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  <title>DSpace Community:</title>
  <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/30" />
  <subtitle />
  <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/30</id>
  <updated>2013-05-25T16:15:35Z</updated>
  <dc:date>2013-05-25T16:15:35Z</dc:date>
  <entry>
    <title>The concept of happiness in Kant's moral, legal and political philosophy</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3547" />
    <author>
      <name>Pinheiro Walla, Alice</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3547</id>
    <updated>2013-05-23T19:08:09Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pinheiro Walla, Alice</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This doctoral thesis analyzes the systematic role of Kant’s conception of happiness in his moral, legal and political theory. Although many of his conclusions and arguments are directly or indirectly influenced by his conception of human happiness, Kant’s underlying assumptions are rarely overtly discussed or given much detail in his works. Kant also provides different and apparently incompatible definitions of happiness. This research explores the domains of Kant’s practical philosophy in which his conception of happiness plays a systematic role: the relation between the natural need of human beings to pursue happiness and the ends-oriented structure of the human will; Kant’s anti-eudaimonism in ethical theory; Kant’s claim that we have an indirect duty to promote our own happiness and the problem that under certain circumstances, the indeterminacy of happiness makes it not irrational to choose short term satisfaction at the costs of one’s overall, long term happiness, given Kant’s conception of non-moral choice as expectation of pleasure; Kant’s justification of the duty to adopt the happiness of others as our ends (the duty of beneficence) and the latitude and eventual demandingness of this duty; finally, since Kant also subsumes subsistence needs and welfare under the concept of happiness of individuals, I also engage with the question of state provision for the poor in the Kantian Rechtsstaat and explore Kant’s conception of equity or fairness (Billigkeit) as an alternative to the traditional minimalist and the welfare interpretations of the Kantian state.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The subversion of everyday life : an anthropological study of radical political practices : the Greek revolt of December 2008</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3545" />
    <author>
      <name>Kallianos, Ioannis</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3545</id>
    <updated>2013-05-23T18:54:57Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Based on eighteen months of fieldwork amongst anarchist and anti-authoritarian groups in Athens this thesis focuses on the December 2008 Greek revolt. It is an ethnographic exploration of collective self-organised practices in the public spaces of Athens and the occupied buildings of that period. It posits that these sets of processes were developed in the revolt as politics of subversion of the everyday life which in the thesis is considered both the site of alienation and emancipation. Based on Bourdieu, this study suggests that the everyday practices of subversion in radical politics are habitual dispositions of action that have been developed, based on past events which go as far back as the Greek civil war (1946-49), to establish a political living in the present, a process that is explored based on what Friedman calls ‘mythologisation’ . Drawing on De Certeau, Lefebvre and Vaneigem it is argued that these collective dispositions are the productive factors of tactics of the subversion which emerge in the context of everyday situations defined by the particularities of public space, imagination and public memory.This suggests that the revolt was not an organised process to create a counter-hegemony but rather, a multitude of micro-processes which used everyday situations as sites of subversion. This argument is explored based on the notion of the social imaginary as defined by Taylor and Castoriadis. In this thesis imagination is considered to be constitutive of the politics of subversion. Fuelled by past events and habitual dispositions of actions radical political practices in the revolt were formative of an ontological process which imagines and explains the political as personal and the private as public. According to that interpretation the event of the death of Alexandros Grigoropoulos generated sites where official power could be challenged, escaped and confronted by tactics of subversion.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kallianos, Ioannis</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Based on eighteen months of fieldwork amongst anarchist and anti-authoritarian groups in Athens this thesis focuses on the December 2008 Greek revolt. It is an ethnographic exploration of collective self-organised practices in the public spaces of Athens and the occupied buildings of that period. It posits that these sets of processes were developed in the revolt as politics of subversion of the everyday life which in the thesis is considered both the site of alienation and emancipation. Based on Bourdieu, this study suggests that the everyday practices of subversion in radical politics are habitual dispositions of action that have been developed, based on past events which go as far back as the Greek civil war (1946-49), to establish a political living in the present, a process that is explored based on what Friedman calls ‘mythologisation’ . Drawing on De Certeau, Lefebvre and Vaneigem it is argued that these collective dispositions are the productive factors of tactics of the subversion which emerge in the context of everyday situations defined by the particularities of public space, imagination and public memory.This suggests that the revolt was not an organised process to create a counter-hegemony but rather, a multitude of micro-processes which used everyday situations as sites of subversion. This argument is explored based on the notion of the social imaginary as defined by Taylor and Castoriadis. In this thesis imagination is considered to be constitutive of the politics of subversion. Fuelled by past events and habitual dispositions of actions radical political practices in the revolt were formative of an ontological process which imagines and explains the political as personal and the private as public. According to that interpretation the event of the death of Alexandros Grigoropoulos generated sites where official power could be challenged, escaped and confronted by tactics of subversion.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Appealing to intuitions</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3544" />
    <author>
      <name>Langkau, Julia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3544</id>
    <updated>2013-05-23T18:56:34Z</updated>
    <published>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.&#xD;
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.&#xD;
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.&#xD;
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Langkau, Julia</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is concerned with the ontology, epistemology, and methodology of intuitions in philosophy. It consists of an introduction, Chapter 1, and three main parts.&#xD;
In the first part, Chapter 2, I defend an account of intuitions as appearance states according to which intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs or belief-like states. I argue that an account of intuitions as appearance states can explain some crucial phenomena with respect to intuitions better than popular accounts in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions.&#xD;
The second part, Chapters 3 to 5, is a reply to Timothy Williamson’s (2004, 2007) view on the epistemology and methodology of intuitions. The practice of appealing to the fact that we have an intuition as evidence from thought experiments has recently been criticised by experimental philosophers. Williamson argues that since thought experiments reliably lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition, we can avoid this criticism and the resulting sceptical threat by appealing to the content of the intuition. I agree that thought experiments usually lead to knowledge of the content of our intuition. However, I show that appealing to the fact that we have an intuition is a common and useful practice. I defend the view that for methodological reasons, we ought to appeal to the fact that we have an intuition as initial evidence from thought experiments.&#xD;
The third part, Chapter 6, is devoted to a paradigm method involving intuitions: the method of reflective equilibrium. Some philosophers have recently claimed that it is trivial and could even accommodate scepticism about the reliability of intuitions. I argue that reflective equilibrium is not compatible with such scepticism. While it is compatible with the view I defend in the second part of the thesis, more specific methodological claims have to be made.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The traitor as patriot : Guy Burgess, Englishness and camp in Another Country and An Englishman Abroad</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3492" />
    <author>
      <name>Girelli, Elisabetta</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3492</id>
    <updated>2013-04-24T13:31:02Z</updated>
    <published>2012-07-12T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This article focuses on the representation of the spy Guy Burgess, one of the famous Cambridge ring, in two very successful British heritage films, An Englishman Abroad (John Schlesinger, UK, 1983) and Another Country (Marek Kanievska, UK, 1984). The article argues that the films rely on popular notions of Englishness as politically safe and non-extremist, thus fabricating a view of the past that misrepresents Burgess in the effort to normalize him. Similarly, stereotypical views of gay men as frivolous and non-ideological are amply exploited in the films' portrayal of their protagonist. Burgess's upper-class English roots are used to package him as part of the heritage experience, while his homosexuality is not only presented as the reason for spying, but it is also constructed as a camp performance, effectively defusing the threat of ideological commitment and political betrayal. The radical, lethal and devoutly Marxist Burgess is thus stripped of his ideology and turned into a safe national icon.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-07-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Girelli, Elisabetta</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This article focuses on the representation of the spy Guy Burgess, one of the famous Cambridge ring, in two very successful British heritage films, An Englishman Abroad (John Schlesinger, UK, 1983) and Another Country (Marek Kanievska, UK, 1984). The article argues that the films rely on popular notions of Englishness as politically safe and non-extremist, thus fabricating a view of the past that misrepresents Burgess in the effort to normalize him. Similarly, stereotypical views of gay men as frivolous and non-ideological are amply exploited in the films' portrayal of their protagonist. Burgess's upper-class English roots are used to package him as part of the heritage experience, while his homosexuality is not only presented as the reason for spying, but it is also constructed as a camp performance, effectively defusing the threat of ideological commitment and political betrayal. The radical, lethal and devoutly Marxist Burgess is thus stripped of his ideology and turned into a safe national icon.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Measuring the effect of the reflection of sound from the lips in brass musical instruments</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3481" />
    <author>
      <name>Kemp, Jonathan A</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Smith, Richard</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3481</id>
    <updated>2013-04-17T09:31:03Z</updated>
    <published>2012-04-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The lips of the player are often assumed to perfectly reflect sounds that strike them. Experimental and theoretical calculations of input impedance demonstrate the pressure that would build up if a flat, perfectly reflecting volume velocity source were used to excite the air into vibration. In reality the lips should project slightly into the instrument mouthpiece and absorb a small amount of the energy that strikes them and this study will quantify this effect using wave separation/impedance apparatus. For closed lips it is expected that the strength of resonances will be reduced, but that the correction will be small. The condition for reflection from lips that are not fully closed will differ more significantly from perfect reflection and it is anticipated that this data will be useful for integration into physical models of brass instruments.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kemp, Jonathan A</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Smith, Richard</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The lips of the player are often assumed to perfectly reflect sounds that strike them. Experimental and theoretical calculations of input impedance demonstrate the pressure that would build up if a flat, perfectly reflecting volume velocity source were used to excite the air into vibration. In reality the lips should project slightly into the instrument mouthpiece and absorb a small amount of the energy that strikes them and this study will quantify this effect using wave separation/impedance apparatus. For closed lips it is expected that the strength of resonances will be reduced, but that the correction will be small. The condition for reflection from lips that are not fully closed will differ more significantly from perfect reflection and it is anticipated that this data will be useful for integration into physical models of brass instruments.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Embodiment in the war film : Paradise Now and The Hurt Locker</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3473" />
    <author>
      <name>Burgoyne, Robert James</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3473</id>
    <updated>2013-04-10T11:31:03Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-12T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this article I compare two recent films that foreground the body at risk in the new wars of the twenty-first century. Paradise Now (Abu-Assad, 2005) and The Hurt Locker (Bigelow, 2008) convey the subject of the body in war from what would seem to be opposing perspectives, the first representing the experience of a resistance fighter, a suicide bomber in present-day Palestine, and the latter rendering the perceptions of a US soldier, the leader of a bomb disposal squad in Iraq. Seeming opposites, antitheses of each other, the two protagonists and the two films can be set face to face in a way that brings the changing nature of modern war into frame. No longer defined by the ideology of total war that shaped the grand narratives of twentieth-century combat, the new imagery of war and resistance, of insurgency and counter-insurgency, is crystallized here in a new symbolic iteration of the body at risk.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-12T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Burgoyne, Robert James</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this article I compare two recent films that foreground the body at risk in the new wars of the twenty-first century. Paradise Now (Abu-Assad, 2005) and The Hurt Locker (Bigelow, 2008) convey the subject of the body in war from what would seem to be opposing perspectives, the first representing the experience of a resistance fighter, a suicide bomber in present-day Palestine, and the latter rendering the perceptions of a US soldier, the leader of a bomb disposal squad in Iraq. Seeming opposites, antitheses of each other, the two protagonists and the two films can be set face to face in a way that brings the changing nature of modern war into frame. No longer defined by the ideology of total war that shaped the grand narratives of twentieth-century combat, the new imagery of war and resistance, of insurgency and counter-insurgency, is crystallized here in a new symbolic iteration of the body at risk.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Man and boy : Montgomery Clift as a queer star in Wild River</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3467" />
    <author>
      <name>Girelli, Elisabetta</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3467</id>
    <updated>2013-05-12T03:32:55Z</updated>
    <published>2011-09-23T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Montgomery Clift has been underexplored by film scholars, who have mostly focused on his early career. This article uses queer theory to examine Clift's later work, focusing on Wild River (dir. Elia Kazan, 1960); it argues that in this film Clift's narrative role, performance, and star persona radically challenge normative masculinity and heterosexuality.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-09-23T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Girelli, Elisabetta</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Montgomery Clift has been underexplored by film scholars, who have mostly focused on his early career. This article uses queer theory to examine Clift's later work, focusing on Wild River (dir. Elia Kazan, 1960); it argues that in this film Clift's narrative role, performance, and star persona radically challenge normative masculinity and heterosexuality.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3466" />
    <author>
      <name>Sachs, Benjamin Alan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3466</id>
    <updated>2013-04-04T13:31:02Z</updated>
    <published>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion) constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and offering. Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of warning and offering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong, and that an agent's issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to elucidate the descriptive differences between threats, warnings and offers, which sets up the later project of elucidating the moral differences between them.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sachs, Benjamin Alan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion) constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and offering. Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of warning and offering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong, and that an agent's issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to elucidate the descriptive differences between threats, warnings and offers, which sets up the later project of elucidating the moral differences between them.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Epistemic theories of democracy, constitutionalism and the procedural legitimacy of fundamental rights</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3465" />
    <author>
      <name>Allard-Tremblay, Yann</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3465</id>
    <updated>2013-04-04T15:55:43Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Allard-Tremblay, Yann</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Concepts in context</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462" />
    <author>
      <name>Onofri, Andrea</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3462</id>
    <updated>2013-04-03T13:26:38Z</updated>
    <published>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call “pluralist-contextualist”: 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more “coarsely”, have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more “finely” and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S’s behavior, the speaker’s intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”: if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the “Fregean constraint” (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called “Frege cases” must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this “plurality” of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers’ intentions) to “select” the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Onofri, Andrea</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>My thesis discusses two related problems that have taken center stage in the recent literature on concepts: 1) What are the individuation conditions of concepts? Under what conditions is a concept C₁ the same concept as a concept C₂? 2) What are the possession conditions of concepts? What conditions must be satisfied for a thinker to have a concept C? The thesis defends a novel account of concepts, which I call “pluralist-contextualist”: 1) Pluralism: Different concepts have different kinds of individuation and possession conditions: some concepts are individuated more “coarsely”, have less demanding possession conditions and are widely shared, while other concepts are individuated more “finely” and not shared. 2) Contextualism: When a speaker ascribes a propositional attitude to a subject S, or uses his ascription to explain/predict S’s behavior, the speaker’s intentions in the relevant context determine the correct individuation conditions for the concepts involved in his report. In chapters 1-3 I defend a contextualist, non-Millian theory of propositional attitude ascriptions. Then, I show how contextualism can be used to offer a novel perspective on the problem of concept individuation/possession. More specifically, I employ contextualism to provide a new, more effective argument for Fodor’s “publicity principle”: if contextualism is true, then certain specific concepts must be shared in order for interpersonally applicable psychological generalizations to be possible. In chapters 4-5 I raise a tension between publicity and another widely endorsed principle, the “Fregean constraint” (FC): subjects who are unaware of certain identity facts and find themselves in so-called “Frege cases” must have distinct concepts for the relevant object x. For instance: the ancient astronomers had distinct concepts (HESPERUS/PHOSPHORUS) for the same object (the planet Venus). First, I examine some leading theories of concepts and argue that they cannot meet both of our constraints at the same time. Then, I offer principled reasons to think that no theory can satisfy (FC) while also respecting publicity. (FC) appears to require a form of holism, on which a concept is individuated by its global inferential role in a subject S and can thus only be shared by someone who has exactly the same inferential dispositions as S. This explains the tension between publicity and (FC), since holism is clearly incompatible with concept shareability. To solve the tension, I suggest adopting my pluralist-contextualist proposal: concepts involved in Frege cases are holistically individuated and not public, while other concepts are more coarsely individuated and widely shared; given this “plurality” of concepts, we will then need contextual factors (speakers’ intentions) to “select” the specific concepts to be employed in our intentional generalizations in the relevant contexts. In chapter 6 I develop the view further by contrasting it with some rival accounts. First, I examine a very different kind of pluralism about concepts, which has been recently defended by Daniel Weiskopf, and argue that it is insufficiently radical. Then, I consider the inferentialist accounts defended by authors like Peacocke, Rey and Jackson. Such views, I argue, are committed to an implausible picture of reference determination, on which our inferential dispositions fix the reference of our concepts: this leads to wrong predictions in all those cases of scientific disagreement where two parties have very different inferential dispositions and yet seem to refer to the same natural kind.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>In and around Beijing with Mr Yang and others : space, modernisation and social interaction</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3455" />
    <author>
      <name>Yang, Qingqing</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3455</id>
    <updated>2013-05-16T09:29:16Z</updated>
    <published>2013-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The aim of my PhD project has been to understand how Hutong residents’ ideas about living space have been different from those living in the high-rise compound and how their concept of living space has been changed by both internal and external factors, meaning additional affiliated functions and governmental city-planning. &#xD;
&#xD;
I conducted my fieldwork in Beijing between July 2009 and September 2012: fourteen months in total, interspersed with trips to St. Andrews.  I spent ten months from July 2009 to May 2010 living in a Hutong called Xingfu Street (the word translates as  ‘happiness’). Then I moved into a high-rise apartment outside the inner city, called Suojiafen Compound, for a further four months. &#xD;
&#xD;
This study concerns space in the contemporary city of Beijing: how space is humanly built and transformed, classified and differentiated, and most importantly how space is perceived and experienced.&#xD;
&#xD;
In the end I have developed the concept “overlapped” space as a way to detect the “personality” of space in both Hutong and high-rise apartment: how they differentiated from each other and how they have been transformed in different way by the residents inside.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Yang, Qingqing</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The aim of my PhD project has been to understand how Hutong residents’ ideas about living space have been different from those living in the high-rise compound and how their concept of living space has been changed by both internal and external factors, meaning additional affiliated functions and governmental city-planning. &#xD;
&#xD;
I conducted my fieldwork in Beijing between July 2009 and September 2012: fourteen months in total, interspersed with trips to St. Andrews.  I spent ten months from July 2009 to May 2010 living in a Hutong called Xingfu Street (the word translates as  ‘happiness’). Then I moved into a high-rise apartment outside the inner city, called Suojiafen Compound, for a further four months. &#xD;
&#xD;
This study concerns space in the contemporary city of Beijing: how space is humanly built and transformed, classified and differentiated, and most importantly how space is perceived and experienced.&#xD;
&#xD;
In the end I have developed the concept “overlapped” space as a way to detect the “personality” of space in both Hutong and high-rise apartment: how they differentiated from each other and how they have been transformed in different way by the residents inside.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Nyungar wiring boodja : Aboriginality in urban Australia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3448" />
    <author>
      <name>Hemmers, Carina</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3448</id>
    <updated>2013-03-29T09:59:20Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The present thesis examines the themes of ‘shared history,’ ‘place-making,’ and ‘reconciliation’ to assess how these come together in the establishment of an Aboriginal identity in Perth, Western Australia. Focusing on individuals who do not represent the common stereotypes associated with Aboriginal Australians, it will be demonstrated that these individuals are forced into an in-between place where they have to continually negotiate what Aboriginality means in the twenty-first century. Taking on this responsibility they become mediators, stressing a ‘shared history’ in order to create a place for themselves in the non-Aboriginal landscape and to advance reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia by fighting the dominant discourse from within.&#xD;
Beginning with the State and Government’s Native Title appeal premiss that Nyungar never existed, this thesis will examine this claim by first presenting an account of the history of southwest Western Australia to establish the place Aboriginal people have been forced into by the colonists during early settlement, and the processes of which extend into the present day. From there on in the focus will be on individual Aboriginal people and their careers and businesses, examining how they attempt to redefine what is perceived and accepted as Aboriginality through different interaction and mediation ‘tactics’ with non-Aboriginal Australians. Finally, this thesis will take a closer look at the reconciliation movement in Australia and the people involved in it. It will determine different approaches to reconciliation and assess their possibility and meaning for the construction of a twenty-first century Aboriginal identity.&#xD;
The thesis will conclude that although Nyungar are forced into the dominant discourse, their resistance from within credits a new kind of Aboriginality that is just as valid as the ‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’ Aboriginality imagined by non-Aboriginal Australia.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hemmers, Carina</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The present thesis examines the themes of ‘shared history,’ ‘place-making,’ and ‘reconciliation’ to assess how these come together in the establishment of an Aboriginal identity in Perth, Western Australia. Focusing on individuals who do not represent the common stereotypes associated with Aboriginal Australians, it will be demonstrated that these individuals are forced into an in-between place where they have to continually negotiate what Aboriginality means in the twenty-first century. Taking on this responsibility they become mediators, stressing a ‘shared history’ in order to create a place for themselves in the non-Aboriginal landscape and to advance reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia by fighting the dominant discourse from within.&#xD;
Beginning with the State and Government’s Native Title appeal premiss that Nyungar never existed, this thesis will examine this claim by first presenting an account of the history of southwest Western Australia to establish the place Aboriginal people have been forced into by the colonists during early settlement, and the processes of which extend into the present day. From there on in the focus will be on individual Aboriginal people and their careers and businesses, examining how they attempt to redefine what is perceived and accepted as Aboriginality through different interaction and mediation ‘tactics’ with non-Aboriginal Australians. Finally, this thesis will take a closer look at the reconciliation movement in Australia and the people involved in it. It will determine different approaches to reconciliation and assess their possibility and meaning for the construction of a twenty-first century Aboriginal identity.&#xD;
The thesis will conclude that although Nyungar are forced into the dominant discourse, their resistance from within credits a new kind of Aboriginality that is just as valid as the ‘traditional’ and ‘authentic’ Aboriginality imagined by non-Aboriginal Australia.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Extortion and the ethics of "topping up"</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3434" />
    <author>
      <name>Sachs, Benjamin</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3434</id>
    <updated>2013-03-26T16:31:02Z</updated>
    <published>2009-10-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2009-10-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sachs, Benjamin</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Consequentialism's double-edged aword</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3433" />
    <author>
      <name>Sachs, Benjamin</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3433</id>
    <updated>2013-03-26T16:31:01Z</updated>
    <published>2010-09-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Recent work on consequentialism has revealed it to be more flexible than previously thought. Consequentialists have shown how their theory can accommodate certain features with which it has long been considered incompatible, such as agent-centered constraints. This flexibility is usually thought to work in consequentialism's favor. I want to cast doubt on this assumption. I begin by putting forward the strongest statement of consequentialism's flexibility: the claim that, whatever set of intuitions the best non-consequentialist theory accommodates, we can construct a consequentialist theory that can do the same while still retaining whatever is compelling about consequentialism. I argue that if this is true then most likely the non-consequentialist theory with which we started will turn out to have that same compelling feature. So while this extreme flexibility, if indeed consequentialism has it (a question I leave to the side), makes consequentialism more appealing, it makes non-consequentialism more appealing too.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-09-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sachs, Benjamin</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Recent work on consequentialism has revealed it to be more flexible than previously thought. Consequentialists have shown how their theory can accommodate certain features with which it has long been considered incompatible, such as agent-centered constraints. This flexibility is usually thought to work in consequentialism's favor. I want to cast doubt on this assumption. I begin by putting forward the strongest statement of consequentialism's flexibility: the claim that, whatever set of intuitions the best non-consequentialist theory accommodates, we can construct a consequentialist theory that can do the same while still retaining whatever is compelling about consequentialism. I argue that if this is true then most likely the non-consequentialist theory with which we started will turn out to have that same compelling feature. So while this extreme flexibility, if indeed consequentialism has it (a question I leave to the side), makes consequentialism more appealing, it makes non-consequentialism more appealing too.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Trust, distrust and commitment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3430" />
    <author>
      <name>Hawley, Katherine Jane</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3430</id>
    <updated>2013-05-12T04:34:00Z</updated>
    <published>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2013-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hawley, Katherine Jane</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Hasse Ekman : a question of authorship in a national context</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3421" />
    <author>
      <name>Gustafsson, Fredrik</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3421</id>
    <updated>2013-04-03T13:32:21Z</updated>
    <published>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis takes a historical approach to its subject and focuses on Swedish cinema of the 1940s and 1950s. The thesis argues that Swedish cinema experienced a renaissance in the 1940s, lasting approximately from 1940 to 1953. It further suggests that one of the most important filmmakers in this renaissance was Hasse Ekman. By focussing upon Ekman and this renaissance, a much-needed contextualisation of Ingmar Bergman will be achieved. Ingmar Bergman is one of the most well-known and well-researched filmmakers of all time, but there are still gaps in the material surrounding him, and one such gap concerns his cinematic origins. Bergman was a part of the 1940s renaissance, during which Bergman worked with, and was influenced by, other filmmakers and in particular Ekman.&#xD;
&#xD;
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the relevant literature and discusses ideas of authorship and national cinema. It also provides a historic overview of Swedish society and cinema during the 1940s and 1950s, providing the context needed to better understand the films of Ekman, and Bergman too. This part also looks at the 1930s to illustrate what came before this renaissance, and how the films of the 1940s differed from what had gone before. The second part is a chronological overview of Ekman's career from the late-1930s to his move to Spain in 1964. The last part is a discussion of Ekman's relation to Swedish society and his view of the world, based on close textual readings of his films.&#xD;
&#xD;
The aim of the thesis is to present, for the first time, a coherent and extensive overview of Ekman's career and body of work, while also situating it in the specific context in which it emerged, thereby shedding new light on an important, though neglected, episode in cinema history.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Gustafsson, Fredrik</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis takes a historical approach to its subject and focuses on Swedish cinema of the 1940s and 1950s. The thesis argues that Swedish cinema experienced a renaissance in the 1940s, lasting approximately from 1940 to 1953. It further suggests that one of the most important filmmakers in this renaissance was Hasse Ekman. By focussing upon Ekman and this renaissance, a much-needed contextualisation of Ingmar Bergman will be achieved. Ingmar Bergman is one of the most well-known and well-researched filmmakers of all time, but there are still gaps in the material surrounding him, and one such gap concerns his cinematic origins. Bergman was a part of the 1940s renaissance, during which Bergman worked with, and was influenced by, other filmmakers and in particular Ekman.&#xD;
&#xD;
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part introduces the relevant literature and discusses ideas of authorship and national cinema. It also provides a historic overview of Swedish society and cinema during the 1940s and 1950s, providing the context needed to better understand the films of Ekman, and Bergman too. This part also looks at the 1930s to illustrate what came before this renaissance, and how the films of the 1940s differed from what had gone before. The second part is a chronological overview of Ekman's career from the late-1930s to his move to Spain in 1964. The last part is a discussion of Ekman's relation to Swedish society and his view of the world, based on close textual readings of his films.&#xD;
&#xD;
The aim of the thesis is to present, for the first time, a coherent and extensive overview of Ekman's career and body of work, while also situating it in the specific context in which it emerged, thereby shedding new light on an important, though neglected, episode in cinema history.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Transient observations : the textualizing of St Helena through five hundred years of colonial discourse</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3419" />
    <author>
      <name>Schulenburg, Alexander Hugo</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3419</id>
    <updated>2013-03-22T15:30:53Z</updated>
    <published>1999-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis explores the textualizing of the South Atlantic island of St Helena (a&#xD;
British Overseas Territory) through an analysis of the relationship between&#xD;
colonizing practices and the changing representations of the island and its&#xD;
inhabitants in a range of colonial 'texts', including historiography, travel writing,&#xD;
government papers, creative writing, and the fine arts.&#xD;
Part I situates this thesis within a critical engagement with post-colonial&#xD;
theory and colonial discourse analysis primarily, as well as with the recent&#xD;
'linguistic turn' in anthropology and history. In place of post-colonialism's rather&#xD;
monolithic approach to colonial experiences, I argue for a localised approach to&#xD;
colonisation, which takes greater account of colonial praxis and of the continuous&#xD;
re-negotiation and re-constitution of particular colonial situations.&#xD;
Part II focuses on a number of literary issues by reviewing St Helena's&#xD;
historiography and literature, and by investigating the range of narrative tropes&#xD;
employed (largely by travellers) in the textualizing of St Helena, in particular&#xD;
with respect to recurrent imaginings of the island in terms of an earthly Eden.&#xD;
Part III examines the nature of colonial 'possession' by tracing the island's&#xD;
gradual appropriation by the Portuguese, Dutch and English in the sixteenth and&#xD;
early seventeenth century and the settlement policies pursued by the English&#xD;
East India Company in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.&#xD;
Part IV provides an account of the changing perceptions, by visitors and&#xD;
colonial officials alike, of the character of the island's inhabitants (from the late&#xD;
eighteenth to the early twentieth century) and assesses the influence that these&#xD;
perceptions have had on the administration of the island and the political status of&#xD;
its inhabitants (in the mid- to late twentieth century).&#xD;
Part V, the conclusion, reviews the principal arguments of my thesis by&#xD;
addressing the political implications of post-colonial theory and of my own&#xD;
research, while also indicating avenues for further research.&#xD;
A localised and detailed exploration of colonial discourse over a period of&#xD;
nearly five hundred years, and a close analysis of a consequently wide range of&#xD;
colonial 'texts', has confirmed that although colonising practices and&#xD;
representations are far from monolithic, in the case of St Helena their continuities&#xD;
are of as much significance as their discontinuities.</summary>
    <dc:date>1999-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Schulenburg, Alexander Hugo</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis explores the textualizing of the South Atlantic island of St Helena (a&#xD;
British Overseas Territory) through an analysis of the relationship between&#xD;
colonizing practices and the changing representations of the island and its&#xD;
inhabitants in a range of colonial 'texts', including historiography, travel writing,&#xD;
government papers, creative writing, and the fine arts.&#xD;
Part I situates this thesis within a critical engagement with post-colonial&#xD;
theory and colonial discourse analysis primarily, as well as with the recent&#xD;
'linguistic turn' in anthropology and history. In place of post-colonialism's rather&#xD;
monolithic approach to colonial experiences, I argue for a localised approach to&#xD;
colonisation, which takes greater account of colonial praxis and of the continuous&#xD;
re-negotiation and re-constitution of particular colonial situations.&#xD;
Part II focuses on a number of literary issues by reviewing St Helena's&#xD;
historiography and literature, and by investigating the range of narrative tropes&#xD;
employed (largely by travellers) in the textualizing of St Helena, in particular&#xD;
with respect to recurrent imaginings of the island in terms of an earthly Eden.&#xD;
Part III examines the nature of colonial 'possession' by tracing the island's&#xD;
gradual appropriation by the Portuguese, Dutch and English in the sixteenth and&#xD;
early seventeenth century and the settlement policies pursued by the English&#xD;
East India Company in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century.&#xD;
Part IV provides an account of the changing perceptions, by visitors and&#xD;
colonial officials alike, of the character of the island's inhabitants (from the late&#xD;
eighteenth to the early twentieth century) and assesses the influence that these&#xD;
perceptions have had on the administration of the island and the political status of&#xD;
its inhabitants (in the mid- to late twentieth century).&#xD;
Part V, the conclusion, reviews the principal arguments of my thesis by&#xD;
addressing the political implications of post-colonial theory and of my own&#xD;
research, while also indicating avenues for further research.&#xD;
A localised and detailed exploration of colonial discourse over a period of&#xD;
nearly five hundred years, and a close analysis of a consequently wide range of&#xD;
colonial 'texts', has confirmed that although colonising practices and&#xD;
representations are far from monolithic, in the case of St Helena their continuities&#xD;
are of as much significance as their discontinuities.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Morality, adapted</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3415" />
    <author>
      <name>Sachs, Benjamin Alan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3415</id>
    <updated>2013-03-21T17:01:02Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Over the last few decades, scientists have been busy debunking the myth that nonhuman animals relate to each other in a primarily competitive, aggressive way. What they have found is that many species of animal, including many of those most closely related to humans, display a remarkable range of cooperative, "prosocial" behavior. In fact, it appears that some animal societies adhere to a moral code. What is preventing us, then, from saying that the members of these societies are moral beings? Nothing important, according to a recent book. Probing further into this question, I suggest that in fact quite a lot is at risk in making this move. To integrate nonhuman animals fully into the moral domain, we may have to adapt our conception of morality in some very troublesome ways.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sachs, Benjamin Alan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Over the last few decades, scientists have been busy debunking the myth that nonhuman animals relate to each other in a primarily competitive, aggressive way. What they have found is that many species of animal, including many of those most closely related to humans, display a remarkable range of cooperative, "prosocial" behavior. In fact, it appears that some animal societies adhere to a moral code. What is preventing us, then, from saying that the members of these societies are moral beings? Nothing important, according to a recent book. Probing further into this question, I suggest that in fact quite a lot is at risk in making this move. To integrate nonhuman animals fully into the moral domain, we may have to adapt our conception of morality in some very troublesome ways.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Locations of envy : an ethnography of Aguabuena potters</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3404" />
    <author>
      <name>Castellanos Montes, Daniela</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3404</id>
    <updated>2013-03-20T15:14:40Z</updated>
    <published>2012-12-04T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an anthropological exploration of the envy of Aguabuena people, a small rural community of potters in the village of Ráquira, in the Boyacá region of Andean Colombia. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork among these potters, I propose an understanding of envy in Aguabuena as an existential experience, shaping relationships between the self and others in the world, crosscutting metaphysical and physical spheres, and balancing between corrosive and more empathetic ways of co-existence. Disclosing the multipresence of envy in Aguabuena’s world, its effects on people (including the ethnographer), and the way envy is embodied, performed, reciprocated and circumvented by the potters, I locate envy in various contexts where it is said to be manifested. Furthermore, I discuss the complex spectrum of envy and its multivalent meanings, or oscillations, in the life of Aguabuena people. I also present interactions with people surrounding potters, such as Augustinian monks, crafts middlemen, and municipal authorities, all of whom recount the envy of potters. My research challenges previous anthropological interpretations on envy and provides an alternative reading of this phenomenon. Moving away from labelling and regulatory explanations of envy, performative models, or pathological interpretations of the subject, I analyse the lived experience of envy and how it encompasses different realms of experience as well as flows of social relations. While focusing on the tensions and entanglements that envy brings to potters, as it constrains social life but also activates and reinforces social bonds, I examine the channels through which envy circulates and how it is put into motion by potters. Additionally, my thesis intends to contribute to anthropological studies of rural pottery communities in Andean Colombia. I present my unfolding understanding of envy by using both the potters’ concept and material detail, punto, location, referring to a spot from where Aguabuena people enter different vistas of the world, or denoting a precise time when things or materials change their physical qualities. Through this device, I disclose realms of envy, while seeking to immerse the reader in the lived experience of envy.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-12-04T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Castellanos Montes, Daniela</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an anthropological exploration of the envy of Aguabuena people, a small rural community of potters in the village of Ráquira, in the Boyacá region of Andean Colombia. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork among these potters, I propose an understanding of envy in Aguabuena as an existential experience, shaping relationships between the self and others in the world, crosscutting metaphysical and physical spheres, and balancing between corrosive and more empathetic ways of co-existence. Disclosing the multipresence of envy in Aguabuena’s world, its effects on people (including the ethnographer), and the way envy is embodied, performed, reciprocated and circumvented by the potters, I locate envy in various contexts where it is said to be manifested. Furthermore, I discuss the complex spectrum of envy and its multivalent meanings, or oscillations, in the life of Aguabuena people. I also present interactions with people surrounding potters, such as Augustinian monks, crafts middlemen, and municipal authorities, all of whom recount the envy of potters. My research challenges previous anthropological interpretations on envy and provides an alternative reading of this phenomenon. Moving away from labelling and regulatory explanations of envy, performative models, or pathological interpretations of the subject, I analyse the lived experience of envy and how it encompasses different realms of experience as well as flows of social relations. While focusing on the tensions and entanglements that envy brings to potters, as it constrains social life but also activates and reinforces social bonds, I examine the channels through which envy circulates and how it is put into motion by potters. Additionally, my thesis intends to contribute to anthropological studies of rural pottery communities in Andean Colombia. I present my unfolding understanding of envy by using both the potters’ concept and material detail, punto, location, referring to a spot from where Aguabuena people enter different vistas of the world, or denoting a precise time when things or materials change their physical qualities. Through this device, I disclose realms of envy, while seeking to immerse the reader in the lived experience of envy.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The pattern changes changes : gambling value in Highland Papua New Guinea</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3389" />
    <author>
      <name>Pickles, Anthony J.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3389</id>
    <updated>2013-03-14T09:21:34Z</updated>
    <published>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis explores the part gambling plays in an urban setting in Highland Papua New Guinea. Gambling did not exist in (what is now) Goroka Town before European contact, nor Papua New Guinea more broadly, but when I conducted fieldwork in 2009-2010 it was an inescapable part of everyday life. One card game proliferated into a multitude of games for different situations and participants, and was supplemented with slot machines, sports betting, darts, and bingo and lottery games.&#xD;
One could well imagine gambling becoming popular in societies new to it, especially coming on the back of money, wage-work and towns. Yet the popularity of gambling in the region is surprising to social scientists because the peoples now so enamoured by gambling are famous for their love of competitively giving things away, not competing for them. Gambling spread while gifting remained a central part of the way people did transactions. This thesis resists juxtaposing gifting and selfish acquisition. It shows how their opposition is false; that gambling is instead a new analytic technique for manipulating the value of gifts and acquisitions alike, through the medium of money.&#xD;
Too often gambling takes a familiar form in analyses: as the sharp end of capitalism, or the benign, chance-led redistributor of wealth in egalitarian societies. The thesis builds an ethnographic understanding of gambling, and uses it to interrogate theories of gambling, money, and Melanesian anthropology. In so doing, the thesis speaks to a trend in Melanesian anthropology to debate whether monetisation and urbanisation has brought about a radical split in peoples’ understandings of the world. Dealing with some of the most starkly ‘modern’ material I find a process of inclusive indigenous materialism that consumes the old and the new alike, turning them into a model for action in a dynamic money-led world.</summary>
    <dc:date>2013-06-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pickles, Anthony J.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis explores the part gambling plays in an urban setting in Highland Papua New Guinea. Gambling did not exist in (what is now) Goroka Town before European contact, nor Papua New Guinea more broadly, but when I conducted fieldwork in 2009-2010 it was an inescapable part of everyday life. One card game proliferated into a multitude of games for different situations and participants, and was supplemented with slot machines, sports betting, darts, and bingo and lottery games.&#xD;
One could well imagine gambling becoming popular in societies new to it, especially coming on the back of money, wage-work and towns. Yet the popularity of gambling in the region is surprising to social scientists because the peoples now so enamoured by gambling are famous for their love of competitively giving things away, not competing for them. Gambling spread while gifting remained a central part of the way people did transactions. This thesis resists juxtaposing gifting and selfish acquisition. It shows how their opposition is false; that gambling is instead a new analytic technique for manipulating the value of gifts and acquisitions alike, through the medium of money.&#xD;
Too often gambling takes a familiar form in analyses: as the sharp end of capitalism, or the benign, chance-led redistributor of wealth in egalitarian societies. The thesis builds an ethnographic understanding of gambling, and uses it to interrogate theories of gambling, money, and Melanesian anthropology. In so doing, the thesis speaks to a trend in Melanesian anthropology to debate whether monetisation and urbanisation has brought about a radical split in peoples’ understandings of the world. Dealing with some of the most starkly ‘modern’ material I find a process of inclusive indigenous materialism that consumes the old and the new alike, turning them into a model for action in a dynamic money-led world.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>On the contrary: disagreement, context, and relative truth</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3360" />
    <author>
      <name>Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3360</id>
    <updated>2013-02-18T15:57:35Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Towards moral and authentic generalization : humanity, individual human beings and distortion</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3336" />
    <author>
      <name>Rapport, Nigel Julian</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3336</id>
    <updated>2013-01-29T18:01:02Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The article treats the issue of generality. How may one conceive of the relationship between the uniqueness of individuality and the commonality of the human (species and society) without reduction? Can generalization be made moral – es-chewing stereotypes in society – and can it be made authentic – enacting a human science which treats the individual as a thing-in-itself? Simmel’s seminal inter-vention was to see generality as a necessary kind of distortion. In contrast, this article offers rational models of the one and the whole which expect to retain the uniqueness of the one; and it suggests characteristics of human embodiment (ca-pacities, potentialities) that speak to individuality and generality at the same time. The article ends with a reconsideration of distortion as a humane artistic represen-tation, by way of the work of Stanley Spencer.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Rapport, Nigel Julian</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The article treats the issue of generality. How may one conceive of the relationship between the uniqueness of individuality and the commonality of the human (species and society) without reduction? Can generalization be made moral – es-chewing stereotypes in society – and can it be made authentic – enacting a human science which treats the individual as a thing-in-itself? Simmel’s seminal inter-vention was to see generality as a necessary kind of distortion. In contrast, this article offers rational models of the one and the whole which expect to retain the uniqueness of the one; and it suggests characteristics of human embodiment (ca-pacities, potentialities) that speak to individuality and generality at the same time. The article ends with a reconsideration of distortion as a humane artistic represen-tation, by way of the work of Stanley Spencer.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Folding cubanidad : a Deleuzian approach to contemporary Cuban cinema</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3322" />
    <author>
      <name>Monaldi, Paola</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3322</id>
    <updated>2013-01-09T15:39:41Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this thesis I look at the way in which Cuban cinema of the post-Cold War period re-envisions the image of the nation through a theoretical framework of Deleuzian extraction. In particular, I refer to Deleuze's philosophy of difference and multiplicity to explain how national difference can be produced by film narratives operating within given ideological boundaries, and national identity differentiated within a broader, socialist idea of society.&#xD;
&#xD;
A review of recent Cuban cinema reveals the emergence of intensive and crystalline regimes of narration in both fiction and documentary cinema.  Chapters one and two will therefore examine the shift of Cuban fiction cinema towards forms of time-image (metanarrative and magical realism); chapter three will consider the affective turn of the new Cuban documentary. In both cases, the inclination of Cuban cinema towards affection- and time-image will appear motivated by a national need for self-revision. In particular I will argue that, by raising intensities and virtualities, contemporary Cuban cinema acts as modern political cinema. While Cuba is rethinking itself and its position in the wider world, Cuban cinema is reimagining the nation in terms of becoming-minoritarian, that is, as a transformative and multifaceted entity in which national contradictions can be reconciled and similarities with the outside world can be more easily found. &#xD;
&#xD;
By bringing together Deleuze and Cuban cinema, this research aims to contribute to the studies on cinema and national identity through the case study of Cuba, and to the field of Deleuzian studies by presenting a new application of Deleuze’s philosophy in a socialist context.
Description: Electronic version excludes material for which permission has not been granted by the rights holder. Copyright permissions are pending.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Monaldi, Paola</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this thesis I look at the way in which Cuban cinema of the post-Cold War period re-envisions the image of the nation through a theoretical framework of Deleuzian extraction. In particular, I refer to Deleuze's philosophy of difference and multiplicity to explain how national difference can be produced by film narratives operating within given ideological boundaries, and national identity differentiated within a broader, socialist idea of society.&#xD;
&#xD;
A review of recent Cuban cinema reveals the emergence of intensive and crystalline regimes of narration in both fiction and documentary cinema.  Chapters one and two will therefore examine the shift of Cuban fiction cinema towards forms of time-image (metanarrative and magical realism); chapter three will consider the affective turn of the new Cuban documentary. In both cases, the inclination of Cuban cinema towards affection- and time-image will appear motivated by a national need for self-revision. In particular I will argue that, by raising intensities and virtualities, contemporary Cuban cinema acts as modern political cinema. While Cuba is rethinking itself and its position in the wider world, Cuban cinema is reimagining the nation in terms of becoming-minoritarian, that is, as a transformative and multifaceted entity in which national contradictions can be reconciled and similarities with the outside world can be more easily found. &#xD;
&#xD;
By bringing together Deleuze and Cuban cinema, this research aims to contribute to the studies on cinema and national identity through the case study of Cuba, and to the field of Deleuzian studies by presenting a new application of Deleuze’s philosophy in a socialist context.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Validity for strong pluralists</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3235" />
    <author>
      <name>Cotnoir, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3235</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:32:01Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Cotnoir, Aaron</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Virtue Ethics, Kantian Ethics, and the 'One Thought Too Many' Objection</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3234" />
    <author>
      <name>Baron, Marcia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3234</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T09:05:40Z</updated>
    <published>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2008-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Baron, Marcia</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Down to earth philosophy: an anti-exceptionalist essay on thought experiments and philosophical methodology</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3228" />
    <author>
      <name>Sgaravatti, Daniele</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3228</id>
    <updated>2012-10-25T14:21:09Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In the first part of the dissertations, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical&#xD;
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same&#xD;
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of&#xD;
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue&#xD;
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sgaravatti, Daniele</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In the first part of the dissertations, chapters 1 to 3, I criticize several views which tend to set philosophy apart from other cognitive achievements. I argue against the popular views that 1) Intuitions, as a sui generis mental state, are involved crucially in philosophical&#xD;
methodology 2) Philosophy requires engagement in conceptual analysis, understood as the activity of considering thought experiments with the aim to throw light on the nature of our concepts, and 3) Much philosophical knowledge is a priori. I do not claim to have a proof that nothing in the vicinity of these views is correct; such a proof might well be impossible to give. However, I consider several versions, usually prominent ones, of each of the views, and I show those versions to be defective. Quite often, moreover, different versions of the same&#xD;
worry apply to different versions of the same theory. In the fourth chapter I discuss the epistemology of the judgements involved in philosophical thought experiments, arguing that their justification depends on their being the product of a competence in applying the concepts involved, a competence which goes beyond the possession of the concepts. I then offer, drawing from empirical psychology, a sketch of&#xD;
the form this cognitive competence could take. The overall picture squares well with the conclusions of the first part. In the last chapter I consider a challenge to the use of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy coming from the ‘experimental philosophy’movement. I argue that there is no way of individuating the class of hypothetical judgements under discussion which makes the challenge both interesting and sound. Moreover, I argue&#xD;
that there are reasons to think that philosophers possess some sort of expertise which sets them apart from non-philosophers in relevant ways.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Poincaré against foundationalists old and new</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3212" />
    <author>
      <name>Sands, Michael Thomas Jr.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3212</id>
    <updated>2012-10-23T13:14:09Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism&#xD;
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,&#xD;
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose&#xD;
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminant. One of the objections&#xD;
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any&#xD;
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ&#xD;
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.&#xD;
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had&#xD;
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's&#xD;
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers&#xD;
as Objects [63] by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving&#xD;
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's&#xD;
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and&#xD;
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of&#xD;
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language&#xD;
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of&#xD;
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection&#xD;
can be made against the revived logicist project.&#xD;
The current project investigates  	Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,&#xD;
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates&#xD;
the effctiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's&#xD;
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sands, Michael Thomas Jr.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The early 20th century witnessed concerted research in foundationalism&#xD;
in mathematics. Those pursuing a basis for mathematics included Hilbert, Russell,&#xD;
Zermelo, Frege, and Dedekind. They found a vocal opponent in Poincaré, whose&#xD;
attacks were numerous, vituperative, and often indiscriminant. One of the objections&#xD;
was the petitio argument that claimed a circularity in foundationalist arguments. Any&#xD;
derivation of mathematical axioms from a supposedly simpler system would employ&#xD;
induction, one of the very axioms purportedly derived.&#xD;
Historically, these attacks became somewhat moot as both Frege and Hilbert had&#xD;
their programs devastated-Frege's by Russell's paradox and Hilbert's by Godel's&#xD;
incompleteness result. However, the publication of Frege's Conception of Numbers&#xD;
as Objects [63] by Crispin Wright began the neo-logicist program of reviving&#xD;
Frege's project while avoiding Russell's paradox. The neo-logicist holds that Frege's&#xD;
theorem-the derivation of mathematical axioms from Hume's Principle(HP) and&#xD;
second-order logic-combined with the transparency of logic and the analyticity of&#xD;
HP guarantees knowledge of numbers. Moreover, the neo-logicist conception of language&#xD;
and reality as inextricably intertwined guarantees the objective existence of&#xD;
numbers. In this context, whether or not a revived version of the petitio objection&#xD;
can be made against the revived logicist project.&#xD;
The current project investigates  	Poincaré's philosophy of arithmetic-his psychologism,&#xD;
conception of intuition, and understanding of induction, and then evaluates&#xD;
the effctiveness of his petitio objection against three foundationalist groups: Hilbert's&#xD;
early and late programs, the logicists, and the neo-logicists.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Labour, life, and language: personhood and relations among the Yami of Lanyu</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3206" />
    <author>
      <name>Kao, Hsin-chieh</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3206</id>
    <updated>2012-10-19T15:43:00Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis discusses the concepts of labour, life, and language among the Yami&#xD;
of Lanyu, Taiwan. In the local context, it is labour, life and language that comprise the&#xD;
concept of personhood among the Yami: tao, i.e. the ‘person’ in Yami language, is&#xD;
someone created labouring, and his labour in turn creates affluence, authority, and&#xD;
truth. I name this culturally particular image of a real or true person as Homo laboris&#xD;
or ‘Man the Worker’. This thesis aims to explore how labour, wealth, power, and&#xD;
knowledge are interrelated in Yami culture, and behind these relations, what material,&#xD;
social and epistemological conditions exist and render the relatedness possible. By&#xD;
analysing the contemporary economic predicament among the Yami, I attempt to&#xD;
highlight the effect of an episteme: when the Yami recognise and pursue wealth in the&#xD;
context of market economy they seem to be blind to the enormous invisible wealth in&#xD;
the market, because their category of wealth is constructed through numerous&#xD;
vis-à-vis relationships whose meaning resides in what a particular person is able to&#xD;
‘see’.&#xD;
The concept of wealth is being re-categorised among the Yami, due to both their&#xD;
continuous trial and error in business management and the invincible power of&#xD;
abstract money. Accordingly, the straightforward relations between wealth, power,&#xD;
knowledge and labour are dissolving. The image of a real person is also changing now.&#xD;
In short, what money and commodities introduce to the Yami is not merely their use-&#xD;
or exchange- value but a set of new relations and a new way to see and recognise the&#xD;
world.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kao, Hsin-chieh</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis discusses the concepts of labour, life, and language among the Yami&#xD;
of Lanyu, Taiwan. In the local context, it is labour, life and language that comprise the&#xD;
concept of personhood among the Yami: tao, i.e. the ‘person’ in Yami language, is&#xD;
someone created labouring, and his labour in turn creates affluence, authority, and&#xD;
truth. I name this culturally particular image of a real or true person as Homo laboris&#xD;
or ‘Man the Worker’. This thesis aims to explore how labour, wealth, power, and&#xD;
knowledge are interrelated in Yami culture, and behind these relations, what material,&#xD;
social and epistemological conditions exist and render the relatedness possible. By&#xD;
analysing the contemporary economic predicament among the Yami, I attempt to&#xD;
highlight the effect of an episteme: when the Yami recognise and pursue wealth in the&#xD;
context of market economy they seem to be blind to the enormous invisible wealth in&#xD;
the market, because their category of wealth is constructed through numerous&#xD;
vis-à-vis relationships whose meaning resides in what a particular person is able to&#xD;
‘see’.&#xD;
The concept of wealth is being re-categorised among the Yami, due to both their&#xD;
continuous trial and error in business management and the invincible power of&#xD;
abstract money. Accordingly, the straightforward relations between wealth, power,&#xD;
knowledge and labour are dissolving. The image of a real person is also changing now.&#xD;
In short, what money and commodities introduce to the Yami is not merely their use-&#xD;
or exchange- value but a set of new relations and a new way to see and recognise the&#xD;
world.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Knowledge, chance, and contrast</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3202" />
    <author>
      <name>Dimmock, Paul</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3202</id>
    <updated>2012-10-19T13:52:48Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge&#xD;
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the&#xD;
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’&#xD;
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon&#xD;
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about&#xD;
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of&#xD;
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand&#xD;
united in their rejection of contextualism.&#xD;
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out&#xD;
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second&#xD;
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is&#xD;
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-&#xD;
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to&#xD;
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism&#xD;
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at&#xD;
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be&#xD;
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not&#xD;
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to&#xD;
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue&#xD;
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Dimmock, Paul</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the rise of contextualist theories of knowledge&#xD;
ascriptions (and denials). Contextualists about ‘knows’ maintain that utterances of the&#xD;
form ‘S knows p’ and ‘S doesn’t know p’ resemble utterances such as ‘Peter is here’&#xD;
and ‘Peter is not here’, in the sense that their truth-conditions vary depending upon&#xD;
features of the context in which they are uttered. In recent years, contextualism about&#xD;
‘knows’ has come under heavy attack. This has been associated with a proliferation of&#xD;
defences of so-called invariantist accounts of knowledge ascriptions, which stand&#xD;
united in their rejection of contextualism.&#xD;
The central goal of the present work is two-fold. In the first instance, it is to bring out&#xD;
the serious pitfalls in many of those recent defences of invariantism. In the second&#xD;
instance, it is to establish that the most plausible form of invariantism is one that is&#xD;
sceptical in character. Of course, the prevailing preference in epistemology is for non-&#xD;
sceptical accounts. The central conclusions of the thesis might therefore be taken to&#xD;
show that – despite recent attacks on its plausibility – some form of contextualism&#xD;
about ‘knows’ must be correct. However, this project is not undertaken without at&#xD;
least the suspicion that embracing (a particular form of) sceptical invariantism is to be&#xD;
preferred to embracing contextualism. In the course of the discussion, I therefore not&#xD;
only attempt to rebut some standard objections to sceptical invariantism, but also to&#xD;
reveal – in at least a preliminary way – how the sceptical invariantist might best argue&#xD;
for the superiority of her account to that of the contextualist.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The ideal role of women in Plato's and Aristotle's societies</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3201" />
    <author>
      <name>Jawin, Alixandra</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3201</id>
    <updated>2012-10-19T13:22:20Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-19T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s&#xD;
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter&#xD;
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is&#xD;
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s&#xD;
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will&#xD;
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that&#xD;
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the&#xD;
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women&#xD;
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no&#xD;
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second&#xD;
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as&#xD;
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the&#xD;
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to&#xD;
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal&#xD;
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s&#xD;
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the&#xD;
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit&#xD;
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This&#xD;
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good&#xD;
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize&#xD;
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to&#xD;
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,&#xD;
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his&#xD;
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than&#xD;
appreciated.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-19T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Jawin, Alixandra</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation analyzes Plato’s and Aristotle’s&#xD;
conception of women’s proper role in the state. The first chapter&#xD;
demonstrates that due to Plato’s belief that the soul is sexless it is&#xD;
impossible to determine one’s role in society by one’s sex. Plato’s&#xD;
claim in the Republic that women who are qualified by nature will&#xD;
become guardians is therefore consistent with his larger view that&#xD;
one’s role in society should only be based on one’s nature. Since the&#xD;
only distinction between male and female Guardians is that women&#xD;
give birth to children and are physically weaker than men, there is no&#xD;
justification for barring women from the Guardian class. The second&#xD;
chapter turns to the Symposium and Plato’s thoughts on intellectual as&#xD;
well as physical pregnancy, and specifically that according to Plato the&#xD;
process of giving birth does not affect a woman’s soul or capacity to&#xD;
reason. In the third chapter I demonstrate that even outside the ideal&#xD;
city of the Republic, Plato does not revise his position on women’s&#xD;
capacities. The Laws is more concerned with practicality than the&#xD;
Republic and Plato is therefore forced to make concessions which limit&#xD;
women’s opportunity to govern, but such concessions are minor. This&#xD;
chapter also emphasizes Plato’s belief that good laws make good&#xD;
people and describes how this realization enables him to recognize&#xD;
that the poor condition of the women in Classical Athens is due to&#xD;
Athenian social institutions and not to women’s inferior nature. Finally,&#xD;
the fourth chapter turns to Aristotle and seeks to prove that his&#xD;
position on women’s role in the state is far more nuanced than&#xD;
appreciated.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Justifications and excuses</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3174" />
    <author>
      <name>Baron, Marcia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3174</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:30:45Z</updated>
    <published>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions (viewed in isolation from the agents performing them). Those who think, as I do, of “His action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.” In addition to (and sometimes in the course of) sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth (and does require reasonable belief), we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse.</summary>
    <dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Baron, Marcia</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a justification, or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions (viewed in isolation from the agents performing them). Those who think, as I do, of “His action, X, was justified” as “He was justified in doing X” are far more likely to allow that justification requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than are those who think of “His action, X, was justified” as “Although actions of this type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible.” In addition to (and sometimes in the course of) sorting out the differences and tracing them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue to use the term “justified” in a way that does not require truth (and does require reasonable belief), we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who reject the reasonable belief view of justification, justification thus understood does not reduce to excuse.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Provocation Defense and the Nature of Justification</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3173" />
    <author>
      <name>Baron, Marcia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3173</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:30:29Z</updated>
    <published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Baron, Marcia</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Perspective in context : relative truth, knowledge, and the first person</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3164" />
    <author>
      <name>Kindermann, Dirk</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3164</id>
    <updated>2013-05-01T09:20:06Z</updated>
    <published>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I  am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. &#xD;
&#xD;
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kindermann, Dirk</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation is about the nature of perspectival thoughts and the context-sensitivity of the language used to express them. It focuses on two kinds of perspectival thoughts: ‘subjective’ evaluative thoughts about matters of personal taste, such as 'Beetroot is delicious' or 'Skydiving is fun', and first-personal or de se thoughts about oneself, such as 'I  am hungry' or 'I have been fooled.' The dissertation defends of a novel form of relativism about truth - the idea that the truth of some (but not all) perspectival thought and talk is relative to the perspective of an evaluating subject or group. &#xD;
&#xD;
In Part I, I argue that the realm of ‘subjective’ evaluative thought and talk whose truth is perspective-relative includes attributions of knowledge of the form ’S knows that p.’ Following a brief introduction (chapter 1), chapter 2 presents a new, error-theoretic objection against relativism about knowledge attributions. The case for relativism regarding knowledge attributions rests on the claim that relativism is the only view that explains all of the empirical data from speakers' use of the word "know" without recourse to an error theory. In chapter 2, I show that the relativist can only account for sceptical paradoxes and ordinary epistemic closure puzzles if she attributes a problematic form of semantic blindness to speakers. However, in 3 I show that all major competitor theories - forms of invariantism and contextualism - are subject to equally serious error-theoretic objections. This raises the following fundamental question for empirical theorising about the meaning of natural language expressions: If error attributions are ubiquitous, by which criteria do we evaluate and compare the force of error-theoretic objections and the plausibility of error attributions? I provide a number of criteria and argue that they give us reason to think that relativism's error attributions are more plausible than those of its competitors.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Part II, I develop a novel unified account of the content and communication of perspectival thoughts. Many relativists regarding ‘subjective’ thoughts and Lewisians about de se thoughts endorse a view of belief as self-location. In chapter 4, I argue that the self-location view of belief is in conflict with the received picture of linguistic communication, which understands communication as the transmission of information from speaker's head to hearer's head. I argue that understanding mental content and speech act content in terms of sequenced worlds allows a reconciliation of these views. On the view I advocate, content is modelled as a set of sequenced worlds - possible worlds ‘centred’ on a group of individuals inhabiting the world at some time. Intuitively, a sequenced world is a way a group of people may be. I develop a Stalnakerian model of communication based on sequenced worlds content, and I provide a suitable semantics for personal pronouns and predicates of personal taste. In chapter 5, I show that one of the advantages of this model is its compatibility with both nonindexical contextualism and truth relativism about taste. I argue in chapters 5 and 6 that the empirical data from eavesdropping, retraction, and disagreement cases supports a relativist completion of the model, and I show in detail how to account for these phenomena on the sequenced worlds view.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Non-wellfounded mereology</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3157" />
    <author>
      <name>Cotnoir, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Bacon, Andrew</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3157</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:32:00Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges’ Aleph, and the Trinity; other examples are less so, like Time Traveling Bricks, and even Geach’s Tibbles the Cat. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared to classical mereology. We provide a class of models with respect to which the non-wellfounded mereology is sound and complete.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Cotnoir, Aaron</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Bacon, Andrew</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This paper is a systematic exploration of non-wellfounded mereology. Motivations and applications suggested in the literature are considered. Some are exotic like Borges’ Aleph, and the Trinity; other examples are less so, like Time Traveling Bricks, and even Geach’s Tibbles the Cat. The authors point out that the transitivity of non-wellfounded parthood is inconsistent with extensionality. A non-wellfounded mereology is developed with careful consideration paid to rival notions of supplementation and fusion. Two equivalent axiomatizations are given, and are compared to classical mereology. We provide a class of models with respect to which the non-wellfounded mereology is sound and complete.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The answering machine paradox</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150" />
    <author>
      <name>Gudmundsson, David</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3150</id>
    <updated>2012-10-25T09:08:15Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate&#xD;
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the&#xD;
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst&#xD;
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present&#xD;
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the&#xD;
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a&#xD;
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals&#xD;
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-&#xD;
theoretical intuitions.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Gudmundsson, David</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The answering machine paradox has relatively recently sparked some debate&#xD;
regarding Kaplan’s Demonstrative (1977). A popular approach to solve the&#xD;
answering machine paradox has been to reject Kaplan’s proper context thesis whilst&#xD;
largely maintaining his framework for indexicals. In this thesis I will firstly present&#xD;
two new answering machine type cases and argue that the existing solutions to the&#xD;
answering machine paradox cannot deal with these cases. Then, I will propose a&#xD;
near-side pragmatic solution to the answering machine paradox that adequately deals&#xD;
with these new answering machine cases in a way that adheres with our pre-&#xD;
theoretical intuitions.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The routes of sense : thought, semantic underdeterminacy and compositionality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3142" />
    <author>
      <name>Pedriali, Walter B.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3142</id>
    <updated>2013-04-30T16:10:26Z</updated>
    <published>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey&#xD;
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?&#xD;
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal&#xD;
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent&#xD;
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we&#xD;
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent&#xD;
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression&#xD;
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,&#xD;
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular&#xD;
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value&#xD;
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.&#xD;
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising&#xD;
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).&#xD;
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places&#xD;
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,&#xD;
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing&#xD;
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to&#xD;
meta-ethical reflection.&#xD;
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try&#xD;
to address in the rest of the thesis.&#xD;
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining&#xD;
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly&#xD;
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for&#xD;
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon&#xD;
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The&#xD;
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible&#xD;
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of&#xD;
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).&#xD;
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by&#xD;
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither&#xD;
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson&#xD;
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably&#xD;
minimal conception of content.&#xD;
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants&#xD;
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart&#xD;
of the compositional machinery.&#xD;
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.&#xD;
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing&#xD;
content-minimalism.&#xD;
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view&#xD;
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles&#xD;
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pedriali, Walter B.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>What does it mean to be a rational language user? What is it to obey&#xD;
linguistic rules? What is the proper account of linguistic competence?&#xD;
A Fregean answer to these questions would make essential appeal&#xD;
to the notion of sense: we are masters of a language to the extent&#xD;
that we are able to recognise the cognitive value of its expressions; we&#xD;
are rational judges regarding truth-value assignments to the extent&#xD;
that we are sensitive to the ways in which the sense of an expression&#xD;
guides us in the semantic evaluation process; and as for obeying rules,&#xD;
it is our ability to respond to how sense directs us, for a particular&#xD;
assertion of a sentence, towards the determination of its truth-value&#xD;
that best exemplifies what it is like to follow a linguistic rule.&#xD;
My thesis explores a cluster of closely interrelated issues arising&#xD;
from these questions (whether or not considered from a Fregean perspective).&#xD;
Accordingly, in tracing the routes of sense my dissertation places&#xD;
itself at the intersection of the philosophy of language, linguistics,&#xD;
philosophy of logic, and meta-ethics—and indeed, I end up agreeing&#xD;
with Allan Gibbard that the theory of meaning really belongs to&#xD;
meta-ethical reflection.&#xD;
Chapter 1 introduces some of the main research questions that I try&#xD;
to address in the rest of the thesis.&#xD;
In chapter 2 I state a number of theses which I take to be the defining&#xD;
ones for semanticism. I show that they form a class of jointly&#xD;
incompatible commitments. I choose nonsense as a problem case for&#xD;
compositionality and I argue that it forces the semanticist to abandon&#xD;
either the learnability or the compositionality constraint. The&#xD;
escape route I adopt, going radically minimalist about content, is incompatible&#xD;
with another key semanticist thesis, namely, that grasp of&#xD;
meaning is grasp of truth-conditions (robustly conceived).&#xD;
In chapter 3, I consider the account of atomic meanings given by&#xD;
both the semanticist and the pragmaticist and I conclude that on neither&#xD;
account does interpretation come out as a process of rational choice between candidate bearers of content. Again, I suggest the lesson&#xD;
from indeterminacy is that we ought to embrace an ineradicably&#xD;
minimal conception of content.&#xD;
In chapter 4 I turn my attention to the meaning of the logical constants&#xD;
and I argue that indeterminacy worries extend to the very heart&#xD;
of the compositional machinery.&#xD;
Chapter 5 examines the view that logic is the science of reasoning.&#xD;
Unsurprisingly, I conclude that a defence of this claim requires endorsing&#xD;
content-minimalism.&#xD;
In chapter 6 I conclude my dissertation by sketching a radical view&#xD;
of content minimalism and I try to show how it can solve the puzzles&#xD;
I had been considering over the course of the previous chapters.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Framed intimacy : representation of woman in transnational cinemas</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3138" />
    <author>
      <name>Pekerman, Serazer</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3138</id>
    <updated>2013-04-30T14:30:26Z</updated>
    <published>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This study compares independent films from different countries (Turkey, Denmark,&#xD;
Iran and Spain) in a transnational context. Making use of schizoanalytic concepts, it&#xD;
presents an analysis of filmic space in relation to character construction in the&#xD;
internationally acclaimed contemporary films: Ten (Abbas Kiarostami, 2002), Talk to&#xD;
Her (Pedro Almodóvar, 2002), Two Girls (Kutluğ Ataman, 2005), Allegro&#xD;
(Christoffer Boe, 2005), The Others (Alejandro Amenábar, 2001), Destiny (Zeki&#xD;
Demirkubuz, 2006), Offside (Jafar Panahi, 2006), Dogville (Lars von Trier, 2003) and&#xD;
Climates (Nuri Bilge Ceylan, 2006). I argue that these films are feminist texts, in&#xD;
which becoming-woman of the female character deterritorializes the patriarchal ideal&#xD;
of home(land) as a political statement. In the above listed films filmic space is never&#xD;
configured as a harmonious unity of a righteous woman and a peaceful home. Despite&#xD;
the pervading homelessness, the female characters turn the male dominated public&#xD;
space into a habitable place through the filmic assemblages with space, objects and&#xD;
other characters. I also argue that the homelessness and the problematic connection&#xD;
between the female character and the storyworld posits a metaphor for the&#xD;
disconnection between the auteur-filmmakers and their home(land)s.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pekerman, Serazer</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This study compares independent films from different countries (Turkey, Denmark,&#xD;
Iran and Spain) in a transnational context. Making use of schizoanalytic concepts, it&#xD;
presents an analysis of filmic space in relation to character construction in the&#xD;
internationally acclaimed contemporary films: Ten (Abbas Kiarostami, 2002), Talk to&#xD;
Her (Pedro Almodóvar, 2002), Two Girls (Kutluğ Ataman, 2005), Allegro&#xD;
(Christoffer Boe, 2005), The Others (Alejandro Amenábar, 2001), Destiny (Zeki&#xD;
Demirkubuz, 2006), Offside (Jafar Panahi, 2006), Dogville (Lars von Trier, 2003) and&#xD;
Climates (Nuri Bilge Ceylan, 2006). I argue that these films are feminist texts, in&#xD;
which becoming-woman of the female character deterritorializes the patriarchal ideal&#xD;
of home(land) as a political statement. In the above listed films filmic space is never&#xD;
configured as a harmonious unity of a righteous woman and a peaceful home. Despite&#xD;
the pervading homelessness, the female characters turn the male dominated public&#xD;
space into a habitable place through the filmic assemblages with space, objects and&#xD;
other characters. I also argue that the homelessness and the problematic connection&#xD;
between the female character and the storyworld posits a metaphor for the&#xD;
disconnection between the auteur-filmmakers and their home(land)s.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Mosaic space and mosaic auteurs : Alejandro González Iñárritu, Atom Egoyan, Hou Hsiao-hsien, Michael Haneke</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3122" />
    <author>
      <name>Chen, Yun-Hua</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3122</id>
    <updated>2013-04-30T16:07:51Z</updated>
    <published>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this thesis I propose approaching multi-strand films in a way that extends our focus&#xD;
beyond narrative strategy, arguing that the assemblage of narrative threads in fact infers a&#xD;
larger spatial mosaic. In this mosaic, spaces with diverse socioeconomic and geopolitical&#xD;
backgrounds, historical implications, and virtualities are interwoven through a variety of&#xD;
cinematic means, which include not only narrative but also editing, framing and mise-en-scene.&#xD;
In addition, I demonstrate that in certain auteurs’ works the construction of filmic&#xD;
mosaic space correlates with the bringing-together of film professionals, locations, financial&#xD;
resources and distribution routes across borders through the auteurs’ travelling. Hence this&#xD;
thesis lies in the intersection between the cinematic manifestations of mosaic space, spatial&#xD;
representations, and transnational filmmaking networks facilitated by authorship. Since the&#xD;
term “mosaic” is used here as a spatial metaphor to connect the interlinking concepts of&#xD;
space, narrative, and authorship, I term the travelling auteurs “mosaic auteurs”, the multistrand&#xD;
narrative “mosaic narrative”, and the assembled film space “mosaic space”. I will use&#xD;
the filmmaking contexts and film works of Michael Haneke, Hou Hsiao-hsien, Atom Egoyan&#xD;
and Alejandro González Iñárritu as examples, and the spatial theories of Marc Augé, Gilles&#xD;
Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Saskia Sassen, Mike Featherstone among others to explain the&#xD;
dynamism of spatial configurations.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Chen, Yun-Hua</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this thesis I propose approaching multi-strand films in a way that extends our focus&#xD;
beyond narrative strategy, arguing that the assemblage of narrative threads in fact infers a&#xD;
larger spatial mosaic. In this mosaic, spaces with diverse socioeconomic and geopolitical&#xD;
backgrounds, historical implications, and virtualities are interwoven through a variety of&#xD;
cinematic means, which include not only narrative but also editing, framing and mise-en-scene.&#xD;
In addition, I demonstrate that in certain auteurs’ works the construction of filmic&#xD;
mosaic space correlates with the bringing-together of film professionals, locations, financial&#xD;
resources and distribution routes across borders through the auteurs’ travelling. Hence this&#xD;
thesis lies in the intersection between the cinematic manifestations of mosaic space, spatial&#xD;
representations, and transnational filmmaking networks facilitated by authorship. Since the&#xD;
term “mosaic” is used here as a spatial metaphor to connect the interlinking concepts of&#xD;
space, narrative, and authorship, I term the travelling auteurs “mosaic auteurs”, the multistrand&#xD;
narrative “mosaic narrative”, and the assembled film space “mosaic space”. I will use&#xD;
the filmmaking contexts and film works of Michael Haneke, Hou Hsiao-hsien, Atom Egoyan&#xD;
and Alejandro González Iñárritu as examples, and the spatial theories of Marc Augé, Gilles&#xD;
Deleuze, Félix Guattari, Saskia Sassen, Mike Featherstone among others to explain the&#xD;
dynamism of spatial configurations.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Virtue epistemology and the analysis of knowledge</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118" />
    <author>
      <name>Church, Ian M.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3118</id>
    <updated>2012-10-24T14:02:00Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.  &#xD;
         &#xD;
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. &#xD;
&#xD;
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. &#xD;
&#xD;
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Church, Ian M.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis centers on two trends in epistemology: (i) the dissatisfaction with the reductive analysis of knowledge, the project of explicating knowledge in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, and (ii) the popularity of virtue-theoretic epistemologies. The goal of this thesis is to endorse non-reductive virtue epistemology. Given that prominent renditions of virtue epistemology assume the reductive model, however, such a move is not straightforward—work needs to be done to elucidate what is wrong with the reductive model, in general, and why reductive accounts of virtue epistemology, specifically, are lacking.  &#xD;
         &#xD;
The first part of this thesis involves diagnosing what is wrong with the reductive model and defending that diagnosis against objections. The problem with the reductive project is the Gettier Problem. In Chapter 1, I lend credence to Linda Zagzebski’s grim 1994 diagnosis of Gettier problems (and the abandonment of the reductive model) by examining the nature of luck, the key component of Gettier problems. In Chapter 2, I vindicate this diagnosis against a range of critiques from the contemporary literature. &#xD;
&#xD;
The second part involves applying this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology. In Chapter 3, we consider the virtue epistemology of Alvin Plantinga. In Chapter 4, we consider the virtue epistemology of Ernest Sosa. Both are seminal and iconic; nevertheless, I argue that, in accord with our diagnosis, neither is able to viably surmount the Gettier Problem. &#xD;
&#xD;
Having diagnosed what is wrong with the reductive project and applied this diagnosis to prominent versions of (reductive) virtue epistemology, the final part of this thesis explores the possibility of non-reductive virtue epistemology. In Chapter 5, I argue that there are three strategies that can be used to develop non-reductive virtue epistemologies, strategies that are compatible with seminal non-reductive accounts of knowledge and preserve our favorite virtue-theoretic concepts.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>John Stuart Mill and romanticism</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3097" />
    <author>
      <name>Macleod, Christopher</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3097</id>
    <updated>2012-10-24T15:56:10Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement.  The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined.  I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory.  For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny.  I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions.  The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation.  The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’.  I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.&#xD;
&#xD;
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5.  Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively.  In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history.  Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress.  I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history.  In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature.  Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Macleod, Christopher</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an examination of the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and its relation to the romantic movement.  The Introduction outlines reasons to believe that such an inquiry is sensible: Mill’s readings of the British and German romantics are outlined.  I proceed to offer an argument for the application of an historical term such as ‘romanticism’ in philosophy and suggest that the space opened up by the revisionist view of romanticism as an extension, rather than a denial, of the Enlightenment project creates room to take seriously Mill’s relation to the romantic movement.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapters 1-4 are concerned with Mill’s metanormative theory.  For Mill, the norms of acting and believing are founded on the assent given to our primitive dispositions under critical scrutiny.  I investigate this foundation in the context of Mill’s denial of normative validity to intuitions.  The relation of Mill’s metanormative theory to romanticism is taken up during the process of interpretation.  The movement shows broad endorsement of what I term ‘romantic-cognitivism’ – the post-Kantian view that we can arrive at truth through the process of ‘creative-discovery’.  I hold that Mill’s metanormative theory is not so far away from romantic-cognitivism in orientation as might be thought.&#xD;
&#xD;
I turn to Mill’s macro-epistemology and conception of mind in Chapter 5.  Mill’s view of how we come to know, I suggest, moves towards a Coleridgean position – Mill sees the mind as active, and holds that we come to possess a deeper state of knowledge by engaging with propositions actively.  In Chapter 6, I consider Mill’s philosophy of history.  Many have noted that Mill endorses a directional theory of historical progress.  I argue that he also adopts ‘hermeneutical historicism’ in his discussions of history.  In Chapter 7, I consider Mill’s theory of human nature.  Mill believes that human nature is malleable: it is subject to change and emendation.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Metafreedom? The carnivalesque of freedom in a Brazilian favela</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3095" />
    <author>
      <name>Lino e Silva, Moises</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3095</id>
    <updated>2012-10-24T15:52:54Z</updated>
    <published>2012-05-15T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis dwells on the existence of freedom in the life of people in a Brazilian favela (shantytown). The ethnography presents the dance of freedom with the full intensity of a carnivalesque. The exploration also ponders the existence of metafreedom (proposed as the freedom necessary for the expression of freedom) as a form of control over iterations of freedom. At the same time that it argues for a radical carnivalization of narratives of freedom, it flirts with the very limits of freedom as a concept and as a practice. One of the main contributions is in avoiding a reductive analysis of the concept of freedom, narrowing it to a simpler or alternative notion. Instead, the project presents the complex relations of five experienced objects – livre; livre-arbítrio; libertação; liberada and liberdade – to one another and to the life situations in which they come to existence in Favela da Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro. In methodological terms, the research argues that one of the ways to approach the topic of freedom from an ethnographic perspective is through the occurrences of linguistic expressions of freedom as objects that can be empirically experienced and registered by the ethnographer. It is mainly by making the complexities of freedom visible ethnographically, by tracing freedoms in their daily existence and by connecting these different kinds of freedom to diverse lived experiences and social contexts that the thesis advances the debate on freedom. The discussion of a carnivalesque of freedom in a Brazilian favela is also a call for a reflection on what ethnography as an empirical method, and anthropology more broadly, can offer to the understanding of freedom.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-05-15T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lino e Silva, Moises</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis dwells on the existence of freedom in the life of people in a Brazilian favela (shantytown). The ethnography presents the dance of freedom with the full intensity of a carnivalesque. The exploration also ponders the existence of metafreedom (proposed as the freedom necessary for the expression of freedom) as a form of control over iterations of freedom. At the same time that it argues for a radical carnivalization of narratives of freedom, it flirts with the very limits of freedom as a concept and as a practice. One of the main contributions is in avoiding a reductive analysis of the concept of freedom, narrowing it to a simpler or alternative notion. Instead, the project presents the complex relations of five experienced objects – livre; livre-arbítrio; libertação; liberada and liberdade – to one another and to the life situations in which they come to existence in Favela da Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro. In methodological terms, the research argues that one of the ways to approach the topic of freedom from an ethnographic perspective is through the occurrences of linguistic expressions of freedom as objects that can be empirically experienced and registered by the ethnographer. It is mainly by making the complexities of freedom visible ethnographically, by tracing freedoms in their daily existence and by connecting these different kinds of freedom to diverse lived experiences and social contexts that the thesis advances the debate on freedom. The discussion of a carnivalesque of freedom in a Brazilian favela is also a call for a reflection on what ethnography as an empirical method, and anthropology more broadly, can offer to the understanding of freedom.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>On the margins of the states : contesting Gypsyness and belonging in the Slovak-Ukrainian-Hungarian borderlands and in selected migration contexts</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3094" />
    <author>
      <name>Grill, Jan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3094</id>
    <updated>2012-10-24T15:54:26Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-21T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis investigates the transnational migration of Slovakian Roma from the eastern borderlands of the European Union to Great Britain. Based on more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the village of Tarkovce and in several British cities, this study examines concrete pathways through which Roma come to migrate and experience their movement. For Tarkovce Roma, the most recent migration opportunity offers a potential means to carve out a sense of a viable life and of autonomy amidst the oppressive circumstances and asymmetrical relations they experience with non-Roma dominant groups and non-related Roma. I focus on Tarkovce Roma strivings for existential mobility, which condition their physical movement to the place of destination, and on their hopes for upward socio-economic mobility. I argue that migration enables Roma to contest and re-negotiate the hegemonic racial and social categories which historically place them at the bottom of social hierarchies. The thesis explores the unevenly distributed possibilities and complex inequalities that Tarkovce Roma encounter on their journeys towards realising their hopes in migration. I situate these differences within the daily sociability of Tarkovce Roma, intense webs of kinship and friendship ties, and key concepts of ‘soft hearts’ and ‘heaviness.’ I describe how Roma migrants come to occupy one of the most vulnerable positions in the British labour market and how they simultaneously, and constantly, search for other ways of making ‘big money.’ Finally, I address questions of categorisations, in particular the internal differentiations between Roma, as well as the transformation that many Roma migrants encounter in British cities, from initial ‘invisibility’ to ‘visibility’. By focusing on one particular neighbourhood in Glasgow, I analyse the shifting forms of ethno-cultural categorisations that mark Roma/Gypsy difference.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-21T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Grill, Jan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis investigates the transnational migration of Slovakian Roma from the eastern borderlands of the European Union to Great Britain. Based on more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork in the village of Tarkovce and in several British cities, this study examines concrete pathways through which Roma come to migrate and experience their movement. For Tarkovce Roma, the most recent migration opportunity offers a potential means to carve out a sense of a viable life and of autonomy amidst the oppressive circumstances and asymmetrical relations they experience with non-Roma dominant groups and non-related Roma. I focus on Tarkovce Roma strivings for existential mobility, which condition their physical movement to the place of destination, and on their hopes for upward socio-economic mobility. I argue that migration enables Roma to contest and re-negotiate the hegemonic racial and social categories which historically place them at the bottom of social hierarchies. The thesis explores the unevenly distributed possibilities and complex inequalities that Tarkovce Roma encounter on their journeys towards realising their hopes in migration. I situate these differences within the daily sociability of Tarkovce Roma, intense webs of kinship and friendship ties, and key concepts of ‘soft hearts’ and ‘heaviness.’ I describe how Roma migrants come to occupy one of the most vulnerable positions in the British labour market and how they simultaneously, and constantly, search for other ways of making ‘big money.’ Finally, I address questions of categorisations, in particular the internal differentiations between Roma, as well as the transformation that many Roma migrants encounter in British cities, from initial ‘invisibility’ to ‘visibility’. By focusing on one particular neighbourhood in Glasgow, I analyse the shifting forms of ethno-cultural categorisations that mark Roma/Gypsy difference.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Anti-symmetry and non-extensional mereology</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3081" />
    <author>
      <name>Cotnoir, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3081</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:31:59Z</updated>
    <published>2010-04-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: I examine the link between extensionality principles of classical mereology and the anti-symmetry of parthood. Varzi’s most recent defence of extensionality depends crucially on assuming anti-symmetry. I examine the notions of proper parthood, weak supplementation and non-well-foundedness. By rejecting anti-symmetry, the anti-extensionalist has a unified, independently grounded response to Varzi’s arguments. I give a formal construction of a non-extensional mereology in which antisymmetry fails. If the notion of ‘mereological equivalence’ is made explicit, this non-anti-symmetric mereology recaptures all of the structure of classical mereology.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-04-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Cotnoir, Aaron</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>I examine the link between extensionality principles of classical mereology and the anti-symmetry of parthood. Varzi’s most recent defence of extensionality depends crucially on assuming anti-symmetry. I examine the notions of proper parthood, weak supplementation and non-well-foundedness. By rejecting anti-symmetry, the anti-extensionalist has a unified, independently grounded response to Varzi’s arguments. I give a formal construction of a non-extensional mereology in which antisymmetry fails. If the notion of ‘mereological equivalence’ is made explicit, this non-anti-symmetric mereology recaptures all of the structure of classical mereology.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Generic truth and mixed conjunctions : some alternatives</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3080" />
    <author>
      <name>Cotnoir, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3080</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:31:58Z</updated>
    <published>2009-07-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2009-07-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Cotnoir, Aaron</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>True, false, paranormal, and 'designated'? : a reply to Jenkins</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3079" />
    <author>
      <name>Caret, Colin Ready</name>
    </author>
    <author>
      <name>Cotnoir, Aaron</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3079</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:31:58Z</updated>
    <published>2008-07-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2008-07-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Caret, Colin Ready</dc:creator>
    <dc:creator>Cotnoir, Aaron</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A defence of the Kaplanian theory of sentence truth</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3070" />
    <author>
      <name>Sweeney, Paula</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3070</id>
    <updated>2012-11-01T15:10:10Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth&#xD;
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed&#xD;
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply&#xD;
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a&#xD;
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this&#xD;
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one&#xD;
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of&#xD;
sentence truth against these challenges.&#xD;
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.&#xD;
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,&#xD;
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the&#xD;
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are&#xD;
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory&#xD;
of sentence truth.&#xD;
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the&#xD;
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a&#xD;
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic&#xD;
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.&#xD;
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes&#xD;
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to&#xD;
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.&#xD;
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning&#xD;
vague predicates.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sweeney, Paula</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>When David Kaplan put forward his theory of sentence truth&#xD;
incorporating demonstratives, initially proposed in ‘Dthat’ (1978) and later developed&#xD;
in ‘Demonstratives’ (1989a) and ‘Afterthoughts’ (1989b), it was, to his mind, simply&#xD;
a matter of book-keeping, a job that had been pushed aside as a complication when a&#xD;
truth conditional semantics had been proposed. The challenges considered in this&#xD;
thesis are challenges to the effect that Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth is, for one&#xD;
reason or another, inadequate. My overarching aim is to defend Kaplan’s theory of&#xD;
sentence truth against these challenges.&#xD;
In chapter one I am concerned only with setting out some preliminary considerations.&#xD;
In chapter two I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against a general challenge,&#xD;
motivated by linguistic data from ‘contextualists’ and ‘relativists’. I argue that the&#xD;
methods and data employed by proponents of contextualism and relativism are&#xD;
lacking and as such should not be taken to have seriously challenged Kaplan’s theory&#xD;
of sentence truth.&#xD;
In chapter three I defend Kaplan’s theory of sentence truth against challenges to the&#xD;
effect that his theory is not suited to delivering on its initial purpose—to provide a&#xD;
semantics for indexical and demonstrative terms. I then develop a form of semantic&#xD;
pluralism that I take to be entirely compatible with the Kaplanian model.&#xD;
In chapters four I demonstrate the efficiency of this Kaplanian model when it comes&#xD;
to defending Kaplan’s theory against the challenge of providing suitable semantics to&#xD;
accommodate discourse involving future contingents.&#xD;
And finally, in chapter five I consider contextualist accounts of discourse concerning&#xD;
vague predicates.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The place that words come from... : an ethnography of Quaker worship practices and their social enactment</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3069" />
    <author>
      <name>Lloyd-Richards, Huw</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3069</id>
    <updated>2013-03-22T14:50:15Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis addresses the worship practices of contemporary Quakers and their&#xD;
social enactment. It presents an ethnography that attempts to evoke&#xD;
participation in Meeting for Worship at a local site (St Andrews Quaker Meeting)&#xD;
and also adopts a strategic perspective towards Quaker practices as a&#xD;
dispersed community of practice. It deploys two major theoretical frameworks: a&#xD;
revised theory of secularisation developed by Taylor (2007) and Martin (2005);&#xD;
and Cultural Theory developed from Douglas (1996,1998). A short history of&#xD;
Quakers is set out. A context for contemporary Quakers, the ‘spiritual&#xD;
landscape’ (Taylor, 2007), is characterised. Quaker reflexive literature is&#xD;
reviewed. Following the ethnography of a Meeting for Worship, four key&#xD;
domains of practice are further discussed – the body, silence, speech and&#xD;
gatheredness. The Meeting for Worship for Business is described using&#xD;
ethnographic material. Sources of power, decision-making criteria, the&#xD;
construction of the Quaker narrative, and the emergence of renewal initiatives&#xD;
are reviewed. Four central elements of Quaker practice – the Worship ritual, the&#xD;
Testimonies, Business Meetings, and Cosmologies – are plotted within the grid-&#xD;
group model and Cultural Theory. The thesis has twenty-two Figures and five&#xD;
Appendices which contain a Dramatis Personae, a Fieldwork Diary and&#xD;
background information on Quaker practice. The challenge for contemporary&#xD;
Quakers is portrayed as the attempt to create and maintain unity in diversity and&#xD;
this is explicated by analysing Quaker practices in the light of the pressures of&#xD;
secularisation and cross-pressures within the spiritual landscape, in particular&#xD;
the dialectical tension theorised by Taylor (2007) between ‘transcendence’ and&#xD;
‘immanence’.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lloyd-Richards, Huw</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis addresses the worship practices of contemporary Quakers and their&#xD;
social enactment. It presents an ethnography that attempts to evoke&#xD;
participation in Meeting for Worship at a local site (St Andrews Quaker Meeting)&#xD;
and also adopts a strategic perspective towards Quaker practices as a&#xD;
dispersed community of practice. It deploys two major theoretical frameworks: a&#xD;
revised theory of secularisation developed by Taylor (2007) and Martin (2005);&#xD;
and Cultural Theory developed from Douglas (1996,1998). A short history of&#xD;
Quakers is set out. A context for contemporary Quakers, the ‘spiritual&#xD;
landscape’ (Taylor, 2007), is characterised. Quaker reflexive literature is&#xD;
reviewed. Following the ethnography of a Meeting for Worship, four key&#xD;
domains of practice are further discussed – the body, silence, speech and&#xD;
gatheredness. The Meeting for Worship for Business is described using&#xD;
ethnographic material. Sources of power, decision-making criteria, the&#xD;
construction of the Quaker narrative, and the emergence of renewal initiatives&#xD;
are reviewed. Four central elements of Quaker practice – the Worship ritual, the&#xD;
Testimonies, Business Meetings, and Cosmologies – are plotted within the grid-&#xD;
group model and Cultural Theory. The thesis has twenty-two Figures and five&#xD;
Appendices which contain a Dramatis Personae, a Fieldwork Diary and&#xD;
background information on Quaker practice. The challenge for contemporary&#xD;
Quakers is portrayed as the attempt to create and maintain unity in diversity and&#xD;
this is explicated by analysing Quaker practices in the light of the pressures of&#xD;
secularisation and cross-pressures within the spiritual landscape, in particular&#xD;
the dialectical tension theorised by Taylor (2007) between ‘transcendence’ and&#xD;
‘immanence’.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Coincidence and modality</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3037" />
    <author>
      <name>Kang, Li</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3037</id>
    <updated>2012-08-09T09:21:16Z</updated>
    <published>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: How should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kang, Li</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>How should we understand de re modal features of objects, if there are such features? Any answer to the question is connected to how we should think about coincident objects, objects which occupy the same spatio-temporal region and share the same underlying matter. This thesis is mainly about the connections between de re modality and coincidence. My interest in the connections is twofold: First, how do theories of de re modality interact with theories about coincidence? Details of interactions are discussed from chapter 2 to chapter 5. Second, do the considerations about de re modality offer reasons to favour a particular position about coincidence? And how does this answer contribute to current meta-ontological debate? These are raised in chapter 1 and are answered in conclusion.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Negation in context</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3031" />
    <author>
      <name>De, Michael</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3031</id>
    <updated>2012-07-27T11:27:30Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>De, Michael</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Old ways - new ways : Talang Mamak of Tiga Balai, Inderagiri Hulu, Propinsi Riau, Sumatra</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2964" />
    <author>
      <name>Singleton, William</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2964</id>
    <updated>2012-07-10T13:58:41Z</updated>
    <published>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this thesis&#xD;
I&#xD;
place&#xD;
detailed descriptions&#xD;
of&#xD;
Talang Mamak lives in&#xD;
an&#xD;
historically&#xD;
reconstructed context which&#xD;
focuses&#xD;
upon the Talang Mamak's&#xD;
status as&#xD;
debt-bondsmen&#xD;
of the&#xD;
Sultans&#xD;
of the&#xD;
kingdom&#xD;
of&#xD;
Inderagiri (1509-1963). Information&#xD;
about current&#xD;
Talang Mamak&#xD;
lives is&#xD;
presented&#xD;
in the&#xD;
form&#xD;
of&#xD;
five life-histories,&#xD;
or&#xD;
biographies, in&#xD;
which&#xD;
both local issues&#xD;
(development; deforestation; drought;&#xD;
crime; relationships with wider,&#xD;
Muslim,&#xD;
society;&#xD;
debt-&#xD;
management;&#xD;
)&#xD;
and&#xD;
local&#xD;
practices&#xD;
(leadership,&#xD;
rice-farming, rubber cultivation and tapping,&#xD;
cock-fighting, shamanism, marriage, etc) are&#xD;
described in terms of the&#xD;
biographical&#xD;
subjects'&#xD;
experiences of them. Preceding the&#xD;
life-histories&#xD;
and&#xD;
forming&#xD;
a context&#xD;
in&#xD;
which they can&#xD;
be&#xD;
understood,&#xD;
is&#xD;
an&#xD;
historical&#xD;
reconstruction of&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
and&#xD;
Malay&#xD;
settlements along the&#xD;
Inderagiri&#xD;
river, the establishment of the&#xD;
kingdom&#xD;
of&#xD;
Inderagiri&#xD;
and&#xD;
its&#xD;
relationship with the&#xD;
Dutch&#xD;
and the Republic&#xD;
of&#xD;
Indonesia. In this&#xD;
history I&#xD;
re-describe&#xD;
both&#xD;
the well-documented&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
and the as-yet undocumented&#xD;
Talang Mamak, in terms of relationships&#xD;
between&#xD;
rulers and their&#xD;
debt-bondsmen&#xD;
subjects and show that&#xD;
forms&#xD;
of social organisation such as&#xD;
matrilineal&#xD;
inheritance, duolocal&#xD;
residence and&#xD;
bride-price&#xD;
were enforced,&#xD;
by&#xD;
rulers, upon&#xD;
their debt-bondsmen&#xD;
subjects as a means of maintaining and manipulating social&#xD;
inequalities.&#xD;
After the five life-histories, by&#xD;
way of a conclusion,&#xD;
I&#xD;
suggest that the&#xD;
`culture'&#xD;
of many&#xD;
isolated,&#xD;
non-Muslim groups on&#xD;
both&#xD;
sides of the Straits&#xD;
of&#xD;
Melaka, including Talang Mamak&#xD;
and&#xD;
Kubu in Sumatra,&#xD;
and&#xD;
Semai&#xD;
and&#xD;
Temuan in Malaysia,&#xD;
can&#xD;
be best&#xD;
understood&#xD;
in terms of&#xD;
their economic relationships with&#xD;
Malay&#xD;
and&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
rulers and recent changes to these&#xD;
ties introduced by&#xD;
modern nation-states.&#xD;
Using this perspective I&#xD;
reject the&#xD;
label `Proto-&#xD;
Malay'&#xD;
which&#xD;
has been&#xD;
customarily used to&#xD;
describe isolated&#xD;
non-Muslim populations&#xD;
in&#xD;
Sumatra,&#xD;
such as&#xD;
Talang Mamak,&#xD;
and&#xD;
in Malaysia,&#xD;
such as&#xD;
Semai, in terms of so-called ethnic&#xD;
characteristics.&#xD;
I&#xD;
propose that what these groups of people&#xD;
have in&#xD;
common&#xD;
is&#xD;
not an ascribed&#xD;
ethnicity&#xD;
but&#xD;
rather similar&#xD;
historical&#xD;
relationships with&#xD;
Muslim kingdoms&#xD;
who they served as&#xD;
debt-bondsmen.</summary>
    <dc:date>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Singleton, William</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this thesis&#xD;
I&#xD;
place&#xD;
detailed descriptions&#xD;
of&#xD;
Talang Mamak lives in&#xD;
an&#xD;
historically&#xD;
reconstructed context which&#xD;
focuses&#xD;
upon the Talang Mamak's&#xD;
status as&#xD;
debt-bondsmen&#xD;
of the&#xD;
Sultans&#xD;
of the&#xD;
kingdom&#xD;
of&#xD;
Inderagiri (1509-1963). Information&#xD;
about current&#xD;
Talang Mamak&#xD;
lives is&#xD;
presented&#xD;
in the&#xD;
form&#xD;
of&#xD;
five life-histories,&#xD;
or&#xD;
biographies, in&#xD;
which&#xD;
both local issues&#xD;
(development; deforestation; drought;&#xD;
crime; relationships with wider,&#xD;
Muslim,&#xD;
society;&#xD;
debt-&#xD;
management;&#xD;
)&#xD;
and&#xD;
local&#xD;
practices&#xD;
(leadership,&#xD;
rice-farming, rubber cultivation and tapping,&#xD;
cock-fighting, shamanism, marriage, etc) are&#xD;
described in terms of the&#xD;
biographical&#xD;
subjects'&#xD;
experiences of them. Preceding the&#xD;
life-histories&#xD;
and&#xD;
forming&#xD;
a context&#xD;
in&#xD;
which they can&#xD;
be&#xD;
understood,&#xD;
is&#xD;
an&#xD;
historical&#xD;
reconstruction of&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
and&#xD;
Malay&#xD;
settlements along the&#xD;
Inderagiri&#xD;
river, the establishment of the&#xD;
kingdom&#xD;
of&#xD;
Inderagiri&#xD;
and&#xD;
its&#xD;
relationship with the&#xD;
Dutch&#xD;
and the Republic&#xD;
of&#xD;
Indonesia. In this&#xD;
history I&#xD;
re-describe&#xD;
both&#xD;
the well-documented&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
and the as-yet undocumented&#xD;
Talang Mamak, in terms of relationships&#xD;
between&#xD;
rulers and their&#xD;
debt-bondsmen&#xD;
subjects and show that&#xD;
forms&#xD;
of social organisation such as&#xD;
matrilineal&#xD;
inheritance, duolocal&#xD;
residence and&#xD;
bride-price&#xD;
were enforced,&#xD;
by&#xD;
rulers, upon&#xD;
their debt-bondsmen&#xD;
subjects as a means of maintaining and manipulating social&#xD;
inequalities.&#xD;
After the five life-histories, by&#xD;
way of a conclusion,&#xD;
I&#xD;
suggest that the&#xD;
`culture'&#xD;
of many&#xD;
isolated,&#xD;
non-Muslim groups on&#xD;
both&#xD;
sides of the Straits&#xD;
of&#xD;
Melaka, including Talang Mamak&#xD;
and&#xD;
Kubu in Sumatra,&#xD;
and&#xD;
Semai&#xD;
and&#xD;
Temuan in Malaysia,&#xD;
can&#xD;
be best&#xD;
understood&#xD;
in terms of&#xD;
their economic relationships with&#xD;
Malay&#xD;
and&#xD;
Minangkabau&#xD;
rulers and recent changes to these&#xD;
ties introduced by&#xD;
modern nation-states.&#xD;
Using this perspective I&#xD;
reject the&#xD;
label `Proto-&#xD;
Malay'&#xD;
which&#xD;
has been&#xD;
customarily used to&#xD;
describe isolated&#xD;
non-Muslim populations&#xD;
in&#xD;
Sumatra,&#xD;
such as&#xD;
Talang Mamak,&#xD;
and&#xD;
in Malaysia,&#xD;
such as&#xD;
Semai, in terms of so-called ethnic&#xD;
characteristics.&#xD;
I&#xD;
propose that what these groups of people&#xD;
have in&#xD;
common&#xD;
is&#xD;
not an ascribed&#xD;
ethnicity&#xD;
but&#xD;
rather similar&#xD;
historical&#xD;
relationships with&#xD;
Muslim kingdoms&#xD;
who they served as&#xD;
debt-bondsmen.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Scottish Highlanders in colonial Georgia : the recruitment, emigration and settlement at Darien, 1735-1748</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2960" />
    <author>
      <name>Parker, Anthony W.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2960</id>
    <updated>2012-07-10T10:54:46Z</updated>
    <published>1996-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This&#xD;
volume&#xD;
is&#xD;
a study of&#xD;
the immigration&#xD;
of&#xD;
three individual&#xD;
groups&#xD;
of&#xD;
Scottish Highlanders&#xD;
as&#xD;
they&#xD;
ventured&#xD;
to the&#xD;
new colony of&#xD;
Georgia in&#xD;
British North America between the&#xD;
years&#xD;
1735&#xD;
and&#xD;
1748. It&#xD;
examines&#xD;
the&#xD;
importance&#xD;
of&#xD;
the area of&#xD;
the Altamaha River in&#xD;
which&#xD;
they settled and&#xD;
the conflicts along&#xD;
the&#xD;
southern&#xD;
frontier&#xD;
of&#xD;
British&#xD;
colonial&#xD;
America&#xD;
between the&#xD;
rival powers of&#xD;
Great Britain, Spain, France,&#xD;
and&#xD;
the Native&#xD;
American&#xD;
population.&#xD;
These&#xD;
struggles would necessitate&#xD;
the organised&#xD;
recruiting efforts made on&#xD;
the&#xD;
part of&#xD;
the Trustees for Establishing the&#xD;
Colony&#xD;
of&#xD;
Georgia in America to bring Highland Scots, in&#xD;
particular,&#xD;
to the&#xD;
province as&#xD;
their first line&#xD;
of&#xD;
defense.&#xD;
The focus&#xD;
of&#xD;
the text is&#xD;
on&#xD;
the Scots themselves as&#xD;
the&#xD;
changing&#xD;
conditions&#xD;
in the Highlands&#xD;
motivated&#xD;
them to leave their&#xD;
native glens of&#xD;
Scotland to&#xD;
come&#xD;
to the&#xD;
pine&#xD;
barrens&#xD;
of&#xD;
Georgia. The thesis&#xD;
explores&#xD;
the&#xD;
ability of&#xD;
these immigrants to face the challenges of a new environment&#xD;
and&#xD;
the trials&#xD;
of&#xD;
the frontier&#xD;
settlement at&#xD;
Darien. It is&#xD;
an account of&#xD;
how&#xD;
their cultural&#xD;
distinctiveness&#xD;
and&#xD;
"old&#xD;
world" experience aptly prepared&#xD;
them to adapt and to&#xD;
prosper&#xD;
in the&#xD;
new&#xD;
land&#xD;
and&#xD;
to&#xD;
play a vital role&#xD;
in&#xD;
the&#xD;
survival of colonial&#xD;
Georgia. The Highlanders&#xD;
of&#xD;
Scotland&#xD;
who settled&#xD;
at&#xD;
Darien during the first two decades&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
colony's existence&#xD;
have been&#xD;
relegated&#xD;
to the&#xD;
shadows of&#xD;
Georgia's&#xD;
colonial&#xD;
history for too long&#xD;
and&#xD;
this&#xD;
work&#xD;
hopes to establish&#xD;
their importance during this&#xD;
crucial period.</summary>
    <dc:date>1996-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Parker, Anthony W.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This&#xD;
volume&#xD;
is&#xD;
a study of&#xD;
the immigration&#xD;
of&#xD;
three individual&#xD;
groups&#xD;
of&#xD;
Scottish Highlanders&#xD;
as&#xD;
they&#xD;
ventured&#xD;
to the&#xD;
new colony of&#xD;
Georgia in&#xD;
British North America between the&#xD;
years&#xD;
1735&#xD;
and&#xD;
1748. It&#xD;
examines&#xD;
the&#xD;
importance&#xD;
of&#xD;
the area of&#xD;
the Altamaha River in&#xD;
which&#xD;
they settled and&#xD;
the conflicts along&#xD;
the&#xD;
southern&#xD;
frontier&#xD;
of&#xD;
British&#xD;
colonial&#xD;
America&#xD;
between the&#xD;
rival powers of&#xD;
Great Britain, Spain, France,&#xD;
and&#xD;
the Native&#xD;
American&#xD;
population.&#xD;
These&#xD;
struggles would necessitate&#xD;
the organised&#xD;
recruiting efforts made on&#xD;
the&#xD;
part of&#xD;
the Trustees for Establishing the&#xD;
Colony&#xD;
of&#xD;
Georgia in America to bring Highland Scots, in&#xD;
particular,&#xD;
to the&#xD;
province as&#xD;
their first line&#xD;
of&#xD;
defense.&#xD;
The focus&#xD;
of&#xD;
the text is&#xD;
on&#xD;
the Scots themselves as&#xD;
the&#xD;
changing&#xD;
conditions&#xD;
in the Highlands&#xD;
motivated&#xD;
them to leave their&#xD;
native glens of&#xD;
Scotland to&#xD;
come&#xD;
to the&#xD;
pine&#xD;
barrens&#xD;
of&#xD;
Georgia. The thesis&#xD;
explores&#xD;
the&#xD;
ability of&#xD;
these immigrants to face the challenges of a new environment&#xD;
and&#xD;
the trials&#xD;
of&#xD;
the frontier&#xD;
settlement at&#xD;
Darien. It is&#xD;
an account of&#xD;
how&#xD;
their cultural&#xD;
distinctiveness&#xD;
and&#xD;
"old&#xD;
world" experience aptly prepared&#xD;
them to adapt and to&#xD;
prosper&#xD;
in the&#xD;
new&#xD;
land&#xD;
and&#xD;
to&#xD;
play a vital role&#xD;
in&#xD;
the&#xD;
survival of colonial&#xD;
Georgia. The Highlanders&#xD;
of&#xD;
Scotland&#xD;
who settled&#xD;
at&#xD;
Darien during the first two decades&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
colony's existence&#xD;
have been&#xD;
relegated&#xD;
to the&#xD;
shadows of&#xD;
Georgia's&#xD;
colonial&#xD;
history for too long&#xD;
and&#xD;
this&#xD;
work&#xD;
hopes to establish&#xD;
their importance during this&#xD;
crucial period.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Acculturation and bilingualism in Guambía (Colombia)</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2955" />
    <author>
      <name>Long, Violet</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2955</id>
    <updated>2012-07-10T08:35:51Z</updated>
    <published>1980-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The objective of&#xD;
this study&#xD;
is to trace the&#xD;
relationship&#xD;
between&#xD;
oveit and covert acculturation and&#xD;
bilingualism in the Colombian Indian community of&#xD;
Guambia.&#xD;
The first section&#xD;
describes the ten indicators of&#xD;
innovative behaviour that form the Overt Acculturation&#xD;
Scale,&#xD;
on&#xD;
the basis&#xD;
of which&#xD;
the informants were allocated&#xD;
to three Acculturation Categories. These indicators,&#xD;
weighted according&#xD;
to their&#xD;
relative&#xD;
importance for the&#xD;
Guambianos, are:&#xD;
dress&#xD;
and&#xD;
language;&#xD;
occupation, migration&#xD;
and education; reciprocal&#xD;
labour,&#xD;
goods and&#xD;
the home,&#xD;
ritual&#xD;
and medicine, and access&#xD;
to the media.&#xD;
Acculturation has&#xD;
noticeably affected very&#xD;
few. These&#xD;
form&#xD;
an elite of well-educated young men who wear&#xD;
Western&#xD;
clothes,&#xD;
have specialised occupations and skills, and are&#xD;
well-acquainted with&#xD;
White culture and society&#xD;
through&#xD;
personal&#xD;
ties, migration and&#xD;
the&#xD;
media.&#xD;
All&#xD;
others are&#xD;
distributed along a continuum,&#xD;
taking&#xD;
more or&#xD;
less from the&#xD;
White World.&#xD;
Secondly, imaginative stories&#xD;
told in Guambiano and&#xD;
Spanish to&#xD;
a series of pictures&#xD;
by the informants&#xD;
were&#xD;
analysed&#xD;
for&#xD;
signs of covert acculturation.&#xD;
Six hypotheses&#xD;
were statistically&#xD;
tested&#xD;
which&#xD;
held that the&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
identity&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
characters portrayed, as&#xD;
Guambiano&#xD;
or&#xD;
White, would&#xD;
affect&#xD;
their&#xD;
personalities, actions, aims,&#xD;
interactions&#xD;
and emotions. Also, the&#xD;
acculturational level&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
story-&#xD;
teller&#xD;
and&#xD;
the language&#xD;
used would affect the&#xD;
content,&#xD;
except&#xD;
for&#xD;
emotion.&#xD;
In Guambiano&#xD;
all&#xD;
display similar beliefs in traditional&#xD;
values and a similar&#xD;
acculturated are&#xD;
fav&#xD;
achievement-oriented&#xD;
show ambivalence and&#xD;
people and culture.&#xD;
Thirdly, these&#xD;
ethnocentrism; in Spanish the highly&#xD;
curable&#xD;
to White&#xD;
characters and more&#xD;
and ambitious, the&#xD;
slightly acculturated&#xD;
the&#xD;
unacculturated defend their&#xD;
own&#xD;
same stories were used&#xD;
to investigate&#xD;
bilingual&#xD;
proficiency.&#xD;
The&#xD;
range of syntactic constructions&#xD;
used&#xD;
in the two languages, the&#xD;
range of vocabulary&#xD;
found in&#xD;
Spanish,&#xD;
and the levels&#xD;
of grammatical and&#xD;
lexical&#xD;
interference in both languages&#xD;
were used as measures of oral&#xD;
productive proficiency.&#xD;
The&#xD;
majority shows sufficient&#xD;
proficiency in Spanish for inter-group&#xD;
communication,&#xD;
but&#xD;
some&#xD;
few have&#xD;
only a passive&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
and others prove&#xD;
more fluent than in Guambiano&#xD;
on&#xD;
the test.&#xD;
The major conclusion&#xD;
is that the Guambianos'&#xD;
strong&#xD;
ethnic identity&#xD;
-&#xD;
symbolised&#xD;
in their dress, language, land&#xD;
and work -&#xD;
prevents greater acculturation. At&#xD;
present only&#xD;
the highly&#xD;
acculturated elite&#xD;
is innovative&#xD;
and&#xD;
bicultural,&#xD;
while&#xD;
the&#xD;
majority seeks&#xD;
to&#xD;
maintain&#xD;
its&#xD;
cultural&#xD;
heritage.&#xD;
It is&#xD;
economic interaction,&#xD;
not&#xD;
bilingualism, that&#xD;
will&#xD;
probably&#xD;
lead to&#xD;
eventual wholesale modification, since&#xD;
the&#xD;
Guambiano language&#xD;
remains strong&#xD;
but the&#xD;
economic situation&#xD;
grows ever worse.</summary>
    <dc:date>1980-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Long, Violet</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The objective of&#xD;
this study&#xD;
is to trace the&#xD;
relationship&#xD;
between&#xD;
oveit and covert acculturation and&#xD;
bilingualism in the Colombian Indian community of&#xD;
Guambia.&#xD;
The first section&#xD;
describes the ten indicators of&#xD;
innovative behaviour that form the Overt Acculturation&#xD;
Scale,&#xD;
on&#xD;
the basis&#xD;
of which&#xD;
the informants were allocated&#xD;
to three Acculturation Categories. These indicators,&#xD;
weighted according&#xD;
to their&#xD;
relative&#xD;
importance for the&#xD;
Guambianos, are:&#xD;
dress&#xD;
and&#xD;
language;&#xD;
occupation, migration&#xD;
and education; reciprocal&#xD;
labour,&#xD;
goods and&#xD;
the home,&#xD;
ritual&#xD;
and medicine, and access&#xD;
to the media.&#xD;
Acculturation has&#xD;
noticeably affected very&#xD;
few. These&#xD;
form&#xD;
an elite of well-educated young men who wear&#xD;
Western&#xD;
clothes,&#xD;
have specialised occupations and skills, and are&#xD;
well-acquainted with&#xD;
White culture and society&#xD;
through&#xD;
personal&#xD;
ties, migration and&#xD;
the&#xD;
media.&#xD;
All&#xD;
others are&#xD;
distributed along a continuum,&#xD;
taking&#xD;
more or&#xD;
less from the&#xD;
White World.&#xD;
Secondly, imaginative stories&#xD;
told in Guambiano and&#xD;
Spanish to&#xD;
a series of pictures&#xD;
by the informants&#xD;
were&#xD;
analysed&#xD;
for&#xD;
signs of covert acculturation.&#xD;
Six hypotheses&#xD;
were statistically&#xD;
tested&#xD;
which&#xD;
held that the&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
identity&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
characters portrayed, as&#xD;
Guambiano&#xD;
or&#xD;
White, would&#xD;
affect&#xD;
their&#xD;
personalities, actions, aims,&#xD;
interactions&#xD;
and emotions. Also, the&#xD;
acculturational level&#xD;
of&#xD;
the&#xD;
story-&#xD;
teller&#xD;
and&#xD;
the language&#xD;
used would affect the&#xD;
content,&#xD;
except&#xD;
for&#xD;
emotion.&#xD;
In Guambiano&#xD;
all&#xD;
display similar beliefs in traditional&#xD;
values and a similar&#xD;
acculturated are&#xD;
fav&#xD;
achievement-oriented&#xD;
show ambivalence and&#xD;
people and culture.&#xD;
Thirdly, these&#xD;
ethnocentrism; in Spanish the highly&#xD;
curable&#xD;
to White&#xD;
characters and more&#xD;
and ambitious, the&#xD;
slightly acculturated&#xD;
the&#xD;
unacculturated defend their&#xD;
own&#xD;
same stories were used&#xD;
to investigate&#xD;
bilingual&#xD;
proficiency.&#xD;
The&#xD;
range of syntactic constructions&#xD;
used&#xD;
in the two languages, the&#xD;
range of vocabulary&#xD;
found in&#xD;
Spanish,&#xD;
and the levels&#xD;
of grammatical and&#xD;
lexical&#xD;
interference in both languages&#xD;
were used as measures of oral&#xD;
productive proficiency.&#xD;
The&#xD;
majority shows sufficient&#xD;
proficiency in Spanish for inter-group&#xD;
communication,&#xD;
but&#xD;
some&#xD;
few have&#xD;
only a passive&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
and others prove&#xD;
more fluent than in Guambiano&#xD;
on&#xD;
the test.&#xD;
The major conclusion&#xD;
is that the Guambianos'&#xD;
strong&#xD;
ethnic identity&#xD;
-&#xD;
symbolised&#xD;
in their dress, language, land&#xD;
and work -&#xD;
prevents greater acculturation. At&#xD;
present only&#xD;
the highly&#xD;
acculturated elite&#xD;
is innovative&#xD;
and&#xD;
bicultural,&#xD;
while&#xD;
the&#xD;
majority seeks&#xD;
to&#xD;
maintain&#xD;
its&#xD;
cultural&#xD;
heritage.&#xD;
It is&#xD;
economic interaction,&#xD;
not&#xD;
bilingualism, that&#xD;
will&#xD;
probably&#xD;
lead to&#xD;
eventual wholesale modification, since&#xD;
the&#xD;
Guambiano language&#xD;
remains strong&#xD;
but the&#xD;
economic situation&#xD;
grows ever worse.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The role of the imagination in Hume's science of man</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2940" />
    <author>
      <name>Bernard, Christopher</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2940</id>
    <updated>2012-07-09T08:30:26Z</updated>
    <published>1990-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on&#xD;
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,&#xD;
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I&#xD;
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his&#xD;
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better&#xD;
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on&#xD;
the imagination.&#xD;
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's&#xD;
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.&#xD;
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is&#xD;
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst&#xD;
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He&#xD;
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of&#xD;
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from&#xD;
the claims of poets.&#xD;
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the&#xD;
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.&#xD;
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in&#xD;
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and&#xD;
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events&#xD;
in the History of England.&#xD;
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from&#xD;
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume&#xD;
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,&#xD;
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception&#xD;
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out&#xD;
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles&#xD;
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt&#xD;
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining&#xD;
of the false view.</summary>
    <dc:date>1990-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Bernard, Christopher</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In recent years there has been an explosion of writing on&#xD;
David Hume. His scepticism, his writings on morality, politics,&#xD;
and religion, have all received substantial attention. What I&#xD;
attempt to do in this thesis is to suggest that his&#xD;
revolutionary contributions in all these fields can be better&#xD;
understood if we consider his attempt to found the sciences on&#xD;
the imagination.&#xD;
What little work there is on the imagination in Hume's&#xD;
writings is almost all concerned with Book I of the Treatise.&#xD;
As regards Book I, I suggest that Hume's overarching problem is&#xD;
to argue that belief is dependent on the imagination, whilst&#xD;
still keeping a contrast with the whims of the 'fancy'. He&#xD;
wants to disabuse us of the idea that we believe on account of&#xD;
reason; but he wants to distinguish the claims of science from&#xD;
the claims of poets.&#xD;
But I also examine why he thinks his explanation of the&#xD;
production of passions support his conclusions about belief.&#xD;
And I argue that his former account guides conclusions found in&#xD;
other genres. So for example, I examine certain essays and&#xD;
letters about politics, and his explanation of religious events&#xD;
in the History of England.&#xD;
Why do men falsely believe that they are distinguished from&#xD;
the animals through possessing reason? On the one hand Hume&#xD;
tries to explain the origin of the sciences; on the other hand,&#xD;
he tries to show how men have come to have a false conception&#xD;
of themselves. A central aim of the thesis is to bring out&#xD;
these themes through showing the use Hume makes of principles&#xD;
of the imagination. I pay special attention to Hume's attempt&#xD;
to argue that Christianity plays a major role in the sustaining&#xD;
of the false view.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Freud's concept of the unconscious</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2934" />
    <author>
      <name>Lewczuk, Zinaida</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2934</id>
    <updated>2012-07-06T12:56:07Z</updated>
    <published>1983-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>1983-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lewczuk, Zinaida</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Phonology of San Martin Quechua</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2895" />
    <author>
      <name>Howkins, Douglas William</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2895</id>
    <updated>2012-07-23T08:40:59Z</updated>
    <published>1972-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: While the present work is far from being a definitive one,&#xD;
it does aim at providing a fairly complete phonology of San&#xD;
Martin Quechua. The author has tried to give a satisfactory account&#xD;
of the descriptive problems and their possible solutions for the&#xD;
dialect. The theoretical principles used to solve the problems&#xD;
are explained, the notions of the theory are defined, and their&#xD;
application to the data is outlined in every case, and explained&#xD;
in some detail in many cases as well.&#xD;
This work is unusual among works on Quechua as regards the&#xD;
space it devotes to explaining and solving problems in the description.&#xD;
Existing descriptions of Quechua may be characterised as&#xD;
supposedly problem-less descriptions. The present work treats&#xD;
Phonology, not as a subsidiary to grammar but as a universe in&#xD;
its own right, with its own problems and solutions. The European&#xD;
background of the work, and the 'axiomatic' approach of Mulder,&#xD;
have undoubtedly contributed in, great measure to the nature of this&#xD;
description, and to what some might call its 'preoccupation' with&#xD;
problems. Without wishing to tag derogatory labels on Bloomfieldian&#xD;
linguistics (enough writers have done so already). I have written&#xD;
the present work as a possible answer to what I believe to be an&#xD;
inadmissable ‘gap’ in Quechua linguistic description as it stands&#xD;
the lack of a rigorous autonomous phonology, which attempts to&#xD;
recognise, state and solve descriptive problems. It is to be hoped&#xD;
that the present work provides a beginning for a fully-fledged&#xD;
discipline of Quechua phonology. [Taken from the forward not from the abstract].</summary>
    <dc:date>1972-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Howkins, Douglas William</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>While the present work is far from being a definitive one,&#xD;
it does aim at providing a fairly complete phonology of San&#xD;
Martin Quechua. The author has tried to give a satisfactory account&#xD;
of the descriptive problems and their possible solutions for the&#xD;
dialect. The theoretical principles used to solve the problems&#xD;
are explained, the notions of the theory are defined, and their&#xD;
application to the data is outlined in every case, and explained&#xD;
in some detail in many cases as well.&#xD;
This work is unusual among works on Quechua as regards the&#xD;
space it devotes to explaining and solving problems in the description.&#xD;
Existing descriptions of Quechua may be characterised as&#xD;
supposedly problem-less descriptions. The present work treats&#xD;
Phonology, not as a subsidiary to grammar but as a universe in&#xD;
its own right, with its own problems and solutions. The European&#xD;
background of the work, and the 'axiomatic' approach of Mulder,&#xD;
have undoubtedly contributed in, great measure to the nature of this&#xD;
description, and to what some might call its 'preoccupation' with&#xD;
problems. Without wishing to tag derogatory labels on Bloomfieldian&#xD;
linguistics (enough writers have done so already). I have written&#xD;
the present work as a possible answer to what I believe to be an&#xD;
inadmissable ‘gap’ in Quechua linguistic description as it stands&#xD;
the lack of a rigorous autonomous phonology, which attempts to&#xD;
recognise, state and solve descriptive problems. It is to be hoped&#xD;
that the present work provides a beginning for a fully-fledged&#xD;
discipline of Quechua phonology. [Taken from the forward not from the abstract].</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Archaeology of Trobriand knowledge: Foucault in the Trobriand Islands</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2844" />
    <author>
      <name>Slattery, David P.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2844</id>
    <updated>2012-06-22T15:44:40Z</updated>
    <published>1992-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis holds that the application of the archaeological&#xD;
method, developed by the French philosopher Michel&#xD;
Foucault, to the field of anthropology reveals a hitherto&#xD;
hidden primitive episteme. Such a project represents a&#xD;
rejection of a search for a fundamental Truth, available&#xD;
through the traditional figures of rationality, either&#xD;
vertically in history or horizontally across cultures. The&#xD;
form of reason posited by this project does not have a&#xD;
constant and universal occurrence but is given in the discontinuous&#xD;
figures of the episteme. The quest for a single&#xD;
manifestation of the conditions of validity in reason is&#xD;
replaced by a study of the conditions of possibility of the&#xD;
truths, discourses and institutions of a primitive peoples.&#xD;
The conditions of possibility for the emergence of the&#xD;
elements of primitive knowledge and practices are available&#xD;
through the application of the explanatory unities of the&#xD;
archaeological method. These unities replace the traditional&#xD;
explanatory role of the subject, with all of its psychological&#xD;
baggage, which has a central role in modern theories of&#xD;
rationality. The subject-knowledge link that dominates&#xD;
traditional anthropological analyses is replaced by a powerknowledge&#xD;
link that postulates the two axes of discursive&#xD;
and non-discursive concerns. The discursive axis is concerned&#xD;
with the objects, concepts, statements and discursive&#xD;
formations of primitive knowledge while the non-discursive&#xD;
axis is concerned with the systems of power that propagate&#xD;
and sustain those discourses. These two axes constitute the&#xD;
nature of the archaeology employed in this study.&#xD;
This thesis is sustained by both negative and positive&#xD;
evidence. The negative evidence takes the form of an antisubjectivist&#xD;
thrust where the subject-dependent explanatory&#xD;
unities of the tradition are replaced by the positivistic&#xD;
elements of archaeology. The positive evidence primarily&#xD;
takes the form of a detailed analysis of the presence of the&#xD;
guiding codes of the episteme amongst the Trobriand Islanders&#xD;
that give rise to their primitive knowledge and practices.&#xD;
In this area, I make extensive use of Malinowski's&#xD;
ethnographic observations for their breath of detail and&#xD;
application without employing his subject-dependent psychobiological&#xD;
conclusions. Further, I am proposing a transformative&#xD;
position such that orality becomes a feature of the&#xD;
episteme rather than its condition of possibility.&#xD;
The guiding codes of the Trobriand episteme take the&#xD;
form of enclosed oppositional figures that are everywhere&#xD;
related to space. The Trobriand episteme provides the conditions&#xD;
for the emergence of primitive discourses and orders&#xD;
the experiences of the Trobrianders. The guiding figures of&#xD;
the episteme are based in a form of complementary opposition,&#xD;
causation as vitality and a dogma of topological space&#xD;
that give rise to primitive knowledge which is a form of&#xD;
divination. A significant part of this dissertation is taken&#xD;
up with an examination of the detail and limitation of these&#xD;
figures where ideas from Levy-Bruhl, Hallpike, and others&#xD;
are employed to produce the most appropriate configuration&#xD;
for my project. A particular form of language as the manipulation&#xD;
of real signs, rather than ideational signs, has its&#xD;
possibility in this configuration which has consequences for&#xD;
the type of knowledge produced. The form of knowledge appropriate&#xD;
to the presence of such a model of language is magic.&#xD;
Writing has no possibility for emerging in this episteme&#xD;
and, therefore, there are significant consequences for the&#xD;
type of knowledge that can be maintained and propagated in a&#xD;
context which must utilise static tradition to the detriment&#xD;
of reflection.&#xD;
An archaeological analysis of the Trobriand Islanders,&#xD;
focusing on discourses on sex and marriage, the nature of&#xD;
tabooed sexual acts, economic relations arising out of&#xD;
marriage and the role of the polygamous chief, the nature of&#xD;
love-magic and magic in general, reveals a shared possibility&#xD;
for all of these discursive realms in the figures of the&#xD;
episteme. These discourses are regulated by the presence of&#xD;
a fundamental opposition between a brother and his sister.&#xD;
This opposition forms the motif for primitive problematizations&#xD;
and constitutes a vulnerable boundary which is the&#xD;
appropriate focus of taboos relating to sex and food,&#xD;
amongst others.&#xD;
This primitive episteme characterises the unity of the&#xD;
experiences of the Trobrianders. This experience is discontinuous&#xD;
with our own and does not involve a role for the&#xD;
individual ego. This project represents a worthwhile contribution&#xD;
to an understanding of human experience and knowledge&#xD;
in general which does not seek to reduce the natural diversity&#xD;
of man to just the monotonous experience of modern man.&#xD;
In conclusion, I tentatively speculate about the appropriateness&#xD;
of the Trobriand figures for primitive experience in&#xD;
general.</summary>
    <dc:date>1992-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Slattery, David P.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis holds that the application of the archaeological&#xD;
method, developed by the French philosopher Michel&#xD;
Foucault, to the field of anthropology reveals a hitherto&#xD;
hidden primitive episteme. Such a project represents a&#xD;
rejection of a search for a fundamental Truth, available&#xD;
through the traditional figures of rationality, either&#xD;
vertically in history or horizontally across cultures. The&#xD;
form of reason posited by this project does not have a&#xD;
constant and universal occurrence but is given in the discontinuous&#xD;
figures of the episteme. The quest for a single&#xD;
manifestation of the conditions of validity in reason is&#xD;
replaced by a study of the conditions of possibility of the&#xD;
truths, discourses and institutions of a primitive peoples.&#xD;
The conditions of possibility for the emergence of the&#xD;
elements of primitive knowledge and practices are available&#xD;
through the application of the explanatory unities of the&#xD;
archaeological method. These unities replace the traditional&#xD;
explanatory role of the subject, with all of its psychological&#xD;
baggage, which has a central role in modern theories of&#xD;
rationality. The subject-knowledge link that dominates&#xD;
traditional anthropological analyses is replaced by a powerknowledge&#xD;
link that postulates the two axes of discursive&#xD;
and non-discursive concerns. The discursive axis is concerned&#xD;
with the objects, concepts, statements and discursive&#xD;
formations of primitive knowledge while the non-discursive&#xD;
axis is concerned with the systems of power that propagate&#xD;
and sustain those discourses. These two axes constitute the&#xD;
nature of the archaeology employed in this study.&#xD;
This thesis is sustained by both negative and positive&#xD;
evidence. The negative evidence takes the form of an antisubjectivist&#xD;
thrust where the subject-dependent explanatory&#xD;
unities of the tradition are replaced by the positivistic&#xD;
elements of archaeology. The positive evidence primarily&#xD;
takes the form of a detailed analysis of the presence of the&#xD;
guiding codes of the episteme amongst the Trobriand Islanders&#xD;
that give rise to their primitive knowledge and practices.&#xD;
In this area, I make extensive use of Malinowski's&#xD;
ethnographic observations for their breath of detail and&#xD;
application without employing his subject-dependent psychobiological&#xD;
conclusions. Further, I am proposing a transformative&#xD;
position such that orality becomes a feature of the&#xD;
episteme rather than its condition of possibility.&#xD;
The guiding codes of the Trobriand episteme take the&#xD;
form of enclosed oppositional figures that are everywhere&#xD;
related to space. The Trobriand episteme provides the conditions&#xD;
for the emergence of primitive discourses and orders&#xD;
the experiences of the Trobrianders. The guiding figures of&#xD;
the episteme are based in a form of complementary opposition,&#xD;
causation as vitality and a dogma of topological space&#xD;
that give rise to primitive knowledge which is a form of&#xD;
divination. A significant part of this dissertation is taken&#xD;
up with an examination of the detail and limitation of these&#xD;
figures where ideas from Levy-Bruhl, Hallpike, and others&#xD;
are employed to produce the most appropriate configuration&#xD;
for my project. A particular form of language as the manipulation&#xD;
of real signs, rather than ideational signs, has its&#xD;
possibility in this configuration which has consequences for&#xD;
the type of knowledge produced. The form of knowledge appropriate&#xD;
to the presence of such a model of language is magic.&#xD;
Writing has no possibility for emerging in this episteme&#xD;
and, therefore, there are significant consequences for the&#xD;
type of knowledge that can be maintained and propagated in a&#xD;
context which must utilise static tradition to the detriment&#xD;
of reflection.&#xD;
An archaeological analysis of the Trobriand Islanders,&#xD;
focusing on discourses on sex and marriage, the nature of&#xD;
tabooed sexual acts, economic relations arising out of&#xD;
marriage and the role of the polygamous chief, the nature of&#xD;
love-magic and magic in general, reveals a shared possibility&#xD;
for all of these discursive realms in the figures of the&#xD;
episteme. These discourses are regulated by the presence of&#xD;
a fundamental opposition between a brother and his sister.&#xD;
This opposition forms the motif for primitive problematizations&#xD;
and constitutes a vulnerable boundary which is the&#xD;
appropriate focus of taboos relating to sex and food,&#xD;
amongst others.&#xD;
This primitive episteme characterises the unity of the&#xD;
experiences of the Trobrianders. This experience is discontinuous&#xD;
with our own and does not involve a role for the&#xD;
individual ego. This project represents a worthwhile contribution&#xD;
to an understanding of human experience and knowledge&#xD;
in general which does not seek to reduce the natural diversity&#xD;
of man to just the monotonous experience of modern man.&#xD;
In conclusion, I tentatively speculate about the appropriateness&#xD;
of the Trobriand figures for primitive experience in&#xD;
general.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>At home in national parks : a study of power, knowledge and discourse in Banff National Park and Cairngorms National Park</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2819" />
    <author>
      <name>Rettie, Kathleen</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2819</id>
    <updated>2012-06-20T10:41:31Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: National Parks bear greater implications than simply preserving or conserving pockets&#xD;
of&#xD;
landscape. They&#xD;
evoke values of conservation versus development, livelihood&#xD;
economics, environmental stewardship and personal enrichment; they fulfil&#xD;
positions&#xD;
in&#xD;
relation to the national and the international&#xD;
stage.&#xD;
Social&#xD;
characteristics are&#xD;
revealed though this comparative study of&#xD;
Banff National Park&#xD;
and the Cairngorms&#xD;
National Park. Perceptions of space, place and boundaries crucially&#xD;
imply different&#xD;
meanings to the people&#xD;
living inside the national park&#xD;
boundaries&#xD;
and those living&#xD;
outside the boundaries. 'Insiders'&#xD;
are&#xD;
long-term&#xD;
permanent residents&#xD;
for&#xD;
whom&#xD;
being&#xD;
in the park&#xD;
is&#xD;
a practical activity;&#xD;
'outsiders' include&#xD;
scientists, conservationists,&#xD;
bureaucrats,&#xD;
and tourists, who take various&#xD;
ideological&#xD;
positions regarding the park's&#xD;
purpose.&#xD;
Both&#xD;
sides take a serious&#xD;
interest in the park and&#xD;
how it is&#xD;
managed and&#xD;
regard&#xD;
it&#xD;
as a place where they are&#xD;
'at home'. Groups&#xD;
within these spaces considers&#xD;
their values and rights superior to others and conflict often arises.&#xD;
Non-violent&#xD;
means&#xD;
of gaining power as theorized by Foucault&#xD;
and&#xD;
Bourdieu,&#xD;
employing&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
and&#xD;
discourse,&#xD;
are&#xD;
highly&#xD;
suggestive&#xD;
in the study of national parks.&#xD;
Discourse&#xD;
of nature&#xD;
is&#xD;
strategically significant as&#xD;
it influences&#xD;
purpose and policy that drive&#xD;
government's&#xD;
decisions&#xD;
on&#xD;
how the park will&#xD;
be&#xD;
managed - in&#xD;
this way&#xD;
discourse&#xD;
shapes the culture&#xD;
of&#xD;
how&#xD;
we use nature.&#xD;
Knowledge,&#xD;
as symbolic capital and as the basis for truth,&#xD;
sparks&#xD;
divisiveness - in&#xD;
particular scientific&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
versus experiential&#xD;
knowledge.&#xD;
Changes to the exclusive&#xD;
North American&#xD;
model, such as those instituted in the&#xD;
Caimgorms,&#xD;
mark the increased&#xD;
social utility and&#xD;
inclusive&#xD;
nature of national parks.&#xD;
The&#xD;
challenge remains&#xD;
for&#xD;
park managers to reconcile values connected with&#xD;
nationalism and environmental ethics with values connected with&#xD;
local livelihoods.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Rettie, Kathleen</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>National Parks bear greater implications than simply preserving or conserving pockets&#xD;
of&#xD;
landscape. They&#xD;
evoke values of conservation versus development, livelihood&#xD;
economics, environmental stewardship and personal enrichment; they fulfil&#xD;
positions&#xD;
in&#xD;
relation to the national and the international&#xD;
stage.&#xD;
Social&#xD;
characteristics are&#xD;
revealed though this comparative study of&#xD;
Banff National Park&#xD;
and the Cairngorms&#xD;
National Park. Perceptions of space, place and boundaries crucially&#xD;
imply different&#xD;
meanings to the people&#xD;
living inside the national park&#xD;
boundaries&#xD;
and those living&#xD;
outside the boundaries. 'Insiders'&#xD;
are&#xD;
long-term&#xD;
permanent residents&#xD;
for&#xD;
whom&#xD;
being&#xD;
in the park&#xD;
is&#xD;
a practical activity;&#xD;
'outsiders' include&#xD;
scientists, conservationists,&#xD;
bureaucrats,&#xD;
and tourists, who take various&#xD;
ideological&#xD;
positions regarding the park's&#xD;
purpose.&#xD;
Both&#xD;
sides take a serious&#xD;
interest in the park and&#xD;
how it is&#xD;
managed and&#xD;
regard&#xD;
it&#xD;
as a place where they are&#xD;
'at home'. Groups&#xD;
within these spaces considers&#xD;
their values and rights superior to others and conflict often arises.&#xD;
Non-violent&#xD;
means&#xD;
of gaining power as theorized by Foucault&#xD;
and&#xD;
Bourdieu,&#xD;
employing&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
and&#xD;
discourse,&#xD;
are&#xD;
highly&#xD;
suggestive&#xD;
in the study of national parks.&#xD;
Discourse&#xD;
of nature&#xD;
is&#xD;
strategically significant as&#xD;
it influences&#xD;
purpose and policy that drive&#xD;
government's&#xD;
decisions&#xD;
on&#xD;
how the park will&#xD;
be&#xD;
managed - in&#xD;
this way&#xD;
discourse&#xD;
shapes the culture&#xD;
of&#xD;
how&#xD;
we use nature.&#xD;
Knowledge,&#xD;
as symbolic capital and as the basis for truth,&#xD;
sparks&#xD;
divisiveness - in&#xD;
particular scientific&#xD;
knowledge&#xD;
versus experiential&#xD;
knowledge.&#xD;
Changes to the exclusive&#xD;
North American&#xD;
model, such as those instituted in the&#xD;
Caimgorms,&#xD;
mark the increased&#xD;
social utility and&#xD;
inclusive&#xD;
nature of national parks.&#xD;
The&#xD;
challenge remains&#xD;
for&#xD;
park managers to reconcile values connected with&#xD;
nationalism and environmental ethics with values connected with&#xD;
local livelihoods.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Freedom as a moral concept</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2814" />
    <author>
      <name>Kristjansson, Kristjan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2814</id>
    <updated>2012-06-20T08:55:49Z</updated>
    <published>1990-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the&#xD;
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically&#xD;
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes&#xD;
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a&#xD;
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to&#xD;
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not&#xD;
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains&#xD;
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or&#xD;
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes&#xD;
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This&#xD;
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,&#xD;
in the given context, to ask A for a justification&#xD;
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.&#xD;
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,&#xD;
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain&#xD;
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is&#xD;
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;&#xD;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.&#xD;
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person&#xD;
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,&#xD;
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts&#xD;
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,&#xD;
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions&#xD;
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential&#xD;
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,&#xD;
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an&#xD;
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and&#xD;
critical but non-relative.</summary>
    <dc:date>1990-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kristjansson, Kristjan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis constitutes a conceptual inquiry into the&#xD;
nature of social freedom, which is held to be logically&#xD;
distinct from other freedom-concepts although it presupposes&#xD;
free-will/autarchy. The thesis argues for a&#xD;
'responsibility view' of negative freedom according to&#xD;
which an agent B is socially free to do x iff he is not&#xD;
constrained by another agent A from doing x. A constrains&#xD;
B when A can be held morally responsible for imposing or&#xD;
not removing a real obstacle to choice/action that impedes&#xD;
(to a greater or a lesser extent) B's doing x. This&#xD;
responsibility condition is satisfied when it is appropriate,&#xD;
in the given context, to ask A for a justification&#xD;
of his act/omission. Social freedom is a relational concept.&#xD;
Its irreflexive nature implies that internal bars,&#xD;
for which no other agent is responsible, cannot constrain&#xD;
our own freedom. Moreover, it is argued that autonomy is&#xD;
not a necessary condition of particular cases of freedom;&#xD;
nor is freedom in general a necessary condition of autonomy.&#xD;
Accounts of positive liberty assume that a) a person&#xD;
can constrain his own freedom; b) freedom is an exercise-,&#xD;
not an opportunity-concept. Hence, they are not accounts&#xD;
of social freedom but uphold other, logically distinct,&#xD;
values. The last part of the thesis deals with questions&#xD;
of method. It is argued that the widely held essential&#xD;
contestability thesis is either circular or paradoxical,&#xD;
and that it is methodologically possible to construct an&#xD;
authoritative definition of freedom which is normative and&#xD;
critical but non-relative.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The self and self-conciousness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2704" />
    <author>
      <name>Hamilton, Andrew J.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2704</id>
    <updated>2012-06-08T14:30:24Z</updated>
    <published>1988-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of&#xD;
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.&#xD;
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the&#xD;
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a&#xD;
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a&#xD;
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal&#xD;
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine&#xD;
assertions.&#xD;
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.&#xD;
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the&#xD;
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein&#xD;
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in&#xD;
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the&#xD;
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent&#xD;
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as&#xD;
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.&#xD;
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which&#xD;
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error&#xD;
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,&#xD;
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and&#xD;
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for&#xD;
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.&#xD;
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism&#xD;
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,&#xD;
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really&#xD;
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.&#xD;
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the&#xD;
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the&#xD;
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion&#xD;
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the&#xD;
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in&#xD;
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can&#xD;
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority&#xD;
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-&#xD;
cognitive thesis.&#xD;
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of&#xD;
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on&#xD;
the concept itself.</summary>
    <dc:date>1988-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hamilton, Andrew J.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>It is the aim of this thesis to consider two accounts of&#xD;
1st-person utterances that are often mistakenly conflated - viz.&#xD;
that involving the 'no-reference' view of "I", and that of the&#xD;
non-assertoric thesis of avowals. The first account says that in a&#xD;
large range of (roughly) 'psychological' uses, 'I' is not a&#xD;
referring expression; the second, that avowals of 1st-personal&#xD;
'immediate' experience are primarily 'expressive' and not genuine&#xD;
assertions.&#xD;
The two views are expressions of what I term 'Trojanism'.&#xD;
This viewpoint constitutes one side of a 'Homeric Opposition in the&#xD;
Metaphysics of Experience', and has been endorsed by Wittgenstein&#xD;
throughout his writings; it has received recent expression in&#xD;
Professor Anscombe's article 'The First Person'. I explore the&#xD;
ideas of these writers in some depth, and consider to what extent&#xD;
they stand up to criticism by such notable 'Greek' contenders as&#xD;
P.F. Strawson and Gareth Evans.&#xD;
I first give neutral accounts of the key-concepts on which&#xD;
subsequent arguments are based. These are the immunity to error&#xD;
through misidentification (IEM) of certain 1st-person utterances,&#xD;
the guaranteed reference of 'I', avowal, and the Generality Constraint. I consider the close relation of Trojanism to solipsism and&#xD;
behaviourism, and then assess the effectiveness of two arguments for&#xD;
that viewpoint - Anscombe's Tank Argument and the argument from IEM.&#xD;
Though each is appealing, neither is decisive; to assess Trojanism&#xD;
properly we need to look at the non-assertoric thesis of avowals,&#xD;
which alone affords the prospect of a resolution of the really&#xD;
intractable problems of the self generated by Cartesianism.&#xD;
In the course of the latter assessment I consider the&#xD;
different varieties of avowal, broadening the discussion beyond the&#xD;
over-used example 'I am in pain'. I explore Wittgenstein's notion&#xD;
of 'expression', and discuss how this notion may help to explain the&#xD;
authority a subject possesses on his mental states as expressed in&#xD;
avowals. My conclusion is that an expressive account of avowals can&#xD;
provide a satisfactory counter to the Cartesian account of authority&#xD;
without our needing recourse to a non-assertoric or even to a non-&#xD;
cognitive thesis.&#xD;
Discussion of self-consciousness is implicit in discussion of&#xD;
the Homeric Opposition, but there is in addition a short chapter on&#xD;
the concept itself.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Poincaré's philosophy of mathematics</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2703" />
    <author>
      <name>Folina, Janet</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2703</id>
    <updated>2012-10-23T12:55:20Z</updated>
    <published>1986-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate&#xD;
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of&#xD;
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is&#xD;
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's&#xD;
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist&#xD;
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains&#xD;
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.&#xD;
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on&#xD;
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.&#xD;
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the&#xD;
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.&#xD;
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the&#xD;
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of&#xD;
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory&#xD;
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his&#xD;
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an&#xD;
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that&#xD;
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to&#xD;
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides&#xD;
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in&#xD;
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's&#xD;
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori&#xD;
intuitions, and which describes a position in between&#xD;
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism&#xD;
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be&#xD;
true.</summary>
    <dc:date>1986-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Folina, Janet</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The primary concern of this thesis is to investigate&#xD;
the explicit philosophy of mathematics in the work of&#xD;
Henri Poincare. In particular, I argue that there is&#xD;
a well-founded doctrine which grounds both Poincare's&#xD;
negative thesis, which is based on constructivist&#xD;
sentiments, and his positive thesis, via which he retains&#xD;
a classical conception of the mathematical continuum.&#xD;
The doctrine which does so is one which is founded on&#xD;
the Kantian theory of synthetic a priori intuition.&#xD;
I begin, therefore, by outlining Kant's theory of the&#xD;
synthetic a priori, especially as it applies to mathematics.&#xD;
Then, in the main body of the thesis, I explain how the&#xD;
various central aspects of Poincare's philosophy of&#xD;
mathematics - e.g. his theory of induction; his theory&#xD;
of the continuum; his views on impredicativiti his&#xD;
theory of meaning - must, in general, be seen as an&#xD;
adaptation of Kant's position. My conclusion is that&#xD;
not only is there a well-founded philosophical core to&#xD;
Poincare's philosophy, but also that such a core provides&#xD;
a viable alternative in contemporary debates in&#xD;
the philosophy of mathematics. That is, Poincare's&#xD;
theory, which is secured by his doctrine of a priori&#xD;
intuitions, and which describes a position in between&#xD;
the two extremes of an "anti-realist" strict constructivism&#xD;
and a "realist" axiomatic set theory, may indeed be&#xD;
true.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Equality, priority, and aggregation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2690" />
    <author>
      <name>Hirose, Iwao</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2690</id>
    <updated>2012-06-08T11:24:47Z</updated>
    <published>2004-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:&#xD;
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend&#xD;
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although&#xD;
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling&#xD;
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is&#xD;
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse&#xD;
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the&#xD;
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes&#xD;
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of&#xD;
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:&#xD;
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects&#xD;
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such&#xD;
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the&#xD;
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the&#xD;
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This&#xD;
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is&#xD;
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism&#xD;
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor&#xD;
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently&#xD;
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be&#xD;
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support&#xD;
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the&#xD;
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than&#xD;
Prioritarianism.</summary>
    <dc:date>2004-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hirose, Iwao</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this dissertation, I discuss two distributive principles in moral philosophy:&#xD;
Derek Parfit's Prioritarianism and Egalitarianism. I attempt to defend&#xD;
a version of Egalitarianism, which I call Weighted Egalitarianism. Although&#xD;
Parfit claims that Egalitarianism is subject to what he calls the Levelling&#xD;
Down Objection, I show (a) that my proposed Weighted Egalitarianism is&#xD;
not subject to the Objection, and (b) that it gives priority to the worse&#xD;
off people. The real difference between the two principles lies in how the&#xD;
weight of each person's well-being is determined. Prioritarianism assumes&#xD;
that there is a moral scale of the goodness of well-being, independently of&#xD;
distributions of people's well-being. I raise two objections to this claim:&#xD;
firstly, it is hard to believe that the choice of the level of well-being affects&#xD;
our distributive judgement; secondly, it is hard to believe that there is such&#xD;
a moral scale independently of distributions of people's well-being. On the&#xD;
other hand, Weighted Egalitarianism claims that the weight is given by the&#xD;
rank order position of the person in the ranking by well-being level. This&#xD;
means that, in Weighted Egalitarianism, the goodness of a distribution is&#xD;
an increasing, linear function of people's well-being. Weighted Egalitarianism&#xD;
is not affected by the choice of the level of people's well-being. Nor&#xD;
does it require require the moral scale of the goodness of well-being independently&#xD;
of distributions of people's well-being. Leximin, which might be&#xD;
a version of Prioritarianism, avoids my objections. But it is hard to support&#xD;
Leximin, because it rules out the trade off between the better off and the&#xD;
worse off. I conclude that Weighted Egalitarianism is more acceptable than&#xD;
Prioritarianism.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The Rainbow Family : an ethnography of spiritual postmodernism</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2679" />
    <author>
      <name>Berger, Adam</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2679</id>
    <updated>2012-06-08T08:37:57Z</updated>
    <published>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The Rainbow Family of Living Light is an intentional society devoted to&#xD;
achieving world peace through spiritual healing. A loose association of spiritual&#xD;
seekers that explicitly rejects all forms of leadership and imposed authority, it&#xD;
represents an interesting example of an anarchist and communal society.&#xD;
Rainbow Family events regularly draw thousands of people. These take place all&#xD;
over the world. While some participants may question the label, it can be&#xD;
described as one of the biggest and most geographically diverse New Age&#xD;
groups on the planet. As such, it is a very important factor in shaping the entire&#xD;
present day New Age movement.&#xD;
I conducted fieldwork with the Rainbow Family between the autumns of&#xD;
1998 and 2002, traveling with the nomadic group throughout the United States.&#xD;
The Rainbow Family rejects any sort of official membership, accepting anyone&#xD;
who attends its events as an equal participant. Spending extended periods of&#xD;
time in the field, I became immersed in this alternative society. The distinction&#xD;
between ethnographic researcher and informants was highly problematic under&#xD;
such circumstances. This made me acutely aware of the issues surrounding&#xD;
fieldwork and anthropological authority. My own work began to seem quite&#xD;
similar to the spiritual seeking of other participants. As such, I began to consider&#xD;
the commonalities between anthropology and the spirituality encountered&#xD;
within the Rainbow Family.&#xD;
The spiritual discourses produced by Rainbow Family participants are&#xD;
uniquely eclectic and ludic in tone. In a setting explicitly championing individual&#xD;
freedom rather than coercion, there is no sense of spiritual orthodoxy. The ways&#xD;
in which spiritual discourses are treated by the Rainbow Family display&#xD;
interesting attitudes towards truth, authority, and reality. These attitudes are&#xD;
reminiscent of epistemological orientations within postmodernist anthropology.&#xD;
Rainbow Family participants find noteworthy solutions to the apparent&#xD;
ontological dilemmas postmodernism presents. It is my hope that looking at the&#xD;
Rainbow Family of Living Light will suggest a viable way for anthropology to&#xD;
productively deal with its current crisis of identity.</summary>
    <dc:date>2006-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Berger, Adam</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The Rainbow Family of Living Light is an intentional society devoted to&#xD;
achieving world peace through spiritual healing. A loose association of spiritual&#xD;
seekers that explicitly rejects all forms of leadership and imposed authority, it&#xD;
represents an interesting example of an anarchist and communal society.&#xD;
Rainbow Family events regularly draw thousands of people. These take place all&#xD;
over the world. While some participants may question the label, it can be&#xD;
described as one of the biggest and most geographically diverse New Age&#xD;
groups on the planet. As such, it is a very important factor in shaping the entire&#xD;
present day New Age movement.&#xD;
I conducted fieldwork with the Rainbow Family between the autumns of&#xD;
1998 and 2002, traveling with the nomadic group throughout the United States.&#xD;
The Rainbow Family rejects any sort of official membership, accepting anyone&#xD;
who attends its events as an equal participant. Spending extended periods of&#xD;
time in the field, I became immersed in this alternative society. The distinction&#xD;
between ethnographic researcher and informants was highly problematic under&#xD;
such circumstances. This made me acutely aware of the issues surrounding&#xD;
fieldwork and anthropological authority. My own work began to seem quite&#xD;
similar to the spiritual seeking of other participants. As such, I began to consider&#xD;
the commonalities between anthropology and the spirituality encountered&#xD;
within the Rainbow Family.&#xD;
The spiritual discourses produced by Rainbow Family participants are&#xD;
uniquely eclectic and ludic in tone. In a setting explicitly championing individual&#xD;
freedom rather than coercion, there is no sense of spiritual orthodoxy. The ways&#xD;
in which spiritual discourses are treated by the Rainbow Family display&#xD;
interesting attitudes towards truth, authority, and reality. These attitudes are&#xD;
reminiscent of epistemological orientations within postmodernist anthropology.&#xD;
Rainbow Family participants find noteworthy solutions to the apparent&#xD;
ontological dilemmas postmodernism presents. It is my hope that looking at the&#xD;
Rainbow Family of Living Light will suggest a viable way for anthropology to&#xD;
productively deal with its current crisis of identity.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Of life and happines: morality, aesthetics, and social life among the southeastern Amazonian Mebengokré (Kayapó), as seen from the margins of ritual</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2665" />
    <author>
      <name>de Oliveira, Adolfo</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2665</id>
    <updated>2012-06-06T10:20:04Z</updated>
    <published>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis deals with different aspects of the processes of production of sociability&#xD;
among the Xikrin-Mebengokre of the Catete River, central Brazil. I focus on&#xD;
ceremonies and their performance, as ways of access to Mebengokre conceptions&#xD;
concerning the morality and aesthetics of social life. I analyse the semiotics of&#xD;
'kin'-ship production, the performative aspects of emotion as a sociability tool, the&#xD;
use of song and dance for the co-ordination of collective technical tasks, and a&#xD;
Mebengokre 'theory of language' as social agency. In the conclusion I focus on the&#xD;
criticism of some of the key theoretical aspects of Ge ethnology, in the light of my&#xD;
previous analysis.</summary>
    <dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>de Oliveira, Adolfo</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis deals with different aspects of the processes of production of sociability&#xD;
among the Xikrin-Mebengokre of the Catete River, central Brazil. I focus on&#xD;
ceremonies and their performance, as ways of access to Mebengokre conceptions&#xD;
concerning the morality and aesthetics of social life. I analyse the semiotics of&#xD;
'kin'-ship production, the performative aspects of emotion as a sociability tool, the&#xD;
use of song and dance for the co-ordination of collective technical tasks, and a&#xD;
Mebengokre 'theory of language' as social agency. In the conclusion I focus on the&#xD;
criticism of some of the key theoretical aspects of Ge ethnology, in the light of my&#xD;
previous analysis.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Islam, traditional beliefs and ritual practices among the Zaghawa of Sudan</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2618" />
    <author>
      <name>Mohamed-Salih, El Tigani Mustafa</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2618</id>
    <updated>2012-06-04T10:05:19Z</updated>
    <published>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is about the traditional beliefs and the process of Islamization among&#xD;
the Zaghawa. It examines Islam as understood and practised by the Zaghawa&#xD;
society rather than the "universal model" of Islam or Islam as it is supposed to be.&#xD;
Chapter one is concerned with the 'basic' cosmology, system of belief and objects of&#xD;
sanctity among the Zaghawa. The Zaghawa gave the names of their ha mandas (sacred&#xD;
mountains) to their territorial divisions and their newly appointed chiefs in the past&#xD;
slaughtered a pregnant camel on top of their clans' ha mandas in order to legitimise their&#xD;
leadership and power.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter two explains how the harsh environmental conditions of Dar Zaghawa&#xD;
and the lack of security in the past caused many uncertainties and led the Zaghawa to&#xD;
consult various divinatory techniques to arrive at the hidden knowledge and the hazards&#xD;
that might lie ahead. The various divinatory techniques practised by the Zaghawa are&#xD;
also examined in detail in this chapter in addition to various forms of afflictions caused&#xD;
by supernatural powers and their traditional healing devices.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter three is devoted-to the introduction of Islam into the Zaghawa society.&#xD;
It shows how the point at which Islam met the Zaghawa at first was such that it&#xD;
appeared less alien to them, a fact which made it easy for them to accept the new&#xD;
religion. This chapter furthermore examines the impact of Islam upon cosmology,&#xD;
system of belief, objects of sanctity, divination, affliction and healing. It also explains&#xD;
why Islamization brought about the sex division of religion and how the concept of&#xD;
religious purity and pollution introduced by Islam has been interpreted by the fakis to&#xD;
justify the discrimination against the mai .&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter four describes the Islamic ritual practices, notably the five pillars of&#xD;
Islam and the ritual practices related to the life cycle, agricultural activities, purification&#xD;
and reconciliation on the occasion of adultery and manslaughter. The main purpose of&#xD;
this chapter is to discern how these general Islamic rituals have been influenced by the&#xD;
particular setting of the Zaghawa environment.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter five discusses and evaluates the effect of formal education, the&#xD;
establishment of the new Sudanese state and formal peace keeping institutions, the&#xD;
improvement of communications and medical services and the deterioration of&#xD;
environmental conditions in Dar Zaghawa in facilitating religious change. The chapter&#xD;
goes on to explain how the socioeconomic crises and political upheavals in Dar&#xD;
Zaghawa in the sixties on the one hand and the complicity of the national political&#xD;
parties with the Zaghawa chiefs on the other anguished the commoners and led many of&#xD;
them to join the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaa Ansar al--Sunna al--Mohamediva&#xD;
and demand the return to the pristine Islam and the application of the Islamic shari'a&#xD;
law. It furthermore explains why the religious reformers, though they succeeded in&#xD;
persuading the Zaghawa to accept the religious changes in some aspects of their lives,&#xD;
failed to do so in many other aspects, notably the gender relations and the&#xD;
discrimination against the mai.&#xD;
&#xD;
The concluding chapter critically assesss and evaluates the existing literature on&#xD;
conversion to Islam in Africa. The syncretism and the marginalization models, though&#xD;
important, do not go far enough to explain why the Zaghawa continued to perform&#xD;
their pre--Islamic rituals even when their belief changed. It suggests Fernandez's&#xD;
model, which differentiates between the social consensus and cultural consensus, as&#xD;
particularly useful for deeper analyses of the impact of Islam upon the Zaghawa&#xD;
society.</summary>
    <dc:date>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Mohamed-Salih, El Tigani Mustafa</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is about the traditional beliefs and the process of Islamization among&#xD;
the Zaghawa. It examines Islam as understood and practised by the Zaghawa&#xD;
society rather than the "universal model" of Islam or Islam as it is supposed to be.&#xD;
Chapter one is concerned with the 'basic' cosmology, system of belief and objects of&#xD;
sanctity among the Zaghawa. The Zaghawa gave the names of their ha mandas (sacred&#xD;
mountains) to their territorial divisions and their newly appointed chiefs in the past&#xD;
slaughtered a pregnant camel on top of their clans' ha mandas in order to legitimise their&#xD;
leadership and power.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter two explains how the harsh environmental conditions of Dar Zaghawa&#xD;
and the lack of security in the past caused many uncertainties and led the Zaghawa to&#xD;
consult various divinatory techniques to arrive at the hidden knowledge and the hazards&#xD;
that might lie ahead. The various divinatory techniques practised by the Zaghawa are&#xD;
also examined in detail in this chapter in addition to various forms of afflictions caused&#xD;
by supernatural powers and their traditional healing devices.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter three is devoted-to the introduction of Islam into the Zaghawa society.&#xD;
It shows how the point at which Islam met the Zaghawa at first was such that it&#xD;
appeared less alien to them, a fact which made it easy for them to accept the new&#xD;
religion. This chapter furthermore examines the impact of Islam upon cosmology,&#xD;
system of belief, objects of sanctity, divination, affliction and healing. It also explains&#xD;
why Islamization brought about the sex division of religion and how the concept of&#xD;
religious purity and pollution introduced by Islam has been interpreted by the fakis to&#xD;
justify the discrimination against the mai .&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter four describes the Islamic ritual practices, notably the five pillars of&#xD;
Islam and the ritual practices related to the life cycle, agricultural activities, purification&#xD;
and reconciliation on the occasion of adultery and manslaughter. The main purpose of&#xD;
this chapter is to discern how these general Islamic rituals have been influenced by the&#xD;
particular setting of the Zaghawa environment.&#xD;
&#xD;
Chapter five discusses and evaluates the effect of formal education, the&#xD;
establishment of the new Sudanese state and formal peace keeping institutions, the&#xD;
improvement of communications and medical services and the deterioration of&#xD;
environmental conditions in Dar Zaghawa in facilitating religious change. The chapter&#xD;
goes on to explain how the socioeconomic crises and political upheavals in Dar&#xD;
Zaghawa in the sixties on the one hand and the complicity of the national political&#xD;
parties with the Zaghawa chiefs on the other anguished the commoners and led many of&#xD;
them to join the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaa Ansar al--Sunna al--Mohamediva&#xD;
and demand the return to the pristine Islam and the application of the Islamic shari'a&#xD;
law. It furthermore explains why the religious reformers, though they succeeded in&#xD;
persuading the Zaghawa to accept the religious changes in some aspects of their lives,&#xD;
failed to do so in many other aspects, notably the gender relations and the&#xD;
discrimination against the mai.&#xD;
&#xD;
The concluding chapter critically assesss and evaluates the existing literature on&#xD;
conversion to Islam in Africa. The syncretism and the marginalization models, though&#xD;
important, do not go far enough to explain why the Zaghawa continued to perform&#xD;
their pre--Islamic rituals even when their belief changed. It suggests Fernandez's&#xD;
model, which differentiates between the social consensus and cultural consensus, as&#xD;
particularly useful for deeper analyses of the impact of Islam upon the Zaghawa&#xD;
society.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>An account of a valuable phenomenon found primarily in art, after Collingwood</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2559" />
    <author>
      <name>McGuiggan, James Camien</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2559</id>
    <updated>2012-04-16T14:47:19Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is&#xD;
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is&#xD;
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by&#xD;
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and&#xD;
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role&#xD;
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more&#xD;
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is&#xD;
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'&#xD;
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and&#xD;
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.&#xD;
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and&#xD;
briefly argues that it is very valuable.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>McGuiggan, James Camien</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation enquires into the nature and value of a phenomenon which is&#xD;
typically found in art. Chapter 1 attempts to get clear on what phenomenon is&#xD;
being discussed by considering various thinkers' attempts to talk about it, and by&#xD;
considering artworks which exemplify (or are) it. I call the phenomenon 'art' and&#xD;
roughly characterise it as the expression of emotion. Chapter 2 considers the role&#xD;
of artists' intentions to the meaning of the artworks they create, and more&#xD;
broadly the role of utterers' intentions to the meanings of their utterances. This is&#xD;
done because certain positions regarding the role of intentions to utterances'&#xD;
meanings breaks the communicative link between the utterer of an utterance and&#xD;
the apprehender of the utterance, which link is important to the thesis advanced.&#xD;
Chapter 3 argues for a particular analysis of what I call art in Chapter 1, and&#xD;
briefly argues that it is very valuable.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>On subsistence and human rights</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2556" />
    <author>
      <name>Tomalty, Jesse</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2556</id>
    <updated>2012-04-16T11:20:34Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005). &#xD;
&#xD;
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Tomalty, Jesse</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The central question I address is whether the inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights can be justified. The human right to subsistence is conventionally interpreted as a fundamental right to a basic living standard characterized as having access to the material means for subsistence. It is widely thought to entail duties of protection against deprivation and duties of assistance in acquiring access to the material means for subsistence (Shue 1996, Nickel, 2004, Griffin 2008). The inclusion of a right to subsistence among human rights interpreted in this way has been met with considerable resistance, particularly on the part of those who argue that fundamental rights cannot entail positive duties (Cranston 1983, Narveson 2004, O’Neill 1996, 2000, 2005). &#xD;
&#xD;
My purpose in this dissertation is to consider whether a plausible interpretation of the human right to subsistence can succeed in overcoming the most forceful and persistent objections to it. My main thesis is that a minimal interpretation of the human right to subsistence according to which it is a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence provides the strongest interpretation of this right. Although the idea that the human right to subsistence correlates with negative duties is not new, discussion of these duties has been overshadowed in the literature by debate over the positive duties conventionally thought to be entailed by it. I show that the human right to subsistence interpreted as a right not to be deprived of access to the means for subsistence makes an important contribution to reasoning about the normative implications of global poverty.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>'Es una comunidad libre' : contesting the potential of indigenous communities in southeastern Bolivia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2549" />
    <author>
      <name>Groke, Veronika</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2549</id>
    <updated>2012-04-10T10:51:28Z</updated>
    <published>2012-06-21T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The thesis is a study of a Guaraní community (comunidad) situated in the Department of Santa Cruz in the southeastern lowlands of Bolivia. The thesis uses the concept of ‘comunidad’ as a focus of investigation. While this concept is one that is familiar and firmly embedded in contemporary discourses throughout Bolivia, the meanings which different people and interest groups attach to it and the purposes which they ascribe to it are far from unanimous. Apart from the physical and legal entity, comprising a group of people, the land on which they live, and the legal title for its ownership, a comunidad is a multifaceted and multilayered complex of diverging and sometimes competing ideas, desires and agendas. Questioning the concept of ‘comunidad’ in this way opens up new perspectives on what people are doing and why that could easily be overlooked in continuing to assume that we know what we are talking about when talking about a ‘comunidad indígena’ in Bolivia today. The thesis explores the case of Cañón de Segura by eliciting and bringing together the various claims and perspectives that impact on the lives of its inhabitants (comunarios). Starting with a historical overview to situate the comunidad within Bolivian and Guaraní history, the thesis moves into an ethnographic discussion of the comunarios’ own perceptions and meanings of ‘comunidad’, followed by an exploration of various outsiders’ perspectives on the same topic that impact on the comunarios’ lives in different ways. The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the overlap and entanglements between these different positions in order to show how the different perspectives on the meaning and purpose of a Guaraní ‘comunidad’ all contribute to shape the actual realities of people’s lives ‘on the ground’.</summary>
    <dc:date>2012-06-21T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Groke, Veronika</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The thesis is a study of a Guaraní community (comunidad) situated in the Department of Santa Cruz in the southeastern lowlands of Bolivia. The thesis uses the concept of ‘comunidad’ as a focus of investigation. While this concept is one that is familiar and firmly embedded in contemporary discourses throughout Bolivia, the meanings which different people and interest groups attach to it and the purposes which they ascribe to it are far from unanimous. Apart from the physical and legal entity, comprising a group of people, the land on which they live, and the legal title for its ownership, a comunidad is a multifaceted and multilayered complex of diverging and sometimes competing ideas, desires and agendas. Questioning the concept of ‘comunidad’ in this way opens up new perspectives on what people are doing and why that could easily be overlooked in continuing to assume that we know what we are talking about when talking about a ‘comunidad indígena’ in Bolivia today. The thesis explores the case of Cañón de Segura by eliciting and bringing together the various claims and perspectives that impact on the lives of its inhabitants (comunarios). Starting with a historical overview to situate the comunidad within Bolivian and Guaraní history, the thesis moves into an ethnographic discussion of the comunarios’ own perceptions and meanings of ‘comunidad’, followed by an exploration of various outsiders’ perspectives on the same topic that impact on the comunarios’ lives in different ways. The aim of the thesis is to illustrate the overlap and entanglements between these different positions in order to show how the different perspectives on the meaning and purpose of a Guaraní ‘comunidad’ all contribute to shape the actual realities of people’s lives ‘on the ground’.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The social reproduction of Jamaica Safar in Shashamane, Ethiopia</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2548" />
    <author>
      <name>Gomes, Shelene</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2548</id>
    <updated>2012-04-10T09:48:35Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Since the 1950s, men and women, mainly Rastafari from the West Indies, have moved as repatriates to Shashamane, Ethiopia. This is a spiritually and ideologically oriented journey to the promised land of Ethiopia (Africa) and to the land granted by His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie I. Although migration across regions of the&#xD;
global south is less common than migration from the global south to north, this move is even more distinct because it is not primarily motivated by economic concerns.&#xD;
&#xD;
This thesis - the first in-depth ethnographic study of the repatriate&#xD;
population - focuses on the conceptual and pragmatic ways in which repatriates and their Ethiopian-born children “rehome” this area of Shashamane that is now called Jamaica Safar (or village in the Amharic&#xD;
language). There is a simultaneous Rasta identification of themselves as Ethiopians and as His Majesty’s people, which is often contested in legal and civic spheres, with a West Indian social inscription of &#xD;
Shashamane. These dynamics have emerged from a Rastafari re-invention of personhood that was fostered in West Indian Creole society.&#xD;
&#xD;
These ideas converge in a central concern with the inalienability of the land grant that is shared by repatriates, their children and Rastafari outside Ethiopia as well. Accordingly, the repatriate&#xD;
population of Shashamane becomes the centre of international social and economic networks. The children born on this land thus demonstrate the success of their parents’ repatriation. They are the ones who will ensure the Rastafari presence there in perpetuity.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Gomes, Shelene</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Since the 1950s, men and women, mainly Rastafari from the West Indies, have moved as repatriates to Shashamane, Ethiopia. This is a spiritually and ideologically oriented journey to the promised land of Ethiopia (Africa) and to the land granted by His Imperial Majesty Emperor Haile Selassie I. Although migration across regions of the&#xD;
global south is less common than migration from the global south to north, this move is even more distinct because it is not primarily motivated by economic concerns.&#xD;
&#xD;
This thesis - the first in-depth ethnographic study of the repatriate&#xD;
population - focuses on the conceptual and pragmatic ways in which repatriates and their Ethiopian-born children “rehome” this area of Shashamane that is now called Jamaica Safar (or village in the Amharic&#xD;
language). There is a simultaneous Rasta identification of themselves as Ethiopians and as His Majesty’s people, which is often contested in legal and civic spheres, with a West Indian social inscription of &#xD;
Shashamane. These dynamics have emerged from a Rastafari re-invention of personhood that was fostered in West Indian Creole society.&#xD;
&#xD;
These ideas converge in a central concern with the inalienability of the land grant that is shared by repatriates, their children and Rastafari outside Ethiopia as well. Accordingly, the repatriate&#xD;
population of Shashamane becomes the centre of international social and economic networks. The children born on this land thus demonstrate the success of their parents’ repatriation. They are the ones who will ensure the Rastafari presence there in perpetuity.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Types of conceptual enquiry : a case for thinking there is a type that does not depend on the notion of analyticity</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2530" />
    <author>
      <name>Dawes, Ryan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2530</id>
    <updated>2012-03-29T13:46:01Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Many if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic&#xD;
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.&#xD;
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for&#xD;
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts&#xD;
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that&#xD;
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of&#xD;
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of&#xD;
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true&#xD;
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they&#xD;
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that&#xD;
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of&#xD;
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to&#xD;
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary&#xD;
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or&#xD;
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.&#xD;
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for&#xD;
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Dawes, Ryan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Many if not all Analytic Philosophers in the first seventy years or so of Analytic&#xD;
Philosophy thought that enquiry into concepts had a significant place in philosophy.&#xD;
This is not a view shared by most contemporary Analytic Philosophers. One reason for&#xD;
this change in attitude is Quine’s famous critique of analyticity. Enquiry into concepts&#xD;
had been thought to depend on a satisfactory notion of analyticity. Many thought that&#xD;
Quine had shown that no such notion is available. It is true that the traditional model of&#xD;
Conceptual Analysis operated with the notion of analyticity. The reductive project of&#xD;
Conceptual Analysis was supposed to issue in analytic truths that were necessarily true&#xD;
and knowable a priori. Furthermore the necessity of these truths, and the fact that they&#xD;
were knowable a priori were accounted for in terms of their analyticity. I argue that&#xD;
there is an alternative model of Conceptual Enquiry which does not require a notion of&#xD;
analyticity to do the work it does. I argue that the notion of analyticity is not central to&#xD;
the style of philosophising of the Ordinary Language Philosophers. Major ‘Ordinary&#xD;
Language Philosophers’ did not appeal to the notion of analyticity in describing or&#xD;
accounting for their work. Neither is such a notion required to account for their work.&#xD;
The upshot is that one ought not to conclude that enquiry into concepts is redundant for&#xD;
philosophical purposes on account of there being no satisfactory notion of analyticity.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>On describing</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2468" />
    <author>
      <name>Schoubye, Anders Johan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2468</id>
    <updated>2012-03-27T15:28:17Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence. &#xD;
&#xD;
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.&#xD;
&#xD;
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Schoubye, Anders Johan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The overarching topic of this dissertation is the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions. It focuses on the question whether sentences such as ‘the king of France is bald’ literally assert the existence of a unique king (and therefore are false) or simply presuppose the existence of such a king (and thus fail to express propositions). One immediate obstacle to resolving this question is that immediate truth value judgments about such sentences (sentences with non-denoting descriptions) are particularly unstable; some elicit a clear intuition of falsity whereas others simply seem awkward or strange. Because of these variations, truth value judgments are generally considered unreliable. In the first chapter of the dissertation, an explanation of this phenomenon is developed. It is observed that when these types of sentences are considered in the context of a discourse, a systematic pattern in judgments emerges. This pattern, it is argued, should be explained in terms of certain pragmatic factors, e.g. whether a speaker’s utterance is interpreted as cooperative. A detailed and general explanation of the phenomenon is then presented which draws importantly on recent research in the semantics and pragmatics of questions and focus. It is shown that the behavior of these judgments can be systematically explained, that truth value judgments are not as unreliable as standardly assumed, and that the proposed explanation best supports the conclusion that definite descriptions presuppose rather than assert existence. &#xD;
&#xD;
In the second chapter, the following problem is investigated. If definite descriptions are assumed to literally assert existence, a sentence such as ‘Hans wants the ghost in his attic to be quiet’ is incorrectly predicted to be true only if Hans wants there to be a (unique) ghost in his attic. This prediction is often considered evidence against Russell’s quantificational analysis and evidence in favor of the referential analysis of Frege and Strawson. Against this claim, it is demonstrated that this problem is a general problem about the existence commitments of natural language determiners, i.e. not an argument in favor of a referential analysis. It is shown that in order to avoid these undesirable predictions, quite radical changes to the semantic framework are required. For example, it must be assumed that a sentence of the form ‘The F is G’ has the open sentence ‘x is G’ as its asserted content. A uniform quantificational and presuppositional analysis of definites and indefinites is outlined which by exploiting certain features of so-called dynamic semantics unproblematically assumes that the asserted contents indeed are open sentences.&#xD;
&#xD;
In view of the proposed quantificational/presuppositional analysis, the dissertation is concluded by a rejection of the argument put forward by Reimer (1998) and Devitt (2004) that definite descriptions are ambiguous between attributive (quantificational) and referential (indexical) uses. Reimer and Devitt’s argument is (in contrast to Donnellan, 1966) based primarily on the assumption that definite descriptions are conventionally used to communicate singular thoughts and that the conventional meaning of a definite description therefore must be fundamentally indexical/directly referential. I argue that this argument relies crucially on tacit assumptions about semantic processing for which no empirical evidence is provided. I also argue that the argument is too general; if sound, it would be an argument for an indexical treatment of most, if not all, other determiners. I then conclude by demonstrating that the view does not explain any new data and thus has no clear motivation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In short, this dissertation provides a detailed pragmatic explanation of a long-standing puzzle about truth value judgments and then outlines a novel dynamic semantic analysis of definites and indefinites. This analysis solves a significant problem about existence commitments — a problem that neither Russell’s nor the Frege/Strawson analysis are equipped to handle. This analysis is then defended against the claim that definite descriptions are ambiguous.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Miller, Bradwardine and the Truth</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2447" />
    <author>
      <name>Read, Stephen</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2447</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T13:19:14Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticised Thomas Bradwardine’s theory of truth and signification and my defence of Bradwardine’s application of it to the semantic paradoxes. Much of Miller’s criticism is sympathetic and helpful in gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Bradwardine’s proposed solution to the paradoxes and Alfred Tarski’s. But some of Miller’s criticisms betray a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of Bradwardine’s account of truth and signification.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Read, Stephen</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In his article "Verdades antiguas y modernas" (in the same issue, pp. 207-27), David Miller criticised Thomas Bradwardine’s theory of truth and signification and my defence of Bradwardine’s application of it to the semantic paradoxes. Much of Miller’s criticism is sympathetic and helpful in gaining a better understanding of the relationship between Bradwardine’s proposed solution to the paradoxes and Alfred Tarski’s. But some of Miller’s criticisms betray a misunderstanding of crucial aspects of Bradwardine’s account of truth and signification.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Epidemic events : state-formation, class struggle and biopolitics in three epidemic crises of modern China</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2150" />
    <author>
      <name>Lynteris, Christos</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2150</id>
    <updated>2012-01-04T14:16:54Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Based on extended research on Chinese medical and epidemiological archival material dating back to the beginning of the 20th century, and on six months of internship in epidemiology in Beijing’s Medical School and in Haidian District’s Centre of Disease Control and Prevention, this thesis explores the conjunction of three major epidemiological crises in modern Chinese history with processes of State formation: the 1911 Manchurian pneumonic plague, the 1952 germ-warfare, and the 2003 SARS outbreak. Analysing the three crises as Events in line with Alain Badiou’s epistemology it seeks to establish how different strategies of governmental fidelity to the imagined cause of each crisis have led to distinct modes of organisation and valorisation of the social: Republican China and its decline to fascism; the clash between professional revolutionaries and technocrats in Maoist China; and the emergence of the “Harmonious Society” of mass exploitation and repression today. This conjunction between State formation and epidemiological Events is explored with the use of Foucault’s genealogical method in a quest for a historical materialist approach that posits at its epicentre processes of class composition, decomposition and recomposition, and their contested enclosure by the governmental apparati of capture. The present thesis thus examines the three major epidemiological crises of modern China as forming grounds for biopolitical strategies that give rise to modes of subjectivation and circuits of debt/guilt within the context of the class struggle. And at the same time, it aims to create a new field of investigation for anthropology: the relation of State and Event, from a viewpoint that contests the accepted relation of event and structure expounded by Marshall Sahlins, proposing as the main object of this investigation the conjunction between necessity and will that can never be reduced either to the naturalism of historical determinism, nor to the culturalism of subjective contingency.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lynteris, Christos</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Based on extended research on Chinese medical and epidemiological archival material dating back to the beginning of the 20th century, and on six months of internship in epidemiology in Beijing’s Medical School and in Haidian District’s Centre of Disease Control and Prevention, this thesis explores the conjunction of three major epidemiological crises in modern Chinese history with processes of State formation: the 1911 Manchurian pneumonic plague, the 1952 germ-warfare, and the 2003 SARS outbreak. Analysing the three crises as Events in line with Alain Badiou’s epistemology it seeks to establish how different strategies of governmental fidelity to the imagined cause of each crisis have led to distinct modes of organisation and valorisation of the social: Republican China and its decline to fascism; the clash between professional revolutionaries and technocrats in Maoist China; and the emergence of the “Harmonious Society” of mass exploitation and repression today. This conjunction between State formation and epidemiological Events is explored with the use of Foucault’s genealogical method in a quest for a historical materialist approach that posits at its epicentre processes of class composition, decomposition and recomposition, and their contested enclosure by the governmental apparati of capture. The present thesis thus examines the three major epidemiological crises of modern China as forming grounds for biopolitical strategies that give rise to modes of subjectivation and circuits of debt/guilt within the context of the class struggle. And at the same time, it aims to create a new field of investigation for anthropology: the relation of State and Event, from a viewpoint that contests the accepted relation of event and structure expounded by Marshall Sahlins, proposing as the main object of this investigation the conjunction between necessity and will that can never be reduced either to the naturalism of historical determinism, nor to the culturalism of subjective contingency.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The ethics of globalisation, free trade and fair trade</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2115" />
    <author>
      <name>Wood, Daniel</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2115</id>
    <updated>2011-12-19T10:15:24Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair&#xD;
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade&#xD;
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and&#xD;
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that&#xD;
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis&#xD;
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the&#xD;
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt&#xD;
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems&#xD;
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in&#xD;
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I&#xD;
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be&#xD;
seen as damaging to my position.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Wood, Daniel</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this thesis I take a broadly consequentialist normative position and argue that because fair&#xD;
trade is an inefficient method of aiding the poor, we should not support it and prefer free trade&#xD;
goods with an appropriate and equal donation to a charity, designed to aid the poor and&#xD;
encourage development in the undeveloped and developing world, instead. I also argue that&#xD;
globalisation is the best means of development and we should support it as well. The thesis&#xD;
progresses first by considering consequentialism, which I argue is especially suited to the&#xD;
problem of analysing poverty in applied ethics, and some objections to it, which I briefly attempt&#xD;
to answer. Following that, I consider fair trade and both some theoretical and practical problems&#xD;
that it faces which my alternative does not. Then I briefly consider how globalisation results in&#xD;
development and why it should be supported. Finally, I conclude with a brief chapter where I&#xD;
respond to a few pertinent objections which arise on the periphery of my discussion that could be&#xD;
seen as damaging to my position.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Kametsa asaiki : the pursuit of the 'good life' in an Ashaninka village (Peruvian Amazonia)</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2114" />
    <author>
      <name>Sarmiento Barletti, Juan Pablo</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2114</id>
    <updated>2011-12-19T10:45:02Z</updated>
    <published>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an ethnographic study of the pursuit of kametsa asaiki (‘the good life’) in&#xD;
an Ashaninka village by the Bajo Urubamba River (Peruvian Amazonia). My study&#xD;
centres on Ashaninka social organization in a context made difficult by the wake of&#xD;
the Peruvian Internal War, the activities of extractive industries, and a series of&#xD;
despotic decrees that have been passed by the Peruvian government. This is all&#xD;
framed by a change in their social organization from living in small, separated&#xD;
family-based settlements to one of living in villages.&#xD;
This shift presents them with great problems when internal conflicts arise.&#xD;
Whilst in the past settlements would have fissioned in order to avoid conflict, today&#xD;
there are two related groups of reasons that lead them to want to live in centralised&#xD;
communities. The first is their great desire for their children to go to school and the&#xD;
importance they place on long-term cash-crops. The second is the encroachment of&#xD;
the Peruvian State and private companies on their territory and lives which forces&#xD;
them to stay together in order to resist and protect their territory and way of life.&#xD;
I suggest that this change in organisation changes the rules of the game of&#xD;
sociality. Contemporary Ashaninka life is centred on the pursuit of kametsa asaiki, a&#xD;
philosophy of life they believe to have inherited from their ancestors that teaches&#xD;
emotional restraint and the sharing of food in order to create the right type of&#xD;
Ashaninka person. Yet, at present it also has new factors they believe allow them to&#xD;
become ‘civilised’: school education, new forms of leadership and conflict resolution,&#xD;
money, new forms of conflict resolution, intercultural health, and a strong political&#xD;
federation to defend their right to pursue kametsa asaiki.&#xD;
My thesis is an anthropological analysis of the 'audacious innovations' they&#xD;
have developed to retake the pursuit of kametsa asaiki in the aftermath of the war. I&#xD;
show that this ethos of living is not solely a communal project of conviviality but it&#xD;
has become a symbol of resistance in their fight for the right to have rights in Peru.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sarmiento Barletti, Juan Pablo</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an ethnographic study of the pursuit of kametsa asaiki (‘the good life’) in&#xD;
an Ashaninka village by the Bajo Urubamba River (Peruvian Amazonia). My study&#xD;
centres on Ashaninka social organization in a context made difficult by the wake of&#xD;
the Peruvian Internal War, the activities of extractive industries, and a series of&#xD;
despotic decrees that have been passed by the Peruvian government. This is all&#xD;
framed by a change in their social organization from living in small, separated&#xD;
family-based settlements to one of living in villages.&#xD;
This shift presents them with great problems when internal conflicts arise.&#xD;
Whilst in the past settlements would have fissioned in order to avoid conflict, today&#xD;
there are two related groups of reasons that lead them to want to live in centralised&#xD;
communities. The first is their great desire for their children to go to school and the&#xD;
importance they place on long-term cash-crops. The second is the encroachment of&#xD;
the Peruvian State and private companies on their territory and lives which forces&#xD;
them to stay together in order to resist and protect their territory and way of life.&#xD;
I suggest that this change in organisation changes the rules of the game of&#xD;
sociality. Contemporary Ashaninka life is centred on the pursuit of kametsa asaiki, a&#xD;
philosophy of life they believe to have inherited from their ancestors that teaches&#xD;
emotional restraint and the sharing of food in order to create the right type of&#xD;
Ashaninka person. Yet, at present it also has new factors they believe allow them to&#xD;
become ‘civilised’: school education, new forms of leadership and conflict resolution,&#xD;
money, new forms of conflict resolution, intercultural health, and a strong political&#xD;
federation to defend their right to pursue kametsa asaiki.&#xD;
My thesis is an anthropological analysis of the 'audacious innovations' they&#xD;
have developed to retake the pursuit of kametsa asaiki in the aftermath of the war. I&#xD;
show that this ethos of living is not solely a communal project of conviviality but it&#xD;
has become a symbol of resistance in their fight for the right to have rights in Peru.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The value of pleasure in Plato's Philebus and Aristotle's Ethics</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2105" />
    <author>
      <name>Aufderheide, Joachim</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2105</id>
    <updated>2011-12-14T15:42:06Z</updated>
    <published>2011-11-28T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-11-28T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Aufderheide, Joachim</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is a study of the theories of pleasure as proposed in Plato’s Philebus, Aristotle’s EN VII.11-14 and EN X.1-5, with particular emphasis on the value of pleasure. Focusing on the Philebus in Chapters 1 and 2, I argue that the account of pleasure as restorative process of a harmonious state in the soul is in tension with Plato’s claim that some pleasures are good in their own right. I show that there are in fact two ways in which pleasure (and other processes of the soul) can have value in the Philebus. The tension in Plato’s position arises because he focuses exclusively on only one way in which pleasure can have value. Chapter 3 deals with Aristotle’s response to Plato in EN VII.11-14. According to the standard interpretation only complete activities (such as thinking and seeing) can be pleasures in their own right, but not incomplete activities (such as eating and drinking). Since this interpretation attributes to Aristotle both an implausible view and a bad response to Plato, I offer a novel interpretation of EN VII.12 according to which the central contrast is not between complete and incomplete activities, but between states and their use. This interpretation is more faithful to Aristotle’s text and gives him a better response to Plato. In Chapter 4 I turn to the central claim of EN X.4-5 that pleasure perfects an activity. I argue that we cannot understand how pleasure functions unless we take into account the state whose activation is perfected by pleasure. In particular, the agent’s disposition of being a lover of a certain activity (an attitude which belongs to the activated state) is crucial for explaining why the agent takes pleasure in it. The focus on the agent’s attitude highlights that the value of pleasure does not depend solely on the value of the activity (as many interpreters assume). I suggest instead that pleasure is valuable when and because it is an appropriate response to a given situation.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Subverting space : Private, public and power in three Czechoslovak films from the 1960s and ‘70s</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2012" />
    <author>
      <name>Girelli, Elisabetta</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/2012</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T12:31:54Z</updated>
    <published>2011-03-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This paper focuses on three Czechoslovak films from the Communist era: two New Wave features, the Oscar-winning Ostre SledovanéVlaky/Closely Observed Trains (Jirí Menzel, 1966) and O Slavnosti A Hostech/The Party And The Guests (Jan Nĕmec, 1966), plus a key post-Prague Spring film, Ucho/The Ear (Karel Kachyňa, 1970). All three films were banned following the 1968 Soviet invasion. This paper considers the films in the light of their use of spatial constructions and narratives; it argues that the films’ inherent subversive content is primarily articulated through spatial strategies, which also provide the films with their main motivation. Specifically, the paper examines a filmic discourse of political and social subversion which hinges on the negotiation and appropriation of space. Starting from the notion that space is produced by social agency and interaction, and from Michael Foucault’s assertion that ‘we do not live inside a void, inside of which we could place individuals and things […] we live inside a set of relations’, this paper will look at the dynamic relationship of the films’ characters to their allotted spatial situations. At the same time, narrative and visual texts will be contextualized, by relating the films’ representation of private and public space to the national context in which the films were made.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-03-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Girelli, Elisabetta</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This paper focuses on three Czechoslovak films from the Communist era: two New Wave features, the Oscar-winning Ostre SledovanéVlaky/Closely Observed Trains (Jirí Menzel, 1966) and O Slavnosti A Hostech/The Party And The Guests (Jan Nĕmec, 1966), plus a key post-Prague Spring film, Ucho/The Ear (Karel Kachyňa, 1970). All three films were banned following the 1968 Soviet invasion. This paper considers the films in the light of their use of spatial constructions and narratives; it argues that the films’ inherent subversive content is primarily articulated through spatial strategies, which also provide the films with their main motivation. Specifically, the paper examines a filmic discourse of political and social subversion which hinges on the negotiation and appropriation of space. Starting from the notion that space is produced by social agency and interaction, and from Michael Foucault’s assertion that ‘we do not live inside a void, inside of which we could place individuals and things […] we live inside a set of relations’, this paper will look at the dynamic relationship of the films’ characters to their allotted spatial situations. At the same time, narrative and visual texts will be contextualized, by relating the films’ representation of private and public space to the national context in which the films were made.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Changing pleasures of spectatorship : early and silent cinema in Istanbul</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1985" />
    <author>
      <name>Balan, Canan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1985</id>
    <updated>2011-08-16T13:14:45Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This project explores a curious facet of early cinema that has not been studied&#xD;
as yet: the relationship between Turkish modernity and the culture of spectatorship&#xD;
within the context of the late nineteenth century’s viewing habits along with the era&#xD;
of early and silent cinema in Istanbul. The aim of this project is to examine the&#xD;
evolution of viewing habits in Istanbul at a particular period in which a radical&#xD;
cultural transformation was experienced, namely from the 1890s to the 1930s, when&#xD;
the late Ottoman era with its pre-cinematic shows, the cinematograph, and silent&#xD;
films led to the early Turkish Republic and the end of silent cinema. In order to cover&#xD;
the shift in the reception of early cinema, this study makes use of revisionist works&#xD;
on early cinema and on modernity in Ottoman history. To this end, newspapers,&#xD;
novels, memoirs and consular trade records that formed the majority of the primary&#xD;
sources of this project are analyzed. The transformation of Istanbulite spectatorship&#xD;
was initially experienced through a rupture in the late nineteenth century created by&#xD;
the global flow of mechanical images. The cinematograph was viewed by a multi-&#xD;
ethnic public that was accustomed to seeing both traditional and other more widely&#xD;
recognized pre-cinematic shows such as the shadow play, public storytelling,&#xD;
dioramas, panoramas and magic lanterns. At first the early cinematograph displays&#xD;
were haphazard and parts of other shows. Yet, the international influence of the early&#xD;
cinema attracted a curiosity-driven public even if the same public was critical of the&#xD;
imperfect technology of the apparatus. With the outbreak of World War I, nationalist&#xD;
resistance played a role in the reception of popular European films, particularly&#xD;
Italian melodramas. The end of the war caused the demise of the Ottoman Empire&#xD;
and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, after which, cinema started to be seen as&#xD;
an educational tool in the service of nation-building.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Balan, Canan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This project explores a curious facet of early cinema that has not been studied&#xD;
as yet: the relationship between Turkish modernity and the culture of spectatorship&#xD;
within the context of the late nineteenth century’s viewing habits along with the era&#xD;
of early and silent cinema in Istanbul. The aim of this project is to examine the&#xD;
evolution of viewing habits in Istanbul at a particular period in which a radical&#xD;
cultural transformation was experienced, namely from the 1890s to the 1930s, when&#xD;
the late Ottoman era with its pre-cinematic shows, the cinematograph, and silent&#xD;
films led to the early Turkish Republic and the end of silent cinema. In order to cover&#xD;
the shift in the reception of early cinema, this study makes use of revisionist works&#xD;
on early cinema and on modernity in Ottoman history. To this end, newspapers,&#xD;
novels, memoirs and consular trade records that formed the majority of the primary&#xD;
sources of this project are analyzed. The transformation of Istanbulite spectatorship&#xD;
was initially experienced through a rupture in the late nineteenth century created by&#xD;
the global flow of mechanical images. The cinematograph was viewed by a multi-&#xD;
ethnic public that was accustomed to seeing both traditional and other more widely&#xD;
recognized pre-cinematic shows such as the shadow play, public storytelling,&#xD;
dioramas, panoramas and magic lanterns. At first the early cinematograph displays&#xD;
were haphazard and parts of other shows. Yet, the international influence of the early&#xD;
cinema attracted a curiosity-driven public even if the same public was critical of the&#xD;
imperfect technology of the apparatus. With the outbreak of World War I, nationalist&#xD;
resistance played a role in the reception of popular European films, particularly&#xD;
Italian melodramas. The end of the war caused the demise of the Ottoman Empire&#xD;
and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, after which, cinema started to be seen as&#xD;
an educational tool in the service of nation-building.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Placing Paamese : locating concerns with place, gender and movement in Vanuatu</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1972" />
    <author>
      <name>Lind, Craig</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1972</id>
    <updated>2011-08-12T13:57:30Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This is a study of coming to know what it is to be Paamese. The work seeks to present an anthropological understanding of ontological concerns that constitute a Paamese perception of subjectivities. I take my lead from Paamese perceptions that the internal capacities of subjects or “things” (e.g. persons, villages, islands, and movement itself) are revealed through relations with others. This correlates with anthropology’s methodology of testing its analytical strategies through the ethnographic practices of others in order to reach more accurate representations. Paamese, as is common elsewhere in Vanuatu and Melanesia, have an extremely fluid attitude towards sociality and easily accommodate urban dwelling without leaving Paama behind. I suggest that a nuanced multi-positioned approach in which several aspects of Paamese sociality are considered from a point of limitation employed by Paamese to focus an event, such as a marriage exchange, will present a better understanding of how these subjectivities, that is Paamese people and Paama Island, adhere such that they do not part company wherever they go. Paamese suggest that each event should be considered as if following a single branch in the canopy of a tree – a scalable perception that offers the promise that a multi-faceted approach will reveal a replicable form. I take this approach to specificity seriously and employ a looping aesthetic, measi, adapted from Paamese sand-drawing in order to consider the shifting concerns expressed by Paamese perceptions of out (place), āmal (agnatic clans), sise (road), vatte (origin), ara (blood) and asi (bone). I suggest that these, parts, can be considered together as a holography for how to come to know what it is to be Paamese.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lind, Craig</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This is a study of coming to know what it is to be Paamese. The work seeks to present an anthropological understanding of ontological concerns that constitute a Paamese perception of subjectivities. I take my lead from Paamese perceptions that the internal capacities of subjects or “things” (e.g. persons, villages, islands, and movement itself) are revealed through relations with others. This correlates with anthropology’s methodology of testing its analytical strategies through the ethnographic practices of others in order to reach more accurate representations. Paamese, as is common elsewhere in Vanuatu and Melanesia, have an extremely fluid attitude towards sociality and easily accommodate urban dwelling without leaving Paama behind. I suggest that a nuanced multi-positioned approach in which several aspects of Paamese sociality are considered from a point of limitation employed by Paamese to focus an event, such as a marriage exchange, will present a better understanding of how these subjectivities, that is Paamese people and Paama Island, adhere such that they do not part company wherever they go. Paamese suggest that each event should be considered as if following a single branch in the canopy of a tree – a scalable perception that offers the promise that a multi-faceted approach will reveal a replicable form. I take this approach to specificity seriously and employ a looping aesthetic, measi, adapted from Paamese sand-drawing in order to consider the shifting concerns expressed by Paamese perceptions of out (place), āmal (agnatic clans), sise (road), vatte (origin), ara (blood) and asi (bone). I suggest that these, parts, can be considered together as a holography for how to come to know what it is to be Paamese.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>South Korean historical drama : gender, nation and the heritage industry</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1924" />
    <author>
      <name>Hwang, Yun Mi</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1924</id>
    <updated>2011-07-20T15:28:59Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: From the dynamic landscape of contemporary South Korean cinema, one trend that stands out is the palpable revival of the historical drama (known as the ‘sageuk’ in Korean). Since the early 2000s, expensive, visually striking, and successful costumed pieces have been showcased to the audience. Now rivalling the other mainstream genres such as gangster action, romantic comedy, and the Korean blockbuster, the sageuk has made an indelible impact on the national film industry. Even so, the cycle has yet to receive much critical attention. This thesis addresses the gap, driven by the question, what is the impetus behind the surge of the ‘historical’ witnessed in recent sageuk films? &#xD;
For this, I first take a diachronic view of the historical context of the genre, which later serves as the reference point for the genre memory. Adopting a synchronic approach, I then examine the industrial, political, and social contexts in Korea at the turn of the new century that facilitated the history boom. While national memory and transnational politics fuelled Koreans’ interest in their past, the popular media – cinema, television, publishing industry, and performance theatre – all capitalised on this drive. The government also took part by supporting the ‘culture content industry’ as a way to fashion an attractive national image and accelerate the cultural export system. Collectively, these efforts translated to the emergence of history as a commodity, carving a unique space for historical narratives in the national heritage industry. As such, different agents – the consumers, the industry, and the state – had their stakes in the national mobilisation of history and memory with competing ideological and commercial interests. Ultimately, the sageuk is the primary site in which these diverging aspirations and desires are played out. &#xD;
In chapters that follow, I engage with four main sub-types of the recent historical drama, offering textual and contextual readings. The main discussion includes the ‘fusion’ sageuk (Untold Scandal), the biopic (King and the Clown and Portrait of a Beauty), the heritage horror (Blood Rain and Shadows in the Palace), and the colonial period drama (Rikidozan, Blue Swallow and Modern Boy). While analysing the generic tropes and narrative themes of each film, I also pay attention to contemporary discourses of gender, and the cultural treatment of masculinity and femininity within the period setting. Such investigation, in turn, locates the place of the historical genre in New Korean Cinema, and thus, offers a much-needed intervention into one of the neglected topics in the study of cinematic trends in South Korea.
Description: Electronic version excludes material for which permission has not been granted by the rights holder</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hwang, Yun Mi</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>From the dynamic landscape of contemporary South Korean cinema, one trend that stands out is the palpable revival of the historical drama (known as the ‘sageuk’ in Korean). Since the early 2000s, expensive, visually striking, and successful costumed pieces have been showcased to the audience. Now rivalling the other mainstream genres such as gangster action, romantic comedy, and the Korean blockbuster, the sageuk has made an indelible impact on the national film industry. Even so, the cycle has yet to receive much critical attention. This thesis addresses the gap, driven by the question, what is the impetus behind the surge of the ‘historical’ witnessed in recent sageuk films? &#xD;
For this, I first take a diachronic view of the historical context of the genre, which later serves as the reference point for the genre memory. Adopting a synchronic approach, I then examine the industrial, political, and social contexts in Korea at the turn of the new century that facilitated the history boom. While national memory and transnational politics fuelled Koreans’ interest in their past, the popular media – cinema, television, publishing industry, and performance theatre – all capitalised on this drive. The government also took part by supporting the ‘culture content industry’ as a way to fashion an attractive national image and accelerate the cultural export system. Collectively, these efforts translated to the emergence of history as a commodity, carving a unique space for historical narratives in the national heritage industry. As such, different agents – the consumers, the industry, and the state – had their stakes in the national mobilisation of history and memory with competing ideological and commercial interests. Ultimately, the sageuk is the primary site in which these diverging aspirations and desires are played out. &#xD;
In chapters that follow, I engage with four main sub-types of the recent historical drama, offering textual and contextual readings. The main discussion includes the ‘fusion’ sageuk (Untold Scandal), the biopic (King and the Clown and Portrait of a Beauty), the heritage horror (Blood Rain and Shadows in the Palace), and the colonial period drama (Rikidozan, Blue Swallow and Modern Boy). While analysing the generic tropes and narrative themes of each film, I also pay attention to contemporary discourses of gender, and the cultural treatment of masculinity and femininity within the period setting. Such investigation, in turn, locates the place of the historical genre in New Korean Cinema, and thus, offers a much-needed intervention into one of the neglected topics in the study of cinematic trends in South Korea.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Strengthening the capability approach : the foundations of the capability approach, with insights from two challenges</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1902" />
    <author>
      <name>Watene, Krushil P. M.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1902</id>
    <updated>2011-07-05T11:45:53Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.&#xD;
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.&#xD;
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Watene, Krushil P. M.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The Capability Approach was initially developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen, with the first basic articulation presented in his 1979 ‘Equality of What?’ Tanner Lecture. Since then, the approach has gained a huge amount of attention as a conceptual framework which offers a clear and insightful way to measure well-being and development. Most recently, the approach has been refined and extended by Martha Nussbaum to issues of disability, nationality, and species membership in political philosophy.&#xD;
This project is about the foundations of the capability approach. More specifically, this project asks whether we can, and whether there are good reasons to, strengthen those foundations. The conclusions drawn here are that we ought to think seriously about the way that the capability approach develops as a theory that responds to real world challenges and change. More importantly, this project contends – in light of the challenges of future people and indigenous peoples – that there is good reason to think of new ways to ground the approach. This project takes up this challenge and grounds the approach in a modified version of Tim Mulgan’s approach to well-being. This project demonstrates that this alternative enriches the capability approach by providing us with a way of making sense of important problems, and with options for moving forward.&#xD;
Overall, this project asks important questions about how the capability approach could evolve based on challenges that remain relatively under-explored in the current literature. This project contributes to this literature by demonstrating that we can and ought to strengthen the capability approach and its ability to understand, take on board, and resolve these challenges.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The transcendental structure of the world</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1890" />
    <author>
      <name>Bader, Ralf M.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1890</id>
    <updated>2011-07-07T09:02:26Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Bader, Ralf M.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation provides a systematic account of the metaphysics of transcendental idealism. According to the proposed theory, appearances are understood as intentional objects, while phenomena are considered as logical constructs that are grounded in noumena, whereby the grounding relation can be modelled by means of a coordinated multiple-domain supervenience relation. This framework is employed to provide a vindication of metaphysics, by giving dual-level explanations that explain how the world can have ontological structure, making intelligible the applicability of metaphysical concepts, such as unity, persistence, causation and mind-body interaction, to the empirical realm. The key claim that is advanced in the dissertation is that in order to be realists we have to be transcendental idealists. In particular, transcendental arguments are provided that establish that if realism about science, metaphysics and ethics is to be possible, then (i) the world must have a transcendental structure that integrates the fragmented perspective-dependent spatio-temporal frameworks into a unified perspective-independent space-time manifold, (ii) space and time must be forms of intuition that give rise to correspondences between appearances and phenomena, making it the case that we can have non-trivial scientific knowledge of the world, and (iii) we must have a priori concepts, namely the mathematical and dynamical categories, that allow us to cognise the empirical as well as ontological structure of the world. The ‘fact of experience’ as well as the ‘fact of reason’ are then brought in to strengthen the case for scientific, metaphysical and moral realism, thereby warding off the threat of nihilism. Moreover, a refutation of the more attractive versions of scepticism and idealism is provided, namely of those versions that claim that a subject’s representations or episodes of awareness can be temporally ordered even though they deny or doubt the existence of a law-governed external world. The conclusion then is that a realist stance is to be adopted and that we should consequently accept transcendental idealism and hold that the world has a transcendental structure.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Freedom as faith</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1883" />
    <author>
      <name>Aganey, Diana</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1883</id>
    <updated>2012-10-19T13:16:30Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-06T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-06T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Aganey, Diana</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The belief in free will is something we are entitled to hold despite what determinism says. This notion however cannot be adequately explained or defended by traditional accounts of freedom amongst which, compatibilist and libertarian perspectives dominate the field of inquiry. I argue that an alternative approach is necessary to capture the full implications of what freedom as an idea contains and to establish this idea's validity, though one which exhibits none of the usual extravagances which philosophers so often pursue in their attempts at justification.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Plato's understanding of piety</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1863" />
    <author>
      <name>Abraham, David</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1863</id>
    <updated>2012-11-08T17:09:55Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-21T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-21T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Abraham, David</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The Euthyphro portrays Plato’s mentor, Socrates, asking the question, “what is piety”? In the Apology Socrates defends himself from charges of impiety and suggests an answer to this question. Plato amplifies this answer in the Republic and the Laws. As he refines his understanding of piety, he criticizes traditional understanding of divinity. In the Republic he argues that the traditional divinities are morally inadequate; in the Laws he argues that they are theologically inadequate. The philosophic work Plato accomplishes in these dialogues, as well as the Timaeus, suggests a definitive answer to the Euthyphro’s question. Ultimately, this answer requires further analysis. An appendix is amended to the back of this essay with a collection of all the formal arguments and stipulated definitions referred to in the body of the text.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Moral geographies in Kyrgyzstan : how pastures, dams and holy sites matter in striving for a good life</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1862" />
    <author>
      <name>Feaux de la Croix, Jeanne</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1862</id>
    <updated>2011-06-20T14:09:43Z</updated>
    <published>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an ethnography of how places like mountain pastures (jailoos), hydro-electric dams and holy sites (mazars) matter in striving for a good life. Based on eighteen months of fieldwork in the Toktogul valley of Kyrgyzstan, this study contributes to theoretical questions in the anthropology of post-socialism, time, space, work and enjoyment. I use the term ‘moral geography’ to emphasize a spatial imaginary that is centred on ideas of ‘the good life’, both ethical and happy. This perspective captures an understanding of jailoos which connects food, health, wealth and beauty. In comparing attitudes towards a Soviet and post-Soviet dam, I reveal changes in the nature of the state, property and collective labour. People in Toktogul hold agentive places like mazars and non-personalized places like dams and jailoos apart, implying not one overarching philosophy of nature, but a world in which types of places have different gradations of object-ness and personhood.&#xD;
I show how people use forms of commemoration as a means of establishing connections between people, claims on land and aspirations of ‘becoming cultured’. I demonstrate how people draw on repertoires of epic or Soviet heroism and mobility in conceiving their life story and agency in shaping events. Different times and places such as ‘eternal’ jailoos and Soviet dams are often collapsed as people derive personal authority from connections to them. Analysing accounts of collectivization and privatization I argue that the Soviet period is often treated as a ‘second tradition’ used to judge the present.&#xD;
People also strive for ‘the good life’ through working practices that are closely linked to the Soviet experience, and yet differ from Marxist definitions of labour. The pervasively high value of work is fed from different, formally conflicting sources of moral authority such as Socialism, Islam and neo-liberal ideals of ‘entrepreneurship’. I discuss how parties, poetry and song bring together jakshylyk (goodness) as enjoyment and virtue. I show how song and poetry act as moral guides, how arman yearning is purposely enjoyed in Kyrgyz music and how it relates to nostalgia and nature imagery. The concept of ‘moral geography’ allows me to investigate how people strive for well-being, an investigation that is just as important as focusing on problem-solving and avoiding pain. It also allows an analysis of place and time that holds material interactions, moral ideals, economic and political dimensions in mind.</summary>
    <dc:date>2011-06-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Feaux de la Croix, Jeanne</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an ethnography of how places like mountain pastures (jailoos), hydro-electric dams and holy sites (mazars) matter in striving for a good life. Based on eighteen months of fieldwork in the Toktogul valley of Kyrgyzstan, this study contributes to theoretical questions in the anthropology of post-socialism, time, space, work and enjoyment. I use the term ‘moral geography’ to emphasize a spatial imaginary that is centred on ideas of ‘the good life’, both ethical and happy. This perspective captures an understanding of jailoos which connects food, health, wealth and beauty. In comparing attitudes towards a Soviet and post-Soviet dam, I reveal changes in the nature of the state, property and collective labour. People in Toktogul hold agentive places like mazars and non-personalized places like dams and jailoos apart, implying not one overarching philosophy of nature, but a world in which types of places have different gradations of object-ness and personhood.&#xD;
I show how people use forms of commemoration as a means of establishing connections between people, claims on land and aspirations of ‘becoming cultured’. I demonstrate how people draw on repertoires of epic or Soviet heroism and mobility in conceiving their life story and agency in shaping events. Different times and places such as ‘eternal’ jailoos and Soviet dams are often collapsed as people derive personal authority from connections to them. Analysing accounts of collectivization and privatization I argue that the Soviet period is often treated as a ‘second tradition’ used to judge the present.&#xD;
People also strive for ‘the good life’ through working practices that are closely linked to the Soviet experience, and yet differ from Marxist definitions of labour. The pervasively high value of work is fed from different, formally conflicting sources of moral authority such as Socialism, Islam and neo-liberal ideals of ‘entrepreneurship’. I discuss how parties, poetry and song bring together jakshylyk (goodness) as enjoyment and virtue. I show how song and poetry act as moral guides, how arman yearning is purposely enjoyed in Kyrgyz music and how it relates to nostalgia and nature imagery. The concept of ‘moral geography’ allows me to investigate how people strive for well-being, an investigation that is just as important as focusing on problem-solving and avoiding pain. It also allows an analysis of place and time that holds material interactions, moral ideals, economic and political dimensions in mind.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Moving through dance between New York and Dakar : ways of learning Senegalese 'Sabar' and the politics of participation</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1835" />
    <author>
      <name>Bizas, Eleni</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1835</id>
    <updated>2011-04-21T14:43:03Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis explores a network of participants, dance students and teachers, who&#xD;
travel between New York City and Dakar, Senegal, around the practice of West African&#xD;
dance forms. Focusing on the Senegalese dance-rhythms Sabar, I joined this movement&#xD;
and my fieldwork methodology included apprenticeship as a student. I explored&#xD;
different learning environments of Sabar in New York and Dakar: the understandings&#xD;
involved, how this movement is maintained and how it affects dance forms. The&#xD;
methodological move enabled a comparative approach to research questions of learning&#xD;
and performing, local aesthetics and notions of being.&#xD;
This thesis discusses the role of the imagination in mobilizing students and&#xD;
teachers to travel within this network. I explore how participants navigate through the&#xD;
political geography of this movement, sustain the network, and how in turn the cultural&#xD;
flow of Sabar is ‘punctuated’ by socio-economic relationships. Secondly, I explore the&#xD;
understandings involved in each learning context, how these are negotiated and&#xD;
contested on the dance floor and how they relate to broader socio-cultural discourses&#xD;
and relationships that they reinforce or subvert. I argue that while different Sabar&#xD;
settings cannot be understood as ‘bounded’ in as much as people and ideas circulate&#xD;
through them, they are also distinct in that they produce different forms of Sabar.&#xD;
The learning contexts provide the meeting grounds for alternative conceptions&#xD;
of ‘dance’ and pedagogy. I explore how these notions are negotiated in relation to the&#xD;
specific socio-cultural and economic environments in which they are located.&#xD;
Specifically I analyse some common problems New York students face in learning and&#xD;
performing Sabar and explore the reasons behind them: the complex connection&#xD;
between movement and rhythm and the achievement of a specific kinaesthetic in&#xD;
movement. I delineate the relationship between movement and rhythm in Sabar and the&#xD;
importance of the aesthetic of improvisation. I argue that the prevalence of certain&#xD;
paradigms of learning and ‘dance’ over others is related to the specific socio-economic&#xD;
relationships of the participants. Specifically, an over-emphasis on movement distracts&#xD;
from other important aspects in the performance of Sabar and I argue that skills need to&#xD;
be understood as environed processes, malleable and shifting in relation to the&#xD;
broader socio-economic settings that link the participants together.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Bizas, Eleni</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis explores a network of participants, dance students and teachers, who&#xD;
travel between New York City and Dakar, Senegal, around the practice of West African&#xD;
dance forms. Focusing on the Senegalese dance-rhythms Sabar, I joined this movement&#xD;
and my fieldwork methodology included apprenticeship as a student. I explored&#xD;
different learning environments of Sabar in New York and Dakar: the understandings&#xD;
involved, how this movement is maintained and how it affects dance forms. The&#xD;
methodological move enabled a comparative approach to research questions of learning&#xD;
and performing, local aesthetics and notions of being.&#xD;
This thesis discusses the role of the imagination in mobilizing students and&#xD;
teachers to travel within this network. I explore how participants navigate through the&#xD;
political geography of this movement, sustain the network, and how in turn the cultural&#xD;
flow of Sabar is ‘punctuated’ by socio-economic relationships. Secondly, I explore the&#xD;
understandings involved in each learning context, how these are negotiated and&#xD;
contested on the dance floor and how they relate to broader socio-cultural discourses&#xD;
and relationships that they reinforce or subvert. I argue that while different Sabar&#xD;
settings cannot be understood as ‘bounded’ in as much as people and ideas circulate&#xD;
through them, they are also distinct in that they produce different forms of Sabar.&#xD;
The learning contexts provide the meeting grounds for alternative conceptions&#xD;
of ‘dance’ and pedagogy. I explore how these notions are negotiated in relation to the&#xD;
specific socio-cultural and economic environments in which they are located.&#xD;
Specifically I analyse some common problems New York students face in learning and&#xD;
performing Sabar and explore the reasons behind them: the complex connection&#xD;
between movement and rhythm and the achievement of a specific kinaesthetic in&#xD;
movement. I delineate the relationship between movement and rhythm in Sabar and the&#xD;
importance of the aesthetic of improvisation. I argue that the prevalence of certain&#xD;
paradigms of learning and ‘dance’ over others is related to the specific socio-economic&#xD;
relationships of the participants. Specifically, an over-emphasis on movement distracts&#xD;
from other important aspects in the performance of Sabar and I argue that skills need to&#xD;
be understood as environed processes, malleable and shifting in relation to the&#xD;
broader socio-economic settings that link the participants together.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Health professionals and ethnic Pakistanis in Britain : risk, thalassaemia and audit culture</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1714" />
    <author>
      <name>Murphy, Richard</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1714</id>
    <updated>2011-03-28T11:08:51Z</updated>
    <published>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The central theme or&#xD;
`red-thread' that I&#xD;
consider&#xD;
in this thesis is the concept of risk as it is&#xD;
perceived&#xD;
by&#xD;
and affects the two sides of&#xD;
the medical encounter&#xD;
-&#xD;
in this instance&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
and&#xD;
Health Professionals&#xD;
-&#xD;
in Britain. Each&#xD;
side very often perceives risk quite&#xD;
distinctively,&#xD;
relating to the balance between the spiritual and temporal realms.&#xD;
This is&#xD;
particularly germane&#xD;
in&#xD;
matters to do&#xD;
with possible congenital&#xD;
defects&#xD;
within the prenatal&#xD;
realm&#xD;
for the ethnic&#xD;
Pakistani,&#xD;
and predominantly&#xD;
Muslim,&#xD;
side of this encounter.&#xD;
Thus&#xD;
one&#xD;
of the factors&#xD;
considered&#xD;
in this thesis is how&#xD;
senses of&#xD;
Islam impact&#xD;
upon the two sides.&#xD;
By&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis Islam is&#xD;
seen as central to all&#xD;
life decisions,&#xD;
whilst&#xD;
Health Professionals&#xD;
view&#xD;
Islam&#xD;
with some considerable trepidation, little&#xD;
understanding&#xD;
it&#xD;
or&#xD;
its&#xD;
centrality to the&#xD;
former's decision-making&#xD;
processes. This is&#xD;
particularly significant with regard to attitudes&#xD;
to health&#xD;
and&#xD;
health&#xD;
care.&#xD;
In the initial&#xD;
stages of the project&#xD;
I had thought first&#xD;
cousin&#xD;
marriage&#xD;
(FCM),&#xD;
seen by&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
as desirable&#xD;
and&#xD;
by Health Professionals&#xD;
as&#xD;
putting ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
at-risk to be&#xD;
central to the argument,&#xD;
but&#xD;
concluded that concerns&#xD;
around&#xD;
FCM&#xD;
were a&#xD;
`red herring',&#xD;
merely a trope for the tensions between the two sides -&#xD;
at&#xD;
once&#xD;
both British&#xD;
and at-risk&#xD;
from&#xD;
audit culture.&#xD;
Although&#xD;
no&#xD;
longer&#xD;
central,&#xD;
FCM&#xD;
remains a&#xD;
viable touchstone in&#xD;
consideration of the two sides' perceptions of genetic risk.&#xD;
In this thesis&#xD;
the medical encounter&#xD;
between&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
and&#xD;
Health Professionals is&#xD;
performed&#xD;
within the realm of the so called&#xD;
New Genetics. Here the respective understandings of the&#xD;
New Genetics&#xD;
are&#xD;
informed by the enculturation processes that shape the two sides' world&#xD;
view.&#xD;
Furthermore, I&#xD;
will agree with&#xD;
Lord Robert Winston's&#xD;
and others' concern that any&#xD;
attempt&#xD;
to eradicate an adaptive genetic mutation,&#xD;
in this instance, thalassaemia, from the&#xD;
gene pool&#xD;
is&#xD;
not only undesirable&#xD;
in the short term, but&#xD;
also that such eradications may&#xD;
have&#xD;
an adverse, and&#xD;
far&#xD;
reaching, effect on whole population groups&#xD;
in the future. The&#xD;
main&#xD;
thrust of my argument&#xD;
is that audit culture not only compounds risk&#xD;
for both&#xD;
sides,&#xD;
but&#xD;
also&#xD;
perpetuates institutional&#xD;
racism within the National Health Service (NHS), by&#xD;
promulgating&#xD;
what&#xD;
I have&#xD;
called the language&#xD;
myth.&#xD;
That is to say that much&#xD;
institutional&#xD;
racism&#xD;
is the&#xD;
unwanted&#xD;
by-product&#xD;
of the NHS's&#xD;
attempts to become&#xD;
more patient centred and&#xD;
its&#xD;
continuing efforts to develop&#xD;
systems of&#xD;
best practice.&#xD;
This&#xD;
professionalisation process&#xD;
within&#xD;
the NHS&#xD;
can&#xD;
be&#xD;
seen to impact&#xD;
most strongly&#xD;
in&#xD;
relation to communication&#xD;
-&#xD;
particularly the claimed&#xD;
language barrier between the two sides.&#xD;
This `barrier' has worrying&#xD;
policy&#xD;
implications for&#xD;
any meaningful communication&#xD;
between the two sides, notably&#xD;
relating to obtaining&#xD;
informed&#xD;
consent&#xD;
from&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistani&#xD;
patients&#xD;
-&#xD;
with a resultant&#xD;
increase in&#xD;
risk&#xD;
for&#xD;
the two sides and clear economic consequences for the NHS.</summary>
    <dc:date>2005-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Murphy, Richard</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The central theme or&#xD;
`red-thread' that I&#xD;
consider&#xD;
in this thesis is the concept of risk as it is&#xD;
perceived&#xD;
by&#xD;
and affects the two sides of&#xD;
the medical encounter&#xD;
-&#xD;
in this instance&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
and&#xD;
Health Professionals&#xD;
-&#xD;
in Britain. Each&#xD;
side very often perceives risk quite&#xD;
distinctively,&#xD;
relating to the balance between the spiritual and temporal realms.&#xD;
This is&#xD;
particularly germane&#xD;
in&#xD;
matters to do&#xD;
with possible congenital&#xD;
defects&#xD;
within the prenatal&#xD;
realm&#xD;
for the ethnic&#xD;
Pakistani,&#xD;
and predominantly&#xD;
Muslim,&#xD;
side of this encounter.&#xD;
Thus&#xD;
one&#xD;
of the factors&#xD;
considered&#xD;
in this thesis is how&#xD;
senses of&#xD;
Islam impact&#xD;
upon the two sides.&#xD;
By&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis Islam is&#xD;
seen as central to all&#xD;
life decisions,&#xD;
whilst&#xD;
Health Professionals&#xD;
view&#xD;
Islam&#xD;
with some considerable trepidation, little&#xD;
understanding&#xD;
it&#xD;
or&#xD;
its&#xD;
centrality to the&#xD;
former's decision-making&#xD;
processes. This is&#xD;
particularly significant with regard to attitudes&#xD;
to health&#xD;
and&#xD;
health&#xD;
care.&#xD;
In the initial&#xD;
stages of the project&#xD;
I had thought first&#xD;
cousin&#xD;
marriage&#xD;
(FCM),&#xD;
seen by&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
as desirable&#xD;
and&#xD;
by Health Professionals&#xD;
as&#xD;
putting ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
at-risk to be&#xD;
central to the argument,&#xD;
but&#xD;
concluded that concerns&#xD;
around&#xD;
FCM&#xD;
were a&#xD;
`red herring',&#xD;
merely a trope for the tensions between the two sides -&#xD;
at&#xD;
once&#xD;
both British&#xD;
and at-risk&#xD;
from&#xD;
audit culture.&#xD;
Although&#xD;
no&#xD;
longer&#xD;
central,&#xD;
FCM&#xD;
remains a&#xD;
viable touchstone in&#xD;
consideration of the two sides' perceptions of genetic risk.&#xD;
In this thesis&#xD;
the medical encounter&#xD;
between&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistanis&#xD;
and&#xD;
Health Professionals is&#xD;
performed&#xD;
within the realm of the so called&#xD;
New Genetics. Here the respective understandings of the&#xD;
New Genetics&#xD;
are&#xD;
informed by the enculturation processes that shape the two sides' world&#xD;
view.&#xD;
Furthermore, I&#xD;
will agree with&#xD;
Lord Robert Winston's&#xD;
and others' concern that any&#xD;
attempt&#xD;
to eradicate an adaptive genetic mutation,&#xD;
in this instance, thalassaemia, from the&#xD;
gene pool&#xD;
is&#xD;
not only undesirable&#xD;
in the short term, but&#xD;
also that such eradications may&#xD;
have&#xD;
an adverse, and&#xD;
far&#xD;
reaching, effect on whole population groups&#xD;
in the future. The&#xD;
main&#xD;
thrust of my argument&#xD;
is that audit culture not only compounds risk&#xD;
for both&#xD;
sides,&#xD;
but&#xD;
also&#xD;
perpetuates institutional&#xD;
racism within the National Health Service (NHS), by&#xD;
promulgating&#xD;
what&#xD;
I have&#xD;
called the language&#xD;
myth.&#xD;
That is to say that much&#xD;
institutional&#xD;
racism&#xD;
is the&#xD;
unwanted&#xD;
by-product&#xD;
of the NHS's&#xD;
attempts to become&#xD;
more patient centred and&#xD;
its&#xD;
continuing efforts to develop&#xD;
systems of&#xD;
best practice.&#xD;
This&#xD;
professionalisation process&#xD;
within&#xD;
the NHS&#xD;
can&#xD;
be&#xD;
seen to impact&#xD;
most strongly&#xD;
in&#xD;
relation to communication&#xD;
-&#xD;
particularly the claimed&#xD;
language barrier between the two sides.&#xD;
This `barrier' has worrying&#xD;
policy&#xD;
implications for&#xD;
any meaningful communication&#xD;
between the two sides, notably&#xD;
relating to obtaining&#xD;
informed&#xD;
consent&#xD;
from&#xD;
ethnic&#xD;
Pakistani&#xD;
patients&#xD;
-&#xD;
with a resultant&#xD;
increase in&#xD;
risk&#xD;
for&#xD;
the two sides and clear economic consequences for the NHS.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Indexicality and presupposition : explorations beyond truth-conditional information</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1704" />
    <author>
      <name>Stokke, Andreas</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1704</id>
    <updated>2011-03-18T11:38:24Z</updated>
    <published>2010-11-30T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.&#xD;
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.&#xD;
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.&#xD;
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while&#xD;
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-11-30T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Stokke, Andreas</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis consists of four essays and an introduction dedicated to two main topics: indexicality and presupposition.&#xD;
The first essay is concerned with an alleged problem for the standard treatment of indexicals on which their linguistic meanings are functions from context to content (so-called characters). Since most indexicals have their content settled, on an occasion of use, by the speaker’s intentions, some authors have argued that this standard picture is inadequate. By demonstrating that intentions can be seen as a parameter of the kind of context that characters operate on, these arguments are rejected. In addition, it is argued that a more recent, variable-based framework is naturally interpreted as an intention-sensitive semantics.&#xD;
The second essay is devoted to the phenomenon of descriptive uses of indexicals on which such an expression seems to contribute, not its standard reference as determined by its character, but a property to the interpretation. An argument that singular readings of the cases in question are incoherent is shown to be incorrect, and an approach to descriptive readings is developed on which they arise from e-type uses akin to other well known cases. Further, descriptive readings of the relevant kind are seen to arise only in the presence of adverbs of quantification, and all sentences in which such an adverb takes scope over an indexical are claimed to be ambiguous between a referential and an e-type (descriptive) reading.&#xD;
The third essay discusses a version of the variable analysis of pronouns on which their descriptive meanings are relegated to the so-called phi-features – person, gender and number. In turn, the phi-features are here seen as triggering semantic presuppositions that place constraints on the definedness of pronouns, and ultimately of sentences in which they appear. It is argued that the descriptive information contributed by the phi-features diverges radically from presuppositional information of both semantic and pragmatic varieties on several dimensions of comparison, and instead the main role of the phi-features is seen to be that of guiding hearers’ attempts to ascertain the speaker’s intentions. The fourth essay addresses an issue concerning the treatment of presuppositions in dynamic semantics. Representing a semantic treatment of pragmatic presuppositions, the dynamic framework is shown to incorrectly regard conversational infelicity as sufficient for semantic undefinedness, given the standard way of defining truth in terms of context change. Further, it is shown that a proposal for a solution fail to make correct predictions for epistemic modals. A novel framework is developed on which context change potentials act on contexts that have more structure than the contexts usually countenanced by dynamic semantics, and it is shown that this framework derives truth from context change while&#xD;
making correct predictions for both presuppositions and modals.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Elastic selves and fluid cosmologies : Nahua resilience in a changing world</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1690" />
    <author>
      <name>Feather, Conrad</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1690</id>
    <updated>2012-11-02T14:53:16Z</updated>
    <published>2010-11-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In May 1984, the Nahua, a Panoan speaking indigenous people living in a remote corner&#xD;
of the Peruvian Amazon, experienced their ‘first contact’ with Peruvian national&#xD;
society. 25 years later they appear to many observers to have ‘thrown away their&#xD;
culture’ under pressure from the outside world. This thesis argues instead that these&#xD;
changes were adopted by the Nahua for their own very good reasons and that these&#xD;
transformations reflect greater continuity with the past than first appears.&#xD;
The apparent lack of nostalgia that the Nahua have for the past instead reflects an&#xD;
inherent capacity for flexibility. This flexibility is manifested at a collective level in the&#xD;
frequent fissions of local groups and at an individual level in their susceptibility to&#xD;
losing their sense of self. The thesis focuses on two key aspects of this flexibility.&#xD;
The first is that the Nahua understand the site of their personal transformations to be the&#xD;
body which they describe as ‘soft’. This ‘softness’ refers to its ability to incorporate&#xD;
other worldly powers and become like the animals they eat or the people with whom&#xD;
they co-reside. Nevertheless, this capacity also means they can become ‘other’ when&#xD;
they live apart from their kin. This elasticity of selfhood is typical of many indigenous&#xD;
Amazonian peoples but the Nahua sit at the more flexible end of this spectrum. This is&#xD;
because they cultivate an attitude of radical hunger towards the outside world and place&#xD;
relatively less importance on techniques of restraint and control.&#xD;
The second aspect is the astonishing flexibility of Nahua worldviews. This is because&#xD;
their cosmologies are less a fixed set of facts and more a shamanic technique of&#xD;
knowing the unknown. These techniques help the Nahua understand the mysteries of&#xD;
the spirit world, their dreams and the world of Peruvians.&#xD;
In conclusion, it is the ‘softness’ of their bodies, the elasticity of their selves and the&#xD;
flexibility of their cosmologies that explain the extraordinary resilience of the Nahua in&#xD;
the face of dramatic transformations in the surrounding world.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-11-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Feather, Conrad</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In May 1984, the Nahua, a Panoan speaking indigenous people living in a remote corner&#xD;
of the Peruvian Amazon, experienced their ‘first contact’ with Peruvian national&#xD;
society. 25 years later they appear to many observers to have ‘thrown away their&#xD;
culture’ under pressure from the outside world. This thesis argues instead that these&#xD;
changes were adopted by the Nahua for their own very good reasons and that these&#xD;
transformations reflect greater continuity with the past than first appears.&#xD;
The apparent lack of nostalgia that the Nahua have for the past instead reflects an&#xD;
inherent capacity for flexibility. This flexibility is manifested at a collective level in the&#xD;
frequent fissions of local groups and at an individual level in their susceptibility to&#xD;
losing their sense of self. The thesis focuses on two key aspects of this flexibility.&#xD;
The first is that the Nahua understand the site of their personal transformations to be the&#xD;
body which they describe as ‘soft’. This ‘softness’ refers to its ability to incorporate&#xD;
other worldly powers and become like the animals they eat or the people with whom&#xD;
they co-reside. Nevertheless, this capacity also means they can become ‘other’ when&#xD;
they live apart from their kin. This elasticity of selfhood is typical of many indigenous&#xD;
Amazonian peoples but the Nahua sit at the more flexible end of this spectrum. This is&#xD;
because they cultivate an attitude of radical hunger towards the outside world and place&#xD;
relatively less importance on techniques of restraint and control.&#xD;
The second aspect is the astonishing flexibility of Nahua worldviews. This is because&#xD;
their cosmologies are less a fixed set of facts and more a shamanic technique of&#xD;
knowing the unknown. These techniques help the Nahua understand the mysteries of&#xD;
the spirit world, their dreams and the world of Peruvians.&#xD;
In conclusion, it is the ‘softness’ of their bodies, the elasticity of their selves and the&#xD;
flexibility of their cosmologies that explain the extraordinary resilience of the Nahua in&#xD;
the face of dramatic transformations in the surrounding world.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The demandingness of Scanlon's contractualism</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1568" />
    <author>
      <name>Ashford, Elizabeth</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1568</id>
    <updated>2013-05-12T01:02:10Z</updated>
    <published>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Ashford, Elizabeth</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Gypsy/Roma diasporas. A comparative perspective</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1508" />
    <author>
      <name>Gay y Blasco, Paloma</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1508</id>
    <updated>2012-12-12T12:09:17Z</updated>
    <published>2002-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this article I explore the imaginative and practical links that the Gitanos of Jarana, in Madrid, make with other Gitanos and Gypsies elsewhere. What kind of diaspora do they see themselves as belonging to? The context to my investigation is the fast growth of both Gypsy Pentecostalism and Roma international political activism – two movements that, in very different ways, call for the unity of all Gypsies/Roma worldwide. Their efforts contrast greatly with the world-views and attitudes of many of the people of Jarana who reject social harmony and cohesion as paths to community-making.</summary>
    <dc:date>2002-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Gay y Blasco, Paloma</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this article I explore the imaginative and practical links that the Gitanos of Jarana, in Madrid, make with other Gitanos and Gypsies elsewhere. What kind of diaspora do they see themselves as belonging to? The context to my investigation is the fast growth of both Gypsy Pentecostalism and Roma international political activism – two movements that, in very different ways, call for the unity of all Gypsies/Roma worldwide. Their efforts contrast greatly with the world-views and attitudes of many of the people of Jarana who reject social harmony and cohesion as paths to community-making.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Aristotle on ethical ascription : a philosophical exercise in the interpretation of the role and significance of the hekousios/akousios distinction in Aristotle's Ethics</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348" />
    <author>
      <name>Echeñique, Javier</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1348</id>
    <updated>2010-11-17T15:24:52Z</updated>
    <published>2010-09-22T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-09-22T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Echeñique, Javier</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In his ethical treatises Aristotle offers a rich account of those conditions that render people’s behaviour involuntary, and defines voluntariness on the basis of the absence of these conditions. This dissertation has two aims. One is to offer an account of the significance of the notions of involuntariness and voluntariness for Aristotle’s ethical project that satisfactorily explains why he deems it necessary to discuss these notions in his Ethics. My own account of the significance of these notions for Aristotle’s Ethics emerges from my arguments against the two most influential views concerning this significance: I argue that Aristotle’s concern with voluntariness in his Ethics is not (primarily) shaped by a concern with accountability, i.e. with those conditions under which fully mature and healthy rational agents are held accountable or answerable for their actions; nor is it (primarily) shaped by a concern with the conditioning of pain-responsive agents for the sake of socially useful ends that are not, intrinsically, their own. Rather, his concern is with reason-responsive agents (which are not morally accountable agents, nor merely pain-responsive agents) and the conditions for attributing ethically significant behaviour to them. This is what I call ‘ethical ascription’. The second aim of this dissertation is to provide a comprehensive account of those conditions that defeat the ascription of ethically significant pieces of behaviour to reason-responsive agents, and to show the distinctiveness of Aristotle’s views on the nature of these conditions. The conclusions I arrive at in this respect are shaped by the notion of ethical ascription that I develop as a way of reaching the first aim.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Sounds of satire, echoes of madness : performance and evaluation in Cefalonia, Greece</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1016" />
    <author>
      <name>Pollatou, Efpraxia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1016</id>
    <updated>2010-10-14T09:16:40Z</updated>
    <published>2009-08-05T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is about the construction of 'satire' as an exclusive practice among the Cefalonian and hence proposes the term satiricity (satirikotita). It explores the construction of the category of the Cefalonian "madman" by means of dialogics between performance and evaluation. It is observed that the relation depends on three principles that obtain among audience members and a performer: conditioning the performance, participation in and observation of the performance and evaluation of it. Being one of the few anthropological studies on the Ionian islands of Greece, this thesis aims to contribute to the anthropology of the Ionian islands and of Cefalonia in particular. It looks at the relation between a town and a village on the ground of teasing events and refutes the argument of satire as an urban phenomenon only. It sets the elementary principles towards anthropology of satire and emphasizes the importance of studying everyday teasing events. It also contributes to understanding a 'native' researcher's presence in different ways. Satiricity is seen as a 'par excellence' feature that Cefalonians have. No matter if Cefalonia is a part of the Greek nation-state and people follow 'modern Greek culture', they still employ satiricity as a way of distancing themselves from Greeks. 'Distance' is forged on the basis of absolute exclusion of Greeks from having, practising and understanding satiricity in the way that Cefalonians do. The Conclusions leave the ground open for more investigation on teasing events and application of such viewpoints around other areas of the island, and of the Ionian islands or other Greek islands. I also point to studies looking at island and mainland teasing events and potential differences. After all, we need to examine not only how people construct the claim on the exclusivity of 'satire'. We need to examine how such a claim is applied, supported or contrasted and possibly rejected when Cefalonians engage with other Greeks away from the island.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-08-05T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pollatou, Efpraxia</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is about the construction of 'satire' as an exclusive practice among the Cefalonian and hence proposes the term satiricity (satirikotita). It explores the construction of the category of the Cefalonian "madman" by means of dialogics between performance and evaluation. It is observed that the relation depends on three principles that obtain among audience members and a performer: conditioning the performance, participation in and observation of the performance and evaluation of it. Being one of the few anthropological studies on the Ionian islands of Greece, this thesis aims to contribute to the anthropology of the Ionian islands and of Cefalonia in particular. It looks at the relation between a town and a village on the ground of teasing events and refutes the argument of satire as an urban phenomenon only. It sets the elementary principles towards anthropology of satire and emphasizes the importance of studying everyday teasing events. It also contributes to understanding a 'native' researcher's presence in different ways. Satiricity is seen as a 'par excellence' feature that Cefalonians have. No matter if Cefalonia is a part of the Greek nation-state and people follow 'modern Greek culture', they still employ satiricity as a way of distancing themselves from Greeks. 'Distance' is forged on the basis of absolute exclusion of Greeks from having, practising and understanding satiricity in the way that Cefalonians do. The Conclusions leave the ground open for more investigation on teasing events and application of such viewpoints around other areas of the island, and of the Ionian islands or other Greek islands. I also point to studies looking at island and mainland teasing events and potential differences. After all, we need to examine not only how people construct the claim on the exclusivity of 'satire'. We need to examine how such a claim is applied, supported or contrasted and possibly rejected when Cefalonians engage with other Greeks away from the island.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Russians abroad in postcommunist cinema</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1015" />
    <author>
      <name>Kristensen, Lars Lyngsgaard Fjord</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1015</id>
    <updated>2010-12-06T16:10:12Z</updated>
    <published>2010-07-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <dc:date>2010-07-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kristensen, Lars Lyngsgaard Fjord</dc:creator>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A grammar of Resígaro</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1012" />
    <author>
      <name>Allin, Trevor R.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1012</id>
    <updated>2010-09-22T14:41:31Z</updated>
    <published>1976-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The thesis gives a description within the framework of tagmemic theory of Resigaro,  a South American Indian language&#xD;
of the Huitoto group, spoken in the region between the Amazon and the Putumayo, in north-eastern Peru.&#xD;
The Introduction reviews critically previous work on the language, and sets out modifications in tagmemic theory which&#xD;
it is claimed avoid circularity and repetition and improve the&#xD;
description. Principal among these is a strict separation of&#xD;
the three modes of Contrast, Variation and Distribution, and the use of multiplication of derive structures.&#xD;
Part I of the thesis describes the first two levels of the&#xD;
Phonological Hierarchy - Phoneme level and Syllable level.&#xD;
Part II describes the grammatical hierarchy, in which the following levels are set up:&#xD;
Root&#xD;
Stem&#xD;
Word&#xD;
(Group)&#xD;
(Piece)&#xD;
Phrase&#xD;
Clause &#xD;
Sentence &#xD;
(Group and Piece are sub-levels affecting only the Verb class.)  Each Level is described in a separate chapter, starting at the lowest level (Root).  Each class (Verb, Noun, Pronoun, etc.) is described in turn at each level at which it has elements.                                     At Phrase level, Phrases are described as being either Endocentric or Axis-Relator.  Endocentric Phrases (Verb, Noun, and Numeral) are described first.                                        At Clause level, the description of Clause structure is preceded by a description of Clause-level tagmemes - first the nuclear, and then the peripheral tagmemes.  It is indicated that this simplifies the presentation of Clause structure.                                    Under Clause structure, the Declarative clause is described first, and other Clause classes are derived from this, viz.: Interrogative, Imperative, Nominalized and Relativized.                                  The description of the Contrast and Variation modes of Sentence level is followed by an analysis of the first section of a text.&#xD;
&#xD;
Appendix I presents a lexicon of Resigaro in two parts: Part I is Resigaro-Spanish-English, and Part II is Spanish-Resigaro.&#xD;
&#xD;
Appendix II presents a 376-word four-language comparative word list for Resigaro, Bora, Ocaina and Huitoto Muinane</summary>
    <dc:date>1976-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Allin, Trevor R.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The thesis gives a description within the framework of tagmemic theory of Resigaro,  a South American Indian language&#xD;
of the Huitoto group, spoken in the region between the Amazon and the Putumayo, in north-eastern Peru.&#xD;
The Introduction reviews critically previous work on the language, and sets out modifications in tagmemic theory which&#xD;
it is claimed avoid circularity and repetition and improve the&#xD;
description. Principal among these is a strict separation of&#xD;
the three modes of Contrast, Variation and Distribution, and the use of multiplication of derive structures.&#xD;
Part I of the thesis describes the first two levels of the&#xD;
Phonological Hierarchy - Phoneme level and Syllable level.&#xD;
Part II describes the grammatical hierarchy, in which the following levels are set up:&#xD;
Root&#xD;
Stem&#xD;
Word&#xD;
(Group)&#xD;
(Piece)&#xD;
Phrase&#xD;
Clause &#xD;
Sentence &#xD;
(Group and Piece are sub-levels affecting only the Verb class.)  Each Level is described in a separate chapter, starting at the lowest level (Root).  Each class (Verb, Noun, Pronoun, etc.) is described in turn at each level at which it has elements.                                     At Phrase level, Phrases are described as being either Endocentric or Axis-Relator.  Endocentric Phrases (Verb, Noun, and Numeral) are described first.                                        At Clause level, the description of Clause structure is preceded by a description of Clause-level tagmemes - first the nuclear, and then the peripheral tagmemes.  It is indicated that this simplifies the presentation of Clause structure.                                    Under Clause structure, the Declarative clause is described first, and other Clause classes are derived from this, viz.: Interrogative, Imperative, Nominalized and Relativized.                                  The description of the Contrast and Variation modes of Sentence level is followed by an analysis of the first section of a text.&#xD;
&#xD;
Appendix I presents a lexicon of Resigaro in two parts: Part I is Resigaro-Spanish-English, and Part II is Spanish-Resigaro.&#xD;
&#xD;
Appendix II presents a 376-word four-language comparative word list for Resigaro, Bora, Ocaina and Huitoto Muinane</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The astronomy of Andean myth : the history of a cosmology</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1011" />
    <author>
      <name>Sullivan, William F.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1011</id>
    <updated>2011-07-21T15:24:41Z</updated>
    <published>1986-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The paper aims to show that Andean myth, on one level, represents a technical language recording astronomical observations of precession and, at the same time, an historical record of simultaneous social and celestial transformations. &#xD;
&#xD;
Topographic and architectural terms of Andean myth are interpreted as a metaphor for the organisation of and locations on the celestial sphere. Via ethnoastronmical data, mythical animals are identified as stars and placed on the celestial sphere according to their "topographical " location. Tested in the planetarium, these "arrays" generate clusters of dates -  200 B.C. and 650. A. D. Analysis of the names of Wiraqocha and Manco Capac indicates they represent Saturn and Jupiter and that their mythical meeting represents their conjunction in 650 A.D. &#xD;
&#xD;
The astronomy of Andean myth is then used as an historical tool to examine how  the Andean priest-astronomers recorded the simultaneous creation of the ayllu and of this distinctive astronomical system about 200 B.C. The idea that the agricultural ayllu, with its double descent system stressing the importance of paternity, represents a transformation of society from an earlier matrilineal/horticultural era is examined in light of the sexual&#xD;
imagery employed in myth. Wiraqocha’s androgyny and the division of the celestial sphere&#xD;
into male (ecliptic) and -female(celestial equator = “earth” ) are interpreted as cosmological validations of the new social structure.</summary>
    <dc:date>1986-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sullivan, William F.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The paper aims to show that Andean myth, on one level, represents a technical language recording astronomical observations of precession and, at the same time, an historical record of simultaneous social and celestial transformations. &#xD;
&#xD;
Topographic and architectural terms of Andean myth are interpreted as a metaphor for the organisation of and locations on the celestial sphere. Via ethnoastronmical data, mythical animals are identified as stars and placed on the celestial sphere according to their "topographical " location. Tested in the planetarium, these "arrays" generate clusters of dates -  200 B.C. and 650. A. D. Analysis of the names of Wiraqocha and Manco Capac indicates they represent Saturn and Jupiter and that their mythical meeting represents their conjunction in 650 A.D. &#xD;
&#xD;
The astronomy of Andean myth is then used as an historical tool to examine how  the Andean priest-astronomers recorded the simultaneous creation of the ayllu and of this distinctive astronomical system about 200 B.C. The idea that the agricultural ayllu, with its double descent system stressing the importance of paternity, represents a transformation of society from an earlier matrilineal/horticultural era is examined in light of the sexual&#xD;
imagery employed in myth. Wiraqocha’s androgyny and the division of the celestial sphere&#xD;
into male (ecliptic) and -female(celestial equator = “earth” ) are interpreted as cosmological validations of the new social structure.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The making of real people : an interpretation of a morality-centred theory of sociality, livelihood and selfhood among the Muinane (Colombian Amazon)</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1010" />
    <author>
      <name>Londoño Sulkin, Carlos David</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1010</id>
    <updated>2011-07-22T15:23:45Z</updated>
    <published>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this monograph I interpret a wide-ranging native theory of sociality of&#xD;
the Muinane, an indigenous group of the Colombian Amazon. This theory&#xD;
simultaneously addresses their livelihood activities, some aspects of their&#xD;
phenomenological experience, their bodily form, their group identity, and their&#xD;
views on the achievement of a uniquely human, morally sociable way of life.&#xD;
The Muinane understand their thoughts/emotions as well as their bodies to be&#xD;
material in origin and character. Proper bodies and thoughts/emotions are&#xD;
made out of ritual substances and foodstuffs, which have divine subjectivities&#xD;
and agencies of their own, and which ‘sound’ through people, establishing&#xD;
people's subjectivities and agencies. Such subjectivities and agencies lead to&#xD;
the communal achievement of `coolness', the state of convivial sociability,&#xD;
tranquility, abundance and generalised good health that constitutes ideal&#xD;
community life. Because they share substances, kin are also understood to&#xD;
share bodily features and thoughts/emotions. Their consubstantiality leads to&#xD;
mutual love and to an intersubjectivity that enables them to live well together,&#xD;
without unseemly contestations or differences in ultimate moral purposes.&#xD;
However, the material character of bodies and thoughts/emotions is&#xD;
also a source of danger. Animals and other evil beings can sabotage proper&#xD;
community life by replacing people's moral substances with their own false&#xD;
ones, causing people to experience mad, envious, angry and even sorcerous&#xD;
thoughts/emotions, and to suffer from weakening or lethal bodily diseases.&#xD;
It is the moral obligation and inclination of properly constituted human&#xD;
beings to make new human beings, by intentionally forging their bodies, their&#xD;
thoughts/emotions and their ‘baskets of knowledge.’ They must do this by&#xD;
transforming evil substances into proper substances, through work and&#xD;
through everyday or sporadic rituals.&#xD;
The matters addressed in this monograph -native theories of sociality,&#xD;
of self, of livelihood and so on- are of central pertinence to ongoing&#xD;
discussions in Amazonianist anthropology.</summary>
    <dc:date>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Londoño Sulkin, Carlos David</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this monograph I interpret a wide-ranging native theory of sociality of&#xD;
the Muinane, an indigenous group of the Colombian Amazon. This theory&#xD;
simultaneously addresses their livelihood activities, some aspects of their&#xD;
phenomenological experience, their bodily form, their group identity, and their&#xD;
views on the achievement of a uniquely human, morally sociable way of life.&#xD;
The Muinane understand their thoughts/emotions as well as their bodies to be&#xD;
material in origin and character. Proper bodies and thoughts/emotions are&#xD;
made out of ritual substances and foodstuffs, which have divine subjectivities&#xD;
and agencies of their own, and which ‘sound’ through people, establishing&#xD;
people's subjectivities and agencies. Such subjectivities and agencies lead to&#xD;
the communal achievement of `coolness', the state of convivial sociability,&#xD;
tranquility, abundance and generalised good health that constitutes ideal&#xD;
community life. Because they share substances, kin are also understood to&#xD;
share bodily features and thoughts/emotions. Their consubstantiality leads to&#xD;
mutual love and to an intersubjectivity that enables them to live well together,&#xD;
without unseemly contestations or differences in ultimate moral purposes.&#xD;
However, the material character of bodies and thoughts/emotions is&#xD;
also a source of danger. Animals and other evil beings can sabotage proper&#xD;
community life by replacing people's moral substances with their own false&#xD;
ones, causing people to experience mad, envious, angry and even sorcerous&#xD;
thoughts/emotions, and to suffer from weakening or lethal bodily diseases.&#xD;
It is the moral obligation and inclination of properly constituted human&#xD;
beings to make new human beings, by intentionally forging their bodies, their&#xD;
thoughts/emotions and their ‘baskets of knowledge.’ They must do this by&#xD;
transforming evil substances into proper substances, through work and&#xD;
through everyday or sporadic rituals.&#xD;
The matters addressed in this monograph -native theories of sociality,&#xD;
of self, of livelihood and so on- are of central pertinence to ongoing&#xD;
discussions in Amazonianist anthropology.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Nahuatl in the Huasteca Hidalguense : a case study in the sociology of language</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1009" />
    <author>
      <name>Stiles, Neville</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1009</id>
    <updated>2011-06-17T15:44:56Z</updated>
    <published>1982-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis examines the vitality of Hidalgo Nahuatl (HN) in the&#xD;
communities of Jaltocan, Panacaxtlan, Santa Cruz, Santa Teresa&#xD;
and Zohuala in the Huasteca Hidalguense, Mexico.&#xD;
The research, conducted in Mexico and St. Andrews University&#xD;
from 1976-1982, applies an analysis of HN within the framework of&#xD;
the Sociology of Language and Dependency Theory, thereby using a&#xD;
multi-disciplinary approach. Through an investigation of the historical,&#xD;
social, cultural and economic factors related to HN, the&#xD;
latter is embedded in its reality.&#xD;
HN is shown to be originally a language of dependency and oppression,&#xD;
supported by a long mestizo tradition of "caciquismo". It is&#xD;
demonstrated that an increasing number of Spanish (S) monolinguals,&#xD;
together with other socio-economic factors, is encouraging Nahuas&#xD;
to bilingualize and S:: =A. is fast becoming the new language of dependency.&#xD;
The Hidalgo Nahuas possess practical reasons for the acquisition&#xD;
of S., these being to solve their daily problems - especially&#xD;
land tenancy -, to communicate with the mestizo out-group and to&#xD;
undertake trading with non-HN speakers. However, the Nahuas are&#xD;
not surrendering their native language as they bilingualize, but&#xD;
rather, tend to limit its usage to native Nahua contexts and speakers.&#xD;
HN has become important to the Nahuas in order to demonstrate&#xD;
their ethnic identity and territoriality.&#xD;
The introduction of government projects to the communities, such as&#xD;
the Castellanizacion project or bilingual-bicultural education, are&#xD;
shown to be theoretically bilingual in approach, but fail to take&#xD;
into account sufficiently the regional Indian language in the praxis.&#xD;
The stable maintenance of HN is highlighted by statistical results&#xD;
from the word-count of recorded texts, documents and publications&#xD;
and the range of morphological phenomena affecting S. words&#xD;
in HN is described with examples from the Corpus.&#xD;
The linguistic interference from S. in HN is located within Dependency&#xD;
Theory and this author suggests the use of the term dependency&#xD;
word rather than loan word and dependency language, thus implying&#xD;
 a diachronic sociological process which is reflected in HN.&#xD;
Extended Texts are offered as evidence of the linguistic standard&#xD;
of HN and attitudes of Nahuas towards their language are presented.&#xD;
The final conclusion is that modern HN is a viable, vital and&#xD;
functional language at the time of undertaking this research and&#xD;
demonstrates a frequent usage by a large number of speakers. HN&#xD;
has still not entered into:. -avital process of language death, as&#xD;
is the case in other Nahuatl-speaking regions of Mexico, and is&#xD;
still being maintained, particularly at community level, by adults&#xD;
and children alike.</summary>
    <dc:date>1982-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Stiles, Neville</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis examines the vitality of Hidalgo Nahuatl (HN) in the&#xD;
communities of Jaltocan, Panacaxtlan, Santa Cruz, Santa Teresa&#xD;
and Zohuala in the Huasteca Hidalguense, Mexico.&#xD;
The research, conducted in Mexico and St. Andrews University&#xD;
from 1976-1982, applies an analysis of HN within the framework of&#xD;
the Sociology of Language and Dependency Theory, thereby using a&#xD;
multi-disciplinary approach. Through an investigation of the historical,&#xD;
social, cultural and economic factors related to HN, the&#xD;
latter is embedded in its reality.&#xD;
HN is shown to be originally a language of dependency and oppression,&#xD;
supported by a long mestizo tradition of "caciquismo". It is&#xD;
demonstrated that an increasing number of Spanish (S) monolinguals,&#xD;
together with other socio-economic factors, is encouraging Nahuas&#xD;
to bilingualize and S:: =A. is fast becoming the new language of dependency.&#xD;
The Hidalgo Nahuas possess practical reasons for the acquisition&#xD;
of S., these being to solve their daily problems - especially&#xD;
land tenancy -, to communicate with the mestizo out-group and to&#xD;
undertake trading with non-HN speakers. However, the Nahuas are&#xD;
not surrendering their native language as they bilingualize, but&#xD;
rather, tend to limit its usage to native Nahua contexts and speakers.&#xD;
HN has become important to the Nahuas in order to demonstrate&#xD;
their ethnic identity and territoriality.&#xD;
The introduction of government projects to the communities, such as&#xD;
the Castellanizacion project or bilingual-bicultural education, are&#xD;
shown to be theoretically bilingual in approach, but fail to take&#xD;
into account sufficiently the regional Indian language in the praxis.&#xD;
The stable maintenance of HN is highlighted by statistical results&#xD;
from the word-count of recorded texts, documents and publications&#xD;
and the range of morphological phenomena affecting S. words&#xD;
in HN is described with examples from the Corpus.&#xD;
The linguistic interference from S. in HN is located within Dependency&#xD;
Theory and this author suggests the use of the term dependency&#xD;
word rather than loan word and dependency language, thus implying&#xD;
 a diachronic sociological process which is reflected in HN.&#xD;
Extended Texts are offered as evidence of the linguistic standard&#xD;
of HN and attitudes of Nahuas towards their language are presented.&#xD;
The final conclusion is that modern HN is a viable, vital and&#xD;
functional language at the time of undertaking this research and&#xD;
demonstrates a frequent usage by a large number of speakers. HN&#xD;
has still not entered into:. -avital process of language death, as&#xD;
is the case in other Nahuatl-speaking regions of Mexico, and is&#xD;
still being maintained, particularly at community level, by adults&#xD;
and children alike.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The hearer, the hunter and the agouti head : aspects of intercommunication and conviviality among the Pa'ikwené (Palikur) of French Guiana</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1008" />
    <author>
      <name>Passes, Alan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1008</id>
    <updated>2011-07-20T14:04:16Z</updated>
    <published>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The thesis is in the broadest terms an anthropological exploration of&#xD;
intercommunication; it concerns concepts and practices of speech and&#xD;
hearing among a Lowland Amazonian people, the Pa'ikwene, concentrating&#xD;
particularly on the community of Deuxieme Village Esperance in southern&#xD;
Guyane (French Guiana). A significant aspect of the subject is the&#xD;
axiological one, i. e., the moral and aesthetic values attaching to proper&#xD;
dialogic, and consequently social, relations - or what Ingold describes&#xD;
(1986: 141) as the "conversation that is social life".&#xD;
Revealing the speech of ordinary people to be as `powerful' in its way as that&#xD;
of chiefs, the study addresses the instrumentality of speaking and hearing in&#xD;
the creation and maintenance of sociality. Essentially, I argue that&#xD;
intersubjective communication does not so much `imply' Pa'ikwene society&#xD;
(Levi-Strauss 1973: 390) as construct it as a sociable, pleasurable and&#xD;
egalitarian entity; that it is, in short, one of the fundamental `tools for&#xD;
conviviality' (Illich 1973).&#xD;
While the role of language in the process of society has long been&#xD;
recognised by anthropology, and comprehensively investigated, tht of&#xD;
listening to it seems, perhaps because of the more `private' nature of the act,&#xD;
not to have enjoyed the same level of sociological interest. Given this&#xD;
imbalance, special emphasis is laid on native audition as embodied by the&#xD;
cultural phenomenon of "Tchimap", "to hear-listen-understand", and its use&#xD;
in three key spheres, the political, economic and magico-religious.&#xD;
One central issue deals with the agency and perceived value of "good&#xD;
hearing" in the generation of good relations between humans, and of&#xD;
productive ones between humans and non-humans. Another major theme,&#xD;
of relevance to the ongoing theoretical debate on 'individualismcollectivism',&#xD;
involves the efficacy of "Tchimap" as a performative means of&#xD;
personal autonomy, within and as part of, rather than in opposition to, the&#xD;
group.</summary>
    <dc:date>1998-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Passes, Alan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The thesis is in the broadest terms an anthropological exploration of&#xD;
intercommunication; it concerns concepts and practices of speech and&#xD;
hearing among a Lowland Amazonian people, the Pa'ikwene, concentrating&#xD;
particularly on the community of Deuxieme Village Esperance in southern&#xD;
Guyane (French Guiana). A significant aspect of the subject is the&#xD;
axiological one, i. e., the moral and aesthetic values attaching to proper&#xD;
dialogic, and consequently social, relations - or what Ingold describes&#xD;
(1986: 141) as the "conversation that is social life".&#xD;
Revealing the speech of ordinary people to be as `powerful' in its way as that&#xD;
of chiefs, the study addresses the instrumentality of speaking and hearing in&#xD;
the creation and maintenance of sociality. Essentially, I argue that&#xD;
intersubjective communication does not so much `imply' Pa'ikwene society&#xD;
(Levi-Strauss 1973: 390) as construct it as a sociable, pleasurable and&#xD;
egalitarian entity; that it is, in short, one of the fundamental `tools for&#xD;
conviviality' (Illich 1973).&#xD;
While the role of language in the process of society has long been&#xD;
recognised by anthropology, and comprehensively investigated, tht of&#xD;
listening to it seems, perhaps because of the more `private' nature of the act,&#xD;
not to have enjoyed the same level of sociological interest. Given this&#xD;
imbalance, special emphasis is laid on native audition as embodied by the&#xD;
cultural phenomenon of "Tchimap", "to hear-listen-understand", and its use&#xD;
in three key spheres, the political, economic and magico-religious.&#xD;
One central issue deals with the agency and perceived value of "good&#xD;
hearing" in the generation of good relations between humans, and of&#xD;
productive ones between humans and non-humans. Another major theme,&#xD;
of relevance to the ongoing theoretical debate on 'individualismcollectivism',&#xD;
involves the efficacy of "Tchimap" as a performative means of&#xD;
personal autonomy, within and as part of, rather than in opposition to, the&#xD;
group.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Quechua religious terms in the departments of Apurimac and San Martin, Peru</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1007" />
    <author>
      <name>McIntosh, G. Stewart</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1007</id>
    <updated>2010-10-01T15:08:57Z</updated>
    <published>1976-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: My thesis "Quechua Religious Terms in the Departments of&#xD;
Apurimac and San Martin, Peru" deals with the problem&#xD;
of changing meaning-loads of Quechua religious terms.&#xD;
I chose the departments (counties) of Apurimac and&#xD;
San Martin as representative of a montana (jungle)&#xD;
and sierra (mountain) Quechua culture respectively.&#xD;
The purpose of the thesis is to show though the analysis&#xD;
from a corpus of one hundred and thirty-two terms that&#xD;
Quechua religious terms still carry much of tine nearing&#xD;
load they had before the Spanish conquest despite more&#xD;
than four hundred years of religious and other cultural&#xD;
pressures. This study also highlights the difficulties&#xD;
and unresearched areas in the fields of dialectology&#xD;
and folklore of the Quechua culture, a culture that is&#xD;
still very much the life of some ten million people&#xD;
in Latin America today.</summary>
    <dc:date>1976-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>McIntosh, G. Stewart</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>My thesis "Quechua Religious Terms in the Departments of&#xD;
Apurimac and San Martin, Peru" deals with the problem&#xD;
of changing meaning-loads of Quechua religious terms.&#xD;
I chose the departments (counties) of Apurimac and&#xD;
San Martin as representative of a montana (jungle)&#xD;
and sierra (mountain) Quechua culture respectively.&#xD;
The purpose of the thesis is to show though the analysis&#xD;
from a corpus of one hundred and thirty-two terms that&#xD;
Quechua religious terms still carry much of tine nearing&#xD;
load they had before the Spanish conquest despite more&#xD;
than four hundred years of religious and other cultural&#xD;
pressures. This study also highlights the difficulties&#xD;
and unresearched areas in the fields of dialectology&#xD;
and folklore of the Quechua culture, a culture that is&#xD;
still very much the life of some ten million people&#xD;
in Latin America today.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Evangelization in the writings of Latin American liberation theologians</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1006" />
    <author>
      <name>Pope-Levison, Priscilla</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1006</id>
    <updated>2011-07-21T14:02:43Z</updated>
    <published>1988-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation investigates evangelization in the writings of&#xD;
ten Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians who were chosen due to&#xD;
their interaction with the major themes of Liberation Theology and their&#xD;
interest in evangelization. The six Roman Catholic theologians include&#xD;
Leonardo Boff, Segundo Gulilea, Gustavo Gutihrrez, Archbishop Oscar&#xD;
Romero, Juan Luis Segundo, and Jon Sobrino. The four Protestant&#xD;
theologians include Mortimer Arias, Emilio Castro, Orlando Costas, and&#xD;
Jose Miguez Bonino. Along with a chapter on each theologian, two separate&#xD;
chapters are devoted to a comparison of the Roman Catholics as a&#xD;
group and the Protestants as a group. The concluding chapter collects&#xD;
the findings and presents a common view of evangelization in Latin&#xD;
American Liberation Theology. In addition, this thesis is set in its&#xD;
historical context with studies of evangelization in four Roman Catholic&#xD;
Documents – Vatican II, Medellin, Evanglii Nuntiandi, and Puebla, and&#xD;
WCC documents tram the New Delhi Assembly (1961) to the Vancouver&#xD;
Assembly (1983).&#xD;
&#xD;
This study demonstrates that evangelization is a central theme of&#xD;
Latin American Liberation Theology. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant&#xD;
liberation theologians devote a great deal of attention to this topic&#xD;
which serves for them as a bridge between theology and praxis. In the&#xD;
theological realm, evangelization is founded on the concept of the reign&#xD;
of God. III the arena of praxis, evangelization is centered on proclamation and action. &#xD;
In addition, evangelization stands as a theme around&#xD;
which Roman Catholic and Protestant liberation theologians unite; the&#xD;
similarities between them are significant and numerous.&#xD;
&#xD;
These theologians present a view of evangelization which has the&#xD;
potential to alter traditional understandings and existing structures of&#xD;
evangelization. Their concept of evangelization pioneers new frontiers&#xD;
as it interacts with liberation, the poor, denunciation, action, collective conversion, &#xD;
and a comprehensive view of the reign of God.</summary>
    <dc:date>1988-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pope-Levison, Priscilla</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation investigates evangelization in the writings of&#xD;
ten Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians who were chosen due to&#xD;
their interaction with the major themes of Liberation Theology and their&#xD;
interest in evangelization. The six Roman Catholic theologians include&#xD;
Leonardo Boff, Segundo Gulilea, Gustavo Gutihrrez, Archbishop Oscar&#xD;
Romero, Juan Luis Segundo, and Jon Sobrino. The four Protestant&#xD;
theologians include Mortimer Arias, Emilio Castro, Orlando Costas, and&#xD;
Jose Miguez Bonino. Along with a chapter on each theologian, two separate&#xD;
chapters are devoted to a comparison of the Roman Catholics as a&#xD;
group and the Protestants as a group. The concluding chapter collects&#xD;
the findings and presents a common view of evangelization in Latin&#xD;
American Liberation Theology. In addition, this thesis is set in its&#xD;
historical context with studies of evangelization in four Roman Catholic&#xD;
Documents – Vatican II, Medellin, Evanglii Nuntiandi, and Puebla, and&#xD;
WCC documents tram the New Delhi Assembly (1961) to the Vancouver&#xD;
Assembly (1983).&#xD;
&#xD;
This study demonstrates that evangelization is a central theme of&#xD;
Latin American Liberation Theology. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant&#xD;
liberation theologians devote a great deal of attention to this topic&#xD;
which serves for them as a bridge between theology and praxis. In the&#xD;
theological realm, evangelization is founded on the concept of the reign&#xD;
of God. III the arena of praxis, evangelization is centered on proclamation and action. &#xD;
In addition, evangelization stands as a theme around&#xD;
which Roman Catholic and Protestant liberation theologians unite; the&#xD;
similarities between them are significant and numerous.&#xD;
&#xD;
These theologians present a view of evangelization which has the&#xD;
potential to alter traditional understandings and existing structures of&#xD;
evangelization. Their concept of evangelization pioneers new frontiers&#xD;
as it interacts with liberation, the poor, denunciation, action, collective conversion, &#xD;
and a comprehensive view of the reign of God.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The biblical concept of conversion and its social implications from a Latin American perspective</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1005" />
    <author>
      <name>Mahecha, Guidoberto</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1005</id>
    <updated>2010-10-07T14:12:24Z</updated>
    <published>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This work presents a concept of conversion using the&#xD;
researches of Liberation theologians and the relation of&#xD;
Jesus to four groups in the Synoptics.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter one, the main concern is the hermeneutical&#xD;
problem as it defines the kind of emphasis the&#xD;
interpretation of the Bible will support. Liberation&#xD;
theology focuses on its context as the key aspect for a&#xD;
practical interpretation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter two six Liberation theologians are studied with&#xD;
a focus on the concept of conversion. All of them criticize&#xD;
the type of conversion that has produced a Christianity&#xD;
centered on spiritual features and disregarding the Latin&#xD;
American situation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter three the situation of Palestine in Jesus' time&#xD;
is described and the political, economic, and religious&#xD;
situation is explored. The aim of this chapter is to show&#xD;
that Jesus was born and lived under political, economic, and&#xD;
religious oppression.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter four the relationship of Jesus to four groups&#xD;
is stated. In relation to the Pharisees, two aspects are&#xD;
considered: that the table-fellowship of Jesus with the&#xD;
outcasts produced a confrontation with the Pharisees; and&#xD;
that, at least one time, Jesus talked about overriding the&#xD;
Law because of the Kingdom of God. In relation to the&#xD;
religious authorities, Jesus prophetically rejected the&#xD;
Temple and Its system. In relation to the Roman authorities,&#xD;
Jesus established that all things belong to God and that&#xD;
loyalty to any government must be relative. In relation to&#xD;
the rich and the poor, Jesus stressed through hard criticism&#xD;
of riches that the Good News are preferentially to the poor.&#xD;
&#xD;
In the conclusion, using "the relation of relationship"&#xD;
model of C. Boff, it is stated that the concept of&#xD;
conversion of Liberation theologians with social, economic&#xD;
and political implications, is based on the Scriptures and&#xD;
it is the best solution for Christianity in an oppressive&#xD;
situation.</summary>
    <dc:date>1991-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Mahecha, Guidoberto</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This work presents a concept of conversion using the&#xD;
researches of Liberation theologians and the relation of&#xD;
Jesus to four groups in the Synoptics.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter one, the main concern is the hermeneutical&#xD;
problem as it defines the kind of emphasis the&#xD;
interpretation of the Bible will support. Liberation&#xD;
theology focuses on its context as the key aspect for a&#xD;
practical interpretation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter two six Liberation theologians are studied with&#xD;
a focus on the concept of conversion. All of them criticize&#xD;
the type of conversion that has produced a Christianity&#xD;
centered on spiritual features and disregarding the Latin&#xD;
American situation.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter three the situation of Palestine in Jesus' time&#xD;
is described and the political, economic, and religious&#xD;
situation is explored. The aim of this chapter is to show&#xD;
that Jesus was born and lived under political, economic, and&#xD;
religious oppression.&#xD;
&#xD;
In chapter four the relationship of Jesus to four groups&#xD;
is stated. In relation to the Pharisees, two aspects are&#xD;
considered: that the table-fellowship of Jesus with the&#xD;
outcasts produced a confrontation with the Pharisees; and&#xD;
that, at least one time, Jesus talked about overriding the&#xD;
Law because of the Kingdom of God. In relation to the&#xD;
religious authorities, Jesus prophetically rejected the&#xD;
Temple and Its system. In relation to the Roman authorities,&#xD;
Jesus established that all things belong to God and that&#xD;
loyalty to any government must be relative. In relation to&#xD;
the rich and the poor, Jesus stressed through hard criticism&#xD;
of riches that the Good News are preferentially to the poor.&#xD;
&#xD;
In the conclusion, using "the relation of relationship"&#xD;
model of C. Boff, it is stated that the concept of&#xD;
conversion of Liberation theologians with social, economic&#xD;
and political implications, is based on the Scriptures and&#xD;
it is the best solution for Christianity in an oppressive&#xD;
situation.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>When sadness is beautiful : a study of the place of rationality and emotions within the social life of the Àve de Jesus</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1004" />
    <author>
      <name>Campos, Roberta Bivar Carneiro</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1004</id>
    <updated>2011-07-21T14:13:22Z</updated>
    <published>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The ethnographic object of study of my thesis is a group of penitents, called ‘Ave de&#xD;
Jesus’, that dwells in the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil. As many other groups and&#xD;
penitents of this area they have a strong devotion to Padre Cicero -a deceased priest who&#xD;
founded the city in which they live, Juazeiro do Norte - who they believe to be Jesus&#xD;
himself. In fact, according to them, all the events of the Bible there in Juazeiro do Norte,&#xD;
such that they live in a biblical time, the Bible being their actual history which should&#xD;
culminate in destruction - A final end to the world.&#xD;
&#xD;
The Ave de Jesus have incorporated into their form of life the ways of being and relating to&#xD;
the world of those missionaries and religious leaders from the past, such as Padre Ibiapina,&#xD;
Antonio Conselheiro, Padre Cicero, and many ‘beatos’ who wandered throughout the&#xD;
‘Sertao’* preaching penance and charity. Although these religious images make a lot of&#xD;
sense for those who live in such a harsh area as the ‘Sertoes’, there is no doubt that they&#xD;
are also in conflict with the mainstream system of interpretation of reality.&#xD;
&#xD;
In my thesis I explore how the biblical images take part in the construction and negotiation&#xD;
of truth and meaning, and how they work as references for acting, thinking and ‘feeling’.&#xD;
Because these biblical images are invariably related to moral sentiments - such as&#xD;
compassion, generosity, mercy, commiseration and a highly moral evaluation of the&#xD;
experience of suffering - that underlies the way of life of many penitents in Juazeiro, my&#xD;
thesis focuses on the social role of emotion in building up truth and creating sociability.&#xD;
&#xD;
The Chapter I provides the Introduction in which is given a bibliographical review on&#xD;
messianic and millenarian movements and pilgrimage, and points to my own theoretical&#xD;
choice. It is also in the introduction that I discuss the issue of rationality, ideology and&#xD;
narratives related to the problem of my research and the methodological approach.&#xD;
In Chapter III provide an overall ethnography of penance within the surrounds of Juazeiro&#xD;
do Norte in the past and present.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter III I first introduce a brief ethnography of the Ave de Jesus.&#xD;
In Chapter IV I explore the situation of conflict between systems of interpretation within&#xD;
which Master Jose - the leader of the Ave de Jesus - finds himself. The subject of&#xD;
discussion in this chapter is the role of the affective and beauty in negotiating meaning and&#xD;
constructing truth.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter VI dwell upon Emotions. In this chapter I provide a discussion concerning the&#xD;
importance of emotions in understanding the way of life of many penitents in Juazeiro do&#xD;
Norte, with special attention to the Ave de Jesus. Another subject of discussion is what an&#xD;
emotion is about and their relation to action and thought. In my ethnography and&#xD;
interpretation of emotions I have focused on those emotions which are cognitively stressed&#xD;
by the Ave de Jesus, such as suffering, compassion, mercy, etc. which underlies their form&#xD;
of life.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter VI I provide a discussion on how images of charity are related to an ideal image&#xD;
of society -a Utopia. By going deeper into the relation between images of suffering,&#xD;
poverty and mendicancy I explore how the Ave de Jesus creates a sociality based on&#xD;
generosity, hospitality and sharing whereby they realise a messianic expectation.&#xD;
In the Conclusion I have tried to answer the main task of my thesis, that is, to provide an&#xD;
understanding of how sadness is beautiful. Through all the issues elected to for discussion&#xD;
in each chapter I intend to give support to my interpretation of the role and importance of&#xD;
emotions within the social life of the Ave de Jesus.&#xD;
&#xD;
*The semi-arid backlands of Northeast Brazil</summary>
    <dc:date>2000-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Campos, Roberta Bivar Carneiro</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The ethnographic object of study of my thesis is a group of penitents, called ‘Ave de&#xD;
Jesus’, that dwells in the hinterlands of Northeast Brazil. As many other groups and&#xD;
penitents of this area they have a strong devotion to Padre Cicero -a deceased priest who&#xD;
founded the city in which they live, Juazeiro do Norte - who they believe to be Jesus&#xD;
himself. In fact, according to them, all the events of the Bible there in Juazeiro do Norte,&#xD;
such that they live in a biblical time, the Bible being their actual history which should&#xD;
culminate in destruction - A final end to the world.&#xD;
&#xD;
The Ave de Jesus have incorporated into their form of life the ways of being and relating to&#xD;
the world of those missionaries and religious leaders from the past, such as Padre Ibiapina,&#xD;
Antonio Conselheiro, Padre Cicero, and many ‘beatos’ who wandered throughout the&#xD;
‘Sertao’* preaching penance and charity. Although these religious images make a lot of&#xD;
sense for those who live in such a harsh area as the ‘Sertoes’, there is no doubt that they&#xD;
are also in conflict with the mainstream system of interpretation of reality.&#xD;
&#xD;
In my thesis I explore how the biblical images take part in the construction and negotiation&#xD;
of truth and meaning, and how they work as references for acting, thinking and ‘feeling’.&#xD;
Because these biblical images are invariably related to moral sentiments - such as&#xD;
compassion, generosity, mercy, commiseration and a highly moral evaluation of the&#xD;
experience of suffering - that underlies the way of life of many penitents in Juazeiro, my&#xD;
thesis focuses on the social role of emotion in building up truth and creating sociability.&#xD;
&#xD;
The Chapter I provides the Introduction in which is given a bibliographical review on&#xD;
messianic and millenarian movements and pilgrimage, and points to my own theoretical&#xD;
choice. It is also in the introduction that I discuss the issue of rationality, ideology and&#xD;
narratives related to the problem of my research and the methodological approach.&#xD;
In Chapter III provide an overall ethnography of penance within the surrounds of Juazeiro&#xD;
do Norte in the past and present.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter III I first introduce a brief ethnography of the Ave de Jesus.&#xD;
In Chapter IV I explore the situation of conflict between systems of interpretation within&#xD;
which Master Jose - the leader of the Ave de Jesus - finds himself. The subject of&#xD;
discussion in this chapter is the role of the affective and beauty in negotiating meaning and&#xD;
constructing truth.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter VI dwell upon Emotions. In this chapter I provide a discussion concerning the&#xD;
importance of emotions in understanding the way of life of many penitents in Juazeiro do&#xD;
Norte, with special attention to the Ave de Jesus. Another subject of discussion is what an&#xD;
emotion is about and their relation to action and thought. In my ethnography and&#xD;
interpretation of emotions I have focused on those emotions which are cognitively stressed&#xD;
by the Ave de Jesus, such as suffering, compassion, mercy, etc. which underlies their form&#xD;
of life.&#xD;
&#xD;
In Chapter VI I provide a discussion on how images of charity are related to an ideal image&#xD;
of society -a Utopia. By going deeper into the relation between images of suffering,&#xD;
poverty and mendicancy I explore how the Ave de Jesus creates a sociality based on&#xD;
generosity, hospitality and sharing whereby they realise a messianic expectation.&#xD;
In the Conclusion I have tried to answer the main task of my thesis, that is, to provide an&#xD;
understanding of how sadness is beautiful. Through all the issues elected to for discussion&#xD;
in each chapter I intend to give support to my interpretation of the role and importance of&#xD;
emotions within the social life of the Ave de Jesus.&#xD;
&#xD;
*The semi-arid backlands of Northeast Brazil</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Fertile words : aspects of language and sociality among Yanomami people of Venezuela</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1003" />
    <author>
      <name>Rubio, Javier Carrera</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1003</id>
    <updated>2011-07-20T15:30:57Z</updated>
    <published>2004-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In the first part of the thesis (Chapters I to 7)1 discuss two Yanomami myths of&#xD;
origin, namely the myth of the origin of the night, and the myth of the master of&#xD;
banana plants. While drawing heavily on Lizot's ethnographical and linguistic&#xD;
work, my analysis of the myth will be embedded within two interconnected&#xD;
debates of present concern to anthropology: On the one hand, the strong&#xD;
linkage between the poetics of myth narration and the poetics of the everyday&#xD;
life. To better explore this relationship I will also drawn on Overing's recent work&#xD;
on the fundamental importance of understanding the political philosophy that&#xD;
pervades such linkage. On the other hand there is also the important role that&#xD;
the world of the felt, the senses and passions play in Yanomami conceptions&#xD;
and practices of sociality.&#xD;
In part 2 of the thesis, I deal with the issue of Yanomami warfare by describing&#xD;
Yanomami people's understanding of warfare. In doing this, I endeavour to&#xD;
develop a shift from the anthropologist's theories of war among the Yanomami&#xD;
to the Yanomami's own theories about both peace and its failure. War and&#xD;
conflict are addressed here from the point of view of the Yanomami aesthetics&#xD;
of their own convivial relations and sociality, along with its multiple oral&#xD;
expressions. I demonstrate that Yanomami people have their own (strong)&#xD;
theories about what is conducive to peace and war and how these theories are&#xD;
grounded in moral and political values attached to a particular Yanomami&#xD;
aesthetics of egalitarianism. In doing this, I explore the way Lizot emphasises&#xD;
the dialectic between Yanomami conceptions of peace and warfare.&#xD;
Furthermore, through an exploration of the linkage Lizot establishes between&#xD;
Yanomami warfare and their morality, I wish to shed new light on the political&#xD;
dimensions of their conflicts and the place of warfare in their culturally specific&#xD;
aesthetics of egalitarian relationships.&#xD;
Part 3 of the thesis (chapters 9, 10, 11) deals with the Yanomami elders'&#xD;
speech, a mode of communication that has been almost neglected in other&#xD;
previous works. After having discussed various topics (myth and the everyday,&#xD;
Yanomami warfare) through which various aspects of Yanomami moral and&#xD;
political philosophy can be grasped, in this last part of the thesis I show the&#xD;
strong linkage between such philosophy and this type of speech. The elders'&#xD;
speech is dealt with in various parts of the thesis and also in various ways. First,&#xD;
and departing from the way a myth of origin explicitly makes references to it, I&#xD;
illustrate, the way Yanomami people conceive of this type of speech. I do this by&#xD;
describing, following Hymes' (1981,2003) insights, the way in which the myth&#xD;
teller "describes" this speech in his narrative. Second, in Chapter 3, I make a&#xD;
brief description of the speech and in Chapters 9, 10, and 11 I provide&#xD;
fragments of the speech of an elder that I transcribed and analysed.</summary>
    <dc:date>2004-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Rubio, Javier Carrera</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In the first part of the thesis (Chapters I to 7)1 discuss two Yanomami myths of&#xD;
origin, namely the myth of the origin of the night, and the myth of the master of&#xD;
banana plants. While drawing heavily on Lizot's ethnographical and linguistic&#xD;
work, my analysis of the myth will be embedded within two interconnected&#xD;
debates of present concern to anthropology: On the one hand, the strong&#xD;
linkage between the poetics of myth narration and the poetics of the everyday&#xD;
life. To better explore this relationship I will also drawn on Overing's recent work&#xD;
on the fundamental importance of understanding the political philosophy that&#xD;
pervades such linkage. On the other hand there is also the important role that&#xD;
the world of the felt, the senses and passions play in Yanomami conceptions&#xD;
and practices of sociality.&#xD;
In part 2 of the thesis, I deal with the issue of Yanomami warfare by describing&#xD;
Yanomami people's understanding of warfare. In doing this, I endeavour to&#xD;
develop a shift from the anthropologist's theories of war among the Yanomami&#xD;
to the Yanomami's own theories about both peace and its failure. War and&#xD;
conflict are addressed here from the point of view of the Yanomami aesthetics&#xD;
of their own convivial relations and sociality, along with its multiple oral&#xD;
expressions. I demonstrate that Yanomami people have their own (strong)&#xD;
theories about what is conducive to peace and war and how these theories are&#xD;
grounded in moral and political values attached to a particular Yanomami&#xD;
aesthetics of egalitarianism. In doing this, I explore the way Lizot emphasises&#xD;
the dialectic between Yanomami conceptions of peace and warfare.&#xD;
Furthermore, through an exploration of the linkage Lizot establishes between&#xD;
Yanomami warfare and their morality, I wish to shed new light on the political&#xD;
dimensions of their conflicts and the place of warfare in their culturally specific&#xD;
aesthetics of egalitarian relationships.&#xD;
Part 3 of the thesis (chapters 9, 10, 11) deals with the Yanomami elders'&#xD;
speech, a mode of communication that has been almost neglected in other&#xD;
previous works. After having discussed various topics (myth and the everyday,&#xD;
Yanomami warfare) through which various aspects of Yanomami moral and&#xD;
political philosophy can be grasped, in this last part of the thesis I show the&#xD;
strong linkage between such philosophy and this type of speech. The elders'&#xD;
speech is dealt with in various parts of the thesis and also in various ways. First,&#xD;
and departing from the way a myth of origin explicitly makes references to it, I&#xD;
illustrate, the way Yanomami people conceive of this type of speech. I do this by&#xD;
describing, following Hymes' (1981,2003) insights, the way in which the myth&#xD;
teller "describes" this speech in his narrative. Second, in Chapter 3, I make a&#xD;
brief description of the speech and in Chapters 9, 10, and 11 I provide&#xD;
fragments of the speech of an elder that I transcribed and analysed.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The application of geomatic technologies in an indigenous context : Amazonian Indians and indigenous land rights</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1000" />
    <author>
      <name>Menell, David</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/1000</id>
    <updated>2010-09-22T15:52:41Z</updated>
    <published>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Indigenous people have employed Western analogue techniques (maps, charts, etc) to&#xD;
support their land rights ever since their traditional territories came under threat.&#xD;
Although indigenous groups utilise such tools there is still a significant divide between&#xD;
the epistemological conception of these analogue techniques and the ontology of the&#xD;
indigenous people. This research looks at one of the latest technologies to be utilised by&#xD;
indigenous peoples, that of geomatics technologies. It examines their design and&#xD;
application using the analytical techniques of anthropology juxtaposed with the&#xD;
geographical methodologies. Using both the literature and three case studies drawing&#xD;
from fieldwork conducted in the Peruvian Amazonian I argue that although previous&#xD;
analogue techniques carried a certain epistemological baggage, they were effectively&#xD;
neutral and did not impact of the ontology of the indigenous peoples. Geomatics&#xD;
technologies are not neutral and carry more than just baggage, so they are not so simply&#xD;
appropriated. Indigenous conceptions of landscape are not compatible with the current&#xD;
design of geomatics technologies but indigenous federations are increasingly employing&#xD;
them. The indigenous federation along with non-governmental organisations adopt the&#xD;
geomatics technologies because of their perceived authority in land rights and their&#xD;
applications in land management and saving cultural heritage. The State recognises this&#xD;
authority because the design and output of geomatics conforms to its legal system.&#xD;
However, indigenous peoples have a different agenda and conception of land rights.&#xD;
Their agenda is based on revitalising their heritage and land rights derived through self-determination.&#xD;
This research reveals such issues of power, politics and authenticity&#xD;
behind its application and the ontological and epistemological philosophy of its design.</summary>
    <dc:date>2003-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Menell, David</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Indigenous people have employed Western analogue techniques (maps, charts, etc) to&#xD;
support their land rights ever since their traditional territories came under threat.&#xD;
Although indigenous groups utilise such tools there is still a significant divide between&#xD;
the epistemological conception of these analogue techniques and the ontology of the&#xD;
indigenous people. This research looks at one of the latest technologies to be utilised by&#xD;
indigenous peoples, that of geomatics technologies. It examines their design and&#xD;
application using the analytical techniques of anthropology juxtaposed with the&#xD;
geographical methodologies. Using both the literature and three case studies drawing&#xD;
from fieldwork conducted in the Peruvian Amazonian I argue that although previous&#xD;
analogue techniques carried a certain epistemological baggage, they were effectively&#xD;
neutral and did not impact of the ontology of the indigenous peoples. Geomatics&#xD;
technologies are not neutral and carry more than just baggage, so they are not so simply&#xD;
appropriated. Indigenous conceptions of landscape are not compatible with the current&#xD;
design of geomatics technologies but indigenous federations are increasingly employing&#xD;
them. The indigenous federation along with non-governmental organisations adopt the&#xD;
geomatics technologies because of their perceived authority in land rights and their&#xD;
applications in land management and saving cultural heritage. The State recognises this&#xD;
authority because the design and output of geomatics conforms to its legal system.&#xD;
However, indigenous peoples have a different agenda and conception of land rights.&#xD;
Their agenda is based on revitalising their heritage and land rights derived through self-determination.&#xD;
This research reveals such issues of power, politics and authenticity&#xD;
behind its application and the ontological and epistemological philosophy of its design.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Aristotle's eudaimonia and two conceptions of happiness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/994" />
    <author>
      <name>Grech, George J.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/994</id>
    <updated>2010-11-12T14:30:56Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What&#xD;
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up&#xD;
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.&#xD;
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often&#xD;
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human&#xD;
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there&#xD;
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.&#xD;
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his&#xD;
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly&#xD;
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,&#xD;
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is&#xD;
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all&#xD;
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine&#xD;
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to&#xD;
the objection from perfectionism.&#xD;
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an&#xD;
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the&#xD;
better.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Grech, George J.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Are you happy? This question is asked of people by friends, parents and psychiatrists alike. What&#xD;
happiness consists of for each person seems, at first glance, to be entirely subjective in that is it up&#xD;
to each individual person to define what the happy-making ingredients of her life are.&#xD;
This dissertation centrally involves an interpretation of Aristotle’s eudaimonia, often&#xD;
translated as ‘happiness’. Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is an inquiry into the chief good for human&#xD;
beings, and according to Aristotle everyone agrees that this chief good is ‘happiness’, however there&#xD;
is major disagreement about what ‘happiness’ consists of.&#xD;
What follows critically interprets Aristotle’s eudaimonia through a close reading of his&#xD;
arguments. Once Aristotle’s eudaimonia is explicated, it is used to question the supposedly&#xD;
subjective conception of happiness that the happiness literature argues is pervasive. Finally,&#xD;
Aristotle’s eudaimonia is defended as a theory of well-being against a charge of perfectionism. It is&#xD;
argued that Aristotle’s eudaimonia commits its adherents to maximising virtuous activity at all&#xD;
times, that is, to perfect themselves. It is this interpretation of Aristotle that seeks to undermine&#xD;
eudaimonia as a plausible theory of well-being, and I end this dissertation by providing a response to&#xD;
the objection from perfectionism.&#xD;
This project attempts, fundamentally, to show that Aristotle’s eudaimonia is not simply an&#xD;
intellectual curiosity: studying eudaimonia can help change the way we live our lives, and for the&#xD;
better.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Drugs, danger, delusions (and Deleuzians?) : extreme film-philosophy journeys into and beyond the parallel body and mind.</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/985" />
    <author>
      <name>Fleming, David H.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/985</id>
    <updated>2010-09-13T11:40:25Z</updated>
    <published>2009-11-23T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Drugs, Danger, Delusions (and Deleuzians?) opens up a philosophical investigation into a series of ‘extreme’ mind and body films drawn from different historical contexts. Through two sections and four distinct chapters, cinema is explored as an agent of becoming that allows viewers to think and feel in an affected manner. Investigating a broad spectrum of extreme narratives focusing on drugs, hooligan violence, insomnia and madness, the project provides a focused historical understanding of the films’ affective regimes and aesthetic agendas. The different lines of flight and escape explored on-screen all somehow appear to spiral around the same issues, concepts, ideas and philosophies. Utilising the cinematic theories of Gilles Deleuze along with his philosophical work co-authored with Félix Guattari, the thesis aims to investigate a range of related films, that in the extreme, reveal underlying models of an integrated or parallel mind and body and immanently embedded identity; wherein the concept of a stable and fixed being is replaced by that of a fluid becoming. All chapters investigate how immanently embedded characters embark upon extreme or dangerous lines of escape, where the reinvention of living and thinking is explored and made visible. The first section investigates a range of ‘head-films’ that take the mind as their theme, but are found to plicate and expand consciousness into the parallel body. The second section investigates extreme body films that push the sensory-motor schema to its limits so that thought, perception and consciousness become affected. The two interrelated sections investigate how the films and filmmakers employ different regimes of mind and body cinema to aesthetically convey and relay these concepts to the spectator. The project thus strives to develop Deleuzian paradigms beyond their original scope to explore parallel-image regimes and sequences that allow spectators to think and feel&#xD;
the films’ underlying philosophical concepts and positions.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-11-23T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Fleming, David H.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Drugs, Danger, Delusions (and Deleuzians?) opens up a philosophical investigation into a series of ‘extreme’ mind and body films drawn from different historical contexts. Through two sections and four distinct chapters, cinema is explored as an agent of becoming that allows viewers to think and feel in an affected manner. Investigating a broad spectrum of extreme narratives focusing on drugs, hooligan violence, insomnia and madness, the project provides a focused historical understanding of the films’ affective regimes and aesthetic agendas. The different lines of flight and escape explored on-screen all somehow appear to spiral around the same issues, concepts, ideas and philosophies. Utilising the cinematic theories of Gilles Deleuze along with his philosophical work co-authored with Félix Guattari, the thesis aims to investigate a range of related films, that in the extreme, reveal underlying models of an integrated or parallel mind and body and immanently embedded identity; wherein the concept of a stable and fixed being is replaced by that of a fluid becoming. All chapters investigate how immanently embedded characters embark upon extreme or dangerous lines of escape, where the reinvention of living and thinking is explored and made visible. The first section investigates a range of ‘head-films’ that take the mind as their theme, but are found to plicate and expand consciousness into the parallel body. The second section investigates extreme body films that push the sensory-motor schema to its limits so that thought, perception and consciousness become affected. The two interrelated sections investigate how the films and filmmakers employ different regimes of mind and body cinema to aesthetically convey and relay these concepts to the spectator. The project thus strives to develop Deleuzian paradigms beyond their original scope to explore parallel-image regimes and sequences that allow spectators to think and feel&#xD;
the films’ underlying philosophical concepts and positions.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Two sources of moral reasons</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/981" />
    <author>
      <name>Macdonald, Iain Ezra</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/981</id>
    <updated>2010-08-26T11:14:24Z</updated>
    <published>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral&#xD;
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single&#xD;
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In&#xD;
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two&#xD;
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –&#xD;
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a&#xD;
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the&#xD;
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct&#xD;
sources of moral reasons.&#xD;
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive&#xD;
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,&#xD;
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons&#xD;
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –&#xD;
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.&#xD;
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as&#xD;
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and&#xD;
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral&#xD;
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter&#xD;
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the&#xD;
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is&#xD;
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian&#xD;
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory&#xD;
for applied ethics.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Macdonald, Iain Ezra</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>One of the core questions in contemporary metaethics concerns the nature and status of moral&#xD;
claims. However, this question presupposes that morality is unified, and that a single&#xD;
metaethical account will suffice. This thesis aims to challenge that presupposition. In&#xD;
particular, I argue that there is a substantial theoretical payoff to be had from combining two&#xD;
distinct metaethical theories – realism, on the one hand, and constructivism, on the other –&#xD;
whilst limiting the scope of each. In the realist case, the discourse aims to describe a&#xD;
particular feature of reality; in the constructivist case, the discourse aims to solve some of the&#xD;
coordination problems faced by people as social beings. We have, therefore, two distinct&#xD;
sources of moral reasons.&#xD;
The resulting ‘hybrid’ theory is appealing at the metaethical level, but also yields an attractive&#xD;
picture at the applied level. Specifically, it retains the core intuition underlying utilitarianism,&#xD;
whilst incorporating a broadly contractarian account of morality. On this account, our reasons&#xD;
for not harming other persons are at least the same as our reasons for not harming animals –&#xD;
but we have additional reasons to refrain from harming persons.&#xD;
Chapter One establishes a moderate presumption in favour of moral realism, understood as&#xD;
the claim that moral discourse aims to represent the world, deals in objective truths, and&#xD;
yields statements capable of truth or falsity. Chapter Two addresses arguments for moral&#xD;
antirealism: these arguments can be met by restricting the scope of moral realism. Chapter&#xD;
Three explores the content of the resultant moral realism: specifically, realism about the&#xD;
intrinsic value of hedonic states. Chapter Four deals with that part of morality which is&#xD;
unaccounted for by restricted moral realism, and offers an outline form of contractarian&#xD;
constructivism. Chapter Five investigates the consequences of the hybrid metaethical theory&#xD;
for applied ethics.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The two shamans and the owner of the cattle : alterity, storytelling and shamanism amongst the Angaité of the Paraguayan Chaco</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/965" />
    <author>
      <name>Villagra Carron, Rodrigo Juan</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/965</id>
    <updated>2010-11-10T13:16:59Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: My thesis examines from an ethnographic account how history has been made, told and interpreted by the Angaité people of the Chaco since the Paraguayan nation-state effectively carried out the colonization of this territory in the 19th century until the present day. The key elements of this account are the Angaité’s notions and practices on alterity, storytelling and shamanism and how they interplay with one another.&#xD;
&#xD;
I explore the notions of alterity and its counterpart similarity in the context of multiple material transactions in which the Angaité engage both among themselves and with outsiders. I also examine the inseparable socio-moral evaluations attached to such transactions. I show how certain transactions such as exchange or commoditisation do not necessarily conflict with good social relations. Nevertheless, the closest relationships – preferably evoked in kinship terms - are constantly constructed by the combination of several practices including sharing, pooling, cohabitation and companionship and the relational morality that underpins them. &#xD;
  &#xD;
This relational morality, I argue, is both inscribed and enacted through the telling of Nanek Any’a narratives –“Old news/events”. I analyze some of these narratives in order to show how the Angaité people interpret the consequences of the colonization of the Chaco. For this I provide an intelligible context for the Nanek Any’a that may otherwise appear contradictory or incomprehensible to a non-Angaité listener. The Angaité’s versions of history compared to the official accounts challenge the simplistic of the Angaité as “acculturated” and a homogenous indigenous people and situate them as main actors of their own lives. Rather than the Angaité being the victims of history the Nanek Any’a emphasize that it was the mistakes and failing of their ancestors in their original encounter with the Paraguayans that resulted in an unbalanced relationship with the latter in socio-economic terms. In addition to this, I describe in the light of the historical processes undergone in the lives of the Angaité, how the shamanic discourses and capacities and Angaité cosmology have changed. I explore how they have constantly incorporated external elements, and thus such shamanic elements pervades contemporary areas of life and interactions that include not only the paradigmatic indigenous shaman, but unusual figures such as pastors, powerful outsiders and leaders.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Villagra Carron, Rodrigo Juan</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>My thesis examines from an ethnographic account how history has been made, told and interpreted by the Angaité people of the Chaco since the Paraguayan nation-state effectively carried out the colonization of this territory in the 19th century until the present day. The key elements of this account are the Angaité’s notions and practices on alterity, storytelling and shamanism and how they interplay with one another.&#xD;
&#xD;
I explore the notions of alterity and its counterpart similarity in the context of multiple material transactions in which the Angaité engage both among themselves and with outsiders. I also examine the inseparable socio-moral evaluations attached to such transactions. I show how certain transactions such as exchange or commoditisation do not necessarily conflict with good social relations. Nevertheless, the closest relationships – preferably evoked in kinship terms - are constantly constructed by the combination of several practices including sharing, pooling, cohabitation and companionship and the relational morality that underpins them. &#xD;
  &#xD;
This relational morality, I argue, is both inscribed and enacted through the telling of Nanek Any’a narratives –“Old news/events”. I analyze some of these narratives in order to show how the Angaité people interpret the consequences of the colonization of the Chaco. For this I provide an intelligible context for the Nanek Any’a that may otherwise appear contradictory or incomprehensible to a non-Angaité listener. The Angaité’s versions of history compared to the official accounts challenge the simplistic of the Angaité as “acculturated” and a homogenous indigenous people and situate them as main actors of their own lives. Rather than the Angaité being the victims of history the Nanek Any’a emphasize that it was the mistakes and failing of their ancestors in their original encounter with the Paraguayans that resulted in an unbalanced relationship with the latter in socio-economic terms. In addition to this, I describe in the light of the historical processes undergone in the lives of the Angaité, how the shamanic discourses and capacities and Angaité cosmology have changed. I explore how they have constantly incorporated external elements, and thus such shamanic elements pervades contemporary areas of life and interactions that include not only the paradigmatic indigenous shaman, but unusual figures such as pastors, powerful outsiders and leaders.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>By being human : an anthropological inquiry into the dimension and potential of consciousness in the context of spiritual practice</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/960" />
    <author>
      <name>Lenk, Sonja</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/960</id>
    <updated>2010-07-05T10:43:42Z</updated>
    <published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The research explores the concept of human consciousness and its being experienced in a&#xD;
particular social context, focusing on consciousness’s ‘highest potential’ as described in&#xD;
both ancient Buddhist Philosophy and more recent spiritual teachings. The main attention&#xD;
is on the individual’s emotional and mental experience of ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’&#xD;
reality as taught by these traditions and the possible transformation of consciousness they&#xD;
might initiate.&#xD;
Two years of fieldwork was carried out at the Barbara Brennan School of Healing, which&#xD;
is a spiritual educational institution, offering a four-year training to become a healer. The&#xD;
School emphasis is on the human individual and his or her inherent existential power to&#xD;
transform and transcend limitations or delusions, focusing on the process of self-&#xD;
transformation. Being human in the eyes of the School is seen as an endless potential for&#xD;
growth, creativity, the capacity to love, and about learning to become fully responsible&#xD;
for one’s own life and happiness. The thesis explores the effect that this particular&#xD;
understanding of human potential has in the quotidian existence of the trainee and her or&#xD;
his social relations.&#xD;
Methodologically the study is based in phenomenological anthropology. This approach&#xD;
here implies that life cannot be understood through the conceptual or systematic study of&#xD;
its outward forms. Therefore it places conscious experience at the centre of its&#xD;
investigation, rather than disengaged objectivity. By employing the first-person&#xD;
perspective and undertaking part of the training myself, I hope to do justice to the&#xD;
inherently subjective dimension of consciousness and to gain as deep an understanding as&#xD;
possible of the processes of its transformation. The thesis thus includes subjective&#xD;
personal experience as primary data, and understands being objective in the sense of&#xD;
being open and without bias to both internal and external experience, giving the&#xD;
‘perennial wisdom’ of spiritual traditions the same status as approved scientific laws.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Lenk, Sonja</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The research explores the concept of human consciousness and its being experienced in a&#xD;
particular social context, focusing on consciousness’s ‘highest potential’ as described in&#xD;
both ancient Buddhist Philosophy and more recent spiritual teachings. The main attention&#xD;
is on the individual’s emotional and mental experience of ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’&#xD;
reality as taught by these traditions and the possible transformation of consciousness they&#xD;
might initiate.&#xD;
Two years of fieldwork was carried out at the Barbara Brennan School of Healing, which&#xD;
is a spiritual educational institution, offering a four-year training to become a healer. The&#xD;
School emphasis is on the human individual and his or her inherent existential power to&#xD;
transform and transcend limitations or delusions, focusing on the process of self-&#xD;
transformation. Being human in the eyes of the School is seen as an endless potential for&#xD;
growth, creativity, the capacity to love, and about learning to become fully responsible&#xD;
for one’s own life and happiness. The thesis explores the effect that this particular&#xD;
understanding of human potential has in the quotidian existence of the trainee and her or&#xD;
his social relations.&#xD;
Methodologically the study is based in phenomenological anthropology. This approach&#xD;
here implies that life cannot be understood through the conceptual or systematic study of&#xD;
its outward forms. Therefore it places conscious experience at the centre of its&#xD;
investigation, rather than disengaged objectivity. By employing the first-person&#xD;
perspective and undertaking part of the training myself, I hope to do justice to the&#xD;
inherently subjective dimension of consciousness and to gain as deep an understanding as&#xD;
possible of the processes of its transformation. The thesis thus includes subjective&#xD;
personal experience as primary data, and understands being objective in the sense of&#xD;
being open and without bias to both internal and external experience, giving the&#xD;
‘perennial wisdom’ of spiritual traditions the same status as approved scientific laws.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>What if? : an enquiry into the semantics of natural language conditionals</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/949" />
    <author>
      <name>Hjálmarsson, Guðmundur Andri</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/949</id>
    <updated>2010-07-13T10:36:00Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.&#xD;
   The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.&#xD;
   The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions&#xD;
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to&#xD;
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative&#xD;
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.&#xD;
   The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/&#xD;
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be&#xD;
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.&#xD;
   The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis&#xD;
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined&#xD;
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered&#xD;
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional&#xD;
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.&#xD;
   The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to&#xD;
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of&#xD;
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface&#xD;
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface&#xD;
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.&#xD;
   Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hjálmarsson, Guðmundur Andri</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is essentially a portfolio of four disjoint yet thematically related articles that deal with some semantic aspect or another of natural language conditionals.&#xD;
   The thesis opens with a brief introductory chapter that offers a short yet opinionated historical overview and a theoretical background of several important semantic issues of conditionals.&#xD;
   The second chapter then deals with the issue of truth values and conditions&#xD;
of indicative conditionals. So-called Gibbard Phenomenon cases have been used to&#xD;
argue that indicative conditionals construed in terms of the Ramsey Test cannot have truth values. Since that conclusion is somewhat incredible, several alternative&#xD;
options are explored. Finally, a contextualised revision of the Ramsey Test is offered which successfully avoids the threats of the Gibbard Phenomenon.&#xD;
   The third chapter deals with the question of where to draw the so-called indicative/&#xD;
subjunctive line. Natural language conditionals are commonly believed to be&#xD;
of two semantically distinct types: indicative and subjunctive. Although this distinction is central to many semantic analyses of natural conditionals, there seems to be no consensus on the details of its nature. While trying to uncover the grounds for the distinction, we will argue our way through several plausible proposals found in the literature. Upon discovering that none of these proposals seem entirely suited, we will reconsider our position and make several helpful observations into the nature of conditional sentences. And finally, in light of our observations, we shall propose and argue for plausible grounds for the indicative/subjunctive distinction.distinction.&#xD;
   The fourth chapter offers semantics for modal and amodal natural language conditionals based on the distinction proposed in the previous chapter. First, the nature of modal and amodal suppositions will be explored. Armed with an analysis&#xD;
of modal and amodal suppositions, the corresponding conditionals will be examined&#xD;
further. Consequently, the syntax of conditionals in English will be uncovered&#xD;
for the purpose of providing input for our semantics. And finally, compositional&#xD;
semantics in generative grammar will be offered for modal and amodal conditionals.&#xD;
   The fifth and final chapter defends Modus Ponens from alleged counterexamples. In particular, the chapter offers a solution to McGee’s infamous counterexamples. First, several solutions offered to the counterexamples hitherto are all argued to&#xD;
be inadequate. After a couple of observations on the counterexamples’ nature, a solution is offered and demonstrated. the solution suggests that the semantics of&#xD;
embedded natural language conditionals is more sophisticated than their surface&#xD;
syntax indicates. The heart of the solution is a translation function from the surface&#xD;
form of natural language conditionals to their logical form.&#xD;
   Finally, the thesis ends with a conclusion that briefly summarises the main conclusions drawn in its preceding chapters.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Autonomy and purity in Kant's moral theory</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/937" />
    <author>
      <name>Benson, Carolyn Jane</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/937</id>
    <updated>2010-12-06T15:51:12Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. &#xD;
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. &#xD;
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Benson, Carolyn Jane</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Kant believed that the moral law is a law that the rational will legislates. This thesis examines this claim and its broader implications for Kant’s moral theory. &#xD;
Many are drawn to Kantian ethics because of its emphasis on the dignity and legislative authority of the rational being. The attractiveness of this emphasis on the special standing and capacities of the self grounds a recent tendency to interpret Kantian autonomy as a doctrine according to which individual agents create binding moral norms. Where this line is taken, however, its advocates face deep questions concerning the compatibility of autonomy and the conception of moral requirement to which Kant is also certainly committed – one which conceives of the moral law as a strictly universal and necessary imperative. &#xD;
This thesis has two main aims. In the first half, I offer an interpretation of Kantian autonomy that both accommodates the universality and necessity of moral constraint and takes seriously the notion that the rational will is a legislator of moral law. As a means of developing and securing my preferred view, I argue that recent popular interpretations of Kantian autonomy fail to resolve the tensions that seem at first glance to plague the concept of self-legislation, where what is at stake is the legislation of a categorical imperative. In the second half of this thesis, I examine the connections between my preferred interpretation of self-legislation and Kant’s dichotomisation of reason and our sensuous nature. I argue that some of the more harsh and seemingly unreasonable aspects of Kant’s moral philosophy can be defended by bringing to light the ways in which they are connected to his commitment both to the autonomy of the will and to developing a genuinely normative ethics.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Real impossible worlds : the bounds of possibility</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/924" />
    <author>
      <name>Kiourti, Ira Georgia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/924</id>
    <updated>2010-12-06T16:44:16Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.&#xD;
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for&#xD;
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR&#xD;
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical&#xD;
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without&#xD;
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis&#xD;
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating&#xD;
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the&#xD;
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI&#xD;
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against&#xD;
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-&#xD;
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter&#xD;
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine&#xD;
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kiourti, Ira Georgia</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Lewisian Genuine Realism (GR) about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds.&#xD;
It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for&#xD;
impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR&#xD;
even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical&#xD;
framework? Since the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without&#xD;
compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis&#xD;
against (old and new) objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating&#xD;
impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the&#xD;
form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI&#xD;
venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against&#xD;
such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion-&#xD;
beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter&#xD;
V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine&#xD;
impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The structure of logical consequence : proof-theoretic conceptions</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/892" />
    <author>
      <name>Hjortland, Ole T.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/892</id>
    <updated>2010-08-06T11:06:53Z</updated>
    <published>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the  model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.&#xD;
&#xD;
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hjortland, Ole T.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The model-theoretic analysis of the concept of logical consequence has come under heavy criticism in the last couple of decades. The present work looks at an alternative approach to logical consequence where the notion of inference takes center stage. Formally, the  model-theoretic framework is exchanged for a proof-theoretic framework. It is argued that contrary to the traditional view, proof-theoretic semantics is not revisionary, and should rather be seen as a formal semantics that can supplement model-theory. Specifically, there are formal resources to provide a proof-theoretic semantics for both intuitionistic and classical logic.&#xD;
&#xD;
We develop a new perspective on proof-theoretic harmony for logical constants which incorporates elements from the substructural era of proof-theory. We show that there is a semantic lacuna in the traditional accounts of harmony. A new theory of how inference rules determine the semantic content of logical constants is developed. The theory weds proof-theoretic and model-theoretic semantics by showing how proof-theoretic rules can induce truth-conditional clauses in Boolean and many-valued settings. It is argued that such a new approach to how rules determine meaning will ultimately assist our understanding of the apriori nature of logic.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Kinship and the saturation of life among the Kuna of Panamá</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/891" />
    <author>
      <name>Margiotti, Margherita</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/891</id>
    <updated>2012-11-21T12:36:19Z</updated>
    <published>2010-05-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an ethnographic analysis of kinship among the Kuna of the San Blas Archipelago of eastern Panamá, which focuses on the creation of bodies and persons. San Blas island villages are characterized by a compact layout and a burgeoning demographic concentration in relation to space. Despite land is available on surrounding mainland areas, the Kuna continue living in nucleated villages, emphasizing kinship as the value of a life in spatial and social concentration. By describing quotidian life in one Kuna community, this thesis considers what it means to live in concentration from a Kuna perspective, and how wellbeing is created through daily practices and rituals aimed at contrasting the social disengagement, that people consider an effect of domestic splitting, the ramification of collateral ties, and illnesses inflicted by invisible pathogenic beings.&#xD;
My analysis focuses on two main lines of enquiry: 1) the progression of social relations from close to distant. Beginning from the house, where the bodies of co-residents are made consubstantial through commensality, the thesis analyses marriageability as the management of social distance, and the celebration of communal drinking festivals as the re-patterning of relations with different types of non-kin (e.g. non co-resident kin, the dead, and pathogenic spirits) for the regeneration of fertility and wellbeing. 2) It focuses on the person and discusses how adults make sense of babies and processes of body and kinship making in relation to non-human beings.&#xD;
By describing how ritual and micro-quotidian practices operate according to patterns of density and repetition, this thesis demonstrates that concentration and saturation are the core notions of sociality and personhood for the Kuna. The thesis argues that saturation is interior to the ongoing creation of kinship.</summary>
    <dc:date>2010-05-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Margiotti, Margherita</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an ethnographic analysis of kinship among the Kuna of the San Blas Archipelago of eastern Panamá, which focuses on the creation of bodies and persons. San Blas island villages are characterized by a compact layout and a burgeoning demographic concentration in relation to space. Despite land is available on surrounding mainland areas, the Kuna continue living in nucleated villages, emphasizing kinship as the value of a life in spatial and social concentration. By describing quotidian life in one Kuna community, this thesis considers what it means to live in concentration from a Kuna perspective, and how wellbeing is created through daily practices and rituals aimed at contrasting the social disengagement, that people consider an effect of domestic splitting, the ramification of collateral ties, and illnesses inflicted by invisible pathogenic beings.&#xD;
My analysis focuses on two main lines of enquiry: 1) the progression of social relations from close to distant. Beginning from the house, where the bodies of co-residents are made consubstantial through commensality, the thesis analyses marriageability as the management of social distance, and the celebration of communal drinking festivals as the re-patterning of relations with different types of non-kin (e.g. non co-resident kin, the dead, and pathogenic spirits) for the regeneration of fertility and wellbeing. 2) It focuses on the person and discusses how adults make sense of babies and processes of body and kinship making in relation to non-human beings.&#xD;
By describing how ritual and micro-quotidian practices operate according to patterns of density and repetition, this thesis demonstrates that concentration and saturation are the core notions of sociality and personhood for the Kuna. The thesis argues that saturation is interior to the ongoing creation of kinship.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Shades of Jewishness : the creation and maintenance of a liberal Jewish community in post-Shoah Germany</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/872" />
    <author>
      <name>Kranz, Daniela</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/872</id>
    <updated>2013-02-28T08:19:12Z</updated>
    <published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This PhD thesis focuses on the creation and maintenance of the liberal Jewish&#xD;
community in present day Cologne, Germany. The community has the telling name&#xD;
Gescher LaMassoret, which translates into „Bridge to Tradition.‟ The name gives away&#xD;
that this specific community, its individual members and its struggles cannot be&#xD;
understood without the socio-historic context of Germany and the Holocaust. Although&#xD;
this Jewish community is not a community of Holocaust survivors, the dichotomy&#xD;
Jewish-German takes various shapes within the community and surfaces in the&#xD;
narratives of the individual members. These narratives reflect the uniqueness of each&#xD;
individual in the community. While this is a truism, this individual uniqueness is a key&#xD;
element in Gescher LaMassoret, whose membership consists of people from various&#xD;
countries who have various native languages. Furthermore, the community comprises&#xD;
members of Jewish descent as well as Jews of conversion who are of German, non-&#xD;
Jewish parentage. Due to the aftermaths of the Holocaust and the fact that Gescher LaMassoret houses a vast internal diversity, the creation of this community which lacks&#xD;
any tradition happens through mixing and meshing the life-stories and other narratives&#xD;
of the members, which flow into the collective narrative of the community. On the&#xD;
surface, the narratives of the individual members seem in conflict, they even contradict&#xD;
each other, which means that the narrative of the community is in constant tension.&#xD;
However, under the dissimilarities on the surface of the individual narratives hide&#xD;
similarities in terms of shared values and attitudes, which allow for enough overlaps to&#xD;
create a community by way of braiding a collective narrative, which offers the&#xD;
members to experience a 'felt ethnicity.'</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kranz, Daniela</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This PhD thesis focuses on the creation and maintenance of the liberal Jewish&#xD;
community in present day Cologne, Germany. The community has the telling name&#xD;
Gescher LaMassoret, which translates into „Bridge to Tradition.‟ The name gives away&#xD;
that this specific community, its individual members and its struggles cannot be&#xD;
understood without the socio-historic context of Germany and the Holocaust. Although&#xD;
this Jewish community is not a community of Holocaust survivors, the dichotomy&#xD;
Jewish-German takes various shapes within the community and surfaces in the&#xD;
narratives of the individual members. These narratives reflect the uniqueness of each&#xD;
individual in the community. While this is a truism, this individual uniqueness is a key&#xD;
element in Gescher LaMassoret, whose membership consists of people from various&#xD;
countries who have various native languages. Furthermore, the community comprises&#xD;
members of Jewish descent as well as Jews of conversion who are of German, non-&#xD;
Jewish parentage. Due to the aftermaths of the Holocaust and the fact that Gescher LaMassoret houses a vast internal diversity, the creation of this community which lacks&#xD;
any tradition happens through mixing and meshing the life-stories and other narratives&#xD;
of the members, which flow into the collective narrative of the community. On the&#xD;
surface, the narratives of the individual members seem in conflict, they even contradict&#xD;
each other, which means that the narrative of the community is in constant tension.&#xD;
However, under the dissimilarities on the surface of the individual narratives hide&#xD;
similarities in terms of shared values and attitudes, which allow for enough overlaps to&#xD;
create a community by way of braiding a collective narrative, which offers the&#xD;
members to experience a 'felt ethnicity.'</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Lewis, counterfactual analyses of causation, and pre-emption cases</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/822" />
    <author>
      <name>Landsberg, David</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/822</id>
    <updated>2010-10-25T10:31:31Z</updated>
    <published>2009-10-16T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-10-16T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Landsberg, David</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Over the past few decades analyses of causation have proliferated in almost immeasurable abundance, and with two things in common; firstly, they make much of counterfactual dependence, and secondly, none of them successfully handle all the pre-emption cases. In this thesis, I fore-mostly investigate David Lewis’ promising counterfactual analyses of causation (along with many others), and provide an extensive examination of pre-emption cases. I also offer my own counterfactual analysis of causation, which I argue can handle the problematic pre-emption cases, and therein succeed where so many other prominent analyses of causation have failed. I then conclude with some morals for the continuing debate.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Relations that unite and divide : a study of Freedom of Information legislation and transparency in Scotland</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/751" />
    <author>
      <name>John, Gemma</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/751</id>
    <updated>2012-09-18T11:38:20Z</updated>
    <published>2009-06-23T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This research (the first long-term ethnographic study of FOI in Britain) investigates concepts at the heart of FOI - transparency, trust, secrecy, truth, private, public, power and agency.  Eighteen months participant observation fieldwork, alongside policy-makers, practitioners, and end-users facilitated in depth, study of the radical subject-object transformations that FOI requires, and the aesthetics that underpin it. &#xD;
&#xD;
The introduction of FOI entailed a 'culture change' - from a culture of secrecy to one of disclosure - driven, in Scotland, by the Scottish Information Commissioner through conferences. These were an opportunity for practitioners to come into new knowledge about the Act, their shared knowledge dissolving the divisions between them.  But new divisions then opened between practitioners and colleagues; culture change being in the replication of a form of a relationship that previously lay between government and citizens. &#xD;
&#xD;
In their replicated form, individual practitioners disappeared - were made 'transparent' - only to reappear on being differentiated, leaving them acutely aware of the personal relations this fissure disclosed, and throwing into sharp question a theory of people's division as indicative of their 'secrecy'.  Transparency, here, depended on whether people were divided or combined - acting in their own capacity, or that of the organization. &#xD;
&#xD;
While making personal relations absent from new disclosures was necessary for FOI compliance, this concealment hid a complex network of relations, and turned knowledge into 'information'.  Yet the division between information and knowledge was not crisp: end-users continued to read practitioners' personal relations in disclosed information, thus relations were both absent from and implied in the information released.&#xD;
&#xD;
Whether information was public (and accessible) depended on the undifferentiated status of those who created, handled, or were the subjects of, information.  As people came into new knowledge, invoking their divided or common footing, they alternated between appearing 'private' or 'public' - person or thing - a division between individuals reflecting a division within each of them.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-06-23T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>John, Gemma</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This research (the first long-term ethnographic study of FOI in Britain) investigates concepts at the heart of FOI - transparency, trust, secrecy, truth, private, public, power and agency.  Eighteen months participant observation fieldwork, alongside policy-makers, practitioners, and end-users facilitated in depth, study of the radical subject-object transformations that FOI requires, and the aesthetics that underpin it. &#xD;
&#xD;
The introduction of FOI entailed a 'culture change' - from a culture of secrecy to one of disclosure - driven, in Scotland, by the Scottish Information Commissioner through conferences. These were an opportunity for practitioners to come into new knowledge about the Act, their shared knowledge dissolving the divisions between them.  But new divisions then opened between practitioners and colleagues; culture change being in the replication of a form of a relationship that previously lay between government and citizens. &#xD;
&#xD;
In their replicated form, individual practitioners disappeared - were made 'transparent' - only to reappear on being differentiated, leaving them acutely aware of the personal relations this fissure disclosed, and throwing into sharp question a theory of people's division as indicative of their 'secrecy'.  Transparency, here, depended on whether people were divided or combined - acting in their own capacity, or that of the organization. &#xD;
&#xD;
While making personal relations absent from new disclosures was necessary for FOI compliance, this concealment hid a complex network of relations, and turned knowledge into 'information'.  Yet the division between information and knowledge was not crisp: end-users continued to read practitioners' personal relations in disclosed information, thus relations were both absent from and implied in the information released.&#xD;
&#xD;
Whether information was public (and accessible) depended on the undifferentiated status of those who created, handled, or were the subjects of, information.  As people came into new knowledge, invoking their divided or common footing, they alternated between appearing 'private' or 'public' - person or thing - a division between individuals reflecting a division within each of them.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Why death can be bad and immortality is worse</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/724" />
    <author>
      <name>Kalnow, Cara</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/724</id>
    <updated>2010-11-12T15:17:22Z</updated>
    <published>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of&#xD;
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally&#xD;
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I&#xD;
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad&#xD;
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are&#xD;
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition&#xD;
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the&#xD;
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To&#xD;
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the&#xD;
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as&#xD;
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of&#xD;
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a&#xD;
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided&#xD;
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative&#xD;
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a&#xD;
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from&#xD;
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be&#xD;
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for&#xD;
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary&#xD;
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual&#xD;
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kalnow, Cara</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis examines the moral implications of the metaphysical nature of&#xD;
death. I begin with the Epicurean arguments which hold that death is morally&#xD;
irrelevant for the one who dies, and that one should regard it accordingly. I&#xD;
defend the Epicurean claim that death simpliciter can be neither good nor bad&#xD;
from objections which purport to show that the negative features of death are&#xD;
bad for the one who dies. I establish that existence is a necessary condition&#xD;
for a person’s being morally benefited or wronged, and since death is the&#xD;
privation of existence, death cannot be bad for the person who dies. To&#xD;
account for the commonly-held belief that death is an evil, I explain that the&#xD;
prospect of death can be morally relevant to persons while they are alive as&#xD;
death is one of the many states of affairs that may prevent the satisfaction of&#xD;
persons’ desires for the goods of life. I claim that categorical desires ground a&#xD;
disutility by which death can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided&#xD;
and feared. I then consider an infinite life as a possible attractive alternative&#xD;
to a finite life. I argue that a life which is invulnerable to death cannot be a&#xD;
desirable human existence, as many of our human values are inseparable from&#xD;
the finite temporal structure of life. I conclude that death simpliciter can be&#xD;
neither good nor bad, but the fact of death has two moral implications for&#xD;
living persons: death as such is instrumentally good (it is a necessary&#xD;
condition by which the value of life is recognized); and our own individual&#xD;
deaths can rationally be regarded as an evil to be avoided.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Possible preferences and the harm of existence</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/717" />
    <author>
      <name>Larock, Marc</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/717</id>
    <updated>2010-08-06T10:53:38Z</updated>
    <published>2009-06-20T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: How good or bad is a person’s life?  How good or bad is a world?  In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions.  Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing.  Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place.  A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off.  If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is.  Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important. &#xD;
 In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence.  I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world.  The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims: &#xD;
i.	Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference. &#xD;
ii.	Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.    &#xD;
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist.  Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence.  I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox.  For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well.  Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions.  Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements.  If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.</summary>
    <dc:date>2009-06-20T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Larock, Marc</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>How good or bad is a person’s life?  How good or bad is a world?  In this dissertation, I will attempt to answer these questions.  Common-sense would dictate that if a person’s life would be extremely bad, then bringing her into existence is a bad thing.  Not only is it bad for the person who lives it, but also, it is bad because it makes the world a worse place.  A world populated only by individuals who have lives full of unrelenting misery and suffering is certainly worse than a world only populated by individuals who are extremely well off.  If we can measure the value of a person’s life and the value of a world, then we can determine how good or bad our lives are and how good or bad the actual world is.  Investigating these issues and providing satisfactory answers to these questions is immensely important. &#xD;
 In this dissertation I argue that all actual human lives are so bad that it would have been better had all of us never come into existence.  I also argue that our world is worse than an empty world.  The nucleus of my view consists of the following two claims: &#xD;
i.	Each person has an interest in acquiring a new satisfied preference. &#xD;
ii.	Whenever a person is deprived of a new satisfied preference this violates an interest and is thus a harm with a finite disvalue.    &#xD;
If one holds both (i) and (ii), then one is a deprivationalist.  Any deprivationalist will have to claim that existence is worse for all actual persons than non-existence.  I also show that deprivationalism presents a clear strategy for escaping The Repugnant Conclusion and The Mere Addition Paradox.  For a deprivationalist, the Non-Identity Problem is neutralized as well.  Parfit’s challenge in Reasons and Persons was to devise a theory of beneficence that could escape these cases without leading to other unacceptable conclusions.  Parfit failed to find a theory—“Theory X”—that would meet these requirements.  If the conclusions in this dissertation are correct, then deprivationalism is a good candidate for Theory X.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Inferences in context : contextualism, inferentialism and the concept of universal quantification</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/688" />
    <author>
      <name>Tabet, Chiara</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/688</id>
    <updated>2010-08-06T09:32:50Z</updated>
    <published>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.&#xD;
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.&#xD;
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier. &#xD;
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context. &#xD;
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Tabet, Chiara</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This Thesis addresses issues that lie at the intersection of two broad philosophical projects: inferentialism and contextualism.&#xD;
It discusses and defends an account of the logical concepts based on the following two ideas: 1) that the logical concepts are constituted by our canonical inferential usages of them; 2) that to grasp, or possess, a logical concept is to undertake an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the concept when deploying it in a linguistic practice.&#xD;
The account focuses on the concept of universal quantification, with respect to which it also defends the view that linguistic context contributes to an interpretation of instances of the concept by determining the scope of our commitments to the canonical consequences of the quantifier. &#xD;
The model that I offer for the concept of universal quantification relies on, and develops, three main ideas: 1) our understanding of the concept’s inferential role is one according to which the concept expresses full inferential generality; 2) what I refer to as the ‘domain model’ (the view that the universal quantifier always ranges over a domain of quantification, and that the specification of such a domain contributes to determine the proposition expressed by sentences in which the quantifier figures) is subject to a series of crucial difficulties, and should be abandoned; 3) we should regard the undertaking of an inferential commitment to the canonical consequences of the universal quantifier as a stable and objective presupposition of a universally quantified sentence expressing a determinate proposition in context. &#xD;
In the last chapter of the Thesis I sketch a proposal about how contextual quantifier restrictions should be understood, and articulate the main challenges that a commitment-theoretic story about the context-sensitivity of the universal quantifier faces.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Truth and goodness : a minimalist study</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/684" />
    <author>
      <name>Edwards, Douglas O.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/684</id>
    <updated>2010-12-06T17:09:31Z</updated>
    <published>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental? &#xD;
&#xD;
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff &#xD;
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories. &#xD;
&#xD;
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view &#xD;
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as &#xD;
a case study.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Edwards, Douglas O.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Philosophers are often thought to be in the business of analysing concepts, in particular, concepts taken to be fundamental in human thought and practice: truth, goodness, beauty, knowledge, meaning, rightness, causation, to name just a few. But what can we expect from such analyses? Can we expect a comprehensive account of one concept in terms of one or more others? Can we expect to reduce these kinds of concepts to concepts which are taken to be more fundamental? &#xD;
&#xD;
This study is concerned with a particular approach to conceptual analysis, minimalism, which, in general, offers very modest answers to these questions. Minimalist theories, by and large, hold that the strategy for analysing concepts ought not to go much further than the collection of some rather ordinary, ‘platitudinous’ thoughts about those concepts. Accordingly, minimalist theories do not often encourage ambitious pro jects of giving a comprehensive analysis of one concept in terms of another, where this process encourages the construction of such biconditional claims as ‘X falls under concept F iff &#xD;
X falls under concept G’. Just how far we are to extend our analysis beyond the point of a collection of platitudinous principles is a point of contention between different types of minimalist theories. &#xD;
&#xD;
This study has three main aims. Firstly, it aims to give a taxonomy of minimalist theories. Secondly, it aims to examine in detail the types of minimalist theories pertinent to the study of truth, and propose the best view &#xD;
available. Thirdly, it aims to examine how the minimalist methodology may be extended to other normative concepts, taking the concept of goodness as &#xD;
a case study.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Liberal legitimacy : a study of the normative foundations of liberalism</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/563" />
    <author>
      <name>Rossi, Enzo</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/563</id>
    <updated>2010-11-20T13:40:13Z</updated>
    <published>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political&#xD;
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest&#xD;
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is&#xD;
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to&#xD;
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the&#xD;
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political&#xD;
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and&#xD;
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry&#xD;
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal&#xD;
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries&#xD;
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),&#xD;
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification&#xD;
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in&#xD;
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most&#xD;
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the&#xD;
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal&#xD;
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case&#xD;
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the&#xD;
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the&#xD;
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal&#xD;
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal&#xD;
polities.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-11-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Rossi, Enzo</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is a critique of the prominent strand of contemporary liberal political&#xD;
theory which maintains that liberal political authority must, in some sense, rest&#xD;
on the free consent of those subjected to it, and that such a consensus is&#xD;
achieved if a polity’s basic structure can be publicly justified to its citizenry, or to&#xD;
a relevant subset of it. Call that the liberal legitimacy view. I argue that the&#xD;
liberal legitimacy view cannot provide viable normative foundations for political&#xD;
authority, for the hypothetical consensus it envisages cannot be achieved and&#xD;
sustained without either arbitrarily excluding conspicuous sectors of the citizenry&#xD;
or commanding a consent that is less than free. That is because the liberal&#xD;
legitimacy view’s structure is one that requires a form of consent that carries&#xD;
free-standing normative force (i.e. normative force generated by voluntariness),&#xD;
yet the particular form of hypothetical consent through public justification&#xD;
envisaged by the view does not possess such force, because of its built-in bias in&#xD;
favour of liberalism. I also argue that the liberal legitimacy view is the most&#xD;
recent instantiation of one of two main strands of liberal theory, namely the&#xD;
nowadays dominant contract-based liberalism, which seeks to ground liberal&#xD;
political authority in a hypothetical agreement between the citizens. My case&#xD;
against the liberal legitimacy view, then, contributes to the revitalisation of the&#xD;
other main approach to the normative foundations of liberalism, namely the&#xD;
substantivist one, which legitimates liberal political authority through an appeal&#xD;
to the substantive values and virtues safeguarded and promoted by liberal&#xD;
polities.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Syntactic relations in San Martin Quechua</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/529" />
    <author>
      <name>Howkins, Angela</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/529</id>
    <updated>2008-08-14T12:19:37Z</updated>
    <published>1977-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Linguistic description has been described as "the application of a particular linguistic theory to a selected field of linguistic phenomena". The thesis presented here offers a partial application of Axiomatic Functionalism, (partial because its concern is with syntax only), to data collected on the San Martín dialect of Quechua.&#xD;
&#xD;
Proportionate to the whole body of Quechua studies, there has been little produced on the syntax of any Quechua dialect. Most syntactic studies, as do the large majority of phonological and morphological studies, use American methodology, be it based on Bloomfieldian linguistics, or be it based on those of Chomsky. The present methodology stands diametrically opposed to both schools of American linguistics cited above, and as a result introduces a fresh approach to the study of the syntactic aspect of Quechua. With Axiomatic functionalism, a new way of looking at Quechua grammar is presented and thus much of what is accepted "fact" reappraised. For this reason, while the concern of the thesis is with producing a description of syntactic relations in San Martín Quechua under the terms of Axiomatic Functionalism, reference is made to descriptions of other Quechua dialects, most notably where the application of Axiomatic Functionalism produces statements containing certain phenomena which are quite different from statements made on equivalent phenomena in other dialects using a different linguistic theory. Moreover, Axiomatic Fundamentalism is a deductive theory, and so statements regarding the data contained in the description are not statements of "fact", but are hypotheses which may stand as valid hypotheses regarding the data unless they can be refuted.&#xD;
&#xD;
Given that the theoretical base on which the description rests is different from that used in other descriptions of Quechua dialects, and so that the hypotheses made regarding syntactic relations in San Martín Quechua may be tested, Part I of the thesis is given over to the theoretical side of the work: to explaining the relation between theory and description in Chapter I, to giving brief explications of those notions in the theory which have particular relevance for a syntactic description in Chapter II, and in noting some of the limits set to the selection of the data for description in Chapter III./ The axioms and definitions of the theory are given in Appendix A. Part II of the thesis, which is in six chapters, deals with the description proper. Structures which may stand as sentences are established and analysed into their constituent structures, the relations between each constituent being ascertained. Analysis is carried through to the stage where there are no constituents analysable in syntactic terms left.</summary>
    <dc:date>1977-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Howkins, Angela</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Linguistic description has been described as "the application of a particular linguistic theory to a selected field of linguistic phenomena". The thesis presented here offers a partial application of Axiomatic Functionalism, (partial because its concern is with syntax only), to data collected on the San Martín dialect of Quechua.&#xD;
&#xD;
Proportionate to the whole body of Quechua studies, there has been little produced on the syntax of any Quechua dialect. Most syntactic studies, as do the large majority of phonological and morphological studies, use American methodology, be it based on Bloomfieldian linguistics, or be it based on those of Chomsky. The present methodology stands diametrically opposed to both schools of American linguistics cited above, and as a result introduces a fresh approach to the study of the syntactic aspect of Quechua. With Axiomatic functionalism, a new way of looking at Quechua grammar is presented and thus much of what is accepted "fact" reappraised. For this reason, while the concern of the thesis is with producing a description of syntactic relations in San Martín Quechua under the terms of Axiomatic Functionalism, reference is made to descriptions of other Quechua dialects, most notably where the application of Axiomatic Functionalism produces statements containing certain phenomena which are quite different from statements made on equivalent phenomena in other dialects using a different linguistic theory. Moreover, Axiomatic Fundamentalism is a deductive theory, and so statements regarding the data contained in the description are not statements of "fact", but are hypotheses which may stand as valid hypotheses regarding the data unless they can be refuted.&#xD;
&#xD;
Given that the theoretical base on which the description rests is different from that used in other descriptions of Quechua dialects, and so that the hypotheses made regarding syntactic relations in San Martín Quechua may be tested, Part I of the thesis is given over to the theoretical side of the work: to explaining the relation between theory and description in Chapter I, to giving brief explications of those notions in the theory which have particular relevance for a syntactic description in Chapter II, and in noting some of the limits set to the selection of the data for description in Chapter III./ The axioms and definitions of the theory are given in Appendix A. Part II of the thesis, which is in six chapters, deals with the description proper. Structures which may stand as sentences are established and analysed into their constituent structures, the relations between each constituent being ascertained. Analysis is carried through to the stage where there are no constituents analysable in syntactic terms left.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Carving wood and creating shamans : an ethnographic account of visual capacity among the Kuna of Panamá</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/523" />
    <author>
      <name>Fortis, Paolo</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/523</id>
    <updated>2008-08-14T11:25:37Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is an ethnographic account of  the carving of wooden ritual statues and of the shamanic figure of the seer among the Kuna of the San Blas archipelago of Panamá. Through a study of the production of wooden ritual statues and of the birth and initiation of seers, I show that the distinction between the visible and the invisible, and between designs and images, is a crucial aspect of Kuna ways of thinking and experiencing their world. On one hand, the Kuna theory of design shows the importance of the development of social skills in the creation of person and sociality. On the other hand, the Kuna concept of image points to the relation between human and ancestral beings and to the transformative capacities of both. Through the constant interplay of the two categories, people interact with cosmic forces and create social life.&#xD;
The ethnography explores three aspects of the problem. First, the relationship between the islands inhabited by Kuna people and the mainland forest is described, focusing on the distance and separation of the two domains. The forest is perceived as a space populated by ancestral animal and tree entities, as well as demons and souls of the dead.&#xD;
Second, the carving of the ritual statues and the skill of Kuna carvers are described in relation to human and supernatural fertility. The birth of seers, different from that of other babies, provides evidence of the importance of natal design as the potential skills of each person.&#xD;
Third, relationships between human and supernatural beings are described considering Kuna myth and ritual action, in comparison with other indigenous American societies. This thesis concludes that it is through carving wooden statues and developing the capacity to see, Kuna people seek security in social life and protection from a predatory cosmos.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Fortis, Paolo</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is an ethnographic account of  the carving of wooden ritual statues and of the shamanic figure of the seer among the Kuna of the San Blas archipelago of Panamá. Through a study of the production of wooden ritual statues and of the birth and initiation of seers, I show that the distinction between the visible and the invisible, and between designs and images, is a crucial aspect of Kuna ways of thinking and experiencing their world. On one hand, the Kuna theory of design shows the importance of the development of social skills in the creation of person and sociality. On the other hand, the Kuna concept of image points to the relation between human and ancestral beings and to the transformative capacities of both. Through the constant interplay of the two categories, people interact with cosmic forces and create social life.&#xD;
The ethnography explores three aspects of the problem. First, the relationship between the islands inhabited by Kuna people and the mainland forest is described, focusing on the distance and separation of the two domains. The forest is perceived as a space populated by ancestral animal and tree entities, as well as demons and souls of the dead.&#xD;
Second, the carving of the ritual statues and the skill of Kuna carvers are described in relation to human and supernatural fertility. The birth of seers, different from that of other babies, provides evidence of the importance of natal design as the potential skills of each person.&#xD;
Third, relationships between human and supernatural beings are described considering Kuna myth and ritual action, in comparison with other indigenous American societies. This thesis concludes that it is through carving wooden statues and developing the capacity to see, Kuna people seek security in social life and protection from a predatory cosmos.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Hong Kong cinema 1982-2002 : the quest for identity during transition</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/516" />
    <author>
      <name>Cheung, Wai Yee Ruby</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/516</id>
    <updated>2009-03-24T11:09:55Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis seeks to interpret the cinematic representations of Hong Kongers’ identity quest during a transitional state/stage related to the sovereignty transfer.  The Handover transition considered is an ideological one, rather than the overnight polity change on the Handover day.  This research approaches contemporary Hong Kong cinema on two fronts and the thesis is structured accordingly: Upon an initial review of the existing Hong Kong film scholarship in the Introduction, and its 1997-related allegorical readings, Part I sees new angles (previously undeveloped or underdeveloped) for researching Hong Kong films made during 1982-2002.  Arguments are built along the ideas of Hong Kongers’ situational, diasporic consciousness, and transformed ‘Chineseness’ because Hong Kong has lacked a cultural/national centrality.  This part of research is informed by the ideas of Jacques Derrida, Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall, and the diasporic experiences of Ien Ang, Rey Chow and Ackbar Abbas.  With these new research angles and references to the circumstances, Part II reads critically the text of eight Hong Kong films made during the Handover transition.  In chronological order, they are Boat People (Hui, 1982), Song of the Exile (Hui, 1990), Days of Being Wild (Wong, 1990), Happy Together (Wong, 1997), Made in Hong Kong (Chan, 1997), Ordinary Heroes (Hui, 1999), Durian Durian (Chan, 2000), and Hollywood Hong Kong (Chan, 2002).  They meet several criteria related to the undeveloped / underdeveloped areas in the existing Hong Kong film scholarship.  Hamid Naficy’s ‘accented cinema’ paradigm gives the guidelines to the film analysis in Part II.  This part shows that Hong Kongers’ self-transformation during transition is alterable, indeterminate, and interminable, due to the people’s situational, diasporic consciousness, and transformed ‘Chineseness’.  This thesis thus contributes to Hong Kong cinema scholarship in interpreting films with new research angles, and generating new insights into this cinematic tradition and its wider context.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Cheung, Wai Yee Ruby</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis seeks to interpret the cinematic representations of Hong Kongers’ identity quest during a transitional state/stage related to the sovereignty transfer.  The Handover transition considered is an ideological one, rather than the overnight polity change on the Handover day.  This research approaches contemporary Hong Kong cinema on two fronts and the thesis is structured accordingly: Upon an initial review of the existing Hong Kong film scholarship in the Introduction, and its 1997-related allegorical readings, Part I sees new angles (previously undeveloped or underdeveloped) for researching Hong Kong films made during 1982-2002.  Arguments are built along the ideas of Hong Kongers’ situational, diasporic consciousness, and transformed ‘Chineseness’ because Hong Kong has lacked a cultural/national centrality.  This part of research is informed by the ideas of Jacques Derrida, Homi Bhabha and Stuart Hall, and the diasporic experiences of Ien Ang, Rey Chow and Ackbar Abbas.  With these new research angles and references to the circumstances, Part II reads critically the text of eight Hong Kong films made during the Handover transition.  In chronological order, they are Boat People (Hui, 1982), Song of the Exile (Hui, 1990), Days of Being Wild (Wong, 1990), Happy Together (Wong, 1997), Made in Hong Kong (Chan, 1997), Ordinary Heroes (Hui, 1999), Durian Durian (Chan, 2000), and Hollywood Hong Kong (Chan, 2002).  They meet several criteria related to the undeveloped / underdeveloped areas in the existing Hong Kong film scholarship.  Hamid Naficy’s ‘accented cinema’ paradigm gives the guidelines to the film analysis in Part II.  This part shows that Hong Kongers’ self-transformation during transition is alterable, indeterminate, and interminable, due to the people’s situational, diasporic consciousness, and transformed ‘Chineseness’.  This thesis thus contributes to Hong Kong cinema scholarship in interpreting films with new research angles, and generating new insights into this cinematic tradition and its wider context.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>McDowell, Gettier, and the bipartite account of perceptual knowledge</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/511" />
    <author>
      <name>Archer, Adrian Avery</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/511</id>
    <updated>2008-06-18T11:11:12Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-27T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.”  In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification.  To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive.  On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge.  My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail.  Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-27T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Archer, Adrian Avery</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In his essay, “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, John McDowell claims that “seeing that p constitutes false-hood excluding justification for believing that p.”  In this thesis I attempt to construct an account of perceptual knowledge that exploits McDowell’s notion of false-hood excluding justification.  To this end, I limn a justified (strong) belief, or bipartite, account of perceptual knowledge in which justification is seen as factive.  On this picture, the truth requirement of the traditional tripartite account is incorporated into the justification condition for knowledge.  My account of perceptual knowledge is McDowellian in spirit, but not in detail.  Specifically, I part ways with McDowell in my insistence that knowledge should be seen as a composite rather than primitive concept in which belief, understood as commitment to the truth of a proposition, and justification, understood as the possession of a factive reason, both figure.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Culture of indifference : dilemmas of the Filipina domestic helpers in Hong Kong</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/509" />
    <author>
      <name>Kennelly, Estelle M</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/509</id>
    <updated>2008-06-23T13:37:36Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this study, an examination of the everyday experiences of the contract migrant Filipina domestic helpers exposes a culture of indifference which pervades the Hong Kong society on all levels--individual, community, and judiciary.  At the centre of the abuses inflicted upon the Helpers is the employment contract with extraordinarily restrictive terms which promotes abuse by many employers.  This study also looks at the transnational informal social infrastructure which has been organized by the Filipino community to mediate the hostile working environment engendered by the indifference of the global economic and political climate upon their lives.&#xD;
    Faced with the task of implementing new policies for controlling labour migration into Hong Kong, the legislators have focused on the end result and finding the means with which to accomplish their goal.  Embedded within this process are unexamined cultural mores and practices.  Although the starting point is to benefit the community, by providing domestic helpers to serve the middle and upper class households, too often the abusive consequences to individual migrants are ignored as the women become the means to an end.  Migration has often been viewed as an aberration to the notion of the sedentary community.  Treated as an anomaly, it is the migrant who problematizes simple theoretical positions of social organization and structure.  The migrant is always treated as the one who does not conform to the ideal community and is conveniently merged into existing social categories, such as the lower status of women in Hong Kong, and the lower status of domestic workers -- relegated thereby to the periphery of the society's consciousness.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Kennelly, Estelle M</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this study, an examination of the everyday experiences of the contract migrant Filipina domestic helpers exposes a culture of indifference which pervades the Hong Kong society on all levels--individual, community, and judiciary.  At the centre of the abuses inflicted upon the Helpers is the employment contract with extraordinarily restrictive terms which promotes abuse by many employers.  This study also looks at the transnational informal social infrastructure which has been organized by the Filipino community to mediate the hostile working environment engendered by the indifference of the global economic and political climate upon their lives.&#xD;
    Faced with the task of implementing new policies for controlling labour migration into Hong Kong, the legislators have focused on the end result and finding the means with which to accomplish their goal.  Embedded within this process are unexamined cultural mores and practices.  Although the starting point is to benefit the community, by providing domestic helpers to serve the middle and upper class households, too often the abusive consequences to individual migrants are ignored as the women become the means to an end.  Migration has often been viewed as an aberration to the notion of the sedentary community.  Treated as an anomaly, it is the migrant who problematizes simple theoretical positions of social organization and structure.  The migrant is always treated as the one who does not conform to the ideal community and is conveniently merged into existing social categories, such as the lower status of women in Hong Kong, and the lower status of domestic workers -- relegated thereby to the periphery of the society's consciousness.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Living on the slippery slope : the nature, sources and logic of vagueness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/508" />
    <author>
      <name>Zardini, Elia</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/508</id>
    <updated>2010-11-20T13:40:53Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then&#xD;
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models&#xD;
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Zardini, Elia</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of vagueness, according to which the nature of the vagueness of an expression consists in its not drawing boundaries between any neighbouring objects in an appropriately ordered series. It is argued that expressions and concepts which do present this feature play an essential role in our cognitive and practical life, allowing us to conceptualize—in a way which would otherwise be impossible—the typically coarse-grained distinctions we encounter in reality. Despite its strong initial plausibility and ability to explain many phenomena of vagueness, the naive theory is widely rejected because thought to be shown inconsistent by the sorites paradox. In reply, it is first argued that accounts of vagueness based on the dominant approach are themselves subject to higher-order sorites paradoxes. The paradox is then&#xD;
solved on behalf of the naive theory by rejecting the unrestricted transitivity of the consequence relation on a vague language; a family of logics apt for reasoning with vague expressions is proposed and studied (using models&#xD;
with partially ordered values). The characteristic philosophical and logical consequences of this novel solution are developed and defended in detail. In particular, it is shown how the analysis of what happens in the attempt of surveying a sorites series and deciding each case allows the naive theory to recover a "thin" notion of a borderline case.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The role of emotion-arousal in Aristotle’s Rhetoric</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/501" />
    <author>
      <name>Dow, Jamie P.G.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/501</id>
    <updated>2010-11-17T14:29:19Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Dow, Jamie P.G.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>The principal claim defended in this thesis is that for Aristotle arousing the emotions of others can amount to giving them proper grounds for conviction, and hence a skill in doing so is properly part of an expertise in rhetoric. We set out Aristotle’s view of rhetoric as exercised solely in the provision of proper grounds for conviction (pisteis) and show how he defends this controversial view by appeal to a more widely shared and plausible view of rhetoric’s role in the proper functioning of the state. We then explore in more detail what normative standards must be met for something to qualify as “proper grounds for conviction”, applying this to all three of Aristotle’s kinds of “technical proofs” (entechnoi pisteis). In the case of emotion, meeting these standards is a matter of arousing emotions that constitute the reasonable acceptance of premises in arguments that count in favour of the speaker’s conclusion. We then seek to show that Aristotle’s view of the emotions is compatible with this role. This involves opposing the view that in Rhetoric I.1 Aristotle rejects any role for emotion-arousal in rhetoric (a view that famously generates a contradiction with the rest of the treatise). It also requires rejecting the view of Rhetoric II.2-11 on which, for Aristotle, the distinctive outlook involved in emotions is merely how things “appear” to the subject.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A portrait of the artist as a political dissident : the life and work of Aleksandar Petrović</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/480" />
    <author>
      <name>Sudar, Vlastimir</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/480</id>
    <updated>2010-11-20T13:41:53Z</updated>
    <published>2007-11-23T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Exploration of the influence that politics may have on artists’ creativity has been undertaken by looking at selected works of Yugoslav film director Aleksandar Petrović. An attempt was made to identify thematic or stylistic motifs in his films that could be understood as reflections on the political context in which the work was made. One of the most common approaches to examine a work of one filmmaker, the auteur theory, has been modified into the theory of political auteur, to aid in identifying recurrent motifs and themes that artists introduce in their work as a reaction to the surrounding political reality. As Petrović worked in Yugoslavia during Socialism, this period was historicised in order to support the identification of ‘political motifs’ in his films. The period between 1965 and 1973 is taken as the focus of research, since it is known as the 'liberal hour', the period of great artistic and intellectual freedoms, during which Petrović directed four of his most significant films. Each of these four films is analysed in respective chapters, first by elaborating on the then current political background, and then by analysing the films’ narratives against it, and extrapolating thematic and stylistic motifs reflecting back on this background. Such exploration of art and politics has been undertaken with a view to emphasise consistent motifs in art works, not only to do with an artist’s personal interests, but also those that emerge as a result of imposing societal structures.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-11-23T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Sudar, Vlastimir</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Exploration of the influence that politics may have on artists’ creativity has been undertaken by looking at selected works of Yugoslav film director Aleksandar Petrović. An attempt was made to identify thematic or stylistic motifs in his films that could be understood as reflections on the political context in which the work was made. One of the most common approaches to examine a work of one filmmaker, the auteur theory, has been modified into the theory of political auteur, to aid in identifying recurrent motifs and themes that artists introduce in their work as a reaction to the surrounding political reality. As Petrović worked in Yugoslavia during Socialism, this period was historicised in order to support the identification of ‘political motifs’ in his films. The period between 1965 and 1973 is taken as the focus of research, since it is known as the 'liberal hour', the period of great artistic and intellectual freedoms, during which Petrović directed four of his most significant films. Each of these four films is analysed in respective chapters, first by elaborating on the then current political background, and then by analysing the films’ narratives against it, and extrapolating thematic and stylistic motifs reflecting back on this background. Such exploration of art and politics has been undertaken with a view to emphasise consistent motifs in art works, not only to do with an artist’s personal interests, but also those that emerge as a result of imposing societal structures.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Gente de isla - island people : an ethnography of Apiao, Chiloé, southern Chile</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/456" />
    <author>
      <name>Bacchiddu, Giovanna</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/456</id>
    <updated>2008-08-11T15:31:13Z</updated>
    <published>2008-06-24T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is based upon fieldwork carried out in the island of Apiao, in the archipelago of Chiloé, southern Chile. It is an ethnographic exploration of the way the small community of Apiao conceive of communication and interaction with both fellow human beings and supernatural creatures. The thesis describes details of every day life, with an emphasis on visiting as the main mode of social interaction. Through reciprocal hospitality the islanders enact balanced reciprocal exchange. Food and drink is offered and received; this is always returned in equal measure with a return visit. Visits between friends or neighbours are articulated according to a formal ritualistic etiquette based on asking. Balance is temporarily interrupted and small debts incurred when favors are asked. These must be reciprocated promptly. Momentary interruption of equilibrium perpetuates relations among people who describe themselves as being 'all the same'.&#xD;
Marriage equates to forming an independent, productive unit with a focus on inhabitants of households rather than on family in terms of decent or blood ties. Kinship terms are limited to the word mama and this refers to the grandmother, the focal role in raising children. Active memory as expression of love and care is what makes people related to each other. Kin ties must be kept active by constant love and care. Forgetful kin are in turn forgotten and slowly erased from memory. &#xD;
The thesis shows that religious beliefs are centered on exchange relationships with powerful entities that belong to the supernatural world. The dead and the miraculous San Antonio are powerful and ambivalent: they protect and help the living but can be revengeful and harmful if neglected by the living. Novenas are offered to the dead and the San Antonio in exchange for protection and miracles. Novenas represent a public and powerful ritual display of hospitality, enacting values of memory, solidarity and exchange.</summary>
    <dc:date>2008-06-24T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Bacchiddu, Giovanna</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is based upon fieldwork carried out in the island of Apiao, in the archipelago of Chiloé, southern Chile. It is an ethnographic exploration of the way the small community of Apiao conceive of communication and interaction with both fellow human beings and supernatural creatures. The thesis describes details of every day life, with an emphasis on visiting as the main mode of social interaction. Through reciprocal hospitality the islanders enact balanced reciprocal exchange. Food and drink is offered and received; this is always returned in equal measure with a return visit. Visits between friends or neighbours are articulated according to a formal ritualistic etiquette based on asking. Balance is temporarily interrupted and small debts incurred when favors are asked. These must be reciprocated promptly. Momentary interruption of equilibrium perpetuates relations among people who describe themselves as being 'all the same'.&#xD;
Marriage equates to forming an independent, productive unit with a focus on inhabitants of households rather than on family in terms of decent or blood ties. Kinship terms are limited to the word mama and this refers to the grandmother, the focal role in raising children. Active memory as expression of love and care is what makes people related to each other. Kin ties must be kept active by constant love and care. Forgetful kin are in turn forgotten and slowly erased from memory. &#xD;
The thesis shows that religious beliefs are centered on exchange relationships with powerful entities that belong to the supernatural world. The dead and the miraculous San Antonio are powerful and ambivalent: they protect and help the living but can be revengeful and harmful if neglected by the living. Novenas are offered to the dead and the San Antonio in exchange for protection and miracles. Novenas represent a public and powerful ritual display of hospitality, enacting values of memory, solidarity and exchange.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>A critical discussion of Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/363" />
    <author>
      <name>Schwind, Philipp</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/363</id>
    <updated>2010-11-12T14:38:34Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: 'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of&#xD;
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues&#xD;
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in&#xD;
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.&#xD;
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral&#xD;
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to&#xD;
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to&#xD;
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.&#xD;
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity&#xD;
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses&#xD;
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's&#xD;
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution&#xD;
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of&#xD;
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks&#xD;
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that&#xD;
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not&#xD;
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical&#xD;
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting&#xD;
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to&#xD;
traditional moral theories.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Schwind, Philipp</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>'Moral Particularism' is a view that questions the role of&#xD;
principles in ethics. Jonathan Dancy, the most eminent particularist, argues&#xD;
that principles which claim that it is right or wrong to do a certain thing in&#xD;
all situations cannot adequately account for the role context plays in moral deliberation.&#xD;
The aim of this dissertation is to critically evaluate the theory of Moral&#xD;
Particularism. The first section discusses various positions opposed to&#xD;
particularism. It considers the emergence of particularism as a response to&#xD;
Hare's Theory of Universalizability and Ross's Theory of Prima Facie Duty.&#xD;
The dissertation then moves on to examine the view that context-sensitivity&#xD;
does not support particularism. The second part of this dissertation analyses&#xD;
Dancy's theory in closer detail. It begins with a clarification of Dancy's&#xD;
conception of principles and is followed by a consideration of the evolution&#xD;
of particularism over time. The plausibility of the various versions of&#xD;
this theory are then compared. The third part of the dissertation looks&#xD;
at criticism of particularism by others apart from Dancy. It argues that&#xD;
context-sensitivity can only ground particularism as an epistemic, and not&#xD;
as a metaphysical theory. Furthermore, it discusses whether thick ethical&#xD;
concepts can ground principles. The dissertation concludes by asserting&#xD;
that whilst the claims of particularism are true, they are no serious threat to&#xD;
traditional moral theories.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Conceptual room for ontic vagueness</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/348" />
    <author>
      <name>Barnes, Elizabeth</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/348</id>
    <updated>2008-02-11T15:30:07Z</updated>
    <published>2007-06-20T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it.  This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified.  I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind.  I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form.  I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented.  Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic.  I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-06-20T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Barnes, Elizabeth</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis is a systematic investigation of whether there might be conceptual room for the idea that the world itself might be vague, independently of how we describe it.  This idea – the existence of so-called ontic vagueness – has generally been extremely unpopular in the literature; my thesis thus seeks to evaluate whether this ‘negative press’ is justified.  I start by giving a working definition and semantics for ontic vagueness, and then attempt to show that there are no conclusive arguments that rule out vagueness of this kind.  I subsequently establish what type of arguments I think would be most effective in establishing ontic vagueness and provide some arguments of this form.  I then highlight a potential worry for this type of argument, but argue that it can be circumvented.  Finally, I consider the main ways that the opponent of ontic vagueness would be likely resist the arguments I have offered, and argue that these strategies of response are methodologically problematic.  I conclude by claiming that ontic vagueness is a perfectly plausible ontological commitment.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>"Why should I be moral?" : a critical assessment of three contemporary attempts to give an extra-moral justification of moral conduct</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/346" />
    <author>
      <name>Pedersen, Johnnie R. R.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/346</id>
    <updated>2007-06-12T11:59:11Z</updated>
    <published>2007-06-20T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-06-20T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Pedersen, Johnnie R. R.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>In this dissertation I consider three distinct attempts to answer the normative question “Why should I be moral?”, all of which assume that a successful answer must be capable of arguing someone who is currently not motivated by moral considerations at all into becoming moral. I outline an argument against the possibility of doing so which relies on the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality, and which states that since morality essentially involves agent-neutrality and since failure to recognize the reason-giving force of agent-neutral considerations is not necessarily irrational, one cannot be argued into being moral. I then show how the approaches of Christine Korsgaard, as encountered in her "The Sources of Normativity", Joseph Raz, as he puts it forth in “The Amoralist”, and lastly, David Brink as he puts it forth in “Self-Love and Altruism”, each in their different ways, fail in their attempts to argue someone into becoming moral.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Global distributive justice</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/216" />
    <author>
      <name>Hanisch, Christoph</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/216</id>
    <updated>2007-03-07T11:49:09Z</updated>
    <published>2007-06-22T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.&#xD;
	The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice. &#xD;
	Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-06-22T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Hanisch, Christoph</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This dissertation is concerned with the moral-philosophical dimensions of global poverty and inequality. The first chapter argues in favour of justice-based – contrasted with beneficence-based – obligations asking the wealthy to actively do something about severe poverty abroad. The distinguishing property of justice-based obligations is that they derive their high level of moral stringency from the fact that they ask the obligation-bearer to rectify for past and/or present violations of negative obligations, such as the obligation not to harm anybody (regardless of geographical distance). Partly in following and partly in reinterpreting Thomas Pogge the first chapter concludes that the current economic and political order harms the global poor by making it difficult or impossible for them to satisfy their basic needs. To the extent that better-off states (citizens and their democratically accountable governments) uphold such an unjust global order and contribute to the poor’s enduring dire straits they have obligations of justice to secure the basic needs of the poor. This is why the approach introduced and defended in this essay is called “basic needs cosmopolitanism”.&#xD;
	The second chapter examines the idea of “basic needs” more detailed. Basic needs cosmopolitanism employs a specific notion of basic needs that is derived from Martha Nussbaum’s list of ten central human functional capabilities. These capabilities are of universal appeal, i.e. they are concerned with activities and states of being that are indispensable features of every human life. After discussing Nussbaum’s justification for the universal applicability of her list and after examining in more detail the list itself the argument distinguishes between basic needs for the material (financial, resource-related, etc.) and basic needs for the non-material (political, social, etc.) prerequisites for possessing these central capabilities. Both groups of basic needs have to be satisfied by a sufficient quality and quantity in order for a society to count as being able to meet its citizens basic needs and as being able to secure all its citizens’ central capabilities. The crucial idea is that if Nussbaum’s central capabilities are presented as having universal appeal, the related basic needs are of global applicability as well. The standard of material and non-material prerequisites is applied to a) the question of whether and to what extent the global order harms the poor and b) the question of what and how much material transfers from the wealthy to the poor are required on grounds of justice. &#xD;
	Since this dissertation’s topic is global distributive justice the primary focus of this argument lies on the material pre-requisites that have to be available in order to secure central capabilities for all. This does not imply that the non-material basic needs for living in a society ruled by just and stable political and social institutions are less important. A complete version of basic needs cosmopolitanism will have to dedicate equal consideration to obligations of justice related to the global order’s responsibility for poor countries’ lack of the non-material prerequisites. The notion of “potential functionings”, introduced in concluding this essay, is supposed to underline the importance of securing central capabilities for all members of poor societies and expresses again basic needs cosmopolitanism’s commitment to identifying universal minimal standards of social and economic global justice.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Being art - a study in ontology</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/213" />
    <author>
      <name>Weh, Michael</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/213</id>
    <updated>2007-05-07T10:27:53Z</updated>
    <published>2007-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: I present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that &#xD;
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of &#xD;
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds &#xD;
of realisations.  &#xD;
  I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal &#xD;
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out &#xD;
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be &#xD;
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.  &#xD;
  The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also &#xD;
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an &#xD;
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.  &#xD;
  A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the &#xD;
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation &#xD;
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work, &#xD;
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.  &#xD;
  I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are &#xD;
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why &#xD;
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised &#xD;
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides &#xD;
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the &#xD;
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to. &#xD;
  Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the &#xD;
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in &#xD;
its parts and still remain the same work.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Weh, Michael</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>I present and defend a two-category ontology of art. The basic idea of it is that &#xD;
singular artworks are physical objects, whereas multiple artworks are types of &#xD;
which there can be tokens in the form of performances, copies, or other kinds &#xD;
of realisations.  &#xD;
  I argue that multiple artworks, despite being abstract objects, have a temporal &#xD;
extension, thus they are created at a certain point of time and can also drop out &#xD;
of existence again under certain conditions. They can, however, not be &#xD;
perceived by the senses and cannot enter into causal relations.  &#xD;
  The identity of an artwork is determined by its structural properties, but also &#xD;
by the context in which it was made. The essential contextual properties of an &#xD;
artwork are those that are relevant to the meaning of the work.  &#xD;
  A realisation of a multiple artwork has to comply with the structure of the &#xD;
work and has to stand in the correct intentional and/or causal-historical relation &#xD;
to the work. Realisations that diverge too much from the structure of the work, &#xD;
like translations of literary works, are what I call “derivative artworks”.  &#xD;
  I argue against the thesis that all artworks are multiple. I claim that there are &#xD;
singular artworks, and some of them are even necessarily singular. I show why &#xD;
certain standard arguments against the idea that all artworks can be realised &#xD;
multiple times are flawed, and present my own theory about what decides &#xD;
whether a work is singular or multiple, namely that successful intentions of the &#xD;
artist determine which category an artwork belongs to. &#xD;
  Concerning singular artworks, I also investigate what the relation between the &#xD;
work and the matter it is made of is, and how a work can survive a change in &#xD;
its parts and still remain the same work.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Making sense of response-dependence</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/211" />
    <author>
      <name>Busck Gundersen, Eline</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/211</id>
    <updated>2007-05-16T14:49:45Z</updated>
    <published>2007-06-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-06-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Busck Gundersen, Eline</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>This thesis investigates the distinction, or distinctions, between response-dependent and response-independent concepts or subject matters. I present and discuss the three most influential versions of the distinction: Crispin Wright’s, Mark Johnston’s, and Philip Pettit’s. I argue that the versions do not compete for a single job, but that they can supplement each other, and that a system of different distinctions is more useful than a single distinction. I distinguish two main paradigms of response-dependence: response-dependence of subject matter (Johnston and Wright), and response-dependence of concepts only (Pettit). I develop Pettit’s ‘ethocentric’ story of concept acquisition into an account of concept evolution that suggests answers to a range of hard questions about language, reality, and the relation between them. I argue that while response-dependence theses of subject matter can be motivated in very different ways, the resulting theses are less different than they might seem. I suggest that the traditional ways of distinguishing response-dependent subject matters from response-independent ones – in terms of a priori biconditionals connecting facts of the disputed class with responses in subjects in favourable conditions, and fulfilling some further conditions such as non-triviality and sometimes necessity – may not be the best approach. I also discuss two general problems for response-dependence theses: the problem of ‘finkish’ counterexamples, and the problem of specifying the ‘favourable conditions’ a priori, yet in a non-trivial way. The discussion of response-dependence is informed by a framework based on the idea that some realism disputes can be viewed as location disputes: disputes over the correct location of the disputed properties among several levels of candidate properties. The approach taken in this work is a charitable one: I try to make sense of response-dependence. The conclusion is the correspondingly optimistic one that the idea(s) of response-dependence makes sense.</dc:description>
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The metaphysics of agency</title>
    <link rel="alternate" href="http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163" />
    <author>
      <name>Schlosser, Markus E.</name>
    </author>
    <id>http://hdl.handle.net/10023/163</id>
    <updated>2007-03-14T10:42:32Z</updated>
    <published>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</published>
    <summary type="text">Abstract: Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.&#xD;
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.</summary>
    <dc:date>2007-01-01T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
    <dc:creator>Schlosser, Markus E.</dc:creator>
    <dc:description>Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind.&#xD;
In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.</dc:description>
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