Global problems and individual obligations : an investigation of different forms of consequentialism in situations with many agents
Abstract
In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise
in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world.
Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions
which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act
Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations
where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by
donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism
here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise
agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically
simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second
challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem
arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better,
e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they
can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or
protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy.
Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only
considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural
response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers
the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act
Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far
these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.
Type
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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