“Identity through difference”: Liminal diasporism and generational change among the Koryo saram in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

The article is a case study of the Koryo saram, the ethnic Koreans living in the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan, to reflect on how notions of diasporas, community and identity have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It contends that the Koryo saram are best understood through the lenses of diasporic conditions rather than as bounded communities as such an approach allows for greater recognition of heterogeneity within such communities. While many Koryo saram continue to claim some form of Korean-ness, how they related to issues of homeland-orientation and boundary maintenance evidences internal variation and growing in-betweenness. The community’s hybridity (“hyphenization”) and liminality (“identity through difference”) stand out when examining generational differences and are especially evident among the local Korean youth.

The article pursues two aims. First, it seeks to broaden the analysis of Korean diasporas beyond the more common focus on Koreans in the West, 4 China, 5 and Japan. 6 At about 500,000 (table 1) the post-Soviet Koreans represent the world's fifth-largest Korean diaspora.
In the post-Soviet context, what makes the experience of the Koryo saram noteworthy is that, as Marco Buttino notes, they show how "a deported minority ingeniously adapted to the new environment and was capable of negotiating with the Soviet authorities a respectable position Türkmenistanyň milli hasplary, Aşgabat, 2012.
In the pages that follow, I zoom in on one of the lesser known cases from the post-Soviet space, namely that of the Koreans of Kyrgyzstan, 13 in order to broaden the empirical scope of the Koryo saram scholarship. The article thus seeks to move the discussion beyond the important, but by now well-covered issues in the literature, such as the initial migration of the Koreans to Russian territory, 14 and their deportation 15 in favour of a greater acknowledgement and appreciation of intra-group variation. 16 Overall, in this article I take issue with recent trends in the scholarship that seek to establish whether the Koryo saram are "still" Korean or constitute a new, "separate", Korean nation. Questioning whether the Koryo sarams are "still" Korean or whether their distinctiveness makes them substantially different from the Koreans of the peninsula has gained some traction in the literature, 17 which makes this a relevant issue to engage with. At the same time such an approach (are the Koryo saram still Korean?) perpetuates assumptions of an idea of the Korean nation as primordialist, essentialist, and fundamentally static.
To explore these issues, I draw on insights from constructivist and more critical approaches to the study of identities and diasporas. The work of Rogers Brubaker 18 is especially useful in that it questions assumptions of groupism and groupness still dominating the study of ethnicity and diasporas. Furthermore, the work of James Clifford 19 and Floya Anthias 20 appears similarly relevant in shifting the focus away from the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland (and particularly the latter), and towards the condition of the diasporic communities themselves, allowing a diversity of voices to emerge. correspondence between Soviet authorities at the time, and Soviet census data (1926, 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, and 1989) and publications of the local Korean cultural centre, such as the periodical ильчи/일치 published primarily in Russian with a handful of pages in Korean. In addition, I conducted several semi-structured interviews, in Russian or English, with local Koryo saram. Although the sample was not representative and the findings are more exploratory than conclusive, they speak to the usefulness of single-country case studies. 21 Although my concern here is to contribute to unpacking notions of groupness in diasporas common in the comparative study of politics and sociology, the article shares with comparative area studies, 22

From diasporas to diasporic conditions: contesting groupness
The Diaspora Studies scholarship has broadened its substantive and geographical scope in recent decades, reflecting the expansion, arguably the conceptual stretching, of what groups the term is supposed to include. As Appadurai notes, the notion of "diaspora denotes the transnational movement and ties in with arguments around globalisation and the growth of nonnation-based solidarities." 29 As such, the concept places a strong emphasis on "contingency [and] indeterminacy." 30 Diaspora "involves a conception of identity that avoids the essentialism of much of the discussion on ethnic and cultural identities" and "refocuses attention on transnational and dynamic processes, relating to ethnic commonalties, which can recognise difference and diversity." 31 Much has changed since the term, which semantically comes from the ancient Greek διασπορά ("scattering of seeds"), was first applied to the Jewish dispersal, and later the Armenian one. Because the term now tends to share meaning with cognate groups, such as immigrants, refugees, guest workers and ethnic communities, 32 the world has truly witnessed a proliferation of diasporas. 33 A key problem arising from the increasingly loose use of the term is what Brubaker calls its "dispersion [...] in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space." 34 The conceptual over-stretching implies that if everything, all sort of communities more or less dispersed, become diaspora, then nothing is distinctively so. The term therefore loses its discriminating power, making it impossible to distinguish diasporic from nondiasporic communities, (im)migrants in primis.
At the risk of simplification, conceptualizations of diasporas can be divided into two approaches. 35 On the one hand are those that think of diasporas in a more classical sense, as communities or "bounded entities." 36 The classical definition of diaspora comes from the work of William Safran; a community can be referred to as diaspora if it presents the following six features: a history of dispersal, myths/memories of the homeland, alienation in the host country, desire for eventual return, ongoing support of the homeland, and a collective identity defined by this relationship. 37 This approach is relevant to the post-Soviet context.
Predominant approaches to identity and nation-building across the post-Soviet space have been informed by Stalin's infamous definition of the nation, which was heavily materialist, essentialist and primordialist. A nation was defined as "a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture." 38  would they go? Furthermore, there is an evident problem arising from the application of such an essentialist approach to the Koryo saram: its homeland-centredness. As Clifford also argues, homeland-centrism, and the links -material or symbolic -between the homeland and the diaspora, are not relevant to many communities that experience a diasporic condition. This is because, he continues, a diasporic condition arises from the "… experience of being from one place and of another" is linked "[…]with the idea of particular sentiments towards the homeland, whilst being formed by those of the place of settlement." 39 Such an approach allows for what are now called hyphenated identities, highlighting a community's attachment to more than one place.
Anti-essentialist approaches to diasporas, informed by constructivist and more critical sensibilities, have gained traction in recent decades and seem preferable here because they shift the focus from what diasporas are, or are supposed to be, to what they actually do, or is done in their name; from being (a diaspora) to claiming (to be one). In this respect, a useful way of thinking about this phenomenon is less in terms of diasporas per se, and more as diasporic conditions and diasporism. The diasporic condition is therefore "one where one is constructed in and through difference, and yet is one that produces differential forms of cultural accommodation or syncretism: in some versions, hybridity. boundary maintenance, that is the preservation of a distinctive identity vis-à-vis the host society.
First is the question of the importance of dispersion as a defining dimension of the diasporic experience. Originally, diasporas were communities that emerged out of a forced dispersion.
While dispersion and the memory thereof still remain central to diasporic identities, two new aspects have enriched the debate. One is the fact that dispersal may not necessarily have a traumatic or even forced origin, and the other is that -as a result of the reconfiguration political spaces in post-communist Eurasia -dispersion may not only be the result of the movement of peoples across borders, but also the consequence of the movement of borders across settlements.
The Russian-speaking communities in the former Soviet space is a clear illustration of this new type of mobility.
The second reason for preferring an anti-essentialist approach to diasporas is that the very relationship with the homeland has started to be called into question. Homeland orientation (in terms of the memory of the dispersion or the commitment to return) dominated classical definitions of diasporas. Homeland remained the ultimate source of identity.
Diasporas were homeland-centered communities. Especially on the wave of contributions coming from post-modernism, the salience of homeland orientation has been replaced by an approach that critiques the teleology of return, thus de-centering diasporas 43 .
In addition to the above, according to Brubaker, there is "a tension in the literature between boundary-maintenance and boundary-erosion." 44  Beyond his focus on diasporas, Brubaker has insightfully questioned notions of groups and groupness, which are too often unproblematically taken-for-granted, 45 . What he takes issue with is a tendency, in academia as much as beyond, to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as "basic constituents of social life, fundamental units of social analysis." 46 The problematization of groupness evokes 47 the notion of Bourdieu's performative character, whereby "by invoking groups, they seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being." 48 What follows, therefore, is that we tend to "treat groupness as variable and contingent rather than fixed and given." 49 Quite the contrary, groupness, according to Brubaker, should be treated "as an event, as something that happens." 50 In ultimate analysis, groupness may or may not happen. 51 In light of the above, asking whether the Korean diaspora forms a "single transnational community" or whether the Koryo saram have evolved into a "separate Korean nation" is, it seems to me, immaterial. While the Koryo saram may have constituted a more homogenous and bounded community when they settled in the Russian Far East from the 1860s onwards, the farmers and peasants that migrated at the beginning were soon joined by political dissidents in the early 20 th century, 52  (nakazannye narody), unlike the Germans, Chechens, Volga Tatars and others. 66 The nature of the deportation was pre-emptive, as -the Soviet argument went -the local Korean population might have become involved in espionage in favour of the Japanese, but were not accused of any crime. 67 Thus, initially, the legal status of the deported Koreans was that of "internal exiles" (ssylka/poselentsy). They were confined to the Central Asian countryside (with some exceptions), 68 where they were tied to the land and worked in local (Korean) collective farms, primarily cultivating rice. The procedures accompanying their deportation, as laid out in Resolution 1428-326ss also made it clear that they were entitled to take property with them during resettlement, claim compensation for the valuables and property left in the Far East; the document also refers to the fact that proper arrangements and assistance would be set in place on arrival. 69 Uniquely in the experience of the Soviet deported peoples, those Koreans willing to leave the Soviet Union were to be allowed to do so, as long as they were not working in the secret police themselves. 70 Reality turned out to be much harsher than what appeared on paper and the deportation, as Pohl notes, "greatly altered their legal status, spatial distribution and everyday culture." 71 Upon arriving in Central Asia some Koreans did nevertheless move, leaving the Kazakh SSR for the Uzbek SSR, either for family re-union or because of the milder climate there 72 . In practice there were both differences between the administrative exile category and the special settlement regime, and some areas of overlap. Similarly to the nations deported later, Koreans suffered from legal restrictions as to the place of residence, but were not placed in special camps.
They could not live the Central Asian SSRs where they had been resettled and nor were they allowed to live in border districts there. They were also subject to surveillance by the NKDV to which they had to report regularly. The deported Koreans were also barred from serving in the army; rather they were forced to serve in the labour army, constructing industrial plants or where they were taught in Uzbek language, would later read Uzbek-language newspapers and listen to radio programmes in Uzbek. 79 The Uzbek SSR had its own institutions, besides schools, including theatres, parliament, a flag and a constitution. All Soviet citizens were reminded, from an early age onwards, of who they were (or who the authorities had decided they would be). Ethnic institutions helped foster and maintain a sense of national belonging.
Ultimately, the relevant entry in one's own passport (the piataya grafa, or fifth line) crystallized one's own ethnicity. In short, the Soviet language of self-determination and debate over nationality issues crucially framed how populations were organized and how their national consciousness was, to some degrees, promoted. 80 Francine Hirsch called this a double assimilation policy (2000): first of groups into nations and then subsequently into the aforementioned Soviet people. The disintegration of the Soviet state occurred before this process was completed.
What did this all mean for the Soviet Koreans? As a dispersed population without its own national territory on Soviet soil, they had some of these ethnic institutions, but not all.
Crucially, they were not endowed with a national territory, as Korea (under Japanese rule 1910-1945 and then the two Koreas) was regarded as their historical homeland(s). Thus, petitions for territorial autonomy in the Far Eastern regions of the Russian SFSR was not granted on the grounds that an external, historical homeland already existed ("Korea"). 81 As such there was no cadre policy either since there was no land where Koreans could enjoy a primus inter pares status, where they could be regarded as the "titular nation" (titul'naya natsiya) in Soviet parlance. Koreans, and other smaller groups among them, started to be referred to as one of the diasporas/ диаспоры, a term that was also used, confusingly, to refer to groups with a history of dispersal to settler groups (such as the Russians) or local indigenous communities (like the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan). The everyday reality for Soviet Koreans was one of steady Russification, in the form of their assimilation into Russian language and culture.

Dispersal
The memory of the deportation, its direct experience for the older generations and the way its narrated and passed on across generations, remains an important dimension of the Koryo saram's diasporic condition, although the extent to which this is a defining moment depends on individual experiences and especially the generation. All young Koreans I spoke to in Bishkek recalled stories they had been told by their grandparents" "I know the events took

Homeland orientation
If ties with the homeland, a sense of longing and belonging, the need to either restore or return to it were key element of traditional diasporic identities, these are clearly not applicable to the case of Bishkek's Koreans. How Koryo saram relate to the notion of homeland is, by contrast, blurred and contested. "My home is where I was born" local Koreans all seem to concur. The strongest parallel between the younger and older generations is an attachment to territory, wherever they may be living. Gennadi Li emphatically proclaimed it thus: "our homeland