


**HOW RESISTING DEMOCRACIES CAN DEFEAT SUBSTATE
TERRORISM : FORMULATING A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR STRATEGIC COERCION AGAINST NATIONALISTIC
SUBSTATE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS**

Michael Andrew Berger

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
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How Resisting Democracies Can Defeat Substate Terrorism:

Formulating a Theoretical Framework for Strategic Coercion against Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organizations

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I was admitted as a research student in September 2006, and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in the School of International Relations in May 2007; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St. Andrews between September 2006 and September 2009.

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Abstract

The following dissertation develops a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), and effectively manipulating the terrorist group's (and its supporting elements') decision-making calculus. In particular, the theory of strategic coercion has been chosen as a basis for formulating this framework, based upon: 1) the invaluable guidance it offers in dynamically drawing upon *all* instruments of national power—economic, diplomatic, military, etc.—to accomplish politico-strategic objectives; and 2) the unique insights it provides into making strategic moves aimed at influencing the choices taken by an adversary. However, strategic coercion theory as it currently stands is inadequate for applications against substate terrorist organizations.

As a quintessential cornerstone for prescriptive policy in strategic studies, such a looming deficiency vis-à-vis one the most important security threats of the modern age is unacceptable. The new theoretical framework established in this dissertation—entitled the *Balance Theory* of strategic coercion—addresses this deficiency. The Balance Theory stresses that three key coercive elements of strategic coercion are fundamentally important for successfully ending the hostilities posed by NSTOs, being: A) Isolation of external/international support; B) Denial; and C) Isolation of popular support. It posits that these three aspects of strategic coercion serve as the *sine qua non* for success in countering an NSTO's campaign of violence and effectively manipulating its decision-making process. Implementation of these three elements, moreover, must be pursued in tandem, taking care so as not to sacrifice one aspect for the other.

The Balance Theory is tested through the employment of case-study analysis. In pursuing this end, both cross-case and within-case analyses are performed, accompanied by the utilization of the methods of focused, structured comparison. The cases examined are those of: 1) The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007); and 2) Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present).

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Chapter I:

Strategic Coercion versus Substate Terrorism

Referencing the *Strategy of Conflict* by Thomas Schelling, *strategy* can be understood as the series of moves initiated by an actor (or actors) aimed at influencing the choice of an opposing actor, in a manner favorable to itself. In the words of Schelling, the ultimate aim of such strategic moves is to “set up for one’s self and communicate persuasively to the other player a mode of behavior... that leaves the other a simple maximalization problem whose solution for him is the optimum for one’s self, and to destroy the other’s ability to do the same.”¹ The aim of this dissertation, simply put, is to establish a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy—and strategic moves—of democratic states in successfully countering the hostilities of a substate terrorist organization, and effectively manipulating the terrorist group’s (and its supporting elements’) decision-making calculus—or *choice*—in a manner favorable to itself.

To be sure, a multitude of attempts have been made to guide strategy against substate threats—be they against specific types of terrorist organizations, insurgency more broadly, or otherwise. What makes this dissertation unique is that it marks a first attempt to develop such a framework through primarily drawing upon strategic coercion theory. Developed by scholars such as Thomas Schelling, Alexander George, Lawrence Freedman and others, strategic coercion theory elaborates upon developing and employing strategies that apply the full gamut of national power instruments—military, diplomatic, economic, political, etc.—in an integrated fashion to attain desirable political outcomes. What makes strategic coercion theory so important, however, that it would merit such a focused application in this context?

The answer is two-fold. First, only very few strategies exist that comprehensively ponder how to utilize all elements of national power to counter the threat of substate terrorism. Strategic coercion, a well-established theoretical cornerstone in contemporary strategic thought benefiting

¹ Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, 160.

from a wealth of decades of research and analysis, offers the promise of readily contributing in this regard to better understanding how to leverage these elements of national power for strategic gain against such substate adversaries. Second, strategic coercion offers unique insights on how to affect the decision-making calculus of substate terrorist organizations; insights vital to better understanding how to compel such hostile groups to take a choice of action desired—i.e. ceasefire, modified end-objectives, renunciation of violence, disarmament/decommissioning, the signing of a peace treaty, etc. Ultimately, strategic coercion offers a unique and valuable way for the construction of strategy at the highest levels to meet the threat of substate terrorism.

Surprisingly, only limited efforts have been made to apply this aspect of strategic thought to one of the most pressing security challenges of the modern day: substate terrorist organizations. As will be discussed in further detail over the course of this chapter and the next, attempts to consider strategic coercion vis-à-vis substate terrorist organizations have been rather limited, often constraining their focus to the challenges associated with it. To date, no such work has established a clear and comprehensive theory for successfully employing strategic coercion to counter the threats of substate terrorist organizations.

This dissertation marks a divergence from these limited, prior attempts. In doing so, it has referenced the lessons and principles of strategic coercion and related literature to establish a theoretical framework for guiding a democratic state's strategic moves against a formidable substate terrorist organization (or organizations). And in order to test this theory, an extensive case-study analysis is employed, empirically evaluating its validity over the course of approximately 80-years of strategic coercion waged by democratic states against substate terrorist organizations.

Prior to proceeding with the establishment of such a theoretical framework, however, it is important to elaborate in further detail on what comprises strategic coercion, and what current limitations are associated with applying it within the context of substate terrorist organizations.

What is Strategic Coercion?

The study of strategic coercion is concerned with attaining desirable political outcomes—or avoiding undesirable ones—through the threatened or actual application of limited military force and/or economic and political sanctions, often assisted through diplomatic action. These mechanisms, which can be accompanied by economic and political inducements, are thus applied with the intention of favorably altering the decision-making calculus of an adversarial political entity to pursue ongoing or threatened hostilities. In short, strategic coercion aims to either dissuade an opponent from taking an undesirable course of action, or to stop and undo an undesirable course of action (or series of actions) already taken, by making the costs of said action(s) exceed the benefits of possible rewards associated with pursuing it/them.

Of importance to note, force and sanctions applied in strategic coercion are the minimal necessary to manipulate the hostile adversary's *choice*. In other words, the intention of strategic coercion is not to accomplish its objective by bludgeoning the targeted opponent to the point of utter destruction, whereby it simply can no longer pursue hostilities. Such a strategy is generally referred to as the application of *brute force*², and in today's age is both difficult to achieve and—in most instances—politically unviable for democracies. Rather, strategic coercion is about applying just enough force and/or sanctions to persuade the targeted political adversary to choose not to engage in, or continue, the undesired hostilities.

Considering that the amount of force required to completely eliminate an adversary's ability for organized resistance is tremendous in the modern age, and, of foremost importance,

² Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960, 3.

that democracies are unwilling to countenance such a wholesale and destructive application of force for normative reasons, strategic coercion proffers a valuable means for considering applications of power instruments, threatened or actual, for achieving victories against hostile political entities. Moreover, literature devoted to strategic coercion help to provide the policymakers of democracies with a better understanding of how to utilize their power instruments on the politico-strategic level in order to attain desired political outcomes from hostile opponents.

Regrettably, Current Literature in Strategic Coercion is Deficient

Unfortunately, despite the apparent utility that it might offer in the context of a better understanding of how democratic states can counter substate terrorist organizations, the existing literature on the this aspect of strategic coercion has only been sparingly investigated. The source of this problem is two-fold. First, in the field of strategic coercion, most existing research is rooted in the Cold War era, preoccupied with deterrence and state-actors. As the mass-casualty producing terrorists of today are often too fanatical to defeat through a strategy of deterrence alone and are non-state in existence, these facts render much of this literature limited in utility. Second and furthermore, the majority of the literature produced after the Cold War is still predominantly concerned with state-centric applications of power.

As explained above, this dissertation will endeavor to take the first necessary steps for surmounting this dearth of knowledge and helping further pioneer the field of strategic coercion into that of counter-terrorism. It will accomplish this by examining how *democratic* states may utilize strategic coercion to effectively counter and stop the hostilities of *nationalistic* substate terrorist organizations.

Why *Democratic* States?

There are pragmatic and normative reasons for the selection of states of a democratic variety, where strategies of counter-terrorism are pursued. Pragmatically, the reason that democratic states are ideal subjects is that they constitute those states that are most interested in utilizing the minimum force necessary to accomplish their objectives, and most constrained in their options regarding the application of it.³ Strategic coercion theory—which is concerned with *limited* applications of force—thus provides the most value to this subset of states. From a normative perspective, this dissertation is concerned with exploring strategies constituted by the proportional and justified use of force by a legitimate government in pursuit of its (or its allies') self-defense. While democracies certainly do not always use force in a proportional or justified manner, they do provide the most likely candidates to hypothetically fit such a consideration, and are most likely to constitute states willing to act along these normative lines.

What are considered to be democracies? This study considers a state to be a democracy if it possesses a government of freely elected representatives (where all/nearly all adult aged citizens are free to vote or run for office); subjected to a constitution (written or unwritten) ensuring individual rights and limits of government power; possessing some form of active check on the government's (and especially the executive's) power by the domestic courts and/or a specific system of checks and balances.

Why *Nationalistic* Substate Terrorist Organizations?

The subset of substate terrorist organizations to be investigated includes those of a *nationalistic* orientation such as the IRA, ETA, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc. Nationalistic groups

³ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 108-111; Rob de Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West's Military Superiority Scarcely Matters*, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005, 110; Wyn Q. Bowen. "Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism." Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds). *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 444.

have been chosen for reasons related to research expediency and policy relevance. Regarding research expediency, two primary reasons stand for the selection of cases involving nationalistic substate terrorist organizations. First, where the application of strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations is concerned, most available and relevant historical cases applicable to this type of research only involve nationalistic cases. Second, and furthermore, as nationalistic groups have often been considered by many to be what Paul Wilkinson dubs *corrigible* terrorist organizations⁴—that is, their hostile behavior is recognized as being rational and susceptible to correction and pacific modification—they appear the best starting point for investigating how strategic coercion can be used to modify the behavior of violent substate terrorist organizations.

Selecting cases of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations, moreover, is also important in terms of policy relevance. Nationalistic groups tend to be the best organized, highly motivated, well-supported, and capable of inflicting a great number of casualties over time. Indeed, better understanding how strategic coercion can be applied to nationalistic cases of substate terrorist organizations is also very important for better understanding how to conduct a “war on terror” against Al Qaeda and its affiliate groups that, in seeking to re-establish the Islamic Caliphate⁵—are in many ways similar to nationalistic groups themselves (discussed in Chapter VI).

Thus, this dissertation will examine how democratic states may utilize strategic coercion to effectively counter nationalistic substate terrorist organizations. However, prior to elaborating upon exactly *how* this dissertation will accomplish this, it is first important to expound upon a number of points, including: 1) the definitions of terrorism and (nationalistic) substate terrorist

⁴ Paul Wilkinson. “The War Without Frontiers,” *Scotland on Sunday*, 8 September 2002. Available Online at: http://www.martinfrost.ws/htmlfiles/without_frontiers.html [Last Viewed 23 August 2009].

⁵ Essentially a single, united Islamic nation for the world’s Islamic community or “Ummah”, in place of a variety of states considered apostate regimes.

organizations used in this study; 2) the concept of strategic coercion; and 3) the general applications of strategic coercion that are possible vis-à-vis substate terrorist organizations.

Defining Terrorism and Substate Terrorist Organizations

Drawing from a number of elements in oft-cited definitions⁶, this dissertation defines terrorism as:

A form of premeditated, violence-based communication aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets for the purpose of creating and exploiting fear within a targeted audience to compel a political change, coerce a desired action, advance a cause, generate propaganda, or destabilize critical political, constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.

Terrorism, moreover, can be pursued by individuals, substate groups and organizations, clandestine agents, and state actors. The audience it seeks to target can range from an entire state or states, governments, international organizations, ethnic or religious groups, political parties, and public opinion in general. Finally, the defining characteristics of terrorism that set it apart from other forms of organized violence is that it specifically wreaks destruction upon noncombatants and symbolic targets; its main target is not the victims it assaults but the audience it intimidates and exploits as a consequence; and its objective is not destruction in itself but the political change it can compel as a result.

⁶ See: Walter Lacqueur, *The Age of Terrorism*, Boston: Little Brown, 1987, 72; U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism*, Washington: Dept. of State, 2001, vi; Council of the European Union, *Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism (2002/475/JHA)*, Official Journal 164, 22/06/2002 P.0003 – 0007; Her Majesty's Stationary Office (HMSO), *Terrorism Act 2000, Chapter 11*, London: The Queen's Printer of Acts of Parliament, 2000. Available Online at: <http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/00011--b.htm> [Last Viewed 23 August 2009]; Brian Jenkins, *International Terrorism: The Other World War*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corp., 1985; Bruce Hoffman, "Defining Terrorism." Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds), *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 23; Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman, *Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data Bases, Theories, and Literature*, Amsterdam: North Holland, Transaction Books, 1988.

Nationalistic Substate Terrorist Organizations (NSTOs)

With a clear definition of terrorism put forth, it is important to also elaborate upon what constitutes a substate terrorist organization. A substate terrorist organization is defined in this work as:

An organization, which does not constitute a state government or recognized state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.) that is dedicated in whole or in part to employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets for the purpose of creating and exploiting fear within a targeted audience to compel a political change, coerce a desired action, advance a cause, generate propaganda, or destabilize critical political, constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.

Importantly, it is necessary to distinguish what *nationalistic* substate terrorist organizations are. Labeling them “nationalist terrorists”, Paul Wilkinson refers to this subset of terrorist organizations as those groups “seeking political self-determination,” who may “wage their struggle entirely in the territory they seek to liberate, or... may be active both in their home area and abroad.”⁷ Dubbing substate terrorist organizations of this nature to be those that follow “ethno-nationalist/separatist terrorism,” Bruce Hoffman gives a comparable description.⁸ Following a similar tangent, this study will consider any substate terrorist organization as nationalistic whose primary objective is self-determination and/or self-liberation, whether in the form of gaining regional sovereignty, separating/emerging to form or reform a new nation-state, overthrowing the existing regime, and/or removing an occupying force.

However, this study’s classification of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations—also referred to as NSTOs—importantly differs from the oft-cited ones espoused by Wilkinson and Hoffman. The reason for this differentiation is that both Wilkinson and Hoffman consider terrorist organizations that are nationalistic in nature to differ from those which are inspired by

⁷ Paul Wilkinson. *Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, 19.

⁸ Hoffman, 45-65.

religious motivations or justifications. Considering it possible, however, for nationalistic terrorist organizations to have religious motivations and/or justifications—as has been the case with Hezbollah, Hamas, the Tamil Tigers, and others—this study does not make this distinction. Rather, in this work, such religiously motivated terrorist organizations are considered a subset of NSTOs. Thus, where the primary objective remains various forms of self-determination and freedom from occupation, this study considers those groups—regardless of their motivations or justifications—to be nationalistic in orientation.

In returning to and concluding the matter of defining nationalistic substate terrorist organizations, the following definition will hold for this study:

Nationalistic substate terrorist organizations are organizations, which do not constitute a state government or recognized state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.), that are dedicated in whole or in part to achieving the primary objective of self-determination/nation (re)formation and/or freedom from occupation through employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets with the intent of creating and exploiting fear within a targeted audience, generating propaganda, or destabilizing critical political, constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.

Clarification for What is Intended by “Substate” Terrorist Organizations

Prior to proceeding, it is important to briefly clarify what is intended by the designation “substate” when referring to substate terrorist organizations. In applying the term substate, the intention is not to pass judgment upon any group of people/nation, neither inferring that the land they currently (or strive to) occupy does not constitute a state, nor that they are not entitled to one. Rather, the designation “substate” is used to refer to the nature of the (terrorist) organization under question; being that these organizations do not constitute a state government or recognized state apparatus. Moreover, as such terrorist organizations operate below the state level—the highest level of recognizable sovereignty—they are designated as “substate”.

Of course, it should also be pointed out that just because the term “substate” is used this does not imply that such terrorist organizations may not constitute an important political party or element of a recognized state government or authority. Such groups may very well be a significant (or minor) party in a state government (i.e. Hezbollah in Lebanon); they may be clandestine instruments of a state government or authority (see the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades linked to Fatah and the Palestinian Authority); or such organizations may possess political representation, officially or unofficially from a third party (i.e. Sinn Fein for the IRA). However, as the organization itself neither constitutes a state government, nor a recognizable state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.), it is thus classified as being a “substate” terrorist organization, regardless of its potential state connections.

All NSTOs are “Insurgents”; Not All Insurgents are NSTOs

All nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs) comprise insurgent groups. As loosely defined by David Galula, “an insurgency is a protracted struggle conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”⁹ According to Michael Boyle, “In most cases, insurgency is a form of asymmetric warfare, because the insurgent forces are generally weaker than the government or occupying army... Insurgent warfare is marked by the absence of fixed battle lines, by the use of secrecy and ambush, and by the competition for the support of the population between the insurgents and their opponents...”¹⁰ The activities of NSTOs, and the objectives they pursue, clearly match such descriptions. However, while NSTOs may constitute “insurgent organizations,” not all insurgent organizations may be identified as NSTOs.

⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (PSI Classics of Counterinsurgency Era Edition), New York: Praeger Security International, 2006, 2.

¹⁰ Michael Boyle, “Terrorism and Insurgency,” *Contemporary Security Strategy*, 2nd Edition, edited by Craig A. Snyder, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, 186.

Mao's communist insurgency and the Red Army/People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Malayan National Liberation Army (MNLA), the Viet Cong, etc. are all examples of insurgent organizations that would not be considered NSTOs. The key difference between such groups and organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Provisional IRA, etc. that do constitute NSTOs, is that while terrorism may have been used as a tactic (though certainly not in all cases¹¹), it did not comprise a primary strategy of the insurgent organization—which were typically focused on guerrilla warfare, exerting control over territory, and eventually overcoming conventional forces. For NSTOs, terrorism is one of, if not *the* primary strategy of asymmetric violence pursued against an opposing state/government. It should thus be understood that while all NSTOs may constitute insurgent groups, not all insurgent groups are nationalistic substate *terrorist* organizations.

The Concept of Strategic Coercion

Theoretically speaking, strategic coercion involves the deliberate and targeted use of (or threat to use) hard power instruments—be they diplomatic, economic or military—in order to manipulate and influence the politico-strategic choices of an actor or player in international relations. It is precisely defined by Lawrence Freedman of King's College London, as the “deliberate and purposive use of overt threats to influence another's strategic choices.”¹² Strategic coercion can be conceptualized as a process that takes place over a spectrum of increasing severity. At the beginning and more moderate side of this spectrum there is *coercive diplomacy*. Coercive diplomacy can be understood as the limited use or threat of force in conjunction with economic sanctions, and possibly inducements, aimed at compelling or

¹¹ Mao Tse Tung for example, did not embrace terrorism and rejected it as a tactic against noncombatants. Boyle, 186.

¹² Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 15.

detering an opponent towards or against pursuing a certain type of behavior.¹³ The general objective is to back one's demands on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply.¹⁴ When the application of force is chosen in coercive diplomacy as part of this punishment, its use is conducted in a limited and exemplary manner, meaning that just enough force is used to demonstrate sufficient resolve to protect one's interests and to establish the credibility of one's determination to use more force if necessary.¹⁵

When a political entity such as a state moves past latent or very limited applications of force and begins to pursue the application of military power instruments in a broader and more active sense, that actor has moved along the spectrum of strategic coercion into that of *military coercion*. Here, coercion involves the application of force on a *massive* scale to achieve political and military objectives.¹⁶ Specifically, force is used to change the behavior of the opponent by manipulating costs and benefits in such a way that compels it to alter its behavior.¹⁷ In the modern vernacular, military coercion is generally referred to as an *intervention*.¹⁸ In undergoing military coercion, political actors seek to change the behavior of an adversary that still retains the capacity for organized military resistance.¹⁹ If the state decides to bludgeon its adversary past this point, where resistance is no longer possible and total destruction ensues, then the state has moved beyond the most extreme spectrum of strategic coercion and into the realm of brute force.

¹³ De Wijk, 12-13.

¹⁴ Alexander L. George, *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991, 4.

¹⁵ George, 5.

¹⁶ De Wijk, 13.

¹⁷ Pape, 4.

¹⁸ De Wijk.

¹⁹ Pape, 12.

Using Strategic Coercion against Substate Terrorist Actors

The application of strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations is about the deliberate application, or threat to use, diplomatic, economic and military power instruments for the purpose of manipulating the politico-strategic choices of a substate terrorist entity. More simply put, it is about the application of power instruments by the state against substate terrorist groups to compel them to renounce violence, disarm/decommission, and if necessary, to agree to a viable political solution. It is important to distinguish here that strategic coercion is *not* about the application of brute force to crush a terrorist organization out of existence. Rather, strategic coercion is aimed at compelling a terrorist organization—as well as those it is composed of and receives support from—to alter or undo a course of action; in this case violent terrorist hostilities. Thus, the objective of employing strategic coercion against terrorist organizations is not necessarily about the elimination of the organization itself, but rather about compelling it to cease hostilities²⁰ and/or removing its capacity to enact or threaten violence against the democratic state and its interests.

When Does the Process of Strategic Coercion Begin?

Pursuing strategic coercion against a substate terrorist organization is a serious undertaking. Typically, a democratic state does not engage in strategic coercion until it becomes clear that the substate terrorist organization has become completely intractable to the police and criminal justice system. As Yezid Sayigh puts it, “States, for their part, do not usually move beyond conventional policing as a response until the non-state adversary has built a popular

²⁰ This may involve a ceasefire, nonviolent negotiations, disarmament, surrender/renunciation of violence, peace treaty, etc.

following sufficient to disrupt normal administration and economic activity or... has developed its base on a scale that both requires a strategic coercive effort and offers suitable targets for it.”²¹

A second, and important, indicator that a state will engage in strategic coercion occurs when the substate terrorist organization no longer only formulates claims and demands, but actually has come to exercise physical control over an appreciable number of inhabitants and a corresponding geographical area of the state itself (if not, additionally, another state as well).²² Such a development may also be accompanied by a basic level of institutional development in the terrorist organization, including a discernible command structure, identifiable leadership, and distinct decision-making processes.²³ While all substate terrorist organizations may not share this organizational formulation²⁴, they do generally consist of five common elements at this stage: 1) movement leaders; 2) combatants; 3) political cadre; 4) auxiliaries (active followers who provide important services); and 5) a mass base (comprised of the supporting elements of the population).²⁵

Thirdly, and perhaps the most critical indicator of when a democratic state will engage in a campaign of strategic coercion against a substate terrorist organization is linked to whether or not the insurgent organization has come to threaten the vital interests of the state. These vital interests, which may be political, strategic, territorial, economic or the very physical and psychological well-being of the nation’s populace, compel the democratic state to act when these interests are plausibly threatened. Indeed, under these circumstances, it will often be the overwhelming position of the democratic state’s constituency to act in a manner that utilizes all

²¹ Yezid Sayigh. “A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced: The PLO in Lebanon, 1969-1976”, Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 214.

²² Sayigh, 214.

²³ Sayigh.

²⁴ Indeed, David Kilcullen points out that many insurgent terrorist organizations may function more as a “self-synchronizing swarm of independent, but cooperating cells,” as opposed to the more traditional NSTOs described here. “Counterinsurgency *Redux*.” *Survival*, vol. 48, Spring 2007, 117.

²⁵ U.S. Army and Marine Corps. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 20.

aspects of the nation's power in order to confront this threat—thereby initiating the process of strategic coercion.

Finally, it should also be noted out that while the above criteria point out the circumstances for which a campaign of strategic coercion may “begin”, strategic coercion may also ensue following a resumption of violence by a terrorist organization. Such an instance typically occurs throughout the course of a long conflict as a consequence of stalled peace talks, failed negotiations or unimplemented agreements, and can mark a new or simply resumed campaign of strategic coercion against said substate terrorist organization. Indeed, as Sayigh remarks, “strategic coercion involving non-state actors is likely to be part of inseparable, continuous adversary relationships rather than one-off episodes”²⁶—an issue that will be revealed more in depth in Chapters IV and V, which examine the various episodes of strategic coercion against NSTOs in two historic cases.

Differences in Strategic Coercion Translate into Difficulties to Achieving Success

The differences present in applying strategic coercion against state actors vis-à-vis its application against substate terrorist organizations entail difficulties for state governments in achieving success. A major reason for this can be accounted for in the complexities of coercing a terrorist organization, whose form and composition is uncertain and susceptible to change. Beyond this, moreover, a wide array of factors, including state vulnerability to *counter*-coercion from terrorist organizations, lack of clear targets for coercive force, the ease with which such organizations can hide, extremely high terrorist motivation, little susceptibility to deterrence or punishment, and the extensive length of time and costly commitment of ground troops required in coercive efforts against terrorist organizations all serve to make such an actor difficult for states to strategically coerce. To sufficiently address and surmount this difficulty a better

²⁶ Sayigh, 212.

understanding is required of the process of strategic coercion against substate terrorist actors. This, of course, brings the discussion to the objectives of this study.

Research Objectives

The research objectives of this study are twofold. The first objective is to adapt strategic coercion theory, so that it might yield valuable insights for democratic states formulating a strategy to be employed against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations. In pursuing this objective, the following questions are asked:

- What key strategic elements are necessary for successful coercion against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations?
- How can these key elements be incorporated into a theoretical framework of strategic coercion directed against nationalistic substate terrorist organizations?

The second research objective involves empirically testing the conclusions formulated in response to the first research question. Namely:

- Do its conclusions about the necessary conditions for success hold true within the context of real world examples? And can this modified theory be used to prescribe effective policies for strategic coercion against NSTOs?

Research Objective 1: Adapting Strategic Coercion Theory

In order to fulfill this research objective, two steps are taken (in Chapter III). The first involves drawing from existing strategic coercion theory and adapting it to fit the context of application by a (democratic) state actor against an NSTO (or NSTOs). The second will then involve drawing from additional sources of literature, primarily derived from counter-insurgency

(COIN) theory—classic and contemporary. COIN theory is drawn from given the insight it possesses in state efforts against substate groups employing asymmetric strategies of violence; as mentioned earlier, all NSTOs may be considered insurgent organizations. Moreover, given its richness and depth, COIN literature contains important lessons for guiding the construction of any strategic framework against NSTOs, and also possesses important information regarding the operational breakdown of strategic designs—the latter of which is important for both elaborating on guidance for achieving strategic objectives, as well as providing an observable breakdown for measuring the phenomena of strategic coercion against NSTOs. In this way will strategic coercion theory be adapted vis-à-vis substate terrorist threats, addressing the questions: 1) What strategic elements are vital to success against an NSTO?; and 2) What action would a modified theory of strategic coercion prescribe to achieve such conditions?

Research Objective 2: Methodology for Empirical Testing

In seeking to select the most appropriate methodology for the purpose of testing the hypotheses of the modified theory put forth, this dissertation draws upon the work of Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, entitled *Development in the Social Sciences*. This quintessential work on methodology has been chosen as a guiding reference in that it: 1) serves as one of the definitive works for the employment of the case-study method; and 2) serves as a high utility guide for testing the validity of mid-range theories, such as those associated with strategic coercion. Moreover, the choice of this work makes particular sense in that its primary author, Alexander George, is one of the pre-eminent scholars in the field of strategic coercion, and in it he distills his methodology for related studies here. That being said, the methodology chosen employs the following:

The Case-Study Method

For the purpose of testing the validity of the theory on strategic coercion put forth, this study employs the case-study method. This method was chosen over alternative methodologies because case-studies provide some of the strongest means of assessing *whether* and *how* a variable matters—as opposed to more quantitative methods that assess *how much* it matters.²⁷ This is key, in that this study is more concerned with discovering the conditions under which a specified outcome occurs, and the mechanisms through which this occurrence takes place—i.e. when and how democratic states are successful in employing strategic coercion to end the hostilities of NSTOs—rather than uncovering the frequency with which such conditions and their outcomes arise.

Applying the Within-Case Method and Cross-Case Comparisons

In addition to choosing the case-study method, this study also employs a combination of the within-case method and cross-case comparisons. Such an approach has been chosen due to the growing consensus in the academic field that “the strongest means of drawing inferences from case studies is the use of a combination of within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons within a single study or research program.”²⁸ The rationale for the utility of applying both within-case analysis and cross-case comparison can be attributed to the fact that it greatly reduces the risks of inferential errors that can arise from using either method alone.²⁹

²⁷ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science*, Cambridge (Massachusetts): MIT Press, 2004, 25.

²⁸ George and Bennett, 18.

²⁹ George and Bennett, 235.

Cross-Case Comparison and Selection Criteria for Cases

In implementing a cross-case comparison, cases should be chosen in order to provide the kind of control and variation required by the research problem.³⁰ Moreover, the scope and domain of the generalizations to be made must also be clearly specified. Finally, cases chosen should abide by the criteria of being historically significant, theoretically relevant, and possessing of both multiple episodes for within-case analysis and ample evidence for research.

Regarding the scope and domain, the theory here put forth focuses on democratic states, in contemporary times, which seek to end the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations through the application of strategic coercion. Based upon these criteria, two cases in particular stand out as providing excellent models for observation:

1. The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007)
2. Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs (1967-Present)³¹

Both cases, moreover meet the initial requirement of control and variation. Regarding control, both cases offer instances where: 1) the state pursuing strategic coercion is a Western-styled democracy; 2) the NSTOs involved are well supported by a popular cause, and very well organized; 3) the ongoing conflict between the state and the NSTOs is underpinned by long-running historical grievances and dissatisfaction with the political status quo; 4) strategic coercion took place during a similar time period, influenced by similar international events (i.e. decolonization, the Cold War and its collapse, 9/11, etc.); 5) both cases involve a conflict that is clearly divided along religious lines; and 6) the motivation for conflict in both cases is essentially over the issue of control of *land*.

³⁰ George and Bennett, 83.

³¹ At the time of writing, “present” = summer 2009.

Variation, meanwhile, is clearly present in a number of instances, including: 1) the degree of international/external support widely varies in scope between the two cases³²; 2) geographical differences in terms of the scope of surrounding hostile countries; 3) the international reach of attack by the NSTOs in question; 4) the presence, or lack, of suicide bombings as a component of terrorist attacks; 5) cultural differences, both amongst the coercing states and the NSTOs and their supporters; 6) the presence of a single dominant NSTO involved in the conflict versus multiple significant groups³³; and 7) the presence, or lack, of third parties in the conflict³⁴.

Applying the Method of Focused, Structured Comparison

In applying the cross-case comparison, the method of focused, structured comparison will be employed. Here the method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined—i.e. those dealing with strategic coercion. It is “structured”, moreover, in that a general set of questions are posed for each case-episode that reflect the research objective of this study, for the purpose of guiding and standardizing data collection, and thereby, in the words of George and Bennett, “making systematic comparison and cumulation of the findings of the cases possible.”³⁵

Within-Case Analysis

In addition to employing a cross-case comparison, this study will also draw on the method of within-case analysis, which serves as a supplement for the comparative methods here

³² Especially in the case of Israel, external material aid was considerably larger for Palestinian NSTOs than their Republican counterparts.

³³ In the case of Northern Ireland during the time period examined (1969-2007), the Provisional IRA definitely constituted the dominant NSTO. However, during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there was seldom a time where the situation was dominated by a single NSTO (explained further in Chapter V).

³⁴ For instance, in the case of Northern Ireland, a third group party to the conflict was present, involving the majority population of Northern Ireland, Protestant Unionists—and their extremist elements, Loyalists—who were very much opposed to the IRA (discussed further in Chapter IV).

³⁵ George and Bennett, 67.

pursued. Within-case observations can be especially helpful due to their ability to reduce the over-simplification, or omission of contexts, often found in case-studies examined through the comparative method alone.³⁶ Therefore, in adherence to within-case analysis, both the case of the United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs, as well as Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs will be broken up into several coercive (with-in case) episodes for examination.

This within-case analysis, moreover, will attempt to trace the links between aspects of state coercive actions (i.e. the independent variables) and observed outcomes (the dependent variable). This will be achieved by examining histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, memoirs and other sources of information in order to determine if the causal process the theory here hypothesizes is actually evident in the cases examined.

Further, with-in case analysis will also be used to assess the predictive utility of the theory of strategic coercion here espoused. In doing so, it will both measure the outcome in light of the presence and value of the independent variables specified, as well as actively watch for possible alternative explanations/hypotheses or intervening variables, unsupported by the theory posited, which may account for the outcome observed. Such alternative explanations and intervening variables may include different elements of strategic coercion (i.e. punishment and decapitation) that directly influence the outcome observed, international events that shape the process and outcome of strategic coercion, and/or other salient occurrences/circumstances attributed causal significance present in the histories examined.

By employing this method, a check will be placed on whether the explanations hypothesized by the posited theory are spurious through monitoring for alternative determinants or *equifinality*. Equifinality is the case where the same type of outcome can emerge in different cases via a different set of independent variables—in other words, the observed outcome may

³⁶ George and Bennett, 6-7.

emerge as the result of an alternative explanation.³⁷ Through the within-case analysis conducted, the potential for this occurrence is reduced, as is the possibility that spurious conclusions related to the theory will be made.

Structure of this Dissertation

In concluding this chapter, the following dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter II provides a review of literature pertaining to considerations of strategic coercion vis-à-vis NSTOs. Chapter III proceeds with the construction of the new theoretical framework, based upon the principles of strategic coercion, and asserts a set of hypotheses for empirically assessing its validity. Chapters IV and V extensively cover case-study analysis over multiple within-case episodes in the historic instances of the UK versus Republican NSTOs (1969-2007), and Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs, (1967-present). Chapter VI concludes with a discussion of the results, assessment of validity of the new theoretical framework established, implications of findings, and considerations of if and how the new framework might offer advice in countering the contemporary substate terrorist challenge: Al Qaeda.

³⁷ George and Bennet, 157.

Chapter II:

Evaluating Literature on Strategic Coercion against Substate Terrorist

Organizations

This chapter evaluates the literature on strategic coercion theory as it applies to substate terrorist organizations. In doing so, it provides: 1) a brief examination of the origins of strategic coercion theory; 2) an assessment of the most influential strategic coercion literature; 3) a review of strategic coercion literature as it applies to substate terrorist organizations; 4) an appraisal of the limitations of current literature; and 5) an assertion of the need for more research to properly adapt strategic coercion theory towards confronting substate terrorist organizations.

The Origins of Strategic Coercion

Strategic coercion theory, and its associated body of literature, comprises a sub-section of strategic theory. Daniel Moran defines *strategic theory* as the “branch of social theory concerned with the use of force to achieve the goals of one community in conflict with others. It explores how to employ armed forces to advance political, social, economic, cultural, or ideological interests.”¹ In strategic theory, war—and the general application of force—is considered instrumental, subordinated to objectives outside itself. Accordingly, Colin Gray defines *strategy* as “the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power *per se* nor political purpose. By strategy [it is meant] *the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy.*”²

¹ Daniel Moran, “Strategic Theory and the History of War,” *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, Baylis, J., Wirtza, J., Cohen, E., and Gray, C. (eds), New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 18.

² Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 17 (emphasis in original text).

The Evolution of Strategic Theory

Still, it was not until work published by Carl von Clausewitz that strategic theory began to be broadened to considerations other than the efficient application of forces on the battlefield and in the potential area of operations. The genius of Clausewitz's work derived from underscoring that politics permeates all levels of military action. Moreover, as war was, in Clausewitz's perception, a "continuation of politics by other means", it was made clear that such politics held a primacy in militant conflicts, meaning that there could never be a purely military solution to any strategic problem.³

In time, Clausewitz's wider considerations for strategic theory would be complemented by others. Alfred Thayer Mahan came to consider "sea power" as the key to cutting off a nation from its overseas suppliers and markets, thereby depriving an enemy state of the capacity to wage industrialized war.⁴ Meanwhile, in considering airpower, Giulio Douhet considered the potential for a tremendous psychological shock conveyed by airpower that could force governments to surrender.⁵ And Billy Mitchell and Hugh Trenchard, conceived of applications for airpower that could wear away at an enemy's material resources through the destruction of war industries and civil infrastructure over an extended period, and potentially compel an adversary nation to concede in face of the costs incurred.⁶

The Emergence of Strategic Coercion Theory

The central goal of strategic theory has involved considerations of preserving war's political utility through limiting its social costs and subordinating its violent character within the

³ Von Clausewitz, Carl. *On War*, New York: Penguin Classics, 1982, 119.

⁴ Moran, 34.

⁵ See: Giulio Douhet, *The Command of the Air*, Office of Air Force History (United States), 1983 (republished).

⁶ Moran, 38-9.

parameters of rational control⁷. Following the Second World War, this central premise would not change, however strategic theory would come to be challenged by a new environment, possessing its own unique strategic challenges. This new environment was characterized by the Cold War, and the ever-present threat of a clash between nuclear-armed superpowers possessing a global reach.

In the 1960s and 1970s, a new subset of strategic theory began to emerge to help guide policy in considerations of this new environment. This subset of strategic theory came to be known as *strategic coercion theory*, and quickly emerged as a quintessential cornerstone in contemporary strategic thought. The manifestation of this branch of theory transpired during the height of the Cold War, when both scholars and policymakers considered how each superpower used threats of nuclear attacks to manipulate its rival, as well as the ways in which limited amounts of force could be used to pursue strategic interests across the globe without sparking wider (if not nuclear) conflagrations.⁸

In *Arms and Influence* (1960), the first and perhaps most influential work specifically dedicated to the concept, Thomas Schelling developed the theoretical structure of coercion theory, applying his prior work on the strategy of conflict to assert that rational adversaries often use the threat of military force as a quintessential part of their diplomacy.⁹ Furthermore, he concluded that through gradually raising the costs of resistance, a targeted adversary could be induced to concede. The crux of Schelling's conclusion rested on the approach he identified as a "risk strategy," whereby threatening the civilian population and presenting the prospect of

⁷ Moran, 40.

⁸ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 15.

⁹ Thomas Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960.

(mutual) terror, the actor could force his opponent to change its behavior for fear of further assault and damages.¹⁰

Alexander George further helped to develop the concept in *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy* in 1971 (later expanded with an investigation in 1991 aided by William Simons) and other works, reviewing a series of studies so as to draw lessons pertaining to the success and failure of coercive threats. Importantly, this work distinguished between defensive “coercive diplomacy” and offensive “military strategy,” asserting that coercive diplomacy involves the use of diplomatic means, reinforced by power instruments—with the purpose being to force an adversary to cease unacceptable activities.¹¹ From this work, important insights were found, including the conclusions that the relative strengths of parties’ motivations and the clarity and urgency of their objectives are critical determinants as to the success of coercive diplomacy.¹²

In other instances of classic works on strategic coercion, William Simons produced independent work that offered valuable insights on the ability to inflict costs while denying the adversary the capability to do so.¹³ Scholars such as Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and others meanwhile further explored Schelling’s rationality assumption and—finding it lacking—argued that “abstract rationality fails to provide an adequate description of how states actually behave.”¹⁴ And finally, David Baldwin provided the field with valuable contributions, as he explained the situational nature of power and the choices that often go into a strategy of coercion.¹⁵

¹⁰ Schelling, 69-91.

¹¹ Alexander George and William Simons. *The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1991, 7.

¹² George and Simons, 7.

¹³ Byman and Waxman, 2002, 16.

¹⁴ Richard Ned Lebow. “Conclusions.” Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (eds). *Psychology and Deterrence: Perspectives on Security*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1985, 204.

¹⁵ David Baldwin. “Power Analysis and World Politics.” *World Politics*, 31:2 (Jan. 1979) 161-194.

Research during the Viet Nam War on Applications of Strategic Coercion in the Context of Counter-Insurgency Strategy

Despite the focus on nuclear-deterrence-centric coercion throughout the Cold War, some research was undertaken to examine the applications of strategic coercion in the context of counter-insurgency strategy during the period of the Viet Nam war. Sir Robert Thompson wrote on the possibility of using force against the civilian population as a punishment against joining or supporting violent insurgent organizations, and as a means of compelling its cooperation with the governing authority. According to Thompson, such coercion could play a key role in deterring defection in the populace to the insurgency and the provision of support through linking a clearly understood set of threatened punishment.¹⁶

Meanwhile, some researchers were beginning to question the utility of more traditional “hearts and minds” approaches to countering an insurgency. In 1968, Edward Mitchell discovered through statistical analysis of South Viet Nam that there was little evidence to suggest that the appeal of the Viet Cong was impacted through material poverty, nor that it could be mitigated through rural development, land reform, education, official honesty and other forms of material benefits.¹⁷ Samuel Huntington took heed of this, writing in the “Bases of Accommodation,” that the answer to countering “wars of national liberation” might be to implement “forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power.”¹⁸ Through this, Huntington implied that coercive firepower that drove the masses to seek refuge and resettle in cities might be the solution to improving control and security over the population and eliminating support for the insurgency.

¹⁶ Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Studies in International Security: 10, New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966.

¹⁷ Edward J. Mitchell, “Inequality and Insurgency: A Statistical Study of South Vietnam,” *World Politics*, April 1968, 438.

¹⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, “The Bases of Accommodation,” *Foreign Affairs*, July 1968, 647.

Along the lines of these perspectives, research was undertaken by analysts at the RAND institute, who attempted to develop a coercive strategy for reducing popular support for insurgents within a broader framework of counter-insurgency. Charles Wolf began this research in 1965, contesting approaches that were overly concerned with mitigating social injustices and boosting economic development in order to win over “hearts and minds” and reduce popular support for substate insurgent groups.¹⁹ Wolf argued about the impracticality of such a strategy; for him the real concern was about reducing the availability of “inputs”²⁰ needed for the guerrilla group to carry out its insurgency, while curtailing the “outputs”—the violent manifestations of the insurgency—through blocking/destroying them and interfering with the conversion of inputs to outputs.²¹

In order to reduce inputs necessary to fuel the insurgency, Wolf recommended an approach—later referred to as cost/benefit or coercion theory—that entailed making recruitment and the provision of assistance to the insurgency from within the local populace less desirable in the decision-making calculus of “hypothetical men at the margin” through increasing the potential costs of lending such assistance, and providing a system of tangible inducements to the population and local security forces to encourage cooperation with the government against insurgents.²² Wolf also wrote about affecting the decision-making calculus of active members of the insurgency through amnesty and resettlement programs.²³ Further, when it came to issues of providing economic and social improvement programs, Wolf recommended targeting the

¹⁹ Charles Wolf, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: New Myths and Old Realities*, *Yale Review*, Vol. 56, December 1966, 234.

²⁰ Insurgency inputs are described as such things as recruits, information, shelter, food, cadres, materiel, funds, etc. Wolf, 10.

²¹ Wolf, 11.

²² Wolf, 15.

²³ Wolf 16.

implementation of such programs to assist strategic coercion through rewarding villages willing to cooperate with the government, particularly in areas susceptible to insurgent influence.²⁴

In Wolf's work with Nathan Leites in *Rebellion and Authority* (1970), his theory was refined, this time openly considering coercion against the *populace* to be an important component of counter-insurgency strategy. As Leites and Wolf remarked, "Unfortunately, the contest between R [the Rebellion] and A [the Authority] is often as much a contest in the effective management of coercion as a contest for the hearts and minds of the people."²⁵ In effectively carrying out such coercion to ensure the populace refrain from supporting the insurgent organization, Leites and Wolf recommended avoiding "damage-infliction on the population" from activities not part of a "conscious design" (i.e. excessive violence from security forces), while adhering to the following advice where punishment affecting the population would be required:²⁶

Effective coercion—"effective" in the sense of obtaining compliance from the population—depends on several specific complex elements: (a) the degree of understanding on the part of the population as to what is intended and why; (b) the appropriateness of the penalties; (c) the extent of their enforcement through time; (d) the extent to which innocents are spared; and (e) the degree of protection available *if* compliance is forthcoming, in the face of countercoercion by the other side.

Research assuming this perspective would run into heavy criticism both publicly and in the face of researchers from the hearts and minds school of counter-insurgency. Regarding criticism from researchers who contested their perspective, Daniel Ellsberg and Constantin Melnik in particular warned about the problem of government coercion and over reaction leading to an increase in support for the insurgency that—in a form of "revolutionary judo"—could be

²⁴ Wolf, 22-3.

²⁵ Charles Wolf, Jr., and Nathan Leites, *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, February 1970, 155.

²⁶ Wolf and Leites, 156.

turned against the state.²⁷ Melnik noted in particular that: “it is necessary to eliminate the negative feelings on which the insurgency is based. *However, the use of force and violence runs the risk of increasing these same negative feelings.*”²⁸

Following the ignominious end to the Viet Nam war, further research on strategic coercion in the asymmetric contexts of insurgency largely came to a halt. Literature dealing with strategic coercion would meanwhile resume an almost exclusive focus on either deterrence or more limited forms of coercion between states—the superpowers in particular—until the end of the Cold War.

End of the Cold War and the Contemporary Evolution of Strategic Coercion Theory

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, literature on coercion would undergo a metamorphosis. In the post-Cold War era, U.S. actions were no longer dominated or restrained by the prospect of a cataclysmic nuclear exchange, and consequently a number of dynamics that affected coercion underwent a shift, with focus moved from nuclear threats to active applications of coercive tools such as air power and economic sanctions.²⁹ Moreover, as the restraints of a bipolar world no longer apply, works on coercion also began to shift in their consideration of the *latent* to the *active* application of force.

This first became evident following the U.S.-led coalition’s success against Iraq in the *Gulf War*, whereby the heavy reliance on precision airpower against Iraqi assets moved Colonel John Warden to write on the active uses of airpower for the purpose of incapacitating enemy

²⁷ See: Daniel Ellsberg, *Revolutionary Judo: Working Notes from Viet Nam, No. 10*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1970; and Constantin Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1964.

²⁸ Melnik, 146 (emphasis within the original text).

²⁹ Byman and Waxman, 2002, 16.

leaders and paralyzing their capabilities to make war.³⁰ In his work, he argued that the entire state system could be targeted by airpower in a strategy aimed at *weakening* or *incapacitation*, and thus the destruction of the regime's power base could lead to its collapse.³¹

Shortly after Warden's publication, Robert Pape also produced a significant work in the field of strategic coercion concerned with the active application of force. In *Bombing to Win*, Pape argued (in contrast to Warden) that where coercive uses of airpower were concerned, *denial*—the tactic of targeting a state's military strategy to prevent it from obtaining its objectives—has been the only application of coercive airpower to prove effective.³² Moreover, Pape posited that coercion is most effective when it aims at the cost-benefit calculation that every actor makes in considering continued resistance. Thus, for a coercive strategy to be effective, the opposing side must consider the cost of surrendering to the demands of intervening states to be lower than the cost of resistance. Consequently, Pape argued that this outcome is only possible when the coercer withholds military success from the opponent, while offering a reward after demands have been met.³³

Research on Strategic Coercion Related to Substate Terrorist Organizations

While work on strategic coercion following the end of the Cold War may have come to consider more active applications of coercive force, the focus remained largely state-centric with considerations being limited to symmetric coercive exchanges. Even following the events of 9/11, much of the literature still reflects this—an unfortunate reality, considering that strategic coercion has come to be perhaps *the* dominant, and most developed branch of contemporary strategic theory. Accordingly, only a handful of authors have written any substantial work in

³⁰ John A. Warden III. "Employing Air Power in the Twenty-First Century." Richard Schultz, Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., (eds). *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*. Maxwell Airforce Base, AL: Air University Press, 1992, 57.

³¹ Warden.

³² Robert A. Pape. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 11.

³³ Pape, 1996, 17-18.

relation to the issue of using coercive means to affect the decision-making calculus of, and thereby counter, substate terrorist organizations. Fortunately, from the endeavors of these scholars and analysts, some nascent understanding has been developed regarding the process of state strategic coercion applied against substate terrorist organizations.

Regarding the process of engaging in strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations, it has been found that states do not usually move beyond conventional policing as a response to substate actors that pose a threat, until the non-state adversary has built a popular following sufficient for the purposes of disrupting normal administration and economic and social activity; or as Yezid Sayigh puts it, “[the substate adversary] has developed its base on a scale that both requires a strategic coercive effort and offers suitable targets for it.”³⁴ Thus, according to Sayigh, two specific criteria must be met before strategic coercion is relevant in the case of non-state actors. These criteria include that: 1) the non-state actor not only challenges state authority with its acts, but “ultimately seeks to exercise state power, whether by taking over an existing state, inducing significant structural changes to its political, legal, and administrative systems, or acquir[es] territory to establish a new state,”³⁵; and 2) that the non-state actor has moved beyond formulating claims and demands, to the point that it exercises actual control over “an appreciable number” of inhabitants and a corresponding geographical area of one sovereign state or another.”³⁶

Indeed, in 1998, both Stephen Cimbala and Syed Ali identified in separate works that substate terrorist organizations may pursue their own ends through strategic coercion against a state or states.³⁷ Robert Pape, in *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*,

³⁴ Yezid Sayigh, “A Non-State Actor as Coercer and Coerced: The PLO in Lebanon, 1969-1976.” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 214.

³⁵ Sayigh, 214.

³⁶ Sayigh.

³⁷ Stephen Cimbala, *Coercive Military Strategy*, College Station, TX, Texas A&M University Press, 1998, v; Syed Ali, “South Asia: The Perils of Covert Coercion,” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 249.

provided important insights into such strategic coercion employed by substate terrorist organizations, finding that “most [such] terrorism is undertaken as a strategic effort directed toward particular political goals; it is not simply the product of irrational individuals or an expression of fanatical hatreds.”³⁸ Regarding suicide terrorism in particular, Pape found that the main purpose is “to use the threat of punishment to compel a target government to change policy, and most especially to cause democratic states to withdraw forces from land the terrorists perceive as their national homeland.”³⁹

The Challenges of Attempting Strategic Coercion Against Substate Terrorist Organizations

According to the extant literature, many are the challenges of attempting strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations. In his book, *The Art of Military Coercion*, Rob de Wijk comments on the serious difficulties encountered by Western governments in attempting to coerce substate terrorist organizations and other asymmetric actors. Problematically, the asymmetric nature of substate terrorist organizations “create insurmountable problems for the [state] coercer,” making military victories at the hands of Western forces difficult to achieve.⁴⁰ As a result, *enforcement costs*⁴¹ are high in such undertakings, especially in light of the reality that operations against unconventional actors tend to be protracted by nature, demanding considerable time, lives and resources.

Work by Byman and Waxman, moreover, highlights the specific weaknesses that American forces possess when attempting strategic coercion against asymmetric and substate actors. In particular five exploitable factors can be used against the United States, which are: 1)

³⁸ Robert Pape. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House Trade, 2005, 27.

³⁹ Pape, 2005.

⁴⁰ Rob de Wijk, *The Art of Military Coercion: Why the West's Military Superiority Scarcely Matters*, Amsterdam: Mets & Schilt, 2005, 242.

⁴¹ “Enforcement costs”, according to Lawrence Freedman, are those costs “involved in overcoming the target’s resistance.” Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 30.

a preference for multilateralism⁴²; 2) an intolerance for US casualties; 3) an aversion to enemy civilian suffering; 4) a reliance on high-technology options; and 5) a commitment to international norms.⁴³ These factors, furthermore, give rise to a series of “countermoves” applied by asymmetric adversaries in neutralizing American coercive strategies.⁴⁴

In pursuing these countermoves against the democratic state, the substate terrorist organization becomes involved in its own strategy of *counter-coercion*. In doing so a substate terrorist organization will seek to raise enforcement costs to the democratic state, meanwhile clearly warning the coercing democratic state of painful reprisals to come, while insisting that anything that the state demands is non-negotiable.⁴⁵ In particular, the strategy of counter-coercion most likely to be employed will be what Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman call “denial plus unrest.”⁴⁶ Here the terrorist organization will seek to deny the resisting democratic state’s preferred path to victory, while eroding the public support for maintaining the campaign of strategic coercion. Regardless, it must be accepted that a determined substate terrorist organization will continue to increase enforcement costs, as well as imposing additional costs of its own, through counter-coercion waged at the democratic state. Moreover, if current terrorist and guerilla hostilities prove insufficient to counter-coerce the state, then the substate terrorist organization will likely adopt even more extreme measures over time—including mass-casualty suicide attacks.⁴⁷ Thus the potential for counter-coercion by a determined substate foe poses a formidable challenge as well.

Moreover, counter-coercion and high enforcement costs are not the only problems that states face in undertaking strategic coercion against substate threats. In case-study analysis of

⁴² For instance, even the “unilateralist” George W. Bush Administration still insisted upon constructing “Coalitions of the Willing” that were as large as possible in absence of UN-backing.

⁴³ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman. “Defeating US Coercion.” *Survival*, 41:2 (Summer 1999) 108.

⁴⁴ Byman and Waxman, 1999, 111.

⁴⁵ Freedman, 30.

⁴⁶ Byman and Waxman, 2002, 194.

⁴⁷ Robert Pape. *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. New York: Random House Trade, 2005, 93.

strategic coercion by India involving Sudhan rebels, tribal Pathan “Lashakrs”, the National Volunteer Defence Army (NVDA) of the Khampa and Amdoan guerrillas, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Syed Ali uncovered a troubling reality for would-be state coercers.⁴⁸ Ali found that the impact of strategic coercion was difficult to control in such a “complex setting” that often involved coercion and counter-coercion from state supporters as well as substate militant groups. The problematic result being that in the cases studied, Ali concluded that strategic coercion “led to a buildup of tensions that were only resolved, if temporarily, through more overt warfare.”⁴⁹ Thus, where significant state supporters exist that identify with the terrorist organization(s) in question, the democratic state runs the risk of embarking upon full-scale warfare triggered by tensions associated with its application of strategic coercion.

In *The Dynamics of Coercion*, Byman and Waxman also present the problems involved with attempting coercive strategies against substate actors. The first and most apparent problem for policy planners is that substate adversaries “often lack the types of assets that military planners are schooled in identifying and targeting,” as these actors “seldom possess munitions factories, electric grids, power plants, or other elements of a modern military-industrial infrastructure.”⁵⁰ Further, as substate actors do not control the state, “efforts to target national infrastructure may hold less promise of moving adversary decision than they might against a state.”⁵¹

Perhaps most problematically, substate terrorist organizations also pose the potential challenge of being unable to implement negotiated settlements; a fact that may prove a daunting challenge to resisting democratic states. This challenge is a reality, due largely to the substate

⁴⁸ Ali, 250.

⁴⁹ Ali, 250-251.

⁵⁰ Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, 2002, 190-1.

⁵¹ Byman and Waxman, 2002.

organization's structure, whereby leadership often exercises only limited control over its component parts. Thus, even if leadership decisions can be modified, changes to policy may not trickle down to those who carry it out.⁵² The situation will be even more difficult in cases where there are multiple substate terrorist organizations. Ultimately, this challenge may make it appear that any sustainable resolution is impossible when negotiated settlements and ceasefires consistently breakdown.

Moreover, the dispersed organization of substate terrorist organizations may also cause a problem for strategic coercion in another regard. This concerns pursuing a decapitation strategy, aimed at compelling a meaningful change in terrorist organization's behavior through the arrest or liquidation of the group's leading members. The problem is that lack of hierarchy, easy access to the internet to facilitate communication, and the emergence of a number of small groups with no organized links entails that attempts at decapitation may ultimately prove fruitless. As Stephen Cimbala wrote in *Coercive Military Strategy* on this matter, "Cutting off the head of the scorpion no longer renders its tail nonlethal."⁵³

Joseph Lepgold, writes of other challenges in pursuing strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations. According to Lepgold, utilizing denial tactics may be difficult, in that while passive forms of denial "may work for protecting key buildings and high-level officials, there is no way to deny terrorists access to open public spaces."⁵⁴ Further, active denial in the form of pre-emptive strikes is problematic as well, because substate terrorist organizations have few assets to lose, leave few traces, and often hide in cities so that it will be difficult to attack them without seriously alienating the local populations.

⁵² Byman and Waxman, 2002, 21.

⁵³ Cimbala, 150.

⁵⁴ Joseph Lepgold. "Hypotheses on Vulnerability: Are Terrorists and Drug Traffickers Coercible?" Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 140.

Finally, Lepgold laments that substate terrorist organizations are extremes cases of “asymmetric motivation”, whereby the “potential targets of coercion find the activities so attractive that it is very hard to deny or punish them enough to make them stop.”⁵⁵ This in itself is a tremendous problem, given that a key proposition in the literature is that success is likeliest when the coercer is more motivated than the target. Moreover, returning to the work of Byman and Waxman, this problem is compounded in that “the costs of acquiescence to an outside power’s demands can be prohibitively high.” As with any group that relies on resistance to attract new members, “concessions may destroy the group more effectively than the coercer could ever hope to do.”⁵⁶ Thus, while a terrorist organization’s motivations for resistance are exceptionally high, so too may their motivation be for giving in to coercion.

On Applying Strategic Coercion to Counter Substate Terrorist Organizations

While the outlook may appear grim for pursuing strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations, scholars and analysts have advanced a number of proposed applications and recommendations in effectively pursuing it. According to Joseph Lepgold, strategic coercion can be aimed against terrorist organizations via two different forcible responses. The first of such responses involves conducting a campaign designed to attack the terrorist organization’s infrastructure. This type of response would involve the disruption of lines of communication and supply, infiltrating terrorist’s cells to gather intelligence, and so on. The coercive objective would be to raise the costs to the terrorist organization enough so as to disable them. The second type of response, meanwhile, includes “protracted military interventions,” conducted with the intention of “wip[ing] out the terrorist’s infrastructure completely.”⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Lepgold, 149.

⁵⁶ Byman and Waxman, 2002, 64.

⁵⁷ Lepgold

However, Lepgold himself admits, “this is hard to accomplish without risking a protracted war of attrition”.⁵⁸

Additionally, Lepgold also advocates a third method. This method includes “retaliatory coercion” against a state that “is known to be involved in a pattern of terrorist activity,” in that “this gives victims a specific permanent ‘address’ at which to knock.”⁵⁹ The rationale for this is that, “states are vulnerable to coercion and inducements in ways that shadow trans-state terrorist groups are not,” since these states will have fixed assets that can be threatened, and need other states “to satisfy many of their security and economic needs.”⁶⁰

In his work, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*, meanwhile, Robert Pape argues that the key to denying irregular forces from achieving success in strategic coercion, is to separate them from the populations that form the basis of their support. This can be achieved, for instance, by relocating villages to more secure areas. Moreover, “when meaningful counter-concentration does not occur and when logistic requirements are miniscule,” Pape argues that “air power is most effectively used directly against guerrillas rather than against their combat support functions.”⁶¹

In other works, Wyn Bowen and Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva write about employing deterrence against terrorist organizations. In, “Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism,” Bowen, proposes utilizing punishment and denial as deterrents against hostilities from (mass-casualty-seeking) terrorist organizations. In the case of threatening punishment, Bowen states that, “the key question is whether there are suitable high-value targets that could be threatened to make radicals... weigh the relative merits of various courses of action.”⁶² Such targets could

⁵⁸ Lepgold, 141.

⁵⁹ Lepgold, 142.

⁶⁰ Lepgold, 142-3.

⁶¹ Pape, 79.

⁶² Wyn Bowen. “Deterring Mass-Casualty Terrorism.” Russel D. Howard and Reid L. Sawyer (eds). *Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment*. Guilford: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2002, 444.

include family, supporters and even symbolic targets of commensurate value vis-à-vis the targets attacked by the substate terrorist organization. However, such an approach would be difficult to pursue or legitimize by “democratically elected governments because of political, legal, and ethical constraints.”⁶³

Consequently, in the case of democracies, the more practical deterrent option available for use against terrorist organizations is *denial*. Here, the denial approach would center on demonstrating that “the capability exists to ward off—or to minimize damage in the event of—an attack, thus mitigating the desired effects of the terrorists.”⁶⁴ However this strategy is beset by the drawback that “detering an attack in one area can force a non-state enemy to change focus and strike at less protected areas with unpredictable and more heinous modes of attack.”⁶⁵

Speaking of deterrence that implements denial, or “deterrence by denial”, Trager and Dessislava elaborate that this would involve the “hardening” of targets “in the hope of making an attack on them too costly to be tried and convincing terrorists of the state’s determination not to make concessions in the face of terror tactics.”⁶⁶ Meanwhile, in discussing deterrence by punishment, Trager and Dessislava explain: “we take deterrence by punishment to refer to the threat of harming something the adversary values if it takes an undesired action. Such a threatened trigger of punishment might be a terrorist attack, but it might also be an action believed to be a precursor to an attack.”⁶⁷ While Trager and Dessislava note that some elements of terrorist organizations may be too extremely committed to deter, it is important to remember that terrorist organizations are not comprised of uniform members: there are leaders, lieutenants, financiers, logisticians, various facilitators, foot soldiers, supporting segments of the population,

⁶³ Bowen, 2002.

⁶⁴ Bowen, 2002.

⁶⁵ Bowen, 446.

⁶⁶ Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can be Done,” *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 3, Winter 2005/06, 91.

⁶⁷ Trager and Dessislava, 91.

religious and ideological figures—all of whom may vary in their susceptibility to coercion. As Trager and Dessislava observe, “Some elements of the terrorist system are more difficult to deter than others. Financiers, for example, are sometimes less fanatically motivated than other elements of the system and thus easier to deter.”⁶⁸

Moving on from advocated methods/applications of pursuing strategic coercion, several authors have also provided some important advice against substate terrorist organizations. Returning to Joseph Lepgold, he elucidates that a terrorist group’s size can have an effect on its coerceability that cuts two ways. Thus, in regards to smaller terrorist organizations, these may prove harder to find but easier to disable with a large blow once found. Similarly, while larger terrorist groups leave more traces, they are ultimately harder to coerce through physical assault.⁶⁹ Rob de Wijk, meanwhile, asserts that in fighting terrorist organizations, it is only “through the physical *control* of an area or *isolation* of the opponent that military objectives can be met.”⁷⁰ Moreover, de Wijk recommends that in order for Western forces to be successful in strategically coercing asymmetric actors such as terrorist organizations, “creativity and a flexible mind” are of the utmost importance.⁷¹

Finally, returning to Pape, he advises that in devising a strategy to counter substate terrorist organizations employing suicidal means, it is important to heed a number of caveats. First, a clear conception of victory must be developed, where it is imperative to understand that the enemy “is not ‘terrorism’ per se”, but rather a terrorist campaign or organization in particular. Secondly, offensive military action rarely works against terrorist organizations, in that while it can “disrupt a terrorist group’s operations temporarily, it rarely ends the threat.”⁷² Third, dealing out concessions in any strategy of coercive diplomacy must be “handled very carefully,” as

⁶⁸ Trager and Dessislava, 96.

⁶⁹ Lepgold, 147.

⁷⁰ De Wijk, 102.

⁷¹ De Wijk, 104-109.

⁷² Pape, 238.

concessions leading to “even [a] genuine resolution of the main dispute will not end terrorism immediately, since any concessions will almost always strengthen the terrorist leaders’ belief in their own coercive effectiveness.”⁷³ Finally, in any attempts to successfully coerce a terrorist organization, the objective of preventing the rise of a new generation of terrorists must be effectively pursued.⁷⁴

Limitations of Literature and the Need for More Research

Current research, while valuable, clearly possesses a substantial number of limitations and provides only a murky picture of the puzzle that is strategic coercion against terrorist organizations. This has been the result, perhaps, of a combination of two elements: 1) lack of studies dedicated to investigating the possibility of pursuing strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations; and 2) the general absence of any concerted effort to divine a strategy to employ when undertaking strategic coercion against such a threat. Moreover, as is apparent from a review of this literature, most of the extant work is overly pessimistic, placing disproportionate emphasis on the obstacles preventing states from successfully coercing substate terrorist adversaries, while often failing to account for how states have successfully coerced terrorist organizations in the past to end hostilities. This perspective is problematic, in that while it may reflect the political motivations of academics and analysts in earlier time-periods who were wary of recommending any strategy that might require costly, drawn-out commitments against substate actors that their governments had only limited interests in fighting, it does not reflect the exigencies of the post-9/11 world.

⁷³ Pape, 240.

⁷⁴ Pape, 247.

What This Dissertation Brings to the Table

It is thus the objective of this dissertation to address this deficiency in strategic coercion theory, so as to meet the exigencies of the contemporary era. As such, it marks a first effort at specifically utilizing—and adapting—strategic coercion theory for providing insights into countering the hostilities of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations. In doing so, it is the aim of this dissertation to establish a theoretical framework for guiding the strategy of states in resisting the violent hostilities of NSTOs. This theoretical framework is established through identifying the key elements of strategic coercion necessary for success against an NSTO (or NSTOs)—and prescribing guidance for their implementation.

In achieving this, this dissertation takes the unique initiative of identifying coercive elements based upon their importance in *manipulating the choice of the NSTO* (and its affiliated actors), in order to compel it to take a certain course of action (ceasefire, moderated objectives, disarmament, renunciation of violence, etc.). This importantly differs in two ways from prior efforts in strategic coercion against substate threats (namely conventional insurgencies) arising during the Viet Nam era, couched under COIN literature. In the first manner, such literature generally limited its considerations of coercion to manipulating the choice of potential supporters amongst the populace—the “hypothetical men at the margin”. In the second, these considerations of coercion were principally limited to threatening and/or employing punishment against the population in conjunction with targeted inducements (applying a “cost/benefit ratio”) to ensure compliance. Strategic coercion, however, is not such a simple (or barbaric) concept limited to threat of punishment against civilian populaces. Accordingly, this dissertation considers a much broader variety of coercive elements, and focuses to a large extent on how to coerce the substate (terrorist) threat itself.⁷⁵

⁷⁵ And as will be seen in the following chapters, punishment targeted against the civilian population is not one of them.

Furthermore, having constructed this new theory of strategic coercion and its hypotheses, this dissertation will test it over the course of 80-years of coercion within the context of two historic cases and multiple within-case episodes to establish a broad basis for assessing its validity. In accomplishing this, this dissertation provides an important effort in addressing the deficiencies noted above within the body of strategic coercion literature, while providing important insights for policy from a unique perspective in constructing a strategy against (nationalistic) substate terrorist organizations. Such a strategy employs all aspects of national power in order to effectively compel them to moderate their positions, take a desired course of action (or avoid an undesired one), and/or weaken them to the point where they lack the strength to continue hostilities and can be eliminated.

Chapter III:

Towards a New Theoretical Framework of Strategic Coercion:

The Balance Theory

The aim of this dissertation is to create a theoretical framework drawn from the lessons of strategic coercion literature, which informs democratic states as to the most effective elements of coercion to employ in manipulating the decision-making calculus of nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs) and ending the threat of hostilities posed by them. However, strategic coercion literature as it currently stands is unable to help construct such a theory. This chapter will thus seek to address this issue by both adapting valuable lessons in extant strategic coercion literature, and complimenting them, where additional insight is needed, with important contributions from other fields, namely counter-insurgency (COIN) literature. As mentioned previously, COIN literature has been selected due to: a) the strategic insights it possesses in dealing with substate organizations employing strategies of asymmetric violence; and b) the operational insights it offers, which are invaluable to understanding how strategic objectives elaborated can be pursued. Moreover, in the later, these insights are also very important for establishing an observable set of criteria for empirically measuring to what degree key strategic elements have been implemented.

In developing this new theory of strategic coercion—geared toward NSTOs—this chapter provides the following: 1) an elaboration of the most essential strategic elements used to construct this new theory; 2) an operational/procedural breakdown of how to implement the strategic elements discussed; 3) a clear assertion of the new theory comprised by these key elements; 4) an establishment of the hypotheses of the theory asserted; and 5) a review of the methodology to be employed in measuring the validity of this new theory and its hypotheses.

An Elaboration of the Key Coercive Elements in the Development of a New Theory

In developing this new theory of strategic coercion, it is first important to identify the elements most fundamentally important to prevailing in any campaign directed against NSTOs. It is the contention of this paper that several key elements exist. The first element is that of *denial*. Denial is a concept of strategic coercion concerned with preventing an adversary from attaining their goals, with the objective of creating a form of hopelessness by demonstrating to the adversary the futility of their efforts.¹ As Glenn Snyder elaborates, denial is the ability to deter an adversary through targeting “his estimate of the probability of gaining his objective.”² The end result is a cessation of the adversary’s violent campaign through convincing them that their undesired course of behavior will not yield the results anticipated.

For many years, denial has been recognized for its fundamental value in strategic coercion. Comparing the advantages of denial with that of punishment for the purposes of deterrence, Snyder noted that “A threat of denial action will seem more credible on two counts: it is less costly for the deterrer and it may be effective in frustrating the aggressor’s aims, or at least in reducing his gains. A denial response is more likely than reprisal action to promise a rational means of *defense* in case deterrence fails; this consideration supports its credibility as a deterrent.”³ In *Bombing to Win*, Robert Pape thoroughly investigated the value of denial—especially in active compellance aimed at stopping an opponent from ceasing and/or undoing a course of undesired, violent action. Through empirical research, Pape found that when denial is

¹ David Johnson, Karl Mueller and William Taft V, *Conventional Coercion Across the Spectrum of Conventional Operations: The Utility of U.S. Military Forces in the Emerging Security Environment*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002, 17.

² Glenn H. Snyder, *Deterrence and Defence: Toward a Theory of National Security*, West Port, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1961, 14-15.

³ Snyder, 15.

successfully implemented, chances are very high that the opponent will be successfully compelled to halt its undesired course of action.⁴

This dissertation accepts the premise that denial is a key element in strategic coercion. However, while denial is generally preoccupied with preventing battlefield successes and the seizure of territory when applied in the conventional sense between states, its essence changes somewhat in considerations tied to substate terrorist actors. Here denial is concerned with preventing the NSTO from successfully conducting acts of violence against the state's interests, or compelling change through doing so. The objective is to convey to the substate group's supporters and leadership that acts of terrorism will not yield the desired outcomes, nor compel the state to enact the political changes desired.

Implementing denial against substate groups—in this case NSTOs—however, is not as straightforward as in conventional state-to-state cases. Substate terrorist organizations do not tend to field large military formations or combat support functions/industry, nor offer as clear cut strategic targets for implementing denial operations. This issue is made considerably more problematic in light of the elusive nature of these groups, which can hide amongst population centers, or foreign sanctuaries while receiving the support necessary to continue to strike. As such, efforts at denial must be accompanied by another key strategic element—that of *isolation*.

As mentioned in earlier chapters, strategic coercion is about affecting an adversary's *choice*.⁵ In that sense, denial is concerned with creating a sense of “hopeless”⁶ through demonstrating the futility of pursuing continued (violent/terrorist) efforts. In complimenting the efforts of denial to convey a sense of hopelessness, isolation aims to convey a sense of *despair* through manipulating the NSTO's perception of *existential vulnerability*. Its purpose is to

⁴ See: Robert A. Pape. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996.

⁵ Lawrence Freedman, “Strategic Coercion,” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 15.

⁶ Johnson, Mueller and Taft, 17.

demonstrate to the NSTO that it can indeed be targeted and eliminated (i.e. fatally held accountable), and will not be able to survive without the protection afforded to it by safe havens, willing populaces, and the material strength granted to it from external sources.

Isolation thus involves removing the NSTO from its sources of support, and can be broken down into two categories: 1) Isolation of external and international support; and 2) Isolation of popular support. In the case of external/international support, no shortage of policy space can be noted in those expounding on the necessity of implementing this facet of strategy. Indeed, the Administration of George W. Bush in its “Global War on Terror” clearly specified for years the need to crack down on states providing sanctuary and succor to substate groups. Isolation of external and international support is essential in order to limit or remove the tangible and political support, as well as the provisions of foreign sanctuaries to substate terrorist organizations that make them more difficult to coerce, while enabling them to conduct their campaign(s) of violence.

However external and international support is not the only source of support requiring isolation. Isolation of popular support must also be enacted, which is critical to “draining the sea” (in Mao’s parlance) in which terrorist insurgent fish swim.⁷ While discussions of the importance of isolation of popular support are comparatively limited in the body of existing strategic coercion literature, the importance for conducting popular isolation can be found within works dedicated to the field of counter-insurgency (COIN). The perspective of the importance of popular support within COIN literature can perhaps be traced to T.E. Lawrence’s observation that “Rebellion [or insurgency] must have a population, not actively friendly, but *sympathetic* to

⁷ See: Mao Tse Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, Translated by Samuel Griffith, Chicago, IL: First Illinois Paperback, 2000.

the point of not betraying a rebel movement to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by two percent active in a striking force, and 98 percent passively sympathetic...”⁸

This passively sympathetic population is perhaps most valuable to insurgents, in that it provides a “wall of silence” behind which the substate group can hide. However, the important support that a sympathetic population can provide is not limited to this—it can also provide moral and political support, as well as very tangible support such as manpower, materials, safe houses, logistical needs, etc. It is therefore of the utmost importance to isolate these substate organizations from their sources of popular support. Once this support has been cut off, these insurgent groups will, according to John Nagl, “wither on the vine or [be] easily coerced to surrender or destroyed by the security forces with the aid of the local populace.”⁹ Indeed, as David Galula clearly asserts, a victory emerges following the “permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”¹⁰

This dissertation accepts this perspective espoused in COIN theory on the necessity of isolating the substate insurgent organization from its base of popular support.¹¹ Isolation of popular support importantly serves to sap the NSTO of its support, protection, personnel and resources drawn from a complicit populace, thereby diminishing the capacity of the terrorist organization to conduct operations, and forcing it out into the open for targeting by the democratic state—all of which serves to enhance the sense of existential vulnerability felt by the NSTO. In contrast, however, to early works on investigating strategic coercion towards this end during the Viet Nam era, this dissertation takes the position that the most effective approach

⁸ T. E. Lawrence, *Evolution of a Revolt; Early Post-War Writings of T. E. Lawrence*, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968, 119.

⁹ John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002, 28.

¹⁰ Galula, David. *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (PSI Classics of Counterinsurgency Era Edition), New York: Praeger Security International, 2006, 54.

¹¹ In COIN literature, this fundamentally important perspective is generally referred to as “Hearts and Minds” theory—a term coined by Sir Gerald Templer during the Malayan Emergency.

to isolating popular support does include coercing the populace to ensure its compliance—but rather through a “hearts and minds” approach aimed at winning the support of populations championed by the terrorist organization, or at a minimum, persuading it to embrace non-violent options. The reason is that this dissertation contends that the most effective way to isolate popular support is through winning over the populace and addressing their grievances (rather than through coercing their compliance).¹² Furthermore, as elaborated by Melnik and Ellsberg (mentioned earlier), use of coercion also runs the direct risk of actually generating support within the populace for the insurgent organization.¹³

Isolation of popular support is also fundamentally important for another reason—one that would likely be adversely affected from an approach that targeted the populace with punishment. This reason is concerned with effectively manipulating the NSTO’s considerations of *measured political expediency* in its course of actions. As it is assumed in this dissertation that *nationalistic* substate terrorist organizations depend (to at least some significant degree) on a specific population (or populations) for support—seeking to present themselves as “champions” of the people’s cause—then NSTOs will be concerned with maintaining the support of these people. The aim of isolation of popular support is thus meant to convey to the NSTO that at the very least, the granting of concessions and renunciation of violence will be accepted by the people they claim to represent (and receive support from)—if not, in the best case scenario, met favorably by/be demanded by these people. In lieu of such isolation of popular support, with populace(s) championed crying out for violence and revenge, it is unlikely that the NSTO will be willing to favorably comply with efforts at strategic coercion by the democratic state, as such compliance may entail an existential catastrophe for the NSTO.

¹² For a good study on this, see: Michael Findley and Joseph Young, “Fighting Fire with Fire? How (Not) to Neutralize and Insurgency,” *Civil Wars*, 9:4, December 2007, 378-401.

¹³ See: Daniel Ellsberg, *Revolutionary Judo: Working Notes from Viet Nam, No. 10*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1970; and Constantin Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1964.

Moreover, isolation of popular support also contributes to efforts at denial, in that without it an NSTO with substantial popular support will be both harder to target and stronger in its military capacity through the provision of recruits, intelligence, funding and possible weaponry. Isolating popular support also contributes to efforts at isolation of external/international support, in that foreign adversarial nations will be more forthcoming in their provision of external support upon witnessing what they perceive to be the dire plight of co-religionists, co-ethnic/national groupings, etc. Furthermore, should negotiations through coercive diplomacy be necessary to bring the conflict to an end, then isolation of popular support will prove vital in developing and sustaining a willingness on the part of the NSTO to move forward towards negotiated progress.

Identifying the Three Key Elements

Given the above breakdown, three key elements are made clear for strategic coercion targeted against an NSTO. The first element, intended to instill a sense of hopelessness through demonstrating the futility of its violent efforts is *denial*. The second and third elements, in turn both include forms of isolation. They are isolation of external support and isolation of popular support. Both lend to enhancing the existential vulnerability felt on the part of the substate terrorist organization. Furthermore, isolation of popular support also helps to affect the NSTO's considerations of measured political expediency. Taken together, it is the contention of this dissertation that these three elements are vitally important to conducting a successful campaign of strategic coercion against any NSTO. Prior to specifically elaborating upon why and how these elements are so critically important to success in strategic coercion, however, it is first important to elaborate on what implementing these three elements entails.

An Operational/Procedural Breakdown of How to Implement the Key Strategic Elements

Having identified the key strategic elements to comprise this new theory of strategic coercion as isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support, it is now important to provide an operational/procedural breakdown of how these elements can be implemented against NSTOs. The reason for this is two-fold. First, it provides guidance for better understanding how these strategic elements can be pursued and enacted. And second, it helps to establish a set of observable indicators that can be evaluated through empirical assessment.

Isolation of External and International Support

The more external and international support enjoyed by the substate terrorist organization, the more difficult it will be to strategically coerce. Such support may manifest itself in a variety of forms, be it moral, political¹⁴, technical¹⁵, financial¹⁶, and/or military¹⁷ in nature.¹⁸ It is thus a top priority for the democratic state in executing strategic coercion to isolate the NSTO from as much external/international support as possible. In attempting to achieve this objective, the democratic state can employ a number of coercive means.

¹⁴ In this instance pressure may be applied directly upon the democratic state from an external actor, or indirectly by diplomatic action in an international forum.

¹⁵ This may include the provision of advice in regards to its movement, organization, and/or the conduct of political and military operations.

¹⁶ Both overt and covert.

¹⁷ This may take place through either direct intervention by the external actor on the substate terrorist organization's behalf, or by providing training facilities and equipment to the insurgent actor.

¹⁸ Galula, 25-6.

The first of these involves applying coercive diplomacy, aimed at the state or states providing passive or active support¹⁹ to the substate terrorist organization, through using either the mechanisms of international law and organizations, or pursuing unilateral punitive action. In the former case of coercive diplomacy, the primary lever that is applied is that of sanctions enacted in a broadly multilateral effort, organized under the auspices of a major regional or international organization. Such sanctions, moreover, can be economic, military, or diplomatic, and may be threatened in conjunction with inducements.

Unilateral punitive measures may also be applied to compel an end to the external sponsor's support. When engaged in this effort, the resisting democratic state may take, in particular, a number of coercive actions. These include: 1) levying wide spanning sanctions on a second state for either financially supporting a terrorist organization, or for being uncooperative with that state's counter-terrorist efforts; 2) sanctioning third countries or companies associated with them that support terrorist organizations or state sponsors; 3) promise the lifting of already existing sanctions as an incentive for compliance; 4) offering economic incentives, such as trade preference, loans, direct financial assistance, or otherwise, in order to entice the targeted state to cooperate; and/or 5) making a strong legitimacy appeal that stresses the coercing state's security concerns (and implicitly conveys how likely the coercing state is to act should these not be addressed).

Finally, whether pursued through multilateral or unilateral means, coercive diplomacy is not the only way through which a state may attempt to end external state support. Military coercion also presents another possible option. In this instance, a state may apply military force on a massive scale, often called an "intervention", against the external supporter of the substate terrorist organization. In addition to simply eliminating terrorists and their training camps

¹⁹ Such support can include harboring the terrorist organization, providing it arms, finance, training and intelligence, directly assisting it in carrying out militant attacks, turning a blind eye to crossing its border into the democratic states territory, etc.

through brute force, military coercion employed in this manner will have the goal of either compelling the state to cease its support for the terrorist organization and/or properly securing its lands and borders, or removing the regime in power through decapitation, with the aim of installing a more amicable government which is willing to crack down on terrorists.

Military coercion, however, can be much more costly than coercive diplomacy. One reason for this is that the operation may require tremendous amounts of time, effort and expenditures impossible for the democratic state to give and sustain under intense counter-coercion from the terrorist organization and opposing state, as well as international and regional pressures to withdraw. Another is that in the circumstances of attempting to replace the existing regime with a more favorable one, the democratic state may become indefinitely bogged down in nation-building efforts in order to ensure the success of the new government and the prevention of the return to power of the old one. Finally, the intervention may simply cause the state's collapse, if it is fragile and weak, resulting—in the long run—in a situation that is even more chaotic and supportive for the activities of the opposing terrorist organization. This option of military coercion, then, should only be pursued in the most extreme of circumstances, where no other alternatives exist.

Denial

In the substate context, denial is concerned with preventing the adversary's *capacity* to achieve political and military objectives. Denial against NSTOs thus serves the purpose of reining in a terrorist organizations' capacity for violence and its ability to unleash terror amongst a targeted audience or audiences. Effectively implementing denial is fundamentally important for bringing violence down to more "acceptable" levels. Moreover, denial may manifest itself in a number of forms during strategic coercion against an NSTO. Most actively, denial may

transpire as direct military coercion that interdicts a planned attack, or launches a variety of operations against the members of the terrorist organization and its support structures. It may also take on a more passive role, referred to by Trager and Zagorcheva as “deterrence by denial,”²⁰ that targets the substate adversary’s estimate of the probability of achieving his objectives.²¹ In considering deterrence by denial against terrorist organizations, Trager and Zagorcheva advise “hardening” targets—i.e. fortifying embassies, placing air marshals on flights, upgrading border security, etc.—“in the hope of making an attack on them too costly to be tried and convincing terrorists of the state’s determination not to make concessions in the face of terror tactics.”²²

In addition to “hardening” specific key targets, deterrence by denial may also entail other options. Most benignly, this may include enhancing post-attack crisis management capabilities to minimize damage when attacks do successfully occur. More controversially, it also may entail the construction of separation walls. As Joseph Lepgold remarks, terrorist insurgents “must be physically kept from achieving their goals or... reaping symbolic gains from their actions.”²³ The erection of separation barriers can be key in working toward preventing NSTO access to targets. Such barriers, moreover, may also involve physically separating members of the NSTO from vulnerable populations and target areas, possibly through demographic separation²⁴, or in worst-case scenarios, the resettlement of populations into safer areas.

In addition to deterrence by denial, several more active forms of denial are available for the democratic state to implement. These include:

²⁰ Robert Trager and Dessislava Zagorcheva, “Deterring Terrorism: It Can be Done,” *International Security*, vol. 30, no. 3, Winter 2005/06, 90.

²¹ Snyder, 14-15.

²² Trager and Dessislava, 91.

²³ Joseph Lepgold, “Hypotheses on Vulnerability: Are Terrorists and Drug Traffickers Coercible?” Lawrence Freedman (ed.) *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, 144.

²⁴ Pape, 240.

Denial of the Ability to Operate

A fundamental prerequisite to denying an NSTO from achieving political and military objectives rests in denying it the ability to freely and effectively operate. In order to achieve this end, the democratic state must strive to deny the substate terrorist organization the capacity to conduct basic, fundamental activities such as planning, training, recruitment, travel and communication. This is accomplished through a variety of means, including: infiltration into the ranks of the substate terrorist organization; proactively gathering intelligence and using it to thwart operations; capturing, killing and/or arresting terrorists and their associates; the occupation and clearing of hostile areas controlled by the NSTO; creation of checkpoints to restrict movement; expansion of powers by the democratic state government for search and seizure; sending out regular patrols of cities, towns, villages, hamlets, roads, bridges, power sources and the countryside; and—where the state controls territory upon which the NSTO operates—possibly establishing a line of defended localities, with the intention of denying the opposing forces terrain in which to operate.²⁵

Denial of the Ability to Evade State Security Forces

Another key objective of military coercion applied against the NSTO is that of denying it the ability to evade democratic state security forces once an attack has been launched. In order for the democratic state to accomplish such an interdiction capacity, the possession of lightly armed forces capable of high mobility and transport via airlift is of critical importance. The democratic state's forces should be able to move quickly, capable of keeping up with and eliminating terrorist insurgents on their own terrain. In their efforts, moreover, they should be

²⁵ U.S. Marine Corps. *Small Wars Manual* (Reprint of 1940 edition), Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1987, Chapter V. Initial Operations, Methods of Pacification, 17-19.

assisted with air power (especially helicopters), capable of moving their troops, equipment and supplies, as well as performing intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions.²⁶

Denial of Vital Resources

The final form of denial is that aimed at denying the NSTO of vital resources—namely armaments, explosive devices and the funds necessary to procure them. Here the resisting democratic state's forces ought to pursue a number of ends. The first of these involves seizing possible armaments and preventing further ones from coming into the country/area of operations. This will eliminate a major source of weapons and ammunition within the country/region.²⁷ It will also serve to restore tranquility for the local inhabitants themselves by decreasing the number of firearms present in the conflict zone.

Secondly, the resisting democratic state must strive to cut off cash flows into the country. This can include freezing bank accounts, cracking down on “hawala” networks, restricting the terrorist organization's capacity to transfer and access finances, ending illegal narcotics operations, etc. in order to deprive the NSTO of vital resources needed to conduct its hostilities. Finally, the resisting democratic state must move to interdict the movement of foreign arms and men across porous borders—be this through frequent patrols or the construction of walls/border detection systems. Such action will be key to preventing external fighters and supplies from pouring into the country and replenishing the NSTO's capability for hostile action.

Isolation of Popular Support:

Isolation of popular support is of essential importance in removing key material, personnel and political support for the NSTO, as well as driving it out into the open for targeting.

²⁶ U.S. Army and Marine Corps. *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2007, 363.

²⁷ U.S. Marine Corps, Chapter XI, Disarmament of Population: General, 1-3.

In order to provide for this isolation of popular support, the state must implement and observe the following measures:

Successfully Conveying the Democratic State's Own Narrative:

In attempting to isolate an NSTO from its sources of popular support, one of the most important measures is to effectively communicate the state's position or narrative in the conflict. It is important that the state demonstrate its position in the conflict as benign and legitimate, refuting any attempts at demonization pursued by the NSTO to turn the populace against the state. In attempting to do so, the promulgation of what is referred to in COIN literature as the *single narrative* is of fundamental importance. The single narrative is a simple, unifying, easily expressed story/explanation that organizes people's experiences and provides a framework for understanding events.²⁸ It is also a vital way for the resisting democratic state to frame a counter-cause to that promulgated by the NSTO. As Paul Wilkinson once remarked, "Against groups which enjoy at least some degree of mass support, democratic governments need to wage simultaneously both a security campaign to contain and reduce terrorist violence and a political and information campaign to secure popular consent and support and to sustain it."²⁹

This end can be achieved through exploiting a well-constructed single narrative, passed through cooperative opinion makers in order to undercut the terrorist insurgent's attempts to co-opt the populace. However, in order for the government to successfully promulgate such a single narrative and win the populace over, three additional measures must be ensured. These are: avoidance of excessive violence; addressing existing grievances; and—if applicable given the circumstances—providing for the security of the population.

²⁸ U.S. Army and Marine Corps, 298.

²⁹ Paul Wilkinson. *Terrorism versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response*. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, 230.

Avoidance of Excessive Violence:

In employing a single narrative, the first and perhaps most important concept that must be adhered is the avoidance of excessive violence. As Austin Long points out, the problem is that “repressive measures taken by the government in response to insurgency can actually stimulate insurgent activity.”³⁰ Such actions raise the ire of the population, create new sources of grievances, and work to drive the population into the hands of NSTOs, thereby completely undermining any attempts to win them over. Constantin Melnik classically described this problematic situation as one where the state’s use of force in counter-insurgency operations can be turned against it: “[T]he counterinsurgent resembles an old boxer, huge but awkward, who becomes the toy of a small and youthful judo artist. His hammer blows miss their mark or if they do not, his smaller adversary turns their force against him.”³¹ Indeed, Daniel Ellsberg specifically warned of this strategy—noting that: “many insurgent forces have thus relied vitally upon [such] a strategy that can be called ‘revolutionary judo’ in which ... a stronger opponent’s ... own strength and momentum are used to unbalance and overthrow him.”³²

In avoiding excessive violence, the principle of minimum use of force must be strongly adhered to, and paired with equally appropriate rule of engagement. It also entails establishing government oversight to constantly monitor military actions taken during operations, and redressing any immediate grievances that result during operations against the insurgent group.³³ Finally, avoidance of excessive violence also entails restraint from employing collective

³⁰ Austin Long, *On “Other War”: Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006, 27.

³¹ Constantin Melnik, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1964, 136.

³² Daniel Ellsberg, *Revolutionary Judo: Working Notes from Viet Nam, No. 10*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, January 1970, 1.

³³ U.S. Army and Marine Corps, 276-77.

punishment, which may under gird the substate terrorist organizations and its cause amongst the population.

Redressing Grievances:

Of utmost importance in convincing the populace that the state is not the villain it has been portrayed as, it is the task of the state to address the root causes driving the population away from it. This involves redressing social, political and economic grievances that fuel rage and upset within the population, compelling many to either actively or passively support the NSTO.³⁴ It also means preventing new grievance from emerging that may serve to create terrorism triggers, such as salient political events or crimes used to rally people to the violent cause of the terrorist organization.

As Thomas Schelling noted, “insurgency warfare typically involves two actively opposed sides—the authorities and the insurgents—and a third group, a large population subject to coercion and cajolery.”³⁵ To win this third group and isolate it from the substate terrorist organization that is being fought against, it is imperative to redress salient grievances while preventing the emergence of new ones. A fundamental component necessary for ensuring this involves the state demonstrating the ability to legitimately govern and provide law and order (whether during a temporary occupation, or if the land contested by the NSTO resides within the state’s pre-existing territory). As Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. stated, “Demonstrating competence and acquiring a reputation for effective action constitute A [the Authority’s] political tasks.”³⁶ If A is unable to effectively do so and democratic revision of the situation is in question, then this holds the potential to erupt as a major popular grievance.

³⁴ U.S. Army and Marine Corps, 41.

³⁵ Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, Westport (Connecticut): Greenwood Press, 1967, 200.

³⁶ Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, February 1970, 73.

Providing Security

Under circumstances where the NSTO in question resides within the resisting democratic state's own territory—or the territory of a friendly government that it is intervening to assist—then the state must strive early on to provide physical and psychological security to the population. Providing security to the population under these circumstances is key to compelling the population to give up (coerced) support for the substate terrorist organization, through convincing them that the resisting democratic state will keep them safe and prevent further coercion against them by the NSTO.³⁷ Should this not be done, the end result is that the terrorist organization will step in to fill the power vacuum left in the wake of the absence of the state's authority, and people—in the interests of their own survival—will inevitably come to at least passively side with their new (terrorist) caretakers.

According to counter-insurgency theory, the democratic state can prevent this from transpiring (or undo it once it has) through asserting its authority over and protecting the population. This objective is best achieved through *clear-hold-build* operations. These operations are executed by clearing a city, town, village, or region of active insurgent members of the NSTO, establishing a semi-permanent presence there (until the indigenous population is strong enough to assume this task itself), and developing infrastructure and self-maintained security mechanisms, so that the population is rid of the terrorist insurgent fish attempting to swim in it.³⁸ As Sir Robert Thompson notes, the intention is to “restore government authority and win the people to the sides of the government.”³⁹

³⁷ Leites and Wolf, 154.

³⁸ U.S. Army and Marine Corps, 174.

³⁹ Sir Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*. Studies in International Security: 10, New York: Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966, 106.

In conducting clear-hold-build operations, it is also fundamentally important to have a sufficient number of “boots on the ground” in proportion to the population in order to provide the necessary security. According to the research of James Quinlivan examining a series of stabilization operations, success was only found in instances with a minimum number of 10 members of the security forces (military and police forces) to every 1,000 members of the population.⁴⁰ Quinlivan also found that in successful British counterinsurgency operations such as the Malayan Emergency, a force ratio of approximately 20 members of the security forces to every 1,000 members of the population, or a ratio of 1 to 50, was present.⁴¹

It must also be noted that in deploying security forces to protect the population, these troops and police must be stationed “where the population actually lives and not on positions deemed to possess a military value.”⁴² To this end, the primary function of counterinsurgency forces is a police—not a military role. Once police patrolling can provide security to local communities, only then will support for the resisting democratic state begin to be built. Critically, it is only at this point that the people will begin to have enough trust for government security forces, having daily contact with them, that they will begin to provide the valuable intelligence required for hunting down and eliminating members of the NSTO.⁴³

The Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion

Having discussed what this dissertation contends to be the three key elements of strategic coercion for implementation against NSTOs, and their procedural/operational breakdowns, the *Balance Theory* can now be established. The Balance Theory assumes a mutual interdependence between the three key elements: isolation of external and international support, denial and

⁴⁰ James T. Quinlivan, “Force Requirements in Stability Operations,” *Parameters*, Winter 1995, 63.

⁴¹ Quinlivan.

⁴² Galula, 78.

⁴³ U.S. Army and Marine Corps, 231.

isolation of popular support. In order for the NSTO to be made susceptible to strategic coercion, isolation of external/international support is a fundamentally important component: the NSTO's ability to find sanctuary and launch assaults from the territory of other states must be purged, and its ability to collect material and political support must be reduced if not eliminated. If this is not achieved, denial efforts will suffer—passive denial efforts will be undermined by an adversary that can strike at will, and the efficacy of more active forms of denial targeted at reducing the NSTO's ability to operate, gather vital resources, and evade the democratic state's forces will be critically diminished.

Preferably with external/international support reduced—especially in terms of the availability of foreign sanctuary and the ability to infiltrate and assault from external states—it is a primary objective of the democratic state to implement denial operations. The aim of this to provide a secure environment, whereby the state looks to: 1) demonstrate to the NSTO and its supporters that violence will not produce the outcome(s) they desire; and 2) contain the spread of terror so that cooler heads and policies may prevail—especially if negotiations are required to reach a political settlement. Simultaneously, the state must also implement isolation of popular support and work to co-opt any susceptible populaces in the cause of peace. This condition must be obtained so as to weaken the NSTO's capacity to carryout acts of violence, while making it vulnerable to other elements of strategic coercion.

Accordingly, the Balance Theory contends that effective isolation of external/international support is necessary to facilitate denial operations. Denial, in turn, is required to create the secure environment necessary for protecting the state's populace and interests, while demonstrating to the NSTO and its supporting elements that grievances and unrealistic demands cannot be addressed by violent, non-democratic or undiplomatic means. Denial is also required to help enable efforts at isolation of popular support. As noted earlier, a

populace susceptible to force and the threat of it by substate insurgents is unlikely to willingly proffer its cooperation to the state. Moreover, even if the implementation of violence may be perceived as repugnant by large swaths of the population, it is likely that they may sublimate their impulse to reject it should it prove highly effective and likely to attain the political outcome desired by the affected communities.

Conversely, attempts at isolation of popular support will make NSTOs more susceptible to denial efforts, through removing passive and active support that NSTOs require to function—while hopefully opening up greater sources of intelligence that the state can employ in denial operations. Further, no matter how effective the denial operations, without significant gains in isolation of popular support, the democratic state is unlikely to enjoy anything more than a stalemate against the NSTO—that is a situation where violence continues indefinitely, albeit at reduced levels between both sides in absence of any meaningful political resolution. The reason is that in lieu of such successful isolation, the will, drive and support for the terrorist organization will remain fueled by an angry population bent on seeing a political change in the status quo enacted by what they may consider to be the only effective recourse available: violence.

Thus in line with the Balance Theory of strategic coercion's name, each of these three key elements must be pursued together in a *balanced* fashion. Each element must be pursued simultaneously, as each element helps to complement the other. But importantly, care must be taken not to sacrifice the success of one of these elements for success in another. For example, a denial-centric strategy that does not adequately isolate external/international support will likely find its efforts consistently undermined through access to sanctuary, material aid and other forms of assistance that negate the state's constraint of the NSTO's ability to strike and operate. Further, overly zealous efforts at denial may produce excessive violence and new grievances, the

result being to undermine efforts to isolate popular support for the NSTO—if not stimulate renewed support all together.

Alternatively, seeking to implement isolation of popular support cannot sacrifice denial and external isolation efforts. For instance, a democratic state may find it tempting to focus its efforts almost entirely on winning over susceptible populaces through addressing “root causes” of support for terrorist violence and inducement-based diplomacy against state sponsors, meanwhile eschewing or only reluctantly engaging in security-centric external isolation and denial operations. However, if terrorist violence is not reined in through external isolation and denial operations, softer popular isolation efforts may be for naught as an NSTO given free sway will increasingly enlarge its scope of violence, while coercing the support it needs from the populace in absence of the implementation of law and order. Under such circumstances, the result is likely to be an outbreak of increasingly violent terrorist attacks that cause the situation to spiral out of control. Accordingly, each element of strategic coercion is of vital importance, and the effective implementation of the three elements is the *sine qua non* for success—being the renunciation of violence, the disbandment of the NSTO, and/or the forging of an equitable treaty that provides an acceptable end-state, and end of the conflict, for all parties.

Finally, in achieving an enduring end to hostilities—that is a high level of success in efforts at strategic coercion—the Balance Theory recognizes that negotiations may be required, particularly when the NSTO is well-established and heavily supported. In conducting these negotiations and providing for their implementation, it is imperative that the state continues its balanced approach to maintaining effective isolation of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support. Should the state fail to do so, it is unlikely that these negotiations will yield any results of benefit. Without effective denial—aided by isolation of external support—it is unlikely that the NSTO(s) will be convinced that non-violent means are the most

effective way to get the best deal possible or achieve the changes they desire. Without effective isolation of support from the populace meanwhile, the NSTO will likely find it neither prudent nor expedient to negotiate concessions while it still enjoys a large degree of popular support for continuing its armed campaign. The NSTO may even consider concessions at this point anathema, as they could be seen as amounting to defeat—thereby prompting its supporters to abandon it. Moreover, even if a settlement is negotiated under conditions for which there is still substantial support for a campaign of violence, then rival NSTOs or splinter groups looking to draw from this support are likely to emerge. Consequently, for negotiations to be successful, the conditions must be established whereby the NSTO's position of strength for making gains through violent attacks must be eliminated along with any substantial popular support that it enjoys for pursuing its armed campaign.

Achieving Success in Strategic Coercion against an NSTO: Hypotheses of the Balance Theory

The Balance Theory posits the following. Three key elements are required to successfully compel an enduring end to hostilities from the NSTO: 1) isolation of external support; 2) denial; and 3) isolation of popular support. An overall significant to high level of success in implementing these elements will result in the success of strategic coercion against the NSTO (or NSTOs). From the perspective of strategic coercion—dealing specifically with affecting the *choice* of the adversary—the reason is that the presence of all three elements will help compel an enduring end to the NSTO's campaign of terror and a renunciation of violence through demonstrating the futility of such efforts, conveying a sense of despair through instilling a sense of existential vulnerability (particularly amongst the NSTO's leadership and supporting elements), and demonstrating the political expediency of ceasefire and pursuing/accepting a non-violent settlement.

Conversely, an overall level of failure or worse (backfire) in implementing the three key elements will result in a similar outcome of failure for strategic coercion efforts. Here, the NSTO will not only be tangibly strengthened, but also inevitably encouraged, convinced of the effectiveness of its methods, invincibility of its position, and backing from the communities it claims to champion—either through their active call to violent “resistance” or their passive acquiescence. Accordingly, the democratic state must diligently work to prevent such broad failure in these elements of strategic coercion, lest the situation violently spin out of control and lead to the state’s eventual defeat.

Furthermore, each element plays its own part in contributing to the success (or failure) of strategic coercion against the NSTO(s). Breaking the elements down in terms of their importance, isolation of external support and denial are necessary to rein in violence and the NSTO’s capacity to operate and strike. Limited progress in implementing these two elements of strategic coercion will result in an outcome of no more than limited success. Moreover, should significant to high levels of denial be achieved—aided through at least the requisite of limited implementation of isolation of external support—then the minimum outcome should be no less than moderate success. This will be the case, given the great reduction of violence-levels and demonstration to the NSTO that its campaign of terror will not produce an unconditional surrender on the part of the democratic state (thereby opening it up to the possibility of negotiations and moderating its objectives). However, in order to attain levels above moderate success—also referred to as a “stalemate”—isolation of popular support will also be required. The reason for this is that higher levels of isolation of popular support will be necessary in order to further weaken, expose and pressure the NSTO, as well as bring about the requisite progress towards political resolution for ending the conflict and/or compelling the NSTO to end its campaign of terror and renounce violence against the state and its interests.

Accordingly, these assertions of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion against can be broken down into the following hypotheses:

H1: The presence of overall significant to high levels of the key elements of isolation of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be associated with higher** levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

**Higher levels of success is considered anything to be a “significant success” or higher.

H2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

Measurement Scales and Standardized Questions for Empirically Testing Hypotheses

In empirically measuring the hypotheses of the Balance Theory, a focused, structured comparison, including both cross-case and within-case analysis, will be employed, using the British experience against Republican NSTOs in Northern Ireland (1969-2007) and Israel’s experience with Palestinian NSTOs (1967-present) as the examined cases. In doing so, three independent variables—being the three key coercive elements—will be examined in relation to how they affect the dependent variable, which is the level of success achieved at the outcome of strategic coercion. The following measurement scales will be employed in order to conduct empirical assessment of these variables.

Independent Variable Measurement (1): *Level of External Isolation Achieved*

High:	All major sources of external support—financial, military, and political—are severely restricted, if not completely eliminated; foreign safe havens prevented/eliminated
Significant:	Major external sources of financial and military support significantly reduced/blocked; political/diplomatic support for the violent cause of the NSTO reduced; access to foreign safe havens significantly diminished
Limited:	Some blockage of external financial and military support achieved; ability of NSTO to freely use a foreign safe haven reduced
Failure:	Negligible or zero isolation of external support achieved; foreign safe havens, if present, remain in tact
Backfire:	External support significantly increases in military, financial and/or political terms; safe havens, if present, continue to provide shelter and launch pad for attacks and may even multiply

Independent Variable Measurement (2): *Level of Denial Achieved*

High:	Through security measures, passive and active, the NSTO's ability to launch major terrorist attacks is nearly eliminated; the NSTO's access to vital resources is greatly reduced; the NSTO's ability to operate is heavily impeded through crackdowns on its capacity to recruit, train, communicate, move freely and plan; violence capacity of additional significant substate groups related to conflict reined in.
Significant:	The NSTO's ability to launch major terrorist attacks is significantly reduced; the NSTO's access to vital resources is hampered; its ability to operate in terms of recruitment, training, communication and planning is significantly reduced; violent capacity of additional significant substate groups related to conflict reined in.
Limited:	The NSTO's ability to launch major terrorist attacks is reduced, through remains a significant threat; the NSTO's access to vital resources is reduced, though negligibly so; the NSTO's ability to operate is minimally impacted.
Failure:	The NSTO's ability to launch major terrorist attacks remains unchanged; little if any impact on eliminating the NSTO's access to vital resources and its capacity to operate.
Backfire:	The NSTO's ability to launch major terrorist attacks increases; the NSTO's access to vital resources expands; the NSTO's capacity to operate is enhanced.

Independent Variable Measurement (3): Isolation of Popular Support:

High:	Popular support is denied to the NSTO; grievances well-addressed; excessive violence prevented; complete absence of collective punishment; security fully provided to susceptible populations within democratic state's control; populace accepts democratic state's political and strategic position.
Significant:	Popular support to the NSTO for conducting hostilities greatly reduced; existing grievances reduced; excessive violence limited; absence of collective punishment; security largely provided to susceptible populations within democratic state's control; large portions of the populace in question begin to accept the democratic state's political and strategic position.
Limited:	Popular support to the NSTO is reduced; emergence of new significant grievances avoided; excessive violence reduced; minimal collective punishment; limited progress in addressing existing grievances; security may be poorly provided for to susceptible populations within democratic state's control
Failure:	No reduction of popular support for the NSTO or gains for the democratic state; existing grievances and issues of excessive violence not properly addressed; security poorly provided, is simply absent, or may even be deteriorating for susceptible populations within democratic state's control.
Backfire:	Support for the NSTO and popular opposition to the democratic state is significantly increased; primary grievances remain poorly addressed; excessive violence and collective punishment likely; new significant grievances emerging; security situation for population may rapidly deteriorate.

Dependent Variable Measurement (4): Success for Strategic Coercion versus the NSTO

High Success:	 <p>Lasting end to conflict with all major NSTOs involved formally announcing an end to their violent campaign(s); all violence halted by the NSTO(s); satisfactory and enduring political resolution for all major issues achieved – OR – NSTO is eliminated all together, in instances where it is weak enough for this to be achieved</p>
Significant Success:	Violence-levels kept low; some important political resolution achieved; possible establishment of an enduring ceasefire; possible deal established to end violence with some, but not all of the major NSTOs involved in the conflict
Moderate Success (Stalemate):	Violence levels are greatly reduced or maintained at “acceptable levels” ^{**} ; stalemate results as a recognition emerges that neither side can claim victory over the other through force; limited or no political resolution is achieved; potential establishment of a temporary ceasefire; NSTO(s) remains committed to campaign of terrorist violence
Limited Success:	Violence levels are reduced or kept from expanding; limited or no political resolution achieved; potential establishment of temporary ceasefire; NSTO(s) remains committed to campaign of terrorist violence
Failure:	Violence levels remain high; limited or no significant political resolution achieved; situation remains highly problematic and unchanged despite coercive endeavors
Backfire:	Violence-levels are high and continue to increase; limited or no significant political resolution; new issues requiring political resolution likely to emerge; situation likely to rapidly deteriorate

^{**}What a democratic state considers relatively “acceptable” levels of violence is a consideration unique to the concerns and culture of that state. For the purposes of this dissertation, determining if levels of violence have been brought down to “acceptable” levels is assessed on the basis of two criteria, being: 1) casualties from NSTO violence remain significantly lower in comparison to peak years; and 2) the state is not compelled to undertake drastic revisions to its current external isolation and denial strategies in order to rein in violence.

An Explanation of the Assessment of the Dependent Variable

It is important to note that observing the outcome of a phenomenon like strategic coercion is always a tricky task. Ultimately, it is difficult to observe non-events associated with deterrence, or definitively elaborate on the decision-making process of a terrorist organization and its leadership. Moreover, establishing a set of criteria to accurately measure “success”, “failure/backfire” and everything in between is a very subjective exercise couched within a (very) politically sensitive subject matter.

This dissertation attempts to surmount this considerable hurdle through assessing the tangible elements of any outcome. The elements include levels of violence suffered by the state during its conflict with the terrorist organization, measurable progress towards a political resolution of the conflict, and/or the public renunciation by the NSTO of its campaign of violence. In assessing levels of violence, the indicator drawn upon includes casualties resulting from NSTO violence and efforts by the democratic state to suppress it. Accordingly, both civilian and military victims of terrorism are accounted for, as well as military personnel who have died during operations against the NSTO(s) in question.⁴⁴ Where violence results in significant damage to the state’s infrastructure, this too is accounted for.

Progress towards a political resolution is assessed either in terms of new political/constitutional arrangements enacted by the state in order address issues exacerbating the conflict, and/or the degree to which progress towards resolving the conflict is made—observable in attempts at negotiations, the establishment of negotiated settlements, public declarations regarding a change in strategy/approach by the NSTO, the implementation of any political

⁴⁴ This is not to say that a moral, ethical, and/or functional distinction cannot or should not be made when distinguishing between civilian casualties resulting from terrorist violence and the death of security forces while undertaking operations against these NSTOs. For the purpose of this study, however, all three types of casualties—civilian victims of terror, military victims of terror, and military deaths during operations conducted against the NSTO(s)—are accounted for due to the fact that they collectively help comprise important indicators in regards to accounting for the level of violence suffered by the state in its conflict with the NSTO(s).

settlement achieved, etc. Further, renunciation of hostilities by the NSTO is measured in terms of enduring ceasefires, decommissioning/disarming of weapons stockpiles, and formal declaration of the cessation of the terrorist campaign by the NSTO(s) in question (and the actual extent to which the NSTO abides by such declarations).

Finally, in order to try and ensure that the key elements of strategic coercion are what accounted for the outcome of success or failure—that is that the correlation observed is *causal* and *not spurious*—every assessment is preceded by an examination to see if significant alternative factors may have influenced or accounted for the observed outcome. Described in Chapter I as monitoring for equifinality, this includes checking for the influence of alternative coercive elements (i.e. decapitation, punishment, etc.), significant international events, and salient occurrences/circumstances considered as particularly influential in the histories of the within-case episodes studied.

Standardized Questions for Focused, Structured Comparison:

In measuring the hypotheses here put forth—and applying the measurement scales depicted above—the following standardized questions will be asked of each case episode of strategic coercion during the course of the focused, structured comparison conducted in the following chapters:

1. What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?
2. To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?
3. What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?
4. Did additional significant factors affect the outcome? (Control question for equifinality)
5. How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

Chapter IV:

The United Kingdom versus Republican NSTOs, 1969-2007

Having asserted the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, this chapter will begin testing its hypotheses through providing a case-study analysis of the United Kingdom's efforts from 1969 until 2007 to counter violence from Republican nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs). This historic case will furthermore be broken down into several within-case episodes as follows:

1. **1969-1972:** The “Troubles” begin; from peacekeeping to countering a terrorist insurgency
2. **1972-1975:** Direct Rule to Sunningdale, its collapse, and an uncertain ceasefire
3. **1975-1982:** Ulsterisation, Criminalisation, Normalisation
4. **1982-1989:** Moving to enhance involvement from the Republic of Ireland
5. **1989-1997:** Aiming for a political settlement, ceasefire and breakdown
6. **1997-2007:** Achieving a political settlement, seeing it implemented

However, prior to proceeding with this within-case analysis of British strategy against the Provisional IRA (hereto also referred to as just “IRA”), a background of the conflict will be provided, which gives an elaboration of: 1) the conflict's history in brief; and 2) the political context of this historic case.

A Brief History of the Conflict in Northern Ireland

The conflict in Northern Ireland dates back to the sixteenth century. It began following the decision by Queen Elizabeth I to begin the “settlement of Ulster” with Protestant English, Welsh and Scottish settlers in northeastern regions of Ireland, so as to ensure the presence of a British stronghold on the island of Ireland to prevent a staging ground for attacks by Britain's

Catholic adversaries in mainland Europe. Given its long and pronounced history, it would be well beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the entirety of the history of this conflict, even in brief. Still, in needing to provide an adequate explanation for the roots of the current conflict, it is perhaps best to start in the early Twentieth Century. After a hard fought guerrilla war led by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) lasting from January 1919 until July 1921, Republican leader Michael Collins negotiated the Anglo-Irish Treaty with British Prime Minister Lloyd George. The result was the securing of dominion status for the new Irish Free State. This treaty was far from perfect from a Republican standpoint, however, as it possessed a number of shortcomings, the most important of which was that it resulted in the partition of the six counties of Ulster. These counties would come to be known as “Northern Ireland,” and with their Protestant Unionist majority, would remain a part of the United Kingdom.

The Irish, represented at the time through the Dáil Éireann, were never consulted about the partition of Northern Ireland, and regarded the 1920 Government of Ireland Act that enabled it to be illegitimate, not least since it broke up the province of Ulster by omitting the three counties with the largest Catholic majorities in order to ensure the maintenance of a Protestant majority.¹ Meanwhile, for Catholics trapped in the new statelet, an equal future free from discrimination was not to be. James Craig, the first Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, was determined to ensure one-party rule (that is by Protestant Unionists) indefinitely, and in so doing abolished proportional representation and gerrymandered the constituencies. All judges were to be Unionists, appointed by the Northern Ireland Stormont government. The heavily armed auxiliary police force, the Ulster Special Constabulary—known as the B Specials—were all Protestant, and the police force itself—the Royal Ulster Constabulary or RUC—was 90%

¹ Jonathan Powell, *Great Hatred, Little Room: Making Peace in Northern Ireland*, London: The Bodley Head, 2008, 42.

Protestant. Meanwhile the jobs in the civil service, engineering works and the shipyards were all overwhelmingly kept for Protestants, with Catholics being twice as likely to be unemployed.²

For the next forty years, the IRA attempted in various instances to wage campaigns aimed at bringing down the Stormont government in Northern Ireland and expelling British control. The attempts were largely unsuccessful, however. Meanwhile the Protestant Unionists managed to maintain, unhindered, a religious and political one-party state up until the late 1960s. The source of change in the 1960s came from a civil rights movement, which campaigned for one man one vote, changes to electoral boundaries, anti-discrimination in the provision of social housing, the repeal of special powers and the disbanding of the B Specials.³

While the civil rights movement would help to bring about changes, in conjunction with a progressive Unionist Prime Minister in the form of Terence O'Neill, it would also serve to stir up sectarian tensions through the bitterness of the reaction it provoked in Unionist circles.⁴ This tension gave way to Loyalist (militant Unionists) aggression and violence, which played a major part in creating the post-1960s "Troubles". As Richard English explains, "Just as the IRA felt that the illegitimacy and injustice of the north legitimated their own military existence, so loyalists for their part considered the republican and nationalist threat to their state a sufficient justification for carrying out appalling actions."⁵

The situation finally came to a head in August 1969, when the Unionist Apprentice Boys staged their traditional march in Derry and triggered a flare up in violence as skirmishes between Catholics and Protestants escalated into something close to a full-scale uprising.⁶ In wake of the violence, the authorities lost control over a substantial part of Derry city, and rather than abating,

² Richard Ashmore, Lee Jussim and David Wilder, *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, 153.

³ Powell, 43.

⁴ Richard English, *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*, London: Pan Books, 2004, 99.

⁵ English.

⁶ David McKittrick and David McVea, *Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland*, Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002, 54.

violence then continued to spread to other parts of Northern Ireland. Violence engulfed large numbers of Protestants and Catholics in the Falls and Ardoyne-Crullim Road areas of north Belfast. As a result of the violence in Northern Ireland, 1,800 families fled their homes—with over 1,500 of them being Catholic. Moreover, over 80% of the premises damaged were occupied by Catholics, and six of eight people killed in August were Catholics.⁷ Since one of the primary roles of the IRA was supposed to be the defense of Catholic areas against the security forces and loyalists, the IRA came under heavy criticism for its evident ineffectiveness.⁸ The consensus that emerged in the back streets of the Catholic ghetto was that the current IRA had failed them, and that a new defense force was needed. The result was the emergence of the Provisional IRA, which in separating from the Official IRA (then largely committed to nonviolent nationalism) returned to traditional physical force republicanism⁹, with terrorist violence soon coming to be their primary mode of attack.

Political Context of the Conflict in Northern Ireland

The (violent) political context of the conflict of Northern Ireland can find its roots in the contentious perception of whether or not the country of Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom occupying the Northeastern portion of the island of Ireland, constitutes a legitimate entity and territorial division. From a Republican perspective—argued by various incarnations of the IRA (including the Provisionals)—Northern Ireland is not a recognized entity. Nor for that matter is the Republic of Ireland (consisting of 26 of the 32 counties of all of Ireland) or its government legitimate. All are illegitimate constructs. From their perspective, the Irish Republic proclaimed in the Easter Rising in 1916 and established by the Dáil Éireann (the then

⁷ Ronaldo Munck, *Ireland: Nation, State, and Class Struggle*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1985, 141.

⁸ Robert Orttung and Andrei Stanislavovich Makarychev, *National Counter-Terrorism Strategies: Legal: Institutional and Public*, NATO Security Through Science Series, Brussels: IOS Press, 2006, 95.

⁹ Powell, 44.

House of Representative for the Irish Republic) in 1919—which includes all 32 counties of the island of Ireland—constitutes the only legitimate entity, and they are committed to see its existence realized. For Republicans, the position is further reinforced by the fact that the Dáil Éireann was composed of—and their decision was concluded by—a majority of the MPs then representing Ireland in British Parliament, thereby enshrining it with democratic legitimacy.

While established in 1919, this all-Ireland Republic was not long to last. Following the conclusion of the Irish War of Independence and the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922 (which was not accepted by Republicans and prompted the Irish Civil War), Ireland was to become a self-governing British dominion. However, the Protestant Unionists of the six counties of Northern Ireland, or “Ulster” as it was referred to by them, opted out of this new arrangement, choosing to rejoin the UK instead. While Irish Republicans refused to recognize this territorial division on the grounds elaborated above, Protestant Unionists considered the partition of Northern Ireland to be a direct reflection of their democratic will—that is the democratic will of the majority population in the six counties of Ulster. For the Protestants, they highly valued their British heritage and ties to the United Kingdom, and feared persecution (or worse) by a Catholic majority controlled all-Ireland government—a fear that was informed by a long and often times bloody history. Unfortunately, however, while the formation and maintenance of Northern Ireland helped to ensure that Protestant Unionists would not suffer such persecution, the new arrangement resulted in serious inequality and (sometimes violent) discrimination that helped directly lead to the conflict that would emerge in full force in the late 1960s.

Primary Actors Involved in the Conflict and their Political Agenda

The conflict in Northern Ireland involves several main actors. The first of these are constituted by Republican nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs), bent on seeing

the establishment of an all-Ireland Republic through violence. The main organization amongst these groups—of which this case-study is primarily focused on—is the Provisional IRA.¹⁰ In the mindset of the Provisional IRA, Unionists were not a major threat, as they were simply puppets of British imperialism. In Republican theory it was Britain who comprised the real enemy, and once Britain had been defeated, Unionist resistance would simply collapse.¹¹ Moreover, the Provisional IRA considered themselves to be the rightful successors of the Irish Republican Army of 1919. Their goal, thus, was to pursue terrorist violence so as to make it too costly for the British to remain in Northern Ireland.¹²

The second actor, or rather set of actors, are Northern Ireland's Constitutional Nationalists, primarily embodied through the Social Democratic Labour Party or SDLP. Being primarily Catholic themselves and sharing the aspiration of Republicans for a united Ireland, Constitutional Nationalists differed in a number of ways from their more extreme counterparts. As John Hume, former leader of the SDLP clearly stated: "The difference between Republican and Nationalist was that Nationalists worked constitutionally through conventional politics and Republicans believed in physical force and giving their lives for Ireland."¹³ Constitutional Nationalist thus sought to achieve their objectives through peaceful means, and through gaining the consent of Northern Ireland's Unionist majority. They also helped to play a key role in attaining political progress throughout the conflict.

Next are the Unionists, the majority population of Northern Ireland. Though not a monolithic group, the perspective of the Unionists both before and during the Troubles is that of

¹⁰ Other Republican groups consisted of the Official IRA of Marxist orientation (which implemented a permanent ceasefire in 1972); the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), which emerged in 1974 as a splinter group of the Official IRA; the Irish People's Liberation Organization (a branch of the INLA that was forcibly disbanded in 1992); the Continuity IRA, which emerged in 1986 as a splinter group of the Provisional IRA; and the Real, which was another splinter of the IRA in 1997 following the Good Friday Agreement.

¹¹ McKittrick, McVea, 128.

¹² Denis Barritt, *Northern Ireland—A Problem to Every Solution*, Belfast: Corrymeela Press, Northern Friends Peace Board, 1982, 23.

¹³ John Hume. *Personal Views: Politics, Peace and Reconciliation in Ireland*, Dublin: Town House, 1996, 13.

a group considering itself to be perpetually under siege, rooted in the feeling that they themselves are a threatened minority on the Island of Ireland, and often very resistant to constitutional changes to the existing political system. Since 1937, when Eamon de Valera amended the Irish constitution to claim that the territory of the Irish state included the entire island of Ireland (and thus all of Unionist Northern Ireland), Unionists have felt that they were facing a hostile Nationalist state to the south, a hostile Nationalist minority within, and a government in London they distrusted.¹⁴ As John Hume elucidates, “This explains their stubborn refusal to share power with the minority in Northern Ireland, whom they feared as the Trojan horse of the “real” majority in Ireland, the Catholics.”¹⁵

The fourth group of importance are those who share the goal of Unionists to remain in the United Kingdom, but similar to Republicans are more extreme in pursuing these ends through violence. Those that comprise this group are known as Loyalists, and while they do not comprise a *nationalistic* substate terrorist organization themselves—as defined in this dissertation¹⁶—a clear argument can be made that they are a terrorist organization nonetheless with sectarian objectives. Present in such organizations as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF), loyalists often engaged in terrorism themselves, launching attacks against innocent Catholic civilians in order to ensure “good behavior” from Republicans elsewhere.

Finally, there is the government of the United Kingdom. The position of the UK by the time of the Troubles is perhaps best summed up by Hugh Rossi, a former minister of the Northern Ireland Office who stated that: “From the time of the Spanish Armada down to World War II, Great Britain had a great strategic interest in a strong military presence in Ireland. By the

¹⁴ David George Boyce and Alan O'Day, *Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism Since 1801*, London: Routledge, 2001, 10.

¹⁵ Hume, 56.

¹⁶ It has never been the objective of loyalist paramilitary organizations to overthrow the British government, or end any form of British/English occupation.

1960s, the geopolitics of the world had rendered this impractical and unnecessary.”¹⁷ As a consequence, consideration of withdrawal from Northern Ireland was not a taboo subject—even Winston Churchill secretly explored the idea with the Republic of Ireland during the Second World War in exchange for their assistance against Nazi Germany.¹⁸

So what was Britain’s motivation for remaining engaged in the conflict, and not complying with the demands of the NSTO known as the Provisional IRA? The answer is that every British government during the Troubles came to the same conclusion that a withdrawal leading to a united Ireland would, in the words of Peter Neumann, “lead to sectarian strife and civil war,” where London assumed that “the withdrawal of British troops would be followed by a Protestant genocide of the Catholic minority, thus provoking a military intervention.”¹⁹ This concern was exacerbated by Northern Ireland’s close proximity to the United Kingdom. Moreover, the terrorist campaign of the Provisional IRA was also a direct challenge to the British democratic system and rule of law. Consequently, while the British government would question the feasibility of remaining in Northern Ireland and countering the terrorist insurgency of the Provisional IRA from time to time, it would remain committed to seeing a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

Within-Case Episode #1: 1969-1972—“The Troubles” Begin: from Peacekeeping to Countering a Terrorist Insurgency

Following the violence that proceeded in the wake of the crisis ignited by the march of the Apprentice Boys of Derry, and the chaos that spread throughout Northern Ireland, the police force of Northern Ireland, the RUC, soon found themselves exhausted and overwhelmed. As a

¹⁷ Peter Neumann, *Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 19.

¹⁸ Powell, 54.

¹⁹ Neumann, 21.

consequence, James Chichester-Clark, the Stormont Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, requested assistance from the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson in the form of a military deployment. In doing so, rapid strategic changes came into place, with the British government agreeing to provide troops “in aid of the civil power”, while deciding that the aim of their strategy would be to re-insulate Northern Ireland from Great Britain. Moreover, while the British government hoped that the Stormont regime in Belfast would be able to continue on, it also publicly placed it on “probation”, making it clear that its continued existence depended on it carrying out a program of reform that ensured “British standards of citizenship.”²⁰

In the meantime, British troops were deployed to Northern Ireland on 14 August 1969, marking what one military commentator described as a “watershed” where “the Army became inextricably involved in Ulster.”²¹ On their arrival to Northern Ireland, the troops were to act as peacekeepers whose purpose was to help calm down a situation that had exceeded the control of the local police authorities. At first the British soldiers found themselves welcomed by the Catholic population as they arrived to separate and restore order between the two warring communities. It was not long, however, before the British Army ended up alienating them as effectively as the RUC had, appearing to direct their attention exclusively to Catholic areas.²² Matters were made worse as major curfews were placed on large parts of the Catholic community, with the indiscriminate ransacking of their homes, and fourteen people being shot dead by the Army in the process.²³ The British Army thus came to be seen by the nationalist community as defenders of the Unionist state rather than serving a peace-keeping function.²⁴

²⁰ Neumann, 45.

²¹ M. Dewar, *The British Army in Northern Ireland*, London: Arms and Armour Press, 1985, 33.

²² Michael Freeman, *Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003, 53.

²³ Powell, 45.

²⁴ Robert Rubinstein and Mary Lecron Foster, *The Social Dynamics of Peace and Conflict: Culture in International Security*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1988, 118.

In this environment, circumstances were most propitious for the rapid growth of the young and newly formed Provisional IRA. Having only formed after a split from the “Official” IRA in the end of 1969, the Provisionals would soon find themselves thriving in the wake of the ongoing sectarian chaos, and alienation from the British Army, with their terrorist violence coming into ever increasing effect.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

During the 1969-1972 episode of strategic coercion against the Provisional IRA, the British government found little success in efforts to stem the flow of external/international support. Beginning in early 1970, a key gun-running network was re-established, run by George Harrison in New York, which helped to provide the IRA with a steady and plentiful supply of thousands of Armalites. Moreover, through the establishment of the Irish Northern Aid Committee (Noraid), also based in New York, the Provisionals were able to raise funds for their movement, and for these arms.²⁵

Nor was the United States the only source of support for the IRA. In the Republic of Ireland money went from government sources to the Provisionals.²⁶ And after the debacle that was created by the botched attempt at internment (discussed shortly), Anglo-Irish relations took a severe battering that resulted in an outpouring of support from the Republic. In the Republic of Ireland, IRA fugitives could now find sanctuary, safe in the knowledge that the Garda—the Irish national police force—would not throw them behind bars. Meanwhile the Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch, who had initially considered introducing internment in tandem with the Stormont

²⁵ Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connection: States that Sponsor Terrorism*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, 247.

²⁶ English, 119.

government abandoned the idea after witnessing how it had been mismanaged in Ulster.²⁷ Even Irish cabinet ministers such as Charles Haughey would come to be caught providing guns to the IRA.²⁸

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Though by late 1971, the British managed to mitigate some of the damage that had been done with relations vis-à-vis the Republic through the Anglo-Irish *rapprochement*, this episode of strategic coercion witnessed a “backfire” as the outcome of its efforts to isolate the IRA from external and international support. American guns began to flow-in unmitigated, and not only was support not gained from the Republic of Ireland to crack down on the IRA, but British policies in Northern Ireland resulted in an explosion of support from the Irish Republic. External support for the IRA by the end of this episode of strategic coercion had thus increased dramatically.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

British forces on the ground were instructed to employ minimum force in line with Arthur Young (head of the RUC)’s “softly softly” approach; however they followed this policy so firmly that it instead became more akin to minimum action. This was especially the case when it was thought that force would make the British security forces unpopular with one of the communities. Protestant marches, and paramilitary funerals were thus allowed to go ahead, helping to raise sectarian tensions, while the troops failed to eliminate safe-havens for the IRA in “no-go” areas within Derry-City and West-Belfast, allowing the IRA to freely plan and organize.

²⁷ Ed Moloney, *A Secret History of the IRA*, 2nd Ed., London: Penguin Books, 2007, 101.

²⁸ Tim Pat Coogan, *The I.R.A.*, Dublin: The Irish Book Center, 1987, 464.

As a consequence of this reluctance to take meaningful (or impartial) action, the IRA found itself rapidly gaining strength and enhanced capabilities. Meanwhile, the continued presence of no-go areas constrained British forces from effectively mounting searches, screenings and various other surveillance and information gathering exercises.²⁹ And to make matters worse, the intelligence position in Northern Ireland was chaotic. There was no coordination amongst the various intelligence agencies—MI5, MI6, the Army and the police.³⁰ The result was that by Easter 1970, the Provisional IRA had grown so quickly that it was obliged to reorganize.³¹ Nor were British forces making any attempt to regain the initiative through reorganizing to meet the growing challenge posed by the Provisionals. It was not until November 1970 that the Commander Land Forces recognized that the Army was “now facing organized terrorism,” and that the IRA’s campaign would necessitate a “prolonged campaign of counterinsurgency.”³²

Internment:

As a consequence of the lack of accurate intelligence that was further aggravating Britain’s ability to effectively implement any form of denial against the Provisional IRA, a new policy was considered. This policy was that of internment, which involved the “preventive detention” of terrorist suspects. As former Prime Minister Edward Heath later explained the rationale for this policy: “Internment offered us a chance to bypass this wall of silence by swooping on terrorist suspects without warning.”³³

²⁹ Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict, and Emancipation*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 129.

³⁰ Steven Crawford Greer, *The Supergrass System in Northern Ireland: A Study in Counter-insurgency Law Enforcement* [Unpublished], PhD Dissertation, The Queen’s University of Belfast, 6 October 1989, 62.

³¹ Moloney, 87.

³² “Army ‘now facing terrorist threat’”, *Irish News*, 3 November 1970.

³³ Edward Heath, *The Course of My Life: My Autobiography*, London: Coronet Books, 1998, 428.

So it was that on 9 August 1971 a large-scale arrest operation was launched, code-named *Operation Demetrius*, with thousands of police and troops dispatched to round up the Provisional IRA. While the first swoops produced 340 arrests, it very quickly became clear that little was going to plan. It soon emerged that the RUC Special Branch had not kept accurate intelligence on the rapidly expanding Provisional IRA. And with most IRA men aware of the impending sweep, troops and police ended up largely arresting the wrong people based on poor intelligence, while most legitimate targets had already fled across the border into the Republic of Ireland.³⁴ Consequently, internment failed, a fact that was evident in the IRA's ability to escalate terrorist violence and urban guerrilla warfare in its wake.³⁵

Assessment of Degree of Denial

The outcome of denial by at the conclusion of this episode of British strategy against the Provisional IRA can be evaluated as that of "backfire"; the Provisional IRA's ability to launch major terrorist attacks increased, while both its access to vital resources for carrying out assaults and capacity to operate continued to enhance.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

In the beginning of the 1969-1972 episode of strategic coercion, the cabinet of Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London aimed to make a number of political reforms to help assuage anger in the Catholic community and bring an end to violence. These reforms included the disbanding of the auxiliary police force, the B Specials (hated by the Catholic community), and its replacement with the Ulster Defense Regiment; the disarming of the RUC (similar to police forces in Britain) along with its reorganization to make it more attractive to Catholic recruits; the

³⁴ Heath, 429.

³⁵ Martin Dillon, *Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts*, New York: Routledge, 1990, 30.

removal of public housing allocation powers from Northern Ireland's Unionist dominated local councils; the establishment of plans to outlaw public expressions of sectarian hatred and to improve community relations; and in 1971, the implementation of the system of one man one vote in Northern Ireland local elections.

London also implemented a new economic strategy in the hopes of winning over members of both communities from violence. This strategy was guided by the assumption that there was a link between internal peace and prosperity.³⁶ Accordingly, economic measures were implemented to bring down unemployment and raise living standards. The British government increased the subvention to Northern Ireland, provided additional funds for training the workforce and housing subsidies, and provided generous financial incentives to attract further investment.³⁷

The Failure of British Strategy

Unfortunately, London's strategy to isolate popular support within both communities towards violence fell flat. The decision to allow the Unionist government to implement reform turned out to be a failure. Moreover, the continued existence of the one-party Stormont government, which remained the only source of political power in the province, created fertile ground for the existing system to be seen as unjust, illegitimate and discriminatory for the Catholic community, raising support for Republicanism and the IRA. And while London instructed the British Army to act impartially, the fact that Westminster tied its political authority to the Unionist government resulted in the British government compromising its role as an "honest broker" between the two communities.³⁸

³⁶ Neumann, 65.

³⁷ Rosemary Sales, *Women Divided: Gender, Religion, and Politics in Northern Ireland*, London: Routledge, 1997, 90.

³⁸ Neumann, 46.

Meanwhile London's economic strategy was proving itself to be ineffective. None of its measures contributed to breaking the existing patterns of recruitment and material distribution, and therefore maintained discrimination. The problem lay in the assumption that simply raising the economic conditions in *absolute* terms would be sufficient to substantially resolve Northern Ireland's problems. Relative deprivation would remain a major issue, however.³⁹

British Army Failures Contribute to the Growth and Success of the IRA as a Popular Movement

A number of British Army failures served to help drive up popular support for the IRA. In June 1970, one of these prominent failures took place as the British Army simply stood by and made no effort at preventive action as a crowd of angry Loyalist mobs gathered in East Belfast and laid siege to St. Matthew's Church in the small Catholic ghetto of Short Strand. The opportunity turned out to be a godsend for the Provisional IRA, which showed up and engaged in a full-scale battle with Loyalist forces. In the end, the IRA managed to defend the church in what came to be known in Republican folklore as "the siege of St. Matthew's", which established the Provisionals as the Catholics' only reliable defenders, while discrediting the British Army to the Catholic community.⁴⁰

Meanwhile, in rural areas, the British Army attempted to reduce the IRA capacity for cross-border raids by crating border roads with explosives in order to make them unusable. The result was that, while it did not hamper IRA access to the Republic, it produced angry members of the local farming communities—needing the road links to conduct day-to-day business—and served only to antagonize a broad swath of rural Catholics, thereby energizing the IRA outside of

³⁹ Neumann, 94.

⁴⁰ Moloney, 90.

Belfast in Counties Tyrone, Armagh, and Fermanagh, where new units, battalions and brigades of Provisionals were formed or expanded.⁴¹

By Christmas of 1970, the Provisional IRA found itself to be gaining even more popular support in wake of the Falls Road curfew (which predominantly targeted Catholics), and the Ballymurphy riots that had been met with a heavy handed response by security forces. Moreover, vague guidance for the Rules of Engagement to be applied by British soldiers on the ground often left it to troops on the ground to decide the appropriate level of force—which frequently turned out to be anything but the minimum. And the presence of crack troops such as the Parachute Regiment and Marines who were sent in to fulfill common policing duties often had a very brutal impact.⁴²

Internment

One of the most costly British measures that both turned popular support away from their cause and into the hands of the IRA came in the form of internment. As mentioned earlier, the sweeps used to apprehend terrorist suspects turned out to be highly ineffective. This was compounded by a number of factors. First of these was the casual brutality used by troops during arrest operations—largely against innocent persons. Upon arrest, prisoners were then kept in poor conditions on either an ageing ship in Belfast Lough, or at Long Kesh near Belfast—a prison facility whose temporary structure resembled a World War II prison camp.⁴³ On top of the brutality associated with the arrests, experimental techniques of interrogation such as white noise, sensory deprivation and spread-eagling suspects for hours were applied, causing massive outrage.⁴⁴ And to add insult to injury, internment was introduced in a completely one-

⁴¹ Moloney, 103.

⁴² Moloney, 96.

⁴³ Kevin Kelley, *The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA*, Belfast: St. Martin's Press, 1982, 251.

⁴⁴ Powell, 46.

sided manner, targeting only the Catholic Nationalist population, while completely excluding Protestant Loyalists.

The result of interment was the complete alienation of the Catholic community from the state and its security forces.⁴⁵ As a consequence, scores of young men and women, eager to strike back, flocked to the IRA, while older and more moderate nationalists registered their disgust by resigning from public positions.⁴⁶

Bloody Sunday

During a peaceful civil rights march on Sunday, 30 January 1972, the British Army killed thirteen people in Derry, with another dying from his wounds. As Jonathan Powell recalled, “Members of the Parachute Regiment appeared to have run amok, live on TV, and the pictures of a Catholic priest running, half crouched, through the Bogside waving a white handkerchief to try and help fatally wounded victims will haunt the British establishment forever. Its effect was devastating.”⁴⁷ The deaths of Bloody Sunday completely outraged Nationalist Ireland, and a wave of anger swept through the country. In Derry, even moderate SDLP leader John Hume said that the mood was now for “a united Ireland or nothing.”⁴⁸

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

The degree of isolation of popular support achieved by the end of this episode of strategy coercion can only be coded as a complete “backfire”, as despite efforts by the British government to address the grievances of the Catholic community, popular support instead

⁴⁵ Timothy Shanahan, *The Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, 170.

⁴⁶ Moloney, 102.

⁴⁷ Powell, 45.

⁴⁸ See: P. J. McLoughlin, “...It’s a United Ireland or Nothing? John Hume and the Idea of Irish Unity, 1964-1972,” *Irish Political Studies*, 21:2, 2006, 157-180.


exploded against British and local (Protestant majority) forces and in favor of the IRA, and a campaign of violence. Moreover, neither community felt that their security interests were being overseen by British forces (many in the Catholic community even perceived these forces to be a primary threat themselves), and thus both sides were motivated to turn towards armed substate groups to ensure their protection.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

At the conclusion of this episode of British strategy against the Provisional IRA, only one additional factor may have played a role in effecting the outcome according to a review of the histories. This factor came in the form of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson meeting with the IRA leadership in Dublin (without the permission of the sitting government, Prime Minister Heath or the Unionist majority population) and going over a “Twelve Point Plan” that called for all parties to work actively toward the reunification of Ireland within a timescale of fifteen years. It is possible that the result of this action was that it may have contributed to the IRA stepping up their attacks, thinking that victory was near, while in turn encouraging further violence from outraged and fearful Protestant Loyalists.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

Besides the grim elaboration of this episode of strategic coercion, the following chart—which illustrates casualty figures per year of victims in terms of those killed by Republican and Loyalist groups—helps to illustrate the degree of success (or rather lack thereof) achieved:

Figure 4.1: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1969-1972⁴⁹

As is clear from this chart, violence and casualties were exploding (literally) by the end of this episode of strategic coercion. Prime Minister Edward Heath was left with little other choice but to suspend the ruling Stormont government and institute Direct Rule in Northern Ireland, while frantically searching for a new strategy. Thus, with violence-levels both high and increasing, little significant political resolution achieved, new substantial grievances emerging in the form of internment and Bloody Sunday, and a rapidly deteriorating security situation, the degree of success observed at the conclusion of this episode can thus be assessed as “backfire.”

Within-Case Episode #2: 1972-1975—Direct Rule to Sunningdale, Its Collapse and an Uncertain Ceasefire

Following Bloody Sunday in 1972, it became clear to Westminster that their current strategy needed to be altered. As former Prime Minister Edward Heath reflected, “I was resolved all along... that we should now devote all our energies towards working for a lasting

⁴⁹ Statistical information for this graph provided for by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993*, Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994. Online Cross-tabulation of this information provided for by the CAIN Web Service at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

cross-community settlement – and only Direct Rule could offer us the breathing space necessary for building it.”⁵⁰ The one-party Protestant dominated Stormont government was thus suspended, with Direct Rule coming directly from London. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Heath intended the following:

I had come to the view years before that there was only one way of achieving any permanent solution for Northern Ireland: some form of power-sharing between the two communities. If the Protestant, loyalist majority was to continue holding all levers of power at the provincial level, then the grievances of the Catholics would remain as deeply held as ever. In order to give Catholics a real stake in society, it was not enough for them to be protected from discrimination. They also had to be given a positive role in governing the country in which they lived, at both local and national level. I also believed that the Republic of Ireland had to be brought into the relationship once more.⁵¹

The British government thus set about to create a power-sharing system, while also allowing for some sort of “Irish dimension” that involved the government of the Republic of Ireland. In doing so, they also acknowledged that political and military aims were interdependent.⁵²

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

Success in achieving isolation of external/international support was rather limited during this episode of strategic coercion. Material support from elements within the United States continued to flow unmitigated. Efforts were made during the negotiations for the Sunningdale Agreement to enhance security cooperation and provide for extradition from the Republic of Ireland, but these efforts fell flat. Still, Anglo-Irish relations did improve some as a result of the discussions and the common effort to work towards a new power-sharing cross-community government for Northern Ireland.

⁵⁰ Heath, 436.

⁵¹ Heath, 423.

⁵² Neumann, 77.

Meanwhile Colonel Qaddafi of Libya opened up a new front of support for the IRA. Finding a natural sympathy for the IRA in that both blamed colonialism for their country's struggles, and that through the IRA Libya could strike at one of their former rulers—Britain—Qaddafi soon began to funnel guns, and explosives to the IRA. Through the newly forged Libyan supply line, the IRA would also receive over \$3.5 million (over \$10 million in current prices)—a crucial supplement to the IRA's income at a time when its campaign was at its height.⁵³ However the Libyan supply of arms and finance would weaken following a scandal with the IRA representative appointed to Libya, with the supply of guns and money being cut off until years later.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

As is clear from the above discussion, isolation of external/international support was rather limited. Though Anglo-Irish relations did improve some, little tangible progress was apparent in the security realm. American guns and money continued to flow in. And Libya even managed to open up a supply line for further arms, explosives and finances for a time. With nothing more than a negligible reduction of tangible support at best, and the continued presence of safe havens in the Republic of Ireland, isolation of external support for this episode can be scored as “failure”.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

In the first few months following the suspension of the Stormont government, London ran into some difficulties attempting to balance its different imperatives regarding the use of force. In the beginning, the British government attempted to regain the trust of the Catholic community, which, combined with their belief that they could persuade parts of the IRA to

⁵³ Moloney, 10.

abandon violence, led to the scaling down of the presence of security forces in Catholic areas. As a consequence, significant opportunities were missed to apply military pressure against the IRA, allowing the NSTO to regroup and extend their influence. This issue was compounded, moreover, by the continued existence of “no go” areas, which the British government remained reluctant address. In the meantime, the IRA had become so increasingly bold in their attacks, that they came to proclaim 1972 as “the year of victory”, while unveiling their new weapon—the car bomb—which caused extraordinary damage.⁵⁴

Operation Motorman

On July 31, 1972—in response to the dramatic increase in violence—*Operation Motorman* would commence as British security forces finally moved to eliminate the problematic “no go” areas. The operation involved 31,000 troops, making it the largest military operation on Irish soil in the 20th century.⁵⁵ Centurion tanks fitted with bulldozer equipment rolled up barricades, while the IRA fled south across the border into the Republic. Within weeks, military forts were constructed on the doorsteps of the areas the IRA had formerly controlled, and the NSTO’s freedom of movement in the North was severely restricted.⁵⁶

Operation Motorman was a complete success. As William Whitelaw, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, recalled: “The Army was almost at once in full control of the area.”⁵⁷ Moreover, the opening up of the “no go” areas brought in a vastly increased flow of intelligence and returned control by the British authorities to these areas. The result was that in the three weeks before *Operation Motorman* there were 2595 shooting incidents in Northern Ireland, and

⁵⁴ M.L.R. Smith, *Fighting for Ireland? The Military Strategy of the Irish Republican Movement*, London: Routledge, 1995, 101,

⁵⁵ Simon Winchester, “4,000 More Troops in for Ulster Offensive,” *The Guardian*, 28 July 1972.

⁵⁶ Moloney, 117.

⁵⁷ William Whitelaw, *The Whitelaw Memoirs*, London: Headline Book Publishing, 1990, 135.

in the following three weeks after there were only 380.⁵⁸ As a consequence of the success of “Motorman”, the IRA went from proclaiming imminent victory to preparing for a long and bloody war.

UWC Strikes Following the Sunningdale Agreement

Following British efforts, led by William Whitelaw and Edward Heath, to create a new, power-sharing government that would empower the Catholic minority community of Northern Ireland, the Sunningdale Agreement was established. However, almost as soon as the new government came into being, Loyalist elements sought about to bring the agreement that enabled it and its fledgling institutions down. Fashioning themselves the “Ulster Workers Council” or UWC, this Unionist paramilitary group set about to bring life to a standstill in Northern Ireland.

As Brian Faulkner recalls:

Gangs of paramilitary supporters were out on the streets building barricades and openly intimidating those going to their work. Men in para-military ‘uniform’, sometimes wearing masks and carrying cudgels, walked into shops and simply ordered shopkeepers to close [sic]. A lunchtime meeting of several thousand workers at Harland and Wolff’s shipyard was told that any cars left in the car park after lunchtime would be burned.⁵⁹

Where the real problem came in, however, was in the reluctance of the British security forces to take any meaningful action to stop the UWC. As SDLP leader John Hume later wrote: “in what was one of the most squalid examples of government irresponsibility, it surrendered its policy in the face of a political strike organized by a paramilitary minority on the Unionist side.”⁶⁰ The RUC thus received no clear instructions for proceeding, while the Army took the position that it was their job to combat terrorism and not “curb street protests.”⁶¹

⁵⁸ Smith, 10.

⁵⁹ Brian Faulkner, *Memoirs of a Statesman*, John Houston (ed.), London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1978, 261.

⁶⁰ Hume, 38.

⁶¹ McKittrick and McVea, 103-4.

With both local and British national forces refusing to step in against the UWC, matters rapidly deteriorated. Northern Ireland's power workers soon came under the influence of UWC intimidation, bringing over 70% of the province's power supply into question. Yet the ruling Labour government remained reluctant to break the "strike" imposed by the loyalist paramilitary. By the end of the week, with the UWC in full control of both work routes and Northern Ireland's power, the stage was set for the collapse of the recently achieved power-sharing government.

Assessment of Degree of Denial

The degree of success achieved through denial at the end of this episode of British strategy was mixed. Initially, British attempts at denial were rather weak. Following *Operation Motorman* though, denial against the Provisional IRA became greatly enhanced, with the elimination of safe havens in West Belfast and Derry. However the British government soon dropped the ball when it failed to exercise denial against the extremists on the other side. As a result, the major efforts made towards achieving a new political solution were dashed and violence continued at substantial levels. Thus while the IRA's ability to launch terrorist attacks was significantly reduced, violence remained at unacceptably high levels while extremist Loyalists remained unrestrained. The degree of denial is thus scored as being that of "limited".

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

At the beginning of this episode of British strategy, Northern Ireland Secretary William Whitelaw looked to take a number of measures to win over support from the Catholic community that could be used towards the establishment of the new power-sharing government. One of the most significant of these included the release of scores of Catholics who had been interned under Brian Faulkner's rule, gradually phasing out internment. The second involved the

granting of “special category status” to paramilitary prisoners—be they from the IRA or loyalist organizations—which allowed them to wear their own clothes, report to their own “commanding officers” rather than prison guards, and control their own compounds (more akin to prisoners of war) within the prison facilities they were housed in.

Outcome of *Operation Motorman*

As time progressed, a significant event occurred that helped to reduce popular support in both Protestant and Catholic communities for extremism. This was the success of *Operation Motorman*. On the one hand, it removed the major source of tension that was motivating Loyalist gunmen to launch gun battles against Catholic areas, thinking that Westminster did not possess the will to defeat the IRA or protect Unionist areas.⁶² On the other, it strengthened moderate Nationalists’ resolve (in the form of the SDLP) to stand up to the terrorist methods employed by the IRA and commit themselves to constitutional politics. As such, the success of *Operation Motorman*—in strengthening popular support for the position of moderates on both sides—made dialogue between Nationalist and Unionist possible.⁶³

The Sunningdale Agreement

By late 1973, following sustained efforts by William Whitelaw and leaders of moderate Unionism and Nationalism, an agreement was forged. Known as the “Sunningdale Agreement”, it established a new power-sharing government. William Whitelaw explains the details of the new government:

The basis was to be a legislative assembly of eighty members to be elected by proportional representation. ...The new Assembly would have powers over a wide range of police matters. However, electoral arrangements, the judiciary, prosecution and emergency powers would be permanently reserved to Westminster, while other powers

⁶² Faulkner, 164.

⁶³ Neumann, 80.

over the police, criminal law and prisoners would be temporarily reserved until the British Government was satisfied that they could be transferred. It was proposed to set up a new Council of Ireland as a forum for discussion between North and South, but it was reaffirmed yet again that Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom so long as that was the majority wish.⁶⁴

In it, the agreement held the potential to win over much popular support amongst the Catholic Nationalist community by empowering them in government institutions. Meanwhile both sides could claim some victory in achieving this agreement: for Unionists, there was a declaration by the Irish Republic recognizing Northern Ireland's sovereign status, a law commission to tackle cross-border security problems and a Council of Ireland that they argued was largely lacked any effective power; and for moderate Nationalists their position was secured at the highest level of government, while with new all-Ireland institutions were established with the potential to evolve.⁶⁵

Unfortunately however, the Sunningdale Agreement was not destined to last. Following the unmitigated campaign of intimidation launched by the UWC, as well as the cutting of power to much of Northern Ireland, the new power-sharing Executive was brought to the edge. Nor was its position very strong from the start. Controversial to many Unionists, especially after the Irish courts found the agreement by Irish Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave to acknowledge Northern Ireland as a sovereign territory to be unconstitutional (and thus null and void), the new government was established on uncertain legs to begin with. Perhaps the final straw came following an antagonizing television broadcast by Prime Minister Wilson who—rather than give support to the moderate Unionist population, besieged by the extremist UWC paramilitary—pinned the blame on common Unionists, referring to them as “people who spend their lives sponging on Westminster and British democracy.”⁶⁶ In the days that followed, with the majority

⁶⁴ Whitelaw, 140.

⁶⁵ Marianne Elliot, *The Long Road to Peace in Northern Ireland*, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001, 189.

⁶⁶ CAIN Web Service, “UWC Strike – Text of Broadcast by Harold Wilson,” 25 May 1974, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/uwc/docs/hw25574.htm> [Last Viewed 20 August 2009].

of power remaining cut, intimidation rampant on the streets and in workplaces, and the Unionist population enraged with pro-Sunningdale Unionist parties pulling out of the new agreement, the new power-sharing government collapsed.

The result of the collapse of the power-sharing government and the consequences surrounding it was an angered Unionist community on the one hand, who found themselves increasingly indifferent to the will of Westminster. On the other, the Catholic Nationalist community came to perceive violence as the best approach against the British, certain that any attempts at a political settlement would simply be thwarted. Popular support was thus enhanced for extremists on both sides.

Continued Failures to Implement Meaningful Economic Reform

During this episode of strategic coercion, the British government continued to attempt to implement economic policies to improve the quality of life, lower unemployment and give the youth of Northern Ireland future opportunities. A committee was established to examine the problem of job discrimination in the private sector, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (SACHR) was created to monitor the economic situation in the province, discrimination on religious or sectarian grounds were outlawed in the Northern Ireland Constitution Act (1973), and job training centers sprang up in droves in the hopes that this would translate into greater job opportunities for unemployed Catholics. Despite these efforts, however, London refused to enforce any sort of affirmative action program to bring about equality in unemployment, and failed to tackle any of the informal methods of job discrimination that continued to exist. Little progress was thus made to assuage the relative deprivation levels in terms of economic circumstances between the two communities.

Diplock Courts

A final negative source that reduced attempts to isolate the Catholic community from the Provisional IRA came from the new “Diplock courts” which were implemented following the Diplock report published in December 1972. These courts, which were established to deal with the problem of jury intimidation, suspended jury trial and reduced criminal hearings to involving a single judge who would pass down decisions. To further antagonize the local population, a relaxation of the law on the admissibility of confessions was also implemented in cases involving the activities of paramilitary organizations. This translated into the allowance for statements or confessions to be accepted as evidence, as long as they were obtained by methods short of “torture” or “inhuman or degrading treatment”—the standard of measurement for which was left the observing judge himself.⁶⁷ The result of this new procedure only served to anger the Catholic community, while creating further outrage in the Republic of Ireland.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

Despite the failing of Sunningdale, the shortcomings of British economic policies, and the anger caused by the introduction of the Diplock courts, both major occurrences of excessive violence by the security forces and seismic grievance causing events (such as Bloody Sunday and internment) were avoided. Moreover internment was phased out, and important gains were made in winning over the populace through the success of *Operation Motorman* which made great strides in assuring members of both communities that the government could exert its authority and provide for their safety. In light of this, the degree of isolation of popular support for this episode is thus observed as being “limited”.

⁶⁷ Peter Taylor, *Beating the Terrorists? Interrogation at Omagh, Gough and Castlereagh*, London: Penguin Books, 1980, 34.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

A number of additional factors did play a role in influencing the outcome of this episode of strategic coercion. Britain's economic policies, for instance, were undermined as a result of the international oil crisis and the ensuing recession that saw further declines in manufacturing and agriculture. Indeed, unemployment levels reached 11%, the highest on post-World War II record, by 1976. Another external factor that had an impact on the outcome of this episode came in the form of IRA overkill during a massive bombing operation on "Bloody Friday" in July 1973. Following it, even many of the IRA's supporters accused them of using sheer terror tactics. The result was a swift political impact, with moderate Nationalists putting even more distance between themselves and the IRA, and the emergence of a community consensus that allowed *Operation Motorman* to successfully go ahead.⁶⁸

A further issue that may have significantly impacted the outcome of this episode of strategic coercion came in the form of the reassignment of William Whitelaw as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland immediately following the achievement of the Sunningdale Agreement. He was succeeded by Francis Pym who was immediately thrown into deep waters, and was soon over his head as the UWC strike began within days. As former Stormont Prime Minister Brian Faulkner recalls, "The removal of Whitelaw was, in my opinion, overhasty and ill-timed and showed an inadequate appreciation of the importance to the whole United Kingdom of the successful conclusion of his efforts in Northern Ireland."⁶⁹

Finally, a further additional factor was implementation of another facet of strategic coercion—being that of decapitation. This came on 18 July 1973, as British army patrols conducted an important arrest operation. In doing so, they seized a number of the IRA's so-called "Young Turks"—hardliners opposed to negotiations and any form of peace settlement—

⁶⁸ Moloney, 117.

⁶⁹ Faulkner, 226.


including Gerry Adams and other significant members of the IRA's Brigade Staff. Simultaneously, the British government also released more "pragmatic" members of the IRA from internment, and began to open up secret contacts with them behind the backs of the "Young Turks". This may have directly contributed to the achievement of the 1974 cease-fire, discussed in greater detail shortly.⁷⁰

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

At the end of this episode of strategic coercion, some dramatic gains had been made. In the beginning of 1972, following Bloody Sunday and the suspension of the Stormont government, the IRA had predicted imminent victory; by 1976 they were geared up for a long and bloody war. Moreover, the death toll dropped in 1973, never again to approach the levels witnessed in 1972. The following chart depicts this:

Please See the Following Page

⁷⁰ Moloney, 139.

Figure 4.2: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1972-75⁷¹

Still, as can also be observed in figure 5.2, despite the relative drop in violence, levels of violence overall still remained high. In terms of progress towards any political resolution of the situation, two instances initially possessing promise took place. One of these involved an attempt to change the political status quo through the Sunningdale Agreement in order to ensure proportional political representation of the Catholic (Nationalist) community in Northern Ireland's devolved government. However, as discussed above, the precarious agreement soon fell through in the face of Loyalist pressure, lack of resolve on the part of the Northern Ireland Office and security forces, and the British governments poor handling of the situation.

The other instance occurred following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement when the new Labour government took over, returning Harold Wilson to power as Prime Minister. Following secret overtures by Wilson, the IRA leadership agreed to a ceasefire around Christmas 1974.⁷² This ceasefire was extended until February, before being declared indefinite, and was reciprocated by the British government which responded by releasing detainees, scaling down

⁷¹ Statistical information for this graph provided for by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993*. Online Cross-tabulation of this information provided for by the CAIN Web Service at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

⁷² Powell, 47.

operations in nationalist areas, and setting up “incident centers” from which the IRA could report on events in particular districts.⁷³

However the rationale for this ceasefire was not to conduct negotiations so much as to lure in Republican “doves” by creating conditions in which the IRA would find it more difficult to restart their campaign of violence.⁷⁴ In fact, as Jonathan Powell elaborates, “From a British government point of view there were no negotiations... James Allan, the political adviser on Merlyn Rees’s [Secretary of State for Northern Ireland] staff was not to negotiate, but to advise the IRA of what action the British government and security forces might take if there were a cessation of violence on the part of the IRA.”⁷⁵ Little progress towards any political resolution was thus made, and by early November, the ceasefire existed only in name and the incident centers closed. Soon after—and less than a year into its announcement—the ceasefire was ended by an outraged IRA which considered it to be nothing more than a diversion to reduce Republican morale and energy while the British security forces regrouped.

Thus, by the end of this episode, only a fleeting and oft-breached ceasefire was achieved, while any real political settlement proved elusive, and the IRA—continuing to enjoy popular support—remained strongly committed to its campaign of terrorist violence. Considering this, and the levels of violence present at the conclusion of this episode, the outcome of strategic coercion is assessed as one of “limited success”.

⁷³ CAIN Web Service, “IRA Truce: 9 February 1975 to 23 January 1976 – Summary of Main Events,” 31 May 2009, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/truce/sum.htm> [Last Viewed 18 August 2009].

⁷⁴ Neumann, 85.

⁷⁵ Powell, 69.

Within-Case Episode #3: 1975-1982—Ulsterisation, Criminalisation, Normalisation

Following the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, the British government decided that its new strategy should be to move away from pursuing a political agreement, and instead concentrate on providing stability in the security and economic fields. To achieve this, Direct Rule from Westminster on a semi-permanent basis was embraced, while London used the ceasefire in 1975 to develop its new strategy and implement the necessary changes associated with it.⁷⁶ This new strategy was laid out in an unpublished British strategy paper entitled “The Way Ahead”, and was broken down into three components, being: Ulsterisation, Normalisation and Criminalisation.

Ulsterisation, which was a play on the word “Vietnamization”—involved planning a gradual decrease in the number of regular British troops and their replacement by the local RUC and UDR. Further, it entailed “police primacy” in giving the RUC the lead in security matters and placed the army under its direction.⁷⁷ Normalisation, meanwhile, was meant to assist Ulsterisation. It entailed phasing out of emergency arrangements and ending the primary role of the British regular forces in maintaining order, thereby “normalizing” the security situation for the police to take control of law enforcement.⁷⁸ This was implemented in conjunction with Criminalisation, whereby the IRA and other paramilitary/terrorist organizations were to be denied any acknowledgement of political motivation and were to be treated in exactly the same manner as those sardonically referred to by the authorities as “ordinary decent criminals.”⁷⁹ Criminalisation was largely intended to serve as a propaganda instrument in the British

⁷⁶ Neumann, 107.

⁷⁷ Graham Ellison and Jim Smyth, *The Crowned Harp: Policing Northern Ireland*, London: Pluto Press, 2000, 82.

⁷⁸ Michael Cunningham, *British Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969-2000*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001, 7.

⁷⁹ McKittrick and McVea, 123.

government's attempt to change the perceptions of the conflict as one of a colonial war (as depicted in Republican propaganda) to that of a simple campaign against criminal gangs.

Finally, in order to effectively implement this new strategy, the British government would appoint Roy Mason as the Northern Ireland Secretary in 1976. Mason took a comparatively hard-line approach, bluntly stating that he was going to squeeze and rollup the terrorists "like a tube of toothpaste."⁸⁰

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

The British government's attempts at isolation of external/international support enjoyed more success for the 1975-1982 period than in previous episodes. Most of this success came as a result of successful lobbying from the government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that succeeded in persuading the White House to direct the FBI against the IRA. As a consequence, the Harrison network was destroyed, and the IRA's supply of weaponry would become erratic as the NSTO was forced to turn to unreliable sources.⁸¹

However, sources of external/international support remained available to the IRA. In the Republic of Ireland the IRA maintained stockpiles of arms, "factories" for churning out homemade explosives, and training camps. Moreover the will of the Irish Republic to crackdown on this was undermined by several major sources of conflict. The first two of these involved London's adoption of Direct Rule on a quasi-permanent basis (while abandoning efforts to develop a new power-sharing arrangement), and the maintenance of the single-judge Diplock court system. The third came as a result of the outrage stirred up by the 1981 Hunger Strikes, which resulted in the death of 10 Republican hunger strikers, including MP Bobby Sands. Thus,

⁸⁰ Christopher Tuck, "Northern Ireland and the British Approach to Counter-Insurgency," *Defense and Security Analysis*, 23:2, 2007, 167.

⁸¹ Moloney, 17.

while no direct support would be delivered to Republican groups from the Irish Republic, crackdowns were limited and passive support endured.

Finally, Libya once again started to provide the IRA with active support. Impressed by the massive international publicity generated by the hunger strikes, Libya once again began channeling money to the IRA (though still refrained from delivering weapons), resulting in the provision of \$1.5 million over the next three years.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Progress was made during this episode of British strategy on the front of isolation of external/international support with the destruction of the Harrison Network in the USA. However passive support and sanctuaries remained in the Irish Republic, and financial support continued to flow from Libya. Isolation of External/International Support was thus “limited.”

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

In this episode, large gains were made in implementing denial. The key to much of this success began with the reorganization of the RUC with the aid of Kenneth Newman, Deputy and then Chief Constable of Northern Ireland. In reorganization, Newman’s first aim was to deal with the problems caused by the division of Northern Ireland into three operational regions—North, South and Belfast—each with of which were subdivided into 16 divisions. To the IRA, each Regional and Divisional boundary represented an invisible border across which they could escape, with an IRA Active Service Unit (ASU) from one Divisional area being able to carry out an operation in another area, while escaping to a third. As Peter Taylor describes it, the old system was “like a dinosaur chasing a ferret.”⁸² Several changes were thus instituted. First, intelligence would be centralized, with a computer-assisted Criminal Intelligence Section being

⁸² Taylor, 60.

established in Belfast. Second, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was reorganized, bringing in four additional Regional Crime Squads to assist the Divisional CIDs. These Regional Crime Squads, which were similarly organized to the IRA's ASUs, possessed the freedom to move across divisional boundaries and would be set to the task of smashing the Provisional IRA by targeting the most active members of the terrorist organization. Finally, the Chief Constable's third change was to make Castlereagh a fulltime, centralized, specialist Interrogation Center.⁸³

An advanced system was thus set up, which in functioning much like a conveyor belt, found the Criminal Intelligence Section uncovering and collating information on terrorist suspects, which was then sent to the Regional Crime Squad that would use this intelligence to track down and detain paramilitary suspects, with the suspects then sent to Castlereagh for intensive interrogation.⁸⁴ Here confessions made and elicited signed statement would then be used as evidence—and accepted under the relaxed admissibility tests—of the Diplock court system, following which convicted detainees would be shipped out to the Long Kesh Prison camp.

As this advanced police system was put into place, the army lent active support to security operations, providing bomb disposal units, manning vehicle checkpoints, ensuring route patrolling along the border and in Republican strongholds, and conducting undercover surveillance and intelligence operations.⁸⁵ The result was that by 1977, security forces had greatly undercut the IRA's capacity for conducting its campaign of terrorist violence.

Meanwhile the new Northern Ireland Secretary Roy Mason also demonstrated a willingness to firmly crackdown on Loyalist extremists in a manner hitherto not seen. Not only were security measures equally applied to these groups, but Mason also reacted firmly against

⁸³ Taylor, 63.

⁸⁴ S.K. Gosh, *Terrorism: World Under Siege*, New Delhi: Ashish, 1995, 186.

⁸⁵ Greer, 73.

any disruptive attempts by paramilitary “strikers”. Thus when Loyalist paramilitary groups reorganized themselves into a new organization—the United Unionist Action Council or (UUAC)—pushing for a return to majority rule and a tougher security policy, the security forces rapidly moved to break up paramilitary intimidation gangs, tear down barricades and open the roads. Thus, unlike in 1974 following the Sunningdale Agreement, a strong message was sent to Loyalists that their strikes and disruptions would be swiftly halted.⁸⁶

Assessment of Degree of Denial

By only the early mid-point (1977) of this episode of British strategy, the capacity of the IRA to wage an armed campaign was greatly reduced—so much so that it had to completely restructure itself and its objectives. Even Loyalist extremist groups were largely brought into line. The IRA would maintain the capacity to launch significant, well-planned terrorist attacks, but from here on out it would never again be able to do so on levels previously experienced. Thus, with the IRA’s capacity to launch terrorist attacks significantly reduced, its ability to operate continuously hemmed in, and the hostilities of additional substate groups (Loyalists) also reined, the degree of denial in this episode is assessed as “significant”.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

The result of attempts at enacting an isolation of popular support during this episode of British strategy was mixed. Many negative effects occurred as a result of the implementation of Britain’s new strategy. To begin with, Direct Rule—now instituted on a quasi-permanent basis—was starting to become an irritant with the Catholic community. The reason is that it proved to many Catholics that Constitutional Nationalism was not the way forward (with the clear alternative being violent Republicanism), and it forced the moderate SDLP to adopt a more

⁸⁶ McKittrick and McVea, 114.

intransigent attitude towards the British government. Direct Rule was thus coming to have a destabilizing and polarizing effect.⁸⁷

Meanwhile, the policies of Ulsterisation, Normalisation and Criminalisation—while enjoying some success in the realm of denial—were causing a number of problems in terms of isolation of popular support. Ulsterisation, which placed the locally recruited security forces on the front-line, underscored the sectarian dimension of the conflict, as it pitted the almost entirely Protestant/Unionist RUC and UDR against the entirely Catholic/Nationalist IRA.⁸⁸ Thus “police primacy” through Ulsterisation and Normalisation also produced a situation where one community was policing the other, which created the perception that security forces were not there to impartially counter violence—but rather were a biased tool in an inter-communal power struggle.⁸⁹

Another negative issue related to “police primacy” was that in the local security force’s efforts to acquire workable intelligence, they often resorted to excessive brutality. Both Republican and Loyalists came to believe that such brutality was routine within Castlereagh, and that convictions were being secured “through the systematic application of torture techniques.”⁹⁰ This caused stirrings within the local communities, as well as within civil liberty groups.

Criminalisation also provided a series of problems. The first was simply that its intended effect—to change the popular perception of the IRA being engaged in a colonial struggle against an oppressive imperial power, to one where the Provisionals were simply common criminals—did not transpire. The message of Criminalisation was both too incredible and inconsistent. That the government continued to rely on emergency powers authorizing the use of uncorroborated evidence (often acquired through means approaching torture), extended holding powers and the

⁸⁷ Neumann, 116.

⁸⁸ Greer, 72.

⁸⁹ Neumann, 109.

⁹⁰ Gerry Adams, *Before the Dawn: An Autobiography*, New York: Harper Perennial, 1998, 260.

use of non-jury courts undercut the message that the IRA were simply common criminals—regardless of the status they were given in prison.⁹¹

The worst result of Criminalisation, however, would come in the form of the 1981 Hunger Strikes. Occurring as a result of the deprivation of privileges granted to paramilitary prisoners with the 1972 Special Category status, the prisoners began staging a number of protests, which culminated in the 1981 Hunger Strikes. During this event, 10 prisoners died while on hunger strike. Most dramatically among these hunger strikers was a young man named Bobby Sands—who during the hunger strike became the Nationalist candidate in the by-election in Fermanagh-South Tyrone, and then won. Following Sands' death, and that of the other hunger strikers, enormous revulsion spread within the Nationalist communities of Ireland, as well as around the world.⁹² Nor was this event (or at least its conclusion) unavoidable. Then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher could have stepped in and provided “involuntary feeding” to the prisoners to avert their deaths. However as Thatcher recounts, “In striving to end the crisis, I had stopped short of force-feeding, a degrading and itself dangerous practice which I could not support.”⁹³ The situation thus ended in outrage, which greatly bolstered popular support for the IRA.

Fall Out from New Shoot-to-Kill Punishment Strikes

Another problem in restricting popular support for the IRA came as a result of new shoot-to-kill punishment strikes. Conceived of by the Security Coordinator for Northern Ireland, Sir Maurice Oldfield, the new policy involved “taking out” the “middle management” of the Republican NSTOs through selective assassination.⁹⁴ The policy would soon draw criticism,

⁹¹ Neumann.

⁹² Powell, 49.

⁹³ Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993, 392-3.

⁹⁴ Greer, 89.

however, as apparent shoot-to-kill policies took place, often against unarmed members of the IRA who could have been arrested instead. Combined with a series of accidental civilian deaths as a result of such lethal stings, the policy would draw criticism and bolster popular support for Republican NSTOs in the Catholic community and abroad.

Only Very Limited Gains in Economic Policy

Despite the emergence of Margaret Thatcher and the Conservative government (which saw marked reductions in government spending), the British government's economic policy of generous government investment in the province remained unchanged. However, as in previous periods, this investment was not matched by an enthusiasm for eradicating relative deprivation. Gains through such policies in terms of reducing unemployment amongst and discrimination against members of the Catholic community remained quite limited.

Despite Setbacks, Some Impressive Gains Emerge

During the 1975-1982, the British government did make some impressive gain in the realm of isolation of popular support—despite its many setbacks. Support was won from the SDLP and many moderate Nationalists (including the Dublin government) following Mason's firm handling of the UUAC strike—in stark contrast to the failing against the UWC in 1974. And of major significance, many of those involved in Loyalist paramilitaries—witnessing the successes the government's new denial strategy—came to conclude that violence on their parts and further involvement in the extremist paramilitaries was no longer necessary. As a consequence of this—in conjunction with the defeat of the UUAC—loyalist violence decreased from 127 killings in 1976 to just 28 in 1977. Further, in the following years, Loyalist

paramilitary operations would remarkably drop by approximately 90%⁹⁵, thereby greatly serving to ease violent sectarian tensions (one of the greatest sources of popular support for the IRA and Republicanism).

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

Objectively assessing the degree of isolation of popular support for this episode of strategic coercion is somewhat difficult regarding the mixed nature of the outcome. On the one hand, the British government significantly increased popular support for the IRA through laying the foundation for (and not preventing) a new source of significant grievance in the 1981 Hunger Strikes; instituting brutality in interrogation measures; developing a situation of “us versus them” by deploying an almost exclusively Protestant police force (the RUC) to ensure security in the Catholic community; discrediting Constitutional Nationalism as an effective means of change through a seemingly unending maintenance of Direct Rule; and pursuing controversial shoot-to-kill strikes. On the other, respect was won within the Nationalist community for the government’s newfound courage in dealing with Loyalist extremists; and popular support for violent Loyalist paramilitaries was highly reduced, witnessing a 90% reduction in violence—a major component in the generation of popular support for the IRA. Given these achievements, it would be difficult to assess isolation of popular support to be either “backfire” or “failure”, even in light of the many setbacks that occurred during this episode. Isolation of popular support is thus assessed as being “limited”.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Several additional factors may have played a role in the outcome of strategic coercion during this episode of British strategy. The first came from the shoot-to-kill punishment strikes

⁹⁵ Neumann, 108.

against the middle management of Republican NSTOs. While it is true that such assaults stirred up public and international criticism, the reality cannot be discounted that they also may have had an important impact in disrupting and denying the IRA's capacity to carry out violent attacks; moreover they may also have provided a deterrent function as well.

The second additional factor that may have had some impact came in the form of the 1976 Peace People movement. Championed by two Belfast women, Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams, the Peace People movement sprang up protesting civilian deaths at the hands of both substate groups and security forces. While the movement was only to last for several months, it did manage to attract the support of tens of thousands of people, as well as tremendous international publicity and the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to the two women who led it.⁹⁶

The third factor involved a condition that was also present in the previous episode of British strategy. This was the continued global economic recession that certainly played some role in undermining British efforts in raising the fiscal prosperity of Northern Ireland. And finally the fourth factor involved a significant occurrence of IRA overkill in the instance of the bombing of the La Mon House in February 1978. The event, which resulted in the death of twelve Protestants (seven of them women) and the injury of thirty others, had a tremendous negative effect on the IRA, costing it considerable popular and international support.


Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

At the conclusion of the 1975-1982 episode of strategic coercion, the British government had made some important gains. With much more effective efforts at denial put in place, security greatly improved, Loyalist paramilitary groups which were taking security into their

⁹⁶ BBC News, "Legacy of NI Peace Movement," 11 August 2006, Available Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/4781091.stm [Last Viewed 20 August 09].

own hands greatly declined, and violence levels plummeted. The following chart illustrates the degree to which violence was brought under control:

Figure 4.3: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1975-1982⁹⁷



Still, a number of challenges and setbacks remained. Even with violence greatly reduced and brought to something approaching “acceptable levels”, the IRA retained the capacity for launching spectacular strikes, as was illustrated by the August 1979 Mountbatten assassination and a deadly two stage-assault on the Parachute Regiment on the same day, as well as a coordinated attack in 1982 on British soldiers in two London parks.

Further, despite the significant reduction of violence levels, little if any political resolution was achieved. This situation was due in part to: 1) Roy Mason making it an explicit policy that no negotiations towards a new political/constitutional arrangement would be undertaken during this period; and 2) a reluctance of the part of the IRA, now under the control

⁹⁷ Statistical information for this graph provided for by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993*. Online Cross-tabulation of this information provided for by the CAIN Web Service at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

of new leadership from members such as Gerry Adams who perceived ceasefire and negotiations as dead-ends routes meant only to weaken the IRA and give British and local security forces the chance to consolidate their position. Considering this, the situation at the end of this episode was one of “moderate success” (stalemate). The British government had reasserted its authority and could now demonstrate to the IRA that it could not force a political change through terrorist violence; but by 1982 the British were also coming to acknowledge that security measures alone could not resolve the conflict.

Within-Case Episode #4: 1982-1989—Moving to Enhance Involvement from the Republic of Ireland

By the early 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear to both sides that a stalemate had emerged. Moreover, the British government began to arrive at the conclusion that undiminished Direct Rule from London was not a viable framework for containing the conflict. With little real prospect of establishing a new, devolved power-sharing government, the British concluded that handling the province could be improved by enhancing joint action with the Irish government.⁹⁸ As a consequence, the British government worked to establish the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985 with the Republic of Ireland. Specifically, the government of Margaret Thatcher sought a number of outcomes through such enhanced cooperation, including: greater deployment of resources by Irish security forces along the border and increased crackdowns within the Republic on sanctuaries, weapons stockpiles and training camps; assistance from Dublin in ending the Catholic minority’s reluctance to support the security forces and political system in Northern

⁹⁸ Neumann, 123.

Ireland; and the emergence of the Irish government as a responsible stakeholder in the management of Northern Ireland.⁹⁹

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

In their efforts to make a significant impact on isolating external and international support, the British focused much of their efforts during this episode on enhancing cooperation with the Republic of Ireland in the field of security through the AIA. The AIA gave the Irish government a consultative role in Northern Ireland through a ministerial Inter Governmental Conference (IGC) and a small permanent joint secretariat. In exchange for granting this new consultative role to the Irish, the British expected an enhancement of security cooperation, including crackdowns on IRA training camps, sources of money and supplies of arms within the Republic, as well as increased patrolling of the border and sharing of intelligence.¹⁰⁰

In terms of enhancing security cooperation, however, the agreement turned out to be a disappointment. A new string of watchtowers were erected along the border, aimed at curbing IRA activity across it. However serious enhancements in patrolling the border were left wanting, and the Irish government proved resistant to enhancing counter-terrorism operations and intelligence-sharing. This led Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to bitterly conclude that “in fighting terror we would have to stand almost alone, while the Irish indulged in gesture politics.”¹⁰¹

Still, the AIA did provide some important outcomes that would translate into enhanced isolation of external support for the IRA. First among these is that the AIA marked a substantial shift in Anglo-Irish relations, with both sides coming to adopt the perspective that they had to

⁹⁹ See: Thatcher, 396-402.

¹⁰⁰ Thatcher, 385.

¹⁰¹ Thatcher, 407.

work together. This new perspective blunted much of the critical stance adopted by Ireland in previous episodes of British strategy, while it also helped rein in some of the “megaphone diplomacy” that certainly did not help the UK in generating popular support for their own position amongst the Catholic community. Moreover, as the years of violence continued, this new arrangement helped provide for a convergence of positions between London and Dublin. The Republic subsequently would no longer see itself as warring with Britain over the fate of the north, and both governments came to view it as a difficult, dangerous problem to both.¹⁰²

The Libyan Connection

A significant challenge to isolation of external support came as a result of stepped up support from Colonel Qaddafi’s Libya. Through four separate shipments beginning in 1984, Qaddafi provided the IRA with large stocks of modern military hardware, including thousands of rifles with armor-piercing rounds capable cutting through protected police vehicles, flame-throwers, Semtex and SAM-7 missiles and anti-aircraft guns capable of downing British aircraft. Qaddafi also began to funnel \$10 million to the IRA, with the promise of more to come and the facilitation of introductions with other sympathetic governments. Following such generous support, British security estimated that the IRA had received a total of \$40 million in weaponry. Most importantly for the IRA, they now had the wherewithal to fight a truly long war, with the necessary supplies to carry out violence for another twenty years.¹⁰³

Neither the IRA nor Libya was content to stop there, however. Through the arrival of a further shipment—one that would equal the amount of arms received from the four previous shipments put together—the IRA intended to bring about a major escalation of violence. The plan was to initiate an IRA-style “Tet Offensive” that would cause so much damage in the first

¹⁰² McKittrick and McVea, 165.

¹⁰³ Moloney, 20.

two weeks of the assault that the momentum would keep the IRA going for another 18 months. During this time, the IRA planned to hold the areas of Armagh, Tyrone and Fermanagh, while striking British targets abroad, with the hope of triggering a disproportionate British response.¹⁰⁴ The hope was that the surge of popular support caused by this, combined with an erosion of British will as result of such lethal setbacks, would trigger a British withdrawal.

Fortunately for the British government, this was not to come to pass. An informer (suspected to be an agent of the British intelligence services) on board the *Eksund*—the vessel sent to deliver this massive shipment of arms—tipped off authorities. The French customs police subsequently intercepted the vessel, denying the IRA of the capacity to launch their hoped for “Tet Offensive”. Meanwhile the surprise factor needed to implement the “Tet Offensive” with Libya’s weapons was lost, and British security forces immediately moved to put in place countermeasures that would greatly mitigate much of the effectiveness of these new weapons. Colonel Qaddafi, who was outraged by the public revelation of his support, immediately cancelled his cash payments to the IRA (including half of the promised \$10 million). The IRA’s coffers were thus suddenly left empty, and their ability to intensify their campaign was severely curtailed.¹⁰⁵

Irish Support Post-*Eksund*

Following the interception of the *Eksund*, the Irish government, which now saw itself as working together with British—and fearful of the IRA’s new military capacity—quickly moved to disrupt IRA structures within its borders, conducting a massive 26 county-wide search for Libyan weaponry received from earlier shipments. And supporting operations from the Irish government would continue: in January 1988, they would make a massive preventive find,

¹⁰⁴ Moloney, 22.

¹⁰⁵ Moloney, 23.

seizing five machine guns, 100 rifles, 100 pounds of explosives and 50,000 rounds of ammunition at the Five Finger Strand in Malin in County Donegal.¹⁰⁶

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Isolation of external and international support during this episode of strategic coercion turned out to be something of mixed bag. On the one hand, the successfully received Libyan shipments made the IRA a more dangerous enemy than it had been in years, with the capacity of continuing armed hostilities for twenty years. On the other, the worst possible outcome was prevented, further supplies of weaponry and finances from Libya were cut off for good, and weaponry stockpiled in the Republic of Ireland were being seized. A new string of watchtowers oversaw the border area, and the Irish government was beginning to demonstrate increasing resolve to cooperate with the British on security matters. Moreover, of the weapons that had been obtained from Libya, many of them proved to be worthless, often being either too old to use, too impractical for implementation by guerrilla fighters, missing necessary components, etc.¹⁰⁷ Considering these factors, the level of external isolation is thus assessed as “limited.”

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

Implementation of denial remained largely successful during this episode, and even improved. This improvement occurred as a result of several factors. The first of these was the implementation of the supergrass system between late 1981 and 1986, which by 1983 had succeeded in further reducing terrorist violence, and had even broken up the command structure of the Loyalist UVF.¹⁰⁸ The system worked through using former members of Northern Ireland’s terrorist organizations as police informants—known as supergrasses—who would

¹⁰⁶ English, 260.

¹⁰⁷ Moloney, 329.

¹⁰⁸ Ed Moloney, “Will Supergrass Sow a Bitter Harvest?” *The Times*, 13 September 1983.

testify against their alleged former associates. In exchange, supergrasses were often provided a new life outside of Northern Ireland, reduction of prison sentences if not complete immunity from prosecution, and sometimes the payment of substantial sums of money.¹⁰⁹ The supergrass system enabled the authorities to surmount the problem of converting intelligence into evidence that would stand up in a court of law, thereby providing for the conviction of the so-called “godfathers” or leaders of terrorist organizations.

Denial—in particular of capable fighting men and operators—also improved as it was aided through increasingly enhanced intelligence that enabled the successful enactment of interdiction operations. The East Tyrone IRA learned this first-hand as they were interdicted in the middle of a terrorist operation, by members of the SAS and the RUC’s elite Mobile Support Unit, resulting in the elimination of a number of key members who were known to be amongst the IRA’s most proficient and dangerous operators. These denial operations continued with such success that the East Tyrone IRA, which carried out 21% of all IRA operations in Northern Ireland in 1986, would be reduced to accounting for no more than 11% per year by 1993.¹¹⁰

Libyan Challenges and Successes

Towards the mid 1980s, progress in the realm of denial—both through the maintenance of the 1975-1982 denial strategy, as well as improvements in intelligence collection and the use of accomplice based evidence to put members of the terrorist leadership behind bars—began to be undermined by considerable supplies of Libyan arms flowing into Northern Ireland. These new weapons enabled the IRA to step up their dwindling levels of violence. The IRA’s killing rate thus rose from 37 in 1986 to 58 in 1987 and 66 in 1988.

¹⁰⁹ Steven Greer, *Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995, 274.

¹¹⁰ Moloney, 319.

British security forces, however, reacted effectively, investing in anti-terrorist security measures that would prevent further terrorist assaults against military installations in Britain and Europe (particularly West Germany). Meanwhile the British also effectively implemented countermeasures to nullify the IRA's new Libyan granted arsenal, equipping their helicopters with electronic countermeasures that rendered the IRA's SAM-7s useless, changing helicopter formations so that they operated in groups of fives (so that if one was attacked, the others could respond), and reinforcing the armor of British vehicles to withstand the IRA's new capabilities.¹¹¹

Assessment of Degree of Denial

At the conclusion of the 1982-1989 episode of strategic coercion, the capacity of Republican NSTOs to launch major terrorist attacks continued to be kept at low levels. Still, a level of "high" denial was prevented through the arrival of support from Colonel Qaddafi and the Libyan arsenal. The degree of denial is thus assessed as "significant" for this episode of British strategy.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Isolation of popular support during this episode continued to suffer from several ongoing issues, present in previous episodes of strategic coercion. The first of these was the maintenance of Britain's apparent to shoot-to-kill policy by its security forces. The result was that following a number of incidents, when it was clearly apparent that the security forces had exceeded the level of force necessary to make arrests, Britain came under criticism, and Catholic communities

¹¹¹ Moloney, 23.

witnessed increased alienation vis-à-vis the security forces.¹¹² This issue was further exacerbated both by the RUC's engagement's in such activities (mimicking the SAS) with their new E4A unit, as well as a controversial incident in Gibraltar which left three members of the IRA dead, despite claims by witnesses that they were shot while unarmed, lying on the ground.¹¹³

The second issue that continued to contribute little to the British government's attempts to isolate popular support for the IRA came from their insufficient economic reform policies, which did little to reduce discrimination or relative deprivation in Northern Ireland. By 1989, through the Fair Employment Act, a significant change occurred in that London, for the first time, acknowledged that the material inequality between the two communities needed to be addressed if political stability was to emerge.¹¹⁴ Even so, however, the new Act was insufficient to address the problem. As Peter Neumann explains:

...whilst the 1989 Act compelled employers to consider affirmative action in order to redress existing imbalances, it explicitly prohibited them from taking measures that were exclusive to one particular community. This apparent contradiction illustrated London's difficulties in acting upon the logic of communal rights whilst maintaining the principle of individual merit and trying to avoid adverse reaction by the majority community.¹¹⁵

Finally, the third adverse issue simply had to do with the continued presence of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. As the leader who had been blamed and villainized in Ireland's Nationalist communities for the death of the Bobby Sands and the other hunger strikers, Thatcher's continued position as head of the British government restricted efforts at winning over popular support for the UK's position—and thus away from the IRA.

¹¹² Sean Byrne, *Growing up in a Divided Society: The Influence of Conflict on Belfast Schoolchildren*, Florham, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1997, 45.

¹¹³ David McKittrick, "Exclusive: UK Cleared Over Killing of IRA Gang: SAS 'Did Not Use Unnecessary Force' in Gibraltar," *The Independent*, 5 June 1994.

¹¹⁴ Neumann, 144.

¹¹⁵ Neumann, 145.

Some Important Gains

Despite these continuing setbacks, the British government did make a number of important gains as a result of the establishment of the AIA. The agreement was so embraced by moderate Nationalists, in fact, that Sinn Fein publicly acknowledged this outcome—while witnessing a significant drop in electoral support for the Republican political organization at the ballot box. Additionally, the involvement of Ireland for consultation in British security decisions in Northern Ireland went a long way towards reducing grievances in the Catholic community which nourished support for the IRA.¹¹⁶

Another outcome also took place as a result of the AIA. Importantly, members of both the Republican-leaning Nationalist community, as well as within the IRA and its leadership, witnessed London's willingness to implement a policy that was considered unpopular with the Unionist population—and indeed even face down the resistance that had emerged in opposition to it. This led many in Republicanism to believe that a political solution might indeed be possible, believing that the British government was now willing to “stand up to the Unionists.”¹¹⁷ The result of this was the emergence of a growing isolation of support against a campaign of violence.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

The 1982-1989 period witnessed some reduction in popular support for the IRA, the avoidance of major new grievances, a continued drop in civilian deaths caused by the British security forces, and some important gains through the establishment of the AIA. Continued cross-community grievances from discrimination, controversial shoot-to-kill strikes by British security forces, and the continued presence of Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister, restricted

¹¹⁶ Moloney, 241.

¹¹⁷ Neumann, 141.

greater levels of popular isolation. Isolation of popular support for this episode of strategic coercion is thus assessed as being “limited.”

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Several additional factors may have played a role in influencing the outcome of this episode of strategic coercion. One of these involved the *deterrence* effect of the denial strikes carried out by the SAS and RUC’s Headquarters Mobile Support Unit mentioned earlier. These denial strikes were also shoot-to-kill in nature, and through eliminating experienced IRA units, were meant to serve as a deterrent against would-be terrorists. Sir John Wheeler, former Security Minister of Northern Ireland, explained the rationale: “If you really want to bring about a change in terrorist behavior, you have to create a climate whereby they are frightened to commit crime because they fear either apprehension... or being caught in a cross-fire situation whereby they get killed.”¹¹⁸

Another factor that may have influenced the outcome of strategic coercion came from an instance of IRA overkill in November 1987 as a result of the Enniskillen bombing, which left 11 Protestants dead, 60 injured on the morning of Remembrance Day in memorial for the dead. Support within Nationalist communities across Ireland for the IRA—as well as internationally—contracted following the incident, with many safe houses shut to the IRA south of the border.¹¹⁹


¹¹⁸ Neumann, 132.

¹¹⁹ Moloney, 324.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

During this episode of strategic coercion, violence was kept low at “acceptable levels,”¹²⁰ with a stalemate continuing between British security forces and the IRA. This situation is illustrated in figure 4.4:

Figure 4.4: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1982-1989¹²¹



However, other than perhaps the Anglo-Irish Agreement (which helped ease tension regarding the Irish Republic’s role in the conflict), little political resolution capable of ending the conflict was achieved, and the IRA continued to enjoy sufficient popular support for continued hostilities. This was due in part to a complete aversion both on the part of Republican NSTOs—the Provisional IRA in particular—and the Catholic Nationalist community to countenance any form of negotiations, or embrace moves towards political resolution while Margaret Thatcher, a

¹²⁰ For more information, see: Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993*, Belfast: Beyond the Pale Publications, 1994.

¹²¹ Statistical information for this graph provided for by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 1969-1993*. Online Cross-tabulation of this information provided for by the CAIN Web Service at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

woman they blamed for the death of the Hunger strikers in 1981, remained at the helm (not to mention Thatcher's own aversion to negotiations). Furthermore, the IRA remained committed to a campaign of terrorist violence, and thanks to support from Colonel Qaddafi, had the wherewithal to oblige this desire for some time to come. The level of success for this episode of strategic coercion is thus assessed as "moderate".

Within-Case Episode #5: 1989-1997—Aiming for a Political Settlement, Ceasefire and Failure

Following the establishment of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA), two important developments emerged. The first was that London realized that pursuing enhanced cooperation with the Republic of Ireland alone would not be sufficient to resolve the conflict. The second was that on the Republican side, elements of the IRA's leadership—in experiencing increased political marginalization in addition to ongoing military stalemate—were increasingly beginning to consider possibilities for a political settlement that would lead to an end of violence.

With the exit of Margaret Thatcher and the entrance of John Major as the new British Prime Minister, London began to shift its strategy, declaring its objective to be one of seeking out a comprehensive and agreed political solution to the conflict. This solution—which would be produced through gaining the *agreed* consent of both Nationalist and Unionist communities, rather than simply being imposed—would involve a form of devolution¹²² and power-sharing, including some element of North-South Cooperation with the Republic of Ireland over matters concerning the province.¹²³ Overtime, these efforts would meet some success, with a ceasefire achieved in late August 1994. However the government of John Major, which was constrained

¹²² Devolution meaning rule of the province through a local government as Stormont had in the past, only with a more equitable distribution of power.

¹²³ Neumann, 162.

in the political and strategic choices it could make through its reliance on the support of Ulster Unionists for their narrow majority in Parliament, lacked both the capacity to sufficiently take on the Unionist part of the conflict equation in pursuit of such a political settlement.¹²⁴

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

Throughout the 1989-1997 period, isolation of external/international support for the IRA continued to improve. A large contribution to these efforts came in the form of the joint Anglo-Irish Downing Street Declaration (DSD) that elevated the principle of consent¹²⁵, while publicly setting out the conditions in which the IRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, could be admitted to a talks process regarding a potential political settlement. The proclamation of the DSD had the impact of greatly aligning the position of Dublin behind the British agenda for limited constitutional change.

Moreover, British and Irish perspectives would continue to coalesce, as in February 1995 the two governments jointly published a "framework document." The document envisaged Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom, while simultaneously stressing the importance of Unionist consent *and* that the "Irishness" of Nationalists should be formally expressed, namely through a progressive increase in cross-border institutions with Dublin.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ George Mitchell, *Making Peace*, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999, 88.

¹²⁵ This principle held that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland (i.e. its potential withdrawal from the Union and integration with the Republic of Ireland) could not be implemented without the consent of a majority of voters in Northern Ireland.

¹²⁶ British and Irish Governments, "The Framework Documents – A New Framework for Agreement," 22 February 1995, CAIN Web Service, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/fd22295.htm> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Isolation of external and international support continued to improve during this episode of strategic coercion. The Irish and British came even further together in their positions and cooperation on the issue of Northern Ireland, while in the meantime, sources of external arms supplies and finances such as those in the US remained minimal. Nor did any major supplier re-emerge, as Colonel Qaddafi's regime had in the last episode. Thus, even though the IRA continued to enjoy some popular sympathy in the Republic—with a porous border that helped them enjoy it (often in the form of safe havens, and locations for weapons' factories and storage)—the degree of external/international support enjoyed by the IRA was at its lowest levels since the 1960s. The degree of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as being "significant".

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

The 1989-1997 episode of strategic coercion continued to witness improvements in British efforts at implementing denial. Following ever improving access to intelligence—much of it gained through IRA infiltration—the British were able to prevent with ease a massive IRA escape plan from the Crumlin Road Jail. And when the IRA decided to try implementing a new strategy involving sending over flying columns along the border area and in Belfast and Derry, this aspiration quickly came to an end when the first of such columns (composed of around 20 of the IRA's most experienced and trusted operators) was intercepted by heavy British gunfire and helicopters. Denial operations were becoming so successful that IRA operatives were becoming "afraid to go on column operations."¹²⁷ Meanwhile, MI5 was making deep inroads into the IRA's English department to the extent that the IRA was forced to largely abandon the use of its

¹²⁷ Moloney, 336.

“sleeper units” (groups that were sent in to merge with the local populace and become activated for terrorist operations when commanded).¹²⁸

The British were making technical adjustments as well that limited the capacity of the IRA to successfully assault them. Patrolling soldiers now wore flak jackets that could not be penetrated by any bullet in the IRA’s armory. Radio signals used by the IRA to trigger remote-controlled bombs could now be blocked by the British; bombs triggered by landmines could now be detected due to the implementation of infrared sensors fitted to British helicopters; and the effectiveness of culvert bombs (stuffed into drains beneath rural roads)—that had terrorized military patrols in rural areas to the point where South Armagh had once been made too dangerous for road patrols—was now greatly reduced through the placement of wire mesh, which made it impossible to IRA engineers to set such booby-traps.¹²⁹

The IRA Still Manages to Carry out Some Successful Operations

Throughout this episode, the IRA still managed to carry out some important operations against the British. In April 1992, an IRA bombing operation was carried out with extraordinary effect in the City of London, targeted at Britain’s financial center. The attack, which struck London’s Baltic Exchange, inflicted serious damage to Britain’s economy, causing £800 million of damage.¹³⁰ In late 1992, the IRA repeated their assault on London’s financial district, setting off a large bomb at Bishopgate. The damage was once again extraordinary, and the British government was left desperate to prevent any subsequent recurrence, worried that any further

¹²⁸ Moloney.

¹²⁹ Moloney, 339.

¹³⁰ CAIN Web Service, “A Chronology of the Conflict – 1992”, 31 May 2009, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch92.htm> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

successful strikes in London's financial district might cause major financial institutions to relocate to other countries not subject to such dangers.¹³¹

Such IRA Success was only Fleeting

Despite the success of the IRA's bombing operations in London, these assaults were interpreted as a sign of weakness in Westminster.¹³² Firstly, the operation revealed that the IRA was finding it difficult to successfully carry out further meaningful attacks in Northern Ireland. Secondly, the attack demonstrated an over-reliance by the IRA on their South Armagh battalions—the last Republican stronghold that the IRA considered safe from infiltration. The knowledge that financial district bombs had originated from South Armagh made it a prime target for British security forces, leading to a successful undercover operation by the British in April 1994 arresting seven of the South Armagh battalion's key operators. According to Ed Moloney, the operations sent a clear message to Republicans: "If the British could hit the South Armagh IRA, then the war was as good as over."¹³³

And indeed, the statistics on the effectiveness of IRA operations bore this message out. By this timeframe, only 6% of IRA operations actually went ahead, with the RUC estimating that by the early 1990s, 70% of all planned IRA operations in Northern Ireland had to be aborted for fear of detection, while amongst the remaining 30%¹³⁴ of operations that went ahead, another 80% were prevented or interdicted by the security forces.¹³⁵

¹³¹ McKittrick and McVea, 182.

¹³² Neumann, 157.

¹³³ Moloney, 459.

¹³⁴ Neumann, 157.

¹³⁵ House of Commons Debate, "Northern Ireland (Security)," vol. 202, c.21, 20 January 1992, Available Online at: <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1992/jan/20/northern-ireland-security> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

Denial After Breakdown of Ceasefire

Even after the breakdown of the ceasefire in February 1996, it was becoming increasingly clear that the IRA was being rendered ineffective. The IRA Northern Command's special unit that had been used to successfully restart the campaign in the North with the bombing of the Thiepval barracks was soon rolled up by the RUC. The IRA then turned to their standard Active Service Units (ASUs) to carry out operations, but their attempts were largely interdicted—or bungled for fear of being so. Thus, despite the fact that the IRA mounted dozens of attacks in Northern Ireland following the collapse of the ceasefire, few such attacks ever came close to hitting their target, and the IRA's killing rate continued to drop significantly. By mid-1997—a year after the ceasefire had ended—the IRA had only succeeded in killing just two soldiers and two civilians.¹³⁶

Assessment of Degree of Denial

By 1997—even in light of the breakdown of the 1994 ceasefire—British security forces had managed to greatly reduce the IRA's ability to carry out successful operation, nearly eliminating their capacity to conduct (at least in a sustained fashion) major terrorist attacks. Moreover, the IRA was finding its ability to operate, plan, and enjoy any degree of freedom of movement to be greatly impaired. Consequently casualty levels remained low during this timeframe. The degree of denial against the IRA for this episode is thus assessed as being “high”.

¹³⁶ Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland – Revised and Updated Extracts from Sutton's Book*, CAIN Web Service, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/book/> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Efforts at isolation of popular support continued to be enhanced during this episode. This improvement began with the replacement of Tom King by Peter Brooke as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who breached new ground with both the Catholic community and members of the IRA. In November 1990, Brooke stated that the British government had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”—a crucial step urged by John Hume for encouraging the IRA to lay down their weapons and consider a ceasefire en route to a political solution.¹³⁷

Even further progress was made under Prime Minister John Major through the Downing Street Declaration (DSD). Based off of a secret dialogue between John Hume and Gerry Adams, the DSD held two very important points for both the Nationalist community and the IRA’s grassroots. The first was that Prime Minister John Major clearly stated (repeating Brooke’s declaration) that the British government had no selfish economic or strategic interest in Northern Ireland. Rather their primary interest was to “see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the people who inhabit the island.”¹³⁸ Secondly, the issue of self-determination was also addressed in the DSD, with Major stating that “[t]he British government agrees that it is for the people of the island of Ireland *alone* by agreement between the two parties respectively, to exercise their right to *self-determination* on the basis of consent, *freely* and concurrently given, north and south, to bring about a united Ireland if that is their wish.”¹³⁹ Meanwhile the DSD even managed to appease moderate Unionists, with a declaration from the Irish Prime Minister that “it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence of the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.”¹⁴⁰ Accordingly, the Irish government also firmly pledged to change Article 2 and 3 of its Constitution (dealing with

¹³⁷ Powell, 64.

¹³⁸ Hume, 98.

¹³⁹ Hume.

¹⁴⁰ John Major and Albert Reynolds, “Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration,” 15 December 1993, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/peace/docs/dsd151293.htm> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

the recognition of Northern Ireland's sovereign existence) in the event of a "balanced constitutional accommodation."¹⁴¹

The result of the DSD was that it managed to unite the entire spectrum of Constitutional Nationalism, as well as the UUP (the main party for moderate Unionists), behind the British position; it therefore achieved the feat of producing a declaration that placed the maximum possible pressure on Republicans, while giving them an out in the form of a ceasefire and a political process towards a settlement.¹⁴²

Other Important Moves for Isolating Popular Support Prior to a Ceasefire

The British government under John Major also made other moves to continue to isolate popular support. One of these involved the fusion of the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR) with the Royal Irish Rangers in 1992, and the gradually phasing out of UDR activities—an important move for winning support from the Catholic community, which considered the organization an offensive symbol.¹⁴³ Another saw important changes in Britain's economic policy. Changing their position from early periods that absolute poverty was the sole economic "cause" of the conflict, the British government now argued that community differentials in terms of relative deprivation were equally significant.¹⁴⁴ The government thus launched the "Targeting Social Need" initiative, which was meant to alleviate poverty in the province's worst affected areas.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴¹ Major and Reynolds.

¹⁴² McKittrick and McVea, 196.

¹⁴³ Tim Ripley and Mike Chappell, *Security Forces in Northern Ireland, 1969-92*, London: Osprey Publishing, 1993, 48.

¹⁴⁴ Neumann, 176.

¹⁴⁵ V.K. Borooah, "Targeting Social Need: Why are Deprivation Levels in Northern Ireland Higher for Catholics than for Protestants?" *Journal of Social Policy*, 29:2, 2000, 282.

Moves Taken During the Ceasefire to Encourage Progress

Further moves were also made following the ceasefire, which was declared in late August 1994, in order to encourage popular support within the Catholic community in favor of achieving a political settlement. One such move involved the transfer of terrorist prisoners in the United Kingdom to holding facilities in Northern Ireland (so that they could be closer to their families), as well as the increase of remission for these prisoners.¹⁴⁶ The British government also moved to reduce security levels in Northern Ireland, reducing military patrols, helicopter activity, vehicle checkpoints and making symbolic changes in weapons and headgear, as well as re-opening border roads.¹⁴⁷

Moreover, throughout the ceasefire period, the British government attempted to enhance the “feel good factor” through transferring savings in security spending to social programs, housing, education, and so forth, while maintaining high levels of public spending through a “peace dividend to address the province’s “special needs”.¹⁴⁸ This translated into an additional investment subsidy of £73 million from the British Exchequer, which was further complemented by £230 million in aid from the European Union, and further significant contributions from Commonwealth countries and the United States. At the same time, however, the government also made it clear that if the ceasefire were to end, and security measures reintroduced, then economic subsidies would come back down as “everyone must share the pain.”¹⁴⁹

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

With popular support for continued terrorist violence and the IRA greatly reduced, existing grievances (such as the perception that the British government remained involved in

¹⁴⁶ Powell, 85.

¹⁴⁷ Neumann, 158.

¹⁴⁸ House of Commons Debate, Vol. 248, c.1101, 27 October 1994.

¹⁴⁹ House of Commons Debate, Vol. 291, c.412, 27 February 1997.

Northern Ireland affairs due to selfish strategic and economic interests, and that London was attempting to suppress Irish self-determination) being addressed at Britain's highest levels, the emergence of any new significant grievances avoided, excessive violence almost completely eliminated and the continued provision of security for the province's population provided by the British government, this level of Isolation of popular support is assessed as "significant".

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

A number of additional significant factors played a role in influencing the outcome of this episode of British strategy. The first, simply put, was the departure of Margaret Thatcher as Britain's Prime Minister, and her replacement by John Major. Major, who was something of an unknown in Northern Ireland, carried none of the political baggage possessed by his predecessor, and thus had the opportunity to be both more flexible and imaginative in his approach towards Northern Ireland.¹⁵⁰

Another factor influencing the outcome of this episode of British strategy came in the form of secret talks between the IRA's Gerry Adams and various representatives (be they John Hume, the Catholic Church, the Irish Government and various elements within the British Government) over the last decade. These talks assisted the government in both its efforts towards addressing existing grievances/issues of concern through the DSD, and its moves towards bringing about a ceasefire with the possibility of a resultant peace process.

A third factor was present—once again—in bungled IRA operations that produced overkill and disgust throughout the late 1980s until 1992. With each disastrous operation that claimed the lives of more and more civilians, support for the IRA continued to shrink, which was tangibly registered in a consistent drop in the ballot box for Sinn Fein. With the implementation of the "human bomb"—whereby the IRA would force an uninvolved outsider to essentially carry

¹⁵⁰ Moloney, 283.

out a suicide car-bombing while his family was kept hostage—and the Teebane Crossroads massacre that resulted in the death of eight Protestant civilians—support for the IRA shrank to an all time low, with Sinn Fein suffering tremendous setbacks in capturing a share of the vote, and even Gerry Adams losing his West Belfast seat in Parliament to the SDLP.

A fourth factor affecting the outcome of this episode came from abroad, as the Bill Clinton Administration granted Gerry Adams a visa to come to the USA. Despite strong resistance from John Major, Clinton believed that granting such a visa would help to make it easier for the IRA to call a ceasefire—which it did in late August 1994—by demonstrating the potential political gains that could be made should the organization choose to give up violence as a way forward. Indeed, massive media attention was poured on Gerry Adams, and financial support flooded into Sinn Fein's coffers (restricted through US Government monitoring to ensure political use only).¹⁵¹


The final factor came from the limitations of John Major's government. While he was freer and more empowered to take political action than Margaret Thatcher had been, his government still found its hand tied to a large extent. The reason for this was that Major's Conservative government increasingly found itself dependent on the Unionist vote. Depending on them to maintain his party's slim majority in Westminster, Major was always constrained in his actions—especially regarding moves in relation to Sinn Fein and the IRA—for fear of alienating the Unionists and potentially bringing down his government. This limitation would prove to be a particularly troublesome issue in achieving any negotiated progress with the Provisional IRA, discussed in the following assessment.

¹⁵¹ Powell, 79.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

Despite the failure of the British government to achieve or implement a successful political settlement that would have brought an end to the violence in Northern Ireland, the British government's campaign of strategic coercion enjoyed some gains during this period. As illustrated by figure 4.5, violence-levels were kept low:

Figure 4.5: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1989-1997¹⁵²



Moreover, some important political resolution was achieved. This was particularly the case with establishment of the Downing Street Declaration, which formally witnessed Britain addressing the issue that it had no selfish strategic or economic reason for retaining Northern Ireland, while fairly addressing the issue of self-determination and the conditions under which Northern Ireland's constitutional/political status might change (namely that consent, freely given, of the

¹⁵² Statistical information for this graph provided for by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland – Revised and Updated Extracts from Sutton's Books*. Online Cross-tabulation of this information provided for by the CAIN Web Service at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/crosstabs.html> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

majority of Northern Ireland's population would be required). This progress helped lead the IRA to declare a "complete cessation of military operations" by the IRA on August 31, 1994. Serious negotiations, however, never had much of a chance to commence, as the issue of decommissioning (the destruction or surrender of IRA weapons), would soon pose an insurmountable hurdle.

Decommissioning would soon become an obstacle following the proclamation by Prime Minister John Major that "huge progress" would have to be made in this regard before any exploratory talks could become formal, leading to negotiations and a peace process. This demand was met with fierce resistance from Sinn Fein and the IRA. Decommissioning essentially required the IRA to surrender its military capability before negotiations for peace even commenced.¹⁵³ Sinn Fein predictably announced that the IRA would not surrender its weapons before a political settlement, demanding that this issue be dealt with in talks.

Realizing that its position on decommissioning was serving to hold up any progress towards negotiations, the British government attempted to soften its position. In publicly laying out what would come to be known as the "Washington Three" conditions for peace talks¹⁵⁴, Patrick Mayhew (then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) reduced John Major's initial demand of "huge progress" in decommissioning to just the "actual decommissioning of some arms."¹⁵⁵ However, this still would not prove to be enough to get the IRA moving on their end. John Major thus moved to create the independent International Commission on Disarmament, bringing in American former-Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, Canadian General John de Chastelain, and former Finnish Prime Minister Hari Halkiri. In George Mitchell's own

¹⁵³ Powell, 81.

¹⁵⁴ These conditions were that the IRA had to: 1) disarm progressively; 2) agree to what decommissioning would entail; and 3) undertake "actual decommissioning of some arms" before talks could begin (Powell, 82).

¹⁵⁵ Mitchell, 25.

words, “The British government had gotten itself on the hook of prior decommissioning... and we had been brought in to get them off.”¹⁵⁶

The recommendation of the international commission led by George Mitchell was that decommissioning should take place in parallel with negotiations. At the same time, six “Mitchell Principles” were also established as a precondition for negotiations to guarantee the IRA (and all other paramilitary groups) commitment to peace¹⁵⁷. John Major was reluctant, however, to endorse the position of the international body, and decided to come up with his own alternative route to overcoming the hurdle that the issue of decommissioning had become. John Major’s alternative was to give the IRA (and all other paramilitary groups) the choice of *either* enacting some decommissioning prior to negotiations *or* moving to secure a democratic mandate (through elections) for engaging in all-party talks towards a peace settlement.¹⁵⁸

Unfortunately, John Major’s new proposal came too late. After 18 months of inaction caused by the issue of decommissioning—and only three weeks after Major’s new proposal—the ceasefire would end as a large bomb was detonated on February 9, 1996 in Canary Wharf, killing two people and causing millions of pounds worth of damage.¹⁵⁹ In the end, then, what was achieved during this episode of negotiations was a negotiated ceasefire, but that was effectively it. Negotiations/talks towards a peaceful settlement never really got off the ground with Sinn Féin perpetually banned from the negotiating table over the issue of decommissioning, and eventually even the ceasefire collapsed in February 1996.

Thus, despite some important progress towards political resolution and the maintenance of (increasingly) low levels of terrorist violence, full—or “high”—success was not achieved by

¹⁵⁶ Mitchell, 30.

¹⁵⁷ These principles demanded commitments for the parties to: 1) democratic and exclusively peaceful means; 2) total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations; 3) disarmament taking place in a manner verifiable by an independent commission; 4) renunciation of the use/threat of force; 5) acceptance of the agreement reached without attempt to alter it by force; and 6) an end to punishment beatings and killings. (Powell, 87).

¹⁵⁸ Mitchell, 40.

¹⁵⁹ Tony Geraghty, *The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict Between the IRA and British Intelligence*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 289.

the conclusion of this episode of strategic coercion. The outcome observed is thus assessed as being one of “significant success.”

Within-Case Episode #6: 1997-2007—Achieving a Political Settlement, Seeing it Implemented

The 1997-2007 episode of British strategy was similar to that of the 1989-1997 episode in terms of strategic coercion measures such as denial, and isolation of external and popular support. However it significantly differed in its approach to conducting negotiations. This new episode commenced following the landslide victory of the Labour party, with Tony Blair replacing John Major as Prime Minister. Upon assuming his position as Prime Minister, Blair possessed a crucial advantage that Major did not: a substantial majority in Parliament, which gave him a degree of freedom in formulating his Northern Ireland policies.

Tony Blair made it a top priority to bring resolution to the conflict. Blair soon reversed the policy of the Major government, which made decommissioning a precondition for engaging in all-party talks. The only concession demanded was the implementation—and maintenance of—a true ceasefire, which Sinn Fein readily accepted within two months. Sinn Fein obliged, and the IRA committed itself to a new ceasefire in July 1997. This time all-party talks—involving direct negotiations with Sinn Fein—would commence shortly thereafter. Further, meaningful negotiations were assisted through Tony Blair and the Labour Government’s decision to include all groups party to the conflict in the negotiations process. Thus, moderate Nationalists and Unionists, as well as Loyalist groups with ties to the paramilitary UDA and UVF, were brought onboard for the talks process. As this episode of strategic coercion played out, it would thus become the objective of the Blair government to negotiate a political settlement that would provide a viable resolution to the conflict, thereby ending the hostilities of

extremist substate groups on both sides. The result was the achievement of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, discussed in further detail later, and ensuing efforts by the British government to ensure its implementation.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

During this episode of British strategy, isolation of external/international support for the IRA continued to improve. With a renewed ceasefire, and the achievement of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, both Washington and Dublin had become firm supporters of the British agenda.¹⁶⁰ Thus in 1998, following the Omagh Bombing, Britain and Ireland worked closely together to enact legal reforms to tackle terrorism on both sides of the border. Meanwhile support from sources originating in the US continued to be thwarted—in 1999 the FBI uncovered a large-scale gunrunning plot in Florida organized by the IRA.¹⁶¹

Furthermore, the British government was successful in proactively preventing support from emerging elsewhere for the IRA, as it had once done from Libya. The proof of this came when British intelligence helped to tip off a liaison between the IRA and Colombia's FARC in August 2001. According to Irish Justice Minister Michael McDowell, had the deal not been intercepted, the IRA would have received \$35 million from the narcotics-rich FARC in exchange for training in explosives and mortar production for their guerillas.¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ Francis Carroll, *American Presence in Ulster: A Diplomatic History, 1796-1996*, Washington, D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2005, 239.

¹⁶¹ English, 328.

¹⁶² Shawn Pogatchnik, "3 IRA-linked Fugitives Back in Ireland – Trained FARC in Columbia – Hid Out in Venezuela/Cuba," *Boston Globe*, 6 August 05.

Further Isolation Post-9/11

Following the September 11th terrorist attacks by Al Qaeda in New York and Washington D.C., external support was even further squashed for the IRA. The Administration of George W. Bush—which had already demonstrated that it would not lend the same degree of political support or involvement as had been enjoyed by Sinn Fein under Bill Clinton—along with previously supportive members of corporate and congressional Irish-America, halted all public support for Sinn Fein, and demanded to see “action now” regarding IRA decommissioning and a formal renunciation of violence.¹⁶³

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

By the end of the 1997-2007 episode of strategic coercion, the IRA had now found itself near completely isolated from external and international support. With Dublin and Washington in lockstep over support for British efforts leading up to and following the Good Friday Agreement, serious anti-terrorism legislation being passed on both sides of the border in Ireland, the near-complete elimination of support from groups in the US, and any further potential sources of support being interdicted before they could become manifest, the level of isolation of external/popular support reached the status of “high.”

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

During the 1997-2007 period, the capacity of Republican NSTOs for terrorist violence continued to be greatly mitigated due to successful denial efforts by the British government. The British even began to branch out and address a recurring potential powder-keg for sectarian tensions—the Unionist Drumcree marches. At Mo Mowlam’s (then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) behest, laws were implemented, granting new powers for a Parades

¹⁶³ Moloney, 487.

Commission in February 1998 to oversee the physical direction through which parades could march, effectively blocking them from marching down the primarily Catholic Garvaghy Road. To enforce this, the British security forces mobilized prior to the large marches, erecting large containers of concrete and razor wire across cordoned off roads—surrounded by a moat—which was armed by troops and mobile water cannons.¹⁶⁴ While the marches remained disruptive, loss of life was largely prevented, as was a potential mechanism for re-igniting the conflict.

IRA Splinter Groups

Following the establishment of a new ceasefire in 1997, and Sinn Féin's commencement in all-party talks, a new splinter group split off from the Provisional IRA, fashioning themselves the Real IRA (RIRA). The RIRA soon attempted to merge their efforts with other existing Republican splinter groups—the Continuity IRA (which had split from the Provisionals in the 1980s) and the INLA (an offshoot of the Official IRA in the 1970s)—pooling resources for a bombing campaign, which began with a van-bomb on the RUC station at Markethill, County Armagh. This campaign, which began in September 1997, was marked by a deadly series of car bomb and mortar attacks, primarily in County Armagh, and would carry into 1998.

This new alliance of Republican splinter groups was not long to last, however. The three groups soon experienced tensions as they were unable to develop a common political manifesto that would surmount their ideological differences. And following a major bombing in the market town of Omagh in August 1998 that killed 29 people, the INLA and the Continuity IRA let the RIRA take the fall for the catastrophic operation. The result was a complete souring of relations, with the Continuity IRA and the INLA calling ceasefires three weeks after the attack. Dissident unity was thus smashed, and none of the three groups would thereafter be able to mount any

¹⁶⁴ Mo Mowlam, *Momentum: The Struggle for Peace, Politics and the People*, London: Coronet Books, 2003, 108.

serious challenge to either the British government or the Provisional IRA, which took to calling them “micro groups.”¹⁶⁵

Moreover, the RIRA was to continue to suffer significant setbacks. The largest of these perhaps came in March 2001, when their leader—Micky McKevitt—was arrested and convicted on the basis of evidence supplied by a US sympathizer who had infiltrated the group at the behest of the FBI and MI5. The combination of this catastrophe, and the organization’s ineffectiveness at carrying forth any further armed struggle, deterred any potential disgruntled Provisional Republicans from jumping ship and lending support to the RIRA’s cause. Thus, by the time the Provisionals decommissioned in late 2001, the threat from splinter groups had been reduced to a minor concern.¹⁶⁶

Assessment of Degree of Denial

Similar to the previous episode, by the end of the 1997-2007 episode of strategic coercion British intelligence and security forces were able to all but eliminate Republican NSTO capacity for carrying out major terrorist attacks, with their ability to operate greatly reduced and kept at very low levels. In addition, the threat from splinter groups was significantly mitigated to levels of low concern, and even the threat of sectarian tensions that could re-ignite IRA activities from the Drumcree marches was adequately addressed. The degree of denial is thus assessed as being “high” for this episode.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Isolation of popular support continued to improve during this episode of strategic coercion. With levels of popular support already reduced for the IRA following the previous

¹⁶⁵ Moloney, 508.

¹⁶⁶ Moloney, 509.

episode, the British government under Tony Blair set itself almost immediately to further eliminate popular support for a campaign of violence. This was most notably demonstrated a month after Blair came to office, as the British government formally apologized for the 1845-49 potato famine, which was a recurring theme in the Nationalist narrative of British cruelty in Ireland.¹⁶⁷ In 1998, the government of Tony Blair followed this move by appealing to Nationalists through opening up an independent inquiry to investigate the events of the 1972 Bloody Sunday massacre—still ongoing, it marks the largest investigation in British history.

Further Moves to Isolate Popular Support Prior to Good Friday Agreement

The British government continued in its attempt to win over popular support by putting into action commitments for improvements in human rights, changes in policing structures, tackling discrimination in employment, and—as was discussed earlier—reducing the (often lethal) disruptiveness of parades.¹⁶⁸ Meanwhile, the process of relocating prisoners to Northern Ireland was sped up—a move that crucially appealed to both Nationalists and Loyalists as it meant easing the strain on families in enabling visitation.

Tony Blair also reached out to Unionists to support a political settlement, making a number of public pledges, including:

[N]o change in the status of N. Ireland without the express consent of the people of N. Ireland; power to take decisions returned to a N. Ireland assembly, with accountable north-south cooperation; fairness and equality guaranteed for all; those who use or threaten violence excluded from the government of N. Ireland; and prisoners kept in unless violence is given up for good.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁷ Powell, 38.

¹⁶⁸ Mowlam, 165.

¹⁶⁹ Mowlam, 251.

Post-Good Friday Agreement Action

Several very significant actions also took place following the Good Friday Agreement. The first of these was the release of political prisoners two years after the Agreement. Moreover, to assuage the fears of Unionists and to provide a popular disincentive against supporting a return to violence, these prisoners were released on license, which could be immediately revoked if either they or their organizations engaged in acts of violence.¹⁷⁰ The second was the implementation of the reforms of the RUC, which saw the RUC renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland or PSNI (to make it less antagonizing to the Catholic community), and the eventual creation in 2005 of the Historical Enquiries Team that continues to investigate the 3,269 unsolved murders committed during “the Troubles” (a move that appealed to both communities, the Unionists in particular). Lastly, devolved government would finally return to Northern Ireland in 2007—this time empowering the Catholic minority under an acceptable agreement to the Unionists.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

This episode of British strategy marked a clear success for British efforts at isolating any further popular support for the IRA and all terrorist groups committed to violence. Popular support was nearly completely denied for the IRA; grievances—both contemporary and historic—were well-addressed; new grievances were avoided; excessive violence was prevented; and security was well provided for by the local security force (the new PSNI). Isolation of popular support is thus assessed as “high.”

¹⁷⁰ House of Commons Debate, vol. 310, cc.493-5, 20 April 1998.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Additional significant factors did indeed play a role in influencing the observed outcome. One of these factors was, importantly, the presence of the right leaders at the right time. Tony Blair was vital to this end, proving to possess a high-level of commitment to Northern Ireland and the implementation of the Good Friday Agreement; that he possessed a large majority in Parliament also crucially assisted his position in that it freed his hand to be more flexible in terms of conducting negotiations with the Provisional IRA. Bertie Ahern, the Fianna Fail Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, was both more than willing to work with the British, as well as exercise the political courage necessary to deliver on the Irish end in coming up with any settlement. Amongst Sinn Féin, much credit must also be given to Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness for their commitment to seeing an end to violence and having the will face down intransigent members of the IRA who preferred not to return to a ceasefire at all. In the Unionist party, former UUP leader David Trimble must be given much credit for bravery and commitment towards progress, and, in the end, DUP leader Ian Paisley who agreed to the implementation of a power-sharing government. Other important actors—who were also invaluable to the peace-process, and the implementation of the subsequent agreement—include Mo Mowlam, SDLP leader John Hume, American envoy and former Senator George Mitchell, and President Bill Clinton.

A second major factor involved the September 11th terrorist attacks, and a shift in international policy vis-à-vis terrorist organizations—especially from the United States. This event, and the new perspective of a post-9/11 world, brought much pressure on the IRA from what were once key sources of support—the White House and congressional and corporate Irish-America. Within weeks of the attack, substantial pressure from the US helped force the IRA's hand in finally decommissioning.

Finally, the IRA was suffering its own popularity problems. Discontent at their mafia-style enforcement of order in local communities came to a head with the murder of Robert McCartney (a Republican himself) on February 14th at the order of a local IRA captain. The episode created a major crisis for the IRA in their remaining base of support, and in international public opinion.¹⁷¹ Not surprisingly, within months the IRA formally announced the end to its armed campaign of terrorist violence.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

The campaign of strategic coercion conducted by the British proved to be a highly successful one by the conclusion of this episode. Much political progress was achieved through negotiations following the 1997 ceasefire, particularly in the attainment of the Good Friday Agreement (or “Belfast Agreement” as it is referred to by Unionists). This agreement provided for recognition of the Republican preoccupation for self-determination, but made consent a crucial component of this—where consent was defined as requiring the majority of people of Northern Ireland to decide whether or not the province stayed in Britain or joined a united Ireland. It enacted a rewriting of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish constitution—which prevented recognition of the entity of Northern Ireland, and left open a claim by the Republic to the territory of the North—much to the consternation of Unionists. And the Good Friday Agreement also provided for a new 108-member Belfast Assembly, to which Westminster would devolve full power over health, education and agriculture, as well as the right to make new laws, with London retaining control over issues of defense and law and order (with a promise to consider devolving security powers at a later stage). Finally, the new devolved government would consist

¹⁷¹ Jim Cusack, “IRA Savages Murder Bert McCartney – and Taint Sinn Féin with His Blood,” *The Independent*, 20 February 2005.

of a First Minister (who would be a Unionist), a Deputy First Minister (who would be a Nationalist), and ten departmental ministers beneath them (of which posts would be allocated in proportion to party strengths on an agreed mathematical formula).¹⁷²

The Good Friday Agreement was not perfect; issues regarding decommissioning, reforms to the RUC, and compelling the Unionists to implement the new power-sharing government still had to be resolved—and these issues would cause the suspension for a time of the implementation of a new devolved Executive. However, the result was an equitable agreement, which was approved by a wide majority in referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic¹⁷³, produced a commitment to non-violence in pursuance of their aspirations for all-parties concerned, and would be implemented overtime. George Mitchell perhaps best sums up what was achieved:

It is based on the principle that the future of Northern Ireland should be decided by the people of Northern Ireland, and it seeks to promote tolerance and mutual respect. It includes constitutional change in the Republic of Ireland and in the United Kingdom. It creates new democratic institutions to provide self-governance in the north and to encourage cooperation between the north and south for their mutual benefit. It explicitly repudiates the use or threat of violence for any political purpose and commits signatories and supporters to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations.¹⁷⁴

Furthermore, the British government moved to promptly implement the Good Friday Agreement. While this task took nearly nine years, and faced significant hurdles on the issues of decommissioning, implementing reforms to the local police service (the RUC), and the formation and maintenance of a new devolved Executive, the British government kept up solid efforts to see these hurdles overcome. As Mo Mowlam, then-Secretary of State for Northern Ireland perhaps best described the government's mood following the settlement: "It was a big, big

¹⁷² For Details See: Northern Ireland Office, "The Agreement: Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations", 10 April 1998, Available Online at: <http://www.nio.gov.uk/the-agreement> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

¹⁷³ In Northern Ireland, the Yes vote was 71.12%, No 28.88%; in the Republic of Ireland, it was Yes 94.39%, no 5.61%.

¹⁷⁴ Mitchell, 187.


programme of work, and I worried from the outset that people would not have the energy to keep it up... But I knew it was crucial that we didn't ease up and lose the tide of local and international goodwill that was surging with us after the Agreement.”¹⁷⁵

Despite its painstaking implementation though, the British government ensured that the Good Friday Agreement was carried to its successful conclusion. Accordingly, this episode was marked by a number of important milestones following the Good Friday Agreement, including the decommissioning (or disarming) of IRA weapon stockpiles, verified by an independent commission in October 2001; the announcement of a formal and permanent end to the Provisional IRA's armed campaign in July 2005; and finally the full implementation of reforms and constitutional change promised by the Good Friday Agreement, the culmination of which was the new devolved power-sharing government of Northern Ireland that came to power in March 2007.

Further, at the end of this episode, a lasting resolution to the conflict with the Provisional IRA—as well as with major Loyalist terrorist organizations—was brought forth with a formal announcement regarding the cessation of their campaign. Violence from the Provisional IRA was thus halted, with violence from splinter groups kept at very low levels from 1999 onwards, as is illustrated in figure 4.6:

Please See the Following Page

¹⁷⁵ Mowlam, 255.

Figure 4.6: Deaths Attributed to Republican and Loyalist Groups, 1997-2007¹⁷⁶

Thus, this episode witnessed a satisfactory and enduring political resolution achieved for all major issues (and parties), culminating in the renunciation of violence by the chief Republican NSTO—the Provisional IRA—while splinter “micro” groups such as the Continuity and Real IRA remained weak, unsupported, and largely ineffectual. This episode of strategic coercion is thus assessed as being a “high success”.

¹⁷⁶ Statistical information for this graph provided by Malcolm Sutton, *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland – Revised and Updated Extracts from Sutton’s Books*, and from the CAIN Web Service, “Violence in Northern Ireland,” 2009, Available Online at: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/violence.htm> [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

Chapter V: Israel versus Palestinian Terrorist NSTOs, 1967-Present

This chapter will now examine the attempts by Israel to strategically coerce Palestinian terrorist insurgent organizations between 1967 and the present (2009). Similar to the Northern Ireland case study, this historic case is broken down into several within-case episodes:

1. **1967-1977:** Post-1967 War, a strategy of deterrence and punishment
2. **1977-1987:** Likud comes to power, full-scale military interventions in Lebanon
3. **1987-1991:** The first *Intifada*
4. **1991-2000:** The Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords, Peace Process and its Collapse
5. **2001-2004:** The *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and Israeli military coercion
6. **2004-Present (2009):** Unilateral disengagement, Hamas comes to power, entrenched stalemate

Prior to proceeding with this analysis, a background of the conflict will be provided, which gives an elaboration of: 1) the conflict's history in brief; and 2) the political context of this case and the main actors involved.

A Brief History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

To discuss the entirety of the history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict¹ would be well beyond the scope of this paper. The brief history to be discussed will thus begin with Israel's declaration of independence, and the ensuing situation for Jews and Arabs in the land of Israel/Palestine. On November 29, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 181 (II), which in recommending the partition of the Western portion of the Palestine Mandate into two different (provisional) states—one Jewish and one Arab—laid the framework

¹ This conflict may be also referred to as the "Arab-Israeli" or even "Arab-Israeli-Palestinian" conflict. Given that this case-study analysis is specifically concerned with the Palestinian dimension of the conflict, namely in terms of Palestinian NSTOs and Israel's attempts to utilize strategic coercion to counter their capacity for terrorist violence, this case is referred to as the *Israeli-Palestinian* conflict for the purpose of this dissertation.

for the emergence of the State of Israel.² The partition plan was accepted by the Jewish Agency. Problematically, the plan was also swiftly rejected by Arab leadership.³

Following the resolution, a number of irregular Arab attacks took place against the Jewish community of Palestine. On May 14, 1948 following the expiration of the British Mandate, the Jewish community of Palestine formally declared their independence and the establishment of the State of Israel.⁴ Almost immediately thereafter, the Arab states declared war on Israel. Israel emerged victorious from the confrontation, which came to an end following armistice agreements in March 1949.⁵ The armistices did not, however, mark an end to the conflict.

Consequences of the Israeli Declaration of Independence for Palestine's Arab Population

While Israel's War of Independence was a defensive one, it entailed a number of grave consequences for the Arab population of Palestine. Following the war, over half the number of Arabs living in the Palestine Mandate either fled or were expelled, and came to know generations of occupation⁶—both from Israel and neighboring Arab states. Here, in the words of Rashid Khalidi, the Palestinians would be fated to become “prey to profound, justified, and realistic fears of being destroyed and dispersed as a people.”⁷ Further, the land that would have been partitioned off to the Palestine mandate's non-Jewish population was gobbled up by Israel, Jordan and Egypt. In the words of Benny Morris, the Israeli War of Independence ended up as a

² George Joseph Tomeh, Regina Sherif and Michael Simpson, *United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1947-74*, Jerusalem: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988, 15.

³ Avi Shlaim, *The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World*, New York: Norton & Company, Inc., 2001, 25-27.

⁴ Itamar Rabinovich and Jehuda Reinharz, *Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations, Pre-1948 to the Present*, 2nd Edition, Boston: Brandeis, 2007, 74.

⁵ Netanel Lorch, *Israel's War of Independence, 1947-1949*, 2nd Edition, Bridgeport, CT: Hartmore House, 1969, 563.

⁶ Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood*, Boston: Beacon Press, 2007, 183.

⁷ Khalidi, 183.

“multinational land grab focusing on the Arab areas of the country.”⁸ Meanwhile, the plight of displaced Palestinian Arabs was set aside—considered as a humanitarian issue to be addressed amongst Israel and the existing Arab states.

The 1967 Arab-Israeli War/Six Day War and its Consequences

Following the armistices of 1949, a fragile peace settled on the Arab-Israeli conflict, marked by intermittent violence, including cross-border *Fedayeen* attacks from Arab irregulars and the Suez Canal Crisis.⁹ A defining moment came in Israel’s post-independence period in 1967 with the outbreak of the Six Day War, which ended with a resounding victory for Israel. As a result of its victory, a new map of the Middle East came into being, with Israel coming into possession of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem. Along with the acquisition of this new territory, Israel also came to occupy land inhabited by 1.3 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁰

Meanwhile, a change was brewing within the Palestinian communities scattered throughout the region. Until June 1967, Palestinians relied for the most part on Arab governments for their salvation. However, following the stunning defeat of the Arab states, new movements such as *Fatah* lead by Yasser Arafat would emerge, looking to take the struggle into their own hands.¹¹ Arab states, bitter and recovering from the calamitous events of the 1967 war, eagerly began to support them in this. Palestinians groups would soon conduct frequent acts of guerrilla warfare and terrorism, seeking to place pressure on Israel and seize the world’s attention to their cause. Israel, in turn, was swift with its retaliation.¹²

⁸ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims*, New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

⁹ Benny Morris, *Israel’s Border Wars, 1949-1956*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993, 420.

¹⁰ Ian Bickerton and Carla Klausner, *A History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 5th Edition, Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2007, 147.

¹¹ Anat Kurz, *Fatah and the Politics of Violence: The Institutionalization of a Popular Struggle*, Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2006, 37.

¹² Kurz, 31-34.

Political Context of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The political context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is dominated by a number of issues. The primary issues involved in any resolution of the conflict include: possession of East Jerusalem; Palestinian refugees and how to accommodate them; and Israeli settlements in land occupied after 1967. This section will discuss these issues, as well as present a breakdown of the major actors involved.

The Issue of East Jerusalem

From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, retaining possession of East Jerusalem—in particular the Old City—is a fundamental must. Originally intended in the UN Partition Plan for Palestine to be made into a special international regime administered by the United Nations,¹³ the Old City of East Jerusalem was seized and annexed by Jordan in the 1948-9 Israeli War of Independence. In June 1967, following the Six Day War, Israel reclaimed East Jerusalem. Exuberant, Israel annexed the city and declared Jerusalem to be once again unified for all time. To confirm this new reality, the Israeli government quickly moved to sever the political connection between Jerusalem and the West Bank, and began to encircle Jerusalem with neighborhoods/settlements inhabited by Israelis.¹⁴

From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, retention of East Jerusalem is of very high importance. Historically, Jerusalem is of central value to the Jewish people, having served as the capitol for David and Solomon's kingdoms. It provides a reminder of the golden age of the

¹³ Marvin Gettleman and Stuart Schaar, *The Middle East and Islamic World Reader*, New York: Grove Press, 2003, 189.

¹⁴ James Gelvin, *The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: One Hundred Years of War[Second Edition]*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 182-3.

ancient Israeli kingdom.¹⁵ Perhaps most importantly, it houses the most important religious site in the Judaic world, the Western Wall (also referred to as the Wailing Wall or *Kotel*), which stands on the Western flank of the Temple Mount, and symbolizes the sole remnant of Judaism's Holy Temple. Retaining possession of East Jerusalem, is further reinforced by the perspective that it comprises territory won through a defensive war.¹⁶ The final status of East Jerusalem has thus remained a major obstacle in negotiations over peace with the Palestinian people.

From a Pro-Palestinian/Arab perspective, there can be no basis for surrendering East Jerusalem, based on several considerations. First, regardless of any history, the majority population today in East Jerusalem is exceedingly non-Jewish. Further, Jerusalem from their perspective was illegally obtained through military conquest in the 1967 war, and its annexation is in contravention to their interpretation of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁷ Furthermore, Palestinians regard possession of East Jerusalem to be of fundamental importance considering its own religious and historical importance in the Islamic world. In the Islamic world, East Jerusalem—or Al-Quds (“the Holy”)—represents the third most important religious site on the globe. The city contains the Al-Haram ash-Sharif (“the Noble Sanctuary”), a complex (built on the Jewish Temple Mount mentioned above), that includes the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque (or “the Farthest Mosque”), where it is believed that the Prophet Mohammed ascended to Heaven in 621.¹⁸ Indeed, given (East) Jerusalem's importance, the Palestinian position has frequently expressed the intention of claiming it as the capitol of any Palestinian state.

¹⁵ Gelvin.

¹⁶ Michael Dumper, *The Politics of Jerusalem Since 1967*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 163.

¹⁷ Edward Said and David Barsamian, *Culture and Resistance: Conversations with Edward W. Said*, New York: Pluto Press, 2003, 42.

¹⁸ Rivka Gonen, *Contested Holiness: Jewish, Muslim, and Christian Perspectives on the Temple Mount in Jerusalem*, Jersey City, NJ: Ktav Publishing House, 2003, 126.

Refugees

With the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, and the war of independence that followed it, a major refugee crisis was ignited, with hundreds of thousands of people—both Jews and Arabs/non-Jews becoming displaced. Regarding Arab/non-Jewish refugees, a major political crisis would emerge. While estimates vary widely, 711,000 Arab Palestinian refugees were displaced during the Israeli war of independence according to the final estimate of the United Nations.¹⁹ The matter of their fate and who deserves blame for it, as well as what will become of them following any sort of enduring peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians has since become a highly contentious political issue.

From a Pro-Palestinian/Arab perspective, the matter is relatively straightforward: in a war launched by foreign settlers against the wishes of the majority of Palestine's population, the security forces of what would come to be Israel set to ethnically cleanse the land of its indigenous population. Since then, millions of Palestinians have come to languish in harsh, impoverished and humiliating circumstances amongst a plethora of refugee camps spread throughout the region.²⁰ The obvious solution is that in any settlement, all refugees (including all of their offspring and subsequent generations) must be allowed to return to the land of Palestine—which of course includes Israel as it is currently constituted.

The Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, not surprisingly, markedly differs on the situation. To begin, this perspective completely disagrees that Israel is to blame for the refugee crisis caused by the 1948-49 War of Independence. From their perspective, the refugee crisis was begun by the pillaging of Arab irregulars, general instability caused by the war, and the encouragement of

¹⁹ United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950*, published by the United Nations Conciliation Commission, 23 October 1950. (U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 18, Document A/1367/Rev. 1). Available Online at: http://www.mideastweb.org/conciliation_commission_1950.htm [Last Viewed 28 April 2009].

²⁰ Randa Farah, "The Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees," Nicklaus Steiner, Mark Gibney and Gil Loescher (eds.), *Problems of Protection: The UNHCR, Refugees, and Human Rights*, London: Routledge, 2003, 156.

Arab armies/the personal decision of Arab inhabitants to evacuate and wait out the conflict in the surrounding region whilst expecting a quick finish of the Jewish state.²¹ Even for those in the Pro-Israel camp who accept some degree of Israeli culpability, their conclusion is that the refugee crisis was a result of the instability caused by war—a war initiated by the Arab states.²²

Moreover, the Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective contends that the return of Palestinian refugees (at least beyond symbolic numbers) would be impossible. Their rationale for this is that if Israel were to accept the return of all Palestinian refugees and their subsequent generations—some 4.6 million people as of 2008²³—then Israel would lose its Jewish majority and (in a democratic country) cease to exist as a Jewish state. Ultimately, the Pro-Israel position holds the Arab states responsible for the ongoing refugee crises, contending that Arab states have deliberately avoided integrating Palestinian refugees in efforts to turn them into a political and propaganda tool.

Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories

Following Israel's occupation of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza as a result of the 1967 war, settlements have sprung up in increasing numbers. The Israeli settlement program initially began as early 1967, though it began to greatly pickup speed following the seizure of power by Likud in the late 1970s. These settlements were initially built on the fringes of the Occupied Territories.²⁴ They have since branched out to encircle East Jerusalem, take up

²¹ Alan Dershowitz, *The Case for Israel*, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Press, 2003, 78-90.

²² Benny Morris, *The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, 286-289.

²³ United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) [Online], "Who is a Palestinian Refugee", Available Online at: <http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/whois.html> [Last View 28 April 2009].

²⁴ Gelvin, 188.

significant (high quality) portions of land in the West Bank, and to provide access to holy sites for religious settlers.²⁵

From a Pro-Israel/Zionist perspective, these settlements fulfill an important purpose in serving as an effective buffer against external invasion from Israel's neighbors.²⁶ From a more conservative, religious Israeli position, such settlements also help to create "facts on the ground" for maintaining possession of the land falling within Eretz Yisrael Ha-Shlema (the complete land of Israel), thereby making it more difficult to negotiate it away under any settlement. In such a case, these settlements help Israel to maintain a permanent foothold of the Territories, and at the very least an expensive bargaining chip to be traded away in any settlement negotiations.²⁷

From a Pro-Palestinian perspective, such settlements are clearly provocative. These settlements serve to continually confiscate high quality Palestinian land, while increasingly reducing the possibility of a Palestinian state from emerging in the Occupied Territories. These settlements represent a flagrant violation of international law under UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which forbids the transfer of a state's civilian population.²⁸ Furthermore, these settlements stand in the way of the emergence of any Palestinian state as provided for by UN Resolution 181.

Main Actors Involved in the Conflict

In contending these issues a number of major actors, endogenous to the conflict, can be identified. Not counting numerous external supporters—whose role will be discussed in the case-episodes—these actors include the State of Israel (including the differing political wings

²⁵ Josie Sandercock, *Peace Under Fire: Israel/Palestine and the International Solidarity Movement*, London: Verso, 2004, 10.

²⁶ Gelvin.

²⁷ Aharon Kellerman, *Society and Settlement: Jewish Land of Israel in the Twentieth Century*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1993, 101.

²⁸ For the full text of the Fourth Geneva Convention, see online at:

<http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/6756482d86146898c125641e004aa3c5>

(provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross [Online])

within the country), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) lead by Fatah, the early rejectionist groups, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

The State of Israel

In regards to both the Israeli-Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conflicts, the primary objective of the State of Israel is to survive, and remain a Jewish state capable of providing a safe haven and global representation to its co-religionists. Israel takes issues of security very seriously, and is reluctant to take a progressive stance that might leave it too vulnerable.²⁹ In particular, Israel seeks to bring an end to terrorist violence suffered at the hands of Palestinian NSTOs. However, there is some disparity of views between Israeli moderates and hawks regarding what will accomplish this.

Regarding the disposition of occupied land after 1967, moderates—such as Israel’s Labour party—considered the acquisition of this new territory to hold the potential to be a bargaining chip towards peace with neighboring Arab states, and later on, with the Palestinians themselves. Hawks—such as the Likud—however, contended that the (permanent) acquisition of such vast new amounts of land would actually remove the threat of war by providing Israel with the needed strategic depth that it had thus far lacked. Both moderates and hawks alike recognized Israel’s main geo-strategic weakness to be its “soft underbelly”—consisting of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank).³⁰ For moderates, the demilitarization of the West Bank, with the removal of weaponry and significant hostile forces, was deemed essential to maintaining Israel’s security. Hawks, however, took this a step further and believed that the best way to ensure

²⁹ William Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000, 344.

³⁰ Daniel Bar-Tal, *Shared Beliefs in a Society: Social Psychological Analysis*, London: Sage Publications, Inc., 2000, 99.

Israel's security was to retain military control indefinitely over the whole of the West Bank.³¹ Moreover, hawks have been motivated to support the growth of settlements that not only enhanced strategic control of the Territories, but also help to create "facts on the ground" in a *de facto* process of annexation.³²

Hawks and moderates also differ regarding engagement and negotiations with the Palestinians. Moderates, while not swift to directly engage with the Palestinian people or the PLO, were certainly quicker to do so than their hawkish counterparts. Hawks doubt the sincerity of Palestinian pledges towards peace and their word in negotiations. In contrast, moderates have been much more willing to take risks en route to a political settlement. However, even in the case of moderates, their own reluctance to freeze and remove settlements while in a position of power has often called into question their commitment to realize this goal.

The PLO and Fatah

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was organized following the first Arab summit meeting held by the Arab League in January 1964.³³ Unwilling at that point to challenge Israel in a direct military confrontation, and wanting to place some control over any Palestinian national movements, the PLO would soon come into existence at the behest of the Arab League and the design of Gamal Abdul Nasser.³⁴ The PLO was to serve as an umbrella organization to guerrilla groups whose objective was to "liberate Palestine from its colonialist oppressors, the Zionists," with "armed struggle" as the method adopted to achieve this end.³⁵ However, while the PLO may have ostensibly been committed to representing Palestinian national interests, it

³¹ Sergio Castignani, *Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army*, London: Routledge, 2008, 61.

³² Castignani, 52.

³³ Kirsten Schulze, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 2nd Edition, Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2008, 33.

³⁴ Gelvin, 194.

³⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, 141.

was in truth designed to “mollify and rein in those interests.”³⁶ This would soon change following the emergence of Fatah and the 1967 war.

Fatah was initially founded in the late 1950s by a group of Palestinian students in Cairo, of which Yasser Arafat was a part. Meaning “conquest”, Fatah is an acronym whose letters in reverse stand for Harakat al-Tahir al-Falastini, or “Movement for the Liberation of Palestine.”³⁷ Following the 1967 war, Fatah experienced a meteoric rise as a result of two factors. The first involved a recognition by many Palestinians that the Arab states were incapable of defeating Israel.³⁸ The second factor, which helped reinforce the first, came as a result of the battle that took place in the Jordanian town of Karameh, in which Palestinian forces managed to inflict more than a hundred casualties on Israeli forces, forcing their eventual withdraw. The event would take on mythic status amongst Palestinians as the “Battle of Karameh,” and following it Fatah’s popularity would explode.³⁹ Thousands of recruits would soon pour into its ranks, and it was not long before Fatah would join the PLO.⁴⁰ As the largest and most popular Palestinian organization, Fatah would come to play a leadership role. In 1969, Fatah leader Yasser Arafat would be elected the chairman of the Palestine National Council (PNC), becoming the new leader of the PLO.

Rejectionist Groups

While Fatah comprised the largest and most powerful organization within the PLO, it still could not manage any form of direct control. Fatah was a *primes inter pares* among a number of other influential groups within the PLO, including: the Popular Front for the Liberation of

³⁶ Gelvin, 194.

³⁷ Riad El-Rayyes and Dunia Nahas, *Guerrilla for Palestine*, London: Portico Publications, 1976, 27.

³⁸ Gelvin, 199.

³⁹ Gelvin.

⁴⁰ Jamal Raji Nassar, *Globalization and Terrorism: The Migration of Dreams and Nightmares*, 2nd Edition, Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2009, 50.

Palestine (PFLP), the Palestinian People's Party (PPP), the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), As-Sa'eqa, the Palestine Democratic Union (Fida), the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), and the Palestinian Arab Front (PAF). Further, following a split in the PFLP, the PLO would also come to comprise the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP/PDFLP), the Organization of Arab Palestine (OAP), and the PFLP General Command (PFLP-GC).⁴¹

Moreover, a number of these groups rallied to form what came to be known as a "Rejectionist Front" that rejected any compromise with Israel (meaning, any solution that stopped short of Israel's destruction). The Rejectionist Front formed as a political coalition by radical Palestinian groups in 1974, rejecting the Ten Point Program adopted by the PLO that called for the establishment of a national authority on any piece of liberated Palestinian territory⁴² (which set the initial foundation for some form of compromise). Important Rejectionist organizations included the PFLP, DFLP, As-Sa'eqa, the Arab Liberation Front, and the Abu Nidal Organization.

Contemporary Rejectionists: Hamas and Islamic Jihad

As time progressed and the initial Rejectionist Front lost steam, two new groups of significance would emerge to fill the role of rejectionists and major competitors to Fatah's reign. The first and most significant is that of Hamas. Meaning "courage" or "bravery", Hamas emerged in the Gaza Strip during the first Intifada as the armed wing of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in the Palestinian Territories. Hamas wed a Salvationist Islamist platform to the national struggle for Palestine, and rejected as un-Islamic any dealings with Israel and with

⁴¹ Hanan Alon, *Countering Palestinian Terrorism in Israel: Toward a Policy of Analysis of Countermeasures*, Santa Monica: Rand, August 1980, 25.

⁴² Maria Chakhtoura, *La guerre des graffiti*, Beyrouth, Éditions Dar an-Nahar, 2005, 136.

Jews.⁴³ In time, Hamas would establish itself as the foremost competitor to the PLO. Indeed, Hamas would eventually come to politically challenge Fatah and the PLO under their own institutions⁴⁴—the Palestinian Authority—creating what many now consider to be a ponderous obstacle to peace. Hamas is well-armed, disciplined and organized. They receive considerable popular backing and are generously funded, receiving an annual budget of tens of millions of dollars through Saudi Arabian channels, the Gulf States and the Iranian government.⁴⁵

Additionally, Islamic Jihad provides another contemporary rejectionist group. Beginning as a radical, ideological offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Jihad was founded by Dr. Fathi Shqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda, and advocates violence to end the Israeli occupation and bring forth the establishment of an Islamic state in place of Israel. Unlike Hamas, though, Islamic Jihad is not simply a Palestinian group—elements of the Islamic Jihad have appeared in most Arab states, as well as some parts of the non-Arab Islamic world. However, both Islamic Jihad and Hamas share a similar position in their adversarial relationship with Fatah and the PLO.⁴⁶ While not as large or well-funded as Hamas, Islamic Jihad still comprises a considerable threat to Israeli interests and an obstacle to the efforts of Palestinian moderates towards peace.

Within-Case Episode #1: 1967-1977—Post-1967 War, a Strategy of Deterrence, “Active Self Defense” and Punishment

Following the 1967 Six Day War, Israel found itself in possession of a number of new territories, amongst which included the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip—upon

⁴³ Bickerton and Klausner, 221-223.

⁴⁴ Amal Jamal, *Media Politics and Democracy in Palestine: Political Culture, Pluralism, and the Palestinian Authority*, Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, 2005, 147.

⁴⁵ Anthony Cordesman, *The Israeli-Palestinian War: Escalating to Nowhere*, London: Praeger Security International, 2006, 192.

⁴⁶ For a detailed account of the two groups, see: Yonah Alexander, *Palestinian Religious Terrorism: Hamas and Islamic Jihad*, Hotei Publishing, 2002.

which over one million Palestinians came under Israeli control. Initially, few in Israel thought that this occupation of land would be permanent.⁴⁷ For the Israelis, acquisition of such territory—with the exception of East Jerusalem—was initially seen as a bargaining chip for peace and recognition with neighboring Arab states. The Arab states, however, were interested in no such peace. In late August/early September 1967 at the Arab Summit in Khartoum, the Arab states declared the famous “Three NOs” to Israel—no peace, no recognition, no negotiations, and that action should be taken to safeguard the right of the Palestinian people to their homeland.⁴⁸

For the Palestinians, meanwhile, the outcome of the June 1967 war was a tragedy—it was now apparent that Arab states were not capable of liberating Palestinians or their land. Emerging Palestinian NSTOs took charge of the situation and began to step-up acts of violence against Israel and Israeli targets abroad in order to inspire a “popular revolution” that was hoped to bring an end to the “Zionist regime”.⁴⁹ Further, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon moved to align with Syria to support the Palestinian “war of liberation”. Thus, Palestinian NSTOs would find following the 1967 war new sources of arms acquisition, bases, platforms for penetration into Israel, direct operational support and funds.⁵⁰

A dramatic increase in Palestinian terrorism and guerilla warfare would thus begin. These acts of violence involved terrorism and guerrilla strikes against military and civilian targets within the Occupied Territories and Israel proper. However, they would also include high profile acts of international terrorism against Israeli and Jewish targets, such a plane hijackings, the hostage-taking and murder of the Israeli Olympic team at Munich, assaults/bombings upon Israeli embassies and tourists abroad, etc.

⁴⁷ Martin Gilbert, *Israel: A History*, London: Black Swan, 1999, 398.

⁴⁸ Alan Dowty, *Israel/Palestine*, Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 2005, 117.

⁴⁹ Aryeh Yodfat and Yuval Arnon-Ohanna, *PLO Strategy and Tactics*, London: Croon Helm, 1981, 168.

⁵⁰ Alon, 41.

Israel's response to increased violence and terror executed by Palestinian NSTOs was an enhancement of reprisal operations and the enactment of deterrent and preventative measures along its porous borders. A strategy of deterrence plus punishment would thus come into play, whereby patrols and passive defense measures were hoped to deter attacks and reduce chances for violent success, meanwhile punitive retaliatory strikes and raids would be undertaken against Palestinian targets and Arab states providing sanctuary and serving as launching pads for terrorist attacks into Israel. Israel would also move to erect a military government (MG) in the newly Occupied Territories, tasked with the responsibility of putting down any popular insurgencies.⁵¹

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

In the early stages of this episode, Jordan provided the primary staging ground for terrorist infiltrations into Israel and the Occupied Territories. This made Jordan a primary target for isolating external support to Palestinian NSTOs. Thus, Israel would target regular Jordanian Army units and Jordanian military/government structures, making it clear to Amman that a high price would be paid for continuing such support. Eventually these retaliations lead to heavy exchanges of artillery fire, which became so serious that King Hussein demanded the cessation of terrorist activities in Jordan.⁵² Following the refusal of Palestinian NSTOs to do so, King Hussein launched a war against them, culminating in September 1970. Israel's symmetric

⁵¹ Tom Segev, *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East*, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2007, 464.

⁵² Mordechai Bar-On, *Never-Ending Conflict: Israeli Military History*, Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006, 180-3.

reprisal actions against Jordan would thus contribute in a major way to the expulsion of terrorists from that country, and a subsequent near complete cessation of terrorist activity.⁵³

Following the Jordanian war against Palestinian NSTOs—known as “Black September”—the PLO and associated organizations were forced to relocate to Lebanon. There, under the 1969 Cairo Agreement, the PLO insurgents already freely occupied a portion of southern Lebanon; following their exodus from Jordan, some 15,000 Palestinian guerrillas would join their ranks in “Fatahland”.⁵⁴ Terrorist incursions and rocket attacks from across the Lebanese border were soon thereafter stepped up against Israel.⁵⁵

In attempting to stop assaults from Lebanon, Israel launched retaliatory strikes and raids. Israel also facilitated the transfer of Lebanese Christian Maronite militiamen into the south of Lebanon to make penetration and assaults across the border more difficult. In doing so, the Israelis linked their efforts with the dissident Lebanese army officer, Saad Haddad (a Greek Catholic).⁵⁶ Saad’s efforts to expand the range of his territory led to increased tensions with Palestinian forces, however, who were now returning to the south (from northern Lebanon) in accordance with the Cairo Agreement. Clashes soon erupted, with Israel and Syria intervening to define unofficial spheres of influence in the country.⁵⁷ In these circumstances, both Syria and Israel attempted to restrict the activities of Palestinian NSTOs (Syria’s motivation was to preserve its control over Lebanon). However, increasing tension and conflict would help create a situation where the PLO could build itself up and plan/launch attacks against Israel.

Israel’s strategy regarding Lebanon—whereby it would place pressure on the state itself to crack down on Palestinian NSTOs through raids and incursions did not realize the same success as had transpired in Jordan. Instead, Lebanon, a fractured state too weak to enforce law

⁵³ Alon, 80.

⁵⁴ Bickerton and Klausner, 208.

⁵⁵ Bar-On, 184.

⁵⁶ Charles Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988, 251.

⁵⁷ Smith.

and order in its own land, and riddled with ethnic/religious tensions, soon began a descent into turmoil, while Palestinian terrorist insurgents were free to train, organize and launch attacks into Israel.⁵⁸

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Overall, Israeli efforts at isolation of external/international support enjoyed some success. Through pressure from Israeli military coercion, Jordan—the primary base for terrorist attacks into Israel—was rendered inhospitable for Palestinian NSTOs. However, any success that might have been enjoyed as a consequence of this was soon mitigated by sanctuary in an increasingly chaotic Lebanon, combined with ongoing extensive external/international support from Arab states, the USSR and China. Palestinian NSTOs thus would soon enjoy all the safe haven and basing they would need, which combined with continued extensive external support allowed them to evade Israeli denial efforts and continue to launch attacks against the Jewish state. Thus, despite some important gains, the level of isolation of external support for this episode is assessed as being “Limited.”

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

Following the June 1967 War, the PLO undertook a massive effort, involving training men and sending them back into the occupied West Bank to setup networks among the civilian population, and establish insurgent bands and bases.⁵⁹ During this period, over 1,000 Palestinian insurgents were funneled into the West Bank and Gaza from Jordan.⁶⁰ Israel worked quickly to smash such efforts, launching patrols and erecting anti-infiltration barriers, as well as utilizing

⁵⁸ Dowty, 123.

⁵⁹ Yezid Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Autumn 1983, 26-7.

⁶⁰ Yezid Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982”, *International Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs)*, Vol. 65, No. 2, Spring 1989, 265.

intelligence and mass arrests to uncover and imprison local networks. These efforts, combined with an inability of Palestinian NSTOs to initially raise the necessary local popular support, made the conduct of insurgency dangerous and difficult. As such, the Palestinian NSTOs would soon resort to basing and planning their operations beyond the 1967-ceasefire lines. As mentioned in the section above, Jordan served as their initial substitute for conducting these operations, followed by Lebanon.

Passive Defense

As time progressed, Israel moved to implement considerable countermeasures aimed at passive defense against assault from Palestinian NSTOs. The first of these measures included the construction of a major border security system, eventually erected along all 531 kilometers (330 miles) of Israel's land borders.⁶¹ This border security system utilized a combination of physical obstacles and mobile military units, while implementing parallel barbed-wire fences, enclosed by minefields.⁶² Another measure included the construction of public and residential shelters—in response to the firing of Katyusha Rockets across the borders of Jordan and Lebanon—with the goal of achieving 100% sheltering by 1975. Further, around all border settlements and essential installations fences were erected and guarded by military reservists. Moreover, by 1970, civil defense reserve personnel were assigned guard detail of all public gathering sites and entertainment facilities. Finally, in response to the frequent planting of improvised explosive devises (IEDs) by Palestinian militants, a national bomb disposal system was established by the police to assist in countering the threat, and was accompanied by a major

⁶¹ Martin Gilbert, *The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 7th Edition, New York: Routledge, 2005, 73.

⁶² Alon, 77.

advertising campaign launched to increase public awareness about how to deal with such a threat.⁶³

Human Intelligence Provisions

In order to ensure a smooth flow of valuable human intelligence (HUMINT), the Israeli General Security Service (GSS) established in the Occupied Territories “a sophisticated and efficient intelligence network, tightly connected to the operational arms” of the IDF/police.⁶⁴ The effectiveness of this intelligence network for providing actionable HUMINT was evidenced in a large number of terrorist cells exposed between 1967 and 1970, and the numerous arrests that followed.⁶⁵ Indeed, this success at acquiring actionable HUMINT—enacted through Israeli agents and Palestinian collaborators—was even further aided by the *Shin Bet*, whose presence and efficacy was so great that its interrogators managed to achieve an 80% confession rate, thereby providing the necessary information to successfully prevent 90% of attempted terrorist actions.⁶⁶

“Active Self Defense”

In response to growing shellings/rocket attacks and incursions launched from neighboring Arab territory, Israel adopted a policy of “active self defense”. This policy entailed large-scale joint operations across Israel’s borders into Jordan and Lebanon in order to disrupt militant strongholds and conventional Arab state support structures. Such operations also served as direct reprisals intended to deter continued support from neighboring Arab states, and to carry out “knock on door” operations, particularly in Lebanon, where Israeli forces sought out terrorist

⁶³ Alon, 83-85.

⁶⁴ Shlomo Gaazit, “The Administered Territories: Policy and Deeds”, *Maarachot*, Vol 55 (1970), No. 4, 37.

⁶⁵ John Laffin, *Fedayeen: The Arab-Israeli Dilemma*, London: Cassel, 1973, 126.

⁶⁶ Castignani, 74-5.

hiding in southern Lebanese villages.⁶⁷ Success, though, was somewhat limited in that few PLO men were killed, and most of their bases were soon re-established following the conduct of these operations.⁶⁸ Perhaps even more problematically, these operations served to stir up internal tensions in Lebanon, thereby leading to a “rehearsal” civil war in 1973.⁶⁹

Deterrence by Denial: Preventative Measures Against Acts of International Terrorism

With the growth of acts of international terrorism, Israel took a number of steps to implement passive security measures, including: security agents assigned to all El Al aircraft and to all official Israeli offices abroad; electronic detection devices installed in Lod Airport and Israeli buildings abroad; and the accompaniment by bodyguards of all Israeli official delegations going abroad for an international event.⁷⁰ These Israeli countermeasures were largely preventative, however an exception entailed a long-range airborne raid on Entebbe, Uganda (July 4, 1976) to rescue the hostages of a hijacked Air France plane.⁷¹

Regarding hostage taking situations, Israel generally adhered to a policy of not yielding to terrorist demands. For incidents within Israel, Israel employed special military commando units to respond to terrorist strikes-in-process. This procedure lead to a successful rescue of hostages hijacked in a Sabena airplane that was forced to land in Lod on May 9, 1972—though many of these operations ended in casualties among the hostages, inflicted by terrorists facing storming Israeli forces.⁷² Still, Israel’s resolve to fight and try to rescue hostages taken, made

⁶⁷ Alon, 71.

⁶⁸ Sayigh, “Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon,” 29.

⁶⁹ Yezid Sayigh, “Palestinian Armed Struggle: Means and Ends,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Autumn, 1986, 100.

⁷⁰ Alon, 81.

⁷¹ James J.F. Forest, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the Twenty First Century*, New York: Praeger, 2007, 465-468.

⁷² Alon, 82.

hostage-taking for Palestinian terrorists a difficult, suicide operation—a fact that saw Palestinian hostage-taking operations decrease dramatically after 1974.”⁷³

Assessment of Degree of Denial

Overall, Israeli efforts at implementing denial enjoyed some important success in this episode. Israeli countermeasures managed to reduce Palestinian raids into Israel proper, as well as reduce the number of successful attacks carried out against Israeli targets overseas. Israel also successfully managed to prevent attempts by the PLO to start a popular insurgency in the Territories in the late 1960s, while employing effective HUMINT capabilities to root out Palestinian militants. Still, Israel’s ability to deny Palestinian NSTO’s the ability to operate, accrue vital resources and evade Israeli security forces remained limited, especially given the ongoing presence of Lebanon as a major nearby sanctuary. As a consequence, Israeli civilian casualties from acts of terrorism were soon back on the rise. Thus, even despite effective Israel efforts, Israel’s success at implementing denial is assessed as being “Limited”.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Initially, Israel made attempts to isolate the emergence of popular support for insurgency within the Occupied Territories. This began with the implementation of Defense Minister Moshe Dayan’s “open bridges policy”. From Dayan’s perspective, instability in the West Bank would frustrate Israeli control, fuel Palestinian nationalism, and help swell the ranks of Palestinian NSTOs. To help mitigate such circumstances, Dayan’s policy would allow for West Bankers to continue crossing back and forth to Jordan to work, engage in commerce and visit relatives. Moreover, Israel would soon supplement the connection with Jordan, to one with Israel proper,

⁷³ Alon, 83.

thereby allowing Palestinians to travel and take up work in all of historic Palestine.⁷⁴ This opening of the Israeli labor market to Arab labor soon reduced unemployment in the Occupied Territories to nearly zero (98% employment)⁷⁵; the objective being to decrease as much as possible the incentives of the local Palestinian population to take part in any insurgency.⁷⁶ As Nadav Safran explains, the employment of Palestinians in Israel “did not make the Israeli occupation acceptable, but it did give the majority of the population a vested interest in the avoidance of seemingly pointless trouble.”⁷⁷

In further keeping with these efforts to provide a less “irksome” occupation unlikely to spurn on popular support for Palestinian NSTOs, Dayan looked to ensure adherence to a principle of minimal contact. According to this principal, too much exposure to Israeli security forces would be abrasive for the population. Dayan thus sought to co-opt Palestinian community leaders for running day-to-day activities in the Occupied Territories, so as to keep direct contact with the Israeli occupation to a minimum.⁷⁸

Shortcomings of Israeli Strategy to Isolate Popular Support

Despite working to co-opt communal leaders and various Palestinian collaborators, the Israeli government failed to foster any indigenous leadership acceptable to the Palestinians. To make matters worse, Israel believed it to be possible to stamp out any sign of “native” resistance to the occupation; thus any potential leader of Palestinian nationalism (regardless of how moderate) was deported or jailed, while “restlessness” or collaboration with any nationalistic organization was punishable by administrative detention.⁷⁹ Such actions served only to assist the

⁷⁴ Allan Gerson, *Israel, the West Bank and International Law*, New York: Frank Cass and Company, 1978, 206.

⁷⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, 185.

⁷⁶ Alon, 71-3.

⁷⁷ Nadav Safran, *Israel, the Embattled Ally*, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1978, 269.

⁷⁸ Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, 93.

⁷⁹ Edward Said, *The Question of Palestine*, New York: Vintage Books, 1992, 137.

growing influence and success of the PLO in the Occupied Territories.⁸⁰ Further, Israel's decision to implement an "occupation tax" upon the population in the Territories, strictly enforced by threat and punishment did little to win support.

Civilian Casualties and Collective/Administrative Punishment

Whatever its shortcomings, Israel's efforts at isolating popular support for Palestinian NSTOs was further undermined by several factors. The first of these involved high civilian casualties following retaliatory strikes and operations launched under "active self defense." While this occurred partially as a result of terrorist installations being nested within densely populated areas⁸¹, Israel was not overly concerned with minimizing the impact of such collateral damage—a point that directly fed into fueling hostile support against Israel.

In addition to civilian casualties, various forms of administrative (often interpreted as "collective") punishments were implemented against the Palestinian population.⁸² These included razing villages and population transfers, curfews, the defoliation of fields, and mass arrests followed by detention and interrogations. Moreover, any Palestinian even suspected of nationalistic offenses against the Israeli occupation could be deported⁸³, while any citizenship rights to the land resided on were denied apart from work and travel visas.

One of the most controversial forms of Israeli administrative punishment involved the demolition of homes of captured terrorists and collaborators (not to mention their families residing there), often referred to as "neighborhood punishment." As General Shlomo Gazit, tasked with heading the "Unit for the Coordination of Operations in the Territories", explained:

⁸⁰ Bickerton and Klausner, 157.

⁸¹ Alon, 80.

⁸² Amal Jamal, *The Palestinian National Movement: Politics of Contention, 1967-2005*, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005, 26-27.

⁸³ Said, 137.

The great advantage of administrative punishment is the rapidity of its implementation. In combating terrorism, a government cannot allow itself to wait... In order to deter, a sanction must be visible immediately. Blowing up terrorist homes is intended to achieve this purpose. ...blowing up his home the day after he was caught and obtained his confession—this is “the pillar of fire” which everybody sees, listens to, and understands.⁸⁴

Unfortunately, while such strikes indeed served as a “pillar of fire” that everyone saw and heard, the reaction tended to be less one of deterring acts of terrorism, and more that of raised public furor against the occupation and in support of Palestinian NSTOs.

Settlements

Another issue that served to increasingly undermine Israeli attempts at isolating popular support for Palestinian NSTOs came in the form of its settlement policies. Shortly after the 1967 war, Israel soon began to establish Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the Golan Heights. Initially, these were military settlements erected for security reasons.⁸⁵ However it was not long before religious political parties like Gush Emunim and others began evoking religious and historical sentiments that involved a call for the absorption of the West Bank—or Judea and Samaria—as part of Eretz Yisrael. Along these lines, official and unofficial civilian settlements began to spring up amongst existing Arab towns. By 1977, approximately 85 such settlements had been established. In addition to being in contravention of the Fourth Geneva Convention that prohibits the transfer of a civilian population into occupied territory⁸⁶, the construction of these settlements served to raise the ire of Palestinians in the Territories, as well as question whether or not Israel’s intention was to ever leave at all or was rather to annex and

⁸⁴ Alon, 75.

⁸⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, 186.

⁸⁶ Gregory Harms and Todd Ferry, *The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction*, London: Pluto Press, 2005, 128.

colonize them (most tended to believe the latter). Such sentiments obviously helped drive further support for Palestinian NSTOs.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

Israeli efforts at isolating Palestinian NSTOs from popular support enjoyed rather limited success. Shortcomings of the Israeli strategy, combined with high civilian casualties, administrative and collective punishment, civilian transfers, mass arrests and interrogations, and the erection of settlements (in increasing numbers) undermined the Israeli position, and fueled popular support for Palestinian NSTOs. However, Israel's attempts were not met with complete failure; its policies of "open bridges" and "minimal contact" kept tensions from sparking too high—thereby avoiding most open insurrection in the Occupied Territories during this episode. Isolation of popular support for this episode of strategic coercion is thus scored as "limited".

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Additional significant factors did influence the outcome of this episode. The first of these involved the crackdown in Jordan against Palestinian NSTOs. While it is true that Israeli retaliatory strikes put pressure on the government in Amman, the ultimate reason for King Hussein's decision to oust Palestinian militants boiled down to the direct challenge such groups posed to his kingdom's very survival (and his own life). Along these lines, King Hussein was driven to launch a major operation in September 1970 against Palestinian NSTOs operating in the Hashemite Kingdom. During the course of this conflict, 3,000 Palestinian insurgents were killed and Palestinian NSTOs were expelled from the country.⁸⁷ While a new sanctuary and primary headquarters for NSTO operations was quickly established in Lebanon, the Jordanian

⁸⁷ William Cleveland and Martin Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th Edition, Oxford: Westview Press, 2009, 362-3

war took a major toll on the manpower and morale of Palestinian NSTOs. It is thus not surprising that following this action taken by Amman, casualties from Palestinian acts of terrorism dropped dramatically in 1971.⁸⁸

Following the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and Egypt, Syria and Iraq, a number of important events influenced Israel's efforts at strategic coercion against Palestinian NSTOs. The first involved the recognition of the PLO at the 1974 Arab League meeting as the "sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people"⁸⁹ thereby enhancing the legitimacy of NSTOs working under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The second involved the global oil embargo implemented by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) to varying degrees against countries perceived as biased towards Israel. These actions had a significant effect in shaping the positions of many states previously more supportive of Israel.⁹⁰ The European Economic Community (EEC) for instance, soon thereafter publicly called at the UN General Assembly in 1974 for the recognition of the "right" of the Palestinian People to express their national identity. Indeed, by 1976 the EEC had come to endorse the French opinion that Palestinians had a right to their own homeland.⁹¹

The ultimate impact of such international recognition was a boom in legitimacy for the recognition of the Palestinian people, their right to self-determination, and the provision of a homeland, all of which bolstered the cause of Palestinian NSTOs, and the PLO in particular. This position, combined with a vastly growing membership in the UN General Assembly of post-colonial developing countries, lead to the UN General Assembly holding a full debate on the "Question of Palestine" whereby Yasser Arafat was invited on November 13, 1974 to speak before the General Assembly—the first representative of a nonstate ever invited to do so. These

⁸⁸ Alon, 60.

⁸⁹ Congressional Quarterly, "Arab Heads of State Declaration at Rabat, October 28, 1974," *The Middle East*, 7th Edition, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1990, 302.

⁹⁰ Bickerton and Klausner, 172.

⁹¹ Ben Soetendorp, *Foreign Policy in the European Union*, London: Longman, 1999, 102.

actions paved the way for an opening of popular support and international legitimacy for Palestinian NSTOs.

Additional Coercive Elements Employed: Punishment and Decapitation

As noted earlier, Israel employed a system of administrative punishment when support for nationalistic organizations was suspected. This often involved destruction of homes for entire families, as well as the temporary closure or restrictions on Israel's "open bridges" policy. Israel's top ministers such as Moshe Dayan were convinced that such punishment provided a deterrent effect⁹², however this is difficult to assess. What is clear is that it certainly did not cur favor for the Israeli occupation, nor reduce popular support for Palestinian NSTOs.

Also mentioned earlier, Israel employed a strategy of punishment-based retaliation—often targeted against neighboring states. While this had a positive outcome in leading to the reining in of terrorist violence in Jordan, significantly less success was enjoyed in Lebanon, where the state simply did not have the strength or power to do as Israeli punitive action demanded. Instead, Israeli punitive action helped to stir up conflict and chaos in the country, helping to pave the foundation for a civil war that would have negative ramifications for Israel.⁹³ Additionally, following provocative retaliatory strikes, Israel tended to promote at least as much support (popular and international) as resentment for Palestinian NSTOs.

Israel also attempted to enact decapitation strikes against PLO leaders and operatives responsible for planning and carrying out terrorist acts. Perhaps most famously conveyed in the 2005 film *Munich*, these assaults were typically waged by Mossad agents in Europe and Lebanon.⁹⁴ The ultimate effectiveness of such operations in disrupting the capacity for

⁹² Dayan, 402.

⁹³ Yazid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim, *The Cold War and the Middle East*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 93.

⁹⁴ Kameel Nasr, *Arab and Israeli Terrorism: The Causes and Effects of Political Violence*, Jefferson, NC: MacFarland & Company, 1996, 65.


Palestinian NSTOs to carry-out further attacks, however, is unclear. What is clear is that any deterrent effect that was hoped for through such action was minimal, as acts of (and attempts at) international terrorism against Israeli targets continued regardless.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

At the conclusion of this episode of strategic coercion, Israel found itself still confronted by a well-organized and dangerous terrorist organization. Israel did enjoy some success in reining in violence through a combination of denial successes and the isolation of Jordan as a launching pad for Palestinian attacks. As stated by Alon: “Altogether, the Palestinian organizations carried out over 6839 operations from June 1967 to December 1978. However, 72.2 percent (4991) of the operations were carried out during the first three years.”⁹⁵ Despite this success, however, Palestinian NSTOs were able to maintain a high level of operations against Israeli targets. And even after managing to eliminate Jordan as a safe haven for Palestinian NSTOs, Lebanon was quickly established as a replacement.

Violence thus continued at levels higher than might be regarded as “acceptable” to the Israeli public, as is illustrated in figure 5.1:

⁹⁵ Alon, 43.

Figure 5.1: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1967-1977⁹⁶

Further, no headway was made toward achieving any sort of political resolution with the Palestinians. Moreover, little isolation of popular support for Palestinian NSTOs was achieved, and Palestinian NSTOs remained unquestioningly committed to violence. Some progress was made in that Israeli efforts at denial helped to force mainstream PLO groups (Fatah in particular) in 1974 to scale down their demands for a single “secular, democratic” (read Palestinian) state in place of Israel, to consider a more realistic objective being the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. However many Palestinian NSTOs rejected this position (forming a “Rejectionist Front”), and even the ones who accepted it were ambiguous about whether such a state would be their end goal, or merely a stepping stone along the path toward the creation of a single Palestinian state by force. Considering this, this episode of strategic coercion is assessed as one of “limited success.”

⁹⁶ Statistical information for this chart provided for by: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Terrorism Deaths in Israel – 1920-1999,” 1 January 2000, Available Online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/1/Terrorism+deaths+in+Israel+-+1920-1999.htm [Last Viewed 15 July 09].

Within-Case Episode #2: 1977-1987—Likud Comes to Power, Full-scale Military Interventions in Lebanon

May 1977 saw the victory of Menachem Begin and his right-wing Likud coalition in the Israeli national elections. Prime Minister Begin had no intention of relinquishing the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), and especially not East Jerusalem. Begin's position was bolstered by ultra-nationalists and ultra-religious parties, who similarly opposed trading "land for peace". This position would see a great expansion of Israeli settlement efforts. By 1981, Begin oversaw the expansion of settlers to number some 110,000⁹⁷—and the expansion would steadily continue.

During this time period, Egypt and the United States would press Begin's government into peace accords at Camp David. Begin and the Likud eventually played along, seeing a peace treaty with Egypt as enabling Israel to consolidate its control over the West Bank. Still, Israel would remain obstinate in the face of calls from both of these countries to seek a political resolution recognizing the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians.

Meanwhile in southern Lebanon, the PLO continued to build itself up, securing its position in the country while developing formidable military capabilities. The PLO arsenal came to include heavy weapons and large formations of PLO forces (Israeli estimates placed the number of PLO fighters at 12,000 to 18,000).⁹⁸ Using this new found military strength, the PLO consolidated their position in Lebanon, while launching dramatic raids into Israel along the Lebanese border and supporting ever-increasing clandestine militant operations within the West Bank.⁹⁹ In doing so, the PLO had even reached a point of strength where threatened artillery assault upon Northern Israel had come to increasingly tie Israel's hands in launching retaliatory strikes or raids.

⁹⁷ Bickerton and Klausner, 187.

⁹⁸ Yezid Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 4, Summer 1983, 9.

⁹⁹ Sayigh, "Palestinian Armed Struggle," 94.

This situation, combined with the arrival of the hawkish Begin, would soon witness a dramatic escalation in Israeli military operations. Prior to 1977, most Israeli operations were limited in scale or confined to retaliatory raids. However, Israel would soon engage in its first “war of choice” (at least since 1956), and for the first time initiate a war specifically targeted against Palestinian NSTOs, as opposed to neighboring Arab states.¹⁰⁰

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

During this episode, Israeli efforts at isolation of external/international support and denial closely overlapped. Israel attempted to both isolate Palestinian access to Lebanon, while simultaneously attempting to deny the PLO the ability to operate, maintain vital resources and continue to evade Israeli security forces. Both were achieved through increasing military interventions into southern Lebanon. Considering this, actions aimed at providing for isolation of external/international support and denial are largely considered together during this episode.

By 1978, with Israeli civilian casualties rising, and the Israeli government now lead by the Begin, the comparative calm that had fallen over the Israel-Lebanese border since 1973 fell apart. Accordingly, Israel would soon initiate an invasion into southern Lebanon in March 1978, code-named *Operation Litani*. This Israeli incursion was the largest of its kind against Palestinian NSTOs, and was initiated with the objective of creating a buffer zone from its border up to the Lebanese Litani River.¹⁰¹ The operation was carried out primarily through the advance of Israeli infantry, however they met fierce resistance from entrenched PLO units that had been

¹⁰⁰ Tami Amanda Jacoby, *Bridging the Barrier: Israeli Unilateral Disengagement*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2007, 115.

¹⁰¹ Ian Black and Benny Morris, *Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services*, New York: Gove Press, 1991, 362.

building up strength¹⁰²—foreshadowing an increasing difficulty presented to Israel in undertaking limited operations aimed at dislodging and disrupting PLO positions.

Still, Israel managed to achieve some success through a combination of two outcomes. The first was cooperation with Lebanese Christian Maronite militias under command of Major Saad Haddad to carve out a buffer zone in the south. The second was the arrival of UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon) to occupy additional territory north of Haddad's position. The result was the creation of a buffer zone where all contiguity between the IDF and PLO was eliminated except for an eight-kilometer-wide section facing Beaufort Castle. Further, through use of Israeli gunboats, the PLO could frequently be subjected to blockade.¹⁰³

With loss of direct contact between the PLO and Israeli forces, clashes between Israel and the PLO would take on a new manifestation. Israel's action took two main forms: 1) continuous artillery shelling of the Tyre and Nabatieh regions, combined with frequent air raids against Lebanon's coast strip; and 2) attacks by units advancing on foot, transported in by helicopters or boats.¹⁰⁴ Both forms of Israeli action would soon be impaired by Palestinian resistance. Regarding the first method, the PLO would retaliate in kind with their own artillery shelling, creating a war of attrition that displaced tens of thousands of Israelis in northern Israel. This counter-shelling and the disastrous consequences for Israel's northern civilian population led to an artillery ceasefire; however the PLO continued to organize terrorist and guerrilla assaults in the Territories, and slip terrorist guerrillas through the Lebanese border.¹⁰⁵ Meanwhile the PLO managed to continue to smuggle in arms—despite the efforts of the Israeli navy—and Israeli raids became largely ineffective due to the ever-strengthening position of the PLO.

¹⁰² Yezid Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 32.

¹⁰³ Sayigh, "Palestinian Armed Struggle," 96.

¹⁰⁴ Sayigh, "Israel's Military Performance in Lebanon", 29-31.

¹⁰⁵ Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History*, Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, Inc., 2002, 1159.

Operation Peace for Galilee

By spring 1982, Israel moved to counter the situation with a full-scale assault, with plans laid for the invasion of Lebanon. The rationale behind these plans was to: A) destroy the PLO and its infrastructure; B) secure the area up to 25 miles (40 km) north of Israel's border; and C) restore control of the "legitimate" government over the country, preferably in the person of Bashir Gemayel, an ally of Israel.¹⁰⁶ Israel put its plan to action, invading Lebanon on June 6, 1982, following the shooting of Shlomo Argov, Israel's ambassador to London. *Operation Peace for Galilee* was implemented in full-effect and marked the largest Israeli military operation ever targeted against Palestinian NSTOs. Indeed, Israel's invasion force amounted to a total size of 120,000 men, 1,600 tanks, and 1,600 armored personnel carriers, combined with massive air and naval support.¹⁰⁷

Consequences for the PLO following Operation Peace for Galilee

The result of Israel's massive intervention was that evacuation of the PLO from Beirut on August 21, 1982. This evacuation included the exodus of 10-12,000 members of the PLO, many of which would be dispersed to eight different countries.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile, a multinational peacekeeping force arrived in Beirut at the heels of the Palestinian NSTO evacuation. Further, the PLO split badly, faced with mutual recriminations following the siege of Beirut, as many of Arafat's opponents blamed him for the defeat of Palestinian fighters and their withdrawal. Syria and Amal (a loyal-Syrian Shi'a insurgent organization) used the opportunity to thrust a weakened Arafat for good from Lebanon to Tunisia¹⁰⁹; from there Arafat was forced to re-

¹⁰⁶ Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon*, New York: Nation Books, 2002, 350.

¹⁰⁷ Sayigh, "Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War," 6.

¹⁰⁸ Sayigh, "Palestinian Armed Struggle," 95.

¹⁰⁹ Edward Said, *Reflections on Exile and Other Essays*, Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2001, 543.

establish PLO headquarters 4800 kilometers away from Israel and the Occupied Territories, while the Lebanese parliament scrapped the Cairo Agreement.¹¹⁰

Moreover, along with Lebanon, the PLO lost two major assets. These included a quasi-autonomous political power base in Beirut and south Lebanon, and an integrated military complex maintained directly by the PLO. As Yezid Sayigh states, “The PLO enjoyed not only combat presence and administrative/logistical infrastructure but also geographical continuity internally, proximity to Israel externally, and the political and practical option of undertaking military action.”¹¹¹ By August 1982, this was now all lost to the PLO.

Israel’s Success in Lebanon Frustrated

The success of Israel’s intervention in Lebanon, however, was not complete and would soon be frustrated. Shortly following his election and victory, Bashir Gemayel—the loyal politician Israel hoped to “help” place in office—was assassinated. Further, the multinational force that had arrived to secure Beirut was soon forced to withdraw by acts of Lebanese suicide terror against a US Marine barracks and French contingent’s compound.¹¹² Meanwhile, as Amin Gemayel arrived on the scene to replace his father as president, he moved quickly to cancel the Lebanese accord with Israel, and mended fences with Syria, allowing for its continued military occupation in Lebanon. In this environment, Israel’s Christian allies in the Maronites and the Phalange were unable to re-establish their former control over the country, and began distancing themselves from the Jewish state.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ Marius Deeb, *Syria’s Terrorist War on Lebanon and the Peace Process*, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, 135.

¹¹¹ Sayigh, “Palestinian Military Performance in the 1982 War,” 95-6.

¹¹² Anthony McDermott and Kjell Skjelsbaek, *The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984*, Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 1991, 64.

¹¹³ Bickerton and Klausner, 213.

Furthermore, Israel would find itself confronted with a new threat arising from its attempts to impose control over a buffer zone in southern Lebanon. This would come from NSTOs organized by Lebanon's southern Shi'a population. Ironically, the Shiites and southern Lebanese initially welcomed Israeli troops, hoping for them to dislodge the PLO.¹¹⁴ However, following IDF disregard for their property, traditional economic patterns, and policies that seemed designed to incorporate them into the Israeli economy, combined with high civilian casualties for Israeli operations in southern Lebanon, these Shi'a began organizing into resistance movements targeted at Israeli forces and their allies. Amongst these were the Shi'a NSTOs Hezbollah ("Party of God") and the Amal ("Hope") Movement, which were supported and funded by Syria and Iran.¹¹⁵

Faced with fierce assaults, aided by suicide bombings in Lebanon, the IDF soon redeployed to a smaller security zone south of the Awali River to reduce insurgent infiltration. However even this position proved tenuous to defend; by June 1985, Israeli troops would withdraw from Lebanon to a small border zone. From here, Israel would manage to create enough depth to successfully reduce artillery and rocket attacks on Northern Israel—though this would come at the cost of the death of numerous IDF servicemen.

PLO Reorients and Rebuilds

Denied considerable military, political and logistical capacity, dispersed across the region and left to the mercy of Syria and hostile dissident factions such as Abu Nidal, the surviving PLO under Yasser Arafat began to reorient itself. Despite its losses and the severe disadvantages of operating in exile, Fatah retained its majority following amongst

¹¹⁴ David Cook and Olivia Allison, *Understanding and Addressing Suicide Attacks: The Faith and Politics of Martyrdom Operations*, London: Praeger, 2007, 22.

¹¹⁵ Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger, *Political Parties and Terrorist Groups*, 2nd Ed., New York: Routledge, 2008, 44-45.

Palestinians.¹¹⁶ In Lebanon, meanwhile, it managed to send back in a steady flow of guerrillas, leadership cadres and military supplies by sea (despite the Israeli naval blockade), rebuilding the strength of the PLO in the Sidon region to an estimated 10,000. By the late 1980s, Arafat was able to reassert his control over the PLO, and enjoyed tremendous support among Palestinians in Lebanon; indeed, fully 90% of Fatah's fighters were born and bred in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.¹¹⁷

With this re-established strength, Arafat looked to resume PLO terrorist strikes against Israel. While no longer able to field heavy weaponry or plan and launch operations on the same scale, the PLO now began to launch terrorist raids into Israel and supported clandestine military activity in the Occupied Territories, all the while continuing to reconstruct a modest military capability in Lebanon.¹¹⁸

Assessment Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

By the mid-point of this episode, Israel managed to greatly isolate external/international support for Palestinian NSTOs in displacing them from their sanctuary in Lebanon. However, Israeli efforts to install a friendly government, and a buffer-zone enforced by a multinational taskforce were for naught, while Israel itself was pushed back by emerging Shi'a NSTOs. Moreover, by the end of this episode, the PLO was able to rebuild itself in Lebanon to a respectable degree. Still, even considering these facts, Israel managed to greatly weaken the PLO and its ability to base itself in important external sanctuaries. Isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as "limited".

¹¹⁶ Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without," 258.

¹¹⁷ Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without," 256.

¹¹⁸ Sayigh, "Palestinian Armed Struggle," 97.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

As noted earlier, actions aimed at denial and isolation of external/international support overlapped. Information in the previous section can thus be used to form an assessment of the degree of denial achieved. That being said, at the conclusion of the 1977-1987 episode of strategic coercion, Israel had made some important gains in implementing denial against Palestinian NSTOs in general, and the PLO in particular. Despite initial setbacks, Israel was able to significantly dislodge and weaken the PLO's capacity to conduct violent operations against Israel following *Operation Peace for Galilee*, and subsequent efforts while maintaining a security zone in Lebanon. However, the PLO—even with its primary leadership in exile in Tunis—would still manage to gradually return and resume terrorist strikes. Still, the PLO's capacity to assault Israel remained greatly diminished. Considering this, combined with ongoing deterrent measures that continued to effectively make Israeli targets more difficult to strike, a major reduction in the PLO's access to vital resources and ability to operate, denial for this episode is assessed as “significant”.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of Isolation of popular support were achieved?

Pressured by the Jimmy Carter Administration and President Sadat of Egypt under to the context of the Camp David Accords, Menachem Begin's Likud government was forced into the position to make some concessions regarding the question of Palestinian rights. The result was that for the first time during the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, an Israeli government agreed within the Camp David meetings that any solution to the conflict must acknowledge the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.”¹¹⁹ Begin, furthermore, agreed to negotiate with Palestinian representatives over the future of the Occupied Territories;

¹¹⁹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Camp David Accords, September 17, 1978,” 2008, Available Online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Camp%20David%20Accords> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

though this position was greatly hedged in that he specified that he would only be willing to consider a limited five-year period of autonomy.

Begin was unable, however, to gain Egyptian agreement to any autonomy scheme—especially following Sadat’s assassination. The Likud government thus decided to implement its own version of Palestinian autonomy. On November 8, 1981, Begin’s government announced the creation of a separate civilian administration designed to handle all local concerns in the West Bank, while the military government in operation since 1967 was abolished. In truth, though, this move was effectively an act of thinly veiled subterfuge, as the Israeli government remained in control in the West Bank, with civilian officials subordinate to them. In the words of Charles Smith, “The only difference was that the military authority was now situated in Israel rather than centered in the West Bank.”¹²⁰ Meanwhile, Israel staffed the supposed Palestinian self-governing authority with collaborators. The result was the construction of local village leagues that were given legislative powers, excluding the election of mayors and village officials. Israel hoped that in controlling patronage and the power to issue permits that these leagues would be able to win support.¹²¹ The result instead was a strong arousal of Palestinian resistance to these actions. Israel’s response was to respond with an “iron fist”.

Excessive Palestinian Civilian Casualties

Excessive civilian casualties of Palestinians in *Operation Peace for Galilee* and after did little to help Israel isolate Palestinian NSTOs from popular support. During its bombardment of Beirut, Israel caused thousands of civilian casualties in Lebanon, and the situation did not improve in the land invasion that followed. The end result was a flood of support for Palestinian

¹²⁰ Smith, 262.

¹²¹ Smith, 263.

militant activities launched by NSTOs—indeed, as mentioned earlier, fully 90% of Fatah’s militants were born and bred in these affected areas.¹²²

Problematic Aspects of the Israeli Occupation in the Territories

As time progressed, the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza yielded a number of detrimental results. While the occupation may have initially begun with an economic boom, by the end of this episode circumstances had seriously worsened. Extensive social and economic dislocation had resulted largely as a consequence of Israeli policy, stemming from over 1,300 military regulations governing most aspects of Palestinian life.¹²³ Meanwhile land expropriations by the Israeli government placed 53% of the West Bank and 35-42% of the crowded Gaza Strip under Israeli ownership. Israeli water policies reduced resources for Arab agriculture, with 431 of 720 Arab wells closed in the West Bank, and the area under Arab cultivation declining from 260,000 hectares (in 1967) to 160,000 hectares (in 1987). Correspondingly, the same period witnessed a drop in the number of industrial establishments in the West Bank from 7,300 to 2,991.¹²⁴ And under-financed public investment policies in the Territories wreaked havoc on Palestinian infrastructure.¹²⁵ The Israeli “iron fist” policy further exacerbated matters by brutally cracking down with punishments—including administrative detentions, house demolitions, deportation and school closings—for any unrest demonstrated.

Settlement Expansion

Following the arrival of Menachem Begin, Israeli settlement expansion began in earnest. The new Likud government provided for this by working in lock-step with newly formed settler

¹²² Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle Without”, 256.

¹²³ James Ron, *Frontiers and Ghettos: State violence in Serbia and Israel*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, 132.

¹²⁴ Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle Without,” 262.

¹²⁵ Gelvin, 215.

organizations to cultivate willing individuals to partake in such settlement. The Israeli government helped provide encouragement for settlement, moreover, through offering an array of incentives, including tax breaks, grants and low-interest loans.¹²⁶ To provide land for these settlements, Israeli authorities designated over two million dunams (500,000 acres) to be acquired in the Territories—roughly 40% of the total land area. Appropriations were enacted by the Israeli government through arbitrary declarations of “state land” over large tracts (regardless of existing title), with the stipulation that the land could be turned over to Israeli settlers in three weeks if Arab claimants could not prove ownership in the allotted time (a prospect that was highly unlikely). Judgment over the status of ownership, furthermore, was made by military tribunals within the Territories, with no further recourse to a plaintiff.¹²⁷

Settlements were often established, moreover, in a very abrasive fashion. These settlements were not built to fit in, but to stand out, in the words of James Gelvin, “like the Crusader fortresses of old.”¹²⁸ Settlers would often act with little respect for local inhabitants, often enjoying impunity behind the guard of the IDF. Suffice it to say, not only did these settlements arouse furor among the Palestinian population, they also made any hope of realizing a Palestinian state seem increasingly less likely.

Sabra and Shatila Refugee Camp Massacres

One of the most egregious acts undermining isolation of popular support transpired between September 15 and 18, 1982. During this period, shortly following the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, Israel had re-entered West Beirut to “keep the peace.” However, in an area then-controlled by the Israelis, Christian Phalangists bent on avenging the death of their leader

¹²⁶ Virginia Tilley, *The One-State Solution: A Breakthrough for Peace in the Israeli-Palestinian Deadlock*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2005, 41-43.

¹²⁷ Smith, 261.

¹²⁸ Gelvin, 296.

(Bashir) were permitted to enter the refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila.¹²⁹ What ensued was a fearful massacre of hundreds of Palestinians—the majority of which were women and children.¹³⁰

The Israeli military did not make matters any better when the IDF rejected claims that the Phalange entered the camps without the assistance or even knowledge of the Israeli command. This position was not tenable, however, and the Kahan Commission found Israeli officials—in particular Ariel Sharon and Rafael Eitan—indirectly responsible for the massacre.¹³¹ Still the damage had been, and Israel was in a position where little more could have vilified it to Palestinians.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

By the end of this episode of strategic coercion, not only had Israel failed to achieve any isolation of popular support for Palestinian NSTOs, it had helped fuel it onward. Along with primary political grievances remaining poorly addressed, excessive violence and collective/administrative punishment in full effect, and new significant grievances emerging, the degree of isolation of popular support in this episode of Israeli strategy is assessed as “backfire.”

Assessment Question 5: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Several additional factors did have some influence on the outcome of this episode. First, pro-Syrian PLO factions were keen to undermine the influence of Arafat and Fatah in Lebanon. Following the Israeli invasion, these factions launched a civil war within the organization, greatly weakening the PLO and factions loyal to Fatah. In so doing, these Syrian-backed rebel groups played a major role in ensuring that not only was the PLO expelled from Beirut, but

¹²⁹ Bickerton and Klausner, 211.

¹³⁰ Smith, 272.

¹³¹ Smith.

Lebanon all together.¹³² Thus, while the Israeli military intervention forced the PLO to evacuate from Beirut, the Syrian backed Palestinian civil war saw the PLO forced into exile across a broad geographic region thousands of miles away, while losing physical contact with Palestinian communities in Lebanon and Syria.¹³³

While these actions initially helped to weaken the PLO and Fatah, they would—ironically—help strengthen Fatah’s position in the PLO in the end. Six years following their expulsion, Fatah remained the central force within the PLO. Indeed, as Syrian-backed opposition groups came to be discredited as puppet organizations, Arafat and Fatah’s position had been strengthened to the point where they (and Arafat in particular) became the sole leader and ultimate decision-maker of the PLO. This outcome would play a significant role in allowing Arafat to begin to moderate the PLO’s policy, and begin undertaking a more serious investigation of diplomatic options leading to a settlement with Israel.¹³⁴

Shi’a NSTOs – Amal and Hezbollah

During *Operation Peace for Galilee*, Israeli heavy-handedness in absence of any sort of “hearts and minds” strategy helped serve as the catalyst for the emergence of Hezbollah—a radical Islamic umbrella organization—and the strengthening of Amal, which were bent on driving the IDF out of Lebanon through the use of terrorism and guerrilla tactics. Supported by Iran and Syria, these organizations would put up fearsome resistance against Israeli efforts to secure Lebanon from NSTOs targeting Israel. Terrorist acts by these groups proved formidable, as they would be the first to employ a strategy of suicide bombing against the IDF, resulting in

¹³² L. Carl Brown, *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2004, 174.

¹³³ Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle Without,” 255.


¹³⁴ Sayigh, “Struggle Within, Struggle Without,” 260.

Israel's retreat to the South Lebanese Security Zone (leaving Lebanon free once again for terrorist organizations to operate).¹³⁵

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

Despite setbacks, *Operation Peace for Galilee* and subsequent Israeli denial efforts in Lebanon did significantly weaken the PLO's operational capacity. The PLO were driven from Beirut, and Israeli action served as the catalyst that saw PLO forces driven from Lebanon. Accordingly, violence levels were reduced to relatively "acceptable" levels as demonstrated in the figure 5.2:

Figure 5.2: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1977-1987¹³⁶



In wake of this weakened position (as well as with his hands freed from more radical dissident factions that had now been discredited), Arafat was both compelled and placed in the position to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 and 343—which entailed the acceptance

¹³⁵ Castignani, 66.

¹³⁶ Statistical information provided for by the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terrorism Deaths in Israel – 1920-1999," 1 Jan 2008, Available Online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFAArchive/2000_2009/2000/1/Terrorism+deaths+in+Israel+-+1920-1999.htm [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

of the “sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence” of Israel—as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 181 accepting a two-state solution to the conflict, and he began pursuing diplomatic options towards the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state in the Occupied Territories in joint efforts with Jordan.¹³⁷

Still terrorist assaults on Israel would continue, whether at the hands of dissident factions, or PLO raids. The PLO—and Fatah in particular—enjoyed continual and increasing popular support, and managed to regroup and rebuild itself to an extent, including the re-establishment of a presence in Lebanon. Meanwhile, under the Premiership of Shimon Peres (who had succeeded Yitzhak Shamir following the departure of Begin), Israel considered negotiations with a Joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation (excluding PLO elements). Even this, however, was dismissed out of hand by the Likud. Thus despite some political movement on the part of Arafat, no ground providing for real political resolution was gained. This episode is thus assessed as being one of “moderate success” or stalemate. However, with Palestinian tension in the Occupied Territories reaching a boiling point, it would not be long before even this degree of Israeli success was soon undermined.

Within-Case Episode #3: 1987-1991— The First *Intifada*

Despite the “moderate success” level enjoyed in the previous episode of strategic coercion, tensions were left ready to burst, given the complete backfire in flawed Israeli attempts to isolate popular support. By 1987, an entire generation of Palestinian youth had grown up under an increasingly oppressive occupation, and they had lost faith that either the Arab governments (defeated in 1967 and 1973) or the PLO (which had been weakened following its exile from Lebanon) could succeed in securing Palestinian self-determination. For Palestinians

¹³⁷ Castignani, 98.

in the Occupied Territories, moreover, no sector of the Palestinian economy or part of the Palestinian landscape remained untouched by the ongoing occupation, and Israel continued to expropriate land in the Territories for “military training,” “public needs,” and even nature preserves.¹³⁸ The economic benefits that the Palestinians had initially benefited from under the occupation had all but disappeared, leaving the Palestinians with structural underdevelopment, and unemployment running at 50-60%.¹³⁹ Unrest was rising and fast.

The spark that ignited the *Intifada* took place in December 1987, following the accidental death of four Palestinians caused by an IDF tank-transport collision with a truck bringing back Palestinian workers from Israel.¹⁴⁰ The eruption of the Intifada caught the Israeli government by surprise. Israeli authorities had not predicted a looming civilian revolt, and considered cases of nationalist defiance to be individual undertakings.¹⁴¹ Even after the initial outbreak of the Intifada, Israeli leaders were slow to recognize the challenge posed by it, and slower still to respond accordingly. However, the Intifada soon became organized under the United National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU)—swiftly co-opted by Yasser Arafat and the PLO—and Palestinians began engaging in various forms of civil disobedience and organized boycotts against Israeli products and employers.¹⁴² Their efforts at organized civil disobedience began to win tremendous support in the Territories, the region and internationally—while Israeli responses were met with international outrage. Arafat would use this political outcome to help leverage his position of pursuing a political settlement.

In the backdrop of this, terrorist assaults against Israeli civilians would continue. Meanwhile, the PLO were able to exploit both Israel’s preoccupation with the *Intifada* in the

¹³⁸ Gelvin, 215.

¹³⁹ Ahron Bregman, *Israel’s Wars, 1947-93*, London: Routledge, 2000, 121.

¹⁴⁰ Castignani, 77.

¹⁴¹ Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Jewish Civilization: The Jewish Historical Experience in a Comparative Perspective*, New York: State University of New York Press, 1992, 207.

¹⁴² Jonathan Schanzer, *Hamas vs. Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, 23.

Occupied Territories, as well as Israel's struggle to maintain a foothold in southern Lebanon in the face of suicide terror and guerrilla assaults perpetrated Lebanese Shi'a NSTOs (particularly Hezbollah), in order to fully replenish its military strength in Lebanon by 1990.¹⁴³

Emergence of Palestinian Radical Islamic NSTOs

To exacerbate matters, radical Islamic NSTOs were now emerging within the Occupied Territories as well, inspired by the Iranian Revolution of 1978-9 and the successes of Hezbollah against the IDF. These two groups involved the arrival of two highly radical organizations, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. For both, the objective was to not only to end Israeli occupation, but to establish an Islamic Arab state in place of Israel.¹⁴⁴ In working towards this goal, Hamas was the recipient of exceedingly hefty sums of international financial support particularly from the Gulf states, the Saudi royal family, and Iran.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, Hamas would emerge during this time period as a competitor to the PLO and PLO-dominated UNLU.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

During this episode of strategic coercion, Israel's ability to affect any substantial isolation of external and international support was significantly constrained on two ends: 1) Israel's ongoing efforts to maintain its thin security zone in southern Lebanon in the face of considerable pressure from Shi'a NSTOs; and 2) Israel's efforts to pacify the Intifada which had exploded in the Occupied Territories. The Intifada, moreover, had some important consequences for international support for the political cause championed by the Palestinians and the PLO.

¹⁴³ Bickerton and Klausner, 218.

¹⁴⁴ Loren D. Lybarger, *Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle Between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007, 83-85.

¹⁴⁵ Harold Cubert, *The PFLP's Changing Role in the Middle East*, New York: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1997, 176.

Prior to the outbreak of the Intifada, the Palestinian cause had found itself increasingly slipping into decline in attention—both regionally and internationally. Indeed, following the 1988 Amman summit, the Palestinian issue had been relegated to its lowest point in the annals of the Arab League.¹⁴⁶ However the eruption of the Intifada swiftly changed this situation, with the Palestinian issue quickly returning to the forefront of Arab concerns. Following the subsequent meetings of the Arab League, the PLO was promised an immediate boost of \$128 million, with an additional \$43 million a month for the remainder of the year (1988).¹⁴⁷ Iraq too would individually grant increasing financial aid to Arafat, while allowing for the basing of Fatah armed units there.¹⁴⁸ Meanwhile, the PLO would experience a marked improvement in relations with three important neighbors: Jordan, Egypt and Syria.

In Jordan, King Hussein ceased his competition with the PLO for influence in the West Bank, moving to formally renounce Jordanian responsibility for, and claims of, sovereignty over the Territory.¹⁴⁹ Further, following a subsequent warming of relations between King Hussein and the PLO, the embassy of the State of Palestine was opened in Amman, providing the PLO with a new freedom of action on Jordan's soil that enhanced Arafat's capability for directing political action in the Occupied Territories, while promoting his control of the Intifada.¹⁵⁰ Syria, meanwhile was forced to move towards at least a partial reconciliation with the PLO, while forcing its client Palestinian NSTOs to soften and/or mute their rhetorical attacks on the dominant Palestinian NSTO, the PLO.¹⁵¹ Perhaps most importantly, the magnification of the PLO's position in relation to the Intifada pressured Assad to issue the directive to lift the Shi'a

¹⁴⁶ Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab Israeli Conflict*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998, 305.

¹⁴⁷ Sela, 309.

¹⁴⁸ Sela, 315.

¹⁴⁹ Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990, 329.

¹⁵⁰ Sela, 311.

¹⁵¹ Helena Cobban, "The Palestinians," *The Middle East from the Iran-Contra Affair to the Intifada*, Robert Freedman (ed.), Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1991, 260.

Amal militia's siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon¹⁵², while allowing Palestinian commanders back into the Tyre region for the first time since 1982.¹⁵³ Indeed, in Lebanon, the PLO was able to restore its strength in Lebanon to over 11,000 trained PLO militants.¹⁵⁴

Perhaps most straining for Israel, however was the pressure from the United States that was demonstrating increasing concern over Israel's handling of the Intifada. The Intifada had compelled the US to activate sustained diplomatic engagement, not seen since the Camp David talks of 1979, with Secretary Shultz making numerous visits to the region. Indeed, the position of the US government began to take up the position that the peace process could not be advanced without the engagement of the PLO.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

By the end of this episode, Israeli efforts at implementing isolation of external support for Palestinian NSTOs and their political cause was faltering. Political and diplomatic support were at an all time high for the Palestinian national movement, new funds were issued to the PLO from supporting Arab countries while the issue of Palestine was moved to the top of the agenda, Israel's most important ally began to place pressure on it for political movement contrary to its desires, and the PLO was able to reconstitute itself and consolidate its position once again in Lebanon. Still, it is difficult to assess this episode as one where Israel's efforts to enact an isolation of external support rank as "failure" or worse—despite the increase in support for the PLO following the outbreak of the Intifada, Israel managed to prevent (whether through deterrence, negotiated agreements, or its security zone in Lebanon) any neighboring state from serving as a launching pad into Israel. For this episode, isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as "limited".

¹⁵² Sela, 305.

¹⁵³ Sayigh, "Struggle Within, Struggle Without: The Transformation of PLO Politics Since 1982," 256.

¹⁵⁴ Bickerton and Klausner, 218.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

During this episode, Israeli efforts to implement denial against Palestinian NSTOs mainly centered upon efforts to put down the Intifada, which the Israeli government believed to be sustained by members of Palestinian NSTOs—namely the PLO and their involvement through the UNLU. It should be pointed out that Israel benefited during this time period from a cessation of the targeting of Israeli civilians by the Fatah-lead PLO, in accordance with Arafat's February 1989 Geneva declaration. However, Israel would still have its hands full: in attempting to put down the Palestinian popular uprising, the IDF was placed in the unfamiliar position of initiating a policing mission—something it was not prepared for.¹⁵⁵ Undertaking this policing mission was a new and difficult experience for the IDF, however, undermined by a lack of greater strategic guidance from Israel's political leadership. This issue was even further complicated by lack of specific training provided to prepare soldiers to undertake this new mission.¹⁵⁶

Meanwhile during the Intifada, Israel attempted to maintain its capacity for cracking down on and implementing denial against Palestinian NSTOs. In doing so, the IDF tried restricting Palestinian movement to quell riots in order to facilitate the movements of IDF troops, Israeli border police (*Magav* units) and GSS agents around the Territories. However, with the uprising in full effect, Israeli security personnel found it increasingly difficult to undertake preventative and retaliatory operations against Palestinian NSTOs, as they became vulnerable and subjected to rock and Molotov cocktail throwing (not to mention physical and human barricades all over the Territories).¹⁵⁷ At the same time, vital intelligence for conducting denial operations was being undermined. Following the resignation of massive numbers of Palestinian

¹⁵⁵ Don Peretz and Gideon Doron, *The Government and Politics of Israel*, 3rd Ed., Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, 262.

¹⁵⁶ Castignani, 91-2.

¹⁵⁷ Castignani, 84.

civil administrators and the public recantation of collaborators and informers that followed the outbreak of the *Intifada*, the Israeli intelligence network in the Territories took a severe hit.¹⁵⁸

Assessment of Degree of Denial

During this episode Israel's capacity to effectively carry-out denial operations was increasingly undermined in the Territories, with the IDF enjoying only limited success in putting down the Intifada, and the PLO re-establishing its strength in Lebanon. Still, Israeli countermeasures held to prevent or deter most significant acts of terrorism from NSTOs unwilling to abide by Arafat's Geneva declaration to renounce violence against civilians, and border infiltrations and attacks were kept to a minimum. In light of this information, the level of denial is assessed as "limited".

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Following the previous episode of strategic coercion, popular support—whether for Palestinian NSTOs, violence, or general civil disorder—was exploding. Under Rabin's "Iron Fist" policy, widely unpopular actions were carried over into this episode of Israeli strategy, including deportations, house demolitions, collective curfews and press censorship.¹⁵⁹ Within the first eight weeks of the Intifada, Israeli heavy-handedness in putting down the uprising resulted in the death of 38 Palestinians, as well as the imprisonment without trial (under indefinite administrative detention) of many others. As the next year (1988) progressed, more than 150 Palestinians would be killed, and more than 11,500 wounded—almost two-thirds of which were children under 15 years of age. Indeed, the death rate of rock-throwing Palestinian

¹⁵⁸ Joost Hiltermann, "Israel's Strategy to Break the Uprising," *Journal of Palestine*, vol. 19, no. 2, Winter, 1990, 5.

¹⁵⁹ Hassan Abdulmuhi Barari, *Israeli Politics and the Middle East Peace Process, 1988-2002*, London: Routledge, 2004, 32.

children was six times the annual per capita death rate of American soldiers in Vietnam.¹⁶⁰ Adding to these unpopular fatalities, Israel often targeted high profile activists/organizers in the *Intifada* for liquidation.

While Israel would attempt to rein in excessive violence within six weeks of the *Intifada*'s outbreak, their new rules for engagement often proved difficult to implement. This combined with Defense Minister Rabin's policy of "force, might and beatings" that employed plastic and fiberglass truncheons because wooden ones shattered too frequently on Palestinian bodies did little to win away any popular support within the Occupied Territories.¹⁶¹ Frequent deaths from the employment of plastic bullets—within the first 5 months of the implementation of plastic bullets, 47 Palestinians were killed as a result and 288 suffered serious injury—only exacerbated the situation.¹⁶²

Matters only worsened with the ever-declining morale of IDF troops, which lead to a loss of self-control, restraint and professionalism of soldiers in the Occupied Territories. The result was that "shooting deaths of Palestinian youths sometimes occurred as visceral reactions by soldiers to stone throwing and other incidents."¹⁶³ And similar to the British in Northern Ireland, any attempt to pass along clear rules of engagement (RoE) for IDF troops dealing with rioters was difficult to achieve given the reluctance of the top brass to pass along unambiguous guidelines.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶⁰ Bickerton and Klausner, 219-226.

¹⁶¹ Mark Tessler, "The Impact of the Intifada on Israeli Political Thinking" in Rex Brynen and Neil Caplan (eds), *Echoes of the Intifada on Israeli Political Thinking: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991, 46.

¹⁶² Andrew Bigby, *Living the Intifada*, London: Zed Books, 1991, 61.

¹⁶³ Hunter, 106.

¹⁶⁴ Castignani, 85.

Administrative/Collective Punishment, House Demolitions, Settlements and Other Provocative Israeli Policies

To exacerbate matters, the Israeli implementation of administrative and collective punishments remained in full swing. The first of these involved administrative detention; a process that saw about 175,000 Palestinians pass through Israeli jails during the Intifada, where some 23,000 thousand were subjected to “harsh interrogation” techniques.¹⁶⁵ Regarding house demolition, some two thousand Palestinian homes were destroyed as punishment, with demolitions stepped up following the uprising. To crush the tax revolt, Israel would often raid shops, camps and villages, as well as seize automobiles at checkpoints.¹⁶⁶ Nor were the Israelis reluctant to implement various forms of collective punishment. Throughout the Intifada, the Israel government would often cut off electricity and telephone communications, impose limits on money being brought from Jordan, ban agriculture harvesting and commerce and impose general economic restrictions. However, perhaps most abrasive to the Palestinian community involved curfews of whole villages and cities, and closures of schools and universities.¹⁶⁷ Overall, it was estimated that the standard of living in the territories following the Intifada had plummeted another 40%.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, to exacerbate matters further, the Israeli government continued its policy of establishing and expanding settlements, while expropriating Palestinian property and encouraging Israeli citizens to move into the Occupied Territories. By 1987, Israel had expropriated over 55% of the West Bank and 40% of the Gaza Strip, and it continued to expand its grasp.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁵ Gelvin, 220.

¹⁶⁶ Hiltermann.

¹⁶⁷ Castignani, 84.

¹⁶⁸ Gelvin.

¹⁶⁹ Bickerton and Klausner, 226.

Shamir Unsuccessfully Attempts to Win Some Palestinian Support

Prime Minister Shamir attempt to defuse the situation somewhat by proposing elections aimed at selecting individuals to participate in negotiations towards an interim settlement. This effort failed miserably, however, for several reasons. The Palestinians were not allowed to vote for anyone with ties to the PLO, and Shamir clearly stated that the outcome of negotiations would preclude Palestinian self-determination and an independent Palestinian state. At best, Shamir was only willing to countenance autonomy (not including security control) as an outcome of these negotiations. Little support for either the elections or the Israeli government was won as a result.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

This episode was clearly marked by “backfire” in Israeli attempts to isolate popular support for Palestinian NSTOs. Clearly, popular support for Palestinian NSTOs increased; primary grievances remained (very) poorly addressed; excessive violence and collective punishment were present in full force; and new significant grievances were continuing to emerge following harsh Israeli crackdowns.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Additional significant factors affecting the outcome of this episode were few. Perhaps the most important dealt with an Israeli decapitation strategy against “hard-core” activists helping to organize the Intifada. In implementing this strategy, the Israeli military targeted 700 “bingos” identified by their ID card numbers.¹⁷⁰ Israel also organized direct assassinations through the Israeli Secret Service, the Shin Bet, Sayeret Matkal and “units of Arabists” whose task was to “go after individual suspects and arrest or kill them” by infiltrating local populations


¹⁷⁰ Hiltermann, 92.

in the Arab territories while in Arab guise.¹⁷¹ It is unclear to what extent such a strategy affected the situation in the Territories, but it clearly did little to help put down the Intifada or win any popular (or international) support for the Israel.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

By the end of this episode, Israel had made little progress in bringing an end to the violent campaigns waged by Palestinian NSTOs. A full-scale popular uprising remained in effect, meanwhile acts of terrorism continued and even increased, with casualties continuing as a result of violence organized by Palestinian NSTOs. Figure 5.3 illustrates this:

Figure 5.3: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1988-1991¹⁷²



¹⁷¹ Martin Van Creveld, *The Sword and the Olive: A Critical History of the Israeli Defence Forces*, New York: Public Affairs, 1998, 344.

¹⁷² Statistical information from: B'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, *Statistics: Fatalities in the First Intifada*, 2009, Available Online at: http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

Meanwhile, any tangible political resolution remained a long way off. During this episode, Israel did not engage in negotiations with Palestinian NSTOs—indeed, the Israeli government under Prime Minister Shamir maneuvered as best it could to avoid them. In 1988, a group of American Jews met with PLO representative Khalid al-Hassan to announce a joint statement. Dubbed the Stockholm Declaration, it stated that the PNC recognized Israel as a state and rejected terrorism in all its forms. Arafat confirmed the position at the General Assembly in Geneva, where he disavowed terrorism¹⁷³ (though this was not necessarily the case for all the component groups of the PLO). Shamir, however, was not impressed, claiming Arafat’s move to be a “monumental act of deception,” while proclaiming, “We are not ready and will never be ready to talk to the PLO.”¹⁷⁴

Still, this episode was not a total failure. Violence levels from terrorist attacks were generally kept from exploding out of control, and the Fatah-lead PLO was increasingly recognizing that Israel could deny Palestinian NSTO success enacted through terrorist violence—the outcome being Arafat’s renunciation of terrorism in late-1988 and his continued push for diplomatic initiatives. This episode of strategic coercion is thus assessed as a “limited success.”

Within-Case Episode #4: 1991-2000—The Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords, Peace Process and its Collapse

While the Intifada was beginning to lose steam at the beginning of this episode, it had made a huge impression on the Israeli public. Combined with the awareness of the rise of radical

¹⁷³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “419 Statement by Yasser Arafat—14 December 1988,” 2008, Available Online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Israels%20Foreign%20Relations%20since%201947/1984-1988/419%20Statement%20by%20Yasser%20Arafat-%2014%20December%201988> [Last Viewed 21 August 09].

¹⁷⁴ Samih Farsoun and Naseer Hasan Aruri, *Palestine and the Palestinians: A Social and Political History*, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2006, 201.

Islamic groups, Israeli public opinion began to shift in favor of finding more sustainable paths to peace that involved engagement with the Palestinians. Under pressure, Prime Minister Shamir agreed to partake in the Madrid Conference in 1991. This peace conference (chaired by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev) involved negotiations amongst Israel, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Under these auspices, a number of formal rounds of negotiations would subsequently take place in Washington. Little tangible progress towards peace would be made, however, with Shamir resisting any direct dialogue with the PLO.

However, with the public mood increasingly favoring compromise with the Palestinians, the Israeli elections in 1992 saw Yitzhak Rabin and the Labour Movement come to power. This resulted in a series of goodwill overtures by Rabin that would eventually see engagement in secret channels in Oslo, with Rabin and Labour accepting the principle of “land for peace” with the Palestinians.¹⁷⁵ This secret channel thus eventually yielded the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (known as the Oslo Accords) on September 13, 1993, and laid the framework for the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA or PA), beginning in Gaza and Jericho.¹⁷⁶ The PA, furthermore, was tasked with limited-autonomy in the Territories—taking up authority and responsibility in place of the withdrawing Israeli security forces from Palestinian population centers—and the Oslo Accords would see the emergence of a peace process.

Following the turnover of Israeli Prime Ministers, the peace process would continue. In the wake of Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, Shimon Peres continued to proceed with the implementation of the Taba accords, speeding up Israel’s redeployment from the remaining Arab population centers in the West Bank, thereby allowing for the continued expansion of the newly

¹⁷⁵ Sven Behrendt, *The Secret Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations in Oslo: Their Success and Why the Process Ultimately Failed*, New York: Routledge, 2007, 65.

¹⁷⁶ Dennis Ross, *The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005, 115.

established PA. The Taba accords also established three areas in the West Bank: Area A, comprised of territory placed under direct Palestinian control; Area B, jointly controlled territory, in which the Palestinians would exercise civil/administrative control but Israel would retain security responsibility; and Area C, territory where Israel maintained exclusive control over administrative and security functions.¹⁷⁷

Following Netanyahu's victory in 1996, negotiations initially stalled, particularly regarding further Israeli redeployments from the West Bank.¹⁷⁸ However, negotiations did eventually proceed. In the Wye River Memorandum in 1998, both sides agreed upon an Israeli redeployment plan and a security cooperation plan.¹⁷⁹ With the election victory of Ehud Barak in 1999, a new wind emerged to carry the negotiations forward. Sadly, however, despite Barak's best efforts, negotiations—and the peace process—were destined for failure. Despite Barak's attempts to break a deadlock in talks through speeding up the transfer of land control to the PA, little resolution was achieved and a February 13, 2000 target date for the achievement of a framework agreement came and went without an outcome.

In attempting to see the resumption of progress towards a framework agreement for a final peace settlement, President Bill Clinton stepped in, summoning Barak and Arafat to Camp David for summit meetings. Barak accepted the invitation, but at a great cost that significantly weakened his bargaining position: the Sharansky party, NRP and Shas defected from Barak's coalition, leaving Barak with a minority government of 42 of 120 members, and on the eve of the summit, Barak himself narrowly escaped a no-confidence vote in the Knesset.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Information Division, Israel Foreign Ministry, Jerusalem, "Taba Accord: The Interim Agreement Between Israel and the PLO," 28 September 1995.

¹⁷⁸ Neil Lochery, *The Difficult Road to Peace: Netanyahu, Israel and the Middle East Peace Process*, Ithaca, NY: Ithaca Press, 2000, 54.

¹⁷⁹ Frontline, "Shattered Dreams of Peace," PBS, 2005, Available Online at: www.pbs.org [Last Viewed 22 August 09].

¹⁸⁰ CBS News: World, "Barak Timeline: Major Events in Barak's Time as Prime Minister," 9 December 2000, Available Online at: www.cbsnews.com [Last Viewed 22 August 09].

By Barak's final attempt at negotiations at Taba in January 2001, he made the boldest offer of any Israeli head-of-state. Barak would offer concessions on Jerusalem in exchange for Palestinian flexibility regarding refugee resettlement. Accordingly, Israel would agree to Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and Arafat would in turn abandon claims to the right of return.¹⁸¹ Barak also publicly stated for the first time a willingness to recognize a Palestinian state, while offering a return of 94-96% of Palestinian Territory (including land swaps)¹⁸², and proposed to symbolically accept some of the refugees from 1948 while arranging for a compensation package for those refugees not returning to Israel.¹⁸³

Still, a number of problems were manifest in Barak's offer. These included sovereignty issues and Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem, disproportionate land exchanges and the division of the West Bank into non-contiguous cantons overseen by Israeli security control.¹⁸⁴ To compound the issue, Arafat and his negotiators would also refuse to budge on the issue of right of return. The progress towards a settlement that Barak sought to achieve would thus prove to be elusive, with Arafat leaving the negotiating table and the Al-Aqsa Intifada moving into full swing. Subsequently, any efforts at negotiating a framework agreement towards a final settlement came to an end for this period.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

For the first time in years, Israel witnessed some gains in the domain of isolation of external/international support against Palestinian NSTOs—though much of this was due to

¹⁸¹ Bickerton and Klausner, 333.

¹⁸² Bill Clinton, *My Life: The Presidential Years*, Volume 2, New York: First Vintage Books, 2005, 624.

¹⁸³ Marwan Bisharah, *Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid: Occupation, Terrorism and the Future*, Revised Ed., London: Zed Books, 2003, 73.

¹⁸⁴ Edward Said, *From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map*, New York: Vintage Books, 2004, xiv.

external factors, rather than Israeli efforts. Of consequence, the PLO found much of their external material support drying up, following the collapse of the USSR, and Arafat's mistaken choice of publicly backing Saddam Hussein. In the latter case, Arafat's decision resulted in a considerable loss of funds from his primary financial backers: the Arab Gulf States. This would have catastrophic ramifications for the PLO, as their reserves dwindled from \$7 billion in the mid-1980s to \$2.5 billion in April 1993, and their annual budget dropped from \$245 million to \$85 million between 1991 and 1993.¹⁸⁵

Problematically for both the PLO and Israel, however, the weakening of external support for the PLO corresponded with a broadening of support for Hamas. By 1993, it was estimated that Hamas was receiving as much as \$20-30 million annually from Iran.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, it had come to support itself with a well-established transnational network in cooperation with other Muslim Brotherhood organizations in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and various Gulf states. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, angered by Arafat's siding with Saddam Hussein, now began to re-channel financial support from the PLO to Hamas.¹⁸⁷

That being said, two additional factors helped Israel in the realm of isolation of external/international support. The first came from the transfer of PLO security forces into the Territories, in line with the Oslo Accords and the construction of the PA. The result being that foreign sanctuary diminished as a significant issue: PLO militant forces were now in the Territories, tasked with policing and counter-terrorism duties (no longer hiding with the potential/goal of infiltrating into Israel from foreign borders). The second factor resulted from a less hostile Israeli relationship with the Arab world following the signing of the Oslo Accords. Most importantly, this involved a peace treaty signed on October 26, 1994 between Israel and

¹⁸⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, 250.

¹⁸⁶ Cordesman, 206.

¹⁸⁷ Behrendt, 22.

Jordan.¹⁸⁸ Tangibly, this new relationship saw important results for Israel, with King Abdullah's government enforcing controls on Hamas and other militant Palestinian organizations operating in Jordan. Additionally, Jordan cooperated closely with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority in closing down Hamas and Muslim Brotherhood offices in Amman, and arrested a number of Hamas activists, including three senior Hamas leaders.¹⁸⁹

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Isolation of external/international support was relatively successful during this episode, even if much of this success could be attributed to external factors and changing circumstances as a result of the Oslo Accords. The dominant Palestinian NSTO, the PLO, saw a sizeable decline in international material/financial aid, and foreign sanctuary for sizeable PLO deployments and camps became a much less significant issue—meanwhile Israel maintained a degree of control over what entered the Territories. Israel also now possessed peace treaties and cooperation with two very important neighbors—Jordan and Egypt—and infiltrations from Lebanon by Palestinian NSTOs was no longer the concern it once was. NSTOs remained well-armed and funded—especially rising radical groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad—however, in *relative* consideration, this episode probably saw the most success yet enjoyed by Israel in isolating external support and sanctuary as an issue in its efforts at strategic coercion. The level of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as “significant”.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

When Rabin came to power, he paired increased overtures and willingness for engagement/diplomacy with the PLO with a heightened security policy. As Rabin stated, the

¹⁸⁸ Avi Kober, *Coalition Defection: The Dissolution of Arab Anti-Israeli Coalitions in War and Peace*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002, 123.

¹⁸⁹ Cordesman, 246.

government would “wage a ruthless war on terrorism with every means permitted by Israeli law.”¹⁹⁰ One of the prime objectives of this new security policy was “to get Gaza out of Tel Aviv”; an act that namely entailed ending the current situation whereby Palestinians could freely move between the heart of Israel and the Territories.¹⁹¹ In pursuit of this policy, Rabin imposed a closure on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.¹⁹²

Meanwhile, the Israeli government implemented a number of denial counter-measures. One such measure included the employment of security guards at the majority of public venues to provide a final-line of defense against the increasing occurrence of suicide bombers.¹⁹³ Another measure entailed the construction of secure bypass roads within the Territories to ensure the safe transport of Israeli citizens and security forces. These roads helped to secure settlements, while allowing for the IDF to redeploy into the West Bank and reinforce its position along the Jordan River. This also enabled the IDF to establish a significant military presence anywhere inside the West Bank within 48-96 hours, and allow it to only risk serious casualties if it decided to establish strong points within Palestinian towns and cities.¹⁹⁴ Finally, in foreshadow of things to come, Israel erected a security fence around the Gaza Strip, which proved to be nearly 100% effective in preventing terrorists from entering Israel from Gaza.¹⁹⁵

Denial Short-comings Associated with Entrusting Security and Counter-Terrorism to the Palestinian Authority

During this episode, Israel also suffered a number of denial setbacks, linked to the transfer of security and counter-terrorism responsibilities to the PA. Tasked by the Security

¹⁹⁰ Behrendt, 70-1.

¹⁹¹ Graham Usher, *Dispatches from Palestine: The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process*, London: Pluto Press, 1999, 18.

¹⁹² Behrendt.

¹⁹³ Cordesman, 451.

¹⁹⁴ Cordesman, 438.

¹⁹⁵ Alan Dershowitz, *The Case for Peace: How the Arab-Israeli Conflict can be Resolved*, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2005, 101.

Annex of the September 1995 accords, the Palestinian Police were to take over security within specified areas in the Territories (known as Area “A”). The Palestinian Police were charged with the responsibility to take action against all expressions of violence and terror, confiscate illegal arms, and arrest and prosecute individuals suspected to be involved in acts of terrorism.¹⁹⁶

However, the Palestinian Police (and security forces under the PA in general) faced a number of problems in assuming such responsibilities. The first issue hindering these efforts involved the simple fact that the Oslo Accords had not involved the consent of radical Islamic groups—notably Hamas and Islamic Jihad—now growing in strength and opposed to the efforts of Arafat’s security forces. To perpetually exacerbate matters, these radical groups were bent on committing major acts of terrorism to undermine the Peace Process; a fact that was not helped by the Palestinian Authority’s reluctance to counter/discourage such violence.

The lack of ability to rein in terrorism on the part of the PA was not simply constrained to a perceived willingness (or unwillingness), however. Pragmatically, the Palestinian Police and PLO associated security forces were lacking in the resources necessary to effectively carryout counter-terrorism operations.¹⁹⁷ The PA could only attempt to build an effective counter-terrorism force from cadres that had lost much of their income after the Gulf War.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Arafat himself exacerbated the situation by dividing the security forces into competing factions that he could personally control. To make matters worse, Arafat—who was concerned with preventing the emergence of a contender for power, or a cohesive general staff with authoritative power—also staffed the various security services with a heterogeneous group of generals at odds with each other.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁶ Europa Publications, *The Middle East and North Africa*, 50th Edition, London: Routledge, 2003, 81.

¹⁹⁷ Brynjar Lia, *Building Arafat’s Police: The Politics of International Police Assistance in the Palestinian Territories After the Oslo Agreement*, Ithaca: Ithaca Press, 2006, 109.

¹⁹⁸ Cordesman, 35.

¹⁹⁹ Cordesman, 40-42.

Not surprisingly, efforts to implement denial within the Territories took a plunge in terms of effectiveness. Whereas before this period, most terrorist attacks had originated from outside Israel's borders, the majority of attacks were initiated within the Territories. With black holes emerging within the Territories, Palestinian NSTOs were able to much more freely plan, organize and initiate attacks. Smuggling and hiding military equipment was much easier, terrorist groups could operate openly (and even run bomb factories), terrorist leaders and key personnel were largely immune from arrest, and once an attack had been conducted, the ability of the attackers to evade Israeli security forces was also greatly increased. Correspondingly, the number of attacks on Israelis zoomed upward.²⁰⁰

Still, it would be inaccurate to state that the PA's takeover of security functions did not have some positive benefits in terms of denial efforts. Through training by the CIA and material assistance from a variety of countries, the PA's capacity to implement counter-terrorism increased over time.²⁰¹ Israeli and Palestinian security forces also came to successfully cooperate, with national, regional, and district level security liaison offices established and manned on a 24-hour basis with special communication links. Following the Wye Accords, Israel and the PA engaged in sharing intelligence, conducting joint patrols on key roads, and organized joint mobile units to rapidly respond to disturbances and terrorist attacks.²⁰² Through joint cooperation, Israel and the PA were able to extensively disrupt Hamas and Islamic Jihad networks that were planning large-scale attacks against Israeli targets. Palestinian security forces even frequently undertook unilateral action, pre-empting terrorist attacks by Hamas and Islamic Jihad.²⁰³

²⁰⁰ Barry Rubin and Judith Rubin, *Yasser Arafat: A Political Biography*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 156.

²⁰¹ Charles Hauss, *International Conflict Resolution*, New York: Continuum, 2001, 149.

²⁰² Cordesman, 43-44.

²⁰³ Cordesman, 31.

Assessment of Degree of Denial

Levels of denial fluctuated widely during this episode. As it unfolded, the level of denial dropped to what could be assessed as “limited”, as PA security forces had difficulty enforcing security and enacting counter-terrorism measures in the Territories. However, levels of denial were brought back up and then some—nearly to “high” levels—in 1998 and 1999 as the PA’s security forces improved in their capacity for conducting counter-terrorism and general security functions, as well as cooperation with Israeli security forces. Unfortunately, however, Israel’s inability to make progress in both winning over the Palestinian populace away from support for violence and advancing a diplomatic solution would see a rapid breakdown in security cooperation with the PSS, with the Territories increasingly coming to serve as safe havens and launching pads for Palestinian NSTOs. Thus, despite initial success, this episode of strategic coercion is assessed as ultimately achieving no greater than “limited” levels of denial.

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

This episode initially held promise for an improvement in popular isolation with the defeat of Likud, and the entry of Yitzhak Rabin and a Labor-led coalition government. Shortly after his assumption of power, Rabin made several goodwill gestures, freeing over 800 political prisoners, allowing for the return of some 30 Palestinians that had been deported, halting most settlement activity, and reiterating Labour’s position of land for peace.²⁰⁴ His efforts soon lead to successful negotiations through secret channels in Oslo, resulting in the Oslo Accords. These accords established a peace process between Israel and the Arafat-led PLO (though it excluded Hamas and Islamic Jihad), and involved the principle of “early empowerment”, whereby a Palestinian National Authority (PA) would come into being, charged with taking over control of

²⁰⁴ Vaughn Shannon, *Balancing Act: US Foreign Policy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, 93.

certain aspects of civil administration in the Territories, including health, education and culture, welfare, tourism and direct taxation. Israeli military forces, meanwhile, would eventually be redeployed outside of populated areas in the West Bank (though they would continue to protect Jewish settlements), and the PA would eventually take over security functions. Some progress would be made over water allocation, with Israel officially recognizing Palestinian rights to water resources in the West Bank.²⁰⁵ And a series of negotiations would proceed in search of a political settlement.

Unfortunately, despite these historic efforts, Israel's attempts to isolate popular support for terrorist violence were hampered by a number of shortcomings. First, while Israel halted settlement activity, their reluctance to withdraw—while holding in possession 55% of the total land area of the West Bank and 30% of the Gaza Strip in 1992²⁰⁶—only served to frustrate expectations that peace would bring Palestinian statehood. Second, the enhanced security measures under Rabin translated into significant economic hardship for the Palestinians, as new travel restrictions prevented as many as 120,000 Palestinian day laborers from maintaining their jobs in Israel. Combined with Israel's efforts to import laborers from East and South Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa, Palestinian unemployment jumped to 50%, with 68% of the Gaza population living below the poverty line.²⁰⁷

With the return to power of Likud, and the arrival of Benjamin Netanyahu to the post of prime minister, the peace process would run into some major difficulties costing Israeli efforts at popular isolation. On his assumption of power, Netanyahu quickly announced that the four-year freeze on settlement expansions would be lifted, while it was reported that the Israeli Army had come up with plans to pave some 300 miles of new roads to link the Jewish settlements (which

²⁰⁵ Bickerton and Klausner, 277.

²⁰⁶ Farsoun and Aruri, 228.

²⁰⁷ Gelvin, 186.

required the confiscation of more Palestinian land).²⁰⁸ Netanyahu further liberalized rules on expanding existing settlements, while offering financial incentives to settlers. Further, by March 1998, Netanyahu announced plans to proceed with a 6500-unit housing project for Jews on Har Home/Jabal Abu Ghneim, overlooking East Jerusalem. Netanyahu also pursued the provocative excavation of the Hasmonean Tunnel along the western perimeter of the Temple Mount/Harem al-Sharif, with a new exit opened on the Via Dolorosa. The act was met with outrage, and fighting broke out for 3 days, leaving 55 people dead and hundreds wounded.²⁰⁹

With Ehud Barak replacing Netanyahu as prime minister in 1999, some progress was once again made. Barak sped up redeployment of the IDF, expanding PA control over portions of the Territories (Area “A”), released several hundred Palestinian prisoners and moved for progress towards a final settlement following the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement. Barak’s government, however, would also be hounded by some of its own shortcomings.²¹⁰ Despite a pledge that he would permit no new settlements, Barak gave into pressure from the National Religious party and authorized the construction of nearly 2600 housing units in the existing West Bank settlements.²¹¹ Additionally, in response to Palestinian terror attacks in 2000, Barak authorized reprisals that involved bombing Palestinian offices and targets in Gaza and the West Bank, border closures, the blocking of Gaza roads, the isolation of Palestinian towns behind IDF checkpoints, the prevention of imports, and blocked exports (which greatly disrupted the Palestinian economy)—all of which aroused Palestinian furor.²¹²

²⁰⁸ Bickerton and Klausner, 289.

²⁰⁹ David Guinn, *Jerusalem’s Holy Sites: A Strategy for Negotiating a Sacred Peace*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 61.

²¹⁰ Clayton Swisher, *The Truth About Camp David: The Untold Story About the Collapse of the Middle East Peace Process*, New York: Nation Books, 2004, 196.

²¹¹ Deborah Sontag, “Barak’s Ministry Outpaces Netanyahu’s On New Settlements,” *New York Times*, 28 September 1999.

²¹² Bickerton and Klausner, 330.

Peace Process Fails to Isolate Popular Support

Most problematically during this episode, Israel's attempts to isolate popular support through the peace process established at Oslo failed. Much of this failure was tied to inherent shortcomings in the peace process itself: while small, limited steps were taken at a grudgingly slow pace towards a settlement, all the key final status issues—Palestinian sovereignty and statehood, the status of Jerusalem, the refugee issue, Israeli settlements, and water—were kept off the table at the insistence of Israel.²¹³ In addition, Palestinians did not just see settlements continue, but the number of Israeli settlers in the Territories doubled to over 400,000. To make matters worse, these settlements were strategically located to make the creation of a contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank impossible. Meanwhile Israeli regulations over control of the Palestinian Territories increased. There was even a complete absence of any financial dividends associated with the peace process: Palestinian GDP per capita increased by only \$6 from 1995 (\$1,380) to 2000 (\$1,386).²¹⁴ Thus, while the Oslo process was established to “build confidence” leading toward a final settlement, it actually only served to destroy it, along with any faith in the Palestinian community for the political expediency of non-violent negotiations.

Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

While this episode may have begun with the best of intentions following Rabin's assumption of office, the peace process that defined it turned out to be an abysmal failure in terms of popular isolation. If the Israeli government meant to convey the narrative that it truly desired a settlement leading to a two-state solution in exchange for peace, what it conveyed instead was that it never truly intended to leave—as illustrated not only by the failure to permanently freeze and remove settlements, but by their massive growth during this period—and

²¹³ Khalidi, 162.

²¹⁴ Khalidi, 203.

that Israel would use such a time of peace to consolidate its control over the land, while avoiding progress on any of the key political issues. The result was a complete disillusionment in the Palestinian population for supporting the peace process and non-violent means towards a change of the (ever worsening) status quo. Unsurprisingly, this discontent would explode as soon as the right trigger was available. Thus, with a deteriorating situation, lack faith in the peace process, significant political grievances/issues remaining unresolved (if not worsening), and the emergence of renewed support for violence, the degree of isolation of popular support is assessed as “backfire”.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

A number of additional significant factors did influence the outcome of this episode. The first of these involved the rise of Hamas, which served to place a sense of urgency not only upon the PLO—that sought to preserve its primacy—but also on the government of Yitzhak Rabin that began to fear that the ascendancy of Hamas over the PLO would yield a situation where negotiations would be impossible.²¹⁵

Other significant factors included:

Operation Accountability

Operation Accountability, launched in the summer of 1993 against Hezbollah in Lebanon, served to undermine any Israeli efforts at popular isolation and caused initial bumps for the peace process. The operation proved to be the most forceful Israeli attack against Hezbollah in a decade. A particular aspect of the operation, involving bombardments within and

²¹⁵ Castignani, 99.

around Lebanese civilian population centers certainly had a negative impact on popular perceptions of Israel both within the Territories and the broader region.²¹⁶

Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin

On November 4, 1995 a Jewish zealot by name of Yigal Amir assassinated Rabin, claiming to prevent the land of Israel from being handed over to the Palestinians. Known as “Mr. Security”, Rabin—a former general and defense minister—brought a credibility to the peace process that would be difficult to replace.²¹⁷ Rabin was succeeded by Shimon Peres who lacked the respect of his predecessor in terms of security credentials, and was politically defeated by the hard-line Benjamin Netanyahu within a year. The peace process would thus be left bereft of a political dove with the security credentials needed to push for a settlement until long after it began to lose steam with the election of Ehud Barak.

Decapitation Efforts: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killings

As in other episodes, Israel continued to pursue its policy of targeted killings. This policy, however, had the unintended consequence of escalating violence. Following the assassination of Fathi Shqaqi in October 1995 and of Yahya Ayyash in January 1996, Islamic Jihad and Hamas engaged in a series of revenge attacks resulting in the death of 59 Israelis.²¹⁸ These attacks, combined with the bolstering of support in the Palestinian community for Hamas following the assassination of the very popular Ayyash led to the weakening of Arafat’s position.

²¹⁶ Castignani, 68.

²¹⁷ Yoram Peri, *The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000, 97.

²¹⁸ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (Revised Ed.), New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 151.

Operation Grapes of Wrath

In 1996 another major Israeli incursion into Lebanon took place. After strikes from Katyusha rockets, the Israeli government authorized a number of “surgical strikes” with F16 fighters that resulted in the death of some 200 Lebanese villagers and noncombatants, accompanying the displacement of some 400,000 Lebanese. Similar to *Operation Accountability*, *Grapes of Wrath*—which ended following the shelling of a UN outpost that resulted in the death of more than 100 men, women and children seeking shelter there—negatively impacted Israeli efforts at popular isolation.²¹⁹

Lebanon Withdrawal

In May 2000, following nearly a generation of occupation, Ehud Barak withdrew Israeli forces from southern Lebanon without negotiations or preconditions. Israel’s unilateral withdrawal, dubbed *Operation Early Dawn*, would portend negative consequences for Israeli strategic coercion against Palestinian NSTOs and the peace process. As Sergio Castignani explains, the withdrawal “had been a serious blow to Israel’s deterrent posture and proved a major galvanizing factor for a second uprising in the Territories.”²²⁰ Indeed, Marwan Barghouti, a senior leader in the PLO *Fatah Tanzim*, stated at the beginning of 2001 that “the thinking of the entire new Palestinian generation is influenced by the experiences of our brothers in *Hezbollah* and by Israel’s retreat from Lebanon... I must say that Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon was indeed one contributing factor to the [*Al-Aqsa*] *Intifada*.”²²¹ Israel’s unilateral withdrawal thus served to inspire Palestinian NSTOs and frustrated members of the Palestinian community to

²¹⁹ Bickerton and Klausner, 285-6.

²²⁰ Castignani, 102.

²²¹ Daniel Sobelman, “*Hizbullah* Lends its Services to the Palestinian *Intifada*,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, vol. 13, no. 5, May 2001, 37.

believe that violence could force the hand of the Israeli government, thereby bypassing fruitless negotiations.

Ariel Sharon Visits the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif

On September 28, 2000, Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, and made a speech in which he pledged that Israel would never surrender the Mount. This provocative act, combined with a considerable police presence in this sensitive area, served as a flame to a growing powder keg, igniting riots leading to the deaths of several Palestinians.²²² A wave of violence would thereby commence. Accompanied by the failure of negotiations at Taba II, this new outbreak of violence would mark the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

Accurately scoring the outcome of strategic coercion for this episode is somewhat challenging, given the degree to which circumstances and conditions varied between the earlier and latter part of this episode. Initially, some important political progress was achieved as a result of the peace process. The Declaration of Principles established through the Oslo Accords saw mutual recognition finally take place: Israel unconditionally recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, and Israel received unconditional recognition of its legitimate right to exist in peace and security.²²³ As Sven Behrendt explains, “On the Israeli side, recognition of the PLO meant an end to the ideological foundations on which the very concept ‘Eretz Israel’ was based; recognition of Israel by the PLO implied the end of the struggle


²²² Zeev Maoz, *Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy*, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2009, 263.

²²³ Behrendt, 106.

for the liberation of the whole of Palestine.”²²⁴ Along these lines, on April 24, 1996, Arafat convened a meeting of the Palestinian National Council and amended the PLO covenant to remove those articles calling for the destruction of Israel.²²⁵ This achievement was followed by the abandonment of Israel’s Labour party of its longstanding opposition to a Palestinian state.²²⁶

Moreover, this episode of strategic coercion initially enjoyed considerable success as the promise of a peaceful settlement held in the early years. While violence initially rose due to problems of transferring security responsibilities over to the PSS, violence levels were eventually brought down to very low levels by 1998 while cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians continued—which is illustrated in Figure 5.2:

Figure 5.4: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 1991-2000²²⁷



Unfortunately, however, stalling progress in negotiations, the inability to freeze and withdraw settlements, ongoing (and new) grievances, and Palestinian intransigence at times in reining in violence from rejectionist groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, would see a

²²⁴ Behrendt, 105.

²²⁵ For more information on these letters, see the Israel/Palestine Center for Research and Information Online at: <http://www.ipcri.org/files/arafatrabin.html> [Last Viewed 26 July 2009].

²²⁶ Mark Heller, “Towards a Palestinian State,” *Survival*, 39:2, Summer 1997, 7.

²²⁷ Statistical information from: B’Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, *Statistics: Fatalities in the First Intifada*, 2009, Available Online at: http://www.btselem.org/english/statistics/First_Intifada_Tables.asp [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

critical deterioration in the situation. Palestinians were disillusioned by the prospect of successfully changing the status quo through peaceful means, and frustrated by settlements and Israeli policies in the Territories.

The peace process in turn, would come to an end, failing to result in either a negotiated settlement, or a framework agreement towards one. By the end of this episode, following Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif, violence would once again explode—this time to heights previously unseen—in what would be called the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Thus despite the initial gains made, this episode would end with higher tension, higher levels of death and destruction, and a much greater embrace for a strategy of violence amongst both Palestinian communities and NSTOs. The overall situation thus moved from one of a “significant success” to a final assessment of “backfire”, whereby violence-levels skyrocketed, any efforts at political resolution were completely sidelined and the situation rapidly deteriorated.

Within-Case Episode #5: 2001-2004: The Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israeli Military Coercion

By the beginning of 2001, the peace process had failed. In its place emerged the Al-Aqsa Intifada—named after the riots that ensued following Ariel Sharon's provocative visit to the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif. The Al-Aqsa Intifada transpired in several phases, quickly evolving from more traditional stone throwing protests to include: 1) gunmen hiding within angry mobs; 2) the launching of ambushes and laying of roadside bombings by NSTOs while the PA turned a blind eye; and 3) the conduct of large-scale attacks with suicide bombings²²⁸—assisted by the PA—while simultaneously plotting “mega attacks” aimed at killing thousands.²²⁹

²²⁸ These NSTOs primarily included Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the PLO-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade. Amos Harel, “Shin Bet: 145 Suicide Bombers Since the Start of the Intifada”, *Ha'aretz*, 1 October 2002.

²²⁹ Cordesman, 126-28.

Initially, Prime Minister Ehud Barak responded to the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada by adopting a dual strategy of continuing negotiations with the PA while allowing the IDF to conduct restrained preventive and retaliatory operations—forbidding the IDF from entering PA-controlled “A” areas.²³⁰ Neither Barak nor his strategy was long to last, however, as the Israeli public was tired of fruitless negotiations accompanied by increasingly virulent acts of terror. Accordingly, on February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister. Perceiving the Al-Aqsa Intifada and Palestinian terrorism to pose an existential threat to Israel, Sharon sidelined negotiations while pursuing a much fiercer security strategy.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

By the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, militant Fatah elements of the PLO (Force 17, Tanzim), as well as Hamas, had enhanced links with Iran. Iraq under Saddam Hussein, meanwhile, provided \$10,000, and later \$25,000, to the families of Palestinian suicide bombers. Additional funds for dead and wounded Palestinians were generated through private Islamic foundations linked to Hamas and Islamic Jihad.²³¹ Syria renewed its relations at an Arab summit in Amman with Arafat after a ten year freeze, while providing financial and military assistance to Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, DFLP and PLF.²³² Hezbollah, meanwhile was suspected of providing significant material assistance to Palestinian NSTOs through the smuggling of arms and military intelligence, as well as providing training and guidance for conducting ambushes, roadside bombings and rocket attacks.²³³

²³⁰ Castignani, 103.

²³¹ BBC News, “Palestinians Get Saddam Funds,” 13 March 2003, Available Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2846365.stm [Last Viewed 22 August 2009].

²³² Cordesman, 239.

²³³ Castignani, 106.

Israel enjoyed some success in reducing this support, however. In January 2002, for example, Israeli naval commandos intercepted the *Karine-A*, which contained more than 50 tons of weapons bound for the PA.²³⁴ Meanwhile, US efforts under the administration of George W. Bush resulted in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and subsequent ouster of the PLF and capture of their leader, Abu Abbas, in Iraq. Additionally, Israel enjoyed some success in uncovering and destroying smuggling tunnels on the Gaza-Egypt border in Rafah, known as the Philadelphi Route, while Egypt assisted Israel by increasing its security presence along the border.²³⁵ Maintaining control of Palestinian borders, coasts and airspace, Israel also managed to prevent tangible aid from reaching Palestinian NSTOs. In achieving this, the IDF demolished runways at Gaza International Airport, while enforcing a naval blockade of Gaza, setting up an array of intelligence sensors and cooperating with Egypt.²³⁶

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Generally speaking, while Palestinian NSTOs continued to receive external support from the usual suspects (Iran, Syria, Iraq for a time during the regime of Saddam Hussein, Hezbollah, etc.), external/international support was relatively low during this period. Despite the maintenance of foreign headquarters and training camps, no major foreign sanctuaries serving as launch pads for attacks were in play as in earlier periods, and Israel enjoyed a considerable degree of success in sealing and blocking the Territories from the reception of external support through a combination of its own measures and cooperation with its neighbors, namely Egypt and Jordan. The degree of isolation of external/international support is thus assessed as "significant".

²³⁴ Stacy Perman, "Business Innovation from Israel's Masters of Espionage: The Intercept," *Financial Times*, 22 July 2005.

²³⁵ Cordesman, 251.

²³⁶ Cordesman, 355.

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

With Ariel Sharon succeeding Barak as prime minister, Israel's security strategy would rapidly shift, with the perception that the Al-Aqsa Intifada posed an existential threat to Israel.²³⁷ Israel brought to bear a wide array of military instruments, including AH-64A Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, F-15I and F-16 aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), armor and tanks, artillery, special forces, a Field Intelligence Corps²³⁸, bulldozers and naval forces. Israel also introduced a number of new weapon systems to reduce its soldiers' exposure to enemy fire. Finally, by June 2002, Israel launched a new program to upgrade the IDF's Tez'elim National Training Center in the Negev Desert in order to provide enhanced urban warfare training.²³⁹

In effectively utilizing these tools towards an overall denial strategy, Israel pursued a number of tactics. These tactics included: 1) deploying specially trained anti-guerrilla units accompanied by airpower and standoff weapons²⁴⁰; 2) the destruction of high-value PA targets with heavy firepower; 3) infantry search and seizure missions targeting militant leaders and terrorist infrastructure²⁴¹; 4) the employment of the method of "Environmental Air Control" using air power to detect and prevent infiltration, enforce curfews, destroy weapons caches, and attack terrorist cells; 5) provision of real-time intelligence to assist raids and operations through the Field Intelligence Corps, *Mistar'aravim* ("to become an Arab") units blended into the local populace, and the presence of UAVs and AH-1S Cobra helicopters²⁴²; 6) the implementation of real-time intelligence digitally distributed to "swarm" Palestinian forces from all directions with

²³⁷ Castignani, 123.

²³⁸ *Jane's Information Group*, "IDF Steps Up Intelligence War Against Palestinians," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 23 June 2004.

²³⁹ Barbara Opall-Rome, "Objective: Re-create the Fog of War," *Defense News*, 24 June 2002.

²⁴⁰ Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel: Training Moves to Front," *Defense News*, 9 February 2004.

²⁴¹ Barbara Opall-Rome, "In Israel, Air Power Takes on Ground Jobs," *Defense News*, 28 February 2005.

²⁴² David Fulghum and Robert Wall, "Israel's future includes armed, long-range UAVs", *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, 25 June 2002.

small-unit infantry, armor and power²⁴³; 7) the use of D-9 bulldozers to clear to clear out dangerous alleyways riddled with booby-traps, snipers and suicide bombers²⁴⁴; and 8) the dedication of substantial resources to enhancing rapid medical responses designed to swiftly treat injuries from suicide bombing attacks.²⁴⁵

Isolating Palestinian Cities and Territory

Throughout this episode, a key feature of Israel's denial strategy involved isolating Palestinian cities and territory to prevent access to vital resources needed to conduct acts of terrorism, make it difficult for militants to travel, and to enable search and seizure operations while preventing Palestinian terrorists from fleeing Israeli forces. To achieve this, Israel erected numerous checkpoints, physical barriers and separation zones, while maintaining a network of security access roads that enabled Israeli forces to quickly travel and deploy at will. Israel also worked towards containing the entire territory of Gaza, through sealing off and patrolling its borders and coasts, while controlling its airspace. Indeed, to enable the separation and isolation of Gaza from Israel proper—as well as the outside world—Israel effectively employed UAVs, unattended ground sensors, ground-based radars, night vision and surveillance equipment, and a separation barrier.²⁴⁶

Setbacks from Oslo Arrangements

Initially, Israel suffered setbacks as a result of arrangements carried out under the auspices of the Oslo Accords—most notably the transfer of security responsibilities to the PA in “A” areas. Such setbacks included difficulties in resolving the right of hot pursuit of terrorists,

²⁴³ Seth G. Jones, “Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups: Lessons from Israel,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 30, 2007, 282.

²⁴⁴ Castignani, 114.

²⁴⁵ New York Times Magazine, “The Ambulance-Homicide Theory”, 15 December 2002, 66.

²⁴⁶ Cordesman, 408.

providing for the security of settlements, a ready stockpile for Palestinian NSTOs accounting for tens of thousands of rifles and small arms, mortars, rockets and other light weapons, an absence of actionable intelligence for raids and operations²⁴⁷, and a platform for launching mortar and rockets attacks. Moreover, with the collapse of the peace process and the faltering of cooperation between Israel and Palestinian Security Services, such “A” areas increasingly served as sanctuaries and launching pads for a variety of Palestinian NSTOs.²⁴⁸

Israel Punishes PA Security Services

In order to prevent “A” areas from becoming complete safe havens for Palestinian NSTOs, Israel launched strikes against the PSS in order to compel the PA to implement denial operations itself against terrorist groups. Such strikes were typically launched in response to acts of Palestinian terrorism against Israelis, and often targeted PSS training facilities, police installations and infrastructure supporting Arafat’s personal security forces.²⁴⁹ Following this course of action, the IDF destroyed most the 150 PA security facilities by 2002.²⁵⁰ The results of this strategy were mixed. On the one hand, Israel did achieve some success in compelling Arafat to crackdown on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, going after their infrastructure and arresting their militant supporters. On the other, Israel severely weakened the PA and its security services, allowing for a growing power vacuum to emerge favoring the growth of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other radical groups.

²⁴⁷ Cordesman, 257.

²⁴⁸ Efraim Karsh, *Arafat’s War: The Man and His Struggle for Israeli Conquest*, New York: Grove Press, 2003, 217.

²⁴⁹ Cordesman, 168-9.

²⁵⁰ Karin Laub, “Palestinian Security Forces in Ruins,” *Associated Press*, 25 April 2002.

Operation Defensive Shield

Israel embarked upon *Operation Defensive Shield* with the purpose of retaking the security functions it had delegated during the peace process. In April 2002 the operation commenced following the March “Passover Massacre” suicide bomb attack. The largest urban warfare operation conducted since the siege of Beirut in 1982, *Defensive Shield* marked a shift in limiting action to short anti-terror and guerrilla raids, to engaging in full-scale operations. 20,000 reservists were mobilized, and moved into PA-controlled “A” areas, which the Israeli government hoped would, “take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge.”²⁵¹ Accordingly, the main objectives of *Defensive Shield* were to perform major weapons seizures, arrest terrorists and dismantle their support network, destroy weapons factories and suicide bomb workshops, engage in the targeted killing of “ticking bomb” suicide terrorists, and the gathering of intelligence for conducting further raids and operations.²⁵²

From a denial standpoint, *Defensive Shield* yielded great success: numerous significant arrests of NSTO operatives were made; Israel made significant progress in the dismantling of terrorist infrastructure and seizure/destruction of small arms, munitions and weapons factories; and ground-breaking evidence of the PA’s connection to terrorist activity was discovered.²⁵³

The Separation Barrier

On June 17, 2002, Israel began construction of a “separation barrier” (or “security fence”) along the West Bank, initially running roughly near the old green line that marked the pre-June 1967 borders. This security barrier encompassed a combination of structures such as walls, ditches, patrol roads, fenced portions, multi-layered composite obstacles, and electronic

²⁵¹ Shaul Mofaz, “The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: What Next?”, *Peacewatch 400, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy*, 8 October 2002, Available Online at:

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2091> [Last Viewed 23 August 09].

²⁵² Castignani, 111.

²⁵³ Castignani, 167.

surveillance units—tailored to the security problems of different areas.²⁵⁴ The security fence was also built to encompass Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The construction of this security fence has been viewed as a great success, credited with dropping successful suicide bombing attacks in Israel from 55 in 2002 to 11 in 2004.²⁵⁵

Assessment of Degree of Denial

Israeli efforts at denial enjoyed considerable success. Israeli interdiction efforts served to thwart some 80% of attempted terrorist attacks during this period.²⁵⁶ Meanwhile, Israeli efforts prevented mass-casualty attacks such as the one planned on the Shalom Towers. Overall, Israel was able to make important progress in denying Palestinian NSTOs access to vital resources, the ability to operate and conduct successful attacks, and evade Israeli security forces. Terrorist attacks still continued through both suicide bombings and rocket attacks, however the effectiveness and lethality of such attacks—as well as their overall frequency—dropped off in large measure. The degree of denial is thus assessed as “significant.”

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

During this episode, little effort was made by the Israeli government towards popular isolation. As Sergio Castignani explains, “The emphasis on providing military tactical solutions to Palestinian threats led to an almost complete oversight of a ‘hearts and minds’ strategy.”²⁵⁷ Perhaps the most visible manifestation of this was evidenced in issues of excessive collateral damage. Israeli security forces used excessive force against protesters and rock throwers, whilst responding to threats during patrols, in the pursuit of fleeing suspects, and in responding to

²⁵⁴ Cordesman, 442.

²⁵⁵ Associated Press, “Terror Report: Fewer Palestinian Successes, but Not for Lack of Trying,” *Israel Insider*, 11 January 2005.

²⁵⁶ Bruce Hoffman, “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” *Atlantic Monthly*, June 2003, 45.

²⁵⁷ Castignani, 185.

trespassers in restricted areas—at times resulting in death.²⁵⁸ The implementation of heavy weaponry in dense urban areas resulted in additional collateral damage. Notable examples of this include the decision to deploy the Merkava battle tank for the first time to assist in operations in the Territories, as well as dropping heavy payloads from F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The result from the firing of tanks shells and heavy machine gun rounds, as well as aerial bombardment, in such densely populated areas was that of unneeded civilian casualties. Such collateral damage was further increased, moreover, through Israeli policies of targeted killings, which often killed more innocent bystanders than targeted individuals.²⁵⁹

Also apparent was the adverse economic impact of Israeli security measures in response to the new uprising's violence. The World Bank, for instance, published a report in 2004 noting an approximate annual 40% percent drop in Gross National Income since the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, a 25-30% decline in per capita food consumption over two years with child malnutrition rates climbing, and 60% of the population living on less than \$1.5 a day.²⁶⁰ In addition to serious economic and collateral damage problems, however, a number of other issues prevailed that would drive up popular support for violence and NSTOs.

Mass Arrests and Detention

Mass arrests and detentions posed a serious issue during this episode.²⁶¹ Hundreds of Palestinians were held in administrative detention per year, while individual administrative detention orders could be issued for up to six-month periods with the possibility of being

²⁵⁸ US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Israel and the Occupied Territories 2003*, 25 February 2004, Available Online at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27929.htm> [Last Viewed 22 August 09].

²⁵⁹ Aryeh Dayan, "One Day in Five, the IDF Attempts Assassination," *Haaretz.com*, Available Online at: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=295256&contrassID=2&subContrassID=5&sbSubContrassID=0&listSrc=Y> [Last Viewed 29 June 09].

²⁶⁰ World Bank, *Four Years – Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis: An Assessment*, October 2004.

²⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, "2004 Human Rights Report: Israel and the Occupied Territories", *2004 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, Available Online at: <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41723.htm> [Last Viewed 29 June 09].

renewed indefinitely.²⁶² Moreover, once detained, Israel often provided harsh conditions for Palestinian prisoners, while police officers often beat and (allegedly) tortured detainees.²⁶³

Friction: Checkpoints and Curfews

Israel caused increasing friction within the Territories through the increasing implementation of checkpoints and curfews. At its height, tens of thousands of Palestinians traveling between towns and villages faced as many as 730 different barriers to movement—all the while often encountering some form of abuse from soldiers at the various checkpoints.²⁶⁴ Extensive curfews, meanwhile, affected every aspect of Palestinian life, severely impacting society and the economy, causing food and water shortages, and impeding the provision of medical care and supplies.²⁶⁵ *Operation Determined Path* served to exacerbate matters, extensively implementing checkpoints and wide-ranging curfews, in addition to the closures of businesses and schools and home demolitions.²⁶⁶

Questionable IDF Conduct and Practices

Questionable IDF conduct involved the arbitrary destruction and/or looting of Palestinian property; the soliciting of bribes during military operations and at checkpoints²⁶⁷; the subjecting of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to beatings, and tire slashings and gunfire directed against them or their vehicles because they were traveling on, or trying to circumvent IDF blocked roads²⁶⁸. Certain Israeli practices also helped to exacerbate the situation by raising the ire of the Palestinian community. Such practices included: excessive house demolition—i.e.

²⁶² Cordesman, 146.

²⁶³ U.S. Department of State, 2004.

²⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, 2004.

²⁶⁵ Cordesman, 151.

²⁶⁶ Castignani, 121.

²⁶⁷ U.S. Department of State, 2004.

²⁶⁸ U.S. Department of State, 2003.

leveling entire apartment buildings after a single terrorist hid there; the punitive use of home demolition, and house demolition not met with (any) compensation; the quartering of Israeli troops in Palestinian homes; the failure to regularly investigate the actions of Israeli security force members who killed and injured Palestinians under suspicious circumstances; obstructing the movement of, and firing on ambulances and Palestinian medical personnel; the IDF destruction of Palestinian agriculture and irrigation systems²⁶⁹; allowing IDF soldiers to engage in the “neighbor practice”²⁷⁰ of using Palestinians (often against their will) as human shields either to make contact with homes suspected of housing militants, or literally to fire behind²⁷¹; and the practice of not restraining Israeli settlers violently rampaging against Palestinians and their property in the Territories.²⁷²

The Separation Barrier: Issues

An important part of Israel’s denial strategy, the separation barrier posed a number of problems adversely impacting popular isolation. Such problems included construction over Palestinian land—especially around settlements—that resulted in cutting tens of thousands of Palestinians off from their work, land and families, and the spreading of the perception that Israel was attempting to unilaterally draw-up territorial lines and annex Palestinian lands.²⁷³ As Rashid Khalidi describes the situation:

Whatever this barrier may have done for Israeli security, it would have done even more had it been erected within Israel, along the Green Line marking the 1949 armistice boundary. Instead, it has been built virtually in its entirety within the West Bank, in many cases deep within it, thereby making possible the seizure of thousands of hectares

²⁶⁹ U.S. Department of State, 2003.

²⁷⁰ It should be noted that in 2002 the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled against this practice, this practice was still continued, under the interpretation that it could be permitted as long as Palestinians “consented” to it, a dubious distinction in a war zone. Cordesman, 143.

²⁷¹ Castignani, 118-19.

²⁷² U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2003.

²⁷³ Daniel Seidemann, “Erecting a Barrier to Peace,” *The Washington Post*, 14 August 2003.

of additional Palestinian land, along with valuable water resources, separating Palestinian farmers from their livelihood, sowing more resentment and anger for the future.²⁷⁴

Losing the Media Battle

Several incidents that transpired with poor considerations for media implications entail an adverse impact on Palestinian (and international) perceptions. Two important such episodes include the death of 12-year-old Mohammed Aldura and the Battle of Jenin. In the first case, Mohammed Aldura was caught on video on September 30, 2001 in a crossfire and gunned down by the IDF along with his father who became paralyzed. The incident exploded in internet and television media—especially in the Arab and Islamic world. Following a rushed investigation, the IDF accepted that its troops were likely to blame, and attempted to put the incident behind them.²⁷⁵ Yet years later, following a detailed investigation, it was found that—in terms of physics—it would have been impossible for the IDF to have gunned down Aldura and his father.²⁷⁶ Regardless, Israel learned the importance of needing a way to rapidly respond with a public relations approach following such an incident.

Another such media failure involved the “Battle of Jenin”. The “Battle of Jenin” took place on April 3, 2002, when Israeli troops entered the densely populated Jenin refugee camp as part of *Operation Defensive Shield*. In conducting the operation, the IDF decided to exclude access to international media. With the absence of first-hand reporting and video footage, rumors quickly spread of intensive civilian casualties and collateral damage on the level of an “unprecedented massacre”, claiming that over 600 people had been killed.²⁷⁷ Though never substantiated, these claims were quickly accepted as fact in world opinion and international media outlets. Ironically, civilian casualties in Jenin were remarkably low considering the

²⁷⁴ Khalidi, 205.

²⁷⁵ Cordesman, 371.

²⁷⁶ James Fallows, “Who Shot Mohammed Aldura,” *The Atlantic Monthly*, June 2003.

²⁷⁷ David Selbourne, *Losing the Battle with Islam*, New York: Prometheus Books, 2005, 194.

circumstances, with the UN and Human Rights Watch eventually confirming that no such massacre had taken place.²⁷⁸ Still, the damage had been done—made possible in no small part by denying access to the media, with the result being that the worst was suspected without confirmation.

Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

At the conclusion of this period, primary grievances remained poorly addressed (while new ones were emerging from Israeli security operations and the implementation of the separation barrier), excessive violence and collective punishment were present, and the general security situation throughout the Palestinian Territories significantly deteriorated. Overall then, the degree of popular isolation for this episode is assessed as “backfire”.

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Several additional significant factors may have influenced the outcome of this episode. First, following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the US invasion of Iraq, the regime of Saddam Hussein was brought down, which had been supportive in providing financial assistance to Palestinian NSTOs and the families of suicide bombers, as well as sanctuary to certain terrorist groups like the PLF. External US efforts thus played some (limited) role in reducing external/international support for Palestinian NSTOs.

Another possible additional factor may have been Israel’s decapitation strategy. The effectiveness of such a strategy is questionable in terms of tangibly disrupting the operational capability of Palestinian NSTOs.²⁷⁹ What is certain, however, is that such attacks did raise the

²⁷⁸ See: BBC News [World Edition], “UN Says No Massacre in Jenin,” 1 August 2002, Available Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2165272.stm [Last Viewed 30 June 09]; BBC News, “No Jenin Massacre,” 3 May 2002, Available Online at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1965471.stm [Last Viewed 30 June 09].

²⁷⁹ Cordesman, 141.

ire of the Palestinian community, as they were often accompanied by excessive collateral damage. Such targeted killings were also likely to have encouraged revenge attacks, as was apparent by statements from groups such as Hamas.²⁸⁰ Interestingly, a study examining this period found that Israel's policy of targeted assassination had little effect in either decreasing or increasing Palestinian violence.²⁸¹

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

During this episode, little headway was achieved in resuming political progress towards a settlement. Upon election, Sharon pledged not to negotiate “under fire”.²⁸² Any hope for negotiations were further dashed in December 2001 following a Hamas bus bombing, whereupon Sharon's cabinet declared Arafat irrelevant and cutoff contact with him.²⁸³ On June 24, 2002, the Quartet (USA, UN, Russia and the EU) attempted to restart negotiations, proposing a “Road Map” aimed at achieving peace. The Road Map was planned to be carried out in three phases between 2003 and 2005 as follows: 1) provision for a cessation of Palestinian violence and the establishment of Palestinian political reforms (including the appointment of a new leader—a prime minister—through democratic elections); 2) the establishment of an independent Palestinian state; 3) the achievement of final-status agreement on issues such as final borders, the status of Jerusalem and the fate of Palestinian refugees and remaining Israeli settlements.²⁸⁴

²⁸⁰ See: Ibrahim Barzak, “ Hamas Leader Yassin Killed in Airstrike, Prompting Threats of Revenge Against Israel, US,” *Associated Press*, 22 March 2004.

²⁸¹ See: Mohammed Hafez and Joseph Hatfield “Do Targeted Assassination Work? A Multivariate Analysis of Israel's Controversial Tactic During the Al-Aqsa Uprising,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, Vol. 29, No.4, July 2006.

²⁸² Daniel Williams, “Old Tactics Get New Life Under Sharon,” *Washington Post*, 21 April 2001.

²⁸³ Mark Matthews, *Lost Years: Bush, Sharon, and Failure in the Middle East*, New York: Nation Books, 2007, 141.


²⁸⁴ United Nations Security Council, “A Performance-Based Roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” S/2003/529, 7 May 2003.

Following elections in line with the first phase of the Road Map, Mahmoud Abbas became prime minister of the Palestinian National Authority.²⁸⁵ Under US pressure the Israeli cabinet accepted the principle of a Palestinian state, and Sharon soon began negotiations with Abbas. Sharon offered to withdraw the IDF from most Palestinian city centers in the West Bank and from the northern Gaza Strip, as well as lift border restrictions in exchange for a commitment to crack down on terrorism. Sharon also stated that if Abbas were successful and violence ceased, then Israel would participate in negotiations to form a provisional Palestinian state. Abbas agreed to Sharon's terms and worked toward ending violence and attempting to secure a ceasefire from Hamas. Unfortunately, within a few days, Arafat publicly stated that Abbas had made too many concessions, and Hamas announced that it would not hold any ceasefire-talks. Abbas soon found his position untenable without the support of Arafat or the security forces still under his control. By September, with Arafat actively engaged in a destabilizing power struggle with Abbas, Abbas decided to resign. Along with him, any short-lived hope of the resumption of meaningful negotiations under the Road Map died.²⁸⁶

Despite short-comings on the front of political progress, however, Sharon's strategy succeeded in greatly reducing violence levels: at the episode's conclusion, Israeli casualties from Palestinian NISTO violence were brought down from a peak of 453 in 2002, to 118 by year's end in 2004. This is illustrated by figure 5.5:

²⁸⁵ Robert Owen Freedman, *Contemporary Israel: Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Security Challenges*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008, 278.

²⁸⁶ Bickerton and Klausner, 360.

Figure 5.5: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 2001-2004²⁸⁷

However, It was also becoming clear to Israel that denial measures and security cooperation with its neighbors would be insufficient in themselves to resolve the situation, given the significant continued commitment (and ability) towards carrying out acts of violence by Palestinian NSTOs. Indeed, both sides discovered (once again) the impossibility of attaining a zero-sum victory through force. Based on this outcome and the achievement of little political resolution, the level of success for this episode is assessed as “moderate”.

Within-Case Episode #6: 2004-Present (2009) – Unilateral disengagement, Hamas Comes to Power, Entrenched Stalemate

By 2004, Prime Minister Sharon came to the conclusion that the conflict’s stalemate had to be resolved on a political level.²⁸⁸ Accordingly, Sharon began to take action on a decision he

²⁸⁷ Israeli casualty figures cited from: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008*, Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), May 2008, Available Online at: http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/terror_07e.pdf [Last Viewed 30 August 09].

²⁸⁸ Castignani, 170.

had made in December 2003 to progress with the Road Map through unilateral disengagement.²⁸⁹ As the original architect of Israel's settlement policy, Sharon's new policy caught everyone by surprise—including his own party (soon requiring him to forge a new one, *Kadima*). By late Spring of 2004, Sharon's disengagement plan called for the dismantling of all twenty-one Jewish settlements in Gaza, the evacuation of approximately 8,000 settlers, and the dismantling of four small settlements in the northern West Bank. Following the withdrawal, however, Israel would retain control of the border between Gaza and Egypt, patrol security along the Israeli-Gaza border maintained by a 650 kilometer-long security fence, and enforce control over Gaza's airspace and seacoast. The rationale behind Sharon's disengagement plan was that it would reduce the chances of friction between the Israeli and Palestinian populations.²⁹⁰

Sharon's plan, however, was hounded by a number of concerns. Sharon's decision to implement his plan unilaterally meant Israel would receive no *quid pro quo* towards peace. Both the PA and some Israelis were also concerned that the unilateral Israeli withdrawal would leave Gaza without effective government in an area where the PA had been unable to establish firm control, leading to greater instability as Hamas and Islamic Jihad extended their own influence.²⁹¹

Arafat Dies, Abbas Elected President of the PA, Hamas Electoral Victories

Following the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Mahmoud Abbas was elected President of the PA in January 2005. The new development briefly yielded an improvement in relations between Israel and the PA, with Sharon and Abbas jointly announcing an end to the violent conflict that had prevailed since late 2000. Unfortunately, however, newfound hopes of

²⁸⁹ Menachem Klein, *A Possible Peace Between Israel and Palestine: An Insider's Account of the Geneva Initiative*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2006, 200.

²⁹⁰ Castignani, 125.

²⁹¹ Bickerton and Klausner, 363-4.

progress towards a political resolution were not long to last. In municipal elections between January and May 2005, Hamas scored major victories, particularly in the Gaza Strip. But most dramatically, in 2006 Hamas won the majority of seats in the Palestinian legislative election, obtaining 74 of the 134 seats and defeating the Fatah government²⁹², whom many Palestinians considered to be ineffective and corrupt. After the election, Hamas came into control of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the government, while Fatah controlled the Presidency (Abbas), the Palestinian Security Services (PSS), and the PLO (the only recognized Palestinian representation abroad).²⁹³

Hamas' initial signals upon assuming control were problematic: upon presenting its 12-point political program, it claimed the legitimate right to maintain (violent) resistance to end Israel's occupation and did not recognize Israel, thereby disregarding the Quartet's preconditions. Accordingly, the PLO rejected Hamas' position, while Israel, the US and the EU began a political and economic boycott against the PA.²⁹⁴ Hamas, meanwhile, faced challenges from Fatah. Following the formation and deployment in May 2006 of a 3,000 man "Executive Force" charged with internal security duties—and directly challenging Fatah and the PLO's monopoly on force—President Abbas committed a substantial deployment of the PSS in the Gaza Strip. Factional clashes soon broke out eventually ending in June 2007 with Hamas' takeover of the Gaza Strip, while Fatah/PLO formed its own government and confronted Hamas in the West Bank. The end result saw Israel pursue a double-track strategy of engaging in dialogue with Fatah/PLO leadership in the West Bank, while boycotting Hamas rule in the Gaza

²⁹² Central Elections Commission, Palestine, "The Final Results of the Second PLC Elections," 29 January 2006, Available Online at: <http://www.elections.ps/template.aspx?id=291> [Last Viewed 13 July 09].

²⁹³ Diego Bailani, "After Annapolis' Failure: The Chances of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process in the Light of Hamas' Control of Gaza," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT), Herzilya, 23 March 2009, Available Online at: <http://www.ict.org.il/Articles/tabid/66/Articlsid/673/currentpage/1/Default.aspx> [Last Viewed 13 July 09].

²⁹⁴ Bailani.

Strip. Indeed, following continual rocket and mortar attacks, Gaza would be declared a “hostile territory”, and would continue to be subjected to IDF operations.

Assessment Question 1: What levels of isolation of external/international support were achieved?

During this episode, Iran continued to provide Palestinian NSTOs— Hamas in particular—with both financial and material support. Such support included arms transported by sea. In these instances, Iran would either send a freighter to unload weapons at Egypt’s Port Said, at which point the illicit cargo would be smuggled into Gaza by land, or drop off containers at sea picked up by Palestinian fisherman.²⁹⁵

The largest concern for Israel has been the smuggling of arms and ammunition into Gaza via the Philadelphi Route along the Egypt-Gaza border. Such smuggling is enabled by the construction of tunnels under Palestinian homes (primarily in Rafah). Preventing such smuggling has proven very difficult, due to the short time needed to construct such tunnels by engineers, an ever-willing network of smugglers, and the financial appeal to Palestinians willing to allow their homes to be used for smuggling tunnels.²⁹⁶ In isolating such external support, however, Israel has enjoyed some success—particularly from cooperation with Egypt—as witnessed by Egypt’s interception of an Iranian freighter bearing arms on January 22, 2009. Israel has also enjoyed some degree of success through operations into Gaza, aimed in part at the destruction these networks of tunnels.

²⁹⁵ Yaakov Katz, “Cairo Intercepts Iranian Arms Ship,” *The Jerusalem Post*, 27 January 2009.

²⁹⁶ Cordesman, 411.

Assessment of Degree of Isolation of External/International Support

Palestinian NSTOs continued to be deprived of major sanctuaries serving as launch pads, and Israel's control of the borders, coasts and airspace of the Palestinian Territories—along with cooperation from Jordan and Egypt—helped to minimize material support that could be smuggled into the Territories. Significant financial support, as well as material support—particularly from Iran—continued to make it into the hands of Palestinian NSTOs, however, especially through smuggling into Gaza. The degree of isolation of external/international support during this period is assessed as “significant.”

Assessment Question 2: To what degree did the democratic state manage to implement denial?

Throughout this episode, Israel successfully managed to deny Palestinian NSTOs the capacity to conduct suicide bombing attacks against civilians within Israel and against Israeli settlements—aided largely in part by the effectiveness of its newly constructed separation barrier. Indeed, Israel was so successful at this that it likely played a significant factor in Hamas' April 2006 announcement that it would be stopping such attacks.²⁹⁷ In place of suicide bombing attacks, Palestinian NSTOs thus began to pursue alternative means of assault—including the launching of mortars and rockets (in particular from Gaza), and attacking IDF bases and outposts by constructing large underground tunnels rigged with explosives beneath them.²⁹⁸

In responding to these assaults in 2004, while making preparations to carryout Sharon's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza, Israel launched *Operation Rainbow* in May, and *Operation Days of Penitence* in September. Both operations involved the deployment of Israeli troops into Gaza—supported by airpower and D-9 bulldozers—in order to destroy smuggling


²⁹⁷ Conal Urquhart, “Hamas in Call to End Suicide Bombings,” *The Guardian (UK)*, 9 April 2006.

²⁹⁸ Castignani, 246.

tunnels, weapon stockpiles (especially Qassam rocket equipment), rocket/mortar launch pads, known NSTO leaders/militants, and terrorist infrastructure.²⁹⁹

Problems concerning rocket and mortar fire from Gaza would both persist, however. Indeed, following Israel's withdraw from Gaza in August and September 2005, rocket and mortar fire increased dramatically. The situation even further worsened following Hamas' establishment of control in Gaza. The following figure of annual rocket and mortar attacks from 2005 (Gaza disengagement) onwards clearly depicts the situation:

Figure 5.6: Annual Rocket & Mortar Attacks, 2005-2008³⁰⁰



Israel accordingly followed up with a number of operations, including *Operation Summer Rains* (June–November 2006)—which included the major sub-operation, *Autumn Clouds*—and *Operation Hot Winter* (February 2008). Similar to *Rainbow* and *Days of Penitence*, these operations aimed to target militant groups and infrastructure in Gaza, while cracking down on smuggling and weapons stockpiles—and in particular providing for the destruction of the means

²⁹⁹ Castignani, 129; Cordesman, 362.

³⁰⁰ Statistics for graph taken from: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), Provided for Online by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Available at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm#statistics> [Last Viewed 8 July 09]

of producing, transporting and firing Qassam rockets. The operations also sought to secure the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit (captured by Hamas in June 2006).

Despite these operations, rocket and mortar attacks continued. In June 2008, a ceasefire was negotiated between Israel and Hamas that provided for a near complete cessation of rocket and mortar attacks for several months. However, following the ceasefire's gradual collapse from November to late December, hostilities once again resumed, with Palestinian NSTOs recommencing with considerable rocket and mortar fire.

Israel responded to these attacks by launching the massive *Operation Cast Lead* into Gaza, commencing on December 27, 2008. During the operation, Israel targeted tunnel complexes; rocket and mortar launching points; Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives and leadership; Hamas outposts; weapons storage facilities/bunkers containing weapons and rockets; and Hamas police headquarters. Operations were carried out by the IDF and IAF with the support of Israel's Navy.³⁰¹ By the Operation's conclusion, the IDF assessment was that it managed to destroy roughly 1,200 rockets (one third of Hamas' arsenal), and killed 700 militiamen. Still, as Diego Bailani points out, the IDF "...destroyed no more than 2.8% of Hamas estimated forces."³⁰²

Assessment of Degree of Denial

Throughout this episode, Israel managed to cement its implementation of significant denial levels, increasing its ability to thwart suicide attacks with further construction of the security fence, relying on increasing cooperation with Fatah/the PLO in the West Bank to rein in assaults from Palestinian NSTOs, and launching operations into Gaza that helped reduce Hamas'

³⁰¹ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "IDF Operation in Gaza: Cast Lead," 21 January 2009, Available Online at: http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+and+Islamic+Fundamentalism-/Aerial_strike_weapon_development_center+Gaza_28-Dec-2008.htm [Last Viewed 13 July 09].

³⁰² Bailani.

access to vital resources, and capacity to operate and launch attacks. Despite this success, however, Israel's withdraw from Gaza has provided a safe haven for militants where they can create/stockpile weapons and launch rocket and mortar attacks. Indeed, even after *Operation Cast Lead*, some 481 rockets and 183 mortars were fired into Israel by June 2009.³⁰³ Despite the relatively low fatality levels of these rocket and mortar attacks, they continue to pose a significant challenge to Israel's security. Denial for this episode is thus assessed as "significant".

Assessment Question 3: What levels of isolation of popular support were achieved?

Initially, following Arafat's death, Israel made some positive movement on the popular isolation front. In January 2005, Israel announced that it would stop marking Palestinian militants for death, and in February Abbas and Sharon declared an end to the violence that had prevailed since the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada. The Israeli attorney general also declared unlawful the government decision to seize land around Jerusalem from Palestinian owners, while in a goodwill gesture, the Israeli cabinet agreed to release 900 Palestinian prisoners, and Israeli forces pulled troops back from West Bank towns, including Jericho. Sharon also announced that Israel would allow exiled militants involved in the siege of the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem (2002) to return to their hometowns. Shortly thereafter, Sharon announced that Israel would pull back from major West Bank cities and return control to the PSS, work towards issuing more work permits for Gazans, and had Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz order a halt to the policy of demolishing the homes of Palestinian militants.³⁰⁴ By August/September 2005, moreover, Sharon made good on his promise to withdraw settlements and Israeli security forces from the Gaza Strip. The departure of these 8,000 settlers marked an important milestone, and one that initially promised to ease tensions, given that Israeli settlements in Gaza took up 40% of

³⁰³ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Hamas Terror War Against Israel," Available Online at: www.mfa.gov.il/MFA [Last Viewed 13 July 09].

³⁰⁴ Bickerton and Klausner, 370.

the land and siphoned off scarce water supplies.³⁰⁵ Unfortunately, Hamas electoral victories in 2005 and 2006 would quickly undermine these efforts to warm relations with the Palestinians.

Limitations of the Gaza Withdrawal

Despite the important milestone set by the withdrawal of Israeli settlements from Gaza, the event was undermined by Palestinian perceptions that the disengagement from the Strip was meant to help distract international attention and assist in consolidating Israel's control over the West Bank. Indeed, both before and after the withdrawal, Sharon authorized new homes in the West Bank, including a government plan to build an additional 3,500 housing units in a 4.6 square mile area (known as E-1) extending the municipal boundaries of the settlement Ma'ale Adumim.³⁰⁶ The construction of these new housing units would link the settlement to Jerusalem, creating Israeli territorial contiguity in an area where the status was supposed to be determined in peace negotiations with the Palestinians.³⁰⁷ Indeed, with settlement construction expanding in the West Bank, the Israeli settler population increased from 441,828 in 2004 to 484,862 by the end of 2007³⁰⁸; a large net increase despite the number of settlers removed from Gaza.

Another problem posed by the Gaza withdrawal involved perceptions as a consequence of Israel's *unilateral* disengagement. Since Israel decided to leave without a negotiated *quid pro quo*, Israel's action helped give credence to the claim by radical groups that violence and armed resistance had forced Israel's hand in withdrawing. Hamas used the occasion to plan large, post-pull out victory celebrations³⁰⁹—and it is likely that Israel's unilateral decision helped to

³⁰⁵ Gelvin, 194.

³⁰⁶ Philipp Misselwitz and Tim Reiniets, *City of Collision: Jerusalem and the Principles of Conflict Urbanism*, Basel: Birkhauser, 2006, 167.

³⁰⁷ Bickerton and Klausner, 372.

³⁰⁸ Foundation for Middle East Peace, *Comprehensive Settlement Population 1972-2007*, Available Online at: http://www.fmep.org/settlement_info/settlement-info-and-tables/stats-data/comprehensive-settlement-population-1972-2006 [Last Viewed 9 July 09].

³⁰⁹ Castignani, 171.

convince many in the Territories of the utility of armed resistance and terrorism in place of fruitless negotiations.

Security Fence Issues

During this episode, the construction of Israel's security fence—particularly on areas of Palestinian land, often surrounding Israeli settlements—remained an issue of tension. In June 2004, the Israeli Supreme Court did rule that a 40-kilometer (25-mile) section of the proposed 620-kilometer fence in the West Bank be rerouted for violating the human rights of 35,000 local Palestinians.³¹⁰ However, the continued presence of the fence around (growing) settlements in the West Bank and around Jerusalem—cutting off Palestinians from their land, family, and work, while making travel even more complicated—continues to generate considerable friction.

Civilian Casualties Resulting from Israeli Operations in Gaza

The various (repeated) operations waged in Gaza between 2004 and 2009 to destroy smuggling tunnels, rocket and mortar launching capabilities, and terrorist infrastructure took their toll in terms of civilian casualties and damages. As a consequence of such operations, many civilians were left homeless following the demolition of homes suspected of being used in smuggling operations. Meanwhile hundreds of Palestinian civilians were killed—including women and children (an issue exacerbated by Palestinian gunmen hiding amongst civilian quarters). In particular, during *Operation Cast Lead* (December 08-January 09), Israeli forces killed over 1,300 Palestinians—many of which were civilians, and among them a large number of whom (315) were minors under the age of 18.³¹¹ Many such civilian casualties could be

³¹⁰ Ohad Gozani, "Israeli Supreme Court Orders Security Fence to be Moved," *Telegraph (UK)*, 1 July 2004.

³¹¹ B'Tselem, *Guidelines for Israel's Investigation into Operation Cast Lead*, Jerusalem, February 2009, 3-5.

attributed, moreover, to the extensive (and avoidable) use of imprecise artillery and mortar fire into densely populated areas by the IDF.³¹²

Gaza Declared “Hostile Territory”

Following the June 2007 takeover of Gaza by Hamas, the Strip was declared “hostile territory.” A direct consequence of this was Israel closing Gaza’s border-crossings and greatly limiting the entry of goods, including fuel, medical equipment, and replacement parts. The effect of this policy proved disastrous for the residents of Gaza. As stated by B’Tselem, “People who previously worked to support their families became totally dependent on handouts of basic commodities and services.”³¹³ Further, the economic situation in Gaza greatly deteriorated following Israeli policies, seeing unemployment reach 50% in the second quarter of 2008, with 79% of Gazan households living below the poverty line—70% of which were in deep poverty.³¹⁴ Palestinians have perceived the situation as collective punishment against them in Gaza.³¹⁵

Questionable Israeli Policies During *Operation Cast Lead*

During Israel’s massive *Operation Cast Lead*, a number of questionable policies/actions were carried out. The first, and perhaps most high profile of these, involved the use of white phosphorous, which is prohibited by international law, especially when targets are located within a residential area.³¹⁶ Another involved the employment (once again) of the “neighbor practice”, where the military used Palestinians as human shields during the operation, as well as ordered them to enter buildings and check suspicious objects ahead of the military to see if they were

³¹² B’Tselem, February 2009, 6-7.

³¹³ B’Tselem, February 2009, 19.

³¹⁴ B’Tselem, February 2009, 20.

³¹⁵ BBC News, “Israelis Declare Gaza ‘Hostile,’” 19 September 2007.

³¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Israel: White Phosphorus Use Evidence of War Crimes,” 25 March 2009, Available Online at: <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/03/25/israel-white-phosphorus-use-evidence-war-crimes> [Last Viewed 14 July 09].

booby-trapped.³¹⁷ Similarly, reports again emerged of Israelis firing on ambulances and impeding their transportation of wounded, while failing to setup an effective mechanism for allowing humanitarian agencies to evacuate the wounded.³¹⁸ Israel also kept the crossings into Gaza closed after 19 December, cutting off humanitarian supplies, and resulting—due to a lack of spare parts—in Gaza’s power being shut off (exacerbated by Israel striking several power lines), affecting all aspects of daily life including sanitation, water, and power supply.³¹⁹ It should be mentioned that Israel made efforts to open up a humanitarian corridor for a few hours each day by early January, however this corridor was vastly insufficient to deal with the humanitarian disaster in the strip that had been worsening since Israel declared Gaza a “hostile territory.” Finally, Israel’s decision to conduct aerial bombardment also proved to be particularly devastating.

Assessing the Degree of Isolation of Popular Support

Despite initial attempts to do so, little was positively achieved during this episode to isolate popular support for violence and Palestinian NSTOs. Primary Palestinian grievances remained poorly addressed, excessive violence and collective punishment were present in Israeli operations and policies in Gaza, and new significant grievances began to emerge due to the dire humanitarian plight in Gaza. Given these circumstances, isolation of popular support is assessed as “backfire.”

³¹⁷ Kevin Flower and Paula Hancocks, “Report Claims Israelis Used Palestinians as Human Shields,” CNN.com, 15 July 2009, Available Online at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/07/15/israel.gaza.report> [Last Viewed 16 July 09].

³¹⁸ B’Tselem, February 2009, 15-18.

³¹⁹ Global Security [Online], “Operation Cast Lead,” 22 January 2009, Available Online at: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/operation-cast-lead.htm> [Last Viewed 14 July 09].

Assessment Question 4: Did additional significant factors influence the outcome?

Several additional factors may have had an effect on the outcome of this episode. The first deals with the death of two prominent figures of the conflict: Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon. Following the death of Yasser Arafat on November 11, 2004—and the subsequent election of Mahmoud Abbas to president of the PA—an opportunity for some progress was made, including the declaration of an end to hostilities between Israel, and Palestinian NSTOs associated with Fatah/the PLO.³²⁰ While such progress would be short-lived with the electoral victories of Hamas, it is important to take note that Arafat's death did have an important impact on altering Israel's relationship with the Fatah/PLO-leadership divide of Palestinian NSTOs. With the loss of Ariel Sharon on January 4, 2006 to stroke, Israel lost the primary figure driving its centrist movement, Kadima. Ehud Olmert, the hawkish mayor of Jerusalem would replace Sharon as acting prime minister, however Olmert never possessed the security credentials or national support that Sharon had—ultimately undermining Kadima's agenda for disengagement and a return to negotiations.

Israel's Policy of Targeted Killings/Assassinations

Once again, Israel pursued its policy of targeted killings against Palestinian NSTO leadership. This was most clearly demonstrated with the assassination of Hamas leaders Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz Rantisi. As a result of these decapitation strikes, Hamas would become more reluctant to announce the names of its leadership. However, other consequences were also apparent. Targeted assassinations against such leaders enraged public supporters and

³²⁰ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Sharon and Abbas Declare End to Four Years of Hostilities," 8 February 2005, Available Online at: <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Archive/Israel+Line/2005/Israel+Line+8-Feb-2005.htm> [Last Viewed 31 August 09].

helped escalate levels of violence.³²¹ Further, despite such assassinations, Hamas remained undeterred—as was illustrated by an increase in Qassam rocket attacks.³²²

International Sanctions Against Hamas

These international sanctions were targeted at Hamas by the US and EU following Hamas assuming control of the Palestinian government in March 2006. Applied for 15-months as a means of prodding Hamas into changing its positions on Oslo and the two-state solution, these sanctions meant that the US and EU would not provide financial support (worth hundreds of millions of US dollars) to the PA until Hamas agreed to recognize Israel, renounce terrorism, and commit itself to observing previous agreements. Even after the sanctions were brought to an end, the US added further pressure, moreover, by informing Hamas that banks transferring money to Hamas would face strong penalties under American anti-terrorism laws.³²³

The Second Lebanon War

Finally, it is also important to mention the Second Lebanon War. Launched by Israel between July 12 and August 14, 2006 in response to Hezbollah rocket fire into Israeli border towns, an anti-tank missile assault on two Israeli Humvees, and the capture of two Israeli soldiers (and killing of three others), Israel's operations against its northern neighbor marked a massive 34-day military conflict. The war resulted in the death of approximately one thousand Lebanese civilians³²⁴, while damaging Lebanese civil infrastructure, and displacing approximately one million Lebanese³²⁵ (as well as 300-500 thousand Israelis³²⁶). Israel's

³²¹ Gelvin, 253.

³²² Castignani, 129.

³²³ Gelvin.

³²⁴ Max Boot, "The Second Lebanon War," *Council on Foreign Relations*, September 4, 2006.


³²⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Lebanon: Displaced Return Amidst Growing Political Tension*, Norwegian Refugee Council, 15 December 2006, Available Online at: <http://www.internal-displacement.org> [Last Viewed 15 July 09].

onslaught that lead to large numbers of civilian casualties—including its use of widely proscribed cluster bombs—against other Arabs and Muslims just north of the border almost certainly had a negative impact on any efforts at winning over popular support.

Assessment Question 5: How successful overall was the campaign of strategic coercion against the NSTO at the conclusion of the episode?

The overall outcome of this episode of strategic coercion was one of entrenched stalemate. During this episode, Israel managed to further consolidate its security position through the separation barrier, controlling the borders, coasts and airspace of the Territories, and launching multiple operations into Gaza. Consequently, Israel was able to increasingly bring down casualty levels (despite increasing rocket and mortar attacks), as illustrated by figure 5.7:

Figure 5.7: Deaths from Palestinian NSTO Violence, 2004-2008³²⁷



³²⁶ Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Behind the Headlines: The Second Lebanon War – One Year Later,” July 2007, Available Online at:

<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/The+Second+Lebanon+War+-+One+year+later+-+July+2007.htm> [Last Viewed 15 July 09].

³²⁷ Statistical Information for this chart from: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, *Anti-Israeli Terrorism in 2007 and its Trends in 2008*; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism Since September 2000.”

Several attempts at resuming political progress did take place during this episode. The first transpired following the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, and the election of Mahmoud Abbas as President of the PA in January 2005. During this period Sharon resumed political contacts with the PA and a cessation of hostilities was announced. Abbas ordered security forces to prevent attacks against Israel, and Sharon moved to implement a number of goodwill gestures. Abbas was unwilling and unable, however, to dismantle other extremist organizations such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad for fear of unleashing a civil war. With electoral victories for Hamas in 2005 and 2006, maneuvering on negotiations towards any sort of political settlement was put on ice.

In late 2007, circumstances changed following the Annapolis Conference that was put together at the behest of the George W. Bush Administration. An important conference, it marked the first time that the two-state solution was articulated as the mutually agreed-upon outline for a final settlement, and the willingness of an Israeli prime minister to engage in serious negotiations on all final-status issues.³²⁸ Unfortunately, though, negotiations under the aegis of the Annapolis Conference soon ran into problems as both sides had difficulties implementing obligations under the Quartet's 2003 Road Map. Olmert's government, meanwhile, proved too weak to serve as a serious interlocutor on negotiations over final status issues—it possessed only 48 out of 120 seats in the Knesset, and Shas (a prominent member of its coalition) used its 12 seats to veto any serious discussion on the issue of Jerusalem and its division. No position acceptable to the Palestinians could thus be negotiated.³²⁹ As a result, little real negotiated progress was achieved.

Finally, negotiations between Israel and Hamas—brokered by Egypt—were attempted to at least reach a ceasefire in 2008. These were successful, resulting in a six-month ceasefire

³²⁸ Bailani.

³²⁹ Bailani.

beginning on June 19.³³⁰ However, following Israel's failure to ease restrictions on Gaza border controls and the blockade, and Hamas' intransigence over negotiations for the release of Gilad Shalit, the ceasefire was not extended and fell apart in late 2008, culminating in the commencement of *Operation Cast Lead*. Despite the sending of George Mitchell as a US peace envoy in 2009 following the Israeli operation³³¹, little progress has yet to manifest in regards to renewed negotiations.

In conclusion, despite the maintenance of violence levels at relatively low levels, Palestinian NSTOs (particularly Hamas and Islamic Jihad) remained committed to pursuing terrorist violence—as evidenced by rocket and mortar attacks, attempts at suicide bombing, and a variety of other violent acts—and any real progress towards a political resolution or settlement (not to mention its implementation) remained elusive. The level of success for this final episode of examined Israeli strategic coercion is thus assessed as “moderate”.

³³⁰ *BBC News*, “Israel and Hamas ‘Agree Truce’,” 18 June 2008.

³³¹ CNN Politics.com [Online], “George Mitchell Named Special Envoy for the Middle East,” 22 January 2009, Available Online at: <http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/01/22/obama.mitchell/index.html> [Last Viewed 31 August 09].

Chapter VI: Conclusion

The purpose of this dissertation has been to develop a theoretical framework drawing from strategic coercion literature, suitable for providing an explanation of the coercive elements necessary for bringing about an end to hostilities posed by formidable nationalistic substate terrorist organizations (NSTOs). The result was the creation of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, which contends that three key coercive elements are necessary to compel an enduring end to hostilities from an NSTO: isolation of external and international support, denial, and isolation of popular support. Moreover, the Balance Theory also assumes an interdependence amongst these key elements; thus gains in one element may enable and lead to gains in another. Conversely, failure in one element may negatively impact other elements. In review, the Balance Theory posits the following hypotheses:

H1: The presence of overall significant to high levels of the key elements of isolation of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be associated with higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

H5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

In order to assess the Balance Theory of strategic coercion and test the validity of its hypotheses, this dissertation has examined, through case-study analysis, the campaigns of strategic coercion pursued by Britain and Israel against Irish Republican and Palestinian NSTOs, over approximately a 40-year period in each case. The result is that some 80-years of strategic coercion against NSTOs have been examined. In conducting these case studies, moreover, the

method of focused, structured comparison has been applied to provide a standardized means of rigorous assessment of the two cases studied, and their multiple within-case episode (12 in total), so as to obtain as accurate an assessment of the validity of the Balance Theory and its hypotheses as possible.

This chapter provides: 1) a brief review of the results of the case-study analysis; 2) an assessment of the Balance Theory and its hypotheses; 3) an elaboration of the implications of the findings in this study; and 4) a conclusion that examines if and how the Balance Theory may offer policy advice in dealing with the pre-eminent substate terrorist organization of the modern day: Al Qaeda.

Reviewing Results of Case-Study Analysis on British and Israeli Strategic Coercion against NSTOs

Both efforts of strategic coercion by the UK and Israel transpired in different ways. For the British, efforts at strategic coercion began as a catastrophic failure in implementation of all three key coercive elements—and correspondingly, the outcome. As the conflict progressed, however, the British were able to achieve a stalemate, bringing violence down to relatively acceptable levels through improved efforts at denial and isolation of external support. By the latter stages of the conflict, following great strides in isolation of popular support, the British eventually set the stage for negotiations towards a political settlement, which they successfully achieved and implemented. Conversely, in its efforts at strategic coercion, Israel began with better—albeit limited—end results in terms of success achieved against Palestinian NSTOs. However, while Israel’s impressive efforts at isolation of external support and denial were often able to reduce violence to relatively “acceptable” levels, little more than a stalemate was ever achieved in the face of abysmal efforts to isolate popular Palestinian support for NSTOs and

violence. This stance in Israeli strategic coercion has largely remained unchanged—including during the peace process following the Oslo Accords—and remains in place today.

The following two figures provide a summary of the results of assessments involved in the case-study analysis of these two episodes:

Figure 6.1: Assessment Results – UK vs Republican NSTOs, 1969-2007

UK vs. Republican NSTOs	Isolation: External Support	Denial	Isolation: Popular Support	Overall Success at Completion of Episode
Episode 1: 1969-1972	Backfire	Backfire	Backfire	Backfire
Episode 2: 1972-1975	Failure	Limited	Limited	Limited Success
Episode 3: 1975-1982	Limited	Significant	Limited	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Episode 4: 1982-1989	Limited	Significant	Limited	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Episode 5: 1989-1997	Significant	High	Significant	Significant Success
Episode 6: 1997-2007	High	High	High	High Success

Figure 6.2: Assessment Results – Israel vs Palestinian NSTOs, 1967-Present (2009)

Israel vs. Palestinian NSTOs	Isolation: External Support	Denial	Isolation: Popular Support	Overall Success at Completion of Episode
Episode 1: 1967-1977	Limited	Limited	Limited	Limited Success
Episode 2: 1977-1987	Limited	Significant	Backfire	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Episode 3: 1987-1991	Limited	Limited	Backfire	Limited Success
Episode 4: 1991-2001	Significant	Limited	Backfire	Backfire
Episode 5: 2001-2004	Significant	Significant	Backfire	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Episode 6: 2004-2009	Significant	Significant	Backfire	Moderate Success (Stalemate)

Assessing the Balance Theory

Having compiled the results of the case-study analysis conducted, it is now possible to assess the validity of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, beginning with an evaluation of its hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The presence of overall significant to high levels¹ of the key elements of isolation of external/international support, denial and isolation of popular support will be associated with higher² levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

This hypothesis was confirmed in two regards. To begin, of the only two within-case episodes to achieve a level of success of “significant” or “high”, an overall significant to high level of the key elements was present. In the first case—the UK versus Republican NSTOs,

¹ “Overall” significant to high levels is assessed as the presence of at least two significant and one high level in the key elements of strategic coercion.

² “Higher” levels of success are considered those of “significant success” or above in the measurement scales employed.

Episode 5 (1989-1997)—a significant level of isolation of external support, a high level of denial, and a significant level of isolation of popular support were present. The outcome, in turn, was one of significant success—that is violence levels were kept “acceptably” low, some important political resolution was achieved, and the ground was set for a future political settlement.

In the second case—being the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 6 (1997-2007)—high levels were present in all three elements of isolation of external support, denial, and isolation of popular support. Correspondingly, the outcome achieved was a high success, marked by an enduring ceasefire by the Provisional IRA implemented in July 1997, the establishment and implementation of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement in May 1998, the decommissioning (or disarming) of IRA weapon stockpiles in October 2001, the announcement of a formal and permanent end to the Provisional IRA’s armed campaign in July 2005, and the erection of the new devolved power-sharing government of Northern Ireland in March 2007. Further, while splinter groups such as the Real and Continuity IRA continue to exist, they lack popular and external support, and their capacity to successfully carryout terrorist attacks has been kept at considerably low levels through effective denial efforts.

Moreover—and in the second regard of confirmation—in *all* of the examined within-case episodes where overall significant to high levels of the three key elements were *not* present, a higher level of overall success was not achieved at the conclusion of the episode of strategic coercion. Thus, after examining approximately 80 years of strategic coercion efforts in two different historic instances by democratic states against NSTOs, Hypothesis 1 is confirmed. In both cases where higher levels of success were achieved, overall significant to high levels of isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support were also

present. In all cases where overall significant to high levels of the key coercive elements were not present, higher levels of success in the outcome of strategic coercion were not achieved.

Hypothesis 2: The presence of overall levels of failure or worse in the key elements will be associated with similar levels of failure in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

Evidence from the results of case-study analysis provided limited support for this hypothesis. This assertion was confirmed in one of the two cases where a coercive backfire took place. This case was that of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 2 (1969-1972). In that episode, overall levels of backfire in isolation of external support, denial, and isolation of popular support also corresponded with an outcome of backfire in strategic coercion. In the other case of failure/backfire, however, similar overall levels in the three key coercive elements were not present. In this case of Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000), the level of isolation of external support was ranked as significant, the level of denial was limited, and only the level of isolation of popular support was assessed as backfire. Yet a backfire in the overall outcome of strategic coercion transpired nonetheless.

Having conducted the case-study analysis of this episode, a qualitative assessment would explain the second backfire in the outcome of strategic coercion as follows. Isolation of popular support against Palestinian NSTOs and their campaign of terrorist violence was initially won through the Oslo Accords and promise of peace. By the end of the episode, however, not only had many of the major political issues remained, many of them had been exacerbated, with the number of settlers doubling, land continuing to be seized to protect, expand and link settlements, and stiff Israeli enforced security regulations remaining in place. To Palestinians, what was initially seen as a peace process leading to an acceptable resolution of the political status quo became perceived as an underhanded means of consolidating Israeli control of Palestinian land,

while Palestinian lives did not improve and the realization of a Palestinian state appeared an increasingly distant dream. Accordingly, by the end of the episode, isolation of popular support had completely backfired, moving rapidly towards the embrace of violence—especially following Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount/Harem al-Sharif and the ensuing riots.

While a backfire in terms of isolation of popular support was also present in many other episodes of Israeli strategic coercion (Episodes 2 through 6), this was accompanied in Episode 4 by an altered situation in terms of Israeli denial. In accordance with the peace process, security responsibilities and policing duties had been transferred over to the Palestinian Authority (PA) in many Palestinian urban centers within the Occupied Territories—referred to as “A” areas. Overall, as long as the PA and the Palestinian Security Services (PSS) embraced the peace process, they generally co-operated with Israel in maintaining counter-terrorism efforts within the Territories (despite a number of early challenges). When their cooperation disappeared, following public outrage over lack of progress and unmet expectations with the peace process, these areas effectively became sanctuaries for Palestinian NSTOs in terms of stockpiling weapons and explosives, planning and launching attacks, and evading Israeli security forces. The combination of this striking room provided for by these new security arrangements and the outrage at the ineffectiveness of the peace process—not to mention a general failure in Israel’s popular isolation strategy—allowed for an explosion in violence and a rapidly deteriorating situation embodied in the Al Aqsa Intifada.

Thus, in the second case, even though levels of isolation of external support and denial remained significant and limited, respectively, a backfire still transpired in strategic coercion. The conclusion that can perhaps thus be reached is that while failure or worse in all three key elements will result in a similar outcome for strategic coercion, such a failure (or worse) may be accounted for in other coercive circumstances that are not as deficient overall. Alternatively,

limited to significant degrees of success in two of the key coercive elements may still result in the failure/backfire of strategic coercion overall against the NSTO.

To provide a clearer understanding of what might produce an outcome of failure, and better test this hypothesis, further research could prove most helpful. Such research would provide needed insights through identifying a wider number of cases of failure/backfire in strategic coercion against NSTOs, and investigate the possible causes associated with this failure.

Hypothesis 3: Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial will correspond with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

Hypothesis 3 was confirmed in the results of case study analysis. In no instance was an outcome greater than “limited success” achieved while the overall levels of both isolation of external support and denial were limited or below. This situation was illustrated in four of the within-case episodes, as depicted in figure 6.3:

Figure 6.3: Assessment of Cases with a Limited (or Less) Implementation of External Isolation and Denial

Within-Case Episodes	Isolation: External Support	Denial	Overall Success at Completion of Episode
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 1: 1969-1972	Backfire	Backfire	Backfire
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 2: 1972-1975	Failure	Limited	Limited Success
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 1: 1967-1977	Limited	Limited	Limited Success
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 3: 1987-1991	Limited	Limited	Limited Success

Still, it is also important to note that an overall level rising above limited implementation of isolation of external support and denial does not guarantee that the outcome of strategic coercion will rise above “limited success”. This was demonstrated in Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000). In that case, a significant level of external isolation was achieved, and denial was implemented to a limited extent. Nonetheless—and as discussed above—a backfire in overall strategic coercion still resulted. Thus, while overall levels of limited implementation or below of isolation of external support and denial may correlate with no more than limited levels of success, the presence of levels of implementation beyond this do not necessarily guarantee greater gains in the outcome of strategic coercion.

Hypothesis 4: Significant to high levels of denial will correspond with no less than moderate levels of success (stalemate) in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

The results of case study analysis supported this hypothesis. In all cases where significant to high levels of denial had been implemented, the outcome of strategic coercion bore no less than moderate success. This is illustrated in figure 6.4:

Figure 6.4: Assessment of Cases with a Significant to High Implementation of Denial

Within-Case Episodes	Denial	Overall Success at Completion of Episode
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 3: 1975-1982	Significant	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 4: 1982-1989	Significant	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 5: 1989-1997	High	Significant Success
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 6: 1997-2007	High	High Success
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 2: 1977-1987	Significant	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 5: 2001-2004	Significant	Moderate Success (Stalemate)
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 6: 2004-2009	Significant	Moderate Success (Stalemate)

It is important to note, however, that while the presence of significant to high levels of strategic coercion correlated with no less than moderate levels of success, in only two of the seven cases demonstrating such levels of denial was an outcome greater than moderate success achieved. In the majority of circumstances (five out of seven cases), a stalemate ensued, whereby despite the constraint of violence to levels considered “acceptably” low, the NSTO remained committed to continuing its campaign of terrorist violence, with little hope of a resolution to the conflict in sight. Thus, while significant to high levels of denial may be a necessary component in achieving at least moderate success, high levels of implementation of this coercive element alone do not guarantee higher levels of success in strategic coercion.

Hypothesis 5: Significant to high levels of isolation of popular support will correspond with higher levels of success in strategic coercion against an NSTO(s).

Evidence from case-study analysis supports Hypothesis 5: in the only two cases where significant to high levels of isolation of popular support were implemented, higher levels of success in the outcome of strategic coercion were also achieved. Figure 6.5 illustrates this:

Figure 6.5: Assessment of Cases with a Significant to High Implementation of Popular Isolation

Within-Case Episodes	Isolation: Popular Support	Overall Success at Completion of Episode
UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5: 1989-1997	Significant	Significant Success
UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 6: 1997-2007	High	High Success

Interestingly, in *all* cases where significant to high levels of isolation of popular support were not present, higher levels of success in the outcome of strategic coercion were also not present. However, it is important to note that despite the apparent correlation between significant to high levels of isolation of popular support and success, higher levels of isolation of popular support were only manifest in cases whereby an overall significant to high level of denial and isolation of external support were also present. Indeed, even the achievement of *limited* implementation of popular isolation was not recorded to have transpired where the level of denial itself was not at least limited or greater. This is illustrated in figure 6.6:

Figure 6.6: Assessment of Limited and Greater Levels of Popular Isolation

Within-Case Episodes	Isolation: External Support	Denial	Isolation: Popular Support
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 2: 1972-1975	Failure	Limited	Limited
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 3: 1975-1982	Limited	Significant	Limited
UK vs Republican NSTOs, Episode 4: 1982-1989	Limited	Significant	Limited
UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5: 1989-1997	Significant	High	Significant
UK versus Republican NSTOS, Episode 6: 1997-2007	High	High	High
Israel vs Palestinian NSTOS, Episode 1: 1967-1977	Limited	Limited	Limited

This is not to say that significant to high levels of either isolation of external support or denial (or both) promote higher levels of isolation of popular support. Indeed, in a number of cases the reverse was true, particularly when security-centric external isolation and denial strategies were conducted at the expense of isolation of popular support, resulting in high collateral damage, civilian casualties, and the emergence of new grievances. However, what can be inferred from this discussion of the evidence is that despite the correlation between higher levels of popular isolation and higher levels of success in outcomes of strategic coercion against NSTOs, attaining such higher levels of isolation of popular support is not possible without first implementing significant to high levels of external isolation and denial.

Assessing the Possible Influence of Additional Factors

Having monitored for alternative influences over the course of case-study analysis, it is possible that both the levels of the key elements of strategic coercion and the outcome observed may have been skewed by additional factors. These factors can be broken down into: 1) alternative coercive elements that were employed; 2) salient occurrences/circumstances recorded in the histories; and 3) influential international events.

Alternative Coercive Elements

Three alternative coercive elements were observed within the case-episodes studied that may have impacted the levels of isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support, as well as the outcome observed, in both positive and negative fashions. These alternative coercive elements include decapitation, punishment targeted against NSTOs, and punishment targeted against the civilian population/collective punishment. In the case of decapitation, this alternative coercive element demonstrated a tendency to both positively and negatively impact the level of denial, as well as the outcome, observed. In the one case of positive influence³, for example, decapitation managed to empower moderate elements leading to a relatively-lengthy ceasefire. The result was lowered levels of violence, which both affected the measurement of the observed outcome, and allowed security forces to regroup and improve denial efforts.

In several other cases, however, the results of decapitation likely had a negative impact on the level of denial and outcome observed. In these instances⁴, decapitation efforts that eliminated prominent figures within the NSTO were often followed by waves of revenge

³ See the case of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 2 (1972-1975), following decapitation carried out through the arrest of younger radical leadership elements within the Provisional IRA, known as the “Young Turks”.

⁴ For particularly salient examples, see Israel’s assassinations of Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders: Fathi Shqaqi (1995), Yahya Ayyash (1996), Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (2004), and Abdel Aziz Rantisi (2004).

violence—confounding denial efforts through heightened and/or renewed levels of motivation to carry-out attacks on the part of the NSTO, as well as skewing the outcome observed through higher levels of violence suffered by the democratic state. Additionally, decapitation efforts also demonstrated a tendency to negatively impact the level of isolation of popular support in instances where assassination strikes were accompanied by high-levels of civilian casualties.

Regarding the punishment strikes targeted against NSTOs, this alternative element of coercion appeared to have a mixed affect in influencing the key coercive elements of denial and isolation of popular support. Punishment targeted against the NSTO and its operatives, for example, demonstrated a positive influence in several instances, deterring further acts of terrorism for fear of lethal response.⁵ This positive effect, however, was limited in instances where the NSTO's membership were (or had become) committed to acts of suicide terrorism and martyrdom. Punishment targeted against NSTOs also demonstrated a capacity to negatively influence the level of isolation of popular support. This was the case when public furor was roused following the perception that the security forces were acting as executioners rather than protectors⁶, as well as following punishment measures that indirectly had a negative effect upon the populace themselves—including the demolition of homes and property, and high-civilian casualties resulting from collateral damage.⁷

Finally, punishment targeted against the civilian population—also referred to as “collective punishment”—also appeared to play a role in impacting the levels of external and popular isolation observed. While it is controversial to allege that either state employed measures amounting to collective punishment, from the perspective of Catholic Nationalist and Palestinian communities the British and Israelis did employ such measures through the

⁵ For examples, see the British shoot-to-kill policy in the 1970s and 1980s, and Israel's no-negotiations stance accompanied by lethal response to hostage-takers in the 1970s.

⁶ For a prominent example, reference the SAS killing of three suspected IRA terrorist in Gibraltar in 1988.

⁷ See fallout within the Palestinian communities following Israel's policy of “targeted killings” against known operatives of Palestinian NSTOs that often resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties.

imposition of extended curfews, internment, and travel restrictions. Israel also enacted such measures as the demolition of entire apartment structures terrorists may have hidden in, and blockading Gaza following the election and maintenance of support for Hamas. It is unclear whether or not such actions played any significant role in reducing popular support for NSTOs by turning the populace against these terrorist organizations—or in deterring those who were already sympathetic to the NSTOs from continuing to lend their support. What was clear from case-study analysis, however, was that these actions negatively impacted the level of isolation of popular support through rousing the ire of the local populace, and may have even helped increase the levels of external/international support available to the NSTO(s) depending on how grievous the instance of collective punishment was.

Salient Occurrences/Circumstance and Influential International Events

In addition to the presence of alternative coercive elements, other factors such as salient occurrences and circumstances, as well as influential international events, may have impacted the levels of the key elements of strategic coercion and the outcomes observed. Beginning with salient occurrences/circumstances, overkill perpetrated by NSTOs demonstrated a tendency to have a positive impact on the level of popular isolation. In these instances⁸, particularly gruesome acts of violence that claimed the lives of many civilians served to turn off popular support. Meanwhile, the presence of a head of state/government widely resented by the populace/community championed by the NSTO⁹ may have resulted in a negative impact upon attempts to isolate popular support and the outcome of strategic coercion observed. The very

⁸ Reference the following perpetrated by the IRA: “Bloody Friday” in July 1973; the bombing of La Mon House in 1978; the 1987 Enniskillen bombing; the IRA’s use of the “human bomb” in the early 1990s; the Teebane Crossroads Massacre in 1992; and the Omagh bombing in 1998.

⁹ For notable examples, see the presence of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in the UK, who was resented for her role in the death of the 1981 Hunger Strikers, and Ariel Sharon as prime minister in Israel, who was associated with the Sabra and Shatila refugee camp massacres, the designing of Israel’s settlement policy, and the trigger for the Al-Aqsa Intifada.

presence of such figures may have served to arouse consternation within the susceptible population(s), while impeding any efforts towards negotiated political progress.¹⁰

Another salient factor observed included governmental disunity, which may have served to exacerbate the outcome observed. This was potentially the case through disunity: 1) confounding efforts towards political resolution and progress towards a negotiated settlement by depriving the state's leadership of the necessary political flexibility;¹¹ and 2) undermining the credibility of any settlement proposed by the government during negotiations with the NSTO.¹²

Political courage—of both the state's government, as well as the NSTO's leadership—also presented another potential factor that influenced the outcome observed. In particular, a lack of political courage tended to negatively impact the outcome, resulting in stalled negotiations (if negotiations transpired at all) and limited political progress. High levels of political courage, however, helped drive forward political progress and negotiations, without which the highest levels of success observed in this study likely would not have been possible.¹³ Similarly, the loss of a strong leading individual possessing political courage demonstrated a propensity to have a negative impact on the observed outcome through undermining attempts at negotiations, and/or the implementation of any political agreements.¹⁴

¹⁰ Witness the deadlock within the Northern Ireland conflict over political progress and negotiations until the end of the Thatcher government.

¹¹ For prominent examples, see: 1) The case of the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5 (1989-1997) whereby John Major's government was constrained in needing the approval of Unionists to maintain its thin Conservative majority in British Parliament (resulting in decommissioning becoming an insurmountable issue); 2) Israel throughout the peace process under the Oslo (Episode 4, 1991-2001); and 3) Israel under Prime Minister Ehud Olmert during the Annapolis Conference negotiations, with Kadima's minority government in the Knesset held hostage to intransigent positions taken by parties such as Shas (Episode 6, 2004-2009).

¹² For a possible example, see the failure of Ehud Barak's attempts at Camp David II and Taba II, where his proposals were offered whilst he held a very weak position in the Israeli government that made it apparent that any concessions that he promised would be difficult to implement.

¹³ For perhaps the most important example of political courage on all sides, see the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 6, 1997-2007; such courage helped lead to the achievement of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement and its subsequent implementation.

¹⁴ For good examples, see William Whitelaw's departure as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland following the achievement of the Sunningdale Agreement, and the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

A further salient circumstance/occurrence observed involved the unilateral removal of support from state benefactors that had come into conflict with their NSTO client(s). Such occurrences tended to correspond with a positive impact on the level of external/international isolation. This tended to result as a consequence of funds, weapons, and sanctuaries once available to the NSTO drying up, often following either the shifting political interests of the state benefactor, or an event upsetting the state sponsor's government with the NSTO recipient.¹⁵

Finally, significant international events may also have affected the levels of the key elements of strategic coercion and the outcome observed. Such events may include global recessions that can undermine the economic policies of a state aimed at reducing poverty levels to assuage extremism.¹⁶ Others may entail high profile international events that either positively or negatively affect isolation of external support through constraining the availability of international aid to the NSTO,¹⁷ or strengthening the position of the NSTO (morally, politically, and/or tangibly) in its conflict with the democratic state.¹⁸

International events of consequence may also involve major operations or wars carried out by the democratic state that affect the NSTO's co-religionists/ethnic groups/nationalists in other parts of the world. These foreign interventions may adversely affect efforts to isolate popular support through arousing public furor as a consequence of excessive collateral damage on the part of the state.¹⁹ Additionally, a particular international event that demonstrated a capacity to adversely impact overall denial and popular isolation efforts involved the granting of

¹⁵ For notable examples, see: Amman's ouster of the PLO from Jordan following Black September (1970); Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States pulling hundreds of millions of dollars in funding from the PLO following Yasser Arafat's endorsement of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait; and in the case of Northern Ireland, Qaddafi's cessation of support in the 1970s and 1980s following a media scandal and his embarrassment at being caught directly supporting the IRA.

¹⁶ This was clearly an issue during Episodes 2 and 3 (1972-1982) of the UK versus Republican NSTOs.

¹⁷ For events that helped constrain the availability of international aid to the NSTOs, reference the end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union, and the major terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.

¹⁸ See the Arab oil embargo in 1973, following the Yom Kippur War that served to coercively increase international political and diplomatic support for the cause championed by Palestinian NSTOs.

¹⁹ For examples, see major Israeli operations in Lebanon during Episodes 4, 5, and 6 (1991-2009), and the ensuing consequences for its public image in the region.

unilateral concessions by the state to NSTOs faced in *different* conflicts.²⁰ Such events may have served to undermine denial through reinvigorating the motivation of NSTOs to pursue hostilities, and negatively impacted isolation of popular support through demonstrating the effectiveness of violence in changing the political status quo to susceptible populaces.

Limitations of Findings

Prior to elaborating upon the overall assessment of the validity of the Balance Theory, it is important to discuss the limitations of the methodology used to test this theory, as well as the theory itself. Methodologically, it should be noted that while the *comparative* case-study method has been employed in order to provide a greater test for the Balance Theory's generalizability (or external validity), only two different historical cases were examined. Furthermore, while the cases analyzed possessed adequate degrees of control and variation, both cases were of Western-styled democracies. Providing case-analysis of historical instances involving governments that were not Western-styled democracies would further enhance an understanding of the applicability of the Balance Theory.

Moreover, it should also be mentioned that the lack of (within-)cases illustrating higher levels of success in strategic coercion—only two in total—may have hampered validity assessments (though this may be a simple reflection of how inherently difficult it is to pursue strategic coercion against NSTOs). Alternatively, only two cases present exhibited an outcome of failure or worse (backfire). The shortcoming associated with this is that a more robust explanation could not be established accounting for the factors (coercive elements or otherwise) leading to the failure of strategic coercion against an NSTO. Still, given the scope of analysis—

²⁰ Perhaps the most notable example of this to be found in the episodes examined transpired in the case of Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs in Episode 4, following Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 in the face of assaults from Hezbollah—and the corresponding resurgence of support for armed struggle within Palestinian communities and NSTOs that followed.

approximately 40 years of strategic coercion in each context over multiple within-case episodes—it would have been difficult to have provided additional cases and further analysis given the constraints of this dissertation. However, future research, specifically aimed at examining the external validity of either the Balance Theory, or the applications of strategic coercion in general against NSTOs, would benefit from a more expansive range of cases—particularly ones that involved clear instances of success and, conversely, failure.

Further, another methodological challenge hampering empirical observation of the Balance Theory and its hypotheses through case-study analysis included isolating the influence of alternative independent variables. Such additional independent variables included alternative coercive elements, salient occurrences/circumstances, and influential international events that transpired during the within-case episodes. As was evident from the preceding discussion, the presence of such independent variables may have skewed (both positively and negatively) the achievement of the key levels of strategic coercion and the outcome observed. Such an issue is typical of the problems associated with the empirical examination of social phenomena, and in studies such as this—that examine more than one or two cases in a highly complex environment exposed to the influence of a confluence of factors—completely isolating for these influences is very difficult if not impossible. The best that could be achieved throughout the course of this theoretical assessment was controlling for the possible influence of such alternative independent variables through actively monitoring for their influence in each within-case episode.

Regarding the Balance Theory itself, three theoretical limitations should be pointed out. The first is that while the Balance Theory may be correct in contending that failure or worse will occur in efforts at strategic coercion when overall levels of failure/backfire are present in the three key coercive elements, other conditions may also account for failure. As was seen in Israel versus Palestinian NSTOs, Episode 4 (1991-2000), a backfire in strategic coercion occurred

while significant and limited levels of external isolation and denial (respectively) were present. What can be inferred from this is that other conditions may account for failure in strategic coercion against NSTOs. Accordingly, both the Balance Theory and strategic coercion literature in general would benefit from future research geared towards investigating specific conditions leading to failure in coercive endeavors aimed at compelling an end to hostilities from NSTOs.

The second limitation is that the significant to high presence of all three elements of strategic coercion by themselves may not ultimately bring about an end to the conflict in terms of ensuring the successful negotiation of a political settlement and its implementation (should the state deem this necessary). As seen in the UK versus Republican NSTOs, Episode 5 (1989-1997), despite an overall significant to high presence of the three key elements, the attainment of a political settlement—or even negotiations towards it—was constrained by the political exigencies of the Conservative government of John Major regarding the issue of decommissioning. Thus, it should be noted that while these three key elements may serve as an important precondition for success in such negotiations, what will also be required are the skilled efforts of committed and courageous interlocutors whose position in government is well-supported.

Third, simply because the Balance Theory prescribes the levels of certain coercive elements necessary to achieve success against NSTOs, it does not mean that any state (or state government) may simply be able to implement them. High levels of entrenched international/external support will always be difficult to resolve—whether by force or persuasion—as Israel, a strong state, can work to reduce Iranian and Syrian support for Palestinian NSTOs, but cannot eliminate it. Meanwhile hardline elements within a state's own democratic constituency may be reluctant to engage in popular isolation strategies or pursue negotiations with the NSTO. Finally, implementing effective denial strategies is also a difficult

task. This may require resources (material, financial, technological) that the challenged democratic state may not possess or cannot afford without outside support. Alternatively, active denial operations can raise public and international criticism (both in terms of civilian casualties and the state's own body count), and the strategic culture of some democratic states may simply not be up to the challenge of committing itself to such possibly bloody tasks.

Overall Assessment of the Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion

Despite its limitations, the Balance Theory of strategic coercion held widely true through the course of analysis conducted. In two different historical cases, over a total of 80 combined years of strategic coercion against NSTOs and 12 within-case episodes, the Balance Theory and its hypotheses proved largely accurate. Overall significant to high levels of the three key coercive elements—isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support—correlated with higher levels of success in strategic coercion aimed at compelling an end to hostilities against NSTOs. Failure or worse in the outcome of strategic coercion occurred in association with levels of failure or worse in the implementation of the three key coercive elements—even if this was not the only circumstance under which a failure/backfire in strategic coercion might transpire. Overall limited levels and below of isolation of external support and denial corresponded with no greater than limited levels of success in strategic coercion against NSTOs. Significant to high levels of denial corresponded with no less than moderate levels of success, and only in instances where a significant to high level of isolation of popular support was achieved was a significant to high level of success also the result of strategic coercion against the NSTO(s) in question.

Accordingly, as contended in Chapter III, each element played its own part in contributing to the success (or failure) of strategic coercion against the NSTO(s). Isolation of

external support and denial were necessary to rein in violence and the NSTO's capacity to operate and strike. Moreover, the implementation of significant to high levels of denial—made possible through at least the limited implementation of isolation of external support—served to ensure a great reduction in violence-levels, while demonstrating to the NSTO that its campaign of terror would not produce an unconditional surrender on the part of the democratic state (often resulting in the moderation of the NSTO's end-objectives). Isolation of popular support, meanwhile, was specifically required in order to attain levels of success beyond that of a stalemate through weakening, exposing and pressuring the NSTO, as well as bringing about the requisite progress towards political resolution necessary for ending the conflict and/or compelling the NSTO (or NSTOs) to end its campaign of terror and renounce violence against the democratic state and its interests.

Regardless of the additional factors also accounted for throughout the extensive analysis conducted, these principles of the Balance Theory held true in each of the 12 case-episodes examined. Without the three key elements present in significant to high levels, successful strategic coercion against NSTOs was not to be found. And in the only instances where higher levels of success were achieved, the three key elements were present at significant levels or above. Though additional factors may have aided (or confounded) the achievement of these significant to high levels of the key elements, the Balance Theory held correct in that these three coercive elements—isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support—were ultimately the most important strategic factors in achieving success against NSTOs. And in line with the evidence that supported the Balance Theory's hypotheses, these elements mutually assisted one another in the overall campaign of strategic coercion.

In conclusion, the Balance Theory of strategic coercion is assessed as demonstrating high validity in determining both the coercive elements necessary for achieving success against NSTOs, as well as how these elements work together to accomplish this end-result.

Implications

As a result of the study conducted, a theory of strategic coercion specifically applied to the formulation of strategy for countering the terrorist threat of NSTOs has been established for the first time. Consequently, a number of important implications derived from the findings of this study need to be considered in terms of: 1) *theory*; and 2) *policy*.

Implications for Theory

The Balance Theory holds a number of relevant points for consideration amongst students of strategic coercion theory. The first is that typical coercive instruments such as *punishment* and *denial* are not enough to achieve success against formidable nationalistic substate terrorist organizations. Punishment is likely to backfire in instances where it is used excessively, and will likely enjoy only limited utility outside of coercing state sponsors of the NSTO. Denial is a very important feature, but pursued alone it will likely achieve at best a stalemate, which will only last until the NSTO finds a way around such denial-based measures.

Two additional strategic conditions are thus also necessary, being isolation of external/international support and isolation of popular support. Isolation of these two elements is needed in order to create a sense of despair and vulnerability on the part of the NSTO in its decision-making calculus. Isolation of external/international support is also needed, in particular, to enable denial efforts, so as to create a sense of hopelessness and demonstrate to the NSTO and its members that they cannot achieve a successful alteration of the status quo through

terrorist means, nor avoid the repercussions of pursuing such a violent strategy. Isolation of popular support, meanwhile, provides additional stimulus through: 1) depriving the NSTO of the political motivation required to compel its violent action onwards; and 2) creating popular resistance to the NSTO's terrorist campaign that may force it to moderate its methods, and at the very least will constrain the support available to it.

Furthermore, unlike in cases against conventional state actors where the primary target of coercion is an opposing state government, strategic coercion against substate terrorist organizations claiming to champion the political cause of a people or peoples must be directed against the decision-making calculus of *multiple* groups, including:

- The NSTO's leadership cadre
- Members of the NSTO, as well as those providing support to it (active and passive)
- The population(s) the NSTO claims to champion and draw support from
- States/external sources providing material aid and sanctuary to the NSTO(s)
- Possibly other groups/communities that have a stake in the outcome of the conflict

Addressing so many different groups through the application of strategic coercion is a much more complicated task than in more conventional episodes of state-to-state coercion, and will require a *balance* of the effective implementation of the three key elements of coercion.

Such a balance is necessary to demonstrate to the NSTO's leadership and members the futility of its methods and, and the costly consequences associated with them. It will be necessary to convince and/or win over elements providing support (passive or active) to refrain from doing so, if not place pressure on the NSTO(s) to pursue a non-violent (potentially negotiated) solution to their grievances. And such balance may also be necessary to compel additional substate groups party to the conflict (particularly those championing other minority or majority groups) to refrain from violence exacerbating the conflict. Achieving such a balance

will require the effective implementation of isolation of external support, denial, and isolation of popular support—and only through doing so will real success be achieved in strategic coercion aimed towards compelling an end to the threat of violence from an NSTO (or NSTOs).

Implications for Policy

Lessons from the Balance Theory and its accompanying examination point to the reality that a balance must be struck between the forceful and accommodating ends of the spectrum when employing strategic coercion against NSTOs. The message this should send regarding policy is that neither a strategy that is mainly centered on denial through implementing security measures and using military coercion against external supporters, nor one that is almost entirely focused on isolation of popular support through addressing root causes and grievances is enough. A balanced mixture between the two approaches is required.

There is a clear necessity to use the instrument of force in denial, and possibly in external isolation measures, in order to secure the situation. If the situation cannot be secured, terrorist violence reined in, and the NSTO convinced that its violent actions will *not* succeed in producing the political change coveted, then efforts at isolation of popular support will likely achieve only limited results at best. At worst, such popular isolation attempts in lieu of a secure situation will encourage the NSTO to carry on, convinced that it is compelling such change through terrorist action, while the situation violently spirals out of control.

However, isolation of popular support will be required in order to achieve higher, more enduring levels of success. Without it, the NSTO(s)—or new rival/splinter groups—will continue to be motivated to pursue terrorist violence to change the status quo, and they will continue to be supported by their communities in pursuing such ends. In providing for popular isolation, what will be needed is a degree of accommodation to political concerns, addressing

perceived grievances while avoiding the creation of new ones, keeping civilian casualties to minimal levels, and—if necessary—negotiating a political settlement to alter the status quo.

In implementing popular isolation, moreover, it is best to avoid moves that either involve, or can be interpreted as, punishment against the population/community that the NSTO(s) draws support from/champions. While such measures *may* have an initial effect of making the population resent the NSTO, the more likely result—especially over the long-term—is that the populace/community will resent the democratic state, and side with the NSTO against it.

Perhaps of greatest importance to remember is that popular isolation involves a large component of *perception*. Besides tangible issues such as avoiding civilian casualties, excessive force, ameliorating dire humanitarian situations, etc., of utmost importance is the necessity to *convince* the opposing community supporting the NSTO that violence is not necessary, and an alternative, non-violent approach is (credibly) available for adequately addressing issues in the current status quo that cause friction. Doing so will be of particular value in situations that involve the legitimate claims of multiple groups regarding control of land or the rights of significant minority (or majority) groups, where a political settlement achieved through negotiations may be necessary to resolve the conflict.

Finally, it should be noted that there are no shortcuts in pursuing strategic coercion against NSTOs. Simply focusing on decapitation efforts is unlikely to produce any lasting results. They certainly did not do so in the case of either the UK or Israel in approximately 40 years of strategic coercion for each. Moreover, the result of pursuing decapitation measures is usually mixed, and can have seriously adverse consequences both in terms of popular isolation and in generating waves of revenge attacks that challenge denial efforts. What is required instead for strategic coercion to be successful against NSTOs is the effective implementation of

the three key coercive elements and, based on the British and Israeli experiences, accomplishing this may ultimately require several decades of effort.

Addressing Instances Where Success Has Been Achieved Through a Primarily Military-Centric Approach

Before proceeding further, it is also important to address instances where success has been achieved against NSTOs without much “balance” through a military or force-centric approach. In these instances—for example an in the case of Algeria versus the Armed Islamic Group (GIA)—the method of strategic coercion employed involves a very heavy focus on denial and, if necessary, isolation of external support (often pursued through force-centric measures). Efforts towards isolation of popular support are generally relegated to an ancillary concern, and where pursued tend to essentially confront the population with a choice: stop supporting terrorists or you will be violently punished (similar to the “cost/benefits ratio” approach of Wolf and Leites discussed in Chapter II). Hearts and minds operations tend to be a distant concern.

History reveals that such strategies can produce success. This is especially the case where the substate terrorist organization possesses a large traditional guerrilla element—that is, it seeks to gain, hold and control territory of its own. Removing its ability to control such territory may give way to a more conventional-style defeat. Such an approach is also facilitated by cases where the NSTO does the job for the government of isolating popular support against it, as was the case in the aforementioned Algeria where the GIA’s terrorist massacres against fellow Muslim Algerians helped to turn people away from the organization.

Regardless, there are two clear problems with such strategies that make them less suited for countering the hostilities of NSTOs than the approach outlined in the Balance Theory. The first problem applies to democratic (especially Western) countries. In order to pursue such a

strategy, these countries will likely encounter strong resistance from normative, ethical, and possibly legal standpoints in pursuing such strategies, given the heavy (and often indiscriminate) use of force required to achieve such success. The democratic state's constituency may very well be unlikely to support such an approach from the start, and if so, its conviction may not last.

The second problem is that while such an approach may prove effective for a time, it possesses important limitations that constrain the sustainability of any end-result achieved solely through force. The NSTO(s) may be eliminated, but like-minded groups are likely to spring up from the remains of the organization, and amongst the population which remain aggrieved. Once again in reference to Algeria, this was evidenced by the replacement of the GIA with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), which would later merge with Al Qaeda to form Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). All this stands in contrast to the current situation in Northern Ireland following successful British strategic coercion, where despite the existence of minor splinter groups such as the Real and Continuity IRA, peace has endured and the peoples of Northern Ireland remain committed to supporting it.

Thus even if it is possible to conduct military-centric approaches, the end results of such a strategy are unlikely to be sustainable over the long-term. As stated by the Balance Theory, military-based denial measures can play a very important role in providing for a secure environment and manipulating the decision-making calculus of the players involved in the conflict. However, only through winning over the population, if not achieving and implementing a negotiated settlement, is the achievement of enduring positive results likely to be possible.

The Balance Theory of Strategic Coercion and Al Qaeda

In concluding this dissertation, it is important to investigate the Balance Theory of strategic coercion vis-à-vis the most dangerous terrorist organization of the modern day: Al

Qaeda. Namely, can the Balance Theory be used to provide insights about how the United States, its allies and the international community can counter Al Qaeda? And if so, how?

Al Qaeda as an NSTO

It can be argued that Al Qaeda fits the mold of an NSTO, as defined in this dissertation:

Nationalistic substate terrorist organizations are organizations, which do not constitute a state government or recognized state apparatus (i.e. ministry of defense, army, intelligence service, etc.), that are dedicated in whole or in part to achieving the primary objective of self-determination/nation (re)formation and/or freedom from occupation through employing terrorism aimed at (repeatedly) harming and/or threatening to harm noncombatants and symbolic targets with the intent of creating and exploiting fear within a targeted audience, generating propaganda, or destabilizing critical political, constitutional, economic, social or electronic structures.

Al Qaeda is certainly substate in that it does not constitute a state government or recognized state apparatus, and there is little debate that it constitutes a terrorist organization. Importantly, Al Qaeda can also be interpreted as “nationalistic” in that its primary objective is a combination of: 1) ending the occupation of Western forces and influence in Muslim lands; and 2) nation reformation in the form of the re-establishment of the Caliphate, or pan-Islamic state, meant to encapsulate and represent the world’s Islamic community or Ummah.

From Al Qaeda’s perspective, the Muslim world has been vulnerable to exploitation and abuses from the West since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and as a consequence, the reformation of a strong Islamic super-state is needed to properly represent and defend the Ummah. Al Qaeda thus seeks to re-establish the empire that, within a century of Muhammad’s death, had spanned from the West African coast to northern India.²¹ In order to re-establish this Caliphate, Al Qaeda seeks to work with like-minded regional and local groups to conduct terrorism and guerrilla warfare. In doing so, Al Qaeda aspires to remove Western influence from

²¹ Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, 2001, 106.

the Muslim world and overthrow corrupt, apostate Muslim governments. From there, the objective is to eventually erase Muslim state boundaries, unifying the Muslim world under the rule of the Caliphs (heads of the various regions under the Caliphate).²² Upon its re-establishment, the Caliphate would then be used as a launch pad for jihad against the West, with the ultimate goal of remaking the world order that would place the Muslim world in a dominant position.²³

Some may argue, however, that due to Al Qaeda's decentralized nature and transnational ideology, the organization constitutes something closer to a jihadist franchise, rather than a nationalistic group. As Rohan Gunaratna explains the constitution of the terrorist organization:

Al Qaeda's organizational and operational infrastructure differ markedly from other guerrilla or terrorist groups. ...It is neither a single group nor a coalition of groups: it [is] comprised [of] a core base or bases... satellite terrorist cells worldwide, a conglomerate of Islamist political parties, and other largely independent terrorist groups that it draws on for offensive actions and other responsibilities.²⁴

Ideologically, though, Al Qaeda remains focused on a nationalistic goal—even if the nation it seeks to re-establish is not currently in existence, but is currently constituted by a variety of (what it considers to be) apostate nation-states that it does not recognize. Further—as noted by the US State Department—despite its decentralized nature, Al Qaeda does possess a number of qualities resembling that of a more traditional terrorist insurgent organization, that being “propaganda campaigns, grass roots support, and political and territorial ambitions.”²⁵ Moreover, the strategies it employs in carrying out acts of terrorism and guerrilla warfare share many similarities with more traditional groups such as Palestinian NSTOs. Like elements of Al Qaeda, for instance, Palestinian NSTOs employed a combination of operating abroad and

²² US Department of State, *Fact Sheet: The Charges Against International Terrorist Usama bin Laden*, 2001.

²³ David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol 28, No. 4, August 2005, 601.

²⁴ Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, London: Hurst & Company, 2002, 54.

²⁵ US Department of State – Office for the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, *Countries Report on Terrorism 2007*, Chapter 1 – Strategic Assessment, Available Online at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/> [Last Viewed 9 August 09].

planning international attacks from safe havens, and supporting terrorism and asymmetric warfare efforts in local areas such as Jordan, Lebanon, and currently the Occupied Territories. Furthermore, Al Qaeda affiliates—such as AQI (Al Qaeda in Iraq)—tend to employ more traditional NSTO strategies themselves.

Finally, Al Qaeda's existence as a franchise group does not necessarily disqualify it as either an NSTO, or an organization to which the Balance Theory of strategic coercion can be applied. Through deconstructing—or in David Kilcullen's terms, "disaggregating"²⁶—the Al Qaeda universe, the terrorist movement/franchise can be broken down into the central Al Qaeda network run by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the variety of local affiliated groups such as AQI or AQIM. In regards to the former, AQ central, this organization is nationalistic in its desire to re-establish the Caliphate, and the Balance Theory can be applied directly to the organization itself and to the main regions where it seeks sanctuary (i.e. the Afghan-Pakistan border area). Concerning the latter, such groups constitute nationalistic organizations based upon their primary desire to realize freedom from occupation and/or a change in the ruling regime within their own countries, aided through an alliance to AQ central. Due to the more traditional nationalistic constitution of these local entities, the Balance Theory can be applied without issue to such terrorist organizations.

How would a broad strategy against the Al Qaeda movement be constituted, however?

Forming a Strategy to Counter Al Qaeda

Applying the concepts of the Balance Theory of strategic coercion, the aim of any strategy employed against Al Qaeda should be to contain the spread of the central organization's influence and ideology, as well as to weaken it and constrain its ability to operate and attack.

²⁶ See: David Kilcullen, *Countering Global Insurgency*, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 28 No. 4, pp. 597-617, August 2005.

The ultimate objective of such a strategy will be to: 1) convey to Al Qaeda—its leaders, members, and supporters—the futility of pursuing terrorism and violence in order to bring about the political change it desires; 2) instill a sense of vulnerability and despair that weakens the organization's resolve and dries up a willingness to support Al Qaeda, both in terms of individual recruits and regional/local organizations willing to work as franchise groups under the AQ banner; and 3) eliminate the popular drive motivating the organization onwards. In line with the Balance Theory, achieving these objectives will require the effective implementation of isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support.

Denial and Isolation of External/International Support:

Measures geared towards effectively implementing denial and isolation of external support need to be planned together in countering Al Qaeda, given its transnational nature and the fact that it is not based in any one state. In countering Al Qaeda, the primary objectives of combined denial and external isolation efforts are to: 1) prevent the emergence and maintenance of area(s) that can be used as safe havens providing sanctuaries, a base of operations, and launch pad for attacks; 2) harden targets to make successful terrorist attacks more difficult to carry-out; and 3) eliminate access to the vital resources necessary to conducting a campaign of terrorism.

In moving to eliminate areas that can be used as safe havens for Al Qaeda, the US and its coalition allies have made some progress through their intervention in Afghanistan, leading to the ouster of the Taliban. However, a number of problems remain in this regard concerning areas within failed states, weak states and poorly-governed territories. According to the US State Department, significant examples of safe havens providing varying degrees of sanctuary to Al

Qaeda include²⁷: the Afghan-Pakistan border area; Somalia; Trans-Sahara²⁸; Libya²⁹; Sudan³⁰; Yemen; Iraq³¹; and virtual safe havens³².

In order for effective denial and external isolation measures to be implemented it is imperative that these safe havens be eliminated. To achieve this, a number of challenging tasks must be pursued. The first such task involves the successful stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan. In the case of the former, there has been an increasing drive to rapidly withdraw from Iraq. While doing so is necessary in popular isolation terms, in freeing up assets for denial operations elsewhere, and to abide by the democratic will of the Iraqi people, this withdrawal should not be pursued too hastily. Moreover, the US government must continue to work with the new Iraqi government to ensure the appropriate representation of minority—particularly Sunni Arab—communities, and see that cooperation is maintained with local Sunni communities and former nationalist militants against Al Qaeda. Should this fail, the stabilization of Iraq may also rapidly go south—especially following the withdrawal of US troops. The prevention of this from happening must be a top priority, as an Iraqi failed-state would provide not only sanctuary to Al Qaeda members in the ensuing chaos, but a launch pad for its violent jihad in the heart of the Arab world.

²⁷ US State Department – Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Countries Report on Terrorism 2008*, 30 April 2009, Available Online at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2008/> [Last Viewed 10 August 09].

²⁸ Here AQIM operates, focused on targeting the Algerian government, as well as targets in France, Italy, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain. AQIM maintains training camps and support network in isolated areas in Algeria and Northern Mali.

²⁹ While the Libyan government does not support Al Qaeda-related terrorist organizations, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)—which merged with Al Qaeda in November 2007—has aided AQIM in using the Sahel to train Islamic militants in small arms, use of explosives, and guerrilla tactics.

³⁰ Though Sudan remains cooperative in attempting to employ counterterrorism measures, Al Qaeda inspired terrorist elements remain operational in the country.

³¹ Strides have been made against AQI following the initiative of Coalition and Iraqi security forces to cooperate with tribal and local leaders that have successfully encouraged Sunni tribes and local citizens—including former nationalist militants—to reject AQI and its extremist ideology. However, AQI remains strong with an estimated membership of 2,000-4,000.

³² Al Qaeda uses the internet to provide a “virtual safe haven” from which to promulgate propaganda, fundraise, recruit, and provide electronic training.

In the case of Afghanistan, successful stabilization and reconstruction will require ensuring the necessary force levels, material assets, and financial aid. If the requisite forces are not present in Afghanistan, then the Taliban will continue to be able to evade coalition forces and large “no-go areas”, especially in Southern and Eastern Afghanistan will remain, allowing the Taliban to eventually wear down the will of coalition forces, possibly forcing their departure and leading to the overthrow of the current government. This too cannot be allowed to happen, lest Afghanistan be restored as the major safe haven it once was for Al Qaeda.

Regarding the ongoing safe haven in the Afghan-Pakistan border area, this will require firm engagement and cooperation with Pakistan. While Pakistan has recently reinvigorated efforts towards committing operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the area, it cannot be forgotten that the Pakistani government has been lax in fulfilling such responsibilities in the past—often forming counter-productive “peace deals” with the Taliban that have allowed them to operate freely. To ensure this situation does not recur, the US in particular must be sure to leverage its resources in terms of the billions of dollars in financial aid it provides. This aid should readily be tied to Pakistan’s willingness to crackdown on this threat.

In areas such as Mali, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, etc., the United States and the international community ought to continue work towards strengthening counter-terrorism capabilities. Where reluctance is present, the US and its allies should be ready to impose adequate amounts of diplomatic pressure—or inducements—in order to coax the enactment of necessary laws and enforcement measures. In cases—such as in southern Somalia—where Al Qaeda’s sanctuary is guaranteed by a militant substate entity (al-Shabaab), the US and its allies should be prepared to work together with the country’s government and provide logistical support, training, and arms if necessary.

Finally, in countering virtual safe havens, research should be undertaken into the most effective ways to counter this new threat as it emerges on the internet. In addition, the US, its allies, and the international community should move to train agents capable of infiltrating such sites, create counter-information sites to appear under related internet searches, and actively attempt to shut down and block access to extremist sites where possible.

Hardening Targets

In hardening targets, the US and many countries around the world have made progress, especially in airline, shipping and cargo security, and in reducing the vulnerability of countries themselves to penetration from clandestine terrorist operatives through tightening visas and border-control schemes. A number of problems remain, however. The presence of air marshals is minute, and only a small percentage of cargo is actually inspected. Meanwhile domestic vulnerabilities remain readily available to be exploited by extremists. In the US, for instance, much of the expanse of its borders are still essentially open; its nuclear reactors and chemical plants remain vulnerable targets; US railroad security remains porous; US ports are open to devastating attack; and the US remains vulnerable to instances of bioterror.³³

Addressing these deficiencies remains critical to preventing further attacks, as well as demonstrating the futility of attempting to do so to Al Qaeda and its affiliated terrorist organizations. Otherwise, as long as these gaps remain open it is only a matter of time before another major attack transpires.

³³ Stephen van Evera, "Assessing U.S. Strategy in the War on Terror," ANNALS, AAPSS, 607, September 2006, 14.

Eliminating Terrorist Access to Vital Resources

It is imperative to deny Al Qaeda and its affiliates access to vital resources, necessary to operate and carry-out destructive attacks. In doing so, two resources are of particular importance: 1) finances; and 2) the materials necessary to construct weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Denying access to finances is a considerably important undertaking. While the cost of mounting individual terrorist attacks is relatively inexpensive, the cost of maintaining the infrastructure to support terrorist activities is high. Terrorist networks require cash to train, equip, and pay operatives, secure materials and promote their cause.³⁴ According to Rohan Gunaratna in 2002, for instance, the cost of maintaining several thousand members in Afghanistan and clandestine agents overseas costs Al Qaeda at least \$36 million a year, on top of which the group's set-up costs—including weapons, technology, infrastructure, camps, vehicles, etc.—were thought to have been approximately \$50 million.³⁵ Al Qaeda's affiliates, moreover, are just as dependant on finances. For example, as was discovered following seized AQI records, it was made apparent that facilitation of the terrorist network operating in western Iraq incurred significant costs related to salaries and family support, not to mention training, traveling, planning operations, bribing corrupt officials, and other activities.³⁶

To eliminate access to financial resources, what is most important is to focus on cutting off chokepoints critical to laundering and transferring funds.³⁷ In doing so, it is important to encourage compliance from susceptible countries that have been frequently used by Al Qaeda and its affiliates to transfer funds—particularly the Gulf Countries. Here, stern diplomatic efforts must be pursued to see countries such as Kuwait categorize terrorist financing as a crime and require currency reporting upon exit from the country, Saudi Arabia develop an effective

³⁴ Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson, *The Money Trail: Finding, Following, and Freezing Terrorist Finances*, Policy Focus #89, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Studies, November 2008, 3.

³⁵ Gunaratna, 61.

³⁶ Levitt and Jacobson, 3.

³⁷ Levitt and Jacobson.

mechanism to oversee its charitable sector, and the UAE start convicting individuals for terrorist financing and money-laundering.³⁸

It is also important to reinvigorate international efforts to counter terrorist financing, such as strengthening the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to ensure that not only do countries have adequate counter-terrorist financing regimes, but that they are enforcing them.³⁹ Additionally, the US, its allies, and the international community ought to actively continue to improve its methods for cracking down on existing remittance systems such as *Hawala*, and address new trends in terrorists' attempts to gain access to funds through the internet, mobile phone banking, and cash smuggling through international couriers.⁴⁰ The private sector can and should also become more involved, through information-sharing and training to make them increasingly aware of the threat and how to take steps to counter it.

Regarding resources for creating WMD, it is of utmost importance to deny the ability of Al Qaeda and its affiliates to carry-out and/or threaten catastrophic acts of terror. In doing so, it is fundamentally important to deny terrorists access to materials, expertise, and other enabling capabilities for WMD development, including weapons-usable fissile materials, dangerous pathogens and poisonous chemicals. These denial efforts may also involve developing effective punishment methods to be employed against potential supporters or providers of such materials. And in preventing these resources from falling into the wrong hands, it is also imperative to expand the global capacity for detecting illicit materials and weapons in transit abroad.⁴¹

³⁸ Michael Jacobson, "Grading U.S. Performance Against Terrorist Financing," Policy Watch #1280, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 September 2007, Available Online at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2656> [Last Viewed 10 August 09].

³⁹ Levitt and Jacobson, 43.

⁴⁰ Jacobson.

⁴¹ US State Department – Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Countries Report on Terrorism 2008*.

Isolation of Popular Support

Measures directed towards isolation of external support and denial must also be accompanied by efforts to isolate popular support for Al Qaeda and its affiliates. Al Qaeda itself attempts to sustain popular support for its cause through manipulating perceived grievances. In particular, it demonizes the West for propping up cruel, apostate regimes, for supporting Israel; for maintaining forces on Muslim territory; and for Muslim lives lost as a result of military operations. Indeed, the narrative told from the standpoint of Al Qaeda is that the West, the US in particular, seeks to destroy any effective Arab or Muslim military force close to Israel, while guaranteeing the submission of Arab and Islamic states to a Zionist-Crusader alliance.⁴²

In attempting to isolate popular support for Al Qaeda, it is vital to counter this narrative. To accomplish this, it is imperative to successfully complete operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The US should also be cognizant of the implications of threatening Iran with coercive military measures unless absolutely necessary. Further, the US and its coalition allies must avoid and eliminate grievance triggers such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay. The West must vigorously pursue democracy promotion (different from democracy *imposition*), and it should take a strong stand in pushing for a resumption of progress in negotiations and diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with the goal of achieving an equitable peace for both sides.

Importantly, the West—and the US especially—need to work towards promulgating their own narrative of the conflict while discrediting the one espoused by Al Qaeda. That is that the West is *not* an enemy of, and does not exploit, the Muslim world. That it is working diligently to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than cooperate in Palestinian oppression. And that where dissatisfaction prevails regarding ruling governments, the West is working assiduously to be part of the solution, rather than the problem. Furthermore, while Al Qaeda and its inspired

⁴² *Clouds Institute*, “America Must Leave the Lands of Islam” – An interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri, 8 October 2002.

terrorist organizations may claim to be acting in the best interests of the Muslim world, it is a statistical fact that well over 50% of the victims of terrorism are Muslim, and that more than 65% of those victims are civilians.⁴³ Al Qaeda and its affiliates, therefore, are not champions of justice, but rather a grizzly threat to life, stability and order. To effectively convey this message, bolstered efforts and funds must be placed towards Western, and especially American, public diplomacy. However, what is most important are the actions of the US and its allies, as well as the avoidance of further salient triggers for grievances.

Following Implementation of the Three Key Coercive Elements

Following the implementation of these coercive elements, Al Qaeda—the organization and its ideology—should be greatly weakened. As a consequence of seeing the impotence of the group and its cause, as well as unpopularity accorded to those associated with Al Qaeda, its co-opted regional affiliates will likely suffer in turn and disaggregate themselves from Al Qaeda's utopian cause of re-establishing the Caliphate.⁴⁴ With the organization having been denied any place to enjoy safety, convinced of the futility of their efforts, and introduced to the despair and hopeless of their cause, the organization may simply collapse or fade away over time. The decapitation—be it through arrest or liquidation—of hardcore resistant members may help to facilitate this in the end.

If this is not the outcome, however, and Al Qaeda proves able to endure despite such successes, then indefinite containment of the organization, combined with some limited negotiations, might be necessary. In such a case, what negotiations could involve might be a discussion of Al Qaeda and its members' fate. Should the organization be greatly weakened and its members on the run, for instance, negotiations over amnesty and rehabilitation deals would

⁴³ US State Department – Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *Countries Report on Terrorism 2008*.

⁴⁴ For a good discussion on the importance disaggregation, see David Kilcullen, *Countering Global Insurgency*, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol 28 No. 4, pp. 597-617, August 2005.

likely go a long ways towards the ultimate collapse of the transnational NSTO as an effective entity and the reintegration of its members into society. Meanwhile the remnants of the organization, should they continue to exist, would be contained indefinitely by existing security cooperation and public diplomacy measures, relegating Al Qaeda and its ideology to a minor anachronistic nuisance.

Remembering the Concept of *Balance*:

In concluding the discussion of how to implement a successful strategy against Al Qaeda and its affiliates, it is important to remember to adhere to not only an implementation of the three key coercive elements of strategic coercion, but to maintain *balance* in doing so. Pursuing successful security-based denial measures, and possibly employing military coercion to isolate external support is important, but these actions must not be over-emphasized or taken too far to the detriment of efforts to isolate popular support. In attempting to isolate popular support, moreover, simply taking a hands-off approach to denial measures in order to make diplomatic goodwill gestures and focus on root causes will also come up short in producing an end to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and its dangerous ideology. Failure in denial and external isolation will enable Al Qaeda to successfully conduct acts of terrorism and carry out its strategy, while failure to isolate popular support will swell Al Qaeda's ranks and coffers, and—if new grievances are salient—possibly hamper efforts to isolate external support as well.

Such balance is especially important to bear in mind vis-à-vis the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to eventually be successful in selling our own narrative of the benign-nature of the West and the malevolent one of Al Qaeda, it is important to expeditiously stabilize and withdraw from the two countries. At the same time, however, too hasty of a withdraw prior to ensuring the stability required will likely have very adverse results, particularly in denial and

isolation of external support through the (re)creation of vital safe havens and launching pads for Al Qaeda. It may also result in the perception of a new grievance, with the US and its allies blamed for the collapse/failure of a Muslim state, with only the deaths of tens of thousands of Muslims to show for it. We must therefore commit ourselves to make the best efforts now, with a steady focus on what the end-goal will be and how our exit strategy will be implemented.

Ultimately, a balanced implementation of the key coercive elements of isolation of external/international support, denial, and isolation of popular support against Al Qaeda and its affiliates will likely take time. Any hope that short-term action such as the invasion of one scapegoat country or the decapitation of high ranking leadership will lead to the demise of Al Qaeda and its ideology is misplaced. In order to prevail, a balanced employment of strategic coercion may be required for years, if not decades.

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Chapter VI: Conclusion

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