

**WOMEN IN REVOLUTIONARY ORGANISATIONS**

**Caron E. Gentry**

**A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
University of St. Andrews**



**2003**

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Submitted for the degree of Ph.D., University of St. Andrews

February 25, 2003



## **Abstract**

The main aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that the female revolutionary is no different from her male compatriot. She enters the organisation in the same manner; she shares the same ideology; she participates equally within the revolutionary organisation; and, if she leaves the struggle, she does so in much the same way as her peers. The thesis uses a framework based upon New Social Movement theory to establish the social and historical context of the women by comparing the following five aspects of a new social movement: historical context, leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and the revolutionary dimension. Before the three historical narratives on the American Movement, the West German student movement and the Palestinian Resistance Movement are undertaken, a literature review covers Social Movement theory, New Social Movement theory, theories on Violence and Terrorism Studies. The thesis also looks at how women have been gendered in criminology and war and how this gendering has influenced some of the leading research on the female terrorist. In order to show that the female revolutionary is very similar to the male, this thesis examines the three historical narratives mentioned above. After reviewing the social and historical context, the respective new social movement, the role of women in the revolutionary organisations (the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction and Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) are reviewed in depth by studying their entry, ideology, group dynamics and exit.

## Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been written without the help, encouragement and support of many people. I would like to thank my parents, Tom and Liz Gentry, my sisters and brother, Andrea, Scot and Christy, and friends who should be family, David and Peggy Kinzel, for their unending support and encouragement. An enormous thank you to my supervisor for his own unfailing support, Professor Paul Wilkinson. I apologise for driving him to the point of pulling his hair out. To all of my friends here—Kristen Deede and Trygve Johnson, Suchitra Dutta, Anthony Richards, Steven, Gina and Samuel Prokopchuk, Ed, Anna and Samuel Russell, Heather Huntley, Mary Abbott, Christine Laennec and family, and my Wednesday and Thursday groups—and abroad—Emily Graves, Jessica Steege, Jeanne Bloom, Katy Oznick, Tracy Nectoux, Mar Stearns, Lauren Hummel, Fredrik Skoglund, Silje Eikås, Lessa Millard and Katia Evans—thank you for many laughs and good times. A big thank you to Maria Siemer for reading the *entire* thing, finding all of my mistakes and for watching all of the stupid movies I have picked out over the years. A special thank you to Dr. Anders Strindberg for trusting me and to Leila Khaled for her honesty with me. To all of the professors and lecturers in the Department of International Relations—thank you. With a special thank you to Ian Hall, Dr. John Anderson (and family), Professor Nick Rengger and Professor William Walker. Applause goes to the ever-patient, amazing secretaries—Fiona Oviatt, Gillian McIlwaine and Gillian Flemming. To Professor Kavita Khory, Professor Joan Cox, Professor Christine Kelly-Filkohazi, Professor Penny Gill and Assistant Dean Elizabeth Hogan at Mount Holyoke College for teaching me, challenging me and encouraging me to go further. Thank you to Professor Cynthia Enloe at Clark University for reading my paper and answering endless questions from a faceless woman all the way over in Scotland. I must also thank the University of Chicago's Regenstein Library and the British Library for access to their stacks. And above all, I thank God for his many blessings.

## List of Abbreviations

ANM	Arab Nationalist Movement
APO	<i>Ausserparlamentarische Opposition</i> (Extra-parliamentary Opposition)
AStA	<i>Allgemeiner Studenten Ausschuss</i> (General Students Council)
AUB	American University of Beirut
BDM	<i>Bund Deutscher Mädel</i> (Federation of German Girls)
BKA	<i>Bundeskriminalamt</i> (Federal Criminal Bureau)
BLA	Black Liberation Army
CDU	<i>Christlich-Demokratische Union</i> (Christian-Democratic Party)
CSU	<i>Christlich-Soziale Union</i> (Christian-Socialist Party)
CORE	Congress of Racial Equality
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DFU	<i>Deutsche Friedens Union</i> (German Peace Union)
DKP	<i>Deutsche Kommunistische Partei</i> (Stalinist Communist Party)
ETA	<i>Euskadi ta Askatasuna</i>
ERAP	Economic Research and Action Projects
Fateh	<i>Harakat al-Tahir (al-Watani) al-Filastani</i> (The Palestine (National) Liberation Movement)
FLN	<i>Front de Libération Nationale</i> (National Liberation Front)
GUPW	General Union of Palestinian Women
Hamas	<i>Harakat al-Muqawwana al-Islamiyya</i> (Islamic Resistance Movement)
HUAC	House Committee on Un-American Activities
JOIN	Jobs Or Income Now
KPD	<i>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Maoist Communist Party)
KPD-AO	<i>Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Leninist Communist Party)
LID	League for Industrial Democracy

LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam
MOBE	National Mobilisation Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People
NLF	National Liberation Front
NOW	National Organisation of Women
PA	Palestinian Authority
PASC	Palestine Armed Struggle Command
PDFLP	Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command
PFOC	Prairie Fire Organising Committee
PL	Progressive Labour
PLA	Palestine Liberation Army
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organisation
PMT	Pre-Menstrual Tension
PNC	Palestine National Council
PRM	Palestinian Resistance Movement
RAF	<i>Rote Armee Fraktion</i> (Red Army Faction)
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
RYM	Revolutionary Youth Movement
SANE	Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
SDS	Students for a Democratic Society
SDS	<i>Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund</i> (Socialist Students Union)
SLID	Student League for Industrial Democracy
SNCC	Student Non-violent Conferencing Committee

SPD	<i>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (Social Democratic Party)
UAR	United Arab Republic
UNLU	Unified National Leadership of the Uprising ( <i>al-Qiyada al-Wastaniya al-Muwahhada</i> )
UNWRA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
VDS	<i>Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften</i> (Union of German Students Association)
WITCH	Women's International Conspiracy from Hell
WUO	Weather Underground Organisation
YWCA	Young Women's Christian Association
YIP(pies)	Youth International Party

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## Introduction Chapter

Jean Bethke Elshtain describes society's view of female violence as "slid[ing] off the edge of a divide between bounded and unbounded activity, falling into the unstructured, chaotic, marginal as something disintegrative, anomalous, threatening."<sup>1</sup> This quote puts into perspective the challenge of studying women involved in revolutionary organisations. The use of terror as a tactic and strategy is rarely an acceptable practice. When women use this tactic, reactions go far beyond that of 'unacceptable.' The female revolutionary is a threat to society's stability and societal norms of both the West and the Middle East.

When I first started this project, there was no difference in my mind between the male and female terrorist. However, some of the research that has been conducted on the female terrorist portrays her as more deviant and unnatural. The female terrorist, because she is more ruthless, has to be 'dealt' with in a different manner from the male terrorist. She is depicted in more horrific ways than the male terrorist and this seems to be more of a bias than a truth. Men, due to their existence in the public realm, have traditionally been considered the only natural perpetrators of violence. Women, who exist in the private realm, are meant to be nurturing caregivers. Women who act violently reject their role in society. Therefore, this rejection of her place in her normative sphere makes the female terrorist far scarier. Men and women do employ different decision-making processes. Biologically, we fulfil different reproductive functions. Men are stronger physically; women are weaker, but this does not mean women cannot be violent. Both sexes have the capacity for violence and the use of violence by either sex is equally reprehensible.

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<sup>1</sup> Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Women and War. (University of Chicago Press: London, 1987) p. 169

Learning to differentiate between gender and sex has clarified my argument. Gender refers to “cultural and social meanings, experiences and institutional structures that are defined as appropriate for males and females.” Sex is biological—“the chromosomal, chemical, anatomical apparatuses that make us male or female.”<sup>2</sup> During the summer of 2001, the BBC ran their second series of “Child of Our Time,” where they are following a set of children who were born in the winter of 2000. *Programme 2: Tomboy or Sissy?* dealt specifically with the issue of gender and sex. The BBC asked: how much do hormones and/or society dictate in the development of a girl and a boy? The BBC’s answer: “although our hormones determine our sex it is probably our environment that has the last say in our choice of gender roles.”<sup>3</sup> In the end there are certain sex differences, but hormones and genetics “provid[e] the raw material” and society determines the rest.<sup>4</sup>

Therefore, when some researchers within Terrorism Studies discuss the differences between a male and a female terrorist they are under the influence of societal norms. This study needs to understand how these researchers have arrived at such a gendered explanation for female political violence. Beyond this, I wanted to know whether or not my opinion could be upheld: that the female terrorist is not all that different from the male. She enters the organisation in the same way; ideology, as in the case of the male, is her driving force; she participates equally within the group; and if she leaves, the female terrorist exits along the same lines. However, before this can be achieved, the female terrorist must be placed within context—social and historical. One of my major critiques of the research done on the female terrorist is the lack of context in which she is analysed. Sometimes by assuming or knowing the

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<sup>2</sup> Kimmel, Michael S. and Aronson, Amy, eds. *The Gendered Society Reader*. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2000) p. 2

<sup>3</sup> “Child or Our Time: *Programme 2: Tomboy or Sissy?*” Transmitted 4<sup>th</sup> July 2001, 21:00-22:00. [www.bbc.co.uk/factsheets/child\\_of\\_our\\_time/prog\\_1521.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/factsheets/child_of_our_time/prog_1521.shtml), site accessed 16<sup>th</sup> July 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Kimmel and Aronson, op. cit., p. 2

context in which the authors<sup>5</sup> were writing, helps to make their arguments more palatable; even if I still do not agree with their outcome. Of the studies I have read on women and violence, crime and war, the ones with which I have the most trouble take the women under study out of context. For example, Martin van Creveld discusses the role women have played in instigating war. One of his examples is the “war hysteria that overtook much of Europe” with the outbreak of World War I. He only describes the hysteria of women, not society’s, as they accompanied troops to the railway stations, bringing food and “covering [the soldiers] with flowers and kisses.”<sup>6</sup> Because of their encouraging actions, women ‘instigated’ the war. This view distorts the women’s support of the soldiers without letting the reader know the media’s reactions, the government’s wartime propaganda or the reaction of the men. Therefore, this thesis strives to place the female revolutionary into her social and historical context. This means that, from the outset, I prefer not to use the terms ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism.’ Instead, I prefer to use the terms that those involved in revolutionary organisations use to describe themselves, such as revolutionary, activist and/or guerrilla. The women under study did not typically consider themselves to be terrorists; so while the terms terrorist and terrorism are used throughout this thesis, they are typically only used when quoting or paraphrasing someone else.

The role of the female revolutionary has been examined, though not quite as thoroughly as the male, since the rise of modern terrorism in 1969. In the revolutionary groups of the 1960s, women typically played a prominent role. However, their image and place within the revolutionary organisation has been consistently misconstrued to fit acceptable gender roles within the society in which they were (dys)functioning. The

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<sup>5</sup> I.e., H.H.A. Cooper’s chapter on the female terrorist from 1979 was written in the aftermath of Marxist-Leninist groups worldwide. Or Robin Morgan’s approach to the female terrorist was written in view of her position as a second-wave, radical feminist with close connections to the Weather Underground.

<sup>6</sup> van Creveld, Martin. Men, Women and War. (Cassell and Co.: London, 2001) p. 21

groups of the 1960s were usually Marxist-Leninist in ideology, making the inclusion of women more natural in accordance with their ideology of equality. The world saw women leading such groups as America's Weather Underground and West Germany's Red Army Faction. In the Palestinian struggle, women were hijacking planes. Yet, these women are portrayed as emotionally bankrupt, psychologically unfit or playing a maternal role. Somehow, I envisioned their role going beyond this. In accurate accounts of the groups, like the books by Jillian Becker, Bill Ayers, Susan Stern, Jane Alpert, Stefan Aust, Leila Khaled and even United States Congressional hearings, women were leaders, planners, ideologues and actors. Women were more involved within the organisations than "house-wife-y" roles. They were full-fledged members and deserve to be depicted as such.

## **Methodology**

Alain Touraine encourages (New) Social Movement theorists to engage in a relationship with the movements they are studying. The methodology adopted by the contributors for Donatella della Porta's collected volume on underground organisations and their relationship to social movements includes the use of biographical materials, autobiographies, in-depth interviews with current or former members, newspapers and trial records. The main objective in della Porta's volume is "to approach the phenomenon of 'terrorism' through the understanding of individual motivations and perceptions."<sup>7</sup> The goal is to "explain the distinctive—socially constructed—reality shared by members of the underground." All groups have varying goals, tactics and strategies that must be studied in order to understand terrorism.<sup>8</sup> The materials listed above allow the researcher to understand and to come into closer contact with the

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<sup>7</sup> della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations, volume 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. International Social Movement Research. (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) p. 5

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 5

members of revolutionary organisations. However, materials alone do not provide for a methodology. For methodology, I have turned to Alexander L. George and Arend Lijphart's establishment of a structured, focused comparative study.

The structured, focused comparison is titled as such because the methodology is

focused because it deals selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case...and structured because it employs general questions to guide the data collection and analysis in that historical case.<sup>9</sup>

The theoretical or practical interest should define which case a researcher "singles out for description and explanation."<sup>10</sup> A researcher can employ a qualitative approach to their research methodology, instead of using a statistical approach. A statistical approach would "maximi[se] the number of cases and statistically manipu[late] the data in order to test empirical hypotheses while control is exercised by means of partial correlations."<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, a case study, in the singular form "is not entirely satisfactory because the single cases investigated...are usually implicitly viewed in the theoretical context of a larger number of cases." Lijphart defines a case study as "a study of a certain problem, proposition or theory, and a case belong[ing] to a larger category of cases."<sup>12</sup> There is not enough data on female revolutionaries to provide a statistical study. A single case study would also be inadequate for the purposes of this thesis, as I will be combating the gender stereotypes of the female revolutionary. It would benefit this thesis more to select multiple historical narratives in order to justify my supposition. In order to form a comparative study, the researcher must treat case studies "as members of a 'class' or type of phenomenon."<sup>13</sup> For this study, I have chosen strong and visible female members from left-wing revolutionary organisations

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<sup>9</sup> George, Alexander L. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The method of structured, focused comparison." In Ulricks, Teddy J. *Diplomacy*. (Sage Publications: London, 1979) pp. 43-68. pp. 61-62

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid*, p. 50

<sup>11</sup> Lijphart, Arend. "The Comparable-Case Strategy in Comparative Research," *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 8, no. 2, July 1975, pp. 158-177. p. 163

<sup>12</sup> Lijphart, op. cit., p. 160

<sup>13</sup> George, op. cit., pp. 45-46

with ties to new social movements. Bernardine Dohrn, Kathy Boudin and Susan Stern of the Weather Underground, Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin of the Red Army Faction and Leila Khaled of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, “have all provoked more interest and speculation than their male comrades”<sup>14</sup> through their actions in their revolutionary organisations. These revolutionary groups have links to new social movements. I have chosen these ‘infamous’ women as a way of combatting the West German GSG-9 command, ‘Shoot the women first.’

George also provides the researcher with blueprints for a controlled comparison. It is comprised of three phases: design, case studies and drawing theoretical implications. In his Phase One, the researcher chooses the research topic; decides to either uphold or criticise the relevant theory; finds a way to narrow down the narratives; and determines points of comparison. George, like Touraine and della Porta, believes historical or cultural sensitivity is necessary. As I am not interested in creating a model or proving a hypothesis right or wrong, I am taking a relaxed approach to George’s and Lijphart’s structured, focused comparison. I do not plan to prove a hypothesis, but develop a way of understanding the role women can and have played in certain revolutionary groups. This will allow others to generate more research in this area without creating a testable hypothesis. This also means that the new social movements and groups I chose to study are not case studies, but historical narratives. In order to establish the context behind the new social movements and the revolutionary groups, I narrate the historical, social and personal atmosphere at the time.

I chose my historical narratives by looking for strong women involved in revolutionary groups. The largest amount of and most reliable research on

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<sup>14</sup> Kennedy, Helena. *Eve Was Framed: Women and British justice*. (Vintage: London, 1992) pp. 261-262

revolutionary groups with female participants was based in the 1960s and was typically Marxist-Leninist. The narratives under analysis are the American Weather Underground, the West German Red Army Faction and two groups involved in the Palestinian Resistance Movement of 1967, Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These groups saw themselves more as revolutionary organisations than terrorist groups, therefore the groups and their members will be referred to as revolutionary.

Terrorism Studies “tends to be interdisciplinary” as it draws from anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy and economics. Since there is no “overarching theory” on terrorism, Martha Crenshaw finds it is helpful to use theories of political violence.<sup>15</sup> I will look at theories on violence developed by John Dollard, Samuel Huntington, Ted Robert Gurr and Erich Fromm. There is only one volume of work that creates a theoretical framework in which to analyse the female terrorist. Luisella de Cataldo Neuberger and Tiziana Valentini developed the “maternal-sacrifice” theory. I challenge this theory as it is based upon a false perception of the gendered nature of violence. I am also critical of some work done in Terrorism Studies, as it does not take women or the gendering of violence seriously.

Touraine instructs researchers to “enter into a relationship with the social movement.” One needs to “designate the social and cultural stakes of the conflict.”<sup>16</sup> Revolutionary organisations are not the modern equivalent of Athena hatching fully formed from Zeus’ head. They find inspiration, energy and membership from somewhere. New Social Movement theory helps demarcate the relationship. The movements of the 1960s illustrate the distinction between a social movement and a new social movement. The labour and union (old) social movements had happened over a

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<sup>15</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “Current Research on Terrorism: The academic perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 15, pp. 1-11. p. 5

<sup>16</sup> Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements*. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 150

generation ago, with World War II in between. The new movements of the sixties were not concerned with capitalism and exploitation, per say. They were issue and culturally oriented. The new movements' ideology still referred to Marx, but the activists in America and West Germany were fighting for a 'freer' society. In the Palestinian Resistance Movement, they were and are fighting for liberation of what they perceive to be their homeland. The various revolutionary organisations were splinters of all of these new social movements. They are the frustrated elements that John Dollard warned people about in 1944. Therefore, not only is an analysis of the relationship between movement and revolutionary organisation studied, it also puts into perspective the society and culture in which these women were becoming active.

George feels the "framework must be comprehensive enough to capture the major elements of the historical explanation." The comparison "must be adequate to absorb enough of the richness of the historical explanation."<sup>17</sup> In order to capture the momentum and dynamic nature of a movement, a description of the historical events is necessary. By looking at the leadership and the membership of the new social movement, one can understand where the sexes 'fell'—i.e., which sex found it easier to participate as members or as leaders. Studying the collective action and the group ideology of the new social movement, it is easier to see the escalation in events and ideology as the new social movement moved closer and closer to violence. When the violence appears, it is usually produced by a frustrated faction of the new social movement and represents the revolutionary dimension.

The implications of my study are two-fold. First, I am hoping to combat the gender stereotypes placed upon the female terrorist. When a woman commits the same act of violence as a man, the implications of guilt and deviance should not be stronger for a woman due to societal norms. The root of the problem is the way in which

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<sup>17</sup> George, *op. cit.* p. 57

female violence has been conceptualised. The second implication is for the use of New Social Movement theory when studying revolutionary groups. Gurr theorises that relative deprivation first appears as politicised discontent, which then moves into violent action against political institutions and its representatives. This relates to the idea of a terrorist or revolutionary organisation splintering from a larger new social movement. Similarly Huntington said if a government is unwilling to incorporate political groups, like those that a new social movement encompasses, then the frustrated groups may become revolutionary. For Touraine, this revolutionary danger comes from a splinter group creating a more zealous micro-party. Della Porta and Mario Diani feel the more politicised an activist is, the more likely they are to react strongly.<sup>18</sup> Thus, this study intends to show how frustrated groups within a new social movement moved towards revolutionary violence.

George recommends that “a standardised set of questions in a controlled comparison is necessary to assume acquisition of comparable data.”<sup>19</sup> Even in my relaxed study, this suggestion is still important. Each of my three historical narratives follows the same set structure. After the social context is clarified the new social movement is explored through these five points of comparison: historical context, leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and revolutionary dimension. Once this context is elaborated upon, the comparative points of the female revolutionary—her entry, her ideology, the group dynamics and her exit—can be discussed. These points were picked as a way to compare the females’ involvement with that of the males’. These will be applied towards demonstrating that the female revolutionary is not that different from the male revolutionary. In the Palestinian

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<sup>18</sup> della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. Social Movements: An introduction. (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1999)

<sup>19</sup> George, op. cit., p. 62

historical narrative an exception is made as a further question is examined. How has the role of women changed as the nature of Palestinian nationalism shifted?

The differences between points of comparison from narrative to narrative can often be attributed to the cultural context and societal norms that affect each of the movements and organisations in this study. This does not damage the integrity of this work. Indeed, the variances between the points of comparison strengthen my overall argument. I believe there is little difference between a male and female revolutionary; the ways in which a woman enters the revolution; what she believes about the revolution; how she interacts with those around her; and how she may or may not leave it behind. All of these reasons have to be considered through the lens of her society and how gender is constructed within this society. It speaks highly of the committed woman who enters the revolution in spite of cultural norms. It may seem she is discarding her “femininity”—and thus she is viewed in a negative light—when, in reality, she is shedding cultural gender norms.

I chose to tell the narratives of the American Weather Underground, West Germany’s Red Army Faction and the Palestinian groups, Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, to re-examine and retell the stories of the ‘notorious’ women involved in each. Each of my narratives has both social and historical backgrounds which lend much towards the understanding of the revolutionary organisation and the female revolutionary. Accordingly, each of my narratives is broken into two parts. The first looks at the new social movement; the second part analyses the individual women. I believe that through my multi-faceted comparison, the gendering of the female terrorist by a segment of researchers within Terrorism Studies will be apparent.

## **Thesis Structure**

*Chapter One: New Social Movement Theory and Theories on Violence* is a literature review of New Social Movement theory, theories on violence and Terrorism Studies. The first part of the chapter begins by critiquing and evaluating Resource Mobilisation, Rational Choice and Social Movement theories. It continues by examining New Social Movement theory with the reasons why it is appropriate to this thesis. The chapter moves into theories on violence by John Dollard, Samuel Huntington, Ted Robert Gurr and Erich Fromm. These provide the perfect segue way into a brief background on Terrorism Studies. This section helps the reader to understand the connection between new social movements and the formation of revolutionary organisations. The reasons for examining the leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and revolutionary dimension are made clear in this chapter.

*Chapter Two: The Gendering of the Female Revolutionary* explores the gendering of crime, violence and war over time in order to understand how some researchers within Terrorism Studies have come to biased conclusions of the female revolutionary. This chapter examines the idea that there is something biologically and inherently wrong with a woman who commits a crime or an act of violence. It is shown that a woman who acts outside her gender role is “doubly damned.” When a woman is violent, society is challenged. It also examines the roles women play in war. The female warrior, evoking the image of the Amazon, is seen as chaotic and threatening. The limits that are placed upon women inform the idea of the female terrorist as more violent and more threatening. It becomes apparent in this chapter why the female revolutionary’s entry, ideology, group dynamics and exit are important to this study.

*Chapter Three: The Women of the Weather Underground* is a historical narrative of the American student movement, the Movement, and one of its splinter groups, the Weather Underground. The chapter traces the Students for a Democratic Society from

the early 1960s onwards. Women were a sidelined segment of the membership, which had two generations, the Old Guard and the radical Prairie-Power. Respectively, these two groups advocated different extremes of similar ideologies, as represented by the philosophies of ‘participatory democracy’ and a ‘revolutionary youth movement.’ Women were strongly involved in the revolutionary organisation, the Weather Underground, as leaders and as members. Their involvement is in contrast to the systemic sexism within the SDS and in sharper contrast to the criticism from the emerging Women’s Movement. These women, along with their peers, wanted to start a violent revolution in America.

*Chapter Four: The Women of the Red Army Faction* also looks at another Western student movement, the Extra-parliamentary Opposition (APO) in West Germany, in the 1960s. The West German movement grew out of the remaining guilt and refusal of the Third Reich and the shadow of the Berlin Wall. The movement’s origins are found in the pacifist anti-atom bomb movement of the late 1950s. By the end of the 1960s, however, several violent, underground organisations were in operation. The members of the APO adopted, like many other 1960s student movements, the issues of the Vietnam War and American foreign and internal policy. The West German students also had to contend with what they perceived as latent fascism, both in the use of former Nazis in government and of the underlying ‘fascist’ nature of the capitalist system. The Red Army Faction had strong ties to the APO. The Red Army Faction had two strong female leaders, both with different roots within the student movement. These women, Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin, are examined in order to understand the role women played in the Red Army Faction.

*Chapter Five: The Women of the Palestinian Resistance Movement of 1967* looks at two separate groups, Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which together formed the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Both groups were

established in universities and were very much the product of frustrated and suppressed Palestinian nationalism. The revolutionary groups were most active in 1967, after the Six-Day War in June. Fateh and the PFLP still operate today. As Fateh is secular in ideology and the PFLP was Marxist-Leninist, they both had relatively high numbers of female members. Both groups used women as hijackers in the late 1960s, among other military activities. However, the traditional Middle Eastern culture of the Palestinians cannot be denied. Middle Eastern societal norms shaped the role and the extent of involvement of women in the 1960s; more women could be found in gendered roles than in military roles. With the rise of Political Islam from the late 1970s onward, especially during the first Intifada of 1989, the role of women has been limited and their future questionable.

The concluding chapter, *Moving Beyond the Myths of the Female Terrorist?*, will draw larger parallels between the new social movements and the female revolutionary. All of these historical narratives study new social movements. Recruitment and entry into the revolutionary groups came from affectional, sometimes familial, ties that were based within the larger new social movement and its network. Comparing the role of leadership and the role of general members with that of the female revolutionary, one can gain a better idea of a woman's role within the revolutionary organisation. Ideology, secular or Marxist-Leninist, was very important for sustaining membership and momentum. Subsequently, ideology was also inseparable from or strongly linked to the actions of the groups. By looking at the movements', the revolutionary groups' and the individual woman's ideology, one can see how closely related her ideology was to those around her. After demonstrating that some segments of Terrorism Studies do gender the female revolutionary, this chapter concludes that the female revolutionary is not all that different from the male.

## **Chapter One: New Social Movement Theory and Theories on Violence**

### **Introduction**

Bernardine Dohrn was first involved in the American Movement through her work with Jobs or Income Now in inner-city Chicago. After helping to provide legal defence for students arrested at the Columbia University take-overs, she was elected to a leading position in the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). Within a year, she was leading the Weather Underground<sup>1</sup>, planning riots and planting bombs in the Pentagon. Kathy Boudin, while attending Bryn Mawr College, joined an SDS collective house in Cleveland to help low-income families find political representation. Later, she helped Dohrn, among others, plan the Chicago Days of Rage, when the Weather Underground rampaged through downtown Chicago. Susan Stern, a graduate student at the University of Washington, Seattle, School of Social Work, joined the SDS. Later she led women in her Weather Underground collective in destroying the Reserve Officer Training Corps building.

Ulrike Meinhof demonstrated and wrote against West German re-armament. She was a pacifist involved in the anti-atom bomb movement. At the age of 36, she helped to free Andreas Baader, who was in prison for arson. They became part of the triumvirate leadership of the Baader-Meinhof Gang/ Red Army Faction (RAF). Gudrun Ensslin was a scholar who protested in West Berlin as a member in the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition movement against the Vietnam War. She was bright and articulate, especially as the third leader of the RAF. Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader and other members bombed United States Army installations in West Germany. They robbed banks; trained with PLO fedayeen groups in Jordan; and bombed the Springer press building in the early 1970s.

Leila Khaled snuck out of her house in her pyjamas to attend Arab Nationalist Movement meetings. As a student in high school and in her first and only year at the American University of Beirut, she protested as a Palestinian. In her mid-twenties, in 1969 and 1970, she hijacked two planes as an operative for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Therese Halaseh was a student nurse involved in the student group, Free Conscious. She was subsequently recruited and militarily trained by Fateh. Black September then recruited her to hijack a plane.

What these paragraphs are attempting to show is a larger pattern. These women became involved in revolutionary groups which had some sort of relationship with a larger social movement. How did this happen? New Social Movement theory, with an understanding of theories of violence, provides some of the answers. New Social Movement theory differentiates between 'old' movements formulated upon Marxist paradigms alone and those 'new' movements which emerged in the 1960s, with identity and communitarian ideals as their driving force. The women studied in this thesis, along with their groups, were all part of something larger, a new social movement.

New Social Movement theory is helpful as it creates an understanding of how a revolutionary organisation might form. This can help society and governments then realise where potential 'hot spots' are. Sometimes, as a new social movement grows in popularity, many of its ideas are often co-opted by the system to which it is opposed. When this happens, this perceived sell-out of the co-operative parties is opposed by splinter groups, who are often violent in rhetoric and action. Or the movement is completely frustrated by the system, which in turn leads to aggression and violence. These violent groups are the negative or revolutionary dimension which Alain Touraine warns about further on in this chapter.

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<sup>1</sup> The Weatherman, the original name for the group, was renamed the gender neutral Weather Underground in 1970.

Thus, this chapter attempts to create an understanding of what a new social movement is and how it is different from a social movement. It also illustrates the development of both Social Movement theory and New Social Movement theory from Resource Mobilisation and Rational Choice theories. Additionally, theories on violence and political unrest will be examined. These theories will then lead into the field of Terrorism Studies, which, as it is interdisciplinary, has found both New Social Movement theory and theories on violence helpful.

### **Approaches to the Study of Social Movements and Theories on Violence**

At one time social movements were thought of as the labour rising up against the exploitative producers. Social movements were truly Marxist in conception—they dealt with the means and control of production. Formulated in the factory and fought by unions, movements were purely economic conceptions. Social Movement theory could not explain the personal, community based nature of the radical student movement in 1960s America and West Germany, and the similar movement in the Palestinian diaspora. Marxist paradigms were too abstract and macro-constructed, it did little to illustrate the *zeitgeist* nature of the movements or the reasons actors participated. The new movements are intensely familiar in nature—it is not just about labour issues—but about creating a new way of life, protection of culture and nation and, many times, making the personal political. With the advent of such personal movements in the post-war and post-industrial society, scholars in America attempted to create theories that fit them, like Resource Mobilisation and Rational Choice. While at the same time, European scholars, not so afraid to refer back to Marxism, were developing New Social Movement theory.

Resource Mobilisation theory was first introduced when there was an increase in social movement activity, mainly in the 1960s and 1970s. In the decades before this,

from the 1930s to the 1950s, Social Movement theorists “emphasised what was ‘wrong’ with the individual.” The scholars of the 1960s onward were typically movement activists or sympathisers themselves. Therefore, they approached social movements as “normal, rational and highly organised challenges by aggrieved groups.”<sup>2</sup> Resource Mobilisation splits into two approaches. The first approach, organisational-entrepreneurial, looks at organisation dynamics, leadership and resource management. The second, the political model, focuses on collective action, networks and the links between aggrieved groups. Resource Mobilisation asserts change is political, not cultural, in nature.<sup>3</sup>

There are several core assumptions Resource Mobilisation theory makes. First, behaviour incurs cost. Mobilisation and participation all cost the actor something—time, money, etc. The weighing of these costs implies “choice and rationality.”<sup>4</sup> While literal resource mobilisation usually occurs from within the aggrieved group, it may also come from other sources. Organising activity is crucial—as the resources are both organised and mobilised. Depending upon the state’s and society’s attitude towards the movement, the costs of participation may be higher or lower. The final assumption is the uncertainty of the outcome. An outcome is not dependent upon the amount of mobilisation, thus, it is hard to predict.<sup>5</sup> Resource Mobilisation is often critiqued for limiting its movements to those of institutional and internal change.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, Resource Mobilisation defines actors by their goals and not by their social relationships. It tends to overlook the finer points of mobilisation. While theorists have tried to answer this challenge with micromobilisation, it is the ultimate focus on “a logic of

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<sup>2</sup> Hastings, Margaret Denton. “Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements,” *New Zealand Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, November 1998, pp. 208-238. pp. 218-219

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 220-221

<sup>4</sup> Zaid, Mayer B. “Looking Backward to Look Forward: Reflections on the past and future of the Resource Mobilisation program.” In Morris, Aldon and Mueller, Carol McClurg, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (Yale University Press: London, 1992) pp. 326-348. p. 332

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 332-333

economic rationality” which disillusion the researcher.<sup>7</sup> Resource Mobilisation marginalises ideology and places importance upon the calculating “rational actor” who uses “strategic and instrumental reasoning.”<sup>8</sup> Thus, social movements are more of a study of strategy than they are a study of the dynamics of the movement.

Rational Choice theory grew out of the flaws—the exclusion of values, grievances and ideology—in Resource Mobilisation theory.<sup>9</sup> Debra Friedman and Doug McAdam define Rational Choice theory as “the assumption that individuals have given goals, wants, tastes or utilities.” Scarcity of time and resources will mean all goals are not achievable, thus individuals will have to choose between them.<sup>10</sup> They critique Rational Choice theory as a “*description* of behaviour” with no means to explain person-to-person variations on value choices—“without such a theory of value, it is impossible to predict when an individual will engage in collective action.”<sup>11</sup> Rational Choice theory ignores the fact that individuals may not choose to join a social movement, but due to their community and affectional ties, an actor may already be involved in collective action. Rational Choice theory does not explain behaviour—it is “misleading” to “postulate...that individuals will always act to maximise their personal benefits and reduce their costs.”<sup>12</sup> Rational Choice theory’s “significant limitations” lie “in its conception of human nature, the collective good and reason itself.”<sup>13</sup> Myra Marx Ferree has three major critiques of Rational Choice theory.

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<sup>6</sup> Mueller, Carol McClurg. “Building Social Movement Theory.” In Morris and Mueller, op. cit., pp. 3-25. p. 17

<sup>7</sup> Touraine, Alain. “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” *Social Research*, Winter 1985, pp. 749-787. p. 769

<sup>8</sup> Hastings, op. cit., p. 221

<sup>9</sup> Ferree, Myra Marx. “The Political Context of Rationality: Rational choice theory and Resource Mobilisation.” In Morris and Mueller, op. cit., pp. 29-52. p. 30

<sup>10</sup> Friedman, Debra and McAdam, Doug. “Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, choices and the life of a social movement.” Morris and Mueller, op. cit., pp. 156-173. p. 159

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 160

<sup>12</sup> Ferree, op. cit., p. 30

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*, p. 43

Ferree refers to her first critique as One-Dimensional Rationality. If all forms of behaviour are strategically rational then “a realistic explanation of when behaviour may be more or less than an expression of self-interest” is “excluded.”<sup>14</sup> In order to fully understand and analyse action a researcher “needs to take...motivational meanings into account.”<sup>15</sup> Rational behaviour does not necessarily mean “instrumental” rationality. It may refer to a “value-rationality” which reflects “consideration of ends or values rather than means.”<sup>16</sup> This is a sign of New Social Movement theory’s growing influence. New Social Movement theorists have a problem with Resource Mobilisation researchers establishing a preference on what they perceive as rational behaviour and “stable structures” without taking into account the various “frames” during a movement “in which choices are perceived.”<sup>17</sup>

Her second critique is a major, well agreed upon problem within Rational Choice theory: the free rider problem. It was in Mancur Olson’s economic analysis of collective action that Rational Choice theory fully developed. Olson argues the free-rider problem:

collective benefits alone would be insufficient to motivate a rational actor because free-riding on the efforts of others would provide the same share of collective goods at less cost to the individual.<sup>18</sup>

Brought to its logical conclusion, more people will free ride and the action loses its membership. Ferree points out that Rational Choice theory’s problem is constructing individuals as “out for themselves and searching for reasons they ‘should’ enter a community.” Rational Choice theory “assumes...social isolation is typical.” It must realise people are, from birth, “a part of a number of communities of greater and lesser

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<sup>14</sup> Ferree, op. cit., p. 32

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 32

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 35

<sup>18</sup> Ferree, op. cit., p. 30

salience” which shape their values and beliefs.<sup>19</sup> The person who chooses to act as an individual *abandons* their community. Ferree argues, however, “[w]henver collective identity is important, collective incentives will be important too, and vice versa.”<sup>20</sup>

Rational Choice theory views “all individuals as essentially interchangeable units”—they are, disturbingly, “pseudo-universal human actor[s].”<sup>21</sup> Structural conflicts, somehow, have nothing to do with the construction of experiences or perspectives.<sup>22</sup> Theoretically, the participants of collective action do not perceive “race, class, gender and historical circumstances” as significant. Values seen “are those of white middle-class men in Western capitalist” societies. Anything different is seen “as less rational or less fully human.”<sup>23</sup> When value judgements on what is rational are made, anything other than the norm is dismissed.<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, Rational Choice theory “affirms this division as natural and shows a decided preference for one side.” Ferree writes,

It typically contrasts ‘sentimental attachments’ against ‘rational interests’ and thus not only devalues the former but obscures the ways in which community relations and rootedness are, for many people, inseparable from their self interest.<sup>25</sup>

Resource Mobilisation theory and its partner theory of Rational Choice dehumanise the actors of social movements, turning them into robots which act for what benefits them. Theorists perceive actors on limited terms who only participate, after weighing the costs, for economically explained benefits. Resource Mobilisation and Rational Choice theories ignore that an actor may feel passionate about an issue and therefore act on this passion. Resource Mobilisation and Rational Choice disregard a

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 37

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, p. 40

<sup>21</sup> Ferree, op. cit., pp. 40-41

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 41

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 41

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 42

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 41

persons' connection to community and their value systems as a mobilising force, ideas which are key to New Social Movement theory.

Alain Touraine, one of the leading theorists in the social movements field, in his 1980 book, The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements,<sup>26</sup> begins to define a difference between social movements and *new* social movements: "What is crucial now is no longer the struggle between capital and labour in the factory but that between the different kinds of apparatus and user."<sup>27</sup> In this book he addresses: the process in which societies are moving away from industrialisation; he defines social movements in context; offers his position on ideology in a social movement; explains the importance of a revolutionary dimension and where violence fits in; and outlines a methodology for future social movement researchers. In the post-industrial society, Touraine notices power is no longer "concentrated in monumental institutions [but it] pervades the entire social tissue."<sup>28</sup> In the industrial pre-war society, struggles were contained within the purely Marxist realm of economic and labour relations. The transformation into a post-industrial society changes the focus of the actors to social conflicts.<sup>29</sup> Touraine explores this transition from industrial to post-industrial, or programmed, societies.<sup>30</sup>

Touraine creates a six-step process transforming society from industrial to programmed. The first three stages move away from industrial societies and the last three stages come closer to collective action and the programmed society. First, there is a decline of social movements followed by, second, a cultural crisis which "threatens the foundations of the past society." Society then rejects growth and begins to look for

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<sup>26</sup> Touraine, Alain. The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, pp. 6-7

<sup>28</sup> Ibid, p. 5

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, pp. 7 and 9

<sup>30</sup> A programmed society is: "1) more industrialised societies have had their entrepreneurial spirit replaced as principal factors of power by government, management, i.e. policy; protest movements are more political struggles; 2) society is decreasingly a society of inheritance and reproduction and increasingly one of production and change; 3) power is more diffuse." (Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, op. cit., pp. 6-7)

“new forms of balance.” The fourth stage is anti-establishment criticism by liberal or libertarian sources which “[replace] a still confused social struggle.” In this rejection of the state, the cultural crisis deepens and creates a social vacuum. This leads to the “quest for personal and community identities capable of standing up against the ravages of history.” During the sixth stage, the populist movements stand on these social groups, strengthening the collective identity<sup>31</sup>, who gain “control over their own development.”<sup>32</sup>

Touraine’s formal definition of a social movement “*is the collective organised action through which a class actor battles for social control of historicity in a given and identifiable historical context.*”<sup>33</sup> Touraine finds representations of industrial society within social movements:

a dominator imposes laws, beliefs and a political regime just as much as it imposes an economic system; the people submit to these impositions but revolt against them when their physical and cultural existence becomes threatened.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, industrial society is increasingly less to blame as social movements move from labour and class based issues to “*culturally oriented* forms of behaviour.”<sup>35</sup> To Touraine, social movements “lie permanently at the heart of social life” and “are the expression of collective will.”<sup>36</sup>

A social movement cannot be “defined by an objective or a principle.” Yet, “[a] movement produces an ideology [and] a Utopia, by means which it becomes identified with the stakes of the struggle and with historicity itself.” It is the ideology which sustains the actors.<sup>37</sup> Touraine is right in placing this importance on ideology, but he is wrong in saying a movement cannot be defined by an objective or principle. Goals and principles are a part of a movement’s ideology and they cannot be separated.

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<sup>31</sup> Collective identity is “a social construct linking the individual, the cultural system and, in some cases, the organisational carrier of the movement.” (Mueller, op. cit., p. 16)

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, pp. 11-20

<sup>33</sup> Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye*, op. cit., pp. 30-31

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 78

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, p. 80

Touraine believes a social movement must have a revolutionary, or “negative,” dimension. Without a negative force, a movement “is swiftly reduced to institutionalised conflict.”<sup>38</sup> The level of violence depends upon the type of institutional system within which the movement is operating. If a system is “entirely closed,” i.e. an autocratic society, the struggles must “rise immediately to the highest level” or suffer under complete repression.<sup>39</sup> A social movement is an “unstable balancing” act between the more institutionalised interests of the movement and “an armed force ready to take over power.”<sup>40</sup> For example, Northern Ireland’s Troubles began as a civil rights movement for the Catholics. Because their demands were dealt with slowly, the Provisional IRA seized control and demanded Irish unification along with an escalation of reactionary violence. Thus, the “real danger” lies in a well organised, realistic “splinter group form[ing] a micro-party.”<sup>41</sup>

The Voice and the Eye is a guide for those studying social movements. Touraine provides helpful instructions for forming a methodology. A researcher’s objective should be to truly represent the nature of the movement and its conflicts. The most fundamental requirement “is to enter into a relationship with the social movement itself.” One “cannot remain contented...with studying actions or thoughts”—one “must come face-to-face with the social movement.”<sup>42</sup> In order to set the social movement in context, the researcher must seek the point of view of both the opponent and the militant and “designate the social and cultural stakes of the conflict.”<sup>43</sup> The researcher should “listen to individuals” through interviews,

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 29

<sup>37</sup> Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, p. 98

<sup>38</sup> Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, op. cit., pp. 83-84

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, p. 89

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, pp. 89

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>42</sup> Touraine, The Voice and the Eye, op. cit., p. 142

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 143

questionnaires and autobiographies and “hear the political, strategic and tactical form given to the movement.”<sup>44</sup>

In 1980 and 1984, Alberto Melucci published two articles defining and designating the differences between Social Movement and New Social Movement theory. In the first article, “The New Social Movements: A theoretical approach,”<sup>45</sup> Melucci outlines the impasse Marxism and functionalist sociology came to over social movements. European based Marxists were concerned with defining “the preconditions of revolution” through an examination of the capitalist system. Yet, Marxists have “underestimated” how “collective action emerges.” Marxism, of course, provides “an analysis of the mode of capitalist production” and thereby “defines the conditions under which the system enters a state of crisis.” Yet, as a theory of revolution it does not have the tools “required for defining the actors.”<sup>46</sup> American functionalist sociology has efficiently addressed collective behaviour—“the whole spectrum of types of behaviour ranging from panic to changes in fashion, from crowd behaviour to the revolution.” They are limited, however, because they put actors on the same plane as panic and revolution. The only differences between them are the “magnitude of beliefs which mobilise the respective actions.” Because of these failures, Melucci proposes that a new theory needs to be developed which is not “confined either to...capitalist development or the dysfunctions in the system’s integrative mechanisms.”<sup>47</sup>

Melucci thus begins to define New Social Movement theory. Social movements are no longer, or not necessarily, influenced by external forces. Collective action and social movements are also no longer just “the expression of class conflict in a concrete

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 150

<sup>45</sup> Melucci, Alberto. “The New Social Movements: A theoretical approach,” *Social Science Information*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pp. 199-226

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, pp. 199-200

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, pp. 200-201

political system and/or social organisation.”<sup>48</sup> In the post-industrial society, production reaches beyond the simple limits of capitalism and into such areas as “consumption, services and social relations.” The “control over information[,] ...institutions of symbolic-formation and...intervention in interpersonal relations” are manipulated in much the same way the labour force was exploited during industrialisation.<sup>49</sup> The stakes of conflict have intensified as identity is perceived as a “product of social action.” The defence of this identity now constitutes “the substance of new conflicts.”<sup>50</sup> Melucci does not completely dismiss the old base for social movements, he incorporates basic Marxism into New Social Movement theory:

The new social movements are struggling...not only for the re-appropriation of the material struggle of production, but also for collective control over socio-economic development, i.e., for the re-appropriation of time, of space, and of relationships in the individual's daily existence. ...In mass society, in which cultural models and ways of life tend to become homogenous, conflicts mobilise the categories and groups which are most directly affected by the manipulation of socio-economic development.<sup>51</sup>

Melucci lists a number of characteristics of new social movements which go far in defining them. The first four characteristics are as follows:

- 1) The “*end of the separation between public and private zones*”—basically, the personal has become the political. New social movements use sexual, personal and cultural identity as the stakes in conflict.
- 2) The level of *deviance* has become an important feature of new social movements. Since identity and daily life are dominated, “opposition necessarily takes the form of marginality and of deviance.”
- 3) As collective action centres around group identity, “*solidarity [becomes] an objective.*”

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<sup>48</sup> Melucci, “The New Social Movements...,” op. cit., pp. 213 and 215

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 217

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 218

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, p. 219

- 4) The idea of “*direct participation*” is very important to the new struggles. It is not enough to be represented, it is important to mobilise and represent oneself. Thus, “the mechanisms of control and manipulation” cannot be “reproduced.”<sup>52</sup>

The first four characteristics are easy to find in the movements under study: the 1960s American and West Germany radical students’ movement and the Palestinian resistance. “The personal is political” was popularised in America during the 1960s and the deviance and counter-culture attitude of the students was renowned. Solidarity and group identity as “hippies,” “radicals” or “demonstrators” was key. Direct participation was known in their ideal of participatory democracy. The personal as political became an important part of the West German student movement in the 1960s also. The mainstream leaders, who threatened to ‘bomb’ Hubert Humphrey with custard pie, relied heavily upon deviance as protest. As deviance became more mainstream, the advocacy of violence grew in the more marginalized groups; Baader-Meinhof took full advantage of this charged atmosphere to begin their revolt against the West German government. The Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) of 1967 created a sense of solidarity and revolutionary actions united the Palestinians. The leaders of the PRM took control of the Palestinian diaspora.

The fifth characteristic—“new social movements...*are not focused on the political system*”—is more problematic. Melucci writes “they are not oriented toward the conquest of political power or of the state apparatus.” Instead they seek “the control of a field of autonomy or of independence vis-à-vis the system.”<sup>53</sup> Certainly, parts of the mainstream 1960s movements in America and West Germany were about creating a field of autonomy through their creation of the counter-culture and its emphasis on

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<sup>52</sup> Melucci, “The New Social Movements...,” *op. cit.*, pp. 219-220

doing everything in opposition to the previous generation. Yet, the American movement was also about the end of racial segregation, Vietnam and the draft—all of which focused on the political system. The mainstream did not seek to overthrow the American government, although the splinter groups (the Weather Underground) did. The student movement in West Germany felt that traces of Nazism lingered in their government. The RAF concerned themselves, in part, with exposing the ‘latent fascist’ nature of the government. Most importantly, however, is the Palestinian case. The entire Palestinian struggle is against existence of the Israeli state.

In Melucci’s second article<sup>54</sup> he continues to clarify his definition of new social movements. Melucci analytically defines “a social movement as a form of collective action, (a) based on solidarity, (b) carrying on a conflict, (c) breaking the limits of the system in which action occurs.” Melucci’s explanations are again grounded in Marxist theory:

A movement is seen...as a *personnage*, acting on the historical scene with a unity of consciousness....<sup>55</sup>

He does again, however, elucidate the break between a social movement and a new social movement: “Social conflicts move from the traditional economic/ industrial system to cultural grounds: they affect personal identity.”<sup>56</sup> Melucci also clarifies “today’s ‘movements’” as a “network of small groups submerged in everyday life which require a personal involvement in experiencing and practising cultural innovation.”<sup>57</sup> Thus a movement is not one organisation, but many and they can be highly or loosely structured. The American Movement was composed of many groups which individually typically focused on one issue—like the Southern Non-violent Conference

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<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 220

<sup>54</sup> Melucci, Alberto. “An End to Social Movements? Introductory paper to the sessions on ‘new social movements and change in organisational forms,’” *Social Science Information*, vol. 23, nos. 4/5, 1984, pp. 819-835

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 825

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 826

Committee on Southern racial segregation, the Mobilisation Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) on peace issues and the SDS on various issues. The PRM was composed of many organisations and groups in various states. Now these groups can be found under the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's umbrella, Fateh, the PFLP, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, etc. Together they serve to unite the scattered Palestinians. The separate groups in all movements serve as a "system of exchange" with people and information circulating amid agencies like "local free radio, bookshops [and] magazines." Militantism is not total, the required involvement and solidarity may be "only part-time and short-term."<sup>58</sup>

Melucci also brings up a weakness in new social movements. Movements bring "modernisation, stimulate innovation [and] give impetus to reform." They seek not just "the equality of rights, but rather the *right to be different*." Melucci writes "one of the deepest needs in post-industrial or post-material society" is the need to be "recognised as different." Yet, the political success of a movement weakens it. Fragmentation occurs when some groups within the movement become more political and bureaucratised while others move to "disruptive sectarianism."<sup>59</sup> The ones that move to professionalism, like MOBE and the PLO, lead others to feel as though the movement has been co-opted. Thus, the groups, like the Weather Underground and the PFLP, move towards violence.

In 1985, Touraine published his article "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements." Here Touraine begins to sound a bit more like Melucci's new social movements. Touraine conceives social movements "as a special type of social conflict." Because "[a] conflict presupposes a clear definition of opponents or competing [sic] actors and of the resources they are fighting for or negotiating to take control of. Such

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 829

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, p. 829

<sup>59</sup> Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?...", op. cit., pp. 830-831

an elementary definition leaves the way open to many different approaches.<sup>60</sup> He formulates eight various types of conflicts, of which six are social and two are historical. All of the approaches share common references: “actors and to ends which are valued by all competitors or adversaries.”<sup>61</sup>

Touraine’s first approach, or type, of conflict is the “competitive *pursuit of collective interests*.” He defines it in classical sociological terms “as the expression of a relationship between actors’ inputs and outputs in an organisation, or of their relative deprivation.”<sup>62</sup> His second, third, fifth and sixth types are the ones of interest here. Touraine’s second type is the “*reconstruction of a social, cultural or political identity*.” The opponent is viewed as a “foreigner or invader” instead of the “upper class, [the] power elite or management.” The actor is a mobilised community “whose values are threatened by invasion or destruction.”<sup>63</sup> This echoes the Marxist/Fanon colonial struggle and one easy to relate to the Palestinian struggle. The third type works easily with the Movement in 1960s America. The Movement began as “*a political force aim[ed] at changing the rules of the game*.” Here the actors are readily definable because their “conflict is strongly organised” and “it has a great capacity for mobilisation.”<sup>64</sup> Both traits are apparent in the early Movement. Yet, as Melucci stated, movements tend to fragment. While Touraine does not detail this problem, I believe the Movement, as it splintered, relates more to type six of social conflicts. This approach is more extreme: it is simply “*revolution*.” The groups under this approach, like the Weather Underground and the Black Panther Party, sought the “[c]reation of a new order,” different from current society because it is “more rational or more national [and] defined by its

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<sup>60</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., pp. 750-751

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 751

<sup>62</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., p. 751

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 752

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, p. 753

integration and its capacity to eliminate conflicts.”<sup>65</sup> The fifth type is Touraine’s main approach and one in which he grounds *all* social movements. It is “*the social control of the main cultural patterns.*” The three main cultural patterns are: “a model of knowledge, a type of investment and ethical principles.” It is a community’s fight for cultural control over values the state opposes.<sup>66</sup> This, in fact, is also a major characteristic of the Movement in America, or the Palestinians in Israel, who may not *govern* them, but certainly *controls* them in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The fourth approach is one related to a more privileged population because it is “*the defence of a status or privilege.*” This happens when “neo-corporatist policies...appear [as] an interest group is incorporated into the State.”<sup>67</sup>

The last two conflicts are historical in nature. The first of these is national conflict. The identity of a developing nation “cannot be based on social actors and social relations...transformed, destroyed or created by...historical change” like industrialisation. It is only the state or nation which can maintain identity “throughout a process of change.”<sup>68</sup> The second historical conflict is especially relevant in this age of globalisation. It is easily related to the growing rise of fundamentalist religious sects and governments and to the anti-globalist and anti-capitalist crusades seen in Seattle 1999 and Genoa 2001. It is “*neo-communitarianism*, the effort to reject a historical transformation which comes from abroad and destroys traditional values and forms of social organisation.” Touraine refers to this approach as an “anti-revolution, and it is as important at the end of the twentieth century [and beyond] as the revolutionary movements were a century ago.” It is the struggle outlined by Benjamin R. Barber in Jihad versus McWorld.<sup>69</sup> The great conundrum is globalisation’s ability to bring

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, p. 755

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 755

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, p. 754

<sup>68</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., pp. 757-758

<sup>69</sup> Barber, Benjamin R. Jihad vs. McWorld. (Ballantine Books: New York, 1995)

together not only the multi-national rioters at various global summits but geographically separated fundamentalists are able to read the same web-sites. Touraine feels

[t]he planet is more dominated today by the opposition between social and democratic movements on the side of neo-communitarian States or political groups on the other than by the internal social conflict between capitalism and socialism.<sup>70</sup>

Touraine defines three distinctive types of social movements. They are, as previously mentioned, centred around the social control of cultural patterns—type five of social conflicts. Touraine is also very clear that a social movement “is defined by a clear interrelation between conflicting actors and the stakes in their conflict.”<sup>71</sup> The first he describes is the ‘economic’ social movement. His three components of a social movement are the identity (*i*) of the actor, the definition of the opponent (*o*) and the “cultural totality (*t*) which defines the field of conflict.” In his first type of social movements, Touraine sets the social movement as the conflict “about the social control of industry,” where (*i*) equals workers, (*o*) equals management and (*t*) equals the industry.<sup>72</sup> The only time frame Touraine mentions is pre-World War I in Europe and the United States when “business unionism was predominant.”<sup>73</sup> Thus, by definition, making this an old school social movement.

In Touraine’s second social movement, he does not give any examples or time frames, but it is closer to Melucci’s new social movement than any other type. In the second one, the “actor identifies himself with values, eliminates the idea of an internal structural conflict and presents the image of an homogenised community to opponents” who become enemies. This is Melucci’s ‘personal is political’ and the valued community, while the source of conflict, between internal and external, is still questioned. The revolution will build “a new social and political order,” while the

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 758

<sup>71</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., p. 760

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, pp. 760-761

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, p. 762

actors seek purity and fight against and purge those who “undermine the new community.” It is still a dialectic process: “Saturn ate his children, revolutions eat their father.”<sup>74</sup> The Movement in America was not successful if one expected a complete break with the old system. Yet, it was successful in winning Civil Rights legislation, bringing awareness to women’s liberation and making the personal political. Did it end American imperialism, as the activists saw it? No, but it did make the American general public more aware of its foreign policy. For example, who does not have an opinion on the legitimacy of the Vietnam War?

The third type is very “visible” and for a long time has been at the centre of political transformation. It is the “subordination of ‘historical’ and particularly national movements to social movements.” This is very specific to the study of the PFLP in the Palestinian struggle:

Communism and nationalism have often joined forces, but never has a social movement developed its autonomous action in a national revolutionary regime. ... In many dependent countries, especially in Latin America, ‘mixed’ three-dimensional socio-political movements predominate with a class, an anti-colonialist or anti-imperialist and a national integrative dimension. ... [S]o, it is necessary to analyse ‘national-popular’ regimes as indirect expression of social movements.<sup>75</sup>

Touraine devotes a section of his article to the nature of social movements. Thus, he clarifies “[s]ocial movements are always defined by a social *conflict*” and opponents. Social movements cannot be measured in non-qualitative ways: intensity, emotions or “‘volcanic’ force.” They are not “positive or negative agents of history,” instead they act within a “given type of social production and organisation.” This is why Touraine emphasises social over historical movements. This emphasis makes it clear “that the multiplicity of social conflicts or, more precisely, the idea that there is no central conflict corresponds to a system-centred analysis.”<sup>76</sup> This brings an end to the

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<sup>74</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., p. 762

<sup>75</sup> Ibid, p. 763

<sup>76</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., p. 773

idea that social movements must organise around the central idea of controlling state power.<sup>77</sup> In this way, Touraine truly makes a break with the old conception of social movements. Fewer conflicts are centred around “labour and economic problems.” They evolve around “cultural and especially ethical problems,” the domination of the production of “symbolic goods...of information and images, of culture itself” is now being challenged by social actors.<sup>78</sup> Touraine, hence, introduces his study of new social movements.

He begins with a critique of social movements by simply equating them with labour movements and insists that “[w]e cannot analyse our societies with the concepts of caste...and less and less of class.”<sup>79</sup> Touraine finally directly mentions the personal nature of the new social movements: “The public space...is now spread over all fields of experience: private life becomes public.”<sup>80</sup> The “main political problems” in recent times “deal directly with private life—fecundation and birth, reproduction and sexuality, illness and death and, in a different way, with home-consumed mass media.”<sup>81</sup> Where social movements “opposed themselves to the domination of tradition and natural principles,” utilitarianism threatens new social movement which “defend the self and its creativity against interest and pleasure.” It is the appeal to personal and collective freedom which inspires protest movements now. As “the separation between private and public life [fades]” new social movements are “more socio-cultural” and “less socio-political.” Touraine also feels that the “crisis of industrial values” experienced in the 1960s and early 1970s formed a new consciousness. Post-industrial life is “more

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<sup>77</sup> Ibid, p. 775

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, pp. 774 and 776

<sup>79</sup> Touraine, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” op. cit., p. 777

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, pp. 778-779

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 779

global and radical” and it provides a “new culture and...field for new social conflicts and movements.”<sup>82</sup>

In 1999, Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani published Social Movements: An introduction.<sup>83</sup> While the title does not designate new social movements, their book is free of formal Marxist themes and they specify situations—like an emphasis on the 1960s movements and social-psychology underpinnings—which point towards New Social Movement theorising. A social movement is formed when there is the “co-existence of contrasting value systems and of groups in conflict with each other.” When traditional norms provide “a satisfactory structure for behaviour,” due to cultural evolution, “the individual is forced to challenge the social order through various forms of non-conformity.” It becomes a social movement when the dissatisfaction grows and the “inflexible institutions” fail to respond.<sup>84</sup> Dissatisfaction, della Porta and Diani write, is always present, so “the emergence of collective action” is not this easily explained. It is necessary to “study the condition[s] which enable[s] discontent to be transformed into mobilisation.” Key to this are Resource Mobilisation’s input of material resources—“work, money, concrete benefits, services”—and the new social movement themes of non-material resources—“authority, moral engagement, faith [and] friendship.”<sup>85</sup> Della Porta and Diani acknowledge the different theories in social movement studies, but they define movements by these four characteristics:

- 1) informal networks which may be a “plurality of individuals, group and/or organisations.” Like Melucci, these loose or tightly knit networks circulate information. Networks help to create the “preconditions for mobilisation.”

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 779

<sup>83</sup> della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. Social Movements: An introduction. (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1999)

<sup>84</sup> Ibid, p. 6

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 8

- 2) Shared beliefs and solidarity
- 3) Collective action focusing on conflicts
- 4) Use of protest<sup>86</sup>

It is important to point out, due to the importance of networks, one “simple organisation, whatever its dominant traits, is not a social movement.”

Since the “relationship between organisational and movement identities” is unstable, movements are fluid. If organisational identities dominate or if one feels more a part of a group than a movement, a movement will burn out. Individual participation in the movement is, thus, “essential.” The sense of “being involved in a collective endeavour” gives the movement its strength. And like a movement being composed of many organisations, movement membership “can never be reduced to a single act of adhesion.” Instead, it is “a series of differentiated acts, which, taken together, reinforce the feeling of belonging and identity.”<sup>87</sup> Taking this to the next level, a social movement must be thought of as more than a single episode because this episode is just another one in “a longer-lasting action.”<sup>88</sup>

Della Porta and Diani spend time explaining identity and its importance. Like Touraine’s neo-communitarianism, della Porta and Diani discuss what they refer to as the “‘problematization’ of social identities.” They describe the world as increasingly splintered:

class allegiances seem fragmented[.] political and religious ideologies are in crisis, cultural consumption, use of one’s free time, ways of organising one’s emotional life, eating habits or styles of clothes can all represent a potent factor for diversification.

The stakes of conflicts have become based upon lifestyle, which provides “the legitimacy of emerging cultural forms, the defence of traditional ones or the protection

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid, pp. 14-15

<sup>87</sup> della Porta and Diani, op. cit., p. 17

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 19

of a new set of citizens' rights.'<sup>89</sup> If action is driven by the causes with which the actor identifies, then it is the actors' values which define the specific goals and ways in which strategies are formulated. The values "provide the motivation necessary to sustain the costs of the action." Thus, the more "intense one's socialisation," "the stronger the impetus to act."<sup>90</sup> Identity is constantly redefined and shaped through the "evolution of collective action." Identity is not wholly "pre-existing" as the feeling of belonging is strengthened or weakened through collective action.<sup>91</sup> Thus, identity and collective action are in a symbiotic relationship. This explains why social movements escalate based upon the entrenched identity of the actors. What must not be ignored "is the identification of the 'other.'" Collective action or a social movement cannot happen without an opponent. An actor will form his or her identity in opposition to this "other." Collective action "cannot occur in the absence of a 'we.'" Solidarity is found in the identification of many against the other and in pitting their shared belief against the other. Solidarity is not necessarily found through direct contact, but within the networks that make up a movement.<sup>92</sup>

Della Porta and Diani's book exemplifies how, as New Social Movement theory developed, the theorists and researchers came to depend less and less upon Marxist paradigms and context. Robert Fisher's 1992 article<sup>93</sup> provides a clear, concise interpretation of these various theorists. Fisher outlines several shifts within movement theory, two of which are major. The first shift happened after World War II as the loci of movements moved "from class-based movements to constituency organising." (italic emphasis removed) Essentially, organisers ceased to mobilise in the factories and began to organise in communities and neighbourhoods based upon race, gender, sexual issues

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<sup>89</sup> della Porta and Diani, op. cit., p. 41

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, pp. 61-62

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, p. 87

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 88

and values. There was also a shift in organising method “from ideological to non-ideological to post-ideological.” (italic emphasis removed) Simply put, movements no longer organised around “the ‘old’ ideologies of capitalism, fascism and communism.” The new movements focus “around quality-of-life concerns and cultural issues.”<sup>94</sup> (italics removed) Touraine, in The Voice and the Eye, also mentions this abandonment of ideology. Yet, even if the participants of new social movements do not look to capitalism, fascism or communism for ideological guidance, it does not mean they do not create and form their own important ideology. Fisher sees cultural issues transpiring “among affluent constituency groups in the U.S.” This shift from working-class to middle-class is also seen in West Germany and Italy in the 1960s. The new movements “never simply sought empowerment” but “intended to win...redistributional goals...prior movements did not.”<sup>95</sup> Women were more involved in these movements because the personal became political and organising outside male-dominated workplaces allowed women to “play more prominent, critical roles.”<sup>96</sup>

Barbara Epstein<sup>97</sup> also manages to describe new social movements without the heavy reliance on Marxist terminology. Epstein articulates:

Traditional Marxism has no way of accounting for movements that centre around the defence and construction of identity (as in the gay and lesbian movements), the critique of personal life and gender (as in the women’s movement) or the effort to realise a utopian vision of community (as in the direct action movement).<sup>98</sup>

Epstein believes New Social Movement theory “emphasises the diffuse, fragmentary quality of” these later movements particularly “their defensive quality,” their

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<sup>93</sup> Fisher, Robert. “Organising in the Modern Metropolis: Considering New Social Movement theory,” *Journal of Urban History*, vol. 18, February 1992, pp. 222-237

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 224

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 231

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 234-235

<sup>97</sup> Epstein, Barbara. “Rethinking Social Movement Theory,” *Socialist Review*, vol. 20, no. 1, January-March 1990, pp. 35-65

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45

“utopianism that relies upon a shared vision” and the “belief that there are strong connections among the various movements.”<sup>99</sup>

Margaret Denton Hastings provides the same description of New Social Movement theory that Fisher and Epstein do, but she also manages to offer some critiques of the theory. Hastings understands

social movement action to be based on political, ideological and cultural imperatives as well as purely economic ones and that identity was defined by differences such as gender, ethnicity and sexuality as well as by class.<sup>100</sup>

Hastings offers three criticisms of new social movements. She feels “there is a tendency to ignore” the way politics and political action help to construct identity. New Social Movement theorists do not clarify how new social movements “resist economic and political power” because “theorists” are “reacting against a Marxist tendency to reduce social life to economic principles.” Because the theorists “[stress] agency,” political construction is ignored.<sup>101</sup> Social Movement theorists “[fail] to confront the issue of power.” They do not “elaborate what the historical significance” of the social movement is. The new social movements are “seen as a major protagonist of social change,” but Hastings is unclear whether “they can emerge as vehicles of historical transformation.”<sup>102</sup> For this work, her most important criticism is found in a footnote:

New Social Movement theory has also been criticised for failing to analyse the process by which individuals and groups make decisions, develop strategies and mobilise resources; even though these are all integral to the identity developed.<sup>103</sup>

It is important to keep these issues in mind when studying a movement and a revolutionary organisation. No true understanding of any movement, organisation or

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 46

<sup>100</sup> Hastings, op. cit., p. 210

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 213

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 216

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 213

group can come without looking at micro-level developments—leadership, relationships, strategies and decision-making—whether individual or inter-group.

Revolutionary organisations are the by-product, the radicalised elements, of the movements. But this is not enough of an understanding. A review of theories on violence is also necessary. Theories on violence and theories on women and violence are treated independently simply because theories on violence look at “man” in general. These generalisations are taken to mean humankind. However, when violent women are specifically addressed, they have been treated in a very different manner from men. Therefore, the next chapter clarifies how women have been gendered in studies not only on violence but also in criminology and War Studies. This leads to an analysis of the research conducted on the female revolutionary.

John Dollard wrote one of the most influential and often cited theories of violence, Frustration and Aggression,<sup>104</sup> in 1944. Dollard “assum[es] ... *aggression is always a consequence of frustration.*”<sup>105</sup> When a goal is interfered with, it leads to frustration. These goals may not be “overt movements” but may also exist in the realm of “phantasy [sic] or...even a well-thought-out plan of revenge.” The aggression can be directed at the source of the frustration, displaced or even directed at the self, “as in masochism, martyrdom and suicide.”<sup>106</sup> Dollard defines aggression as “an act whose goal-response is injury to an organism (or organism-surrogate).” (italic emphasis removed) There are two types of frustrations which can lead to aggression. The goal is either temporarily interrupted, thus leading to immediate aggression until progress can resume; or the goal is completely interfered with.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Dollard, John; Miller, Neal E; Doob, Leonard N.; Merver, O.H.; Sears, Robert R. Frustration and Aggression. (Keegan Paul: London, 1944)

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, p. 1

<sup>106</sup> Ibid, pp. 5 and 7

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, p. 8

Dollard's own dated examples of frustration actually serve to prove one of the most important points of this thesis. Even though he uses "person" throughout his work, the examples he gives are of the frustrations specifically related to a man. And these illustrations are in such benign settings, one cannot imagine that this would actually lead to violent aggression. Two such examples of this are: Fromm's description of a young man trying to impress his date with his skilled driving, only to be "frustrated" by being pulled over by the police; and the illustration of a newly married couple trying to move up in society in order to help the husband's career. It ends badly when the neighbourhood's power couple snubs them. It is simply hard to believe that violent aggression would be the outcome of such frustrations. His premise is, however, excellent and relevant.

Most importantly, and a perfect tie-in to the next chapter, Dollard, through his outdated opinions on sex and gender, helps argue that aggression is natural to all humans, man and woman alike. Dollard states,

It is essential that the social personality of each individual should turn out to match his sex in the biological sense; i.e. boys must have boys' habits and girls must have girls' habits.

This "typing" is "obviously foreordained in a biological sense" and is necessary in "prepar[ing] children for their adult roles as parents." Frustration thus occurs in training the child to act in appropriate ways as accorded to their sex. Boys "must fight" other boys "unless they wish to be called sissies." Girls learn that tree-climbing "is unladylike." Boys learn crying is "not a proper response to a conflict situation" while girls are less "pressed" to give up this behaviour.<sup>108</sup> Thus, it is boys who learn that aggression is not only appropriate, but *necessary*, to their future manliness. While girls learn to curtail this response. It is then perfectly normal and acceptable that women suppress their frustration and, hence, their aggression. Women do not act aggressively

because it is not *socially* acceptable. Dollard's examples show that this suppression is a *learned* behaviour, just as a boy's aggression is an encouraged and *learned* behaviour.

Samuel Huntington writes about the influx of violence in modernising and developing countries. He was writing at the same time as Ted Robert Gurr and Erich Fromm, who both look at why men are driven to acts of violence. Huntington also looked at violence, but on a more macro-level, by analysing mobilisation and problems on the state level. In many ways, Gurr and Huntington echo each other. Huntington equates political violence with the modernisation of developing countries—"modernity means stability and modernisation instability."<sup>109</sup> Modernisation is a time of upheaval and ethnic, class and economic divisiveness. The degree of instability may be directly correlated to the rate of modernising. Violence, extremism and social strife exist in wealthier parts of a transitional country, where people's aspirations may grow at a much faster rate than the actualisation of these aspirations. Whereas the West modernised over several centuries, it is expected that underdeveloped nations develop overnight. Suddenly these countries face "the problems of the centralisation of authority, national integration, social mobilisation, economic development, political participation, social welfare...simultaneously."<sup>110</sup> Huntington creates a list of the changes modernisation brings:

1. the disruption of social groups, which includes family, class and caste;
2. the production of *nouveaux riches*;
3. the increase of geographical mobility, i.e. migration from the country to the city, creating the situation described in (1.);

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<sup>108</sup> Dollard, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>109</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University Press: London, 1968) p. 43

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 46

4. an increase in people whose standard of living is dropping, which may widen the gap between rich and poor;
5. while income may rise, it does not rise relatively;
6. a need to restrict consumption to promote investment, this in turn creates popular discontent;
7. the increase of literacy, education and the influence of mass media increases aspiration without satisfying it;
8. regional and ethnic conflicts may be aggravated by the distribution of resources;
9. organisations are able to mobilise better, thus creating demands on the government, who is unable to satisfy them.<sup>111</sup>

Huntington mentions that similar conditions to these were present at the English, American and Russian Revolutions. If the transitional government and society were “open,” the frustrations, demands and grievances of modernisation could be “expressed through legitimate channels and...moderated and aggregated within the political system.”<sup>112</sup> Democracies are able to deal more successfully with demands and absorb new groups into the political system, thus “successful great revolutions...do not occur in democratic political systems.”<sup>113</sup>

The more the country becomes divided between the haves and the have nots, the more likely rebellion is to occur. One must take into account that the economic have nots could be unemployed educated persons:

Alienated university graduates prepare revolutions; alienated technical or secondary school graduates plan coups; alienated primary school leavers engage in more frequent but less significant forms of political unrest.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid, pp. 49-50

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, pp. 54-55

<sup>113</sup> Ibid, pp. 275

<sup>114</sup> Huntington, op. cit., p. 48

As a country develops, aspirations rise, and both Gurr and Huntington concur that if these aspirations are not met people are more likely to rebel. If a government is unable or unwilling to incorporate political groups, the frustrated group may become revolutionary. Just as a movement must be made up of multiple organisations, a revolution must “involv[e] the alienation of many groups from the existing order.” Especially relevant is Huntington’s claim that the “true revolutionary class in most modernising societies is...the middle-class.” It is the principle source of urban government opposition. Middle-class values dominate the political life of cities. Their actions are more extreme and more radical than that of blue-collar workers.<sup>115</sup> It is very difficult for the revolutionary intelligentsia of the middle-class to revolutionise and mobilise the “peasantry.” While most revolutionary intelligentsia will ally themselves with the lower-class, they “cannot create a revolutionary peasantry.”<sup>116</sup> This was a large part of the problem with the Weather Underground and one of its key contrasts to the PRM. Huntington blames the lack of connection between the two groups on the fact that they simply do not share a common cause. Huntington does suggest an exception—nationalism. Nationalism may unite the two groups in order to defeat a common enemy, usually foreign.<sup>117</sup> Thus, one can see the success of the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN). The effectiveness of violence is only relevant if there are no other alternatives. Violence also loses its effectiveness once the novelty of such actions wears off and as impact of repetitive acts of violence declines.<sup>118</sup>

Ted Robert Gurr published his theory on political violence in 1970.<sup>119</sup> His basic position is based on Dollard’s theory of frustration-aggression. As the title of his book suggests, he writes in order to answer the question, “Why do men rebel?” Gurr ends by

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid, p. 289

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, p. 303

<sup>117</sup> Ibid, p. 304

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, p. 361

creating an influential theory of his own—relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is a “perceived discrepancy between men’s value expectations<sup>120</sup> and their value capabilities<sup>121</sup>,”<sup>122</sup> much like Huntington’s distinction between aspirations and reality. Relative deprivation plays out as a discontent among people who then politicise the discontent, finally moving into “violent action against political objects and actors.”<sup>123</sup> Gurr feels that a general call to action is “[d]eprivation-induced discontent” and the greater this discontent, the more likely the action is to be violent. The more violent they are, the more likely they are “to be focused primarily or exclusively on the political system.”<sup>124</sup> Gurr defines political violence as “all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors—including competing political groups as well as incumbents—or its policies.” Revolutions, guerrilla wars, coups d’état, rebellions and riots fall under political violence.<sup>125</sup>

Gurr also names justifications for political violence, which are divided into normative and utilitarian justifications. The “attitudes and beliefs” people possess “about the intrinsic desirability of taking or threatening” political violence are normative justifications. Utilitarian justifications “are the beliefs men hold about the extent to which the threat or use of violence in politics will enhance their overall value position and that of the community with which they identify.”<sup>126</sup> Violence norms are acquired from “how we are taught to deal with aggressive impulses.”<sup>127</sup> Thus, if a man is encouraged to be aggressive in certain situations, he will have no trouble being

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<sup>119</sup> Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1970)

<sup>120</sup> Value expectations “are the goods and conditions of life which people believe they are rightfully entitled.” (Ibid, p. 13)

<sup>121</sup> Value capabilities “are the goods and conditions [people] think they are capable of attaining or maintaining given the social means available to them.” (Ibid, p. 13)

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, p. 13

<sup>123</sup> Ibid, pp. 12-13

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, pp. 13-14

<sup>125</sup> The “*potential of collective violence* is a function of the extent and intensity of shared discontents among members of a society; the *potential for political violence* is a function of the degree to which some discontents are blamed on the political system and its agents.” (Ibid, pp. 3-4 and 8)

<sup>126</sup> Gurr, op. cit., p. 157

aggressive in times of felt relative deprivation. If a woman, however, has been culturally trained to suppress her aggressive instincts, she may be less likely to suggest or resort to violence. This does not make her incapable of violence. Yet, if the norms of an extremely frustrated person do not provide an adequate framework for violence, “they are susceptible to new ideas which justify different courses of action.” These norms, old or new, are part of an ideational framework—an ideology, which “provide[s] men with an interpretation of the world for purposes of acting.” A person’s ideational system or ideology “usually incorporate[s] norms about the desirability of political violence.”<sup>128</sup> However, justification is typically post-hoc and most revolutionaries “do not carry complex ideologies around in their heads.” Ideology is a tactic of *movements* and leaders. Leaders provide slogans and catchphrases that serve as “mental reminders of the nature and causes of his discontent and internal cues, based on recollection and observation of others using the slogans.”<sup>129</sup> Gurr is criticised on this point, most especially by Paul Wilkinson, who argues Gurr does not “appreciate the influence of certain ideologies in *creating* and legitimating aspirations and expectations and equipping militant minorities to act in the name of the masses.” Wilkinson writes that the possibility of an ideology sanctioning violence, “inevitably strongly influences the nature of its adherents’ collective response to anger, rejection or opposition.”<sup>130</sup>

Erich Fromm began his book, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness,<sup>131</sup> in 1967, just as the movements across the globe were on the rise. His psychoanalysis of human violence is written in a sympathetic voice towards the radicals and full of Marxist hope. Given that he is sympathetic to the radicals, he presents an understanding of

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid, p. 193

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, p. 194

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, p. 195

<sup>130</sup> Wilkinson, Paul. “Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence.” In Alexander, Yonah; Carlton, David; and Wilkinson, Paul, eds. Terrorism: Theory and practice. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1979) pp. 45-71. p. 62

<sup>131</sup> Fromm, Erich, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. (Jonathon Cape: London, 1973)

violence, while also wanting to extricate humankind from the cyclic nature of violence. Fromm states that at the time he conducted his study there were only two ways of explaining human violence: instinctivism or behaviourism. Instinctivists believe “man’s aggressive behaviour as manifested in war, crime, personal quarrels and all kinds of destructive and sadistic behaviour is due to a...programmed, innate instinct.”<sup>132</sup> Fromm finds this limiting as there is no other reason behind human violence; thus implying, “that, even if we all must perish, we can at least do so with the conviction that our ‘nature’ forced this fate upon us.”<sup>133</sup> Behaviourist theory does not concern itself with how a person feels, but only in the way a person behaves and the “social conditioning that shapes [this] behaviour.”<sup>134</sup> This again eliminates any need for asking why a person would behave violently. Fromm offers a different option.

Fromm first distinguishes between two different types of aggression. The first type of aggression is one that humans share with animals: that of “defensive” or “benign” aggression. It is for the survival of the “individual or species” and ends when the threat ceases to exist. The second is “malignant” aggression or wilful and purposeful destructiveness and cruelty. Fromm finds it only in humans. Fromm emphasises malignant aggression “has no purpose and its satisfaction is lustful.”<sup>135</sup> Fromm makes a useful point to concern his study with human drives, “whether or not they are expressed in immediately observable behaviour.” The impulses behind aggression can be conscious or unconscious and “most of the time, integrated in a relatively stable character structure.”<sup>136</sup> Fromm also creates an important distinction between sociobiologically rooted passions and the natural category of instincts.

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid, p. 2

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, p. 3

<sup>135</sup> Fromm, op. cit., p. 4

<sup>136</sup> Ibid, p. 6

Passions Fromm lists include “the strivings to love, to be free, ...the drive to destroy, to torture, to control and to submit.” Passions, not instincts, form the basis for a person’s

interest in life, his enthusiasm, his excitement; they are the stuff from which not only his dreams are made but art, religion, myth, drama—all that makes life worth living.<sup>137</sup>

Most importantly, Fromm connects passion to human destructiveness. For when a person cannot achieve “satisfaction on a higher level, man creates for himself the drama of destruction.”<sup>138</sup>

Fromm refuses to dismiss passions through reductionist psychology. Instead, passions are “man’s attempt to make sense out of life and to experience the optimum of intensity and strength he can (or believes he can) achieve under the given circumstances.” (italic emphasis removed) This includes vices and virtues. Della Porta and Diani emphasise it is not enough to study dissatisfaction, as it is always present.

They want to know how dissatisfaction becomes collective action. Perhaps the answer lies in Fromm’s belief that people mobilise by “furthering passions” therefore “experiencing a superior sense of vitality and integration to the one he had before.”<sup>139</sup>

Before moving on from Fromm, the question of women needs to be addressed.

Fromm’s work has thus far been interpreted as relevant to humankind in general. Yet, as one can tell by the incorporated quotes, Fromm uses “man” instead of “person.”

While granting that women, for the most part, have historically been denied feeling passionate about anything, with, perhaps, the exceptions of fashion and mothering, and women are, in a sense, excluded here, they should not necessarily fall out of the gaze of the current researcher. Fromm is relevant to this study of female revolutionaries. His explanation of passions as a guide for aggression is consistent with what has appeared in research on how terrorists relate to their ideology and belief system.

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid, p. 7

<sup>138</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>139</sup> Fromm, op. cit., p. 9

## Terrorism Studies

Martha Crenshaw, a well-respected American academic, offers an introduction to the study of terrorism. She discusses the difficulty of making value judgements while studying terrorism. Judgements, she feels, are an “important part of the social construction of violence and the perception of actors.”<sup>140</sup> Similarly, another well respected expert, Paul Wilkinson, writes that “one of the greatest needs...is to develop a conceptual framework and method in which value judgements are made explicit.” The study of terrorism, in order to be valuable, “must come to terms with fundamental ethical and philosophical issues.”<sup>141</sup> Value judgements do have to be made when dealing with an unlawful act. However, just because one can value an action as right or wrong in accordance with ones own morality, ethics and judicial system, one should not ignore an act of political violence. Crenshaw continues by saying “political violence is the result of reasoned, instrumental behaviour.”<sup>142</sup> Terrorist violence is a “wilful choice...made for strategic reasons.” Terrorism must not be “dismissed as ‘irrational’” and thus unexplainable. Terrorist actions “need not be an aberration. It may be a reasonable and calculated response to circumstances.”<sup>143</sup> Hence, Crenshaw moves beyond judgement values and into the heart of the matter.

Wilkinson clearly outlines one problem of terrorist organisations in general: that of legitimacy. In this study, the four different groups examined are very different in this respect. The Weather Underground, the RAF, Fateh and the PFLP were operating at the same time and were espousing secular or Marxist-Leninist ideology. Yet, they had very different amounts of support. The Weather Underground, at the height of its

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<sup>140</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “Current Research on Terrorism: The academic perspective,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, vol. 15, pp. 1-11. p. 3

<sup>141</sup> Wilkinson, Paul, “Terrorist Movements.” In Alexander, et al., op. cit. pp. 99-117. p. 101

<sup>142</sup> Crenshaw, op. cit., p. 7

actions, had a support base of only 300 persons. The RAF survived for several generations and had a support base that was thought to have reached into the thousands. This may have been in part thanks to a larger rebellion against the Nazi past. Fateh and the PFLP had, and still do have, an international support base in the thousands, because, as Huntington said, their cause is also nationalist. Wilkinson clarifies this situation. Ideological terrorist groups in the West did not “constitute...a serious long-term threat to individual Western states.”<sup>144</sup> Yet a group with nationalist tendencies tends to have a greater legitimacy due to its greater responsibility to the people it represents.<sup>145</sup> However many questions these issues raise on how to view revolutionary violence and legitimacy of these groups within various societies, the focus is on how women “work” within these groups.

For this thesis, terrorist organisations must be placed within the context of new social movements. Della Porta does this very well in her 1992 edited volume on social movements and underground organisations.<sup>146</sup> In her introduction to this volume, della Porta articulates her highly influential approach to terrorism studies and how terrorist organisations are a part of a social movement. Della Porta argues “for deeper insight into individual motivations in the underground.”<sup>147</sup> She feels, along with contributing authors, that scholars in the field are more concerned with “generating antipathy toward the subject than with theory and scholarship.”<sup>148</sup> Granted this is not true of many in the field like Mark Juergensmeyer, Yonah Alexander, Bruce Hoffman, Wilkinson and Crenshaw but it is very easy to use “terrorist” as a label which then distances the researcher from the subject. In an already over-sensationalised field, this distance is less

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<sup>143</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice.” In Reich, op. cit., pp. 7-24. pp. 7-8 and 10

<sup>144</sup> Wilkinson, Paul. “Terrorist Movements,” op. cit., p. 101

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, p. 108

<sup>146</sup> della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations, volume 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. International Social Movement Research. (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT)

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, p. 3

than helpful. Instead of trying to understand motivation and reasoning, the field can be concerned more with policy-making and actions of terrorist groups than with what truly motivates the actors. Della Porta explains “[t]o interview militants was...deemed a sign of dangerous sympathy.”<sup>149</sup> This “sympathy” must be re-framed, one cannot find a solution to a problem without fully comprehending it. As Touraine argues, to conduct interviews and focus on primary research leads to a better understanding of a terrorist, not necessarily to a sympathy. Ideally, with this understanding in hand, one can find a solution to a problem which plagues the globe. Certainly, terrorism is a criminal act—to murder and destroy are criminal—but it is very crucial not to dismiss a terrorist simply because they are criminals. A dismissal leads to a lack of understanding of their cause, which will only serve to frustrate the already frustrated. Even if the researcher does not agree with the cause, one must try to represent all sides of the conflict and not present a biased point of view.

Della Porta’s volume also seeks to demonstrate “that underground organisations can be seen as part of a larger ‘social movement sector.’” This study is in agreement with this, as outlined above in relation to Melucci and Touraine’s writings. The groups studied in della Porta’s volume—the Weather Underground, the RAF and the Italian Red Brigades—“were founded by social movement activists...as a by-product which constitute the essence of a social movement.” Thus terrorists are “small minorities within larger political sub-cultures or counter-cultures.”<sup>150</sup> Della Porta also asserts that the more entrenched one becomes in the environment, it is easier for them to accept “the ‘armed struggle.’”<sup>151</sup> However, “social movement ideologies differ from underground ideologies in many ways.”<sup>152</sup> Social movements, while trying to maintain

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<sup>148</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, p. 4

<sup>150</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 12

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, p. 14

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, p. 20

internal cohesion, are also trying to communicate “with external elements.” This is a delicate balancing act. Underground organisations are focused internally to strengthen ideology, solidarity and identity. The more isolated the group, however, the more vulnerable they are to groupthink or “the more abstract, ritualistic and inaccessible to factual argument their ideologies become.” They spend less time on recruitment, abandon “the imagery and language they shared with the counter-culture” and construct “an ‘alternative’ reality.”<sup>153</sup> Their entrenchment leads to an intractable conflict of “heroes” and “villains.” The enemy becomes “absolute.” If governments respond with this kind of absoluteness, the conflict will indeed be irreconcilable. Terrorist organisations try to deny governments legitimacy by calling them “fascists,” “nazis” and “pigs.” In turn, their legitimacy, their belief in their cause, cannot be denied. What can be denied is their tactical agency by not accepting it. This means governments cannot respond with their own terrorist tactics but should adopt more strategies like George Mitchell’s Northern Irish peace talks—participation based upon a cease-fire. This has also happened recently in Sri Lanka.

One point della Porta makes in her introduction is important to Terrorism Studies and is relevant to this study of female revolutionaries. Several authors, like H.H.A. Cooper and Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini, believe that women become involved in terrorist organisations due to their relationships or to belong to something.<sup>154</sup> However, della Porta and her contributors all agree socialisation “is highly relevant” and “friendship ties within social movement organisations have proved to be a prime inducement to participation” for all members.<sup>155</sup> It is their “affective ties” which encouraged male and female participants

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<sup>153</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>154</sup> As will be explored in *Chapter Two*.

<sup>155</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 7

“to make the transition from non-militant groups to the underground.”<sup>156</sup> Many underground organisations “were founded by cliques of friends [or] composed of couples and several siblings.”<sup>157</sup> Jerrold M. Post found that there is no “particular psychological type, [no] uniform terrorist mind.”<sup>158</sup> A terrorist may be more prone to externalisation and splitting, two psychological mechanisms found in persons with narcissistic and borderline personalities. These two aspects, very importantly, lead to a need to belong as an attempt to “consolidate a fragmented psychological identity.”<sup>159</sup> For many involved in a terrorist organisation, “belonging to the terrorist group may be the first time they truly belonged, truly felt significant, the first time they felt that what they did counted.”<sup>160</sup> Unfortunately, the “intensity of the need to belong” can lead to groupthink. A “group mind” reduces “internal divisiveness” while further separating the group from reality.<sup>161 162</sup> This need to belong, which was used to discredit a woman’s involvement, is true of many members of underground organisations. Friendship networks also help people become more radical—“the passage from low-risk to high-risk activities, in general, increased within activist networks, ideological socialisation and construction of an activist identity all served to enforce an individual’s commitment.”<sup>163</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>158</sup> Post, Jerrold M. “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces.” In Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 25-40. p. 27

<sup>159</sup> Ibid, pp. 27 and 31

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, p. 31

<sup>161</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>162</sup> Post makes this point: “individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist groups and commit acts of terrorism.” (italic emphasis removed) Unfortunately, this argument leaves out ideology and commitment as reasons for involvement. (Ibid, p. 35)

<sup>163</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 9

## Conclusion

It is necessary to continue to place revolutionary organisations within the larger context of new social movements. Therefore, comparative points from all three historical narratives must be made explicit. In order to develop the movements from which the revolutionary organisations split or developed, several comparisons must be drawn. First, one cannot separate a movement from the larger historical and social context from which it is operating. This context must be outlined and explained. From the movement itself, several points must be drawn. They are: 1) the leadership of the movement; 2) the membership of the movement, including the solidarity drawn from the network and identity with the movement; 3) the leading ideology and how it shaped collective action and continued to enhance solidarity; 4) the fragmentation of the movement into splinter groups and whether some of these splinters developed a revolutionary dimension.

Leadership is extremely important, as the leaders are the ones who develop, enhance or argue the ideology. They plan the collective actions. Their words and enthusiasm keep the group together. Yet, as Hastings points out, interactions on the individual level are overlooked by New Social Movement theory. Leadership is also important to this thesis as it makes clear the group hierarchy and where women were placed within this hierarchy. As will be shown through the three historical narratives of the three movements in America, West Germany and the scattered Palestinian society; women were not typically leaders of any of the three *movements* (although this is not the case in the revolutionary organisations).

Membership is important because so many aspects of a new social movement may be included under this general subheading. Members were recruited and involved in a movement through the important networks. The network helped to create a sense of solidarity and this was furthered by a members identity within the movement. A

member's identity developed in opposition to the movement's opponent. The general recruitment of membership in the movement will be compared to a woman's entry into the revolutionary group. This will allow the researcher to determine whether or not her entry into the group was that far from the norm.

Collective action and group ideology retain and sustain members. Ideology gives the movement members a sense of purpose and collective action provides them with a focus. This continues to build a movement's solidarity. If all members of the movements under study were equals, then it is expected that the women and men participated in the same manner. This would then hold true, it is expected, for the splinter groups that developed from the fragmented new social movements. As will be revealed, social and historical contexts played a large part in how women in all of the groups were received, perceived and how they participated.

The last point of comparison will establish how the new social movement fell apart. If, from this fragmentation, groups developed with a revolutionary, violent dimension, as is the case in the American and West German movements, the genesis of these revolutionary organisations must be understood. The PRM did eventually dissolve, but the revolutionary dimension was always a part of the movement. Still, fragmentation in general is very important to this study as it explains how a revolutionary group develops from a new social movement—whether it is from co-optation, frustration or relative deprivation, these reasons must be examined.

The three historical narratives will be established as new social movements in the first half of each of the relevant chapters. As stated previously, this theory helps to depict revolutionary organisations as by-products of new social movements, but it does not help establish a framework for understanding the female revolutionary. Instead it helps create a framework for understanding her larger context. Where are the women in all of this? Where do they belong in the revolutionary organisation? How did

women become involved in the Weather Underground, the RAF or the Resistance groups of Fateh and the PFLP? The next chapter will examine the literature on the female terrorist and why there is a need to look at her entry into the group, her personal ideology, the group dynamics and her (possible) exit from the organisation. By providing information on these four points of comparison, a working knowledge of women in revolutionary organisations is made explicit. It would not have been enough to just make these four points of comparison on the female revolutionary. One cannot look at the four points of comparison without putting the female revolutionary in her larger social and historical context. To do so would be to depict only half of the situation within which the female revolutionary is operating. Even though women may not have played a large role within the new social movement and so appear to be ignored in the first half of the historical narrative chapters, this is far from the truth. The social and historical context of the new social movement must be drawn out before one can even begin to discuss the role of women in the revolutionary organisations.

## Chapter Two: The Gendering of the Female Revolutionary

### Introduction

In almost every culture and every period of history, a she-devil emerges as an example of all that is rotten in the female sex. This Medusa draws together the many forms of female perversion: a woman whose sexuality is debauched and foul, pornographic and bisexual; a woman who knows none of the fine and noble instincts when it comes to men and children; a woman who lies and deceives, manipulates and corrupts. A woman who is clever and powerful. This is a woman who is far deadlier than the male, in fact not a woman at all.<sup>1</sup>

Over time, representations of this she-devil have been found in suffragettes, female criminals, female murderers, feminists and, lastly, female insurgents. This bias is clearly articulated in work done on women and crime, violence and war. It is also very apparent in some work done on female terrorists, like in an H.H.A. Cooper article and in Robin Morgan's book The Demon Lover. The female "terrorist" has become this era's she-devil, the new Amazon. The female terrorist is "disgruntled," "irrational," "emotional" and her actions are equated with sex—she is either a sex maniac or a frozen Madonna; she is a lesbian or a slut. Descriptions of this nature could go for women who commit perjury, fraud or murder. Are criminal women really like this? Or can Western society not handle a woman who chooses to act outside her gendered role? Why should a woman who commits the same crime as a man be any different? How did we arrive at the conclusion that woman is equated with irrationality? That deviancy is related to her sexual practices? To understand the stereotypes imposed upon female revolutionaries, one must first understand the traditional views of women. To do this one must go back in time to theories and ideas better left behind and whose basic premises, unfortunately, continue to maintain their influence.

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<sup>1</sup> Kennedy, Helena. Eve Was Framed: Women and British justice. (Vintage: London, 1992) p. 240

Aristotle described the family as one ruled by the natural superiority of man. The female is the subject because she is “naturally inferior.” The domination of the home by the husband must “necessarily apply in the case of humankind generally...there are by nature slaves for who [sic] to be governed by this kind of authority is advantageous.”<sup>2</sup> Aristotle firmly established the patriarchy, which classical political discourse continues. Anyone with a background in Political Science or International Relations is familiar with the separation of the private and public spheres. The private sphere is the woman’s domain or, as Jean Bethke Elshtain so positively refers to it, the woman’s field of honour.<sup>3</sup> The woman is to remain in the home, perform domestic tasks and raise the children. She is capable of raising a virtuous male child, without, until the twentieth century, being virtuous enough to be a citizen herself. The man’s sphere is the public one, as he is more worthy and able. He exists in the world of business and commerce, politics, violence and war. A nineteenth century male anti-suffragist stated:

[The separation of public and domestic affairs] has been so from the beginning...and it will continue to be so to the end, because it is in conformity with nature and its laws, and is sustained and confirmed by the experience and reason of six thousand years. ...The domestic altar is a sacred flame where woman is the high and officiating priestess. ...To keep her in that *condition of purity*, it is necessary that she should be separated from the exercise of suffrage and from all those stern and contaminating and demoralising duties that devolves upon the hardier sex—man.<sup>4</sup>

Yet, with the women’s right to vote and the feminist movement, modern day thinking has for the most part broken down the separation of spheres. If they choose, women can now work outside the home, be a businesswoman or be Prime Minister. However, barriers continue to exist. The Women’s Movement may say all issues are

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<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Politics*, Book I, Part I, [www.classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html](http://www.classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html), site accessed on 27<sup>th</sup> January 2003

<sup>3</sup> Elshtain, Jean Bethke. *Women and War*. (University of Chicago Press: London and Chicago, 1987) p. 50

<sup>4</sup> As cited by Elshtain, *op. cit.*, p. 5

women's issues but the realm of 'women's issues,' such as child care, education, equal opportunity and abortion remains. This separation of issues indicates there is more to be broken down. Western notions of gender hold women in the place that classical political thought used to. Gender norms establish woman as naturally *biologically* nurturing, emotionally sensitive and domesticated. Man is the rational, independent, rough-and-tumble economic provider. Women's qualities and capacities are thought of as inferior to men's and the gender norms exist on polar opposites. Thus, if man is rational, woman is naturally irrational. While women have a greater reputation for being more empathetic and caring, there is little proof that they are more caring in their behaviour.<sup>5</sup>

Western society has for centuries held gender norms as truth, when this is not necessarily the case. Norms stabilise society. They uphold traditions and values. They are a lens people look through when weighing an action by an individual—whether one realises it or not. Thus gender norms establish how one looks at and compares a woman's actions to a man's and vice-versa. It is the voice behind a "woman's place is in the home" and the spirit behind male bravado. It is how we determine whether or not a woman is "butch" or a man a "queen" because of traits that this woman or man seem to possess "ought" to be determined biologically. So once a person acts outside of the "typical" gendered role, they can be assaulted with any number of labels.

However this thesis is about female revolutionaries, so focus will remain on women. Labels for women range from the virtuous and saintly; think Queen Elizabeth the First or Princess Diana. Or the labels run the gamut to whore and deviant: Myra Hindley or Eva Peron. Women in the military services in both America and Britain face this. They can either play a completely a-sexual role, if possible, or they put out, sexually, for their

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<sup>5</sup> Stone, Carolyn. "Gender Values and Identity: Carol Gilligan's work on women's moral development." In Cosslet, Tess; Easton, Alison; and Summerfield, Penny, eds. Women, Power and Resistance: An introduction to Women's Studies. (Open University Press: Buckingham, 1996) pp. 165-175. pp. 165 and 171

male peers and are called “sluts” or they can refuse and are called “lesbians”—both of which can ruin a promising military career.<sup>6</sup> When women in Northern Ireland “abandon” their “prime role as mother” by becoming involved in paramilitary operations, they “forfeit” a sense of “innocence or purity.” These women are “often seen as tainted” because they have “plunged into the unnatural.”<sup>7</sup> There is rarely a grey area when one considers a woman who has chosen to live outside cultural norms. It does not matter if she is doing her civic duty as a soldier, a mother working outside the home, accused of committing a crime or faced with murder charges. She is often judged for not being true to her sex—her *sex* not her *gender*. This is more of the case with women who have committed crimes—from the simple robbery to the most horrifically violent murder. There is little desire to understand women who reject the norms. Women who break the norms are viewed as a destabilising force and as a threat to the patriarchy.

### **Women and Violence, Crime and War**

Ann Jones, author of Women Who Kill, was not the only one to equate the feminist with the female murderer, for each “tests society’s established boundaries.”<sup>8</sup> Each time the female crime rate is on the rise, it is used to “represent all the ills of

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<sup>6</sup> As one “administratively dismissed” accused-lesbian WRAC said in an interview with Enloe: “Men soldiers don’t respect WRACs at all. If you’re in it, you’re a lesbian or a slut. And there’s a real pressure to sleep with men.” (Enloe, Cynthia. Does Khaki Become You? The militarisation of women’s lives. (Pluto Press: London, 1983) pp. 141-142)

<sup>7</sup> The author forwards this with a description of expectations of women in Northern Ireland. Women marry young and start their families quickly. They are expected to keep the family together, help make ends meet and support political campaigns as chosen by the men. To deviate “from these accepted norms of femininity would be considered the grossest betrayals to one’s community.” (Dowler, Lorraine. “‘And They Think I’m Just A Nice Old Lady.’ Women and War in Belfast, Northern Ireland,” *Gender, Place and Culture—A Journal of Feminist Geography*, vol. 5, no. 2, July 1998, pp. 159-176. pp. 164 and 167-168)

<sup>8</sup> Jones, Ann. Women Who Kill. (Ballantine: New York, 1980) p. 13

modern society.”<sup>9</sup> This anxiety was a reflection more on women’s changing roles through the suffragist movement or, later, the women’s movement, than on relations between the sexes. Yet the anxiety manifested in accusations against the women:

in the fear that women are ‘unsexing themselves,’ ...[the] elevat[ion of] regressive ‘femininity’ to ‘total womanhood,’ and to make abortion a criminal offence; in the fear that the family is disintegrating, which results in virulent attacks upon women’s colleges, divorce, homosexuality, women in the work force, federally funded day-care and unisex bathrooms; and in the fear that women, released from some traditional restraints, will turn to unbridled evil, mayhem and murder.<sup>10</sup>

This anxiety will continue until we realise “free people are not dangerous.”<sup>11</sup> If one insists the women’s movement is to blame for female violence, one is “falling foul [of] the andocentric fallacy that men provide the norm for behaviour and standards for humanity.” It is illogical that “since men are aggressive,” liberated women will be too— “[w]omen are not ‘deviant’ men.” Both sexes have the potential to be aggressive, only it is understood in men—“boys will be boys”—and discouraged in women.<sup>12</sup> This was even understood and articulated by John Dollard in 1944.<sup>13</sup> Until society is willing to stop excusing female violence based upon their biology or ignoring it based upon their gender, nothing is going to change and it will never comprehend female criminality and violence for what it really is.

Why is the genderisation of society relevant to criminology? Because it tells us what is normal or abnormal and criminology has “always defined crime through the prism of gender.”<sup>14</sup> Criminal women are abnormal. Criminal men are not so abnormal.

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<sup>9</sup> Arnot, Margaret and Osborne, Cornelia, “Why Gender and Crime? Aspects of an international debate.” In Arnot, Margaret and Osborne, Cornelia, eds. Gender and Crime in Modern Europe. (University College London Press: London, 1999) pp. 1-43. p. 23

<sup>10</sup> Jones, op. cit., p. 3

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 14

<sup>12</sup> Lloyd, Ann. Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s treatment of violent women. (Penguin Books: London, 1995) p. 194

<sup>13</sup> Dollard, John; Miller, Neal E.; Doob, Leonard M.; Mervin, O.H.; Sears, Robert R. Frustration and Aggression. (Keegan Paul: London, 1944) p. 49

<sup>14</sup> Klein, Dorie. “Crime Through Gender’s Prism: Feminist criminology in the United States.” In Rafter, Nicole Hahn and Heindensohn, Frances, eds. International Feminist Perspectives in

The law casts women “outside the field of vision” because the “experiences, the expectations and the values” it was set-up to represent were male. Laws were established to deal with the threat of male criminality; thus making male violence more palatable, not more moral or ethical. No such system was constructed to deal with the threat of female crime. Thus, when women are brought into view of the law, “they are regarded as in some way aberrant from the human=male norm.” The subliminal message sent is “reasonable people are men, not women.”<sup>15</sup> More importantly, for this chapter, female crime brings up the issue of women’s nature. Women are not *supposed* to act like criminals—that is a man’s job. What does criminology’s interpretation have to do with female insurgents and revolutionaries? Just about every construction of a female revolutionary by Terrorism Studies is rooted in what is about to be presented.

If our cultural heritage perpetuates the notion that women are inherently gentle and caring and this tradition is never questioned—the notions remain as seemingly valid “(mis)conceptions.”<sup>16</sup> The problem outlined above is the failure to recognise the difference between sex and gender. This is the fallacy most early criminologists made as they blamed female criminality on perceived biological deficiencies.<sup>17</sup> This denied women motivation and free will and failed to see sociological reasons behind crime. Two of the earliest works on female criminality were written by the Italians Caesar Lombroso and William Ferrero, The Female Offender, and by the American Otto Pollak, The Criminality of Women. Even though Lombroso and Ferrero have been discredited, their work continued to be highly influential until the late 1960s when they

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Criminology: Engendering a discipline. (Open University Press: Buckingham, 1995) pp. 216-240. p. 219

<sup>15</sup> Naffine, Ngaire. Female Crime: The construction of women in criminology. (Allen and Unwin: London, 1987) p. 4. See also Waller, Marguerite R. and Rycenga, Jennifer, eds. Frontline Feminisms. (Garland Publishing, Inc.: London and New York, 2000) p. 68

<sup>16</sup> Smart, Carol. Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist critique. (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1976) p. 30

<sup>17</sup> This is similar to the Instinctivists Erich Fromm had such a problem with in his book: The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. (Jonathon Cape: London, 1973) p. 2

were combated by criminologists inspired by feminism, such as Carol Smart, Frances Heindensohn and James Messerschmidt. The influence of Lombroso and Ferrero and Pollak still clouds contemporary analysis of female offenders and, thus, women in underground organisations.

No matter how illogical it seems now, Lombroso and Ferrero were biological determinists. Biological determinism is the ultimate confusion of gender with sex by specifying that gender traits were inherent biological traits of the sexes. What is now recognised as gendered ideals of femininity and masculinity, Lombroso and Ferrero took as biological traits. Since crime is male, and as the gender traits are polar opposites, crime is antithetical to what is female. Women criminals are, therefore, anomalies and more like men. Lombroso and Ferrero saw female criminals as atavistic and to prove this, they sought traits, such as thick, dark hair, strong jaws, canine teeth and facial asymmetry, to correlate with the degree of a woman's criminality. This correlation proved to them that female crime was determined biologically and not sociologically. Here are two descriptions of women they used in their study:

The woman was remarkable for the asymmetry of her face, her nose was hollowed out, her ears projecting, her brows more fully developed than is usual in a woman, her jaw enormous with lemurian appendix.

They seemed to ignore the fact that another woman they studied was sixty-years-old:

Here again we have the asymmetry of the face, breadth of jaw, enormous frontal sinuses, numerous wrinkles, a hollowed-out nose, a very thin upper lip, with deep-set eyes wide apart and wild in expression.<sup>18</sup>

To Lombroso and Ferrero, female criminality is a matter of impulse and instinct, women's brains are not used for reasoning or rationalising.<sup>19</sup> Lombroso and Ferrero's equation of the "abnormal" criminal woman with a man assumes that gender is built

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<sup>18</sup> Lombroso, Caesar and Ferrero, William. "Criminals and Prostitutes." In Adler, Freda and Simon, Rita James, eds. *The Criminology of Deviant Women*. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979) pp. 10-13. Originally published in *The Female Offender*. (T. Fisher Unwin: London, 1895) pp. 88-93

<sup>19</sup> Smart, Carol. *Law, Crime and Sexuality*. (Sage Publications: London, 1995) p. 25

upon an immutable biological base.<sup>20</sup> Obviously, it is extraordinary that Lombroso and Ferrero placed such importance upon black hair and facial asymmetry, but unfortunately they became a foundation upon which other criminologists grew. They have been discredited, but it must be said, and it is said by Carol Smart and Brian Eastlea, that these determinist thoughts still pervade. The idea that there is something biologically wrong with criminal women remains. We may no longer seek black hair as an explanation but society certainly seeks some other deficiency in criminal women.

Otto Pollak's The Criminality of Women carries on Lombroso and Ferrero's theme. Pollak brings physiological reasoning to support a biological determinist base. Thankfully Pollak sees the division of spheres as undesirable, but only because it helps to cover female criminality:

[O]ur society assigns to women the roles of homemaker, the rearer of children, the nurse of the sick, the domestic helper...it furnishes them...many opportunities to commit crimes in ways and means which are not available to men.<sup>21</sup>

The "masked" nature of female crime occurs in part because women are manipulative and deceitful but also because women, through their confinement to the private sphere, can commit crimes in mainly undetected ways.<sup>22</sup> Because women are taught to conceal natural body functions—menstruation, pregnancy, menopause and lack of sexual orgasm—they are more used to practising deceit.<sup>23</sup> Offences by women also tend to go un- or under-reported because they are protected by the nature of our society. Men, in some twisted chivalrous way, are reluctant to report or accuse a woman. To some extent this line of thinking is valid because society also masks women who "misbehave" for to admit to it, would admit to a deeper problem. Pollak also has problems with teenage girls' sexual nature and women's emancipation. The first, if it is a problem of

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<sup>20</sup>Ibid, p. 33

<sup>21</sup> Pollak, Otto. The Criminality of Women. (AS Barnes and Co.: New York, 1950) p. 3

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, pp. 10-11

sexual over-development, automatically leads to juvenile delinquency.<sup>24</sup> The second, of course, is to blame for the increased total volume of female crime.<sup>25</sup> Criminologist Carol Smart criticises Pollak for relying too heavily “upon tenuous assumptions about the behaviour of men and women which clearly do not constitute sufficient grounds for his assertions.”<sup>26</sup>

Brian Eastlea, author of Science and Sexual Oppression, writes,

By calling an institution or practice sexist I mean that it is characterised in at least one of the following ways: that the institution discriminates against women, that it denigrates women, that it is concerned to underwrite and promote a male-dominated society or civilisation. In other words, I mean that the institution behaves in an unjustifiable, indeed irrational, way against women in general.<sup>27</sup>

Biological determinism does just this. Perhaps not purposely, Lombroso and Ferrero’s data promotes the idea that criminal women are unnatural, thus undermining the women. Pollak simply uses data to legitimise his patriarchal views. More progressive criminologists have encountered difficulty in breaking free of the assumption that “crime is essentially a ‘masculine’ activity.”<sup>28</sup> If crime is a prerogative of a man, then “women’s lawbreaking” is a “manifestation of a *lack of femininity*.”<sup>29</sup> Scientific reasoning behind the criminality of women dismisses socio-economic status, power and culture as relevant variables—even if they were considered as reasons behind male criminality. Making women criminal by nature or “pathological” because they deviate from what is assumed to be biologically female robs them of free will, of the power to make decisions.<sup>30</sup> Science or political discourse had, up to a certain point in time, said women were either criminal by nature, on one hand, or domestic on the other. There was no grey area in between. In no way was a woman’s own ability to use her brain, reason for

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid, p. 125

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, p. 75

<sup>26</sup> Smart, Women, Crime and..., op. cit., p. 49

<sup>27</sup> Eastlea, Brian. Science and Sexual Oppression. (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1981) p. 66

<sup>28</sup> Carlen, Pat, ed. Criminal Women. (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1985) p. 6

<sup>29</sup> Ibid, p. 8

<sup>30</sup> Smart, Law Crime and..., op. cit., p. 19

herself, govern herself over what was supposed to be her “nature,” ever taken into account. If we deprive women of free will, we equate them to animals or inanimate objects. If we hold her prisoner to her nature as defined by Aristotle, Lombroso and Ferrero or Pollak, we reduce her to a level lower than a human being. Sean French creates this argument:

[I]t might be said that the human being is a part of nature, while the person is a part of society; the human being is subject to the laws of nature, the person has rights and duties as a citizen; the human being has instincts, the person has free will. The human being acts without volition, the person kills and tortures because that is what he or she wants to do. Women can be people too.<sup>31</sup>

What is so invaluable about Carol Smart’s works that are highlighted here, Women, Crime and Criminology: A feminist critique and Law, Crime and Sexuality, is that she was the first to publish a feminist critique of criminology without making it *feminist* criminology. She writes with a feminist perspective and brings women into criminology for the first time without gendering them. Radical feminism over the past three decades has “shifted away from the socialisation of ‘core gender identities’ to a concentration on essential sex differences between men and women.”<sup>32</sup> A radical feminist criminology thesis would recreate the gender division in the field of criminology by making woman naturally different from man. Radical feminists try to place a positive spin on these innate differences between the sexes. What they end up doing, as will be seen later with the feminist Robin Morgan’s book on female terrorists, The Demon Lover, is to simply convey the same stereotypes about female “terrorists” as many of the out-of-date and often sexist authors do with regard to female criminals. They would maintain that crime could never be a feminine activity—that it is a part of the masculine—something frighteningly close to biological determinists. It is

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<sup>31</sup> French, Sean. “Partners in Crime: Defending the female of the species.” In Wight, Sarah and Myers, Alice, eds. No Angels: Women who commit violence. (HarperCollins: London, 1996) pp. 29-43. p. 43

<sup>32</sup> Messerschmidt, James W. “From Patriarchy to Gender: Feminist theory, criminology and the challenge of diversity.” In Rafter and Heindensohn, op. cit., pp. 167-188. p. 168

unfortunate that the more radical feminists have continued to separate woman from man. Certainly there are inherent differences between the two sexes, but it is more important to look at how the sexes have been gendered within society and how one can break these norms down. Until this is done, society cannot fully understand women and crime, violence or war. Smart addressed the need for perspective, input and recognition of criminal women that was not gendered. Thus, what she has tried to do is break down these norms.

Smart also discusses how biological determinists “legitimised” the concept of “female criminality [as]...a biologically rooted sickness” manifested in descriptions of sexual deviancy, mental instability and irrationality.<sup>33</sup> These descriptions are also frequently found in the work done on female terrorists. According to a study that Smart refers to, it was found that girls are three times more likely to be recommended for institutionalisation than boys, due to the fact the girls’ crimes were viewed as sexually delinquent.<sup>34</sup> These recommendations demonstrate that sexual deviancy in girls is much more threatening than any other form of delinquent behaviour and is “a sign of a much deeper pathology than deviancy by a male.”<sup>35</sup>

Since female crime has, for the majority, been such a rare event, it is “insignificant in statistical terms,” making research done on female criminality scarce and the perception of women criminals as “sick.”<sup>36</sup> While it is common to link criminal behaviour with mental instability and irrational motivation, it is more common to see this link when it is women who have committed crime, especially violence. It makes mental illness the acceptable “outlet” for female deviancy and an extension of women’s biological instability. Women who kill are presented to society as “mentally unstable”

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<sup>33</sup> Smart, *Law, Crime and...*, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>34</sup> Or more deviant. See also Heimer, Karen and De Coster, Stacy. “The Gendering of Violent Delinquency,” *Criminology*, vol. 37, no. 2, 1999, pp. 277-317. p. 283

<sup>35</sup> Smart, *Women, Crime and...*, op. cit., pp. 132-133

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 147

and therefore “not legitimate agents of the use of violence.”<sup>37</sup> The logical outcome of this is that all facets of female criminality are irrational and unintentional.<sup>38</sup> The “character and context” of women’s violence is “routinely misrepresent[ed]” to de-emphasise its implications.<sup>39</sup> By seeking psychiatric reasons behind women’s violence, society makes it “invisible” and we can allay our fears that society “is falling apart.” If women hold the family, the foundation of society, together, we would rather not admit all women have the potential for being violent.<sup>40</sup> It again denies cultural and societal pitfalls as agencies in crime and it again leads to differences between men and women not explained by the genderisation of society but by biological differences. This leads to women “being perceived as less rational, less intelligent and less self-directing than men.”<sup>41</sup>

Statistically, women tend to be more violent towards family members. This type of violence is more passionate and emotional than it is instrumental. Women who either rationally try to explain or defend their violence are seen as societal abominations. Women are typically given excuses to lessen the meaning and impact of their violence. Guilty women unwilling to use these excuses are vilified and demonised in a way most male violent offenders are not. The excuses exonerate the woman from her actions and diminish her responsibility, “thereby allow[ing] traditional and idealised beliefs around women’s...passivity to remain in place.”<sup>42</sup> Again, woman is established as peaceful. Society allows her, and itself, to take the back exit instead of facing up to the fact that a

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<sup>37</sup> Peach, Lucinda-Joy. “Is Violence Male? Law, gender and violence.” In Waller and Rycenga, op. cit., pp. 57-71. p. 60

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 173

<sup>39</sup> Chesney-Lind, Meda. “Contextualising Women’s Violence and Aggression: Beyond denial and demonisation,” *Behavioural and Brain Sciences*, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 222-223. p. 223

<sup>40</sup> Kennedy, op. cit., p. 23

<sup>41</sup> Smart, *Women, Crime and...*, op. cit., p. 148

<sup>42</sup> Ballinger, Annette. “The Guilt of the Innocent and the Innocence of the Guilty.” In Wight and Myers, op. cit., pp. 1-28. p. 2

woman can be violent too. Society blames her violence on something biologically innate in womanhood and brings itself back to Lombroso and Ferrero or Pollak.<sup>43</sup>

Since violent women are beyond the bounds of femininity, the irrationality of this act must be explained. One such explanation is Pre-menstrual Tension (PMT).<sup>44</sup> It is unfortunate but true that if a woman acts as if she is the least bit upset or aggressive, her “bad” mood is blamed on her “time of the month.” It locates women’s anger as a monthly occurrence, not caused by any legitimate feelings of frustration but by her unstable biology. PMT “splits” a woman by placing the blame within her, but outside of her control. In this way, “PMT represents the ultimate denial of agency.”<sup>45</sup> It is even more unfortunate that this excuse is used successfully as legal defence against murder. Sandie Craddock, a waitress in London, was acquitted of murder charges because of her PMT defence. This excuse serves to veil women’s aggression—society is not to blame if it is a biological problem. It has been suggested, and will be dealt with later, a woman’s involvement in terrorist organisations is similar to that of anorexia and both can be cured with the help of a medical doctor. This means there is no need to understand a woman’s actions because she probably does not understand them herself. She is a victim of her body’s uncontrollable biology. *She* is the victim, not the person she killed.

“Diminished responsibility is problematic” as it continues to mask the fact that women can kill out of anger and frustration like men. Instead, diminished responsibility says women only kill out of fear, desperation or out of instinct, without cognitive

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<sup>43</sup> Pearson, Patricia. When She Was Bad: How women get away with murder. (Virago Press: London, 1997) p. 42 and Birch, Helen, ed. Moving Targets: Women, murder and representation. (Virago Press: London, 1993) pp. 4-5

<sup>44</sup> PMT is defined as “a form of biochemical disturbance manifested in a range of physical and mental symptoms, of which the prime psychological ones are depression and anxiety, and characterised by the appearance of these symptoms in the pre-menstrual period and of their disappearance afterwards.” (Benn, Melissa. “Body Talk: The sexual politics of PMT.” In Birch, op. cit., pp. 152-171. p. 156)

<sup>45</sup> Benn, op. cit., pp. 163-165

knowledge of their actions.<sup>46</sup> The more a woman does not hide behind insanity or instability, the less “respectable” her actions are and thus she is more likely to receive a more severe sentence.<sup>47</sup> Patricia Pearson’s lesson from research on her book, When She Was Bad: How women get away with murder, was that “evidence lies in the eyes of the beholder. As long as patriarchy and radical feminists alike covet the notion that women are gentle, they will not look for the facts to dispute it.”<sup>48</sup> In fact, her book comes across as harsh until one realises she wants, above all, for women to be as equal as men by taking responsibility for their actions. Yet, she finds this is denied by the patriarchy and the radical feminists who insist women are gentle. By doing so, radical feminists set their own trap and “preserve the myth that women are more susceptible than men to being helpless, crazy [and] biddable.”<sup>49</sup> The problem with these radical feminists is they would rather see a woman as a victim than as an agent. Radical feminists construct women as “helpless [and] dependent;” they “ignore women’s capacity for and use of violence.”<sup>50</sup> It is very much the same way Robin Morgan describes female terrorists by placing them in “the harem of the demon lover.” Women get involved in revolutionary organisations because of their love and infatuation with the male terrorist—the demon lover—not for their own justifications for the use of violence. One goal of this work is to defeat the notion of the harem.

Since the focus of this research is to understand the female revolutionary, it would be obvious to look at how women are involved in war. The research tends to focus on how war affects women’s lives. And war is even more of a “masculine” activity than criminality. This gender-sex difference is conceptualised in the themes of *virtú* and *fortuna*. Male *virtú* embodies boldness, bravery, aggression and decisiveness.

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<sup>46</sup> Birch, op. cit., pp. 4-5

<sup>47</sup> Lloyd, op. cit., pp. 60-61

<sup>48</sup> Pearson, op. cit., p. 11

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, p. 56

<sup>50</sup> Peach, op. cit., p. 68

*Fortuna*—again, as a feminine image, is antithetical—irresolution, infirmity and hesitancy. *Fortuna* needs to be conquered and controlled by man. Thus women’s participation in wartime is controlled by the needs of man. The way that women participate in war is to provide a support base for the men. Women have acted as camp followers, World War II “Rosies” and “Doughnut Dollies” during the Vietnam War—anything, even outside their expected role, but fight in combat in traditional, institutional Western armies. During wartime, women were allowed to leave the house, get jobs and give men the freedom to fight for their women waiting back home. Apparently, even in more recent times, like the past decade, men would be demoralised if they did not have their wives, daughters, sisters and mothers back home to fight for.

Women on the battlefield “symbolised social chaos” during the 1500s,<sup>51</sup> especially since most of the women were there for the benefit of the male soldiers as camp followers. Women pose a problem to discipline; it is assumed the camp followers are all prostitutes whose influence makes the soldiers “idle and seditious.”<sup>52</sup> Women were responsible for every wrongdoing. They were not to be allowed anywhere near the battle campaigns.

There is another way of thinking about this. The Amazon, the women warriors of Greek mythology, also represented chaos. Amazons were kept apart from Greek civilisation; they existed in a realm beyond.<sup>53</sup> Thus the fantasy and fear of women who dominated were kept at a distance, part of a dreamscape or, rather, a nightmare. Yet, these amazingly beautiful women were also monsters, for to be functional as warriors, they amputated their breast, typically the right one.<sup>54</sup> They were the female Spartans, the reversal of Greek patriarchal society. The Greeks believed that patriarchy was the

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<sup>51</sup> Crim, Brian. “Silent Partners: Women and warfare in Early Modern Europe.” In DeGroot, Gerard J. and Bird-Peniston, Corinna, eds. *A Soldier and a Woman: Sexual integration in the military*. (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, 2000) pp. 18-32. p. 27

<sup>52</sup> Crim, op. cit., p. 28

<sup>53</sup> Enloe, op. cit., pp. 117-118

<sup>54</sup> *A mozos* is Greek for ‘woman without a breast.’

natural way of the world—anything that was not Greek was not natural. The image of the Amazon way of life was used to represent the chaos of women who not only engaged actively in warfare and battle, but who ruled.<sup>55</sup> If matriarchy were ever to overwhelm the patriarchy, Greeks believed the world would immediately be thrown into chaos. The authors, Richard J. Lane and Jay Wurts, of In Search of the Woman Warrior, believe the message of the Amazon myths is: “women who step outside their assigned roles damage all of civilisation.” The Amazons are the ultimate outsider, “a terrifying force for unmanaged change.”<sup>56</sup> This links directly, in my mind, to how women in terrorist organisations are perceived. Their violence is not anymore or any less damaging, terrifying or worse than the male’s, but it is more threatening.

During modern wartime, women have always filled the vacancies left by the men who go to fight. It was a new freedom and independence for women who were used to being kept in their places, but once the war was over, women were forced to return to their more traditional roles. Where women are left behind to be the cheerleaders to the men on the front, they are learning how to cope with life without man. Cynthia Enloe outlines in her book Does Khaki Become You? that women were used in the First and Second World Wars only reluctantly—and only in the face of total war. But the duties they were given were quickly gendered. The recruited women were made to perform tasks that belonged to women—typing, note taking, cleaning, etc. There were exceptions of women who were used for more combative positions, but as soon as the wars were over, they were among the first to be demobilised.<sup>57</sup> Even the women who fought behind enemy lines, and who were captured and killed, were not considered combatants.<sup>58</sup> Any independence or power gained during wartime was

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<sup>55</sup> Lane, Richard J. and Wurts, Jay. In Search of the Woman Warrior: Role models for modern women. (Element: Boston, and Shaftesbury, 1998) pp. 41 and 48 and Crim, op. cit., p. 20

<sup>56</sup> Lane and Wurts, op. cit., pp. 51-52

<sup>57</sup> Enloe, op. cit., pp. 123 and 161

<sup>58</sup> van Creveld, Martin. Men, Women and War. (Cassell and Co.: London, 2001) pp. 128 and 134

quickly taken away—the social independence war brought expired and the women could return to their socially acceptable roles of wives and mothers. Like the women described in the introduction to this chapter, women involved in the military were watched carefully to make sure they did not violate social expectations. During World War II, rumours of wild women who partied all night and “acted like men” were rife. There seemed to exist this belief that unchaperoned women would get out of control and automatically resort to “deviousness.”<sup>59</sup> The rumours jeopardised the women involved in such organisations as the Women’s Auxiliary Army Corps (WAAC) or Women of the Royal Navy (WRN).

Enloe, in another book, Maneuvers: The international politics of militarising women’s lives, discusses the dilemmas that militaries face when sexual matters and women are discussed. There is the double standard of promoting prostitution—regulated, of course—and completely misunderstanding the purpose and reasons behind rape. Not to mention the sexual harassment and the sexual hierarchy that the United States military cannot seem to get rid of. Prostitution is allowed for: lectures are given before leave on how to protect against sexually transmitted diseases. When 7,000 United States Sailors went on shore leave in Pattaya, Thailand in March of 1991, Lieutenant Sherman Baldwin of the *Midway* said,

We’re beating men over the head to use condoms. The Navy is doing all it can do in terms of information and education to get the word across to every 18- and 19-year old sailor about how to protect themselves.<sup>60</sup>

The use of prostitutes is certainly a security threat. But, in the infamous rape case of a Japanese schoolgirl in Okinawa, because the three men could not afford a prostitute, they, with a plan in hand, rented a car, abducted the girl and raped her. Admiral

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<sup>59</sup> DeGroot, Gerard J. “Lipstick on Her Nipples, Cordite in Her Hair: Sex and romance among British servicewomen during the Second World War.” In DeGroot and Bird-Peniston, op. cit., pp. 100-118. pp. 109-110

<sup>60</sup> Enloe, Cynthia. Maneuvers: The international politics of militarising women’s lives. (University of California Press: London, 2000) p. 72

Macke's response was, "I think it was absolutely stupid, I've said several times. For the price they paid to rent the car, they could have had a girl."<sup>61</sup> The problem here is this:

[The] imagined separation between militarised rape and militarised prostitution serves the interests of many patriarchal officials: it allows them to discuss rape and prostitution as if their perpetrators and their victims were entirely different. In actual practice, in the world of military policymaking, officials think of rape and prostitution *together*. Providing organised prostitution to male soldiers is imagined to be a means of preventing those same soldiers from engaging in rape.<sup>62</sup>

When what really needs to be realised by these policy makers is that prostitution objectifies a woman; there is no relationship formed; no respect for the woman; thus the prostitute and other faceless women become nothing more than sexual commodities.

The second dilemma shows the military's need to control women. If, on the one hand, the military needs women to bolster men's morale, how does this happen without the woman being subversive? And if she is going to join the ranks of the military, how do we make a woman acceptable in the most male world there is? Rarely have military wives been allowed to work off the base. They are there for their husband. The families are there to help the military man advance. The military wife should accept these caveats to be successful:

She has come to her own conclusions that the most important thing for her own and her family's well-being is that her husband perform his military job well.

Being a supportive military wife gives her a genuine sense that she is doing her 'patriotic duty.'

She realises that she has to accept a number of restrictions, but she views those restrictions as a logical and crucial building block in 'national security.'<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 117

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 111

<sup>63</sup> Enloe, Maneuvers..., op. cit., pp. 162-163

As for the woman who is actually a member of the armed forces—if the military is not controlling what the woman is wearing<sup>64</sup>, they are certainly thinking of ways to prove that a woman is not as capable as a man.

As far as the military is concerned it is still important to keep women in their place during peacetime. While women are allowed into military service and duty, the military “seems to have an exaggerated need to pursue more and more refined measures of sexual difference” to prove that women cannot perform combat duty.<sup>65</sup> Studies are conducted on pregnancy, upper-body strength and menstruation to prove the differences between men and women. It is the search for evidence to provide “an essentialist barricade that many senior military policy-makers will protect their institution against the onslaught of ‘feminisation.’”<sup>66</sup> It all comes back to biological determinism, for a woman cannot perform a task based upon her natural, biological inferiority to man. Just think of Captain Philippa Tattersall, who, on May 31<sup>st</sup>, 2002, passed the gruelling eight-week training course and achieved her Green Beret. But it does not mean she can *use* it. She performed just as well as the men, but she is still incapable of fighting on the front line and even unable to call herself a Marine.<sup>67</sup> It is a continuation of the argument made of camp followers: women are distractions; they are dead weight; they slow down the streamlined armies of the twenty-first century. As one American military official is quoted as saying:

War is man’s work. Biological convergence on the battlefield would not only be dissatisfying in terms of what women could do, but it would be an enormous psychological distraction for the male who wants to think that he’s fighting for that woman somewhere behind, not up there in the same foxhole with him. It tramples the male ego. When you get right down to it, you’ve got to protect the manliness of war.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Everything (bra, slip, panty and pantyhose) a woman in uniform wears is regulated. (Ibid, p. 271)

<sup>65</sup> Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?, op. cit. p. 138

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 139

<sup>67</sup> Wilson, Jamie. “First Woman Wins Marines’ Green Beret—But can only join the band,” *The Guardian*, 1<sup>st</sup> June 2002. [www.guardian.co.uk](http://www.guardian.co.uk), site accessed 18<sup>th</sup> June 2002.

<sup>68</sup> Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?, op. cit., pp. 153-154

“Women in war” typically does not mean women fighting war. It means, as Elshstain eloquently wrote, women in war “observe, suffer, cope, mourn, honour, adore, witness and work.” It is the men who describe and define war and the women who react to it.<sup>69</sup> Thus, if women have been conceptualised as the “official mourners, lamenting the destruction of the war”<sup>70</sup> since the time of Aristotle, the idea of a woman revolutionary is very scary. She is the Amazon, the woman who exists to participate in combat effectively, no matter how hard the militaries of the world try to prove that women are incapable of doing battle.

It is these lingering images which influence the research done on female revolutionaries. The themes of biological and mental instability, irrationality, dependency upon males, lack of ideological commitment and the inability to be independent legitimate agents of violence will all be echoed in the next section. The image of the female revolutionary is deeply rooted in society’s interpretation of the female criminal and women’s role in war.

### **Women and Terrorism Studies**

Myths float around the literature on female terrorists casting harmful shadows which lead the researcher and student to ill-formed conclusions. One such myth is the image of Leila Khaled with her machine gun—the “sexy” poster girl for terrorism, like Farrah Fawcett for Charlie’s Angels. Helena Kennedy says that Bernardine Dohrn and Kathy Boudin of the Weather Underground and Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin of the Baader-Meinhof Gang “have all provoked more interest and speculation than their male comrades.” Unfortunately, it has nothing to do with their politics and everything to do with “their sexual liberation,” which sparks the interest of “their male voyeur.”<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Elshstain, op .cit., p. 164

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, p. 121

<sup>71</sup> Kennedy, op. cit., pp. 261-262

Or Marion Coyle's cold heartlessness is revived for another go. As an IRA member, she, with Eddie Gallagher, held Tiede Herrerma, a Dutch businessman, hostage. Unlike Gallagher, Coyle did not form a relationship with Herrerma. She shot at the police when they raided, while Gallagher covered in a corner.<sup>72</sup> There is also Susanne Albrecht of the Red Army Faction who was involved in the murder of a family friend on his birthday. She is made out to be even more ruthless for knowing him but it is often ignored she was told he would not be harmed.<sup>73</sup> Many researchers, i.e. H.H.A. Cooper, Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini and Catherine Taylor, all admit it is hard to contextualise the female terrorist's violence. Thus, instead of trying to understand what cannot be placed into the context of societal norms, researchers, again Cooper, the anonymous author of "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing," and feminist Robin Morgan, condemn and vilify the female terrorist above and beyond that of a male terrorist. Those just listed buy into the stereotype of the female terrorist as more ruthless, cold, dominant and hyper-sexual.

The vilification of "deviant" women seen in the previous section of this chapter is highlighted in one of the first articles written on female terrorists. "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing" was published in the *Top Security Project No. 2 Part IV* from November 1976, and is cited in many works on female terrorists from those immediately following the publication<sup>74</sup> to a chapter published in 2000.<sup>75</sup> As with Lombroso and Ferrero, no matter how much it is acknowledged that this piece of work is out-of-date, the image of women this author chooses to depict is still being read and used. The author offers "erotomania" as the "primary cause of female terrorism" because young women, or "girls," have been neglected by society in general "and the

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<sup>72</sup> Jamieson, Alison. The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and conflict in the Italian state. (Marion Boyers: London, 1989) p. 65. See also Cooper, op. cit., p. 152

<sup>73</sup> Becker, Jillian. Hitler's Children. (Michael Joseph: London, 1977) p. 36

<sup>74</sup> Cooper, H.H.A. "Woman as Terrorist." In Adler and Simon, op. cit., pp. 150-157

<sup>75</sup> Taylor, Catherine. "And Don't Forget to Clean the Fridge": Women in the secret sphere of terrorism." In DeGroot and Bird-Peniston, op. cit., pp. 294-304

father in particular.” This again links female ‘deviancy’ with sexual misconduct, as pointed out by Carol Smart in regards to delinquent teenage girls. The author specifically blames the rise in female involvement on “pressure from disgruntled females who probably form a large majority of the women’s liberation movement.” While the author mainly presents severe misconceptions of women involved in underground organisations, the advice given to security forces is:

When [one] is dealing with a female terrorist one is usually dealing not with rational, but with emotional motivation. ... Thus her violence will in all probability stem not from dedication to the particular cause which she appears to espouse, but from blind obedience to another more personal cause....<sup>76</sup>

The women in these groups are equated with women suffering from anorexia, because like anorexia, a woman’s motivation behind joining an underground organisation is really just a nervous condition. Thus, security forces should deal with and “cure” a woman’s involvement in underground organisations as a medical doctor would “cure” anorexia. Throughout this article, the author in no way deviates from the belief that “girls” are involved in subversive groups because “pop-culture” has got its claws in them and that the absentee father of today’s society has let them go the way of violence. Especially since “girls” are “less suited to the stresses and strains of an independent life.”<sup>77</sup> The article ends with this thought:

It must never be forgotten that the female terrorist is but one symptom of a massive syndrome of female unrest and discontent with the male, whose vitality and confidence this minority movement is sapping.

One awaits the outcome of this struggle for freedom from (largely mythical) male domination—a struggle which the majority of women probably do not wish to win.<sup>78</sup>

H.H.A. Cooper begins his chapter in Adler and Simon’s book The Criminology of Deviant Women by admitting the attitudes on female terrorists may well be sexist.

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<sup>76</sup> “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing,” *Top Security Project No. 2 Part IV—Summary and Analysis*, November 1976, pp. 242-245. p. 245

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 244

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 245

He acknowledges “we are handicapped” because so few women are violent or involved in terrorism. “Terrorism is the ugly side of man and woman alike[;]” unfortunately, men are “conditioned” to look for physical or spiritual beauty in women. Female terrorists, thus, offend this delicate sensibility.<sup>79</sup> Cooper confesses the horrified reactions towards female terrorists is the product of classical patriarchal thought— “terrorism is simply not women’s work.”<sup>80</sup> Cooper states that “the female terrorist has not been content to just praise the Lord and pass the ammunition.” Female terrorists

have consistently proved themselves more ferocious and more intractable in these acts than their male counterparts. There is a cold rage about some of them that even the most alienated of men seem quite incapable of emulating.<sup>81</sup>

Since she is not content with hypothetical women’s work, Cooper vilifies the female terrorist, just as was seen with the vilification of criminal women in the previous section. After describing Marion Coyle’s “single-minded, fanatically inhuman behaviour” towards Herrerra, and in contrast to Gallagher’s humanity, Cooper says Coyle’s “behaviour...is typical of the pitiless attitude many women terrorists are capable of assuming.” Their attitude is one “that men find curiously hard to match.”<sup>82</sup> This obvious sexism was also seen during the 1986 IRA bombing of Brighton court case. Martina Anderson and Ella O’Dwyer were singled out by the judge from their equally responsible male co-defendants and chastised for their cold-heartlessness.<sup>83</sup> The message here reads: women are meant to care, men are not. Gallagher was an acceptable anomaly for his fraternal behaviour. Female terrorist’s are the ultimate traitors for being less than compassionate and nurturing.

Cooper suggests, since the female terrorist has altered “preconceptions...and patterns for response” due to her “heinous activities,” she should be “dealt with after

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<sup>79</sup> Cooper, op. cit., p. 151

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 151

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, p. 151

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 152

<sup>83</sup> Kennedy, op. cit., p. 262

the fashion of the Gorgon.”<sup>84</sup> A female terrorist is no longer human, she is sub-human in her personality defects and super-human in her strength. Women are “eager” to develop “skills and techniques of the violent terrorist.” They “delight in aping” soldiers and in their “childish” motivation are “all too [ready to] surpass their masters in both violence and rhetoric.”<sup>85</sup> Women do not, according to Cooper, engage in terrorism for the same reasons as men. They become involved for personal reasons which have “obsessive [and] pathological” qualities. Therefore, “[i]t is *useless* to inquire why women become terrorists.”<sup>86</sup> (italic emphasis added) Female terrorists, it seems, are not worthy of research, as their reasoning is completely unfathomable and therefore “useless” to the understanding of terrorism. This is reflected in Cooper’s acceptance of “erotomania” as offered by the previous article as a reasonable and a “primary cause of female terrorism.” It is sexual relationships which lead women into terrorism. He lists Jane Alpert and Sam Melville, Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader and Carlos the Jackel and his host of women. Cooper ignores 1) Gudrun Ensslin was the brains in that couple and 2) the women Carlos was involved with were not terrorists.

Yet this sexual relationship theory is something the feminist Robin Morgan espouses. Her book is based upon Jungian psychology’s hero journey—“the terrorist ...[,] the ultimate sexual ideal of a male-centred tradition [...] ...is the logical extension of the patriarchal hero....”<sup>87</sup> Morgan does manage to make some excellent points; unfortunately she is too influenced by her personal politics and her own near miss with the Weather Underground and the radical violence of the 1960s. Morgan dismisses the experts in the field, like Richard Clutterbuck, Anthony Burton and Paul Wilkinson. Morgan writes from a feminist perspective and bases her definition of a terrorist upon

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<sup>84</sup> Cooper, op. cit., p. 152

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 153

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 154

<sup>87</sup> Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism. (Washington Square Press: New York, 1989) p. xvi

this: “The terrorist is the logical incarnation of patriarchal politics in a technological world.”<sup>88</sup> (italic emphasis removed) Her definition is basically another way of defining a dialectic revolution. Only she leaves the women out. If ‘sons’ have learned violence from living in a violent society, so have the ‘daughters.’ Yet, Morgan surprisingly refers to women as “token terrorists” and as participating in the harem of the Demon Lover, the male terrorist. Morgan finds “[b]iological determinism” to be a “failure of intellectual nerve” and she does not mean to create a “mirror-image feminist version.”

Yet, Morgan writes:

I do not make the argument that women are inherently more peaceable, nurturant, or altruistic than men. . . . Yet it is undeniable that history is a record of most women acting peaceably, and of most men acting belligerently—to a point where the capacity for belligerence is regarded as an essential ingredient of manhood and the proclivity for conciliation is thought largely a quality of women.

She continues to define woman as “outside the body politic, except as victims or tokens.”<sup>89</sup> She denies women the capability to make decisions for themselves. The “token terrorist” “is no more a true representative of women than the airbrushed Playboy centrefold.”<sup>90</sup> A “‘revolutionary’ woman” buys into the “male ‘radical’ line” and “diassociate[s] herself from her womanhood. . . her reality.” The token terrorist defends her loyalty and her commitment while in denial to her true self.<sup>91</sup> Thus women who participate in the armed struggle have made the wrong choice, forsaking the more humane path of feminism for male-dominated political violence. Morgan’s thesis simply carries on the victimisation of women by denying women any cause but feminism, reminiscent of the radical feminists in the criminology and violence section. Morgan labels Leila Khaled, of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, as a token terrorist, because she has “never spoke[n] about women.” Morgan writes Khaled

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, pp. 27-28

<sup>90</sup> Ibid, pp. 59-60

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, pp. 196-198

“has not survived being female.” Simply because, in a quote of Khaled’s Morgan uses, “When I [Khaled] speak at an international conference...I represent Palestinians, not women.”<sup>92</sup> <sup>93</sup> Morgan diminishes the role of female terrorists by listing such left-wing couples, like Mara Cagol and Renato Curcio, who both started the Italian Red Brigades, and comments that the women who were partnered with a male terrorist only acted as they did “for male approval and love.”<sup>94</sup> Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof’s roles in Baader-Meinhof are distorted by Morgan, who refers to them as “followers” and rebels for “love’s sake [which is] a classic feminine behaviour.”<sup>95</sup> If women such as Mara Cagol, Gudrun Ensslin and Ulrike Meinhof were simply in the “harem” of a male terrorist, this negates the fact that women, even terrorists, possess the ability to act on their own volition.

The anonymous author and Cooper portray female terrorists as devoid of any emotion other than anger, vengeance and bloodlust. Whilst Morgan simply portrays them as empty-headed women gone wrong. This type of research has turned female terrorists into monsters, much more so than the males. Eileen MacDonald titled her book from the West German GSG 9’s command, “Shoot the women first.” As women are supposed to be that much more ruthless and aggressive than the men. MacDonald, however, admits that the female terrorists she interviewed were “disturbingly normal” and after the first round of interviews she “stopped looking for their horns.”<sup>96</sup> MacDonald helps by combating this desire to demonise the women. When MacDonald interviewed Susanna Ronconi of the Red Brigades, Ronconi was appalled that

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid, pp. 210-211

<sup>93</sup> In a recent interview, Leila Khaled not only speaks about women, but speaks about the need for Palestinian women’s liberation. Khaled is also a member of the General Union of Palestinian Women. (Khaled, Leila. Interviewed in Amman, Jordan, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2002, pp. 1-24)

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, pp. 204-205

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, p. 208

<sup>96</sup> MacDonald, Eileen. Shoot the Women First. (Arrow Books: London, 1988) p. 11

MacDonald even needed to ask whether or not Ronconi considered if one of her targets had children or was with a child. “Of course,” Ronconi answered, flinching visibly.<sup>97</sup>

Alison Jamieson’s book, The Heart Attacked, focusing on the Italian Red Brigade’s kidnapping of Aldo Moro, tries to dismiss the myths surrounding female terrorists. “The driving force” behind female participation seemed “to conform largely to that of the male.” In the Red Brigades, the sexes were united in their sense of injustice, hatred of an unequal society and their belief in violent revolution. The female terrorist’s idealism, however, “stripped of the elements of fantasy, heroism and the *bella morte* ... may be rawer, more acute and more passionately felt.” Even as a journalist herself, Jamieson concludes that the “mythical female terrorist” is “more of a creation of the media” than of reality.<sup>98</sup> One Milanese Public Prosecutor she interviewed, Armando Spartaro, felt much exaggeration is made about female terrorists and “rejects” that “characteristics and motivations differ significantly between the sexes.”<sup>99</sup>

Neuburger and Valentini’s work also focuses on the Italian Red Brigades in an attempt to understand why women were more resistant than men to penitentiism<sup>100</sup> in the Italian criminal system. Their work highlights the high level of commitment achieved by the women. Over time, Red Brigade’s leadership had a total of 12 men and seven women. Sixteen percent of the men became penitents, while none of the women did.<sup>101</sup> They attribute it to a heavier ideological commitment by women to the organisation.

Neuburger and Valentini introduce as a reference the “feminine ‘way’” of living, the definition of which states “women tend to develop their experience in accordance

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<sup>97</sup> MacDonald, op. cit., p. 177

<sup>98</sup> Jamieson, op. cit., pp. 67-68

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, p. 67

<sup>100</sup> A penitent (*pentito*) is a terrorist in the Italian criminal system who disassociates himself or herself from the terrorist organisation and collaborates with the justice authorities. (Neuburger and Valentini, op. cit., p. 9)

<sup>101</sup> Neuburger and Valentini, op. cit., pp. 3 and 7-8

with an affective model based on sacrifice, on caring for others, on responding to others' needs and on protection."<sup>102</sup> This is what they call the "maternal-sacrifice code." Thus, Neuburger and Valentini pinpoint a woman's involvement based upon her desire to belong to something. In the interview they conducted with Mara Aldrovandi, she talked about the "collective aspect" and the wish not to be alone. Aldrovandi was satisfied with being "needed...and [she] let [her]self be used." In Aldrovandi's eyes, the women diverted conflict and brought the two sexes together.<sup>103</sup> However, her desire to belong corresponds to the experiences of other members in clandestine groups. Women may be more nurturing, what must be conveyed is that a woman will get involved for the same reasons as a man: because of her strong belief in a cause and a particular organisation. Neuburger and Valentini overlook a woman's desire to get involved in the terrorist organisation based on her ideology. Bonnie Cordes, a researcher for Rand, concluded that both men and women join terrorist organisations to belong to a collection of like-minded individuals and for the community a group creates.<sup>104</sup> This echoes della Porta's contention that friendship and familial ties lead both sexes into involvement in revolutionary groups.

Leonard Weinburg and William Eubank theorise that Italian women did not seek out participation in terrorist groups, instead the women followed their husbands or brothers into the movement. They indicate "romantic or affectional ties" as a source of motivation. Yet, one of the founders of the Italian Red Brigades was a woman, Mara Cagol, and female participation in said organisation was close to 20 percent. In spite of this, Weinburg and Eubank conceptualise the role of women as "housekeepers"—mirroring the "traditional female role in society" where the female members of Italian

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<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 81

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, p. 17

<sup>104</sup> Cordes, Bonnie. *When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on terrorist literature*. (Rand Corp.: Santa Monica, CA, 1987) p.8

groups submitted and provided support to their men.<sup>105</sup> Yet, if these women did not join of their own free will, why did they not participate in penitencism while their male, ideologically committed counter-parts did?

Researchers, such as MacDonald, Neuburger and Valentini, Zwerman and Jamieson, and female revolutionaries alike emphasise that female terrorists have a harder decision to make in becoming clandestine. A woman chooses to give up what is “hers” sociologically—home, marriage and children. Gudrun Ensslin, Ulrike Meinhof and Adriana Faranda’s abandonment of their children is often mentioned. Mara Aldrovandi, a Prima Linea<sup>106</sup> member interviewed by Neuburger and Valentini, felt that “women have more at stake than men” when joining the armed struggle. She continued,

I am sure that for a woman giving up motherhood is terrible, the idea of not marrying because there is no time is terrible. A man does not have motherhood at stake. In a word, women think it over three times before joining the armed struggle.<sup>107</sup>

This all leads to the same thought that women members are more driven and convinced of their ideology. Gilda Zwerman is a great proponent of this belief. Giving up what is theirs sociologically does not mean a woman is being victimised or being taken advantage of; it is, after all, her choice to do what she wants with her life. A woman’s involvement in clandestine organisations “re[fects] a complexity of decisions and consideration involving political commitment, personal sacrifice and emotional conflict.”<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Weinburg, Leonard and Eubank, William. “Italian Women Terrorists,” *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 9, 1985

<sup>106</sup> Prima Linea is a column of the Italian Red Brigades.

<sup>107</sup> Neuburger, and Valentini, op. cit., p. 118

<sup>108</sup> Zwerman, Gilda. “Conservative and Feminist Images of Women Associated with Armed, Clandestine Organisations in the United States.” In della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations*, volume 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. *International Social Movement Research*, (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) pp. 133-159. p. 134

Catherine Taylor is caught between the two sides. She tries to fight the stereotypical image of the female terrorist—as either cold and deviant or supplicant and nurturing. Yet, the overall tone of her piece puts her in place with Neuburger and Valentini. She recognises that a female terrorist is “a living contradiction—she has chosen to take life, not to give it.”<sup>109</sup> These activities set her apart from society and her gender. Taylor also combats the referral of female terrorists as “girls.” In her mind it serves two purposes: to deny the women political maturity and it “desexualises them,” thereby lessening the contradiction between their actions and their gender.<sup>110</sup> She sets the female terrorist apart when she describes the stereotype “which combines sex and violence in a titillatingly erotic mix.” But, this is “probably quite [an] accurate description of the role which female terrorists often play.”<sup>111</sup> To be fair, this has happened. Women in the Weather Underground, like Bernardine Dohrn and Susan Stern, did use their sexuality as power. However, this is the environment the Weather Underground unwittingly set up for both men and women. This is not the case in many other groups. Ulrike Meinhof was the ideological leader for Baader-Meinhof without using her sex as a weapon or power. Nor did many of the other women involved in Baader-Meinhof/ Red Army Faction.<sup>112</sup> The women in the Italian Red Brigades did not appear to do this at all. For a woman to be sexy in the Palestinian groups, or in Palestinian society in general, is not only dangerous, but she would be totally stripped of her power as a member of the organisation.<sup>113</sup> Taylor does not back up her hypothesis with multiple examples. She discusses the depiction of Maureen O’Hara, an IRA

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<sup>109</sup> Taylor, op. cit., p. 295

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, p. 296

<sup>111</sup> Ibid, p. 300

<sup>112</sup> Becker, op. cit. and Aust, Stefan. The Baader-Meinhof Group: The inside story of a phenomenon. (The Bodley Head: London, 1985)

<sup>113</sup> See the example of Rula in *Chapter Five: The Women of the Palestinian Resistance Movement of 1967 under Group Dynamics.*

terrorist, who used her beauty “to lure British soldiers” to their death. Yet to use one example to serve for many is irresponsible.

To give Taylor credit, she does recognise and try to fight the stereotypes which do exist. Yet, she does it in a way which only serves to reinforce them. This is shown with the final three sentences of her chapter:

In the public sphere, the unnatural quality of the female terrorist has contributed to a tendency to question her commitment and often to ignore her existence entirely. Women terrorists, like women soldiers, hit the wall of what is considered ‘natural.’ There are only girls or sluts in the terrorist world, or deluded women led astray by men.

She tries hard to say that these images and myths of female terrorists are not accurate or helpful. Yet she perpetuates them by not offering any other image of a female terrorist but a negative one. This is most unfortunate.

One recent article, by Amy Caiazza, does have a fresh approach.<sup>114</sup> Caiazza acknowledges that women participate less in terrorism due to sexist and patriarchal norms “that preclude women from militaristic action.”<sup>115</sup> Some women will participate for perceived equality that engaging in the struggle might bring. For Caiazza, a woman who might engage maternally with the group is just one aspect of many. And as a woman writing for a woman’s organisation she does not deny a woman’s agency by making the woman’s involvement a negative. By seeking a reasonable explanation behind a woman’s engagement in the armed struggle, does not mean this study condones warfare and violence. This study does not seek a sugar-coated depiction of any struggle or of any specific woman; it is seeking to find a depiction of a woman engaged in revolutionary activity whose image has not been distorted by a gender bias. It is not fair or responsible to say that a woman’s involvement in terrorism is easily dismissed as sexual or gendered in nature. Many still do not see the woman for being a

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<sup>114</sup> Caiazza, Amy. “Why Gender Matters in Understanding September 11: Women, militarism and violence.” *Institute for Women’s Policy Research*, IWPR Publication #1908, November 2001. pp. 1-6. [www.iwpr.org](http://www.iwpr.org), site accessed 24<sup>th</sup> May 2002.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3

capable person with reasons behind her actions. Instead, researchers continue to dismiss a woman for being controlled by her body and hormones, making “inappropriate” actions innate within a woman instead of a rational choice.

## Conclusion

The criminal woman is, as Ann Lloyd titled her book, “doubly deviant”—for both breaking the law and the “unwritten code for proper female behaviour”—and “doubly damned.”<sup>116</sup> If a female criminal is doubly damned, what does that mean for the female terrorist? She has not only willingly been involved with criminal activities, she has participated fully in acts of warfare. A female revolutionary is involved in what society perceives as the chaotic, in this sense, she is a return to the idea of the Amazon. She has gone beyond the actions of Sylvia Pankhurst—this woman has bombed the Pentagon, hi-jacked planes and kidnapped state officials. The female revolutionary acts outside the norms that society has established for women and thus she is labelled as a slut, a demon, a vulgar slap-in-the-face to all that femininity is supposed to be. Elshtain wrote,

we can accept female spies, for that is a *sexualised* and *manipulative* activity. ...We think rarely of women who have actually fought, who have...volunteer[ed] their services to resistance and guerrilla movements.<sup>117</sup> (*italic emphasis added*)

Can society actually handle a woman involved in a revolutionary organisation who does not demonstrate these traits of sexualised and manipulative activity?

If anything, this chapter has set out to put out there several ideas. First to reiterate that revolutionary organisations are often splinters of a new social movement. They are born of extreme frustration, agitation and increasing volatility. There may be an element of groupthink, but always a sense of group identity and belonging. The

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<sup>116</sup> Lloyd, *op. cit.*, p. 19

<sup>117</sup> Elshtain, *op. cit.*, p. 173

revolutionary group, whether it is the Weather Underground, Baader-Meinhof, Fateh or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, is a place of belonging, acceptance and action. These four groups accepted both men and women as equals, not withstanding the problems related to the societies and cultures to which these groups belonged. The men and women acted together as partners—planning, implementing and taking the responsibility for their actions together. Further down the road, neither group admitted that women did not belong because of hidden problems with their fathers; because they had followed their boyfriends into the group; or because they had some sort of problem with nymphomania. This speaks for the second idea of this chapter—women are not some sort of hyped up hormonal by-product, devoid of any other form of personality. They commit crimes, acts of violence and acts of war for the same reasons as a man may. To ignore this, ignores any sort of culpability, legitimacy and rationality a woman may claim as her own.

In each of the three historical narratives to follow, the first part of the chapters will establish the historical and social context and the movement as a new social movement. This is necessary in order to understand the role of the women in the revolutionary group. The second part of the chapters will be solely concerned with the female revolutionary. The points of comparison that will be employed include a woman's entry into the organisation; her personal ideology and how that corresponds to the group's ideology; how the group interacts as a whole and how it reacts to female participants; and if, when and how a woman eventually leaves the revolutionary group. If a woman only joined an underground organisation to mother her fellow participants or followed her partner or brother into the group, than her reasons for entry would differ substantially from that of a man. If a woman was just either a sexual being whose only involvement in the group could be pinned to emotional causes or simply interested in mothering the revolutionary organisation, than she would indeed be devoid of any

ideology. As will be shown in the three historical narratives, this simply is not the case. If a woman is just a nymphomaniac or a mother, than the group dynamics will reflect this role. One would assume then the female revolutionary did not plan or participate in operations. And if a woman was not committed to the group and to the ideas of the groups, she would not be a long-term member. Her entry and exit from a revolutionary organisation could be taken as a whim and therefore lead to unreliable group participation. Again, these ideas will be refuted throughout the three historical narratives.

## Chapter Three: The Women of the Weather Underground

### Introduction

When television shows, movies or magazines depict or refer to the 1960s in America, the public is greeted with images of Woodstock, Volkswagen busses, tie-dyed t-shirts and longhaired men. When the media gets truly introspective, sound bites of Martin Luther King, Jr. are played; the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr., John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy are analysed; the violence in the South is discussed. Rarely, however, are the revolutionary organisations mentioned. The Black Panther Party, WITCH (Women's International Conspiracy from Hell) and, most especially, the Weather Underground are barely a part of the American consciousness. With regard to the sixties, one does not typically picture Bernardine Dohrn, Susan Stern or any other woman resisting arrest after inciting or participating in a riot, much less picture the wanted posters featuring these women, and other women and men, of the Weather Underground. Like the other groups under study, Weather Underground was Marxist-Leninist in ideology and had a high-level of female involvement. The students sought the overthrow of the then current, out-dated government. They saw themselves as the vanguard Lenin wrote about; they would motivate the working-class, the oppressed, to rise up and form a truly communist/utopian society or, at the very least, establish a free state for African-Americans. To understand the Movement and the rise of the revolutionary dimension, an understanding of American society must be established. The role and place of women in American society radically changed between the early 1960s and the end of the decade. Understanding women in American society will help the reader understand the place of women in the Movement, along with the attitudes of all of the Movement members.

Alain Touraine says the “real danger” in social movements develops when a well-organised faction becomes a micro-party, which may come to represent a revolutionary or negative force.<sup>1</sup> Most of the student movements in the 1960s produced splinter groups with this revolutionary dimension—West Germany’s Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, France’s Action Directe, the Japanese Red Army, Britain’s Angry Brigade and America’s Weather Underground. Groups like the Angry Brigade and the Weather Underground were so small in number and in support, their respective countries have forgotten these groups even existed. With, perhaps, several exceptions. West German university students still discuss the suicides of the first generation of Red Army Faction leaders. They, Ulrike Meinhof, Gundrun Ennslin, Andreas Baader and Jan-Carl Raspe, have achieved a mythological, cult-like status. Italy will probably never forget the kidnapping of Aldo Moro. These groups all coincided with the rise of modern terrorism—when Palestinian organisations began hijacking international airplanes and committing acts of terrorism in countries outside the Middle East. These legacies do not exist elsewhere.

Women were more likely to be involved in these new movements. The emphasis on equality, for race and sex, played an important part, as did the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) newsletter, *New Left Notes*, quoted Lenin, “The proletariat cannot achieve complete freedom, unless it achieves complete freedom for women.” Women, in the American movement, were just as likely to participate as men. This does not mean the SDS was not without problems, the members debated “the women question” endlessly and the chauvinistic attitude of the men was infamous. Yet, it goes without saying that, women are more likely to be involved in left-wing groups than in more conservative, right-wing

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<sup>1</sup> Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements*. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 150

organisations. In the first generation of the Red Army Faction, known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, ten members were women and six were men. Eighteen percent of all leaders in Italian leftist groups were women, the right-wing neo-fascists in Italy had only one (1.4 percent) female leader.<sup>2</sup> In all of the movements of this thesis, it was a struggle to involve women at all, even in America and West Germany.

During the 1950s a survey reported 40 percent of young men could not think of any way in which they would want to differ from their fathers. Fifty female students were asked to write an essay on their goals for the next ten years, 46 responded with visions of suburbia, being “married to a successful professional man or junior executive...chauffeur[ing] three of four children in a station wagon and participating in various civic organisations.”<sup>3</sup> In the 1966 National Organisation for Women (NOW) Statement of Purpose, the authors highlighted these statistics: 46.4 percent of all women between 18 and 65 worked outside the home; 75 percent of these women were in “routine clerical, sales or factory jobs, or they [were] household workers, cleaning women [or] hospital attendants;” two-thirds of African-American women were in the “lowest paid service occupations;” full-time women workers earned only 60 percent of what men earned; “[i]n 1964, of all women with a yearly income, 89 percent earned under \$5,000 a year;” only one in three women attained a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and only one in ten of the PhDs granted were to women; “women were less than one percent of the Federal judges; less than four percent of all lawyers; seven percent of doctors.” At the time, women comprised 53 percent of the American population.<sup>4</sup>

When Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex was published in America, a critic “commented that she obviously ‘didn’t know what life was all about;” de Beauvoir was

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<sup>2</sup> Weinburg, Leonard and Eubank, William. “Leaders and Followers in Italian Terrorist Groups,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 1, April 1989, pp. 156-175. p. 164

<sup>3</sup> Anderson, Terry H. The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1995) p. 19

<sup>4</sup> Friedan, Betty. It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women’s Movement. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998) pp. 110-111

writing about French women and in America “the women problem...no longer existed.”<sup>5</sup> Betty Friedan is often credited with providing the catalyst for the Women’s Movement in America. In 1963, she published The Feminine Mystique, which described the social situation of women in the United States. She went on to form NOW. First though, she described “the problem that has no name”—how women behaved 15 years after the end of WW II:

the words written for women, and the words women used when they talked to each other, while their husbands sat on the other side of the room and talked shop or politics or septic tanks, were about problems with their children, or how to keep their husbands happy, or improve their children’s school or cook chicken or make slipcovers. Nobody argued whether women were inferior or superior to men; they were simply different. Words like ‘emancipation’ and ‘career’ sounded strange and embarrassing; no one had used them for years.<sup>6</sup>

The nameless problem was the inability for American women in the mid-twentieth century to find fulfilment in anything but the role of housewife.<sup>7</sup> Friedan rightly ventures

the problem that has no name stirring in the minds of so many American women today is not a matter of loss of femininity or too much education or the demands of domesticity. It is far more important than anyone recognises. It is the key to these other new and old problems which have been torturing women and their husbands and children, puzzling their doctors and educators for years. It may well be the key to our future as a nation and a culture. We can no longer ignore that voice within women that says: ‘I want something more than my husband and my children and my home.’<sup>8</sup>

It was a recognition that a woman (as a person) had a need to find fulfilment in another area of her life. It did not delegitimise her fulfilment in her home life; it sought to expand her happiness, which would only be reflected back into her personal life.

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<sup>5</sup> Friedan, Betty. “The Problem That Has No Name.” In Norton, Mary Beth and Alexander, Ruth, eds. Major Problems in American Women’s History. (D.C. Heath and Co.: Lexington, MA, 1996) pp. 439-442. p. 440

<sup>6</sup> Ibid, p. 440

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, pp. 441-442

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 442

The feminine mystique is easily related back to Sean French's argument, "Women can be people too," used in *Chapter 2*.<sup>9</sup> At a speech on the University of California, San Francisco campus in 1964, Friedan furthered her point that women were not living as full citizens, or as fully realised people:

Are we confined by that simple age-old destiny that depends on our sexual biology and chance, or do we actually have the freedom of choice that is open to use as women today in America?<sup>10</sup>

In retrospect, Friedan wrote in 1998,

[t]he logic was inexorable. Once we broke through that feminine mystique and *called ourselves human*—no more, no less—surely we were entitled to enjoyment of the values which were our American, democratic human rights.<sup>11</sup> (*italic emphasis added*)

Just as female abolitionists found it difficult to achieve rights as citizens after achieving it for the slaves in the South, women who participated in the South with the Student Non-Violent Conferencing Committee (SNCC) found it extremely difficult to achieve equal status with men in their respective organisations and in society in general. As will be shown later, even the men of the SDS, these radical men fighting for an equal society, were more than stubborn in helping to change the role of women in the SDS. This leads now to the context of the Movement. Who was involved and how? Why? Where did the women belong in the Movement? And how did the Weatherman faction rise to power?

## **The Movement**

When researching a new social movement, the researcher must come to understand all aspects of the movement. This chapter attempts to understand the place of women within the revolutionary group, the Weather Underground. However, what

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<sup>9</sup> French, Sean. "Partners in Crime: Defending the female of the species." In Wight, Sarah and Myers, Alice, eds. *No Angels: Women who commit violence*. (HarperCollins: London, 1996) pp. 29-43. p.43

<sup>10</sup> Friedan, "*It Changed My Life...*," op. cit., p. 78

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, p. 105

must first be analysed is the movement out of which the Weather Underground grew. The situation of women in America was established above: in the early sixties the American woman's consciousness was just beginning to be raised. What, then, was the more general context? The American movement's leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and its revolutionary dimensions must be known in order to put the women of the Weather Underground fully into context. New Social Movement theory tends to overlook the role of leaders and "the process by which individuals and groups make decisions."<sup>12</sup> Leadership must be looked at in order to realise the salience of ideology, the group identity and how the group functions. This will help the reader know where the women stood. Leaders through their personality and ideology attract members. Where these members come from and why they join is also key to establishing a basic knowledge of the female revolutionaries context.

A movement is made up of many parts—different organisations, numerous individuals and multiple media sources—which together create a network. The network serves as a "system of exchange" of information, especially ideology.<sup>13</sup> The solidarity a network forms is cemented by collective action. The strength of a movement, the solidarity, is found within the network.<sup>14</sup> Collective action also contributes to a feeling of solidarity and is often guided by the shared ideology.<sup>15</sup>

New social movements do not last forever. They eventually fragment into various small factions. One reason for fragmentation may be when the movement's ideology or identity has become mainstream or co-opted. In this case some factions

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<sup>12</sup> Hastings, Margaret Denton. "Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements," *New Zealand Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, November 1998, pp. 208-238. p. 213

<sup>13</sup> Melucci, Alberto. "An End to Social Movements? Introductory paper to the sessions on 'new social movements and change in organisational forms,'" *Social Science Information*, vol. 23, nos. 4/5, 1984, pp. 819-835. p. 829

<sup>14</sup> della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. *Social Movements: An introduction*. (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1999) p. 88

<sup>15</sup> Mueller, Carol McClurg. "Building Social Movement Theory." In Morris, Aldon and Mueller, Carol McClurg, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (Yale University Press: London, 1992) pp. 3-25. p. 16

may move towards political violence.<sup>16</sup> By 1968, the Movement and the SDS had various, violent, negative factions. These included the Black Panther Party, the Yippies, the Motherfuckers and, most importantly, the Weathermen. As the Movement grew, so did emotions and frustrations; the ideology, as expressed in protest slogans, speeches and articles in *New Left Notes*, became more intense, calling for larger, more destructive actions. The Movement was a dynamic process that overwhelmed the more peaceful, mainstream activists. As organisations involved in the Movement gained members, more radical and highly charged activists entered—people who were more willing to go that extra step in civil disobedience, disobedience which rapidly became uncivil. It was a group mindset—‘must go further,’ ‘must push harder,’ ‘must shock more’—that developed the Chicago Days of Rage, that planned dropping acid into Chicago’s water system, that eventually bombed banks on Wall Street, post offices in Massachusetts and the Pentagon.

### Historical Context

The movements of the sixties are illustrative examples of the shift from Social Movement theory to New Social Movement theory. The new movements were not the Marxist/socialist labour and union movements of the 1930s. These new movements were based upon cultural and identity issues. Touraine and Melucci see a shift from problems of an industrialised society to those of a post-industrial society. Issues were now based more within the community and upon ideological and cultural imperatives.<sup>17</sup> American students found problems in capitalism and the war in Vietnam—the symbol of America’s ‘hypocritical’ Western hegemony. While civil rights and free speech may be as far from labour unions and picket lines as possible, it does not mean these

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<sup>16</sup> Melucci, op. cit., pp. 830-831

<sup>17</sup> Touraine, op. cit., p. 5. Values were shifting from economical issues to those of “identity and personal existence.” (Melucci, Alberto. “The New Social Movements: A theoretical approach,” *Social Science Information*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pp. 199-226. p. 218)

students were void of purpose and meaning. Only, scholars of the older generation at the time dismissed the student's protests as alienation from society, a growth process everyone goes through. Once "the young man...renounc[es] his bookish dreams and ideals and com[es] to terms with reality" the hopeless protestation would end.<sup>18</sup> To Lewis Feuer, a student movement was "inspired by aims which they *tr[ie]d* to explicate in a political ideology." (italic emphasis added) It was an "emotional rebellion" against the older generation.<sup>19</sup> It is fair to say the Movement was aimed at the gerontocracy<sup>20</sup>, as a rebellion is a dialectical process. But to label these protests as "emotional rebellions" or to say the students pin their emotions on a political ideology they can only *grasp* is patronising. This interpretation of the student movements of the sixties does not attempt to understand them as people in their own right. It only serves to perpetuate the "father knows best" condescending attitude which the students fought against. Just because the students were not part of a "rational organisation" like a trade union with well-understood grievances<sup>21</sup>, it does not mean the "urges" behind the new movements were that easily dismissed. For how can one dismiss very similar movements that were occurring across the globe? They may not have come together in a way they envisioned, globalisation was not yet fully realised, but these student movements in various countries, mostly democracies, were fighting the same fight.

The 1960s in America started off as a decade of hope and idealism, it was a youthful rebellion against America's ills. It was rebellion that, by the end of the decade, left bright-eyed and innocent ideals behind. From the enthusiasm of the SDS' paper

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<sup>18</sup> Feuer, Lewis S. The Conflict of the Generations: The character and significance of student movements. (Heinemann: London, 1969) p. 33

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 11

<sup>20</sup> Gerontocracy is defined as a situation "where the older generation possesses a disproportionate amount of economic and political power and social status. Where the influences of religion, ideology and the family are especially designed to strengthen the old, there is a student movement, as an uprising of the young will be most apt to occur." (Feuer, op. cit., p. 12) See also Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisations. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1947) p. 346

<sup>21</sup> Feuer, op. cit., p. 11

*The Port Huron Statement* to the Weathermen's militancy in "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows," the decade-long Movement was comprised of two generations of activists, the Old Guard and Prairie-Power. Multiple groups of students, from the African-Americans in the South to the Northern, typically liberal, whites, came together in a rejection of their parent's indifference to America's rapidly developing imperialist attitude, the atomic bomb and Jim Crow. Students are the best candidates for protests—they have enormous amounts of energy and little to lose in the way of career and family.<sup>22</sup> All movements, as defined in the first chapter, grow out of and are bound by multiple organisations, which form the necessary network.<sup>23</sup> The Movement of the sixties is no different. It was a combination of the Civil Rights Movement and students involvement in the SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP), the Free Speech Movement, the anti-atom bomb groups like the Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) and the university based SDS.<sup>24</sup> To some, like Allen Smith, SDS has been given too much credit for its role in the radical student movement, yet it did receive most of the publicity and, for the purpose of this chapter, Weatherman was a faction of the SDS. Additionally, the SDS undeniably helped to define the New Left through *The Port Huron Statement* and inspire other groups with their projects and actions.<sup>25</sup>

In the United States, anyone who turned 18 between 1960 and 1972 is considered a part of the sixties generation.<sup>26</sup> The students that entered college at the beginning of the sixties were the first generation of the SDS and the Movement. They

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<sup>22</sup> Anderson, op. cit., pp. 39, 49 and 57

<sup>23</sup> della Porta, and Diani, op. cit., pp. 14-15

<sup>24</sup> SDS was formerly known as the Student League for Industrial Democracy (SLID). Al Haber, a student at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, instigated the name change and gave the organisation new life. It was the student arm of the League for Industrial Democracy (LID).

<sup>25</sup> Smith, Allen. "Present at the Creation and Other Myths: The Port Huron Statement and the origins of the new left," *Socialist Review*, vol. 27, nos. 1 and 2, 1999, pp. 1-27. p. 7

<sup>26</sup> Anderson, op. cit., p. 88

differ greatly in attitude from the ones who ended the decade with violence at the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention and the Chicago Days of Rage in 1969. There were only 16 million 18- to 24-year-olds in America in 1960; by 1970 there were 25 million. The baby boomers, who numbered over 70 million, started to enter college in 1963. Enrolment in the autumn of 1964 went up 37 percent. Education was readily available and more than a third of youth went to college.<sup>27</sup> By the end of the 1960s, more than half of all 18- to 21-year-olds were enrolled in university. In 1967, six million students were enrolled at 2,300 colleges and universities in the United States.<sup>28</sup> These numbers created the “generation gap”—the alienation of parents and children from each other. The generation that emerged from the chaos of the Depression and the War put an emphasis on financial and familial security, thereby creating cultural norms of staid professionalism and nuclear families. The sixties generation would introduce “free love” and communal living to mainstream America.

The students involved in the sixties movement tended to come from liberal backgrounds. In the United States, this meant a well-educated, upper-middle-class background; in other countries, as socialist and communist parties received more support from the working-class, it meant more of a blue-collar background,<sup>29</sup> although, members of the Italian Red Brigades and the West German Baader-Meinhof Gang, like the members of the SDS, were more often than not from affluent and well-educated backgrounds. Only 17 percent of the SDS members were from working-class backgrounds and 55 percent came from upper-middle-class families.<sup>30</sup> In a Harris Poll, *Relationship Between Political Opinions of Parents and Students-May 1970*, students were ten times more likely to describe themselves as “far left” (as opposed to “far right,”

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<sup>27</sup> Gitlin, Todd. *The Sixties: Years of hope, days of Rage*. (Bantam Books: New York, 1987) p. 164

<sup>28</sup> Peterson, Richard E. “The Student Left in American Higher Education.” In Altbach, Philip G., ed. *The Student Revolution*. (Lalvani Publishing House: Bombay, 1970) pp. 313-335. p. 318

<sup>29</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Rebellion in the University: A history of student activism in America*. (Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1972) p. 80

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p. 83

“conservative,” “middle of the road,” “liberal,” and “not sure”) than use that term for their fathers. Another Harris Poll, *Relationship of Family Socio-economic and Religious Background to Political Identification-May 1970*, continued to find that “the children of professionals and of white collar workers were more likely” to be in the far left than the children of manual workers.<sup>31</sup> The more affluent the upbringing, the more likely the child was to belong to the far left. While enrolled at university, students from affluent backgrounds moved to the left of their parents, more so than students from less-privileged Democratic or liberal families.<sup>32</sup> The more affluent student was more likely to study liberal arts subjects—the social sciences, humanities and natural sciences—and were “more prone to be interested in abstract rather than practical subjects” than the less politically active and more conservative student.<sup>33</sup> The parents of the students were also more likely to be highly educated themselves.<sup>34</sup> Thus it can be said, that, “Students who identified as far left tended to come from large schools in the East with average or above average admissions standards and majored in the humanities. These white students were fairly divided between the sexes, came from educated, white collar, high income families with Jewish or non-religious affinities.”<sup>35</sup> The far left students “perceiv[ed] themselves as independent from most sources of social influence and authority.”<sup>36</sup> Students may also have been expressing a newly found freedom in attending universities away from home or freed from the restrictions of boarding school. Thus they may have engaged in “various forms of ‘nonconformist’ behaviour.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, pp. 84-85

<sup>32</sup> Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Students and Politics in Comparative Perspective.” In Altbach, op. cit., pp. 29-49. p. 32

<sup>33</sup> Lipset, *Rebellion in the University...*, op. cit., p. 87

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 88

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, pp. 92-93. See also Peterson, op. cit., p. 323

<sup>36</sup> Peterson, op. cit., p. 324

<sup>37</sup> Lipset, “Students and Politics...,” op. cit., p. 35

Lipset suggests the size of the campus, the impersonal treatment of the students, or the bureaucratisation of campus-life, and the previous politicisation of the students and faculty as factors involved in campus unrest.<sup>38</sup> Campus size speaks for itself. Simply put, a protest needs a certain amount of people to be viable, thus a protest-prone school would typically involve a larger campus size. As already mentioned, the campuses at this time were overcrowded with the baby-boomer generation. The baby-boomer expansion caused enormous amounts of strain. Classes were enlarged and personal contact between the lecturer and the student decreased. Some classes were even taught via television. While universities had become independent from political and religious institutions, their research and development had become instrumental to the government. Thus, problems the students had with the government came back to haunt the academic consultants.<sup>39</sup> Universities introduced IBM cards to keep track of the student. A student became known as a number and not as a person. It was this depersonalised, factory-like environment that also heightened the tensions on campuses, leading to protests and mobilisation. The generation gap, the Vietnam war, perceived latent fascism in the government and the inspiration of the Civil Rights Movement, meant the sixties were ripe for disruption.

The university was also a hotbed of radical activity due to its own political traditions, student-administration relationships and the political orientation of the faculty. In the United States, long before the activity of the sixties, Berkeley and the University of Wisconsin, Madison, had reputations for being the “centres of radicalism.”<sup>40</sup> During McCarthyism, an unpublished study found Berkeley faculty to be “the most liberal of any of the schools sampled.”<sup>41</sup> When the Free Speech Movement erupted at Berkeley in 1964, the “vigour and effectiveness” of the movement are

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<sup>38</sup> Lipset, *Rebellion in the University...*, op. cit., p. 100

<sup>39</sup> Lipset, “Students and Politics...,” op. cit., pp. 42-43

<sup>40</sup> Lipset, *Rebellion in the University...*, op. cit., p. 97

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. 98

credited “to the prior existence of a well-organised and politically experienced group of activist students.” Throughout the demonstrations of the sixties, faculty members were known to join the students in “classroom-based efforts to end the [Vietnam] war.”<sup>42</sup>

Leadership and membership of the Movement’s Old Guard were concentrated on a handful of campuses: Ann Arbor, Berkeley, University of Texas, Austin, etc. Todd Gitlin, a member of the Ann Arbor SDS, describes the young SDS as a tightly knit “incestuous” family. From the beginning, SDS men were leaders, women were the behind-the-scenes-workers. Even though women were highly effective organisers, “the SDS Old Guard was essentially a young boys’ network.”<sup>43</sup> Women were rarely given a chance to truly display their merit: “Men sought [women] out, recruited them, took them seriously, honoured their intelligence—then subtly demoted them to girlfriend, wives, notetakers, coffeemakers.”<sup>44</sup> Who were these men and who were the women who filled the ranks as girlfriend, wife, notetaker or coffeemaker?

### Leadership

New Social Movement theory is criticised for failing to analyse individuals—“even though [they] are all integral to the identity developed.”<sup>45</sup> The leaders of the SDS established a strong guiding ideology;<sup>46</sup> but they also set the tone for group dynamics, which would eventually be partly responsible for the fragmentation of the SDS. Surprisingly, and almost hypocritically, the SDS was a sexist organisation. From 1964 onwards, the male members were criticised for sexist behaviour and for their dominating personalities. Max Weber says that there is a “relatively high probability

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 98

<sup>43</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 367

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, p. 367

<sup>45</sup> Hastings, op. cit., p. 210

<sup>46</sup> Paul Wilkinson comments, ideology “*creat[es]* and legitim[ises] aspirations and expectations.” (Wilkinson, Paul. “Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence.” In Alexander, Yonah; Carlton, David; and Wilkinson, Paul, eds. *Terrorism: Theory and practice*. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1979) pp. 45-71. p. 62)

that the actions of a definite, supposedly reliable group of persons will be primarily, oriented to the execution of the supreme authority's general policy and specific commands."<sup>47</sup> Perhaps in the case of the SDS, the implicit behaviour and attitude of the male leaders contributed to the sexist nature of the organisation overall. It was the male leaders who provided the SDS members with ideology, but it was the women who began one of the largest and most divisive debates within the SDS, that of the role of women.

The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor is described as containing the "SDS inner circle." Tom and Casey Hayden, Paul Potter and Todd Gitlin were all students there. Gitlin described the Ann Arbor group as "charged with intensity. ... [The members] were at once analytically keen and politically committed... and unabash[edly]... cared for one another." However, the family was also "an incestuous clan. ... The sexual intensity matched the political and intellectual."<sup>48</sup> The SDS was at times dominated by issues between the sexes: the sexist nature of SDS men and the use of sex as power would be Old Guard issues transferred to Prairie-Power and the Weathermen.

The undisputed leader of the SDS was Tom Hayden, who wrote the paper, *The Port Huron Statement*, which provided the SDS Old Guard with much of their ideology.<sup>49</sup> Hayden was an intense intellectual who strongly criticised the current social scientists, David Bell and Seymour Martin Lipset, for their belief in the "end of ideology."<sup>50</sup> Hayden, like the rest of the Movement, was heavily influenced by the SNCC and the events in the South. He found that "[t]he honesty, insight and leadership of rural Negroes demonstrat[ed] to the students that their upbringing has been based on a

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<sup>47</sup> Weber, op. cit., p. 324

<sup>48</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 101, 105 and 108

<sup>49</sup> *The Port Huron Statement* became the Old Guard's guiding ideology instilling within them a sense of service through the principle of 'participatory democracy.'

<sup>50</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 102

framework of lies.” The alternative was the creation of freedom schools, cooperatives and political communal houses. The idea for Economic Research and Action Projects (ERAP) houses<sup>51</sup> came from a conversation Hayden had with SNCC leader Stokely Carmichael in August of 1963. It was also Hayden who began to escalate the protests; another Ann Arbor SDSer, Paul Potter, wrote in 1965:

“Tom seems to be moving closer and closer to a position that the liberal establishment (if not all liberals) constitutes the most dangerous enemy we confront. ... We have avoided direct and personal confrontations in favour of arguments over issues and we have searched for common ground.”<sup>52</sup>

Potter himself was a high-ranking member. He was from the Midwest and was the Vice President for the National Student Association. Potter was one of the first to make a link between the students and the Cuban revolutionaries—“we...were somehow fighting the same battle.”<sup>53</sup>

In the same way the male leadership was centred around Ann Arbor, so were the women ‘leaders,’ or at least the strongest female SDS members. Sandra Casen, who became Casey Hayden, Tom’s wife, was a Texan and present at Port Huron. She went South after 1963 with the SNCC. She also organised voter registration projects through the Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) and the National Student Association.<sup>54</sup> Al Haber recruited Sharon Jeffrey as one of the first members of the Ann Arbor SDS. Jeffrey’s mother was a high-ranking organiser for United Automobile Workers. Jeffrey became a key member in Michigan and organised tutorial projects.<sup>55</sup> When the ERAP houses were fully underway, from 1964 to 1967, the women were able to reach more people than the men because “[s]peechmaking, manifesto-writing, analysing the economy or the history of liberation—...the *men’s* talents—were not

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<sup>51</sup> This will be explained under Collective Action and Group Ideology.

<sup>52</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 165-166

<sup>53</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 102

<sup>54</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 128 and 366

<sup>55</sup> Ibid, p. 366

much use over coffee at some welfare mother's kitchen table."<sup>56</sup> (italic emphasis added) Thus, when Casey Hayden and Mary King issued their memo on the position of women to the Movement at large, it was "greeted by tremors of recognition."<sup>57</sup>

The women of the SDS had experience and education; they *should* have been leaders in their own right. But they were underrepresented and subordinated. Friendships between the men and women were "common [and] intense...[b]ut in public, at the big national meetings, women had a hard time making themselves heard."<sup>58</sup> When Friedan tried to involve African-American women in the fledgling Women's Movement by making special trips to the SNCC headquarters in Atlanta, she was less than warmly received. Friedan reports,

'We don't want anything to do with that feminist bag,' one of them said. The important thing for black women, they said, was for black men to get ahead. And when the black men got the rights they had been denied for so long, they would give black women all the equality they deserved.<sup>59</sup>

At one point Friedan was told, "Women are not a civil rights issue."<sup>60</sup> When Friedan visited Cornell University in January of 1969, she was met with "the vocal opposition of the radical young men, and a suspicious—auspicious—quiet from the radical young women." One radical man told Friedan she had no right to refer to Women's Liberation as a "revolution." The only people to be concerned with were the working-class. At the Columbia University 1968 take-overs, the women were there to cook while the "men made and carried out the strategies."<sup>60</sup> The women refused to go along with this. Shortly thereafter, the women presented a Women's Liberation resolution at

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 367

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 128

<sup>58</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 367

<sup>59</sup> Friedan, "It Changed My Life"..., op. cit., p. 121. See also Wallace, Michele. . Black Macho and the Myth of the Superwoman. (Verso: London, 1990)

<sup>60</sup> Friedan, "It Changed My Life"..., op. cit., pp. 137-138

an SDS convention, only to be mocked. It was then the women decided to begin their separatist Women's Liberation groups.<sup>61</sup>

It is no wonder the women felt they had no choice but to become separatist.

Gitlin describes the attitude of the men in blunt and unflattering terms:

....A man interrupting a woman sounded normal, a woman interrupting a man violated caste. ...

Women were not the writers or speakers the men were. ...SDS male heavies were well read, well spoken, adept at circulating in a man's world.<sup>62</sup>

As socially pre-determined, men led the SDS and even though the women tried to fight this they came against a very stubborn wall of resistance. Before the ideology of the SDS will be analysed and before more about the women's eventual separation from the SDS can be written about, the membership of the SDS should be discussed. While the women contributed to the SDS break-up, a larger issue was the divide between the Old Guard and Prairie-Power.

### Membership

The SDS was only one of the many organisations belonging to the Movement. The SDS was joined by multiple organisations like CORE and SANE and influenced by the SNCC. During the Old Guard's reign, the SDS inclusion in this network<sup>63</sup> was extremely important. The network cemented ties which helped draw 15,000 to 25,000 people to the March on Washington and increase SDS membership from 575 members to almost 100,000 in less than a decade. From the network a sense of solidarity forms—people unite to fight similar causes. The participation of members in

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<sup>61</sup> See Echols, Alice. Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975. (University of Minnesota Press: Oxford, 1989)

<sup>62</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 367-368

<sup>63</sup> Melucci even defines a movement as a "network of small groups submerged in everyday life which require a personal involvement in experiencing and practising cultural innovation." (Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?..." op. cit., p. 829)

“collective endeavour[s]” is “essential” for the strengthening of the movement.<sup>64</sup> It is crucial to know where the SDS membership was drawn from and whether or not they would continue to be united by through the same issues. Understanding the shift in SDS membership from the Old Guard to Prairie-Power helps the researcher also understand the shift in ideology, from peaceful protest to violence. The change in SDS membership makes it clear why the SDS eventually fragmented and allowed violent, revolutionary factions, like the Weathermen, to rise.

In 1961, SDS had only 20 campus chapters and 575 members; by 1964, there were 27 chapters and 1,200 members.<sup>65</sup> After the students were radicalised by witnessing and participating in events in the South, there was a desire to involve others. Even though a 1963 *Life* article lauded the class of 1967 as “the best prepared, stablest and most promising class in US history” and asked the nation to “listen” to the students; university administrators were not prepared to do so. Administrations across the nation were still stuck in an ivory tower of *in loco parentis*, which fostered an attitude of authoritative condescension. The administrations determined course offerings, curriculum, speakers and intramural sports. University newspapers were censored by faculty advisors. Mandates included no drinking, smoking, drugs, gambling or sex, but demanded class attendance, dress codes, dorm assignments and, at public universities, Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC).<sup>66</sup> Thus, when students at Berkeley set-up Civil Rights Movement recruitment tables, university officials arbitrarily banned tables of this sort from the campus. On September 21<sup>st</sup>, 1964, students from all over campus protested this decision with signs not only against the administration—“Ban Political Birth Control”—but “Ban the Bomb” too. While the administration tried to combat it, by taking down names and clearing the students, more students were back the next day,

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<sup>64</sup> della Porta and Diani, *op. cit.*, p. 17

<sup>65</sup> Miller, James. *Democracy is in the Streets: From Port Huron to the siege of Chicago*. (Harvard University Press: London and Cambridge, Mass., 1994) p. 65

<sup>66</sup> Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 100

finally invading the administrative building, Sproul Hall, overnight. Even though eight students were suspended by University of California president Clark Kerr, neither dissent nor resentment decreased. On October 1<sup>st</sup>, Jack Weinburg planted his recruitment table in the forbidden space of Sproul Plaza and was promptly arrested. The police had a difficult time getting him to jail as their cruiser was blocked by students for 32 hours.<sup>67</sup> The Free Speech Movement was born and it joined the Civil Rights Movement in the politicised nature of campuses in 1960s America.<sup>68</sup>

In the summer of 1965, Steve Max articulated what would become the SDS's major problem:

Today in SDS there is no predominate theory of any permanence which guides the organisation—it rapidly becomes what its members are and its members change with events.<sup>69</sup>

The Movement would experience solidarity<sup>70</sup>, but because the SDS was growing at an ever-increasing pace, the new members were not socialised in the same manner or ideology as the Old Guard. From 1965 to 1967, SDS membership went from 125 campus chapters and 4,000 members to 227 chapters and 30,000 members.<sup>71</sup> The innocent ideology of the intellectual Port Huron crowd gave way to a cynical, less intellectual youth influenced by drugs and growing disillusionment.

The new generation was drawn in by the magnitude of the March on Washington. Many of them came from working- and middle-class families in the Midwest and the Southwest, hence the name “Prairie-Power.” As the new members were largely drawn from areas new to the SDS, Prairie-Power had little one-on-one

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<sup>67</sup> Miller, op. cit., p. 164

<sup>68</sup> Anderson, op. cit., pp. 87-89

<sup>69</sup> Miller, op. cit., p. 238

<sup>70</sup> The March on Washington in 1965 is the best example of Old Guard solidarity. It drew in 15,000-25,000 people from a range of organisations: the Committee for Non-Violent Action, Women Strike for Peace, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, the Committee on Christian Peace, Concerns of the National Student Christian Federation, Young People's Socialist League, Young Socialist Organising Committee and May 2<sup>nd</sup> Movement. (Miller, op. cit., p. 233)

<sup>71</sup> Heath, G. Louis, ed. Vandals in the Bomb Factory: The history and literature of the Students for a Democratic Society. (The Scarecrow Press, Inc.: Metuchen, NJ, 1976) pp. x-xi and 41

contact with the Old Guard.<sup>72</sup> Gitlin describes them as “instinctive anarchists, principled and practised anti-authoritarians.” In rejection of the SDS’ ideological base, Prairie-Power decided to build an action-based movement along the same issues as before, only with increased hostility to liberalism and notions of class.<sup>73</sup> Gitlin says their innocent belief in America led to their predisposition towards violent protest. He writes that Prairie-Power identified with the Vietcong as communists, as their own deviant behaviour had been labelled communist by the government and other authority figures. In spite of this, Gitlin believes that they somehow maintained an innocent belief in America’s “goodness.” Thus when the truth of America’s violence in Vietnam became known, Prairie-Power’s shock and loss of innocence led to their own violence.<sup>74</sup> This is not an adequate explanation for the violence. The Old Guard was more idealistic in their hope to change America, thus their shock should have been greater when their actions proved ineffective. The violence in this movement can be equated with the violence in radical student movements across the globe, i.e. West Germany, France and Italy, as a dialectic process. It is a problem both Alberto Melucci and Donatella della Porta and Mario Diani saw in new social movements. Second, third or fourth generations in all revolutionary groups are typically more willing to take violence and ideology further.<sup>75</sup> The more entrenched the students became, the more entrenched the new members were immediately. These new members had to make their stand and their individuality known through actions that were more intense, more committed and

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<sup>72</sup> Ross, Robert J. “Primary Groups in Social Movements: A memoir and interpretation.” In Myers, R. David, ed. Toward a History of the New Left: essays from within the movement. (Carlson Publishing Inc.: Brooklyn, New York, 1989) p. 165

<sup>73</sup> Smith, op. cit., p. 18

<sup>74</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 186

<sup>75</sup> The more intense a member’s socialisation is, the “stronger the impetus to act.” (della Porta and Diani, op. cit., pp. 61-62) Though Prairie-Power was not socialised by the Old Guard, they were socialised by the escalating events in America: the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Tet Offensive and the growing American involvement in Vietnam.

more zealous than the previous generations'. Bill Ayers, of the Prairie-Power generation and eventual Weatherman member, explains in his 2001 autobiography,

I was of a generation guided by the precept, Break as many rules as you can. The system was death; defiance and insubordination was life itself. *Go further*, we said. Shock, offend, outrage, overstep, disturb. Know no limits. Lose control. Events *cascaded* on, new limits replaced old ones, standards were reassessed.<sup>76</sup> (italic emphasis added)

Just as SNCC organisers adopted the look of farm-country Mississippi and Georgia of denim jackets, work shirts and overalls, the counter-culture, hippie look of long-hair, beards, beads, tie-dye and the smell of marijuana united those in the Movement's second generation. The horror of men with long hair and raggedy beards and women not wearing bras and walking around with unshaven underarms and legs may have started as "symbols of teenage *difference* or *deviance* [but] were fast transformed into signs of cultural *dissidence*."<sup>77 78</sup> The dissidence was everywhere. Marijuana could be smelled in the air for the first time at the 1965 SDS conference. Gitlin, an active participant of the sixties, describes the purpose of marijuana as a way "to open up a new space...; you could take refuge from the Vietnam war, from your own hope, terror, anguish."<sup>79</sup>

Success, co-optation or what was once deviant becoming the 'norm' leads to the fragmentation of a movement. This could allow for the rise in "disruptive sectarianism."<sup>80</sup> Ideology had acted as the glue which held the SDS together. *The Port Huron Statement* and its principle of participatory democracy guided the Old Guard in developing their collective action. Prairie-Power did not reject it so much as ignored it. This faltering of ideology, as will be examined in the next section, led directly to the end of the SDS. It was this shift in membership from more staid members to more zealous

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<sup>76</sup> Ayers, Bill. *Fugitive Days: A memoir*. (Beacon Press: Boston, 2001) p. 131

<sup>77</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 215

<sup>78</sup> Melucci also highlights the need of movement members to be "recognised as different" in order to create a unique identity. (Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?...", op. cit., pp. 830-831)

<sup>79</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 202

<sup>80</sup> Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?...", op. cit., pp. 830-831

members which led to the fragmentation of the SDS. It is clearly seen in the dramatic change in ideology exemplified between *The Port Huron Statement* and the Weather paper.

### Collective Action and Group Ideology

As a movement grows and gains popular support, collective identity is cemented through the network and through ideology.<sup>81</sup> A “movement produces an ideology [and] a Utopia” through which it identifies itself<sup>82</sup>; for the SDS Old Guard, *The Port Huron Statement* did just this. *The Port Huron Statement*, the defining paper of the SDS, established, for the first time in America, the differences between the Old Left and the New Left. The paper combated racial segregation, the role of America in international affairs, anti-communism and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC). Following along the same lines as President John F. Kennedy’s “Ask not what your country can do for you...,” this generation sought ways to strengthen American democracy. *The Port Huron Statement* inspired a new generation of left-wing students to years of volunteer work with the concept of a “participatory democracy.” Ideology also shapes collective action as it centres around group identity.<sup>83</sup> The SDS and *The Port Huron Statement* were a part of the golden age of Camelot—they joined Kennedy’s Peace Corps and established their own activities at home, such as the Freedom Summer of 1964, the 1964 Berkeley Free Speech Movement and the ERAP houses.

As the Old Guard shifted further left they created a break in left-wing ideology. Like Social Movement theory versus New Social Movement theory, the New Left no longer focused on capitalism versus communism. The Old Left focused on economic reasons—the class struggle and labour disputes—for mobilisation. It had a bureaucratic

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<sup>81</sup> Touraine, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, p. 98

<sup>83</sup> Melucci, Alberto. “The New Social Movements...” op. cit., pp. 219-220

national organisational framework, yet the New Left developed more of an “anti-structural attitude.”<sup>84</sup> The new generation de-emphasised economics and instead valued civil rights and liberties. The New Left is defined as “a collection of social movements based on issues of civil rights, civil liberties, community organisations, peace, women and students.” As the SDS was a university based organisation, they expected to recruit college students, not the working-class. If the Old Left strove for socialism, the New Left wanted to develop “radical consciousness,” the involvement of individuals within the democracy of America.<sup>85</sup> No more would “evil” be taken “lying down”—“this practical moralism was a good part of the movement’s appeal.”<sup>86</sup>

Reigning in the energy of their generation, 43 SDS members, along with 16 others, met at a camp on the shores of Lake Michigan in June 1962 to discuss and dissect a 50-page manuscript by Tom Hayden. The finished *Port Huron Statement* articulated a vision of the future and shaped the attitude of the first generation of activists. *The Port Huron Statement’s* beginning easily captures the paper’s theme:

We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherit.

When we were kids the United States was the wealthiest and strongest country in the world; the only one with the atom bomb, the least scarred by modern war, an initiator of the United Nations that we thought would distribute Western influence throughout the world. Freedom and equality for each individual, government of, by, and for the people—these American values we found good, principles by which we could live as men. Many of us began maturing in complacency.

As we grew, however, our comfort was penetrated by events too troubling to dismiss. . . .<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Smith, op. cit., p. 8

<sup>85</sup> Anderson, op. cit., p. 64

<sup>86</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 84. See also Flacks, Richard. “Port Huron: Twenty-five Years After,” *Socialist Review*, vol. 17, nos 3 and 4, 1987, pp. 140-147

<sup>87</sup> Hayden, Tom et al. *The Port Huron Statement*. (Students for a Democratic Society: Chicago, 1962) p. 1

The document addressed the growing differences between wealth and poverty, the naiveté of “all men are created equal.” It gave birth to the key concept of the first half of the decade: participatory democracy.<sup>88</sup> Participatory democracy called for new levels of civic involvement in order for citizens to “share in those social decisions determining the quality and direction of his life.”<sup>89</sup> It was the inspiration of participatory democracy that led to the voluntary nature of leftist activists that has lasted far beyond the idealism of the early 1960s. Yet, as an “imprecise’ term,” it led to an inability of SDS leadership to limit the organisation’s reach. SDS meant too many different things to too many different people.

Starting in 1962, SDS members travelled to the South to help the SNCC mobilise African-Americans. During 1963 the SNCC’s staff grew to 200 organisers; 930 civil rights demonstrations occurred in at least 115 cities in 11 Southern states; over 20,000 people were arrested. The SDS’s excitement blossomed out of these events.<sup>90</sup> By 1963, the SDS in the North was staging campus walk-offs, precursors to marches, to bring attention to disarmament and withdrawal from Vietnam. The members campaigned through education, leaflets and conferences.<sup>91</sup> Many members participated in the Freedom Summer of 1964, when hundreds of Northern students again travelled to the South to work again with the SNCC to educate, register African-American voters and mobilise against Southern authority. While also running Freedom Schools for African-American children, the Mississippi Summer Project registered 17,000 people, of which only 1,600 were permitted to officially vote, for the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party.<sup>92 93</sup> After the Freedom Summer, the students returned to their

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<sup>88</sup> Anderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-64

<sup>89</sup> Hayden et al., *op. cit.*, p. 6

<sup>90</sup> Gitlin, *op. cit.*, p. 129

<sup>91</sup> Heath, *op. cit.*, pp. ix-x

<sup>92</sup> Gitlin, *op. cit.*, p. 151

<sup>93</sup> There were other factors involved in the success of the Civil Rights Movement other than student protest. Credit is not solely given to the students for civil rights legislation, there were other more

campuses in the fall with their eyes open. America was not the flawless nation they were raised to believe. “Mississippi was the ignition”<sup>94</sup>—the techniques learned in the South, of sit-ins, teach-ins, picketing and boycotting were used against administrations and other institutions in the North with which the students had a problem.

SDS founded such projects as Students and Labour, University Reform and the Peace Research and Education Project. In addition to the conversation between Hayden and Carmichael, Richard Flacks presented a paper, “America and the New Era,” of which ERAP was a brainchild. Similar to the “freedom houses”—communal living of SNCC members—100 ERAP volunteers moved into inner-city ghettos to find methods of organising and politicising the residents. By 1964, ERAP had spread into low-income communities in Newark, Trenton, Boston, Baltimore, Cleveland, Chicago, Philadelphia, Chester (Pennsylvania), Louisville and Hazard (Kentucky).<sup>95</sup>

In addition to this, the Freedom Summer ended with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in Vietnam on August 2<sup>nd</sup>-4<sup>th</sup>. The attack upon two US ships escalated the Vietnam War. Although there were war protests immediately following August 1964, the first major Vietnam War protest was the March on Washington to End the War in Vietnam on April 17<sup>th</sup>, 1965 during Easter Weekend. The SDS alone sponsored it, but invited any group to join. It was one of the first times Marxist-Leninist groups were warmly welcomed. The March advocated the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam for the following three reasons:

- (a) the war hurts the Vietnamese people
- (b) the war hurts the American people
- (c) SDS is concerned about the Vietnamese and American people.<sup>96</sup>

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important factors involved, such as: Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference; the Montgomery Bus Boycotts; the Freedom rides; and the support of President John F. Kennedy and Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in federal investigations and in their encouragement of the cause.

<sup>94</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 164

<sup>95</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. ix-x

<sup>96</sup> Miller, op. cit., p. 227 and Gitlin, op. cit., p. 181

In Washington, the Movement revelled in its last glorious moment. At this event, “[t]he vision of participatory democracy crystallised in a new experience, a new sense of power, a new sentiment of solidarity.”<sup>97</sup> After I.F. Stone and Bob Moses spoke, Paul Potter, then SDS president, gave his “name the system” speech:

What kind of system is it that justifies the United States or any country seizing the destinies of the Vietnamese people and using them callously for its own purpose? What kind of system is it that disenfranchises people in the South, leaves millions upon millions of people throughout the country impoverished and excluded from the mainstream and promise of American society, that creates faceless and terrible bureaucracies and makes those the place where people spend their lives and do their work, that consistently puts material values before human values—and still persists in calling itself free....

We must name that system. ... We must name it, describe it, analyse it, understand it and change it.

Potter later remarked, “I talked about the system not because I was afraid of the term capitalism but because I wanted ambiguity....”<sup>98</sup>

Even though Potter addressed the ‘disenfranchisement’ of the African-Americans in the South, he, along with many other SDS members, failed to address or see the disenfranchisement of women most everywhere. As early as 1964, several years before the Women’s Movement began in full force, there was tension developing between the men and the women of the SDS. In 1964, Mary King and Casey Hayden, as members of the SNCC, before the expulsion of white members, and the SDS, wrote an anonymous letter of complaint about the treatment of women within the organisation. After discussion with other women about the problems in personal life and in work “as independent and creative people,” they found “recurrent ideas or themes.” They saw “parallels...between the treatment of Negroes and treatment of women in our society as a whole.” Hayden and King uncovered “a system which, at its

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<sup>97</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 233

<sup>98</sup> Gitlin, *op. cit.*, p. 184 and Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232

worst, uses and exploits women.”<sup>99</sup> The problem with the perception of this system was three-fold:

- 1) The caste system is not institutionalised by law (women have the right to vote, to sue for divorce, etc.);
- 2) Women can’t withdraw from the situation (à la nationalism) or overthrow it;
- 3) There are biological differences.<sup>100</sup>

They criticised the general population and members of the Movement for the inability to see “the sexual-caste system and if the question is raised they respond with: ‘That’s the way it’s supposed to be.’...Or with other statements which recall white segregationists confronted with integration.”<sup>101</sup> When these discussions took place,

very few men [could] respond non-defensively. [This] inability to see the whole issue as serious, as the straitjacketing of both sexes, and as societally [sic] determined often shapes our own response so that we learn to think in their terms about ourselves and to feel silly rather than trust our inner feelings.<sup>102</sup>

Women were always assigned to office tasks, ignored at meetings and undervalued:

Women had comprised the ranks and filing cabinet of the civil-rights movement, and continued to do so in the anti-war movement. For years, we had run mimeograph machines but not meetings, made coffee but not policy. ...For the white male Left, such issues as rape, abortion, sexuality, child care, and even poverty and peace, were insular and bourgeois when compared to the issues that were ‘universal’ like the draft or GI rights.<sup>103</sup>

This same type of atmosphere existed within the SDS. The men were the leaders and the women struggled to be heard. Sharon Jeffrey decided to join the Cleveland ERAP because the leader, Paul Potter, was committed to treating women as equals. She opted

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<sup>99</sup> Hayden, Casey and King, Mary. “A Kind of Memo.” In Norton and Alexander, op. cit., pp. 443-444. p. 443

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, p. 443

<sup>101</sup> Ibid, p. 443

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, p. 444

<sup>103</sup> Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism. (Washington Square Press: New York, 1989) pp. 221-222

out of joining an ERAP “dominated by strong male personalities,” like Gitlin in Chicago or Hayden in Newark.<sup>104</sup>

Potter’s words did reflect the increasing boldness that was appearing in the Vietnam protests. Before the March on Washington there were protests across the country including: 300 students marching in front of the San Francisco Post Office for a cease-fire and withdrawal in Vietnam; a seven person fast for peace in the George Washington University cafeteria; an all night teach-in by SDS members at the University of Michigan; and posters showing a napalmed scarred girl with the message: “Why are we burning, torturing, killing the people of Vietnam?...to Prevent Free Elections.”<sup>105</sup> The SDS was also becoming more radical in ideology. Immediately after the March on Washington, the desire on the part of newer members to take this shift further would make themselves known at the 1965 SDS Convention in Kewadin, a town in upper Michigan.

When the SDS gathered for the conference in June 1965, clean-shaven met beards and joints. Disorganisation reigned at the conference. People with little leadership experience were running the show and votes went uncounted, although they did manage to strike the communist-exclusion clause from the SDS constitution.<sup>106</sup> The Old Guard was preoccupied with ERAP projects and unconcerned with campus projects. They were either moving on or had already done so. With little contact between old and new, new members were not properly socialised. The result was a lack of connection between Prairie-Power and the idealism of participatory democracy. A concept that for so long had been its guiding beacon fell to the wayside as confusion settled over the SDS. The new member cliques, Progressive Labour (PL)<sup>107</sup> and Prairie-

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<sup>104</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 192

<sup>105</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 228-229

<sup>106</sup> Gitlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190 and Heath, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43

<sup>107</sup> May 2<sup>nd</sup> Movement was a front for PL, the first Marxist-Leninist group to attend an SDS conference.

Power, felt “disaffected from the ‘old leadership.’”<sup>108</sup> The Old Guard thought in the long term—discipline and organisation would yield results along the way. Gitlin wrote, “The hip-youth-drug thing...was way beyond our control, and we must have sensed that the disciplines of politics (including our own) were in danger of being overwhelmed.”<sup>109</sup> It was here that Casey Hayden and Mary King introduced their memo. During the 1965 Conference, the women met separately, closing the doors on the shocked men. The women in this session were “[t]ired of a ‘participatory democracy’ monopolised by men.” They described the SDS men as “manipulating and overbearing hypocrites.”<sup>110</sup>

Mike Klonsky, future SDS officer, belatedly wrote about this problem in 1968. This glimpse into the future helps clarify what happened within the SDS. He warned “our internal contradictions can serve to make us strong, or they can destroy us.” Klonsky saw the problem with attracting new members without properly incorporating them. Yet, he also saw hope in the members who graduated or quit school, because these lost members became workers—and “if they are to continue to function as radicals they must organise with workers.”<sup>111</sup> The working-class, which the graduates were unlikely to come into contact with, would provide the basis for Klonsky’s ideology in “Toward a Revolutionary Youth Movement.”<sup>112</sup>

When all of the national officers stepped down there was talk that leadership was no longer necessary.<sup>113</sup> One Prairie-Power presenter said, “Leaders mean organisation, organisation means hierarchy and hierarchy is undemocratic. It connotes bureaucracy and impersonality.”<sup>114</sup> Yet, the SDS kept its leadership positions and Jeff

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<sup>108</sup> Ross, op. cit., p. 165 and 171

<sup>109</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., p. 212

<sup>110</sup> Miller, op. cit., pp. 257-258

<sup>111</sup> Klonsky, Mike. “The State of SDS,” *New Left Notes*, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1968, p. 3

<sup>112</sup> Which will be looked at later.

<sup>113</sup> Miller, op. cit., p. 242

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*, p. 249

Shero, from the University of Texas, was elected vice president. As a Prairie-Power member, he suspiciously regarded Tom Hayden as a member of the structural elite at odds with the goals of the Movement.<sup>115</sup> Prairie-Power felt decentralisation was necessary to create the Movement and had little desire to create or maintain coalitions with more mainstream groups.<sup>116</sup> With the increased radicalisation came confusion. Confusion over who was going to lead the SDS and in what direction it was going to be led. The refusal to lead the anti-war movement and the insistence on being a multiple issue organisation led to a scattered sense of direction. The rise of the Women's Movement also spurred more issues and more debates.

Background issues also provided some of this lack of direction. The informal network that is so important to the functioning of a movement was falling apart. The SDS had always looked to SNCC for inspiration and connection. Unfortunately, this ended in June of 1966. Earlier in the spring, SNCC reorganised with Stokely Carmichael as their chairman. Soon after, SNCC discouraged white people from participation as it pursued a more militant "black power" nationalism.<sup>117</sup> White SNCC ex-staffers drifted into various pursuits—some became antiwar activists, some tried to organise poor whites and others became hippies in New York, Vermont and San Francisco. Abbie Hoffman is one such example. He went onto form the Yippies<sup>118</sup>, an abstract, radical and sometimes violent group. Another influence this break-up had on SDS members was the introduction of "soul sessions" to the 1965 Conference. An ex-SNCC staffer presented these encounter sessions, which would later turn into the criticism/self-criticism sessions<sup>119</sup> which the leaders of Weatherman used to "improve"

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<sup>115</sup> Miller, op. cit., p. 241

<sup>116</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 42 and Myers, op. cit., pp. 5-6

<sup>117</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 54

<sup>118</sup> The name Yippie came first, members later created the acronym: Youth International Party. "Guerrilla theatre and acts intended to outrage were the Yippie staples." (Myers, op. cit., p. 8)

<sup>119</sup> The criticism/self-criticism sessions will be discussed later under Group Dynamics.

individual members.<sup>120</sup> Another divorce, while velvet and unavoidable, also happened during this time. LID finally let the SDS go its own way. The loss of a more staid left-wing direction influenced the members of the SDS to identify with and hero-worship the National Liberation Front (NLF) of Vietnam. NLF and Ho Chi Minh banners appeared at marches in late 1967. While not specifically calling for an armed struggle at this point, both national vice president Davidson and national secretary Greg Calvert (academic year 1966-1967) found appeal in guerrilla tactics.<sup>121</sup> From 1965 until 1969, SDS delegates were sent to Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, West Germany, France and Cuba to meet with other young revolutionaries and to receive direction from members of the Vietnamese and Cuban governments.<sup>122</sup>

Other changes in 1967 included the support of draft protest. In December 1966 the SDS National Council passed a resolution, *SDS and the Draft, From Protest to Resistance*. It committed SDS money, raised from membership dues, to staff, finance and supply “unions of draft resisters.” The slogan for this campaign was “Girls Say Yes to Guys Who Say No.” Not only did the campaign only focus on issues affecting male members, but it subordinated and sexualised the role of women. The SDS targeted high schools, colleges and communities for demonstrations during pre-induction physicals and inductions and at draft boards and recruiting stations.<sup>123</sup> In contrast to this, and probably in an exhausted backlash to the success of the March on Washington, the SDS had little desire to continue to organise any Vietnam protests. Instead they maintained their stance that the SDS was a multi-issue organisation committed to such injustices as racism, poverty and campus radicalisation.<sup>124</sup> The Vietnam issue could have been an excellent way to maintain solidarity between the growing number of now

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<sup>120</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 168-169

<sup>121</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 83

<sup>122</sup> Myers, op. cit., pp. 8-9 and Smith, op. cit., pp. 14-15

<sup>123</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 55 and 62

<sup>124</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 42 and Myers, op. cit., pp. 6-7

decentralised campus chapters. Instead, national reports by Davidson told of chapters “doing [their] own thing’...composed...of anti-intellectual activists attracted by slogans, not theories.”<sup>125</sup>

The loss of the leading ideology, participatory democracy, the loss of the informal network and the loss of direction all contributed to the rise of the negative dimension within the SDS. The SDS had moved rapidly from a “political force aimed at changing the rules of the game” to a revolutionary struggle aimed at the “creation of a new world order.”<sup>126</sup> The militancy in all areas of radical activists lives—anti-war protests, draft resistance, nationalist black power and women’s liberation—was only encouraged by the events of 1968. The rapid pace of events created an atmosphere of surrealism. The events happened quickly and astonishingly. Within months of each other, Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were both assassinated. McCarthy ran a peace campaign supported by students while Johnson decided not to run for another term. Nixon was elected. Vietnam escalated with the Tet offensive, as did black nationalism with the emergence of the Black Panther Party, led by Eldridge Cleaver. Students took over countless campuses, including Columbia University. The SDS finally split due to a battle between the Weatherman faction and the PL.

### Revolutionary Dimension

The attitudes and tone had changed in the SDS. Prairie-Power radicals ruled the SDS. Now the interorganisational secretary<sup>127</sup> for academic year 1967-1968, Carl Davidson commented “the possibility for peaceful change in America has died.”<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 58

<sup>126</sup> Touraine, Alain. “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” *Social Research*, Winter 1985, pp. 749-787. pp. 753 and 755

<sup>127</sup> The positions of president and vice-president were eliminated at the June 25-30<sup>th</sup>, 1967 Ann Arbor national convention. Top offices became national secretary, national education secretary and interorganisational secretary. (Heath, op. cit., p. 79)

<sup>128</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 89

The revolutionary dimension was on the rise. One of the main organisations of the Movement was falling apart. The Old Guard was growing out of the Movement and Prairie-Power was growing into “disruptive sectarianism.”<sup>129</sup> The confusion was over, the hope for peace defeated. Davidson directed SDS leaders to tell administrations, when campus protest was ineffective, “Either give us what we’re asking for, or we’ll shut this school down.”<sup>130</sup> Which is exactly what the students and SDS organisers did at Columbia University in the spring of 1968. On April 23<sup>rd</sup>, the SDS, led by local chapter member Mark Rudd, protested Columbia’s relationship with the Institute for Defense Analysis and the University’s ‘racist’ policies in Harlem. It started with 150 students taking over three buildings for 24 hours. By the next day, the protesters were 700 to 1,000 members strong, extending beyond that of the SDS and the Students African-American Society. Administrative offices, including that of the president, were ransacked. On the sixth day, 1,000 police officers entered the campus and cleared the students out of the six occupied buildings. Written on the walls was “create two, three, many Columbias” like Che Guevara’s cry to create two, three, many Vietnams.<sup>131</sup>

New national secretary Mike Klonsky, of the Los Angeles regional office and interorganisational secretary Bernardine Dohrn were elected at the June 9<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup>, 1968 convention at Michigan State University, East Lansing. Just after being nominated, Klonsky described himself as a communist and, when asked if she was a socialist, Dohrn replied she was a “revolutionary communist.”<sup>132</sup> The SDS decided to remain decentralised while being held together by a “spider-web network of comrades with informal connections who act as a roughly-constructed cadre group.” They also proposed new strategies which included changing the “emphasis from building a radical

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<sup>129</sup> Or when factions move towards violent protest. (Melucci, “An End to Social Movements? . . .,” op. cit., pp. 830-831)

<sup>130</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 84

<sup>131</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 109-111 and 136

<sup>132</sup> Heath, op. cit., p. 117

movement to the work of ‘making’ revolution;” and to “create a revolutionary political party.”<sup>133</sup> In their own words, the SDS unwittingly established themselves as a new social movement, including the move from a peaceful movement to a revolutionary movement.

The SDS decided to join the mass anti-war demonstration sponsored by the National Mobilisation Committee to End the War in Vietnam (MOBE) scheduled to coincide with the 1968 Democratic National Convention, August 25<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup>. The hope of the SDS was to “reassert the sovereignty of the people” through covert guerrilla tactics. David Horowitz, in his retrospective article on the sixties, blames much of the student agitation in Chicago on Hayden. It is interesting to see this radical shift in Hayden: the man who wrote *The Port Huron Statement*; the man most able of all the radicals to communicate with the government and politicians; the man who held his hat in his hand and cried over Robert F. Kennedy’s casket; also goaded the crowd and put Bobby Seale, a Black Panther Party leader, on the stage. Hayden told the mass of demonstrators that “we will be saying No from the streets...many of us will not be good Germans under the new Nazis.”<sup>134</sup> Seale advised the crowd, “If a pig comes up to us and starts swinging a billy club, and you check around and you got your piece, you got to down that pig in defence of yourself. We’re gonna barbecue us some pork!”<sup>135</sup>

<sup>136</sup> Hayden also invited Abbie Hoffman’s Yippies, who “threatened” to put LSD in the Chicago water supply.<sup>137</sup> Sid Peck, a member of MOBE, felt betrayed by Hayden, who had been less than forthright with MOBE about what his goals for August 1968 were.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 114-115

<sup>134</sup> Miller, op. cit., pp. 298-299

<sup>135</sup> Horowitz, David. “Scenes from the ‘60s: One radical’s story.” *The American Enterprise*, May-June 1997, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 28-33

<sup>136</sup> This identification of police as ‘pigs’ is a “convenient device for making reprehensible activities” more respectable. (Bandura, Albert. “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement.” In Reich, Walter, ed. *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 161-191. p. 170)

<sup>137</sup> Two key players of the future Weatherman faction, Bernardine Dohrn and Mark Rudd, were in Yugoslavia and Cuba, respectively, on trips paid for by the SDS. Dohrn met with members of the

Susan Stern participated in the Chicago riots high on speed with Klonsky leading her. Stern's report of what happened during the street fighting is clouded by the drugs in her system, but she describes the mass desire to destroy capitalists' property and bring power to the people. While the protesters rampaged, the police—the “pigs”—surrounded them and started swinging their billy clubs at “heads, not windows; noses and teeth, not windshields; flesh and blood, not steel and glass.”<sup>139</sup> Even if Stern's account is dramatic, police brutality under the urging of Mayor Richard Daley<sup>140</sup> was very real. While students threw rocks and shouted “Fuck pigs, oink, oink!” the police countered with tear gas and clubs shouting, “Kill the Commies!” and “Get the bastards!” Gitlin describes the police coming down “like avenging thugs.” He records that they beat indiscriminately—sometimes for minor violations, like breaking curfew, sometimes for major violations, like antagonistic taunting and the throwing of rocks, and sometimes for nothing at all. They targeted long-hairs and slashed tyres on cars with McCarthy stickers. The police beat up reporters and guaranteed the alienation of the press. As the nation tried to watch the Democrats falling apart at their own National Convention, nominating Hubert Humphrey instead of Senator McCarthy for Presidential candidate, the media cameras were pulled away from the Amphitheatre and redirected downtown to Grant and Lincoln Parks. Scenes of police hitting and beating young adults and students were broadcast across America. For every one policeman injured, there were five students. The wounds on those policemen were mainly on the hands—offensive, not defensive, wounds.<sup>141</sup> Although the police had cleared out

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Vietnamese NLF and Rudd was shown the successes of communism in Cuba. (Collier, Peter and Horowitz, David. Destructive Generation: Second thoughts about the Sixties. (Summit Books: London, 1990), p. 74)

<sup>138</sup> Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 28-33

<sup>139</sup> Stern, Susan. With the Weathermen. (Double Day and Co.: Garden City, NY, 1975) pp. 19-24

<sup>140</sup> Who, during the riots after Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination, told the police to shoot to kill any looters, making this street protest extremely dangerous. (Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 28-33) As an aside, Mayor Daley was also on a first-name-basis with Bill Ayers' father. (Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 78)

<sup>141</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 326-327

Lincoln Park on Sunday, Monday and Tuesday, the showdown was scheduled for Wednesday.

Wednesday was the one-day the MOBE had been given an official permit to hold a rally in Grant Park, opposite the Conrad Hilton Hotel, which hosted the convention delegates. Every night the students had gathered, but Wednesday was when the true violence began.<sup>142</sup> The students were not only joined by the police they now feared, but by 600 National Guardsmen carrying M-1 rifles, carbines, ammunition and gas masks. By mid-afternoon their jeeps and tanks blocked the streets of Chicago while the rally got under way. James Miller cites that “perhaps 10,000”<sup>143</sup> protesters gathered and listened restlessly to the speakers. At some point, perhaps because someone tried to take down an American flag, the National Guard moved in on the crowd. Although rally organiser Dave Dellinger tried to keep everyone calm, the National Guard was met with the lobbing of rocks. But the agitated students were surrounded by Guardsmen on the ground and on the roofs of surrounding buildings and by helicopters circling overhead.<sup>144</sup> No matter how provoked the Chicago police may have been, press coverage shifted in favour of the students.

The 1968 riots did for this generation of SDS what the March on Washington in 1965 did for the Old Guard. The violence the students were met with served to escalate their own violence and alienate them further from mainstream society. After Chicago, tens of thousands of membership applications made their way to the Chicago SDS office. It became clear to Dohrn, John Jacobs (J.J.) and Rudd that “control of the national office meant leadership of the Movement.” Under this guise, they attended the October SDS national conference in Boulder, Colorado, to promote a “revolutionary

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<sup>142</sup> Gitlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 326-327

<sup>143</sup> Horowitz claimed that only 2,000-3,000 showed up. (Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-33)

<sup>144</sup> Miller, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-303

youth movement.” Afterwards they retreated to a cabin to plan their next course of action.<sup>145</sup>

The “revolutionary youth movement” came into its own at the national council meeting in Ann Arbor from December 26<sup>th</sup>-31<sup>st</sup>, 1968. Attendance reached 1,200 with a strong PL majority. Stern remembers the major issues at Ann Arbor were racism, the “women question” and the position of youth in the revolution.<sup>146</sup> Klonsky and Dohrn introduced “Toward a Revolutionary Youth Movement” as a proposal. This proposal became known as RYM and it served as the foundation for the Weatherman ideology. Instead of remaining focused on college and university students, the SDS would target “young workers, high school students, the Armed Forces, community colleges, trade schools, dropouts, and the unemployed” for recruitment. As Stern recalls this was the major impetus for “moving SDS from campuses and into the streets.”<sup>147</sup> Those involved in RYM envisioned themselves in the same struggle as the Vietnamese and the Black Panther Party.

Klonsky’s “Toward a Revolutionary Youth Movement,” was published by *New Left Notes* on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 1968. It is a Marxist inspired directive for the students to reach out to young members of the working-class, who would then provide a way “to bring the dynamic of the student movement to workers.” To remain only as a student movement and organisation “was no longer viable.” For “students alone” would not be able to “bring about the downfall of capitalism.” The movement needed youth in addition to students with a raised class-consciousness. Thus, to be truly revolutionary a bridge to the working-class was necessary. Involving the working-class and creating a class struggle would insure that the movement was not “reactionary.” Klonsky called it a “dialectical approach,” as youth would add “militancy” and raise the

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<sup>145</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 74-75

<sup>146</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 43

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, p. 44

class-consciousness of the working-class. Combining all of this would “guarantee that the youth movement would have the correct class perspective,” as bringing the working-class into the youth movement would make it a class movement. This struggle was now on a par with “the Vietnamese and the black liberation struggle.”<sup>148</sup>

However, before totally adopting RYM’s policies, education secretary Fred Gordon wanted the SDS to fully examine this option. He asked, “What will be the political effect of the politics of youth violence in the whole of the American political context?”<sup>149</sup> He worried that the SDS did not “have the political capital” to “make a Revolution without offending people.” Gordon was uncertain that the more mainstream SDS was prepared and willing to see every political protest turn “into a battle” of their making. His clarity and understanding of the estrangement facing the RYM was ultimately ignored.

The primary disagreements between PL and RYM were strategically and ideologically based. PL and other SDS factions, like the White Panthers, the Motherfuckers and Women’s Liberation groups<sup>150</sup>, had problems with RYM’s refusal and alienation of alliances. PL also disagreed with the importance placed on race, instead of the working-class. By now, RYM’s position was even more clarified with the publication of their paper, “You Don’t Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows.”<sup>151</sup> It took tactics and strategy to a more militant level than “Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement.”<sup>152</sup> It raised PL’s hackles and proved to be the wedge that split the SDS.

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<sup>148</sup> Klonsky, Mike. “Toward a Revolutionary Youth Movement,” *New Left Notes*, 23<sup>rd</sup> December 1968, p. 3

<sup>149</sup> Gordon, Fred. “Looking Towards Boulder: Politics of violence,” *New Left Notes*, 23<sup>rd</sup> September 1968, p. 7

<sup>150</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 57

<sup>151</sup> A line from Bob Dylan’s song “Subterranean Homesick Blues.” The Weather paper was printed in the 18<sup>th</sup> June 1969 issue of *New Left Notes*.

<sup>152</sup> Because of the proposed violent tactics of the Weathermen, Mike Klonsky prepared another paper, “RYM II,” along with other national members. Thus, Weatherman was really RYM renamed and the

The doors of the June 1969 Convention in the Chicago Coliseum opened on the 18<sup>th</sup>. For the first time, 2,000 SDS members were frisked before entering. Everyone knew there would be tension at the convention, but Stern wrote, “we never seriously thought about a split.” Yet, there were constant arguments between PL and the rest, which would end in “fierce chanting, with each side standing on benches and stamping their feet.”<sup>153</sup> Even though the RYM faction had rushed to get like-minded people signed up as national members, in the hope of outvoting PL, there was an obvious PL majority. When the Panthers asked for PL expulsion, PL countered with an attack on black nationalism and charged SDS leadership with “opportunism” for inviting the Panthers. Dohrn and Rudd finally took the stage and led RYM and RYM II out of the hall for an 18-hour recess. At midnight on the 21<sup>st</sup>, Dohrn, flanked by Stern, Robbins and Rudd and a mass of supporters, filed back in, and after shouting out, “Long live people’s war!”, read the PL out of the SDS. They then marched out of the Coliseum, fists raised, as the new SDS.<sup>154</sup>

The new leaders—national secretary Rudd; interorganisational secretary Jeff Jones; and educational secretary Ayers—endorsed “mass struggle and militant action” for the summer and fall of 1969. The climax of these demonstrations was to be on the streets of Chicago in the fall, to coincide with the trial of the Chicago 8—Rennie Davis, Dave Dellinger, Tom Hayden, Abbie Hoffman, Jerry Rubin, John Froines, Lee Weiner and Bobby Seale—charged with conspiracy for the 1968 riots. The leadership, along with the national interim committee, which included Machtinger, Klonsky and Dohrn of Chicago and Linda Evans of Detroit, seized the Chicago headquarters—inheriting the printing press, membership lists and control of the finances. The new leadership

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others became RYM II. In order to defeat PL, RYM and RYM II joined forces. When this common enemy was defeated, RYM and RYM II split. (Heath, op. cit., p. 170)

<sup>153</sup> Stern, op. cit., pp. 54 and 58

<sup>154</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 81-82; Jacobs, Ron. The Way the Wind Blew: A history of the Weather Underground. (Verso: London, 1997) pp. 24-25; and Stern, op. cit., pp. 58-59

also made members pledge an oath of loyalty to alienate members who might sympathise with PL. The oath designated that “SDS members would hereafter be expected to agree to support domestic ‘national liberation’ struggles by black and Latin ‘colonies’ (with a right of succession for such groups if they desired it) and to support the South Vietnamese communist revolutionaries.”<sup>155</sup>

It is thought that Weatherman only had the support of 4,000 SDS members out of the largest SDS membership of 100,000. In late August, Klonsky quit the national interim committee because Weatherman/ RYM and RYM II would never see eye-to-eye on how to build an armed revolution. RYM II did not agree with Weatherman’s timing or their complete dismissal of the “white working-class as hopelessly reactionary.”<sup>156</sup> The Weathermen felt efforts to reform institutions in America would only shore-up privileges of the white population. Klonsky resigned because he felt Weatherman was pursuing radical tactics too soon.<sup>157</sup>

The more intensely socialised second generation, Prairie-Power, succeeded in splitting off from the rest of the Movement. Their ideology of a Marxist revolution truly pushed the idealistic participatory democracy into the wayside. While the loss of LID and the SNCC had harmed the network, there was still one in existence. By advocating an unpopular strategy, the new SDS, the Weathermen, alienated themselves from much of the network and the larger Movement. The negative dimension was too premature for many of the Movement activists. America was still a democracy, no matter if the activists disagreed with the policies. As a democracy, it was much easier for the major political parties to co-opt the Movement’s issues. Thus, the radical Weatherman faction never really had popular support, which for revolutionary groups

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<sup>155</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 156-158

<sup>156</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 39

<sup>157</sup> Klonsky wrote an article, “Why I Quit,” in *New Left Notes*, 29<sup>th</sup> August 1969, which was followed by a response in Mark Rudd and Terry Robbins’ article, “Goodbye, Mike.” Both pieces continue the arguments between RYM II and Weatherman with no resolution, which itself illustrates why Klonsky left.

means legitimacy. It is very difficult for the middle class to mobilise the blue-collar workers as the Weathermen tried to do. They simply did not share a common cause.<sup>158</sup> Therefore, no matter how hard the Weathermen tried, their ideology had no resonance with the working-class and therefore no power. However, the Weathermen had a large number of women leaders and members. What now needs to be answered is how the women entered; what they believed in; how the women conformed (or not) to the standards of the group; and how or why they left.

## **The Women of the Weather Underground**

### Entry

When one reads H.H.A. Cooper's and Robin Morgan's accounts of the female revolutionary, the researcher would expect to find a woman devoid of intellect, controlled by her 'childish' eagerness to "ap[e] soldiers"<sup>159</sup> or a woman involved in the revolutionary organisation to be with her male partner. If a woman acts solely "for male approval and love"<sup>160</sup> then she, the female revolutionary, would not possess intelligence or an ideology. She would not have been involved in any other Movement activity or have joined the Weathermen because of her belief in its purpose. What this section will demonstrate is that the women of the Weathermen became involved in the Movement much like the people introduced under Leadership. These female revolutionaries are not that different from their Movement counterparts.

The old SDS chapters allied with RYM evolved into Weatherman collectives during the summer of 1968. The Weatherman's "bible" was Régis Debray's handbook

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<sup>158</sup> Although Huntington is referring to modernising societies, America could be viewed, in Touraine's terminology, as post-industrial, where the society may not have been modernising but the issues movements' organised around were shifting. (Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University Press: London, 1968) p. 303)

<sup>159</sup> Cooper, H.H.A. "Woman as Terrorist." In Adler, Freda and Simon, Rita James, eds. The Criminology of Deviant Women. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979) pp. 150-157. p. 153

<sup>160</sup> Morgan, op. cit., p. 205

on guerrilla warfare in Latin America, *Revolution in the Revolution?*. He defined *focos*, what Weatherman called collectives, as small autonomous groups acting clandestinely. As a whole, they made up a revolutionary army, which the Weatherman saw itself forming. The *focos* would follow a strategy set out by central leadership: the Weather Bureau, composed of those in national positions and the ones left on the national interim committee. The Weatherman collectives would educate and agitate the masses.<sup>161</sup> For the most part, the collectives operated independently. They were forced to raise their own money and were left to their own initiative in planning local actions. The Weather Bureau dictated their political position and organised collective actions, like the National Action, renamed Days of Rage, scheduled for October 8<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup>, 1969 in Chicago. Maintaining finances was the trickiest part. Some members still had trust funds and financial support from their families. One ruse was to get married, register for gifts and then return them for the cash. Other collectives sold drugs or had members with jobs or who stole.<sup>162</sup> Stern worked for a time as a stripper. The Seattle collective paid for utilities by credit card, rigged their house for unmetered electricity and never paid their telephone bill.<sup>163</sup>

It was the Columbia University take-over that brought many of the future leaders, like Rudd and ideologue J.J., of the Weathermen together. It was these leaders who helped Hayden intensify protests in Chicago in August, 1968. Others, like Bernardine Dohrn, arrived on the scene after the Columbia University take-over and immediately made waves with her fervour and demeanour. Members of the Ann Arbor SDS, Bill Ayers, son to wealthy Chicago Chairman of the Board for the massive utility Commonwealth Edison, Jim Mellen and Terry Robbins, called themselves the Jesse James Gang. The trio advocated militant tactics as an example to young people that

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<sup>161</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 34-35 and Dohrn, Bernardine. "No Class Today, No Ruling Class Tomorrow!" *New Left Notes*, 18<sup>th</sup> October 1968, pp. 1 and 3

<sup>162</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 45

<sup>163</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 95

“we *can* make a difference, we *can* hope to change the system, and also that life within the radical movement can be liberated, fulfilling and meaningful.”<sup>164</sup> Ayers had dropped out of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor several years before. After working as a Merchant Marine, he finally returned to Ann Arbor and worked at a progressive day-care centre. There he became involved in the Movement and the SDS.<sup>165</sup>

The police at the Columbia take-over arrested 712 students. The New York chapter of the National Lawyers Guild came to the defence of the students. Dohrn was among them as a recent graduate of the University of Chicago’s law school. She was raised in Whitefish Bay, Wisconsin. Her father was a credit manager of a furniture store. The family name was originally Ohrstein, which was changed while she was in high school because “people accused [her father] of ‘Jewing’ them out of their money.” Dohrn started university at Miami University of Ohio and later transferred to University of Chicago. She previously worked with Jobs or Income Now (JOIN), an SDS project in Chicago to help rural families who had relocated to the city. She also worked with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to help desegregate Northern cities. Inspired by the events at Columbia, she joined the SDS and published a variety of articles. She was known for her provocative attitude. In New York, Dohrn wore a button reading “Cunnilingus is Cool, Fellatio is Fun,” when everyone else was wearing “Stop the War” buttons. J. Edgar Hoover referred to her as “Las Pasionaria of the Lunatic Left.”<sup>166</sup> She could be cool and aloof, but was seen with tears streaming down her face when Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated.<sup>167</sup>

Susan Stern, product of a wealthy New Jersey childhood, became involved while she was doing her Master’s at the University of Washington, Seattle, School of Social Work in 1965. She was newly married and her husband, Robbie, was in law school. By

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<sup>164</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>165</sup> Ayers, *Fugitive Days...*, op. cit., pp. 42-90

<sup>166</sup> Kolbert, Elizabeth. “The Prisoner,” *The New Yorker*, 16<sup>th</sup> July 2001, pp. 44-57. p. 49

<sup>167</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 72-73

the spring of 1966, Stern had left Robbie and moved into a commune. She became increasingly alternative and involved in moratoriums and peace marches. In August of 1967, she joined the SDS. Stern became a feminist in 1968 and began to lead the Seattle SDS chapter, where women members dominated.<sup>168</sup>

Kathy Boudin was the daughter of the well-known civil rights lawyer, Leonard Boudin. Her uncle was the left-wing writer I.F. Stone. Her baby-sitter, Judith Viorst, a writer, remembers Boudin as idealistic from an early age. At school, she was “energetic, disciplined, and self-doubting.”<sup>169</sup> As a child, she remembers FBI agents visiting her home in Greenwich Village, New York City. Boudin graduated magna cum laude from Bryn Mawr in 1965. As an undergraduate, Boudin worked with the Cleveland ERAP house where

she found a new sense of purpose. ‘It was thrilling. . . . I felt like I was learning about the realities of class, of poverty. It was the discovery that there was a whole other world that I was living next to, part of, and didn’t really know about.’

After graduation, she returned there, while applying for law school. However, “I [Boudin] felt increasingly ambivalent about whether I could see myself moving toward a professional life. It seemed like it would perpetuate, in my own life, more privilege.”<sup>170</sup> After the Cleveland house fell apart, Boudin drifted while becoming more absorbed by the SDS/ Weathermen leadership. After the rioting in Chicago in 1968, she was asked to join something “secret.” Boudin “welcomed [this]. I thought because it was secret it had a sense of status to it, a higher level of commitment.” She helped plan the Days of Rage, where she was arrested. Even though she was never interested in becoming a leader in the Weathermen, she identified strongly with the Weathermen’s belief in black nationalism. Boudin felt a strong affinity for this quasi-Marxist ideology: “With black

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<sup>168</sup> Stern, op. cit., pp. 1-9

<sup>169</sup> Kolbert, op. cit., pp. 47-48

<sup>170</sup> Ibid, p. 48

people there was just an understanding that there was something fundamentally wrong with the whole system.”<sup>171</sup>

The women’s entry into the Weathermen was similar to that of the men’s. They were all involved in SDS activities—JOIN, ERAP or just as SDS members. Yet the women are made out to be different—less committed to the group and more committed to their sexuality. This simply was not true. All members were committed to Weatherman, even if perhaps,

[m]ore than ideology...it was sex and violence, and more specifically the sexiness of violence that the group contributed to the revolutionary cause. The Weatherman leadership swaggered around in sunglasses and leather, looking petulantly cool.<sup>172</sup>

Maybe their ideology was not all that original or accurate—their interpretation of Marxism may have been flawed; their revolution may have been premature, but it makes them no less committed to the ideology of the Weatherman, however.

### Ideology

The author of “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing” wrote in 1976 that

When one is dealing with a female terrorist one is usually dealing not with rational, but emotional motivation. ...[H]er violence [does not] stem...from dedication to [her] particular cause...but from blind obedience to another more personal cause.<sup>173</sup>

If one were to accept this unquestioningly, then one would expect the female revolutionary to be without her own ideology. The article was written at the very end of the Weathermen’s operational life. Were the Weatherwomen really devoid of ideology and commitment to the cause? Did they not believe in any of the Weatherman ideology? What this section seeks to prove is the women’s dedication to the

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid, p. 49

<sup>172</sup> Kolbert, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>173</sup> “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing,” *Top Security Project No. 2 Part IV—Summary and Analysis*, November 1975, pp. 242-245. p. 245

Weatherman cause. They not only followed the basic ideology but they wrote articles further articulating it and defending the Weathermen against their critics. The women were also criticised then, as now by Morgan<sup>174</sup>, for forsaking the cause of feminism.

Women were not forsaking the cause of feminism by belonging to the Weathermen and not to the Redstockings or WITCH.<sup>175</sup> They were simply fighting another struggle, not because of their 'men,' but because of, as will be shown, their individual belief in Weatherman ideology. Before the women's own ideology can be explained and before the outside criticisms of the Weathermen can be explored, the more general ideology of the Weathermen will first be illuminated.

One of the first pieces by the emerging (but not yet formed) Weathermen leaders was published in the spring of 1969. "Hot Town: Summer in the City," written by Bill Ayers and Jim Mellen, essentially supports and expands upon "Towards a Revolutionary Youth Movement."<sup>176</sup> By using SDS organisers to target the "lowest tracked kids" in high school and establishing a base in community colleges, they would "learn more about city youth and the class content of their struggle." They encouraged college students to leave campus for the summer and move to cities to work in factories, study revolutionary tactics and organise working-class communities, especially targeting the youth. Stern said her return to the Columbia SDS, which she joined after the Chicago riots, was frenzied as they tried to organise high school students—who did not appreciate "our supercilious attitude" or when "we told them they had bad

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<sup>174</sup> Morgan believes a revolutionary woman "disassociate[s] herself from her own womanhood." (Morgan, op. cit., pp. 196-198)

<sup>175</sup> The Redstockings were a "very militant," explicitly feminist radical group created by Ellen Willis and Shulamith Firestone in 1969. The name "represent[ed] a synthesis of two traditions: that of the earlier feminist theoreticians and writers who were insultingly called "Bluestockings" in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the militant political tradition of radicals—the red of revolution." WITCH was a radical group with a Yippie style of protest created by Robin Morgan. (Echols, Alice. Daring to Be Bad: Radical Feminism in America 1967-1975. (University of Minnesota Press: Oxford, 1989) pp. 139-140)

<sup>176</sup> Ayers, Bill and Mellen, Jim. "Hot Town: Summer in the City," *New Left Notes*, 4<sup>th</sup> April 1969

politics.”<sup>177</sup> Later, Stern returned to Seattle as a Weathermember, where she helped recruit high school students for the National Action in Chicago of 1969 by leafleting and chatting with the targeted students.

Additionally, Ayers and Mellen recognised the importance of the black nationalist movement. This position was also articulated in an article Dohrn wrote a year earlier for *New Left Notes*.<sup>178</sup> She outlined the history and position of the Black Panther Party and encouraged co-operation between the SDS and the Black Panthers. It would be “the best thing we [could be] doing for ourselves, as well as the struggle.” The black liberation struggle was “instrumental” in bringing a “clearer understanding of imperialism, class oppression in the US...[and] the need for armed struggle as the only road to revolution.” Dohrn wrote that the repression of the Black Panther Party was aided “by the absence of substantial material support—power—by the white movement.” She linked the two ideas—of a revolutionary youth movement and black liberation—because to mobilise the working-class was to provide the “necessary extension of the support” for the Black Panther Party. RYM fought racism, not just because of the institutionalised practice of it in the South, but because the RYM believed, like the Black Panthers, that the African-Americans were engaged in an anti-colonial struggle within America.<sup>179</sup>

The Weatherman paper was 30,000-words typewritten by J.J. but edited and added onto by the rest of the authors: Ayers, Mellen, Dohrn, Rudd, Jones, Terry Robbins, Howie Machtinger, Gerry Long, Karin Ashley and Steve Tapis.<sup>180</sup> It spoke of their advocacy of the NLF and their dislike of American imperialism. The introduction starts with some basic Marxism. They declared the main global struggle in the world was between US imperialism and various national liberation struggles. It was not just

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<sup>177</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>178</sup> Dohrn, Bernardine. “White Mother Country Radicals,” *New Left Notes*, 29<sup>th</sup> July 1968, pp. 1 and 5

<sup>179</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 126-127

<sup>180</sup> By the end of the year, Ashley and Tapis were no longer associated with Weatherman.

the people of Vietnam, Africa or Latin America who were being oppressed by the US—so were the African-Americans. The authors categorised all African-Americans into a black “colonial labour caste,” as African-Americans mainly held “poor petit bourgeoisie and farm[ing]” positions. Therefore, the black nationalist movement was a colonial struggle for “self-determination, freedom and liberation from US imperialism.” The black liberation movement was “automatically in and of itself an inseparable part of the whole revolutionary struggle against US imperialism and for international socialism.”

The strategy outlined in “You Don’t Need a Weatherman...” was one also advocated by other far-left revolutionary groups like the Red Army Faction in West Germany and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. They all planned to wear down the various national governments through intense and protracted confrontations that would also expose the government’s ‘latent fascist’ nature. The young working-class in America was important because they were seen as the most receptive to an immediate revolutionary struggle. Weatherman did set out to engage the working-class in their movement. The actions that followed during the summer of 1969 displayed the intent to reach their targets. One oddity is in their supposed emulation of Black Panther Party techniques. They mention the Panther’s community breakfast for children, which was a service for lower-income families. It was a simple action that built support and a positive image, albeit a small one, for the Panthers. Yet, Weatherman never did anything this elementary or endearing. Instead, they were known for shouting at striking workers! Weatherman was more troublesome than effective. What would eventually alienate the Weathermen from the rest of RYM was its violent rhetoric—what was termed “Custeristic.”<sup>181</sup>

The Weatherman paper barely addressed the women question. They admitted as much and that the “SDS ha[d] not dealt in any adequate way with [it].” The authors

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<sup>181</sup> Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 81-82

acknowledged their “limited understanding of the tie-up between imperialism and [women.]” They encouraged SDS women to be more responsible when it came to the “self-conscious organising of women.” In order to mobilise and attract women to the revolution, they had to “speak directly to their own oppression.” Women would never be able to fully undertake the revolutionary role “unless they break out of their women’s role.” It was important for the revolution to create a place where women could “take on new and independent roles.” What the original role of women was and what the new role could be was never defined. This inability to address the issue made the Weathermen vulnerable to criticism. They could have used the women question to radically change the systemic nature of the SDS and as a way to attract more supporters.

The Weathermen paper may not have given the women question enough attention; however, several of their female supporters did. The women question is thoroughly addressed in various articles before the Weather Underground officially addressed it in *Prairie Fire*. Cathy Wilkerson applies the same Marxist theory to women that was applied to black liberation. Reform under the current system of 1960s America would not be satisfactory, instead a “whole new set of values—socialist values—” were necessary. “Where the noose is getting tighter it is especially tight around the necks of women[.]” when unemployment and working conditions worsen, women are among the first to be hit. Women’s issues, thus, could not be “considered or dealt with separately” from “the way the major contradictions affect the whole proletariat.” Still, little was suggested for how a woman could improve her situation. The Weatherman paper passed the responsibility from the SDS organisation to the women. Wilkerson concerned herself solely with the achievement of equality through the entire revolution. But Weatherman was just as sexist as the SDS had been before them.

Ruthie Stein “pointed out” to her friend Ayers that “gender inequality was everywhere—encoded into laws, enacted in the economy and the culture, and always

apparent to her in relationships within the movement.”<sup>182</sup> Susan Stern, as an SDS member from August 1967 and a future Weather member, read The Feminine Mystique in early 1968. From there, she started developing classes for SDS women. As the Chairwoman of the General Assembly in Seattle, she insisted on Women’s Liberation as the main theme, much to the very vocal dismay of the men, as it was a waste of time. Stern won in the end.<sup>183</sup> The more radical people in SDS became, the more the women “were aware” of their limited role within the organisation. The author of an article in the *Washington Free Press*, summer 1968, pointed out that women were “discouraged from articulating political positions or taking organisational leadership.”<sup>184</sup> Many women left the SDS to join separatist organisations, but Dohrn hoped a “new strategy could be developed.”<sup>185</sup> Dohrn co-authored an article with Naomi Jaffe for *New Left Notes*, March 18<sup>th</sup>, 1968, “You Got the Look,” which articulated that liberation did

‘not demand equal jobs, but meaningful creativity for all; not a larger share of power, but the abolition of commodity tyranny; not equally reified sexual roles but an end to sexual objectification and exploitation; not equal aggressive leadership in the movement, but the initiation of a new style of non-dominating leadership.’<sup>186</sup>

Actions made by the collectives reflected the growing emphasis on a woman’s participation. Women were also a dominant force in the Detroit ‘Motor City’ collective. Nine women, who would become known as the Motor City 9, interrupted an exam at McComb Community College. They blocked the door with the teacher’s desk and spoke about the upcoming Days of Rage, imperialism and the oppression of women. Several male students attempted to leave, but the Weatherwomen stopped them with their knowledge of karate. The women did not get away in time and were arrested and

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<sup>182</sup> Ayers, *Fugitive Days...*, op. cit., p. 144

<sup>183</sup> Stern, op. cit., pp. 9 and 11-12

<sup>184</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 22

<sup>185</sup> Ibid, p. 22

<sup>186</sup> Ibid, p. 23

charged with disorderly conduct.<sup>187</sup> Another women's action happened on September 4<sup>th</sup> in Pittsburgh when 80 women ran through the halls of South Hills High School shouting "jailbreak" and asked if the students were for or against the African-American and Vietnamese revolutions. This time, after putting up a vicious fight, 26 women were arrested, charged and found guilty of disorderly conduct.<sup>188</sup> In Seattle, women, who had struggled with male chauvinism, took the lead—

The women were more interested in having an affinity group that could...attack swiftly, than in the exact mechanics of any action.<sup>189</sup>

During the Ave (the Haight-Ashbury of Seattle) Riots of mid-August, the women emerged as the street-fighting force and destroyed the university's ROTC building.<sup>190</sup>

*New Left Notes* moved from pure ideology to more explicit propaganda articles during the summer of 1969. Though these articles are more general ideological discussions on collective actions, they highlight the important role women were beginning to play. The Motor City 9 were praised in "Break on Through to the Other Side."<sup>191</sup> In the classroom, the women of the Motor City 9 "confronted [the students] with their...position in capitalist society." In order to raise people's consciousness and fight the revolution, it was necessary to use both men and women as fighters. Women were "key to the way [they did] work."

This same style of analysis is used in the article, "Women's Militia," discussing the Pittsburgh "jailbreak."<sup>192</sup> An account of the South Hills High School was written. Concerning the arrest of 26 women, they solved the problem in a following

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<sup>187</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 44-45 and Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 83

<sup>188</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 50-51 and Heath, op. cit., p. 165

<sup>189</sup> Stern, op. cit., pp. 73 and 76

<sup>190</sup> Ibid, pp. 79-80

<sup>191</sup> "Break on Through to the Other Side," *New Left Notes*, August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1969, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, ed. *The Weatherman*. (Ramparts Press: New York, 1970) pp. 152-162

<sup>192</sup> "Women's Militia," *New Left Notes*, September 12<sup>th</sup>, 1969, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., pp. 163-165

criticism/self-criticism session. During the jailbreak, women acted in affinity groups<sup>193</sup> led by a tactical leader. Like Motor City, the tactical leaders had planned the action. Yet, as revealed by the criticism/self-criticism session, the Pittsburgh collective did not use the affinity groups “to move offensively against the pigs.” In the end, the article spoke of the good that resulted from the action. The jailbreak in Pittsburgh “attacked imperialism and racism.” As it was women only,

it dealt a particularly strong blow to male chauvinism in men and women. It challenged the passive, non-political role which women are forced into, a role which only helps to maintain imperialism.

This would be continued by an all Weatherwomen action at the Days of Rage.

In Chicago, the Weatherman was “Bringing the War Home.” Ayers told members,

[w]e’re not urging anybody to bring guns to Chicago. ...But we’re also going to make it clear that when a pig gets iced that’s a good thing, and that everyone who considers himself a revolutionary should be armed, should own a gun [and] should have a gun in his home.<sup>194</sup>

Towards the end of the summer of 1969, the Weather Bureau criss-crossed the country trying to drum up all the support they could for their revenge and “the beginning of the end for the American state.” The Weather Bureau had initially predicted 10,000 recruits; by mid-summer they halved it and halved it again to 2,500. By October 8<sup>th</sup>, fewer than a thousand activists—from experienced ones that had spent years in the Movement, to working- and lower-class Chicago youth, to high school students sprinkled with counter-culture activists and undercover agents—were organised into affinity groups. They wore the motorcycle helmets, dark clothing with long sleeves, steel-toed boots and padding recommended in the leaflets passed out by the collectives during the summer.<sup>195</sup> When the Weather Bureau, dressed in camouflage, took the stage

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<sup>193</sup> Affinity groups were smaller, tactical groups which operated within the larger collective.

<sup>194</sup> Ayers, Bill. “A Strategy to Win,” reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., p. 183-195. p. 193

<sup>195</sup> *Extent of Subversion in the New Left*, Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 91<sup>st</sup> Congress, January 20<sup>th</sup>, 1970, p. 729

they acknowledged that less than 1,000 people had shown; but those who did were praised for being the only non-racists in America and for “truly” being “a vanguard.”<sup>196</sup> It was Dohrn who rallied those gathered. They surprised the police by screaming down the Loop towards the wealthy Gold Coast. The police recovered their lost ground within 20 minutes and started their counter-attack swinging clubs, spraying mace and tear gas and carrying guns. By 11:30 p.m. the random Weatherman violence had ended, doing as much damage to banks and corporate offices as to personal and private property. Between 68 and 75 participants were arrested. Twenty-one officers and dozens of Weathermembers were injured—six members had wounds from police weapons.<sup>197</sup>

In the face of 2,000 National Guardsmen gathering in the city, a “jailbreak,” much like the one in Pittsburgh, was cancelled for Friday the 11<sup>th</sup>. The action planned for Thursday was the Women’s Action, the Sister Stomp. The women decided to go through with their storming of a draft board after gathering in Grant Park. Only 70 to 80 women participated. Dohrn’s pep-talk included these encouraging statements: “a few buckshot wounds, a few pellets, means we’re doing the right thing here.” The fear the women felt then had “to be put up against the hunger, fear, death and suffering of black, brown and yellow people in this country and all over the world.” The women were stopped several blocks before the draft board by a police barricade. The women were ordered to drop their weapons of pipes and bricks. Instead, the women charged the police and fought for 20 minutes against 300 police officers. All were arrested, including Stern and Dohrn. Stern described watching Dohrn fight with the police: “I had seen her fighting with genuine rage. I had watched the women about her fighting just as hard. But she was still the high priestess.” While in jail together, Dohrn held

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<sup>196</sup> Jacobs, Ron, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56

<sup>197</sup> Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89 and Jacobs, Ron, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-57

herself aloof, her face expressing her disdain for her surroundings, while impeccably clothed in a “short black leather jacket, . . . purple blouse [and] boots—everything just so.”<sup>198</sup> Stern sat in jail for several days, while Dohrn was promptly released on bail. In total, there were 284 arrests that week, 40 on felony charges. Bail charges were more than \$1.5 million. Fifty-seven police officers were hospitalised. Damages to the city of Chicago were over \$1 million.<sup>199</sup>

During the Days of Rage, the Weather Bureau realised that something had gone seriously wrong in their planning. In a criticism/self-criticism session they determined that Weatherman’s “sectarianism, humourless franticness, their blind obedience to leadership’ and a misconception concerning the nature of adventurism” were to blame for the low turn-out. During this session, the Tupamaro solution was introduced. It was suggested that the way Weatherman confronted the police was always bound to fail and guerrilla tactics, like going underground and picking up the gun, were the road to success. The Tupamaro solution was put on the back burner for the time being.<sup>200</sup>

The yearly December SDS national conference was renamed the War Council and held in Flint, Michigan, December 26<sup>th</sup>-31<sup>st</sup>, 1969. It was the last public meeting of the Weathermen. G. Louis Heath, one of the most comprehensive chroniclers of the rise of Weatherman, recorded that some of the 400 participants were turned off by “Weatherman discussions of violence for the sake of violence.”<sup>201</sup> Stern, on the other hand, remembers being moved by

some of the most beautiful . . . speeches [she had] ever heard. [The Weather Bureau] concentrated on explanations of Weatherman’s insistence on violent revolution [and] the historic rationales behind our political theories.

Their strategy of overextension was reinforced on the first night—

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<sup>198</sup> Stern, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144 and Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89

<sup>199</sup> Jacobs, Ron, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-64

<sup>200</sup> Jacobs, Ron, *op. cit.*, p. 57

<sup>201</sup> Heath, *op. cit.*, p. 168

the notion of forcing the disintegration of society by creating strategic armed chaos to replace pig order. The threat to pig America that wherever they were, we would be, making their lives impossible to live.<sup>202</sup>

In addition to these speeches on strategy, the Weather Bureau went around praising the recent murders by Charles Manson and his followers in California. Dohrn, who ran the War Council, at one point said, “Dig it. First they killed those pigs, then they ate dinner in the same room with them, they even shoved a fork into a victim’s stomach! Wild!” Participants went around saluting by extending three fingers—the “fork salute.”<sup>203</sup> Looking back, Stern believed “the Masonite trip was born out of despair and frustration. It in no way corresponded to the quality of the rest of Weatherman politics.”<sup>204</sup>

On the second day, the Weather Bureau announced their decision to take Weatherman underground. At this point, indictments, hearings and scheduled trials, along with the prospect of needing more bail money, were catching up with the leaders. Thus creating an idealistic solution for a very realistic problem. The remaining time at the Council focused on making war and debating terrorist tactics. In small groups the Weathermembers “discussed terrorism, its roots in revolutionary history, and what would be required of us to go underground.”<sup>205</sup>

Contrition was also in the air. The Weather Bureau had already acknowledged that they had alienated many of their allies, including the Black Panthers. They felt the need to reconnect with the Movement.<sup>206</sup> One of Weatherman’s goals was to help the Black Panthers achieve national self-determination through the building of a white revolutionary movement.<sup>207</sup> The relationship with the Panthers, however, was already

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<sup>202</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 198

<sup>203</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 96

<sup>204</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 205

<sup>205</sup> Stern, op. cit., pp. 203-204

<sup>206</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 90 and Stern, op. cit., p. 202

<sup>207</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 13

too strained. The Panthers were critical of the Days of Rage. Fred Hampton of the Chicago Panthers remarked, ““The Weatherman should have spent their time organising the white working and lumpen class instead of prematurely engaging in combat with trigger-happy pigs.””<sup>208</sup>

During 1970, there were approximately 5,000 bombings across the United States. The major ones, or the ones Weatherman claimed, began with the bombing of New York City Headquarters on June 9<sup>th</sup>, 1970 after they had sent out a “Declaration of a State of War” on May 21<sup>st</sup>, 1970. The next day the Associated Press received a handwritten note signed by Weatherman taking responsibility. There were several bombings in honour of Castro’s 17 years of revolutionary activity on July 26<sup>th</sup> and July 27<sup>th</sup>. The San Francisco Presidio army base was bombed the first day and the Bank of America on Wall Street was bombed on the 27<sup>th</sup>. On September 12<sup>th</sup>, Weatherman helped Timothy Leary, LSD guru, escape from San Luis Obispo and smuggled him out of the country. The Weathermen began their fall offensive on October 8<sup>th</sup>, by blowing up the police statue in Haymarket Square, Chicago, again, to celebrate the one-year anniversary of the Days of Rage. It was co-ordinated with bombs at the criminal courthouse in Long Island City, New York and the Hall of Justice in Marin County, California.<sup>209</sup> The Women’s Brigade of Weather bombed the Center for International Affairs at Harvard on October 14<sup>th</sup> as a gesture of solidarity to Angela Davis, who had been arrested that day on charges of interstate flight and conspiracy to commit murder.<sup>210</sup> For the first time, the communiqué was signed gender neutral Weather Underground.<sup>211</sup>

The women of the Weather Underground were not entering the Harem as Morgan sees it. They joined the Movement in similar ways to other Movement members. By citing their articles, it is obvious that the Weatherwomen did believe in

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid, p. 53

<sup>209</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 194-195 and Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 118-120

<sup>210</sup> For her attempt to free the Soledad Brothers from jail in Marin County, California.

<sup>211</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 123-124

the struggle in which they chose to participate. While they did not chose to belong to the Women's Movement or the separatist women's groups, the Weatherwomen obviously found a way to be liberated through the larger revolutionary struggle. It will become obvious in the next section that the Weather Underground struggled considerably with sexism within the collectives and the organisation as a whole. However, they did attempt to address the question of women. By doing so, the awareness of a woman's role was raised, thus her participation increased.

### Group Dynamics

In the previously mentioned article, "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing," the anonymous author puts forth the idea that revolutionary women are motivated by erotomania. H.H.A. Cooper accepts this explanation as a "primary cause of female terrorism." The female terrorist is involved due to "obsessive" personal reasons, which make it difficult or unnecessary to "inquire why women become terrorists."<sup>212</sup> When this seemingly sexist attitude is reflected by radical feminist Robin Morgan's idea of the Demon Lover's Harem<sup>213</sup>, the researcher must attempt to understand these authors' approach. The Weathermen were operating at a time when sexual boundaries were breaking down. Group dynamics within the Weathermen mirrored and intensified this trend. The Weathermen advocated several tactics to create group solidarity, including criticism/ self-criticism sessions and the 'smashing of monogamy.' The latter example and the endless debate between Weatherwomen and their critics demonstrate that many group interactions revolved around the women question.

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<sup>212</sup> "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing..." op. cit., p. 245 and Cooper, op. cit., p. 154

<sup>213</sup> The Demon Lover, the male terrorist, as "the logical extension of the patriarchal hero/ martyr," is the "ultimate sexual ideal of a male-centred tradition." His Harem is filled with female "token terrorists" who participate in terrorist activities because of him. (Morgan, op. cit., pp. xvi and 27-28)

The summer before the Days of Rage, as described by Ayers and Stern in their autobiographies, illustrates the intensity and damaging group dynamics that shaped Weatherman politics and actions. Criticism/self-criticisms were group sessions within a Weatherman collective. Adopting criticism/self-criticisms, as many Marxist-Leninist groups did, the Weatherman collectives began the creation of a “group mind”<sup>214</sup> that completely dismantled a member’s sense of self and built-up the idea of Weatherman’s infallibility. The house leader led the sessions and they worked on issues such as “white-skin privilege,” smashing monogamy and strengthening the collective. This attitude of self-sacrifice for the good of the group was nothing new in the SDS. The original collectives, the ERAP houses, had very limited means and the different cities competed to see who could live off the least amount of money, like a welfare budget of 25 cents per meal.<sup>215</sup> This was not too much of a problem as sacrifice was expected of such committed radicals. Sharon Jeffrey described, from her experience in the Cleveland ERAP house, their shared attitudes: “[A]ren’t radicals martyrs? Don’t you give up everything and nail yourself to the Cross?”<sup>216</sup> When Bill Ayers was called an elitist, he could scarcely believe it. How could he, with no money, eating beans and rice every day, owning only a change of clothes, be an elitist? One can sense his retrospective realisation that elitist was accurate: “We felt righteous and, yes, superior.”<sup>217</sup> The guilt of being raised in white affluence—white skin privilege—was extremely effective. Weathermembers in 1968 later wrote an article designed to

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<sup>214</sup> Jerrold M. Post describes the creation of a group mind: “[g]iven the intensity of the need to belong, the strength of the affiliative needs, and for many members, the as-yet incomplete sense of individual identity, terrorists have a tendency to submerge their own identities into the group,” which is when the “group mind” emerges.” (Post, Jerrold M. “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces.” In Reich, op. cit., pp. 25-40. p. 33)

<sup>215</sup> Gitlin, op. cit., pp. 165-166

<sup>216</sup> Miller, op. cit., pp. 197-199

<sup>217</sup> Ayers, Fugitive Days..., op. cit., p. 110

encourage the shedding of middle-class privileges of wealth and education and it equated opportunities with weakness and futility.<sup>218</sup>

Criticism/self-criticism sessions were an important part of everyday life in Weatherman. Members of the Weather Bureau would travel to various Weather collectives across the country. Once there, they would evaluate who could lead and who needed criticism/self-criticism—“Weatherpeople tended to treat each other...as objects...whose personality had to be pillaged.” Following the line that building communism “begins with the remaking of people,” criticism/self-criticism sessions were supposed to rebuild its members.<sup>219</sup> Ayers said, in “A Strategy to Win,” “[t]here’s a lot in white Americans that we do have to fight, and beat out of them, and beat out of ourselves...in order to build a revolutionary movement.”<sup>220</sup> The sessions were an attempt by the Weather Bureau to “crush any vestiges of bourgeois ideology” for the creation of efficient, fearless and ego-less revolutionaries. The encounter sessions were described as “emotional collisions of calculating brutality meant to substitute a group identity for an individual one.”<sup>221</sup> In their propaganda piece for the Days of Rage “Bringing the War Home: Less talk, more action,” Boudin, Dohrn and Robbins wrote, “[w]e no longer organise people to participate in actions as individuals because we no longer act out of individual anger or alienation.”<sup>222</sup> Weatherman demanded the complete submission of self to group.<sup>223</sup>

Stern said the Seattle collective started their encounter sessions willingly—enthusiastic to begin throwing out “all the garbage our parents and schools taught us”

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<sup>218</sup> Wilkerson, Cathy; Spiegel, Mike and Coleman, Les. “The False Privilege,” *New Left Notes*, 7<sup>th</sup> October 1968, pp. 8-9

<sup>219</sup> Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., p. 306

<sup>220</sup> Ayers, Bill. “A Strategy to Win,” op. cit., p. 194

<sup>221</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 93-94

<sup>222</sup> Boudin, Kathy; Dohrn, Bernardine and Robbins, Terry. “Bringing the War Home: Less talk, more action,” *New Left Notes*, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 1969, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., pp. 174-181

<sup>223</sup> Bandura describes the problem of group decision making of general terrorist organisations as a practice that “enables otherwise considerate people to behave inhumanly, because no single person feels responsible for policies arrived at collectively. When everyone is responsible, no one is really responsible.” (Bandura, op. cit., p. 176)

and eager to import “the wisdom of Mao, Ho Chi Minh and Che Guevara.”<sup>224</sup> Even though the sessions became torture, “no amount of anguish was intolerable when one considered the end result: a revolutionary warrior.”<sup>225</sup> Eventually Stern compared the members during sessions to “a punching bag which has been punched so many times that it was deflated, and now thudded dully...instead of bouncing back. We had all been hit too often.”<sup>226</sup> She also attributed the around-the-clock sessions as one of the major causes of isolation from the community around them. They still leafleted and organised, but they had convinced themselves in the sessions that what they did was right, necessary and improvable. Ayers writes about the damage done in the sessions:

Criticism/self-criticisms became a regular practice in the collectives...sense of self was disappearing, and the collective assumed the stance of an eagerly policing superego.

A focus on failures, gaps, inadequacies and perceived mistakes in the works devolved rapidly into an exclusive interest in backward tendencies within ourselves, the small but grave obstacles to becoming revolutionaries.

We began to speak mostly in proverbs from Che or Ho. Soon all we heard in the collectives was an echo.<sup>227</sup>

Della Porta writes about this problem in her volume on underground organisations. Instead of focusing on recruitment, members of underground organisations “construct an ‘alternative’ reality.” They believe themselves to be strengthening ideology and identity but they are becoming vulnerable to the group mind and “the more abstract, ritualistic and inaccessible to factual argument their ideologies become.”<sup>228</sup> Likewise, the Weathermen believed that sessions such as these are conducted to strengthen

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<sup>224</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 94

<sup>225</sup> Ibid, p. 96

<sup>226</sup> Ibid, p. 208

<sup>227</sup> Ayers, *Fugitive Days...*, op. cit., pp. 154-156

<sup>228</sup> della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations*, vol. 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. *International Social Movement Research*. (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) p. 7

identity. However, as Stern pointed out in reality, the group in theory becomes isolated and more interested in their 'alternative reality' than in recruitment and truth.

Smashing monogamy began as a way to empower and liberate women. Cathy Wilkerson, in "Towards a Revolutionary Women's Militia,"<sup>229</sup> wrote in order for women to change their societal role there must be a

break down [in] existing forms of social relationships. Only by developing forms in which we can express love in non-exploitative and non-competitive ways will men and women develop their full human and revolutionary potential for struggle.

This is the basic argument for the smashing of monogamy. Freeing women from being committed to only one partner was seen as a way to free her entire person—to liberate herself body and soul. It gave them a reasonable excuse for free love as well. Ayers connected "the destruction of monogamous relationships" with the end of "male chauvinism and male supremacy, and the development of women's leadership." The resistance to smashing monogamy came from men who "[dug] the fact that they [had] control over another person." When the relationships were destroyed, women in the collectives "[began] to get strong, [began] to assert themselves, [began] to come out as leaders." The collectives were also strengthened as all "outs" were to be destroyed and monogamous relationships allowed two people to lean on each other "and not be responsible to the entire collective."<sup>230</sup> The anonymous Weatherwoman who wrote "Inside the Weather Machine" echoed Ayers assertions.<sup>231</sup> She added that monogamous relationships were "built around weakness and dependency." The women in them defined themselves "through their men" and as the only way to "feel secure and loved." However, by making members end relationships or 'participate' in free love, the Weathermen's own policies led to their alienation from outside groups

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<sup>229</sup> Wilkerson, Cathy. "Towards a Revolutionary Women's Militia," *New Left Notes*, 18<sup>th</sup> July 1969

<sup>230</sup> Ayers, "A Strategy to Win," op. cit., p. 193

<sup>231</sup> "Inside the Weather Machine," *Rat*, 6<sup>th</sup> February 1970, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., pp. 321-326

and members. The Weathermen had good intentions; they did believe these methods would strengthen the collectives. Yet, this led to defections from Weatherman.

Even though the author of “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing” found erotomania to be a perfectly acceptable reason for a woman’s involvement in revolutionary organisations and Cooper accepts this reason, this is more of a reflection on the atmosphere present within Weatherman in general, not necessarily only true of the women. The sixties social revolution had much to do with sex and this is evident in Weatherman politics. Sex represented a way to break down old cultural norms, a main objective of the Weathermen. Ayers explains,

We found ourselves there, on the sexual front—as in the political and cultural and social wars—tireless freedom fighters. ... We...embraced a subversive sexual style, and resisted civic instruction in sexual propriety.<sup>232</sup>

The male leaders, like Ayers, J.J. and Rudd, were used to moving about the country meeting the different collectives. Stern said many of the SDS regional and national male representatives “would drop into small-town USA with their grinning good looks.” According to Stern, “There was a quality about [Ayers] that I couldn’t stand. It was almost as though he *expected* every woman in the world to want to fuck him.” Stern resisted because she “couldn’t stand the thought of being just another piece of ass to SDS men.”<sup>233</sup> Robin Morgan found “the New Left [to be] terminally diseased with sexism.”<sup>234</sup> A woman told Ayers at the time, “free love only meant that movement men could screw any woman they could get, free of emotional encumbrances.” Sex in the Movement was fraught with “emotional dishonesty...and sexual exploitation.”<sup>235</sup> It was the men who were being criticised for their sexual behaviour. Then why did H.H.A. Cooper only discuss female terrorists as the ones inspired by erotomania? He was

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<sup>232</sup> Ayers, *Fugitive Days...*, op. cit., p. 105

<sup>233</sup> Stern, op. cit., p. 70

<sup>234</sup> Morgan, op. cit., p. 219

<sup>235</sup> Ayers, *Fugitive Days...*, op. cit., p. 105

writing just after the height of Weatherman actions and the Weatherwomen did use sex as power. *However*, sex was not their driving force *and* the women used sex because the men did. The women did not do this as an explicit strategy but as an implicit, sub-conscious as it were, reaction to the systemic sexism. Dohrn is described as having dressed sexily—mini-skirts and high boots. The button she wore, as described earlier, refers to her provocative attitude. Dohrn was not alone in this; Stern discusses the kick she would get from acting sexy. Thus, everyone, man and woman, acted in a sexually provocative manner. To only point at the women is sexist and demonstrates a fear of women who do not know ‘their place.’

However, the sexism which did exist within Weathermen alienated it from the fledgling Women’s Movement. Robin Morgan’s article “Goodbye to All That”<sup>236</sup> in *Rat* heavily criticised Weatherman: “Weather Sisters...reject their own radical feminism for that last desperate grab at male approval.” Weatherwomen subjugated themselves with their “machismo” style and violence by “believing that this is the way for a woman to make her revolution.” Thus, she said, “Goodbye to the illusion of strength when you run hand in hand with your oppressors.” Morgan’s early argument illustrates where her future view of women revolutionaries developed.

The Bread and Roses collective, a Women’s Liberation group, wrote a criticism of Weatherman, “Weatherman Politics and the Women’s Movement.”<sup>237</sup> For the most part, they admitted to agreeing with Weatherman politics and ideas. However, they did not agree that terrorist tactics were capable of producing “*conditions* that would end imperialism internationally.” They also agreed with the Panthers that “the Weatherman timetable for revolution is off.” They made the point that the Movement was shrinking and the continuation of Weatherman politics as it was, would further polarise the

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<sup>236</sup> Jacobs, Harold, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-305

<sup>237</sup> Bread and Roses, “Weathermen Politics and the Women’s Movement,” *Women*, Winter 1970 reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-336

country and give an excuse for the “fascist” government to “turn people to the right.” Bread and Roses also disagreed with the notion of white-skin privilege, as there were poor white people in America who also needed help and encouragement.

Bread and Roses’ main criticism of Weatherman was the women question. They felt Weatherwomen were doubly oppressed: not only were “they told that their oppression...[was] less important ...than the oppression of blacks or Vietnamese” but that they “must struggle in terms defined by men.” A woman in Weatherman became a good revolutionary only when she was “a tougher, better fighter than the men.” Kathy McAfee and Myrna Wood’s *Leviathan* article’s main critique stemmed from the subordination of the women question to the primary struggle of anti-racism.<sup>238</sup> The organisation continued to be male dominated even though they were theoretically against male supremacy. They argue that a woman’s acceptance in the Movement at large still depended “on her attractiveness, and men do not find women attractive when they are strong-minded and argue like men.”

The leaflet “Honky Tonk Women”<sup>239</sup> was passed around during the Days of Rage as an attack on Women’s Liberation separatist groups. For “our sad...fiery-eyed sisters” who think they “can do it alone, do not see that a separatist movement is doomed to failure.” Separatist women’s groups formed only out of fear of men. Those women “accepted the chauvinism of men as unchangeable” and were thus defeated by their “inability to be transformed into Communists.” Liberation, as women and as individuals, could only happen when a woman was a part of a fighting force. Their responsibility as individuals was “to build a Communist movement.” Small reforms, like day-care and equal pay, were not victories. The real oppression came from “pig Amerika,” thus the only way to be free was to fight the system. The article, “Inside the

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<sup>238</sup> McAfee, Kathy and Wood, Myrna. “What is the Revolutionary Potential of Women’s Liberation?” *Leviathan*, June 1969, pp. 1-15.

<sup>239</sup> Weathermen, “Honky Tonk Women,” October 1969, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., pp. 313-320

Weather Machine,” saw the struggle against chauvinism happening simultaneously as the struggle for liberation—“[w]omen must pick up the gun and kill the pig. Our liberation depends on this...” Lorraine Rosal’s article “Who Do They Think Could Bury You?” in the August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 1969 *New Left Notes*<sup>240</sup> highlighted results of criticism/self-criticism sessions in the Columbus, Ohio collective. Her collective focused on women’s actions. Through these actions “we ourselves have felt more liberated and have begun to build a women’s army within our own movement. We have rejected our...bourgeois roles.” They found “dignity” fighting as women “not just for own liberation, but for the liberation of all the people.” Weatherwomen also initiated women’s actions in Columbus, Philadelphia and Seattle. This did not end the outside criticism, however.

When Robin Morgan wrote The Demon Lover in 1989, she reflected on her near miss with the Weathermen. Morgan even felt women were seen in leadership positions as figure-heads, as ways to ward off feminist criticisms. Morgan remarks on Dohrn’s changing beliefs; in 1977, Dohrn publicly declared: “For seven years, I have upheld a politics which is male supremacist.”<sup>241</sup> From other material, it would appear that women did truly lead collectives and Dohrn was a national leader, if not *the* leader. This does not mean, however, that they were not leading a sexist organisation. Stern, Morgan and Dohrn have stated or given accounts of the sexist nature of the Weather Underground. Even Ayers acknowledged this problem and gave testimony to it. Morgan feels Weather Underground fell apart, in some degree, because of the Women’s Movement, which “has changed demography, the labour force and the structure of the family itself in ways more radical than the Left ever dreamed and the Right ever feared.”

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<sup>240</sup> Rosal, Lorraine. “Who Do They Think Could Bury You?” *New Left Notes*, 23<sup>rd</sup> August, 1969, reprinted in Jacobs, Harold, op. cit., pp. 147-151

<sup>241</sup> Morgan, op. cit., pp. 232 and 235

This failure to see the full power of the Women's Movement is "what really went wrong with home-grown terrorism or where the authentic political energy went."<sup>242</sup>

Regardless if Morgan is right or wrong, Weather Underground was an organisation without true respect for and knowledge of how to deal with their female members. The Weatherman paper had the opportunity to fully address the problem, before the major criticisms began. Yet, instead of addressing the problem and trying to solve it, they cowardly declared they did not know how to deal with them.

Subsequently, articles written, in defence of a Weatherwoman's participation in the Weather Underground on how to organise and how to fight internationally, for women were too late. The damage was already done. Regardless of whether women and men were equal, they were not perceived to be from the outside. Instead, this perception of inequality and sexism joined that of premature revolutionaries who used violence for the sake of violence. By becoming so convinced they were in the right, the Weathermen were incapable of hearing any truth in the criticism levelled at them.

This then presents itself as the major problem with the Weather Underground. Their group dynamics were dominated by the groupmind due to the power of their ideology and the criticism/ self-criticism sessions. The ideology of all members was so intensely felt and lived, it was difficult for members to maintain ties with the rapidly dissolving Movement. The Weather Underground's support base declined rapidly—their ideology was unpopular but their internal dynamics, especially the aspect of sexuality, further alienated the Weather Underground from the rest of the Movement.

### Exit

Unlike the other groups under study in this thesis, the Weather Underground lasted less than a decade. Ninety percent of all terrorist organisations last less than one

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<sup>242</sup> Ibid, p. 241

year. Half of those that survive do not do so for longer than a decade.<sup>243</sup> Left-wing organisations' visions of the future, as is the case with the Weather Underground, "com[e] across as so vague and idyllic as to appear almost completely divorced from reality." Often, the future "was too...abstract a concept to comprehend." Because knowledge of the future was less than coherent, it was much harder to continue to motivate people with this image. Just because the Weather Underground did predictably fall apart within the first decade of their existence, it does not mean the members did not continue to struggle. If women were just involved for a sexual thrill, they would keep moving from titillating lifestyle to titillating lifestyle. Instead, the women (and men) of the Weather Underground continue to advocate for change in American society.

In the aftermath of the Days of Rage and the War Council, Weatherman membership dropped below 300. Radicals involved in other groups, like RYM II, Black Panthers and Young Patriots, felt the Weather Bureau's strategy would either "wipe out' revolutionaries or win them long terms in jail."<sup>244</sup> Rudd gave speeches across the country, but he was vague about what the revolution would bring. The emphasis was placed on defeating the current system and all the 'pigs' in it—which now included anyone involved in the Establishment. Results of the revolution would "vary in different countries," only after the defeat of the military would the "outlines of a new society...become clear."<sup>245</sup>

The beginning of 1970 saw the Weather Bureau meeting in various cities throughout the mid-west, where they deliberated kidnapping wealthy "ruling-class victims." There was excitement in the air as they were finally getting "*it on*" and

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<sup>243</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. (Indigo Press: London, 1998) p. 170

<sup>244</sup> Heath, op. cit., pp. 183-184

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid*, p. 184

“perhaps they were even going to die.”<sup>246</sup> Over the weekend of February 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup>, 1970, the Weather Bureau quietly cleared out the old SDS offices in downtown Chicago. During this time, the entire Weather Bureau disappeared from public view. Dohrn, Jones, J.J. and Robbins emerged as the upper-tier of leaders and met with the collectives to “consolidate.” This meant getting rid of members unable to carry out the revolution. Weatherman collectives were pared down to three to five members. The Central Committee (the Weather Bureau) were assigned to Berkeley, Chicago, Detroit and New York. The collectives used false identification and communicated through sympathisers, mainly members who decided to stay above ground.<sup>247</sup>

J.J. and Robbins, as the “logical ones,” set-up a collective in Greenwich Village, New York City, in a townhouse owned by James Platt Wilkerson, media magnate and father of Cathy. The mission of “the Fork,” as the collective was known in homage to Manson, was “to bring military action against the enemy.” Ted Gold, Boudin and Diana Oughton were also members. In late February, Robbins firebombed the home of Justice Murtagh, who was presiding over the trial of the Panther 21 case.<sup>248 249</sup>

On March 6<sup>th</sup>, 1970, Weatherman suffered its first, devastating tragedy by their own hands. While building a bomb planned for a Fort Dix, New Jersey army dance, Robbins, with Oughton’s help, accidentally crossed two wires. Gold, in the doorway of the basement, was crushed by a beam. Oughton, daughter of a small-town banker and state senator and one-time girlfriend to Ayers, could only be identified by two of her fingers found in the rubble. Robbins was finally identified a month later by a Weatherman communiqué admitting he was also in the townhouse. Wilkerson and

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<sup>246</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 97

<sup>247</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 97-98, Heath, op. cit., p. 192 and Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 93-94

<sup>248</sup> Members of the New York City Black Panthers were charged with conspiring to bomb police stations, Macy’s, the Bronx Botanical Gardens and various government buildings around the city. (Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 95)

<sup>249</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 98-99

Boudin fled.<sup>250</sup> Authorities found dynamite, blasting caps, timing mechanisms and home-made fragmentation bombs, all of which were intended for, as Dohrn described, a “large-scale, almost random bombing offensive.”<sup>251</sup>

Humbled, other Weather Bureau members journeyed to California to join Dohrn and Jones. There was a gathering in late April attended by Dohrn, Jones, J.J., Ayers, Machtiger, Wilkerson and Boudin. Blame was placed on J.J. for the explosion as he had shared East Coast leadership with Robbins. It became a destructive criticism/self-criticism in which J.J. tried to fight back, finding support in Wilkerson and Boudin for only a short time. Rudd explains, “J.J. had no advocates. ... They just chewed him up. ... Finally, J.J. was told he had to leave the organisation.” After Rudd tried to stick up for him, Rudd was demoted and sent to the San Francisco collective to pull himself together.<sup>252</sup> Rudd eventually left Weatherman.

In December 1970, they released a paper, “New Morning—Changing Weather,” which dealt with the townhouse bombing. Seemingly, their grief

‘destroyed our belief that armed struggle is the only real revolutionary struggle.... This tendency to consider only bombings or picking up the gun as revolutionary, with the glorification of the heavier the better, we’ve called the military error.’<sup>253</sup>

Hypocritically, they bombed again. The Weather Underground’s most destructive bombs happened in the spring of 1971. In reaction to the invasion of Laos, Dohrn and Boudin planted a bomb in the women’s bathroom at the US Capitol on March 1<sup>st</sup>. There was another bomb placed in the women’s bathroom of the Pentagon on May 19<sup>th</sup> (Ho Chi Minh’s birthday), in protest to the mining of Haiphong Harbour. It destroyed the plumbing, thus flooding the first floor and shutting down a computer that was a part of a global military communications network. It also ruined a computer tape

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<sup>250</sup> Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 100

<sup>251</sup> Jacobs, Ron, *op. cit.*, p. 98

<sup>252</sup> Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103

<sup>253</sup> Collier and Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 106

archive holding highly classified information.<sup>254</sup> In late August they bombed California prison offices in San Francisco; followed by the September bombing of the New York Commissioner of Corrections Offices in Albany; and ended with the bombing of Vietnam War architect McGeorge Bundy's MIT offices in October.

As the Weathermembers risked life underground, they realised they would have to change some of their more radical lifestyle decisions. To remain anonymous, they adopted "the bourgeois respectability and monogamy" they so despised. They were constantly learning and developing new ways to obtain fake i.d.s and passports. There were several times they came close to arrest. Ayer's brother Rick says "They lived off...moneyed friends who told them...what courageous revolutionaries they were...."<sup>255</sup> In 1972, Jane Alpert, a fugitive after bombing the Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan and General Motor buildings and Federal Plaza in New York, met with Dohrn and others in San Francisco. Alpert was amazed at how "laid-back" the attitudes were towards disguises and anonymity. They discussed feminism and politics—Weathermembers were supporting anti-war McGovern. Alpert noted upon leaving that "[n]othing was more important to them than staying together."<sup>256</sup> In January 1973, the cease-fire between America and Vietnam was signed. By 1974, about 50 members were still involved, who infrequently took part in some sort of action. The collectives were located in the San Francisco area and the northeast. Boudin, at least, was living in Boston when Alpert met with Dohrn.

In 1974, Weather Underground published its first ideological paper since "New Morning—Changing Weather." Later they published *Prairie Fire*, 188-pages written by Dohrn, Ayers and Celia Sojourn (a pseudonym for several individuals). It was a collection of essays on revolution, racism, imperialism and Vietnam. It included a

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<sup>254</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 103-106 and Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 142

<sup>255</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 107-109

<sup>256</sup> Alpert, Jane. *Growing Up Underground*. (William Morrow and Company, Inc.: New York, 1981) pp. 221-224 and 326-328

history of the American Left, which suggested “they were the logical heirs of all its traditions.”<sup>257</sup> Weather Underground continued to encourage the anti-imperialist movement to follow their revolutionary path. They backtracked on their claim to an immediate revolution, as a revolution in America would be “complicated and protracted.” They acknowledged their blindness in only believing in clandestine *focos*, instead they developed a new strategy that included both mass and clandestine organisations. In contrast to “You Don’t Need a Weatherman...,” *Prairie Fire* addressed the women question—“imperialism, by definition, necessitates the subjugation of women.” The enemy was not men, but the system, “which manipulated both sexism and racism to its own ends.” To simply reform the system, with birth-control, day-care and higher wages, does nothing.<sup>258</sup> In January 1975, government offices in Washington, D.C. and Oakland, California were bombed along with the bombing of the Agency for International Development in Washington. In June, the Banco de Ponce in New York was bombed. Weather Underground also hit Kennecott Corporation headquarters in Salt Lake City in October.

In 1975, Weather Underground began to build an above-ground support network: Prairie Fire Organising Committee (PFOC). It was led by Jennifer Dohrn, Bernardine’s sister, Annie Stein and Clayton van Lydegraf, an ex-Communist Party member, who, as an older man, provided ideological ‘guidance.’ The PFOC was a Communist-front organisation with chapters in San Francisco, Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle and Chicago. It called a conference, Hard Times, to bring all the movement activists together, in support, hopefully, of *Prairie Fire*. It failed since the Weather Bureau was not there to defend their ideas. During this time, van Lydegraf, who had been a member since 1969, went underground. In the spring of 1976,

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<sup>257</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., p. 112

<sup>258</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 160-166

Weather Underground split into the Central and Revolutionary Committees over race, gender and organisational issues. Van Lydegraf led the Revolutionary Committee and pitted it against the Central Committee of Ayers, Jones, Dohrn and Boudin. The Central Committee was brought into a criticism/self-criticism led by van Lydegraf, who essentially expelled them from Weather Underground in late December of 1976.<sup>259</sup>

In September 1977, the Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) continued to work in minute ways as a second generation. Five WUO members were arrested in November. After leaving the group and moving to Santa Fe in the early 1970s, Mark Rudd surrendered in New York in September of 1977. In 1980, Cathy Wilkerson came above ground, also in New York. Following her, Dohrn and Ayers, who had been together as a couple since the early 1970s, surfaced in New York, where she had been a waitress and Ayers had worked in a pre-school. They had two sons and were living as Lou Douglas and Anthony Lee in Manhattan. When they surfaced, they refused to apologise for their past. Dohrn still believed “in the necessity of underground work.”<sup>260</sup> Dohrn flew to Chicago to face her remaining charges, as the ones against Ayers had already been dropped.<sup>261</sup> She received three years probation and a \$1,500 fine. During her sentencing, the judge scolded Dohrn, “We have a system for change that does not involve violence.” She retorted that they “had differing views on America.”<sup>262</sup> At a press conference, she stated, “I regret not at all our efforts to side

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<sup>259</sup> Collier and Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 111-115 and Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., pp. 170-171

<sup>260</sup> “Dohrn Again,” *The New Republic*, vol. 193, 14<sup>th</sup> October 1985, pp. 4-5

<sup>261</sup> A Justice Department investigation into Weatherman activities resulted in the indictment on July 23<sup>rd</sup> 1970 of 13 Weathermembers—Rudd, Ayers, Dohrn, Boudin, Evans, Wilkerson, Dianne Donghi, Russell Neufield, Jane Spielman, Ronald Fliegelman, Larry Grathwohl (a police informant), Naomi Jaffe and Robert Burlingham—on charges of conspiracy to bomb and kill. Several years later, these indictments were dropped because of illegal FBI and police procedures. The first five in the list above were also indicted by the Federal Grand Jury in Chicago on April 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1970 along with Jones, Judy Clark, Robbins, J.J., Machtinger, Michael Speigal and Lawrence Weiss on charges of conspiring to cross state lines to incite a riot, stemming from the Days of Rage. (Heath, op. cit., p. 199 and *Weatherman*, Committee of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 94<sup>th</sup> Congress, First Session, January 1975, p. 131)

<sup>262</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 184

with the forces of liberation. ...The nature of the system has not changed.”<sup>263</sup>

However, she did eventually say this in an interview:

I wish I could take back some of the things I said and some of the things I did. ...But in the bigger picture, I don't feel that it was violent and terrible. I feel like it was *primarily*—obviously not completely—moral, based on a vision that the government should be better, and that people could be better, and that democracy should be real.<sup>264</sup>

In 1981, Dohrn and Ayers were married. Dohrn is now a law professor and director of the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University's School of Law. Ayers teaches history at the University of Illinois, Chicago. Susan Stern was forced out of the Weather Underground and went on trial in Seattle with another group before she died of a drug overdose in a Jacuzzi in the early 1970s.<sup>265</sup> Jeff Jones was arrested in October 1981 in New York.

The last major action by people affiliated with Weather Underground also occurred that month: the Black Liberation Army (BLA)<sup>266</sup> attempted to rob a Brinks armoured truck in Nyack, New York. Two police officers were killed and Kathy Boudin was arrested at the scene.<sup>267</sup> Boudin is still in prison in upstate New York. Dohrn and Ayers have raised her son, now at Yale University, with their own boys. Boudin has had a very successful career from the inside. She earned a Master's in Adult Education. Boudin co-wrote a book for inmates with children in foster care. She designed an AIDS support program which is now a model for prisoners nationwide. Boudin has been published in *Harvard Educational Review* and the *Journal of Correctional Education*. Additionally, her poetry won a PEN award.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> Minter, Richard. "Weatherman Leader Heads ABA Panel," *Insight on the News*, vol. 11, no. 32, 21<sup>st</sup> August 1995, pp. 23-24

<sup>264</sup> Coughlin, Ellen K. "From Radical Fugitive to Children's Advocate," *The Chronicle for Higher Education*, 14<sup>th</sup> July 1993, p. A5

<sup>265</sup> Morgan, op. cit., p. 236

<sup>266</sup> The BLA was a splinter of the Black Panther Party. (Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 28-33)

<sup>267</sup> Jacobs, Ron, op. cit., p. 185

<sup>268</sup> Kolbert, op. cit., pp. 46 and 52

While the Weather Underground did not last as long as the West German RAF, Fateh or the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the core members continued to struggle. They, Ayers, Dohrn, Boudin, specifically, may no longer be underground or free, but they continue to advocate change in the American 'system.' If the women had joined the organisation to be with their lovers, then their commitment to their chosen cause would not have lasted 35 years. Instead one would have seen these women leave the revolutionary cause once it became trying. Instead, the women risked prison, the loss of children and the loss of professional credibility for their belief in the revolution.

### **Conclusion**

Often much is made of the sexual appeal of women involved in the Weather Underground. Weather Underground politics and ideology are dismissed via the misplaced emphasis on sexualised violence and the women have seemed to bear this burden more than the men. It is the woman's politics, involvement and ideology which is dismissed due to the sexual fog which seems to envelope all of the Weather Underground. It is because of this emphasis on the sexual nature of this underground organisation that the social and historical context of the Weather Underground must be established.

The Weatherwomen were not simply involved in the organisation due to some underlying problem with their fathers, due to a nervous condition or to follow their men into the organisation. They did not do this to impress someone and make this someone 'want' them. The Weatherwomen were, or perceived themselves to be, equal partners with the men in their revolution, no matter how unsuccessful it was. The problem the Weatherwomen have faced is the desire, implicit or explicit, on the part of those who have studied them to decontextualise their involvement. It was not just the women who were sexualised, even though they are the ones primarily accused of this.

While descriptions of Dohrn include her appearance and her provocative demeanour, her future husband or other male members of the Weather Underground were not so described. It was only the women, Stern and Morgan, who, in their autobiographies and reflections, mention the sexual behaviour of the men, and not the researchers. Removing Dohrn from the actions and demeanour of the rest of the group distorts her own actions and involvement. This should not happen; one cannot fully understand an individual without looking at the society and culture which have shaped this individual. This is why the use of New Social Movement theory is so important. It is why the leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology of the overarching movement were all studied—in order to put the entry, personal ideology and group dynamics of the specific women into this larger and more appropriate context. By comparing the entry of general movement members into the Movement and the Weather Underground, the entry of the women, like Dohrn, Stearn and Boudin, does not seem that unusual. Comparing their revolutionary ideology with that of the Old Guard and the Prairie-Power helps the researcher understand where and how the revolutionary dimension grew. Understanding how leadership and membership shaped the politics and dynamics of the SDS and how this in turn shaped group dynamics of the Weather Underground, allows the researcher to grasp not just how much of the Movement and Weather Underground politics were shaped by both the emerging revolutionary ideology of the Prairie-Power but also that of the women question.

In the early sixties, the students were facing two issues. One was the growing awareness of the inequality of race in America, which launched the Northern white students' rebellion against university officials for a more relaxed campus atmosphere. In their newly formulated ideology of participatory democracy the SDS became a centre of activity for many issues: free speech, the Vietnam War, poverty, etc. As the Movement grew, as the network enlarged and as a new generation entered the SDS

halfway through the decade, the SDS was under strain. Vietnam was escalating and the Civil Rights Movement was becoming more militant. The new SDS generation, Prairie-Power, intensified the protests, the ideology and the actions.

As will be established in the following historical narratives on the RAF and the Palestinian Resistance Movement, women in all three had to carve their own path for struggling in the face of their unique social and historical contexts. Therefore, the second problem facing the students was that which Friedan describes as the one 'that has no name.' Friedan helped uncover the dissatisfaction many women felt in their lives. But the SDS was led by dynamic, intense and intelligent men; men who unfortunately recognised too late that the women members of the SDS also felt the dissatisfaction of this nameless problem. Women who found no support for women's liberation within the SDS left to form their own separatist groups. But there were women who remained to struggle within the larger context.

What of the accusation of sexism? It was quite valid. By tracing the leadership and membership of the SDS, one can see how sexism was systemic within the SDS. Leadership traits were well developed within the men; the women were often left to cook, make coffee, prepare letters and make copies. When women tried to speak out in meetings, they were often ignored or dismissed. The relationships were 'incestuous,' intense and often sexual in nature. The SDS embraced the Sexual Revolution and pushed the sexual boundaries of America. Instead of creating equality, however, this new sexual freedom did not end the sexism. The Weather Underground also adopted this style of leadership.

However, as more women began to take charge within the Weather Underground and as the organisation came under more criticism, the Weather Underground tried to enact policies and requirements which would liberate the women. After the Pittsburgh 'jailbreak,' the collective believed they had truly challenged the

chauvinism of both men *and* women. The separatist women's struggle would not gain any ground, as they were not working with the other half of the human race. Within the larger Weather Underground there was an acknowledgement that women were exploited and the leadership urged them to take initiative and become full members. In their criticism/ self-criticism sessions, the Weather Underground attempted to 'smash monogamy,' which would allow the woman to stop hiding behind her partner. Even if they were misguided, Weathermembers truly believed they were trying to liberate women, along with the African-Americans and the working-class.

Membership in this new social movement will be shown to be similar to the West German and Palestinian new social movements. Prairie-Power members, who included future Weather Underground members and leaders—Bernardine Dohrn, Bill Ayers, J.J., Jeff Jones, Tim Mellen and Susan Stern—entered the Movement in the same manner as members and leaders of the Old Guard—Tom Hayden, Casey Hayden, Todd Gitlin, Paul Potter and Sharon Jeffrey—through SDS campus groups and SDS projects. Bill Ayers, Tim Mellen and Terry Robbins (the Jesse James Gang) became involved at Ann Arbor, where the Haydens, Gitlin, Jeffery and Potter were all early members of the SDS group. Bernardine Dohrn first worked on JOIN in Chicago. Kathy Boudin was a member of the Cleveland ERAP house, as was Sharon Jeffrey. What differentiated Prairie-Power from the Old Guard was ideology and this difference eventually led to the creation of the Weather Underground.

As Prairie-Power intensified their involvement, the ideology and actions reflected this. As the over burdened Movement faltered, the revolutionary force grew and took over. The ideology that the Weather Underground advocated was revolutionary in the language and in the actions it promoted. This struggle was thought to be the one Marx had written about. It would become a global, class based revolution joining with those in Europe, Vietnam and the Middle East. The women of the

Weather Underground believed in this ideology just as the men. This will be shown to be similar to women in the Red Army Faction, Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Even though the Weather Underground was ostracised from what remained of the Movement and criticised by those they were supposedly supporting, it was the Weatherwomen who seemed to come under specific attack. The Weatherwomen were either forsaking the cause of feminism or they were criticised for their involvement in a sexist organisation. Instead, one should highlight the fact that the Weatherwomen were liberated through their participation in this larger, more inclusive struggle.

In reading the material about these different women, from the interview with Boudin to Stearn's autobiography, it cannot be inferred that these women became involved in the revolution by following their men. They make no mention of feeling neglected by their fathers or by society at large. They do not even mention being driven by erotic intentions. They do mention being taken in by and believing in the ideology. Dohrn and Boudin continue to be advocates for changing the American system. Dohrn is a child and family legal advocate. Boudin, from her prison cell, is leading penal reforms in regards to AIDS and imprisoned mothers. If they had involved themselves for superficial reasons, these women would not continue to fight. They would have given up the New Left struggle long ago; but they are intelligent women who continue to use their drive and experience to struggle.

## Chapter Four: The Women of the Red Army Faction

### Introduction

The Baader-Meinhof Gang was the fabled “Bonnie and Clyde” in West Germany’s 1970s. The “Gang” lived a life of violence, rhetoric, fast cars and stylish clothes. Their well-documented underground lives ended with arrest and prison; only to have their deaths surrounded by a mystery which inspired conspiracy theories for years to come. However, to be equated with Bonnie and Clyde and dismissed as ‘violence driven criminals’ undermines the goals and ideology of the Baader-Meinhof Gang. The members of Baader-Meinhof referred to themselves as the Red Army Faction (*Rote Armee Fraktion* (RAF)), a revolutionary organisation that operated until 1992. The Baader-Meinhof Gang had close ties with the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (*Ausserparlamentarische Opposition* (APO)) and the West German Socialist Students Union (*Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund* (SDS)—no relation to the United States’ SDS). The ideology of the Baader-Meinhof Gang was based on Marxism-Leninism and, like many other Marxist-Leninist groups of the 1960s and 1970s, there was a high level of female involvement. In fact, of Baader-Meinhof’s triumvirate leadership, two were women—Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin.

In order to understand Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin’s drive and the group they helped lead, these two women must be set into a social and historical context. Like the Weather Underground, the RAF developed from the fragmentation of a new social movement. Again, like the Weather Underground and Fatch and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, West German women were not prominent leaders in the APO or the SDS, but were leaders, like the Americans Bernardine Dohrn and Kathy Boudin, of the revolutionary group. Unlike the American SDS and the Weather Underground, the ‘women question’ was not largely discussed by

the larger West German student movement nor by the RAF. Nevertheless, the origins of the West German movement and how it was a new social movement are very important and relevant. In order to analyse Meinhof and Ensslin's involvement in Baader-Meinhof, their ideology, the group dynamics and their exit, or deaths, one must know how or by what they were politicised. This analysis cannot be undertaken until the West German movement is itself analysed, by looking at the movement's leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and its revolutionary dimension.

Meinhof was a well-paid journalist and mother of two, who left her life behind to become a violent revolutionary. Meinhof began her political career as a student leader in the pacifist anti-atom bomb movement. She gradually moved further left; eventually joining the underground West German communist party. She advocated change and left-wing ideology, but when did her pacifist attitude give way to the negative rhetoric of revolution? And why? Ensslin was a gifted scholar and mother to a young son. She protested the Vietnam War and threw eggs at the American House in West Berlin. Ensslin began a publishing house with her fiancé. Yet, she broke off her engagement, became Andreas Baader's lover and firebombed a Frankfurt department store. This act began her life as a criminal and as a member of the underground. Contrary to Robin Morgan's belief<sup>1</sup>, Ensslin did not follow Baader into the movement or use his ideology as her own. Indeed, Ensslin's ideology provided Baader with a justification for his affinity to violence. However, what provided a catalyst for the development of the Baader-Meinhof Gang?

The 2<sup>nd</sup> of June, 1967 would change something in Ensslin. On that night students had gathered to protest at the Shah of Iran's visit. It became a violent confrontation between the police and the students. The night ended with the death of

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<sup>1</sup> Morgan saw both Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin as "followers" for "love's sake." (Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism. (Washington Square Press: New York, 1989) p. 208)

one student protester, Benno Ohnesorg. When a group of students gathered in the SDS offices the next night, one highly emotional student grabbed everyone's attention by shouting,

‘This fascist state means to kill us all. We must organise resistance. Violence is the only way to answer violence. This is the Auschwitz generation, and there's no arguing with them!’<sup>2</sup>

The student was Gudrun Ensslin.

The social context of post-World War II West Germany was emotionally loaded with guilt over the Holocaust, uncertainty of West Germany's democratic credentials and suspicion of those in government. Ensslin's accusation of fascism was not her own idea. It was an accusation which had been fermenting for several months, if not years, within the student movement and in the APO particularly. Rudi Dutschke, the leader of the APO, found the current democracy to be “proto-fascist and “anti-human.” Was the government latently fascist? No, however, the shadow of fascism lingered.<sup>3</sup> Jillian Becker writes that the students' insistence upon the latently fascist nature of the government was “to fight a battle a generation too late.” These protesters wanted to be the “heroes their fathers had failed to be.” Just as the members of the Movement and the Weather Underground experienced guilt over their “white skin privilege,” the West German students felt the guilt not only of living in the affluent West, but also the guilt of being born in post-World War II West Germany. The students

took refuge in ‘belonging to a generation’ which disclaimed the guilt for what their fathers were doing, whether making war in Vietnam, exploiting the South American peasants and the North American blacks, or ordering the police action in West Germany, and, as they were the

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<sup>2</sup> Aust, Stefan. The Baader-Meinhof Group: The inside story of a phenomenon. (The Bodley Head: London, 1985) p. 44

<sup>3</sup> Harold Marcuse finds that all of the 1968 movements have “a concern with legitimacy.” In West Germany, “Nazism and the Holocaust...were wielded as symbolic weapons” to gain or discredit legitimacy. (Harold Marcuse, “The Revival of Holocaust Awareness in West Germany, Israel and the United States.” In Fink, Carole; Gassert, Philipp; and Junker, Detley, eds. 1968: The world transformed. (The German Historical Institute: Washington, DC, 1998) pp. 421-438. p. 421)

victims of the last, they had a right to identify themselves with, and champion, the victims of the distant wars and exploitations.<sup>4</sup>

They went further than just identifying with the Vietcong or the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), they identified with the victims of the Third Reich and claimed, “We are the Jews of today.”<sup>5</sup>

Peter Fritzsche sees Becker creating the argument that the generation who fought in and experienced World War II created the RAF by repressing the students. Fritzsche argues that the generation involved in the war are the only ones who “can be called Hitler’s children.” Instead, Fritzsche “proposes that terrorism is not so much the work of Hitler’s children as it is the mistaken fight against those children.”<sup>6</sup> The burden of fascism, as Fritzsche sees it, creates a conundrum. The movement’s seizure upon latent fascism is perceived as threatening, which creates a defensive and “very aggressive response.” The heavy-handed response of the police and government was interpreted by the movement “as a residue of the Fascist past or as a revival of Fascist tendencies.”<sup>7</sup> This created an escalating cycle of violence.

The student movement in West Germany spanned over a decade. It began with the pacifists in the late 1950s and ended with the more militant radicals in the late 1960s. By the middle of the decade, violence began to be seen as a more acceptable solution. What of these three works by Becker, Fritzsche and Marcuse, which help to keep alive the accusations of the students? How guilty were West German politicians, civil servants and police of former Nazi party membership?

When the Western Allies took over West Germany there was a shortage of people able to staff the various government departments and agencies. Therefore, the

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<sup>4</sup> Becker, Jillian. *Hitler’s Children: The story of the Baader-Meinhof Gang*. (Granada Publishing: London, 1978) pp. 69-70

<sup>5</sup> Ibid, p. 69

<sup>6</sup> Fritzsche, Peter. “Terrorism in the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy: Legacy of the ’68 Movement or the ‘Burden of Fascism?’” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, vol. 1, October 1989, pp. 446-481. p. 468

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 469

Allies, while restricting the most active Nazi Party members, lifted the ban limiting former Nazis from working as civil servants. Gerard Braunthal estimates that 90 percent of all former civil servants were retained in such roles as teachers, judges, lawyers, police and security officers.<sup>8</sup> By 1950, a former Nazi party member, Storm Trooper (*Sturmabteilung*) or Blackshirt (*Schutzstaffel*) only had to provide a police certificate of good conduct to find a job in the civil service. In 1951 the conservative party the Christian Democratic Union (*Christlich-Demokratische Union* (CDU))/ Christian Socialist Union (*Christlich-Soziale Union* (CSU), the CDU's Bavarian counterpart) passed a law "which allowed [the] reinstatement of civil servants who had been dismissed or suspended" in 1945 for affiliation with the Nazi party. The only people barred were Gestapo officials.<sup>9</sup>

T. H. Tetens discusses in depth the case of Dr. Hans Globke. Globke was chief legal advisor and head of the Office of Jewish Affairs of the Third Reich. His position made him "a direct participant" in making Germany *judenrein* (Jewish free). In the Federal Republic, Dr. Globke, according to the newspaper *Die Welt*, was "the only man who ha[d] access to [Chancellor] Adenauer at all times." Tetens also writes "that Dr. Globke ha[d] done more than anyone else to re-Nazify West Germany." Dr. Globke appointed many ex-Nazi party members to key positions. Chancellor Adenauer's second cabinet, formed after the 1953 election, was problematic: "the record showed a number of his ministers either were members of the Nazi party and the SS or as extreme nationalists who served the Hitler cause in important positions." Tetens paraphrases an article from the *Deutsche Zeitung* from the 22<sup>nd</sup> of April, 1959, which states "it had become a habit of senior officials to bring into their department scores of

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<sup>8</sup> Braunthal, Gerard. Political Loyalty and Public Service in West Germany: The 1972 Decree against radicals and its consequences. (University of Massachusetts Press: Amherst, 1990) p. 10

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid*, p. 11

officials who had worked with them during the Hitler regime.”<sup>10</sup> This created a tension between the former Nazis and “the smaller group of democratic and anti-Nazi civil servants appointed to top post by the Allies after 1945.”<sup>11</sup> Fritzsche also cites the ability of “most businessmen, doctors, judges and civil servants who had supported Fascism to continue their careers under democracy.” This continuity burdened West Germany’s young democracy along with the “unchanged convictions of the ‘unreformable’ Fascists.”<sup>12</sup>

How did Nazism and the aftermath of the war affect women? War typically allows a woman to act outside the norm—either by working outside the home or by working for or within the army. However, Nazi ideology specified that women become active mothers for the Third Reich—changing their constitutional position of equality as it had been under the Weimar Republic. Under National Socialism “[m]otherhood was glorified.” There was a medal of honour (*Mutterorden*) for women who bore four or more children and the *Lebensborn* were “breeding factories where specially selected German women should conceive biologically desirable (in Nazi terms) offspring.”<sup>13</sup> Girls and young women were corralled into service through the Federation of German Girls (*Bund Deutscher Mädel* (BDM)). The BDM “was created to mould the female half of German youth to the designs of the Nazi state, and create generations of physically fit, nationally devoted mothers.”<sup>14</sup> The war economy did change the desire to keep women at home—slightly. Women were brought into industrial labour; but Nazi regulations said,

[W]omen must not be employed in tasks which demand special presence of mind, decisiveness and quick action. Women shall not

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<sup>10</sup> Tetens, T. H. *The New Germany and the Old Nazis*. (Secker and Warburg: London, 1961) pp. 38-41, 50 and 53

<sup>11</sup> Brauthal, op. cit., p. 11

<sup>12</sup> Fritzsche, op. cit., p. 468

<sup>13</sup> Kolinsky, Eva. *Women in Contemporary Germany: Life, work and politics*. (Berg Publishers: Oxford, 1989) p. 14

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17

normally be employed in tasks which require special technical understanding and technical know-how.<sup>15</sup>

By the end of the war and the beginning of occupation, the situation was vastly different. One in three Germans lost everything due to the bombings or as refugees. Half of the population was removed from “their habitual social environment.” It was the women who coped. By 1946, “women outnumbered men by seven million.” There were almost 2.5 million war widows “and many more [women] did not know the whereabouts of their husbands.” By mid-1947, 2.3 million men were still prisoners of war and it was not until 1955 that the Soviet Union released their final 50,000 prisoners of war.<sup>16</sup> By the late forties, Germans were more concerned with survival in the face of food and supply shortages and “women were ‘in the forefront of the fight for survival against hunger and want of all types.’” Instead of looking towards politics, women were more concerned with the “private sphere, home, family, enough food, furniture [and] comfort.” Most families only had women as the adult members.<sup>17</sup> Perhaps this is a not ‘politically correct’ statement in today’s society, but

[t]he conditioning which women had received under National Socialism, that they should give service and be prepared for self-sacrifice in support of their children, nation, or whatever the prescribed cause may have been, appears to have served German women well after 1945.

While there may have been some women who hoped their “new-found confidence” would be carried out into the public sphere, most “women did not question these traditional roles but tried to fulfil them at high emotional and physical cost.”<sup>18</sup> As Eva Kolinsky summarises:

Despite their new social prominence, and their role in the fight for survival, the place of women had only been disrupted, not transformed.... They had little impact on the social conventions that governed the private lives of men and women. After the zero hour deprivations, normality meant sufficient food, consumer goods, a

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>16</sup> Kolinsky, op. cit., pp. 24-25

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 27

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 28

comfortable home and a level of economic prosperity which could cushion the private sphere from the pressures of the world, and allow women to be homemakers and carers within that sphere if they wanted to. ...By itself, it did not generate new participatory styles in society. If anything, it gave the private sphere, its conventions and traditions a new aura of desirability.<sup>19</sup>

Even though social equality was not seemingly important to West German women, the Basic Law stipulated political equality. Article 3 (Principle of Equality) states,

1. All men [*Menschen*] are equal before the law.
2. Men and women have equal rights.
3. No one may be prejudiced or privileged because of his sex, his descent, his race, his language, his homeland and origin, his faith or his religion and political opinions.<sup>20</sup>

Though it was determined that women should have more than just political equality, the issue how women were to balance or combine family, childcare and work was unresolved. One woman at the time, Elisabeth Selbert, even argued,

[M]en and women were not so much equal as of equal value. Equality should mean that men and women pursue different activities in society and perform different social roles. Not the roles, but their recognition should change. ...[M]otherhood remained the major and natural task for women and housework as valuable as paid employment....<sup>21</sup>

Therefore, motherhood continued to be institutionalised within West Germany. Laws were made to protect the wife—if a marriage ended in divorce, all property was now considered jointly owned.<sup>22</sup> Women also receive a pension equivalent to one year of employment for each child she has.<sup>23</sup> West German legislation in the fifties then concerned itself with how to protect the rights of women within her private sphere. It was not until the 1970s that women began to take constitutional and political equality out of their traditional sphere and truly challenge the male, public sphere—“The

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid, p. 31

<sup>20</sup> Kolinsky, op. cit., p. 42

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 45

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, p. 49

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 68

[s]eventies were buzzing with questions and views on how the ‘constitutional command’ of equality could or should be translated into social realities.”<sup>24</sup>

In relation to this chapter, the West German women’s movement did not begin in earnest until the 1970s, long after Meinhof, Ensslin and Baader had been socialised and politically mobilised. Even though Sabine Lang questions if women have become “a silent majority” within the (then) recently reunified Germany<sup>25</sup>, it could be argued that women have faced a silencing minority for far longer than events of the recent past would indicate. The women’s movement of the 1970s was really the first time a greater majority of women in West Germany focused on issues of autonomy; finally women “articulated their refusal to be subsumed and co-opted by structures that allowed for neither easy access to nor the active incorporation of a feminist agenda.”<sup>26</sup> Therefore, the women of Baader-Meinhof/RAF were not necessarily thinking within a feminist context or about women’s issues and this should not reflect poorly on them. It does not make them any less a woman or an activist—just as it did not make the women of the Weather Underground any less important. Instead, it would appear that the students, male and female, were more focused on the issues presented by Becker, Fritzsche and Marcuse—they were more concerned with exposing and defeating the ‘latent’ fascist government of West Germany and the ‘hypocrisy’ of the American government’s Western hegemony.

From the early 1960s until the end of the decade, West German society “became increasingly absorbed with the past.” The intelligentsia produced works which linked West Germany’s past with its present and future and this had a profound impact

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<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 66

<sup>25</sup> Lang, Sabine. “The NGO-isation of Feminism: Institutionalisation and institution building within the German women’s movements.” In Smith, Bonnie G., ed. *Global Feminisms Since 1945*. (Routledge: London, 2000) pp. 290-304. pp. 291

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 296

on the “emerging protest generation.”<sup>27</sup> The awareness of former Nazis in government created very tangible tensions, which fed the student movement and sustained the RAF. The major difference in the two societies of America and West Germany was their experience in World War II. Hitler’s legacy for the sixties generation was guilt, refusal and rebellion against their parents’ perceived acquiescence to the Nazis. After the Baader-Meinhof leaders were imprisoned, their political popularity grew. In Baader-Meinhof’s active years, 1970-1972, the police were only searching for 40 people. From 1970 to 1976, there were 54 people, of whom 23 were women, who were arrested or took part in RAF actions. By the end of 1976, the police were looking for 300 people. Baader-Meinhof/RAF actions were more extreme than those of the Weather Underground. The RAF caused more damage and actually kidnapped and killed high-ranking officials. The RAF ceased to operate in 1992, 15 years after the expulsion of the original Weather Underground leadership. With the social context of West Germany established, in what context did the student movement exist?

### **The Movement**

Just as the female revolutionary does not exist out of time, a new social movement does not exist independently of culture and history. It must be set into some sort of context and the movement must be understood in depth.<sup>28</sup> The discussion of West Germany’s Nazi past helps the researcher to understand what the students felt they were battling against; it also helps to understand why the RAF lasted almost as long as the continuing groups of Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Nazi past, the division of Germany, the alliance with NATO and the threat of communism are all a part of the social reality and the historical context of the West

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<sup>27</sup> Marcuse, *op. cit.*, p. 424

<sup>28</sup> Touraine, Alain. The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 142

German student movement. In addition to context, the leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and the revolutionary dimension of the movement will be analysed. New Social Movement theory has not fully developed an analysis of individual decision-making.<sup>29</sup> This in turn could de-emphasise the importance of leaders. Leaders influence membership—it is the leaders' strength which attracts members. Mobilisation of members is key to the survival of a new social movement. The ever-important network holds the members together as information, technology and ideology are exchanged through it.<sup>30</sup> Solidarity and identity are solidified by the network, collective action and ideology.<sup>31</sup> Ideology gives impetus to a member and defines the acceptability and the boundaries of collective action.<sup>32</sup> A movement also contains a revolutionary, or 'negative,' dimension. A true revolution will always have a violent aspect and this will arise, or come into its own, when the movement fragments and more zealous splinter parties develop.<sup>33</sup>

### Historical Context

The student move[ment] in West Germany...provid[es] striking examples of the importance of national and historical context...because [West German society] had experienced...fascism, foreign invasion, defeat and destruction followed by major post-war political transi[tion], rapid economic development and integration into the NATO alliance. ...[T]he students...reached backward to the years of fascism...to battle against the establishment.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> "New Social Movement theory has...fail[ed] to analyse the process by which individuals and groups make decisions, develop strategies and mobilise resources." (Hastings, Margaret Denton. "Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements," *New Zealand Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, November 1998, pp. 208-238. p. 213)

<sup>30</sup> Melucci, Alberto. "An End to Social Movements? Introductory paper to the sessions on 'new social movements and change in organisational forms,'" *Social Science Information*, vol. 23, nos. 4/5, 1984, pp. 819-835. p. 829

<sup>31</sup> della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. Social Movements: An introduction. (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1999) p. 88

<sup>32</sup> Touraine, op. cit., p. 98

<sup>33</sup> Melucci, op. cit., pp. 830-831 and Touraine, op. cit., p. 150

<sup>34</sup> Hilwig, Stuart J. "The Revolt Against the Establishment: Students versus the press in West Germany and Italy." In Fink, Gassert and Junger, op. cit., pp. 321-349. pp. 322-323

Unlike their American counterparts, European students, German in particular, have always been politically active. Even Marx commented on the part of the German students in the German revolution of 1848.<sup>35 36</sup> From as early as 1904, there was a socialist youth movement in Germany, along with similar movements in England and France. These student groups were affiliated with the Socialist parties of each country. As an example of the dialectic, the youth groups were “more militant” and therefore, the “parent organisation often found itself at odds with its youth groups.”<sup>37</sup> However, after World War I, German youths were concentrated more heavily in the right-wing groups. The Social Democratic and the Communist parties lost their students to National Socialism. Even in the university, the infatuation with the *Volke* and the romance of German culture grew. There was student resistance to the growing Nazi presence, which could not compete with the appeal of the Nazi party. The Nazis

[were] notoriously successful in drawing upon youthful energies to create its own version of a new and better world to replace the ‘decadent,’ bureaucratic, bourgeois culture that had preceded it.<sup>38</sup>

By the end of World War II, student political activity declined. Communism was no longer an attractive option. Fritzsche declared the Federal Republic of Germany as the “most virulent anti-commun[ist]” country. In the 1950s, the CDU Chancellor Konrad Adenauer enacted a staunch anti-communist policy, which aligned West Germany with the West. The West German population at the time supported this policy as they associated “communism with national socialism as twin totalitarian menaces.”<sup>39</sup> West Germany’s post-war economy was booming and, referring back to Huntington and

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<sup>35</sup> Rothman, Stanley and Lichter, S. Robert. Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians and the New Left. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1982) p. 350

<sup>36</sup> There had also been a democratic women’s movement in Germany since its inception as a state in 1871. In the 1920s, German suffragettes were successful in reforming women’s education, social reforms and winning a woman’s right to vote. (Maleck-Lewy, Eva and Maleck, Bernhard. “The Women’s Movement in East and West Germany.” In Fink, Gassert and Junker, eds., op. cit., pp. 373-395. p. 379)

<sup>37</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 350

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, p. 351

<sup>39</sup> Braunthal, op. cit., pp. 18-19

Gurr's individual theories on violence, a healthy economy, where newly educated peoples' aspirations are satisfied, does not encourage radical political activity.<sup>40</sup>

Interestingly, Tetens highlights the ignorance of many students in the 1950s of the Third Reich. Or at least the students professed ignorance, as "they were imitating their parents who prefer[ed] to keep silent about the Hitler period." However, the students were still not receiving a comprehensive education of Germany under Hitler. The Ministry of Education in the State of Hesse surveyed the top grades in 266 schools. The survey discovered that only 50 percent had "devoted five hours or more to the history of the Nazi period and World War II." The other half had not gone beyond World War I or had only briefly mentioned Hitler.<sup>41</sup> Out of 100 teaching students in Bavaria, 75 claimed complete ignorance of Hitler. The other 25 alleged the bare minimum of knowledge. When 50 university students and young teachers were asked about the number of Jews killed under the Nazi regime, "a majority said they had no knowledge of such killings." A few made estimates of the number dead; the highest figure given was 40,000. Tetens writes,

It is correct to say that the tremendous collective effort to repress the evil record of the Nazi past from the national conscience has created a nation of self-styled 'historical illiterates.'<sup>42</sup>

This post-war generation was known as the "sceptical generation." They were uninterested in making any ideological commitment, which strongly contrasted to the student activism in previous generations.<sup>43 44</sup> Yet, the situation in West Germany was about to rapidly change.

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<sup>40</sup> Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University Press: London, 1968) pp. 49-50 and Gurr, Ted Robert. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1970) p. 13

<sup>41</sup> Tetens, op. cit., p. 222

<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 225

<sup>43</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 352

<sup>44</sup> It was not just the students who were uninterested in politics. The older generation was also "weary of war and politics [and so] turned to the business of economic reconstruction. This...led to the concentration of power in the hands of a small political and cultural elite." (Hilwig, op. cit., p. 323)

By the end of the 1950s, an anti-atom bomb and anti-rearmament movement was developing. This movement involved people unwilling to deny or ignore the past; they were also fearful of West Germany becoming a military power again. One of the leaders of this movement was Ulrike Meinhof's foster mother, the well-respected academic Renate Riemeck. By 1960, she was one of the first directors of the German Peace Union (*Deutsche Friedens Union* (DFU)). In 1967, she received the East German Carl von Ossietzky medal "for her efforts to promote peace." Riemeck believed the Germans had "treated the Poles, Czechs and other Slavs so badly that we owe them recompense."<sup>45</sup> The guilt factor is evident. In relation to what Becker, Fritzsche and Marcuse believe, the student protests that were about to erupt were a refusal, however one wants to view them, of (West) Germany's recent history and represented a growing awareness of it and the former Nazi party members still in government.

The post-war Nazi purge also happened in the universities only to be reversed due to the lack of capable teachers and administrators. Students protested against this, along with the faculty's and administration's use of power. Similarly to America, the number of students seeking higher education in West Germany began growing in the early 1960s. The government was unable to provide the necessary resources:

"[b]uildings and facilities were inadequate, courses were antiquated and academic administration was traditional to the point of petrification."<sup>46</sup> Student complaints were ignored and students were not involved in decision-making.<sup>47</sup> With the idealisation of democratic values, came the respect for free speech. However, as at Berkeley, the students, unable to participate in governing themselves or denied the freedom to express themselves, perceived this as a denial of their right to free speech. The student councils in existence—the General Students Council (*Allgemeiner Studenten Ausschuss*

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<sup>45</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 144-145

<sup>46</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 26-27

<sup>47</sup> This could be related to Huntington, as student aspirations were being frustrated—"alienated university students prepare revolutions." (Huntington, op. cit., p. 48)

(AStA)) and the national Union of Student Associations (*Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften* (VDS))—were for student representation only and did not try to organise for political issues.<sup>48</sup> This left the SDS.

Just as the American SDS tried to mobilise students for multiple issues, the West German SDS “concerned itself with wider issues...and hoped and tried to politicise students generally.”<sup>49</sup> The SDS had various chapters and affiliated organisations which operated independently. From the beginning, a variety of leftist groups found representation. The SDS became the centre of the network for “independent Trotskyite, Maoist and other quasi-Marxist sects.” Within this network, two different ideological factions were coming to light. There were the traditional revolutionary Marxist faction and the “anarcho-communists ‘anti-intellectual’ or ‘anti-authoritarian’ wing.” The first group could be considered an example of the Old Left, concerning itself with theoretical analysis of Marx, capitalism versus labour and the necessary education of the masses before revolution. The second group was New Left, with a strong belief in “self-expressive political protest,” which manifested itself as provocative confrontations. This group would take the lead in radicalising the movement and bringing it to a more violent level.<sup>50</sup>

### Leadership

The leadership of the SDS and the APO was primarily based upon strong personalities. Leadership of a movement is important because leaders inspire members by developing or strengthening ideology and shape collective actions. Gurr sees leaders as providing slogans and statements which serve as “mental reminders of the nature and

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<sup>48</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 27

<sup>49</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 28

<sup>50</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 359

causes of...discontent.”<sup>51</sup> Paul Wilkinson takes Gurr’s point further, after some criticism, by writing ideology legitimises “aspirations and expectations” of group members who believe they are “act[ing] in the name of the masses.”<sup>52</sup> This is obviously seen with the adoption, by the movement, of “Dutschkism” and of Fritz Teufel’s “happenings.”<sup>53</sup> However, as Margaret Denton Hastings points out, New Social Movement theory ignores individuals’ decision-making processes and how they “develop strategies and mobilise resources” along with how the group does this.<sup>54</sup> It is not only important then to look at the leaders of a new social movement, but how female revolutionaries ‘micro-level’ activities relate to the leaders and members of the movement as a whole. The female revolutionary does not act on her own; she must be studied within her context. Thus, the importance of this section is to look at the personalities involved in the West German student movement.

Among the anarcho-communist wing were the increasingly politically active communes. In the 1960s<sup>55</sup>, a group of students went to Kochelsee lake to discuss the revolutionary potential in Europe. They called themselves the Viva Maria group, after a Louis Malle film with Brigitte Bardot and Jeanne Moreau, which depicted a “revolution of fun and style in Mexico.” Among them were Rudi Dutschke and Fritz Teufel. There were women among them at Kochelsee, but at this time, there were no apparent female leaders or strong female personalities. Viva Maria members studied or engaged in student life at the Free University. They soon renamed themselves Kommune I. Another commune also existed at this time, the Psychoanalytic-Amateur-Dramatic Society, which later called itself Kommune II. Kommune I was known for staging

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<sup>51</sup> Gurr, op. cit., p. 195

<sup>52</sup> Wilkinson, Paul. “Social Scientific Theory and Civil Violence.” In Alexander, Yonah; Carlton, David; and Wilkinson, Paul, eds. Terrorism: Theory and practice. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1979) pp. 45-71. p. 62

<sup>53</sup> Both of these terms will be explained later.

<sup>54</sup> Hastings, op. cit., p. 216

<sup>55</sup> Aust places their formation in 1967, while Becker, never giving a date, refers to Kommune I as early as 1965.

“happenings,” which were a satirical form of political protest.<sup>56</sup> For example, Teufel broke into the university’s Rector’s room, took his cigars and office seal, donned the Rector’s cap and gown and rode around town on a bicycle honking a horn. He cycled down to the university’s Auditorium Maximum, the Audi Max, into the hall, and greeted the gathered students, who promptly elected him Rector.<sup>57</sup>

Becker says that the APO was formed during Vietnam Week in December of 1966.<sup>58</sup> Aust places the formation between 1967 and 1968. Rothman and Lichter say it happened after Ohnesorg’s funeral, on June 8<sup>th</sup> 1967, when 20,000 Berlin students marched behind his coffin and another 20,000 attended the funeral in Hanover. All agree Rudi Dutschke led it. Dutschke was inspired by Marcuse and his practical application of it became known as “Dutschkism.”<sup>59</sup> Dutschkism believed that the current system was a “subtly repressive, modern industrial Leviathan,” which flourished by exploiting the Third World and allowed for domestic, political opposition until it threatened the system. However, this dissent was really repressive, as “it purposely foster[ed] the illusion that human liberation is possible.” This created a false consciousness which, along with material comfort, “stifle[d] any widespread revolutionary impulse.” Only a vanguard of psychologically liberated individuals could resist conformity. Creative agitation was the only way to disrupt the system.<sup>60</sup>

Dutschke was a refugee from East Germany. He was also editor of *Der Anschlag* (Attack). He promoted violent street confrontations to “overcom[e] the ‘acute feelings of powerlessness...of those who are integrated into capitalist society.’”<sup>61</sup> Dutschke wrote:

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<sup>56</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 25-26

<sup>57</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 32-33

<sup>58</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 34

<sup>59</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 360

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 360

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 359

...the fundamental prerequisite of democracy lies in the existence of conscious and creative men—new men characterised by radically new needs and interests, by an antiauthoritarian character structure.

A conscious democratic autonomy...can develop only through the permanent conflict with dogmatic-authoritarian forces and essentially depends upon the acquisition of consciousness by the masses.<sup>62</sup>

Dutschke took the student violence to another level. It was pre-revolutionary and Dutschke was “loathe to condemn any act that might further the advancement of revolutionary mentality.” Although, political murder was unacceptable as “the leaders of modern bureaucratic society were no longer ‘individual’ enough to personify evil.”<sup>63</sup>

Even at Teufal’s own trial—in late November of 1967 on suspicion of a severe breach of the peace; plotting violence against the American Vice-President; and for throwing a stone at a police officer on the night of the Ohnesorg shooting—he continued his satyre. He was held in Moabit prison from June until August, but after he was released, before his trial, he returned and asked to be let back inside. When asked to stand up by the judge at his trial, he replied, “Certainly...if it will help uncover the truth.” Additionally, he declared the Shah of Iran “an operetta gangster from Tehran.” When he was cleared of all charges and met by friends in early December, he was dressed up as the Spirit of Christmas and “shyly” posed for the media gathered.<sup>64</sup>

Dutschke and Dutschkism strongly influenced the APO’s general ideology. This, along with Teufal’s happenings and personality, shaped the APO’s collective actions. All of this will be examined further. Before the leader’s impact on the West German movement can be fully realised, knowledge of the West German membership must be attained. Numerical and participatory membership in the West German movement was never as strong or as solid as it was in the American Movement or the Palestinian Resistance Movement.

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<sup>62</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit, p. 361

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, p. 361

<sup>64</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 52-56

## Membership

Networks and collective actions are extremely important to a new social movement.<sup>65</sup> They create the solidarity which in turn influences a movement's spirit and energy. Though the West German movement had well publicised, individualistic collective actions, the number of members in the APO never reached the level of SDS involvement in the United States or that of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. The biggest numbers in the West German movement were seen in marches and protests after the Ohnesorg and Dutschke shootings. Collective action happens through the distinction between "us" and "them."<sup>66</sup> After the shootings, the students felt even more alienated—creating a stronger sense of solidarity in their collective identity against the West German press and the general population. This section will highlight where the APO and the SDS found their biggest body of support and how they were influenced by America. This will lead into the movement's collective action and group ideology and how the escalation of these led to the movement's disintegration.

Much of the student radicalism to come was focused on the Free University of Berlin, the Berkeley of West Germany. Its importance to the movement far outweighed Berkeley's input to the American Movement. The Free University was established after the war to symbolise the 'freedom' of the democratic West. West Berlin was West Germany's shining example of being on the 'right' side of the Cold War.<sup>67</sup> Several factors led to the "special character" of the school. Men were able to escape conscription by living in Berlin. There were many student refugees from East Berlin and East Germany, including Rudi Dutschke. These refugees resented the Soviet

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<sup>65</sup> Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?...", *op. cit.*, p. 825

<sup>66</sup> della Porta and Diani, *op. cit.*, p. 88

<sup>67</sup> Rothman and Lichter, *op. cit.*, p. 356

system but they all shared “a strong commitment to some form of socialism.”<sup>68</sup> The Free University was the only university with a constitutional provision of allowing two students to sit on the council. The charter directed that students “play an active role in making decisions and setting educational policies.” The Free University became the “vanguard for educational reform” in West Germany. Student power did “dissi[pate] under the pressures of growth and bureaucratisation;” however, the student role at the Free University remained unique due to the students being able to influence policy and reform.<sup>69</sup>

Rothman and Lichter cite the influence of the American Movement via television as helping to solidify and direct the West German student movement.<sup>70</sup> The influence of the American Movement was first felt in West Germany, where the students adopted its ideals and practices. Due to America’s role in helping to rebuild Western Europe and its role as the Western hegemonic power, “the United States had come to symbolise Western political and economic institutions.” The youth of the 1950s “accepted the United States as the embodiment of their own hopes and aspirations.”<sup>71</sup> Rothman and Lichter write that the Allies victory was not just a military one, but an ideological one as well: “The United States was accepted as the very model of a liberal democracy, the ultimate referent in the Germans’ effort to establish a domestic parliamentary political system.” The moral superiority of the United States was not to last. Since the United States embodied democratic practices, West German students, along with other European students were disillusioned when images of the civil rights demonstrations and the Vietnam War flickered from television sets.

In 1959, the Social Democratic Party of (West) Germany (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD)) renounced Marxist principles. The only socialist party of West

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid, p. 357

<sup>69</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 356 and Becker, op. cit. p. 27

<sup>70</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 352

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, p. 353

Germany would function as a leftist alternative “along the lines of the pragmatic non-communist European socialist parties.” This outraged its student affiliate, the SDS. To the SDS, this meant leaving behind a legitimate ideological legacy. In 1961 the students formally split with the SPD.<sup>72</sup> Strangely enough, the SPD had already created another student organisation, the Social Democratic University Union. The SDS and the SPD had already disagreed at the 1959 SDS conference in Berlin when the students voted to begin negotiations with East Germany, which flew in the face of the SPD’s “no negotiating with Pankow” policy.<sup>73</sup> Still, the SPD’s renunciation of Marxism “left the SDS as the sole repository of radical socialism.”<sup>74</sup> Becker deems the SDS the most notable force in the student movement even though membership only reached 2,500. In the most politically active city, Berlin, the SDS only rallied, at most, five percent of the student body for the more typical protests.<sup>75</sup> Thus, the West German movement was never as large as the American Movement; nevertheless, the revolutionary dimension of the West German movement lasted longer.<sup>76</sup>

Also in contrast to American universities, the percentage of women in the general student body population was quite low. In 1965, only 25 percent of West German students were women. Even by 1975, women only made up 33.7 percent of the student population. The number of women who worked, however, was higher. In 1968, 49 percent of women between the ages of 15 and 65 were employed, equalling 36.2 percent of the total workforce.<sup>77</sup> Additionally the West German women’s movement was “significantly shaped by the philosophy and political practices” of the APO and the rest of the student movement. Similarly to the American SDS, women in

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<sup>72</sup> Rothman and Lichter, *op. cit.*, pp. 354-355

<sup>73</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 22

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 357

<sup>75</sup> SDS chapters in Frankfurt and Munich were also very active.

<sup>76</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 28

<sup>77</sup> Between 1950 and 1960 in America women aged between 18 and 24 enrolled in college increased by 47 percent. By 1970 it had increased another 168 percent. (Gitlin, Todd. The Sixties: Years of hope, days of rage. (Bantam Books: New York, 1987) pp. 367-368

the APO and the West German SDS “felt discriminated against by their male colleagues.” After the women filed papers, answered the phones and made the coffee, the men—“the theorists and leaders”—“had no ear for women’s problems.” One of the first women’s leaflets read:

‘We were envious because equal rights always came somewhat harder to us...because we always fell short of desired “lofty flights” of genius, because our individual attempts to integrate studies, love and children only dissipated our energies.’<sup>78</sup>

By the end of 1967, women were meeting in separate working groups. In 1968, the working groups became the Action Council for Women’s Liberation, which was formed to “clarify [the women’s] relationship to the student movement and the [APO].”<sup>79</sup>

Issues the Council focused on were: “the role of women in the revolution;” childcare; and “emancipation theory.” Ulrike Meinhof also contributed by writing an article, “The Women in SDS,” for *konkret*, where she was an editor, on the “power discrepancy between the sexes.” In September, Helke Sanders gave a speech to the SDS hoping to rally the whole of the organisation behind women’s liberation. Instead, the men ignored her. It became a “battle between the sexes” and resulted in the formation of new women’s groups. By the end of 1968, the West German Women’s Movement was fully developed and drew in women from all segments of society, not just students.<sup>80</sup>

The inclusion of women into the SDS and the APO was not seamless. Women in all three historical narratives in this thesis had to struggle for their own rights, even amongst others who struggled for a variety of rights. Unlike America, West German women did not make up a large portion of the student population at only one-quarter to one-third. This made it harder for them to be visible. As will be discussed later, researchers of the movement in West Germany did not even feel it was worth including women in their data. How, then, does this help the researcher analyse women in

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<sup>78</sup> Maleck-Lewy and Maleck, op. cit., p. 376

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, p. 377

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, p. 381

Baader-Meinhof? Both Meinhof and Ensslin were involved in the movement and both had ties to the APO. Why did they not participate in women's groups? It would appear, from their own ideology and from their social context, that Meinhof and Ensslin's concern lay with the equality of all people and sought to end the imperialist nature of the American government. They were not interested in 'limiting' themselves to women's liberation, even if they supported it. It is important to understand where the majority of the SDS and APO's members came from; how they got involved; the ideology they held; and the collective actions in which they participated. Only in this way can the women of Baader-Meinhof truly be set into context.

#### Collective Action and Group Ideology

Protests and collective action will take "the form of marginality and of deviance" when identity and daily life are dominated and/or culturally conformist.<sup>81</sup> The ideology Dutschke and Teufel adhered to led to imaginative and 'devious' demonstrations. It was Dutschke's own close following of Marcuse which was most popular amongst the student protesters. It was his outspokenness which led to collective actions. These actions helped to develop movement solidarity. Touraine emphasises the change in social movements from "socio-political" to "socio-cultural." There was a 'new consciousness' and it was "more global and radical." This appeals to personal and collective freedom.<sup>82</sup> Dutschkism was the reality of Touraine's theorising. The West German movement's ideology was very much a product of its social and historical environment and the participants were involved on an intense personal level.

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<sup>81</sup> Melucci, Alberto. "An End to Social Movements?..." op. cit., p. 825. And Melucci, Alberto, "The New Social Movements: A theoretical approach," *Social Science Information*, vol. 19, no. 2, 1980, pp. 199-226. pp. 219-220

<sup>82</sup> Touraine, Alain. "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements," *Social Research*, Winter 1985, pp. 749-787. pp. 777-779

As much as the West German student movement adopted such issues as Vietnam, free speech and anti-authoritarian attitudes in the universities, the West Germans also needed to advocate issues more pertinent to their own society and culture. Rothman and Lichter keep their focus upon the West German students' mirroring of the American students and fault the West Germans for not "focusing on indigenous issues." Rothman and Lichter fail to fully emphasise the problems the West German students had with 'latent fascism' and the 'fascism' of bourgeois democracy. Rothman and Lichter eventually highlight these issues, but perhaps it comes a bit late. Instead they cite the influence of C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite, Vincent Packard's The Hidden Persuaders and John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent Society. Additionally, the German students also found the return of Horkheimer and Adorno to the Frankfurt School (of radical sociology) and Herbert Marcuse's lecture tours influential. Dutschke found Marcuse's critique of bourgeois democracy particularly helpful.<sup>83</sup>

Dutschke popularised Marcuse's criticism of the bourgeois democracy as a "proto-fascist practitioner of social and psychological 'manipulation' and 'repressive tolerance.'" Dutschke initiated the 'Great Refusal' of "this anti-human system" and for a replacement of "an anti-authoritarian *participatory democracy*." (italic emphasis added) Here is a combination of a more organic ideology—anti-fascism—and the great American SDS ideal of participatory democracy. For the West German movement to gain in popularity and appeal and for the RAF to last for two decades there was a need for something which fitted the West German society. The rebellion against their parents' perceived weakness and the legacy of fascism was this organic reasoning. This is similar to Huntington's and Paul Wilkinson's arguments that longer-lasting movements combine left-wing ideology with or take advantage of widespread

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<sup>83</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit. pp. 354-356

nationalist sentiment.<sup>84</sup> In this way, subversive groups find some measure of success. The West German movement found a more appealing, quasi-nationalist sentiment to mobilise people just as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine combined Marxism-Leninism with national sentiment. The larger support numbers and longevity of the RAF and the Popular Front for the Liberation of People reflect this success in both societies.

As in America, the identification with the revolutionaries in Algeria and Vietnam escalated the violence and gave the German students a sense of legitimacy. Eventually the RAF would also establish ties with Palestinian groups. Rothman and Lichter write that the students' empathy "discredited [the] moral authority of Bonn and Washington."<sup>85</sup> Rothman and Lichter finally address the issue of the past:

[The students'] apparent internationalism was really a *militant ersatz nationalism*, an attempt to fill the emotional void created by the rejection of their own past. ...The students were waging guerrilla warfare against their own heritage. (italic emphasis added)

The attachment to the Vietcong or the Algerian FLN and the Palestinian Resistance Movement was very similar to Weather Underground's attachment to the Black Panthers.<sup>86</sup>

The first major protest occurred in 1964, when a thousand plus students protested against the visit of Congolese Prime Minister Moise Tshombe. It was a mild demonstration, but it was the first time the protesters broke through the police line. Previous demonstrators had not challenged the police authority. The public response to the students was extremely negative. Reacting to this negativity and subsequent political isolation by the political parties and unions, the students criticised public

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<sup>84</sup> Huntington, op. cit., p. 304 and Wilkinson, Paul. "Terrorist Movements." In Alexander et al., op. cit., pp. 99-117. p. 108

<sup>85</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 362

<sup>86</sup> Ibid, p. 362

opinion as “a ‘manipulated consensus.’”<sup>87</sup> To some extent this was true. The press heavily denounced the students. At the time the conservative Springer Press controlled 80 percent of Berlin’s daily newspapers. Over time, Springer would falsely report on the student actions, depicting the demonstrations as more extreme than they really were. Some of the Springer Press headlines included: “‘Exterminate the Troublemakers;’ ‘Help the police find the troublemakers and eliminate them;’ and ‘We mustn’t leave all the dirty work to the police.’”<sup>88</sup>

1965 also saw a rise in protests. Free University students went on strike against the administration’s banning of a left-wing writer, Erich Kuby, from speaking on campus. The “Kuby Affair” became a symbol for free speech, which was soon eclipsed by anti-Vietnam protests. As the African-Americans in America saw themselves as the colonial oppressed, so the West German students felt victimised by the authoritarian attitudes of the government and university administration. They wanted America out of Vietnam and the Dominican Republic and the right to their own self-determination: “Down with the authoritarianism of the university—and of America.”<sup>89</sup> Early in 1966, official permission was given for a student protest against the Vietnam War. The students protested in front of the America House in West Berlin where eggs were thrown at the side of the building. They sang out “The International” and chanted Ho Chi Minh’s name.<sup>90</sup> December 3<sup>rd</sup>-10<sup>th</sup> was declared “Vietnam Week.” The SDS with other groups were planning teach-ins along with demonstrations throughout West Berlin. Placards read:

Christmas wishes on their way—  
Bombs made in the USA

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<sup>87</sup> Rothman and Lichter, *op. cit.*, p. 358

<sup>88</sup> Fritzsche, *op. cit.*, p. 472. See also Hilwig, *op. cit.*, p. 325

<sup>89</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 29-30

<sup>90</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 31

Kommune I's happening included draping a Christmas Tree with the United States' flag and a ribbon that read "Bourgeois of all lands, unite!" Papier-mâché heads of Lyndon Johnson and Walter Ulbricht, Head of State in East Germany, sat beside the tree. The Kommune I members failed in their attempt to set it all on fire. To put out the fire, a few hundred policemen arrived, arresting 60 students (in addition to the 90 already under arrest) and anyone else who looked suspicious wearing jeans, beads or sporting long hair on the popular shopping street of Kurürstendamm.<sup>91</sup>

On behalf of 25 students, demonstrator and left-wing lawyer Horst Mahler wanted action taken against the police, for the students were just exercising their right to public protest during Vietnam Week. He charged the police, on the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1967, with "depriving innocent people of their freedom,' 'using compulsion against peaceful citizens,' 'arresting the innocent,' and 'insulting behaviour.'" This did not help. The next day the police raided the SDS offices. They seized the printing press, membership files and pamphlets. Mahler arrived just in time and insisted on sealing the files, which was done before the police took them away. The next day, the students protested against "the high-handed and undemocratic action of the police."<sup>92</sup> At Easter time, coloured eggs were thrown at the America House. During Hubert Humphrey's visit to West Berlin, Teufel and Kommune I had planned to throw custard pies at him, but, the newspapers were informed before any such event occurred and attempted to shame the students with this sensationalist headline from *Bild*, "Bomb Attack on US Vice-President Planned in Berlin."<sup>93</sup>

The climax of the student movement came on the night of the Shah of Iran's visit. He was officially welcomed on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1967 to a city that had been plastered with "Wanted" posters featuring him and his "crimes." Kommune I sold

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<sup>91</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 34-36

<sup>92</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 37

<sup>93</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 33

Shah and Farah masks with eye slits, for the demonstrators to wear for anonymity. Students, police and Persian nationals were all present that night outside the Opera House, where the Shah, his wife and the mayor would be in attendance. Both students and police were in hostile moods. Before the Shah even arrived, Teufel was arrested. It is uncertain how the fighting began. Becker quotes a senator, who, from his apartment, saw some of the Shah-welcoming Persians as the first to kick and shove the students. Another rumour says the students first stabbed a policeman. It is not even certain if the students had begun throwing their eggs, tomatoes and stones. What is certain is that the police charged the students with batons; the students fought back; and arrests were made. A water cannon was turned on the students and the students ran. One of the runners was Benno Ohnesorg. He was shot and killed when a policeman, Karl-Heinz Kurras, fired his gun. The night after, June 3<sup>rd</sup>, students gathered in the SDS office, the Audi Max, the AStA offices, the campus and the communes—anywhere they felt safe to gather. Excitement was running at fever pitch. That night, Gudrun Ensslin made her hysterical speech that the ‘fascist’ state meant to kill them all.<sup>94</sup>

The riots continued throughout 1967 and 1968. The day before Good Friday, 11<sup>th</sup> April 1968, a mentally challenged housepainter from Munich arrived in Berlin to find Dutschke. Once he did, he shot him in the head, throat and chest. Amazingly Dutschke survived. Josef Erwin Bachman had shot Dutschke because “he just couldn’t abide Communists.” He was inspired by the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.<sup>95</sup> Students felt the assassination attempt on Dutschke was “an attack on themselves...on the entire [APO] movement.”<sup>96</sup> The student rioting that followed was intense and spread to universities throughout West Germany. Immediately after the shooting, the students blockaded the Springer presses. The rioting this time extended into the

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<sup>94</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-49 and Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-45

<sup>95</sup> Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58

<sup>96</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 54

summer. Fifty thousand students demonstrated in Berlin in May; there were demonstrations in Bonn; strikes and building take-overs at the majority of West German universities; there was even a women's revolt.<sup>97</sup>

The assassination attempt served as another symptom of latent fascism to the students. Fritzsche explains the attempt on Dutschke's life as the "fascism of ordinary people." Before the shooting, counter-demonstrations were held, with such slogans as: "Dutschke—Enemy No. 1 of the People;" ... "Masons and builders, we need your backing: send Dutschke packing!;" .... "This couldn't have happened in Adolf's day;" [and] "Put political enemies into a concentration camp."<sup>98</sup> Two-thirds of West Germany's population was against the students. In West Berlin, nine out of ten disagreed with the students.<sup>99</sup> Clearly, the attempted assassination escalated an already tense relationship between the students and the larger society. The threat to the leader's life, the quasi-encouragement of it by the press and the general population's disagreement with the students all served to alienate and polarise the students. With the loss of Dutschke's leadership, the movement was in the perfect place for disintegration and fragmentation.

### Revolutionary Dimension

The fragmentation of the West German movement is not quite the classic fragmentation as New Social Movement theorists would see it—no part of the student movement was truly co-opted or legitimised.<sup>100</sup> However, as the revolutionary dimension, the APO evidently broke "the limits of the system" and some groups, more

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 57

<sup>98</sup> Fritzsche, op. cit., p. 472

<sup>99</sup> Bruanthal, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>100</sup> Fragmentation happens when some groups become co-opted and others move towards violence. (Melucci, "An End to Social Movements?...", op. cit., pp. 830-831)

than just Baader-Meinhof, were moving towards “disruptive sectarianism.”<sup>101</sup> After Dutschke recuperated, he left to study in England. The movement had lost its brightest leader. The condemnation of the students by the public and his departure seemed to spell the end of the movement. The effect of this loss points to the obvious need for strong leadership in a new social movement. In a very real sense the movement was over; in 1970, the SDS dissolved. By this point, universities were reformed and new student constitutions were in place.<sup>102</sup> Yet all the factions that were once united under the SDS and APO’s network were now on their own.

Many of these factions were the anarchist, anti-authoritarian, proto-Marxist groups. In the university, left-wing groups continued to rise. These New Left groups included the Young Socialists (Jusos) and the Young Democrats. By 1971, left-wing groups took 58 percent of the seats in 45 university student parliaments. Yet this declined to less than 35 percent by 1974. However, some students on the university campuses were more “anarchistic advocat[es] of spontaneous, direct action.” They disrupted classes and exams and threatened and attacked professors and students with whom they disagreed. They later grew into three different communist parties, the Maoist Communist Party (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands* (KPD)—the official one was banned in 1958), the Stalinist Communist Party (*Deutsche Kommunistische Partei* (DKP)—formed as a legal party in 1968) and the Leninist KPD-AO—this “bespeaks the pervasive factionalism that turned the campus Left into a ‘red kaleidoscope.’”<sup>103</sup> Since May 1968, there were 1,900 prosecutions of APO members from West Berlin alone. ‘Legal departments’ and ‘fact-finding commissions’ were established on campuses to help those on trial. These would later become ‘Red Aid’ groups, which helped fund the RAF trial lawyers. At the same time the APO was purposely escalating

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid, pp. 825 and 830-831

<sup>102</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 63

<sup>103</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., pp. 363-364

the violence and there was soon a call for armed struggle against the state—“Smash the thing that smashes you.” Other violent groups included the West Berlin Tupamaros, the Black Rats and the highly important 2<sup>nd</sup> of June Movement.<sup>104</sup> Teufel himself did not just disappear; he became involved with the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June Movement. In 1972, the same year Meinhof, Ensslin and Baader were arrested, Teufel was being released after serving two years for the attempted arson of the Berlin Lawyer’s Ball. He soon went underground with the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June, robbing banks and helping to kidnap the politician Peter Lorenz.<sup>105</sup> But the rise of these groups and the mood of increasing factionalism and lack of direction allowed for the rise of Baader-Meinhof/RAF.<sup>106</sup>

Donatella della Porta sees a direct link between revolutionary organisations and the “larger ‘social movement sector.’” The Weather Underground, Fateh, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the RAF, as by-products of a new social movement, were all founded by “social movement activists.” Revolutionary groups are the concentration of a new social movement’s negative dimension and the revolutionaries are “small minorities within larger political subcultures.”<sup>107</sup> Gurr writes that “violent activism in democracies requires” enough of an acceptance to create a support group. This group may be a “[commune], faction, political tendency or class...whose members seek a particular kind of political change.”<sup>108</sup> In 1977, the Federal Criminal Bureau (*Bundeskriminalamt* (BKA)) “estimated that a hard core of 1,200 ‘ultras’ was operating within a wider network of 6,000 sympathisers who provide[d] funding, safehouses and other assistance.”<sup>109</sup> It is interesting to note that Baader-

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<sup>104</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 66

<sup>105</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 293 and 299

<sup>106</sup> See also Fritzsche, op. cit., p. 473

<sup>107</sup> della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations, vol. 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. International Social Movement Research. (JAI Pres, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) p. 5

<sup>108</sup> Gurr, Ted Robert. “Terrorism in Democracies: Its social and political bases.” In Reich, op. cit., pp. 86-102. p. 87

<sup>109</sup> Rothman and Lichter, op. cit., p. 364

Meinhof not only had women leaders while the general movement did not; Baader-Meinhof also had a larger support base than the original movement.

Surveys conducted as late as 1978 found some surprising information.

University students were still very sympathetic to the radical rejection of the West German government. The students were also sympathetic to the use of violence to achieve political aims. One-third of the students and over half of the political activists surveyed “called force a ‘legitimate means’ to carry out political goals.” One-fifth of the activists and eight percent overall agreed with the use of violence against people. Of “far left” students, 46 percent were willing to use violence against people.<sup>110</sup> This survey was conducted around the time of a high-profile kidnapping by the RAF; a hijacking on behalf of the RAF; and the subsequent suicides of Gudrun Ensslin, Andreas Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe and Irmgard Moeller (an attempted suicide). Thus, there would have been a heightened political and emotional atmosphere for students who were left-wing radicals.

The problem with the available surveys is their ignorance of female participants. It was either not important to break down where women were involved or it was purposely left out. Specifically, in 1973 Rothman and Lichter conducted a student survey questionnaire which was administered to 300 students. Only 80 of these were women. However, they found that “very few of the females were either ideological radicals or political activists of any stripe.” The data from the women would have played with the other data, thus the data collected from women was dropped.<sup>111 112</sup> There is not any way to refute the data they found and they did not publish their original questionnaire. Therefore questions cannot be raised about any unrealised

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<sup>110</sup> Rothman and Lichter, *op. cit.*, p. 366

<sup>111</sup> Rothman and Lichter, *op. cit.*, pp. 368 and 451

<sup>112</sup> As if in response, Helke Sanders said in her speech to the SDS: “Most women are apolitical because politics have always been defined unilaterally and their needs have never been addressed.” (Maleck-Lewy and Maleck, *op. cit.*, p. 380)

gender bias. This decision is surprising as at the time, the RAF was 50 percent women. Surely this percentage would have been reflected within the general movement's population. Why was it not? Baader-Meinhof adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology which demands the equality of all people. Dutschke never seemed compelled to address the women question; even though the RAF did not, the implicit nature of Marxism-Leninism allows for the equality seen in Baader-Meinhof/ RAF.

Bonnie Cordes writes,

Terrorist statements give us our best and, sometimes, only inside view of terrorist life and thinking. To comprehend the terrorist mindset it is crucial to uncover its rationale, motivations and mechanisms for denial.<sup>113</sup>

There is a variety of material written about the RAF. This chapter focuses on Baader-Meinhof and on Meinhof and Ensslin in particular. With this limited focus, there are three main books, by Stefan Aust, Jillian Becker and Tom Vague, which provide first-hand observations, statements and recorded conversations between the two women and their peers. This kind of intimate insight is unusual and something difficult to replicate within the Weather Underground and the Palestinian historical narratives. This insight is still highly valuable and researchers are able to gain access to details of RAF life underground and in prison. Thus, Meinhof and Ensslin's lives are explored through the four points of comparison: entry, ideology, group dynamics and exit.

## **The Women of the Red Army Faction**

### Entry

Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini<sup>114</sup>, Cordes<sup>115</sup> and Donatella della Porta<sup>116</sup> all found that both sexes join revolutionary organisations to belong to

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<sup>113</sup> Cordes, Bonnie. When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on terrorist literature. (Rand Corporation: Santa Monica, CA, 1987) p. 3

<sup>114</sup> Neuburger, Luisella de Cataldo and Valentini, Tiziana. Women and Terrorism. (MacMillan: London, 1996) p. 17

something greater and to find a group of like-minded individuals. This belief is readily apparent in Meinhof's growing involvement with the student movement and her friendship with Ensslin. Meinhof was an anomaly within the Baader-Meinhof leadership—she was a 'left-over' from the student movement's origins. Meinhof was politicised peacefully—there was no one else really (with perhaps the exception of Horst Mahler, who was ostracised) from her age group. As will be clarified further on, Meinhof had found a family in the illegal communist party, the old KPD, in the early sixties. When her marriage fell apart in the late 1960s, Meinhof left behind not only her husband, but also her friendships within the New Left elite in Hamburg. She moved to West Berlin with her twin daughters where her unhappiness did not abate, it increased. When Ensslin and Baader arrived, they rescued her from her doldrums and gave her the opportunity to be a part of a familial group again. This reason for involvement is not readily apparent when one studies Gudrun Ensslin, however. Ensslin and Baader, along with Jan-Carl Raspe (an original member of both Kommune I and the APO), Astrid Proll and other Baader-Meinhof members, were a part of the generation radically politicised following the events of June 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1967. Similar to Robin Morgan's belief that women simply follow men into revolutionary organisations, Ensslin was attracted to Baader's wildness.<sup>117</sup> Ensslin's involvement and ideology escalated, however, before she met Baader. Ensslin and Baader found within each other the perfect match.

Meinhof and Ensslin were both involved in the student movement before they formed the RAF, along with Baader, Horst Mahler, Astrid Proll, Irene Goergens and Ingrid Schubert. Only, Meinhof and Ensslin's respective movement membership was separated by almost ten years—a virtual generation in the lifespan of a movement.

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<sup>115</sup> Both men and women join revolutionary organisations to belong to a group of individuals who feel similarly to themselves. (Cordes, op. cit., p. 8)

<sup>116</sup> Della Porta also found that men and women join revolutionary organisations for similar reasons. (della Porta, op. cit., pp. 7-8)

<sup>117</sup> Morgan, op. cit., pp. 196-198

Meinhof was a student leader in the pacifist anti-atom bomb and anti-rearmament movement of the late 1950s. Ensslin was politicised between 1965 and 1967, when throwing eggs at the America House and identification with the Vietcong was acceptable. It is not hard to see Ensslin moving toward violent means; it is more difficult to understand why Meinhof left behind a respectable career in journalism, her children and a pleasant bourgeois life to join Ensslin and Baader underground.

Ulrike Meinhof was born in Oldenburg on the 7<sup>th</sup> of October 1934. Her father was a museum curator from an old Württemberg family known for producing Protestant theologians. During the Nazi period, the Meinhofs joined the Hessian Dissent, as the Protestant church now fell into line with the Nazi regime. When Meinhof was nearly six, her father died of cancer. Money was tight because the family was not eligible for the state pension, so her mother took in a boarder. She was the scholar and future protester, Renate Riemeck. Riemeck and Ingeborg Meinhof were both, privately, against the Nazis and felt their downfall was imminent. In 1945, Riemeck and Ingeborg Meinhof joined the SPD when it was still a Marxist organisation. Ingeborg Meinhof died in 1949 of an infection following a cancer operation. Riemeck fostered both Ulrike and her sister, but her relationship with Ulrike, who hero-worshipped and emulated her, was undeniably closer.<sup>118</sup>

Meinhof was an unusual, yet popular, teenager. She was known for her “intelligence and charm.” She was a committed Christian who rolled her own cigarettes and smoked a pipe. During her first term in university at Marburg, she supported the revival of a Protestant youth work movement and studied education and psychology. When Meinhof transferred to Münster in the winter of 1957, she joined the SDS affiliated anti-atomic death committee. Meinhof was elected as the committee’s spokesperson and joined the SDS in 1958. She published articles on the nuclear issues

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<sup>118</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18 and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-142

and organised functions, petitions, lecture boycotts and demonstrations. At the end of May 1958, Ulrike spoke at a 5,000 strong silent march in Münster.<sup>119</sup> For Meinhof, according to Riembeck, membership in the anti-atom bomb movement was “more a moral than political question.”<sup>120</sup> Her personal identification was wrapped up in what other people might consider political choices. This extreme identification established Meinhof’s never-ending commitment to creating a just world.

Meinhof joined the banned KPD in 1958. Meinhof had not first read Marx, Lenin or Luxemburg; her first contact with Marxism came through the neo-Marxism of the developing New Left. The banned communists to Meinhof “were the logical embodiment of anti-fascism in a republic where many former Nazis had important posts.” In retrospect, Meinhof spoke of the party in a familial sense.<sup>121</sup> The banned KPD had strong ties to a growing magazine, *konkret*.<sup>122</sup> As an articulate student leader, Meinhof caught the eye of Klaus Rainer Röhl. Röhl, along with Klaus Hübötter and Peter Rühmkorf started a left-wing student magazine, *Studentenkurier* (*Student Courier*). It was renamed *konkret* in 1957. On January 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup>, 1959, there was a student congress against atomic weapons in West Berlin. This was the conference which distanced the SDS and SPD. There was a conflict between two factions. The first advocated the SPD official line. The second, which included Meinhof, was led by *konkret*. The *konkret* faction wanted to establish a study group on “atomic armament and reunification” along with the previously mentioned negotiation between the two Germanys. The *konkret* faction won. This shocked both the press and the SPD, which declared working for and contributing to *konkret* as incompatible with SPD membership. Already, Meinhof was moving herself out of the mainstream. In January 1960, Meinhof became

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<sup>119</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 19-20

<sup>120</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 159

<sup>121</sup> As will be shown in following paragraphs.

<sup>122</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 38

*konkret*'s editor-in-chief. In time, Röhl finally began to see Meinhof in a romantic light. They married in late December 1961.<sup>123</sup>

When Meinhof was pregnant with twins in 1962, she developed symptoms of a brain tumour. Instead of giving up the pregnancy, she dealt with the painful headaches and uncontrollable eye movements. At seven and a half months, she had a successful Caesarean section. Soon after, Meinhof underwent brain surgery—the tumour was an enlarged blood vessel. Her recovery took three months and Riemeck took care of the twins, Bettine and Regine. Meinhof returned immediately to her work. The importance of this event is Meinhof's reaction to it. Her determination to keep her pregnancy is striking, as is her fear of being thought of as incapable—she had a need to prove herself. Riemeck later commented on this time:

‘She worked too hard. ...She wanted to get her self-confidence back after the operation. ...Her self-confidence was never as great as she let people think. She always needed a stronger personality to support her. As a child she was intelligent and good-natured, but she always reflected her environment. In one way, that was her strength. She wanted to explore her limitations, find out how far she could go. ...She never had a cold intellect.’<sup>124</sup>

Meinhof's passionate intellect comes through in her articles for *konkret*, which will be discussed in the ideology section.

After the operation, Meinhof gave up her editorial responsibilities. She still wrote her column, in addition to doing sociological research into fringe society for radio and television programmes. With her success, she was increasingly invited to high society parties in Hamburg, where the Meinhof-Röhl family lived. Röhl's co-founder, Rümhkorf, commented:

[Meinhof] was much admired: a young woman who was clever with words, presenting her extreme, rigid political views to a circle which couldn't really make anything of such stern attitudes. She was a society

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<sup>123</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 21-23 and Becker, op. cit., pp. 165-169

<sup>124</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 37-38 and Becker, op. cit., pp. 170-176

pet.... [S]he was invited out a great deal, used as a kind of decoration.<sup>125</sup>

Thus, Meinhof began living in two worlds. Meinhof and Röhl bought a nice house in Blankenese, a very affluent area of Hamburg. Meinhof decorated it expensively and with care. She bought expensive dresses and jewellery at fashionable boutiques and was vetted by the *schili*, the chic New Left. Yet, she also worked with and wrote about young offenders and factory workers. Meinhof was frequently in Berlin, reporting and becoming involved in the growing APO movement. Röhl found this statement in her diary:

My relationship with Klaus, my acceptance by the Establishment, my work with the students—three aspects of my life that seem irreconcilable are pulling and tearing at me.

‘Our house, the parties...all of that’s only partly enjoyable, but among other things it’s the basis from which I can be a subversive element. Television appearances, contacts, the attention I get, they’re all a part of my career as a journalist and a Socialist, they get me a hearing beyond *konkret*, by way of radio and television. I even find it pleasant, but it doesn’t satisfy my need for warmth, solidarity, belonging to a group. The part I play [in this society...] involves me adopting the attitude of a puppet, forcing me to say things smilingly when to me, to all of us, they are deadly serious—so I say them with a grin, as if masked.’<sup>126</sup>

Meinhof’s confusion grew as her contact with the APO increased. To some extent, she participated in the APO’s blockade of the Springer presses following the Dutschke shooting.<sup>127</sup> Dutschke was shot on the 11<sup>th</sup> of April 1968, but nine days earlier a group affiliated with both the SDS and the APO had firebombed two Frankfurt department stores. The arsonists, Ensslin, Baader, Thorwald Proll and Horst Söhnlein, were already in custody. Meinhof met Ensslin several times in prison to write articles on their action. In an editorial meeting at *konkret*, Meinhof declared, “‘If what she told me was published, they would never get out of prison at all.’”<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 39

<sup>126</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 40 and Becker, op. cit., pp. 180-183

<sup>127</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 54-55

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, p. 60

Earlier in the year, Meinhof began to make her break with her conflicted life in Hamburg. She divorced Röhl, who was known for his marital indiscretions, and moved the twins to Berlin. Meinhof continued to write for *konkret* until April 1969. She even tried to take over *konkret* in May 1969, a coup Röhl neatly avoided by moving operations. When it failed, Meinhof, along with her fellow conspirators, trashed the house Meinhof and Röhl had once lived in together.<sup>129</sup> Becker believes Meinhof “could not enjoy her own enjoyment.” This reluctance could, perhaps, be owed to her perception that “she was betraying some old principles of youth” by living the way that she did.<sup>130</sup> This all echoes what Becker and Fritzsche write of the guilt of West Germany’s sixties generation. It mirrors the Weather Underground’s ‘white skin privilege’ and their guilt for being born white middle-class children in America. Ensslin neatly entered Meinhof’s life when her inner-turmoil and conflict peaked.

Gudrun was born in Bartholoma on the 15<sup>th</sup> of August 1940, as the fourth of seven children. Her father was a left-wing Protestant pastor, who belonged to the ‘Confessing Church,’ which had been opposed to Hitler. In 1945, it became the Evangelical Church in Germany and placed an importance on the examination of conscience.<sup>131</sup> Gudrun, like Meinhof, was committed to Christian activities while growing up. She was a group leader in the Protestant Girl’s Club and conducted bible studies.<sup>132</sup> In high school, Ensslin went to Pennsylvania for a year. The American’s regarded her as “clever, socially committed [and] cosmopolitan.”<sup>133</sup> She found Americans politically naïve and materialistic. She went to the University of Tübingen to study philosophy, Anglistics and Germanics.<sup>134</sup> At university, Ensslin became engaged to Bernward Vesper, son of Third Reich poet, Will Vesper. Ensslin and Vesper started

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<sup>129</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 208

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, pp. 183 and 204-208

<sup>131</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 80

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, p. 82

<sup>133</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 25

<sup>134</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 82

a publishing house in 1963 and their first piece published was Against Death, an anti-atom bomb anthology. At this point, Ensslin was a committed anti-atom bomb and anti-Vietnam war pacifist. Ensslin and Vesper moved to West Berlin in 1965, where Ensslin enrolled in the Free University.<sup>135</sup> Ensslin won the extremely competitive Study Foundation of the German People scholarship. She worked on her doctorate and held literary ambitions—Röhl and Meinhof, as editors of *konkret*, rejected poems by Ensslin and Vesper as “hysterical.”<sup>136</sup>

Both Ensslin and Vesper were SPD members and worked in the office writing election campaign speeches. When the SPD lost in 1966, the party formed a coalition with the CDU. Ensslin took this as a betrayal and left the SPD for the SDS. Ensslin and Vesper began demonstrating against Vietnam. After receiving a writing contract with a publishing house, Ensslin and Vesper celebrated by conceiving a child. Felix Robert was born in May 1967. His parents brought him to demonstrations in his pram, which sported a placard reading, “When I am big I’ll carry my machine gun with me always! Use your head!”<sup>137</sup>

Felix was only a month old on the night of June 2<sup>nd</sup>. Of that night and Ensslin’s reaction, an SDS leader remarked of Ensslin: “she was too hysterical...to help us in an analysis of the event for a pamphlet we were about to put out about it.” Although her speech was overly emotional,

[h]er words had a big effect on many students. Suddenly she seemed to be speaking for an entire faction. ...It was as if the event had brought some sort of revelation to Ensslin: “Now that I have experienced reality I cannot be a pacifist any longer.” At times on the night Benno Ohnesorg was shot she was crying so much we thought we’d have to lock her up.<sup>2</sup>

Ensslin did continue to protest with the SDS in West Berlin throughout 1967, but became increasingly restless. Finally, she rejected everything: Vesper, the SDS and

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<sup>135</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 27

<sup>136</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 86

<sup>137</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 87

motherhood, which “felt like a trap.” Felix was 11 months old when she left him with Vesper.<sup>138</sup>

In leaving Vesper, she found another sexual partner who shared her vision of protest. Ensslin had met Baader, a vain, spoilt bully. Baader had never joined the SDS or the APO in West Berlin, but he had been on the radical scene since 1963. Michael “Bommi” Baumann, future 2<sup>nd</sup> June leader, met Ensslin and Baader through his connection to Kommune I. He found Baader to be boarish. Baader would “needle people in bars, letting the argument come to the point of physical violence.” It was usually the other person who walked away, giving Baader “a certain authority.” Baader captured other people’s interests by talking of “nothing but terrorism.”<sup>139</sup> Ensslin and Baader had bonded over their desire to use violence to combat the fascist state. Baader told Ensslin, “the state wasn’t worth thinking about...it was just a ‘shat-in shithouse.’ The police were ‘bulls’ and ‘pigs.’” Ensslin found him to be “more ‘refreshingly close to reality’ than anyone else she’d known.” Baader also had a child, Suse, born in 1965, who he abandoned when Ensslin abandoned Felix. They moved together to Frankfurt, where Ensslin formally introduced Baader to the SDS.<sup>140</sup>

In May of 1967, a fire in a Brussels department store killed over 300 people. The anarcho-communists seized upon this event, wanting to restage it in West Germany. Pamphlets circulated the Free University with these headlines: “New Kinds of Demonstrations Tried Out for the First Time in Brussels;” “Why Do You Burn, Consumer?;” “When Will the Department Stores in Berlin Burn?” One of the pamphlets’ commentaries read:

For the first time in any big European city, a burning store full of burning people gives that crackling Vietnam feeling. ...Sympathetic as we feel towards the pain of the bereaved in Brussels, yet being receptive

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<sup>138</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 89

<sup>139</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 47

<sup>140</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 90-93

to new ideas, we cannot help admiring the bold and unconventional character of the Brussels department store fire...

The pamphlets equated Brussels with Hanoi and they encouraged students “to light a discreet cigarette in the changing room” of any department store.<sup>141</sup>

Ensslin and Baader, joined by Proll and Söhnlein, were inspired. On the 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 1968, they firebombed two Frankfurt department stores. The damage inflicted cost DM 282,339 and DM 390,865. No one was injured. By the next day, all four were in custody. The SDS distanced themselves from the actions by denouncing the arsonists and declaring the arsons “acts of terror which cannot be justified.” The APO-led Kommune I, on the other hand, supported them: “We understand the psychological situation which now makes some individual’s employ such means.”<sup>142</sup>

While in prison, awaiting trial, Ensslin participated in a political and literary group. Baader wrote to Kommune I, who was participating in the post-Dutschke-shooting riots, “When Berlin falls, leave NATO for us...” Their trial started on the 14<sup>th</sup> of October 1968. The arsonists would not plea, as defending themselves in what they viewed as a pre-determined trial in a class-based legal system was nonsensical.<sup>143</sup> Horst Mahler provided part of their defence. During the trial, Ensslin was the only defendant to talk with the court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Reinhard Rethardt. He found her to “remarkably civil and friendly, but rigid and inflexible inside.” Ensslin told him of their need not “to be just a page in the history of culture.”<sup>144</sup> They were all sentenced to three years in prison at the end of October. Yet, they were released in June 1969 while they appealed against their sentence. However, in November 1969, the Federal High Court rejected their appeal. Instead of returning to prison, Ensslin, Baader and Proll went underground. Söhnlein was the only one to return to prison.

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<sup>141</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 34 and Becker, op. cit., pp. 64-67

<sup>142</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 49-51

<sup>143</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 57-58

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, p. 59

They travelled around France (leaving behind Thorwold Proll in Strasbourg and retaining his sister Astrid) and Italy. They returned to Germany in February 1970.<sup>145</sup>

At the same time, Meinhof was still in Berlin. She was busy writing a television show on young female offenders, *Bambule*. Meinhof was unhappy, though, as her social circle was severely deficient. Her large apartment was open to visitors—the young people she knew from her research were welcome at all times—even at a cost to her relationship with the twins. Filming for *Bambule* ended in February 1970. A few days later, Baader showed up at her door looking for a safe place for him and Ensslin to stay. Meinhof agreed to let them live with her; “[t]here seemed to her more consistency in the arsonists’ lives than in her own.” Aust claims they plied and seduced her to their ‘side’ with LSD. However, he also writes of Meinhof’s fascination with Ensslin’s lifestyle. Ensslin “represent[ed] a new morality. The morality of a revolutionary who must sever all connections with [her] origins and burn all [her] bridges behind [her].” They stayed for two weeks and never during this time was the formation of an urban guerrilla group ever mentioned.<sup>146</sup>

Yet, Baader was taken back into custody on the 4<sup>th</sup> April, 1970. Ensslin desperately tried to find someone to help her break him out. Eventually a plan was formed. Meinhof asked permission to start researching a book, on young offenders living outside society, with Baader. They needed to do research together at the Institute for Social Issues. On May 14<sup>th</sup>, Meinhof met Baader, and his guards, at the Institute. The team used to break him out consisted of five women—Meinhof, Ensslin, Astrid Proll, Ingrid Schubert and Irene Goergens (who inspired *Bambule* and was mentored by Meinhof)—and, for the sake of equality, one anonymous man (Mahler

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<sup>145</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 69-73

<sup>146</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 75-77 and Poussany, Stefan T. and Bouchey, L. Francis. International Terrorism: The Communist connection-with a case study of West German terrorist Ulrike Meinhof. (ACWF: London, 1978) p. 140

could not participate as he was too well known).<sup>147</sup> Ensslin, Schubert and Goergens and the masked man, stormed the library, where Meinhof and Baader were already ‘working.’ They shot the librarian, George Linke, in the liver, freed Baader and all escaped through the window. The two prison guards never fired their guns. The assailants ran to the waiting car, driven by Proll, and drove off. The RAF was born.<sup>148</sup>

It is true Meinhof longed for “warmth, solidarity [and] belonging” (as cited previously from a diary entry), but she also possessed “extreme, rigid political views” (as quoted previously from Rümhorkorf). Belonging is not just a trait of the female revolutionary. Friendship ties are extremely relevant as they “have proven to be a prime inducement for participation.”<sup>149</sup> Ensslin and Baader’s befriending of Meinhof went a long way towards her membership in the underground. Jerrold M. Post sees the need to belong as a way of trying to “consolidate a fragmented psychological identity.”<sup>150</sup> Meinhof had trouble reconciling her worlds—home, work and society—until Ensslin and Baader came along and convinced her of the need for violent revolution. Her confusion both drove her into the revolution and created within her a permanent state of ambiguity. Ensslin, in contrast, always seemed sure of herself and more than convinced of how she was living her life, no matter how controversial her decisions were. Baader may have played a part in involving both women in violence, but he was not solely responsible as Robin Morgan would have her readers believe. Instead, as the next section will demonstrate, Meinhof and Ensslin’s own well-developed ideology actually helped shape Baader’s desire for action.

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<sup>147</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 85-86

<sup>148</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 126-128

<sup>149</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>150</sup> Post, Jerrold M. “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces.” In Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 25-40. pp. 27 and 31

## Ideology

Ideology acts as a glue to hold an organisation together; it sustains the members and gives justifications for which to fight.<sup>151</sup> Cordes believes members “must feel good about themselves.” Writing and communiqués serve as autopropaganda—“a way to applaud[,] glorify[,]...justify and even to criticise their actions.”<sup>152</sup> Additionally, ideology provides people “with an interpretation of the world for purposes of action.”<sup>153</sup> This idea is made evident in the RAF’s ideology and even in their group dynamics. In one publication, “Serve the People,” the RAF conceptualised themselves as the “server and guardian of the interests of the multitudes.”<sup>154</sup> They truly believed that the revolution and the overextension of America’s imperialist power was imminent. The RAF leadership did not view their actions as criminal; they were at war with the Western Allies and even wanted to be treated as prisoners under the Geneva Conventions. The extremity of their self-righteousness grew along with their ideological commitment. It is thus important to look at Meinhof and Ensslin’s ideology from the beginning of their involvement with left-wing ideology and how their personal ideology shaped RAF ideology.

Helena Kennedy writes that Meinhof and Ensslin, along with the Weather Underground’s Dohrn and Boudin, “have all provoked more interest and speculation than their male comrades.” This interest has little to do with their ideology and is more concerned with “their sexual liberation.”<sup>155</sup> This may be a more accurate depiction of the Weather Underground politics. It is understood female revolutionaries are more sexually titillating than male revolutionaries, but the RAF’s external politics and ideology

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<sup>151</sup> Touraine, Alain. The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 98

<sup>152</sup> Cordes, op. cit., p. 9

<sup>153</sup> Gurr, op. cit., p. 194

<sup>154</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 165

<sup>155</sup> Kennedy, Helena. Eve Was Framed: Women and British justice. (Vintage: London, 1992) pp. 261-262

had little to do with sexual liberation. Additionally, Robin Morgan views Meinhof and Ensslin as the aforementioned “followers” and revolutionaries for the sake of love—“a classic feminine behaviour.” The only reason Morgan allows for Meinhof and Ensslin’s involvement is to participate with their ‘men.’<sup>156</sup> All of these views go into simplifying Meinhof and Ensslin’s role in Baader-Meinhof; when, in fact, their involvement and leadership of the group was highly complex.

Gilda Zwerman believes a woman’s membership “re[fects] a complexity of decisions and consideration involving political commitment, personal sacrifice and emotional conflict.”<sup>157</sup> Sociologically a woman has more at stake when becoming a revolutionary. Meinhof’s ambiguity demonstrates this; nonetheless, she is convinced of her ideology and of her commitment to the perceived revolution. This is apparent in her articles for *konkret* and her RAF writings. Meinhof did not just go underground to belong—she drove herself into it convinced of her ideology. Aside from the fact there was no man for Meinhof to ‘follow’ into the group, Meinhof and Ensslin provided much of the ideology for the organisation. Once Mahler was essentially expelled, Meinhof was the only person left to articulate RAF demands. Ensslin did also contribute, but it will become apparent under Group Dynamics that both Ensslin and Baader needed Meinhof’s talent for writing to legitimise their strategies and tactics.

Ulrike Meinhof’s first impact as a journalist came when she wrote a highly controversial article about Franz Josef Strauss, Chair of the CSU. In her *konkret* article from May 1961, “Hitler in You,” she predicted: “As we now ask our parents about Hitler, we shall be asked about Herr Strauss one day.” Needless to say, Strauss sued, but lost. As a result, Meinhof became well known and *konkret*’s circulation rose.<sup>158</sup> Meinhof had kept her articles to political events and the political environment of the

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<sup>156</sup> Morgan, op. cit., pp. 204-205 and 208

<sup>157</sup> Zwerman, Gilda. “Conservative and Feminist Images of Women Associated with Armed, Clandestine Organisations in the United States.” In della Porta, op. cit., pp. 133-159. p. 134

<sup>158</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 36

times—she mourned Kennedy’s death and blasted the Shah and Farah of Iran. As the student movement grew, more and more often, her column was devoted to covering it.

In defence of Kommune I and the Humphrey/ pudding incident, Meinhof penned:

‘it seems that throwing napalm bombs at women, children and old is not criminal; protesting against it is...

‘it is thought rude to throw pudding and curd cheese at politicians, but not rude to welcome politicians who have villages wiped out and cities bombed...napalm yes, pudding no.’<sup>159</sup>

After the Dutschke shooting, Meinhof clarified the move from protest to resistance.

Protest is vocal; resistance “ensure[s] that what does not suit me no longer occurs.”

Counter-violence happens when “police brutality decides the rules of the game, where helpless rage takes over from cool rationality.” Meinhof’s titles from her *konkret*

column illustrate her continued reporting on the escalating protests: February 1967—

“Counter-Violence;” March 1967—“The Struggle in the Big Cities;” May 1967—“From

Protest to Resistance;” and June 1967—“Class Struggle Emergency.”<sup>160</sup> No longer

committed to the pacifist movement, “violence...was now [Meinhof’s] great good—violence intolerably provoked by the fascist-capitalist-imperialist powers.”<sup>161</sup>

Meinhof’s growing identification with the radical student cause may be seen as her new or developing justification for violent action and “destructive conduct is made personally and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of moral purpose.”<sup>162</sup>

Meinhof severed her relationship with *konkret* through a letter to the *Frankfurter*

*Rundschau*. She declared *konkret* an “instrument of the counter-revolution.”<sup>163</sup> Her

world became focused on disaffected youth. She explained in a 1969 radio report, that

state custody of criminal youth is “a stick with which to beat the proletarian youth.”

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid, p. 33

<sup>160</sup> Ibid, pp. 56-57

<sup>161</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 192

<sup>162</sup> Bandura, Albert. “Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement.” Reich, op. cit., pp. 161-191. p. 163

<sup>163</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 67

Meinhof wrote *Bambule*, which means rebellion and counter-violence, in an “effort towards liberation” because “such things are in the air.”<sup>164</sup>

Meanwhile, Ensslin was perfecting her own belief system. It is already clear that Ensslin followed the APO ideology of anti-Vietnam and anti-fascism. She made herself known the night Ohnesorg was shot. Her position, and Baader’s, was not really refined until the arson trial in October of 1968. On the third day of the trial, Ensslin made a statement. She claimed only herself and Baader set the fires; accordingly, Proll and Söhnlein were not involved. Ensslin and Baader set the fires “in protest against people’s indifference to the murder of the Vietnamese.”... “We have found that words are useless without action.”<sup>165</sup> In a sound only television interview after the trial, Ensslin described the arsons as liberating acts:

‘The bourgeois schizophrenia of forever doing things you don’t believe in has reached the point where people who really want a democratic society are simultaneously constructing a fascist one. Our action is to do with development.’<sup>166</sup>

Interestingly, Meinhof, at the time, did not agree. This could serve as an example of Meinhof’s future ambiguity and a precursor to Meinhof’s strained relationship with the rest of the RAF leadership.

Meinhof’s *konkret* article after speaking with Ensslin objected to the arsons. The arsonists needlessly endangered human life. The destruction did not harm capitalist society because insurance companies covered the cost of the damage. From this perspective, “arson in department stores is not an anti-capitalist act, but rather one that maintains the system and is counter-revolutionary.”<sup>167</sup> The only good in the act was the lawbreaking—“the criminality of the action.”<sup>168</sup> Somehow, in those two weeks in February and March 1970, Ensslin and Baader convinced Meinhof to become

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid, p. 74

<sup>165</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 58

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, p. 63

<sup>167</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 68

<sup>168</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 112

completely revolutionary. During their time in her apartment, Ensslin came up with her version of the Ten Commandments—“Thou *shalt* kill;” “Thou *shalt* commit adultery;” etc.<sup>169</sup> Meinhof’s emotional vulnerability made her susceptible to Ensslin’s dominance.<sup>170</sup> She acquiesced—“Writing is shit, now let’s make the revolution.”<sup>171</sup> If Meinhof regarded herself as the conscience of society, her desire to make society just could have brought her into the Marxist struggle. In an interview with French journalist, Michelle Ray, following Baader’s jailbreak, Meinhof declared,

‘What we are doing and what we want to demonstrate is that armed struggles are feasible and furthermore that it is possible for us to engage in actions which we win and which the other side loses.’<sup>172</sup>

The first Baader-Meinhof communiqué came after they sprang Baader. While the phrase “Red Army Faction” is not used, the communiqué is ended with “Build up the Red Army!” They chastised the officials—“Did they really believe that we would talk about the development of class struggle and reorganisation of the proletariat without arming ourselves at the same time?” Those who did not join the struggle would be

‘buried alive in prisons, in reform schools, in the slums of worker districts, in the stone coffins of the new housing developments, in the crowded kindergartens and schools, in brand new kitchens and bedrooms filled with fancy furniture bought on credit.’<sup>173</sup>

Two groups left for Jordan in June 1970. Mahler led a group—Hans-Jürgen Bäcker, Monika Berberich, Brigitte Asdonk, Manfred Grashof and Petra Schelm—and arrived first. A week later, the group who conducted the jailbreak followed. They ‘trained’ with Fateh in the Jordanian desert, but were asked to leave when the West Germans failed to respect the rules of the camp. They returned to West Germany to begin their urban

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<sup>169</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 76

<sup>170</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 213-214

<sup>171</sup> Cordes, op. cit., p. 31

<sup>172</sup> Poussany and Bouchey, op. cit., pp. 149-150

<sup>173</sup> Vague, Tom. *Televisionaries: The Red Army Faction story 1963-1993*. (AK Press: Edinburgh, 1998) p. 21

guerrilla struggle.<sup>174</sup> The next year and a half was spent robbing banks, stealing cars, searching for a support network and losing members to arrest. They were essentially setting up operations. Over the course of time, the first generation would rob six banks, stealing DM 586,964.50. They broke into town halls to steal passports, identity cards, seals and notepaper.<sup>175</sup>

For all of their ideology, they were not getting anywhere quickly. In December 1970, many core members gathered in a deserted sanatorium in Bad Kissingen. Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Jan-Carl Raspe, Raspe's girlfriend, Marianne Herzog, Proll, Holger Meins, Beate Sturm and Heinrich Jansen were all there to discuss future actions. They discussed kidnapping Axel Springer (of Springer Press), Willy Brandt or Franz Josef Strauss. These discussions went nowhere— instead they made plans for more bank robberies.<sup>176</sup> By the 26<sup>th</sup> December 1970, more members had been arrested than were present for another gathering. The group now consisted of Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Raspe, Herzog, Meins, Sturm and Ilse “Teeny” Stachiowack. The group was critical and the mood of failure dominated. This time they located banks to rob in Kassel for the 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1971.<sup>177</sup>

Horst Mahler had been arrested at the end of September. Early in 1971, he wrote from his jail cell the “Statement of Position.” He did not ask the rest of the RAF for feedback. This was a mistake, especially with regard to Ensslin and Baader, whose relationship with Mahler was already strained. They rejected it and Mahler. Meinhof was assigned the task of writing “The Urban Guerrilla Concept.”<sup>178</sup> It was printed in April. Meinhof wrote, on behalf of the RAF, of the American ‘paper tiger,’ which could

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<sup>174</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 89-91

<sup>175</sup> Vague, op. cit., pp. 25-31

<sup>176</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 126-127

<sup>177</sup> Ibid, pp. 131-133

<sup>178</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 142-143

be defeated by overextending the American military forces. She defined the urban guerrilla as the

logical consequence of the negation of parliamentary democracy long since perpetrated by its very own representatives; the only and inevitable response to emergency laws and the rule of the hand grenade; the readiness to fight with those same means the system has chosen to use in trying to eliminate its opponents. The “urban guerrilla” is based on a recognition of the facts instead of an apologia of the facts.’

The urban guerrilla would target “the state apparatus of control at certain points and put them out of action, to destroy the myth of the system’s omnipresence and invulnerability.” The RAF had wanted to combine grassroots mobilisation along with guerrilla activity; however, ““ [w]e have learned that individuals cannot combine legal and illegal activity.””<sup>179</sup>

The autumn and winter of 1971 saw some abandoned and failed actions. In October, Ensslin and Baader made plans to kidnap the American, British and French Berlin city commanders. The other members were in Hamburg.<sup>180</sup> Ensslin and Baader also heard members of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June Movement, Bommi Baumann and Georg von Rauch, were going to free prisoners. Ensslin and Baader wanted to free Goergens and Schubert; there was no plan to free Horst Mahler. The 2<sup>nd</sup> of June agreed to help. The effort failed because the women were unable to see through the bars on their windows. Before long, both the RAF and the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June decided to go their own way, as they were incompatible partners due to the extreme personality clashes.<sup>181</sup>

In December 1971, the police found a draft of a letter to the Labour Party of the People’s Republic of Korea. Meinhof pleaded for funding, training and weapons.<sup>182</sup> A year and a half had already gone by since Baader’s jailbreak and no major action had taken place. Finally Meins approached a metal sculptor, Dierk Ferdinand Hoff, to build

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<sup>179</sup> Vague, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-30

<sup>180</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 161

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168

<sup>182</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 184

a movie prop, one that sounded suspiciously like a bomb. By April, the metal sculptor was being asked to change the grip on a sub-machine gun and make bomb casings.<sup>183</sup> The sculptor himself devised a bomb which would look like a pregnant woman's belly. While Hoff made the basic parts, the group built and packed the explosives. They used coffee mills and egg beaters to grind ammonium nitrate and charcoal.<sup>184</sup>

The RAF was ready and the events in Vietnam in May gave them justification. Bruce Hoffman quotes the Italian republican extremist, Carlo Pisacane, who believed:

Violence was necessary not only to draw attention to, or generate publicity for, a cause, but to inform, educate and ultimately rally the masses behind the revolution.<sup>185</sup>

RAF violence was simply a form of propaganda and a way of expressing their dissent and disagreement with international events. When Ensslin, Baader, Raspe and Gerard Müller heard about the American Air Force mining North Vietnamese harbours, Ensslin suggested attacking the American military installations in West Germany. On the 11<sup>th</sup> of May 1972, three pipe bombs exploded in the officers' mess of the Fifth US Army Corps in Frankfurt am Main. Thirteen people were injured; one was killed. The Petra Schelm<sup>186</sup> Commando stated,

West Germany and West Berlin will no longer be a safe hinterland for the strategists of extermination in Vietnam. ... There will be nowhere in the world left where they can be safe from the attacks of revolutionary guerrilla units.<sup>187</sup>

May 12<sup>th</sup> saw two attacks. The first was on the Augsburg police headquarters; five were injured. Two hours later a car parked at the Munich BKA office exploded. Sixty cars were demolished. On the 15<sup>th</sup> of May, they targeted Judge Budenburg's car; instead of the Judge, they severely wounded his wife. On the 19<sup>th</sup>, the Springer Building was bombed; 17 people were injured. After the Springer attack, the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June

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<sup>183</sup> Becker, op. cit., p. 277

<sup>184</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 205-206

<sup>185</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. (Indigo: London, 1998) p. 17

<sup>186</sup> Petra Schelm was the first RAF member to be shot and killed by the police.

<sup>187</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 208-209

Commando' (not to be confused with the 2<sup>nd</sup> of June Movement) took responsibility. On the 24<sup>th</sup>, two car bombs went off at the Barracks Block 28 at the European headquarters for the US Army in Hiedelberg. Three soldiers were killed: Clyde Bonner, Ronald Woodward and Charles Peck; five were hurt. The letter claiming responsibility read:

'The people of the Federal Republic will not support the security forces in the hunt for the bombers, because they want nothing to do with the crimes of American imperialism and their condonation [sic] by the ruling class here; because they have not forgotten Auschwitz, Dresden and Hamburg; because they know that bomb attacks on the mass murderers of Vietnam are justified; because they have discovered that demonstrations and words are of no use against the imperialist criminals.'<sup>188</sup>

This links clearly with both Becker and Fritzsche's opinions that, for whatever reason, RAF actions were in reaction to World War II and the atrocities which happened under Hitler. With this bombing campaign, a massive crackdown by the federal government began. By the end of June, the major players were arrested—Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Meins and Raspe.

The trial for the five RAF members did not begin until May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1975. In the meantime, there were three hunger strikes. The third hunger strike resulted in the death of Holger Meins. The hunger strikes were to protest Meinhof's physical and acoustical isolation from other prisoners along with other prison conditions. Baader announced the first hunger strike at Mahler's trial in Berlin in Autumn 1972. It lasted two months. The second hunger strike took place between the 8<sup>th</sup> of May and the 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1973. It is the first time prison officials implemented force-feeding. A total of 40 prisoners went on hunger strike, including non-RAF members. Meinhof announced the third hunger strike at her trial with Mahler and Hans-Jürgen Bächer for the Baader jailbreak on August 27<sup>th</sup>, 1974. The strike was finally called off after 140 days on February 2<sup>nd</sup>,

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<sup>188</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-213 and Becker, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-282

1975.<sup>189</sup> During the trial for the four key members (Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader and Raspe), three medical experts gave their opinion on the physical and mental state of the four defendants. Unanimously, they believed the four were suffering from weakness, poor physical fitness and speech and vision disorders; all four were 14 to 23 kilograms below their proper weights, had low blood pressure and poor concentration. Meinhof especially was “suffering from [the] actual inability to concentrate.”<sup>190</sup>

The RAF members were able to stay in touch through their “info-system;” which was the passing of notes and letters through their lawyers. It was developed by Ensslin in order to avoid a “balls-up.” The info-system was used as a way to participate in criticism/self-criticisms and as a way of sharing ideological and technological information. Books the RAF members were reading at this time included: What We Can Learn from the Tupamaros; The Guerrilla in the Industrial State; Theories of War; German Military Dictionary and the NATO ABC; The Explosives Expert—Modern Explosives Technology; Assassins and Saboteurs—Modern Terrorism; The German Journal of Weaponry; Military Technology; Radio Technology; and Urban Guerrilla Warfare.<sup>191</sup>

Meinhof, despite her conditions of imprisonment and her hunger strike, was able to produce some ideological work for the RAF. After the Munich Massacre at Olympic Village in September 1972, Meinhof supported this through her article, “The Action of Black September at Munich—Towards the Strategy of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle.” The Palestinian Black September

‘have brought their own Black September of 1970—when the Jordanian army slaughtered more than twenty thousand Palestinians—home to the place whence that massacre sprang: West Germany, formerly Nazi Germany, now the centre of imperialism. The place from which Jews of Western and Eastern Europe were forced to emigrate to Israel. ...The

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<sup>189</sup> Vague, op. cit., pp. 50, 52 and 55-56

<sup>190</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 328

<sup>191</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 251-252 and Vague, op. cit., p. 52

place celebrated by the Springer press when they hailed Israel's blitzkrieg of June '67 as an anti-communist orgy.<sup>192</sup>

Before the third hunger strike, Meinhof was asked to write a basic history of the RAF. She initially titled it "On the Anti-Imperialist Struggle." Meinhof never progressed very far, but her initial notes remain. The formation of the RAF, she wrote, was spontaneous. Joining the movement, or becoming the RAF, was the "only real way" the comrades could do "their revolutionary duty." The members were sickened by the society in which they were surrounded and "deeply disappointed by the actions of the student movement and the [APO]." The RAF was a "matter of salvaging...the whole state of ...the movement of 1967/1968; it was a case of not letting the struggle fall apart again."<sup>193</sup>

The five RAF prisoners, Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Meins<sup>194</sup> and Raspe, were indicted on the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October 1974. They were to be held at the new high security 'super-prison' built at Stammheim. Ensslin, Baader and Raspe were transferred to its seventh floor after the indictment. After her trial for Baader's escape in Berlin, Meinhof joined them. At this time, contact between the prisoners was still very limited. When the trial finally did begin it gave the remaining four ample opportunities to shed light on their views and to act contemptuously of the judicial and political systems. On the 23<sup>rd</sup> day of the trial, August 5<sup>th</sup>, 1975, Baader and Meinhof defined for the court their idea of a terrorist and why the RAF was not a terrorist organisation. Baader spoke first. He used the Interior Minister of the Rhineland-Palatinate's elaboration on terrorism:

'The basic rule of terrorism is to kill as many people as possible. Numb horror is the state of mind terrorists obviously wish to produce in more and more people throughout the world.'

Baader then declared Israel's policy against the Palestinians and America's policy in Vietnam as terroristic. Additionally,

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<sup>192</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-235

<sup>193</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236

<sup>194</sup> One month and a week before he died.

‘that is the precise definition of the policy of the Federal Prosecutor’s Office, its basic rule being as many dead fighters as possible, as many dead prisoners as possible, execution in the open street, shooting to kill and so on. Numb horror is, in fact, exactly the state of mind the Federal Prosecutor’s Office wants to produce....’

After Baader was silenced, Meinhof continued the discussion. She explained, “‘Terrorism operates amidst the fear of the masses. The city guerrilla movement, on the other hand, carries fear to the machinery of the state.’” The urban guerrillas would never direct their actions against the people—“‘They are always directed against the imperialist machine. The urban guerrilla fights the terrorism of the state.’” This is a prime example of the RAF’s leadership belief in their own moral superiority. The defendants were removed from the courtroom before the charges of the indictment were read.<sup>195</sup>

The defendants tried various tactics to make their ideology known throughout the trial. One of their attorneys, von Plottnitz, challenged the court by trying to use the Geneva Conventions as a way to protect the four RAF leaders. Von Plottnitz stated that because this was war, the Geneva Conventions were needed to protect the prisoners “‘from something that is to be considered legitimate in consequence of the judges’ decision: the deliberate destruction of their health.’”<sup>196</sup> Thus, not only did the RAF believe they were fighting a recognised legitimate war against the state, in which case the Geneva Conventions would have to be followed, the RAF also believed the judges and the system were purposefully trying to harm them.

In mid-January 1976, the defendants admitted to belonging to an urban guerrilla group and took responsibility for the bombing attacks. They would not, however, take responsibility for the criminal aspect of their actions.<sup>197</sup> Hoffman writes “‘violence is meant to be equally ‘symbolic.’” The “‘purpose” of the terrorist “is not to destroy

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<sup>195</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 324-326

<sup>196</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 335

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 337-338

property or obliterate tangible assets, but...call attention to a political cause.”<sup>198</sup> For the leaders, the bombings were not criminal; they were political by-products of the legitimate war the RAF was waging against the West German state and the presence of the United States. The RAF leaders tried “to put the trial on a political footing,” by calling certain people—Ex-President Nixon, Former US Secretary of Defence Melvin Laird, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Ludwig Erhard, George Kiesinger and Walter Scheel—to give evidence.<sup>199</sup> This happened on Meinhof’s last day in court. She was not there to hear this call and she was not there to hear Ensslin deny responsibility for the bombing of the Springer building. Ensslin said, “we knew nothing [of the bombing].” They disagreed with it in “principle...and [an action] which we disowned while it was in progress.” Meinhof had written the letter claiming responsibility; and Gerhard Müller testified later that it was Meinhof who had planted the bombs. Meinhof committed suicide four days later.<sup>200</sup> The distance created by Ensslin between herself, Baader and Raspe against Meinhof will be discussed in the next section. On April 28<sup>th</sup>, 1977, the three remaining defendants were found guilty of: forming a criminal association; three murders in conjunction with six attempted murders; one further murder in conjunction with one attempted murder; 27 other attempted murders, in conjunction with bomb attacks. Baader and Raspe were found guilty of two more attempted murders and Ensslin only one more attempted murder. All were sentenced to life imprisonment.<sup>201</sup>

It is obvious that the women’s own ideology really shaped the group’s ideology. Baader did not start to read and explore Marxist works until he was in prison for the

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<sup>198</sup> Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 159

<sup>199</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 343

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 344-345

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 402

first time.<sup>202</sup> Ensslin and Baader relied upon Meinhof to articulate their goals and provide an ideological underpinning. Gurr writes justification for actions usually comes after the fact and that revolutionaries “did not carry complex ideologies around in their heads.”<sup>203</sup> Perhaps this was true of Baader, but it was certainly not true of Meinhof or Ensslin. These women obviously attempted to live their lives according to a certain standard—it may not have been exact and it may have been flawed—but they were intelligent, intense and extremely driven women who did not need a man to define their lives.

### Group Dynamics

How the group perceives a woman and how she interacts is valuable to the study of revolutionary organisations. It allows the researcher to see if a woman was respected as a full-fledged member of the group in question. If the female revolutionary is simply a “mother” to the rest of the group, in accordance with Neuburger and Valentini’s maternal-sacrifice code<sup>204</sup>, then this would appear when her group interactions are analysed. If the female revolutionary is a ‘demon,’<sup>205</sup> where her anger and sexually unbalanced personality dominates, not only would she be devoid of ideology, she would not be able to interact with other group members. Her rage would hold her far apart from those who reason and rationalise. Instead, the women of the RAF had complex personalities, in addition to Baader’s dominating personality, which shaped group dynamics. Neither Meinhof nor Ensslin played the role of mother or

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<sup>202</sup> When Baader was in prison for the first time, he finally began to read the influential left-wing literature. (Becker, op. cit., p. 109)

<sup>203</sup> Gurr, op. cit., p. 195

<sup>204</sup> Where “women tend to develop their experience in accordance with an affective model based on sacrifice, on caring for others, on responding to others’ needs and on protection.” (Neuburger and Valentini, op.cit., p. 81)

<sup>205</sup> H.H.A. Cooper believes the female terrorist is “more ferocious and more intractable” than their male peers. (Cooper, H.H.A. “Women as Terrorist.” In Adler, Freda and Simon, Rita James, eds. The Criminology of Deviant Women. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979) pp. 150-157. p. 151)

demon, even though Ensslin tended to soothe things over after Baader's rages. Yet, one would never see Ensslin staying behind to clean out the fridge.<sup>206</sup> To a large extent, Meinhof and Ensslin were the true leaders of the RAF. They rallied the members and they provided the ideology which went into shaping RAF tactics and strategies.

Group dynamics, especially on the very personal level one is able to study in the RAF, inform the researcher of how a woman functioned and was perceived within the group. From very early on, Ensslin and Baader established their dominance. The only reason the media and the police dubbed the group "Baader-Meinhof" was due to Baader's jailbreak owing much of its notoriety to Meinhof's fame as a journalist. The Special Commission on Terrorism was led by Alfred Klaus, who made this observation of the three leaders: Meinhof was the head, Baader the engine and Ensslin the soul.<sup>207</sup> Meinhof was wracked by insecurities, a weakness of which Ensslin and Baader took full advantage. Baader was the uncontested leader who ruled by instilling fear through his rage and aggression. Ensslin was there to pacify, using the vulnerability of fear to indoctrinate the members. She was obviously quite intelligent and extremely good at manipulating people. It is interesting to find that some researchers, like Rothman and Lichter, thought Meinhof and Baader were lovers. In fact, they were the furthest from it due to their highly contentious relationship. Ensslin and Baader were, in all observations, highly committed lovers.

The prison doctor at Stammheim, Dr. Henck, described the leadership as such:

'Ensslin was the driving force intellectually. With her cool, somewhat schizoid temperament, she thought up outrageous ideas, which [Meinhof]...then set down on paper, to be subsequently endorsed or rejected by Baader. ...It was mostly Baader who took initiatives and gave orders.'

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<sup>206</sup> A reference to Catherine Taylor's title: "'And Don't Forget to Clean the Fridge': Women in the secret sphere of terrorism." In DeGroot, Gerard J. and Bird-Peniston, Corrina, eds. A Soldier and a Woman: Sexual integration in the military. (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, 2000) pp. 292-304

<sup>207</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 267

None of them, according to Dr. Henck, made any final decision. There would always be a discussion; it would be over anything, even medication and force-feeding.<sup>208</sup> While in Stammheim, Ensslin created cover names for the various prisoners in order to confuse the mail censors. Most of the names came from Moby Dick. Baader was Ahab, the captain who hunted and battled that great white whale, the Leviathan. Ensslin was Smutje, the cook, who “keeps the pans scoured and preaches to the sharks.” Mahler was surprisingly included in this group ‘activity’ and named after the *retired* whaler, Captain Bildad. Meins was Starbuck, an “earnest man” heavily influenced and led by Ahab. Raspe, mechanically gifted, was Carpenter. Only Meinhof’s nickname was not from Moby Dick. Ensslin appointed her Teresa after a Carmelite nun who reformed the order to purity and was canonised in 1622.<sup>209</sup> Through her own observations, Ensslin obviously understood each members role in the group and reinforced them.

Aust describes Baader as “aggressive [and] contemptuous;” “he spat venom until he was foaming at the mouth. He was deaf to rational argument.” Ensslin and Baader as lovers and as leaders had their own unique role to play within the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Ensslin “preach[ed] her new morality.”<sup>210</sup> While in prison, Margrit Schiller admitted to being “terrified of A. [Baader].” Ensslin always defended him. Baader, Ensslin replied to Schiller and the rest of the group, was

[t]he rival, absolute enemy...of the state: the collective consciousness, the morale of the humiliated and insulted, of the urban proletariat.

‘Because 14 May [1970, the date of the freeing of Baader in Berlin] has turned out to mean the struggle for power. It was the first battle we won, an armed rescue operation, our model.

‘We could measure ourselves by Andreas, by what he is...the new order: clear, strong, implacable, determined.

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<sup>208</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 280

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, pp. 247-249

<sup>210</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 92-93

‘Because he governs himself by our aims.’<sup>211</sup>

Baader’s attitude did more than just estrange RAF members. He also alienated other violent revolutionary groups. The RAF had wanted to join forces with the 2<sup>nd</sup> June. Baumann, who later participated with Carlos the Jackal in the OPEC hostage situation, disliked Ensslin and Baader. Ensslin and Baader always referred to women as “cunts.” Baader was always “Baby.” Baumann felt their vulgar language was intentional and it had “an unnatural, exaggerated, artificial effect.” When Baader dominated, Ensslin would watch those present ““ [t]he way a cobra sways in front of you.”” She would sense someone’s weakness and strike—“She was an excellent psychologist.”” Baumann described Baader as a chain smoker and speed addict, who talked non-stop about any topic: “He was forever delivering lectures.”<sup>212</sup>

Meinhof’s leadership was always ambiguous. On the one hand, she provided ideology to legitimise Baader-Meinhof’s actions. On the other hand, she displayed a hesitancy towards her own membership, along with an extremely volatile relationship with Baader (and to some extent Ensslin). After Baader’s jailbreak and before the trip to Jordan, Meinhof could not be found for two days. She was finally located at a friend’s house and reluctantly told her searcher that Ensslin and Baader could pick her up there. Meinhof spent much of her time underground away from Ensslin and Baader. At one point, in the spring of 1972, the media announced the possibility of Meinhof’s death. The BKA had found no trace of her since the end of 1971. (She was in Italy.) Ensslin and Baader knew so little of her whereabouts that they were upset by the news. She returned to Hamburg soon after this minor crisis, recruiting new members by her own initiative.<sup>213</sup> Meinhof’s ambivalence was also evident during her time in prison. At the beginning she was allowed visits and letters from Bettine and

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<sup>211</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261

<sup>212</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-169

<sup>213</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 200

Regine. Her letters to them enthusiastically re-established a relationship with them. Meinhof advised them on personal matters, while also teaching them Marxist values. However, just before Christmas 1973, she returned the Advent calendar they made for her and stopped sending them letters. No reason was given for this and it contrasts sharply with the letter she mailed a few months earlier:

I'm thinking about you a lot at the moment. ...[C]ome and see me!  
And write to me—do! Or paint me a picture, will you? ... I'm just  
Mummy, your Mummy, that's it.<sup>214 215</sup>

Meinhof and Baader had a confusing relationship. He would be supportive—“stop tormenting yourself...you're not to lower yourself to something like a fawning dog”<sup>216</sup>—or highly derogatory—“you're one of those liberal cunts”<sup>217</sup>—from one moment to the next. Baader was one of the only people from whom Meinhof could take criticism. She rarely fought him, in one of the instances she did he immediately reacted with insults and obscenities at her and all gathered.<sup>218</sup> On Boxing Day 1970, when more of the group was in jail or prison than underground, Meinhof particularly angered Baader. Meinhof felt if the RAF was not getting anywhere it was due to mistakes and they needed to retreat and analyse the problem. Voices were raised, especially Meinhof and Baader's. Baader finally exploded, “You cunts! Shouting at your menfolk, that's all your liberation amounts to!” Silence followed until Ensslin calmly chastised, “Baby, you really can't know anything about that.” Finally Marianne asked why Baader always singled out Meinhof. He felt anyone in the group had to be tough—“If you're not tough enough then you've no business being here.”<sup>219</sup>

Baader took most of his aggression out on Meinhof. While they were training with Fateh, Meinhof's twins were 'volunteered' to the Palestinian cause. Bettine and

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<sup>214</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 240-241 and 255

<sup>215</sup> Ensslin and Baader never had contact with their respective children.

<sup>216</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 261

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, p. 275

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, p. 130

<sup>219</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 131-132

Regine would be orphaned in a training camp to grow up as *fedayeen* (or guerrillas) for the Palestinian cause. Fortunately, word of this reached Röhl's friends in West Germany. The twins were rescued in Italy a day before they were to be picked up and brought to Jordan.<sup>220</sup> If Meinhof expressed guilt over the twins, Ensslin and Baader found this as a sign of weakness. Baader's favourite term for Meinhof was "bourgeois cunt"—a term very effective at silencing Meinhof.<sup>221</sup> When they worked together on the cell circulars, she would submit a piece for his approval only to have him rip it up in her face after calling it "shit." In addition to accusing her of betraying the revolution, he berated her, "don't fool yourself, you hate us. ... The problem is that you... have now become a burden. ... You're the one destroying us."<sup>222</sup>

Beate Sturm, though, left the group in part because of Baader's treatment of Meinhof. She joined the RAF after participating in the APO. While in the RAF, she had felt liberated "because there were some things women could simply do better than men, on account of being stronger, braver, less quarrelsome." Ensslin's statement above alludes to this. Baader was treated like a prince—always getting the best of everything. The group was expected to sacrifice for his comfort because he had been in jail. His rants, instead of inspiring and drawing Sturm in, only alienated her from the RAF's message. Although Sturm was fed up with Baader, it was Meinhof's behaviour which completed her estrangement. When Teeny crashed one of the cars into a parked Volkswagen and left it, Meins went back for it and found all four tires slashed. Meinhof felt the vandalism was "significant, a justified act of self defence on the part of the citizen." Sturm just thought it was "some fascist carry-on." Only Meinhof insisted it was the owner's political consciousness being raised—"That's progress towards a politically aware proletariat acting independently." Perhaps Meinhof's initial ambiguity

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<sup>220</sup> Becker, op. cit., pp. 249-253

<sup>221</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 106

<sup>222</sup> Ibid, p. 276

was abating, leaving her with this need to insist upon pre-revolutionary occurrences. Sturm finally left the day after Meinhof woke her in the middle of the night to discuss Sturm's lack of political motivation, for four hours.<sup>223</sup> This is an example of how the commitment to the group was reinforced "through intense, mutual indoctrination." In some ways this procedure acts similarly to brainwashing. Through the constant reminder of personal inadequacies members are only whole or true revolutionaries through their commitment to the group.<sup>224</sup>

In prison, Meinhof, Ensslin and Baader could not avoid each other once they were moved into Stammheim, where their movements were recorded and the conversations were often conducted via paper. With the RAF leadership concentrated, the tense group dynamics were even more obvious. Meinhof and Baader would continue to have a combative relationship. Meinhof and Ensslin's relationship is not that clear-cut. Meinhof had begun respecting, if not idolising, Ensslin's revolutionary zeal and bravado. Ensslin had made Meinhof feel needed and useful, something Meinhof had always wanted. Although Meinhof was insecure, she was intelligent and she began to realise the extent to which Ensslin was manipulating her. With this realisation, Meinhof and Ensslin's relationship began to break down, especially since Ensslin would not admit to it nor change her behaviour. Meinhof, upon writing her response to the Munich massacre, made the same mistake Mahler did—she did not seek approval from Ensslin and Baader. Ensslin assumed Mahler wrote it and wrote to him declaring it "[a]ll crap." Meinhof saw this and defended her piece. Instead of criticising Meinhof, Ensslin retracted, "I could still blush for the wording of my criticism. ...I was [an] idiot...to think all that could be his (Horst Mahler's) work." For whatever reason, Ensslin wanted Meinhof's participation; she may still have respected

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<sup>223</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 124 and 132-133

<sup>224</sup> Poussany and Bouchey, *op. cit.*, p. 132

Meinhof's contribution and did not want to alienate her—yet. Meinhof could be very sensitive and responded to Ensslin's apology with an apologetic attitude: “Well really, I do find my own work bleak.”<sup>225</sup>

Meinhof found it difficult to write the RAF's history. Ensslin and Baader, who also did not approve of her original outline, preyed upon her hesitancy. Meinhof responded to their criticism with her own doubt and self-criticism. Meinhof wrote to both of them:

‘The essential thing, my disturbed relationship with you both and particularly Andreas, will arise from the fact that I wasn't animated by revolutionary violence....

‘I never fully resolved my relationship to...the ruling class...[which] kept killing things off inside of me.

‘In jail I thought for a long time, too, that it must really be obvious the setbacks of '72 were mostly my stupid fault. ... I wanted to be led [not leading the action].’

Baader responded without his usual acidity. He wanted her working on the history—

‘And do stop tormenting yourself and crawling. Work, as far as you possibly can. You've drawn the wrong conclusion from our criticism. You're not to lower yourself to something like a fawning dog; come on, snap out of it so that you can deliver the goods.’<sup>226</sup>

This encouragement was not to last. Baader wrote to Meinhof a few months later:

‘You're one of those liberal cunts...you'll liberate yourself only in the fight, and not by whirling *yourself* in the fight like a spinning top. And of course what you're producing does it no good either....’

Ensslin began a new round of criticism of Meinhof by describing her as “really gloomy: a vampire.” Meinhof, Ensslin told her, was “the knife in the back of the RAF.”

Baader joined in, “don't fool yourself, you hate us.”<sup>227</sup>

By the end of Meinhof's life, Meinhof and Ensslin were constantly bickering.

When Ensslin would retype Meinhof's statements, she would change or leave things

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<sup>225</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 235

<sup>226</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 259-260

<sup>227</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 275-276

out. Later, Ensslin would tell Meinhof only “to torment [her].” Ensslin found Meinhof “mistrustful, and more than that, suspicious. She doubts what I say.” Meinhof declared herself unable to cope with the group relations—“I’m not up to, the burden of the mistakes, the crap I’ve allowed to go on over the years.” Meinhof told her sister during a visit she thought the group was deliberately cutting her off and withholding information. Meinhof wanted Raspe to read her work, telling Ensslin,

‘Either you throttle me when I take a breath of air...or it seems to me that *you* are choking. That’s the set-up within which we’re struggling.... So it’s not a matter of reproach, and it’s not anyone’s fault. But it all cries out for a solution.’

Ensslin replied Baader was the only one who could criticise Meinhof and get away with it. Meinhof would not let it go, however: “I don’t know why you do it, pouncing on mistakes of mine and keeping on about them.” Ensslin always tried to control these conversations. She would be the one to end them with statements such as: “I’ve had enough;” or “Paranoia, swine, paranoia.” Finally, Ensslin ended this discussion with:

‘I’m not a witch. But I’ve come to be brutal at times.’ As to [Meinhof’s] ‘wallowing in the dirt,’ she wrote, ‘The only thing you manage to convey with that rat-like trick is that you’re doing it because you want to crack up.’<sup>228</sup>

Within such a daunting situation it is not very hard to imagine Meinhof’s stance. Meinhof interpreted Ensslin’s criticisms as an attack on her importance and standing in the group. No more was Meinhof the revered ideologue—the “voice of the RAF”—the one Ensslin respected. Meinhof had seen them ostracise other members, like Horst Mahler, to know the same was now happening to her. The people she had once regarded as her closest companions, the people for whom she had abandoned her family now referred to her as a vampire, a cunt, a paranoid swine, and perhaps worst of all, bourgeois. Ensslin and Baader never let her fully belong to the group. The final blow came on her last day in court.

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<sup>228</sup> Aust, op. cit., pp. 340-342

As stated, this was the day Ensslin denied RAF responsibility for the Springer bombing. Before Ensslin made her statement, Meinhof and Ensslin, taking advantage of their ability to leave and enter the courtroom seemingly at will, had left the courtroom for a half an hour. Ensslin returned alone. Ensslin's declaration was the utmost betrayal. The night before Mother's Day, Meinhof hung herself in her cell. Earlier she had written in the margins of one her strategy papers "Suicide is the last act of rebellion."<sup>229</sup>

### Exit

It is clear that the female leaders of the RAF provided much of the ideology. Baader did have an extremely strong leadership role, but it was an emotional leadership which left him dependent upon Ensslin's people management and Meinhof's articulation of ideological strategising. What is also obvious about RAF ideology is the lack of a clear vision for the future. Hoffman blames the ineffectual nature of left-wing revolutionaries on the inability to "articulate future plans."<sup>230</sup> What may also be clear about this is the eventual feeling of futility among the leadership and why it left them with suicide as the only option. It may also explain why, as a group, their numbers did not grow like they did within the Palestinian Resistance Movement and why the RAF failed to retain members.

The extreme commitment of all of the leaders, men and women, cost them their lives. Meins died first due to the hunger strike; the others, Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader and Raspe, followed of their own free will. Unlike the men and women of the Weather Underground, the RAF leadership did not live to struggle another day. Their lives and deaths were devoted to combating the West German state as they saw it. In order to

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<sup>229</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 347

<sup>230</sup> Hoffman, op. cit., p. 172

convince the masses that the West German government was truly fascist, they planned their suicides to look like murders—murders only the state could have planned.

Before being moved to Stammheim, Meinhof was kept in a completely empty building, ‘the dead section,’ in Osendorf jail from June 1972 until February 1973. Being kept in physical and acoustical isolation was torturous for Meinhof. She described it as such:

‘The feeling that the top of your skull must be going to split and come off.

‘Furious aggression for which there is no outlet. That’s the worst thing. A clear awareness that your chance of survival is nil. Utter failure to communicate that. Visits leave no trace behind them. Half an hour later, you can tell if the visit was today or last week only by mechanically reconstructing it.’<sup>231</sup>

Ensslin and Meinhof compared the prison conditions to those of the concentration camps. Ensslin wrote,

‘The difference between the dead section and isolation is the difference between Auschwitz and Buchenwald. It’s a simple distinction: more people survived Buchenwald than Auschwitz. Those of us in there, to put it bluntly, can only be surprised they don’t spray the gas in.’

Meinhof said “My ideas of Auschwitz became very realistic in there [the dead section].”<sup>232</sup>

Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Meins and Raspe, continued, as much as possible, to lead from inside. They plotted and issued commands to those in prison and those outside alike. Their commands to those in prison are more apparent; for example, Ensslin issued orders to people not to give up the hunger strike or ostracised them when they did. During their second hunger strike, Ensslin admitted it was not working—“We won’t get an end to solitary confinement, or even, ... to the concentration camp approach.”<sup>233</sup> Ensslin wrote this suggestion to the leaders:

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<sup>231</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232

<sup>232</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 253 and Vague, *op. cit.*, p. 52

<sup>233</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 253

I have this brainwave—I'll put it to you first, Coachman [Baader], and then to Ulrike and Jan. Brainwave only in so far as it's another way we can work the hunger strike.

‘We can say one of us will commit suicide every third week (or second or fourth week, it doesn't matter which), until we're all out of our isolation...’<sup>234</sup>

While planning the third hunger strike, Baader communicated that this time, “some people will die.” Ensslin supported this with her tactical ideology, “Hunger strikes are a weapon only when it is clear they will go on until the collective demand has been met—even if it means illness or death.”<sup>235</sup>

After Meinhof's death, both Ensslin and Raspe accused the court of having her murdered. Dr. Heldmann, member of the defence team, spoke on behalf of the defence counsel. He asked the court for a ten-day recess and cited Meinhof's death as suspicious.

‘The prisoners themselves, their defence counsel—and not only ourselves—have considerable doubts of the official version which claims Ulrike Meinhof committed suicide. No one had noticed so much as the hint of a sign of any such thing. And that again militates against the official suicide story. It is our strongest and most pressing concern—I am speaking of the defending lawyers still remaining here—to recognise the dangers that could perhaps arise from this incident, including threats to the lives of the other three prisoners.’

Raspe spoke next, “We think Ulrike was executed. We don't know how, but we know by whom. And we can work out the way it was calculated.” He accused Chief Federal Prosecutor Siegfried Buback and compared Meinhof's death to Meins' ‘execution.’ In the end, Raspe defended their relationships with Meinhof; she would have told them if she was depressed—“It was that kind of relationship.” Meinhof and Baader *especially* had a brother/ sister relationship. “To claim now that there were stresses and an estrangement between Ulrike and ourselves, using that crude, wicked slander” to turn Meinhof's “execution” into a suicide is a “possible weapon of psychological warfare.”

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<sup>234</sup> Aust, op. cit., p. 277

<sup>235</sup> Ibid, pp. 256-257

When Ensslin had her chance to speak, she recounted Meinhof's last day to the judge, "under whose auspices two out of five prisoners have been killed."<sup>236</sup> Thus, the remaining leaders began to establish their case or belief that the state meant to kill them. One is reminded of Ensslin's infamous first words—"This fascist state means to kill us all."

On the 5<sup>th</sup> of September 1977, Hanns Martin Schleyer was kidnapped by the RAF. In return for his freedom, the RAF wanted Ensslin, Baader, Raspe, Ingrid Schubert, Irmgard Möller, Verena Becker, Werner Hoppe, Karl-Heinz Dellwo, Hannelise Krabbe and Bernhard-Maria Rössner released.<sup>237</sup> The prisoners would be flown to a country of their choice, accompanied by human rights activists Paster Niemöller and Denis Payot. Over the course of the next few weeks, the BKA and the RAF kidnapers negotiated. On September 13<sup>th</sup>, Klaus went to Stammheim with a flight questionnaire for the prisoners. Possible countries named by Baader were Algeria, Vietnam, Libya, Yemen and Iraq, though he stipulated the countries must agree to accept them. The BKA began negotiating with Algeria and Libya. However, by September 30<sup>th</sup>, Libya, Algeria, Vietnam and Yemen refused the prisoners. Raspe added Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and Ethiopia. On October 2<sup>nd</sup>, a contact ban was placed upon the prisoners. Baader responded with this message:

'Putting together all the measures adopted over the last six weeks, one can conclude that the administration is hoping to incite one or more of us to commit suicide, or at least to make suicide look plausible. I state here that none of us intend to kill ourselves. Supposing, again in a prison officers' words, we should be 'found dead,' then we have been killed in the fine tradition of all the judicial and political measures taken during these proceedings.'<sup>238</sup>

The RAF campaigned to convince the public that whatever may happen next would be the fault of, and the evidence of, the government's latent fascism. The prisoners, on

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<sup>236</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 348-350

<sup>237</sup> Dellwo, Krabbe and Rössner stormed the West German embassy in Stockholm. Becker, a member of the 2<sup>nd</sup> June, was arrested when acting on behalf of the RAF.

<sup>238</sup> Vague, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-78

multiple occasions, requested and were granted an audience with Klaus. Baader made this “irreversible decision” — “a threat” —:

‘If this wretched game, if the increased isolation... doesn’t come to an end soon, well, the prisoners will decide. ... The security services will be confronted with a dialectic of political evolution which shows them as tricksters who’ve been duped themselves. The prisoners don’t intend to accept the present situation any longer.’

When Klaus flew back to Bonn, he took notes about the conversation and came to this conclusion: “In the circumstances, the prisoners’ decision he mentioned can only mean suicide.”<sup>239</sup> Ensslin told him that any future decision by them was of concern to the government

‘because the Government is responsible for the facts which account for it; five years of torment and murder, the show trial, the constant electronic surveillance, torture by drugs and solitary confinement—the whole wretched ritual carried out to break our will and consciousness, and it is also responsible for the way this inhuman conception has been taken to extremes over the last six weeks; total social and acoustic isolation, and all the harassment and torments that are supposed to finish us off.’<sup>240</sup>

The prisoners, however, were not in complete acoustic isolation. Raspe had rewired the prison loudspeakers to create a two-way radio between the prisoners’ cells.

It was Dr. Henck who first raised the alarm that the prisoners, Raspe especially, might be suicidal. He sent a memo to the prison administration, which said “we must assume that there is a genuine predisposition to suicide among the prisoners.” The administrators took him quite seriously and Dr. Henck was to visit Raspe once a day.<sup>241</sup> When Raspe spoke with Klaus, he warned, “It’s dead prisoners, not prisoners released from jail, that would mean political catastrophe.” Klaus asked, “Are you planning to kill yourselves, like Ulrike Meinhof?” Raspe replied, “I don’t know. ... There are other methods too....” Days after, Möller announced they were going on a limited hunger and thirst diet. By mid-October, both Ensslin and Baader had made comments about

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<sup>239</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, p. 491

<sup>240</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 79

<sup>241</sup> Aust, *op. cit.*, pp. 486-487

collective suicide in front of Dr. Henck, who was surprised that even with the contact ban they used the same exact wording. Only Ensslin retracted: “Suicide here is out of the question.”

On October 13<sup>th</sup>, 1977 a Lufthansa Boeing 737 from Mallorca bound for Frankfurt was hijacked by Palestinians, led by PFLP Captain Martyr Mahmud, for “the release of our comrades in German prisons.” Schleyer was still being held hostage. The Schleyer kidnapers made contact with the BKA to let the authorities know that the hijackers were under their command and demanded the additional release of two Palestinians and \$15 million. The Lufthansa plane hopped from country to country, while being followed by a GSG-9 squad in another plane. The Stammheim prisoners were aware of current events and knew of their possible release. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, the official captain of the plane, Jürgen Schumann, was shot for trying to end the hijacking. His body was placed in the coat closet. On the 17<sup>th</sup>, the plane landed in Mogadishu. At the same time, Baader was finally able to make a statement to a minor politician. Baader expressed his disagreement with the hijacking as it put innocent people at risk, but the authorities must realise that new generations “would be more brutalised and consequently more brutal.” He continued:

‘We don’t know Schleyers’s kidnapers and other people the police are after personally. If the BKA’s saying these operations were masterminded from prison, that can’t be so except in the ideological area. The armed combat has internationalised itself. It could be the Japanese or the Palestinians who are going to decide the course of events now.’

Baader defended their disagreement with the Vietnam War and admitted to having made mistakes. He ended the discussion by saying “that the prisoners would have to die one way or another.”<sup>242</sup>

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<sup>242</sup> Vague, op. cit., pp. 80-88

At 12:38 am, October 18<sup>th</sup>, the radio press announced that the GSG-9 had successfully ended the hijacking in Mogadishu. Three of the hijackers were killed; only a female hijacker, one of two, survived after taking cover in the toilet. After the news announcement, the prison guard checked on the prisoners. His 23:00 log recorded that Baader and Raspe were given medication. In Cell 720, Ensslin hung herself by tying an electrical cord to her window. In Cell 719, Baader took a hidden 7.65 calibre FEG pistol out of its hiding place in his record player, fired a few shots around the room to suggest a struggle and then shot himself in the head. In Cell 716, Raspe took his 9 mm Heckler and Koch pistol out from behind the skirting board and shot himself in the temple. In Cell 725, Irmgard Möller stabbed herself four times in the chest. Only Möller survived and she claimed she heard noises before hearing ““a loud rushing noise”” in her head. Schleyer was killed the same night.<sup>243</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Unlike the American movement, the women question was not an important question to either the larger West German student movement or to the RAF. Should this discount the role the women played in the RAF? Not at all, in fact, it would be impossible to discount Ulrike Meinhof and Gudrun Ensslin's participation. The women question was not important in West German society at this time; it was becoming more important as the Women's Movement gained support. The point of highlighting the leadership and membership of the larger new social movement is to demonstrate that a woman's inclusion and participation within the movement and the revolutionary organisation was not that different from the male's involvement. To further this point, looking at the new social movement's collective action and group ideology is meant as a way to draw a comparison between, or contrast with, the

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<sup>243</sup> Vague, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-91

revolutionary organisation's and the woman's own personal ideology. To show that women were equal members and even leaders within the revolutionary group, the group dynamics are examined. By looking at the social and historical context of West German women, it may be shown that a woman's decision to go underground reflects a complex decision making process.

Men were more prone to being leaders in the public sphere due to the nature of West German society. Women had full constitutional equality, but most women relished their role in the private sphere. In many ways this theme is repeated throughout the three historical narratives to various degrees. Men in all three movements, America, West Germany and the Palestinian Resistance Movement, were the dominating leaders. Women had to struggle for equality and/or to prove their worth in all three. While men, Rudi Dutschke and Fritz Teufel especially, dominated the larger West German student movement, it was the women who were the leaders of the RAF. Just as Dutschke and Teufel provided ideology which rallied the students and inspired the collective actions, like the happenings and the egging of the American House; Ulrike Mienhof and Gudrun Ensslin provided the ideology for the RAF and inspired (or at least legitimised) Andreas Baader's own predilection for action and violence. The RAF was the revolutionary dimension of the student's new social movement and this is apparent in their desire to take ideology and action further than either Kommune I or II were willing to. Although Dutschke and Kommune I supported the actions of the RAF, he did not join them—instead he left West Germany after the assassination attempt to continue his studies in Britain. Teufel ended up joining the 2<sup>nd</sup> June Movement and was arrested twice. While the revolutionary agenda of the RAF was not that far removed from the leadership of the new social movement, the majority of the students did not join the RAF. The RAF found a more inclusive agenda, similar to that of nationalism, which helped to attract and perpetuate its *support*

*base*, but not those actually willing to take part in RAF actions, throughout the 1970s. It was an appeal to the younger generations collective guilt over their country's past that manifested in accusations of latent fascism in the government.

Both Meinhof and Ensslin had been members of the student movement before moving towards the radical, revolutionary left. They entered as university students, just like Dutschke and Teufel. *Baader* is the one leader of all of the groups under examination in this thesis who differs from the rest. He was not an original member of the student movement. He was involved in the fringes of the radical movement, but he was never a member in the same way Dutschke, Teufel, Meinhof, Ensslin or Mahler were. The RAF was not something the women found themselves mistakenly trapped in; it was an organisation they willingly *created*, not just joined. Meinhof, as a journalist, an underground member of the Communist Party and as a former student activist, began her life in the left-wing almost a decade before Ensslin. She had a family and a well-established and well-paid career. However, it was not enough. She was unhappy; she felt like a hypocrite; and she was determined to prove her commitment to Marxist-Leninist causes. By leaving her daughters behind and by giving up her 'respectable bourgeois' life-style, she proved to herself and to the world that she was more than her public appearance. This decision to go underground was complex and is similar to the decision-making process as described by Gilda Zwerman. Meinhof's life cannot be dismissed by describing her as a 'follower;' her 'following' should be looked upon as the desire to be a part of something she strongly believed in and her desire to be with like-minded individuals. This desire is described by Jerrold M. Post, Bonnie Cordes and Donatella della Porta in relation to other members of underground organisations, not just women. It is not a weakness. Leaving behind family, friends and a career is not an easy decision and one Meinhof had been wrestling with for a long period of time, as reflected in the journal entries she made while still married to Röhl.

Underground, Meinhof expressed guilt over the abandonment of her children and over her former life, something that Ensslin apparently never did. Again, this should not be taken as a sign of weakness, but as a sign of humanity. Meinhof had lived that life fully, even if it was lived hesitantly. Ensslin, although she became willingly engaged to Vesper and became pregnant as a celebration of their life together, never fully lived the life of wife or mother. She gave Vesper custody when their son was only 11 months old; after that her mother raised the child. Ensslin had been a student and an activist first, a fiancée and mother second. Her intelligence led her further into the left-wing; her conscience, extreme as it was, would not allow her to remain a member of the SPD after it created a coalition government with CDU. Instead of the man leading the woman into the terrorist organisation; it was Ensslin who first introduced Baader to Marxist-Leninist ideology. Baader first read revolutionary material in prison, after the department store arson. In both Meinhof and Ensslin, Baader found a justification for the acts of terrorism he advocated while living in Berlin.

Together, the women, Meinhof and Ensslin, provided the majority of the RAF's published ideology after Mahler was expelled from the group. Ensslin and Baader turned to Meinhof to write the history of the RAF, to ask the North Korean government for aid and weapons and to justify their actions. After Baader was silenced in court, it was Meinhof who continued to provide the RAF's defence of their actions. Even though the women's ideology gave Baader legitimacy, his personality dominated the RAF. His extreme nature would not allow for anyone else to lead. Ensslin used her impressive ability to read and manipulate people to use Baader's rages to their advantage. She portrayed Baader as 'special' and as a victim of the system the RAF was fighting. By making him into this martyr, his rages became understandable and the ideology she 'preached' after his anger passed even more important and impressive.

The RAF lasted for nearly 25 years. The original leadership did not. In one way or another, from starvation or suicide, the five original leaders—Meinhof, Ensslin, Baader, Raspe and Meins—all died before the RAF had lasted one decade. The RAF had a larger support base than the Weather Underground and it was a woman, Brigitte Monhaupt, who continued writing the ideology after Meinhof died. But unlike the Weather Underground and its leaders, Dohrn, Boudin or Ayers, the leaders of the RAF decided the best way to guarantee a revolution and as a way to defeat the ‘system’ was to commit suicide; suicides that were manufactured to look as though the West German government had really murdered them. In court, Raspe accused the West German government of murdering Meinhof, as it had killed Meins before her. In their last months, while hoping for release in exchange for Schelyer, Ensslin, Baader and Raspe dropped numerous ‘hints’ that they believed their lives were in danger. Their deaths were questioned, just as Meinhof’s had been. But instead of inspiring a popular, mass revolution, their deaths inspired an urban legend.

## Chapter Five: The Women of the Palestinian Resistance Movement of 1967

### Introduction

This chapter attempts to set the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM) of 1967 within the larger context of this thesis. How were the groups, Fateh and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), part of the PRM? When did it begin using violence; and where were the women? How were they involved and why? Women in the Middle East faced a more restrictive society than those in America or West Germany. Thus, the challenges implicit in Middle Eastern society need to be addressed. If the literature on female revolutionaries prepares the researcher to find either domesticated helpmates<sup>1</sup> or unnaturally violent women<sup>2</sup> here, the researcher would be misled. It is true that women in Palestinian Resistance groups are more concentrated within 'women's roles' of behind the scenes work. Yet, there have also been women who have insisted upon guerrilla training. In the late 1960s women were participants in numerous hijacking operations. Currently a worrying trend is the willingness of women to become self-martyrs. But how did women get involved? And why? Answers to these questions will be made clear by looking at a woman's entry, her ideology, the dynamics of the groups she belonged to and her possible exit. In light of New Social Movement theory, what must first be looked at, however, are the events in Palestinian society and history which shaped the national struggle.

Palestinian nationalism is not a current trend. Its origins are not found in the autumn of 2000, with the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, nor with the first

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<sup>1</sup> Neuburger, Luisella de Cataldo and Valentini, Tiziana. *Women and Terrorism*. (MacMillan: London, 1996) and Weinburg, Leonard and Eubank, William. "Italian Women Terrorists," *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 9 1985

<sup>2</sup> "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing," *Top Security Project No. 2 Part IV—Summary and Analysis*, November 1976, pp. 242-245 and H.H.A. Cooper. "Women as Terrorist." In Adler, Freda and Simon, Rita James, eds. *The Criminology of Deviant Women*. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979) pp. 150-157

Intifada in December of 1987. It is not a creation of the 1967 PRM. Contrary to Golda Meirs' denial of the existence of a Palestinian people, Palestinian consciousness can be traced back to the late 1800s and in relation to the Zionist movement. Palestinian uprisings and rebellions correlated to events that directly affected their lives and their land. Each time a threat manifested—from the British Mandate of 1917 to the Six-Day War in 1967—there were Palestinian protests and rebellions that acted as signs of a larger awareness. There is the larger nationalist movement that overarches the subsequent, smaller movements. These have had different leadership and various ideological groundings. The Great Rebellion, 1936-1939, engaged masses of Palestinians, mostly peasants and workers, under the leadership of Shaikh Izz id-Din al-Qassam,<sup>3</sup> to liberate Palestine from colonial rule and the encroachment of Zionist settlements. Both Intifadas are prime examples of social movements—clear leadership by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) (*al-Qiyada al-Wataniya al-Muwahhada*), Islamic Jihad and Hamas, mass mobilisation, hidden networks and a clear goal: the overthrow of Israeli occupation in Gaza and the West Bank.<sup>4</sup>

All of these movements also involved women. Why, then, the focus on the 1967 Resistance Movement? The guidelines set out by this study were to look at women who actively engaged in revolutionary violence through membership in a group within the network of a new social movement. In order to define the PRM as a new social movement, the social and historical context of the Palestinian situation needs to be established. The PRM grew out of the Arab defeat in the Six-Day War. It can be seen as the merging of two already existing movements of Fateh and the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM). Although they both came together under the

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<sup>3</sup> Lustick, Ian S. "Terrorism in the Arab-Israeli Conflict." In Crenshaw, Martha, ed. *Terrorism in Context*. (The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, Pennsylvania, 1995) pp. 514-552. p. 535

<sup>4</sup> Nassar, Jamal. "The Culture of Resistance: The 1967 War in the context of the Palestinian struggle," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 19, no. 3, Summer 1997, pp. 77-102. p. 94

Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO)-umbrella, they still have unique and distinct identities. Fateh and the PFLP, the eventual outcome of the ANM, were religiously secular and, to varying degrees, supportive and encouraging of the inclusion of women. In a traditional Arab society this was unusual. The first Intifada and the subsequent, continuing Intifada of 2000 also witnessed female participation. In Arabic society, Palestinian specifically, women will be allowed, maybe even encouraged, to become involved during *crisis*. Yet when the crisis passes, women are expected to once again accept the sexual division of Middle Eastern society. Women are the first to leave PLO-umbrella organisations during peacetime or retreat. During crisis, a woman's role will be gendered—to struggle and suffer as mothers, sisters or daughters in order to protect what is theirs: home, husbands and children. Mothers are expected to raise fighters; a woman's strategy is one of sacrifice and suffering. Yet one does see Palestinian women breaking out of this norm. Why?

Ideology is the key difference between the 1967 Resistance and the Intifadas. While Fateh and the ANM/ PFLP did not espouse Islamic views, the leadership that emerged from the first Intifada did. Hamas (zeal), the acronym for *Harakat al-Muqawwama al-Islamiyya* (Islamic Resistance Movement), gained mass support in 1987 that continued after the Oslo peace process. With its immediate connection to the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas is distinctly Islamic with the creation of a politically Islamic Palestinian state as a goal. The Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s decided that society needed to be “re-Islamised.” This included creating social and welfare services to compete with the PLO's. Hamas was its militia.<sup>5</sup> A major trend has been the use of self-martyrdom as a tactic by Islamic groups, like Hamas and Hizb'allah, and is reminiscent of Dollard's frustration-aggression theory. As mentioned in *Chapter One*,

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<sup>5</sup> Kristianasen, Wendy. “Challenge and Counterchallenge: Hamas's response to Oslo,” *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXVIII, no. 3, Spring 1999, pp. 19-36. p. 20

Dollard felt a person's aggression would be directed at the source of their frustration and even displaced, as in the cases of suicide and martyrdom.<sup>6</sup>

Self-martyrdom is not a tactic PFLP members will employ because it limits the role of the person involved—they can never again participate—and it targets and kills innocent civilians.<sup>7</sup> Both Fateh and the PFLP's end goal is the establishment of a democratic and non-sectarian Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. This freedom from Islamic doctrine allows for the participation of women. However, over the past 35 years, both of these groups have struggled to retain female members. Yet, women have been a continued presence. Presently in the PFLP, two women are on the Politburo, one, Leila Khaled, is on the Central Committee.<sup>8</sup> These low numbers may be in stark contrast with other Marxist groups created at the same time, yet they are reflective of the society in which the PFLP exists. While Leila Khaled said current PFLP membership is split between the sexes, “[the] first to leave are women.”<sup>9</sup> Thus, the societal context of Islam and the history behind Palestinian nationalism is necessary in order to understand how women “fit” into the PRM of 1967.

What then do women face in the social context of the Middle East? Nahla Abdo explains that Palestinian society lives under three sets of laws: “formal ‘state’ or civil laws; the unwritten customary laws; and the religious laws, *shari’a*, governing personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance and so on).”<sup>10</sup> Customary laws “continue to predominate over written laws,” especially over gender issues, a woman's personal and bodily sovereignty and sexuality. Religious laws “reinforce and overlap customary laws.” Religious communities are responsible for the issues listed above, including

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<sup>6</sup> Dollard wrote that aggression could be directed towards the source of frustration through such acts as “martyrdom [and] suicide.” (Dollard, John; Miller, Neal E. Doob, Leonard N.; Merver, O.H.; Sears, Robert R. *Frustration and Aggression*. (Keegan Paul: London, 1944) p. 5)

<sup>7</sup> Khaled, Leila, Interviewed in Amman, Jordan, 6<sup>th</sup> March 2002, pp. 1-24. p. 3

<sup>8</sup> Ibid, p. 17

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 20

<sup>10</sup> Abdo, Nahla. “Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXVIII, Winter 1999, no. 2, pp. 38-51. p. 43

dowries, alimony and child custody. Therefore, “it is *shari’a* law that governs the most important aspects of a Palestinian woman’s life.<sup>11</sup> The origins of the shari’a and its gendered interpretation are rooted in the history of Islam.

Leila Ahmed argues that Islamic patriarchy and its androcentric laws were established, not by Muhammad, but by the Umyyad and Abbasid periods’ interpretations of the Quran. Ahmed suggests Muhammad’s intention for an egalitarian interpretation of the Quran would serve as a foil to Aristotle’s “gender-based understanding of the nature of virtue.”<sup>12</sup> (Aristotle’s establishment of Western patriarchy is discussed in *Chapter Two*.) Throughout her book, Ahmed emphasises the early records of Muhammad’s respectful treatment of women, especially his wives. She also quotes this section of the Quran to affirm “the absolute moral and spiritual equality of men and women

For Muslim men and women,—  
For believing men and women,  
For devout men and women,  
For true [truthful] men and women,  
For men and women who are  
Patient and constant, for men  
And women who humble themselves,  
For men and women who give  
In charity, for men and women  
Who fast (and deny themselves),  
For men and women who  
Guard their chastity, and  
For men and women who  
Engage much in God’s praise,—  
For them has God prepared  
Forgiveness and great reward. (Sura 33:35)<sup>13</sup>

The equality of men and women’s spiritual nature is relatively ignored in modern Islam, mainly due to “the law as developed in the Abbasid age.”<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, p. 44

<sup>12</sup> Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam. (Yale University Press: London, 1992) p. 65. See also Nikki R. Keddi’s introduction in: Keddi, Nikki R. and Baron, Beth, eds. Women in Middle Eastern History: Shifting boundaries in sex and gender. (Yale University Press: London, 1991)

<sup>13</sup> Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 64-65

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, p. 88

Patrilineal marriage, with the control of women by men, existed in Arabia before Muhammad preached Islam. Islam chose this custom, along with others, from Arabian tribal societies. Central to Islam “were the pre-eminence given to paternity and the vesting in the male the proprietary rights to female sexuality and its issue.” These changes “reformulated the nexus of sexuality and power between men and women.”<sup>15</sup> During the Abbasid period (750-1258) the institution of androcentric laws and vision were established that have influenced Islam ever since. It was during the Abbasid era when “the words *women*, and *slave* and *object for sexual use* came close to being indistinguishably focused.”<sup>16</sup> In contrast to Muhammad’s time, during the Abbasid period women had no verbal power: “women were so debased that even their kinship with a great man could not have rendered their words worthy of note.”<sup>17</sup> This is linked by Ahmed to the passing of a new (as of 1992) regulation in Pakistan “where the testimony of two women is adjudged equal to that of one man.”<sup>18</sup> The origins of the social stigma of marrying a non-virgin are also found in the Abbasid era. Wealthy women could stipulate in marriage contracts independence and a monogamous marriage, but this would soon change.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, women of the Abbasid period were further removed from public life and the community. Elite and bourgeois women lived in seclusion; wealthier women were also guarded by eunuchs.<sup>20</sup> Women in Islam had no control “over their sexual, psychological and emotional lives.” The only tools left to women were “manipulation, poison and falsehood—the means of the powerless.”<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 45-56

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, p. 67

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, p. 73

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, p. 74

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, pp. 75-78

<sup>20</sup> Ahmed, op. cit., p. 79

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, p. 85

The idea of women in Islam as property, as objects, as strictly private, with little importance placed upon her voice and her experience is still a modern concern. The control of women in Afghanistan (still an anxiety even after the removal of the Taliban) and Pakistan and Hamas' control of women principally in Gaza, but also in the West Bank, during the first Intifada, are a few examples. Fatima Mernissi agrees gender divisions still exist in modern Islam. Women "are considered by Allah to be a destructive element, they are to be spatially confined and excluded from matters other than those of the family."<sup>22</sup> A classical Muslim thought prevails, "women [are] unable to judge what is good and what is bad."<sup>23</sup> This explains why women have predominantly been assigned "subordinate position[s] and status informed their perception of their abilities and the parameters of their social activities."<sup>24</sup> As far as actual law goes, a Palestinian woman and her children are assigned the same citizenship as her husband.<sup>25</sup> Until 1996 women still needed their male guardians to acquire travel documents for them. Honour killings, when a male family member is "justified" in killing a female relative who has dishonoured the family, still happen.<sup>26</sup> This is something that the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) is currently trying to end by asking for a change in the penal code to make "crimes of honour as premeditated crimes that have no legal justification."<sup>27</sup>

One must also keep in mind Simona Sharoni's warning not to stereotype Middle Eastern women as powerless by buying into the Western view of a veiled woman. This study is trying to depict just a few of the strong women who have participated in the

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<sup>22</sup> Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female dynamics in modern Muslim society. (Al-Saqi Books: London, 1985) p. 18

<sup>23</sup> Ibid, p. 168

<sup>24</sup> Peteet, Julie. Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement. (Columbia University Press: New York, 1991) p. 110

<sup>25</sup> Abdo, op. cit., p. 43

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, pp. 43-44

<sup>27</sup> General Union of Palestinian Women, "The National Strategy for the Advancement of Palestinian Women: Part Three. In the Legal Realm." [www.gupw.org/publications/st5.htm](http://www.gupw.org/publications/st5.htm), site accessed 24<sup>th</sup> September, 2002.

Palestinian struggle. While trying not to subsume Palestinian women to the image of the veil (‘veil’ is used metaphorically for the creation and continued belief in the differences between Western and Middle Eastern Women), the understanding of a woman’s place within traditional Islamic society is undeniably important to this study. If one was to only see Muslim women as veiled—“powerless and voiceless”—then they would be buying into an Orientalist stereotype. It would also “creat[e] the illusion that gender equality and women’s liberation [has] already been achieved in Western countries.”<sup>28</sup> New Social Movement theory demands that the researcher understand the historical and societal context of the movement and people under study. Accordingly, this study does not try to declare the women in the West as freer than Palestinian women. It is trying to understand the context in which Palestinian women struggle.

It is of interest to note that women in early Islam also participated in warfare. They tended to the men on the field and to the wounded, but they also fought. One of Muhammad’s wives, Umm ‘Umara, fought with such effectiveness that Muhammad observed “she acquitted herself better than many men.” She fought until she lost her hand in battle. In one early Islamic sect, the Khariji, mandated that, as men do, women participate in *jihad* (waging war) as it was a religious duty like prayer, pilgrimage, fasting and almsgiving.<sup>29</sup> Contrary to what one might expect even in more recent times, women have participated in Islamic militaries and revolutions. Women were heavily involved in the Algerian revolution against the French; women fought against the Taliban in Afghanistan during their rise to power; and the Iranian Mujahidin have all-female combatant units.<sup>30</sup> In 1981, Qaddafi opened Libyan military schools and

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<sup>28</sup> Sharoni, Simona. Gender and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: The politics of women’s resistance. (Syracuse University Press: Syracuse, NY, 1995) pp. 27-28

<sup>29</sup> Ahmed, op. cit., p. 70

<sup>30</sup> Coughlin, Kathryn M. “Women, War and the Veil: Muslim women in resistance and combat.” In DeGroot, Gerard J. and Peniston-Bird, Corinna, eds. A Soldier and a Woman: Sexual integration in the military. (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, 2000) pp. 223-239. p. 226

colleges to “Libyan Arab girls [and]...all the girls of the Arab nation and Africa.” His Republican Guard and his personal bodyguards are women.<sup>31</sup>

During crisis, like the Intifada, women who were not normally allowed out of the home have participated in the defence of the home and community.<sup>32</sup> Previously prohibited behaviour was “reconceptualised and filtered through a nationalistic lens.”<sup>33</sup> A woman’s involvement in politics is similar to the growth of Palestinian nationalism—“it is located in the historical and social specificity” of the challenges to Palestinian self-determination.<sup>34</sup> Women have always participated, but the manner in which they participate is constantly shifting.<sup>35</sup> A woman’s involvement is also shaped by the society and the culture, both of which have been challenged by the changing Palestinian situation. In the PRM, the involvement of men and women is drawn along class lines. The women who participate are mainly educated and from the bourgeois class, where society’s attitude is more lenient towards women.<sup>36</sup> Even though women are allowed to do more outside the home, they are still typically involved in traditional occupations, nursing, cooking and concealing people. They carry out the plans others, men, have made.<sup>37</sup> But does this make the women housekeepers as Weinburg and Eubank would theorise; does this prove Neuberger and Valentini’s maternal-sacrifice code?

A woman represents “the status of power” within the society and community, thus, if all is well, it is important to keep a woman in her ‘place.’ She “uphold[s] its honour;” she will do what is necessary, like taking on untraditional roles, to carry this

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<sup>31</sup> Ibid, p. 232

<sup>32</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 3

<sup>33</sup> Ibid, p. 32

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, p. 40

<sup>35</sup> Jawwad, Islah Abdul. “The Palestinian Woman’s Movement in the Uprising.” In Hudson, Michael C., ed. *The Palestinians: New directions*. (Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 63-76. p. 68

<sup>36</sup> Kazi, Hamida. “Palestinian Women and the National Liberation Movements.” In Khamsin Collective, *Women in the Middle East*. (Zed Books: London, 1987) pp. 26-39. p. 26

<sup>37</sup> Hatem, Mervat. “Toward the Development of Post-Islamist and Post-Nationalist Feminist Discourse in the Middle East.” In Tucker, Judith, ed. *Arab Women: Old boundaries, new frontiers*. (Indiana University Press: Bloomington, IN, 1993) pp. 29-48. p. 42

honour.<sup>38</sup> It is not the lack of politicisation which limits a woman's involvement, it is "on account of social constraints...[and] women are incorporated in the struggle as the necessity arises." Like the experience of women involved in the Italian Red Brigades as mentioned in *Chapter Two* or the complexity of Meinhof's decision to join, women in the Middle East "comment that political consciousness is more intense and sociologically meaningful." This reconstruction of society "implies a questioning of the gender order and domesticity." Yet the reconstruction of society is not yet complete. In an interview, Amal, an unmarried activist, said, "For a girl like me there's no going back." Women and girls who are active against their families' wishes

cannot return to a state of existence where others make decisions for them. Formal political participation, in a traditionally nonfemale arena, implies a challenge to what is, in effect, proper female comportment.<sup>39</sup>

This brief explanation of women in Middle Eastern society begins to answer the problems a woman might face when becoming politically active. But where will their energies go? What groups and movements did the women find open to them? In the sixties, it was 'easier' for a woman to participate, because at that time, the PRM was mainly independent of Islamic ideology. That differs from the dominating role of Islam in Palestinian groups currently.

### **The Movement**

When studying new social movements, leading theorist Alain Touraine challenges the researcher to "come face-to-face" with the social movement.<sup>40</sup> The researcher must understand the social and historical context of the struggle. The social reality of Middle Eastern women was established above, what now needs to be

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<sup>38</sup> Peteet, Julie. "Authenticity and Gender: The presentations of culture." In Tucker, op. cit., pp. 49-62. p. 53

<sup>39</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., pp. 69-70

<sup>40</sup> Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements.* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 142

discussed is the historical context of the PRM preceding 1967. Its leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and its revolutionary dimension must be discussed. One criticism of New Social Movement theory is its lack of understanding on the micro, personal interaction/ decision-making level.<sup>41</sup> Because of this, leadership and individual participation has been overlooked. The role of leaders within a new social movement must be understood in order to appreciate where female members were placed along the hierarchy. Additionally, membership recruitment and mobilisation must be studied. New social movements are known for establishing networks, from where they could draw new or more active members and additional information.<sup>42</sup> The solidarity a network forms is cemented by collective action.<sup>43</sup> Additionally, something discussed further in relation to Palestinian women is the importance to an individual of “the feeling of belonging and identity” which comes from participation in various actions.<sup>44</sup> Belonging is important to all members, not just the women. Collective action is guided by ideology and a belief system. New social movements are based upon personal/communal identities which “[stand]...against the ravages of history.”<sup>45</sup> It is the long-lasting, deeply felt ideology which sustains the actors.<sup>46</sup>

New social movements do eventually falter and fragment. This could be attributed to a variety of reasons including: frustration, because some movements are not operating in democracies where legitimate channels of political protest are

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<sup>41</sup> Hastings, Margaret Denton. “Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements,” *New Zealand Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, November 1998, pp. 208-238. p. 213

<sup>42</sup> Melucci, Alberto. “An End to Social Movements? Introductory paper to the sessions on ‘new social movements and change in organisational forms,” *Social Science Information*, vol. 23, nos. 4/5, 1984, pp. 819-835. p. 829

<sup>43</sup> della Porta, Donatella and Diani, Mario. *Social Movements: An introduction*. (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 1999) p. 88

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p. 17

<sup>45</sup> Mueller, Carol McClurg. “Building Social Movement Theory.” In Morris, Aldon and Mueller, Carol McClurg, eds. *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*. (Yale University Press: London, 1992) pp. 3-25. p. 16

<sup>46</sup> Touraine, op. cit., p. 98

available<sup>47</sup>; relative deprivation, which happens when a person's expectations are not realised and may move this person towards political protest and political violence<sup>48</sup>; or co-optation, when some groups in the movement's network become mainstream while others, reactively, move into riotous factions.<sup>49</sup> The real danger occurs when the movement fragments, leaving behind a more zealous "micro-party."<sup>50</sup> In the case of the PRM, frustration<sup>51</sup>, relative deprivation<sup>52</sup> and co-optation<sup>53</sup> have all played a part. The PRM did not need the movement to fragment before the negative, revolutionary dimension formed. Due to the nature of the movement and the frustration of the Palestinian people, as will be made evident shortly, the violent dimension of the PRM, within the groups of Fateh and the ANM, were always apparent. What this section does is establish the context in which women were joining the PRM. The leadership hierarchy, membership network and mobilisation, collective action and group ideology and the revolutionary dimension must be analysed in order to understand a Palestinian woman's position within the PRM.

### Historical Context

In order to understand the PRM as a new social movement, the Palestinian historical context must first be clarified. In the aftermath of the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, there were an estimated 960,000 Palestinian refugees receiving United

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<sup>47</sup> Huntington, Samuel. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University Press: London, 1968) pp. 54-55

<sup>48</sup> Gurr, Tedd Robert. Why Men Rebel. (Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey, 1970) p. 13

<sup>49</sup> Melucci, op. cit., pp. 830-831

<sup>50</sup> Touraine, op. cit., p. 150

<sup>51</sup> The PRM was frustrated with the reticent Arab regimes to engage with Israel or other perceived enemies on behalf of the Palestinians.

<sup>52</sup> Deprivation due to the situational poverty of the camps and the Palestinians lowly status as refugees.

<sup>53</sup> The PFLP have rejected the PLO's more mainstream approach as it is perceived as a betrayal or a selling out of the Palestinian cause.

Nations' aid throughout the Middle East.<sup>54</sup> In the last month of 1947 and in the first four and a half months of 1948, 350 villages, or more, were destroyed and 500,000 to 1,000,000 Palestinians were refugees.<sup>55</sup> *Al-nakba*, “the disaster,” was followed by *al-ghurbah*, “the exile”—“terms that evoke sentiments of loss alienation, tragedy and betrayal. The year 1948 marks the transition from the tangibility of Palestine to a state of exile.”<sup>56</sup> The Arab armies, who promised to defend the Palestinians against the Zionist settlers and the Jewish Defence Force, underestimated the Israeli power. The Syrian President was recorded as saying, “[O]ur Army and its equipment are of the highest order and well able to deal with a few Jews.” By the time the Arab armies of Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt entered Palestine on May 15, 1948, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Tiberias, other towns and villages, along with strategic routes, were already lost to the Haganha, the Palmach and the Irgun forces.<sup>57</sup> The direct attacks on Palestinian villages served to highlight the lack of Arab and Palestinian leadership and of arms. There was no Palestinian authority, no united Arab leadership, there was not even a plan for mass evacuation.<sup>58</sup>

Though some evacuations were organised in cities like Haifa, most Palestinians left only when the war reached their doorstep and only when it became absolutely necessary. They left thinking they could return, they “never imagined that they could be prevented from returning to their homes once the War was over.”<sup>59</sup> This created the idea of return—a hope that was carried within the exiled Palestinian community. While Palestine is the “Paradise Lost,” there has never been the “tendency to paint the past in

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<sup>54</sup> Chaliand, Gérard. *The Palestinian Resistance*. (Penguin Books: Harmondsworth, 1972) p. 33

<sup>55</sup> Migdal, Joel S. and Kimmerling, Baruch. *Palestinians: The making of a people*. (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1994) p. 148

<sup>56</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 19

<sup>57</sup> Khalidi, Rashid. *Palestinian Identity: The construction of modern national consciousness*. (Columbia University Press: New York, 1997) p. 27

<sup>58</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary. *Palestinians: From peasants to revolutionaries*. (Zed Books: London, 1979) pp. 64-66

<sup>59</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, op. cit., p. 68

unreal colours.” The Palestinians see continuity between the struggles before the creation of Israel and the struggle from outside, after the flight. It is this depiction of Palestine “as a precious land coveted by others” which is “linked to this image...of tenacious peasant struggle to hold on to their land, in spite of the superior force of the enemy.”<sup>60</sup> Even 50 years after al-nakba and 35 years after the Six-Day War, the PFLP still believes the struggle will not be won anytime soon. It is a generational struggle and not one easily resolved.

The Return was not an idea born of the politicians. It was an idea stemming from nearly a million leaderless people. David Hirst writes,

The whole mystique of The Return...dominated everything, but violence, a just and necessary violence, was an inevitable sub-theme. The Return shaped camp rituals and regalia; children were steeped in it from birth.<sup>61</sup>

Following 1948, there was no Palestinian leadership. Amin al-Husseini tried to establish the All Palestine Government in Gaza, only to have it worn down by the Egyptians and the Arab League “to window dressing.” Those that joined the Hashemite government in Jordan distanced themselves, implicitly or explicitly, from the rest of the Palestinian population. The years between 1948 and 1967 “marked a certain limbo.” As much as possible the old social institutions of family, clan and village were re-established and “reinvigorated” within the camps inside and outside of the occupied territory. They offered familiarity when everything else, including the attitudes of the host countries, seemed so unwelcoming. The old Palestinian leadership had failed and the leaders and movements that would form the 1967 Palestinian Resistance Movement were not yet politicised or present.<sup>62</sup> The rebirth of Palestinian nationalism in 1967 would in no way

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 58

<sup>61</sup> Hirst, David. *The Gun and the Olive Branch*. (Faber and Faber: London, 1977) pp. 265-266

<sup>62</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, op. cit., pp. 185-187 and 195-196. See also Khalidi, op. cit., p. 27

draw upon the old leadership, mainly from the elite of pre-1948, for they were seen as having “lost” Palestine.<sup>63</sup>

Alienation is a major theme one must think about when considering the life of the Palestinian refugee in the 1950s and 1960s. Not only were they living outside their homeland, but there was a segregation of the refugees from their host countries. Within the camps, the Palestinians clung to the memory of Palestine and vision of The Return. These two ideals contrasted with the poverty and humiliation of camp life. Outside the camp, the refugees were treated with disdain. While the Arab regimes “called them [brother]” the Palestinian refugees “were often made to feel despised and unwanted.”<sup>64</sup> The suffering caused by the isolation and disdain created “a new diaspora consciousness.”<sup>65</sup> In Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan, “the Palestinians remained politically disenfranchised.”<sup>66</sup> In many of the Arab host countries, like Lebanon and Jordan, Palestinians were not allowed to create their own organisations. Organisations, nonetheless, were created. The Jaffa Muslim Sports Club and the Haifa Cultural Association in Nablus were for Palestinians only. Organisations, such as this, “helped...to keep alive the memory of now inaccessible places and to create new bases of association.”<sup>67</sup> Between 1959 and 1963 in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan and other host countries in the Middle East, somewhere around 40 organisations each with membership close to 400 were created. These groups expressed a “frustration with the passivity of their parents—as well as with the Arab states’ propensity to use the Palestinian issue for their own purposes.”<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 180

<sup>64</sup> Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 268

<sup>65</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, pp. 195 and 202-203

<sup>66</sup> Sayigh, Yezid. *Armed Struggle and the Search for State*. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1997) pp. 40 and 52-53

<sup>67</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, p. 195

<sup>68</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, p. 208

Pan-Arabism was the overriding ideology of the first half of the twentieth century; it climaxed with Nasir's rise to power in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>69</sup> Palestinians were more "Nasirist than Nasir," because they gained the most from this greater Arab unity where state and individual nationality were not as important. Arab nationalism promoted

the beliefs that the Arab people constitute a single political community or nation, which should be either independent and united under a common government or a set of independent and united states.<sup>70</sup>

Arab nationalism could be broken down into two camps. The Hashemite/ Jordanian Arab nationalism was based upon an ideal of confederal unity. Nasir was more radical in advocating a single political Arab unity. These two conflicting camps made it difficult for any "consistent action."<sup>71</sup> Like many other nationalist ideologies, self-determination was the core concept. Arab nationalism grew in response to colonialism, imperialism and, most especially, Zionism. The Palestinian conflict was placed within the larger context of pan-Arabism's fight against imperialism and colonialism.<sup>72</sup> Unity was thought to be the only way to achieve Palestinian liberation; Palestinian organisations and leadership "were secondary to the plethora of Arab political movements."<sup>73</sup> Although the treatment of the Palestinians by the Arabs was often tense, the Palestinians gave them "their main allegiance...as an indirect means of promoting their own."<sup>74</sup>

The blind faith in an ultimate Arab victory soothed the Palestinians, "creating a mood of patient, loyal waiting rather than one of anger and action."<sup>75</sup> During the

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<sup>69</sup> Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 181

<sup>70</sup> Hirst, *op. cit.*, pp. 272-273

<sup>71</sup> Schulz, Helena Linholm. The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between revolution and statehood. (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1999) p. 31

<sup>72</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196

<sup>73</sup> Quandt, William B.; Jabber, Fuad; Lesch, Ann Mosely. The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism. (University of California Press: London, 1973) p. 49

<sup>74</sup> Khalidi, *op. cit.*, p. 181

<sup>75</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, *op. cit.*, p. 68

limbo, Palestinians, thanks in large part to United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) schools,<sup>76</sup> were becoming highly educated people. These educated Palestinians began to lead and agitate in ways that the old leadership was not willing to do.<sup>77</sup> A small number of Palestinians saw that the pan-Arab groups were only using the Palestinian issue as a way to fulfil their own ambitions. Although this remained a small minority until after the Six-Day War, there was activity both inside and outside the camps. They operated as small, highly secretive, underground cells calling for armed struggle.<sup>78</sup> They recruited cautiously and along “existing ties of family, village or party comradeship.”<sup>79</sup> By the 1960s, with Palestinian guerrilla groups carrying out attacks across the boarder in Israel, Lebanon especially feared retaliatory attacks and conducted harsher surveillance of the camps. In 1962 the Lebanese authorities decreed that any Palestinian who had received military training out of the country was not allowed to re-enter Lebanon.<sup>80</sup>

The patient mood in the camps began to transform into one of frustration, tension and “revolutionary readiness, which Lebanese oppression only made more explosive.”<sup>81</sup> Sayigh points directly at the repressive situation in the camps as one of the major reasons that made The Return all the more important to the Palestinians. No longer could The Return be “postponed until ‘the Arabs [were] ready.’” There was a feeling of re-emerging nationhood that was more about political oppression than class oppression, though class oppression “existed like a foetus in the womb.”<sup>82</sup> The myth-like status of the Return was reflected in the creation of a “quasi-mystical icon of the

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<sup>76</sup> UNRWA schools provided nearly universal elementary education. As one of the most inclusive school systems in the Middle East, by the 1980s 95 percent of all refugee children, girls and boys, attended school. (Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, p. 205)

<sup>77</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, p. 207

<sup>78</sup> Khaled, *op. cit.*, p. 3

<sup>79</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, *op. cit.*, p. 149

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid*, p. 150

<sup>81</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, *op. cit.*, p. 150

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, p. 153

feday.”<sup>83</sup> A military culture had grown in the camps with the passing down of the stories of the struggles the Palestinians had always faced:

A basic dichotomy of ‘struggle/resistance’ and ‘suffering/sacrifice’ gradually came to embody a Palestinian narrative of selfhood and history.<sup>84</sup>

A minor precursor to the disillusionment the Palestinians felt after the Six-Day War was the break up of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1961.<sup>85</sup> This was the union of Egypt and Syria, through Nasir’s influence, and one heavily supported by the members of the ANM. The failure of the UAR served as an example to the Palestinians that pan-Arab unity was probably not a viable option. With the resounding defeat of the Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in June of 1967 by the extremely capable Israeli army, the faith pinned upon pan-Arabism faded. The next four years saw unprecedented hijackings, guerrilla actions, challenges to the Jordanian and Lebanese governments and mass mobilisations within the camps.<sup>86</sup> The immediate realisation among those involved in the movements of Fatch and ANM was that conventional warfare would not defeat Israel. The Palestinians decided it was time to take the conflict into their own hands as “reliance on Arab unity to recover the losses in Palestine might mean an indefinite postponement of their struggle.”<sup>87</sup>

The Six-Day War in June of 1967 provides an easy date with which to pinpoint this phase of Palestinian nationalism and the failure of the Arab regimes in trying to protect and control the Palestinian population. Yet, like many other guerrilla groups across the world, these groups—Fatch and al-Assifa and the PFLP and its offshoots—had been in the works for many years. They are the direct outcome of movements which began in the 1950s. Like in the United States and West Germany of the 1960s,

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<sup>83</sup> ‘Feday’ is the singular form of ‘fedayeen,’ which means “the men who sacrificed themselves” or “guerrillas.”

<sup>84</sup> Schulz, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-38

<sup>85</sup> Hirst, *op. cit.*, p. 273

<sup>86</sup> Quandt et al., *op. cit.*, p. 2

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 50. See also Sayigh, Rosemary, *op. cit.*, p. 147

the universities brought the activists together. Arab universities provided a freedom which allowed the intelligent and highly motivated Palestinian activists to organise. Yasir Arafat founded the *Ittihad talabat Filastin* (The Union of Palestine Students), at Cairo University in 1950, which in 1959 became Fateh, the reverse anagram for *Harakat al-Tabir (al-Watani) al-Filastani* (The Palestine (National) Liberation Movement). George Habash founded the *Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-'Arab* (Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM)), which became the PFLP, at the American University of Beirut (AUB) during the 1951-1952 academic year.

The Union of Palestine Students eventually grew into Fateh's core leadership and was based in Gaza, Cairo and eventually Kuwait. The ANM gradually moved into Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.<sup>88</sup> Both of these groups continued the generational struggle. Rashid Khalidi writes that the "prehistory" of the new generation began in the workplaces, the schools and the universities "where Palestinians congregated in the years after 1948."<sup>89</sup> Rosemary Sayigh agrees that 1967 was the eye-opener for the Palestinians, but the Revolution (the Palestinian Resistance Movement) officially began with Fateh's first operation on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1965, which was a bungled bombing attempt in Israel.<sup>90</sup> The failure of the Arab regimes created a vacuum which these movements, Fateh and the ANM, conceptualised now as the PRM, were more than ready to fill.

Fateh, by far, was the largest movement and became the leading group. By the summer of 1970, it was the largest Palestinian organisation with 5,000-10,000 armed men. It was funded from a variety of sources, including Libya, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Algeria and from private Palestinian supplies.<sup>91</sup> The ANM, beset by fragmentation and with ideological debates, remained smaller in numbers and financing. It was still quite important and in 1968 turned into the PFLP. The PFLP, in contrast to

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<sup>88</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., pp. 82-83

<sup>89</sup> Khalidi, op. cit., pp. 179-180

<sup>90</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, op. cit., p. 147

<sup>91</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., p. 66

Fateh, remained a middle-sized group by 1970 with only 1,000-3,000 armed men and Iraq as its main source of funding.<sup>92</sup> The ideology of the PFLP presented a threat to the Arab world. While Fateh may have been frustrated with Arab reluctance, it never advocated a full-fledged revolution within the Arab world as the PFLP did. This explanation makes it obvious why Fateh managed to get such a diverse source of funding while the PFLP did not.<sup>93</sup> Fateh has tried to remain secular and free of any overriding ideology. Due to a large number of Muslims in Fateh, however, “Muslim religious motivations are clearly more apparent in Fateh;” whereas, the ANM/ PFLP leadership came from Christian backgrounds.<sup>94</sup> The ANM over time turned from Nasirism to Marxism-Leninism.<sup>95</sup> Because of the two groups’ secular ideologies, women were involved in both as support members and guerrillas.

### Leadership

In a new social movement, leaders are responsible for recruiting and retaining members, planning actions, providing exciting ideology and creating a compelling atmosphere. Leadership is especially relevant when studying Fateh and the ANM/ PFLP. Arafat and Habash led each respectively for so long, they were accused of creating personality cults. They are often described as charismatic leaders, which according to Max Weber can only

be applied to a certain quality of an individual by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid, p. 66

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, p. 62

<sup>94</sup> Amos II, John W. Palestinian Resistance: Organisation of a nationalist movement. (Pergamon Press: New York, 1980) pp. 33-34

<sup>95</sup> With the break-up of the Soviet Union, the PFLP dropped Leninism while remaining Marxist. (Khaled, op. cit., pp. 8-9)

<sup>96</sup> Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation. (Oxford University Press: New York, 1947) p. 358

Weber continues to clarify those leaders which can be considered charismatic— prophets, mystics and communal leaders. Charismatic authority “is sharply opposed both to rational, and particularly bureaucratic authority, and to traditional authority.” It exists “outside the realm of everyday routine.”<sup>97</sup> Therefore, neither Arafat nor Habash had the same qualities as, for example, David Koresh, but they were still two dominating figures. Although Fateh was ideologically secular and the ANM/ PFLP was Nasirist/ Marxist-Leninist, and both had female members, at the beginning neither had high-ranking female members. When looking at the two groups, Arafat and Habash are the most relevant leaders of the early group.

Fateh’s ability to dominate the PRM is often attributed to the continuity of its leadership. Yasir Arafat’s staying power is quite evident; he is still the leader of the PLO and the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 2002. Arafat is said to be a “moder[ate] and flexib[le]” leader. This flexibility has allowed for stability and coalition building within and outside of the PLO.<sup>98</sup> His leadership was also prescient enough to continue to involve rival organisations on the executive committee and as a part of the Palestinian National Council (PNC). Fateh found backing in all classes, but the leadership came mainly from the same social background: the educated, small and middle bourgeoisie— as it did with many of the Resistance groups throughout the world.<sup>99</sup>

The ANM began as a strongly pro-Nasirist, anti-Hashemite movement with goals to unify, like Nasir, the Arab nation, liberate it from imperialism and find vengeance for al-nakba. Unlike Arafat, Greek Orthodox Dr. George Habash was not the undisputed leader of the ANM and the PFLP. While working on his medical degree at AUB, he became involved in a student group, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa* (The Firm Tie), of

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid, p. 361

<sup>98</sup> Amos, op. cit., p. 50

<sup>99</sup> Sayigh, Rosemary, op. cit., p. 185 and Amos, op. cit., p. 44

which he eventually became president.<sup>100</sup> In the 1950s, after being recognised as one of the prominent leaders of the ANM, Habash turned to Syria and Egypt for support. During the Syrian-Egyptian union of the UAR, the ANM remained loyal to Nasir. In 1959, the ANM was recognised for this and received funding and support from the UAR. Thus, when the union broke apart in 1961, Habash was forced to flee Syria for Lebanon, where he continued organising the more moderate, pro-Nasir faction of the ANM. By 1961, Wadi Haddad, a middle-class Greek Orthodox Christian like Habash, and Syrian Hani al-Hindi were also leaders of the movement. Al-Hindi was the son of a Colonel in the Iraqi army, whose experience in Palestine politicised his son.<sup>101</sup> Thus, like the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction, the obvious leaders and ideologues of the Palestinian movement were privileged Palestinians.<sup>102</sup>

In order to fully understand the importance of Arafat's and Habash's leadership skills, an overview of the membership level and activity is needed. Each man's different abilities as a leader led to differing results in Fateh and the ANM/ PFLP's ability towards recruiting members, creating networks and establishing the all important solidarity.

### Membership

Membership in new social movements is important; one can think of the general category of membership as composed of the groups, the network and, abstractly, the movement's solidarity. Touraine defined three different components of a social movement, two of which are identity and opposition. Within identity, how the member defines him or herself and the ideology they hold as important are part of this.

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<sup>100</sup> Kazziha, Walid. Revolutionary Transformations in the Arab World: Habash and his comrades from Nationalism to Marxism. (Charles Knight and Co.: London, 1975) pp. 18-19

<sup>101</sup> Kazziha, op. cit., p. 19

<sup>102</sup> AbuKhalil, "PFLP, Decision Making and Policy Orientation," *The Middle East Journal*, vol. 41, no. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 361-378, p. 365

Defining themselves in opposition to what they are not strengthens solidarity between the members.<sup>103</sup> The networks that structure a movement are also very important for creating solidarity. What will be seen in this section is how Fateh and the ANM created networks throughout the Arab world in order to draw in new members. Within the longer struggle, solidarity was very important to the Palestinians in this new movement. Arafat, as the leader of Fateh, knew how to keep the group from dissolving and his power is shown with his takeover of the PLO. Habash found group governance more challenging. This is demonstrated through the evolution of the ANM into the PFLP and beyond.

After being established in the universities, Fateh and the ANM were the dominant movements of the 1950s. Both were founded by Palestinians who were relatively well-off and did not come from the camps. Consider these numbers: 47 percent of the refugees were peasants or farm workers; 25 percent were petty employees. Some may argue that the Palestinian nationalism displayed in the 1960s was a bottom-up movement, but Helena Lindholm Schulz argues, “the class dimension of the exile and the struggle is striking.” Those who formulated the struggle were from the middle-class, the peasants and labourers constituted the fighters. The organisations that came under the future umbrella of the PLO were “largely an urban, bourgeois phenomenon.” The refugees who did not need to live within the camps because of economic and social means “shunned their Palestinian compatriots” forced to live in the camps. Thus, Schulz sees the Revolution as “an urbanised movement, juxtaposed with rural popular culture.”<sup>104</sup> However, many Palestinians, no matter where they were living, felt frustrated with the Arab states. The young, elite leaders merely capitalised upon and politicised this near-universal feeling.

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<sup>103</sup> Touraine, *The Voice and the Eye...*, op. cit., p. 84

<sup>104</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 42

The refugee camps provided most of the “rank-and-file” members, while recruiting was also carried out among Palestinian student groups at universities in Western Europe, West Germany in particular, and even in the United States.<sup>105</sup> Since Arafat had worked as an engineer in oil-rich countries, like Kuwait, the networks and connections he had made there contributed money. After the UAR break-up in 1961, Syria’s Ba’athist regime, introduced to Fateh by the Algerian *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN), also provided money and a secure base. Syrian sponsorship resulted in al-Assifah (The Storm), the guerrilla arm of Fateh.<sup>106</sup> Syrian funding of Fateh was also a way to embarrass Nasir, who was opposed to guerrilla action.<sup>107</sup> Although Fateh received enormous amounts of money from Arab regimes, the regimes greeted Fateh’s frustrations with suspicion because a Palestinian organisation existed exclusively for the Palestinians and their goals.<sup>108</sup> Fateh tried to build guerrilla groups outside the influence of the Arab states.<sup>109</sup>

William Quandt argues that the PLO was created by the Arab League under Egyptian influence in 1964 as a way to ward off fedayeen activities and to keep the Palestinians under Arab control. The original leaders of it were old Palestinian nationalist elites with Ahmad al-Shuqayri as the dominating presence. Revolutionary armed struggle was not the type of warfare for which the PLO was created. Instead, the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) was a “conventionally trained and equipped army” stationed in Egypt, Iraq and Syria.<sup>110</sup> When the frustration with conventional warfare

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<sup>105</sup> Hirst, op. cit., p. 275

<sup>106</sup> Amos, op. cit., pp. 49-50

<sup>107</sup> Hirst, op. cit., p. 275

<sup>108</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., p. 51

<sup>109</sup> El-Rayyes, Riad and Nahas, Dunia. *Guerrillas for Palestine*. (Portico Publications: London, 1976) p. 35

<sup>110</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., pp. 50-51

grew and the support of fedayeen activity skyrocketed, faith in the PLO as a more conventional, Arab-allied mouthpiece faded.<sup>111</sup>

Fateh took over the PLO at the National Assembly in February 1969 when Arafat was elected chairman of the 15 member executive committee. Many of his Fateh peers were placed within other important positions. Fateh controlled half of the PNC, a parliament which existed in exile. Fateh also gained control of the PLA, whose units now numbered 12,000.<sup>112</sup> Through his position, Arafat was able to participate in “top-level Arab deliberations and maintain official representatives in all Arab countries.” Arafat and his administration went about creating a stronger PLO and worked to resolve the conflicts and division that existed between the various Palestinian revolutionary groups. They created the Palestine Armed Struggle Command (PASC), which became the umbrella under which groups like the PFLP resided. It existed outside the framework of the PLO with the purpose of supervising the military activities of the fedayeen groups. Its initial members were Fateh, Sa’iqa (a Syrian sponsored and created fedayeen group), the PLA and, eventually, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).

In addition to fedayeen activity, Fateh’s takeover of the PLO led to institution-building as a means to unite the Palestinian people. It ran hospitals, schools, social security and tax collecting.<sup>113</sup> In 1965, the GUPW was established within the PLO framework. It represented Palestinian women everywhere in order to improve their “material and moral interests” and “their social, cultural, vocational and living standards.” The GUPW also strove to achieve “equality in all areas of social and

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<sup>111</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, *op. cit.*, p. 222

<sup>112</sup> Sharabi, Hisham. Palestine Guerrillas: Their credibility and effectiveness. (Georgetown University: Washington, D.C., 1970) pp. 28-29

<sup>113</sup> Sharabi, *op. cit.*, p. 28

economic life.”<sup>114</sup> The GUPW does provide a good foil to the PLO’s ambiguity over women’s status, but the struggle to gain equality within Palestinian society continues.

In 1952 the ANM succeeded in mobilising a large number of students. Subsequently, Beirut leadership was given to the second generation so that Habash and other leaders could go to other Arab countries to develop their movement.<sup>115</sup> The ANM tended to attract professionals, teachers, lawyers and doctors, as opposed to Fateh’s more universal attraction.<sup>116</sup> Habash and Haddad started a clinic in Amman, where they met East Bank Jordanian student Nayif Hawatmah. In 1953, the ANM established cells in Tripoli and Tyre and contact with Palestinian refugees on the coast and in the camps was made.<sup>117</sup> The various regional branches were not strongly connected. The cells in Kuwait and Iraq were heavily involved in local politics, which set them apart from the rest of the Movement. In 1959, 1963 and 1965 attempts to form cells in Bahrain were suppressed by the government. Saudi Arabian support was so low that the efforts there were abandoned by 1962.<sup>118</sup> With the advent of the UAR, the ANM moved easily into Syria; but in 1961, half of the members left and some joined the new Syrian regime. Thus, the growth of the ANM in Kuwait, Lebanon and Egypt was more organic; whereas in Jordan, Syria and Iraq it was more deliberate “in accordance with the Movement’s assessment of the political situation in a certain region and its relevance to its overall strategy.”<sup>119</sup>

By 1963, a younger generation joined by Hawatmah was developing a stronger philosophy devoted to Marxist-Leninist revolutionary ideology. The younger generation of the ANM was based in Beirut and with the use of the ANM newsletter, *al-Hurriya (Freedom)*, they began publishing Marxist-Leninist ideology. They were also

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<sup>114</sup> Sharoni, op. cit., p. 62 and Jawwad, op. cit., p. 65

<sup>115</sup> Kazziha, op. cit., p. 25

<sup>116</sup> Amos, op. cit., p. 71

<sup>117</sup> Kazziha, op. cit., pp. 30-31

<sup>118</sup> Ibid, pp. 35-36

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, pp. 43-44

rebelling against the “strict, rigid and uncompromising” personal code of conduct which existed within the ANM. Members could not buy foreign products or show interest in any cause but Arab nationalism. The ANM was “highly centralised” and “highly secretive.”<sup>120</sup> Differing opinions were typically not allowed. Supposedly “flexible centralism” was practiced, but power was concentrated in a “few individuals who were at the top of the hierarchy.”<sup>121</sup> Even while the newer members were agitating, the Executive Committee was expanded to include two new delegates from each Regional Command and permanent members from the new Political Bureau. This attempted to open the decision-making process to junior members and to create dialogue between leadership and the branches. After Habash returned from a Syrian prison, he endorsed these rogue changes while trying to reign in the younger members’ enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism.<sup>122</sup> Yet by 1964 Habash was being criticised by the more militant members for not being conscious enough of the class struggle.<sup>123</sup> Hawatmah “increasingly pushed the Movement to take a more radical stand.” The ideological clash between “the old guard and the new generation, the militants,” would eventually lead to a major organisational split, very similar to the events in the American Movement.<sup>124</sup>

With the advent of the PLO under al-Shuqayri and the challenge of Fateh, Habash created a Palestinian Regional Command, drawing Palestinians away from the ANM Regional Commands with which they had originally been associated. It became a refuge for Habash supporters. The new branch was known as the National Front for the Liberation of Palestine and had as its political and military objectives to act “as a catalyst which would detonate a conventional war between the Arab states” and Israel.

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<sup>120</sup> Kazziha, *op. cit.*, p. 23

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 47

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 76

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 81

This ended with the Six-Day War, when the ANM ‘discovered’ that the Arab states served the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>125</sup> Nasir’s mix of nationalism and socialism “had proved to be a weak basis for mobilising the masses for the recovery of Palestine.”<sup>126</sup> Thus, at the Palestinian Regional Conference in September of 1967, Habash and supporters denounced their “previous strategy” and adopted one of Palestinian revolution, with only lingering hints of pan-Arabism.

Additionally, in 1965 and 1966, several groups were emerging with loose ties to the ANM: the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) and the Vengeance Youth. Ahmad Jibril conducted military attacks against Israel from late 1966 until the Six-Day War with his organisation, the PLF. Jibril also received funding and training from Fateh.<sup>127</sup> Wajih al-Mandani, a commander from the PLA, led the National Front, also known as the Heroes of the Return. Hawatmah and other Palestinians created the Vengeance Youth in 1965 in opposition to the Heroes of the Return’s connection to the PLA. During December 1967 and January 1968, negotiations were conducted to unite the PLF, the Heroes of the Return and the Vengeance Youth.<sup>128</sup> The PFLP emerged under the direction of Habash on the 11<sup>th</sup> of December 1967. The first political statement said the merger was the “unity of all those forces which realise that the nature and dimensions of the battles and the forces opposed to it make it imperative to rally the revolutionary ranks of our people.”<sup>129</sup>

In 1968, Habash was imprisoned in Syria after asking to conduct raids on Israel from Syria and for the release of arms intended for the PFLP that Syria had intercepted. It has been suggested that Jibril and Hawatmah were jealous or tired of Habash’s

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<sup>125</sup> Kazziha, *op. cit.*, p. 84

<sup>126</sup> AbuKhalil, *op. cit.*, p. 362

<sup>127</sup> Quandt et al., *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60

<sup>128</sup> Amos, *op. cit.*, p. 77. See also AbuKhalil, *op. cit.*, pp. 362-363

<sup>129</sup> El-Rayyes and Nahas, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-37

control of the PFLP.<sup>130</sup> During his seven and a half month absence, the more militant and left-wing members tried to take over. Numerically they were stronger than the Habash supporters, but they did not have the skills to enforce their doctrine. In the fall of 1968, Jibril left the PFLP to establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), also known as the al-Aqsa Fedayeen Front.<sup>131</sup> Habash escaped in November 1968 and his reassertion of authority led to disagreements with Hawatmah. Hawatmah was twelve years younger than Habash and part of the generation politicised by 1967, and thus more zealous.<sup>132</sup> Fighting was fierce and continued into early 1969, “with the better-armed Habash faction using force to intimidate the younger, more ideologically sophisticated dissidents.” To resolve this bitter dispute, they turned to Fateh for mediation. In February 1969, Hawatmah’s PDFLP was recognised by the PLO as a group independent of the PFLP.<sup>133</sup>

#### Collective Action and Group Ideology

Momentum is extremely important to a new social movement and its collective action, which is often based upon ideology. The momentum can be seen as creating the *zeitgeist*, which often defines a movement. Collective actions help to create solidarity and are a place for movement members to channel their energies. The ideology, which informs what actions a group will make, at this precarious point in a new social movement, often espouses the “[c]reation of a new order,” which is more “rational or more national.”<sup>134</sup> The development of Fateh’s ideology and their subsequent first action in 1965 are perfect examples of the leadership knowing what the members and the general public wanted from Fateh—action. The PFLP advocated mass

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<sup>130</sup> AbuKhalil, op. cit., p. 364. See also Chaliand, op. cit., pp. 84-85

<sup>131</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., pp. 62-63

<sup>132</sup> Amos, op. cit., p. 70

<sup>133</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., p. 63

<sup>134</sup> Touraine, Alain, “An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements,” *Social Research*, Winter 1985, pp. 749-787. p. 755

mobilisation, but it was riddled with internal divisions. Where Arafat had complete control of Fateh; Habash was not able to keep the PFLP unified and this hindered the PFLP's mass mobilisation and popular war. The PFLP did finally manage to overcome its problems and create the most notorious acts of international 'external operations' by hijacking foreign airplanes.

Fateh began to publish *Filastinuna* (*Our Palestine: The call to life*) as a means to publicise Fateh's strategy "of provoking the Arab states into a war that...would eventually end Israeli control of Palestine." It also created a forum for discussion on the Palestinian cause. The frustration of the Palestinians and of those involved in Fateh was clearly written about in *Filastinuna* of August 1964:

'The days pass; the conferences are held; the Arab military experts' conference; the Arab resources conference; the Arab Foreign Ministers' conference; the Arab Information Ministers' conference; the Jerusalem conference. ...If we Palestinians take a look at ourselves, we find that we are going round in an empty circle of inter-Arab rivalries....'<sup>135</sup>

Fateh felt that the ultimate realisation of Arab unity was through the repatriation of Palestinians. Fateh hoped to "liquid[ate] the Zionist aggressor-state politically, militarily, socially and ideologically." Fateh's revolution would end in the Democratic State of Palestine, where acceptance of Jews as citizens was inevitable. Fateh understood there could be no removal of the Jewish population from this contested area. The Palestine of tomorrow would be:

'progressive, democratic, non-sectarian...in which Christian, Muslim and Jew will worship, live peacefully and enjoy equal rights.'<sup>136</sup>

This, along with Fateh's insistence on military action, did not sit well with Nasir and his followers.<sup>137</sup>

In 1963, Fateh, bored and restless, was ready to end Palestinian inertia. Even though Fateh was still small in size and would risk "hounding and suppression," it

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<sup>135</sup> as cited in Hirst, op. cit., p. 274

<sup>136</sup> Hirst, op. cit., p. 292

<sup>137</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, op. cit., pp. 214-215

wanted to do something. Some of this impatience may have come from Arafat and other leaders visits to Algeria to meet the FLN leaders to discuss ideology and tactics.<sup>138</sup>

In September 1964, *Filastinuma* published:

‘Our people ask “when shall we begin?” It feels that the time has come for it to do something, to throw itself—with all the fury boiling up inside it, with all the fighting strength its sinews can muster, with all the anger that it feels to the depths of its being—to throw itself into battle. ...Our slogan is: let the revolution begin.’<sup>139</sup>

Al-Assifa planted the first bomb in Israel on January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1965.<sup>140</sup> The attempt failed and the bomb did not get planted until January 3<sup>rd</sup>. Even then the Israelis discovered it before detonation. Yet, the publicity of the act “captured the attention and respect of the frustrated Palestinians.” Al-Assifa released a military communiqué on January 1<sup>st</sup>:

Depending on God, believing in the right of our people to struggle to regain their usurped homeland, believing in the duty of *Jihad*, and believing in the support of the world’s free and honest men, [our units carried out a mission on the 31<sup>st</sup> of December 1964].<sup>141</sup>

This marked the early beginning of the PRM.<sup>142</sup>

The PFLP, after rejecting Nasirism, adopted a Marxist-Leninist ideology. As the leader, Habash provided much of the ideology. Habash defined the organisational strategy of the PFLP with the three aspects of popular war: “the leadership of a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist party, a broader national front, and the principle of armed struggle.”<sup>143</sup> The role of the party was to mobilise the workers and peasants “and bas[e] the movement on scientific socialism.” The Front mobilised other national classes and groups willing to fight for liberation. The principle of armed struggle “transform[ed] guerrilla warfare into a people’s war of liberation.” He understood the limits of the popular armed struggle and thus advocated time as a part of the strategy.

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<sup>138</sup> Amos, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>139</sup> as cited in Hirst, op. cit., p. 276

<sup>140</sup> The ANM did not begin actions until late 1966. (Sayigh, Yezid, op. cit., p. 31)

<sup>141</sup> El-Rayyes and Nahas, op. cit., p. 27

<sup>142</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, op. cit., pp. 215 and 219-220

<sup>143</sup> Habash, George. “Al-Hadaf (The Target),” 20<sup>th</sup> December 1969, p. 8, reprinted in English in Sharabi, op. cit., p. 54

The war would prove to be long. To shift the balance-of-power “would constitute a long-term undertaking requiring many years to accomplish, so there [was] no alternative to the long road of protracted struggle and great sacrifice.”<sup>144</sup> Habash believed in the armed struggle’s efficacy of educating and mobilising the masses.<sup>145</sup> During the days of the ANM, the enemy was International Judaism: “all Jews from the far left to the extreme right.”<sup>146</sup> However, as Marxist-Leninist ideology grew, their enemies were specified as Israel, World Zionism, World Imperialism and Arab Reaction.<sup>146</sup> Like Fateh, the PFLP advocated the creation of a democratic, non-sectarian state where people of all religions would enjoy equal rights.<sup>147</sup>

PFLP ideology was based largely upon Mao Sedong’s revolutionary model. The ANM believed in the intellectual elite leading the vanguard. This intellectual elite emphasised achieving an educational, technological and military equality with Israel. The relationship between Jordan and Palestine was also stressed. Jordan needed liberation from Hashemite King Hussein—“This is the only way in which Amman can become an Arab Hanoi—a base for the revolutionaries fighting inside Palestine.”<sup>148</sup> Six principles also emerged after the December 1967 unification: 1) the only way of communicating with their opponents was through revolutionary violence; 2) fighting against their opponent in the occupied land was the only option available due to the historical dimensions of the struggle; 3) all Palestinians were to play a part in fighting the enemy—“the entirety of its economic, civilian and political organisation must be boycotted;” 4) the only weapon against Zionism available to the masses was armed

<sup>144</sup> “Al-muqatil al-thawri (The Revolutionary Fighter),” 15<sup>th</sup> June 1969, reprinted in English in Sharabi, op. cit., pp. 52-54

<sup>145</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., p. 99

<sup>146</sup> Arab reaction is represented in feudalism and capitalism. Arab capitalism is not independent and Arab regimes “thus, cannot take independent political positions.” (PFLP, “The Political Organisational and Military Report of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.” In Kadi, Leila S., ed. Basic Political Documents of the Armed Resistance Movement. (Palestine Liberation Organisation Research Center: Beirut, December 1969) pp. 181-247. p. 187

<sup>147</sup> Quandt et al., op. cit., pp. 100-101

<sup>148</sup> Schulz, op. cit., pp. 35-36. See also AbuKhalil, op. cit., p. 375 and Sharabi, op. cit., pp. 26-27

resistance; 5) the masses must be mobilised through a “popular revolutionary organisation;” 6) the Palestinian struggle contributed to the Arab revolution “against world imperialism and its lackeys. . . . Armed Palestinian action will serve as a touchstone throughout the Arab world for those who are for the Palestinian revolution and those who are against it.”<sup>149</sup>

After the ANM’s hesitation to begin guerrilla warfare in the early 1960s, the PFLP’s actions reflected an impatience to begin. In order to capture the attention of the media and the international community, the PFLP engaged in a campaign of hijacking commercial airplanes. Habash stated,

When we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now.<sup>150</sup>

The PFLP truly set themselves up as a vanguard by becoming “the forerunner in advocating terrorism (or ‘external operations’) as a legitimate instrument in the resistance.”<sup>151</sup> ‘Imperialists’ and their control of Israel were “one and omnipresent.” As representatives of ‘imperialism,’ the airplanes they hijacked—TWA, BOAC, Swissair and El Al—were legitimate targets. Between the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1968 and the 9<sup>th</sup> of September 1970, the PFLP conducted 17 operations: eight hijackings (successful or not), two attacked planes, four grenade or bomb attacks, one attack on a US embassy employee, two hotel takeovers in Amman and one assassination of a US military attaché.<sup>152</sup> The PFLP bombed Aramco pipelines because it was American and consorted with the “feudal” House of Saud. As a major fundraiser for Israel, a Marks and Spencer was firebombed.

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<sup>149</sup> El-Rayyes and Nahas, op. cit., pp. 37-38

<sup>150</sup> Hirst, op. cit., p. 304

<sup>151</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 39

<sup>152</sup> Merari, Ariel and Elad, Shlomi. The International Dimension of Palestinian Terrorism. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1986) pp. 130-131

It is apparent, in the overview of both Fateh and PFLP ideology above, that both already contained a violent, revolutionary dimension. Indeed, their collective actions and external operations were above and beyond the collective action occurring in other new social movements globally. In the Weather Underground and in Baader-Meinhof, the movements that these groups splintered from did not, as an overarching theme, advocate violence. Yet, from nearly the beginning, Fateh did and the PFLP, reluctantly at times, followed. This is largely attributed to the nationalist nature of the Palestinian struggle.

### Revolutionary Dimension

The revolutionary dimension, heavily influenced by the Algerian revolution, has always existed within the PRM. In relation to this thesis, the three movements under investigation, the student movements in America and West Germany and the PRM, and the revolutionary organisations under study, the Weather Underground, the Red Army Faction, Fateh and the PFLP, look very similar on the surface. All three movements were led by university-educated elites who were attempting to mobilise the working class or peasantry. The Western movements splintered into revolutionary groups, which adopted Marxist-Leninist ideology. While Fateh was the direct outcome of Arafat's original student movement, the PFLP was more of a by-product of the ANM than a splinter. Still, the Marxist-Leninist groups were hoping to overthrow the current regimes: the American government, the West German government and the various Arab governments. However, it was really only the PRM which succeeded in mobilising the masses. The Palestinians have had a fairly stable and active involvement over the past 35 years; the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction did not. Why? The roots of the Palestinian struggle are grounded in something much more historic and stable: nationalism.

Highlighted in *Chapter Two* is Paul Wilkinson's argument that, in contrast to easily co-opted ideological groups like the Weather Underground or Baader-Meinhof, nationalist groups endure for longer periods due to their legitimacy within the greater society.<sup>153</sup> The use of identity in new social movements is taken to a higher level within a national movement. The personal is not just political it is *life*. Mobilisation occurs when "values are threatened by invasion and destruction."<sup>154</sup> Quite literally, Palestinian values and way of life are under attack—in response to: Zionism, the British Mandate, the formation of Israel, the Six-Day War and Israel's policies in the occupied territories—thus the Palestinians are easily mobilised to defend themselves and their community. Included within Touraine's work is the combination of the national and the historic. This relates especially to the PFLP's mixing of nationalism and Marxist-Leninist ideology. This echoes the work of Frantz Fanon<sup>155</sup> and combines both emotional and intellectual reasons for engaging in the movement.

As a nationalist movement, entry into and exit from the various organisations, whether they are secular, ideological or religious, is not as clear as with the Weather Underground or the Red Army Faction. A Palestinian can pinpoint when he or she joined various groups or what their first action was, but when does one truly become conscious of a nationalist identity? Nationalism is a manufactured identity, but if a community, like the Palestinians, are steeped in it from birth, then it is impossible to distinguish oneself from the larger movement. Thus, Palestinianism is not a

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<sup>153</sup> Left-wing groups do not "constitute...a serious long-term threat." A nationalist group is responsible to the people it represents, thus granting it a greater legitimacy. (Wilkinson, Paul. "Terrorist Movements." In Alexander, Yonah; Carlton, David; and Wilkinson, Paul, eds. *Terrorism: Theory and practice*. (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1979) pp. 99-117. pp. 101-108) Additionally, Bruce Hoffman writes that nationalist groups "are able to draw sustenance and support from an existing constituency—namely, fellow members of their ethno-nationalist group." Left-wing groups must actively recruit members "thus rendering themselves vulnerable to penetration." (Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. (Indigo: London, 1998) p.171)

<sup>154</sup> Touraine, "An Introduction to the Study of Social Movements," op. cit., p. 752

<sup>155</sup> Franz Fanon wrote on the Algerian revolution against the French. The Algerian struggle was a post-colonial, national struggle with a Marxist-Leninist ideology. (Fanon, Frantz. *The Wretched of the Earth*. (Penguin: London, 1990))

“membership” which can be applied for or declined. This makes a person’s involvement in the cause longer and more sustainable. It is also reflected in the society’s treatment of the groups, where acceptance and support is greater than it was in America or West Germany. Because of this acceptance, the legitimacy of the groups, from the society’s perspective, is very high and allows for sustainable involvement.

The specific nature of the PRM did, however, fade. The end of the PRM should have been foreseeable. As the Resistance groups gained in membership and power, they challenged the home rule of the Jordanian and Lebanese governments. By 1970, skirmishes between Jordanian Bedouin troops and the fedayeen were frequent occurrences. The use of Jordanian land to train the fedayeen and to run operations from led to Black September in 1970. King Hussein ordered his Bedouin troops to expel the PLO-fedayeen within ten days. It is described as “fratricidal fighting” and the Jordanian civil war.<sup>156</sup> After Black September, a retreat from operations was needed.

After the October War in 1973, Fateh campaigned for recognition from the Arab states to allow for PLO participation in any negotiations of the Palestinian problem. Fateh also asked for a Palestinian National Authority as it sought a more moderate image.<sup>157</sup> The PFLP headed up the “Rejectionist” front. The PLO involved itself with Israeli and Arab talks that led to the Egyptian-Israeli military disengagement. By the end of the 1970s, Arafat had addressed the United Nations General Assembly and the PLO had a special observer status.<sup>158</sup> Recognition of the PLO by United States President Jimmy Carter also helped the peace process. When a Japanese airliner was hijacked in July 1973, Habash was highly critical. In 1972, Habash had suspended hijackings “because the friendly socialist countries did not manifest an understanding for the hijacking of aircraft.” The Japanese aircraft was not, according to Habash,

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<sup>156</sup> Hirst, op. cit., p. 307

<sup>157</sup> Merari and Elad, op. cit., p. 32

<sup>158</sup> Hoffman, op. cit., p. 75

“part of the strategy of the people’s war of liberation.” It was seen as “erroneous and non-political...which can only do harm to the revolution.” By 1979, Habash fully articulated the PFLP’s move from international actions to a priority “on action[s] within Israel and on its frontiers.”<sup>159</sup> Thus, while the PLO was trying to gain political recognition and respect, the PFLP was limiting operations in order not to alienate itself. From the Camp David Accords (1978), the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (1979), the Fez Peace Plan (1981) to the Reagan Proposal (1982), the Palestinians were uncertain about their standing and alliances in the Middle East. The Arab regimes had “become reconciled to the changed situation. New priorities arose, and the Arab-Israeli confrontation receded from public view.”<sup>160</sup>

Even though the specific nature of the PRM met an end in the early 1970s, Palestinian nationalism continues. These past five sections help to clarify the nature of the PRM as a new social movement. The historical context of the PRM has been outlined. The leadership, membership, ideology and collective action and the revolutionary dimension of the PRM have been established. Through this general understanding of the PRM, a more detailed survey of Palestinian women can begin. Where, how and why women were involved in the PRM are questions which will be answered in the next half of the chapter.

### **Women in the Palestinian Resistance Movement**

The social context of Palestinian women was established at the beginning of this chapter. Public space—political and social—is usually not widely available to Middle Eastern women. It is therefore easier to engender the role of Palestinian women. Yet, Julie Peteet and Helena Lindholm Schulz have argued that Palestinian women are

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<sup>159</sup> Merari and Elad, *op. cit.*, p. 33

<sup>160</sup> Hunter, F. Robert. *The Palestinian Uprising: A war by other means.* (University of California Press: Los Angeles, 1993) p. 15

allowed to enter the public domain during crisis. This means that to simplify the Palestinian woman's situation would be to grossly misrepresent her. Instead of using the research already conducted on women in clandestine, armed political groups, one can create an argument for a Palestinian woman's involvement in the PRM as a very complex decision. By looking at various Palestinian women's entry into the group, their ideology, the group dynamics of the PRM and their possible exit from the PRM, the researcher can gain a clearer understanding of Palestinian women's participation in the PRM.

### Entry

Neuburger and Valentini think a woman becomes involved in a clandestine group based upon her need to care for others, her response to another's need and to belong to something. They framed this belief within the gendered "maternal-sacrifice code."<sup>161</sup> In Weinburg and Eubank's estimation, women participate in revolutionary groups not because of their ideology, but only to follow their husbands or brothers. They see this mirroring the traditional role of women in Italian society—one of submission and sacrifice.<sup>162</sup> According to these two works, a woman, then, in revolutionary organisations did not act of her own free will. She simply let herself drift in and out of a group based upon what she needed to do as a woman—provide for a group in a mothering way or take care of her "man." Ideas such as these do not incorporate a woman being politicised or mobilised in the same manner as a man. Nor do they allow for a woman to be committed to the group's ideology. What has been shown on general work done on terrorists is that affective ties are important to all

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<sup>161</sup> Neuburger and Valentini, *op.cit.*, p. 81

<sup>162</sup> Weinburg and Eubank, *op. cit.*

members of the group.<sup>163</sup> Belonging is extremely important to all members, as this “may be the first time they...truly felt significant [and] the first time they felt what they did counted.”<sup>164</sup> The importance of this section is to prove that women in the PRM involved themselves along the same lines as the men in the resistance groups.

One source claims that by the end of 1969, both Fateh and the PFLP had trained between them 30,000-50,000 fedayeen.<sup>165</sup> Training took place in the refugee settlements and training camps within both Jordan and Syria. Acceptance into commando training required age, physical and psychological health qualifications. While 94 percent of 1,000 guerrillas were literate, only eight percent had college degrees.<sup>166</sup> Al-Assifah was limited in membership to Palestinians aged between 20 and 30 years. Their oath of loyalty included 24-hour-alert and organisational and mission secrecy. It was divided into cells with contact only between the cell leader and one higher up member. In 1965, al-Assifah had only 26 men; by 1966, it had 500. No greater victory exists for Arafat’s rise to power than the Battle of Karameh, which took place on March 21, 1968. In order to stop guerrilla activity, Israel invaded Jordan to destroy the headquarters located in the refugee camp of Karameh. It was the first battle in which the Israelis and the Palestinians fought face-to-face since 1948. It was also the opening of the Jordanian regime to guerrilla relations, as Jordanian artillery helped send the Israelis into retreat without reaching their goal. While only 25 Israeli soldiers were killed and as five times as many Palestinian fighters were lost, so Karameh, which means honour, became a legendary battle. At Karameh, Fateh’s total membership was only

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<sup>163</sup> della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations, Volume 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. International Social Movement Research. (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) p. 8

<sup>164</sup> Post, Jerrold M. “Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces.” In Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 25-40. p. 31

<sup>165</sup> Sharabi, op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, pp. 22-24

722.<sup>167</sup> After it, thousands of Palestinians, as many as 30,000, rushed to join the fedayeen activity.<sup>168</sup> As John Amos II and Samuel Huntington both point out, it was difficult to mass mobilise all but the elite. Thus, once easily identified events, like the Six-Day War and Karamah, occurred, it was much easier to involve camp and village inhabitants.<sup>169</sup>

Women between 18 and 30 years of age were also part of the fedayeen groups. The women took part in operations across the cease-fire lines and “in combat missions inside Israeli-occupied territory.” By the early 1970s, “a few thousand [women] form[ed] part of the regular cadres” of Fateh and the PFLP.<sup>170</sup> The number of women involved militarily did rise. In 1967, only ten women were arrested in Israel; in 1968, there were 100 female prisoners; by 1979, there were 3,000 female prisoners.<sup>171</sup> These numbers reflect the increased guerrilla activity over that decade and the growing military crisis in Palestinian society. When there is a conflict, women in Palestinian society are more able to participate in the male realm. These numbers are proof of that trend.

A group’s mobilisation of women has much to do with their group ideology, which serves as a guideline for what is acceptable. Even though Fateh and the PFLP had different ideologies, “on the question of women little of substance distinguishes their theoretical expositions.”<sup>172</sup> Neither group discussed a gender or women’s agenda as part of the larger struggle<sup>173</sup>; yet, the Resistance “redefined societal structures and roles.” Women were politicised and “increasingly evident [at] demonstrations and political events.” Women were mobilised gradually in order to avoid “offence to conservative sectors of society and to avoid the appearance of promoting overly rapid,

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<sup>167</sup> Amos, op. cit., p. 57

<sup>168</sup> Migdal and Kimmerling, op. cit., pp. 222-223 and Hirst, op. cit., p. 296

<sup>169</sup> Amos, op. cit., pp. 33-34 and Huntington, op. cit., p. 303

<sup>170</sup> Sharabi, op. cit., p. 34

<sup>171</sup> Jawwad, op. cit., p. 66

<sup>172</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 160

<sup>173</sup> Jawwad, op. cit., p. 65

culturally inappropriate social change.”<sup>174</sup> Mobilisation accompanied the raising of a woman’s political consciousness. In order to access women, resistance groups designed new institutions “to serve the basic needs of the community as well as expand the process of political education.” These institutions were meant to give women and other non-politicised segments of the population a feeling of ‘place’ and importance through education, skills training and entry into the Resistance groups—for social work or fedayeen training.<sup>175</sup> Huda, a woman from the Shatila refugee camp, is an activist and mobiliser who was recruited, like the men, as a university student. In her mind, mobilising women

is not just political mobilisation. It is to get women to participate in society. It is to get rid of social obstacles through being involved in production. In this way women build up their self-confidence. Then I try to tie in work with politics.

This is also very similar to PFLP policy.<sup>176</sup>

General recruitment was centred around the universities and camps. Julie Peteet, in her ethnographic work in Lebanon, *Gender in Crisis*, talked with several female fedayeen recruited after the 1970s. Bassimah was mobilised through a general campaign in 1981 on her university campus. Rula, illiterate and unskilled, had been a full-time fighter since the civil war. She decided to fight after her entire family minus her mother was killed in the siege on the Tal al-Za’atar camp. Another woman, Layla, joined in the 1960s and had to fight against being used to mobilise women. This was not “real political work,” she was determined to be involved militarily. She later became a base commander.<sup>177</sup> Therese Halaseh, a Greek Orthodox Israeli Arab with a background which would lead her more to joining the PFLP, was nonetheless recruited by Fateh when she was a student nurse in Nazareth. Her family claimed she had never

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<sup>174</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 110

<sup>175</sup> Ibid. p. 104

<sup>176</sup> Ibid, p. 109

<sup>177</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 149

thought about the Palestinian struggle while she was growing up, nevertheless, it seems she embraced it upon leaving home. In 1971, due to her involvement in the student group, Free Conscience, she went to Lebanon overnight. She never returned to university and instead began training in a camp outside Sidon. There she learned to handle automatic rifles, grenades, bazookas and self-detonating, electrical mines. She also studied politics from books at the training camp's library.<sup>178</sup>

There was also a heavy emphasis on family ties. At one point, it became a PFLP policy to encourage participants to bring in their family members, especially for brothers to recruit sisters. It was often easier to mobilise girls and women whose male family members were actively involved with or employed by the Resistance groups and organisations. Active male family members were and still are less likely to object to a woman's participation than a non-active or non-affiliated family. Additionally, "the parents are acquainted with Resistance members and feel their daughters have a protected status." These women are also more politicised; they have been exposed to politics and political arguments in the home. Peteet argues "[l]iving in a family where brothers (or sisters) are active may draw women into the Resistance."<sup>179</sup> Thus, it is not as Neuburger and Valentini or Weinburg and Eubank indicate—that a woman's involvement in the PRM is less about nurturing than it is about availability and personal politicisation. Leila Khaled is a perfect example of this.

Leila Khaled describes the seizing of Haifa, her hometown, in April 1948:

I do remember being terrified. ...I only remember hearing bombs exploding. ...I hid under the staircase....

The spread of death and terror, and fear for our future impelled my family and most other Arabs to leave. The eight of us [children] and my mother left for Sour on April 13, 1948 [four days after her fourth birthday].

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<sup>178</sup> Halasa, Malu. "A Deadly Inheritance," *The Guardian Weekend*, 11<sup>th</sup> January 1997, pp.181-188

<sup>179</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 119

I didn't see my father again for several months. And when he came to Sour he was a broken man.

He remained exiled in Lebanon until his death in 1966. ...I, as his daughter, am attempting to realise [his dream of returning to Haifa]. I shall not fail my father and my nation. If I am unable to return and live in freedom in Palestine, my children will return.<sup>180</sup>

Her politicisation is very similar to that of Habash, who said this about the events he witnessed in 1948:

I have no personal motive (to participate in the political struggle in the area) except that which every Palestinian citizen has. ...I have seen with my own eyes the Israeli army entering the town and killing its inhabitants. I am not exaggerating. ...They have killed our people and expelled us from our homes, towns and land. ...What can you do after you have seen all this? You cannot but become a revolutionary and fight for the cause.<sup>181</sup>

Khaled makes no mention of following a lover or a husband into the group. What she does mention is her desire to fight for her 'nation' and for Palestinian territory.

Leila Khaled first became involved in the ANM when she was 15 years old in 1959. Her older brothers and sisters were already members—"I was involved politically because my family was politically involved."<sup>182</sup> This statement should not lessen her involvement in the movement, because Khaled is an ideologically committed member of the PFLP. Instead, it reinforces the cultural norm that Middle Eastern women usually cannot become active unless their family already is. Khaled was so committed—"we had our goals. And our goal was to go back to Palestine"—she snuck out of the house in her pyjamas, after her mother had refused to let the "child politician" go to the meetings. Khaled's mother was very protective of her because of her young age and because she was a female:

My mother strongly disapproved of the political activities of the girls in the family. She felt that *now that the civil war was over the girls should stay at home and leave the politics to the men*. ...She said she was...afraid of

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<sup>180</sup> Khaled, Leila. *My People Shall Live: The autobiography of a revolutionary*. (Hodder and Stoughton: London, 1973) p. 26

<sup>181</sup> Kazziha, op. cit., pp. 17-18

<sup>182</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 2

scandalous talk in the neighbourhood about women in politics. Mother knew that social ostracism would result if any one of us stepped out of line.<sup>183</sup> (*italic emphasis added*)

When Khaled was a teacher in Kuwait, after the Six-Day War and before she joined the PFLP, she was a member of Fateh. She began asking questions about “what we were doing to create a new Palestine.” In addition to more general questions about Fateh’s plans for revolution, she asked “what women could do beyond fund-raising?” Eventually, her persistence paid off with a visit from Fathi Arafat, Yasir Arafat’s brother. During the course of their discussion, she

raised the question of women and their role in Fateh. I pleaded with him to let me join their military wing, Al-Assifah, because I had been militarily trained for years. I was prepared to go on patrols and operations inside the occupied territories. He promised to see what he could do and report back to me. ...To this day he has not returned to tell me when and where to report or whom to contact.

Instead, Fateh tried to involve Khaled in assisting families in the camps and visiting martyr’s families: “‘Social work,’ I scoffed, ‘is not social revolution. I want to participate fully in the revolution.’”<sup>184</sup> After Karamah, the PFLP hijacked an El Al plane—“I had found an alternative to Fateh,” and Khaled made contact with the PFLP. She was told before she could fight, she must “‘study the ideology and strategy of the PFLP.’”<sup>185</sup> After she heard about Amina Dhahbour, the first woman to participate in a foreign mission, i.e. a hijacking on February 18<sup>th</sup> 1969, Khaled agreed to join the PFLP’s Special Operations Squad.<sup>186</sup> Although Khaled’s involvement was helped by her older siblings’ involvement with the ANM, it does not mean she was not equally committed to the Palestinian struggle. The fact that she questioned Fateh’s policies and agreed to learn PFLP ideology should represent her commitment to the cause and to the PFLP.

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<sup>183</sup> Khaled, *op. cit.*, p. 2 and Khaled, *My People Shall Live...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50

<sup>184</sup> Khaled, *My People Shall Live...*, *op. cit.*, p. 106-107

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 108 and 111

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid*, p. 116

The next section will highlight Fateh's and the PFLP's attitudes towards women. It will also highlight the women's own ideological commitment to their respective groups. This will demonstrate, for the following section Group Dynamics, where and how women are placed within the two resistance organisations. As much as possible, a woman's own ideology will be discussed, which will also demonstrate how she places herself within the group.

### Ideology

Unlike Baader-Meinhof, where the two women leaders provided the ideology, or the Weather Underground, where women contributed to the ideology, women in the PRM did not write or contribute at any great length to the ideology. However, Palestinian groups did discuss the 'women question,' even if not in depth. Fateh maintains that the women question can only be addressed after the national struggle is won—although the PLO has addressed the UN on the status of Palestinian women.<sup>187</sup> The PFLP does believe in gender equality, but divisions do exist, which will be discussed in the next section. As the “articulation of so concrete a goal is by far the most potent and persuasive rallying cry,”<sup>188</sup> it is helpful to understand not only the group's ideology, most of which was discussed in the first half of the chapter, but also the woman's own ideology. If a woman only became involved in a group to tend house or support her lover, husband or brother, she would not have an ideology of her own. She would either be a mouthpiece for him or a mindless robot. Yet, the women's views in this section demonstrate that these Palestinian women are neither. They are

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<sup>187</sup> Mrs Somaia Barghouti, as Counsellor of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN, addressed the UN on the advancement of women at the 50<sup>th</sup> Session in 1999, at the Outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women at the 53<sup>rd</sup> Session in 1998, at the Fourth World Conference on Women at the 52<sup>nd</sup> Session in 1997, at the 42<sup>nd</sup> Session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1997, at the Fourth World Conference on Women at the 51<sup>st</sup> Session in 1996, at the 41<sup>st</sup> Session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women in 1996, etc. From [www.palestine-un.org/mission](http://www.palestine-un.org/mission), site accessed 24<sup>th</sup> September 2002.

<sup>188</sup> Hoffman, *op. cit.*, p. 171

obviously committed to the struggle in their own right. This view of women helps the researcher understand where the Palestinian woman's theoretical place in the group is and how the group dynamics, the next section, will be shaped.

Alison Jamieson, Eileen MacDonald and Gilda Zwerman all emphasise that a female revolutionary has a harder decision to make when joining the organisation. This led all of these researchers to the same thought: women are more driven and convinced of their ideology—without making them heartless or irrational.<sup>189</sup> This thought is echoed by Peteet:

Does political consciousness have a different meaning and social context for women than men? Women often comment that political consciousness is more intense and sociologically meaningful for women. Being politically conscious can indicate a profound distaste for social constructs and a commitment to creating new ones. Active involvement in the process of reconstructing society implies a questioning of the gender order and domesticity as a primary locus of loyalty and identification. Like education, political consciousness has shaped a new sense of self-worth and pride. But is this perception of political consciousness and its manifestation in action as more meaningful for women valid? Convention holds that unmarried activists are likely to engage in disreputable behaviour as a consequence of activism, which gives them fairly free access to men. ...Formal political participation, in a traditionally non-female arena, implies a challenge to what is, in effect, proper female comportment. For men, activism carries no such affront to cultural definitions of maleness.<sup>190</sup>

What is so invaluable about this quote is its summation of this thesis' major argument and it refers to Palestinian women while strongly mirroring what has been said about Western women. Questioning and *challenging* gender norms does not imply that the woman is any less of a woman or a human. It means she is driven to do something for a political cause in which she strongly *believes*. It is unclear if this really makes her commitment stronger than the male's commitment and that is not what is under study.

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<sup>189</sup> Jamieson, Alison. *The Heart Attacked: Terrorism and conflict in the Italian state*. (Marion Boyers: London, 1989) pp. 67-68; Eileen MacDonald. *Shoot the Women First*. (Arrow Books: London, 1988) p. 11; and Zwerman, Gilda. "Conservative and Feminist Images of Women Associated with Armed, Clandestine Organisations in the United States." In della Porta, *Social Movements and Violence...*, op. cit., pp. 133-159. p. 134

<sup>190</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., pp. 69-70

What is clear is just how strong her involvement is and this can be shown through an examination of a female activist's ideology.

Fateh's official policy held that the struggle for women's liberation was secondary to the national struggle. Women must wait for national liberation and the formation of a state. It was argued in the late 1970s by a Fateh member that men and women have the same political interests. Women are not necessarily oppressed or cast out of society, thus they "should not be mobilised any differently...nor do they have concerns apart from that facing all Palestinians." Activism should not compromise a woman's devotion to the household—"women should strive for complementarity [sic] between activism and domesticity."<sup>191</sup> Even though this Fateh member did not quite grasp the obstacles in the way of a woman's involvement, women were trained for guerrilla tactics. Yet, it was not exactly encouraged—no "coherent policy was ever articulated by the PLO on the issue of women and military training." There was no "unified training program" although each PLO-umbrella organisation did have a training program for women under Fateh sponsorship.<sup>192</sup> The PLO's shaky stance reflects a larger societal ambiguity over female fedayeen.

Therese Halaseh is an example of a female feday. Halaseh, along with another woman, Rima Issa Tannous, and two men, Abdul Aziz Al-Atrash and PFLP Captain Kamal Rafat, were picked by Abu Ali Hassan Salameh, leader of the Black September group<sup>193</sup> to hijack a Sabena Boeing 707 from Brussels on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 1972. It ended when a team of Israeli commandoes stormed the plane. This serves as an example of Fateh training women for military action, even if they operated for another group within the PLO-umbrella.<sup>194</sup> However, Halaseh's ideology became conflicted after the hijack came to an end. Halaseh was shot in the armpit by one of the soldiers; she was

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<sup>191</sup> Petecet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., pp. 161-162

<sup>192</sup> Ibid, p. 151

<sup>193</sup> Named in response to (Black) September of 1970 in Jordan.

<sup>194</sup> Halasa, op. cit., pp. 181-183

taken to Shebah Hospital, where upon regaining consciousness, she said “Now that I have been given Jewish blood, I want to become Jewish.”<sup>195</sup>

During her seven year prison sentence, though, she continued to study economics and psychology, along with Marxism, while secretly engaging in politics. The woman Halaseh shared her prison cell with “called her a natural leader, and together they organised prison strikes.” It was Halaseh’s reputation for commitment to the struggle which allowed for her cousin, the author of this article, to become involved with the DFLP.<sup>196</sup> Therese Halaseh’s American cousin, Malu Halasa’s, interest was more about “fascination” and “intrig[ue]” than about ideology. Nevertheless, family friends helped her meet Arafat to discuss Halaseh: “he recounted my cousin’s exploits in the manner of a proud uncle.” Arafat “was not only grateful” to Halaseh for “giving up her freedom for her political beliefs”—“[t]here was no greater sacrifice”—but he was also “in her debt.”<sup>197</sup> No matter that Halaseh had wanted to become Jewish at a vulnerable time in her life; she had hijacked for the Resistance and she was now devoted to it in her jail cell. Her time in prison ended when she was traded on November 24, 1983, along with 4,500 other political detainees, for six Israeli airmen captured by Fateh and the PFLP. This is after she almost died during a nine-month prison strike after tear gas was sprayed directly into her face.<sup>198</sup> Halaseh was mobilised after Khaled had experienced frustration with Fateh. Even though Fateh had initially been reluctant to include women in missions, it did happen and the women, like Halaseh, were successful enough to gain the respect of Arafat.

An ANM internal command explained their position on pan-Arab unity:

When we advocate union, we mean a total integration of all parts of the Arab fatherland, and not simply the unity of two or three Arab

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<sup>195</sup> Ibid, p. 184

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, pp. 184-186

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, p. 186

<sup>198</sup> Ibid, p. 188

countries. ... Our struggle at this stage should go on to achieve that integration.<sup>199</sup>

That same internal command spoke against the exploitation of South Arabia by the Western imperialists through the Baghdad Pact and the Eisenhower Project—

Liberation means to be free from the shackles of foreign exploitation no matter what the shape or form it takes.<sup>200</sup>

Liberation would have to apply to all areas of life, including women. For the PFLP, women's liberation remains key to the class struggle "since the origins of their oppression are intimately connected to the emergence of private property and class differentiation." Like the national struggle, the women's struggle will be long and protracted. The PFLP acknowledged that during conflict "new values emerge...but national victory does not mean an end of the struggle for women's liberation." Thus, the PFLP "emphasis[es] consciousness raising of both men and women." Habash, in 1982, stated the PFLP's "position on women and their right to equality[,] and their right to equality and liberation comes as the result of moral values...a people who exploits another is not free."<sup>201</sup>

PFLP ideology strongly shaped and influenced PFLP actions. Khaled emphasised "ideology...is the basis [for] the action—not the actions the basis of ideology—...they interact."<sup>202</sup> From the PFLP document, *Al-muqatil al-thawri* (*The Revolutionary Fighter*),<sup>203</sup> the PFLP is "the people's army, composed of all citizens, of men and *women*, devoted to the revolutionary cause." (italic emphasis added) The people's army will attack Israel, as the agent of imperialism, by "apply[ing] pressure" and "us[ing] conspiracy and espionage" in trying to fight the popular war. However, only "total lightning war" can defeat the PFLP. The PFLP believes the war against the Palestinians

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<sup>199</sup> ANM internal command, "Al-Andaf al-'Arabiyya al-Ra'isiyya (The Major Arab Aims)," 1957, as cited in Kazzuha, op. cit., pp. 18-19

<sup>200</sup> Ibid, p. 61

<sup>201</sup> Petecet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 164

<sup>202</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 13

<sup>203</sup> "Al-muqatil...", op. cit., pp. 52-54

is unjust and therefore “[political violence] is always, always justified when there is injustice.”<sup>204</sup>

In her book, Khaled recounts the PFLP’s official ideology in several places; it does not need to be reiterated.<sup>205</sup> What it does demonstrate, as she said in an interview, is her commitment to the PFLP’s ideology:

Before anyone wants to be a member, one should accept the program and the rules of the group itself. When you accept that, then the minute you are a member, you have the opportunity to discuss everything in the group. ...[E]ven though they are not my ideas, ...I have to defend the decisions that are taken. ...I have to speak with the ideas of the group and not myself. This teaches us...how to be faithful to the group...and to the goals of the organisation.<sup>206</sup>

After Khaled completed her training, she was approached by her commander. He told her she was expected the next day in Beirut and asked her if she was ready to go to prison for the revolution; if she could hold up under torture; and if she was prepared to die. She answered each question affirmatively. After saying goodbye to her family, she was told she was going to hijack her first plane.<sup>207</sup> Khaled carried out two hijackings: of a TWA plane in August 1969 and of an El Al plane in September 1970. The El Al hijacking was not successful. Her partner, Patrick Arguello, died and she was detained in London for 28 days. Khaled was released after the PFLP hijacked a BOAC plane to demand her release, along with others who were held in Europe.<sup>208</sup>

Khaled does value the life of innocents. She said,

[K]illing, by itself, is something inhuman. ...[But] it is justified that we defend ourselves, we can defend ourselves by declaring...that we are living under harsh circumstances. It’s war—to be killed or to kill is justified.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>204</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 11

<sup>205</sup> See Khaled, *My People Shall Live...*, op. cit., pp. 112-115, 125-130

<sup>206</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 14

<sup>207</sup> Khaled, *My People Shall Live...*, op. cit., pp. 123-124

<sup>208</sup> Baum, Philip. “Leila Khaled: In her own words,” *Aviation Security International*, October 2000, pp. 5-13

<sup>209</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 11

It is very important to note: like the distinction between Jew and Zionist, there was a distinction between civilian and government. Thus, even if a person was a citizen of an imperialist power, they were not necessarily imperialists—

We look at Jews, not as one nation or one people, because a Jew is like a Christian or a Muslim. It's a religion...not a nationality. But the Zionist movement used it as a nationality to mobilise the Jews in the world.<sup>210</sup>

The indiscriminate targeting of civilians is not a PFLP tactic. Events like Lockerbie are not justifiable:

I'm [Khaled] against [the loss of civilian life] because the people on that plane are not involved. ...They are not the ones to be sacrificed.<sup>211</sup>

In an interview with Philip Baum of *Aviation Security International*, he asked of September 1970, “[W]ould you have been prepared to kill if necessary?” Khaled responded:

No, I had instructions only to defend myself. ...[P]assengers are still alive, the crew, only my comrade was killed, not any [others].<sup>212</sup>

A bit of a conundrum, however, exists. Events like the machine-gunning of an El Al Boeing at Athens airport, killing two, in 1968 and the night-time killings of an Israeli West Bank family in their home, killing four, injuring three, on 20<sup>th</sup> June 2002, both by PFLP gunmen, raise questions.<sup>213</sup>

It is now obvious that the women involved in Fateh and the PFLP were committed to the groups and the groups' ideology. Relationships with men were not solely responsible for a woman's decision to be an active member of the PRM. Familial ties are extremely important to women in the PRM, more so than the Weather Underground and the RAF. But this must not discount their commitment to the struggle and the ideology. It was more than a commitment, it was a belief deeply rooted within the woman's psyche. Even though these women were fully-fledged members, how were they, as female fedayeen, treated by the rest of the members of the

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<sup>210</sup> *Ibid*, p. 10

<sup>211</sup> Baum, *op. cit.*, p. 12

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid*, p. 12

<sup>213</sup> Beaumont, Peter. “Children Shot Dead in Their Home,” *The Guardian*, 22<sup>nd</sup> June 2002, p. 20

organisation? Were they accepted members of the organisation by other members or by society at large? Was their sex still holding them back due to the gendered nature of Middle Eastern society?

### Group Dynamics

Where women were found within the PRM and where they are found today is relevant as it demonstrates how the leaders of the Resistance groups perceive women and even how the women perceive their own role. As the above group and personal ideology has shown, women espouse the same ideology as the men. This has led to them participating in various high-level actions, including the aforementioned hijackings. These women are not just “housekeeping.” Yet, do some of the numbers reveal the women members mirroring the “traditional female role in society” as Weinburg and Eubank see it?<sup>214</sup> And is the femininity of the women questioned or repudiated? And does this mean the female fighter is “disassociat[ing] herself from her womanhood...her reality”?<sup>215</sup> Or does it mean, in spite of criticism, in spite of various women’s demands and ‘successes’ that the PRM was unwilling or unprepared, and therefore unable to use a woman in the same way as a man? Conflict means that people are needed not just to fight but to work behind the scenes, this happens in both the West and in the Middle East. A woman’s participation is as much a sign of troubled times as “an indicator of modernisation, radicalism, progressiveness and social development and a sign of rejection of the ‘backward past.’” It is still quite apparent that Palestinian women were “mobilised...with the intention that they serve in a support capacity to operate the social institutions of the Resistance.” This was part of a plan “to enhance, but not radically alter, the social standards of the Palestinian

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<sup>214</sup> Weinburg and Eubank, op. cit.

<sup>215</sup> Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism. (Washington Square Press: New York, 1989) p. 196

community.”<sup>216</sup> Thus, they were mobilised to serve in gendered roles and that is where they became concentrated. It was not necessarily a choice or biological instinct on the part of the women; it was passively mandated and normatively controlled that the women serve in gendered roles.<sup>217</sup>

Palestinian women were active in all parts of the PLO state building enterprises. However, they were, and still are (as of 1999), more concentrated in social and domestic fields—education, information and health. Where the participation of women in Steadfastness, *summud*<sup>218</sup>, was 67 percent, only 27 percent of the leadership was female. Women comprised 65 percent of Social Affairs, as compared to the 36 percent involved in Planning. The Red Crescent was 70 percent women, but again, only 25 percent of Red Crescent leadership was women.<sup>219</sup> The “major framework” for women’s participation was in the “over one hundred traditional charitable societies located in the towns.”<sup>220</sup> Over the years, women were least involved in upper-level political positions and in the military. Thus, “[i]n spite of a few highly visible and powerful women, the vast majority remain distant from the centres of power and decision making.”<sup>221</sup> Women did participate with men on missions, but not with any consistency. Instead, the gendering of activities “simply extends the public/ private dichotomy.”<sup>222</sup> An assumption has been made that when women become involved in the revolutionary struggle in traditional societies, she serves as a matter of course in a gendered position, as put forth by Neuburger and Valentini’s “maternal-sacrifice code” and by Weinburg and Eubank’s “housekeeper.” This assumption is presented as if the women naturally

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<sup>216</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., pp. 101-103

<sup>217</sup> Ibid, pp. 101-102

<sup>218</sup> The idea of *summud* was adopted post-1967 and represented the refusal of the Palestinians to leave their land. (Schulz, op. cit., p. 54)

<sup>219</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 37

<sup>220</sup> Giacaman, Rita and Johnson, Penny. “Palestinian Women: Building barricades and breaking barriers.” In Lockman, Zachary and Beinin, Joel, eds. *Intifada: The Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation*. (MERIP: Washington, D.C., 1989) pp. 155-169. p. 158

<sup>221</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 147

<sup>222</sup> Kazi, op. cit., p. 31

chose this, which fails to see that women have been purposely mobilised by men to fulfil these roles and that nature and biology have nothing to do with it.

In a 1979 article the PFLP was critical of the Resistance groups for failing to develop a policy on women. The PFLP did include itself in this critique especially as they were left-wing and had failed to set an example. They were also critical of the PRM's "reliance on traditional forms of social organisation and ideology as a basis for recruitment into and the operation of the Resistance movement, noting their obstruction of women's full participation."<sup>223</sup> As an original member of the ANM and subsequently an early member of the PFLP, Leila Khaled discusses those early days:

[F]or a woman, it was a challenge for us as members just to prove to ourselves that we can do the same thing. The whole atmosphere was encouraging, it wasn't against women being involved. But, in the society, women [were] involved to an extent [but] not as many. ... [I]t was a double-challenge for us to prove ourselves that we can do the same thing. ... [T]hey accepted it that [women] went once for a demonstration, but not every time. Because in the culture...women are not supposed to be in the streets demonstrating. Now it's different. But, it was at the beginning of the sixties.<sup>224</sup>

Khaled's difficult experience with Fateh has already been mentioned, as was her mother's reluctance to let Khaled become involved with the ANM. After Khaled arrived at the ANM meeting in her pyjamas, the other members "were shaken by what they regarded as immoral behaviour." Some were on the verge of expelling Khaled, as it was "tradition-trampling [and] sex-enticing." However, Khaled remembers being perturbed by their outrage,

Tradition-trampling it might have been; sex-enticing it was not. I was terribly disturbed by their male chauvinism and self-righteousness. ... How could we liberate Palestine and the Arab homeland, if we ourselves were not liberated? How could we advocate equality and keep over half—the female half—of the human race in bondage? ... It took the ANM nearly a decade [the late sixties] to start tapping to the full human reservoir of women.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 164

<sup>224</sup> Khaled, op. cit., pp. 3-4

<sup>225</sup> Khaled, *My People Shall Live...*, op. cit., p. 51

In comparison to the first generation, the second and third generation of refugee women were easily recruited. Despite the ambiguity, mobilising women by 1967 had become an “explicit goal.” Women involved were mainly middle-class, educated and urban and their goal was “to mobilise camp women and integrate them into the national movement.”<sup>226</sup> The years between 1969 and 1974 marked the peak of camp recruiting for both sexes. The women who became involved were more than likely teachers and members of the ANM. Even if the mobilising of women was explicit, implicit gender divisions remained. Khaled does say “PFLP women are members the same as men. They have the same rights and the same duties.” However, Khaled admits the “inheritance of old traditions and the culture of our society, [affect] the people, even in the [PFLP].” Until a woman proves herself as committed and efficient, “[w]omen [are] always...second.”<sup>227</sup>

When women are involved on the military side, the “experience awakened women to their potential equality to men.” As the women proved themselves able, physically and emotionally, the idea that women were incapable diminished.<sup>228</sup> New female recruits often “demand[ed] military training and service,” especially the women who were self-mobilised. This is attributed to a woman using military service as a way to prove herself “as capable as” a man. The rigours of military training proved a woman’s commitment to the cause.<sup>229</sup> The female feday is a direct challenge to the political culture. Currently, as during the PRM, Resistance groups continue to be aware of how the role of women reflects upon their organisation as a whole. The female activists are used to illustrate how al-nakba and the ensuing militancy have “transformed society, compelling the casting aside of traditional cultural norms.” The more women are involved, the more progressive and modern the group will seem. An activist warned:

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<sup>226</sup> Petecet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 101

<sup>227</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 4

<sup>228</sup> Petecet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., p. 150

<sup>229</sup> Ibid, p. 150

“Be careful of the official line. The Resistance...put[s] on a good face about women when foreigners come.”<sup>230</sup>

The next aspect to deal with in regards to the PRM is what Malu Halasa refers to as the

schizophrenia of the Palestinian resistance, where women who hijacked planes worried about their reputation....<sup>231</sup>

Within her cousin’s experience during the hijacking, there was much sexual tension, which perhaps explains her swift defence of her virginity at her trial, when she was accused of sleeping with a fellow hijacker. One of the male hijackers of that mission proposed to the other “attractive” female hijacker.<sup>232</sup> The ideas and norms that lie behind a woman’s involvement has led to interesting group dynamics. In meetings with both sexes, “women rarely spoke” but in meetings with only women “there were lively, spirited discussions.”<sup>233</sup> This is in keeping with Islam’s segregation of the sexes: “women should be under the authority of fathers, brothers or husbands.”<sup>234</sup>

Like women involved in Western militaries, Palestinian women involved in the revolutionary groups also face the problem of perception. It was highlighted in *Chapter Two* that the perception of women in military service during World War II were “act[ing]” like men; their loose behaviour was considered to be demoralising.<sup>235</sup> Palestinian female fedayeen are often viewed as “loose” and “immoral.” These perceptions will only disappear if she gains status by going “beyond what is expected [...] achieve[s] martyrdom; is] wounded [; carries] out incredibly heroic acts [;] or abid[es] by high moral standards.” Talking about personal matters or behaving freely—

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<sup>230</sup> Petect, “Authenticity and Gender...,” op. cit., p. 58

<sup>231</sup> Halasa, op. cit., p. 187

<sup>232</sup> Ibid, p. 181

<sup>233</sup> Petect, *Gender in Crisis....*, op. cit., p. 110

<sup>234</sup> Mernissi, op. cit., p. 18

<sup>235</sup> DeGroot, Gerard J. “Lipstick on Her Nipples, Cordite in Her Hair: Sex and romance among British servicewomen during the Second World War.” In DeGroot and Peniston-Bird, op. cit., pp. 100-118. p. 109-110

laughing and playfulness—“can bring about disparagement and sexual labelling.” To behave this way and to be labelled as sexually loose will result in “deleterious consequences for a woman’s political credibility.”<sup>236</sup>

Rula, the woman mentioned earlier, was neither well respected as a woman nor as a fighter. She was argumentative with the men. Although she did not have a boyfriend or flirt, she wore tight clothing and make-up, this put her “in the category of woman first, militant second.” Rula was put on guard duty instead of being sent out to fight. On the other hand, another woman on Rula’s base, Majidah, was very well respected and often sent on “important missions and was often in command.” She was university-educated and “strait laced.” She never joked or spoke personally with the men and was very serious. She always dressed in military uniform and kept herself covered. Majidah was a “sister of men.” Because of the desegregated living and sleeping conditions, the creation of a “fictitious kinship between her and the fighters” allowed for “desexed interaction.” Majidah was an “honorary man...not really a woman in the sense of sex.”<sup>237</sup> Does this mean she is denying her “womanhood” as Robin Morgan would so like for her reader to believe? Perhaps Majidah is denying the trappings of womanhood, like make-up and sexy clothing, but these would not normally be allowed in a highly traditional Muslim society anyhow. Morgan, as a radical feminist, would probably not hold the abandonment of make-up against the women. If Majidah is not participating in Palestinian society as a woman normally would, is that any different from a career-oriented woman in the West? They are both putting off children and family, again the norms of a ‘woman’s’ life. Choosing to struggle is not a denial of what is inherently female. To depict it as such is simply to place a woman back into an acceptable package. The Palestinian women who *choose* to struggle and

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<sup>236</sup> Peteet, Gender in Crisis..., op. cit., p. 152

<sup>237</sup> Peteet, Gender in Crisis..., op. cit., pp. 153-155

who do not argue with the men, do not wear make-up or tight clothing are simply playing by the rules as dictated by Middle Eastern culture. Therefore, if one is to look beyond the veil, one cannot hold these against the women either.

If the Palestinian woman is not viewed as sexy or as an honorary man, she may be depicted similarly to Neuburger and Valentini's 'maternal-sacrifice code.' "The image of woman as guerrilla fighter" may have been "widely held," women were more often than not really "sisters of men" or "mothers of martyrs." Men, the fighters, struggle. Women suffer. The woman represents the "defeats, the traumas and the pain."<sup>238</sup> This is reminiscent of women in war "observe, suffer, cope, mourn, honour, adore, witness and work."<sup>239</sup> The idea of "mothers of martyrs" combines both the traditional gender role of women, as mothers, with militancy. Women who lose their sons are respected for their "sacrifice." Thus, like many other nationalist struggles, the reproductive role of women was her strategic function: "Women's contribution to the nation and the cause is represented by their sacrifice of sons being martyred."<sup>240</sup> The community and the authorities grant these women a high status role. She is given the seat of honour at events; she is visited on holidays; her social and financial needs are met by community organisations.<sup>241</sup> During the first Intifada women were urged, when they saw an arrest occurring, to consider those men their sons and protect them as such. A woman's role as sister or mother "should give her more incentives to act and demonstrate and confront soldiers."<sup>242</sup> All of this contributes to the militarisation of a woman's role. In a conflicted traditional society such as this, it is far easier to create a long-term identity of woman as sufferer than one of the non-traditional female feday.

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<sup>238</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 41

<sup>239</sup> Elshtain, Jean Bethke. Women and War. (University of Chicago Press: London, 1987) p. 164

<sup>240</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 70

<sup>241</sup> Peteet, "Authenticity and Gender..." op. cit., p. 56

<sup>242</sup> Jawwad, op. cit., pp. 72-73

## Exit

The various organisations may have gone through periodic retreats and a subsequent lessening of actions, but these retreats had little to do with continued membership within the Resistance. The Israelis operate under Realist assumptions with deterrence theory as a major guiding force—“the notion that rational men will cease and desist from hostile acts if the threat of retaliation is sufficiently grave and credible.” The Palestinians operate under a completely different set of guiding forces, polar opposites even. The Palestinian driving force is more emotional: “Honour and revenge [and] the desire to undo a perceived wrong.”<sup>243</sup> Emotional does not imply a negative view of Palestinian reasoning; instead this points to Palestinian involvement as something more personal and thus more sustainable. It is a nationalist struggle, which implies a personal identification and commitment to the struggle. However,

asserting the Palestinian identity was never, of course, the Palestinian activists’ sole goal. Nobody ever joined the movement just to sing patriotic songs.... They joined to get their land back.<sup>244</sup>

Della Porta and Diani stress the ‘othering’ involved in new social movements.

Collective action could not occur without a clear opponent.<sup>245</sup> While the student groups in the West identified their government often as their ‘other,’ the Palestinians have a clear-cut national identity (their ‘we’) and a clearly defined enemy, an ‘other,’ in the Israelis. This ‘us’ versus ‘them’ allows for an extreme solidarity, which informs the groups, the networks and the movement as a whole. It is a protracted conflict. The Palestinians are fighting for self-determination and the state that goes with this. Until they get it, there will be no peace. In his chapter on this conflict, Milton J. Esman is very clear about the conflict’s nature. The zero-sum attitudes on both sides cannot be

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<sup>243</sup> Amos, op. cit., pp. 12-13

<sup>244</sup> Cobban, Helena. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, power and politics. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1984) p. 253

<sup>245</sup> della Porta and Diani, op. cit., p. 88

co-opted as effectively as mainstream politicians co-opted issues of the student movements in America and West Germany.<sup>246</sup>

Amos uses these statistics to emphasise long-term Palestinian involvement in the Resistance groups. *Fortune* magazine of July 1970 said there were 25,000-armed fedayeen in Fateh—10,000 trained guerrillas and 15,000 in the militia—although Amos believes these numbers are too high for Fateh alone. They probably reflect all of the Resistance groups. In August of that same summer, the *Christian Science Monitor* reported there were 15,000 members. By 1974, as a consequence of Black September, there were only 6,700, as reported by *Time*. Yet, by 1980, al-Assifah had 10,000-12,000 members with another 15,000 able to mobilise within 48 hours. Not all of these were combatants, 20 to 30 percent served in support roles.<sup>247</sup> However, a problem remains in finding a solution to the sustainable mobilisation of women.

The women's committees, like the GUPW, have realised that women need to be mobilised for sustainable entry, not just in the face of each new crisis. A woman's mobilisation is cyclical; she is involved for the crisis and retreats once it is over, only to become involved again as the next one arises. Mobilisation during crisis, for some, does create a lifetime commitment to political activism. Familial ties continue to be important. The women who do not stay active will be addressed below. The women who typically stay involved are middle-class, educated and married to another activist, for whom it is important to be married to an active woman.<sup>248</sup> The women who find it easiest to become involved are related, usually, to active men. These women members then encourage their female relations to get involved by bringing them to their first

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<sup>246</sup> Esman, Milton J. *Ethnic Politics*. (Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY, 1994) pp. 111-146

<sup>247</sup> Amos, op. cit., pp. 57-58

<sup>248</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, op. cit., pp 129 and 131

meeting or event.<sup>249</sup> For example, Khaled is now married to another PFLP member with whom she has two sons.<sup>250</sup>

The “dangerous years”—after puberty and before marriage—are spent working outside the home or by being politically active. These young women are more “receptive to mobilisation campaigns.” The problem with sustainable entry is marriage. Women leave resistance groups upon marriage and will not stake their domestic status on something that could brand them as loose or immoral. Mobilisers do not even target married women or those in their 30s and 40s. Marriage “signifies a fundamental transformation in status, self-perception and extra-domestic roles.” Marriage constitutes a change in self-perception; when a woman gets married, those in the movement comment, ‘She has graduated.’<sup>251</sup>

Beyond the revolutionary struggle, the GUPW is trying to find public space for Palestinian women. Some of their objectives are to “set Palestinian legislations that would protect, and consolidate women’s rights and to amend existing laws according to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.” The GUPW seeks to include women on “legal committees to review draft laws concerning the protection of women.” They want to “guarantee gender equality before the law” and establish a “Personal Status Department concomitant with advancing the status of women and their development.” The GUPW hopes to “develop various methods of Palestinian women’s participation in the national, political and social struggle in Palestine and abroad, in order to fulfil the Palestinian aims.”<sup>252</sup> Although the PFLP has advocated the advancement of women while subsuming this to the national cause, will public space be provided for Palestinian women post-revolution? Fateh and

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<sup>249</sup> Ibid, pp. 113-114

<sup>250</sup> Khaled, op. cit., pp. 1 and 19

<sup>251</sup> Peteet, *Gender in Crisis...*, pp. 132-133

<sup>252</sup> General Union of Palestinian Women, “The National Strategy for the Advancement of Women,” [www.gupw.org/publication/st3.htm](http://www.gupw.org/publication/st3.htm), site accessed 24<sup>th</sup> September, 2002

the PLO hold the same view as the PFLP, even while they have sent delegates to the UN to speak specifically about women. Will there be public space for women if the two-state solution ever takes shape?

The End of the Palestinian Resistance Movement—the end of women’s involvement?

During the difficult and conflicted post-1970 era, a new generation of activists was created with a more grassroots base, mainly centred in the West Bank. From 1977, the long-term national struggle moved from outside the occupied territories into the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>253</sup> Again, these grew out of the universities. Women were also a part of this new generation. Where the older women’s committees were centred around the middle-class women, these new committees targeted “the urban poor and women workers as well as intellectuals and urban middle-class women, in a united women’s movement.”<sup>254</sup> Two left-wing groups, the Women’s Work Committee and the Working Women’s Committee, targeted women factory workers. In the early 1980s, the Palestinian Women’s Committee and the Women’s Committee for Social Work, joined forces with the aforementioned groups in “launch[ing] a series of projects serving women: literary, small-scale production training, nurseries and kindergartens and health education.” This was done to raise a woman’s social status and her awareness of the national cause.<sup>255</sup> Dean of Arts at Birzeit University Dr. Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi argues this increased visibility of women “has removed the basis of authority of the male. Traditional hierarchies are challenged by new hierarchies.”<sup>256</sup> Women who participated

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<sup>253</sup> Cobban, *op. cit.*, p. 257

<sup>254</sup> Giacaman and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 159

<sup>255</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159

<sup>256</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 160

in the first Intifada were quoted as saying, “After independence, the role of our society will be to help build our new state.”<sup>257</sup>

Most women do not become involved as feminists (as concerned with challenging institutions for women’s rights) but as nationalists concerned with changing their peoples’ lives. Although the GUPW is campaigning for the rights listed previously, it may not happen. Coughlin, writing before the second Intifada, outlines a very hopeful and positive image of Palestinian women’s involvement:

Politically as well as ‘militarily,’ Palestinian women are more visible in public space; they are enfranchised and serve in some political and legislative offices. The nascent Palestinian Legislative Council boasts several women representatives, and Intisar al-Wazir currently serves as Minister of Social Affairs. After over 50 years of struggle, Palestinian women are beginning to focus more on gender issues and questions of their status in the new Palestinian state, though stalled peace process negotiations effectively mute any significant discourse on the role of women in society. As long as nationalist concerns dominate public debate, the feminist concerns of Palestinian women (whether they be Islamist, secular or other) will remain sidelined.<sup>258</sup>

The end of her paragraph on Palestinian women does become more realistic, but even so Palestinian women do not represent a huge amount of the vote. The visibility of Palestinian women will always be second to that of nationalist concerns, but this second-hand visibility is being threatened, as Coughlin mentioned, by the rise of Islamic groups.

Hamas and the Islamic forces aim to establish an Islamic state with the shari’a as law.<sup>259</sup> When Hamas was emerging in the late 1970s, “it offered a model of society and social behaviour relevant” to the problems facing the poorer Gazan residents. Their solution was a return to Islamic morality.<sup>260</sup> Women were more visible during the first Intifada and are now infamous through the hype over female self-martyrdom in the

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<sup>257</sup> Bennis, Phyllis. From Stones to Statehood: The Palestinian uprising. (Zed Books: London, 1989) p. 32

<sup>258</sup> Coughlin, op. cit., p. 230

<sup>259</sup> Hunter, op. cit., p. 5

<sup>260</sup> Hammami, Rema. “Women, the Hijab and the Intifada,” *Middle East Report*, May-August 1990, pp. 24-28. p. 25

second, only their role is strictly controlled. Hamas first mandated the wearing of the *hijab*, the traditional headscarf. It became a symbol of the resistance:

[W]omen were following the modest way of life of the uprising; that is, there were to be no gaiety, no social gatherings, no celebrations.<sup>261</sup>

Women not wearing the hijab were victims of violent harassment. This mandate from Hamas encouraged men and boys to harass women who were not complying. One woman said, “[The hijab] is not an issue for me.... In my community it’s natural to wear it. The problem is when little boys, including my son, feel they have the right to tell me to wear it.” Women who did not wear it were seen as “vain and frivolous or, at worst, anti-nationalist.”<sup>262</sup> Veiled women served as Hamas’ “symbol of Palestinianism.” Hamas ideology only conceptualises women as “the factory of men.”

The role of women was in reproduction, in producing men, the real subjects and agents of the struggle. Modernity and women’s emancipation were perceived as part of the enemy’s strategy in the struggle against Islam and national liberation.<sup>263</sup>

Women, then, were defenders only of the hearth and traditional values. She did not militarily fight for Palestine anymore. Rema Hammami argues the regulation of the hijab was less a return to Islamic traditional values and more “an instrument of oppression, a direct disciplining of women’s bodies for political ends.”<sup>264</sup> During the first Intifada, after various women were attacked for not wearing the hijab, UNLU finally addressed it in #43 of their *bayan*, or pamphlet. Attackers would be considered in the same league as collaborators—not tolerated. UNLU stated in #43’s appendix:

Woman as we perceive her, besides being a mother, daughter, sister or wife, is an effective human being and full citizen with all rights and responsibilities....

We should value highly the role women have played in our society during these times in achieving our national goals and confronting the occupation and they should not be punished without cause.

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<sup>261</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 71

<sup>262</sup> Hammami, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>263</sup> Schulz, op. cit., p. 71

<sup>264</sup> Hammami, op. cit., p. 25

The phenomenon of harassing women contradicts the traditions and norms of our society.... At the same time it denigrates the patriotism and humanity of each female citizen.<sup>265</sup>

However, many women felt UNLU took too long to address the harassment; therefore UNLU tacitly agreed with Hamas.<sup>266</sup> The rise of Political Islam does not bode well for Palestinian women's emancipation.

It must be mentioned that post-Oslo, Hamas has relaxed its directives. It claims credit for not insisting that women wear the hijab anymore, but it was actually a result of the PA's "liberalisation of the dress code."<sup>267</sup> Yet, Nahla Abdo still sees Hamas as a threat to women's liberation. The PA "employs harsh tactics against Hamas" due to Israeli pressure; yet, the PA appeases Hamas "in part by not 'giving in' to women's demands."<sup>268</sup> Malu Halasa wrote:

With the rise of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hizb'allah, a shift in power has taken place, and terrorism—once the norm—has become the preserve of a small, extreme, religious minority. The suicide bomber has replaced the female hijacker.<sup>269</sup>

But what happens when the self-martyrs are female?<sup>270</sup> If the groups, like Al-Aqsa and Hamas, are just using the women, then the desperation of Palestinian groups is being clearly expressed.

Since the end of January 2002, there have been four female self-martyrs in total: Wafa Idris, 27<sup>th</sup> January; Darin Abu Aysheh, 27<sup>th</sup> February; Ayat Akhras, 29<sup>th</sup> March; and Nidal Daraghni, 12<sup>th</sup> April.<sup>271</sup> If self-martyrdom is symptomatic of a desperate people, the self-martyrdom of women in an Islamic society is even more so.

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<sup>265</sup> Ibid, p. 27

<sup>266</sup> Ibid, p. 28

<sup>267</sup> Kristianasen, op. cit., p. 26

<sup>268</sup> Abdo, op. cit., p. 49

<sup>269</sup> Halasa, op. cit., p. 188

<sup>270</sup> The first female self-martyr in the Middle East was in 1985 when a 16-year-old girl drove into an Israeli checkpoint in southern Lebanon. She killed herself and two guards. (Walker, Christopher and Beeston, Richard. "Israel Alert for More Female Suicide Attacks," *The Times*, 29<sup>th</sup> January 2002)

<sup>271</sup> Walker and Beeston, op. cit. Usher, Graham. "At 18, Bomber Became Martyr and Murderer," *The Guardian*, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2002, p. 5. Usher, Graham. "Six Killed by Jenin Camp Bomber," *The Guardian*, 13<sup>th</sup> April 2002, p. 4.

Martyrdom, in some minds, is one way for a woman to gain equality with men. However, the women, like Red Crescent paramedic Wafa Idris, were protesting against the destruction they witnessed on a daily basis. In a meeting with Khaled in early March of 2002, equality was not even an issue to her. When the fighting is more intense, then more women will become involved and because of the current situation, more women will choose self-martyrdom.<sup>272</sup> Whether or not self-martyrdom is effective as a weapon, and whether or not it is justified<sup>273</sup>, “there are women now who have reached to the extent that the distance between life and death is minimised because of this powerless situation they are living in.”<sup>274</sup> Even if a stronger commitment and stronger drives were necessary to gain equality during the early days of the PFLP, this did not hold true for Idris, Aysheh, Akhras and Daraghni. None of these women were concerned with equality; they were not brainwashed; they were not instruments of the men; they were acting of their own accord, filing a protest by taking their own lives.

It typically takes weeks of training to prepare for a self-martyrdom mission.<sup>275</sup> However, when 20 year-old Arien Ahmed volunteered for self-martyrdom she did not receive the expected training or “questioning from her recruiters about why she wanted to kill and die.” Instead, they told her she would join her fiancé, a slain fighter, in paradise. Ahmed “recalled thinking [this idea was] stupid even at the time.” Ahmed quit in the middle of the mission when she decided, “that nobody has the right to stop anybody’s life.” Ahmed’s decision is unusual and it highlights the desperation of the

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<sup>272</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 23

<sup>273</sup> The PFLP does not encourage self-martyrdom—“you’ll not hear about women [or anyone] from the PFLP doing this thing.” “It’s not a way of struggle, to see people go to their death.” Especially since a highly committed life “cannot do anymore.” (Khaled, op. cit, p. 23)

<sup>274</sup> Khaled, op. cit., p. 12

<sup>275</sup> The indoctrination that is most often used in the Middle East happens quickly and occurs close to the time of the mission. It involves the “persuasion of the person intended for suicide, usually by a charismatic political, military or religious leader.” (Merari, Ariel. “The Readiness to Kill and Die.” In Reich, op. cit., pp. 192-207. p. 199)

groups—that they are so in need of willing martyrs that they will forgo training. It also raises the question, were they taking advantage of Ahmed’s grief over her fiancé and thus abusing her? From her jail cell in Israel, she affirms this: “They abused me.” Are the groups not training anyone or is it just women? Perhaps training and religious/ideological commitment has little to do with the act anymore. Often the self-martyrdom missions are associated with fundamentalist Islamic groups; however, even in the mid-1980s secular groups carried out most of the attacks.<sup>276</sup> The al-Aqsa Brigades are a faction associated with secular Fateh. Ahmed and her fiancé were associated with Tanzim, a militia connected to Fateh. In fact, a Palestinian psychiatrist in Gaza City, Dr. Iyad Sarraj, believes self-martyrdom has become a systemic problem. Palestinian children were beginning to equate self-martyrdom attacks and death with power. “They are creating a new kind of culture,” he said and this culture “creat[es] something automatic.” Ahmed may not have gone through with her own mission, but she still understood why other people did: “It’s a result of the situation we live in.... There are also innocent people killed on our side.” As for Ahmed, after serving her time in jail, she expects to be rejected by her “[her] nation.”<sup>277</sup>

Women are being used and are involving themselves in the current uprising. Yet, they are not serving in leadership roles in the Resistance groups, at least not in ways that have been reported or that can be seen. Their leadership capabilities are largely limited to the grassroots organisations or women’s committees. When women are leaders in resistance groups, it is usually in groups that were operating during 1967—like Leila Khaled on the Central Committee and the two anonymous women on the Politburo of the PFLP. The shift from the religiously secular ideology from 1967 to

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<sup>276</sup> Merari, “The Readiness to Kill and Die,” op. cit., p. 204

<sup>277</sup> Bennet, James. “Mideast Turmoil: The Bombers; Rash of New Suicide Bombers Exhibit No Patterns or Ties,” *The New York Times*, 21<sup>st</sup> June 2002.

1989 to the present is responsible for this loss of women leaders. This accounts for the focus of this thesis, then, on the Palestinian Resistance Movement of 1967.

## **Conclusion**

In all of the historical narratives in this thesis, the revolutionary women under study have had to overcome obstacles—systemic sexism or outside commitments—which have made their decision to join all that more complex. Perhaps the most complex of all, is the decision made by Palestinian women. By becoming involved in the PRM or even the Intifadas, a woman faces losing her honour and her worth in the eyes of Palestinian society at large. Because of this threat, it makes it much harder to dismiss her involvement as maternal or nurturing. The revolutionary Palestinian woman cannot be labelled as easily as this. Her social context makes it difficult for her to become involved as a combatant revolutionary; her historical context makes it sometimes necessary.

The Palestinian woman faces a far more conservative society than women in America or West Germany. A Palestinian woman's traditional role is daughter, wife and mother. Not until recently could a woman hold her own passport, without the involvement of her father or husband. During all but the most intense of fighting, a woman is the 'mother of martyrs.' She is engaged in a support capacity. In the face of extreme fighting and all out war, a woman may be allowed to become involved on a higher level. The historical context of the Palestinians illustrates the desperation this nation has felt at different periods in time. During the various Palestinian periods of resistance, women have become engaged in higher levels of the struggle than what might be considered normal. During the PRM of 1967, this is most especially evident. After the Arab states were defeated in the Six-Day War and were seen as having failed the Palestinian people; when it became apparent that the al-ghurba (exile) was not going

to end anytime soon, women were actively recruited, even if ambiguously, by the two largest organisations, Fateh and the PFLP. The historical necessity of a woman's involvement is indicative of the continued presence of the revolutionary dimension in Palestinian nationalism.

As is apparent in the other historical narratives, women often enter and participate in the movement and the revolutionary groups in much the same manner as the men. This is no different in the Palestinian case; even if it is harder for the women, they still enter in the same way. Entry of the Palestinian revolutionary woman conformed largely to that of men who became involved. By looking at leadership and membership into the PRM, one can compare this to the entry of Palestinian women. Men and women were both recruited in the camps or at university. Fateh and the PFLP specifically targeted the refugee camps and university campuses as sources for new members. All of the women discussed in this chapter, Khaled, Basimah, Rula and Halaseh, were either recruited or insisted on joining. Again this does not differ greatly from a man's involvement. Not one of them was romantically engaged with a man at the time of their initial involvement with the PRM. All of the women highlighted in this chapter, with perhaps the exception of Rula, were first involved in the PRM or other protest groups, e.g. Therese Halaseh and Free Conscience. Women may have made up a small minority of the PRM, but it does mean the statistics only covered wives or partners. Familial ties played, and continue to play, an important role. This may be more important in Palestinian groups, but familial and friendship ties were also important in the Western groups. This should not lessen a woman's role. What it means is her family was not only committed to the Resistance, but they were more comfortable with and more accepting of their daughter, sister or wife choosing to become involved. It also reflects upon a woman's commitment; she was more familiar

with the risks and the ideology and what it meant to be a part of revolutionary organisation.

A woman was not necessarily involved simply out of desperation. Her involvement may have been more palatable to the general society because of an overarching desperation, but she would still need to be passionate about and committed to the ideology of the organisation. Arien Ahmed demonstrated this by abandoning her self-martyrdom mission. She was neither convinced of the ideology nor for the need to kill and die. Khaled was not allowed to become a member of the PFLP until she read and believed in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Her commitment to the PFLP has spanned 35 years. If Khaled was simply engaged in combat during desperate times or as a way for her to be maternal, her commitment would have ended long ago. In fact, once she had her own children in the 1980s, her supposed maternal need would have been transferred from the group to her children. Yet, this did not happen. Palestinian women have made sacrifices in their life to be a part of the PRM. Khaled, due to her fame, has given up privacy. Halaseh almost lost her life twice. In some ways, they have denied their femininity to be a member of the Resistance. In order to be taken seriously, they must prove themselves. This would include acting properly. Mijidah became a 'sister of men' and was allowed to lead missions after she proved her worth. On the same base, Rula, due to her improper behaviour and inappropriate dress, has been, in effect, demoted and treated with something akin to disdain. A Palestinian woman is working against her social context. She must make her superiors and her peers realise she is more than a 'mother of martyrs' or only fit for social work. Palestinian women must prove their worth as fedayeen. They would not go to this

## Conclusion: Moving Beyond the Myths of the Female Terrorist?

In a rather current volume, Marysia Zawelski criticises International Relations for treating feminism as a “not very successful” addition. She continues by stating that “the discipline of International Relations” only “tolerates...an apparently sanitised kind of feminism, that is, a feminism that does not seriously challenge the status quo.”<sup>1</sup> She accuses International Relations of being “overwhelmingly male-dominated and increasingly uninterested in and seemingly unaffected by most feminist work.”<sup>2</sup> Another critic notes that an “essentialist argument” remains in International Relations: “that women *per se*, that is, per sex, are less corrupt, ‘cleaner’ [and] more peaceful.” She continues by explaining that women were to be “mobilised as an ‘anti-corruption weapon’” in the field of women’s/humans rights.<sup>3</sup> Traditional International Relations and the rather rudimentary versions of Realism and neo-Realism have been accused of failing to deal with women, which relegates them to the private sphere. Instead of legitimate actors, women tend to be treated as victims or casualties of International Relations. Terrorism Studies is guilty of this behaviour as well and continues to be blind to the reality of individual female lives. Terrorism Studies, like International Relations, cannot seem to stop treating women as anything other than passive and when this field is confronted with the female terrorist there is a tendency to dismiss her violence. If a woman, who is supposed to be an anti-corruption weapon, acts instead as a ‘corrupt’ vehicle for political violence, then she is dirtying the waters of International Relations. The female terrorist challenges the status quo of International Relations in several ways. She not only acts as a person defying social norms, but also as a woman

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<sup>1</sup> Zalewski, Marysia. “Feminists in International Relations: What impact on the discipline?” In Braig, Marianne and Wölte, Sonja, eds. Common Ground or Mutual Exclusion: Women’s movements and International Relations. (Zed Books: London, 2002) pp. 23-34. p. 24

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p. 27

<sup>3</sup> Wichterich, Christa. “Accommodation or Transformation? Women’s Movements and International Relations: Some remarks on Marysia Zalewski’s and Nighat Said Khan’s contributions.” In Braig and Wölte, op. cit., pp. 46-51. p. 47

defying gender norms. Instead, female terrorists are placed into neat boxes which serve to counter-act her challenge to society and to the more masculinist thinking of realist and neo-realist theories in International Relations. By using New Social Movement theory to develop a macro-level (and micro-level) analysis of movements and the in-depth study of why women became revolutionaries, this thesis challenges Terrorism Studies as a sub-field of International Relations to acknowledge the implicit gendering of women and thereby recognise women as fully-valued humans.

The assumptions made about female terrorists are similar to many of the gendered labels which are applied to women who commit a crime or who are violent. A female terrorist, if she is not fairly portrayed, can only belong to two different camps: maternal or gorgon. These assumptions fail to see a female terrorist as a person who thinks, who reasons and who acts on her extreme belief in a cause or an organisation. Various researchers, the anonymous author of "The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing," H.H.A. Cooper, Robin Morgan, Luisella de Cataldo Neuburger and Tiziana Valentini and Leonard Weinburg and William Eubank, treat her entirely differently. She is differentiated by their attitudes toward her participation in a terrorist organisation, not by the social and historical context in which she struggles. This research has chosen to place the female terrorist within her context. It has attempted to see her as an individual, an activist and a revolutionary. The women under study saw themselves as revolutionaries involved in legitimate struggles. They are often robbed of their legitimacy by the researchers who try to lessen their involvement by excusing or explaining away their political violence. In order to place her in context, a framework based upon New Social Movement theory was developed to demonstrate that the assumptions are invalid.

The first assumption is that the woman becomes an active member in a terrorist organisation to act as a mother to the other (male) members. Her entire motive behind

joining a terrorist organisation is based upon “an affective model based on sacrifice, on caring for others, or responding to others’ needs and on protection.”<sup>4</sup> The female terrorist *only* participates out of her biological or sociological need to be maternal. She is a “housekeeper” who is motivated by “romantic or affectional ties.”<sup>5</sup> She is a background member who is content to clean the fridge, make dinner and darn socks while the men get down to the real business of terrorism. The woman is simply playing out her biological role. Women do not act aggressively. It is simply not in their nature.

Aggression should be, as John Dollard explains, suppressed in girls, as females are not to act aggressively; it has been “foreordained in the biological sense.”<sup>6</sup> For if a woman was aggressive and not passive; if she refused peaceful action but learned to fire a gun; she would be forsaking her femininity.<sup>7</sup> This behaviour is not acceptable in a woman. Crime is a “‘masculine’ activity.” A woman who breaks the law is “manifest[ing]...a *lack of femininity*.”<sup>8</sup> Lawbreaking means she is acting outside her nature and is thus pathological. Criminal women were first seen as biological anomalies. Caesar Lombroso and William Ferrero believed criminal women were atavistic<sup>9</sup>—they did not belong to modern, advanced society. Even though Lombroso and Ferrero’s biological determinism has been discredited, a female offender, criminal, violent or terrorist, is irrational and biologically unfit. Her decision to join a terrorist organisation is either because she is oversexed or because she has a treatable nervous condition<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Neuburger, Luisella de Cataldo and Valentini, Tiziana. Women and Terrorism. (MacMillan: London, 1996) p. 81

<sup>5</sup> Weinburg, Leonard and Eubank, William. “Italian Women Terrorists,” *Terrorism: An International Journal*, 9, 1985.

<sup>6</sup> Dollard, John; Miller, Neal E.; Doob, Leonard N.; Merver, O.H.; Sears, Robert R. Frustration and Aggression. (Keegan Paul: London, 1944) p. 49

<sup>7</sup> Morgan, Robin. The Demon Lover: The roots of terrorism. (Washington Square Press: New York, 1989) pp. 196-198

<sup>8</sup> Carlen, Pat, ed. Criminal Women. (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1985) p. 8

<sup>9</sup> Lombroso, Caesar and Ferrero, William. “Criminals and Prostitutes.” In Adler, Freda and Simon, Rita James, eds. The Criminology of Deviant Women. (Houghton Mifflin: Boston, 1979) pp. 10-13. Originally published in The Female Offender. (T. Fisher Unwin: London, 1895) pp. 88-93

<sup>10</sup> “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing,” *Top Security Project No.2, Part IV—Summary and Analysis*, November 1976, pp. 242-245

(read: mental health problem). This is easily linked to the problem Carol Smart, Lucinda-Joy Peach and Meda Chesney-Lind all encountered when researching the gendered nature of criminology. Smart found that women criminals are treated as if they are “sick,” “mentally unstable” and “not legitimate agents of the use of violence.”<sup>11</sup> Peach found that a female criminality’s ‘logical outcome’ was to treat her as irrational and her actions as unintentional.<sup>12</sup> Chesney-Lind saw female crime as misrepresented in order to downplay its larger societal meaning and even described the demonisation of the female criminal.<sup>13</sup> Not only is she a misfit, the criminal woman is not responsible for her own actions, which are made by a part of her that is outside her control. This instinctive impulse makes her seem chaotic, not culpable. The same attitudes are reflected in the ‘ultimate demon,’ the female terrorist. The female terrorist is “single-minded [and] fanatically inhuman.” She must be “dealt with after the fashion of the Gorgon.”<sup>14</sup> The female terrorist does not possess reason; her actions are not instrumental. Yet, Martha Crenshaw states terrorist violence is a “wilful choice...made for strategic reasons.”<sup>15</sup> It must not be “dismissed as ‘irrational.’” It is the “result of reasoned, instrumental behaviour.”<sup>16</sup> Why should the female terrorist be any different?

In addition to these (mis)labels, she is also captivating and titillating. The female terrorist is sexy. The women of the Weather Underground and the Red Army Faction (RAF) produced “more interest and speculation than their *male counterparts*” due to their

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<sup>11</sup> Smart, Carol. Women, Crime and Criminality: A feminist critique. (Routledge and Keegan Paul: London, 1976) pp. 132-133 and 147

<sup>12</sup> Peach, Lucinda-Joy. “Is Violence Male? Law, gender and violence.” In Waller, Marguerite R. and Rycenga, Jennifer, eds. Frontline Feminisms. (Garland Publishing Inc.: London and New York, 2000) pp. 57-71) p. 60

<sup>13</sup> Chesney-Lind, Meda. “Contextualising Women’s Violence and Aggression: Beyond denial and demonisation,” Behavioural and Brain Sciences, vol. 22, no. 2, 1999, pp. 222-223

<sup>14</sup> Cooper, H.H.A. “Woman as Terrorist.” In Adler and Simon, op. cit., pp. 150-157. pp. 152-153

<sup>15</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist behaviour as a product of strategic choice.” In Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 7-24. pp. 7-8

<sup>16</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. “Current Research on Terrorism: The academic perspective,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 15, pp. 1-11. p. 7

“sexual liberation” by “male voyeur[s].”<sup>17</sup> (italic emphasis added) She is a terrorist because her sexuality is running rampant. She joins due to erotomania.<sup>18</sup> This links her decision to be a terrorist with sexual deviancy.<sup>19</sup> Like women in the military, she is a slut.<sup>20</sup> Her violence is a come-on. She acts as a modern Mata Hari, to seduce and destroy. These researchers continue to place an abhorrent female figure into acceptable boxes. Society can understand if she just wants to act maternally. Or society can dismiss her as an emotionally deviant or bankrupt woman who acts as she does because she is just an individual in need of some psychotherapy.

These gendered assumptions reflect the norm or “the classical patriarchal representation” of the “idea that women are ‘inadequate’ or indeed not fully formed’ *on their own*.”<sup>21</sup> Zawelski is discussing International Relations in general and her view of International Relations may be a disputed one. This line of thinking, however, is still apparent in Terrorism Studies’ treatment of female terrorists as über-mothers or sexualised demons. This androcentric gendering may be stopped by the inclusion of and the linkage between “macro-, meso- and micro-levels”<sup>22</sup> and by “focus[ing] on both ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics’ in contrast with IR’s (earlier) emphasis on ‘high politics.’” Incorporating both the macro- and micro-level should open, for this thesis, New Social Movement theory and Terrorism Studies to “a gender perspective.”<sup>23</sup> Using New Social Movement theory to study both the macro-level (historical and social context) and

<sup>17</sup> Kennedy, Helena. Eve Was Framed: Women and British justice. (Vintage: London, 1992) pp. 261-262

<sup>18</sup> See both Cooper, H.H.A. and “The Female Terrorist and Her Impact on Policing.”

<sup>19</sup> Smart found that delinquent girls are more likely to be institutionalised than boys because the girls’ crimes were seen in light of their sexuality. A girl’s problems are far more serious than boys as a sign of something more pathological. (Smart, op. cit., pp. 132-133)

<sup>20</sup> Enloe, Cynthia. Does Khaki Become You? The militarisation of women’s lives. (Pluto Press: London, 1983) pp. 141-142. See also DeGroot, Gerard J. “Lipstick on Her Nipples Cordite in Her Hair: Sex and romance among British servicewomen during the Second World War.” In DeGroot, Gerard J. and Bird-Peniston, Corinna, eds. A Soldier and a Woman: Sexual integration in the military. (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, 2000) pp. 100-118

<sup>21</sup> Zalewski, op. cit., p. 30

<sup>22</sup> von Braunmühl, Claudia. “Mainstreaming Gender—a critical revision.” In Braig and Wölte, op. cit., pp. 55-79. p. 64

<sup>23</sup> Reimann, Cordula. “Engendering the Field of Conflict Management: Why gender does not matter! Thoughts from a theoretical perspective.” In Braig and Wölte, op. cit., pp. 100-128. p. 102

micro-level (through the development of leadership, membership and ideology) helps to develop fully the micro-level context of the female revolutionary—something the studies mentioned above fail to do. If mention is made of her origin, her reason to join or her ideology, one or all may be neatly dismissed by those studies. Neuberger and Valentini and Morgan all did this. Dismissing her context deprives the woman of her personality, her intelligence and her rationality. Arriving at an understanding of what a male or female does because of social norms is to arrive at an understanding of gender. It would seem then that all people ‘gender’—they arrive at conclusions of appropriate behaviour based upon a person’s sex. This thesis is asking Terrorism Studies to recognise this action. The anonymous author, Cooper, Neuberger and Valentini and Morgan are all voicing their own perspectives, shaped by their unique experiences. This is their individual context. The recognition of their context, by themselves or by their reader, is important. Therefore, this thesis suggests that some segments of Terrorism Studies, when dealing with women, are antiquated because they do not recognise the differences between sex and gender.

By placing the revolutionaries into a context, this thesis attempts to demonstrate that there is little difference between the two sexes’ *reasons* for involvement. There is support for this. To place the revolutionaries in context is encouraged by both Alain Touraine and Donatella della Porta. Because of this thesis’ reliance on New Social Movement theory, Touraine’s encouragement to engage in a relationship with the movement is extremely influential. An objective of della Porta’s work on underground organisations and social movements is to explain the social construction of the members. By placing the women into context, the work done by Terrorism Studies’ experts, Bonnie Cordes, Jerrold M. Post and, again, della Porta, helps support this thesis. Cordes found *both* sexes joined terrorist organisations to *belong* to a group of

people who believed in the same ideology, tactics, strategy, etc.<sup>24</sup> Post discovered similar motivations: there is an intense need to belong by all members.<sup>25</sup> Della Porta writes that many organisations were formed by friends, couples and siblings.<sup>26</sup> It was not just the women motivated by relationships.

The framework based upon New Social Movement theory was developed to discover the role of the revolutionary woman and to flesh out fully the relationship between new social movements and revolutionary organisations. A new social movement emerges when multiple collective identity groups mobilise to gain control over their own development. The groups are linked by ideology and organise against a common opponent, e.g. campus administration, the government or imperialism. In a new social movement, the personal has become political; solidarity, the identification of a 'we' versus a 'them,' is an objective. It is based upon a network, a "system of exchange," where individuals and information circulate freely.<sup>27</sup> The use of protest and direct participation is marked by a level of deviance. Looking at these five facets makes comparisons between the historical narratives: historical context, leadership, membership, collective action and group ideology and the revolutionary dimension. Leadership and membership help define the specific collective identity of this movement. Looking at collective action and group ideology delineate the movement's solidarity. Additionally, the social context is established to help the researcher understand the society in which the new social movement was developing and how the women were perceived.

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<sup>24</sup> Cordes, Bonnie. When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on terrorist literature. (Rand Corp: Santa Monica, CA, 1987) p. 8

<sup>25</sup> Post, Jerrold M. "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces." In Reich, Walter, ed. Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind. (Woodrow Wilson Centre Press: Washington, D.C., 1990) pp. 25-40. pp. 27 and 31

<sup>26</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>27</sup> Melucci, op. cit., p. 829

It is not that much or all of the information presented in the three historical narratives of this thesis is completely new. In one form or another, one can read about all three movements and all four groups. What is new is the contribution it makes to New Social Movement theory, Terrorism Studies and to International Relations overall. If New Social Movement theory is criticised for not looking enough at the individual and the micro-level interactions of the various groups, the addition of gender helps to further develop this criticism. This is very similar to the criticisms made of International Relations at the beginning of this chapter. If one is supposed to engage in a face-to-face relationship with the new social movement, then understanding the concept of gender in that given society, in light of its historical context, is necessary. Gender, or the gendering of the roles of the sexes, can be applied to all new social movements, not just ones the which fragment into politically violent factions. Gendering shaped the identity of the American Movement, the West German *Ausserparlamentarische Opposition* (Extra-parliamentary Opposition) and the Palestinian Resistance Movement (PRM). The direct, although implicit, outcome of this gendering had ramifications for how women were perceived and on what level they could participate.

A patriarchal society is illustrated at the beginning of each of the three historical narratives to varying degrees; that this existed in all three societies at the beginning of the 1960s is relatively unsurprising. In America, West Germany and the Middle East, women were still bound to their roles as mothers, wives, sisters and daughters. The National Organisation of Women's Statement of Purpose makes use of statistics to prove the low profile of American women in the public realm: the great majority of employed women were found in factory, service or cleaning positions where they

earned only 60 percent of what men made.<sup>28</sup> In West Germany, the Basic Law legalised political equality while society still relished woman as mother and this was reflected in laws protecting women as wives and mothers. For example, mothers received a year of pension for each child they had, and if a marriage ended in divorce the property was considered jointly owned.<sup>29</sup> In Palestinian society, shari'a law guided the actions and lives of women. It was only recently that Palestinian women were able to possess their own travel documents and honour killings still occur.<sup>30</sup>

It should not be surprising to a New Social Movement theorist that the new social movements reflect the cultural attitudes towards gender. This is seen most clearly when examining the micro-level sections of leadership and membership. New Social Movement theory is criticised for not examining fully “the process by which individuals and groups make decisions.”<sup>31</sup> This criticism is used in this thesis to develop a micro-level analysis of leadership and membership. The importance of leadership and how this is reflected in relationships and ideology cannot be undermined. It is the leaders who provide “the mental reminders” of the “causes of...discontent.”<sup>32</sup> As it is the leaders who shape the group through ideology and dynamics, it is then obvious that if the leaders are sexist, then the entire organisation is also going to be sexist.

In both America and West Germany, movement women complained about the tasks of men versus the tasks of women. Men were the ideologues, philosophers and speakers—the leaders. Women filed, cooked, cleaned and served coffee but were also ‘somehow’ the only ones to reach the working-class women. A woman’s involvement

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<sup>28</sup> Friedan, Betty. *“It Changed My Life: Writings on the Women’s Movement.”* (Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA, 1998) pp. 110-111

<sup>29</sup> Kolinsky, Eva. *Women in Contemporary Germany: Life, work and politics.* (Berg Publishers: Oxford, 1989) pp. 45 and 49

<sup>30</sup> Abdo, Nahla. “Gender and Politics Under the Palestinian Authority,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* XXVIII, Winter 1999, no. 2, pp. 38-51. pp. 43-44

<sup>31</sup> Hastings, Margaret Denton. “Theoretical Perspectives on Social Movements,” *New Zealand Sociology*, vol. 13, no. 2, November 1998, pp. 208-238. pp. 218-219. p. 210

<sup>32</sup> Gurr, Ted Robert. *Why Men Rebel.* (Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1970) p. 195

in the PRM reflected crisis and women were most heavily involved in the background work; only the smallest percentages of women were involved in the leadership of PLO activities, such as Red Crescent work, summud and planning.<sup>33</sup> Simona Sharoni's warning that Western society cannot veil Middle Eastern women by declaring their liberation as necessary when a Western woman's liberation is just as doubtful seems especially relevant here. Women in all three historical narratives were not leaders or even a well-included part of the general membership. Gender plays a role in a new social movement and, in this thesis, it mirrors that of the role of gender in the larger society. It contrasts with the strong role women seemingly played within the revolutionary organisation—a development which will be discussed later.

The second impact that this thesis makes is New Social Movement theory's contribution to Terrorism Studies. By creating a stronger link between the revolutionary dimension of a new social movement and 'terrorist' organisations, that is to say organisations that use political violence to achieve their goals, both fields are enriched. New Social Movement theory, on the macro-level, helps to develop the context over time. The historical narratives in this thesis are not just 'snapshots' of the revolutionary group at a certain point. Instead what is seen, by looking at leadership and membership on the micro-level, is how a variety of personalities and a variety of relationships came together to form a politically violent group. Through this attempted empathetic understanding<sup>34</sup>, it is understood that sweeping generalisations about 'terrorists,' women in particular, cannot be made. The study of the historical and social context helps to prevent further stereotypes from developing.

There are difficulties in conducting this type of study. One difficulty is the weighing of evidence and the reliance upon one person's word to count for the entire

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<sup>33</sup> Schulz, Helena Linholm. The Reconstruction of Palestinian Nationalism: Between revolution and statehood. (Manchester University Press: Manchester, 1999) p. 39

<sup>34</sup> Empathy in the sense of a deeper understanding, not a sympathy for or an agreement with the use of political violence.

truth. If the 'terrorist' is reliant upon the 'propaganda of the deed' and those who research them are reliant upon them for the 'ultimate truth,' how is one to know what exactly the truth is? Is this not trying to differentiate between multiple perceptions? How does one filter all evidence collected? It is difficult to represent the revolutionary group from the inside. The researcher can do as recommended by interviewing, reading all accounts, studying autobiographies, but one can only take those under study at their word and to try to verify this truth by comparing it with others' perspectives on the same experiences, to verifiable data from the media, to other academics or with other disseminated information. What is needed here and what Terrorism Studies fails to do, along the same lines as International Relations failure to do the same, is use 'low' politics to uncover a micro-level understanding of revolutionary organisations. The development of leadership and membership and how this reflects a gendered society in New Social Movement theory helps to create a better understanding of revolutionary groups. These groups are then no longer objectified and treated only as 'pests' to governments.

Three of the major New Social Movement theorists, Alberto Melucci, Touraine, and della Porta<sup>35</sup>, mention the revolutionary dimension without fully going into detailed reasons why the revolutionary dimension might grow. Della Porta, however, also effectively and influentially demonstrates how the revolutionary dimension is connected to politically violent organisations. All point to the fragmentation of the new social movement which means the ideology and collective demands may be co-opted, thus driving some groups onto higher levels of deviance. New members are more zealous

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<sup>35</sup> Touraine, Alain. *The Voice and the Eye: An analysis of social movements*. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1980) p. 150; Melucci, Alberto. "An End to Social Movements? Introductory paper to the sessions on 'new social movements and change in organisational forms,'" *Social Science Information*, vol. 23, nos. 4/5, 1984, pp. 819-835. pp. 830-831; and della Porta, Donatella, volume editor. *Social Movements and Violence: Participation in underground organisations*, volume 4, 1992. Klandermans, Bert, series editor. *International Social Movement Research*. (JAI Press, Inc.: London and Greenwich, CT) p. 14

and are then willing to take collective actions further. A revolutionary dimension develops and is, in principle, a negative force. Theories on violence help to understand further the development of this 'negative' force. Terrorism Studies is typically the study of the aftermath or the fully developed 'negative' force. Terrorism Studies mainly creates an overview for policy-making. New Social Movement theory explains not only the larger perspective, but it can be used to explain leadership, membership and gender. This all creates an understanding of personal level decision making and group dynamics, which creates the empathetic understanding of the organisations under scrutiny.

Current concrete examples of this are helpful in understanding how New Social Movement theory and violent groups interact. Two separate events help clarify this issue which happened at nearly the same time. The Spanish government, after years of violence from *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA), the separatist Basque-nationalist group, placed a three-year ban on the Basque political-front party Batasuna. In Sri Lanka, the politically violent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), was legalised by the government after a four-year ban. Because of a link between ETA and Batasuna, the Spanish government has censored the Basque voice by casting it outside the realm of legitimacy. While there are other Basque political parties in Spain, after the ruling was made the "police in the Basque country were braced for a violent response."<sup>36</sup> The Sri Lankan government did just the opposite. Instead of perpetuating the struggle for another 19 years, they gave, after a cease-fire, the LTTE voice a little more room in the legitimate realm of politics to move their country towards peace talks.<sup>37</sup> One could consider the Basques and the Tamils to be participating in a new social movement reliant upon nationalist sentiment much like the Palestinian struggle. In relation to what

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<sup>36</sup> Daly, Emma. "Basque Party Faces Ban," *The New York Times*, 24<sup>th</sup> August 2002, p. 6 and Daly, Emma. "Judge Bans Basque Party, Linking It To Terrorists," *The New York Times*, 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2002, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com), site accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2003

<sup>37</sup> Waldman, Amy. "Ban on Rebels Ends," *The New York Times*, 9<sup>th</sup> May 2002, p. 6 and Waldman, Amy. "Talks Open in Sri Lanka Today to End 19-Year War," *The New York Times*, 16<sup>th</sup>, September 2002, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com), site accessed 23<sup>rd</sup> January 2003

is about to be explained, the Basques could now be considered further 'frustrated' and the Tamil's given a chance to lessen their frustration. In fact, Martha Crenshaw goes so far as to say, "responsibility for violence in political conflict can be and often is shared. The process of violence is interactive." Governments, through their responses to various levels of resistance activities, contribute to the level of frustration that may lead a group to violence.<sup>38</sup> It is the theories on violence which help cement the relationship between the revolutionary dimension and politically violent organisations.

The two theories on violence that were most helpful to this study were John Dollard's frustration-aggression theory and Samuel Huntington's belief in violence as a result of modernisation. John Dollard found aggression to be the product of frustration. Aggression happens when goals are thwarted—from "overt movements" to "plans of revenge" to self—"masochism, martyrdom and suicide."<sup>39</sup> This can be seen in the Weather Underground and their frustration with the American government to win equal rights, free speech and to end the war in Vietnam, the RAF's frustration with the perceived continuance of a 'fascist' West German government and the Palestinian struggle and their frustration with Israel and the Arab states.

Samuel Huntington writes violence and instability rise as a country modernises. Violence is a problem of change and transition as expectations grow and aspirations do not.<sup>40</sup> Huntington also articulates "alienated university graduates prepare revolutions."<sup>41</sup> This idea is especially relevant as all of the new social movements under study began in the university. It is the middle-class who is the "true revolutionary class" and until the middle-class can successfully mobilise the peasantry/working-class, the revolution will

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<sup>38</sup> Crenshaw, Martha. "Relating Terrorism to Historical Contexts." In Crenshaw, Martha, ed. Terrorism in Context. (The Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, Pennsylvania, 1995) pp. 3-26. p. 6

<sup>39</sup> Dollard, op. cit., pp. 1, 5 and 7

<sup>40</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. (Yale University Press: London, 1968) p. 43

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, p. 48

fail.<sup>42</sup> One of Huntington's suggestions for a successful revolution in a changing society is to draw upon nationalist sentiment.<sup>43</sup>

In fact, this leads to a major theme within this thesis: legitimacy. The three historical narratives are ordered within the thesis for specific reasons. The two Western movements are together to create a stronger contrast between them and the Palestinian narrative. Legitimacy is the implicit outcome of this contrast. The Weather Underground was unable to recruit the working-class. The support base and membership levels were the lowest of the three narratives. Instead, the Weather Underground is typically seen as 'vandals in the bomb factory'<sup>44</sup>—young, wealthy kids leaving their upper middle-class pre-determined path for a few years. The RAF was moderately successful in recruiting and developing a support base due to the combination of Marxism-Leninism with the more saliently felt resentment of the 'fascist' government. Rothman and Lichter even define this sentiment as "ersatz nationalism."<sup>45</sup> Only the Palestinians were truly successful in sustainable long-term recruitment by drawing upon nationalist sentiment. The Palestinians are refugees without a homeland and value the idea of The Return—of one day being able to return to a complete Palestine. Due to the nationalist nature of the struggle, the fedayeen find unwavering support in the entire society. Political violence resonates and is felt to be justified within Palestinian society. There may be nothing greater than nationalism to lend legitimacy to a struggle.

How does this help the researcher to understand better the female revolutionary? The five points of comparison for new social movements feed into the

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, p. 289

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, p. 304

<sup>44</sup> This is a reference to G. Louis Heath's edited volume: Vandals in the Bomb Factory: The history and literature of the Students for a Democratic Society. (The Scarecrow Press, Inc.: Metuchen, NJ, 1976)

<sup>45</sup> Rothman, Stanley and Lichter, S. Robert. Roots of Radicalism: Jews, Christians and the New Left. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1982) p. 362

four micro-level points of comparison made between the female revolutionaries (entry, ideology, group dynamics and exit). By looking at the leadership and membership of the new social movement, one gains a clearer idea of how all members, men and women, entered the group. Knowing who dominated, who led and what roles the different sexes played or what groups developed within the movement helps to create a backdrop for the female revolutionary under study. Additionally, this understanding contributes to group dynamics. If a woman was there only to act as a housemother, this would be shown under group dynamics. She would participate in the background, not plan actions or lead. Understanding the movements' collective action and group ideology not only demonstrates how the revolutionary group escalated both the actions and the ideology but it also shows whether or not the woman's ideology was in keeping with those around them. If her ideology was vastly different, then the possibility of her being irrational might be accurate. If the woman was completely devoid of ideology, then maybe she really was a modern gorgon. If this were true, if she was a gorgon, then her exit from the group would demonstrate this. She would easily move from one new and exciting adventure to another. In addition to comparing her to the larger new social movement, theories on violence and Terrorism Studies are used to contextualise her choices and her political violence. This is done to demonstrate that the female's motivation, ideology and reasoning is not so different from the male's.

The reasons given for a woman's participation have included the maternal need to belong, a romantic need to belong, an erotic, irrational desire to belong and mental instability. What reasons are given for participation in studies which do not focus on women? Della Porta believes friendships, relationships and socialisation are "prime inducement to participation" without distinguishing if this is a masculine or feminine

motivation.<sup>46</sup> It is because of these friendship ties *people* may become more intensely driven.<sup>47</sup> Bonnie Cordes echoes della Porta—men and women participate to create a community of like-minded individuals. To create a distinction between a man and a woman's participation, especially when it puts one sex, the woman, in a bad light, shows poor judgement. By comparing the female revolutionary's entry with leadership and membership of the new social movement in which she was involved the researcher may be able to determine if she was at all different.

If a simple list of all women studied in depth in this thesis were composed it would include Bernardine Dohrn, Kathy Boudin, Susan Stern, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, Leila Khaled, Therese Halaseh, Basimah, Majidah and Rula. Of these 10 women, nine were originally members of a new social movement. Of the men, mentioned or looked at in this study, who were involved in the revolutionary dimension of the movements, i.e. Bill Ayers, Tom Hayden (to some extent), J.J., Jeff Jones, Jim Mellen, Mark Rudd, Terry Robbins, Andreas Baader, Horst Mahler, Holger Meins, Thorwald Proll, Jan-Carl Raspe, Yasir Arafat, Dr. George Habash, Wadi Haddad and Nayif Hawatmah, only Andreas Baader was not a part of a new social movement as a confirmed member. On the surface, a woman's original participation did not differ dramatically from the men's. Both sexes were originally involved in the new social movement. Yet, a woman's original participation was different from the men's' because of the gendered nature of the new social movements. As members of the general movements, women were kept apart and placed in subservient roles compared with the men. Yet, these women found their way into leadership or public positions as members of the revolutionary organisation. This can be attributed to Neuberger and Valentini's, Jamieson's and Zwerman's assertion that women have a complex decision to make in

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<sup>46</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 7

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 9

deciding to become members. They think it over ‘three times;’<sup>48</sup> they have to weigh the sociological consequences of their decision against the future goals of the revolution. This may in fact make the women more ideologically committed and more driven. Perhaps this is why women were seen as leaders in the Weather Underground and the RAF and why Palestinian women were chosen to be hijackers. This, along with the current desperation felt in Palestinian society, may also explain the self-martyrdom of Wafa Idris, Darin Abu Aysheh, Ayat Akhras and Nidal Daraghni.

Superficially, how different were the women? Were friendship ties more important to women than to men? Not necessarily. Bill Ayers was a member of the Ann Arbor SDS and created a group within that nicknamed the Jesse James Gang. The three men in the Jesse James Gang, Ayers, Mellen and Robbins, were all founding members of the Weatherman. Additionally, the friendships of Ensslin and Baader were enough to ward off temporarily Meinhof’s ambivalence and persuade her to go underground. There were relationships formed between the men and women that went beyond friendship. Bernardine Dohrn and Bill Ayers have now been married for 20 years and together as a couple for longer. Kathy Boudin’s partner was also a member of the Black Liberation Army. Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader were committed partners. Leila Khaled is married to another PFLP member. Did it appear that Dohrn, Boudin, Ensslin and Khaled only became committed members of their respective revolutionary organisation because of their relationships? No. Only Ensslin and Baader were partners before going underground. Would society even question a man’s involvement in a revolutionary group as romantic? Absolutely not. Therefore, asking this of a woman undermines her reasons for participation. Instead, it would appear these women engaged in revolutionary activity only after participating in their respective new social movements, and after watching the collective action and group ideology

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<sup>48</sup> Neuberger, and Valentini, *op. cit.*, p. 118

escalate to the point where the revolutionary dimension was able to take-over the weakening movement.

What may set the female revolutionaries apart are their rejection of norms and thus their sacrifice of their place in society. The woman revolutionary may simply be set apart because of her refusal to act as a woman *should* within 'normal' society. The women were equally, if not more, convinced of the need to use violence as the only means to achieve their goals. Crenshaw maintains that terrorists are rational individuals who demonstrate reasonable and instrumental behaviour. She is not making an exclusive argument that only male terrorists are rational; male and female terrorists, all terrorists, should be examined as rational perpetrators of political violence. Therefore, her argument should not be used to explain only male political violence while female political violence is beholden to romantic or emotional reasoning.

As the Western women were struggling in patriarchal societies then under siege by the activists and the fledgling Feminists and the Palestinian women were defying the static patriarchy of the Middle East, all three groups of women had to struggle for their voice. This struggle could be why so many achieved high level leadership positions in the Weather Underground, such as Dohrn, Boudin, Cathy Wilkerson and Diana Oughton, and the RAF, such as Meinhof and Ensslin. However, the social context of Palestinian women is such that they would be restricted from leading and, to some extent, from participating. Active engagement in the Resistance or revolutionary violence could seriously jeopardise a woman's respectability within the general society. This contrasts with the American and West German women welcoming cultural dissonance. A Palestinian woman is likely to participate if her family is already open to or active within the Resistance. This reflects the nationalist grounding of the Palestinian struggle, as nationalism protects cultural values and norms. Yet, this is still not very different from the rationale given by Cordes, Post and della Porta. Familial and

friendship ties are not a reason to discount a woman's involvement, they are reasons why men and women seem to join for similar reasons.

In fact, one should take a Palestinian woman's desire to participate even more seriously due to the obstacles she faces. Her decision to join not only weighs the commitment to an ideology but it also incorporates the active decision to participate in acts of political violence. It means all of her actions are now under scrutiny. She must act strictly within the given societal gender norms to maintain her respectability. Rula was the one woman who did not participate in a non-revolutionary Palestinian organisation before joining the Resistance. She became a revolutionary after most of her family was killed in the seizure of Tal al-Za'atar. She was also a woman who Julie Peteet mentioned for acting improperly—wearing make-up and tight clothing—and thereby losing the respect of her fellow fedayeen and lowering the perception of her ability to participate in combat. While there may be no link between these two issues—movement activity and a disreputable image—it *may* be attributed to a lack of proper socialisation by not participating in the new social movement. Khaled may have resented the reaction to her showing up to an ANM meeting in her pyjamas, but she learned quickly and at an early age (15) that she could not act in such a manner in Palestinian society, influenced by Marxism-Leninism or not. Therefore, social context does play a role.

This is especially witnessed under extreme duress and in times of desperation. The Palestinian historical narrative demonstrated that how and to what extent a woman is involved is dependent upon the social and historical context. In Palestinian society, women become involved during crisis or when the society is completely desperate. The current situation in the West Bank and Gaza is reflected in the ability of women to become self-martyrs. This is similar to the high number of Chechen women involved in

the Moscow theatre hostage situation. Women become involved when there is no other option but to fight.

Entry is simple enough to explain on its own, but it does not really tell the researcher *why* the woman became involved in revolutionary activity. What really needs to be examined is the women's own ideology. A revolutionary organisation's ideology is quite different from a new social movement's. A movement is concentrated on maintaining solidarity while also trying to change the larger cultural or political situation. It is, thus, trying to communicate externally. Collective actions—protests, marches, demonstrations and sit-ins—all try to communicate the new social movement's ideology to the outside world. A revolutionary group, however, is internally concentrated to strengthen their *faction's* ideology and identity.<sup>49</sup> Their communication with the outside world is typically through acts of political violence and communiqués.<sup>50</sup> When one compares the movement's collective action and group ideology to the individual female revolutionary's ideology, one not only sees how far the ideology has escalated, but also if the revolutionary's ideology conforms to those in her revolutionary organisation.

The escalating ideology is apparent in all of the movements. In the American Movement, as Prairie-Power took over, their desire was to take 'things' further. The demands grew stronger; it was no longer just necessary to end the war in Vietnam, but to overthrow the American system through the use of violence. Instead of repeating events like the successful March on Washington, the SDS rampaged through downtown Chicago. *The Port Huron Statement* was replaced with "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows." In West Germany, Dutschke and Teufel's relatively harmless and rather mischievous 'happenings' were overshadowed by the department store arson. Meinhof went from writing articles against Strauss to planning

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<sup>49</sup> della Porta, op. cit., p. 20

<sup>50</sup> Hoffman, Bruce. *Inside Terrorism*. (Indigo Press: London, 1998) pp. 17-18

(but never attempted) to kidnap him. Ensslin went from egging the America House to bombing American bases in West Germany. The women were not alone in their actions, they were joined by the men. Within their own peer group they were not acting irrationally. This may be more a reflection of the 'groupmind' and the conviction that what these groups were doing was just.<sup>51</sup> Within the PRM, the move from deviance towards radical violence was not terribly drastic. The revolutionary dimension always existed within the PRM; it did not need to 'wait' for the movement to fragment. This is representative of the extreme frustration on the part of the Palestinians and the zero-sum quality of nationalism.

The women's own ideology and their participation in actions are not very different from the rest of their revolutionary organisation. By and large, the women's own ideology, which is represented in their articles, recorded in their conversations or revealed in autobiographical and biographical accounts, conformed to that of the group. In both the Weather Underground and the RAF, women contributed to or dominated the production of ideology and actions. Dohrn helped write the Weatherman paper along with another woman, Karin Ashley. Dohrn, in addition to Boudin, Naomi Jaffe, Wilkerson and Oughton, contributed pieces to the *New Left Notes* and later to *Prairie Fire*. In the RAF, after Mahler was ostracised, Meinhof was the only person left to write down the ideology she, Ensslin, Baader and Raspe discussed while underground or in prison. After they died, it was a woman, Brigitte Monhaupt, who continued to demarcate the RAF stance.

The one exception, again, is the Palestinian women. The General Union for Palestinian Women's website is informative as it explains what it hopes to achieve for Palestinian women after the struggle is won. However, during the course of research,

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<sup>51</sup> Post, Jerrold M. "Terrorist Psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces." In Reich, op. cit., pp. 25-40. p. 33

Palestinian women were not authors of any available ideological tracts. Khaled's autobiography, however, is full of PFLP ideology. She writes that before she could join the PFLP, she was required to learn and to agree with the Marxist-Leninist belief structure. Khaled admitted in an interview, that when she speaks publicly, she speaks as a PFLP member. While the women may not contribute to disseminated information, it makes the belief in the cause no less different. Why else would they jeopardise their social standing?

By believing in and contributing to the ideology of the revolutionary organisations, it can be asserted that the women in these groups were not just the 'token' terrorists Morgan believes they are. They were not there to back up and provide 'support' for their men. These women participated of their own accord. If they did not, one might assume that these women would not take any responsibility for their actions. And thus demonstrating that these women were not culpable actors using their brains to reason and rationalise. Were these women 'housekeepers'? No, by their accounts, women in the revolutionary organisations helped plan activities; women participated equally; and women led. In the Weather Underground, Susan Stern's collective was led by women. The Motor City 9 was all women. It was Meinhof who planned the bombing of the Springer Press building. It was Ensslin who suggested the RAF bombing campaign of United States' Army installations after the group heard about the mining of North Vietnamese harbours. If Khaled was really only supposed to cook falafel, why was she asked to hi-jack two planes for the PFLP? She refused to be pushed into the traditional role of female social worker; this is why she left Fateh for the PFLP. She, like other Palestinian women, had to work harder to prove her worth; but she is now a respected member of the PFLP Central Committee.

How a woman chooses to leave the group is also indicative of her commitment to the group. If she left after only one action or even like Karin Ashley—who left

shortly after helping to write the Weatherman paper—then her commitment to the group would be questionable. Yet, the women under study devoted the rest of their lives to changing the system—whether they continued to engage in acts of violence or not. Dohrn, from her office in Chicago, and Boudin, from her prison cell in upstate New York, continue to fight the ‘system.’ Khaled is still a devoted member of the PFLP even to the detriment of her private life. The women of the RAF gave their lives to the struggle. Instead of choosing to continue their fight from prison, as Boudin has and Halaseh did, Ensslin decided suicide was a better way to hasten the revolution.

Therefore, understanding the social and historical context of the woman is of the utmost importance. One must understand the society in which she struggled and the reasons behind her struggle. The *reasons* are often similar to the male revolutionary’s. Realising the gendered nature of society helps one to understand the larger context in which revolutionary women struggle. Understanding how the women were constructed in their respective societies helps to defeat the myths that surround the female revolutionary. She is more than a gorgon, an erotomaniac or a housekeeper/mother. She is a person who has chosen to struggle in the face of societal constructs and to join the revolution due to a belief in the ideology. On the surface she does not appear to be that different from her male counterpart. The female revolutionary is a committed individual, responsible for her rational actions, no matter how deplorable they may be.

The women of the Weather Underground, the RAF, Fateh and the PFLP were committed leaders, members and combatants. Revolutionary women have been accused of acting out of some sort of sick, sexual need. Nowhere in the research did an erotic desire on the part of the women appear. It must be said that the Weather Underground was operating in a very charged period of American history, which included the Sexual Revolution. The advent of the Pill allowed women, for the first

time, to be freer in their sexual behaviour; men were ready and willing partners in this development. Weatherwomen were known for dressing sexily; the male leaders were known for sleeping with women wherever they travelled. It is the women, however, who are accused of acting 'loosely' or out of an erotic motivation and as if this was her *sole* reason for participating in the revolutionary cause. This accusation could not be more sexist and/or biased. The sexual behaviour of the (literal) Weathermen are not even discussed. The women of the RAF may have also been freer in their sexual behaviour, but it is obvious in reading the accounts that neither the men nor the women were prompted by an erotic desire. If one were to apply the cause of 'erotomania' to the Palestinian woman, it would be extremely detrimental to their image. Women in the PRM, Fatch or the PFLP *could not* and *cannot* act in this way if they wish to continue as members who are respected and treated equally by their peers and their superiors. To label the revolutionary woman simply as erotomaniacs is reprehensible.

Instead of criticising these women for not joining a peaceful struggle or for not joining women's liberation groups, one should instead see the value of studying women who participated wholly in the worldwide struggle as they saw it. Knowing how to study women in conflict or just in general is something with which Terrorism Studies and International Relations struggle. These women took a chance in carving out their paths within a larger, more sexist struggle. Their reasons for involvement should be of interest and not cast aside as Cooper advocates.<sup>52</sup> Instead of continuing 'the woman as victim' myth one should treat with respect their participation, which was undertaken of their own free will. These women challenged societal norms in the West and the Middle East—they were rational and intelligent women who have chosen to be the agents of political violence. Political violence may not be the best solution nor may it be the 'moral' one; however, what is under study here is not the morality of these

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<sup>52</sup> Cooper feels it is "useless to inquire why women become terrorists." (Cooper, op. cit., p. 154)

women's actions, but why they chose it and how they were perceived within their revolutionary organisations and by society as a whole. These women should not be dismissed, there is something to be learned from their decisions.

First, gender is an important concept which should be included in the study of new social movements. This can happen through the further development of the micro-level aspects (leadership, membership and gendering) of new social movements. It is equally important to understand the implications of gendering and this needs to be applied within the sub-field of Terrorism Studies and to International Relations at large. Second, New Social Movement theory allows for a deeper understanding of the development of the revolutionary dimension and, thus, revolutionary, politically violent organisations. This understanding is more than a glossy policy-making recommendation. This study attempts to engage with and study in-depth the new social movements and the revolutionary organisations in America, West Germany and Palestinian society. Most importantly, this thesis tries to understand why women engage in acts of political violence. Women should be seen as equally responsible and of enough equal intelligence to join a revolutionary organisation. The women may have had to overcome more obstacles in regards to how women have been gendered and by what role they typically play in a given society. Their decision may have been a complicated one to make. This may make them more driven and convinced of the goals of the group. This then may set the women apart from the men but it does mean that researchers or students should *knowingly* treat the women differently from the men. Even if this treatment of gender and “the concepts of masculinity and femininity” turns International Relations “into something quite unrecognisable” and something “that most traditional and neotraditional International Relations theorists [do not] desire,”<sup>53</sup> it still must be done if International Relations is to stop being a male-dominated field.

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<sup>53</sup> Zawelski, op. cit, p. 30

This study only begins to touch upon the importance of gender and International Relations and it only does so by examining one sub-field's gendered treatment of women. There is still more to be examined and this thesis is just one way to add to this important but struggling dialogue.

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