UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE ACTION IN REPRESSIVE CONTEXTS : THE ROLE OF PERCEIVED RISK IN SHAPING COLLECTIVE ACTION INTENTIONS

Arin H. Ayanian

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
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University of St Andrews



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Պապ, I dedicate this thesis to your beautiful soul.

Understanding collective action in repressive contexts: the role of perceived risks in shaping collective action intentions

Abstract

The aim of the present research is to advance a general predictive model of the social psychological processes underlying collective action in contexts where collective action is met with significant repression by the authorities. The model integrates the recent advancements in the collective action literature and examines the unique predictive role of anger and fear (emotional pathway), political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies (instrumental pathway), politicised identification (identity pathway) as well as moral obligation, over and above past participation. Moreover, the research investigates how perceived risk, due to government sanctions, shapes these antecedents and the willingness to engage in collective action. Five survey studies (Studies 1 to 5) test this model in various repressive contexts (i.e., Egypt, Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey). In addition, one experimental study (Study 6) examines the causal relation between perceived risk and (a) the antecedents of collective action and (b) the action intentions in a British sample. The results confirm the intensifying role of perceived risk, whereby it indirectly spurs further resistance through shaping the antecedents of collective action. The results also suggest that protesters are intrinsically motivated to engage in collective action when placed under risk. Specifically, although not motivated by political efficacy, protesters are strategic as they are motivated by the likelihood to consolidate the identity of their protest movement and the likelihood of their own participation to incrementally contribute to achieving the desired goals. Moreover, they are emotional, politicised and dutiful as their outrage towards how the authorities treat the protesters, their identification with their protest movement, as well as their sense of moral responsibility encourage them to take action despite the risks.

Thesis Summary

This thesis examines the social psychological processes motivating individuals to engage in collective action in repressive contexts where participating in such actions carries with it substantial risks to protesters' wellbeing. It also investigates the idea that perceived risks due to government sanctions can galvanise action through shaping the antecedents of collective action.

In Study 1, I investigate the idea that perceived risks due to government sanctions can spur action through fuelling anger, shaping political and identity consolidation efficacies, and increasing identification with the movement. I also argue that anger, efficacy beliefs and identification motivate action intentions directly and indirectly through reducing the personal importance activists attach to these risks. I examine my hypotheses within a sample of Egyptian activists from two protest movements who protested against Morsi's government and the military interventions, respectively, during the 2013 anti-Coup uprising. In line with the hypotheses, the perceived likelihood of risks was positively associated with anger and identity consolidation efficacy, and positively predicted action intentions indirectly through these variables. Perceived likelihood of risks was also associated with increased political efficacy, but only among anti-military protesters. Anger and political efficacy predicted action intentions directly and indirectly through reduced risk importance. Results also highlighted differential significance of emotional and instrumental motives for the two protest movements.

In studies 2-5, based on the preliminary evidence from Study 1, I test an integrative model of the motivators of collective action in four contexts where collective action is met with substantial repression by the state, specifically Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. I examine the roles of emotions (i.e., anger and fear), instrumental beliefs (i.e., political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, and participative efficacy), politicised identification, and moral obligation as predictors of willingness to engage in collective action, over and above past participation. To further examine the idea that risks imposed by the authorities can intensify resistance and spur further action, I consider perceived likelihood of being subject to risks due to state repression as a distal predictor. A meta-analytic integration of the findings from the four contexts highlights the intensifying role of perception of risks through its positive prediction of outrage, identity consolidation efficacy, politicised identification, and moral obligation which in

their turn positively predicted willingness to engage in collective action. Moreover, outrage, participative efficacy, and politicised identification positively predicted moral obligation, and had an indirect path to collective action through moral obligation. Fear and political efficacy neither predicted moral obligation nor action intentions.

In Study 6, I tackle the limitation of cross-sectional data of the past five studies which do not allow to infer any causal relations. Specifically, I examine how the manipulation of the perceived risk of protesting impacts the social psychological antecedents of collective action (i.e., outrage and fear, political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, participative efficacy, politicised identification, and moral obligation), as well as willingness to engage in future collective action. Moreover, I target a sample of non-activist to examine whether the results of the previous studies generalise to samples with limited activism and politicisation level. I focus on the protests organised against extreme energy extraction processes (e.g., fracking) taking place in United Kingdom. Results show that high levels of perception of risk increase participants' outrage. There were no other significant effects for perception of risk on any of the remaining variables. Furthermore, given the low politicisation of such a sample, I follow the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action, and examine the role of perceived illegitimacy of the fracking process in shaping the effects of perceived risk. The interaction between risk manipulation and perceived illegitimacy of fracking positively predicted outrage, and action intention directly and indirectly. The indirect link was through the path from outrage to politicised identification to moral obligation to collective action.

The present thesis significantly contributes to the current literature of collective action. It complements the present social psychological literature on collective action by integrating the recent advancements in one predictive model, and testing this model in contexts where activists face considerable risks. Moreover, it is an inter-disciplinary work as it integrates literature from political science and sociology on protest movement and revolutions, and from social psychology on collective action to advance the hypothesised model. The results of the present research confirm the motivating role authority sanctions can have on spurring further resistance through shaping the antecedents of collective action. Furthermore, the results also support the delineation of protesters as emotional, strategic, politicised, and dutiful as they are motivated to engage in collective action under risk to the extent to which they are outraged toward authorities' repression, believe that the protests will consolidate the identity of the protest

movement and their own contribution will help the protest movement to achieve its goals, identify with the protest movement, and feel an obligation to take action.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

> "*I do share part of my life, part of my thinking, part of my ideology with the people around me… I wanted to redress the injustice that was inflicted on us in this country… We were all in this together… getting beaten in the same way… it was likely for any of us to lose his life for the sake of my goal, which is also his goal and all the protesters' goal. It kind of gives that sense of obligation. I didn't mind then to sacrifice my life for the sake of this goal, and I knew then that all the people around me could have sacrificed their lives for the sake of my goals, which are also their goals. It's kind of a shared thing between us…. I had to feel that obligation..."*
>
> AAS, an Egyptian activist (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016)

The 1989 Monday demonstrations in East Germany and the massacres in Tiananmen Square and, more recently, the protests in Russia, Ukraine, and the Arab World are just a few examples of activists engaging in collective action under considerable personal risk, including arrest, injury, or even death. An individual is considered to engage in "collective action any time that she or he is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990, p. 995). From a theoretical perspective of protesters as rational actors who maximise utility (e.g., Oberschall, 1973), such behaviour may seem paradoxical as protesters are not only renouncing "free-riding" (Olson, 1968) but they are undertaking considerable personal risks though the outcomes of the collective action are unsure (see Pearlman, 2013). What motivates people to participate in collective action under such conditions, and what are the psychological correlates of expectations of such risks?

Civil resistance[1], protest movements, and revolutions in oppressive contexts attracted sustained attention from political scientists and sociologists who have

[1] Civil resistance is defined as "a form of political conflict in which ordinary people choose to stand up to oppressive structures—be it occupation, colonialism, or unjust practices of government—with the use of various tactics of nonviolent action such as strikes, boycotts, protests, and civil disobedience" (Bartkowski, 2013, p. 4).

examined the macro- and meso-level factors inciting or deterring resistance (Schock, 2015a, 2015b, 2013). Social psychology scholars, however, examined the role of social psychological factors underlying collective action in relatively liberal and democratic societies, where engagement in activism is rather safe (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Tausch & Becker, 2013). Hence, it is still unclear whether the social psychological variables have similar predictive roles in repressive contexts where activists face substantial risks, and how the subjective perception of risk impacts these variables as well as the willingness to engage in collective action.

The present thesis aims to address this shortcoming by examining collective action in contexts where recent uprisings occurred and where the authorities have been engaged in longstanding repression of any kind of resistance. I integrate the social psychological literature on the role of group-based emotions, efficacy concerns, identification, and moral obligation with insights from the political science and sociology literatures on civil resistance and protest movements in repressive contexts to advance an integrative predictive model of collective action under risk.

Overview of the Collective Action Literature

Why are people motivated to take part in collective action? Collective action scholars have examined this question for decades. Gustave LeBon's (1960 [1895]) pathologising description of the collective behaviour exemplified most of the earlier explanations of crowd behaviour, revolutionary processes, collective action, and social movements. LeBon (1895) considered the crowd as characterised by the irrationality and the unconscious impulses of the participants. He explained the behaviour of the crowd through the sense of anonymity, which liberates these impulses, and contagion, which allows the spread of, mostly irrational, emotions and behaviour.

With time, however, scholars distanced themselves from the irrational protester explanations of crowd behaviour (see Reicher, 1996) and suggested three main motivators. People are motivated to participate in collective action when they consider their in-group suffering from illegitimately-imposed grievances and feel outraged toward these grievances or the responsible agents, have the necessary resources to challenge and address these grievances and perceive the likelihood of achieving change as high, and identify with their fellow in-group members who share the same grievances. These three motivations stem from different theoretical approaches.

Grievances

The early theories of collective action emphasised the role of grievances in mobilising individuals (Klandermans, 1997). Grievances refer to individuals' emotional and cognitive responses to perceived disadvantages (e.g., discrimination or authorities' response to current social or political issues; Klandermans, 1997). One of the prominent theories of grievances is the relative deprivation theory which guided most of the early research on social movement participation (Folger, 1986). According to the relative deprivation theory, individuals perceive they are suffering from deprivation whenever they believe their situation is less than what they deserve, and unjustly so (Festinger, 1954; Folger, 1986; Runciman, 1966). In a recent meta-analysis, Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, and Bialosiewicz (2012) concluded that the personal perception of deprivation rather than actual or real adversity motivates engagement in collective action. In fact, the effects associated with perceived deprivation are reliably larger compared to the objective deprivation effects. Furthermore, their results confirmed the significance of injustice-related affective responses (e.g., anger and resentment) in improving the prediction of collective action.

Scholars differentiate between two types of grievances. When a grievance concerns one's personal situation, the relative deprivation is referred to as egoistic deprivation, and when it concerns a group one belongs to, it is referred to as fraternalistic deprivation (Runciman, 1966). Group level deprivation is considered as a stronger predictor of collective action participation in comparison with individual level grievances (Runciman, 1966; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). The relative importance of group level deprivation can be explained through the social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

Social identity theory considers the shared collective identity as the most important psychological basis for collective action (Turner, 1982). Collective identity refers to the shared cognitions (e.g., norms, beliefs, values) of a social group. Social identity is "that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 251). An individual's identification with a collective identity is the link between the social and collective identities.

Based on the social identity theory, the self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) further asserts that categorising the self as a group member entails perceiving oneself according to one's similarity to the defining characteristics of a group, rather than according to one's personal characteristics (Abrams & Hogg, 2001; Hogg & Abrams, 2006). Prototypes refer to the cognitive representations of these defining features of the social categories. These prototypes accentuate the in-group similarities and the inter-group differences. Depersonalisation refers to the process of individuals perceiving themselves and their surrounding social groups in terms of these prototypes rather than personal characteristics. The self-categorisation theory considers depersonalisation as the core process allowing the group processes of collective behaviour.

According to the social identity theory, once individuals categorise themselves as group members, and perceive their group as being treated unfairly (e.g., discriminated against or repressed), they would be more likely to take action on behalf of the group, since the group is part of the self, and individuals tend to prefer to be members of esteemed social groups. Individuals who are part of disadvantaged groups which decide to collectively address the shared disadvantage, rather than individually, can chose from an array of potential identity management strategies (e.g., redefining or changing the attribute upon which the comparison is being made or assimilating with a different group). Individuals engage in collective action only if a combination of factors are present. To be specific, when people perceive the boundaries between the groups as impermeable (e.g., individuals are incapable of individually advancing through the different social groups) (Ellemers, 1993; Wright, et al., 1990), the intergroup relations as insecure (i.e., individuals perceive their disadvantaged status as illegitimate and unstable), and begin envisioning potential routes to challenge their disadvantage, they initiate collective action (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993).

Foster and Matheson (1995, 1999) proposed that double relative deprivation defined as perception of both egoistic and fraternalistic deprivation (Runciman, 1966) is a strong predictor of collective action. They argued that once the discrepancy between the experiences of personal and social selves are minimal whereby individuals perceive a disadvantage as affecting them as individuals but also shared with fellow members of a particular social group (e.g., the difference between social and personal discrimination

is low), the motivation to engage in collective action is higher. In such circumstances, the self and group interests are perceived to be the same. Specifically, Foster and Matheson (1999) examined the relative significance of egoistic, fraternal, and double deprivations in predicting collective action against discrimination based on gender among female students in Carleton University, Canada. Their results affirmed double relative deprivation to be a significant predictor of collective action above and beyond fraternal and egoistic deprivation.

Scholars nowadays consider the emotional responses to perceived grievances as the key motivators for action (Smith & Ortiz, 2002). They emphasise appraisals and emotions based on individuals' social identities to explain behavioural tendencies (Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 2006; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). The underlying theory is the intergroup emotion theory (Devos, Silver, & Mackie, 2002; Frijda, Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Lazarus, 1991; Smith 1993) that is based on the appraisal theories of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 1993; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985) and the self-categorisation theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, et al., 1987). As explained above, according to self-categorisation theory once individuals' social identity is salient, they think of themselves as in-group members and emphasise the similarities between themselves and fellow in-groupers. Hence, group members appraise or evaluate the pressing situations according to the consequences they have for the in-group rather than themselves. Moreover, group members perceive the most important issues threatening their in-group's interests or goals to be shared among fellow members. Following the appraisal theories of emotions, these appraisals will give rise to emotions which are also felt at the in-group level; individuals feel the emotions not because they are personally affected by a situation but because their in-group is (Smith, 1993). These group emotions in their turn determine individuals' tendencies to take action.

Recent work on collective action considers group-based anger and outrage toward perceived disadvantage as the central protest emotions (Leach, et al., 2006; Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012; Thomas & McGarty, 2009; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004). Anger and outrage are approach emotions (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003) activated through the Behavioural Activation System (BAS; Fowles, 1980, 1988; Harmon-Jones

& Sigelman, 2001). They have the adaptive function of attacking a negative or threatening stimulus with the attempt to hurt or remove the stimulus (Frijda et al., 1989; Roseman et al., 1994), and are characterised by appraisals of unfairness and blaming the opponent, as well as confrontational behaviours (Brehm, 1999; Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989; Fischer & Roseman, 2007; Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Consequently, once individuals appraise their in-group's disadvantage as unjust or unfair, anger or outrage towards their disadvantage is expected to energise their motivation to challenge the injustice and fight back (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). For instance, Mackie et al. (2000) provided empirical evidence for the above premise. Using correlational and experimental research designs, the authors showed that anger towards the out-group is shared among the in-group members and motivates action against the out-group especially when the in-group is perceived to be strong. Leach et al. (2006) examined the role of anger in motivating a sample of Australian citizens, a relatively advantaged group, to engage in political action against the government's attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the Australian Aborigines, a relatively disadvantaged group. Their results confirmed the significant role of group-based anger about perceived grievances in motivating action and its mediating effect in the relation between relative deprivation and action intentions.

Research has also confirmed the role of moral outrage, another injustice related emotion, in motivating individuals to take part in collective action (Thomas et al., 2012). For example, Thomas and McGarty (2009) examined the role of norms of moral outrage and political efficacy in predicting collective action. They particularly examined collective action directed towards reducing diseases and poverty in poor countries among a sample of university students in Australia. Their results confirmed their hypothesis of norms of moral outrage to increase action intentions.

Instrumental Factors

In the 1970s scholars challenged the relative deprivation theory and the research stemming from it (Calhoun, 1970; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Snyder & Tilly, 1972; Tilly, 1977). They considered perceptions of disadvantage as an insufficient condition for resistance movements to develop, mobilise people, and dissent to occur, and highlighted the inconsistent results of the studies examining relative deprivation theory (for reviews, Brush, 1996; Gurney & Tierney, 1982; McPhail, 1971;

Walker & Smith, 2002). For instance, Thompson (1989) found no significant relation between deprivation and collective violence within the Northern Ireland context between 1922 and 1985. Snyder and Tilly (1972) also criticised the over reliance on disadvantage as an explanation and motivator for collective violence. Their time-series analysis of collective violence in France during a 30-year period (1830 – 1860) did not show any significant support for the role of disadvantage. Moreover, Calhoun (1970) critiqued the methodology followed by relative deprivation theorists on the promise that they over rely on divergent and even debatable operational definitions of disadvantage and legitimacy, and disregard motivational factors which might be of greater value for resistance movement and dissent such as "consciousness" or "identity". In similar lines, Gurney and Tierney (1982) commented on how relative deprivation theory does not specify the processes underlying the transformation of individual deprivation to collective action intentions or actual behaviour. These scholars called for the need to consider other factors to explain dissent.

The resource mobilisation theory was developed in an attempt to address these issues and shortcomings, and complement the relative deprivation theory. This line of research has emphasised the strategic and instrumental aspect of collective action, the rationality of the protesters, and the role of institutions, organisations, and political opportunities (Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Early theories considered the availability of resources to be an important factor for movements to organise and plan their resistance (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1977). These resources include, but are not limited to the strength of social ties among members and relationships with third parties (e.g., other social or political movements, international parties), and the effectiveness of political and social institutions in promoting the desired change (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Moreover, these theories mainly followed the rational decision making models (Feather, 1982) according to which individuals weigh the costs and benefits of a situation and decide to engage in the most beneficial behaviour for themselves.

Klandermans (1984, 1997) integrated the value-expectancy theory (Feather & Newton, 1982) with the collective action theory (Olson, 1968; Oberschall, 1973) to advise a more comprehensive model of why individuals may decide to take part in collective action. Following the value-expectancy theory, individuals examine the value

of the outcomes and the perceived likelihood of achieving these outcomes in order to decide whether to engage in a behaviour. According to the collective action theory (Olson, 1968; Oberschall, 1973), individuals are motivated to participate in collective action for two main benefits; collective and selective. Collective benefits refer to the goals a protest movement would achieve through collective effort. Any individual in the society can benefit from these achievements regardless whether they contributed to the movement. The selective incentives, social and non-social, however, are specific to individuals who take part in the process. The social incentives refer to the responses or evaluations of significant others to individuals' participation, and the non-social incentives refer to the costs associated with participation (e.g., time, physical risks). In particular, individuals assess the perceived likelihood of occurrence and the subjective importance or utility of the costs and benefits; the higher the costs of participation relative to its benefits, the lower individuals' motivation to engage in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994). Simon et al. (1998) examined the role of the costs-benefits calculations (social, reward, and collective motives) and collective identification in a dual pathway model. They showed that two independent paths predict willingness to engage in collective action; cost-benefit calculations and collective identification. Specifically, they confirmed the predictive role of cost-benefit calculations and collective identification as an activist within the Gay Panthers' movement (i.e., an elder rights group) in Germany. They also confirmed the causal effect of collective identification as an activist within the gay rights movement in United States above and beyond the role of costs and benefits (social, reward, and collective motives) by manipulating the shared fate of gay people in the United States as being part of a discriminated minority.

Furthermore, as part of the instrumental factors, scholars highlight the role of likelihood of achieving goals, referred to as efficacy, in motivating people to take action. Azzi (1998) proposed three different types of efficacy. The first type of efficacy is collective efficacy which refers to the belief that the group has the resources to face the out-group, fellow in-group members will also take part in the collective action, and the collective action can eventually achieve the desired goals. The second is the individual self-efficacy which refers to belief that the individual is capable of achieving the desired goals independently from his/her group. Azzi (1998) considered this efficacy

as a determinant of whether an individual will stay in the group or decide to challenge the disadvantage all alone or even simply exit the in-group. The third is the participatory self-efficacy which refers to an individual's belief that his/her participation will contribute to the in-group's efforts to achieve the desired goals. Azzi (1998) considered participatory and collective efficacies as necessary conditions for an individual's participation in collective action. He further argued that beliefs in participatory efficacy are particularly crucial since without these beliefs individuals might be prone to free-ride, whereby they would prefer not to participate in collective action but simply enjoy the benefits.

Similar to Azzi (1998), Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, and Mielke (1999) highlighted the role of group efficacy, defined as "people's collective shared belief of being able to solve their group-related problems by unified effort" (p. 232), as an important motivation for individuals to participate in collective action (Klandermans, 1997). The concept of group efficacy is based on Bandura's (1995; 1997) collective efficacy which he defined as "a group's shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainments" (p. 477). Bandura (2000) highlighted the role of collective efficacy in encouraging a commitment or an obligation towards achieving the goals, as well as a resilience to hardship. Research heavily documented the significance of collective efficacy in positively predicting engagement in collective action (Brunsting & Postmes, 2002; Berman & Wittig, 2004; Hornsey, Blackwood, Louis, Fielding, Mavor, Morton, et al et al. 2006; van Zomeren et al. 2008). For instance, van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, and Leach (2004) confirmed the role of political efficacy in predicting collective action against the university decision to increase tuition fees, and number of lab testing hours within different student samples in Netherlands.

Hornsey et al. (2006), however, noted the weak significance of collective efficacy that some researchers find in their studies, and suggested that this weak significance can be partially due to the narrow operational definition of collective efficacy that researchers usually adopt where they concentrate on challenging the group's particular political or social grievance. Consequently, they called for the need to differentiate between different types of efficacy beliefs and delineate more group-specific goals, such as publicly expressing one's views, building a protest movement,

and forming solidarity among the members of the movement. They explored the relative importance of these different efficacy concerns in the context of protests against the 2001 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Australia. Their analyses confirmed the significance of the efficacy of the protests to build an "oppositional movement" in predicting action intentions for members of the movement (p. 1713), and the significance of the efficacies of expressing values and affecting the public for non-members. Importantly, the efficacy of influencing the government was not a significant predictor, neither for members nor non-members.

Along the same lines, Klein, Spears, and Reicher (2007) recently proposed social "identity performance", defined as group's strategic expression of their in-group's identity, as a possible goal for collective action (p. 29). They consider "identity performance" to realise two functions. Firstly, the expression of one's in-group's identity can help the group consolidate its identity, which refers to the group's attempt to "affirm, confirm or strengthen" its identity in the face of an out-group (p. 28). Secondly, the identity expression can mobilise the group's identity, which encourages group members to behave in a way that would ameliorate their in-group's position in the social hierarchy.

Based on the recent work by Hornsey et al. (2006) and Klein et al. (2007), Saab, Tausch, Spears and Cheung (2015) have distinguished two different types of collective efficacy: political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy. They define political efficacy as the protest movement's efficacy at confronting the out-group and addressing the group's grievances, and identity consolidation efficacy as the efficacy of the protest movement at "affirming, confirming, and strengthening the identity of the protesting group" (Saab et al., 2015, p. 3). Their results from a sample of protesters at the National Demonstration for Palestine in London (May 2008) and a sample of Hong Kong citizens surveyed about their willingness to participate at the June 4th vigil (i.e., the annual tribute for the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacres) confirmed the distinction between political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy. Their results also highlighted the significance of these two efficacies in directly predicting engagement in collective action, and playing a mediating role between politicised identity and engagement in collective action.

Van Zomeren, Saguy, & Schellhaas (2013) noted that the significance of efficacy beliefs in predicting collective action introduces a paradox. According to the rational actor theory, with heightened beliefs that the protest movement can achieve the group goals, individuals should prefer to not personally invest in the protests since they can benefit from the gains regardless of their participation. This is referred to as the free rider problem (Olson, 1968). Oslon (1977) suggested that different selective incentives might be needed to reduce the free rider problem. For instance, the social incentives are such selective motives that encourage individuals to override the free rider problem and engage in collective action since these benefits are particular to individuals who participate in the protests (Klandermans, 1984, 1997). In a similar attempt, Van Zomeren et al. (2013) suggested participative efficacy to find an instrumentally based explanation of why individuals do not free ride when their political efficacy is high. They defined participative efficacy as an individual's belief that his/her own efforts will have an "incremental contribution" to in-group's efforts in achieving the desired goals (Azzi, 1998; Klandermans, 1997; van Zomeren et al., 2013, p. 619). They considered participative efficacy as "a critical link, or conceptual bridge, between beliefs in the group's achievement of group goals through collective action (i.e., group efficacy beliefs) and beliefs about the efficacy of one's own action to achieve them (i.e., individual efficacy beliefs)" (p. 619). According to the authors, even if individuals have high political efficacy beliefs, they are less likely to free ride when they also have high participative efficacy (van Zomeren et al., 2013). They demonstrated both the construct validity of the concept as well as its ability to predict collective action independently of group and individual efficacies. Specifically, participative efficacy positively predicted nonviolent collective action intentions in two different contexts and population demographics: a sample of Dutch students within the context of potential educational cuts, and a sample of Israeli citizens within the context of protests against the expensive costs of living. Moreover, participative efficacy positively predicted violent collective action intentions within the Israeli sample. The authors also confirmed the significance of participative efficacy in positively predicting actual behaviour (i.e., sign a petition) in a sample of foreign students from the University of Groningen within the context of potential educational cuts.

I think the various forms of group efficacy covered above are specific forms of Bandura's (2000) social cognitive concept of human agency which is related to all human behaviour and refers to the belief that individuals have the ability to define their experiences and environments (Bandura, 2000; Gergen, 1999). Hence, these various forms of efficacy can empower individuals, and strengthen their perception of themselves and their group as "effective collective actors" which can lead to further engagement in collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2005, p. 36; Klandermans, 1997).

Although there is strong evidence for the predictive role of collective efficacies, several studies found weak to no significant positive relation between collective efficacy and motivation to engage in collective action (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Schofield & Pavelchak, 1989). The weak relation between collective efficacy and collective action intentions was prevalent when in-group identification was also considered as a predictor (Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, & Jorger, 2003). For instance, Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) showed that the group efficacy positively predicted British women's intentions to engage and actual participation in various women-related group behaviours. However, group efficacy was not a significant predictor of collective action intentions and behaviour for participants who strongly identified themselves as part of the feminist protest movement (activists). Along the same lines, Kelly and Kelly (1992) argued that for individuals who highly identify with their in-group, instrumental factors such as personal cost-benefit calculations do not play a significant role in motivating them to take action. Therefore, group efficacy's predictive role seems to be contingent on the levels of identification with the in-group, and social identification might be playing a more prominent role in motivating individuals to take part in collective action than instrumental factors. Hence, examining the role of identification in shaping people's motivation to engage in collective action is deemed necessary.

Social Identity

A complementary approach to the perceived grievances and instrumental factors views collective identity formation and individuals' subjective sense of belonging to this collective as cornerstone for mobilisation (Drury & Reicher, 2005; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998; Hogg, & Reid, 2006; Reicher, Spears, & Haslam,

2013; Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000 for a comprehensive review; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

The role of social identity in mobilising individuals is explained through the social identity approach (Reicher et al., 2013; Turner, et al., 1987). People who belong to an in-group that is perceived to face a disadvantage will aim to rectify their status as they prefer to be members of valued social groups. When people perceive their grievances as illegitimate and shared among fellow in-group members, the inter-group boundaries as impermeable, the social system as unstable, and the out-group as the agent to be blamed, their in-group identification is fortified which leads to a decision to address the disadvantage as a group and initiates collective action. Collective identification links the social and collective identities and is parallel to group commitment. It refers to individuals' sense of belonging to and the felt pride of being part of the in-group, as well as the values, norms and fate shared among the fellow members (Reicher et al., 2013; Turner, et al., 1987).

Scholars have also noted that although identification with a disadvantage group is a significant predictor of collective action, identification with a particular protest movement is even a stronger predictor (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998). Simon et al. (1998) suggested that being part of a protest movement "makes an activist identity available, which includes specific implications for activist behaviour. The willingness to perform such behaviour then increases with the extent to which the activist identity is embraced" (p.651). Simon and Klandermans (2001) further explained the relative importance of identifying with a protest movement in predicting action through the politicisation process. They argued that once individuals experience the grievances as shared among in-group members, struggle over power as self-conscious collectives against the common enemy responsible for their disadvantage, and attempt to involve the wider society in their struggle, the social identity is said to be politicised (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). They specifically defined politicised identity as "the extent that they (people) engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out" (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 319). Scholars consider this politicised identity an agentic identity since it is focused on the power to achieve change (Drury & Reicher, 1999), and an identity that can foster feelings of

inner obligation that can motivate further participation in collective action through the internalisation of the in-group's norms (a point I will elaborate below; Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

Research validated the unique contribution of politicised identification in predicting collective action in different social contexts. For instance, Stürmer, Simon, Loewy, and Jorger (2003) examined the role of collective identification in predicting movement participation. Specifically, they examined the Fat Acceptance Movement in the United States. Their results confirmed two independent routes to willingness to engage in collective action: identification with the movement and the cost-benefit calculation. Moreover, Stürmer and Simon (2004) provided a thorough review of the theories underlying politicised identification and summarised the empirical evidence for its role to predict collective action. More recently, in a meta-analysis, van Zomeren et al. (2008) confirmed the significant role of both collective identity and politicised identity in predicting collective action participation, and demonstrated that politicised identity is a stronger predictor of collective action.

Scholars have integrated the collective identification and instrumental motives to explain individuals' motivation to take part in collective action. For a long time, researchers examined the cost-benefit model only at the individual level, whereby individuals evaluate personal costs and benefits. Following the social identity approach, however, one can expect individuals to also consider costs and benefits associated with the group to which they belong to. In fact, according to the social identity approach, once the social identity is contextually salient, individuals' personal characteristics and interests become less prevalent and the interests of the in-group become priority (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, et al., 1987). This alignment leads individuals to guide their behaviours by the in-group's shared values, norms, and behaviours (Haslam et al., 1998; Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001). As such, in-group's interests play a more prominent role in their decisions. Louis, Taylor and Neil (2004), Louis, Taylor and Douglas (2005), and Blackwood and Louis (2012) have examined the role of social identification in shaping the relative importance of group versus individual costs and benefits. For instance, Louis et al. (2004) examined the rational decision making processes in the context of English-French relations in Quebec. Their results suggested that high in-group identifiers base their individual cost-

benefit analysis on the in-group's cost-benefit. Specifically, high identifiers match their individual and group level costs and benefits, and group level cost-benefit analyses mediated the relation between in-group identification and perceived individual benefits of collective action and action intentions. The authors conclude that in-group influence shapes decision-making related to group action. Additionally, Louis (2009) suggested that cost-benefit analyses can be both at individual and group levels depending on the saliency of social identities. Scholars have also noted that costs of collective action participation, including self-sacrifice, can be perceived as shared and part of the in-group values and norms (Louis, 2009; Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007). Consequently, activists perceive accepting these costs as a manifestation of their commitment to the in-group (Louis, et al., 2004). Recently, Blackwood and Louis (2012) examined the peace activists in Australia who supported collective action against the war in Iraq. Their results provided evidence of in-group identification (as well as political efficacy) predicting individual level cost-benefit analyses. Moreover, identification, efficacy and cost-benefit analyses predicted action intentions. They argued for an inter-connected relation between individual and group level processes underlying engagement in collective action.

Moral Obligation

More recently, scholars emphasised the role of ideology in motivating individuals to engage in collective action. As part of the ideology, scholars consider moral convictions, defined as the "strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral" (Skitka & Bauman, 2008, p. 31), as a significant drive for action since these convictions convey what one ought to do (White, 2009). Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2012) demonstrated in two studies the significant role of moral convictions in predicting collective action intentions and actual behaviour directly, as well as indirectly through politicised identification, anger, and political efficacy. Moreover, van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, and Bettache (2011) demonstrated the role of moral convictions in motivating the advantaged group to defy the perceived inequality and to act in solidarity with a disadvantaged group.

Stern, Dietz, Abel, Guagnano, and Kalof (1999) took a different approach in examining the role of threatened values. They generalised Schwartz's moral norm-activation theory (Stern et al., 1999) to explain why individuals advocate protest

movements. They proposed the value-belief norm theory, whereby whenever members feel that their group's values are threatened, and they, as individuals, have the ability to reinstate these values, they feel an obligation to support a movement. Similarly, one can argue that moral convictions (i.e., threatened values) should incite a sense of obligation which should be the most proximal predictor of action.

A sense of obligation or moral obligation is defined as an individual's feeling of an obligation to take action since it is the right thing to do or ought to be done (Bandura, 1986, 1991; Stürmer, et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012; Zimbardo, 2007). Although scholars defined this sense of obligation somewhat differently, focusing on more personal sense of obligation or obligation toward the in-group values and norms, they considered this sense of obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action (Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). A handful of studies have explored the significance of sense of obligation in motivating individuals to take part in collective action. For instance, Stern et al. (1999) tested their value-belief-norm theory with a national data of 420 American participants, and found a strong support for the role of moral obligation in predicting collective action. Moreover, Stürmer et al. (2003) showed inner obligation, defined as individuals' feeling of an obligation towards the in-group to engage in collective action, to mediate the effect of identification with social movements on willingness to engage in action. Moreover, in their meta-analysis, van Zomeren et al. (2008) commented that the unique role of politicised identification in predicting collective action can "be due to the possibility that identity can politicize, and, hence, people feel a stronger internal obligation to engage in collective action" (p. 526).

Furthermore, Vilas and Sabucedo (2012) also proposed the concept of moral obligation. They defined it as "a personal decision to participate in a specific collective action based on the belief that this is what should be done" (p.371), and considered it as an important predictor of collective action. Similar to Stürmer et al. (2003), they considered moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of action intentions, whereby politicised identification, anger, and political efficacy predict action intentions directly but also indirectly through moral obligation. They tested their model in a sample of Spanish students within the context of potential increases in University registration fees. Their results confirmed the predictive role of moral obligation over

and above the other antecedents of collective action. Moreover, politicised identification, anger and political efficacy indirectly predicted collective action intentions through moral obligation supporting the hypothesis of considering moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action. Moreover, according to these authors, once individuals feel a sense of obligation they engage in a certain action regardless of the potential costs associated with their action (see also Bandura, 1986, 1991; Zimbardo, 2007).

Integrative Models of Collective Action

During the past decade, scholars integrated the different theories of collective action covered earlier, to advance more integrative models of collective action (Klandermans, 1997; Simon et al., 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008). At first, Simon and colleagues (1998) advanced the dual path model whereby both instrumental and identity processes independently account for individuals' motivation to engage in collective action. Van Zomeren et al. (2004) advanced a second dual path model. They confirmed the importance of both instrumental (efficacy concerns) and emotional (anger) factors as "complementary but distinct" factors predicting collective action participation (p. 60). They related the emotional and instrumental motivations to two coping styles suggested by Lazarus (1991, 2001) in his emotion appraisal theory: emotion-focused and problem-focused coping. Specifically, emotion-focused coping helps people handle the emotions associated with disadvantage such as anger and outrage. Problem-focused coping is expected to solve the problem through focusing on the costs and benefits as well as efficacy of protest to solve the disadvantage. At a later time, in a meta-analysis, van Zomeren et al. (2008) proposed the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) whereby identity, collective efficacy, and perceived injustice are positive and unique predictors of collective action intentions and actual behaviour. Moreover, politicised identity also indirectly predicts collective action through injustice and efficacy. Their model advanced Simon et al. (1998) model by incorporating the role of perceptions of injustice, as well as van Zomeren et al. (2004) model by acknowledging the distinctive role of politicised identity in directly and indirectly predicting collective action. Hence, the model "allows for social-identity-based processes of emotion and politicisation" (van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 523), whereby politicised identity gives rise to perceptions of injustice and empowerment. Moreover, through the comprehensive meta-analysis the

authors conducted, they were able to demonstrate the causal relations between these various variables.

More recently, Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor (2009) and Thomas, Mavor, and McGarty (2011) advanced the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA) to explain continuing support and engagement in collective action. The authors suggested the most proximal and central antecedent of collective action to be social identity which encompasses the group's emotional reactions to their disadvantage (e.g., anger or outrage) as well as their belief that change is possible (i.e., efficacy beliefs). In other words, they consider emotions, and efficacy beliefs as group norms defining the social identity (Thomas & McGarty, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009, 2012). They based their model on several empirical research studies supporting their suggestions that anger (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, Bruder & Schepherd, 2011; Thomas & McGarty, 2009), and efficacy beliefs (van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2010) can precede social identification.

These integrative models along with acknowledging the unique role of the different social psychological motivators of collective action also specify the specific relations among these various predictors. Hence, they provide elaborate explanations of the social psychological factors underlying the mobilisation process (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Specifically, although the last two models differ in terms of how they specify the interrelations between the key antecedents (i.e., whether social identification predicts outrage and efficacy or is predicted by these variables), the evidence overall gives a central role to politicised identification, and indicates that all three variables of identification, anger and efficacy concerns uniquely predict willingness to participate (see van Zomeren et al., 2008, for meta-analytical evidence). The exact position of the social identity in these models might not be a critical issue since as Thomas, et al. (2011) have argued "social identities can be a precursor to, and a product of, reactions to injustice and group efficacy in the development and maintenance of commitment to collective action" (p. 4).

Thomas et al. (2012) examined the fit of the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) and the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA) using multigroup structural equation modelling on three samples (i.e., general community, psychology students, and university community). They measured

participants' identification with the United Nations' Water for Life movement and their willingness to engage in collective action supporting the movement. Their results validated both models. The authors concluded that the key point remains that these various models summarise the dynamic nature of participating in collective action, and each can be valid in different contexts. In fact, one can further argue that these different models can be relevant to people who are at different stages of involvement in collective action. The encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA) (Thomas et al., 2009, 2012) might be more relevant for individuals who are at the early stages of their involvement, since their outrage and efficacy concerns may motivate them to identify with the movement. However, for individuals who are already engaged, the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA) (van Zomeren et al., 2008) or the dual pathway model (Simon et al., 1998) could be more pertinent, since their identification with the protest movement can further feed into their outrage and efficacy beliefs. The outrage and empowerment feelings in turn will lead to further involvement in collective action. Thomas et al. (2012) argued for the validity of both models by considering outrage and efficacy beliefs as group norms "built into the identity", hence, "facilitating and encapsulating" the content of the social identity (p. 11).

Limitations of the Current Social Psychological Research on Collective Action

From the earlier review of the social psychological research on collective action, we can clearly recognise the significant advancements this area of research has witnessed. Van Zomeren and Iyer (2009) and Wright (2009) provide a more thorough overview of these advancements as well as the limitations the scholars still need to address. They also suggest several directions for future research. In the following section, I highlight the limitations that my research project attempted to tackle.

Integration of the Recent Advancements

Scholars have partially integrated the recent advancements in collective action literature with the exiting models of collective action. Specifically, Saab et al. (2015) extended the dual pathway model of van Zomeren et al. (2004) and examined the predictive role of political and identity consolidation efficacies along with the perceptions of injustice, feelings of sympathy, empathy, and moral outrage. Vilas and Sabucedo (2012) integrated the role of moral obligation within the social identity model of collective action. However, the various advancements, including the three different

types of efficacies, political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, and moral obligation have not been integrated in one predictive model whereby each variable's unique predictive significance can be examined.

My research project aimed to tackle this limitation. In particular, in Study 1, I examine the predictive role of political and identity consolidation efficacies along with outrage and politicised identification in predicting collective action. In studies 2-5, I integrate into this model, participative efficacy and moral obligation.

Western Context Bias

Another limitation of the current collective action literature is its Western context bias. In fact, most of the social psychological research on collective action covered hitherto was conducted in Western democratic societies of Western Europe (e.g. De Weerd & Klandermans, 1999; Tausch & Becker, 2013), North America (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1999), and Australia (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Hornsey et al., 2006), where engagement in collective action is rather safe and viewed as part of civic engagement. Moreover, within these contexts, authorities refrain from using force against the activists and the likelihood of achieving group protest goals is plausible. The extent to which previous findings can be generalised to contexts where activists face substantial sanctions by the authorities is as yet unknown.

Testing the antecedents of collective action in more repressive contexts whereby activists face substantial risks associated with their activism is therefore of paramount importance since in contexts such as these mobilising people, organising and carrying out successful resistance can have a significant impact on people's lives whereby governmental decisions are challenged and even authoritarian regimes are toppled. Moreover, based on Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) work, it is also interesting to examine how the repressive sanctions of the authorities shape the antecedents of collective action (e.g., politicised identity, group based anger, efficacy beliefs, and moral obligation), and willingness to engage in collective action.

The social psychological processes underlying high and low risk collective action can be argued to be different. For instance, collective action in more repressive contexts, where activists are in direct conflict with the authorities, challenging their rule, and facing significant personal risks due to the sanctions imposed by the authorities can be expected to have different underlying social psychological processes. In fact, van

Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk (2009) proposed that the motivational dynamics of protest vary among social movements depending on the goals that are pursued. They provided evidence that, in contexts where two groups are directly competing over power, the motivation to engage in action is driven by political efficacy. This was not the case among members of value-oriented movement. Moreover, Drury and Reicher (2005, 2009) and Reicher (2004) emphasised the dynamic nature of the relationship between the politicised identity, the out-group's reactions, and the collective action. In particular, they demonstrated how the aggressive reaction of the police (e.g., arrests) can re-define the identity of the protesters, including the norms of the in-group, empower them, and motivate them to engage in more oppositional collective action. Moreover, the underlying processes between "high and low-risk/cost activism" are argued to be different considering the level of commitment and investment, and obstacles to overcome are expected to be higher in "high-risk/cost activism" (a point I will cover in more detail in the section below; McAdam, 1986, p. 64).

Furthermore, in repressive contexts where authorities are ready to harshly suppress any dissent that threatens their power, protesters might be well aware that the likelihood of achieving specific political goals might be limited. Hence, their willingness to engage in action, despite the risks to their wellbeing, can be expected to be delineated by motives other than just achieving specific political or social goals. For instance, in such contexts, consolidating and expressing an opposition identity can be particularly important. In fact, while examining the South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970-1979), Chang (2008) acknowledged how repression led to further movement growth and consolidation through facilitating the development of alliances between various movements (e.g., student, intellectual, journalist). Such alliances help activists to increase their resources to organise further protests. The author also highlighted how repression spurred solidarity within the movement. Similarly, Loveman (1998) and Chang and Kim (2007) showed that activists try to establish their movement's organisation and identity frames as a reaction to state repression (Latin America and South Korea respectively).

Moreover, individuals might be particularly tempted to free ride in repressive contexts, since they not only face the usual costs of participating in collective action,

but also face substantial risks to their wellbeing, as well as the wellbeing of their relatives. Hence, beliefs that one's own contribution can incrementally help the protest movement achieve its goals might motivate them to get engaged in collective action. Additionally, a sense of obligation might play a crucial role in motivating individuals to take part in collective action under risk. In fact, Schwartz (1970), Bandura (1991) and Zimbardo (2007) have emphasised the role of sense of obligation or duty to motivate individuals to engage in different types of action regardless of the costs of these actions, as well as their possible effectiveness. Moreover, Opp (1994) emphasised the role of moral incentives referring to an individual's perceived obligation or duty to conform to their morality of standing against unjust policies as an important instigator of risky activism.

Furthermore, within repressive contexts, fear might be a relevant emotion. In general, however, the social psychological literature of collective action has largely overlooked the potential significance of fear. Fear, having the adaptive function of avoiding harm (Smith & Kirby, 2001), has been shown to motivate individuals to distance themselves from the out-group (Dumont, et al., 2003; Mackie, et al., 2000). For instance, Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, and Gordijn (2003), in an attempt to build on Mackie et al. (2000) work, tried to examine the role of self-categorisation and fear in predicting behavioural tendencies and actual behaviour in the context of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Specifically, in their first experiment, participants felt higher levels of fear when victims were categorised as part of their in-group (the out-group being the same across the two experimental conditions (Arabs)). In their second experiment, participants felt more fear when victims were part of their in-group than when the victims were categorised as an out-group, and they showed stronger behavioural intentions (e.g., helping and providing support to the victims and gathering more information about the event) and actual behaviours (e.g., providing email address to receive information on how to help or support victims, and information about the terrorists' networks) which are considered to be self-protective and avoiding. More recently, Smith, Cronin, and Kesssler (2008) examined the role of fear, anger and sadness in predicting faculty members' behavioural responses to perceived in-group disadvantage of unequal pay as well as benefits. Their results confirmed their hypothesis that anger towards the disadvantage motivates faculty members to take

action, however, fear did not predict willingness to protest, and unexpectedly predicted increased organisational allegiance. Moreover, Miller et al. (2009) suggested that along with being an important inhibitor of collective action, fear can also play a suppressor effect in the relation between anger and collective behaviour as the two variables are positively correlated but have opposite effects on collective action. Moreover, Osborne, Smith, and Huo (2012) examined the role of emotional responses to egoistic relative deprivation among faculty members in California, United States. Their results showed that fear towards the perceived egoistic relative deprivation predicts intentions to engage in behaviours which are categorised as seeking exit from the situation (e.g., look for another job) and mediates the relation between the perceived relative deprivation and action intentions. Anger, however, predicted willingness to engage in behaviours which are more confrontational (e.g., sign a petition) and mediated the relation between perceptions of disadvantage and action intentions. More recently, and in particular to repressive contexts, Saab and Ayoub (2016) manipulated perceptions of threats of repression and examined the manipulations' effects on the antecedents of collective action (i.e., anger, fear, political efficacy), and willingness to engage in future collective action. They gathered their data from a sample of Lebanese students. Their analyses confirmed that perception of threats increases emotions of fear and decreases people's motivation to engage in collective action, and fear was a significant mediator in the relation between perception of threat and action intentions.

The second aim of my research project addressed this Western context bias, and examined the social psychological processes underlying collective action under risk and how perception of risk shapes these antecedents and people's willingness to participate in collective action. In specific terms, my project targeted current waves of collective action that were taking place in contexts where the authorities try to repress any kind of resistance and protesters risk being arrested, detained, and injured whenever they engage in collective action.

In the following two sections, I summarise research from the political science and sociology literature on protest movements, civil resistance and revolutions about high risk activism to gain some insights about the processes underlying high and low risk activism, and about the relation between repression and collective action to explore

the potential effects of repression on the antecedents of collective action and people's willingness to engage in collective action.

High-Risk Collective Action

McAdam (1986) was the first to advance a model for high risks/costs activism. He first distinguished between costs (i.e., energy, time, and financial losses incurred) and risks (i.e., the expected legal, physical, or social dangers associated with activism). Wiltfang and McAdam's (1991) argued that this distinction is important from an analytical and practical perspectives, as it provides a "conceptual tool" to differentiate between activists' experiences (p. 990). A collective action can be of low cost but of high risk in certain contexts, such as signing a petition does not take much time nor energy, however, it can be quite risky in repressive regimes whereby authorities can detain citizens for signing petitions voicing disapproval of the government (e.g., the recent detainment of Turkish academics who signed a peace petition (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Similarly, a collective action might be of low risk but of great costs. For example, if an individual engages in sit ins in a democratic context, although he/she does not particularly face any risk, the act will be costly as it will necessitate a lot of time and energy. Moreover, Wiltfang and McAdam's (1991) stated that risks, unlike costs, are not entirely under the control of the activists and has an objective element. In fact, although activists' decision to engage in collective action partly endangers them, the responses of authorities or third parties to activists' actions defines the severity and likelihood of being affected by these risks, independent of the activists. Hence, "the work of an activist may carry risks unknown to, unacknowledged by, or even denied by the activist" (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991, p. 990).

To examine the distinction between high and low risks/costs activism, McAdam (1986) compared the profiles of the applicants of the Mississippi Freedom Summer Movement of 1976. He distinguished the members from those who withdrew their applications to be members, got rejected or had an unclear status regarding their membership. Through this comparison, he asserted that supporting the movement's ideology is an important condition for one's involvement, but social ties with fellow activists further encourage individuals to engage in low risk/cost activism. To engage in high risk/cost activism individuals should first have already engaged in low risk/cost activism and are free from demographic restraints (e.g., not married, young, from high

socioeconomic status). Their initial involvement in low risk/cost activism ensures one's integration in the movement which increases identification with the collective identity and adopting the movement's goals. McAdam (1986) considers this social integration and identification with the movement as crucial processes for one's readiness to engage in high risk/cost resistance.

Following McAdam's (1986) work, Wiltfang and McAdam's (1991) examined the differential antecedents of high-risk and high-cost activism in the Sanctuary Movement in United States which was against the deportation of refugees (i.e., from El Salvador and Nicaragua) who were in Central America. They analysed survey data from 141 individuals who had different levels of involvement in the protest movement and were active in the Tucson area which is 90 miles from the borders between United States and Mexico. Their correlational analyses confirmed the distinction between risks and costs (e.g., the correlation between the two measures was .30). They also reported a differential correlational pattern for the costs and risks. Costs negatively correlated with age, number of children at home, employment, and participation in national electoral campaigns, but positively with anti-war demonstrations. Subjective and objective perceptions of risks negatively correlated with age, but positively with number of children at home, employment status, participation in anti-war demonstrations, and state electoral campaigns. Moreover, objective risks positively correlated with participation in civil rights demonstrations and labour organisations. Regarding the correlations with participation in other social movements, objective risks positively correlated with student, farm workers, contemporary peace, anti-apartheid, and world hunger movements. The subjective risk positively predicted only with involvement in farm workers, and contemporary peace movement. As for the determinants of activism, age negatively predicted high cost activism, religious attendance and other activism positively predicted high-risk activism. The authors confirmed the central role of social integration and value commitment in high-risk activism. However, Nepstad and Smith (1999) criticised the work by McAdam (1986) and Wilfang and McAdam (1991) for their mixed predictions regarding their hypothesis that individuals free from biographical restraints will be more likely to engage in high-risk activism. For example, McAdam's (1984) results confirmed that young people as well as those who have full time jobs are more likely to participate in high-risk activism. Nepstad and Smith (1999),

in their turn, examined the factors leading to high-risk activism within the peace movement of Nicaragua Exchange from Central United States in 1980s. Their analysis affirmed the role of personal relations with activists (i.e., relations with family, friends, and colleagues who are also members of the movement), however, questioned the relevance of biographical restraints and membership to organisations (i.e., number of organisation one is member of) in motivating individuals to engage in high risk activism. They also emphasised the importance of "constraint management skills", referring to the strategies employed to reduce the risks or costs of participation, in order to sustain activists' engagement in high risk activism (p. 39).

At a later time, Nepstad (2004) examined the factors promoting sustained engagement in high-risk activism within the Catholic Left Plowshares movement in United States. This movement first started in the 1980s to resist the spread of nuclear weapons and was still active in the 2000s. He conducted ethnographic observations, and developed a survey based on these observations. He collected data from fifty-four members of the movement. His conclusions were based on his observations and interviews, as well as the relative percentages of the respective measurements in the survey. In line with Klandermans (1997), his observations highlighted the roles of strengthening activist identity and enhancing "affective, normative, and continuance commitment" in helping activists sustain their involvement in the resistance movement (p. 31). Specifically, the affective commitment is the level of emotional attachment to the in-group along with the satisfaction of achieving the in-group goals (Klandermans, 1997; Meyer et al., 1993). The movement attempted to strengthen this commitment through regular gatherings to revitalise the relational bonds among their members. The normative commitment refers to the moral obligation to engage in collective action to ensure achieving the in-group's objectives (Klandermans, 1997; Meyer et al., 1993) and is sustained through community rituals (e.g., biblical prayers). The continuance commitment refers to individuals' level of contribution to the movement including personal sacrifices (Klandermans, 1997; Meyer et al., 1993). This commitment is contingent upon the presence and quality of alternative routes to achieve goals (Klandermans, 1997; Meyer et al., 1993). Through these processes, individuals have the opportunity to realise and reinforce their identities which is considered a significant factor in sustaining engagement in high risk resistance.

More recently, DiGrazia (2014) examined the differential predictors of "conventional and unconventional" activism defined by differing "levels of risk, demands, and political legitimacy" (p. 111). He analysed nationally representative data of Americans from the World Values Survey (fourth wave, 2000). His results confirmed that the two types of activism have different predictors. Resources (e.g., having a higher educational background and being from advantaged groups) predicted conventional activism (e.g., petitions and sanctioned demonstrations) which is characterised with low levels of demands and risks and is considered legitimate. However, being committed to the ideology of the resistance movement and lack of resources (e.g., being from disadvantaged groups) predicted unconventional activism (e.g., strikes and occupation of buildings) defined with high levels of demands and significant risks and are considered illegitimate. Being member of political organisations and interested in politics positively and having trust in political institutions negatively predicted both types of activism, biographical restraints and one's own efficacy had no significant role.

Lastly, the consequences of taking part in high risk resistance have also been examined. For instance, Taylor and Raeburn (1995) examined the consequences of asserting one's homosexual or bisexual identity in a professional setting (e.g., sociology academics). Their analysis of survey data collected in 1981 and 1990 highlighted the significant discrimination academics were subject to due to their resistance whereby they openly discussed their sexuality and oriented their work towards topics of sexuality.

The above review clearly highlights the need to differentiate between high and low risk activism, since distinct processes seem to be involved for the different forms of activism. In fact, supportive attitudes towards the movement would motivate individuals to get engaged in action. However, identification and integration with the protest movement, and moral obligation seem to characterise high risk activism. Demographic variables do not seem to significantly differentiate between the various forms of activism. Moreover, although the research studies provided good insight into the processes underlying high risk activism, none of the studies provided a thorough examination of the social psychological processes predicting high-risk activism. The importance of this examination is further accentuated by the clear distinction between

costs and risks. Although social psychological studies examined the role of costs in people's motivation to engage in collective action (e.g., Blackwood & Louis, 2012), the role of risks has yet to be examined. With the scarce research on high risk activism much is still needed to understand the social psychological motivation underlying such activism. Hence, it is crucial to examine whether the social psychological antecedents of collective action identified and examined in the western cultures generalise to collective action under risk.

Further insights into high-risk activism, and specifically on how risks impact the antecedents of collective action and willingness to engage in collective action, can be gleaned from scholars in the fields of social movements, civil resistance, political conflict, violent collective action, and radicalisation, who have examined extensively the relation between state/authority repression and mobilisation. Francisco (1995) even considers the impact of repression on mobilisation as "the core of any theory of rebellion" (p. 263).

Repression and Collective Action

Scholars suggested several theoretical models and provided empirical support to explain the relation between state/authority repression and collective action. The most prominent model is the inverted-U curve (DeNardo, 1985; Gurr, 1970) that argues for an initial increase of mobilisation as a response to modest levels of repression, and only past a certain level of repression, dissent decreases. Muller and Weede (1990) examined the effects of repression on political violence for the period between 1973 and 1977 in 131 states around the world which were independent. His results confirmed the inverted-U relationship between authority repression, both institutionalised (e.g., legal restrictions imposed on civil/political rights) and violent coercion (e.g., punishing dissent), and political violence.

However, Francisco (1995) argued for an escalation effect at very high levels of repression. He examined the effects of repression on dissent in three different countries, mainly Czechoslovakia and German Democratic Republic between 1986 and 1989, and the Palestinian Intifada between 1987 and 1989. The time-series analysis of data gathered through media strongly confirmed this escalation effect. Furthermore, Rasler (1996) also confirmed the escalation effect. Specifically, she examined the relation between repression and collective action during the Iranian revolution, specifically in

1979 when the Shah was vacated. Her analyses showed that repression reduced resistance in the short-run (i.e., one week); however, it spurred more resistance in the long-run (six weeks) due to the "micro-mobilisation processes" whereby the authority is perceived as illegitimate and the benefits of participation (e.g. approval from significant others) are accentuated (as also suggested by Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523). These results hold even when high and low levels of repression are compared. More to the point, Carey (2006) argued for a bidirectional relation between repression and dissent whereby dissent leads to repression, and repression in its turn leads to more dissent. She confirmed her hypothesis within three African and six Latin American countries during the time period, between 1970 and 1990, whereby protests lead to further repression, and repression to further dissent.

Macro Level of Analysis

Scholars have argued that the effects of repression on collective action may also differ according to the level of analyses the various studies adopt (Earl, 2011; Earl & Soule, 2010). According to Earl (2011), at the macro level of analysis whereby the structural factors are examined, and variables are measured at the state or society levels (e.g., number of collective action events or clashes with the police/army), deterrence effects received conflicting support (Earl & Soule, 2010). For instance, Koopman (1997) examined the interaction between the various strategies of repression (i.e., institutional/structural in contrast with situational/ behavioural) deployed by the German authorities and the mobilisation (i.e., violent contrasted with nonviolent dissent) of the German radical right and xenophobic movements during 1990-1994 across the sixteen German states. His results confirmed a clear distinction between the two forms of repression. Situational repression of mobilisation events (e.g., police repression) spurred further resistance, however, institutional repression (e.g., trials, banning of organisations and demonstrations) had a moderate deterring effect (e.g., from the six mobilisation variables examined, only two showed a decrease). He also flagged that with less extreme movements, even institutional repression can incite moral outrage and lead to third parties to align with the resistance movements in defence of civil and human rights. Koopman (1997) explained the effectiveness of institutional/structural repression in decreasing mobilisation as due to its constant attempt to prevent the occurrence of any kind of resistance and its perceived legitimacy by the society.

Tilly (1978) argued for the radicalising effects of repression, whereby violent collective action emerges as a reaction to authorities' repression of legitimate nonviolent resistance. He suggested that repression of nonviolent resistance when perceived as illegitimate encourages activists to adopt more oppositional and violent strategies. Scholars refer to this as the backfire effect or the backlash model (Francisco 1995, 2004, 2005; Hess & Martin 2006; Jenkins & Schock 2004; Ondetti 2006; White 1989). According to the backlash model, people tend to not protest at very low levels of authority repression, however, they engage in protest at moderate levels of repression and engage in political violence, and even radicalise, in response to severe state repression since they perceive it as illegitimate (Francisco, 1996; Hoover & Kowalewski, 1992; Khawaja, 1993; Loveman 1998). For instance, analyses of the protests in Palestine (West Bank), during the Palestinian Intifada between 1976 and 1985 (Fransisco, 1995) confirmed this hypothesis. More to the point, Ortiz's (2007) examined the conditions leading to backlash effects through analysing data from 52 countries in the time between 1973 and 1979, using the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III data set. His analysis first confirmed the inverted-U model. However, when he tested a "round-shaped N-curve" (p. 228), the results were more significant than the inverted-U model, and supported the backlash effect whereby political violence increases as a result of severe state repression. Moreover, Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005) even argued that high levels of repression can even lead to the emergence of terrorists' groups since authorities repress their legitimate right for resistance.

Meso Level of Analysis

Earl (2011) highlighted that at the meso-level of analysis, referring to analysis at the institutional and movement level, research findings confirm the validity of deterrence effect (Beckles, 1996). For instance, Jeffries (2002) examined the Black Panther Party in Baltimore, United States, between 1968 and 1972. The movement was fighting for the rights of blacks in United States. The authorities harshly repressed the movement, legally and violently, which was eventually fully demobilised. Some of the specific effects of repression were depletion of funds to cover the legal costs of freeing activists from prison, distancing the public from the ideology of the movement (e.g.

describing the movement as un-American), fear of informers within the movement which lead to mistrust among fellow members, and constant high levels of fear.

As the above review summarises, studies at the macro and meso level of analysis provide conflicting support for the deterring and backlash effects of repression. Although these studies provide important information on how repression can affect a movement's development and sustainability, examining the effects of repression on the individual protesters and their motivation to engage in dissent, the micro-level of analysis, is important. In fact, knowing how repression affects the individual protesters and what are the antecedents of collective action in such contexts would help leaders and protest organisers to know how to encourage people to take part in collective action under risks (e.g., promote certain emotions, beliefs, norms), and correspondingly how to achieve social change under such repressive conditions.

Micro Level of Analysis

At the micro level of analysis, where the unit of analysis is the individual, we can explain the deterring and backlash effects of authority repression by referring to the classical theories of mobilisation and collective action I covered earlier. The resource mobilisation theory (Oberschall, 1973) and the rational actor model (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1982) can explain the deterring effect. According to the resource mobilisation theory, repression restraints the resources available to protest movements (e.g., national or international funding, communication chains among members, etc); hence, it limits their ability to organise themselves and mobilise individuals (Beckles, 2003; Jeffries, 2002; Jenkins & Perrow, 1977; Olson, 1977). According to the rational actor model, people are primarily rational beings who weigh the costs and benefits of their choices, and favour the most beneficial choice that will allow them to achieve their desired goals while enduring the minimal costs possible. Accordingly, repression is expected to deter individuals from action by increasing the costs and risks associated with participating in collective action, and reducing the likelihood of achieving the group goals (Muller & Weede, 1990; Tilly, 1978). Hence, repression can be expected to reduce the instrumental role of collective action.

Alternatively, according to relative deprivation theory, "imposed sanctions are deprivations, the threat of sanctions is equivalent to the concept of anticipated deprivation, the innate emotional response to both is anger" (Gurr 1970, p. 238).

Repression, hence, can be considered as suddenly imposed grievances (Klandermans, 1997; van Zomeren et al., 2008). Klandermans (1997), following Walsh (1988), defined suddenly imposed grievances as "unexpected threat or inroad upon rights" (p. 40), and considered these grievances as powerful motivators of collective action since individuals can easily identify an out-group to be blamed for their grievances, and these grievances can create a collective identity unifying the victims affected by them. As I mentioned in the summary of the social psychological literature of collective action, when an identity is formed based on a shared fate and blaming an out-group for this grievance, this identity is referred to as politicised identity, and is one of the cornerstone of motivating people to engage in collective action. These grievances would also incite feelings of outrage which are also strong motivators of collective action.

In fact, as part of the backfire effect, civil resistance scholars highlight the role of outrage towards repression and the responsible authorities (Hess & Martin, 2006; Martin, 2007, 2010, 2015; Snow, 2004; Snow & Soule, 2010) in mobilising further resistance. In particular, they argue that repression is perceived as a "moral shock" (McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly, 2001). Jasper (1997, 1998, p. 399) used the term moral shock to refer to the feelings of outrage towards a suddenly imposed disadvantage that would motivate individuals to take action (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). His concept of moral shock was similar to Walsh's (1981) concept of suddenly imposed grievances, but with the inclusion of emotions. The moral shock implied "a visceral, bodily feeling, on a par with vertigo or nausea" leading to strong emotions (Jasper, 1998, p. 409).

Repression can be considered as a moral shock since it shatters the expected norms of how the authorities should treat civil society (Goldstone, 1998); hence, it triggers outrage among the population (Jasper, 1997, 1998). Moreover, repression's indirect effect of strengthening resistance (Francisco, 1995; Opp, 1994; Opp & Roehl, 1990) may occur once activists and bystanders consider repression as illegitimate grievance and view collective action as a viable route to challenge it (Almeida, 2003; Gerlach & Hine, 1970; Goodwin, 2000; Loveman, 1998). For instance, Pearlman (2013) argued that emotions such as anger, pride and joy lead to optimistic evaluations of risks, acceptance of risks, and increases in feelings of efficacy as well as willingness to engage in collective action, even if risks are high. The author confirmed her hypotheses

in the context of the Egyptian and Tunisian Uprising based on archival data gathered through a wide range of sources (e.g., personal testimonials, press releases, videos).

Another possible explanation of the backlash effect of repression by authorities stems from the psychological reactance theory (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Psychological reactance is "the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur when a freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination" (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 37). In more detail, according to the psychological reactance theory, any abolishment of or threat to individuals' behavioural freedom incites in them a motivational arousal to reinstate the specific eliminated or threatened freedom, and re-establish their control of their situation. This reactance is mostly due to individuals' perceptions of themselves as autonomous and efficacious human beings. Hence, as summarised by Quick, Shen and Dillard (2012), "there are four components to reactance theory: Freedom, threat to freedom, reactance, and restoration of freedom" (p. 20).

The restriction is also hypothesised to heighten the attractiveness of the endangered freedom. Moreover, individuals can expect the fringing of a specific freedom to be generalised to other instances of fringing different freedoms, hence, their motivation to react and restore the endangered freedom and control is heightened. Individuals' reactive response is considered to be their attempt to reassert their autonomy and freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981).

Based on Brehm and Brehm (1981) assertion that reactance "may be accompanied by feelings of hostility" (p. 392), recent studies have explored feelings of anger as an emotion accompanying reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick et al., 2012). Furthermore, along with anger, scholars have suggested negative cognitions about the threat or restriction to underlie the process of psychological reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005). For instance, Quick and Stephenson (2007) examined this assumption within the context of the influence of condom ads. Their structural equation modelling of participants' responses to seven condom ads confirmed the validity of considering psychological reactance as a latent concept formed of anger and negative cognitions. Current research confirms the validity of an intertwined model whereby anger and negative cognitions, together, form the reactance (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2007; Rains & Turner, 2007; Shen, 2010).

When we apply this logic to repressing collective action, individuals would feel angry towards authorities' repression, be disposed to react in a way that is the opposite of what the authorities were trying to implement through the restraints, and further participate in collective action in an attempt to restore their right and freedom to participate in collective action and reassert their control and autonomy.

At the micro-level of analysis, empirical research on the processes underlying engagement in collective action in repressive contexts is scarce (Earl, 2011). Karl Opp is one of the prominent scholars who has examined the effects of repression on collective action at a micro level. For instance, Opp and Roehl (1990) acknowledge a negative direct effect of repression on resistance due to increases in costs, however, argue for an indirect positive effect whereby repression spurs more dissent through setting off "micro-mobilisation" processes that enhance the incentives for participation in collective action and reduce the costs associated with action (p. 523). They examined three potential incentives that can promote or reduce further resistance. The first is social incentive which refers to the attitudes and expected behaviour of significant others. The second is moral incentive which refers to the sense of moral obligation to resist the unjust repression (White, 1989) and includes two dimensions: "protest norms" (i.e., the extent to which individuals think they should take part in protests) and "norms of violence" (i.e., the extent to which individuals perceive engagement in violent collective action as justified) (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 524). Finally, public good incentive refers to the efficacy of resistance to achieve the desired goals. The authors further argue that repression is more likely to set off "micro-mobilisation" if it is perceived as illegitimate and if people are already engaged in political organisations or protest movements (p. 523). They tested their arguments within a sample of West German activists who opposed the use of nuclear power. They collected two-waves of data, one in 1982 and the second in 1987. Their analyses confirmed that exposure to repression positively predicted social, moral and public good incentives (for the 1987 data set). Moreover, expectations of being subject to repression positively predicted legal and illegal protests for individuals who were integrated in the activists' networks, and only legal protests for those who were not integrated. From the incentives, only public good incentives positively predicted legal and illegal protests (for the 1987 and 1982 data sets).

Furthermore, Opp and Gern (1993) also examined the micro-level processes underlying individuals' engagement in the East German Revolution of 1989. They examined the relative predictive role of public goods operationalised as discontent with the political situation and perceived effectiveness of demonstrations, moral and social incentives as defined earlier. They also looked at the role of membership to groups and organisations, personal networks (e.g., whether friends and colleagues were critical of the situation, and/or were participating in demonstrations), and demographic variables. Importantly, they examined the role of probability, severity and past experiences of repression from authorities. Their dependent variable was participants' involvement in the protests before and on October 9, 1989. They analysed data from a representative survey collected in Leipzig in 1990. Results confirmed the significant role of public goods incentives. Interestingly, experienced repression positively predicted participation in demonstrations, however, expectation and severity of repression were not significant predictors. Moreover, the number of close friends who were discontented of the situation in Germany and who were taking part in the demonstrations positively predicted participation in demonstrations, and was positively correlated with social and moral incentives. Furthermore, probability and severity of repression positively correlated with moral incentives and public goods motivations. Relating to the social psychological literature of collective action, these results highlight the potential positive path from perception of risk to efficacy beliefs, identification, and moral obligation, and the significant role of these variables in motivating individuals to engage in collective action under risk.

The above summary clearly suggests a direct as well as an indirect path from repression to collective action. Repression might increase people's outrage towards the perceived illegitimate repression, their identification with their fellow members and protest movement, as well as their moral, social, and public good incentives. These increases in their turn would lead to greater participation in collective action. Since empirical studies examining these possible links are scarce, and when present do not adequately operationally define these concepts, future research is needed to examine how perception of risk affects these various antecedents and willingness to engage in future collective action.

Present Research Project

The present research project is the first to examine the social-psychological processes underlying engagement in collective action in contexts where although authorities have been engaged in enduring repression and activists have faced considerable risks whenever they engaged in any form of resistance, they witnessed recent uprisings. Throughout these studies, I chose to use the term risks rather than costs. This choice was based on previous research on social movements, which distinguished between high/low risk and cost activism (Loveman, 1998; McAdam, 1986; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1988). Moreover, the concept of risk, which has been defined as adverse specific effects that might occur only if one decides to engage in certain behaviour to achieve a goal (Fischhoff, Watson, & Hope, 1984; Luhmann, 1990; Renn, 1992; Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991), seems appropriate as I am interested in peoples' decisions of whether or not to get engaged, over and above their past levels of activism (Fillmore & Atkins, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

In Chapter 2, I examine the roles of perception of risk, politicised identification, emotions (i.e., outrage), and efficacy beliefs (i.e., political and identity consolidation efficacies; Saab et al., 2015) as predictors of willingness to engage in collective action, above and beyond past participation, within a sample of Egyptian activists during the 2013 post-coup uprising (Study 1). Based on the initial evidence gathered from this study, in Chapter 3, I advance an integrative predictive model of collective action where I specifically examine the roles of perception of risk, emotions (i.e., outrage and fear), efficacy beliefs (i.e., political, identity consolidation, and participative efficacies; Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2013), politicised identification, and moral obligation as predictors of willingness to engage in collective action, over and above past participation. I test the validity of the proposed model in four high-risk contexts: Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey (studies 2-5). I conduct a meta-analytic structural equation modelling on the four data sets to provide a systematic summary of the results and test the overall pattern of results more rigorously. In Chapter 4, I test for causal relations between perception of risk and the antecedents of collective action in an experimental study I conducted in United Kingdom. To be specific, I investigate how the manipulation of perceived risk attached to activism impacts on the various antecedents and willingness to engage in collective action. Moreover, I examine

whether being in a high or low risk condition affects the antecedents differentially according to the perceived legitimacy of the social issue under study. Finally, in Chapter 5, I discuss the general results of my research project, the limitations, and future directions.

Chapter 2

How risk perception shapes collective action intentions in repressive contexts: A study of the Egyptian Activists during the 2013 Post-Coup uprising[2]

Abstract

I investigate the idea that perceived risks due to government sanctions can galvanise action by fuelling anger, shaping efficacy beliefs, and increasing identification with the movement. I also argue that anger, efficacy beliefs and identification motivate action intentions directly and indirectly through reducing the personal importance activists attach to these risks. I tested the hypotheses within a sample of Egyptian activists (N = 146) from two protest movements who protested against Morsi's government and the military interventions, respectively, during the 2013 anti-Coup uprising. In line with the hypotheses, the perceived likelihood of risk was positively associated with anger and identity consolidation efficacy, and positively predicted action intentions indirectly through these variables. Risk was also associated with increased political efficacy, but only among anti-military protesters. Anger and political efficacy predicted action intentions directly and indirectly through reduced risk importance. Results also highlighted differential significance of emotional and instrumental motives for the two protest movements.

[2] This chapter is based on the manuscript by Ayanian and Tausch accepted for publication in the British Journal of Social Psychology.

Although there is a vast literature on the psychological factors that foster engagement in collective action (see van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2010, for a review), as I mentioned in the introductory chapter, the current social psychological literature has been conducted in mostly democratic contexts. The present research aims to address this limitation by investigating the psychological predictors of willingness to engage in collective action in a high-risk context, namely the 2013 post-coup protests in Egypt, during which hundreds of protesters were killed in clashes with the security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In this context, I examine how the subjective likelihood of risk faced through participation shapes the psychological antecedents (anger, efficacy beliefs, and identification) of protest and predicts willingness to engage in collective action. In addition, I explore how anger, efficacy beliefs, and identification relate to an additional dimension of risk appraisal, the subjective importance of risk (i.e., the extent to which activists accept the potential dangers of engagement), and examine to what extent this variable mediates the links between anger, efficacy beliefs, identification and action intentions.

Egypt presented the perfect opportunity to study collective action under risk. In fact, Egypt has been under the emergency law since 1981, when President Anwar el Sadat was assassinated. For decades, the authorities exploited this law to supress people's civil rights (e.g., freedoms of expression), restrict political parties, and legalise arrests, detainments, and trials of people in state security courts (Human Rights Watch, 2008; Worldwide Movement for Human Rights, 2001). Despite these repressive circumstances, Egypt was the arena of several waves of protests and sit-ins demanding social and political change since January 2011 up till 2014 (Gaber, 2014). These protests were persistently and violently oppressed by the police and army. The protesters, however, determinedly took to the streets to voice their demands (Gaber, 2014). These protests continued for months in spite of the high risks and setbacks whereby hundreds of protesters were imprisoned, wounded and killed. What motivated these activists to participate in collective action under such high risks?

In the next section, I delineate the main hypotheses, followed by a summary of the political context in Egypt. I then introduce the research methodology I adopted. Finally, I summarise and discuss the results.

The Present Research

The present research seeks to shed further light on the individual-level processes involved in the effects of sanctions associated with protesting on protest behaviour. I propose a general predictive model summarised in Figure 1. While I acknowledge the possibility of a direct, negative link between the perceived likelihood of risk and willingness to engage in collective action, in line with the established effects of cost (e.g., Klandermans, 1984), I suggest that the risks associated with activism also have positive, indirect links to activism. In line with ideas from relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), I consider risks to be considered as illegitimately-imposed grievances which are responded to with anger. Hence, I expect the perceived risks to positively predict anger toward the authorities (H1). I chose this target as I aim to delineate the effects of risk perceptions which are considered as the pertinent grievances in this context. In fact, social movement and civil resistance literatures document the role of anger towards repression or its agents as triggers for further resistance (Hess & Martin, 2006; Pearlman, 2013). To examine the relation between perceived risks and efficacy beliefs, I examine two forms of perceived efficacy following recent work by Saab et al. (2015). Political efficacy refers to perceived efficacy of an action in achieving the political goals of the movement, and identity consolidation efficacy is the effectiveness of an action in expressing what the movement stands for and in gaining support to build a strong movement. Both types of perceived efficacy were shown to uniquely explain variance in collective action intentions (Saab et al., 2015).

Alternative hypotheses are conceivable regarding the relation between risks and efficacy beliefs. On the one hand, the perceived likelihood of risk might negatively predict political efficacy (H2a) as the sanctions imposed by the authorities can signal their resolve and ability to resist protesters' demands (Muller, 1985). Similarly, the expectations of such sanctions might reduce perceived identity consolidation efficacy (H3a) as severe reprisals against protesters might be expected to reduce social action support (i.e., the perceived number of other group members who are willing to act; van Zomeren et al., 2004) and thus reduce the perceived ability of the movement to mobilise people.

On the other hand, it is possible that the risks due to government sanctions increase the expected political efficacy of the movement (H2b). White (1989), Opp and

Roehl (1990), and Goodwin (2000) suggested that oppression can lead to increases in efficacy since individuals feel alienated from the political system and consider collective action as the best alternative for political change. One can also hypothesise that the increase in political efficacy is due to protesters' expectation that authorities' oppressive actions signal the government's weakening and concern (Chenoweth, 2015; Sharp, 2005), and can attract the attention of international powers that can impose pressure on the outgroup to concede to protesters' demands (Dudouet, 2015; Ondetti, 2006; Wisler & Giugni, 1999).



Figure 1: Summary of main hypotheses

Also, perceived risks might be positively related to both identification with the movement and identity consolidation efficacy. The greater the risks faced by protesters, the greater their perception of common fate, which will lead them to feel closer to other protesters and increase their psychological investment in the group (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996). Awareness of such processes, as well as the fact that the repression of protest can strengthen a movement by drawing in sympathy and support from bystanders and pushing yet uninvolved people onto the streets (DeNardo, 1985), is also likely to increase identity consolidation efficacy. In fact, this idea of a backlash effect forms part of the strategy of many radical movements (see Kydd & Walter, 2006) who are often successful in engendering wider support for their goals due to excessive countermeasures that alienate moderates from the state (e.g., Sedgwick, 2004). Thus, awareness of the risks attached to protesting might increase the belief that taking action will ultimately strengthen the group (H3b) and increase identification with the movement (H4).

A second goal of the present research was to examine how anger, efficacy and identification predict subjective importance of risk. Psychological models of the effects of risk on behaviour typically distinguish at least two dimensions of risk appraisal (see Brewer, Chapman, Giobbons, Gerrard, et al., 2007). Specifically, the expected likelihood of being harmed can be distinguished from the extent to which individuals perceive that risk is important (see Rohrmann, 2008). Risk importance has been conceptualised as the key proximal predictor of risk behaviour (Rohrmann, 2008) and is itself subject to the influence of a variety of psychological factors (e.g., experiential, cultural, societal; see Rohrmann, 1999). I operationalise risk importance as the subjective importance of the risks of participation and expect this variable to be a proximal and negative predictor of protest behaviour (H9).

Moreover, I expect anger, efficacy beliefs, and identification to negatively predict risk importance, and for risk importance to at least partially mediate the effects of these variables on protest intentions. There is substantial evidence from laboratory studies in psychology showing that anger increases risk taking (Fessler, Pillsworth, & Flamson, 2004; Lerner & Keltner, 2001). In the context of the 2011 Egyptian and Tunisian uprisings, Pearlman (2013) highlighted the role of "emboldening emotions" (p. 388) in encouraging protesters to devalue risk importance. She noted that the anger and

indignation aroused by repressive government actions played a pivotal role in overcoming psychological barriers to action under risk of severe government reprisals. Thus, I hypothesise that anger is a negative predictor of risk importance (H5).

I expect political (H6) and identity consolidation (H7) efficacies to be negative predictors of risk importance for two reasons. First, this prediction follows from a simple cost-benefit analysis; a greater perceived likelihood of protest in achieving the political goals or in strengthening the movement should lead people to put less emphasis on the potential negative consequences of protesting. Second, prior research (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2005) suggests that feelings of empowerment can motivate individuals to undertake bolder and more confrontational actions. Empowerment, hence, seems to encourage protesters to downplay the risk importance.

Finally, I expect identification with the movement to be a negative predictor of risk importance (H8), in line with social identity theory which suggests that a shared identity encourages people to downplay the relevance of personal interests and risks and to align their interests and behaviours with those of the in-group (see Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). This process is further articulated in the model of agentic normative influence (Louis et al., 2004) which emphasises that the importance of costs and personal sacrifices is determined by contextually-salient social identities, such that "even the ultimate sacrifice of one's life might be subjectively experienced as personally beneficial, where it is a normatively valued response that is beneficial to the group and its goals" (Blackwood & Louis, 2012, p. 76). Similar processes are highlighted in work on repression and political action, which described the role of collective identity in carving risky collective action as "self-serving" rather than "self-sacrificing" (Calhoun, 1991, p.69). I tested these predictions while controlling for current involvement in collective action[3] to allow us to predict action intentions over

[3] Scholars have highlighted how past participation in collective action affects protesters' identity, their identification with and commitment to the protest movement, and feelings of empowerment (Drury, Cocking, Beale, Hanson, & Rapley, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005, 2009), as well as their emotions (Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011), and willingness to engage in future collective action (Becker et al., 2011). Particularly to repressive contexts, being exposed to repression in the past is positively associated with higher rates of participation in demonstrations and protests (Opp, 1994; Opp & Roehl, 1990), and an attenuation of the perceptions of risks (e.g., likelihood and importance) associated with their activism (Hollander, 2001; Linnerman, 2003).

and above baseline levels, thus giving some insights into relative changes in action intentions as a function of the predictor variables.

Note that within my model, I preferred to consider politicised identification at the same level as the remaining antecedents. As I discussed in the first chapter, in the current social psychological models of collective action, the interrelations between politicised identification and the remaining antecedents follow one of two specifications. The dual pathway (van Zomeren et al., 2004) and social identity model of collective action (Van Zomeren et al., 2008) consider politicised identification as a predictor of grievances (or outrage) and efficacy concerns. In contrast, the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (Thomas et al., 2012) considers outrage toward grievances and efficacy concerns as predictors of social identification. However, these different models can be relevant to people who are at different stages of involvement in collective action. Since my main aim was to develop a general predictive model, I considered modelling politicised identification at the same level as the remaining antecedents the best option since my participants can be expected to be at different stages of their activism.

Study 1: Egypt

The first context I examined was Egypt since it presented the perfect opportunity to study collective action under risk. During the past few years, Egypt witnessed two major waves of protests, the Arab Uprising in 2011 and a second wave in 2013, during which the discontented Egyptian people voiced their disapproval of their political, social, and economic situation. During these two waves of protests, thousands of protesters were injured and hundreds were killed as a result of authority repression.

The 2011 Uprising

By 2011, Hosni Mubarak had been president of Egypt for three decades. The population was generally discontent with his rule, since the country was suffering harsh political, social, and economic conditions. As I mentioned earlier, with the Emergency law, Egyptian citizens had limited civil liberties whereby the Central Security Services restricted the development of political and even social movements, censored the online and printed media, and monitored the public gatherings. The risk of being randomly arrested for investigation and detained due to minimal level of activism was prevalent (El Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2008). As for the economic

situation, the majority of the Egyptian population lived on minimal wages and even in poverty, and only a small minority of the population enjoyed wealth and prosperity (Lesch, 2012). Moreover, the corruption in the country was widespread on a political and social level (Lesch, 2012).

Since 2000, Egypt had been witnessing a wave of small protests (Sadiki, 2007; El-Mahdi, 2009). For instance, Egyptian activists organised protests against the Iraq war in 2003 and the Gaza war in 2008, Kefaya movement organised demonstrations in 2004-2005 demanding political change, and labour unions organised several protests and demonstrations mainly in Mahalla in 2006 for better working and economic conditions (Korany & El-Mahdi, 2012). In 2010 various silent stands and protests were organised to express resentment towards the murder of Khaled Said, who was beaten to death by two policemen in Alexandria (Londono, 2011).

However, these small protests turned into massive demonstrations when the president of Tunisia, Sine al-Abidine Ben Ali, stepped down and flew the country after massive protests against his rule spread across Tunisia. From January 25 to February 11, 2011, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian citizens protested and staged sit-ins. They first demanded reforms, and eventually the resignation of Mubarak. The protesters were chanting " عيش, كرامة , وحرية " (translated as: "bread, dignity and freedom") and "النظام إسقاط " (translated as: "the fall of the regime"). These protesters were marked by the authorities' violent repression, including the heavy use of tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets, and even live ammunition, and the incarceration and imprisonment of protesters. Hundreds of protesters were killed, thousands wounded, and many others imprisoned (Human Rights Watch, 2011, 2013).

On February 11, 2011, Mubarak stepped down and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces ("SCAF") took power. After around a month of Supreme Council of Armed Forces' rule, protesters were back to the streets to voice their dissatisfaction with its rule, demanded the trial of the rulers and police officers who were responsible for the death of so many protesters, and insisted on their revolutionary demands. These protests were once again violently attacked by the military and the policemen (Human Rights Watch, 2013; for an overview of events please refer to Childress, 2013).

The 2013 Wave of Protests

In May 2012, the presidential elections were held, and on 30 June 2012, Mr. Mohamed Morsi became the president of Egypt. Morsi was a member of the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood ("MB").

Since President Morsi's election, Egyptians have been divided between those who were in favour of his rule, and those who considered his reign as the manifestation of the Muslim Brotherhood's dominance. Several protests were organised throughout the country to voice disapproval of Morsi (Childress, 2013). These protests took momentum, and Egypt went through a new wave of radical political upheaval at the end of June 2013. Specifically, massive protests took place when Morsi issued a declaration giving him outright powers, and the new constitution was perceived as Islamic and unrepresentative of the Egyptian community (BBC News, 2015). On June 30 2013, millions of Egyptians took to the streets, calling for President Morsi to resign. These protests were supported by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (the military) in Egypt (Fayed & Saleh, 2013; Kingsley, 2013c). This protest movement, which hereby I will refer to as June 30 protest movement, gathered various factions of the Egyptian society who demonstrated throughout 2013 against the growing influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and criticised Morsi for mismanagement of the country. A mass demonstration on June 30, 2013 called for Morsi's resignation. The Egyptian Armed Forces sided with this movement and removed Morsi from power on July 3, 2013 (Childress, 2013).

The second main protest movement, which I hereby refer to as the anti-military movement, gathered members and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and anti-military activists who demanded Morsi's reinstatement (Aljazeera, 2013; Ketchley & Biggs, 2014). Their major protests in Al Adwiyeh and El Nahda were violently opposed by the military and police, resulting in the death of hundreds of protesters (Kingsley, 2013). It should be noted that within the anti-Morsi group there was variation in terms of their agreement with the repressive military actions, with some fully supporting these actions against what they referred to as "terrorists" and others expressing discomfort with the un-democratic and violent actions of the military (Ayanian & Tausch, 2015).

Importantly, the two groups differed substantially in terms of the dangers involved in protesting, with much greater risks faced by anti-military protesters as they

were directly targeted by the security services (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Moreover, while the anti-Morsi group had achieved their goal of ending Morsi's presidency, the anti-military movement was struggling to secure the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood in political life (Ketchley, 2013).

Considering these group differences, I hypothesised differential relevance of instrumental vs. emotional factors in motivating activists. I expected security repression of protests to be a common grievance for most participants regardless of protest movement due to the witnessed police violence during the 2011-2012 protests (Ayanian & Tausch, 2015). However, instrumental factors might have been particularly important motivators of further action for the anti-military activists as they were in direct conflict with the authority since they were forcefully distanced from their legitimately-gained power and had the long-term goal of trying to regain their political position. In fact, van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and Dijk (2009) proposed that the motivational dynamics of protest vary among movements depending on the goals that are pursued. They provided evidence that, in contexts where two groups are directly competing over power, the motivation to engage in action is driven by political efficacy. This was not the case among members of a value-oriented movement. Moreover, since this group was presently being repressed and media was widely covering it, I hypothesised risk likelihood to positively predict political efficacy particularly for this group.

On the other hand, members of the anti-Morsi movement, having achieved their goal of ousting Morsi, might have been driven to act for a democratic transition by the extent to which they were angry about the actions of the security forces against protesters. Hence, I hypothesised anger to be particularly significant and political efficacy to play a lesser role among the anti-Morsi movement.

Since I aimed at developing a general predictive model of risky collective action while acknowledging potential contextual particularities, I tested the model in the total sample and examined whether group membership moderated any of the proposed relations.

Method

Procedure and Respondents

I launched an online survey on 17th August, 2013, a period during which a wave of major protests initiated by both groups took place. Participants were recruited

through Facebook and Twitter and were asked to share and re-tweet the link. I advertised the survey as a project examining the psychological factors underlying engagement in protests in Egypt.

A total of 377 participants entered the survey but a substantial number discontinued the survey early on and completed less than 70% of the questions. I deleted these cases from the data set, which resulted in a reduced sample of 233, from which participants who supported either of the two protests mentioned above were considered for analysis. The final sample consisted of 146 participants (47 women; M_{age} = 26.20; 88 from the anti-Morsi movement). Most participants (58.9%) were from Cairo, and most (97.2%) had a university degree. The majority of participants were involved in the protests; 30.8% were regular protesters, 23.3% were occasional protesters, and 37% were active only on social networks.

Measures

Separate bilingual speakers translated and back-translated the survey into Arabic. In addition to a number of questions about the situation in Egypt which are not examined here, respondents completed measures of the key constructs.

Support for protest movement. Participants specified their support for one of the protests; supporting the removal of Morsi, against the military interventions, other (to specify) or none.

Current involvement in protests. Using a five-point scale (1 = *never participated* to 5 = *participated to a great extent*), I measured participants' level of current involvement in protests.

Likelihood of risk. On five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants evaluated the likelihood of being injured, killed, arrested, tortured, or sexually harassed (α = .89) while protesting.

Importance of risk. Participants rated how important each of these risks are for them personally (1 = *very unimportant* to 5 = *very important*; α = .86).

Anger towards the police. Participants' indicated their anger towards the police within the context of treatment of protesters (1 = *to a very little extent* to 5 = *to a great extent*).

Political efficacy. Based on my previous interviews with Egyptian activists (Ayanian & Tausch, 2015), I selected five goals which were highly relevant for both

protest movements. Participants rated how likely it was for the protests to achieve these goals (i.e., "have an impact on what the military does", "stand against injustice", "bring justice to the protesters who were killed", "improve the situation in Egypt", and "stand up for the demands of the January 25 revolution", α = .85) on five-point scales ranging from 1 (*impossible*) to 5 (*guaranteed*).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Participants evaluated how likely it was for the protests to achieve three goals (i.e., "increase support in Egyptian public opinion for the protest movements", "strengthen the solidarity among protest movement participants", "ensure international support for the protest movement") using five-point scales ranging from 1 (*impossible)* to 5 (*guaranteed)* (α = .75; adapted from Saab et al., 2015). In line with the distinction proposed by Saab et al. (2015), a two-factor solution for identity consolidation and political efficacies was a better fit to the data than a one factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 5.144$, $p = .050$).

Politicised identification. Participants responded to three items on five-point scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (e.g., "being part of the anti-military/anti-Morsi movement is an important part of who I am", α = .73; adapted from Cameron, 2004).

Future collective action. Participants rated how willing they are to engage in six actions if a democratic transition in Egypt does not occur within six months (e.g., "demonstrate peacefully", "participate in sit-ins", "be active on social networks (α = .91). They responded on 5-point scales ranging from 1 (*not at all willing*) to 5 (*extremely willing*).

Demographic information. Participants also provided demographic information on their gender, age, marital status, monthly income (from 1 = *less than 200 EGP* to 8 = *more than 5000 EGP*), education (from 1 = *primary and below* to 6 = *higher education*) and place of residence.

Results

Except for anger, politicised identification, and level of current involvement in protests, which had less than 3% missing data, all other variables had between 17.8 and 21.2% of missing values. I examined the pattern of distribution of missing values through a missing value analysis in SPSS. Little's Missing Completely at Random test ($\chi^2(1018) = 1036.57$, $p > .05$) indicated that the pattern of missing values was

completely at random. I thus imputed the missing scores using the EM method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) and corrected out of range imputed values to the closest scale point. There were only minor differences in results when this method was used compared to listwise deletion[4].

The means and standard deviations and respective *F*-values from a series of ANOVAs testing for group differences are displayed in Table 1. The anti-military movement scored significantly higher on their risk perceptions, anger, politicised identification, and willingness to engage in future collective action. The anti-Morsi movement scored significantly higher on risk importance. Pearson correlations between the key variables are presented in Table 2.

[4] A number of previously significant results only approached significance, specifically, the link between risk likelihood and identity consolidation efficacy within the anti-military movement (*N* = 113, *B* = .23, *SE* = .16, *p* = .07, [-.01, .46]). The interaction between political efficacy and protest movement was not significant (*N* = 107, *B* = -.42, *SE* = .31, [-1.05, .20]). Risk importance was no longer a significant mediator for the anti-Morsi movement (*N* = 107, *B* = -.05, *SE* = .06, [-.21, .04]), and the index of moderated mediation was not significant (*N* = 107, *B* = .13, *SE* = .10, [-.03 .40]).

Table 1: *Means, Standard Deviations (SD) on Key Variables, by Protest Movement*

	Protest Group				
	Anti-Morsi Protesters		Anti-military Protesters		
Variable	Means	*SD*	Mean	*SD*	*F*
Current Engagement in Protests	3.32	1.11	3.54	1.12	1.41
Likelihood of Risk	3.10	.73	3.81	.82	29.68***, ω^2 = .16
Anger towards the Police	2.69	1.15	4.81	.48	125.28***^ ,ω^2 = .55
Political Efficacy	3.19	.62	3.30	.99	.86.83^
Identity Consolidation Efficacy	3.47	.65	3.58	.81	.83
Politicised Identification	3.97	.75	4.31	.67	7.85**, ω^2 = .04
Importance of Risk	3.74	.88	3.44	1.21	96^
Future Collective Action	3.70	.98	4.14	.80	8.08** ,ω^2 = .05

Note: *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. ^ Welsh is reported since homogeneity of variance was not assumed.

Table 2: *Correlations among Key Variables, Collapsed and by Protest Movement*

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Overall Sample (N = 146)	1. Current Engagement in Protests	1.00							
	2. Gender	-.07	1.00						
	3. Likelihood of Risk	.12	.13	1.00					
	4. Anger towards the Police	.13	.02	.53**	1.00				
	5. Political Efficacy	.34**	-.00	.12	-.02	1.00			
	6. Identity Consolidation Efficacy	.36**	.00	.32**	.22**	.45**	1.00		
	7. Politicised Identification	.46**	-.04	.06	.11	.37**	.32**	1.00	
	8. Importance of Risk	-.19*	.15	-.01	-.17*	-.40**	-.14	-.20*	1.00
	9. Future Collective Action	.31**	-.16	.24**	.45**	.15	.36**	.23**	-.34**
Anti-Morsi Movement (N = 88)	1. Current Engagement in Protests	1.00							
	2. Gender	.00	1.00						
	3. Likelihood of Risk	- .05	.34**	1.00					
	4. Anger towards the Police	.05	.15	.45**	1.00				
	5. Political Efficacy	.30**	.08	-.20	-.16	1.00			
	6. Identity Consolidation Efficacy	.31**	.17	.32**	.28**	.39**	1.00		
	7. Politicised Identification	.45**	-.01	-.16	-.18	.47**	.30**	1.00	
	8. Importance of Risk	-.18	.12	.35**	-.16	- .02	.05	-.08	1.00
	9. Future Collective Action	.28**	-.07	.24**	.49**	.09	.30**	.12	-.26**
Anti-Military Movement (N = 58)	1. Current Engagement in Protests	1.00							
	2. Gender	-.18	1.00						
	3. Likelihood of Risk	.27**	-.07	1.00					
	4. Anger towards the Police	.20	-.14	.22	1.00				
	5. Political Efficacy	.38**	-.08	.35**	-.02	1.00			
	6. Identity Consolidation Efficacy	.42**	-.19	.32*	.23	.50**	1.00		
	7. Politicised Identification	.45**	-.05	.13	.26*	.28*	.34**	1.00	
	8. Importance of Risk	-.18	.17	-.23	.02	-.66**	-.29*	-.28*	1.00
	9. Future Collective Action	.33*	- .31*	.03	.26*	.20	.46**	.32*	-.43**

Note: *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

To test the main hypotheses for direct paths I conducted path analysis using a series of multiple regressions in SPSS. I used the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013) to examine interactive (by protest group) and indirect paths, employing the bootstrapping[5] method with 5000 re-samples and examining 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). For each analysis, I controlled for current engagement in protests, protest group (coded 1 for anti-Morsi group and 2 for anti-military), and gender (coded 1 for men and 2 for females). I controlled for gender since the literature on risk perception highlights gender differences (Boholm, 1998) and our risks measurement included one item on risks of sexual harassment. I report the unstandardized regression coefficients throughout.

Direct Paths

In the first set of regressions, I regressed anger, efficacy beliefs, and identification on risk likelihood. I then examined whether these paths interacted with protest group using PROCESS (Model 1). As hypothesized (H1), likelihood of risk positively predicted anger (B = .43, SE = .10, p < .001). The interaction with protest movement was significant (B = - .62, SE = .19, p = .002), such that risk likelihood positively predicted anger in the anti-Morsi movement (B = .72, SE = .13, p < .001), but not in the anti-military movement (B = .10, SE = .14, p = .490). Risk likelihood did not predict political efficacy in the overall sample (B = .07, SE = .08, p = .407), however, the interaction with group was significant (B = .53, SE = .16, p = .001), such that it positively predicted political efficacy for the anti-military movement (B = .36, SE = .12, p = .003), but not for the anti-Morsi movement (B = - .18, SE = .11, p = .108). Consistent with H3b, risk likelihood positively predicted identity consolidation efficacy (B = .28, SE = .07, p < .001). This association was not moderated by group (B = - .07, SE = .14, p = .627). Unexpectedly, risk likelihood did not predict politicised

[5] Bootstrapping is a technique that randomly resamples an original sample, considering this original sample as the population from which to draw a definite number of samples of same size (e.g., 5 0000 or 10 000 samples) with replacements (Stine, 1989; Zhu, 1997). Bootstrapping estimates the various statistics or parameters for each resample and computes the sampling distribution of these statistics, including the beta coefficients and confidence intervals (Efron, 1987; Efron & Tibshirani, 1986). These new statistics are not restricted by the normality assumptions and are of greater accuracy (Byrne, 2009; Hayes, 2013; Stine, 1989; Zhu, 1997). Bootstrapping also allows to overcome the normality issues in mediation analyses (Nevitt & Hancock, 2001; Shrout & Bolger, 2002).

identification (*B* = - .08, *SE* = .07, *p* = .269), and the interaction with group was not significant (*B* = .16, *SE* = .15, *p* = .278).

Next, I regressed risk importance on anger towards the police, political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, and identification. In line with the hypothesis (H5), anger was a significant negative predictor of risk importance (*B* = -.25, *SE* = .09, *p* = .007). Although there was no interaction with group (*B* = .39, *SE* = .28, *p* = .160), anger predicted risk importance only for the anti-Morsi movement (*B* = -.28, *SE* = .10, *p* = .005) but not the anti-military *(B* = -.02, *SE* = .27, *p* = .956). As expected (H6), political efficacy negatively predicted risk importance (*B* = -.60, *SE* = .12, *p* < .001). This link was moderated by group (*B* = -.89, *SE* = .23, *p* < .001), such that political efficacy was a negative predictor of risk importance for the anti-military movement (*B* = - .91, *SE* = .13, *p* < .001), but not for the anti-Morsi movement (*B* = -.01, *SE* = .17, *p* = .976). Contrary to our expectations, identity consolidation efficacy and politicised identification did not predict risk importance (*B* = .16, *SE* = .14, *p* = .254, and *B* = -.05, *SE* = .13, *p* = .706, respectively), and the interaction terms were not significant (*B* = .13, *SE* = .25, *p* = .593 and *B* = -.12, *SE* = .23, *p* = .602, respectively).

I then regressed future collective action on all of the remaining variables. As expected (H9), risk importance was a negative predictor of willingness to engage in future collective action, over and above all of the other variables (*B* = -.21, *SE* = .07, *p* = .003). In addition, there were significant direct paths from anger (*B* = .35, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001) and identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .27, *SE* = .11, *p* = .017) to action willingness. Although the moderation by group was not significant for the link between anger and collective action (*B* = .39, SE = .28, p = .160), inspection of the simple slopes showed that anger predicted collective action for the anti-Morsi movement (*B* = .33, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001) but not the anti-military movement (*B* = .25, *SE* = .19, *p* = .196).There was no direct paths from politicised identification (*B* = .10, *SE* = .10, *p* = .322) and political efficacy (*B* = - .11, *SE* = .10, p = .299), but a significant interaction between group and political efficacy (*B* = -.48, *SE* = .22, *p* = .029), such that this predictor was not significant for anti-Morsi protesters (*B* = .18, *SE* = .18, *p* = .299), but was for anti-military activists (*B* = -.32, *SE* = .13, *p* = .019). There was an interaction with group for the direct path from likelihood of risk to collective action (*B* = -.48, *SE* = .20, *p* = .016), but this path was not significant for either group (*B* = .32, *SE* = .17, *p* = .055, for anti-

Morsi protesters, and B = -.18, SE = .11, p = .106, for anti-military protesters). I summarise the results of the analysis in Figure 2.

Indirect Paths

To examine the size and significance of indirect paths and to test for moderated mediation, I used PROCESS Models 4 and 59[6], respectively. I calculated indices of moderated mediation (IMM, Hayes, 2015) to test whether the indirect paths differ significantly between groups.

There was a significant and positive total indirect path from perceived risk to future action intentions (.19, SE = .06, [.07, .32]), in line with the idea that repressive measures can mobilise further action (Opp & Roehl, 1990). In the total sample, two of the specific indirect paths were significant; the indirect path from risk likelihood to action willingness via anger (.15, SE = .06, [.07, .32]) and via identity consolidation efficacy (.07, SE = .04, [.01, .19]). However, there were significant group differences. The indirect path via anger was qualified by group (IMM = -.22, SE = .08, [-.40, -.08]), such that it was significant for the anti-Morsi movement (.24, SE = .08, [.11, .42]), but not for the anti-military movement (.02, SE = .03, [-.01, .11]). Although the indirect path via risk importance was not significant for the total sample (-.01, SE = .03, [-.08, .06]), it varied by group (IMM = .20, SE = .10, [.03, .45]); it was significant among anti-Morsi activists (-.09, SE = .06, [-.04, -.01]), but not anti-military protesters (.10, SE = .09, [-.03, .32]).

There was also a significant indirect path from anger to future collective action via reduced risk importance (.04, SE = .03, [.01, .12]), as well as a significant indirect path from political efficacy to action via reduced risk importance (.13, SE = .06, [.03, .27]). The latter indirect path was moderated by group (IMM = .29, SE = .12, [.08, .56]), such that it was significant among anti-military (.30, SE = .11, [.13, .57]), but not anti-Morsi protesters (.01, SE = .05, [-.05, .16]).

[6] Model 4 is a simple mediation model. Model 59 allows all three paths in a mediation to be moderated (i.e., the link from the independent variable to the mediator, the link between the mediator and the dependent variable, and the direct link between the independent and dependent variables).



Figure 2: Results of path analysis using multiple regression analyses. The dashed arrows are non-significant paths in the overall sample. Regression coefficients are the unstandardised estimates. Separate regression coefficients for each movement are represented in boxes for paths where there was a significant interaction with group. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Discussion

Overall, the findings of Study 1 indicate that the key motivators of collective action meaningfully predict action intentions in such high-risk context, but with some variations (discussed below) which reflect the political complexities of this context as well as the nature of the present sample. Importantly, the findings are consistent with the idea that risks due to government repression positively predict action by arousing anger and heightening beliefs that collective action can build a movement and ultimately achieve its political goals. This is in line with Opp and Roehl's (1990) argument that the imposition of sanctions can indirectly stimulate protest by setting in motion "micro-mobilisation" processes, and provides first evidence of the psychological processes involved. Moreover, results showed that that the key psychological antecedents predict future action intentions in part by determining the extent to which risks are experienced as important; that is, they help to explain how activists overcome psychological barriers to action under risk of severe reprisals. Below I first discuss the findings; I then acknowledge a number of limitations of the present study and introduce the next chapter.

Summary of Results

Consistent with the idea that sanctions associated with protest are in themselves grievances which are responded to with anger and raise protest behaviour (Gurr, 1970; see Opp & Roehl, 1990), risk likelihood positively predicted anger, which, in turn, predicted increased willingness to engage in collective action (over and above current involvement in protests), directly as well as indirectly by reducing the subjective importance of such risks. This confirms the importance of anger as a motivator of collective action (see van Zomeren et al., 2004). This finding is also in line with laboratory studies showing that anger increases risk taking (Fessler et al., 2004; Lerner & Keltner, 2001), as well as observational work describing anger as one of several emboldening emotions that decrease risk importance among protesters (Pearlman, 2013). However, there were significant group differences in the present sample. Risk likelihood predicted anger towards the police, and anger was a direct predictor of action, only among anti-Morsi protesters. Anger had no significant role for the anti-military protesters. A potential ceiling effect (96.6% of participants scored above the scale midpoint) can partly explain this non-significance, however, the particular context also

provides some insight. At the time of data collection, the Muslim Brotherhood was facing threats to its collective interests as it was denied its right to political participation. Hence, risks to personal welfare measured in this study might have been perceived as less relevant and just by-products of the risks to collective goals. Moreover, in such highly repressive and oppositional situations, resisting risks to personal welfare due to one's activism can become part of realising one's identity as an activist (Calhoun, 1991; Escobar, 1993), especially for a movement supporting the Muslim Brotherhood which has a religious identity with the main ideology of political Islam (Muson, 2001). Their identification might have decreased their level of distress (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; Muldoon, Schmid, & Downes, 2009; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010) and increased their valuing of martyrdom. In such situations, risks to personal welfare can be perceived as opportunities to confirm their loyalty to the group's ideology and interests and activist identity through risking one's own safety in an attempt to contribute to in-group's goals (Calhoun, 1991). These particularities can also account for the importance of instrumental factors for the anti-military group, a point I further elaborate below.

Furthermore, perceived risk was positively associated with identity consolidation efficacy, consistent with the idea that protest met with severe repression by the authorities is believed to strengthen the movement (e.g., by drawing in yet uninvolved bystanders and increasing group cohesion; see DeNardo, 1985). Moreover, perceived risk had a positive indirect path to action tendencies via identity consolidation efficacy and this variable also directly predicted future action intentions. Consolidating a protest movement can be the building block to achieve long term political change, which for now is difficult. These findings further support the idea that goals other than achieving the ultimately desired political change can motivate engagement in collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; Saab et al., 2015). Unexpectedly, however, there was no significant relation between identity consolidation efficacy and risk importance.

Perceived risks were also positively related to political efficacy, but only among anti-military protesters. As mentioned above, increased political efficacy as a function of risk can be explained by protesters' expectation that repressive action would receive media coverage, which can bolster local support for their cause as well as international powers' intervention. Consistent with this idea, Wisler and Giugni (1999) found that

media coverage of oppression was negatively related to subsequent police repression of collective actions. Moreover, Ondetti's (2006) analysis of the landless protesters' struggle in Brazil during 1990s showed how the massive repression galvanised domestic and international support for protesters' cause which spurred further protests and obliged authorities to respond to protesters' demands.

Furthermore, political efficacy negatively predicted risk importance, but only for the anti-military movement. This is in line with previous research which has shown that self-efficacy reduces people's estimates of risk and increases their perceptions of positive possibilities in risky decisions and risk taking behaviour (Llewellyn, Sanchez, Asghar, & Jones, 2008; Krueger & Dickson, 1994). The social identity approach further suggests that once a social identity is salient, attaining group-level goals becomes of foremost importance (Reicher, Spears, & Haslam, 2013; Ouwerkerk, De Gilder, & De Vries, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Our findings are consistent with this idea as they indicate that personal risks are downplayed to the extent to which action is likely to fulfil group goals.

Interestingly, over and above the indirect positive path from political efficacy to action intentions via reduced risk importance, there was also a residual negative direct path from political efficacy to action intentions. While this finding might on the surface seem counter-intuitive, it may reflect a 'free rider effect' whereby individuals' perceptions of efficacy demotivate them to act as the group can achieve its goals without their efforts. It also resonates with recent work on the role of perceived efficacy in predicting non-normative collective action which has suggested that such action is considered in particular among those who perceive themselves as marginalised from the political arena (Tausch, Becker, Spears, et al., 2011; Spears, Scheepers, van Zomeren, Tausch, & Gooch, 2015).

This can certainly be applied to the anti-military movement which was in direct conflict with the authority over power and control and which might have considered collective action as the only possible way to oppose the military, even if chances to achieve the goals were limited. Moreover, as I mentioned earlier, some anti-military activists might have perceived risks to their welfare as an opportunity to enact their identity as activists and show loyalty to their group through risking their own safety (Calhoun, 1991). This readiness along with the potential to value martyrdom might have

contributed to the decrease in risk importance and the adoption of a 'nothing to lose' strategy (Spears et al., 2015).

Finally, in contrast to my expectations, politicised identification did not play a significant role. It was not predicted by perceived risk, nor did it predict risk importance or collective action intentions in either group. This is inconsistent with previous findings (see van Zomeren et al., 2008). Additional analyses also did not find any evidence of its role as a moderator. I believe that the most likely reason for these unexpected results, at least within the anti-military movement, is a ceiling effect or power issues. In fact, the majority (93.1%) of participants from this group scored higher than the scale midpoint on this variable and the sample size was small (N = 58). For the anti-Morsi movement, it could be due to the nature of this movement which gathered different fractions of the society which were united mostly around the short term goal of distancing the Muslim Brotherhood from power which was already achieved by the time the study was launched. This does not mean, however, that politicised identification does not play a role in this context. I would expect a greater predictive role of this variable in samples of the wider population.

Limitations

The present study presents only initial evidence for the role of risk perceptions in collective action and has a number of limitations. It is important to note that the present sample, which consisted mainly of young and highly educated people who had already some level of involvement in protests and were from Cairo, is unlikely to be representative of Egyptian protesters in general. This naturally restricts the external validity and generalisability of the findings. While this is normally less of a problem for research where relations between variables rather than absolute values are of primary interest, it may still have restricted the variance on some variables, as I discussed above.

Moreover, Study 1 certainly does not consider the full set of psychological variables that operate in high-risk activism. For example, other emotions, such as fear, might be of relevance. As I have specified in the first chapter, fear can be expected to play a significant role in such repressive contexts, where the wellbeing of protesters is at risk. The suppressing effect of perceptions of risks on collective action can be due to its indirect effect through fear. One can hypothesise that perception of risks increases feelings of fear, which in its turn leads to decreases in people's motivation to get

engaged. Furthermore, as I have mentioned in the introductory chapter, in repressive contexts, the role of political efficacy might be limited. Hence, individuals' willingness to get engaged can be expected to be motivated by other efficacy beliefs such as participative efficacy. Finally, one can also expect moral obligation to significantly motivate individuals to participate in collective action under risk (Bandura, 1991; Opp, 1994; Zimbardo, 2007).

Based on these limitations, I conducted four survey studies, where I integrated the role of fear, participative efficacy and moral obligation in the predictive model. Furthermore, I tested this model in four different contexts with different political and social underpinnings to be able to generalise the results. I summarise these four survey studies in the following chapter.

Chapter 3

Examining resistance in various repressive contexts: Survey data from Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey

Abstract

I summarise four studies which I conducted to test an integrative model of the motivators of collective action in four contexts where collective action is met with substantial repression by the state, specifically Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey. I examine the roles of emotions (anger and fear), efficacy beliefs (political, identity consolidation, and participative efficacies), politicised identification, and moral obligation as predictors of willingness to engage in collective action, over and above past participation. To examine the idea that risks imposed by the authorities can intensify resistance and spur further action, I also investigate the role of the perceived likelihood of being subject to risks due to state repression as a distal predictor. A meta-analytic integration of the findings highlights the role of imposed risks in positively predicting outrage, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, politicised identification, and moral obligation. These variables in their turn positively predicted willingness to engage in collective action. Moreover, outrage, participative efficacy, and politicised identification positively predicted moral obligation, and had an indirect link to collective action through moral obligation. Fear and political efficacy neither predicted moral obligation nor collective action intentions.

From early 2011, the world witnessed waves of protests against repressive regimes, where activists' courage and determination to resist these regimes and voice their discontent was awe-inspiring. Although, the different protests had distinct political and social underpinnings, they were all characterised by the significant risks the activists faced due to the sanctions imposed by the authorities.

In the present four studies, I aimed to extend the previous study (Study 1) by examining collective action in different repressive contexts, and with different political and social issues. Furthermore, I aimed to develop a general predictive model of collective action by integrating the roles of fear, participative efficacy, and moral obligation in the previously suggested model. Specifically, I examined the roles of outrage and fear (emotional pathway), political, identity consolidation, and participative efficacies (instrumental pathway; Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren, et al., 2012), politicised identification (identity pathway), and moral obligation (Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012) as outcomes of perceived risk, and predictors of willingness to engage in collective action, over and above past participation. I tested the proposed model in four high-risk contexts, namely Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey. Moreover, I integrated the results from the four studies in a meta-analytic structural equation modelling to provide an integrative summary of the results.

In the next sections, I first briefly summarise the new variables I included in the previous model and give an overview of the four contexts I examined. Next, I outline the hypotheses regarding the suggested model and describe each study and its respective results. Finally, I present the results of the meta-analytic structural equation model, and discuss the general results and limitations of these four studies.

The New Variables

For the present four studies, I advance a general predictive model of collective action under risks, whereby I consider the role of fear, participative efficacy, and moral obligation in predicting collective action under risk, above and beyond the role of anger, political and identity consolidation efficacies, politicised identification, and past participation. Below, I briefly summarise these concepts and the rationales for considering them as relevant factors in risky activism (to note that I already covered these concepts in chapter 1).

Fear

Fear is an avoidance emotion with the adaptive function of avoiding harm (Smith & Kirby, 2001), and is associated negatively with willingness to engage in collective action (Dumont et al., 2003; Mackie et al., 2000; Osborne et al., 2012). In repressive contexts, fear of being subject to the sanctions imposed by the authorities can be expected to be a significant inhibitor of action intentions. In fact, Saab and Ayoub (2016) examined how imposed risks associated with activism increase participants' feelings of fear, which negatively predicts their willingness to engage in collective action.

Participative Efficacy

The participative efficacy refers to the belief that one's action will have an additive contribution to the protest movement's efforts in achieving the social or political goals (Azzi, 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2013). Scholars consider participative efficacy, along with collective efficacy, as a necessary condition for an individual's motivation to take collective action (Azzi, 1998). Moreover, they propose participative efficacy as a crucial factor attenuating individuals' tendency to free-ride (Azzi, 1998; van Zomeren et al., 2013). As I mentioned earlier, van Zomeren et al. (2013) considers participative efficacy as the "critical link, or conceptual bridge, between beliefs in the group's achievement of group goals through collective action (i.e., group efficacy beliefs) and beliefs about the efficacy of one's own action to achieve them (i.e., individual efficacy beliefs)" (p. 619).

In repressive contexts, participative efficacy can be expected to play an important role. Along with the general costs associated with participating in collective action (e.g., time, energy), individuals considering engagement in collective action in repressive contexts also face risks associated with activism (e.g., injury, arrests, monetary fines). Hence, their tendency to free-ride might be more prominent. Beliefs about one's own contribution is therefore of particular relevance in motivating individuals to engage in collective action rather than preferring not to participate in collective action and simply enjoying the benefits.

Moral Obligation

Moral obligation refers to the sense of responsibility to take action against a certain political or social issue (Bandura, 1986, 1991; Stürmer, et al., 2003; Vilas et al.,

2012). Scholars have shown that moral obligation is a significant predictor of action intentions, and mediates the relation between the antecedents of collective action (i.e., politicised identification, anger, and efficacy beliefs) and action intentions (Stürmer, et al., 2003; Vilas et al., 2012). Following their model, I expect moral obligation to be the most proximal predictor of collective action.

The indirect path from identity consolidation efficacy, participative efficacy, and politicised identification to action intention through moral obligation can be explained through the strong link between politicised identification and moral obligation (Haslam, 2001; Turner et al., 1987). Following social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), once individuals identify with a protest movement, they would feel a stronger sense of responsibility to be a good member and conform to the in-group's norms. Consequently, as a good member, when a person feels he/she has the ability to personally contribute, the sense of obligation might increase and lead to further engagement. Moreover, beliefs that group efforts can solidify one's movement and strengthen this identity can also lead to increases in moral obligation, especially that this efficacy is closely linked to identity processes (Saab et al., 2015). Hence, politicised identification, identity consolidation efficacy, and participative efficacy beliefs can indirectly predict willingness to engage in collective action through increasing moral obligation (Stürmer, et al., 2003; Vilas et al., 2012).

Furthermore, one can also feel an obligation to uphold one's personal or in-group's convictions. When these convictions are threatened, the outrage felt toward these threats might increase the sense of obligation to take action and redress any transgression. Specifically, following the group-based appraisal theory (Smith, 1993), research has shown that anger is an injustice based emotion (e.g., individuals will feel anger whenever they appraise situations as unjust or unfair; Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), and an approach emotion (e.g., anger motivates individuals to take action to remove the injustice; Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Frijda et al., 1989; Harmon-Jones, 2003; Mackie et al., 2000; Miller, 2000). Moreover, Stern et al. (1999) showed that threatened values give rise to a sense of moral obligation to act to reinstate the threatened value. Hence, I hypothesise that outrage will also have an indirect link to collective action intentions through this sense of obligation to redress the injustice.

Regarding political efficacy, I expect one's belief that the movement or the group has the chance to achieve certain political goals to decrease one's sense of responsibility to take action, as he/she would feel there is no need to invest when the goals are likely to be achieved. In fact, Stürmer et al., (2003) found a negative, although not significant, relation between reward motive and moral obligation. Accordingly, I expect political efficacy to indirectly predict individuals' willingness to engage in collective action through moral obligation.

Following Vilas and Sabucedo (2012) model, I expect outrage, fear, efficacy beliefs and politicised identification to also directly predict action intentions since regardless of whether individuals are feeling a sense of obligation, these variables can still motivate them to take action (Saab et al., 2015; Stürmer, et al., 2003; van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2013; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012).

Regarding the relevance of moral obligation specifically in repressive contexts, as I mentioned in chapter 1, moral obligation might play an important role in motivating individuals to take part in collective action under risk, where the likelihood of achieving political or social reforms can be limited. Schwartz (1970), Bandura (1991), and Zimbardo (2007) have emphasised the significance of moral obligation in motivating individuals to engage in collective action even if the risks associated with such action is high, and the likelihood of achieving the specific goals is low. Moreover, Opp (1994) suggested moral incentives, referring to individuals' perceived moral duty to stand against injustice, as important motivators for engagement in risky collective action. Furthermore, several scholars have documented the importance of morality and normative commitment in encouraging individuals to take action to resist injustice (Nepstad, 2004; Opp & Roehl, 1990; White, 1989). Consequently, I expect moral obligation to play a significant role in collective action under risk, and I consider it as the most proximal predictor, whereby emotions, efficacy beliefs, and politicised identification directly predict collective action, as well as indirectly through moral obligation.

Overview of Studies

I tested the hypothesised model in four repressive contexts where protesters were fighting for different political and social issues. I conducted Study 2 in Hong Kong, targeting the Umbrella movement which was calling for an amendment of the

electoral procedures to be followed in 2017. I examined Hong Kong citizens' willingness to engage in peaceful collective action if the democracy is further violated in Hong Kong. In Study 3, I examined my predictions in a different context, Russia. I focused on the protests which were against the perceived authoritarian rule of Mr. Vladimir Putin, and demanded political and social reforms. I measured the participants' intentions to engage in peaceful sanctioned collective action in the very near future. Study 4 examined the Ukrainian protests against the separation of the south eastern regions in Ukraine. I measured participants' motivation to engage in future collective action if the situation in Ukraine does not improve. In Study 5, I tested my hypotheses in Turkey, in the context of the recent protests against the urban regeneration projects. The protests were mainly environmentally oriented; however, they also had political underpinnings (e.g., voicing disapproval of the authoritarian rule of Mr. Ragap Erdogan). I measured participants' willingness to engage in various nonviolent collective action as part of the upcoming protests against government-led urban regeneration projects.

The Hypothesised Model

The current model is an extension of the model I tested within the Egyptian context[7]. I present the hypotheses and their respective rationales in the following section, and I summarise the hypotheses in figure 3.

The Predictions of Perceived Risk

Following the rational actor model, I acknowledge that perception of risk can indirectly suppress collective action. I expect the likelihood of risk to positively predict fear (H1). In fact, Saab and Ayoub (2015) experimentally manipulated the threats a participant would face when engaging in collective action. Their results showed that imposed risks due to one's activism increase fear. As in chapter two, I expected risks to

[7] Within the present studies, the measure of importance of risk was not a significant predictor of collective action, and most of the antecedents of collective action did not predict it. I think the non-significant predictions can be due to the measurement I used. For instance, participants in the Hong Kong context (Study 2) specified, in the open ended question for general comments, that the measures of importance of risk were unclear. Hence, I decided not to include this variable in the current model. Further research is needed to explore the meaning and relevance of this concept in motivating individuals to engage in collective action under risk.

also decrease individuals' political (H3a), identity consolidation (H4a), and participative (H5a) efficacies.

As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, perception of risk can also indirectly increase motivation to participate in collective action. In line with relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970), I hypothesise the likelihood of risk to positively predict feelings of outrage toward the agents of repression (H2) once the authorities' sanctions of collective action are considered as grievances. Risks can also increase political efficacy (H3b) since repression can signal the authorities' weakness as they are losing the voluntary compliance to their rule (Chenoweth, 2015; Sharp, 2005) and galvanise domestic and international support which can impose pressure on the authorities to concede to protesters' demands (Dudouet, 2015; Ondetti, 2006; Wisler & Giugni, 1999), and political protests are perceived as a possible path to secure political or social change (Opp & Roehl, 1990; White, 1989).

I also expect risks to positively predict identity consolidation efficacy (H4b) and participative efficacy (H5b), politicised identification (H6), and moral obligation (H7). In fact, according to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), once individuals consider their group as suffering from a common illegitimate grievance (i.e., risks associated with sanctions from the authorities) they will further identify with their fellow in-group members who are sharing the same fate (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Cocking, & Reicher, 2009; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Reicher, 1996), downplay the relevance of personal interests as well as risks, adopt and commit to the beliefs and behaviour of the in-group, and advance their in-group's interests (Ellemer et al., 1999). Moreover, their identity as activists facing repression empowers them through the solidarity and morale built in the group (Einwohner, 2006; Escobar, 1993; Gregg, 1966; Sharp, 1973). This empowerment along with the sympathy and support drawn in from bystanders (DeNardo, 1985) can lead to increases in the perceived efficacy of the group to solidify their identity as a protest movement and achieve the envisaged goals. The feelings of empowerment can also be expected to lead to increases in one's belief that personal contributions can incrementally increase protest movement's ability to achieve the envisaged goals.

Predicting Moral Obligation

Furthermore, as I mentioned above, I consider moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action (Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). Individuals' outrage toward the authority sanctions can be expected to increase their sense of moral obligation as anger is a justice and an approach emotion, inciting an attack action against the perpetrator who is perceived to threaten their values (Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Harmon-Jones, 2003). Moreover, as I argued above, increased efficacy beliefs (i.e., identity consolidation efficacy and participative efficacy) as well as politicised identification can also be expected to increase individuals' sense of moral obligation to engage in collective action and promote the goals of the in-group (Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). Hence, I expect outrage (H9), identity consolidation efficacy (H11), participative efficacy (H12), and politicised identification (H13) to positively predict moral obligation.

However, I expect political efficacy (H10) to negatively predict moral obligation (Stürmer et al., 2003). I also hypothesise fear to negatively predict moral obligation (H8), since fear is an avoidance emotion that motivates flight and has been linked to avoiding behaviours associated with negative consequences, even if the behaviours are socially responsible ones (Howell, James, & Shepperd, 2013; Manirankunda, Loos, Nostlinger, Assebide, & Colebunders, 2009).

Predicting Collective Action

In line with previous research (Saab et al., 2015; Stürmer et al., 2003; van Zomeren et al., 2008, 2013; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012), I predict outrage (H15), political efficacy (H16), identity consolidation efficacy (H17), participative efficacy (H18), politicised identification (H19), and moral obligation (H20) to positively predict willingness to engage in collective action. Specific to repressive contexts, the social movement and civil resistance literatures emphasised the role of anger toward the agents of repression as an instigator for further mobilisation (Hesss & Martin, 2006; Pearlman, 2013). Identification with the movement (Calhoun, 1991), moral obligation (Bandura, 1991; Schwartz, 1979; Zimbardo, 2007), and identity consolidation efficacy (Drury & Reicher, 2009; Einwohner, 2006) have also been shown to play key roles in inciting further resistance in repressive contexts. However, fear, having the adaptive function to be vigilant and avoid harm (Lerner & Keltner, 200; 2001; Smith & Kirby, 2001), might

motivate individuals not to take action (Dumont et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2009; Osborne et al., 2012; Saab & Ayoub, 2016; Smith et al., 2008). Hence, I expect fear to negatively predict collective action (H14).

In sum, in line with the rational actor model (Olson, 1965), I acknowledge a potential suppressing effect of perception of risk, whereby the likelihood of risk indirectly decreases collective action through increasing fear and decreasing perceived efficacy. I also allowed a residual direct negative path to collective action. However, in line with Opp and Roehl's (1990) argument that repression increases protests through setting off 'micro-mobilisation' processes (p. 523), the likelihood of risks can also indirectly increase collective action, namely through anger, efficacy beliefs, politicised identification, and moral obligation. I summarised these various hypotheses in figure 3.



Figure 3: Summary of main hypotheses

Study 2: Hong Kong

I conducted the first study in the context of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong. In the next section, I briefly sumarise the political context.

In 1997, China regained control of Hong Kong after 155 years of British colonisation, and Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region. Although China aknowledged the autonomy of Hong Kong according to the initial agreement between the two countries, China recurrently overruled this autonomy (BBC news, 2015; McKirdy, 2014; Ortman, 2015; Tweed, 2016). For instance, in 2004, China granted itself the right to veto any changes to the electoral laws, and any attempt to further democratisation in Hong Kong (Ortman, 2015). These interferences spurred several protests against the Chinese rule (BBC news, 2015). In 2007, the Chinese government promised Hong Kong to allow its citizens to direclty elect their Chief Executive officer, who is considered to be the ruler of Hong Kong, in 2017, and their legislators by 2020. However, in 2012, the new laws of legistlative elections suggested otherwise, whereby, as in previous years, the Hong Kong citizens would directly elect 50% of the members of Legislative Council, and a group of elites, mostly businessmen and largely perceived as an ally of the Chinese government, would determine the remaining 50% (Chan, 2014). Moreover, the small group of Election Committee would elect the Chief Executive (please refer to Chan (2014) for a review of the electoral system). Furthermore, the White Paper, issued by Beijing, clearly indicated that Beijing was still controlling Hong Kong's autonomy and refusing to share authority (Davis, 2015).

By the end of 2012, three professors from the University of Hong Kong inititated the Occupy Central with Love and Peace movement which advocated for an amendment of the Hong Kong electoral procedures in 2017 and promoted civil disobedience (Chan, 2014; Ortmann, 2015). At the end of August 2014, when the Hong Kong government announced that 2017 elections would be similar to the 2012 elections, various groups of students (e.g., The Hong Kong Federation of Students, and Scholarism) began boycotting classes. From September 26 to December 15, Occupy central along with the students and citizens of Hong Kong organised protests and staged sit-ins to voice their disapproval of these electoral rules (Chan, 2014; Ortman, 2015). The movement in Hong Kong was eventually called Umbrella Movement. The protests and the sit-ins lasted until December when the gradual clearing of the sit-ins started.

Along with their main demand of open and popular voting for Hong Kong's chief executive in 2017, whereby the candidates do not need to obtain the approval of more than the half of the "nomination committee", protesters called for the chief executive officer to step down, and democracy in general to be respected in Hong Kong (Chan, 2014, p. 572). The police used tear gas, pepper spray, batons, and physical force to clear the protest sites, and the government responded with increases in censorship, court orders, and arrests (Barber, 2014; Branigan, 2014; Lague, Torode, & Pmfret, 2014; Professional Commons and Hong Kong Media, 2015; Tsui, 2015).

Some Hong Kong citizens perceived Beijing's refusal to amend the electoral law as a threat to Hong Kong's democracy and respect for human rights (Davis, 2014). They considered the repressive measures and the refusal to cede to protesters' demands as an indication of Beijing's reluctance to accord Hong Kong further autonomy in fear of endangering its superiority, as well as an indication of Hong Kong's business elite's fear of losing power (Ortmann, 2015).

Method

Procedure and Respondents

The survey was launched online on November 12, 2014, and targeted supporters of the Umbrella Movement. The link to the survey was posted on several Facebook pages promoting the Umbrella Movement, tweeted, and sent as emails to my collaborators' personal contacts in Hong Kong (e.g., friends, academics, and activists). I advertised the survey as a study examining the social psychological motivators of engagement in, and disengagement from, protests within the context of the Umbrella protests in Hong Kong. A total of 115 participants filled in the survey (52 women, 60 men, 3 preferred not to answer; M_{age} = 29.37, SD = 9.41). Most participants were from Hong Kong (86.7%) and of Chinese ethnic background (77.4%) and most (53.3%) had an undergraduate education (32.2 % had higher education). Ninety-two participants self-identified as being part of the Umbrella Movement, and the majority had some level of past participation in collective action; 18.3% were regular protesters, 52.4% were occasional protesters, and 16.6% were active on social networks.

Measures

A committee of two bilinguals translated and back-translated the survey to Chinese. Participants had the options to fill in the Chinese or English versions of the

survey. Participants completed measures of the main variables, as well as series of questions about the political situation in Hong Kong which are not analysed in this thesis (please refer to the appendix for full item lists).

Support for protest movement. Participants specified whether they are part of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong (1 = *Yes*, 2 = *No*).

Past involvement in protests. Participants indicated their level of involvement in past protests (protests before the Occupation/Umbrella revolution 2014) on a single five-point scale ranging from *never* (1) to *frequently* (5). They also used five categories to define their past invlovement (e.g., "I did nothing", "participated by being active on social networks", "occasional protester", "regular protester", and "protest organiser").

Likelihood of risk. I measured perceptions of risks using eight items on five-point scales ranging from *very unlikely* (1) to *very likely* (5) (e.g., "being harassed by the police", "being arrested", "being imprisoned or detained for some time", α= .91; adapted from chapter 2)

Outrage. On a five-point scale ranging from *never* (1) to *a great extent* (5), participants rated the extent they feel outraged when thinking about the police treatment of protesters in Hong Kong.

Fear. On a five-point scale ranging from *never* (1) to *a great extent* (5), participants evaluated how fearful they are about being affected by the risks while participating in non-violent collective action as a protest to fight for democracy.

Political efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the Umbrella Movement to realise two goals (e.g., "protect democracy in Hong Kong" and "respect the freedom of speech and other democratic freedoms", $r = .84$, $p < .001$).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the Umbrella Movement to realise two goals (e.g., "strengthen the solidarity among the protesters", and "help to build a mass movement for democratic freedoms in Hong Kong", $r = .69$, $p < .001$; adapted from Saab et al., 2015).

Participative efficacy. I used two items adapted from van Zomeren et al. (2013) to measure participants' participative efficacy (e.g., I believe that I, as an individual "can contribute so that members of the Umbrella Movement, as a group, can achieve

their goals", $r = .86$, $p < .001$). Participants rated these two items on five-point scales (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*).

In line with the distinction of three types of efficacies, a three-factor solution for political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies was a good fit ($\chi^2(5) = 7.686$, $p = .174$, with χ^2/df ration of 1.54 < 3.00, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA= .069, [.000, .159], *p*-close = .309; AIC = 39.686) to the present data, and a better fit than a one factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 13.088$, $p < .001$).

Politicised identification. Participants rated five items on five-point scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (e.g., "I feel I belong to the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong", "being part of the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong is an important part of who I am", α = .95; adapted from Cameron, 2004).

Moral obligation. Participants rated how obliged they felt to participate in collective action by rating four items on five-point scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (e.g., "I feel morally obliged to participate in the fighting for democratic voting", "I feel a strong sense of responsibility to participate in fighting for true democratic voting", α = .95; adapted from Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012)

Future collective action. Using a single item, on a five-point scale ranging from *not at all willing* (1) to *extremely willing* (5), participants rated their willingness to engage in peaceful collective action (e.g., "if democracy is further violated, please tell us how willing you would be to engage in peaceful protest actions (i.e., peaceful protests, peaceful demosntrations, peaceful sit-ins, etc.) in the future").

Demographics. I also collected information on participants' gender (1 = *male*, 2 = *female*), age, socioeconomic status (from 1 = *less than 5 000 HK$* to 7 = *more than 50 001 HK$*), education level (from 1 = *primary and below* to 9 = *PhD or above*), and current residence (Hong Kong and Other).

Results and Discussion

Missing value analysis and data screening

Most variables had less than 5% of missing values, except for moral obligation, being part of the protest movement, fear, and willingness to engage in future collective action, which had missing values between 7 and 12.2. %. I used the Little's Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test in SPSS to examine the missing values' pattern of

distribution. Little's MCAR test was non-significant, χ^2 (323) = 342.028, p = .223, indicating a completely at random pattern of missing values. I thus used the expectation-maximization (EM) method to impute missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). I changed the out of range imputed scores to the closest acceptable value. I noted only a few differences in results when I repeated the analyses with listwise deletion[8].

I present the means and standard deviations, and the Pearson correlations between the various variables in Table 3.

[8] The proposed model showed a good fit, $\chi^2(5) = 7.683$, p = .175, with χ^2/df ratio 1.537 < 3.00, CFI = .996, RMSEA =.069, [.000, .159] with p-close = .310, AIC = 127.683. There were only two differences; the total path from outrage to collective action intentions through outrage was significant (.23, *SE* = .10, p = .024, [.032, .437]), and moral obligation was not a significant mediator in the relation between participative efficacy and collective action (.05, *SE* = .04, p = .024, p = .184, [-.004, .157]).

Table 3: *Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation between the Variables within the Hong Kong Context*

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Likelihood of Risk	3.77	.86	1.000									
2. Outrage	4.33	1.13	.53**	1.000								
3. Fear	2.74	1.26	.43**	.35**	1.000							
4. Political Efficacy	3.46	1.07	.26*	.23*	.01	1.000						
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	3.98	.91	.44**	.49**	.21*	.57**	1.000					
6. Participative Efficacy	3.62	1.07	.54**	.61**	.24*	.51**	.66**	1.000				
7. Politicised Identification	3.73	1.02	.56**	.68**	.33**	.40**	.59**	.78**	1.000			
8. Moral Obligation	4.06	1.07	.58**	.75**	.35**	.35**	.65**	.76**	.79**	1.000		
9. Future Collective Action	4.26	1.11	.49**	.65**	.22**	.39**	.60**	.71**	.76**	.76**	1.000	
10. Past Involvement	2.71	1.01	.44*	.51**	.09	.16	.29**	.45**	.55**	.51**	.56**	1.000

Note: *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Path Analysis

In the model, I allowed politicised identification to covary with outrage, efficacy beliefs and fear. The three efficacy beliefs were also allowed to covary. I considered past involvement in protests as a covariate[9].

I used the maximum likelihood estimation in AMOS (version 23) to assess the significance of the suggested paths and evaluate the indirect paths. I also report the model fit, however, this is of less interest since almost all paths were allowed to vary (except for the correlations between outrage and fear and between emotions and efficacy beliefs which were constrained to 0, unless the M.I. suggested a significant covariance). For the model fit, I report the chi-square test, the comparative fit index (CFI), and the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA), and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). I assessed the adequacy of the model fit through the following guidelines: non-significant chi-square test, χ^2/df ratio < 3, CFI ≥ .95, RMSEA ≤ .06 - .08 (*p* - close > .05 - .10) (Byrne, 2009). I assessed the significance of the specific indirect paths by examining the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals, based on 5000 bootstrap samples using PRCOCESS model 4 and 6[10] (Hayes, 2011; Preacher & Hayes, 2008). I report the unstandardised regression coefficients throughout.

Data screening revealed that the Multivariate normality assumption is not met within the data set, with Multivariate Kurtosis of 21.825, c.r.= 7.554 (> 1.96). I thus followed the bootstrapping procedure with 5000 bootstrap sample and examined the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals to overcome the normality issue (Byrne, 2009).

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[9] Past participation in collective action positively predicted likelihood of risk (*B*= .38, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.220, .537), outrage (*B* = .38, *SE* = .11, *p* = .001, [.174, .599]), participative efficacy (*B* = .27, *SE* = .09, *p* = .002, [.098, .469]), politicised identification (*B* = .37, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.201, .572), and collective action (*B* = .17, *SE* = .085, *p* = .042, [.007, .360]).

[10] I was able to combine the results of AMOS and PROCESS as I have included all the possible direct paths in the model I tested in AMOS.
Model 6 allows to examine serial mediational paths, whereby the independent variable predicts mediator 1 which is linked to mediator 2 which in its turn predicts the dependent variable. (e.g., from likelihood of risk to outrage to moral obligation to collective action). It provides the coefficients for the indirect links between independent variable to mediator 1 to dependent variable, the indirect link between independent variable to mediator 1 to mediator 2 to dependent variable, and the indirect link between independent variable to mediator 2 to dependent variable.

Note that the same statistical procedure and guidelines were followed for the next three studies (i.e., Russia, Ukraine, and Turkey).

Structural Model. The proposed model showed a poor fit, $\chi^2(7) = 32.196$, $p < .001$, with χ^2/df ratio of 4.599 > 3.00, CFI = .964, RMSEA =.178, [.118, .242] with *p*-close = .001, AIC = 128.196. Based on the modification indices, I included in the model a covariance between outrage and participative efficacy, and between outrage and identity consolidation efficacy. Although scholars have shown that the two paths of efficacy beliefs (i.e., political efficacy) and emotion (i.e., anger) are independent (van Zomeren et al., 2004), following Saab et al. (2015) reasoning, I decided to include these two covariances since identity consolidation efficacy and participative efficacy are linked to one's social identity, hence, can be expected to also be linked with the antecedents of collective action such as outrage (Saab et al., 2015; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2004). The model showed a good fit; $\chi^2(5) = 9.470$, $p = .092$, with χ^2/df ratio of 1.894 < 3.00, CFI = .994, RMSEA =.089, [.000, .174] with *p*-close = .193, AIC = 109.470.

Direct Paths. As hypothesised, perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted fear (*B* = .72, *SE* = .12, $p < .001$, [.473, .939]) and outrage (*B* = .50, *SE* = .13, $p < .001$, [.217, .724]) confirming hypotheses H1 and H2. As hypothesised (H3b), risks also positively predicted political efficacy (*B* = .29, *SE* = .14, $p = .047$, [.008, .558]). Moreover, in line with hypotheses H4b, H5b, and H6, perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .41, *SE* = .13, $p = .001$, [.157, .648]), participative efficacy (*B* = .54, *SE* = .11, $p < .001$, [.289, .726]), and politicised identification (*B* = .47, *SE* = .11, $p < .001$, [.246, .658]). As I argued earlier, this positive link can be due to repression increasing protesters' perception of common fate, which can lead them to feel closer to each other and empowered, and increase their involvement in the movement, hence, their identification with the movement, and the efficacy of the movement and one's own contribution to the movement might also increase (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Furthermore, as repression increases, bystanders might also join the movement, hence, the likelihood of solidifying the identity of the movement is also increased (Saab et al., 2015). Contrary to hypothesis H7, perceived likelihood of risk did not predict moral obligation (*B* = .05, *SE* =.08, $p = .469$, [-.102, .234]).

As expected, outrage (*B* = .27, *SE* = .06, *p* = .001, [.155, .389]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .24, *SE* = .08, *p* = .004, [.075, .399]), participative efficacy (*B* = .24, *SE*=.09, *p* = .011, [.048, .404]), and politicised identification (*B* = .28, *SE* = .10, *p* = .009, [.068, .465]) positively predicted moral obligation, confirming hypotheses H9, H11, H12, and H13 respectively. However, fear (*B* = .04, *SE* =.05, *p* = .344, [-.046, .133]) and political efficacy (*B* = -.08, *SE* = .07, *p* = .265, [-.220, .058]) did not predict moral obligation. Hence, hypotheses H8 and H10 are not confirmed.

In line with the hypotheses, politicised identification (H19; *B* = .31, *SE* = .13, *p* < .021, [.052, .572]) and moral obligation (H20; *B* = .29, *SE* = .11, *p* = .005, [.090, .554]) positively predicted collective action intentions. Contrary to the hypotheses, perceived likelihood of risk (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .11, *p* = .641, [-.279, .159]), fear (H14; *B* = -.04, *SE* = .06, *p* = .474, [-.157, .070]), outrage (H15; *B* = .08, *SE* = .09, *p* = .381, [-.085, .264]), political efficacy (H16; *B* = .04, *SE* = .09, *p* = .713, [-.143, .213]), identity consolidation efficacy (H17; *B* = .14, *SE* = .11, *p* = .177, [-.065, .358]), and participative efficacy (H18; *B* = .09, *SE* = .12, *p* = .459, [-.159, .322]) did not predict collective action. The model explained 69% of the variance in collective action intentions. I summarised the results in Figure 4.



Figure 4: Results of path analysis using AMOS (version 23) within the Hong Kong context. The dashed arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Indirect Paths. As hypothesised, perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted moral obligation (.50, *SE*= .11, $p < .001$, [.278, .703]). PROCESS showed that this indirect path was specifically through outrage (.14, *SE* = .05, $p = .002$, [.053, .246]), identity consolidation efficacy (.10, *SE* = .05, $p = .020$, [.029, .223]), participative efficacy (.13, *SE* = .06, $p = .016$, [.034, .253]), and politicised identification (.13, *SE* = .06, $p = .011$, [.035, .264]). The total path from likelihood of risk to moral obligation was positive and significant (.55, *SE* = .12, $p = .001$, [.299, .765]).

As expected, perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action (.43, *SE* = .11, $p < .001$, [.230, .640]). PROCESS showed that this indirect link is through politicised identification (15, *SE* = .07, $p = .020$, [.032, .326]), and moral obligation (.16, *SE* = .07, $p = .026$, [.047, .331]). However, none of the specific serial mediational paths was significant. The total path from perceived likelihood of risk to collective action was positive and significant (.39, *SE* = .15, $p = .016$, [.077, .646]). The positive indirect and total paths from likelihood of risk to collective action confirm the backfire effect of authority sanctions, and these specific indirect relations delineate the specific "micro-mobilisation" processes that incite further resistance in the face of repression (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523).

Moreover, outrage (.08, *SE* = .04, p = .005, [.022, .173]), identity consolidation efficacy (.07, *SE* = .04, $p = .006$, [.013, .179]), participative efficacy (.07, *SE* = .04, $p = .008$, [.015, .168]), and politicised identification (.08, *SE* = .04, $p = .006$, [.018, .205]) had significant indirect links to action intentions through moral obligation. These indirect links show that the roles of these antecedents in predicting collective action is partly due to their positive links to moral obligation, hence, confirm the hypothesis that moral obligation is the most proximal predictor of action intentions.

The period during which I launched the survey might explain the non-significant results related to the direct paths from outrage[11] and efficacy beliefs (political, identity consolidation as well as participative efficacies) to collective action intentions. During November 2014, the Umbrella Movement was losing momentum (Pao, 2014). In fact, the public support for the movement had severely decreased by November since the

[11] The non-significant role of outrage in directly predicting collective action intentions can be partly explained by the ceiling effect (e.g., 82.6 % of participants scored above the scale's midpoint).

public perceived the protests as needing to change their strategy, and preferred accepting the proposed electoral system. Moreover, the protest movement had no clear strategy for how to proceed, and the government was not showing any signs for potential concessions (Pao, 2014). During such difficult periods for a protest movement, efficacy beliefs and outrage might not be strong enough to motivate individuals to engage in collective action under considerable risk. However, these variables (except for political efficacy) indirectly contributed to action intentions through increasing participants' moral obligation to take action. One's sense of responsibility and social identity of a protester seem to play crucial role in motivating individuals to take action under such circumstances.

The next study (Study 3) examined the hypothesised model in a different context that is also characterised by authorities' long-term repression of civil resistance. Particularly, the study targeted the protests demanding greater political and civil freedom in Russia. I first provide a brief description of the political context in Russia, then I summarise the methodology and results.

Study 3: Russia

Russia witnessed several protests starting in 2004 / 2005 (Henry, 2012; Javeline & Linderman-Komarova, 2010; Smyth, Soboleva, Shimek, & Sobolev, 2013). The protests were about different political and economic issues. With time, the protests grew bigger, and in 2005 Russia witnessed protests throughout its territory. Some protests were mainly about economic concerns and were organised primarily by the labour unions. Other protests had more political underpinnings; they were against the perceived authoritarian and corrupt regime, and the limited political rights the citizens were allowed to have (e.g., Strategy 31, KPRF May Day, and Russia Marches). Few other protests addressed more specific issues such as educational and social reforms (Smyth et al., 2013).

In 2011 Russia witnessed a new wave of protests. These protests were against the perceived authoritarian, inefficient, and corrupt government, and were a reaction to the 2011-2012 Russian legislative and presidential elections perceived by many as illegitimate and fraudulent (Ross, 2015; please refer to Gel'man (2015) for an overview of the opposition movement in Russia). The opposition movement gathered the opposition, the left civil activists, as well as the wider society that was against the

elections and the hostility of the authorities (Gel'man, 2015). The protests were first of small scale, mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg. However, with time, they escalated into massive protests in Moscow, and spread across the country. The protesters demanded political and economic reforms. They called for political prisoners to be freed, political freedoms to be respected and broadened (i.e., registration of opposition parties), and corruption to end. These protests challenged the authority, and tried to draw attention to the government's corruption and the abolition of Russian citizens' political rights. During these protests, the authorities arrested hundreds of protesters, and imprisoned few of the main leaders of the protests.

From June 2012, new laws were implemented to impose penalties for any collective action that is not sanctioned by the authorities. Putin also signed a law that imprisons for up to five years anyone who tries to threatens the integrity of Russia, even if such threats are called for online (Demirjian, 2014). Moreover, the authorities harassed several opposition leaders and scrutinised the NGOs which participate in activism (Amnesty International, 2014; Demirjian, 2014; International Federation for Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Centre, 2014; Lyytikainen, 2013; Niemelainen, 2013). Furthermore, several websites were censored and even blocked for voicing the authorities' breaches of human rights (Amnesty International, 2014).

With the 2011 protests, the opposition movements gained momentum and voiced discontent toward various social and political issues (Sakwa, 2014). In general, the opposition movement held occasional protests, and the political opponents were regularly active on social networks. During late 2013 and early 2014, protests were organised against the Russian authorities' interference in Ukraine, specifically regarding the Crimean conflict.

Specific to the time period during which the survey was conducted, the Russian activists were attempting to organise the annual May 6 protests day, which are a commemoration of the 2012 protests against the inauguration of Putin, during which protesters were harshly repressed, hundreds were arrested, and several were imprisoned and trialled. The government was trying to repress any potential mobilisation, and refused to authorise any protest (Amnesty International, 2014).

Method

Procedure and Respondents

On 2nd of May 2014, few days before the expected May 6 protests, an online survey was launched targeting the opposition movement in Russia (Elder, 2013). The link to the survey, advertised as a research project examining the protests in Russia, was sent to a group of activists, as well as posted on one of the pro-oppositional radio station's website called Eco of Moscow.

A total of 308 participants completed the survey (156 women, 152 men; M_{age} = 37.52, *SD*= 11.34). Most participants (46.3%) were from Moscow, and nearly all (94.5%) had higher education. 165 participants identified themselves as part of the protest movement in Russia, and the majority had some level of past participation in collective action; 1.9% were protest organisers, 9.4% were regular protesters, 42.9% were occasional protesters, and 21.8% were active on social networks.

Measures

Two bilingual speakers translated and back-translated the survey into Russian. Participants completed measures of the key variables, as well as a series of questions I did not analyse in this thesis (please refer to the appendix for the full items lists).

I measured support for protest movement, past involvement in protests, outrage, fear, participative efficacy (r = .76, p < .001), politicised identification (α = .92), and moral obligation (α = .96) using the same measures as in Study 2, but adapted to the Russian context.

Likelihood of risk. I measured perception of risk using seven items on five-point scales ranging from *very unlikely* (1) to *very likely* (5) (e.g., "being harassed by the police", "risking employment or university degree", "being tortured", "being killed", α = .92). The items were specific to the Russian context.

Political efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the protests in Russia to achieve nine goals (e.g., "end of corruption in Russia", "registration of oppositional parties", "passing the new democratic legislation", "defence of human rights", α = .93).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Using five-point scales (1= *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants evaluated how likely it was for the protests in Russia to achieve three goals (e.g., "increase public support for the protests in Russia", "strengthen the

solidarity among the protesters", "ensure international support for the protests in Russia", α = .78; adapted from Saab et al., 2015).

The three-factor solution for political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies was a fair fit to the present data ($\chi^2(68) = 172.059$, $p < .001$, with χ^2/df ration of 2.53 < 3.00, CFI = .960, RMSEA= .071, [.059, .084], *p*-close = .005; AIC = 246.059). Inspection of the M.I. suggested that the model misfit is due to covariances between items of different factors. I decided to consider these factors as three different constructs to be consistent with the theoretical frame I am following, and since it was a better fit compared to a one factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 34.707$, $p < .001$).

Future collective action. Participants rated their willingness to engage in sanctioned peaceful collective action[12] using a single item on a five-point scale ranging from *not at all willing* (1) to *extremely willing* (5) (e.g., "Please tell us how likely it is that you would engage in sanctioned, non-violent protest actions (e.g. protesting, demonstrating, being active on social networks) in the very near future").

Demographics. I also collected information on participants' gender (1 = *male*, 2 = *female*), socioeconomic status (from 1 = *less than 15 000 RUB* to 6 = *more than 120 000 RUB*), education level (from 1 = *primary and below* to 5 = *university degree*), and current residence (e.g., Moscow, Saint Petersburgh, Other).

Results and Discussion

Missing value analysis and data screening

Most variables had less than 5% of missing values, except for age, moral obligation, and willingness to engage in future collective action, which had missing values between 7.5 and 23%. Fear had missing values of 39.7%. I used the Little's Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test in SPSS to examine the missing values' pattern of distribution. Little MCAR test was non-significant, $\chi^2(1087) = 1156.346$, $p = .071$, indicating a completely at random pattern of missing values. I used the expectation-maximization (EM) method to impute the missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). I corrected the out of range imputed scores to the closest acceptable value. I noted only few differences when I repeated the analyses with listwise deletion[13]. I

[12] Peaceful sanctioned collective action refers to actions (e.g., demonstrations, protests, etc) that have received prior approval from the authorities.

[13] The proposed model showed a very good fit, $\chi^2(10) = 13.181$, $p = .214$, with χ^2/df ratio 1.318 < 3.00, CFI = .997, RMSEA =.032, [.000, .074] with *p*-close = .708, AIC=

deleted three multivariate outliers identified through Casewise diagnostic. The final sample was composed of 305 participants.

I present the means and standard deviations and the Pearson correlations between the variables in Table 4.

147.181. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .08, *SE* = .06, *p* = .219) and political efficacy (*B* = -.11, *SE* = .07, *p* = .085) did not predict moral obligation. Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .09, *SE* = .06, *p* = .155) and participative efficacy (*B* = .10, *SE* = .06, *p* = .090) did not predict collective action intentions. The indirect path from likelihood of risk to moral obligation through fear and participative efficacy was not significant (-.02, *SE* = .03, [-.073, .032] and .00, *SE* = .03, [-.043, .007] respectively). The indirect path from likelihood of risk to collective action intentions via outrage and participative efficacy were not significant (.03, *SE* = .02, *p* = .163, [-.001, .10]; .00, *SE* = .01, *p* = .999, [-.019, .017]). Moral obligation had no significant mediating role in the relation between fear and collective action intentions (-.02, *SE* = .03, *p* = .315, [-.091, .025]).

Table 4*: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation between the Variables within the Russian Context*

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Likelihood of Risk	3.40	.91	1.000										
2. Outrage	3.34	1.34	.37**	1.000									
3. Fear	2.25	.86	.34**	.13*	1.000								
4. Political Efficacy	2.60	.79	-.16*	.05	-.11	1.000							
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	3.40	.82	.14**	.24**	.09	.40**	1.000						
6. Participative Efficacy	2.77	1.06	.19**	.27**	-.02	.35**	.39**	1.000					
7. Politicised Identification	2.96	1.01	.39**	.43**	.05	.13*	.36**	.59**	1.000				
8. Moral Obligation	3.31	1.16	.36**	.47**	-.05	.07	.27**	.59**	.77**	1.000			
9. Future Collective Action	3.26	1.14	.21**	.45**	-.19**	.19**	.35**	.58**	.72**	.76**	1.000		
10. Past Involvement	2.37	1.17	.14*	.30**	-.14*	.16**	.20**	.45**	.55**	.64**	.65**	1.000	
11. Age	3.40	.91	.10	.19**	-.20**	.05	.01	.15**	.28**	.28**	.22**	.17**	1.000

Note: *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Path Analysis

I tested the same model I tested within the Hong Kong context. I considered past involvement in protests and age as covariates[14].

Since there was significant multivariate kurtosis (13.130, c.r.= 6.780), I again used bootstrapping with 5000 re-samples and examined 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals.

Structural Model. The proposed model showed a good fit, $\chi^2(10) = 17.273$, $p = .069$, with χ^2/df ratio of 1.727 < 3.00, CFI = .995, RMSEA =. 049, [.000, .087] with *p*-close = .469, AIC = 129.273.

Direct Paths. As expected, perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted fear (*B* = .36, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.271, .469]), confirming hypothesis H1. Perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted outrage (*B* = .48, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.316, .629]), once again confirming hypothesis H2, and suggesting that once repression is considered as grievances, it can increase feelings of outrage. Moreover, perceptions of risk positively predicted participative efficacy (H5b; *B* = .14, *SE* = .06, *p* = .027, [.017, .259]), politicised identification (H6; *B* = .34, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.233, .432]), and moral obligation (H7; *B* = .09, *SE* =.04, *p* = .031, [.010, .177]). These significant relations suggest that protesters perceive facing repression as a fate they share with

[14] Age was considered as covariate as it significantly correlated with several of the main antecedents and collective action. It positively correlated with past involvement (*r* = .17, *p* < .001), outrage (*r* = .19, *p* < .001), fear (*r* = -.20, *p* < .001), participative efficacy (*r* = .15, *p* = .009), moral obligation (*r* = .28, *p* < .001), politicised identification (*r* = .28, *p* < .001), and collective action (*r* = .22, *p* = .003).
Past participation in collective action positively predicted perceived likelihood of risk (*B* = .11, *SE* = .04, *p* = .020, [.019, .192]), outrage (*B* = .27, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.150, .385]), political efficacy (*B* = .13, *SE* = .04, *p* = .001, [.050, .207]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B*= .13, *SE* = .04, *p* = .002, [.055, .208]), participative efficacy (*B* = .38, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.293, .474]), politicised identification (*B* = .41, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.330, .483]), and moral obligation (*B* = .27, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.205, .345]). Past participation negatively predicted fear (*B* = -.12, *SE* = .04, *p* = .003, [-.185, -.045]. It positively predicted collective action (*B* = .19, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.113, .275].
Age positively predicted past involvement in protests (*B* = .02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .002, [.007, .028]), outrage (*B* = .01, *SE* = .01, *p* = .033, [.001, .026]), and politicised identification (*B* = .02, *SE* = .00, *p* < .001, [.007, .024]). Age negatively predicted fear (*B* = -.02, *SE* = .00, *p* < .001, [-.024, -.007]). It did not predict participative efficacy (*B* = .01, *SE* = .00, *p* = .192, [-.003, .015]), moral obligation (*B* = .00, *SE* = .00, *p* = .220, [-.002, .010]), nor collective action intentions (*B* = -.01, *SE* = .00, *p* = .165, [-.011, .002]).

other protesters. This perception can increase their feelings of solidarity with each other, feelings of empowerment, as well as involvement in the movement. Consequently, their identification with the movement is increased, along with their belief that their own involvement will incrementally contribute to the protest movement achieving its goals, as well as their sense of obligation to take action (Drury & Reicher, 2000). Confirming hypothesis H3a, perceived likelihood of risk negatively predicted political efficacy (*B* = -.17, *SE* = .05, *p* = .002, [-.267, -.059]), which potentially suggests that repression can be perceived as authorities' ability to suppress movements' demands (Muller, 1985; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Contrary to hypothesis H4, perceived likelihood of risk did not predict identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .10, *SE* = .06, *p* = .097, [-.017, .259]).

As expected, outrage (*B* = .11, *SE* = .03, *p* = .001, [.052, .182]), participative efficacy (*B* = .21, *SE* =.05, *p* < .001, [.110, .323]), and politicised identification (*B* = .50, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.372, .625]) positively predicted moral obligation, confirming hypotheses H9, H12, and H13 respectively. Interestingly, confirming hypothesis H10, political efficacy (*B* = -.13, *SE* = .05, *p* = .006, [-.230, -.040]) negatively predicted moral obligation. Contrary to hypotheses H8 and H11, fear (*B* = -.10, *SE* =.05, *p* = .057, [-.200, .002]) and identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = -.03, *SE* = .05, *p* = .591, [-.134, .076]) did not predict moral obligation.

As predicted, outrage (*B* = .11, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.057, .181]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .12, *SE* = .05, *p* = .016, [.023, .207]), participative efficacy (*B* = .10, *SE* = .05, *p* = .028, [.012, .204]), politicised identification (*B* = .30, *SE* = .07, *p* = .001, [.157, .437]), and moral obligation (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.182, .444]) positively predicted collective action intentions, confirming hypotheses H15, H17, H18, H19, and H20 respectively. Fear (*B* = -.24, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [-.343, -.129]) negatively predicted action intentions confirming hypothesis H14. Contrary to the hypotheses, political efficacy (H16; *B* = .00, *SE* = .05, *p* = .947, [-.094, .102]) and perceived likelihood of risk (*B* = -.06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .242, [-.178, .042]) did not predict collective action intentions. The model explained 72% of the variance in collective action intentions. I summarised the results in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Results of path analysis using AMOS (version 23) within the Russian Context. The dashed arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Indirect Paths. The perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted moral obligation (.24, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.159, .314]). PROCESS showed that this indirect path is specifically through outrage (.06, *SE* = .02, *p* = .002, [.024, .104]), fear (-.04, *SE* = .02, *p* = .040, [-.073, -.000]), political efficacy (.02, *SE* = .01, *p* = .050, [.005, .051]), participative efficacy (.03, *SE* = .02, *p* = .041, [.006, .069]), and politicised identification (.17, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.111, .244]). The total path from perceived likelihood of risk to moral obligation was positive and significant (.33, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.240, .415]). These results firstly confirm the argument that facing risks associated with one's engagement in collective action might increase one's obligation to take action not only directly, but also indirectly through increasing outrage, participative efficacy, and politicised identification. Interestingly, fear had an inhibitory role through decreasing the positive link between perceived likelihood of risk and moral obligation. Furthermore, political efficacy was a mediator in the relation between perceived likelihood of risk and moral obligation, whereby perceived likelihood of risk decreases individuals' political efficacy, and this decrease in political efficacy would promote an increase of moral obligation.

The perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action (.20, *SE* = .049, *p* < .001, [.108, .298]) through outrage (.06, *SE* = .02, *p* = .002, [.024, .099]), fear (-.09, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [-.143, -.042]), participative efficacy (.01, *SE* = .01, *p* = .126, [.001, .042]), politicised identification (.10, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.052, .162]), and moral obligation (.10, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.055, .162]).

Regarding the specific serial mediational path from likelihood of risk to action intentions, the path through outrage to moral obligation to collective action (.02, *SE* = .01, [.004, .027]), through fear to moral obligation to collective action (-.01, *SE* = .01, [-.025, -.001]), through political efficacy to moral obligation to collective action (.01, *SE* = .00, [.002, .020]), and through politicised identification to moral obligation to collective action (.03, *SE* = .01, [.014, .064]) were significant.

The total path from the perceived likelihood of risk to collective action was positive and significant (.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .025, [.014, .247]). This significant positive indirect and total path from likelihood of risk to collective action confirm the hypothesis that risks, rather than reducing willingness to engage in collective action, increase individuals' motivation to participate in collective action. These results also highlight

the specific "micro-mobilisation" processes encouraging further action (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523; White, 1989). Fear, as expected, had an inhibitory role through decreasing the positive link between likelihood of risk and collective action.

Outrage (.04, *SE* = .01, p < .001, [.015, .068]), fear (-.03, *SE* = .02, *p* = .033, [-.072, -.003]), political efficacy (-.04, *SE* = .02, *p* = .004, [-.087, -.012]), participative efficacy (.07, *SE* = .02, *p* < .001, [.031, .121]), and politicised identification (.16, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.091, .241]) indirectly predicted action intentions through moral obligation. The total link of outrage (.15, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.084, .227]), fear (-.27, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [-.379, -.152]), participative efficacy (.17, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.073, .279]), and politicised identification (.46, *SE* = .07, *p* = .001, [.317, .580]) to collective action was significant. As in Study 2, these significant relations confirm the argument that moral obligation is the most proximal predictor of collective action.

I would like to highlight a few of the results in this study. The results affirm the backfiring effect of repression (Martin, 2012) whereby repression is expected to increase further dissent through inciting feelings of outrage. In fact, the results showed that perceptions of risk positively predicted outrage, which positively predicted action intentions directly and indirectly through moral obligation, and played a significant mediating role in the relation between perception of risk and action intentions.

In line with the hypotheses, fear had an inhibitory role. In fact, perception of risk positively predicted fear, which, in turn, negatively predicted the willingness to engage in future action. Moreover, the likelihood of risk had a negative indirect path to moral obligation through fear, and fear had a negative indirect path to action intentions through moral obligation. The inhibitory role of fear is in line with research in risk taking behaviour showing fear's association with cautious and risk-averse behavioural decisions (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Smith & Kirby 2001). It also resonates with research in collective action literature, whereby fear mediates the relation between grievances and 'exit' behaviour (Dumont et al., 2003; Miller et al., 2009; Osborne, et al., 2012; Saab et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2008).

Interestingly, political efficacy negatively predicted moral obligation, and had an indirect negative path to collective action through moral obligation. This finding is in line with Stürmer et al. (2003) who found a negative, though non-significant, relation between political efficacy and moral obligation. I suggest that this finding highlight the

processes underlying the "free rider effect" (Olson, 1968). The more an individual feels that the protest movement is able to achieve the goals and he/she has the chance to enjoy the outcomes without risking anything, the less likely he/she feels the obligation or responsibility to take part, hence, the less likely the motivation to get engaged. This is an important finding as it highlights the potential deterring role political efficacy can play in such risky contexts. Hence, the political efficacy of collective action can partially reduce one's motivation to take action through decreasing participants' intrinsic motivation (i.e., moral obligation) which seems to be based on identity related processes such as politicised identification, outrage, identity consolidation efficacy and participative efficacy (a point I will elaborate in the following sections). Consequently, protest organisers can consider not overly promoting the protest movement's ability to achieve the political or social goals, since this political efficacy can motivate some not to take part, as they would feel no obligation to take part since there is no need for their own contribution.

Moreover, participative efficacy was a significant mediator in the relation between risks and action intentions, and it significantly predicted the willingness to engage in collective action directly and indirectly through moral obligation. This significance highlights that personal contribution is not only important in contexts where political efficacy is high (van Zomeren et al., 2013), but also in repressive contexts where activists are facing substantial risks to their wellbeing. In sum, the differential significance of the different types of efficacies (i.e., the positive role of participative efficacy in directly and indirectly, and of identity consolidation efficacy in directly, predicting collective action, along with the negative role of political efficacy) confirm the importance of delineating different efficacy beliefs individuals participating in collective action might have.

The particular Russian context provides some understanding of the pattern of results. Having been under autocratic rule for decades, the Russian population's belief that changing the political system is possible through collective action might have weakened (i.e., participants scored below the median on political efficacy), hence, political efficacy was not a particularly significant motivation to take part. However, the likelihood of building a protest movement and personally contributing to the movement significantly motivated individuals to take part in collective action. The significance of

the likelihood of solidifying the protest movement identity is in line with Smith et al. (2013) interviews, where activists highlighted the importance of reaching to the wider population for broader awareness and support for the movement, and forming alliances with different movements and organisations to ensure the success of the protests. Moreover, their interviews confirmed the significant role of politicised identification and moral obligation as motives to engage in protests. In fact, participants referred to the importance of the emotional ties with their fellow activists, investment in movement, and their moral duty to participate in collective action as their main drives for participating in the protests. They are also in line with Lukyanova's (2016) qualitative interviews with Russian activists who have also argued for the importance of solidarity they feel with their fellow activists and the necessity to participate in the protests to ensure that a large number of protesters are present at the scenes as motives for their participation.

Furthermore, the inhibitory role of fear can also be explained by the specific context. New anti-protest laws were passed not long after the survey was launched, however, the rumors for such repressive measures were prevalent (Demirjian, 2014; Lukyanova, 2016). Hence, participants might have perceived participating in collective action as particularly fearful, and this fear might have been strong enough to decrease their willingness to engage in collective action.

The third context I examined was Ukraine. The survey targeted the protests which were against the annexation of the south eastern regions in Ukraine, and which were harshly repressed by the pro-Russian agents. Ukraine provided a new political context quite different from the previous two contexts as the protests had a different political underpinning. Specifically, Ukraine protests were against the separation of south eastern regions in Ukraine, as well as a foreign country's (i.e., Russian) intervention in one's independent country. Moreover, Ukraine had witnessed a bloody wave of protests earlier that year, and was facing an armed resistance promoting the separation. The two previous protest movements (studies 2 and 3) did not face any armed resistance, and were not directed against foreign interventions or the loss of national territories. In the following section, I briefly summarise the waves of protests Ukraine witnessed over the past decade, and the specific time period during which I

launched the survey. I then summarise the methodology I followed and the results of the study.

Study 4: Ukraine

Ukraine witnessed several waves of protests within the past decade. In 2004-2005, the Orange Revolution spread across Ukraine. The protests first started as a response to the perceived electoral fraud, whereby Mr. Yanukovych, considered a pro-Russian and corrupt candidate, was elected president of the country. This revolution highlighted the regional divide in Ukraine, whereby Ukrainians from the West and Central Ukraine promoted these protests, and the Eastern Ukrainians strongly opposed these protests (Kuzio, 2010). Moreover, the Western and Central Ukrainians promoted pro-Western economic and political reforms, as for the Eastern Ukrainians, they were pro-Russia and preferred closer political and economic ties with Russia (for an overview, see Kuzio, 2010). The Orange Revolution allowed the opposition movement to seize power in Ukraine.

During November – December 2013, Ukraine witnessed the beginning of a new wave of protests, the Euromaidan protests. The Euromaidan protesters demanded the Ukrainian government to be a closer ally of the West, rather than of Russia, and sign an agreement with Europe. However, Mr. Yanukovych, the president of Ukraine during that period, disregarded the protesters' demands and agreed to sign a deal with Russia which would help Ukraine financially. The protesters perceived not signing the agreement with Europe as a threat to Ukraine's future integration with Europe (BBC news, 2014). These protests gained momentum when on November 30 2013 the security forces brutally repressed the protesters and hundreds were injured. As a consequence, the protesters started demanding respect of human rights and civil liberties (e.g., peaceful protests and demonstrations), and voicing their dissatisfaction with the government, corruption in general, and the economic situation of the country (Duvell & Lapshyna, 2015). The Euromaidan protests were successful in ousting Yanukovych, and the opposition movement took power.

During these various protest waves, the government and pro-Russian agents violently repressed the protesters. They heavily used water cannons, tear gas, harassments, arrests, detainment, and physical violence (Amnesty International, n.d.). For example, during the Orange Revolution (in 2004-2005) and the Euromaidan

protests (during 2013-2014), thousands of protesters were injured and hundred others were killed by snipers and heavily armed state or Russian agents (BBC news, 2014; Popova, 2014). Moreover, some reported the disappearances of activists, who after being tortured or humiliated were left in hospitals or forests across the country, or whose fate remained unknown (Blair, 2014; Chivers, 2014).

After Euromaidan, the divide between the Western / Central and Southeaster Ukraine was accentuated. In general, the citizens in south-eastern Ukraine were dissatisfied with the political developments in Kiev, whereby the government was supporting more independent relations with Russia, and closer ties to Europe (Dearden, 2014; Duvell & Lapshyna, 2015). The southeast Ukrainians felt alienated from power and feelings of discontent increased in these regions. In March 2014, this divide culminated in the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian authorities (Dearden, 2014; Duvell & Lapshyna, 2015). Furthermore, during April 2014, pro-Russian separatists subjugated governmental buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk, and on May 11, 2014, they claimed that 90% of the residents in Donetsk and Luhansk support separating these two regions from Ukraine (Williams, 2014). Several protests were organised to oppose the pro-separatists in these regions (Williams, 2014). The government in Kiev issued an operation to fight the pro-separatists in an attempt to reclaim power within these regions (Kirby, 2015). An armed conflict erupted in these regions, and the outbreak of conflict resulted in more than 5,600 deaths, 13,961 wounded, and around one million internally displaced (Amnesty International, 2014, 2015; Kirby, 2015; see BBC (2014) for the timeline of events).

I focused on the protests against the separation/federalisation of the eastern regions of Ukraine, as well as the general disapproval of the Russian interference in the country's political life in the southeast of the country (see Bebler (2015) for a brief review of events).

Method

Procedure and Respondents

The survey was launched on 24th of August 2014, at a time when the conflict between Ukraine and Russia was progressing at alarming rates and the threat of war was prevalent. The research was advertised as a study about the protests around the Eastern Ukraine question. The link to the survey was disseminated through sending mass emails

to personal contacts, contacting a local NGO in the southeast region, and posting on several Facebook webpages which were posting or discussing the events in the South East of Ukraine. A total of 136 participants filled in the survey (77 women, 59 men; M_{age} = 32.22, *SD* = 8.70). Most participants (89.7%) were of Ukrainian ethnic background, the majority (38.6%) was living in Kiev, and most (87 %) had completed higher education. 120 participants self-identified as being part of the protest movement and the majority had some level of past participation in collective action; 5.9% were protest organisers, 25% were regular protesters, 33.1% were occasional protesters, and 22.1% were active on social networks.

Measures

Two bilingual speakers separately translated the survey to Ukrainian and Russian, and corrected the inconsistencies. Participants had the option to fill in the Russian or Ukrainian versions of the survey. Along with the main measurements, participants completed series of other items not part of this thesis (please refer to the appendix for the full item lists).

I measured support for protest movement, past involvement in protests, outrage, fear, participative efficacy (r = .90, $p < .001$), politicised identification (α = .94), and moral obligation (α = .96) using the same measures as in Studies 2 and 3, but adapted to the Ukrainian context.

Likelihood of risk. Participants evaluated the likelihood of being subject to eight risks using five-point Likert scales (1 = *very unlikely* to *5 = very likely)* (e.g., "risking employment/or university degree", "being harassed by the opponent parties' representatives", "being blackmailed by state controlling units (such as tax inspection of personal businesses)", "being imprisoned or detained", "being tortured", and "being killed"; adapted from chapter 2, α = .91). These items were specific to the Ukrainian context.

Political efficacy. Participants rated how likely it was for the protests to achieve eight goals using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*) (e.g., "end corruption and nepotism in Ukraine", "achieve democratisation in Ukraine", and "defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine", α = .91).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the protests to achieve three goals

(e.g., "increase public support in Ukraine for the protests" and "ensure international support for the protest movement in Ukraine", α = .78; adapted from Saab et al., 2015).

A three-factor solution for political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies was a fair fit to the present data ($\chi^2(59) = 94.468$, $p = .002$, with χ^2/df ration of 1.602 < 3.00, CFI = .969, RMSEA= .067, [.040, .091], *p*-close = .136; AIC = 158.468). M.I. indicated that the misfit is due to covariances between items of different factors. Once again, I decided to consider these factors as three different constructs to be consistent with the theoretical frame I am following, and since a three factor solution was a better fit than a one factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 19.028$, $p < .001$).

Future collective action. Using a single item, participants rated their willingness to engage in nonviolent protest actions on a five-point scale ranging from *not at all willing* (1) to *extremely willing* (5) (e.g., "if the situation in Ukraine does not improve, please tell us how willing you would be to engage in nonviolent protest actions (i.e., protesting, demostrating, being active on social networks) in the very near future").

Demographics. I also gathered information on participants' age, gender (1 = *male*, 2 = *female*), socioeconomic status (from 1 = *less than 2000 HRN* to 6 = *more than 200 000 HRN*), education level (from 1 = *below secondary* to 5 = *completed higher education*), and current residence (e.g., city of Kiev, city of Sebastopol, Crimea, Donetska Oblast, Kharkiv Oblas).

Results and Discussion

Missing value analysis and data screening

The likelihood of risk, participative efficacy, fear, moral obligation, and collective action had missing values between 5.9 and 19.1 %. The remaining variables had less than 5% missing values. I used the Little's Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test in SPSS to examine the missing values' pattern of distribution. Little's MCAR test was non-significant, χ^2 (852) = 876.374, $p = .274$, indicating that the missing values have a completely random pattern. I used the expectation-maximization (EM) method to impute the missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). I corrected the

out of range imputed scores to the closest acceptable value. I noted only few differences in results when I repeated the analyses with listwise deletion[15].

I present the means and standard deviations, and the Pearson correlations between the various variables in Table 5.

[15] The proposed model showed a good fit, $\chi^2(6) = 4.70$, $p = .583$, with χ^2/df ratio 0.783 < 3.00, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA =.000, [.000, .097] with *p*-close = .752, AIC= 122.700. Participative efficacy did not predict moral obligation (*B* = .165, *SE* = .087, *p* = .056). Moral obligation was not a significant mediator in the relation between participative efficacy and collective action intentions (*B* = .041, *SE* = .037, *p* = .187, [-.006, .153]). The mediation effect for politicised identification only approached significance (*B* = .128, *SE* = .11, *p* = .060, [-.009, .407]).

Table 5*: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation between the Various Variables within the Ukrainian Context*

	Means	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Likelihood of Risk	3.11	.83	1.000									
2. Outrage	3.73	1.09	.07	1.000								
3. Fear	2.04	.88	.44**	-.04	1.000							
4. Political Efficacy	3.38	.85	-.02	.21*	-.02	1.000						
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	3.79	.77	-.02	.20*	-.02	.54**	1.000					
6. Participative Efficacy	3.51	.99	-.04	.34**	-.07	.52**	.48**	1.000				
7. Politicised Identification	3.77	.89	.02	.37**	.07	.49**	.51**	.62**	1.000			
8. Moral Obligation	3.71	1.07	.00	.36**	-.03	.49**	.46**	.64**	.75**	1.000		
9. Future Collective Action	3.89	.94	-.06	.28**	.03	.37**	.45**	.54**	.65**	.65**	1.000	
10. Past Involvement	2.78	1.22	.06	.24**	.02	.23**	.32**	.47**	.55**	.57**	.44**	1.000

Note: *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Path Analysis

I tested the same model proposed in the previous two studies. I considered past involvement in protests as a covariate[16]. Data screening revealed that the Multivariate normality assumption is not met within the data set, with Multivariate Kurtosis of 23.464, c.r. = 8.832 (> 1.96). As in the previous studies, I followed the bootstrapping procedure with 5000 bootstrap sample and examined the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals to address the non-normality issue and followed the same fit criteria as in the previous two studies.

Structural Model. The proposed model showed a good fit, $\chi^2(7) = 12.166$, $p = .095$, with χ^2/df ratio of 1.738 < 3.00, CFI = .990, RMSEA = .074, [.000, .142] with *p*-close = .244, AIC = 108.166. Based on the modification indices I included a covariance between outrage and participative efficacy (please refer to Study 2 for the rational of including this covariance). The fit was very good, $\chi^2(6) = 5.927$, $p = .431$, with χ^2/df ratio of .988 < 3.00, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA = .000, [.000, .111] with *p*-close = .628, AIC = 103.927.

Direct Paths. The perceived likelihood of risk only predicted fear (*B* = .46, *SE* = .10, $p < .001$, [.279, .659]), confirming H1. Contrary to the hypotheses, the perceived likelihood of risk did not predict any of the remaining variables: outrage (H2; *B* = .07, *SE* = .13, *p* = .618, [-.188, .309]), political efficacy (H3a/b; *B* = -.04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .713, [-.228, .165]), identity consolidation efficacy (H4a/b; *B* = -.03, *SE* = .07, *p* = .634, [-.173, .109]), participative efficacy (H5a/b; *B* = -.08, *SE* = .09, *p* = .341, [-.267, .097]), politicised identification (H6; *B* = -.02, *SE* = .09, *p* = .818, [-.191, .151]), or moral obligation (H7; *B* = .01, *SE* = .09, *p* = .772, [-.138, .215]).

In line with hypotheses H12 and H13, participative efficacy (*B* = .18, *SE* = .09, *p* = .050, [.000, .355]) and politicised identification (*B* = .55, *SE* = .11, $p < .001$, [.324, .760]) positively predicted moral obligation. Fear, outrage, political efficacy, and identity consolidation efficacy were not significant predictors of moral obligation (H8,

[16] Past participation in collective action positively predicted outrage (*B* = .21, *SE* = .07, *p* = .006, [.064, .352]), political efficacy (*B* = .159, *SE* = .06, *p* = .004, [.047, .276]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .20, *SE* = .06, $p < .001$, [.088, .314]), participative efficacy (*B* = .38, *SE* = .06, $p < .001$, [.257, .513]), politicised identification (*B* = .40, *SE* = .06, $p < .001$, [.279, .518]), and moral obligation (*B* = .17, *SE* = .08, *p* = .001, [.067, .267]).

B = -.06, *SE* = .08, *p* = .398, [-.244, .085]; H9, *B* = .06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .329, [-.057, .168]); H10, *B* = .14, *SE* = .09, *p* = .095, [-.023, .336]), and H11, *B* = .02, *SE* = .09, *p* = .831, [-.161, .188], respectively).

Confirming hypotheses H19 and H20, and in line with the previous two studies, politicised identification (*B* = .30, *SE* = .13, *p* = .034, [.025, .536]) and moral obligation (*B* = .28, *SE* = .13, *p* = .011, [.055, .547]) positively predicted collective action intentions. Contrary to the hypotheses, the perceived likelihood of risk (*B* = -.10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .160, [-.257, .047]), fear (H14; *B* = .07, *SE* = .08, *p* = .292, [-.073, .226]), outrage (H15; *B* = .01, *SE* = .07, *p* = .786, [-.110, .147]), political efficacy (H16; *B* = -.06, *SE* = .10, *p* = .509, [-.270, .136]), identity consolidation efficacy (H17; *B* = .14, *SE* =.11, *p* = .189, [-.078, .364]), and participative efficacy (H18; *B* = .11, *SE* = .09, *p* = .243, [-.075, .289]) did not predict action intentions. The model explained 51% of the variance in collective action intentions. I summarised the results in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Results of path analysis using AMOS (version 23) within the Ukrainian Context. The dashed arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Indirect Paths. The perceived likelihood of risk had no significant indirect path to moral obligation (-.06, *SE* = .08, *p* = .423, [-.232, .100]). None of the antecedents were significant mediators. The total path from perceived likelihood of risk to moral obligation was also not significant (-.04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .624, [-.247, .153]). The perceived likelihood of risk also had no significant indirect path to collective action (.00, *SE* = .07, *p* = .848, [-.121, .152]). None of the antecedents were significant mediators, nor the serial mediational paths. The total path from likelihood of risk to collective action was also non-significant (-.10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .244, [-.260, .066]).

Participative efficacy (.05, *SE* = .03, p = .030, [.005, .141]) and politicised identification (.15, *SE* = .09, *p* = .009, [.028, .369]) indirectly predicted collective action through moral obligation. The total path from politicised identification to collective action (.45, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.270, .634]) was significant. These results, in line with the previous two studies, confirm the hypothesis that moral obligation is the most proximal predictor of collective action intentions. Moreover, the results also highlight the significant role of participative efficacy, politicised identification, and moral obligation in predicting collective action under risk, even when a different political context is considered.

The results from Ukraine were different from the two previous contexts as most of the hypotheses related to the perceived likelihood of risk were not supported; contrary to expectation, the perceived likelihood of risk did not predict any of the antecedents of collective action except for fear, and it had no significant indirect link to either moral obligation or action intentions. The non-significant results might be due to the historical period during which I launched the survey. Specifically, I measured risks related to the sanctions associated with participating in collective action. However, since Ukraine was at the edge of war with Russia, the risks associated with collective action might have been less pertinent compared to the risks and costs of war which are far more detrimental.

The last context in which I tested the proposed model was Turkey. Turkey presented a new context with a distinct social issue where protests were environmentally oriented. In particular, the protests were organised to refute the government led urbanisation and regeneration projects in Turkey. Although, the protests had an environmental issue at the core, they also reflected the general discontent

towards the perceived undemocratic rule in Turkey. These protests were harshly repressed by the authorities.

Study 5: Turkey

Turkey witnessed its own wave of protests which started in May 2013. The initial movement had the aim to prevent the destruction of Gezi Park in Istanbul and the construction of a shopping mall (Bilgin, 2013). By May 31st 2013, the environmentally oriented protests changed into political protests against Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's perceived authoritarian and anti-democratic rule once the police violently repressed the peaceful protesters in an attempt to evict the protesters from the park (Gokay & Shain, 2013; Morris, 2013). These protests expanded to Izmir and Ankara (Bilgin, 2013). Erdogan, however, ignored these protests and announced that the urbanisation and regeneration plans would take place as initially planned. His statement spurred more protests across several cities in the country. Erdogan accused these thousands of protesters of being radicals and terrorists (Bilgin 2013). The Gezi Park protests continued until June 25, after which the protests gradually lost momentum.

These protests highlighted the general discontent among part of the Turkish citizens who were dissatisfied with Erdogan and his government's perceived authoritarian and totalitarian rule (Bilgin, 2013; Gokay & Xypolia, 2013). Erdogan was perceived to control all the power, and suppress the civil society (e.g., journalists, academics), and political opposition (for a review, see Harrington, 2015). The protesters, hence, were mainly demanding their civil freedoms to be respected, voicing their disapproval of the Justice and Development Party government, and demanding the stopping of the construction of a mall and a mosque at Gezi Park. The protests, however, did not lead to any major political change, as Erdogan and his government stayed in power and no reforms were introduced (Bilgin, 2013).

Nevertheless, numerous protests are still taking place against the government led urbanisation and regeneration projects. The current protests target the government-led urbanisation projects across the country, including Heysel and Yirca, as well as Sulukule, Okmeydani, and Validbag in Istanbul. These projects are developed without any consultation with the local residents and no environmental considerations, and the implementation of these projects are not monitored (Pierini, 2013). The urban regeneration projects and the protests against these plans are now considered to

represent the Turkish citizen's struggle with the government which amends the laws to facilitate these projects, which are in line with the its own interests, and uses force to suppress any attempted resistance (Pierini, 2013).

During these waves of protests, the police repeatedly used water cannons, tear gas, and rubber bullets to disperse the protesters; hundreds of protesters were arrested, thousands others injured, and eleven killed (Alexander, 2013; Amnesty International, 2015, March 27). The government is now suppressing the press, the freedom of assembly, freedom of expression, and controlling the judicial system (e.g., unfair trials of anyone questioning the authorities' rule) (Harington, 2015). Recently, on March 25, 2015, new reforms gave the police absolute power to repress any resistance including detaining people and using firearms (Amnesty International, 2015, March 27).

Method

Procedure and Respondents

I targeted the current protests against the government led urbanisation and regeneration projects. On May 22, 2015, an online survey was launched at the University of Ozyegin in Istanbul. The link to the survey was sent to the students taking Psychology classes. A total of 296 participants completed the survey (180 women, 116 men; M_{age} = 21.86, SD = 1.761). Most participants (35.8%) were psychology major students and the majority (89.5%) was of Turkish ethnic background. 160 participants were part of the protest movement in Turkey and the majority of participants had some level of past participation in collective action; 0.3% were protest organisers, 3.7% were regular protesters, 20.8% were occasional protesters, and 33.7% were active on social networks.

Measures

A bilingual translated the survey to Turkish. Participants filled in the Turkish version of the questionnaire comprised of measures of the key variables and a number of questions not analysed in this thesis[17] (please refer to the appendix for the full item lists). I measured support for protest movement, past involvement in protests,

[17] I designed this study as an experiment, whereby I manipulated the likelihood of risk (i.e., high and low experimental conditions). However, the manipulation failed as there was no significant difference in perception of risk between high and low risk conditions ($t(294) = .484$, $p = .628$). Hence, I decided to use the data as a survey data, while taking manipulation as a control variable.

participative efficacy (r = .52, $p < .001$), politicised identification (α = .90), and moral obligation (α = .91) using the same measures as in Studies 2, 3 and 4, but adapted to the Turkish context.

Likelihood of risk. Participants rated their perceptions of risks using seven items on five-point scales ranging from *very unlikely* (1) to *very likely* (5) (e.g., "being expelled from university", "phones being tapped by the police", "being arrested", and "being injured", α = .87).

Outrage. Participants evaluated their outrage about the police's behaviour (referring to how they treat the protesters) on a five-point scale, ranging from *not at all* (1) to a *great extent* (5).

Fear. On a five-point scale ranging from *not at all* (1) to *great extent* (5), participants evaluated how afraid they are of police repression's consequences for the protesters.

Political efficacy. Participants evaluated how likely it was for the protests in Turkey to achieve two goals using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), (e.g., "stop further unwanted urbanization across the country", "prevent further building in green spaces in Istanbul", r = .67, $p < .001$).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the protests in Turkey to achieve two goals (e.g., "help in building a mass movement in Turkey against government-led urban regeneration projects", and "strengthen the solidarity among the protesters", r = .61, $p < .001$; adapted from Saab et al., 2015).

In line with the distinction of three types of efficacies, a three-factor solution for political, identity consolidation, and participative efficacies was a good fit for the present data ($\chi^2(9) = 8.743$, $p = .461$, with χ^2/df ration of 0.971 < 3.00, CFI = 1.000, RMSEA= .000, [.000, .064], *p*-close = .859; AIC = 46.743), and a better fit than a one factor solution ($\Delta\chi^2(2) = 16.167$, $p < .001$).

Future peaceful collective action. Participants rated their willingness to engage in six peaceful collective actions as part of the upcoming protests against the government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey using a five-point scale ranging from *not at all willing* (1) to *extremely willing* (5) (e.g., "demonstrate peacefully",

"participate in marches", "participate in strikes", "sing petitions", "express disapproal of urbanization on social networks", and "participate in sit-ins"; α = .89).

Demographics. I collected information on participants' gender (1 = *Male*, 2 = *Female*), age, socioeconomic status (from 1 = *500 to 999.99* Euro to 6 = *3000 Euro or more*), and ethnicity (e.g., Turkish, Kurdish, Greek, etc).

Results and Discussion

Missing value analysis and data screening

Outrage, fear, likelihood of risk, as well as political and identity consolidation efficacies had less than 5% of missing values. The other variables had missing values ranging between 5.7 and 15.5%. The item assessing participants' membership in the protest movement had 23% of missing values. I examined the pattern of missing values through SPSS Little's Missing Completely at Random (MCAR). Little MCAR test was significant, $\chi^2(2006) = 2302.979$, $p < .001$, indicating that the pattern of distribution is not completely at random. I imputed the missing values using the expectation-maximization (EM) method (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). I changed the out of range scores to the nearest acceptable value. There were only a few differences when we repeated the analyses with listwise deletion[18].

I present the means and standard deviations and the Pearson correlations between the various variables in Table 6.

[18] The proposed model showed a good fit, $\chi^2(8) = 10.207$, $p = .251$, with χ^2/df ratio 1.276 < 3.00, CFI = .998, RMSEA =.031, [.000, .079] with *p*-close = .690, AIC = 174.207. Fear (*B* = .149, *SE* = .07, *p* = .029), and political efficacy (*B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .043) positively predicted collective action. Fear had a significant mediating role in the relation between perception of risks and moral obligation (*B* = .10, *SE* = .05, *p* = .043, [.011, .204]).

Table 6*: Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlation between the Variables within the Turkish Context*

	Means	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Likelihood of Risk	3.96	.72	1.000										
2. Outrage	4.21	1.17	.44**	1.000									
3. Fear	4.38	.97	.55**	.67**	1.000								
4. Political Efficacy	2.31	.84	.00	-.02	-.02	1.000							
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	3.65	.85	.32**	.28**	.43**	.25**	1.000						
6. Participative Efficacy	2.91	.96	.13**	.17**	.16**	.15*	.25**	1.000					
7. Politicised Identification	3.32	.85	.33**	.38**	.46**	.05	.36**	.29**	1.000				
8. Moral Obligation	3.20	.98	.44**	.43**	.51**	.10	.37**	.30**	.63**	1.000			
9. Future Collective Action	3.41	1.07	.47**	.51**	.58**	.16**	.49**	.28**	.61**	.66**	1.000		
10. Past Involvement	2.00	1.10	.26**	.29**	.30*	.18**	.22**	.15**	.34**	.46**	.45**	1.000	
11. Gender			.24**	.18**	.31**	-.04	.26**	.12*	.31**	.34**	.37**	.21**	1.000

Note: *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Path Analysis

I tested the same model I proposed for the previous contexts, considering past involvement in protests, gender, and manipulation as covariates[19]. Data screening revealed that the multivariate normality assumption was not met within the data set, with multivariate kurtosis of 16.796, c.r. 7.882 (> 1.96). Hence, I followed the bootstrapping procedure with 5000 bootstrap sample and examined the 95% bias corrected confidence intervals.

Structural Model. The proposed model showed a poor fit, $\chi^2(9) = 142.130$, $p < .001$, with χ^2/df ratio of 15.792 > 3.00, CFI = .876, RMSEA = .224, [.192, .257] with *p*-close < .001, AIC = 280.130. Based on the modification indices, I included the covariances between fear and outrage, and identity consolidation efficacy and fear. Although anger is an approach emotion and fear is an avoidance emotion (Lerner & Keltner, 2000), I decided to include a covariance between these two emotions as they are both negative emotions and several studies have included this covariance (Smith, Cronin, & Kessler, 2008; Spanovic, Lickel, Denson, & Petrovic, 2010). As for the covariance between identity consolidation efficacy and fear, as I argued in Study 2, although emotion and efficacy belief paths are independent (van Zomeren et al., 2004), one can expect a link between fear and identity consolidation efficacy as this particular efficacy is related to identity processes (Saab et al., 2015), and emotions and identity are linked (Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

[19] Gender was considered as a covariate as it correlated with collective action and several of the antecedent variables. Gender positively correlated with likelihood of risk ($r = .24$**), fear ($r = .31$**), outrage ($r = .18$**), participative efficacy ($r = .12$*), identity consolidation efficacy ($r = .26$**), politicised identification ($r = .32$**), moral obligation ($r = .34$**), past involvement ($r = .21$**), and collective action ($r = .37$**). Manipulation (1= *High risk* and 2 = *Low risk*) did not correlate with nor predict any of the variables.
Past participation in collective action positively predicted likelihood of risk ($B = .14$, $SE = .03$, $p = .001$, [.074, .214]), politicised identification ($B = .40$, $SE = .06$, $p < .001$, [.282, .522]), and moral obligation ($B = .19$, $SE = .05$, $p < .001$, [.086, .285]). It did not predict collective action ($B = .025$, $SE = .06$, $p = .662$, [-.093, .143].
Gender predicted likelihood of risk ($B = -.03$, $SE = .01$, $p = .014$, [-.047, -.006]), fear ($B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p = .012$, [.004 .035]), and moral obligation ($B = .02$, $SE = .01$, $p = .016$, [.003, .029]).

The model improved and showed a good fit, $\chi^2(7) = 11.964$, $p = .102$, with χ^2/df ratio of 1.71 < 3.00, CFI = .995, RMSEA = .049, [.000, .095] with p-close = .454, AIC = 153.964.

Direct Paths. As hypothesised, the perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted fear (H1; *B* = .64, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.504, .767]), outrage (H2; *B* = .62, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.453 .782]), identity consolidation efficacy (H4b; *B* = .29, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.158, .432]), politicised identification (H6; *B* = .26, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.146, .383]), and moral obligation (H7; *B* = .19, *SE* = .07, *p* = .007, [.054, .315]). It did not predict neither political efficacy (H3a/b; *B* = -.05, *SE* = .07, *p* = .505, [-.193, .095]) nor participative efficacy (H5; *B* = .11, *SE* = .08, *p* = .115, [-.031, .273]).

Confirming hypotheses H12 and H13, participative efficacy (*B* = .10, *SE* = .04, *p* = .026, [.011, .182]) and politicised identification (*B* = .42, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.285, .586]) positively predicted moral obligation. However, fear (H8; *B* = .11, *SE* =.06, *p* = .073, [-.011, .228]), outrage (H9; *B* = .05, *SE* = .04, *p* = .208, [-.027, .148]), political efficacy (H10; *B* = .04, *SE* = .06, *p* = .450, [-.064, .152]), and identity consolidation efficacy (H11; *B* = .03, *SE* = .05, *p* = .536, [-.067, .142]) did not predict moral obligation.

As hypothesised, outrage (H15; *B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .024, [.012, .210]), identity consolidation efficacy (H17; *B* = .18, *SE* = .06, *p* = .003, [.066, .301]), politicised identification (H19; *B* = .28, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.145, .436]), and moral obligation (H20; *B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* = .001, [.125, .357]) positively predicted collective action intentions. Contrary to the expectation, the perceived likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .089, [-.023, .260]), fear (H14; *B* = .12, *SE* = .06, *p* =.054, [-.001, .249]), political efficacy (H16; *B*= .09, *SE* = .05, *p* = .078, [-.009, .201]), and participative efficacy (H18; *B* = .02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .550, [-.064, .118]) did not predict collective action intentions. The model explained 62% of the variance in participants' willingness to engage in future collective action. The results are summarised in figure 7.



Figure 7: Results of path analysis using AMOS (version 23) within the Turkish Context. The dashed arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the standardized regression estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Indirect Paths. Regarding the mediation analyses, the perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted moral obligation (.23, *SE* = .05, p < .001, [.139, .332]) only through politicised identification (.11, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.054, .189]). The total link from perceived likelihood of risk to moral obligation was positive and significant (.42, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.286, .551]).

Moreover, the perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action (.37, *SE* = .06, p < .001, [.263, .499]) specifically through outrage (.07, *SE* = .03, *p* = .023, [.012, .149]), identity consolidation efficacy (.06, *SE* = .02, *p* = .009, [.019, .108]), politicised identification (.07, *SE* = .03, *p* = .003, [.029, .136]), and moral obligation (.10, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.055, .171]). Regarding the serial mediational analysis, only the path through fear to moral obligation (.01, *SE* = .01, *p* = .003, [.001, .023]) was significant. The total path from the perceived likelihood of risk to collective action was positive and significant (.49, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.347, .639]). This positive path to action intentions through these variables once again provide strong evidence for the "micro-mobilisation" processes through which repression from authorities can spur further resistance (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523). The significance of outrage in directly and indirectly predicting collective action intentions is consistent with the backfire effect (Marin, 2012) and grievances theories (Gurr, 1970). Moreover, the significance of identity consolidation efficacy in directly and indirectly predicting action intentions along with the non-significance of political efficacy stresses the idea that the likelihood of achieving goals other than the ones articulated by the movement might play more important role in motivating individuals to engage in collective action in repressive contexts (Hornsey et al. 2006; Saab et al., 2015).

Fear (.03, *SE* = .02, *p* = .043, [.001, .066]), participative efficacy (.02, *SE* = .01, *p* = .017, [.003, .056]), and politicised identification (.10, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.050, .173]) had an indirect path to collective action intentions through moral obligation. The total path from fear (.15, *SE* = .07, *p* = .023, [.021, .280]), and politicised identification (.38, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.250, .531]) to collective action was significant.

The indirect paths from participative efficacy and politicised identification to collective action through moral obligation are in line with the findings of the previous studies, and confirm that part of the effect of these variables in motivating action intentions is through their positive link to moral obligation.

Interestingly, fear did not have the hypothesised inhibitory role. On the contrary, fear had a positive path to willingness to engage in collective action through moral obligation. A possible explanation for the positive role of fear can be that I might have measured participants' compassion toward the protesters who might be affected by the sanctions rather than their feelings of fear from the police repression. I specifically measured participants' fear of the consequences the police repression might have for the protesters (i.e., When thinking about how the Turkish police is likely to treat protesters, to what extent do you feel afraid of the consequences for the protesters). If this item did measure compassion, then it would explain the positive correlation with anger ($r = .67$, $p < .001$) and intention to take action ($r = .58$, $p < .001$). In fact, compassion is considered to be a complex emotion enclosing an appraisal of suffering, an emotion of sympathy as well as sadness, and a willingness to relieve the suffering (Dunton, et al., 2006; Kanov et al., 2004; Miller, 2007). Research has confirmed that compassion is a positive predictor of action intention directed at removing the suffering of other people (Goetz, Keltner, & Simon-Thomas, 2010). Accordingly, being aware of protesters' potential suffering due to police repression, participants might have felt sympathetic and sad, and motivated to take action to confront this repression.

I refer to the particular Turkish context to explain the non-significant results related to political and participative efficacies. Turkey witnessed one of its first wave of protests in 2013 (Böcü, 2015). During these protests the protesters were harshly repressed, imprisoned, and even killed. Recent laws expanded policemen's authority to use force against the protesters. Furthermore, although the government accepted not to build a shopping mall in the Gaza Park, Erdogan's authoritarian rule or even the regeneration projects did not halt after the first wave of protests (Böcü, 2015). In fact, no significant changes to the political system were implemented after the protests (Böcü, 2015). Consequently, protesters' belief that their individual contribution or the protests can make a difference might not be strong enough to motivate them to take action under considerable risks. However, the likelihood of achieving a strengthened opposition movement, identification with the protest movement, and one's sense of moral responsibility to take action significantly predicted willingness to engage in collective action. This significance can be explained through the possible aftermaths of the Gezi Park protests. Letsch (2014) reported that Turkish activists perceive the Gezi

Park protests as a symbol for awareness, solidarity with victims, determination to voice disapproval, and a more inclusive identity englobing different fractions of the Turkish society; an identity that is based on activism and opposition to injustice and authoritarianism (Böcü, 2015).

Meta-Analysis

In general, the results across the four studies supported the validity of the proposed model, and confirmed most of the hypothesised paths. I decided to conduct a meta-analysis to be able to integrate the results from the previous four studies. Since the parameter estimates are not independent (i.e., several parameters are estimated per study), I could not follow the univariate meta-analysis techniques. Hence, I used the Meta-analytic structural equation modelling (MASEM). Meta-analytic structural equation modelling (MASEM) is a multivariate method of meta-analysing the data whereby the dependence among the different correlation matrices is accounted for (Cheung, 2015). Specifically, MASEM integrates two statistical analyses; structural equation modelling and meta-analysis (Cheung, 2015; Cheung & Cheung, 2014; Cheung & Hafdahl, in press). MASEM allows researchers to test a specific model, and the significance of direct and indirect effects in different samples. In the correlation based MASEM, the correlation matrices from different studies are synthesised, and the specific model under study is fitted on the merged correlation matrix (Cheung, 2015).

Having tested the same model across the four studies overcomes the common issue of differences in the models between the studies. Moreover, I have measured the dependent and independent constructs in similar way across the different studies, which addresses the potential issue of differences in metrics.

I conducted the meta-SEM using the R software and a code developed by Cheung (2015). I used the fixed-effect model since the primary purpose is to provide a summary of the results of the four studies and not infer the distribution of the effect sizes nor to attempt to generalise the results beyond the four present studies (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). The fixed-effects in meta-SEM, based on weighted least squares estimation, is similar to the fixed-effects meta-analysis based on generalized least squares estimation. I followed the WLS estimation method since the distribution of the data is not normal (Cheung, 2015) and examined the 95% Likelihood Based Intervals of the estimates to evaluate their significance. These procedures would ensure the validity

of the estimates since they are unbiased (e.g., independent of the sample sizes of each study) (Cheung, 2015).

Direct Paths

OpenMx Status was 0, showing that the optimization is good (i.e., the iterations for the tested model and the parameters converged), hence the results of the analysis can be trusted. Past participation in collective action positively predicted perceived likelihood of risk (β = .23, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.0161, .290]), outrage (β = .28, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.214, .354]), political efficacy (β = .20, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.134, .269]), identity consolidation efficacy (β = .22, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.152, .291]), participative efficacy (β = .37, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.306, .434]), politicised identification (β = .45, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.396, .509]), moral obligation (β = .22, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.166, .270]), and collective action (β = .16, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.106, .218]). Past participation did not predict fear (β = -.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .426, [-.010, .042]).

Confirming the hypotheses, perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted fear (H1; β = .51, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.446, .566]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .39 and .49), outrage (H2; β = .39, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.327, .460]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .06 and .38), identity consolidation efficacy (H4a; β = .22, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.154, .293]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.04 and .40), participative efficacy (H5a; β = .14, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.008, .212]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.07 and .43), politicised identification (H6; β = .28, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.221, .342]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.02 and .40), and moral obligation (H7; β = .10, *SE* = .03, *p* = .002, [.035, .158]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .01 and .14). However, disconfirming hypothesis H3a/b, perceived likelihood of risk did not predict political efficacy (H3a/b; β = -.06, *SE* = .03, *p* = .089, [-.128, .009]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.19 and .23).

Regarding the prediction of moral obligation, in line with the hypotheses, outrage (H9; β = .14, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.086, .189]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .06 and .29), participative efficacy (H12; β = .16, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.106, .211]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .09 and .24), and politicised identification (H13; β = .43, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001,

[.106, .211]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .20 and .46) were positive predictors. Fear (H8; β = -.03, *SE* = .03, *p* = .214, [-.082, .183]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.08 and .11), political efficacy (H10; β = -.02, *SE* = .02, *p* = .430, [-.066, .028]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.09 and .11), and identity consolidation efficacy (H11; β = .04, *SE* = .03, *p* = .098, [-.008, .093]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.02 and .20) did not predict moral obligation. Our hypotheses were hence disconfirmed.

Finally, as hypothesised, outrage (H15; β = .12, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.063, .171]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .01 and .14), identity consolidation efficacy (H17; β = .12, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.067, .171]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .08 and .15), politicised identification (H19; β = .25, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.187 .318]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .26 and .28), and moral obligation (H20; β = .31, *SE* = .04, *p* < .001, [.241, .380]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .22 and .32) positively predicted willingness to engage in future collective action. Contrary to the hypotheses, fear (H14; β = -.04, *SE* = .03, *p* = .177, [-.089, .016]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.18 and .11), political efficacy (H16; β = .02, *SE* = .02, *p* = .338, [-.025, .072]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.06 and .08), participative efficacy (H18; β = .05, *SE* = .03, *p* = .101, [-.009, .102]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between .02 and .14), and perceived likelihood of risk (β = .00, *SE* = .03, *p* = .999, [-.064, .064]; the standardized effect sizes across the contexts varied between -.09 and .08) did not predict action intentions, rejecting the hypotheses. I summarised the results in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Results of Meta-SEM using the R Software. The coefficients are the standardised regression estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Indirect Paths

Regarding the mediation analyses, the perceived likelihood of risk indirectly predicted moral obligation (.19, [.139, .251]) through outrage (.05, [.03, .08]), participative efficacy (.02, [.01, .04]), and politicised identification (.12, [.093, .153]).

Moreover, the likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action (.160, [.108, .217]) specifically through outrage (.05, [.02, .07]), identity consolidation efficacy (.03, [.01, .04]), politicised identification (.07, [.05, .10]), and moral obligation (.03, [.01, .05]). This positive path to action intentions through these variables once again provide strong evidence for the "micro-mobilisation" processes through which repression from authorities can indirectly spur further resistance (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523). The significance of outrage in directly and indirectly predicting collective action intentions is consistent with the backfire effect (Martin, 2012) and grievances theories (Gurr, 1970). Moreover, the significance of identity consolidation efficacy in directly and indirectly predicting action intentions along with the non-significance of political efficacy once again stresses the idea that engagement in collective action, specifically in repressive contexts, is motivated by the likelihood of consolidating the protest movement's identity, a goal not articulated by the movement but playing a significant role (Hornsey et al. 2006; Saab et al., 2015).

Moreover, outrage (.04, [.03, .06]), participative efficacy (.05, [.031, .071]), and politicised identification (.13, [.102, .171]) indirectly predicted collective action intentions through moral obligation, confirming the hypothesis that part of the effects of these variables in predicting collective action is due to the increase in individuals' sense of moral obligation or duty to take action. In other words, once individuals feel outraged, believe they have the ability to contribute to the protest movement achieving its goals, and identify with the protest movement, their sense of responsibility to contribute and take action is increased, and leads to a higher willingness to engage in collective action.

In summary, the meta-analysis supports most of the hypotheses, and provides insights into the social psychological processes underlying the effects of sanctions by authorities on inciting further resistance. This indirect positive link of perceptions of risk to collective action is in line with civil resistance and social movement's scholars' argument

that political repression and violence can incite rebellion through setting off "micro-mobilisation" processes (Goodwin, 2001; Jenkins & Schock, 2004; Opp & Roehl, 1990).

General Discussion

The present large-scale study involving four survey studies conducted in four different contexts characterised by repression of civil resistance provides empirical evidence for an integrative predictive model of collective action under high-risk. The model combines recent advancements in the social psychology literature of collective action and explains considerable variance in action intentions (between 51% and 72%). Furthermore, it presents initial quantitative micro-level evidence for the hypotheses advanced by civil resistance and social movement scholars, and affirms that the key social psychological antecedents of collective action meaningfully predict collective action but with contextual distinctions.

The MASEM results (as well as across the contexts, except in Study 4 (Ukraine)) confirmed an overall positive relation between the perceived likelihood of risk and intentions to engage in collective action. This positive relation is consistent with the idea that sanctions imposed by the government to reduce dissent can actually have the opposite effect of what they are intended to do, whereby they indirectly incite further resistance. This positive relation provides empirical support for the backfire/backlash effect suggested in the political science and sociology literatures of protest movement, civil resistance, and revolutions. Although for some this positive relation may suggest that these protesters are irrational, since they are simply reacting to the sanctions imposed by the authorities and risking their own wellbeing, while the likelihood of achieving social and political goals are slim, the results of the present studies suggest otherwise. In fact, this overall positive relation is due to the role of perception of risks in shaping the antecedents of collective action. When faced with authority repression, protesters' outrage, participative and identity consolidation efficacies, politicised identification, and moral obligation increase and lead to their motivation to engage in collective action. Hence, the results delineate the specific social psychological "micro-mobilisation" processes underpinning this indirect positive path (Opp & Roehl, 1990), which reflect the passionate, strategic, politicised, and dutiful side of these protesters, their intrinsic motivation. In the following paragraphs, I will

elaborate the different processes through which likelihood of risk indirectly affects individuals' motivations to engage in collective action.

MASEM analysis and the results from the four contexts (Hong Kong, Russia, Ukraine and Turkey) confirmed that sanctions imposed by authorities positively predict outrage. Moreover, MASEM analysis and the Russian and Turkish results (studies 3 and 5) confirmed that outrage positively predicts action intentions and is a significant mediator in the relation between likelihood of risk and action intentions. Furthermore, in MASEM analysis and within the Hong Kong context, outrage also indirectly predicted action intentions through moral obligation. These results suggest that repression by authorities engenders incidental grievances (Gurr, 1970; Gurr & Moore, 1997; Opp & Roehl, 1990; Walsh and Piazza, 2010) and moral shock (Goldstone, 1998; McAdam, et al., 2001; White, 1989) which lead to feelings of outrage toward these grievances. They also confirm the importance of outrage toward repressive sanctions as a significant motivator of action intentions (van Zomeren et al., 2008) providing empirical support for the social psychological processes underlying the backfire effect (Martin, 2012). They are also in line with research in risk literature which provides experimental support for a positive relation between feelings of anger and risky decision making (Fessler et al., 2004; Lerner & Keltner, 2001).

Regarding fear, MASEM analysis and results across the four studies confirmed a positive link between perception of likelihood of risk and fear. MASEM results showed a non-significant role of fear, whereby fear does not predict moral obligation nor collective action intentions. Moreover, fear had no significant mediating role in the relation between likelihood of risk and moral obligation or collective action. However, in Study 3 (Russia), fear had an inhibitory role, whereby it negatively predicted moral obligation and action intentions, and it was a significant negative mediator in the relation between likelihood of risk and moral obligation, and likelihood of risk and collective action. This inhibitory role is in line with previous research in the literature of collective action (Miller et al., 2009; Saab & Ayoub, 2016) as well as emotion (Smith & Kirby, 2001). Remarkably, within the Turkish context (Study 5), fear had an indirect positive link to collective action intentions. As I mentioned earlier, this positive indirect path can be due to the fact that the item of fear

measured compassion for the potential harm protesters might be subject to. Consequently, further research is needed to delineate the specific effects of fear in collective action under risk.

The MASEM analysis and the results across the four contexts stressed differential significance of the three types of efficacies. Political efficacy did not predict collective action intentions within the four contexts as well as in the MASEM analysis. Although this result contradicts previous findings of causal relation between political efficacy and collective action (van Zomeren, Leach, & Spears, 2010; van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2010), it echoes some findings of a weak to non-significant role of political efficacy (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2003). These authors highlight the fact that the role of political efficacy in predicting collective action is contingent upon politicised identification; once participants' identification with the movement is taken into account, the predictive role of political efficacy is reduced (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simon et al., 1998). Their results suggest that the identity of an activist is far more important predictor than the mere likelihood of achieving certain social or political goals. Moreover, Hornsey et al. (2006) suggested that the significant relation between perceived efficacy and collective action that some scholars find might be due to the possible artifact of the high correlation between identification and perceived efficacy. Furthermore, as I argued in the introductory chapter, within such repressive contexts, where the authorities are ready to harshly repress any dissent that questions their rule and threatens their control and power, the likelihood of achieving specific political goals might be quite limited, although there would be the possibility that these repressive measures signal authorities' loss of power or can attract international intervention. Aware of these restrictions, the willingness of the protesters to engage in action despite the risks to their wellbeing can be expected to be delineated by motives other than just achieving specific political or social goals. Hence, examining different motives distinct from achieving political and social reforms is important in order to understand engagement in collective action under risk. As I will be elaborating below, and in line with previous research, other forms of efficacy beliefs (Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2013), identification with the protest movement (van Zomeren et al., 2008),

and moral obligation (Stürmer & Stürmer, 2004; Stürmer et al., 2003) were the significant predictors of collective action rather than political efficacy.

In the MASEM analysis, and within the Russian and Turkish contexts (studies 3 and 5), identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted action intentions, and in the MASEM and Study 5 (Turkey), it played a significant mediating role in the relation between the likelihood of risk and the willingness to engage in collective action. Moreover, in Study 2 (Hong Kong context), identity consolidation efficacy played a significant mediating role in the relation between likelihood of risk and moral obligation. These results assert the strategic nature of collective action in these contexts. As argued by Hornsey et al. (2006) and Klein et al. (2007), consolidating one's identity as an oppositional movement is an important basis for the movement to coordinate its efforts and organise resistance, which creates the necessary conditions to ultimately achieve political and social goals (Haslam, 2001, Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Turner, 2005). Hence, the likelihood of achieving such a consolidated oppositional movement, which would help to eventually achieve the desired political or social change, would be a strong motivator to engage in collective action. In fact, Saab et al.'s (2015) studies showed how identity consolidation efficacy not only directly predicts collective action, but also indirectly through political efficacy.

Consolidating and expressing an oppositional identity can be particularly important within repressive contexts since the authorities' aim is to suppress or control the opposition. Hence, the identity threat can further motivate individuals to value solidifying and expressing their protest movement's identity (Reicher & Levine, 1994). The results of the present studies are in line with Chang (2008), Loveman (1998), and Chang and Kim (2007) who acknowledge how repression leads to a movement's growth and consolidation by spurring solidarity within the movement and facilitating the development of alliances between different protest movements.

These results also suggest that repression further strengthens people's beliefs that the movement might get stronger since it can attract the approval of bystanders and the attention of national and international powers (DeNardo, 1985; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007). In fact, the civil resistance and social movement literatures emphasise the

importance of mobilising third parties as an important strategy for resistance to survive repression (Hess & Martin, 2006; Martin, 2007, 2012).

Regarding the importance of participative efficacy, it positively predicted collective action in the Russian context (Study 3). Within the Hong Kong (Study 2), Ukrainian (Study 4), and Turkish (Study 5) contexts, as well as the MASEM analysis, participative efficacy indirectly predicted collective action through moral obligation. The significance of participative efficacy to directly and indirectly, through moral obligation, predicting collective action intentions highlight the processes through which the 'free rider effect' can be reduced (Olson, 1965). Individuals tend to free ride, not to take action and just enjoy the collective benefits at the end of the process of change, when they perceive the impact of their own contribution as limited (Denardo, 1985). Consequently, to overcome this problem, protest organisers should highlight each individual's unique contribution to achieve the desired goal which would incite a sense of responsibility and duty and motivate them to act.

Across the contexts (studies 2 to 5), and in the MASEM analysis, politicised identification reliably predicted action intentions. The relevance of identification is in line with the current literature considering politicised identification as the building block for motivating individuals to take part in collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Smith et al., 1998; Stürmer et al., 2003; van Zomeren, et al., 2008), and a significant predictor for involvement in more demanding collective action (Kelly & Kelly, 1992). The significance of politicised identification can be explained through the increase in commitment to the group, and solidarity and empowerment feelings built within the group which can help activists face the risks associated with their activism (Haslam, 2001; Hirsch, 1990; Turner et al., 1987). For instance, Escobar (1993) asserted in his study of the Los Angeles Police Department's repression of the Chicano Movement that the repression led to the politicisation of the general Mexican population, as well as increases in the Mexican Americans' ethnic identification, their solidarity and determination to face the repression, and an affirmation of their legitimate right to protest. The Mexican Americans felt empowered and engaged in further resistance. Moreover, Goodwin and Pfaff (2001) showed how in-group identification and intimate social networks directly and indirectly

reduce fear within the US civil rights as well as the East German Opposition movement. They ascertained that these strategies help individuals to protest regardless of and even in reaction to the risks associated with protesting.

Furthermore, when individuals identify with a group, their appraisal of costs and benefits takes place at the group level whereby the individual risks are discounted and group goals are prioritised (Haslam, 2001; Louis, Taylor, & Neil, 2004; Simon, 1998). Louis et al. (2004) proposed the agentic normative influence model where in-group level costs and benefits shape individual level costs and benefits, and individual sacrifice for the group's benefit is considered as moral (Louis, 2009; Louis & Taylor, 2002). Moreover, activists start considering collective action as a means to express (Kelly, 1993) and 'realise' their identity as activists opposing the repressive authorities (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005, p. 51). Calhoun (1991) further argued that, in high-risk contexts, if activists refuse or avoid facing risks associated with their activism, they feel they are betraying their commitment to one's identity as an activist, and hence feel ashamed or humiliated.

Finally, the results of the four contexts and the MASEM analysis also consistently highlighted the important role of moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of willingness to engage in future action intentions. Most of the antecedents of collective action indirectly predicted action intentions through increasing individuals' sense of obligation to engage in collective action. In the MASEM analysis and across the contexts participative efficacy and politicised identification significantly predicted moral obligation. Social identity theory provides the framework for the significance of identification and individual contribution to predict moral obligation in high risk contexts. As I explained before, once individuals identify with a protest movement they commit to the movement's interests and norms and feel solidarity with their fellow members (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Moreover, as members of a group, they also value the consequences of their personal contribution to the movement. These in turn increase their feelings of obligation to take action (Schwartz, 1970; Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas et al. 2012). Interestingly, within the Hong Kong and Russian contexts, outrage towards the treatment of protesters significantly predicted moral obligation. Moreover, the likelihood of risk indirectly predicted moral obligation through outrage, and outrage indirectly predicted collective

action through moral obligation. These findings confirm Opp's (1994) results which also highlighted the role of moral indignation towards repression to increase moral incentives which in their turn lead to collective action participation.

The significance of moral obligation is in line with Calhoun (1991), Stürmer et al. (2003), and Vilas et al. (2012) work confirming the importance of sense of responsibility in motivating individuals to take action. It is also in line with Schwartz (1970) argument that self-sacrificing behaviour is more likely to occur when one feels morally obliged to take action since personal responsibility is flagged. This significance along with the role of politicised identification advocate an intrinsic motivation to take part in collective action under risk regardless of the likelihood of achieving political or social goals (Stürmer et al., 2003).

The importance of identity consolidation and participative efficacies along with moral obligation resonate with Opp (1994) theoretical model explaining the deterring and initiating effects of repression on collective action. In fact, in line with the cost-benefit analysis (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; Klandermans, 1984), Opp (1994) argues that repression would incite further resistance once the selective incentives (goods and moral) to participate in collective resistance outweigh the costs.

Limitations

The present four studies extend the survey study I conducted in Egypt, by examining collective action in different repressive contexts and incorporating the recent advancements in the collective action literature. However, the results of the four contexts cannot be generalised to the general population in the different contexts I examined, as the samples were internet-based convenience samples rather than random or nationally representative ones. In fact, most of the participants were rather young, had higher education (i.e., 85.5% in Hong Kong, 94.5% in Russia, 87% in Ukraine, and 100% in Turkey), and were from the major cities of the countries under study (i.e., 86.7& from Hong Kong, 46.3% from Moscow, 38.6% from Kiev, 100% from Istanbul). However, the samples allowed to understand how activists and individuals who have a certain level of past participation in activism respond to the perceived risks. Future research can examine

whether the relations between perceived risks and the antecedents of collective action as well as action intentions generalise to samples of non-activists.

Moreover, different specifications of the role of risk and politicised identification can also be investigated, whereby risk and politicised identification are considered as moderators. For instance, in highly risky contexts, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, as well as politicised identification and moral obligation may play a more important role as protesters would need more resources to cope with the risks (Opp & Roehl, 1991). I explored the moderating role of perception of risk and politicised identification and provided a summary of the analyses in the supplementary material. As a brief note, results across the contexts showed an inconsistent pattern. In general, when there were significant differences, some of the antecedents positively predicted participants' willingness to engage in collective action at moderate and high levels of risk in Russia (Study 3) and Turkey (Study 5), and at low and moderate levels of risk in Hong Kong (Study 2) and Ukraine (Study 4). These results provide further empirical evidence for the backfire effect and argue against the deterring effect of repression. Similarly, regarding the moderating role of politicised identification, in Hong Kong (Study 2) and Turkey (Study 5) perceived risk positively predicted some of the antecedents of collective action at low and moderate levels of politicised identification. In other words, once individuals highly identify with the protest movement, repression no longer leads to increases in their outrage, efficacy beliefs and moral obligation. These results can suggest that the highly identified individuals have already internalised the emotional and efficacy norms of the movement, and have largely committed to the movement, consequently, repression does not significantly affect their emotions and efficacy beliefs (please refer to the supplementary material for a detailed analysis of each context).

Furthermore, I cannot infer causal relations from the cross-sectional data. I tried to address this issue by including past involvement in collective action as a control variable in all of the four analyses, as well as the MASEM analysis. To further address this issue, the final study I conducted was an experiment where I manipulated the levels of risks associated with engagement in collective action. Within this experiment, I also tried to test the proposed model in a sample in which participants are not too involved in collective

action, since most of the participants in the previous five studies had at least some level of past participation in collective action, and at least half of the participants in each sample self-identified as member of the protest movement. In the next chapter, I describe the experiment, summarise and discuss the results.

Chapter 4

Examining the causal effects of perceived risks

Abstract

I investigate the potential causal effects of likelihood of risk on the antecedents of collective action and action intention. Specifically, I examine how the manipulation of the perceived risk of protesting impacts the social psychological antecedents of collective action (i.e., outrage and fear, political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, participative efficacy, politicised identification, and moral obligation), as well as willingness to engage in future collective action. Moreover, I explore whether the relation between perception of risk and the antecedents of collective action generalise to a non-activist sample. I focus on the protests organised against extreme energy extraction processes (e.g., fracking) taking place in United Kingdom. Data from 89 participants with very low levels of involvement in collective action showed that risk manipulation only increases feelings of outrage, with no significant effects on any of the remaining antecedents of collective action. Furthermore, given the low politicisation of such a sample, I follow the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action, and examine the role of perceived illegitimacy of the fracking process in shaping the effects of perceived risk. The interaction between risk manipulation and perceived illegitimacy of fracking positively predicted outrage, whereby perceived risk increases outrage at medium and high levels of perceived illegitimacy of fracking. The interaction also directly and indirectly, through the path from outrage to politicised identification to moral obligation, predicted collective action intentions.

I designed the present experiment to tackle one of the main limitations of the past five studies; the cross-sectional data across the five studies did not allow to infer any causal relations. Previous findings have confirmed the causal relation between the antecedents of collective action and action intentions and behaviour (van Zomeren, et al., 2008). However, the causal relation between perception of risk and the antecedents of collective action and willingness to engage in collective action is still unclear.

Moreover, the past five samples were composed of mainly activists, who had at least some level of past participation in collective action. In the present study, I targeted a population of non-activists, who are unlikely to be politicised and heavily involved in collective action. Such a sample would allow to explore whether the relations between perceived risk and the antecedents of collective action I found earlier apply to a sample of non-activists with relatively low levels of politicisation and past participation in collective action. Furthermore, as I targeted a general population sample, I explored how the perceived legitimacy of an issue interacts with being exposed to repressive or non-repressive conditions of collective action (i.e., manipulation of the perceived risks of protesting), and how this interaction shapes the social psychological antecedents of collective action (i.e., outrage and fear, political, identity consolidation and participative efficacy, identification, and moral obligation), and willingness to engage in collective action.

In the present study, I focused on the protests organised against extreme energy extraction processes (e.g., fracking) taking place in United Kingdom. The present study's context was quite different from the previous five studies, which were characterised with high levels of authority repression and with issues which are relatively highly politicised. I chose United Kingdom as a context and fracking as the issue of protest to increase the probability that participants believe the manipulation of risk. In fact, in highly repressive contexts, participants might find it hard to believe that the authorities will not engage in repressive acts. Moreover, for highly politicised issues, participants might be knowledgeable of the issue and already involved in protests, which would also reduce the extent to which they believe the manipulation. For instance, in the Turkish context (Study 5), the risk manipulation failed as previous protests in Turkey were harshly repressed by the

authorities, and participants had some level of past participation in collective action, which might have exposed them to risks. Hence, believing in a potential low risk scenario was difficult. In fact, participants in the low and high risk conditions scored higher than the median on likelihood of risk ($M_{\text{high risk}}$ = 3.98, *SD* = .70; $M_{\text{low risk}}$ = 3.97, *SD* = .74). Furthermore, I specifically chose the anti-fracking protests as the focus of the protests was timely. In fact, on 24th of May, 2016, after the North Yorkshire councillors conveyed their approval to allow the fracking procedure in a nearby village, hundreds of pro-environmental protesters took to the streets to voice their disapproval of this decision (BBC news, 2016).

Study 6

Fracking refers to energy (e.g., oil and gas) extracting method mainly based on hydraulic fracturing. The extraction process aims at breaking the rocks using a combination of chemicals, sand, and water which are flooded into the rocks at extremely high pressure (Lallanilla, 2015). Some people are proponents of fracking procedure as it allows the extraction of large amounts of natural energy which would lead to a lower energy price, and a boost in economy and job market (Jackson, et al., 2014; Wihbey, 2015). Moreover, the amount of water needed during the fracking process is assessed to be less than the amount consumed during other extraction processes such as oil or coal (Jackson et al., 2014; Wihbey, 2015). Furthermore, it is argued that the air pollution due to fracking process is less compared to other methods of energy extraction (Jackson et al., 2014; Wihbey, 2015). However, several reports argue for potentially dangerous environmental effects fracking can have (Bamberger & Oswald, 2012; Gandossi & von Estroff, 2015; Hoffman, 2012; Howarth, Santoro, & Ingraffea, 2011; Jackson et al., 2014). For instance, they report that during the extraction process, there is the risk of shale gas (Methane (CH_4)), a more dangerous gas than Carbone dioxide, escaping into the air. Moreover, when the waste water consumed during the fracking procedure and contaminated with toxic chemicals returns to the ground, it contaminates the environment. Fracking also increases the rates of earthquakes, and noise pollution (Bamberger & Oswald, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; Howarth, et al., 2011). These effects pose potentially adverse threats to public health as well as the surrounding ecology. Several national and international groups thus campaign against

fracking (Goodey, 2013; Talkfracking, n.d.; Wood, n.d.). They organise protests and demonstrations to voice their disapproval of the extraction process.

Theoretical Model

An important distinction between this study and the previous ones is the model I followed. In the previous studies, I considered politicised identification to be at the same level as the remaining antecedents of collective action (i.e., anger and outrage, and efficacy beliefs), however, in this study, I followed the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (EMSICA, Thomas, et al., 2012), whereby the key antecedents of collective action predict politicised identification rather than politicised identification being at the same level as the other antecedents. As I argued in the first chapter, scholars have suggested various integrative models which differ in terms of how the different variables are interrelated. I decided to follow the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action since the sample I targeted was expected to be formed mainly of non-activists, who would have minimal level of past-participation in collective action and politicisation. In such a non-activist sample, as I argued in the first chapter, the encapsulated model of the social identity in collective action is likely to be more fitting as their politicised identity is unlikely to have been formed, and can be expected to be shaped by their feelings of outrage and efficacy beliefs. In the model, I allowed the antecedents to directly predict collective action as well as indirectly through politicised identification and moral obligation. I summarised the suggested paths in figure 7.

In the present study, as I targeted a general population sample, I also examined the effects of the interaction between the manipulation of risk and perceived illegitimacy of fracking on the more proximal antecedents of collective action and action intention. In specific terms, I hypothesised that the manipulation will increase feelings of outrage, efficacy beliefs, politicised identification and moral obligation at medium and high levels of perceived illegitimacy of fracking. As I covered in the introductory chapter, the legitimacy of grievances plays an important role in mobilising people to engage in collective action. In fact, as I mentioned in the earlier chapters, the social identity theory (Ellemers, Wilke, & van Knippenberg, 1993; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) emphasises the role of perceived legitimacy of concerns as one of the important factors

determining whether people decide to engage in collective action to address their grievances. The relative deprivation theory (Runcimann, 1966) also highlights the role of perceived legitimacy of group's disadvantage, as well as the emotions stemming from it (i.e., anger and outrage; Walker & Smith, 2002), in motivating people to engage in collective action. Hence, perceived risks can increase willingness to engage in collective action directly, but also can interact with the perceived illegitimacy of a certain political or social issue, whereby their willingness is much higher when they perceive the situation as illegitimate, and are in a risky context. Accordingly, I expected a significant effect for the interaction between perceived illegitimacy of fracking and risk manipulation, whereby, the effect of risk manipulation on the antecedents of and willingness to engage in collective action may vary according to whether people perceive fracking as illegitimate or not. Perceiving fracking as illegitimate and being in the high risk condition would increase participants' outrage, efficacy beliefs, politicised identification, and moral obligation, as well as action intentions. In fact, as I previously discussed, once individuals perceive themselves, their in-group, or even a third party, suffering from illegitimately imposed disadvantage, they would feel outraged towards this grievance (van Zomeren et al., 2004). Moreover, they would further identify with the protest movement, feel solidarity with their fellow in-group members who share the same beliefs and fate. They would also perceive increased support within the in-group (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005, 2009). Their identification along with the perceived solidarity and support would increase their beliefs of achieving group relevant goals. These combined would increase their sense of obligation to take action (Vilas et al., 2012). However, perception of risk can also decrease one's collective action intentions, as it might increase feelings of fear and decrease efficacy beliefs since risks can signal authorities' determination to resist to protesters' demands (Muller, 1985).



Figure 7: Summary of the suggested paths.

Method

Procedure and Respondents

I launched an online survey on 13th June, 2016. Participants from United Kingdom were recruited through Pureprofile[20] which allows to collect online data from its registered members. The survey was advertised as a project examining attitudes toward fracking. Participants who completed the survey received rewards to spend on the Pureprofile website.

A total of 128 participants took the survey (64 women and 65 men; M_{age} = 51.24, *SD* = 12.49). Almost all participants (96.1 %) were British, and most (36.4 %) had a university degree. The majority of participants had never participated in protests against fracking (86.8 %), 6.3 % were active on social networks, 3.9 % were occasional protesters, 1.6 % were regular protesters, and 1.6 % were protest organisers. 94.6 % of participants were not part of the protest movement against fracking.

Design

Participants first completed several socio-demographic questions, after which they read a paragraph explaining what fracking is and its potential long-lasting detrimental threats to the surrounding environment. Following this text, participants answered a question about the extent to which they consider fracking to be legitimate (i.e., legitimate, moral, and unjustified). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions, high or low risk of authority sanctions. Specifically, they read one of the two texts describing how the police responded to the recent protests against fracking organised in United Kingdom over the last few weeks. After the manipulation, participants filled in the manipulation check (i.e., perceived risk), and the remaining measures. At the end of the survey, participants read the debriefing form and were thanked for their participation.

[20] Pureprofile is an international company helping clients collect online data from participants who are registered as Pureprofile members. The members have profiles where they specify their interests and preferences. Whenever they participate in a survey, they get rewards to spend on Pureprofile website.

Measures

I measured support for protest movement, past involvement in protests, outrage, fear, participative efficacy (r = .87, p < .001), and moral obligation (α = .96) using the same measures as in the previous four studies, but adapted to the present context.

Manipulation check. I measured perception of risk using four items on five-point scales ranging from *very unlikely* (1) to *very likely* (5) (i.e., "being injured", "being arrested", "being detained for some time", "being imprisoned", α = .91). Participants also rated the extent to which they thought the information about the British police's behaviour was real, using 5-point Likert scale (1 = *not real at all* to 5 = *very real*).

Perceived legitimacy of fracking. I measured whether participants considered fracking as legitimate using three items (i.e., legitimate, moral, and unjustified) on 5-point Likert scale (1 = *not at all* to 5 = *to a great extent*). I recoded the two items of legitimacy and morality for the scale to reflect the perceived illegitimacy of fracking, (α = .81).

Political efficacy. Using five-point scales (1 = *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants rated how likely it was for the anti-fracking protests in United Kingdom to achieve three goals (e.g., "ban all forms of extreme energy extraction processes", "influence the government on implementing strict and tighter laws regarding energy extraction processes", "advocate further research into the environmental and public health consequences of these extreme extraction processes", α = .80).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Using five-point scales (1= *very unlikely* to 5 = *very likely*), participants evaluated how likely it was for the anti-fracking protests in United Kingdom to achieve three goals (i.e., "increase public support for the protests against extreme energy extracting processes in United Kingdom", "strengthen the solidarity among the protesters", "help in building a mass movement in United Kingdom against extreme energy extracting processes", α = .86; adapted from Saab et al., 2015).

A three-factor solution for political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies was a poor fit ($\chi^2(17) = 46.370$, p < .001, with χ^2/df ration of 2.728 < 3.00, CFI = .942, RMSEA= .133, [.088, .180], p-close = .002; AIC = 84.370). Inspection of the M.I. suggested that the model misfit is due to few covariances between items of different factors. As in the previous studies, I decided to consider these factors as three different

constructs to be consistent with the theoretical frame I am following, and since the three factor solution was a better fit ($\Delta\chi^2(1) = 37.499$, $p < .001$) than a one factor solution.

Politicised identification. Participants responded to six items on five-point scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (e.g., "I feel I belong to the protest movement against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., fracking) ", "being part of the protest movement against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., fracking) is an important part of who I am", $\alpha = .946$; adapted from Cameron, 2004).

Future collective action. Participants rated their willingness to engage in six peaceful collective actions as part of the upcoming protests against fracking using a five-point scale ranging from *not at all willing* (1) to *extremely willing* (5) (i.e., "demonstrate peacefully", "participate in marches", "participate in strikes", "sing petitions", "express disapproal of urbanization on social networks", and "participate in sit-ins"; $\alpha = .92$).

Demographics. I collected information on participants' gender (1 = *male*, 2 = *female*), age, nationality (1 = *British*, 2 = *Other*), socioeconomic status (from 1 = *less than 500£* to 6 = *more than 2 501£*), and education level (from 1= *primary and below* to 5 = *university degree*).

Results

Missing value analysis and data screening

All variables had less than 5% of missing values. I used the Little's Missing Completely at Random (MCAR) test in SPSS to examine the missing values' pattern of distribution. Little's MCAR test was non-significant, $\chi^2(487) = 480.662$, $p = .572$, indicating a completely at random pattern of missing values. I used the EM method to impute the missing values (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). There were no out of range imputed scores.

Manipulation Checks

To check whether participants believed the manipulation of likelihood of risk, I checked whether any of the participants rated the information about the police's future behaviour as unreal. 24.1% perceived it as unreal. I decided to omit these cases ($n = 31$) from my final sample ($N = 98$). Furthermore, I conducted an independent t-test to examine whether there was a significant difference in perception of likelihood of risk between the

participants who read the high vs low risk manipulation texts. The results showed that participants in the high risk condition (n = 49, M = 3.43, SD = .83) perceived significantly higher likelihood of being affected by risks than participants in the low risk condition (n = 49, M = 2.66, SD = .88; $t(96)$ = - 4.485, $p < .001$[21]). Hence, the manipulation of risks was successful.

Sample Descriptives

Participants who were in the high risk condition showed significantly higher levels of outrage (M = 2.24, SD = 1.12) and fear (M = 2.63, SD = 1.27) than participants in the low risk condition (outrage M = 1.72, SD = 1.16, t (96) = -2.242[22], p = .027; fear M = 1.98, SD = 1.07, t (96) = -2.755, p = .007[23]). There were no significant group differences on any of the other variables.

I present the means and standard deviations between the low and high risk conditions, and the respective independent t-tests in Table 4, and the correlation between the main variables in Table 5.

[21] The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed ($F(1, 96)$ = 1.459, p = .230).
[22] The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed ($F(1, 96)$ = 0.084, p = .773).
[23] The assumption of homogeneity of variance was confirmed ($F(1, 96)$ = 3.374, p = .069).

Table 1*: Means and Standard Deviations by the Experimental Groups, and Series of Independent t-Tests*

	Low Risk Condition		High Risk Condition		
	Means	SD	Mean	SD	Independent t-tests
1. Likelihood of Risk	2.658	.879	3.434	.832	t (96) = - 4.485, $p < .001$, d = .907
2. Outrage	1.72	1.155	2.24	1.125	t (96) = -2.242, p = .027, d = .456
3. Fear	1.98	1.070	2.63	1.270	t (96) = -2.755, p = .007, d = .554
4. Political Efficacy	2.673	.961	2.246	.821	t (96) = 1.201, p = .233
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	3.264	1.073	3.389	.898	t (96) = -.624, p = .534
6. Participative Efficacy	2.561	1.036	2.461	.877	t (96) = .517, p = .606
7. Politicised Identification	2.210	.981	2.295	.894	t (96) = -.448, p = .655
8. Moral Obligation	1.980	.996	2.149	1.000	t (96) = -.838, p = .404
9. Future Collective Action	2.268	1.117	2.438	1.054	t (96) = -.773, p = .441
10. Past Involvement	1.20	.816	1.19	.555	t (96) = .119, p = .905
11. Illegitimacy of Fracking	2.993	.914	3.186	.911	t (96) = - 1.045, p = .299

Table 2*: Pearson Correlation between the Variables*

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Likelihood of Risk	1.000										
2. Outrage	.41**	1.000									
3. Fear	.47**	.83**	1.000								
4. Political Efficacy	-.14	.34*	.27**	1.000							
5. Identity consolidation Efficacy	.08	.45**	.55*	.52**	1.000						
6. Participative Efficacy	-.04	.50**	.52**	.63**	.56**	1.000					
7. Politicised Identification	.17	.59**	.64**	.49**	.70**	.57**	1.000				
8. Moral Obligation	.18	.61**	.61**	.45**	.59**	.59**	.82**	1.000			
9. Future Collective Action	.17	.63**	.70**	.40**	.67**	.54**	.84**	.81**	1.000		
10. Past Involvement	.02	.31**	.28**	.25*	.37**	.40**	.48**	.51**	.45**	1.000	
11. Illegitimacy of fracking	.12	.22*	.37**	-.07	.44**	.10	.33**	.19	.40**	-.04	1.000

Note: *$p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Main Analysis

Inspection of the correlation matrix showed a very high correlation between fear and outrage ($r = .83$, $p < .01$), and fear was positively correlated with all of the antecedents of collective action, and especially with action intentions ($r = .70$, $p < .01$). These correlations and the examination of the item measurig fear suggested that this item might have tapped a different emotion than fear, that of compassion. Similar to the Turkish context (Study 5), I specifically measured participants' fear of the consequences the police repression might have for the protesters (i.e., "When thinking about how the British police is likely to treat protesters, to what extent do you feel afraid of the consequences for the protesters"). Henceforth, I might have measured participants' compassion toward the protesters who might be affected by police repression. To deal with this possibility, and to also adress the issue of multicollinearity, I decided to exclude fear from the analysis, as this item might have measured a concept which was not part of hypothesised model.

Moderation by illegitimacy of fracking. I first conducted a series of moderation analysis using PROCESS model 1 to examine whether the efffect of perceieved risk on the antecedents of collective action differ according to the different levels of peceived illegitimacy of fracking. Analyses showed that likelihood of risk differentially affect only outrage. The manipulation significantly predicted outrage ($B = .47$, $SE = .23$, $p = .04$, [.026, .911]), however, the illegitimacy of fracking did not predict outrage ($B = .25$, $SE = .13$, $p = .060$, [-.01, .505]). The interaction between the manipulation and the illegitimacy of fracking was significant (.60, $SE = .26$, $p = .023$, [.082, 1.135]). Inspection of the simple slopes showed that being in the high risk condition positively predicted outrage at medium and high levels of perceived illegitimacy of fracking ($B = .47$, $SE = .22$, $p = .038$, [.026, .911], and $B = 1.01$, $SE = .34$, $p = .004$, [.339, 1.690] respectively). I plotted the simple slopes of the manipulation effect on outrage at different levels of perceived illegitimacy of fracking in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Simple slopes for the manipulation on outrage at mean, low and high levels of perceived illegitimacy of fracking (±1 SD). The unstandardized regression coefficients are used to plot the interaction.

The manipulation did not predict political efficacy (*B* = -.21, *SE* = .19, *p* = .280, [-.580, .170]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .04, *SE* = .18, *p* = .851, [-.331, .401]), participative efficacy (*B* = -.12, *SE* = .20, *p* = .544, [-.518, .274]), politicised identification (*B* = .02, *SE* = .18, *p* = .911, [-.337, .377]), moral obligation (*B* = .13, *SE* = .20, *p* = .518, [-.267, .527]), and collective action (*B* = .08, *SE* = .20, *p* = .698, [-.319, .475]). Illegitimacy of fracking predicted identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .47, *SE* = .12, *p* = .002, [.224, .711]), politicised identification (*B* = .34, *SE* = .12, *p* = .008, [.090, .583]), and collective action (*B* = .48, *SE* = .13, *p* = .005, [.212, .557]), however, it did not predict political efficacy (*B* = -.06, *SE* = .14, *p* = .661, [-.332, .211]), participative efficacy (*B* = .11, *SE* = .12, *p* = .373, [-.134, .354]), and moral obligation (*B* = .21, *SE* = .14, *p* = .137, [-.067, .478]). There were no significant interactions with the manipulation for political efficacy (*B* = -.19, *SE* = .27, *p* = .50, [-.730, .356]), identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = -.10, *SE* = .25, *p* = .692, [-.584, .389]), participative efficacy (*B* = -.17, *SE* = .25, *p* = .488, [-.660, .317]), politicised identification (*B* = .06, *SE* = .25, *p* = .795, [-.428, .557]), moral obligation (*B* =.16, *SE* = .27, *p* = .566, [-.387, .702]), and collective action (*B* = .30, *SE* = .27, *p* = .259, [-.226, .830]).

Effect of the interaction between perceived risk and illegitimacy of fracking. Since the interaction between the manipulation and the illegitimacy of fracking had a significant effect only on outrage, I decided to concentrate on the mediated path from the interaction to action intentions through outrage. As I mentioned earlier, I followed the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action (Thomas et al., 2012), whereby outrage and efficacy beliefs predict politicised identification, and have a direct as well as an indirect (through politicised identification) link to collective action. Moreover, as I considered moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action, I hypothesised politicised identification to predict moral obligation. Hence, the indirect link from the interaction to collective action is a serial mediation; from outrage, to politicised identification, to moral obligation. Past involvement and the remaining antecedents of collective action (i.e., manipulation, efficacy beliefs, and illegitimacy of fracking) were considered as covariates. To test the mediated paths within the model, I conducted mediation analysis using PROCESS macro model 6 (Hayes, 2013) in SPSS to examine the significance of the direct and indirect paths, as well as the specific indirect effects. I employed the bootstrapping method with 5000 re-samples and examined the 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). I report the unstandardized regression coefficients.

Direct Paths. The interaction positively predicted outrage (B = .18, SE = .08, p = .029, [.019, .345]). Outrage positively predicted politicised identification (B = .21, SE = .06, p = .001, [.087, .332]), however, the interaction did not predict it (B = .07, SE = .05, p = .170, [-.030, .167]). Outrage (B = .14, SE = .06, p = .023, [.020, .265]) and politicised identification (B = .67, SE = .10, p < .001, [.476, .869]) positively predicted moral obligation, however, the interaction did not (B = -.04, SE = .05, p = .394, [-.135, .053]). The interaction (B = .13, SE = .05, p = .004, [.042, .219]), politicised identification (B = .44, SE = .11, p < .001, [.209, .661]), and moral obligation (B = .37, SE = .10, p < .001, [.176, .567]) positively predicted collection action intentions. Outrage did not predict action intentions (B = .10, SE = .06, p = .103, [-.020, .216]). The model explained 80% of the variance in collective action. The results are summarised in Figure 9.



Figure 9: Results of path analysis using SPSS PROCESS macro (model 6). The dashed arrows are the non-significant paths. The coefficients are the unstandardized regression estimates. The manipulation, illegitimacy of fracking, efficacy beliefs and past participation were controlled for. Significance of coefficients is indicated, *p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.

Indirect Paths. The total indirect path from the interaction to action intentions was not significant (.09, *SE* = .05, [-.01, .173]). However, the indirect path from the interaction to outrage to politicised identification to collective action (.02, *SE* = .01, [.003, .048]) was significant. Moreover, the indirect path from the interaction to outrage to moral obligation to collective action (.01, *SE* = .01, [.004, .033]) was significant. Finally, the indirect path from the interaction, to outrage, to politicised identification, to moral obligation to collective action (.01, *SE* = .01, [001, .030]) was also significant. The total path from the interaction to collective action intentions was also significant (.22, *SE* = .06, $p < .001$, [.095, .338]).

In sum, participants in the high risk condition who perceived the fracking procedure as moderately or highly illegitimate felt outraged towards how the policemen treat the protesters, and were willing to engage in collective action. Moreover, their feelings of outrage positively predicted their identification with the anti-fracking movement and moral obligation to act, and through this path being at risk and perceiving the fracking procedure as moderately or highly illegitimate increased their intention to take action.

Discussion

The results of the present experiment partially confirmed the suggested hypotheses. Contrary to my expectations, the manipulation had no effect on any of the antecedents of collective action, except for outrage. In specific terms, being in the high risk condition (i.e., being exposed to repressive measures) did not increase participants' efficacy beliefs (i.e., political, identity consolidation, and participative), politicised identification, moral obligation, and collective action. Moreover, the interaction between the manipulation and the perceived illegitimacy of the fracking procedure also did not have any direct effect on these antecedents.

However, being in the high risk condition (i.e., being exposed to repressive measures) significantly increased feelings of outrage. This significance suggests that being exposed to risky or repressive measures might be considered as suddenly imposed grievances inciting feelings of outrage (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Moreover, the interaction between the manipulation and perception of the fracking process as illegitimate was significant, whereby the manipulation positively predicted feelings of outrage for participants who perceived the fracking procedure as moderately or highly

illegitimate. Moreover, this interaction indirectly predicted collective action intentions, through the indirect path from outrage to politicised identification to moral obligation. In other words, individuals who are exposed to repressive measures, and who perceive the political or social issue at hand as illegitimate (e.g., medium or high levels) feel outraged, and their feelings of outrage predict higher politicised identification, which in its turn predicts moral obligation as well as willingness to engage in collective action. This indirect path provides empirical evidence for the social psychological processes through which the backfire effect takes place, whereby protests against perceived illegitimate social or political situations are galvanised when the authorities counter these protests with sanctions, since this repression incites a moral shock, consequently feelings of outrage (Hess & Martin, 2006). Not directly related to the role of outrage, however, Drury and Reicher (2005) have also shown how protests against a simple social issue can be galvanised when authorities try to repress legitimate protests. Specifically, Drury and Reicher (2005), in their qualitative analysis of two crowd events in United Kingdom related to the campaign against the M11 Link Road project (i.e., "tree-dressing ceremony", and a mass eviction of a gathering protecting the trees at the site) (p. 38), confirmed that police brutality increased protesters willingness to engage in collective action since protesters were also motivated to expose the illegitimacy of the authorities rather than just protest to save the tree.

Furthermore, the illegitimacy of the fracking procedure positively predicted identity consolidation efficacy, politicised identification, moral obligation as well as intentions to engage in collective action. This significance highlights the importance of the illegitimacy of a social issue in forming or increasing a politicised identity, enhancing the belief that the movement can solidify and strengthen its identity, increasing one's sense of moral obligation, and inciting resistance. The significance of the illegitimacy of a social issue in motivating collective action is in line with previous research (Ellemers et al., 1993; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; van Zomeren et al., 2008).

Moreover, the significance of politicised identification and moral obligation in predicting willingness to engage in collective action is in line with previous research (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Kelly & Kelly, 1992; Reicher, 1996; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Vilas et al., 2012), as well as with the results of the four

survey studies in this thesis (studies 2 to 5), whereby politicised identification and moral obligation consistently predicted willingness to engage in collective action above and beyond the remaining antecedents of collective action and past participation. As I mentioned in the previous chapter, this significance can be explained through the increase in perceptions of fate, commitment to the group, and solidarity among fellow members that would motivate individuals to face the risks, and would increase one's sense of duty to redress the injustice.

Moreover, the specific indirect path from the interaction between the manipulation and the perceived illegitimacy of the fracking process to collective action intentions (i.e., outrage to politicised identification to moral obligation) confirm the validity of at least one of the paths within the encapsulated model of social identity in collective action in a sample of non-activists (Thomas et al., 2012). For individuals who are not heavily involved in activism but who perceive a certain situation as illegitimate, exposure to sanctions or repression will increase their feelings of outrage towards this repression, which will shape their identification with the protest movement, consequently, increase their moral obligation to take action, and eventually their willingness to engage in future collective action.

Limitations and Contribution

Contrary to the hypotheses, the manipulation of risk did not predict most of the antecedents of collective action. Moreover, I examined only part of the suggested path (i.e., outrage), as fear and outrage were highly correlated, and the manipulation and the interaction of the manipulation with the illegitimacy of the fracking process did not predict any of the antecedents, except outrage. Hence, I could not provide causal evidence for the effects of perceived risk and its interaction with illegitimacy of the fracking process on the remaining antecedents of collective action. Potential explanation for the non-significant effects might be that the participants scored lower than the scale midpoint on almost all variables with a relatively small variance. Low power can also be another possible explanation as the sample size was quite small (N = 98). Moreover, detecting significant moderating effects in survey data is quite difficult in field research and with continuous variables (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Shieh, 2009). Hence, future research can target a larger sample size to explore whether these effects are present.

Moreover, given the methodology of data collection and the nature of the sample, the results of the study cannot be generalised to populations who do not have the same characteristics as the present sample; all participants were British, 80 % were above the age of 40 (M_{age} = 51.24, *SD* = 12.49), and 36 % had a university degree. Moreover, the sample was recruited through Pureprofile, a company which allows to collect online data from its registered members, hence, my participants were interested in taking part in surveys.

Despite these limitations, the present study provided experimental evidence for the effect of high risk condition in increasing feelings of outrage. It also highlights the social psychological processes underlying the backfire effect advanced by the political science and sociology scholars. However, it is important to note that this causal pathway does not reflect the irrationality of protesters. As Jasper (1998) has noted "emotions do not render protestors irrational; emotions accompany all social action, providing both motivation and goals" (p. 397), a point I will elaborate in the following chapter.

In the next chapter I provide a summary of the key findings of my thesis, discuss the implications of these findings, and the main limitations across the different studies, and suggest future research grounds.

Chapter 5

General Discussion

The role of authorities' sanctions in shaping resistance has been heavily examined at the macro level (i.e., the structural social and/or political circumstances shaping collective action such as political opportunities favouring the development of resistance), and the meso level (i.e., the factors affecting the resistance movements and their relations with other groups or society in general such as the formation of alliances between different protest movements). However, the micro level processes (i.e., individual members' motivation to engage in collective action) received less attention, and the empirical evidence is scarce. The present research is one of the few studies to examine the micro level processes underlying collective action intentions in contexts where engagement in such action carries substantial risks, such as detainment, imprisonment, injuries, and even death. Furthermore, to my knowledge, the present research is the first to examine how perceptions of such risks may shape the key psychological predictors of engagement (i.e., anger and fear, efficacy beliefs, identification, and moral obligation) and impact on future action tendencies. In sum, the research provides evidence for a general predictive model of collective action under risk, acknowledging the relevance of multiple pathways (i.e., emotional, instrumental, and identity) that can motivate people to take action under risk. The thesis also confirms the hypothesis that perceived risk indirectly instigates resistance through shaping the antecedents of collective action.

Summary of Results

In the present research I examined the social psychological processes underlying willingness to engage in collective action under risk in five different contexts characterised by the authority's repression of civil resistance; Egypt (Study 1), Hong Kong (Study 2), Russia (Study 3), Ukraine (Study 4), and Turkey (Study 5). I also examined the causal effects of risk associated with authority sanctions of resistance on the main antecedents of collective action and action intention (Study 6). Through integrating the recent advancements in the social psychological literature of collective action, I advanced a general predictive model of collective action under risk, whereby the different antecedents have distinct but complementary roles, and perception of risk

shapes these antecedents and intentions to engage in collective action. In particular, in Study 1, I examined the role of emotional (anger), instrumental (political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy), and identity (politicised identification) paths to collective action. In studies 2 to 5, I integrated to this model several of the newly advanced antecedents of collective action. Specifically, I examined the role of anger and fear (emotional paths), political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, and participative efficacy (instrumental paths), politicised identification (identity path), and moral obligation in predicting collective action in repressive contexts. In Study 6, I manipulated perceived risks in a sample of non-activist British participants to examine whether there are causal relations between perceived risk and the antecedents of collective action. In the next sections, I review the key findings of these various studies.

Antecedents of Collective Action under Risk

Emotional Pathway. The social psychological literature on collective action confirmed the role of anger and outrage as significant predictors of collective action (Leach et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2012; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2007; van Zomeren et al., 2004). The political science and sociology literatures on civil resistance have argued for the important role of outrage toward authorities' sanctions of peaceful resistance or its agents in inciting further resistance under repressive conditions (Hesss & Martin, 2006; Martin, 2007, 2010, 2015; Opp, 1994). In particular, as I mentioned in the previous chapters, when repression is perceived as an illegitimate restriction on people's democratic and civil liberties (Nepstad, 2011), it leads to feelings of outrage toward the authorities which can provoke more resistance (Hess & Martin, 2006; Martin, 2007, 2010, 2015). The present studies provided strong empirical evidence for this suggestion, and confirmed the role of outrage as a significant predictor of collective action under risk. Specifically, studies 1 (specifically within the anti-Morsi protest movement), 2, 3 and 5, and the MASEM results confirmed the positive link between perception of risk and outrage toward authorities, and Study 6 provided causal evidence for this positive link. The results from studies 1 (anti-Mursi protest movement), 3, 5 and 6, and the MASEM also confirmed the positive relation between outrage and willingness to engage in future collective action. The results from these three studies (1, 3 and 5) and MASEM also showed an indirect positive path between perception of risk and willingness to engage in future action via outrage. Additionally, outrage indirectly

predicted collective action through decreasing importance of risk (Study1), and increasing moral obligation (studies 2 and 3, and MASEM). The significance of outrage in predicting collective action is in line with the current social psychological literature affirming the motivating role of anger and outrage (Leach et al., 2006; Thomas et al., 2012; van Zomeren et al., 2004). Moreover, the indirect paths provide empirical evidence for the social psychological processes underlying the backfire effect (Hess & Martin, 2006), whereby authorities' illegitimate repression of protests incites feelings of outrage, and this outrage galvanises dissent through increasing protesters' politicised identification (Study 6) and moral obligation (studies 2 to 6, and MASEM).

Along with anger, in contexts where repression is widespread, fear is another emotion that may play a role in people's motivation to engage in collective action under risk. Previous studies have examined the role of fear in participation in collective action, and affirmed its inhibitory role, whereby it reduces individuals' willingness to engage in collective action (Dumont et al., 2008; Mackie et al., 2000; Miller et al., 2009; Osborne et al., 2012). In the present research, I expected perceived risk to positively predict fear, which in its turn would decrease motivation to engage in collective action. Results from studies 2, 3, 4, and 5, and MASEM confirmed the positive link between perceived risk and fear. Moreover, Study 3 confirmed the inhibitory role of fear, whereby fear negatively predicted collective action intentions. The inhibitory role of fear was also an indirect one, whereby fear indirectly predicted collective action intentions through decreasing moral obligation, and likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action through fear (Study 3). Interestingly, in the Turkish context (Study 5), fear positively predicted collective action through increasing moral obligation. As I explained in chapter 3, a potential explanation for this positive path can be a measurement issue whereby the fear item tapped into compassion toward the protesters who might be affected by the sanctions rather than fear of police repression. Compassion being a complex emotion encompassing appraisals of suffering, emotion of sympathy, and a tendency to take action can lead to increases in moral obligation to take action, consequently, increases in willingness to engage in collective action (Dutton, et al., 2006; Kanov et al., 2004; Miller, 2007).

In sum, these results highlight the importance of outrage towards the repressive treatment of protesters in spurring resistance, and of fear in deterring individuals from

further engagement. However, protesters are not only emotional beings motivated by outrage or demotivated by fear. They are also strategic, politicised, and dutiful beings, intrinsically motivated to strengthen their protest movement, contribute as individuals to achieve the desired group goals, act on their identity as activists, and fulfil their moral duty to take action. I will elaborate each of these motivators in the below sections.

Instrumental Pathway Recent research distinguished between different types of efficacy beliefs (Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2013). In the present research, I examined the role of three types of efficacy beliefs; political efficacy refers to the beliefs that the protest movement can achieve its goals through collective action, identity consolidation efficacy refers to the beliefs that through collective action the protest movement can assert and strengthen the identity of the protest movement, and participative efficacy refers to the likelihood of individuals' personal contribution for the protest movement to achieve its goals. Based on the social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the political science and sociology literatures, I suggested alternative hypotheses regarding the possible link between perception of risk and efficacy beliefs. Perception of risk can increase efficacy beliefs since the sanctions imposed by the authorities can be perceived as a signal for authorities' loss of power (Chenoweth, 2015; Sharp, 2005), people consider collective action as the best viable path to social and political change (Goodwin, 2000; Opp & Roehl, 1990; White, 1989), and they expect repression to attract the attention and intervention of the international powers (Dudouet, 2015; Ondetti, 2006; Wisler & Giugni, 1999). However, perception of risk can also decrease efficacy beliefs as these sanctions can be perceived as the out-group's resolve and power to repress the demands of the protesters (Muller, 1985), and limit the ability of the protest movement to mobilise more people (DeNardo, 1985). The results of the present studies showed that perception of risk has differential links to the various efficacy beliefs across the examined contexts. Likelihood of risk positively predicted political efficacy in studies 1 (specifically for the anti-Morsi movement) and 2, and negatively in Study 3, and had no significant path to political efficacy in studies 4 and 5, and MASEM. Political efficacy had no significant direct path to action intentions across the five survey studies (except for Study 1, the anti-military movement) and MASEM. Although the political science, sociology and social psychology literature argue for the importance of believing in possible political or social changes as a

motivator to provoke resistance (Mummendey et al., 1999; Nepstad, 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2010), the results of the present study show a non-significant role for political efficacy beliefs in motivating collective action in repressive contexts. The non-significance of political efficacy to motivate individuals to engage in collective action under risk is in line with several studies that found a weak and sometimes non-significant role of political efficacy as an antecedent of collective action. Moreover, it endorses the argument advanced by scholars to not consider activists or protesters to be solely motivated by the potential benefits of collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; Klandermans, 1997; Klein et al., 2007; Simon et al., 1998; Stürmer et al., 2003; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren & Spears, 2009), and calls for further research to explain the variability in the results. As I mentioned in earlier chapters, the weak association between political efficacy and collective action is prevalent when identification with the in-group is simultaneously considered as a predictor (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Kelly & Kelly, 1992). Moreover, specific to repressive contexts, protesters might be aware that the likelihood of achieving concrete political or social change at the present time is quite difficult. Hence, their motivation to engage in collective action while endangering their well-being might be delineated by other motives (Chang, 2008; Chang & Kim, 2007; Loveman, 1998).

It is important to note, however, that in Study 1 political efficacy negatively predicted collective action in the anti-military protest movement. Hence, the less the activists' belief that political change can be achieved, the more their willingness to engage in collective action. I explained this significance through the "nothing to lose strategy" (Spears et al., 2015), whereby activists would engage in collective action since they perceive it as a viable route to potential political or social change, even if the likelihood of achieving such goals is unlikely. This negative link can also signal a "free rider effect", whereby protesters are less likely to participate in collective action if they perceive their group able to achieve the desired goals. Interestingly, political efficacy had also a positive link to collective action through decreasing the importance of risk (Study 1). This result confirms previous findings in the risk literature, which argues for the role of self-efficacy in reducing risk estimates and encouraging riskier behaviour (Llewellyn, et al., 2008; Krueger & Dickson, 1994). Moreover, this result is in line with the social identity theory which asserts that once individuals identify with a social

group, they prioritise the group's benefits and goals, and downplay the costs and risks to themselves (Reicher et al., 2013; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, in the Russian context (Study 3), political efficacy had a negative role whereby it negatively predicted collective action through decreasing moral obligation. I suggested that this path highlights the process through which the free rider effect might occur; when individuals believe that the protest movement is likely to achieve the group goals, their obligation to take part is decreased, and consequently, their motivation to engage in collective action under risk is also reduced.

Although some would consider the general non-significant role of political efficacy as a sign for the irrationality of the protesters, whereby they are engaging in collective action under considerable risk without consideration for the potential political or social gains, the significance of identity consolidation efficacy, participative efficacy, politicised identification, and moral obligation suggests otherwise.

Likelihood of risk positively predicted identity consolidation efficacy in studies 1, 2, and 3, as well as in MASEM. Identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted moral obligation (Study 2) and willingness to engage in collective action (studies 3 and 5, and MASEM). Moreover, likelihood of risk indirectly predicted collective action through identity consolidation in Study 5 and MASEM, and identity consolidation efficacy indirectly predicted collective action through moral obligation in Study 2. The results of these studies are in line with recent research highlighting the importance of affirming a protest movement's identity and legitimacy in motivating individuals to take action as this affirmation can consolidate and strengthen the movement's identity as well as convey the behavioural norms to follow (Drury & Reicher 2000, 2005; Klein et al., 2007). As I mentioned in the previous chapters, the significance of identity consolidation efficacy highlights the strategic nature of collective action in such repressive contexts. Consolidating a movement would allow activists to organise and coordinate their efforts and contributions, which can lead to a more effective route to achieving the envisaged political and social goals (Haslam, 2001; Klein et al., 2007; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005; Turner, 2005). Hence, the likelihood of consolidating a movement can be the cornerstone for potential future success in achieving the desired political or social change. In fact, the results of Saab et al.'s

(2015) studies provided evidence for the role of identity consolidation efficacy in indirectly predicting collective action intentions through increasing political efficacy.

Perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted participative efficacy in studies 2 and 3 and the MASEM. In studies 2, 3, 4 and 5, and MASEM, participative efficacy positively predicted moral obligation. Moreover, participative efficacy directly predicted collective action in Study 3, and indirectly through moral obligation in studies 2, 3, 4, and 5, and MASEM. Additionally, participative efficacy had a significant mediating role in the relation between likelihood of risk and collective action intentions in Study 3. These significant findings affirm the importance of individuals' belief in one's own contribution for the protest movement to achieve the movement's goals as a motivator of action intentions in repressive contexts where protesters face significant risks. Hence, regardless of the protest movement's likelihood of achieving the envisioned goals, one's belief that his or her behaviour can contribute to the movement's efforts will motivate him/her to take action. These findings highlight the rationality of the protesters in such repressive contexts. Furthermore, as the protesters' incentive to take action is partly due to their need to personally contribute to the potential success of the in-group, one can argue that the role of participative efficacy is due to the empowering feelings the knowledge of one's ability to contribute to a protest movement can have, as individuals feel to be agentic human beings capable of having an impact on their and their social group's conditions, and feel they have the chance to realise their social identity as activists. Previous studies have shown the significant role of this empowerment and the opportunity to actualise one's social identity as an activist in motivating people to take action (Drury & Reicher, 2005; 2009). Moreover, this empowerment can motivate people who are only marginally involved in the protest movement to be willing to engage in more demanding or oppositional forms of collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009).

Finally, the differential relevance of the three types of efficacy beliefs in the different contexts endorses the importance to not conceptualise the effectiveness of a protest movement strictly in terms of directly influencing the out-group, and brining about the desired social and political change. Rather to consider goals which the protest movement might not articulate, however, can lead to more dedicated members and solidified movement. For instance, although forming an opposition movement might not

be on the demands' list of a protest movement, the likelihood of gathering different factions of a society under the umbrella of opposition, strengthening mutual solidarity and support within this movement, and ensuring support from bystanders would enhance the intra-group relations and empower the protest movement. Consequently, empowered activists who feel stronger bonds with their in-group members would feel an increased sense of duty to participate in future collective action. The likelihood of achieving such a change can itself be considered as a success (Klein et al., 2007).

Identity Pathway. Likelihood of risk positively predicted politicised identification in studies 2, 3, and 5, and MASEM. The importance of politicised identification to predict moral obligation and collective action was confirmed within each of the survey studies (2 to 5, except Study 1), as well as MASEM. Moreover, in studies 2, 3, and 5, and MASEM, likelihood of risk had an indirect path to collective action through politicised identification, and politicised identification positively predicted action intentions through moral obligation. This significant role of politicised identification is in line with the current social psychological literature of collective action which emphasises the significance of identification in predicting willingness to engage in collective action across different social and political contexts (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 1996; Simon et al., 1998; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). As I mentioned in the introduction, social identity and self-categorisation theories consider social identity as a cornerstone for collective action (Turner, 1982, 1991; Turner et al., 1987). Specifically, the social identity model of crowd action (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; Reicher 1996) argues that once individuals are part of a crowd, they feel as a homogeneous entity, increase their solidarity and cooperation with fellow in-group members, and conform to group normative behaviour. Moreover, the out-group's reaction also shapes the saliency of the activist identity and behaviour, whereby the perceived illegitimate and indiscriminate repression of the in-group's legitimate crowd behaviour highlights the shared fate among the in-group members, the saliency of the group's identity, as well as the solidarity among the in-group members and feelings of empowerment (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005, 2009; Reicher, 1996). Hence, identification with a protest movement motivates individuals to engage in collective action, and can even incite more opposition and radical action. In particular to repressive contexts, Haslam and Reicher (2011) confirmed the paramount

role of shared identity and fate in empowering individuals to engage in resistance in relatively risky contexts in their examination of prisoners' resistance in three different prisons (Maze, Robben Island, and Sobibor Extermination Camp), and Zimbardo (2007) in Stanford Prison Experiment.

Furthermore, as I mentioned above, politicised identification indirectly predicted action intentions through moral obligation. Hence, one of the ways in which politicised identification affect individuals' motivation to engage in collective action is through increasing their sense of responsibility or obligation (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Vilas et al., 2012). This positive path can be linked to the importance protesters attribute to realising and actualising their identity as opposition or activists through participating in collective action (Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009). Hence, highly identifying with the protest movement may strengthen individuals' need to act upon this identity, which would strengthen their sense of obligation to take part in collective action.

Moral Obligation. Perceived likelihood of risk positively predicted moral obligation in studies 3 and 5 as well as MASEM, and it indirectly predicted moral obligation through outrage (studies 2 and 3, and MASEM), identity consolidation efficacy (Study 2), participative efficacy (studies 2 and 3, and MASEM), and politicised identification (studies 2, 3, and 5, and MASEM). Furthermore, results across studies 2 to 5 and MASEM confirm the significance of moral obligation in predicting willingness to engage in collective action under risk. Moreover, as I mentioned previously, likelihood of risk (MASEM), politicised identification (studies 2 to 5, and MASEM), outrage (studies 2 and 3, and MASEM), identity consolidation efficacy (studies 2 and 3), and participative efficacy (studies 2, 3, and 5, and MASEM) indirectly predicted collective action through moral obligation. These results highlight that the effects of politicised identification, identity consolidation efficacy and participative efficacy are partly due to individuals' sense of responsibility raised through their identification as activists and the knowledge that their participation can strengthen the protest movement, and contribute to achieving the movement's goals. This significant role of moral obligation is in line with recent findings highlighting the role of moral obligation as the most proximal predictor of collective action (Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). Particularly to repressive contexts, Opp (1994) showed how perceptions of infringement of one's political or social values and rights incites feelings

of moral outrage which lead to feelings of moral responsibility to take action. Nepstad (2004) also highlighted the role of moral obligation in fostering continued commitment to a resistance under repressive circumstances.

The significance of participative and identity consolidation efficacies, politicised identification, and moral obligation provide further evidence for the argument that, even in repressive contexts where activists face substantial risks, individuals do not lose themselves in a crowd, but perceive collective action as an opportunity to express their outrage, consolidate the identity of the protest movement they identify with, personally contribute to this movement, and realise their identity as activists. The sense of responsibility deriving from these antecedents motivates individuals to further engage in collective action. Hence, the present research challenges the Le Bonian irrationality claims and the deindividuation theory (Le Bon, 1985) and argues for the emotional, strategic, politicised, and dutiful protester.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

Several limitations should be highlighted regarding the present six studies. The use of online surveys might be less than ideal, however, recent research argues for the validity and contribution of 'internet' samples (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John, 2004). In fact, Gosling et al. (2004) examined six common preconceptions about data from internet samples. Their results from a comparison of psychological questionnaires (i.e., personality) between large internet based sample and a non-internet or paper-and-pencil based samples confirmed that the internet based samples are as reliable as the paper-and-pencil samples, with comparable variability in gender, age, and socioeconomic status, adequate representativeness and generalisability of results, as well as low rates of random answering. Moreover, the formatting of the questionnaire had no significant effect on the results. Importantly, the results from the internet sample are comparable to the results from the traditional paper-and-pencil samples.

Moreover, as I mentioned in the previous chapters, the present samples (except Study 6) consisted mainly of young and highly educated people who had at least some level of past participation in collective action, and samples from Studies 1, 2, and 3 were composed mainly of activists. The generalisability of the findings is hence restricted. Future research should consider the role of risk perceptions in the wider population with samples from different demographic backgrounds, target activists and

non-activists, and examine the potential differences between the samples. Indeed, van Zomeren (2015) highlighted the differences in motivations between activists and non-activists. Activists have higher political identification and are more motivated by identification (van Zomeren et al., 2008) and moral obligation (Stürmer & Simon, 2004), but less so by anger (Groves, 1995; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012; Stürmer & Simon, 2004, 2009; Tausch et al., 2011). They are also motivated by different efficacy concerns (van Zomeren, 2015). Political efficacy would be more predictive for non-activists (Louis et al., 2004), identity consolidation efficacy and participative efficacy for activists (Giguere & Lalonde, 2010; Mazzoni, van Zomeren, & Cicognani, 2015; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). The relative significance and increase (due to perceived risk; as argued and confirmed in the present research) of politicised identification, moral obligation, participative efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy would empower the activists and may lead perception of risks to have a more facilitatory role for activists.

Furthermore, I note that the generalisability of some of the present results is restricted to the particular contexts I examined, the specific time periods I launched my surveys, as well as the emphasis on risks to personal welfare. In line with previous research, I expect these various motivators to uniquely contribute to encouraging people to take action under risk (van Zomeren et al., 2004, 2012; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). In line with the civil resistance and protest movement literature (Martin, 2015), I expect the paths to and from anger towards the police to be significant in most contexts. However, I predict non-significant paths of anger within groups with ideologies valuing personal sacrifice or with highly oppositional relation with authorities, where risks to personal welfare can be perceived as by-products of threats to an in-group's identity and collective goals. Under such circumstances, risks to personal welfare can be perceived as opportunities to confirm one's loyalty to the in-group's ideology and actualise one's social identity through risking one's own safety (Calhoun, 1991; Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009; Escobar, 1993). Consequently, I expect outrage to be of lesser importance and the paths associated with political efficacy to be significant and negatively associated with collective action since protesters might adopt a 'nothing to lose strategy' (Spears et al., 2015). Otherwise, political efficacy might play a less significant role since achieving political and social change is difficult. However, other forms of

efficacies such as identity consolidation and participative efficacies (Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren, et al., 2012) might be more relevant. Hence, examining the moderating effects of protest movements' ideologies can be an important future contribution, since understanding how the ideology of a protest movement may shape the significance of the different antecedents of collective action might explain the variability in results of past research highlighting differential significance for the role of instrumental (e.g., the relevance of the different efficacy beliefs), emotional, and identity paths to collective action. Furthermore, related to the temporality issues, launching the surveys at different stages of a protest movement's lifespan might reveal different results, whereby the relative significance of each predictor might change according to whether the protest movement is at its early, mid, or end stages.

Political science and sociology scholars have also suggested that different types of authority or government sanctions (institutional/long term vs situational/short term) can have differential effects on social movements and dissent (Wiltfang & McAdam, 1991). For instance, they argued that longitudinal and subtle forms of sanctions (e.g., surveillance) are very effective in confining collective action since these measures restrain the development of an opposition movement, without endangering the legitimacy of the authorities (Barkan, 2006; Boykoff, 2007). On the other hand, situational or short term repression (e.g., violent police intervention during protests or demonstrations) can be perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate, consequently can spur further resistance. However, Moore (1998) stressed that long run repression would increase dissent through the micro-mobilisation processes identified by Opp (1990), and short run repression is likely to decrease protest behaviour (Rasler, 1996). Consequently, future research can examine whether different forms of repression differentially shape the antecedents of and willingness to engage in collective action. It would also be interesting to examine the long term consequences of these different forms of repression. For instance, I expect these repressive measures to increase identification with certain sub-groups and disidentification with the state or authorities, consequently promote more resistance and even radical action.

I also recognise that I examined willingness to engage rather than actual participation in collective action. Although past research has shown that willingness to engage is a good predictor of actual participation (Blackwood & Louis, 2012; De

Weerd, & Klandermans, 1999), a number of additional barriers to actual participation are likely to operate in contexts where protest carries substantial risks. It is thus desirable for future research to examine actual engagement in protests in risky contexts. Moreover, related to overcoming barriers of participation, since I was able to examine importance of risks only within the Egyptian context (Study 1), future research studies should further examine and revise this concept. Exploring the factors decreasing the importance activists attribute to the risks is an important contribution since it can help us understand the factors helping activists overcome the barriers of participation in high risk activism, which is part of the last step toward actual engagement in collective action (Klandermans, 1984; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987), and which generally receives less attention by scholars.

I also acknowledge that the concepts of threats and risks are likely to be strongly related. In fact, the (limited) work that is available suggests that threat is one of several predictors of perceived risk (Brooks, 2003; Pinkerton, 2014; Threat Analysis Group, n.d.). Repressive measures pose a number of particular threats, such as a threat to activists' identity (Livingstone, Spears, Manstead, & Bruder, 2009), which, as much previous research has shown, heightens anger and in-group identification (Crisp, Heuston, Farr, & Turner, 2007; Doosje, Spears, & Ellemers, 2006; Voci, 2006). I would expect threat to be a more distal predictor of willingness to protest, mediated in part by the specific risks of being subject to horrifying hazards (e.g., injured, detained or killed) due to this threat. Hence, I acknowledge that some of the effects found in this study can be a function of threats rather than risks, however, as I have no separate measures of threats in the present studies, I am unable to disentangle the unique effects of threat vs. risk and suggest that this issue should be addressed in future research.

The key limitation of the present research is the use of cross-sectional data in most studies. Cross-sectional data does not allow to make any causal inferences. Moreover, as the concepts are measured simultaneously in a cross-sectional design, delineating the specific relational paths between the variables is difficult, especially with mediational models, as it is quite hard to decide with confidence which variable should be the independent and which the mediator (Muller, Judd, & Yzerbyt, 2005; Roe, 2011). Alternative specifications therefore cannot be excluded. Longitudinal as well as experimental studies, hence, are needed to address the causal sequence problem.

Study 6 partially tackled this issue through manipulating risk and providing evidence for the causal sequence between perceived risk and outrage. However, future research with bigger sample is still needed to further explore the causal sequential relation between perceived risk and the other antecedents of collective action (i.e., fear, efficacy beliefs, identification, and moral obligation).

Some of the alternative specifications of the role of risk to be investigated in future research are the following. For instance, in Study 1 where I examined the role of perceived importance of risks, following the appraisal theory of emotions (Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980), the interaction between risk likelihood, as primary, and risk importance, as secondary appraisals, can be explored. Risk likelihood might also act as a moderator in the relation between the predictors and action intentions. For example, politicised identification and identity consolidation efficacy may play a more important role in very high-risk contexts as protesters would need more resources to cope with the risks (Opp & Roehl, 1991). All these moderating effects were non-significant, except for risk likelihood moderating the relation between anger and action intentions, such that anger was a significant predictor of action intentions only at low and medium levels of risk. Within Study 1, the non-significant moderating effects might be due to the nature of the data (observational and continuous variables) and small sample size (McClelland & Judd, 1993; Shieh, 2009). Regarding Studies 2 to 5, I examined the moderating role of likelihood of risk and politicised identification, and the results across the contexts showed a similar pattern. As I mentioned in chapter 3, the antecedents of collective action were significant predictors of action intentions at medium and high levels of perceived risks. These results provide empirical evidence for the backfire effect and argue against the deterring effect of repression. Furthermore, they delineate the specific "micro-mobilisation" processes spurring further resistance despite the sanctions imposed by the authorities (Opp & Roehl, 1990). As for the moderating role of politicised identification, perceived risk positively predicted the antecedents of collective action only at low and moderate levels of politicised identification. I argued that highly identified individuals might have internalised the emotional and efficacy norms of the movement, and have largely committed to the movement, consequently, repression does not significantly affect their emotions and efficacy beliefs. Moreover, they probably already hold specific (negative) views of the authorities, and the use of

repression only confirms their views (please refer to the supplementary material for a detailed reporting of these results).

Furthermore, it would be particularly interesting to examine the factors that determine the extent to which perceived risks are responded to with fear and anger, and the potential differences between activists and non-activists in the importance of these emotions. For instance, future research can examine the effects of efficacy beliefs in inciting emotions of fear vs anger in such repressive contexts. The appraisal theory of emotions (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1988) argue for the role of sense of control or power in instigating fear or anger in an individual. When individuals feel powerful or strong, they are more likely to experience anger when faced with a threatening stimulus. However, when individuals feel weak, they are more likely to experience fear or anxiety. In similar line, one can expect for political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies to play a significant role in inciting emotions of anger (rather than fear) when faced with repression.

Since examining collective action under risk from a social psychological perspective is still at its early stages, numerous future research grounds can be suggested. The present research project did not examine a comprehensive range of potential antecedents. Other factors might also play significant role in helping activists to overcome the risks associated with activism. For instance, as politicised identification emerged as one of the most significant predictors of action intentions under risk, future research can examine whether in-group norms of resisting risks and/or helping the fellow in-group members in times of need shape individuals' motivation to take action. In fact, previous research highlighted how in-group norms shape the costs and benefits one values (Hornsey, Blackwood, & O'Brien, 2005; Livingstone & Haslam, 2008; Louis, Taylor, & Douglas, 2005), as well as emotions and beliefs (Thomas et al., 2009).

Furthermore, other emotions such as pride, hope, and joy might lead to feelings of empowerment and an increase sense of efficacy (Tausch & Becker, 2013; Pearlman, 2013; Sharp, 2005) that might further motivate individuals to engage in collective action under risk. Future research can examine whether these positive emotions have any causal effects on individuals' willingness to engage in collective action under risk, and if so through which social psychological processes (e.g., efficacy beliefs). For instance, Tausch and Becker (2013) have shown the indirect effect of pride in relation to success

of one's in-group in motivating participants to engage in future collective action, through increasing efficacy beliefs. Moreover, examining the significance of reciprocal emotions of affective ties within a movement (e.g., love, solidarity, and loyalty, Jasper, 1997, 1998) may also be of importance. Specifically to risky activism, according to the civil resistance and social movement literatures, relational ties with other protesters (DiGrazia, 2014; Jasper, 1998; Loveman, 1998; McAdam, 1986; Nepstad, 2004; Nepstad & Smith, 1999; Opp & Roehl, 1990) play an important role in initiating and sustaining collective action. Accordingly, it might be interesting to examine whether these ties are affected by the perceived authority sanctions, and how they shape the antecedents of collective action and willingness to engage in future action.

Importantly, civil resistance literature highlights the need for sustained resistance for a movement to achieve its goals. In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) argue that in general nonviolent resistance campaigns last about three years before they conclude (in either success or failure). Schock (2015) identified several social psychological factors that might potentially help activists to endure repression (e.g., stubbornness, perseverance). Hence, examining social psychological predictors of sustained collective action in risky or repressive contexts is another potential future research direction. For example, a potential factor promoting resilience in the face of repression can be the use of humour in collective action. In fact, the civil resistance literature asserts the utility of humour in repressive contexts (Hart, 2007; Hart & Bos, 2008; Sombutpoonsiri, 2015). For example, Hart and Bos (2008) highlighted the role of humour in movements' attempts to mobilise people and oppose the repressor. Other scholars argued for the role of humour in forming the identity of the movement as a non-violent agent, helping activists overcome fear, building unity and solidarity among activists, and shielding from oppression through delineating it as a de-legitimate act directed towards peaceful, legitimate, and 'humorous' protesters (Hart, 2007; Sombutpoonsiri, 2012; Sorensen, 2008). Accordingly, social psychological research can examine the role of humour in predicting empowerment, solidarity among protesters, positive emotions (e.g., happiness), and action intentions.

Moreover, examining sustained resistance resonates with recent calls to conduct longitudinal studies (Louis, 2009). Longitudinal studies of collective action under risk are necessary since participation in such action can have significant impact on the

protesters (Drury & Reicher, 2005, 2009; Tausch & Becker, 2012). Louis, Amiot, and Blackwood (2016) examined the factors promoting sustained activism in non-risky context in two correlational studies. Their results confirmed the role of belonging to community groups in motivating individuals to sustain their activism. They argued for three potential reasons for the importance of membership in different organizations to be a significant motivator for sustained activism; an increase in social network, political knowledge, and activist identity. Moreover, as McCarthy and Zald (1977) have argued, strong social networks and leadership to be important factors promoting sustained mobilisation.

Another potential future research direction can be to examine the social psychological factors motivating third parties to support a resistance movement whereby this support would endanger their wellbeing (e.g., Turkish support movements to the Kurdish cause). Social psychological studies have recently shed light on the possible predictors for solidarity movements (Saab, et al., 2015), however, the examined contexts were not risky ones. This would be a significant query since part of the backfire effect is enhancing recruitment among sympathetic publics (Martin, 2007) which would help in promoting a successful resistance (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). For instance, previous findings showed how violent incidences incite moral outrage towards the offenders which leads to a motivation to take solidarity action with the people who were affected by the violence (Lodewijkx, Kersten, & van Zomeren, 2008).

Finally, the studies within this research project focused on peaceful collective action. Future studies should examine the generalisability of the results in regards to violent collective action. Recent research has delineated different social psychological paths to normative and non-normative collective action (Tausch et al., 2011). From an emotional standpoint, contempt rather than anger motivates violent collective action, as for instrumental motives, political efficacy negatively predicts non-normative action intentions. It may also be interesting to examine the social psychological factors motivating the transition from violent resistance to non-violent resistance, and the commitment to non-violent resistance. Veronique Dudouet (2013) emphasises the role of intra-group (e.g., leadership change, efficacy beliefs) and relational (e.g., seeking new allies) factors to play a significant role in this shift.

Contributions and Implications of the Current Research Project

In spite of these limitations, I believe that the present thesis makes a number of important contributions. Firstly, it is a very timely research as it attempts to understand why some people decided to take action within the recent waves of civil resistance that spread across the world. These waves occurred in contexts where the authorities impose harsh sanctions on any attempt to organise or carry civil resistance. Despite these conditions activists took to the streets to voice their opposition.

Secondly, the present research has a strong theoretical contribution as it complements the present social psychological literature on collective action (van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2013; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012) by integrating the recent advancements in one predictive model, and testing this model in contexts where activists face considerable risks. Furthermore, I based my hypotheses on theories from political science and sociology literature on civil resistance, revolutions and protest movements, and social psychology literature on collective action, and provided initial empirical evidence from different social and political contexts for these hypotheses. Additionally, it introduces concepts from the psychological literature on risk (Rohrmann, 2008) to better understand engagement in collective action in contexts where protesters are faced with severe consequences, including arrest, injury, or even death, and provides first insights into the psychological processes that help protesters to overcome the psychological barriers to action under such conditions. Hence, the present thesis is in line with recent calls to integrate the different literatures examining collective action since the various disciplines, although examine the same phenomena of collective action, they rarely tend to synthesise their results with other disciplines (Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2007; van Zomeren, 2013; for some exceptions of integrating various disciplines, please refer to Earl, 2011; Earl & Soul, 2010; Shock, 2013). It also opens up a number of potentially fruitful lines for future inter-disciplinary research that could further contribute to our understanding of the underlying processes motivating individuals to take part in collective action under risks.

Thirdly, the present findings have direct implications to protest movement organisers or leaders, and activists in general who wish to mobilise against authoritarian regimes. As DeNardo (1985) has mentioned, repression is a "double-edged sword,

sometimes deterring and intimidating and sometimes producing a political backlash that enhances the movement's support" (p. 155), the results highlight the processes through which impositions of risks attached to protesting can indirectly spur further resistance. Hence, based on these results, I can provide some suggestions for protest organisers and leaders on how to shape the collective action frames to incite willingness to engage in collective action under risk (Reicher et al., 2006). Protest organisers or leaders should highlight in their discourse the illegitimacy of the repression exerted by authorities to foster feelings of outrage towards how activists are being treated. As my data and previous work have shown (Thomas & McGarthy, 2009; Thomas et al., 2009), outrage can lead to stronger identification with the protest movement and an increase in sense of obligation to take action, and are significant motivators of collective action. Moreover, protest organisers and leaders should emphasise the importance of each individual's personal contribution to achieve greater group goals, and the significance and likelihood of solidifying the protest movement to achieve the movement's goals (Saab et al., 2015; van Zomeren et al., 2013). These efficacy beliefs would mobilise individuals to take action under risk (Thomas et al., 2009). Importantly, in contexts where authorities do not refrain from using repression, protest organisers should not concentrate their discourse only on achieving political goals, as the likelihood of achieving such goals does not predict willingness to engage in collective action. Actually, as I argued previously, political efficacy has the potential to instigate a free rider effect, whereby the motivation to engage in collective action decreases with increases in political efficacy, through reducing feelings of moral obligation. Notably, organisers and leaders should also delineate a protest movement identity emphasising the shared fate and solidarity, and cultivate a sense of responsibility and obligation to do something against the injustice. As moral obligation can be an attempt to conform to both personal and group norm, protest organisers should attempt to delineate engagement in collective action under risk as personal as well as group norm (Stürmer et al., 2003; Vilas & Sabucido, 2012).

Conclusion

In the present thesis I address two important limitations within the social psychological literature of collective action. Firstly, I advance an integrative model of collective action whereby I examine the significance of the most recent advancements

(i.e., political, identity consolidation and participative efficacies, fear, and moral obligation) simultaneously, above and beyond the role played by past participation. Secondly, I test this model in contexts where engagement in any kind of civil resistance is faced with substantial risks due to authority sanctions. Consequently, I also examine how perceptions of risk shape the antecedents of collective action, and the willingness to engage in future collective action. The findings of the present thesis provide evidence for a complex relation between authority sanctions and collective action. Perceived likelihood of risk associated with authority repression indirectly increases civil resistance through setting off "micro-mobilisation" processes (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523). Although the specific micro-mobilisation processes differed according to the contexts, the main antecedents of collective action meaningfully predicted participants' willingness to engage in collective action under risk. The results across the studies argue against the pathologising of collective action under risk. Though some would perceive the behaviour of protesters in such risky contexts as irrational since they are facing substantial risks when the likelihood of achieving tangible social or political change is limited, the results show that these protesters are strategic since they are motivated by the likelihood to consolidate the identity of their opposition movement which can be the building block to achieve long term political and social change. Moreover, they are passionate as their main motivation is their outrage towards how the authorities treat the protesters, their identification with their protest movement, the likelihood of their own contribution for the protest movement to achieve its goals, as well as their sense of moral responsibility to take action. Collective action allows them to express and actualise their identity of being activists regardless of the instrumental costs and benefits calculations.

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Appendix

Study 1: Egypt

University of St Andrews

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

1 May 2013

Ethics Reference No: *Please quote this ref on all correspondence*	PS9786
Project Title:	The Psychological Factors Underlying Engagement and Disengagement in Protests Within the Egyptian Context
Researcher's Name:	Arin Ayanian
Supervisor:	Dr Nicole Tausch

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the Psychology & Neuroscience School Ethics Committee meetings on the 13th and 27th March 2013. The following documents were reviewed:

1.	Ethical Application Form	24/04/2013
2.	Advertisement	24/04/2013
3.	Participant Information Sheet	24/04/2013
4.	Consent Form	24/04/2013
5.	Debriefing Form	24/04/2013
6.	Questionnaire	24/04/2013

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects which have not commenced within two years of original approval must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant changes which occur in connection with this study, and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

M Latimer

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Dr N. Tausch (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

UTREC Convenor, Mansefield, 3 St Mary's Place, St Andrews, KY16 9UY
Email: utrec@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462866
The University of St Andrews is a charity registered in Scotland: No SC013532

Some Egyptian citizens try to express dissatisfaction with, or resist, the current situation in Egypt.
Please think about how the Police treats/reacts to the protesters who are currently taking part in the protests against the Military interventions. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions while thinking about the police.
When you think about the police, you feel anger:

1. To a very little extent	2. Very Slightly	3. Somewhat	4. To a certain extent	5. To a great extent

Are you supporting any of the following current protests (please tick only one):

- Protests that are against the Military interventions (Protests defending the legitimacy of Mr Morsi and/or being against the Military interventions)
- Protests that are supporting the June 30 Uprising (Protests supporting the ouster of Mr Morsi and the military intervention)
- Other, please specify
- None

Please specify the level of your involvement in the current protests that are .....

1. I did nothing	2. Participated by being active on social networks	3. Occasional Protester	4. Regular Protester	5. Protest Organiser

Using the scale below, please specify your level of involvement in the protests that are .....

1. Never participated	2. Did not participate	3. Participated to a certain extent	4. Participated	5. Participated to a great extent

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about being a protester in ..... Please think of yourself as a protester in ..... Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- Being part of the protest movement that is supporting ..... is an important part of who I am

- I have a lot in common with other protesters from the protest movement that is .....
- I'm proud of being part of the protest movement that is supporting ….

Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that the protests will achieve these goals:

1. Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	5. Guaranteed to a great extent

Political Efficacy
- Have an impact on what the Military does
- Stand against injustice
- Bring justice to the protesters who were killed
- Improve the situation in Egypt
- Stand up for the demands of the January 25th revolution

Identity Consolidation (Group level)
- Increase support in Egyptian public opinion for the protest movements
- Strengthen the solidarity among the protests movement participants
- Ensure international support for the protest movements

The following questions are about the possible costs associated with protesting. If you were to protest, how LIKELY do you think you might face the following:

	(1) Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	(5) Very Likely
Being Injured					
Being Killed					
Being Arrested					
Being Tortured					
Being Sexually Harassed					

The following questions are about the possible costs associated with protesting. If you were to protest, how IMPORTANT are the following risks for you:

	Very Unimportant	Unimportant	Neutral	Important	Very Important

Being Injured					
Being Killed					
Being Arrested					
Being Tortured					
Being Sexually Harassed					

Consider that within 6 months, the democratic transition does not occur, and the military continues its control over the political scene in Egypt. Using the scale below, please tell us how likely it is that you would engage in the following actions.

1. Not at all willing	2. Willing to a certain extent	3. Neutral	4. Willing	5.Extremely willing

- Demonstrate peacefully
- Participate in marches
- Participate in sit-ns
- Sign petitions
- Participate in street art
- Be active on social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Blogs)

Demographics
Gender
Male Female

Age Please specify (in years)

1st Nationality
1. Egyptian 2. Other, please specify

Which area in Egypt are you living in:
1.Cairo 2. Alexandria 3.Port Said 3. Suez 4. Al Mahallah al Kubra 5. Aysut 6. Al Jizah 7. Tanda 8. Other, please specify 9. Not applicable

Education

1. Primary and below 2. Elementary 3. Secondary
4. Vocational Education 5. University 6. Higher Education

Your monthly income

1. Less than 200 L.E. (EGP) 2. 201-500 L.E. (EGP) 3.501-1000 L.E. (EGP)
4. 1001-1500 L.E. (EGP) 5. 1501-2000 L.E. (EGP) 6. 2001-3000 L.E. (EGP)
7. 3001-5000 L.E. (EGP) 8. More than 5001 L.E. (EGP)

Study 2: Hong Kong

University of St Andrews
from first to foremost

600 YEARS
1413 – 2013

Project Title	The Psychological Factors Underlying Engagement in, and Disengagement from, Collective Action
Researcher's Name	Arin Ayanian
Supervisor	Dr Nicole Tausch
Department/Unit	School of Psychology & Neuroscience
Ethical Approval Code (Approval allocated to Original Application)	PS9786
Original Application Approval Date	24 April 2013
Amendment Application Approval	10 November 2014

Ethical Amendment Approval

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which was considered at the Psychology & Neuroscience School Ethics Committee meeting on the 4th November 2014. The following documents were reviewed:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form 10/11/2014
2. Participant Information Sheet 10/11/2014
3. Consent Form 10/11/2014
4. Debriefing Form 10/11/2014
5. Questionnaires 10/11/2014

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years from the original application only. Ethical Amendments do not extend this period but give permission to an amendment to the original approval research proposal only. If you are unable to complete your research within the original 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply. You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

pp

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Dr N. Tausch (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP
Email: psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462071

Think of the times, the police was/is the more extreme measures (e.g. arrestments, use of force, use of tear gas and pepper spray, etc…). When thinking about the treatment of protesters in Hong Kong, to what extent do you feel?

- Outraged

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent	6. I prefer not to answer

Using the scale below, please indicate how you would define your level of involvement in past protests (protests before the Occupation/ Umbrella movement, 2014).

1. I did nothing	2. Participated by being active on social networks	3. Occasional Protester	4. Regular Protester	5. Protest Organiser	6. I prefer not to answer

Using the scale below, please indicate how often you participated in past protests (protests before the Occupation/Umbrella revolution, 2014).

1. Never	2. Rarely	3. Occasionally	4. Often	5. Frequently	6. I prefer not to answer

Do you consider yourself as part of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong?

1. Yes
5. No

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about the current Umbrella movement in Hong Kong.
Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements**.**

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- Being part of the umbrella movement in Hong Kong is an important part of who I am
- I have a lot in common with other members of the Umbrella movement in Hong Kong
- I'm proud of being part of the umbrella movement in Hong Kong
- I feel solidarity with the umbrella movement in Hong Kong
- I feel I belong to the umbrella movement in Hong Kong

Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that the occupation movement will achieve the following goals.

1. Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	5. Very likely

Political efficacy

- Protect democracy in Hong Kong
- Respect for the freedom of speech and other democratic freedoms

Identity consolidation efficacy

- Strengthen the solidarity among the protesters
- Helping in building a mass movement in Hong Kong for democratic freedoms in Hong Kong

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

I believe that I, as an individual, can…

- contribute so that members of the Umbrella revolution, as a group, can achieve their goals
- provide a significant contribution so that, through joint actions, members of the Umbrella Revolution can achieve their goals

The following questions are about the possible dangers associated with engaging in non-violent sanctioned collective action in Hong Kong (i.e. peaceful protests, peaceful demonstrations, peaceful sit ins, occupations etc..).

How LIKELY do you think it is that people who engage in non-violent protest in Hong Kong face the following.

	1. Very Unlikely	2. Unlikely	3. Neutral	4. Likely	5. Very Likely
Risking employment/expel from university					

Being harassed by the police					
Being harassed by the gangsters					
Having a family member harassed by the police (e.g., losing privileges)					
Having a family member harassed by the gangsters					
Being arrested					
Being imprisoned, detained for some time					
Being Tortured					

When thinking about protesting to fight for the democracy, please indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions when you engage in non-violent sanctioned collective action (i.e. peaceful protests, peaceful demonstrations, peaceful sit ins, peaceful occupations etc..).

- Fear of being affected by the risks

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

Please think about why you participate in collective action. Use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I feel morally obliged to participate in the fighting for true democratic voting
- I feel that it is my moral duty to participate in fighting for true democratic voting
- I feel a strong responsibility to participate in fighting for true democratic voting

- If I do not participate in fighting for true democratic voting, I would have a bad consciousness

If democracy is further violated, using the scale below, please tell us how willing you would be to engage in sanctioned, non-violent protest actions (i.e. peaceful protests, peaceful demonstrations, peaceful sit ins, etc...) in *the future*.

1. Not at all willing	Willing to a certain extent	Neutral	Willing	5.Extremely willing	6. I prefer not to answer

Demographics

Gender
Male Female

Age Please specify (in years)

1st Nationality
1. Chinese 2. Other, please specify

Where are you living currently?
1. Hong Kong 2. Other, please specify

Education

1.Primary and below 2. Grade 7- 9 3. Grade 10-11 4. Grade 12

5. Grade 13 6. Associate degree 7. Undergraduate degree
8. Master's degree 7. PhD or above

Monthly Income
1.Less than 5 000 HK$ 2. 5 000 HK$ - 10 000 HK$ 3. 10 001 HK$ - 20 000 HK$
4. 20 001 HK$ - 30 000 HK$ 5. 30 001 HK$ - 40 000 HK$
6. 40 001 HK$- 50 000 HK$ 7. More than 50 001 HK$

Study 3: Russia

University of St Andrews
from first to foremost

600 YEARS
1413 – 2013

Project Title	The Psychological Factors Underlying Engagement in, and Disengagement from, Collective Action
Researcher's Name	Arin Ayanian
Supervisor	Dr Nicole Tausch
Department/Unit	School of Psychology & Neuroscience
Ethical Approval Code	PS9786
Original Application Approval Date	24/04/13
Amendment Application Approval	02/05/14

Ethical Amendment Approval

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which was considered at the Psychology & Neuroscience School Ethics Committee meeting on the 23rd April 2014. The following documents were reviewed:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form 02/05/14
2. Consent Forms 02/05/14
3. Questionnaires 02/05/14
4. Debriefing Forms 02/05/14

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years from the original application only. Ethical Amendments do not extend this period but give permission to an amendment to the original approval research proposal only. If you are unable to complete your research within the original 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply. You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

pp

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Dr N. Tausch (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP
Email: psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462071

When thinking about the treatment of protesters in Russia, to what extent do you feel?

- Outraged

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

Using the scale below, please indicate how you would define your level of involvement in past protests.

1. I did nothing 2. Participated by being active on social networks 3. Occasional Protester 4. Regular Protester 5. Protest Organiser

Using the scale below, please indicate how often you participated in the past protests.

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Occasionally (sometimes) 4. Often 5. Frequently

Do you consider yourself as part of the protest movement in Russia?

2. Yes 5. No

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about the protest movement in Russia.

Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- Being part of the protest movement in Russia is an important part of who I am.
- I have a lot in common with other protesters in Russia.
- I'm proud of being part of the protest movement in Russia.
- I feel solidarity with the protest movement in Russia.
- I feel I belong to the protest movement in Russia.

<u>Goals:</u> Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that the protests will achieve the following goals.

1. Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	5. Very likely

<u>Political efficacy</u>

- End corruption in Russia

- Defending human rights
- Democracy in Russia
- Resignation of Putin and new democratic elections of president/parliament
- Registration of oppositional parties
- Passing the new democratic legislation
- Respect for the freedom of word and other democratic freedoms
- Creation of independent courts
- Freedom for political prisoners

Identity consolidation efficacy

- Increase public support in Russia for the protests.
- Strengthen the solidarity among the protesters
- Ensure international support for the protest movement in Russia

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

I believe that I, as an individual, can…

- contribute so that members of the Umbrella revolution, as a group, can achieve their goals
- provide a significant contribution so that, through joint actions, members of the Umbrella Revolution can achieve their goals

The following questions are about the possible dangers associated with engaging in non-violent collective action in Russia (e.g., participating in protests, marches, being active on Facebook).

How LIKELY do you think it is that people who engage in non-violent protest in Russia face the following?

	Very Unlikely (1)		Neutral		Very Likely (5)
Risking employment/or university degree					
Being harassed by the police					

Having a family member being harassed by the police (losing privileges, e.g. jobs…)					
Being Imprisoned, detained etc.					
Being Arrested					
Being tortured					
Being killed					

When thinking about protesting against the government, please indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions when you engage in non-violent sanctioned collective action.

- Fear

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

Please think about why you participate in collective action. Use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I feel morally obliged to participate in the anti-government protests.
- I feel that it is my moral duty to participate in the anti-government protests.
- I feel a strong responsibility to participate in the anti-government protests.
- If I do not participate in the anti-government protests, I would have a bad consciousness.

Using the scale below, please tell us how likely it is that you would engage in sanctioned, non-violent protest actions (protesting, demonstrating, being active on social networks) in *the very near future*.

1. Not at all willing	Willing to a certain extent	Neutral	Willing	5.Extremely willing	6. I prefer not to answer

Demographics

Gender

1. Male 2. Female

Age Please specify (in years)

Citizenship

1. Russian 2. Other, please specify

Which city are you living in currently?

1. Moscow 2. Saint Petersburgh 3. Other, please specify

Education

1.Primary and below 2. Elementary 3. Secondary 4. Vocational Education 5. University degree

Income

1. Less than 15.000 rub 2. 15.000 – 30.000 rub 3. 30.000 – 60.000 rub
4. 60.000 – 90.000 rub 5. 90.000 – 120.000 rub 6. More than 120.000 rub

Study 4: Ukraine

University of St Andrews
from first to foremost

600 YEARS
1413 – 2013

Project Title	The Psychological Factors Underlying Engagement in, and Disengagement from, Collective Action
Researcher's Name	Arin Ayanian
Supervisor	Dr Nicole Tausch
Department/Unit	School of Psychology & Neuroscience
Ethical Approval Code	PS9786
Original Application Approval Date	24 April 2013
Amendment Application Approval	13 August 2014

Ethical Amendment Approval

Thank you for submitting your amendment application which was considered at the Psychology & Neuroscience School Ethics Committee meeting on the 5th August 2014. The following documents were reviewed:

1. Ethical Amendment Application Form 5/08/14
2. Online Consent Form 5/08/14
3. Questionnaires 5/08/14
4. Online Debriefing Form 5/08/14

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years from the original application only. Ethical Amendments do not extend this period but give permission to an amendment to the original approval research proposal only. If you are unable to complete your research within the original 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply. You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/media/UTRECguidelines%20Feb%2008.pdf) are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

MP Latimer

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Dr N Tausch (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP
Email: psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462071

There have been protests in Ukraine to express dissatisfaction with the current situation in in the state; especially to voice their disapproval of separation of the eastern regions of Ukraine.

When thinking about how these protesters are treated by their opponents, to what extent do you feel:

- Outraged

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

Using the scale below, please indicate how you would define your level of involvement in past political protests (We are referring to protests before, during or after Euromeidan**).**

1. I did nothing 2. Participated by being active on social networks 3. Occasional Protester 4. Regular Protester 5. Protest Organiser

Using the scale below, please indicate how often you participated in the past political protests (We are referring to protests before, during or after Euromeidan**).**

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Occasionally (sometimes) 4. Often 5. Frequently

Do you consider yourself as part of the protest movement in Ukraine which is for the united Ukraine and against the separation /federalization of Ukraine or against the Russian interference?

1. Yes 2. No

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about the protest movement in Ukraine which is for the united Ukraine and against the separation in /federalization of Ukraine or against the Russian interference.

Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- Being part of the protest movement in Ukraine is an important part of who I am.
- I have a lot in common with other protesters in Ukraine.
- I'm proud of being part of the protest movement in Ukraine.
- I feel solidarity with the protest movement in Ukraine.
- I feel I belong to the protest movement in Ukraine.

Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that protests will achieve the following goals.

1. Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	5. Very likely

Political efficacy

- End corruption and nepotism in Ukraine
- Democratization in Ukraine
- Defending human rights
- Real change in political regime
- Initiation of criminal cases against those guilty of prosecution of activists
- Changes in Constitution
- General improvement of living conditions
- Defend the territorial integrity of Ukraine

Identity consolidation efficacy

- Increase public support in Ukraine for the protests.
- Strengthen the solidarity among the protesters
- Ensure international support for the protest movement in Ukraine

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

I believe that I, as an individual can:

- Contribute greatly so that the protesters of the protest movement I am participating in, as a group, can achieve their goals.
- Provide a significant contribution so that, through joint actions, protesters of the protest movement I am participating can achieve their goals.

The following questions are about the possible dangers associated with engaging in non-violent protests in Ukraine (e.g., participating in protests, marches, and demonstrations).

How LIKELY do you think it is that people who engage in non-violent protest in Ukraine face the following?

1. Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neutral	Likely	5. Very likely

- Risking employment/or university degree

- Being harassed by the opponent parties' representatives
- Having a family member being harassed by the opponent parties' representatives
- "Blackmailing" by state controlling units (such as tax inspectorate of personal businesses)
- Being Imprisoned (or detained)
- Being Arrested
- Being tortured
- Being killed

When thinking about protesting, please indicate the extent to which you feel the following emotions when you engage in non-violent protests (e.g., participating in protests, marches, demonstrations).

- Fear

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

Please think about why you participate/may participate in political protests which are against the separation/federalization of Ukraine or which are simply against the Russian interference. Use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I feel morally obliged to participate in political protests.
- I feel that it is my moral duty to participate in political protests.
- I feel a strong responsibility to participate in political protests.
- If I do not participate in political protests, I would have a bad consciousness.

If the situation in Ukraine does not improve, please tell us how willing would you be to engage in non-violent protest actions (protesting, demonstrating, being active on social networks) in *the very near future*. Please use the scale below.

1. Not at all willing	Willing to a certain extent	Neutral	Willing	5.Extremely willing	6. I prefer not to answer

Demographics

Gender

1. Male 2. Female

Age Please specify (in years)

Citizenship

1. Ukrainian 2. Other, please specify

Ethnics Background

1.Ukrainian 2.Russian 3.Crimean Tartar 4. Other, please specify

Where are you living currently?

1.Ukraine 2. Other, please specify

Which area in Ukraine are you living in?

1.City of Kiev 2. City of Sebastopol 3. Crimea 4. Dnepropetrovsk Oblast
5. Donetska Oblast 6. Kharkiv Oblast 7. Luhanska Oblast 8. Lvivska Oblast
9. Odesska Oblast 10. Zaporizka Oblast 11. Other Oblast, please specify

Education

1.Below secondary 2. Secondary 3. Vocational Education
4. Incomplete higher education or basic higher education (bachelor degree)
5. Completed higher education (specialist or master degree)

Monthly Income

1.Less than 2000 hrn 2. 2001–3000 hrn 3.3001–5000 hrn
4. 5001 – 10000 hrn 5. 10000 – 20000 hrn 6. More than 20000 hrn

Study 5: Turkey

University of St Andrews

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee
Sub-committee

12 May 2015

Ethics Reference No: *Please quote this ref on all correspondence*	PS11488
Project Title:	The Psychological Factors Underlying Engagement in Political Protests within Perilous Contexts
Researcher's Name:	Arin Ayanian
Supervisor:	Dr Nicole Tausch

Thank you for submitting your application which was considered at the Psychology & Neuroscience School Ethics Committee meeting on the 21st April 2015. The following documents were reviewed:

1.	Ethical Application Form	11/05/2015
2.	Participant Information Sheet	11/05/2015
3.	Consent Form	11/05/2015
4.	Debriefing Form	11/05/2015
5.	External Permissions	11/05/2015
6.	Questionnaires	11/05/2015
7.	Manipulations	11/05/2015

The University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) approves this study from an ethical point of view. Please note that where approval is given by a School Ethics Committee that committee is part of UTREC and is delegated to act for UTREC.

Approval is given for three years. Projects, which have not commenced within two years of original approval, must be re-submitted to your School Ethics Committee.

You must inform your School Ethics Committee when the research has been completed. If you are unable to complete your research within the 3 three year validation period, you will be required to write to your School Ethics Committee and to UTREC (where approval was given by UTREC) to request an extension or you will need to re-apply.

Any serious adverse events or significant change which occurs in connection with this study and/or which may alter its ethical consideration, must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee, and an Ethical Amendment Form submitted where appropriate.

Approval is given on the understanding that the 'Guidelines for Ethical Research Practice' https://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelines/ are adhered to.

Yours sincerely

MP Latimer

Convenor of the School Ethics Committee

Ccs Dr Nicole Tausch (Supervisor)
School Ethics Committee

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP
Email: psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462071

As you probably know, protests are ongoing against destruction of forests in the north of Istanbul for construction of the third airport and third bridge, as well as neighbourhoods set for urban renewal in more central parts of Istanbul. These protests mainly focus on the social and environmental impacts of construction. Protests have been largely peaceful, though some have used fireworks and stones against police. Turkish police used water cannon and tear gas during the protests to restore order. Reports say many people were injured and a number of people were detained. These types of environmental protests have continued for years, but became more well-known with the Gezi Park protests in 2013. As efforts to change public spaces in Istanbul go on, these protests continue today.

High risk condition

The violence used against the protesters throughout these various protests (including the Gezi park protests) received very little criticism. Up until now, no official investigation was put forward to examine the conditions that led to police violence, or to identify the responsible agents behind these harsh measures. On the contrary, during an interview, Mr. Sami Turgut, an Istanbul police commissioner, stated that "It is unacceptable to have such social disorder across Turkey. The federal and local police forces are very likely to employ similar measures of protest policing in the future to ensure order on the streets is maintained." This is especially more likely to be the case now that the new domestic security bills have been passed, which allow police to arrest and detain protesters without receiving permission from a judge or prosecutor. Police will also be allowed to use even firearms against protesters who are without life-threatening weapons (e.g., Molotov cocktails). Several reports from international human rights organizations, who have followed the events in Istanbul, are expecting the risks related to protesting (i.e. being affected by tear gas, being injured, being arrested) to be heightened for future protests across Turkey. Their concerns have increased due to the new domestic security laws that detainees may be subject to inhumane conditions or even get lost in the system. In the last protest alone, over 100 people were injured or arrested.

Low risk condition

The violence used against the protesters (including the Gezi park protests) received massive local and international criticism. An official investigation is in progress to examine the conditions that led to police violence and to identify the responsible agents behind these harsh measures. In an interview, Mr. Sami Turgut, an Istanbul police commissioner, stated that “the harsh measures taken against the protesters are unacceptable for federal and local police forces. Given the critique the Turkish police force is now facing; they are likely to be much more restrained in their policing of protests in the future". Especially leading up to the elections and with increased pressure from the EU, the Turkish government and police forces are attempting to maintain a low profile to prevent incidents from being broadcast to international media. Several reports from international human rights organizations, who have followed the events in

Istanbul, are therefore expecting the risks related to protesting (i.e. being affected by tear gas, being injured, being arrested) to be much reduced for future protests across Turkey.

A number of protests against government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey are likely to take place in the near future across Turkey.

Given what you have read about Turkish police plan of policing future protests in Turkey, how likely it is that protesters will face the following risks while engaging in protests against the government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.

	1.Very Unlikely	2.Rather unlikely	3.As unlikely as likely	4.Rather likely	5.Very Likely
Risking being expelled from university					
Phones tapped by the police					
Being injured					
Being arrested					
Being detained for sometime					
Being imprisoned					
Being killed					

When thinking about how the Turkish police is likely to treat protesters, to what extent do you feel:

1. Never	2. To a very little extent	3. Somewhat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent

- Afraid of the consequences for protesters.
- Outraged about the police's behavior.

Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that upcoming protests against the government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey in Turkey will achieve the following goals.

1. Very unlikely	2. Unlikely	3. Neutral	4. Likely	5. Very likely

Political efficacy

- Stop further unwanted urbanization across the country
- Prevent further building in green spaces in Istanbul

Identity Consolidation Efficacy

- Strengthen the solidarity among the protesters.
- Help in building a mass movement in Turkey against **government-led urban regeneration projects.**

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

I believe that I, as an individual, can…

- Contribute so that members of the protest movement against the **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey** as a group, can achieve their goals
- Provide a significant contribution so that, through joint actions, members of the protest movement against the **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey** can achieve their goals

Using the scale below, please indicate how you would define your level of involvement in the anti government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey protests of the past six months

1. I did not participate 2. I participated by being active on social networks 3. Occasional Protester 4. Regular Protester 5. Protest Organiser 6. I prefer not to answer

Using the scale below, please indicate how often you participated in past anti government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey protests of the past six months

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Occasionally (sometimes) 4. Often 5. Frequently 6. I prefer not to answer

Please think about protests against the government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.

Would you consider yourself as part of protest movement against these government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey?

3. Yes 5. No

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about the protest movement against these government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.

Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- Being part of the protest movement against **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey** is an important part of who I am.
- I have a lot in common with other members of the protest movement against **government-led urban regeneration projects** in Turkey.
- I'm proud of being part of the protest movement against **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.**
- I feel solidarity with the protest movement against **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.**
- I feel I belong to the protest movement against **government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.**

Please think about why you participate/may participate in political protests which are against the separation/federalization of Ukraine or which are simply against the Russian interference. Use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statement.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I feel morally obliged to participate in political protests.
- I feel that it is my moral duty to participate in political protests.
- I feel a strong responsibility to participate in political protests.
- If I do not participate in political protests, I would have a bad consciousness.

Please indicate your willingness to engage in the following actions as part of the upcoming protests against government-led urban regeneration projects in Turkey.

1. Not at all willing	Willing to a certain extent	Neutral	Willing	5.Extremely willing	6. I prefer not to answer

- Demonstrate peacefully
- Participate in marches
- Participate in Strikes
- Sign petitions
- Express disapproval of urbanization on social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Blogs)
- Participate in sit-ins

Demographics

Gender

1. Male 2. Female

Age Please specify (in years)

Nationality

1.Turkish 2. Other, please specify

Ethnic Background

1. Turkish 2. Kurdish 3. Greek 4. Armenian
5. Roma 6. Other, please specify ……..

Monthly income

1. 500 to 999,99 Euro 2. 1000 to 1499,99 Euro 3. 1500 to 1999,99 Euro
4. 2000 to 2499,99 Euro 5. 2500 to 2999,99 Euro 6. 3000 Euro or more

Study 6: United Kingdom

University of St Andrews | FOUNDED 1413

University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee

25 May 2016

Dear Arin

Thank you for submitting your ethical application which was considered at the School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee meetings on 21st April and 5th May 2016; the following documents have been reviewed:

1. Ethical Application Form
2. Advertisement
3. Participant Information Sheet
4. Consent Form
5. Debriefing Form
6. Questionnaires and Conditions
7. Data Management Plan

The School of Psychology & Neuroscience Ethics Committee has been delegated to act on behalf of the University Teaching and Research Ethics Committee (UTREC) and has granted this application ethical approval. The particulars relating to the approved project are as follows -

Approval Code:	PS12102	**Approved on:**	25/05/2016	**Approval Expiry:**	25/05/2021
Project Title:	Attitudes Towards Fracking				
Researcher:	Arin Ayanian				
Supervisor:	Dr Nicole Tausch				

Approval is awarded for five years. Projects which have not commenced within two years of approval must be re-submitted for review by your School Ethics Committee. If you are unable to complete your research within the five year approval period, you are required to write to your School Ethics Committee Convener to request a discretionary extension of no greater than 6 months or to re-apply if directed to do so, and you should inform your School Ethics Committee when your project reaches completion.

If you make any changes to the project outlined in your approved ethical application form, you should inform your supervisor and seek advice on the ethical implications of those changes from the School Ethics Convener who may advise you to complete and submit an ethical amendment form for review.

Any adverse incident which occurs during the course of conducting your research must be reported immediately to the School Ethics Committee who will advise you on the appropriate action to be taken.

Approval is given on the understanding that you conduct your research as outlined in your application and in compliance with UTREC Guidelines and Policies (http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/utrec/guidelinespolicies/). You are also advised to ensure that you procure and handle your research data within the provisions of the Data Provision Act 1998 and in accordance with any conditions of funding incumbent upon you.

Yours sincerely

MP Latimer

Convener of the School Ethics Committee

cc Dr Nicole Tausch (Supervisor)

School of Psychology & Neuroscience, St Mary's Quad, South Street, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9JP
Email: psyethics@st-andrews.ac.uk Tel: 01334 462071

When thinking about these extreme energy extracting processes, such as fracking, to what extent do you consider their use as:

1. Not at all	2. To a very little extent	3. Somew hat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent	6. I prefer not to answer

- Legitimate
- Moral
- Unjustified

The United Kingdom has been witnessing an upsurge of protests against fracking over the last few weeks.

High risk condition

Many of these protests have been resulted in unprovoked clashes with the police. The police confronted protesters with baton charges. The protesters were surrounded by patrol barriers and even the police dogs were present. Several injuries were reported and some protesters were taken to hospital. More than 30 protesters were arrested and detained for several days.

It is envisaged that the police will have a similar attitude towards future anti-fracking protests in the light of the new criminal laws that give the police extra power when dealing with the potential threats posed by protesters (Scriptonite, November, 2012). In a recent interview Police Commissioner James McKenzie stated that "The time for being a soft touch with people intent on causing trouble is over. It is unacceptable to have social disorder. The police have specific commands to forcefully impose order even if that would mean the use of force". Several human rights and environmental groups have voiced their concern over this decision as it is expected to increase the risks of protesting and might lead to many injuries and arrests.

The local communities and anti-fracking activists are planning a series of protests and demonstrations to show opposition to fracking, which they expect to have detrimental impacts on the environment.

Low risk condition

The police generally responded to these protests with utmost respect. Although the protesters were surrounded by policemen, no conflict was registered.

It is envisaged that the police will have a similar attitude towards future anti-fracking protests in the light of the new laws that restrict the use of force by the police against protesters (Scriptonite, November, 2012). In a recent interview Police Commissioner James McKenzie stated that "Within a democratic country as ours, it is unacceptable to repress peaceful protests. We respect the freedom of expression of each citizen, as long

as they respect the law. The police have specific commands to restrain the use of force against protesters". Several human rights and environmental groups applauded this decision and it is expected to ensure the safety of protesters.

The local communities and anti-fracking activists are planning a series of protests and demonstrations to show opposition to fracking, which they expect to have detrimental impacts on the environment.

Given what you have read about the British police plan of policing future protests in United Kingdom, how likely it is that protesters will face the following risks while engaging in protests against the extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking).

	1.Very Unlikely	2.Rather unlikely	3.As unlikely as likely	4.Rather likely	5.Very Likely
Being injured					
Being arrested					
Being detained for some time					
Being imprisoned					

Given what you have read, please think about how the police might react to future protests in United Kingdom. Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you think that this treatment of protesters would be legitimate

1. Not at all legitimate 2. Legitimate to a very little extent 3. Somewhat legitimate 4. Legitimate to a large extent 5. Legitimate to a very great extent 6. I prefer not to answer

When thinking about how the British police is likely to treat anti-fracking protesters in the future, to what extent do you feel:

1. Not at all	2. To a very little extent	3. Somew hat	4. To a large extent	5. To a very great extent	6. I prefer not to answer

- Afraid of the consequences for protesters.
- Outraged about the police's behavior.

Using the scale below, please indicate how LIKELY it is that upcoming protests against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking) in United Kingdom will achieve the following goals.

1. Very Unlikely	Unlikely	As unlikely as likely	Likely	5. Very Likely

Political efficacy

- Ban all forms of extreme energy extraction processes.
- Influence the government on implementing strict and tighter laws regarding energy extraction processes.
- Advocate further research into the environmental and public health consequences of these extreme extraction processes.

Identity Consolidation Efficacy

- Increase public support in United Kingdom for the protest movement.
- Strengthen the solidarity among the protesters.
- Help in building a mass movement in United Kingdom against extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking).

Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

I believe that I, as an individual, can…

- Contribute so that members of the protest movement against extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking) as a group, can achieve their goals
- Provide a significant contribution so that, through joint actions, members of the protest movement against extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking) can achieve their goals

As mentioned before, across United Kingdom, citizens engage in collective action as a way to express their disapproval of the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking)

The following questions are about your views of and involvement in pro-environmental protests.

Using the scale below, please indicate how you would define your level of involvement in the protests against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking) within the past six months or longer.

1. I did not participate 2. I participated by being active on social networks 3. Occasional Protester 4. Regular Protester 5. Protest Organiser 6. I prefer not to answer

Using the scale below, please indicate how often you participated in protests against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking) within the past six months

1. Never 2. Rarely 3. Occasionally (sometimes) 4. Often 5. Frequently 6. I prefer not to answer

Please think about the protests against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking).
Would you consider yourself as part of protest movement against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking)?

1. Yes 2. No

The following questions are about your opinions and feelings about the protest movement against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking). Using the scale below, please specify your level of agreement with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I identify with the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking).**
- Being part of the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking)** is an important part of who I am.
- I have a lot in common with other members of the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking).**
- I'm proud of being part of the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking).**
- I feel solidarity with the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking).**
- I feel I belong to the protest movement against **the use of extreme energy extracting processes (Fracking).**

Please think about why you participate/may participate in protests which are against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking). Use the scale below to indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.

1. Strongly disagree	2. Disagree	3. Neutral	4. Agree	5. Strongly agree

- I feel morally obliged to participate in these protests.
- I feel that it is my moral duty to participate in these protests.
- I feel a strong responsibility to participate in these protests.
- If I do not participate in these protests, I would have a bad consciousness.

Please indicate your willingness to engage in the following actions as part of the upcoming protests against the use of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g., Fracking).

1. Not at all willing	Willing to a certain extent	Neutral	Willing	5.Extremely willing	6. I prefer not to answer

- Demonstrate peacefully
- Participate in marches
- Participate in Strikes
- Sign petitions
- Express disapproval of extreme energy extracting processes (e.g. Fracking) on social networks (Facebook, Twitter, Blogs)
- Participate in sit-ins

Earlier in the survey we presented you some information about the British police's plans to handle future protests. To what extent did you think this information was real?

1. Not real at all 2. Not real 3. Not unreal nor real 4. Real 5. Very real

Demographics

Gender

1. Male 2. Female

Age Please specify (in years)

Nationality

1.British 2. Other, please specify

Education

1.Primary and below 2.Elementary 3. Secondary 4. Vocational
5. University degree

Monthly Income

1.Less than 500 £ 2. 501 to 1000 £ 3. 1001 to 1500 £
4. 1501 to 2000 £ 5. 2001 to 2500 £ 6. More than 2501 £

Supplementary Material

Chapter 2

In the tables below I summarised the results of all the analyses I conducted.

Table 1

Regression Analyses: Regressing Anger towards the Police, Efficacy and Politicised Identification on Perceived Likelihood of Risk, Protest Movement, and Their Interaction. We present the unstandardized regression weights and standard errors of the direct path from likelihood of risk to each of the variables from a series of simple regressions. The interaction terms and the simple slopes for each protest movement are from a series of moderated regressions conducted using PROCESS (Model 1).

	Anger towards the Police	Political Efficacy	Identity Consolidation Efficacy	Politicised Identification
Likelihood of Risk Predicting	*B* = .43, *SE* = .10, *p* < .001	*B* = .07, *SE* = .08, *p* = .407	*B* = .28, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001	*B* = -.08, *SE* = .07, *p* = .269
Interaction with Protest Movement	*B* = - .62, *SE* = .19, *p* = .002, [- 1.00, -.23]	*B* = .53, *SE* = .16, *p* = .001, [.21, .86]	*B* = -.07, *SE* = .14, *p* = .627, [- .36, .22]	*B* = .16, *SE* = .15, *p* = .278, [- .13, .45]
Simple Slopes				
Anti-Morsi:	*B* = .72, *SE* = .13, *p* < .001, [.46, .97]	*B* = -.18, *SE* = .11, *p* = .108, [- .40, .04]	*B* = .31, *SE* = .10, *p* = .002, [.11, .50]	*B* = -.15, *SE* = .10, *p* = .122, [- .35, .04]
Anti-military:	*B* = .10, *SE* = .14, *p* = .490, [- .18, .38]	*B* = .36, *SE* = .12, *p* = .003, [.12, .59]	*B* = .24, *SE* = .11, *p* = .026, [.03, .45]	*B* = .01, *SE* = .11, *p* = .967, [-.20, .21]

Table 2

Regression Analysis: Regressing Importance of Risk on Anger towards the Police, Efficacy, Politicised Identification, Protest Movement and Their Interactions. We present the unstandardized regression weights and standard errors of the direct path from each of the variables from a series of simple regressions. The interaction terms are from the moderated mediation analysis using (Model 59) PROCESS. The simple slopes for each protest movement are from a series of moderated regressions conducted using PROCESS (Model 1).

	Direct Path	Interaction		Single Slopes
Anger towards the Police	*B* = -.25, *SE* = .09, *p* = .007	*B* = .39, *SE* = .28, *p* = .160, [-.16, .93]	Anti-Morsi:	*B* = -.28, *SE* = .10, *p* = .005, [-.47, -.09]
			Anti-military:	*B* = -.02, *SE* = .27, *p* = .956, [-.55, .52]
Political Efficacy	*B* = - .60, *SE* = .12, *p* < .001	*B* = - .89, *SE* = .23, *p* < .001, [-1.35, -.43]	Anti-Morsi:	*B* = -.01, *SE* = .17, *p* = .976, [-.35, .34]
			Anti-military:	*B* = -.91, *SE* = .13, *p* < .001, [-1.17, -.66]
Identity Consolidation Efficacy	*B* = .16, *SE* = .14, *p* = .254	*B* = .13, *SE* = .25, *p* = .593, [-.36, .63]	Anti-Morsi:	*B* = .36, *SE* = .17, *p* = .040, [.02, .70]
			Anti-military:	*B* = -.05, *SE* = .17, *p* = .783, [-.39, .29]
Politicised Identification	*B* = -.05, *SE* = .13, *p* = .706	*B* = - .12, *SE* = .23, *p* = .602, [-.58, .34]	Anti-Morsi:	*B* = .08, *SE* = .15, *p* = .582, [- .21, .38]
			Anti-military:	*B* = -.29, *SE* = .19, *p*= .144, [-.67, .10]

Table 3

Direct, Indirect and Total paths from Likelihood of Risk to Future Collective Action

	Direct Path	Interaction	Simple Slopes	Total Indirect Paths	Conditional Total Indirect Paths	Total Paths	Conditional Total Path
Likelihood of Risk	*B* = .00, *SE* = .09, *p* = .981	*B* = -.48, *SE* = .20, *p* = .016, [-.87, -.09]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .32, *SE* = .17, *p* = .055	*B* = .19, *SE* = .06, [.07, .32]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .10, *SE* = .15, [-.16, .41]	B = .25, *SE* = .09, *p* = .004, [.08, .42]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .32, *SE* = .14, *p* = .004, [.14, .70]
			Anti-military: *B* = -.18, *SE* = .11, *p* = .106		Anti-Military: *B* = .12, *SE* = .10, [-.06, .33]		Anti-Military: *B* = -.07 *SE* = .13, *p* = .60, [-.31, .18]

Table 4

Regression Analysis: Regressing Future Collective Action on Likelihood of Risk, Anger, Efficacy, Politicised Identification, Importance of Risk, Protest Movement and Their Interactions.
We present the unstandardized regression weights and standard errors of the direct path from each of the variables through a simple regression analysis. The interaction terms are from a moderated regression using Model 4 in PROCESS, the indirect effects are through a moderated mediation analysis using Model 59 in PROCESS.

	Direct Paths	Interaction	Simple Slopes	Indirect Paths	Conditional Indirect Paths
Anger towards the Police	B = .35, SE = .08, p < .001	*B* = -.10, *SE* = .24, *p* = .679, [-.57, .37]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .33, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001 Anti-Military: *B* = .25, *SE* = .19, *p* = .196	*B* = .15, *SE* = .06, [.07, .32]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .24, *SE* = .08, *p* = .007, [.11, .42] Anti-Military: *B* = .02, *SE* = .03, *p* = .43, [-.01, .11]
Political Efficacy	*B* = - .11, *SE* = .10, p = .299	*B* = -.48, *SE* = .22, *p* = .029, [-.91, -.05]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .18, *SE* = .18, *p* = .299 Anti-Military: *B* = -.32, *SE* = .13, *p* = .029	*B* = -.01, *SE* = .02, *p* = .50, [-.07, .01]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = - .03, *SE* = .05, *p* = .38, [-.17, .04] Anti-Military: *B* = - .11, *SE* = .07, *p* = .12, [-.30, -.01]
Identity Consolidation Efficacy	*B* = .27, *SE* = .11, *p* = .017	*B* = .33, *SE* = .21, *p* = .130, [-.10, .75]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .06 *SE* = .17, *p* = .712 Anti-Military: *B* = .40, *SE* = .13, *p* = .003	*B* = .07, *SE* = .04, *p* = .02, [.01, .19]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .02, *SE* = .06, *p* = .73, [-.07, .20] Anti-Military: *B* = .09, *SE* = .07, *p* = .13, [-.01, .26]
	B = .10,	*B* = - .06,	Anti-Morsi:	*B* = .01,	Anti-Morsi:

Politicised Identity	*SE* = .10, p = .322,	*SE* = .20, *p* =.761, [- .46, .34]	*B* = .10, *SE* = .14, *p* = .507 Anti-Military: *B* = .03, *SE* = .15, *p* = .852	*SE* = .01, *p* = .99, [-.06, .01]	*B* = -.01, *SE* = .03, *p* = .61, [-.11, .02] Anti-Military: *B* = .00, *SE* = .03, *p* = .98, [-.05, .07]
Importance of Risk	*B* = -.21, *SE* = .07, *p* = .003	*B* = - .11, *SE* = .15, *p* = .468, [-.41, .19]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = -.24, *SE* = .11, *p* = .035 Anti-Military: *B* = -.37, *SE* = .10, *p* < .001	*B* = - .01, *SE* = .03, *p* = .94, [-.08, .06]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = -.09, *SE* = .06, *p* = .09, [-.24, -.01] Anti-Military: *B* = .10, *SE* = .09, *p* = .19, [-.03, .32]

Table 5

We present the Index of Moderated Mediation for the Conditional Indirect Paths to Collective Action from Anger, Efficacy, Politicised Identification, and Importance of Risk calculated using Model 59 in PROCESS

	Index of Moderated Mediation	Standard Error and Confidence Interval
Anger towards the Police	-.22	*SE* = .08, [-.40, -.08]
Political Efficacy	-.08	*SE* = .08, [-.27, .07]
Identity Consolidation Efficacy	.07	*SE* = .09, [-.10, .27]
Politicised Identification	.02	*SE* = .04, [-.05, .11]
Importance of Risk	.20	*SE* = .10, [.02, -.45]

Table 6

Regression Analysis: Indirect Paths from Anger towards the Police, Efficacy and Politicised Identification to Future Collective Action through Importance of Risk. We present the indirect paths through a series of simple mediation analyses conducted using Model 4 in PROCESS. The index of moderated mediation and conditional indirect paths are from a series of moderated mediation analyses conducted using Model 59 in PROCESS.

	Indirect Paths	Index of Moderated Mediation	Conditional Indirect Path through Importance of Risks
Anger towards the Police	*B* = .04, *SE* = .03, [.01, .12]	-.05, *SE* = .08, [-.23, .10]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .04, *SE* = .04, [-.01, .14] Anti-military: *B* = -.01, *SE* = .07, [-.16, .14]
Political Efficacy	*B* = .13, *SE* = .06, [.03, .27]	.29, *SE* = .12, [.08, .56]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = .01, *SE* = .05, [-.05, .16] Anti-military: *B* = .30, *SE* = .11, [.13, .57]
Identity Consolidation Efficacy	*B* = -.04, *SE* = .04, [-.15, .02]	.07, *SE* = .08, [-.06, .28]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = - .07, *SE* = .07, [-.28, .02] Anti-military: *B* = - .00, *SE* = .05, [-.11, .11]
Politicised Identification	*B* = .01, *SE* = .03, [-.03, .09]	.09, *SE* = .07, [-.03, .26]	Anti-Morsi: *B* = -.01, *SE* = .03, [-.10, .03] Anti-military: *B* = .08, *SE* = .07, [-.02, .24]

Chapter 3

Testing for Moderating Effects

I acknowledge that likelihood of risk can be considered as a moderator, whereby high, medium or low levels of risk can differentially affect the relation between the antecedents of collective action (i.e., outrage, fear, efficacy beliefs, and moral obligation) and action intentions. Moreover, one can also expect high or low identification with the protest movement to play a role in how likelihood of risk affect the antecedents of collective action and willingness to engage in collective action. Hence, I tested the moderating role of likelihood of risk, within the four contexts in a multiple moderated-mediation analyses, using PROCESS macro, model 59. Specifically, in each analysis, I considered each antecedent as a predictor, moral obligation as a mediator, and likelihood of risk as a moderator. For each analysis, I considered the remaining antecedents and past participation as covariates. I also examined whether politicised identification is a moderator in the relation between likelihood of risk and the antecedents of collective action in a series of simple moderation analyses using PROCESS model 1.

Study 2: Hong Kong

Likelihood of Risk as a Moderator

Outrage. Outrage significantly predicted moral obligation (*B* = .26, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.119, .394]). Likelihood of risk did not predict moral obligation (*B* = .04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .714, [-.161, .234]). The interaction term between outrage and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .485, [-.101, .048]). Outrage (*B* = .00, *SE* = .10, *p* = .963, [-.193, .203]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .271, [-.393, .116]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .26, *SE* = .13, *p* = .037, [.016, .494]). The interactions between likelihood of risk and outrage (-.03, *SE* = .12, *p* = .836, [-.268, .217]) and between likelihood of risk moral obligation (-.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .262, [-.391, .107]) were not significant. Outrage did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risk. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.10, *SE* = .05, [.018, .221]) and medium (.07, *SE* = .04, [.007, .150]) levels of perceived risks.

Fear. Fear (*B* = .04, *SE* = .05, *p* = .512, [- .072, .144]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .06, *SE* = .10, *p* = .560, [-.142, .260]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction

term between fear and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.02, *SE* = .06, *p* = .764, [-.100, .137]). Fear (*B* = -.01, *SE* = .06, *p* = .892, [-.124, .109]). Likelihood of risk (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .271, [-.393, .116]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .27, *SE* = .12, *p* = .028, [.028, .511]). The interactions between likelihood of risk and fear (-.09, *SE* = .09, *p* = .306, [-.274, .087]), and between likelihood of risk moral obligation (-.12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .095, [-.263, .021]) were not significant. Fear did not predict action intention at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was not a significant mediator at any level of perceived risk.

Political efficacy. Political efficacy (*B* = -.05, *SE* = .08, *p* = .545, [-.213, .113]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.00, *SE* = .08, *p* = .976, [-.166, .161]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between political efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.14, *SE* = .07, *p* = .063, [-.275, .008]). Political efficacy (*B* = .01, *SE* = .09, *p* = .950, [-.174, .185]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.13, *SE* = .13, *p* = .336, [-.383, .132]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .27, *SE* = .12, *p* = .029, [.028, .521]). The interaction between likelihood of risk and political efficacy (.06, *SE* = .10, *p* = .541, [-.137, .260]) was not significant, however, the interaction between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.19, *SE* = .06, *p* = .004, [-.312, -.063]) was significant. Political efficacy did not predict action intentions and moral obligation was not a significant mediator at any level of perceived risk.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .22, *SE* = .09, *p* = .018, [.037, .387]) positively predicted moral obligation, but likelihood of risk (*B* = .04, *SE* = .09, *p* = .680, [-.150, .228]) did not predict it. The interaction term between identity consolidation efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.05, *SE* = .05, *p* = .350, [-.147, .052]). Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .15, *SE* = .12, *p* = .188, [-.076, .384]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .271, [-.393, .116]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .26, *SE* = .12, *p* = .028, [.028, .486]). The interaction between likelihood of risk and identity consolidation efficacy (.08, *SE* = .08, *p* = .328, [-.081, .240]) was not significant, however, between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.22, *SE* = .07, *p* = .002, [-.353, -.078]) was significant. Identity consolidation efficacy

did not predict action intention at any level of perceived risk. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.12, *SE* = .06, [.026, .261]) and medium (.05, *SE* = .04, [.007, .157]) levels of perceived risk.

Participative efficacy. Participative efficacy (*B* = .23, *SE* = .10, *p* = .025, [.030, .430]) positively predicted moral obligation, but likelihood of risk (*B* = .03, *SE* = .10, *p* = .780, [-.171, .228]) did not predict it. The interaction term between participative efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.04, *SE* = .04, *p* = .311, [-.128, .041]). Participative efficacy (*B* = .14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .299, [-.125, .402]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .271, [-.393, .116]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .26, *SE* = .12, *p* = .035, [.018, .493]). The interactions between likelihood of risk and participative efficacy (.06, *SE* = .20, *p* = .780, [-.337, .448]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.22, *SE* = .18, *p* = .002, [-.567, .144]) were not significant. Participative efficacy did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.12, *SE* = .08, [.016, .296]) and medium (.06, *SE* = .04, [.003, .154]) levels of perceived risk.

Politicised identification. Politicised identification significantly predicted moral obligation (*B* = .25, *SE* = .11, *p* = .025, [.032, .463]), however, likelihood of risk did not (*B* = .02, *SE* = .10, *p* = .793, [-.165, .216]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.07, *SE* = .04, *p* = .118, [-.156, .018]). Politicised identification (*B* = .25, *SE* = .14, *p* = .079, [-.029, .523]), likelihood of risk (*B* = -.14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .271, [-.393, .116]), and moral obligation (*B* = .22, *SE* = .13, *p* = .093, [-.037, .476]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and politicised identification (-.26, *SE* = .19, *p* = .192, [-.642, .130]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (.06, *SE* = .18, *p* = .751, [-.306, .423]) were not significant. Inspection of the simple slopes showed that politicised identification significantly predicted action intentions only at low levels of likelihood of risk (*B* = .47, *SE* = .22, *p* = .033, [.038, .896]), and moral obligation was a significant mediator at medium levels of perceived risks (*B* = .05, *SE* = .04, [.005, .163]).

Politicised Identification as a Moderator

Outrage. Politicised identification significantly predicted outrage (*B* = .42, *SE* = .14, *p* = .003, [.143, .694]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = .16, *SE* = .10, *p* = .117, [-.040, .358]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.19, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [-.280, .094]). Likelihood of risk predicted outrage at low levels of politicised identification only (*B* = .35, *SE* = .10, *p* = .001, [.142, .558]).

Fear. Likelihood of risk significantly predicted fear (*B* = .61, *SE* = .17, *p* < .001, [.281, .946]). Politicised identification did not predict it (*B* = .29, *SE* = .15, *p* = .060, [-.023, .587]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (.04, *SE* = .08, *p* = .610, [-.110, .187]). Likelihood of risk predicted fear at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = .57, *SE* = .14, *p* < .001, [.295, .854]), medium (*B* = .61, *SE* = .17, *p* < .001, [.281, .946]), and high (*B* = .65, *SE* = .22, *p* = .004, [.218, 1.09]).

Political efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted political efficacy (*B* = .41, *SE* = .14, *p* = .006, [.123, .694]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = .06, *SE* = .16, *p* = .711, [-.259, .379]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .649, [-.235, .147]). Likelihood of risk did not predict political efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .42, *SE* = .12, *p* = .001, [.174, .663]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = .15, *SE* = .12, *p* = .220, [-.091, .389]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.08, *SE* = .08, *p* = .294, [-.244, .075]). Likelihood of risk did not predict identity consolidation efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Participative efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted participative efficacy (*B* = .73, *SE* = .10, *p* < .001, [.520, .928]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = .18, *SE* = .13, *p* = .176, [-.083, .446]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .716, [-.111, .076]). Likelihood of risk did not predict participative efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Moral obligation. Politicised identification (*B* = .60, *SE* = .11, *p* < .001, [.378, .827]) significantly predicted moral obligation. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .16, *SE* = .10, *p* = .099, [-.032, .362]) did not. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.13, *SE* = .04, *p* = .003, [-.219, -.047]). Likelihood of risk predicted moral obligation at low levels of politicised identification (*B* = .30, *SE* = .10, *p* = .003, [.104, .498]).

Study 3: Russia

Likelihood of Risk as a Moderator

Outrage. Outrage (*B* = .12, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.048, .182]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = .09, *SE* = .04, *p* = .046, [.002, .179]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between outrage and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.01, *SE* = .03, *p* = .780, [-.061, .046]). Outrage (*B* = .11, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.048, .178]) and moral obligation (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.169, .451]) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .06, *p* = .236, [-.184, .046]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and outrage (.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .432, [-.044, .103]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.04, *SE* = .04, *p* = .333, [-.125, .042]) were not significant. However, inspection of the simple slopes showed that outrage was a significant predictor of action only at medium (*B* = .11, *SE* = .03, *p* < .001, [.048, .178]) and high level of perception of risks (*B* = .14, *SE* = .04, *p* = .002, [.052, .229]). Moreover, moral obligation was a significant mediator at all levels of perceived risks: low (.04, *SE* = .02, [.014, .086]), medium (.04, *SE* = .01, [.014, .069]), and high (.03, *SE* = .01, [.008, .066]).

Fear. Fear (*B* = -.12, *SE* = .06, *p* = .038, [-.230, -.007]) negatively, and likelihood of risk (*B* = .10, *SE* = .04, *p* = .018, [.018, .192]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between fear and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.07, *SE* = .05, *p* = .146, [-.024, .161]). Fear (*B* = -.22, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [-.326, -.108]) negatively, and moral obligation (*B* = .32, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.174, .460) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = -.08, *SE* = .06, *p* = .236, [-.186, .066]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and fear (-.06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .353, [-.186, .067]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.02, *SE* = .04, *p* = .536, [-.092, .048]) were not

significant. However, fear significantly predicted action only at medium (*B* = -.22, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [-.326, -.108) and high (*B* = -.27, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [-.423, -.120) levels of risks, and moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (-.06, *SE* = .03, [-.130, -.013]) and medium (-.04, *SE* = .02, [- .082, -.006]) levels of perceived risk.

Political efficacy. Political efficacy (*B* = -.12, *SE* = .05, *p* = .018, [-.221, -.021]) negatively, and likelihood of risk (*B* = .10, *SE* = .04, *p* = .026, [.012, .182]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between political efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.06, *SE* = .04, *p* = .101, [-.135, .012]). Political efficacy (*B* = .01, *SE* = .05, *p* = .899, [-.100, .114]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .06, *p* = .220, [-.192, .044]) did not predict action intentions, however, moral obligation did (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.168, .450]). The interaction between likelihood of risk and political efficacy (-.01, *SE* = .05, *p* = .784, [-.110, .083]) as well as between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.02, *SE* = .04, *p* = .501, [-.096, .047]) was not significant. Political efficacy did not predict action intentions at any level of risks. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at medium (-.04, *SE* = .02, [-.084, -.009]) and high (-.06, *SE* = .02, [-.106, -.017]) levels of perceived risk.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = -.02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .690, [-.127, .084]) did not predict moral obligation, but likelihood of risk did (*B* = .10, *SE* = .05, *p* = .029, [.010, .191]) did not predict it. The interaction term between identity consolidation efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .383, [-.044, .114]). Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .030, [.010, .206]) and moral obligation (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.171, .453]) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .06, *p* = .220, [-.192, .044]) did not predict action intentions. The interaction between likelihood of risk and identity consolidation efficacy (-.02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .770, [-.120, .089]) was not significant, however, between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.02, *SE* = .04, *p* = .597, [-.099, .057]) was significant. Identity consolidation efficacy was a significant predictor of action intentions only at medium level of risks (*B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .030, [.010, .206]). Moral obligation was not a significant mediator at any level of perceived risk.

Participative efficacy. Participative efficacy (*B* = .21, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.102, .325]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .10, *SE* = .04, *p* = .028, [.010, .180]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between participative efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.02, *SE* = .03, *p* = .548, [-.043 .082]). Participative efficacy (*B* = .12, *SE* = .05, *p* = .028, [.012, .211]) and moral obligation (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.166, .444]) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .06, *p* = .236, [-.184, .046]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and participative efficacy (.06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .372, [-.066, .177]), and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.06, *SE* = .05, *p* = .224, [-.163, .038]) were not significant. Participative efficacy significantly predicted action intentions at medium (*B* = .12, *SE* = .05, *p* = .028, [.012, .211]) and high (*B* = .16, *SE* = .08, *p* = .038, [.009, .315]) levels of perceived risk. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at all levels of likelihood of risk: low (.07, *SE* = .03, [.026, .140]), medium (.06, *SE* = .02, [.030, .119]), and high (.06, *SE* = .02, [.021, .120]).

Politicised identification. Politicised identification (*B* = .50, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.368, .634]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .09, *SE* = .04, *p* = .041, [.004, .179]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.00, *SE* = .04, *p* = .935, [-.072, .066]). Politicised identification (*B* = .30, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.151, .456]) and moral obligation (*B* = .31, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.167, .451]) predicted action intentions. The interaction between likelihood of risk and politicised identification (.04, *SE* = .09, *p* = .691, [-.141, .212]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.05, *SE* = .07, *p* = .480, [-.200, .094]) were not significant. Inspection of the simple slopes showed that moral obligation was a significant mediator at all levels of perceived risks; low (.18, *SE* = .05, [.100, .300]), medium (.15, *SE* = .04, [.090, .241]), and high (.13, *SE* = .05, [.045, .243]).

Politicised Identification as a Moderator

Outrage. Politicised identification (*B* = .32, *SE* = .11, *p* = .002, [.122, .531]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = .37, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.189, .546]) significantly predicted outrage. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.01, *SE* = .08, *p* = .923, [-.158, .143]). Likelihood of risk predicted

outrage at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = .37, *SE* = .11, *p* < .001, [.169, .581]), medium (*B* = .37, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.189 .546]), and high (*B* = .36, *SE* = .13, *p* = .007, [.101, .619]).

Fear. Likelihood of risk significantly predicted fear (*B* = .373, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.264, .482]). Politicised identification did not predict it (*B* = .07, *SE* = .07, *p* = .301, [-.062, .201]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (.11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .028, [.011, .203]). Likelihood of risk predicted fear at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = .26, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.145, .385]), medium (*B* = .37, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.264, .481]), and high (*B* = .480, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.314, .647]).

Political efficacy. Politicised identification (*B* = .13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .042, [.004, .246]) positively, and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.22, *SE* = .06, *p* = .964, [-.320, -.103]) negatively predicted political efficacy. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.00, *SE* = .06, *p* = .964, [-.114, .108]). Likelihood of risk predicted political efficacy at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = -.21, *SE* = .07, *p* = .003, [-.346, -.072]), medium (*B* = -.22, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [-.320, -.103]), and high (*B* = -.21, *SE* = .09, *p* = .015, [-.387, -.042]).

Identity consolidation efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .42, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.189, .430]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .05, *p* = .421, [-.145, .061]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.13, *SE* = .06, *p* = .016, [-.242, -.026]). Likelihood of risk predicted identity consolidation efficacy at high levels of politicised identification (*B* = -.18, *SE* = .07, *p* = .014, [-.318, -.037]).

Participative efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted participative efficacy (*B* = .55, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.412, .683]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .05, *p* = .501, [-.142, .070]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .439, [-.051, .118]). Likelihood of risk did not predict participative efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Moral obligation. Politicised identification (*B* = .62, *SE* = .05, *p* < .001, [.520, .724]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .04, *p* = .005, [.036, .199]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between politicised identification and

likelihood of risk was not significant (-.00, *SE* = .03, *p* = .912, [-.061, .055]). Likelihood of risk did not predict moral obligation at all levels of politicised identification.

Study 4: Ukraine

Likelihood of Risk as a Moderator

Outrage. Outrage (*B* = .06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .327, [-.057, .171]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .01, *SE* = .10, *p* = .922, [-.183, .205]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between outrage and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.06, *SE* = .06, *p* = .357, [-.183, .066]). Outrage (*B* = .01, *SE* = .07, *p* = .855, [-.128, .154]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.08, *SE* = .08, *p* = .354, [-.240, .086]) did not predict action intentions, however moral obligation (*B* = .28, *SE* = .14, *p* = .050, [.005, .566]) did. The interactions between likelihood of risk and outrage (.05, *SE* = .07, *p* = .474, [-.085, .182]) and likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.04, *SE* = .07, *p* = .563, [-.175, .096]) were not significant. Outrage did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was not a significant mediator at all levels of perceived risks.

Fear. Fear (*B* = -.06, *SE* = .09, *p* = .479, [-.235, .111]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .01, *SE* = .10, *p* = .900, [-.182, .207]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between fear and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.01, *SE* = .08, *p* = .894, [-.167, .146]). Fear (*B* = .03, *SE* = .08, *p* = .717, [-.126, .183]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .240, [-.254, .064]) did not predict action intentions, however moral obligation (*B* = .28, *SE* = .14, *p* = .05, [.006, .556) positively predicted action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and fear (.13, *SE* = .09, *p* = .142, [-.043, .299]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.00, *SE* = .07, *p* = .954, [-.146, .137]) were not significant. Fear did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was not a significant mediator at any levels of perceived risk.

Political efficacy. Political efficacy (*B* = .15, *SE* = .09, *p* = .087, [-.022, .319]) negatively predicted moral obligation, however, likelihood of risk (*B* = -.00, *SE* = .09 *p* = .972, [-.180, .174]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between political efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.159, *SE* = .08, *p* = .049, [-.318, -.001]). Political efficacy (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .12, *p* = .569, [-.303, .167]), likelihood of risk (*B* = -.10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .249, [-.265,

.069]), and moral obligation (*B* = .278, *SE* = .15, *p* = .061, [-.013, .570]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and political efficacy (.01, *SE* = .11, *p* = .961, [-.110, .220]) as well as between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.03, *SE* = .08, *p* = .756, [-.184, .134]) were not significant. Political efficacy did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.08, *SE* = .05, [.010, .222]) levels of perceived risk.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = -.03, *SE* = .11, *p* = .802, [-.236, .183]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .728, [-.168, .240]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between identity consolidation efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.24, *SE* = .15, *p* = .113, [-.544, .058]). Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .14, *SE* = .13, *p* = .284, [-.116, .391]), likelihood of risk (*B* = -.10, *SE* = .08, *p* = .249, [-.265, .069]), and moral obligation (*B* = .28, *SE* = .14, *p* = .055, [-.006, .563]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and identity consolidation efficacy (.01, *SE* = .19, *p* = .965, [-.370, .386]), and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.02, *SE* = .07, *p* = .745, [-.173, .124]) were not significant. Identity consolidation efficacy did not predict action intentions at any level of perceived risks. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low levels of perceived risk (.05, *SE* = .04, [.001, .166]).

Participative efficacy. Participative efficacy (*B* = .18, *SE* = .09, *p* = .05, [.004, .366]) positively predicted moral obligation, and likelihood of risk (*B* = .00, *SE* = .09, *p* = .997, [-.179, .179]) did not. The interaction term between participative efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.08, *SE* = .07, *p* = .267, [-.229 .064]). Participative efficacy (*B* = .12, *SE* = .09, *p* = .224, [-.072, .302]), likelihood of risk (*B* = -.07, *SE* = .08, *p* = .381, [-.226, .086]) did not predict action intentions, but moral obligation (*B* = .29, *SE* = .14, *p* = .032, [.026, .562]) positively predicted action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and participative efficacy (.18, *SE* = .10, *p* = .078, [-.020 .379]), and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.11, *SE* = .08, *p* = .149, [-.262, .040]) were not significant. Participative efficacy positively predicted action intentions (*B* = .27, *SE* = .12, *p* = .032, [.026, .506]) only at high levels of perceived risks. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at

low (.10, *SE* = .05, [.015, .220]), medium (.05, *SE* = .04, [.006, .146]) levels of likelihood of risk.

Politicised identification. Politicised identification (*B* = .56, *SE* = .18, *p* < .001, [.332, .795]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .01, *SE* = .10, *p* = .932, [-.184, .200]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.05, *SE* = .09, *p* = .579, [-.236, .132]). Politicised identification (*B* = .27, *SE* = .13, *p* = .035, [.020, .529]) and moral obligation (*B* = .29, *SE* = .13, *p* = .019, [.049, .534]) predicted action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and politicised identification (.33, *SE* = .17, *p* = .051, [-.001, .658]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.26, *SE* = .15, *p* = .083, [-.556, .024]) were not significant. Inspection of the simple slopes showed that politicised identification is a significant predictor of action intentions at medium (*B* = .27, *SE* = .13, *p* = .035, [.020, .529]) and high (*B* = .55, *SE* = .20, *p* = .008, [.144, .953]) levels of perceived risks. Moreover, moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.31, *SE* = .11, [.141, .582]) and medium (.16, *SE* = .08, [.048, .349]) levels of perceived risks.

Politicised Identification as a Moderator

Outrage. Politicised identification (*B* = .42, *SE* = .14, *p* = .003, [.149, .689]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = .078, *SE* = .134, *p* = 577, [-.198, .355]) significantly predicted outrage. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.02, *SE* = .17, *p* = .898, [-.367, .322]). Likelihood of risk did not predict outrage at all levels of politicised identification.

Fear. Likelihood of risk significantly predicted fear (*B* = .46, *SE* = .11, *p* < .001, [.247, .668]). Politicised identification did not predict it (*B* = .10, *SE* = .11, *p* = .350, [-.116, .324]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.07, *SE* = .16, *p* = .654, [-.379, .238]). Likelihood of risk predicted fear at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = .52, *SE* = .18, *p* = .005, [.161, .879]), medium (*B* = .457, *SE* = .11, *p* < .001, [.247, .668]), and high (*B* = .394, *SE* = .17, *p* = .022, [.058, .730]).

Political efficacy. Politicised identification (*B* = .52, *SE* = .10, *p* < .001, [.323, .720]) positively, and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .10, *p* = .646, [-.239, .149]) negatively predicted political efficacy. The interaction term between politicised

identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.15, *SE* = .13, *p* = .248, [-.394, .103]). Likelihood of risk did not predict political efficacy at all levels of politicised identification.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .42, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.254, .591]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .07, *p* = .565, [-.179, .098]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.11, *SE* = .08, *p* = .164, [-.268, .046]). Likelihood of risk did not predict identity consolidation efficacy at all levels of politicised identification.

Participative efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted participative efficacy (*B* = .57, *SE* = .10, *p* < .001, [.365, .766]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = -.08, *SE* = .09, *p* = .384, [-.251, .097]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.02, *SE* = .09, *p* = .830, [-.206, .166]). Likelihood of risk did not predict participative efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Moral obligation. Politicised identification (*B* = .76, *SE* = .11, *p* < .001, [.545, .972]) significantly predicted moral obligation, and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.04, *SE* = .07, *p* = .574, [-.181, .100]) did not. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.07, *SE* = .10, *p* = .454, [-.262, .118]). Likelihood of risk did not predict moral obligation at any level of politicised identification.

Study 5: Turkey

Likelihood of Risk as a Moderator

Outrage. Outrage (*B* = .05, *SE* = .04, *p* = .271, [-.038, .134]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .17, *SE* = .07, *p* = .017, [.031, .310]) did not predict moral obligation. The interaction term between outrage and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.06, *SE* = .04, *p* = .164, [-.151, .026]). Outrage (*B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .029, [.012, .217]) and moral obligation (*B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* = .001, [.119, .361]) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .093, [-.021, .269]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and outrage (-.02, *SE* = .06, *p* = .672, [-.137, .088]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.04, *SE* = .06, *p* = .523, [-.079, .154]) were not significant. However,

inspection of the simple slopes showed that outrage was a significant predictor of action only at medium (*B* = .11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .029, [.012, .216]) level of perception of risks. Moreover, moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.02, *SE* = .02, [.000, .060]) level of risk perception.

Fear. Fear (*B* = .09, *SE* = .07, *p* = .202, [-.046, .217]) did not predict moral obligation. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .17, *SE* = .07, *p* = .016, [.032, .312]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between fear and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.06, *SE* = .05, *p* = .290, [-.165, .049]). Fear (*B* = .15, *SE* = .07, *p* = .040, [.007, 284]) and moral obligation (*B* = .25, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.124, .367) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .13, *SE* = .07, *p* = .074, [-.013, .278]) did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and fear (.06, *SE* = .08, *p* = .460, [-.095, .278]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.01, *SE* = .06, *p* = .859, [-.137, .114]) were not significant. However, fear significantly predicted action only at medium (*B* = .15, *SE* = .07, *p* = .001, [.007, .284) level of risks, and moral obligation was a significant mediator at low (.03, *SE* = .02, [.002, .083]) level of perceived risk.

Political efficacy. Political efficacy (*B* = .05, *SE* = .06, *p* = .454, [-.074, .165]) did not predict moral obligation, however, likelihood of risk (*B* = .19, *SE* = .07, *p* = .007, [.051, .326]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between political efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.03, *SE* = .09, *p* = .718, [-.204, .141]). Political efficacy (*B* = .09, *SE* = .06, *p* = .126, [-.024, .196]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .093, [-.019, .261]) did not predict action intentions. However, moral obligation did (*B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.124, .364]). The interactions between likelihood of risk and political efficacy (.07, *SE* = .07, *p* = .269, [-.058, .206]) as well as between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (.01, *SE* = .06, *p* = .807, [-.095, .122]) were not significant. Political efficacy was a significant predictor of action intentions at high (*B* = .14, *SE* = .07, *p* = .047, [.002, .277]) level of perceived risk. Moral obligation was not a significant mediator at any level of risk perceptions.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .03, *SE* = .05, *p* = .525, [-.072, .141]) did not predict moral obligation, but likelihood of risk did (*B* = .18, *SE* = .07, *p* = .009, [.045, .313]). The interaction term between identity

consolidation efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (-.12, *SE* = .06, *p* = .029, [-.237, -.012]). Identity consolidation efficacy (*B* = .18, *SE* = .06, *p* = .004, [.059, .305]) and moral obligation (*B* = .25, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.130, .377]) positively predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .093, [-.020, .261]) did not predict action intentions. The interaction between likelihood of risk and identity consolidation efficacy (.12, *SE* = .08, *p* = .124, [-.033, .274]) was not significant, however, the interaction between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (-.02, *SE* = .08, *p* = .754, [-.181, .131]) was significant. Identity consolidation efficacy was a significant predictor of action intentions only at medium level (*B* = .18, *SE* = .06, *p* = .004, [.059, .304]), and high levels of risks (*B* = .27, *SE* = .08, *p* = .001, [.109, .429]). Moral obligation was a significant mediator only at low level of perceived risk (.04, *SE* = .02, [.002, .093]).

Participative efficacy. Participative efficacy (*B* = .10, *SE* = .04, *p* = .04, [.004, .187]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .19, *SE* = .07, *p* = .006, [.053, .322]) positively predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between participative efficacy and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.00, *SE* = .07, *p* = .990, [-.132 .134]). Participative efficacy (*B* = .02, *SE* = .05, *p* = .713, [-.086, .125]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .093, [-.021, .269]) did not predict action intentions, and moral obligation (*B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.121, .364]) positively predicted action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and participative efficacy (.01, *SE* = .06, *p* = .806, [-.086, .125]), and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (.04, *SE* = .07, *p* = .592, [-.103, .180]) were not significant. Participative efficacy did not predict collective action at any level of perceived risk. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at medium level of likelihood of risk (.02, *SE* = .01, [.003, .055]).

Politicised identification. Politicised identification (*B* = .42, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.266, .579]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .19, *SE* = .07, *p* = .005, [.057, .321]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk in predicting moral obligation was not significant (.02, *SE* = .07, *p* = .789, [-.127, .167]). Politicised identification (*B* = .28, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.126, .429) and moral obligation (*B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.122, .367]) predicted action intentions. Likelihood of risk (*B* = .12, *SE* = .07, *p* = .093, [-.021, .269])

did not predict action intentions. The interactions between likelihood of risk and politicised identification (-.07, *SE* = .10, *p* = .490, [-.279, .134]) and between likelihood of risk and moral obligation (.06, *SE* = .09, *p* = .506, [-.121, .246]) were not significant. Inspection of the simple slopes showed that moral obligation was a significant mediator at all levels of perceived risks; low (.08, *SE* = .04, [.018, .180]), medium (.10, *SE* = .03, [.053, .179]), and high (.13, *SE* = .05, [.053, .233]).

Politicised Identification as a Moderator

Outrage. Politicised identification (*B* = .31, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.136, .483]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .49, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.318, .658]) significantly predicted outrage. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.28, *SE* = .12, *p* = .017, [-.506, -.049]). Likelihood of risk predicted outrage at low (*B* = .72, *SE* = .12, *p* < .001, [.487, .961]), medium (*B* = .49, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.318 .659]), but not high (*B* = .25, *SE* = .14, *p* = .076, [-.026, .529]) levels of politicised identification.

Fear. Likelihood of risk significantly predicted fear (*B* = .50, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.369, .634]). Politicised identification did not predict it (*B* = .31, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.154, .465]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (.11, *SE* = .05, *p* = .028, [.011, .203]). Likelihood of risk predicted fear at all levels of politicised identification; low (*B* = .*75*, *SE* = .09, *p* < .001, [.564, .939]), medium (*B* = .50, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.369, .634]), and high (*B* = .252, *SE* = .11, *p* = .017, [.045, .459]).

Political efficacy. Politicised identification (*B* = .01, *SE* = .07, *p* = .828, [-.116, .145]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = -.06, *SE* = .08, *p* = .503 [-.219, .108]) did not predict political efficacy. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.10, *SE* = .10, *p* = .316, [-.290, .094]). Likelihood of risk did not predict political efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Identity consolidation efficacy. Politicised identification (*B* = .24, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.109, .362]) and likelihood of risk (*B* = .20, *SE* = .07, *p* = .003, [.067, .337]) significantly predicted identity consolidation efficacy. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was significant (-.20, *SE* = .08, *p* = .009, [-.346, -.050]). Likelihood of risk predicted identity consolidation efficacy at low (*B*

=.37, *SE* = .08, *p* < .001, [.208, .532]), and medium (*B* = .20, *SE* = .07, *p* = .003, [.067, .337]) levels of politicised identification.

Participative efficacy. Politicised identification significantly predicted participative efficacy (*B* = .29, *SE* = .09, *p* = .001, [.116, .468]). Likelihood of risk did not predict it (*B* = .05, *SE* = .08, *p* = .545, [-.103, .194]). The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (.03, *SE* = .04, *p* = .439, [-.051, .118]). Likelihood of risk did not predict participative efficacy at any level of politicised identification.

Moral obligation. Politicised identification (*B* = .51, *SE* = .07, *p* < .001, [.369, .654]), and likelihood of risk (*B* = .28, *SE* = .06, *p* < .001, [.162, .402]) significantly predicted moral obligation. The interaction term between politicised identification and likelihood of risk was not significant (-.04, *SE* = .07, *p* = .561, [-.172, .093]). Likelihood of risk predicted moral obligation at all levels of politicised identification.

Summary of the Moderation Analyses

The results of the moderation analyses across the contexts showed an inconsistent pattern, and the interaction terms were mostly non-significant. In general, when there were significant differences, the antecedents positively predicted participants' willingness to engage in collective action at moderate and high levels of risk in Russia and Turkey, and at low and moderate levels of risk in Hong Kong and Ukraine. These results provide empirical evidence for the backfire effect and argue against the deterring effect of repression. Similarly, the interaction terms between politicised identification and likelihood of risk were generally not-significant. In Hong Kong and Turkey, the moderation analyses of politicised identification showed that perceived risk positively predicted some of the antecedents of collective action only at low and moderate levels of politicised identification. In other words, once individuals highly identify with the protest movement, repression no longer leads to increases in their outrage, efficacy beliefs and moral obligation. These results can suggest that the highly identified individuals have already internalised the emotional and efficacy norms of the movement, and have largely committed to the movement, consequently, repression does not significantly affect their emotions and efficacy beliefs. As I mentioned earlier, the non-significant results can be due to the cross-sectional nature of the data as well as power issues. Future research should more systematically address the

potential moderating roles of likelihood of risk and politicised identification with experimental data and bigger samples.

More specifically, within the Hong Kong context (Study 2), likelihood of risk did not play a significant moderating role in predicting action intentions. However, moral obligation was a significant mediator in the relation between identity consolidation efficacy, participative efficacy, and politicised identification and action intentions at low and medium levels of perceived risk. As for the moderating role of politicised identification, the interaction between perceived risk and politicised identification was significant in predicting outrage and moral obligation, whereby perceived risk positively predicted outrage and moral obligation at low levels of politicised identification.

Within the Russian context (Study 3), although the interaction between perceived risk and the antecedents of collective action was not significant, the simple slopes suggested differential predictions according to the level of perceived risk. Outrage, fear, political efficacy, and participative efficacy positively predicted action at moderate and high levels of perceived risk. Identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted action intention at moderate level of perceived risk. As for the moderating role of politicised identification, the only significant interaction was for predicting identity consolidation efficacy, whereby likelihood of risk positively predicts identity consolidation efficacy only at high levels of politicised identification.

Within the Ukrainian context, moral obligation was a significant mediator in the relation between political efficacy, identity consolidation efficacy, and collective action only at low levels of perceived risk. For participative efficacy and politicised identification, moral obligation was a significant mediator at low and moderate levels of perceived risk. There were no significant results regarding the moderating role of politicised identification.

Within the Turkish context, although the interactions between perceived risks and the antecedents were not significant, outrage and fear predicted action intentions only at moderate levels of risk. Political efficacy and identity consolidation efficacy positively predicted action intention at moderate and high levels of perceived risk. Moral obligation was a significant mediator at low levels of risk in the relation between all the antecedents (except political efficacy) and action intentions. As for the

moderating role of politicised identification, the interaction was significant for outrage and identity consolidation efficacy, whereby likelihood of risk positively predicts outrage and identity consolidation efficacy at low and moderate levels of politicised identification.