Freedom as a moral concept
Abstract
This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,
in the given context, to ask A for a justification
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and
critical but non-relative.
Type
Thesis, PhD Doctor of Philosophy
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