2024-03-29T14:53:30Zhttps://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/oai/requestoai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/135452023-04-18T23:39:44Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Quatenus and Spinoza's monism
Douglas, Alexander
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Spinoza
Quatenus
Pierre Bayle
Monism
Restriction
B Philosophy (General)
T-NDAS
BDC
B1
I examine Spinoza’s use of the term quatenus. It is, I argue, an operator working in the context of a broader logical theory and blocking certain inferences that, according to critics such as Pierre Bayle, lead Spinoza’s metaphysical system into absurdities. I reconstruct this crucial theory from some treatises on logic to which Spinoza had access. I then show how a later logical theory—that of the Port-Royal Logic—does not permit Bayle’s troublesome inferences to be blocked by the use of terms like quatenus. Most likely Bayle was thinking in terms of the later theory, Spinoza in terms of the earlier.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-04
2018-05-25T15:30:05Z
2018-05-25T15:30:05Z
Journal article
Douglas , A 2018 , ' Quatenus and Spinoza's monism ' , Journal of the History of Philosophy , vol. 56 , no. 2 , pp. 261-280 . https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2018.0023
0022-5053
PURE: 251028374
PURE UUID: 26b75486-97af-4f5e-8f92-403579528b9c
Scopus: 85045692661
ORCID: /0000-0001-9486-8991/work/69029488
WOS: 000430366900004
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13545
https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2018.0023
https://www.dropbox.com/s/31vwip9epu9rtkn/Spinoza%20Quatenus.docx?dl=0
eng
Journal of the History of Philosophy
Copyright © 2018 Journal of the History of Philosophy, Inc. his work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.2018.0023
20
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/91202023-04-18T10:11:13Zcom_10023_30com_10023_117com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_861col_10023_118col_10023_880
Reply to Blackson
Weatherson, Brian James
University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
B Philosophy (General)
B1
Thomas Blackson argues that interest-relative epistemologies cannot explain the irrationality of certain choices when the agent has three possible options. I argue that his examples only refute a subclass of interest-relative theories. In particular, they are good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the stakes involved in the gambles that she faces. But they are not good objections to theories that say that what an agent knows depends on the odds involved in the gambles that she faces. Indeed, the latter class of theories does a better job than interest-invariant epistemologies of explaining the phenomena he describes.
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2016
2016-07-12T15:30:03Z
2016-07-12T15:30:03Z
Journal article
Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Reply to Blackson ' , Journal of Philosophical Research , vol. 41 , pp. 73-75 . https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201663072
2153-7984
PURE: 244241593
PURE UUID: 01713948-2af8-4a88-8f72-ae5d219c605a
Scopus: 85049138247
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9120
https://doi.org/10.5840/jpr201663072
eng
Journal of Philosophical Research
Copyright 2016 Philosophy Documentation Center. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jpr201663072
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/133022023-04-25T23:53:03Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Corporate agency and possible futures
Mulgan, Tim
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
University of St Andrews. St Andrews Centre for Exoplanet Science
Collective agency
Corporate agency
Corporate responsibility
Future people
Climate change
Broken world
Virtual reality
Artificial intelligence
B Philosophy (General)
HD Industries. Land use. Labor
T Technology (General)
T-NDAS
SDG 13 - Climate Action
SDG 15 - Life on Land
B1
HD
T1
We need an account of corporate agency that is temporally robust – one that will help future people to cope with challenges posed by corporate groups in a range of credible futures. In particular, we need to bequeath moral resources that enable future people to avoid futures dominated by corporate groups that have no regard for human beings. This paper asks how future philosophers living in broken or digital futures might re-imagine contemporary debates about corporate agency. It argues that the only temporally robust account is moralised extreme collectivism, where full moral personhood is accorded (only) to those corporate groups that are reliably disposed to respond appropriately to moral reasons.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-05-03
2018-05-04T15:30:10Z
2018-05-04T15:30:10Z
Journal article
Mulgan , T 2018 , ' Corporate agency and possible futures ' , Journal of Business Ethics , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3887-1
0167-4544
PURE: 252933797
PURE UUID: 8aa20d25-7b50-454d-8812-0a9af879367a
Scopus: 85046495277
WOS: 000458212600002
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13302
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3887-1
eng
Journal of Business Ethics
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
16
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/160592024-02-15T04:37:41Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
The semantic error problem for epistemic contextualism
Greenough, Patrick Michael
Kindermann, Dirk
Jenkins-Ichikawa, Jonathan
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
B Philosophy (General)
B1
2017-03-22
2018-09-24T11:42:12Z
2018-09-24T11:42:12Z
2018-09-22
Book item
245947509
bea85373-29a4-4dd2-88c3-216fbed3780e
85025612409
Greenough , P M & Kindermann , D 2017 , The semantic error problem for epistemic contextualism . in J Jenkins-Ichikawa (ed.) , The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism . Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy , Routledge Taylor & Francis Group , London .
9781138818392
ORCID: /0000-0002-5337-8993/work/64697672
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/16059
https://www.routledge.com/9781138818392
eng
The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism
Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
238859
application/pdf
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/168182023-04-18T23:55:03Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Is Weak Supplementation analytic?
Cotnoir, Aaron
The Leverhulme Trust
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Mereology
Identity
Parthood
Supplementation
Analyticity
Extensionality
B Philosophy (General)
T-NDAS
B1
The research and writing of this paper was supported in part by a 2017-2018 Leverhulme Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust.
Mereological principles are often controversial; perhaps the most stark contrast is between those who claim that Weak Supplementation is analytic—constitutive of our notion of proper parthood—and those who argue that the principle is simply false, and subject to many counterexamples. The aim of this paper is to diagnose the source of this dispute. I’ll suggest that the dispute has arisen by participants failing to be sensitive to two different conceptions of proper parthood: the outstripping conception and the non-identity conception. I’ll argue that the outstripping conception (together with a specific set of definitions for other mereological notions), can deliver the analyticity of Weak Supplementation on at least one sense of ‘analyticity’. I’ll also suggest that the non-identity conception cannot do so independently of considerations to do with mereological extensionality.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2021-08
2019-01-09T15:30:05Z
2019-01-09T15:30:05Z
Journal article
Cotnoir , A 2021 , ' Is Weak Supplementation analytic? ' , Synthese , vol. 198 , no. 18 , pp. 4229-4245 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02066-9
0039-7857
PURE: 256901621
PURE UUID: 6ba5a88d-1984-40af-9cf9-b1bd70def39d
WOS: 000687995100002
Scopus: 85059187379
ORCID: /0000-0003-4528-7570/work/65702597
WOS: 000687995100002
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/16818
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-02066-9
RF-2017-046\10
eng
Synthese
© The Author(s) 2018. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
17
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/72862023-04-18T09:54:28Zcom_10023_274com_10023_39com_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_276col_10023_118col_10023_880
Indexicality, transparency, and mental files
Ball, Derek Nelson
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
University of St Andrews. Arché Philosophical Research Centre for Logic, Language, Metaphysics and Epistemology
B Philosophy (General)
B1
Francois Recanati’s Mental Files (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) presents a picture of the mind on which mental representations are indexical and transparent. I dispute this picture: there is no clear case for regarding mental representations as indexical, and there are counterexamples to transparency.
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2014
2015-08-19T23:10:45Z
2015-08-19T23:10:45Z
2015-08-20
Journal article
Ball , D N 2014 , ' Indexicality, transparency, and mental files ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.883752
0020-174X
PURE: 155241458
PURE UUID: d6192059-8e0b-4f99-89ee-655f7b9fcffc
Scopus: 84929610004
ORCID: /0000-0002-7229-3282/work/66398271
WOS: 000354531600001
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7286
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2014.883752
eng
Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
© 2014. Taylor & Francis. This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy on 20 February 2014, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/0020174X.2014.883752
20
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/111442023-04-18T23:37:12Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Biosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self
Higgins, Joe
University of St Andrews. University of St Andrews
Selfhood
Cognitive science
Embodiment
Ensocialment
Body-social problem
Enactivism
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
RC0321 Neuroscience. Biological psychiatry. Neuropsychiatry
T-NDAS
B
RC0321
In a recent paper, Kyselo (2014) argues that an enactive approach to selfhood can overcome ‘the body-social problem’: “the question for philosophy of cognitive science about how bodily and social aspects figure in the individuation of the human individual self” (Kyselo, 2014, p. 4; see also Kyselo and Di Paolo (2013)). Kyselo’s claim is that we should conceive of the human self as a socially enacted phenomenon that is bodily mediated. Whilst there is much to be praised about this claim, I will demonstrate in this paper that such a conception of self ultimately leads to a strained interpretation of how bodily and social processes are related. To this end, I will begin the paper by elucidating the body-social problem as it appears in modern cognitive science and then expounding Kyselo’s solution, which relies on a novel interpretation of Jonas’s (1966/2001) concept of needful freedom. In response to this solution, I will highlight two problems which Kyselo’s account cannot overcome in its current state. I will argue that a more satisfactory solution to the body-social problem involves a re-conception of the human body as irrevocably socially constituted and the human social world as irrevocably bodily constituted. On this view, even the most minimal sense of selfhood cannot privilege either bodily or social processes; instead, the two are ontologically entwined such that humans are biosocial selves.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-07
2017-07-04T14:30:09Z
2017-07-04T14:30:09Z
Journal article
Higgins , J 2018 , ' Biosocial selfhood : overcoming the ‘body-social problem’ within the individuation of the human self ' , Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences , vol. 17 , no. 3 , pp. 433-454 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2
1568-7759
PURE: 250088588
PURE UUID: c0ebeb53-a72d-4405-bcdc-4107079afd5b
Scopus: 85020683997
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/11144
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-017-9514-2
eng
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
22
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/93892023-04-18T10:02:40Zcom_10023_30com_10023_117com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_861col_10023_118col_10023_880
Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience
McGrath, Matthew
University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Evidence
Perceptual Justification
Perception
Content of Experience
B Philosophy (General)
B1
According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they do because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the ‘‘capacity view.’’ In this paper, I will raise three concerns about Schellenberg’s capacity view. The first is whether we might do better to leave capacities out of our epistemology and take content properties as the fundamental epistemically relevant features of experiences. I argue we would. The second is whether Schellenberg’s appeal to factive and phenomenal evidence accommodates the intuitive verdicts about the bad case that she claims it does. I argue it does not. The third is whether Schellenberg’s account of factive evidence is adequate to capture nuances concerning the justification for singular but non demonstrative perceptual beliefs, such as the belief that’s NN, where NN is a proper name. I argue it is not. If I am right, these points suggest a mental-state-first account of perceptual justification, rather than a capacity-first account, and one which treats the good and bad cases alike in respect of justification and complicates the relation between perceptual content and what one is justified in believing.
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2016-04
2016-08-28T23:34:32Z
2016-08-28T23:34:32Z
2016-08-28
Journal article
McGrath , M 2016 , ' Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. 173 , no. 4 , pp. 897-905 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7
0031-8116
PURE: 215729582
PURE UUID: 0f4a4871-15b3-4ad4-ba1f-6855249626cc
Scopus: 84961129201
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9389
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7
eng
Philosophical Studies
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0529-7
9
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/158062023-04-18T10:12:46Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Comments on Brian Epstein's The Ant Trap
Hawley, Katherine
The Leverhulme Trust
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
University of St Andrews. St Andrews Centre for Exoplanet Science
Anchoring
Social metaphysics
Grounding
Facts
Dependence
B Philosophy (General)
B1
The Ant Trap is a terrific book, which opens up new opportunities to use philosophical methods in the social realm, by drawing on the tools and techniques of contemporary metaphysics. Epstein uses concepts of dependence, constitution, and grounding, of parts and whole, of membership and kindhood, both to clarify existing accounts of social reality and to develop an account of his own. Whilst I admire the general strategy, I take issue with some aspects of Epstein’s implementation, notably his distinction between grounding and anchoring. I recommend that he give up this distinction, which is not crucial to his project.
Postprint
Non peer reviewed
2017-02-13
2018-08-12T23:33:20Z
2018-08-12T23:33:20Z
2018-08-13
Journal item
Hawley , K 2017 , ' Comments on Brian Epstein's The Ant Trap ' , Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1289694
0020-174X
PURE: 245528459
PURE UUID: 045ba94e-139b-4dab-a872-8c3e340efc89
Scopus: 85012920342
ORCID: /0000-0002-8179-2550/work/39736446
WOS: 000457144300006
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15806
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1289694
eng
Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
© 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1289694
13
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/111692023-04-18T10:04:25Zcom_10023_30com_10023_117com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_861col_10023_118col_10023_880
Memory, belief and time
Weatherson, Brian James
University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Memory
Knowledge
Belief
Rationality
Time
B Philosophy (General)
B1
I argue that what evidence an agent has does not supervene on how she currently is. Agents do not always have to infer what the past was like from how things currently seem; sometimes the facts about the past are retained pieces of evidence that can be the start of reasoning. The main argument is a variant on Frank Arntzenius’s Shangri La example, an example that is often used to motivate the thought that evidence does supervene on current features.
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2016-01-08
2017-07-08T23:33:20Z
2017-07-08T23:33:20Z
2017-07-08
Journal article
Weatherson , B J 2016 , ' Memory, belief and time ' , Canadian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 45 , no. 5-6 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
0045-5091
PURE: 230788799
PURE UUID: 3626b403-d855-4c15-91a2-3ebb31b5eb76
Scopus: 84954114294
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/11169
https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
eng
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
© 2015 Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2015.1125250
application/pdf
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/71392023-04-18T10:01:22Zcom_10023_30com_10023_117com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_861col_10023_118col_10023_880
Recombination and paradox
Uzquiano, Gabriel
University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
BC Logic
BC
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2015-08
2015-08-06T14:10:01Z
2015-08-06T14:10:01Z
Journal article
Uzquiano , G 2015 , ' Recombination and paradox ' , Philosophers' Imprint , vol. 15 , no. 19 .
1533-628X
PURE: 205541332
PURE UUID: f18ae5c6-51de-415c-a37c-28fef73e0412
Scopus: 84939799353
WOS: 000360789000001
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/7139
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0015.019
eng
Philosophers' Imprint
Copyright 2015 Uzquiano. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License.
application/pdf
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/30792023-04-18T09:46:21Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
True, false, paranormal, and 'designated'? : a reply to Jenkins
Caret, Colin Ready
Cotnoir, Aaron
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
BC Logic
BC
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2008-07
2012-09-20T14:01:02Z
2012-09-20T14:01:02Z
Journal article
Caret , C R & Cotnoir , A 2008 , ' True, false, paranormal, and 'designated'? a reply to Jenkins ' , Analysis , vol. 68 , no. 3 , pp. 238-244 . https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/68.3.238
0003-2638
PURE: 27619226
PURE UUID: 90cc594a-976a-40d0-8ac0-1b9607a54514
Scopus: 61249720026
ORCID: /0000-0003-4528-7570/work/65702593
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3079
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/68.3.238
eng
Analysis
This is a pre-copy-editing, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication in Analysis. The definitive publisher-authenticated version is available online at doi: 10.1093/analys/68.3.238 (c) 2008 The Analysis Trust
6
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/34662023-04-18T09:46:40Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong
Sachs, Benjamin Alan
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Coercion
Threat
Warning
Offer
Intention
BJ Ethics
BJ
It is usually thought that wrongful acts of threat-involving coercion are wrong because they involve a violation of the freedom or autonomy of the targets of those acts. I argue here that this cannot possibly be right, and that in fact the wrongness of wrongful coercion has nothing at all to do with the effect such actions have on their targets. This negative thesis is supported by pointing out that what we say about the ethics of threatening (and thus the ethics of coercion) constrains what we can say about the ethics of warning and offering. Importantly, our favoured explanation of the wrongness of certain kinds of threatening should not commit us to condemning as wrong parallel cases of warning and offering. My positive project is to show how this can be done. I defend the claim that wrongful coercion is nothing more than the issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong, and that an agent's issuing of a conditional threat to do wrong is wrong because it constitutes motivation for that agent to adopt the announced intention to do wrong. The idea of explaining the wrongness of wrongful coercion in this way has gone unnoticed because we have thus far been mistaken about what a threat is. In this essay I present my moral analysis of coercion only after presenting a careful descriptive analysis of threats. On my view, it is essential to a threat that the announced intention is one that the agent does not possess before announcing it. This analysis makes it possible to elucidate the descriptive differences between threats, warnings and offers, which sets up the later project of elucidating the moral differences between them.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2013
2013-04-04T13:31:02Z
2013-04-04T13:31:02Z
Journal article
Sachs , B A 2013 , ' Why coercion is wrong when it’s wrong ' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , vol. 91 , no. 1 , pp. 63-82 . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.646280
0004-8402
PURE: 29951537
PURE UUID: 024c44bb-b6cb-4769-8011-9276b48208df
Scopus: 84876112799
ORCID: /0000-0002-2307-7620/work/69029273
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/3466
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2011.646280
eng
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
(c) 2013 Australasian Association of Philosophy. This is an Open Access article. For full terms and conditions of use, see: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/ terms-and-conditions esp. Part II. Intellectual property and access and license types, § 11. (c) Open Access Content
20
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/136782023-04-19T00:41:43Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
The Grotian concept of a right
Skorupski, John Maria
Kuzniar, Adrian
Odrowaz-Sypniewska, Joanna
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
B Philosophy (General)
JC Political theory
B1
JC
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2016-06
2018-06-01T23:33:22Z
2018-06-01T23:33:22Z
2018-06-01
Book item
Skorupski , J M 2016 , The Grotian concept of a right . in A Kuzniar & J Odrowaz-Sypniewska (eds) , Uncovering Facts and Values : Studies in Contemporary Epistemology and Political Philosophy . Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (Idealization) , vol. 107 , Brill , Leiden , pp. 280-292 , Polish-Scottish Philosophy Workshop 2013 , Warsaw , Poland , 6/09/13 . https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312654_019
workshop
9789004319103
9789004312654
0303-8157
PURE: 249578154
PURE UUID: 39c7811f-05f9-44b9-a325-3622280da36e
Scopus: 85055649437
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13678
https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312654_019
eng
Uncovering Facts and Values
Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (Idealization)
Copyright © 2017 Koninklijke Brill NV. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004312654_019
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Brill
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/124092023-04-18T23:41:38Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
A bitter pill for closure
Backes, Marvin
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Lottery paradox
Preface paradox
Multi premise closure
Paradox of the pill
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion
T-NDAS
B
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce a new epistemic paradox that puts pressure on the claim that justification is closed under multi premise deduction. The first part of the paper will consider two well-known paradoxes—the lottery and the preface paradox—and outline two popular strategies for solving the paradoxes without denying closure. The second part will introduce a new, structurally related, paradox that is immune to these closure-preserving solutions. I will call this paradox, The Paradox of the Pill. Seeing that the prominent closure-preserving solutions do not apply to the new paradox, I will argue that it presents a much stronger case against the claim that justification is closed under deduction than its two predecessors. Besides presenting a more robust counterexample to closure, the new paradox also reveals that the strategies that were previously thought to get closure out of trouble are not sufficiently general to achieve this task as they fail to apply to similar closure-threatening paradoxes in the same vicinity.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2017-11-18
2018-01-03T13:30:22Z
2018-01-03T13:30:22Z
Journal article
Backes , M 2017 , ' A bitter pill for closure ' , Synthese , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1620-8
0039-7857
PURE: 251494974
PURE UUID: fb01e7bc-b3d6-4373-bc90-0f2ade22076b
Scopus: 85034234557
WOS: 000490473800017
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12409
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1620-8
eng
Synthese
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
15
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159512022-04-14T10:30:52Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision
Badura, Christopher
Berto, Francesco
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Impossible worlds
Inconsistent fiction
Sylvan's box
Truth in fiction
Belief revision
B Philosophy (General)
Philosophy
T-NDAS
B1
Franz Berto’s research was funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Consolidator grant no. 681404, ‘The Logic of Conceivability’. Christopher Badura’s research was funded by the Ruhr University Research School PLUS, funded by Germany’s Excellence Initiative [DFG GSC 98/3].
We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-02-27
2018-09-03T16:30:06Z
2018-09-03T16:30:06Z
Journal article
Badura , C & Berto , F 2018 , ' Truth in fiction, impossible worlds, and belief revision ' , Australasian Journal of Philosophy , vol. Latest Articles . https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698
0004-8402
PURE: 255688631
PURE UUID: 2024905d-04ea-40fd-9e14-163909a8c919
Scopus: 85042919505
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132030
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15951
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1435698
eng
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
16
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III - Contractarianism as a political morality
Sachs, Benjamin Alan
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
University of St Andrews. Institute of Legal and Constitutional Research
B Philosophy (General)
BDC
B1
Contractarianism initially made its mark, in the seventeenth century, as a sort of theory of everything in ethics. But gradually philosophers became convinced that there were resources available outside contractarianism for settling important moral questions—for instance, ideas of human rights and the moral equality of persons. Then Rawls revived contractarianism with a more modest aim—namely, as a theory of justice. But even this agenda for contractarianism has been called into question, most notably by G.A. Cohen, who contends that we have other tools at our disposal for identifying the true conception of justice. So the question remains: how should contractarianism be construed if it is to provide answers to questions that cannot be answered in some other way? In my essay I offer a very simple answer: contractarianism should be construed as a political morality. I arrive at this answer by starting with contractarianism as a theory of everything and paring away the unappealing layers of contractarianism so understood. I begin by describing what contractarianism is. Then I dispense with contractarianism as a theory of state legitimacy, as a theory of interpersonal morality, and as a theory of justice. Finally, I distinguish political morality from the other already-mentioned areas of morality, and argue that contractarianism is a sensible theory of its grounds.
Postprint
Non peer reviewed
2016-05-26
2018-06-02T23:32:36Z
2018-06-02T23:32:36Z
2018-06-02
Journal article
Sachs , B A 2016 , ' III - Contractarianism as a political morality ' , Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , vol. 161 , no. I , pp. 49–67 . https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow001
0066-7374
PURE: 240546862
PURE UUID: b488d98a-756d-45c0-ab32-c389f9425a84
Scopus: 85009464466
ORCID: /0000-0002-2307-7620/work/69029285
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13679
https://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow001
eng
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
© 2016 The Aristotelian Society. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aow001
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Sense, incomplete understanding, and the problem of normative guidance
Pedriali, Walter B.
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Frege
Incomplete Understanding
Concepts
Burge
Normativity
Logic
B Philosophy (General)
T-NDAS
B1
Frege seems committed to the thesis that the senses of the fundamental notions of arithmetic remain stable and are stably grasped by thinkers throughout history. Fully competent practitioners grasp those senses clearly and distinctly, while uncertain practitioners see them, the very same senses, “as if through a mist”. There is thus a common object of the understanding apprehended to a greater or lesser degree by thinkers of diverging conceptual competence. Frege takes the thesis to be a condition for the possibility of the rational intelligibility of mathematical practice. I argue however that the idea that senses could be grasped as a matter of degree is in tension with the constitutive theses that Frege held with regard to sense. Given those theses, there can in fact be no such thing as misty grasp of sense, since any uncertainty as to the logical features of a given sense will entail that one is getting hold of a different sense or of no sense at all. I consider various ways of resolving the tension and conclude that Frege’s thesis cannot be defended if we take it to be a thesis about our competence with concepts. This leaves unresolved what I call the problem of normative guidance, that is, the problem of explaining how the fundamental notions of logic and arithmetic can provide inferential guidance to thinkers.
Postprint
Peer reviewed
2017
2018-06-01T23:32:38Z
2018-06-01T23:32:38Z
2018-06-01
Journal article
Pedriali , W B 2017 , ' Sense, incomplete understanding, and the problem of normative guidance ' , Grazer Philosophische Studien , vol. 94 , no. 1-2 , pp. 1-37 . https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09303001
0165-9227
PURE: 241731987
PURE UUID: 3ed6058c-3464-42d6-b954-403afd62e964
Scopus: 85045579189
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/13674
https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09303001
eng
Grazer Philosophische Studien
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2016.This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-09304001
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159552024-02-26T00:43:38Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Simple hyperintensional belief revision
Berto, F.
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Belief revision
Doxastic logic
Epistemic logic
Framing effects
Hyperintensionality
Inconsistent belief management
Non-monotonicreasoning
B Philosophy (General)
BC Logic
Philosophy
Logic
T-NDAS
B1
BC
I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.
Peer reviewed
2018-02-05
2018-09-04T10:30:15Z
2018-09-04T10:30:15Z
Journal article
255688797
8915cfe3-1bdb-496a-8c6d-ad1bd4fc7958
85045068238
Berto , F 2018 , ' Simple hyperintensional belief revision ' , Erkenntnis , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1
0165-0106
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132001
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15955
10.1007/s10670-018-9971-1
eng
Erkenntnis
17
335988
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159602023-04-18T23:51:33Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
There’s plenty of Boole at the bottom : a reversible CA against information entropy
Berto, Francesco
Tagliabue, Jacopo
Rossi, Gabriele
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Cellular automata
Digital physics
Philosophy of information
B Philosophy (General)
QA75 Electronic computers. Computer science
Philosophy
Artificial Intelligence
B1
QA75
“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, said the title of Richard Feynman’s 1959 seminal conference at the California Institute of Technology. Fifty years on, nanotechnologies have led computer scientists to pay close attention to the links between physical reality and information processing. Not all the physical requirements of optimal computation are captured by traditional models—one still largely missing is reversibility. The dynamic laws of physics are reversible at microphysical level, distinct initial states of a system leading to distinct final states. On the other hand, as von Neumann already conjectured, irreversible information processing is expensive: to erase a single bit of information costs ~3 × 10−21 joules at room temperature. Information entropy is a thermodynamic cost, to be paid in non-computational energy dissipation. This paper addresses the problem drawing on Edward Fredkin’s Finite Nature hypothesis: the ultimate nature of the universe is discrete and finite, satisfying the axioms of classical, atomistic mereology. The chosen model is a cellular automaton (CA) with reversible dynamics, capable of retaining memory of the information present at the beginning of the universe. Such a CA can implement the Boolean logical operations and the other building bricks of computation: it can develop and host all-purpose computers. The model is a candidate for the realization of computational systems, capable of exploiting the resources of the physical world in an efficient way, for they can host logical circuits with negligible internal energy dissipation.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2016-12
2018-09-04T11:30:08Z
2018-09-04T11:30:08Z
Journal article
Berto , F , Tagliabue , J & Rossi , G 2016 , ' There’s plenty of Boole at the bottom : a reversible CA against information entropy ' , Minds and Machines , vol. 26 , no. 4 , pp. 341-357 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9401-6
0924-6495
PURE: 255688991
PURE UUID: 21547935-cc65-44ef-b6bc-542040afe755
Scopus: 84990852223
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132017
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15960
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11023-016-9401-6
eng
Minds and Machines
© The Author(s) 2016. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
17
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/170822024-03-27T00:43:00Zcom_10023_30com_10023_117com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_861col_10023_118col_10023_880
Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle
McGrath, Matthew
University of St Andrews. School of Philosophical, Anthropological and Film Studies
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Epistemic norms
Knowledge
Epistemology
Value
Epistemic value
Kant
B Philosophy (General)
B1
In recent work, Sosa proposes a comprehensive account of epistemic value based on an axiology for attempts. According to this axiology, an attempt is better if it succeeds, better still if it is apt (i.e., succeeds through competence), and best if it is fully apt, (i.e., guided to aptness by apt beliefs that it would be apt). Beliefs are understood as attempts aiming at the truth. Thus, a belief is better if true, better still if apt, and best if fully apt. I raise a Kantian obstacle for Sosa's account, arguing that the quality or worth of an attempt is independent of whether it succeeds. In particular, an attempt can be fully worthy despite being a failure. I then consider whether Sosa's competence-theoretic framework provides the resources for an axiology of attempts that does not place so much weight on success. I discuss the most promising candidate, an axiology grounded in the competence of attempts, or what Sosa calls adroitness. An adroit attempt may fail. I raise doubts about whether an adroitness-based axiology can provide a plausible explanation of the worthiness of subjects' beliefs in epistemically unfortunate situations, such as the beliefs of the brain in a vat. I conclude by speculating that the notion of a belief's fit with what the subject has to go on, a notion missing from Sosa's competence-theoretic framework, is crucial to explaining epistemic worth.
Peer reviewed
2018-02-17
2019-02-17T00:34:32Z
2019-02-17T00:34:32Z
2019-02-17
Journal item
252219534
b96b92d1-eb25-42fe-974b-6c3d10546836
85042128147
000595368200012
McGrath , M 2018 , ' Sosa on epistemic value : a Kantian obstacle ' , Synthese , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1717-8
0039-7857
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/17082
10.1007/s11229-018-1717-8
eng
Synthese
14
609005
application/pdf
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/164282023-07-24T14:30:32Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
How natural is a unified notion of time? Temporal experience in early Greek thought
Sattler, Barbara Michaela
Philips, Ian
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
B Philosophy (General)
B1
Postprint
2017-05-10
2018-11-10T00:45:08Z
2018-11-10T00:45:08Z
2018-11-10
Book item
Sattler , B M 2017 , How natural is a unified notion of time? Temporal experience in early Greek thought . in I Philips (ed.) , The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience . Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy , Routledge Taylor & Francis Group .
9781138830745
PURE: 247431324
PURE UUID: fa8bcc59-a618-4a26-a5ba-75d425c1871d
Scopus: 85050002162
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/16428
https://www.routledge.com/9781138830745
eng
The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience
Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy
© 2017, Publisher / the Author. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://www.routledge.com/9781138830745
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Routledge Taylor & Francis Group
oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/158462023-04-18T23:50:58Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem
Backes, Marvin
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Justification
Defeat
Normalcy
Multi premise closure
Lotteries
B Philosophy (General)
T-NDAS
B1
Recent years have seen the rise of a new family of non-probabilistic accounts of epistemic justification. According to these views—we may call them Normalcy Views—a belief in P is justified only if, given the evidence, there exists no normal world in which S falsely beliefs that P. This paper aims to raise some trouble for this new approach to justification by arguing that Normalcy Views, while initially attractive, give rise to problematic accounts of epistemic defeat. As we will see, on Normalcy Views seemingly insignificant pieces of evidence turn out to have considerable defeating powers. This problem—I will call it the Easy-Defeat Problem—gives rise to a two-pronged challenge. First, it shows that the Normalcy View has counterintuitive implications and, second, it opens the door to an uncomfortable skeptical threat.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-08-20
2018-08-20T11:30:06Z
2018-08-20T11:30:06Z
Journal article
Backes , M 2018 , ' Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem ' , Philosophical Studies , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1155-y
0031-8116
PURE: 255418458
PURE UUID: 61f5bf02-5bd7-4c28-a359-58cba048b660
Scopus: 85051764623
WOS: 000487033400003
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15846
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-018-1155-y
eng
Philosophical Studies
© The Author(s) 2018. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
19
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159882023-04-18T23:51:32Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Counting the Particles : Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics
Berto, Francesco
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Identity
Identity of indiscernibles
Individuation
Metaphysics of physics
Philosophy of quantum physics
B Philosophy (General)
Philosophy
T-NDAS
B1
I would like to attack a certain view: The view that the concept of identity can fail to apply to some things although, for some positive integer n, we have n of them. The idea of entities without self-identity is seriously entertained in the philosophy of quantum mechanics (QM). It is so pervasive that it has been labelled the Received View (French and Krause 2006. Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical, and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford UP: 105). I introduce the Received View in Section 1. In Section 2 I explain what I mean by entity (synonymously, by object and thing), and I argue that supporters of the Received View should agree with my characterization of the corresponding notion of entity (object, thing). I also explain what I mean by identity, and I show that supporters of the Received View agree with my characterization of that notion. In Section 3 I argue that the concept of identity, so characterized, is one with the concept of oneness. Thus, it cannot but apply to what belongs to a collection with n elements, n being a positive integer. In Section 4 I add some considerations on the primitiveness of identity or unity and the status of the Identity of Indiscernibles. In Section 5 I address the problem of how reference to indiscernible objects with identity can be achieved.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2017-04-01
2018-09-07T11:30:05Z
2018-09-07T11:30:05Z
2018-03-18
Journal article
Berto , F 2017 , ' Counting the Particles : Entity and Identity in the Philosophy of Physics ' , Metaphysica , vol. 18 , no. 1 , pp. 69-89 . https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0001
1437-2053
PURE: 255688905
PURE UUID: 8555c50f-7f63-484f-8ab0-e5b69745384a
Scopus: 85018794388
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132011
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15988
https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0001
eng
Metaphysica
© 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the final published version of the work, which was originally published at: https://doi.org/10.1515/mp-2017-0001.
21
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159532023-04-18T23:51:30Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Conceivability and possibility : some dilemmas for Humeans
Berto, Francesco
Schoonen, Tom
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Conceivability and possibility
Imagination
Mental imagery
Mental representation
Modal epistemology
B Philosophy (General)
Philosophy
Social Sciences(all)
T-NDAS
B1
This research is published within the Project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
The Humean view that conceivability entails possibility can be criticized via input from cognitive psychology. A mainstream view here has it that there are two candidate codings for mental representations (one of them being, according to some, reducible to the other): the linguistic and the pictorial, the difference between the two consisting in the degree of arbitrariness of the representation relation. If the conceivability of P at issue for Humeans involves the having of a linguistic mental representation, then it is easy to show that we can conceive the impossible, for impossibilities can be represented by meaningful bits of language. If the conceivability of P amounts to the pictorial imaginability of a situation verifying P, then the question is whether the imagination at issue works purely qualitatively, that is, only by phenomenological resemblance with the imagined scenario. If so, the range of situations imaginable in this way is too limited to have a significant role in modal epistemology. If not, imagination will involve some arbitrary labeling component, which turns out to be sufficient for imagining the impossible. And if the relevant imagination is neither linguistic nor pictorial, Humeans will appear to resort to some representational magic, until they come up with a theory of a ‘third code’ for mental representations.
Publisher PDF
Peer reviewed
2018-06
2018-09-04T10:30:14Z
2018-09-04T10:30:14Z
Journal article
Berto , F & Schoonen , T 2018 , ' Conceivability and possibility : some dilemmas for Humeans ' , Synthese , vol. 195 , no. 6 , pp. 2697-2715 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1346-7
0039-7857
PURE: 255688728
PURE UUID: c5d96a07-d4ce-49dd-bce8-b69738b648b9
Scopus: 85013776346
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132025
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15953
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1346-7
eng
Synthese
© The Author(s) 2017. Open Access. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
19
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oai:research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk:10023/159522024-03-03T00:43:49Zcom_10023_117com_10023_30com_10023_879com_10023_878col_10023_118col_10023_880
Taming the runabout imagination ticket
Berto, Francesco
University of St Andrews. Philosophy
Aboutness
Counterfactual thinking
Epistemology of imagination
Mental simulation
Variably strict epistemic modals
B Philosophy (General)
Philosophy
Social Sciences(all)
T-NDAS
B1
This research is published within the project ‘The Logic of Conceivability’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant Number 681404.
The ‘puzzle of imaginative use’ (Kind and Kung in Knowledge through imagination, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016) asks: given that imagination is arbitrary escape from reality, how can it have any epistemic value? In particular, imagination seems to be logically anarchic, like a runabout inference ticket: one who imagines A may also imagine whatever B pops to one’s mind by free mental association. This paper argues that at least a certain kind of imaginative exercise—reality-oriented mental simulation—is not logically anarchic. Showing this is part of the task of solving the puzzle. Six plausible features of imagination, so understood, are listed. Then a formal semantics is provided, whose patterns of logical validity and invalidity model the six features.
Peer reviewed
2018-03-13
2018-09-04T10:30:13Z
2018-09-04T10:30:13Z
Journal article
255688682
69657b85-f09a-4b31-af7f-788312c37231
85043688898
Berto , F 2018 , ' Taming the runabout imagination ticket ' , Synthese , vol. First Online . https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1751-6
0039-7857
ORCID: /0000-0003-3246-657X/work/48132009
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/15952
10.1007/s11229-018-1751-6
eng
Synthese
15
322257
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