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# Hont and Koselleck on the Crisis of Authority

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## Abstract

This paper examines the reception of Reinhart Koselleck's *Kritik und Krise* by the intellectual historian István Hont. Relying on hitherto unpublished manuscripts, it argues that the later work of Hont can be seen as a critical response to Koselleck and his characterisation of the crisis of modern politics as a crisis of political authority.

## Keywords

István Hont – Reinhart Koselleck – reason of state – public debt – crisis – political authority – Adam Smith – Emmanuel Sieyès

## I

In 2011, István Hont (1947–2013) jokingly remarked that whenever one encounters an American political theorist, it is a useful exercise to ask the question: who is their German?<sup>1</sup> The proposed utility of this exercise was meant to reflect the extraordinary influence exerted on American political theory – and thus on modern political theory in general – by theorists of Germanic origin, especially from the 1970s onwards, and not least by post-war *émigrés* such as Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss. As such it was perhaps little more than a truism. John

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1 István Hont, “CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 5: Leo Strauss”, *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/324. (<https://arts.st-andrews.ac.uk/intellectualhistory>).

Rawls, arguably the most influential American political theorist of the late twentieth century, had been educated by *émigré* theologians at Princeton and owed an obvious debt to Immanuel Kant. In Hont's words, Rawls' *Theory of Justice* was a "revisionist updating of Immanuel Kant's contract theory, merged with modern welfare economics and American constitutional assumptions."<sup>2</sup> Next to John Rawls, the work of Carl Schmitt had also risen to prominence in America, where his agonistic definition of 'the political' found adherents on both the right and left side of Rawls' liberal egalitarianism. However, Schmitt's popularity among American political theorists, Hont believed, was especially due to the great historical importance that he – as a German – attributed to the modern maritime dominance of Anglo-America and, crucially, to the reshaping of the international order signalled by the US entry into the First World War.<sup>3</sup> Similarly, the influential work of Leo Strauss was firmly rooted in the German tradition of thinking about politics. Despite his long tenure at the University of Chicago from 1949 to 1967, and despite lending his name to a distinctly American 'school' of thought, Strauss remained highly critical of American society and, much like Hannah Arendt, never became an American. However, Strauss was a "first-rate historian" of political thought, according to Hont, and studying his work in detail, as opposed to merely engaging critically with his 'methodology' of esotericism, was essential for understanding the development of contemporary political theory, not least since much of it had come to revolve around "the debate in which the authors of these [Straussian] works increasingly contrast their interpretations with the kind of history of political thought that has been developed in Cambridge since the 1970s".<sup>4</sup> In regard to Reinhart Koselleck, whose works began to appear in English translation in the 1980s, Hont insisted that he was first and foremost a historian of political thought and, in particular, of the momentous transformation that ensued Napoleon's victory at Jena. "His great *Lexicon of German Historical Concepts*, the *GG*," Hont claimed,

was not an execution of a Heideggerian-Gadamerian project about the relevance of time in human life, but an attempted description of the

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- 2 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 6: John Rawls", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/325; See also Hont, "Adam Smith's History of Law and Government as Political Theory", in R. Bourke & R. Geuss (eds.), *Political Judgement* (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 133.
- 3 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 3: Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/322
- 4 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 5: Leo Strauss", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/324

apparent break between pre-modern and modern concepts of politics that began in the wake of the Jacobin Terror and Thermidor in France and Germany.<sup>5</sup>

More surprisingly, Michel Foucault, arguably the most influential French theorist in America, was also best understood from a German point of view. Foucault's works could most profitably be read under the pretence that they had been written by a German historian who "for some peculiar reason was not burdened by the weight and guilt of German history".<sup>6</sup> Most importantly, his lectures on the history of political thought at the Collège de France, the lectures dealing with *gouvernementalité*, could only really be understood in relation to the distinctly German interwar preoccupation with *Staatsräson*. "Foucault can be seen", Hont stated, "as a theorist of the welfare state and modern social institutions that developed after the Napoleonic period as the extension of early modern *Staatsräson* to modern social circumstances".<sup>7</sup> In other words, Foucault belonged to the same tradition of thought as Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt, a tradition which Hont traced back to Friedrich Meinecke and the state of liberal anxiety and pessimism that prevailed in Weimar Germany, and which had caused Meinecke to undergo a personal disillusionment with his earlier optimism – the optimism of Leibniz, Hegel, Goethe and Ranke – resulting in his historical re-examination of 'reason of state'-thinking in his *Die Idee der Staatsräson in der neueren Geschichte* (1924).<sup>8</sup>

However accurate this 'useful exercise' might be, it certainly reveals something true about Hont's own praxis as a historian of modern political thought, namely the desire to return ideas to their source – a source that very often, and not just regarding American or French theory, turned out to be German. In fact, Hont's early work on Scottish political economy can be seen as applying this exact heuristic to Adam Smith, whose conjectural history of property and government, culminating in a commercial society, Hont showed to be indebted to the German jurist and political philosopher Samuel Pufendorf.<sup>9</sup> Among his

5 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 3: Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/322.

6 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 7: Michel Foucault", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/326.

7 *Ibid.*

8 Friedrich Meinecke, *Machiavellism – The Doctrine of Raison d'État and Its Place in Modern History*, trans. Douglas Scott, 2nd ed. (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), xxvii.

9 István Hont, "The Language of Sociability and Commerce: Samuel Pufendorf and the theoretical foundations of the 'Four-Stages Theory'", in A. Pagden (ed.), *The Language of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe* (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 253–276.

Cambridge peers, this strong orientation towards Germany was uncommon, and at least one contemporary found it somewhat unwelcome. In a letter to J. G. A. Pocock, the historian N. T. Phillipson aired his frustration, stating that he was “a bit stinky with H[ont] (...) because he wants to turn my paper into a monument of early 20th century German (or perhaps modern Hungarian) scholarship”.<sup>10</sup>

Given that searching for the German derivation of ideas was a recurrent *modus operandi* for Hont, it might be a useful exercise to turn Hont’s joke on himself and ask the question: Who was Hont’s German? In some ways, however, the answer is straightforward, but only regarding the first half of his career. Having spent the first nearly thirty years of his life in communist Hungary, Hont’s education was naturally dominated by Marxism, and his early interest in the Scottish Enlightenment evidently arose from his desire to understand the intellectual origins of Marx’s historical materialism. Moreover, Hont’s lifelong ambition to bridge the gap between history and theory, between past and present, was formed out of his disillusionment with the academic environment that he encountered as a student in Hungary, which in Hont’s mind had abandoned the Marxian effort to combine theoretical thinking with genuine historical research. In fact, his decision to focus on David Hume for his PhD was born out of a conviction that Hume’s economic essays represented an exemplary historical case of bridging this exact gap, being in effect a “point of mediation” between the political theory of the *Treatise on Human Nature* and Hume’s later political historiography of the *History of England*.<sup>11</sup>

Although the importance of Marx is only visible to a minor degree in Hont’s published works, his unpublished works – especially from the early 1980s – reveal the centrality of Marx to Hont’s work as an intellectual historian. More specifically, it was Hont’s ambition to write the history of modern political theory from Pufendorf to Marx, a project which he at one point entitled *Culture, Needs and Property Rights*, and which was intended to uncover the hidden linkages between the three dominant discourses on modern society, namely natural jurisprudence, political economy and Marxism. Hont attempted to establish this continuity by changing the focus from rights to needs, thus exposing the shared philosophical anthropology – or theory of

10 N. Phillipson to J.G.A. Pocock, 10 August 1979. Special Collections, University of St Andrews; See also Lasse S. Andersen & Richard Whatmore (2023), “Liberalism and republicanism, or wealth and virtue revisited”, *Intellectual History Review* 33/1 (2022), 140.

11 Hont to D. A. Parry, 29 September 1977. The Papers of István Hont. Special Collections, University of St Andrews.

sociability – that underlay these three discourses. What he wished to demonstrate was that Marxism, far from standing outside the Western rights tradition, was in fact best understood as its natural culmination, based on the anticipation that the right-less and stateless community of mankind's early beginnings, theorised by Pufendorf as a 'negative community', would re-emerge at a higher stage of civilisation as a consequence of the production of material abundance unleashed by capitalism.<sup>12</sup> By the late 1980s, however, Hont had seemingly lost interest in this project; the last time he spoke publicly at any length on Marx was in Chicago in 1989, less than a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall.<sup>13</sup> With the collapse of communism and the emergence of a new international order, 'reason of state' moved to the centre of Hont's concerns as a discourse whose revival was urgently needed, and which in addition held the potential of overcoming the historiographical divide that had emerged in Cambridge between natural jurisprudence and republicanism.<sup>14</sup> Since 'reason of state'-thinking belonged to neither of these discourses exclusively, examining the ways in which various authors and communities had responded to political crises could help erode the tunnel-walls of recent Cambridge historiography and reveal important points of intersection. Moreover, such an examination might also shed light on the capability of various idioms "to formulate political judgements".<sup>15</sup>

In April 1993, Hont organised a conference in Cambridge intended to "consider the historical idiom of 'reason of state' and the analytical problems it posed in relation to the historiographical gains made in 'Cambridge School' studies of republicanism, natural jurisprudence and political economy".<sup>16</sup> But aside from its academic purpose, Hont also envisioned this conference as a counter-point to the prevailing sense of liberal optimism, the token statement of which was then, as now, attributed to Francis Fukuyama<sup>17</sup> – perhaps somewhat unjustly, given that his 'German', Hegel, was in fact seconded by a fair amount of Nietzsche. Hont introduced the conference with a reflection on Meinecke, stating that

12 Hont, "Negative Community and Communism: The Natural Law Heritage from Pufendorf to Marx", Unpublished manuscript [1989]. The István Hont Papers. Special Collections, University of St Andrews.

13 In February of 1989, Hont delivered a series of four lectures at the University of Chicago, which included a version of the paper cited above, see note 12.

14 J. G. A. Pocock, 'Cambridge paradigms and Scotch philosophers', in Hont & Ignatieff, *Wealth and Virtue* (Cambridge, 1983), 235–252.

15 Hont, "The Politics of Necessity and the Language of Reason of State", Unpublished manuscript [1993], *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/558, 4.

16 *Ibid.*

17 Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

At the end of the century we have no good reasons to be more complacent than he [Meinecke] was. History is not at an end, the problem of the Janus-faced nation state is still with us and it is a noticeable feature of the current political climate that reasons of state are yet again moving closer to the centre of our intellectual attention. Purely domestic conceptions of political order are poor devices for the dilemmas of modern states. This, of course, is regarded as a truism by specialists in international relations theory. What is startling, however, is that these concerns became marginalised in the history of political thought and that no history of reason of state on a comparable scale of theoretical and historical ambition has been written since Meinecke's book.<sup>18</sup>

Hont was by no means uncritical of Meinecke. Any attempt to resurrect 'reason of state'-thinking for the present moment had to take stock of the theoretical and methodological advances that had been made since Meinecke's book, and which in large part had emerged in reaction to the kind of *Ideengeschichte* that he exemplified. His teleological narrative of the rise of the nation state had to be discarded, and as for his related "forlorn" hope of taming reason of state under the aegis of the national *Rechtsstaat*, it too had to be rejected.<sup>19</sup> Hont thus agreed with Carl Schmitt's criticism of Meinecke's attempt to distinguish between good reason of state (Ethos) and bad reason of state (power/Kratos), a moral dualism that oscillated throughout Meinecke's history, and which largely followed from his decision to begin his narrative with Machiavelli and to identify 'reason of state' with Machiavellism.<sup>20</sup> But where Schmitt had sought to divest politics of both moral and economic categories, identifying 'the political' with the act of deciding friend and enemy, Hont instead wished to replace Meinecke's moral dualism with another tension-laden dichotomy, namely the modern intersection of the market and the state. Methodological issues aside, Meinecke had been right in pointing out the "Janus-faced" nature of the nation state: being both the guardian of justice within its borders, a protector of the common good, and an actor operating externally in an anarchic, international state of nature. Or as Meinecke put it, the "State is an amphibious creature, which simultaneously inhabits the ethical and the natural worlds."<sup>21</sup> For Hont, however, it was important that reason of state was not seen as confined to the

18 Hont, "The Politics of Necessity and the Language of 'Reason of State'", 5.

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*; See also Carl Schmitt, "Zu Friedrich Meineckes *Idee der Staatsräson*", *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* Bd. 56 (1926): 226–34.

21 Meinecke, *Machiavellism*, 16.

politics of war. The idea of the common good, the *salus populi* principle, was a very slippery notion, as indeed Meinecke had lamented. As such it could be seen to encompass not just the preservation of the community but also the promotion of its collective well-being. Meinecke's understanding of well-being was, Hont argued, closely linked to the Machiavellian notion of *grandezza*, entailing the necessity of growth and conquest.<sup>22</sup> What he had failed to properly appreciate was how the rise of commerce meant that inter-state rivalry had become driven by the quest for markets and, in addition, how *grandezza* had gradually been reconceptualised in domestic economic terms, culminating in the thought of Adam Smith. In short, the emergence of genuinely international markets transformed reason of state into political economy.<sup>23</sup> Nonetheless, what remained highly relevant in Meinecke was his insistence on the indispensability of the history of political thought for modern political theory and for the fight against complacent liberalism. In Hont's words, Meinecke had

noticed that the language of reason of state had fallen into disuse after the early nineteenth century, but insisted nonetheless that we needed to recover the history of early modern European reason of state theories if we were to stand a chance of understanding the conundrum of the modern nation state. (...) the rise of modern liberalism changed the language of politics, exorcising dangerous idioms like reason of state from our political vocabulary, and in Meinecke's view losing this language (and with it a clear view of the disturbing problems it captured) had impaired our understanding of politics. This part of his message remains timely.<sup>24</sup>

By expanding the notion of reason of state to include commerce and thereby distancing it from Machiavelli, who, as Hume remarked, had "kept a profound silence in regard to it", Hont realised that a wider and more encompassing notion of crisis was also required – one that went beyond the specific crises of military conquest faced by the Italian republics.<sup>25</sup> As Hont wrote: "Dropping Meinecke's identification of Machiavelli with reason of state may allow us to see the problem in terms of a transposition of a political sensibility originally created by, but then cut loose from, the crisis of republican Florence in a

22 Hont, 'The Politics of Necessity and the Language of 'Reason of State'', 7.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.*, 2.

25 Hume, 'Of Liberty and Despotism' [1741], retitled 'Of Civil Liberty' [1758], *Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary* [1777] (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), 88–9.

post-republican world.”<sup>26</sup> One possibility was that crisis in the post-republican world was endogenous to commerce and that a commercial society was inherently unstable and self-undermining, thus requiring the intervention of ‘reason of state’-measures to ensure its survival. An example of such a view was of course contained in the Marxist theory of imperialism, according to which capitalist production inevitably engendered crises of domestic underconsumption; crises that historically found alleviation through territorial expansion and the conquest of new markets.<sup>27</sup> However, Hont rejected this view as “yesterday’s” theory of imperialism, based on the economic determination of politics.<sup>28</sup> Another, older model of commerce-engendered crisis was the view that wealth was inherently self-destructive either because rising wage-costs left rich countries with a competitive disadvantage, or because commerce tended to generate public debt crises that threatened to upend the social order and undermine national prosperity. This latter view, in both of these incarnations, had been attributed to David Hume, most notably by Duncan Forbes and J. G. A. Pocock respectively, yet Hont was convinced that Hume had held neither of these opinions.<sup>29</sup> Hume did not believe that commerce was inherently self-undermining or self-generative of dangerous levels of public debt. The real cause of the crisis that Hume had identified, and which he feared would lead to absolutism, was exogenous to commerce, namely what he termed ‘jealousy of trade’, meaning the unfortunate conjunction of commerce and inter-state power politics. The jealous eye with which Europe’s large monarchies looked at each other’s commercial success – and at each other’s markets – meant that the reciprocal logic of commerce was inflected by the zero-sum logic of war, which in turn made reason of state a more wide-ranging and domestically-oriented concern. A bridge was formed between the state’s outward might and the administration of its domestic resources, a bridge that became treacherous with the advent of public debt financing, enabling the state to exceed its natural power through borrowing. But since the public debt had to be serviced through taxation, and since creditors did not necessarily

26 Hont, “The Politics of Necessity and the Language of ‘Reason of State’”, 5.

27 The classic statement is V. I. Lenin, *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* [Petrograd, 1917].

28 Hont, “The Wealth of One Nation and the Dynamics of International Trade”, Unpublished manuscript [1986]. The Papers of István Hont. Special Collections, University of St Andrews.

29 Hont, “The ‘rich country-poor country’ debate in Scottish classical political economy”, in *Wealth and Virtue*, 288n58.; Hont, “The Rhapsody of Public Debt: David Hume and Voluntary State Bankruptcy”, in N. Phillipson and Q. Skinner (eds.), *Political Discourse in Early Modern Britain* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 321–48.



reside within the state's borders, it was also dangerously Janus-faced, jeopardising the prosperity and future survival of the very community whose interest it was raised to promote. For Hume, the "true antithesis" to this political crisis, Hont argued, was neither a rejection of commerce nor acquiescence to a cyclical view of history, but a *durable* peace "where public debt ceased to exist while commerce expanded."<sup>30</sup> However, Hume had scant hope that such a peace was feasible. To excise the public debt would require an assertion of political authority against the commercial interest, against the property rights of bond holders, and thus a risky subordination of justice – and possibly prosperity and well-being as well – to reason of state. But in a commercial society, where could such a source of authority be located? How could such a transition be managed? Much like Montesquieu, Hume came to vest his hopes in the existence of intermediate social orders, principally the landed interest, whose authority was tied to the soil and thus relatively independent of commerce and public opinion.

The problem of the public debt represented the "archetypical feature of the politics of commercial society."<sup>31</sup> It revealed that the real crisis of commercial society was less about commerce than about the politics of commerce. It also revealed that the Scottish political economists – principally Hume and Smith – were profoundly political thinkers, increasingly concerned with the status of political authority in commercial society. As such, they provided a crucial antidote to those ideologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which subordinated the political to economic forces and vested their hopes in utopian solutions such as the spread of *doux commerce* (liberalism) or the withering away of the state (Marxism). In this way, Hont echoed especially Schmitt's criticism of the depoliticisation of political theory caused by the intrusion of moral, social or economic categories.<sup>32</sup> However, the German thinker who had the largest influence on Hont's thinking in this period – Hont's new German – was arguably Reinhart Koselleck, whose *Kritik und Krise* (1959) provided a diagnosis of the modern predicament that Hont found congenial to his own concerns, not least because it highlighted the crisis of modernity as a crisis of political authority.

30 Hont, "The Rhapsody of Public Debt ...", 322.

31 Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century: The Problem of Authority in David Hume and Adam Smith", in W. Melching & W. Veleva (eds.), *Main Trends in Cultural History* (Amsterdam and Atlanta: GA, Rodopi, 1994), 73.

32 Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political*, trans. George Schwab, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University Press, 2007), 22.

## II

Hont became acquainted with Reinhart Koselleck in the early 1980s and invited him (along with Wilhelm Hennis) to participate in a King's College conference on 'The Identity of Political Economy'.<sup>33</sup> This conference was the last of a series of conferences that Hont co-organised in Cambridge as part of a long-running research project entitled 'Political Economy and Society, 1750–1850'.<sup>34</sup> At that time, Koselleck was belatedly becoming a well-known name in Cambridge. Especially Melvin Richter and Keith Tribe drew attention to the value of the *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe*, and by the end of the decade both *Vergangene Zukunft* (1979) and *Kritik und Krise* had appeared in translation.<sup>35</sup> Koselleck's emphasis on the historicity of concepts struck a welcome chord among 'Cambridge School' contextualists, who generally saw Koselleck's methodology as consonant with their own approach.<sup>36</sup> Yet the substantive argument of *Kritik und Krise* received only little attention and, to the extent that it did provoke a response, it was largely negative.<sup>37</sup> This near-exclusive focus on methodology was unfortunate, according to Hont, since his 'methodology' – as with Leo Strauss – could not be properly understood in isolation from his politics, which above all owed a considerable debt to Carl Schmitt. In order to understand *Vergangene Zukunft*, in other words, one had to be familiar with the argument of *Kritik und Krise*. "The secondary literature," Hont noted in 2011,

sees Koselleck as a methodological and hermeneutical author. As a historian of political thought, however, Koselleck was first and foremost a

33 "The Identity of Political Economy: Programme", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/536.

34 "Political Economy and Society: Report", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/535.

35 Keith Tribe translated the GG article by Franz-Ludwig Kne Meyer on 'Polizei' in 1979, published in *Economy and Society* 9 (1980): 172–96. This was followed by a spate of other translations, including R. Koselleck, "Modernity and the Planes of Historicity", *Economy and Society* 10 (1981): 166–83; and "Begriffsgeschichte and Social History", *Economy and Society* 11 (1982): 409–27; See also Melvin Richter, "Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) and Political Theory", *Political Theory* 14/4 (Nov., 1986): 604–637; Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past*, trans. Keith Tribe (MIT, 1985; republished by Columbia University Press, 2004); *Critique and Crisis – Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern Society* (Oxford: Berg Publishers Ltd., 1988).

36 Keith Tribe, "Translator's Introduction", in R. Koselleck, *Futures Past* (Columbia University Press, 2004), viii.

37 Anthony J. La Vopa, "Review: Conceiving a Public: Ideas and Society in Eighteenth-Century Europe", *The Journal of Modern History* 64/1 (March, 1992): 79–116.

critic of Meinecke and the most important follower of Carl Schmitt's critique of political romanticism. When he was a lecturer in German in Bristol in the 1950s he re-translated Hobbes's *Leviathan* and his celebrated doctoral dissertation on the pathology of modern social thought, entitled *Critique and Crisis*, debunked moralised and utopian forms of politics in all, even in its most attractive forms. It was the most powerful condemnation of the Enlightenment as the intellectual and political source of modernity. In all his life Habermas tried to answer it, and those who only read the response, without the initial provocation, will never understand contemporary German political thought.<sup>38</sup>

In his preface to the English edition, Koselleck explained that *Kritik und Krise* had been a product of his attempt to understand National Socialism and its "loss of reality and Utopian self-exaltation".<sup>39</sup> But rather than a *Sonderweg* story, Koselleck placed the German catastrophe in the context of a more general pathology of the modern world, one that had produced not only National Socialism but also the Cold War standoff between two rival superpowers, each committed to an ideological exclusiveness that prevented them from recognising the other as an opponent, thus "destroying the opportunity for peace".<sup>40</sup> Koselleck found the origin of this modern pathology in the eighteenth century, more specifically in the apolitical or anti-political attitude that had emerged in the Enlightenment, most notably in its progressive philosophies of history wherein the *locus* of moral authority shifted from the state to society. The precondition of this shift, however, lay in Absolutism and its subordination of the citizen's private conscience to the interest of the state, of which Hobbes was the paradigmatic theoretical representative. In fact, the threat of civil and religious war had made the doctrine of reason of state near ubiquitous in the seventeenth century, recognised and applied by monarchies and republics alike. "Every power which in those days sought to equip itself with authority and a generally binding nature required this exclusion of the private conscience in which the bonds of religion or of feudal loyalty were anchored."<sup>41</sup> For Koselleck, the Enlightenment was an intellectual movement that gradually inverted this subordination. Being denied participation in government, the intellectual elite had sought refuge in private morality and criticism, beginning

38 István Hont, "CRASSH Seminar 2011, Seminar 3: Carl Schmitt and Reinhart Koselleck", *Intellectual History Archive*, IHA/Hont/322.

39 Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis*, 1.

40 *Ibid.*

41 *Ibid.*, 21.

with Pierre Bayle's Republic of Letters and culminating in Kant's *Critiques*. The evolving process of criticism saw its jurisdiction expand and eventually intrude on the public realm, but the presumed neutrality of critique prevented the elite from seeing itself as a political phenomenon.<sup>42</sup> Convinced of its own innocence and moral superiority, the Enlightenment ultimately denounced the absolutist state as an illegitimate, Machiavellian polity, but the apolitical vantagepoint from which this moral judgement was made rendered its critique extreme, unable to distinguish between the legitimate use of power and its abuse.<sup>43</sup> In consequence, a hypocritical dualism between politics and morality emerged that rendered compromise unconscionable and cast the political opponent in the image of a monster. The "staying power" of this moral dualism, Koselleck argued,

can be gathered from the almost inevitable employment of ostensibly moral categories for political purposes. In using the weapons appropriate to the eighteenth century, all parties became the victim of a mutually intensifying and compulsory resort to ideology which has characterised the modern age ever since.<sup>44</sup>

The anticipation of an eventual escape from the hard constraints of politics made the Enlightenment blind to the real possibilities of the present, exacerbating the crisis of the *Ancien Regime* by seeing it as the harbinger of the future victory of society over the state. This was the dialectic of critique and crisis that had come to characterise modern politics since the French Revolution, and which had propelled the world into a state of "permanent crisis".<sup>45</sup> The Enlightenment had, he argued,

developed patterns of thought and behaviours which, at the latest from 1789 onwards, foundered on the rocks of the concrete political challenges that arose. The Enlightenment succumbed to a Utopian image which, while deceptively propelling it, helped to produce contradictions which could not be resolved in practice and prepared the way for the Terror and for dictatorship.<sup>46</sup>

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42 The central chapter is chapter 8: 'The Process of Criticism', *Ibid.*, 98–123.

43 *Ibid.*, 119.

44 *Ibid.*, 151n.

45 *Ibid.*, 5, 12.

46 *Ibid.*, 2.

In his new preface, Koselleck drew attention to two key themes of modernity that he hoped *Critique and Crisis* would help to highlight, both of which “persistent structures” that could be seen as “elements of historical anthropology”. The first was “the sense that we are being sucked into an open and unknown future, the pace of which has kept us in a constant state of breathlessness ever since the dissolution of the traditional *ständische* societies”.<sup>47</sup> In this way, Koselleck pointed to its connection with his later theoretical work on the transformation of our political sense of time, which he argued had occurred during the *Sattelzeit*, the period between 1750 and 1850 when philosophical history flourished and the ‘horizon of expectations’ diverged from the ‘space of experience’.<sup>48</sup> The second theme he hoped to highlight was the “pressure on our post-theological age to justify politics and morals without us being able to reconcile the two.”<sup>49</sup> In other words, Koselleck believed that his analysis was revealing of both the difficulty and the need to ground political authority on secular foundations, a problem that had also preoccupied Carl Schmitt and Leo Strauss in the guise of the ‘theologico-political problem’. However, Koselleck also acknowledged that the passage of time had shown certain aspects of the book to be outdated, not least its conception of the Enlightenment as a unified movement. In particular, he regretted that he had paid only “marginal attention” to the fact that Great Britain “never experienced the tension between State and society which so shaped the nations on the European continent”.<sup>50</sup> Possibly with the King’s College seminars in mind, Koselleck recognised that the Scottish Enlightenment had been different, and that Britain had been relatively insulated from utopian ideas on account of the “sober theories” of the Scottish moral philosophers. Naturally, this concession piqued the interest of István Hont, who quickly realised the value of asking questions about Scottish political economy from a Koselleckian point of view. In 1990, Hont listed the questions that his reading of *Critique and Crisis* had prompted regarding Adam Smith:

Do we find in his work an intimation of how critique and reform could co-exist in a relatively coherent and harmonious system? Did Smith escape the pathological desire of the Enlightenment to undermine the definition of the political bequeathed to it by the 17th-century ‘Absolute

47 *Ibid.*, 3.

48 Reinhart Koselleck, “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’: Two historical categories”, in *Futures Past*, 255–275.

49 Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis*, 3.

50 *Ibid.*

State', so clearly formulated by Hobbes? Smith, clearly, was not a follower of Hobbes, nor did he develop an alternative theory to Hobbes's problem of the representation of the unified political body in the contract theory idiom, as Rousseau, Kant, and others have attempted. Did Smith then, in any way, work out a new notion of the political which could lead from critique (for he was undoubtedly a social critic) not to the return of secular enthusiasm but to true reform(ation), an endeavour clearly central to his project? Did Smith leave to us a legacy of proper political theory, and hence of genuine guidance for reform, at all?<sup>51</sup>

From the late 1980s, much of the work that Hont did on Adam Smith – both published and unpublished – can be seen as attempts to provide affirmative answers to these questions. He did so by contrasting Adam Smith's critique of the mercantile system with that of the French physiocrats, highlighting Smith's antipathy towards the utopian politics of Quesnay and the differences between their desired reform-paths. Moreover, the 1993 conference on reason of state, which Koselleck also attended, resulted in Hont's major work of the 1990s, the long article on 'The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind' from 1994, in which he provided a characterisation of the modern crisis that was significantly inspired by Koselleck, who also discussed the paper with Hont in detail before its publication. As a point of criticism, Hont also nuanced Koselleck's unitary view of the French Revolution, driving a wedge in between the forms of critique advanced by Emmanuel Sieyès and the Jacobins in particular.

### III

In retrospect, Smith characterised the *Wealth of Nations* as a "violent attack (...) upon the whole commercial system of Great Britain".<sup>52</sup> In other words, it was a scathing critique of the existing mode of governance, which purported to promote the public good by making commerce a reason of state. In reality, however, the mercantile system represented a distortion of reason of state, according to Smith, favouring the commercial interest at the expense of the common interest. In its place, Smith wished to see a return to a system of natural liberty, in which the state refrained from intervening in the economy

51 Hont, "Authority and Reformation: Critique and Crisis in Adam Smith", Unpublished manuscript [1990], The Papers of István Hont. Special Collections, University of St Andrews, 1.

52 Adam Smith to Andreas Holt, 26 Oct. 1780, E. G. Mossner & I. S. Ross (eds.), *Correspondence of Adam Smith* (Oxford University Press, 1977), 251.

and instead concentrated on its main objective, namely to defend the nation against external enemies, to administer justice internally, and to provide the necessary infrastructure that allowed commerce and society to thrive. In seeking to actively regulate the economy so as to maintain competitiveness in international trade, for instance by keeping wages low through restrictions on food exports, the mercantile system had enacted policies that were not in the interest of society at large and, moreover, presupposed an intelligence that no human being possessed.

Fundamentally, the state for Smith remained the embodiment of the common interest. But he diagnosed the impossibility of fostering the common interest of market actors through the same representational agency of sovereignty which made up the backbone of political society. Discharging the duty of a sovereign in regimenting commercial society required more than what any human being (or group of human beings) could do.<sup>53</sup>

As damning as Smith's criticism of the mercantile system was, he nonetheless understood that a total remodelling of the existing order was impractical and dangerous. Despite the harsh language, Smith's 'violent attack' was not blind to the dilemmas of transition. Not only had the existing commercial order entrenched itself in the dispositions of the people, but a radical reform of the entire system would be subject to the same epistemic limitations as the mercantile management of the economy and thus likely to cause more damage than good, especially regarding liberty. "Instead of facing the task of inventing the best legislation for commercial society," Hont wrote,

Smith precisely premised his argument on its impossibility. His project was formulated in a negative fashion, because it was built on the denial of access to that divine superior intelligence which could discover the best regulation for markets. (...) The correction of disorder in the constitution of the state, Smith pointed out, was likely to cause another disorder. If economic restructuring was not [sic] done with less than the utmost caution, critique could lead to crisis.<sup>54</sup>

53 Hont, "Authority and Reformation ...", 3; See also, Hont, "Commercial Society and Political Theory in the Eighteenth Century ...", 81.

54 Hont, "Authority and Reformation ...", 4.

According to Hont, this cautious attitude was a consistent feature of Smith's political thought, dating all the way back to his early Edinburgh lectures on natural jurisprudence.<sup>55</sup> His aversion towards projectors and enthusiasts, most eloquently expressed in his caution against the "man of system" in the 6th and final edition of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), published in 1790, was thus not the result of an aging man's conservative reaction to the French Revolution, nor was it a reflection of a waning commitment to a system of natural liberty. When Smith spoke in abstract terms about projectors and men of system, Hont argued, he had in mind fellow critics of the mercantile system such as François Quesnay, who placed themselves in the position of a 'first legislator' and wished to implement a system of natural liberty through the powers of absolutism, consolidated into a legal despotism.

If for Smith the epithet "projector" was a byword for a vicious species of aggressively progressive politics, a harmful and pathological outgrowth of reforming intent, then in his view Quesnay and his sect had to be judged [sic] guilty of being projectors. Summarizing their ideas, he spoke of the production of perverse effects likely to be caused by their politics, a political philosophy which lacked a proper understanding of the way human beings form society through their intricate and complex social interactions. Smith was a sharp critic of any dogmatic commitment to the rash remodelling of society according to the natural order. For Smith, the restoration of an order of natural liberty (like Hume, he always talked about "restoration") was not a "project". As he saw it, for Quesnay and his followers it was.<sup>56</sup>

Thus, while Smith took the side of the Physiocrats when it came to liberating the economy from the vestiges of feudalism and from the commercial distortions of lobbying merchants, this agreement did not extend to the politics of transition. The reason for this difference, Hont argued, was to be found in Smith's different and more inclusive conception of natural jurisprudence, which was much better geared towards facilitating sound political judgements.

First of all, Smith's jurisprudential theory of history, the theory of how society ideally progressed from barbarism to civilisation through different modes of subsistence, included a fourth stage beyond agriculture – a commercial

55 Hont, "The Political Economy of the 'Unnatural and Retrograde' Order: Adam Smith and Natural Liberty", in *Französische Revolution und Politische Ökonomie, Schriften aus dem Karl-Marx-Haus*, vol. 41 (Trier: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 1989), 125.

56 *Ibid.*, 128.



society – in which every man “becomes in some measure a merchant”.<sup>57</sup> In contrast, the Physiocrats were reluctant to accept commerce as a naturally developed mode of subsistence for large territorial monarchies. Commerce was by definition a derivative mode of subsistence, a necessary but ultimately ‘sterile’ exchange of surpluses, and for that reason a commercial society was only properly suited for small, populous republics like the Dutch, who were forced to specialise in trade due to their scarce supply of land. The only route to lasting prosperity for a large country, according to the Physiocrats, was to follow the natural path of cultivating the soil before engaging in manufacturing and foreign trade, and this path-exclusiveness, this strict adherence to natural law theory, was precisely what made their politics so uncompromising. For Smith, on the other hand, this natural order of progress was a poor guide to political action. Instead, political judgement had to start by acknowledging the progress that had in fact occurred, however imperfectly. Although economic development had followed an unnatural path in Europe’s monarchies, with commerce and manufacturing developing before agriculture, the distortions of feudalism and the mercantile system had not been able to suppress the natural desire of human beings to better their own condition. Nor had agriculture languished completely, given that any progress in commerce, even a forced progress, inevitably expanded the division of labour and created a demand for food, which necessarily stimulated agricultural improvements, albeit in a retrograde fashion. By supplementing pure theory with real history in this way, as he did in the *Wealth of Nations*, especially in Book III, Smith was, Hont believed, developing a new and improved kind of natural jurisprudence. In fact, Book III was nothing short of an “embodiment of natural jurisprudence as he saw it”, constituting the best representation of the larger project on the “general principles of law and government”, of which the *Wealth of Nations* was merely a part, which Smith announced in all editions of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* but never published.<sup>58</sup> However, it would be mistaken, Hont emphasised,

to see Smith’s effort as aiming to replace natural jurisprudence with a purely historical, and hence strongly sceptical, science of the legislator. He insisted on the relevance of natural jurisprudence until his last days. (...) The explanatory power of the book stems from its juxtaposition of

57 Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, eds. R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, & W.B. Todd, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1975), I.iv.i.

58 Hont, “Authority and Reformation ...”, 8; Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, eds. D.D. Raphael & A.L. Macfie (Oxford, 1976), VII.iv.37.

the natural and the unnatural models, not merely from the refinement of its dissection of the working of human artifices.<sup>59</sup>

This improved and more historically sensitive natural jurisprudence enabled Smith to adopt a negative reform programme, which instead of a radical and dangerous over-correction towards agriculture merely required the removal of all preferential policies from the existing unnatural system. In short, whereas the Physiocrats argued for an abrupt course correction, Smith believed in the continuation of progress through a gradual convergence between the actual and the natural order of development.

Nonetheless, every reform, even a cautious one, was likely to disrupt existing property relations and thus negatively impact the wealth of many investors and the livelihood of many labourers. If reform was not carried out with the utmost prudence, it could easily lead to social disorder and political crisis. And if such a situation was to arrive, if public grievances were allowed to grow, then every patriotic citizen was soon faced with the dilemma of choosing between preserving the *status quo* or promoting the well-being of the people through radical reform. In 1789, when the Revolution broke out in France, this was exactly the problem that Smith addressed when he chose to add a new chapter to the 6th edition of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. As Hont pointed out, Smith's new chapter was an analysis of "the possible motivations and delusions which could lead one to desire innovation".<sup>60</sup> In effect, Hont suggested that Smith had been highly aware of the dangerous critique-crisis dialectic that could potentially unfold insofar as the desire for change was animated by a 'spirit of system' rather than by 'public spirit'. As Hont wrote:

The distinction between these two sets of motivations, Smith insisted, was of paramount importance. In times of crisis, he pointed out, the two were bound to get mixed up, what starts as a genuine concern for the well-being of others easily turns into fanaticism and the pursuit of systems, allowing for no other possibility of improvement but a radical remodelling of the constitution and the existing institutional order. The "spirit of system" could attach itself parasitically to justified demands of necessary change. Since the basic demands of the two kind of reform efforts could easily appear to be the same, and originally indeed might

59 Hont, "Authority and Reformation ...", 8; For a different view see Paul Sagar, *Adam Smith Reconsidered – History, Liberty, and the Foundations of Modern Politics* (Princeton University Press, 2022).

60 Hont, "The Political Economy of the 'Unnatural and Retrograde' Order ...", 142.

spring from the same root, Smith tried to call attention to the difference between their *modus operandi*, by setting limits beyond which no improving intent could remain genuinely moderate and virtuous.<sup>61</sup>

As stated above, Hont believed that Smith's caution against the 'man of system' was a consistent feature of his political thought. Ultimately, it rested on his theory of political obligation, which was yet another innovative aspect of his natural jurisprudence. Whereas most natural law theories relied heavily on the principle of common interest – or utility – in their explanations of the origin of government and private property, and none more so than those which derived obligation from a contract, Smith's natural jurisprudence was different. Like Hume, Smith rejected the idea of a contract as well as the connected idea of a prior 'state of nature'. Instead, he developed a conjectural history of society's progress from barbarism to civilisation, which accounted for the origin of government and private property by reference to two principles rather than one, namely utility and authority. His theory of obligation thus had a dual foundation, which made it much more robust, Hont argued, both historically and politically.<sup>62</sup> Most importantly, the principle of authority had a foundation in human nature and was thus natural, devoid of any theological assumptions. It derived from the natural tendency of human beings to show deference to visible markers of authority such as age and superior wisdom, superior strength or ability, and superior wealth. In this way, authority preceded the rise of civil society in the form of a natural social hierarchy, which gradually – as property emerged and inequality grew – was institutionalised, embedded in custom and codified into law. A rudimentary form of government thus predated the development of an exact regime of justice, just as a corporative form of land-ownership, held collectively by tribes or small nations, predated the decision to parcel out the land into exclusive private property.

Utility, or common interest, however, had no such natural foundation in human nature. When common interest acted as a source of political obligation, it was based on a calculation, a retrospective perception, of the utility of order and good government. But as such, it was an inherently fragile basis for allegiance to government, given that it was highly subject to interpretation and

61 *Ibid.*

62 Hont first explored the importance of this aspect of Smith's jurisprudence in a long unpublished article, which he delivered in Chicago in February of 1989 and subsequently in Göttingen in June. Hont, "The Idea of Natural Jurisprudence and Adam Smith's Two Versions of the Four Stages Theory: From Property to Politics and Back", Unpublished manuscript [1989], The Papers of István Hont, Special Collections, University of St Andrews.

could, if a change of government promised more utility, sanction revolution. However, the natural tendency to admire the wealthy and powerful meant that people were generally reluctant to overthrow the existing order, especially one that was supported by longstanding custom. This was evident from the fact that revolutions were so rare, and that people generally remained loyal to their rulers and respected private property despite great inequality and dis-utility to themselves. “The social order of ranks,” Hont argued about Smith,

was unlike a system of order based on utility alone. If anything, it was its countervailing principle. (...) The natural sentiment to respect the rich and the powerful, in fact, was the great bulwark against disorder and revolution fuelled by the disutility of existing society.<sup>63</sup>

The constant working of this natural countervailing principle meant that revolutionaries were unlikely to succeed unless they were aided by an enthusiasm strong enough to overpower people’s natural conservatism. For Smith, as for Hume, the word ‘enthusiasm’ had religious, possibly eschatological, connotations, signifying a kind of utopian fervour, which elevated the private judgement of men to the supreme standard of justice. Smith identified, Hont claimed,

the sole reliance on the dictates of common interest (...) as the cause of past instability and also as the most likely potential danger for the future. The destabilizing of sovereignty and collapse into disorder or revolution was not likely to happen, he maintained, without an agency to lead it. Smith dreaded enthusiasm in the service of any reformation, religious or economic. In the context of secular reformation, he identified as a dangerous agency a particular combination of the contract theory of sovereign power, based on the principle of utility, with the usurpation of the noble role of the divine office of the first legislator.<sup>64</sup>

For Hont, the dual foundation of political obligation meant that Smith’s critique of the mercantile system avoided the pathology of modern politics as identified by Koselleck. Moreover, it demonstrated a profound awareness of the inherent danger of substituting utopia for sound political judgement, which above all dictated that any successful reform, any infringement of existing property rights and entitlements, had to rely on the natural principle of

<sup>63</sup> Hont, “Authority and Reformation ...”, 16.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*

authority and the system of ranks to which it gave rise. Without a hierarchy of legitimate authority, without a system of ranks, society would be incapable of opposing either government or the commercial interest. This of course placed limitations on what a reform was able to accomplish, but the virtuous reformer, Hont concluded, would “aim not at the best, but at the best possible in the circumstances.”<sup>65</sup>

#### IV

Having demonstrated Smith’s awareness of the critique-crisis dialectic, Hont proceeded to give a different account of its ultimate origin. In his 1994 article on the ‘permanent crisis of a divided mankind’, Hont located the source of the modern crisis not in the exclusion of the intellectual elite from politics under absolutism, nor indeed in the realm of ideas, but in the character of the nation state as such. Because its territorial claims ultimately could not be given any solid *de jure* basis in international law, but only ever received recognition as *de facto* possession, the nation state had always, in fact, been in crisis. For this reason, the word crisis was something of a misnomer, given that ‘crisis’ was simply a feature of the fact that mankind was divided into separate territorial communities, existing among each other in a state of nature. “If the crisis of ‘nation states’” Hont wrote,

is linked to a weakness in the legitimation of their territorial specification, and that is linked to the legitimation of national property in land, then the idea of the ‘nation state’ cannot now be in crisis, because it has always been in ‘crisis’. The only possible world of territorial security is a world of perpetual peace.<sup>66</sup>

The real question that presented itself at the end of the Cold War was thus whether the nation state was likely to undergo a terminal crisis or whether it was a durable feature of modern politics – a question with profound implications for the politics of bringing about a lasting peace. Historically, there had been many suggestions as to what a terminal crisis would entail. One was the Marxian prediction that the productive power of capitalism would bring about a united world without scarcity and thus enable a return to the ‘negative’

65 *Ibid.*, 17.

66 Hont, “The Permanent Crisis of a Divided Mankind: ‘Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State’ in Historical perspective”, *Political Studies* 42 (1994), 179.

community of man's early beginnings. Another was the idea that nation states would one day consolidate themselves into a supra-national world state, for better or worse. Short of these extremes, however, modern political history was more often characterised by either trivial or pathological modes of crisis perception, or by 'crisis-mongering', in which the crisis of the nation state was seen as either temporary or lamented for its intractability – the latter being outright *Kulturpessimismus*. But between the optimism of a perfect solution and the despair of its absence, there was a third option, Hont maintained, an option that had in fact been suggested in Koselleck's long article on *Crisis*, and which was embodied in the 'realist' doctrine of international politics.<sup>67</sup> This was the idea of crisis as a *permanent* predicament, as a mere manifestation of continuing economic and political change. However, as Koselleck had documented, it was a characteristic feature of modern political thought that the word 'crisis' had become stubbornly entwined with the idea of revolution. Indeed, it was an "index of the malaise of modern political language", Hont noted, that such a "non-pathological interpretation of 'permanent crisis' does not have a commonly agreed name."<sup>68</sup> If crisis was the normal mode of existence for the nation state, then the term was not only unsuitable, but ill-considered, given that it inevitably invoked some form of finality and thus invited utopian thinking. In contrast, accepting crisis as a permanent condition, however contradictory in terms, promised only the non-revolutionary and non-teleological outcome of a "happy escape from death, which falls short of achieving a utopian return to real health".<sup>69</sup>

By the 1990s, there was ample discussion about globalisation and the contemporary crisis of the nation state. Much of this, Hont believed, was simply a rehearsal of old ideas, in particular those of the French Revolution, which largely, as Hont proceeded to show, revolved around the issue of popular sovereignty and its conceptualisation as either indirect and national or direct and popular. Exploring this historical parallel, Hont embarked on the Koselleckian enterprise of conceptual history, determining the ways in which the concept of 'the nation' had historically been coupled and un-coupled with the concept of 'the state', especially during the dialectical struggles that played out between the moderates and the Jacobins in the debates over the 1789 and 1793 declarations of the Rights of Man. Whereas Emmanuel Sieyès' notion of 'national

67 Reinhart Koselleck, "Crisis", trans. Michaela W. Richter, *Journal of the History of Ideas* 67, no. 2 (2006), 371; For the identification of 'permanent crisis' with the realist doctrine of international politics, see Hont, "The Permanent Crisis ...", 176.

68 Hont, "The Permanent Crisis ...", 169.

69 *Ibid.*

sovereignty' was congruent with Hobbes' notion of 'the state', contributing only the implied substratum of a territorially defined nation (of individuals) capable of choosing its representatives, Robespierre's advocacy of popular sovereignty was based on a rejection of the Hobbesian state in favour of the people, understood collectively, non-territorially, and ultimately comprising the whole human race, of which the nation state was merely an artificial subdivision, the creation of power-hungry kings and aristocrats. Behind this disagreement about national or popular sovereignty lay a whole host of differing outlooks on modern society and modern politics, especially differing views about human sociability. For Sieyès, the idea of representation was a fundamental fact of modern society. Not only was it a necessity in a large nation, it constituted a mere extension of the modern division of labour, which in turn was based on commercial sociability. In contrast, the Jacobins viewed sovereignty as inalienably located in the people, whom they imbued with a cosmopolitan, communitarian sociability of ancient republican inspiration. Their revolution in effect required, Hont argued, "political homogenization on a world scale and moral cleansing of a totally universal character".<sup>70</sup> As such, it constituted a full-scale attack on the idea that sovereignty was in any way an expression of territoriality, such as Sieyès had maintained, or indeed that the nation, whilst existing among other nations in a state of nature, could properly represent the will of the people. The analysis that Koselleck had presented in *Critique and Crisis* thus applied comfortably to the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, but not to Sieyès, who accepted the nation state as the *locus* of political authority and denied that it could be circumscribed or challenged by any other power, either domestically or internationally.<sup>71</sup> For Sieyès, the Janus-faced nature of the state was permanent, and his nation, like all modern nations, had to contend with the often contradictory demands of representation and reason of state, without the expectation of an eventual escape – a terminal crisis of the nation state.

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70 *Ibid.*, 207.

71 *Ibid.*, 205.