http://hdl.handle.net/10023/276 Wed, 19 Jun 2013 08:05:29 GMT 2013-06-19T08:05:29Z http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:80/retrieve/12420/6761.jpg http://hdl.handle.net/10023/276 http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2447 Abstract: In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticised Thomas Bradwardine’s theory of truth and signification and my defence of Bradwardine’s application of it to the semantic paradoxes. Much of Miller’s criticism is sympathetic and helpful in gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Bradwardine’s proposed solution to the paradoxes and Alfred Tarski’s. But some of Miller’s criticisms betray a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of Bradwardine’s account of truth and signification. Wed, 01 Jun 2011 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2447 2011-06-01T00:00:00Z Read, Stephen In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticised Thomas Bradwardine’s theory of truth and signification and my defence of Bradwardine’s application of it to the semantic paradoxes. Much of Miller’s criticism is sympathetic and helpful in gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Bradwardine’s proposed solution to the paradoxes and Alfred Tarski’s. But some of Miller’s criticisms betray a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of Bradwardine’s account of truth and signification.