Philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/117
2024-03-28T19:06:45ZAristotle on the limits of final causes. The case of extended teleology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29487
In this thesis, I discuss the concept of Aristotelian extended teleology (i.e., non-theistic teleological causation in which more than one substance is involved). I argue that some passages of Aristotle’s corpus and Theophrastus’ Metaphysics can be read as arguments of extended teleology. To interpret those passages, I introduce the concept of “axiarchism”, according to which X is actual because X is good. The thesis is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce both the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes and the discussion of the reach of final causes according to the second book of the Physics. In chapter 2, I discuss the teleological arguments that can be found in the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. I argue that some of these arguments can be read as arguments for extended teleology. In chapter 3, I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that, for Aristotle, the sublunary is not a random result of the superlunary and that, therefore, there is some form of order in all the parts of the universe. In this chapter, I focus particularly on Physics VIII, Generation and Corruption II 10. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Metaphysics XII. I defend the view that the tenth chapter of book Lambda can be read as an explicit question about the order and unity of all the parts of the world. In chapter 5, I discuss Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I argue that Theophrastus is pointing towards the need for an account of extended teleology. He claims that not everything can be the result of a final cause, because some natural phenomena (e.g., the rotation of the sun that causes the yearly seasons) cannot be explained in teleological terms. In questioning the possibility of explaining these phenomena in teleological terms, however, Theophrastus is already thinking in terms of extended teleology.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZHernández Villarreal, AndrésIn this thesis, I discuss the concept of Aristotelian extended teleology (i.e., non-theistic teleological causation in which more than one substance is involved). I argue that some passages of Aristotle’s corpus and Theophrastus’ Metaphysics can be read as arguments of extended teleology. To interpret those passages, I introduce the concept of “axiarchism”, according to which X is actual because X is good. The thesis is composed of five chapters. In chapter 1, I introduce both the doctrine of Aristotle’s four causes and the discussion of the reach of final causes according to the second book of the Physics. In chapter 2, I discuss the teleological arguments that can be found in the first book of Aristotle’s Politics. I argue that some of these arguments can be read as arguments for extended teleology. In chapter 3, I argue that it is reasonable to suppose that, for Aristotle, the sublunary is not a random result of the superlunary and that, therefore, there is some form of order in all the parts of the universe. In this chapter, I focus particularly on Physics VIII, Generation and Corruption II 10. In the fourth chapter, I discuss Metaphysics XII. I defend the view that the tenth chapter of book Lambda can be read as an explicit question about the order and unity of all the parts of the world. In chapter 5, I discuss Theophrastus’ Metaphysics. I argue that Theophrastus is pointing towards the need for an account of extended teleology. He claims that not everything can be the result of a final cause, because some natural phenomena (e.g., the rotation of the sun that causes the yearly seasons) cannot be explained in teleological terms. In questioning the possibility of explaining these phenomena in teleological terms, however, Theophrastus is already thinking in terms of extended teleology.Trust, audit, and public engagement
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29478
Public auditors such as Audit Scotland aim to provide independent assurance to the public that money is spent effectively, efficiently and that it, and the activities of public organisations, provide public value. This project has two objectives. Firstly, to develop conceptual models of public audit that support public organisations' trustworthiness as organisations that provide public value. Secondly, to develop conceptual models of public engagement that auditors (and public organisations generally) can use to build public trust in their organisations.
The project has three parts. Part 1 provides the project's philosophical foundations, defining the core concepts of trust, trustworthiness, distrust, and untrustworthiness that I employ in the thesis. Then I apply those concepts to trust relations between the public and public organisations. In part 2, I examine the relationship between audit and the trustworthiness of government. I will defend audit against audit sceptics, who argue that audit undermines public organisations' trustworthiness and public trust in those organisations. I will do this by arguing that whether audit faces these objections is dependent on the model of audit practice that we adopt, and I propose models of audit that avoid the audit sceptics’ objections. In part 3, I develop conceptual models of trust- conducive public engagement, and I examine the role that auditors can play in enhancing public trust in public organisations. Firstly, I determine whether the obligation to build trust in public organisations is compatible with audit function. Secondly, I determine what public organisations' communicative obligations are; for instance, do they require public organisations always to be open, honest, and transparent? Finally, I argue that public engagement models that empower the voices of those engaged with are more likely to induce trust between the organisation which empowers and those empowered through such public engagement.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZKelsall, Joshua James ClarkePublic auditors such as Audit Scotland aim to provide independent assurance to the public that money is spent effectively, efficiently and that it, and the activities of public organisations, provide public value. This project has two objectives. Firstly, to develop conceptual models of public audit that support public organisations' trustworthiness as organisations that provide public value. Secondly, to develop conceptual models of public engagement that auditors (and public organisations generally) can use to build public trust in their organisations.
The project has three parts. Part 1 provides the project's philosophical foundations, defining the core concepts of trust, trustworthiness, distrust, and untrustworthiness that I employ in the thesis. Then I apply those concepts to trust relations between the public and public organisations. In part 2, I examine the relationship between audit and the trustworthiness of government. I will defend audit against audit sceptics, who argue that audit undermines public organisations' trustworthiness and public trust in those organisations. I will do this by arguing that whether audit faces these objections is dependent on the model of audit practice that we adopt, and I propose models of audit that avoid the audit sceptics’ objections. In part 3, I develop conceptual models of trust- conducive public engagement, and I examine the role that auditors can play in enhancing public trust in public organisations. Firstly, I determine whether the obligation to build trust in public organisations is compatible with audit function. Secondly, I determine what public organisations' communicative obligations are; for instance, do they require public organisations always to be open, honest, and transparent? Finally, I argue that public engagement models that empower the voices of those engaged with are more likely to induce trust between the organisation which empowers and those empowered through such public engagement.Moral inquiry : we're all in this together
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29446
Moral inquiry is often thought of as an individualistic enterprise. This is in large part because morality not only seems to require doing the right thing, but being in touch with moral reality in the right way: to act well, it is necessary to ground our actions on an insight into moral reasons—reasons we can only understand when we inquire for ourselves. In this dissertation, I defend a picture
of moral inquiry according to which such inquiry is fundamentally social: we are not alone when it comes to making moral decisions. In particular, I argue that the conception of moral inquiry as an individualistic enterprise wrongly delegitimises a central resource of moral inquiry, moral testimony. To this end, I first argue that moral agreement is of crucial justificatory value in moral inquiry. I then go on to address some worries connected to moral testimony, arguing that reliance on moral testimony is not intrinsically wrong and indeed oftentimes permissible if not required of us. I complement this with a discussion of moral
expertise, arguing that the search for moral experts has often been too focused on theoretical knowledge. However, practical experience is a much more reliable way of identifying those we can rely on with respect to a particular moral issue.
Lastly, I discuss one consequence this more social picture of moral inquiry has, namely that blame can not only be allocated to a wrongdoing agent, but also to those who guided the agent to that act. This concludes my contribution to
the defence of a more social picture of moral inquiry. Overall, however, my aim is not to do away with the importance of being rightly connected to moral reality—it is just that the best connection to moral reality available is often not
through ourselves, but through others.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZKüspert, NickMoral inquiry is often thought of as an individualistic enterprise. This is in large part because morality not only seems to require doing the right thing, but being in touch with moral reality in the right way: to act well, it is necessary to ground our actions on an insight into moral reasons—reasons we can only understand when we inquire for ourselves. In this dissertation, I defend a picture
of moral inquiry according to which such inquiry is fundamentally social: we are not alone when it comes to making moral decisions. In particular, I argue that the conception of moral inquiry as an individualistic enterprise wrongly delegitimises a central resource of moral inquiry, moral testimony. To this end, I first argue that moral agreement is of crucial justificatory value in moral inquiry. I then go on to address some worries connected to moral testimony, arguing that reliance on moral testimony is not intrinsically wrong and indeed oftentimes permissible if not required of us. I complement this with a discussion of moral
expertise, arguing that the search for moral experts has often been too focused on theoretical knowledge. However, practical experience is a much more reliable way of identifying those we can rely on with respect to a particular moral issue.
Lastly, I discuss one consequence this more social picture of moral inquiry has, namely that blame can not only be allocated to a wrongdoing agent, but also to those who guided the agent to that act. This concludes my contribution to
the defence of a more social picture of moral inquiry. Overall, however, my aim is not to do away with the importance of being rightly connected to moral reality—it is just that the best connection to moral reality available is often not
through ourselves, but through others.The epistemology of inquiry : individuals, groups & institutions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29356
Inquiring—roughly, the attempt to answer a question—is one of the most common intellectual undertakings. This thesis is comprised of a set of four essays that investigate the epistemology of inquiry. The first essay looks at one key epistemic state with which we end inquiry, viz understanding; the second essay examines collective inquiry; the third essay considers the normative role of curiosity in motivating inquiry; and the fourth essay discusses inquiry in the legal system. These essays will advance our understanding of what motivates inquiry, the mental states involved in inquiring, the sorts of norms that govern inquiry, and what continuities and discontinuities there are between how individuals and various types of collective inquire into different types of question.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZRoss, Lewis DylanInquiring—roughly, the attempt to answer a question—is one of the most common intellectual undertakings. This thesis is comprised of a set of four essays that investigate the epistemology of inquiry. The first essay looks at one key epistemic state with which we end inquiry, viz understanding; the second essay examines collective inquiry; the third essay considers the normative role of curiosity in motivating inquiry; and the fourth essay discusses inquiry in the legal system. These essays will advance our understanding of what motivates inquiry, the mental states involved in inquiring, the sorts of norms that govern inquiry, and what continuities and discontinuities there are between how individuals and various types of collective inquire into different types of question.John Stuart Mill as existentialist : does Mill see the role of government as propagating a Sartrean, existentially authentic moral character?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29309
The purpose of this thesis is to explore whether or not the goal of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy could be described as existentialist. To do this, I will demonstrate that Mill’s philosophy was centred around the cultivation of an ideal individual moral character in the populace, and then I shall show that this moral character is a form of existential authenticity. It will first draw upon the interpretation by Jones of Mill’s philosophy that states that his political project was centred around an ideal of the individual’s life consisting in Victorian moral norms and the perfection of individual rationality. I will devote the first half of this essay to presenting, developing and defending Jones’ interpretation according to this moral character thesis. The second half of the paper will then examine whether or not this moral character could be described as an existentially authentic one. I will use Sartre’s account of authenticity as a framework against which to compare Mill’s moral character. I will then show that this account of authenticity is near identical to Mill’s moral character, despite the two authors working from different ontological frameworks of human action. I will demonstrate this not only by pointing out how the characteristics of each author’s ideal characters are the same, but also by noting that they respond to the same societal problems of alienation and custom and resolving them through the cultivation of free-thinking individuals who respect the freedom of others. Finally, I shall conclude that while Mill does have as the basis for his political project a distinctly existentialist notion of authentic existence, one could not describe him as an existentialist philosopher in the same manner as writers such as Sartre due to the presence in Mill’s philosophy of an abstract, objective normative ethics that existentialism inherently rejects.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZRountree, George HughThe purpose of this thesis is to explore whether or not the goal of John Stuart Mill’s political philosophy could be described as existentialist. To do this, I will demonstrate that Mill’s philosophy was centred around the cultivation of an ideal individual moral character in the populace, and then I shall show that this moral character is a form of existential authenticity. It will first draw upon the interpretation by Jones of Mill’s philosophy that states that his political project was centred around an ideal of the individual’s life consisting in Victorian moral norms and the perfection of individual rationality. I will devote the first half of this essay to presenting, developing and defending Jones’ interpretation according to this moral character thesis. The second half of the paper will then examine whether or not this moral character could be described as an existentially authentic one. I will use Sartre’s account of authenticity as a framework against which to compare Mill’s moral character. I will then show that this account of authenticity is near identical to Mill’s moral character, despite the two authors working from different ontological frameworks of human action. I will demonstrate this not only by pointing out how the characteristics of each author’s ideal characters are the same, but also by noting that they respond to the same societal problems of alienation and custom and resolving them through the cultivation of free-thinking individuals who respect the freedom of others. Finally, I shall conclude that while Mill does have as the basis for his political project a distinctly existentialist notion of authentic existence, one could not describe him as an existentialist philosopher in the same manner as writers such as Sartre due to the presence in Mill’s philosophy of an abstract, objective normative ethics that existentialism inherently rejects.Perception as a way of knowing
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29263
The aim of this thesis is to construct and defend a theory of perceptual justification derived from a knowledge-first account of epistemic justification on which the rational force of experience is grounded its knowledge-producing power. In the constructive part of the project, Chapter 1, I develop a theory of perceptual justification on the basis of the epistemological framework defended in Williamson (2000). In slogan form, this view holds that “perception is a way of knowing,” and can be stated as the following thesis:
PERCEPTION IS A WAY OF KNOWING (PK) S’s belief that p is perceptually justified if and only if S knows that p via a perceptually- individuated method.
In the remainder of the thesis, I defend PK and the normative framework on which it depends. In Chapter 2 I defend a crucial consequence of PK—viz., the Entailment Thesis, according to which seeing that p entail knowing that p—from recent objections due to Turri (2010). In Chapter 3 I distinguish strong vs weak epistemological disjunctivism (of which PK counts as an instance) and argue that the former, as defended by Pritchard (2012), suffers from a devastating objection. In Chapter 4 I defend the normative framework within which PK is constructed—in particular the account of dispositional rationality developed in Williamson’s work on the knowledge norm of belief—from recent objections due to Brown (2018). In Chapter 5 I argue against the claim that externalist accounts like PK support veridicalist responses to skepticism, viz., the view according to which subjects can know ordinary empirical propositions in global skeptical scenarios. And finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that PK is compatible with recent work in vision science which requires, inter alia, defending the principle of epistemic safety from a recent objection.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZSkolits, WesThe aim of this thesis is to construct and defend a theory of perceptual justification derived from a knowledge-first account of epistemic justification on which the rational force of experience is grounded its knowledge-producing power. In the constructive part of the project, Chapter 1, I develop a theory of perceptual justification on the basis of the epistemological framework defended in Williamson (2000). In slogan form, this view holds that “perception is a way of knowing,” and can be stated as the following thesis:
PERCEPTION IS A WAY OF KNOWING (PK) S’s belief that p is perceptually justified if and only if S knows that p via a perceptually- individuated method.
In the remainder of the thesis, I defend PK and the normative framework on which it depends. In Chapter 2 I defend a crucial consequence of PK—viz., the Entailment Thesis, according to which seeing that p entail knowing that p—from recent objections due to Turri (2010). In Chapter 3 I distinguish strong vs weak epistemological disjunctivism (of which PK counts as an instance) and argue that the former, as defended by Pritchard (2012), suffers from a devastating objection. In Chapter 4 I defend the normative framework within which PK is constructed—in particular the account of dispositional rationality developed in Williamson’s work on the knowledge norm of belief—from recent objections due to Brown (2018). In Chapter 5 I argue against the claim that externalist accounts like PK support veridicalist responses to skepticism, viz., the view according to which subjects can know ordinary empirical propositions in global skeptical scenarios. And finally, in Chapter 6, I argue that PK is compatible with recent work in vision science which requires, inter alia, defending the principle of epistemic safety from a recent objection.Logical disagreement : an epistemological study
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29243
While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZAndersen, Frederik J.While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the Ad Hoc Reading according to which logical disagreements occur when two subjects take incompatible doxastic attitudes toward a specific proposition in or about logic. Chapter 2 presents a new counterexample to the widely discussed Uniqueness Thesis. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on the Theory Choice Reading of ‘logical disagreement’. According to this interpretation, logical disagreements occur at the level of entire logical theories rather than individual entailment-claims. Chapter 4 concerns a key question from the philosophy of logic, viz., how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical consequence. In Chapters 5 and 6 we turn to the Akrasia Reading. On this reading, logical disagreements occur when there is a mismatch between the deductive strength of one’s background logic and the logical theory one prefers (officially). Chapter 6 introduces logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia and presents a novel dilemma. Chapter 7 revisits the epistemology of peer disagreement and argues that the epistemic significance of central principles from the literature are at best deflated in the context of logical disagreement. The chapter also develops a simple formal model of deep disagreement in Default Logic, relating this to our general discussion of logical disagreement. The monograph ends in an epilogue with some reflections on the potential epistemic significance of convergence in logical theorizing.Breaking the trust : the case for regulating anonymous shell companies
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29233
Anonymous shell companies (ASCs) are corporate entities whose sole purpose is to cloak the identity of their beneficial owner. Due to their strong anonymity provisions, ASCs allow individuals to perform a variety of illicit activities with little chance of being caught. Thus, they have been used in almost every form of economic crime. Though there is universal agreement in the policy sphere that ASCs facilitate a number of negative externalities, policymakers are divided over how they should be regulated. Specifically, policymakers are stuck in an intractable disagreement over the implementation of a public ownership register – a database containing ownership information of every company registered in a particular country. Opponents of this register argue that the public disclosure of ownership information violates a presumptive right individuals have to privacy. Proponents of this register however, deny the existence of this presumptive right. They point instead to the role of transparency in fostering accountability.
The goal of my thesis is to offer a theoretical justification for the creation of a public ownership register. In short, I argue that we can break this impasse by using the value of public trust to justify creating a public ownership register with specific provisions so as to ensure privacy rights are not infringed upon. My argument proceeds in three parts: First, I establish that trust is at least instrumentally valuable. Thus we have a pro tanto reason to implement regulations to stop trust being undermined. Second, I offer a novel account of public trust predicated on the assumption of a shared intrinsic commitment to a practice rule. Third, armed with this account of public trust, I identify two distinct mechanisms by which ASCs undermine trust. I conclude by showing how drawing on public trust provides a pro tanto reason to implement a public ownership register.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZSorger, Andreas-JohannAnonymous shell companies (ASCs) are corporate entities whose sole purpose is to cloak the identity of their beneficial owner. Due to their strong anonymity provisions, ASCs allow individuals to perform a variety of illicit activities with little chance of being caught. Thus, they have been used in almost every form of economic crime. Though there is universal agreement in the policy sphere that ASCs facilitate a number of negative externalities, policymakers are divided over how they should be regulated. Specifically, policymakers are stuck in an intractable disagreement over the implementation of a public ownership register – a database containing ownership information of every company registered in a particular country. Opponents of this register argue that the public disclosure of ownership information violates a presumptive right individuals have to privacy. Proponents of this register however, deny the existence of this presumptive right. They point instead to the role of transparency in fostering accountability.
The goal of my thesis is to offer a theoretical justification for the creation of a public ownership register. In short, I argue that we can break this impasse by using the value of public trust to justify creating a public ownership register with specific provisions so as to ensure privacy rights are not infringed upon. My argument proceeds in three parts: First, I establish that trust is at least instrumentally valuable. Thus we have a pro tanto reason to implement regulations to stop trust being undermined. Second, I offer a novel account of public trust predicated on the assumption of a shared intrinsic commitment to a practice rule. Third, armed with this account of public trust, I identify two distinct mechanisms by which ASCs undermine trust. I conclude by showing how drawing on public trust provides a pro tanto reason to implement a public ownership register.A defence of the truth norm of belief
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29152
For belief, the standard of correctness is truth. Truth is said to be the norm of belief. This thesis aims to address some recent challenges relating to various aspects of the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework. On a reason-based normative framework, normativity is a matter of (normative) reasons. Reasons are facts that count in favour of a response, grounded in value-based, desire-based, constitutive, or practice-based facts. Reasons are the sort of things that we can respond to and they have weights in making a claim on us when we stand in a relation to them. Three anti-normativist challenges arise in recent discussion. First, the grounding challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly (correctly) and to refrain from believing falsely (incorrectly) can be properly grounded. Second, the guidance challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely is something we can respond to in our belief-formation. Third, the weighting challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely has any weight in making a claim on us regarding what we ought to/may believe. In this thesis, I offer novel responses to all three challenges. I develop and defend a practice-based, variantist account of the truth norm, according to which, the truth norm of belief is grounded in a justified social practice, guides our belief-formation on a reason- responsive model of epistemic guidance, and makes varying claims on us regarding what we
ought to/may believe depending on the circumstances.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZWei, XintongFor belief, the standard of correctness is truth. Truth is said to be the norm of belief. This thesis aims to address some recent challenges relating to various aspects of the truth norm of belief on a reason-based normative framework. On a reason-based normative framework, normativity is a matter of (normative) reasons. Reasons are facts that count in favour of a response, grounded in value-based, desire-based, constitutive, or practice-based facts. Reasons are the sort of things that we can respond to and they have weights in making a claim on us when we stand in a relation to them. Three anti-normativist challenges arise in recent discussion. First, the grounding challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly (correctly) and to refrain from believing falsely (incorrectly) can be properly grounded. Second, the guidance challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely is something we can respond to in our belief-formation. Third, the weighting challenge concerns whether the reason to believe truly and to refrain from believing falsely has any weight in making a claim on us regarding what we ought to/may believe. In this thesis, I offer novel responses to all three challenges. I develop and defend a practice-based, variantist account of the truth norm, according to which, the truth norm of belief is grounded in a justified social practice, guides our belief-formation on a reason- responsive model of epistemic guidance, and makes varying claims on us regarding what we
ought to/may believe depending on the circumstances.Reality Engineering and social kinds
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29133
Conceptual Engineering is a new and interesting trend in Philosophy. However, it is not free from problems. The most relevant issue is that, at least following a Cappelen-like account, we are forced to commit to the controversial metaphysical view that the world has a linguistic structure. Under such view, a modification in the semantics of a term implies a modification in nature of the thing which is referred by that word. I propose to explore the implications of the reversal of such principle, thereby committing to the idea that a modification in the nature of things implies a modification of the semantics of the terms that refer to them, and not the other way around. Following this new principle, I am interested in developing an alternative account to Conceptual Engineering, which I call (following Greenough) Reality Engineering.
In this dissertation, I will focus on the analysis of two major points about Reality Engineering, trying to define what it is about and how to perform it. I will argue that Reality Engineering has kinds as its scope and I will restrict the focus of the present enquiry to social kinds only. I will proceed by providing a taxonomy of the most popular views about the metaphysics of social kinds, since in order to modify something properly, first we have to be clear on what that something is. Out of this taxonomy, I will generate two general theories on social kinds. The first one is what we can call a Top-down view, and it says that a social kind is generated via the acceptance of constitutive rules by some group of authorities and the successful application of those rules in ordinary practice. The second one is what we can call a Bottom-up view, according to which social kinds are nothing but the reification of social external norms, where social external norms are to be intended as the set of attitudes/behaviours/treatments/practices that people who are not members of the kind have towards the members of such kind (trivially, if the kind in question, like money, does not include people as its members, then everyone is external to such kind). After presenting these two views, I will explore the possibility of engineering kinds within them, focusing on some case studies and examples. I will highlight various ways in which social kinds can be defective and propose solutions for all kinds of defectiveness.
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss how typical worries concerning Conceptual Engineering projects translate to my framework, focusing on the problems of Feasibility and Control.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZCalosi, DuccioConceptual Engineering is a new and interesting trend in Philosophy. However, it is not free from problems. The most relevant issue is that, at least following a Cappelen-like account, we are forced to commit to the controversial metaphysical view that the world has a linguistic structure. Under such view, a modification in the semantics of a term implies a modification in nature of the thing which is referred by that word. I propose to explore the implications of the reversal of such principle, thereby committing to the idea that a modification in the nature of things implies a modification of the semantics of the terms that refer to them, and not the other way around. Following this new principle, I am interested in developing an alternative account to Conceptual Engineering, which I call (following Greenough) Reality Engineering.
In this dissertation, I will focus on the analysis of two major points about Reality Engineering, trying to define what it is about and how to perform it. I will argue that Reality Engineering has kinds as its scope and I will restrict the focus of the present enquiry to social kinds only. I will proceed by providing a taxonomy of the most popular views about the metaphysics of social kinds, since in order to modify something properly, first we have to be clear on what that something is. Out of this taxonomy, I will generate two general theories on social kinds. The first one is what we can call a Top-down view, and it says that a social kind is generated via the acceptance of constitutive rules by some group of authorities and the successful application of those rules in ordinary practice. The second one is what we can call a Bottom-up view, according to which social kinds are nothing but the reification of social external norms, where social external norms are to be intended as the set of attitudes/behaviours/treatments/practices that people who are not members of the kind have towards the members of such kind (trivially, if the kind in question, like money, does not include people as its members, then everyone is external to such kind). After presenting these two views, I will explore the possibility of engineering kinds within them, focusing on some case studies and examples. I will highlight various ways in which social kinds can be defective and propose solutions for all kinds of defectiveness.
In conclusion, I will briefly discuss how typical worries concerning Conceptual Engineering projects translate to my framework, focusing on the problems of Feasibility and Control.I'm a believer : Evans' transparency remark and self-knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29132
The central goal of this thesis is to understand self-knowledge through understanding a particularly difficult and promising remark of Gareth Evans’, from his The Varieties of Reference (Evans, 1982), a remark which has formed the basis of so called ‘Transparency’ accounts of self-knowledge. Evans’ Transparency Remark is sometimes read as deflationary of self-knowledge in some respect, and I hope to show that although Evans’ account is indeed deflationary of our ordinary idea of self-knowledge, it retains what we might consider central features of an account of self-knowledge.
I do this by giving an overview of the literature surrounding Evans’ remark and making a distinction between Rationalist and Inferentialist accounts of Transparency. I also suggest that the goal of an account of self-knowledge is to explain, or explain away, the phenomenon of Privileged Access. Having done this we return to Evans’ development of his remark, and from that I develop a novel Rationalist account of self-knowledge of belief which hews closely to Evans’ own development but differs in one significant way, which leads to an answer to one of the central objections to Transparency accounts of self-knowledge, the Puzzle of Transparency. Having developed this Simple Account of Transparency and defended it against what I take to be the major objections to Transparency accounts, I turn to the best developed Inferentialist account, Byrne’s Transparency and Self-Knowledge (Byrne, 2018), and suggest why we might find his account wanting. Finally, I suggest ways in which the Simple Account of Transparency might be extended into a general account of self-knowledge, and suggest there is one important unanswered question remaining.
2022-06-14T00:00:00ZConlan, Paul JohnThe central goal of this thesis is to understand self-knowledge through understanding a particularly difficult and promising remark of Gareth Evans’, from his The Varieties of Reference (Evans, 1982), a remark which has formed the basis of so called ‘Transparency’ accounts of self-knowledge. Evans’ Transparency Remark is sometimes read as deflationary of self-knowledge in some respect, and I hope to show that although Evans’ account is indeed deflationary of our ordinary idea of self-knowledge, it retains what we might consider central features of an account of self-knowledge.
I do this by giving an overview of the literature surrounding Evans’ remark and making a distinction between Rationalist and Inferentialist accounts of Transparency. I also suggest that the goal of an account of self-knowledge is to explain, or explain away, the phenomenon of Privileged Access. Having done this we return to Evans’ development of his remark, and from that I develop a novel Rationalist account of self-knowledge of belief which hews closely to Evans’ own development but differs in one significant way, which leads to an answer to one of the central objections to Transparency accounts of self-knowledge, the Puzzle of Transparency. Having developed this Simple Account of Transparency and defended it against what I take to be the major objections to Transparency accounts, I turn to the best developed Inferentialist account, Byrne’s Transparency and Self-Knowledge (Byrne, 2018), and suggest why we might find his account wanting. Finally, I suggest ways in which the Simple Account of Transparency might be extended into a general account of self-knowledge, and suggest there is one important unanswered question remaining.The verbal dispute about verbal disputes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29131
Whether a dispute is verbal is important to figure out because it appears to make a huge difference for how the dispute should be resolved. To figure out whether individual disputes are verbal and to figure out how to resolve them, it is crucial to answer what it is for a dispute to be verbal. I defend a pluralistic answer to the question of what verbal disputes are: There are at least two phenomena that equally deserve to be called “verbal dispute”. The first phenomenon is the phenomenon of “talking past each other”, which I analyse in pragmatic terms. The second phenomenon is the phenomenon of “not really disagreeing”, which I analyse in doxastic terms. Both notions of “verbalness” respect certain features, but not others of how the expression “verbal dispute” is used. Furthermore, both notions are important to use since both make a difference for how best to proceed if a dispute is “verbal” in the sense in question.
In section 1, I outline why it is important to develop a good analysis of what verbal disputes are. In short, it is important because whether a dispute is verbal appears to make a difference for how to best resolve them. And resolving disputes in philosophy and academic disciplines more broadly is important to make progress. In section 2, I outline the method I use to establish my analyses of verbalness and argue for adopting this method for arguing for (and against) analyses of verbalness. In section 3, I consider a range of phrases typically used to describe what is distinctive about verbal disputes and boil them down to two central markers of verbal disputes: “talking past each other” and “not really disagreeing”. In section 4, I argue that both markers come apart and one may be present without the other, so these two markers of verbalness do in effect express two independent phenomena. In section 5, I consider existing approaches to the question of what verbal disputes are, consider which of the two phenomena these existing analyses are meant to capture and how well they do indeed capture the phenomenon in question. Building on how these existing approaches can be improved, I argue in section 6 for my analyses of pragmatic verbalness (“talking past each other”) and doxastic verbalness (“not really disagreeing”). In section 7, I argue that the dispute about verbal disputes is itself pragmatically and doxastically verbal. In section 8, I reply to a range of potential objections to my account of verbal disputes.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZBecker, NiklasWhether a dispute is verbal is important to figure out because it appears to make a huge difference for how the dispute should be resolved. To figure out whether individual disputes are verbal and to figure out how to resolve them, it is crucial to answer what it is for a dispute to be verbal. I defend a pluralistic answer to the question of what verbal disputes are: There are at least two phenomena that equally deserve to be called “verbal dispute”. The first phenomenon is the phenomenon of “talking past each other”, which I analyse in pragmatic terms. The second phenomenon is the phenomenon of “not really disagreeing”, which I analyse in doxastic terms. Both notions of “verbalness” respect certain features, but not others of how the expression “verbal dispute” is used. Furthermore, both notions are important to use since both make a difference for how best to proceed if a dispute is “verbal” in the sense in question.
In section 1, I outline why it is important to develop a good analysis of what verbal disputes are. In short, it is important because whether a dispute is verbal appears to make a difference for how to best resolve them. And resolving disputes in philosophy and academic disciplines more broadly is important to make progress. In section 2, I outline the method I use to establish my analyses of verbalness and argue for adopting this method for arguing for (and against) analyses of verbalness. In section 3, I consider a range of phrases typically used to describe what is distinctive about verbal disputes and boil them down to two central markers of verbal disputes: “talking past each other” and “not really disagreeing”. In section 4, I argue that both markers come apart and one may be present without the other, so these two markers of verbalness do in effect express two independent phenomena. In section 5, I consider existing approaches to the question of what verbal disputes are, consider which of the two phenomena these existing analyses are meant to capture and how well they do indeed capture the phenomenon in question. Building on how these existing approaches can be improved, I argue in section 6 for my analyses of pragmatic verbalness (“talking past each other”) and doxastic verbalness (“not really disagreeing”). In section 7, I argue that the dispute about verbal disputes is itself pragmatically and doxastically verbal. In section 8, I reply to a range of potential objections to my account of verbal disputes.The time we experience : understanding the phenomenologies of temporal passage and presentness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/29033
This dissertation explores what is involved in the alleged phenomenologies of the passage of time and the present, two phenomenological data that are normally cited to support the A-theory of time. It argues that the phenomenology corresponding to the purported passage phenomenology is that of dynamic changes in things’ states, and the phenomenology corresponding to the purported presentness phenomenology is that of (only) some things and events occurring simpliciter. It claims that these illusory phenomenologies are products of the feature of our perceptual experience of having a confined temporal horizon, which includes three aspects – limited access, involuntariness, and directionality. It also argues that the illusory phenomenologies of dynamic change and things and events occurring simpliciter, despite being at odds with the B-ontology, do not lend support to the A-theory of time. Furthermore, it provides insight into why our perceptual experience has a confined temporal horizon and how the intuitive beliefs that we experience temporal passage and presentness arise from the illusory phenomenologies.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZChen, KeyuThis dissertation explores what is involved in the alleged phenomenologies of the passage of time and the present, two phenomenological data that are normally cited to support the A-theory of time. It argues that the phenomenology corresponding to the purported passage phenomenology is that of dynamic changes in things’ states, and the phenomenology corresponding to the purported presentness phenomenology is that of (only) some things and events occurring simpliciter. It claims that these illusory phenomenologies are products of the feature of our perceptual experience of having a confined temporal horizon, which includes three aspects – limited access, involuntariness, and directionality. It also argues that the illusory phenomenologies of dynamic change and things and events occurring simpliciter, despite being at odds with the B-ontology, do not lend support to the A-theory of time. Furthermore, it provides insight into why our perceptual experience has a confined temporal horizon and how the intuitive beliefs that we experience temporal passage and presentness arise from the illusory phenomenologies.Indeterminacy and the law of the excluded middle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28934
This thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZEngler, Jann PaulThis thesis is an investigation into indeterminacy in the foundations of mathematics and its possible consequences for the applicability of the law of the excluded middle (LEM). It characterises different ways in which the natural numbers as well as the sets may be understood to be indeterminate, and asks in what sense this would cease to support applicability of LEM to reasoning with them. The first part of the thesis reviews the indeterminacy phenomena on which the argument is based and argues for a distinction between two notions of indeterminacy: a) indeterminacy as applied to domains and b) indefiniteness as applied to concepts. It then addresses possible attempts to secure determinacy in both cases. The second part of the thesis discusses the advantages that an argument from indeterminacy has over traditional intuitionistic arguments against LEM, and it provides the framework in which conditions for the applicability of LEM can be explicated in the setting of indeterminacy. The final part of the thesis then applies these findings to concrete cases of indeterminacy. With respect to indeterminacy of domains, I note some problems for establishing a rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of the height of the set theoretic hierarchy. I show that a coherent argument can be made for the rejection of LEM based on the indeterminacy of its width, and assess its philosophical commitments. A final chapter addresses the notion of indefiniteness of our concepts of set and number and asks how this might affect the applicability of LEM.The mark of the cognitive
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28831
Several philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind and of the cognitive sciences seem to require the elaboration of a mark of the cognitive (MOC). Some proposals for individually necessary and/or jointly sufficient conditions for cognition are already available, but each of them is not entirely satisfactory for different reasons.
I start by drawing on some of the extant proposals, and I advance a possible candidate necessary condition for cognition. I motivate the claim that cognition requires the existence of a first-person perspective (1PP) associated with it. However, while reasonable, I argue that we should not ultimately accept this claim. Moreover, some of the reasons that I provide for not accepting it also apply to the broader methodological family of approaches to cognition that has been labelled by Lyon (2006) the “anthropogenic” family. As a result, it is not just the 1PP condition that needs to be dismissed, it is the entire anthropogenic approach to cognition that should not be pursued in attempting to elaborate a MOC.
Luckily, the other broad methodological family, the one of the “biogenic” approaches to cognition, is not vulnerable to the same issues that arise in the case of anthropogenic approaches. We should therefore adopt a biogenic approach to the issue of finding a mark of the cognitive. Nevertheless, elaborating a MOC within a biogenic framework may not prove as beneficial as one may hope. In fact, what appears to be the most promising and positively received product of a biogenic approach, namely the Free-Energy Principle and the accounts of cognition based on it, needs to be understood in instrumentalist terms. Consequently, while we may still be able to achieve an understanding of what cognition is, some of the debates meant to be settled by the elaboration of a MOC may remain unsettled.
2024-06-10T00:00:00ZPisano, Niccolò AimoneSeveral philosophical debates in the philosophy of mind and of the cognitive sciences seem to require the elaboration of a mark of the cognitive (MOC). Some proposals for individually necessary and/or jointly sufficient conditions for cognition are already available, but each of them is not entirely satisfactory for different reasons.
I start by drawing on some of the extant proposals, and I advance a possible candidate necessary condition for cognition. I motivate the claim that cognition requires the existence of a first-person perspective (1PP) associated with it. However, while reasonable, I argue that we should not ultimately accept this claim. Moreover, some of the reasons that I provide for not accepting it also apply to the broader methodological family of approaches to cognition that has been labelled by Lyon (2006) the “anthropogenic” family. As a result, it is not just the 1PP condition that needs to be dismissed, it is the entire anthropogenic approach to cognition that should not be pursued in attempting to elaborate a MOC.
Luckily, the other broad methodological family, the one of the “biogenic” approaches to cognition, is not vulnerable to the same issues that arise in the case of anthropogenic approaches. We should therefore adopt a biogenic approach to the issue of finding a mark of the cognitive. Nevertheless, elaborating a MOC within a biogenic framework may not prove as beneficial as one may hope. In fact, what appears to be the most promising and positively received product of a biogenic approach, namely the Free-Energy Principle and the accounts of cognition based on it, needs to be understood in instrumentalist terms. Consequently, while we may still be able to achieve an understanding of what cognition is, some of the debates meant to be settled by the elaboration of a MOC may remain unsettled.In defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28678
In contrast to an intensional conception of properties, which says that sameness of intension among properties implies property identity, a hyperintensional conception of properties says that sameness of intension among properties does not imply property identity, and hence distinct properties may have the very same intension. This PhD thesis is about the metaphysical standing of a hyperintensional conception of properties. While this conception of properties might have an important place in discussions concerning the different ways we represent properties in our language and thought, skepticism looms large among proponents of an intensional conception of properties when a metaphysician takes a hyperintensional conception of properties to extend beyond how we represent properties and into discussions concerning how properties themselves are. The central project of this thesis is to articulate the considerations that underlie this skepticism and defend a hyperintensional conception of properties against them.
In chapter one, I set the scene by addressing a number of preliminary matters that shape my defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties. In chapter two, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties relies on distinct properties that do not have the same intension. In chapter three, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is based upon some linguistic and/or epistemic illusion. In chapter four, I present and examine a modal objection, which calls into question hyperintensional distinctions among properties. In chapter five, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is problematic on theoretical and methodological grounds. In chapter six, I round out my defence by proposing a hyperintensional theory of property identity, in order to resolve two problems that lie at the heart of any metaphysically adequate hyperintensional conception of properties.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZSnodgrass, J. J.In contrast to an intensional conception of properties, which says that sameness of intension among properties implies property identity, a hyperintensional conception of properties says that sameness of intension among properties does not imply property identity, and hence distinct properties may have the very same intension. This PhD thesis is about the metaphysical standing of a hyperintensional conception of properties. While this conception of properties might have an important place in discussions concerning the different ways we represent properties in our language and thought, skepticism looms large among proponents of an intensional conception of properties when a metaphysician takes a hyperintensional conception of properties to extend beyond how we represent properties and into discussions concerning how properties themselves are. The central project of this thesis is to articulate the considerations that underlie this skepticism and defend a hyperintensional conception of properties against them.
In chapter one, I set the scene by addressing a number of preliminary matters that shape my defence of a hyperintensional conception of properties. In chapter two, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties relies on distinct properties that do not have the same intension. In chapter three, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is based upon some linguistic and/or epistemic illusion. In chapter four, I present and examine a modal objection, which calls into question hyperintensional distinctions among properties. In chapter five, I consider and respond to objections that this conception of properties is problematic on theoretical and methodological grounds. In chapter six, I round out my defence by proposing a hyperintensional theory of property identity, in order to resolve two problems that lie at the heart of any metaphysically adequate hyperintensional conception of properties.The unity of virtues in Plato and Aristotle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/28676
“Unity of virtues” is the idea that virtues should be understood in holistic terms.
Part I focuses on Plato’s Protagoras. It argues that, according to Plato’s Socrates, “unity of virtues” is true in the sense that all the apparently different virtues are in fact the same state of soul, namely the state of knowledge. Knowledge shapes how one perceives, deliberates, chooses, acts, and feels. Socrates’ ideal agent is transparent in the sense that what he knows of himself is the same as the truth about what ought to be the case. Further, the idea that “virtue is one” has important pedagogical significance: in reminding us that virtue cannot be compartmentalised, it demands us to stay vigilant: there is always an opportunity to be virtuous, just as there is always an opportunity to be vicious.
Part II concentrates mainly on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI and its relation to II-V. It argues that, according to Aristotle, “unity of virtues” is true because attaining practical truth implies the mutual entailment of the ethical virtues. The different ethical virtues can be seen as different ways to attain practical truth, and these different ways of attaining practical truth are themselves manifestations of our nature as practical rational beings. Aristotle’s ideal agent is transparent in an even deeper sense: the excellent condition of his soul reveals the truth about what it is to live well as a practical rational being. Further, in emphasising the importance of “choice”, Aristotle’s account captures how, contra Plato’s Socrates, the well-functioning of the practical intellect is hostage to the well-functioning of the non-rational soul. Aristotle’s theory is just intellectualised enough: the wise practical intellect has its proper role to play, but the ethical virtues are not thereby reduced to wisdom.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZChong, I Xuan“Unity of virtues” is the idea that virtues should be understood in holistic terms.
Part I focuses on Plato’s Protagoras. It argues that, according to Plato’s Socrates, “unity of virtues” is true in the sense that all the apparently different virtues are in fact the same state of soul, namely the state of knowledge. Knowledge shapes how one perceives, deliberates, chooses, acts, and feels. Socrates’ ideal agent is transparent in the sense that what he knows of himself is the same as the truth about what ought to be the case. Further, the idea that “virtue is one” has important pedagogical significance: in reminding us that virtue cannot be compartmentalised, it demands us to stay vigilant: there is always an opportunity to be virtuous, just as there is always an opportunity to be vicious.
Part II concentrates mainly on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI and its relation to II-V. It argues that, according to Aristotle, “unity of virtues” is true because attaining practical truth implies the mutual entailment of the ethical virtues. The different ethical virtues can be seen as different ways to attain practical truth, and these different ways of attaining practical truth are themselves manifestations of our nature as practical rational beings. Aristotle’s ideal agent is transparent in an even deeper sense: the excellent condition of his soul reveals the truth about what it is to live well as a practical rational being. Further, in emphasising the importance of “choice”, Aristotle’s account captures how, contra Plato’s Socrates, the well-functioning of the practical intellect is hostage to the well-functioning of the non-rational soul. Aristotle’s theory is just intellectualised enough: the wise practical intellect has its proper role to play, but the ethical virtues are not thereby reduced to wisdom.A human right to cultural heritage
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27848
In recent years, global institutions like the UN and UNESCO have increasingly treated obligations to preserve cultural heritage as obligations to uphold human rights. Owing to the relative novelty of this approach, little work has been done to see what exactly such rights would be and how this treatment of cultural heritage could be justified. Not only is it unclear what the foundations of a human right to cultural heritage are or what precisely such a right ought to entail, but it is equally uncertain what is meant by cultural heritage in the first place. Considering this, the aims of the thesis are the following: (i) provide a philosophically robust definition of cultural heritage and its social value that could serve as a foundation of the human rights approach to cultural heritage; (ii) building on this understanding of cultural heritage, provide a systematic conceptual analysis of obligations to preserve cultural heritage understood in the language of human rights. The thesis defends a constructionist-inspired account of cultural heritage, according to which cultural heritage is not primarily about historical objects and practices, but rather about how we employ such objects and practices to make sense of our internal and external worlds, both as individuals and as communities. Equipped with this understanding of cultural heritage the thesis provides a justification of a human right to cultural heritage by appealing to the centrality of cultural heritage to our individual normative agency. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of a human right to cultural heritage, where such limits are determined by its harmful uses. Lastly, the thesis provides a discussion of legal duties that a human right to cultural heritage will generate and briefly considers whose responsibility such duties are.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZDavidaviciute, RasaIn recent years, global institutions like the UN and UNESCO have increasingly treated obligations to preserve cultural heritage as obligations to uphold human rights. Owing to the relative novelty of this approach, little work has been done to see what exactly such rights would be and how this treatment of cultural heritage could be justified. Not only is it unclear what the foundations of a human right to cultural heritage are or what precisely such a right ought to entail, but it is equally uncertain what is meant by cultural heritage in the first place. Considering this, the aims of the thesis are the following: (i) provide a philosophically robust definition of cultural heritage and its social value that could serve as a foundation of the human rights approach to cultural heritage; (ii) building on this understanding of cultural heritage, provide a systematic conceptual analysis of obligations to preserve cultural heritage understood in the language of human rights. The thesis defends a constructionist-inspired account of cultural heritage, according to which cultural heritage is not primarily about historical objects and practices, but rather about how we employ such objects and practices to make sense of our internal and external worlds, both as individuals and as communities. Equipped with this understanding of cultural heritage the thesis provides a justification of a human right to cultural heritage by appealing to the centrality of cultural heritage to our individual normative agency. This is followed by a discussion of the limits of a human right to cultural heritage, where such limits are determined by its harmful uses. Lastly, the thesis provides a discussion of legal duties that a human right to cultural heritage will generate and briefly considers whose responsibility such duties are.Self-identification, group-membership, and the race-gender analogy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27812
Self-identification is often quickly dismissed as a possible criterion for group-membership. I explore what self-identification might be and how it might figure into group-membership. I set out desiderata for an account of group-membership that considers the analogy between race and gender to have some merit as well as the broad theoretical framework underlying discussions around the nature of race and gender. I argue a constructivist framework of some kind is most appropriate as it has the potential of being maximally inclusive as well as ameliorative. I criticize Haslanger’s ameliorative account, which focuses on social positioning as a membership criterion, based on its lack of recognition of the interactive nature of social groups and its normativity. Haslanger’s account lacks the inclusion of individual “choice” on one’s individual identity. I explore Jenkins’ inclusion problem and argue that her solution of multiple and equally weighted target concepts has some shortcomings as she fails to consider that these concepts might conflict when they are practically applied, and hence cannot be equally weighted. I distinguish between self- identification and self-declaration. I argue that the former has more relevance pertaining to actual group-membership rather than perceived membership. I argue that, especially in the case of race, it cannot be the sole criterion due to arbitrariness objections and the interactivity of social concepts. I further lay out why it cannot be one of many equally weighted criteria: The risk is self-identification will be outweighed by other criteria, which would result in it not figuring into group-membership after all. This risks entrenching historical injustices, and is similar in structure to my objection against Jenkins.
Hence, I put forward that self-identification might come into play when other criteria don’t give a clear indication. This is also where the race-gender analogy might fall apart as the restrictive criteria might differ. However, examining this stipulation is outside the scope of this project. This dissertation aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of race and gender concepts as they have practical policy implications.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZKopec, Kim LauraSelf-identification is often quickly dismissed as a possible criterion for group-membership. I explore what self-identification might be and how it might figure into group-membership. I set out desiderata for an account of group-membership that considers the analogy between race and gender to have some merit as well as the broad theoretical framework underlying discussions around the nature of race and gender. I argue a constructivist framework of some kind is most appropriate as it has the potential of being maximally inclusive as well as ameliorative. I criticize Haslanger’s ameliorative account, which focuses on social positioning as a membership criterion, based on its lack of recognition of the interactive nature of social groups and its normativity. Haslanger’s account lacks the inclusion of individual “choice” on one’s individual identity. I explore Jenkins’ inclusion problem and argue that her solution of multiple and equally weighted target concepts has some shortcomings as she fails to consider that these concepts might conflict when they are practically applied, and hence cannot be equally weighted. I distinguish between self- identification and self-declaration. I argue that the former has more relevance pertaining to actual group-membership rather than perceived membership. I argue that, especially in the case of race, it cannot be the sole criterion due to arbitrariness objections and the interactivity of social concepts. I further lay out why it cannot be one of many equally weighted criteria: The risk is self-identification will be outweighed by other criteria, which would result in it not figuring into group-membership after all. This risks entrenching historical injustices, and is similar in structure to my objection against Jenkins.
Hence, I put forward that self-identification might come into play when other criteria don’t give a clear indication. This is also where the race-gender analogy might fall apart as the restrictive criteria might differ. However, examining this stipulation is outside the scope of this project. This dissertation aims to contribute to a clearer understanding of race and gender concepts as they have practical policy implications.Perspectival attitudes and assertions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27798
This thesis examines two types of perspectival attitudes and assertions: those about oneself, such as "I am in Martyrs Kirk Library" or "my house is on fire", and those about matters of personal tastes, such as "Super Mario is a fun game" or "century eggs are disgusting". The aim of this thesis is to challenge some published arguments in favour of the relativist, centred-worlds framework for these attitudes and assertions and to offer novel explanations for relevant phenomena including the inferior status of testimony about taste matters, the acquaintance inference of taste assertions, the connection between de se attitudes and actions, and the non-reducibility of de se attitudes to non-de se attitudes. I argue that the centred-worlds framework is not a well-motivated framework for these two types of attitudes and assertions. In addition, I propose that taste assertions are governed by a special knowledge-why norm, and de se attitudes have impossible-worlds contents.
2023-11-29T00:00:00ZLin, LixiaoThis thesis examines two types of perspectival attitudes and assertions: those about oneself, such as "I am in Martyrs Kirk Library" or "my house is on fire", and those about matters of personal tastes, such as "Super Mario is a fun game" or "century eggs are disgusting". The aim of this thesis is to challenge some published arguments in favour of the relativist, centred-worlds framework for these attitudes and assertions and to offer novel explanations for relevant phenomena including the inferior status of testimony about taste matters, the acquaintance inference of taste assertions, the connection between de se attitudes and actions, and the non-reducibility of de se attitudes to non-de se attitudes. I argue that the centred-worlds framework is not a well-motivated framework for these two types of attitudes and assertions. In addition, I propose that taste assertions are governed by a special knowledge-why norm, and de se attitudes have impossible-worlds contents.Philosophy and the aim for truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27737
This thesis seeks to answer the question: Does philosophy aim for truth? To address this question, I must first ask a more general question: What is it to aim for truth? My approach to answering this latter question uses pragmatism as its frame of reference by exploring the practical significance of the aim for truth. Huw Price argues that this aim provides a common purpose that helps us to engage with each other, turning our inquiry into a shared enterprise. (Price 2003) Price’s theory gives an apt description of the practical role of aiming for truth. However, I argue that this aim, conceived as such, is not advantageous to all of our inquiries. This thesis formulates a distinction between shared inquiry that aims for truth — such as scientific inquiry — and personal inquiry that lacks this aim — such as the inquiry into matters of taste. While this distinction is practical, it has many theoretical reverberations that this thesis tries to trace. It cuts across many topics of philosophical concern, such as the mechanics of disagreement, the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, and knowledge. After dressing up the practical distinction between personal and shared inquiry in these theoretical layers, I apply it to the inquiry to which this thesis belongs. I argue against the popular belief that philosophical inquiry is scientific and thus shared. An analysis of philosophical practices shows that philosophical inquiry is personal. As a result, my thesis concludes that philosophy does not aim for truth.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZKaspers, TomThis thesis seeks to answer the question: Does philosophy aim for truth? To address this question, I must first ask a more general question: What is it to aim for truth? My approach to answering this latter question uses pragmatism as its frame of reference by exploring the practical significance of the aim for truth. Huw Price argues that this aim provides a common purpose that helps us to engage with each other, turning our inquiry into a shared enterprise. (Price 2003) Price’s theory gives an apt description of the practical role of aiming for truth. However, I argue that this aim, conceived as such, is not advantageous to all of our inquiries. This thesis formulates a distinction between shared inquiry that aims for truth — such as scientific inquiry — and personal inquiry that lacks this aim — such as the inquiry into matters of taste. While this distinction is practical, it has many theoretical reverberations that this thesis tries to trace. It cuts across many topics of philosophical concern, such as the mechanics of disagreement, the nature of truth, objectivity, rationality, and knowledge. After dressing up the practical distinction between personal and shared inquiry in these theoretical layers, I apply it to the inquiry to which this thesis belongs. I argue against the popular belief that philosophical inquiry is scientific and thus shared. An analysis of philosophical practices shows that philosophical inquiry is personal. As a result, my thesis concludes that philosophy does not aim for truth.Thought and predication in Frege and Russell
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27670
This dissertation offers a reappraisal of how Russell’s views about thought and predication around the time of his Principles of Mathematics relate to Frege’s own theorizing about those topics. It does so by telling a story about the encounter of Russell’s world with Frege’s logic. The main protagonist in that story is Russell. Briefly, the story is as follows.
Russell inherited from Moore the elements of the largely atomistic worldview that he upheld around 1903. Underlying that worldview was a model of term combination that we may call the building blocks model. That model was primarily targeted at the composition of atomic propositions (chapter 3). In one respect, the model proved advantageous, in that it prevented Russell from mistaking propositional functions (or what they stand for) for properties in the traditional sense (chapters 1 and 4). In other respects, it had a deleterious effect on Russell’s theorizing. In fact, it would break down even in the case of atomic propositions themselves (chapter 4). However, it was as a model for the kinds of complexity introduced by propositional functions (chapter 5) and that-clauses (chapter 6) that it proved seriously inadequate. By contrast, Frege’s model of complexity derived entirely from his account of generality, and was therefore perfectly suited to functions (chapter 2). Yet, Frege’s relative indifference towards ontological questions, or at any rate his lack of a developed picture of the world comparable to Russell’s, meant that he could avoid any deep commitments with regard to the other two cases (chapters 2 and 7).
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZPereira Mestre Da Conceicao, Jose ManuelThis dissertation offers a reappraisal of how Russell’s views about thought and predication around the time of his Principles of Mathematics relate to Frege’s own theorizing about those topics. It does so by telling a story about the encounter of Russell’s world with Frege’s logic. The main protagonist in that story is Russell. Briefly, the story is as follows.
Russell inherited from Moore the elements of the largely atomistic worldview that he upheld around 1903. Underlying that worldview was a model of term combination that we may call the building blocks model. That model was primarily targeted at the composition of atomic propositions (chapter 3). In one respect, the model proved advantageous, in that it prevented Russell from mistaking propositional functions (or what they stand for) for properties in the traditional sense (chapters 1 and 4). In other respects, it had a deleterious effect on Russell’s theorizing. In fact, it would break down even in the case of atomic propositions themselves (chapter 4). However, it was as a model for the kinds of complexity introduced by propositional functions (chapter 5) and that-clauses (chapter 6) that it proved seriously inadequate. By contrast, Frege’s model of complexity derived entirely from his account of generality, and was therefore perfectly suited to functions (chapter 2). Yet, Frege’s relative indifference towards ontological questions, or at any rate his lack of a developed picture of the world comparable to Russell’s, meant that he could avoid any deep commitments with regard to the other two cases (chapters 2 and 7).Time, self-consciousness, and categorial unity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27567
These essays are an attempt to elucidate the notion of a category, which, broadly speaking, is a concept that accounts for the manner in which the constituents of experience are combined or held together. The relation of such concepts to the unity of self-consciousness and the unity of time is explicated in order to consider the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSatija, AtulThese essays are an attempt to elucidate the notion of a category, which, broadly speaking, is a concept that accounts for the manner in which the constituents of experience are combined or held together. The relation of such concepts to the unity of self-consciousness and the unity of time is explicated in order to consider the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge.From evidence to underdetermination : essays in the way of scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27516
Scepticism about justification is the view that justification is impossible. Underdetermination scepticism is scepticism that turns on the idea that our beliefs are underdetermined by the evidence relative to certain sceptical hypotheses. This thesis provides an elucidation and a defence of underdetermination scepticism on an evidentialist framework for justification and a mentalist conception of evidence. The thesis consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the Underdetermination Argument for scepticism and explains the core concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between closure and underdetermination scepticism. Chapter 3 responds to the Infallibility Objection, the idea that the Underdetermination Argument is a bad argument because the inference from sameness of evidence to underdetermination presupposes infallibilism. Chapter 4 responds to the charge that the Underdetermination Argument relies on excessive demands on the cognitive accessibility of evidence. Chapter 5 responds to attempts to resist scepticism on the ground that it is a Moorean fact that our beliefs are justified. The conclusion reviews and generalizes the results of the previous chapters. The upshot is that a significant set of objections against underdetermination scepticism fails. At the end of the day, we might have to take the possibility of living with scepticism seriously – or at least more seriously than we thought.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSavino, PaoloScepticism about justification is the view that justification is impossible. Underdetermination scepticism is scepticism that turns on the idea that our beliefs are underdetermined by the evidence relative to certain sceptical hypotheses. This thesis provides an elucidation and a defence of underdetermination scepticism on an evidentialist framework for justification and a mentalist conception of evidence. The thesis consists of five chapters and a conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the Underdetermination Argument for scepticism and explains the core concepts of the thesis. Chapter 2 explores the relationship between closure and underdetermination scepticism. Chapter 3 responds to the Infallibility Objection, the idea that the Underdetermination Argument is a bad argument because the inference from sameness of evidence to underdetermination presupposes infallibilism. Chapter 4 responds to the charge that the Underdetermination Argument relies on excessive demands on the cognitive accessibility of evidence. Chapter 5 responds to attempts to resist scepticism on the ground that it is a Moorean fact that our beliefs are justified. The conclusion reviews and generalizes the results of the previous chapters. The upshot is that a significant set of objections against underdetermination scepticism fails. At the end of the day, we might have to take the possibility of living with scepticism seriously – or at least more seriously than we thought.Working for each other : an account of the need for work in society
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27440
This dissertation evaluates a need for work. In doing so, it addresses a neglected topic – by systematically exploring the concept of work and its relation to basic needs – and situates that contribution in the context of existing philosophical literature on work and adjacent research in the humanities and social sciences. Second, it offers up new conceptual tools – by arguing for the usefulness of a needs-centred perspective on work – which can aide in our deliberations about how to construct a more human(e) future of work. The project defends an account of a need for work which is grounded in the basic, non-contingent needs we hold, not as individuals, but as a society. It begins by defining work and need, and clarifying the meaning of the question, “Do we need work?” in light of these definitions. It then draws a distinction between the different levels of social life at which we can be understood to hold needs: as individuals, as a community, and as a society. I argue that it is possible, at each of these levels, to ask and answer a different question about work’s relationship to our basic, non-contingent needs. Subsequently, I find that work is important, but not necessary for our ability to meet such needs as individuals and members of a community, since we can do so through non-work activities. It is, however, necessary at the level of society. As a society, we have a need for a shared system of reciprocity to govern how we recognise and communicate about contribution. Work allows us to meet this need by functioning as a signalling mechanism for value. In fulfilling this function, it cannot be straightforwardly replaced by non-work activities, since activities like leisure are not connected to contribution in the same way.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZThomas, Deryn MairThis dissertation evaluates a need for work. In doing so, it addresses a neglected topic – by systematically exploring the concept of work and its relation to basic needs – and situates that contribution in the context of existing philosophical literature on work and adjacent research in the humanities and social sciences. Second, it offers up new conceptual tools – by arguing for the usefulness of a needs-centred perspective on work – which can aide in our deliberations about how to construct a more human(e) future of work. The project defends an account of a need for work which is grounded in the basic, non-contingent needs we hold, not as individuals, but as a society. It begins by defining work and need, and clarifying the meaning of the question, “Do we need work?” in light of these definitions. It then draws a distinction between the different levels of social life at which we can be understood to hold needs: as individuals, as a community, and as a society. I argue that it is possible, at each of these levels, to ask and answer a different question about work’s relationship to our basic, non-contingent needs. Subsequently, I find that work is important, but not necessary for our ability to meet such needs as individuals and members of a community, since we can do so through non-work activities. It is, however, necessary at the level of society. As a society, we have a need for a shared system of reciprocity to govern how we recognise and communicate about contribution. Work allows us to meet this need by functioning as a signalling mechanism for value. In fulfilling this function, it cannot be straightforwardly replaced by non-work activities, since activities like leisure are not connected to contribution in the same way.Identifying oneself as an element of the objective order : Nagel's question and Evans' response
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27384
Frege leaves us with a task: to elucidate the fundamental character of the way in which we know which spatio-temporal particular is in question when we use the first person by formulating a semantic account of the first person. This investigation takes up this task, approaching it through the following question, Nagel’s question: is it possible for one to identify oneself as an element of the objective order? After thinking through the insights of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 'The First Person' and examining the collapse of Gareth Evans’ response to the question, the investigation draws on Sebastian Rödl’s 'Intentional Transaction' to answer Nagel’s question in the positive by formulating a semantic account of the first person and, as such, resolves its central task.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZMcGrath, Jack DylanFrege leaves us with a task: to elucidate the fundamental character of the way in which we know which spatio-temporal particular is in question when we use the first person by formulating a semantic account of the first person. This investigation takes up this task, approaching it through the following question, Nagel’s question: is it possible for one to identify oneself as an element of the objective order? After thinking through the insights of Elizabeth Anscombe’s 'The First Person' and examining the collapse of Gareth Evans’ response to the question, the investigation draws on Sebastian Rödl’s 'Intentional Transaction' to answer Nagel’s question in the positive by formulating a semantic account of the first person and, as such, resolves its central task.Affective experience as a source of knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27364
In analytic philosophy, appropriate sources of knowledge do not include affective experience. In this thesis, I oppose this commonly accepted view and argue in favour of valuing the contribution of affective experience to knowledge. My argument unfolds in two parts. In the first part of the thesis, I propose a positive argument favouring the inclusion of affective experience in our sources of knowledge. My main contribution is the Reflective Model, a novel account of affective experience as a source which responds to the common objections towards the epistemic value of affective experience. This new model is built on the idea that affective experience is a reason- tracking ability, which incorporates a reflective element through internal and social calibration. I illustrate this phenomenon by discussing how members from marginalised groups identify microaggressions through their emotions. In the second part of the thesis, I offer a negative argument: given the negative ethical and practical consequences of excluding affective experience, we should include it in our sources of knowledge. I conceptualise a new form of epistemic injustice, source based epistemic injustice, which highlights unfairness towards knowers who utilise unapproved sources of knowledge like affective experience. In addition, I discuss two applied cases where testimony based on affective experience is unfairly downgraded: testimony about lesser-known illnesses and testimony about everyday racism. I argue that the first case leads to the epistemic exploitation of patients, whilst the second gives rise to dialectical white scepticism, a pernicious form of white scepticism which has not been previously theorised. Altogether, I argue that legitimising affective experience as a source of knowledge would enable us to incorporate a greater number of epistemic contributions in our epistemological system, thus reducing instances of injustice and silencing experienced by members of marginalised groups.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZJost, Lara ApollineIn analytic philosophy, appropriate sources of knowledge do not include affective experience. In this thesis, I oppose this commonly accepted view and argue in favour of valuing the contribution of affective experience to knowledge. My argument unfolds in two parts. In the first part of the thesis, I propose a positive argument favouring the inclusion of affective experience in our sources of knowledge. My main contribution is the Reflective Model, a novel account of affective experience as a source which responds to the common objections towards the epistemic value of affective experience. This new model is built on the idea that affective experience is a reason- tracking ability, which incorporates a reflective element through internal and social calibration. I illustrate this phenomenon by discussing how members from marginalised groups identify microaggressions through their emotions. In the second part of the thesis, I offer a negative argument: given the negative ethical and practical consequences of excluding affective experience, we should include it in our sources of knowledge. I conceptualise a new form of epistemic injustice, source based epistemic injustice, which highlights unfairness towards knowers who utilise unapproved sources of knowledge like affective experience. In addition, I discuss two applied cases where testimony based on affective experience is unfairly downgraded: testimony about lesser-known illnesses and testimony about everyday racism. I argue that the first case leads to the epistemic exploitation of patients, whilst the second gives rise to dialectical white scepticism, a pernicious form of white scepticism which has not been previously theorised. Altogether, I argue that legitimising affective experience as a source of knowledge would enable us to incorporate a greater number of epistemic contributions in our epistemological system, thus reducing instances of injustice and silencing experienced by members of marginalised groups.The achievement of perceptual presence : to perceive by having access to the world
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27310
This dissertation provides an enactive approach to perception. It argues that perceptual presence is
achieved by perceivers. They do this by having access to the world through the navigation of
sensorimotor contingencies based on their understanding. In developing this view, the dissertation
defends a version of the enactive account of perception that is originally proposed by Alva Noë and
explores how this account challenges and competes with other accounts of perception, including
sense-datum theory, naïve realism, etc. It also argues that Noë’s enactive account is insightful as he
acutely captures certain features of perceptual phenomena and so makes plausible challenges
towards representationalism about perception. However, he fails to provide a clear and detailed
thesis concerning the way we perceive, especially how sensorimotor understanding can help with
the grasp of the two-dimensionality of presence, i.e., the fact that we perceive how things look and
how they really are at the same time. In order to make the enactive approach a better account, the
dissertation provides an improved explanation of the duality of presence. I argue that things are
always practically remote for us. Such remoteness is the root of the duality as we have to cope with
the remoteness by having access to objects through navigating sensorimotor contingencies. Because
presence is achieved in such a way, it has the two-dimensionality feature. The final chapters provide
an extended explication of the means to the achievement of access by drawing out the way that
sensorimotor understanding is procured through perceivers’ acquiring a sort of practical conceptual
knowledge of their perceptual situations. The dissertation thus ends with the argument that concepts
are necessary skills for perceivers to achieve sustaining access to the world.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZGong, QianrongThis dissertation provides an enactive approach to perception. It argues that perceptual presence is
achieved by perceivers. They do this by having access to the world through the navigation of
sensorimotor contingencies based on their understanding. In developing this view, the dissertation
defends a version of the enactive account of perception that is originally proposed by Alva Noë and
explores how this account challenges and competes with other accounts of perception, including
sense-datum theory, naïve realism, etc. It also argues that Noë’s enactive account is insightful as he
acutely captures certain features of perceptual phenomena and so makes plausible challenges
towards representationalism about perception. However, he fails to provide a clear and detailed
thesis concerning the way we perceive, especially how sensorimotor understanding can help with
the grasp of the two-dimensionality of presence, i.e., the fact that we perceive how things look and
how they really are at the same time. In order to make the enactive approach a better account, the
dissertation provides an improved explanation of the duality of presence. I argue that things are
always practically remote for us. Such remoteness is the root of the duality as we have to cope with
the remoteness by having access to objects through navigating sensorimotor contingencies. Because
presence is achieved in such a way, it has the two-dimensionality feature. The final chapters provide
an extended explication of the means to the achievement of access by drawing out the way that
sensorimotor understanding is procured through perceivers’ acquiring a sort of practical conceptual
knowledge of their perceptual situations. The dissertation thus ends with the argument that concepts
are necessary skills for perceivers to achieve sustaining access to the world.Self-deception and its interaction with introspection
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27275
Self-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZGuarrasi, GuglielmoSelf-deception is a tricky phenomenon to define, especially once we realise the further complications its interaction with introspection might lead to. In this dissertation I am to analyse these two phenomena to show their compatibility. In fact, I am going to argue that, although self-deception is an instance where introspection fails whereas the latter can cause the end of a self-deceive state, no problematic interference happens between them. To reach this aim I am going to rely on the studies conducted by Nisbett and Wilson on instances where subjects fail to introspect certain mental states or processes. I will use this to argue that it is then possible for a subject to fail to introspect certain aspects of their mental life and, thusly, self-deceive. In turn, I am going to show how having areas where introspecting gives us the wrong result is not a major problem as it is a characteristic it shares with sense perception, which is something we are used to rely on.The nature and rationality of trust and trustworthiness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27131
Trust and trustworthiness are highly important concepts; Trusting well enables us to achieve things we cannot do alone and to discover things that we cannot check for ourselves. Issues of trust sit in the intersection of ethics and epistemology; it is commonly thought of as a moral good to be trustworthy and trusting the testimony of others can be a valuable source of knowledge.
By trusting too easily, however, we become hopelessly naïve and risk falling prey to scams and lies. Knowing when to trust is therefore of significant practical value.
The aim of this thesis is to come to a greater understanding of these concepts. The first three chapters deal with what trust and trustworthiness are. In the first, I argue that trust is a kind of reliance, rather than a kind of belief. In the second, I argue that trust is specifically reliance on another to be trustworthy. The third chapter presents a theory of trustworthiness according to which being trustworthy is a matter of keeping commitments.
The following two chapters are about the rationality of trust. The first considers various ideas proposed for what justifies trusting someone and shows why they are not successful. The second lays out my own view, on which trust is justified by both evidence and practical reasons addressing another’s trustworthiness.
Finally, I consider the relationship between commitments and responsibility. It is argued that, by accepting a commitment to do something from another, one is absolved of responsibility for ensuring that it is done. This is also found to help explain why holding victims responsible is a mistake.
Ultimately, a holistic theory of trust and trustworthiness is proposed, which I believe has significant advantages over those already in the literature and will be useful in future philosophical research.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZMitchell, Thomas James ArthurTrust and trustworthiness are highly important concepts; Trusting well enables us to achieve things we cannot do alone and to discover things that we cannot check for ourselves. Issues of trust sit in the intersection of ethics and epistemology; it is commonly thought of as a moral good to be trustworthy and trusting the testimony of others can be a valuable source of knowledge.
By trusting too easily, however, we become hopelessly naïve and risk falling prey to scams and lies. Knowing when to trust is therefore of significant practical value.
The aim of this thesis is to come to a greater understanding of these concepts. The first three chapters deal with what trust and trustworthiness are. In the first, I argue that trust is a kind of reliance, rather than a kind of belief. In the second, I argue that trust is specifically reliance on another to be trustworthy. The third chapter presents a theory of trustworthiness according to which being trustworthy is a matter of keeping commitments.
The following two chapters are about the rationality of trust. The first considers various ideas proposed for what justifies trusting someone and shows why they are not successful. The second lays out my own view, on which trust is justified by both evidence and practical reasons addressing another’s trustworthiness.
Finally, I consider the relationship between commitments and responsibility. It is argued that, by accepting a commitment to do something from another, one is absolved of responsibility for ensuring that it is done. This is also found to help explain why holding victims responsible is a mistake.
Ultimately, a holistic theory of trust and trustworthiness is proposed, which I believe has significant advantages over those already in the literature and will be useful in future philosophical research.Productive being : the continuity between life and action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27090
What is the relationship between life and agency? Are all agents necessarily living organisms? How are we to understand the phenomena of life and action? This thesis aims to answer these questions against the background of the autopoietic enactive approach in cognitive science. I develop a general conception of productive beings as systems capable of engaging in productive processes. A productive process is understood as a purposive, end-directed kind of self-movement whose cause or source lies in the subject which engages in the process. I argue that the capacity of productive systems to engage in productive processes is inextricably tied to their nature as materially precarious systems. In other words, the autonomous form of productive beings cannot be understood without reference to their materially fragile realisation. I then argue that, given an enactive conception of life and precariousness, productive systems must be understood as living systems. Since agents, on the developed view, are productive systems, I conclude that life is necessary for agency, from an enactive viewpoint. The understanding of this continuity between life and action is explored, throughout the thesis, from different perspectives. Apart from a careful examination of enactive concepts and proposals, the discussion engages Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on agency, Michael Thompson’s reflections on life-forms, Philippa Foot’s notion of natural goodness, Hans Jonas’ philosophy of biology, and Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between form and matter.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZProkop, Mirko AlexanderWhat is the relationship between life and agency? Are all agents necessarily living organisms? How are we to understand the phenomena of life and action? This thesis aims to answer these questions against the background of the autopoietic enactive approach in cognitive science. I develop a general conception of productive beings as systems capable of engaging in productive processes. A productive process is understood as a purposive, end-directed kind of self-movement whose cause or source lies in the subject which engages in the process. I argue that the capacity of productive systems to engage in productive processes is inextricably tied to their nature as materially precarious systems. In other words, the autonomous form of productive beings cannot be understood without reference to their materially fragile realisation. I then argue that, given an enactive conception of life and precariousness, productive systems must be understood as living systems. Since agents, on the developed view, are productive systems, I conclude that life is necessary for agency, from an enactive viewpoint. The understanding of this continuity between life and action is explored, throughout the thesis, from different perspectives. Apart from a careful examination of enactive concepts and proposals, the discussion engages Elizabeth Anscombe’s work on agency, Michael Thompson’s reflections on life-forms, Philippa Foot’s notion of natural goodness, Hans Jonas’ philosophy of biology, and Aristotle’s conception of the relationship between form and matter.The apriority of logical truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27072
I defend the claim that knowledge of logical truths does not depend on experience, that it is a priori knowledge. In chapter I, I introduce and clarify the idea of a priori knowledge, and in chapter II, I respond to a widespread objection to it derived from Quine’s critique of analyticity. In chapter III, I distinguish between two approaches to developing an account of a priori knowledge, one that ties apriority to the cognitive abilities of knowers and another that ties it to features of truths known. I motivate the second approach over the first. In chapter IV, I sketch an outline of how the second approach could lead to an account of the apriority of logical knowledge. In the final three chapters, I develop an account which follows the outline.
In chapter V, I introduce the Fregean idea of logic as a study of the laws of truth which I spell out with the help of the semantic conception of truth developed by Tarski. In chapter VI, I defend an idea found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that the signs for logical operations cannot be construed as having objects corresponding to them. The defence proceeds via a defence of Frege’s Context Principle. A consequence of the Tractarian idea is that logical truths are not expressions of thought, that they are truths without a truth-condition. In the last chapter, I spell out the epistemic implications of this idea, that an understanding of truth is accompanied by knowledge of every logical truth and that any acquisition of knowledge by experience therefore presupposes logical knowledge, meaning that logical knowledge itself cannot depend on experience or any other means of learning.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZLobus, IndrekI defend the claim that knowledge of logical truths does not depend on experience, that it is a priori knowledge. In chapter I, I introduce and clarify the idea of a priori knowledge, and in chapter II, I respond to a widespread objection to it derived from Quine’s critique of analyticity. In chapter III, I distinguish between two approaches to developing an account of a priori knowledge, one that ties apriority to the cognitive abilities of knowers and another that ties it to features of truths known. I motivate the second approach over the first. In chapter IV, I sketch an outline of how the second approach could lead to an account of the apriority of logical knowledge. In the final three chapters, I develop an account which follows the outline.
In chapter V, I introduce the Fregean idea of logic as a study of the laws of truth which I spell out with the help of the semantic conception of truth developed by Tarski. In chapter VI, I defend an idea found in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that the signs for logical operations cannot be construed as having objects corresponding to them. The defence proceeds via a defence of Frege’s Context Principle. A consequence of the Tractarian idea is that logical truths are not expressions of thought, that they are truths without a truth-condition. In the last chapter, I spell out the epistemic implications of this idea, that an understanding of truth is accompanied by knowledge of every logical truth and that any acquisition of knowledge by experience therefore presupposes logical knowledge, meaning that logical knowledge itself cannot depend on experience or any other means of learning.Affective engagement with narrative
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27056
This thesis takes the work of psychologists James Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett on core affect and applies it to engagement with narrative. In the first part, I situate core affect in the philosophy of emotion and, drawing on the predictive-processing model of cognition, I explore valence and arousal, the two elements of core affect. The second part relies on Lawrence Barsalou’s research on situated conceptualisation to build a bridge from core affect in philosophy and psychology to affective engagement with narrative. Firstly, I argue that narratives present situated conceptualisations that readers access via their own conceptual frameworks. Secondly, I show that the way that conceptualisations are situated in the narrative can in part explain why readers affectively respond to narratives in the ways that they do. Thirdly, building on the work of R.G. Collingwood and Jenefer Robinson, I explore what it means for some narratives to express affect. In short, this thesis brings an increasingly influential theory of emotion, namely the psychological construction view of emotion, which holds that emotions are constructed out of core affect and emotion concepts, into conversation with models of affective engagement with narrative in aesthetics and offers a framework for thinking about readers’ affective responses to narratives.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZStudt, Eric MichaelThis thesis takes the work of psychologists James Russell and Lisa Feldman Barrett on core affect and applies it to engagement with narrative. In the first part, I situate core affect in the philosophy of emotion and, drawing on the predictive-processing model of cognition, I explore valence and arousal, the two elements of core affect. The second part relies on Lawrence Barsalou’s research on situated conceptualisation to build a bridge from core affect in philosophy and psychology to affective engagement with narrative. Firstly, I argue that narratives present situated conceptualisations that readers access via their own conceptual frameworks. Secondly, I show that the way that conceptualisations are situated in the narrative can in part explain why readers affectively respond to narratives in the ways that they do. Thirdly, building on the work of R.G. Collingwood and Jenefer Robinson, I explore what it means for some narratives to express affect. In short, this thesis brings an increasingly influential theory of emotion, namely the psychological construction view of emotion, which holds that emotions are constructed out of core affect and emotion concepts, into conversation with models of affective engagement with narrative in aesthetics and offers a framework for thinking about readers’ affective responses to narratives.Modal extensional mereology with an application to social groups
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27047
How does Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) interact with time and modality? In its first-order logical setting, CEM does not have the formal tools to deal with these dimensions. Nonetheless, it is often charged with endorsing controversial metaphysical theses like mereological essentialism and mereological constantism. Allowing CEM to interact with quantified modal logic (QML) without adding any further mereological commitment clarifies which modal theorems CEM actually implies and eventually undercuts wrong-headed allegations against it. From the logical side, I endorse system KTB of modal logic with constant domain semantics, but several theorems are also provable with the adoption of weaker logics (like KT and even the simplest K). We will also be able to successfully simulate variable domain semantics via the procedure of existential relativisation. From the mereological side, I necessitate the ordering axioms and the strong-supplementation axiom, leaving the door open for four different alternatives to deal with the axiom of unrestricted composition. The mereological results emerging from this setting include the necessity of extensionality principles – which does not lead to mereological essentialism – and the existence of possible fusions even when an actualist version of unrestricted composition is adopted.
In the final part of the thesis, I apply the main findings of modal extensional mereology to group membership. After showing why some standard objections are misguided, I argue that the standard account of social groups based on CEM fails to be satisfactory because it conceives group membership as just parthood. My proposal is to regard group membership as φ-parthood instead. Under this new account, social groups are not just mereological wholes, but mereological wholes with a specified understanding of the parthood relation. Endorsing this novel account allows us to retain an account of social groups based on CEM while avoiding the knockdown objections faced by the standard one.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSchirripa, GiuliaHow does Classical Extensional Mereology (CEM) interact with time and modality? In its first-order logical setting, CEM does not have the formal tools to deal with these dimensions. Nonetheless, it is often charged with endorsing controversial metaphysical theses like mereological essentialism and mereological constantism. Allowing CEM to interact with quantified modal logic (QML) without adding any further mereological commitment clarifies which modal theorems CEM actually implies and eventually undercuts wrong-headed allegations against it. From the logical side, I endorse system KTB of modal logic with constant domain semantics, but several theorems are also provable with the adoption of weaker logics (like KT and even the simplest K). We will also be able to successfully simulate variable domain semantics via the procedure of existential relativisation. From the mereological side, I necessitate the ordering axioms and the strong-supplementation axiom, leaving the door open for four different alternatives to deal with the axiom of unrestricted composition. The mereological results emerging from this setting include the necessity of extensionality principles – which does not lead to mereological essentialism – and the existence of possible fusions even when an actualist version of unrestricted composition is adopted.
In the final part of the thesis, I apply the main findings of modal extensional mereology to group membership. After showing why some standard objections are misguided, I argue that the standard account of social groups based on CEM fails to be satisfactory because it conceives group membership as just parthood. My proposal is to regard group membership as φ-parthood instead. Under this new account, social groups are not just mereological wholes, but mereological wholes with a specified understanding of the parthood relation. Endorsing this novel account allows us to retain an account of social groups based on CEM while avoiding the knockdown objections faced by the standard one.Demystifying normativity : morality, error theory, and the authority of norms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/27003
We are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The mystery fuels a radical yet prominent scepticism about the existence of normative properties: if they are too strange to actually exist, there is nothing we ought to do. Some take this to mean, moreover, that nothing is morally right or wrong. We must critically examine the ideas behind these theories, which put both morality and normativity in general on the line.
The aim of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of normativity. It uncovers and objects to the influential non-natural conception of it, arguing that we can capture normativity with natural properties. In particular, it explores how the authority of norms can be explained by the commitments of the people subject to them. In connection to this, it challenges the conceptual claim behind the view that all moral judgements are mistaken. Finally, it reveals that treating morality as a mere fiction has revolutionary practical implications. This emphasises the importance of the overall conclusion: we need not conceive of either moral or normative properties as too mysterious to exist.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZGerritsen, ElineWe are subject to many different norms telling us how to act, from moral norms to etiquette rules and the law. While some norms may simply be ignored, we live under the impression that others matter for what we ought to do. How can we make sense of this normative authority some norms have? Does it fit into our naturalist worldview? Many philosophers claim it does not. Normativity is conceived to be distinct from ordinary natural properties, making it mysterious. The mystery fuels a radical yet prominent scepticism about the existence of normative properties: if they are too strange to actually exist, there is nothing we ought to do. Some take this to mean, moreover, that nothing is morally right or wrong. We must critically examine the ideas behind these theories, which put both morality and normativity in general on the line.
The aim of this thesis is to unravel the mystery of normativity. It uncovers and objects to the influential non-natural conception of it, arguing that we can capture normativity with natural properties. In particular, it explores how the authority of norms can be explained by the commitments of the people subject to them. In connection to this, it challenges the conceptual claim behind the view that all moral judgements are mistaken. Finally, it reveals that treating morality as a mere fiction has revolutionary practical implications. This emphasises the importance of the overall conclusion: we need not conceive of either moral or normative properties as too mysterious to exist.Living on through future generations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26967
Abstract redacted
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZCecchinato, MattiaAbstract redactedRunning out of time : the temporal case against the kalam
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26961
In this dissertation, I argue that if the kalam cosmological argument works, then it must work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. I offer several arguments for thinking that the kalam does not work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. The two main versions of the A-theory, presentism and the growing block theory, are considered. Even though I argue that the growing block theorist has the greatest chance of making the kalam work, I nonetheless argue that their attempts fail for various reasons. In the end, the kalam is left unsupported by any major theory of time and is therefore vitiated.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZBray, NathanIn this dissertation, I argue that if the kalam cosmological argument works, then it must work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. I offer several arguments for thinking that the kalam does not work on either the A-theory of time or the B-theory of time. The two main versions of the A-theory, presentism and the growing block theory, are considered. Even though I argue that the growing block theorist has the greatest chance of making the kalam work, I nonetheless argue that their attempts fail for various reasons. In the end, the kalam is left unsupported by any major theory of time and is therefore vitiated.From immersion to understanding : an essay on virtual art and aesthetic cognitivism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26910
This dissertation argues against a cognitive devaluation of virtual art. By cognitive devaluation, I am referring to the charge that an art-kind is less artistically valuable than other art-kinds due to it lacking cognitive merits. I argue against this devaluation with three related arguments. The first argument says that virtual artworks can communicate perspectives which are conducive to understanding. I develop this argument by appealing to the standard features of virtual art, as well as to influential thoughts about the cognitive value of other art-kinds, especially literature. The second argument says that the cognitive value of a virtual artwork can sometimes count towards the artistic value of that artwork when appreciating that cognitive value requires appreciating the artistic success found within that artwork. The final argument shows that virtual art is not cognitively pernicious in any relevant sense, as is sometimes thought. If successful, these arguments jointly show that there is no good reason to devalue virtual art relative to other art-kinds on cognitivist grounds.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZTroesken, ColinThis dissertation argues against a cognitive devaluation of virtual art. By cognitive devaluation, I am referring to the charge that an art-kind is less artistically valuable than other art-kinds due to it lacking cognitive merits. I argue against this devaluation with three related arguments. The first argument says that virtual artworks can communicate perspectives which are conducive to understanding. I develop this argument by appealing to the standard features of virtual art, as well as to influential thoughts about the cognitive value of other art-kinds, especially literature. The second argument says that the cognitive value of a virtual artwork can sometimes count towards the artistic value of that artwork when appreciating that cognitive value requires appreciating the artistic success found within that artwork. The final argument shows that virtual art is not cognitively pernicious in any relevant sense, as is sometimes thought. If successful, these arguments jointly show that there is no good reason to devalue virtual art relative to other art-kinds on cognitivist grounds.Towards a non-uniform epistemology of modality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26897
While most theories of a modal epistemology implicitly assume, or sometimes explicitly state, a uniform picture of the epistemology of modality, in this thesis I challenge this basic assumption. I argue that there is not one single epistemology of modality for all ‘domains of discourse’. That is, there is no one single way of coming to know modal propositions with such different content as those of mathematics, logic, physics, or the empirical world. I am not attempting to show that all epistemologies of modality should be non-uniform, but instead I am arguing that three influential modal epistemologies each fail to paint a uniform picture of our epistemic access of the modal realm on their own, but taken together form a coherent non-uniform epistemology of modality.
The counterfactual theory fails to provide an adequate answer to how we attain modal knowledge of necessary mathematical and empirical propositions. These necessary truths, I argue, do not possess the relevant independence from each other to be analysable in terms of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson is forced to accept a non-uniform epistemology of modality as a result with respect to our knowledge of constitutive truths. Next, I outline Vetter’s possibility-based epistemology of modality and pose three challenges: the access problem, the problem of scope and the generalization problem. The resulting picture is a firmly non-uniform epistemology of modality on at least the level of an epistemology of circumstantial modality and, similar to the counterfactual-based account, the level of essential truths. In the last chapter of this thesis, I discuss Bob Hale’s essentialist modal epistemology. I take on board the essentialist epistemology of necessity, and focus instead on knowledge of possibility on this account. I argue that, on its own, it fails to paint a psychologically plausible picture of how we come to know obvious modal possibility knowledge but instead may plausibly be complemented by other epistemologies of modality.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZBaron, Moritz Viktor JakobWhile most theories of a modal epistemology implicitly assume, or sometimes explicitly state, a uniform picture of the epistemology of modality, in this thesis I challenge this basic assumption. I argue that there is not one single epistemology of modality for all ‘domains of discourse’. That is, there is no one single way of coming to know modal propositions with such different content as those of mathematics, logic, physics, or the empirical world. I am not attempting to show that all epistemologies of modality should be non-uniform, but instead I am arguing that three influential modal epistemologies each fail to paint a uniform picture of our epistemic access of the modal realm on their own, but taken together form a coherent non-uniform epistemology of modality.
The counterfactual theory fails to provide an adequate answer to how we attain modal knowledge of necessary mathematical and empirical propositions. These necessary truths, I argue, do not possess the relevant independence from each other to be analysable in terms of counterfactuals. I argue that Williamson is forced to accept a non-uniform epistemology of modality as a result with respect to our knowledge of constitutive truths. Next, I outline Vetter’s possibility-based epistemology of modality and pose three challenges: the access problem, the problem of scope and the generalization problem. The resulting picture is a firmly non-uniform epistemology of modality on at least the level of an epistemology of circumstantial modality and, similar to the counterfactual-based account, the level of essential truths. In the last chapter of this thesis, I discuss Bob Hale’s essentialist modal epistemology. I take on board the essentialist epistemology of necessity, and focus instead on knowledge of possibility on this account. I argue that, on its own, it fails to paint a psychologically plausible picture of how we come to know obvious modal possibility knowledge but instead may plausibly be complemented by other epistemologies of modality.Moral decision-making : essays from philosophy and economics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26584
This thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.
2023-06-12T00:00:00ZSchönegger, PhilippThis thesis investigates moral decision-making from the two disciplinary angles of philosophy and economics. Moral decision-making includes moral judgements (e.g., judgements as to the moral (im-)permissibility of actions) and moral behaviour (e.g., charitable giving). The topic choice throughout this thesis was primarily motivated by global priorities research, ranging from population ethics to effective charitable giving. The first three chapter primarily focus on experimental philosophy. In them, I (a) investigate the relationship between the dark triad personality traits, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, and narcissism and anti-natalist views, finding that those high on dark triad traits are significantly more likely to endorse anti-natalist views. I also find that this relationship is mediated by depression. Then, I (b) study reflective equilibrium behaviour in the context of population ethics, finding that in accordance with theory, concrete case judgements play a revisionary role with respect to endorsements of general moral principles. Further, I (c) argue that research in psychology and experimental philosophy has not adequately dealt with the issue of incentivisation. I then go on to conduct an empirical showcase of the Bayesian Truth Serum in this context, demonstrating impacts on response behaviour. The last three chapters focus on experimental economics. I (d) analyse charitable giving behaviour under normative uncertainty and show that randomly allocated expert advice is undervalued by donors, though can impact donation behaviour and reduce uncertainty. Then, I (e) investigate the effect of morally demanding charitable solicitations on donor behaviour, finding that while moral arguments raise donations, increases of moral demandingness do not. Lastly, I (f) analyse the predictors of donating to probabilistic and ambiguous charities as opposed to more reliable ones, failing to find an impact of risk and ambiguity uncertainty. Overall, I hope that the work presented in this thesis is able to advance global priorities research into these topics.Disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy : a pragmatic perspective
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26520
In this thesis, I offer a new perspective on the extant disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy - and, in particular, a perspective which is grounded in both the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys of David Bourget and David Chalmers (2014; and forthcoming), as well as a tradition that is often disregarded by contemporary analytic philosophers: Pragmatism. I call it “a pragmatic perspective.” Using that perspective, I work through various aspects of the existing philosophical literatures on disagreement in order to evaluate the discipline’s own. On the one hand, I clarify and extend this literature - especially, as it applies to the discipline. But, several gaps are also found and addressed, including: what pragmatic commitments and policies contemporary analytic philosophers might need to make and enact in order to address their disagreement; how disagreement might affect the possession, transferability, and vindication of various collective epistemic/rational goods (for example, collective knowledge or rational consensus); and what consequences such philosophers might be forced to face - both inside and outside of their discipline - if they are unable to possess, transfer, and vindicate all that many epistemic/rational goods. Overall, my results are more grounded conclusions regarding both the nature and extent of the disagreement within the discipline, as well as a clearer understanding of why contemporary analytic philosophers might be right to worry about it and how they might be able to resolve it.
2022-11-30T00:00:00ZPharr, Quentin ParkerIn this thesis, I offer a new perspective on the extant disagreement within contemporary analytic philosophy - and, in particular, a perspective which is grounded in both the 2009 and 2020 PhilPapers Surveys of David Bourget and David Chalmers (2014; and forthcoming), as well as a tradition that is often disregarded by contemporary analytic philosophers: Pragmatism. I call it “a pragmatic perspective.” Using that perspective, I work through various aspects of the existing philosophical literatures on disagreement in order to evaluate the discipline’s own. On the one hand, I clarify and extend this literature - especially, as it applies to the discipline. But, several gaps are also found and addressed, including: what pragmatic commitments and policies contemporary analytic philosophers might need to make and enact in order to address their disagreement; how disagreement might affect the possession, transferability, and vindication of various collective epistemic/rational goods (for example, collective knowledge or rational consensus); and what consequences such philosophers might be forced to face - both inside and outside of their discipline - if they are unable to possess, transfer, and vindicate all that many epistemic/rational goods. Overall, my results are more grounded conclusions regarding both the nature and extent of the disagreement within the discipline, as well as a clearer understanding of why contemporary analytic philosophers might be right to worry about it and how they might be able to resolve it.Title redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25773
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZLaurens, Hannah Pleunke ElizabethMulti-descriptional physicalism, level(s) of being, and the mind-body problem
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25521
The main idea of this thesis is multi-descriptional physicalism. According to it, only physical entities are elements of our ontology, and there are different ways to describe them. Higher-level vocabularies (e.g., mental, neurological, biological) truly describe reality. Sentences about higher-level entities are made true by physical entities. Every chapter will develop multi-descriptional physicalism or defend it from objections. In chapter 1, I will propose a new conceptual reductive account that conceptually reduces higher-level entities to physical entities. This conceptual reductive account combines resources from Heil’s truthmaker theory and either a priori physicalism or a posteriori physicalism. In chapter 2, I apply this conceptual reductive account to various debates. Physicalism, the multiple-realisability argument, the prototype theory of concepts, and truthmaker explanations will be discussed. In chapter 3, I will argue that a major aim of metaphysics should be to discover which entities are fundamental and explain why they suffice for the existence of derivative entities. In chapter 4, I will propose a new way to explain why sentences apparently about composite objects are true even though there are no composite objects. It combines resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy. In chapter 5, I will argue that the intuition that the mind and the body are very different does not show that the mind is distinct from the body. This intuition can be explained away by mentioning our dispositions to give non-physical explanations when we are ignorant of physical facts. In chapter 6, I will examine two arguments for the existence of a metaphysically independent level, and I will argue that only a modified version of one of them succeeds. I will argue that methodological principles support the view that there is a metaphysically independent level.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZIoannou, SavvasThe main idea of this thesis is multi-descriptional physicalism. According to it, only physical entities are elements of our ontology, and there are different ways to describe them. Higher-level vocabularies (e.g., mental, neurological, biological) truly describe reality. Sentences about higher-level entities are made true by physical entities. Every chapter will develop multi-descriptional physicalism or defend it from objections. In chapter 1, I will propose a new conceptual reductive account that conceptually reduces higher-level entities to physical entities. This conceptual reductive account combines resources from Heil’s truthmaker theory and either a priori physicalism or a posteriori physicalism. In chapter 2, I apply this conceptual reductive account to various debates. Physicalism, the multiple-realisability argument, the prototype theory of concepts, and truthmaker explanations will be discussed. In chapter 3, I will argue that a major aim of metaphysics should be to discover which entities are fundamental and explain why they suffice for the existence of derivative entities. In chapter 4, I will propose a new way to explain why sentences apparently about composite objects are true even though there are no composite objects. It combines resources from Cameron’s truthmaker theory and van Inwagen’s paraphrase strategy. In chapter 5, I will argue that the intuition that the mind and the body are very different does not show that the mind is distinct from the body. This intuition can be explained away by mentioning our dispositions to give non-physical explanations when we are ignorant of physical facts. In chapter 6, I will examine two arguments for the existence of a metaphysically independent level, and I will argue that only a modified version of one of them succeeds. I will argue that methodological principles support the view that there is a metaphysically independent level.The group right to privacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/25152
In the age of Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps, the conventional conception of privacy that focuses excessively on the identification of the individual is inadequate to safeguard an individual’s identity and autonomy, when she is targeted on the basis of her interdependent social and algorithmic group affiliations. In order to overcome these limitations, this interdisciplinary research develops a theoretical framework of the group right to privacy (GRP), which is based on privacy as a social value (Pᵥ).
The quadrumvirate formulation of GRP is articulated on the dual lines of the individual’s right as a member of a group and the right of the group itself. An individual’s interest in her social identity and her socially embedded autonomous self is protected through GRP₁. The individual’s right against algorithmic grouping, GRP₂, is motivated by an interest in group-related aspects of informational self-determination. Thirdly, I provide a non-reductionist account of instances where some organized groups may be entitled to privacy in their own right as GRP₃. Lastly, I articulate the collective interest in Mutual Privacy, understood as an aggregate participatory shared public good which is protected through GRP₄. In all four GRP, I carve out a limited exception for contact tracing by Covid-19 Apps during the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic while safeguarding against the creation of a new normal of erosion of privacy and the rise of post-pandemic simveillance.
To test its efficacy, this theoretical model is critically analysed against the technological challenges posed by Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps. I further examine international privacy legislations to highlight the way this expansive privacy model can be incorporated in the regulatory landscape. In conclusion, this thesis emphasizes that our privacy is not only interdependent in nature, but also existentially cumulatively interlinked and should be protected through the GRP.
2022-06-13T00:00:00ZPuri, AnujIn the age of Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps, the conventional conception of privacy that focuses excessively on the identification of the individual is inadequate to safeguard an individual’s identity and autonomy, when she is targeted on the basis of her interdependent social and algorithmic group affiliations. In order to overcome these limitations, this interdisciplinary research develops a theoretical framework of the group right to privacy (GRP), which is based on privacy as a social value (Pᵥ).
The quadrumvirate formulation of GRP is articulated on the dual lines of the individual’s right as a member of a group and the right of the group itself. An individual’s interest in her social identity and her socially embedded autonomous self is protected through GRP₁. The individual’s right against algorithmic grouping, GRP₂, is motivated by an interest in group-related aspects of informational self-determination. Thirdly, I provide a non-reductionist account of instances where some organized groups may be entitled to privacy in their own right as GRP₃. Lastly, I articulate the collective interest in Mutual Privacy, understood as an aggregate participatory shared public good which is protected through GRP₄. In all four GRP, I carve out a limited exception for contact tracing by Covid-19 Apps during the extraordinary circumstances of the pandemic while safeguarding against the creation of a new normal of erosion of privacy and the rise of post-pandemic simveillance.
To test its efficacy, this theoretical model is critically analysed against the technological challenges posed by Big Data Analytics and Covid-19 Apps. I further examine international privacy legislations to highlight the way this expansive privacy model can be incorporated in the regulatory landscape. In conclusion, this thesis emphasizes that our privacy is not only interdependent in nature, but also existentially cumulatively interlinked and should be protected through the GRP.Consent, epistemic equity and a revised theory of legitimacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/24467
In this thesis I argue, against prevailing wisdom in contemporary political philosophy, that consent is a sufficient ground of political legitimacy and I argue for a set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order for political consent to be valid. I call this a revised theory of consent. This theory focuses on what consenting is. It does so by arguing that what we call consent is a composite of three mental states. These are (i) recognition, (ii) trust and (iii) willingness and I argue that where (i)-(iii) are present we have consent. I then argue that this consent is valid when it is (a) suitably informed and (b) given freely. This applies in ordinary cases and in ‘high stakes’ cases.
I argue that prior versions of consent theory (what I call PCT's) have failed to demonstrate that consent is sufficient for legitimacy because they place an insurmountably high epistemic burden on consenters. I argue that subjects cannot consent in line with these theories because they cannot know enough about what their consent will authorise. I call this problem the Epistemic Challenge and I argue that in order to defeat it the authority must satisfy The Principle of Epistemic Equity. They do so through meeting the conditions of the revised theory of consent by satisfying certain epistemic and equitable conditions in order to enable subjects to give valid consent. Where these necessary conditions are met I argue that the consent given is sufficient for legitimacy.
In the final two chapters of this work I turn my attention to Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’. I argue that Raz’s theory implicitly relies on consent — as I define it — and I show that were Raz to embrace the revised theory of consent then the argument of the service conception would be strengthened.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZMacDougall, Graham DavidIn this thesis I argue, against prevailing wisdom in contemporary political philosophy, that consent is a sufficient ground of political legitimacy and I argue for a set of necessary conditions that must be satisfied in order for political consent to be valid. I call this a revised theory of consent. This theory focuses on what consenting is. It does so by arguing that what we call consent is a composite of three mental states. These are (i) recognition, (ii) trust and (iii) willingness and I argue that where (i)-(iii) are present we have consent. I then argue that this consent is valid when it is (a) suitably informed and (b) given freely. This applies in ordinary cases and in ‘high stakes’ cases.
I argue that prior versions of consent theory (what I call PCT's) have failed to demonstrate that consent is sufficient for legitimacy because they place an insurmountably high epistemic burden on consenters. I argue that subjects cannot consent in line with these theories because they cannot know enough about what their consent will authorise. I call this problem the Epistemic Challenge and I argue that in order to defeat it the authority must satisfy The Principle of Epistemic Equity. They do so through meeting the conditions of the revised theory of consent by satisfying certain epistemic and equitable conditions in order to enable subjects to give valid consent. Where these necessary conditions are met I argue that the consent given is sufficient for legitimacy.
In the final two chapters of this work I turn my attention to Joseph Raz’s ‘service conception’. I argue that Raz’s theory implicitly relies on consent — as I define it — and I show that were Raz to embrace the revised theory of consent then the argument of the service conception would be strengthened.Existence, actuality and logical pluralism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23504
This work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition, and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemology of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cognitive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of logical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds, our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subsequently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N^R, implementing its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N^R. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute attempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch. 4, we take issue with arguments to the extent that logical disputes about `exists' are genuine only if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and possibilism, and find it unwarranted.
2021-12-01T00:00:00ZRossi, AlessandroThis work considers data about the intentional nature of human cognition, and traces their consequences for debates in the philosophy and epistemology of logic, and metaphysics. The first part of this work, comprising its first three chapters, investigates the prospect of revising logic in light of de re intentionality, that is, more precisely, in light of the fact that via their cognitive abilities agents can relate to objects that do not exist. We will consider two candidate systems for logical revision, expressions of two forms of logical revisionism, and eventually motivate, from anti-exceptionalist grounds, our preference for one of them. We will start in Ch. 1 by illustrating the anti-exceptionalist methodological framework assumed in this work. Subsequently, in Ch. 2, we will discuss four classically valid principles inadequate to the data of de re intentionality, reject possible attempts, by proponents of so-called realist abstractionist theories of fiction, to deny those data, and present the system P of positive free logic. We will then go on, in Ch. 3, to illustrate the noneist programme of logical revision and a system, N^R, implementing its principles. We will thus argue from anti-exceptionalist grounds that rational theory choice is exercised by choosing N^R. The rest of the chapter is dedicated to defend a realist account about the ontological dependency of the non-existent on the existent. Ch. 4 and Ch. 5 are dedicated to refute attempts, by Timothy Williamson, to reduce disagreements about non-existent objects to cases of merely verbal disagreements. In Ch. 4, we take issue with arguments to the extent that logical disputes about `exists' are genuine only if the parties use it in deductively ways. In Ch. 5 we address his scepticism towards the dispute, about merely possible objects, between actualism and possibilism, and find it unwarranted.Structural rationality for self-governance : why we ought to have coherent sets of attitudes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23440
In this project I argue that, as agents, we have a normative commitment to avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes. To this end, I defend an amended version of Alex Worsnip’s (2020) position on normative requirements of structural rationality. After offering a more uniform account of coherence requirements for Worsnip’s project, I argue against several problem cases thought to prevent the normativity of these requirements. Finally, I advocate to recast Worsnip’s project within a constitutivist account of agency and self- governance. I argue that doing so provides the necessary framework to explain sufficiently why agents are rationally bound to normative coherence requirements.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZLiBrizzi, JacobIn this project I argue that, as agents, we have a normative commitment to avoid incoherent combinations of attitudes. To this end, I defend an amended version of Alex Worsnip’s (2020) position on normative requirements of structural rationality. After offering a more uniform account of coherence requirements for Worsnip’s project, I argue against several problem cases thought to prevent the normativity of these requirements. Finally, I advocate to recast Worsnip’s project within a constitutivist account of agency and self- governance. I argue that doing so provides the necessary framework to explain sufficiently why agents are rationally bound to normative coherence requirements.Rejuvenating democracy : age, knowledge, and the right to vote
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23356
At the core of democracy is a simple idea: one person, one vote. However, all democracies disenfranchise citizens below a certain age. What justifies this practice? The answer seems obvious: voting isn’t a children’s game. When citizens head to the ballots, a lot is at stake: who runs the government and what policies are implemented significantly affects the lives of many citizens. According to a widely held view, voting requires a certain competence that children lack. If we take this idea a little further, we may conclude that adult citizens ought to demonstrate a certain level of competence before receiving the right to vote, too. However, most contemporary political philosophers reject this “epistocratic” line of thought. Either for epistemic, moral, or pragmatic reasons, they endorse enfranchising every adult. This raises the central question of this dissertation: can we justify giving the right to vote to all and only citizens above a certain age? I argue that we cannot. To establish this claim, I assess three different voting schemes: Standard Democracy, which gives exactly one vote to all and only citizens above a certain age; Epistocratic Democracy, which gives more voting power to “politically knowledgeable” citizens; and Ageless Democracy, which gives all citizens, regardless of age, the right to cast exactly one vote in democratic procedures. First, I defend Standard Democracy against Epistocratic Democracy. This amounts to an argument that all citizens above a certain age should have equal voting rights. I then evaluate potential justifications for conceding these rights only to citizens above a certain age, and reject them. This amounts to a case for Ageless Democracy. Abandoning the voting age is both a theoretically consistent implication of rejecting Epistocratic Democracy and a practically desirable approach to reinvigorating democratic procedures.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZHinze, JakobAt the core of democracy is a simple idea: one person, one vote. However, all democracies disenfranchise citizens below a certain age. What justifies this practice? The answer seems obvious: voting isn’t a children’s game. When citizens head to the ballots, a lot is at stake: who runs the government and what policies are implemented significantly affects the lives of many citizens. According to a widely held view, voting requires a certain competence that children lack. If we take this idea a little further, we may conclude that adult citizens ought to demonstrate a certain level of competence before receiving the right to vote, too. However, most contemporary political philosophers reject this “epistocratic” line of thought. Either for epistemic, moral, or pragmatic reasons, they endorse enfranchising every adult. This raises the central question of this dissertation: can we justify giving the right to vote to all and only citizens above a certain age? I argue that we cannot. To establish this claim, I assess three different voting schemes: Standard Democracy, which gives exactly one vote to all and only citizens above a certain age; Epistocratic Democracy, which gives more voting power to “politically knowledgeable” citizens; and Ageless Democracy, which gives all citizens, regardless of age, the right to cast exactly one vote in democratic procedures. First, I defend Standard Democracy against Epistocratic Democracy. This amounts to an argument that all citizens above a certain age should have equal voting rights. I then evaluate potential justifications for conceding these rights only to citizens above a certain age, and reject them. This amounts to a case for Ageless Democracy. Abandoning the voting age is both a theoretically consistent implication of rejecting Epistocratic Democracy and a practically desirable approach to reinvigorating democratic procedures.The starry heavens above and the moral law within : Kant’s grounding of freedom in experience by way of a principle of intellectual causality, discovered in his third Critique
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/23264
Kant claims in his third Critique (1790) to have proven that the idea of freedom is scibilium, known with certainty. My aim is simply to take his claim seriously. This involves the attempt, which Kant himself suggests in the first Critique is key to properly understanding a philosopher, to form a plausible ‘idea’ of his system. I do so by interpreting it according to the end that he claims. I contend that Kant realises this claimed outcome by demonstrating the necessary effects of a purely intellectual causality in a certain kind of experience in inner sense: pleasure in beauty. This, I argue, then allows him to complete his proof of the reality of freedom. I also present evidence to suggest that Kant knew what must be involved in this proof much earlier than is generally conceded. It is also my view that this interpretation is of no detriment to the consistency of his philosophical system as a whole; in fact, it allows an understanding that fits with his claims. The arguments involved in this thesis involve opposing the majority view that certain concepts appeared first in Kant’s third Critique and must also challenge accepted perspectives on parts of Kant’s other relevant works. It will be necessary to examine aspects of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics, his empirical psychology, aesthetics, and his moral and theoretical philosophy. In such a broad body of work as Kant’s, it can be easy to become overwhelmed and lost, or even to find corroboration for views that are at odds with the general trend of his thinking. In a best attempt to avoid this, I will throughout regulate my own idea of his system and constrain my investigations by remaining conscious of his claims, i.e., by way of a thread tethered to Kant’s own claimed conclusion.
2021-06-28T00:00:00ZPaterson, Gareth HughKant claims in his third Critique (1790) to have proven that the idea of freedom is scibilium, known with certainty. My aim is simply to take his claim seriously. This involves the attempt, which Kant himself suggests in the first Critique is key to properly understanding a philosopher, to form a plausible ‘idea’ of his system. I do so by interpreting it according to the end that he claims. I contend that Kant realises this claimed outcome by demonstrating the necessary effects of a purely intellectual causality in a certain kind of experience in inner sense: pleasure in beauty. This, I argue, then allows him to complete his proof of the reality of freedom. I also present evidence to suggest that Kant knew what must be involved in this proof much earlier than is generally conceded. It is also my view that this interpretation is of no detriment to the consistency of his philosophical system as a whole; in fact, it allows an understanding that fits with his claims. The arguments involved in this thesis involve opposing the majority view that certain concepts appeared first in Kant’s third Critique and must also challenge accepted perspectives on parts of Kant’s other relevant works. It will be necessary to examine aspects of Kant’s epistemology and metaphysics, his empirical psychology, aesthetics, and his moral and theoretical philosophy. In such a broad body of work as Kant’s, it can be easy to become overwhelmed and lost, or even to find corroboration for views that are at odds with the general trend of his thinking. In a best attempt to avoid this, I will throughout regulate my own idea of his system and constrain my investigations by remaining conscious of his claims, i.e., by way of a thread tethered to Kant’s own claimed conclusion.Spatial thought and active experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21984
In the following thesis I attempt to argue that some form of activity is necessary if a subject is to be able to partake in spatial thought and undergo conceptual, spatial experience. I approach this issue by considering a thought experiment of Galen Strawson, concerning the passive creatures that he calls the 'Weather Watchers', and by attempting to demonstrate that such passive creatures could not meet certain requirements necessary for conceptual spatial awareness. I argue against the idea that such passive beings could possess spatial concepts by employing certain transcendental arguments that connect the possession of particular concepts to the having of certain sorts of experience. More specifically, I claim that in order to view oneself as located in space and to make sense of the causal relations holding between oneself and other spatial items, one must possess the concept of a material object. I argue that the possession of this concept is only available to those subjects able to actively interact in certain ways with other objects. Next, I argue that the ability to grasp the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is essential if one is to grasp that one's perceptual experience represents something other than one's own states, and that a passive subject will have no means by which it might achieve such a grasp. Parallels are drawn between this approach and that of P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. Finally, I attempt to demonstrate that the spatial content of sensation alone is inadequate for full conceptual, spatial awareness. This section draws upon Brian O'Shaughnessy's work on the body image.
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZLindsay, Christopher J.In the following thesis I attempt to argue that some form of activity is necessary if a subject is to be able to partake in spatial thought and undergo conceptual, spatial experience. I approach this issue by considering a thought experiment of Galen Strawson, concerning the passive creatures that he calls the 'Weather Watchers', and by attempting to demonstrate that such passive creatures could not meet certain requirements necessary for conceptual spatial awareness. I argue against the idea that such passive beings could possess spatial concepts by employing certain transcendental arguments that connect the possession of particular concepts to the having of certain sorts of experience. More specifically, I claim that in order to view oneself as located in space and to make sense of the causal relations holding between oneself and other spatial items, one must possess the concept of a material object. I argue that the possession of this concept is only available to those subjects able to actively interact in certain ways with other objects. Next, I argue that the ability to grasp the distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is essential if one is to grasp that one's perceptual experience represents something other than one's own states, and that a passive subject will have no means by which it might achieve such a grasp. Parallels are drawn between this approach and that of P. F. Strawson and Gareth Evans. Finally, I attempt to demonstrate that the spatial content of sensation alone is inadequate for full conceptual, spatial awareness. This section draws upon Brian O'Shaughnessy's work on the body image.Consequentialism and moral demands
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21933
The aim of this thesis is to outline a form of consequentialism which denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of our actions and practices, and of what there is most reason to do. I begin from the well-rehearsed objection to consequentialism that it is unreasonably demanding, arguing that this constitutes a good objection to the theory in its traditional form, but showing that my favoured form of consequentialism- one which limits itself to claims about value and reasons- is not susceptible to it. I discuss criticisms of consequentialism from influential work in the second half of the twentieth century, showing how the strongest objections outlined therein apply only to consequentialism as a theory of moral obligation, and not to consequentialism as a theory of value. Finally, I outline what a consequentialist should say positively about moral demands, explaining the limited role which the theory should have in shaping our moral obligations. I conclude that consequentialists should not be preoccupied with developing a distinctively consequentialist theory of moral demands.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZMcElwee, BrianThe aim of this thesis is to outline a form of consequentialism which denies the deeply unintuitive claim that we have a moral obligation to bring about the best consequences we can. Consequentialism should not be understood primarily as a theory of morality narrowly conceived as focusing on obligation, but instead as a theory of the goodness and choiceworthiness of our actions and practices, and of what there is most reason to do. I begin from the well-rehearsed objection to consequentialism that it is unreasonably demanding, arguing that this constitutes a good objection to the theory in its traditional form, but showing that my favoured form of consequentialism- one which limits itself to claims about value and reasons- is not susceptible to it. I discuss criticisms of consequentialism from influential work in the second half of the twentieth century, showing how the strongest objections outlined therein apply only to consequentialism as a theory of moral obligation, and not to consequentialism as a theory of value. Finally, I outline what a consequentialist should say positively about moral demands, explaining the limited role which the theory should have in shaping our moral obligations. I conclude that consequentialists should not be preoccupied with developing a distinctively consequentialist theory of moral demands.Revising logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21862
In this thesis I explore the prospects for the revision of classical logic through an analysis of the philosophical arguments offered for and against such change. The body of the thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One I seek to establish a general picture of logical revision. The picture provides a defence of the conceptual possibility of logical revision and an account of the ways it can work. The first chapter is concerned with the comparison of different logical systems. I offer a classification of equivalence classes of logical systems in which a difference between 'rival' and 'non-rival' systems may be articulated. The second chapter is addressed to the 'kinematics' of logic: how logical systems change. Here my principal concern has been to explain the significance of the shared content that may endure through such change. The third chapter addresses the 'dynamics' of logic, exploring the forces that bring about theory change within logic. To this end I offer an account of the broader theoretical context of logical systems, and develop an application of a methodology adequate to describe and analyse logical theory change. Part Two consists of case studies of specific logical reform proposals, and is designed to illustrate the general picture defended in Part One. Four successive chapters address the claims made on behalf of intuitionistic logic, quantum logic, relevant logic and paraconsistent logic. Collectively, the case studies serve to examine the applicability of a general account of logical revision and to explore the finer detail of a variety of different debates within especially illustrative contexts.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZAberdein, AndrewIn this thesis I explore the prospects for the revision of classical logic through an analysis of the philosophical arguments offered for and against such change. The body of the thesis is divided into two parts. In Part One I seek to establish a general picture of logical revision. The picture provides a defence of the conceptual possibility of logical revision and an account of the ways it can work. The first chapter is concerned with the comparison of different logical systems. I offer a classification of equivalence classes of logical systems in which a difference between 'rival' and 'non-rival' systems may be articulated. The second chapter is addressed to the 'kinematics' of logic: how logical systems change. Here my principal concern has been to explain the significance of the shared content that may endure through such change. The third chapter addresses the 'dynamics' of logic, exploring the forces that bring about theory change within logic. To this end I offer an account of the broader theoretical context of logical systems, and develop an application of a methodology adequate to describe and analyse logical theory change. Part Two consists of case studies of specific logical reform proposals, and is designed to illustrate the general picture defended in Part One. Four successive chapters address the claims made on behalf of intuitionistic logic, quantum logic, relevant logic and paraconsistent logic. Collectively, the case studies serve to examine the applicability of a general account of logical revision and to explore the finer detail of a variety of different debates within especially illustrative contexts.Semantic theory and sentential understanding : a discussion of tacit knowledge and compositionality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21834
This essay is an attempt to look critically at some issues arising from the idea that competent speakers of a natural language can tacitly know an extensionally correct theory of meaning for their language. In the first chapter I outline the idea that sentential understanding is to be construed as an ability, and argue that a speaker's tacitly knowing a theorem of a semantic theory should be construed as his possessing an intention to uphold the regularity prescribed by that theorem. I then go on to deal with objections that have been raised against the idea that speakers can have such tacit knowledge by Baker and Hacker, Appiah, and McDowell. In the second chapter I ask whether a similar story can be given concerning tacit knowledge of the axioms of a semantic theory, and come to the conclusion that it cannot: using modifications of arguments by Evans, Wright, and Stich, I show that speakers cannot be ascribed intentional states corresponding to semantic axioms. I then go back to argue that the ascription of such intentional states corresponding to theorems does not violate a plausible constraint on the ascription of such states. In the third chapter I look at the prospects for the use of the notion of tacit knowledge in the justification of the compositionality constraint. Beginning with Evans, I eventually come to the conclusion that tacit knowledge of a semantic theory is a sort of causal explanatory structure, to be found in the abilities which constitute language mastery : this finds expression in Davies' version of the mirror constraint. Inter alia , I sketch responses to difficulties that have been pointed out concerning this account by Wright, Davies, and Sainsbury, but conclude that there are still at least some difficulties looming which stem from the later Wittgenstein's attack on the objectivity of meaning.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZMiller, Alexander, 1965-This essay is an attempt to look critically at some issues arising from the idea that competent speakers of a natural language can tacitly know an extensionally correct theory of meaning for their language. In the first chapter I outline the idea that sentential understanding is to be construed as an ability, and argue that a speaker's tacitly knowing a theorem of a semantic theory should be construed as his possessing an intention to uphold the regularity prescribed by that theorem. I then go on to deal with objections that have been raised against the idea that speakers can have such tacit knowledge by Baker and Hacker, Appiah, and McDowell. In the second chapter I ask whether a similar story can be given concerning tacit knowledge of the axioms of a semantic theory, and come to the conclusion that it cannot: using modifications of arguments by Evans, Wright, and Stich, I show that speakers cannot be ascribed intentional states corresponding to semantic axioms. I then go back to argue that the ascription of such intentional states corresponding to theorems does not violate a plausible constraint on the ascription of such states. In the third chapter I look at the prospects for the use of the notion of tacit knowledge in the justification of the compositionality constraint. Beginning with Evans, I eventually come to the conclusion that tacit knowledge of a semantic theory is a sort of causal explanatory structure, to be found in the abilities which constitute language mastery : this finds expression in Davies' version of the mirror constraint. Inter alia , I sketch responses to difficulties that have been pointed out concerning this account by Wright, Davies, and Sainsbury, but conclude that there are still at least some difficulties looming which stem from the later Wittgenstein's attack on the objectivity of meaning.Necessity and modal systems: an essay on modal terms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21826
The purpose of this paper is to determine if our ordinary-language notions of modal terms furnish a basis for the development of modal logics, and if so, how and to what extent. I shall begin by distinguishing the "use" of a modal term and the "ground" for it. Briefly, the logical relations between statements are due to the uses of their terms, and the grounds for a statement are the reasons we would produce to justify its assertation. In Chapter One I shall distinguish five uses of modal terms, and in Chapter Two I shall enumerate a number of grounds for sentences containing modal terms. In the next two chapters I shall employ the results of Chapter One and Chapter Two in connection with the two most important problems facing modal logic: Iterated modalities and statements in which a quantifier binds a variable which is within the scope of a modal term.
1971-01-01T00:00:00ZEsterline, Albert CrawfordThe purpose of this paper is to determine if our ordinary-language notions of modal terms furnish a basis for the development of modal logics, and if so, how and to what extent. I shall begin by distinguishing the "use" of a modal term and the "ground" for it. Briefly, the logical relations between statements are due to the uses of their terms, and the grounds for a statement are the reasons we would produce to justify its assertation. In Chapter One I shall distinguish five uses of modal terms, and in Chapter Two I shall enumerate a number of grounds for sentences containing modal terms. In the next two chapters I shall employ the results of Chapter One and Chapter Two in connection with the two most important problems facing modal logic: Iterated modalities and statements in which a quantifier binds a variable which is within the scope of a modal term.A defence of Wittgenstein’s radical conventionalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21498
The first part of this thesis develops a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox, based on Wittgenstein's suggestion in the Philosophical Investigations that to follow a rule is a practice. I introduce the notion of a basic constitutive practice which I argue can account for the correctness conditions of rule-following and meaning, for indefinitely many cases and without circularity, by identifying correctness with a point on a correlated equilibrium of such a practice. The solution crucially relies on, and makes precise, the Wittgensteinian concepts of training, agreement in judgement and our form of life.
In the second part of the thesis, this solution to the paradox is applied to the problem of mathematical truth. I argue that the essence of Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein as a radical conventionalist is not Dummett's emphasis on decision, but rather the contrast with more moderate forms of conventionalism, whereby an unreduced notion of consequence is appealed to in order to move from stipulated truths to further, more remote truths. Instead of this picture, the radical conventionalist view holds that each truth is a direct expression of the convention and that there is no external criterion at all for the correctness of each step in a mathematical proof except our own practice.
By then identifying mathematical correctness with correctness in basic constitutive practices the view is able to avoid the problems that dogged moderate forms of conventionalism, e.g. Quine's regress problem, as the game-theoretic structure of such practices is able to define correctness for indefinitely many cases without appealing to anything outside itself. Finally, I argue that thus put, common and forceful arguments against radical conventionalism can be answered and conclude that it remains a viable view in the philosophy of mathematics.
2021-06-01T00:00:00ZMatthíasson, Ásgeir BergThe first part of this thesis develops a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox, based on Wittgenstein's suggestion in the Philosophical Investigations that to follow a rule is a practice. I introduce the notion of a basic constitutive practice which I argue can account for the correctness conditions of rule-following and meaning, for indefinitely many cases and without circularity, by identifying correctness with a point on a correlated equilibrium of such a practice. The solution crucially relies on, and makes precise, the Wittgensteinian concepts of training, agreement in judgement and our form of life.
In the second part of the thesis, this solution to the paradox is applied to the problem of mathematical truth. I argue that the essence of Dummett's reading of Wittgenstein as a radical conventionalist is not Dummett's emphasis on decision, but rather the contrast with more moderate forms of conventionalism, whereby an unreduced notion of consequence is appealed to in order to move from stipulated truths to further, more remote truths. Instead of this picture, the radical conventionalist view holds that each truth is a direct expression of the convention and that there is no external criterion at all for the correctness of each step in a mathematical proof except our own practice.
By then identifying mathematical correctness with correctness in basic constitutive practices the view is able to avoid the problems that dogged moderate forms of conventionalism, e.g. Quine's regress problem, as the game-theoretic structure of such practices is able to define correctness for indefinitely many cases without appealing to anything outside itself. Finally, I argue that thus put, common and forceful arguments against radical conventionalism can be answered and conclude that it remains a viable view in the philosophy of mathematics.The meaning of quantifiers and the epsilon calculus : on the logical formalization of dependence relations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21474
This work argues that the expressive and inferential powers of quantified logic are not exhausted by the classical quantifiers ∀ and ∃. Indeed, based on both the Model and Proof theoretic semantics frameworks, the work will highlight two relations of dependence as arising within formulas and inferences which are not correctly represented by the standard interpretation of ∀ and ∃. Instead, I will claim that the quantifiers ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ should be interpreted as choice functions − according to the ε-operator of the Epsilon Calculus. Finally, I will consider as a case study the Set theory formulated in the Epsilon Calculus so as to consider how the choice functions interpretation of quantifiers affects debates concerning impredicative definitions and the logical/combinatorial view of collections.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZBonatti, NicolaThis work argues that the expressive and inferential powers of quantified logic are not exhausted by the classical quantifiers ∀ and ∃. Indeed, based on both the Model and Proof theoretic semantics frameworks, the work will highlight two relations of dependence as arising within formulas and inferences which are not correctly represented by the standard interpretation of ∀ and ∃. Instead, I will claim that the quantifiers ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ should be interpreted as choice functions − according to the ε-operator of the Epsilon Calculus. Finally, I will consider as a case study the Set theory formulated in the Epsilon Calculus so as to consider how the choice functions interpretation of quantifiers affects debates concerning impredicative definitions and the logical/combinatorial view of collections.Body, brain, and situation in sensorimotor enactivism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21473
This thesis tackles issues that arise around Sensorimotor Enactivism’s (SMEn) conception of embodiment. SMEn is a theory that claims that perception is something perceivers do, that requires the possession and execution of practical knowledge about the way sensory information changes after an interaction. One of the key commitments of this view is to the idea that this knowledge—sensorimotor knowledge—depends on details of the body of the perceiver.
The thesis is divided in four parts, each addressing different challenges. Part I sets the stage for the problems that are discussed in the rest of the thesis. I examine SMEn’s claims that perception is active and knowledgeable, as well as its position regarding representations and externalism.
In Part II, I discuss the concern that SMEn is chauvinistic in that it claims that only creatures with bodies like ours can have experiences like ours. I argue that SMEn cannot be said to be chauvinistic because, even if its embodiment claim involves a commitment to an irreducibly perspectival aspect of perceptual experience, Sensorimotor Contingencies (SMCs) are structural descriptions of perceptual systems that already involve information about objects’ invariant features.
In Part III, I defend a predictive approach to SMEn to address the concern that, while it claims that perception is embodied, it leaves out one crucial element of the material basis of perceptual experience: the brain. Although the predictive framework is standardly taken to involve a representational and internalist profile, I argue in favour of the compatibility between SMEn and the Free Energy Approach (FEA).
Part IV addresses a concern that is based on the phenomenological analysis of the body, according to which the body is marked by someone’s social and historical circumstances. I argue that the predictive version of SMEn makes plausible the idea that perceptual experience is social all the way down.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZClavel Vázquez, María JimenaThis thesis tackles issues that arise around Sensorimotor Enactivism’s (SMEn) conception of embodiment. SMEn is a theory that claims that perception is something perceivers do, that requires the possession and execution of practical knowledge about the way sensory information changes after an interaction. One of the key commitments of this view is to the idea that this knowledge—sensorimotor knowledge—depends on details of the body of the perceiver.
The thesis is divided in four parts, each addressing different challenges. Part I sets the stage for the problems that are discussed in the rest of the thesis. I examine SMEn’s claims that perception is active and knowledgeable, as well as its position regarding representations and externalism.
In Part II, I discuss the concern that SMEn is chauvinistic in that it claims that only creatures with bodies like ours can have experiences like ours. I argue that SMEn cannot be said to be chauvinistic because, even if its embodiment claim involves a commitment to an irreducibly perspectival aspect of perceptual experience, Sensorimotor Contingencies (SMCs) are structural descriptions of perceptual systems that already involve information about objects’ invariant features.
In Part III, I defend a predictive approach to SMEn to address the concern that, while it claims that perception is embodied, it leaves out one crucial element of the material basis of perceptual experience: the brain. Although the predictive framework is standardly taken to involve a representational and internalist profile, I argue in favour of the compatibility between SMEn and the Free Energy Approach (FEA).
Part IV addresses a concern that is based on the phenomenological analysis of the body, according to which the body is marked by someone’s social and historical circumstances. I argue that the predictive version of SMEn makes plausible the idea that perceptual experience is social all the way down.The 'theoretical virtues' theory : towards a joint solution to the meta-descriptive and meta-normative problems
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21470
There are at least four main problems that the 'theoretical virtues' theory needs to solve. Those are the descriptive, meta-descriptive, normative, and meta-normative problems. The first two problems are about virtue discovery and its methods, and the latter two are about virtue justification and its methods. The principles constituting a solution to the descriptive problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority between the theoretical-explanatory virtues, and their combinations in various degrees, based on the considered judgments of expert natural and social scientists, and philosophers of science, on actual cases of explanatory-theory choice. The principles constituting a solution to the normative problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority that should guide the judgments of both experts and non-experts in rational explanatory-theory choice in science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning. In this study it is argued that the two meta-level problems are prior to the two lower-level problems, and also, that they are interdependent and can be solved jointly. Such a joint solution is explored with the aim of eventually solving the two lower-level problems. After evaluating the most recent solutions that have been proposed to the descriptive and normative problems, the historical philosophy of science method and experimental philosophy of science method are also evaluated for their meta-descriptive and meta-normative potential. After their limitations are examined, it is argued that as part of any adequate solution to the two meta-level problems, the concept of a ‘theoretical-explanatory virtue’ would need to be conceptually re-engineered into, one, combinations of features of explanatory theories, and, two, a set of principles that describe each feature’s and each combination’s weight in an order of epistemic priority. Finally, the proposed solution to the meta-level problems is further developed by utilizing techniques from the methods of philosophical artificial intelligence and reflective equilibrium.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZSaranteas, PanagiotisThere are at least four main problems that the 'theoretical virtues' theory needs to solve. Those are the descriptive, meta-descriptive, normative, and meta-normative problems. The first two problems are about virtue discovery and its methods, and the latter two are about virtue justification and its methods. The principles constituting a solution to the descriptive problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority between the theoretical-explanatory virtues, and their combinations in various degrees, based on the considered judgments of expert natural and social scientists, and philosophers of science, on actual cases of explanatory-theory choice. The principles constituting a solution to the normative problem need to adequately describe the order of epistemic priority that should guide the judgments of both experts and non-experts in rational explanatory-theory choice in science, philosophy, and everyday reasoning. In this study it is argued that the two meta-level problems are prior to the two lower-level problems, and also, that they are interdependent and can be solved jointly. Such a joint solution is explored with the aim of eventually solving the two lower-level problems. After evaluating the most recent solutions that have been proposed to the descriptive and normative problems, the historical philosophy of science method and experimental philosophy of science method are also evaluated for their meta-descriptive and meta-normative potential. After their limitations are examined, it is argued that as part of any adequate solution to the two meta-level problems, the concept of a ‘theoretical-explanatory virtue’ would need to be conceptually re-engineered into, one, combinations of features of explanatory theories, and, two, a set of principles that describe each feature’s and each combination’s weight in an order of epistemic priority. Finally, the proposed solution to the meta-level problems is further developed by utilizing techniques from the methods of philosophical artificial intelligence and reflective equilibrium.Attitudes first : rationality attributions and the normativity of rationality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21448
This thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent’s attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution’s robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions.
The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality’s normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality’s normativity in terms of commitment – if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZBastian, LisaThis thesis has two distinct aims. The first is to shed light on our practice of attributing rationality to others. To begin, Chapter 2 demonstrates that we cannot rely on questions of what rationality requires to make sense of this practice. Chapter 3 explores a different strategy and directly engages with rationality attributions. It lays out some desiderata for an adequate account of such attributions. Chapter 4 develops a novel account of rationality attributions. This account focusses on explicitly mentioning sets of an agent’s attitudes, and also includes a measure for the attribution’s robustness. Thanks to these features, the account meets the desiderata, and also allows for progress on persisting disagreements in the debate. Chapter 5 further illustrates the account by contrasting it with an alternative contextualist understanding of rationality attributions.
The second aim of this thesis is to defend the Normativity of Rationality. In Chapter 6, I consider problems for a reasons-based understanding of the Normativity of Rationality which arise from so-called transmission principles, and point out strategies to defend rationality’s normativity. Chapter 7 provides further support for one of these strategies. Finally, Chapter 8 presents my positive argument. I propose to understand rationality’s normativity in terms of commitment – if you are rationally required to x, you are committed to x. Commitment can avoid the counter-examples of alternative understandings in terms of reasons or ought by combining features of both notions. This makes commitment a promising normative notion in its own right.Brain death: what we are and when we die
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21308
When does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate the death of the organism in the presence of external life support. Soon the so-called brain death became the new worldwide standard. In recent years, however, doubts about this neurological criterion have been growing. Is brain death really our death? This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer. To this end, we shall connect the medical debate about the definition of death to the philosophical debate about personal identity. While we will find that the destruction of its brain does in fact not correspond to an organism’s death, we shall also ask whether the assumption that we are essentially organisms is correct. May brain death be the ceasing to exist of a different entity? Substituting clinical case reports and considerations about human physiology for the use of thought experiments, the thesis takes a novel and philosophically unconventional approach to the problem of what we essentially are. We shall analyse various pathological conditions and their respective effects on the bodily and mental characteristics of our existence. We will conclude that brain death is indeed our death – but for reasons entirely different from those cited in the original justification of this criterion.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZMeier, Lukas JostWhen does a human being cease to exist? For millennia, the answer to this question had remained largely unchanged: death had been diagnosed when heartbeat and breathing were permanently absent. Only comparatively recently, in the 1950s, rapid developments in intensive-care medicine called into question this widely accepted criterion. What had previously been deemed a permanent cessation of vital functions suddenly became reversible. A new criterion of death was needed. It was suggested that the destruction of the brain could indicate the death of the organism in the presence of external life support. Soon the so-called brain death became the new worldwide standard. In recent years, however, doubts about this neurological criterion have been growing. Is brain death really our death? This is the question that this thesis seeks to answer. To this end, we shall connect the medical debate about the definition of death to the philosophical debate about personal identity. While we will find that the destruction of its brain does in fact not correspond to an organism’s death, we shall also ask whether the assumption that we are essentially organisms is correct. May brain death be the ceasing to exist of a different entity? Substituting clinical case reports and considerations about human physiology for the use of thought experiments, the thesis takes a novel and philosophically unconventional approach to the problem of what we essentially are. We shall analyse various pathological conditions and their respective effects on the bodily and mental characteristics of our existence. We will conclude that brain death is indeed our death – but for reasons entirely different from those cited in the original justification of this criterion.Virtue education and deliberation : an Aristotelian account
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21260
Building on a philosophical reconstruction of Aristotle, this dissertation argues
for a non-intellectualist account of virtue education and practical deliberation.
This dissertation will first examine the notion of habituation. It argues that
habituation consists in immersing into a certain cultural context, through which
one will develop one’s unique ethical sense and will know what is noble and
fine. This rules out two intellectualist positions: that habituation gives us a firm
understanding of eudaimonia, and that habituation itself involves the exercise
of the practical intellect.
The non-intellectualised account of habituation is further supported by a topic-specific
study of Aristotle’s conception of children. In cultivating the seeds of
virtues that are accessible even to children, one forms evaluative appearances
about what is and what is not worth-pursuing by generalising from particular
evaluative experiences. These experiences may come from early private
education, perceptions, emotions, imitation of others’ attitudes and behaviour,
and understanding one’s friends’ decisions. These experiences help shape
one’s ethical sense.
Developing friendship (philia) appears to be ethically important, since we learn
about values through friendship, and since practical deliberation is more like
imagining conversations between individuals we are familiar with. This is in
stark contrast to the intellectualist account of excellent deliberation, which
consists in deliberating through a comprehensive conception of human values.
But ultimately, friendship is ethically indispensable because, as a form of
intimate relationship between agents of equal status, it epitomises an
Aristotelian ideal: an egalitarian ethical community. Arguably, this community
constitutes the context for habituation (immersion).
This dissertation shows how opposing positions concerning a variety of
particular issues become an opposition between two philosophical packages,
one of intellectualist and one of non-intellectualist, and why the non-intellectualist one is closer to the truth.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZChong, I XuanBuilding on a philosophical reconstruction of Aristotle, this dissertation argues
for a non-intellectualist account of virtue education and practical deliberation.
This dissertation will first examine the notion of habituation. It argues that
habituation consists in immersing into a certain cultural context, through which
one will develop one’s unique ethical sense and will know what is noble and
fine. This rules out two intellectualist positions: that habituation gives us a firm
understanding of eudaimonia, and that habituation itself involves the exercise
of the practical intellect.
The non-intellectualised account of habituation is further supported by a topic-specific
study of Aristotle’s conception of children. In cultivating the seeds of
virtues that are accessible even to children, one forms evaluative appearances
about what is and what is not worth-pursuing by generalising from particular
evaluative experiences. These experiences may come from early private
education, perceptions, emotions, imitation of others’ attitudes and behaviour,
and understanding one’s friends’ decisions. These experiences help shape
one’s ethical sense.
Developing friendship (philia) appears to be ethically important, since we learn
about values through friendship, and since practical deliberation is more like
imagining conversations between individuals we are familiar with. This is in
stark contrast to the intellectualist account of excellent deliberation, which
consists in deliberating through a comprehensive conception of human values.
But ultimately, friendship is ethically indispensable because, as a form of
intimate relationship between agents of equal status, it epitomises an
Aristotelian ideal: an egalitarian ethical community. Arguably, this community
constitutes the context for habituation (immersion).
This dissertation shows how opposing positions concerning a variety of
particular issues become an opposition between two philosophical packages,
one of intellectualist and one of non-intellectualist, and why the non-intellectualist one is closer to the truth.How to kill 999 flowers : in defence of logical monism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/21253
How many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.
2021-06-21T00:00:00ZSkinner, JamesHow many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.Disagreement, concepts and convergence : a new theory of political realist legitimacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20893
This thesis argues for a novel conception of political realism as a theory of political legitimacy: the Dual Convergent Conception. The thesis is framed by the thought that one way of theorising about political legitimacy involves working out how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order so that, despite their profound moral differences, they may live together governed by principles they have sufficient moral reason to affirm from within their own point of view. I argue that this ultimately involves making a special sort of argument that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. This is an argument with two parts. The first part involves finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. After arguing against all extant explanations of reasonable disagreement, I develop a novel explanation: Diverse Packages Theory. This explanation makes use of the idea of metalinguistic negotiation and empirical work in developmental psychology on concepts, to argue that the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice is that reasonable people possess and use diverse concepts and conceptions of justice. The second part of the Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves proposing, on the basis of Diverse Packages Theory's explanation, how all reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate and continue coordinating over time on coercive principles or rules that order society's basic institutions. I then argue that extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve this. I then argue that by combining certain elements of the political liberal view of convergent agreements, and the political realist focus on a contextually situated acceptance of coercively enforced political principles, the Dual Convergent Conception of political realism can show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.
2020-12-02T00:00:00ZSudarshan, SarangaThis thesis argues for a novel conception of political realism as a theory of political legitimacy: the Dual Convergent Conception. The thesis is framed by the thought that one way of theorising about political legitimacy involves working out how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order so that, despite their profound moral differences, they may live together governed by principles they have sufficient moral reason to affirm from within their own point of view. I argue that this ultimately involves making a special sort of argument that takes reasonable disagreement about justice seriously: a Disagreement to Legitimacy argument. This is an argument with two parts. The first part involves finding the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice. After arguing against all extant explanations of reasonable disagreement, I develop a novel explanation: Diverse Packages Theory. This explanation makes use of the idea of metalinguistic negotiation and empirical work in developmental psychology on concepts, to argue that the best explanation of reasonable disagreement about justice is that reasonable people possess and use diverse concepts and conceptions of justice. The second part of the Disagreement to Legitimacy argument involves proposing, on the basis of Diverse Packages Theory's explanation, how all reasonable people can have sufficient moral reason to coordinate and continue coordinating over time on coercive principles or rules that order society's basic institutions. I then argue that extant conceptions of political liberalism and political realism cannot show how reasonable people can achieve this. I then argue that by combining certain elements of the political liberal view of convergent agreements, and the political realist focus on a contextually situated acceptance of coercively enforced political principles, the Dual Convergent Conception of political realism can show how reasonable people can achieve a stable political order.Is it OK to make mistakes? : appraisal and false normative belief
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20854
Sometimes we make mistakes, even when we try to do our best. When those
mistakes are about normative matters, such as what is required, this leads to a
puzzle. This puzzle arises from the possibility of misleading evidence about what
rationality requires. I argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish
between two kinds of evaluation: requirement and appraisal. The strategy I
defend connects three distinct debates in epistemology, ethics, and normativity:
the debate over how our theories of epistemic rationality should accommodate
misleading evidence, the debate over the relationship between complying with
requirements and deserving particular appraisals, and the debate over whether
normative ignorance can excuse. Part 1 shows how three apparently plausible
claims about epistemic rationality generate a puzzle when agents have
misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Part 2 solves this puzzle by
distinguishing between evaluations of requirement and appraisal and rejecting
the idea that one is required to conform to the Enkratic Principle. I argue instead
that complying with the Enkratic Principle provides defeasible evidence that the
agent should be positively appraised. One of the consequences of this solution is
that false normative beliefs can sometimes excuse agents from negative appraisal
they would otherwise deserve for violating requirements. Part 3 defends the view
that false normative belief can sometimes excuse against the rival views that false
normative belief always excuses, and that false normative belief never excuses. I
argue that false normative belief can sometimes excuse violations of
requirements, when it is the case that the agent has done what it is reasonable to
expect of her.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZField, Claire AnneSometimes we make mistakes, even when we try to do our best. When those
mistakes are about normative matters, such as what is required, this leads to a
puzzle. This puzzle arises from the possibility of misleading evidence about what
rationality requires. I argue that the best way to solve this puzzle is to distinguish
between two kinds of evaluation: requirement and appraisal. The strategy I
defend connects three distinct debates in epistemology, ethics, and normativity:
the debate over how our theories of epistemic rationality should accommodate
misleading evidence, the debate over the relationship between complying with
requirements and deserving particular appraisals, and the debate over whether
normative ignorance can excuse. Part 1 shows how three apparently plausible
claims about epistemic rationality generate a puzzle when agents have
misleading evidence about what rationality requires. Part 2 solves this puzzle by
distinguishing between evaluations of requirement and appraisal and rejecting
the idea that one is required to conform to the Enkratic Principle. I argue instead
that complying with the Enkratic Principle provides defeasible evidence that the
agent should be positively appraised. One of the consequences of this solution is
that false normative beliefs can sometimes excuse agents from negative appraisal
they would otherwise deserve for violating requirements. Part 3 defends the view
that false normative belief can sometimes excuse against the rival views that false
normative belief always excuses, and that false normative belief never excuses. I
argue that false normative belief can sometimes excuse violations of
requirements, when it is the case that the agent has done what it is reasonable to
expect of her.Why more than what happens matters : robust rights and harmless wronging
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20770
This thesis examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one no harm. Call these cases of harmless wronging. These cases raise a serious problem for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is not satisfied. I offer a novel, welfare-based explanation of why we have rights against harmless wrongs, the Safety Condition. This holds that for someone to hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty. In addition to extensional accuracy, one reason for this focus on modality—on what might have been—is that it removes an objectionable form of luck from rights. And, it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this objectionable way for this requires that we, as duty-bearers, are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: that we do not only not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed them.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZBowen, JosephThis thesis examines a range of cases in which it appears one’s rights against harm are violated by another’s behaviour, even though this behaviour has done one no harm. Call these cases of harmless wronging. These cases raise a serious problem for most theories of rights, though the problem is most pronounced on the Interest Theory of Rights. According to that theory, rights necessarily protect their holder’s wellbeing. At first glance, one might think that the person’s wellbeing cannot be said to be protected by the right in cases of harmless wronging because they are not harmed in such cases—so, the necessary condition set for the ascription of a right is not satisfied. I offer a novel, welfare-based explanation of why we have rights against harmless wrongs, the Safety Condition. This holds that for someone to hold a right against us that we not perform some action, we look to whether our performing that action could easily leave them sufficiently worse off to place us under a duty. In addition to extensional accuracy, one reason for this focus on modality—on what might have been—is that it removes an objectionable form of luck from rights. And, it matters that rights do not depend on luck in this objectionable way for this requires that we, as duty-bearers, are sensitive to others’ wellbeing: that we do not only not harm others, but that we could not easily have harmed them.The dignity of persons : Kantian ethics and utilitarianism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/20205
This work is an attempt to develop a general ethical framework, the product of the synthesis of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, giving us a basic account of the dignity of persons and the structure of the moral community. There is a Kantian doctrine of human dignity, and an associated conception of the nature of morality, which together should be taken to provide the basic conceptual framework in ethical theory. However, the conception of morality implicated in the Kantian story recognises not only the dignity of human beings as moral subjects, but also the dignity (the special moral standing) of all sentient beings, who therefore count as persons for moral purposes. This is shown to be the case by means of an argument for Utilitarianism (taken as a technical view in philosophy) being consistent with the basic Kantian framework already in place, argument that involves disassociating Utilitarianism from both Consequentialism and Welfarism and construing it as an Agapist doctrine (i.e. as a philosophy of practical love or rationally-based benevolence).
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZSierra Vélez, LucasThis work is an attempt to develop a general ethical framework, the product of the synthesis of Kantian ethics and Utilitarianism, giving us a basic account of the dignity of persons and the structure of the moral community. There is a Kantian doctrine of human dignity, and an associated conception of the nature of morality, which together should be taken to provide the basic conceptual framework in ethical theory. However, the conception of morality implicated in the Kantian story recognises not only the dignity of human beings as moral subjects, but also the dignity (the special moral standing) of all sentient beings, who therefore count as persons for moral purposes. This is shown to be the case by means of an argument for Utilitarianism (taken as a technical view in philosophy) being consistent with the basic Kantian framework already in place, argument that involves disassociating Utilitarianism from both Consequentialism and Welfarism and construing it as an Agapist doctrine (i.e. as a philosophy of practical love or rationally-based benevolence).Plato on time as a cosmic phenomenon
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19958
The thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject the standard reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’ and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua living being. It follows that the creation of time – being the image of αἰών – is essential to the cosmic living being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I examine two essential aspects of Plato’s account that need further enquiry – life and structure. In Part II I focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’. In fact, αἰών and time are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world.
2020-07-27T00:00:00ZLazzarini, LorenzoThe thesis presents an original interpretation of the account of time in the Timaeus (37c6-39e2), arguing that time in Plato is best conceived of as a cosmic phenomenon. In Part I, my view is contrasted in crucial respects with the consensus reading, that focuses on the metaphysical definition (time is a moving image of eternity, 37d5) and downplays the importance of the cosmos and the planets in the creation of time. I reject the standard reading of αἰών as ‘eternity’ and take it instead as a feature that is essential to the model qua living being. It follows that the creation of time – being the image of αἰών – is essential to the cosmic living being. Time, however, is best defined as a cosmic phenomenon, because it is constituted by the living motion of the cosmos and identified with the visible revolutions of the planets. In the continuation of the thesis, I examine two essential aspects of Plato’s account that need further enquiry – life and structure. In Part II I focus on the semantic history of αἰών and argue that in Plato, αἰών acquires a paradigmatic function in relation to time, while still retaining the core of its traditional meaning as ‘lifespan’. In fact, αἰών and time are both defined by Plato as totalities of life, although αἰών consists in an undivided unity, whereas time is structured in sequences of parts composing a whole. In Part III I focus on how the planets make the periods of the cosmic soul visible and, as a consequence, display the enumerable structure of time. That structure consists in fact in the visible patterns of changing configurations the planets display. In doing so, they mark out sequences of units, whose optimality makes time the best instantiation of number in the physical world.Remember the medium! : film, medium specificity, and response-dependence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19586
Medium specificity is a theory, or rather a cluster of arguments, in aesthetics that rests on the idea that media are the physical material that makes up artworks, and that this material contains specific and unique features capable of 1) differentiating media from one another, and 2) determining the aesthetic potential and goals of each medium. As such, medium specificity is essential for aestheticians interested in matters of aesthetic ontology and value. However, as Noël Carroll has vehemently and convincingly argued, the theory of medium specificity is inherently flawed and its many applications in art history ill-motivated. Famously, he concluded that we should ‘forget the medium’ entirely. In this thesis, I reject his conclusion and argue that reconstructing a theory of medium specificity, while taking Carroll’s objections into account, is possible. To do so, I offer a reconceptualization of the main theoretical components of medium specificity and ground this new theory in empirical research. I first redefine the medium not as the physical material that makes up artworks but as sets of practices – not the material itself but how one uses the material. I then show that what makes media specific and unique is not certain physical features, but the human responses, which can be empirically investigated, to the combination of practices that constitute media. This relation is one of response-dependence, albeit of a novel kind, which I develop by appealing to social metaphysics. The resulting theory is more complex but also much more flexible and fine-grained than the original and provides insight into a variety of current aesthetic theories.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZTorregrossa, ClotildeMedium specificity is a theory, or rather a cluster of arguments, in aesthetics that rests on the idea that media are the physical material that makes up artworks, and that this material contains specific and unique features capable of 1) differentiating media from one another, and 2) determining the aesthetic potential and goals of each medium. As such, medium specificity is essential for aestheticians interested in matters of aesthetic ontology and value. However, as Noël Carroll has vehemently and convincingly argued, the theory of medium specificity is inherently flawed and its many applications in art history ill-motivated. Famously, he concluded that we should ‘forget the medium’ entirely. In this thesis, I reject his conclusion and argue that reconstructing a theory of medium specificity, while taking Carroll’s objections into account, is possible. To do so, I offer a reconceptualization of the main theoretical components of medium specificity and ground this new theory in empirical research. I first redefine the medium not as the physical material that makes up artworks but as sets of practices – not the material itself but how one uses the material. I then show that what makes media specific and unique is not certain physical features, but the human responses, which can be empirically investigated, to the combination of practices that constitute media. This relation is one of response-dependence, albeit of a novel kind, which I develop by appealing to social metaphysics. The resulting theory is more complex but also much more flexible and fine-grained than the original and provides insight into a variety of current aesthetic theories.Fiction and its objects
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19537
This thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional practice and maximally preserves the meanings of our fictional utterances. I begin by asking two questions: How can it be true of a fictional object such as Dune's Paul Atreides that he was born on the planet Caladan to the Lady Jessica (an intrafictional claim), that he was created on Earth by Frank Herbert (an extrafictional claim), and that he does not exist (a nonexistence claim)? If one or more of these is not true, then what is the nature of our assent to these three types of propositions about fictional objects? I argue that fiction's social nature and its basis in imaginative acts provides us with a dualist account of fictional objects: 'Paul Atreides' in the intrafictional and nonexistence claims refers to merely possible people while 'Paul Atreides' in extrafictional claims refers to an actual abstract artifact. I defend imagination's central role in fiction and argue that it's a norm of imagination that it models possibilities. I then define fiction as a social practice necessarily consisting in 1) acts of social imagining, 2) agreement maintained by implicit principles, 3) an aesthetic function or aim, and 4) the creation of abstract artifacts through which it achieves that aim. The result is that intrafictional claims are not assertions about the actual world, but expressions of imaginings that have as their intentional objects possible objects and states of affairs. Extrafictional claims are assertions about the actual abstract artifacts created by fictional practice that bear a picking out relation to the possibilia of fictive imaginings. Finally, nonexistence claims are assertions about the possibilia of our fictive imaginings - assertions that they are not actual. I defend the compatibility of these artifactualist and possibilist accounts and show how their union under the umbrella of a full theory of fiction both explains their intuitive appeal and solves the major issues they encounter individually.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZWatkins, Ashley EverettThis thesis develops a metaphysics of fictional objects that is embedded in a theory of fictional practice and maximally preserves the meanings of our fictional utterances. I begin by asking two questions: How can it be true of a fictional object such as Dune's Paul Atreides that he was born on the planet Caladan to the Lady Jessica (an intrafictional claim), that he was created on Earth by Frank Herbert (an extrafictional claim), and that he does not exist (a nonexistence claim)? If one or more of these is not true, then what is the nature of our assent to these three types of propositions about fictional objects? I argue that fiction's social nature and its basis in imaginative acts provides us with a dualist account of fictional objects: 'Paul Atreides' in the intrafictional and nonexistence claims refers to merely possible people while 'Paul Atreides' in extrafictional claims refers to an actual abstract artifact. I defend imagination's central role in fiction and argue that it's a norm of imagination that it models possibilities. I then define fiction as a social practice necessarily consisting in 1) acts of social imagining, 2) agreement maintained by implicit principles, 3) an aesthetic function or aim, and 4) the creation of abstract artifacts through which it achieves that aim. The result is that intrafictional claims are not assertions about the actual world, but expressions of imaginings that have as their intentional objects possible objects and states of affairs. Extrafictional claims are assertions about the actual abstract artifacts created by fictional practice that bear a picking out relation to the possibilia of fictive imaginings. Finally, nonexistence claims are assertions about the possibilia of our fictive imaginings - assertions that they are not actual. I defend the compatibility of these artifactualist and possibilist accounts and show how their union under the umbrella of a full theory of fiction both explains their intuitive appeal and solves the major issues they encounter individually.The anatomy of aesthetic experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19508
The primary aim of this thesis is to formulate an intensional definition of aesthetic experience. Its secondary aims are (i) to show how this definition might be used for empirical research and (ii) to better understand other terms that are qualified by ‘aesthetic’ (chiefly, ‘aesthetic properties’ and ‘aesthetic value’). In chapter one, I will explain the nature of the problem we face and why it demands our attention. In chapters two and three, I will critically survey positions in the literature and argue that none adequately characterise aesthetic experience. In chapter four, I will motivate and defend an intensional definition of ‘aesthetic experience’ and an art-based account of ‘aesthetic properties’. The former states, put briefly, that aesthetic experiences are those which acquire a valence when the subject attends to the content of her experience for its own sake and discerns aesthetic properties. The latter states that ‘aesthetic properties’ are those which comprise the value artworks have as works of art. In chapter five, I will use this definition of aesthetic experience to formulate the hypothesis that mindfulness training can augment one’s propensity for having rewarding aesthetic experiences of nature and everyday life. I will then propose how this hypothesis could be empirically investigated. In chapter six, I conclude by examining what my analysis of ‘aesthetic experience’ and ‘aesthetic properties’ reveals about ‘aesthetic value’. I will then, finally, highlight topics requiring further research.
2020-06-22T00:00:00ZUrsell, JamesThe primary aim of this thesis is to formulate an intensional definition of aesthetic experience. Its secondary aims are (i) to show how this definition might be used for empirical research and (ii) to better understand other terms that are qualified by ‘aesthetic’ (chiefly, ‘aesthetic properties’ and ‘aesthetic value’). In chapter one, I will explain the nature of the problem we face and why it demands our attention. In chapters two and three, I will critically survey positions in the literature and argue that none adequately characterise aesthetic experience. In chapter four, I will motivate and defend an intensional definition of ‘aesthetic experience’ and an art-based account of ‘aesthetic properties’. The former states, put briefly, that aesthetic experiences are those which acquire a valence when the subject attends to the content of her experience for its own sake and discerns aesthetic properties. The latter states that ‘aesthetic properties’ are those which comprise the value artworks have as works of art. In chapter five, I will use this definition of aesthetic experience to formulate the hypothesis that mindfulness training can augment one’s propensity for having rewarding aesthetic experiences of nature and everyday life. I will then propose how this hypothesis could be empirically investigated. In chapter six, I conclude by examining what my analysis of ‘aesthetic experience’ and ‘aesthetic properties’ reveals about ‘aesthetic value’. I will then, finally, highlight topics requiring further research.Generics, modality, and morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/19244
The issues in this dissertation reside at the intersections of, and relationships between,
topics concerning the meaning of generic generalizations, natural language modality,
the nature and role of moral principles, and the place of supererogation in the overall
structure of the normative domain. In ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I argue
that generics—exception-granting generalizations such as ’Birds fly’ and ’Tigers are
striped’—involve a covert weak necessity modal at logical form. I argue that this improves
our understanding of the variability and diversity of generics. This chapter
also argues that we can account for variability concerning normative generics within
a modal approach to generics. In ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I provide evidence
for the view that moral principles are generic generalizations, and, on the basis
of this claim, argue that moral principles do not provide adequate support for reasoning
about the moral statuses of particular cases. In ’Supererogation and the Structure
of the Normative Domain’, I investigate the diversity of the central normative modal
notions and argue that we should distinguish between two senses of supererogation
based different ways deontic modals are sensitive to background information.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZThakral, RaviThe issues in this dissertation reside at the intersections of, and relationships between,
topics concerning the meaning of generic generalizations, natural language modality,
the nature and role of moral principles, and the place of supererogation in the overall
structure of the normative domain. In ’Generics and Weak Necessity’, I argue
that generics—exception-granting generalizations such as ’Birds fly’ and ’Tigers are
striped’—involve a covert weak necessity modal at logical form. I argue that this improves
our understanding of the variability and diversity of generics. This chapter
also argues that we can account for variability concerning normative generics within
a modal approach to generics. In ’The Genericity of Moral Principles’, I provide evidence
for the view that moral principles are generic generalizations, and, on the basis
of this claim, argue that moral principles do not provide adequate support for reasoning
about the moral statuses of particular cases. In ’Supererogation and the Structure
of the Normative Domain’, I investigate the diversity of the central normative modal
notions and argue that we should distinguish between two senses of supererogation
based different ways deontic modals are sensitive to background information.Taking moral indeterminacy seriously : in defence of compatibility between moral realism and indeterminacy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18849
Moral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy without any inconsistency or incompatibility.
I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through epistemicism.
The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this regard.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZKim, JiwonMoral indeterminacy appears to be incompatible with moral realism at first glance because moral realists believe that there are objective moral facts in the world, which seem determinate. Given the commitment to objective moral facts, moral realists would want to argue that there can be a considerable amount of convergence on moral matters. However, moral disagreement is too prevalent for realists to be optimistic that there will be convergence sometime in the future. Some moral disagreements seem to remain irresolvable or even faultless. Since it is reasonable to think that moral disagreements arise because there is indeterminacy, moral realists would want to explain indeterminacy without any inconsistency or incompatibility.
I argue that moral realism is compatible with every kind of indeterminacy: metaphysical indeterminacy, semantic indeterminacy, and epistemic indeterminacy. What I contribute to indeterminacy and moral realism debate is that, in contrast with how some philosophers argue that all moral indeterminacy can be reduced to metaphysical indeterminacy or epistemicism, I argue that every kind of indeterminacy has its own place. I show that each kind of indeterminacy is helpful for moral realists to explain different types of moral disagreement: faultless moral disagreement can be explained through semantic indeterminacy; irresolvable moral disagreement can be explained through metaphysical indeterminacy; resolvable disagreement can be explained through epistemicism.
The upshot of my research is that moral realists can still uphold their tenets on moral objectivity and truth while embracing indeterminacy, the cause of disagreement, at the same time. If the strength of a metaethical theory is measured by how much explanation it can provide, my dissertation shows that moral realism wins over anti-realism in this regard.Analogy, rule-following and meaning
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18627
In this thesis, I argue that meaning something by a linguistic expression should be thought to consist,
not in following a rule, but in drawing an analogy. I argue that using a linguistic expression meaningfully
involves analogically extrapolating from our past experience of that expression, by observing a similarity
between the present instance (that which the expression is being applied to) and previous instances (our
past experiences involving the use of that expression). This is in opposition to the classical account of
meaning, according to which meaning something by a linguistic expression involves following a rule – a
rule stating necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the expression to apply. I argue that there is no
one thing that all meaningful instances of many linguistic expressions have in common, such that its
meaning could be captured in the form of a rule. I claim that the categories corresponding to our
linguistic expressions (containing the objects that any given expression is true of), are defined not in
terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but in terms of family resemblance relationships
between particular instances, such that analogy plays an essential role in every meaningful application of
a linguistic expression. I argue that metaphorical uses of linguistic expressions are clearly dependent on
analogy, and that as we are unable to uphold a principled distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical, that all meaningful uses of language should be thought to depend on analogy. I argue that
conceiving of meaning as governed by analogy, rather than rules, helps to diffuse the rule-following
paradox, laid out by Saul Kripke. I claim that the meaning of every linguistic expression is governed by
analogy, including the word ‘rule’, such that there may be scope to speak of ‘rules’ of meaning, after all.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZWilliams, Andrew SimeonIn this thesis, I argue that meaning something by a linguistic expression should be thought to consist,
not in following a rule, but in drawing an analogy. I argue that using a linguistic expression meaningfully
involves analogically extrapolating from our past experience of that expression, by observing a similarity
between the present instance (that which the expression is being applied to) and previous instances (our
past experiences involving the use of that expression). This is in opposition to the classical account of
meaning, according to which meaning something by a linguistic expression involves following a rule – a
rule stating necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the expression to apply. I argue that there is no
one thing that all meaningful instances of many linguistic expressions have in common, such that its
meaning could be captured in the form of a rule. I claim that the categories corresponding to our
linguistic expressions (containing the objects that any given expression is true of), are defined not in
terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, but in terms of family resemblance relationships
between particular instances, such that analogy plays an essential role in every meaningful application of
a linguistic expression. I argue that metaphorical uses of linguistic expressions are clearly dependent on
analogy, and that as we are unable to uphold a principled distinction between the literal and the
metaphorical, that all meaningful uses of language should be thought to depend on analogy. I argue that
conceiving of meaning as governed by analogy, rather than rules, helps to diffuse the rule-following
paradox, laid out by Saul Kripke. I claim that the meaning of every linguistic expression is governed by
analogy, including the word ‘rule’, such that there may be scope to speak of ‘rules’ of meaning, after all.Vehicle relationism : essays on samethinking and samesaying
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18564
This thesis is about the nature of samethinking and samesaying. These notions
are broad and capture various distinct but related phenomena. I will focus on
two particular understandings of ‘samethinking’, and on one particular
understanding of ‘samesaying’. Let me address samethinking first. On the first
understanding of ‘samethinking’, samethinking occurs whenever two thoughts
concern the same referent. We may distinguish between two different ways in
which this can occur. First, there are cases in which the sameness of reference is
manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two beliefs BOB DYLAN IS A
MUSICIAN and BOB DYLAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. In such cases, the sameness of
reference is transparent to the thinker in such a way that she may combine the
two beliefs in an inference and conclude directly from these two beliefs alone
that a musician won a Nobel Prize.
Second, there are cases in which two thoughts concern the same referent, but
where the sameness of reference is not manifest to the subject. Take for instance
the two thoughts BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN WON A
NOBEL PRIZE. ‘Robert Zimmerman’ is Bob Dylan’s birth name, so the two
thoughts concern the same individual. However, unless the thinker has a further
belief to the effect that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman, she may not rationally
infer from these beliefs that a musician won a Nobel Prize. We see, then, that two
pairs of thoughts that are referentially equivalent may nonetheless play different
roles in cognition. In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how to understand the
difference between cases of samethinking such as those above.
The second understanding of ‘samethinking’ that I will discuss in this thesis is a
broader phenomenon. Two thoughts, typically entertained by distinct
individuals or the same individual at different times, can be said to concern the
same subject matter despite differing in their overall semantic properties.
Likewise, it seems that two utterances may concern the same topic despite
differing in their overall semantic properties. Consider for instance someone
uttering the sentence “Whales are fish” in the 18th century, where such an
utterance would generally be regarded as true. If someone today were to utter
the same sentence, however, we would regard it as false. We have reason to
think that the meaning of the term ‘fish’ has changed between then and now.
Even if this is the case, it seems as though the 18th-century person and the
current day individual are, in an interesting way, talking about the same topic
when uttering the sentence. This is the notion of ‘samesaying’ I will address in
this thesis. I shed light on what it is for two thoughts or two utterances to be the
same in this way.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZVikesdal, Sara KasinThis thesis is about the nature of samethinking and samesaying. These notions
are broad and capture various distinct but related phenomena. I will focus on
two particular understandings of ‘samethinking’, and on one particular
understanding of ‘samesaying’. Let me address samethinking first. On the first
understanding of ‘samethinking’, samethinking occurs whenever two thoughts
concern the same referent. We may distinguish between two different ways in
which this can occur. First, there are cases in which the sameness of reference is
manifest to the subject. Take for instance the two beliefs BOB DYLAN IS A
MUSICIAN and BOB DYLAN WON A NOBEL PRIZE. In such cases, the sameness of
reference is transparent to the thinker in such a way that she may combine the
two beliefs in an inference and conclude directly from these two beliefs alone
that a musician won a Nobel Prize.
Second, there are cases in which two thoughts concern the same referent, but
where the sameness of reference is not manifest to the subject. Take for instance
the two thoughts BOB DYLAN IS A MUSICIAN and ROBERT ZIMMERMAN WON A
NOBEL PRIZE. ‘Robert Zimmerman’ is Bob Dylan’s birth name, so the two
thoughts concern the same individual. However, unless the thinker has a further
belief to the effect that Bob Dylan is Robert Zimmerman, she may not rationally
infer from these beliefs that a musician won a Nobel Prize. We see, then, that two
pairs of thoughts that are referentially equivalent may nonetheless play different
roles in cognition. In this thesis, I offer a novel account of how to understand the
difference between cases of samethinking such as those above.
The second understanding of ‘samethinking’ that I will discuss in this thesis is a
broader phenomenon. Two thoughts, typically entertained by distinct
individuals or the same individual at different times, can be said to concern the
same subject matter despite differing in their overall semantic properties.
Likewise, it seems that two utterances may concern the same topic despite
differing in their overall semantic properties. Consider for instance someone
uttering the sentence “Whales are fish” in the 18th century, where such an
utterance would generally be regarded as true. If someone today were to utter
the same sentence, however, we would regard it as false. We have reason to
think that the meaning of the term ‘fish’ has changed between then and now.
Even if this is the case, it seems as though the 18th-century person and the
current day individual are, in an interesting way, talking about the same topic
when uttering the sentence. This is the notion of ‘samesaying’ I will address in
this thesis. I shed light on what it is for two thoughts or two utterances to be the
same in this way.When others fail to comply : Kant on revolution, self-defence, and lying
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/18339
According to a prominent line of interpretation, Kantians must sometimes choose between leaving individuals defenceless against evil or developing strategies to mitigate the stringency of duties in the face of others’ bad intentions. The thesis reacts to this setup, which unduly privileges Kant’s early critical moral theory at the expense of his mature system. In particular, it vindicates the relevance of Kant’s legal-political philosophy by discussing three cases where others’ noncompliance seems to ground exceptions to duties: political revolution, self-defence, and defensive lying. In addition to considering neglected yet significant passages from Kant, it makes the following main contributions. Chapter 1 analyses Kant’s state of nature as a systemic, inter-individual problem of noncompliance, suggesting that Kant’s political solution (exiting the state of nature) leads to a different version of the problem, involving citizens and sovereign. Turning to political revolution, Chapter 2 introduces an issue affecting both restricted and unrestricted interpretations of its prohibition: while, for Kant, supreme de facto power is at least a necessary condition for a state’s legitimacy, such supremacy is never conclusively established. The chapter also discusses the role of lex permissiva in state foundation, arguing against employing it to justify revolts by introducing a test for principles of non-contingent moral progress. Chapter 3 focuses on self-defence. After examining it in connection to the alleged right of necessity, it explores its juridical and ethical dimensions, with a particular focus on the issue of moderation. It makes room for a narrow state-enforced limitation on defence of individuals’ rights vis-à-vis one another, and, together with Chapter 1, advances a Kantian analysis of violence as unilateral exercise of force or immoderate self-defence. Chapter 4 discusses in detail Kant’s arguments against lying and his 1797 essay On an Alleged Right to Lie. Together with Chapter 3, it highlights Kant’s different attitudes toward the morality of defensive lying and force, putting his verdict on Inquiring Murderer in due philosophical perspective. Building on Chapter 2, it provides an account of how a lie wrongs “humanity as such”, vindicating Kant’s commitment to the idea that progress must happen in principle and on principle.
2019-12-04T00:00:00ZLo Re, StefanoAccording to a prominent line of interpretation, Kantians must sometimes choose between leaving individuals defenceless against evil or developing strategies to mitigate the stringency of duties in the face of others’ bad intentions. The thesis reacts to this setup, which unduly privileges Kant’s early critical moral theory at the expense of his mature system. In particular, it vindicates the relevance of Kant’s legal-political philosophy by discussing three cases where others’ noncompliance seems to ground exceptions to duties: political revolution, self-defence, and defensive lying. In addition to considering neglected yet significant passages from Kant, it makes the following main contributions. Chapter 1 analyses Kant’s state of nature as a systemic, inter-individual problem of noncompliance, suggesting that Kant’s political solution (exiting the state of nature) leads to a different version of the problem, involving citizens and sovereign. Turning to political revolution, Chapter 2 introduces an issue affecting both restricted and unrestricted interpretations of its prohibition: while, for Kant, supreme de facto power is at least a necessary condition for a state’s legitimacy, such supremacy is never conclusively established. The chapter also discusses the role of lex permissiva in state foundation, arguing against employing it to justify revolts by introducing a test for principles of non-contingent moral progress. Chapter 3 focuses on self-defence. After examining it in connection to the alleged right of necessity, it explores its juridical and ethical dimensions, with a particular focus on the issue of moderation. It makes room for a narrow state-enforced limitation on defence of individuals’ rights vis-à-vis one another, and, together with Chapter 1, advances a Kantian analysis of violence as unilateral exercise of force or immoderate self-defence. Chapter 4 discusses in detail Kant’s arguments against lying and his 1797 essay On an Alleged Right to Lie. Together with Chapter 3, it highlights Kant’s different attitudes toward the morality of defensive lying and force, putting his verdict on Inquiring Murderer in due philosophical perspective. Building on Chapter 2, it provides an account of how a lie wrongs “humanity as such”, vindicating Kant’s commitment to the idea that progress must happen in principle and on principle.Propositional unity and representation : theories of judgement from Kant to Wittgenstein
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17925
The aim of the thesis is to provide a fresh look at the beginning of the British analytic
tradition, represented by early G. E. Moore and B. Russell and later by a young L. Wittgenstein,
and emphasize especially the way in which this tradition was influenced by Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology in general, and the notion of judgment in particular. In
doing so, I open my account by focusing on how Moore’s ground-breaking notion of a
“proposition” as a mentally-independent entity emerged out of his critical reflections on Kant’s
account of judgment as a mental activity of bringing representations under the unity of
transcendental apperception. Subsequently, I present Russell as adopting this notion of a
proposition, providing a thoroughgoing analysis of it and, after discovering its philosophical
shortcomings, finally abandoning it in favour of his multiple relation theory of judgment. Based
on the detailed description of the nature and changes within Russell’s multiple relation theory,
I then attempt to disentangle Wittgenstein’s famous, oft discussed argument against it and
introduce the notion of a “proposition” from the Tractatus as Wittgenstein’s attempt at the more
appropriate theory of judgment. Eventually, I illuminate how the approaches to judgement and
proposition under consideration may all be considered particular responses to Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology, something I do by paying attention in particular to the
notions of unity of single propositions and judgments as opposed to the overall unity within the
body of all propositions or judgments.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZDankova, ZuzanaThe aim of the thesis is to provide a fresh look at the beginning of the British analytic
tradition, represented by early G. E. Moore and B. Russell and later by a young L. Wittgenstein,
and emphasize especially the way in which this tradition was influenced by Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology in general, and the notion of judgment in particular. In
doing so, I open my account by focusing on how Moore’s ground-breaking notion of a
“proposition” as a mentally-independent entity emerged out of his critical reflections on Kant’s
account of judgment as a mental activity of bringing representations under the unity of
transcendental apperception. Subsequently, I present Russell as adopting this notion of a
proposition, providing a thoroughgoing analysis of it and, after discovering its philosophical
shortcomings, finally abandoning it in favour of his multiple relation theory of judgment. Based
on the detailed description of the nature and changes within Russell’s multiple relation theory,
I then attempt to disentangle Wittgenstein’s famous, oft discussed argument against it and
introduce the notion of a “proposition” from the Tractatus as Wittgenstein’s attempt at the more
appropriate theory of judgment. Eventually, I illuminate how the approaches to judgement and
proposition under consideration may all be considered particular responses to Kant’s
transcendental-idealistic epistemology, something I do by paying attention in particular to the
notions of unity of single propositions and judgments as opposed to the overall unity within the
body of all propositions or judgments.What justifies belief? : probability, normalcy, and the functional theory
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17919
‘What justifies belief?’ This question is arguably one of the most important questions
in contemporary epistemology. The first part of this study looks at two very different
answers to the above question, but ultimately finds both of them wanting. According
to probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that makes a belief justified is
some property along the lines of being highly probable. I call this picture of
justification the Lockean View. In contrast, according to the most prominent non-
probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that justifies belief is some
property along the lines of being true in all normal worlds. I call this non-probabilistic
picture of justification the Normalcy View. However, as we will see, both families of
views turn out to be problematic. While probabilistic accounts are incompatible with
an attractive principle called multi premise closure (MPC), non-probabilistic
accounts, I argue, are too demanding and therefore too stingy. This leaves us in a
dilemma; neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts of justification seem to
be wholly satisfactory. I call this the (MPC)-Stinginess Dilemma.
The second part of this study is concerned with how we should respond to this
dilemma. After considering but rejecting some initial options, I argue that the dilemma
can be avoided if we reject the almost universally accepted monist assumption that
there is only one way for a belief to be justified; or, that there is only one property that
can make a belief justified. Subsequently I develop and defend a novel, pluralist,
theory of epistemic justification. I call it the Functional Theory of Justification. One
upshot of the functional theory is that it makes room for the idea that there is more
than one way for a belief to be justified; or, more precisely, that depending on our
epistemic environment, justification can be realized by different properties.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZBackes, Marvin‘What justifies belief?’ This question is arguably one of the most important questions
in contemporary epistemology. The first part of this study looks at two very different
answers to the above question, but ultimately finds both of them wanting. According
to probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that makes a belief justified is
some property along the lines of being highly probable. I call this picture of
justification the Lockean View. In contrast, according to the most prominent non-
probabilistic accounts of justification, the property that justifies belief is some
property along the lines of being true in all normal worlds. I call this non-probabilistic
picture of justification the Normalcy View. However, as we will see, both families of
views turn out to be problematic. While probabilistic accounts are incompatible with
an attractive principle called multi premise closure (MPC), non-probabilistic
accounts, I argue, are too demanding and therefore too stingy. This leaves us in a
dilemma; neither probabilistic nor non-probabilistic accounts of justification seem to
be wholly satisfactory. I call this the (MPC)-Stinginess Dilemma.
The second part of this study is concerned with how we should respond to this
dilemma. After considering but rejecting some initial options, I argue that the dilemma
can be avoided if we reject the almost universally accepted monist assumption that
there is only one way for a belief to be justified; or, that there is only one property that
can make a belief justified. Subsequently I develop and defend a novel, pluralist,
theory of epistemic justification. I call it the Functional Theory of Justification. One
upshot of the functional theory is that it makes room for the idea that there is more
than one way for a belief to be justified; or, more precisely, that depending on our
epistemic environment, justification can be realized by different properties.An investigation into Moritz Schlick's foundationalist epistemology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17818
Moritz Schlick is an influential figure in the history of philosophy, but his place in the narrative is often confined to having been the man who brought great thinkers together, rather than having been a great thinker himself. In this thesis I argue that Schlick’s ideas deserve greater philosophical recognition, and to this end I focus on his work on the foundations of scientific enquiry. I trace Schlick’s thought from Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre through the prism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and into his later work on the form and content of statements. I then look at the Vienna Circle’s so-called “protocol sentences debate” and explain why Schlick felt the need to introduce his controversial account of Konstatierungen, his objective being to find epistemically-guaranteed foundations for our scientific beliefs. The problem with Schlick’s account appears to be that any statement that is epistemically secure cannot be connected appropriately to our network of scientific beliefs, which itself is never immune to revision. I argue that Schlick may have been attempting to bridge this gap with the middle-Wittgensteinian notion of the criteria for the acceptance of a statement as separate from its truth conditions, but I argue that this approach leaves the link between Konstatierungen and science underexplained. Finally, I consider some of the advances made in philosophy since Schlick’s death – Donald Davidson’s arguments against the need for individually-infallible judgements to form the foundations of knowledge, and David Chalmers’ scrutability framework which helps us explicate the connection needed between foundational statements and the system of science. I conclude that there is a viable position within the scrutability framework – “weak phenomenal structuralism” – that allows us to retain Schlick’s emphasis on the role of experience in science and implies that science, as a whole, is well-founded, but individually-guaranteed Konstatierungen must stand wholly outside this system.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZHealey, Daniel JamesMoritz Schlick is an influential figure in the history of philosophy, but his place in the narrative is often confined to having been the man who brought great thinkers together, rather than having been a great thinker himself. In this thesis I argue that Schlick’s ideas deserve greater philosophical recognition, and to this end I focus on his work on the foundations of scientific enquiry. I trace Schlick’s thought from Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre through the prism of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and into his later work on the form and content of statements. I then look at the Vienna Circle’s so-called “protocol sentences debate” and explain why Schlick felt the need to introduce his controversial account of Konstatierungen, his objective being to find epistemically-guaranteed foundations for our scientific beliefs. The problem with Schlick’s account appears to be that any statement that is epistemically secure cannot be connected appropriately to our network of scientific beliefs, which itself is never immune to revision. I argue that Schlick may have been attempting to bridge this gap with the middle-Wittgensteinian notion of the criteria for the acceptance of a statement as separate from its truth conditions, but I argue that this approach leaves the link between Konstatierungen and science underexplained. Finally, I consider some of the advances made in philosophy since Schlick’s death – Donald Davidson’s arguments against the need for individually-infallible judgements to form the foundations of knowledge, and David Chalmers’ scrutability framework which helps us explicate the connection needed between foundational statements and the system of science. I conclude that there is a viable position within the scrutability framework – “weak phenomenal structuralism” – that allows us to retain Schlick’s emphasis on the role of experience in science and implies that science, as a whole, is well-founded, but individually-guaranteed Konstatierungen must stand wholly outside this system.Why there can be a human right to internet access
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17802
In this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to claim a standalone natural human right to internet access. The central argument is in Chapter II. I start my argument by analysing the issue of trans-historical universality of human rights. Human rights are traditionally defined as rights possessed by all human beings in all places at all times. It is claimed that if a human right to X was not possible in the past due to X having been unavailable at that past time, then — on pain of contradicting the universality of human rights — there cannot be a human right to X now, and such human right claim is invalid. If the internet as a historically contingent invention was not available in the past, then there cannot be a human right to internet access. I refute this challenge in chapter II, particularly in section 2.1 and 2.3. On this basis, I develop a framework based on the concept ‘harm’ which I call Theory Alpha (in section 2.5). I argue that Theory Alpha, with its Human Rights Generation Conditionals, provides a philosophical ground to justify human rights such as a right to internet access in a naturalistic approach. Chapter III, by reflecting on the current world, provides some reasons why a human right to internet access is possible according to Theory Alpha. Chapter IV addresses potential objections and issues regarding my Theory Alpha. Particularly, section 4.2 deals with how Theory Alpha would solve the issue concerning universality of human rights. I provide a more detailed preview of the dissertation in section 1.3. I conclude that Theory Alpha provides satisfactory answers to some important questions about human rights and supports that there can be a human right to internet access.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZHuang, ZhengyueIn this dissertation, I argue that it is possible to claim a standalone natural human right to internet access. The central argument is in Chapter II. I start my argument by analysing the issue of trans-historical universality of human rights. Human rights are traditionally defined as rights possessed by all human beings in all places at all times. It is claimed that if a human right to X was not possible in the past due to X having been unavailable at that past time, then — on pain of contradicting the universality of human rights — there cannot be a human right to X now, and such human right claim is invalid. If the internet as a historically contingent invention was not available in the past, then there cannot be a human right to internet access. I refute this challenge in chapter II, particularly in section 2.1 and 2.3. On this basis, I develop a framework based on the concept ‘harm’ which I call Theory Alpha (in section 2.5). I argue that Theory Alpha, with its Human Rights Generation Conditionals, provides a philosophical ground to justify human rights such as a right to internet access in a naturalistic approach. Chapter III, by reflecting on the current world, provides some reasons why a human right to internet access is possible according to Theory Alpha. Chapter IV addresses potential objections and issues regarding my Theory Alpha. Particularly, section 4.2 deals with how Theory Alpha would solve the issue concerning universality of human rights. I provide a more detailed preview of the dissertation in section 1.3. I conclude that Theory Alpha provides satisfactory answers to some important questions about human rights and supports that there can be a human right to internet access.Kantian constructivism : a restatement
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17374
This thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person.
By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority.
Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZSchaab, Janis DavidThis thesis provides a restatement of Kantian constructivism, with the aim of avoiding some of the objections and clearing up some of the ambiguities that have haunted previous versions of the view. I restate Kantian constructivism as the view that morality’s normativity has its source in the form of second-personal reasoning, a mode of practical reasoning in which we engage when we address demands person-to-person.
By advancing a position about the source of moral normativity, Kantian constructivism addresses a metaethical question, albeit one that is distinct from the questions that many traditional metaethical positions, such as moral realism, focus on. Kantian constructivism has an advantage over competing views of the source of moral normativity when it comes to answering the so-called Normative Question, which I interpret as the question of why we are rationally required to do what we take to be our moral obligation. Kantian constructivism can answer this question because, unlike its competitors, it does not conceive of practical reason as a receptive faculty that is determined by external inputs. Instead, it regards the very form of second-personal reasoning as grounding the fact that morality is normative, thus explaining morality’s rational authority.
Although second-personal reasoning is fundamentally distinct from the merely first-personal mode of reasoning that we must engage in insofar as we are agents, all those agents whom we would ordinarily consider bound by moral obligations seem to engage in it. Indeed, although it involves irreducibly second-personal notions, such as accountability and the authority to address legitimate demands, second-personal reasoning is not to be mistaken for a social practice. Instead, it can be applied to purely self-regarding contexts, such as that of committing oneself to a personal project and thereby holding oneself accountable for pursuing it, as well as to interactions with others.Quantifier expressions and information structure
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17137
Linguists and philosophers of language have shown increasing interest in the expressions that refer to quantifiers: determiners like ‘every’ and ‘many’, in addition to determiner phrases like ‘some king’ and ‘no cat’. This thesis addresses several puzzles where the way we understand quantifier expressions depends on features that go beyond standard truth conditional semantic meaning.
One puzzle concerns the fact that it is often natural to understand ‘Every king is in the yard’ as being true if (say) all of the kings at the party are in the yard, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be true if and only if every king in the universe is in the yard. Another puzzle emerges from the observation that ‘Every American king is in the yard’ sounds odd relative to contexts where there are no American kings, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be trivially true. These puzzles have been widely discussed within linguistics and philosophy of language, and have implications for topics as diverse as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the ontological commitments of ordinary individuals. Yet few attempts have been made to incorporate discussions from the linguistics literature into the philosophical literature. This thesis argues that attending to the linguistics literature helps to address these puzzles. In particular, my solutions to these puzzles rely on notions from work on information structure, an often overlooked area of linguistics. I will use these notions to develop a new theory of the pragmatics of ordinary discourse, in the process of resolving the puzzles.
In the first two chapters, I provide accessible overviews of key notions from the literature on quantifier expressions and information structure. In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of contextual domain restriction. In the fourth chapter, I consider the problems posed by empty restrictors. In the final chapter, I tackle the issue of category mistakes.
2019-06-24T00:00:00ZMankowitz, PoppyLinguists and philosophers of language have shown increasing interest in the expressions that refer to quantifiers: determiners like ‘every’ and ‘many’, in addition to determiner phrases like ‘some king’ and ‘no cat’. This thesis addresses several puzzles where the way we understand quantifier expressions depends on features that go beyond standard truth conditional semantic meaning.
One puzzle concerns the fact that it is often natural to understand ‘Every king is in the yard’ as being true if (say) all of the kings at the party are in the yard, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be true if and only if every king in the universe is in the yard. Another puzzle emerges from the observation that ‘Every American king is in the yard’ sounds odd relative to contexts where there are no American kings, even though the standard truth conditions predict it to be trivially true. These puzzles have been widely discussed within linguistics and philosophy of language, and have implications for topics as diverse as the distinction between semantics and pragmatics and the ontological commitments of ordinary individuals. Yet few attempts have been made to incorporate discussions from the linguistics literature into the philosophical literature. This thesis argues that attending to the linguistics literature helps to address these puzzles. In particular, my solutions to these puzzles rely on notions from work on information structure, an often overlooked area of linguistics. I will use these notions to develop a new theory of the pragmatics of ordinary discourse, in the process of resolving the puzzles.
In the first two chapters, I provide accessible overviews of key notions from the literature on quantifier expressions and information structure. In the third chapter, I discuss the problem of contextual domain restriction. In the fourth chapter, I consider the problems posed by empty restrictors. In the final chapter, I tackle the issue of category mistakes.Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17082
In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.
2018-02-17T00:00:00ZMcGrath, MatthewIn recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.Is Weak Supplementation analytic?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16818
Mereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic—constitutive of our notion of proper parthood—and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I’ll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I’ll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of ‘analyticity’. I’ll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.
The research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a 2017-2018 Leverhulme Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.
2021-08-01T00:00:00ZCotnoir, AaronMereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic—constitutive of our notion of proper parthood—and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I’ll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I’ll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of ‘analyticity’. I’ll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.Refugee law and states' obligations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16743
The current legal definition of the term ‘refugee’ fails to recognise the centrality of refugees’ hardship and in doing so draws morally arbitrary distinctions between different types of refugees. I use Wiggins’ 1987 paper to give us reason to think that hardship ought to be central to morality. From here I make hardship the core of a modified legal definition of the term ‘refugee’. Then I explore moral obligations that states have to refugees in virtue of their hardship. First, I ask whom states are obligated to and show that the only morally relevant distinguishing feature between refugees is the ‘level’ of hardship they experience. Second, I ask what kinds of moral and legal obligations states have to refugees. I argue that states’ moral obligations to ‘give refuge’ are perfect duties and that states’ legal obligations differ for different types of refugees.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZWalker, JessicaThe current legal definition of the term ‘refugee’ fails to recognise the centrality of refugees’ hardship and in doing so draws morally arbitrary distinctions between different types of refugees. I use Wiggins’ 1987 paper to give us reason to think that hardship ought to be central to morality. From here I make hardship the core of a modified legal definition of the term ‘refugee’. Then I explore moral obligations that states have to refugees in virtue of their hardship. First, I ask whom states are obligated to and show that the only morally relevant distinguishing feature between refugees is the ‘level’ of hardship they experience. Second, I ask what kinds of moral and legal obligations states have to refugees. I argue that states’ moral obligations to ‘give refuge’ are perfect duties and that states’ legal obligations differ for different types of refugees.Personal identity and practical reason
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16607
In this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZHummel, Patrik AlexanderIn this thesis, I argue that the interdependence between personal identity and practical concerns is overstated. In paradigmatic places where philosophers and common sense suggest that personal identity constrains how we should reason and care, or vice versa, the two spheres are in fact neutral to each other. I defend this claim by considering four specific cases. First, a rough characterization of the distinction between the complex and the simple view is that the former takes personal identity to consist in other relations, whereas the latter does not. I argue that the extreme claim according to which the complex view fails to give reasons for future-directed concern can be resisted. We maintain forward-looking attitudes and projects not because someone will be us, but because we relate to future selves in other, more important ways. Second, I argue that intuitions in a range of popular imaginary cases are contaminated by practical concerns whose relevance for personal identity is far from straightforward. Third, I argue that on a closer look, the complex versus simple distinction is confused. It thus cannot be what grounds differences in judgements on what matters. Debates about personal identity should be framed in terms of better understood notions. Finally, I argue that it is not a constraint on rational transformative choice that decision-maker and transforming individual are identical. Moreover, whether we are deciding for ourselves or for others - the importance of informed consent for transformative treatments is not diminished by the decision-maker's failure to projectively imagine the outcomes.Invariance and intensionality : new perspectives on logicality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16573
What are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations or isomorphisms. The first chapter is about extending “invariance” accounts of logicality to intensional notions, by asking for invariance under arbitrary permutations of both possible worlds and objects. I discuss the results one gets in this extended theory of invariance, and how to fix many technical issues.
The second chapter is about setting out a better theory of logicality. I discuss the limits of invariance frameworks, and the need for a theory of logicality with a more solid philosophical ground. I believe that the concept of information can play a major role in defining what logic is and what logical notions are. I spell out this intuition, by designing a new test for logicality. A notion is logical iff it behaves in a certain way, by checking only “structural aspects of information”, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of its “informational inputs”.
In the last chapter I explore some interesting features of my theory. I show how, contrary to standard invariance, in mine logical notions tend to stay persistent across different models of information. I also spell out an intermediate notion of quasi-logicality to make sense of the formality of “world-sensitive” notions: notions whose behaviour changes across worlds. I finally propose a case study: deontic modals. I discuss how one can argue for their quasi-logicality, in my framework. The dissertation is concluded with a technical appendix, in which I prove that my theory is a restriction of standard permutation invariance (at least for a class of items) when we model the space of information in a certain way: as a set of complete powersets of some sets.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZGrossi, MarcoWhat are logical notions? According to a very popular proposal, a logical notion is something invariant under some “transformation” of objects, usually permutations or isomorphisms. The first chapter is about extending “invariance” accounts of logicality to intensional notions, by asking for invariance under arbitrary permutations of both possible worlds and objects. I discuss the results one gets in this extended theory of invariance, and how to fix many technical issues.
The second chapter is about setting out a better theory of logicality. I discuss the limits of invariance frameworks, and the need for a theory of logicality with a more solid philosophical ground. I believe that the concept of information can play a major role in defining what logic is and what logical notions are. I spell out this intuition, by designing a new test for logicality. A notion is logical iff it behaves in a certain way, by checking only “structural aspects of information”, and it does so under arbitrary transformations of its “informational inputs”.
In the last chapter I explore some interesting features of my theory. I show how, contrary to standard invariance, in mine logical notions tend to stay persistent across different models of information. I also spell out an intermediate notion of quasi-logicality to make sense of the formality of “world-sensitive” notions: notions whose behaviour changes across worlds. I finally propose a case study: deontic modals. I discuss how one can argue for their quasi-logicality, in my framework. The dissertation is concluded with a technical appendix, in which I prove that my theory is a restriction of standard permutation invariance (at least for a class of items) when we model the space of information in a certain way: as a set of complete powersets of some sets.The dual nature of causation : two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16561
In this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows:
Causation: 𝘤 is a cause of 𝘦 within a possibility horizon ℋ iff
a) 𝘤 is process-connected to 𝘦, and
b) 𝘦 security-depends on 𝘤 within ℋ.
More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – the cause 𝘤 and the effect 𝘦 – and a possibility horizon ℋ.
I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect.
The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in Chapter 6) – captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).
The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in Chapter 8) – captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10).
Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 11).
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZTouborg, Caroline TorpeIn this dissertation, I propose a reductive account of causation. This account may be stated as follows:
Causation: 𝘤 is a cause of 𝘦 within a possibility horizon ℋ iff
a) 𝘤 is process-connected to 𝘦, and
b) 𝘦 security-depends on 𝘤 within ℋ.
More precisely, my suggestion is that there are two kinds of causal relata: instantaneous events (defined in Chapter 4) and possibility horizons (defined in Chapter 5). Causation is a ternary relation between two actual instantaneous events – the cause 𝘤 and the effect 𝘦 – and a possibility horizon ℋ.
I argue that causation has a dual nature: on the one hand, a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process; on the other hand, a cause must make a difference to its effect.
The first condition – namely, the condition of process-connection (defined in Chapter 6) – captures the sense in which a cause must be connected to its effect via a genuine process. This condition allows my account to separate causation from mere correlation, distinguish genuine causes from preempted backups, and capture how a cause must be at the right level of detail relative to its effect (Chapter 7).
The second condition – namely, the condition of security-dependence (defined in Chapter 8) – captures the sense in which a cause must make a difference to its effect. This condition allows my account to yield intuitively correct verdicts on the counterexamples to the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation, resolve the problem of profligate omissions, accommodate structurally isomorphic but causally different cases, and handle contrastive causal claims (Chapter 9 and 10).
Finally, my proposed account of causation logically entails restricted versions of three important principles of causal reasoning concerning the sufficiency of counterfactual dependence for causation, and the transitivity and intrinsicness of causation (Chapter 11).An edition of two 15th-century treatises on universals
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16486
An edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.
1974-01-01T00:00:00ZDeahl, Julian GeorgeAn edition of William Milverley's 'Universalia Magistri Guilhelmi Milverleii' in Latin with a parallel English translation, together with an edition of John Tarteys' 'Universalia Magistri Johannis Tarteys'.How natural is a unified notion of time? Temporal experience in early Greek thought
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16428
2017-05-10T00:00:00ZSattler, Barbara MichaelaThe semantic error problem for epistemic contextualism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16059
2017-03-22T00:00:00ZGreenough, Patrick MichaelKindermann, DirkCounting the Particles : Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15988
I would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by entity (synonymously, by object and thing), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by identity, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
2017-04-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoI would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by entity (synonymously, by object and thing), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by identity, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.There’s plenty of Boole at the bottom : a reversible CA against information entropy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15960
“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton (CA) with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoTagliabue, JacopoRossi, Gabriele“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton (CA) with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation.Simple hyperintensional belief revision
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15955
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
2018-02-05T00:00:00ZBerto, F.I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.Conceivability and possibility : some dilemmas for Humeans
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15953
The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations.
This research is published within the Project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
2018-06-01T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoSchoonen, TomThe Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations.Taming the runabout imagination ticket
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15952
The ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.
This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
2018-03-13T00:00:00ZBerto, FrancescoThe ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15951
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Franz Berto’s research was funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Consolidator grant no. 681404, ‘The Logic of Conceivability’. Christopher Badura’s research was funded by the Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].
2018-02-27T00:00:00ZBadura, ChristopherBerto, FrancescoWe present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.A pluralistic solution to the relationalism versus representationalism debate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15877
A great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception (broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of perception and are, therefore, compatible.
2018-12-07T00:00:00ZBlack, Paul AndrewA great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception (broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of perception and are, therefore, compatible.Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15846
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.
2018-08-20T00:00:00ZBackes, MarvinRecent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.Comments on Brian Epstein's The Ant Trap
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15806
The Ant Trap is a terrific book, which opens up new opportunities to use philosophical methods in the social realm, by drawing on the tools and techniques of contemporary metaphysics. Epstein uses concepts of dependence, constitution, and grounding, of parts and whole, of membership and kindhood, both to clarify existing accounts of social reality and to develop an account of his own. Whilst I admire the general strategy, I take issue with some aspects of Epstein’s implementation, notably his distinction between grounding and anchoring. I recommend that he give up this distinction, which is not crucial to his project.
2017-02-13T00:00:00ZHawley, KatherineThe Ant Trap is a terrific book, which opens up new opportunities to use philosophical methods in the social realm, by drawing on the tools and techniques of contemporary metaphysics. Epstein uses concepts of dependence, constitution, and grounding, of parts and whole, of membership and kindhood, both to clarify existing accounts of social reality and to develop an account of his own. Whilst I admire the general strategy, I take issue with some aspects of Epstein’s implementation, notably his distinction between grounding and anchoring. I recommend that he give up this distinction, which is not crucial to his project.Title redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15677
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZRandall, Leonard AveryEssentialism in Aristotle, Kripke and Fine : differences in explanatory purposes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15633
In this dissertation I compare the different forms of essentialism that we find in Aristotle, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine. I argue that there is a clear difference in explanatory purpose between Aristotle’s essentialism on the one side and Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism on the other, while the last two have closely connected explanatory purposes. Aristotle’s essentialism is mainly concerned with questions of substance, in particular in what sense essences are substances. In contrast, Kripke’s ‘modal essentialism’ and Fine’s ‘definitional essentialism’, as I dub them, are both primarily concerned with questions of modality, in particular where metaphysical necessity has its place or source. Both associate metaphysical necessity closely with essence, though in different ways. While Fine claims (implicitly) that his essentialism is broadly Aristotelian in spirit, I argue that there are substantial differences between them, in particular with respect to their conceptions of real definition and related notions. And it is exactly the difference in explanatory purpose between fine’s and Aristotle’s essentialism that explains these substantial differences. I show how closely Fine’s and Kripke’s essentialism are connected, despite clear differences with respect to their conceptions of essential properties; and further where and why Aristotle’s essentialism differs from Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism with respect to the kinds of properties that count as essential (apart from differences in that respect between Kripke and Fine). I further argue for a systematic (though imperfect correspondence between the kinds of properties of individuals considered to be essential in Kripke and Fine, and certain kinds of causal relations in the broad Aristotelian sense. I conclude that there is good reason to hold, that Aristotle’s essentialism has basically a different subject matter than Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism, contrary to a widespread assumption. And I identify several issues for future research to complete my comparison.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZSattler, WolfgangIn this dissertation I compare the different forms of essentialism that we find in Aristotle, Saul Kripke and Kit Fine. I argue that there is a clear difference in explanatory purpose between Aristotle’s essentialism on the one side and Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism on the other, while the last two have closely connected explanatory purposes. Aristotle’s essentialism is mainly concerned with questions of substance, in particular in what sense essences are substances. In contrast, Kripke’s ‘modal essentialism’ and Fine’s ‘definitional essentialism’, as I dub them, are both primarily concerned with questions of modality, in particular where metaphysical necessity has its place or source. Both associate metaphysical necessity closely with essence, though in different ways. While Fine claims (implicitly) that his essentialism is broadly Aristotelian in spirit, I argue that there are substantial differences between them, in particular with respect to their conceptions of real definition and related notions. And it is exactly the difference in explanatory purpose between fine’s and Aristotle’s essentialism that explains these substantial differences. I show how closely Fine’s and Kripke’s essentialism are connected, despite clear differences with respect to their conceptions of essential properties; and further where and why Aristotle’s essentialism differs from Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism with respect to the kinds of properties that count as essential (apart from differences in that respect between Kripke and Fine). I further argue for a systematic (though imperfect correspondence between the kinds of properties of individuals considered to be essential in Kripke and Fine, and certain kinds of causal relations in the broad Aristotelian sense. I conclude that there is good reason to hold, that Aristotle’s essentialism has basically a different subject matter than Kripke’s and Fine’s essentialism, contrary to a widespread assumption. And I identify several issues for future research to complete my comparison.Taking meaning out of context : essays on the foundations of natural language semantics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15555
David Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language
semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality
and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the
compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative
to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several
questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic
values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand
the relation between them.
Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved
methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an
account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language
semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory
of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and
communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of
generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language
semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and
issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical
form.
In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and
criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the
perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize
our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to
clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and
its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZCameron, Matthew DunbarDavid Lewis articulated minimal constraints on a formal theory of natural language
semantics that have been widely adopted by subsequent theorists: compositionality
and sentence truth in a given context. In the process, Lewis distinguished between the
compositional semantic value of an expression and its propositional content relative
to a context. This dissertation consists of a series of essays in which I address several
questions that arise from this distinction, including how we should understand semantic
values, how we should understand propositional content, and how we should understand
the relation between them.
Related to this, I explore and address a number of interesting and unresolved
methodological issues that arise in relation to context-sensitivity, and provide an
account of the role of speaker intentions in a formal theory of natural language
semantics. Additionally, I provide a detailed analysis of the role of context in a theory
of natural language semantics and its connection to various aspects of language use and
communication. I also motivate coherence with syntactic structure (in the tradition of
generative grammar) as an additional constraint on a formal theory of natural language
semantics and assess its import for how we theorize about tense and modality and
issues related to the syntax-semantics interface, including covert structure and logical
form.
In broad strokes, this dissertation addresses issues concerning the aims, scope and
criteria of a theory of natural language semantics. I approach these issues from the
perspective of generative grammar, a theoretical framework that aims to characterize
our understanding of natural language independent of its use. These essays help to
clarify what should be expected of a formal theory of natural language semantics and
its contribution to theories of speech acts and communication.Kant's concept of the good
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15554
This dissertation asks what Kant means when he talks about the good, and what role this concept plays in his ethical theory. It is divided into three chapters. The first examines the context in which this question was first asked, namely in a review of Kant’s ‘Groundwork’ by H. A. Pistorius. I analyse this review and Kant’s direct response to it in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, where he clarifies that the good is the “necessary object of the faculty of desire” and that it can only be determined “after and by means of” the moral law. I argue that traditional law-first and good-first readings of these passages both fail, and that instead we should prefer Stephen Engstrom’s reading which takes the food as an a priori concept of practical reason, whose content is determined by the moral law. The remaining chapters investigate this view, and specifically the strong guise of the good thesis to which it commits Kant. In the second I clarify the guise of the good and the specific version of it to which Engstrom’s view is committed, which is one that holds all willing to aim at satisfying a condition of universal validity. I argue that self-conceit and despondency are two notions from Kant’s psychology which provide a model for how non-moral willing can aim at universal validity. In the third chapter, I use this general framework to try and explain specific cases of non-moral willing. Ii find that the framework can adequately explain away diabolical willing as mere evil willing. It can also deal with frailty, though this requires departure from Engstrom’s and Reath’s views and the introduction of ‘persistent illusion’. It has the same trouble dealing with listlessness that all Kantian views do. I conclude that Engstrom’s view of the good is viable.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZTonissen, Bas Ben MartienSnedegar, JustinThis dissertation asks what Kant means when he talks about the good, and what role this concept plays in his ethical theory. It is divided into three chapters. The first examines the context in which this question was first asked, namely in a review of Kant’s ‘Groundwork’ by H. A. Pistorius. I analyse this review and Kant’s direct response to it in his ‘Critique of Practical Reason’, where he clarifies that the good is the “necessary object of the faculty of desire” and that it can only be determined “after and by means of” the moral law. I argue that traditional law-first and good-first readings of these passages both fail, and that instead we should prefer Stephen Engstrom’s reading which takes the food as an a priori concept of practical reason, whose content is determined by the moral law. The remaining chapters investigate this view, and specifically the strong guise of the good thesis to which it commits Kant. In the second I clarify the guise of the good and the specific version of it to which Engstrom’s view is committed, which is one that holds all willing to aim at satisfying a condition of universal validity. I argue that self-conceit and despondency are two notions from Kant’s psychology which provide a model for how non-moral willing can aim at universal validity. In the third chapter, I use this general framework to try and explain specific cases of non-moral willing. Ii find that the framework can adequately explain away diabolical willing as mere evil willing. It can also deal with frailty, though this requires departure from Engstrom’s and Reath’s views and the introduction of ‘persistent illusion’. It has the same trouble dealing with listlessness that all Kantian views do. I conclude that Engstrom’s view of the good is viable."You want me to do what?!" : a reasonable response to overly demanding moral theories
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15546
This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various
moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be
rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this
objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrity
objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to undermine
the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome
conception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view would
leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third
chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to
demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors
(the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factors
as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these
potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the
responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,
which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.
In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship
to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficulty
can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposal
by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why
they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty
as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw
attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an
excuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. In
the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,
utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and
giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness
objections.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZSlater, JoeThis thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various
moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be
rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this
objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams's integrity
objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to undermine
the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome
conception of morality fail, and that accepting their `extreme' view would
leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third
chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to
demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors
(the conduct and expectations of one's community) and psychological factors
as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these
potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the
responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,
which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.
In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship
to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action's difficulty
can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent proposal
by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why
they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty
as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw
attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an
excuse, suggesting that there is no `default' obligation to do the best. In
the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,
utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and
giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness
objections.Assertion : the context sensitivity dilemma
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15543
It looks as though many philosophers assume that the intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes motivates the following dilemma: either (1) we embrace a knowledge norm of assertion (KNA), and are forced into a view that takes knowledge, or ‘knowledge’ to be sensitive to practical stakes, or (2) we stick to our classical invariantist (CI) guns, but then KNA goes out the window and we get practical sensitivity in the normativity of assertion. Let us dub this The Sensitivity Dilemma.
This dissertation aims to bring this implicitly assumed dilemma to centre stage in order to then take a step back. It is argued here that the Sensitivity Dilemma is a false dilemma: a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion, I argue, is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. And, more ambitiously, the dissertation aims to offer independent reason to believe that, if Classical Invariantism and KNA are true, shiftiness in assertability is exactly what we should expect. To this effect, I put forth a functionalist rationale for KNA, in a classical invariantist framework. I argue that not only are the data at hand friendly to CI and KNA, but, if we look at the main epistemic function of assertion, KNA readily follows.
I begin by arguing that the Sensitivity Dilemma rests on deontic equivocation. To this effect, Chapter #1draws an important distinction between epistemic norms and mere norms with epistemic content. In the light of this distinction, I argue that a knowledge norm for assertion need not imply context sensitivity of either knowledge/knowledge attribution or proper assertion. Now, say that it turns out that the knowledge norm of assertion, in its biconditional form, is perfectly compatible with the shiftiness data. Does that also mean that KNA is correct? The answer, of course, is ‘no’. After all, empirical adequacy is shared by several of the competing views on the market. We need further reasons to believe KNA is the correct account. Chapter #2 looks at several extant attempts to provide a rationale for KNA, and finds them wanting.
In Chapter #3, I offer an alternative answer to the rationale question: assertion, I argue, is governed by a particular epistemic norm in virtue of serving a particular epistemic function. More precisely, according to the proposed account, a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion drops right out of the assertion’s epistemic function of generating testimonial knowledge. Chapters #4 and #5 defend, in turn, the necessity and sufficiency directions of KNA against the classical objections in the literature. I argue that: (1) The necessity claim involved in KNA scores better than weaker norms when it comes to both accommodating linguistic data and explaining how a speaker can be blameless, yet in breach of the norm, and (2) The sufficiency direction of KNA survives the intuitive need for more than knowledge in cases put forth by Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, since the latter is not sourced the epistemic norm governing assertion, but in further norms with epistemic content stepping n and raising the bar.
Last but not least, in Chapter #6 I argue that several theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and prior plausibility, favour my functionalist account over extant competing explanations of the shiftiness data.
2018-01-01T00:00:00ZSimionescu, Mona IoanaIt looks as though many philosophers assume that the intuitive variability of proper assertion with practical stakes motivates the following dilemma: either (1) we embrace a knowledge norm of assertion (KNA), and are forced into a view that takes knowledge, or ‘knowledge’ to be sensitive to practical stakes, or (2) we stick to our classical invariantist (CI) guns, but then KNA goes out the window and we get practical sensitivity in the normativity of assertion. Let us dub this The Sensitivity Dilemma.
This dissertation aims to bring this implicitly assumed dilemma to centre stage in order to then take a step back. It is argued here that the Sensitivity Dilemma is a false dilemma: a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion, I argue, is perfectly compatible with Classical Invariantism. And, more ambitiously, the dissertation aims to offer independent reason to believe that, if Classical Invariantism and KNA are true, shiftiness in assertability is exactly what we should expect. To this effect, I put forth a functionalist rationale for KNA, in a classical invariantist framework. I argue that not only are the data at hand friendly to CI and KNA, but, if we look at the main epistemic function of assertion, KNA readily follows.
I begin by arguing that the Sensitivity Dilemma rests on deontic equivocation. To this effect, Chapter #1draws an important distinction between epistemic norms and mere norms with epistemic content. In the light of this distinction, I argue that a knowledge norm for assertion need not imply context sensitivity of either knowledge/knowledge attribution or proper assertion. Now, say that it turns out that the knowledge norm of assertion, in its biconditional form, is perfectly compatible with the shiftiness data. Does that also mean that KNA is correct? The answer, of course, is ‘no’. After all, empirical adequacy is shared by several of the competing views on the market. We need further reasons to believe KNA is the correct account. Chapter #2 looks at several extant attempts to provide a rationale for KNA, and finds them wanting.
In Chapter #3, I offer an alternative answer to the rationale question: assertion, I argue, is governed by a particular epistemic norm in virtue of serving a particular epistemic function. More precisely, according to the proposed account, a biconditional knowledge norm of assertion drops right out of the assertion’s epistemic function of generating testimonial knowledge. Chapters #4 and #5 defend, in turn, the necessity and sufficiency directions of KNA against the classical objections in the literature. I argue that: (1) The necessity claim involved in KNA scores better than weaker norms when it comes to both accommodating linguistic data and explaining how a speaker can be blameless, yet in breach of the norm, and (2) The sufficiency direction of KNA survives the intuitive need for more than knowledge in cases put forth by Jessica Brown and Jennifer Lackey, since the latter is not sourced the epistemic norm governing assertion, but in further norms with epistemic content stepping n and raising the bar.
Last but not least, in Chapter #6 I argue that several theoretical virtues, such as simplicity and prior plausibility, favour my functionalist account over extant competing explanations of the shiftiness data.Exploratio intentionis
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15534
1986-01-01T00:00:00ZCrawford, J. M. B.Entitlement in mathematics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14980
This first half of this thesis investigates the epistemological foundations of mathematical theories, with special attention devoted to two questions: (1) how can we have a warrant for the satisfiability and consistency of mathematical theories, and (2) given we conceive of mathematical judgement as objective - as being concerned with a realm of abstract entities - can we have a warrant for thinking that such a realm of entities exists? In Chapter 2, two kinds of mathematical scepticism are developed. The regress sceptic argues that we can have a warrant for accepting neither the satisfiability nor the consistency of a mathematical theory. The I-II-III sceptic maintains that there can be no warrant for thinking that a realm of abstract entities exists if mathematical judgement is conceived as being objective. The notions of entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of substance - recently introduced into the literature by Crispin Wright - are invoked to respond to the mathematical regress and I-II-III sceptic. This is done in Chapters 3 and 4. The distinctive feature of an entitlement is its non-evidential nature. What is relevant is not the presence of positive evidence, but rather the absence of sufficient countervailing evidence. The second half of the thesis explores and develops certain aspects of this proposal. Chapter 5 develops the notion of entitlement of cognitive project by investigating two of its three defining clauses. Chapter 6 draws a picture of a wider philosophical framework of which entitlement can be regarded an integrated part. In so doing entitlement is discussed in light of the internalism/externalism distinction and the distinction between monism and pluralism about epistemic value. Chapter 7 tables two fundamental challenges to the entitlement proposal - firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic notion of warrant at all, and secondly, whether the notion of rationality associated with it is epistemic in nature or of some other kind?
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZPedersen, Nikolaj J.This first half of this thesis investigates the epistemological foundations of mathematical theories, with special attention devoted to two questions: (1) how can we have a warrant for the satisfiability and consistency of mathematical theories, and (2) given we conceive of mathematical judgement as objective - as being concerned with a realm of abstract entities - can we have a warrant for thinking that such a realm of entities exists? In Chapter 2, two kinds of mathematical scepticism are developed. The regress sceptic argues that we can have a warrant for accepting neither the satisfiability nor the consistency of a mathematical theory. The I-II-III sceptic maintains that there can be no warrant for thinking that a realm of abstract entities exists if mathematical judgement is conceived as being objective. The notions of entitlement of cognitive project and entitlement of substance - recently introduced into the literature by Crispin Wright - are invoked to respond to the mathematical regress and I-II-III sceptic. This is done in Chapters 3 and 4. The distinctive feature of an entitlement is its non-evidential nature. What is relevant is not the presence of positive evidence, but rather the absence of sufficient countervailing evidence. The second half of the thesis explores and develops certain aspects of this proposal. Chapter 5 develops the notion of entitlement of cognitive project by investigating two of its three defining clauses. Chapter 6 draws a picture of a wider philosophical framework of which entitlement can be regarded an integrated part. In so doing entitlement is discussed in light of the internalism/externalism distinction and the distinction between monism and pluralism about epistemic value. Chapter 7 tables two fundamental challenges to the entitlement proposal - firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic notion of warrant at all, and secondly, whether the notion of rationality associated with it is epistemic in nature or of some other kind?The context principle and implicit definitions : towards an account of our a priori knowledge of arithmetic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14916
This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZEbert, Philip A.This thesis is concerned with explaining how a subject can acquire a priori knowledge of arithmetic. Every account for arithmetical, and in general mathematical knowledge faces Benacerraf's well-known challenge, i.e. how to reconcile the truths of mathematics with what can be known by ordinary human thinkers. I suggest four requirements that jointly make up this challenge and discuss and reject four distinct solutions to it. This will motivate a broadly Fregean approach to our knowledge of arithmetic and mathematics in general. Pursuing this strategy appeals to the context principle which, it is proposed, underwrites a form of Platonism and explains how reference to and object-directed thought about abstract entities is, in principle, possible. I discuss this principle and defend it against different criticisms as put forth in recent literature. Moreover, I will offer a general framework for implicit definitions by means of which - without an appeal to a faculty of intuition or purely pragmatic considerations - a priori and non-inferential knowledge of basic mathematical principles can be acquired. In the course of this discussion, I will argue against various types of opposition to this general approach. Also, I will highlight crucial shortcomings in the explanation of how implicit definitions may underwrite a priori knowledge of basic principles in broadly similar conceptions. In the final part, I will offer a general account of how non-inferential mathematical knowledge resulting from implicit definitions is best conceived which avoids these shortcomings.Some aspects of the evolutionary origin of human behaviour and their implications for the study of Christian ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14823
1974-10-01T00:00:00ZCromie, Richard MarlinAn application of certain thomistic metaphysical and epistemological theories to the contemporary clash between naturalistic and non-naturalistic ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14821
1953-08-01T00:00:00ZTulloch, Doreen MaryEthical realism in British and American protestantism from 1920 to 1950
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14818
1966-01-01T00:00:00ZShoop, William GeorgeThe ethological roots of morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14816
1978-07-01T00:00:00ZButler, Emma FrancisThe theory of rational decision and the foundations of ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14814
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.
1983-07-01T00:00:00ZSowden, Lanning PatrickThe primary concern of this thesis is to investigate what light (if any) the theory of rational decision can throw on certain problems in first-order ethics. In particular, it examines whether given a correct theory of decision we can determine which of the two major rivals in the field of contemporary ethics, utilitarianism and contractarianism, is the more adequate moral theory. I begin by outlining what I call orthodox decision theory and note from this theory together with a minimal characterization of what it is to make a moral judgement we can deduce utilitarianism. The apparent conflict between utilitarianism and our moral intuitions is then examined. I criticize a common response made by utilitarians to this conflict, namely, their recourse to the distinction between rule and act utilitarianism. But I then ask the question of whether this conflict really matters? I conclude that in a sense it does not. I then turn from a consideration of the implications of utilitarianism to its foundations, particularly, its foundations in orthodox decision theory. I attempt to establish that orthodox theory has empirical content and that it has been falsified. I also consider the theory from the normative standpoint and construct a prima facie case against it. I now consider the dispute between the contractarian and the utilitarian and note that it is essentially decision theoretic in character. From a consideration of what was found to be mistaken about orthodox theory I now argue for a defence of the selection rule for rational choice presupposed by contractarianism and thereby offer a (partial) defence of a contractarian theory of justice.Moral realism, moral expertise and paternalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14812
In this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict: autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonomy seem to be compatible.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZFrimannsson, Gudmundur HeidarIn this essay I examine the notion of moral objectivity of moral properties. Moral objectivity seems to be able to resist the arguments of subjectivists. There seem to be true moral sentences and moral facts can explain actions and occurrences in the world. Values seem best accounted for in objective terms and persons can have interests or good independently of their desires. It seems to be reasonable to think of the nature of moral value in terms of consequences. Knowledge requires truth so the objectivity of moral properties makes moral knowledge possible. Moral knowledge should be accounted for in similar terms as other kinds of knowledge. The major requirement on moral knowledge is coherence. Moral expertise is both possible and plausible and so are moral experts. Paternalism is possible because our values can conflict: autonomy can conflict with general welfare. Paternalism is making someone do what is in his own interest. This seems best thought of in terms of the consequences for his good. The justification of paternalistic interventions seems best based on the weighing of the consequences of the intervention and the decision of the agent. One thing which must be taken into this weighing is the rationality of the decision of the agent. Rationality is basically thought of as the maximization of good. Autonomy is part of everyone's good. It can conflict with the agent's general or overall welfare. But the importance of autonomy for every agent creates a presumption against paternalism. But paternalism can maximize autonomy and paternalism can be justified to secure some minimal autonomy. So paternalism and autonomy seem to be compatible.Art and understanding
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14810
The essay explores topics related to the objectivity and rationality of aesthetics. Initially, the nature of objectivity is considered. The question is raised: what is it for something to be objective? Various metaphysical objections to the view that value is an objective, feature of the world are considered. These include the idea that what truly exists is coincident with that which is subject-independent; that will and cognition are distinct autonomous mental faculties; that value is, epistemologically, a 'queer' commodity the experience of which is qualitatively distinct from sense-experience. Thereafter, aesthetic concepts are investigated more closely. The idea that the meaning of an expression is secured by a definition is challenged. It is argued that the practical impossibility of defining aesthetic terms does not preclude their having a precise meaning in discussion. In particular, the view that understanding is a mental process involving the grasp of something like a definition is criticized. The idea that the sense of a concept is, like the notes of music, influenced by its whole context is introduced. Aesthetic concepts, it is argued, are governed by conditions no less than concepts such as 'intelligent', 'resourceful', and the like. Finally, the view that aesthetic value, being a disposition of the will is cognitively ungoverned is investigated. It is concluded that in so far as the disposition of the will is sensitive to, i. e., can be modified by, means that deserve, in virtue of their wide currency, to be counted rational the will is cognitively constrained.
1989-07-01T00:00:00ZReid, NeilThe essay explores topics related to the objectivity and rationality of aesthetics. Initially, the nature of objectivity is considered. The question is raised: what is it for something to be objective? Various metaphysical objections to the view that value is an objective, feature of the world are considered. These include the idea that what truly exists is coincident with that which is subject-independent; that will and cognition are distinct autonomous mental faculties; that value is, epistemologically, a 'queer' commodity the experience of which is qualitatively distinct from sense-experience. Thereafter, aesthetic concepts are investigated more closely. The idea that the meaning of an expression is secured by a definition is challenged. It is argued that the practical impossibility of defining aesthetic terms does not preclude their having a precise meaning in discussion. In particular, the view that understanding is a mental process involving the grasp of something like a definition is criticized. The idea that the sense of a concept is, like the notes of music, influenced by its whole context is introduced. Aesthetic concepts, it is argued, are governed by conditions no less than concepts such as 'intelligent', 'resourceful', and the like. Finally, the view that aesthetic value, being a disposition of the will is cognitively ungoverned is investigated. It is concluded that in so far as the disposition of the will is sensitive to, i. e., can be modified by, means that deserve, in virtue of their wide currency, to be counted rational the will is cognitively constrained.A philosophical commentary on Schiller's 'Letters on the aesthetic education of man'
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14809
This work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. (1795). In the introduction, the author's aims and methodology are briefly stated. There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant's critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, art and beauty. The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller's text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts. In part one (Letters 1 - 9) we follow Schiller as he describes the afflictions of civilization and their cure. From a critique of Contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17) we follow Schiller as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the need for, a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man's dual nature is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the psychological development of the individual and species from a sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; attention is given to Schiller's changing methodology; and Schiller's ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to those of Kant and Fichte. The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.
1990-07-01T00:00:00ZMurray, Patrick TimothyThis work provides a detailed philosophical exposition of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. (1795). In the introduction, the author's aims and methodology are briefly stated. There then follows a survey of those books in English with chapters on the treatise. The introduction concludes with an outline of Kant's critical system, and a summary of his theories of aesthetic judgement, art and beauty. The main body of the work consists of an exegesis of Schiller's text. Its 27 Letters are divided, for convenience, into three parts. In part one (Letters 1 - 9) we follow Schiller as he describes the afflictions of civilization and their cure. From a critique of Contemporary society, he argues for a political revolution resting upon the psycho-ethical reform of the individual. Such reform involves feeling becoming harmonized with reason, through the educative power of beauty and art. In part two (Letters 10 - 17) we follow Schiller as he considers the essential nature of man and beauty. He constructs an a priori model of our fundamental human nature, and asserts the need for, a corresponding model of ideal beauty, if man's dual nature is to be fully realized in a harmoniously integrated manner. In part three (Letters 18 - 27), we follow Schiller as he describes the psychological development of the individual and species from a sensuous to a rational condition, through the mediation of the aesthetic. The exposition is accompanied by assessment and criticism; attention is given to Schiller's changing methodology; and Schiller's ideas and theoretical perspectives are related, where derivative, to those of Kant and Fichte. The conclusion commences with a recapitulation of the main arguments in each Letter. This is followed by an evaluation of the Aesthetic Letters, identifying those specific theories of contemporary relevance, and with the potential for further theoretical development.The nature and value of art
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14807
This thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZKieran, Matthew LaurenceThis thesis examines the nature and value of art. It is primarily concerned to advance an argument which makes sense of the significance we ordinarily afford art, rather than rendering it merely aesthetic and thus cognitively trivial. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, it is argued that 'art' does not have two distinct senses. Rather, we should understand art as an inherently evaluative, evolving cultural practice. Thus, I argue, 'art' is essentially a cluster concept. I consider an account of art according to which it is in the pleasure art affords, that its value lies. However, though we derive pleasure even from apparently unpleasant artworks, the mark of art's value lies elsewhere. That is, the pleasure we derive from art is the result of an artwork's being of value in some other way. Through critically assessing the standard accounts of art's value, I argue that art's pleasures are primarily cognitive. Furthermore, I argue, the cognitive value of art arises primarily from the engagement of our imagination and interpretation of artworks. That is, we enjoy the imaginative activity of engaging with artworks and the promotion of particular imaginative understandings. Furthermore, as imaginative understanding is of fundamental importance in grasping the nature of our world and others, art may have a distinctive significance. That is, art may afford insights into and thus promote our imaginative understandings of our world and others. Thus, through the promotion of imaginative understanding, art may cultivate our moral understanding. Therefore, art is of profound significance and import.The structures and significance of mimesis in Adorno's "Aesthetic Theory"
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14778
This thesis starts from the point of departure of asking why Aesthetic Theory is difficult to read. In answering this question it is argued that the difficulty of the work is a function of the unusual claims Adorno makes about the relation between art and philosophy, and that the presentation of these arguments exemplifies these claims. This complimentary relation between form and content has implications for the way Adorno can be understood as engaging the idea of mimesis. Aesthetic Theory should be understood as a theory of mimesis in modern art and as a mimetic work itself. Given this idea, the question of the readability of the work emerges as inseparable from the explicit claims Adorno makes for mimesis. If the work ultimately cannot be understood because Adorno does not define his concepts, or it is unexplainable for any other reason, then mimesis will be shown to be untenable. The issue of the readability of Aesthetic Theory is explored in the Introduction through a discussion of issues arising from the recent history of Adorno's reception. Particular attention is paid to the differences between critics who have emphasised the significance of the particular claims Adorno makes against those who emphasise his method. Chapter I rejects this distinction while it argues that the character of Adorno's writing is uneven, that is to say, Aesthetic Theory cannot usefully be read in a uniform way.
Chapter I considers different aspects of this lack of uniformity and argues that the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 'philosophy' is often tenuous as it moves in and out of other modes of argument. Chapters 2 and 3 look at different aspects of the identity of Aesthetic Theory as philosophy. Chapter 2 explains the strategic significance of the work as a continuation of a tradition of philosophy from Hegel onwards. This tradition, it is argued, has explicitly understood the problem of philosophy as recognising itself as experience while it attempts to describe experience. Chapter 3 extends this theme into a consideration of philosophical form. If philosophy is understood as a mode of experience then its form as well as its content is significant. Through a consideration of Heidegger and Derrida, Chapter 3 examines the uniqueness of the philosophical form of Aesthetic Theory. Having made this distinction. Chapter 4 reads Aesthetic Theory as philosophical form, describing aspects of it as mimetic. Chapters 5 and 6 then give detailed readings of parts of Aesthetic Theory which are particularly relevant for an understanding of Adorno's theory of the mimetic potential of modern art. The concluding chapter argues that the internal consistency of Aesthetic Theory in its practice and definition of the crisis of mimesis in modernism has significant implications for the practice of art history and criticism of twentieth-century art.
1997-07-01T00:00:00ZHooker, RichardThis thesis starts from the point of departure of asking why Aesthetic Theory is difficult to read. In answering this question it is argued that the difficulty of the work is a function of the unusual claims Adorno makes about the relation between art and philosophy, and that the presentation of these arguments exemplifies these claims. This complimentary relation between form and content has implications for the way Adorno can be understood as engaging the idea of mimesis. Aesthetic Theory should be understood as a theory of mimesis in modern art and as a mimetic work itself. Given this idea, the question of the readability of the work emerges as inseparable from the explicit claims Adorno makes for mimesis. If the work ultimately cannot be understood because Adorno does not define his concepts, or it is unexplainable for any other reason, then mimesis will be shown to be untenable. The issue of the readability of Aesthetic Theory is explored in the Introduction through a discussion of issues arising from the recent history of Adorno's reception. Particular attention is paid to the differences between critics who have emphasised the significance of the particular claims Adorno makes against those who emphasise his method. Chapter I rejects this distinction while it argues that the character of Adorno's writing is uneven, that is to say, Aesthetic Theory cannot usefully be read in a uniform way.
Chapter I considers different aspects of this lack of uniformity and argues that the identity of Aesthetic Theory as 'philosophy' is often tenuous as it moves in and out of other modes of argument. Chapters 2 and 3 look at different aspects of the identity of Aesthetic Theory as philosophy. Chapter 2 explains the strategic significance of the work as a continuation of a tradition of philosophy from Hegel onwards. This tradition, it is argued, has explicitly understood the problem of philosophy as recognising itself as experience while it attempts to describe experience. Chapter 3 extends this theme into a consideration of philosophical form. If philosophy is understood as a mode of experience then its form as well as its content is significant. Through a consideration of Heidegger and Derrida, Chapter 3 examines the uniqueness of the philosophical form of Aesthetic Theory. Having made this distinction. Chapter 4 reads Aesthetic Theory as philosophical form, describing aspects of it as mimetic. Chapters 5 and 6 then give detailed readings of parts of Aesthetic Theory which are particularly relevant for an understanding of Adorno's theory of the mimetic potential of modern art. The concluding chapter argues that the internal consistency of Aesthetic Theory in its practice and definition of the crisis of mimesis in modernism has significant implications for the practice of art history and criticism of twentieth-century art.Dialectics of contingency : Nietzsche's philosophy of art
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14775
This thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche's philosophy. Its primary concern is with Nietzsche's turn to art as the means to counter what he terms metaphysics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objective truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of exhausting the totality of these antecedent truths. This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse Nietzsche's criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme scepticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their necessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics. Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn to art is a response to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere cynical Nihilism.
1993-07-01T00:00:00ZRampley, MatthewThis thesis examines the function of art in Nietzsche's philosophy. Its primary concern is with Nietzsche's turn to art as the means to counter what he terms metaphysics. Metaphysics is a metonym for the system of beliefs sustaining our culture whereby human judgements about the world are perceived as uncovering an objective truth antecedent to those judgements, with an implicit faith in the possibility of exhausting the totality of these antecedent truths. This thesis consequently has two principal strands. The first is to analyse Nietzsche's criticism of metaphysics. The second is to explore the way in which, using a specific understanding of art, Nietzsche attempts to reconcile extreme scepticism towards all forms of human knowledge with a continued belief in their necessity. The thesis argues that Nietzsche lays an importance on art as providing an aesthetic education to replace the misguided theoretical orientation of metaphysics. Nietzsche criticises metaphysics for its inability to recognise that its interpretations are mere interpretations, that logic and the rational serve as means to make the world meaningful from the human perspective. My thesis explores how he sees art, and in particular the tragic, as constituting a mode of world interpretation which declares its status as such. I argue that for Nietzsche this is crucial inasmuch as a failure to recognise the contingency of our interpretations results in a refusal to give value in any interpretations. For Nietzsche the advent of the Modern age heralds the danger of such refusal, and hence I argue that his turn to art is a response to the specifically Modern temptation to descend into mere cynical Nihilism.Realism, reference and the growth of scientific knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14770
In Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.
1979-07-01T00:00:00ZSmith, Peter JamesIn Chapter 1, I discuss the background to the problems which confront a realist account of the growth of scientific knowledge. At the beginning of Chapter 2, I explain in what sense relativism constitutes a challenge to this account. Four interconnected questions are then posed which are said to underlie the realist position. The chapter finishes with an explanation of how some of them arise in an actual case study. Chapter 3 deals with a general argument of Quine's for the view that reference is inscrutable. In reply I maintain that the argument does not hold good, either with respect to interpreting our own language or when it comes to translating an alien language. With Chapter 4, I begin to answer the four questions. I explain how Tarski's theory of truth can be seen as a correspondence theory. It is argued, however, that Tarski's theory itself presupposes theories of reference and extension, and certain recent attempts to overcome this lacuna are criticized. In the next chapter I draw an analogy between natural kind predicates, which are of particular importance in science, and proper names, and offer cluster theories of reference for both. This answers the third most basic of the four questions. These theories are defended against criticisms made by Kripke and Putnam, Chapter 6 aims to answer the second most basic question by considering in detail how we can understand what earlier scientific theories were about. I develop some arguments of Davidson's as a counter to Quine's doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation of sentences. I claim that although translation might in fact be indeterminate, Quine, through concentrating on behavioural evidence to the exclusion of other physical evidence, has failed to show that it is, and that in any case indeterminacy of sentence translation does not imply inscrutability of reference of terms. Finally, in Chapter 7, I sum up ray explication of the realist's account of the growth of science with respect to natural kind predicates. I then consider two cases of theory change of different sorts and suggest how my work might be extended.Realism and idealism in the theory of value
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14766
This thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZLenman, JamesThis thesis defends an account of value which emphasizes the central place occupied by experiences among the objects of evaluation, a point that is particularly stark in the case of aesthetic value, to which a chapter is devoted that adumbrates the wider understanding of value subsequently defended. More generally it is argued that values do not transcend the attitudes and institutions in which they are embodied. They nonetheless enjoy in virtue of their structuring by norms of consistency, stability and deference enough in the way of objectivity to do justice to various phenomenological considerations often thought to favour realism. It is argued however that this level of objectivity is compatible with the rejection of any form of reductive naturalism and, more generally, of cognitivism- views which should indeed, it is argued, be rejected in favour of an expressivistic understanding of value.Wittgensteinian fideism and the linguistic turn in post-war British philosophy of religion
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14759
The intention of this dissertation is to provide a descriptive account of the changes that occurred in British philosophy of religion after it began to be influenced by the so- called 'revolution in philosophy' in the nineteen fifties. This had produced a re-invigoration of empiricism in mainstream philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century, and had led to an interest in the nature and status of the meaning of language, and the means by which this meaning could be justified. This debate entered the philosophy of religion in the form of the verification principle, which denied meaning to any language which could not demonstrate how it was to be verified. Some philosophers were then criticised for allegedly utilising the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and claiming that religion was what he meant by a language-game or a form of life, and that meant religious belief could only be criticised by criteria that arose within the same language-game or form of life, so denying validity to any criterion that attempted to adjudicate meaning in all forms of discourse. The work of the philosopher most often associated with this position, D.Z. Phillips, will be discussed, and an argument made that this is an inadequate characterisation of his work. An account will then be given of what Wittgenstein himself understood by the terms, language-game and form of life, and that in fact this possible interpretation raises the possibility that what is signified by these terms may have the unavoidable effect of opening up religious language to criticism of a kind related to the empiricist critique, rather than closing it off.
1998-08-01T00:00:00ZSouter, AdrianThe intention of this dissertation is to provide a descriptive account of the changes that occurred in British philosophy of religion after it began to be influenced by the so- called 'revolution in philosophy' in the nineteen fifties. This had produced a re-invigoration of empiricism in mainstream philosophy in the early decades of the twentieth century, and had led to an interest in the nature and status of the meaning of language, and the means by which this meaning could be justified. This debate entered the philosophy of religion in the form of the verification principle, which denied meaning to any language which could not demonstrate how it was to be verified. Some philosophers were then criticised for allegedly utilising the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and claiming that religion was what he meant by a language-game or a form of life, and that meant religious belief could only be criticised by criteria that arose within the same language-game or form of life, so denying validity to any criterion that attempted to adjudicate meaning in all forms of discourse. The work of the philosopher most often associated with this position, D.Z. Phillips, will be discussed, and an argument made that this is an inadequate characterisation of his work. An account will then be given of what Wittgenstein himself understood by the terms, language-game and form of life, and that in fact this possible interpretation raises the possibility that what is signified by these terms may have the unavoidable effect of opening up religious language to criticism of a kind related to the empiricist critique, rather than closing it off.The Kantian defence of freedom : with special reference to eighteenth-century determinism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14758
1954-08-01T00:00:00ZLewis, Walter L.What structuralism could not be
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14756
Frege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.
1998-05-01T00:00:00ZFerguson, StephenFrege's arithmetical-platonism is glossed as the first step in developing the thesis; however, it remains silent on the subject of structures in mathematics: the obvious examples being groups and rings, lattices and topologies. The structuralist objects to this silence, also questioning the sufficiency of Fregean platonism is answering a number of problems: e.g. Benacerraf's Twin Puzzles of Epistemic and Referential Access. The development of structuralism as a philosophical position, based on the slogan 'All mathematics is structural' collapses: there is no single coherent account which remains faithful to the tenets of structuralism and solves the puzzles of platonism. This prompts the adoption of a more modest structuralism, the aim of which is not to solve the problems facing arithmetical-platonism, but merely to give an account of the 'obviously structural areas of mathematics'. Modest strucmralism should complement an account of mathematical systems; here, Frege's platonism fulfils that role, which then constrains and shapes the development of this modest structuralism. Three alternatives are considered; a substitutional account, an account based on a modification of Dummett's theory of thin reference and a modified from of in re structuralism. This split level analysis of mathematics leads to an investigation of the robustness of the truth predicate over the two classes of mathematical statement. Focussing on the framework set out in Wright's Truth and Objectivity, a third type of statement is identified in the literature: Hilbert's formal statements. The following thesis arises: formal statements concern no special subject matter, and are merely minimally truth apt; the statements of structural mathematics form a subdiscourse - identified by the similarity of the logical grammar - displaying cognitive command. Thirdly, the statements of mathematics which concern systems form a subdiscourse which has both cognitive command and width of cosmological role. The extensions of mathematical concepts are such that best practice on the part of mathematicians either tracks or determines that extension - at least in simple cases. Examining the notions of response dependence leads to considerations of indefinite extensibility and intuitionism. The conclusion drawn is that discourse about structures and mathematical systems are response dependent but that this does not give rise to any revisionary arguments contra intuitionism.Intuitionistic semantics and the revision of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14755
In this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of anti-realism. I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZWeiss, BernhardIn this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of anti-realism. I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity.Belief and action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14754
The role of "believes" is identified by finding a unique and unparaphraseable use of the term that is integral to the structure of important forms of language. This role can only be roughly indicated here. Roughly, "believes" identifies someone's reasons for doing or thinking something or what he counts as success in certain activities, without committing the speaker to accepting them; and so it allows the possibility of mistake. Standard objections to dispositional accounts are reviewed and found unconvincing. The central difficulty is found to be that dispositional accounts give no satisfactory explanation of the fact what it is (part of) an explanation of action to cite the agent's beliefs. It is argued that causal accounts have the same deficiency, that the role or point of "believes" in language is not satisfactorily explained. It is concluded that neglect of this central question vitlates even the real strengths of these accounts. The relation between different questions about belief is explored, and analogous questions about other cases, especially artefacts, are considered. Explanations of actions are discussed to bring out the role of "believes." This appears in explaining the relation between the "point or purpose" of an action and the actions of which it consists at a lower level of description. "Believes" identifies what governs this relation while allowing the possibility of mistake. Ryle's claims about thinking are considered, and an interpretation of the notion of an adverbial verb is suggested. The central difficulty concerns the cases of the thinking of le Penseur or of Eucild. Although it seems important that we should be able to say what the constituents of thinking are here, we cannot do so, since the relevant vocabulary is not adapted to giving the constituents of anything. These activities have their own "objects" as well as their own criteria of success. Activities, "objects", and criteria of success are bound up together, and do not connect in any simple way with the vocabulary that we try to connect them with in asking what their constituents are. This far from unique. Music provides another relevant example. The last chapters examine various contexts in which "believes" is important. Topics considered are reasons, evaluations, assertions, belief and the will, internationality, and speech-act accounts. In each case particular doctrines are critically examined.
1976-01-01T00:00:00ZPehrson, Claud W. P.The role of "believes" is identified by finding a unique and unparaphraseable use of the term that is integral to the structure of important forms of language. This role can only be roughly indicated here. Roughly, "believes" identifies someone's reasons for doing or thinking something or what he counts as success in certain activities, without committing the speaker to accepting them; and so it allows the possibility of mistake. Standard objections to dispositional accounts are reviewed and found unconvincing. The central difficulty is found to be that dispositional accounts give no satisfactory explanation of the fact what it is (part of) an explanation of action to cite the agent's beliefs. It is argued that causal accounts have the same deficiency, that the role or point of "believes" in language is not satisfactorily explained. It is concluded that neglect of this central question vitlates even the real strengths of these accounts. The relation between different questions about belief is explored, and analogous questions about other cases, especially artefacts, are considered. Explanations of actions are discussed to bring out the role of "believes." This appears in explaining the relation between the "point or purpose" of an action and the actions of which it consists at a lower level of description. "Believes" identifies what governs this relation while allowing the possibility of mistake. Ryle's claims about thinking are considered, and an interpretation of the notion of an adverbial verb is suggested. The central difficulty concerns the cases of the thinking of le Penseur or of Eucild. Although it seems important that we should be able to say what the constituents of thinking are here, we cannot do so, since the relevant vocabulary is not adapted to giving the constituents of anything. These activities have their own "objects" as well as their own criteria of success. Activities, "objects", and criteria of success are bound up together, and do not connect in any simple way with the vocabulary that we try to connect them with in asking what their constituents are. This far from unique. Music provides another relevant example. The last chapters examine various contexts in which "believes" is important. Topics considered are reasons, evaluations, assertions, belief and the will, internationality, and speech-act accounts. In each case particular doctrines are critically examined.Second-order logic is logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14753
"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic. The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a contemporary context.
1997-06-01T00:00:00ZFriend, Michèle Indira"Second-order logic" is the name given to a formal system. Some claim that the formal system is a logical system. Others claim that it is a mathematical system. In the thesis, I examine these claims in the light of some philosophical criteria which first motivated Frege in his logicist project. The criteria are that a logic should be universal, it should reflect our intuitive notion of logical validity, and it should be analytic. The analysis is interesting in two respects. One is conceptual: it gives us a purchase on where and how to draw a distinction between logic and other sciences. The other interest is historical: showing that second-order logic is a logical system according to the philosophical criteria mentioned above goes some way towards vindicating Frege's logicist project in a contemporary context.A 4-valued theory of classes and individuals
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14739
1971-07-01T00:00:00ZBrady, Ross ThomasA developed description of the Kierkegaardian art object
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14736
1998-08-01T00:00:00ZKoterbay, ScottThe effect of Bergson's thought on French Roman Catholic philosophy and literary theory up to 1939, with detailed reference to the work of Jacques Maritain, Maurice Blondel, Charles Peguy and Charles Du Bos
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14734
Most research into Bergson's influence to date has failed to take enough account of the philosopher's interest in the spiritual of meta-physical dimension of life. In seeking to interpret Bergson's thought many have focused upon 'la durée réelle' or 'l'élan vital' as the key concepts in his whole philosophy. If, instead, one were to begin with Bergson's main continuing preoccupation at first inchoate and only later more fully developed with spiritual activity in life, then the whole philosophy hangs together as a tapestry of one harmonious piece. Not only can it be clearly seen why Bergson opposes Kant and the positivists so vehemently, but it can also be understood why he eventually set his sights upon The two sources of morality and religion. In the eyes of many critics this work, far from completing a natural progression of thought, stands outside the main body of work as something ill-fitting and almost cavalier. This thesis attempts to redress the balance by demonstrating how the spiritual and religious interpretation of life is central to Bergson's thought. Having established this, I have assumed it likely that a lively Catholic interest in Bergson is something quite logical and natural. This proved to be the case. After all, the Catholics in France stood to gain or lose most by the introduction in intellectural circles of a new philosophical 'spiritualism'. They would obviously themselves have a vested interest in the discrediting of materialist and positivist philosophies. However, scholars have not seen the connection between Bergson and Christian thought very clearly and no detailed research into this particular field has been undertaken. I have consequently attempted to review both the general field of Catholic reactions in a largely chronological way and also the detailed ways in which Bergson's thought had on impact upon Catholic writers. My main conclusion from this research is that Bergson's work lent itself to adaptation and alteration to something more orthodox in Catholic terms. However it was some time before it was viewed in a favourable enough light for anything like this to be attempted. Much prejudice and misinterpretation surrounded Bergson for some years. Eventually, however, his theories made deep inroads into the mainstream of Catholic thought. His theories of perception and intuition, of movement and change, of static and dynamic religion, helped bring about a significant change in the development of twentieth century religious thought.
1978-01-01T00:00:00ZHarris, Robert GeoffreyMost research into Bergson's influence to date has failed to take enough account of the philosopher's interest in the spiritual of meta-physical dimension of life. In seeking to interpret Bergson's thought many have focused upon 'la durée réelle' or 'l'élan vital' as the key concepts in his whole philosophy. If, instead, one were to begin with Bergson's main continuing preoccupation at first inchoate and only later more fully developed with spiritual activity in life, then the whole philosophy hangs together as a tapestry of one harmonious piece. Not only can it be clearly seen why Bergson opposes Kant and the positivists so vehemently, but it can also be understood why he eventually set his sights upon The two sources of morality and religion. In the eyes of many critics this work, far from completing a natural progression of thought, stands outside the main body of work as something ill-fitting and almost cavalier. This thesis attempts to redress the balance by demonstrating how the spiritual and religious interpretation of life is central to Bergson's thought. Having established this, I have assumed it likely that a lively Catholic interest in Bergson is something quite logical and natural. This proved to be the case. After all, the Catholics in France stood to gain or lose most by the introduction in intellectural circles of a new philosophical 'spiritualism'. They would obviously themselves have a vested interest in the discrediting of materialist and positivist philosophies. However, scholars have not seen the connection between Bergson and Christian thought very clearly and no detailed research into this particular field has been undertaken. I have consequently attempted to review both the general field of Catholic reactions in a largely chronological way and also the detailed ways in which Bergson's thought had on impact upon Catholic writers. My main conclusion from this research is that Bergson's work lent itself to adaptation and alteration to something more orthodox in Catholic terms. However it was some time before it was viewed in a favourable enough light for anything like this to be attempted. Much prejudice and misinterpretation surrounded Bergson for some years. Eventually, however, his theories made deep inroads into the mainstream of Catholic thought. His theories of perception and intuition, of movement and change, of static and dynamic religion, helped bring about a significant change in the development of twentieth century religious thought.Procedures and outcomes: a defence and development of J. L. Austin's conception of speech acts
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14729
This work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.
1977-01-01T00:00:00ZKeenan, Michael GarthThis work's main thesis is that a theory of action provides a more appropriate framework than a theory of language for furthering the purpose of Austin's conception of speech acts. The main purpose of that conception was the elucidation of the species of language-use that is exemplified by illocutionary acts and is distinct from those species exemplified by locutionary and perlocutionary acts. Austin's conception of locutionary acts isolates those features of a speech act situation which are amenable to subsumption under a theory of language. This conception is expounded, developed and defended in Chapter One. The orthodox "reject-and-replace" view of the relationship between Austin's performative-constative distinction and his distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts threatens several of Austin's insights concerning the type of theory appropriate for developing his conception of speech acts. In Chapter Two the performative-constative distinction is expounded, the "reject-and-replace" is shown to be false, and an alternative view, which retrieves the threatened insights, is advanced. Austin's distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts, and his parallel distinction between locutionary meaning and illocutionary force, are also established in the course of defending them against objections. The terms in which Austin drew the distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts - those of a conventional act distinct from its non-conventional outcomes indicate the theoretical framework required for a development of his conception. In Chapter Three this distinction is expounded and a partial analysis is made of the concepts of some outcomes of acts, viz., effects, consequences and results. Illocutionary acts are not constituted in toto by agents' bodily movements - a point captured in Austin's thesis that illocutionary acts are conventional acts. In Chapter Pour the interpretation customarily imposed on that thesis is discussed and shown to be unfaithful. An alternative interpretation is constructed from points in Austin's own lectures. The solution to the problem of the constitution of illocutionary acts provided by this interpretation is that such acts are constituted by the conventional procedures as part of which locutionary acts are performed. Some other suggested solutions are canvassed. In Chapter Five an account is given of the conventional procedures constitutive of illocutionary acts. In Chapter Six the claim embodied in the main thesis of this work is defended against the counter-claims implicit in Schiffer's, Strawson's and Searle's work. In the Appendix Austin's performative-constative distinction and his later views on truth are defended. An analytical table of contents is included.Trial and error and the idea of progress
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14722
1973-01-01T00:00:00ZPirie, MadsenJoseph Glanvill and the seventeenth century reaction against enthusiasm
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14720
1968-01-01T00:00:00ZWaller, Marian JoanIntuitionism and David Hume's philosophy of religion
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14719
Humean philosophy has been defined in the following ways. (a) A system based on the classical influence of Cicero. (b) An attempt to offer a parallel in moral philosophy to Sir Isaac Newton's contribution to the physical sciences. (c) Intuitionism based on the Shaftesbury/Hutcheson tradition. If we consider Hume's scholarly output as a whole, it would appear difficult to select one work and claim that it represents a definitive, final position. The approach which is taken in this study is that of following the development of Hume's thinking, from his early education through to that stage in his career which saw the completion of his major philosophical works. For a significant part of the later period of his career he broke no new ground in his philosophical studies; but was content to revise his earlier works, turning attention instead to literature, history and religious disputes. When this approach is followed it becomes obvious that the secular interpretation of Humean philosophy, which has gained a great deal of acceptance this century, is far from convincing. Hume in fact wrote a fairly conservative work on natural Religion. Moreover, his Intuitionism makes little sense without the religious foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for granted. What new, significant contribution did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as a fine example of 'applied philosophy', anticipating the insights of modern clinical psychology at a number of points. It is important to see Hume as working in an educational tradition. Scottish, humanistic, Reformed. His family was Presbyterian, and the young Hume would have received a good Christian training. Although he was not considered an outstandingly bright pupil, he attended Edinburgh University at an early age, and soon developed a voracious appetite for reading scholarly literature on his own. The deeply introspective side of his philosophical studies may well have come from his Presbyterian background.
1995-07-01T00:00:00ZMacRae, Malcolm HerbertHumean philosophy has been defined in the following ways. (a) A system based on the classical influence of Cicero. (b) An attempt to offer a parallel in moral philosophy to Sir Isaac Newton's contribution to the physical sciences. (c) Intuitionism based on the Shaftesbury/Hutcheson tradition. If we consider Hume's scholarly output as a whole, it would appear difficult to select one work and claim that it represents a definitive, final position. The approach which is taken in this study is that of following the development of Hume's thinking, from his early education through to that stage in his career which saw the completion of his major philosophical works. For a significant part of the later period of his career he broke no new ground in his philosophical studies; but was content to revise his earlier works, turning attention instead to literature, history and religious disputes. When this approach is followed it becomes obvious that the secular interpretation of Humean philosophy, which has gained a great deal of acceptance this century, is far from convincing. Hume in fact wrote a fairly conservative work on natural Religion. Moreover, his Intuitionism makes little sense without the religious foundation which Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had taken for granted. What new, significant contribution did Hume make? His work can be looked upon as a fine example of 'applied philosophy', anticipating the insights of modern clinical psychology at a number of points. It is important to see Hume as working in an educational tradition. Scottish, humanistic, Reformed. His family was Presbyterian, and the young Hume would have received a good Christian training. Although he was not considered an outstandingly bright pupil, he attended Edinburgh University at an early age, and soon developed a voracious appetite for reading scholarly literature on his own. The deeply introspective side of his philosophical studies may well have come from his Presbyterian background.The philosophy of common sense
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14717
1958-01-01T00:00:00ZGrave, Selwyn Alfred GraveThe religion of Thomas Hobbes
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14713
1954-04-01T00:00:00ZColes, D. M. T.Content and computation : a critical study of some themes in Jerry Fodor's philosophy of mind
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14711
In this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised.I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.
1997-06-01T00:00:00ZCain, MarkIn this thesis I address certain key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and psychology via a study of Jerry Fodor's hugely important contributions to the discussion of those issues. The issues in question are: (i) the nature of scientific psychology; (ii) the individuation of psychological states for the purposes of scientific psychological explanation; and (iii) the project of naturalising mental content. I criticise many of Fodor's most significant and provocative claims but from within a framework of shared assumptions. I attempt to motivate and justify many of these shared assumptions. Chapter 1 constitutes an overview of the key themes in Fodor's philosophy of mind. In Chapter 2 an account of scientific psychology within the orthodox computationalist tradition is developed according to which that discipline is concerned with explaining intentionally characterised cognitive capacities. Such explanations attribute both semantic and syntactic properties to subpersonal representational states and processes. In Chapters 3 and 5 Fodor's various arguments for the conclusion that scientific psychology does (or should) individuate psychological states individualistically are criticised.I argue that there are pragmatic reasons why scientific psychology should sometimes attribute contents that are not locally supervenient. In Chapter 4 I consider Marr's theory of vision and conclude that the contents that Marr attributes to the states of the visual module are locally supervenient. Inconsistency is avoided by stressing the continuity of scientific psychological content with folk psychological content. In Chapter 6 I develop an account of the project of naturalising mental content that vindicates that project. In Chapter 7 I address the question of whether Fodor's theory of content constitutes a successful engagement in that project. I argue for a negative answer before drawing some morals as to how we should proceed in the light of the failure of Fodor's theory.Attitudes and their attributions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14692
This doctoral dissertation is on the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned with various kinds of analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of the general form 'X Øs that a is F', where 'X' can be replaced by the name of the person who is in the particular mental state, 'Ø' can be replaced by a propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', 'hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can be replaced by the name of the individual/object about whom/which the particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a paradigmatic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction still needs to be made between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can be made by distinguishing between two different kinds of propositions -- Russellian propositions corresponding to de re beliefs, and Fregean propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is motivated by arguing that the recent proposals of the 'hybrid' type concerning the semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, Crimmins, Richard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of overgeneralisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de re/de dicto distinction. Therefore, if the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, and the propositions occurring within these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. We need two different semantical accounts to capture the distinction. A de re report is best understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.
1996-07-01T00:00:00ZSen, ManidipaThis doctoral dissertation is on the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions. To be more precise, it is mainly concerned with various kinds of analyses of singular propositional attitude ascriptions. These are sentences of the general form 'X Øs that a is F', where 'X' can be replaced by the name of the person who is in the particular mental state, 'Ø' can be replaced by a propositional attitude verb, like 'believe', 'doubt', 'hope', 'desire', etc., 'a' can be replaced by the name of the individual/object about whom/which the particular attitude is held, and 'F' can be replaced by the name of the property that the individual/object is said to have. The dissertation takes belief to be a paradigmatic example of a propositional attitude, and, thus, focuses mainly on the semantics of ascriptions of beliefs. The thesis it defends is that while a correct analysis of belief ascriptions in general involves a relation between the believer and the proposition which is believed (and which can be regarded as the reference of the 'that'-clause of the belief report), a semantic distinction still needs to be made between de re and de dicto beliefs. This distinction can be made by distinguishing between two different kinds of propositions -- Russellian propositions corresponding to de re beliefs, and Fregean propositions corresponding to de dicto beliefs. This approach is motivated by arguing that the recent proposals of the 'hybrid' type concerning the semantics of belief reports, advocated by such philosophers as Schiffer, Crimmins, Richard, etc., fail. These proposals fail because of overgeneralisation, and, therefore, fail to capture the de re/de dicto distinction. Therefore, if the de re/de dicto distinction is genuine, and the propositions occurring within these two kinds of reports are essentially different, then a single account of belief ascriptions cannot be given. We need two different semantical accounts to capture the distinction. A de re report is best understood by a semantics of the broadly Russellian variety, while a de dicto belief report is best understood by a semantics of the Fregean variety.Objectivity and realism : meeting the manifestation challenge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14685
The anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised.
1999-08-01T00:00:00ZRosenkranz, SvenThe anti-realist maintains that all thoughts that we may entertain are thoughts whose truth-values we can in principle come to recognise. The realist refuses to make any such claim about the limits of our thinking. The anti-realist purports to arrive at her position on the basis of considerations which relate to the manifestability of understanding, i.e. the idea that grasp of thoughts must be manifested in linguistic abilities. Thus she argues against the realist that this requirement cannot be met unless truth is understood not to extend beyond what we can know. Turning the tables, I argue that it is the antirealist who cannot vindicate her position on these grounds. Some thoughts are apt for objective truth; their truth cannot be equated with their current assertibility. Our grasp of such thoughts is not yet manifested in our ability to assert or deny sentences. Once we have identified patterns of linguistic usage which display our grasp of such thoughts however, it transpires that there is no reason either to believe that their truth-values can in principle be recognised.Realism: a critical analysis of some arguments by Michael Dummett
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14680
CHAPTER ONE This thesis is a critical analysis of arguments which Michael Dummett has developed against realism. Dummett characterizes realism as the thesis that the meaning of sentences should be analyzed in terms of the notions oftruth and falsity which obey the classical principle of bivalence. Before examining Dummett's arguments against realism, I consider the two models Dummett proposes for analyzing the content of assertions and examine his thesis that the realist notion of truth is induced for some sentences by their use as constituents in compound sentences.
CHAPTER TWO I begin the examination of Dummett's arguments against realism by noting that Dummett allows in his recent work that a Tarskian truth-theory, couched in terms of a non-classical notion of truth, may act within a theory of meaning as the theory of reference yielding an inductive specification of truth- conditions. I then present Dummett's distinction between modest and full- blooded theories of meaning and suggest that the difference between them lies in the fact that the latter type possesses, while the former type lacks, a theory of sense, which Dummett conceives of as a series of correlations between practical abilities and T-sentences. I then consider the manifestation form of the argument against realism and argue that it fails on several counts. I then consider the acquisition form of the argument and point out the disputable assumptions about language-acquisition on which it is based. In the concluding section I question whether a theory of meaning which makes due allowance for idealization in the study of semantic competence should require a theory of sense of the kind Dummett suggests and question why the theory of reference should be responsive to the particular practical abilities which Dumniett emphasizes.
CHAPTER THREE In this chapter I complete the discussion of Dummett's arguments against realism and argue that Dummett has no satisfactory line of defence against my principal reaction to the manifestation form of the argument against realism. I then present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations and canonic al proofs his general distinction between between direct and indirect verifications. Then consider Dummett's attempts to characterize mathematical truth in terms of canonical proof and general truth in terms of direct verification. I conclude by outlining a problem which confronts a verificationist theory meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw in his argument that a verificationist theory of meaning leads to a rejection of classical logic.
CHAPTER FOUR I begin this chapter by examining Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-realism. I argue that there is a sense in which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of uniformly characterizing anti-realist positions on a number of subjects in terms of the thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing for it. I then consider Dummett's claim that a realist interpretation of counterfactuals involves asserting the unrestricted validity of the law of conditional excluded middle. I conclude by arguing that the anti-realist cannot acknowledge the defeasibility of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences and at the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in terms which do not beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.
1981-07-01T00:00:00ZMenzies, Peter CharlesCHAPTER ONE This thesis is a critical analysis of arguments which Michael Dummett has developed against realism. Dummett characterizes realism as the thesis that the meaning of sentences should be analyzed in terms of the notions oftruth and falsity which obey the classical principle of bivalence. Before examining Dummett's arguments against realism, I consider the two models Dummett proposes for analyzing the content of assertions and examine his thesis that the realist notion of truth is induced for some sentences by their use as constituents in compound sentences.
CHAPTER TWO I begin the examination of Dummett's arguments against realism by noting that Dummett allows in his recent work that a Tarskian truth-theory, couched in terms of a non-classical notion of truth, may act within a theory of meaning as the theory of reference yielding an inductive specification of truth- conditions. I then present Dummett's distinction between modest and full- blooded theories of meaning and suggest that the difference between them lies in the fact that the latter type possesses, while the former type lacks, a theory of sense, which Dummett conceives of as a series of correlations between practical abilities and T-sentences. I then consider the manifestation form of the argument against realism and argue that it fails on several counts. I then consider the acquisition form of the argument and point out the disputable assumptions about language-acquisition on which it is based. In the concluding section I question whether a theory of meaning which makes due allowance for idealization in the study of semantic competence should require a theory of sense of the kind Dummett suggests and question why the theory of reference should be responsive to the particular practical abilities which Dumniett emphasizes.
CHAPTER THREE In this chapter I complete the discussion of Dummett's arguments against realism and argue that Dummett has no satisfactory line of defence against my principal reaction to the manifestation form of the argument against realism. I then present Dummett's distinction between demonstrations and canonic al proofs his general distinction between between direct and indirect verifications. Then consider Dummett's attempts to characterize mathematical truth in terms of canonical proof and general truth in terms of direct verification. I conclude by outlining a problem which confronts a verificationist theory meaning of the kind Dummett espouses and show that there is a flaw in his argument that a verificationist theory of meaning leads to a rejection of classical logic.
CHAPTER FOUR I begin this chapter by examining Dummett's claim that reductionism is neither necessary nor sufficient for anti-realism. I argue that there is a sense in which reductionism is necessary and claim that there is a way of uniformly characterizing anti-realist positions on a number of subjects in terms of the thesis that a sentence is true in virtue of the evidence existing for it. I then consider Dummett's claim that a realist interpretation of counterfactuals involves asserting the unrestricted validity of the law of conditional excluded middle. I conclude by arguing that the anti-realist cannot acknowledge the defeasibility of evidence for empirically undecidable sentences and at the same time meet a legitimate demand that he explain in terms which do not beg any questions his conception of truth for such sentences.The individual and the absolute: a re-examination of some points in British Idealist philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14675
1973-10-01T00:00:00ZIslam, AminulThe background and use of the term 'idea' by Malebranche, Locke and Leibniz
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14672
The general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind.
We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing.
In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism.
In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke’s causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke’s position suffers from the omission of concepts.
1978-01-01T00:00:00ZEsterline, Albert CrawfordThe general distinction between uses of the term "idea" which we draw is between occurrences in the mind and dispositions for them as opposed to concepts. Locke uses "idea" in the first way, Malebranche uses it in the second. Leibniz allows that the mind is infinite and that dispositions in the body correspond to dispositions in the mind; thus he is able to maintain that idea are both concepts and dispositions in the mind.
We explain concepts in terms of conventional rules, for the most part linguistic and especially mathematical. We call a system of conventional rules an objective structure and, as those who took ideas to be concepts held that they are concepts of divine science, we treat God as the unique objective structure. The question in seventeenth century theories of ideas is how that body of knowledge comprising ideas and their relations is applicable to thing.
In the first four chapters, we consider concepts and the Cartesian programme to reduce the description of everything but that which applies concepts to mathematical descriptions. Descartes, Malebranche, and Leibniz held that the lack of simplicity and exactness in human knowledge arises from the correspondence between microscopic activities in the body and mental occurrences. With occurrences in the body explained mechanically, it was held, the world can be described with maximum simplicity and exactness. Extended things are law-obeying configurations to which concepts are applied; thinking things are rule-following things by virtue of applying these concepts. But the parts played by convention and behaviour are left out of their accounts and, omitting these, the world cannot be shown to be anything more than a diagram, perhaps portrayed only in the mind of the investigator. In the antepenultimate chapter, we discuss two related views which led the rationalists to maintain that all rational beings naturally follow a unique objective structure: their position on the correspondence between the activity of the body and occurrences in the mind (illustrated in their theories of vision) and the view that divine science is the standard for all scientific formulations. In the penultimate chapter, we present evidence that rationalist accounts of cognition were in fact modelled on rule-governed activity, Plato's theory of knowledge and Ideas is compared with rationalist accounts and is found to have less relevance to rule-governed activity, Kant, we admit, saw the relevance of rules, but no more than the rationalists. In the ninth chapter, we discuss Malebranche's vision in God (which most clearly presents ideas as concepts), its relation to Descartes' and Leibniz's positions and its dependent on occasionalism.
In the fifth chapter, we argue against Chomsky's innatist position and, more generally, claims in the behavioural and social sciences to explain human knowledge in terms of internalized components and covert activities. It is also maintained that Chomsky's innatism bears little resemblance to that of seventeenth century rationalism. We discuss in the sixth through the eighth chapters the Scholastic back-ground to the use of the term "idea" and theories of ideas. In the sixth chapter, the pervasive influence of Suarez is established, as is the prevalence of nominalism in the seventeenth century and its connection with Gaszendism and eventually Locke. Suarez combined aspects of Thomism and nominalism, Thomism was concerned with so-called spiritual objects of knowledge, which roughly act as standards and are the contribution of the knower to what is known; rationalism's account of knowledge maintained these aspects of Thomism, nominalism, on the other hand, presented what we shall call a causal or genetic account of knowledge (according to which our knowledge arises from causal relations and operations of the intellect) and was concerned with so-called material objects got from sensation (while allowing for spiritual operations). The distinction between spiritual and material objects and faculties is introduced in the sixth chapter. In the seventh chapter, we discuss the bridge between these facilities, the intellectus agens, which served as an objective structure in Thomist accounts. In the eight chapter, we discuss uses of “spiritual”, “idea” and “mind”, beginning with Scholastic uses, but concentrating on the differences between Descartes and Gassendi. Locke’s causal account is discussed in the final chapter. We emphasise his divergence from Cartesianism, such as his view on the narrow compass of the understanding, his treatment of mathematical ideas as signs and his reliance on mental dispositions. Locke’s position suffers from the omission of concepts.The ideas of the Sophists in Plato's dialogues
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14667
Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in five of Plato's dialogues: the Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Republic I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists. Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' physis with the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence (ὰρϵϮή). Chapter II investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter III shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps to explain his idea of physis and "the natural continuous bodies of being". Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other fellow's good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.
1992-07-01T00:00:00ZChang, K. -C.Aiming, in contrast to the traditional attitude, to arrive at general distinction of the role of the Sophists and the Sophistic Movement, this research concentrates on the individual Sophists rather than Socrates in five of Plato's dialogues: the Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Republic I. The thinking of six individual Sophists is examined in detail by contrasting the historical Sophists and the Sophists as portrayed by Plato in his dialogues. In addition to this the study considers whether or not Plato's logical validity is consistent in developing an argument between Socrates and the individual Sophists. Chapter I attempts to contrast the meaning of Callicles' physis with the Homeric hero's power and honour in unrivalled strength and prowess, closely interrelated with one's competitive excellence (ὰρϵϮή). Chapter II investigates the thinking of the two Sophists, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, finding it to be closely interrelated with the logic and ontology of the Eleatics in the respect of developing their systematic fallacies. Chapter III shows that Hippias, as polymath, has derived his basic ideas from the natural philosophers, Heraclitus and Empedocles, and shows how this helps to explain his idea of physis and "the natural continuous bodies of being". Chapter IV discusses how Protagoras' claim to be a teacher of the art of politics and of making men good citizens can be coherently justifiable through his use of myth and argument. Chapter V clarifies how Thrasymachus' definition of justice as "justice and the just are the other fellow's good" leads to his other proposition "justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger" in the actual world, involving the courage to look the real facts in the face rather than hide behind the name of justice. In particular Socrates' ineffectiveness is well displayed in dealing with the powerful claim of the moral sceptic, for his counterattack falls short of refuting Thrasymachus' position in this dialogue.Remembering dreams
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14663
This thesis concludes that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk about dreams being dream during sleep stands open to contradiction by empirical evidence supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained by peculiarities in the manner of awakening. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appeal's to have happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. Chapter One ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done") argues that sober reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") argues that the ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Part One (What Appeals To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what beaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows that we do remember something else, some irreducible mental activity. The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during sleep. Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues that the scientific study of sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support die hypothesis that a person remembers thoughts and intentions from sleep. Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued that neither evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion that dreams are episodes remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from sleep. Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of the conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Without Experience") argues that our conviction that dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep is an empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of die Received Opinion. The conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argument that the concept of dreaming is not a theoretical concept and from that of Squires' (1973) argument that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues that assumptions about the causal explanation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'. The Conclusion ("A Truth of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap forced by the thesis between the unreasoning confidence of our awakening conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the Dispositional Analysis. It recommends an uneasy resignation to die conclusion that our undoubting faith that something is remembered reduces to nothing more substantial than the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is the exercise of an unconsciously acquired and retained disposition to awake with a merely apparent memory of episodes occurring during sleep.
1994-07-01T00:00:00ZRobertson, MichaelThis thesis concludes that our commonplace conviction that dreams are dreamt during sleep and remembered or forgotten upon waking is, at best, a speculative hypothesis open to a very reasonable scepticism. The conclusion follows from a defence of the Dispositional Analysis, that to remember or forget a dream is to retain or lose an ability acquired during sleep to tell without invention or inference a fictitious story as if of events witnessed and deeds done. According to the Dispositional Analysis everyday talk about dreams being dream during sleep stands open to contradiction by empirical evidence supporting Globot's Hypothesis that the content of our awakening narratives is explained by peculiarities in the manner of awakening. According to the Dispositional Analysis, our ordinary assumption that 'telling a dream' is an exercise of memory can only be tested within a theory enabling us to predict whilst a person is asleep what, if any, dream he would tell, if awoken in a normal manner, prompted to say what appeal's to have happened (no matter how incredible or unimaginable), and not distracted. Chapter One ("Events Witnessed and Deeds Done") argues that sober reflection on what we already know shows that, in 'telling a dream', a person usually does not remember perceptions and actions from sleep. In Chapter Two ("The Unimagined and Unimaginable") argues that the ability to tell a dream cannot be reduced to memory of thoughts and intentions directed towards images. The conclusion drawn from Part One (What Appeals To Be Remembered) is not merely that there is no general account of what beaming consist in, as if the fact that we do not remember illusory perceptions, thoughts or images shows that we do remember something else, some irreducible mental activity. The conclusion is that when we 'remember dreams' we generally remember nothing of what happened during sleep. Chapter Three ("'Actions' During Sleep") argues that the scientific study of sleepwalking, sleeptalking, night terrors, prearranged 'signalling' during sleep fail to support die hypothesis that a person remembers thoughts and intentions from sleep. Chapter Four ('"Perceptions During Sleep"), it is argued that neither evidence of physiological activity peripheral to the central nervous system (e.g. eye movements, muscular twitches, penes erections, etc.) interpreted as 'covert behaviour' during sleep, nor evidence of neurological activity of the forebrain interpreted as critical responses to internally generated 'stimuli' supports the Received Opinion that dreams are episodes remembered from sleep. Part Two ("Scientific Studies of Sleep and Dreaming"), concludes that experimental sleep research is consistent with the conclusion that a person telling a dream is typically not remembering mental acts, events, states or processes from sleep. Part Three ("The Dispositional Analysis") questions the implications of the conclusion that the Received Opinion is false. Chapter Five ("Dreaming Without Experience") argues that our conviction that dreams are dreamt or 'occur' during sleep is an empirical hypothesis which survives the falsification of die Received Opinion. The conclusion drawn here departs both from that of Malcolm's (1959) argument that the concept of dreaming is not a theoretical concept and from that of Squires' (1973) argument that dreaming is a bad theoretical concept. Chapter Six, argues that assumptions about the causal explanation of telling a dream whilst central to our talk about dreams being dreamt or occurring during sleep cannot not explain our commonplace conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep. In particular, it is argued against Dennett (1976) that a causal-cum-representational analysis of remembering dreams does not escape the need to distinguish between the everyday notion of memory appropriate to retaining an ability to tell a dream and a technical notion of storage in short-term 'memory'. The Conclusion ("A Truth of Underwhelming Importance?") reflects upon the gap forced by the thesis between the unreasoning confidence of our awakening conviction that dreams are remembered from sleep and the speculative justification accorded to it by the Dispositional Analysis. It recommends an uneasy resignation to die conclusion that our undoubting faith that something is remembered reduces to nothing more substantial than the hypothesis that 'telling a dream' is the exercise of an unconsciously acquired and retained disposition to awake with a merely apparent memory of episodes occurring during sleep.The concept of application
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/14660
1960-01-01T00:00:00ZStoothoff, Robert H.What do I know? scepticism : reasoning and knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13770
This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZCarrick, LaurenceThis thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, I critically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4, I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of semantic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning, together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.III - Contractarianism as a political morality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13679
Contractarianism initially made its mark, in the seventeenth century, as a sort of theory of everything in ethics. But gradually philosophers became convinced that there were resources available outside contractarianism for settling important moral questions—for instance, ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons. Then Rawls revived contractarianism with a more modest aim—namely, as a theory of justice. But even this agenda for contractarianism has been called into question, most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal for identifying the true conception of justice. So the question remains: how should contractarianism be construed if it is to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered in some other way? In my essay I offer a very simple answer: contractarianism should be construed as a political morality. I arrive at this answer by starting with contractarianism as a theory of everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood. I begin by describing what contractarianism is. Then I dispense with contractarianism as a theory of state legitimacy, as a theory of interpersonal morality, and as a theory of justice. Finally, I distinguish political morality from the other already-mentioned areas of morality, and argue that contractarianism is a sensible theory of its grounds.
2016-05-26T00:00:00ZSachs, Benjamin AlanContractarianism initially made its mark, in the seventeenth century, as a sort of theory of everything in ethics. But gradually philosophers became convinced that there were resources available outside contractarianism for settling important moral questions—for instance, ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons. Then Rawls revived contractarianism with a more modest aim—namely, as a theory of justice. But even this agenda for contractarianism has been called into question, most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal for identifying the true conception of justice. So the question remains: how should contractarianism be construed if it is to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered in some other way? In my essay I offer a very simple answer: contractarianism should be construed as a political morality. I arrive at this answer by starting with contractarianism as a theory of everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood. I begin by describing what contractarianism is. Then I dispense with contractarianism as a theory of state legitimacy, as a theory of interpersonal morality, and as a theory of justice. Finally, I distinguish political morality from the other already-mentioned areas of morality, and argue that contractarianism is a sensible theory of its grounds.The Grotian concept of a right
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13678
2016-06-01T00:00:00ZSkorupski, John MariaSense, incomplete understanding, and the problem of normative guidance
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13674
Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZPedriali, Walter B.Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers.The nexus of control: intentional activity and moral accountability
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13660
There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZConradie, NiëlThere is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent’s openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.Quatenus and Spinoza's monism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13545
I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.
2018-04-01T00:00:00ZDouglas, AlexanderI examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.The role of well-being in ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13350
In this thesis I assess the role of well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a threefold charge against the importance of well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon argues (1) that the concept of well-being plays very little role in the thinking of an agent; (2) that no unified theory of well-being can be found; (3) that welfarism is false. In Part I, I argue that the concept of well-being does play an explanatorily and justificatorily important role in the thinking of a rational agent. I arrive at this conclusion by distinguishing levels of thinking activity as well as by considering the implicit rather than explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. I conclude this part of the thesis by illustrating the relation between the idea of well-being, its parts and its sources. In Part II, I put forward a unified theory of well-being and I do so by taking on board with a slight modification Scanlon's own buck-passing account of value. I argue that something is a part of a person's good if, and only if, there is reason for this person to desire it. I claim that this account does not fall prey to the 'scope problem'. I also discuss a number of different though connected issues such as the defence of the claim that well-being is itself a normative notion and issues concerning the various parts of well-being. In Part III, I begin to sketch the normative role of well-being both first-personally and impartially. With Scanlon, I agree that welfarism is false. Yet, I argue in favour of a moderate form of welfarism, a view that takes a positive function of each individual's well-being to afford the ultimate criterion of practical reason.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZRodogno, RaffaeleIn this thesis I assess the role of well-being in ethics. In order to do so I reply to a threefold charge against the importance of well-being in ethics. In What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon argues (1) that the concept of well-being plays very little role in the thinking of an agent; (2) that no unified theory of well-being can be found; (3) that welfarism is false. In Part I, I argue that the concept of well-being does play an explanatorily and justificatorily important role in the thinking of a rational agent. I arrive at this conclusion by distinguishing levels of thinking activity as well as by considering the implicit rather than explicit role well-being plays in our deliberation. I conclude this part of the thesis by illustrating the relation between the idea of well-being, its parts and its sources. In Part II, I put forward a unified theory of well-being and I do so by taking on board with a slight modification Scanlon's own buck-passing account of value. I argue that something is a part of a person's good if, and only if, there is reason for this person to desire it. I claim that this account does not fall prey to the 'scope problem'. I also discuss a number of different though connected issues such as the defence of the claim that well-being is itself a normative notion and issues concerning the various parts of well-being. In Part III, I begin to sketch the normative role of well-being both first-personally and impartially. With Scanlon, I agree that welfarism is false. Yet, I argue in favour of a moderate form of welfarism, a view that takes a positive function of each individual's well-being to afford the ultimate criterion of practical reason.Corporate agency and possible futures
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13302
We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.
2018-05-03T00:00:00ZMulgan, TimWe need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.Rejecting moral obligation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13225
The thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are no categorical requirements on action; therefore, there are no moral obligations. The underlying claim is that, because of this, morality itself rests on a mistaken view of normativity. The view of categoricity I provide rests on there being 'external reasons' for action. Having explained the connections between oughts (in particular the ought of moral obligation) and reasons for action in the first part of the thesis, I then develop and defend a version of reasons internalism that I call 'recognitional internalism'. The basic idea, which is not itself incompatible with categoricity, is that to have a reason one must be able to recognise that one has that reason. However, I work this basic claim into a substantive truth-condition for reason-statements and argue that the reasons one is able to recognise are controlled by one's subjective motives. I use this to argue that there are no categorical moral obligations. Nonetheless, I also argue that the substantive challenge internalism poses morality is importantly different, indeed more pressing, than usually thought. This is to justify the objective supremacy of the reasons for action constitutive of moral obligation.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZRobertson, SimonThe thesis argues that, were there any moral obligations, they would be categorical; but there are no categorical requirements on action; therefore, there are no moral obligations. The underlying claim is that, because of this, morality itself rests on a mistaken view of normativity. The view of categoricity I provide rests on there being 'external reasons' for action. Having explained the connections between oughts (in particular the ought of moral obligation) and reasons for action in the first part of the thesis, I then develop and defend a version of reasons internalism that I call 'recognitional internalism'. The basic idea, which is not itself incompatible with categoricity, is that to have a reason one must be able to recognise that one has that reason. However, I work this basic claim into a substantive truth-condition for reason-statements and argue that the reasons one is able to recognise are controlled by one's subjective motives. I use this to argue that there are no categorical moral obligations. Nonetheless, I also argue that the substantive challenge internalism poses morality is importantly different, indeed more pressing, than usually thought. This is to justify the objective supremacy of the reasons for action constitutive of moral obligation.Contemporary ethical naturalism : a comparative metaethical evaluation of expressivism and Cornell realism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13224
This thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZSonderholm, JornThis thesis contains a critical discussion of two metaethical theories: expressivism, as developed in the works of Simon Blackburn, and Cornell realism, as presented by Richard Boyd and David Brink. In the introduction, a distinction is made between external and internal accommodation projects for moral discourse and it is argued that the external accommodation project should be guided by acceptance of methodological naturalism. Expressivism and Cornell realism are then subjected to an extended comparative evaluation, and an answer is sought to the question of which of the two should be favoured. The main conclusion of the thesis is that Cornell realism is rationally preferable to expressivism. This conclusion is arrived at by looking at how well the two theories, respectively, explain various deeply embedded features of moral discourse. Explaining such features is what the internal accommodation project for moral discourse consists in. The assertoric surface-form of moral discourse and the supervenience of moral predicates on natural predicates receive special attention in the study. It is argued that expressivism and Cornell realism do equally well on the issue of moral supervenience. But whereas expressivism is still vulnerable to a particular argument from the philosophy of language (the Frege-Geach point), Cornell realism can fend off the criticism that most persistently has been directed at it from this area of philosophy. In a comparative evaluation involving the selected issues, Cornell realism therefore fares better than expressivism.Why should I be moral? : toward a defence of the categoricity and normative authority of moral considerations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13223
Can we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZHurtig, KentCan we ever be fully practically justified in acting contrary to moral demands? My contention is that the answer is 'no'. I argue that by adopting a 'buck-passing' account of wrongness we can provide a philosophically satisfying answer to the familiar 'why should I be moral?'. In working my way toward the buck-passing account of wrongness, I outline (and, to some degree, defend) the metaethical and 'metanormative' assumptions on which my theory stands. I also consider and reject the 'internalist' (or as it can also be described, the neo-Humean) answer to 'why should I be moral?'. The account I end up with is decidedly non-consequentialist and it is consistent with common-sense morality. It also provides a way of showing why moral considerations (in competition with non-moral considerations) are overridingly normative in a way that is consistent with our best current understanding of what practical reason requires of us.Legal paternalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13222
Legal paternalism is the interference by the state in the choice or choices of citizens, for the good of those citizens. There are strong intuitions for and against paternalism, which correspond to the value we place on well-being and self-determination, respectively. This thesis takes as a starting point a certain balance between these two values, and explores its ramifications at a number of levels. Paternalism is taken to be justified only when the choices in question are not expressions of self-determination. I first explore what it takes for a choice not to be an expression of self-determination through a discussion of voluntariness and its relationship to compatibilism in discussions of freedom of the will. I conclude that which choices are expressions of self-determination is a matter to be settled in the practical domain. This idea is explored in a discussion of decision-making competence. Finally, I outline the positive normative ethical evaluation of self-determination which provides the justification for the anti-paternalist stance.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZBatstone, AislinnLegal paternalism is the interference by the state in the choice or choices of citizens, for the good of those citizens. There are strong intuitions for and against paternalism, which correspond to the value we place on well-being and self-determination, respectively. This thesis takes as a starting point a certain balance between these two values, and explores its ramifications at a number of levels. Paternalism is taken to be justified only when the choices in question are not expressions of self-determination. I first explore what it takes for a choice not to be an expression of self-determination through a discussion of voluntariness and its relationship to compatibilism in discussions of freedom of the will. I conclude that which choices are expressions of self-determination is a matter to be settled in the practical domain. This idea is explored in a discussion of decision-making competence. Finally, I outline the positive normative ethical evaluation of self-determination which provides the justification for the anti-paternalist stance.Naturalism, normativity, and the 'open question' argument
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13218
The 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZFisher, Andrew DavidThe 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.Aesthetic antirealism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13217
A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory that accommodates both intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role of imagination in the experience of artworks, and the metaphorical quality of aesthetic discourse. The hallmark of realism, namely the mind-independence of aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment that yields an impoverished view of artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which preserves the objectivity of aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception of artworks and our interaction with them.
2003-06-01T00:00:00ZCooke, Brandon L.A puzzle is generated by two intuitions about artworks: 1. There is no prima facie reason to take artworks to be mind-independent objects; 2. Aesthetic judgments are objective. These intuitions seem to be in tension, for if artworks or their aesthetic properties are mind-dependent, how can aesthetic judgments be objective? The common solution to the puzzle lies in rejecting or revising one of the two intuitions. Typically, realists reject 1, and many antirealists reject 2. I develop an antirealist aesthetic theory that accommodates both intuitions, focusing on critical disagreement between epistemically optimal judges, realist difficulties with supervenience and response-dependence, the role of imagination in the experience of artworks, and the metaphorical quality of aesthetic discourse. The hallmark of realism, namely the mind-independence of aesthetic qualities, is an untenable commitment that yields an impoverished view of artworks. A cognitivist anti-realism is available which preserves the objectivity of aesthetic discourse and yields a richer conception of artworks and our interaction with them.Philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13193
This thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it.
Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note.
Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses.
The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed.
The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZNowak, Lisa RebeccaThis thesis is concerned with philosophical perspectives on the stigma of mental illness, with each chapter exploring different philosophical issues. Chapter one delineates the central concept around which the rest of the work revolves: the stigma of mental illness. It provides an outline of the stigma mechanism, how it applies to mental illness, why it is such a large public health concern and what has been done so far to combat it.
Chapter two is concerned with the application of recent literature in the philosophy of implicit bias to the topic of mental illness. It suggests that we have hitherto been preoccupied with explicit formulations of the stigma mechanism, but argues that there are distinctive issues involved in combatting forms of discrimination in which the participants are not cognisant of their attitudes or actions, and that anti-stigma initiatives for mental illness should take note.
Chapter three applies the philosophical literature concerning the ethics of our epistemic practices to the stigma of mental illness. It contains an analysis of how epistemic injustice- primarily in the forms of testimonial injustice and stereotype threat- affects those with mental illnesses.
The fourth chapter brings in issues in the philosophy of science (particularly the philosophy of psychiatry) to explore the possibility of intervening on the stigma process to halt the stigma of mental illness. The first candidate (preventing labelling) is discounted, and the second (combatting stereotype) is tentatively endorsed.
The fifth chapter is concerned with how language facilitates the stigma of mental illness. It suggests that using generics to talk about mental illness (whether the knowledge structure conveyed is inaccurate or accurate) is deeply problematic. In the former, it conveys insidious forms of social stereotyping. In the latter, it propagates misinformation by presenting the category as a quintessential one.The phrasal implicature theory of metaphors and slurs
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13189
This thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic
literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is
only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential
pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against
this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can
explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs.
In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an
outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims
on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to
present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3
introduces the notion of "phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase-level
pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my
theory of metaphor, which I call "phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and
discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a
new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics
distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory
of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal
implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various
uses of slurs.
2018-06-28T00:00:00ZYavuz, AlperThis thesis develops a pragmatic theory of metaphors and slurs. In the pragmatic
literature, theorists mostly hold the view that the framework developed by Grice is
only applicable to the sentence-level pragmatic phenomena, whereas the subsentential
pragmatic phenomena require a different approach. In this thesis, I argue against
this view and claim that the Gricean framework, after some plausible revisions, can
explain subsentential pragmatic phenomena, such as metaphors and slurs.
In the first chapter, I introduce three basic theses I will defend and give an
outline of the argument I will develop. The second chapter discusses three claims
on metaphor that are widely discussed in the literature. There I state my aim to
present a theory of metaphor which can accommodate these three claims. Chapter 3
introduces the notion of "phrasal implicature", which will be used to explain phrase-level
pragmatic phenomena with a Gricean approach. In Chapter 4, I present my
theory of metaphor, which I call "phrasal implicature theory of metaphor" and
discuss certain aspects of the theory. The notion of phrasal implicature enables a
new conception of what-is-said and a different approach to the semantics-pragmatics
distinction. Chapter 5 looks into these issues. In Chapter 6, I compare my theory
of metaphor with three other theories. Finally, in Chapter 7, I develop a phrasal
implicature theory of slurs, which I argue outperforms its rivals in explaining various
uses of slurs.Proper names and possible worlds
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/13083
In this essay a theory of proper names is developed and
applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a
discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds.
The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty
singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege’ s
problem with identity .
In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of
Russell’s and Frege’s theories of names, a theory is developed. It
is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established
between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of
the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary,
fictional, and other such non-existent things.
The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine’s
programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that
the programme cannot be justified.
The third chapter centres around the construction of
logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is
assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established
the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed
without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity
can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate
a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal
systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions
about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the
interpretation of modal operators
1975-01-01T00:00:00ZGirle, Roderic AllenIn this essay a theory of proper names is developed and
applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a
discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds.
The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty
singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege’ s
problem with identity .
In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of
Russell’s and Frege’s theories of names, a theory is developed. It
is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established
between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of
the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary,
fictional, and other such non-existent things.
The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine’s
programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that
the programme cannot be justified.
The third chapter centres around the construction of
logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is
assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established
the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed
without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity
can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate
a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal
systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions
about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the
interpretation of modal operatorsTime, fixity, and the metaphysics of the future
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12951
Philosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so called 'pure' forms of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The 'pure' B-Theory, with its denial of objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. The 'pure' A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic arguments which rely upon the determinateness of future truth as their key premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZDiekemper, JosephPhilosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so called 'pure' forms of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The 'pure' B-Theory, with its denial of objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. The 'pure' A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic arguments which rely upon the determinateness of future truth as their key premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.Rule-following: conventionalism, scepticism and rationality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12950
The thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZPanjvani, CyrusThe thesis argues, in lie main, for both a negative and positive agenda to Wittgenstein's rule-following remarks in both his Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the foundations of Mathematics. The negative agenda is a sceptical agenda, different than as conceived by Kripke, that is destructive of a realist account of rules and contends that the correct application of a rule is not fully determined in an understanding of the rule. In addition to these consequences, this negative agenda opens Wittgenstein to Dummett's charge of radical conventionalism (a charge that also, but differently, applies to certain mid-period views and this is addressed in the first chapter). These negative consequences are left unresolved by Kripke's sceptical solution and, notably, are wrongly assessed by those that dissent from a sceptical reading (e.g., McDowell). The positive agenda builds on these negative considerations arguing that although there is no determination in the understanding of a rule of what will count as a correct application in so far unconsidered situations, we are still able to follow a rule correctly. This seems to involve an epistemic leap, from an underdetermined understanding to a determinate application, and, in respect of this appearance, involves what Wittgenstein calls following a rule "blindly" in an epistemic sense. Developing this view, of following a rule blindly, involves developing an account of an alternative rational response to rule instruction, one that need not involve a role for interpreting or inferring, but all the same allows for correctness in rule application in virtue of enabling agreement in rule application.Knowledge, lies and vagueness : a minimalist treatment
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12921
Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. In the second part of this thesis, I develop a minimal theory of vagueness in which a rigorous but neutral definition of vagueness is shown to be possible. Three dimensions of vagueness are distinguished and a proof is given showing how two of these dimensions are equivalent facets of the same phenomenon. From the axioms of this minimal theory one can also show that there must be higher-order vagueness, contrary to what some have argued. In the final part of this thesis, I return to issues concerning the credentials of truth-minimalism. Is truth-minimalism compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Is it right to say that truth-minimalism is crippled by the liar paradox? With respect to the former question, I develop a novel three-valued logical system which is both proof-theoretically and truth-theoretic ally well-motivated and compatible with at least one form of minimalism. With respect to the second question, a new solution to the liar paradox is developed based on the claim that while the liar sentence is meaningful, it is improper to even suppose that this sentence has a truth-status. On that basis, one can block the paradox by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sentential sequent calculus. The first lesson of the liar paradox is that not all assumptions are for free. The second lesson of the liar is that, contrary to what has been alleged by many, minimalism concerning truth is far better placed than its rival theories to solve the paradox.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZGreenough, PatrickMinimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. In the second part of this thesis, I develop a minimal theory of vagueness in which a rigorous but neutral definition of vagueness is shown to be possible. Three dimensions of vagueness are distinguished and a proof is given showing how two of these dimensions are equivalent facets of the same phenomenon. From the axioms of this minimal theory one can also show that there must be higher-order vagueness, contrary to what some have argued. In the final part of this thesis, I return to issues concerning the credentials of truth-minimalism. Is truth-minimalism compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Is it right to say that truth-minimalism is crippled by the liar paradox? With respect to the former question, I develop a novel three-valued logical system which is both proof-theoretically and truth-theoretic ally well-motivated and compatible with at least one form of minimalism. With respect to the second question, a new solution to the liar paradox is developed based on the claim that while the liar sentence is meaningful, it is improper to even suppose that this sentence has a truth-status. On that basis, one can block the paradox by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sentential sequent calculus. The first lesson of the liar paradox is that not all assumptions are for free. The second lesson of the liar is that, contrary to what has been alleged by many, minimalism concerning truth is far better placed than its rival theories to solve the paradox.Quine and Boolos on second-order logic : an examination of the debate
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12920
The aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the logical status of higher-order logic-with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition that higher-order logic is of a genuinely logical character. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over the question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos. Chapter I will be a detailed consideration of Quine's conception of logic and its place within the wider context of his philosophy. Only once this backdrop is in place will I then examine his views on higher-order logic. In Chapter II, I turn to Boolos's response to Quine-his attempt to examine the extent to which we may want to count higher-order logic as logic and the extent to which we may want to count it as set theory. With each point Boolos raises, I attempt to give what I think would have been Quine's reply. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider Boolos's attempt to show that monadic second-order logic (MSOL) should be understood as pure logic as it does not commit us to the existence of classes, as we may take the standard interpretation of MSOL to do. I discuss here some of the major reactions to Boolos's plural interpretation (Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo), and conclude with more speculative remarks on what Quine's own response might have been. Throughout this thesis, my primary method has been one of close textual analysis.
2005-01-01T00:00:00ZMorris, SeanThe aim of this thesis is to examine the debate between Quine and Boolos over the logical status of higher-order logic-with Quine taking the position that higher-logic is more properly understood as set theory and Boolos arguing in opposition that higher-order logic is of a genuinely logical character. My purpose here then will be to stay as neutral as possible over the question of whether or not higher-order logic counts as logic and to instead focus on the exposition of the debate itself as exemplified in the work of Quine and Boolos. Chapter I will be a detailed consideration of Quine's conception of logic and its place within the wider context of his philosophy. Only once this backdrop is in place will I then examine his views on higher-order logic. In Chapter II, I turn to Boolos's response to Quine-his attempt to examine the extent to which we may want to count higher-order logic as logic and the extent to which we may want to count it as set theory. With each point Boolos raises, I attempt to give what I think would have been Quine's reply. Finally, in Chapter III, I consider Boolos's attempt to show that monadic second-order logic (MSOL) should be understood as pure logic as it does not commit us to the existence of classes, as we may take the standard interpretation of MSOL to do. I discuss here some of the major reactions to Boolos's plural interpretation (Resnik, Parsons, and Linnebo), and conclude with more speculative remarks on what Quine's own response might have been. Throughout this thesis, my primary method has been one of close textual analysis.A vindication of logical necessity against scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12919
Some philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.
2002-01-01T00:00:00ZPhilie, PatriceSome philosophers dispute the claim that there is a notion of logical necessity involved in the concept of logical consequence. They are sceptical about logical necessity. They argue that a proper characterisation of logical consequence - of what follows from what - need not and should not appeal to the notion of necessity at all. Quine is the most prominent philosopher holding such a view. In this doctoral dissertation, I argue that scepticism about logical necessity is not successful. Quine's scepticism takes three forms. Firstly, he is often interpreted as undermining, in his classic paper 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', the very intelligibility of notions such as meaning, necessity, and analyticity. If the notion of necessity is meaningless, it is clear that ascriptions of logical necessity are also meaningless. In the thesis, I defend Quine's criticism of these notions by situating it in its historical context and emphasising that the real target in those writings is not the intelligibility of these notions as such, but only their Platonistic interpretation. I agree with Quine that a good theory about meaning, necessity, or analyticity must avoid such an ontological commitment. Secondly, Quine advocates, in the same paper, a holistic picture of knowledge and claims that in this picture, ascriptions of logical necessity are superfluous. I then show that holism a la Quine is committed to admit the necessity of statements of logical consequence. Thirdly, there is Quine's substitutional account of logical consequence (as exposed in his (1970)). He contends that this theory makes no use of logical necessity, thus showing its superfluousness. I show that any plausible account of logical consequence needs to appeal to logical necessity, thus undercutting Quine's claim - and, more generally, undercutting scepticism about logical necessity.Davidson's third dogma
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12917
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZHough, Gerard MichaelImmunity to error through misidentification and the trilemma about the self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12916
The thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZColiva, AnnalisaThe thesis addresses the issues of error through misidentification and immunity to error through misidentification in relation to the problem of the first person. First, it provides an explanation of error through misidentification. Secondly, it shows that there are two possible ways of understanding immunity to error through misidentification. It is then argued that the first understanding of immunity to error through misidentification leads to what is labelled "the trilemma about the self". That is to say, either we provide an explanation of immunity to error through misidentification, but we subscribe to two contentious metaphysical views about the self-the Cartesian and the Idealist; or else we hold the view that the self is identical with a human being, but we have no explanation of immunity to error through misidentification. It is then shown that in order to solve the trilemma, a different understanding of immunity to error through misidentification must be offered. After discussing various possible understandings of immunity to error through misidentification, a sound account of it is finally provided. Moreover, it is shown how non-inferential, introspection-based mental self-ascriptions can comply with it, in such a way that they turn out to be logically immune to error through misidentification. Finally, by drawing on Evans' and Peacocke's accounts of the possession conditions of the first person concept-in which IEM I-judgements play a central role-, it is shown that it is a concept of a human being who thinks of herself as such. Hence, our first person concept is firmly anti-Cartesian and anti-Idealist. As a consequence, it is maintained that not only is there no need to hold the Cartesian and the Idealist metaphysics of the self in order to explain why some I-judgements can be immune to error through misidentification, but it is also argued that one can no longer be either Cartesian or Idealist. For that would expose one to conceptual incoherence.Formal causation and mental representation : a thomistic proposal
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12915
In the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.
2003-01-01T00:00:00ZDe Anna, GabrieleIn the past years, the relevance of Thomas Aquinas's theory of cognition for contemporary debates on epistemology has been widely discussed. That theory claims that mind and world are formally identical and that this relationship overcomes various problems associated with scepticism concerning mental representation. The proposal, however, is grounded on the idea that the world can act on the mind through a relation of formal causation. This thesis attempts to develop a Thomistic theory of formal causation which may be suitable for a realist account of mental representation and which may meet the requirements prompted by current discussions. The suggested view is grounded on Aquinas's metaphysics, according to which the world is constituted of substances. The claim that change is possible since substances are hylomorphically constituted (viz., metaphysically composed of form and matter) is defended. Aquinas's claim that some substances have forms which may act independently of matter is also supported. The paradigmatic examples are human souls, i.e. the forms of human beings, whose higher cognitive capacity, i.e. thinking, can be in principle carried on without the need of any material organ. A Thomistic theory of causation is subsequently proposed. It is argued that hylomorphism explains the distinction among four species of causes (material, formal, final and efficient). Aquinas's attempt to explain causal relations conditionally is developed along the lines suggested by John Mackie's INUS conditional analysis. Jaegwon Kim's implementation of Mackie's proposal through an object-based metaphysics of events is then adapted to the hylomorphical account of substances. On these grounds, a theory of formal causation can be proposed and applied to Aquinas's theory of mental representation. The ensuing proposal is offered not in the spirit of historical exegesis but as a substantive philosophical account and it is Thomistic only in the broad sense that it is built on Aquinas's metaphysics and is consistent with his claims on causation.Vagueness and identity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12912
The main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZOdrowąż-Sypniewska, JoannaThe main focus of this thesis is indeterminate identity and its relations to vague objects and to imprecise designation. Evans's argument concerning indeterminate-identity statements is often regarded as a proof that vague objects cannot exist. In chapter I I try to argue that the argument may be refuted by vague objects theorists. In chapter II I present various accounts of what indeterminate identity between objects may consist in and three different characteristics of it. I argue that there are objects whose identity is indeterminate and that such indeterminacy is ontic in the sense that it concerns individuation and spatio-temporal boundaries of objects. I also formulate the argument showing that (independently of Evans's argument) terms designating indeterminately identical objects cannot be precise designators. Chapter III is devoted to problems concerning vagueness and identity-over-time. The indeterminate answer to the questions concerning diachronic identity in puzzling cases can be regarded as the correct response by both endurantists and perdurantists. However, while for perdurantists the whole vagueness of persistence conditions is a conceptual matter, for endurantists it deserves the name of "ontic vagueness". Chapter IV focuses on questions concerning vagueness and identity-at-a-time. I offer a new solution to the problem of the many, according to which in each case in which the problem arises there is - contrary to appearances - only one (vague) object present. The problem arises because each such object has many precisifications, which nevertheless have no ontological significance. I also propose a new account of what it takes for an object to be vague. Chapter V deals with indeterminate identity in the domain of quanta. The first part investigates the various problems concerning identity and individuation of quantum particles, whereas the second part is devoted to analysis and critique of E. J. Lowe's example of alleged indeterminate identity-over-time between electrons.On having meaning in mind
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12911
There have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.
2001-01-01T00:00:00ZKallerstrup, JesperThere have traditionally been two views as to what makes it the case that a singular term has the prepositional content that it does. According to Descriptivism, the content of a term is descriptive since it is given by a cluster of descriptive properties commonly associated with it. According to Referentialism, the content of a term is singular since it is determined by the object it picks out. It follows that empty terms can have descriptive, but not singular, content. If narrow content is what intrinsic duplicates have in common, then descriptive content is arguably narrow. Singular content, however, is wide since intrinsic duplicates who inhabit different environments express different singular contents by the same terms. On the face of it, the arguments against Descriptivism and Semantic Internalism - the view that content is narrow - seem convincing, but a worry persists, namely how to reconcile Semantic Externalism - the view that content is wide - with the kind of Privileged Access speakers enjoy with respect to the contents of their occurrent attitudes. By thorough examination of those arguments I find space for an intermediate position. What we learn is not that reference cannot go by properties, but rather which properties mediate reference. Kripke's Modal Argument proves that we need rigidified descriptive properties, Putnam's Twin Earth Argument shows that we better include causal properties, and Burge's Arthritis Argument highlights that we frequently invoke properties involving reference to other speakers. What is more, considerations about the behaviour of singular terms in intentional contexts strongly suggest that their propositional contents cannot be exhausted by their referents. By deploying so-called Two-Dimensionalism, as developed by Stalnaker, Kaplan, Evans, Davies, and others, I argue that singular content is knowable only after relevant empirical information about the actual world is in, and so is not subject to Privileged Access. Descriptive content, however, is a priori knowable since it is independent of which possible world is actual. But if that is so, then descriptive content constrained by rigidity, causality and other-dependence must also be a priori. All it takes is knowledge of how to describe various thought experiments. Although the latter kind of content is not object-dependent, as is singular content, it is wide in that it fails to be shared by duplicates who are embedded in distinct physical or social environments. So, we should expect compatibility between Semantic Externalism and Privileged Access only if Rigidified Causal Descriptivism is adopted.Essays on the nature and roles of knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12601
This dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles
of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read
as such. Contents: 1. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment --
2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge --
3. Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attributions? --
4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms --
5. From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And Beyond
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZHughes, NicholasThis dissertation is comprised of five independent essays on the theme of the nature and roles
of knowledge. The essays are intended to be free-standing pieces of work and should be read
as such. Contents: 1. An Existential Argument For Pragmatic Encroachment --
2. Environmental Luck Gettier Cases And The Metaphysical Roles Of Knowledge --
3. Might The Simulation Heuristic Influence Knowledge Attributions? --
4. Excuses And Epistemic Norms --
5. From Moore's Paradox To The Knowledge Norm Of Belief And BeyondA bitter pill for closure
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12409
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.
2017-11-18T00:00:00ZBackes, MarvinThe primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.Frege's case for the logicality of his basic laws
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12252
Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it’s likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we’re right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege’s comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable.
In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege’s case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege’s laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege’s arguments for his basic laws can’t be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege’s primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege’s axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege’s enterprise.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZYates, AlexanderFrege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it’s likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we’re right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege’s comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable.
In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege’s case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege’s laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege’s arguments for his basic laws can’t be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege’s primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege’s axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege’s enterprise.A challenge to the permissibility of procreation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/12095
The Non-Identity Problem (the NIP) raises a series of problems to the morality of procreation. The NIP, I believe, highlights a fundamental problem concerning the justifiability of procreation. In chapter 1, I introduce the NIP and show that the logic of the NIP does not rule out the anti-natalist claim. Moreover, there are reasons, which are independent of its capacity to solve the NIP, to accept the anti-natalist claim. However, the anti-natalist claim poses a serious justificatory challenge to the permissibility of procreation. To see whether we can restore the permissibility of procreation, I examine the impersonal pro-natalist claim in chapter 2 and argue that there is not only no good reason to believe that whatever makes life worth living gives us an impersonal reason to procreate but good reason not to believe that. In chapter 3, I examine the justifications for the right to procreate and argue that most promising ground – that is, parenting interest – fails to establish a moral right to procreate. Therefore, the justification of procreation is in trouble, at least, at the individual level because there is a reason against procreation out of concern for possible people and no impersonal reason to procreate and the moral significance of parenting interests fails to justify imposing the harm of coming into existence. This is, nevertheless, a somewhat moderate conclusion because it does not defend that procreation is all-things-considered wrong. More works need to be done to show why procreation is morally permissible (or impermissible).
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZSu, Yu-TingThe Non-Identity Problem (the NIP) raises a series of problems to the morality of procreation. The NIP, I believe, highlights a fundamental problem concerning the justifiability of procreation. In chapter 1, I introduce the NIP and show that the logic of the NIP does not rule out the anti-natalist claim. Moreover, there are reasons, which are independent of its capacity to solve the NIP, to accept the anti-natalist claim. However, the anti-natalist claim poses a serious justificatory challenge to the permissibility of procreation. To see whether we can restore the permissibility of procreation, I examine the impersonal pro-natalist claim in chapter 2 and argue that there is not only no good reason to believe that whatever makes life worth living gives us an impersonal reason to procreate but good reason not to believe that. In chapter 3, I examine the justifications for the right to procreate and argue that most promising ground – that is, parenting interest – fails to establish a moral right to procreate. Therefore, the justification of procreation is in trouble, at least, at the individual level because there is a reason against procreation out of concern for possible people and no impersonal reason to procreate and the moral significance of parenting interests fails to justify imposing the harm of coming into existence. This is, nevertheless, a somewhat moderate conclusion because it does not defend that procreation is all-things-considered wrong. More works need to be done to show why procreation is morally permissible (or impermissible).Early eighteenth-century British moral philosophers and the possibility of virtue
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11973
The general aim of this thesis is to further undermine the convention that British moral philosophy of the early eighteenth century is best conceived as a struggle between rationalist and sentimentalist epistemologies. I argue that the philosophers considered here (Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, Gilbert Burnet, John Balguy and John Gay) situated their moral epistemologies within the wider framework of an attempt to prove the ‘reality’ of virtue in terms of virtue being an achievable, practical endeavour. To this end, they were as much concerned with the attributes that motivated or caused God to create in the way that he did – his communicable attributes - as they were with our own natural moral abilities. I maintain that this concern led Clarke, Burnet and Balguy to look beyond a rationalist epistemology in an attempt to account for the practical possibility of moral action. I claim that it led Hutcheson to develop a moral theory that reflected a realist theistic metaphysics that went some way beyond an appeal to providential naturalism. I argue that it led Gay to try to synthesise the approaches of rival moral schemes in order to offer a unified account of agency and obligation. The thesis has three key objectives: 1) to examine the relationship of rationalism to obligation and motivation in the work of Clarke, Burnet and Balguy, and 2) to explore the relative roles of sense and judgment in the moral epistemologies of Hutcheson, Burnet, Balguy and Gay and to (re) examine the nature of Hutcheson’s moral realism, and 3) to investigate the theistic metaphysical claims made by all parties with respect to their arguments about moral realism.
2017-10-02T00:00:00ZVeitch, EmmaThe general aim of this thesis is to further undermine the convention that British moral philosophy of the early eighteenth century is best conceived as a struggle between rationalist and sentimentalist epistemologies. I argue that the philosophers considered here (Samuel Clarke, Francis Hutcheson, Gilbert Burnet, John Balguy and John Gay) situated their moral epistemologies within the wider framework of an attempt to prove the ‘reality’ of virtue in terms of virtue being an achievable, practical endeavour. To this end, they were as much concerned with the attributes that motivated or caused God to create in the way that he did – his communicable attributes - as they were with our own natural moral abilities. I maintain that this concern led Clarke, Burnet and Balguy to look beyond a rationalist epistemology in an attempt to account for the practical possibility of moral action. I claim that it led Hutcheson to develop a moral theory that reflected a realist theistic metaphysics that went some way beyond an appeal to providential naturalism. I argue that it led Gay to try to synthesise the approaches of rival moral schemes in order to offer a unified account of agency and obligation. The thesis has three key objectives: 1) to examine the relationship of rationalism to obligation and motivation in the work of Clarke, Burnet and Balguy, and 2) to explore the relative roles of sense and judgment in the moral epistemologies of Hutcheson, Burnet, Balguy and Gay and to (re) examine the nature of Hutcheson’s moral realism, and 3) to investigate the theistic metaphysical claims made by all parties with respect to their arguments about moral realism.Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Hume on pride and honour
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11863
Pride has been a problematic passion in many moral systems for it has been seen as having harmful consequences at an individual and political level. This thesis will argue that is a philosophical tradition that has seen self-love and its manifestation, pride, can be useful in society. This been said, each and every author that speaks about pride considers the conditions under which the love that we feel towards ourselves and the desire to be esteemed by others are justified. In other words, pride can be given under circumstances and in degrees that make it due or undue.
Mandeville and Hume saw self-love and due pride, respectively, as supplementing moral duty, prudence and reason in guiding us to moral ends. Hutcheson too, allowed for a sense of honour that displays pride to naturally accompany the attitudes that are approved of by the moral sense. Therefore, what had been a neglected passion in most accounts of morals, became an important means of transforming our passions into social standards.
This introduction will first explain the idea that the anatomy of the passions became paramount for the study of human nature. The idea behind this is that the passions transform and substitute each other as motivations. Second, I shall provide insight into the attitudes towards pride that shaped Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson's theories, paying special attention to the French Neo-Augustinians and Protestants.
2014-09-01T00:00:00ZBarrenechea Dominguez, BihotzPride has been a problematic passion in many moral systems for it has been seen as having harmful consequences at an individual and political level. This thesis will argue that is a philosophical tradition that has seen self-love and its manifestation, pride, can be useful in society. This been said, each and every author that speaks about pride considers the conditions under which the love that we feel towards ourselves and the desire to be esteemed by others are justified. In other words, pride can be given under circumstances and in degrees that make it due or undue.
Mandeville and Hume saw self-love and due pride, respectively, as supplementing moral duty, prudence and reason in guiding us to moral ends. Hutcheson too, allowed for a sense of honour that displays pride to naturally accompany the attitudes that are approved of by the moral sense. Therefore, what had been a neglected passion in most accounts of morals, became an important means of transforming our passions into social standards.
This introduction will first explain the idea that the anatomy of the passions became paramount for the study of human nature. The idea behind this is that the passions transform and substitute each other as motivations. Second, I shall provide insight into the attitudes towards pride that shaped Mandeville, Hume, Hutcheson's theories, paying special attention to the French Neo-Augustinians and Protestants.Russell's metaphysical accounts of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11744
Bertrand Russell’s works on logic, despite his reputation as a founder of mathematical logic, appear unnecessarily metaphysical and even naïve to contemporary logicians and philosophers. He offered several accounts of logic whilst pursuing the goal of logicism, the view of mathematics as reducible to logic. In their attempts to explain why those accounts look naïve nowadays, many commentators have sought one or another simple philosophical doctrine which can characterise his conception of logic. Instead of thus assuming a coherent theme underlying his works on logic, I propose to understand them as a shift from a conception of logic towards another. By looking into books, papers and manuscripts which he wrote during the period from 1898 to 1918, I argue that he inherited an antique, metaphysical conception of logic from his idealist predecessors and, through his attempts to replace some idealistic features of the conception with his realist alternatives, he became more sympathetic to—though never fully convinced of—a linguistic conception of logic, which was proposed by some of his contemporary logicians and has been widely accepted since then.
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZIto, RyoBertrand Russell’s works on logic, despite his reputation as a founder of mathematical logic, appear unnecessarily metaphysical and even naïve to contemporary logicians and philosophers. He offered several accounts of logic whilst pursuing the goal of logicism, the view of mathematics as reducible to logic. In their attempts to explain why those accounts look naïve nowadays, many commentators have sought one or another simple philosophical doctrine which can characterise his conception of logic. Instead of thus assuming a coherent theme underlying his works on logic, I propose to understand them as a shift from a conception of logic towards another. By looking into books, papers and manuscripts which he wrote during the period from 1898 to 1918, I argue that he inherited an antique, metaphysical conception of logic from his idealist predecessors and, through his attempts to replace some idealistic features of the conception with his realist alternatives, he became more sympathetic to—though never fully convinced of—a linguistic conception of logic, which was proposed by some of his contemporary logicians and has been widely accepted since then.Commutative justice
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11605
The purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of commutative justice. Commutative justice is defined as that part of justice in transfer (as opposed to justice in acquisition as well as distributive or rectificatory justice), which deals with transferring goods via market exchanges. Thus, this thesis examines which conditions a market exchange has to fulfil in order to be called just.
Whereas traditionally speaking conditions like non-coercion or non-deception have received most attention – i.e. conditions focusing on the act of exchanging itself – the thesis’ focus is a different one. It argues that we necessarily also have to take into account the consequences of a certain market exchange in order to judge whether it is just. Therefore, the thesis proceeds to analyze how problematic market outcomes like externalities, the formation of monopolies, violations of the Lockean proviso, inequality, and commodification affect the justice of the market exchanges which gave rise to them.
The thesis finds that we need to broaden our conception of commutative justice – but only a little. Whereas the issues of externalities, violations of the Lockean proviso, and inequalities do not affect whether a certain market exchange is just, monopolization and commodification do. In order to be commutatively just, a market exchange must not only fulfil the traditional conditions of non-coercion, non-deception, etc., but it also must not bring about certain forms of monopoly nor further certain kinds of commodification. This conclusion leaves open the idea that, say, inequality or externalities could be relevant to distributive justice if not commutative justice.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZMildenberger, Carl DavidThe purpose of this thesis is to present a conception of commutative justice. Commutative justice is defined as that part of justice in transfer (as opposed to justice in acquisition as well as distributive or rectificatory justice), which deals with transferring goods via market exchanges. Thus, this thesis examines which conditions a market exchange has to fulfil in order to be called just.
Whereas traditionally speaking conditions like non-coercion or non-deception have received most attention – i.e. conditions focusing on the act of exchanging itself – the thesis’ focus is a different one. It argues that we necessarily also have to take into account the consequences of a certain market exchange in order to judge whether it is just. Therefore, the thesis proceeds to analyze how problematic market outcomes like externalities, the formation of monopolies, violations of the Lockean proviso, inequality, and commodification affect the justice of the market exchanges which gave rise to them.
The thesis finds that we need to broaden our conception of commutative justice – but only a little. Whereas the issues of externalities, violations of the Lockean proviso, and inequalities do not affect whether a certain market exchange is just, monopolization and commodification do. In order to be commutatively just, a market exchange must not only fulfil the traditional conditions of non-coercion, non-deception, etc., but it also must not bring about certain forms of monopoly nor further certain kinds of commodification. This conclusion leaves open the idea that, say, inequality or externalities could be relevant to distributive justice if not commutative justice.Knowledge-how : linguistic and philosophical considerations
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11566
This thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.
2017-12-08T00:00:00ZHabgood-Coote, JoshuaThis thesis concerns the nature of knowledge-how, in particular the question of how we ought to combine philosophical and linguistic considerations to understand what it is to know how to do something. Part 1 concerns the significance of linguistic evidence. In chapter 1, I consider the range of linguistic arguments that have been used in favour of the Intellectualist claim that knowledge-how is a species of propositional knowledge. Chapter 2 considers the idea that sentences of the form ‘S knows how to V’ involve a free relative complement, and the relation between this claim and the Objectualist claim that knowledge-how is a kind of objectual knowledge. Chapter 3 argues that Intellectualism about knowledge-how faces a problem of generality in accounting for the kinds of propositions that are known in knowledge-how, which is analogous to the generality problem for Reliabilism. Part 2 turns to philosophical considerations, offering an extended inquiry into the point of thinking and talking about knowledge-how. Chapter 4 considers why we should want to work with a concept of knowledge, isolating two hypotheses: i) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to pool skills, and ii) that thinking and talking about knowledge-how helps us to engage in responsible practices of co-operation. Chapter 5 criticises the former hypothesis by arguing against the suggestion that there is a knowledge-how norm on teaching. Chapter 6 offers an indirect argument for the latter hypothesis, arguing for a knowledge-how norm on intending. Part 3, which consists of chapter 7, offers a positive account of knowledge-how which takes into account both philosophical and linguistic considerations. According to what I will call the Interrogative Capacity view, knowing how to do something consists in a certain kind of ability to answer the question of how to do it.Being : a dialetheic interpretation of the late Heidegger
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11353
In my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second
Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to
which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show
that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of
being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between
Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between
Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality,
and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret
Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the
third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to
nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes
formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the
totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the
complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we
obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger,
nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well.
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of
grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form
of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of
foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism
2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second
Heidegger.
2017-01-01T00:00:00ZCasati, FilippoIn my thesis, I present a novel interpretation of the so-called second
Heidegger. In the first chapter I discuss the paradox of being, according to
which talking and thinking about being leads to a contradiction. I also show
that the late Heidegger endorses dialetheism, accepting the contradiction of
being as a true one. In the second chapter, I present a comparison between
Heidegger and Meinong. First of all, I discuss some similarities between
Heidegger’s account of intentionality and Meinong’s account of intentionality,
and Heidegger’s ontology and Meinong’s ontology. Secondly, I interpret
Heidegger’s being as a special case in Meinong’s ‘Theory of Objects’. In the
third chapter, after showing that, according to Heidegger, being is identical to
nothingness, I present a paraconsistent mereological system that makes
formal sense of Heidegger’s metaphysics. In this mereological system, the
totality is taken to be the mereological sum of everything that is and the
complement of the totality is interpreted as nothingness, namely what we
obtain removing all things from the totality. Since, according to Heidegger,
nothingness is being, the complement of totality is taken to be being as well.
Finally, in the fourth and last chapter, I discuss Heidegger’s theory of
grounding. I show that the early Heidegger endorses a particularly strong form
of foundationalism. Moreover, I present two paraconsistent versions of
foundationalism (called para-foundationalism 1.0 and para-foundationalism
2.0) that can accommodate the inconsistent views endorsed by the second
Heidegger.Memory, belief and time
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11169
I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
2016-01-08T00:00:00ZWeatherson, Brian JamesI argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.Biosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/11144
In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.
2018-07-01T00:00:00ZHiggins, JoeIn a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.The source of modal truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10949
This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is
it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a
matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't.
I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to
show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn
of his dilemma can be resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the
propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of.
I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart
theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special
problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to
account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could
have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been.
I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual
world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but
argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the
ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal
realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we
shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology.
I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that
there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use
modal language.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZCameron, Ross P.This thesis concerns the source of modal truth. I aim to answer the question: what is
it in virtue of which there are truths concerning what must have been the case as a
matter of necessity, or could have been the case but isn't.
I begin by looking at a dilemma put forward by Simon Blackburn which attempts to
show that any realist answer to this question must fail, and I conclude that either horn
of his dilemma can be resisted. I then move on to clarify the nature of the
propositions whose truth I am aiming to find the source of.
I distinguish necessity de re from necessity de dicto, and argue for a counterpart
theoretic treatment of necessity de re. As a result, I argue that there is no special
problem concerning the source of de re modal facts. The problem is simply to
account for what it is in virtue of which there are qualitative ways the world could
have been, and qualitative ways it couldn't have been.
I look at two ways to answer this question: by appealing to truthmakers in the actual
world, or by appealing to non-actual ontology. I develop a theory of truthmakers, but
argue that it is unlikely that there are truthmakers for modal truths among the
ontology of the actual. I look at the main possibilist ontology, David Lewis' modal
realism, but argue that warrant for that ontology is unobtainable, and that we
shouldn't admit non-actual possibilia into our ontology.
I end by sketching a quasi-conventionalist approach to modality which denies that
there are modal facts, but nevertheless allows that we can speak truly when we use
modal language.Kant on love
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10833
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZRinne, PärttyliTitle redacted
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10830
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZParis, Panagiotis S.Being and thinking in the social world : phenomenological illuminations of social cognition and human selfhood
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10640
At least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain.
Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human.
In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin (chapters 1 and 2) with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters (5-7), I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial’, such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective.
Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZHiggins, JoeAt least since the time of Aristotle, it has been widely accepted that “man is by nature a social animal”. We eat, sleep, talk, laugh, cry, love, fight and create in ways that integrally depend on others and the social norms that we collectively generate and maintain.
Yet in spite of the widely accepted importance of human sociality in underlying our daily activities, its exact manifestation and function is consistently overlooked by many academic disciplines. Cognitive science, for example, regularly neglects the manner in which social interactions and interactively generated norms canalise and constitute our cognitive processes. Without the inescapable ubiquity of dynamic social norms, any given agent simply could not cognise as a human.
In this thesis, I aim to use a range of insights – from phenomenology, social psychology, neuroscience, cultural anthropology and gender studies – to clarify the role of sociality for human life. More specifically, the thesis can be broadly separated into three parts. I begin (chapters 1 and 2) with a broad explanation of how human agents are fundamentally tied to worldly entities and other agents in a way that characterises their ontological existence. In chapters 3 and 4, I criticise two recent and much-discussed theories of social cognition – namely, we-mode cognition and participatory sense-making – for failing to make intelligible the social constitution of human existence. In the later chapters (5-7), I then propose foundations for a more satisfactory theory of social cognition, as well as explicating a view of human selfhood as ‘biosocial’, such that even the autonomy of biological bodies is socially codified from a human perspective.
Taken together, the aforementioned chapters should contribute to calls for a new direction in social cognitive science, whilst also yielding novel insights into the nature of human selfhood.Acta and omissions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10385
I identify and examine the grounds on which we describe an
agent's non-doing as an omission to do X, and a cause of Y. I
distinguish between the formal and material aspects of an omission.
This is useful in setting aside obvious differences between actions
and omissions, which some writers take to be significant, in
particular the view that an omission can be identified with whatever
action an agent performs or movement he makes when he omits to X. In
fact, he need not make a bodily movement, perform some other action in
order to prevent himself from doing X, or decide not to perform X. It
is by no means certain that any omission is timeable, and most are
certainly not. I note difficulties for any account of intention that
is meant to embrace intentional omissions as well as actions. I do
not offer a single, all-embracing account of omissions, because I
think it is impossible to provide one.
I acknowledge the importance of the role of expectation in
identifying omissions, particularly as causes, but argue that there
are sorts of omissions which are not identified by the presence of
defeated expectation. I take the view that some omissions are in an
important way indistinguishable from actions and may therefore be
regarded as causes. Also that some non-doings which are not omissions
may be regarded as causes. I criticise the ability of traditional
analyses of causality to comprehend the possibility of omissive
causation and expound alternative accounts of what constitutes a cause in order to do justice to that possibility. I find useful Collingwood's account of what it is to speak of causality in terms
appropriate to a practical natural science; that is, in the language
of means and ends.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZDonald, Alexander PaulI identify and examine the grounds on which we describe an
agent's non-doing as an omission to do X, and a cause of Y. I
distinguish between the formal and material aspects of an omission.
This is useful in setting aside obvious differences between actions
and omissions, which some writers take to be significant, in
particular the view that an omission can be identified with whatever
action an agent performs or movement he makes when he omits to X. In
fact, he need not make a bodily movement, perform some other action in
order to prevent himself from doing X, or decide not to perform X. It
is by no means certain that any omission is timeable, and most are
certainly not. I note difficulties for any account of intention that
is meant to embrace intentional omissions as well as actions. I do
not offer a single, all-embracing account of omissions, because I
think it is impossible to provide one.
I acknowledge the importance of the role of expectation in
identifying omissions, particularly as causes, but argue that there
are sorts of omissions which are not identified by the presence of
defeated expectation. I take the view that some omissions are in an
important way indistinguishable from actions and may therefore be
regarded as causes. Also that some non-doings which are not omissions
may be regarded as causes. I criticise the ability of traditional
analyses of causality to comprehend the possibility of omissive
causation and expound alternative accounts of what constitutes a cause in order to do justice to that possibility. I find useful Collingwood's account of what it is to speak of causality in terms
appropriate to a practical natural science; that is, in the language
of means and ends.Liberal trusteeship : preparatory work for an epistemic defence of non-egalitarian liberalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10251
This thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt.
The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZDagkas-Tsoukalas, VladimirosThis thesis examines some epistemic defences of democracy put forward by David Estlund, Michael Fuerstein, Cheryl Misak, and Fabienne Peter, as well as a critique of democracy raised by Jason Brennan. It then develops an epistemic defence of a moderately non-egalitarian system, which it proposes to call liberal trusteeship. According to the proposed theory, the power to draft laws ought to be separated from the power to enact those drafts into law. The former power ought to be vested in trustees, who are essentially specialists that have inquired extensively into a given matter, and the latter power ought to be vested in a democratically elected parliament. Subsequently, this thesis argues that parliament should nevertheless have the prerogative to ultimately override trustees on ethics and pass its own legislation regulating moral matters; that the criteria for selecting trustees should be determined by jury courts; and that parliament and jury courts should be given some powers to influence the composition of trustee committees, so that the political process can guard against the risk that trustees might be biased or corrupt.
The above proposal is grounded on three principal claims. Firstly, this thesis argues that moral authority and legitimacy ought to be reserved for the political system that strikes the best balance between competence and equality. Secondly, it argues that liberal trusteeship is more likely than democracy to determine correctly what ought to be done in light of the progress of open and vigorous inquiry into a given matter. Thirdly, and as a result, it argues that liberal trusteeship is likely to exercise power sufficiently more competently than democracy, such that its moderate deviation from political equality will be justified. In the light of this, the thesis concludes that liberal trusteeship would strike a better balance between competence and equality than democracy.Proof, rigour and informality : a virtue account of mathematical knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10249
This thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.
2017-06-22T00:00:00ZTanswell, Fenner StanleyThis thesis is about the nature of proofs in mathematics as it is practiced, contrasting the informal proofs found in practice with formal proofs in formal systems. In the first chapter I present a new argument against the Formalist-Reductionist view that informal proofs are justified as rigorous and correct by corresponding to formal counterparts. The second chapter builds on this to reject arguments from Gödel's paradox and incompleteness theorems to the claim that mathematics is inherently inconsistent, basing my objections on the complexities of the process of formalisation. Chapter 3 looks into the relationship between proofs and the development of the mathematical concepts that feature in them. I deploy Waismann's notion of open texture in the case of mathematical concepts, and discuss both Lakatos and Kneebone's dialectical philosophies of mathematics. I then argue that we can apply work from conceptual engineering to the relationship between formal and informal mathematics. The fourth chapter argues for the importance of mathematical knowledge-how and emphasises the primary role of the activity of proving in securing mathematical knowledge. In the final chapter I develop an account of mathematical knowledge based on virtue epistemology, which I argue provides a better view of proofs and mathematical rigour.Reflective luck and meta-epistemological scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/10205
In this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”,
motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue
that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge
to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I
contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should
be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true
propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able
to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of
accommodating commonsense.
Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is
not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate
internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I
identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can
respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as
essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do
justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However,
accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within
the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that
externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not
especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework
for doing epistemology.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZNeil, Charles AnthonyIn this thesis, I argue that a particular type of epistemic luck, called “reflective luck”,
motivates a meta-epistemological challenge to externalism about justification. I argue
that the meta-epistemological challenge consists in a substantive philosophical challenge
to externalism that entails the rejection of a naturalized epistemology. However, I
contend that the philosophical challenge to the externalist analysis of justification should
be tempered with an anti-sceptical intuition that we do have knowledge of putatively true
propositions. To this end, I argue that an externalist analysis of justification is best able
to accommodate our anti-sceptical intuitions; externalism, I argue, is the best way of
accommodating commonsense.
Although externalism is preserved and survives the meta-epistemological challenge, it is
not unscathed. Specifically, I contend that externalism deprives us of adequate
internalist epistemic grounds to think that we have externalistically justified beliefs. I
identify that in principle this is not a problem for externalism, because externalism can
respond in a number of ways (one way is to abandon the concept of justification as
essential to knowledge), but that nonetheless an adequate epistemology ought to do
justice to the legitimacy of the meta-epistemological challenge. However,
accommodating this legitimacy and preserving putative knowledge is not possible within
the traditional absolutist framework for doing epistemology. My conclusion is that
externalism is correct, but that the kind of externalist knowledge we have is not
especially fine-grained or perfect; this should put pressure on the absolutist framework
for doing epistemology.Against type E
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9895
It’s generally assumed that a compositional semantic theory will have to recognise a semantic category of expressions which serve simply to pick out some one object: e-type expressions. Kripke’s views about names (Kripke, 1980), Kaplan’s about indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989), the standard Tarskian semantics for bound variables (Tarski, 1956), Heim and Kratzer’s Strawsonian view about definites (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), even an (admittedly somewhat unpopular) analysis of indefinites (namely Fodor and Sag, 1982), assume as much.
In this thesis, I argue that recent advances in the semantics of names and of quotation, and in metaphysics, give good reason to doubt there is such a category. I do so in two parts. In the first part, comprising about two thirds of the thesis, I combine two recent views, one from semantics and one from metaphysics. From semantics, I take over predicativism about names, the view, as one might have guessed, that names are predicates. From metaphysics, I take over the doctrine that there are temporal parts. Putting them together, I hold that the semantic contribution of the name ’Joan’, in a sentence like ’Joan is a barrister’, is a predicate, and in particular (and somewhat roughly) a predicate the extension of which is Joan’s temporal parts. Names are not, as is commonly thought, e-type expressions.
In the second part, building on the first, I further undermine the existence of a semantically important category of e-type expressions by arguing that a construction which might be thought to mandate such a category, namely de re attitude ascriptions, in fact, when properly analysed, does not do so. I argue this by considering the nature of transparent occurrences of expressions in opaque contexts in general, and in particular by considering the phenomenon of mixed quotation. I present a new theory of it, and show how it can be parlayed into a new Fregean theory of de re attitude ascriptions. The thesis overall, then, will provide strong evidence against the semantic importance of e-type expressions either in language, or in (our reporting of) thought.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZMcKeever, MatthewIt’s generally assumed that a compositional semantic theory will have to recognise a semantic category of expressions which serve simply to pick out some one object: e-type expressions. Kripke’s views about names (Kripke, 1980), Kaplan’s about indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989), the standard Tarskian semantics for bound variables (Tarski, 1956), Heim and Kratzer’s Strawsonian view about definites (Heim and Kratzer, 1998), even an (admittedly somewhat unpopular) analysis of indefinites (namely Fodor and Sag, 1982), assume as much.
In this thesis, I argue that recent advances in the semantics of names and of quotation, and in metaphysics, give good reason to doubt there is such a category. I do so in two parts. In the first part, comprising about two thirds of the thesis, I combine two recent views, one from semantics and one from metaphysics. From semantics, I take over predicativism about names, the view, as one might have guessed, that names are predicates. From metaphysics, I take over the doctrine that there are temporal parts. Putting them together, I hold that the semantic contribution of the name ’Joan’, in a sentence like ’Joan is a barrister’, is a predicate, and in particular (and somewhat roughly) a predicate the extension of which is Joan’s temporal parts. Names are not, as is commonly thought, e-type expressions.
In the second part, building on the first, I further undermine the existence of a semantically important category of e-type expressions by arguing that a construction which might be thought to mandate such a category, namely de re attitude ascriptions, in fact, when properly analysed, does not do so. I argue this by considering the nature of transparent occurrences of expressions in opaque contexts in general, and in particular by considering the phenomenon of mixed quotation. I present a new theory of it, and show how it can be parlayed into a new Fregean theory of de re attitude ascriptions. The thesis overall, then, will provide strong evidence against the semantic importance of e-type expressions either in language, or in (our reporting of) thought.Perspectives on what to believe : the information-sensitivity of the doxastic 'should' and its implications for normative epistemology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9890
This thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’ and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should’ vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance.
In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should’ can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should’ has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should’ that is relativized to one’s first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one’s higher-order evidence, one shouldn’t. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ against truth-relativist challenges.
2016-12-01T00:00:00ZBecker, Sebastian Josef AlbrechtThis thesis explores the extent to which the doxastic ‘should’ is information-sensitive and the implications of this for a number of debates in normative epistemology. The doxastic ‘should’ is a special case of the deontic modal ‘should’ and occurs in sentences such as ‘You shouldn’t believe everything you read online’. In the recent semantics literature, it has been suggested that the deontic ‘should’ is information-sensitive, meaning that sentences of the form ‘S should do A’ are relativized to information-states. After a short introductory chapter, I survey the relevant semantics literature in chapter 2 and provide a simplified contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’, according to which the truth-conditions of sentences containing the doxastic ‘should’ vary with the information-state provided by their context of utterance.
In chapters 3 to 6, I discuss the different kinds of information-states the doxastic ‘should’ can be relativized to and how the respective relativization matters for normative epistemology. Chapter 3 argues that the doxastic ‘should’ has a subjective and an objective sense and that this distinction solves the apparent conflict between subjective epistemic norms and the truth norm for belief. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how one should react to misleading higher-order evidence. I propose that two seemingly opposing views on this issue, Steadfastness and Concilliationism, are both correct. In a sense of ‘should’ that is relativized to one’s first-order evidence, one should remain steadfast in the face of misleading higher-order evidence, but in another sense, which is relativized to one’s higher-order evidence, one shouldn’t. In chapters 5 and 6, I argue that when we advise others on what they should believe, we talk about what they should believe in light of their and our joint evidence. Chapter 7 concludes this thesis with a defence of contextualist semantics for the doxastic ‘should’ against truth-relativist challenges.The foundations of linguistics : mathematics, models, and structures
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9584
The philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective.
Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects.
In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.
2016-11-30T00:00:00ZNefdt, Ryan MarkThe philosophy of linguistics is a rich philosophical domain which encompasses various disciplines. One of the aims of this thesis is to unite theoretical linguistics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of science (particularly mathematics and modelling) and the ontology of language. Each part of the research presented here targets separate but related goals with the unified aim of bringing greater clarity to the foundations of linguistics from a philosophical perspective.
Part I is devoted to the methodology of linguistics in terms of scientific modelling. I argue against both the Conceptualist and Platonist (as well as Pluralist) interpretations of linguistic theory by means of three grades of mathematical involvement for linguistic grammars. Part II explores the specific models of syntactic and semantics by an analogy with the harder sciences. In Part III, I develop a novel account of linguistic ontology and in the process comment on the type-token distinction, the role and connection with mathematics and the nature of linguistic objects.
In this research, I offer a structural realist interpretation of linguistic methodology with a nuanced structuralist picture for its ontology. This proposal is informed by historical and current work in theoretical linguistics as well as philosophical views on ontology, scientific modelling and mathematics.A response to external world scepticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9502
In this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that
scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are
coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an
empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility
from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject
matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible
with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are
considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are
inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate
response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I
develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim,
and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get
clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a
conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question
whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZThorpe, JoshuaIn this thesis I give a response to external world scepticism. I first argue that
scepticism arises when we accept that it is an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, that is, a scenario in which my beliefs are
coherent, and yet my empirical beliefs are false. The idea that it is an
empirical question whether I am in a sceptical scenario gets its plausibility
from the realist claim that our empirical beliefs have an objective subject
matter. I then attempt to give a response to scepticism that is compatible
with this realist claim. Three promising responses to scepticism are
considered, but are found to be inadequate. Seeing why these responses are
inadequate helps us to appreciate some of the conditions on an adequate
response to scepticism. By drawing on the work of Donald Davidson I
develop a response to scepticism that is compatible with the realist claim,
and that meets these conditions. According to this response, when we get
clear about the concept of belief we see that sceptical scenarios are a
conceptual impossibility. Thus, just as it is not an empirical question
whether I am a married bachelor, it is not an empirical question whether I
am in a sceptical scenario, and the argument for scepticism breaks down.A fragmented world
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9498
Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives
that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial
revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific.
The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from
different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that
is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is
false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding
of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment
according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every
fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible
facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced
sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of
phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of
passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience
against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about
colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it
makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are
attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as
length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the
way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the
world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it
shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified
than it really is.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZLipman, Martin A.Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives
that are on a par. Phenomena of this kind have been responsible for crucial
revisions to our conception of the world, both philosophical and scientific.
The standard response to them is to deny that the way things appear from
different perspectives are ways things really are out there, a response that
is based on an implicit metaphysical assumption that the world is a unified whole. This dissertation explores the possibility that this assumption is
false, that the world is fragmented instead of unified. On the proposed understanding
of such worldly fragmentation, there is a notion of co-obtainment
according to which two facts may obtain without co-obtaining. Since not every
fact that obtains also co-obtains with every other fact, two incompatible
facts may both obtain, as long as they do not co-obtain in the introduced
sense. The possibility of such fragmentation sheds new light on a range of
phenomena. It allows us to explore a view of time that takes the notion of
passage as its defining primitive. It bolsters a no-subject view of experience
against the objection that it leads to solipsism. It allows a realist view about
colours to withstand the objection from conflicting appearances. And, it
makes room for a view on which things really have the properties that are
attributed to objects and events across different frames of reference, such as
length, mass, duration and simultaneity. Overall, fragmentalism changes the
way in which the manifest image feeds into an objective conception of the
world: what is manifest to us is not misleading in what sort of properties it
shows the world to have, it's only misleading in making it seem more unified
than it really is.Expanding individualism : moral responsibility for social structural harms
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9473
The central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities
in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural
harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to
make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short,
leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches
to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy
the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups required by these accounts, I turn to an attempt to
provide an individualist account of responsibility in these cases presented by Young. I argue that
there are many interesting ideas in her work that support an account of collective responsibility
for social structures, but that her specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral
responsibility ultimately fails. I therefore examine an alternative account of joint responsibility
based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on the reasons why
agents become involved and complicit in collective harms. Through the further development of
Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and participation in harmful
practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual agents and social
structures, I suggest an alternative approach to analysing social structural harm: expanded
individualism. To support this account, I analyse the ways in which agents come to be involved
in these harms in a blameworthy manner, and the reasons why participation makes individuals
responsible for addressing the harms caused by the social structures in which they participate.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZCurzon, Rebecca Elizabeth MaryThe central concern of this thesis is the examination of individual agents’ moral responsibilities
in large-scale social structures. I begin with a discussion of the emergence of social structural
harm and the history of the collective responsibility debate. I suggest that previous attempts to
make accurate responsibility ascriptions in cases of social structural harm have fallen short,
leaving responsibility for the harm caused underdetermined. Arguing that collectivist approaches
to large-scale harms are inadequate, because those participating in social structures cannot satisfy
the criteria for responsibility-bearing groups required by these accounts, I turn to an attempt to
provide an individualist account of responsibility in these cases presented by Young. I argue that
there are many interesting ideas in her work that support an account of collective responsibility
for social structures, but that her specific attempt to develop a new kind of non-moral
responsibility ultimately fails. I therefore examine an alternative account of joint responsibility
based on agent motivation and attitude presented by Bjornsson, who focusses on the reasons why
agents become involved and complicit in collective harms. Through the further development of
Bjornsson’s discussion of the importance of agent motivation and participation in harmful
practices, and Young’s analysis of the relationship between individual agents and social
structures, I suggest an alternative approach to analysing social structural harm: expanded
individualism. To support this account, I analyse the ways in which agents come to be involved
in these harms in a blameworthy manner, and the reasons why participation makes individuals
responsible for addressing the harms caused by the social structures in which they participate.Disagreement and philosophical method
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9458
This dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement,
argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out and
attempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreement
and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature
of verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is a
justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeing
and disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the right
way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at
a few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such a
theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers's
theory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third
chapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. I
introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptual
analysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could get
over these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily
inspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapian
explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is in
the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept
in analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against other
specific criteria.
2015-01-01T00:00:00ZCook, JamesThis dissertation is primarily concerned with the subjects of disagreement,
argument, and the methodology of philosophy. The first chapter sets out and
attempts to answer the question of what the connection between disagreement
and disputing is. The second chapter is primarily a investigation into the nature
of verbal disputes. The answer the chapter puts forward is that there is a
justificatory relation (or at least we behave as if there is one) between disagreeing
and disputing, so that, for example, if two parties do not disagree in the right
way, then they (prima facie) should not dispute. In the second chapter I will look at
a few theories of verbal disputes, and I will discuss some of the features such a
theory should have. I go on to explicitly endorse a version of David Chalmers's
theory of verbal disputes, and defend it from some potential objections. The third
chapter is a defence of the method of conceptual analysis in philosophy. I
introduce some potential objections to the Canberra plan style of conceptual
analysis, and show how a different conception of conceptual analyses could get
over these problems. The conception of conceptual analysis I argue for is heavily
inspired by Rudolf Carnap's system of explication. The main way Carnapian
explication would differ from the Canberra plan style of conceptual analysis is in
the way that it would allow one to move further away from the original concept
in analysing it, by balancing closeness to the original concept against other
specific criteria.How is the culpability we assign to recklessness best accounted for in criminal law?
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9457
In order to be properly applied, criminal law must determine what conduct warrants
punitive action. Figuring out exactly how one must act to be criminally liable is a
difficulty that faces any legal system. In many jurisdictions criminal recklessness is
regarded as an important notion for liability. However, recklessness is difficult to define,
and attempts at this exercise have been a problem in legal philosophy since the mid-twentieth century, and persist today (Crosby 2008). This thesis discusses accounts of
recklessness with the aim of defining it in a way that overcomes several problems which
have arisen in recent legal history. It is widely accepted, as well as prima facie intuitive,
that people can be culpable for acts committed recklessly. Despite this, whether or not a
state of mind is reckless is difficult to define, let alone define in a way that is not only
conceptually sound, but also pragmatically apt.
Recklessness occurs when an agent engages in some risky activity, but factors like
the agent’s attitude and whether the risk is foreseen have been cited as relevant when
ascertaining their recklessness. I discuss some difficulties in legally framing
recklessness, before criticising some definitional manoeuvres made by judges and
scholars in the past. With some problems in previous accounts noted, I consider the
foundations of culpability in general. I suggest that two accounts of culpability – the
agency theory and the choice theory – are both plausible, and each correlates to a
prominent contemporary position on recklessness (and criminal law in general). After
serious consideration of both positions, I conclude that the position advocated by
Antony Duff, which I see as in keeping with the agency theory of culpability, is both
more generally useful for criminal law and much more coherent with our everyday
practices of blaming and punishing.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZSlater, JoeIn order to be properly applied, criminal law must determine what conduct warrants
punitive action. Figuring out exactly how one must act to be criminally liable is a
difficulty that faces any legal system. In many jurisdictions criminal recklessness is
regarded as an important notion for liability. However, recklessness is difficult to define,
and attempts at this exercise have been a problem in legal philosophy since the mid-twentieth century, and persist today (Crosby 2008). This thesis discusses accounts of
recklessness with the aim of defining it in a way that overcomes several problems which
have arisen in recent legal history. It is widely accepted, as well as prima facie intuitive,
that people can be culpable for acts committed recklessly. Despite this, whether or not a
state of mind is reckless is difficult to define, let alone define in a way that is not only
conceptually sound, but also pragmatically apt.
Recklessness occurs when an agent engages in some risky activity, but factors like
the agent’s attitude and whether the risk is foreseen have been cited as relevant when
ascertaining their recklessness. I discuss some difficulties in legally framing
recklessness, before criticising some definitional manoeuvres made by judges and
scholars in the past. With some problems in previous accounts noted, I consider the
foundations of culpability in general. I suggest that two accounts of culpability – the
agency theory and the choice theory – are both plausible, and each correlates to a
prominent contemporary position on recklessness (and criminal law in general). After
serious consideration of both positions, I conclude that the position advocated by
Antony Duff, which I see as in keeping with the agency theory of culpability, is both
more generally useful for criminal law and much more coherent with our everyday
practices of blaming and punishing.Foundational issues in the metaphysics of David Lewis
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9454
Few contributions in the field of metaphysics can be compared, for their depth and impact, to
the work of the American philosopher David K. Lewis. A feature of this work, which partly
explain its great appeal, is its systematicity. Lewis’s views on intrinsicality, naturalness,
supervenience, mind and modality, to mention just a few themes, constitute a unified and
connected body of doctrines. As Lewis himself acknowledged in the introduction to the first
volume of collected papers: “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher,
offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be” (Lewis 1983, p. XI).
Surely there is an element of beauty in this systematicity. But there is also an element of
precariousness. For a body of doctrines has some vital organs: claims or assumptions that are so
central to the life of the system that, if one were to reject them, the system as a whole would
likely collapse. This seems to be true, in particular, of Lewis’s metaphysical system. What I
present here are two investigations concerning, respectively, the problem of ontic vagueness and
the existence of a fundamental level. I believe that the evaluation of these two issues is of vital
importance for assessing the tenability of Lewis’s systematic metaphysics.
There is a general worry lurking behind my discussion, which it’s worth making explicit
here. The worry is that, if the justification for Lewis’s claims on ontic vagueness and
fundamentality turned out to be wanting or otherwise unsatisfactory, and if I am right to think
that these theses are part of a number of central claims constituting the basis of his metaphysical
system, then it seems we should start being suspicious of the very tenability of the Lewisian
metaphysics as a whole.
What I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of this dissertation provides, in my view,
enough material for a modest defense of Lewis’s views on ontic vagueness and fundamentality.
I will clarify the content of this modest defense, and explain its significance for the development
of the contemporary debate in metaphysics, as well as for a redefinition of a kind of Lewisian
metaphysics, in a brief note at the end of the introduction.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZNappo, FrancescoFew contributions in the field of metaphysics can be compared, for their depth and impact, to
the work of the American philosopher David K. Lewis. A feature of this work, which partly
explain its great appeal, is its systematicity. Lewis’s views on intrinsicality, naturalness,
supervenience, mind and modality, to mention just a few themes, constitute a unified and
connected body of doctrines. As Lewis himself acknowledged in the introduction to the first
volume of collected papers: “I should have liked to be a piecemeal, unsystematic philosopher,
offering independent proposals on a variety of topics. It was not to be” (Lewis 1983, p. XI).
Surely there is an element of beauty in this systematicity. But there is also an element of
precariousness. For a body of doctrines has some vital organs: claims or assumptions that are so
central to the life of the system that, if one were to reject them, the system as a whole would
likely collapse. This seems to be true, in particular, of Lewis’s metaphysical system. What I
present here are two investigations concerning, respectively, the problem of ontic vagueness and
the existence of a fundamental level. I believe that the evaluation of these two issues is of vital
importance for assessing the tenability of Lewis’s systematic metaphysics.
There is a general worry lurking behind my discussion, which it’s worth making explicit
here. The worry is that, if the justification for Lewis’s claims on ontic vagueness and
fundamentality turned out to be wanting or otherwise unsatisfactory, and if I am right to think
that these theses are part of a number of central claims constituting the basis of his metaphysical
system, then it seems we should start being suspicious of the very tenability of the Lewisian
metaphysics as a whole.
What I will be arguing for in the two main chapters of this dissertation provides, in my view,
enough material for a modest defense of Lewis’s views on ontic vagueness and fundamentality.
I will clarify the content of this modest defense, and explain its significance for the development
of the contemporary debate in metaphysics, as well as for a redefinition of a kind of Lewisian
metaphysics, in a brief note at the end of the introduction.Davidson, interpretation and values
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9452
The broad aim of this research is to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts.
The central idea that I consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role
in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken
to show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to
values as well as beliefs.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZPayne, SimonThe broad aim of this research is to outline, assess and elaborate on Davidson’s work on
radical interpretation and its connections to his understanding of values, and particularly on
his understanding of the nature of ethical judgments and concepts.
The central idea that I consider is that the principle of charity must play much the same role
in the attribution of values to a speaker as it does in the attribution of beliefs. This is taken
to show that certain general claims about the content of propositional attitudes, which
Davidson thinks follow from the consideration of radical interpretation, can be applied to
values as well as beliefs.Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9389
According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.
2016-04-01T00:00:00ZMcGrath, MatthewAccording to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.Understanding Bernard Williams's criticism of Aristotelian naturalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9315
In Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP) Williams claims that holding a naturalistic
Aristotelian ethical theory is no longer an option for us—we cannot believe what Aristotle believed
about human beings. It is the purpose of this thesis to understand what Williams means by this claim
and to evaluate whether or not it constitutes a pressing argument against Aristotelian naturalism.
The modern Aristotelian (represented here by Martha Nussbaum, Philippa Foot and Rosalind
Hursthouse) seems to be untouched by the claim as presented—they do not have to hold Aristotle’s
view of human nature. The Aristotelian approaches human nature, not from an “outside” perspective,
like the scientist, but from an “inside” perspective—from the point of view of an ethically engaged
agent. The method does not seek to use a theory-independent notion of human nature to vindicate the
Aristotelian claim that the properly functioning human being is virtuous. Rather, the Aristotelian is
engaged in a project of using the notions of virtue that we already possess, to paint a picture of the
kind of lives that we can all identify with, and endorse as properly functioning.
However, there is a reading of Williams’s claim, which I draw from his replies to Nussbaum
(in Mind, World and Ethics) and his essay “St Just’s Illusion”, according to which he accuses the
Aristotelian, who attempts to reach human nature from the “inside”, of forgetting, that part of that
reflection from the inside, will constitute a consciousness of oneself as an evolved creature.
Understanding that human beings are evolved creatures, a “bricolage of powers and instincts”, should
temper one’s reflection on the idea that any one life could constitute proper human functioning, as it
must make us aware of the many lives that it is possible for a human being to lead.
2016-06-01T00:00:00ZAddison, MichaelIn Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (henceforth ELP) Williams claims that holding a naturalistic
Aristotelian ethical theory is no longer an option for us—we cannot believe what Aristotle believed
about human beings. It is the purpose of this thesis to understand what Williams means by this claim
and to evaluate whether or not it constitutes a pressing argument against Aristotelian naturalism.
The modern Aristotelian (represented here by Martha Nussbaum, Philippa Foot and Rosalind
Hursthouse) seems to be untouched by the claim as presented—they do not have to hold Aristotle’s
view of human nature. The Aristotelian approaches human nature, not from an “outside” perspective,
like the scientist, but from an “inside” perspective—from the point of view of an ethically engaged
agent. The method does not seek to use a theory-independent notion of human nature to vindicate the
Aristotelian claim that the properly functioning human being is virtuous. Rather, the Aristotelian is
engaged in a project of using the notions of virtue that we already possess, to paint a picture of the
kind of lives that we can all identify with, and endorse as properly functioning.
However, there is a reading of Williams’s claim, which I draw from his replies to Nussbaum
(in Mind, World and Ethics) and his essay “St Just’s Illusion”, according to which he accuses the
Aristotelian, who attempts to reach human nature from the “inside”, of forgetting, that part of that
reflection from the inside, will constitute a consciousness of oneself as an evolved creature.
Understanding that human beings are evolved creatures, a “bricolage of powers and instincts”, should
temper one’s reflection on the idea that any one life could constitute proper human functioning, as it
must make us aware of the many lives that it is possible for a human being to lead.Reply to Blackson
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9120
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
2016-01-01T00:00:00ZWeatherson, Brian JamesThomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9107
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts.
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZMarkey, Bren AprilThis thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy,
based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis
consists of two parts.
In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based
on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as
intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that
identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as
patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor
guide to moral reality.
In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from
feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw
out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I
examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually
use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and
a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the
context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I
argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary
methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral
philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential
part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position
for the methodology of moral philosophy.Full-bloodedness, modesty and minimalist truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9032
This thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett’s claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett’s dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett’s argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell’s insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett’s claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBillinge, DanielThis thesis discusses the central ideas that surround Michael Dummett’s claim that there is an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth. These ideas are brought into relation to the work of John McDowell and Donald Davidson, as all three philosophers can be better understood by locating them within Dummett’s dialectic regarding the incompatibility. Dummett’s argument crucially depends upon the assumption that a meaning-theory should be full-blooded in nature, against McDowell’s insistence that a meaning-theory can only ever be modest. The main contention of this thesis is that neither Dummett nor McDowell is successful in establishing their strong contentions regarding the form that a meaning-theory should take. McDowell only wants to provide trivial answers to questions about the constitutive nature of the meanings and competency of particular items in a language. Dummett, on the other hand, wants to provide a reductive account of the central concepts that concern the philosophy of language. What this thesis will argue is that once both of these claims have been rejected, the position Dummett and McDowell jointly dictate is in fact the position that we should read Davidson as occupying, who lies in a conceptual space between the extremes of maximal full-bloodedness and modesty. This is an understanding of Davidson that is contrary to how McDowell reads him, who has been an influential commentator of Davidson. How Davidson should actually be interpreted is achieved by understanding how he has the resources to avoid Dummett’s claim of an incompatibility between a truth-conditional conception of meaning and a minimalist conception of truth.An argument for anti-perfectionism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/9007
In political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is not the job of the state to promote good lives. Instead it should restrict itself to securing basic rights and duties, a threshold level of resources and so on. Citizens should be left to adopt pursuits however they see fit. For some anti-perfectionists, this is precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons.
All accounts of anti-perfectionism must overcome what has been called the asymmetry objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti-perfectionism? Why believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on judgements about flourishing? My thesis argues that attempts to respond to the asymmetry objection have failed thus far. Further, I offer an account of political morality that can overcome the problem.
The first four chapters of the thesis clarify the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, narrowing the former down into its most plausible form. Chapters five and six focus on two failed attempts to vindicate anti-perfectionism – Brian Barry’s argument from scepticism and Jonathan Quong’s Rawlsian approach. In the final chapter I put forward a much more promising argument in favour of anti-perfectionism – justice as a set of constraints.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZMcDevitt, PatrickIn political philosophy, perfectionism is the view that it is the job of the state to best enable its citizens to live good or flourishing lives. It claims that certain lives can be judged to be sound, and thus instructs governments to promote those lives using state institutions etc. Anti-perfectionism denies this. It says that it is not the job of the state to promote good lives. Instead it should restrict itself to securing basic rights and duties, a threshold level of resources and so on. Citizens should be left to adopt pursuits however they see fit. For some anti-perfectionists, this is precisely because we cannot judge any putative life to be sound. However, many are not sceptics, and justify state neutrality for other reasons.
All accounts of anti-perfectionism must overcome what has been called the asymmetry objection: what justifies the imbalance inherent in anti-perfectionism? Why believe that the state is permitted to act on judgements about justice, but not on judgements about flourishing? My thesis argues that attempts to respond to the asymmetry objection have failed thus far. Further, I offer an account of political morality that can overcome the problem.
The first four chapters of the thesis clarify the debate between perfectionists and anti-perfectionists, narrowing the former down into its most plausible form. Chapters five and six focus on two failed attempts to vindicate anti-perfectionism – Brian Barry’s argument from scepticism and Jonathan Quong’s Rawlsian approach. In the final chapter I put forward a much more promising argument in favour of anti-perfectionism – justice as a set of constraints.The epistemic province of photography
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8963
This thesis argues that photographs enhance the repertoire of seeing the way eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes do. This kinship is based on these devices sharing a feature called transparency. Transparent devices facilitate visual information about objects without interrupting the causal link between the object and our eyes, and do so by maintaining a belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual dependence on that object. Handmade pictures also offer visual information about objects, but because handmade pictures depend on the perceptual experiences of their makers, they interrupt the causal link between the object represented and our eyes. Consider how a drawing can represent the misperceptions and hallucinations of its illustrator, but in contrast, photographs do not reproduce the contents of hallucinations or misperceptions had by their photographers. I use transparency to map the epistemic province of photographs, arguing that photographs are not just ontologically similar to microscopes and telescopes, but also epistemically akin to them, –perhaps even more than they are like other picture types. This is illustrated by two further comparisons. The first is technological: while cameras define the information scope of photographs, handmade pictures are not subject to pre-sets that strictly limit their representational scope in the same way. The second comparison shows how photographs and handmade pictures are subject to different sceptical hypotheses: handmade pictures are susceptible to scepticism about their illustrator, –i.e., as we might question the credibility of someone giving testimony– but photographs are not beholden to scepticism about their photographer. I conclude with a proposal on the epistemology of photography, where contrary to the character of other picture types, photographs provide genuine perceptual knowledge about objects.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZDe Asis, Ines Nicole EchevarriaThis thesis argues that photographs enhance the repertoire of seeing the way eyeglasses, microscopes and telescopes do. This kinship is based on these devices sharing a feature called transparency. Transparent devices facilitate visual information about objects without interrupting the causal link between the object and our eyes, and do so by maintaining a belief independent and similarity preserving counterfactual dependence on that object. Handmade pictures also offer visual information about objects, but because handmade pictures depend on the perceptual experiences of their makers, they interrupt the causal link between the object represented and our eyes. Consider how a drawing can represent the misperceptions and hallucinations of its illustrator, but in contrast, photographs do not reproduce the contents of hallucinations or misperceptions had by their photographers. I use transparency to map the epistemic province of photographs, arguing that photographs are not just ontologically similar to microscopes and telescopes, but also epistemically akin to them, –perhaps even more than they are like other picture types. This is illustrated by two further comparisons. The first is technological: while cameras define the information scope of photographs, handmade pictures are not subject to pre-sets that strictly limit their representational scope in the same way. The second comparison shows how photographs and handmade pictures are subject to different sceptical hypotheses: handmade pictures are susceptible to scepticism about their illustrator, –i.e., as we might question the credibility of someone giving testimony– but photographs are not beholden to scepticism about their photographer. I conclude with a proposal on the epistemology of photography, where contrary to the character of other picture types, photographs provide genuine perceptual knowledge about objects.Necessitism, contingentism and theory equivalence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8814
Two main questions are addressed in this dissertation, namely: 1. What is the correct higher-order modal theory; 2. What does it take for theories to be equivalent.
The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the joint truth of two higher-order modal theories, namely, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Plantinga (1974) and committed to the contingent being of some individuals, and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Williamson (2013) and committed to the necessary being of every possible individual.
The case for the truth of these two theories relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: i) Thorough Serious Actualism, according to which no things could have been related and yet be nothing, ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, according to which necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories.
Prima facie, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are jointly inconsistent. The argument for their joint truth thus relies also on showing i) their equivalence, and ii) that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is merely verbal. The case for i) and ii) relies on the Synonymy Account, an account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to the account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same structure of entailments and commitments, and the occupiers of the places in that structure are the same propositions. An immediate consequence of the Synonymy Account is that proponents of synonymous theories are engaged in merely verbal disputes. The Synonymy Account is also applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans, revealing that what is in question in that debate is what are the expressive resources available to describe the world.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZJacinto, BrunoTwo main questions are addressed in this dissertation, namely: 1. What is the correct higher-order modal theory; 2. What does it take for theories to be equivalent.
The whole dissertation consists of an extended argument in defence of the joint truth of two higher-order modal theories, namely, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Plantinga (1974) and committed to the contingent being of some individuals, and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism, a higher-order necessitist theory advocated by Williamson (2013) and committed to the necessary being of every possible individual.
The case for the truth of these two theories relies on defences of the following metaphysical theses: i) Thorough Serious Actualism, according to which no things could have been related and yet be nothing, ii) Higher-Order Necessitism, according to which necessarily, every higher-order entity is necessarily something. It is shown that Thorough Serious Actualism and Higher-Order Necessitism are both implicit commitments of very weak logical theories.
Prima facie, Plantingan Moderate Contingentism and Williamsonian Thorough Necessitism are jointly inconsistent. The argument for their joint truth thus relies also on showing i) their equivalence, and ii) that the dispute between Plantingans and Williamsonians is merely verbal. The case for i) and ii) relies on the Synonymy Account, an account of theory equivalence developed and defended in the dissertation. According to the account, theories are equivalent just in case they have the same structure of entailments and commitments, and the occupiers of the places in that structure are the same propositions. An immediate consequence of the Synonymy Account is that proponents of synonymous theories are engaged in merely verbal disputes. The Synonymy Account is also applied to the debate between noneists and Quineans, revealing that what is in question in that debate is what are the expressive resources available to describe the world.Saying nothing : in defence of syntactic and semantic underdetermination
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8630
According to the Encoding Model, speakers communicate by encoding the propositions they want to communicate into sentences, in accordance with the conventions of a language L. By uttering a sentence that encodes p, the speaker says that p. Communication is successful only if the audience identifies the proposition that the speaker intends to communicate, which is achieved by decoding the uttered sentence in accordance with the conventions of L.
A consequence of the Encoding Model has been the proliferation of underdetermination arguments, each of which concludes against some linguistic theory T, on the grounds that, were T true, audiences would be unable to know what was said by utterances of some particular linguistic form, and therefore unable to know what speakers intended to communicate by these utterance. The result, if we accept the conclusion of these arguments, is radical restriction of the domain of viable linguistic theory.
This Thesis defends an alternative model according to which there need be nothing encoded in an uttered sentence – nothing that is said by its utterance – for the audience to retrieve. Rather, there are indefinitely many ways to interpret uttered sentences – indefinitely many routes to the propositions that speaker intend to communicate – which proceed through different interpretations of what is said.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBowker, MarkAccording to the Encoding Model, speakers communicate by encoding the propositions they want to communicate into sentences, in accordance with the conventions of a language L. By uttering a sentence that encodes p, the speaker says that p. Communication is successful only if the audience identifies the proposition that the speaker intends to communicate, which is achieved by decoding the uttered sentence in accordance with the conventions of L.
A consequence of the Encoding Model has been the proliferation of underdetermination arguments, each of which concludes against some linguistic theory T, on the grounds that, were T true, audiences would be unable to know what was said by utterances of some particular linguistic form, and therefore unable to know what speakers intended to communicate by these utterance. The result, if we accept the conclusion of these arguments, is radical restriction of the domain of viable linguistic theory.
This Thesis defends an alternative model according to which there need be nothing encoded in an uttered sentence – nothing that is said by its utterance – for the audience to retrieve. Rather, there are indefinitely many ways to interpret uttered sentences – indefinitely many routes to the propositions that speaker intend to communicate – which proceed through different interpretations of what is said.Love and madness in Plato's Phaedrus
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8424
The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind.
Socrates’ account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates’ account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates’ account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates’ depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life.
This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates’ account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates’ conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato’s Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZFan, LiThe central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind.
Socrates’ account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates’ account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates’ account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates’ depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life.
This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates’ account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates’ conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato’s Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.Acting and understanding
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/8417
This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.
2016-06-23T00:00:00ZBlomberg Stathopoulos, Alexander C.This thesis concerns the question of what it is for a subject to act. It answers this question in three steps. The first step is taken by arguing that any satisfactory answer must build on the idea that an action is something predicable of the acting subject. The second step is taken by arguing in support of an answer which does build on this idea, and does so by introducing the idea that acting is doing something which is an exercise of a particular kind of disposition on the part of the acting subject. The third step is taken by arguing that the disposition in question must be of a kind which is exercised in conditions in which the acting subject thinks they are acting. From this vantage point the thesis develops many further commitments: That action is constitutively subject to a mode of explanation that mentions the kind of disposition just mentioned; that any case of acting requires a veridical representation of a means by which the action is performed; and that a problem about the underspecified nature of desire ascriptions can be solved by appeal to the conceptual materials made available by these investigations. The thesis finally develops several objections to the account it gives, both substantive and methodological, and explains why these objections ought to be rejected.Essentialism, nominalism, and modality: the modal theories of Robert Kilwardby & John Buridan
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7820
In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques.
In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic.
In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZJohnston, Spencer C.In the last 30 years there has been growing interest in and a greater appreciation of the unique contributions that medieval authors have made to the history of logic. In this thesis, we compare and contrast the modal logics of Robert Kilwardby and John Buridan and explore how their two conceptions of modality relate to and differ from modern notions of modal logic. We develop formal reconstructions of both authors' logics, making use of a number of different formal techniques.
In the case of Robert Kilwardby we show that using his distinction between per se and per accidens modalities, he is able to provide a consistent interpretation of the apodictic fragment of Aristotle's modal syllogism and that, by generalising this distinction to hypothetical construction, he can develop an account of connexive logic.
In the case of John Buridan we show that his modal logic is a natural extension of the usual Kripke-style possible worlds semantics, and that this modal logic can be shown to be sound and complete relative to a proof-theoretic formalisation of Buridan's treatment of the expository syllogism.Testimony, context, and miscommunication.
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7705
This thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted, and this assertion has been understood. Questions regarding the audience's ability to grasp communicated contents are largely ignored. This is a mistake. Work in the philosophy of language (and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways. This thesis investigates the epistemology of testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication.
The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of language, and psychology, and argues that there is good reason to investigate the three. One obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said then the risk of miscommunication will block testimonial knowledge. Chapter two argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters discuss problems which do to arise from miscommunication. Chapters three and four focus on the epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms. Chapter three argues that many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive. Chapter four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their assertions. Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background mental states affecting our linguistic understanding. Chapter five explores the social/ethical consequences of this, arguing that certain groups are disproportionately subject to harmful misinterpretation. Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions about a range of cases of cognitive penetration.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZPeet, AndrewThis thesis integrates the epistemology of testimony with work on the epistemology, psychology, and metaphysics of language. Epistemologists of testimony typically ask what conditions must be met for an agent to gain testimonial justification or knowledge that p given that p has been asserted, and this assertion has been understood. Questions regarding the audience's ability to grasp communicated contents are largely ignored. This is a mistake. Work in the philosophy of language (and related areas) suggests that the determination and recovery of communicated contents is far from straightforward, and can go wrong in many ways. This thesis investigates the epistemology of testimony in light of this work, with a special focus on miscommunication.
The introduction provides a brief overview of some relevant work on testimony, the philosophy of language, and psychology, and argues that there is good reason to investigate the three. One obvious problem in this area is that if testimonial knowledge requires knowledge of what is said then the risk of miscommunication will block testimonial knowledge. Chapter two argues that testimonial knowledge does not require knowledge of what is said. The remaining four chapters discuss problems which do to arise from miscommunication. Chapters three and four focus on the epistemic uncertainty of communication with context sensitive terms. Chapter three argues that many beliefs formed on the basis of context sensitive testimony are unsafe and insensitive. Chapter four argues that speakers often have plausible deniability about the contents of their assertions. Chapters five and six explore types of miscommunication which arise as a result of background mental states affecting our linguistic understanding. Chapter five explores the social/ethical consequences of this, arguing that certain groups are disproportionately subject to harmful misinterpretation. Chapter six argues that testimonial anti-reductionists make the wrong predictions about a range of cases of cognitive penetration.Common human reason in Kant : a study in Kant’s moral psychology and philosophical method
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7445
In my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference.
In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence.
In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions.
In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing.
In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.
2015-11-30T00:00:00ZSticker, MartinIn my thesis I explain why the common, pre-theoretical understanding of morality is an important part of Kant’s ethics, and I critically evaluate what the strengths and weaknesses are of doing ethics with the common perspective as a point of reference.
In chapter 1, I discuss the significance of common rational capacities for the deduction in Groundwork III as well as for the Fact of Reason. Attention to the fundamental role of common rational capacities in the Second Critique reveals that Kant intends to provide further warrant for the Fact than its introspective self-evidence.
In chapter 2, I discuss what it means for a rational agent to be endowed with common rational capacities. The agent has everything she needs to reason on her own about what she ought to do and act from rational judgements. Furthermore, I critically evaluate Kant’s claim that his ethics spells out fundamental, pre-theoretical convictions.
In chapter 3, I discuss Kant’s conception of rationalizing (“Vernünfteln”). I analyse rationalizing as a process of self-deception in which an agent tries to justify or excuse violations of the moral law. This can lead to loss of the reliable use of common rational capacities. I discuss what help critical practical philosophy and moral education can afford against rationalizing.
In chapter 4, I argue that Kant saw dialogical engagement with ordinary agents as an important way of obtaining data concerning the correct starting point of practical philosophy. Kant demands that whatever we get from dialog and observation has to be isolated from its contingent elements. I conclude that the main problem for Kant’s method is how we can, on the one hand, exclude non-rational content, and, on the other hand, be open to what other agents actually have to say about morality.Normativity and law
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7363
An action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible
example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault
is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed action. Still, assault's
illegality is irrelevant in this case: the reason would pertain (assault would cause
suffering; we would have reason not to assault) even if assault were not legally
proscribed.
On the other hand, it appears that a reason can be one that derives from
the interposition of law. This thesis is about reasons of this second type (legal
reasons). In particular, it is about their formal features. For example, it is about
their individuating conditions (when are p and q two legal reasons rather than
one?) and about how legal reasons can be second-order rather than first-order
(what follows when p is a reason not to have another reason figure in
deliberation about action?). Most particularly, however, it is about their identity
conditions (if p is a reason, when and only when is p a legal reason?).
I argue against three widely-accepted claims about the nature of legal
reasons: (i) p is a legal reason only if p is a content-independent reason (chapters
5 and 6); (ii) if p is a legal reason to ¢, p could be a complete reason to ¢ or a
part of a complete reason to ¢ (chapters 2, 3 and 4); (iii) a legal reason p has a
significant formal feature when p is an exclusionary reason (chapter 8). I also
argue that one argument to the conclusion that analytical jurisprudence must pay
special to attention moral legal reasons - an argument seen in recent work by R.
A. Duff - is unconvincing (chapter 7).
2000-01-01T00:00:00ZMarkwick, PaulAn action's illegality can be irrelevant to a reason not to perform it. A plausible
example of a reason not to assault is that assault causes suffering. Since assault
is illegal, the reason pertains to a legally proscribed action. Still, assault's
illegality is irrelevant in this case: the reason would pertain (assault would cause
suffering; we would have reason not to assault) even if assault were not legally
proscribed.
On the other hand, it appears that a reason can be one that derives from
the interposition of law. This thesis is about reasons of this second type (legal
reasons). In particular, it is about their formal features. For example, it is about
their individuating conditions (when are p and q two legal reasons rather than
one?) and about how legal reasons can be second-order rather than first-order
(what follows when p is a reason not to have another reason figure in
deliberation about action?). Most particularly, however, it is about their identity
conditions (if p is a reason, when and only when is p a legal reason?).
I argue against three widely-accepted claims about the nature of legal
reasons: (i) p is a legal reason only if p is a content-independent reason (chapters
5 and 6); (ii) if p is a legal reason to ¢, p could be a complete reason to ¢ or a
part of a complete reason to ¢ (chapters 2, 3 and 4); (iii) a legal reason p has a
significant formal feature when p is an exclusionary reason (chapter 8). I also
argue that one argument to the conclusion that analytical jurisprudence must pay
special to attention moral legal reasons - an argument seen in recent work by R.
A. Duff - is unconvincing (chapter 7).Indexicality, transparency, and mental files
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7286
Francois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZBall, Derek NelsonFrancois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.Recombination and paradox
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7139
2015-08-01T00:00:00ZUzquiano, GabrielCausation and responsibility : four aspects of their relation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7060
The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an
agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent
and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain
unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different
properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views.
Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent
relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a
naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that
such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility
attributions to an objective relation.
Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that
responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences.
I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism
and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify
with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable.
Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine
the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency
and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively
independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist
stance towards group agency talk.
Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but
only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set
of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack
clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic
argument against consequentialism.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZTarnovanu, HoriaThe concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an
agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent
and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain
unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different
properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views.
Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent
relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a
naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that
such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility
attributions to an objective relation.
Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that
responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences.
I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism
and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify
with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable.
Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine
the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency
and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively
independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist
stance towards group agency talk.
Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but
only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set
of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack
clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic
argument against consequentialism.Ideals, reasons, and the second person
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/7043
The aim of this thesis is to shed light on important aspects of the role ideals play in
practical reasoning. In the first chapter an account of ideals as conceptions of
admirable ways of being (a true friend, a great athlete, a perfect dandy) is provided,
distinguishing proper ideals from bad and incomplete ones. In the second chapter, it
is shown what it takes for a person to have an ideal. The phenomenon of ideal
possession reveals a complex dispositional structure at the centre of which lies a kind
of affective desire, a feeling of a calling to be the way conceptualised by the ideal.
Admiration for ideal ways of being observed in real and imaginative others can,
under certain conditions, trigger such a desire. In the third chapter, the normative
implications of ideal possession are examined. To have an ideal comes with a
standing vocational reason to pursue one’s ideal. This standing reason, in turn, gives
rise to a steady supply of case-dependent vocational reasons to act and to feel in
certain ways; reasons that ultimately guide one’s attempts at living up to one’s ideal.
Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the contribution of a pursuit of ideals to the
quality of one’s life. The main focus is on the kind of recognition that successful
idealists are likely to receive from actual admirers. It is argued that second-personal
expressions of admiration can endow the idealist with petitionary reasons to
maintain or develop her admirable properties. The result is the doubling of reasons:
The interplay of both ideal-based vocational reasons and admiration-based
petitionary reasons pulling in the same direction, helping the idealist to live a life in
which her individual and social natures are better reconciled with each other – a life
which is not necessarily happier, but likely more meaningful.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZGrahle, AndréThe aim of this thesis is to shed light on important aspects of the role ideals play in
practical reasoning. In the first chapter an account of ideals as conceptions of
admirable ways of being (a true friend, a great athlete, a perfect dandy) is provided,
distinguishing proper ideals from bad and incomplete ones. In the second chapter, it
is shown what it takes for a person to have an ideal. The phenomenon of ideal
possession reveals a complex dispositional structure at the centre of which lies a kind
of affective desire, a feeling of a calling to be the way conceptualised by the ideal.
Admiration for ideal ways of being observed in real and imaginative others can,
under certain conditions, trigger such a desire. In the third chapter, the normative
implications of ideal possession are examined. To have an ideal comes with a
standing vocational reason to pursue one’s ideal. This standing reason, in turn, gives
rise to a steady supply of case-dependent vocational reasons to act and to feel in
certain ways; reasons that ultimately guide one’s attempts at living up to one’s ideal.
Finally, the fourth chapter investigates the contribution of a pursuit of ideals to the
quality of one’s life. The main focus is on the kind of recognition that successful
idealists are likely to receive from actual admirers. It is argued that second-personal
expressions of admiration can endow the idealist with petitionary reasons to
maintain or develop her admirable properties. The result is the doubling of reasons:
The interplay of both ideal-based vocational reasons and admiration-based
petitionary reasons pulling in the same direction, helping the idealist to live a life in
which her individual and social natures are better reconciled with each other – a life
which is not necessarily happier, but likely more meaningful.Aristotle on mathematical objects
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6864
My thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. The
first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle’s cryptic and challenging view on
mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The
thesis’ central focus is on Aristotle’s view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures.
In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number
of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based
on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle’s view on number by applying
it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project
because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum.
Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to
lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when
we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status
of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only
be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered
in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle’s and Plato’s views
on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of
my comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s epistemological views to their respective
ontological views regarding mathematics.
In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege’s view on numbers into play and engage
with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments
to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for
a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege
and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege,
I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle’s
abstractionism in mathematics against Frege’s counting block argument. This whole
project sheds more light on Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects and explains why
it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.
2015-06-01T00:00:00ZGühler, JanineMy thesis is an exposition and defence of Aristotle’s philosophy of mathematics. The
first part of my thesis is an exposition of Aristotle’s cryptic and challenging view on
mathematics and is based on remarks scattered all over the corpus aristotelicum. The
thesis’ central focus is on Aristotle’s view on numbers rather than on geometrical figures.
In particular, number is understood as a countable plurality and is always a number
of something. I show that as a consequence the related concept of counting is based
on units. In the second part of my thesis, I verify Aristotle’s view on number by applying
it to his account of time. Time presents itself as a perfect test case for this project
because Aristotle defines time as a kind of number but also considers it as a continuum.
Since numbers and continuous things are mutually exclusive this observation seems to
lead to an apparent contradiction. I show why a contradiction does not arise when
we understand Aristotle properly. In the third part, I argue that the ontological status
of mathematical objects, dubbed as materially [hulekos, ÍlekÀc] by Aristotle, can only
be defended as an alternative to Platonism if mathematical objects exist potentially enmattered
in physical objects. In the fourth part, I compare Aristotle’s and Plato’s views
on how we obtain knowledge of mathematical objects. The fifth part is an extension of
my comparison between Aristotle’s and Plato’s epistemological views to their respective
ontological views regarding mathematics.
In the last part of my thesis I bring Frege’s view on numbers into play and engage
with Plato, Aristotle and Frege equally while exploring their ontological commitments
to mathematical objects. Specifically, I argue that Frege should not be mistaken for
a historical Platonist and that we find surprisingly many similarities between Frege
and Aristotle. After having acknowledged commonalities between Aristotle and Frege,
I turn to the most significant differences in their views. Finally, I defend Aristotle’s
abstractionism in mathematics against Frege’s counting block argument. This whole
project sheds more light on Aristotle’s view on mathematical objects and explains why
it remains an attractive view in the philosophy of mathematics.Generics in context : generalisation, context and communication
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6606
This thesis consists of four chapters and an introduction.
The first chapter is concerned with cases of purported genericity which are true despite only a minority of the kind in question satisfying the predicated property and whose predicated property is somehow striking. I argue that such cases are pathological, and hence shouldn’t be used as evidence for claims about the nature of genericity or the semantics of generics. In particular, these cases pose no difficulty for theorists who want to solve the problem of variability (the main obstacle in providing an adequate theory of generics), at least in part, by appeal to the linguistic property of quantifiers known as (contextual) domain restriction.
The second chapter is devoted to defending a quantificational analysis of generics in which the logical form of generics contains an unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. The chapter defends the original argument of Carlson (1989), the multiple readings argument, which has recently come under scrutiny. In addition, it provides a novel argument in favour or Gen. This chapter also responds to various objections to the quantificational analysis, in particular to the linguistic evidence offered in favour of the kind-predication analysis.
The third chapter defends the positive view that the unpronounced quantifier expression Gen is an indexical. The chapter argues that a given generic sentence expresses different generalisations in different contexts of utterance. A semantics for generics which treats Gen as an indexical A-quantifier is given. The indexical approach advocated has many virtues which are outlined in the chapter. Objections to the view are also addressed.
The fourth chapter discusses two further classes of generics -existential generics and indexical singular generics. Diagnoses of the issues arising from these classes of data is given, and their relation to the positive view developed in the third chapter is outlined.
2014-04-01T00:00:00ZSterken, RachelThis thesis consists of four chapters and an introduction.
The first chapter is concerned with cases of purported genericity which are true despite only a minority of the kind in question satisfying the predicated property and whose predicated property is somehow striking. I argue that such cases are pathological, and hence shouldn’t be used as evidence for claims about the nature of genericity or the semantics of generics. In particular, these cases pose no difficulty for theorists who want to solve the problem of variability (the main obstacle in providing an adequate theory of generics), at least in part, by appeal to the linguistic property of quantifiers known as (contextual) domain restriction.
The second chapter is devoted to defending a quantificational analysis of generics in which the logical form of generics contains an unpronounced quantifier expression Gen. The chapter defends the original argument of Carlson (1989), the multiple readings argument, which has recently come under scrutiny. In addition, it provides a novel argument in favour or Gen. This chapter also responds to various objections to the quantificational analysis, in particular to the linguistic evidence offered in favour of the kind-predication analysis.
The third chapter defends the positive view that the unpronounced quantifier expression Gen is an indexical. The chapter argues that a given generic sentence expresses different generalisations in different contexts of utterance. A semantics for generics which treats Gen as an indexical A-quantifier is given. The indexical approach advocated has many virtues which are outlined in the chapter. Objections to the view are also addressed.
The fourth chapter discusses two further classes of generics -existential generics and indexical singular generics. Diagnoses of the issues arising from these classes of data is given, and their relation to the positive view developed in the third chapter is outlined.Liberalism & internally illiberal minority cultures : a plea for a substantive exit rights strategy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6604
This dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be
internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint?
The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is
fundamentally committed to the protection of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of (more) progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own
members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met:
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations.
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children.
To realise condition (i), which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to
ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition (ii) is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious
whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can
justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible.
My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual
freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to
live (autonomously or non-autonomously) in accordance with one’s conception of the good.
2014-06-01T00:00:00ZDe Vries, BoukeThis dissertation seeks to answer the following question: does a commitment to liberalism require state remediation of illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own members? Put differently, it asks: should the state deny illiberal minority cultures such as those of the Amish, Ultra-Orthodox Jews, Pueblo Indians, et cetera the freedom to be
internally illiberal from a liberal viewpoint?
The answer proposed by this dissertation is a qualified ‘no’. Assuming that liberalism is
fundamentally committed to the protection of individual freedom, I argue that states should allow illiberal minority cultures to be internally illiberal in order to respect the individual freedom of citizens with illiberal conceptions of the good. At the same time, I propose limits to this toleration in order to protect the individual freedom of (more) progressive-minded citizens, as well as to guard children from severely harmful cultural practices. Whether the state should tolerate illiberal practices of illiberal minority cultures that only affect their own
members, I claim, should depend on whether the following conditions are met:
(i) Their adult members are guaranteed substantive exit rights, i.e. rights to a realistic ability to change cultural affiliations.
(ii) The cultural communities in question do not engage in illiberal practices that inflict severe harm on children.
To realise condition (i), which forms the core of this dissertation’s ‘substantive exit rights strategy’, I argue that the state should take five measures. These include making an autonomy-facilitating education compulsorily for children, providing particular groups of defectors with financial assistance, and ensuring that the liberal majority culture is open to
ex-members of illiberal minority cultures. By contrast, condition (ii) is not considered to be central to this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy, the reason being that it is dubious
whether liberalism’s core commitment to the protection of individual freedom alone can
justify a ban on cultural practices that severely harm children. Even so, it will become clear that adding this condition renders this approach more plausible.
My central claim is that this dissertation’s substantive exit rights strategy better protects the individual freedom of members of illiberal minority cultures than the main rival liberal strategies, as proposed by Will Kymlicka and Chandran Kukathas. Whereas Kymlicka gives members of these groups too little liberty to engage in illiberal practices, I argue that Kukathas makes the opposite mistake of granting them too much liberty. In both cases, we will see that the individual freedom of some members of illiberal minority cultures is not appropriately protected. This holds true, I conclude, regardless of whether individual
freedom is construed as personal autonomy or in a less demanding way, namely as ability to
live (autonomously or non-autonomously) in accordance with one’s conception of the good.The agential fork : the hidden consequences of agency for plenitude in David Lewis' thesis of genuine modal realism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6551
In this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to
accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes
that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that happens at worlds. However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However,
plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not
collapse into the chance-based principle. But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any
world. This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible world. The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The
former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its neutrality either way, to its detriment.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZCole, Marc WilliamIn this dissertation, I argue that David Lewis' abductive argument for Genuine Modal Realism (GMR) has the unwelcome, and hidden, implication of being unable to
accommodate agent causation theories of free will. This is because of his formulation of plenitude, which basically says that every way that a world or a part of a world could be is the way that some world, or part of some world is. This formulation tacitly assumes
that chance and nomological principles are sufficient to account for everything that happens at worlds. However, agent causation theories argue that free will is neither reducible to chance nor determined by physics. My argument recasts a fork argument made by Andrew Beedle. I proceed by arguing that chance-based principles evince an ontologically distinct kind of modality than agent causation principles. However,
plenitude only accounts for the physics/chance-based kind of modality. There is no similar principle of plenitude that can be given for agential modality that does not
collapse into the chance-based principle. But even if such a principle could be found, it would violate the doctrine in GMR that claims worlds are causally isolated. If no agential plenitude principle can be found and there is agential modality, then plenitude fails. If there is no agency at our world, and Lewis’ original formulation of plenitude is correct, then GMR implies no agency at any
world. This is the fork: If there is agency and GMR holds, then either plenitude fails, or isolation fails. But if there is no agency, and GMR holds, then there is no agency at any possible world. The latter prong is too strong a claim for an abductive argument like GMR. The
former proves that GMR cannot accommodate agent-causation theories. GMR loses its neutrality either way, to its detriment.The unity of action
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6550
This thesis develops a disjunctivist approach to action as an alternative to the standard causal theory, or 'causalism'. The standard theory promotes a concept of action as constituted by a bodily event joined to certain mental conditions by a bond of causation. A disjunctivist approach, in contrast, claims that action must be distinguished by more than merely its etiology: action and mere movement are fundamentally different kinds. Recent objections to the causal theory of action are first surveyed, and the common causalist assumption claiming Aristotle as the progenitor of the causal theory is examined and dismissed. More refined interpretations of Aristotle's thought on action yield two different concepts: action as change, and action as a unified psychophysical process. The latter in particular is argued to hold promise as a basis for developing the disjunctivist approach to action. The remainder of the thesis therefore considers a contemporary account of psychophysicality, known as 'embodiment theory' (Hanna and Maiese 2009), with the conclusion that the intelligibility of the account depends on appeal to a recent variant of top-down causation (Steward 2012). The thesis also concludes that consideration of the concept of an animal agent makes it entirely unsurprising that the mental and physical are always found together in voluntary movement, and that the embodiment theory’s central notion of ‘property fusion’ potentially complements a naturalistic variant of top-down causation in explanations of agency.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZChik, Janice TzulingThis thesis develops a disjunctivist approach to action as an alternative to the standard causal theory, or 'causalism'. The standard theory promotes a concept of action as constituted by a bodily event joined to certain mental conditions by a bond of causation. A disjunctivist approach, in contrast, claims that action must be distinguished by more than merely its etiology: action and mere movement are fundamentally different kinds. Recent objections to the causal theory of action are first surveyed, and the common causalist assumption claiming Aristotle as the progenitor of the causal theory is examined and dismissed. More refined interpretations of Aristotle's thought on action yield two different concepts: action as change, and action as a unified psychophysical process. The latter in particular is argued to hold promise as a basis for developing the disjunctivist approach to action. The remainder of the thesis therefore considers a contemporary account of psychophysicality, known as 'embodiment theory' (Hanna and Maiese 2009), with the conclusion that the intelligibility of the account depends on appeal to a recent variant of top-down causation (Steward 2012). The thesis also concludes that consideration of the concept of an animal agent makes it entirely unsurprising that the mental and physical are always found together in voluntary movement, and that the embodiment theory’s central notion of ‘property fusion’ potentially complements a naturalistic variant of top-down causation in explanations of agency.Second-order logic : ontological and epistemological problems
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6407
In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.
2006-01-01T00:00:00ZRossberg, MarcusIn this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic
and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the
questions whether (a particular form of) second-order logic can count as logic in some
(further to be specified) proper sense of logic, and what epistemic status it occupies.
More specifically, second-order logic is sometimes taken to be mathematical, a mere
notational variant of some fragment of set theory. If this is the case, it might be
argued that it does not have the "epistemic innocence" which would be needed
for, e.g., foundational programmes in (the philosophy of) mathematics for which
second-order logic is sometimes used. I suggest a Deductivist conception of logic,
that characterises logical consequence by means of inference rules, and argue that
on this conception second-order logic should count as logic in the proper sense.Knowledge of modality by imagining
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6351
Assertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZStrohminger, MargotAssertions about metaphysical modality (hereafter modality) play central roles in philosophical theorizing. For example, when philosophers propose hypothetical counterexamples, they often are making a claim to the effect that some state of affairs is possible. Getting the epistemology of modality right is thus important. Debates have been preoccupied with assessing whether imaginability—or conceivability, insofar as it’s different—is a guide to possibility, or whether it is rather intuitions of possibility—and modal intuitions more generally—that are evidence for possibility (modal) claims. The dissertation argues that the imagination plays a subtler role than the first view recognizes, and a more central one than the second view does. In particular, it defends an epistemology of metaphysical modality on which someone can acquire modal knowledge in virtue of having performed certain complex imaginative exercises.Carnap's conventionalism : logic, science, and tolerance
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6334
In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZFriedman-Biglin, NoahIn broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature.
Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.Logic in theory and in practice : the normative status of logic
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6329
In my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.
2015-06-25T00:00:00ZCelani, LauraIn my thesis, I address the question ʽWhat normative status does logic have?', to argue that logical normativity is of a weak sort, and that its constraining power is similar to that of recommendations. The thesis first discusses the notion of logical validity and logical formality, then asks whether logic is a priori and whether it can provide a priori norms for thinking. Subsequently, the issue of the bridge principles linking formal logic to informal reasoning is addressed, jointly with a brief discussion of the deontic operators included in the bridge principles. Then, the thesis addresses three criticisms of the normative role of logic with respect to rational reasoning. The first criticism is discussed in the fourth chapter; it starts from the consideration of the cognitive limitations of human agents and discusses a model of rationality that takes those limitations into account. The second criticism is analyzed in the fifth chapter; it is motivated by the empirical studies in the psychology of reasoning, and discusses human reasoning from a descriptive point of view, lending support to the model of rationality presented in the fourth chapter. The third criticism, presented in the sixth and final chapter, addresses the normative role of logic from an a priori point of view, showing how the epistemic paradoxes are crucial for determining what normative import logic has on rational reasoning. The final chapter defends the main thesis that logic has a weak import on our reasoning, which resembles a recommendation rather than an obligation.A phenomenological-enactive theory of the minimal self
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/6043
The purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZWelch, BrettThe purpose of this project is to argue that we possess a minimal self. It will demonstrate that minimal selfhood arrives early in our development and continues to remain and influence us throughout our entire life. There are two areas of research which shape my understanding of the minimal self: phenomenology and enactivism. Phenomenology emphasizes the sense of givenness, ownership, or mineness that accompanies all of our experiences. Enactivism says there is a sensorimotor coupling that occurs between us and the environment in a way which modulates the dynamic patterns of our self development; the laying down of these basic patterns helps make us who we are and gives rise to the phenomenological, experiential mineness. Drawing on these two core ideas, I will be arguing for a Phenomenological-Enactive Minimal Self (abbreviated PEMS). I will be emphasizing the role of the body and the role of affects (moods, feelings, and emotions) as the most important components relevant to understanding minimal selfhood. Put more concretely, the set of conditions which constitute the PEMS view are: (i) The minimal self is the experiential subject; the minimal sense of self is present whenever there is awareness. It is the subjectivity of experience, the sense of mineness, or givenness which our experiences contain. (ii) The phenomenological part of the PEMS view turns on the idea of a bodily and dynamic integration of sensorimotor coupling and affective experience. It is, ontologically speaking, the lived body in enactive engagement with the environment. It is this embodied subject which anchors and forms the foundation for the later ‘narrative’ self, which emerges from it and which is continually influenced by it. It is the subject enactively engaged with others, dependent on sensorimotor processes and affects. We have an identity, but it emerges from relational and dynamic processes.On rights and demands : how theorists of rights can benefit from taking demands seriously
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5892
This thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZHo, Kin TingThis thesis explores the normative significance of making a rights-backed, authorized demand as a right holder. Rights, I argue, enable their holders to make a special kind of demand which comes with a special force. It is, in other words, one of rights’ functions that they are demands-enabling. I single out what sort of demands I am interested in exploring. I also look at how these special demands are normatively significant. I call them rights-backed, authorized demands. They are normatively significant, first, because of the interesting role they play in other agents’ practical-reasoning, and , second, because the very making of these demands, as a matter of rights, is empowering in an abstract way. I go on to contrast my view with other ‘demand theories’ in existence and conclude that my view is substantively different. In particular, existing demand theories of rights all fail to sufficiently highlight the importance of actual demands, and instead focus on the ‘status’ of ‘being in a position’ to make demands. I argue that this focus is a fundamental mistake. I also consider how my view can contribute to some related literature on rights. First, I argue that my view highlights a new function which rights have: it has interesting implications on the shape of the long-standing debate between the will and interest theory of rights. Second, I argue that my view provides us with a new way to counter one of the most discussed criticisms of the existence of welfare human rights, which is the argument that rights must correlate with some specific duties as a necessary existence condition, and that human welfare rights fail on this mark. I conclude that if human rights indeed have a demand-related function as I argue, it weakens the intuitive appeal of this criticism.The sensorimotor theory of perceptual experience
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/5544
The sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.
2014-12-01T00:00:00ZSilverman, DavidThe sensorimotor theory is an influential, non-mainstream account of perception and perceptual consciousness intended to improve in various ways on orthodox theories. It is often taken to be a variety of enactivism, and in common with enactivist cognitive science more generally, it de-emphasises the theoretical role played by internal representation and other purely neural processes, giving theoretical pride of place instead to interactive engagements between the brain, non-neural body and outside environment.
In addition to offering a distinctive account of the processing that underlies perceptual consciousness, the sensorimotor theory aims to offer a new and improved account the logical and phenomenological character of perceptual experience, and the relation between physical and phenomenal states. Since its inception in a 2001 paper by O’Regan and Noë, the theory has prompted a good deal of increasingly prominent theoretical and practical work in
cognitive science, as well as a large body of secondary literature in philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of perception. In spite of its influential character, many of the theory’s most basic tenets are incompletely or ambiguously defined, and it has attracted a number of prominent objections.
This thesis aims to clarify the conceptual foundations of the sensorimotor theory, including the key theoretical concepts of sensorimotor contingency, sensorimotor mastery, and presence-as-access, and defends a particular understanding of the respective theoretical roles of internal representation and behavioural capacities. In so doing, the thesis aims to highlight the sensorimotor theory’s virtues and defend it from some leading criticisms, with particular attention to a response by Clark which claims that perception and perceptual experience plausibly depend on the activation of representations which are not intimately involved in bodily engagements between the agent and environment. A final part of the thesis offers a sensorimotor account of the experience of temporally extended events, and shows how with reference to this we can better understand object experience.How to commit to an individual : logic, objects and ontology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4527
In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.
2014-06-26T00:00:00ZJanssen, F. M.In this thesis I propose an improved theory of ontological commitment, one which is neutral on epistemology. Although Quine's quantificational criterion of ontological commitment has many advantages over its competitors, like its univocal treatment of being and existence, its clear account of ontological reduction and its capacity to accommodate implicit commitments, I argue that it has a fatal flaw: the inability to account for ontological commitment to individuals. Quine's choice of a first-order language of regimentation without constants is so entwined with his holist epistemology that imputations of existence cannot be made except to objects-qua-F, qua some wholly third-personal description. Commitments of those who believe that minds reach out directly to objects by means of acquaintance or introspection, encoded in language by constants, are ungrammatical in Quine's language. This breakdown of grammaticality, on my view, is an avoidable result of Quine's behaviourism and holist epistemology filtering into his choice of canonical language. I opt for a broader conception of ontological commitments as incurred by formalised theories with one or more semantic categories of categorematic objectual expressions, whose function is to stand for objects. I expand the language of regimentation at least to first-order logic with constants and identity. This preserves the attractive features of Quine's position. It retains its elegant treatment of reduction and implicit ontological commitments, and its capacity to explain away Meinongian confusions, without being beholden to global holism. My canonical language makes room for acquaintance and first-personal methods as sources of ontological commitment. It has the advantage of allowing theories like Quine's, which confine themselves to objects-qua-F, to be regimented as well as non-holist theories whose criteria of ontological commitment are 'to be is to be the referent of a name' or 'to be is to be the value of a constant or variable'.Ramsey's 'Universals'
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4504
Ramsey’s Universals has not been served well by its critics and, as a result, the real
and important contentions of Ramsey’s essay are often obscured in discussion of his
work. This thesis is intended to form the beginning of an attempt to rectify this by
offering an exposition and critique of Ramsey’s essay that is particularly sensitive to
the background context and purpose of the essay as a whole and to the subtle
structure of the argumentation within it.
The construction of the arguments in Universals is so intricate that to assess any of
its arguments without placing them in the context of the overall strategy of
Ramsey’s essay is to grossly underestimate them. For this reason, most of the labour
in this thesis will be directed towards articulating Ramsey’s concerns in his essay
and the way in which Ramsey’s arguments are supposed to supplement each other
in order to establish his main contentions. These tasks take up the first two
chapters. Only then will the third chapter consider one particular argument- the
incomprehensible trinity argument- and assess whether it is successful by first
identifying the role that the argument is intended to play in the overall structure of
Ramsey’s argument and then asking whether or not the argument can be said to
fulfil such a role.
This final chapter is a mere beginning towards a proper critique of Ramsey’s
difficult and subtle argumentation in Universals. Nonetheless it serves as an example
of how offering a critique of Ramsey which places his arguments within the context and concerns of the essay as a whole, while it does not immediately vindicate them
of all criticism, shows them to be far more subtle and robust than they have been
estimated to be.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZDoherty, Fiona TeresaRamsey’s Universals has not been served well by its critics and, as a result, the real
and important contentions of Ramsey’s essay are often obscured in discussion of his
work. This thesis is intended to form the beginning of an attempt to rectify this by
offering an exposition and critique of Ramsey’s essay that is particularly sensitive to
the background context and purpose of the essay as a whole and to the subtle
structure of the argumentation within it.
The construction of the arguments in Universals is so intricate that to assess any of
its arguments without placing them in the context of the overall strategy of
Ramsey’s essay is to grossly underestimate them. For this reason, most of the labour
in this thesis will be directed towards articulating Ramsey’s concerns in his essay
and the way in which Ramsey’s arguments are supposed to supplement each other
in order to establish his main contentions. These tasks take up the first two
chapters. Only then will the third chapter consider one particular argument- the
incomprehensible trinity argument- and assess whether it is successful by first
identifying the role that the argument is intended to play in the overall structure of
Ramsey’s argument and then asking whether or not the argument can be said to
fulfil such a role.
This final chapter is a mere beginning towards a proper critique of Ramsey’s
difficult and subtle argumentation in Universals. Nonetheless it serves as an example
of how offering a critique of Ramsey which places his arguments within the context and concerns of the essay as a whole, while it does not immediately vindicate them
of all criticism, shows them to be far more subtle and robust than they have been
estimated to be.On Plato's conception of philosophy in the Republic and certain post-Republic dialogues
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4497
This dissertation is generally concerned with Plato’s conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic’ dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy’ does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity.
A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic’ (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato’s science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher.
In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.
2014-01-01T00:00:00ZLabriola, DanieleThis dissertation is generally concerned with Plato’s conception of philosophy, as the conception is ascertainable from the Republic and certain ‘post-Republic’ dialogues. It argues that philosophy, according to Plato, is multi-disciplinary; that ‘philosophy’ does not mark off just one art or science; that there are various philosophers corresponding to various philosophical sciences, all of which come together under a common aim: betterment of self through intellectual activity.
A major part of this dissertation is concerned with Plato's science par excellence, ‘the science of dialectic’ (he epistêmê dialektikê). The science of dialectic is distinguished in Plato by being concerned with Forms or Kinds as such; the science of dialectic, alone amongst the philosophical sciences, fully understands what it means for Form X to be a Form. I track the science of dialectic, from its showcase in Republic VI and VII, and analyze its place in relation to the other philosophical sciences in certain post-Republic dialogues. Ultimately, I show that, whilst it is not the only science constituting philosophy, Plato’s science of dialectic represents the intellectual zenith obtainable by man; the expert of this science is the topmost philosopher.
In this dissertation I also argue that Socrates, as variously depicted in these dialogues, always falls short of being identified as the philosopher par excellence, as that expert with positive knowledge of Forms as such. Yet I also show that, far from being in conflict, the elenctic Socrates and the philosopher par excellence form a complementary relationship: the elenctic philosopher gets pupils to think about certain things in the right way prior to sending them off to work with the philosopher par excellence.Global problems and individual obligations : an investigation of different forms of consequentialism in situations with many agents
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4458
In this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise
in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world.
Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions
which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act
Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations
where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by
donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism
here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise
agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically
simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second
challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem
arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better,
e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they
can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or
protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy.
Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only
considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural
response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers
the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act
Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far
these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZPinkert, Felix ChristianIn this thesis, I investigate two challenges for Act Consequentialism which arise
in situations where many agents together can make a difference in the world.
Act Consequentialism holds that agents morally ought to perform those actions
which have the best expected consequences. The first challenge for Act
Consequentialism is that it often asks too much. This problem arises in situations
where agents can individually make a difference for the better, e.g. by
donating money to charities that fight extreme poverty. Act Consequentialism
here often requires agents to make immense sacrifices which threaten to compromise
agents future ability to do more good, reduce agents to a drastically
simple lifestyle, and amount to taking up the slack left by others. The second
challenge is that Act Consequentialism often asks too little. This problem
arises both in situations where agents can not make any difference for the better,
e.g. by stopping to pollute the environment, and in situations where they
can not make any difference whatsoever, e.g. when they individually vote or
protest against a morally bad but widely supported policy.
Act Consequentialism is subject to the above challenges because it only
considers the differences that individuals can make on their own. A natural
response is to adopt a form of Collective Consequentialism which considers
the difference that agents can make together. I investigate how far Act
Consequentialism can deal with each of the above challenges, and how far
these challenges require us to adopt Collective Consequentialism.At the borders of arthood : a methodology for the definition of art
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4210
The first-order debate about the definition of art focuses on the ‘What is art?’ question and those who engage in it answer the question by putting forward definitions (or at least characterizations) of art. The second-order debate about the definition of art, on the other hand, focuses on questions like the following one: what are the success-conditions of the definition of art? Under what conditions, that is, does a definition of ‘work of art’ count as successful or correct? In this dissertation, I develop an answer to this second-order question by putting forward a methodology whereby definitions of art can be assessed. The borderline methodology, as I call it, is proposed as an alternative to Stephen Davies’ extensional methodology and Nick Zangwill’s explanatory methodology. According to it, extensional adequacy is the main success-condition of the definition of art, since it is the success-condition whereby much that we believe about works of art (qua works of art) is adequately explained. In particular, there is no way a definition of art is extensionally adequate and yet does not explain that we have beliefs about the ontology of art (Thesis I) and the value of art (Thesis II). I argue for these two fundamental tenets of the borderline methodology in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to explanatory power as a success-condition of the definition of art and propose a fine-grained account of it derived from the account of extensional adequacy previously defended. In the light of these two success-conditions of the definition of art, I develop in Chapter 4 two pairs of tests – the extensional adequacy tests and the explanatory power tests – and assess definitions of art on the basis of them, concluding that ‘work of art’ cannot be successfully defined using certain types of logical structure.
2013-11-30T00:00:00ZDos Santos, Miguel F.The first-order debate about the definition of art focuses on the ‘What is art?’ question and those who engage in it answer the question by putting forward definitions (or at least characterizations) of art. The second-order debate about the definition of art, on the other hand, focuses on questions like the following one: what are the success-conditions of the definition of art? Under what conditions, that is, does a definition of ‘work of art’ count as successful or correct? In this dissertation, I develop an answer to this second-order question by putting forward a methodology whereby definitions of art can be assessed. The borderline methodology, as I call it, is proposed as an alternative to Stephen Davies’ extensional methodology and Nick Zangwill’s explanatory methodology. According to it, extensional adequacy is the main success-condition of the definition of art, since it is the success-condition whereby much that we believe about works of art (qua works of art) is adequately explained. In particular, there is no way a definition of art is extensionally adequate and yet does not explain that we have beliefs about the ontology of art (Thesis I) and the value of art (Thesis II). I argue for these two fundamental tenets of the borderline methodology in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to explanatory power as a success-condition of the definition of art and propose a fine-grained account of it derived from the account of extensional adequacy previously defended. In the light of these two success-conditions of the definition of art, I develop in Chapter 4 two pairs of tests – the extensional adequacy tests and the explanatory power tests – and assess definitions of art on the basis of them, concluding that ‘work of art’ cannot be successfully defined using certain types of logical structure.Space and its dis-contents : new directions for intrinsicality, substance and dimensionality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4196
This dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth.
Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies.
Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.
2013-11-30T00:00:00ZWalker-Dale, HeatherThis dissertation examines key areas in ontology through the intersection of metaphysics and physics. I argue that modern physics gives us good cause to look for new metaphysical models in place of the classical conceptions of ‘object’ and ‘space’. Part I addresses the object in itself, wherein I argue that physics, along with various philosophical concerns, encourages us to re-evaluate the intrinsic/ extrinsic distinction in favour of new classifications. In particular, I use conclusions of relativity theory and the acquisition of mass via the Higgs field as indications of the inadequacy of intrinsicality, concluding that the distinction is more trouble than it is worth.
Part II examines the intersection of objects and space, wherein I criticise substantivalism and promote singular fundamental ontologies like relationalism and supersubstantivalism. I examine phenomena like spatial expansion and field theory as well as separability issues more generally to emphasise the lack of rationale for a substance dualism of ‘object material’ and ‘space material’. I also challenge the coherence of substantivalism’s ‘occupation relation’ and the ease of interpreting mathematical models into physical terms. I conclude that, again, the classical notion of ‘object’ and its substantival framework are misplaced and should be put aside in favour of developing monistic ontologies.
Part III looks at space in itself and the properties commonly attributed to it. I explore issues of separability using key experiments, and what makes spaces ‘physically real’, before an extended examination of dimensions and dimensionality, highlighting the confusion physicists express toward such a ubiquitous concept in modern physical theories. I also explore how we use dimensions and reasons for adopting realist or instrumentalist approaches toward them, arguing that much more work should be focused on this area. I conclude with ways in which physics motivates new metaphysical models and suggest improvements for future methodological partnerships.Business ethics & collective responsibility
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4121
The idea that ‘business ethics’ picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action.
The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct’ collective entities.
From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential’ moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.
2013-11-30T00:00:00ZDempsey, James A.The idea that ‘business ethics’ picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action.
The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct’ collective entities.
From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential’ moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.Dismissivism in metaphysics : debates about what there is and debates about what grounds what
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/4108
In this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.
2013-11-30T00:00:00ZPorro, Laura CeciliaIn this thesis I focus on dismissivism in metaphysics. Some philosophers argue that
at least some metaphysical disputes are not substantial, and as a consequence should
be dismissed. In this work I restrict my attention to metaphysics and focus on
debates about existence and grounding. In particular I am interested in finding out
whether there is a difference between the possible options available for dismissing
debates about what there is and the possible options available for dismissing debates
about what grounds what. I will delve into this in two different steps. First of all
I explore the possibility to dismiss debates about what there is, and as a case
study I analyse the debate between three-dimensionalism and four-dimensionalism.
Secondly I delve into whether it is possible to dismiss debates about what grounds
what, thanks to the discussion of another case study, i.e. the debate between
tropes ontologies and universals ontologies. It is worth exploring the nature of
dismissivism, because it bears on the future of philosophy. If philosophy has to
have a future, we have to make sure that at least some disagreements within it are
substantial.
My conclusions will be that metaphysical debates about what there is can be
dismissed for a variety of reasons (semantic, epistemic, ...). I also argue there is no
general formula to find out whether a specific debate should be dismissed. On the
other hand I argue that debates about what grounds what should be dismissed. I
offer two distinct arguments in favour of my claim. Firstly, I argue that disputants
are having a verbal dispute when they talk about what grounds what, and thus
their disagreement is non genuine. Secondly, I argue that the notion of grounding
is underspecified, because it cannot be properly distinguished from causation.The pattern in the weave : an account of Wittgenstein's remarks on meaning-as-use and of their relation to social psychology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3715
The thesis begins with a criticism of the 'theory of meaning' approach to the philosophy of language. It then goes on to establish an account of language understanding in terms of Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following and meaning as use. This characterization is extended to aspects of the philosophy of social science. Inferences are then drawn, on the basis of this extension, as to the overall framework within which empirical
social studies should be located. A critical assessment is offered of a specific social scientific theory which is, in some ways, typical of empirical social research.
This criticism is followed by a formulation of an alternative approach to empirical questions in the social sciences. The alternative approach is depicted as more sympathetic to the general perspective on social scientific theories outlined earlier.
1989-01-01T00:00:00ZMcKinlay, AndrewThe thesis begins with a criticism of the 'theory of meaning' approach to the philosophy of language. It then goes on to establish an account of language understanding in terms of Wittgenstein's comments on rule-following and meaning as use. This characterization is extended to aspects of the philosophy of social science. Inferences are then drawn, on the basis of this extension, as to the overall framework within which empirical
social studies should be located. A critical assessment is offered of a specific social scientific theory which is, in some ways, typical of empirical social research.
This criticism is followed by a formulation of an alternative approach to empirical questions in the social sciences. The alternative approach is depicted as more sympathetic to the general perspective on social scientific theories outlined earlier.Overcoming the minority rights paradox : a new approach to intercultural deliberation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3683
The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZLowe, Ruth E.The minority rights paradox is articulated at the level of political theory, is deployed by liberal democratic institutions, and can be observed in the political discourse of mass communications. Minority groups, it is argued, are paradoxically claiming purported rights that are unsupported by the values upon which the claimants base their claim. On the one hand, minority claims are made on the basis of rights secured by a liberal democracy; on the other hand, the claims undermine the legitimacy of liberal reasoning—the same reasoning that legitimizes the rights on which the claims are made. The self-referential implications of this paradox are as follows: Either the minority claim negates its own justification or the underlying justification renders the claim moot. In either case, the charge of paradox effectively puts an end to the conversation by dismissing minority rights claims before they are properly understood. My aim is to first, come to terms with political dialogues in which the charge of paradox occurs and second, to overcome the stultifying effects of the minority rights paradox through a deliberative approach to negotiating the concept and content of minority rights claims. Evaluating the claims of minorities, I will argue, requires a dialogue that can adapt to the participants in the dialogue—an inclusive deliberative process that gives formal, procedural and substantive recognition to the worldviews of minority cultures in political decision-making.On Wittgenstein's notion of the objectivity of mathematical proofs
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3679
This work analyses and defends Wittgenstein's definition of mathematical objectivity, looking particularly at his account of mathematical proofs, of what makes them normative, and what role mathematical and linguistic practices play in their establishment. It aims to provide a
clearer view of Wittgenstein's idea that the objectivity of proofs is inextricably rooted in empirical regularities, detected within what he calls our 'form of life', and which are in turn constituted by both regularities in nature and regularities in human practices. To accomplish this, the thesis makes an exhaustive analysis of Wittgenstein distinction between proofs and experiments. Drawing from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, this paper addresses important criticisms that have hindered a serious study of his remarks on mathematics, and
vindicates his arguments as cogent, solid accounts of mathematical necessity and practice. This exploration will show that mathematical proofs do not have to be regarded as tools for the discovery of mathematical truths, of any sort, that depict mathematical facts, but can be
correctly characterised as norms that produce new understanding, forming new concepts to deal with reality, and which ultimately affect the very limits of intelligibility, of what we can think,
express and do. Thus, a philosophically relevant link between mathematical proofs and
possibilities of action is set.
2013-06-01T00:00:00ZTrevino-Tarango, Martha AliciaThis work analyses and defends Wittgenstein's definition of mathematical objectivity, looking particularly at his account of mathematical proofs, of what makes them normative, and what role mathematical and linguistic practices play in their establishment. It aims to provide a
clearer view of Wittgenstein's idea that the objectivity of proofs is inextricably rooted in empirical regularities, detected within what he calls our 'form of life', and which are in turn constituted by both regularities in nature and regularities in human practices. To accomplish this, the thesis makes an exhaustive analysis of Wittgenstein distinction between proofs and experiments. Drawing from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, this paper addresses important criticisms that have hindered a serious study of his remarks on mathematics, and
vindicates his arguments as cogent, solid accounts of mathematical necessity and practice. This exploration will show that mathematical proofs do not have to be regarded as tools for the discovery of mathematical truths, of any sort, that depict mathematical facts, but can be
correctly characterised as norms that produce new understanding, forming new concepts to deal with reality, and which ultimately affect the very limits of intelligibility, of what we can think,
express and do. Thus, a philosophically relevant link between mathematical proofs and
possibilities of action is set.Propositions : an essay on linguistic content
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3677
This thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZHodgson, Thomas William StricklandThis thesis presents an account of the nature of structured propositions and addresses a series of questions that arise from that proposal. Chapter 1 presents the account and explains how it meets standard objections to such views. Chapter 2 responds to the objection that this version of propositionalism is really a form of sententialism by arguing for the distinct advantages of the propositionalist view. Chapter 3 argues against a closely related view of propositions by way of general principles about how to construct such theories. Chapter 4 illustrates how a theory of propositions of the sort proposed can be defended against a recent argument that propositions need not play a central role in linguistic theory.Defining art culturally : modern theories of art - a synthesis
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3675
Numerous theories have attempted to overcome the anti-essentialist scepticism about the possibility of defining art. While significant advances have been made in this field, it seems that most modern definitions fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-changing nature of art raised by Morris Weitz, and rarely even attempt to provide an account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This thesis looks at the most successful definitions currently defended, determines their strengths and weaknesses, and offers a new, cultural definition which can preserve the good elements of other theories, solve or avoid their problems, and have a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. The resulting theory is a synthetic one in that it preserves the essential institutionalism of Dickie's institutional views, is inspired by the historical and functional determination of artistic phenomena present in Levinson's historicism and Beardsley's functionalism, and presents the reasons for something becoming art in a disjunctive form of Gaut's cluster account. Its strengths lie in the ability to account for the changing art-status of objects in various cultures and at various times, providing an explanation of not only what is or was art, but also how and why the concept 'art' changes historically and differs between cultures, and successfully balancing between the over-generalisations of ahistorical and universalist views, and the uninformativeness of relativism. More broadly, the cultural theory stresses the importance of treating art as a historical phenomenon embedded in particular social and cultural settings, and encourages cooperation with other disciplines such as anthropology and history of art.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZFokt, SimonNumerous theories have attempted to overcome the anti-essentialist scepticism about the possibility of defining art. While significant advances have been made in this field, it seems that most modern definitions fail to successfully address the issue of the ever-changing nature of art raised by Morris Weitz, and rarely even attempt to provide an account which would be valid in more than just the modern Western context. This thesis looks at the most successful definitions currently defended, determines their strengths and weaknesses, and offers a new, cultural definition which can preserve the good elements of other theories, solve or avoid their problems, and have a scope wide enough to account for art of different times and cultures. The resulting theory is a synthetic one in that it preserves the essential institutionalism of Dickie's institutional views, is inspired by the historical and functional determination of artistic phenomena present in Levinson's historicism and Beardsley's functionalism, and presents the reasons for something becoming art in a disjunctive form of Gaut's cluster account. Its strengths lie in the ability to account for the changing art-status of objects in various cultures and at various times, providing an explanation of not only what is or was art, but also how and why the concept 'art' changes historically and differs between cultures, and successfully balancing between the over-generalisations of ahistorical and universalist views, and the uninformativeness of relativism. More broadly, the cultural theory stresses the importance of treating art as a historical phenomenon embedded in particular social and cultural settings, and encourages cooperation with other disciplines such as anthropology and history of art.Understanding : moral evaluation and the ethics of imagining
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3667
Analytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding’ and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings’ ethics of care and Richard Hare’s preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding’s usefulness.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZWoerner, ChristopherAnalytic ethics often neglects the exploration and appreciation of morality as it is actually practised on a day-to-day basis. But by looking at how, in a practical sense, we are able to interact with others in a morally appropriate way we can construct a compelling picture of what some of our most pervasive obligations are. This thesis takes such an approach through the concept of understanding – understanding essentially taken here to involve those processes involved in detecting and correctly responding to beings typically possessing inherent moral significance. In the first two chapters ‘understanding’ and the understanding approach are themselves explicated, and placed in the context of several other related approaches in the English-speaking tradition – Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments, Nel Noddings’ ethics of care and Richard Hare’s preference utilitarianism. This approach is then used to provide us with an alternative idea about what our moral reasoning suggests to be of fundamental ethical significance, and of what kinds of activity morality recommends to us. The activity explored in most detail here is that of engaging with fiction – or more broadly, fictive imaginings. While understanding shows us that fictional characters and events themselves cannot have an inherent moral valence or significance, it also shows us when and how it is possible and appropriate to ethically assess fictive engagement, be it as creator or consumer. This is seen after exploring how and in what ways our moral understanding can be appropriately applied to and exercised by fictions at all, and why fiction should be of particular interest to the understanding agent, looking at the work of Martha Nussbaum, Jenefer Robinson, Peter Lamarque and others on aesthetic cognitivism. Ultimately this leads us to discern a minimal ethical constraint on our interpretation of fiction and art in general, further proving understanding’s usefulness.John Locke on persons and personal identity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3609
John Locke claims both that ‘person’ is a forensic term and that personal
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is
to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account
of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of
consciousness.
My interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is
embedded in Locke’s sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke’s sortal-dependent
account of identity provides an important theoretical framework
for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke’s account of personhood
is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My
approach gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term,
because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal
kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that
two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in
sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception
of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of
just accountability and just reward and punishment.
Given one accepts Locke’s conception of a person and his understanding
of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke
regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but
the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also
sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity within Locke’s epistemological, metaphysical
and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective,
the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and
that it is a verbal question whether Locke’s term ‘consciousness’ refers not
only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying
ontological constitution.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZBoeker, RuthJohn Locke claims both that ‘person’ is a forensic term and that personal
identity consists in sameness of consciousness. The aim of my dissertation is
to explain and critically assess how Locke links his moral and legal account
of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of
consciousness.
My interpretation of Locke’s account of persons and personal identity is
embedded in Locke’s sortal-dependent account of identity. Locke’s sortal-dependent
account of identity provides an important theoretical framework
for my interpretation: It makes clear that Locke’s account of personhood
is to be considered separately from his account of personal identity. My
approach gives full credit to Locke’s claim that ‘person’ is a forensic term,
because I argue that persons, according to Locke, belong to a moral and legal
kind of being: they are subjects of accountability. On this basis I argue that
two components explain why Locke argues that personal identity consists in
sameness of consciousness: firstly, his particular moral and legal conception
of a person, and, secondly, his particular understanding of the conditions of
just accountability and just reward and punishment.
Given one accepts Locke’s conception of a person and his understanding
of the conditions of just accountability, it will be easy to see why Locke
regards sameness of consciousness to be necessary for personal identity, but
the more challenging question is whether sameness of consciousness is also
sufficient. I critically assess this question by considering Locke’s account of
persons and personal identity within Locke’s epistemological, metaphysical
and religious views. I will argue that, at least from the divine perspective,
the underlying ontological constitution has to be taken into consideration and
that it is a verbal question whether Locke’s term ‘consciousness’ refers not
only to phenomenologically given consciousness, but also to the underlying
ontological constitution.Emotional responses to interactive fictions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3595
We commonly feel a variety of emotional responses to works of fiction. In this thesis I propose to examine what we understand by the terms fictional and narrative, and to describe what sorts of narrator might be required within a narrative work.
Of particular interest are interactive works of art, both narrative and non-narrative, and I provide a definition of what features a work should possess if it should properly be considered interactive. I discuss the notions of interactive narratives and examine how interactivity affects any possible narrator.
I examine the paradox of fiction - how it is that we can feel emotions towards characters
we know not to exist, and suggest how the paradox can be dissolved. I further discuss
how it can be rational to feel these emotional responses and note particular responses that it does not seem possible to feel rationally when engaging with non-interactive narratives.
I then examine what effect the introduction of interactivity to both non-narrative and
narrative works has, and argue that it reduces the control the artist has to direct our emotions, but increases the range of emotions which we can feel. Finally I suggest that some of the emotional responses that would be irrational to feel when engaging with non-interactive narrative works can be rational when we are engaged with their interactive counterparts, but that at least one emotional response cannot genuinely be felt rationally even in interactive cases.
2012-01-01T00:00:00ZHagger, AndrzejWe commonly feel a variety of emotional responses to works of fiction. In this thesis I propose to examine what we understand by the terms fictional and narrative, and to describe what sorts of narrator might be required within a narrative work.
Of particular interest are interactive works of art, both narrative and non-narrative, and I provide a definition of what features a work should possess if it should properly be considered interactive. I discuss the notions of interactive narratives and examine how interactivity affects any possible narrator.
I examine the paradox of fiction - how it is that we can feel emotions towards characters
we know not to exist, and suggest how the paradox can be dissolved. I further discuss
how it can be rational to feel these emotional responses and note particular responses that it does not seem possible to feel rationally when engaging with non-interactive narratives.
I then examine what effect the introduction of interactivity to both non-narrative and
narrative works has, and argue that it reduces the control the artist has to direct our emotions, but increases the range of emotions which we can feel. Finally I suggest that some of the emotional responses that would be irrational to feel when engaging with non-interactive narrative works can be rational when we are engaged with their interactive counterparts, but that at least one emotional response cannot genuinely be felt rationally even in interactive cases.The concept of happiness in Kant's moral, legal and political philosophy
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3547
This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZPinheiro Walla, AliceThis doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.Appealing to intuitions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3544
This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.
2013-06-27T00:00:00ZLangkau, JuliaThis thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.Why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3466
It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion) constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and offering. Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of warning and offering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong, and that an agent's issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to elucidate the descriptive differences between threats, warnings and offers, which sets up the later project of elucidating the moral differences between them.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZSachs, Benjamin AlanIt is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion) constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and offering. Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of warning and offering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong, and that an agent's issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to elucidate the descriptive differences between threats, warnings and offers, which sets up the later project of elucidating the moral differences between them.Epistemic theories of democracy, constitutionalism and the procedural legitimacy of fundamental rights
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3465
The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZAllard-Tremblay, YannThe overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.Concepts in context
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462
My thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent
literature on concepts:
• What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a
concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂?
• What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied
for a thinker to have a concept C?
I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and
possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions,
and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to
other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them.
In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude
ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the
problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to
provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”, according to
which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological
generalizations to be possible.
Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing
versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers.
Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our
best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to
modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed
to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege
cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist
picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically
individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated
and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with
other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the
localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson.
2013-01-01T00:00:00ZOnofri, AndreaMy thesis tackles two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent
literature on concepts:
• What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a
concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂?
• What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied
for a thinker to have a concept C?
I will develop a pluralist and contextualist theory of concept individuation and
possession: different concepts have different individuation and possession conditions,
and contextual factors play a crucial role in determining what concepts we attribute to
other subjects when we ascribe propositional attitudes to them.
In chapters 1-3, I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude
ascriptions. Then, I suggest contextualist theories of ascriptions can be applied to the
problem of concept individuation/possession. In particular, I use contextualism to
provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”, according to
which concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological
generalizations to be possible.
Publicity has important implications: in particular, it is inconsistent with existing
versions of holism, on which concepts cannot be shared by ordinary thinkers.
Nonetheless, in chapters 4-5 I show how holism can still play an important role in our
best theory of concepts. More specifically, I argue that the tradition of appealing to
modes of presentation in order to give an account of “Frege cases” is in fact committed
to holism. To develop a version of holism that will give a successful account of Frege
cases without violating publicity, I suggest we should adopt my pluralist-contextualist
picture: on that picture, the concepts involved in a Frege case will be holistically
individuated and not public, while other concepts will be more coarsely individuated
and widely shared. In chapter 6, I will develop this view further by contrasting it with
other pluralist theories (Weiskopf) and with rival theories of concepts, such as the
localist views defended by Peacocke, Rey and Jackson.On the contrary: disagreement, context, and relative truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3360
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZHuvenes, Torfinn ThomesenDown to earth philosophy: an anti-exceptionalist essay on thought experiments and philosophical methodology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3228
In the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZSgaravatti, DanieleIn the first part of the dissertation, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’ movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.Poincaré against foundationalists old and new
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3212
The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminate. One of the objections
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers
as Objects by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection
can be made against the revived logicist project.
The current project investigates Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates
the effectiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.
2011-11-30T00:00:00ZSands, Michael Thomas Jr.The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminate. One of the objections
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers
as Objects by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection
can be made against the revived logicist project.
The current project investigates Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates
the effectiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.Knowledge, chance, and contrast
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3202
The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand
united in their rejection of contextualism.
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZDimmock, PaulThe late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand
united in their rejection of contextualism.
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.The ideal role of women in Plato's and Aristotle's societies
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3201
This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than
appreciated.
2012-06-19T00:00:00ZJawin, AlixandraThis dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than
appreciated.Perspective in context : relative truth, knowledge, and the first person
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3164
This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group.
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.
2012-11-30T00:00:00ZKindermann, DirkThis dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group.
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.The answering machine paradox
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150
The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.
2012-01-01T00:00:00ZGudmundsson, DavidThe answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-theoretical intuitions.The routes of sense : thought, semantic underdeterminacy and compositionality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3142
What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reflection.
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing
content-minimalism.
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.
2012-01-01T00:00:00ZPedriali, Walter B.What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to
meta-ethical reflection.
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try
to address in the rest of the thesis.
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably
minimal conception of content.
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart
of the compositional machinery.
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing
content-minimalism.
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118
This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature.
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem.
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.
2012-06-01T00:00:00ZChurch, Ian M.This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature.
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem.
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.John Stuart Mill and romanticism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3097
This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement. The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined. I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory. For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny. I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions. The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation. The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’. I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5. Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively. In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history. Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress. I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history. In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature. Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.
2011-11-30T00:00:00ZMacleod, ChristopherThis thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement. The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined. I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory. For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny. I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions. The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation. The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’. I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5. Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively. In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history. Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress. I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history. In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature. Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.True, false, paranormal, and 'designated'? : a reply to Jenkins
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3079
2008-07-01T00:00:00ZCaret, Colin ReadyCotnoir, AaronA defence of the Kaplanian theory of sentence truth
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3070
When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of
sentence truth against these challenges.
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory
of sentence truth.
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning
vague predicates.
2010-06-01T00:00:00ZSweeney, PaulaWhen David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of
sentence truth against these challenges.
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory
of sentence truth.
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning
vague predicates.Coincidence and modality
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3037
How should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.
2011-01-01T00:00:00ZKang, LiHow should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.Negation in context
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/3031
The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.
2011-06-24T00:00:00ZDe, MichaelThe present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.The role of the imagination in Hume's science of man
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2940
In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on
the imagination.
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from
the claims of poets.
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events
in the History of England.
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining
of the false view.
1990-01-01T00:00:00ZBernard, ChristopherIn recent years there has been an explosion of writing on
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on
the imagination.
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from
the claims of poets.
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events
in the History of England.
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining
of the false view.Freud's concept of the unconscious
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2934
1983-01-01T00:00:00ZLewczuk, ZinaidaFreedom as a moral concept
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2814
This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,
in the given context, to ask A for a justification
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and
critical but non-relative.
1990-01-01T00:00:00ZKristjansson, KristjanThis thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,
in the given context, to ask A for a justification
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and
critical but non-relative.The self and self-conciousness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2704
It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine
assertions.
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-
cognitive thesis.
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on
the concept itself.
1988-01-01T00:00:00ZHamilton, Andrew J.It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine
assertions.
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-
cognitive thesis.
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on
the concept itself.Poincaré's philosophy of mathematics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2703
The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori
intuitions, and which describes a position in between
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be
true.
1986-01-01T00:00:00ZFolina, JanetThe primary concern of this thesis is to investigate
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori
intuitions, and which describes a position in between
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be
true.Equality, priority, and aggregation
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2690
In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than
Prioritarianism.
2004-01-01T00:00:00ZHirose, IwaoIn this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than
Prioritarianism.An account of a valuable phenomenon found primarily in art, after Collingwood
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2559
This dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and
briefly argues that it is very valuable.
2011-11-01T00:00:00ZMcGuiggan, James CamienThis dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and
briefly argues that it is very valuable.On subsistence and human rights
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2556
The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005).
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.
2012-06-01T00:00:00ZTomalty, JesseThe central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005).
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.Types of conceptual enquiry : a case for thinking there is a type that does not depend on the notion of analyticity
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2530
Many if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.
2011-11-01T00:00:00ZDawes, RyanMany if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.On describing
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2468
The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence.
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.
2011-11-25T00:00:00ZSchoubye, Anders JohanThe overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence.
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.The ethics of globalisation, free trade and fair trade
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2115
In this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be
seen as damaging to my position.
2011-06-01T00:00:00ZWood, DanielIn this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be
seen as damaging to my position.The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/2105
This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.
2011-11-28T00:00:00ZAufderheide, JoachimThis thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.Strengthening the capability approach : the foundations of the capability approach, with insights from two challenges
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1902
The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.
2011-06-24T00:00:00ZWatene, Krushil P. M.The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.The transcendental structure of the world
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1890
This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.
2010-01-01T00:00:00ZBader, Ralf M.This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.Freedom as faith
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1883
The belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.
2011-06-06T00:00:00ZAganey, DianaThe belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.Plato's understanding of piety
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1863
The Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.
2011-06-21T00:00:00ZAbraham, DavidThe Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.Indexicality and presupposition : explorations beyond truth-conditional information
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1704
This thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.
2010-11-30T00:00:00ZStokke, AndreasThis thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.Aristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethics
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348
In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.
2010-09-22T00:00:00ZEcheñique, JavierIn his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.Aristotle's eudaimonia and two conceptions of happiness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/994
Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to
the objection from perfectionism.
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the
better.
2010-01-01T00:00:00ZGrech, George J.Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to
the objection from perfectionism.
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the
better.Two sources of moral reasons
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/981
One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct
sources of moral reasons.
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory
for applied ethics.
2010-01-01T00:00:00ZMacdonald, Iain EzraOne of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct
sources of moral reasons.
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory
for applied ethics.What if? : an enquiry into the semantics of natural language conditionals
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/949
This thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.
The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.
The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.
The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.
The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.
2010-06-25T00:00:00ZHjálmarsson, Guðmundur AndriThis thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.
The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.
The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.
The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.
The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.
The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.
Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.Autonomy and purity in Kant's moral theory
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/937
Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory.
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative.
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.
2010-06-25T00:00:00ZBenson, Carolyn JaneKant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory.
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative.
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.Real impossible worlds : the bounds of possibility
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/924
Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.
2010-06-25T00:00:00ZKiourti, Ira GeorgiaLewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.The structure of logical consequence : proof-theoretic conceptions
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/892
The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.
2010-06-25T00:00:00ZHjortland, Ole T.The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/822
Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.
2009-10-16T00:00:00ZLandsberg, DavidOver the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.Why death can be bad and immortality is worse
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/724
This thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.
2009-01-01T00:00:00ZKalnow, CaraThis thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.Possible preferences and the harm of existence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/717
How good or bad is a person’s life? How good or bad is a world? In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions. Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing. Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place. A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off. If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is. Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important.
In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence. I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world. The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims:
i. Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference.
ii. Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist. Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence. I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox. For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well. Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions. Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements. If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.
2009-06-20T00:00:00ZLarock, MarcHow good or bad is a person’s life? How good or bad is a world? In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions. Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing. Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place. A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off. If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is. Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important.
In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence. I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world. The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims:
i. Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference.
ii. Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist. Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence. I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox. For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well. Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions. Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements. If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.Inferences in context : contextualism, inferentialism and the concept of universal quantification
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/688
This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier.
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context.
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.
2008-11-27T00:00:00ZTabet, ChiaraThis Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier.
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context.
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.Truth and goodness : a minimalist study
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/684
Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental?
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories.
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as
a case study.
2008-11-27T00:00:00ZEdwards, Douglas O.Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental?
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories.
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as
a case study.Liberal legitimacy : a study of the normative foundations of liberalism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/563
This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal
polities.
2008-11-27T00:00:00ZRossi, EnzoThis thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal
polities.McDowell, Gettier, and the bipartite account of perceptual knowledge
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/511
In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge. My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail. Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.
2008-06-27T00:00:00ZArcher, Adrian AveryIn his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.” In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification. To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive. On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge. My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail. Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.Living on the slippery slope : the nature, sources and logic of vagueness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/508
According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.
2008-06-25T00:00:00ZZardini, EliaAccording to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.The role of emotion-arousal in Aristotle’s Rhetoric
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/501
The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.
2008-06-25T00:00:00ZDow, Jamie P.G.The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.A critical discussion of Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/363
'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to
traditional moral theories.
2007-01-01T00:00:00ZSchwind, Philipp'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to
traditional moral theories.Conceptual room for ontic vagueness
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/348
This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.
2007-06-20T00:00:00ZBarnes, ElizabethThis thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it. This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified. I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind. I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form. I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented. Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic. I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment."Why should I be moral?" : a critical assessment of three contemporary attempts to give an extra-moral justification of moral conduct
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/346
In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.
2007-06-20T00:00:00ZPedersen, Johnnie R. R.In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.Global distributive justice
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/216
This dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.
The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice.
Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.
2007-06-22T00:00:00ZHanisch, ChristophThis dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.
The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice.
Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.Being art - a study in ontology
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/213
I present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds
of realisations.
I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.
The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.
A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work,
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.
I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to.
Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in
its parts and still remain the same work.
2007-06-01T00:00:00ZWeh, MichaelI present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds
of realisations.
I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.
The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.
A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work,
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.
I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to.
Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in
its parts and still remain the same work.Making sense of response-dependence
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/211
This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.
2007-06-01T00:00:00ZBusck Gundersen, ElineThis thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.The metaphysics of agency
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/163
Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.
2007-01-01T00:00:00ZSchlosser, Markus E.Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.