


**FROM BAD WEAPONS TO BAD STATES:
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. COUNTERPROLIFERATION POLICY**

Michael Kimo Quaintance

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St. Andrews**



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**From Bad Weapons to Bad States:
The Evolution of U.S. Counterproliferation Policy**

Michael Kimo Quaintance

This dissertation is submitted in part requirement for the Degree of PhD at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, and is solely the work of the named candidate.

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Contents

Abstract	vi
Introduction	1
Chapter 1	
Examining Assumptions: Competing Theories of CP Policy Evolution	22
<i>The Rational Actor Model</i>	24
<i>Bureaucratic Politics</i>	32
<i>Cognitive approaches</i>	39
<i>Culture and norms: the social sphere of policy evolution</i>	47
<i>Strategic culture</i>	52
<i>Organization theory</i>	66
<i>Interaction of the military organization and strategic culture</i>	77
Chapter 2	
Organizational Reassessment: 1989-1992	86
<i>The question of a post-Cold War military doctrine</i>	88
<i>Deterrence and preventative war in the post-War era</i>	93
<i>Organizational ‘lessons’ drawn from the Gulf War experience</i>	102
<i>Counterproliferation</i>	112
<i>The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance</i>	114
Chapter 3	
Strategic Culture: 1989-1993	126
<i>Non-proliferation leadership and the challenge of “renegade regimes”</i>	129
<i>The political transformation of WMD</i>	133
<i>Gulf War ‘lessons’: WMD and the legitimacy of the NP Regime</i>	136
<i>The politics of threat response: the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative</i>	147
Chapter 4	
Institutionalizing Counterproliferation: 1994-1998	160
<i>Early resistance to the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative</i>	162
<i>Explaining resistance to the DCI</i>	169
<i>The institutionalization of CP policy</i>	172
<i>Developing CP capabilities</i>	181
<i>Emergence of an offensive CP Policy from the DOD</i>	186

Chapter 5	
Strategic Culture: 1993-99	194
<i>Liberal strategic culture during the Clinton Administration</i>	196
<i>Neoconservatism</i>	203
<i>Liberal and Conservative strategic cultural policy preferences</i>	213
<i>Republicans in power</i>	218
<i>Legislating National Missile Defense: policy strategies and discursive practices</i>	225
 Chapter 6	
The Path to Preemptive Counterproliferation: 1999-2002	238
<i>The state of CP Policy at the end of the 1990's</i>	240
<i>Conservative Strategic Culture in Office</i>	246
<i>Policy Response to 9/11</i>	257
 Conclusion	266
 Bibliography	281

Michael Kimo Quaintance
University of St Andrews
School of International Relations
PhD Candidate

Thesis Abstract

“From Bad Weapons to Bad States: The Evolution of U.S. Counterproliferation Policy”

One of the key features of the 2002 United States National Security Strategy was an abrupt shift from the traditional U.S. approach to proliferation threats that prioritized deterrence and promotion of nondiscriminatory nonproliferation norms, to an approach called counterproliferation that emphasized military preemption and direct challenges to adversarial state identity. This thesis asks the question, what caused counterproliferation to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policies of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? The thesis argues that to understand this policy change requires not merely an appreciation of changes in the post-Cold War international security environment, but also an examination of how culturally shaped threat conceptions among American policymakers interacted with capabilities development and policy institutionalization within the U.S. military. As no current theory adequately addresses those dynamics, complimentary strategic culture and organizational theory models are presented as the framework for analysis. This thesis will contend that policy shift from NP to CP resulted from the merging of strategic cultural efforts aimed at legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with a military organizational drive to avoid uncertainty through the development of counterproliferation capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational responses to shifting proliferation threats altered the menu of choice for policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices. This thesis relies on a detailed case study of the evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1993 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of public discourse, declassified policy planning and Department of Defense documents, and participant interviews.

Introduction

Ideas have consequences.¹ One of the consequences, for better or for worse, is that as ideas become the stories we tell to make sense of the world around us, they also significantly condition our actions and challenge our ability to understand others. Stories are essentially simplifications that take the rich diversity of human experience and shape it into recognizable, transmittable forms, providing the basis for our cultures, our associations, as well as the justifications for our actions. Such stories can obscure just as easily as illuminate, or sow suspicion rather than foster mutual understanding.

In broad terms, this thesis is an examination of how we create and transmit ideas in the political world, as told through the lens of American foreign policy at the end of the Cold War. Specifically, this thesis focuses on the genesis and evolution of policy ideas about the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their associated means of delivery.² Far from being an unambiguous conceptual issue with a single ‘rational’ policy response, responding to unconventional weapons proliferation required U.S. policymakers to first conceptualize the threat, create adequate policy responses to meet identified threats, and then justify both threat conceptions and policy choices to others. Each stage entailed subjective interpretations of reality that significantly affected the ultimate direction of U.S. foreign policy. As no clear consensus on proliferation threats or responses had emerged from the Cold War, competing ideas clashed within the halls of power and on the public stage over many years. The ultimate victors in this process claimed the argumentative ground of ‘common sense’, and their ideas have strongly affected the direction of U.S. foreign policy on proliferation issues ever since.

¹ Though I owe a personal debt to conservative thinker Richard M. Weaver for this phrase, it is hardly an original concept to which authorship can reasonably be attributed. See Richard M. Weaver, Ideas Have Consequences, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984)

² This thesis follows the lead of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by eschewing the use of the term “WMD” in favor of “unconventional weapons” as a blanket term for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their associated delivery systems. As will be argued in this thesis, “WMD” is a term with overt political connotations that will be a focus of analysis, and thus is inappropriate as a general descriptive term for the relevant weapons categories. See Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar (eds.), Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, Second Edition, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005)

However, for social scientists, political claims of ‘common sense’ lead to additional questions, rather than the acceptance of given assumptions. In the case of the proliferation of unconventional weapons, the issues that arise from questioning supposedly common sense threat conceptions reveal many important issues about the creation and evolution of U.S. foreign policy. These issues have important implications concerning the potential for peaceful relations between the United States and various non-democratic regimes and non-state actors, and especially the use of American military force in attempting to prevent the proliferation of unconventional weapons.

At the time of this writing, more than 130,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Iraq as the result of a conflict that has led to the deaths of more than 4,000 U.S. soldiers, an estimated 150,000 Iraqis, and a cost to the United States of more than \$750 billion.³ Though subject to a shifting rationale by the Bush Administration, the conflict was ostensibly triggered by Iraq’s possession of unconventional weapons and its refusal to fully comply with UN Security Council Resolutions calling for its complete disarmament.⁴

Across the Iraqi border to the east, the United States and Israel are engaged in a dangerous game of brinksmanship with Iran over the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program, with both the Israeli and American governments signaling their willingness to use preventative military force if Iran is unresponsive to economic sanctions and political pressure to abandon its weapons program.⁵ Political tensions and the potential for

³ Although reliable figures on Iraqi fatalities as the result of conflict are difficult to determine, the most widely respected recent study by the Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group (in collaboration with the World Health Organization) estimates approximately 151,000 fatalities. See Iraq Family Health Survey Study Group, ‘Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 2002 to 2006’, *The New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 358 (January 31, 2008), pp. 484-493; Estimates of financial costs of the Iraq War are drawn from Amy Belasco, ‘The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11’, Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, September 22, 2006. www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/r133110.pdf (accessed July 6, 2008)

⁴ For a listing of the relevant Security Council Resolutions, see U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, ‘Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq’ <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm> (accessed July 6, 2008)

⁵ Agence France-Presse, ‘Israel trains for possible strike on Iran: reports’, June 20, 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5gG5oYXZ9oJBk4Ls5-nmW_7R7eGZA (accessed July 6, 2008)

devastating military escalation also remain high on the Korean Peninsula, once again focused on the North Korean nuclear weapons program and international efforts to press for its disarmament.

From the late 1960's until relatively recently, the United States addressed the proliferation of unconventional weapons primarily through a combination of deterrence and nonproliferation policy. With potential adversaries who possessed unconventional weapons, the United States fashioned a military doctrine of deterrence that threatened massive military retaliation against those who would use these weapons against the United States, its forces abroad, or its allies. For states that did not yet possess these weapons, the United States helped shape a regime consisting of multilateral, nondiscriminatory diplomatic, legal and economic tools known as **nonproliferation** (NP) policy, intended to dissuade states from acquiring or developing these weapons.⁶ More than simply a set of foreign policy tools, NP policy encompasses a set of normative beliefs that view these weapons as inherently destabilizing and advocates eventual global disarmament. It is only since the end of the Cold War that the United States has developed a controversial alternative policy to address proliferation called **counterproliferation** (CP). CP policy entails the application of military force to defend against or even rollback the spread and use of unconventional weapons, conceptualizing the threat of proliferation as largely stemming from the possession of such weapons by supposedly irrational "rogue regimes" and transnational terrorist organizations assumed to be unresponsive to traditional deterrence strategies.⁷

Considering the centrality of debates over nonproliferation and counterproliferation approaches to many of the vital security issues of the past two decades, there exists a surprising degree of confusion over the history and nature of counterproliferation policy,

⁶ Though most often referring directly to nuclear weapons, NP policy is a blanket term loosely covering U.S. support for similar regimes intended to control chemical and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles.

⁷ See particularly United States Government, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', (September 2002), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (accessed July 6, 2008); and United States Government, 'National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction', (December 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf> (accessed July 6, 2008)

both within academic circles and even the U.S. government itself. A number of academics have shown little concern for the distinction between counterproliferation and nonproliferation, using the term as a general label for all policy responses to proliferation.⁸ Confusion about the difference between the approaches exists on the national level, with the Canadian Navy claiming participation in the U.S.-led counterproliferation activity of militarily interdicting suspected proliferation-related cargo on the high seas as a form of “nonproliferation assistance.”⁹ In another telling example of enduring conceptual confusion, the United States National Defense University recently changed the name of its Counterproliferation Center to the Center for the Study of WMD, claiming that “many people, even in the military, aren’t exactly sure what counterproliferation means.”¹⁰ As a clear understanding of CP policy is critical to understanding the concepts and methods the United States applies in its response to proliferation, it is vital to provide an explanation of what exactly is meant by counterproliferation policy and how it evolved into its current form.

The central question asked by this thesis is: How did counterproliferation come to largely replace deterrence and nonproliferation as the central national security policy of the U.S. concerning unconventional weapons? This challenge was most clearly articulated in the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ of preemptive force as set forth in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States. In the course of answering this question, both the central concepts and significant consequences of counterproliferation policy will be examined.

⁸ Caroline F. Ziemke, ‘The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective’, in Victor A. Utgoff, (ed.) The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 87-122; see also Derek D. Smith, ‘Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, *Security Studies*, (June 2003), pp. 152-197; and Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006)

⁹ This activity is classified under the Proliferation Security Initiative. For Canadian military perspectives on this, see Vice Admiral Drew Robertson, ‘A Conversation with Vice Admiral Drew Robertson’, *Canadian Naval Review*, Vol. 2, No. 4, (Winter, 2007), pp. 4-8

¹⁰ Interview with John P. Caves, Senior Research Professor, National Defense University WMD Center, and former Deputy Director for Counterproliferation Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 21, 2005

Without an authoritative explanation of the evolution of CP, there is little common ground for understanding what precisely CP policy is, much less the ability to adequately discuss the implications of this policy for existing deterrence strategies or nonproliferation norms and practices. How the United States frames the problem of proliferation and appropriate policy responses carries important implications for the international system. The reorientation of American policy responses to proliferation in a more military, coercive direction hold the potential to alter or directly challenge established global approaches to the use of force, the legitimacy of preventative or preemptive use of force, the question of nuclear ordering, the future of deterrence as viable military doctrine, and the future of the multilateral NP regime with its focus on diplomatic and economic tools for influencing state behavior.

Understanding how CP evolved can help reveal the forces behind the transformation of normative beliefs at the national level, shed light on the relationship between civilian policymakers and military organizations in developing policy, and show how important challenges to broadly legitimized and institutionalized practices and conceptions occur at the national level. Additionally, without a clear understanding of the forces behind CP policy evolution, analysts and policymakers risk failing to understand the longevity and scope of the policy. Will the central conceptions and practices of CP persist beyond the current presidential administration? Will the targets of CP action expand or reduce in number? Will CP efforts be focused on reducing the physical threat posed by unconventional weapons proliferation, or will CP methods be applied as part of broader efforts to remove the adversaries themselves? Although a better understanding of the past will not provide unambiguous answers to these questions, such an examination is essential for understanding how current choices have been shaped by past actions and conceptions.

Existing Literature on Counterproliferation

Despite the importance of CP policy to one of the central security issues of the post-Cold War, as well as its challenge to deterrence and nonproliferation, it is surprising there is

relatively little literature that deals directly with CP, with almost nothing of significance written on the evolution of CP policy. Existing literature on CP policy is characterized by a widespread confusion about the nature of the policy itself, and universally thin examination and analysis of its evolution.

This conceptual confusion and lack of analytical depth perhaps stem from the tangled history of counterproliferation, which saw the policy pass through several guiding hands and public pronouncements.

Though having its roots in the immediate post-Cold War years, CP was publicly unveiled with much fanfare by the Clinton Administration in December of 1993. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) was introduced as the first major defense initiative of the Clinton Administration and intended to bolster existing NP policy by giving the Department of Defense a strengthened ability to protect U.S. forces from use of unconventional weapons in future conflicts. It was greeted with strong resistance in three major areas: first was a wave of external criticism that the initiative threatened to undermine multilateral nonproliferation efforts; second was stiff bureaucratic opposition from the State Department worried about its own NP policy turf; and third was internal resistance from senior military members arguing the DCI would present little more than an unnecessary budgetary burden for the DOD. Facing such a range of resistance, counterproliferation disappeared from public prominence as quickly as it had appeared. It was only with the publication of the National Security Strategy in 2002, and its articulation of counterproliferation as central to a new doctrine of preemption, that CP policy returned to public prominence.¹¹

The contentious public path taken by CP over the years has led some analysts to conclude there was never a single CP policy, but in fact several competing policies bearing the

¹¹ 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', preface

name of CP, each coming to prominence when championed by a new Administration or leading defense official, and in turn generating controversy and fading into obscurity.¹²

While acknowledging the competing interpretations of CP, the bulk of existing literature is concerned with supporting or critiquing one of the three following general assumptions about the nature and scope of CP policy.¹³

1) Counterproliferation means merely nonproliferation activities undertaken by the Department of Defense

Interpretations of CP drawing from this assumption often reflect the conceptual confusion resulting from the public “failure” of the policy following the announcement of the DCI in 1993. Though examined in greater detail in following chapters, the strong controversy that met the DCI announcement was resolved by a set of working definitions for NP and CP formulated by the National Security Council (NSC). Under these definitions, CP was supposedly limited to the activities of the DOD such as export control verification and intelligence collection to support larger NP policy led by the State Department. Though serving to mollify critics, this definition was hardly representative of conceptions of CP held by the DOD, and far from an accurate assessment of the much more active policy developed and institutionalized in subsequent years.

The literature that holds to this definition is often either wholly misguided as to the nature and scope of CP policy, or simply mistakes the public resolution of controversy

¹² Important critical analyses that touch on the competing forms of CP policy include, Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, in Brad Roberts (ed.), Weapons Proliferation in the 1990’s, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150; Thomas Mahnken, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, *National Security Studies Quarterly*, (Summer 1999), pp. 91-102; Brad Roberts, ‘From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation’, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Gilles Andréani, ‘The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy’, *Survival*, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61; Leonard S. Spector, ‘Neo-Nonproliferation’, *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85; and Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1998), pp. 21-36

¹³ These three definitions are loosely drawn from a larger list detailed in the most comprehensive early analysis of CP policy by Müller and Reiss, “Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles”

surrounding the announcement of CP for the end of substantive evolution and institutionalization of the policy. The first category includes analyses such as those by Smith and Ziemke conflating NP and CP, and results from taking the NSC definitions at face value.¹⁴ In these accounts, CP is used as a blanket term denoting all foreign policy tools of the United States to address proliferation threats, with no distinction made between the political and economic methods of traditional NP policy and the range of military methods presented at different stages of CP policy evolution. Considering the controversy surrounding CP methods from many quarters at the time of the announcement of the DCI, it is surprising that these authors do not take a more critical stance towards their analysis of both the clear normative and operational distinctions between nonproliferation and counterproliferation.

A particular weakness in Smith's approach to assessing U.S. policies is that in ignoring the contentious history of counterproliferation, he uncritically adopts many of the most politically charged terminology at the heart of the divide between CP and NP. Smith's use of terms such as WMD and "rogue regimes" would not be problematic in itself, were he to display an appreciation of those terms as politically negotiated and representative of one facet of the proliferation policy debate. As it stands, the terms and their embedded concepts are accepted as representative of objective fact removed from the broader process of threat perception and policy response, illustrating the problem of removing issues like CP policy from their historical and political context.

2) Counterproliferation means preparing U.S. military forces to survive and continue to fight in a battlefield featuring unconventional weapons usage

A larger body of literature proceeds from the assumption of CP policy as centrally articulated in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, and as defended by Clinton Administration officials responding to criticism of CP as oriented towards preemptive military strikes. In this conception, the focus of the policy is on CP capabilities such as

¹⁴ Smith, *Detering America*; Smith 'Deterrence and Counterproliferation in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction'; and Ziemke, 'The National Myth and Strategic Personality of Iran: A Counterproliferation Perspective'

battlefield detection of chemical or biological weapons, force protection in the form of protective clothing, vaccinations and mobile decontamination equipment, and active defenses in the form of limited-range forward deployed missile defenses. As such, while presenting new capabilities, CP in this form represents a modest investment in conflict preparedness rather than any comprehensive alternative to existing nonproliferation policy. While potentially exhibiting a lack of confidence in the ability of nonproliferation norms or deterrence postures to prevent the spread and use of unconventional weapons, CP in this form hardly constitutes a significant normative challenge to either NP or deterrence, and instead is merely representative of prudent military preparedness.

While much of the literature in this category acknowledges the history of CP conceptions and practices, this focus of analysis on the evolution of CP policy is secondary to the larger goal of policy advocacy or critique in the literature. Important collections of such policy assessment and prescription literature founded on this assumption are a number of papers from two volumes on CP policy collected as part of government sponsored colloquia in the mid-1990's that drew former defense officials and scholars to answer questions about the status of CP capabilities and the proper direction for CP policy.¹⁵ While this literature contains some important identification of potential forces driving CP policy evolution, most of the writing represents attempts to assess the *performance* of CP to date in addressing proliferation threats, and advocating changes to CP policy where progress in reducing proliferation threats was limited.¹⁶ While relevant to policy makers,

¹⁵ William H. Lewis and Stuart E. Johnson (eds.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995); and Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (eds.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1998)

¹⁶ See particularly, Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 'Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; Robert G. Joseph, 'WMD: A Proliferation Overview', *ibid.*, pp. 3-15; Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 'The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative', in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1998), pp. 21-36; Robert G. Joseph and John F. Reichart, 'NBC Military Planning: Lessons Learned from Analysis and Wargaming', *ibid.*, pp. 171-192; Henry F. Cooper, 'Active Defenses to Help Counter Proliferation', *ibid.*, pp. 193-215; and Robert P. Kadlec and Randall J. Larsen, 'Passive Defense', *ibid.*, pp. 217-237

such literature exhibits little concern for either explanation of the development of CP policy, or assessment of the normative challenges to existing NP policy and deterrence. Instead, these articles often depend loosely on a type of materialist theoretical assumption in explaining the evolution of CP that attributes policy orientation in vague terms to the relative distribution of power in the international system and potential challenges to the status quo presented by proliferation.

One significant account by former defense official Henry Sokolski, which draws a similar conclusion of CP as valuable but limited force protection measures, provides a well-documented account of the complications and roadblocks that faced the adoption and development of the counterproliferation initiative and acknowledges the large conceptual differences that had originally placed CP as an alternative to NP policy.¹⁷ Unfortunately, his conclusions about the evolution of counterproliferation end largely with what he views as the accepted limitations on the scope of CP by the DOD following the controversies of the early 1990's. In doing so, Sokolski fails to fully acknowledge the importance of subsequent re-conceptions of proliferation threats by political leaders, or the transformative institutionalization of CP capabilities within the U.S. military. In Sokolski's account, the political pressures and internal resistance to counterproliferation as a viable DOD mission represent the end of any meaningful challenge CP presents to NP or deterrence, though this conclusion necessitates ignoring much of the later obvious manifestations of CP policy as precisely such a challenge.¹⁸ Without a substantive analysis of policy evolution that extends beyond the early controversies, or one that investigates the continuing ramifications of the important normative challenges embedded in CP concepts, Sokolski presents an analysis that examines only half of CP policy evolution, and not necessarily the most significant half.

3) *Counterproliferation means the offensive military actions to eliminate the unconventional weapons capabilities and production facilities of proliferators*

¹⁷ Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America's campaign against strategic weapons proliferation, (Westport: Praeger, 2001), esp. Ch. 6

¹⁸ Oddly, in interviews and personal conversations, Sokolski first denied that military capabilities and actions targeting unconventional weapons were significant, and later denied such actions and capabilities even constituted counterproliferation.

during conflict, or preceding conflict in the form of preemptive or preventative action.

The most divisive interpretation of CP policy, drawing in the most vocal critics and supporters, is of an offensively oriented policy of preventing the use or development of unconventional weapons by potential adversaries. It is this offensive military conception of CP that involves the potential for preventative or preemptive use of military force prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The instruments of such a policy would be counterforce capabilities of the United States military, particularly deep precision strike capabilities utilizing either standoff weapons or special operations forces. Unsurprisingly, this conception of CP policy has drawn the fiercest critics, who point to the potential for such a policy orientation to undermine both NP and deterrence norms, and perhaps lead to military escalation with devastating results in highly militarized regions with existing tensions such as the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula. It is also an offensively oriented CP policy that is feared to potentially delegitimize the entire multilateral NP regime through the unilateral application of American military power to limit the spread of unconventional weapons.

Unsurprisingly, opposing positions in the literature also hold rather different opinions on the evolution of this particular interpretation of CP policy. Direct advocates generally argue that a policy of counterproliferation should provide an effective set of capabilities to counter threats to American interests posed by inherently irrational regimes, or undeterrable terrorist organizations.¹⁹ Often this literature expresses a certain inevitability or inherent logic of threat assessment in explaining how CP policy supposedly evolved. Analysts with this perspective often fail to explain why such assessments are supposedly

¹⁹ For prominent examples, see Jason D. Ellis, 'The Best Defense: Counterproliferation and U.S. National Security', *The Washington Quarterly*, (Spring 2003), pp. 115-133; Lewis A. Dunn, 'Proliferation Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), *Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; William C. Martel and William T. Pendley, 'Rethinking U.S. Proliferation Policy for the Future', *ibid.*, pp. 207-229; Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1996); and Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999)

common sense for the United States, but obviously controversial or even illegitimate in the eyes of America's allies and strategic partners.

What constitutes "common sense" in these accounts on the issue of threat perception and the fashioning of appropriate policy response is often precisely what requires critical examination if we are to come to an understanding of how the conceptions and practices underpinning CP have evolved and what they mean for existing normative beliefs. Narratives of strategic threat conception necessarily contain a number of basic assumptions. Examining these basic, supposedly "common sense" assumptions, is important to understanding the implications of threat conceptions.

Critics charge that a preemptive policy of counterproliferation destroys confidence in stable deterrence relationships and threatens to lock out other states from the existing nonproliferation decision-making process, thereby placing the United States in the role of global judge, jury and executioner against unconventional weapons.²⁰ Critics also view a policy of counterproliferation as part of a larger trend of unilateralism and a dangerous willingness on the part of the United States to abandon diplomatic and political approaches to international security issues in favor of military or technical solutions.

In explaining the evolution of this form of CP policy, critics often identify powerful individuals or groups of policymakers with shared biases about the nature of the international security environment and the role of American power as the causal drivers of change. It is these individuals or groups, such as the so-called neoconservatives of the Bush Administration, that are assumed to have shaped CP policy by fiat, organizing the

²⁰ Some of the most astute and prescient criticism appeared in the following collected volume: Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (eds.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), especially David Fischer, 'Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?', pp. 11-24; Virginia S.I. Gamba, 'Counterproliferation: Harmony or Contradiction?', pp. 55-72; Benjamin Sanders, 'Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?', pp. 1-10; and Avner Cohen, 'The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate', pp. 73-102. See also, Thomas Mahnken, 'A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative', *National Security Studies Quarterly*, (Summer 1999), pp. 91-102; Brad Roberts, 'From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173; Gilles Andréani, 'The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy', *Survival*, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61; Walter B. Slocombe, 'Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy', *Survival*, (Spring 2003), pp. 117-130; and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York, Palgrave, 2003) Ch. 28

CP capabilities of the DOD around personally identified threat conceptions and policy responses. However, these accounts largely fail to account for earlier capabilities development within the DOD and the evolution of similar organizing conceptions in decisionmaking circles that established the legitimate “menu of choice” for later policymakers. In ignoring or failing to explain earlier processes of political argument and institutionalization of offensive CP capabilities, critics fail to offer an explanation of policy evolution that integrates a wealth of evidence pointing to prior development of CP conceptions, practices and capabilities seized upon by later policymakers responsible for fashioning a CP policy heavily weighted towards preemption.

It is worth reiterating that the distinction between nonproliferation and counterproliferation is not a superficial question of terminology, but rather representative of substantively divergent interpretations of threat assessments and appropriate responses. A traditional NP policy that assumes broadly rational potential proliferators that can be dissuaded from unconventional weapons development through a framework of largely economic and diplomatic incentives and disincentives, presents far different implications for international order than a CP policy that assumes broadly irrational proliferators whose weapons development activities (and indeed, political identities) must be countered by coercive, often military means. Although leveraging these two approaches in concert can be argued to provide a wider spectrum of policy response to proliferation threats, the often contradictory strategic assumptions underpinning these two approaches means they must be treated as distinctly alternative responses to the problem of proliferation, and with very different implications for the international system.

Further Theoretical Limitations on the Existing Analysis of CP Evolution

In directly addressing the evolution of counterproliferation policy, explanations in the literature are largely implicit from the theoretical assumptions that inform the studies, or mentioned only briefly and tangentially, such as in the case of policy advocacy papers. The theoretical assumptions of the existing literature dealing with the evolution of CP policy generally fall into one of three categories:

- 1) Literature based on assumptions similar to Rational Actor Models, which explain the evolution of CP policy as a rational response by the United States to the expansion of military capabilities by potential adversaries.²¹
- 2) Literature explaining CP policy evolution according to Bureaucratic Politics models, with policy outcomes implicitly assumed to be the result of bureaucratic bargaining.²²
- 3) Literature considering CP policy evolution to be the result of individual biases and policy preferences of powerful policymakers, keeping with assumptions common to Cognitive theories of policymaking.²³

An examination and critique of these theoretical assumptions as applied to the explanation of CP policy evolution will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapter.

While the literature debating counterproliferation has explained in some depth the external environment that framed the choices made by the actors within the system, it leaves important gaps in our understanding of *how* those decisions have been made. Significantly, there is not yet any literature that deals with an in-depth study of the constituencies that supported or resisted the development of a policy of counterproliferation, and most of the existing accounts rely largely on finalized speeches or official policy positions announcing milestones in the development of a counterproliferation policy. This has resulted in a simplified analysis that fails to

²¹ For accounts of CP policy evolution dependent on RAM assumptions, see Ashton B. Carter and L. Celeste Johnston, 'Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative', *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1999, pp. 64-71; Wallerstein, 'Concepts to Capabilities'; Wallerstein, 'The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative'; Dunn, 'Proliferation Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism'; and United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2001)

²² Important accounts of CP policy largely dependent on Bureaucratic Politics explanations include, Sokolski, Best of Intentions; Cohen, 'The Lessons of Ossirak'; Sanders, 'Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?'; and Slocombe, 'Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy'

²³ See particularly, Mahnken, 'A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative'; Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation; Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, Ch. 28; and David J. Karl, 'Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers', *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 87-119

adequately identify the relevant actors in the policymaking process, while glossing over competing visions of U.S. foreign policy among the actors it does recognize.

A number of analyses touch promisingly on the concept of competing constituencies supporting different approaches to CP policy. Müller and Reiss mention a number of governmental and nongovernmental “enthusiastic supporters” of the competing interpretations of CP policy, but fail to draw any conclusions as to the significance of these divisions.²⁴ David Karl attempts to make sense of the diverse views on CP policy by dividing advocates into categories of proliferation “pessimists” and “optimists.” These two categories represent either those who perceive an offensive CP policy to be a necessary augmentation to a critically flawed NP regime incapable of reining in proliferation pressures, or those expressing confidence in the NP regime and advocating a largely secondary role for CP respectively.²⁵ Leon Sloss attempts a similar line of argument through more vague categories of “alphas” and “betas” in an attempt to avoid the limiting preconceptions of Karl’s categories in dealing with divergent views on the scope and application of CP.²⁶ In one of the more interesting pieces of analysis in this vein, Leonard Spector briefly raised the possibility of a more offensively oriented CP policy if the Department of Defense, backed by conservative supporters in Congress, was given free reign to develop CP policy as it saw fit.²⁷

Why does the existing literature present important shortcomings to our understanding of CP? Because without a clear understanding of how CP evolved, the organizational forces, political constituencies and strategic assumptions driving CP policy remain hidden. Without a detailed examination, critiques or support address the results of the policy, rather than exploring its origins. By failing to adequately present the diversity of opinions and significant policy influences and outcomes, these accounts offer little to further our understanding of either the implications of counterproliferation policy or the broader process of U.S. foreign policy making. Without such an examination, it is unclear

²⁴ Müller and Reiss, “Counterproliferation”, pp. 140, 141

²⁵ Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’

²⁶ Leon Sloss, The Current Nuclear Dialogue, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, 1999)

²⁷ Spector, ‘Neo-Nonproliferation’

precisely where a policy of counterproliferation has come from, what substantive impacts it has had on the way the United States responds to proliferation threats, what this means for the future of multilateral institutions charged with addressing proliferation at the global level and founded on broadly shared normative beliefs, and whether the United States intends to apply military force to address the problems of proliferation.

Answers Provided by the Thesis

The thesis argues that from a theoretical perspective, we must move beyond the limitations of Rational Actor, Bureaucratic Politics and Cognitive models of decisionmaking, in order to examine the cultural, ideational and institutional forces at the heart of CP policy evolution. To understand how this range of alternatives evolved, close examination must be made into how political entities legitimized new strategic conceptions, how military organizations provided new options for the application of military force, and how both of these forces interacted to challenge existing normative beliefs and alter the choices available to future policymakers. In order to address the cultural and normative issues at the heart of CP policy evolution, the thesis presents two alternate models for analysis focused on the collectively held beliefs of civilian policymakers and those of military organizations, that of strategic culture and organizational theory respectively.

Counterproliferation policy is more than the military capabilities developed by the DOD and the political decisions about when to use them. CP policy is also strongly grounded in widely accepted conceptions about the nature of the proliferation threat and the normative beliefs about appropriate means to respond to that threat. The policy shift from a limited defensive conception of CP to one weighted more heavily towards preemptive military action resulted from the merging of conservative strategic cultural efforts at legitimizing conceptions of proliferation threats as originating from state identity, with an organizational drive to avoid operational uncertainty through the development of effective counterforce and active defense capabilities. Together these strategic cultural and organizational forces incrementally altered the menu of choice for future

policymakers by institutionalizing and legitimizing a policy response to proliferation threats that directly challenged existing nonproliferation norms and practices.

Research Methodology and Sources

The arguments presented in this thesis are based on a detailed case study of the evolution of counterproliferation policy from 1989 to 2002, with particular focus on the analysis of public discourse, declassified national policy planning and Department of Defense documents, and participant interviews.

Materials relevant to the public discourse on counterproliferation include speeches and official policy documents produced by the United States Government from 1989 to 2002, particularly Congressional materials such as testimony presented at unclassified hearings, floor debates and recorded legislation, reports compiled by the Congressional Research Service, and public record communications from the President to Congress. Many of these materials have been made publicly available online in recent years by the Library of Congress, though during the course of research the invaluable personal assistance of Library's staff and its microfilm holdings were of particular value in discovering relevant case study materials. A subset of other significant public materials were documents submitted by the inter-agency Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, the personal papers of involved policymakers, documents and reports produced by U.S. government research bodies such as The National Defense University's WMD Center, and the United States Air Force Counterproliferation Center.

Formerly classified or restricted materials relevant to the study include a wide variety of relevant document types such as briefing memoranda, memoranda of conversations, minutes of meetings (including participant lists), National Security Council Reports, National Security Directives (first Bush Administration), Presidential Decision Directives (Clinton and second Bush administrations), Presidential Review Directives (Clinton and second Bush administrations), reports, policy papers, briefing books, histories, cables,

personal notes and letters. One of the most significant resources for these materials is the voluminous document sets collected by the National Security Archives at George Washington University. These document sets are largely the result of comprehensive Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and Mandatory Declassification Review requests, and cover such topics as *U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy* (2,651 documents), *Presidential Directives on National Security* (2,100 documents), and a collection of so-called ‘*Iraqgate*’ documents related to U.S. policy towards Iraq before the Gulf War (1,913 documents).

Valuable archival assistance was also provided by the staff of the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and by the Department of Defense Office of Freedom of Information & Security Review (OFOISR). The National Security Archives and DOD OFOISR are particularly important resources for formerly classified materials concerning counterproliferation policy, considering the difficulty individual researchers face in directly appealing to the U.S. Government for timely declassification of relevant documents. During the course of the research for this thesis, several FOIA requests were filed for classified policy planning and defense strategy documents, but to date only one document from an extensive list of requested materials was declassified in response to a individual FOIA request by the author.²⁸

Finally, a number of interviews with relevant current and former policymakers were conducted in the Washington D.C. area and by phone. Interview subjects selected were those identified as participating closely in key periods of counterproliferation policy development, largely from within the DOD and relevant Congressional staff offices.

²⁸ Much of the lack of individual success with FOIA requests should be attributed to the backlog of declassification requests, many from the U.S. Government itself associated with ongoing investigations, inter-departmental reviews and Congressional oversight functions, rather than unwillingness on the part of relevant agencies and departments to declassify documents. As one staff member of the National Security Council responsible for document declassification related in a private discussion, “To be quite honest, it would probably be faster for you to get your PhD, apply for a job here, pass your security clearance and declassify them yourself.”

Organization of the Thesis

The historical focus of this thesis is on the period from the imminent end of the Cold War in 1989 to the announcement of the so-called Bush Doctrine with the public presentation of the National Security Strategy of 2002, and divided into three major periods. The first period takes the analysis of counterproliferation from its early post-Cold War origins in 1989 to the announcement of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative in December of 1993. This period is significant as the formative strategic-cultural and organizational thinking on the problems posed by post-Cold War proliferation occurred during this time, culminating in the announcement of a major defense initiative that was intended to direct defense efforts at more effectively responding to supposedly emerging proliferation issues.

The second period covers from the immediate reaction to the DCI in early 1994, to the rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by the U.S. Senate at the end of 1999. It was during this period counterproliferation became institutionalized and transformed within the DOD, solidifying early conceptions of proliferation threats and codifying organizational capabilities responses to those threats. Also during this period, a significant political challenge occurred between competing strategic cultures, resulting in a transformed political framing of proliferation threats, and formalized challenges to existing norms and practices of nonproliferation and deterrence.

Finally the period of 1999-2002 is examined, with the public transformation of counterproliferation in the 2002 NSS placed in perspective as a highly institutionalized policy with strong existing strategic cultural support and significant associated political framing of proliferation threats, already largely in place before the attacks of September 11, 2001. Such historical divisions will assist in clarifying the distinct stages of

counterproliferation policy evolution and allow for clearer comparisons of the military and political features of this policy evolution.

Chapter 1 places counterproliferation in the wider context of competing theories of foreign policy analysis. It begins with a review of theoretical assumptions central to existing explanations of CP policy evolution, offering critiques of the rational actor model, bureaucratic politics model and cognitive models. The chapter then presents the alternative theoretical perspectives of strategic culture and organizational theory.

Chapter 2 examines the period 1989 to 1993 from an organizational perspective, arguing that a strong organizational drive for uncertainty reduction in the wake of the Cold War and Gulf War, coupled with existing cultural biases, fundamentally reshaped how the DOD approached the issue of proliferation.

Chapter 3 looks at the same period of time from a strategic culture perspective, arguing that collective ideational concerns, rather than objective external realities, were central to answering questions of American post-Cold War power as they pertained to reformulating U.S. NP policy.

Chapter 4 makes an in-depth examination of CP policy institutionalization within the DOD from 1994 to 1999. This chapter argues that shifting the focus of CP institutionalization from civilian policymakers to the functional units of the military was crucial to altering organizational practices and capabilities, allowing a more offensively oriented CP doctrine to emerge from organizational efforts.

Chapter 5 examines competing strategic cultures in the period 1994 to 1999, arguing that a crucial determinate of policy outcomes during this period were conservative strategic culture assumptions and preferences informed by neoconservative strategic thought and empowered by a highly coordinated and effective Republican Party machinery of policy promotion.

Chapter 6 looks at the end stage of counterproliferation policy evolution from 1999 to 2002, examining both organizational and strategic cultural forces to explain the policy response to 9/11 that led to a preventative doctrine of counterproliferation as articulated in the 2002 National Security Strategy. This chapter argues that while the central policymakers of the Bush Administration were certainly important in prioritizing and articulating policy, their role in “shaping” CP was largely to give prominence to CP policy responses that had been designed, legitimated and institutionalized by others preceding them.

The thesis concludes with policy implications flowing from the case study, and avenues for further research into the cultural and organizational impacts on policy.

Chapter 1

Examining Assumptions: Competing Theories of CP Policy Evolution

Because simplifications are necessary, competing simplifications are essential.

- Graham Allison ¹

Exploring the evolution of counterproliferation brings the researcher into contact with source material resembling a jigsaw puzzle with thousands of pieces, made up of a wide range of opinions, academic analyses, public arguments, policy documents, intelligence assessments, military plans, interagency policy reviews and participant interpretations, among others. Though it is tempting to assemble the pieces into the first clear image and call the task finished, one soon discovers that the pieces can be arranged into a number of different images, each with its own internal logic and organizing pattern. The easiest picture to assemble often not only presents an oversimplified image, but may leave crucial pieces of the puzzle sitting on the side willfully ignored. The question is thus not one of how many facts make up the phenomena to be explained, but how these facts should be interpreted.

In examining the evolution of CP policy, a number of explanations for its development and transformation are offered in the existing literature and by participants who helped shape the policy. Generally, these explanations fall into three broad categories, each with its own set of underlying assumptions. The first explains CP policy evolution as a rational response by the United States to changes in material capabilities of adversaries, and features assumptions common to many state-centric, rational action models commonly used in IR literature and general armchair analysis. The second are accounts that see CP evolution as the result of rational self-interest on the part of involved bureaucracies, and focus on competing bureaucratic interests as the determinant of change. The third major set of explanations views CP policy evolution as the result of the selective decisions of

¹ Allison and Zelikow, The Essence of Decision, (1999), p. 9

individual policy makers, and shares many common assumptions with cognitive theories that place individual bias and powerful individual action as the explanation of outcomes.

In examining why the assumptions at the core of current explanations of CP fall short in providing convincing accounts of its evolution, it will be argued that all three of these models fail to provide adequate explanation for the evolution of counterproliferation because of their inability to adequately address the impact of ideas, culture and institutionalization. This thesis will then make two theoretical moves simultaneously in seeking to expand our understanding of both the evolution of CP and the broader dynamics at play in the process of foreign policy making. First, the concept of strategic culture will be examined, with particular emphasis placed on its inclusion of cultural inputs ignored by the other theories, such as collective preferences and normative beliefs. Then suggestions are made for improving the theory, with an argument made that current approaches to strategic culture limited to monocultural case studies unnecessarily limit the explanatory reach of the theory. Monocultural strategic culture studies neglect an opportunity to apply the theory to the explanation of policy process representing challenge to normative beliefs, rather than simply general policy orientation of states with static normative content. Furthermore, a monocultural approach to strategic culture under-theorizes the role of political argument, often restricting it to the reinforcement of cultural identity and defense of policy preference, rather than accepting the challenge to explain how tensions between cultural identities challenge or delegitimize existing normative beliefs, and legitimize new norms in their place.

Second, the concept of organizational theory will be examined and integrated with strategic culture to provide an explanation for the specific contributions of the U.S. military to the evolution of CP. Organizational preferences and the capacity for institutionalization through organizational practices and capabilities will be of particular focus. However, while many excellent studies have been written examining the impact of organizational culture and behavior on subjects such as military doctrine, organizational safety and organizational learning, such studies often isolate the impact of organizations in the interests of parsimony, neglecting the larger interaction of organizations and other

significant political entities affecting the process of foreign policy. Neither strategic culture, nor organizational theory has yet been used to explain CP policy evolution, despite the fact that both offer valuable insights into the forces that shape long term policy evolution, especially in areas concerning the use of military force. Together, these theories will be argued to provide a fuller explanation of the legitimization of preventative and preemptive aspects of CP, the concurrent deligitimization of existing NP norms and practices, and the institutionalization of CP which is likely to make these issues salient for policymakers long after the specific policymakers who ushered CP onto the public stage have departed.

The Rational Actor Model

According to one prominent set of accounts explaining the rise of CP policy, as the United States approached the end of the Cold War it began to reassess the changing international strategic environment, focusing on the potential redistribution of military power in the post-Cold War system.² One of the implications of the emerging Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) was that high technology with transformative military applications was seen to be both proliferating widely, and also occurring outside the framework of controls and influence of the superpowers. More and more states had access to high technology with military applications, thus opening up the possibility that even small states could leverage an asymmetrical advantage over the United States in future conflicts.³ The experience of the Gulf War reinforced this assessment, as potential

² For accounts of CP policy evolution dependent on RAM assumptions, see Ashton B. Carter and L. Celeste Johnston, 'Beyond the Counterproliferation Initiative', *National Security Studies Quarterly*, Summer 1999, pp. 64-71; Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 'Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 'The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative', in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, *United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Companies, 1998), pp. 21-36; Lewis A. Dunn, 'Proliferation Prevention: Beyond Traditionalism', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 27-38; and United States Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2001)

³ Brad Roberts, 'From Nonproliferation to Antiproliferation', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 139-173

Iraqi use of chemical or biological weapons against Coalition forces or Israel might have dramatically altered the course and scope of the conflict. The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was unveiled by the United States in December of 1993, as an approach to improving the defensive capabilities of U.S. forces operating in future unconventional weapons environments, thus reducing the expected utility of such weapons by potential adversaries.

Throughout the 1990's, the United States incorporated more active defensive measures such as ballistic missile defense, and counterforce measures such as deep, precision strike capabilities in response to growing evidence indicating that potential regional adversaries were continuing to pursue unconventional weapons and ballistic missile delivery systems. Events like the 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system by a little known religious group indicated that the unconventional weapons threat now included terrorist organizations as well as potentially adversarial states. The asymmetries of power between the United States and these groups meant that the United States would have to view unconventional weapons usage as an inevitable feature of future regional conflicts and terrorist attacks, as no group could hope to match the conventional force advantage of the United States. The events of 9/11 only further demonstrated this dynamic of shifting relative power positions and the ability to leverage asymmetric means to deliver powerful blows to major states, forcing the United States to respond by elevating CP as the primary policy response to the proliferation of unconventional weapons and associated delivery systems.⁴

Basic assumptions of the Rational Actor Model

Implicit in these accounts is the assumption that the United States government, for all intents and purposes serves as a unitary actor, formulating policies as a rational response to objective external changes in the international security environment. Theoretical approaches viewing states as whole units are a powerful tool for abstraction in the social

⁴ Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); see also Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004)

sciences, as the assumption of interacting whole units allows for analysis of action on the systemic level in international relations. In these models, state behavior can be untangled from the highly complex web of social relationships at the individual level, and given meaningful analysis in order to generate both explanations and predictions about state behavior. The literature concerning neorealist and liberal institutionalist thinking about IR for example, begins with the premise of an anarchical international system whose primary units are rationally self interested unitary actors interacting with each other through various forms of competition or cooperation.⁵

This particular group of theories has traveled under the name of materialist, structural, actor-general, rational choice models or more generally the rationalist tradition.⁶ Such theories hold similar assumptions about agency and structure, and for the purposes of this thesis can be loosely grouped under label of the Rational Actor Model (RAM).⁷ One of the analytic benefits of the RAM approach, especially in its rational choice variants, is that by “black-boxing” internal processes, analytic focus can be more easily placed on the relations between actors.⁸ The RAM type approaches have served an invaluable function in the analysis of international behavior, as they focus analytical energies on the international strategic environment, helping especially to illuminate *interactions* between nation states, rather than devoting intellectual energies into the internal processes of the states in question.

⁵ The classic competing examples are Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979); and Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986)

⁶ For discussion of “materialist theories”, see Alexander Wendt, ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992), 391-425; for “structural”, the seminal neorealist text is Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (New York: Random House, 1979); see also Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and Its Critics*; for “actor-general”, see Alexander L. George, “The Two Cultures of Academia and Policy-Making: Bridging the Gap”, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1994), pp. 143-171

⁷ One of the first to explicitly categorize this approach as the Rational Actor Model (RAM) was Graham T. Allison in his 1969 article, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 63, No. 3, (September 1969), pp. 689-718. This was subsequently expanded to form the basis for his now classic, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1971). A second edition, with important evidentiary updates was published in 1999. See Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis - Second Edition*, (New York: Longman, 1999).

⁸ For similar arguments on the supposed benefits of rational choice analyses, see Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, ‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 86, No. 2 (June 1992), p. 308

Taken as an umbrella term, the core assumptions of the RAM are threefold. First, the relevant unit of analysis is assumed to be the state, and states are assumed to be unitary. That is to say states can be abstracted as decisionmakers, whose subunit inputs are aggregated into unitary action. This does not deny that individual action is significant, but rather that international relations “cannot be adequately understood in terms of individual attitudes and behaviors.”⁹ Such an assumption of unitary action and state level of analysis is implicit in the most common forms of popular and academic analysis of international relations, which depict states as a type of “black box”, in which the inner workings are less relevant to the analyst than the characteristics of its inputs and outputs.¹⁰

The second set of assumptions focus on the relationship between those inputs and outputs insofar that states are assumed to be self-interested actors that make rational, value-maximizing choices. Rationality in decisionmaking is often seen in terms of ends vs. means, with states weighing the costs and benefits of their choices in order to best maximize their gains and minimize their losses. The basic assumption of preference-maximizing behavior produces simple propositions central to most RAM explanations. The general principle can be formulated as follows: the likelihood of any particular action results from a combination of a state’s: (1) relevant values and objectives, (2) perceived alternative courses of action, (3) estimates of consequences which will follow from each alternative, and (4) net valuation of each set of consequences.¹¹ This model assumes that the agent of the decision is aware of the possible consequences, and chooses the one that maximizes its interests.¹²

The final set of assumptions concerns these state interests, which are often broadly construed as being material in nature, and socialized by conditions of international

⁹ Sidney Verba, ‘Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System’, *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 1, (Oct. 1961), p. 93

¹⁰ The origins of this term are purported to be from RAF pilots in WWII, who after being taught the working of their radios commented that radios were in fact boxes that ran on black magic contained inside.

¹¹ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision* (1999), p. 25

¹² Verba, ‘Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System’

anarchy.¹³ Often in RAM accounts, states are depicted as concerned with opportunities and threats in the international system measured in terms of relative power.¹⁴ Material interests in an anarchic system are therefore viewed as causally constructive of interests. Together, systemic pressures and the pursuit of national interest serve as the motivation for state behavior to advance or protect national interests. The shifting of relative power positions of states in an anarchical international system, whether by changes in material capability of states through military advancement, or by shifting alliances or changes in relative power among other states, determines what threats and opportunities exist for a state's national interests.

Challenges to the RAM assumptions

Cumulatively, such assumptions carry a certain inevitability, or idealization of strategic interaction. If the material capabilities and actions of international actors themselves carry objective meaning, then the task of the policy maker is to correctly interpret the meaning, and devise strategies that maximize utility relative to national interests for any given situation. However, while the parsimony inherent to RAM type analyses have allowed for a steady flow of quantitative analysis and attendant predictions to develop, important critiques of each category of simplification have been made, ultimately calling into question its overall utility in generating meaningful insights about state behavior – particularly in the realm of foreign policy outcomes.

While it may be practical for certain analytic purposes to treat states as unitary actors, a significant body of research argues that accounting for sub-state action such as the forces of bureaucratic or domestic politics is critical to understanding many foreign policy

¹³ Holsti remarks that scholars who take this approach “regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations.” See Ole R. Holsti, ‘Models of International Relations and Foreign Policy’, *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 13, No. 1, (January, 1989), pp. 15-44

¹⁴ Waltz, Theory of International Politics; John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War,’ *International Security* 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56

dilemmas.¹⁵ In his landmark study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham Allison demonstrated that many of the central strategic puzzles of the conflict cannot be fully understood without investigating the impact of sub-state units on state decisionmaking.¹⁶ From the events leading to the discovery of Soviet nuclear weapons on Cuba, to the range of potential U.S. responses culminating in a naval blockade of Cuba, Allison demonstrates that examining the influence of sub-state units on state behavior is critical to understanding overall state behavior.

Similarly, scholars such as Elizabeth Kier have demonstrated that understanding the development of military doctrine is often not possible without a substantive accounting for the preferences and biases of the individual military organization in question. Challenging assumptions of rational action by the state as a whole, Kier demonstrates how the development of a defensive military doctrine between WWI and WWII in France was largely the result of military biases questioning the ability of conscripts to execute an offensive doctrine.¹⁷ What these and other studies have in common is the argument that accounting for sub-state phenomena is not simply necessary to “fill in the gaps” of existing analytical puzzles, but in fact key to a meaningful understanding of international behavior.

Secondly, the assumption that foreign policy outcomes are the result of a rational response to strategic dilemmas, as based on value maximizing behavior, has been repeatedly called into question by historical case studies, and empirical evidence accumulated in laboratory experimentation and the close study of decisionmakers in

¹⁵ Prominent examples include Allison, ‘Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis’; Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954); Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications’, *World Politics*, Vol. 24 (Spring 1972), pp. 40-79; Robert J. Art, ‘Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique’, *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 4, (December, 1973), pp. 467-490; Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1974); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations’, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 1, No. 1, (March 2005), 1-35

¹⁶ Allison, Essence of Decision, (1971, 1999)

¹⁷ Kier, Imagining War

action.¹⁸ Such studies have called into question assumptions that there is a world of “brute facts” that decision makers appeal to when making utility maximizing calculations. It is argued that those making decisions generally utilize some form of objective criteria, free from the burdens and distortions of such things as previous experience, peer pressure, ideological predisposition, fear and so forth.

As Robert Jervis persuasively argued in his influential 1970 study of foreign policy making, not only do decision makers routinely violate the requirements of rational decision making, but that decision makers, assuming rational, unitary decision making processes in their adversaries, are far more likely to misinterpret actions as being driven by duplicity rather than confusion when facing inconsistent responses.¹⁹ Further erosion of assumptions for rational action based upon objective criteria was provided by Irving Janis’ study of group decisionmaking dynamics, whereby “the motivation to maintain group consensus and personal acceptance by the group can cause deterioration of decision-making quality.”²⁰ Together these studies do not deny that rational action is possible, merely that decisionmaking in the real world rarely meets the criteria for such action. This is not to say that foreign policy decisions are inherently irrational, but rather that significant questions remain about the stated realist assumption of states exhibiting egoistically motivated value maximizing behavior.

Finally, even a casual examination of state behavior in the 20th century would seem to indicate that states do not in fact exhibit such relative similarity in decisionmaking approaches, and that relative power positions do not serve as accurate guide to behavior.

¹⁸ Jeffrey D. Berejikian, ‘A Cognitive Theory of Deterrence’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2002), p. 165-183; Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1982); Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds.), Choices, Values and Frames, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (eds.), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors and Thomas Preston (eds.), Introduction to Political Psychology, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004)

¹⁹ Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976); a similar argument was articulated by U.S. Circuit Court Judge Laurence Silberman, “Every government looking at the actions of another government and trying to explain them always exaggerates rationality and conspiracy, and underestimates incompetence and fortuity.” as quoted by Donald Rumsfeld in ‘Rumsfeld’s Rules’, *The Wall Street Journal*, (January 29, 2001), <http://www.opinionjournal.com/wsj/?id=85000505> (accessed August 15, 2007)

²⁰ Janis, Groupthink

As an example, Thomas Berger has argued that German and Japanese foreign policy behavior shifting from militarism to pacifism in the 20th Century has been far from consistent with what would be expected simply from objective analysis of their relative power position in an anarchic system.²¹ Though some realist scholars have argued that in the post-Cold War security environment German security interests would be best served by a less pacifist foreign policy orientation, this has hardly been in line with what the German government and people have chosen for themselves.²² In fundamental ways, the political systems, cultural identity, historical experience and decisionmaking structure of states matters.²³

Explanatory shortcoming of the RAM in the case of CP policy evolution

The weakness of the RAM in accounting for sub-state influence, plus its overstatement of rational action and materialist motivations on policy outcomes all factor into providing for an unsatisfactory explanation of CP policy evolution. A RAM approach is not equipped to answer why CP policy evolution featured a gradual shift away from a conception of proliferation threats posed by the weapons themselves, to one where proliferation threats were framed primarily in terms of the identity of the potential proliferator. Material interests also would not specify why individual states with objectively little change in relative power at the end of the Cold War would be identified as suddenly presenting grave threats to U.S. national security, nor do supposedly rational ends/means calculations explain why such states would be eventually assumed to be unresponsive to traditional forms of conventional or nuclear deterrence.²⁴

There is a need to explain how and why certain actors were singled out as potential adversaries of the United States warranting a new approach to the problem of

²¹ Thomas U. Berger, 'Norms, Identity and National Security in Germany and Japan', in Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity In World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 317-356

²² Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War'

²³ Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, "On Strategy", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.), *The Making of Strategy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 9

²⁴ Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response*; see also United States Government, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', (September 2002)

unconventional weapons proliferation. The process is illustrative of the subjective ideational and organizational dynamics at play in establishing and legitimizing “common sense” views of the post-Cold War international security environment. As will be argued in the historical chapters of this thesis, what counted for “common sense” in terms of threat identification and policy response for CP was often a consciously contested area of the policymaking process, with the winners of those contests gaining the ability to redefine the boundaries of legitimate discourse, and thus ultimately the framework for policy decisions.²⁵ Thus an important addition to our understanding of the evolution of CP will require space for examining specific *ideas*, not just general interests. We need an understanding of not only how the international security environment *is* in any real sense, but also in how it is *represented* by those making decisions about threats and responses. How such representations are formed and propagated will tell us as much about the range of supposedly ‘legitimate’ responses and thus more adequately explain the challenge to the norm of NP practice presented by CP.

Bureaucratic Politics

A second major set of explanations for the rise and evolution of CP policy are oriented around the motives and actions of powerful bureaucratic actors such as the Departments of Defense and State and their respective leaders. According to these accounts, as the United States approached the end of the Cold War, the leadership of the Department of State and the Department of Defense recognized that many of their traditional missions would be challenged by the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a major adversary.²⁶ For the Department of Defense in particular, the lack of strategic consensus immediately following the end of the Cold War was seen as a potential challenge to its existing

²⁵ Similar arguments about the creation of collective social understanding are made in Jutta Weldes, Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999)

²⁶ Important accounts of CP policy largely dependent on Bureaucratic Politics explanations include, Henry D. Sokolski, Best of Intentions: America’s campaign against strategic weapons proliferation, (Westport: Praeger, 2001); Avner Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Ossirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’ in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 73-102; Benjamin Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?’, *ibid.*, pp. 1-10; and Walter B. Slocumbe, ‘Force, Pre-emption and Legitimacy’, *Survival*, (Spring 2003), pp. 117-130

missions and funding.²⁷ Fearful of budgetary starvation in an era of more diverse, potentially less military oriented security challenges, the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative can be seen as an example of bureaucratic opportunism by a Department of Defense preemptively protecting its interests and missions in an era not focused on a military standoff with a rival superpower.²⁸

Throughout the 1990's, turf battles between the DOD and the State Department resulted in bureaucratically negotiated marginalization of the DCI, with CP being relegated to a minimal supporting role for existing NP policies. Throughout the years immediately following the announcement of the DCI, CP represented less of a coherent policy approach to proliferation threats than a bureaucratic cover for the funding of budget heavy programs such as national missile defense. It was the militarized response to the attacks of 9/11 requested by the executive that brought the DOD into a leadership role in formulating policies to address threats from terrorism and unconventional weapons proliferation. CP emerged as a challenge to traditional NP policy due to a basic reorganization of bureaucratic prominence, rather than any deeper reorganization of normative beliefs about appropriate responses to proliferation.

Basic assumptions of the Bureaucratic Politics Model

These accounts of the development of CP policy rest on a number of assumptions about policy outcomes as the result of bargaining games between bureaucratic sub-units, referred to in the literature as bureaucratic politics.²⁹ Following from the argued

²⁷ Interview with Rebecca Hersman, Senior Research Professor, NDU and former Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, July 15, 2005; and interview with Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, and Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1989-1993), June 20, 2005

²⁸ See particularly, Sokolski, *Best of Intentions*, Ch. 6

²⁹ Important contributions to the literature on bureaucratic politics include Allison, 'Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis'; Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics*; Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics'; Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics'; Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*; Bendor and Hammond, 'Rethinking Allison's Models'; David A. Welch, "The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect", *International Security*, Vol. 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 112-146; and Edward Rhodes, 'Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter? Some Disconfirming Findings from the Case of the U.S. Navy', *World Politics*, Vol. 47, (1994), pp. 1-41

shortcomings of a rational actor model that posits international structural forces as determinate of policy outcomes, the bureaucratic politics model places an analytic focus on the bureaucratic sub-units and individual bureaucratic leaders. In the case of the United States, for example, the focus of the bureaucratic politics model has generally been placed on bureaucracies such as the State Department and Department of Defense, and individuals such as the Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense. The bureaucratic politics model presents an important challenge to the analytic focus of structural theories, as it accepts the significant impact of governmental sub-units on policy outcomes. Bureaucratic politics offers a framework for assessing the impact of ever-present and often public disagreements over policy by officials and organizations, providing explanatory space by incorporating conflicting bureaucratic interests within a state.

The first assumption of the bureaucratic politics model is that policy outcomes are the result of “bargaining games” between representatives of different government agencies rather than result of unitary state interest. A policy outcome is depicted not as representative of a rationally chosen solution to a particular problem, “but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unique influence.”³⁰ Policy outcomes are also constrained by the political “bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government.”³¹ Thus while decision makers are assumed to be rational, final decisions are often not representative of careful cost / benefit analysis, but rather of the outcome of collective “pulling and hauling.”³² Simply put, the outcomes of bureaucratic decisionmaking do not conform to expectations of what a unitary rational actor would have chosen, with bureaucracies viewed as “weakly” rational, in that choices are viewed as intentional, if not conforming to the narrow dictates of strict ends / means calculation under conditions of objective, “full disclosure” of possible informational inputs.³³

³⁰ Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, pp. 294, 295

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 295

³² *Ibid.*, p. 258

³³ Herbert A. Simon, ‘Rationality in Political Behavior’, *Political Psychology*, vol. 16, (1995), pp. 45-61; see also Welch, ‘The Organizational Process’, p. 118

Secondly, positions taken in such bargaining games are reflective of parochial interests as a function of organizational roles. The most famous formulation of this assumption of determinacy is known as Miles' Law, which asserts, "Where you stand depends on where you sit."³⁴ For example, Secretaries of Defense would be expected to take policy positions that promote the budgets and prominence of the Department of Defense, often viewing problems as either military in nature, or with a military solution. Conversely, Secretaries of State would be expected to promote the interests of the State Department and favor the usage of the diplomatic tools of statecraft that are the department's stock and trade. Such primacy of parochial interests is what allows broader expectations about bureaucratically unitary action to be made, rather than requiring the analyst to peer inside the mind of bureaucratic leaders and account for personal bias and preference.

Finally, the ability of bureaucratic decisionmakers to influence policy outcomes is assumed to be a function of their relative bargaining power.³⁵ In the short term, relative bargaining power is argued to be a function of the political influence, knowledge of the "rules of the game", and the ability and will to use bureaucratic leverage held by the decisionmaker in question.³⁶ In the long term, relative bargaining power is assumed to be a function of the skill of policymakers at identifying moments of favorable political conditions and then merging policy ideas with identified problems.³⁷ Such ability often rests on a particular actor's knowledge of how to exploit institutional procedures for facilitating or implementing decisions.³⁸ Partly these assumptions flow from the need to account for significant observed executive involvement without ceding more influence to executive actors in situations where their ultimate decisions are the product of the choices presented to them and advocated by bureaucratic functionaries.³⁹

³⁴ As originally coined by Arnold Miles, see Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers, (New York: Free Press, 1986), p. 157

³⁵ Ibid, pp. 294-304; see also Steve A. Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decisionmaking and the Persian Gulf War, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004) p. 122

³⁶ Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 295-300

³⁷ One of the best studies of the need for policymakers to perceive such intersecting "policy streams", see John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, (New York: Longman, 2003), pp. 280, 281

³⁸ Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy, p. 122

³⁹ See particularly, Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon, (New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1976)

Weaknesses of the Bureaucratic Politics Model

The years of analysis following Allison's influential study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, however, have seen a number of serious challenges presented to the central assumptions of the bureaucratic politics model.⁴⁰ While these challenges are numerous and cover a broad array of logical, methodological and evidentiary concerns, for the sake of simplicity we will focus briefly on three issues relevant to the subject of this thesis. These include an overly broad category of potential influences on policy outcomes, the questionable assumption of parochial interest expressed in adage of "where you sit determines where you stand", and the problem of differentiating between the interests of individuals and that of organizations, including a lack of accounting for the effects of institutionalization.

One of the most common critiques of the bureaucratic politics model, especially as set forth by Allison, is that there are far too many potential variables included for this to be a useful explanatory paradigm.⁴¹ One scholar singled out Allison's inclusive approach to proposing determinants of governmental behavior as a "grab bag of influences" serving to spread a patina of scientific lingo over what essentially amounts to "eclectic palace politics"⁴² Indeed, Allison's articulation of the bureaucratic politics model, and indeed many later bureaucratic politics studies, offer as possible explanations of government behavior such a range of potential players, possible influences and avenues for policy influence as to beg the question of what would *not* be considered significant from this

⁴⁰ Particularly important examples include, Stephen D. Krasner, 'Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)', *Foreign Policy*, vol. 7 (Summer, 1972), pp. 159-179; Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics'; Bendor and Hammond, 'Rethinking Allison's Models'; Welch, "The Organizational Process"; and Barton J. Bernstein, 'Understanding Decisionmaking, U.S. Foreign Policy, and the Cuban Missile Crisis', *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1, (Summer 2000), pp. 134-164

⁴¹ Sometimes referred to as the "kitchen sink" critique, See Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics'; David A. Welch, "A Positive Science of Bureaucratic Politics?" in Eric Stern and Bertjan Verbeek (eds.), "Whither The Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A Symposium", *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 42, (1998), pp. 210-216, and Jutta Weldes, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment', (in *ibid.*) pp. 216-225,

⁴² Bernstein, "Understanding Decisionmaking", pp. 140, 141

perspective.⁴³ This problematic lack of analytical selectiveness is summarized by Bendor and Hammond who state, “a model that is as complicated as the phenomena it represents is of little use.”⁴⁴

A second, more fundamental challenge to the assumptions of bureaucratic politics, are the findings that challenge the primacy of parochial interests in shaping choice. An important case study empirically challenging the assumptions of “where you sit determines where you stand” is Edward Rhodes’ 1994 study of the U.S. Navy.⁴⁵ Rhodes looked for correlation between those who held the positions of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and budgetary allocations to the different branches of the Navy – naval aviation, surface fleet and the submarine fleet. Since the CNO position is rotated between those who climbed the ladder from within one of these branches, and the position of CNO offers a high degree of autonomy in formulating budgetary recommendations, Rhodes argued that if bureaucratic politics had a significant influence on decisions, this would be an excellent place to see it in action. Rhodes findings, however, showed that CNO affiliation was a relatively poor predictor of budgetary allocations, thus challenging one of the central assumptions of bureaucratic politics through extensive case study analysis.⁴⁶ Further studies of bureaucratic politics have argued little consistent correlation exists between bureaucratic position and policy advocacy, and that issues such as preexisting individual beliefs about the role of military force, for example, often play a stronger role in shaping preferences once in office.⁴⁷

⁴³ A more recent study of bureaucratic politics that displays such a weakness in selecting from a range of policy influences is Brian Ripley, ‘Cognition, Culture and Bureaucratic Politics’, in Laura Neack, Jeanne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney, (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 85-97

⁴⁴ Bendor and Hammond, ‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, p. 318

⁴⁵ Rhodes, ‘Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?’, pp. 1-41

⁴⁶ These conclusions are also summarized in Welch, ‘A Positive Science of Bureaucratic Politics?’, p. 215

⁴⁷ Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decisionmaking, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 512; Krasner, ‘Are Bureaucracies Important?’, p. 165 and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics. In response to sustained criticism, Allison revised this statement in the second edition of the *Essence of Decision* from “where you stand depends on where you sit” to “where you stand is substantially affected by where you sit.” Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision (1999), p. 307

Explanatory shortcoming of Bureaucratic Politics in the case of CP policy evolution

In the case of CP policy evolution, the bureaucratic politics model rightly focuses attention on the inputs of bureaucratic entities such as the Department of Defense and State Department, but its simplified conception of bureaucratic interests leaves important questions unanswered. Parochial interests can explain early turf wars over the DCI, as overly broad mandates threaten mission overlap in an environment of limited bureaucratic turf. However, such dynamics provide little guide for interpreting the then steady support for counterproliferation programs and capabilities in the DOD throughout the 1990's. Why were specific programs and capabilities with offensive orientation prioritized and funded, pairing them with the rationale that unconventional weapons usage was an inevitable, rather than a potential condition of future warfare, but for very different reasons than those proposed by many members of the legislature and executive? If budgetary starvation and parochial interest were sufficient guides in and of themselves, a number of alternative force modernization efforts could have been implemented that would have addressed the missions undertaken by the U.S. military at the time, rather than invested in hypothetical scenarios of threat that were actively challenged by powerful legislative and executive actors as threatening existing norms of NP.

Much of the focus on the bureaucracy as a political actor has certain value in the analysis of short term decisions, but carries less ability to explain long term trends, such as how organizing ideas change, and how new norms replace old ones. Such long-term views incorporating a clearer sense of how the organization operates and sees the world around it are essential, as they provide insights ignored by models focusing on the simple preservation and promotion of bureaucratic interests. An examination of CP policy evolution will need to look carefully within the Department of Defense to examine how CP fit into the organization's practices, capabilities and particular view of the international security environment, not just how the domestic political environment shaped its approach to policy formulation and implementation. The following chapters will demonstrate how the approach to CP within the DOD was shaped by organizational

preference, but not necessarily preferences that were tied to the promotion of bureaucratic budget or turf.

The bureaucratic politics model focuses our attention on institutional power and the ways in which such power can shape policy agendas and policy implementation. However, though the bureaucratic politics can point to how bureaucratic action restricts the “menu of options” presented to policymakers in the short term through offering of options and expert advice, it gives little insight into the potential for *institutionalization* of new strategic conceptions and normative beliefs that present a much more lasting effect on choices.⁴⁸ Counterproliferation policy is a combination of specific military capabilities and ideas about how those capabilities are to be exercised in the efforts to prevent proliferation. Understanding its evolution requires examining the ideas and organizational practices that transcended individuals representing the organization, fundamentally shaping the framework of policy choice for decisionmakers through the institutionalization of a military capabilities driven challenge to NP.

Cognitive approaches

A third group of accounts identifies particular individuals with predetermined views on the international security environment as key to the establishment or development of counterproliferation policy.⁴⁹ In this view, it was the existing worldviews, cognitive biases, and historical reasoning employed by key individuals that account for CP evolution. In this set of accounts, CP came into existence largely as a result of the individual biases and preferences of the first Secretary of Defense under Clinton, Les Aspin. Aspin won his position as Secretary of Defense partly on his public criticism of

⁴⁸ Particular arguments of bureaucratic politics can restrict the “menu of choice” are made most clearly by Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. As will be presented in later treatment of organizational theory, Kier, Snyder and Posen have all argued that such dynamics are particularly significant in military organizations.

⁴⁹ See particularly, Thomas Mahnken, ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, *National Security Studies Quarterly*, (Summer 1999), pp. 91-102; Ellis and Kiefer, *Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy*; Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, (New York, Palgrave, 2003) Ch. 28; and David J. Karl, ‘Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers’, *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter 1996-1997), pp. 87-119

the first Bush Administration's policies that allowed Iraq to arm itself with a considerable unconventional weapons capability, and he imagined himself a "defense intellectual" who could craft a range of novel responses for the DOD to the emerging post-Cold War security environment. However, once Aspin left office soon after the announcement of the DCI, responsibility for implementing the DCI fell to lower ranking successors. Without a prominent and powerful backer to champion the initiative, CP largely faded from the agenda of policymakers. Missile defense programs, however, were kept alive by the efforts of prominent Republican lawmakers, each with cognitive biases towards defense policy that placed strong emphasis on increased funding for the U.S. military as the primary focus of protecting their individual vision of American national interests.

The arrival into office of the Bush Administration introduced key policymakers such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy National Security Adviser J.D. Crouch, and senior director for defense policy and arms control at the National Security Council, Frank Miller, who brought with them strong individual biases against policies of disarmament and nonproliferation. Each arrived in office with a belief system shaped by formative experiences during the Cold War that viewed a United States more willing to exercise its military muscle to protect its national interests as a force for peace. These policymakers harbored a deep skepticism of the motives of non-democratic regimes and tended to regard traditional NP methods and practices applied to so-called "rogue regimes" as analogous to appeasement with its historical precedent drawn from the legacy of Munich. To these policymakers, reliance on NP as an instrument of policy to address the problem of unconventional weapons proliferation was not merely unhelpful, but actually served to undermine the security interests of the United States. Thus when the attacks of 9/11 "cleared the table", these decisionmakers championed a radically reoriented, preemptive military vision of CP, transforming it into a formal challenger to existing NP policies.⁵⁰

Basic assumptions of cognitive models

⁵⁰ Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation, pp. 21-25

This third general approach for explaining the development of counterproliferation policy found in the literature and participant interviews is based upon assumptions about the impact of cognitive factors on decisionmaking. Cognitive models, though diverse and often drawing strongly from a wide range of fields in the social sciences, present an attempt to look inside the minds of decisionmakers.⁵¹ As such, they focus on the cognitive boundaries between individuals and their environments, seeking to demonstrate how psychological limitations on the ability to acquire, organize and use knowledge affect policy outcomes.⁵² The focus on individual cognition as a driver of political action is thus introduced in a standard text on political psychology:

To put it most simply, people are driven to act by internal factors, such as personality, attitudes, and self-identity; they evaluate their environment and others through cognitive processes that produce images of others; and they decide how to act when these factors are combined.⁵³

Again, while taken as a whole the rich diversity of cognitive theories do not represent as cohesive an axiomatic approach to international relations as, for example, structural theories, some central features and contributions of cognitive theories can be identified. Of particular interest are the examinations of belief systems and individual bias, and the importance of historical analogies in rationalizing decisions and developing threat perceptions.

Belief systems and biases

A belief system, loosely defined, encompasses a set of assumptions about the world – “how it works, what it is like, what kinds of actions are most likely to be successful” –

⁵¹ Yuen Fong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992); Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics; James M. Goldgeier, ‘Psychology and Security’, *Security Studies*, Vol. 6 (Summer 1997), pp. 137-166; Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); Donald A. Sylvan and James S. Voss (eds.) Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

⁵² Martha Cottam, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors and Thomas Preston (eds.), Introduction to Political Psychology, (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004) p. 38

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 6

that are useful in guiding action in indeterminate circumstances.⁵⁴ One type of belief system used to produce a number of insightful studies of decisionmaking is that of operational codes.⁵⁵ Much of the research on operational codes represents an attempt to answer questions about the potential consistency of individual decisionmakers' choices that would contradict the expectations of rational choice such as found in structural theories of International Relations. Their analytic focus is placed on philosophical and instrumental beliefs individual leaders have drawn from their formative experiences that shape their "beliefs about the nature and source of conflict in the political universe... [their] control over historical development and the role of chance."⁵⁶ Operational codes, though not assumed to unilaterally determine choices, are assumed to be causal mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions.⁵⁷

Without delving into a full detailing of the components and assumptions about belief systems in the cognitive theory literature such as the concept of the operational code, it is sufficient to say that such studies claim that belief systems are seen to regulate political decisionmaking to some degree by inserting highly individualized filtering and assumptions into the process of simplifying information and choices. The analytical establishment of a particular leader's operational code have often involved detailed psychobiographical studies of individual leaders in the hopes that such a profile might explain why certain norms are accepted or rejected by individuals, and why certain leaders have preferred accommodationist or conflictual strategies for interacting with

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 31

⁵⁵ Important studies of operational codes include Nathan Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1951); Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*, (New York, NY: Free Press, 1953); Alexander L. George, 'The "Operational Code": A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-making', *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 3, (1969) pp. 190-222; Alexander L. George, 'The causal nexus between cognitive beliefs and decision making behavior: The "operational code" belief system', in L. Falkowski (ed.), *Psychological Models in International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 95-123; Ole Holsti, 'The "Operational Code" Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, vol. 3, (1970), pp. 123-157; Stephen G. Walker, 'The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry A. Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, (1977: 21), pp. 129-168; and Scott B. Dyson, Drawing Policy Implications from the "Operational Code" of a "New" Political Actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin', *Policy Sciences*, vol. 34, (2001) pp. 329-346.

⁵⁶ Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, 'The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair: Belief Systems of Schemata?' paper delivered at annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2000, www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/walker.pdf, (accessed – April 10, 2008)

⁵⁷ George, 'The "Operational Code"', p. 200

strategic adversaries, among other factors.⁵⁸ It should be noted, however, that although foreign policy beliefs of many leaders have been demonstrated to be highly resistant to change, studies have often presented contradictory evidence establishing casual links between individual belief systems such as operational codes and overall state behavior, leading some to conclude that larger group biases and preferences must be accounted for.⁵⁹

The related literature examining biases also begins from the premise that policymakers do not arrive in their position of influence as a *tabula rasa*, but rather enter their roles with a host of preexisting beliefs, attitudes, memories, emotions and patterns for processing information.⁶⁰ Preexisting biases can serve to misinterpret the behavior and motivation of adversaries, as neutral or positive behavior is discounted as anomalous and negative behavior used to reinforce negative stereotypes and expectations. The cognitive rigidity and biases policymakers bring to their positions can ameliorate or exacerbate tensions between states, create barriers to signaling of credible threats, and serve to discount or dismiss information that contradicts policymakers' existing beliefs.⁶¹ As Robert Jervis has noted, cognitive theories such as formative experience may go some ways towards explaining the rationale for biases, which transcends simple filtering and simplification to cognitive forms of interpreting information and arriving at decisions that are pre-weighted towards certain outcomes.⁶²

The use and misuse of historical analogies

⁵⁸ Holsti, 'The "Operational Code"'; Walker, 'The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior'; Walker and Schafer, 'The Operational Codes of Bill Clinton and Tony Blair'

⁵⁹ Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice, (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980); Stephen G. Walker, 'The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis', *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June, 1990), pp. 403-418 (esp, p. 414)

⁶⁰ Some prominent examples include, George, Presidential Decisionmaking; Ole Holsti, 'Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy', in R. Fagen (ed.), Enemies in Politics, (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 25-96; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (1976), Ch. 6; and Phillip E. Tetlock, Charles B. McGuire and Gregory Mitchell, 'Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence', *Annual Review of Psychology*, vol. 42, (1991), pp. 239-276.

⁶¹ Tetlock, McGuire and Mitchell, 'Psychological Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence', pp. 269-270

⁶² Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Ch. 6

When confronting new situations, decisionmakers sometimes make shortcuts by drawing upon historical analogies. Drawing lessons from history through the use of historical analogy has proven to be a pervasive heuristic in framing problems and justifying action or inaction.⁶³ In the American context, the historical analogy of Vietnam is commonly employed when political debate centers on questions of intervention in situations as diverse as U.S. involvement to oppose Saddam Hussein's occupation of Kuwait to the question of using U.S. military forces to serve as peacekeepers in Bosnia.⁶⁴ The use of the Vietnam analogy is most commonly used to argue against military involvement, with the military action in question being represented as presenting the threat of a political or military "quagmire" with the potential to drain lives, resources and morale for a cause that is not central to American national security interests.

An opposing potent historical analogy often appealed to in the American political discourse is that of Munich. In this analogy, adversaries are often depicted as bloodthirsty tyrants in the mold of Hitler, and strategies for diplomatic resolution of crises are depicted as analogous to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler over the Sudetenland Crisis of 1938; a decision widely argued to have emboldened the Nazi leader, encouraging him to seek even broader territorial claims leading to the outbreak of WWII. In his landmark study of the Johnson Administration's advocacy for deeper military involvement in Vietnam, Yuan Foong Khong demonstrates how the "specter" of Munich affected how the President and his close circle of advisors viewed North Vietnamese motives. Interpreting them as reminiscent of the expansionist Nazi regime, the Johnson Administration argued that further U.S. military involvement in Vietnam was necessary to prevent a "domino" effect of communist expansion in South

⁶³ The best study of historical analogy as a constraint on the rationality of decisionmaking is Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). Other important studies include Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, (New York: Free Press 1986); and Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory Process in Foreign Policy Making, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); historical experience as significant to the formation of cultural identity is addressed in Murray and Grimsley, "On Strategy"; and Sylvan and Voss (eds.) Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision Making

⁶⁴ Preston, The President and His Inner Circle, Ch. 6, 7

East Asia.⁶⁵ While such simplifications are often inaccurate and are considered by some to be an “abuse” of history for political purposes, scholars such as Neustadt and May argue it is important to recognize that such use of historical analogy can have a fundamental impact on foreign policy outcomes.⁶⁶

As will be argued in the historical chapters of this thesis, the issue of political ideology opens the door to a broader questioning of the use of historical analogy. Do politicians use historical analogies like Vietnam and Munich when publicly assessing strategic choices because they truly believe the accuracy of such analogies, or because they find them to be effective political tools to sway public opinion and discredit opponents? For scholars such as Jack Snyder, the answer is the latter. Supporting the placement of historical “lessons” within a social and actively political context, Snyder argues, “It is more accurate to say that statesmen and societies actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it is to say they are shaped by them.”⁶⁷ While assessing ultimate intention is a difficult, if not impossible task for the outside observer, an awareness of the dynamics of argumentative legitimization and delegitimization is essential to explaining the impact of the broader social and political environment on decisionmaking.

Limitations of Cognitive Approaches in explaining CP

Cognitive theories make a significant contribution to our understanding of decisionmaking and the evolution of policy. Understanding how policymakers simplify the huge amount of information drawn from the external environment, and take shortcuts in reasoning to either formulate or justify policy responses, takes us much closer to the actual forces affecting policymaking than can be provided by an abstraction that marginalizes the individual such as the rational actor model. However, it is this focus on the individual that may also form the crucial limitation of cognitive theories. Just as it is true that states as abstractions can’t be realistically assumed to possess agency, human

⁶⁵ Khong, *Analogies at War*

⁶⁶ Neustadt and May, *Thinking in Time*

⁶⁷ Snyder, *Myths of Empire*, p. 30

agency is also limited, especially in the United States, by the variety of institutional frameworks and political structures that routinely place limits on the ability of individuals to place too broad a personal stamp on policy outcomes.

If CP policy evolution resulted largely from a series of individual biases, with each major transformation bearing the individual biases of the decisionmaker, then how are we to explain why the substantive basis of CP capabilities as it was presented in the 2002 NSS in the aftermath of 9/11 was indistinguishable from what it had become at the end of the Clinton Administration? Policy evolution in the case of counterproliferation is simultaneously a story of continual change and remarkable continuity. It is a story of both individual pressures for change and institutional limitations on the extent of those changes. Therefore any explanation of CP policy evolution must broaden its focus beyond simply the ideas individuals possess into an account of the impact of the identities they share, and the institutions that provide ideas with longevity and stability. As Jack Snyder further argues the need to place cognition in the social sphere,

Mental scripts and operational codes used by statesmen are not, at bottom, strictly cognitive. Rather, they are bound up with the social order, the political balance of power within it, its legitimation, and the justification of policies favored by particular social groups. Strategic beliefs exist more in the realm of ideology than in that of pure cognition.⁶⁸

Clearly the impact of biases, belief systems and use of historical analogy are important insights into real-world decisionmaking as are understandings of the structure of the international system and the impacts of bureaucratic politics. However, as will be argued in the following section, these are more useful concepts when elevated from the purely materialist / structural or individual spheres into the larger social world in which strategic discourse plays out and policy is made.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 31

Culture and norms: the social sphere of policy evolution

All of the theoretical approaches presented thus far offer important perspectives for explaining the evolution of counterproliferation policy. However, it will be argued there is a need to accept that the international security environment, and the material capabilities of other states are issues of serious consideration for policy makers, without assuming that the meaning of such capabilities are objectively given, as much as socially constructed. There is a need to accept that bureaucracies and organizations can play a significant role in shaping policy outcomes through their involvement in problem articulation, policy option identification and implementation, but without viewing bureaucratic interests as exclusively determinate of policy outcomes. Finally, there is a need to accept that individuals bring strong cognitive biases and preexisting worldviews to their positions of influence, and that social experience is often subjective, but without assuming that government behavior is merely a function of individual psychological processes. Above all, there is a need to situate policymakers in their social world, rather than attempt to imagine their assessments and actions taking place in an environment of objective, rational decision.

As argued by FPA scholar Valerie Hudson, “Social science is unlike the physical sciences in that what is analyzed possesses agency.”⁶⁹ A strong case has been made that connecting human agency to human society in which assumptions about supposedly objective facts must be brought into question.⁷⁰ This is not to say that meaningful things cannot be said about the world, but merely that when dealing with the inherently complex, non-mechanistic dynamics of the social world, some modesty about the bounds of probabilistic statements drawn from social inquiry should be maintained.⁷¹ Not only

⁶⁹ Hudson, ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’, p. 4

⁷⁰ Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (London: Clarendon, 1991)

⁷¹ Although a deeper examinations of the limits of positive social science is beyond the scope of this thesis, some important studies relevant to the objects of study in this thesis include, Stephen M. Walt, ‘Rigor or Rigor Mortis?: Rational Choice and Security Studies’, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), p. 5-48; Sanford F. Schram and Brian Caterino, Making Political Science Matter: Debating Knowledge, Research and Method, (New York: New York University Press, 2006); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro (eds.), Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science, (New

must some modesty about the limits of predictive knowledge be maintained, but an acceptance that to draw insights from the social world, the collective / intersubjective features of the social world such as culture and norms must be viewed as legitimate and necessary objects of study. Such an approach seeks to inform our existing knowledge of International Relations by providing accounts of what people believe and share in the ideational sphere, rather than relying too heavily on assessments of what they possess in the material sphere.⁷²

Culture

Although decidedly difficult to limit to a single definition, attention must briefly turn to the concept of culture, which represents part of a larger debate of the role of ideas in the study of International Relations.⁷³ If ideas are most simply defined as “beliefs held by individuals” then culture can most broadly be construed as the aggregation of ideas and practices that constitute and regulate a society.⁷⁴ Cultures are furthermore assumed to be collective models of nation-state authority or identity, comprised of patterns of activity, and the symbolic structures that give those activities meaning. As such, culture refers to both the collectively held ideas in a given society and the rules governing how social actors relate to each other in a system.⁷⁵

Cultures exist in meaningful ways at numerous levels in any given society, providing for both the establishment and maintenance of group identity, and in providing important regulative functions. In examples as diverse as hand signs used to communicate membership in street gangs, to larger shared understandings of appropriate state behavior

Haven: Yale University Press, 1994); Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations; John Gerard Ruggie, Constructing the World Polity, (London: Routledge, 1998); and Kahneman and Tversky, Choices, Values and Frames

⁷² As John Lewis Gaddis had commented, “the Cold War ended as much because of what people believed as because of what they possessed.”, in Gaddis, ‘International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War’, *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, (Winter, 1992-1993), p. 52

⁷³ Excellent overviews of the topic include Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993); Katzenstein, Cultures of National Security; Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics.

⁷⁴ Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, p. 3

⁷⁵ This definition borrows heavily from Katzenstein, Cultures of National Security, p. 6; see also Crawford, Argument and Change, pp. 57-78

such as in the case of general anti-militarism in contemporary Germany and Japan, cultures give meaning to the activities and symbolic structures of social identities.⁷⁶ Elizabeth Kier's research, for example, identifies culture constraints on behavior in military organizations reinforced by pervasive indoctrination and socialization, drawing the conclusion that, "military organizations develop strong collective understandings about the nature of their work and the conduct of their missions, and these organizational cultures influence their choices between offensive and defensive military doctrines."⁷⁷

Such social identities condition a range of group expectations and behaviors, from the aforementioned expectations of behaviors particular to certain types of organizations, to collective consensus on the appropriate use of force in international affairs. Therefore, understanding political action requires understanding how *actors define themselves*, and what is accepted as reasonable behavior and practice. Cultural variables are important objects of study, as they can affect state behavior in ways that contradict assumptions of rational, value maximizing behavior implicit in bureaucratic or structural explanations of state behavior.⁷⁸

Norms

A particularly important concept in most cultural approaches to International Relations is that of norms. While the literature on norms is as diverse and complex as that of culture, again, some basic questions relevant to this study can be asked and propositions about norms given. Are norms simply shared beliefs similar to conventions – "this is what we normally do" – or do they carry prescriptive meaning – "these are things we should / should not do"? Additionally, are norms merely representative of culture, or are they constitutive of culture? While there is hardly academic consensus on such questions,

⁷⁶ Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism

⁷⁷ Elizabeth Kier, 'Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security, p. 203

⁷⁸ Peter J. Katzenstein, 'Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security', in Peter J. Katzenstein, (ed.), The Culture of National Security: Norms, and Identity In World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 1-32

some literature points towards helpful clarification on the meaning of norms.⁷⁹ Neta Crawford attempts to clarify the concept by distinguishing between behavioral norms and normative beliefs.⁸⁰ According to Crawford, behavioral norms are equivalent to conventions, simply serving to define what constitutes normal practice. Normative beliefs on the other hand, provide the prescriptive basis for rules, laws and principles. It is through such definition that she concludes, “ethical arguments are characterized by the use of prescriptive statements that rest on normative beliefs.”⁸¹ For Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein,

Norms are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity... Sometimes norms operate like rules defining (and thus "constituting") an identity... In other instances, norms are "regulative" in their effect. They operate as standards for the proper enactment or deployment of a defined identity... Thus norms either define ("constitute") identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviors for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identities will shape behavior in varying circumstances). Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave.⁸²

In setting out to examine the practical regulatory effect of norms on state behavior, Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue that the longstanding taboo against the employment of chemical weapons is explained far more convincingly by the regulative effect of norms than by traditional self-help behavioral expectations.⁸³ Accounting for the constitutive and regulatory effect of norms has been used by Mark Suchman and Dana Eyre to explain the puzzle of investment in expensive modern weapons systems by smaller states that do not realize significant improvements in national security from these investments, by Martha Finnemore to illustrate the dramatic changes in global approaches

⁷⁹ See particularly Diego Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984). For discussion of the lack of consensus regarding the definition of norms, a helpful study is provided by Gregory A. Raymond, ‘Problems and Prospects in the Study of International Norms’, *Mershon International Studies Review*, vol. 41 (November, 1997), pp. 205-245

⁸⁰ Neta Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics, pp. 40, 41

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 41

⁸² Ibid, p. 55

⁸³ Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos’ in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-152

to intervention, and by Neta Crawford to explain the rapid and widespread global demise of colonialism, to name but a few such studies in which cultural identity and normative approaches trump traditional rational action, bureaucratic or cognitive explanations in providing for convincing explanations for state behavior.⁸⁴

This thesis similarly argues that although the external world and individual preference can provide some clues about the drivers of policy evolution, it is more centrally the shared understanding of the external world by cultural groups possessing policymaking and policy implementing responsibilities that determine policy outcomes. It is the culture and accepted norms of these groups that determine what their responsibilities are and what actions are appropriate to that identity, often aided by an identification of who they are not. Such identities are not static, but require constant maintenance, and defense against challenges to their legitimacy and position.⁸⁵ When properly maintained, such identities serve the essential function of reducing uncertainty about the external environment, allowing the categorization of other groups along the spectrum of friends and foes. Categories of appropriate or inappropriate actions by these groups are largely determined by their collective understanding of norms; both behavioral norms and normative beliefs. These norms are not static, but subject to challenge, transformation and replacement. To see how norms give meaning to group action and underpin policy transformation, it is necessary to examine the social “residues” they leave, tracking them through public discourse into policy implementation.⁸⁶

There are two very useful cultural models for exploring these social issues. First is strategic culture, which places its analytic focus on the collectively held beliefs of civilian policymakers and their efforts to legitimize those beliefs through argument and put them into action through policy outcomes. Strategic culture argues that policymaking must be

⁸⁴ Marc C. Suchman and Dana P. Eyre, ‘Military procurement as Rational Myth: Notes on the Social Construction of Weapons Proliferation’, *Sociological Forum*, Vol. 7, No. 1, (March, 1992), pp. 137-161; Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose Of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About The Use Of Force*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004); Crawford, *Argument and Change*

⁸⁵ Jutta Weldes, ‘Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment’, pp. 224, 225

⁸⁶ See Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, (London: Heineman, 1979); also Paul Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*, (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 42-45

seen as a continual series of challenges to both identity and norms by domestic groups, who themselves are ideationally constructed. The second model is organization theory, which focuses on the beliefs collectively held within particular military organizations and their ability to shape policy options and institutionalize emergent norms through organizational practices and capabilities.

Finally, the critical linkage between strategic culture and organizational culture will be examined, and the argument made that the policy impacts of these two on the evolution of CP, while distinct, cannot be understood in isolation. This thesis argues that any study of strategic culture is incomplete without a corresponding study of the institutions tasked with execution of policy. The forces that shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy cannot be separated from the formal institutions that provide longevity to those policies through the development of organizational practices and capabilities. Examining the interrelationship and recursivity of these two forces is crucial to understanding the link between cultural behavior, institutionalization and, ultimately, foreign policy behavior.

Strategic culture

Strategic culture provides a theoretical lens through which to understand the influence of domestic politics and culture on strategic choice, specifically how state action regarding military force is shaped by beliefs collectively held by decision-makers and policy elites. The approach posits that different states with similar material conditions and in similar strategic circumstances will likely formulate different policy responses to the security dilemmas they face. Thus strategic culture attempts to account for how decision-makers in different societies, or even decision-makers in the same societies think and respond to strategic circumstances differently, even when faced with the similar strategic circumstances and choices.⁸⁷ Furthermore, it is argued that strategic cultures play significant roles in challenging and establishing dominant normative beliefs through the causal pathway of political argument.

⁸⁷ Scott D. Sagan, 'The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems', in Peter R. Lavoy, Scott D. Sagan, and James J. Wirtz (eds.), Planning The Unthinkable: How New Powers Will Use Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), p. 31

Basic assumptions and definitions of strategic culture

Although the concept partly emerges from the literature on domestic political culture, the term, ‘strategic culture’, was first coined by Jack Snyder in explaining the cultural roots of Soviet nuclear strategy.⁸⁸ Snyder’s attempt to explain the non-material sources of difference in nuclear strategy between the superpowers resulted in a broad definition of strategic culture as, “a set of semi-permanent elite beliefs, attitudes, and behavior patterns socialized into a distinctive mode of thought.”⁸⁹ As such, Snyder’s work tried to explain what made Soviet nuclear strategy distinctly “Soviet”, as opposed to what might have been expected by rational choice models. Later scholars attempted to clarify the link between culture and state behavior by claiming strategic culture as a “generator of preferences” or “preference structures”, though this language represented a challenge to structural theories while retaining many of the central assumptions of rational choice theories.⁹⁰

Early generation strategic culture studies, while significant in opening up analysis to an investigation of cultural or ideational influences on behavior, on the whole did not offer many serious improvements over RAM, bureaucratic politics or cognitive theories. It is hard to say, for example, how the original strategic culture identification of distinct modes of thought or ranked preferences alone were anything more than a reformulation of central conditions for rational choice models. Not only was little insight generated into how preferences were generated, sustained and put into action, but early studies also featured overly broad categories of “cultural” influences. Studies that incorporated geography, history, technology and ideology were so broad in the end as to leave little

⁸⁸ For the roots of strategic cultural thinking in writing on domestic political culture, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Vebra, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications For Nuclear Options*, (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1977), R-2154-AF

⁸⁹ Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture*, p. 8

⁹⁰ Jeffery S. Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, *International Studies Review*, (Fall, 2002) Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 104, 105

room for non-cultural explanations.⁹¹ Another related shortcoming of the early strategic culture literature was that such a broad interpretation of culture gave no indication where strategic cultural impacts were to be observed.

Only more recently have strategic culture studies made new inroads into the theory by limiting the definition of strategic culture, especially in terms of what can reasonably be considered to inform strategic culture biases and preferences, and where observation of strategic culture is possible.⁹² A particularly useful redefinition of strategic culture is provided by Alasdair Ian Johnston:

Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.⁹³

Three aspects of this definition serve to clarify many of the undefined or overly broad aspects of earlier strategic cultural scholarship. First, in identifying strategic culture as an integrated system of symbols, Johnston argues the object of study requires a focus not only on biases and preferences but also on the discourse that sustains and propagates those biases and preferences. Second, in drawing from earlier efforts an emphasis on pervasive and long lasting preferences, we are equipped to examine strategic culture as guide to behavior, rather than simply a synthesis of possible cultural variables.

Significantly, this conception does not claim that preferences are immutable or

⁹¹ Examples of first generation strategic culture literature include Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture; Colin Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986); and Carnes Lord, 'American Strategic Culture', *Comparative Strategy* Vol. 5, No. 3 (1985), pp. 269-293

⁹² Important "third generation" strategic culture scholarship includes the work of Alasdair Iain Johnston in Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ken Booth and Russell Troad (eds.), Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1998); studies of German and Japanese strategic culture in Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); and work on the common approaches to security in Scandinavian countries by Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, 'Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defense, *Cooperation and Conflict*, (2005) Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 5-23. An important overview of the literature is provided in Jeffrey S. Lantis, 'Strategic Culture and National Security Policy', pp. 87-113

⁹³ Alasdair Iain Johnston, 'Thinking About Strategic Culture', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring, 1995), pp. 45, 54

unchanging, but rather that they serve to interpret structural or material changes in the international security environment, rather than themselves being directed by those changes. Finally, if strategic cultures succeed in “clothing these conceptions in an aura of factuality”, it would follow that ideas bear the potential to condition decision-making behavior in particular ways.

Distinct strategic cultures can be differentiated largely by their long-term collectively held assumptions about the strategic environment and subsequent decision guiding behaviors. As Johnston and other theorists have claimed, the most salient categories of collective assumptions concern questions about the role of conflict in human affairs, the nature of perceived strategic threats and the efficacy of the use of force to address these threats.⁹⁴ First, do the members of the group view conflict as inevitable in human affairs or an aberration? Second, do members view the nature of international threats as posing a zero-sum, or variable sum dilemma? Finally, what is the group view on the utility of force to control outcomes and eliminate perceived threats?

The answers to these questions drive operational assumptions about what options are best suited to dealing with strategic threats, and provide long-term policy preferences that are applied to various strategic circumstances and environments.⁹⁵ A group assuming the inevitability of conflict, zero-sum threats and a high utility of armed force would be predicted to try and ‘solve’ problems posed by strategic threats through offensive strategies rather than accommodation. A group holding the opposite assumptions would likely prefer to manage threats through the application of diplomatic tools or compromise / cooperative strategies. Strategic cultures thus provide established, relatively static preferences for action across different strategic circumstances and time periods through the orienting device of deeply held beliefs and accepted norms that shape views on the

⁹⁴ This section draws heavily from the “central paradigm of strategic culture” as articulated by Johnston in *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China*, pp. 13-15; see also Booth and Trood, *Strategic Cultures in the Asia Pacific Region*

⁹⁵ It should be noted that these sets of preferences are partially derived from the central philosophical and instrumental assumptions for establishing operational codes set out in Alexander L. George, ‘The “Operational Code”, 1969; elaboration of which is set out in Stephen G. Walker, ‘The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis’, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (June, 1990), pp. 403-418 (esp, p. 411)

nature of international threats and the utility of the use of force to address such threats. As Johnston further elaborates, “ideas as independent variables are useful only because they interpret or give meaning to material facts. Thus changes in relative capabilities, for instance, mean something different to a realist politician concerned about relative gains in a competitive world than they do to a liberal concerned about absolute gains.”⁹⁶

Strategic Culture “membership”

In terms of “membership”, policy elites, political institutions such as parties or domestic coalitions, and formal institutions have all been identified as potential bearers of strategic culture. Significant members include policy makers, intellectuals, and other powerful actors who attempt to promote or legitimize strategic conceptions that are in line with the dominant biases and assumptions of the particular strategic culture. The relative fluidity of the membership of strategic cultures within contested political systems assumes a natural turnover of these groups.⁹⁷ By the nature of its fluid membership, influence and acceptance, an individual strategic culture is not entirely static, but prone to a certain degree of adaptation and evolution. All those who possess the biases and assumptions of a strategic culture can legitimately be considered members. Again, emphasis should be placed on collectives rather than individuals, as it is the collectively held beliefs that shape policy outcomes that are of central interest to this study.

This thesis largely focuses on the U.S. Congress and Office of the President in its examination of strategic culture. This is not a claim that other groups and individuals should be considered insignificant in terms of establishing and maintaining shared ideational assumptions and preferences, simply that Congress and presidential administrations play outsized roles in the general foreign policy process, and have been particularly important in the evolution of counterproliferation policy and its underlying

⁹⁶ Johnston, ‘Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China’

⁹⁷ Yitzhak Klein, ‘A Theory of Strategic Culture’, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (1991); Lawrence Jacobs and Benjamin Page, “Who Influences U.S. Foreign Policy?” *American Political Science Review*, 99, 1 (February, 2005) <http://www.northwestern.edu/ipr/publications/papers/2004/WP-04-05>; Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy*

strategic conceptions.⁹⁸ Focus on Congress and the Presidency in this study of strategic culture is also useful as a theoretical counterpoint to many existing studies of the interaction of these two groups.⁹⁹

Much has been written on the relative weakness of the U.S. Congress in “determining” foreign policy outcomes as it has progressively abrogated significant legal authority to the Executive branch. While certainly a valid focus for analysis, such arguments tend to overemphasize qualitative factors of tangible power such as legal precedents for decisionmaking authority, and minimize the often intangible ideational function such an institution plays. A central challenge of this thesis to such instrumental accounts of legislative influence is by repositioning analytic focus on the ways in which influential members, often loosely clustered into identifiable strategic cultures, can establish and maintain “legitimate” policy conceptions. It is such normative legitimization functions embedded in political argumentation that allow the U.S. Congress to control the forms of discourse that can limit the range of appropriate responses to strategic challenges, and steer policymaking away from the “rational” decisionmaking conditions assumed in much of the literature.

The need to account for competing strategic cultures

⁹⁸ Although such limitations exclude the input of think tanks, NGO’s and other international actors such as the UN and NATO, a focus on the formal elements of the US government is appropriate for a study of language and threat framing from within the government, as these processes strongly shape policy positions that are then brought to international forums for discussion, often in largely non-negotiable terms. There are worthwhile examinations of the international perspective on US counterproliferation, such as, Benjamin Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (ed.), International Perspective on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 1-10; as well as consideration of Russian, Indian and Chinese perspectives in this same volume; however, these perspectives are argued to fall outside of the scope of this thesis.

⁹⁹ Though the literature on the interaction between Congress and the President on foreign policy is voluminous, some important accounts include, Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1964); Stephen R. Weissman, A Culture of Deference: Congress’s Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy, (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Gordon Silverstein, Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: how Congress and the president really make foreign policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Bert A. Rockman, ‘Reinventing What for Whom? President and Congress in the Making of Foreign Policy’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 133-154; and James M. Lindsay, ‘Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 2003), pp. 530-546

An important weakness of strategic culture literature is that in the interest of parsimony, states are assumed to possess a single strategic culture in order to map preferences over time to exclude behavioral influences of structural or relative power changes. The advance of strategic culture theory has thus been hobbled by needing to appeal to the narrow methodological confines of structural theories. Such limitations represent an admirable necessity for establishing their analytical validity, but a limiting convention nonetheless. That competing strategic cultures can exist within the same state, each with highly differentiated biases and preferences, challenges any presumption that strategic cultures are themselves the product of structural forces. Thus this thesis argues there is a need to account for the impact of competing strategic cultures on state behavior.

In the strategic culture literature, Germany, Japan and various Scandinavian states have provided good case studies for strategic cultural explanations of policy.¹⁰⁰ They appear to be largely culturally homogenous, and they have made security policy choices in the post-Cold War that seem to, if not directly challenge structuralist assumptions about what policies would be rational, then at least provide accounts of state actions in “structurally indeterminate situations.”¹⁰¹ It is tempting for purposes of parsimony to attribute security policy to factors such as “Japanese society.”¹⁰² However, this ignores the fact that individual societies may experience relatively powerful competition between distinct sets of cultural beliefs and values held by those attempting to shape security policy. Thus strategic culture does not serve as an ideational representation of the state, but rather belongs within the state, and can serve to illuminate significant intra-state political competition. It is assumed that in societies where normative debates are minimal, strategic culture may be homogenous, whereas strategic cultures in polarized societies may be equally representative of such divisive forces.

¹⁰⁰ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*; Neumann and Heikka, ‘Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defense’, Darryl Howlett and John Glenn, ‘Epilogue: Nordic Strategic Culture’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, (2005) Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 121-140;

¹⁰¹ Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies’, *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1999), p. 156-180; See also Sten Rynning, ‘The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (December, 2003), pp. 479-496

¹⁰² Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, p. 1

This thesis posits there are two major competing strategic cultures active within the U.S. that can legitimately affect foreign policy outcomes. Though any divisive labels are incomplete and potentially carry extra theoretic baggage, for purposes of identification, ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ strategic cultures will be the two groups examined in this thesis. Though later chapters will explain specific divisions on proliferation issues, it is important to briefly explain the choice of these labels, so as to avoid later confusion.

Liberal and conservative in this thesis are drawn from the American political context, rather than in reference to International Relations theory. The linguistic division of ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’ popular in much writing since the Vietnam War is avoided for its oversimplification of a conflict / pacifist divide that is not representative of the strategic debates over the issue of proliferation.¹⁰³ ‘Democratic’ and ‘Republican’ are avoided, because although liberal and conservative often overlap with the respective major political parties, these labels carry a much larger set of domestic political connotations inappropriate to the examination of foreign policy analysis. Finally, the descriptions of ‘soft idealpolitik’ and ‘hard realpolitik’ strategic culture favored by theorists such as Johnston are avoided, as the notion of realpolitik is often linked to Rational Actor Model and other systemic theories challenged by this thesis.¹⁰⁴ Additionally, this thesis argues in later chapters that neoconservatives were instrumental in shaping conservative strategic culture in the U.S., and neoconservatives are often opposed to Realists and realpolitik minimization of the role of ideas and identity in favor of concerns such as the balance of material power.¹⁰⁵ Therefore labels of liberal and conservative have been chosen as a middle ground between potentially misleading or otherwise theoretically problematic alternatives.

¹⁰³ For some discussion of the linguistic issues surrounding the labels of ‘hawks’ and ‘doves’, see Friedrich Wilhelm Gerster, ‘Linguistic Aspects of the Vietnam War’, *Amerikastudien/American Studies* 20, no. 2 (1975), pp. 307–319; and David L. Anderson, (ed.) *Shadow on the White House: Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945–1975*, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993)

¹⁰⁴ Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, p. 47

¹⁰⁵ For examples of this mutual enmity, see Norman Podhoretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, *Commentary*, (March 1996), pp. 19–27; and Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 235–238

It is important to note, however, that while “liberal” and “conservative” are useful labels for the purposes of this thesis, such categories should not be mistaken as a blanket homogenization of all liberal and conservative factions within the U.S. political context. For example, while the arguments and activities of the neoconservative wing of the Republican Party are important to incorporate into the analysis of the thesis, it would be a mistake to portray neoconservative positions as representative of those held by all U.S. conservatives.¹⁰⁶ Therefore, although this thesis argues that for purposes of distinguishing broadly divergent strategic assumptions within the U.S. context, such categorization serves as a necessary simplification, such a move should not be taken to imply a lack of meaningful divisions within each category.

Political argument: linking strategic cultural preferences and policy outcomes

Even if we establish that strategic cultures exist in meaningful ways and serve to maintain longstanding preferences and biases, this still leaves several important questions to be answered before causal links to policy outcomes can be made. How can strategic culture help explain the evolution of CP? How does the existence of competing strategic cultures with their associated preferences help explain the evolution of CP in a way that substantially differs from simple cognitive, bureaucratic or rational action models? Is policy evolution more than simply a function of which group holds the reins of political power at any given time? In essence, we still need to connect strategic culture and its associated ideas to the *process* of foreign policy. This requires asking how strategic cultures bring about *change* - and not just individual policy change, but more fundamental normative changes that provide a framework for future policy debates and organizational action. To redress this weakness, the existing strategic culture framework will need to be expanded if it is to prove useful in explaining the evolution of CP, not merely its end state.

The path to such an explanation lies in exploring how strategic cultural preferences are translated through political argument into more lasting ways of framing sets of problems,

¹⁰⁶ This issue is discussed in greater depth in chapter 5

and in the way in which such efforts translate into longer term expectations of what is both necessary and possible in the practice of foreign policy. An examination of argument and framing can illuminate the ways in which strategic cultures legitimize or delegitimize normative frameworks, providing a causal pathway to policy outcomes. It is by exploring these dynamics that a clearer link can be drawn between strategic cultural preference, resulting policy and ultimately the institutionalization of such preferences in organizational practice and capabilities.

Ideas must be expressed in order to be shared, leaving what Theo Farrell calls “physical residues” – codified or recorded clues as to their meaning and path of dissemination.¹⁰⁷ Thus we can in some ways treat the investigation of such shared beliefs by examining not only their origins in strategic cultural preference, but also their methods of transmission and implementation. As ideas in the political sphere are transmitted through argument, and the ideas embedded in argument are both representative and constitutive of culture, analysis should focus on how leaders describe their strategic environment and argue for specific responses to that environment.

Political argument serves not only to express methods of reasoning and convey and reinforce cultural preferences, but also to *persuade* others of the value of such reasoning and justify courses of action.¹⁰⁸ Argumentative vehicles such as policy positions, legislative debates, public speeches, internal correspondence, and other persuasive forms, often do not serve merely to present a course of action as appropriate to address a particular strategic dilemma, but rather represent an attempt to establish or reinforce larger conceptions of cultural identity and appropriate forms of action. Political actors are often concerned with more than the resolution of a particular dilemma, and use the argumentative tools at their disposal to make broader claims about which kinds of actions

¹⁰⁷ Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2002), p. 61

¹⁰⁸ For detailed examinations of the different forms of argument relevant to the study of politics, see Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics*, esp. ch. 1; Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse: Theory and Practice*; Simon Dalby, *Creating the Second Cold War: The Discourse of Politics*, (London: Pinter, 1990); Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, (London: Routledge, 2006); and Stephen Toulmin, *The Uses of Argument*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958)

appropriately serve their conceptions of “national interest”. Political arguments are thus manifestations of not only particular policy prescription, but also larger normative frameworks. As Price and Tannenwald have argued in their study of the chemical weapons taboo, “Discourses produce and legitimate certain behaviors and conditions of life as ‘normal’ and, conversely, construct categories that themselves make a cluster of practices and understandings seem inconceivable or illegitimate.”¹⁰⁹

Even in Berger’s strategic culture analysis of relatively homogenous German and Japanese strategic culture, especially their positions on the external use of force, he admits that, “In both cases, these lessons were shaped by the fierce political debates of the early postwar years...”¹¹⁰ Eventually a single Japanese or German strategic culture is argued to have won the battle for institutionalization, with its biases and preferences established as legitimate starting points for political discourse and debate. Thus if ultimately successful in both argumentation and institutionalization, dominant conceptions act as starting points for discussion, serving to control what is considered legitimate discourse, potentially reshaping normative beliefs about appropriate categories of behavior and thereby limiting both the legitimate ends of foreign policy as well as the means to pursue those ends. Challenger conceptions that fall outside of these boundaries do not start on equal footing, but need to first delegitimize and displace existing conceptions to be themselves accepted as legitimate. This dynamic means there is often a relatively narrow range of legitimate conceptions about identified security threats at any given time.¹¹¹

Neta Crawford presents a similar line of argument in claiming that the cyclical process of legitimization and delegitimization is central to understanding how dominant beliefs and practices undergo change:

First, persuasive ethical arguments deconstruct: they denormalize and delegitimize dominant beliefs and practices. Second, persuasive ethical arguments

¹⁰⁹ Price and Tannenwald, ‘Norms and Deterrence’, p. 125

¹¹⁰ Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism*, pp. 6, 7; see also Jeffery S. Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, *International Studies Review*, (Fall, 2002) Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 87-113

¹¹¹ Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse*, pp. 46, 204

offer a reconstruction, the articulation of an alternative that meets normative criteria. In this phase, alternative conceptions of possibility and interest are discussed and adopted by some actors. And, in the third phase, actors begin to change their social world. If arguments are persuasive among enough individuals and groups (and “enough” depends on the context), then the balance of capabilities between those who favor the dominant normative belief and the new normative belief will begin to change.¹¹²

How do certain arguments, if successful, shape the boundaries of future discourse? The legitimization / delegitimization dynamic of political argument hints at a larger meta-argumentative function beyond the immediate resolution of policy questions – that of framing.

Framing

Consider for a moment, some specific political arguments over the nature of the proliferation threat that emerged during the evolution of CP. An argumentative divide emerged in the early 1990’s over how to interpret the motives of certain potentially adversarial states such as Iraq, North Korea and Iran. One side in the debate argued that while particular behaviors of those states required U.S. response, such behavior was reflective of rational states with limited ambitions. Common sense from this perspective dictated that enhancing traditional forms of defense and deterrence, coupled with strengthening the mechanisms of the NP regime would serve to dissuade such states from engaging in confrontation with the United States. The opposing argument, however, argued that such states were in fact irrational actors, whose ideological motives did not provide reasonable limits on their behavior. Common sense from this perspective dictated that any method that did not ultimately serve to rollback the unconventional capabilities of such states would lead to potentially more catastrophic conflict with the United States, when such conflict ultimately occurred.

This example illuminates the powerful concept of argumentative framing, as defined by communications scholar Robert Entman, “to select some aspects of a perceived reality

¹¹² Crawford, *Argument and Change*, p. 7

and make them more salient in communicating... in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”¹¹³ The focus is on an active process of selection from within a larger set of potential perceptions or interpretations, consisting of a selector attempting to shape the perceptions of an audience.¹¹⁴ Thus in the act of political argument / discourse, the choice of language is vital because it has the potential to evoke moral and conceptual, not to mention emotional associations that condition perceptions of efficacy and legitimacy.¹¹⁵

Effectively framed political messages, sufficiently reinforced through cohesive repetition have a greater potential to create an intense emotional resonance with political audiences than purely ‘rational’ explanations of policy details. Such emotional resonance increases the potential that messages and frames will be perceived as ‘common sense’, or uniquely realistic and efficacious.¹¹⁶ The ultimate goal of such a communications strategy being the bridging of public perceptions of ‘common sense’ policy with the preexisting assumptions and preferences of strategic culture. As Republican communications strategist Frank Luntz commented on the efficacy of this process when successfully employed:

“Common sense” doesn’t require any fancy theories; it is *self-evidently* correct... “Common sense” is not just the best argument for almost any policy prescription you might propose – it’s essential. If you win and occupy the rhetorical territory owned by “*common sense*,” your position will be virtually unassailable.¹¹⁷

¹¹³ Robert M. Entman, ‘Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm’, *Journal of Communication*, Vol 43, No. 4, (1993), pp. 51-58; see also David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, ‘Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation’, *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4. (August, 1986), pp. 464-481; and Gail T. Fairhurst, ‘Reframing The Art of Framing: Problems and Prospects for Leadership’, *Leadership*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2005) pp. 165-185

¹¹⁴ The focus in media studies, political communications and management studies on an active process of audience manipulation departs from the more general sociological focus on ‘collective action frames’. See Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611-639; see also Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

¹¹⁵ George Lakoff, ‘Simple Framing: An introduction to framing and its uses in politics’, Rockridge Institute, February 14 2006, http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_framing, (accessed August 15, 2007)

¹¹⁶ Chilton, *Analysing Political Discourse*, pp. 46, 204

¹¹⁷ Frank Luntz, *Words That Work*, (New York, NY: Hyperion, 2007) p. 211

Such political strategy mirrors the findings of Nobel Prize winning behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, whose research has explored the limits of analytical insight and predictive capacity achieved by treating human beings as rational actors.¹¹⁸ The pair introduced the concept of *framing* into behavioral economics, whereby central axioms of rational choice often do not hold depending on how choices are framed (i.e., presented).¹¹⁹ What the research on framing problems demonstrates is that in the real world of social interaction, *how* a problem is presented is often as important as *what* problem is presented. This further opens the door to a wider questioning of the assumptions of rational choice models insofar as they assume a world of decisions made about objective facts

If, as Crawford argues, “Meta-arguments are causally important when their exponents succeed in setting the framework for understanding events”, then a satisfying strategic cultural perspective must account for both the realities of political competition and purpose of political argument.¹²⁰ Tracing how arguments about the issues of proliferation were framed by different groups of policymakers, and how those arguments shaped or limited the range of subsequent inquiry as reflected in the content of political argument, will be a central feature in the examination of strategic cultural impacts on the evolution of CP. Thus we need to move beyond simply tracking which groups successfully establish domestic political dominance at any given time, and more importantly determine which groups are most successful in establishing the legitimacy of their arguments *over time*. Such an approach can both produce a powerful explanation of policy evolution as well as expose the longer-term effects of political argument that may survive the political dominance of the strategic culture that brought about such changes.

¹¹⁸ Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, ‘The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice’, *Science*, 211 (1981), pp. 453-458

¹¹⁹ Called Prospect Theory in economics. See Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds.), Choices, Values and Frames, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); see also Daniel Kahneman, “A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality”, *American Psychologist*, 58, pp. 697-720

¹²⁰ Crawford, Argument and Change, p. 35

Strategic culture offers a useful framework for explaining policy transformation as partially a function of competitive ideational groups at the domestic level. Once expanded to accept political competition and paired with a deeper understanding of political argument, strategic culture emerges as a useful framework for explaining the evolution of CP. While there is little doubt that the international threat environment had changed as a result of post-Gulf War discoveries about the nature and scope of Iraqi unconventional weapons programs, this should not be taken as bearing implying inherently preferential policy responses. This is not to argue that threat conceptions were merely invented or ignored by various actors, but rather that foreign policy actors interpret events and material changes in the international security environment and then attempt to shape appropriate responses based on these interpretations. Rather than simply imagining threats in isolation from external stimuli, a strategic culture perspective assists in looking within the subjective assumptions and interpretations that form the basis for policy evolution.

Furthermore, as the forces that shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy to particular normative conceptions cannot be separated from the formal institutionalization of those conceptions, this thesis argues that any study of strategic culture is incomplete without a corresponding study of the institutions tasked with execution of policy. The forces that shape cultural beliefs and confer legitimacy cannot be separated from the formal institutions that provide longevity to those policies through the development of organizational practices and capabilities. Therefore, the thesis will now turn to organizational theory, which focuses on the beliefs collectively held within particular military organizations and their capacity to shape policy options through their development or use of military capabilities and their ability to institutionalize emergent norms. Examining the interrelationship of strategic cultural preferences and modes of discourse, together with the role of functional organizations tasked with policy implementation is crucial to understanding the link between ideas, culture, institutionalization and ultimately foreign policy behavior.

Organizational theory

From explanations that began, “It was obvious that the United States needed to...” and, “senior policy maker ‘x’ decided that we needed to...” a number of explanations for CP evolution have been offered in informal conversations and interviews with former DOD policy makers and the writings of members of the military charged with the implementation of counterproliferation. Such explanations generally mirror the theoretical assumptions embodied in the RAM, Bureaucratic Politics and Cognitive models presented at the beginning of the chapter, and are represented by participants as supposedly “common sense” explanations for CP evolution. However, as argued throughout this thesis, what appeared to be self-evident to those involved is often precisely what requires explanation if we are to more fully explain the types of cultural preferences, argumentative structures and institutional processes that ultimately serve to develop one set of foreign policy responses at the cost of another. In the case of the U.S. military, a satisfying explanation must answer how this particular set of preferences came to be seen as not just “common sense” for military leaders but also became embedded in the organizational routines and capabilities of the military itself.

Retrospective explanations of “common sense” fail to adequately explain why a defense initiative intended to provide strictly defensive force protection measures and highly constrained support of NP regime enforcement measures would quickly become heavily invested in counterforce capabilities with strong offensive utility. Similarly, common sense inadequately explains why an initiative senior DOD officials strongly defended from criticism as potentially indicating a preemptive orientation, would very quickly lead to the types of training, missions and capabilities across the different branches of the military that would directly support an eventual preemptive doctrine.

Cultural preferences for policy, and the political arguments that championed those preferences are necessary considerations for explaining the evolution of CP, but alone do not constitute sufficient explanation of that evolution. This section will address why we also need to understand the role of the DOD in CP policy evolution, what special

contribution the DOD made to the evolution of CP by virtue of being a military organization, and how this fits with the impacts of strategic culture.

Organizational biases and preferences

Literature on organizations has demonstrated how the special cognitive and ideational features of organizations can place constraints on rational decisionmaking.¹²¹ Similar to strategic cultures, military organizations often filter inputs and generate preferences in regularized ways. These reified concepts and general worldview are embodied in the umbrella term of organizational culture, “the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understanding,” the acceptance of which is central to the socialization of new members and thus maintenance of the status quo.¹²² For military organizations in particular, incoming members must demonstrate awareness of concepts transmitted in their training throughout their professional careers, and the credibility and effectiveness of individuals often rests on their apparent acceptance of organizational knowledge.¹²³ Additionally, career advancement is often contingent on perceptions of a member’s explicit acceptance and promotion of such concepts. Thus organizational behavior is strongly conditioned by the assumptions and preferences generated through the dissemination and maintenance of organizational culture.¹²⁴

Research into military culture indicates that elite members of military organizations are more likely than civilian policymakers to view conflict as inevitable in the long run, and

¹²¹ Important examinations of the limitations on rational decision making inherent to organizations include Herbert Simon, ‘Human Nature in Politics’; Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963); Allison, Essence of Decision; Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy; Sagan, Limits of Safety; Keir, Imagining War; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany Between the World Wars, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004)

¹²² Kier, Imagining War, p. 28

¹²³ Feaver and Gelpi note that there is yet no consensus on whether such generalized acceptance of military culture should be attributed largely to socialization or self-selection. See Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) pp. 23, 63

¹²⁴ Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 50

more likely to be skeptical of non-military solutions to traditional security problems.¹²⁵ Due to their particular responsibilities and training, professional members of the military are socialized to focus on the purely military influences on conflict outcomes, and thus often “see the world through lenses that filter out important political considerations that can (and should) influence strategic decisions and military outcomes in war.”¹²⁶ Such findings have led to questions about propensity for militarism in the form of an excessive faith in military solutions to a wide range of political problems, leading to greater potential for expansionist foreign policies.¹²⁷ Fear of a tendency towards militarism was an important consideration in the early structuring of balance of powers and strong civilian control over the military in the United States.¹²⁸

An additional concern has been the so-called “cult of the offensive”, in which strong identity functions stemming from organizational culture and organizational routines impact the development of military doctrine.¹²⁹ Scholars such as Barry Posen, Jack Snyder and Scott Sagan have argued that assumptions about the international security environment such as the inevitability of conflict, preferences for the overwhelming rather than incremental use of force, and knowledge-laden routines such as the requirements for coordination of battle, lead to strong preferences within military organizations for offensive doctrines.¹³⁰ Military organizations are largely expected to favor offensive doctrines, and if left to their own devices, even preventative doctrines, as these are

¹²⁵ For studies indicating military officers are generally more inclined than the broader population to believe that war is inevitable, see John P. Lovell, “The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet”, in Morris Janowitz (ed.), The New Military, (New York, Russell Sage, 1964), p. 129; Bengt Abrahamsson, “Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War”, in Jacques van Doorn (ed.) Military Profession and Military Regimes, (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), pp. 35-51

¹²⁶ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, p. 18

¹²⁷ Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); see also Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., The Civilian and the Military, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956)

¹²⁸ Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Establishment in America, (New York: Free Press, 1975)

¹²⁹ Barry Posen defines military doctrine as, “the subcomponent of grand strategy that deals with explicitly with military means. Two questions are important: *What* means shall be employed? And *How* shall they be employed? Priorities must be set among the various types of military forces available to the modern state. A set of prescriptions must be generated specifying how military forces should be structured and employed to respond to recognized threats and opportunities. Ideally, modes of cooperation between different types of forces should be specified.” Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 13

¹³⁰ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; and Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,’ pp. 18-23

assumed to both reduce unexpected battlefield variables in the minds of most military leaders, and limit the long-term opportunities adversaries have to gain military advantages through the development of their own military capabilities.¹³¹ For Posen, “Military organizations will generally prefer offensive doctrines because they *reduce uncertainty* in important ways.”¹³²

Successful execution of military plans often rests on being able to choose combat conditions and execute standard exercises acquired in training, rather than to be forced to react to adversarial initiative.¹³³ The training and analytical skills of military organizations favors the calculation of requirements to defeat measurable adversarial traits such as military capability and force structure, rather than intangible political or social forces such as the will of the adversary to fight, or their motivations in conflict.¹³⁴ Offensive operations by their logistical nature also require more extensive budgetary allocations to support and maintain in both war and peacetime, thus serving to support what some have argued is an organizational tendency to jealously guard and seek to increase turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its “essence” or “mission.”¹³⁵

Are such issues of militarism and offensive doctrinal tendency relevant in the case of the United States? Recent U.S. civil-military relations research illuminates some of the more complex realities and challenges to conventional wisdom about military views on the use of force such as militarism and offensive bias.¹³⁶ In one of the most thorough analyses of

¹³¹ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, pp. 18, 19

¹³² Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, p. 47. A notable exception is presented by Elizabeth Keir, who presents doctrinal choice as *socially conditioned*, and thus dependent on how a particular military organization interprets its own cultural practices and perceives environmental uncertainty, rather than automatically predisposed to offensive doctrine. See Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War

¹³³ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine’, p. 18

¹³⁴ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, pp. 49-50

¹³⁵ Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 28

¹³⁶ See specifically, Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles. Other important studies of civil-military relations include, Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Doubleday, 1954); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960); Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, (New York: Vintage Books, 1964); Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Kenneth C. Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990); Richard K. Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises, (New York: Columbia

elite U.S. civilian and military attitudes towards the use of force, Peter Feaver discovered that American military attitudes support such expectations of offensive doctrinal bias, but are limited to the question of how force is to be applied in conflict, rather than question of whether force should be initiated.¹³⁷ Furthermore, elite military members in the United States appear to be significantly less willing to initiate conflict than their non-military, non-veteran civilian counterparts, especially in circumstances that reach beyond traditionally threats to ‘national security,’ such as humanitarian intervention.¹³⁸ However, once conflict occurs, elite military members are much more likely to favor the overwhelming, decisive use of force and fewer limitations on the use of that force.¹³⁹ One of the most significant conclusions of Feaver’s detailed analysis is a finding that runs contrary to a central expectation of much military organizational theory literature - that it is civilian policymakers in the U.S. rather than military leaders who tend to have “more expansive foreign policy goals and tend to have greater faith in military solutions to political problems.”¹⁴⁰

How can we fit this view of the U.S. military as being generally conflict averse, except in cases of traditionally defined central U.S. national interests, into a better understanding of the forces which shaped CP evolution? Consideration must first be given to how these particular preferences and biases are operationalized in the *organizational routines*, *knowledge processes*, and *capabilities development* practices of the DOD. It is these essential uncertainty reduction functions that fundamentally underpin military doctrine, and ultimately hold the potential to reshape the landscape of choice for civilian

University Press, 1991); Peter D. Feaver, Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992)

¹³⁷ Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles: American Civil-Military Relations and the Use of Force, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005)

¹³⁸ A traditional conception of national security would focus on such issues as direct threats to the American homeland, allies or access to critical resources.

¹³⁹ Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, Ch 2

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 24. Their empirical conclusions strongly support arguments long present in Cold War and post-Cold War American civil-military relations literature. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises; Christopher Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Peter D. Feaver, ‘Civil-Military Conflict and the Use of Force,’ in Donald Snider and Miranda A. Carlton-Carew (eds.), U.S. Civil-Military Relations: In Crisis or Transition?, (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995); and Edward N. Luttwak, ‘From Vietnam to Desert Fox: Civil-Military Relations in Modern Democracies’, *Survival*, vol. 41, no. 1 (1999), pp. 99-112

policymakers. Such an examination will set the stage for exploring the interaction of military organizations and strategic cultures in producing unique causal pathways for policy change.

Organizational routines and knowledge processes

A significant way in which military organizations both simplify their interaction with the external environment and transmit knowledge is through the use of standard operating procedures (SOP's). Large organizations tend to develop SOP's, which, while allowing them to react reflexively despite their inherent unwieldiness, permit little flexibility or creativity.¹⁴¹ Organizations simplify inputs to produce decisions that serve the larger interests of the organization and provide it with a certain degree of predictability and continuity of action. Simply put, large military organizations *require* constraints on rationality in order to perform as cohesive units.

Even a casual reading of U.S. military literature will reveal a vast array of standardized operations and regulations governing a range of military functions from the proper use and maintenance of major weapons systems, to the officially accepted length of a soldier's hair.¹⁴² Military training and socialization places a great deal of emphasis on attention to detail, with the explicit message that the precise adherence to routines, checklists and regulations is what may mean the difference between life and death both in training and combat.¹⁴³ Such routines thus serve not only to impose some regulatory behavior in incredibly complex, often chaotic environments such as the heat of battle, but also allow for a scale of operations that would simply be impossible with autonomous

¹⁴¹ Hudson, 'Foreign Policy Analysis', p. 8; Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, Ch 3

¹⁴² A useful resource for obtaining training manuals, strategic plans, internal correspondence, and planning documents illustrating such organizational procedures and routines is provided by the Federation of American Scientists: www.fas.org.

¹⁴³ On a visit to the United States Air Force Academy, the author witnessed this pervasive culture of attention to detail in matters seemingly irrelevant to combat as guidelines concerning the way cadets' clothes were to be hung in their closets. The rationale for such fastidiousness was, according to one cadet, "If you can't learn to pay attention to the smallest details here, you're more likely to make a mistake later that will cost lives."

units responsible for entirely individual responses to local conditions. However, such regulatory necessity can easily lead to unintended organizational behavior.

In one of the classic texts dealing with the implications of organizational theory for ‘rational’ policy outcomes, Graham Allison argues that organizational procedures led to outcomes unintended by supposedly rational decisionmakers.¹⁴⁴ One of the more illustrative examples in Allison’s study concerning the effects of SOP’s on decisions was in explaining the longstanding mystery of painstaking Soviet secrecy in shipping missiles to Cuba in the early 1960’s and yet subsequent failure to camouflage missile sites from detection by U.S. spy planes. Rather than the intended direct provocation it was assumed to be at the time by U.S. decisionmakers, Allison demonstrates that the difference between the clandestine shipment of missile components and then open missile site construction was simply a function of the KGB and Soviet Missile command acting out their respective SOP’s for transportation of clandestine goods and the physical construction of missile launch facilities.¹⁴⁵ Both were tasked with the execution of duties considered to fall under particular organizational SOP’s – in the case of Soviet Missile Command, the construction of missile bases in Cuba was undertaken according to published organizational guidelines. Allison’s examination of the role of SOP’s in the Cuban Missile Crisis served to further highlight the role of uncertainty in decisionmaking, with decision-makers revealed as not in full control of the implementation of their orders.

In her book, Whole World on Fire, Elisabeth Eden challenged and expanded Allison’s description of SOP’s, positing another significant role for organizational routines – that of formalizing and disseminating organizational learning, and ultimately shaping the course of future organizational inquiry.¹⁴⁶ Eden sought to explain why the U.S. military developed extensive modeling of blast effects of nuclear weapons, but not the effects from fire. Her answer points to a tendency of organizational learning to be path-

¹⁴⁴ Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision (1999)

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 211-213

¹⁴⁶ Eden, Whole World on Fire

dependent.¹⁴⁷ Eden argues that the significant time required to solve problems through the development of capabilities means that once particular ways of solving or addressing problems becomes embedded in organizational routines, they become subsumed in the larger organizational approach to the issue in question. The continued use of “knowledge-laden routines” leads to refinements of routine and a greater ability to “solve” problems. Finally, this increased ability (or assumption of said ability) creates a self-sustaining perception of greater efficacy and provides the organization with a strong rationale for the continued use of such routines.

Taken together, organizational routines and knowledge processes often function not only to simplify and coordinate organizational action, but also filter environmental inputs, allowing for uncertainty to be “absorbed” by the organization and turned into fact.¹⁴⁸ The success of military missions often hinges on the anticipation of adversarial capabilities and tactics, rather than dwelling on the range of potential adversarial motives that might seek to employ such capabilities and tactics. As perfect intelligence about adversarial capability is highly unlikely, especially in the case of unconventional weapons, military organizations generally take a worst-case scenario to questions of preparedness and doctrine in response to potential strategic threats. Such a normal and indeed, necessary attitude towards environmental uncertainty reduction by military organizations can, however, lead to certain self-reinforcing behaviors and circular logic.

In the case of the evolution of counterproliferation policy, the integration of early counterproliferation capabilities into the individual military services and regional warfighting commands meant that CP became part of the military organization’s overall doctrinal approach to combat planning and training. Subsequently, an increased perception of the ability of the DOD to deal with proliferation threats through militarily means reinforced a sense that addressing such threats militarily was both increasingly possible and necessary. The continued inability to provide accurate intelligence on

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 51, 52; for more on the concept of path dependency, see also Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 94, no. 2 (2000), pp. 251-267; for organizational routines as “carriers of knowledge”, see Nelson and Winter, Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, pp. 96-136

¹⁴⁸ Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 50

proliferation only fueled the impetus to reduce environmental uncertainty that was itself rationale to continue with the development of CP capabilities. As will be argued in later chapters, the establishment of organizational routines served to disseminate culturally derived strategic assumptions, ultimately aiding in the institutionalization of practices that were themselves instrumental in challenging normative beliefs about the use of force to address the threat of proliferation.

Capabilities development

By virtue of their responsibility for the application of military force, military organizations occupy a unique position within the cluster of formal institutions responsible for implementing foreign policy decisions and broader strategic conceptions selected by policymakers. Though certainly not possessing complete autonomy in the question of which military capabilities are best suited to meet current and likely future threats to the ambiguous category of “national interests”, the U.S. military in particular possesses the bulk of responsibility for providing appropriate force structure, modernization, unit readiness and sustainability of operations.¹⁴⁹ This broad sense of responsibility to meet environmental uncertainty with all available means was articulated by one senior military professional tasked with managing the research and development of advanced defense capabilities as an institutional obligation to, “be able to give the President the widest number of options.”¹⁵⁰ However, providing military options does not occur outside the policy process, but is partially constitutive of the policy process itself. Military capabilities have historically altered both the framework of decision and menu of choice for policymakers through the development of revolutionary, incremental or ambiguous capabilities.

Revolutionary changes in military capabilities alter policy options in a variety of unpredictable ways. An obvious example of a revolutionary military capability was the

¹⁴⁹ These four categories are what can generally be considered as the components of military capability. See, U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005)

¹⁵⁰ Ronald M. Sega, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), discussion with author, July 10th, 2005

development of nuclear weapons as part of Allied efforts to end WWII. Aside from bringing about the rapid conclusion of hostilities with Japan, nuclear weapons presented policymakers with a host of policy challenges and normative dilemmas that would largely define American foreign policy for decades to come. The specter of post-war nuclear anarchy, coupled with the strategic assumption in the 1950's of aggressor advantage in a nuclear conflict, helped create what has been referred to as an "ordering imperative." This eventually gave rise to sweeping political and strategic changes resulting in the creation of the NP regime, as well as the doctrine of containment backed by the strategy of deterrence that dominated U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War.¹⁵¹

Incremental changes in military capabilities which affect policy options are less dramatic in their immediate impact on policy choice, but over time can lead to significant challenges to broadly accepted normative beliefs motivating policy, especially in wartime. In his magisterial study of strategic bombing of Germany during WWII, Jörg Friedrich examines the effect on Allied considerations of targeting civilians in bombing raids concluding that the effective development of new bombing technologies had a dramatic effect on both the policy alternatives and normative beliefs of civilian decisionmakers during warfare.¹⁵² Each incremental step of military capabilities development allowed for incremental encroachment on existing norms against the intentional targeting of civilians. Although the end result was a type of military campaign designed to inflict mass casualties that had been vigorously rejected by civilian policymakers at the onset of the war as immoral, each intermediate step was viewed by both policymakers and military leaders as necessary for the pursuit of strategic objectives. Although warfare arguably speeds up such a process of incremental

¹⁵¹ For more on the "ordering imperative" introduced by nuclear weapons, see William Walker, 'Nuclear order and disorder', *International Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), p. 705; important studies of deterrence and containment during the Cold War include Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, (New York, Palgrave, 2003); Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security*, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1982)

¹⁵² Jörg Friedrich, *The Fire: The Bombing of Germany, 1940-1945*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006); Jonathan Glover, *Humanity: A Moral History of the Twentieth Century*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), Ch. 11; An excellent study of such normative aspects of air power is Robert Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996)

encroachment on normative practice, it is by no means a phenomenon exclusive to periods of overt conflict.¹⁵³

Finally, ambiguous capabilities are those whose doctrinal orientation is a matter of application, rather than inherent technological purpose. Such capabilities can blur the line between different doctrinal orientations such as deterrent, offensive, defensive, preemptive and preventative, opening opportunities for political challenges to normative beliefs about use of force. A recent example of such ambiguous capabilities is the debate over so-called “bunker busting”, deep penetration weapons argued by many military leaders to be an essential component of a defensively oriented counterforce component necessary to prevent the deployment of unconventional weapons by potential adversaries in wartime. Both critics and supporters of such technologies point out that the effective development of such capability would effectively lower the barrier for future preemptive or preventative doctrine, as there is nothing inherent to the technology itself that would determine whether its effectiveness would be maximized during or before the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁵⁴ Kenneth Waltz’s dictum that “Capabilities foster policies that employ them”, should serve as a general cautionary note that existing rationales for military capabilities often ignore their potential future use outside of existing normative frameworks.¹⁵⁵

Functional organizations such as the DOD play an essential role in the execution of policy, as well as potentially shaping the landscape of choice for policymakers. Military organizational biases and preferences shape organizational views of appropriate doctrine and condition threat perceptions in predictable ways. The tendency to see conflict and the spread of military capabilities as inevitable leads military organizations such as the DOD to prefer offensive doctrines that leave the organization with as much ability to maintain

¹⁵³ An excellent study of the normative dimensions of warfare, including normative encroachment between wars, is James Turner Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Inquiry, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)

¹⁵⁴ Avner, Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (eds.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), p. 77

¹⁵⁵ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), p. 16

strategic initiative and political autonomy as possible. Organizational routines and knowledge processes allow for large-scale coordinated action, but simultaneously reinforce organizational biases and preferences for certain forms of action believed to reduce environmental uncertainty. Finally, capabilities development by military organizations can create new and often unanticipated choices for decisionmakers. Together, these organizational inputs may eventually combine to institutionalize emergent policy conceptions into established military practice, conferring longevity and stability to new forms of action, and altering the landscape of choice for future leaders.

Examining the CP policy through the lens of both strategic culture and organizational theory is important, as both political and military inputs to the policymaking process have strongly shaped its ultimate evolution. However, rather than view each perspective in isolation, attempting to construct a linear progression from political policy inputs to military outputs, it is important to consider the interaction of political and military components of the policy process.

Interaction of the military organization and strategic culture

Although strategic culture and organizational theory make distinct claims about likely policy impacts, this thesis argues that the two perspectives are mutually interdependent. The process of developing threat conceptions and policy responses depends on both civilian and military decisionmakers, and their policy inputs interact in ways not explained by either perspective taken in isolation. This section will offer a brief series of general propositions that are drawn from the two perspectives of strategic culture and organizational theory:¹⁵⁶

- 1) Successful long-term challenges to existing normative practices will not be those simply championed by the dominant strategic culture, but those that**

¹⁵⁶ As this thesis is largely historical and narrative in its approach, *propositions* are more suitable to the scope of this study than general *hypotheses*. Although the case of U.S. counterproliferation policy is in many ways unique, some generalizations with implications for other cases outside the U.S. context can be made, as will be further addressed in the concluding chapter of the thesis.

successfully reframe the strategic conceptions on which those practices are based.

In the United States the balance of domestic political power and the relative strength of issue advocates are constantly in flux. The American political system was designed with constant tension in mind as a safeguard against either tyranny or stagnation. Political actors within the United States are continually engaged in argumentative struggles over threat perceptions and appropriate policy responses, as a constant demonstration of this systemic tension. However, the fact that certain foreign policy preferences and behaviors often maintain a high degree of consistency and longevity points to forces that transcend the ebb and flow of this constantly shifting balance.

As noted earlier in this chapter, such stability is often ascribed to systemic or structural factors stemming from either material endowment or the “rational requirements” of relative power relationships. This thesis, however, argues that relative consistency in security policy is often due to the stabilizing influence of collective ideational forces rooted in broadly shared strategic cultures, and the institutionalized practices of military organizations. With particular relevance to the impact of strategic cultures, the strong appeal to legitimacy and ‘common sense’ found in political discourse suggests that argument frames are key to controlling policy outputs over time.

Framing plays a larger role than mere transient justification for strategic conceptions and policy choices. More fundamentally, framing provides the basis for lasting expectations of what is both necessary and possible in making foreign policy choices. Pervasive normative beliefs that drive policy choices and have their roots in broad social acceptance depend on the establishment and maintenance of conceptual legitimacy. Normative legitimacy in the political sphere is established, maintained and challenged through political argumentative framing. Once an issue is both effectively framed and legitimized, subsequent challenges must be made not from an equal discursive position, but in reference to the legitimate frame. This potential to create discursive space around certain issues is what gives effective framing and argumentation the power to establish lasting

threat conceptions and policy approaches that place constraints on the ability of shifting groups of decisionmakers to refashion policy to their personal whim. Political argument serves as the larger competition for dominance in the articulation of danger, and successful framing establishes the central pillar around which subsequent competing “solutions” are oriented.

As will be examined in chapters 3 and 5, successful framing does more than “explain” arguments to various audiences. Framing can normalize certain types of behavior and belief, and make embedded policy prescriptions seem uniquely effective at addressing identified strategic dilemmas. Framing is thus key to the cycle of legitimization and delegitimization necessary to change the social world in lasting ways. Strategic cultures with members more coordinated and skilled at effectively framing or reframing their strategic conceptions and policy preferences will likely enjoy more success in the struggle for policy dominance than those who simply wield functional power and temporary authority.

2) Successful institutionalization of new normative practices requires penetration of guiding conceptions throughout the functional organization tasked with policy implementation.

Literature on strategic culture suggests that reframing of security practices is essential to legitimization in the political sphere, but also that such practices must also be ‘institutionalized’ in order to enjoy lasting influence.¹⁵⁷ Once institutionalized in organizational practices and capabilities, policy concepts become highly resistant to rapid challenge or transformation. Recognizing this, civilian decisionmakers in the U.S. often attempt to drive policy initiatives and strategic conceptions downward through the DOD, utilizing senior civilian appointees to act as hierarchical stewards of policy priorities.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Lantis, ‘Strategic Culture and National Security Policy’, p. 100

¹⁵⁸ Roger R. Trask and Alfred Goldberg, The Department of Defense 1947-1997: Organization and Leaders, (Washington DC: Historical Office, OSD, 1997)

Though policy conceptions are ostensibly promulgated in a top-down form representative of the formal hierarchy of the military, functional implementation of meaningful change in the military rarely follows such a rigid top-down process. Institutionalization that affects the practices and capabilities of the military is a time-intensive process involving a number of feedback loops. Organizational learning, capabilities development, mission planning and consensus on emerging strategic conceptions all follow a more broadly distributed pattern within the organization that involves all layers of the hierarchy in the process of institutionalization. Far from being an automatic mechanism set in motion by civilian leaders, meaningful change requires active involvement at all levels of the organization in decisionmaking, learning, adaptation and functional capabilities development. The ultimate effectiveness of civilian leaders of the DOD – the “thin patina of political appointees” – does not come from a personal ability to mandate change, but rather results from collective skill in guiding and coordinating the much larger, more stable base of career organizational members.¹⁵⁹

As current U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has noted,

It’s really important, if you want lasting change, to involve the professionals in the institution. Because then the solution, at the end of the day, is their solution, and they’re going to defend it once the person who initiated it is long gone. I think that a lot of people who come to government, often from business... don’t understand how big public bureaucracies work and the capacity of the bureaucracy to outlast anybody.¹⁶⁰

Attempts at policy implementation and institutionalization should be seen as requiring penetration throughout the functional layers of the organization. Additionally, it is argued that bottom-up approaches allowing professional members to shape policy to fit the existing perceptions and practices of the organization will likely be much more effective and pervasive over time than top down edicts intended to force the organization into compliance with policy orientations desired by civilian decisionmakers. Civilian policy

¹⁵⁹ Frank Gaffney, President of the Center for Security Policy, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (1987), discussion with author, July 7, 2005.

¹⁶⁰ U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, quoted in Fred Kaplan, “The Professional”, New York Times Magazine, February 10, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/magazine/10gates-t.html?ref=magazine>, (accessed February 10, 2008)

entrepreneurs face tradeoffs in embedding policy ideas, as there is a generally inverse relationship between organizational longevity and the capacity for immediate action when it comes to new policy implementation.¹⁶¹ Efforts to implement change from above must gain the acceptance and support of the lower ranks of the organization tasked with the actual implementation of directives, and failure to do so often results in paralyzing organizational resistance.¹⁶²

Once successful, institutionalization of new policy practices can serve to ‘normalize’ new normative behavior, often through incremental application. Just as military organizations depend on civilian policymakers to provide policy guidance and establish legitimacy for new military doctrine, civilian policymakers depend on military organizations to serve as institutional sources of policy predispositions.¹⁶³ Legitimacy and institutionalization are thus intimately bound, with new forms of military action and supporting normative beliefs requiring both to succeed in the long term.

3) Without strong civilian oversight to the contrary, capabilities driven defense initiatives will tend to become more offensively oriented over time.

Policymakers working with the Department of Defense face an essential tension in attempting to institutionalize new policy priorities. Meaningful institutionalization requires respecting and leveraging a certain degree of organizational autonomy in shaping implementation of policy, yet granting too much autonomy to the organization may result in transformation of policy contrary to the original intent of civilian leaders.

¹⁶¹ Daniel W. Drezner, ‘Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy’, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 44, No. 4 (October, 2000), pp. 733-749

¹⁶² An extreme example of this kind of resistance was the so-called “Revolt of the Admirals” of 1949 in which the Air Force and Navy waged a fierce political and public relations battle over the acquisition of major weapons systems. Denied a major proposed weapons system by civilian leaders, and fearful of Air Force budgetary dominance in the nuclear age, senior naval leaders organized a rare campaign of public criticism, culminating in testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services that in essence, strategic bombing served no useful purpose and that the use of atomic weapons was *morally* wrong. See Steven L. Rearden, *The Formative Years, 1947-1950*, vol. 1 in *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense*, (Washington D.C.: Historical Office, OSD, 1984), p. 5, and Trask and Goldberg, *The Department of Defense 1947-1997*, pp. 17-18

¹⁶³ John S. Duffield, *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy After Unification*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 29

With too much oversight and external direction, policy initiatives are likely to meet crippling organizational resistance, yet without strong and attentive oversight, policy initiatives with a military component are likely to drift into more offensively oriented methods of practice.

Decision makers establish policy guidelines and boundaries for organizations through oversight functions, budgetary discretion or other forms of pressure, often serving to define what policy approaches are acceptable or unacceptable in normative terms. However, this guidance function often operates with a strong dependency on functional organizations for the generation of policy choices to fulfill stated objectives. Thus the work of organizations is crucial, not only for implementing the decisions of policymakers, but in shaping the decision environment in which political ends are themselves determined. Military practices for reducing uncertainty, particularly through the development of capabilities to meet perceived threats, can strongly affect the subsequent “menu of choice” for decisionmakers, potentially providing new policy options, or by reducing the apparent opportunity costs of existing decisions.

Political and military components of the policy process interact in a recursive manner, requiring fine balancing on both the civilian and military sides, and requiring great care in clearly identifying policy ends and monitoring that military means are in line with underlying normative beliefs. Military capabilities that affect questions of what can be done to respond to strategic threats have significant impacts on political calculations of what should be done, and even on broader political questions of what constitutes a strategic threat. Together, these dynamics pose important implications for the course of future policy and existing normative beliefs if the offensive tendencies of the military organization are not checked by civilian oversight.

- 4) Normative challenges will require significant time for successful institutionalization, often leading to mismatch between operationalized policies and current conceptions of appropriate action.**

Policy that changes most quickly in organizational terms is often also the least likely to survive long enough to become institutionalized into lasting practice. Substantive policy change often experiences a time lag between the moment when an idea is presented to a functional organization, and when that idea can survive the struggle against existing ideational challengers and eventually become institutionalized.

The strategy-doctrine cycle by its very nature, and especially in cases of high tech capabilities development or employment, leads to delayed institutionalization of doctrine to match strategic conceptions.¹⁶⁴ Even bringing existing weapons systems “off the shelf” into meaningful military capabilities requires a huge investment in time, as integration of equipment into organizational procedures, practices and training all possess individual timeframes that may be extensive.¹⁶⁵ The military organizational bias towards offensive capabilities and doctrine presents an oversight dilemma to civilian policymakers. As there is often a gap between the time required for effective implementation of policy initiatives, and the tenure of civilian policymakers (not to mention the attention span of policymakers), disconnects between policy ends and military means to achieve them are not only possible, but likely.

This time delay factor between the emergence of “legitimate” threat conceptions and organizational capabilities response implies there will often be inconsistent doctrine, policy decisions eventually implemented in inappropriate circumstances, and clashes between policy needs and the operational lag in capability to satisfy those policy requirements. Effective changes in national security strategy will tend to outlive the environmental circumstances that created them, in all but the most dynamic, adaptive organizations. Effective implementation of new strategy requires corresponding changes

¹⁶⁴ Chris C. Demchak, ‘Complexity and a Midrange Theory of Networked Militaries’, In Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (New York: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002), p. 128

¹⁶⁵ Though such normally significant time requirements may be minimized in the event of war, or other cases of exceptional need. Author discussion with Ron Sega.

in the operation of the organization – the distribution of resources, identification of priorities and establishment of organizational responsibilities, to name a few.¹⁶⁶

In the case of CP policy, entirely new classes of capabilities were called for by civilian and military decisionmakers, which significantly extended the timeframe for meaningful institutionalization. This process implies that little may happen in public terms during the process of institutionalization, and that such a process may be highly resistant to change once underway. Once in motion, strong organizational and budgetary forces offer resistance to counteracting policy without an equally significant investment of time and effort being made.

Ultimately, strategic culture and organizational theory do not interact in a linear process that simply begins with strategic cultural preferences and ends with institutionalization. Cycles of strategic cultural challenges to dominant norms that shape policy directives are often already influenced by limited informational inputs and existing capabilities offered by organizations. Military responses in organizational practices and capabilities in turn depend upon the legitimacy of strategic conceptions to give meaning to organizational action, initiate the process of institutionalization and sustain the process with budgetary allocation. Therefore, it is important to consider the impacts of strategic culture and organizational theory as both distinct and interdependent. A pairing of the two in analysis of CP aims to reveal many of the significant forces and long-term implications for future policy that have been largely ignored in literature on the subject.

This thesis now turns to the first historical chapter, examining how the strategic dilemmas of the early post-Cold War were conceptualized by the DOD, with special emphasis placed on the subjective “lessons” drawn by the organization from the Gulf War, and how these shaped the genesis of counterproliferation policy.

¹⁶⁶ This last point is further elaborated in John Roberts, The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 281-284

Chapter 2

Organizational Reassessment: 1989-92

This chapter begins in the final years of the Cold War, as the Department of Defense (DOD) began to reassess the international security environment with the apparent demise of the Soviet military bloc. The rapid evaporation of a monolithic Soviet-centered military threat promised a significant reorientation of American defense strategy, with the relative stability of a bi-polar system giving way to a far more fluid and uncertain multi-polar system. In this emerging security environment, hard questions were asked about the proper structuring and capabilities of U.S. military forces to meet the most likely threats to emerge from this shakeup, with much legislative and public sentiment arguing for a sizable “peace dividend” that would see a greatly reduced post-Cold War role and budget for the DOD.

By the end of the first Bush Administration, the massive military threat posed by the Soviet Union had effectively disintegrated and the United States had led an overwhelmingly successful multilateral response to regional aggression posed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. So why the dire warnings from the DOD during this period about the threat of proliferation of unconventional weapons, vocal articulations of the ‘failures’ of the Gulf War, and spirited efforts to resist post-Cold War cuts in defense spending? Why the need for a new approach to proliferation aimed at strengthening the NP regime, yet one that ultimately undermined key NP norms, questioned the utility of deterrence and left open the option of preventative military action to rollback proliferation?

The chapter will argue that a strong organizational drive for uncertainty reduction in the wake of the Cold War and Gulf War, coupled with existing cultural biases and organizational learning processes, fundamentally reshaped how the DOD approached the issue of proliferation in ways poorly explained by bureaucratic or structural models. The

DOD's response to uncertainty was not by nature an objective assessment of potential adversaries and the international security environment, but an attempt to predict what the nature of adversarial capabilities and potential conflicts might become. An organization facing greater environmental and political uncertainty from the dissolution of their central organizing threat responded with a scramble for both orientation and relevance in a new security environment, entailing a projection of revolutionary American military capabilities onto potential adversaries in ways strongly conditioned by military organizational culture. The end result being that although the DOD was conservative on the principle of use of force and argued its role to be supporting the norm of nonproliferation, its doctrinal response to proliferation served to undermine confidence in the NP regime and played directly into its own cultural vulnerability to developing an offensive military doctrine based on uncertainty avoidance that embraced the utility of preventative action.

This chapter will first examine how the DOD framed the emerging security environment through the process of generating strategy documents intended to guide near and long-term organizational planning. Such planning processes, especially focused on emerging asymmetric technologies were well underway when the United States engaged in the first major post-Cold War conflict against Iraq in the Gulf War. The organizational 'lessons' drawn from this conflict, especially pertaining to potential unconventional weapons capabilities of future adversaries, strongly conditioned a pessimistic organizational reassessment of nonproliferation policy. Such pessimism and advocacy of strategies to limit environmental uncertainty mirrored debates about deterrence and preventative war that emerged in the early years of the nuclear age. This earlier period will be briefly examined to provide further perspectives on the organizational biases and assumptions that drive military thinking on appropriate doctrine in similar circumstances. The chapter ends with an analysis of the first major strategy document to emerge from the formative period of post-Cold War organizational uncertainty, the highly controversial 1992 Defense Planning Guidance.

The question of a post-Cold War military doctrine

The first serious attempts to develop an organizational assessment of the emerging strategic environment in the waning years of the Cold War were undertaken as the result of a Presidential directive to produce a series of reports focused on reviewing the basic national defense strategy of the United States.¹ This directive was issued in light of a new global strategic environment emerging from ongoing political changes in Eastern Europe, announced reductions in Soviet and Warsaw Pact military forces, and a troubled Soviet economy. In addition to calling for a reassessment of the Soviet military threat, the directive called upon the DOD to examine the implications of advanced weapons acquisition by so-called “third countries” for changing regional balances of power and impacting U.S. “contingency operations” in areas such as Central America and the Persian Gulf.²

The DOD strategy documents that emerged in response to these directives began with the premise that the Cold War was already over and that the U.S. was no longer facing the continuing threat of nuclear annihilation from a major adversary. Thus the United States would need a more agile military not structured to fight a single major conflict, but rather multiple Major Regional Conflicts (MRC’s).³ As many military leaders argued, the looming end of bipolarity meant that Soviet security guarantees and influence over the military activities of certain states would likely come to an end.⁴ The end of Soviet military aid and the regional power vacuums left by the Soviet Union meant “an economically multi-polar world and militarily uni-polar world that is more disorderly,

¹ White House, National Security Review 12, ‘Review of National Defense Strategy’, March 3, 1989, NS Archives PR01789

² Ibid, pp. 3-8

³ This assessment, sketched out in early memos such as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, was eventually articulated in detailed form in the 1993 Bottom-Up-Review (BUR); see Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, ‘Report on the BOTTOM-UP REVIEW’, October 1993, <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/bur/index.html>, (accessed September 10, 2005); see also Department of Defense, ‘1993 Bottom Up Review – Talking Points’, October 1993, NS Archives CH01621

⁴ Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, Director of Net Assessment, 15 July 1992, p. 47. DOD OROISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF; Committee on Science, Engineering and Public Policy, Finding Common Ground: U.S. Export Controls in a Changed Global Environment, (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1991); interview with Henry Sokolski

more unstable, and more uncertain, with an increased likelihood of Third World conflicts.”⁵

A strategic environment featuring the inevitability of conflict is a premise long assumed by military cultures worldwide. However, what began to be argued as novel about the emerging security environment in the minds of U.S. military thinkers, was the inevitability of conflict combined with a wider availability of high-tech military capabilities and so-called asymmetric capabilities such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their associated long-range delivery systems. Such technological capacity was argued to be fueling a ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) that would likely bring about “a fundamental change in warfare, a change comparable in scope to the introduction of armor and airplanes, or nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.”⁶

US military perspectives on technology and unconventional weapons proliferation

At the heart of the supposed RMA was the combination of high-technology information systems and precision guided long-range weapons. The capacity for highly precise non-nuclear strikes to be quickly launched deep within enemy territory, combined with the capacity to quickly deploy, track and command forces in revolutionary ways posed several dilemmas for defense planning. First, the technological and operational *quality* of armed forces would presumably count more than the *quantity* of forces at the command of military leaders. Second, the capacity to inflict massive, precise damage meant that reaction time for defense would be greatly reduced. Finally, the combined effect of increased offensive capacity and decreased reaction time meant a potential advantage to

⁵ Defense Science Board, ‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Precision Interdiction’, (Washington DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, 1994), p. 11

⁶ The original phrasing used in DOD documents at the time was a ‘military-technical revolution’ (MTR) – a term borrowed from Russian military documents written in the 1980’s. See Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, Director of Net Assessment, 15 July 1992, p. 47. DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF. However for purposes of clarity, the equivalent later term RMA, which was soon adopted into standard usage by the DOD will be used throughout the thesis.

aggressors, much as was assumed in the early years of the Cold War resulting from the development of nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.⁷

The global proliferation of high technology supply sources was presented as signaling a corresponding decrease in the effectiveness of export control measures.⁸ The dilemma as seen by the DOD was summed up by then Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation, Seth Carus, “The issue isn’t really that these people have Scuds... The issue is that they know how to make Scuds. That means they no longer have to rely on Western technology.”⁹ DOD officials begin to publicly argue that there was already a high level of proliferation in the world, and not only nuclear weapons technologies, but also a much larger category of materials and technologies that could pose a threat to U.S. forces and interests abroad.¹⁰

Concurrent with warnings about the effect of a RMA on regional military forces was the reiteration by the DOD of its longstanding concern with the proliferation of unconventional weapons. Countries that held no hope of matching U.S. technological investment in developing greater military power were assumed by DOD strategists to likely turn to unconventional weapons in order to provide a means of advancing their national security objectives. In the immediate post-Cold War period, DOD strategic threat assessments concerning unconventional weapons proliferation also began with the assumption the multilateral nonproliferation regime would ultimately fail. Indeed, the DOD had remained throughout the later years of the Cold War the most consistently

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ See briefing slides, ‘Manufacturers of GPS Consumer Products’, ‘There is Already a High Degree of Crossover Between Commercial and Military COMSATS’, and ‘Findings to Date’, in Institute for Defense Analyses, Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Operational Implications of Proliferation’, DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-869.PDF, pp. II-27, II-78 and II-89 respectively

⁹ Michael Wines, ‘U.S. Explores New Strategies to Limit Weapons of Mass Destruction’, *New York Times*, September 30, 1990, sec. 1, p. 20; (“Scuds” are a type of unguided medium-range ballistic missile capable of delivering unconventional warheads, first developed by the Soviet Union. In addition to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, high technology in general, skills and information control were identified as critical proliferation concerns.)

¹⁰ See Testimony of Henry Sokolski, Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy, Department of Defense, to House Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, ‘Proliferation Issues and Recommended Policy Responses’, June 29, 1990, NS Archives NP02633

hawkish specialist bureaucracy concerning proliferation threats, especially the proliferation threat posed by Iraq.

Such longstanding skepticism of the efficacy of the NP regime to effectively control proliferation had been echoed in recurring interdepartmental disputes in the later Cold War years over capabilities and intentions of regional powers. Of the various agencies tasked with supporting U.S. NP policy, the DOD regularly held the most pessimistic view on global proliferation. As stated in a Department of State memo from the mid 1980's,

DOD differs radically from all other agencies in its assessment of the proliferation threat from Iraq. Using the same intelligence available to DOD, the CIA, DOE and State all agree that there is now effectively no Iraqi proliferation threat – not, of course, because Iraqis have become virtuous, but because they do not have the resources for a nuclear weapons program and will not have in the foreseeable future.¹¹

The nonproliferation role of the DOD during the Cold War had focused largely on harnessing the resources of the defense intelligence community in order to support the efforts of relevant multilateral nonproliferation efforts such as those of the IAEA and various export control bodies.¹² Intelligence support for export controls in particular were seen as the primary contribution of the U.S. military, supporting a strategy of denial focused on keeping certain materials and technologies off the global market. Hence the efficacy of export controls in particular, and the NP regime in general to halt proliferation was the focus of a sustained critique by DOD officials. Though not overtly seeking a broader military role in proliferation prevention, numerous defense officials long argued the minimal efficacy of non-discriminatory diplomatic and economic approaches to proliferation.

¹¹ United States Department of State internal memo, 'Computers for Iraq: DOD's Proliferation Concerns', April 3, 1986, NSArchives IG00319; see also United States Department of State, Action Memorandum, 'Response to Secretary of Defense Cheney Concerning Iraq and Nuclear Export Controls', October 4, 1990, NSArchives IG015448.

¹² Mitchel B. Wallerstein, 'Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 21

The refrain that the United States was living in a “proliferated” world became a common theme among DOD officials during this period, creating friction with other specialist bureaucracies such as the Departments of State and Energy, whose nonproliferation policy support roles were much more prominent, and who generally disagreed with the pessimistic conclusions of the DOD.¹³ Thus, although the DOD dutifully filled its intelligence support role, military assessments challenging the central mechanisms of the NP regime reflect a military organizational world view that anticipated both the pervasiveness of conflict and assumed the inevitable application of available technologies to worldwide arsenals. While the DOD had traditionally held to the governmental consensus that nonproliferation was a diplomatic and political mission, during this period many voices from the DOD began to identify proliferation as a potentially pressing military issue, arguing both that the consequences of proliferation would likely fall on their shoulders, and that greater capabilities and resources would be needed to effectively address the threat.

Strategic reassessment and organizational bias

In this sense, the DOD conception of the emerging security environment was not a strictly rational assessment, as much as a cultural projection of existing biases onto the security environment in lieu of a tangible threat of known capability. From the unique perspective of a professional military organization, the DOD was drawing on an historical lesson taught at all military academies and passed down through organizational indoctrination – that revolutionary technology and operational capacity may be initiated by a single state, but the advantage such developments confer are likely to be short lived as competitors adapt.

¹³ See Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues, March 7, 1991, NS Archives IG01651, pp. 35-40, also John D. Dingell, Memorandum to Members, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, ‘Closed Hearing on the Department of Energy’s Efforts to Prevent Iraq and Other Countries from Getting a Nuclear Weapons Capability’, April 23, 1991, NS Archives IG01692

What also emerged from the DOD threat analysis documents in this period was, in many ways, a conceptual return to its early thinking about nuclear weapons during the opening years of the Cold War, when nuclear capabilities were often assumed to drive adversarial political ambitions, rather than to be subservient methods of achieving larger political ambitions. The message from defense officials was that America must invest to secure its technological advantage, that the deterrent capability of American nuclear forces could not be assumed, and that a lack of knowledge about the motives of potential adversaries necessitated a doctrinal focus on capabilities that *might* shape the material conditions of future conflict. Questions of whether potential adversaries would possess either the operational capacity or political motivation to make use of these technologies were largely secondary and rhetorical areas of exploration in the DOD literature during this period, with a greater emphasis placed on strictly technical questions of potential adversarial capability.¹⁴

It is now beneficial to briefly examine the similar strategic rationale that existed at the dawn of the nuclear age, when the United States possessed a monopoly on new military technology, and faced a similarly uncertain international security environment. Many of the ways in which the Department of Defense approached that dilemma – a sudden and dramatic military capabilities advantage for the United States, and a corresponding certainty that the advantage would be short-lived – can illuminate how military organizations are expected to respond to such environmental uncertainty.

Deterrence and preventative war in the post-War era

In the late 1940's and early 50's, strategic rationale held that due to the devastating power of nuclear weapons, in a nuclear conflict, advantage lay with the aggressor. As a result,

¹⁴ Such capabilities dependent logic pervades military threat analyses as a function of the material nature of military planning. An example can be found in the apolitical criteria for inclusion in the DOD's Militarily Critical Technologies List – “does the technology significantly negate or impair a major military capability of the United States or significantly advance a critical mission area of a potential adversary.” DOD Directive 2040.2, ‘International Transfers of Technology, Goods, Services, and Munitions,’ January 17, 1984, www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/204002p.pdf, (accessed November 7, 2006); see also, Institute for Defense Analyses, Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Operational Implications of Proliferation’, (April 15, 1990), DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-869.PDF, p. I-1

much anxiety in the United States and Soviet Union focused on determining the critical date at which the other country would have a nuclear arsenal sufficient to deliver a “knockout blow” from which they would be incapable of responding.¹⁵ This rationale of “enough weapons”, however, was quickly exhausted by the realities of weapons production in both countries. The logical conclusion of rapid arms development was that both countries would eventually reach the point where neither would have any meaningful advantage over the other in terms of destructive capability.¹⁶

It was clear to leaders such as President Eisenhower and influential strategists like Bernard Brodie that a framework to establish restraint between nuclear powers was needed.¹⁷ As Henry Kissinger commented on the typical European rationale for going to war before the nuclear age, “...countries went to war because the consequences of defeat and even of compromise were deemed worse than those of war.”¹⁸ In the nuclear age, when entire states risked being wiped off the map in a matter of minutes, the costs of nuclear powers going to war assuredly outweighed any tangible benefits. It was precisely this disparity between ends and means in nuclear war that could be considered an important rational dissuasion from aggressive behavior. As Kenneth Waltz noted, “Because catastrophic outcomes of nuclear exchanges are easy to imagine, leaders of states will shrink in horror from initiating them.” Following from this logic, Waltz argues that one way to engender restraint in military relations between states is to “build retaliatory forces able to threaten unacceptable punishment upon a would-be aggressor.”¹⁹

Forces based on retaliatory threat are referred to as deterrent forces, as opposed to defensive forces, which only promise to make gains in warfare difficult to achieve. Both types of forces are intended to dissuade states from attacking one another, but deterrence was particularly relevant to the offensive dilemma posed by nuclear weapons. At its most

¹⁵ Sokolski, *Best of Intentions*, pp. 25-27

¹⁶ Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), p. 16

¹⁷ Sokolski, *Best of Intentions*, pp. 32-35

¹⁸ Henry Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the Twenty-First Century*, (London: Simon & Schuster, 2001, 2002), p. 23

¹⁹ Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May be Better’, in Scott D Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), p. 3, 4

basic theoretic construction, deterrence assumes that the threat of massive punishment will moderate the hostility of others. As Lawrence Freedman has argued, the essence of deterrence consists of “deliberate attempts to manipulate the behavior of others through conditional threats.”²⁰ However, the successful maintenance of a deterrence strategy requires the assumption of an adversarial rationality. Assumptions of rationality are key to successful deterrence as a potential adversary must both recognize one’s retaliatory capabilities, and calculate that the application of such capabilities will more than offset the benefits of aggression.²¹

The path to a doctrine of deterrence, however, was by no means a self-evident “rational” end in itself. Rather, it was the result of a highly disputed and extremely dangerous navigation between policies advocating either deterrence based on voluntary restraint, or preventative warfare intended to indefinitely maintain strategic advantage.²²

Preventative military action, it should be noted, is quite different from *preemptive* military action, though often the different concepts are confused in the public discourse. Preventative actions are those intended to slow or stop the development of significant military capabilities by an adversary *before* they constitute a threat, whereas preemptive actions are those intended to stop the *imminent use* of existing capabilities by an adversary.²³ Arguments in favor of preventative military action often rest on the claim

²⁰ Freedman, *Deterrence*, pp. 2, 6

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11

²² An excellent and concise examination of the early Cold War history of arguments in favor of preventative warfare by the U.S. military is found in Scott D. Sagan, ‘The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons’, *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring, 1994) pp. 74-82; see also William Poundstone, *Prisoner’s Dilemma*, (New York: Doubleday Books, 1992); Richard Rhodes, *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), epilogue; Richard Rhodes, *Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), Ch. 1

²³ A textbook case of preventative military action was the 1981 attack by Israel on the Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak, intended to shutdown Iraqi nuclear weapons development capabilities before weapons-grade fissile material could be produced. See Avner Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), *International Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 76-79; see also Michael I. Handel, ‘The evolution of Israeli strategy: The psychology of insecurity and the quest for absolute security’, in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (ed.), *The Making of Strategy*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 551-553; and Rodger Claire, *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2004)

that it is necessary to fight now in order to avoid unfavorable circumstances for war later, or in the words of Randall Schweller, to “take advantage of a closing window of opportunity, or prevent the opening of a window of vulnerability.”²⁴

As discussed in the previous chapter, the U.S. military possesses many common military organizational biases, assumptions and practices that make advocacy of preventative force options more likely than would be assumed by many non-military decisionmakers:

- First, elite members of military organizations are more likely than civilian policymakers to view conflict as inevitable in the long run, and more likely to be skeptical of non-military solutions to traditional security problems.²⁵
- Second, due to their particular responsibilities and training, professional members of the military are socialized to focus on the purely military influences on conflict outcomes.²⁶ The training and analytical skills of military organizations favors the calculation of requirements to defeat measurable adversarial traits such as military capability and force structure, rather than intangible political or social forces such as the will of the adversary to fight, or their motivations in conflict.²⁷
- Third, military organizations are largely expected to favor offensive doctrines, even preventative doctrines, as these are assumed to both reduce unexpected battlefield variables, and limit the long-term opportunities adversaries have to gain military advantages through the development of their own military capabilities.²⁸ As Barry Posen has argued, “Military organizations will generally

²⁴ Randall L. Schweller, ‘Domestic Structure and Preventative War: Are Democracies More Pacific?’, *World Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (January 1992), p. 236; Another excellent general introduction to the literature on preventative war is Jack S. Levy, ‘Declining Power and the Preventative Motivation for War’, *World Politics*, vol. 40, no. 1 (October, 1987), pp. 82-107

²⁵ For studies indicating military officers are generally more inclined than the broader population to believe that war is inevitable, see John P. Lovell, “The Professional Socialization of the West Point Cadet”, in Morris Janowitz (ed.), *The New Military*, (New York, Russell Sage, 1964), p. 129; Bengt Abrahamsson, “Military Professionalization and Estimates on the Probability of War”, in Jacques van Doorn (ed.) *Military Profession and Military Regimes*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1969), pp. 35-51

²⁶ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, p. 18

²⁷ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, pp. 49-50

²⁸ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems’, pp. 18, 19

prefer offensive doctrines because they *reduce uncertainty* in important ways.”²⁹

Successful execution of military plans often rests on being able to choose combat conditions and execute standard exercises acquired in training, rather than to be forced to react to adversarial initiative.³⁰

- Finally, offensive operations by their logistical nature also require more extensive budgetary allocations to support and maintain in both war and peacetime, thus serving to support what some have argued is an organizational tendency to jealously guard and seek to increase turf and strength, as well as to preserve undiluted what it feels to be its “essence” or “mission.”³¹

Military advocacy of preventative warfare in the early years of the Cold War

Early Cold War thinking on preventative warfare by some senior member of the U.S. military focused on the argued necessity of preventing the development of transformative nuclear weapons technology by adversaries such as the Soviet Union and China. Some of the earliest documents to emerge from the military in the post-war period featured strong advocacy for preventative action to keep the Soviet Union from developing nuclear capabilities that could challenge U.S. nuclear dominance and thus substantively threaten the physical security of the United States and its allies. In September of 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) obliquely advocated planning for preventative warfare in a top secret report on post-war U.S. military doctrine which vaguely stated, “When it becomes evident that forces of aggression are being arrayed against us by a potential enemy, we cannot afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive behavior to permit the first blow to be struck against us.”³²

²⁹ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*, p. 47. A notable exception is presented by Elizabeth Keir, who presents doctrinal choice as *socially conditioned*, and thus dependent on how a particular military organization interprets its own cultural practices and perceives environmental uncertainty, rather than automatically predisposed to offensive doctrine. See Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War*

³⁰ Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine’, p. 18

³¹ Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 28

³² SWNCC 282, ‘Basis For the Formulation of a U.S. Military Policy’, September 19, 1945, as quoted in Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, p. 77

Such opinions, which left the door open to preventative strategies, were not shared by civilian leaders, and indeed generated considerable friction between some military leaders and senior civilian policymakers. In 1950, President Truman personally reprimanded Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews for giving a public speech that argued in favor of preparing for a preventative war against the Soviet Union.³³ One week later, Major General Orvil Anderson of the Air Force was abruptly fired after advocating preventative war against the Soviet Union, stating in a newspaper interview, “Give me the order to do it and I can break up Russia’s five A-bomb nests in a week... And when I went up to Christ – I think I could explain to him that I saved civilization.” Furthermore, Anderson specifically challenged emerging U.S. deterrence doctrine, saying, “to assume that Russia won’t use their A-bombs if we sit by and watch them build them is a dangerous assumption.”³⁴

Though by no means a consistent position throughout the DOD, such senior voices advocating preventative war staked their claims on the necessity for such action in terms familiar to scholars of military organizational behavior. America’s strategic advantage in the early development of nuclear weapons would ultimately come to an end. Military leaders who argued for preventative war strongly believed that if the United States failed to forcibly prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons it would lose an important offensive advantage, with catastrophic nuclear war as the inevitable result. Furthermore, the U.S. military was argued to possess a “moral duty” to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of its adversaries due to their inherent irrationality and aggressiveness. Any national security strategies that depended on political approaches to managing environmental uncertainty ignored the inevitability of nuclear conflict, and effectively squandered tangible military advantage in favor of intangible political risk management. Such strategies were argued to take the safeguarding of national security out of the hands of the military by eliminating the possibility for offensive initiative, reducing the military’s role to one of merely responding to adversarial action.

³³ Austin Stevens, ‘General Removed Over War Speech’, *New York Times*, September 2, 1950, p. 8

³⁴ Ibid.

Even after the clear rejection of preventative warfare options by President Truman, senior military officials continued to support the development of such doctrinal options in official studies such as “Project Control”.³⁵ Led by Colonel Raymond S. Sleeper throughout the early 1950’s at the U.S. Air War College, Project Control was a multi-year study by the Air Force of how to use strategic air power to “force the Soviet Union to acquiesce to strong U.S. policy initiatives and national interests.”³⁶ Colonel Sleeper was primarily concerned with developing innovative means of leveraging U.S. air power to “control the aggressiveness” of the Soviet Union and halt Soviet development of nuclear weapons.

Project Control garnered strong support from senior Air Force officials, whose concerns were not always limited to pessimistic shared assumptions about the ability of the U.S. to deter the Soviet military threat. Notably, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General Nathan F. Twining argued for the development of Project Control out of a fear that U.S. reliance on a doctrine of deterrence would limit both the future roles and budget of the Air Force. Twining feared that the establishment of a doctrine of deterrence would limit the role of the Air Force to nothing more than delivering massive retaliation in the event of a major war, and that such arguments, “contain a fundamental implication that surface forces are more capable of dealing with localized aggressions than are air forces.”³⁷ Further underlining parochial fears of marginalization, Twining complained to other senior officials that if plans for a doctrine of deterrence against the Soviet Union continued unchallenged, the Air Force did not, “appear capable of justifying increased air power to meet the military threats anything short of major war.”³⁸ However, lest Twining be accused of little more than the defense of narrow parochial interests, he also argued in favor of preventative war on the grounds that the Soviet Union was fundamentally

³⁵ David J. Dean (Lt. Col. USAF), ‘Project Control: creative thinking at Air University’, *The Air University Review*, (July-August, 1984) <http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1984/jul-aug/dean.html> (Accessed November 1, 2008); see also *A History of Project Control, Vol. I, Narrative*, Air University Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama

³⁶ Dean, ‘Project Control’

³⁷ Air Force Chief of Staff message date time group 302128Z March 1954, as quoted in Dean, ‘Project Control’

³⁸ Ibid.

irrational – “proven barbarians” as he stated – with an ideological predisposition for aggression.³⁹

Rejection of preventative warfare in favor of deterrence

While it is outside the scope of this thesis to fully examine the evolution of deterrence thinking, it is sufficient to say that early Cold War American leaders strongly rejected preventative war in favor of deterrence on both practical and normative grounds. President Truman in particular presented a clear articulation of normative belief against preventative war by stating, “We do not believe in aggression or preventative war... Such a war is the weapon of dictators, not of free democratic countries like the United States.”⁴⁰ For President Eisenhower, the case against preventative war was framed in similarly normative terms of how the United States could guarantee the prevention of nuclear weapons development in the Soviet Union short of the total destruction of the Soviet government and society. As Eisenhower stated to a group of military officers in 1954,

Gain such a victory and what do you do with it? Here would be a great area from the Elbe to Vladivostok and down through Southeast Asia torn up and destroyed without government, without its communications, just an area of starvation and disaster. I ask you what would the civilized world do about it? I repeat there is no victory in any war except through our imaginations, through our dedication, and through our work to avoid it.⁴¹

Subsequently a doctrine of containment was formally articulated in the national security strategy document NCS-68, which argued a similar blend of practical and normative reasons why a policy of containment with nuclear deterrence as a method would be chosen over preventative war in promoting national security objectives. Preventative war was rejected in NSC-68 as unlikely to be capable of restraining Soviet military forces

³⁹ ‘Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, to the JCS on the Coming National Crisis’, (August 21, 1953), Twining Papers, series 2, topical series, nuclear weapons 1952-1961 folder, USAF Academy, Colorado Springs, CO – as quoted in Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, pp. 79, 80

⁴⁰ ‘Text of Truman’s ‘Report to Nation’ on Korea War’, *New York Times*, September 2, 1950, p. 4

⁴¹ Robert H. Ferrel, ed., *The Diary of James C. Haggerty*, (Bloomington, ID: University of Indiana Press, 1983), p. 69, as quoted in Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, p. 81

from dominating Europe in retaliation, and as “repugnant” to both Americans and European allies.⁴² The acceptance of adversarial rationality that laid the foundation of a strategy of deterrence was not inherently derived from structural realities, but eventually assumed by senior policymakers from arguments about the strategic motivations of the Soviet Union, and the articulation of normative beliefs about preventative war.

Reliance on a doctrine of deterrence eventually rested on a practical issue of accepting “rational” adversaries in possession of offensive forces that assured mutual destruction, and a rejection of preventative war on normative grounds. A secondary normative issue was also subsequently presented in favor of maintaining mutual vulnerability through formal agreements limiting defensive forces. Although nuclear weapons presented an offensive dilemma to the superpowers, mutually destructive arsenals also created a corresponding defensive dilemma. If nuclear deterrence depended on the credible threat of retaliation, then effective defenses against nuclear weapons (such as a working anti-ballistic missile defense system) would once again increase the offensive value of these weapons. Stable deterrence was thus argued to be highly dependent on the mutual vulnerability of states to nuclear attack, and any defensive measures to protect against nuclear strikes threatened the balance of deterrent forces.⁴³ This principle of mutual vulnerability, later formally recognized in the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, provided a degree of stability to the nuclear order by placing formal and voluntary constraints on the development of ballistic missile defenses, providing limitations on the offensive value of unconventional weapons.

Cultural expectations about the inevitability of conflict and the utility of technological advantage shaped the early DOD reassessment of the post-war security environment in ways that projected an assumed structure onto a fluid environment where no such structure or definitive patterns yet existed. As such, the assessments of strategic “necessity” that emerged from certain senior officials offered a uniquely military approach to environmental uncertainty, by turning such uncertainty about adversarial

⁴² Ibid., p. 78

⁴³ William Walker, ‘Nuclear order and disorder’, *International Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), pp. 703-724, p. 707

motive into ‘facts’ that could be answered with military capabilities.⁴⁴ While structural or bureaucratic explanations would not exclude such behavior, an organizational perspective incorporating military cultural biases gives meaning to the specific forms of military behavior in structurally indeterminate situations. It does so in ways that move beyond the mere motivation for the expansion of bureaucratic turf or rational response to structural imperatives. Policy outcomes during this period resulted not from structural imperatives or strictly rational utility maximization, but from the *ideas* that senior policymakers possessed. In the end, it was these ideas, culturally conditioned and transmitted through heated argumentation that made the crucial difference between doctrinal choices of deterrence or preventative war.

Now this chapter will return to the post-Cold War, and examine how the experience of the Gulf War provided many parallel “lessons” to military officials facing a structurally indeterminate security environment with similar sources of strategic uncertainty.

Organizational ‘lessons’ drawn from the Gulf War experience

The organizationally appropriate fixation on the potential military implications of the post-Cold War attained a broader cultural impact within the DOD through the experience of the Gulf War. Military organizations routinely glean “lessons” about the shape of future warfare from conflict, and the particular experience of the Gulf War and its aftermath gave considerable weight to the longstanding proliferation pessimism of the DOD, and emerging concerns about the implications of the RMA to U.S. security strategy. Ironically, it was the success of the United States in applying RMA technologies to the battlefield that spurred many within the DOD to argue that the American technological advantage, coupled with an enhanced ability to control proliferation, would need to be strengthened and expanded if the United States hoped to retain meaningful military superiority well into the future.

⁴⁴ Eden, Whole World on Fire, p. 50

From a public perspective, the Gulf War was largely a story of unqualified American military success. The 44-day combined air and ground operation featured an unprecedented demonstration of the capability of a new generation of high-tech weaponry, especially precision guided munitions, ballistic missile interceptors and coalition forces coordinated via GPS-based battlefield management technologies. Coalition forces faced approximately 500,000 Iraqi troops during the conflict, inflicting more than 20,000 Iraqi battle deaths in the course of the combined air and ground assaults, with U.S. military forces themselves suffering only 147 battle related deaths. The impression drawn by most outside observers of the Gulf War was of the sweeping and technologically unprecedented operational dominance of the U.S. military over a major regional adversary.

Yet in the months after the ticker-tape victory parades, a very different and more sober assessment of the conflict began to emerge from the DOD. Far from basking in the public limelight of success, the organization argued that the Gulf War served as both a model for future conflict, and presented a case study of near disastrous failure for the U.S. military. According to DOD officials, inadequate strategic intelligence meant that U.S. forces did not know the scope of Iraqi unconventional weapons programs; inadequate tactical intelligence meant that U.S. forces could not find and destroy Iraqi unconventional weapons in the field; and inadequate force protection meant that U.S. forces were unprepared to carry out their mission in a “WMD environment.”⁴⁵ Particular weaknesses in force protection were in the detection of chemical or biological agents, and the vulnerability of U.S. troops, forward bases and regional allies to attack from ballistic missiles. This vulnerability came both from the difficulty facing U.S. forces in finding and destroying such weapons on the ground, and the spotty record of missile interceptors in destroying Iraqi ballistic missiles in flight.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Wallerstein, ‘The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative’, p. 23

⁴⁶ On the difficulty of U.S. forces to find and destroy Iraqi missiles on the ground, see Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), *Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), pp. 29, 30; *for the controversial record of American forces in intercepting ballistic missiles once in flight, see Postol papers and testimony.*

In examining the DOD response to the Gulf War, in its post-conflict operational assessments and the longer-term lessons gleaned from the conflict, an important picture of the organizational biases and proclivities of the DOD begins to emerge. Parochial interests in the form of inter-service rivalries within the DOD shaped much of the post-conflict strategic and tactical assessments, as individual military services reflexively focused on the operational shortcomings of their competing branches.⁴⁷ The focus on these operational shortcomings heightened a sense of environmental uncertainty for the organization that was met with an extremely pessimistic capabilities-centric response that, despite conspicuous non-use by Iraq in the Gulf War, assumed widespread adversarial unconventional weapons use in future conflicts. The continuing political uncertainty of shrinking budgets contributed to this highly critical organizational response, as both combat successes and failures were used to support claims for the advancement of force modernization efforts. Ultimately, the DOD drew lessons from the conflict that reinforced its prewar organizational defense planning emphasis on adversarial capabilities over adversarial motives, and created a great deal of organizational self-projection in future threat planning. Such organizational factors would eventually play a defining role in shaping the policy response to proliferation in the form of counterproliferation.

Operational shortcomings

The potential threat posed by assumed Iraqi nuclear, chemical or biological weapons was not lost on the U.S. military. The list of priority targets for U.S. air strikes included Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological research facilities, with the intention being to, “Reduce

⁴⁷ Indeed, the clearest early assessments of operational shortcomings emerged from the competing inter-service accounts and self-critical service literature, rather than from the DOD as a whole. The final report of the DOD to Congress and the President was a disappointing, but unsurprisingly watered down attempt to reconcile these divergent positions by largely ignoring the legitimate operational issues raised. See, Department of Defense, *Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress*, Washington DC, April 1992, <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>, accessed July 20, 2006; The largely Air Force driven post-conflict assessment in Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, (United States Air Force Historical Studies Office, 1993), <http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gwaps.htm>, (accessed January 10, 2005) is a far more illuminating and forthright concerning issues of operational shortcomings than the DOD report to Congress.

[the] long-term international threat.”⁴⁸ Among the targets bombed within Iraq in the first day of the air campaign was the same Iraqi nuclear research facility at Al-Tuwaitha that had been attacked by Israel in 1981.⁴⁹ Iraqi unconventional weapons stockpiles were of great concern to coalition forces in the Gulf, particularly considering the Iraqi use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.⁵⁰ DOD fixation on Iraqi unconventional capabilities extended into post-conflict assessments despite the fact that such weapons were not employed during the conflict, seemingly indicating the success of traditional deterrence despite massive Iraqi military losses.

An uncomfortable further lesson drawn by the DOD from the experience of the Gulf War and subsequent IAEA revelations was the argument that covert nuclear weapons projects by determined proliferators had become increasingly difficult to stop. In 1981, four Israeli warplanes had attacked a nuclear facility in Iraq in broad daylight, setting the Iraqi nuclear weapons program back by at least 10 years.⁵¹ Yet in those ten interceding years, Iraqi expansion, diversification and ‘hardening’ of their nuclear program, coupled with incomplete U.S. intelligence, meant that an air campaign lasting 43 days, consisting of 42,600 strike sorties dropping 88,500 tons of munitions, failed to inflict as much damage to the Iraqi nuclear program as the single strike carried out by the Israelis.⁵²

⁴⁸ United States Joint Chiefs of Staff / Air Force briefing slides to Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, ‘Iraqi Air Campaign Instant Thunder’, August 17, 1990, p. 9, DOD OFOISR 00021-CDR-1 / 651.PDF; See also Malcolm W. Browne, ‘Iraqi Chemical Arms: Difficult Target’, *New York Times*, September 5, 1990, sec. A, p. 15

⁴⁹ Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak and the American Counterproliferation Debate’, p. 94; see also R.W. Apple Jr., ‘War in the Gulf: The Overview; U.S. Foils Missile Attacks on 2 Saudi Cities; Claims Hits on Iraqi Nuclear and Gas Sites’, *New York Times*, January 21, 1991, sec. A, p. 1

⁵⁰ See CIA Reference Aid, ‘Prewar Status of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 03/20/1991, CIA Intelligence Assessment, ‘Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments’, 1990, www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB80/wmd03.pdf, (accessed June 5, 2005); See also prioritization of targets in JCS briefing, ‘Iraqi Air Campaign Instant Thunder’, DOD OFSIR, 00021-CDR-1 / 651.PDF

⁵¹ See Rodger Claire, *Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel's Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb*, (New York: Broadway Books, 2004), the setback was not only through direct material damage to Iraqi nuclear facilities, but also by forcing an end to French nuclear cooperation with Iraq before critical nuclear materials had been shipped. See also Cohen, ‘The Lessons of Osirak’

⁵² Eliot Cohen and Lewis D. Hill, *Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 5: A Statistical Compendium and Chronology*, (Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1993)

Defensive lessons from the conflict were equally ambiguous. The Patriot missile system, originally designed as an anti-aircraft missile system, was pressed into service in the Gulf War to counter the threat posed by Iraqi Scud missiles. While initially reported as a dramatic success by both the U.S. military and media, later studies revealed that Patriot missiles did not entirely destroy any incoming Scud *warheads*, and furthermore that employment of the Patriot system quite possibly caused more casualties and damage to civilian areas than had no Patriot interceptors been launched.⁵³ In the most significant display of this vulnerability, on same day that Iraq announced its withdrawal from Kuwait, U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia were hit by a SCUD attack that killed 27 and wounded 98. Overall, 18% of all U.S. battle deaths and 20% of all wounded in the Gulf War resulted from this single attack utilizing a crude ballistic missile armed with conventional high explosives.⁵⁴ The DOD unsurprisingly argued that much more money needed to be dedicated to ballistic missile defenses, despite strongly disputing such claims of Patriot interceptor ineffectiveness.⁵⁵

Inter-service rivalries and post-conflict responses

The “public success” of the Gulf War in many ways served as a catalyst for parochial interests within the DOD to highlight operational shortcomings of competing military branches. Ground commanders sensitive to claims that air power had ‘won’ the Gulf War

⁵³ Theodore A. Postol and Albert Carnesale, Testimony before Committee on Armed Services: Defense Policy Panel, Subcommittee on Procurement and Military Nuclear Systems, and the Subcommittee on Research and Development, April 16, 1991. See also George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, “An Evaluation of the Army Report ‘Analysis of Video Tapes to Assess Patriot Effectiveness’”, report prepared for Congressman John Conyers Jr., March 31, 1992 (Cambridge, MA: Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1992). See also, Stephen A. Hildreth, “Evaluation of U.S. Army Assessment of Patriot Antitactical Missile Effectiveness in the War Against Iraq”, Congressional Research Service Report, prepared for House Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, April 7, 1992. For figures on Iraqi Scud launches during the Gulf War, see General Merrill McPeak, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, The Air Campaign: Part of the Combined Arms Operation (Washington DC: Department of the Air Force, 1991), briefing graphic 16.

⁵⁴ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Iraq Orders Troops to Leave Kuwait But U.S. Pursues Battlefield Gains; Heavy American Toll in Scud Attack’, *New York Times*, February 26, 1991, sec. A, p. 1; see also Department of Defense, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, ‘Persian Gulf War – Casualty Summary’, (updated June 15, 2004) <http://www.siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/GWSUM.pdf> (accessed June 15, 2006)

⁵⁵ Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress

were quick to point out the spotty record of the Air Force in critical mission areas such as ground destruction of ballistic missile launchers and unconventional weapons stockpiles.⁵⁶ Ground commanders serving as the public face of the Gulf War faced particular embarrassment and irritation from continued SCUD missile attacks. Coalition commander Norman Schwarzkopf's claims that all 30 of Iraq's fixed missile launching sites, and 16 of their 20 mobile missile launchers had been destroyed, were later discovered to be highly inaccurate.⁵⁷

In riposte, Air Force commanders were quick to argue both that air operation shortcomings were largely the result of inadequate intelligence, and that ground forces were under-prepared for combat in the face of potential Iraqi chemical or biological attacks.⁵⁸ These competing discourses highlighted not only the standard historical competition between practitioners of air and land warfare, but also served to shape specific conceptions of the nature of an emerging post-Cold War environmental uncertainty. Challengers to assertions of air or land military dominance backed their criticism with specific identification of the operational shortcomings of competing branches regarding discovered and potential Iraqi military capabilities, pressing a continued discourse of "failure" within the organization.

Proliferation concerns highlighted by the Gulf War experience

⁵⁶ Thomas A. Keaney, 'Surveying Gulf War Airpower', *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 2 (Autumn 1993) pp. 25-36; see also Stephen T. Ganyard (Maj), 'Strategic Air Power Didn't Work', *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* Vol. 121 (August 1995) pp. 31-35; Neil Munro and Barbara Opall, 'Survey Questions U.S. Air Efficiency in Desert Storm', *Defense News*, No. 8 (February 1-7, 1993) p. 3; and, Bruce B. Auster, 'The Limits of Air Power: Sobering Lessons from the Gulf', *U.S. News & World Report*, (May 10, 1993), p. 52

⁵⁷ Israeli sources claimed that more than 40 mobile launchers were in operation after the opening days of coalition air attacks, see R.W. Apple Jr., 'War in the Gulf: The Overview; U.S. Foils Missile Attacks on 2 Saudi Cities; Claims Hits on Iraqi Nuclear and Gas Sites', *New York Times*, January 21, 1991, sec. A, p. 1

⁵⁸ The issue was also raised of significantly greater coalition casualties without U.S. airspace dominance and sustained bombing campaign, see Alan Gropman, 'Success in Persian Gulf Validates Air Force Doctrine', *Air Force Times* (March 18, 1991), p. 23; Price T. Bingham (LtCol), 'U.S. Air Interdiction Capability Challenges Ground War Doctrine', *Armed Forces Journal International*, (October, 1992), p. 62; and Malcolm W. Browne, 'F-117's Opening Strike on Iraq Called Brilliant', *Air Force Times*, (February 4, 1991), p. 26

Although questions of air vs. land war doctrine were unsurprisingly met with a distinct lack of consensus, ultimately this interservice and intraservice criticism and reflection served to shape a general DOD-wide consensus that the proliferation and potential use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons would pose one of the most likely threats to U.S. military forces and interests in the post-Cold War. Preceding the conflict, known Iraqi chemical and biological weapons (and their missile delivery systems) presented the U.S. military with an inversion of traditional deterrence relationships, with the U.S. now placed in the unfamiliar position of possibly being deterred from action in a strategically crucial region by a militarily inferior adversary. The inability of the U.S. military to accurately identify and destroy these weapons during the conflict pointed to an important intelligence and capabilities gap, with the general sentiment being that the U.S. military “dodged a bullet” in terms of its ability to fight and prevail against an adversary armed with unconventional weapons.⁵⁹ Together these experiences formed a set of ‘lessons’ widely agreed upon within the DOD that would significantly shape an emerging counterproliferation policy. As later Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy, Mitchel Wallerstein concluded, “Our Gulf War experience revealed too many limitations on our forces when they are required to confront an adversary armed with WMD.”⁶⁰

Furthermore, the execution of the Gulf War provided a clear demonstration that a technological revolution in warfare had occurred, if only in evidence from the application of such technology by US-led coalition forces. In this area in particular, military analysts effectively inverted the impact of U.S. capabilities and projected them on future adversaries. As internal DOD documents noted soon after the conclusion of the Gulf War, “there is a surprising degree of consensus that a military-technical revolution is underway and that we are just at the beginning. Desert Storm had a major role in creating this consensus.”⁶¹ By the organizational logic of the military, the lessons of technological

⁵⁹ Mitchel B. Wallerstein, ‘Concepts to Capabilities: The First Year of Counterproliferation’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 18

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 19

⁶¹ Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, Director of Net Assessment, 15 July 1992, DOD OIGIR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF

advantage would be drawn by militaries worldwide, and thus the technological edge held by American forces had diminished merely through the demonstration of such technological superiority.

Responses to uncertainty and organizational support for the NP regime

Why were the pessimistic organizational lessons about Iraqi unconventional weapons the new model for future conflict and a damning indictment of the NP regime and binding power of NP norms, rather than seen as an isolated case of regional proliferation that could be adequately dealt with through uniquely tailored means such as the UNSCOM mission?

Underestimating the military capabilities of adversaries does not make for a successful military career. The DOD's assessment of the post-Cold War security environment and lessons from the Gulf War were exercises in conservative military organizational thinking, largely predicated on the long-term assumption that the political and economic enforcement mechanisms of the nonproliferation regime would fail to hinder those determined to develop unconventional capabilities, and that such unconventional military capabilities would likely be utilized in future warfare by adversaries freed of the political limitations on action provided by Cold War bi-polarity. The lesson of 'failure' from the Gulf War by the DOD was not only one of addressing the environmental uncertainty generated by the experience of the conflict, but also in addressing political uncertainty in the form of budgetary downturn to justify the advancement of force modernization efforts, and shift away from a peripheral NP role tied to military doctrine of deterrence. Post-conflict assessments largely avoided questions of Iraqi decisionmaking, and thus rationality, but rather emphasized the centrality of potential adversarial capabilities as a crucial factor for defense planning. The lack of answers on Iraqi non-use of unconventional weapons during the Gulf War was not viewed as a success of deterrence, merely as an unresolved mystery.⁶² Such strategic ambiguity served to increase

⁶² Department of Defense, 'Annual Report to Congress and the President' 1995, <http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/index.html> (accessed, April 22, 2005)

environmental uncertainty for the DOD - an uncertainty that was partially “resolved” by assuming adversarial use in future conflicts. In further developing lessons from the Gulf War, organizational learning combined with uncertainty mitigation as a function of self-projection upon future adversaries. Future threat scenarios became a virtual replay of the Gulf War with a more informed, more capable Iraqi military.⁶³ In lieu of answers to questions of Iraq’s non-use of unconventional weapons, military planners assumed use would occur in future warfare scenarios, and thus began to plan accordingly.

Now in the post-Cold War, U.S. defense planners were left with both a lack of clearly identifiable adversaries, and a lingering ambiguity as to the military capability of potential adversaries. This drove DOD strategists to argue that the U.S. should move towards a capabilities-based defense model, in which acquisitions, training and force posture would be oriented towards the *potential* capabilities of future adversaries.⁶⁴ What this implied was a shift away from calculations of adversarial motives and rationality – the sort of thinking that was central to adopting a doctrine of deterrence during the Cold War – and towards a general assumption of capabilities usage. If advanced or unconventional military capabilities became more widely available, usage by adversaries during conflict with the United States should be assumed. Such assumptions would have sweeping implications for the DOD’s sense of global responsibility, and in particular, organizational support of traditional NP regime functions and roles.

While the institutions of the nonproliferation regime were still the cornerstone of U.S. policy in limiting the spread of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, concern was well established within the DOD that no combination of regime enforcement measures and diplomatic pressure would keep “the most determined proliferators” from developing unconventional weapons capabilities.⁶⁵ It was also precisely the “most determined” states

⁶³ Institute for Defense Analyses, Report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘The Operational Implications of Proliferation’, DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-869.PDF, pp. II-164-174

⁶⁴ Interview with Larry Seaquist, former Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Joint Staff (1988-1990), October 21, 2005

⁶⁵ For a particularly illuminating account of the different perceptions of the proliferation threat posed by Iraq between the Department of Defense and Department of State, see United States Department of State, Memo, ‘Computers for Iraq: DOD’s Proliferation Concerns’, 03/04/1986 (NS Archives IG00319), see also

such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea that were seen as the most likely potential opponents of the United States in major regional conflicts.⁶⁶ In several internal assessments of post-Cold War defense requirements, the DOD singled out the need to develop offensive and defensive capabilities to effectively fight and prevail in future conflicts involving unconventional weapons armed adversaries.⁶⁷ As the DOD sought to define its future missions and capability requirements in the post-Cold War, it was the proliferation of unconventional weapons that continually headed the lists of likely threats.

The post-Gulf War debate over the viability of the NP regime to address proliferation threats exposed longstanding organizational tensions with overall U.S. NP policy that had been long maintained by the DOD. Although the DOD had long given meaningful support to the NP regime through its assigned arms control intelligence support role, U.S. NP policy always provided a source of tension for an organizational culture inclined to skepticism about the utility of normative agreements that were premised on voluntary restraint of military power by potential adversaries, and limited economic barriers to indigenous unconventional weapons development. Many DOD officials had never believed that states like Iraq would play by the rules of a normative regime, and the evidence emerging from Iraq after the Gulf War bore out many of these doubts. This evidence further reinforced a widespread skepticism within the DOD of an NP regime incapable of containing emerging proliferation threats. In order to meet future proliferation threats, military leaders began to argue that military alternatives to the multilateral diplomatic and economic enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime would need to be developed. It was from such a conception of unconventional weapons threats separated from questions of adversarial political motive that the concept of counterproliferation was born.

United States Department of State, Action Memorandum (James Baker), 'Response to Secretary of Defense Cheney Concerning Iraq and Nuclear Export Controls', 04/10/1990 (NS Archives IG01548)

⁶⁶ For arguments on "unstable actors" with "unlimited ambitions", see, Robert G. Joseph, 'WMD: A Proliferation Overview', in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 5; and arguments about "hot nationalist passions", "primitive animosity" and "terror diplomacy" in countries such as Iraq and Iran, see Paul Bracken, Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), pp. 89-90, 124

⁶⁷ Wallerstein, 'The Origins and Evolution of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative', pp. 23, 24, and Les Aspin, 'Counterproliferation Initiative'

Counterproliferation

Even in the years before the Gulf War, DOD officials had discussed alternative approaches to proliferation that were not dependent on normative strategies of disarmament and deterrence. The term *anti*-proliferation had been used sporadically and unofficially for some time when defense officials discussed alternative approaches to proliferation issues that deviated from accepted nonproliferation activities.⁶⁸ Although no evidence indicates organizational advocacy of the sort of preventative military action exemplified by Israel's bombing of the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor at al-Tuwaita in 1981, defense officials were beginning to "think beyond" the confines of the NP regime even before the end of the Cold War.⁶⁹ As the DOD official credited with coining the term counterproliferation during the period of strategic reassessment before the Gulf War commented,

The world had already proliferated... There was a hell of a lot of proliferation going on in the world... so I thought we ought to change the label. Anti-proliferation to me was an attitude, not a program. But counter-proliferation as a term seemed to signal to me that we could counter the existing proliferation, rather than continue to pretend like we were doing non-proliferation.⁷⁰

Counterproliferation appealed as a new label for proactive rather than reactive approaches, implicitly advocating moving beyond strategies of disarmament and deterrence to active denial of the operational ability of adversaries to develop and deploy unconventional or other asymmetric capabilities. CP assumed proliferation would inevitably occur, departing from the basic assumption of nonproliferation that a 'nonproliferated' world could be achieved through the mechanism of the NPT and the

⁶⁸ Seaquist interview

⁶⁹ Although some minor voices in the DOD argued for a tougher military approach similar to the Israeli model, such voices were hardly representative of an organizational consensus. See Claire, *Raid on the Sun*, p. 220. For the larger consensus against such an approach, see National Security Decision Directive Number 6, 'United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Policy', July 16, 1981, NS Archives PD01596; National Security Directive 70, 'United States Nonproliferation Policy' July 10, 1992 – NS Archives PR01781

⁷⁰ The term 'counterproliferation', at least in the American context, was coined by Larry Seaquist, working from 1989 to 1992 as Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy under Paul Wolfowitz in the newly created Office of Strategy and Policy (OSP). Seaquist interview.

norm of nonproliferation. CP thinking also assumed that the military utility of such proliferation for potential adversaries could be mitigated through the development of technologies, force posture and doctrine that minimized the impact of unconventional weapons or high-technology.⁷¹

This early conception of counterproliferation provides an important window into the organizational culture of the DOD, and its views on both its own responsibility and its capacity for shaping the emerging security environment. Rather than simply holding the line to prevent proliferation through supporting the norm of nonproliferation and mechanisms of nonproliferation such as export controls, this larger military strategy envisioned an attempt to *shape* the emerging security environment into a form less threatening to U.S. interests. This amounted to an inward looking conception of organizational responsibility that assumed adversarial acceptance of benign U.S. military hegemony, and also assumed potential adversarial calculations of military development would be largely determined by their strategic relationship with the United States, rather than that of their regional neighbors or other factors. Such an approach would not incidentally entail a far greater military role in post-Cold War national security strategy than congressionally proposed budgets had anticipated.⁷²

In analyzing the DOD's view on proliferation in the early post-Cold War years, it is important to examine how the lessons of the Gulf War, coupled with its established cultural biases shaped a response to the unique circumstances of environmental and political uncertainty as viewed by the organization. How did the DOD view its responsibility in the post-Cold War security environment in the aftermath of the Gulf War? How did the organization envision responding to emerging strategic threats, especially those posed by unconventional weapons programs in the hands of regional aggressors such as Iraq? While no definitive and uncontested answer emerged between the conclusion of the Gulf War and the transition of Administrations from Bush to

⁷¹ Interview with Larry Seaquist

⁷² Defense spending cuts of approximately 30% over 5 years proposed by Congress were also criticized by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, though he argued that a possible continued Soviet military threat justified spending on certain projects such as the B-2 bomber. See Richard Halloran, 'Cheney Criticizes Cuts in Military', *New York Times*, sec. A, p. 20

Clinton, some indication of how military planners conceptualized both the emerging security environment of the post-Cold War, and its responsibilities to respond to that environment, can be drawn from the controversial and ultimately abandoned 1992 Defense Planning Guidance.⁷³

The 1992 Defense Planning Guidance

In principle, U.S. military warfighting plans are developed in a cascading, top-down system. Ultimate national security objectives, priorities and decisions are articulated in National Security Presidential Directives (NSPDs).⁷⁴ If they contain a military component, these large-scale decisions then flow to the Secretary of Defense who is responsible for coordinating a semi-annual document called the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).⁷⁵ The DPG serves as an orienting guide for the military departments to formulate their budgets, bringing their spending plans in line with the overall focus of current U.S. national security strategy. Then the Joint Staff, representing the commanders in chief of the unified commands (CINC's) and chiefs of the military services, produces the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). The JSCP is a "cornerstone" planning document that provides guidance to the CINC's and chiefs of the military services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military capabilities.⁷⁶ It also "assigns tasks and resources to the unified commands for preparing their theater plans."⁷⁷ As one

⁷³ There is a longstanding controversy concerning the authorship and draft status of documents listed in this section. To date, no copies have been publicly declassified, and the only existing sources for these drafts are copies leaked to the New York Times by unnamed Pentagon officials.

⁷⁴ This is the Bush Administration's term for what were referred to under the Clinton Administration as Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs). This follows an odd bureaucratic tradition of incoming presidential administrations renaming their memoranda, a confusing issue for archival document tracing. For example, Nixon era National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDMs), were renamed National Security Decision Documents (NSDDs) under the Regan Administration, National Security Directives (NSDs) under the first Bush Administration, and so forth. See David Rothkopf, *Running the World*, pp. 117, 219, 266, 313 and 402

⁷⁵ Jim Garamone, 'Forming the Plan Behind the Defense Budget', *DefenseLINK News*, May 12, 2002 – <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/May2002/n05/22002-200205121.html> (accessed August 12, 2006)

⁷⁶ United States Air Force, Contingency Wartime Planning Course, 'Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan', IP-4000 – <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/cwpc/4000-JS.htm> (accessed August 12, 2006)

⁷⁷ United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused', GAO/NSIAD-00-97, May, 2000, p. 35

DOD analyst has noted, “Field manuals, JCS publications, and the like may not be standard reading for most Americans, but they are the lifeblood of the services. They form the basis on which our military writes plans and actually prosecutes wars in the interests of the American people.”⁷⁸

In early 1992, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist the Pentagon’s civilian leaders in developing scenarios for future conflicts in order to begin budget planning from 1994-1999. The result was a “regionally focused military strategy”, prominently featuring DOD proliferation pessimism that expected the threat of a resurgent Iraq, unburdened by embargoes and trade sanctions that were predicted to “slacken” and be rendered “largely ineffective by 1995”.⁷⁹ Other major threat scenarios included an invasion of South Korea by a nuclear-armed North Korea, conflict in the Balkans, the Philippines, Panama and a resurgent superpower or coalition of states allied against the United States.⁸⁰

Significantly, the report by the Joint Chiefs emphasized threat scenarios that would require U.S. forces to be prepared to fight in two simultaneous major conflicts against adversaries armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The force posture to meet such threats would, in the eyes of the Joint Chiefs, require a reversal of projected defense spending cuts to enable the armed forces to maintain a technological and doctrinal edge, “and a credible capability to expand military forces.”⁸¹ Congressional oversight committees had been requesting detailed threat scenarios against Pentagon resistance for months, so when the Joint Chiefs’ report was leaked, Congressional skepticism was high over plans that appeared designed to preserve defense budgets rather

⁷⁸ Chris Williams, ‘DOD’s Counterproliferation Initiative: a critical assessment’, in Henry Sokolski (ed.), *Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties*, (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch14.htm> (Accessed - 10 June, 2003)

⁷⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘7 Hypothetical Conflicts Foreseen by the Pentagon’, *New York Times*, February 17, 1992, sec. A, p. 8

⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p. 8

⁸¹ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Pentagon Imagines New Enemies To Fight in Post-Cold War Era’, *New York Times*, February 17, 1992, sec. A, p. 1

than to meet existing national security requirements.⁸² However, nothing in the joint Chiefs' report generated nearly as much controversy as the broader Defense Planning Guidance, leaked to the New York Times the following month.

First appearing in the New York Times on March 8th, 1992, the document known as the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance (1992 DPG) set out for the first time, a revolutionary new role for the DOD in the post-Cold War. Far from merely envisioning likely threat scenarios to guide defense planning, the 1992 DPG envisioned U.S. military power playing a defining role in *shaping* the emerging security environment, rather than merely *responding* to emerging threats. The central organizing vision of the document is worth quoting at length:

Defense Strategy Objectives: Our first objective is to prevent the emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere... This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power.

There are three additional aspects to this objective: First, the U.S. must show the leadership necessary to establish and protect a new order that hold the promise of convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests. Second, in the non-defense areas, we must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. Finally, we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role.

While the U.S. cannot become the world's "policeman," by assuming responsibility for righting every wrong, we will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations. Various types of U.S. interests may be involved in such instances; access to vital raw materials, primarily Persian Gulf oil; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, threats to U.S. citizens from terrorism or regional or local conflict, and threats to U.S. society from narcotics

⁸² Patrick E. Tyler, 'War in 1990's: New Doubts; Pentagon Plans Evoke Skepticism in Congress', *New York Times*, February 18, 1992, sec. A, p. 1

trafficking... Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.⁸³

The draft continued with the implications of implicit American global leadership by asserting that while coalitions such as that gathered for the Gulf War, “hold considerable promise for promoting collective action”, the United States must be prepared to act independently.⁸⁴ A key ingredient of the success of American support for “world order” was thus the capacity for independent action, a capacity that could only be guaranteed by continued high levels of defense spending. Such budgetary support was argued to be key to ensuring that the United States maintained sufficient force posture to meet potential threats, and to ensure American technological and doctrinal superiority sufficient to dissuade regional powers from even attempting to challenge or threaten U.S. national security interests.

On the issue of the threats posed by proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons, the draft proposed a dramatically more assertive role for the DOD. Challenging the traditional NP intelligence support role played by the DOD, the report commented that, “The U.S. may be faced with the question of whether to take military steps to prevent the development of usage of weapons of mass destruction.” Such military steps were proposed to include possible preemptive strikes in the case of imminent attack, or even preventative strikes on nuclear, chemical or biological weapons manufacturing facilities in adversarial nations.⁸⁵ The report also considered the potential implications if the NPT failed to be renewed in 1995, “should it fail, there could ensue a potentially radical destabilizing process” leading to, “critical challenges which the U.S. and concerned partners must be prepared to address.”⁸⁶

Here is a Pentagon vision of a post-Cold War role that proposes a bold and direct challenge to the environmental and political uncertainty faced by the organization. The

⁸³ ‘Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: ‘Prevent the Re-Emergence of a new Rival’’, *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, sec. 1, p. 14

⁸⁴ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘U.S. Strategy Calls For Insuring No Rivals Develop’, *New York Times*, March 8, 1992, sec. 1, p. 1

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 1

major areas identified in previous threat assessments and planning documents, whether the aspirations of regional powers or the proliferation of unconventional weapons, were to be potentially dealt with through a much more assertive and forward projected use of U.S. military force. Especially in the area of proliferation, the traditional multilateral, political mechanisms of the NP regime were viewed as potential areas of failure with direct military consequences. Rather than wait for these threats to present themselves directly, or create deeper levels of environmental uncertainty, the 1992 DPG sought to head off such outcomes by establishing a role for the DOD in actively reducing such uncertainty.

Assessing the meaning of the 1992 DPG from an organizational context

Although the 1992 DPG has often been cited as an early attempt by neoconservatives to establish a unilateral, Pax Americana turn in American foreign policy (drafting had been supervised by Paul D. Wolfowitz, the Pentagon's Under Secretary for Policy, working under Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney), such arguments downplay both the bureaucratic constraints of the DOD and the relevance of this document as a nascent self-identification of post-Cold War organizational responsibility.⁸⁷ Though it is tempting to view this document as a debate over unilateralism vs. multilateralism, it is vital to note that in foreign policy terms, the document represents little more than a case of the Pentagon overstepping its bureaucratic boundaries, to articulating a vision of grand strategy for the United States that it had no mandate to formulate. Unsurprisingly, the reaction from Administration officials, members of Congress and senior officials in competing bureaucracies was swift and damning.⁸⁸ So although indeed revolutionary in

⁸⁷ Although it would be unfair to characterize this document as representing a consensus view across the entire DOD, arguments that the DPG represents merely the personal vision of neoconservative policymakers such as Wolfowitz fail to recognize the involvement of a wide range of senior DOD officials in its drafting – interviews with Seaquist and Hersman. For arguments that the 1992 DPG represents a “neoconservative agenda” see, Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); also James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, (New York: Viking Press, 2004);

⁸⁸ For a range of critical governmental responses to the document, see Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Senior U.S. Officials Assail Lone-Superpower Policy’, *New York Times*, March 11, 1992, sec. A, p. 6; also Patrick E. Tyler, “Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics”, *The New York Times*, March 10, 1992, Sec. A, p. 12

its own terms, the 1992 DPG is ultimately a document of marginal insight to U.S. foreign policy in the years immediately following its release. Yet the document is highly insightful as a guide to examining the organizational response to the considerable strategic and political uncertainty of the times.

Unsurprisingly, the 1992 DPG stands as a strategic reassessment that places a strong emphasis on the possible military consequences of the end of the Cold War. If its premises and proposed responses to the emerging strategic environment were to be adopted, U.S. military forces would play a central role in shaping the post-Cold War security order. Force modernization, expanded forward basing and new ‘missions’ would in large part preserve a defense role and budget that otherwise faced significant reductions in the post-Cold War – a point that was not lost on some lawmakers and rival organizations. As Democratic Senator Joseph Biden commented at the time, “the Pentagon vision reverts to an old notion of the United States as the world’s policeman – a notion that, not incidentally, will preserve a large defense budget.”⁸⁹

It should also be noted that such budgetary assertiveness at this specific point in time was an act of political savvy by veteran Pentagon officials. Although pressing for budgetary expansion in a time of economic recession seems an unlikely plan for success, the relationship of defense spending, especially that of assertive force posturing and acquisitions, to the overall U.S. economy must be taken into account. While proposed expenditures by the Pentagon may have been set artificially high, the economic pain associated with defense cuts, especially huge job losses resulting from closed bases and cancelled contracts, hitting in a time of economic recession was something likely to face strong resistance in Congress, regardless of party arguments about alternative ways to distribute funds.⁹⁰ So rather than a simple discourse of challenging grand strategy, the 1992 DPG must be viewed in context as a combination of attempted strategic positioning and opportunistic political maneuvering.

⁸⁹ Patrick E. Tyler, “Lone Superpower Plan: Ammunition for Critics”, *The New York Times*, March 10, 1992, Sec. A, p. 12.

⁹⁰ Patrick E. Tyler, ‘How Big a Military Does a Superpower Need?’, *New York Times*, March 1, 1991, sec. 4, p. 2

It was widely feared within the corridors of the Pentagon that any emerging military doctrine designed to prepare the U.S. military to cope with post-Cold War security threats would likely face an uphill battle due to significant proposed cuts in the U.S. defense budget.⁹¹ Budgetary shortcomings have a rather different significance for military organizations than other organizations, such that in few other organizations are life and death so closely tied to otherwise mundane issues such as budget allocations and personnel training. Budgets being limited, preparedness cannot be unlimited, thus military preparedness is a function of what missions have been successfully argued and thus supported by budgets. While some members of Congress saw the opportunity to seize a post-Cold War peace dividend as the massive Soviet bloc military threat crumbled, Pentagon planners saw the danger that long-planned force modernization and readiness efforts might be lost in the ensuing flood of red ink.⁹²

The transition years between the Cold War and post-Cold War found the DOD arguing for protection of Cold War budgets levels partially through the rationale that even though the unprecedented military buildup since the end of the Carter Administration had created an agile and capable force, such capability was “fragile” and cutbacks would create “shockwaves” in the armed services and defense industries that would put readiness at risk.⁹³ So although the central organizing threat of the Cold War had disappeared, the changing technological landscape was argued by DOD planners to require the U.S. to maintain high levels of defense spending. Such arguments formed an acknowledgement that the United States was in a vastly superior position, but that only continued strong budgetary support could ensure American military preeminence, and ensure that no effective rivals could emerge.⁹⁴

⁹¹ The Bush Administration had proposed a \$50 billion cut in military spending, while Les Aspin, the influential Democratic chair of the Senate Armed Services committee had proposed defense cuts totaling \$100 billion. See Patrick E. Tyler, ‘Top Congressman Seeks Deeper Cuts in Military Budget’, *New York Times*, February 23, 1991, sec. 1, p. 1

⁹² Interviews with Henry Sokolski and Larry Seaquist

⁹³ Defense Science Board Task Force Report, ‘FY 1994-99 Future Years Defense Plan’, (Washington DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 1993), p. 3

⁹⁴ Memorandum for Secretary of Defense, ‘Assessment of the Military-Technical Revolution’, DOD OFOISR 00019-CDR-1/847.PDF

Organizational views on the inevitability of unconventional weapons proliferation and subsequent use by future adversaries is key to this line of argument. No adversary or combination of adversaries could hope in the near-term to match U.S. conventional superiority. The only area of significant potential weakness was in leveraging unconventional weapons. That evidence of such sweeping adaptation by regional adversaries was sparse at best, and that recent experiences in the Gulf War in many ways disconfirmed fears of unconventional weapons usage did not impact DOD projections of future warfare and salient features of an emerging security environment. According to the logic of a capabilities-based defense, and flowing from well-established military biases and cultural assumptions about the impact of technology on warfare, the mere possibility of such trends was more than sufficient to justify a more broadly activist doctrine.

Conclusions

With the broad strategic reassessment of the emerging security environment, and its particular emphasis on unconventional capabilities by the DOD well established by the end of this period, questions must now be asked of the utility of the organizational theory approach in offering a compelling explanation of these responses and trends. As a model, the organizational perspective downplays individual choice and systemic factors such as structural determinacy, offering a broadly cultural and organizational process-oriented explanation for policy preference. How does such an explanation stack up against alternatives such as the RAM and bureaucratic politics models?

Although a RAM perspective would not seek to explain DOD actions and preferences at this time as independent of larger state behavior, could the identified trends be explained as more broadly representative of rational state response to external stimuli? Again, even if the DOD is assumed to be merely an ancillary component of larger state behavior in adapting to systemic changes, important unanswered questions present themselves. Firstly, from a perspective of relative power relationships, the Gulf War should be seen as a largely successful maintenance of the status quo and affirmation of the success of

existing U.S. deterrence strategy. Leaving aside for the moment Iraqi motivation for the invasion of Kuwait, the response of the U.S. and its allies to Iraqi actions decisively confirmed both the overwhelming military superiority of the United States, as well as the relative ease by which the major powers could rebuff challenges to the status quo.

There is very little reason to suspect, from a rational value maximizing perspective, that there would be obvious utility in pursuing a radically preventative strategy in a system featuring unmatched U.S. military might and broad international legitimacy for established normative approaches NP policy. Furthermore, these normative approaches had led to a quick and uncontroversial multilateral response to Iraqi unconventional weapons programs by the IAEA. Though Iraq was an exceptional cheater within this system, there seemed little reason from a value maximizing perspective to suspect that the system was irreparably broken and unable to provide future security assurances to its members. Hence a RAM perspective would have to discount openly pessimistic DOD behavior as anomalous, or at the very least unrepresentative of larger state value maximizing choice.

Realist scholars such as Schweller are correct to assert that it is not actual shifts in relative power, but perceived shifts that are relevant to the calculations made by policymakers. However, divisions over the use of preventative force in the case of unconventional weapons development present fundamental challenges to the assumptions central to rational actor models in U.S. foreign policy decisions.⁹⁵ Much of the existing RAM-based literature on preventative war would indicate that it is “rational” for a dominant state to be tempted into preventative warfare to stop the rise of a potential competitor. Yet this reduction of state motive to an assumed unitary actor exercising rational utility-maximizing behavior ignores the crucial intra-state dynamics that have determined real outcomes in the case of the United States after the introduction of nuclear weapons, and in the period immediately following the end of the Cold War. Normative

⁹⁵ Schweller, ‘Domestic Structure and Preventative War’, pp. 237, 238; see also William C. Wohlforth, ‘The Perception of Power: Russia in the pre-1914 Balance’, *World Politics*, vol. 39, no. 2 (April, 1987), p. 353

beliefs and cultural conceptions matter if we want to examine the link between significant foreign policy “constituencies” and foreign policy behavior.

A bureaucratic politics model, while offering compelling insights into forms of bureaucratic self-preservation in the face of strong budgetary threat, also falls short in offering a convincing explanation of DOD actions during this period. The strategic conceptions emerging from the DOD during this period go far beyond merely seeing military solutions for potentially non-military problems and the advocacy of increased resources as a support for bureaucratic independence and continued budgetary prominence. Taken together, these conceptions represent a broader worldview oriented towards the fulfillment of a military mission, one with a predictable and relatively static tendency to treat forms of environmental ambiguity in unambiguous ways.

Distinguishing long-term organizational biases and preferences from short-term bureaucratic wrangling allows an explanation of organizational learning and threat articulation that carries beyond the immediate political upheavals of the early post-Cold War period, informing the long term study of policy evolution rather than simply the short term explanation of policy response. Taking an organizational perspective with a focus on culturally derived biases, preferences and practices, allows a connection to be made between the early strategic conceptions addressed in this section, and the broader process of policy institutionalization examined in later chapters.

The military biases and doctrinal preferences by scholars such as Kier, Sagan and Posen, combined with the perspectives on organizational learning and path dependence by scholars such as Eden, help make sense of the DOD’s response to a newly complicated environment. This response involved a collective process of cognitive simplification aimed at giving a known shape to an unknown threat. This collective simplification largely involved matching the unknown elements of the new strategic environment with expected assumptions drawn from a military worldview. The first assessment of the security environment confronted unknown motives for potential “third country” adversaries, so the unknown motives were effectively discarded by the military organization in favor of suspected capabilities, mapped forward from the evolving

processes of modernization within the U.S. military itself. Maintaining an unmatched advantage in these capabilities became of paramount importance to the DOD, as only such unmatched military superiority could reduce uncertainty to organizationally manageable levels. Thus a series of unknowns were transformed via independent internal processes and cultural assumptions into 'known' elements of the emerging security environment.

Proliferation of high technology and unconventional weapons attained prominence in this strategic reassessment, not because of the actual balance of forces in the post-Cold War, but because of the potential environmental uncertainty such capabilities engendered. Managing this source of uncertainty placed the DOD at odds with other specialist bureaucracies, as the formal system of normative restraints embodied by the NP regime were viewed by the DOD as far less effective than military capabilities in limiting uncertainty. This process of environmental simplification entailed developing proactive approaches to solving potential problems, rather than depending on the reactive management of problems assumed to be inherent to existing normative approaches to proliferation. Overall, such tendencies reflect a military cultural assumption that responding to the international security environment in unambiguous ways, especially during periods of perceived change, itself reduces environmental ambiguity. Such a shift, though intended to promote a more peaceful emerging security environment, would ultimately place the U.S. military in a position of developing and advocating a doctrine that held a much greater potential for the use of military force in order to prevent the usage or development of unconventional capabilities by certain states.

Though the form counterproliferation would take had not been laid out in any specific detail during this period, the basic organizational frame of countering capabilities with capabilities had been established and consolidated throughout the organization, strongly supported by the organizational lessons of the Gulf War and its immediate aftermath. Organizational learning spurred by conflict with an unconventionally armed adversary clarified many of the criticisms of non-military approaches to proliferation long discussed within the organization. Thus documents such as the 1992 DPG can be seen not merely as

the aberrant product of powerful individual policymakers, but as partially reflecting organizational self-preservation in the face of budgetary threat assumed by bureaucratic models, and broadly representative of the more specific forms of cultural bias, policy preference and learning expected by the organizational theory model. In essence, an organizational perspective takes the analysis of DOD behavior farther into the specific forms and implications for later policy institutionalization than the competing explanations.

Ultimately, while the organization had drawn important lessons from the experience of the Gulf War, these lessons were merely the first phase in the process of reshaping larger shared understandings of the problems of proliferation. As such, they were far from being institutionalized into meaningful new practices or capabilities during this period, but were still highly significant in informing the eventual process of institutionalization that would later emerge.

Though the actions and perceptions of the DOD during this period are highly significant for the development and later evolution of CP policy, organizational perspectives alone cannot fully explain the form and underlying conceptions of this new response to proliferation. The more broadly political aspects of U.S. strategic culture that competed to frame emerging strategic conceptions during this same period will be the focus of the next chapter. Taken together, these political and organizational inputs can provide a more substantial and satisfying explanation of the meaning, orientation and future implication of this formative period of U.S. policy responses to proliferation.

Chapter 3

Strategic Culture: 1989-1993

The end of the Cold War, initiated by the change of Soviet military doctrine from offensive to defensive, the introduction of “new thinking” of Soviet reformers and the continued signs of economic crisis in the Soviet Union, meant the end of containment as a central organizing principle of American national security strategy.¹ Containment had been a strategy of not only physically restraining an adversarial military power in the form of the Soviet Union, but also restraining the ideational power of international communism. This was in essence a national security strategy associated with the “logic of identity”, and thus the rapid and unexpected end to 40 years of American strategic planning forced decision-makers and policy elites to question the nature and role of American identity in the emerging security environment of the post-Cold War.²

This chapter argues that ideational concerns were central to answering these larger questions about the role of American post-Cold War power as they pertained to reformulating U.S. NP policy. A focus on the Executive and Legislative elite members as the bearers of strategic culture in the United States will be utilized to explain that delegitimizing normative challenges to traditional NP conceptions and practices occurred once contrary conceptions and practices were identified. Furthermore the chapter argues that systemic changes did not provide a priori policy responses or clear alternatives for rational value maximizing choices to be made, but rather posed challenges requiring cultural interpretation before policy alternatives could be specified. Though interpretation

¹ Bernard E. Trainor, ‘Soviet Arms Doctrine in Flux: An Emphasis on Defense’, *New York Times*, March 7, 1988, sec. A p. 1; For more on the Soviet “New Thinking” that some scholars argue was the deciding factor in ending the Cold War, see Robert G. Herman, ‘Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) pp. 271-316

² David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 169

often occurred at the individual level, interpretations were grouped into ideationally defined clusters in ways that challenge cognitive explanations of policy outcomes.

This chapter additionally argues that the U.S. Congress often serves a larger function in the foreign policy making process than simply its instrumental role in providing foreign policy legislation. Much has been written on the relative weakness of the U.S. Congress in “determining” foreign policy outcomes as it has progressively abrogated significant legal authority to the Executive branch.³ While certainly a valid focus for analysis, such arguments tend to overemphasize qualitative factors of tangible power such as legal precedents for decisionmaking authority, and minimize the often intangible ideational function such an institution plays. A central challenge of this thesis to such instrumental accounts of legislative influence is by repositioning analytic focus on the ways in which influential members, often loosely clustered into identifiable strategic cultures, can establish and maintain “legitimate” policy conceptions. It is such normative legitimization functions embedded in political argumentation that allow the U.S. Congress to control appropriate forms of discourse that can limit the range of appropriate responses to strategic challenges, and steer policymaking away from the “rational” decisionmaking conditions assumed in much of the literature.

The first significant discursive trend supporting such normative challenges was the identification of a proliferation threat as emanating from state identity rather than technological capability. This conception was bundled into the language of states as divided into classes of responsible and irresponsible. As such, regional maneuvering and power politics were reclassified as the actions of either those that supported the status quo

³ Though the literature on the interaction between Congress and the President on foreign policy is voluminous, some important accounts include, Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy*, (New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1964); Stephen R. Weissman, *A Culture of Deference: Congress's Failure of Leadership in Foreign Policy*, (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Gordon Silverstein, *Imbalance of Powers: Constitutional Interpretation and the Making of American Foreign Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Rebecca K. C. Hersman, *Friends and Foes: how Congress and the president really make foreign policy*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Bert A. Rockman, ‘Reinventing What for Whom? President and Congress in the Making of Foreign Policy’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 133-154; and James M. Lindsay, ‘Deference and Defiance: The Shifting Rhythms of Executive-Legislative Relations in Foreign Policy’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 3, (September 2003), pp. 530-546

of a US-led international system, or those who sought to challenge such status quo. The second significant discursive trend of delegitimization was in the transformation of the relatively obscure Cold War term for unconventional weapons, “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) into a potent political phrase loaded with associations of imminent threat and irresponsible behavior. While not apparently part of an organized drive for reframing of the threat of proliferation during these early post-Cold War years, both of these argumentative trends would have important implications for the more overt delegitimization of existing NP conceptions and practices that would largely define the strategic cultural divide over proliferation in the years to follow.

As the Gulf War held many organizationally specific lessons for the DOD, it also held many lessons for policy elites concerned with NP policy. While many of these interpretations of the emerging security environment were based on existing cultural biases and policy preferences, the experience of the Gulf War helped shape and consolidate emergent interpretations of appropriate policy response for policymakers, and provided clearly differentiated interpretations of the meaning of the conflict for the relevance of the NP regime. The most significant cultural interpretation for this study was the conservative argumentative reframing of the term WMD as denoting irresponsible adversarial identity, which gained both coherence and broader legitimacy in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The chapter concludes with an examination of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI), publicly unveiled in December of 1993. Although often interpreted as the unique cognitive product of then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, analysis of the content and orientation of the DCI will demonstrate the initiative as the emergent product of the organizational and cultural reframing of the problem of post-Cold War proliferation described in both this and the previous chapter. Posing challenges to both traditional conceptions of deterrence and the utility of non-military normative approaches to address proliferation, counterproliferation emerges through the DCI as the first policy product of both strategic cultural argumentative practices and emerging capabilities-based responses to proliferation favored by the DOD.

Non-proliferation leadership and the challenge of “renegade regimes”

The self-identification of a leadership role in promoting an international system friendly to democracy and free markets had long been articulated in formal U.S. policy and strategy documents.⁴ However, the question central to the end of the Cold War was what did this leadership role mean in the sudden absence of a major military and ideological adversary, combined with the apparent dramatic spread of both democracy and free market capitalism? What form would “American leadership” take when not framed in opposition to an adversarial superpower? Would the policies that guided the United States through the Cold War be suitable to meet whatever strategic challenges might emerge from the demise of the Soviet Union?

Early to emerge from this period of questioning was the potential challenge to U.S. leadership and interests posed by unconventional weapons proliferation.⁵ Although the United States was facing an uncertain strategic environment, there was a widespread consensus that the United States still played an important leadership role regarding nonproliferation norms in their traditional disarmament orientation which focused on the destabilizing potential of the weapons themselves. A definitive Congressional review of U.S. NP policy at the time clearly referenced such self-identification of policy leadership, “U.S. policy towards critical proliferation issues will strongly influence the direction of global responses to the spread of nuclear weapons.”⁶

Before analyzing conceptual debates of the proper form for American post-Cold War leadership on proliferation issues, a brief examination should be made of traditional Cold

⁴ NSC-68, ‘United States Objectives and Programs for National Security’, April 14, 1950, in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.), Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 385, 386. See also Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, Ch. 4

⁵ Paul Lewis, ‘Third World Must Stem Arms Flow, Schultz Warns’, *New York Times*, June 14, 1988, sec. A, p. 15; Michael R. Gordon, ‘U.S. Urges Talks on Missiles in Mideast’, *New York Times*, December 27, 1988, sec. A, p. 1

⁶ Zachary Davis, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy’ *Congressional Research Service*, (March 7, 1991)

War approaches collectively known as nonproliferation policy. Though it is outside the scope of this thesis to give full historical treatment to this material, some basic overview can provide context for both post-Cold War policy debates over proliferation issues, and the broader strategic cultural assumptions on which they were based.

Illustrative of the existing strategic conceptions by the Bush Administration at the end of the Cold War were the 1989 Review of National Defense Strategy, and 1989 Review of United States Non-Proliferation Policy.⁷ Consisting largely of questions about the military capabilities of “regional powers” and their capacity to “threaten or attack U.S. interests, U.S. friends and Allies” and “changing regional balances of power or in shaping regional conflicts,” the documents were intended as a request for policy guidance from the Pentagon and State Department to spur any necessary rethinking of NP policy, military strategy, and force posture responses to the likely end of the Cold War. Though there are few indications in these documents of the Administration’s own strategic conceptions, a significant clue to early Bush Administration thinking on proliferation threats in normative disarmament terms comes near the end of the document. In a section identifying a traditional nondiscriminatory view of nonproliferation that placed the emphasis of threat on weapons themselves, rather than who possesses them, “The review should address security considerations that bear on... restraining the proliferation of destabilizing technologies (nuclear and chemical/biological weapons and ballistic missiles).”⁸

Supporting an NP perspective focused on the threat of unconventional weapons as rooted in destabilizing technologies, this traditional conception was also dominant among legislative policy elites during this period. The problem of proliferation was often framed in terms of indirect threats to U.S. national interests, such as potential arms races in regions with strategic tensions that had been previously dominated by superpower influences. As remarked in 1989 by Senator John McCain in sponsoring early post-Cold

⁷ Respectively, The White House, National Security Review 12, ‘Review of National Defense Strategy’, March 3, 1989, NSArchives PR01789; and The White House, National Security Review 17, ‘Review of United States Non-Proliferation Policy’, June 15, 1989, NSArchives PR01792

⁸ Ibid.

War NP legislation aimed at preventing proliferation in developing countries, “I have cosponsored these bills because they are a vital start toward the kind of fight against proliferation that I feel is absolutely vital if we are to avoid having a new arms race in the Third World replace the current arms race between East and West.”⁹ The threat identified in these terms is one with clear regional, rather than global orientation, and yet also clearly within the familiar framework of arms races and difficult deterrent relationships that had defined proliferation concerns during the Cold War. Thus early proposed legislative responses to proliferation largely centered on measures intended to strengthen existing NP norms, within a framework of U.S. leadership, rather than present any overt challenges to the conceptions and practices underpinning the NP regime.¹⁰

Such early restatements of traditional NP concerns are important to note, as they immediately followed the first DOD reformulation of proliferation threats originating from the potential advanced capabilities of specific states. The first indication of Administration level change came in a 1989 foreign policy address to graduates of the United States Coast Guard Academy by President Bush, who took the opportunity to articulate a vision of U.S. security strategy for the 1990’s:

There’s an opportunity before us to shape a new world. What is it that we want to see? It is a growing community of democracies anchoring international peace and stability, and a dynamic free market system generating prosperity and progress on a global scale... The emergence of regional powers is rapidly changing the strategic landscape... a growing number of nations are acquiring advanced and highly destructive capabilities, in some cases, weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Our task is clear: We must curb the proliferation of advanced weaponry. We must check the aggressive ambitions of **renegade regimes**... And we’re also researching, and we’re committed to deploy when ready, a more comprehensive defensive system, known as S.D.I. Our premise is straightforward: Defense against incoming missiles endangers no person, endangers no country. (emphasis added)¹¹

⁹ Senator John McCain, ‘India Takes New Steps Towards the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, *Congressional Record*, (April 4, 1989), p. S3280

¹⁰ Such as Hon. Fortney Pete Stark making a direct link between the willingness of the United States to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and decisions by states such as India and Pakistan to pursue nuclear weapons. See Hon. Fortney Pete Stark, ‘Comprehensive Test Ban Vital for Nonproliferation’, *Congressional Record*, (September 25, 1990), p. E2987

¹¹ ‘Excerpts from the President’s Address’ *New York Times*, May 25, 1989, sec. A, p. 8

The speech was the first by the Bush Administration to directly address post-Cold War proliferation concerns, and is significant in revealing a number of emerging conceptions. Aside from reiterating a familiar position of continuing American leadership in promoting democratization efforts in the third world, the speech gave an early signal in its emphasis on, ‘the aggressive ambitions of renegade regimes’ of a potential NP policy transition from merely supporting the nondiscriminatory norms of NP regime to a post-Cold War conception of proliferation that linked the problem to both state identity and military capability. The speech also called into question the principle of mutual deterrence in the absence of an adversarial superpower, as now deterrence relationships with regional powers were assumed to flow in one direction. Such monopoly on deterrent capabilities served to further consolidate the legitimate possession of nuclear weapons, targeting states that might challenge the status quo of American leadership of the emerging security environment, or oppose the more democratic orientation of the emerging system.

Also expressive of strategic cultural preference and bias in the intervening months were the emergence of voices from civilian leadership in the DOD and conservative members of Congress responding to Democratic calls for large cuts in post-Cold War defense spending.¹² These conservative voices, fearing a weakened military capability as a result of the expected demand for a “peace dividend” in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet military threat, pursued a rhetorical campaign aimed at undermining liberal budget plans coupled with threats to undermine domestic support for the Administration were it not to follow suit. Representative of these growing conservative voices was the response by former Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci to the first post-Cold War Democratic-led Congressional budget plans,

[Congress] calls upon us to reduce our strength and lower our vigilance at the very moment when events could take us either towards a more peaceful world or in more worrisome directions, at a time when our strength is required to help shape that better world... In the years ahead, despite the best efforts of the United States and its allies, the likelihood will grow that regional rivals and **renegade**

¹² Interviews with Larry Seaquist, Rebecca Hersman

regimes will possess **weapons of mass destruction** and the means to deliver them.” (emphasis added)¹³

Unsurprisingly, a conservative strategic cultural conception of American leadership placed strong emphasis on the military means to shape the emerging strategic environment, and placed overwhelming emphasis on the potential military threats to such American leadership. The inevitability of conflict and zero-sum nature of the international system, coupled with an assumed high utility of military force, offered a conceptual lens that made interpretation of a highly uncertain strategic environment possible. The issue of post-Cold War defense budgets provided the impetus for supporters of ideationally defined positions to express themselves, and develop argumentative strategies to rationalize their implicit biases and policy preferences.

Substantive changes in attitudes towards the problem of proliferation in the post-Cold War period were in some ways inevitable. The nonproliferation regime was in part the response to unstable superpower competition during the Cold War, with proliferation in smaller states assumed to be largely a supply-side problem of acquiring nuclear materials and expertise. Post-Cold War threat assessments often framed the issue in terms of a demand issue, as technologies and materials had begun to proliferate beyond the reach of the regime. However, this potential change in material capabilities did not correspond to objective changes in state motivation, and thus potential adversarial motivations were filtered through the biases of respective strategic cultural lenses. Thus the strategic threats stemming from proliferation were neither “invented” nor “inherent”, rather changes in material capability were subject to cultural interpretation.

The tensions over discriminatory and non-discriminatory views of proliferation threats were put into stark relief by the emergent post-Cold War revitalization of the term “weapons of mass destruction”. Some history of the term and its traditional Cold War usage will serve to clarify the implications of its post-Cold War redefinition. This history

¹³ Former Secretary of Defense, Frank C. Carlucci, ‘No Time to Change U.S. Defense Policy’, *New York Times*, January 27, 1989, sec. A, p. 31; Defense spending cuts proposed by Congress were also criticized by then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, though he argued that a possible continued Soviet military threat justified spending on certain projects such as the B-2 bomber. See Richard Halloran, ‘Cheney Criticizes Cuts in Military’, *New York Times*, sec. A, p. 20

may also shed light on its central argumentative function in later conservative strategic cultural efforts at delegitimizing existing NP norms and practices in favor of a more military-oriented, discriminatory approach to proliferation. The following section will briefly examine the argumentative evolution of WMD, and its links to state identity, particularly that of “renegade regimes.”

The political transformation of WMD

Analysis of political discourse and policy documents concerning WMD reveal a dramatic shift in both the context and consequence of the term for competing domestic political actors. WMD from its earliest usage until the end of the Cold War was an instrumentally descriptive term largely supportive of arms control efforts, and portrayed the weapons themselves as destabilizing objects of attention. In the post-Cold War, the term was transformed into an overtly political phrase symbolizing “inappropriate” behavior implicitly tied to accusations of deviant state identity. This unitary shift in political conception was achieved through series of efforts to gain short-term political leverage on a number of different issues. Some policy makers hoped to pressure the President to apply economic sanctions to specific countries, some represented long standing philosophical positions, some sought symbolic recognition of specific interest groups, and others simply attempted to further their own interpretations of sound nonproliferation legislation. The unifying factor for these disparate motives were the argumentative strategies employed and historical analogies drawn from common conceptions of American strategic culture. It was in this way that, from a range of different individuals, a new and accepted symbolic meaning of WMD emerged.

The term ‘weapons of mass destruction’ has gone through different phases of usage in the context of U.S. strategic culture.¹⁴ The original Cold War usage was as a general term largely focused on U.S. and Soviet nuclear, chemical and biological arsenals, and was simply descriptive. The term was useful in allowing for the development of different

¹⁴ The term “weapons of mass destruction” was coined by the Archbishop of Canterbury in the Times of London in 1937, describing the German aerial bombardment of Spain. ‘Archbishop’s Appeal: Individual Will and Action; Guarding Personality’ *The Times* (London), December 28, 1937, p. 9

types of powerful weapons (atomic, thermonuclear, neutron, etc) that all fit under the rubric of WMD.¹⁵ An example of this Cold War usage is provided by Henry Kissinger, who commented in the 1970's, "I was convinced that a democratic society would never be able to brave the hazards of the nuclear age unless its people were convinced that its leaders responded rationally and soberly to the unprecedented existence of weapons of mass destruction."¹⁶

In this formulation, WMD was a term simply denoting technical capacity, and was conceptualized within the framework of nondiscriminatory NP norms oriented towards disarmament policies that held that technologies were the source of the strategic threat. Thus it was the mechanism of destruction, balanced against the forces of rationality that held the key to the destabilizing element of WMD. It is important to note that due to the widely divergent capabilities and delivery methods of the three major categories of unconventional weapons – nuclear, biological and chemical – the U.S. military generally preferred to avoid using the term WMD, opting more often than not during the Cold War to use the individual labels, nuclear, chemical and biological, or when combined, as "NBC" weapons.¹⁷

At the end of the Cold War, the implicit meaning of the term WMD entered a transitional phase. It is during this phase (1989-1991) that WMD was still widely used as a descriptive phrase, denoting a non-discriminatory technological capability,¹⁸ although some began to identify WMD as a unique threat to international security focused on a select number of states.¹⁹ WMD emerges in this period as central to a new strategic

¹⁵ For usage in this context, see Senate Resolution on SALT II TREATY, NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS (EX. Y, 96-1) - (introduced 06/25/79); 1985 bill to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, space flight, control and data communications, construction of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes; Biological Weapons Act of 1986

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years*, (New York: The Little Brown & Co., 1979), p. 203

¹⁷ W. Seth Carus, 'Defining "Weapons of Mass Destruction"', *Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Occasional Paper No. 4*, (Washington DC: National Defense University, 2006) pp. 7, 8

¹⁸ Senator John Glenn, 'Supercomputers and Super Bombs', *Congressional Record*, (October 31, 1989), p. S14382;

¹⁹ Senator Alfonse D'Amato, 'Leaping From Madman to Madman', *Congressional Record*, (October 3, 1990), p. S14467; See also Senator John McCain identifying the WMD threat as coming not only from the American and Soviet arsenals but also the weapons programs of India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and

conception in which the threat from proliferation is not the merely the destructive technologies themselves, but rather the coupling of destructive technologies with international actors whose actions or identities are in conflict with the type of international order supported by the United States. This strategic conception is by no means one with self-evident implications for policy response.

Regardless of the outcome of debates over appropriate policy responses to proliferation, an aggregate shift in strategic conception occurred that ultimately reformulated the perceived *nature* of the threat from proliferation. Tellingly, in a matter of years, the term WMD had shifted exclusively to a descriptor of what *other* countries were engaged in. Never again would the term WMD be used in elite level discourse in conjunction with the United States or its nuclear, chemical or biological weapons (or ballistic missile) possessing allies. For the United States and its allies, the different classes of unconventional weapons were disaggregated and framed well within the boundaries of traditional disarmament discourse, distinguished from the discourse of WMD by nothing more than the identity of the states that possessed them. The term WMD thus was centrally integrated into the discursive process of delegitimizing both certain actors and certain classes of action. As former member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, John Reichart stated:

The term consolidates nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons into one category because, despite differences in their effects and use, they share enormous lethality and symbolism. Thus, the concept of WMD is significant in a political rather than a military sense. By using the term "WMD," policymakers convey the message that the proliferation of these types of weapons is unacceptable and that their use would be considered an extremely grave matter.²⁰

How did this sudden shift in identification of the threat from unconventional weapons, encapsulated in the language of WMD, shift from a utilitarian conception of technical capacity to an overly political designation of irresponsible state behavior? Examining the

Pakistan, 'The Impact of the Summit Meeting on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', *Congressional Record*, (June 18, 1990), S8075

²⁰ John F. Reichart, (current director of the WMD Center at the National Defense University) 'Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction', *Strategic Assessment 1996*, Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Chapter 16

different responses to the Gulf War, particularly the different implicit lessons the conflict held for various groups, and the conceptual weight it offered those seeking to reframe the threat posed by proliferation, will be key to understanding the evolution of the term and its implications for American political discourse.

Gulf War ‘lessons’: WMD and the legitimacy of the NP Regime

This section will focus on the argumentative strategies and discursive practices employed by the United States Congress in framing the interpretation of the threat to the international security environment posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Due to its nature as a forum for political argumentation and source for foreign policy legislation, the creation and active control of discursive space around particular issues is an important, but under theorized informal function of the U.S. Congress. Both the competitive and cooperative processes of establishing strategic discourse may serve disparate domestic political goals in the short term. However, in the long term, these arguments may deeply affect the range of ‘legitimate’ interpretations of the international security environment that are the basis for threat identification and policy response. Thus tracking the term WMD through Congressional arguments during this period can serve as a reflection of the process whereby certain historical analogies, metaphors and argumentative strategies gain discursive currency, becoming the standard by which ‘valid’ forms of discourse on strategic issues can be maintained.

As argued in the previous chapter, the experience of the Gulf War provided different lessons for different groups. For some including the central players in the Bush Administration, the experience was a vindication of the perceived need to strengthen traditional approaches to the strategic problem of proliferation. In this view, the political failures of the Gulf War were in the weak enforcement of existing NP norms and practices; a problem that could be addressed through U.S. leadership to reinvigorate the NP regime and directly support the strengthening of NP norms. For others, particularly conservative proliferation issue leaders in Congress, it seemed to expose irreparable weakness in the NP regime and served as the catalyst for fundamental challenges to

longstanding NP norms and practices. Though the options for threat response were unclear, the arguments in Congress that fundamental changes were needed began almost immediately following the end of hostilities.

The immediate impact of the Gulf War in Congress was a case of belated yet aggressive oversight resulting in an attempt to assign blame for the crisis, followed by pressure to reshuffle specialist bureaucratic responsibilities.²¹ It is important to point out that the existence of Iraqi nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs was not a surprise to the U.S. government. Rather, what shocked U.S. policy makers was the development of the program far ahead of U.S. intelligence estimates, coupled with the relative impotence of existing NP policy to halt the program.²² There was intense disagreement between relevant departments and agencies within the U.S. government as to the extent, nature and threat posed by Iraqi unconventional weapons programs, with the DOD maintaining the most consistently critical assessments of the proliferation problems presented by Iraq.²³

Subsequent Congressional inquiries into handling of pre-war Iraq intelligence were extremely critical of the role played by the Department of Energy, and to a lesser degree the National Security Council.²⁴ The end result of Congressional criticism being the

²¹ William Safire identified in his April, 1990 editorial several of the issues of Congressional oversight, inter and intra-agency conflict, dubious technology transfers and money laundering that would later surface in the so-called "Iraqgate" investigations. See William Safire, 'Country of Concern', *New York Times*, April 9, 1990, sec. A, p. 19

²² Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, 'Iraqi Ballistic Missile Developments', July 1990, NSArchives IG01025; see also Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Research Comment, 'Iraq's European Procurement Network', June 29, 1989, NSArchives IG00911

²³ United States Department of State internal memo, 'Computers for Iraq: DOD's Proliferation Concerns', April 3, 1986, NSArchives IG00319; see also United States Department of State, Action Memorandum, 'Response to Secretary of Defense Cheney Concerning Iraq and Nuclear Export Controls', October 4, 1990, NSArchives IG015448.

²⁴ U.S. House of Representatives, Representative John D. Dingell, memo to Members, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 'Closed Hearing on the Department of Energy's Efforts to Prevent Iraq and Other Countries from Getting a Nuclear Weapons Capability', April 23, 1991, NSArchives IG01692; see also Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, letter to Representative Henry B. Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, May 28, 1992, NSArchives IG01810. This letter documents the investigations of the Subcommittee into pre-war actions by the DOE to prevent "Iraq and other nuclear proliferant countries from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability." and its ongoing issues concerning cooperation by the DOE and NSC in Congressional investigations.

relative marginalization of the DOE by Congressional oversight committees on proliferation intelligence and NP policy planning matters in favor of the DOD. In seeking to find fault with policy representatives, the post-Gulf War investigations and general Congressional activism provide a strong example of the way in which Congressional oversight duties can shape policy outcomes by formally shifting responsibilities between functional bureaucracies due to perceptions of incompetence or resistance to Congressional sub-committee investigations.

In pursuing policy alternatives that focused on state identity rather than technical capability, many members of Congress articulated positions that contrasted strongly with the post-Gulf War policy positions of the Bush Administration. The Administration maintained that the NP regime in general, and conventions such as the NPT and MTCR in particular, were sufficient to effectively limit the spread of these weapons if adequate political support for such multilateral measures was given.²⁵ The reluctance of the Bush Administration to stray from its stated leadership position with regards to NP norms and NP regime enforcement mechanisms helped open the argumentative door for conservative members of Congress to press their challenges aimed at delegitimizing such longstanding NP norms and practices. Acting in informal coalitions, or “issue clusters”, legislators impacted policy outcomes by constructing limiting discursive space around the issue of unconventional weapons, reclaiming the agenda for threat articulation and policy response in the process.²⁶

Bush Administration policy responses to the Gulf War: maintenance of the status quo

In 1992 the Bush Administration produced a National Security Directive on nonproliferation policy, answering the questions put forth in its 1989 policy reviews. The

²⁵ Bradley Gordon, Assistant Director, Bureau of Nuclear and Weapons Control, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Statement on ‘Nonproliferation Issues’, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, July 11, 1990, NSArchives NP02632

²⁶ Hersman argues that an important locus of legislative activity in Congress is not the political parties themselves, but clusters of issue-oriented legislators cooperating on the crafting and passage of specific interest legislation. See Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes: how Congress and the president really make foreign policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), Ch. 2

document indirectly articulated the proliferation lessons of the Gulf War and was the central document serving to focus and coordinate nonproliferation policy among the relevant departments and agencies.²⁷ As such, the document also serves as a window into the shifting strategic cultural perspectives on approaches to proliferation in the immediate post-Cold War. It recognizes a changed security environment, yet identifies a role for the United States still bound by the norms of the NP regime, and a self-identified leadership in promoting those norms:

In all of these areas, the problems are too difficult to be solved by generalized global norms alone. Therefore, those norms have begun to be supplemented by tailor-made approaches: the special inspection regime for Iraq, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, confidence-building measures such as those proposed for India and Pakistan... The United States should also rely on its alliances to discourage development of weapons of mass destruction and the missiles that deliver them.

The United States will propose that serious violations of international nonproliferation norms – such as the transfer of a weapon of mass destruction, detonation of a nuclear device, confirmed use of chemical or biological weapons, or transfer of critical facilities for weapons of mass destruction – be subject to appropriate international response. To implement this proposal, the United States will consult in the first instance with its friends and allies on steps including agreements on extradition, immigration restrictions against individuals who have knowingly contributed to proliferation, assistance to victims of attacks by such weapons, inspections, United Nations Security Council embargoes and/or other sanctions.²⁸

Aside from the strong normative focus on U.S. nonproliferation policy, the document reveals a number of emerging assumptions about the nature of the post-Cold War security environment. Though international conflict may have been assumed to be inevitable, there is also a relatively clear assumption that the United States itself would not be the direct target of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons attacks. The focus was rather on the steps that should be taken in anticipation of the development, transfer or use in ways that would perhaps threaten U.S. interests, though not the physical security of the United States itself.

²⁷ The White House, National Security Directive 70, 'United States Nonproliferation Policy' July 10, 1992, NSArchives PR01781

²⁸ Ibid.

Although the dynamics of the international system had altered with the end of the Cold War, offering a potentially greater freedom of action for aspiring regional powers, the threats posed by proliferation for the United States were largely anticipated by the Bush Administration to be a continuation of those posed during the Cold War. If the source of proliferation threats was identified as largely political or normative in nature, then the use of military force to address proliferation threats was viewed with relatively low utility, as the nature of those threats was conceptualized within a largely normative framework. Such implicit acceptance of the normative framework of the NP regime is echoed in statements articulating direct proposals for U.S. action and leadership in promoting NP norms, “The United States shall not produce plutonium or highly-enriched uranium for nuclear explosive purposes. This step is intended to encourage countries in the Middle East and other regions of tension to take similar actions...”²⁹

Such a normative focus continued concerning the range of potential U.S. *responses* to proliferation crises:

We must be prepared as members of the international community to step in when crises arise, e.g., by seeking inspections by a body like the UN Special Commission or sanctions by the UN Security Council. That does not mean that the United States will never take unilateral actions. Indeed, the record shows that United States leadership has at times provided a beachhead from which to build multilateral consensus, as in the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative, the Middle East Arms Control Initiative, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Unilateral action by the United States on proliferation threats was identified within the context of unilaterally expanding and strengthening NP norms and multilateral legal, economic and political mechanisms rather than as unilateral military action. The ‘consensus’ to emerge in this document was in many ways reiterating the case for the U.S. as defending the Cold War normative status quo concerning the preferences for action on proliferation issues. U.S. nonproliferation as directed by the Bush Administration emerges as an attempt to strengthen what already exists, and was defined by the notable absence of proposed fundamental changes to the NP regime or challenges to NP norms.

²⁹ Ibid.

Congressional policy responses to the Gulf War: irrational states and WMD

Where the NP norms were finding the most serious challenges were from issue advocates in the U.S. Congress. Unsurprisingly, the lack of administration policy change in response to the Gulf War served as an opening for issue advocates in Congress to press their conceptions of alternative identities and responsibilities for the United States.³⁰ The most important challenge to the broad legitimacy of traditional NP norms and practices was in the Congressional discourse surrounding the symbolic transformation of the term WMD, entailing as it did a subjective interpretation by a number of policy elites of the Gulf War as both a failure of the NP regime and a potential failure of deterrence. In this figuration, the historical analogy of appeasement figured centrally, used by both the Bush Administration and its critics either supporting the use of force against Iraq³¹ or to attack the policy approaches argued to allow Iraqi WMD armament,³² invite Iraqi aggression against Kuwait,³³ or allow continued Iraqi resistance to the United Nations mandate for WMD disarmament.³⁴ In the wake of the Gulf War, some policy makers carried away the ‘lesson’ that strengthening existing NP norms was the key to addressing post-Cold War proliferation threats.³⁵ Others argued that existing NP policy mechanisms must be augmented with “regionally tailored responses”,³⁶ while still others argued that the entire

³⁰ Hersman, *Friends and Foes*, p. 32

³¹ George H. W. Bush, ‘Open Letter to College Students on the Persian Gulf Crisis’, *Public Papers of the Presidents* (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 9, 1991)

³² Senator Claiborne Pell, ‘The Antics of a Misguided Despot’, *Congressional Record*, (April 20, 1990), S4726

³³ Senate Resolution 318, ‘Relative to Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait’, *Congressional Record*, (August 2, 1990), p. S11961; see also Senator Tim Wirth, ‘Bush’s Failed Iraq Policy’, *Congressional Record*, (September 30, 1992), p. S15731

³⁴ Hon. Les Aspin, remarks to the House of Representatives, ‘George Bush’s ‘Threat-And-Forget’ Approach is No Answer to Saddam Hussein’s ‘Cheat-And-Retreat Tactics’, *Congressional Record*, July 31, 1992, p. E2335; see also Les Aspin, ‘Saddam Is Winning’, *Washington Post*, August 11, 1992, sec. op/ed, p. 17

³⁵ Hon. Jim Leach, extension of remarks, ‘War Looms, Peace Beckons’, *Congressional Record*, (October 27, 1990), p. E3613; Senators Glenn and Boschwitz, ‘Senate Concurrent Resolution 113 – Relative to Nuclear Sales to Southeast Asia’, *Congressional Record*, (March 30, 1990), p. S3634

³⁶ R. James Woolsey, Director of Central Intelligence, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, ‘Proliferation Threats of the 1990’s’, February 24, 1993, NSArchives IG01886

NP regime was ineffective at controlling the spread of WMD and that only unilateral action by the United States could curb proliferation.³⁷

Emblematic of the leveraging of the term WMD for political purposes were the legislative arguments of Senator John McCain. From 1989 to 1991, Senator McCain shifted from an argued perception of the nature of proliferation threats as one of destabilizing technologies, to one of “belligerent” states. In the proposed Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfer Control Act of 1991 (also known as the McCain Act), the Senator sought to distinguish between “belligerent and nonbelligerent states” in assessing the threat posed by WMD.³⁸ This act served as legislative tool for shifting NP policy emphasis by effectively pressuring the President to apply unilateral economic sanctions, prohibiting most forms of trade and commerce with nations identified as “threats to world peace.”³⁹ It would also force the President to report to Congress “countries of concern” according to criteria of the bill, which placed the onus on the President to apply sanctions, and maintained the threat of public embarrassment if the President chose not to sanction states that fit Congressionally identified criteria.

Partly this is a reflection of a Congressional habit of either creating overly broad categories of sanction criteria for domestic political purposes, or piggybacking political causes onto existing sanctions through broad interpretation of the sanctions criteria. Similar attempts to politically manipulate the Export Administration Act, intended to limit economic relations with state sponsors of terrorism, drew the pointed criticism of members of Congress from State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Michael Sheehan, “if you have a problem with Cuba on human rights, get your own sanctions, don’t use mine.”⁴⁰

³⁷ Senator John McCain, ‘Controlling the Transfer of Weapons to Countries That Threaten World Peace’, *Congressional Record*, (July 15, 1991), p. S9917

³⁸ S. 309, The Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfer Control Act, as listed in, Davis, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy’, p. 37

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 37

⁴⁰ Quoted in Paul R. Pillar, *Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy*, (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 172. For an excellent discussion of the political complications resulting from such a list that actually served in some situations to inhibit effective counterterrorism policy, see *Ibid.*, pp. 157-178


The legislative method of focusing on WMD proliferation as a way to not only reduce interpretations of state behavior to a single unmitigated, unambiguously negative motivation (threatening world peace), but also to place states in relatively static categories, became something of a trend in Congress in the years following the Gulf War. A series of bills were proposed in the U.S. Senate attempting to link proliferation behavior and state identity with trade relations or economic sanctions.⁴¹ The House of Representatives weighed in with a number of its own resolutions, nearly all of which sought to link U.S. economic or political relations to subjective criteria of WMD proliferation and state behavior.⁴² By the end of the 102nd session of Congress in 1992, the term WMD had found its way into 39 bills, amendments and public laws, up from its inclusion in one bill during the 100th Congress that ended in 1988.⁴³

Combined, these legislative efforts amounted to a high level discursive assault on the non-discriminatory norms of the NP regime that had been commonly accepted during the Cold War. Legislative efforts informed by existing strategic cultural preference

⁴¹ See Bills S.1020 and S. 1084 concerning trade relations with China in Davis, 'Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy', pp. 39, 41; For economic sanctions, see S. 1128 The Omnibus Nuclear Proliferation Control Act of 1991, Ibid, p. 41; See also Senator John Glenn, News Release, 'Proliferation Threats of the 1990's', Hearing of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, February 24, 1993, NSArchives IG01886

⁴² Another significant House resolution, H. Con Res. 97, sought official recognition that "the 1981 Israeli preemptive strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was a legitimate and justifiable exercise of self-defense, and that the United States should seek the repeal of U.N. Security Council Resolution 487 which condemned that 1981 Israeli preemptive strike." Davis, 'Nuclear Nonproliferation Legislation and Policy', p. 28

⁴³ Citations of term WMD in Bills, Amendments, or Public Laws, as listed in the U.S. Congressional Records website at <http://thomas.loc.gov>, accessed January 3, 2006:



effectively undermined the concept that the nature of the proliferation threat was destabilizing technologies. In its place was an evolving conception on proliferation threats that divided states into distinct and unequal classes of proliferators. Of primary concern to a range of policy makers were those states argued to be belligerent, rogue, outlaw, or threats to world peace. Thus not only was the non-discriminatory tradition of NP policy strongly challenged, but the inherent threat mitigation provided by the potential for deterrence relationships was argued as potentially irrelevant. How such a conclusion was reached despite the fact that Iraq had refrained from WMD use throughout the Gulf War was left unanswered.⁴⁴ The net effect of this shift in political discourse was that certain formulations gained a type of self-evident legitimization, forcing a label like WMD to take on a specific interpretation that, as evidenced by the almost complete lack of competing conceptions in subsequent Congressional usage, was very difficult to challenge.

As David Campbell has argued, “The effective discourses of danger that have led to ‘successful’ instances of foreign policy are those that have been able to combine both extensive and intensive forms of power, so that the social identity of the community has been aligned with the political space of the state.”⁴⁵ Regardless of our definitions of ‘success’ in policy, the effectiveness of discourse in altering established conceptions often rests on the ability of policy makers to either appropriately mold policy to the established identity of the community, or to reshape the identity of the community to the form of the policy. Central to establishing perceptions of ‘appropriate’ policy responses is the ability to control discourse in order to limit the range of possible perceptions of policy responses by, “clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” in the words of Alasdair Johnston.⁴⁶ That such a process of challenging existing threat perceptions and establishing new ‘self-evident’ conceptions could be a highly disorganized one, with no clearly identified

⁴⁴ Such a conclusion had not been reached by the DOD, which succinctly argued, “Hussein had a large stock of chemical weapons, had already used them in a war, but did not use them against the coalition forces in Operation Desert Storm. His reasons for non-use must be understood.” Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress and the President, 1995

⁴⁵ Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 170

⁴⁶ Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, p. 46

organizers, should come as a little surprise. If the process of establishing ‘legitimate’ threat perceptions is oriented towards domestic audiences as much as international ones, a range of competing domestic political motives is not simply possible, but should be expected.⁴⁷

Though the discourse on WMD had not fully solidified into a consensus on ‘appropriate’ conceptions of the role and efficacy of military force in addressing proliferation threats, by the time Bill Clinton assumed office, significant changes had occurred that would have serious implications for the interpretation of proliferation threats and responses throughout the 1990’s. The subjective ‘lessons’ of the Gulf War, coupled with a range of domestic political motives had served to transform the term WMD from a largely technical term denoting military capability, to a largely symbolic political term denoting deviant identity. Thus, entirely through a prolonged process of political argument, America and her allies had ceased to be possessors or developers of WMD. Responsible, status quo maintaining states that supported the international order perhaps possessed nuclear forces, or worked to limit the development of chemical weapons. WMD possession or development now fell to belligerent states, rogue regimes and other irresponsible, irrational actors opposed to the international order.

Though little had changed in terms of actual policy responses as a result of this discursive transformation, the cognitive implications of such a shift in discourse would be far-reaching. For although proliferation remained a complex dilemma, challengers of the NP status quo were equipped with a simple formulae for threat identification that coupled technical capability with political identity. For those working to shape proliferation policy responses that went beyond the traditional mechanisms of the NP regime, this formulae afforded a clear pathway for threat response – either the technical capacity or the political identity of target states would have to be challenged if progress in mitigating the threat from WMD was to be made.

⁴⁷ Such a combined domestic / international oriented process has been similarly argued for the establishment of deterrence strategies during the Cold War. See Patrick Morgan, ‘Saving Face for the Sake of Deterrence’, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.), Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 136-145

The final section in this chapter will examine the origins and organizing conceptions of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, which represented the first post-Cold War attempt to establish a defense policy response to unconventional weapons threats beyond existing methods of NP policy.

The politics of threat response: the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative

Counterproliferation thinking that challenged central assumptions and practices of the NP regime was already well established within the DOD and Legislative circles by the time the Clinton Administration took office in early 1993. Up to this point, however, none of the thinking about CP had crossed into actual policy prescriptions or military doctrine, but rather was focused on particular groups rethinking the strategic implications of proliferation in the post-Cold War, and processing of the lessons of the Gulf War. All of that was to change with the announcement of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) in late 1993, the first major defense initiative of the Clinton Administration.

A number of early accounts of the DCI explain the initiative as essentially the cognitive product of the first Secretary of Defense under Clinton, Les Aspin. However, while the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee had placed proliferation as a high priority immediately following his confirmation to the position of Secretary of Defense, a closer examination of his developing thoughts on defense policy reveal an initiative more closely modeled on the existing conceptual developments within the DOD, as well as broadly accepting of the Legislative reformulation of the proliferation threat as focused on state identity. Together these influences go farther in explaining the particular orientation of the initiative than the cognitive biases and preferences of the public figure associated with the announcement.

Challenging cognitive explanations for the origins of the DCI

Though a longtime member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Aspin had no track record of positions on the proliferation of unconventional weapons, or public remarks about the strategic significance of proliferation to the United States. Prior to the Gulf War, Aspin gave an interview to the *Washington Post* listing what he considered to be the likely emerging issues of the post-Cold War.⁴⁸ Neither nuclear weapons nor proliferation of any sort received mention. Immediately following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while voicing support for the Bush administration's intention to use force to expel the Iraqi military from Kuwait, Aspin also made no mention of unconventional weapons, or the proliferation issues central to the crisis in the minds of other policymakers.⁴⁹ It was only after assuming the role of incoming Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration that proliferation concerns topped the list of his articulated defense priorities.⁵⁰

In seeking to explain Aspin's sudden prioritization of proliferation, former members of his Congressional staff identified many of his emerging positions at this time as those of a politician consciously attempting to "refashion himself as a sort of defense intellectual."⁵¹ Aspin wished to be seen as a strong public challenger of the Bush Administration and DOD. His sustained campaign of criticism was an attempt to gain attention from an incoming Democratic Administration that was vetting cabinet level appointees to shore up their candidate's perceived weaknesses on defense issues.⁵² Throughout 1992, Aspin consistently challenged his own more conciliatory record in the Senate on defense issues by publicly going on the offensive against the Bush

⁴⁸ Les Aspin, 'Four Scenarios – Choose One', *Washington Post*, March 9, 1990, p. 23

⁴⁹ Les Aspin, 'Define Our Goals in the Gulf: Getting rid of either Saddam Hussein or his army would be ideal', *Washington Post*, August 10, 1990, p. 15

⁵⁰ Department of Defense, '1993 Bottom Up Review – Talking Points', October 1993, NS Archives CH01621; Interview with Rebecca Hersman

⁵¹ Interview with Rebecca Hersman

⁵² For an insightful analysis of the domestic political and cultural factors that coalesced to form an unusually strong, widespread and personal antipathy from conservatives against Clinton and his wife, see David Halberstam, *War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001), pp. 209-211

Administration, both in Congress and in print, on a number of highly visible defense issues.⁵³

Aside from the intrigue of electoral politics, Aspin's emergent positions on proliferation are revealing largely for what was assumed to constitute "tough rhetoric" on defense. As such, these positions do not reveal as much about individual cognitive biases as much they do on the emerging conservative strategic cultural assumptions about the nature of proliferation threats, and strategic cultural challenges to U.S. NP policy. While it is highly questionable that Aspin could be considered a bearer of conservative strategic culture during this period, the positions adopted from the conservative efforts in the Legislature in the absence of Executive movement away from traditional NP conceptions, reveal what ideas had been adopted as "legitimate" conservative terms of debate on the issue since the end of the Cold War. What had agitated Bush Administration officials so greatly about Aspin's behavior was not simply the questioning of Administration policies by a Democratic Senator, an otherwise unremarkable event in normal Executive-Legislative relations, but rather the adoption by a leading Democratic figure of conservative challenges to the defense positions of the Bush Administration – a maneuver politically equivalent to outflanking the Administration with conceptual challenges from the Right by a figure of the Left.⁵⁴

In adopting tough conservative rhetoric on proliferation issues, Aspin revealed what ground had been gained in the argumentative efforts of Congress in delegitimizing both nonproliferation and deterrence as appropriate to meet post-Cold War strategic

⁵³ Prime examples include Hon. Les Aspin, remarks in the House of Representatives, 'Misunderstanding the Lessons of the War', *Congressional Record*, February 7, 1992, p. E237; Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States House Armed Services Committee, Letter to President George Bush, April 30, 1991, *Congressional Record*, February 7, 1992, p. E238; Eric Schmitt, 'Lawmaker Seeks Revamping of Military', *New York Times*, January 7, 1992, sec. A, p. 13; Hon. Les Aspin, remarks to the House of Representatives, 'George Bush's 'Threat-And-Forget' Approach is No Answer to Saddam Hussein's 'Cheat-And-Retreat Tactics'', *Congressional Record*, July 31, 1992, p. E2335; and Les Aspin, 'Saddam Is Winning', *Washington Post*, August 11, 1992, sec. op/ed, p. 17

⁵⁴ The vehemence and consistency of the attacks on Administration defense positions drew heated calls from an "extremely agitated" National Security Council to Aspin's office, requesting the Senator cease what the NSC claimed were unjustified claims of Bush Administration "weakness" in dealing with Iraq. Interview with Rebecca Hersman

challenges. Consider this statement by Aspin in the months immediately preceding the 1992 elections,

...how we deal with Iraq has implications far beyond that country. We are establishing the foundation of a post-Cold War era. How we deal with Iraq says a lot about how we deal with the new nuclear dangers as well as authority of the United Nations in the coming decades. Nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist state is one of the principle threats facing the United States in the post-Cold War era. Iraq remains a terrorist state, and its nuclear threat has not been eliminated... Every potential proliferator is watching. Nukes in the hands of thugs like Saddam Hussein won't give rogue leaders the wherewithal to win a fight against the United States, but they could be used as instruments of terror against American forces and allies. Moreover, only mass destruction weapons, particularly nuclear ones, can offset huge U.S. advantages in conventional power. We must demonstrate to those who want weapons of mass destruction that the acquisition of these weapons is not worth the effort... If we cannot succeed in Iraq – where our international leverage is enormous – then the prospects for stopping proliferation elsewhere are grim.”⁵⁵

While it was hardly bold for a U.S. Senator in 1992 to label Saddam Hussein a “thug”, the conceptions embedded within the comment are revealing in their reinterpretation of both the nature of proliferation threats, and the range of credible responses. Aspin positions the United States in a familiar leadership role on proliferation issues, but rather than the traditional position of first among equals in a normative systems, Aspin refashions the American role in paternalistic terms, with policy oriented towards setting an example by taking a hard line in dealings with irresponsible, “rogue” regimes. Nuclear weapons are removed from their strategic role in a military balance, and are now instruments of “terror” in the hands of those who would reject the status quo. Allowing proliferation to occur would not simply undermine the norm of nonproliferation, but would embolden such rogue states to engage in irresponsible behavior. The appropriate response to such a strategic threat is no longer framed as one of either maintaining effective deterrence relationships or promoting disarmament, but rather through a demonstration of American ability to deny those weapons to rogue regimes.

⁵⁵ Hon. Les Aspin, ‘We Have More at Stake in Iraq Than We Do In Bosnia-Herzegovina’, *Congressional Record*, September 16, 1992, p. E2668

Such reconceptualization of the strategic threat from proliferation and the appropriate range of responses informed the earliest statements and policies to emerge from the Clinton Administration. Though broadly articulating a position supportive of NP norms, early policy documents indicate a nascent discrimination between *states that accept these norms and those who do not*.⁵⁶ These discriminatory distinctions were themselves supported, at least rhetorically, by the conceptualization of more activist approaches to proliferation as articulated by President Clinton on the same day in his first speech to the United Nations General Assembly:

If we do not stem the proliferation of the world's deadliest weapons, no democracy can feel secure... One of our most urgent priorities must be attacking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction whether they are nuclear, chemical or biological, and the ballistic missiles that can rain them down on populations hundreds of miles away.⁵⁷

Although not representing a sea change in U.S. nonproliferation policy, the early conceptualizations of proliferation threats by Aspin should be situated within the larger social context of challenges to the legitimacy of existing nonproliferation and deterrence norms that brought a conservative strategic cultural pessimism about conflict together with an equally conservative view of the efficacy of military force in meeting the threat posed by proliferation. Though perhaps only crafted as a way to show toughness on proliferation issues to skeptical conservative critics, these challenges, and the ones that were soon to follow in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative are illustrative of the effectiveness of conservative argumentative strategies to shift the legitimate ground of discourse on proliferation, reshaping what were considered legitimately “tough” positions on security issues with strong foundations in nondiscriminatory diplomatic and economic normative beliefs.

The Defense Counterproliferation Initiative

⁵⁶ White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy’, September 27, 1993, NSArchives PR01804

⁵⁷ William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, September 27, 1993’, Public Papers of the Presidents, (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993) Volume 2, p. 1615

Still recovering from the political fallout generated by a leaked draft of its 1992 Defense Planning Guidance, the DOD was further put on the bureaucratic defensive by the 1992 election of Bill Clinton. The Clinton Administration took office with different strategic and budgetary priorities than the Bush Administration; most importantly a stated intention to focus on domestic social spending over internationally defense spending. Clinton's commitment to \$60 billion in defense spending cuts, supported by a Democratic controlled Congress, put an end to the sweeping post-Cold War budgetary aspirations of the DOD. However, sensitive to claims of weakness in foreign affairs and defense issues that had been a focal point of attacks during the election campaign, and concerned that early policy positions had alienated the Pentagon, the incoming Administration and its top Pentagon appointees were eager to demonstrate their commitment to national security issues.⁵⁸ A manifestation of this commitment entailed allowing the incoming Secretary of Defense Aspin to introduce several defense 'initiatives', including one focused on the threat posed by proliferation.

On December 7th, 1993, Aspin unveiled the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI) in a speech made to the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Presented on the anniversary of the Pearl Harbor attack, the speech garnered much national and international attention, as it marked the first major defense initiative of the Clinton Administration. In it, Secretary Aspin detailed the principle threats to U.S. national security since the end of the Cold War, first and foremost among them being the "new nuclear danger".⁵⁹ Unlike the 'old' nuclear threat from massive Soviet arsenals, the new threat was one that could come from "perhaps a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorist groups".⁶⁰ Whereas the old threat had been met with a successful combination of deterrence, arms

⁵⁸ In addition to Clinton's already strained relationship with the military due to his lack of military service and open opposition to the Vietnam War, Clinton had won few supporters in the DOD by pressing for swift change in the DOD's conservative policy towards homosexuals serving in the military. See Halberstam, *War in a time of peace*, pp. 212,213

⁵⁹ Les Aspin, 'Counterproliferation Initiative - Presidential Decision Directive PDD/NSC 18, December 1993' (Speech given to National Academy of Sciences, December 7, 1993) <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd18.htm> (11 July, 2003)

⁶⁰ Ibid.

control, and a nonproliferation policy based on prevention, this approach was claimed to be unable to meet the new nuclear threats for two principle reasons.

The first was that the nature of the proliferation threat was being dramatically altered by the “democratization of technology”, an issue quite similar to that of the emerging RMA as articulated by the DOD some years earlier.⁶¹ The globalization of trade after the Cold War and the attendant widespread availability of technology meant that more countries could develop or import technologies to assist in weapons development outside the jurisdiction of nonproliferation controls.⁶² Determined proliferators would be able to develop or acquire unconventional weapons capabilities, and it would be outside the capabilities of the nonproliferation regime to stop them. As Aspin concluded, “a policy of prevention through denial won’t be enough to cope with the potential of tomorrow’s proliferators”.⁶³

The second underlying weakness of the ‘old’ approach of nonproliferation to the new nuclear threat, as stated in Aspin’s DCI announcement, was that the nature of deterrence as it now applied to the United States had changed dramatically. Now instead of relying on a strong nuclear deterrence to equalize Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, when faced with smaller unconventional weapons armed opponents in the new proliferation environment, the U.S. risked “being the equalizee”.⁶⁴ Potential adversaries could use nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to threaten U.S. forces in the field, or when coupled with ballistic missiles, even threaten the U.S. homeland. Although the use of such weapons was by no means certain, U.S. military commanders would have to assume the threat was real, and be prepared to meet it.

⁶¹ This phrase is borrowed from Joseph Nye, and although he has used primarily in reference to the increasing lethality of terrorism, it is quite similar to that which would aid the proliferation of WMD. See, Joseph S. Nye, ‘Task Force Report on New International Terrorism: a North American perspective’, *notes from the Trilateral Commission Plenary meeting in Seoul*, 11-14 April, 2003, pp. 5-7

⁶² For an excellent and insightful examination of the hurdles that arms-control regimes must overcome in the face of technological proliferation, see Paul Cornish, *The Arms Trade and Europe*, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 57-63, 75-82

⁶³ Aspin, ‘Counterproliferation Initiative’

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Although making it clear that a policy of nonproliferation would be inadequate to meet the new nuclear threats posed by rogue regimes, Aspin emphasized the fact that the DCI was simply an effort to couple the task of protection against unconventional weapons armed opponents to that of the prevention of proliferation, and therefore was in no way intended to replace traditional nonproliferation efforts. Military counterproliferation capabilities would in fact strengthen nonproliferation efforts, serving to devalue the acquisition of unconventional weapons by reducing their “military utility” in the hands of an aggressor.⁶⁵ Thus the logic of the DCI according to Aspin was that if an adversary knew that such weapons would not deter the United States from action, and could not be effectively applied in battle, they would be less likely to pursue their development.

Though clearly a retreat from the language of preemption and prevention in the 1992 DPG, the DCI still presented the United States in general, and the DOD in particular as taking on a far more active role in addressing proliferation threats. Though defended by DOD officials as a defensively oriented initiative aimed at protecting U.S. forces in combat, the concept of “military preparedness” central to the DCI encompassed a broad range of potential organizational responses.⁶⁶ Key to any of these responses was the promise of broadened political mandate for organizational involvement in areas previously the domain of competing bureaucracies, and potential access to funding in a period of budgetary downturn. As a former DOD official critical of the bureaucratically limited nature of the DCI commented, “Like any label that comes into vogue in the Pentagon, money is associated with that. So everyone is re-labeling programs to be counterproliferation programs because they want to get funded for that.”

Ultimately, the concept of counterproliferation articulated in this initiative emerges as a compromise solution to a mix of domestic and international political dilemmas. The organizational role regarding proliferation had been pared down in the DCI to a highly defensive-oriented program, but it still reflected many of the organizational priorities

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ As later Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation Policy, Mitchel Wallerstein would conclude, “military preparedness is at the very heart of what constitutes the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative.” See Wallerstein, ‘Concepts to Capabilities’, p. 20

identified in the DOD's early post-Cold War strategic reassessment, and the more activist conceptions of appropriate responses to proliferation emerging from Congress. While superficial "re-labeling" would occur as a result of the DCI announcement, certain conceptual doors had been cracked open by the 'lessons' of the Gulf War and the overlapping process of strategic reassessment that would prove critical to the ultimate transformation of U.S. nonproliferation policy and challenge existing NP norms. As former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Mitchell Wallerstein noted about the intended implications of the DCI,

As potential adversaries come to understand that the possession of and/or blandishment of WMD is not sufficient to deter or dissuade the United States from defending its interests – and those of its allies around the world, as we have for decades – they will be compelled to reconsider the value of the huge investment of time, money and international credibility they are making to develop such weapons. This would be the optimal outcome of our efforts, since our primary goal remains to stop proliferation from occurring in the first place.⁶⁷

In pressuring for rollback, the idea that acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities will lead to less security, not more would need to be backed up with actual targeted military capability in addressing proliferation threats. Professional members of the military are, by nature of their vocation, experts in the concept of credible threats. Thus while the emphasis on domestic civil preparedness and the capability of U.S. forces to don more effective protective gear in the field might have a negligible effect on the tactical and strategic calculations of potential adversaries, the effective demonstration or application of counterforce capabilities might not. The military logic implicit in "compelled to reconsider" implies the threat not only of defeat on the battlefield, but the threat of inviting preemptive action. Although the DOD imagined itself to be conservative on the use of force, such policy formulations and conceptions played directly into its most vulnerable areas in terms of avoiding the use of force, which effectively lowered the bar for military action by addressing a problem in a way that raised the potential for an ultimate shift towards preventative action absent external political constraints.

⁶⁷ Wallerstein, 'Concepts to Capabilities', p. 25

Conclusions

With the broad strategic reassessment of the emerging security environment as articulated in the DCI at the end of this period, questions must now be asked of the utility of the strategic culture approach in offering a compelling explanation of these responses and trends. Strategic culture, much like the organizational theory approach examined in the previous chapter, downplays individual choice and systemic factors such as structural determinacy. Instead, it offers a broadly cultural and argumentative-oriented explanation for policy preferences and conceptual development. How does such an explanation stack up against alternatives such as the RAM and cognitive models?

A RAM explanation falls into many of the same pitfalls examined in the previous chapter. RAM theories would predict that the United States would support the NP regime as long as participation in the NP regime supported its own interests, but this leaves the central question unanswered – what were U.S. interests, and how were they identified? A central theoretical weakness in attempting to apply RAM-style analysis to the decisions made during this period is that in ignoring the process of policy decisions, RAM analysis assumes inherent state interest, and tends to place objective meaning on material changes. As such, a number of conflicting policy prescriptions ranging from traditional disarmament to newer forms of active denial potentially fulfill the conditions necessary for rational value maximizing behavior. How should we make sense of the range of different policy orientations and broader strategic conceptions forwarded during this time by various political actors?

The RAM explanation posits state security as a central driver of value-maximizing behavior, and an account of CP policy evolution can be made by claiming that more assertive efforts at combating proliferation fulfill cost-benefit analysis criteria by assuming high costs of future conflict with unconventionally armed adversaries. Thus a convincing account of CP policy evolution can be made with such analysis, but competing domestic discourses must also be assumed to be exogenous, and subservient to larger unitary, rational state motivations. A Strategic Culture explanation, however,

claims that such competing discourses reveal a state without such unitary, value maximizing behavior, and opens up the possibility that more important policy drivers lay within the state and its competing political factions. Such an explanation goes further in exploring the significance of divergent strategic discourses as representative of different conceptions of both cost and benefit. Strategic Culture argues that examining political and conceptual competition within the state is a fruitful areas of study in itself, as more can be said about the policy impact of alternative assumptions about the international threat environment than when competing discourses are discounted as ultimately serving a unitary, value maximizing end.

When examining the available evidence, cognitive explanations, often forwarded by scholars and participants in describing the genesis of the DCI, also exhibit weakness. Cognitive focus has been placed on the figure of Les Aspin due to his proximity (and claimed authorship) of the DCI, even though a closer reading of the development of his thought shows little emphasis on the conceptions central to the DCI before being tapped for the position of Secretary of Defense. This cognitive argument is further undermined by the accounts of former staffers who traveled from his Congressional staff to the DOD and participated in the formulation of the DCI. These participants noted his adoption of the new conceptions of ideationally targeted proliferation threat that had been gaining legitimacy within the Legislature. Also former DOD officials who briefed Aspin on their own counterproliferation thinking during the transition observed he carried many of their conceptions forward into the DCI, rather than entering office with a fully formed plan for the defense initiative himself.⁶⁸ The DCI then emerges as a broader articulation of the conceptual trends emerging from strategic cultural debates and the organizational reassessment of the post-Cold War strategic environment, rather than the expression of individual cognitive bias on the part of a bureaucratically powerful individual.

A strategic culture perspective with its emphasis on both ideationally defined biases and preferences, and its emphasis on argumentation as a causal pathway linking such preferences to policy outcomes brings U.S. closer to a satisfying explanation of the

⁶⁸ Interviews with Larry Seaquist, Rebecca Hersman

shifting conceptions about proliferation that resulted in the DCI. Although this was a formative period that was not defined by clear polarizing political divides, significant discursive trends nonetheless emerged over this period that can be tied back to ideational divides present in the U.S. Executive and Legislature. Those with strategic cultural assumptions about opportunities for cooperation over conflict and a low utility for military power to further nonproliferation policy advocated nondiscriminatory diplomatic and economic approaches founded on the continuing legitimacy of traditional normative beliefs about nonproliferation and deterrence strategies. Those with assumptions about the inevitability of conflict and a high utility for military force in meeting the threat posed by proliferation unsurprisingly advocated a rather different set of policy prescriptions.

It was this second group of nonproliferation skeptics that were instrumental in presenting successful argumentative challenges to the legitimacy of nondiscriminatory NP and deterrence norms through the introduction of the language of “rogue regimes” and the political transformation of “WMD”. The experience of the Gulf War served as a strong reinforcement of these conservative strategic cultural trends, placing the group at a relative advantage in efforts to delegitimize, or at least fundamentally question the efficacy of the NP regime and existing normative approaches to proliferation. This shift in legitimacy allowed them to present their alternative conceptions as “uniquely realistic and efficacious.”⁶⁹ If the development of WMD was removed from the broader context of disarmament and closely tied to assumptions of irrational or irresponsible state identity, and Saddam Hussein could be held up as a prime example of the assumed ability of such states to operate outside of the reach of the NP regime, a simple and potent formula for policy response could be bundled into the language, giving it increased utility as an alternative set of policy prescriptions that could be legitimized through further political action. The strategic cultural divide over the legitimacy of these two approaches will be the subject of Chapter 5.

At the end of this period, the DCI emerged with many of the key concepts adopted as representing a “tough new” approach to proliferation that would place more emphasis on

⁶⁹ Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, p. 46

military solutions to proliferation problems traditionally framed in political terms. Though not intended as a broadly preemptive form of unilateralism feared by some contemporary critics, the DCI nonetheless gave military planners an opportunity to institutionalize new conceptions into organizational practices and capabilities that would fundamentally alter the menu of choice for future policymakers. Absent civilian control to the contrary, this further legitimized conceptions and practices of proliferation control through the application of military force. The institutionalization of counterproliferation within the DOD is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 4

Institutionalizing Counterproliferation: 1994-1998

The period immediately following the announcement of the DCI in December of 1993 is widely seen as a period of immediate decline for the new initiative. Strong challenges to the mandate from both inside and outside the DOD forced a retreat from public view that led many to assume the DCI was dead on arrival, a casualty of threatened parochial interests and bureaucratic turf wars. While it is true that counterproliferation shrank quickly from the public spotlight, it is during these years of supposed hibernation that counterproliferation policy was quietly institutionalized and transformed into a potent military approach to the problems of proliferation. A reformulated budgetary mandate, effective embedding of functional counterproliferation planning in regional combat commands, and a continuing evolution of assumptions about the nature of the proliferation threat combined to quietly transform the initiative into a central pillar of the DOD response to proliferation. It was through this transformation that CP began to constitute a fundamental challenge to the traditional policy and doctrinal approaches of nonproliferation and deterrence.

The evolution of counterproliferation within the DOD during this period is both widely misunderstood by outside observers, and poorly explained by bureaucratic politics models. An organizational theory approach rectifies many of the sources of misunderstanding by situating both the initial resistance to the DCI and the broad institutionalization that followed, within the context of the organizational structure, interests and learning processes of the DOD. Without an adequate account of the quiet process of CP institutionalization within the DOD, and the resultant impact on policy, little sense can be made of the particular forms of doctrinal assumptions underlying the supposedly revolutionary preemptive strategy articulated by the Bush Administration in the 2002 NSS.

This chapter argues that the institutionalization of CP policy within the functional units of the DOD resulted in a transformation of the organizational conception of the threat posed by proliferation, and a transformation of the offensive capacity to meet identified threats. Though this evolution did not in itself guarantee any specific resultant military actions, the institutionalization of a more offensively oriented CP significantly altered the options available to future policymakers, and shifted the central emphasis of CP policy. No longer limited to modest defensive measures intended to protect US forces, CP steadily progressed towards a comprehensive set of operational capabilities intended to allow policymakers to decisively alter the strategic threat posed by unconventional weapons proliferation. By ostensibly offering policymakers the potential to unilaterally prevent or roll back existing proliferation with military force, CP now represented a decisive break from traditional NP norms and deterrent practices, further opening the door for the preventative or preemptive application of such force.

The chapter begins with an examination of the period of strong organizational and intra-bureaucratic resistance to the DCI, and explains the sources of resistance and clarifying the confusion over this period in CP evolution that has led some scholars to conclude that bureaucratic politics explains the supposed “demise” of CP at this time. Although the DCI was met with strong initial resistance within the DOD, such resistance was largely over the organizationally inappropriate attempts by DOD civilian appointees such as Secretary Aspin to attempt a top-down institutionalization of the initiative, rather than resistance to the substance of the initiative itself.

The chapter continues with an examination of the efforts at embedding CP into the regional warfighting commands by Aspin’s successors. The effects of independent budgeting and mission reorientation resulting from this institutionalization are examined through the offensive capabilities funded and fielded during this time. Coupled with a paradoxical reconceptualization of unconventional weapons proliferation as necessitated by America’s growing military might, CP began to emerge as a far more offensively oriented policy than assumed by many observers at the time of the DCI. The doctrinal outcome of CP institutionalization was a comprehensive set of organizational

capabilities, practices and conceptions that placed far more offensive bias on possible responses to proliferation than had been originally envisioned by the DCI mandate, or supposedly imposed by bureaucratic bargaining.

Early resistance to the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative

The previous two chapters examined how new conceptions of the problem posed by proliferation gained consensus within the DOD after the Gulf War, and were eventually translated into policy through the DCI. However, an important puzzle encountered by analysts of CP policy is the immediate and strong resistance encountered from within the ranks of the DOD to implementation of the DCI. This strong and substantive resistance to the initiative from within, coupled with debilitating bureaucratic resistance from outside the organization led a number of scholars to discount CP as a “dead initiative.”¹ In these analyses, CP did not evolve, but was merely revived in an offensive form by the second Bush Administration in the wake of 9/11 as central to its doctrine of preemption. This accounting of CP failure leaves a number of puzzles to be addressed in this chapter. First is why the initiative encountered such strong resistance, especially from within the DOD itself, when it appeared largely representative of the emerging consensus on the nature of proliferation threats and appropriate responses. Second, how to account for the significant institutionalization that occurred quietly within the DOD shortly after Aspin’s early departure from the position of Secretary of Defense? What explains *both* the resistance to the DCI and its later adoption and evolution?

This section argues that it was not simply external bureaucratic resistance to the scope of the initiative and internal resistance to the perceived budgetary threat of the initiative that caused the new initiative to flounder. More significantly, top-down implementation efforts failed to take into account the organizational design, cultural biases and political environment in which the US military operated. This failure wasn’t merely attempting to include too much within the initiative, threatening bureaucratic turf, or failing to provide

¹ Jason D. Ellis and Geoffrey D. Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), p. 14; Interview with Henry Sokolski

independent funding, but more importantly, a failure to account for how the military itself viewed its own mission boundaries and a failure to include the functional units of the organization in the decisionmaking process. By examining both the reasons why CP initially failed to become embedded throughout the functional units of the organization, and the reasons for the successful institutionalization that was to soon follow, it will be easier to explain how this processes escaped the notice of many external observers.

Budgetary challenges and organizational response

Secretary Aspin's strong advocacy of the DCI represented the consensus of the DOD on appropriate responses to post-Cold War proliferation that would give it a more prominent role in denying and devaluing unconventional weapons in the hands of potential adversaries. However, functional implementation of the core mission objectives would prove to be far more difficult than simple announcement of the intentions of the initiative. The first major stumbling block encountered by the DCI was the failure to provide adequate funding for the mission areas identified as priorities in the first year. While the DCI was announced with a first year budget of \$400 million, none of this budget was independently appropriated through the Legislature or provided by the Executive Order covering CP efforts within the DOD. Keeping with overall Administration efforts at reducing the Defense budget, funding to cover the \$400 million price tag for the DCI was to be created by the services themselves by identifying areas where cutbacks on other expenditures could be realized.

Unsurprisingly, there was strong internal resistance by the individual services to the DCI on the issue of funding. The central issue being that services already facing potentially serious budget cuts were highly critical of an initiative that placed additional, vaguely articulated responsibilities on their shoulders, while simultaneously expecting them to bear the budgetary burden for implementation of the DCI at a time when very hard choices about future spending were already being made.² Influential members of the

² Michael R. Gordon, with Stephen Engelberg, 'Military to Draft Plan for a 6% Cut in 1992-94 Spending', *New York Times*, November 18, 1989, sec 1, p. 1; David E. Rosenbaum, 'Sizing Up Cuts to the Military

military went so far as to successfully argue before Congressional appropriations committees for paring the first year's DOD counterproliferation budget from the \$400 million originally requested, to a far more modest \$70 million.³

That the DCI was announced with such fanfare by a fresh group of civilian appointees without substantive consultation with the functional units of the organization did little to further a sense of organizational cohesion or mission within the individual services.⁴ Many professional members of the military viewed the DCI as an ill-defined, poorly managed, and inadequately funded initiative imposed on them from above without special funding prerogative. Thus the services saw it as a threat to existing missions and programs in a time of declining defense budgets, and subsequently resisted substantive implementation through direct or indirect forms of bureaucratic resistance.⁵

The immediate organizational response to these budgetary issues was widespread *re-labeling* or *re-justifying* of existing programs in the early period following the announcement of the DCI. This phenomenon of organizational sub-units responding superficially to new mission mandates imposed from above in a climate of budgetary constraint, was described by a former assistant to Secretary Aspin:

With any organization, anytime there's a new initiative, they just re-describe what they were already doing as fitting the new requirements. So you take existing things and just 're-label' them or 're-justify' them under the new requirement, and it's very hard to figure out how much of that constitutes any actual change, or new program, or new activity, and how much is just re-labeling... So the challenge was that you want to have an embedded program, but you want to have one that is

Budget', *New York Times*, January 1, 1990, Sec. 1, p. 12; also Patrick E. Tyler, 'U.S. Could Cut Defense Spending By More Than 33%, Report Says', *New York Times*, September 24, 1991, Sec. A, p. 29

³ Chris Williams, 'DOD's Counterproliferation Initiative: A Critical Assessment', in Henry Sokolski (ed.), *Fighting Proliferation: New Concerns for the Nineties*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/fp/b19ch14.htm> (Accessed - 10 June, 2003), see also Counterproliferation Program Review Committee, 'Report on Activities and Programs for Countering Proliferation', May 1995, p. 18, DOD OFOISR 00018-CDR-1/766.PDF

⁴ Interview with Larry Seaquest

⁵ This resistance to civilian CP initiatives based on funding concerns by the services is documented in Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, *Preventative Defense: A New Security Strategy for America*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999)

meaningful – one that constitutes some genuine change in your posture or capability, but you’ve got this renaming, re-justifying going on.⁶

Re-labeling of mission responsibilities and capabilities reflected fears of political uncertainty within the functional units of the organization and provided a pathway for resisting change and innovation. The phenomena of re-labeling did nothing to improve military readiness, further undermining confidence that the DCI would do anything to address the environmental uncertainty posed by post-Cold War proliferation. Resistant to the possibility that mandated spending would potentially threaten existing programs, the services retreated to an ineffective but predictable position of claiming compliance with the loosely articulated initiative without making any substantive force posture or capabilities changes. If this were not enough to pose a quagmire for the nascent initiative, counterproliferation also faced an extremely hostile response from within the DOD and rival organizations such the State Department, which saw the DCI as one of a host of overly ambitious defense initiatives to emerging from the Office of Secretary of Defense.

“Mission overreach”: cultural and bureaucratic resistance to the DCI

Secretary Aspin believed that proactive DOD involvement in a wider range of foreign policy areas was crucial to shaping the emerging security environment. He felt it was the only organization with the material resources at its disposal to provide meaningful physical involvement in areas of potential instability that had traditionally been dealt with through diplomatic pressure, economic incentives or disincentives, or active participation of multilateral institutions.⁷ The Bush Administration’s civilian Pentagon leadership vision for the future of the US military, and Secretary of Defense Aspin’s particular vision of the core missions of the US military in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union, was in essence a vision of the US military playing a central role in a wide range of activities intended to promote a peaceful post-Cold War security environment. While the

⁶ Interview with Rebecca Hersman, July 21, 2005. This assessment of the early response by the military services to the DCI is also supported by former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nonproliferation, Henry Sokolski (interview, June 20, 2005).

⁷ Interview with Rebecca Hersman; Hon. Les Aspin, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States House Armed Services Committee, Letter to President George Bush, April 30, 1991, *Congressional Record*, February 7, 1992, p. E238

vast military capabilities of the Soviet Union were no longer the focus of US military planning, the post-Cold War still presented threats as well as opportunities for the US military to play a central role in shaping the emerging security environment, partly by redefining the role and mandate of US military forces. This was articulated in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review of US Military Forces, a major DOD planning document guided by Aspin and intended to lay out a broad doctrine for US military forces in the post-Cold War:

This new world we are living in is distinctive because of the new opportunities it presents for us to advance our interests – by preventing or defusing dangers before they arise. Accordingly, we have focused a lot of attention on finding ways to work pro-actively in this new environment to take advantage of such opportunities. Chief among these initiatives are:

- Cooperative Threat Reduction
- Counterproliferation
- FSU Defense/Military Partnership
- Promotion of Democracy through Military-to-Military Contacts
- Peacekeeping
- Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster/Famine Relief⁸

All of these wide-ranging initiatives and policy announcements converged into what was described by senior Defense officials involved at the time as a “huge overreach” in terms of what constituted new military missions for the DOD. Counterproliferation was perceived as one more of a number of such overreaches that contributed to a climate of suspicion within the individual military services and severe hostility from the State Department concerned that counterproliferation was intended to undermine their traditional nonproliferation policy mandate.⁹ Such overreach in organizational missions led to a significant bureaucratic infighting between the State Department and Department of Defense. It was reportedly so severe that then Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with President Clinton and threatened to resign if the scope of the DOD initiatives was not curtailed.¹⁰ As former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation,

⁸ Department of Defense, ‘1993 Bottom Up Review – Talking Points’, October 1993, NS Archives CH01621, p. 18

⁹ Interviews with John P. Caves and Henry Sokolski. The peacekeeping initiative was another area of intense bureaucratic conflict between the State Department and DOD; see Hersman, *Friends and Foes*, pp. 39, 40

¹⁰ Interview with Rebecca Hersman, July 21, 2005

John P. Caves, commented on this period of bureaucratic turf wars, “You can’t understand the hostility about the CP initiative without understanding all of these other things that created a profoundly hostile climate, and that everything was being perceived in the most hostile terms possible.”¹¹

Resistance to meaningful implementation of the DCI from within the DOD wasn’t simply a response to budgetary threats, but also reflected a more fundamentally perceived challenge to the documented civil-military divide over the appropriate nature of military missions.¹² Expansion of the military mission beyond the traditional focus on direct national security threats into areas such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance drew criticism of the DCI as failing to address weaknesses in substantive military capabilities. Despite the argued “consensus” within the DOD on the lessons of the Gulf War in terms of preparedness for conflicts that involved unconventional weapons usage by adversaries, the individual military services argued that counterproliferation, as presented in the DCI, was not in fact a distinct mission from what they were already responsible for. Though the Gulf War had exposed certain weaknesses in mission areas like force protection, some said it was difficult to argue that the US military was completely unprepared to operate in a unconventional weapons environment after more than 40 years of preparations to fight the Soviet Union, which possessed well-known stockpiles of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Though contradicting many of the arguments forwarded after the Gulf War, such resistance should be placed within a framework of widespread perceptions of external meddling with the missions and budgets of the military services, rather than a substantive backtracking on the consensus about proliferation threats.

Limiting CP by definition: The Poneman Memo

It was in this climate of internal resistance and bureaucratic infighting that the scope of the counterproliferation mandate and mission was ‘resolved’ by the National Security

¹¹ Interview with John P. Caves, July 21, 2005

¹² Feaver and Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles, p. 25

Council in a set of official definitions of counterproliferation and nonproliferation, known informally as the Poneman Memo. Aggravated by the policy deadlock resulting from the increasingly public battles over counterproliferation and nonproliferation “missions”, Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Robert Gallucci, informally requested that the National Security Council exercise its policy coordination role by providing a set of working definitions for proliferation, nonproliferation and counterproliferation. This was ostensibly to harmonize proliferation policy between the State Department and DOD.¹³

At this point it is worth quoting the Poneman memo at length:

We have agreed to the following definitions and will ask our staff to be consistent in their usage.

Proliferation is the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities and the missiles to deliver them.

Nonproliferation is the use of the full range of political, economic and military tools to prevent proliferation, reverse it diplomatically or protect our interests against an opponent armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles, should that prove necessary. Nonproliferation tools include: intelligence, global nonproliferation norms and agreements, diplomacy, export controls, security assurances, defenses and the application of military force.

Counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis, with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles.¹⁴

The “agreed definitions” served to place overall policy responsibility for proliferation issues with the Department of State and to reinforce traditional nonproliferation norms and practices. Thus the intention was that the DOD “counterproliferation” efforts would be strictly limited to their existing nonproliferation regime support role and the passive

¹³ Interview with Lewis A. Dunn, July 12 2006

¹⁴ Daniel Poneman, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls, Memorandum for Robert Gallucci (Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs, Department of State) and Ashton Carter, (Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Security and Counterproliferation, Department of Defense), “Agreed Definitions”, February 18, 1994, collection of author.

defenses identified as crucial shortcomings in the Gulf War. The definitions also limited the scope of what would actually be considered proliferation. Gone were the references to technologies and materials that could be considered to offer potential strategic advantage. Thus the memo forced a narrowing of the mandate to eliminate the broad array of activities, proposed by some in the DOD, to deal with the consequences of the Revolution in Military Affairs.

For some, the Poneman Memo definitions signaled the end of a short-lived attempt by the DOD to portray counterproliferation as a healthy, integrated and well supported organizational mission, exposing instead an initiative that lacked significant organizational, political and budgetary support. In the accounts of CP evolution by many outside observers, counterproliferation after the Poneman Memo existed in name only. As such, it did not represent any significant policy shifts or capabilities development beyond rather modest enhancement of protective measures for US troops operating against unconventionally armed opponents.¹⁵

Explaining resistance to the DCI

The bureaucratic politics model attributes “failure” of the initiative to both the bureaucratic hostility engendered by the encroachment of the DCI into the bureaucratic turf of other powerful bureaucracies, and from the threat the DCI posed to the existing budgets and missions of the functional units of the DOD. As such, a bureaucratic politics model would see the outcome as the result of “pulling and hauling” between bureaucratic actors, and failure of Aspin to properly exploit institutional procedures for implementing decisions. Credit has to be given to a bureaucratic politics explanation of the early problems encountered by the DCI. Resistance by the State Department, mediated and resolved by the National Security Council, is difficult to explain outside of a framework of the defense of parochial interests and bureaucratic bargaining. Bureaucratic politics

¹⁵ Peter D. Feaver and Emerson N. S. Niu, ‘Managing Nuclear Proliferation: Condemn, Strike or Assist?’, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 40, No. 2, (June, 1996), pp. 209-233; also Sokolski, Best of Intentions, pp. 95-97

also performs well in providing an explanation of internal resistance to the DCI, with the parochial interests of the DOD offering expected resistance to budgetary threats.

Organizational theory and associated civil-military relations literature points to cultural factors within the military, such as biases about the nature of the international security environment and preferences for certain types of military missions, as important to understanding how organizations both interpret their external environments and formulate responses to perceived threats. Here the problem of widespread perception of CP as bundled into a host of non-traditional mission areas explains the source of some internal resistance to the initiative. However, while more weight is given to cultural variables such as military perceptions of appropriate mission orientation by organization theory, little within the documentary evidence points to primacy of such cultural factors over the ostensibly bureaucratic issues of budgeting already discussed. These cultural factors played a role in the early failure of CP and its associated conceptions and practices to become institutionalized within the DOD, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether these cultural factors were decisive in preventing a rapid institutionalization.

A significant area of organizational theory relevant to explaining the early failure of the DCI is the failure of Secretary Aspin to take into account the structures of decisionmaking and learning processes within the DOD. Although policy conceptions are ostensibly promulgated in a top-down form representative of the formal hierarchy of the military, functional implementation of meaningful change in the military rarely follows such a rigid top-down process. Institutionalization that affects the practices and capabilities of the military is a time-intensive process involving a number of feedback loops. Organizational learning, capabilities development, mission planning and consensus on emerging strategic conceptions all follow a more broadly distributed pattern within the organization that involves all layers of the hierarchy in the process of institutionalization. Far from being an automatic mechanism set in motion by civilian leaders, meaningful change requires active involvement at all levels of the organization in decisionmaking, learning, adaptation and functional capabilities development.

Organizational theory posits that successful institutionalization not only appeals to basic parochial interests through funding and turf protection, but also to cultural interests through appropriate mission orientation and involvement of organizational professionals in defining how new conceptions mesh with organizational practices and capabilities. It could be argued that Secretary Aspin failed a political test by expanding on turf of the DOD, and also failed an organizational test by attempting to impose change from above rather than involve the professional within the organization in development of the initiative.

The larger utility of organizational theory over bureaucratic politics is in the integration of these three issues to predict where successful or unsuccessful institutionalization is likely to occur. Without an appeal to the political realities of bureaucratic coordination of policy approaches and budgeting, a cultural appreciation of traditional mission areas embraced by the military services, or sensitivity to the organizational design of the DOD relevant to effective institutionalization of new conceptions and practices, the DCI stood little chance of gaining any meaningful penetration within the DOD. Absent such penetration, there was little chance the DCI would effectively shape military doctrine or larger policy outcomes. Awareness of such failings, and the outspoken resistance these failings engendered led many observers to dismiss CP as just one of many ideas about military reform and modernization, promoted with fanfare by the Clinton Administration, that had little effect outside the expenditure of political capital.¹⁶ However, if such a combination of factors can be used to explain the failure of early institutionalization, they may also provide an explanation for the successful institutionalization of CP that was soon to follow and its effects on larger policy outcomes.

The following section examines the efforts of Aspin's successors to overcome such shortcomings in the implementation of CP and render the initiative a meaningful change to military capabilities, force posture and operating conceptions in addressing

¹⁶ David, Halberstam, War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001), pp. 209-211

proliferation threats. The key areas of institutionalization examined in this section include shaping CP implementation efforts to fit within the actual organizational learning and decisionmaking structure of the DOD, addressing the fears of budgetary starvation, developing meaningful CP capabilities, and the conceptual transformation that allowed CP to evolve into a unique mission area for the military services. In the process of such transformation, it will be argued that the assumption of adversarial use of unconventional weapons in future conflicts was transformed by the organization from uncertainty into fact, with broad ramifications for the challenge CP ultimately presented to NP and deterrence norms.

The institutionalization of CP policy

While it is true that counterproliferation policy in this period cannot be understood outside of the context of the early organizational battles between the DOD and Department of State, an overemphasis on such issues led many observers to judge CP as a critically constrained and unsupported initiative, thus largely ignoring the measures being taken within the DOD to integrate counterproliferation into its core mission and develop the capabilities that would represent a significant challenge to nonproliferation norms and activities in later years. The dilemma for leading DOD officials was multifaceted: how to (1) formally create a new military mission in response to this threat, (2) acquire hardware appropriate to the threat, and (3) develop necessary new war-fighting doctrine while remaining within the accepted definitions which appeared to significantly restrict the scope of the DOD response. The Poneman Memo definitions left limited room for military planning oriented towards force protection, but seemed to shut the door firmly on offensive operations, such as the possible preemptive or preventative actions feared by critics of the initiative.¹⁷

Although the Poneman Memo definitions seemed to indicate that counterproliferation

¹⁷ See Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, 'Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles', in Brad Roberts (ed.), *Weapons Proliferation in the 1990's*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150, also David Fischer, 'Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?', in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (eds.) *International Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 11-24

would be little more than a minor adjunct to US nonproliferation policy, DOD officials responsible for overseeing CP implementation exploited two loopholes in the memo's definition of CP. Firstly, the DOD still had a great deal of leeway in determining precisely *how* to assure that "U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles."¹⁸ As protection of US forces was argued to be a weakness of the Gulf War, new military capabilities would need to be developed to meet a range of threat scenarios involving unconventional weapons. Secondly, if the State Department was responsible for military responses to proliferation threats, surely this did not entail the actual application of force. If the role allocated for the State Department was that of shaping policy guiding the possible use of force on issues of proliferation, then the Department of Defense still had the responsibility to develop and present military options to future decisionmakers faced with potential threat scenarios. Thus, although the Poneman Memo apparently restricted CP to a minor NP support role, in actuality it left open the opportunity for significant development of new capabilities and practices with transformative potential.

Placing CP policy responsibilities within regional warfighting commands

Formulating a strategy to overcome such strong and well-founded organizational resistance fell in large part to the senior DOD official responsible for implementing CP policy, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation, Ashton Carter.¹⁹ A top-down approach to the DCI that threatened existing organizational policy implementation by imposing counterproliferation spending on the services from above had been the source of much resistance, rather than a lack of merit for the policy itself. Realizing this, Carter instituted a bottom-up approach to CP policy that focused on placing greater responsibility for identification of CP mission requirements, and thus funding priorities,

¹⁸ Poneman Memo

¹⁹ Carter is widely recognized as one of the most important assistant secretaries of defense during the Clinton Administration, second only in policy influence at that level to Joseph Nye, who at the time headed the Office of International Affairs. See James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2005), p. 393

with the integrated regional combatant commands.²⁰ This bottom-up approach leveraged the power of operational concepts, “the means of applying military forces by a senior commander to prosecute a war and the mechanism for implementing a theater campaign strategy,” to the process of institutionalizing CP.²¹ Carter believed that if the actual war-fighting subunits had a hand in directing the implementation of the initiative, much of the organizational resistance could be mitigated.

An important template for future conflicts provided by the Gulf War was of a central regional commander orchestrating the joint operation of U.S. forces in possession of highly mobile precision weaponry.²² A series of comprehensive post-Cold War reviews of military structuring had all promoted visions of American forces as lighter, smaller, more technologically advanced, operating jointly and regionally commanded.²³ The issue of joint command of regional forces was, in effect, a continuation of the defense reorganization begun in the 1980’s. It placed increasing power in the JCS and CINC’s over individual services both in terms of developing region specific defense plans and coordinating budgeting for unified forces.²⁴ This was a trend recognized by DOD officials responsible for the institutionalization of CP policy as a potential pathway for finding policy support and constructive input at the operational level, as regional commanders could adapt CP capabilities to the missions and force posture of the unified troops under their command.²⁵

²⁰ ‘Jane’s Interview: Ashton Carter’, *Jane’s Defense Weekly*, July 30, 1994, p. 40

²¹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, ‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Precision Interdiction’, June 1994, Sec. 1.6.2 (p. 12)

²² A template in no small way aided by the popular acclaim granted to General Norman Schwarzkopf’s handling of the 1991 Gulf War. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, p. 397

²³ These reports were the 1991 Base Force Review, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR), the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)

²⁴ Started by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986

²⁵ Commission on the Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces (CORM), ‘Directions for Defense’, report to the Department of Defense and Congress, May 1995, see also Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress and the President, 1995, Ch. 6; This continued shift in power from the services to the Joint Staff begun with the Goldwater-Nichols reforms was not generally seen as presenting any fundamental challenges to civilian control of the military, despite the fears of some analysts to the contrary. See Colin L. Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington and Richard H Kohn, ‘Exchange on Civil-Military Relations’, *The National Interest* (Summer 1994), p. 23 See also CORM report to the Department of Defense and Congress, May 1995; and Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress and the President, 1995, Ch. 6

Integrating the regional commands in the decisionmaking process also served to constructively address an organizational problem of inter-service rivalry faced by the DOD from its earliest days. As the post-Cold War U.S. military shifted more heavily towards a regionally oriented defense posture, the CINC's assumed the responsibility for shaping a young, technologically focused initiative such as the DCI. Regional combat commanders tasked with determining the counterproliferation capabilities shortfalls in their regions were faced with the responsibility to best utilize all the assets under their command. As the name "unified commands" implies, the CINC's commanded unified Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine forces focused in specific regional theaters. Developing the full range of force capabilities would ensure that all the armed services would have a stake in the successful development of the policy and deployment of capabilities.

Concepts, capabilities and threat conceptions face greater chances of broad acceptance by the functional units of the DOD by incorporating relevant planning responsibilities from the bottom-up than if simply dictated from the civilian leadership.²⁶ As a former DOD official commented, "Ashton Carter should be credited with realizing that a substantive CP policy could be institutionalized by embedding CP within the services."²⁷ That is, by giving the Joint Staff and regional combatant commands a direct role in formulating CP policy and budget planning, the concept would be much more likely to gain general acceptance, as military officers valued the autonomy of directing the CP mission as they saw fit. Effectively embedding the new initiative in the services would be a crucial way in which CP issues and specific capabilities would work their way into actual mission planning and SOP's by the theater CINC's, and not simply remain vague strategic doctrine at higher levels of planning with marginal relevance to operational planning.²⁸ Rather than simply directing that CP policy be carried out at lower levels and mandating spending by the services, DOD directives on CP policy challenged regional commanders

²⁶ This was also a reflection of the overall shift in policymaking power to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set in motion by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986.

²⁷ Interview with Rebecca Hersman

²⁸ Ibid.

to play an active role in both the assessment of threat and the allocation of funds, establishing a process of integrated identification of proliferation threats and regional force posture responses.²⁹

Mitigating budgetary uncertainty

All of the forward thinking placement of CP policy responsibilities with the functional units tasked with actually undertaking a hypothetical future CP mission would have been a moot point were it not for a concurrent reorganization of the budgeting mandate for CP capabilities and missions that removed the fiscal burdens of CP funding from the services themselves.

Established by a newly Republican-controlled Congress, a Counterproliferation Program Review Committee (CPRC) chaired by the Secretary of Defense was established with a mandate to coordinate the technological and scientific aspects of “support for NP policy”, and to provide funding for projects identified and prioritized by the joint commands.³⁰ Neatly circumventing much of the internal resistance to CP policy by establishing budgeting for new military capabilities outside the existing services budgets, the CPRC offered both a budgetary incentive to institutionalization and supported ongoing efforts within the regional commands to identify mission requirements by providing the resources necessary to develop new capabilities to fulfill those requirements.

²⁹ Secretary of Defense Memorandum, ‘CJCS Counterproliferation Missions and Functions Study’ May 5, 1995. This study group is also referred to as the “Joint Staff Missions and Functions Study”, although the full text of this document is still classified, the central conclusions are discussed in documents such as, United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD’s Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused’, May 2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-97; and the 1995 CPRC Report, p. 21; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Concept Plan (CONPLAN 0400-96), May 1996. Classification and availability is same as previously cited document;

³⁰ Originally called the Non-Proliferation Review Committee, the name was changed to CPRC a year later when the participation of the State Department was eliminated. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, (Pub. L. No. 103- 160, sec. 1605, 107 Stat. 1845 (1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-337, sec. _1502, 108 Stat. 2914 (1994); Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, ‘Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs,’ May 1994, Section 1.1. Department of Defense Office of Freedom of Information and Security Review Reading Room (DOD OFISR) #00019-CDR-1/843.PDF

Providing adequate independent budgeting provided incentives for meaningful adoption of CP concepts and practices rather than the superficial adoption or open resistance encountered in the first year of the initiative. The services and regional commands responsible for prioritizing and institutionalizing CP capabilities were quick to develop requirements to meet newly identified CP mission objectives. While the first year funding was limited in relative terms to the overall defense budget, the first year figure for CP programs, totaling approximately \$1 billion in FY 1995, rapidly grew to nearly \$4 billion for FY 1996 and \$4.3 billion in FY 1997.³¹

Substantive funding for CP also built in a feedback loop of sorts, as once general missions had been established and funded, organizational benchmarks for performance could be established and compared. The quantitative question of whether or not CP capabilities were being developed and fielded with appropriate cost effectiveness quickly supplanted the qualitative questions of encroachment on existing NP norms and practices, or potential “mission creep” into the functional bureaucratic territory of other bureaucracies.³² Additionally, the provision of adequate funding and organizational mandate for substantive implementation of the initiative created what Richard Rhodes termed a “technological imperative” common to military organizations – a process of incremental, self-sustaining justifications for developing and employing improved technologies.³³ Once a military capability is developed, there are strong incentives to justify both the original investment of time and resources and the continued advancement

³¹ DOD counterproliferation spending would continue to steadily rise, reaching an all-time high of \$12.65 billion in FY 2004. See Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical and Biological Defense, ‘Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress Executive Summaries’, (1994-2003), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/reports.html>, (Accessed – 20 August, 2005)

³² Establishment of a regularized system of budgetary appropriations eventually placed the DOD CP programs under the scrutiny of the GAO in assessing compliance with the “outcome-oriented principles of the Government Performance and Results Act” – see United States General Accounting Office, Statement of Norman J. Rabkin, Director, National Security Preparedness Issues, National Security and International Affairs Division, ‘Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on Actions Taken to Protect Military Forces’ (Testimony before the Subcommittees on Military Procurement and on Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 10/20/1999, GAO/T-NSIAD-00-49); also addressed in 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), section I

³³ Richard Rhodes, The Making of The Atomic Bomb, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986) p. 562

of underlying technologies, regardless of whether or not such capabilities are employed in conflict. Continued investments in capabilities assist military organizations in “transforming uncertainty into fact” in the words of Elizabeth Eden, by adding perceived utility in meeting identified threats, and in justifying threat conceptions through improving or supplanting existing capabilities regardless of continued ambiguity in the international security environment.³⁴ Such self-sustaining rationale for conceptual and capabilities development predicted by organizational theory are illustrated by the shift to capabilities based defense planning by the DOD. This transformed the perception of unconventional weapons usage threat by adversaries from a minor possibility to an inevitable feature of future conflict.

The paradox of military dominance

Identifying the need in the early 90’s to redefine not only the command structure, but also the threat orientation of U.S. forces, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colin Powell, commented, “Because of the need to accomplish a wide range of missions, our new armed forces will be capabilities oriented as well as threat oriented.”³⁵ This signaled an era in which U.S. forces would be transitioning from defense against a single large, well known global adversary to a security environment featuring a number of smaller, regional powers much less well understood by the U.S. This meant that rather than focus on the “threat” posed by a single adversary, U.S. forces should be prepared to cope with the “capabilities” of any number of smaller regional powers. The emergence of the US military dominance in the post-Cold War period, combined with a shifting emphasis towards potential adversarial capabilities rather than motives, created a paradoxical uncertainty about regional or terrorist threats to American military forces.

A telling example of this type of military logic was illustrated in a meeting of senior DOD officials during a conference on the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, when the

³⁴ Eden, *Whole World on Fire*, pp. 55-60

³⁵ Colin Powell, ‘U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead’, *Foreign Affairs* (Winter, 1992), vol. 71, no. 5, p. 40

threat posed by Iraq to U.S. military forces in a hypothetical attempt to recapture Kuwait and Saudi oil fields was considered:

As long as U.S. aircraft are able to kill approximately one combat vehicle per sortie (which advanced weapons should be able to achieve against exposed, attacking Iraqi forces), Iraq would have to suppress 50 percent or more of the U.S. and allied sorties to reach the Saudi coast, and would have to suppress 80 percent or more of the sorties to reach Dhahran or beyond. Conventional attacks on airfields and other measures that Iraq might apply are unlikely to disrupt U.S. and allied sorties by more than 10 to 20 percent--well short of the 80 percent needed for a successful seizure. Thus, for Iraq to take on the United States and its allies in a conventional battle would be a losing proposition... If Iraq cannot afford to create the military forces required to confront the United States directly, neither can other would-be adversaries of the United States in regional conflicts. *Those foes must reach for asymmetric responses.* NBC weapons--and especially chemical or biological ones (CBW)—would be candidates in such an asymmetrical confrontation with America's military might (emphasis added).³⁶

Thus in the event of a future conflict with Iraq, Iraqi use of unconventional weapons became not simply a possible or even likely condition based on historical experience or psychological insights into Iraqi leadership, but rather a necessity stemming from the asymmetries of military power. While this is certainly the logic that would be employed by the U. S. military if called upon to create battle plans from a position of weakness, it is uncertain if other states would exhibit a similar frame of reasoning. Such is the logic of capabilities based defense – since uncertainty prevents knowing why an adversary might act, threat assessments and military plans must be formulated in an environment dependent on calculations of capabilities. Within this organizational framework, conservative estimates of what an adversary could use determine defense posture, not more liberal and potentially disastrous judgments about why capabilities might be used. American military thinking on the issue of unconventional weapons and asymmetric threats thus began to demonstrate a type of self-sustaining logic, separated from historical or political calculations of adversarial motivation.³⁷

³⁶ Gregory F. Treverton and Bruce W. Bennett, 'Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense Planning', QDR Conference Proceedings, RAND Defense Issues, CF-132 (1997)

³⁷ DOD documents show a similar logic applied to scenarios involving conflict with North Korea. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates of North Korean military WMD potential are quickly correlated into battlefield plans assuming use of these weapons. For examples, see Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea Handbook, Washington, D.C., PC-2600-6421-94, 1994, p. 3-16; Department of Defense, 1995

It should not be surprising that a military organizational subunit responsible for warfighting plans would marginalize the norms of non-use of unconventional weapons³⁸, or even of the restraining power of deterrence. This type of logic is in many ways a simple demonstration of organizational responsibility – the cautious coupling of perceived threats with planned responses to protect U.S. forces and national interests. What is troubling for the issue of norms and practices of nonproliferation or deterrence is that a relative increase in U.S. military strength, by the logic of the military itself, would predict a weakening of precisely these norms. Thus, although the military was required to support these norms through its position within the larger foreign policy framework of the Clinton Administration, it simultaneously assumed that in certain highly asymmetric power relationships such norms would hold little binding value. Even such optimistic aims as “full spectrum dominance” or “total battlespace dominance” only served to further embed the perceived value of asymmetrical weapons and tactics by a ‘logical’ adversary.

Ironically, as the logic of military dominance and the resulting conceptual implication for proliferation threat construction became institutionalized, it fed into a form of cyclical logic directly opposite the original rationale of building capabilities that would dissuade potential adversaries from even developing such unconventional capabilities – the logic that the overwhelming and growing US military power would leave potential adversaries with *no choice* but to employ unconventional weapons in future conflict, as they would have no hopes of defeating the US military under normal conditions. Thus the original conception of CP as dissuading proliferation was ultimately transformed by organizational logic into rationale for why US military capabilities would now necessitate

Annual Report, Ch. 6 1995 CPRC pp. 11, 15 This sort of weakness by military strategists is not unique to the period in question. As Lawrence Freedman comments about many military strategists during the Cold War, “The scenarios they devised often managed to combine the most sophisticated technical analysis with the crudest psychological and political presumptions...” Lawrence Freedman, *Deterrence*, p. 16

³⁸ An excellent study of the evolution of the norm of non-use regarding nuclear and chemical weapons is Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, ‘Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo’, in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 114-152

proliferation, thus requiring further investment in CP capabilities and the development of associated doctrine.

Developing CP capabilities

If CP was indeed following a transformative and self-sustaining course of policy evolution, was it developing into the actual practices and capabilities argued by organizational scholars to represent meaningful institutionalization?³⁹ An examination of the first four years of CP funding reveals important functional development across the spectrum of identified CP mission areas, but especially in the areas of active defenses and counterforce capabilities. It was these two mission areas that were central to both altering available military force options for future policymakers, and presenting challenges to deterrence and NP norms and practices.

Active defenses

Active defenses are class of military capabilities designed to stop unconventional weapons delivered by ballistic or cruise missile once those weapons have been launched. Throughout the mid-90's, billions of dollars in defense appropriations were poured into active defense capabilities such as theater missile defense and advanced Patriot missiles.⁴⁰ Placing missile defenses forward in the field not only served the purpose of avoiding restrictions on the deployment of more comprehensive missile defensive systems imposed by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT), but also reflected embedding of the counterproliferation mission through the theater CINC's.⁴¹ It is not merely by nature

³⁹ Ibid, p. 45-48; for supporting arguments about the need for penetration of capabilities in support of newly legitimized conceptions in order for change to be lasting and meaningful, see Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 7

⁴⁰ Of the \$3.8 billion in DOD CP spending for FY 1996, nearly \$2.4 billion was spent on research and development for active missile defenses. See 1995 CPRC, p. 16; for later totals, see also CPRC Report to Congress, 1998, p. E-8

⁴¹ The policy guidelines for ensuring theater missile defense complied with the ABMT is set forth in, The White House, Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-17, 'U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty', December 11, 1993, NSArchives, PD01805; An analyst critical of early DOD thinking about theater missile defenses and the complications posed by the restrictions of the ABMT is Henry F. Cooper, 'Active Defenses to Help Counter Proliferation', in Peter L. Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and

of the perceived physical threat that the development of theater based missile defense was soon spread across land (Patriot-3)⁴², sea (Aegis cruiser)⁴³ and air (airborne laser)⁴⁴ based systems. By giving a piece of the now independently budgeted pie to all of the services, inter-service challenges to CP were largely circumvented and the fielding of actual capabilities enhancements was allowed to move forward.

The significant investment in missiles defenses across all operational platforms of the military marked a dramatic shift from earlier strategy of mutual deterrence, which had been a central response to the “underlying symmetry” of Cold War military capabilities between the superpowers.⁴⁵ The US military conception of deterrence in the post-Cold War was quickly evolving from this framework of mutual deterrence with a strong normative foundation in non-use, to a one-war deterrence relationship of overwhelming military might. More than purely reflective of the material capabilities of the US, this shift reflected a perception that the military stability of the Cold War had passed, and that the new threat environment faced by the United States required far greater freedom of action for American military forces. The lesson drawn by the DOD from the Gulf War and institutionalized in active defense capabilities was that of an unchallenged “total battlespace dominance” whereby the United States would remain the deterring power, and never the deterred.⁴⁶

Alan R. Van Tassel (ed.), *Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, *United States Air Force Institute for National Security Studies*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 193-215

⁴² Advocates of theater missile defense began pushing for forward deployed advanced Patriot systems in the immediate aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, see Malcolm Wallop (Member of Senate Armed Services Committee), ‘Patriots’ Point the Way’, *New York Times*, January 31, 1991, Sec. A, p. 23. See also Treverton and Bennett, ‘Integrating Counterproliferation into Defense Planning’

⁴³ Early naval anti-ballistic missile defense was conceptualized as the Navy Wide Area System – see Secretary of Defense, William J Perry, ‘Proliferation: Threat and Response’, DoD News Briefing, Thursday, April 11, 1996

⁴⁴ Reuters, ‘Boeing Group Wins Contract for Anti-Missile Laser’, *New York Times*, Nov 13, 1996; On the controversy over cost and potential violations of the ABMT, see William J. Broad, ‘Plan for Airborne Laser Is Attacked’, *New York Times*, Sept 30, 1997, sec. F, p. 1

⁴⁵ Freedman, *Deterrence*, p. 76

⁴⁶ The concept of “total battlespace dominance” is articulated in many defense documents that emerged in the 1990’s. See particularly, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, ‘Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield’, May-July 1996; Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Defense Science Board 1996 Summer Study Task Force on Tactics and Technology for 21st Century Military Superiority – Final Report’, October 1996; The White House, ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’, October 1998; and Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats, 19 October 1999

Though not reflecting a threat environment with significantly altered adversarial ballistic missile capabilities from that faced at the end of the Cold War, significant investment in active defense capabilities development and deployment reflected a military organization translating its very natural suspicion of normative barriers to weapons usage into something approaching a comprehensive new strategy of deterrence. Earlier principles of mutual restraint were being replaced by the principle of preparing to counter a far greater range of *potential* adversarial capabilities in order to ensure American military dominance into the foreseeable future. This new approach by the DOD indicated a functional mission plan of overlapping safeguards and redundant systems engineered to ensure a technological solution to the problem of proliferation, rather than the traditional reliance on deterrence strategies founded on mutual restraint and the strong norm of non-use.

Counterforce capabilities

Counterforce capabilities are designed to place high-value adversarial military assets at risk by enabling the destruction of such capabilities on the ground prior to use. Counterforce options incorporate both the identification and defeat of unconventional weapons, delivery systems, and production and storage facilities. As adversarial unconventional weapons systems and facilities are often hardened and / or deeply buried for survivability, counterforce capabilities include: the ability to track, identify and produce timely intelligence on unconventional targets; the ability to strike deep within adversarial territory with highly precise weaponry; and the ability to mitigate collateral damage by neutralizing or containing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons after target destruction. The application of counterforce capabilities can be through so-called standoff weapons such as cruise missiles or other long distance, precision weaponry, or through the utilization of special operations forces directly neutralizing threats or providing close-in actionable intelligence in support of deep strike capabilities.

Though representing a smaller budgetary allocation than active defenses, throughout the 1990's counterforce capabilities were highly prioritized by the joint combatant commands through the CPRC and given significant new funding.⁴⁷ Over the period from 1994-1998, counterforce capabilities such as "underground facilities defeat and collateral effects mitigation" were funded on the order of several hundred million dollars per year, while special operations capabilities, training exercises and readiness brought in close to \$100 M per year.⁴⁸ Combined with a number of other operations, training and mission planning outlays, CP counterforce capabilities received significant budgeting and doctrinal attention even immediately following the supposed sidelining of CP policy within the DOD.

The original rationale for counterforce capabilities as articulated in the DCI was to "devalue" unconventional weapons development and deployment by potential adversaries by creating the capability to identify and defeat such weapons or weapons programs. Supposedly, potential adversaries would recognize overwhelming American military superiority and choose not to waste the significant time and resources in pursuing such programs that could be easily destroyed by the US military. In practice, such high-minded assumptions of adversarial acquiescence to American military superiority failed to generate the intended outcomes. Although American intelligence on the status of likely adversarial unconventional capabilities and production was incomplete at best, the little intelligence that did emerge indicated heightened efforts by states like North Korea to direct more resources toward concealment and facilities hardening.⁴⁹

Not incidentally, the same counterforce capabilities that were assumed to hold the highest value in dissuading states from developing unconventional weapons were also the

⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion of initial funding outlays for counterforce capabilities, see Office of the Secretary of Defense, 'Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Activities and Programs', May 1994, DOD OFOISR 00018-CDR-1/752.PDF, see also Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, 'Counterproliferation Support Program: FY95 Project Overview', 10 December 1994, DOD OFOISR 00018-CDR-1/754.PDF

⁴⁸ See CPRC reports, 1994-1998

⁴⁹ For a detailed account of North Korean efforts at nuclear weapons development and concealment efforts, see William M. Drennan, 'Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who's Coercing Whom?' in Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.), The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, (Washington DC: The United States Institute of Peace, 2003), pp. 157-223

capabilities that held the highest military utility for potential “roll back” of adversarial capabilities. Any credible offensive operations targeting unconventional weapons facilities or delivery vehicles would require the same combination of actionable intelligence and powerful precision strike capabilities now receiving extensive annual funding. Improving offensive capabilities targeted at unconventional weapons would be a potent doctrinal tool in addressing proliferation threats, but one whose utility might be perceived as higher were action to be taken preventatively, rather than in response to adversarial initiation of conflict. For military professionals socialized into a culture assuming the inevitability of conflict, and valuing the greater predictability of offensive operations, the development of effective counterforce capabilities would place counterforce options at the top of any decisions to use force to limit the spread or military utility of unconventional weapons.⁵⁰

The funding priorities of active defenses and counterforce capabilities from 1994 onwards marked an important shift in DOD CP policy goals away from direct support for NP policy through such capabilities as intelligence collection, to those providing enhanced capabilities for U.S. forces in combat. The ordering of funding priorities for DOD CP programs that remained remarkably consistent throughout the 1990’s represented the active involvement of the commanders in chief of the unified commands (CINC’s) in the process of prioritizing the likely roles and missions their forces would undertake in future warfare scenarios. The doorway for the offensive application of force was reopened through the devolution of CP planning from the civilian leadership to the combat commands. Then the military preference for the overwhelming application of force, as well as focus on the issues involved in the application of force, rather than the political ramifications of military force, defined the institutionalization and subsequent evolution of CP policy within the DOD.

Although CP capabilities were justified as an extension of the stated goal of providing implicit support for NP regimes by demonstrating unconventional weapons possession or

⁵⁰ Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive; and Sagan, ‘The Origins of Military Doctrine and Command and Control Systems,’ pp. 18-23

usage by regional powers would not deter U.S. military action, the funding priorities clearly indicate that whatever support CP policy might provide to nonproliferation policy was secondary to the organizational necessity to equip and prepare U.S. forces to fight in conditions anticipated on future battlefields.⁵¹

If the core of new CP capabilities held strong offensive potential, did this translate into corresponding doctrinal or conceptual decisions to support such an offensive reorientation of CP policy? In other words, if organizational theory would posit that the embedding of policy planning and development of CP within the functional units of the military would result in offensive transformation of the policy, can support for such a proposition be found in the resulting doctrine to emerge from the DOD?

Emergence of an offensive CP Policy from the DOD

A number of CP policy documents from this period remain classified, however, an important directive on CP implementation, declassified as a result of research efforts for this thesis, strongly supports the proposition that embedding of planning and development of CP within the functional units of the military resulted in offensive transformation of the policy.⁵² The document also sheds light on the evolution of CP in the hands of the military resulting from bottom-up institutionalization. Issued less than three years after the formal bureaucratic limitations placed on CP by the Poneman Memo, the CP Implementation Directive of July 1996 shows important changes in CP's relationship to NP, the expansion of the scope of CP responsibilities, and the important introduction of new offensively oriented military elements to the policy.

⁵¹ The DOD succinctly justified the funding priorities in the 1996 CPRC report, "Considering the complexities of facing an adversary armed with WMD, the CPRC places a high priority on proliferation prevention activities. Realizing, however, that efforts to halt the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery may not be entirely successful, DoD must prepare U.S. armed forces to fight, survive, and prevail in any conflict involving the use of NBC weapons by an adversary." CPRC 96, p. 2

⁵² Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISP), Department of Defense Directive Number 2060.2, 'Department of Defense Counterproliferation (CP) Implementation', July 9, 1996, personal collection of author; it is worthwhile to note that even in 1996, the DOD directive refers only to NBC (nuclear, chemical and biological) weapons, and includes no reference to the term "WMD".

Although retaining essential elements of the NSC definition of CP, in the implementation directive special emphasis is placed on the activities of the DOD, “across the full range of U.S. Government efforts to COMBAT proliferation, including the application of military power to protect U.S. Forces and interests”⁵³ Here the role of combat as commonly understood in the military is given first priority over the diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analysis roles emphasized by the Poneman Memo. Special emphasis is placed on DOD efforts to expand beyond mere assistance in preventing proliferation from occurring, but to “roll back proliferation where it has occurred.” Though the nature of such roll back operations are not directly elaborated in the document, in addition to tasking the individual services and regional combat commands to develop their own CP plans, particular mention is made of authorizing the U.S. Commander-in-Chief for Special Operations to prepare U.S. special operations forces to “conduct missions in support of U.S. Government CP objectives.”⁵⁴

On balance, the directive on CP implementation is largely reflective of the concerns of warfighting commands in dealing with the effective application of military force against unconventional weapons targets, and in proactive efforts to combat proliferation with military force. This document does not concern itself with maintaining conceptual consistency with existing policy or normative beliefs about appropriate responses to proliferation. Much of this seems to confirm critics’ fears about the challenge CP would present to NP norms and practices, with a strong redefinition of CP as a military alternative to NP focused on the application of military force.⁵⁵ The concept of “roll back” harkened back to the early days of the Cold War with preemptive and preventative thinking as old as nuclear weapons themselves.⁵⁶ Combined, these factors indicate a drift of CP policy once in hands of the warfighting commands towards a distinct class of military action directed at the ability of the DOD to exercise the proactive, potentially offensive (not to mention preventative or preemptive) application of military force outside of the multilateral framework of the NP regime.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 3

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 7

⁵⁵ Müller and Reiss, ‘Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles’, pp. 139-150; Leonard S. Spector, ‘Neo-Nonproliferation’, *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85

⁵⁶ Sagan, ‘Perils of Proliferation’, p. 74

The following illustration sets out the interlocking levels of the first comprehensive DOD counterproliferation “policy” as envisioned by DOD planners:




Fig. 1 – The “multi-tiered” DOD counterproliferation plan as presented in the 1995 CRPC report⁵⁷

This multi-tiered approach should not be interpreted as a prioritization of approaches, or even ordering of approaches encountered through the course of conflict. Though presented as a type of timeline of DOD CP capabilities employed in a hypothetical conflict, there is no reason why any particular stage would, by necessity, follow another. The necessity of utilizing active defense capabilities in the event of a surprise attack by unconventionally armed ballistic missiles or cruise missiles could be the trigger for conflict. Alternately, the decision to use counterforce capabilities such as precision deep-strike attacks on hard or deeply buried targets could be made preemptively in an effort to prevent unconventional weapons being used by a potential adversary as the initiator of conflict, or preventatively outside the context of imminent conflict to forcibly “roll back”

⁵⁷ CPKC 95, p. 5

emerging adversarial capabilities. Such decisions would not be made by combat commanders, but rather by policy makers seeking solutions to future strategic dilemmas. Developing effective capabilities in these areas, or even the perception of effective capabilities in these areas could dramatically alter the menu of choice for future policymakers.

The capabilities driven evolution of CP within the DOD served to quietly raise the potential for significant challenges to the norms and practices of NP policy in a number of areas. Firstly, the development of a CP doctrine expressed a very public lack of confidence in the norm of nonproliferation and the enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime to stop proliferation where it counted most. Though perfectly reasonable from a pragmatic military planning perspective, the emphasis on active defense and counterforce capabilities did not support broader US policy statements expressing confidence in the enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime and US leadership in strengthening the norm of nonproliferation.⁵⁸

Secondly, substantial counterforce capability held the potential to shift the mandate for acting against proliferators from multilateral institutions wielding political and economic leverage, to the United States government wielding unilateral military force.

Furthermore, in such a scenario the United States would be placed in the position of choosing which proliferators to counter. Certainly from the US perspective, states like India raised far fewer proliferation concerns than states like Iraq and North Korea, thus presenting the United States as unilaterally selecting between good and bad proliferators contrary to the longstanding non-discriminatory norm of NP. Leveraging active defense and counterforce capabilities for such purposes would effectively place the United States in the position long feared by critics of CP as “global judge, jury and executioner” on unconventional weapons.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Anthony Lake, ‘A Year of Decision: arms control and nonproliferation in 1995’, *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Winter, 1995), pp. 55-59

⁵⁹ For the best collection of such critiques, see the collected volume in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (eds.), *International Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995)

Finally, if the United States actively pursued a preemptive or preventative CP policy of proliferation “roll back” by means of counterforce capabilities, such actions would run the substantial risk of military escalation. Once such capabilities were integrated into the force posture and practices of the US military, decisions on the use of such force would be in the hands of future policymakers who might be emboldened to take greater risks in pursuing the goal of roll back.

The significant conclusion to be drawn from this period of policy evolution is that the institutionalization of CP policy within the functional units of the organization had resulted in a transformation of the DOD conception of the threat posed by proliferation, and a transformation in the organizational capacity to meet the threats it had identified. Though this policy evolution did not in itself guarantee any specific resultant military actions, the institutionalization of CP into organizational capabilities, threat conceptions, training and learning processes significantly altered the options available to future policymakers, and shifted the central emphasis of CP policy. No longer limited to modest defensive measures intended to protect US forces, CP was now steadily progressing towards a comprehensive set of operational capabilities intended to allow policymakers to decisively alter the strategic threat posed by unconventional weapons proliferation. By ostensibly offering policymakers the potential to unilaterally prevent or roll back existing proliferation with military force, CP now represented a decisive break from traditional NP norms and deterrent practices, further opening the door for the preventative or preemptive application of force.

Conclusions

How does organizational theory serve to offer the best explanation of CP policy evolution during this period? Again, the most likely alternative approach would be to explain both the demise and resurgence of CP through the lens of a bureaucratic politics model. As discussed earlier in the chapter, bureaucratic politics serves as a rather compelling framework through which to explain the initial resistance and apparent demise of the DCI, as powerful competing bureaucratic interests constrained the initiative from

without, while threatened parochial interests constrained the initiative from within. The lack of skill displayed by then Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, in navigating turbulent bureaucratic waters largely resulted in an initiative at the mercy of the competing bureaucratic forces intent on constraining or doing away with it.

As for the resurgence of CP within the DOD through the 1990's, a bureaucratic politics model would likely explain renewed interest and strength largely through the mechanism of budgetary incentive. In this explanation, the ability of later Defense officials in securing funding for areas such as missile defense mitigated constraining parochial interests within the DOD, while a heightened skill in negotiating compromises on issues of policy "turf encroachment" with competing bureaucracies accounts for diminished resistance from outside the DOD. In this bureaucratic politics account, CP serves largely as a vehicle for increased defense spending, but without any significant challenge to existing NP policy or the interests associated with the execution of such policy.

Compelling though such an explanation might be on the surface, it presents a number of dilemmas to the analyst seeking to reconcile the claims of such an explanation with the documentary evidence available. Firstly, are the numerous policy planning, budgeting and implementation documents assumed to be part of some elaborate shell game of disguising limited parochial interests, rather than representative of meaningful institutionalization? Second, if CP capabilities were only intended to allay parochial interests, then how to account for the particular capabilities funded and integrated into the training and operational preparedness of functional units of the military? Also, how to account for the capabilities development priorities identified by joint regional warfighting commands, rather than by the individual services themselves? Finally, should it be assumed that the challenge CP ultimately presented to NP and deterrence was the accidental by-product of the promotion of parochial interests through broad-based defense spending, rather than representative of serious attempts to prepare US military forces to face organizationally identified strategic threats?

An organizational theory perspective with a focus on culturally derived biases, preferences and practices, allows a connection to be made between the documentary evidence and the broader process of policy institutionalization revealed by significant investments in new capabilities, practices and conceptions. Institutionalization was important in changing organizational practices and capabilities, but also in accounting for why such efforts proved successful. Such efforts escaped external resistance because they did not present immediate public challenges to other bureaucracies, but turned quietly inward, leveraging the decisionmaking structure of the functional units of the organization itself to promote shaping and adoption of the initiative. This bottom-up approach, focused on the needs of warfighters, also drove significant capabilities development and changes to organizational practices like training and force posturing that both altered the menu of choice for future policymakers, but also presented unintended normative challenges to NP and deterrence.

The institutionalization of doctrine does not occur as an automatic rational response by the organization to external stimuli, but rather as the result of ideas operationalized by organizational leaders. However, as the response to the DCI demonstrates, the transformation of ideas to doctrine is not a function of the will of organizational leaders, but rather of the skill of organizational leaders in tailoring ideas to fit within the structure, culture and political interests of the organization. Doctrine can be imposed on military organizations, but institutionalization is unlikely to occur unless doctrine compliments existing organizational preferences and significant organizational members perceive the doctrine to reduce political and environmental uncertainty. If a new doctrine fulfils these conditions, then absent strong civilian influence to the contrary, it will likely displace existing normative practices that are not perceived to fulfill these conditions.

The institutionalization of CP required far more than the announcement of policy objectives, and the acceptance of those objectives by functional units of the organization. The strategy-doctrine cycle by its very nature, and especially high tech capabilities development or employment, leads to delayed institutionalization of doctrine to match

strategic conceptions.⁶⁰ Even attempting to assimilate a new piece of high tech equipment “off the shelf” often leads to long organizational delays between decision and deployment, as such adoption involves coordination with force posturing plans, training, logistical support and any number of other complex issues which routinely set time delays on capabilities adoption.⁶¹ In the case of CP, acknowledgement in the directive that CP would be “established as a mainstream DOD mission area” by 2001, presented both a realistic time-frame for institutionalization, and also raised the issue that an initiative well on its way to implementation would be difficult for civilian policymakers to stop without strong cause and the expenditure of considerable political capital.

The following chapter will examine the political conditions and strategic cultural debates that resulted in weak civilian control of the military in restraining its tendency to develop an offensive CP doctrine. The security discourse in the US Congress will be of particular interest, as it was such process of sustained argumentation and political communications that conferred a broad legitimacy on CP conceptions emerging from the DOD, ultimately elevating them from military contingency plans to national policy.

⁶⁰ Chris C. Demchak, ‘Complexity and a Midrange Theory of Networked Militaries’, In Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds.), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology, (New York: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2002), p. 128

⁶¹ Interview with Ronald M. Sega, July 10, 2005

Chapter 5

Strategic Culture: 1993-99

“Intellectual tendencies, like broad social movements, are often made possible by the existence of a common enemy.”

- James Q. Wilson¹

The Clinton Administration arrived in office clearly voicing its support of the nonproliferation regime, and indicating an unprecedented willingness to position America as a global leader in the promotion of NP norms. From the stated goal of supporting an indefinite extension of the NPT to a desire to take a leadership role in pressing for ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Administration's response to proliferation threats was founded on a policy supportive of global nonproliferation norms exercised through multilateral institutions. Even the announcement of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative was followed by reassurances to international critics that the initiative was intended only to provide protection to US forces on the battlefield, and was a secondary supporting measure to a broader diplomatic, political and economic based nonproliferation policy.

Yet by 1999, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had failed to garner sufficient votes in the Senate for ratification, sinking hopes for further expansion of global nonproliferation norms and raising suspicions that the United States was preparing to contradict its NPT agreements by developing new classes of nuclear weapons. In a further setback for supporters of NP norms, the Clinton Administration affected a turnaround in its long held support for the ABM Treaty by signing into law the 1999 National Missile Defense Act. In six short years, the Clinton Administration had borne witness to a dramatic expansion of counterproliferation capabilities, especially in the controversial areas of active

¹ Forward comments by James Q. Wilson, in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), p. x

defenses and counterforce capabilities, while a concurrent erosion of nonproliferation norms and multilateral institutions had taken place.

Why did attitudes towards proliferation threats and policy responses shift so dramatically during this time period? This chapter argues that a crucial determinate of policy outcomes were conservative strategic culture assumptions and preferences informed by neoconservative strategic thought and empowered by a highly coordinated and focused Republican Party machinery of policy promotion. Conservatives in power were highly effective at promoting their strategic culture preferences, forcing compromises from an Administration struggling to defend its domestic agenda. When later proliferation events occurred, such as the testing of North Korean ballistic missiles over Japan, and the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, ‘solutions’ were already in place for the strategic problems that presented themselves in dramatic public fashion, further weakening opposition to conservative strategic cultural policy preferences. By the end of 1999, the political defeats and compromises made by the Clinton Administration left counterproliferation considerably strengthened in both material capability and policy prominence, while nonproliferation norms and practices were significantly weakened.

This chapter examines the discursive currency of proliferation threats in the form of “WMD” and “rogue regimes” that was effectively adopted by a Republican Party seeking to establish a cohesive party platform before the 1994 mid-term elections. The transformation of political conceptions of the threats posed by proliferation had begun with an uncoordinated, nonpartisan series of efforts to achieve short-term political leverage. They continued under the Clinton Administration with a series of highly coordinated, partisan efforts to achieve long-term political advantage in order to transform conservative strategic culture assumptions and preferences into policy outcomes. This newly reformulated Party platform constituted a strong challenge to the bearers of liberal strategic culture for establishing ‘legitimate’ interpretations of the international security environment and maintaining ‘valid’ forms of discourse on policy responses to strategic threats. Such highly limiting construction of discursive space

presented a fundamental challenge for legitimate representation of American foreign policy approaches to the problem of proliferation.

Liberal strategic culture during the Clinton Administration

Bill Clinton was elected President with not only an uncertain political mandate, but also little in the way of a honeymoon period for his Administration. Although Clinton comfortably defeated incumbent George Bush, an unusually strong showing by third party candidate Ross Perot with 19% of the popular vote left Clinton winning with only 43%. Exit polls showed that although there was strong dissatisfaction with President Bush, there was also a lack of voter confidence in the other candidates, including Clinton.² Even more politically troubling was that long before the election, Clinton had engendered a more ferocious and personal level of political attacks than was traditional in American politics.³ Once in office, a series of early turnarounds on campaign issues and administration nominations underscored the uncertain mandate that brought him to victory, but more importantly, gave the impression to a more cohesively activist Republican Party that the Administration might fold on issues when met with stiff resistance.⁴ This perception would lead to a troubling number of political stalemates, and ultimately to a number of significant policy compromises made by an administration seeking to keep key policies from its domestic agenda alive.

The Clinton Administration's initial approach to foreign policy focused on a liberal internationalism that posited 'democratic enlargement' for a goal and 'assertive multilateralism' as a successor to the Cold War strategy of containment.⁵ The nascent

² Robin Toner, 'The 1992 Elections: President – The Overview; Clinton Captures Presidency With Huge Electoral Margin; Wins a Democratic Congress', *New York Times*, November 4, 1992, sec. A, p. 1; see also R.W. Apple, 'The 1992 Elections: President-Elect – The Overview; Clinton, Savoring Victory, Starts Sizing Up Job Ahead', *New York Times*, November 5, 1992, sec. A, p. 1

³ For an insightful analysis of the domestic political and cultural factors that coalesced to form an unusually strong, widespread and personal antipathy from conservatives against Clinton and his wife, see David Halberstam, *War in a time of peace: Bush, Clinton, and the Generals*, (New York, NY: Scribner, 2001), pp. 209-211

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 211

⁵ James M. McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wasdworth, 2005), p. 186

strategy, with its emphasis on economic engagement, envisioned an international security environment potentially much less prone to conflict, assumed variable-sum relations as the norm, and imagined a reduced centrality of military force in addressing threats.⁶ The strong emphasis placed on economic engagement led to an unexpected amount of early political capital being expended on keystone policy priorities such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the negotiation and approval of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994.⁷

The Clinton Administration's initial approach to nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy also reflected liberal strategic cultural assumptions about the nature of the international security environment and preferences regarding appropriate policy instruments and approaches to address potential security threats. Many of these assumptions and preferences, particularly in the area of proliferation concerns, were continuations of longstanding U.S. policy that placed a strong emphasis on support for the NP regime and NP norms, yet with liberal strategic culture assumptions even more explicitly stated in policy documents than in previous administrations.⁸ How such strategic culture assumptions were translated into policy preferences can be illustrated through a brief examination of the administration's early documents and public statements on nonproliferation policy, ballistic missile defenses, the 1995 extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and efforts to establish a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

Nonproliferation Policy

The earliest Clinton Administration document detailing U.S. nonproliferation policy advocated continued reliance on export control strategies and measures intended to

⁶ Facing strong domestic political resistance and a complex series of international crises and conflicts, the approach was quickly abandoned in favor of 'selective engagement' that sought to use limited American military force to alleviate international humanitarian crises and address ethnic conflict. See Richard N. Haass, 'The Squandered Presidency: Demanding More from the Commander in Chief, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2000

⁷ McCormick, *American Foreign Policy and Process*, pp. 182-184

⁸ For more on the institutionalization of such policy approaches prior to the Clinton Administration, see Emanuel Adler, 'Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security: A Thirty-Year Retrospective and a New Set of Anticipations', *Daedalus* 120, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 1-20

bolster the legitimacy of nonproliferation norms.⁹ Central emphasis was placed on confidence-building measures to encourage restraint at the regional level, and the strengthening of existing NP regime enforcement mechanisms such as IAEA safeguards and inspections. The document called for US leadership in ratifying the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) despite domestic conservative opposition that such a role would not require other nations (primarily Russia) to first abandon their chemical weapons programs before US ratification.¹⁰ The document reveals an NP policy position that reflected an Administration with no desire to challenge the institutionalization of Cold War arms control mechanisms, and overwhelmingly accepting of the concept of mutually engendered restraint through support for multilateral institutions and negotiated normative agreements.

Supporting this institutional, norm-based approach to nonproliferation was a minimized military role in supporting nonproliferation policy that predicted the eventual NSC resolution of the counterproliferation definition controversy in the Poneman Memo.¹¹ Despite the publicity given to the later unveiling of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative (DCI), administration thinking at this point clearly envisioned military force as a minor subservient support to existing NP policy, rather than a competing set of militarily oriented policy options.¹² Finally, the document attempted to integrate NP policy with the larger administration strategy of economic engagement, ‘To strengthen U.S. economic growth, democratization abroad and international stability, we actively seek expanded trade and technology exchange with nations, including former adversaries, that abide by global nonproliferation norms.’¹³

⁹ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy’, September 27, 1993, NSArchives PR01804

¹⁰ This particular issue was an early point of contention with conservatives opposed to the Clinton Administration’s nonproliferation policy, though one that was eventually passed by U.S. Senate in 1997. Interview with Frank Gaffney, President, Center for Security Policy and founding member of the Project for the New American Century, (former Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy 1988-89), July 7, 2005. See also, Center for Security Policy Congressional Scorecards: <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Home.aspx?SID=56&CategoryID=56&SubCategoryID=88&NewsID=11576>, (Accessed July 10, 2005)

¹¹ See previous chapter

¹² The White House, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy’, September 27, 1993

¹³ Ibid.

The Clinton Administration was eager to give limited support to theater missile defenses (TMD); battlefield defenses against medium-range weapons such as the Iraqi SCUD missiles faced by the United States in the Gulf War. However, the Administration was also clearly dedicated to what it saw as the leadership role of the US in promoting and defending NP norms, confidence-building measures and mutual restraint. Hence, a position emerged in which TMD would eventually be fielded, but the technology required for national missile defense (NMD) was given a distant second priority¹⁴, and maintained “as a technology research and development program” so as to adhere to the traditional, or ‘narrow’, interpretation of the ABM Treaty.¹⁵ Such a ‘narrow’ definition of the ABM Treaty was intended to work as a confidence-building measure in support of U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations by precluding either party from developing effective defenses against the type of long-range ballistic missiles both states had developed as the backbone for mutual deterrence.¹⁶ Furthermore, the administration sought to expand its self-identified leadership role in promoting NP norms by attempting to ‘multilateralize’ the ABM Treaty by giving former Soviet states the option to become parties to the treaty.¹⁷

¹⁴ Such ‘TMD first’ priority was set forth in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review under Les Aspin. See also, Russ Shaver, ‘Priorities For Ballistic Missile Defense’, in Paul K. Davis (ed.), New Challenges For Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), pp. 251-300

¹⁵ The White House, Presidential Decision Directive / NSC-17, ‘U.S. Policy on Ballistic Missile Defenses and the Future of the ABM Treaty’, December 11, 1993, NSArchives PR01805

¹⁶ The ABM Treaty had allowed for the US and Russia to establish one ballistic missile defense site with a maximum of 100 interceptors. The interception limits argued by Clinton Administration officials seeking to clarify the ABM Treaty were on missiles with a maximum range of 3,500km and reentry speeds of 5km/sec, compared with long-range ballistic missiles with ranges of approximately 10,000km and reentry speeds of 7km/sec. See Lisbeth Gronlund, George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol, and David Wright, ‘Highly Capable Theater Missile Defenses and the ABM Treaty’, *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 24, No. 3, (April, 1994), pp. 3-8; see also Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security, (Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1990); Dean Wilkening, ‘Amending the ABM Treaty’, *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1, (January 2000), pp. 29-45; and John Deutch, Harold Brown and John P. White, ‘National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?’, *Foreign Policy*, No. 119, (Summer 2000), pp. 91-100

¹⁷ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy’, September 27, 1993, NSArchives PR01804; see also, William J. Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, ‘Joint Statement on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Security’, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, September 29, 1994, p. 1660

Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference

Most explicit in supporting a liberal strategic culture position on proliferation issues was the Clinton Administration's stated intention to support indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995.¹⁸ Despite the continued proliferation problems presented by North Korea and Iraq, the Clinton Administration remained committed to a relatively traditional nonproliferation policy approach that focused on strengthening the enforcement mechanisms of the NP regime, and placed continuing emphasis on NP norm promotion and leadership. CP was seen as a public demonstration of focus on the threats posed by the proliferation of unconventional weapons, but largely a symbolic one that initially allowed for little more than military force protection measures in a poorly defined (and bureaucratically contested) NP policy support role.

To underline the importance of multilateral cooperation as the best approach to the problem of proliferation, the Clinton Administration strove to publicly downplay the importance of counterproliferation, and voice public support for the NPT and nonproliferation regime in advance of the 1995 NPT extension conference. In a 1995 article in the *Nonproliferation Review*, assistant to President Clinton for National Security Affairs, Anthony Lake, clearly and emphatically laid out the administration's support for the institutional framework of the NPT when he claimed that, "...the NPT is not only the cornerstone of our strategy to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation but also the foundation of our efforts to prevent proliferation of all other weapons of mass destruction. Remove it and the architecture collapses."¹⁹ In further distancing the administration from charges that the Administration had sought to unilaterally undermine the NPT through the establishment counterproliferation²⁰, Lake concluded that, "...we

¹⁸ William J. Clinton and Boris Yeltsin, 'Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery', *Public Papers of the Presidents*, January 14, 1994, pp. 71-73

¹⁹ Anthony Lake, 'A Year of Decision: arms control and nonproliferation in 1995', *The Nonproliferation Review*, (Winter, 1995), p. 58

²⁰ For academic criticism of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, see Leonard S. Spector, 'Neo-Nonproliferation', *Survival*, Vol. 37, No. 1, (Spring 1995), pp. 66-85, and Harald Müller and Mitchell Reiss, 'Counterproliferation: Putting New Wine into Old Bottles', in Brad Roberts (ed.), *Weapons Proliferation in the 1990's*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 139-150; David Fischer, 'Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?', in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), *International*

can work to create a world where nations depend on commitments – to each other and to their own people – no less than on arms.”²¹

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

Central to successful negotiation of the indefinite extension of the NPT, was ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Continuing its leadership in promoting the norms of the NP regime, the Clinton Administration dropped the long-standing U.S. position that the CTBT must include an automatic escape clause permitting states to withdraw from the treaty after 10 years. Despite the arguments made by Pentagon officials and Republican lawmakers that such a clause was necessary to ensure the reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, the administration accepted the possibility of a permanent CTBT because, “senior decision-makers became convinced that the U.S. position was considered illegitimate by non-nuclear NPT members, due to the Article IV commitment to eventual disarmament, and might thereby jeopardize the effort to negotiate a permanent extension of the NPT treaty.”²²

The Administration sought to clearly link the issue of leadership on NP norms and the legitimacy of NP enforcement mechanisms in public statements, such as one made by President Clinton to West Point graduates in 1993, ‘We will soon begin negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty which will increase our political leverage to combat this

Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), p. 21; and Benjamin Sanders, ‘Counterproliferation: How Does it Play on the International Stage?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller (ed.), International Perspectives on Counterproliferation, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 1-10. Such strong initial resistance promoted Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, Ashton B. Carter to state, “Let me also be clear that our counterproliferation capabilities are being devised for winning MRC’s (Major Regional Contingencies), not for pre-emptive attack on proliferators, as some academics have speculated.” See Ashton B. Carter, ‘Counterproliferation Initiative: Managing Three Crises’, Defense Issues, Vol. 11, No. 63 (June, 1996), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1996/s19960523-carter.html> (Accessed - 15 July, 2003)

²¹ Anthony Lake, ‘A Year of Decision’, p. 59

²² Scott D. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, (Winter, 1996-1997), p. 80. See also, Douglas Jehl, ‘U.S. in New Pledge on Atom Bomb Test Ban’, New York Times, January 31, 1995, p. 1; Dunbar Lockwood, ‘U.S. Drops ‘Early Out’ Plan; Test Moratorium May Be Permanent,’ Arms Control Today, Vol. 25, No. 2, (March 1995), p. 27

proliferation.’²³ Two years later, Clinton sought to move from rhetoric on NP norm leadership to action, moving to end deadlock in CTBT negotiations by becoming the first U.S. president to call for a total ban on U.S. nuclear weapons testing of all sizes before a CTBT entered into force.²⁴

Unfortunately for the Clinton Administration, not all high level policy makers and influential commentators agreed that leadership in promoting NP norms was the appropriate pathway to addressing proliferation threats. Many opposition figures began to argue that some of the supposed norms central to the legitimacy of the NP regime were in fact little more than Cold War constructs that had not merely lost their relevance in the post-Cold War security environment, but actually served to undermine US national security. Thus the Administration experienced a strong resistance in some quarters to its positions supporting traditional NP policy.

The Clinton Administration’s strategic culture derived preferences for proliferation policy were very clear from the outset, but its policies in support of such preferences were ultimately short lived. The administration faced strong opposition from the emergence of a politically cohesive strategic culture force in the Republican Party, a group that would challenge not merely individual policy prescriptions, but the underlying assumptions that drove policy preferences as well. This opposition would serve to force policy compromises, hand the Administration stinging policy defeats, and by directly manipulating organizational oversight in the form of budgets, weaken the Administration’s control over future military capabilities. Driven first by intellectuals grappling with a conservative position that could serve to generate strategic preferences in the absence of a major adversary, the movement would serve to inform policy makers brought into power by a revitalized and highly organized Republican Party. Republicans would arrive into power with an unprecedented understanding of the importance of

²³ William J. Clinton, ‘Remarks at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York’, *Public Papers of the Presidents*, May 29, 1993, p. 782

²⁴ Steven Greenhouse, ‘President Urges a Permanent Ban on All Atom Tests’, *New York Times*, August 12, 1995, sec. 1, p. 1

language in shaping the terms of the discourse, and a newfound appreciation for the centrality of ideas and culture in both identifying threats and generating policy responses.

Before examining in detail the conservative legislative challenges to Clinton Administration nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy, some ideational and cultural background for the conservative movement at the time will need to be examined. Conservative strategic culture, its assumptions and subsequent policy preferences did not arise in a vacuum. The following section argues for the relevance of neoconservatives not simply because they represent the extreme end of conservative strategic culture, but more importantly because they played an important role in informing and influencing the broader conservative movement through their philosophical emphasis on culture and general ideological determinism. It is these sets of assumptions about the international security environment and the utility of force that helped the larger conservative movement navigate a post-Cold War strategic culture between a conservative realism robbed of its relevance by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and a conservative isolationism bereft of an ability to provide meaningful alternatives to a conception of the purpose of American power as provided by liberal activist foreign policy. Into the vacuum of orienting ideas and assumptions about the nature of the post-Cold War security environment stepped the neoconservatives, revitalizing a conservative movement grappling with a paralyzing dissatisfaction and loss of faith in established organizing principles.

Neoconservatism

“American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony.”

- Robert Kagan²⁵

Although the direct influence of neoconservatives on US FP has been generally overstated²⁶, neoconservative arguments have undoubtedly informed and at times

²⁵ Robert Kagan, ‘Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996

supported those made by high-level policy makers. The relevance of neoconservatism was *not* necessarily in its direct impact in determining policy outcomes, but rather on how its concepts and proponents informed the terms of debate for a certain section of conservative, high-level policy makers at the extreme end of a conservative strategic culture.²⁷ Examining the boundaries of strategic culture as imagined by this group exposes an alternative conception of the international security environment and America's place within that environment. Neoconservatives presented a set of foreign policy conceptions at odds with those held by the leading policy makers of the Clinton Administration and many Democratic legislators, and also articulated the outer limits of a conservative vision of American foreign policy as advocated by many Republican lawmakers and future Bush Administration policy makers. Though all Republicans were certainly not neoconservatives, there was ultimately far more overlap and cross-pollination of ideas between neoconservatives and the broader conservative movement than fundamental divergence and philosophical opposition.

This section will examine an alternate conception of identity, responsibility and power that generates assumptions about the international security environment and the use of force that in turn generates preferences about policy responses. These self-supporting preference sets have implications for civilian control of military organizations that can strongly impact the development of military capabilities and hence the organizational policy options created by the development of such capabilities. Furthermore, the degree of civilian direction over the development of military doctrine strongly impacts the subsequent understanding of a military organization's 'mission', and leads to policy

²⁶ Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); see also Joshua Muravchik, 'The Neoconservative Cabal', *Commentary*, September 2003, pp. 26-34

²⁷ An excellent history of the development of neoconservative thought is Mark Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision: From the Cold War to the Culture Wars, (New York, NY: Madison, 1996). For neoconservatives in their own words, see Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), and Irving Kristol, Neoconservatism: Autobiography of an Idea, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995); An important journalistic account of some prominent neoconservatives in power (and their policy differences with other conservatives) can be found in James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet, (New York, NY: Penguin Group, 2004).

options that may deviate from existing normative practices through the pursuit of organizational efficiency and uncertainty avoidance.

Neoconservative history and identity

The neoconservatives began as a small group of liberal intellectuals who later, through their disenchantment with the American Left, adopted many positions on foreign and domestic issues that were traditionally identified with conservatives.²⁸ The label 'neoconservative' was not one of their own making, but one placed on them by their liberal critics in the 60's and 70's. The label itself was initially rather misleading, as most 'neoconservatives' would have preferred the term liberals, had the label not been. In their view, thoroughly co-opted and distorted by the American left's accepting stance towards Communism and neglect of traditional Judeo-Christian morality from discussions of the common good.²⁹

Many later neoconservatives would come to argue that, although a neoconservative credo was difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively articulate, there are a number of philosophical assumptions that nonetheless roughly unite its adherents. Neoconservative thought springs in large part from a Judeo-Christian morality, with the identification of both social order and personal liberty as flowing from the 'politics of liberty and the sociology of virtue.'³⁰ Such a 'sociology of virtue', alternately known as the 'republican virtue tradition', is an intellectual tradition dating back to the colonial origins of the United States. It stresses that "political liberty requires the moral foundation of a virtuous citizenry; that political virtue includes both the capacity for association and an active concern for the common good; and that these virtues are, in turn, nurtured by

²⁸ Such as their general support of free market capitalism, opposition to affirmative action and views on the importance of religious morality for ensuring social order. The claim that neoconservatives are or were largely comprised of Jewish-American former Trotskyites has been refuted by a number of leading neoconservatives who state that the only significant neoconservative to ever embrace Trotskyism was Irving Kristol, albeit during his student years in the late 1930's. See Muravchik, 'The Neoconservative Cabal', p. 28

²⁹ Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision*, pp. 8, 9

³⁰ William Kristol, 'The Politics of Liberty, the Sociology of Virtue', in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), *The Essential Neoconservative Reader*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), pp. 434-443

participation in a free community.”³¹ Furthermore, as neoconservative commentator James Q. Wilson stated, “...perhaps most important of all, neoconservatives embrace the American conviction that many of the central problems of our society arise out of a want of good character and human virtue.”³²

This emphasis on the moderation of individual interests by an appeal to the greater good by neoconservatives is intertwined with a cautious view of man as inherently imperfect and capable of evil. Neoconservatives maintain deep skepticism of liberal assumptions about the inherent good of man, and argue that such thinking can lead to an unwise excess of tolerance, a weakness that ultimately blinds liberals to the cynical motivations of domestic or foreign enemies who would seek to undermine or corrupt the social order. Such a view was strongly influenced by the ‘Christian realism’ of Reinhold Niebuhr, whose famous aphorism from The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness perfectly captured the neoconservative conception of the potential mediating force of political virtue on the nature of man, ‘Man’s capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man’s inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary.’³³

It was this conception of the interrelationship between liberty and virtue, as much as their personal experiences that led to vehemently anti-Communist and anti-Soviet positions during the Cold War. The philosophical and political assumptions of neoconservatives led to a form of ideological determinism concerning the motives of states – one that placed the United States and the Soviet Union in their view on an unavoidable collision course due to their inherently opposed identities as a democracy and authoritarian regime respectively. Soviet political and military policies were interpreted not as the actions of a ‘normal’ state, but rather of an irrepressibly revolutionary and expansionist state akin to

³¹ Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, p. 9

³² Forward comments by James Q. Wilson, in Mark Gerson and James Q Wilson (eds.), The Essential Neoconservative Reader, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), p. ix

³³ Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, (New York, NY: Scribner, 1944), p. xi, as quoted in Michael Novak, ‘Needing Niebuhr Again’, *Commentary*, (September 1972), pp. 52-62; For more on the influence of Niebuhr on neoconservative thought see, John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1994, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 5-13, 184-188, and Gerson, The Neoconservative Vision, p. 17

Germany under Hitler.³⁴ Neoconservatives aligned themselves in vehement opposition to the policy of détente³⁵ and ‘the correlative delusions of arms control’, identifying them as both moral and political mistakes of the highest order.³⁶

This ideological determinism espoused by its proponents utilized the unambiguous language of moral certitude in an attempt to reshape the focus of the Ford Administration’s foreign policy at the 1976 Republican National Convention. A “Morality in Foreign Policy” plank was introduced to the Republican Party platform, much to the consternation of more moderate conservatives such as Ford and Kissinger.³⁷ As ideological determinists, neoconservatives placed a premium on the defense of democratic discourse and ideas, as much as on democratic institutions and public virtue. As ideology was the independent variable driving divisions or alliances abroad, ideas also were central to the defense of social order at home. Neoconservatives clearly realized the importance of working to control the terms of domestic discourse, as articulated by neoconservative scholar Mark Gerson,

Words have meaning. Words signify ideas, and ideas determine reality. A democratic society must not allow the key signifiers of its civil religion – words like democracy, freedom, liberty, virtue – to be misappropriated. Those who want to drastically change a society will often do so by expropriating its language; this possibility must be watched vigilantly at all times.³⁸

Neoconservative strategic culture

In a strict sense, there is no such thing as a fully defined neoconservative foreign policy, but rather in the words of the ‘godfather’ of neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, ‘a set of attitudes derived from historical experience.’³⁹ Still, a number of these attitudes can be identified and illuminate the assumptions central to neoconservative strategic culture. Though such assumptions are an incomplete guide to determining neoconservative

³⁴ Norman Podhoretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, *Commentary*, (March 1996), p. 22

³⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), pp. 235-238

³⁶ Podheretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, p. 22

³⁷ For a discussion of this intra-Party platform challenge, see Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, pp. 72-79

³⁸ Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision*, p. 19

³⁹ Irving Kristol, ‘The Neoconservative Persuasion’, *The Weekly Standard*, vol. 8, no. 47 (August 25, 2003)

positions on the range of complex foreign policy dilemmas faced by the United States during the 1990's, they do serve particularly well in determining neoconservative policy preferences in situations concerning U.S. relations with authoritarian adversaries. Thus, they function as a rough guide for understanding neoconservative beliefs about the nature of the international security environment, the zero-sum nature of U.S. relations with authoritarian regimes, and general neoconservative bias regarding the efficacy of the use of military force in addressing security threats.

As previously stated, the ideological determinism of neoconservatives plays a central role in conditioning assumptions about the nature of the international security environment. This ideological determinism shaped a neoconservative focus on liberal democracy vs. authoritarian regimes as the defining divide in the modern world. For neocons as long as authoritarian regimes exist, conflict is inevitable in the international system. This is not to say that neoconservatives assume non-democratic actors to be the source of all conflict, merely that these actors are bound by their nature to seek military advantage against less powerful neighbors and weak willed global powers. This assumption, strongly conditioned by the experience of WWII and interpretation of Soviet behavior during the Cold War, provides not only a guide for predicting where conflict will arise, but also for determining the proper orientation of U.S. foreign policy as a whole. As Irving Kristol claimed,

Large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological interests in addition to more material concerns. Barring extraordinary events, the United States will always feel obliged to defend, if possible, a democratic nation under attack from nondemocratic forces, external or internal... No complicated geopolitical calculations of national interest are necessary.⁴⁰

From this central ideological assumption, it follows for neoconservatives that while the nature of relations between the United States and its democratic allies can be at best positive or at worst ambiguous, the nature of relations between the United States and its non-democratic adversaries is clearly zero-sum. Gains by authoritarian and totalitarian

⁴⁰ Ibid.

regimes automatically undermine U.S. national security interests. This also leads neoconservatives to view non-material variables such as U.S. 'resolve' or 'will' as a key determinate of the outcome of zero-sum relations with authoritarian adversaries. The willingness of authoritarian actors to seek advantage or to give expression to their inherent aggression and savagery is a matter of capacity. Limiting that capacity is largely a matter of American willingness to meet force with force. Any perceptions of American weakness, 'emboldens enemies'.⁴¹

Unsurprisingly, assumptions like these lead neoconservatives to view the exercise of hard power as uniquely effective in addressing identified threats, 'the belief that military strength is irreplaceable and that pacifism is folly.'⁴² The willingness to flex military muscle is valuable not simply for its immediate physical impact, but as importantly for the message it sends about American resolve. In the neocon view, advances by enemies, whether by terrorist organizations, the USSR or revolutionary Iran, have been the direct result of perceived declines in American power or American willingness to utilize its overwhelming military might. Hard power is supreme, and bad policies rather than historical forces cause declines in American power – a view certainly at odds with liberal strategic culture that focuses on the moderating influence of institutions, the necessity of restraints on power and the centrality of 'soft power'.

Neocons and 'Rogue' states

Neoconervatives as a group were no more likely than any others to have ready collective answers to many of the thorny post-Cold War security issues such as ethnic conflict in the Balkans, or tribal conflagrations in Africa.⁴³ Many of the post-Cold War sources of conflict did not respond well to the clear philosophical formulations that had provided

⁴¹ Norman Podhoretz, 'World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why We Have to Win', *Commentary*, September 2004, pp. 23, 24

⁴² Muravchik, 'The Neoconservative Cabal', p. 33

⁴³ In the words of Norman Podheretz circa 1996, "Once upon a time, I could foresee with reasonable assurance where any neoconservative would stand on almost any serious issue in world affairs. Today I am hard put to predict where even some of my closest friends will come out when a contentious issue like Bosnia arises..." Podheretz, 'Neoconservatism: A Eulogy', p. 24

them with an unwavering roadmap during their anti-Communist struggles of the Cold War. They did, however, have a ready policy response for situations involving adversaries who appeared to them ideologically similar to the familiar enemy that was the Soviet Union – non-democratic regimes bucking the status quo on proliferation such as North Korea and Iraq. Here were adversaries clearly defined by their identity, their motivations seemingly as immutable to neoconservatives as had been the fascist regimes of World War II, or the Communist dictatorships of the Cold War. In the eyes of neoconservatives, totalitarian regimes in ‘rogue states’ such as North Korea and Iraq were the clear heirs to the international mantle of Neihbur’s ‘children of darkness’. Any attempt to treat them as rational, economically motivated actors responsive to incentive or negotiation was an invitation to disaster. The post-Gulf War revelations of Iraqi deception of the international community regarding its unconventional weapons programs came as no surprise to the neoconservatives, nor did the continuing pattern of brinksmanship and nuclear crisis by North Korea. Rather they were expected patterns of deception by which illiberal regimes would always play on the naïveté and hesitancy of the liberal international community for their own nefarious ends.

In terms of translating strategic culture assumptions into ranked preferences for policy, the formulation for such rogue regimes was relatively straightforward. The neoconservative policy recommendations for dealing with North Korea were neatly encapsulated by Nicholas Eberstadt in the neoconservative policy advocacy group, The Project For the New American Century’s book *Present Dangers*:

The quintessence of Pyongyang’s foreign policy – its enthusiastically confrontational, usually ferocious, and at times plainly savage posture towards its many designated enemies abroad – had placed North Korea in more-or-less permanent conflict with what is now called “the international community.”... The longer the DPRK as we know it manages to survive, the greater its peril to the international community will likely be. In the final analysis, prolonging the tenure of this regime will not – indeed, cannot – serve the interests of the United States and her allies.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Nicholas Eberstadt, ‘North Korea: Beyond Appeasement’, in Robert Kagan and William Kristol (eds.) *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), pp. 145, 174

On Iraq the policy preference for neoconservatives was even more clearly spelled out:

Saddam Hussein must go. This imperative may seem too simple for some experts and too daunting for the Clinton Administration. But if the United States is committed, as the President said in his State of the Union Message, to insuring that the Iraqi leader never again uses weapons of mass destruction, the only way to achieve that goal is to remove Mr. Hussein and his regime from power. Any policy short of that will fail... It is clear that Mr. Hussein wants his weapons of mass destruction more than he wants oil revenue or relief for hungry Iraqi children.⁴⁵

This opposition based largely on the perceived determinism stemming from adversarial state identity became a particularly important view when coupled with the issue of proliferation of unconventional weapons. In this combination, there was little need to parse state motivation for acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities, no requirement to come to terms with the historical and sociological particulars of a totalitarian adversary like North Korea. While it was one thing for liberals to debate the implications of the unique North Korean “juche” (self-reliance) philosophy and the potential long term strategic maneuvering underlying North Korean calls for bilateral over multilateral negotiations, neoconservatives argued that none of these debates took seriously the implications of North Korean identity as a totalitarian regime. It was this identity that would inevitably drive them towards violent, adventurist conflict when it felt conditions were favorable.⁴⁶ Most importantly, nothing had the potential to bring this sense of advantage in the minds of North Koreans like the possession of unconventional weapons. In the neoconservative formulation, the combination of WMD’s and totalitarian regimes

⁴⁵ William Kristol and Robert Kagan, ‘Bombing Iraq Isn’t Enough’, *New York Times*, January 30, 1998. Such sentiments had been recently made by the group in an open letter to President Clinton, part of which read, “The only acceptable strategy is one that eliminates the possibility that Iraq will be able to use or threaten to use weapons of mass destruction. In the near term, this means a willingness to undertake military action as diplomacy is clearly failing. In the long term, it means removing Saddam Hussein and his regime from power.” See, Project for the New American Century, ‘Letter to President Clinton’, January 26, 1998, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm>, (Accessed August 7, 2007)

⁴⁶ For further arguments on “unstable actors” with “unlimited ambitions”, see Robert G. Joseph, ‘WMD: A Proliferation Overview’, in Stuart E. Johnson and William H. Lewis (ed.), *Weapons of Mass Destruction: New Perspectives on Counterproliferation*, (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1995), p. 5; Though not strictly neoconservative, for broader conservative arguments about “hot nationalist passions”, “primitive animosity” and “terror diplomacy” in countries such as Iraq and Iran, see Paul Bracken, *Fire in the East: The Rise of Asian Military Power and the Second Nuclear Age*, (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), pp. 89-90, 124; for claims of “rogue irrationality” in states such as Iraq, North Korean and Iran, see Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 11, 12, 155.

would bring other nations to ruin. Assuming otherwise was at best wishful thinking and at worst moral and political self-delusion that imperiled the lives of millions. Summarizing a common neoconservative understanding of the rationale for unconventional weapons acquisition, “they want these weapons to threaten or strike ancestral enemies, or to make war more efficiently, or to hold at bay their victim’s potential rescuers.”⁴⁷

The ‘death’ of Neoconservatism

By the mid-1990’s, neoconservatism was seen as being subsumed as a distinct cultural and intellectual force, losing much of its purpose and distinctiveness within the larger conservative movement after the end of the Cold War.⁴⁸ Neoconservative thought, though perhaps issued a premature death certificate by its father figures, nonetheless ultimately helped illuminate a path for the conservative movement between a traditional isolationism that was left wanting for its lack of a vision for the uses of American power, and a non-ideational realism that lacked a sense of moral purpose to guide calculations of national interest.⁴⁹ Both seemed unsatisfactory responses to the security challenges of the post-Cold War for many conservatives, who were equally dissatisfied with the liberal internationalist foreign policy approach of economic engagement advocated by the Clinton Administration.⁵⁰

Neoconservative ideas continued to infuse the conservative movement with an emphasis on identity and ideas, informing argumentative strategies and discursive practices, helping to replace uncertain conceptions of systemically derived national interest with a

⁴⁷ Angelo M. Codevilla, ‘Naked To Our Enemies’, *Commentary*, October 1994, p. 46

⁴⁸ Podheretz, ‘Neoconservatism: A Eulogy’, p. 24; Mark Gerson also concluded in his 1996 study of the neoconservative tradition, “Neoconservatism is now coming to an end... This is perhaps the truest testament to the success of neoconservatism in the following sense: what was once considered exclusively neoconservatism is now conservatism... What we now know as conservatism – identified in the ideas of our intellectuals or the words of our politicians – is largely the legacy of the neoconservatives.” See Gerson, *The Neoconservative Vision*, pp. 26, 27

⁴⁹ This branch of conservative American foreign policy is most clearly represented by the figure of – and not coincidentally longtime neoconservative nemesis – Henry Kissinger. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, ‘Was Kissinger Right?’, *Commentary*, May 1999, pp. 55-60

⁵⁰ Robert Kagan, ‘Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy’, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1996

greatly simplified conception of interests as guided by ideational determinism. How such guidance informed policy preferences and distinguished them from those advocated by the Clinton Administration can be seen in the diverging strategic cultural positions on the appropriate policy responses to proliferation that emerged in the 1990's.

Liberal and Conservative strategic cultural policy preferences

Although discussed earlier in this chapter, the policy preferences of the bearers of liberal strategic culture for addressing proliferation threats are worth briefly revisiting in order to contrast those positions with a distinct and mutually exclusive conservative set of policy preferences that emerged during the 1990's.⁵¹ The competing sets of policy preferences revolved around the weighting of three central policy approaches utilized to address the threat posed by proliferation - denial, deterrence and disarmament.⁵²

- *Denial*: A strategy generally represented by some combination of active defenses such as ballistic missile interception capabilities and counterforce options such as ground destruction of weapons systems or production and storage facilities. Denial limits the utility of offensive weapons by degrading the ability of an adversary to attack the United States, placing their offensive weapons at risk by the capacity to identify and destroy them on the ground before use, or by disrupting or destroying an adversarial state's capacity to produce offensive weapons.⁵³ Denial in this formulation is most directly connected to military methods of proliferation control in the form of counterproliferation.
- *Deterrence*: Forces based on retaliatory threat are referred to as deterrent forces, as opposed to defensive forces, which only promise to make gains in warfare

⁵¹ Though it should be acknowledged that conservative strategic culture had unique preference sets during the Cold War, the end of bipolarity and emerging focus on regional powers considerably altered the basis for generally accepted threat perceptions, especially regarding the crucial variable of adversarial rationality.

⁵² A similar set of simplifications can be found in Shaver, 'Priorities For Ballistic Missile Defense', pp. 292, 293

⁵³ Ibid, p. 293

difficult to achieve.⁵⁴ Both types of forces are intended to dissuade states from attacking one another, but deterrence is particularly relevant to the offensive dilemma posed by the devastating power of nuclear weapons. Successful deterrence, however, depends on the rationality of adversaries to calculate that nothing gained by the use of force will outweigh the costs borne by retaliation. Traditionally the United States has depended on both conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities to dissuade states or groups from offensive action that would directly threaten US national security interests.

- *Disarmament*: A strategy broadly intended to deny access to unconventional weapons capabilities through diplomatic and political means such as export controls, normative agreements and consensual, non-discriminatory enforcement mechanisms overseen by multilateral institutions. Disarmament intends to limit both horizontal (spread between states) and vertical (spread within states) proliferation. The framework for such an approach of nonproliferation has been formally established through such agreements as the NPT, the AMB Treaty, the CTBT and others.

Clinton Administration officials and many Democratic lawmakers argued that although the threat posed by the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union was greatly diminished, nuclear deterrence and assumptions of rationality still played the same role as they had during the Cold War, albeit oriented towards major regional powers rather than a single global adversary – an “occasional stratagem rather than a constant, all-purpose stance.”⁵⁵ In this group were senior defense officials under Clinton such as Jan Lodol, principle deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, who stated the Administration’s assumptions about the inherent rationality of adversaries when faced with the overwhelming superiority of U.S. nuclear forces, “Nuclear deterrence worked throughout the Cold War,

⁵⁴ Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘More May be Better’, in Scott D Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), p. 3

⁵⁵ Freedman, Deterrence, p. 76

it continues to work now, it will continue to work into the future... the exact same kinds of nuclear deterrence calculations that have always worked will continue to work.”⁵⁶

If attempting to model a weighted set of preferences, those generated by liberal strategic assumptions could be visualized as follows, with the shaded area representing general policy preferences:




Figure 5.1 – Liberal Strategic Culture Preferences for Addressing Proliferation Threats

Representatives of liberal strategic culture fundamentally believed that the nature of the proliferation threat was one of destabilizing technologies falling into the hands of unfriendly, though potentially deterrable nations. The mechanisms to address the threat from this perspective focused on combining a traditional deterrence posture with a strengthening of the traditional mechanisms and norms of the NP regime. Strategies of denial such as active defenses and counterforce options as envisioned in the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative were seen as minor military support measures limited to forward deployed capabilities for defending American forces in the battlefield and

⁵⁶ Jan Lodal (P)DUSD, Ashton Carter ASD (ISP), with selected reporters, 31 July 1995, Washington, D.C., Press Conference Transcript, pp. 9-10, as quoted in Keith B. Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), p. 87

serving to reinforce the existing NP regime through dissuasion. Developing limited counterproliferation capabilities was not intended to be a method for applying direct military pressure on potential proliferators, but rather would serve to indirectly undermine the rationale for acquiring unconventional weapons capabilities by raising the defensive barrier such weapons would need to overcome in the event of armed conflict. Therefore, such measures as envisioned in the DCI would deny the enemy an offensive advantage, rather than deny them the ability to acquire unconventional weapons capabilities. Such instruments of defense would under no circumstances challenge or replace disarmament mechanisms in the form of global institutionalized NP norms and arms control measures.⁵⁷

For many groups of conservatives, the Clinton Administration's dedication to NP norms, arms control and institutionalized restraints on military power such as the ABM Treaty was not merely misguided policy, but actually constituted a threat to U.S. national security interests.⁵⁸ Conservative oppositional sentiment held that not only did the regional powers, who were repositioning themselves in the power vacuum left by the Soviet Union, pose a significant potential nuclear threat, but that the nature of this threat was one unresponsive to traditional methods of deterrence or disarmament due to the lack of ability to sway such regimes with normative appeals, and voluntary multilateral institutionalized enforcement mechanisms. As these regimes were inherently unstable, irrational, aggressive, thuggish, etc., there was little the United States could hope to do to deter them from using unconventional weapons against US forces abroad, or even the US mainland. Thus active defenses and robust counterforce capabilities were imperative to protect the United States from the eventual unconventional weapons use by rogue regimes or terrorists.

⁵⁷ The Clinton Administration executive order declaring a 'national emergency' on WMD was essentially an enhanced export control and sanctions order that vested implementation powers in the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce. See The White House, Executive Order 12938, 'Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', November 14, 1994, <http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/executive-orders/1994.html>, (Accessed January 5, 2006); and Eric Schmitt, 'Clinton Devises New Guidelines on Arms Sales', *New York Times*, November 16, 1994, Sec A, p. 14

⁵⁸ Later Bush Administration officials such as Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Robert Joseph, had articulated exactly such arguments throughout much of the 1990's. Interview with John P. Caves

If attempting to model a weighted set of preferences, those generated by conservative strategic assumptions could be visualized as follows, with the shaded area representing general policy preferences:




Figure 5.2 – Conservative Strategic Culture Preferences for Addressing Proliferation Threats

For conservatives, the mechanisms to address the threat could not be those of the NP regime, as these were seen as directly abetting the problem. Rather, the solution was in a very aggressive and comprehensive system of counterproliferation that covered the entire spectrum of threats – from robust counterforce capabilities and active forward defenses, to national missile defense and strengthened civil preparedness at home. Such a view was founded on a far more pessimistic view of the nature of the international security environment that assumed the inevitable use of unconventional weapons against the United States, and one that also assumed a more effective role for the use of military force in addressing the threat. Ultimately, this approach would need to be coupled to coercive diplomacy measures oriented towards regime change, as the problem was both of capability and identity. Confronting the technical capacity was likely to prove an

ultimately futile exercise in delay tactics if the underlying identity issue driving the capabilities were not addressed.

Conservatives arguing that the vulnerability of the United States to attack from ballistic missiles was a critical shortcoming of Clinton Administration's national defense priorities sought to increase the policy prominence of national missile defenses and robust counterforce capabilities once in power. If support for nonproliferation norms and institutions could not be immediately overturned, then perhaps it could, in the mid-term, be challenged by an active campaign to fund and bring to policy prominence a potential capabilities-driven challenger in the form of counterproliferation. These issues became a focus of Republican Congressional legislation by a Party leadership who saw both an opportunity to actively support the modernization and rebuilding of the American military while simultaneously undermining the President's credibility on national security issues, and forcing political concessions that would ultimately serve to undermine NP norms and institutions.

The following section will examine how policy preferences were transformed into policy outcomes, largely through the a Republican Party newly empowered and determined to exercise its newfound political power through a carefully managed, cohesive policy approach.

Republicans in power

"You know, there is an old saying in law school... that if the facts are not with you, you argue the law; if the law is not with you, you argue the facts; and if neither are with you, you just argue."

- Former Republican Senator Trent Lott⁵⁹

Significant policy changes regarding US approaches to the security threats posed by proliferation arrived in earnest with the so-called Republican 'revolution' of 1994. In the '94 mid-term election, Republicans gained control of both the US House and Senate for

⁵⁹ 'Defeat of a Treaty; Lott's View: 'It Was Not About Politics, It Was About the Substance'', *New York Times*, October 15, 1999

the first time in 40 years, winning more than 50 seats in a tremendous shift of legislative power. The Republican Party that won the landslide majority was also one of the most cohesive in terms of working for legislation due to its strong leadership and unprecedented communications strategy focused on presenting a consistent and carefully crafted party message on major issues.

Unusually strong Party leadership came thanks to majority leader Newt Gingrich and the man considered to be the most effective majority whip in modern times, Tom DeLay, who together oversaw nearly unprecedented party uniformity of voting in the early years of the majority.⁶⁰ Their aggressive leadership style of enforcing party cohesion was further emboldened by the overtly partisan, divisive form of politics brought to Congress by the new leadership that sought to revitalize by conflict a Republican Party with little experience over the past four decades of determining legislative priorities.⁶¹ As Democratic Representative Harry A. Johnston remarked, “the minority party does not legislate – it is that simple.” Although the minority party can play a role in obstructing or ‘fine tuning’ a bill, “it never plays an activist role in shaping the laws of the country.”⁶²

Although highly partisan, Gingrich’s leadership was marked by a sort of ideological pragmatism towards uniting disparate wings of the Republican Party. The years of Legislative isolation had helped bridge traditional divides within the Party, a process Gingrich had identified during an interview in 1989, “There is almost a new synthesis evolving with the classic moderate wing of the party where, as a former Rockefeller state chairman, I’ve spent most of my life, and the conservative / activist right wing.”⁶³ This “new synthesis” allowed Gingrich as Party leader to recognize the power of neoconservative strategic concepts to clarify differences between Republicans and

⁶⁰ The job of the majority whip is to ensure party members vote and vote according to the wishes of the party leadership. See Robert V. Remini, The House: The History of the House of Representatives, (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Books, 2006), p. 482

⁶¹ As majority leader Newt Gingrich said of the motivation for such leadership, “I intended to radicalize the House.” Ibid, p. 483

⁶² Harry A. Johnston, ‘Power in the U.S. House and the Florida State Senate’, in Frey and Hayes (eds.), Inside the House, p. 189, as quoted in Remini, The House, p. 485

⁶³ Newt Gingrich, Excerpt from an interview with Ripon Forum, www.riponsociety.org/forum308f.htm, (accessed September 5, 2008)

Democrats and frame ambiguous foreign policy issues such as proliferation in unambiguous terms, regardless whether such conceptualizations were representative of his own personal ideological predisposition, or of the majority of his Party.⁶⁴ As Gingrich himself admitted when questioned about the inconsistency of his personal political positions, "...the first duty of a political coalition is to sustain its majority. I can tell you with a straight face I am pragmatic, and as a result I am driven to conservatism. But I am not dogmatic. I think if non-conservatism works, I'll look at it, too."⁶⁵

A view on the newfound cohesiveness of the Republican Party especially regarding foreign and defense issues can be seen from the 'Congressional Scorecard' issued by the extremely conservative policy advocacy organization the Center for Security Policy (CSP) in 1995.⁶⁶ The CSP Congressional Scorecard tracks the voting of all members on the 20 votes in both the House and Senate deemed by the CSP to be, "the most critical national security votes" facing Congress each year.⁶⁷ The CSP gives their opinion on the 'correct' vote for each measure, tracks the voting of all members on those measures, and assigns each member of Congress a score depending on their tally of 'pro' or 'anti-National Security' votes. In the year that preceded the Republican victory, 43 legislators were given perfect scores of 100 points according to CSP criteria, while 93 legislators were given perfect scores in the year following the Republican victory.⁶⁸ Having the total number of legislators who 'achieved' perfect scores by the measure of the CSP increase by 50 was quite a feat of cohesion considering the total number of seats lost by Democrats was 52.

⁶⁴ Jonh J. Pitney Jr., 'The Many Faces of Newt Gingrich', *Reason*, (February, 1997)

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ As commented by the Director and founder of the Center for Security Policy (also a founding member of the Project for the New American Century), Frank Gaffney when asked the purpose of the CSP, "To the right of us is the wall." Interview with Frank Gaffney, July 7, 2005.

⁶⁷ Center for Security Policy, 'Congressional Scorecards', <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/Modules/NewsManager/Center%20publication%20PDFs/CS1995.pdf>, (accessed July 10, 2005)

⁶⁸ It is also significant to note that the number of legislators who scored a zero according to the CSP criteria fell from 13 in the 103rd Congress, to only two in 1995. See Ibid.

The second factor critical to policy cohesiveness by the new Republican majority was the communications strategy brought into office by Gingrich and other Party leaders.⁶⁹ This new communications strategy sought to reorganize the party around a carefully coordinated platform of language dependent identity. Some sense of the strength of leadership arrived long before the election in the form of the Newt Gingrich organized “Contract With America”, a methodically constructed and promoted combination of party solidarity politics and public relations coup promising a 10-point legislative plan of action for the first 100 days of Republican majority. The Contract With America was notable not only for its bold challenge to the legislative priorities of the existing Democratic Administration and Congress, but also for its implied message of Republican Party solidarity – all but two Republican incumbents signed the policy ‘pledge’ five weeks before the election.

The Importance of ‘message’ creation and linguistic framing

Republicans arrived in office with not only a strongly centralized and effective leadership, but also the most highly coordinated communications management team that had been seen in American political history.⁷⁰ This team employed a communications strategy based on the cognitive linguistic art of systematic framing that was no longer focused merely on shaping public perceptions of the identity and positions of candidates for political campaigns, but rather on shaping perceptions of the identity and positions of an entire political party throughout the cycle of governance.⁷¹ The continuous, party-wide

⁶⁹ An insightful insider’s perspective on the 1994 Republican communications strategy, and on the rules for crafting of ‘effective language’, can be found in the writing of a figure hailed by many as a central architect of the ‘Contract With America’, Frank Luntz. See particularly, Frank Luntz, Words That Work: It’s Not What You Say, It’s What They Hear, (New York, NY: Hyperion Books, 2007); and ‘Interview with Frank Luntz’, *Frontline*, December 15, 2003, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/interviews/luntz.html> (accessed August 19, 2007)

⁷⁰ The relatively recent professionalization of political advocacy is given insightful treatment in Jay G. Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh, ‘The Third Age of Political Communications: Influences and Features’, *Political Communication*, Vol. 16 (1999), pp. 209-230

⁷¹ The first systematic analysis of linguistic framing and its potential application was by linguist Erving Goffman. See Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis, (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1986)

communications management reflected a relatively new type of politics that one academic observer remarked was akin to “campaigns without candidates.”⁷²

The Republican party had come to power with an unprecedented understanding at the leadership level of the importance of language in shaping the terms of the discourse, and a newfound appreciation for the centrality of ideas and culture in shaping a party platform, identifying threats and generating policy responses. Party leaders met regularly with polling firms and communications consultants such as Frank Luntz to craft effective language and Party talking points around significant domestic and foreign policy issues.⁷³ More than at any time in modern US history, the battle for political dominance was one that was carefully waged with almost scientific precision towards a domestic audience, reflecting a newfound perception of what Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh call, “the imperatives of the professionalization of political publicity”⁷⁴ This imperative was due partly to significant changes in the way information was being received by the public in an age of increasingly diverse, populist and fast paced media, and partly to the realization by the Republican Party leadership of the value of the consistent application of proven techniques to effectively communicate ideas and messages to the public in a new era of mass media.⁷⁵

The new generation of Republican communication management consultants moved far beyond simple polling and focus groups to examine the impact of political communication on target audiences. Their preferred method was the long, complex and expensive process of ‘Instant Response Dial Sessions’.⁷⁶ Such sessions utilize handheld

⁷² Martin Clark, ‘Selling Issues’. *Campaigns and Elections*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1993), p. 26

⁷³ Luntz had a longstanding relationship with Gingrich, and was instrumental in crafting the particular language behind the “Contract With America” that had helped usher Republicans into power. Though some Party leaders were skeptical of the new wave of PR and “brand management” techniques promoted by Luntz, the strong backing of Gingrich helped assure overall Party adoption of his methods. See Luntz, *Words That Work*, esp. Ch. 3, 4

⁷⁴ Blumler and Kavanagh, ‘The Third Age of Political Communications’, p. 214

⁷⁵ Though it should be acknowledged that many politicians have been aware of this for years, if not decades, 1994 marked the first time a *systematic* application of these communications strategies has been applied by an American majority political party.

⁷⁶ The complexities of organizing and running such sessions mean costs (in 2006) of up to \$40,000 per session, compared with maximum costs for focus groups in the area of \$12,000. A fascinating examination

technology that allows participants to instantly and continuously register their positive or negative emotional reactions to individual words, phrases or visuals from a variety of communications media. Dial sessions revealed the dramatic difference that specific linguistic framing can make on perceptions of identical policies, for example:

While 68% of Americans feel an Inheritance / Estate Tax is unfair, 78% feel a 'Death Tax' is unfair.⁷⁷

INTERNATIONAL trade is favored over FOREIGN trade by 68% of Americans.⁷⁸

Americans are still evenly split on whether they support "school choice" in America's schools. But they are heavily in favor of "giving parents the right to choose the schools that are right for their children", and there is almost universal support for "equal opportunity in education." So frame the issue right and you get the support you need.⁷⁹

The previous three examples illuminate the powerful concept of linguistic framing, as defined by communications scholar Robert Entman, "to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating... in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation."⁸⁰ The focus is on an active process of selection from within a larger set of potential perceptions or interpretations, consisting of a selector attempting to shape the perceptions of an audience.⁸¹ Thus in the act of political communication, the

of the details and advantages of dial sessions over focus groups can be found in Luntz, Words That Work, pp. 78-80

⁷⁷ Frank Luntz, 'The Frank Luntz 2006 Republican Playbook', The Luntz Research Companies, p. 166, available from www.politicalstrategy.org, (accessed August 19, 2007)

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 41

⁷⁹ Luntz, Words That Work, pp. 168, 169

⁸⁰ Entman, 'Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm', pp. 51-58; see also David A. Snow, E. Burke Rochford, Jr., Steven K. Worden and Robert D. Benford, 'Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4. (August, 1986), pp. 464-481; and Gail T. Fairhurst, 'Reframing The Art of Framing: Problems and Prospects for Leadership', *Leadership*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (2005) pp. 165-185

⁸¹ The focus in media studies, political communications and management studies on an active process of audience manipulation departs from the more general sociological focus on 'collective action frames'. See Robert D. Bedford and David A. Snow, 'Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 26 (2000), pp. 611-639; see also Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

choice of language is vital because it has the potential to evoke moral and conceptual associations that condition perceptions of efficacy and legitimacy.⁸²

What Republican communications strategists understood following the 1994 elections was that effectively framed political messages, sufficiently reinforced through cohesive repetition had greater ability to create an emotional resonance with the American electorate than rational explanations of policy details. Such emotional resonance increased the potential that messages and frames would be perceived as ‘common sense’; uniquely realistic and efficacious. The ultimate goal of such a communications strategy being the bridging of public perceptions of ‘common sense’ policy with the preexisting assumptions and preferences of conservative strategic culture. As Republican communications strategist Frank Luntz commented on the efficacy of this process when successfully employed:

“Common sense” doesn’t require any fancy theories; it is *self-evidently* correct... “Common sense” is not just the best argument for almost any policy prescription you might propose – it’s essential. If you win and occupy the rhetorical territory owned by “*common sense*,” your position will be virtually unassailable.⁸³

Utilizing such communications strategies, Republicans attempted to shift policy discourse on effective methods of addressing proliferation threats from the abstract realms of liberal institutionalist theory, to visceral, emotive concerns that might resonate with the American public and prove difficult for Democrats to effectively counter. Republican foreign policy positions were consciously and meticulously crafted for a domestic audience – not that the American electorate were the deciders of individual foreign policy approaches, but that voters were leverage in a longer-term struggle for political legitimacy and party majority. By following the simple rules dictated by their communications management team, the real-world complication of shaping a working and effective long-term strategy for addressing proliferation threats was unnecessary for the Republican Party to communicate. What was necessary to communicate was that the

⁸² George Lakoff, ‘Simple Framing: An introduction to framing and its uses in politics’, Rockridge Institute, February 14 2006, http://www.rockridgeinstitute.org/projects/strategic/simple_framing, (accessed August 15, 2007)

⁸³ Luntz, *Words That Work*, p. 211

nonproliferation strategies of the Clinton Administration did not work, would not work, and could not work. As a replacement, the party would communicate a simplified strategy that proposed to *fix* the problem, rather than simply *manage* the problem.

In identifying which specific policy prescriptions for proliferation threats reflected general conservative strategic cultural preferences and highlighted differences with the Administration, Republicans focused on preexisting policy approaches provided by the DOD in the 1994 Counterproliferation Program Review Committee report. Republican legislators looked beyond the general statements about support for nonproliferation diplomacy and agreements, and with particular interest at two particular capability priorities listed in the 1994 CPRC report, “Being able to seize, disable or destroy weapons of mass destruction in time of conflict if necessary...” and “Employing active or passive defenses that will mitigate the effects of those agents if necessary...”⁸⁴ Funding and prioritizing CP programs for active defenses and counterforce capabilities previously marginalized by the Clinton Administration became an essential way to address the conservative strategic culture distaste for what was seen as a dangerous norm-dependent approach to the problem of proliferation.

At this point it is worth examining in detail one of the CP policy areas targeted by Republicans for such a focused campaign of delegitimizing existing strategic conceptions and policy approaches, and applying concentrated public discourse efforts at legitimizing competing conceptions and policy prescriptions. The debates over National Missile Defense (NMD) stand as an important case study in such a process of competing discourse and legislation. NMD represented an important division between the assumptions and biases of liberal and conservative strategic cultures concerning the nature of both the international security environment and the basic assumptions of adversarial rationality that underpin the doctrine of deterrence. Republican efforts to push NMD forward held many consequences for the overall US approach to proliferation issues, and represented an important turning point in legitimizing conceptions of

⁸⁴ 1994 Report on Nonproliferation and Counterproliferation Programs and Activities; see also Codevilla, ‘Naked To Our Enemies’, p. 46

proliferation threats as originating primarily in irrational state identity, rather than the destructive potential of unconventional weapons themselves.

Legislating National Missile Defense: policy strategies and discursive practices

Incoming Republican committee chairs used their new powers to play a strong agenda setting function, utilizing House and Senate Armed Services and National Security Committee hearings to gather intelligence community representatives to highlight perceived missile defense threats.⁸⁵ Although in many cases the threats discussed in the hearings were not new, placing renewed focus on existing assessments had the effect of presenting them as novel, highlighting the various threat perceptions and supporting new legislation.⁸⁶

Following committee hearings, a flurry of new legislation was proposed in both the House and Senate on the issue of national missile defense.⁸⁷ From the Republican side of the aisle came bills and amendments to increase funding for NMD programs,⁸⁸ motions to table Democratic limitations on NMD funding⁸⁹, and amendments requiring NMD compliance with the ABM Treaty,⁹⁰ as well as appropriations bills requiring set deadlines for NMD system deployment.⁹¹ Democrats proposed their own legislation attempting to

⁸⁵ Representative Weldon, 'Missile Proliferation, One of the Greatest Threats to America in the 21st Century', *Congressional Record*, April 3rd, 1995, p. H4074

⁸⁶ The 1995 National Intelligence Estimate on threats to North America during the following 15 years excluded the threat from ballistic missiles. See DCI National Intelligence Estimate, President's Summary, 'Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years', PS/NIE 95-19, November 1995, <http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm>, (Accessed July 15, 2007)

⁸⁷ The full text of the following bills, amendments and motions from the 104th Congress can be accessed on the *Congressional Record* database accessed via the 'Thomas' website portal for legislative information from the US Library of Congress: <http://thomas.loc.gov/>

⁸⁸ Dole (R-KS) sponsored bill S.1635, and Spence (R-SC) amendment, H.AMDT.168 to H.R.7 (Adopted 221-204); a less contentious measure was the Cohen (R-ME) amendment, S.AMDT.2089 to S.1026, simply expressing Senate concern that the United States defend itself against the threat posed by ballistic missiles (Adopted 69-26)

⁸⁹ Thurmond (R-SC) motion, Rollcall Vote No. 157 Leg (Adopted 51-48)

⁹⁰ Thurmond (R-SC) motion, Rollcall Vote No. 158 Leg (Adopted 51-49)

⁹¹ Senate approval of 1996 Defense Authorization Act, S.1124, (Adopted 51-43)

limit NMD spending outlays⁹² and the scope of NMD programs⁹³, but to little effect. The Republican majority in both houses of Congress ensured favorable outcomes for NMD in an overwhelming number of cases. Maintaining their focus on ‘framing’ NMD programs, Republicans ceased proposing legislation with titles such as ‘Ballistic Missile Defense Act’, opting for the more emotional ‘Defend America Act.’⁹⁴

The effect of Republican political discourse throughout the 1990’s was to both intensify the nexus of WMD threats and irrational regime identity through highly controlled, simplified, repetitive language, and to link that framing to the policy platform of the Republican Party. The effect was control of ‘legitimate’ discourse by the end of the 1990’s. WMD could not be discussed without an implicit association to the supposedly irrational behavior of certain adversarial states or non-state actors like terrorist groups, and that discursive space proved very difficult for Democrats to effectively challenge. This discourse control made it progressively more difficult to discuss proliferation in terms of norms, rationality, multilateral institutions and restraints on power, as conservative policy preferences were effectively framed as a uniquely ‘common sense’ approach to the American public than the traditional methods and norms of nonproliferation. Thus the control of the discourse began to successfully link the strategic cultural assumptions and preferences of conservatives with their policy prescriptions. Especially relevant in policy terms was the expansion of the active defense and counterforce aspects of counterproliferation.

A chorus repeated by the Republicans throughout the legislative debates was, “we have no defense”, or “we have no protection”, lines whose close variations were repeated in every debate on national missile defense by Republican legislators in the 12 months

⁹² Spratt (D-SC) amendment, H.AMDT.428 to H.R.1530 (Rejected 185-242), Dellums (D-CA) motion (Rejected 188-230), DeFazio (D-OR) amendment, H.AMDT.429 to H.R.1530 (Rejected 178-250), and Dorgan (D-ND) amendment, S.AMDT.2377 to S.1087 (Rejected 45-54)

⁹³ Edwards (D-TX) amendment, H.AMDT.166 to H.R.7 (Rejected 206-223), and Levin (D-MI) amendment S.AMDT.1179 to S.CON.RES.13 (Tabled by Thurmond motion)

⁹⁴ The ‘Ballistic Missile Defense Act’ was actually a subsection of the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act. Two ‘Defend America’ Acts were proposed in Congress, one in 1995 by Henry Hyde (R-IL), the second in 1996 by Senator Bob Dole (R-KS) and a large number of co-sponsors. See ‘Defend America Act’, S.1635, *Congressional Record*, March 21, 1996

preceding the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act vote.⁹⁵ Republican lawmakers also tapped in, consciously or not, to the powerful “no loss” maxim of cognitive framing. As explained by psychologist Nobel Prize winning behavioral psychologist Daniel Kahneman, “Framing a decision in terms of possible loss should motivate more than framing the same decision in terms of possible gain. When faced with potential gains or losses, humans regularly choose outcomes perceived to avoid potential losses, even going so far as to sacrifice potential gain.”⁹⁶ Kahneman continues, “A person is more likely to follow conservative strategies when presented with a positively-framed dilemma and choose risky strategies when presented with negatively-framed ones.”⁹⁷

The following examples from the floors of the House and Senate convey a sense of the tone and structure of arguments presented by the Republicans. Each employs samples of crafted linguistic framing and consistent party messaging, intended to reframe NMD as a ‘common sense’ approach to missile threats with emotional appeal.

Senator Bob Dole (R-KS):

Most Americans do not know--let me underscore--most Americans do not know that the United States has no defense against ballistic missiles. If you were to ask the average American, in fact to ask anybody in this Chamber unless they are on the Armed Services Committee, they might not know. If you were asked a question, ‘If a missile, an incoming missile was headed toward Chicago, what should the President of the United States do?’ and the people will tell you in these little focus groups, ‘Shoot it down’--we can’t. We don’t have a defense. So, if a rogue state such as North Korea launched a single missile at the United States, we could do nothing to stop its deadly flight towards an American town or city...So, again, let me repeat the question: If you had an incoming ballistic missile and you ask somebody in my State or any State, What should the President do, they would say, ‘Shoot it down.’ And your response would have to be, ‘We cannot. We have no defense.’⁹⁸

Representative Curt Weldon (R-PA):

⁹⁵ Congressional Record citations, <http://thomas.loc.gov> (accessed May 3, 2007)

⁹⁶ Daniel Kahneman, ‘A Perspective on Judgment and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality’, *American Psychologist*, 58, p. 715

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 715

⁹⁸ Senator Dole, ‘Defend America Act’, *Congressional Record*, May 23, 1996, p. S5626

When I asked my constituents back in Pennsylvania if they think that we have a system to protect us against one single missile coming into America fired accidentally or deliberately, they cannot believe it when I say that we have no system in place. They just cannot understand how a country with the assets that we have, spending the money that we spend, does not yet have a ballistic missile defense system to protect mainstream America...⁹⁹

Representative Robert K. Dornan (R-CA):

...As things stand today, we have no capacity whatsoever to intercept ballistic missiles that might be aimed at the United States. None. Zero. We are unable to stop even a single missile, even a missile fired accidentally, even a missile fired accidentally under circumstances in which the perpetrator of the accident did everything he could to help us avert a calamity. We are totally, completely, abjectly vulnerable.¹⁰⁰

Republicans crafted the discursive presentation of WMD and state identity as a unified conception, transforming it into a polarizing issue by nature of their very public challenge to the Clinton Administration's support for NP norms and traditional conception of deterrence. The policy-dense language of leadership in promoting nonproliferation norms and the strategic relevance of deterrence relationships meant very little to domestic audiences, whereas the specifically worded claims for defending America against missile attack from rogue regimes carried the potential for emotional resonance with otherwise uninformed or indifferent audiences which lent political weight to the argument when repeated often enough.

The flurry of legislative activity over national missile defenses culminated in the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which sought to fund NMD programs with legislatively directed deadlines for fielding a working system. Citing congressional amendments requiring a working national missile defense system in place by 2003, potential ABM treaty violations stemming from the implementation of such a system, and cost estimates ranging in the tens of billions of dollars, President Clinton took the rare

⁹⁹ Hon. Kurt Weldon, 'The Defense of Our Country', *Congressional Record*, February 27, 1995, p. H2296; For similar comments, see also, Hon. Kurt Weldon, 'Missile Proliferation, One of the Greatest Threats to America in the 21st Century', *Congressional Record*, April 3, 1995, p. H4074

¹⁰⁰ Hon. Robert K. Dornan, 'We Need Ballistic Missile Defense – And We Have Absolutely No Defense Today', *Congressional Record*, Extension of Remarks, January 27, 1995, p. E197

decision to veto the defense spending bill,¹⁰¹ forcing Republican legislators to remove deadlines for deployment of a working NMD system.¹⁰² Though the legislative debate was temporarily shelved by the veto, Republican legislators decided to shift their focus to the intelligence on ballistic missile threats. Of particular interest were estimates supporting President Clinton's argument that national missile defenses were an inappropriate response to the projected proliferation threat.

Competing interpretations of missile capabilities intelligence

The complex and inherently inconclusive process of developing intelligence estimates of the unconventional weapons programs of already opaque states presented a number of opportunities for advocates of competing strategic cultures. Much of the Clinton Administration's defense of vetoing the 1996 National Defense Authorization Act, which called for a national missile defense system, centered on a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that stated, "No country, other than the major declared nuclear powers, will develop or otherwise acquire a ballistic missile in the next 15 years that could threaten the contiguous 48 states and Canada."¹⁰³ Republican lawmakers strongly challenged the conclusions of the 1995 NIE, and took the unusual step of requesting the General Accounting Office (GAO) to examine the methodology of the report immediately following Clinton's veto, and held hearings further questioning the NIE findings.¹⁰⁴

Fundamentally, the disagreements over the 1995 NIE were a manifestation of the respective strategic cultural assumptions of the opponents. Findings of the report were

¹⁰¹ 'National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 – Veto Message From The President of the United States', *Congressional Record*, January 3, 1996, H. Doc. No. 104-155

¹⁰² William J. Clinton, 'Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996', *Public Papers of the Presidents*, February 10, 1996, pp. 226, 227

¹⁰³ DCI National Intelligence Estimate, President's Summary, 'Emerging Missile Threats to North America During the Next 15 Years', PS/NIE 95-19, November 1995,

<http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/offdocs/nie9519.htm>, (Accessed July 15, 2007)

¹⁰⁴ General Accounting Office, 'Foreign Missile Threats: Analytic Soundness of National Intelligence Estimate 95-19, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-53, December 4, 1996; Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hearing on Intelligence Analysis on the Long-Range Missile Threat to the United States', http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1996_hr/s961204.htm, (accessed July 15, 2007)

either embraced or rejected based on whether they supported or contradicted existing assumptions and preferences. Highlighting such fundamentally conflicting interpretations of the ‘facts’, an intelligence official tasked with briefing the White House and Congress in 1998 on ballistic missile threats recalled the widely divergent conclusions that were reached from the same briefing depending solely on the makeup of the audience. After presenting his briefing at the White House, Clinton Administration officials concluded the threats to be “modest but manageable” and would “certainly not call for the creation of an expensive national missile defense.” A few days later after presenting an identical briefing to Republicans in Congress, his audience concluded the ballistic missile development constituted “a significant and growing” threat that “clearly warranted the development of an effective ballistic missile defense system.”¹⁰⁵

The issue of ballistic missile intelligence highlights the tensions inherent to the relationship between the policymaking and intelligence communities concerning the use of intelligence to support policy objectives.¹⁰⁶ In attempting to justify divergent interpretations of the intelligence presented, liberals tended to emphasize the *estimates* expressed by the intelligence community, while conservatives tended to emphasize the *uncertainties* expressed by the intelligence community.¹⁰⁷ As the intelligence debate over missile threats continued, liberal strategic cultural biases favored motive-dependent intelligence, which analyzed *likely* threats, while conservative strategic cultural biases sought to emphasize capabilities-dependent intelligence that placed analytical weight on the broader category of *potential* threats.¹⁰⁸ Such a divide over motives vs. capabilities reflected basic assumptions about the rationality of adversarial regimes. If, as assumed by a strategic culture informed by neoconservatism, the motives of states such as Iraq or

¹⁰⁵ Unnamed intelligence official interviewed by Jason D. Ellis, quoted in Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation, p. 5

¹⁰⁶ For an excellent in-depth examination of these tensions, see Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (Second Edition), (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2003) pp. 142-173

¹⁰⁷ John P. Casciano, ‘Intelligence Challenges’ in Peter Hays, Vincent J. Jodoin and Alan R. Van Tassel (eds.), Countering the Proliferation and Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1998), pp. 281-302; see also Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation, Ch. 4

¹⁰⁸ Testimony of Robert Walpole, National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs, National Intelligence Council, Hearing before the International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000), February 9, 2000, S. Hrg. 106-671

North Korea were ideologically determined, then only knowledge of their potential capabilities would be required to determine U.S. defense requirements.

Ultimately, Republican lawmakers, unsatisfied with the findings of the NIE, called for an independent commission led by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, to study the ballistic missile threat to the United States. The final report of the commission arrived at dramatically different conclusions than had the National Intelligence Estimate four years prior, stating, “The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community.”¹⁰⁹ A central methodological departure from the 1995 NIE was the shift in emphasis from *likely* to *potential* threats.¹¹⁰ This difference between the Commission Report and the assessments of the U.S. Intelligence Community echoed the emerging emphasis in the Department of Defense on capabilities-based planning over threat-based planning.¹¹¹ Such capabilities based planning appealed to conservative strategic cultural biases for robust defense planning, as it counted a far greater number of potential threats than would be considered than if complex calculations of motive needed to be factored.

The discursive framing and eventual policy response of national missile defenses raises the issue that serious domestic political contests for representational rights of a state’s strategic culture open transformative opportunities for policies, allowing them to be altered perhaps unrecognizably from their original intent by combinations of political maneuvering and organizational processes. For counterproliferation policy, that meant a transformation ultimately reflective of both the drive for uncertainty avoidance pursued by DOD, and the stated pessimism about the international security environment, likelihood of conflict and assumptions about the efficacy of military force assumed by conservative strategic culture.

¹⁰⁹ Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm> (accessed July 17, 2007)

¹¹⁰ Testimony of Robert Walpole, February 9, 2000

¹¹¹ See previous chapter

Interpreting the proliferation events of 1998: solutions in search of problems

If the defenders of traditional nonproliferation norms and practices were already reeling from the sustained political onslaught, very little of what occurred during 1998 gave them cause to celebrate. On March 11, India conducted the first of 5 underground nuclear tests, catching both US policymakers and the US intelligence community by surprise.¹¹² Two months later, Pakistan responded with 6 underground nuclear tests of its own, stoking fears in the west of a new nuclear arms race in Asia. In the following months, Iran and North Korea both tested new medium-range missiles capable of striking Israel and Japan respectively. By December, years of Iraqi resistance to UN weapons inspections teams resulted in Operation Desert Fox, with the US military striking Iraqi targets in order to “demonstrate to Saddam Hussein the consequences of violating international obligations”¹¹³ and effectively ending the UN disarmament mission.

The long argued conservative ‘solution’ of national missile defense seemed to have finally found its tangible ‘problem’, echoing John Kingdon’s conclusion that more often than not in the American political process, policy ‘solutions’ tend to precede problems.¹¹⁴ Legislators often promote pet policy solutions over the long term, and generally irrespective of tangible strategic threats, as opposed to the traditional rational model of problem identification, proposal of alternatives, and choice of policy alternative to achieve a specified goal. Events such as the proliferation shocks of 1998 open policy windows for old solutions to be attached to new problems.¹¹⁵ The events of 1998 thus

¹¹² The widely held storyline of intelligence surprise by the Indian nuclear tests was vigorously denied by a former CIA analyst who stated, “It was not the event of the nuclear tests, but the specific timing that surprised us. We knew tests were being prepared and had informed policymakers accordingly, but were off by a matter of days in our predictions. Since a number of policymakers had not prepared their public statements on the tests, the general assumption was that the tests had come as a surprise... an assumption that remained unchallenged by those policymakers who sought to shift responsibility to the intelligence community.” Interview with Dr. Thomas G. Ward, CIA Officer in Residence, US Air Force Academy, September 19, 2000.

¹¹³ Department of Defense, ‘Operation Desert Fox: Mission Goals’, http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/desert_fox/ (accessed August 3, 2007)

¹¹⁴ John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy* (2nd ed.), (New York: Longman, 2003), p. 203

¹¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 166-179

served as a tipping point, helping shift the balance of political momentum in favor of conservative policy approaches to proliferation.

In a reversal of long held opposition to the fielding of an NMD system in the near-term, President Clinton signed into law the National Missile Defense Act on July 22, 1999.¹¹⁶ By signing the National Missile Defense Act late in his administration, Clinton accepted the premise of an NMD system, but essentially deferred difficult choices about ultimate compliance with the ABM Treaty to his successor. Some political analysts identified this as merely an attempt to deny Republicans an advantage in the coming 2000 election.¹¹⁷ Finally, in a stinging political defeat for the Clinton Administration, on October 14, 1999, the U.S. Senate voted against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, effectively dooming the hopes that the treaty could serve to strengthen and expand existing nonproliferation norms.¹¹⁸ Both the compromise and defeat served notice at the end of the Clinton Administration that conservative strategic cultural preferences on responses to proliferation threats were now presenting substantive challenges to the foundations of traditional deterrence and nonproliferation policy. A more muscular counterproliferation, militarily oriented towards a wide range of possible adversarial capabilities, and politically oriented towards challenging adversarial identity had now established itself as the most politically and organizationally powerful alternative.

Conclusions

The period examined by this chapter featured a number of important indications that traditional policies of nonproliferation and deterrence were declining in prominence. From the defeat of major nonproliferation policy legislation such as the Comprehensive

¹¹⁶ The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 'National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet', May 20, 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030520-15.html> (accessed July 10, 2007); see also United States Senate, 'National Missile Defense Act of 1999', *Congressional Record*, January 22, 1999, S. 269

¹¹⁷ John E. Pike, 'National Missile Defense: Rushing to Failure', *Journal of the Federation of American Scientists*, Vol. 52, No. 6, (November/December 1999)

¹¹⁸ The vote totals were 51 opposed to ratification and 48 supporting ratification, with 67 votes required for ratification. The United States was one of 22 signatories required to ratify the Treaty before it could go into effect. See, Excerpts from news conference by Senator Trent Lott, 'Defeat of a Treaty; Lott's View: 'It Was Not About Politics, It Was About the Substance'', *New York Times*, October 15, 1999, p. 15

Test Ban Treaty, to the broad funding for robust counterforce capabilities and active forward defenses such as National Missile Defense, the norms and institutions of NP and deterrence were being challenged by CP policy alternatives at every turn. CP as envisioned by conservative supporters held a far more pessimistic view of the nature of the international security environment. It assumed the inevitable use of unconventional weapons against the United States by irrational, undeterrable actors such as “rogue regimes” or terrorist organizations, and also assumed a more effective role for the use of military force in addressing the threat of proliferation. By the end of the 1990’s, not only was CP ascendant in the legitimacy of conceptual and policy terms, but as the previous chapter addressed, an offensively transformed CP was well on its way to being effectively institutionalized as the primary form of proliferation response by the US military.

What accounts for this shift in US conceptions about the problems of proliferation? Explanations that rely on RAM assumptions must ignore or discount two important areas addressed by this chapter. The first is to deem the sustained political competition between liberal and conservative policymakers as either insignificant, or as somehow part of a broader national effort to seek out a unitary rational response to external stimuli. Second would be the need to assume that the major proliferation “events” of the decade such as the unexpected Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests, or North Korean ballistic missile tests of 1998, led to rational policy responses such as the signing of the National Missile Defense Act and rejection of the CTBT in 1999. As the material in this chapter has demonstrated, the potential of such external stimuli to change relative power positions was both deeply contested and *preceded* by years of sustained political discourse advocating divergent policy approaches.

The chapter has argued that the conceptual and policy shifts in favor of CP over NP and deterrence were the result of sustained political discourse and institutionalization, which due to legislative majority and highly coordinated discursive strategies, were dominated throughout much of the 1990’s by representatives of conservative strategic culture. Conservatives in power were highly effective at promoting their strategic culture

preferences, forcing compromises from an Administration struggling to defend its domestic agenda, and limiting restrictive oversight and appropriations pressures on military CP programs in areas such as active defenses and counterforce capabilities. By the time the proliferation events of 1998 arrived, ‘solutions’ were already in place for the strategic problems that presented themselves in dramatic public fashion, further weakening opposition to conservative strategic culture derived policy preferences. By the end of 1999, the political defeats and compromises made by the Clinton Administration left counterproliferation considerably strengthened in both material capability and policy prominence, while nonproliferation norms and practices were significantly weakened.

This chapter has examined two major strategic cultures competing for policy dominance in the United States, each with distinct sets of assumptions and policy prescriptions for addressing proliferation threats. Though it would be tempting to assume that the struggles between these two groups were simply over individual policy outcomes, it is more accurate to say their struggles were over the broader *legitimacy* of their approaches. The establishment of normative beliefs in a contested political environment is a zero-sum game whereby legitimacy cannot be conferred upon one set of policy concepts until another has been delegitimized. However, it is difficult to quantify issues such as legitimization when dealing with government policies and the normative beliefs that support them. When does one normative belief cross the threshold into broad acceptance as legitimate? When can we say that a competing norm has been delegitimized?¹¹⁹

The measure of “enough” individuals supporting an emergent set of normative beliefs to tilt the balance of capabilities towards broad legitimacy and support for those norms depends on the context in question. In the case of those supporting the unilateral application of offensive military force to prevent or roll back unconventional weapons capabilities, there is no single point in the period examined where a fundamental change in the balance of power towards those supporting the emergent norms underpinning CP can be said to have become dominant. Rather, it is the cumulative effects of several years

¹¹⁹ Similar epistemological arguments over vagueness discuss the nature of this problem of perception and agreement in areas resistant to quantification. See for example, Trenton Merricks, “Varieties of Vagueness”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol 62, No. 1, (January, 2001), pp. 145–157.

of strategic cultural competition that yields a better picture of the challenges for CP legitimization at the expense of NP and deterrence. The clothing of these conceptions “with such an aura of factuality that the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious” was an ongoing process that gained momentum, but was by no means completed by the end of the period in question.¹²⁰ Representatives of conservative strategic culture had made much headway in their discursive struggles to legitimize CP, as evidenced by the broad acceptance of their politically charged discourse, the significant policy battles won by CP, and the support given to the ongoing process of CP institutionalization by the DOD.

The following chapter will examine how these two interdependent forces for legitimizing new normative beliefs fundamental to CP and the institutionalization of CP capabilities and concepts within the DOD shaped the landscape of choice for the decisionmakers of the Bush Administration. Though this combination of emergent norms and capabilities institutionalization had begun at the end of the Cold War, and continued without much public notice throughout the 1990’s, it wasn’t until the policy responses to the attacks of 9/11 that the more offensively oriented CP, with its emphasis on the political identity of proliferators rather than merely their capabilities dramatically brought to public attention the policy changes that had been many years in the making.

¹²⁰ Alasdair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking About Strategic Culture’, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring, 1995), pp. 45, 54

Chapter 6

The Path to Preemptive Counterproliferation: 1999-2002

The strategic cultural battles of the Clinton years had left U.S. nonproliferation policy in a state of disarray, with conflicting messages sent both to the international community on America's support for the NP regime, and to the relevant domestic bureaucracies concerning the prioritization of their nonproliferation and counterproliferation programs and policies.¹ Without strong civilian oversight of a DOD counterproliferation policy oriented directly at supporting traditional nonproliferation norms and enforcement mechanisms, the bottom-up institutionalization of CP in the regional combat commands led to a far more militarized policy than had been originally envisioned. Regional commanders concerned with likely adversarial capabilities now drove the development of CP capabilities. Their utilitarian approach to the *means* of CP policy was not always clearly coordinated with civilian leaders still concerned with the *ends* of overall policy responses to proliferation.

Although the DOD was correct in assuming it had succeeded in providing more options to policy makers seeking to respond to the threat posed by the proliferation of unconventional weapons, by the end of the Clinton Administration, such options existed within a much narrower range of overall policy orientations than had been envisioned when the DCI was created. With years of fractious legislative battles over defense priorities and capabilities funding creating weakened civilian oversight, the CP orientation of the DOD more closely reflected the organizational biases and traditional mission preferences of the military itself. Such a narrowing of the boundaries of CP policy allowed not only a more offensive doctrine regarding proliferation threats to emerge, but gave future decisionmakers far more opportunity to see proliferation responses from an essentially utilitarian, technological perspective, rather than the traditional normative political and economic perspectives of the NP regime.

¹ Such mixed messages were well summarized at the time in, Gilles Andréani, 'The Disarray of U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy', *Survival*, (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 42-61

The arrival of the Bush Administration in 2000 brought into office a group of policymakers that carried with them many of the conservative strategic cultural assumptions regarding threats posed by the coupling of illiberal regimes and WMD capabilities.² The group brought with it the skepticism of multilateral institutions long held by bearers of conservative strategic culture, but conceptualized in a more activist form. Many accounts of this period forward explanations for the policy shift that focus on either the personal preferences of the senior Administration leadership, or on intra-Administration struggles representing traditional bureaucratic power plays.³

This chapter challenges accounts that attribute major CP policy change to the decisions and individual preferences of senior Bush Administration officials.⁴ It will be argued that while the central policymakers of the Bush Administration were certainly important in prioritizing and articulating policy, their role in ‘shaping’ CP was largely one of giving special prominence to policy responses designed, legitimated and institutionalized by those who had come before them, and putting those policy priorities into action. Much of what contemporary observers attribute to the unique conceptual biases of the senior members of the Bush Administration – a skepticism of multilateral institutions, an extreme view of “rogue regimes” that set a high expectation for military conflict with these states, a strong view of the utility for proactive use of U.S. military force in addressing post-Cold War security threats – were largely pre-existing conceptions, rather than unique cognitive products of these figures. Much of their early policy efforts and articulations of CP policy drew together many of these earlier conceptualizations “legitimized” by their conservative strategic cultural predecessors, and enabled by a

² On of the most detailed and respected accounts of the figures central to the Bush Administration is provided by James Mann, in Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet, (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 2004); see also Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003)

³ Most of the accounts focusing on the supposed ‘neocon’ aspect of the senior Bush Administration fall into this category. See Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay and James B. Steinberg, ‘The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation’, *The Brookings Institution Policy Brief*, no. 109, (October 2002); Gary Dorrien, Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana (London: Routledge, 2004)

⁴ Examples include Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence and Security Policy, Ch. 1; and Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, (New York, Palgrave, 2003) Ch. 28

military organization advocating a utilitarian, capabilities-driven approach to defense planning.

A supposedly revolutionary policy response that largely entailed selecting from a policy menu prepared by their predecessors in the executive, legislature and DOD illustrates the crucial role played by political legitimization of threat conceptions and the institutionalization of policy responses, especially in the wake of major national crises. Indeed, documentary evidence demonstrates that essential CP concepts embedded in the 2002 NSS were already being formulated into coherent policy before the attacks of 9/11.

The state of CP Policy at the end of the 1990's

As discussed in the previous chapter, by the end of the 1990's the DOD was moving steadily towards a CP mission weighted more towards assertive, proactive military action than NP regime support, one more focused towards preventative force options than force protection. In many ways, the Pentagon was shifting its actual operational weight towards the “secondary thrust of the [DCI]... to provide the Commander-In-Chief with the tools to disarm an adversary unilaterally if necessary, before an adversary can initiate the use of WMD.”⁵

Operation Desert Fox and the cruise missile attack on the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan marked the distinct departure point for the DOD in operational terms from earlier definitions of CP.⁶ No longer simply supporting multilateral NP regimes, but effectively acting as an alternative via unilateral coercive strategies intended to rollback NBC/M capabilities, CP represented a radical redefinition of ‘prevention’ in proliferation terms. Both CP and NP were argued to support the norm of nonproliferation by giving enforcement measures some bite, but enforcement emerged in practice largely as unilateral military coercion, rather than multilateral mechanisms based upon non-discriminatory NP norms.

⁵ Barry R. Schneider, ‘Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation’, *McNair Paper 41*, (May 1995), National Defense University, p. v.

⁶ See Ellis and Kiefer, Combating Proliferation, pp. 154-166

The direct normative challenge of both military strikes to the traditional approaches of NP and deterrence were mitigated by their stated linkage to larger issues; terrorist support in the case of Sudan, and defiance of UN sanctions and NP regime enforcement in the case of Desert Fox. Indeed, only 11 of the nearly 100 air strikes in Iraq were targeted at so-called WMD sites, and the majority of those were related to Iraqi ballistic missile programs.⁷ However, both operations marked an important turning point for overall U.S. policy on controlling the spread of unconventional weapons, as part of the stated rationale for both sets of military strikes was the prevention of unconventional weapons capabilities by the respective target states.

By the final years of the Clinton Administration, evidence of this evolutionary shift in organizational perceptions about the role of CP in relation to NP was illustrated in the public pronouncements of the senior DOD officials tasked with formulating, implementing and institutionalizing CP policy. While still holding to relatively traditional umbrella definitions of NP and CP, the use of force in addressing proliferation threats was much more clearly identified as central to the military mission of CP, serving to quietly shift the overall emphasis of policy away from support of NP. Attempting to minimize this shift, senior defense officials often described the threat or use of military force as intended to support nonproliferation through ‘coercive diplomacy’ or ‘forcible threat reduction’.⁸ Such actions and related justifications seemed to confirm the early suspicions of critics concerned that CP would ultimately pave the way for challenging the diplomatic and economic methods of NP policy with the use of preventative or preemptive force.⁹

⁷ William S. Cohen, General Hugh Shelton, and Rear Admiral Thomas Wilson, DOD News Briefing on Operation Desert Fox, December 18, 1998, http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/1998/12/18/t12181998_t1218sd.html (accessed December 8, 2007)

⁸ Dr. James N. Miller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Requirements, Plans and Counterproliferation Policy, Remarks as delivered, The 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11-12, 1999

⁹ David Fischer, ‘Forcible Counterproliferation: Necessary? Feasible?’, in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Müller (ed.), *International Perspective on Counterproliferation*, (Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1995), pp. 11-24

It is questionable how much the attacks achieved in the mitigation of proliferation threats. However, the significance of the application of overt military force in departing from a troubled and now contradictory NP mission should not be overlooked. For military planners, whether intended by the Clinton Administration or not, both operations signaled that preemptive CP activities would become central to their proliferation response mission, putting into action the CP funding priorities of the past five years. Indeed, the funding category, “NP diplomacy support” had fallen from 5th to a distant 15th out of 15 DOD funding priorities for CP policy by 1998.¹⁰ The miniscule budget for support of the NP regime and multilateral enforcement measures had long since been quietly redistributed and prioritized to the Department of Energy, whose resources and expertise were suited largely to the verification of export control regulations, rather than meaningful enforcement mechanisms.¹¹

Senior DOD officials responsible for CP policy described a post-UNSCOM world as one where the appeal to NP norms and traditional NP regime mechanisms did not figure as centrally in addressing perceived proliferation threats. As a senior Pentagon official tasked with managing the institutionalization of counterproliferation policy within the DOD stated in 1999,

While nonproliferation should be our first objective, proliferation has occurred and will occur despite our best efforts to prevent it. We cannot allow and we cannot rely entirely and solely on diplomatic efforts to solve the problem. Determined proliferators have and will continue to overcome treaties in moderate regimes.¹²

Finally, a ‘new’ concept of deterrence was articulated; one not simply threatening punishment in the case of unconventional weapons *use*, but threatening punishment in the case of unconventional capabilities *development* by target states.¹³ Crucially, senior DOD officials still viewed CP (at least publicly) as complimentary to NP, in that giving CP

¹⁰ Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation and Chemical and Biological Defense, ‘Counterproliferation Program Review Committee Annual Report to Congress Executive Summaries’, (May, 1998), <http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/reports.html>, (Accessed – 10 June, 2003)

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Mitchel Wallerstein, (former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counterproliferation), remarks as prepared, 7th Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, D.C., January 11-12, 1999

“teeth” would ultimately serve to strengthen the NP regime and deterrence strategies. Yet as a critical distinction from their conservative strategic cultural counterparts in the legislature, CP was valued by military leaders because of the implicit assumption of rationality in adversarial states. States whose leaders understood U.S. willingness to take substantive, and potentially devastating preventative military action to stop proliferation activities were assumed less likely to initiate such capabilities development in the first place:

The potential economic costs and risks to national security – and, indeed, to a government’s very political survival – may be perceived as substantially outweighing any possibility of attaining short-term, asymmetrical, political / military advantage. If this message can be driven home convincingly, bilateral and multilateral political and diplomatic solutions to regional proliferation problems may be increasingly viable and attractive to the parties at interest.¹⁴

Considering the stated objectives of the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, announced in 1993, combined with the agreed definitions and missions for CP and NP dictated by the NSC shortly thereafter, the question of how CP under the DOD shifted so dramatically in orientation must be addressed. Although the previous chapter examined some ways in which competing strategic cultures opened funding windows for DOD CP programs, further examination of the interaction between civilian oversight and mission identification by the DOD should be made in order to assess both the natural doctrinal biases of the military, and the organizational assumptions particular to the militarization of CP policy.

Organizational forces driving the further offensive militarization of CP

Some insight into how this transformation came about within the DOD can be found in a United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report commissioned by a longtime legislative supporter of increased DOD CP funding, Representative Floyd D. Spence (R-SC).¹⁵ The committee chaired by Spence had repeatedly increased funding for

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ This office was, until July 2004 named the General Accounting Office. Special thanks to Arturo Holguin, Policy Analyst, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) for his explanation of the role of

DOD CP programs, and the GAO was requested to review the DOD's implementation of the DCI because, "there have been Congressional committee concerns expressed about the direction and DOD's management of the counterproliferation program."¹⁶ Taking as its starting point the assertion in the DOD's 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review that a key challenge for the Department was to institutionalize counterproliferation as an *organizing principle* in every facet of military activity, the GAO report examined how successful the Department had been in achieving that goal. Thus, taking the Department's own assumptions about the CP mission as a given, the GAO report provides a unique historical perspective into the institutionalization and transformation of CP.¹⁷

The report confirms many of the steps taken towards implementation of the DCI as described by other participants and observers.¹⁸ Prominent in the GAO analysis is a picture of the DOD leadership responsible for CP policy as having successfully integrated CP planning, training and capabilities into the regional combatant commands, fostering a bottom-up implementation of the DCI.¹⁹ However, the GAO findings concluded that more needed to be done to formulate a "comprehensive strategy for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and a military strategy for integrating offensive and defensive capabilities."²⁰ Additionally, the report recommended that the DOD work to coordinate overall doctrine and planning more fully across all levels of the Department, and strive to quantify the success of the department's stated goal of rolling back proliferation.²¹

the GAO and its reports. Interview with Arturo Holguin, 8 August 2007. Spence was the chair of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives

¹⁶ What precisely those concerns may have been is unknown. United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction: DOD's Actions to Combat Weapons Use Should Be More Integrated and Focused', May 2000, GAO/NSIAD-00-97, p. 3

¹⁷ This report is particularly invaluable, as many of its sources are DOD policy planning documents that remain classified as of this writing. Thus, although an imperfect guide to DOD thinking on CP throughout the end of the 1990's, the GAO report serves as a vital bridge for analyzing the gap between policy implementation and policy outcomes.

¹⁸ Interviews with Rebecca Hersman, John P. Caves, and Hanry Sokolski.

¹⁹ GAO, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction', p. 6

²⁰ Ibid. pp. 6,7

²¹ Ibid, p. 23

Aside from acknowledging the existence of an offensive CP doctrine, particularly the fact that offensive counterforce planning was already being integrated into joint doctrine documents, the report's definition of CP, taken from the DOD itself, serves to illustrate how much the DOD's understanding of the CP mission and mandate had changed in the six years since the Poneman Memo:²²

Counterproliferation is the activities of DOD to combat the spread of NBC capabilities and the means to deliver them. The offensive component of counterproliferation (referred to as "counterforce") includes actions taken to defeat NBC targets, such as mobile missile launchers, and NBC weapons production and storage facilities. The defensive component includes "active defense," which are actions taken to destroy enemy NBC weapons and delivery vehicles while en route to their targets; "passive defense," which are measures taken to help U.S. forces survive and operate in an NBC environment, such as biological and chemical agent detectors and protective clothing and masks; and "consequence management," which refers to efforts to mitigate the consequences resulting from the use of an NBC weapon, such as the decontamination of weapon systems and equipment and casualty evacuation. Consequence management measures are often included in passive defense.²³

Gone from this re-definition was any emphasis on support for the NP regime, diplomacy, arms control or export controls as earlier implied in the Poneman Memo definitions. In its 21st Century incarnation, CP had become fully militarized, reflecting the 'success' of CP institutionalization by being imbedded into the central mission, force planning and training of the services and regional commands. Such a transformation in emphasis should not come as a surprising outcome of the bottom-up institutionalization sought by civilian leaders. The combat commands are focused on the concrete requirements of warfighting, not the abstract requirements for creating policy or doctrine consistent with established normative traditions.

The GAO report reflected a military organization in which, "forcible threat reduction" stood as a commonly accepted tool for accomplishing military missions and reducing the uncertainty posed by unconventional weapons. Despite whatever may have been

²² On this point, the GAO report references the now declassified document: JCS, 'Joint Doctrine for Countering Air and Missile Threats', Joint Publication 3-01, Oct. 19, 1999. Available from: www.fas.org/spp/starwars/docops/jp3_01.pdf (accessed October 15, 2007)

²³ GAO, 'Weapons of Mass Destruction', p. 3

articulated at the civilian leadership level about the ends of such policy, regional warfighting commands were concerned with the effective means of combat – means that by their nature could serve any number of possible policy ends.

The movement of the DOD on CP policy, spurred on towards certain funding priorities by an activist conservative legislature, served to both reinforce conservative strategic cultural threat perceptions, and again narrowed the range of future options for decision makers. While in purely instrumental terms it may have appeared to DOD officials that the development of CP capabilities only served to offer more “choices to the President,” the practical effect was to offer a wider array of individual force options within an overall narrowed structure of approaches to the problem.²⁴ The understandable shifting of DOD focus to CP methods that aligned with its organizational strengths – namely the application of military force – worked to marginalize the traditional mechanisms of the NP regime in the long-term, absent tighter civilian control to the contrary.

Such organizational limitations would become crucial for an incoming administration attempting to formulate and articulate a coherent policy response to support its conceptions of proliferation threats.

Conservative Strategic Culture in Office

Aside from emboldening Republican supporters of a strengthened U.S. military, the election of George W. Bush brought into office senior civilian officials with established conservative strategic culture credentials as fierce critics of the nonproliferation regime and arms-control policies. Figures such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had been active in earlier conservative efforts aimed at promoting missile defenses as a necessary policy response to unconventional weapons proliferation in ‘rogue regimes’.²⁵ These key figures helped to

²⁴ Interview with Ronald M. Sega.

²⁵ As discussed in the previous chapter, Rumsfeld was particularly significant in leading the commission that had been tasked by Republican lawmakers with challenging the 1995 National Intelligence Estimate on Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States. See Executive Summary of the Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bm-threat.htm> (accessed July 17, 2007)

strengthen the growing assertion within the administration that nonproliferation had failed, deterrence was unreliable, and that a policy of muscular counterproliferation was needed to reverse the proliferation trend in “rogue” states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The sentiments of this group echoed the larger undercurrent of more conservative approaches to U.S. foreign policy, pushing away from multilateral, institutional engagement towards a strategy of unilateral protection of U.S. interests.²⁶

Though the personalities and apparent policy biases of senior Bush Administration officials have been well covered in a number of other sources, it is worth briefly mentioning debates over relative ideational stances within the Administration.²⁷ Though conservative strategic cultural biases and preferences are argued to have been prevalent among most major figures in the Administration, this classification should not be considered monolithic. Particular emphasis has been placed on the division between figures such as Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice as moderate conservatives embracing skepticism towards the casual application of force to address strategic threats and favoring more multilateral approaches to security issues, and others such as Rumsfeld and Vice President Dick Cheney as generally favoring more a more unilateral, activist application of force towards a wider range of national security interests.²⁸

This division between ‘multilateralists’ and ‘unilateralists’, however, was never a particularly accurate description of policy divisions within the administration, and numerous scholars have qualified these divisions with labels ranging from ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’, to ‘democratic imperialists’ and ‘assertive nationalists’.²⁹ Many accounts have

²⁶ Walker, ‘Nuclear order’, p. 713

²⁷ Significant accounts of officials within the Bush Administration include, Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*; Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*, Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*; Dueck, ‘Ideas and Alternatives in American Grand Strategy’, and Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002)

²⁸ It is questionable how much this division had to do with fundamental policy differences, and how much had to do with a long history of skepticism and personal distaste between these individuals. See Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, p. 239

²⁹ For ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’, see Michael J. Mazarr, ‘George W. Bush, Idealist’, *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 3, (2003), pp. 503-522; for ‘democratic imperialists’ and ‘assertive nationalists’, see Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound*, pp. 15, 16

also featured an essential grouping of neoconservatives who are argued to have played a significant role in shaping Bush Administration policy on issues as diverse as missile defense and the Kyoto Protocol.³⁰ It is notable, however, that despite a strong representation in the Administration as a whole, no principle posts were filled by neoconservatives.³¹

Important issue clustering relative to CP could be indicated by those who could be counted as holding a more identifiably neoconservative perspective on ideationally determined threat perceptions, and those who did not hold such strong ideational biases, but still strongly departed from the multilateralism of the Clinton Administration on proliferation issues. If anything, figures such as Colin Powell, and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice represented a conservative strategic culture position with proliferation threat perceptions closer to those that had DOD institutionalization of CP - highly focused on potential capabilities threats, and thus complimentary to neoconservative positions in terms of the application of military means - rather than a genuine opposition to the more ideationally determinate positions of figures like Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, John Bolton and others. The Administration was by no means split along a liberal – conservative divide, but featured varying degrees of conservative strategic cultural bias. Arguably, deep divisions over policy in the early months of the Administration were often overstated in media coverage, rather than supported by accounts of administration insiders, perhaps as the result of reporters hoping to identify forms of palace intrigue that had been so prominent within the Clinton Administration.³²

In the area of proliferation threats, the biases and assumptions of conservative strategic culture towards the international security environment generally prevailed, leaving no

³⁰ Daalder and Lindsay, *America Unbound*; Halper and Clarke, *America Alone*

³¹ Although figures such as Rumsfeld had been longtime supporters of many neoconservative causes, particularly missile defenses and the removal of Saddam Hussein, such as articulated in the now famous Project for the New American Century letter to President Clinton in 1998, urging him to work towards removing Saddam Hussein from power, a letter also signed by Abrams, Armitage, Wolfowitz and Bolton. See Project for the New American Century, 'Letter to President Clinton', January 26, 1998, <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm> (accessed June 5, 2004)

³² A representative example of such overstatement of divisions within the Administration is Jane Perlez, 'Bush Team's Counsel Is Divided on Foreign Policy', *New York Times*, March 27, 2001; for press coverage of clashes within the Clinton Administration inner circle, see Halberstam, *War in a time of peace*, Ch. 6

significant political or bureaucratic opposition to challenge the evolved terms of proliferation discourse emphasizing irrational adversarial identity and the lack of rationale for restraints on U.S. power. Unanimity from senior officials on all points of CP policy was not required to reinforce existing conservative threat perceptions, as the aggregate calls for policy response by the Administration were firmly in line with conservative strategic cultural preferences as a whole. Even more significant, the overall position of administration policymakers on proliferation issues was now strongly complimentary to the DOD's CP policy priorities, rather than weakly opposed or ambiguous, as had been the case for the Clinton Administration.

In line with the shift in military thinking towards capabilities-based planning were numerous Bush Administration officials widely recognized for their criticism of intelligence methodologies requiring 'validated' assessments of unconventional weapons development by so-called 'rogue states'.³³ These shared cultural assumptions were particularly heightened in proliferation issues, coupled as they were with a very weak intelligence track record on unconventional weapons, which was described by one former Clinton Administration official as, "always wrong... usually underestimating WMD capabilities, sometimes overestimating them, but always wrong."³⁴ More than simply a casual attitude towards fact finding in support of a political agenda, these sentiments reflected a conservative inclination towards worst-case scenario planning, similar to that prevalent military culture.³⁵ A military culture with offensive biases towards confronting potential adversarial capabilities meshed well with a strategic cultural offensive bias towards confronting adversarial identity.

Communicating Incoming Administration Policy Priorities

One of the very first foreign policy priorities announced by the incoming Administration was deployment of a working missile defense system. Declaration of the goal of National Missile Defense by the Bush Administration included eliminating the distinction between

³³ Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, pp. 240-242

³⁴ Interview with John P. Caves.

³⁵ Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*

theater and national defenses, and thus implicitly threatened compliance with the ABM Treaty.³⁶ Unlike the Clinton Administration before them, senior Bush Administration officials faced no significant domestic political opposition on the issue of missile defenses, and thus could largely empower the set menu of choice on the issue that had been prepared and legitimated by years of sustained discourse aimed at constructing ballistic missiles as an existential threat with a ‘common sense’ solution in the form of a comprehensive NMD.

The coordinated and highly effective machinery of policy advocacy and political communication utilized by the Administration represented an effort to situate potential political resistance to Administration policy positions within the issue boundaries set by the Administration itself. Their task was significantly aided by the inheritance of “legitimized” discourse on issues such as missile defense, WMD and rogue regimes. The terms of legitimate security discourse had already been successfully framed, enabling the Bush Administration to simply control the discourse in order to dedicate its time and political resources to shaping the methods of a redefined nonproliferation / counterproliferation mission, rather than expending energy legitimizing its policy vision.

The basic concepts of threat conception had been so clearly established by the time the Bush Administration arrived in office, that the mere invocation of the terms already carried deep and implicit conceptual baggage. And invoke such terms they did. In the first months in office, these terms were constantly repeated in policy pronouncements, press releases, press conferences and any other available public venue.³⁷ As one former public relations executive explained the purpose of such repetition,

If your messenger isn’t smart, but is incredibly certain, what do you do with him?
You send him out with very specific messages and the strict instructions not to

³⁶ For international arguments that the Clinton and later Bush Administration’s moves threatening the ABM Treaty would inherently undermine mutual deterrence norms, see those made by then Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Russian Federation, Igor Ivanov, ‘The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty’, *Foreign Affairs* (September / October 2000), pp. 22-38

³⁷ Susan D. Moeller, ‘Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction’, paper prepared for Advanced Methods of Cooperative Security Program at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), (March 9, 2004), pp. 25-34

talk about anything else. It's what we tell companies about talking to the media – it's not a dialogue, it's a presentation. If you limit and repeat your main points, then that's what the reporter writes. It's the only material you've given them.³⁸

Furthermore,

The Bush Administration had very consistent messaging. Everyone 'stayed on message', and the cumulative effect of such constant messaging is to create a wall of certainty and 'truth' that is very difficult for critics to effectively counter. The objective of their PR approach was to sell their policies and control the terms of debate, because if you have the only voice in the absence of all others, it becomes truth.³⁹

The Administration's political communication strategy was indeed a well-oiled machine of repetition and reinforcement of established conservative strategic cultural conceptions. In the case of NMD, for example, the Administration began with the implicit assumption that there was no serious debate over the legitimacy of missile defenses, but only minor debates over the implementation of the Missile Defense Act. Thus the task of political communication for the Bush Administration had fundamentally moved beyond the contentious identification of threats or even the selection of policy responses to proliferation. The closing years of the Clinton Administration had settled the major questions about valid responses through conservative strategic cultural political argumentation and liberal strategic cultural capitulation. The task was now conceptual reinforcement, institutional consolidation and policy implementation. Political "messaging" was now oriented largely towards the implementation of policy decisions.

Assessment of executive-legislative disagreements over the formerly contentious issues of missile defenses and arms control treaties, now directly challenged by the Bush Administration, reveals a surprisingly lack of legislative *resistance* efforts to propose, delay and shape the emerging policy.⁴⁰ However, such relative legislative inactivity on

³⁸ Former senior vice-president of Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide, Cherie Quaintance, interviews, August 13-15, 2007

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ A tendency notably critiqued during the Vietnam War by late Senator J. William Fulbright in his book, The Arrogance of Power, Quoted in Bert A. Rockman, 'The President, Executive, and Congress: The Same Old Story?' in Donald R. Kelley (ed.), Divided Power: The Presidency, Congress, and the Formulation of American Foreign Policy, (Little Rock: The University of Arkansas Press, 2005), pp. 21-25; See also Philip

the issues central to CP correlates well with Marie Henahan's findings on the cyclical nature of legislative activism, in that once central problem identification and alternative specification phases have ended, legislative activity ebbs during the actual implementation of policy.⁴¹

A major victory in the opposition to multilateral legal constraints on American power came with the abandonment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which had placed strict limitations on the development and testing of anti-ballistic missile systems for 28 years. Conservative supporters viewed the ABM treaty as a relic of the Cold War, and saw its abandonment as a critical step in protecting the U.S. interests from the threat of unconventional weapons armed adversaries.⁴² Critics saw the abandonment of the ABM treaty as raising the potential for future arms races, as the existing nuclear forces of countries like China would eventually lose their credible deterrent value.⁴³ A working missile defense system would remove the mutual vulnerability that lay at the heart of deterrence relationships. Additionally, since defensive gaps were much more technologically difficult to bridge than offensive gaps, abandonment threatened to destabilize the system of deterrence by once again raising the offensive value of nuclear weapons.⁴⁴

Abandonment of the ABM treaty also struck at the heart of the original nuclear bargain of the NPT – eventual disarmament by existing nuclear powers. The vast investment in ballistic missile defense seemed to indicate both that the United States was not interested in eventual disarmament, and that military solutions to proliferation were preferred over preventative political or legal solutions.⁴⁵ This threatened the norm of nonproliferation and the general nuclear order by sending the message that proliferation was inevitable,

J. Briggs, Making American Foreign Policy: President-Congress Relations From The Second World War to the Post-Cold War Era, (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), p. 179

⁴¹ Marie T. Henahan, Foreign Policy and Congress: An International Relations Perspective, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 146, 147

⁴² Thom Shanker, 'Rumsfeld in Russia: Less ABM, More Warm Ties', *New York Times*, August 11, 2001.

⁴³ Michael Sirak, 'Life after the ABM Treaty', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 25, (19 June, 2002), pp. 50-53

⁴⁴ Walker, 'Nuclear order', p. 718

⁴⁵ Robert Karinol, 'Interview: Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2 January, 2002), p. 32

deterrence unreliable and disarmament undesirable. As the new under secretary of defense for policy, Douglas J. Feith responded when questioned about the Administration's commitment to arms control treaties such as the ABM treaty and Chemical Weapons Convention:

If we make agreements that we can't enforce and that we have good reason to believe are going to be violated and are going to be open to countries that enter them cynically and in bad faith, the overall consequence of that over time is to cheapen the currency that we should really be preserving the value of.⁴⁶

Abandonment of the ABM Treaty marked one of the first concrete steps taken by the new Administration to actively promote into doctrine what had been developed through institutionalization within the DOD supported by conservative strategic cultural re-conceptualization over the past eight years. What supposedly justified a more offensive CP doctrine were not actual systemic changes in the international system, but a threat conception and policy response based on adversarial political identity for civilian decisionmakers, and potential adversarial capabilities for military leaders.⁴⁷ CP was clearly moving beyond traditional NP and deterrence expectations of restraint on power, and putting into practice a contrary approach entailing more active military pressure to head off the potential strengthening of certain target states.

Now this chapter will briefly examine a specific example of these convergent forces, in the articulation of a nascent national strategy to combat unconventional weapons proliferation set forth in an early 2001 policy speech by President Bush. This speech is significant in revealing Administration policy responses as a product of conservative strategic culture and DOD driven CP policy evolution before the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. In addition to clearly expressing conservative strategic cultural biases mated to DOD capabilities, the speech was the first indication of a policy shift that elevated an offensive military CP to the level of national policy in an open challenge to traditional NP and deterrence norms.

⁴⁶ Quoted in Thom Shanker, 'The World: Mr. Putin, Meet Mr. Bush; Who Needs Treaties?', *New York Times*, June 10, 2001

⁴⁷ Similar arguments for ideational, rather than structural forces as the primary determinant of American Foreign Policy orientation are made by Colin Dueck in, 'Ideas and alternatives in American grand strategy, 2000-2004', *Review of International Studies* (2004), No. 30, p. 521

Incorporation of DOD CP approaches and conservative threat conceptions into policy

In a May 1, 2001 speech at the National Defense University, President Bush presented the new approach to addressing the threats posed by the proliferation of unconventional weapons in a speech largely geared towards rationalizing the desire of the Administration to abandon the ABM Treaty. This speech contained the Administration's most comprehensive articulation to date of the threat from unconventional weapons proliferation. Spelling out ideationally determined proliferation threats, the speech represented a culmination of conservative strategic cultural reframing efforts on the issues of WMD and missile defense. Contrasting with newspaper reports of divides between major Administration figures on the issue of proliferation, this policy articulation had been partly written by Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, both of whom signed off on its final form and attended the speech.⁴⁸

The speech began by articulating a central conservative strategic cultural threat construction concerning the issue of rationality and responsibility. Signaling a clear Administration break from the non-discriminatory norms of the NP regime, Bush divided the issue of proliferation between those who possessed "nuclear forces" and those who were seeking "WMD's", arguing that during the Cold War, "few other nations had nuclear weapons, and most of those who did were *responsible* allies..."⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

President Bush then directly linked a perception of irresponsible adversarial identity to the threat from unconventional weapons proliferation, presenting the identity and motivation of unconventional weapons proliferators in direct opposition to the values and interests of the United States:

⁴⁸ George W. Bush, 'Remarks at the National Defense University', *Public Papers of the Presidents*, May 1, 2001, p. 471; also interview with Rebecca Hersman.

⁴⁹ George W. Bush, 'Remarks at the National Defense University', p. 471

...The list of these countries includes some of the world's least responsible states. Unlike the Cold War, today's most urgent threat stems not from thousands of ballistic missiles in Soviet hands but from a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life. They seek weapons of mass destruction to intimidate their neighbors and to keep the United States and other responsible nations from helping friends and allies... Like Saddam Hussein, some of today's tyrants are gripped by an implacable hatred of the United States of America. They hate our friends. They hate our values. They hate democracy and individual liberty. Many care little for the lives of their own people. In such a world, Cold War deterrence is no longer enough.⁵⁰

Bush continued with a pointed rejection of traditional views on deterrence, and a call for the U.S. to withdraw from the ABM treaty:

We must move beyond the constraints of the 30-year-old ABM Treaty. This treaty does not recognize the present or point us to the future; it enshrines the past. No treaty that prevents us from addressing today's threats, that prohibits us from pursuing technology to defend ourselves, our friends, and our allies is in our interests or in the interests of world peace... We should leave behind the constraints of an ABM Treaty that perpetuates a relationship based on distrust and mutual vulnerability.⁵¹

Such a reconstruction of deterrence sidelined questions of adversarial intention. No distinction would be made between the proliferation of unconventional weapons by adversaries in rational pursuit of national security objectives and proliferation as the result of expansionist or aggressive ambitions. Whereas the first implied a role for traditional conceptions of deference, the second implicitly called for preventative action to stop or rollback proliferation. By blurring the line between the two, the Bush Administration embraced a threat perception heavily weighted towards ideationally defined relationships, rather than those based upon individual estimations of intent. Though identifying a different source of proliferation threat than the DOD, the Administration perspective meshed seamlessly with DOD threat conceptions that sought to shift defense planning away from particular adversarial threats, to the wider range of all potential adversarial capabilities.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 472

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 472, 473

This synergy of compatible doctrinal assumptions also facilitated the upward flow of specific policy prescriptions from the DOD to the executive. A militarized approach to counterproliferation resulting from capabilities based defense planning within the DOD, now served as a template for Bush Administration officials seeking to map out a comprehensive conservative strategic culture policy. Specific policy assumptions articulated in the president's speech would have looked familiar to close observers of CP policy evolution within the DOD over the past five or six years, as they represented a broad adoption of military CP practices, elevated to the scale of national strategy. These policy pronouncements additionally represented an explicit rejection of liberal hopes for the maintenance and expansion of the traditional norms of nonproliferation policy.

Establishing an 'appropriate' U.S. policy response to this new class of proliferation threats, Bush concluded that, "Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defenses."⁵²

Deterrence had no role in addressing this threat, as assumptions of ideological determinism signaled to the Administration that adversarial states were incapable of being deterred. Nonproliferation was still useful, but only in the form of "*active nonproliferation*", which was Administration shorthand for targeted enforcement methods of coercive diplomacy backed by military force, a form of nonproliferation virtually unrecognizable to those familiar with NP throughout the Cold War.⁵³

The substance of the policy speech was essentially a reformulation of the DOD CP priorities that offered enhanced options for coercive diplomacy backed by military force, and a host of military force options that were suitable for offensive or preventative use. Such a policy may have been expected as the military component for a broader policy utilizing a broad range of foreign policy tools. However, the significant step taken by the Bush Administration in this speech was to borrow this highly militarized approach to counterproliferation and situate it as an effective replacement for the existing framework

⁵² Ibid., p. 472

⁵³ Interview with John P. Caves

of traditional NP policy focused on non-discriminatory economic and diplomatic methods. This speech marked an early signal that an offensive, ideationally discriminatory CP was not a secondary, or even equivalent component of a larger strategy, but was now for all intents and purposes the foundation of a national strategy to address proliferation threats.

Policy Response to 9/11

The final defining event that shaped an evolving counterproliferation policy was the response to the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001. While there is no need to examine the September 11th attacks in detail here, it is sufficient to recognize that the immediacy of threat to the United States posed by these attacks prompted rapid and widespread changes in many U.S. foreign policy priorities. The attacks of 9/11 were of monumental significance in altering the domestic political landscape of the United States and crystallizing conservative strategic cultural conclusions about the nature of certain security threats. While examining the full impact of 9/11 on U.S. foreign policy is outside the scope of this study, it is important to note that the attacks constituted a foreign policy ‘crisis’ with few parallels in American history.⁵⁴

Within weeks of the terrorist attacks, policy makers such as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld were publicly arguing that the United States must be prepared to undertake preemptive action on short notice against states that presented an imminent threat.⁵⁵ Additionally, both Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz argued that Saddam Hussein was intent on developing WMD capabilities and possibly providing such weapons to terrorists for use against the United States. Therefore, any U.S. led “war” on terrorism should include Iraq as a target.⁵⁶ Where once terrorism and the proliferation of unconventional weapons were seen as distinct threats, the very public and highly

⁵⁴ The surprise attacks drew many comparisons in both scope and national trauma to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and was the first large-scale attack on the continental U.S. since the War of 1812

⁵⁵ Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), p. 176

⁵⁶ Although Rumsfeld did not make the distinction, the type of action he envisioned against Iraq could only be called a preventative action rather than a preemptive action. Reminiscent of the rationale for the 1981 Osirak reactor attack, Rumsfeld viewed Iraqi nuclear capability as a threat to U.S. national security, though a *planned* nuclear capability could not be called an imminent threat. See *Ibid.*, p. 49

scrutinized U.S. response to September 11th had blurred the conceptual line between the two.

In many ways, this conflation of terrorist and unconventional weapons threats was a relatively minor conceptual step to take for a conservative strategic culture that had spent the years since the first Gulf War delegitimizing the assumption of adversarial rationality underpinning deterrence. In establishing a discursive space around WMD as a description of irrational identity, it made little conceptual difference whether those adversaries were state or non-state actors. Indeed, since the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway by an obscure Japanese cult in 1995, senior civilian and defense officials had been bundling terrorist and state production of WMD into the same threat construction on a regular basis.⁵⁷ WMD had quite definitively been transformed through sustained argumentative discourse from a description of weapons to a description of actor identity.

The momentum behind the newly prominent counterproliferation policy as a response to the September 11th attacks culminated in the United States explicitly reserving the right to preemption and enshrining it in a new strategic doctrine. This new “doctrine of preemption” was formally presented in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002, and given more detailed treatment in the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NSCWMD) of 2002.⁵⁸ Both of these documents feature the same conceptual blurring of the line between “rogue states” and undeterrable terrorists, paving the way for a combined strategy to meet both threats and the proliferation of unconventional weapons. The argument was also made that “rogue” regimes not only shared the irrationality of terrorists, but that they actively supported terrorists and that WMD in the

⁵⁷ Department of Defense, ‘Annual Report to Congress and the President, 1996,’ http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr_intro.html (accessed, April 22, 2008); The White House, ‘A National Security Strategy for a New Century’, October 1998, Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Proliferation: Threat and Response* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 2001); see also the series of essays in Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and Bradley A. Thayer (eds.), *America's Achilles' Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack*, (Cambridge MA: The MIT Press, 1998)

⁵⁸ The White House, ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (September 2002), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (Accessed - 10 February, 2003); and ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, (December 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf> (Accessed 11 July, 2003)

hands of rogue regimes would invariably end up in the hands of terrorists. It was then argued that because the United States was facing such a qualitatively new threat,

We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. ...Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first.⁵⁹

Further establishing a strategic doctrine based on unilateral interpretations of security, the NSCWMD opened the door to further relegitimization of nuclear weapons through its language on meeting threats posed by unconventional weapons proliferation:

U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies must possess *the full range of operational capabilities* to counter the threat and use of WMD by states and terrorists against the United States, our military forces, and friends and allies. ...The United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force – *including through resort to all our options* – to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, and friends and allies.⁶⁰ (emphasis added)

In making a formal break from past nonproliferation policy, the NSCWMD made no mention of disarmament, nor any efforts to limit U.S. nuclear stockpiles.

Counterproliferation efforts in this policy document to “devalue the importance” of unconventional weapons included the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons designed to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets such as hidden production facilities.⁶¹ This initiative threatened not only to close the gap between conventional and nuclear weapons, but by declaring nuclear weapons a tactical niche in the U.S. arsenal, it threatened to undermine the longstanding taboo on the use of nuclear weapons.⁶² The incentives that formed the original nuclear bargain at the heart of the NPT had, in a single

⁵⁹ ‘The National Security Strategy of the United States of America’, (September 2002), pp. 14, 15

⁶⁰ The White House, ‘National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction’, (December 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf> (Accessed 11 July, 2003), pp. 2, 3

⁶¹ Geoff Brumfiel, ‘Experts blast U.S. decision to back nuclear bunker busters’, *Nature*, Vol. 423 (29 May, 2003), p. 469

⁶² Andrew Koch, ‘USA’s tough WMD stance: pitfalls abound’, *Jane’s Defence Weekly*, (18 January, 2002), p. 2

sweeping articulation of intent, been replaced by the selective and unilateral threat of punishment for proliferators.

Such discussions marked an acceleration of an inward turn towards unilateral approaches to the security dilemmas of terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Terrorism and nuclear proliferation were now expressed as problems to be solved, not issues for diplomatic management. Moreover, in coupling counterterrorism to counterproliferation and equating restraint with weakness, counterproliferation as policy was now, at least rhetorically, confirming the worst fears of its early critics - that of the United States pursuing a unilateral vision of nuclear order.

In an important speech at West Point speech following 9/11, President Bush set the stage for the *formalization* of the break with Cold War national security strategy, asserting,

Deterrence – the promise of massive retaliation against nations – means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend... Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.⁶³

The Administration consensus was further coordinated and bolstered by Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, publicly arguing that in the wake of 9/11, “It is not possible to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable time. Defending against terrorism and other emerging threats requires that we take the war to the enemy.”⁶⁴

Although deterrence and containment hadn’t been the organizing principles of U.S. national security strategy since the end of the Cold War, the formal rejection of these two pillars was central to how the alternative security strategy would be framed. In light of the audacity of destruction visited upon the United States by the 9/11 terrorists, the view

⁶³ The White House, ‘President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point’ (June 1, 2002) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html> (Accessed May 5, 2003)

⁶⁴ Donald H. Rumsfeld, ‘Transforming the Military’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 3 (May/June 2002): pp. 20-32

of terrorist threats based on identity rather than motive seamlessly merged with a capabilities-driven view of defense planning. Merging conservative strategic cultural DOD framing of proliferation threats, capabilities that *could* be used or developed by “rogue regimes” *would* be used by terrorists. This threat construction – the triple ‘T’ threat of terrorism, tyranny and technology – was fundamentally the product of longstanding conceptual framing and political argumentation “won” by conservative strategic culture during the Clinton years and the process of institutionalizing CP capabilities and practices within the Department of Defense that had emerged from the lessons of the Gulf War.⁶⁵

This policy response represented the *explicit* privileging of counterproliferation and acknowledgement of the military requirements for preemption, and making a case for its application. Again, what many commentators saw as revolutionary in the 2002 NSS was not revolutionary in the sense of transformative doctrine, but novel for its explicit articulation of an approach that had been steadily evolving since the Gulf War, and indeed had been actively in practice for several years before George W. Bush took office.⁶⁶ Thus it was not the result of a particular group of new decisionmakers creating a set of policy responses from whole cloth, as much as the product of these policymakers pressing forward with established priorities, conceptions and organizational capabilities.

This thesis does not argue that the evolution of CP policy was a necessary precondition to the U.S. military responses that followed the attacks of September 11th. The Bush Administration would likely have found a rationale for strong military response even if proliferation had not been central to their justifications, and it is for good reason that a detailed investigation into the motivations behind the invasion of Iraq in 2003 falls outside the scope of this thesis. This thesis is concerned with the evolution of

⁶⁵ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Lindsay and James B. Steinberg, ‘The Bush National Security Strategy: An Evaluation’, *The Brookings Institution Policy Brief*, no. 109, (October 2002), p. 2

⁶⁶ It is noteworthy that the 2002 NSS was the creation of the National Security Council under Condoleezza Rice, and neither the Pentagon nor the Office of the Vice President had been closely involved in its drafting. See Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, p. 331; See also Daalder, Lindsay and Steinberg, ‘The Bush National Security Strategy’, p. 2

counterproliferation and how it was transformed from a limited defense initiative in support of NP and deterrence, to one of their central challenges.

What seemed revolutionary for CP post-9/11 was in fact a very public presentation of the direction counterproliferation had been steadily taking place for the past decade. Indeed, much of the alarmed reaction to the ‘revolutionary’ nature of the 2002 NSS centered not on what was explicitly stated within the document, but what was assumed to be implicitly implied in terms of likely U.S. military action to attack the sources of proliferation in states such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea.⁶⁷ The trajectory taken by U.S. national security strategy since the end of the Cold War had indeed been hugely transformative and revolutionary, but its these transformations had occurred over a period of years, and was the culmination of incremental, long-term efforts at normative legitimization and institutionalization.

This process had been obscured by the quiet workings of a military bureaucracy going about its duties; by a previous administration that had covered its concessions and transformative actions with appeals to the very norms it actions undermined, and by the din of domestic politics, where the steady drum beat of heated rhetoric masked the dramatic transformations inherent in the substance of that rhetoric. Though in no way did these actions predetermine the policy outcome articulated by the Bush Administration, it is difficult to see how the end result could have been more closely guided by the actions, conceptual transformations and ideological battles that preceded it.

Conclusion

This chapter’s central critique has focused on the overly personalized explanations for CP policy evolution popular in much of the literature on the Bush Administration. In these accounts, central decision makers within the Administration swept into office and transformed CP into a militarized, preventative approach to proliferation, largely by fiat. Challenging this account entails examining how the discursive practices of conservatives

⁶⁷ The White House, ‘The President's State of the Union Address’, January 29, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html>, (accessed, December 15, 2003)

and institutionalization of CP within the DOD had already affected policy decisions and shaped broader conceptions of the problem of proliferation before these decisionmakers came to high office. At this point, it will be useful to briefly summarize the central elements of CP policy evolution that occurred before the Bush Administration came into office, and those that occurred afterwards.

The first transformative influence was the delegitimization of the central conceptions and practices of the NP regime and deterrence that began in earnest at the end of the Cold War. This delegitimization originated both within civilian and military circles, as policymakers attempted to grapple with the strategic changes brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Challenges to the norms of nonproliferation and deterrence during this period took the form of nascent political argumentation over the rationality of potential adversaries such as Iraq and North Korea, whose regional ambitions were expected to draw them into eventual conflict with the United States. Concurrent with questions about the relevance of deterrence were early attempts at legitimization of an alternative discriminatory, ideationally defined threat construction embedded within the earliest conceptions of counterproliferation. This initial process of delegitimizing old conceptions and replacing them with new ones was defined by heated political debate, and hesitant steps within the DOD to identify new military roles suited to the reduction of significant environmental uncertainty.

It was in the wake of the Gulf War that institutionalization of offensive capabilities to stop proliferation were first undertaken by the DOD, ostensibly in order to provide enhanced support to NP and deterrence. Over time, this institutionalization took on a markedly offensive orientation, leading to the development of significant offensive CP military capabilities focused on long-range precision deep strike technologies, new CP missions for special operations forces, and specialized unconventional weapons detection and defeat technologies. Together, these created policy alternatives to traditional NP enforcement mechanisms and expanded the range of military tools that could be applied to strategies of coercive diplomacy and small-scale efforts at proliferation prevention. Institutionalization of such capabilities and practices within the DOD embedded an

offensively oriented CP deep into the central training and mission planning priorities of regional warfighting commands, creating new menus of choice for future policymakers.

The Bush Administration's contribution to CP policy was largely the formalization and policy application of these earlier transformations. First was a U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which formalized the rejection of deterrence as a central organizing military doctrine. In the shock and aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, well established cultural lenses of conservative strategic culture could both draw upon and further legitimize the largely institutionalized CP capabilities and practices of the DOD in order to shape and articulate a comprehensive CP policy of preemptive defense against non-democratic regimes or terrorist groups suspected of wielding unconventional weapons. This recursive relationship between strategic culture and the military organization in this crucial period of post-Cold War history supports Thomas Berger's observation that *existing* normative beliefs, rather than new ideas often determine crisis response, "The interaction between formal institutions and the beliefs and values present in a given society becomes particularly relevant in periods where the political system is undergoing change."⁶⁸

Neoconservatives undoubtedly played a central role in the evolution of CP policy, but the neoconservative aspect of the Bush Administration has been generally overstated in the reporting and literature. The significant role this group played was largely one of shaping conservative strategic culture in the years preceding the Bush Administration, informing conservative strategic culture with powerful biases against non-democratic identities, and thus affecting the range of policy responses appropriate to that threat construction in the years *before* the arrival of the Bush Administration. Indeed, in challenging popular conceptions of a "neoconservative cabal" broadly shaping policy outcomes within the Bush Administration, neoconservative thinker Joshua Muravchik has pointed out the fact that no neoconservatives were elevated to senior policymaking positions in the aftermath of 9/11, and indeed this period saw a net *departure* of neoconservatives from position

⁶⁸ Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, pp. 11-12

within the Administration.⁶⁹ Interviews conducted with prominent neoconservatives and those who work closely with them in Washington DC also reveal a far more divided group of senior policymakers in the years following 9/11, than a homogenous group pressing in unison for unanimously accepted policy ends.⁷⁰

A highly militarized, offensively oriented CP doctrine developed by the DOD served as a template for Administration officials seeking to shape policy actively oriented towards the rollback of proliferation. Conservative strategic cultural biases and assumptions about the utility of force and the nature of the international security environment meshed well with DOD means for countering proliferation and general conservative military biases. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 served not to transform, but rather to accelerate this policy shift, allowing the Bush Administration to co-opt DOD CP policy as the framework for a national strategy to respond to proliferation threats. This explicit establishment of CP as the framework for national policy to control the spread of unconventional weapons focusing national strategy on what once had served as merely the military component of a broader strategy emphasizing diplomatic, political and economic methods.

This transformation culminated with the release of the 2002 National Security Strategy, a document that formalized a long-budding doctrine of proliferation prevention linking terrorism, unconventional weapons and illiberal regimes into a single category of threat and “rational” response, placing the existing framework of CP within an explicit doctrine of preemption.

This thesis will now conclude with a summary of its findings, some implications relevant for policymakers, a brief discussion of the theoretical issues addressed, and discussion for further research suggested by its findings.

⁶⁹ Joshua Muravchik, ‘The Neoconservative Cabal’, *Commentary*, September 2003, pp. 26-34

⁷⁰ Interviews with Frank Gaffney, Rebecca Hersman and Henry Sokolski.

Conclusion

This thesis has argued that culturally conditioned ideas and functional organizations fundamentally shape policy outcomes, and that their interaction must be understood if we are to see how strategic concepts arise and are transmitted into policy implementation. Gaining a clearer understanding of how ideas about security threats and the use of force arise within a political culture, how they compete with existing ideas through argumentation, gain legitimacy in political discourse, and are put into action through organizational institutionalization is essential in moving beyond simplistic assumptions of objective, material “national interest” prevalent in much of the analysis of foreign policy. By ignoring the institutionalization of new conceptions in organizational capabilities and practices, or dismissing argumentation and political communication as “politics as usual”, policymakers (as well as analysts) risk missing the important ways in which their policy choices may be constrained or weighted.

In the case of counterproliferation, it is tempting to see policy transformation as the result of individual choices by Bush Administration policymakers. This thesis has argued, however, that the choices made about CP by Bush Administration officials were not original cognitive products, but selections from a policy menu fundamentally shaped by years of conservative strategic cultural challenges to the normative practices of NP and deterrence. The historical evidence examined supports the first proposition from the theory chapter of this thesis, that successful long-term challenges to existing normative practices will not be those simply championed by the dominant strategic culture, but those that successfully reframe the strategic conceptions on which those practices are based. The way threats are framed in political discourse matters. Years of coordinated challenges to the Cold War concept of WMD as a weapons-based threat eventually transformed WMD into an identity-based threat. These different threat conceptions yield dramatically different policy responses, and control of the discourse surrounding

unconventional weapons accords the power to define ‘appropriate’ responses, regardless of who holds final decisionmaking authority.

The idea that proliferation threats do not stem primarily from the destructive potential of weapons themselves, but from the ideologies of the states that possess them represented a significant reversal of conventional wisdom on proliferation. However, translating this threat conception into a meaningful response required the active participation of the Department of Defense, whose own biases, practices and capabilities strongly shaped the evolution of CP. The second proposition of this thesis, that successful institutionalization of new normative practices requires penetration of guiding conceptions throughout the functional organization tasked with policy implementation, is more ambiguously answered by the case study. While institutionalization of CP by the DOD required the active participation of functional units of the military, it is doubtful whether acceptance of specific conservative strategic cultural threat conceptions was a necessary condition. Indeed, available evidence points to a very different guiding conception of proliferation threat within the DOD; that the proper defense orientation of the U.S. military should be towards *potential* adversarial capabilities, rather than traditional calculations of adversarial motives and intentions. This divergence in organizing threat conceptions did not hinder the institutionalization of CP, however, as offensively oriented capabilities and practices could address both core organizational and strategic cultural threat constructions.

This presents an important dilemma for policymakers, as effective institutionalization of new normative beliefs about the use of force may entail unpredictable interpretation by military organizations. Organizational biases for the expansion of offensive CP capabilities led to a set of capabilities and practices oriented more towards the offensive military prevention of proliferation than the enhanced defensive measures first envisioned by Clinton Administration officials. Paralyzing domestic political battles reduced civilian oversight of the DOD while functional units of the organization were given greater autonomy to determine how CP would be implemented. The resulting shift towards preventative capabilities supports the third proposition that without strong civilian

oversight to the contrary, capabilities driven defense initiatives will tend to become more offensively oriented over time.

In assessing the final proposition, that normative challenges will require significant time for successful institutionalization, often leading to mismatch between operationalized policies and current conceptions of appropriate action, it is difficult to draw definitive answers from the time period in question. Time horizons for successful institutionalization of new types of action are lengthy, often exceeding the tenure of civilian policymakers who initiate them. Yet it remains to be seen whether any lasting mismatch between organizational capabilities and current normative consensus over appropriate CP methods have occurred as the result of time lags rather than basic differences between organizational and strategic cultural biases for action. As the rejection of normative approval for preventative action would entail inaction, it may be difficult to ever conclusively determine the validity of this proposition. A related implication, however, is that mismatches between established practice and current policymaker preference may be common. In the following section, this conclusion argues that such mismatches stemming from time pervasiveness may play an important role in constraining policy decisions.

In the end, CP as a legitimized and institutionalized policy cannot be separated from the overall force modernization efforts of the U.S. military. The problem arises in the inherent uncertainty attached to assessing the threat from unconventional weapons programs in states of concern to US policymakers and military planners, and how powerful figures framed policy responses to these dilemmas. Coupling ideologically determinate threat conceptions to vastly improved military capabilities with strong preventative potential was a recipe for conflict, and the CP responses that followed the release of the 2002 NSS should come as little surprise. In an interconnected world, conflicts rooted in revolutionary attempts to enforce a particular vision of international order have widespread and often unintended consequences that must be carefully studied and understood if counterproductive policy responses are to be avoided.

Policy implications of the discoveries of this thesis

While there are many policy implications that flow from the findings on strategic cultural and organizational interaction in this thesis, three central issues relevant to both analysts and policymakers will be discussed in this section:

- 1) Problems stemming from embracing ideationally determinate threat conceptions
- 2) The time pervasiveness of institutionalization and conceptual legitimization
- 3) The political implications of attempting to conclusively “win” policy arguments

Problems stemming from embracing ideationally determinate threat conceptions

There are significant tradeoffs in conceptualizing the threat of proliferation as originating in the identity of adversarial states. Mutual deterrence and a nonproliferation regime with weak enforcement mechanisms may be somewhat outmoded in a multi-polar international system featuring more liquid supplies of unconventional weapons materials and knowledge. However, the self-restraint on power at the heart of a non-discriminatory system of proliferation control and the underlying assumption of adversarial rationality when faced with the threat of massive retaliation by the American military present certain benefits over assumptions of adversarial irrationality and ideological determinism. While it is certainly prudent to prepare US military forces to combat unconventional weapons, and potentially prudent to take a more aggressive approach to proliferation threats in the face of uncertainty, coupling such capability with assumptions of *inherent* adversarial irrationality and ideological determinism is both unrealistic and unwise.

Assumption of adversarial irrationality often draws upon an ideological determinism not supported by close analysis of the decisionmaking behavior of important potential adversaries like North Korea and Iran, and thus may unnecessarily raise the risks of escalation and general conflict. Long-term observation of the specific motives and behaviors of states like North Korea points towards an essentially rational basis for their

actions.¹ This does not mean the U.S. would be wise to ignore dangerous proliferation activities within North Korea. Nor is the issue that a state such as North Korea makes decisions that would be deemed responsible by US policy makers, but rather that their motives provide significant clues to where flexible and specific policy responses could prove more effective than general, non-actor specific coercive strategies.

The application of actor-general threat assumptions to adversaries with diverse cultural conceptions, historical experiences and political motives isn't simply a problem of unimaginative policymaking. The experience of establishing a relatively stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War should serve as a powerful lesson about the benefits of nuanced foreign policy making. Simply acknowledging that the system of bi-polarity which gave rise to mutual deterrence has ended does not mean that the essential insights of that strategy cannot be imaginatively applied in cases of significant asymmetries of power such as those dominating the post-Cold War international security environment. Providing context-rich interpretations allows more room for the analysis of specific adversarial behaviors and intentions than a threat model that merely assumes hostile intent. There is an important difference between pragmatically hedging against uncertainty by adopting more assertive policy responses, and adopting aggressive policy responses in order to conform to actor-general threat assumptions.

While attempts to more subtly analyze the motives of potential adversaries and construct appropriately nuanced strategic relationships carry distinct risks, the payoff for such efforts can mean the difference between tenuous peace and catastrophic conflict.

The time pervasiveness problem of institutionalization and conceptual legitimization

As Bernard Brodie argued more than 50 years ago when first grappling with the new strategic dilemmas posed by the introduction of nuclear weapons,

¹ An excellent example of such thoughtful analysis of the historical, cultural and political roots of North Korean foreign policy behavior is Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999)

The ideas that are being implemented at any one time are likely to be those which enjoyed an intellectual consensus some two or three years ago – at least the best consensus then available – and which are now perhaps discredited.²

New normative beliefs should be expected to be pervasive over time, and unlikely to be changed with the turnover of presidential administrations. This institutionalization should serve to offer a more highly constrained set of responses to proliferation to incoming administrations. These legitimized conceptions and institutionalized practices could be challenged by unforeseen crisis or failure, but are unlikely to be challenged simply because a new president arrives in office with a different set of priorities or views on the nature of the proliferation threat. The findings of this thesis echo much of the literature on norms and institutionalization in arguing that challenging established conceptions and practices requires another cycle of delegitimization with a potentially significant time horizon.

As dominant normative beliefs are overturned in stages, rather than by fiat, there is strong reason to believe that the normative challenge of CP to NP is likely to last beyond the Bush Administration. Both the terms of discourse and the behavioral norms embodied by a doctrine of preemption are highly persuasive for a large group of citizens and policymakers in the United States, and have been partially institutionalized by the capabilities and doctrinal practices of the DOD. There are strong ideational, cultural and organizational reasons to believe this will not change quickly. Policymakers and analysts alike must think of policy outcomes not simply as representative of the narrow product of bureaucratic or legislative bargaining, but as representative of emerging or established normative beliefs.

In the case of CP policy, it's important to note that both leading 2008 presidential contenders adhered closely to the terms of discourse legitimized since the end of the Cold War in articulating threat conceptions concerning rogue regimes, WMD's and missile defenses. While the beliefs ostensibly motivating the Iraq War have been widely

² Dr. Bernard Brodie, 'Influence of Mass Destruction Weapons on Strategy', 1956 lecture at Naval War College, published in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, (February 1957)

criticized as mistaken, many of the conceptualizations which were used to rationalize the war – rogue regimes allied with radical terrorists, imminent WMD threats to American national security, etc. – have shown pervasiveness beyond the policy failures of the Bush Administration in demonstrating their legitimacy.

An associated policy implication of the findings of this thesis is that major policy changes result largely from both a transformation of legitimate conceptions and a capacity to implement and institutionalize those conceptions. While this may seem obvious, recent experiences have shown that policymakers often underestimate the strength of existing norms and the requirements of normative delegitimization / legitimization cycles. A recent relevant example is the short public life of so-called “bunker-busting” nukes – small yield nuclear devices intended to be deployed with deep penetrating munitions in order to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets. While the intention to develop such a class of weapons was forwarded with much fanfare by the Bush Administration during the rush of policy responses following 9/11, momentum for such capabilities never gained political traction. Although promoted with the same intensity and conceptual “certainty” as proposals such as the right of preemptive military action, the inclusion of such weapons into American doctrinal responses to proliferation quickly faced debilitating resistance from legislative, scientific, public and even some military circles.

The technical hurdles for developing and fielding such a class of weaponry were minor, and the military had already dedicated significant R&D resources to computer modeling of blast effects, collateral damage potential through lack of containment and technical feasibility.³ However, a simple desire by the dominant strategic culture to legitimize the development and use of those weapons was insufficient to overcome strong normative resistance within the legislature and public opinion, founded on the norm of non-use. A utilitarian argument proved insufficient when facing a well-established norm with broad legitimacy.

³ Geoff Brumfiel, ‘Experts blast US decision to back nuclear bunker busters’, *Nature*, Vol 423 (29 May, 2003), p. 469

Though it was not an issue studied in depth through the research for this thesis, the arguments about the interaction of normative legitimization and institutionalization would predict that such resistance would be crippling. While the normative basis for traditional approaches to nonproliferation and deterrence had eroded over a period of nearly 15 years before the unveiling of the 2002 NSS, the strong norm of nuclear non-use had never been addressed during this time. It could be assumed that the failed efforts to legitimize the use of a new class of nuclear weapons were due largely to a lack of required and sustained efforts to delegitimize the existing norm, and legitimize a new norm in its place. Such efforts seem to require significant time to evolve and become effective, even more to become institutionalized in organizational capability and practice. It should not be surprising that the issue of bunker-busting nukes died quickly despite the traumatic attacks of 9/11, which added transformative momentum to policy responses and led to very wide latitude for Executive action.

The political implications of attempting to conclusively “win” policy arguments

All presidential administrations and political parties are engaged in the continual act of selling. The products they market are their policies and the payoff for successful salesmanship can be immense. In their efforts to “sell” CP policy, the leading bearers of conservative strategic culture drew many lessons from the proven insights of the public relations industry. That such a crossover would so dramatically occur in the United States, the Mecca of consumer capitalism, should come as no surprise. However, the effective control of cognitive framing and messaging that is at the heart of modern political communication can have unintended consequences. Taken to extremes, the techniques of effective framing and messaging that successfully promote policy can also severely limit the diversity of opinion that is the lifeblood of a functioning democracy.

Much of CP policy is undoubtedly the result of well-intentioned policymakers attempting to most effectively promote the kinds of policy responses they felt would best protect American lives and interests. However, in the process of attempting to “win” arguments conclusively, rather than to gain advantage through accepting the necessity for political

compromise, political actors can limit the ability of the United States to foster the kind of open, honest debate that is critical to the development of appropriate threat conceptions and policy responses in any healthy political culture. As such, the political communications efforts at the heart of CP policy evolution may also constitute an ironic failure to appreciate one of the central concepts of traditional deterrence – that of the necessity for mutual and voluntary restraints on power. Much as the Cold War realization that “victory” in a nuclear world is likely to be Pyrrhic at best, painful compromise and self-restraint must be viewed as critical to sustaining a healthy domestic political culture.

Additionally, publics sensitive to the lack of meaningful discussion of policy alternatives, especially in the absence of media challenges to dominant political messaging and framing, are left to construct their own collective stories about the important policy issues of the day. With the penetration of new media and social networking technologies, these stories often quickly gather momentum, if not diversity or substantive analysis. In the modern American context, the result has largely been one of deep polarization between a credulous acceptance of dominant political narratives on one side, and incredible narratives of pervasive conspiracy on the other. The cumulative effect being a widespread radicalization and enfeeblement of public discourse that only further erodes the potential for healthy democratic forms of governance. While it should be obvious, it bears repeating that political actors have a responsibility to promote open and honest discussion on the issues of the day. Carefully constructed cognitive frames and highly controlled messages promoted by the efficient machinery of political communications expertise instead can lead to unintended social division and policy stagnation.

Finally, although the events and policy outcomes examined in the thesis were tied to an individual case study, it should not be assumed that the transformation of CP policy over time was a unique case of organizational and political forces that cannot be applied to other contexts. Any state with competing strategic cultures divided over basic assumptions about the international security environment, especially in cases that involve debates over the ‘rationality’ of their adversaries, may be prone to similar policy outcomes. Arguments about adversarial rationality will likely intensify and challenge the

legitimacy of existing normative beliefs after the introduction of nuclear weapons to strategic relationships. Delegitimization of existing normative beliefs about the use of force would be of particular relevance in states such as Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan, as these are states with vibrant domestic political competition and delicate strategic relationships involving unconventional weapons.⁴ Increased political and military organizational pressures favoring preventative or preemptive military strategies are likely to feature prominently in all of these cases. Far from merely a ‘perfect storm’ of factors occurring within the U.S. at a unique point in time, the dynamics of competing strategic cultures and the institutionalization of preventative military practices will be an important feature of international relations as the proliferation of unconventional weapons continues.

Contributions of this thesis to theories of foreign policy making

As dealt with in the first chapter of this thesis, an analysis that incorporates both strategic culture and organizational theory holds significant advantages over the more traditional theoretical approaches often utilized in the analysis of foreign policy, namely the Rational Actor Model (RAM), Bureaucratic Politics models and Cognitive models. Departing from narrow assumptions of rational action, time specific cases of bureaucratic bargaining and the uniqueness of individual biases allows foreign policy analysis that gives critical insight into the process of policy change, rather than simply offering explanations for individual policy decisions. Examining the power of collective ideas and institutionalized practices through the lenses of strategic culture and organizational theory offers many analytical advantages that should be carefully considered by future researchers.

The legitimization strategic cultures can confer on particular strategic conceptions, and the institutionalization of new capabilities and practices by military organizations have significant impacts that are not explained by other theories. Together, these forces can

⁴ Although apparently possessing a cohesive strategic culture, China’s relationship with Taiwan may be subject to similar transformative pressures, especially if Chinese military leaders continue to ‘reduce’ environmental uncertainty through the development of further ballistic missile forces aimed at Taiwan.

challenge important norms of foreign policy conduct through the delegitimization of existing conceptions and the erosion of institutional support for existing policy implementation. In their place, new practices and conceptions can be conferred legitimacy within the realm of domestic political discourse by strategic cultures, and be given staying power through the institutionalization of new capabilities and practices by powerful functional organizations. This staying power means that not only do newly legitimized practices and conceptions stand a better chance of actual policy implementation, but they also face a far greater likelihood of supplanting existing norms from which future policymakers will begin the process of framing strategic dilemmas and selecting appropriate policy alternatives. Understanding this process matters if we are to understand how major foreign policy positions change over time, affecting the broad direction of a state's national security objectives and the choices it makes about the use of force to fulfill those objectives.

Additionally, this thesis has made arguments about the role of the U.S. Congress that expand our current understanding of its foreign policy making influence. Traditional analysis of congressional foreign policy making tends to focus on the formal division of power between Congress and the President, with much discussion over the relative weakness of Congress in deciding when military force should be used. While the particular balance of formalized authority in this relationship is significant, such assumptions limit congressional influence to its ability to act as institution in largely legalistic terms. This thesis has argued that in addition to its formal authority to pass legislation and wield budgetary power, Congress can have a significant impact on foreign policy outcomes through the informal ability of its members to construct discursive space about certain issues such as WMD and National Missile Defense. The role of Congress as a locus for elite political argumentation means that Congress can wield significant informal power in limiting or shaping 'legitimate' threat perceptions and policy responses. In this case study, the challenge of CP policy to NP and deterrence fundamentally depended on linguistic framing as the basis for contests over the legitimacy of proliferation threat conceptions and policy responses. Therefore, the question of how the terms of debate are shaped is not a minor issue of what words are

used in national level discourse, but a central question of how lasting associations are made between threat conceptions and appropriate policy responses.

Further research called for by this thesis

A compromise was made in this thesis by attempting to examine the impact of both competing strategic cultures and organizational behavior on policy evolution. Addressing both was important in realistically accounting for the major influences on CP policy evolution, but certain analytic depth was sacrificed in order to examine their interdependence. More detailed research needs to be undertaken on both approaches in order to develop a clearer understanding of their relative importance and interrelationship. Some specific suggested avenues for further research in each case are as follows:

Firstly, although this thesis has not adopted a positivist methodology, future research would be well served by more systematic testing for the presence and influence of strategic cultural preferences and biases. Although strategic culture is a useful framework for correlating collective preferences and policy outcomes, basic questions about the origins, transmission and evolution of policy preferences among decisionmakers remain. Strategic culture is a broad attempt to grapple with the dilemma of understanding collective action on certain issues, but the theoretical perspective is still in its infancy in many important ways.

This thesis has accepted some of the basic categories of strategic cultural differences – questions about the inevitability of conflict, zero sum nature of the international system and utility of military force – but are there other critical assumptions that serve to more clearly identify and divide one major group from another? Are these differences country specific, or can they be generally applied across strategic contexts? Some strategic culture theorists such as Theo Farrell seem to utilize very different identifying categories, depending on the context, but it is questionable whether this is the result of analytical

insight or merely an analytical convenience.⁵ More comprehensive surveys of senior policymakers and their staff would be helpful in tracing out such linkages and divisions.

Secondly, there is a need for a more comprehensive survey of the links between political communication and cycles of legitimization and delegitimization of normative beliefs. This thesis has argued that political argumentation is key to the establishment and maintenance of legitimate normative beliefs, but significant questions remain about linkages between discourse and the establishment of limiting discursive space around specific threat conceptions and policy responses. This linkage is likely to assume a constantly changing form, as strategic cultures shift in their relative positions of dominance, as presidential administrations arrive in office and depart, and as political communications techniques come into and go out of fashion.

To make sense of ongoing policy debates, it is essential to understand the boundaries of legitimate discourse, and how those boundaries were established. In particular, the weighting of decisionmaker perceptions of what constituted ‘appropriate’ action are key to understanding which arguments are made and which discursive strategies are employed. Further research examining these processes across different historical and cultural contexts is important to create a better understanding of foreign policy behavior. The literature on foreign policy analysis would be well served by establishing whether different strategic culture share successful argumentative strategies for establishing new legitimate normative beliefs, or delegitimizing existing ones.

Finally, this thesis has indicated that organizations and strategic cultures depend on mutual reinforcement in the form of conceptual legitimization and institutionalization to promote and defend policy choice, and that the time required to establish both means that policy choice may be pervasive even in the face of obvious policy failure. However, are there other significant shared cultural or organizational factors that lead groups or

⁵ Compare for example Farrell’s ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme’, *International Studies Review*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (2002), pp. 49-72, and his ‘Strategic Culture and American Empire’, *SAIS Review*, vol. 25, no. 2, (Summer-Fall 2005), pp. 3-18

organizations to defend their policy practices in non-rational circumstances, such as the obvious mounting costs of failed policy?

One potential avenue for exploring alternative explanations would be to apply Kahneman and Tversky's Prospect Theory to broader classes of decision making to determine at what point a collective decision is considered an 'investment' in which irrational decisions will be made to avoid losses. Kahneman and Tversky's general "loss minimization behavior" insight from prospect theory has traditionally been applied to states as unitary actors in the case of explaining motivations for preventative war.⁶ However, this thesis has argued that both military organizations and competing strategic cultures possess different assumptions about what constitutes "loss" and "gain" in such circumstances. Such research could have important implications for understanding the role of culture as either sustaining strategic preference in ways defying the expectations of rational action, or as a cover for political discourse that seeks to simply rationalize policy positions that originate from other sources of strategic preference.

A final word

This thesis began with a question about ideas and their consequences for foreign policy outcomes. The impact of culturally shared beliefs and assumptions motivate and justify our actions in ways often poorly understood by both students and practitioners of foreign policy. When shared ideas and socially constructed threat conceptions are transmitted to formal organizations tasked with foreign policy implementation, an additional layer of complexity makes definitively assessing their impact extremely challenging. It is hoped that this study has contributed to advancing our understanding of how these forces shape foreign policy outcomes in often subtle and unexpected ways.

Examining how the United States has responded to the proliferation of unconventional weapons in the post-Cold War period says a great deal about how American

⁶ Jack S. Levy, 'Declining Power and the Preventative Motivation for War', *World Politics*, vol. 40, no. 1 (October, 1987), pp. 86-90

policymakers see their role in the world. American debates over the nature of the international system, and the ideas about how U.S. power should be used to shape that system are particularly important to understand. Students and practitioners of foreign policy should therefore make the study of U.S. strategic cultures and formal organizations a more central focus of attention in order to develop a better understanding of the forces that can drive the United States towards either constructive or conflictual international relationships.

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Lewis A. Dunn - former Assistant Director for Nuclear and Weapons Control, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 12, 2006

Frank Gaffney - President of the Center for Security Policy, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (1987), July 7, 2005

Rebecca Hersman - Senior Research Professor, National Defense University, former Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and previously Staff member for former Congressman and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, July 21, 2005

Arturo Holguin - Policy Analyst, United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), August 8, 2007

Cherie Quaintance – former senior vice-president of Ogilvy Public Relations Worldwide, August 13-15, 2007

Larry Seaquist - former Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy, Joint Staff (1988-1990), October 21, 2005

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