Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology (Arché)
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/274
2024-03-28T12:03:21ZIndexicality, transparency, and mental files
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7286
Francois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZBall, Derek NelsonFrancois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.Propositions : an essay on linguistic content
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
This thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZHodgson, Thomas William StricklandThis thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.Concepts in context
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462
My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent
literature on concepts:
• What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a
concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂?
• What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied
for a thinker to have a concept C?
I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and
possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions,
and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to
other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them.
In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude
ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the
problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to
provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”, according to
which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological
generalizations to be possible.
Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing
versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers.
Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our
best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to
modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed
to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege
cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist
picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically
individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated
and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with
other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the
localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZOnofri, AndreaMy thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent
literature on concepts:
• What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a
concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂?
• What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied
for a thinker to have a concept C?
I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and
possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions,
and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to
other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them.
In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude
ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the
problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to
provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”, according to
which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological
generalizations to be possible.
Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing
versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers.
Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our
best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to
modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed
to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege
cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist
picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically
individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated
and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with
other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the
localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson.On the contrary: disagreement, context, and relative truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3360
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZHuvenes, Torfinn Thomesen