposes can record data; how long and how they can store those data; who and under what conditions can access those data. Everybody should be enabled to access their own personal data recorded by these technologies. The population must be informed about all these—in a passive form, via leaflets, TV ads, etc., and in active forms” [Postcard, Hungarian Citizen Summit].

Citizens should be notified if they have been part of an investigation and opt-in consent forms should be used whenever possible. When opt-in frameworks are not viable, notification about when, and for what purpose, surveillance is operated needs to be given to help people become aware of these practices. “Active information obligation for data collectors, public and private, means the citizen is not required to make a demand but rather that who collects data should be obliged to inform the concerned person; what is stored, how long and why at all! E.g. also in form of a yearly report of the data collecting
entity, where it is publicly declared for which purpose and how much data is collected” [Recommendation, German Citizen Summit].

Right to access, modify and delete data

When the retrieval of personal data is required for security reasons, citizens considered they should be notified and have the right to access, modify, or have their data removed after the investigation ends. “Uncertainty lies in the fact that we are ignorant of which data are collected, who gathers them and how they are managed. The solution is a specific legislation on new technologies and surveillance. The establishment of a body controlling the use of the data and its processing and mechanisms that enable us to decide whether we want them to go public” [Recommendation, Spanish Citizen Summit]. “The problem I have with CCTV and DPI is who has access to all my information, where is it stored and how long for? Who accounts for it all?” [Postcard, UK Citizen Summit].

Purpose limitation

SOSTs should not be used for operating mass government surveillance, but only for targeting clearly defined threats and within the scope of specific investigations. “Participants argued towards more control of surveillance activities and the demand for justified reasons for surveillance in order to target real suspects and criminals instead of the general public” [Austria National Report, p.33]. Mass surveillance was considered detrimental as it undermines citizens’ perceived safety and their trust in security operators. “By vast dragnet surveillance activities of governmental institutions, the trust in the state would get undermined because citizens perceive themselves subjected to a
blanket suspicion. Broad surveillance measures involving large parts of the population are seen as disproportionate function or mission creep” [German National Report, p.31].

Data collection limitation

Concerns were expressed on the type of data gathered. Some types of data, such as those related to location or bodily appearance, were considered less sensitive than others, such as those related to personal communication. Similarly, information retrieved in public spaces, such as in public buildings or on the street, was considered less sensitive than the one gathered in private spaces, such as homes. In this respect, it is interesting to notice that the Internet tend to be seen as a private space rather than as a public space. Whenever possible, it was argued, security actions should target the least sensitive data in the least sensitive spaces, as this comment reveals: “[a]t some tables participants expressed that they found location as a less sensitive type of data than for example the content of their communication, which can be accessed through deep packet inspection” [Norway National Report p. 28]. Thus, the implementation of basic data management norms, such as EU data protection principles, was recognised by citizens as an important criterium determining the acceptability of SOSTs. “We need clear rules concerning the limits on use and collection of personal data by technological means. In particular, it is necessary to establish rules concerning who may access personal data, for how long, under what conditions and for what purposes” [Recommendation, Italian Citizen Summit].

Technology deployment criteria

Concerns about the ways in which technologies are designed and deployed were also addressed by citizens. The cost of developing and implementing new surveillance devices
was a highly relevant issue, which was discussed in conjunction with themes related to alternative security measures and solutions to complement or improve SOSTs, such as the adoption of privacy-by-design principles in the design phase.

**Cost-effectiveness**

Since tax payers’ money is involved in the acquisition and deployment of SOSTs, it is not surprising that participants wanted to receive more information about the appropriateness, costs and impact of SOSTs: “I have no problems with smart CCTV but the use of it, the running costs, the legitimacy and the effectiveness of it needs to be carefully monitored. And the watchers made accountable” [Postcard, UK Citizen Summit]. As most of these technologies are developed, implemented and operated by public institutions, the presentation of exhaustive cost-benefit analyses was considered absolutely necessary—“Is this cost effective? Very concerned about the future” (UK postcard). Others pointed out that SOSTs need to be supervised and operated by qualified staff—“maintaining the human factor, that is to say, not replacing humans for robots in processes and their uses” (Spanish recommendation).

**Privacy-by-Design**

The idea of privacy-by-design (Cavoukian, 2011) was mentioned as a possible solution to design privacy-preserving SOSTs and, thus, protect citizens’ privacy: “the concept of "privacy by design" was mentioned, hoping that future technology developers would use their knowledge to increase privacy, instead of increasing surveillance” [Norway National Report, p. 23]. This idea was captured also in Italy: “... citizens’ request for
being in control of the personal data processed by SOSTs seems to support the idea of privacy by design currently proposed in policy circles [Italian National Report, p. 41].

*Alternative security approaches*

In designing new security solutions, social, cultural and economic causes of crime and terrorism should never be forgotten (UN, 2007), and humans should be considered part of the solutions, not only part of the problem—in terms of, for example, criminals or suspects. Participants also suggested that SOSTs should be used to support, not to replace, the work of human operators. SOSTs were more favourably seen as part of broader strategies able to tackle the social and economic causes of crime in a non-repressive way. Such strategies should adopt approaches which tackle social inequalities: “a greater investment against poverty and inequality must be made. No doubt this would prevent a lot of insecurity problems” [Postcard, Spanish Citizen Summit].

The best scenario would be to see technology and social action to work in combination and witness the creation of an efficient, crime-preventing security strategy that respects human rights and work to eradicate the causes of crime in collaboration with local communities. “*When talking about alternatives, we have to keep in mind the characteristics of modern urban life, which can be characterized with alienation that can result in a decrease in social morals. At the same time, we can still observe the power of local communities in this area in smaller towns and villages*” [Hungary National Report, p. 36]. “[We need] a clear estimation of the actual need to use these technologies and a realistic evaluation of the threat situation and of the real risks, and appropriately discreet use of security technologies. Alternatives should be sought and in the security sector
greater value should be placed on the human factor, i.e. investigating authorities, than on
the technologies” [Recommendation, Swiss Citizen Summit].

Alternative security approaches, such as those that reduce social inequalities and
limit the surveillance of citizens and their personal data, were also mentioned.
Suggestions included: “i) addressing societal injustice and unease, taking care of the
environment, investing in harmonious cohabitation, rather than targeting criminals; ii)
protecting critical infrastructure at the source, addressing culturally-sensitive issues, such
as tax evasion; iii) investing in neighbourhood patrols, or CCTV cameras”
[Recommendation, Italian Citizen Summit].

Finally, a summary of all criteria identified discussed in previous sections is reported in
table two.

Table 2. SOSTs are more acceptable if...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NORMATIVE CRITERIA</th>
<th>... operated within international or European regulatory framework and under the control of sovra-national regulatory bodies.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. Transparency and accountability</td>
<td>... operated in a context where transparency about actors involved in security operations and accountability of security operators is guaranteed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Public-private separation</td>
<td>... operated only by public authorities and only for public benefits. The participation of private actors in security operations, such as when security agencies acquire banking data or Facebook data or when security functions are outsourced to private operators, therefore, must be avoided or strictly regulated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Notice and consent</td>
<td>... citizens are informed and their use can be regulated through an opt-in approach. Whenever possible, their operation needs to be communicated to targeted individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Right to access, modify and delete data</td>
<td>... they allow monitored individuals to access, modify and remove their own data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Purpose limitation</td>
<td>... they do not pursue a blanket surveillance approach. After reasonable evidence is gathered, they should only address specific targets, at specific times, in specific spaces and for specific purposes. Whilst their purposes may change, these changes need to be explicitly discussed and publicly approved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Collection limitation … they target less sensitive data and space, whenever possible, according to criteria and purposes known by the public.

8. Cost-effectiveness … their benefits largely outweigh their costs, especially in comparison to other non-technological, less intrusive, alternatives.


10. Non-technological alternatives and security measures not based on surveillance … they work and operate in combination with non-technological measures and social strategies addressing the social and economic causes of insecurity. SOSTs should complement—never substitute—human action and judgement.

5. Conclusion

Increasing reliance on security policies that use SOSTs has sparked lively debate about their acceptance. As a result of the increasing surveillance and of the progressive restriction of civil rights triggered by pre-emptive security polices based on SOSTs, several scholars have warned about the implications for democracy and for personal privacy. Surprisingly, however, comparatively few studies in the field of public engagement with science have explored how European citizens assess these technologies. An uncritical adoption of the trade-off between privacy and security by these studies, moreover, has prevented the exploration of alternative frames of analysis, forcing participants in these studies to think how much privacy were they willing to give away in exchange for more security. As a result, scholarly studies have been unable so far to address an emerging security paradox: people keep asking for security improvements whilst they consider their life and their country safe. Mostly static views of citizens’ opinions, these studies shed little light on the reasons and criteria underlying this security paradox.

Relying on revised version of the citizen summit method, this study gathered ten criteria generally adopted by the participants to the summits in 9 European countries to assess the acceptability of some current security technologies, such as smart CCTV, smart phone geolocalization and deep-packet inspection. Using thematic data analysis, the
paper discovered different national interpretations of the concepts of privacy and security but detected the emergence of three shared groups of criteria related to: a) the normative and legal context in which SOSTs operate; b) the protection of the data that SOSTs gather and process; c) the design and deployment of SOSTs.

A first key finding is that some of the criteria citizens use to assess the acceptability of SOSTs converge with the principles and criteria currently adopted by national and European security policies. Criterion one, on international legal framework, for instance, is consistent with the most recent Regulation (EU) 2016/679, which has established an international legal framework capable of overcoming the boundaries between national Data Protection regulations (Commission, 2016b). Criterion four and five, on data access, protection management and control, are also reflected in more recent Directive (EU) 2016/680, which deals directly with data protection rules for security operators. Similarly, Europol’s Data Protection framework compels the agency to comply with data protection principles and to inform affected citizens about the collection and use of their data (Drewer, 2012). Endorsing current implementation of the “right to be forgotten”, the participants stressed the importance of removing and modifying the data gathered by security agencies once the investigation requiring its collection had ended.

Criterion six and seven, on nature and purpose of surveillance and data retrieved, are also consistent with a recent sentence of the European Court of Human Rights and European Court of Justice, which has ruled against mass surveillance in both the Russian and British contexts respectively (Moody, 2015; BBC, 2016). Yet, citizens have also suggested that they should always be notified when under surveillance, even if this might jeopardize security operations. Finally, criterion nine on privacy by design is also in line
with recent EU efforts to introduce Privacy-by-Design principles (Danezis et al., 2014) in the General Data Protection Regulation (Commission, 2016a).

However, some of the findings of this paper suggest that there exist areas where citizens are not satisfied with current security policies and adopt (and suggest) different criteria of implementation and alternative measures. First of all, criterion two on transparency highlights that citizens still perceive a lack of transparency about operation modes, operators, rules, domains and purposes of public security agencies and private security actors. Second, criterion eight on cost-effectiveness reveal that citizens consider that current SOSTs may not be as cost-effective and that they should complement, rather than replace, human intervention. Furthermore, criterion three on public-private separation reveals a mounting anxiety about the implication of private actors in security activities, which has not been sufficiently addressed by current security practices. Last but not least, criterion ten on the implementation of alternative, non-technological security measures, uncovers a deep dissatisfaction with current security policies and technologies not only because these are considered unfit to address the roots and causes of criminal actions but also because they are not operated in combination with non-technological security measures. As a result of these outcomes, the security paradox becomes more comprehensible: participants are not asking for an increased implementation of existing security measures but, rather, for a different implementation of existing and alternative security policies.

This study has important limitations, too. The results of the citizen summits do not proceed from a statistically representative sample of the population, and have been organised around three specific security technologies. Whilst the results cannot be immediately generalised to the countries and to other technologies contributes, many of
the criteria gathered, however, are sufficiently broad to be tested on different samples, countries and technologies. Despite these limitations, our study makes an important contribution to shed light on citizens’ perceptions of SOSTs and confirms the important role that participative exercises can play in increasing our understanding of how people frame complex policy issues. Though more research is needed, our findings suggest that citizens’ views can effectively help not only to understand the impact of security technologies but also to design socially informed security policies which respect civil liberties without losing their required effectiveness.
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